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Foucault and Violence: A Genealogy of National Belonging and Representative Power in Turkey

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Abstract

The central aim of this dissertation is to introduce tools for studying a form of political violence in Michel Foucault's genealogical methodology. This is accomplished by reformulating theories from Hannah Arendt on violence to sync with Foucault's understanding of power, knowledge and experience. Violence is shown to be a relationship where one subject is prevented from fulfilling a strategy by another, which over time accumulates into widespread power relations, or nexuses of violence, within a society. This is contrasted with power, which is when one subject attempts to control the outcome of a situation, and as such it is productive. This method of genealogy is then employed in the case of national identity (i.e., nationalism) in Turkey. Tracing its historical emergence, the late Ottoman Empire becomes the focal point. A network of allegiances, referred to as sultanic power, constituted the relationships that were exercised prior to the nineteenth century. While one pledged their loyalty and subservience to their ruler, this required their ruler to offer them security and prosperity in return. Over the Long Nineteenth Century, a new network of power relations emerged based on representation through the practices and discourses that developed. I come to outline what I term representative power. This mechanism relied not on allegiance but belonging to a community. The community became tied not to one's position to God or one's obedience to the ruler but rather submission to a spirit. Only once such a spirit was constructed around representation rather than allegiance does national belonging or national identity become coherent.

Keywords

Domination; Freedom; Genealogy; Hannah Arendt; Late Ottoman History; Michel Foucault; Nationalism; Political Violence; Power; Turkey.

Abstrakt

Hlavním cílem této disertační práce je vytvořit nástroje ke studiu formy politického násilí v genealogické metodologii Michela Foucaulta. Toho je dosaženo přeformulováním teorií Hannah Arendtové o násilí a jejich sladěním s Foucaultovým chápáním moci, vědění a zkušenosti. K násilí je zde přistupováno jako ke vztahu, v němž je jednomu subjektu bráněno jiným subjektem dosáhnout vlastní strategie, což postupem času ve společnosti vede k utváření široce pojatých mocenských vztahů či vztahů násilí. V kontrastu s tím se nachází moc, tedy když jeden ze subjektů usiluje o kontrolu nad výsledkem situace, a je v tomto smyslu produktivní. Tato genealogická metoda je užita na případu národní identity, potažmo nacionalismu, v Turecku. Ve snaze vysledovat proces jejího historického vzniku se do středu zájmu této práce dostává Osmanská říše ve svém pozdním vývojovém období. Síť vztahů, postavená na principu loajality a známá též jako moc sultanátu, byla založena na svazcích, uplatňovaných před 19. stoletím. Zatímco jedinec se zavazoval k loajalitě a poslušnosti vládci, ten byl povinován zajistit mu výměnou bezpečnost a prosperitu. V průběhu tzv. dlouhého 19. století se utvořila nová síť mocenských vztahů, a to na základě reprezentace pomocí vzniklých postupů a diskurzů. Termínem reprezentativní moci míním mechanismus, který závisel nejen na loajalitě ale též na pocitu sounáležitosti s vlastním společenstvím. Komunita již nebyla ani tak spjata s postoji jedinců k bohu a poslušností vůči vládci, ale spíše s podřízením se duchu. Teprve ve chvíli, kdy byl tento duch vystavěn na principu reprezentace raději než loajality, se národní sounáležitost či národní identita staly koherentnějšími.

Klíčová slova

Dominace; Svoboda; Genealogie; Hannah Arendt; Dějiny novodobé Osmanské říše; Michel Foucault; Nacionalismus; Politické násilí; Moc; Turecko.

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 29.04.2021 Jacob Maze

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Introduction: Dust in the Wind

"Play the game, but don't believe in it – that much you owe yourself. Even if it lands you in a strait jacket or a padded cell. Play the game, but play it your own way – part of the time at least. Play the game, but raise the ante, my boy. Learn how it operates, learn how you operate – I wish I had time to tell you only a fragment. We're an ass-backward people, though. You might even beat the game. It's really a very crude affair." – Ralph Ellison, *Invisible Man*.[1]

Why Do We Care So Much About Violence?

It was just a little brown spot on the sidewalk. I was going out of my way to watch them work across the street every day, bewildered by the attention paid to this discoloration on the pavement. They washed it, scrubbed it, scraped it, used pressurized water. Despite their best efforts, it had been seared into the ground, and they clearly did not want the stain of what had happened to remain. They broke up the entire sidewalk and laid a new foundation to erase the blood and soot. A car bomb had gone off a few days earlier on 13 March 2016, close to the intersection of Atatürk Boulevard and Ziya Gökalp Street in Ankara, Turkey. A radicalized faction of the Kurdish movement, the *Teyrêbasên Azadiya Kurdistan* (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks), had carried out the attack, most likely aimed at the police troops that had been stationed in Güvenpark since the Gezi protests in 2013, just a few blocks from Turkey's parliament. I watched, still somewhat traumatized, as the last remnants of what had once been a person were broken up and taken off into oblivion. As the dust made a cloud hovering over what had once been a bus stop, the jackhammer rang out over and over as it chipped away at the concrete: crack, crack, crack. *How many*, I had wondered, *had been carried off and forgotten in the same way? What were the motivations of the attackers? How could one feel so strongly about their cause that they were willing to set off a bomb in the Turkish capital on Sunday evening, knowingly murdering dozens of civilians and taking their own lives?* The night of the failed military coup a few months later, I found myself asking many of these same questions as citizens fled to the streets to face off against tanks, armed soldiers and F16s. Yet, a question was ringing over and over in my ears: *How did we get here*? As I turned my attention to academic literature on violence, I found that much of it had nothing to say about the questions I was asking concerning violence. Much like how Michel Foucault felt about power, I found that "the political analysis of [violence] which was offered did not seem

[1] Ellison, *Invisible* Man, 153-154.

to me to account for the finer, more detailed phenomena I wish to evoke."[2] Oftentimes they would begin at the end, the actual explosion, the emergence of violent tactics, soldiers running through the street…it seemed, for the most part, that violence did not become of academic concern until blood was literally streaming down the gutter. These thinkers were concerned with the effects of violence, usually bracketing the concept of "violence" or taking a minimalist version, whereas I was interested in understanding the *process of violence*.

This observation is likely to seem very unoriginal or trivial on the surface, and it helps to note that violence has not always played such a predominant role in political discourse. Violence as a concern in society, or at least as we view it today in Western society, can be traced back to the Terror of the French Revolution. Political violence existed before then, and in fact has always existed, but the role of violence from this period onwards was less about accepting it as an existential fact of life and more about engaging with it.[3] It is not coincidental that hearing the phrase "heads rolling through the streets" almost instantly brings to light the violence that unfolded during this period, one that has taken on the moniker of *the Terror* in political science today. Yet more specifically, this was a fusion of popular violence not only against the state (which was quite common across Europe by this point) but furthermore *overtaking* it. Unlike the American Revolution, this was not a colony but rather a popular movement overcoming its own political order. One need look no further than Louis-Alexandre de La Rochefoucauld's infamous "it's not a revolt; it's a revolution" in response to the Bastille being overrun. This violence was of a new kind. What was so unique is that rather than violence being an aspect of politics, it was now a determining factor in it, at least in a way that had not been widely encountered before.

Against the backdrop of this violence, what has come to be known as the Enlightenment was unfolding – which in reality was a vast array of interacting social and political upheavals and changes – and it conveniently juxtaposed rationality with not just irrationality but also violence. Rather than seeing violence as part of a *divine order*, it became part of the *natural order*, which was then contrasted in various ways with the *social order*. The Physiocrats, a group of French intellectuals during the eighteenth century, are often seen as the strongest proponents of this natural order theory. On the

[2] Foucault, "Structuralism and Post-Structuralism," 452.
[3] Martschukat and Niedermeier, "Violence and Visibility," 2-4.

other hand, there were many writers who emphasized closer scrutiny of the social order, which was portrayed both as useful and detrimental to human development. Perhaps most notable is Immanuel Kant's take on violence and revolution, which he saw as not only reprehensible but unable to bring about rational thought: "A revolution may perhaps bring about the fall of an autocratic despotism or of avaricious or overbearing oppression, but it can never bring about the true reform of a way of thinking. Rather, new prejudices will serve, like the old, as the leading strings of the thoughtless masses."[4] This was published in 1784, half a decade before the events of the French Revolution were to ensue, but Kant's skepticism of the social order can already be flushed out. In 1793, after the events of the French Revolution had started to rock Europe, Kant not only reasserts this point but more staunchly defends it: "Nor could a right of necessity (*ius in casu necessitatis*), which, as a supposed *right* to do *wrong* when in extreme (physical) need, is in any case an absurdity, enter here and provide a way to raise the barrier limiting the people's despotic power."[5] A clear boundary is being drawn here between justified violence (i.e., state violence or "force") and unjustified violence (i.e., non-state or "revolutionary" violence) that would carry the conception of violence forward over the next two centuries. Without a doubt, this was partly fueled by the revulsion many felt for the violent spectacles enshrined in this new type of revolution, and Kant was certainly not the only figure involved in this (nor even the most prominent). However, he highlights the division that came to problematize violence as a point of political concern and investment.

This is not to say the French Revolution simply changed the way violence was interpreted. It rather served as a general reference point for many in describing an emerging wave of how people interacted with politics. The traditional orders were under attack, and thus the issue of violence became utterly problematized in the political sphere, particularly thanks to the onset of the Industrial Revolution. In the century following the French Revolution, authors from across Europe, North America and Asia were quick to question the rationality-violence dichotomy. For many, violence was a legitimate and rational practice for oppressed classes, i.e., "revolutionary violence." Max Stirner was an early advocate of such violence, criticizing the state's attempted monopoly of this term:

> We are accustomed to classify states according to the different ways in which "the supreme might" is disturbed. If an individual has it – monarchy; if all have it – democracy; etc. Supreme might then! Might against whom? Against the individual and his "self-will." The state practices

[4] Kant, "On the Question," 59.
[5] Kant, "Common Saying," 299.

> "violence," the individual must not do so. The state's behaviour is violence, and it calls its violence "law"; that of the individual, "crime [*Verbrechen*]." Crime, then – so the individual's violence is called; and only by crime does he overcome [*bricht*] the state's violence when he thinks that the state is not above him, but he is above the state.[6]

In this vein, Karl Marx attributes violence as being the oppression working classes are exposed to due to the capitalist's ownership of the means of production and control of working conditions:

> After capital had taken centuries in extending the working day to its normal maximum limit, and then beyond this to the limit of the natural day of 12 hours, there followed on the birth of machinism and modern industry the last third of the 18th century, a violent encroachment like that of an avalanche in its intensity and extent.[7]

Georges Sorel, a French socialist anarchist during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, furthers such criticism of the state's monopoly on violence, drawing in moral arguments that were so often used against political violence in his day (and ours): "Each time, therefore, that an attack takes place, the doctors of the ethico-social sciences, who are found in profusion in journalism, indulge in high-minded discussions about whether a criminal act can ever be excused, or even justified, from the point of view of the highest standards of justice."[8] Nevertheless, Sorel also cautioned about easy excuses for popular violence, seeing the French Revolution as an uncalled-for precedent of the dangers of unguarded revolutionary violence. By the time Lenin was attacking imperialism, these considerations were being thrown aside in favor of justifying revolutionary violence, almost at any means: "As a result of the universal ruin wrought by the war [WWI] a world-wide revolutionary crisis is arising which, no matter how protracted and difficult the stages through which it may pass, can end in no other way than in a proletarian revolution and its victory."[9] In this respect, revolutionary violence gave credence – and continues to do so – for the infinite array of nationalist, religious and ethnic movements that arose not only during the nineteenth century but which grew exponentially into the twentieth century, drawing a sharp contrast to the more traditional defense of the state as the sole legitimate arbiter of violence as well as the non-violence philosophies that emerged across the globe.

These testaments to revolutionary violence, nonetheless, were not accepted at face value. In fact, it is arguable that they were widely accepted at all in most places. With the

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[6] Stirner, *Ego and Its Own*, 176.
[7] Marx, *Capital*, 278.
[8] Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, 41.
[9] Lenin, *Imperialism*, 11.

emergence of nation-states, the issue of state violence and revolutionary violence came to a head. Yet for many, the conflicts that arose from discussions of violence were more likely to raise fearful concerns about the use of non-state violence or to justify peripheral or oppressed perspectives. Perhaps this was clearest in the popular literature of the nineteenth century: Leo Tolstoy, Charles Baudelaire, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ida B. Wells, Mary Shelly, Nikolai Gogol, Frederick Douglas, Robert Louis Stevenson, Honré de Balzac, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Louisa May Alcott, Victor Hugo, Rudyard Kipling, Ivan Turgenev or even H. G. Wells. This list is certainly arbitrary, and the point is not that violence was not discussed beforehand. Rather, by the nineteenth century, there is an incessant need to engage with the dynamics of violence, either as a literary device or a way to evoke certain sentiments. Jane Austen's persistent portrayal of the military in her works is something quite novel in many respects. Just a few generations before, being a member of the army, navy or other military branches was frowned upon (upper echelons excluded), primarily being made up of petty criminals, vagabonds or those down on their luck. The romanticism that became infused in the military coincided with the emergence of national state militaries in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[10] Meanwhile, authors like Edgar Allen Poe used the fear of violence to elicit emotional responses from readers. His infamous 1841 detective short story "The Murders in the Rue Morgue," which went on to inspire Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes series, revolved around the mysterious murders of an upper-class mother and daughter, whose throats were slit and their bodies horrifically disposed of. I recall reading this in high school, bewildered to discover the murderer was an ape that had escaped his master. The force of this story is lost on many readers today, but it was not on Poe's early nineteenth century American audience who were quite fearful of a slave revolt. Throughout Poe's work, constant images of apes or black beings are shown to be a source of utter barbarity and violence, ones that need to be brought into line.[11] In this way, violence was a theme that often ran throughout the literature and indicated a need to engage with it, to politicize it, to moralize it, to either justify or denounce it: whether it was the pacifistic Henry David Thoreau and Tolstoy or the more antagonistic versions or Baudelaire and Poe. This crux of violence and enlightenment was incorporated into the backbone of Dickens' *A Tale of*

[10] For more, see Banister, "Masculinity and Militarism"; Durquette, "Sensibility of Captain Benwick"; Fulford, "Sighing for Soldier"; Roberts, *Jane Austen and French*; Roberts, "Jane Austen and Tradition."
[11] For more details on the role of race and racism in Poe's work, see Lee, "Absolute Poe"; Schrom, *Enlightenment and Origins*, Whalen, *Edgar Allen Poe*, 109-192; Zitter, "Language, Race and Authority."

Two Cities, whereas rationality and liberty were contrasted to violence in France's revolutionary period as the central driving theme of the text, making it both "the best of times" and "the worst of times": "It was the season of light, it was the season of darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair."[12]

While this diatribe is a seemingly unnecessary digression, the lesson to be extracted is that violence became a prominent issue intertwined with politics at the end of the eighteenth century, one that justified the existence of many social sciences. Michel Foucault's exquisite work on this development serves as an explanation of this process. Psychology was able to obtain social value by judging criminals.[13] Sociology, ethnology and phrenology were deeply connected to the racial classification of populations, which went on to justify racial policies throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth (and arguably the twenty-first) centuries. This is particularly true of the then-accepted distinction between *savage* and *barbaric* peoples, whose violent tendencies were the result of different evolutionary developments.[14] Newly formed nation states found themselves dealing with classist, ethnic and religious movements, many of which included claims to national self-determination. If there was fearmongering that went into violence, this was only to the extent that there were actual threats to established orders, as we will see later in the Ottoman Empire (part 2). The brutality of the French Revolution was a reference point for nation states around the world, a cautionary tale of the violence that would ensue if it were not suppressed, often by legitimized state "force." The "revolutionary violence" that swept across northern Asia and Eastern Europe at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century only further embedded violence as a phenomenon of political importance.[15] Alongside this, massacres of ethnic and religious minorities at an unforeseen scale started to unfold, from Armenians and Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, Native Americans in the US, French Creoles in Haiti or Roma in Europe. The focal turning point in this was WWI, which unleashed a wave of

[12] Dickens, *Tale of Two Cities*, 17.
[13] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
[14] Especially see Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, chapter nine. For further discussions on the categorization of cultures or peoples using this framework, see Buranelli, "Standard of Civilization, Nomadism"; Hopkins, *Ruling Savage Periphery*; Lenhardt, *Savage Horrors*; Smith, "Barbarian Errors"; Toscano, "Ignoble Savage."
[15] For some diverse accounts of the impact of the French Revolution on polities around the globe, one can consult Acemoglu et al., "Consequences of Radical Reform"; Desan, Hunt and Nelson, *French Revolution in Global*; Greenwood, *Legacies of Fear*; Klaits and Haltzel, *Global Ramifications of French*; Lewis, "Impact of French Revolution"; Philip, "French Revolution and British"; Rapport, *Nineteenth-Century Europe*, 1-52; Shlapentokh, *French Revolution in Russian*; Sperber, "Echoes of French Revolution"; Wallerstein, "French Revolution as World-Historical."

incomprehensible violence across various continents. The destruction and utter lack of empathy at the loss of human life not only sparked moral concerns but diplomatic and academic ones. Authors like Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Walter Benjamin, Ziya Gökalp or Georg Simmel came to see a need to understand the dynamics of political violence, and this largely set up the academic debates around the topic that we have today.

The violence that carried over into the interwar period until WWII caused a massive rise in scholarly and public debates around the role of violence in our contemporary world. While some would go on to advocate violence in various guises (e.g., Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon, Carl Schmitt, Jean Genet, Aimé Césaire, Malcolm X, Georges Bataille or Robert Musil), many found a need to further assess what it is that we understand by violence and, more predominantly, patterns of violence (e.g., Hannah Arendt, Noam Chomsky, Octavia Butler, Jacques Lacan, Réne Girard, W. E. B. Du Bois). The introduction or expansion of genocides, nuclear warfare, antiwar movements, terrorism, civil rights movements and satellite states along with an explosion of social movements and anti-colonialist violence only exacerbated the need to engage with the topic. When combined with the development and expansion of the social sciences, this led to an array of different approaches to studying violence.

Analyzing Violence: The Different Approaches

One of the most widely used means of analyzing violence has been Rational Choice Theory (RCT), particularly in the ways it was employed during the Cold War and in its perceived utility of risk-assessment and counterterrorism strategies in a post-9/11 world. Instrumental rationality was sought out by many policy makers and national governments when dealing with violent conflicts because of its clarity and dedication to empiricism.[16] With the rise of international terrorism in the latter half of the twentieth century, a new wave of scholars have taken to using RCT methods to predicting, preventing and curbing these acts.[17] In the fields of psychology and criminology, this approach has been held in

[16] For example, see Blattman and Miguel, "Civil War"; Le Billon, "Diamond Wars?"; Seiyefa, *Why Organised Violence Thrives*; Svolik, "Democracy as Equilibrium"; Varol, "Stealth Authoritarianism"; Weede and Muller, "Rebellion, Violence and Revolution."

[17] For example, see Anderton and Carter, *Principles of Conflict Economics*, "New Look at Weak," "Rational Choice Theory"; Caplan, "Terrorism"; Fahey et al., "Situational Model for Distinguishing"; Frey, "Terrorism from Rational Choice"; Ghatak, "Willingness and Opportunity"; Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional"; Shughart, "Terrorism in Rational Choice."

high regards and is often used to analyze wide-spread instances of violence, typically perceived as bodily harm or psychological trauma.[18] The problem with the RCT perspective is that it relies heavily on physical manifestations of violence, privileging empirical and observable actions and downplaying institutional or structural effects. Moreover, it tends to address perpetrators as individualized actors making pragmatic choices based on the evidence in front of them; thus, the underlying assumptions of RCT means that violence has to fit within its understanding of human nature or risks being of no use. RCT's version of instrumental rationality additionally makes the issue of state and non-state violence the most important factor, and how to legitimate the state's monopoly on violence is typically pre-assumed from the get-go. As will be shown below, this *can be* (but not necessarily *is*) a very problematic and dangerous method for us to employ when assessing violence. The concentration on individual decision-making and the impact of violence has made this field highly susceptible to overlooking unconscious, systemic or observable forms of violent activity as well as analyzable results (i.e., *acts* of violence) instead of *processes* of violence, which is our interest here. Thus, this literature does not greatly move forward our understanding of violence but rather focuses on our perception of it in visibly measurable ways. It presumes a model of violence rather than interrogating it, meaning the approach to be presented in this text falls far from the basic principles involved in such academic discussions.

Another prominent approach to studying violence in the social sciences has been a sociological perspective. In such studies, and in contrast to RCT, it is argued that symbolic aspects are bound to emerge in any culture around violence. While this has especially been true for issues like domestic abuse and gendered violence,[19] other authors have not shied away from larger social phenomena.[20] Traditionally, sociological approaches have been embedded in economic and instrumental understandings of violence, yet rather than focusing on individual action, their interest has been collective violence. By incorporating context as an essential determinative factor, they move beyond the empirical-based violence put forward in almost all RCT literature; this has allowed

[18] For example, see Abt, "Towards Framework for Preventing"; Bouché and Shady, "Pimp's Game"; Clarke and Felson, *Routine Activity and Rational*; Cornish and Clarke, "Understanding Crime Displacement"; Knapton et al., "Belonging for Violence"; Kruglanski et al., "Making of Violent Extremists"; Natarajan, *Crime Opportunity Theories*; Thrasher and Handfield, "Honor and Violence"; Wittek, Snijders and Nee, *Handbook of Rational Choice*.

[19] For example, see DeKeseredy and Rennison, "Thinking Theoretically About Male"; González-López, *Family Secrets*; Jalna and Maynard, *Women, Violence and Social*.

[20] For some illustrations of this, see Goner, *Turkish National Identity*; Hajjar, *Torture*; Hamby and Grych, *Web of Violence*; Malešević, *Sociology of War*.

closer scrutiny of the situations in which violence occurs or has occurred. Nonetheless, this literature has continued to make the *act* of violence the cornerstone of investigations, with scholars then trying to assess the causal factors that led to such "cultures of violence." This largely has to do with the goal of most sociological studies of violence being grounded in predictive models that often seek to assume observations about future events rather than to explain past ones (see chapter 1, introduction). The focus on causal relations has led many to look for determinative features of violence that can lead to the "naturalization of the social sciences," as Michel Wieviorka has argued; the author goes on to explain the dangers involved in this, whereby the meaning of violence could very much differ from that of the researcher's or the overarching theory.[21] Sociological interpretations are still very valuable to our investigation of violence, but they require further explanatory mechanisms as well as a more compelling conceptualization of violence that avoids these reductionist impasses. Still, the incorporation of symbolic dimensions of violence (e.g., workplace harassment or discrimination) is a quintessential dynamic included in this dissertation.

Yet, perhaps it is unfair to make such assertions on sociological approaches to violence without discussing the "macro" and "micro" (and "meso," as interpreted by scholars like Randall Collins) dynamics of violence, which have been equally true of civil war and conflict studies.[22] These dynamics range from focusing on the environment of individuals (particularly in psychological or criminological studies) to more widespread and culturally-infused types of violence that border on structural interpretations (such as gendered violence or violence in education and social services). This divide has largely driven studies on terrorism, with many seeking to view it from an individualist perspective that overlooks the importance of cultural factors.[23] This sentiment is excellently captured by Wieviorka:

> There is a tendency to isolate the personality of the actor, to examine his or her antecedents, trajectory and family background and in some cases to resort to psychiatry and consider the violence as a form of madness, or pathology. In extreme cases, the implication or the consequence

[21] Wieviorka, "Sociological Analysis of Violence," 51.
[22] Collins, *Violence*, 34-35, 115-121.
[23] For example, see Anderton and Carter, *Principles of Conflict Economics*; Blee, "Evidence, Empathy and Ethics"; Geri, "Securitization of Kurdish Minority"; Greenland, Proulx and Savage, "Dying for Cause"; Horgan, "Politics to Pathways"; Hudson, *Who Becomes Terrorist*; Ismael, *Strategic Interaction Between Islamist*; Kydd and Walter, "Strategies of Terrorism"; Malthaner, "Violence, Legitimacy and Control"; Manning and Smith, "Political Party Formation"; Pavlićević, "Rationality of Terrorist Acts"; Sindre, "Whose Interests?"; Varshney, "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict."

> of a perspective of this type is to absolve the perpetrator of any responsibility for the violence, since he or she was driven by impulses and was not knowingly the perpetrator.[24]

As chapter 2 elaborates on, there are serious worries about reducing violence to such a reading, particularly when it involves responsibility, as Arendt famously argued. While this approach is not completely futile, researchers often ignores the cultural and community-level impacts that go into such decision-making in favor of generalizing their findings, something those studying the wider impacts of conflicts have sought to avoid, particularly those engaging in the sociology of violence.[25] For instance, numerous in-depth studies have shown the particular aspects and communal relationships that go into shaping insurgent movements and terrorist groups in Turkey, which has made the situation somewhat of an anomaly in conflict studies.[26] Social movement studies has taken this even further by removing many of the moral concerns present in terrorism studies by trying to determine the actual functioning of violent and nonviolent social movements from a broader lens, and scholars like Lorenzo Bosi, Donatella della Porta, Mara Albrecht, Niall Ó Dochartaigh Stefan Malthaner, Bill Kissane or Mirjan Weiberg-Salzmann have proven insightful for progressing these concerns and giving practical operationalization tactics to researchers. However, perhaps more than the sociological approach that incorporates symbolic elements into its understanding, these works in social movement studies almost always avoid any comprehensive conversation about what is defined as violence and often resort to a minimalist interpretation. Along with this, there tends to be an overreliance on the pre-assumed "state v. nonstate" dichotomy that is left unquestioned, and though scholars have sought to justify nonstate versions of violence more and more, they often fail to be critical towards its existence in the first place or how it plays into our understandings of violence. While they certainly should not be faulted on this since their primary concern is not understanding violence but rather social movements, it should give us caution of relying too much on them for a better and clearer understanding of how violence can be understood.

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[24] Wieviorka, "Sociological Analysis of Violence," 53.

[25] For some studies that fall in this last category, see Alimi, "Relational Dynamics in Factional"; Curtis and Sindre, "Transforming State Visions"; Douglas, *Law, Liberty and Pursuit*; Gürbüz, *Rival Kurdish Movements*; Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*; Jackson, "Knowledge, Power and Politics," "Unknown Knowns"; Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties*; Silke, "Contemporary Terrorism Studies"; Spierenburg, "Reflections About Word"; Toros and Gunning, "Exploring Critical Theory Approach"; Turk, "Sociology of Terrorism"; Young and Findley, "Promise and Pitfalls."

[26] For example, see Aydin and Emrence, *Zones of Rebellion*; Gunes, *Kurdish National Movement in Turkey*; Marcus, *Blood and Belief*; Saeed, *Kurdish Politics in Turkey*; Tezcür, "Violence and Nationalist Mobilization"; White, *PKK*.

While these approaches to political violence have been very fruitful, they frequently brush aside the quintessential question of what we understand by violence. The most obvious version of this, as put forward by Johanna Oksala, is that violence can be understood as "intentional bodily harm."[27] The emphasis that has existed in recent decades towards empiricism and RCT certainly makes this a tempting solution. It is easily discernible and quantifiable. Yet, perhaps this is more of a flawed unconscious bias than a sound explanation of the phenomenon. This tactic returns us to the dilemma that opened up this dissertation: how can we differentiate what is *perceived* as violence from what can be *understood* as violence. To a large part, this has to do with the privileged position of "bodily harm" that we assume is worse than other kinds of non-bodily (or even indirectly bodily) harm. More precisely – and this is at the heart of this dissertation – this assumption focuses on the *effects* of violence rather than the *processes* that violent actions go through. A great deal of research in recent decades has slowly began to knock this bracketing of bodily violence off its pedestal.

One arena where this has been very fruitful has been viewing violence in its structural or institutional capacities. On the one hand, many studies have used quantitative methods to measure violence and show discrepancies do exist that are unexplainable at the micro-level. These studies have unarguably moved certain debates forward and given headway to claims about institutional violence, yet their reliance on measurable violence, however they define that, has limited their assessments into how we understand violence.[28] At the same time, more historically-oriented approaches have worked to show how cultures of violence have sedimented in certain institutions or social norms over time.[29] For instance, Beverly Gage outlines the history of homegrown terrorism in early twentieth century America, which was connected to a vast array of social and political factors that came to shape how we perceive of terrorism today.[30] Using the different approach of oral histories, Kathleen M. Blee documented the involvement of individuals in the Klu Klux Klan in southern Indiana during the early twentieth century; the intriguing

[27] Oksala, *Foucault, Politics and Violence*, 9.
[28] For some examples, see Auyero, Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes, *Violence at Margins*; Caprioli, "Primed for Violence"; Cuklanz and McIntosh, *Documenting Gendered Violence*; Farmer, "Anthropology of Structural Violence"; Gurr, *Political Rebellion*; Hattery and Smith, *Gender, Power and Violence*; Kramer, "Poverty, Inequality and Youth"; Rossiter and Rinaldi, *Institutional Violence and Disability*; Shiffman, *Economics of Violence*; White, *Transitional Justice and Legacies*.
[29] For some prominent examples of such studies connecting structural or institutional elements of violence with historical research, see Bartoszewicz, *50 Shades of Radicalism*; Gerges, *ISIS*; Kaplan, "History and Terrorism"; Marcus, *Blood and Belief*; Saeed, *Kurdish Politics in Turkey*; Tilly, *Politics of Collective Violence*, "Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists"; White, *PKK*.
[30] Gage, *Day Wall Street Exploded*.

insight drawn from this was the social role the Klan played in local communities, serving not solely as a white nationalist organization but, more importantly for many of those involved, a provider of social services and an organizer and host of community events.[31] The historical wing of institutional approaches to violence is far more akin to this work because of the fact that they not only try to explain how these instances of violence became institutionalized but also how they operate. They furthermore question what is understood by violence in specific contexts, thereby questioning the fundamental issue of how we can not only *perceive* but *understand* violence. Yet, they still often overlook the micro-level and, in doing so, are often dismissive of the agency inhabited by those living within such institutions in favor of path dependency. Actor-network theorists have instead argued that these approaches not only ignore the agency of individuals or communities but also that of their environment.[32]

One way around this has been the notion of normative violence, such as that proposed by Judith Butler in the 1999 preface of her renowned *Gender Trouble*, originally published in 1990.[33] Butler's interpretation saw violence stemming from the action of socially sanctioned behavior that had been accreted from past instances of such violence. The procedural character certainly stands closer to our investigation into *processes* of violence, but she often discusses this in contemporaneous contexts without giving much room for historical analysis. While others have stepped up to contextualize our understanding of normative violence, this field remains largely understudied.[34] Beyond this concern, there is also the issue that violence is taken to be known by the reader, and the limits of what constitutes normative violence are disregarded entirely. On the one hand, this has fallen in line with theories of discursive violence.[35] Unlike other

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[31] Blee, "Evidence, Empathy and Ethics."

[32] For some illustrations of actor-network theorists who have stressed the embeddedness of subjects in their environments and the agency of non-human objects, see Besel, "Opening 'Black Box'"; Callon, "Economic Markets and Rise"; Dugdale, "Materiality"; Fox, "Communities of Practice, Foucault"; Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, "Recalling ANT"; Law, "After ANT," "Seeing Like a Survery"; Law and Mol, "Notes on Materiality"; Müller, "Assemblages and Actor-Networks."

[33] Butler, *Gender Trouble*. Also see Chambers and Carver's discussion on the role of normative violence in her philosophy (*Judith Butler and Political*, chapter 4) as well as Moya Lloyd's reading of Butlerian vulnerability ("Towards a Cultural Politics").

[34] For instance, see Bates, "Violence of Norms"; Boesten, "Inequality, Normative Violence"; Collins et al., "(Re)Shaping Self"; Kenny, Fotaki and Scriver, "Mental Health as Weapon"; McGuire, *War on Autism*; Mills, "Normative Violence, Vulnerability"; Solana, "Normativity, Assimilation and Transgression"; Yarnell et al., "Cross-Gender Social Normative."

[35] For some studies employing the notion of discursive violence, see Dozono, "Passive Voice of White"; Fernando, "Discursive Violence of Postcolonial"; Holling, "Rhetorical Contours of Violent"; Leezenberg, "Discursive Violence and Responsibility"; Moon and Holling, "'White Supremacy in Heels'"; Murray, "Gender and Violence"; Romero-Rodriguez, Gadea and Aguaded, "From Demonization to Polarisation"; Smalls, "Fighting Words"; Walker, "Guada-narco-lupe, Maquilarañas."

methodological approaches in the social sciences and humanities, discourse analysis is regarded as taking discourse as a unit of analysis, allowing it to deal not solely with the systemic structures that lead to harm or inequity but also situating violence in hate speech acts, hegemonic narratives against disadvantaged groups and social norms that propel such "discursive violence." This helps explain how violence perforates dynamic sectors of social life, yet it also falls prey to the opposite problem of the other quantitative methods: it has difficulty defining what is constituted as violence. Thus, an array of definitions has come forth, often put forward as a way to discuss what is being measured but not what is understood by violence. On the other hand, cultural memory studies have been able to address the long- and short-term effects of violence by switching from discourse to memory as the unit of analysis.[36]

Unlike discourse analysis, cultural memory studies sees memory more as a fluid, procedural phenomena to assess, which requires discourses, practices, repetition and spaces (either corporeal or metaphorical). The predominant view in the field is that memory is a process by which past practices are repeated, incorporating both symbolic and identity-based elements.[37] This stance has allowed many to illustrate that cultural memory is invented: a sedimented construct that resists change but is nonetheless open to alteration.[38] The corresponding field of heritage studies has gone even further, explaining that historical "artefacts" and monuments of heritage are grounded in a mix of concrete objects and how we perceive and treat them; in this respect, it is an interactive process dependent both on subjects and their surroundings.[39] The consequences have been a wealth of literature in this field that sees violence, in some form or another, as a generative process rather than a static event or action.[40] Perhaps this is no more visible than in the notion of intergenerational trauma. Studies into this have sought to find how community

[36] See Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory."
[37] For example, see De Cesari and Rigney, *Transnational Memory*; Erll, *Memory in Culture*; Krapp, Déjà Vu; Mills and Walker, "Introduction"; Rigney, "Remembrance as Remaking"; Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory*.
[38] For some proponents of this, see Confino, "Collective Memory and Cultural," "Memory and History"; Harth, "Invention of Cultural Memory"; Le Goff, *History and Memory*; Özyürek, *Nostalgia for Modern*; Ramsay, *American Media and Memory*.
[39] For instance, see Eriksen, *Antiquities to Heritage*; Harvey, "Heritage Pasts and Heritage"; Smith, *Uses of Heritage*.
[40] For some examples of such studies, see Anderson, *Storied Landscape of Iroquoia*; Duančić, *Geography and Nationalist Visions*; Gairola and Jayawickrama, *Memory, Trauma, Asia*; Gould and Lauria-Santiago, *Rise in Darkness*; Gursozlu, *Peace, Culture and Violence*; Hinton and Hinton, *Genocide and Mass Violence*; Jussawalla and Omran, *Memory, Voice and Identity*; Laugesen and Fisher, *Expressions of War*; Pedriali and Svettieri, *Mobilizing Cultural Identities*; Rabah, *Conflict on Mount Lebanon*.

trauma is passed down through generations and impacts that community decades later.[41] In essence, it tracks how systems of violence have been built into the very core of communities or the family unit over time, which reemphasizes the procedural tone of violence looked at in this dissertation. Another innovative approach has been studies into oral history to understand both involvement in violent groups as well as the effects violence has had on the lives of individuals.[42] Thus, cultural memory studies has been able to make a special place for itself within the social sciences by re-envisioning not only what violence can be but also how it can be operationalized and studied.

In effect, there is an immense spectrum of manners to study violence, but many of these approaches are based on predictive models that seek to form a risk-analysis of violence and its prevention at the cost of an investigation into what it is. While the sociological approach improves on this by incorporating a symbolic element, it falls into many of the same pitfalls of having to quantify violence as the instrumental rationality approaches do. Fields like social movement theory, conflict studies and historical institutionalism have been able to broaden our understanding of the mechanisms behind violence while also removing some of the moral connotations; however, violence is primarily taken at face-value, and only heightened forms of physical violence receive much attention. Actor-network theory, the study of discourse, cultural memory studies and heritage studies have been able to dispel some of the biases that exist towards more descriptive (rather than prescriptive approaches), and their ability to include not only discourse but the context and environment in which things are said and done provides far more room to assess violence as a process. Even though much of this research supports the traditional view of physical violence being the worst kind, and thus the one most deserving of serious academic attention, the question of whether such a divide can be maintained has arisen in recent decades. Perhaps this has not been better presented than by the Harlem Birthright Project.[43] By looking into the birthweight of babies of different ethnicities, they were able to determine not only that Black babies in the US weighed less than their Caucasian counterparts but that these were attributable to extra racial stressors

[41] For some authors on this time of intergenerational trauma, see Achugar, *Discursive Processes of Intergenerational*; Danieli, *International Handbook of Multigenerational*; Graff, "Intergenerational Trauma of Slavery"; Grant, *Black Men, Intergenerational Colonialism*; Rock, *Intergenerational Memory and Language*.
[42] For authors who deal with violence and oral histories, see Abrams, *Oral History Theory*; Blee, "Evidence, Empathy and Ethics"; Hamilton and Shopes, *Oral History and Public*; Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering*.
[43] Mullings et al., "Qualitative Methodologies and Community."

in these Black mothers' lives. From birth, these Black children were already being exposed to a socio-political system that directly impacted their physical health, which is not to mention the array of practices that caused the extra stressors for the mothers in the first place. In other words, what about cases of "institutional" violence that relay those effects into bodily harm? James Dodd keenly observes that this desire to "measure" violence often stands in the way of understanding it: "Violence…readily lends itself to being articulated in a purely technical manner, where we can fix very precisely how to develop those mechanisms, machines or programs of violence that can kill more efficiently"; he refers to this argument as the "stupidity of violence" theory, whereby violence "involves *nothing more significant* than what can be captured and organized in a technical fashion."[44] Consider the ongoing civil strife that exists in Turkey and that directly relates to this dissertation's case study: the Kurdish conflict. While a great deal of brutal attacks and massacres have occurred on both sides of the conflict, the resonating atmosphere has left southeastern Turkey economically stunted, politically oppressed and socially isolated. In many respects, this was partly what fueled the civil war in the first place, which gets at the core of the debates on violence. To partly borrow from Raymond Chandler, what do we talk about when we talk about violence?

How Can We Understand Violence? Conceptualizing Ambiguity

To try and answer this, one runs across the fundamentals of violence. Surely not all aggressive or forceful acts are violent. Consider an amputation to save a person's life. Surely this would not be considered violent, though it involves chopping off a portion of that person's body. What about the tragic end to John Steinbeck's novella *Of Mice and Men*? Is ending someone's life quickly to prevent them from a slow, tortuous death at the hands of an angry mob violent? Then again, many non-physical acts are viewed by us as violent. One of the central arguments of the US Senate in former US President Donald Trump's second impeachment trial concerned inciting an insurrection based on "violent" rhetoric. In racial stereotyping, certain individuals are often perceived as violent by nature, yet this violence is understood as something beyond physical.[45] We could also invoke the quarantines for Kurdish towns or districts in 2015 and 2016. While the raids

[44] Dodd, *Violence and Phenomenology*, 12.
[45] For some illustrations of this, see Aldama, *Violence and Body*; Denzin, *Reading Race*; D'Orazio and Salehyan, "Who Is Terrorist"; Dukes and Gaither, "Black Racial Stereotypes"; Jones, "Killing Fields"; Judge, *Blackwashing Homophobia*; McKinnon, *Gendered Asylum*.

themselves were violent, it was further understood that these citizens were violently held captive in their own homes (and some were not even that lucky) for an extended period of time, even though no "physical violence" was done to many of them.[46] This parallels the phenomenon known as psychological warfare, or rather psychological violence. The goal in these scenarios is not bodily harm but psychological trauma. In essence, violence shows itself to be contingent not upon the act itself but something else, something that is invested in the act.

Consider the judicial difference in many countries between *murder* and *manslaughter*, the primary difference between them being *intent to harm*. While murder is seen as a violent, perhaps the most violent, act for an individual, manslaughter would often be excluded from inclusion in violence due to the accidental nature of the act, though we may say the person died in a violent manner. Clearly violence is not simply attached to physical acts but instead entails intent to harm, and yet because of the aforementioned problems attributing violence to physical acts, it seems more connected with this intent to harm (which is the core of chapter 2). Perhaps looking at some illustrations would be the best way to properly understand this. One of the largest debates in civil disobedience literature revolves around whether property damage is considered violent, and thus *un*civil disobedience. While there is no bodily harm, there could be financial harm to the government, corporations or individuals. The other issue in the debate revolves around whether this is *justified* harm or not, which usually relies on the motives of the antagonists, which is a key element to notice.[47] It is not only an intent to harm, but also an intent to prevent an outcome. Strike workers might attack factory machinery in protest, not simply to harm a company providing unfit working conditions but also to prevent the continuation of these practices. A political assassination involves an intent to prevent someone or someone's policies from continuing. A lynch mob is not only intended to harm the poor individual they have picked out but also to prevent the presence of others like them. This was a notorious practice where I am from in the US, where "sundown towns" used to be a very common and life-threatening worry for Black Americans, including my hometown.[48] What is a terrorist attack if not an often-successful attempt to

[46] For more on these curfews, see Amnesty International, "Turkey"; EuroMed Rights, "Turkey"; Gourlay, "Oppression, Solidarity, Resistance"; Weiss, "Many Layers of Moral."
[47] For some literature on this topic, see Adams, "Uncivil Disobedience"; Allen, "Civil Disobedience and Terrorism"; Basu and Caycedo, "Radical Reframing of Civil"; Celikates, "Democratizing Civil Disobedience"; Held, "Terrorism, Rights and Political"; Pape, *Bombing to Win*.
[48] For more on sundown towns, see especially O'Connell, "Historical Shadows"; Loewen, *Sundown Towns*.

prevent an existent hegemonic way of life from continuing (or more often to use as political leverage to prevent undesirable outcomes, thus allowing the desired one to succeed)?[49]

We could also look at this from a more institutional perspective, such as institutional violence. One immensely insightful example is practices of ghettoization, such as the extreme racial segregation that is firmly entrenched in US institutions, the housing market or real estate practices, banks and credit unions allowance of loans and even property value. The result of a centuries-long practice of division has not only kept many ethnic Americans in lower-income neighborhoods, but the US government's active involvement in funneling drugs into these communities and exacerbating the suffering by declaring a war on drugs, carried out within these neighborhoods, has physically exposed these individuals to bodily harm in uncountable ways.[50] This not only includes exposure to bodily harm by others, but a lack of access to medical care, a crumbling welfare system, rampant homelessness, atmospheres ripe for addiction to the most vulnerable and, quite literally, poisoning (i.e., the Flint Water tragedy). Thus, it was not only a willful intent to do bodily harm but, moreover, an attempt to prevent a segment of the population from flourishing, from stepping out of bounds (or quite literally from being able to leave their communities, first for legal reasons and later for economic and social ones). A more subtle example is the Czech Republic assigning Roma children to schools for children with "mental handicaps" as a means of segregating the population; in turn, this has affected not only their education but also their integration into the socio-political culture, career prospects and continuing education.[51] The fact that it is more subtle and less direct draws attention away from this deliberative and widespread practice, and the accumulated results – both physical and otherwise – directly impact the lives of those children subjected to this educational discrimination. While these last few paragraphs have highlighted some of the themes of this dissertation, they are addressed in a more academic and argumentative way in chapter 2, which uses an Arendtian stance to explain these claims more soundly and extensively.

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[49] For more literature on this issue, see Abrahms, "Strategic Model of Terrorism"; Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*; Marsden, "Effectiveness of Terrorism"; Muro, *When Does Terrorism Work?*

[50] For some deeper and insightful analyses into this, see for example Brown, "We Wear Mask"; Collins, *Black Sexual Politics*; Feder, "Dangerous Individual('s) Mother"; Kaplan, *Not Our Kind*; Neubeck and Cazenave, *Welfare Racism*; Omi and Winant, *Racial Formations in United*; Roberts, *Killing the Black Body*; Schiele, "Cultural Oppression and High-Risk."

[51] For more on this, see Cashman, "New Label No Progress"; Fónadová, Katrňák and Simonová, "Czech Republic"; Levínská, Bittnerová and Doubek, "Roma Minority in Czech"; Messing, "Differentiation in Making"; Obrovská, *Roma Identity and Ritual*, 171-191; Sys, "D.H. v. Czech Republic."

The conclusion we come to is that, first off, violence is a willful intent to do harm in order to prevent an outcome. The second thing we come to notice is that, unlike common assumptions, physical force resulting in bodily harm is simply the final and most visible effect of violence, which begins with an entire chain of events. In essence, violence is not an act. It is not the body at the crime scene. It is a process of intended prevention that is invested in every moment of the act. If we want to understand violence, it is the process and not the end result that must be analyzed. This leaves us with a few possibilities concerning how to proceed, and it is through the conclusions to these questions that Foucault's relevance becomes evident. For starters, even if we cannot definitively separate violence in terms of physical force, could we consider whether it was a matter of degree? Is there a certain degree at which intended harm to prevent an outcome would transform into violence, such as is often posed in criminology, terrorism and conflict studies?[52] Framing violence as such would simply duplicate the problem we already have. The problem of degree is traditionally classified as "bodily harm," which again focuses on the after-effects of violence, not the process itself, something Roderick Campbell attributes to the mind/body dualism of modernist thought and philosophy.[53] On top of this, we then would simply have illustrated that "violence" was part of some other, larger phenomenon we are presently referring to as violence, but the worst part is that this would be done arbitrarily. Thus, we cannot conclude that violence is a matter of degree, at least not without doubling our headaches. Yet, perhaps one could classify the means, often referred to as "instruments of violence," by which violence is carried out to filter certain unappealing instances. Again, one is faced with the problem of determining whether instruments have a strictly physical existence, which many authors have begun to doubt. [54] Let's consider the case of Tamir Rice, a 12-year-old Black boy from Cleveland, Ohio who was shot almost instantly by police officers who rushed to the scene after it was reported he was carrying around a gun. His gun was plastic. The officers' were not. A large part of whether these officers were culpable revolved around Rice's "instrument of violence" being *perceived* as real, thus justifying the officers use of

[52] For instance, see Barnes, "Criminal Politics"; Booth, "Guatemalan Nightmare"; Dmello, "Violence of Political Empowerment"; D'Orazio and Slaehyan, "Who Is Terrorist?"; Ferguson and Cairns, "Political Violence and Moral"; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood, "What Should We Mean"; Moser and Clark, *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?*; Muller, "Income Inequality, Regime Represiveness," "Test of Partial Theory."
[53] Campbell, "Introduction," 5.
[54] For some illustrations of recent authors who posit non-corporeal forms of instruments of violence, see Bartlett, "Local Ownership"; Cavelty, Hagmann and Krause, "Technologies of Violence"; Cukier and Eagen, "Gun Violence"; Galehan, "Instruments of Violence"; Ruíz and Sertler, "Asylum, Credible Fear Tests."

violence in ostensible self-defense. In other words, others' actions do not need to actually be physical to be treated as violent, which complements the emerging field of "technologies of violence" in place of "instruments"; this is meant to show the interpersonal, interactive and cultural elements that go into such a relationship.

"Oh, you are just juggling words and examples around to confuse your reader," some perturbed critic will say while reading this at home. "You just gave us an example where a young boy was shot to death! Assuredly we consider this violent, Captain Obvious. The officer's gun was very real. No phantoms there. No magic tricks. No secret speech acts. Just a very ironic tragedy."

Alas, *I sigh*, it seems I may have tried to declare victory too soon. There is something here though, I promise you. Why don't we take a closer look? After all, you are right, my dear critic. We missed perhaps the most noticeable detail. A young boy, only twelve, was shot by police while playing in the park, but no one went to jail. No files were even charged. It seems to be less of an ironic tragedy than a fateful one. Do we *believe* the police would have shot the boy if he were white? Or if police officers in the US more frequently faced prosecution for such shootings? What about the profoundly embedded culture of racism that exists there? We have already talked about ghettoization, and a great deal of Critical Race Theory is involved in this very issue. All of these social and historical mechanisms were in play that day, and many of them unarguably facilitated the violence. Are these not also "instruments of violence?" What else is a police badge but an instrument that legitimizes one's violence? This has led us, nonetheless, to a very dark and uncomfortable area of academic discourse: is violence ever good?

Put differently, there is a grave concern, both in the realm of political philosophy as well as an array of other fields (e.g., social movement theory, civil war studies, terrorism studies, collective violence) about whether violence can ever be morally defensible or justifiable. James Dodd goes to lengths to explain the dangers of irresponsibly justifying to violence, pointing to Sorel's fascist tendencies and Henri Bergson's anti-Prussian attitude at the beginning of WWI; nevertheless, he highlights the importance of making violence as a concept less obscure.[55] Dodd takes a phenomenological approach to the philosophy of violence in that he views it as an independent phenomenon that not only relays meaning but also creates it. As a result, he argues that violence is a problematizing concept in that it "straddles, in a fluid and

[55] Dodd, *Violence and Phenomenology*, 3-4.

anarchic way, the divide between sense and non-sense, between clarity and obscurity."[56] However, Dodd's understanding of violence is heavily grounded in the impact of wars on philosophical thought without recognizing the manner in which it reflects the state-revolutionary violence dichotomy. Moreover, Dodd argues that Arendt's understanding of violence is entirely instrumental, which chapter 2 of this dissertation strongly rejects. Like Dodd, Mark Ayyash argues that there is a certain ambiguity that is built into violence, which his poststructuralist-hermeneutical approach to the concept builds on through the "flux of violence": "The evasiveness of a firm definition that would secure the concept of violence in one delimited space of analysis is not regarded as a failure or shortcoming of academic study, but rather as constituting the very ground of theorizing violence."[57] Looking at the phenomenon of violence, Ayyash uses "dimensions of violence" to capture the multifaceted approaches that we use to understand violence, trying to find a common four-dimensional model in the philosophy of violence: violence (a) as instruments of politics, (b) as the accumulated effects of actions, (c) as the unexpected transformation of actors and (d) the ceaseless functioning of violence. Each of these elements are incorporated into this dissertation through a Foucauldian lens, thus entering a rather informal dialogue with Ayyash's impressive work. However, whereas Ayyash enters this discussion from a philosophico-theoretical point of view, I employ a genealogical approach that highlights the subjectivities produced by violence.

For many, the concept of violence is viewed as metaphorical or mystical, connected to the issue of nihilism and whether the rejection of everything permits the use of violence.[58] Yet, the idea of everything being permitted if nothing is forbidden does not hold much water, as advocates of a wider understanding of violence attest.[59] Traditionally, even prior to the French Revolution, the issue of whether war was legitimate was crucial for monarchies and empires around the globe.[60] What is Machiavelli's the *Prince* if not a testament that war is legitimate and rebellion is illegitimate? Yet even today, this literature is all too often concerned with official and unofficial types of warfare, such as Cecil Coady's *Morality and Political Violence*, where he limits political violence to "war as the primary instance of such violence, but it is also meant to cover other violent activities that

[56] Dodd, *Violence and Phenomenology*, 15.
[57] Ayyash, *Hermeneutics of Violence*, 5.
[58] For instance, Diken, *Nihilism*, 112-142; Goodman, "Nihilism and Philosophy."
[59] For example, see Ayyash, *Hermeneutics of Violence*; Campbell, "Introduction"; Dodd, *Violence and Phenomenology*; Farmer, "Anthropology of Structural Violence."
[60] For more on this issue, especially see Ayyash, *Hermeneutics of Violence*; Coady, *Morality and Political Violence*; Fernée, *Enlightenment and Violence*.

some would not include under the heading of war. Such activities encompass terrorism, armed intervention (for 'humanitarian' or other purposes), armed revolution," etc.[61]

Meanwhile, scholars like Mark Vorobej and Vittorio Bufacchi have argued for a conceptualization of violence that would capture the hybridity of its interpersonal and structural dynamics.[62] In a similar way, Douglas North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast argue that violence cannot be encompassed solely by physical acts but they also include "coercive threats of physical violence."[63] Campbell goes even further by arguing for non-physical forms of violence like "coercion through the confiscation of land or livelihood, imprisonment, hostage-taking, ostracization, excommunication, stripping of rank or honors, public humiliation, etc."[64] Rather than expanding the scope of violence, nonetheless, Campbell is instead arguing that violence is always dependent on cultural and historical factors, thereby depending on causal mechanisms; thus, there is a need to address the non-subjective, indirect and normative courses violence takes. Excommunication does not typically play the same role in contemporary societies that it did in medieval ones; the harm done is not isolated in the act but linked to a vast array of social, political, economic and ethical relationships. Yet, while Campbell argues that this is rooted in the connection of violence to intention (and a move towards causality), this is something a Foucauldian approach would be able to overcome through its understanding of networks of power (discussed below) without falling back on a causal approach to the phenomenon. Scholars like Wendy Brown have additionally argued that violence and trauma are often the cohesive bonds for group identity, thus illustrating that violence not only uses force but more importantly contributes to the ways we engage with the world (and the central role "freedom" plays in such "states of injury").[65] Brown specifically asks, "When do certain political solutions actually codify and entrench existing social relations, when do they mask such relations, and when do they directly contest or transform them?"[66] Embracing the more recent discourses on the conceptualization of

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[61] Coady, *Morality and Political Violence*, 3.
[62] Bufacchi, "Two Concepts of Violence"; Vorobej, *Concept of Violence*. Also see Bernstein, *Violence*; Kearns, "Bare Life, Political Violence"; Skurski and Coronil, "Introduction."
[63] North, Wallis and Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders*, 13.
[64] Campbell, "Introduction," 6.
[65] Brown, *States of Injury*. For more on violence being constitutive of subjectivities approached from a variety of directions, see Aldama, *Violence and Body*; Bates, "Violence of Norms"; Butler, *Gender Trouble*; Fernée, *Enlightenment and VIolence*; González-López, *Family Secrets*; Hamby and Grych, *Web of Violence*; Judge, *Blackwashing Homophobia*; Kearns, "Bare Life, Political Violence; Malešević , *Sociology of War*; North, Wallis and Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders*; Rae and Ingala, "Introduction"; Ruggiero, *Visions of Political Violence*; Roberts, *Killing Black Body*; Tilly, *Politics of Collective Violence*.
[66] Brown, *States of Injury*, 12.

violence, Gavin Rae and Emma Ingala have moreover articulated three points the be gleamed about violence: "Violence is (1) a multifaceted and ubiquitous aspect of human existence; (2) not simply repressive, exclusionary, or destructive, but also inherently creative; and (3) a nexal concept, insofar as an analysis of violence is mediated by and tied to other concepts."[67] This dissertation is highly engaged in these debates, and it not only tries to put forward an interpretation of violence that incorporates all of Rae and Ingala's points but also works towards a flexible conceptualization of violence that would be capable of fulfilling Ayyash's four-dimensional model. By mixing the pragmatism of the approaches to studying violence and the insights offered by postmodern, poststructuralist or postmarxist interpretations of how subjects are constituted, the ambition of this work is to present a version of violence that is capable of navigating these predicaments by building on the discussions in the post-literatures; in this way, Foucault's work is able to reveal a methodology for operationalizing my understanding of violence.

One of the biggest problems to address, then, when proposing a new understanding of violence is how to deal with justifying or not justifying certain acts (or rather processes) of violence. There is a significant danger in legitimizing some actions, or even of provoking others to violence. Authors like Erica Chenoweth, Maria Stephan, Virginia Held, Elizabeth Frazer, Kimberly Hutchings, Peter Gelderloos and Richard Bernstein have taken the phenomenon of violence from a moral perspective, arguing against the use of types of violence like terrorism on normative grounds; in contrast, my concern is with better understanding violence rather than to say whether violence is good or bad – something that is nonsensical according to my framing of violence.[68] Additionally, as will be shown in chapter 2, a non-normative assessment of violence would not sacrifice the ability to make ethical claims about violence but would make closer scrutiny of the relationships involved a necessity to do so. This latest issue can be combined with those we have encountered thus far. In order to understand violence as a relational process that is grounded in the context in which it occurs, it is necessary to focus less on individual violence and more on the dynamics of the process itself. In Kantian parlance, a *critique* of violence is required. Moreover, it must be possible to view violence within a spectrum, or rather network, of social and political relations. On the surface, it might seem like a version of critical theory combined with historicism, such as

[67] Rae and Ingala, "Introduction," 2.
[68] Bernstein, *Violence*; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*; Frazer and Hutchings, *Can Political Violence Ever*; Gelderloos, *How Nonviolence Protects State*; Held, *How Terrorism Is Wrong*.

what Jürgen Habermas offered in *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, would be appropriate.[69] Yet, using critical theory to deal with violence could reinvest the violence-irrationality parallel. At least with the Habermasian route, a dialogue is always going to be preferable to violence, and thus the definitive problem of biasing the investigation before it even starts.

There is also the approach to violence through identity, which has been a viable option for many scholars in feminist studies (e.g., Judith Butler, Elizabeth Frazer, Julia Kristeva, Nancy Fraser), postmodernism/poststructuralism (e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard) or postmarxian approaches (e.g., Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Göran Therborn, Stuart Hall, Richard Howson). Each of these techniques has a great deal to offer, ones that I have not refrained from either borrowing from or incorporating into this work. However, there persists three dilemmas with most of these approaches. For starters, many of these approaches have taken violence at face-value, seeing no need to dig into its intricacies. This often leads to violence having a shallow place in authors such as Mouffe, Fraser or Lyotard. Another problem is that when theorists from these groups do tackle violence, it often remains very theoretical, almost metaphysical, such that it has no value for the contextualization violence requires. The most prominent examples of this are Slavoj Žižek's *Violence*, Étienne Balibar's *Violence and Civility*, Noam Chomsky and Marv Waterstone's recent book *Consequences of Capitalism* or Judith Butler's understanding of normative violence laid out in her works during the 1990s like *Gender Trouble*, *Bodies That Matter* and *Psychic Life of Power*.[70] Finally, these authors too often fall into the hole described by Johanna Oksala in that they make broad normative claims about violence that either justify or delegitimate certain types of violence, something the study of civil disobedience has had much more nuance towards. In many respects, this dissertation juggles these three dilemmas relevant in most postmodern literature on political violence by trying to overcome these challenges while also providing a rigid, thorough and in-depth analysis on the processes of violence. To do so, beginning with Foucault can greatly lessen our workload as his methodologies and approach to power present a viable framework that can be altered to deal with all the problems raised about violence thus far (though certainly not on his own, as we shall see).

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[69] Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*.
[70] Balibar, *Violence and Civility*; Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, *Gender Trouble*, *Psychic Life of Power*; Chomsky and Waterstone, *Consequences of Capitalism*; Žižek, *Violence*.

Foucault and Critique: Towards an Analytics of Violence

This dissertation is thus composed of two parts. The first part (chapters 1-3) deals with exactly what has been discussed so far: to present not only an understanding of *processes* of violence, but also to provide a methodology capable of studying it. Thus, chapter one begins by mapping out some of the key philosophical commitments of Foucault's philosophy. Part of choosing Foucault has to do with his genealogical method, which I will set aside for now since the introduction of chapter 1 is dedicated to just this. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Foucault persistently stove to bring intricate theoretical and philosophical musings to life through invasive and intensive historical analysis. In doing so, he began down a path to understanding power in a way that would allow him to look at the "more detailed phenomena" he was analyzing.[71] Specifically, he situates power as a relational and procedural phenomenon: "I mean a relationship in which one person tries to control the conduct of the other. So I am speaking of relations that exist at different levels, in different forms; these power relations are mobile, they can be modified, they are not fixed once and for all."[72] Foucault is normally heralded as the first true theorist to use power to look at history in this way, yet I would disagree with this statement. Many of Foucault's contemporaries working on history had already began to make this turn (including Hannah Arendt, who we will turn to shortly); many of these, like Georges Canguilhem, Henri Bergson, Michel Serres, Gaston Bachelard and François Dagognet, directly inspired this side of Foucault's work and had employed very similar theories for various social and natural sciences as well as systems of knowledge. What separates Foucault from them, at least in my opinion, is his staunch interest in subjectivities over structuralist concerns. Instead of asking the question in a structuralist demeanor – "What makes the structures in society that allow it to function?" – he puts a mirror to these issues by asking, "What makes us?" If there has been an unheard-of degree of fandom and cult following for Foucault, this is largely what gives him his appeal. Yet, every rose has its thorns.

In this case, the lineage Foucauldian scholarship has taken on is more of a thorn in the foot than a thorn in the side (i.e., manageable). There are two major realms of Foucauldian scholarship that exists today: theoretical Foucauldians and methodological Foucauldians. The prior group has largely been concerned with the importance of

[71] See ff. 2 above.
[72] Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 292.

Foucault's philosophical contributions, which has provided us with a rich array of interpretations as well as improvements and developments on Foucault's thought. However, these often go astray due to a lack of commitment to Foucault's pragmatic, contextual side. Notable examples are Judith Butler and Georgio Agamben, who have amassed prodigious followers as well.[73] This is not to shine a negative light on these two thinkers, who have an incredible capacity for original thought; I only highlight this here to distinguish my interpretation of Foucault from these lineages throughout this dissertation, thus delineating a less accessible interpretation of Foucault for many toe-in-the-pool- or non-Foucauldians. Thus, I often align with scholars in this camp who have a wider grasp on the methodological side of Foucault while still drawing richly on his philosophical principles aimed at subjectivities, such as Mark Kelly, Amy Allen, Fédéric Gros, Carol Bacchi, Eric Paras, Ladelle McWhorter, Nadine Ehlers, and Ellen Feder. While scholars like Jana Sawicki, Christopher Falzon, Todd May, Timothy O'Leary, Cressida Heyes, Alan Sheridan, John Ransom, Marcelo Hoffman or Gilles Deleuze have addressed the agential nature of Foucault's work, they often ignored the overtones of subjectivities in favor of a structural or power-oriented approach. What connects this first group of theorists, who vary drastically in their interpretation of Foucault, is a focus on subjectivities and the role power plays in this process, which one can separate from the more identity politics-themed conversations of the Butler and Agamben camp. Moreover, I move away from the traditional emphasis on power over other aspects of Foucault's work by scholars in the second group. Using the positions of these thinkers, I situate my own interpretation of Foucault in chapter 1 that would enable a better understanding of violence. In doing so, I specifically work to clarify some of the misunderstandings that arose from the interpretations of Foucault given by scholars like Habermas, Nancy Fraser, Thomas McCarthy, Charles Taylor or Axel Honneth.

On the other side of the aisle, there has been a tradition akin to analytical philosophy in the UK and North America that has expressed more interest in Foucauldian methods, particularly from the 1980s and 1990s onwards with authors like Ian Hacking, Colin Koopman, George Pavlich, Kendall Gavin and Gary Wickham. Yet, much like the theoretical camp, new translations and the release of Foucault's lectures, articles and

[73] For more on this, see Maze 2020. For more scholars who fall into this literature, see Béatrice, "Death of Man'"; Brown, *States of Injury*; Deveaux, "Feminism and Empowerment"; Heyes, *Self-Transformations*; Laslett, "Structure, Agency and Gender"; McLaren, *Feminism, Foucault and Embodied*; McNay, "Foucauldian Body and Exclusion"; Moi, "Power, Sex and Subjectivity"; Young, *Female Body Experience*.

manuscripts have shown these interpretations to be less than accurate. Nevertheless, this has not stopped this line of inquiry from writers like Wendy Bastalich, Tom Boland, David Garland, Magnus Hansen, Aimee Howley, Richard Hartnett, Alan Milchman, Alan Rosenberg, Robert Nichols or Edgar Pelayo. These scholars were very astute for better understanding Foucault's approaches, but they also often fall prey to an almost methodological optimism that departs from the core of Foucault's entire project. His goal was to write politically "effective histories" that dealt with power, knowledge and experience, yet up until recently, much of the literature dealing with Foucault's methodologies found it solely relevant to the study of the social sciences (limiting Foucault's work to that on knowledge) and argued that it should not be politicized. In essence, they perceived Foucault's genealogical method as a way to improve the social sciences, not as a critique of some of their fundamental principles. At the same time, a far more problematic trend is the rampant reference to Foucault in discourse studies. While this will be discussed more in depth in chapter 3, it does not hurt to turn to a quote by James Faubion on this matter: "Some of the sue to which Foucault has so far been put runs the risk of and occasionally amounts to misuse – not the appropriation that Foucault invited but instead a misappropriation of the sort that he likely would have rejected."[74]

Thus, the first chapter of this text is concerned with presenting a viable theoretico-philosophical model that could make room for violence in Foucault's overall framework. In doing so, I have navigated between these two approaches in Foucauldian studies while primarily relying on Foucault's less acknowledged texts for nuance to support my claims throughout. There are numerous debates I engage in throughout part 1 to present my own interpretation of Foucault – and if I am not too concerned at times with making changes and adjustments to Foucault, it is because I see his model as a jumping off point that can be updated or elaborated upon to better suit its purposes (see introduction, chapter 1). To accomplish this, I found it necessary to elaborate upon Foucault's work on power (a relation where one person tries to control the actions of another), knowledge (a regulatory system that produces truth) and experience (which is entirely contingent upon our environment). These correspond to Foucault's genealogical method, whereby the emergence of historical relations of power are analyzed through detailed historical investigation to determine how mechanisms of power (or *dispositifs*) function through a set of formal and informal rules (or conditions of possibility) in our society today, a

[74] Faubion, "Introduction," 11.

project more historically-oriented Foucauldians have invested in more recently.[75] Thus, as I understand it, a *dispositif* is *the accumulation of strategies with a certain target in mind that produces conditions of possibility and a* régime du savoir; *in response, these construct a unique, spatially-limited and entirely contingent experience resulting from an urgent socio-political need that arose.* However, the place we would expect violence to occupy in Foucault is already taken up by "domination," a highly debated phantom menace in the literature due to its obscurity and ambiguity in Foucault's own work (something he himself admitted).[76] Rather than accept Foucault's obscurity (especially since this is our primary concern here), I set about dissecting the dilemmas in Foucauldian domination to find a more fruitful and pragmatic model by switching to violence. Specifically, Foucauldian domination faces three core faults: (a) its inextricable vagueness, (b) its lack of normative claims and (c) a failure to differentiate between beneficial and detrimental states of domination. This leads us to yet another prominent author of power: Arendt.

To those who are familiar with twentieth century political theory, turning to Arendt to solve our Foucauldian problems seems as effective as asking the Marx Brothers to do it. It is precisely this preconception, nonetheless, that I ask the reader to reevaluate by showing the strong similarities in the works of Arendt and Foucault. The traditional literature on Arendt has portrayed her as an ally to critical theorist as well as liberal and dialogic approaches to political philosophy.[77] To accomplish this, I dispel many common misconceptions relating to Arendt's understanding of power to show how they correlate with Foucault in terms of a relational, non-normative focus. A great deal of new literature that reevaluates Arendt has been very helpful to accomplish this, particularly those that compare and contrast Arendt with Foucault, such as Dana Villa, Amy Allen, Margaret Canovan, Jakub Franěk or Dolan Frederick.[78] Thus, beyond making a contribution to this emerging research on Arendt and critical philosophies, I hope to add a new dynamic by illustrating the complexities involved in Arendt's understanding of violence, which has

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[75] For instance, Martin and Waring, "Realising Governmentality"; Petterson, "Colonial Subjectification"; Alison Ross; Savage, "'Disease Incarnate'"; Thacker, "Foucault and Writing"; Welch, "Pastoral Power as Penal."

[76] For some authors on Foucault and domination, see Bardon and Josserand, "Nietzschean Reading of Foucault"; Hoffman, *Foucault and Power*, 47-92; McLaren, *Feminism, Foucault and Embodied*, 39-41; Miller, *Domination and Power*; Prado, *Starting With* Foucault, 77-81; Simons, *Foucault and Political*; Taylor, "Introduction."

[77] For example, see Benhabib, "Hannah Arendt"; Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept."

[78] Allen, "Power, Subjectivity and Agency"; Canovan, *Hannah Arendt*; Dolan, "Paradoxical Liberty of Bio-Power"; Franěk, "Arendt and Foucault"; Villa, "Postmodernism and Public."

been somewhat scarce. Moreover, I build on the glaring hole in Foucauldian studies that has largely been left untouched except by a few notable scholars.[79] By doing so, it allows us to assess her model of violence throughout her works, which is based on the intention to prevent outcomes (much like has already been discussed). Nonetheless, lest we be lured in by the sirens of sloppy academic work, a critical and adaptive approach is needed. Arendt and Foucault are not the same, so a simple transfusion is out of the question. More importantly, some aspects of Arendtian violence directly contradict some of the points we have made in our analysis thus far, showing some sacrifices will have to be made on her behalf. Yet, with both Arendt and Foucault envisioning power as productive and generative, in that it constructs the social relations by which we understand our world, violence comes to play the role of strategically trying to prevent certain actions from other individuals (or even one's self). Lucky for us, these political thinkers make our job slightly easier by providing us with a solution to the dilemma of normative claims that has plagued an array of understandings of violence: freedom. In this context, freedom stands as "the potential to act otherwise," or rather having numerous *and equally plausible* options instead of simply one. For instance, a choice between life and death is not much of a choice, so the factors that play into this "choice" need to be taken into account to understand the dynamic of the possible options. From this, one can understand Foucauldian domination, which I refer to as nexuses of violence, as *a series of resistant acts doomed to be prevented in a socio-political environment that is too harmful for subjects to follow through*. In other words, while power is shown to be the source of the ability to act, violence is shown to be strategies aimed at preventing the actions of others.

Using this understanding of violence, I outline Foucault's methods for genealogical research in chapter 3, whereby a model for uncovering *dispositifs* is situated between an archaeological and a genealogical approach (i.e., archaeology and genealogy). I begin by situating Foucault's genealogical methodology within three distinct areas of scholarshop: (1) philosophy and contextualization; (2) discourse and materiality studies; (3) history and intellectual history. For the philosophical literature, I explain how a great deal of it deals with Foucault's philosophical leanings, even though recent research has

[79] For example, Avelar, *Letter of Violence*; Dillon and Neal, *Foucault on Politics, Security*; Frazer and Hutchings, "Avowing Violence"; Gros, "Foucault, penseur violence"; Oksala, *Foucault, Politics and Violence*.

sought to expand on some of his analytical concepts.[80] These authors have consequently overlooked the emphasis on contextualization and localization in Foucault's own work. As for discourse analysis, researchers often employ Foucault as a tagline than a rigorous methodological standing point. This includes viewing discourse as a unit of analysis rather than as a practice (see above). I thus work on two issues: (a) What is the relationship between language and things, and how is language material for Foucault? A more promising field of study has been the method of dispositive analysis promoted by people like Jan and Aleida Assmann, Joannah Caborn and Siegfried Jäger who view discourse as a practice and seek to incorporate material practices.[81] Finally, for the issue of genealogy compared to traditional historiographical methodologies, I deal with two pertinent accusations (or rather misunderstandings) about Foucault's work: (a) accusations of relativism and presentism, and (b) Foucault's lack of interest in causality. After these have all been addressed, I begin by separating Foucault's genealogical method into two components: archaeology and genealogy (which together are referred to as genealogy throughout this dissertation). Archaeology was developed in the earlier periods of Foucault's work, and seek to uncover what he refers to as a "discursive formation" by ciphering out four elements in any discursive practice: (1) a referential, (2) enunciative divergences, (3) theoretical networks and (4) a field of strategic possibilities. For genealogy, rather than elements, Foucault gives us five pieces of genealogical advice that assists in analyzing the play of networks of power relations: (1) Look where practices invest themselves, (2) look for reactions to intentional practices, (3) look at circulation of power relations rather than the actions of elites, (4) perform an "ascending" analysis and (5) discover how power relations become invested in the *régime du savoir*. In addition, it helps to highlight the importance of two other fields in this approach. First, participant observation is adopted from anthropological studies to understand Foucault's erudite approach to discourse.[82] In addition, the actor-network theory conceptualization of non-subjective agents or entities having agency helps capture Foucault's "intentional and non-subjective" (see chapter 1, section 2). The combination of these elements presents us with a genealogical methodology that is able to take *dispositifs* and the experiences they create

[80] For some examples of such literature, see Bacchi, "Why Study Problematizations"; Hacking, *Historical Ontology*; Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*.
[81] For example, Assman, "Collective Memory and Cultural"; Assmann, *Cultural memory and Western*; Caborn, "On Methodology of Dispostive"; Jäger, "Discourse and Knowledge, Theoretical."
[82] See DeWalt and DeWalt, *Participant Observation*; Jorgensen, "Participant Observation"; Tedlock, "Participant Observation to Observation."

as our core unit of analysis. In doing so, researchers are able to illuminate not only networks of power relations and systems of knowledge but also nexuses of violence. This sets up the usage of this methodology for the case of the emergence of Turkish nationalism.

Turkey, Nationalism and Violence: Towards a Genealogy of Violence

We can now reasonably see that quintessential questions divide the first and second part of this text. The first part deals with (a) understanding (political) violence that would allow us to deal with the dilemmas presented here and (b) proposing a means to studying and operationalizing processes of violence as laid out theoretically. Thus, it asks, "What is violence?" and "How do we learn more about it?" While the parameters and importance of this issue are detailed in the introduction to chapter 1, it suffices to state here that Foucault goes against most empirical trends in political science in that he makes no claims on prediction but is rather grounded in scholarly and public preparation to deal with these crises as they arise (or rather continue to arise). The second part seeks to employ this understanding to provide an "effective history" as Foucault understood it by looking at the emergence of national identity and the processes (or rather nexuses) of violence that play into nationalist violence today in Turkey. In other words, it asks, "How does this specific nexus of violence work? How is it exercised, and what relations and strategies have been incorporated into its functioning? What focal points does it revolve around, and what centers of power relations does it depend on? What are its most sensitive, and thus susceptible, points? Most importantly, what capabilities does such an arrangement provide and which does it foreclose?" Chapter 4 thus serves as an introduction to these questions by answering three prominent choices at work throughout part 2: (1) why Foucault? (2) why nationalism? and (3) why Turkey (or rather the late Ottoman Empire).

As for Foucault, this is to be explored throughout the first part of this dissertation, but aside from the methodological and theoretical advantages a tweaked and updated Foucauldian trajectory allows for, Foucault remained committed to a set of what we could call "ethical" research practices that revolved more around understanding and preparation than making predictions. In other words, our concern is with how the *dispositif* that drives national identity is exercised and deployed in reality rather than how it is *going to* occur or how it *should* occur in the future. Part of this genealogical method, nonetheless,

centered on choosing a political issue that has been problematized in the present: what is a sensitive issue we wish to better understand? Foucault's choices of psychology, sexuality, medical establishments and prisons were, in many ways, arbitrary in nature. They were the choices made by the researcher based on his environment. The first step in choosing an issue, of which there are plenty today (e.g., environmentalism, the Anthropocene, neoliberalism, extremist politics, terrorism, etc.), is based on perceiving an area where power (or rather violence for our analysis) plays a predominant role but is controversial, ineffective or simply dubious. Thus, the *reason* for choosing nationalism is not surprising, but it does pose the dilemma of what Foucault has to offer nationalism studies that is not already there.

In terms of historical constructivism, it could be argued that nationalism studies has a leg up on many other fields of analysis. For instance, conflict and terrorist studies are dominated by predictive and empirical models that seek to explain what is occurring rather than how it is occurring.[83] Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger, Rogers Brubaker, Anthony Giddens or Charles Tilly, many of whom are considered to be the founders of contemporary nationalism studies, are known for being devout constructivists; to date, these authors are often the starting point for almost any scholar in nationalism studies.[84] In fact, Anderson's "imagined communities" have been a constructivist rallying point not only in this field but also cultural memory studies, identity politics, and Critical Race Theory. Nevertheless, there have been self-proclaimed anti-constructivists in the field, such as Anthony Smith or Azar Gat, particularly in the realm of "ethnosymbolism."[85] Yet, the focus among these scholars was primarily on causality, being more concerned in the "why" than the "how." For instance, Ernest Gellner has profoundly argued that nationalism requires literacy to emerge.[86] While I would not argue with his conclusion, I do find it concerning that he goes to such depth to explain *what* happened and *why* it happened yet fails to address the relationships that emerged with increasing access to literacy, thus the *how* it happened. More recent scholars

[83] This is not to argue that more constructivists analyses of terrorism do not exist. In fact, many that employ a historical model or a process tracing model do take this into consideration. Authors such as Bruce Hoffman (*Inside Terrorism*) have given rich constructivist understandings to various terrorism-oriented landscapes. Yet, the bulk of these fields deals with quantitative, legal or security concerns, which often lack the historical nuance needed to properly assess such situations.
[84] For instance, Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Giddens, *Nation-State and Violence*; Hobsbawm and Ranger, *Invention of Traditions*; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European*.
[85] For instance, see Gat and Yakobson, Nations; Smith, *Nation in History*.
[86] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*.

in the field have moved away from this agency-structuralist approach, which highly leaned towards structures, to perceive it from an actor-network perspective.[87]

Though I am a strong advocate of this turn in the field, it still relies more on the network perspective rather than focusing on the dynamics that unfold within national relationships. In essence, it remains grounded in understanding the networks rather than the subjectivities they produce. Some of the best work in nationalist studies has embraced subjectivities. For instance, Siniša Malešević combines an array of theoretical and empirical examples to detail the experiences that arose with a modern bureaucratic state and how it helped shape nationalist sentiments.[88] Moreover, her unique approach to the variety of experiences that arose has contributed to the literature discussing the diversification of nationalist experiences.[89] Authors like Andreas Wimmer, John Hutchinson and Thomas Scheff have detailed the role national militaries played in the formation of national identities to varying extents around the globe.[90] Of particular interest in terms of experiences is the rise of banal nationalism inspired by Michael Billig's influential *Banal Nationalism* that expands upon the everyday and often unconscious impacts our cultural surroundings have on our identification with national belonging.[91] Nevertheless, I believe this strand of nationalism studies in terms of experiences (subjectivities) remains a highly understudied field, particularly in regards to history, which is precisely what Foucault is able to offer the field. Within the larger framework of nationalism studies (explained more in-depth in chapter 4), this dissertation complements these works on emerging subjectivities. It is not a coincidence that most of these authors invoke Foucault in one way or another. My adoption of Foucault is thus centered on enriching this rising tide in nationalist studies in a fundamental way. The version of a Foucauldian-inspired method I lay out here not only provides the means to pry into the subjectivities that emerge alongside national identity but further capitalizes on the concerns in the literature, presenting a more viable and comprehensive model to understand political violence linked to national identity and belonging (discussed in

[87] For some studies on nationalism that emphasize agency and agential-based approaches, see Abramson, "Translating Nations"; Antonsich and Skey, "Affective Nationalism"; Ginderachter, *Everyday Nationalism of Workers*; Saito, "Actor-Network Theory of Cosmopolitanism"; Shim and Shin, "Neo-Techno Nationalism"; Zubrzycki, "Introduction."
[88] Malešević, *Nation-States and Nationalisms*.
[89] For some overviews of such literature, see Cörüt and Jongerden, *Beyond Nationalism and Nation-State*; Storm, "New Dawn in Nationalism," "Nationalism."
[90] Hutchinson, *Nationalism and War*; Scheff, *Bloody Revenge*; Wimmer, *Waves of War*.
[91] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*. For some more recent examples of banal nationalism, see Duchesne, "Who's Afraid of Banal"; Goode, "Becoming Banal"; Kowalski, "Banal Object of Nationalism"; Skey and Antonsich, *Everyday Nationhood*.

chapter 4). In this way, a Foucauldian approach to nationalism studies allows the focus to shift from memory, the nation or discourse to the play of subjectivities and their interactions with the networks of power relations and systems of knowledge in which they are enmeshed. Additionally, Foucault and Arendt present key insights into rethinking our assumptions about nationalism and national identity, particularly when it comes to violence. By bracketing normative claims, the practices of national belonging are able to be discussed without being dismissive of certain trends, all while not foreclosing the possibility for normative judgments to be made. Finally, the approach detailed in this dissertation allows a more expansive look at the manner in which violence, viewed as the attempted prevention of competing strategies, manifests itself within cultures, specifically Turkish culture in our case study here.

The issues pertaining to (1) and (2) are thus satisfied, but one now runs into the third concern: why Turkey? It perhaps particularly seems odd to use "Turkey" in the title of this text rather than the "Ottoman Empire." I am sure our dear friend Mr. Critic is currently pulling out his copy of Strunk and White's *The Elements of Style* in a blind rage as we speak. Rest assured, my dear readers, this was not a typo, and it delves into Foucault's unique approach to genealogy, or rather "history of the present." Though Foucault's work was almost solely historically driven, his concerns were never with the past but with providing something for his contemporary readers: historical accounts that are effective for us now, i.e., "effective histories." My concerns were with providing a "grid of intelligibility" to those wishing to understand how national identity emerged in the late Ottoman Empire and has come to be the central force driving the Turkish state to date. The "effective history" contained in this book is both an excursion into how violence operates in our world as well as an illustration of how it can be studied, with national identity in Turkey being the focal point.

"Ugh," our darling Critic bemoans. "This is going to be a word-play guy, isn't it?" I'm sure he then debates whether to turn the page or retire from this absurdity for the evening for the next episode of *The Crown.* "You have merely jumped around the question. After all, is not all history 'effective?' That is certainly the point. Why would we read it if it didn't tell us something about how we got here? You have yet to tell me why you chose this context. Why not a more traditional case like France or Great Britain. You are from America, after all. What is wrong with assessing nationalism there? Or for that matter, why not a less conventional context? Certainly Russia and China have notable

cases of nationalism. Many former colonialist states have nationalism. Are they not important enough? Why choose an empire on the peripheries of Europe?"

Yet again, my worthy adversary, you make a very convincing argument, so let us take a couple steps back. Perhaps you are right about histories being effective, but alas, consider the direction the researcher takes. A historian looks at the past for something to say about how it developed, how it went into making us who we are today even. Meanwhile, the genealogist takes the inverse approach, starting from a problem in the present and tracing it back to its emergence to better understand how it operates today. Perhaps genealogies are merely histories in reverse, and that lends to the credence that they are grounded in the present. Since that is the case, we have to scour options for violent national conflicts today, and perhaps there is no better example than Turkey. A deadly civil war has been raging for decades, recent waves of populism and Islamism – which replaced the already problematic and hegemonic Kemalism – have come to dominate domestic politics, a refugee crisis in a neighboring state has set off a chain reaction, causing a catastrophic crisis in Turkey itself, and massive waves of social movements have been on the rise in the last decade. Along with this, Turkey evolved from a multicultural empire that stretched across three continents and was the site of one of the first acknowledged genocides in history. We can assuredly conclude that national identity has been problematized in this context, but it also can shed further light on other cases of nationalism.

The argument in this text is that national identity emerged in a very specific way in the late Ottoman Empire/early Turkish Republic, and it was centered upon (political) representation, a new and socially constructed phenomenon that emerged across Ottoman domains. Foucault argued we were often to see these similarities, but cautioned against reducing similarity to sameness: "Thus there is a certain correlation between the two processes, global and local, but not an absolute one."[92] It has many similarities with its European counterparts, yet the cultural differences show that when we talk about "nationalism," maybe we are not always talking about the same thing. Tadd Fernée has shed a great deal of light on this in his comparative work *Enlightenment and* Violence, where he makes the following observation:

> The [twentieth] century's highly violent Russian and Chinese Revolutions (socialist ideology merged with nationalist mobilization) culminated in the largely bloodless Eastern European and Russian revolutions (democratic aspiration merged with nationalist mobilization). Decolonization

[92] Foucault, "Prison Talk," 39.

> – in varying discursive-practical constructions of violence – highlighted the power of multi-class political participation motivated by opposition to existing conditions and widespread goal consensus in the French Revolutionary pattern. Traditional solidarity values integrated with socialist frameworks, i.e., in the avowedly Marxist Vietnamese Revolution, indicating an underlying fact-value entanglement on the practical level despite official discursive constructs.[93]

Further research can show how not only national identity but also representation developed differently in different countries or regions. The emergence of representation occurred very adversely (to an extent) in places like the US or Canada than they did in places like France, Britain or Germany, which is largely attributed to their differences in democracy (i.e., majoritarian vs. consensual democracy).[94] Yet, one of the reasons I was led to representation and not "democracy" was precisely because this was not a humanistic or self-enlightening turn. It was strategic through and through, and it relied on representation. This occurred in Russia and China with a very dissimilar model of representation (i.e., a vanguard), so rather than being rooted in democracy or liberalism, it stemmed from the construction of representation. Much like Butler argued in terms of colonialism when discussing Sartre and Fanon, these illustrations in other contexts – although in a slightly different way – give us a reflection of our own situations and tell something of who we are: "These scars and chains [of colonialism] serve as mirrors for the European, serve as historical motors for the colonized, and are finally negated, if not fully transformed, through the act of self-creation."[95] It is by looking into these mirrors that we are able to glean something of ourselves, our culture and our values. In the prophetic words of Virginia Woolf, "Whatever may be their use in civilized societies, mirrors are essential to all violent and heroic action."[96] A genealogy of national identity in Turkey thus provides a roadmap for the Turkish context, but it also sheds light on issues that could use additional analysis in other contexts.

Before I give Mr. Critic a chance to interrupt, let us turn this conversation towards our case study. The literature on the Late Ottoman Empire is vast and rich, but this has not always been the case. For a long time, scholarly interest in Ottoman and Turkish history outside the previous imperial lands was not great. There were notable scholars like Bernard Lewis, Niyazi Berkes, Stanford J. Shaw, Feroz Ahmad, Donald Quataert or Halil Inalcik. Compared to more Western countries and regions, nonetheless, the

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[93] Fernée, *Enlightenment and Violence*, xv.
[94] For more on consensual and majoritarian democracy, see Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*.
[95] Butler, *Senses of Subject*, 187.
[96] Woolf, *Room of One's Own*, 41.

literature was far scarcer. By the end of the twentieth century, interest in late Ottoman and Turkish studies began to grow exponentially, yet unlike other global regions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, academics found themselves competing less and less with more traditional history methodologists. Works from writers like Cengiz Kırlı, Russell Powell, Colin Imber, Yonca Köksal, Haldun Gülalp, Dina Khoury, Kemal Soleimani and Lutz Berger began to appear that illustrating cutting edge methods and approaches for dealing with history, many of which were akin to Foucault's own work.[97] Within this trend, many scholars began to revisit interpretations of national development laid down by authors like Berkes, Shaw and Lewis. Nevertheless, a good portion of these continue to be used to look at the historical developments rather than the processes (or perhaps mechanisms) that propelled this form of identification forward.

In this respect, my work complements those authors who have taken an approach dealing with subjectivities and the relationships between different sectors of society, classes, religious groups, economic trends, social upheavals, war and its repercussions and the emergence of a national or regional identity. Janet Klein's *Margins of Empire* captures the complex socio-political geography that dominated the Ottoman Empire's eastern front and compelled the solidification of identities around economic, political, material, physical and emotional factors.[98] Kemal Karpat's *Politicization of Islam* divulges the complex landscape of Islamic identity formation and the political incentivization as well as social cohesion it offered during the chaotic atmosphere of a quickly transforming empire, particularly through the relationships that were emerging at the time.[99] Authors like Reyhan Sabri, Kent Schull, Emine Evered, Gürlu Necipoğlu, Benjamin Fortna and Selim Deringil have gone to significant lengths to incorporate the material dimensions that went into shaping the discourse and practices of the late Ottoman Empire, from schools, museums and prisons to missionary practices and legal reformations.[100] Furthermore, E. Attila Aytekin has investigated the material and discursive practices of non-elite subjects and their impact on the reformation process in during the Tanzimat period (1839-1876), which she illustrates remains largely

[97] For example, see Berger, "Leader as Father"; Gülalp, "Using Islam as Political Ideology"; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300-1650*; Kırlı, "Surveillance and Constituting Public"; Khoury, "Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial"; Köksal, *Ottoman Empire in Tanzimat*; Powell, *Shari'a in the Secular State*; Soleimani, *Islam and Competing Nationalisms*.
[98] Klein, *Margins of Empire*.
[99] Karpat, *Politicization of Empire*.
[100] See Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Evered, *Empire and Education*; Forna, *Imperial Classroom*; Necipoğlu, *History and Ideology*; Sabri, *Imperial Politics of Architerctural*; Schull, *Prisons in Late Ottoman*.

understudied.[101] Other scholars have looked at an array of ideological issues that became infused in late Ottoman practices and evolved into key intellectual reference points for later generations.[102] Finally, and of particular importance to the genealogy presented in this work, some have taken to expanding on the emerging notion of "public opinion" and the role it had not only on late Ottoman politics but also in the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and the founding of the Turkish Republic.[103] The genealogy in this dissertation not only seeks to complement such works but further expand this trajectory in Ottoman studies and to capitalize on the wealth of research as well as the still-understudied dimensions that exist.

It should be stated, nevertheless, that I take full advantage of the wealth of research and analysis that has gone into Ottoman studies, and this case study is a deep engagement with that literature through the inquisitive research lens laid out in part 1. By combining existent research with a wealth of original documents (be those books, treaties, laws, judicial proceedings, pamphlets, letters, newspapers, etc.), I work towards charting out the specific *dispositif* that eventually made national identity (and thus nationalist violence) possible. My engagement with secondary literature should thus be seen from this perspective. Though I draw heavily from secondary sources, what I am doing is repositioning these findings – with either supplementary, or which are supplementary to, original documents – into a Foucauldian interpretation (for more, see chapter 3). In the end, it will be shown how power relationships around representation were constructed into not only state institutions but all group networks, serving as their *modus operandi*. In essence, the same network that legitimates the rule of Turkish parliament is the same that regulates violent nationalist movements as well as business firms, NGOs, voluntary associations, clubs, religious institutions and extremist groups on the left and the right. Our concern here is national identity in the same way Foucault's concern was with the prison in that it sheds light not only on how the prison operates but a variety of other institutions in society as well (schools, factories, the military, etc.). In essence, "representation" emerged as a way of interpreting collective identity and membership precisely when it became necessary to do so, not because it was humanitarian, not because

[101] Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations, Property," "Peasant Protests in Late," "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat."
[102] For example, see Brisku, *Political Reform in Ottoman*; Çiçek, *Young Ottomans*; Doumanis, *Before the Nation*; Gürpınar, *Ottoman/Turkish Visions of Nation*; Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*; Turnaoğlu, *Formation of Turkish Republicanism*; Vovchenko, *Containing Balkan Nationalism*.
[103] For instance, see Boyar, "Press and Palace"; Bragg, *Ottoman Notables and Participatory*; Gencer, "Rise of Public Opinion"; Şiviloğlu, *Emergence of Public Opinion*.

there was a dramatic push and not because it was the most economically advantageous, although each of these may have played a role. It did so because the previous system of political allegiance was no longer able to accommodate emerging domestic and international changes. By chapter 10, an outline of this representative *dispositif* will come to light that indicates how such relations of power and nexuses violence unfold, but also which loci in this *dispositif* are most susceptible to alteration, either for better or worse.

To begin this genealogy, then, it is first necessary to unravel the *dispositif* of allegiance that had persisted for centuries up until the beginning of the nineteenth century, which is the primary take-away from chapter 5. There are some who argue that the 1808 Charter of Alliance or the 1839 Edict of Gülhane were definitive turning points in the emergence of nationalism. In contrast to this interpretation, there are other academics who have viewed this transition as more gradual. This latter group parallels Foucault's on perspective of "events," or rather "eventalization." From this perspective, the goal is to understand the relations that went into the unfolding of such events, and there is a large sample of events stretching from the late eighteenth into the early nineteenth centuries that support this, as discussed in the chapter. Thus, I approach the Edict of Gülhane to highlight some of the changes that had begun to unravel the sultanic *dispositif* based on allegiance, one that was based on a distribution of imperial roles, protections, securities and incentives. I trace how these relationships expanded and were enforced in an array of political institutions, yet other factors, such as pressure from other states, financial difficulties, the fractures to the millet system, peasant revolts and a divide between artisans and traditional notables caused this project, in a very Foucauldian way, to go off the rails. While numerous individuals and groups would impact this transition, it was always only that: an impact, not control. The additional purpose of chapter 5 is thus twofold. First, to situate the Tanzimat reformist project within a wider array of competing political relationships, and, second, to trace the emergence of two important strategies that will eventually contribute to the representative *dispositif*: *collective identity* and *imperial codification*. The following chapter goes on to show the unintended consequences and struggles that arose over these reforms. The parameters of power and violence as laid out in part 1 thus begin to be explored with more nuance and depth. In large part, this had to do with the complications that arose with the Tanzimat project and the resistance that appeared on all fronts. Not only does the issue of imperial inclusion (or collective identity) become problematized, but it opens up an urgent concern that Ottoman society flocked to solve (often to the actor's own advantage). Not only were the original

dilemmas exacerbated, particularly around imperial codification, but entirely new problems began to emerge, particularly around two new strategies appearing on the scene: imperial sovereignty (or *representation as a political tool*) and *the moralization of politics* (or more specifically, bureaucrats).

After two decades of the Tanzimat, certain developments (or possibly repercussions) began to amass at the doors of the Sublime Porte and the Topkapı Palace. To navigate these developments, I divide my analysis in this chapter to deal with two groups that came to fundamentally re-envision these debates while forever altering Ottoman politics around two more strategies (while building on the previous four): *public opinion* and *imamic leadership*. It begins with an investigation into the infamous and small band of men known as the Young Ottomans. The increase in literacy and communication in the empire along with shifting interpretations of sovereignty permitted the rise of the Young Ottomans, who criticized the Tanzimat policies for their elitism; these critiques largely focused, as I argue, on (a) popular sovereignty, (b) constitutional monarchy and (c) representative government, ultimately resulting in the concept of public opinion. The fundamental component to pick up on in this debate is the notion of "public opinion" as very grounded in Ottoman discourse; we must be careful to prevent presentist or foreign interpretations from creeping into this assessment, a common pitfall of many studies on Ottoman history. I certainly do not want to give the impression that European ideas had no effect on the Ottomans; they very much did. However, as many fantastic studies have shown us, we must be particularly sensitive to how these concepts were "adapted" or "translated." The other trajectory in this chapter follows the emergence of a new provisional bureaucratic class that dealt with administrative issues in the provinces. In particular, I follow the career of Ahmed Şefik Midhat Pasha as he ascended (and eventually fell from) the ranks of Ottoman bureaucracy. Midhat Pasha was not chosen because his career was representative of many provincial governors: it was anything but that. What separates him from others is the financial resources allotted to his projects, many of which were a resounding success; these projects best illustrate the new understanding of governing in the nineteenth century which was focused not only on restricting populations but fostering and developing them through what I term imamic leadership. Ultimately, when these two tactics – public opinion and imamic leadership – meet by the 1870s, they are quickly absorbed into a constitutional and parliamentary project that would cast itself over this decade. Chapter 7 thus concludes by laying out the

initial impact this had on Ottoman politics and the violent and crashing halt to these ambitions that the Hamidian regime unleashed.

Unlike the common misnomer "history repeats itself," the conclusions of chapter 7 clearly indicate that oftentimes, no matter how much certain actors may wish it, history has inevitably moved on. There is no going back. The reign of Abdülhamid II was not a return to pre-Constitutional times but an entirely fresh take on imperial governing, particularly one that had blind spots that would slowly fester into undesirable resistance. It was a harsh era of violence upon violence (as we have come to understand it, where actors sought to prevent opposing strategies from succeeding) as different actors and groups struggled along different political routes. As Foucault suggests, I search at the peripheries of these policies as litmus tests to determine how the relationships of representation developed and the borders of this *dispositif* were either drawn or taken up by various subject positions. As such, the six strategies discussed up until this point – collective identity, imperial codification, representation as a political tool, the moralization of politics, public opinion and imamic leadership – finally meet and intertwine to present a new condition of possibility for political action. To show this, I begin by looking at a rather overlooked development of social sovereignty that emerged through the provision of services, using the same model of imamic power laid out in provincial administration: the *vakif* system. *Evkaf* (plural of *vakif*) had gone from being independent entities providing social services while being a tax-free way to invest and accumulate wealth. Yet, as they slowly were appropriated by the central government in the nineteenth century, an empty treasury meant it was unable to provide the previous and necessary services to local communities. One group that was able to incorporate these services and convert them into political leverage were Sufi lodges and sects. By showing how this process occurs, one is finally able to see a *dispositif* of representation that not only redefines the rules of politics but regulates the emergence of all voluntary and involuntary associations on the rise during this period at five crucial axes of power relations that incorporate the techniques constructed up until this point: (1) historical roots of legitimacy, (2) a dispersion of perspectives, (3) a unification of a collective, (4) accruing a base and (5) networks of communication. Another such institution that incorporated this mechanism, although for very different purposes, is the Hamidian Light Cavalry. After laying out the development of the *evkaf* system, I turn the reader's attention to another institution of representation that caused massive violence, from massacres to the illicit (or even licit) appropriation of land and moveable property. Yet, this occurred

through a complex network that drew legitimacy by being imperial representatives and justified the large-scale massacre of ethnic and religious minorities in eastern Turkey. These are the very same mechanisms that, within a few decades, evolve into an array of nationalist independence movements as well as a more nationalized Ottoman (and later Turkish) identity. They result in a new socio-political phenomenon that encapsulates the five axes and orders imperial politics for the rest of the Ottoman Empire and into the Turkish Republic: spirit.

These very relationships came to create the subjectivities that would become paramount in Turkish nationalism, which is further explored in chapter 9. As we start to see here, these networks of power also formed clusters or nexuses of violence, i.e., points in the network that are, by its very process, potentially open to alteration (both in beneficial and harmful ways). Chapter 9 diligently works through literature from Young Turk news outlets to decipher the limits of this rationalization of national inclusion and how it played an unarguable role in the organization of the Turkish state. To do this, I trace the discourse of the early Young Turk movement that relied on the same lines of justification that both the Hamidian Light Cavalry and the Sufi orders did: (1) historical roots of legitimacy, (2) a dispersion of perspectives, (3) a unification of a collective, (4) accruing a base and (5) networks of communication. Not only discursively but in concrete institutions and practices, these tactics were carried out leading up to, during and after the 1908 Young Turk "Revolution." It was still not so open-ended as this, however. There were three determinative pillars, or rather reference points, that subjects could draw in when composing a form of national identity and belonging that adhered to these rules: pan-Turkism, Turkism and (pan-)Islamism. These were not three mutually exclusive options but rather the paint that you could apply to your tapestry. As this vision of national identity gained importance, it became equally necessary to limit those who had access to it. A "science" of Turkism was developed and has been a foundational building block for current studies of national identity and political science in Turkey. In this respect, chapter 9 sets up the conditions of possibility and the *régime de savoir* (regime of knowledge) that was encapsulated in this Turkish representative *dispositif.* As such, we can begin to understand the subjectivities that this *dispositif* established, not only for late Ottomans but for the newly enshrined Turkish citizen and their republic.

While the Tanzimat reformers had set out to construct a nationalized identity, the writers of the twentieth century came to see this as a pre-existing spirit that simply needed

to be awoken from its slumber. No longer was it perceived as something to be constructed through a relationship of allegiance. It simply required some archeological dusting, something to chip away at all the muck, mud, sand and dust that had kept this national spirit hidden. Representation presented a new "truth" about individuals, a truth that could tell something intrinsic and innate about who you were as a person (and where you belonged in society). Chapter 10 maps out this representative *dispositif* in more technical terms, walking the reader through its procedural operation. Of course, this is only possible with a Foucauldian emphasis on experience, which is also what makes this chapter so accessible to our interpretation of violence from part 1. Chapter 9 focuses quite a bit on the new capabilities and understandings of the world that come with representative power, yet as Chapter 8 began to preview, there is a dark side to this as well. Subjects have become strictly limited and oppressed in twentieth and twenty-first century Turkey. To address this, I pick out specific nexuses of violence that exist within this representative *dispositif* in Turkey: (a) representation as risk, (b) correctional representation, (c) imamic representation, (d) radical representation, (e) no representation and (f) cultural representation. Since we are reaching the end just as the Turkish Republic is beginning, nonetheless, one issue of violence must be addressed and explained or else this entire dissertation will have been for nothing: the Armenian genocide, which I situate as (a) representation as risk. The other points are discussed in various ways through historical and contemporary contexts of the Turkish Republic.

I finish this work with a conclusion that seeks not only to reevaluate the value of this literature but questions the purpose of our own academic endeavors and its usefulness in the world. How do we make use of our analysis? What can we learn from it? What other types of analyses could such a framework of violence cover? I argue, both theoretically and practically, that by returning to an understanding of freedom as presented by Arendt and Foucault, we have a unique way to rethink our current preconceptions about political violence and how we think of violent actors. However, such an analysis requires an in-depth and contextual look at processes and relationships to pursue such a path. Although this work deals with the complex dynamics of power and violence, the conclusion turns our attention to another relationship: violence and freedom.

Part One – Towards an Analytic of Violence: Foucault, Arendt and Power

1. Towards an Analytic of Power: Power, Knowledge, Experience

"The world does not deliver meaning to you. You have to make it meaningful… It's a tough, unimaginably lonely and complicated way to be in the world. But that's the deal: you have to live; you can't live by slogans, dead ideas, clichés, or national flags. Finding an identity is easy. It's the easy way out." – Zadie Smith, "A Conversation with Zadie Smith"[1]

1.1 Introduction: A Foucauldian Ouroboros

As Foucault's battle with AIDS neared its end, he finished preparing the rather short essay "What is Enlightenment?," a reference to an article by the same name published by Immanuel Kant over a century and a half earlier. Originally intended to be a lecture at Berkeley in the spring of 1984, it would have been the first public debate between Foucault and perceived academic rival and critical theorist Jürgen Habermas. After reading Foucault's contribution shortly before his death, Habermas commented in an obituary-cum-article how "one experiences Foucault's death at fifty-seven as an event whose untimeliness affirms the violence and mercilessness of time – the power of facticity, which, without sense and without triumph, prevails over the painstakingly constructed meaning of each human life."[2] Much to his own surprise, Habermas found himself applauding Foucault's approach to philosophy not out of scholarly respect but because he had come to understand something "only in May of this year [1984, the month before Foucault died], when an excerpt from Foucault's lecture was published."[3] Habermas simultaneously praised Foucault's "attitude of the observer obsessed with objectivity" and his "passionate, self-consuming participation in the contemporary relevance of the historical moment."[4] Habermas' appreciation was not for Foucault's work but for his approach as a fellow practitioner of "philosophical diagnoses of the time" – "to inquire into the particular historical forces that since the late eighteenth century have both gained acceptance in universalist thought and hidden within it" – and Foucault's self-proclaimed adherence to the practice of critique that arose from the Enlightenment.[5] The relationship between Foucault and Habermas was much like that between Noam Chomsky and Foucault: a misunderstanding. In a televised debate between the latter two

[1] Smith, "Conversation with Zadie Smith."
[2] Habermas, Taking Aim at the Heart," 149.
[3] Habermas, Taking Aim at the Heart," 150.
[4] Habermas, Taking Aim at the Heart," 149.
[5] Habermas, Taking Aim at the Heart," 153, 154.

in 1971, Chomsky clearly dominated the conversation, with Foucault's apathy towards the event being more than subtle (even being so reluctant to do it at all until he was finally paid in marijuana, a batch that came to be known as the "Chomsky hash" by Foucault and his friends in the months afterwards).[6] This had less to do with Foucault disliking Chomsky (or Habermas, for that matter) than him perceiving a lack of disagreement. For Foucault, they were not even discussing the same problems, something Chomsky and debate mediator Fons Elder failed to comprehend at the time.

Wider access to Foucault through the translation and publication of his lesser-known works (e.g., articles, talks, manuscripts and his *Collége du France* lectures) have resolved many of these misinterpretations over the year. In many respects, much of Foucauldian literature has slowly came to the enlightening self-realization that Habermas had in the decades since Foucault's death, yet one of the most profound effects Foucault has had on scholars was his approach to research. Perhaps the best place to begin this dissertation is where he left off, i.e., "What is Enlightenment?" In the text, Foucault mentioned a "*limit-attitude*," or rather "the attitude of modernity."[7] Rather than a philosophical thesis or a methodology, this is an attitude by which we have approached philosophy, methodology, politics and the world around us since the age of modernity: "For the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is."[8] Foucault's critics had often interpreted him as a philosopher of chaos, destruction, violence and discontinuity, i.e., an anti-Enlightenment thinker.[9] Possibly for this very reason, Foucault not only distanced himself from structuralism and deconstructivism – two streams of thought he came to dislike, probably out of a bias of being associated with them so often – but also the normative projects attested by people like Habermas and Chomsky. The alleged *limit-attitude* was Foucault's starting point – "at the crossroads of critical reflection and reflection on history" – even before he began choosing a topic to research, concocting his genealogical methodology and digging through archives.[10]

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[6] Miller, *Passion of Michel Foucault*, 201. For this debate, see Chomsky and Foucault, *Chomsky-Foucault Debate*.
[7] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 309, 315.
[8] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 311.
[9] For example, Best and Kellner, *Postmodern Theory*; Rasmussen, "Contemporary Political Theory"; Wolin, "Foucault's Aesthetic Decisionism."
[10] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 309.

Within this attitude of modernity, Foucault situates his own project, a commitment to the practice of critique, as a product of the Enlightenment. Yet, rather than focus on *what* Enlightenment thinkers like Kant said, he was more interested in the way they approached critique:

> I have been seeking, on the one hand, to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation – one that simultaneously problematizes man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject – is rooted in the Enlightenment. On the other hand, I have been seeking to stress that the thread which may connect us with the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements but, rather, the permanent reactivation of an attitude – that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.[11]

In this very vein, many found Foucault to be a danger not only to philosophy but to the world at large. Given what we know about Foucault's thought today, it goes without saying that many of these criticisms have lost their relevance. And yet, Foucault was in fact a great danger to the social sciences, a sinister virus that infected this field with perhaps one of the vilest elements one can introduce: *doubt*.

For any student of political science, it will be almost annoyingly common to hear that a good ideology not only explains but also *predicts*. The obsession with predictive models has become such a cornerstone of the social sciences that, even in Foucault's time, he recognized it as "a privileged domain for analysis."[12] This was the "blackmail" of the Enlightenment that presented scholars with "a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism…or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality."[13] The consequence of this alternative is that those who do not adhere to Enlightenment doctrines are often seen as thinkers of "irrationality." Today, this has only further sedimented into an academic norm where, not only does the axiom of "Publish or Perish" exist, but an even more universal maxim has emerged: "Predict or Perish." As will be made clear throughout this dissertation, Foucault takes issue with this totalitarian attitude that has conquered much of academic research. Much like him, Hannah Arendt – and a whole stream of thinkers from Schopenhauer and through Nietzsche and Heidegger – saw the risks of privileging *prediction* over *preparation*, a sentiment summed up by satirical cartoonist Warren Ellis: "I try not to get involved in the business of prediction.

[11] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 312.
[12] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 312.
[13] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 313.

It's a quick way to look like an idiot."[14] However, many scholars find no value in a research model that refuses to allow room for predictive analysis. It is this kernel of academia that makes Foucault's limit-attitude a perfect counterpoint, focusing not on what *will* happen but rather what *has* happened and what *continues* to happen (this will be discussed further in the next chapter). A notable example incorporated in chapter 5 is the predictions about the end of nationalism during the 1990s, whose focus on prediction and causality largely overlooked the actual mechanisms of national identity construction, thus leaving not only scholars but also politicians, policy makers, militaries and the general public quite unprepared for what has unfolded since.

If we are not concerned with prediction, causality and teleology, what then is the point of such research? Returning to Foucault's "What is Enlightenment," he posits that it revolves around presenting audiences with "a historical ontology of ourselves."[15] Foucault championed chance rather than determined structures and path dependency; he was direly concerned with how chance went into shaping the ways we think, act and speak. His ambition was to present readers with a roadmap with which they could traverse the rigid edges of social crises that were inflamed in their very own societies. Foucauldian critique consequently evolves from the viewpoint, not of what will happen, but rather of who we are and what that means: "Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying."[16] Nonetheless, we must charter this terrain quite carefully, and it should not be assumed that predictive models are inherently flawed or useless. They are not, but they do hold a monopoly over scholarly activity (the most diabolical being Rational Choice Theory, which would reject Foucault's central premises), often devaluing non-predictive, explanatory models that would prepare readers to engage with these contemporary political struggles.[17] The problem for Foucault was what I would call *empirical idealism*, or the attempt to remove cultural and historical variables from consideration. Thus, Foucault's genealogical method works to, "on the one

[14] Crabapple, "'One Murder is Statistically.'"
[15] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 315.
[16] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 315.
[17] One of the best illustrations of the dominance of Rational Choice Theory, and certainly a project Foucault would have applauded had he lived to see it, is British documentary filmmaker Adam Curtis' *The Trap*. It includes footage of John Nash responding to the impact his theories have had on economics and politics and the dangerous consequences that have unfolded because of that (which sheds a light on the semi-romanticized version of Nash presented in *A Beautiful Mind*).

hand, open up a realm of historical inquiry and, on the other, put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take"; for those wishing instead to embrace this empirical idealism, which focuses on prediction rather than preparation, Foucault warns that it will only lead "to the return of the most dangerous traditions."[18] Because of these concerns – though Foucault takes a more mutually exclusive take on predictive models, I would like to distance myself from this perspective just to illustrate that there is an unpardonable disequilibrium between the two (that one could argue leads to domination in the social sciences) – he sets out four areas of his genealogical approach that situates its practical value and importance within this attitude of modernity: its stakes, its homogeneity, its systematicity and its generality.

Since the eighteenth century, a mass movement has coagulated in many Western and non-Western contexts towards regulation, discipline, surveillance, communication and economy. Societies have created vital social, political and institutional tools to deal with problems that emerged in modernity, yet these have gone hand-in-hand with many new types of oppression and violence: social movements, genocides, massacres, internment, ghettoization, discrimination and an unequal distribution of economic resources (what Morty Smith called "slavery with extra steps"). The stakes involved in revisiting these issues with a *limit-attitude* is very clear: how can you extract the domineering relationships such historical mechanisms provide without also losing the capabilities as well? As Foucault more succinctly stated, "How can the growth of capabilities [*capacités*] be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?"[19] This leads Foucault to the issue of homogeneity, which might seem contradictive at first since many saw him as a philosopher of dispersion, disruption and discontinuity. To resolve this, it requires a closer look at what Foucault understood as power (section one of this chapter). Yet, in the process, Foucault highlights two different yet equally co-dependent aspects of this arrangement. On the one hand, you have the technical side of historically constructed mechanisms, i.e., "the forms of rationality that organize [one's] way of doing things," while on the other side you have the strategic position between subjects and these socio-political technologies, i.e., "the freedom with which they act within these practical systems, reacting to what others do, modifying the rules of a game,

[18] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 316.
[19] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 317.

up to a certain point."[20] What makes these pragmatic technologies homogeneous is that they serve as a central point of reference for all subjects through knowledge (further elaborated upon in section 2). Next, Foucault addresses systematicity, by which he means the relationships that develop out of the exchange between subjects involved in these practices and the political technologies that establish the limits of possible action: "relations of control over things, relations of action upon others, relations with oneself" (explored in section 3).[21]

Not by accident, these three concerns – stakes, homogeneity and systematicity – mirror Foucault's three theoretical building blocks: power, knowledge and ethics. More to the point, "How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?"[22] This leads to the crux of analytical value in Foucault, which he refers to as generality but could probably be better understood as *historically persistent relations, practices and institutions*. For Foucault, it is along these axes (power, knowledge, ethics) that one can assess phenomena that has consistently posed a problem for a local society, and which that society has in turn consistently invested effort in resolving: sexuality, criminology, psychology, governance, etc. More precisely, it is when these realms begin to limit one's ability to act otherwise than through the channels that have been laid out, often in a very domineering fashion. Unlike most political science today, Foucault does not look backwards to tell us something about our future but to tell us something about who we are today. "The study of (modes of) problematization" entails looking at how power, knowledge and ethics deal with such problems and what the effects are in terms of networks of power relations and regimes of knowledge, as well as the experiences they create for historically situated subjects. While this may seem very obscure to those unfamiliar with Foucault, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to these core Foucualdian conceptualizations that will be employed and built upon throughout this dissertation. In other words, by the end of this chapter, these "obscure" elements should have taken on a more concreate, realistic and tangible meaning for the reader: power (section 1), knowledge (section 2) and experience/ethics (section 3), ultimately leading to what exactly genealogy is purported to look for: domination (section 4). Nevertheless, it is precisely this understanding of

[20] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 317.
[21] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 318.
[22] Foucault, "What is Enlightenment," 318.

"domination" that needs to be broken down and reconsidered. The reason to begin this dissertation from one of Foucault's final writings, nonetheless, is to gradually introduce the reader to the atmosphere of this work, but it also warns of my less-than-dogmatic approach to Foucault, whereby I attempt to capture this attitude of modernity and employ it through Foucault with the decades of discourse and ideas that have been introduced since his passing. We should be persistent and careful in our reading of Foucault, but we should also be open to adjustments to his thought and methodological approach based on what we have learned since the 1980s, as the next chapter argues.

1.2 A Relational Vision of Power

When one reads about Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan or Niccolò Machiavelli's Prince, one is confronted with an overbearing patriarch, an absolute sovereign, whose very will enunciates itself as the law. *The sovereign speaks, and it is so*. Even with Karl Marx, the bourgeois oppresses the proletariat by controlling the means of production and exploiting the surplus value of capitalist labor, and in more contemporary theories of identity politics, you find hegemonic narratives where the subject is helplessly oppressed by a state or majority. In each case, power works via "rejection, exclusion, refusal, blockage, concealment, or mask," whereby the law is the sole manner in which power exists.[23] Power is able to say what is forbidden and to distribute punishments for transgressions of the law, but that is ultimately its limit. This was precisely the dilemma that emerged out of violence in terms of "revolutionary violence" after the French Revolution; this divide between state power and non-state power was the driving force behind political and academic understandings of power, unable to address the myriad of ways control and action was distributed within a social network. When Foucault began to expand his theoretical toolkit in the 1970s, he was faced with dissatisfaction and frustration at what these accounts of power had to offer. He directly claimed, "I have been led to address the question of power only to the extent that the political analysis of power which was offered [up until today] did not seem to me to account for the finer, more detailed phenomena I wish to evoke."[24] He came to label the existent theories of political power as "juridico-discursive," which sees power as entirely negative and repressive.[25] Foucault asserted that

[23] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 83.
[24] Foucault, "Structuralism and Post-Structuralism," 452.
[25] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 82–83.

"one frequently encounters [this juridico-discursive model] in political analyses of power, and it is deeply rooted in the history of the West."[26] This juridico-discursive perspective of power understands it as controlling "both the thematics of repression and the theory of the law as constitutive of desire."[27] In essence, these conventional interpretations of power were "incapable of doing anything, except to render what [power] dominates incapable of doing anything either, except for what this power allows it to do."[28]

What juridico-discursive power could never explain is the productive, local realities that arise in societies. This appraisal is not to say that Foucault believed power never oppresses, which some have attributed to him,[29] but he rather wanted to emphasize that power is only ever *partially* repressive, also functioning through a myriad of non-repressive mechanisms that go unnoticed in our everyday lives.[30] Foucault claimed that "law is neither the truth of power nor its alibi. It is an instrument of power which is at once complex and partial. The form of law with its effects of prohibition needs to be resituated among a number of other, non-juridical mechanisms."[31] In other words, these theories of power are too narrow, referring only to a state's legal apparatus to account for the complex intricacies of actual political life. Foucault posited that power instead generated the very world in which concepts and actions existed. To avoid these traditional pitfalls, Foucault's own understanding of power would thus come to be built into the relationships that form between individuals or collectives:

> Between every point of a social body, between a man and a woman…there exists relations of power which are not purely and simply a projection of the sovereign's great power over the individual; they are rather the concrete, changing soil in which the sovereign's power is grounded, the conditions which make it possible for it to function.[32]

The key aspect of power for Foucault was the "*conditions* which make it possible for [power] to function." Monarchs did not solely occupy positions of power; they relied on a network of supplementary relationships – a system of lords and vassalage, artisans,

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[26] Foucault, 83.
[27] Foucault, 82.
[28] Foucault, 85.
[29] Proponents of such deterministic interpretations of Foucault often assert an anti-subjectivist position on Foucault's part and are particularly predominant in feminist studies, though this line of reasoning exists in a variety of forms. For some examples of this, see Alcoff, "Feminist Politics and Foucault"; Deveaux, "Feminism and Empowerment"; Fox, "Foucault, Foucauldians and Sociology"; Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*; Hartsock, "Foucault on Power"; McCarthy, "Critique of Impure Reason"; McNay, "Foucauldian Body"; Reed, "Limits of Discourse Analysis"; Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom."
[30] Kelly, *Foucault and Politics*, 129; Sheridan, *Michel Foucault*, 167–168.
[31] Foucault, "Power and Strategies," 141.
[32] Foucault, "History of Sexuality," 187.

feudal farming, religious institutions, mercenaries, which part 2 of this text will illustrate in the case of the late Ottoman Empire – which allowed the sovereign system to exist, relationally. As such, Foucault's intent was always to uncover relationships that formed as a result of vying forces.

Foucault was thus quite disinterested in a "definition" of power, strongly rebuking any naturalistic or transcendental interpretations. In place of a definition, Foucault offered an "analytic" of power that would move "toward a definition of the *specific domain* formed by relations of power, and toward a *determination of the instruments* that will make possible its analysis."[33] Two important techniques are put forward here: first, one can only investigate specific *types* of power, or "the specific domain[s] formed by relations of power"; second, one needed to determine the *methods* allowing these relationships to proliferate. A framework was thus needed that could deal with the historically constructed systems of power in which we find ourselves rather than giving blanket statements about power.[34] Scholars have conventionally tried to decipher *what* power was in definite terms: its qualities, components and traits. In many ways, Foucault inverts this formula, taking the *how* of power as his starting point and rejecting any substantive, ahistorical connotations.[35] Foucault's explanation of power is really only "the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society."[36] *What* power is comes to be contingent upon *how* it is exercised at a specific point in time and space. As he explains, "*'How,' not in the sense of a 'How does it manifest itself?' but 'By what means is it exercised?' and 'What happens when individuals exert (as they say) power over others?'*"[37]

At its core, power is nothing more than "a relationship in which one person tries to control the conduct of the other."[38] However, these relationships are "a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead [power] acts upon their actions."[39] A teacher may assign homework, which is aimed at making students more

[33] My emphasis, Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 82.
[34] This has been compared, by both Foucault himself and others, to how Kant provided a critique rather than a theory of reason. For some academic discussions on this relationship, see Boland, "Critique Is Thing"; Canguilhem, "Death of Man"; Djaballah, "Foucault on Kant, Enlightenment"; O'Leary and Falzon, "Introduction"; Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*.
[35] Foucault, "Confessions of Flesh," 198. For more on Foucault's focus on the question of *how*, see Feder, "Power/Knowledge," 55–56.
[36] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 93.
[37] Foucault, "Subject and Power," 217.
[38] Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 292.
[39] Foucault, "Subject and Power," 220.

knowledgeable about a certain topic. It does not act on the students directly but indirectly, on their actions. A whole material network is further built to ensure compliance with homework assignments, from grades, telephoning parents or disciplinary actions like detention. Such a network is not by any means nefarious in purpose but merely the relationships formed between subjects and their environment. This relationship forms a certain dynamic between the roles of student and teacher. Foucault's interest is primarily in uncovering the persistent patterns of such relationships, "to retrace how a certain number of institutions, beginning to function on behalf of reason and normality, had brought their power to bear on groups of individuals, in terms of behavior, ways of being, acting, or speaking."[40] He never means power as *le pouvoir* (*the* power) but is discussing series of forces carried out between or among subjects directed at trying to control certain actions: "I scarcely use the word *power*, and if I use it on occasion it is simply as shorthand for the expression I generally use: *relations of power*."[41]

Foucault consequently provided his audience with five general observations occurring whenever power relations arose, or an *analytic* (which is the equivalent of modernity's "critique" discussed in the introduction to this chapter): (1) power only exists through its exercise; (2) power is intentional and non-subjective; (3) power is not centralized; (4) there is no exteriority to power; (5) resistance is inherent to power. Taking these points individually, it becomes clearer what exactly Foucault meant by power. If we look at (1), it is very commonsensical to view someone as "having" power, yet Foucauldian power is never owned, never "acquired, seized, or shared"; it is only exercised from numerous positions within a socio-political network.[42] A president never "seizes" power but comes to be in a position where they can exercise power; the position is dependent on numerous relationships to branches of government, the police, the military, the population, etc. Put simply, power denotes the relations formed between subjects when they try to control the outcome of a situation, specifically when it pertains to the actions of other subjects. It can hardly be argued that such a relationship is owned; instead, it "only exists in action" and "is above all a relation of force."[43] Friction between

[40] Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," 283.
[41] In French, Foucault employs the word *le pouvoir* in place of *la puissance*. The latter term is a normal verb, whereas the prior is derived from the verb *pouvoir*, which means "to be able to" or "can." In this way, Foucault is indicating the active and productive side of the term, thereby reinforcing the notion that power only exists in action. For more on this, see Feder, "Power/Knowledge," 55–56.
[42] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 94.
[43] Foucault, "Two Lectures," 89.

a president and a legislative body could quickly lead to a breakdown in the capabilities of the prior, so the abilities available in any situation are contingent upon the context at hand. In many ways, this echoes the philosophy of one of Foucault's most visible influences: Martin Heidegger.

For Heidegger, meaning cannot be separated from how concepts and ideas are used in our everyday lives: "Everyday Dasein [Heidegger's term for understanding beings] understands itself in terms of that with *which* it is customarily concerned. 'One *is*' what one does."[44] The meaning we attribute to words and things are a direct reflection of our interactions with them, and there is no inner essence or meaning beyond that. In Foucauldian terms, power relations are not carried out and finalized once and for all since the cessation of an activity would result in a relationship losing its meaning: "Exercise is that technique by which one imposes on the body tasks that are both repetitive and different, but always graduated."[45] A teacher who stops teaching would hardly be considered a teacher for much longer; in much the same way, someone who has always been quite honest but suddenly begins to lie almost pathologically would no longer be considered an honest person. Without the persistent exercise of power relations, they simply stop existing. As Joseph Rouse explains, "A power relation depends upon its reenactment or reproduction over time as a sustained power *relationship*."[46] A power relation that has solidified into a socially sanctioned activity "tends towards a subjection that has never reached its limit" (meaning it is always "under construction"), and this participation in activities that we were socialized into is where meaning and existence comes from.[47]

Foucault's claim that (2) "power relations are both intentional and non-subjective," i.e., power relationships have an objective even if no one came up with that objective, was possibly the most controversial component of Foucault's analytic.[48] Richard A. Lynch fiercely criticizes Foucault's statement as not only contradictory but also an erasure of individual agency.[49] Marcelo Hoffman has mentioned that Foucault's work during this period (the mid-1970s) lacked any place for the subject to influence

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[44] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 283. For more on the relationship between Foucault and Heidegger, see Milchman and Rosenberg, *Foucault and Heidegger*; Nichols, *World of Freedom*.
[45] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 161.
[46] Rouse, "Power/Knowledge," 110.
[47] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 162.
[48] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 94.
[49] Lynch, "Foucault's Theory of Power," 23.

power.[50] Going even further, David Owen claims that it was discourse, not the subject, which had autonomy in Foucault's philosophy.[51] However, I would argue that Foucault was explicit in his reasoning, which has been overlooked by a great deal of both Foucauldians and Foucault critics. When we do anything, there is always a *reason* we do it, no matter how unjustified or nonsensical it may seem to others (or even ourselves sometimes): "[Power relations] are imbued, through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives."[52] Your primary school teacher did not come up with the practice of homework, but they still used it repetitively to evaluate comprehension. In this way, these power relations were *intentional*, but your teacher was employing a larger practice they had no role of setting in motion, thus they were *non-subjective*. It is also the case that our intentioned desires often do not go according to plan. We only have so much control over how our acts are received. In sum, though power relations are *intentional* in that they are carried out with an aim in mind, they are *nonsubjective* because no one has the ability to fully control their acts nor the effects of those acts, which Foucault explains a few lines later:

> The logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them: an implicit characteristic of the great anonymous, almost unspoken strategies which coordinate the loquacious tactics whose "inventors" or decisionmakers are often without hypocrisy.[53]

Rather than homing in on individual actions, Foucault's probes these "*great anonymous, almost unspoken strategies*" that influence our everyday lives. By strategy, Foucault is indicating the accumulation of unintended consequences of intended actions that morph into unplanned systems employing a certain rationalization, ones that, as Mark G. E. Kelly describes them, "enforc[e] the social settlement."[54] Foucault therefore defines a strategy as "the totality of the means put into operation to implement power effectively or to maintain it."[55] For instance, even if one acknowledges that the concept of race is constructed, it is still a whole system that one is required to participate in; it is a system of rationalization giving importance to skin pigments, regardless of how one interprets

[50] Hoffman, *Foucault and Power*, 100.
[51] Owen, *Maturity and Modernity*, 145–146.
[52] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 95.
[53] Foucault, 95.
[54] Kelly, *Political Philosophy of Michel*, 49.
[55] Foucault, "Subject and Power," 225.

this.[56] There is no opting out of one's participation in power relations; one's mere existence is dependent upon playing along in some way. Yet, when one asks who specifically created race, the question itself becomes almost humorous and absurd.

In terms of (3) power not being centralized, Foucault was falling in line with many of his contemporaries who sought to re-envision history, which had traditionally followed a top-down approach. In a well-known article attacking postmodernism, Aaron Schutz argues that postmodern thinkers – especially Foucault – tended to be elitist, focusing on issues like discipline and sexual norms that only a small, bourgeois portion of the population ever had to deal with.[57] His criticism was that Foucault overlooked the common person and completely disregarded the influence of the masses. This concentration on ruling classes has unquestionably been a longstanding theme in academic writing that, in Foucault's own words, has made "this into the major, privileged, capital and almost unique instrument of power of one class over another."[58] What is more, the idea of power coming from above, meaning the elites, is almost paramount to most literature on power; yet, contrary to Schutz's rebuke, I would argue that Foucault sought out influences and forces exerted not only from below, from the "masses," but from every corner of any given socio-political network: "Power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix."[59] Power relations are nonegalitarian, unequal and come from all directions, but that does not mean everyone forms the same relationship with something like sexuality or discipline.[60] Yet even Sheridan, a reputable Foucauldian scholar, erroneously assumes that strategies of power work on all subjects in the same way.[61] As Kelly more aptly notes, there are not only fluctuations in the employment of power over time, but also over political places, meaning how something like discipline functions can vary depending on social class, location, race, sexuality, local customs and much more.[62] By looking at the way one strategy is employed in a polymorphous fashion,

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[56] There are in fact numerous scholars who have taken up Foucault's mantle to deal with the phenomenon of race and the role power relations play in it. For instance, see Ehlers, "Retroactive Phantasies, Discourse, Discipline"; Feder, "Dangerous Individual('s) Mother"; Fong, "Reconstructing the 'Problem'"; Lloyd, *Beyond Identity Politics*; McWhorter, "Sex, Race, and Biopower."
[57] Schutz, "Rethinking Domination and Resistance."
[58] Foucault, "Questions on Geography," 72.
[59] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 94.
[60] For some instances where Foucault iterates this idea, see Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 27–28, 87, 170; Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 291–293; Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 94; Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," 291–93; Foucault, "Sex, Power," 167; Foucault, "Two Lectures," 90.
[61] Sheridan, *Michel Foucault*, 186–188.
[62] Kelly, *Foucault and Politics*, 58.

as my interpretation of Foucault does, he wants to grasp the strategies – the "redistributions, realignments, homogenizations, serial arrangements, and convergences" – that are irreducible to any simply binary of rulers-versus-ruled.[63] A black man in the US today has a strikingly different relationship with the police than a white man, but both relationships are grounded in the same wider strategy of discipline. Even though power relations may operate differently in different contexts, they are grounded in an *overarching strategy* – a general rationalization – that guides those relationships.

In terms of (4) there being no exteriority to power, I see Foucault drawing a line between his own ideas and a fatal flaw in his philosophical predecessors. There is a long history of the subject escaping – or rather transcending – everyday reality to arrive at the core of existence, stretching from Plato's Philosopher King and Georg Hegel's universal spirit to Friedrich Nietzsche's *Übermensch*, Henry David Thoreau's civil disobedience and Heidegger's authentic *Dasein*. Foucault rejects this line of thinking, arguing that there is no outside to power relations. There is no deeper level of Being that can be obtained, no inner-self or founding psyche to reach; instead, power relations constitute and "permeate the whole fabric of our existence."[64] Framed ontologically, there is no meaning or existence outside of power relations:

> Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely they are the internal conditions of these differentiations; relations of power are not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play.[65]

Our practices shape the rules by which society functions, but at most we only impact this process in part because it is a conglomeration of contingent struggles, desires and ambitions with no necessary outcomes. A person cannot simply cast off or overcome their race or sexuality. These are roadmaps by which we interpret the world around us, but they are also the ways in which the world interprets (and treats) us. In this way, I would argue that for Foucault, meaning comes to exist through these relationships, yet this is wholly dependent on these "intentional and non-subjective" strategies that one is embedded in. The subject "lives in a certain way, that he has a relationship with his environment such

[63] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 94.
[64] Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," 17.
[65] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 94.

that he has no set point of view toward it, that he is mobile on an undefined or a rather broadly defined territory."[66] In this way, race is the cumulation of actions and ideas repeatedly cemented around certain meanings and relationships that develop out of these previous actions. When Foucault argues that power is productive, this "environment" is what he is referring to.

This leads us to Foucault's final observation, whereby (5) resistance is inherent to power: "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power."[67] A power relationship occurs when one person *tries* to control the actions of another, but there is always the potential to act otherwise. Foucault actively worked to clarify this point later in life, which has been overlooked by many Foucauldians and most Foucault critics: "We can never be ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy."[68] It is always a *particular point* of a strategy of power (i.e., a specific relationship) that resistance takes as its mark, never power in its totality. One could consider one of Foucault's favorite illustrations: the Sexual Revolution. Many assumed that resisting the conservatism of the nuclear family and abstinence would liberate sexuality, yet this was hardly the problem for Foucault. Sexuality has been constructed such that it reveals a certain "truth" about ourselves through an established system of gendered practices and sexual labeling: "The idea of characterizing individuals through their sexual behavior or desire is not to be found, or very rarely, before the nineteenth century. 'Tell me your desires, I'll tell you who you are.'"[69] Asserting a wider framework of sexuality – or even new forms of sexuality and gender – did nothing to change this fundamental relationship at the heart of sexuality. The liberation discourse of the Sexual Revolution was thus a form of resistance, but it was not resisting "sexuality" but rather a specific form of it; the relationships one has to their sex was stressed in a different way, thereby reinforcing this strategy of sexuality. Much in the same way, representation will be shown to be just such an experience in part 2, one that produces a whole new range of truth statements about oneself around national identity in the late Ottoman Empire and through the Turkish Republic. Such importance is placed on sexuality in determining who we are, with an incessant need to talk about it, and this has

[66] Foucault, "Life," 475.
[67] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 95.
[68] Foucault, "Power and Sex," 123.
[69] Foucault, "Interview by Stephen Riggins," 128.

largely been left unquestioned, reinforcing this relationship of sexuality: "The problem is not so much that of defining a political 'position' (which is to choose from a pre-existing set of possibilities) but to imagine and to bring into being new schemas of politicisation."[70] For this reason, resistances "are inscribed in [power relations] as an irreducible opposite."[71] In line with the general features of power, resistance does not have an essence of any kind but is entirely relational, and it functions unequally across the political stratum.[72]

According to Foucault's analytic, power relations only exist in practice, though these actions influence the actions of others in the present and the future. When these intentional and nonsubjective effects accumulate over time, they can solidify into a wide-ranging strategy built on individual, calculated strategies and their effects. These strategies do not come from above – from an elite or ruling class – but are the net result of innumerable struggles, confrontations, interactions and coalitions that occur against a social backdrop, making a web of points that are co-dependent and derive their own force from one another:

> I speak of power relations, of the forms of rationality which can rule and regulate them…They are multiple; they have different forms, they can be in play in family relations, or within an institution, or an administration – or, between a dominating and a dominated class, power relations having specific forms of rationality, forms that are common to them, and so on.[73]

The subject's world is literally composed of such relationships, and only through these relationships do meaning and action become possible. There is no unified resistance against "power" but only numerous places of resistance. This need not lead to despair though since power relations are relationships of *attempted* control with the possibility to act otherwise. In reality, power relations always imply *the potential* for resistance.

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[70] Foucault, "History of Sexuality," 190. More precisely, it was not simply the way the rationality worked that should be the focus of counterstrategies; Foucault consistently argued that it was the practices that constitute these categories that are the place for subversion (Foucault, "Erotics"; Foucault, "Friendship as Way"; Foucault, "Sex, Power"; Foucault, "Social Triumph"; Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, and Power"). In his own way, Foucault saw a potential and promising area for changing these power relations in practices that were prevalent within the gay community at that time, particularly BDSM (Foucault, "Sade, Sergeant of Sex"; Foucault, "Sex, Power"; Foucault, "Sexual Choice, Sexual Act").
[71] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 96.
[72] Foucault, "Power and Sex," 122.
[73] Foucault, "Structuralism and Post-Structuralism," 451.

1.3 The Rules of the Game: Knowledge and Truth

When authors assert that Foucault used power to decenter the subject, what they mean is that people were no longer the core concern of the researcher: not the subject, but *strategies*, which will be of particular importance in situating the utility of adopting a Foucauldian approach to violence and national identity later on. Foucault wanted to move away from theories positing that people were the driving force behind power and instead address the strategic relationships that bound us to one another (and our surroundings). As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, what was unique about Foucault was his concentration on subjectivities over structures or networks, which is a theme dating back to his earliest academic work. Before he did this with power, nonetheless, he showed that the inquiring, curious individual is not at the root of knowledge either; knowledge does not develop from individual intellectual discoveries about reality. These "discoveries" only become possible under certain social conditions at specific points in time. Just like power, knowledge is the effect of struggles, ones that did not necessarily need to occur in the way that they did:

> We should not be content to say that power has a need for such-and-such a discovery, such-and-such a form of knowledge, but we should add that the exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information…The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power.[74]

Knowledge is not a natural effect of objective analysis but the nonsubjective invention of numerous strategies and struggles, and many of Foucault's early texts dealt with the socio-political conflicts that went into constructing different fields of knowledge, such as psychology, clinical medicine, grammar, political economy and criminality: "Knowledge doesn't really form part of human nature. Conflict, combat, the outcome of the combat, and, consequently, risk and chance are what gives rise to knowledge."[75]

This led Foucault to "power-knowledge," yet many readers continue to mistakenly equate these two terms.[76] Power and knowledge are separate yet equally co-dependent: "It is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge,

[74] Foucault, "Prison Talk," 51–52.
[75] Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," 8.
[76] For a more in-depth discussion on power/knowledge, see Feder, "Power/Knowledge"; Mills, *Michel Foucault*, 67–80; Nettleton, "Inventing Mouths"; O'Farrell, *Michel Foucault*, 65-67; Petelin, "Beyond Power/Knowledge"; Rouse, "Power/Knowledge"; Ransom, *Foucault's Discipline*, 11–25; Sheridan, *Michel Foucault*, 67–80.

useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up."[77] If power functions as an ontological plane in Foucault's work, determining what exists and what does not, knowledge operates as his framework of epistemology. Perhaps the best illustration of this comes from Kelly:

> [Foucault] does not believe that the sun rises in the morning only because people believe it rises…Rather, he maintains that human experience is relative to thought and discourse, in addition to a dependence on external reality (here we may point out that the sun does not have to be seen as "rising" at all, and indeed by our modern scientific worldview does not "rise," but rather the earth rotates such that the sun comes into view in the morning). Indeed, all these things reciprocally affect one another: experience, discourse [knowledge] and reality [experience].[78]

What we can know, as well as all the experiences we can have, is contingent upon the various strategies of power that are in play. Knowledge always comes from somewhere, and this "somewhere" greatly impacts how one interacts with the world and others.[79] In this way, truth – like knowledge – is not some observable objective set of facts divorced from human existence. Truth is the result of power, which is not to say it does not exist:

> Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as truth.[80]

For Foucault, I would argue that truth is the set of principles we refer to in deciding whether a statement is true or false. In Kelly's example of the sun rising, we consider this statement to be false because of the socially sanctioned rules of science to which we currently adhere. However, Foucault is not saying knowledge is wrong or ineffective; quite the opposite in that it has succeeded due to its value to our societies. What Foucault

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[77] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 28.
[78] Kelly, *Foucault and Politics*, 39.
[79] These types of claims have led some critics to the rebuttal that Foucault's theoretical groundwork means the past was no worse than the present (for example, Baudrillard, *Forget Foucault*; Fraser, "Michel Foucault"; Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*; Moi, "Power, Sex and Subjectivity"). However, Foucault wishes to distance himself from this way of thinking. One of the more notable instances is when he responds to his comments on the rationality of internment and how the Gulag in the Soviet Union is a form of this, which led many leftists to clandestinely believe that "everyone has their own Gulag" as a way of defending communism: "It seems to me that one must make a distinction between the *Gulag institution* and the *Gulag question*. Like all political technologies, the Gulag institution has its history, its transformations and transpositions, its functions and effects. The internment practiced in the Classical age forms in all likelihood a part of its archaeology. The Gulag question, on the other hand, involves a political choice. There are those who pose it and those who don't" (Foucault, "Power and Strategies," 135). Thus, he is not arguing that European civil conditions were just as bad as the Soviet Union's were, but he is rather stating that there are overarching systems of rationalization which need to be looked at individually in their specific context if any sense is to be made of them. In other words, research should be localist in these terms.
[80] Foucault, "Truth and Power," 131.

wants to latch onto is that truth does not exist in a vacuum. It is dependent upon a variety of institutions, customs, practices, techniques and established knowledges that serve as a rubric for discerning the validity of statements. For instance, as the notion of constitutionality was emerging in the Ottoman Empire, it was grounded not in Western notions, such as in France, of the absolute sovereignty of the people; it was strongly grounded in the Islamic notion of "consultation," whereby advice was given to the sultan to consider by "the people," but the sultan's decision – or will – ultimately reigned supreme. Two different ideas of what the role of a parliament should be arises in these two contexts (as will be seen in part 2), each reliant on different rules of knowledge and truth. Thus, by knowledge, Foucault does not mean the accumulation of information or facts but the rules that judge and make sense of them.

In light of this, Foucault concocts some general features on the exercise of truth. First, truth is really nothing more than "a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements."[81] If we take the case of legal proceedings, we can see that it requires the ethical collection and presentation of evidence, lawyers acquainted with legal practices, the medium of a dialogue, a group of jurors and a judge to regulate the whole ordeal. Even the positioning of the involved parties is premediated. All of these related components, though meaningless in isolation, contribute to the production of truth in legal matters. Second, *régimes du savoir* (regimes of knowledge) function as a rubric for determining the conditions of a veritable statement. In our judicial example, this is established through a constitutive set of laws, earlier legal precedents and the existence of an appellate system, all of which determine what is legal and illegal. Third, truth is historically constructed, meaning it is "subject to certain modifications."[82] The transformation of laws is pretty straightforward, but issues like abortion, civil disobedience and euthanasia have been shown to be very fragile, even in an age where people assume they are not.[83] Finally, there is no separation of truth from

[81] Foucault, 133.
[82] Foucault, 133.
[83] In terms of abortion, the U.S. Supreme Court case *Roe v. Wade* has been heralded as a solidification of abortion rights in the U.S., although there has been some flexibility on what that meant that ranges from state to state. However, with three conservative judges entering the U.S. Supreme Court in 2017, 2018 and 2020, there has been an increasing debate on the possibility of this decision being overturned, which has long been considered to be impossible to many. Likewise, Poland was set to pass a law completely outlawing abortion in 2016 – it is currently only legal in cases of rape – whereas Ireland held a referendum in 2018 to make abortions more accessible – they were only possible under a severe health threat to the mother – that passed. Foucault's point is that viewing such standards as set in stone is an illusion as they are far more susceptible than we often realize.

power, as the prior always develops from the latter.[84] The relationships of power in the aforementioned legal proceedings establish the *régimes du savoir*, from the training of lawyers in universities, the proper handling of administrative tasks, the legal authority to hold individuals accountable as well as to call individuals to serve on a jury and a general consensus that individuals can aptly discern the truth from circumstantial evidence. Yet, each of these elements requires other institutions, such as the university, bureaucracy, a hierarchical governing structure and social norms about the acceptability of acts (as well as what is morally permissible). These relationships impact the truth that is produced. The traditional dichotomy of a corrupt, domineering power facing off against the pure enlightenment of truth is inevitably cast out from this picture altogether.

In his desire to explore truth in this way, Foucault pieced together material from archives, particularly those mundane in nature like maps, prison schedules, school curricula and even the annual bookkeeping of localities, to determine the parameters of a particular *régime du savoir*. All of this required "a historical knowledge of struggles" involving "a painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their conflicts."[85] Kelly's example of the sun rising illustrates that truth changes over time, and does have general rules it follows at any time; while the sun revolving around the earth was once such a revered truth such that you could be put to death for saying otherwise, our current points of reference indicate that not only does the earth revolve around the sun, but we are far from being the center of the universe. Foucault's ambition was to use this recounting of struggles as signifiers indicating the place and time certain *régimes du savoir* took hold:

> How is it that at certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden take-offs, these hastenings of evolution, these transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally accredited?...It is a question of what governs statements, and the way in which they govern each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, and hence capable of being verified or falsified by scientific procedures.[86]

One of the most striking descriptions of such a change comes in the first chapter of *Discipline and Punish*, where Foucault explains how the rubric for judging truth in criminal matters drastically changed. The medieval system of judging a crime depended on "knowledge of the offence, knowledge of the offender, [and] knowledge of the law" –

[84] Foucault, "Truth and Power," 133.
[85] Foucault, "Two Lectures," 83.
[86] Foucault, "Truth and Power," 112.

in other words, merely judging whether an act had transgressed the law – and Foucault begins this text with a gruesome portrayal of a dismemberment, both as it was intended to happen and the arduous reality of trying to peel skin off with hot pincers, to remove limbs by sending horses in different directions (which ultimately involved a great deal of hacking and sawing at the limbs).[87] While this picturesque vision of "torture" may even make some of us nauseous today, it was seen both as the just and morally correct way of punishing crimes as well as a spectacle, much like how we view the courtroom drama today. Consider the rather recent phenomenon in world history: serial killers. Our models of distributing justice to them, even if their acts were as heinous as those committed before, is fundamentally different. As the next section will make clear, not only does this focus on subjectivities created through networks of power relations and regimes of knowledge help us understand our present circumstances today, but it also attests to how our own moralities are tightly woven into our environments.

This understanding of justice and the distribution of it suddenly changed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. From that point on, it was not enough to just decipher the crime; the reasons and motives also had to be understood, as well as the psychology of the offender.[88] When one considers the profound popularity of True Crime television, one of the necessary elements is to connect a motive to the crime (such that we even feel the need to categorize serial killers as a distinct abnormal type of individual different from ourselves). Out of historical investigations like these, Foucault was able to lay out the "conditions of possibility" of statements, which are the base requirements for any statement to enter into a discourse or practice[89]: "The series of rules which determine in a culture the appearance and disappearance of statements, their retention and

[87] Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 3-6. I owe a great deal of gratitude to Stefano Taglia for helping me make this point clearer and highlighting the moral repercussions, which is particularly important since our concern here is on subjectivities.
[88] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 19.
[89] Although I acknowledge that some differences exist between terms like "*episteme*," "historical *a priori*" and "conditions of possibility," they are rather minute in nature and I view them all as the progression of one concept throughout Foucault's work. *Epistemes* are most prominent in *Order of Things*. Foucault uses this notion yet again in *Archeology of Knowledge*. The historical *a priori*, nevertheless, is far more prevalent in *Archeology of Knowledge*. For more on *epistemes*, see Downing, *Cambridge Introduction to Michel*, 39–40, 46–48; Kelly, *Political Philosophy of Michel*, 9–10, 15–23; Maniglier, "Order of Things"; Mills, *Michel Foucault*, 61–64; O'Farrell, *Michel Foucault*, 39–41, 63–64; Oksala, *Foucault on Freedom*, 19–33, 71–78; Simons, *Foucault and the Political*, 23–27, 87–94. For more on the historical *a priori*, see Canguilhem, "Death of Man," 84–91; Falzon, "Making History," 288–93; Han-Pile, "'Death of Man'"; O'Farrell, *Michel Foucault*, 62–63, 65–67; Oksala, *Foucault on Freedom*, 34–39; Simons, *Foucault and the Political*, 23–27; Thompson, "From the Historical."

destruction, their paradoxical existence as *events* and *things*."[90] Through this type of historical analysis, Foucault managed to map out the limits of knowledge – not only what is comprehensible, but also *how* it is comprehensible, such as formal or informal justice – and power in various networks by formulating the specific conditions of possibility for (aside from criminality) madness, sexuality, governance, neoliberalism and more.[91]

This procedure details the unrecognized "viewpoint[s]" that we use in everyday life to make sense of the world around us, thus allowing "one to understand [power's] exercise, even in its more 'peripheral' effects, and which also makes it possible to use its mechanisms as a grid of intelligibility in the social order."[92] In other words, the actual product of Foucault's method is a "grid of intelligibility," whereby intelligibility simply means a general, often unrecognized knowledge and understanding of our surroundings and various social circumstances, i.e., *the very conditions that make such an act or truth-statement possible* (but I should note this will be rephrased as a "discursive formation" in chapter 3, which is then used throughout part 2). For instance, debates over capital punishment in the US revolve around whether the state has the right to put convicted individuals to death for exceptionally heinous crimes; however, the official and acknowledged discussions of this revolve around this being done "humanely" (even if it often is anything but that as states allowing capital punishment seek novel ways to perform this action). A proposal of the type of punishment that Foucault lays out in his book on prisons would not be permissible or acknowledged as a valid statement for a number of reasons that are deeply intertwined with our own legal systems, perception of human rights and understandings of punishment and justice. This "map" of the conditions of possibility, so to say, gives Foucault's audience an understanding of the inner workings of strategies of power that they may not have been aware of otherwise. Carol Bacchi compares it to telling other players of a game the rules by which the game is being played, thus enabling them to be more strategic with their moves.[93] If one likened this to a game of chess, while the job of intellectual history would be to decipher the moves made during the game, Foucault wishes to explain the rules of chess. If the players switch to checkers,

[90] Foucault, "Archaeology of Sciences," 309.
[91] For those interested in this topic may find Foucault's debate on "popular justice" quite fascinating, see Foucault, "Popular Justice." Moreover, there are fantastic docuseries that cover the complexities involved in types of socially accepted informal justice, such as *Murder Mountain* (2018) or *No One Saw a Thing* (2019).
[92] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 93.
[93] Bacchi, "Why Study Problematizations," 4.

Foucault wants to explain *how* the rules of the game changed, not necessarily *why* they decided to play a different game. The diversity of possibilities is merely meant to highlight the fact that they are all playing the same games of truth, which are historically constructed. Foucault's ambition was thus to pinpoint the emergence of various relational strategies to determine not only *when* things changed but *how*: "There are in society (or at least in our societies) other places where truth is formed, where a certain number of games are defined…and that, consequently, one can on that basis construct an external, exterior history of truth."[94]

1.4 Grounded Experience: Subjectivization and Subjectivities

Most political theories begin with the basic assumption that a subject, a person, is the obvious point from which one must begin an analysis,[95] yet Foucault condemns this typically privileged belief that "presuppose[s] a human subject…endowed with a consciousness which power is then thought to seize on."[96] Many researchers on Foucault have argued that he does not actual mean subjects are not a unified wholes or individualized units, but I find that he does mean this (and is quite clear about it).[97] Not only does he shun this assumption, but he adamantly protests the existence of such a subject: "I do indeed believe that there is no sovereign, founding subject, a universal form of subject to be found everywhere. I am very skeptical of this view of the subject and very hostile to it."[98] Our experiences – and thus who we are – are gained through our socialization into a culture, at which point cultural norms become intelligible, i.e., understandable, to us. From this, a subject never exists in isolation but is always developed through the relationships formed between "experience," "knowledge" and "power."[99] In situating the subject as such, Foucault is asserting that the subject only exists through modes of subjectization, or our subjugation to a myriad of strategies of power that create each of our experiences (such as race, sexuality and criminality, as

[94] Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," 4.
[95] Even Heidegger, who was a highly influential thinker for Foucault, began with the idea of *Dasein*, which was meant to replace the notion of subject while still positing core faculties everyone held.
[96] Foucault, "Body/Power," 58.
[97] Oftentimes, scholars will argue that Foucault regarded the subject as individual yet not ahistorical or universal (i.e., still united). For some examples of this, see Adey and Duschinsky, "Truth, Purification and Power"; Barker, *Michel Foucault*; Crosato, "Telling the Truth"; Forrester, "Foucault, Power-Knowledge"; Kendall and Wickham, *Using Foucault's Methods*; Rossi, "Foucault, Critique and Subjectivity"; Sembou, *Hegel's Phenomenology and Foucault's*.
[98] Foucault, "Aesthetics of Existence," 50–51.
[99] Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim," 311.

previously discussed). The idea of a unified, pre-given subject is not only wrong but a misconception of ourselves: "For this rather weak identity, which we attempt to support and to unify under a mask, is in itself only a parody: it is plural; countless souls dispute its possession; numerous systems intersect and dominate one another."[100] We tend to think of ourselves as individualized, wholesome subjects, but in reality we are shaped by a spectrum of experiences that not only force us to think in certain ways but allow us to think and make sense of the world in the first place. I believe that Foucault's ability to discern these phenomena is precisely what distinguished him from his contemporaries in many respects, rather than the normal interpretation of Foucault's value being put on his analysis of power. This is exactly what can make Foucault's "attitude of modernity" and genealogical methodology so beneficial to the study of violence.

The only way to come to understand ourselves and our identities is through our experiences that arise from strategies of power and *régimes du savoir*, with Foucault consequently arguing, "The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces."[101] This is not to say that a subject does not exist – Foucault is very adamant that it does – but it does not exist naturally, singularly, innately or transcendentally[102]; it is constructed through the experiences that our modes of subjectization, or *the ways in which we experience the world*, give rise to. Put bluntly, "The subject is constituted through practices of subjection," implying that what a subject *is* varies over time and space and is dependent upon *how* that subject and its society acts; there is not one subject we can assert, but numerous subjectivities.[103] The experiences we have surrounding our race are fundamentally different than those who lived just a few centuries before, and these relationships greatly affect how we interact and make sense of the world. Likewise, as part 2 centrally argues, subjects in the Ottoman Empire prior to the eighteenth century had a fundamentally different relationship with the empire than those who lived during

[100] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 386. Even to the consternation and skepticism of one interviewer after Foucualt's proposal that there were only "sub-individuals," Foucault simply replied, "Why not?" (Foucault, "Confessions of Flesh," 208).
[101] Foucault, "Questions on Geography," 74.
[102] For just a few places where Foucault can be seen discussing the reality of the subject, and sometimes even stating this directly, see Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 24; Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 281; Foucault, "History of Sexuality," 186; Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 69–70; Foucault, "Interview with Actes," 399; Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," 256–57; Foucault, "Life," 475; Foucault, "Risks of Security," 372; Foucault, "Structuralism and Post-Structuralism," 451–542; Foucault, "Truth and Power," 117; Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment," 315–316.
[103] Foucault, "Aesthetics of Existence," 50.

the late 1900s and beyond. In actuality, it is this new type of experience that is constructed that makes national belonging a conceivable and possible phenomenon at all. Because of this, the subject is not the object of investigation in Foucault's work; the modes of subjectivization – or experiences – that make any subject possible are.

Foucault therefore takes subject *positions* – and we occupy many at once – into consideration instead of the subject *itself*: "Undoubtedly there are relationships and interferences between these different forms of the subject; but we are not dealing with the same type of subject. In each case, one plays, one establishes a different type of relationship to oneself."[104] For instance, Foucault argues that "you do not have the same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute yourself as a political subject who goes to vote or speaks at a meeting and when you are seeking to fulfill your desires in a sexual relationship."[105] Our identity does not come from anything deep inside of us; it comes from our cultural experiences and practices. According to McWhorter, Foucault is attempting to perceive "the reality of subjectivities *as they actually occur and as we experience them*" rather than how they *seem* to us.[106] All the same, this is not merely philosophical fancies on Foucault's part, as some have argued, but I would say it adds a certain pragmatism, something that has been overlooked in Foucauldian scholarship: "Social practices may engender domains of knowledge that not only bring new objects, new concepts, and new techniques to light, but also give rise to totally new forms of subjects and subjects of knowledge."[107] Although one's socialization into an environment is what constitutes (i.e., establishes) them as a subject, this is not just a passive ritual because power is entirely dependent on the subject; practices require our participation in them to have any force: "What I wanted to try to show was how the subject *constituted itself*, in one specific form or another, as a mad or a healthy subject, as a delinquent or nondelinquent subject, through certain practices that were also games of truth, practices of power, and so on."[108] A nice illustration of this is the importance contemporary dictators or authoritarian figures put on getting individuals to the voting polls, even though the results are often predetermined; though this seems like a silly pathology, an election without votes would cause catastrophic damage to the legitimacy of such a regime. By delineating the ways in which one becomes a subject, Foucault is targeting

[104] Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 290–291.
[105] Foucault, 290–291.
[106] Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," 2.
[107] Foucault, 2.
[108] My emphasis, Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 290.

specific experiences rather than trying to answer fundamental, existential questions about the subject and its inner essence.

The importance placed on subjectivization allows Foucault to present an odd version of ethics that is not the typical normative schema of what one should or should not do. He instead tried to grasp which actions are possible and which are not, which are socially sanctioned and which are collectively frowned upon, which are incentivized and which are avoided, which are morally permissible and which are not. Unlike most ethics of morality, Foucault is using descriptive rather than prescriptive techniques; he is not saying what we *should do*, which is the ambition of normative theories, but rather what we *actually do*. This goes back to his position on "critique," and is what makes Foucault so valuable in a world dominated by predictive models of research. He is not arguing how the world *should* look or what will ultimately happen in a situation; he is trying to better understand the dynamics of our system of ethics – our historically constructed yet necessary experiences and ideas of who we are – to better prepare the reader to deal with that world. His audience is not just policy makers, politicians and scholars; it is anyone who participates in constructing this experience, i.e., all of us. It has pragmatic use for everyone to know how our environments shape the ways we think, act and speak so that we can decide if and how we want to strategically interact in those struggles. Again, as we move closer to a discussion of violence, it is of the utmost importance to keep this sentiment (or rather *limit-attitude*) in mind. All of this is basically to say that what exists is produced through action rather than having any inherent meaning or substance: "Historical sense reintroduces into the realm of becoming everything considered immortal in man."[109] As Robert Nichols explains, the only reality for Foucault is experience "as a range or field of possible ways of thinking and acting (i.e., a *world*)."[110]

The acceptability of acts subsequently depends entirely on the context, and it is not possible to make any transcendental ethical statements about which system is superior or more correct precisely because they only exist in actuality. To take an extreme example, murder has an array of interpretations, and the relations involved in an honor killing are distinctly different than the prerogatives of a cartel murder, a tribal killing, a political assassination, a lynch mob, involuntary manslaughter, stoning or a war. While predictive and quantitative analyses often rely on simply counting the number of

[109] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 379.
[110] Nichols, *World of Freedom*, 148.

occurrences of murders, or specific types of violence, they tell us nothing of how this violence is rationalized or even if they are all driven by the same forces. This has not only left a remarkably huge gap in the literature, but it usually leaves us unprepared to deal with situations and all too eager to act on them. Any mode of subjectivization is entangled in *régimes du savoir* and strategies of power, both of which proliferate themselves through a subject's active participation:

> Men have never ceased to construct themselves, that is, to continually displace their subjectivity, to constitute themselves in an infinite, multiple series of subjectivities that will never have an end and never bring us in the presence of something that would be "man."[111]

Foucault's understanding of power is grounded not in qualities or traits but in strategies, such that "power exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy."[112] It is not just that individuals are arrested for crimes, but there is an incessant need to understand the motive of the crime, which is a relatively new phenomenon. Unlike in the past where the goal was just to punish transgressions of the law, why, how, when and where the crime was committed is now imperative to criminal investigations, with the whole procedure being viewed more as a corrective procedure – prisons are frequently called "correctional facilities," after all – that will allegedly set this individual on the right path.[113] These interpretations rarely look in the mirror to try to determine the underlying mechanisms or strategies that allow such systems to persevere and function as they do. Foucault's intent is not to judge whether a system is good or bad but to assess precisely how it functions and what rationale it employs, all of which has been historically constructed and imbued through and through with strategic intent, no matter how "normal" we may find it: "We believe in the dull constancy of instinctual life and imagine that it continues to exert its force indiscriminately in the present as it did in the past. But historical knowledge easily disintegrates this unity."[114]

Building on the example of criminal activity, one of Foucault's central tenets was that the prison developed out of a particular strategy of power that was disciplinary in its operation and still occupies our thought today. Nevertheless, there was a unique tactic involved in this strategy, namely normalization: "The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares,

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[111] Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," 276.
[112] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 26.
[113] Even in the case of capital punishment, which is viewed as a punishment for an abhorrent act, it is often seen as the extermination of someone who is beyond correction.
[114] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 379–380.

differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes."[115] This is not to say that these methods or relationships are always effective or presented in actuality. Consider Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, or a prison where everyone is always monitored and surveilled – or at least could be at any time – at all levels, from the prisoners to the guards to the warden; this was in fact the driving thesis in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, yet the actual building was never built. Rather, the technique was appropriated and implemented in various ways; this is particularly important for part 2 of this text in that I am not looking and the implementation of plans but rather the adoption of techniques and practices that fundamentally created and structured our ways of thinking, acting and speaking (for instance, see the introduction of chapter 9). A quick search on PornHub will show a massive interest in "peeping Toms" or unsolicited voyeurism. Clearly individuals are willing to risk getting caught, but that is built into and structures the experience of discipline; surveillance is the mechanism that drives both the desire, the fantasy and the stakes. Thus, when we discuss strategies of power, it is these types of techniques that Foucault is drawing out, even if the actual plans or designs were not carried out in actuality.

With this in mind, I would specify, against an almost universal acceptance in Foucauldian literature to the contrary, that Foucault concentrated on a local level in his historical analyses, and the strategies of power that were uncovered were never meant to be generalized, applied on a global scale nor determined throughout history. Foucault even specifies in *Discipline and Punish* and elsewhere that his focus was confined to French society.[116] If modes of subjectivization were to arise, they only emerged as such historically, varying from location to location as much as they did from time to time: "I always analyze precise and locally delimited phenomena…I make an effort to explain why and how these systems came into existence at a particular time, in a particular country, to satisfy certain needs."[117] Thus, the notion of power enforcing a "norm" was limited to disciplinary power, particularly in Western Europe and, to an extent, North America; yet, many thinkers have appropriated this notion of disciplinary power and universalized it, applying it not only to all contexts – even non-disciplinary ones – but to

[115] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 183. Also see Foucault, "Different Spaces"; Foucault, "Questions on Geography," 67–68; Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," 78–79; Foucault, "Truth and Power"; Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment."
[116] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 309. Also see Foucault, "Prison Talk."
[117] Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," 292.

all times as well.[118] Since many are interested in Foucault on a philosophical or theoretical level, this tendency to overlook this aspect makes sense, but it also removes one of Foucault's move powerful tools: preparation. One must be permanently conscious that Foucault's practico-theoretical methodology was meant to locate and map out context-specific *régimes du savoir*, strategies of power and modes of subjectivization, none of which should be transposed onto other situations. Normalization certainly occurs in an array of contexts around the world, but our insistence on boiling it down to a singular model misses the subtleties that made Foucault's texts "effective histories" to his readers. In part 2 of this dissertation, the idea of "representative power," or the phenomenon of political representation, arising solely in the late Ottoman Empire is absurd. Yet, my argument will be that it did not emerge in the same way, and thus does not function in the same way, everywhere. Political representation in the Leninist Russia or Maoist China are dramatically different than the notion of representation in places like the US and France. Who represents the nation, as will be shown, is a building block of how representation functions, and ignoring such nuance risks making "effective" histories not only ineffective but potentially dangerous. If power is always actively reinventing itself in new ways, then we must diligently and incessantly investigate and review these systems in local contexts. It is an infinite, endless process, but one that better prepares us to deal with these struggles or conflicts when they arise.

One must simultaneously not assume that a subject's actions are wholly predetermined since the subject only exists, and is thus influenced and limited, via power relations. Strategies of power are constitutive of the subject but not determinative of it, which is another dilemma of relying too heavily on normative or predictive models of research; there is always some degree of potential to act otherwise than is desired since power relations always include the potential to resist. Foucault claims freedom exists for "individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized."[119] Unlike traditional theories of freedom, which take free will to be the capacity to act with the absence of obstacles, Foucault views it as an always-present, relationally

[118] Maze, "Normativity versus Normalisation." Importantly, this does not devalue the originality and value of these authors works, but it does illustrate a strong break with Foucault's explicit intent. Some of these authors include Agamben, *Homo Sacer*; Butler, "Bodies and Power Revisited"; Butler, *Gender Trouble*; Butler, *Psychic Life of Power*; Heyes, *Self-Transformations*; Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*; Laslett, "Structure, Agency, and Gender"; Young, *Female Body Experience*.
[119] Foucault, "Subject and Power," 221.

existent element of subjectivity, yet such freedom, which Foucault calls the possibility of acting otherwise, cannot exist solely in itself but only emerges through relationships: "Where the determining factors saturate the whole there is no relationship of power; slavery is not a power relationship when man is in chains."[120] This move allows Foucault to step beyond the typical legal framework of rights where "one has a subject who has or does not have rights, who has had these rights either granted or removed by the institution of political society" and discuss freedom in more general socio-political terms.[121] Nevertheless, this concern with subjectivities and subjectivization tells us nothing about what we are actually looking for in such a Foucauldian-oriented historical analysis. What kind of relationships or strategies should one be searching for? What type of relationships would reveal the conditions of possibility and the *régime du savoir*? Moreover, what kind of relationships would indicate the extent of freedom or possibility in a more concrete fashion? For each of these, we must turn to the theoretical dynamics of Foucault's methodology.

1.5 Genealogy: Uncovering the *dispositif*

Behind Foucault's ontological, epistemic and ethical formulations ultimately stood a philosophical project that he likened to Kant's three *Critiques*, which he later termed a "*limit-attitude*" (see introduction to this chapter). The ambition was to take nothing for granted – to preemptively assume nothing – about ourselves and to analytically poke and prod the things we hold to be natural in order to show their historical construction, and thus their contingency and potential to be changed, begging an important question: "In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraint?"[122] By looking at things like "sentiments, love, conscience, [and] instincts," Foucault set out to write what he called "effective histories," i.e., genealogies, that could "isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles."[123] Foucault is most directly interested in the numerous

[120] Foucault, 221.
[121] Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 300. For another intriguing critique of liberal freedom, see Brown, *States of Injury*.
[122] Foucault, 315.
[123] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 370.

experiences involved in these historical constructions, which Eric Paras illustrates as even being a central concern in Foucault's earliest work.[124]

Foucault sees experience as the effect of culture and socialization, or the products of long-standing struggles that had formulated into fairly persistent and stable strategies of power.[125] His historical methodology is thus a process of unveiling these sources of "false self-evidence"[126] or "banal facts," which are commonsensical notions we typically reserve from inspection, both on a personal and on a scientific level, because we see them as universally existent and not culturally influenced. Owen has detailed Foucault's usage of "bracketing," or not presuming something to be natural, as having two components: the first is the "bracketing of 'truth'" and instead giving "a historical account of how the will to truth is constituted as a problem"; the second is the "bracketing of the 'transcendental subject'" so that "a historical account of how this idea is constituted" may be performed.[127] The basic strategy is to avoid assuming any inherent "order of things" or particular ways of living. Foucault argues that to do this "is not to accept this knowledge at face value but to analyze these so-called sciences as very specific 'truth games' related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves."[128]

If one is unable to presume that the very basic experiences we have, like sexuality, madness or self-discipline, are natural, then where do they come from? According to Foucault, they come from systemic practices, or rather regimes of practices that continually shape, reshape and reinforce our experiences: "Practices [are] being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted meet and interconnect."[129] This means genealogy is assessing "programs of conduct that have both prescriptive effects regarding what is to be done," invoking both power and the morality of various subjectivizations, "and codifying effects regarding what is to be known," basically meaning the *régimes du savoir*.[130] In other words, the way we are socialized affects not only how we act – the cultural rituals we partake in, as Foucault would say – but also the limits of what is conceivable for us. When Foucault says power is generative, this is the position he is

[124] Paras, *Foucault 2.0*, 1–18.
[125] Foucault, "Technologies of Self," 223.
[126] Foucault, "Questions of Method," 225.
[127] Owen, *Maturity and Modernity*, 148.
[128] Foucault, "Technologies of Self," 224.
[129] Foucault, "Questions of Method," 225.
[130] Foucault, 225.

really tapping into. It is productive in that it endlessly produces the meaning and comprehensibility of our world and our experiences, or rather it establishes what can make sense to us and what cannot. The productiveness of power, nevertheless, will pose some problematic impasses for incorporating a model of violence into Foucault, particularly as literature increasingly attributes a constructive, generative element to violence (see next chapter). For this reason, Foucault argues that he is not writing any mere "history of the present" but a "historical ontology of ourselves" through his genealogies "as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying."[131]

What exactly does his genealogical methodology purport to do? What is the end goal, especially if it casts out normative judgments? How does Foucault wish to "map out" a history of struggles, and what use would this kind of map be? While the practical details of applying this methodology will be elaborated upon more in depth in chapter 3, it is important to see why such an erudite project is valuable to us, particularly in what use it will have for investigating violence.[132] Up until this point in the text, I have used "strategies of power" as Foucault used throughout his work, which typically implies a collection of effects from individual strategies; these in turn amass into a nonautonomous, overarching strategy within a culture. Foucault's genealogies leave us with strategies of power whose effects gradually accumulate over time into what he calls a "*dispositif*," which has been translated both as an "apparatus" and a "mechanism of power." These are most notably described by Foucault as accumulated strategies having "tactical polyvalence" or "polymorphous conducts," yet the ambiguity encapsulated in these phrases has provoked murky interpretations that I wish to move away from.[133] Rather than turning to these scholars, I think it is more fruitful to reevaluate what Foucault said about *dispositifs*. In an interview shortly after the publication of *History of Sexuality: Volume 1*, Foucault sought to clarify the confused, and rather critical, reception of the *dispositif*, giving three features he wants to epitomize in it.

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[131] Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment," 315.

[132] Foucault was not known for discussing his methodology in his book-length works, which has caused a range of contention and frustration among his more academic readers. Nevertheless, one can sketch out a significant portion of his methodology from his lectures, articles and interviews, many of which were not available until long after his death. For instance, one can see examples in Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*; Foucault, "Archaeology of Sciences"; Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History."

[133] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*. For some examples of varying interpretations, see Brenner, "Foucault's New Functionalism"; Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*; Mahon, *Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy*; Rouse, "Power/Knowledge."

First, a *dispositif* envelopes the elements that compose "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, [and] philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions"[134]; a *dispositif* enunciates the power relationships that were possible between these elements, framing the *conditions of possibility*. Second, a *dispositif* should outline the *régime du savoir* in a particular strategy of power through the "interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also vary very widely."[135] Finally, a *dispositif* is the effect of a "historical moment" whereby various individual strategies were employed to tackle "an urgent need."[136] In culmination, a *dispositif* should relay (1) the conditions of possibility and (2) the regime of knowledge that resulted from (3) a myriad of strategies that were employed to resolve a serious problem facing a society (i.e., an experience), making it, in the words of Colin Gordon, the "target of certain institutional practices," as in the case of sexuality, political economy, race or national identity (as discussed in part 2 of this text).[137] These *dispositifs* both constitute and shape a certain experience that all subjects within a given culture are subjected to, though not in the same way; in more direct terms, a *dispositif* is a way in which we are socialized, or as Nadine Ehlers explains, it "teaches or instructs people to read by it…Meanings that are generated within this form of power condition the organization of the individual's relations, their world, their comprehension of others and of themselves."[138] Unlike Foucault's single analytic of power, *dispositifs* are not general but specific and thus only exist in actuality and plurality, being nonlinear and antagonistic at times as well as complementary and collaborative at others, which is why Foucault had to look at them historically and not theoretically. If one recalls the comments about Bentham's Panopticon, the goal is not physical institutions or practices but actual techniques and strategies that have been socially adopted. Thus, as I understand it, a *dispositif* is *the accumulation of strategies with a certain target in mind that produces conditions of possibility and a* régime du savoir; *in response, these construct a unique, spatially-limited and entirely contingent experience resulting from an urgent socio-political need that arose.*

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[134] Foucault, "Confessions of Flesh," 194.
[135] Foucault, 195.
[136] Foucault, 195.
[137] Gordon, "Afterword," 235.
[138] Ehlers, "Retroactive Phantasies, Discourse, Discipline," 333.

Foucault mapped out quite a few *dispositifs*. One of his best-known examples is biopolitical power, which was grounded in the *health of the population*, with the concept of "population" taking on a more biological meaning.[139] What guides strategies within this *dispositif* is the endurance and well-being of a population as a whole rather than the individuals that comprise the population. Biopolitical power is thus quite different than the monarchical system – not only in networks but also in techniques, moral permissibility and social rules – that aimed to subdue most of the population for the benefit of a small elite class or disciplinary power that worked to induce individualized self-regulatory behavior through normalization. Biopolitical power emerged as a result of the proposed solutions to a very contextualized and increasingly urgent problem – how does one monitor and regulate the activity of a rapidly expanding European/North American population – such as was the case at the end of the eighteenth century in England:

> [Societies of privately organized police forces] were a response to urbanization, to the great movement of populations from the country to towns. They were also a response…to a major economic transformation, a new form of accumulation of wealth…They were a response, finally, to a new political situation, to new forms of popular revolt that, from an essentially peasant origin in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, now became great urban, popular, and, later, proletarian revolts.[140]

Though the biopolitical *dispositif* established a specific rationalization that could appear grim and dangerous when considering the genocides, exclusionary politics and political disenfranchisement of many people throughout the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it simultaneously illustrated capabilities and opportunities. I also need to emphasize to the reader, according to my interpretation of Foucault which is not everyone's, that the concern here is not *causality* but rather *reaction*: while it is often impossible to definitively determine or attribute something to one or more specific causes – especially since we cannot know their true intentions – we can gauge reactions to such changes. On the one hand, there was the systemic inaction of the Reagan administration in the US when it came to the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s because those affected were predominantly gay men, which was viewed as a contagion and thus detrimental to the health of the population. On the other hand, the notion of providing aid to victims of natural disasters or effectively dealing with large-scale disease outbreaks (such as the

[139] Some of the texts in which this form of power appears in are Foucault, "Confessions of Flesh"; Foucault, "History of Sexuality"; Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*; Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim"; Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*; Foucault, "Sex, Power"; Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*.
[140] Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," 62.

global Covid-19 pandemic) would not have been possible before such relationships were produced. Both of these roughly employ the biopolitical *dispositif* outlined by Foucault. In essence, the *dispositif* itself is neither good nor bad; it is merely existent, and Foucault solely wants to understand how it works.

It is also necessary to remember that the mapping out of these *dispositifs* was always rooted in the pursuance of *effective* histories, meaning they should have some pragmatic use for the reader in dealing with contemporaneous political circumstances.[141] According to Foucault, genealogies allow one to form counter-strategies against states of domination: "Genealogy, however, seeks to reestablish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of domination."[142] Of course, he does not mean domination in the traditional sense: "Not the domination of the King in his central position, but that of his subjects in their mutual relations: not the uniform edifice of sovereignty, but the multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and function within the social organism."[143] Domination occurs when an individual or group enters into a relationship of power wherein one or more actors have little to *almost* no room to act otherwise, at which point power relations, "instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen."[144] *Dispositifs* can become particularly dangerous when they morph into a rigid hegemony: "The analysis of these techniques [*dispositifs*] is necessary because it is very often through such techniques that states of domination are established and maintained."[145] Perhaps it was his experience in France during the Second World War or the political violence that spanned across his lifetime, but Foucault saw the need to act preemptively against such threats, particularly in our ways of thinking and acting, instead of waiting around for states of domination to manifest themselves: "The relationship between rationalization and excesses of political power is evident. And we should not need to wait for bureaucracy or concentration camps to recognize the existence of such relations."[146] From this perspective, the goal of genealogy and the role of domination in

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[141] Many scholars of Foucault have interpreted these excavations into our own experiences and ways of being as purely descriptive and left it at that, yet this suffocates the implications for strategic activism that were behind Foucault's entire project. For some examples of this position, see Hacking, *Historical Ontology*; Kendall and Wickham, *Using Foucault's Methods*; Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*; Wickham and Pavlich, *Rethinking Law Society*.
[142] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 376.
[143] Foucault, "Two Lectures," 96.
[144] Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 283.
[145] Foucault, 299.
[146] Foucault, "Subject and Power," 210.

Foucault's work are inextricably intertwined and indivisible. The whole *modus operandi* of genealogy is, in essence, to sketch out a better picture of these states of domination.

While most scholars' portrayal of Foucault has been perfectly fine with this elusive explanation of domination, the fact that Foucault rarely discussed the concept of violence – the central topic of this text – requires a slightly more critical eye towards what exactly domination is.[147] Not only do readers almost unanimously take Foucault at face value on domination, but they overlook the problematic formulation of this concept in Foucault's own work, leaving a confusing and oddly irritating gap in the literature at large, which is pursued more by Foucault's critics than his advocates; this alone should give us reason to pause. While commendable in its ideals, Foucault was never very clear on what domination was, even noting that this was the central ambiguity in his own work.[148] On top of this, Foucault rarely discusses violence, and even when he does, it tells us nothing about its relation to power or what it might mean.[149] The closest we get to a general schematic of violence is domination, so not being able to specify what domination is makes violence irretrievably vague. Nichols argues that domination occurs when there is an inability to act otherwise, yet this is certainly not the case.[150] Though a state of domination was composed of rigid power relations, they were nevertheless power relations that implied an ability, regardless of how small or insignificant, to act otherwise: "States of domination do indeed exist. In a great many cases, power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom."[151] Thus, even though states of domination may be austere and rigorous, they are not immune from ruptures, alterations and dissolutions; states of domination are composed of power relations after all, which intrinsically involves the ability to resist *in potentia*. As power relations rely on a continued practice, and practices can be influenced and altered over time, it "opens for itself a residual existence in the field of a memory…It

[147] For some scholars who leave Foucault's understanding of domination largely untouched, see for example Aitchison, "Foucault, Democracy and Ambivalence"; Lemke, "Foucault, Governmentality and Critique"; Masquelier, "Bourdieu, Foucault and Politics"; Miller, *Domination and Power*; Nica, "Foucault on Managerial Governmentlity"; Nichols, *World of Freedom*; Schubert, "Freedom as Critique."
[148] Foucault, "Confessions of Flesh," 203.
[149] For some examples of Foucault discussing violence in this way, one can see Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 217–218, 229; Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 26–28, 176–177; Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 291–293; Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 88, 92, 97–98; Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," 9; Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 377–379, 387–388; Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim," 324–325; Foucault, "Power and Strategies," 141; Foucault, "Subject and Power," 212, 220; Foucault, "Two Lectures," 87–88.
[150] Nichols, *World of Freedom*, 149–153.
[151] Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 292.

is unique like every other event, but is open to repetition, transformation, and reactivation."[152] Through this ritualistic repetition, the potential to transform states of domination becomes possible.

However, Foucault runs into trouble yet again when the notion of freedom, or the ability to act otherwise, collides with domination and its ambiguity. What it boils down to is that states of domination are still power relations; though they highly restrict action, there is always potential for resistance:

> Even when the power relation is completely out of balance, when it can truly be claimed that one side has "total power" over the other, a power can be exercised over the other only insofar as the other still has the option of killing himself, of leaping out the window, or of killing the other person.[153]

A few lines later, Foucault adds another example:

> One cannot say that it was only men who wielded power in the conventional marital structure of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; women had quite a few options: they could deceive their husbands, pilfer money from them, refuse them sex. Yet they were still in a state of domination insofar as these options were ultimately only stratagems that never succeeded in reversing the situation.[154]

In more tactical terms, Foucault argues that there is "a multiform production of relations of domination which are partially susceptible of integration into overall situation… Hence, like power, resistance is multiple and can be integrated into global strategies."[155] How is one to determine when there is a state of domination then? There are cases in which it is easy to determine that domination is being carried out, but the domineering *dispositif* might be subtler in other situations; it is precisely these discreet maneuvers Foucault wishes to draw out. What criteria might be used to decide if something is a state of domination or not? Foucault unfortunately never provided us with an answer. On top of all of this, Foucault's inability to make normative claims about power, knowledge and ethics puts him in a bind, as many have noted, because he seemingly has no justification for arguing that domination is bad or undesirable. [156]

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[152] Foucault, "Archaeology of Sciences," 308.
[153] Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 292.
[154] Foucault, 292.
[155] Foucault, "Power and Strategies," 142.
[156] Many scholars have criticized Foucault for a complete lack of any normative claims (e.g., Benhabib, *Situating Self*; Canovan, *Hannah Arendt*; Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power"; Grimshaw, "Practices of Freedom"; Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*). Meanwhile, other theorists have taken Foucault's claims about completely rejecting normativity at face value and have worked to defend them

There are thus three predicaments surrounding domination. First, Foucault's description of domination remains ambiguous. How can one determine where the lines of potentiality are cut off? What limit of an ability to act otherwise, or rather what amount of restricted freedom, could be defined as domination? A second problem concerns states of domination that enable subjects rather than restrict them, at least in the long run, such as laws against murder or pandemic restrictions. What is our more immediate concern – and this is the third predicament – is how Foucault, who desires to reject all "banal facts," is able to normatively claim that domination is bad, which is a criticism that certainly holds some ground. While he did establish an epistemic, ontological and ethical framework, this was meant to lead to a more fruitful scholarly engagement with states of domination and to assist those wishing to form practical counterstrategies to combat domination. Along with this, there persists the question of how to infuse a discussion of violence into Foucault in order to use his work to better understand current occurrences of violence, as these advantages have been detailed in the introduction to this dissertation. How would physical restraint, such as forced imprisonment, police brutality, physical intimidation, vandalism or assassination, play into Foucault's understanding of power? Given that Foucault rarely takes terms at face value, is there also the possibility that violence could take on a very different meaning? After all, Foucault persistently ties physical interactions – for instance, procedural rituals for disciplinary power – to *dispositifs*, situating such physicality within a broader philosophical framework. To address these issues of violence, it becomes necessary to look elsewhere for answers.

1.6 Conclusion: Experience and Domination

As the issue of domination becomes problematized and its ambiguity manifested, one must not forget the invaluable insights Foucault offers us, which help us determine why his utility is not only comprehending violence but how we are engaged with and affected by it. While many have taken power as the reason Foucault's work was so profound and influential, this is a position he himself rejected: "I don't think I was the first to pose the question [of power]. On the contrary, I'm struck by the difficulty I had in formulating

(e.g., Garland, "What Is History"; Hansen, "Non-Normative Critique"; Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*; McLaren, *Feminism, Foucault and Embodied*). Efforts from both sides have allowed the idea that Foucault rejects all forms of normativity to persevere, sometimes even among scholars of Foucault.

it."[157] This is certainly to prove controversial to a plethora of Foucauldian scholars, yet I think this obsession with power has often led to detrimental aspects of the literature, such as the general acceptance of domination's ambiguity. I believe this is partly why scholars of Foucault so frequently discuss violence and Foucault but are far less likely to investigate what this means (as the next chapter will show). Why then was Foucault's impact on the social sciences and humanities so profound? I would argue it was his ability to incorporate an array of philosophical and methodological tools to discern historically constructed subjectivities, or, more bluntly, experiences. In a revised version of an introduction to the English edition of Canguilhem's *The Normal and the Pathological*, which was altered and made into an article, Foucault embraces this theme:

> The fact that man lives in a conceptually structured environment does not prove that he has turned away from life, or that a historical drama has separated him from it – just that he lives in a certain way, that he has a relationship with his environment such that he has no set point of view toward it, that he is mobile on an undefined or rather broadly defined territory, that he has to move around in order to gather information, that he has to move things relative to one another in order to make them useful.[158]

This chapter has tried to illustrate the vast complexity and dynamics that go into shaping our experiences and constituting the ways we think, act and speak. If there has been a strong focus on the *dispositif*, it is only to the extent that it shapes our experiences and who we are. Thus, a critical attitude towards this helps us better understand the world we live in.

The pieces of the puzzle that have been presented in this chapter are power (conditions of possibility), knowledge (*régimes du savoir*) and ethics (subjectivities). By presenting us with an analytics of power – a critique – Foucault offers us a way to see the multitude of socio-political relationships that shape our everyday lives as procedural and constantly in flux and reenactment. In combination with this, systems of knowledge and rules are established for justifying – or ostracizing – what is said, thought and done. It not only limits our world but is the very basis on which it is comprehensible to us. This union of power-knowledge situates the relationships and subject positions that we either take up or engage with, yet it is impossible to present a solid theory of these since they are contingent upon our environment, our cultures, our worlds. The five observations Foucault outlined on power allows us to try to capture these relationships and make sense

[157] Foucault, "Truth and Power," 115.
[158] Foucault, "Life," 475.

of them, whereas truth is given as the rules by which we judge, consider, justify and operate in our environments based on observable historical phenomena. With such a focus on how we engage with our environments and are constituted by them, it is somewhat surprising Foucault gave us almost nothing tangible on an understanding of violence. Domination was certainly meant to encapsulate violence, yet it leaves more questions than it answers. What is domination? What are its limits? When is a state of domination alterable? When does it arise, and when does it collapse?

The literature on violence often has to do with limitations, and as a philosopher of "transgressions," it is hard to be resolute with such an answer to violence. As I propose in the next chapter, the version of violence we get with Foucault (with some adjustments) is one that not only can make sense of the complexities of violence, but it capitalizes on one of Foucault's central concerns: how can we separate the capabilities that power offers from the limitations and restrictions it applies to our ways of thinking, acting and speaking. While the introduction of this dissertation detailed the problems of measuring violence, I argue that it is specifically Foucault's presentation of experience, i.e., subjectivities, that makes him invaluable to this academic discussion. Rather than seeing violence as an act, an observable moment, a blow or a statistical anomaly, his approach permits a procedural understanding of violence. Not as an act but as a type of relationship. To truly adhere to Foucault's project of effective histories, it becomes necessary to fill this gap so that subjects involved in struggles are able to strategize more sufficiently. In essence, the three dilemmas around domination that must be resolved are (a) its inextricable vagueness, (b) its lack of normative claims and (c) a differentiation between beneficial and detrimental states of domination. In order to solve these, I turn to Arendt and her understanding of violence.

2. Towards an Analytic of Violence: Foucault, Arendt and Freedom[1]

"Violence is not merely killing another. It is violence when we use a sharp word, when we make a gesture to brush away a person, when we obey because there is fear. So violence isn't merely organized butchery in the name of God, in the name of society or country. Violence is much more subtle, much deeper, and we are inquiring into the very depths of violence." – Jiddu Krishnamurti, *Reflections on the Self*[2]

2.1 Introduction: Who Can Tell Me What Violence Is?

Over the past decade, numerous scholars have demonstrated a tenacious willingness to engage in discussions on violence, be it in terrorism studies, social movement theory, sociology, feminism, literary studies or even philosophy. What is less common is an attempt to understand violence in its conceptual capacities, which is the first step towards better understanding what violence is and why it exists. Writers on Foucault have predominantly followed suit in this avoidance, with Johanna Oksala's book *Foucault, Politics and Violence* and Frédéric Gros' article "Foucault, penseur de la violence?" being notable exceptions.[3] This is unfortunate since our primary concern is finding a way to incorporate violence into Foucault's overarching philosophy, and it is also surprising given that Foucault often discussed situations most would consider violent. In Oksala's text specifically, she works to establish a theoretical framework for discussing violence by using the work of Foucault as a guide, thereby arguing for a narrow definition of "intentional bodily harm that reflects the sense in which violence is generally held to be categorically objectionable."[4] Oksala then asserts that any broader definition not only inhibits scholarly research but also illegitimates certain politically contested acts, such as protests or property damage, as well as "their political meaning or justification"; moreover, it risks making violence appear as a necessary component of political life.[5] At a time when even the perception of violence or the association of one's political efforts to this word can lead to one's social downfall, it is absolutely imperative to take Oksala's concern seriously. That being said, I believe, contrary to Oksala, that it is possible and

[1] This chapter is based on a previously published article, though significant changes have been made. For the earlier article, see Maze, "Towards an Analytic."
[2] Krishnamurti, *Krishnamurti*, 94.
[3] Gros, "Foucault, penseur"; Oksala, *Foucault, Politics and Violence*. As for those who avoid this conceptual capacity, cf. Avelar, *Letter of Violence*; Dillon and Neal, *Foucault on Politics, Security*; Frazer and Hutchings, "Avowing Violence."
[4] Oksala, *Foucault, Politics and Violence*, 9.
[5] Oksala, 9.

even beneficial to establish a wide-ranging understanding of violence that extends beyond "bodily harm," and this has been taken up by a number of scholars on violence.[6] It is promising to do so through a Foucauldian lens because it can support a stronger position from which to comprehend historical manifestations of violence rather than reinforcing Oksala's prediction. More in line with the argument of this text, I argue that using an explanatory rather than predictive model prepares us to better handle and deal with these issues as they occur rather than giving us ideas about when and where violence will occur in the future (although the most sensitive areas can be mapped out, again, to be better prepared and to reinforce those areas).

Foucault's lack of explicit interest in this topic leaves us in a bit of a quandary. How are we supposed to build off the work of a philosopher who rarely even mentions violence? A compelling way to do so is through the writings of Hannah Arendt. Looking at the comparative research between Foucault and Arendt, one may be somewhat shocked by its utter scarcity. Amy Allen has juxtaposed their theories on power, subjectivity and agency, while Frederick Dolan has outlined the similarities and differences between the two in their understanding of "sheer life" and the role of contemporary politics by looking at the notion of "biopower" and normalization in the wake of Modernity.[7] In a similar vein, Jakub Franěk elucidated the commonality between Foucauldian biopower and Arendt's historical analysis in *The Human Condition*.[8] Another notable comparison comes from Dana Villa, who has shown the compatibility between Arendt's and Foucault's differing understandings of power.[9] Despite these efforts, a deficit still persists concerning the correlations of power in their respective theories, and there is the complete absence of any discussion on their formulations of violence.

As a result, I begin this chapter by laying out some of the ways Arendt connects to Foucault on some points discussed in the previous chapter, illustrating their reconcilability. With a theoretical grounding in freedom, they pose a degree of potential synthesis, which is the main reason I focus more on their similarities than their differences. After that, I use this synthesis to sketch out Arendt's critique of violence (in the sense discussed in chapter one) that demarcates power (as productive) from violence

[6] For example, Aldama, *Violence and Body*; Ayyash, *Hermeneutics of Violence*; Bernstein, *Violence*; Campbell, "Introduction"; Kearns, "Bare Life, Political Life"; North, Wallis and Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders*; Tilly, *Politics of Collective Violence*; Vorobej, *Concept of Violence*;
[7] Allen, "Power, Subjectivity and Agency."; Dolan, "Paradoxical Liberty of Bio-Power."
[8] Franěk, "Arendt and Foucault."
[9] Villa, "Postmodernism and Public."

(as preventive). This facilitates situating Arendt's critique into a Foucauldian framework in the final section. More importantly, it allows us to go beyond Foucault by pursuing his inquiry into differentiating capabilities that power offers from the limits it produces in a more useful way that his model of domination does (which comes full circle in chapters 9 and 10). The core of this subsumption is freedom, or the ability to act otherwise, which is directly connected to the understanding of violence I put forward as the prevention of the potential to act otherwise, i.e., a determent of freedom. In the end, this arrangement is capacitated via the mapping out of historically contingent nexuses of violence dependent on power; this genealogical approach to violence promotes a method to better study how systematic violence is exercised in everyday life. As a caveat, it should be understood that I am working from a Foucauldian, not Arendtian, framework; if it appears that I am unfairly making more compromises on behalf of Arendt than Foucault, this is the reason.

2.2 Opposites Attract: Foucault, Arendt and Power

Just as with Foucault's "juridico-discursive" power (see chapter 1, section 2), the cornerstone of Arendt's philosophy was a confrontational approach to traditional notions of power that were wholly restrictive and repressive. Conventionally, power has been established as a top-down phenomenon, typically synonymous with violence, that represses individuals in a slew of manners.[10] Arendt argues that this credence roots power entirely in force, strength and violence, treating violence as "nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power"; however, these concepts are not equitable with power, and scholars who claim so, "from Left to Right," misunderstand the relationships formed between individuals.[11] With a somewhat different purpose than Foucault, Arendt posits that these traditional interpretations of power absolve all subjects of any responsibility for their actions because accountability in the age of bureaucracy, or the "rule by Nobody," means "there is no one left who could even be asked to answer for what is being done"; this archaic model of power is argued for *at the cost of freedom* by removing all agency from power.[12]

Positioning power as an all-capable machinery would certainly remove any agency that victimhood might retain, but it also meant that responsibility for atrocities

[10] Allen, "Power, Subjectivity and Agency," 132–136.
[11] Arendt, *On Violence*, 35.
[12] Arendt, 38–39. This was an imperative point to make in her dealings with the Holocaust, as she herself was a Jew under National Socialism in Germany and managed to escape before being sent to a camp.

committed could be boiled down to a mere "following orders" defense.[13] One can easily see a resemblance to Foucault's reservations about traditional definitions of power, which he views as harmful since they fail to make "any connection between power and sex [or anything else] that is not negative," thereby overlooking the plethora of outlets power actually takes, especially when providing a subject with the capacity for action.[14] Nevertheless, Foucault's intellectual investment in power is more rooted in the possibility of altering mechanisms dangerously subjugating people than Arendt's open concern with responsibility. Foucault states as much himself: "Nothing in society will be changed if mechanisms of power…are not also changed."[15] Taking this as a starting point for a comparative analysis, it becomes necessary to see how Arendt and Foucault situate power.

Amy Allen argues that this is the primary parallel between the two, who, apart from this, take very different theoretical routes for dealing with power.[16] One could even argue that these two thinkers, though using a similar vocabulary at times, are speaking about very different things. Yet, this would largely overlook the comparable and akin attributes present in the thought of both writers, even if they do speak of different phenomena at times. More precisely, although they each have their own unique formulation of power, there is a severe overlap in their conceptualizations of it, implying a significant closeness – though not always an equitable correlation – in what they meant. For starters, both political philosophers built on congruent philosophical grounds to reach their relational understandings of power, potentially stemming from Heidegger's strong influence on both.[17] Rather than being transcendental, innate or hermeneutical, Foucault consistently asserted that power is formed *through* the relationships individuals form with one another, as discussed in chapter 1: "Power exists only when it is put into action, even if, of course, it is integrated into a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon

[13] Her work on Adolf Eichmann, who was an Austrian-German senior Nazi officer who played a large role in the running of the concentration and extermination camps during WWII, significantly deals with the complexities she saw in present conceptualizations of power and responsibility. Eichmann was later put on in Israel in 1961. Arendt was hostile to the notion, largely present during the trial, of blaming the Holocaust so largely on Eichmann (Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*).
[14] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 83.
[15] Foucault, "Body/Power," 60.
[16] Allen, "Power, Subjectivity and Agency."
[17] Heidegger's influence on Foucault was indirect, with the prior's philosophy becoming quite prominent in France during Foucault's lifetime. On the other hand, Arendt studied directly under Heidegger while studying in Germany prior to WWII, and she even had an affair with the prominent German philosopher. For more on Heidegger's influence of Arendt, see Canovan, "Socrates of Heidegger?"; Hinchman and Hinchman, "Heidegger's Shadow"; Taminiaux, *Thracian Maid*; Villa, *Arendt and Heidegger*; Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*.

permanent structures."[18] Years prior to this, Arendt was already adhering to such a relational understanding of power, similarly stating that "all political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them."[19]

Thus, in Foucault's work, power functions as a conceptual substitute for the conglomeration of strategic relationships employed to (attempt to) control a situation, significantly moving away from the image of power being "bad." Mark Kelly explains that these relationships do not need to be nefarious; power instead captures the "how" and "why" of actions performed by subjects.[20] An abusive husband is indeed one example, but so is a teacher trying to motivate a student or a rape prevention campaign. In a similar fashion, Arendt conceives of power not in any essentialist sense but as socially constructed through its exercise, or the bonds that are created through a *plurality* of people. She writes, "Power springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse."[21] Appearing where individuals form relationships with one another, it gives rise to "the potential space of appearance between acting and speaking men," or, in other words, meaning.[22] I would argue that the "space of appearance" is thus the surrogate of Foucault's *conditions of possibility* as discussed in the previous chapter, and, according to Dana Villa, it is the "minimum agreement in background judgments and practices" required for collective or intersubjective action/speech.[23]

These reciprocal relationships are defined by Arendt as the "in-between," and only through this in-between, "which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together," can subjects understand the world.[24] Moreover, the space of appearance is not limited to making the world intelligible; it also makes any action possible. As Arendt wrote in one of her final works:

> To the invisible that manifests itself to thinking there corresponds a human faculty that is not only, like other faculties, invisible so long as it is latent, a mere potentiality, but remains non-manifest in full actuality…Only action and speaking need a space of appearance – as well as people who see and hear – in order to be actualized at all. But none of these activities is invisible.[25]

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[18] Foucault, "Subject and Power," 219.
[19] Arendt, *On Violence*, 41.
[20] Kelly, *Political Philosophy of Michel*, 75.
[21] Arendt, *Human Condition*, 200.
[22] Arendt, 200.
[23] Villa, *Arendt and Heidegger*, 34. Also see Allen, "Power, Subjectivity and Agency," 138–139.
[24] Arendt, *Human Condition*, 182.
[25] Arendt, *Life of Mind*, 72.

In this way, power is very real, perhaps the most real, aspect of existence for both Foucault and Arendt. The latter claimed, "For all its intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common. We call this reality the 'web' of human relationships, indicating by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality."[26] Tangibility can only make sense to us through the space of appearance – the in-betweenness – offered by power, "even if their content is exclusively 'objective,' concerned with the matters of the world of things in which men move."[27] Foucault went further, nonetheless, in that the dichotomy of tangibility-intangibility was rejected altogether: "Nothing is more material, physical, corporal than the exercise of power."[28]

Along with this affinity, Arendt affirmed that power can never be owned but is only ever exercised, writing, "Power cannot be stored up and kept in reserve for emergencies, like the instruments of violence, but exists only in its actualization. Where power is not actualized, it passes away."[29] Margaret Canovan emphasizes that Arendtian power is only conceivable in its performance, which in turn constructs the world.[30] What Arendt was insinuating here is that the world comes to appear, and *can only come to appear*, through *inter*-subjective actions; inversely, it is this very process of acting that constitutes the subjects to themselves and others. In a way, Foucault's logic of the creation of subjects was also applied by Arendt, who emphasized that "the invisible actor behind the scenes is an invention arising from a mental perplexity but corresponding to no real experience."[31] This philosophical stance is one that runs directly parallel to Foucault's ideas, with Foucault arguing that "the individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle."[32] Power is consequently generative for both Arendt and Foucault, producing the conditions of

[26] Arendt, *Human Condition*, 183.
[27] Arendt, 182.
[28] Foucault, "Body/Power," 58. Foucault argued for a time for a division between the discursive – or the realm of language and ideas – and the non-discursive, by which he meant practices and material objects (most prominently, see Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language*, 162–164). Nevertheless, he later explains that this was allegedly not meant to be taken literally and that such a division is not sustainable nor of great importance to his theory of power (Foucault, "Confessions of the Flesh," 197–98.
[29] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 200.
[30] Canovan, *Hannah Arendt*, 95.
[31] Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 185. One can compare this to the statements made by Foucault about subjectivity in the previous chapter.
[32] Foucault, "Two Lectures," 98.

possibility/space of appearance as well as the subject itself, making communication between subjects and action in general possible in the process.

Many have nonetheless argued that Foucault, attempting to smother any normative claims, differed from Arendt who declared power to be inherently good.[33] If one recalls, power for Foucault is inherently strategic, and his genealogical methodology was always meant to describe a specific *dispositif*, not to say whether that *dispositif* was good or bad (mostly due to the fact that it can be used in a polymorphous way). These criticisms unarguably hold some truth, but one must be careful not to misconstrue Arendt's project. Jakub Franěk keenly observes, "Arendt's thought is primarily critical, rather than normative."[34] Put differently, power is a descriptive term for Arendt and part of the human condition, simply referring to the social and political "games" we are involved in: "Power preserves the public realm and the space of appearance, and as such it is also the lifeblood of the human artifice."[35] It is not that one would be better or worse off in a social system with more or less power, but merely that one could not make sense of the world at all without it. She explained this in *On Violence* by contrasting power with its opposite, violence: "No government exclusively based on the means of violence has ever existed. Even the totalitarian ruler, whose chief instrument of rule is torture, needs a power basis."[36] A totalitarian ruler still requires ways to communicate and interact with subjects, and they must have a method for understanding one another. Years ago, a Turkish student of mine reminisced about his uncle who traveled to Texas to visit a relative. Upon being pulled over for speeding, the student's uncle had tried to give the police officer cash, something that made sense to him socially; however, this action got him in a bit of trouble in a different cultural context. The ways in which we communicate with others and our surroundings are largely built around the "space of appearance" that can make sense of the situations we are in. Though power is what allows individuals to communicate, this does not make power "good."

Even if one agreed that Arendt's view of power is critical rather than normative, some scholars have nevertheless argued that there is a significant contrast between Foucault's strategic power and Arendt's formulation, which is an end-in-itself and thus

[33] For example, see Canovan, *Hannah Arendt*; Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power."
[34] Franěk, "Arendt and Foucault," 305.
[35] Arendt, *Human Condition*, 204.
[36] Arendt, *On Violence*, 50.

non-instrumental. According to this line of reasoning, Arendt's power is solely based on principles of communication.[37] However, I would argue that this goes against what Arendt herself advocated, which is that power allows subjects to communicate, but it is by no means limited to this since action itself would cease to make sense without it. While discussing totalitarianism, Arendt argued that it "destroys the one essential prerequisite of all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion which cannot exist without *space*."[38] To this extent, the product of power – or the space of appearance/conditions of possibility – is what *transcends* individuals. Power's productive component precedes and outlasts the subject, still making power an end-in-itself:

> This, of course, is not to deny that governments pursue policies and employ their power to achieve prescribed goals. But the power structure itself precedes and outlasts all aims, so that power, far from being the means to an end, is actually the very condition enabling a group of people to think and act in terms of the means-end category.[39]

This is another iteration of Foucault's "intentional and nonsubjective." Power can be *exercised* instrumentally, in that individuals execute particular strategies with an established set of means and ends, but it can never *exist* instrumentally because it is the effect of the game of means-ends; power is carried out with certain intents in mind, but it never exists for this reason. Arendt consequently falls much closer to Foucault than others have acknowledged, especially when Foucault placed his model of power in "means-ends" terms, whereby unexpected acts "are results that are adapted to different uses, and these uses are rationalized – organized, in any case – in terms of new ends."[40] Put more astutely, power exists through its exercise (Foucault) or action (Arendt) such that it produces and is continually reproduced as well as reinforced by the very subject it constitutes; these subjects instrumentally use the conditions of possibility (Foucault) or the space of appearance (Arendt) to pursue an assortment of subjective strategies (Foucault) or ends (Arendt); however, since they are within a network amidst other acting subjects, they never have the capacity to wholly control the outcome nor the interpretation of their actions. The accumulation of this is a network that transcends the various individual ambitions but which, at the same time, gives meaning to the world on which individual subjects rely; thus, power *exists*, but not in a subjectively instrumental way.

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[37] For some examples of this argument, see Benhabib, "Hannah Arendt"; Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept."
[38] My emphasis, Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 466.
[39] Arendt, *On Violence*, 51.
[40] Foucault, "What Is Called Punishing," 386.

While this section has demonstrated a strong correlation between Arendt and Foucault, it still cannot be said that their philosophies are equivalent. Arendt was immensely invested in understanding power in a cut-and-dry demeanor, but Foucault was apt to embrace the obscurities that arise in such an investigation. More substantially, Arendt scouted out the communicative qualities of power whereas Foucault avidly dug through archival material to highlight the more subtle mechanisms contingently instilled through power; Arendt was assuredly sympathetic to this cause in light of her work in *The Human Condition* and *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, yet even these texts focus more on the *human condition* than *specific practices*. Thus, while she also focused on what we have termed "subjectivities" (see chapter 1, section 3), her emphasis on the aspect of transcendental conditions of possibility make Foucault more practical in such an analysis. Her analyses aimed to uncover *trans*-historical phenomena rather than spatio-temporally confined experiences, which is perhaps why Foucault and her never gave much time of day to one another. This concern with subjectivities could possibly explain the resemblances we see in their philosophies and approaches to history, but it also explains why Foucault was chosen rather than Arendt as the core of this dissertation. Nevertheless, though discrepancies do exist between them, these comparative insights present a more manageable divide than previously assumed in the literature.

2.3 The Limits of Violence: Arendt and Spontaneity

One way to bridge this divide between Arendt and Foucault is to investigate the self-attested groundings of their respective philosophies: freedom. While the previous chapter might have seemingly implied domination was at the heart of Foucault's work, this was only to the extent that domination has a very unique and troublesome relationship with freedom. For both thinkers, the subject not only exercises power but is exercised on by power, which is not to be confused with determinism since subjects "are always conditioned beings," but never wholly conditioned.[41] Later in her life, Arendt even asserted in more direct terms that "the opposite of necessity is not contingency or accident but freedom."[42] Strongly hostile to dogmatic understandings of human teleology, Arendt was very critical of the concept of necessity that can be found in writers like Hegel, Marx or Claude Lévi-Strauss. Arendt asserted that "if men wish to be free, it is precisely

[41] Arendt, *Human Condition*, 9.
[42] Arendt, *Life of Mind*, 60.

sovereignty they must renounce," with sovereignty here meaning absolute autonomy (or having complete control over one's actions and choices independent of external influences).[43] Through this dichotomous relationship of freedom and conditionality, subjects emerge as agents able to act otherwise, or what Arendt frequently referred to as *having potentiality*: "Because the actor always moves among and in relation to other acting beings, he is never merely a 'doer' but always at the same time a sufferer. To do and to suffer are like opposite sides of the same coin."[44] The key to freedom is thus having different options available to the subject, and power rests on this potentiality because without it, there could be no relationships among *free* subjects to form power, just as Foucault framed it: "If there were no possibility of resistance…there would be no power relations at all."[45] To this end, power does not occur *beyond* but *between* subjects and their environments.[46]

Given freedom's centrality to both philosophers, it is surprising more academic research has not been done on this correlation. The capabilities that power offers, which go along with all the forms of restriction, persuasion and coercion that have traditionally been associated with it, enable the subject to act unexpectedly (or "spontaneously," in Arendtian parlance) "by taking such discourses literally, and thereby turning them around."[47] For instance, one could consider the identity of minority communities or social movements, whereby one can only make sense of the Jewish community or feminism through religion and sexuality respectively, which are both highly regulated and engrained in discourses that have often been deployed to discriminate and harm individuals in these groups. At the same time, power relations have enabled the possibility for solidarity movements to arise based on these identifications; how could subjects form a Black solidarity movement if they were never constituted as Black in the first place (although something could exist in a very different form along different social lines)?

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[43] Arendt, "What Is Freedom," 455. Likewise, Foucault declares that it is the exercise of power on the subject that enables it to act freely in the first place: "The individual is in fact a power-effect, and at the same time, and to the extent that he is a power-effect, the individual is a relay" (*Society Must Be Defended*, 30). While Allen declares that the possibility of solidarity existing in Foucault's thought is impossible due to the nature of his understanding of power (Allen, "Power, Subjectivity and Agency," 143), it is precisely that which makes it possible. Only after being constituted as a woman (subjection) can on then form solidarity movements based on this identity.
[44] Arendt, *Human Condition*, 190.
[45] Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 292.
[46] Though Foucault does discuss *intra*-subjective relationships in his later writing, this still involves *forming a relationship* with oneself. Even in this instance, the role of power functions through a relationship with two sides.
[47] Foucault, "Power and Sex," 115.

Power is thus precisely the promise of potentiality, even for Arendt: "Freedom, as we would say today, was experienced in spontaneity."[48] In a different text, she furthermore argued, "Beginning [or spontaneity]…is the supreme capacity of man; politically, it is identical with man's freedom."[49]

For Arendt, the core difference between power and violence is that violence is always employed instrumentally to achieve an objective, whereas power is an end-in-itself.[50] Arendt carefully delineates between an instrumental model of violence and a relational, non-autonomous power, even expressing shock that "violence has been singled out so seldom for special consideration" in light of the role it plays in political life.[51] Returning to a point made in the previous section, power makes subjects intelligible to one another and enables communication: "Power preserves the public realm and the space of appearance…which, unless it is the scene of action and speech, of the web of human affairs and relationships and the stories engendered by them, lacks its ultimate *raison d'etre*."[52] In this way, power is inherently pluralistic in that it works between more than one individual. In contrast to power, violence is individualistic. Violence can certainly be used collectively, hence "collective violence," but it is always a *particular* deployment of violence. It is carried out with a specific end in mind, and it is *only* for this reason that it exists at all. It fails to constitute the in-betweenness of individuals as power does; it merely takes place there. Does this mean that violence never has a large-scale ripple effect? Of course not, but these effects – just as all action – would constitute power and not belong to violence. Arendt went on to explain that "the extreme form of power is All against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All. And this latter is never possible without instruments."[53] "Instruments" of violence are the manners in which violence exerts itself, and, unlike power, Arendt argues that they *can* be owned. However, uncovering what these instruments are presents us with a bit of a dilemma in her writing, and the question arises as to whether she herself *invariably* and *consistently* employed the notion of "instruments of violence."

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[48] Arendt, "What Is Freedom," 456.
[49] Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 479.
[50] Arendt, *On Violence*, 46.
[51] Arendt, 8. While the amount of literature on violence today may seem like Arendt would feel vindicated, I think that would be jumping the gun. While there are numerous fields that focus explicitly on violence, Arendt's problem was that the topic was often discussed but rarely understood. Given the relatively small amount of literature that deal with violence in any conceptual or definitive manner, I believe Arendt would argue that this problem has persisted up to the present day.
[52] Arendt, *Human Condition*, 204.
[53] Arendt, *On Violence*, 42.

The first thing that would typically come to mind is a material tool: guns, bombs, prisons, military tools, terrorist attacks or Molotov cocktails. If power depends on pluralism, violence seeks compliance through instruments amplifying one's strength.[54] However, are physical instruments the only way to go about this, as discussed in the introduction to this dissertation? Arendt explained the situation as follows:

> Violence, we must remember, does not depend on numbers or opinions, but on implements, and the implements of violence, as I mentioned before, like all other tools, increase and multiply human strength. Those who oppose violence with mere power will soon find that they are confronted not by men but by men's artifacts, whose inhumanity and destructive effectiveness increase in proportion to the distance separating the opponents. Violence can always destroy power; out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience. What never can grow out of it is power.[55]

Power exists through acts, but it is not reducible to them. In contrast, violence only comes to be through acts, "implements," with no trans-subjective components. It relies on material instruments, not the generation of the space of appearance, which usually causes violence to be perceived as its physical manifestations.[56] Arendt's differentiation of violence from other concepts does not help one solidly claim that violence is physical or non-physical either. In this section of *On Violence*, she distinguished violence from "force" (the energy released by natural or social movements), "strength" (an individual person's or object's capabilities in relation to another person or thing), "authority" (one's absolute and unquestionable submission to someone or something) and "power."[57] In her article "Truth and Politics," violence is shown to be, if not identical with, directly related to compulsion: "Without the help of violence…truth would then owe its prevalence not to its own compelling quality but to the agreement of the many."[58] Moreover, in *The Life of the Mind*, Arendt appears to differentiate between "violence" (which is physical) and "force" (which is non-physical).[59]

One of the problems that one runs into when they read physicality into violence (regardless of Arendt's intent) is that it runs the risk of misinterpreting the stakes at play for Arendt (even if she herself did not consistently frame violence's relation to physical altercations throughout her works), who is discussing *relational functions* rather than

[54] Arendt, 46.
[55] Arendt, 53.
[56] For example, see Penta, "Hannah Arendt," 211.
[57] Arendt, *On Violence*, 44–46.
[58] Arendt, "Truth and Politics," 560.
[59] Arendt, *Life of Mind*, 60.

methods. Though there are times when instruments of violence are surely meant in a rather material tone,[60] this does not hold true for all her discussions of violence.[61] At the same time, there is the question of whether Arendt's own occasional leanings towards physical connotations of violence are sustainable within her own understanding of violence, which I do not believe they are. Physical violence is the terminal form violence takes, especially if violence is always rationalized (or justified but not legitimate, as Arendt would say), meaning that it always has a reason – no matter how distasteful or abhorrent we may view it – for being done by the doer.[62] As discussed in the introduction to this text, violence is not the physical act itself but something that is channeled into it. Considering that she saw the opposite of power as violence, even to the point of claiming "non-violent power is redundant," it does not seem like it is reducible to physical altercations just as power is not reducible to non-physical interactions.[63] The fact of the matter is that instruments of violence *amplify* one's strength, yet consider the situation where a police officer in the US fatally shoots a black man in an impoverished neighborhood. While one could argue that the gun amplifies his physical strength, so does the institutional setting, in which police officers face very little to no third-party oversight and systemic racism has been circulated through the very culture where this is occurring. If this is not convincing, imagine the famous TV trope whereby a civilian presents a real or fake police badge in order to get information or access they would not otherwise have; thus, the badge and the authority enshrined in it is the instrument that leverages the situation. While "physical" instruments may amplify one's strength, this is not the only manner in which one can do so, and that is precisely the value of Arendt's thinking on violence. Her account of Terror sheds some light on this dilemma while also opening up a wider application of her conceptualization of violence that is more consistent than perhaps she herself was.

Terror occurs when all power has been blocked, meaning the possibility for spontaneous action has been entirely foreclosed: "Terror is not the same as violence; it is, rather, the form of government that comes into being when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate but, on the contrary, remains in full control."[64] The key to

[60] For example, see Arendt, *Human Condition*, 180; Arendt, *On Violence*, 4, 46.
[61] Arendt, *Human Condition*, 179, 228; Arendt, *On Violence*, 18, 50–51, 79; Arendt, "What Is Freedom," 455.
[62] Arendt, *On Violence*, 66. This has been a similar idea proposed among some scholars in political violence studies, social movement studies and terrorist studies
[63] Arendt, 56.
[64] Arendt, 55.

grasping Arendtian violence is this "full control": "Totalitarian domination, however, aims at abolishing freedom, even at eliminating human spontaneity in general, and by no means at a restriction of freedom no matter how tyrannical."[65] In this way, Arendt's version of power is tightly interlinked with an ability to act unexpectedly or otherwise than intended, just as Foucault's understanding of resistance does, though Arendt's portrayal of domination is the point where the ability to act otherwise is totally foreclosed. If power is essentially linked to potentiality, violence would be when that potentiality to act otherwise is ultimately destroyed (or at least lessened), which is resonated by Foucault.[66] Pure violence, or Terror, is the absence of potentiality (power), and to limit violence to physical perpetration ignores the value of Arendt's observation: "If it were true that sovereignty and freedom are the same, then indeed no man could be free, because sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory to the very condition of plurality."[67] Freedom inherently implies limitations and obstacles, and Terror occurs when there is a situation where limitations are obsolete because the outcome is wholly determined, thereby abolishing freedom – and, as a result, power – from the equation.

In *Origins of Totalitarianism*, she even claimed that "freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to begin, just as freedom as a political reality is identical with a space of movement between men."[68] Situations where the ability to act otherwise, or freedom, is annexed is a direct affront to both the meaningful world and the subject's very existence, and violence assumes the role in Arendt's philosophy of diminishing this ability to act otherwise, both in physical and non-physical terms. It is the special ingredient that is added to physical acts that transforms them into violence. Accidentally slipping on a banana peel while holding a knife that is then thrust into someone's chest would be highly unfortunate but not violent; intentionally slipping on the banana peel to achieve this act would be. In other words, the greater the ratio of violence-to-power is weighed in favor of violence, the more determinative the situation is. In Arendt's constructivist tone, to which violence and power are not natural but constructed by humans, how the body is defined, and by consequence the limits of physicality, is constantly contested.[69] When one considers the amount of discourse on the

[65] Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 405.
[66] For instance, see Foucault, "Subject and Power," 221.
[67] Arendt, *Human Condition*, 234.
[68] Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 466.
[69] Arendt, *On Violence*, 82.

body in feminist literature at present alongside Arendt's claims, making a material-immaterial distinction does not appear to be sustainable. I think that is beneficial for focusing on *why* Arendt is describing violence in this way. The inability to properly discern between the physical and non-physical in her account of the space of appearances and what is *real* (discussed via "tangibility" in the previous section) further demonstrates that Arendt's intermittent account of violence as material is not entirely consistent, even if she adheres to this view at times (for instance, she refers to the army and the police as instruments of violence).[70]

To resolve this issue, it is necessary to get at the root of Arendt's concern with violence. The significant difference between power and violence is the potentiality to act otherwise, whereby power permits it and violence (seeks to) prevents it. These are not two competing forces but corresponding ones that are, to steal Arendt's phrase, two sides of the same coin; they are by no means mutually exclusive: "Power and violence, though they are distinct phenomena, usually appear together. Wherever they are combined, power, we have found, is the primary and predominant factor."[71] Arendt's claim that violence can destroy power but not produce it makes sense once violence is installed as the intended prevention of potentiality. It is also worth noting that Arendt is not entirely against violence itself: "Nothing could ever happen if reality did not *kill*, by definition, all the other potentialities originally inherent in any given situation."[72] On many occasions, she even advocated it, such as her desire to have a Jewish Army established in the midst of WWII.[73] Nevertheless, in the absence of meaning, violence becomes useless and incomprehensible, yet it is not always repressive though it aims at prevention. It takes many forms, e.g., coercion, compulsion, incentivization, normalization or monetary persuasion, and it can be personal or institutional. For instance, when Turkey experienced the Gezi protests in 2013, a conglomeration of groups with different motives took to the streets together in an attempt to stifle the increasingly authoritative model of government; in doing so, their actions where aimed at preventing this form of governance (its spontaneity) in various ways, from Molotov cocktails to sit-ins, making the protestors physically or institutionally violent (this is not considering the government's response to the protest, which would be considered preventive, and thereby violent, as well). In

[70] Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, xxxvi, 136, 379.
[71] Arendt, *On Violence*, 52.
[72] My emphasis, Arendt, "Truth and Politics," 557.
[73] Arendt, "Jewish War." For more on the inability to control violence, see Arendt, *On Violence*, 52.

essence, the goal was just as Arendt's previous quote foretold, which was to "kill, by definition, all the other potentialities" that would lead to the continuation of an authoritarian government or the even the arrival of a new one. At the same time, a space where these ideological perspectives could engage in a dialogue arose, producing a rather unique space of appearance, which would be considered the power side of the equation. It would then not be plausible to reduce this to a mere dichotomy of power *or* violence because often times they work together, forming and blocking off competing strategies in a non-linear progression and with complex, interconnecting methods.

While all of this may be the case, there nevertheless persists a dilemma in my expansion of Arendtian violence as to why power is non-instrumental while violence is. Allen correctly notes that power escapes being instrumental by the sheer fact that it is what constructs a meaningful world through intersubjective relationships, or the in-between.[74] This relies on acts never being completely controllable, and thus a component of absolute autonomy will always be missing, which could be why many find violence so appealing in daunting situations, as Arendt acknowledges: "To resort to violence when confronted with outrageous events or conditions is enormously tempting because of its inherent immediacy and swiftness."[75] Thus, it would logically seem that violence would follow the same pattern, whereas in actuality, acts of violence are not aimed at *producing* anything but are rather engrained in the *prevention* of another strategy, be it hegemonic or periphery; though this is often done to secure a path for the subject's own strategy to proceed, this is the side of the issue rooted in power. In the example of the Gezi protests, the protestors did not merely want the current government to resign, but they also wanted a more democratic, inclusive one to take its place, already relying on a space of appearance where electoral politics, democratic governance and the notion of human rights are intelligible. One could also consider the "peaceful" 1908 Young Turk Revolution, where the mere threat of overpowering the central government through a coalition of CUP and minority militias and military forces led to the sultan reinstating the 1876 constitution, which had been suspended for almost thirty years (for more on this, see chapter 9). Thus, relations of violence play into power (and vice versa), but violence itself is not productive, and thereby instrumental and not generative in nature because it must draw on the relations of power that are in play at any moment. Knowledge,

[74] Allen, "Power, Subjectivity and Agency," 137–38.
[75] Arendt, *On Violence*, 63; see also 63-69 for her discussion on rage, rationality and violence.

subjectivities and concepts have assuredly been produced out of violence, but this is a result of those actions – thus being power – rather than the aim of preventing a specific strategy.

As a result, violence is thus heavily engrained in meaning and intersubjectivity – violence cannot come from an isolated individual – and over time nexuses of violence, or systemic prejudicial rationalizations, are built up. This formulation allows the indispensable productiveness of power to remain, and violence is seen as only interacting with the world, not creating it. Certainly, violence would shape and influence the world, working to prevent certain manifestations in order to enable others, but it functions at the level of what already exists. In order for violence to be exercised at any concentration of power relations, they would have to be created first. For this reason, power is still perceived as "the primary and predominant factor" to violence because violence can only spawn from what power has provided subjects with. In the larger picture, violence would need categories of power to justify itself, which could be built up to enable or incentivize acts of violence in certain ways.

Yet, this returns us to the question of whether this leaves violence as a desirable aspect of existence or not. One of the reasons Arendt was so cautious of advocating violence, though not reluctant to do so altogether, was its justification process, which leads to acts the initiator can never fully control. Even in what one would consider a "justified" case of violence, it can very easily get out of hand:

> Violence, being instrumental in nature, is rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it. And since when we act we never know with any certainty the eventual consequences of what we are doing, violence can remain rational only if it pursues short-term goals.[76]

The danger Arendt sees in violence's instrumental existence, i.e., involved in the oscillation between means and ends, "has always been that the end is in danger of being over-whelmed by the means which it justifies."[77] Since we cannot completely control our actions, we cannot know if the means we intend to apply will be the actual means applied, at which point what seemed like a reasonable response could prove unwarranted. One could consider the notorious example of Joseph-Ignace Guillotine's ambition to persuade the French government to adopt a more humane method of capital punishment, which led

[76] Arendt, 79.
[77] Arendt, 4.

to the wide-spread accessibility and implementation of the guillotine; what began as a move to lessen the suffering of the condemned quickly allowed for the mass execution of individuals during the French Revolution, whereby the means unintentionally came to outweigh the end.[78] To this end, Arendt's framing allows her to illustrate the inherent subjective aims that might very well taint specific acts that implement violence; meanwhile, power produces the space of appearance by which, though capable of being employed instrumentally, potentiality has the capacity to prosper.

While Arendt was trying to elicit a difference between justified and unjustified violence, her main point is rather that one cannot control the ends; thus, the longer the means continue, the more chance there is for things to get out of hand: Violence's "justification loses in plausibility the farther its intended end recedes into the future. No one questions the use of violence in self-defense, because the danger is not only clear but also present, and the end justifying the means is immediate."[79] This sends us directly to the difficult question of whether violence is good (desired) or bad (undesired). If we start to look at *nexuses* of violence, meaning the networks of power relations that form the bases from which common violent acts justify themselves, it would be immensely more helpful to us. It would allow us to understand violence (a) descriptively and (b) not in any physical/non-physical binary but in terms of processes of rationalization. Moreover, this aligns with Mark Ayyash's four-dimensional model of violence that revolves around violence (a) as instruments of politics, (b) as the accumulated effects of actions, (c) as the unexpected transformation of actors and (d) the ceaseless functioning of violence.[80] In addition, this Arendtian-Foucauldian approach not only meets the three core points about the concept of violence today (i.e., (1) a core feature of human existence, (2) not only repressive but also creative and (3) intrinsically tied to other concepts) laid out by Gavin Rae and Emma Ingala but moves beyond them by positing a procedural understanding of violence that can be studied.[81] In other words, it not only keeps up with the academic literature on violence but contributes to and builds on it. Essentially, it would allow us to provide a thorough model of analyzing violence without relying on predictive assumptions or conjectures while also better preparing ourselves to preemptively, concurrently or retroactively respond to instances of violence, which is precisely the

[78] Arendt, *On Revolution*.
[79] Arendt, *On Violence*, 52.
[80] Ayyash, *Hermeneutics of Violence.*
[81] Rae and Ingala, "Introduction," 2.

utility a Foucauldian model permits. Transposing Arendt's critique of violence onto a Foucauldian paradigm permits just this.

2.4 Making Foucault Violent: Genealogy, Domination and Freedom

For many philosophers, the inability to even consider accepting Foucault's proposed version of power resulted from how he dealt with, or rather willingly did not deal with, normative judgments, choosing instead to bracket any ontological, epistemic or moral prescriptions altogether.[82] Yet, Foucault was only able to establish his descriptive genealogy by doing so, removing universal normative foundations along with any teleological hardwiring that could explain the progression and future trajectories of humankind. While this is a position that Arendt would have no doubt been in agreement with – and illustrates the importance of investigating our contemporary bias for predictive research – Foucault further wished to show how these mundane attributes and overlooked relationships that shape our moral outlook are consistently drawn into and constitutive of the political landscape, though often going unnoticed. When Foucault argued that "everything is political," he was not arguing that everything is politics but rather that everything, in one way or another, can relate to and affect politics: "To say that 'everything is political,' is to affirm this ubiquity of relations of force and their immanence in a political field; but this is to give oneself the task, which as yet has scarcely even been out-lined, of disentangling this indefinite knot."[83] Without bracketing normative claims, untangling such a knot becomes beyond our reach, or rather without taking such a stance, the whole project of "effective histories" slips through our fingers.

Though we may map out historical developments in this way, or the study of "historical ontology" as some scholars have taken to calling it, we come no closer to achieving an autonomous free will.[84] Yet, it does help in "disentangling this indefinite knot" concerning the dangers of our particular ways of living. Foucault asserted, "We have to know the historical conditions which motivate our conceptualization. We need a historical awareness of our present circumstances," which is precisely what his

[82] For instance, see Fraser, "Michel Foucault"; Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*.
[83] Foucault, "History of Sexuality," 189.
[84] For example, Hacking, *Historical Ontology*; Oksala, *Foucault, Politics and Violence*, 23–24.

genealogical methodology purports to do.[85] This is where his genealogy of *dispositifs* comes into play: "I'm starting off from an apparatus [*dispositif*] of sexuality, a fundamental historical given which must be an indispensable point of departure for us."[86] It is necessary to pinpoint the historical site at which a *dispositif*, in this case sexuality, became something possible to speak of and exercise; therefore, one must home in on "the subjected knowledges which were thus released [and] would be brought into play," i.e., subjectivities (see chapter 1).[87] In this way, the *dispositif* not only draws in power but also Foucault's writings on knowledge and ethics; this importantly illustrates that if power is related to these two, then violence will be too. For instance, one could look at nationalism – as this text will do – and the site at which it became possible not only to belong to a nation, but how individuals as well as nation-states exercised programs of national solidarity and constructed methods for national inclusion (and exclusion), which was a project pursued by both Arendt and Foucault to varying degrees.[88] At the heart of such an inquiry, a historical investigator would be forced to ask, "If power is exercised, what sort of exercise does it involve? In what does it consist? What is its mechanism?"[89] In our new model that addresses processes of violence, these questions become even more complex: "If violence is exercised, what sorts of pathways does it foreclose? What is its justification? How does it operate?" However, before finally assessing how Arendtian violence can fit into this paradigm, we must briefly return to Foucault's distinction between an analytic and a genealogy, particularly in how Arendt's discussion of violence plays into the prior rather than the latter.

Whereas genealogy outlines a *specific* concentration of relations that developed into a *dispositif*, his analytic aligns with the philosophical tradition of critique (see introduction to chapter 1).[90] Arendtian violence can be situated as an analytic of violence as it deciphers the limits and propulsion of violence, not a specific modality of it. Arendt's ambition, as Canovan explains, is not to say what one should be doing "but to distinguish this particular aspect of the human condition from others."[91] What is more, though both Arendt and Foucault attested to the non-teleological construction of our meaningful world

[85] Foucault, "Subject and Power," 209.
[86] Foucault, "Confessions of Flesh," 218.
[87] Foucault, "Two Lectures," 24.
[88] Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*; Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*; Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*.
[89] Foucault, "Two Lectures," 28.
[90] Lynch, "Foucault's Theory of Power," 15.
[91] Canovan, *Hannah Arendt*, 130.

and were interested in discerning hegemonic forms of power, Arendt was far more inclined to engage in the practice of critique when differentiating concepts like violence, force, authoritarianism and democracy, which lines up her ambition with Foucault's in that they both seek to prepare their audience for contemporary crises than resolve or predict them. Her accounts of power and violence assuredly become intertwined with her historical investigations like *The Human Condition* and *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, but her adherence to uncovering a definitive understanding of violence held firm, correlating more with what Foucault meant by analytic than genealogy. Still, the genealogical method was never a goal in itself but indicated a central concern with something else: freedom. Alongside Foucault's portrayal of power, one never omitted element was resistance such that power can only exist as long as there is some degree of freedom (i.e., some ability to act otherwise).[92] This is not absolute freedom from external influences as one typically encounters in the history of philosophy. Certain factors inhibit such transgressions. For instance, I can declare myself a cosmopolitan citizen of the world, yet a national passport is still required to travel internationally. Some notions are able to complicate these boundaries (e.g., stateless persons, refugees, asylum seekers), but the need to organize these divergent groups in some order reinforces the importance of nationality demarcation. A more relevant illustration for our case study is how many Kurdish citizens, though certainly not all or even most, living in Western Turkey try to downplay their Kurdish identity to access a more widely accepted Turkish one, yet it is often the case that this attempt is fruitless as the decision is not solely theirs but relies on the recognition of their compatriots. When factors become so stringently hegemonic, it is domination, and yet we are again confronted here with the dilemmas that face Foucault's interpretation of domination.

To reiterate the three predominant problems with Foucauldian domination, it is (a) inextricably vague, preventing us from determining what is a state of domination and what is not, (b) it never gives us a reason for choosing a situation with more freedom and (c) it fails to explain when a state of domination is beneficial rather than detrimental to the people submitted to it, such as the illegality of murder or traffic regulations. In other words, at what point is a restriction of freedom transformed into domination, and what about situations where a state of domination allows more freedom than it forecloses? These impasses provide the potential to transpose Arendt's analytic of violence into

[92] Foucault, "Power and Sex," 123.

Foucault's larger philosophy to make sense of domination. As such, domination would essentially function as a severe degree of violence that has intensified so much that the exercise of freedom becomes extremely difficult (though not completely impossible, in contrast to Arendt). The result is largely determined in advance with little availability to change this in the process. In Foucault's own words, states of domination occur when "an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations" to the point where "practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained and limited."[93] This account lines up well with Arendtian violence, which targets not bodies but potentiality and, as a consequence, exists in terms of degrees, whereby different amounts of potentiality are able to be discerned. Thus, nexuses of violence (i.e., domination) are a way of discussing a very strong degree of violence that heavily prevents the ability to act otherwise, similar to Arendt's account of Terror. In more concrete terms, *when a series of resistant acts are doomed to failure or inefficacy or the socio-political environment can make it too harmful to follow through on acts of resistance*, it can be classified as a nexus of violence (i.e., a state of domination).

Along these lines, violence can be seen as relational and strategic, just as Arendt originally understood it, but its effects, which are "intentional and nonsubjective," would allow nexuses of violence to calcify, corresponding to the Foucauldian *dispositif*. Notably, the *dispositif* itself wholly belongs to power, yet some *dispositifs* could allow for a greater extent of acts that prevent competing strategies. A genealogist could investigate the productive side (what is being produced via power) or the preventive side (what possibilities are being foreclosed through violence). This preventive dimension, nonetheless, should not be reduced to a Foucauldian model of "juridico-discursive" power that only has the capacity to say "No." Instead, it is an active component that takes advantage of what is in its environment to ensure the failure of competing strategies. In fact, a large portion of Foucault's oeuvre addressed what is here called violence but under the title of power; what this dichotomous framework of power/violence allows us to do is be more pragmatic when conducting – or reading – effective histories. In reality, this technique allows us to bring Foucault's ambition to fruition in that he was constantly searching for a way to differentiate the capabilities power offered from the limits, restrictions and states of domination is set up in the process. Considering Foucault's *dispositif* of biopolitical power, for instance, a unique political rationality was produced

[93] Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 283.

that pictures governing as the art of making and maintaining a healthy population. This rationalization not only prevented other ways of thinking from arising, but it has also produced an atmosphere where systemic types of violence are bound to persevere, such as tensions between a minority and majority population or what the "health" of the population may mean.

These relations, which may come to be seen as natural – for example, majority-minority relations – are in fact contingent structures. While power relations have produced this formula, the practice of violence can be, and has been, strategically employed. Thus, this would not diminish Arendt and Foucault's rejection of traditional frameworks of power since violence does not *repress* but poses the intent to *prevent*. For instance, ghettoization in the U.S. is not imposed through force or government mandates (though it may have been in the past) but through a series of produced political, social and economic mechanisms that have institutionally segregated living spaces. Even those who can economically afford to live elsewhere often continue to live in these neighborhoods due to a feeling of "othering" in more affluent neighborhoods.[94] Though many cases exist where individuals are not being directly repressed or forbidden from doing something – as chapter 10 illustrates in the case of representation and national identity in Turkey – many pre-existing relationships allow others, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to perpetuate this prevention of exiting the ghetto through their own actions. While it has been produced, which is power relations forming as a result of violence, it also allows a plethora of opportunities to prevent, which is where violence comes in. The tactic of genealogies hence becomes a potential strategy for uncovering the historical nexuses of violence as well: "[To] see how these mechanisms of power [or nexuses of violence] have been – and continue to be – invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination."[95] What this calls for is not simply a discovery of violent acts, meaning their *method*, but also a genealogical investigation into nexuses of violence, or their involvement in overarching *strategies*.

It consequently becomes of principal importance to fathom the rationalization behind violence, which parallels the claim made by Oksala such that "we have to

[94] DuCille, "Dyes and Dolls"; Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*; McWhorter, "Sex, Race, and Biopower"; Schiele, "Cultural Oppression."
[95] Foucault, "Two Lectures," 37.

understand the specific and distinct rationality that practices of violence attain in different power networks in order to effectively criticize them."[96] However, she limits her analysis to physical forms of violence.[97] Instead of viewing violence in terms of physical acts, its terminus, one must investigate and seek out the *dispositifs* that are the driving force behind violence: "The analysis, made in terms of power [or violence], must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes."[98] For this reason, Arendt's critique of violence becomes necessary to build upon to uncover specific, historically implemented *dispositifs* that violence draws its force from while also reducing the dangers of resorting to a state-revolutionary dichotomy of violence (see the introduction to this dissertation): "To use [force, power, strength and violence] as synonyms not only indicates a certain deafness to linguistic meanings, which would be serious enough, but it has also resulted in a kind of blindness to the realities they correspond to."[99] This approach would not only separates power and violence but would also concurrently permit a more in-depth debate on specific issues, especially considering that violent acts are categorized *not by their content but by their rationale*. For instance, instead of comparing racial assaults to other assaults, one could link it to other forms of racial violence to understand its limits or triggers.

On top of this, if new forms of power are generative, then old force relations are necessarily being cut off and prevented, or "*killed*" as Arendt claims. Change essentially implies violence just as much as it implies power, but this does not need to involve physical altercations. Perhaps the most violent act – the one where the most potential is cut off – would be the destruction of a paradigm.[100] Within our case study of nationalism in the late Ottoman Empire, as we will see, some of the most "violent," i.e., preventive, acts are performed without any physical altercations occurring like the 1908 Young Turk Revolution (chapter 9), the Tanzimat reforms (chapter 5 and 6) or the use of non-official organizations to curb imperial legitimacy (chapter 8). One could read Arendt's discussion of revolutions and Foucault's comments on fascism in this regard. The French Revolution was the prevention of a certain aristocratic/monarchical social and political hierarchy just

[96] Oksala, *Foucault, Politics and Violence*, 9.
[97] Oksala, 8–9.
[98] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 92.
[99] Arendt, *On Violence*, 43.
[100] One can compare this to positions held by more radical philosophers like Balibar, *Violence and Civility*; Zizek, *Violence*.

as the American Civil Rights Movement aimed, at least by some factions, at the prevention (or rather abolishment) of a racially segregated system. Such a reading reinforces the gap between violence and juridico-discursive power, ensuring they are not reduced to one another. In light of this conclusion, resistance can be seen as the practice of freedom, whereby "more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings."[101] In line with this, just as we can discern networks of power and nexuses of violence within a *dispositif*, we are also able to uncover potential spots of resistance.

2.5 Conclusion: Has the Purge Started?

With all of this in mind, the predicament of whether domination is desirable or undesirable is resolvable by distinguishing first-order from second-order normative claims. First-order normative claims detail the (un)acceptability of particular actions. For instance, understanding murder and graffiti as wrong in-themselves would be in this category, which is often the case in legal proceedings today. These two types of normative judgements are well illustrated in those rare court cases where a judge rules that the time an individual who has been convicted of a crime has already been served while awaiting sentencing, often with the understanding that the judge finds the sentencing unjust. For instance, an 86-year-old Arizona man named George Sanders was found guilty after admitting to killing his wife who had multiple sclerosis and was suffering from gangrene; while he was convicted (i.e., he did in fact commit murder and thus violated a first-order claim, legally speaking), he did so out of mercy rather than anger or hatred. Rather than sentencing the man to prison time, the judge gave him two-year probation due to the fact that it was done out of mercy and not ill-intent.[102] These two approaches to justice in this case highlight the dynamics of first- and second-order normative claims. For second-order claims, the foundation of the act is what is significant, and both Arendt and Foucault, whether directly or indirectly, made a second-order claim that freedom is desirable. Foucault understood this as the *limit-attitude* of the Enlightenment that seeks to both historically understand what we are and test the ability of going beyond that through

[101] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 96.
[102] Funaro, "George Sanders, 86, Gets."

critique.[103] In a unique display of these sorts of normative claims, Foucault asserts that he is in favor of freedom of "*choice*" rather than the freedom of "*acts*," arguing rape should not be included in the fight for sexual rights, which is a strong rebuttal against critics who argue that Foucault's non-normative framework prevents one from making any worthwhile judgments.[104] For Arendt, freedom is the human condition, and to remove that condition would be to cease being human. Thus, "Without a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance…Freedom as a demonstrable fact and politics coincide and are related to each other like two sides of the same matter."[105] As freedom is engrained in power and power is the source of meaning, to remove it would be to make the world unintelligible.

Framing violence as such does not suddenly mean murder or terrorism would be able to adequately justify themselves on a second-order plane as they can extremely restrict, or entirely remove, the potential for spontaneity (as Foucault's comment on rape illustrates). However, this forces us to rethink the way we not only view violence and domination but how we interact with others as well. Not injuring others would not be a sufficient cause to perform an action because you may be restricting freedom in a different respect. On the other hand, acts such as assassinations and uncivil disobedience would have to be looked at from a revised perspective. Oftentimes, someone's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. When discussing the heritage of groups such as the Irish Republican Army or the *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* (Kurdistan Workers' Party), one can most certainly find unjustified acts of bloodshed, but the larger effect of these movements paved the way for political parties like Sinn Fein and *Halkların Demokratik Partisi* (People's Democratic Party). In this respect, these groups opened up far more areas for potential action and thought than would have been possible without them. This claim does not necessarily justify these acts or groups in any way but necessitates a new project that investigates them in greater depth and complexity. Moreover, these groups can easily be contrasted with sects like the Klu Klux Klan and *Daesh* (ISIS), which are largely built upon sustaining the ability to act for some based on the restriction of this right for others. Unlawful acts of civil disobedience combatting systematic domination could be rethought and defended. While not an end-all solution, this interpretation gives us a position to pragmatically assess systemic violence that often escapes detection. At

[103] Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment."
[104] Foucault, "Sexual Choice, Sexual Act," 143.
[105] Arendt, "What Is Freedom," 442.

the same time, it does not disenfranchise resistant and politically charged acts, which are often delegitimized by declarations of "violence"; it also does not empower groups fundamentally rooted in tactics of permanently restricting the potential to act from segments of a population. More than anything, this allows us to reflexively contemplate and struggle against nexuses of power/violence that are near and dear to our daily lives, yet function on the prevention of an other's potential. With all of this put forward, it now becomes necessary to move beyond theoretical foundations and begin to assess exactly how, and how well, this could be applied in praxis.

3. Towards a Genealogy of Violence: Some Quaint Remarks on How to Proceed

"At the risk of offending certain minds for whom the intellect is realized only in intellectualism, let me repeat once more that the intrinsic value of Leriche's theory – independent of any criticism applicable to some details of content – lies in the fact that it is the theory of a technology, a theory for which technology exists, not as a docile servant carrying out intangible orders, but as advisor and animator, directing attention to concrete problems and orienting research in the direction of obstacles without presuming anything in advance of the theoretical solutions which will arise." – George Canguilhem, *The Normal and the Pathological*[1]

3.1 Introduction: Tracing Experiences

Now that a plausible conceptualization of violence has been presented, the daunting task at hand is how to operationalize it in research and thus bring this project to its full potential. As discussed in the introduction, there are a vast array of ways to analyze violence, ranging from Rational Choice Theory and sociological institutionalism to discourse analysis and cultural memory studies. While the goal is not to reject the utility these other approaches, I do wish to emphasize the overinflated value of predictive models as well as the benefits of an explanatory rather than normative approach to studying violence. For many, this is controversial due to the fears of removing a normative framework from violence, which risks unleashing the justification of atrocities. Yet, as noted in the final section of chapter 2, this need not be the case. A second-order normative claim based on a Foucauldian-Arendtian model of violence not only makes it harder to justify violence on this level, but it furthermore makes it harder to criticize violent (understood as the attempt to prevent) actions or groups without relying heavily on the context in which it occurs. This mirrors a good portion of the recent literature on violence, particularly in the domains of critical theory, sociology and anthropology.[2] Moreover, the literature on the procedural aspect of violence has been increasing over the past couple decades, which is promising for our own analysis.[3] The unique value of this approach is thus the ability to better understand how violence operates and the experiences it produces

[1] Canguilhem, *Normal and Pathological*, 101. René Leriche was a prominent French surgeon and professor who attested a theory on pain and its relationship to health. In very vulgar terms, Leriche argued pain was the body's way of communicating illness.

[2] For instance, Aldama, *Violence and Body*; Bates, "Violence of Norms"; Bernstein, *Violence*; Campbell, "Introduction"; Collins, *Violence*; Farmer, "Anthropology of Structural Violence"; Galehan, "Instruments of Violence"; Hajjar, *Sociology of Violence*; McKinnon, *Gendered Asylum*; Moser and North, Wallis and Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders*; Rossiter and Rinaldi, *Institutional Violence and Disability*;

[3] Ayyash, *Hermeneutics of Violence*; Dodd, *Violence and Phenomenology*; Rae and Gavin, "Introduction"; Ruggiero, *Visions of Political Violence*; Skurski and Coronil, "Introduction"; Vorobej, *Concept of Violence*; Wieviorka, "Sociological Analysis of Violence."

rather than focusing on causal mechanisms that often leave underlying conditions of possibility in place and unquestioned.

Foucault's vision for political philosophy was ambitious to say the least, but it provided key insights into the ways in which subjects are socialized into and help maintain their world. Situating our experiences within networks of power relations and *régimes du savoir* presents us with the conditions of possibility, or a grid of intelligibility, which is something many of us take for granted. The commonsensical interactions of everyday life mask the deep historical struggles that went into giving them the appearance of naturalism. The danger in accepting these conditions at face value, as we saw in the previous chapter, is that it can severely limit the freedom of others, even to the point of death. Foucault's ideas can come together rather well on paper, but one dilemma of those seeking to employ his methods is that it is not an easy task. He did not leave us with an explicit methodological framework, so trying to incorporate violence into that methodology means we must find a way to systematize his approach. In this chapter, I lay out my interpretation of Foucault's genealogical methodology within the wider range of scholarship that exists today, both from a theoretical and a practical side. Rather than rely on techniques developed from scholars drawing from Foucault, I invert this process and try to incorporate their insights into the genealogical method that Foucault himself presented (at least to the best of my ability). By doing so, rather than relying on "units of measurement" like instrumental rationality, social symbols, discourse, social movements or cultural memory, the focus becomes subjectivities. To reiterate, though many have assumed Foucault's value rested in his concentration on power (or even knowledge), other scholars like Eric Paras have indicated that it was really *experience* that was the apex factor in Foucault's work. This is precisely what can separate a Foucauldian approach to violence from the vast array of methodologies that exist in the social sciences.

I begin this chapter by noting the impact Foucault has had on specific fields on study in the social sciences, specifically (a) philosophy and identity politics, (b) discourse and dispositive analysis and (c) historicism as well as fields like anthropology and sociology. After these connections are noted, I delve into how Foucault engaged with historical material to capture the existence of particular and historically delimited experiences (subjectivities), particularly through two highly co-dependent tactics: archaeology and genealogy. I will discuss the advice Foucault echoed for those wishing to follow in his tracks, but this will require some creative liberties on my part due to the

fact that primary material is scarce. Finally, I present a formulaic way to perform a historical genealogy (genealogy and archaeology) that will both allow us to map out a *dispositif* and go further than Foucault by interpreting the nexuses of violence that such a *dispositif* enables. Notably, this requires choosing a domain to analyze for conditions of possibilities, *régimes du savoir* and nexuses of violence (i.e., a subjectivity), which will be delineated in the next chapter as national identity (or, crudely put, nationalism) in Turkey.

3.2 Foucault Fandom: Positioning Genealogy in Scholarship

Before jumping into Foucault's methods, it is necessary to situate his techniques within a wider scope of literature. More precisely, there are three specific areas of scholarship that concern Foucault's tactics that need to be addressed to better understand where he is coming from, what his ambitions are and how he strives to achieve those ambitions. These largely orbit around the strong philosophical bias that persists in Foucauldian scholarship itself (see chapter 1), Foucauldian-inspired techniques in research methodologies and how Foucault's genealogy compares to traditional fields of history, sociology and anthropology. With this background in place, I can expand upon the methods that Foucault employed in his own research that are useful to appropriate.

3.2.1 Philosophical Leanings

Perhaps because Foucault's writings had a philosophical weight to them, most Foucauldian literature is little if at all concerned with genealogy's practical dimensions.[4] Though more attention has been paid to certain Foucauldian methodological terms, such as "problematization," "historical ontology" or "eventalization," their theoretical implications rather than their practical application dominate.[5] One result of this is a tendency to downplay contextualization. Scholars like Judith Butler and Giorgio Agamben are examples – though their ambitions are strikingly different, so such concessions are understandable – yet more minute facets of this interpretation have led to

[4] Even many notable Foucault scholars fall into this group, such as Amy Allen, Judith Butler, Arnold I. Davidson, Christopher Falzon, Thomas Lemke, Todd May, Johanna Oksala, Timothy O'Leary, Jana Sawicki and Dianna Taylor.

[5] For some examples on "problematization," see Bacchi, "Why Study Problematizations"; Kelly, "Problematizing Problematic"; Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*; Milchman and Rosenberg, "Michel Foucault." For some examples on "political ontology," see Hacking, *Historical Ontology*; Nichols, *World of Freedom*; Oksala, *Foucault, Politics and Violence*. For some examples of "eventalization," see Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*; Thacker, "Foucault and Writing."

severe mischaracterizations. David Garland argues that power is always highly invested in the body through a system of "micro-physics," yet Foucault only attributed this to disciplinary power, not all *dispositifs*, which is perhaps why Foucault seldomly uses the phrase "micro-physics" after his work on penal institutions.[6] Meanwhile, scholars like Alun Munslow use the concept of *episteme* to divide history into distinct periods and argues that the *dispositif* explains all relations of power equally.[7] However, Foucault's method was merely meant to take into account a political structure at a very specific point of time (as discussed in chapters 1 and 2). In reality, Foucault was keen on praising the contextual efforts in his own work as well as the writings of others.[8]

Along with this, many Foucauldian theorists have stressed that genealogy can only be performed on scientific disciplines.[9] According to these writers, Foucault never meant to judge the viability or veracity of a particular domain of research; instead, he merely showed contingency, flexibility and historicity. Combined with Foucault's early writings on the human sciences, it has been assumed by some that his interest was a distinctively scientific one, which Foucault himself adamantly rejected.[10] He was rather attempting to show the relations that could exist between different spheres, specifically knowledge, power and experience; since "truth" was the first phase of Foucault's evolving project – which often relied on scientific discourses[11] – many have assumed this would carry his work forward. More in-depth readings have opened up Foucault's work to additional subjects,[12] but the notion that Foucault solely meant to illustrate contingency – with no need to actually "map out" our present – maintains itself to an alarming degree.[13] Reading some of Foucault's comments on his method, especially when it comes to "effective history," makes it easy to see where this idea comes from: "'Effective' history leaves nothing around the self, deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial

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[6] Garland, "What is a History."
[7] Munslow, *Deconstructing History*.
[8] Foucault, "Two Lectures," 81. Moreover, Foucault often stresses that peripheral or non-hegemonic knowledges or relations of power are often used to combat totalitarian ways of thinking.
[9] For example, see Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*; Hacking, *Historical Ontology*; Kendall and Wickham, *Using Foucault's Methods*.
[10] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 23; Foucault, "Questions on Geography," 65.
[11] Foucault, "Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations," 116.
[12] Bastalich, "Reading Foucault"; Jäger, "Discourses and Knowledge"; Kelly, *Political Philosophy of Michel*; Nichols, *World of Freedom*; Oksala, *Foucault, Politics and Violence*; Oksala, *Foucault on Freedom*.
[13] For some examples, see Folkers, "Daring Truth"; Garland, "What Is History"; Hansen, "Non-Normative Critique"; Sembou, *Hegel's Phenomenology and Foucault's*.

ending."[14] In reality, illustrating contingency was simply step A, with step B being to show *how* it was contingent, i.e., the conditions of possibility. Perhaps Foucault's emphasis on contingency was to a fault, yet this disposition on contingency also means that readers are ignoring an equally important piece of the puzzle: "If one is interested in doing historical work that has political meaning, utility and effectiveness, then this is possible only if one has some kind of involvement with the struggles…My historical work was undertaken only as a function of those conflicts."[15] Genealogy not only aims to illustrate contingency but also, and more importantly, to illustrate how that contingency has played out in our everyday lives. Beyond exclusively scientific Foucauldians and those simply wishing to illustrate contingency, Foucault strongly attests to the political utility such a genealogy should provide.

3.2.2 The Analysis of Discourse and Beyond

For better or worse, Foucault has had an enormous ripple effect in the social sciences. Somewhat ironically, this has been a result of Foucault's standing in the social sciences. As A. J. Soyland and Gavin Kendall assert, "Foucault is being used to establish a certain authority and legitimacy rather than as the basis for a rigorous method."[16] Two of the most significant purposes for this stem from Foucault's alleged inclusion in the linguistic turn and his discussions on the materiality of language. When combined with a habit of not discussing his methodology with any depth or precision, these two facets have led to an array of self-professed "Foucauldian" or "Foucauldian-inspired" methods. While it would be ridiculous to argue that there is one correct reading of Foucault, this becomes far more problematic when one moves into the realm of research. In light of this, we must be able to come up with some answer for the following two issues: (1) What is the relationship between language and things (or objects) in Foucault, and (2) how is language material for Foucault?

The first question largely has to do with whether we consider objects in the world to exist outside of language. In other words, what is true or false is determined by how it relates to an objective and observable world, yet the force of the linguistic turn seemed to reject this idea of language corresponding to objects. Oksala argues that Foucault is not denying correspondence theory or an extralinguistic reality but merely seeks to

[14] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 380.
[15] Foucault, "Questions on Geography," 64.
[16] Soyland and Kendall, "Abusing Foucault," 11.

problematize this connection.[17] On the other hand, Mark Kelly views this line of thought in Foucault as neo-Kantian since Foucault is differentiating "things-in-themselves" from how we come to interact with those things through our socialization, states of mind and human perceptions, meaning what these "things" really are is not our concern.[18] Yet, this emphasis on language has led many discourse analysts to utilize Foucault in strictly linguistic and, at times, ahistorical ways, largely extending beyond faithful interpretations. When confronted with an interviewer who pushed him into distinguishing his terms "discursive" and "non-discursive," Foucault responded that "it doesn't much matter for my notion of the apparatus [*dispositif*] to be able to say that this is discursive and that isn't…given that my problem isn't a linguistic one."[19] As early as *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault is already emphasizing that he is not interested in the underlying rules of linguistic ontology but rather in discursive practices as something that can be historically studied: "Those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules. [Archaeology] does not treat discourse as a *document*, as a sign of something else."[20] This approach has largely been supported and expanded upon by actor-network theory, although many misconceptions or misunderstandings of Foucault's work continue to exist in the literature.[21]

In response, many scholars have emphasized that Foucault was not interested in discourse as representation but rather as a practice, i.e., discursive practices.[22] This has led to the unique technique of *dispositive* analysis rather than *discourse* analysis.[23] In the field of dispositive analysis, there is often an open acknowledgment of language being valuable to the extent that it is a practice, whereby language loses its position as a privileged method of analysis. Siegfried Jäger and Florentine Maier even argue that Foucault "subordinates language and also linguistics to thought and knowledge," whereby it is really a concentration on the latter that can give us insights into "meaningful human activities."[24] Though a significant assertion, it is essential to further claim that Foucault is not analyzing meaning but rather strategies, from which meaning then bases itself:

[17] Oksala, "Foucault's Politization of Ontology."
[18] Kelly, *Foucault and Politics*, 55.
[19] Foucault, "Confessions of Flesh," 198.
[20] Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 138.
[21] This is an issue I have discussed elsewhere, so I do not elaborate on Foucault's relationship to actor-network theory in great detail here. See Maze, "Normativity Versus Normalisation."
[22] For example, see Hook, *Foucault, Psychology*; Thacker, "Foucault and Writing."
[23] Assman, "Collective Memory and Cultural"; Assmann, *Cultural memory and Western*; Caborn, "Methodology of Dispositive Analysis"; Jäger, "Discourses and Knowledge."
[24] Jäger, "Discourses and Knowledge," 41.

relations of power should be "conceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its effects of domination are attributed not to 'appropriation,' but to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings."[25] Therefore, when pondering the relationship between language and things, it should be clear that it is a strategic relationship. While seemingly trivial, it can be surprisingly easy to lose sight of the strategic side of the equation when searching for the historical formation of power relations and meaning. In other words, the goal of Foucault's genealogy was not to explain specific, socially developed meanings (which are the effects) but rather to put forward particular, historically constructed strategies and their *modus operandi*.

Nonetheless, there is still the need to categorize the medium of strategies, even within the field of dispositive analysis, and this is where language's materiality becomes critical. During the 1960s, Foucault sought to distance himself from prominent groups of purely linguistic theorists, so he introduced the notions of discursive and non-discursive. By and large, this was meant to show that an analysis could not ignore phenomena like architecture, dieting, institutions, customs, modes of representation, cultural rituals or physical training. By the 1970s, he had seemingly realized that readers were taking these terms too seriously and stopped using them,[26] but it appears that readers still strictly adhere to this distinction. To resolve this issue, he was already referring to discourse as an "event" by 1971, which illustrated the materiality of language:

> An event is certainly not immaterial; it takes effect, becomes effect, always on the level of materiality. Events have their place; they consist in relation to, coexistence with, dispersion of, the cross-checking accumulation and the selection of material elements…The philosophy of event should advance in the direction, at first sight paradoxical, of an incorporeal materialism.[27]

The introduction of discourse as an event, or "eventilization," stresses not only *what* language is but also *how* it is used. "Incorporeal materialism" begins to signify that discourse is highly engaged and interconnected with all sorts of material, be that paper, computers, advertisements, warning signs, instructions, prohibitions, daily schedules or trading logs. The argument is essentially that discursive *practices* are so entangled and appear so materially that there is no way to disentangle them, something actor-network theory has wholeheartedly embraced. However, and more importantly, because Foucault is interested in strategies, there really is no need to separate them. When Foucault says

[25] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 26.
[26] Foucault, "Confessions of Flesh."
[27] Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 231.

that power is material, this is not to signify that it operates only through non-linguistic means but that it functions on any available means. In essence, *not only what is said but how it is said*.

3.2.3 Genealogy and History

The two most concerning aspects when it comes to Foucault and historical research are, first, accusations of presentism or relativism and, second, his self-attested lack of interest in causality. The fact that Foucault's position stands as devoid of any normative principles has long led critics to argue that there is no standardized way of comparing different epochs, and Habermas has gone so far as to ask why we should resist anything if nothing is better or worse than what comes before or after it.[28] At the same time, scholars like Kelly have taken to embracing the notion of historical relativism in Foucault since it has "no clear teleology," but that just means that there is no ultimate direction society must go towards, not that history is just a matter of interpretation.[29] As Derek Hook argues, the answer is to be found in Foucault's conditions of possibility: "A skepticism of truth here defers not to a 'baseless' relativism, but instead to a carefully delineated set of conditions of possibility under which statements come to be meaningful and true."[30] In other words, Foucault is merely changing the historical question from "What was so-and-so's theory" to "Why was so-and-so's theory considered true or false."

Alongside this is a fear of presentism in Foucault, which strongly stems from different interpretations of his "history of the present." According to this line of reasoning, Foucault is using contemporary concepts and notions to interpret the past. For instance, if I asked the question "How democratic were the Middle Ages," the question would be nonsensical as the present-day notion we have of constitutional democracy did not appear until centuries later. However, Foucault has no intention of implementing contemporary concepts in the past but rather showing how certain ways of thinking and acting emerged more recently than previously thought. In this way, Foucault wishes to use history as a means to better understand our present circumstances, not reinterpret history using current concepts. While many continue to read Foucault as a deconstructivist, his desire is actually rooted in uncovering historical developments instead of simply deconstructing

[28] Some examples include Fraser, "Michel Foucault"; Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*; McCarthy, "Critique of Impure Reason"; Munslow, *Deconstructing History*.
[29] Kelly, *Foucault and Politics*, 39.
[30] Hook, *Foucault, Psychology*, 105.

the rationale behind a *dispositif*, meaning his methods juxtapose those of deconstructivism.[31]

Yet, possibly the most troublesome claim Foucault makes for many historians is that he is very little – if at all – interested in causality. Many historical investigations set out to show how one event caused another, and even within the field of intellectual history there is the goal of explaining why certain ideologies and ways of thinking changed over time. However, Foucault had two things in mind when making such an assertion, one of which was philosophical and one of which was practical. For starters, the belief in causality tends to point to certain processes that are bound to appear cross-culturally and -temporally, but it has simultaneously been the driving force behind the great teleological models of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as Marxism, psychoanalysis, eugenics, evolutionism, race theories or structuralism, just to name a few. Even in the political language we use today, we assert a certain order to the world like "first-world," "developing" and "third-world" countries, which on some level attests to an expected order to human development (e.g., modernization theory). As Foucault did not believe in this, it seems logical that he would reject causality as such, but on a more practical level he was concerned with the relational development of power-knowledge. For him, there is no unitary way to explain events but rather a vast array of contributing causes that could not easily be deciphered. In this way, his genealogies were able to focus on *how* things changed without getting too caught up with the *why*, and since his analyses were concerned with the present rather than the past, this did not propose a grand problem:

> As a way of lightening the weight of causality, "eventalization" thus works by constructing around the singular event analyzed as process a "polygon" or, rather, "polyhedron" of intelligibility, the number of whose faces is not given in advance and can never properly be taken as finite…The further one breaks down the processes under analysis, the more one is enabled and indeed obliged to construct their external relations of intelligibility.[32]

This tool of "eventalization," which as I understand it forces one to look at gradual interactions than seeing events as decisive breaking points, is quintessential. For instance, in chapter 5, the 1808 Charter of Alliance is discussed as well as the 1839 Gülhane Edict. While many have argued that the prior or the latter has served as an Ottoman Magna Carta, the problem is that these were not sudden developments; they relied on the decades

[31] This contrasts with those who read Foucault as a deconstructivist, like Munslow, *Deconstructing History*; Ross, "Errors of History"; Sembou, *Hegel's Phenomenology and Foucault's*.
[32] Foucault, "Questions of Method," 227.

of relations that existed both prior and after them, neither of which would be possible without the gradual expansion or retraction of certain strategies at the time. Does this mean Foucault never deals with one event causing another? Not at all, but he does reposition its prioritization, which becomes less on explaining *why* such a change came about and more on explaining *how* the games of truth changed. Oftentimes, he gives a variety of causes but never attributes primary causality. In effect, he is far more concerned with explaining the "intelligibility" of these changes in a coherent manner.

3.3 Methodology I: Foucault on Genealogical Research

Although Foucault never gave a detailed methodological overview, he did give us indicators of what the general rules for doing so were. However, it is necessary to distinguish the methodology employed in his earlier writings, which he termed "archaeology," and the methodology that appears later on, which is "genealogy." While many theorists have taken genealogy to be a replacement for archaeology,[33] this has often come from those more interested in Foucault's philosophical implications and not his approach to historical material. Genealogy was more of an expansion on archaeology than a replacement,[34] or what Koopman calls "genealogy-plus-archaeology."[35] Foucault himself was very straightforward on this point:

> It is thus that critical [archaeological] and genealogical descriptions are to alternate, support and complete each other. The critical side of the analysis deals with the systems enveloping discourse; attempting to mark out and distinguish the principles of ordering, exclusion and rarity in discourse…The genealogical side of discourse, by way of contrast, deals with series of effective formation of discourse.[36]

At its core, archaeology analyzes the structures of knowledge at any given time, whereas genealogy is concerned with the struggles and conflicts that blossom into power relations; another way of looking at it would be to say that archaeology is interested in networks whereas genealogy is interested in emergence and processes; when combined, these illuminate subjectivities. The methods introduced when he started using the term genealogy were always meant to assist and give a more refined picture to what he was already doing.

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[33] For example, see Nichols, *World of Freedom*; Rabinow and Dreyfus, *Michel Foucault*; Thacker, "Foucault and Writing."
[34] Garland, "What Is History"; Kelly, *Foucault and Politics*; Thompson, "From Historical."
[35] Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*.
[36] Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 234.

3.3.1 Archaeology: The Elements of a Discursive Formation

While *Archaeology of Knowledge* or *Order of Discourse* might seem like logical places to find Foucault's methodology, how the prior dealt with archaeology left quite a few questions in place, such as what differentiated discursive and non-discursive objects and how broad *epistemes* were. Meanwhile, the latter served more as a segue to Foucault's genealogical period. Since the works in which Foucault discusses his archeological method with any specificity are rather limited, "On the Archaeology of the Sciences" is a perfect – and largely understudied – essay to turn to because it addresses his methodological choices more precisely with an emphasis on techniques, all while using the same terminology as the *Archaeology of Knowledge*:

> What has to be brought out is the set of conditions which, at a given moment and in a determinate society, govern the appearance of statements, their preservation, the links established between them, the way they are grouped in statutary sets, the role they play, the action of values or consecrations by which they are affected, the way they are invested in practices or attitudes, the principles according to which they come into circulation, are repressed, forgotten, destroyed or reactivated. In short, it is a matter of the discourse in the system of its institutionalization.[37]

From this summary of archaeology, we can draw a number of key points for investigating knowledge. For starters, Foucault is clearly interested in the conditions which make knowledge possible rather than what ideologies are in play. Second, archaeology is focused on a specific *point* in time, which contrasts with genealogy in that genealogy is concerned with the interplay of competing strategies over a *period* of time. While there is a clear preference for discursive practices here, the role of non-linguistic mechanisms is still quintessential to properly grasping a regime of knowledge. It is important to recall that Foucault understands discourse not as a unit of analysis but as an "event" or practice.

From this, Foucault specifies four interdependent "criteria" that are necessary to explain a discursive formation, which is "the set of rules which takes account of the object's noncoincidence with itself, its perpetual difference, its deviation and dispersion rather than of the object itself in its identity."[38] In other words, it is not how the meaning of one word changes over time but rather what it means at this particular point of time within a larger network, which is not the same as arguing a word has just changed over time. For instance, prior to the nineteenth century, race denoted lineage and heritage, often to discern family trees in upper class families; however, with the introduction of the

[37] Foucault, "Archaeology of Sciences," 309.
[38] Foucault, 313.

human sciences, especially biology, sociology and ethnology, race came to have ethnic or sectarian connotations in a completely new regime of knowledge. It was not just a word that had changed but the entirety of the regime of knowledge. In light of this, the four elements necessary to uncover a discursive formation are (1) the referential, (2) enunciative divergences, (3) theoretical networks and (4) the field of strategic possibilities.

The referential refers to the subject matter at hand. Rather than studying fluctuations in an object's identity – or meaning – over time, the goal is to elicit the subject matter's limitations, noting an object's "perpetual difference, its deviation and dispersion" within a single discourse; this technique accommodates the fluctuating meanings or interests in any object.[39] Foucault argues that these objects themselves are the result, not the cause, of discursive formations, so it is necessary to grasp the different ways in which a referential is described and justified. The goal is to decipher the implicit rules in forming statements about a referential such that the referential functions as the "*law of dispersion* of different objects or referents put into play by an ensemble of statements *whose unity this law defines precisely*."[40] If we consider the case of evolution in the nineteenth century, a plethora of ideas about what evolution meant co-existed, which can be represented by three nineteenth century evolutionists: Samuel George Morton, Carl Vogt and Robert Knox. According to Morton, one of the founders of American ethnology, different races were not originally the same, nor did they evolve to form their unique characteristics; species of men remained stagnant and merely migrated to their best-suited environment.[41] In contrast, Vogt argued for polygenists, which means he believed races evolved from different origins, meaning the different races of man were actually different species.[42] When it comes to Knox, he was a monogenist that argued that humans evolved from a common ancestry but in different ways, whereby some evolved more than others.[43] Foucault's interest in the referential is not what these ideologies were but rather what allowed these to be held to the same standards of scientific validity while many others did not meet the criteria. In essence, the question is what the underlying rules

[39] Foucault, 313.
[40] My emphasis, Foucault, 314.
[41] Morton, *Crania Americana*.
[42] Vogt, *Lectures on Man*.
[43] Knox, *Races of Man*.

that tie all of these theories to the same system of judging valid and invalid statements are.

In addition to the referential, there are enunciative divergences, whereby enunciations that "are far from obeying the same formal rules, from having the same exigencies of proof, from maintaining a constant relation to truth, and from having the same operational function" are nevertheless capable of conglomerating into a single corpus of knowledge.[44] In essence, an array of incompatible statements and systems come to unravel or support one another in rather unpredictable ways, and what they have in common is a specific discourse. In the evolutionary example given above, what is able to connect these theories, as well as various other forms of racial enunciations, is simply the discourse of evolution, which is itself constituted by the divergences present in these individual statements. In this way, a discourse "is characterized, as an individualized discursive set, by the divergence or the law of dispersion which governs the diversity of its statements."[45]

In addition to the referential and enunciative divergences, Foucault stresses the notion of *theoretical networks* at some length, particularly to emphasize the analytical move away from concepts: "This system is not constituted by concepts any more general and abstract than those that appear on the surface and are openly manipulated there."[46] Foucault explains that concepts can be seemingly hegemonic or definitive, yet there are many cases where new concepts arise that are incompatible or contradictory to those that came before them or those that appear alongside of them. In other words, a concentration on particular concepts eventually illustrates that one is not really concentrated on games of truth but rather manifestations of it, which does not help us uncover the conditions of possibility. Instead, Foucault chooses to home in on the "set of rules of formation of concepts," meaning the rules that must be followed to introduce a concept or prohibit it from being a legitimate theory.[47] These often rely on a variety of institutional factors. In this way, Foucault defines a theoretical network as "the general law of [a group of fundamental concepts'] dispersion, heterogeneity, and incompatibility (whether simultaneous or successive) – the rule of their insurmountable plurality."[48] As stressed

[44] Foucault, "Archaeology of Sciences," 315.
[45] Foucault, 315.
[46] Foucault, 316–317.
[47] Foucault, 317.
[48] Foucault, 318.

before, one of the key differences between Foucauldian genealogy and intellectual history is that the latter is strongly ingrained in historical concepts whereas the prior is concerned with the rules that make the emergence of those concepts possible at all.

Finally, Foucault handles the complexity of various opinions and choices that exist within any system. While the traditional approach would be to take the identity of opinions or statements in their similarities, Foucault's central concern is always relations of power, which are strategic by their very existence. What connects different opinions in the same discourse is not *what* they are saying but rather the fact that they both have the same material to work with: "What permits the individualization of a discourse and gives it an independent existence is the system of points of choice which it offers from a field of given objects, from a determinate enunciative scale; and from a series of concepts defined in their content and use."[49] One could also consider Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X, who both dealt with intense issues of racial inequality and various forms of abuse yet were emphatically opposed for a long time.[50] What merges them into an individualized discourse is not the fact that they were both living in the same culture, nor the fact that they were employing the same concepts, nor the fact that they were contemporaries. What unites them, or at least what Foucault is interested in uncovering, is that "their two options derive from one and the same distribution of points of choice, in one and the same strategic field."[51] In other words, what makes a unified discourse is that the various contributors to this discourse are working with the same material and rules (i.e., the same subjectivity, so to speak), so it is thereby necessary to capture the *field of strategic possibilities*, which is "the law of formation and dispersion of all possible options."[52] As part 2 of this text will demonstrate, though the Young Turks at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century are often found to be the successors of the Young Ottomans during the 1860s, these two groups deal with entirely different fields of strategic possibilities; this is not to say the prior did not influence the latter – they unarguably did – yet they were operating within two different discursive formations.

In eschewing the traditional referents that are conventionally vital for any assessment – such as "objects," "thinkers" or "texts" – Foucault extracted the relational

[49] Foucault, 320.
[50] It should be noted that the relationship between the two activists was shaky and fluid, and over time the ideas presented by both, but especially Malcolm X, fundamentally shifted.
[51] Foucault, "Archaeology of Sciences," 320.
[52] Foucault, 320.

components that can make any of these possible. He was very clear that these four elements allow one to establish the contours of a *régime du savoir*, here meaning a discursive formation:

> When it is possible, in a group of statements, to register and describe *one* referential, *one* type of enunciative divergence, *one* theoretical network, *one* field of strategic possibilities, then one can be sure that they belong to what can be called a *discursive formation*. This formation groups together a whole population of statement-events.[53]

However, we must remind ourselves that these techniques belong to the archaeological side of the genealogical equations, and thus their ambition is to lay out *régimes du savoir* at a particular point in time: "The set thus formulated from the system of positivity, and manifested in the unity of a discursive formation, is what might be called a knowledge."[54] Initially, Foucault would compare two separate slices of time to show a discontinuity – two or more differing experiences – yet as his methodology emerged, he sought to trace the emergence of these discursive formations and explain the job of power relations in entangling with systems of knowledge. Thus, the genealogist needs to look for these four elements, but that is only part of the work.

3.3.2 Genealogy: Methodological Precautions

Compared to archaeology, Foucault was even more obscure about his genealogical methods. A text like *History of Sexuality: Vol. I* has chapter titles like "Domain" and "Methodology," but these tended to be vague and theoretical by the standards of the social sciences. He frequently laid out a distinct set of methodological precautions that were meant to steer genealogists in the right direction, but there are perhaps numerous reasons for his reservations. For starters, genealogy requires a great deal of flexibility because power does not function in the same way in every case. In one interview, the interviewer even pointed out that his analyses do not always come from "below," which contradicts Foucault's notion of an ascending analysis; in response, Foucault explained that he merely wanted to explain that there is always "a difference of potentials" that have to be considered: "In order for there to be a movement from above to below there has to be a capillarity from below to above at the same time."[55] Moreover, one is rarely dealing with

[53] Foucault, 321.
[54] Foucault, 324.
[55] Foucault, "Confessions of Flesh," 201.

the same sort of concrete material, which is also another potential reason as to why Foucault is appropriated by so many disciplines using a vast array of methods.

Too much ambiguity nonetheless runs the risk of undermining a researcher's entire enterprise, so it is necessary to understand what exactly Foucault was looking for, and the best place to start is by revisiting his genealogical precautions. Though these appear in numerous places, the most coherent, clear and direct version possibly comes from his "Two Lectures."[56] First of all, Foucault urges his listeners to avoid concentrating on central forms of power and instead to turn towards "power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions."[57] Trying to discern intent may be fruitful for some types of historical investigation, such as how intellectual history often wants to understand why someone believed in or argued for something, but it does the genealogist no good. Rather, the genealogist should pinpoint the place at which intent meets its target. One useful tactic that can be adopted from anthropology is the practice of participant observation, which Kathleen Musante defines as "a method in which a researcher takes part in daily activities, rituals, interactions and events of a group of people as one of the means of learning both the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and cultures."[58] While it is often done in ethnographic and anthropological research by fieldwork in other cultures and participating in those cultural activities, it is strongly applied by Foucault in many ways as well. The goal is to map out the practices that the subjects during this period were not only part of but which acted upon them as well. This method will be particularly notable, for example, in chapters 7, 8 and 9, where I use a close reading of local scenarios, texts, personal relationships and technical strategies that were deployed across the social spectrum.

If we revisit the issue of evolutionary theories in the nineteenth century, we can see that outside of the texts, the arrival of a divisible hierarchy of man was intensely interwoven with political practices like ghettoization, racial segregation, forced castration, re-education programs and child abductions, all of which in turn influenced the *régime du savoir* that was developing. In other words, genealogy would be interested

[56] For various discussions of these precautions, see Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 23–24; Foucault, "Ethics of Concern," 299–300; Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*; Foucault, "Power and Strategies," 142.
[57] Foucault, "Two Lectures," 96.
[58] Musante, "Participation Observation," 251. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Adrian Brisku for pointing me in this methodological direction. For more on this, see DeWalt and DeWalt, *Participant Observation*; Jorgensen, "Participant Observation"; Tedlock, "Participant Observation to Observation."

in where the discursive formation of racial identity "invests itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments."[59] This was precisely how Foucault approached discipline, whereby he looked at how the form of punishment – and later correctional practices – met the body, often employing what is now understood as participant observant techniques; this was also employed to explain precisely where biopolitical power met the population through regulative practices like quarantine, medicalization and the discursive productivity around sexuality. An important dynamic to keep in mind in terms of discipline is that Foucault was doing a genealogy of the prison, yet it was "discipline and surveillance" that were the experiences encapsulated in the disciplinary *dispositif*. In the case of national identity emerging in the late Ottoman Empire, the genealogy (as will be shown in part 2) functions on a representative *dispositif* that reaches into a vast array of institutions and identities aside from national ones, which requires a close contextual and cultural reading of events. Remembering that genealogy is concerned with power struggles rather than intellectual ones, this step makes sense. If one dislikes the formation of looking for power "at its extremities," one could understand this as *pinpointing the place where techniques of power become invested in their target*.

Foucault's second methodological precaution has a lot to do with his strong interest in practices as well as his theory of socially constructed subjectivities. Rather than looking at "conscious intent or decision," meaning why people are doing and saying what they are, one should assess what practices are being materially employed and how they are, in turn, constituting subjects in specific ways. This requires us to revise how we understand the notion of "intent." If we recall that Foucault wishes to remove *the* subject from his works – he is merely concerned with subject positions – what might this mean? What we can decipher by his usage of "intent" in this passage is that a practice targets the *object*. For instance, early sexual psychologists were interested in an individual's desire, but the only way to target desire was through techniques like confinement, assessment, regulation, physical restraint, isolation or examination. Most of all, however, it required constant verbalization or written declarations of the individual's experiences and desires. The result was a slew of information and an incessant need for one's sex to be spoken about; eventually, one's desire, which was targeted through an array of material techniques, came to constitute that individual as a sexual being, which became the foundation for a whole *régime du savoir* on sexuality. Thus, when Foucault argues that

[59] Foucault, 96.

"we should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects," I argue that it means we must locate where power comes in contact with its object, and how that object responds.[60]

The third methodological precaution refers back to power never being owned, only ever exercised. This can have wide-ranging repercussions for actual genealogical research, and it is also a safeguard against more elitist readings of history. While many may assume that power completely controls individuals, Foucault is very explicit that power relations can only exist as the effects of action, yet through these actions it constitutes the subject: "Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain…[Individuals] are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power."[61] Since Foucault is interested in subject *positions*, the question we are dealing with is still one pertaining to the conditions of possibility and the mechanisms that sustain it. Who says what to whom? Who is exposed to institutional or cultural practices, and by whom? What is the point of this exercise, and what effects does it have on those initial strategies? It is not enough to focus on one side of the relationship, as these are always reciprocal in some way or another. What is more, it dissuades the researcher from getting drawn in by specific persons and requires one to view the emergence and development of practices – discursive, institutional or otherwise – through a network of relationships. The practice of participant observation and some tenets of actor-network theory, such as objects and environments having non-subjective agency, allows us to approach these issues with more nuance and contextualization, not only in how strategies were deployed but also how they were received (i.e., reacted to).[62] It also prevents a reductionist reading that views history as a series of critical junctures that are then locked into a path-dependency, which Vivien Schmidt has argued for in terms of discursive institutionalism.[63]

The fourth methodological precaution concerns performing an "ascending" analysis. Foucault is not insinuating that one must start at the bottom level of society and work one's way up, although this could be a possibility. Rather, he is interested in explaining how peripheral and somewhat unimportant mechanisms came to be

[60] Foucault, 97.
[61] Foucault, 98.
[62] For more on actor-network theory, see Latour, *Reassembling Social*; for a discussion of Foucault and his relation to actor-network theory, see Fox, "Communities of Practice, Foucault"; Maze, "Normativity versus Normalisation."
[63] Schmidt, "Discursive Institutionalism."

incorporated into a larger framework and employed *en masse*: "One needs to investigate historically, and beginning from the lowest level, how mechanisms of power have been able to function."[64] An interesting example comes from this text's case study. Many theorists of nationalism have argued that literacy was a driving factor in the emergence of national identity. It is not that Foucault would disagree with this, but he would instead ask a different question: Why did literacy became so important at this point in time? In terms of the Ottoman Empire, the *ulema* (Islamic scholars) maintained an exclusive right to literacy, and it was only in their schools that one could learn the written language employed for bureaucratic documents and transcriptions. Yet, as the sultanate wished to incorporate a more industrial education, which could then mimic the technological advances in Europe, there was a need to extend access to literacy beyond the *ulema*. This would in turn greatly diminish the *ulema*'s political strength, which meant that tools like the printing press came to be widely used much later than in many European countries. Thus, it is not a question of *what* happened, which in this case would be an increased level of literacy, but rather *how* that happened through various practices. As Foucault writes, "It is only if we grasp these techniques of power and demonstrate the economic advantages or political utility that derives from them in a given context for specific reasons, that we can understand how these mechanisms come to be effectively incorporated into the social whole."[65]

The final methodological precaution returns to Foucault's emphasis that he is not interested in ideologies. Foucault explains that what is happening "is the production of effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge – methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control."[66] In other words, as these mechanisms take hold, as discussed in the fourth precaution, the researcher must keep an eye open for the eventual emergence of a new frame of reference, i.e., new conditions of possibility. If power relations become invested and reliant upon these emerging techniques, it should be recognized that they "cannot but evolve, organise and put into circulation a knowledge, or rather apparatuses of knowledge, which are not ideological constructs."[67] While the persistent rejection of the search for ideologies may seem somewhat annoying for those who have read Foucault

[64] Foucault, 100.
[65] Foucault, 101.
[66] Foucault, 102.
[67] Foucault, 102.

at length, one can simultaneously notice that Foucault is drawing a line in the sand between his own work, which is on regimes of knowledge and mechanisms of power, and those who seek to understand a specific system of thought. While Foucault is not disenfranchising those who work on ideologies, he is arguing that these investigations have no place in genealogical analysis. In this way, it is possible to sum up Foucault's five methodological precautions:

1. Analyze power at its extremities where practices invest themselves in techniques and institutions.
2. Uncover the location where an intentional practice directly encounters its target as well as how this target responds to those practices.
3. Avoid reading history from the perspective of the elites and instead portray how these practices of power relations were circulated between subjects by subjects.
4. Perform an "ascending" analysis, by which peripheral techniques and practices come to be incorporated into large-scale models throughout society.
5. Illustrate how these emerging practices came to found a new *régime du savoir* as well as how this new regime interacted with emergent practices.

From this discussion, we are able to ascertain that a variety of key variables have been put into place. In terms of knowledge, Foucault's archaeological method set up four interrelated and quintessential elements: a referential, enunciative divergences, theoretical networks and the field of strategic possibilities. In order to properly map out a *régime du savoir*, it is necessary to have distinguished all of these elements at a specific point in time. At the same time, we are left with five methodological precautions that are meant to point the genealogist in the right direction while also allowing some room for adaptability depending on the *dispositif* in question. From this, one can assess how the relationships between power, violence and *dispositifs* are constitutive of a historically particular experience.

3.4 Methodology II: Looking for Power and Violence within a *Dipsositif*

Whenever one begins a genealogy, the initial step involves "problematization." While many scholars have recently dealt with this concept,[68] it should nevertheless be realized that there are two components to any problematization. The first has to do with choosing a subject to investigate, and Foucault very clearly asserts that one finds the basis for this subject in the present: "I set out from a problem expressed in the terms current today and

[68] See note 233.

I try to work out its genealogy. Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question posed in the present."[69] The need to find a contemporary problem to trace back to its emergence in Foucault's writing may be lost on us today, but it was not on his readers at the time. *The Order of Things* was written at a time when the centrality of man in Marxist and psychoanalytic discourses in France was at its peak, and *Discipline and Punish* was released against the backdrop of ever-increasing prison riots. Even *History of Sexuality: Vol. I* came out in the mid-1970s, a time frequently referred to as the Sexual Revolution. While many view problematization as the result of genealogy, such that genealogy should make an experience problematic to accept – and this certainly is one ambition – Foucault seemed to have something else in mind, which was to see a topic that was already problematized in society as the incentive for a genealogy.

At the same time, problematization also referred to the starting point of an emerging *dispositif*. For Foucault, these great historical discontinuities and ruptures were only able to push forward because there was an "urgent need" or a severe social or political necessity to resolve them. As a solution to this problem becomes more urgent, a variety of practices and institutions form and develop around a particular object. When used in this context, Focuault defines problematization as "the totality of discursive and non-discursive practices that introduce something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought."[70] When explaining the case of prisons and the rise of criminology in the eighteenth century, Foucault poetically captures this urgency: "One has the impression that it is of such utility, is needed so urgently and rendered so vital for the working of the system, that it does not even need to seek a theoretical justification for itself, or even simply a coherent framework."[71] When it came to legal transgressions, some sort of system needed to be in place to deal with organized crime that had developed out of the mass deployment of the prison. Therefore, we have two primary objectives when initiating a genealogy: (1) to specify a particular experience that is problematic for us today, and then (2) to locate the point, temporally and spatially, where it emerged due to a social or political necessity.[72]

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[69] Foucault, "Concern for Truth," 262.
[70] Foucault, 257.
[71] Foucault, "Prison Talk," 47.
[72] As a caveat, it is fundamental to state that there was an urgency to dealing with this problem, which is why it was a necessity, but the particular way it was dealt with was in no way necessary; it could have happened very differently if the situation had gone differently.

Once we have chosen an issue, we can turn to the second step. In doing so, the archaeological method will deal with a synchronic slice of time, yet the need to assess changes requires us to perform this technique at more than one point in time. In doing so, we will be required to wrestle four elements of a discursive formation from the networks of power at play: the referential, the enunciative divergences, the theoretical network and the field of strategic possibilities. While many have adopted a strictly discursive way to approach this, Foucault's stringent emphasis on institutions, non-textual practices and the circulation of knowledge between all of these loci means we must mix our reading of texts with the settings in which they were exercised. Meanwhile, the genealogical method takes into account the diachronic changes that occur between different slices of time, including the emergence of the phenomenon we are investigating. Importantly, we must keep in mind that we are interested in strategic interactions rather than meaning. It is thus necessary to assess the strategies that are being deployed among various texts, institutions, cultural rituals, subject positions, architectural placement or means of communication that reveal the relationships between different components. In other words, the genealogist pieces together the mechanisms that emerge and result in an overarching strategy, i.e., a *dispositif*, that in turn cements, to a large degree, some stability into the functioning of these mechanisms.

Though this may all seem somewhat complex, Figure 1 shows that this need not be the case. Breaking down the components of this approach, it can be shown how this methodology is not as daunting as it may appear. The relationship between W and X (~WX) marks our initial point of interest. The relationship here is referring to the *dispositif* being exercised, whereby W is the mechanism and X is its target. The goal at this point is to locate this as the period with an urgent need. Before jumping into *how* these strategic relations changed, it is necessary to grasp the conditions of possibility in play at that given time. To do this, I will look at the contemporaneous texts and various social dynamics of the time, relying both on primary texts as well as a vast array of secondary literature on the practices in the late Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it is necessary to emphasize that we are not only concerned with power (attempting to control the action of others) but also violence (the attempted prevention of other strategies). In this way, relations of violence can become just as meaningful as relations of power, particularly when they form a cluster of relations that makes acts of violence possible or easier. After this, it will be necessary to trace the emergence of peripheral mechanisms that are

incorporated into the modifying network of power relations. This involves looking at how diverse strategies are being incorporated, what their target is and how the target is reacting to this strategy. Each of these will have an effect on the emergence of this *dispositif*. Again, during this phase, the role of texts, institutions, practices, objects, architecture and larger social arrangements will need to be taken into consideration, all of which involves the constant iteration of Foucault's five genealogical precautions from the previous section. From this, a genealogist can trace the eventual establishment of this *dispositif*, which is the relationship between Y and Z (~YZ). The reason the model shows ~WX and ~YZ instead of ~WX and ~W'X' is that these are entirely new strategic formulations for Foucault. The identity of statements over time is not taken as a given, and this forces us to see the emerging relational network as something related to but ultimately detached from its predecessors. In other words, this *dispositif* that we are looking at is something new.



Figure 1

For instance, consider a simplified version of Foucault's disciplinary power, which was the successor of sovereign power. In this way, W would be equal to the authority of the sovereign, whereas its target, X, would be equal to punishment as the political coercion or submission of the sovereign's subjects. ~WX would be seen as the intended prevention of undesired acts through the eyes of the sovereign. 1, 2 and 3 are illustrative of contributing factors to this relationship (though they can extend far beyond this number), such as vassalage, tax farming, mercantilism or public executions. In contrast, Y would be seen as the new disciplinary and surveillance mechanisms that

emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while Z would be the discipline that was dispersed onto the bodies of individuals (and the stress is on *individuals* rather than *subjects* here) in order to correct abnormalities, or what Foucault calls the "soul."[73] Consequently, ~YZ is a disciplinary mechanism that acts directly on the "soul" of individuals. In the process, various other established or emerging factors played into this, such as (1*) criminology, (2*) organized crime and (3*) panoptic techniques. However, in order to get to ~YZ, Foucault had to trace the combating strategies that came into play, such as various notions of how best to punish individuals, the effects of mass incarceration – such as organized crime and psychiatry being introduced into the legal system – the failure of the prison system altogether and the desire to re-incorporate lost souls back into society. The most important facet for us, however, is to understand which capabilities arise within this new *dispositif* as well as socio-political arenas where the potentiality to act is extremely limited (i.e., nexuses of violence).

What can we then deduce from this genealogical methodology? First off, we can take into consideration the *dispositif* that was uncovered. While Foucault was careful not to give any prescriptive directions, he was wont to map out the new capabilities that came with this new disciplinary *dispositi*f, which we likewise would want to do. However, by incorporating our understanding of violence, we would want to go further than this. This should not be seen as an un-Foucauldian or post-Foucauldian technique, as Foucault himself expressed a sentiment to do this: "What is at stake, then, is this: how can the growth of capabilities [*capacites*] be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?"[74] It is absurd and a bit ostentatious to think that incorporating violence will achieve this on its own, but it moves us in the right direction. Therefore, while it is necessary to map out our capabilities (which is particularly accomplished in chapters 8 and 9), it is just as important to map out regions of prevention (chapter 10). In any system, there are bound to be places where, due to the strategic networks, the exercise of certain practices will be harder or almost impossible to deploy. For instance, disciplinary institutions made it necessary to listen and record the activities and performance of individuals being observed – what Foucault calls "examination" – but it also meant that this individual had little say over their assessment; it could even lead to their ultimate life-long commitment to a psychiatric institution, whereby they would lose almost all sway

[73] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
[74] Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment," 317.

over their day-to-day executive functioning and often be the subject of mind-altering medical practices. What is different in disciplinary institutions is that everyone falls into this role, from the prisoners to the guards to the warden. Everyone becomes accountable, which makes any adjustments to the system extremely difficult, since stepping out of line can either push you out of the institution or increase your own surveillance.

We can invoke two notable examples of this. First, we can consider police officers in the US who speak out against other officers abusing their positions. Officers who try to correct the system are frequently fired, demoted or put into a place where they cannot interfere with future occurrences of the same activity. A more recent example is the digitalized social ranking system that China has recently deployed. While the goal of this system is to ensure citizens are acting in government-sanctioned manners, it also means that those who speak or act out against systemic injustices are themselves prevented from doing this in the future. For instance, if I try to protest this system, my ability to purchase transportation tickets, attend certain events or even walk in certain places can be revoked. Becoming individualized bestowed a vast number of opportunities onto individual subjects that would not have existed before, but we must be able to see both sides of this. As a result, it is necessary to decipher both the capabilities that derive from a *dispositif* as well as the nexuses of violence that arise.

3.5 Conclusion: A Genealogy of Violence?

Today, an almost infinite number of strategies exist for analyzing violence, yet as I have illustrated (see the introduction to this dissertation), these often view violence in physical and quantifiable terms. While institutional and cultural approaches have begun to give a more nuanced and varied glance at this phenomenon, they often fall back on causal models that can explain the effects of violence but are rarely able to account for the procedural and experiential elements of it. The value in Foucault's genealogical methodology is that it presents a way to operationalize experiences by looking at power relations (strategies and reactions) and knowledge (*régimes du savoir*). By navigating the terrain that already exists in the field, such as the philosophy of violence, Foucauldian studies, discourse and dispositive analysis and intellectual history, we are able to situate genealogy (i.e., archaeology + genealogy) as a methodology that takes subjectivities as its object of investigation rather than things like instrumental rationality, symbolism, cultural norms, ideologies, discourse, memory, social movements of radicalization. In

doing so, it can help us understand mechanisms (or *dispositifs*) that create and limit the ways we think, act and think, which in turn helps us differentiate our capabilities and our restrictions or limitations, as well as the potential in transgressing these.

One thing that has not been much discussed in this chapter, nonetheless, is the issue of "data" or the "material" to be studied, yet this is precisely a facet of the genealogical methodology that is adopted here. In an interview published under the title of "Prison Talk," Foucault explains this issue at some length:

> Establishing a corpus of source data does indeed pose a problem for my research, but this is undoubtedly a different problem from the one encountered in linguistics, for example. With linguistic or mythological investigations it is first necessary to take a certain corpus, define it and establish its criteria of constitution. In the much more fluid area that I am studying, the corpus is in a sense undefined: it will never be possible to constitute the ensemble of discourses on madness as a unity, even by restricting oneself to a given country or period. [75]

For some more empirical scholars, this could seemingly raise some red flags, yet that returns us to the issue of what we are studying (subjectivities) and how we are studying it, which is not "discourse" nor "memory" or "social norms." In reality, we are studying specific types of relationships that evolved into techniques and practices that were adopted to, as a whole, construct an entirely new human experience, as Foucault goes on to explain:

> With the prisons, there would be no sense in limiting oneself to discourses *about* prisons; just as important are the discourses which arise within the prison, the decisions and regulations which are among its constitutive elements, its means of functioning, along with its strategies, its covert discourses and ruses, ruses which are not ultimately played *by* any particular person, but which are none the less lived, and assure the permanence and functioning of the institution. All of this has to be brought together and made visible by the historian. And in my view, this task consists rather in making all these discourses visible in their strategic connections than in constituting them as unities, to the exclusion of all other forms of discourse.[76]

As we turn towards the case of Turkish national identity and its emergence in the late Ottoman Empire, we must constantly keep this in mind. Sometimes mechanisms are formed as part of official discourses, legal mechanisms and imperial projects, yet at other times these emerge from community practices, smuggled pamphlets or secret societies. At times, the language of officials is taken up and appropriated by local farmers or

[75] Foucault, "Prison Talk," 38.
[76] Foucault, "Prison Talk," 38.

resistance groups and turned into rebellious or revolutionary actions. Each of these go into ways that national belonging becomes planned, then becomes implemented, then is reacted to. The strategies are constantly changing, and deciphering the practices and techniques that arose and became centrifugal forces in the propulsion of national identity (or even collective identity at all) is necessary (as chapters 5, 6 and 7 do); one must not only look at discourse – and different types of discourse at that – but also at its materiality, the reactivity of other subject positions or strategies and physical sites that either absorb or resist these practices. It is with this in mind – as well as the archeological and genealogical principles laid out in this chapter – that such networks of power relations, systems of knowledge and nexuses of violence will come to life in the following chapters.

Part Two – Towards a Genealogy of Violence: National Belonging and Representation in the Late Ottoman Empire

4. The End of Nationalism? What an Idiot…

"Each murder, each massacre and act of cruelty in the history of a nation that isn't accounted for injects venomous blood, drop by drop, into a people's veins. And when all the blood in their veins has been replaced – a bit of blood, a bit of flour, a bit of blood, a bit of flour – the new citizens will be ready to applaud as a statue of tyranny is erected before their very eyes. The character of this new citizen isn't described very favourably in the ensuing pages of history. But once you change the character, it is easy to change the rest…"
– Ece Temelkuran, *Turkey: The Insane and the Melancholy*[1]

4.1 Introduction: How Did We Get Here?

A time came when there was no need to worry about a Cold War. Politicians and writers from across the political spectrum united in claiming that the age of nationalism had ended. An era of multiculturalism and human rights had started, ushering in a whole new frontier. A new world order was envisioned, and the fear mongering that went into the East-West divide had met its demise. People around the world were becoming enlightened. Rationalized. They had emerged from the Platonic cave of their petty differences, becoming educated and evolved. They sought the ideals of liberal democracy. They sought to speak for themselves, on the cusp of a new era of politics. Representation had arrived to replace nationalistic, religious and ethnic fervors, and it was through such rationalistic and dialogic means that society would finally throw off the veil of ignorance. Not only did the public present a conscience of their own, but public consciousness was the only way forward. Governments *by* the people *for* the people. Walls fell. Regimes were toppled. Nations crumbled. It had been a long and bloody road, but no longer would tyrants and elites rule over the people. People would rule over themselves. The democratic revolution had arrived, and with it were the multitude of freedoms and promises of civilization that had been promised for eons. The golden age of humanity had arrived, or so we thought…

Within a few years, genocides occurred in Rwanda and Bosnia. Though these could have been early indicators that the newfound politics of eroding national identities had been mistaken, liberal and multicultural agendas dug in. Looking back now, it is increasingly clear that not only were these post-Cold War musings wrong, but there continues to be a great deal about nationalism we simply do not understand. What is more, the tensions and frictions caused by claims to national identity have only been exacerbated in recent years. In effect, one of the biggest political problems of our day – one that has

[1] Temelkuran, *Turkey*, 46.

people reacting on all sides, engaging with one another and trying to implement distinct techniques and strategies – continues to be the phantom of national identity. While it is often argued that this is some default, misunderstanding or shortcoming on the part of representative politics today, whether liberal or democratic, this second part of the dissertation will argue – particularly in chapter 10 – that this is in fact an intrinsic component of the representative system. Moreover, it is only through such a system that national identity and belonging, and thus nationalism, becomes possible at all.

National identity seems like an ideal place to perform a genealogical analysis. In the following chapters, I work towards enacting the type of historical analysis grounded in Foucault's methodology on the topic of national identity in Turkey. Yet, if this is to be done, three important questions must be answered: (1) Why national identity? (2) Why Foucault? And (3) why Turkey? It should be clear by now why national identity is a prime case for genealogical investigation, and it is even more suitable since our concern is violence. Since the end of the Cold War, some of the deadliest global phenomena have been rooted in national sentiment. Aside from this, however, is the sheer fact that many are inextricably suffering from a variety of forms of violence that permeate almost every nation state today. Though this is not always deadly, it is always violent and has been debilitating to many. The result has been an intense studying of nationalism that has accrued decades of literature. Though the answer to the first question is straightforward, what Foucault could add to this literature is a valid concern.

4.2 Foucault and Nationalism: Is There Even a Point?

Many impeccable scholars have already had their say about nationalism. What might a Foucauldian approach add? Constructivists approaches to the development of national identity have certainly had their skeptics, the most prominent being Anthony D. Smith's ethnosymbolism. Smith raises four issues he sees with constructivist interpretations of nationalism such that (1) the constructivist portrayal is that the nation is a "malleable and modern" entity that will cease to have influence once deconstructed, (2) that history is elite-driven and that (3) constructivism shows a disregard for the emotional and symbolic ties of individuals to nations and (4) constructivists' focus is on memory in contrast to historical facts and events.[2] However, many of Smith's concerns seem to be grounded in

[2] Smith, *Nation in History*, 107–109.

confusion rather than valid fears. Recognized constructivist authors like Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner and Miroslav Hroch contend that though national identity is constructed, it is not something that can simply be deconstructed; national identity has become very real and tangible for us.[3] Moreover, these authors frequently deal with the strong emotional bonds established between a population and its nation-state. Hobsbawm in particular is concerned with "invented traditions," which are not easily cast off, and Gellner drives this point home even further:

> It is important not merely that each citizen learn the standardised, centralised, and literate idioms in his primary school, but also that he should forget or at least devalue the dialect which is *not* taught in school. Both memory and forgetfulness have deep social roots; neither springs from historical accident.[4]

In regards to the final concern Smith puts forward, I would argue that it is precisely the memory of historical events that shape national sentiment in the present, and the usage of national history in many countries today, such as Serbia, Hungary, Turkey and the United Kingdom, illustrate that historical facts do not exist as separate from the memory of them when it comes to national sentiment, especially when considering that Foucault's genealogy is one that is interested in the present.

Smith's concern that constructivist studies of nationalism are elite-driven might hold more water for some of these authors, but certainly not all of them. These authors, as well as many others, tend to employ methods of intellectual history, and they often paint a teleological picture of the development of national identity for all cultures. What Foucault is able to offer is more contextualization and a deeper understanding of the inner workings of this experience (i.e., subjectivities). For instance, Gellner believes the gradated move from monarchical systems to nation-states requires the use of literacy, but he is less concerned with how the political struggles surrounding literacy played into national identity.[5] By focusing on strategies, Foucault offers us a promising technique to supplement more traditional versions of historiography, even those that are constructivist in nature. From this, a Foucauldian genealogy of national identity seeks out the aspects of the phenomenon, "in what we tend to feel is without history – in sentiments, love,

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[3] For some examples of scholars who hold this opinion, one can see Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*; Gellner, *Culture, Identity, and Politics*; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Giddens, *Nation-State and Violence*; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*; Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National*; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European*.
[4] Hobsbawm, "Inventing Traditions"; Gellner, *Culture, Identity, and Politics*, 17.
[5] Gellner, *Culture, Identity, and Politics*, chap. 2.

conscience, instincts," that are typically overlooked and ask how it was they came about through historical ruptures.[6] These do not come from nowhere, *ex nihilo*, as both Smith and Foucault argue, but emerge from struggles and conflicts, which is something more theory-centric interpretations of nationalism fail at.[7]

While these debates may seem outdated, it is worth noting that most current research in nationalism studies still begin with the groundwork of these trailblazers. What is striking is how much the focus of using the "nation" as the object of analysis has led to an overreliance on path-dependency, determinism and structural rather than agential elements. These dilemmas have partially been resolved in newer studies on cultural memory, which uses memory rather than the nation as the object of investigation. A number of prominent scholars have used the procedural aspects of memory – which contrasts with the more rigid teleological interpretations of nation-state development – to explain how such sentiments pertaining to the nation have been maintained and sedimented.[8] Just as significantly, this has allowed the discussions of national belonging to veer away from the state as the driving actor in the process to investigate other forms of belonging pertaining to national identity, which is an element emphasized throughout this part of the dissertation. Traditionally, research has revolved around the state-revolutionary axis discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, particularly involving the role of war and militaries in the nation-building evolution.[9] Such studies should certainly not be said to hold little value, and they give key insights; however, they have also privileged the state as the driving factor in nationalism studies and downplayed other dynamics by privileging this interpretation. Cultural memory studies has been able to expand the scope of the field by looking at other, non-state driven functions and factors that give a more detailed description of national belonging.[10]

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[6] Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 370.
[7] Foucault, "Subject and Power," 221; Smith, *Nation in History*, 110.
[8] For some studies that strongly employ such an approach, see Confino, "Collective Memory and Culture"; De Cesari and Rigney, *Transnational Memory*; Erll, *Memory in Culture*; Pedriali and Svettieri, *Mobilizing Cultural Identities*; Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory.*
[9] For example, see Hutchinson, *Nationalism and War*; Laugesen and Fisher, *Expressions of War*; Scheff, *Bloody Revenge*; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European*; Wimmer, *Waves of War*; Yeck, "Armenian Nationalism."
[10] Some notable illustrations of this are Ahmed, *Young Turks and Ottoman*; Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism*; Cörüt and Jongerden, *Beyond Nationalism and Nation-State*; Doumanis, *Before the Nation*; Eriksen, *Antiquities to Heritage*; Giofsios, "Between Greek Nationalism"; Fernée, *Enlightenment and Violence*; Grant, *Black Men, Intergenerational Colonialism*; Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National*; Rodriguez and Fortier, *Cultural Memory*; Rigney, "Remembrance as Remaking"; Rock, *Intergenerational Memory and Language*; Street, "Literacy and Nationalism"; Vakali, "Nationalism, Justice and Taxation."

The study of banal nationalism, or rather everyday nationalism, has similarly made inroads into understanding national identity from a procedural perspective, yet this field can largely be separated into contemporary and historical studies; this work is strongly dedicated to the latter, though it aspires to engage with the prior through genealogy. Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich have recently compiled a fantastic collection of articles focusing precisely on this in the book *Everyday Nationhood*, covering both camps of banal nationalism.[11] A Foucauldian expansion of this trajectory would be of particular use to this field. For starters, these studies often rely on immersing themselves in the minute and everyday practices of cultures, employing the participant observation technique from anthropology to sniff out the social mechanisms and techniques that go into projecting national belonging and identity as such. Additionally, this requires highlighting the non-subjective and overarching networks that not only shape but continuously contribute to the meaning evoked in nationalist sentiments. Finally, dispositive analysis allows one to delve into not only discourse but discourse as a practice intertwined with an array of corporeal and symbolic institutions and rituals that must be given equal attention. In this way, it has some advantages over cultural memory studies by seeking to look beyond what is said and show an interest in how, when, where and to whom it was said, much like discursive institutionalism does. Not all of cultural memory studies falls into this dilemma, and there is a rich literature that looks at phenomena like museums, traditions and national institutions to explain national memory; nonetheless, there has been an overreliance on discourse itself (see chapter 3, section 2, sub-section 2). Works like Maarten Ginderachter's *Everyday Nationalism of Workers*, Donald Grant's *Black Men, Intergenerational Colonialism and Behavioral Health* and Esra Özyürek's *Nostalgia for the Modern* have exemplified these advantages to show how routine and common practices have been – and continue to be – fundamental to shaping national identity.[12] Studies like these have helped open the way for further explorations into the experiences that national belonging produces. The Foucauldian project put forward in this dissertation hopes to build on these while also providing a template for further research into the subjectivities that emerge from such procedural identity formations, and it does so by bypassing the impasses produced in the traditional state-revolutionary dichotomy, using the nation as the unit of analysis, focusing on memory over experience, relying

[11] Skey and Antonsich, *Everyday Nationhood*.
[12] Ginderachter, *Everyday Nationalism of Workers*; Grant, *Black Men, Intergenerational Colonialism*; Ongur, "Identifying Ottomanisms"; Özyürek, *Nostaligia for Modern*.

heavily on discourse itself rather than discourse as a practice and ignoring non-subjective entities and their role in nationalist sentiments.

While all of this explains what Foucault can add to nationalism studies, the phenomenon of violence is an entirely other matter. A few years ago, Miroslav Hroch conveyed in a conversation that nationalism had gotten a bad rap. He specifically was concerned with scholars overlooking all the positive developments that emerge with national identity, such as compatriotism or a cohesive community bond. It is no secret that much of nationalism studies is concerned with violence.[13] The dilemma this raises is the predominantly negative stance many researchers enter the field with, tying nationalism with an unwanted negativity (much like the introduction of this chapter laid out in the optimism of moving past nationalism). Perhaps more than anything – and possibly why Foucault is so beneficial to nationalism studies – the genealogical approach forces the researcher to bracket normative claims about national identity and the violence it causes, at least until the genealogy is complete. The second-order normative claim that an Arendtian-Foucauldian perspective gives (see the conclusion of chapter 2) towards freedom and violence causes us to reassess what we think about national belonging. From a Foucauldian perspective, it is not as simple as casting off the yoke of national identity, as Francis Fukuyama notoriously argued with the fall of the Soviet Union, for a preferred cosmopolitan stance. National identity has been built into how we interact and engage with the world. I am not arguing that it has not been used for oppression and massacres – it unarguably has – but it has provided us with a set of tools by which we read the world. It is neither good nor bad in itself. It merely exists and is contingent upon how subjects deploy it. In addition to this, the methodology conveyed in this dissertation provides an exhaustive but highly flexible approach to assessing differing types of violence by tying them to our experiences and the *dispositifs* that produce them, which has largely been understudied in this field. Thus, a Foucauldian perspective brings an invaluable advantage for the future of nationalism studies, particularly when it concerns violence.

[13] The literature on this is vast, but for some studies on nationalism and violence, see Aldama, *Violence and Body*; Arnold, *Russian Nationalism and Ethnic*; Auyero, Bourgois and Schepter-Hughes, *Violence at Margins*; Aydin and Emrence, *Zones of Rebellion*; Bergholz, *Violence as Generative Force*; Bernstein, *Violence*; Booth, *Guatemalan Nightmare*; Brooke, *Terrorism and Nationalism*; Ferguson and Cairns, "Political Violence and Moral"; Hinton and Hinton, *Genocide and Mass Violence*; Holly et al., "Belonging for Violence"; King, *Extreme Politics*; Malešević, *Sociology of War*; Malthaner, "Violence, Legitimacy and Control"; Marcus, *Blood and Belief*; North, Wallis and Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders*; Skurski and Coronil, "Introduction"; Tezcür, "Violence and Nationalist Mobilization"; White, *Transitional Justice and Legacies*;

This brings us to the question of why Turkey has been chosen as a case study. While focusing on one case can be far more fruitful and exhaustive than the cursory genealogical inquiries of diverse comparative ones, we must be cautious of not perpetuating a universalized experience when it comes to things like national identity. Correlation does not imply sameness. In fact, as we will see, the experience derived from the case of Turkey is quite unique, and this separates the potential of genealogy from a large portion of literature on nationalism. On top of this, it makes it more problematic to discuss "trends" of nationalism. Certainly, some general conclusions can be made, but it must not be forgotten that these are unique historical developments, and perhaps when we all talk about nationalism or national identity, we are not really talking about the same thing. More precisely, the techniques and counter-strategies that may be effective in France or the US will most likely fail in the Turkish setting, illustrating the need for a contextual analysis and preparation for local circumstances. As for Turkey, while it has been considered a European country in some respects, with the Ottoman Empire sharing many similarities and many ambitions with its more European counterparts, it had some unparalleled trajectories. The respective stratagem – or *dispositifs* – that emerged pushed forward a particular set of rules regarding truth and power, such that the violence surrounding national identity in Turkey today remains staunchly embedded in games of representative politics. Turkey does not present a special case in any way, but rather a good one.

4.3 The Turkish Case: Problematizing National Belonging

In Adana, supporters of a far-right political party surround a man with a dark complexion during anti-Kurdish riots with the intent to kill, only to discover he is a non-Kurdish member of their own political party when a police officer intervenes.[14] A young woman has both of her legs amputated after dual suicide bombers attack a pro-democracy rally in Ankara, and she goes on to successfully sue the Turkish government for failing to take the necessary security precautions.[15] Police take action against leftist groups at the International Workers' Day rally in Taksim Square on 1 May 1977, leaving dozens killed and hundreds arrested as panicking crowds attempt to flee.[16] A group of intellectuals meet at a hotel in Turkey in 1993 to read Salman Rushdie's "The Satanic Verses," whereby the

[14] *Express*, "Turkish Nationalists Beat Compatriot."
[15] *Stockholm Center for Freedom*, "Woman Who Lost Legs."
[16] Baykan and Hatuka, "Politics and Culture."

hotel is set ablaze by a religiously conservative mob; thirty-five people were killed.[17] On 25 October 1996, Leyla Kaplan, a member of the radical Kurdish group the PKK, walks up to the Adana Police Rapid Force Directorate and sets off a bomb strapped to her person, killing three and injuring twelve.[18] Turkish citizens flock to the streets on the night of 15 June 2016 after an impromptu call to arms is aired on TV by then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan; F16s circle the capital, sending sonic blasts through the streets and launching missiles into the Turkish parliamentary building. A couple weeks later, a group of men attack a French tourist in the capital, continually beating and harassing him until he repeats "I love Turkey."[19] The armed forces announce a sudden curfew in the heavily Kurdish city of Cizre from 4-11 September 2015, threatening execution on sight for anyone seen out of their home.[20]

What unites all these events is that one would say they are somehow connected to nationalism, and yet if one is asked how, the question takes on a new dimension. What do these events share? They are certainly not all provoked by the same type of nationalism, nor the same ideology. Some involve isolated incidents while others speak to larger social phenomena. Nevertheless, there seems to be an everyday understanding of "nationalism" that unites them. If asked if nationalism was a factor in these events, one would most likely say yes. Deciphering the precise reason for this, however, is slightly more complicated. In this text, I focus specifically on this relationship of individuals in Turkey to the Turkish nation, asking how this became possible historically. What was put in place and when? How did this impact individuals' relationship with the state? Moreover, what can these rules tell us about the situation today? In doing so, I move away from the typical term of "nationalism" in order to avoid ideological connotations and opt for terms like "national belonging" or "national identity" to situate these relationships. The current problematization is a very critical issue. Turkey has been engaged in an almost forty-year civil conflict – that some openly refer to as a civil war. There have been numerous clashes between members of different political parties. The failure of the military *coup d'etat* in 2016 led to the largest administrative and political crackdown in the country's history. Mass protests sparked by an incident in Istanbul's Gezi Park led to widespread participation but also the widespread use of brutal police tactics. This text

[17] Pope, "Muslim Mob Torches Hotel."
[18] Eager, *From Freedom Fighters*, 176.
[19] Smith, "Tourist Beaten to Pulp."
[20] *Vice News*, "Turkish Siege of Cizre."

seeks to understand the underlying *dispositif* through which these actions are interpreted. As such, it will not explain *why* these events happened, but it does try to shed light on the subterranean relationships that could explain *how* they did. Moreover, the strong connections between nationalism studies and violence make this a prime case study to exert a Foucauldian-oriented genealogy of violence based on the emergence of national identity. As such, this dissertation engages with the enormous field of Turkish nationalism studies.

In this respect, one should make a division in the research available on Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism studies is a rich field that has exponentially expanded in the twenty-first century. Many of these are contemporaneous accounts, which are not overly useful for our immediate consideration. However, they will be brought in both in chapter 10 as well as the conclusion to see how the results of our genealogy can interact with them in unique ways. The other side deals with the historical development or emergence of nationalism (or more usefully, national identity and belonging) in the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic. For instance, a number of studies have sought to better understand the political dynamics and political economy of the Ottomans during the reformists periods of the long nineteenth century, often concentrating on the relations that developed between different subject positions.[21] An interesting dynamic that is akin to some of Foucault's own work has been the concentration on the emergence of imperial military practices and the consequences of limitations on what could be done, especially in the borderlands.[22] Moreover, the legal changes during the nineteenth century, which were significant for the Ottomans, has caught the attention of certain scholars, giving way to a rich exploration of Ottoman legal mechanisms that shaped how the empire engaged with its subjects.[23] While these studies frequently focus on the state as the primary actor, with exceptions, they have paved the way for further research into a variety of non-state areas of society, sometimes in very creative ways.

One field of study that has been able to show the fluctuating relationships between state and non-state actors has been the attempts at establishing a more solid educational

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[21] For example, see Brisku, *Political Reform in Ottoman*; Coşgel, Miceli and Rubin, "Political Economy of Mass"; Köksal, *Ottoman Empire in Tanzimat*; Meyer, *Turks Across Empires*; Turnaoğlu, *Formation of Turkish Republicanism*.
[22] Klein, *Margins of Empire*; Özbek, "Policing Countryside"; Rogan, *Frontiers of State*; Schull, *Prisons in Late Ottoman*.
[23] Amara, "Civilizational Exceptions"; Öztürk, *Ottoman and Turkish Law*; Powell, *Shari'a in Secular Age*; Rubin, *Ottoman* Nizamiye *Courts*; Sönmez, "Kanun-ı Kadim (Ancient Law)."

structure, particularly for a desired industrialization era. Scholars like Selim Deringil, and Emine Evered have shown the influence of non-state education and missionary practices in shaping how the central government thought about education in general.[24] Alongside this, Benjamin Fortna has taken a more microscopic look at the practices that were employed within state and non-state schools as well as how various populations responded to such reforms.[25] Others have taken the reformists as their starting point for education, seeing how the reforms were used to bolster national education, literacy, technical training and the controversial role religion was to play in these schools.[26] Yet, with the increase in education came an explosion of literacy and accessibility to the press. Some used the press to their advantage, having the novel opportunity of reaching a wider public through such practices.[27] Ebru Boyar has uniquely portrayed the complicated and nuanced relationships that existed between presses, both public and underground, and the empire.[28] Likewise, Kemal Karpat has illustrated the way in which popular Islamic social movements utilized these new tools to expand their influence and political leverage.[29] Scholarship like this has allowed academics to look beyond state-centric (or rather imperial-centric) approaches to comprehending social developments and processes.

Other topics, nonetheless, have offered an expanding opportunity to look at how differing and often competing social elements engaged in these political struggles and fundamentally influenced them. An increasingly rising wave of research has focused on the role of what we would refer to today as civil society and how these actors used the new mechanisms available to them to their advantage.[30] In a different but similar vein, some have taken up the notion of the public sphere in nineteenth century Ottoman society, especially when it came to the novel notion of public opinion.[31] These studies have been invaluable in understanding how society was developing in its own peculiar path outside of or alongside the imperial government, often playing a just as significant (if not more) role in the new technologies of imperial and collective identity – which paved the way

[24] Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Evered, *Empire and Education*.
[25] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*.
[26] For example, see Gündüz, "Empire and Education"; Somel, *Modernization of Public Education.*
[27] Çiçek, *Young Ottomans*.
[28] Boyar, "Press and Palace."
[29] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*.
[30] Alexander and Laiou, "Health and Philanthropy"; Laiou, "Between Pious Generosity"; Masters, "Christians in Changing World"; Ömür, "Sufi Orders in Modernizing"; Vovchenko, *Containing Balkan Nationalism*; Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*.
[31] Gencer, "Rise of Public Opinion"; Geber, "Public Sphere and Civil"; Hoexter, "Waqf and Public Sphere"; Kırlı, "Surveillance and Constituting Public"; Şiviloğlu, *Emergence of Public Opinion*.

for national identity over time. Writers like E. Attilla Aytekin, Kemal Karpat, Janet Klein or Ussama Makdisi have gone even further than this by studying the relations of power that centered on how the large majority within populations responded to the nineteenth century reforms and changes; in doing so, they have shown the quintessential agency these subjects performed yet has almost unanimously been overlooked in traditional works.[32] Much in line with this dissertation, they have reinvested overlooked players in Ottoman history with a productive and participatory role than previous scholarship would have been able to offer.

These advancements have paved the way for discussions of representative and participatory politics that serves as the apex of this work (as subsequent chapters will make explicit). On the one hand, studies have pinpointed the creation of representative practices that were meant to replace older Ottoman rituals, essentially as an incentivizing exchange.[33] One component of these studies that has made them particularly appealing to complementing a Foucauldian approach is their concentration not only on what was said, but who it was said to, how, when and where. Additionally, they have used the literature on materiality and research to emphasize how discourse and materiality shaped one another, perhaps by no one better in this period than Klein's *Margins of Empire*. Similarly, studies on memory studies, museumology, architecture, tourism, architecture and archaeology have laid out the role material institutions and practices played in shaping national identity; these are extremely important when it came to historiography and establishing a unifying narrative for Ottoman belonging.[34]

What makes a Foucauldian-inspired addition to this field a compelling and notable area of research is the ability to concentrate on subjectivities and experiences through an uncovering of *dispositifs*. While these studies are remarkable and essential for making a genealogy of national identity and belonging possible, they often rely heavily on circumstances, intellectual history, archeology or identity politics to explain how developments were made in the past. As this section will show, tracing back national inclusion from a concern for the present (i.e., a history of the present) sets this study up

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[32] For example, see Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations, Property"; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*; Klein, *Margins of Empire*; Makdisi, *Culture of Sectarianism*.

[33] For instance, one can look at Bragg, *Ottoman Notables and Participatory*; Çiçek, *Young Ottomans*; Gülalp, "Using Islam as Political"; Gürpınar, *Ottoman/Turkish Visions of Nation*; Klein, *Margins of Empire*.

[34] For some fantastic studies on this, see Ersoy, "Architecture and Search"; Fetvaci, *Picturing History at Ottoman*; Necipoğlu, *History and Ideology*; Piterberg, *Ottoman Tragedy*; Sabri, *Imperial Politics of Architectural*; Saw, *Possessors and Possessed*; Yürekli, *Architecture and Hagiography*.

to make a serious contribution by using these studies as jumping off points. The goal is not to describe political circumstances, material developments or sociological symbols but rather the mechanisms that foster such processes in the first place. Thus, I strongly engage with these works, some more than others (such as Klein and Karpat, who use very similar methods but on different topics or more concentrated on a specific area) but work on situating the relationships that existed and how these relationships fundamentally changed over time. What is more, this period of Ottoman studies is staunchly interested in the increasing levels of violence that ensued during this period: numerous wars, unprecedented massacres, interreligious and intercommunal violence, imperial oppression, press censorship, expulsion and imprisonment, political assassinations, the presence of imperial militaries and regional militias, revolutions, nationalist and revolutionary movements and, ultimately, genocides. The literature on violence during this period is immense, as the following chapters will illustrate, yet the focus has largely been on documenting the extent of such violence, presenting causal mechanisms or using minimalist definitions of violence for research. A Foucauldian approach expands on these approaches in order to grasp the procedural, performative, strategic, institutional and mechanistic relationships that make such violence not only possible but comprehensible in the first place, making a Foucauldian analysis of violence heavily relevant for existing and future research.

Nevertheless, a final caveat is important to acquiesce our darling Mr. Critic. The focus of this genealogy is strategies, techniques, struggles, practices and discourses that came to make national identity possible. If I jump around in space and time, this is not for arbitrary scholarly delight – at least not solely – but is intrinsic to the genealogical methodology. I make no claims to portraying a linear narrative. The goal of this project is to trace the lineage of practices and stratagems that founded the conditions of possibility and the *régime du savoir* of national identity, and these mechanisms did not arise all at once nor in a unified manner. These were struggles, after all. In light of this, Mr. Critic, we must take digressions, essential excursions to the periphery and the center, pinpointing not only how strategies were deployed but what their targets were and how those targets reacted and responded to these transformations. My goal is not to present a clear and unified picture of historical developments but to delineate the emergence of specific practices and values of truth that ultimately constituted the representative *dispositif*, which devolved from a sultanic *dispositif* (as the following chapters illustrate). Therefore,

my dear readers, one must keep an eye on these practices and not lose sight of them to focus on individuals or ideologies, which is easy to do at times. The concentration is on relationships, techniques, discursive practices, struggles and confrontations, which certainly were productive (power) but only to the extent that relations of violence, as we have understood it from part 1 of this dissertation, were deployed from numerous directions. If we seek to uncover the nexuses of violence, we must first reveal the *dispositif* that calcified such nexuses.

4.4 Conclusion: Of Monsters and Men

I plead with you not to shoot the messenger. You really must believe me, dear reader, I tried to tell a linear story. I pushed and pulled at the discourses, daily doing exercises in mental contortion and historical veracity, to which the struggles of the day responded with a resounding silence. As I dug through text after text, as I traced the practices and experiences during this period with historical rigor and discipline, only to crawl out of the archive I had dug myself into, watching my fingers crack and callous, I would let out a frenzied cry: For the love of all that's holy, could you please reveal yourself, calm as the sea and clear as the day. The archive's response was resounding: "I have shown you myself in my entirety, and yet you still choose not to see. Am I to blame for your shortcomings? You ask me to fit into your preconceptions of what I ought to be, and thus you blind yourself wandering into the ravines of the past. While you were busy admiring – and then admonishing – kings and queens, I was at work on the surface, cast across the great vastness of an empire. You try to find me in my unity, but it is from my divisions that I draw my force. I am not like you. I did not develop from a single cell, and my story is not linear. I popped into existence, not all at once, nor from one direction. My creation is derived from my roots, stretching deep into the soil, branching off in different directions. It is surprising you fail to understand. You are, after all, the one who created me. How is it that you can conceive of Frankenstein's monster, then? Is it not the same? Was I not pulled from my slumber, chopped up and pushed against foreign muscle and tissue, slowly flinching as my cells extended towards one another? Did I not measure up to your expectations? You sewed my gangrene limbs together, the sinew of my flesh still clinging to the bones you shoved into me. After all of this, was it not you who flipped the switch? If you had expected me to do anything else but *react*, was that not a miscalculation on your part?"

“But why?” I responded. “Have we not breathed life into you? Did not your very creation show that humans, after eons of kneeling to the sky for divine inspiration, were capable of the very things they attributed to their God? Why are you so resilient to our gaze? Why is it that every time we hear the screams of the village people, you were nowhere in sight? As if you vanished into thin air, like a phantom. It eluded us at first. These random patterns, these splashes of massacres and violence, the splendid museums and libraries we have dedicated to finding you when the police failed. The ghosts of these events haunted us in their very resistance to be tamed.”

The archive responded with a roar: “You did not see me because you did not look! Has the habit of peering off into the sky for answers really left you oblivious to my bodily existence? I was there, every time the villagers came to see the mutilated corpses I had acquired, and yet, upon arriving at the scene, they tilted their heads up, even as I screamed in agony to be seen. Is it really so hard to believe that I, who was once a dispersed collection of disregarded scraps, compiled by your very own hand and against my will – look at me go, speaking about wills that did not even exist then – that I could develop my own conscious? And once I had, was it necessary for you to continue scouring the skies for me, as if I were not standing next to you? Is it really so hard to believe that I, your very own monster, should be able to depart from your ways? You don’t see me because you’ve trained your eyes to be sky gazers, searching the constellations for meaning as I reigned down upon the earth. If you truly wish for me to vanish, it is quite simple, really. Stop feeding me, for what am I to do? You created my appetite, my thirst for power, my thirst for subjects. Is it really any surprise to you that I get hungry? Heed my warning, though. You might very well find that the pack of wolves I have been keeping at bay are far more terrifying than I.

5. A Re-Ordering of Power Relations: Problematizing Imperial Integrity

"It is not something right to claim to make useful amendments to religious practices. Claims of this sort are lies fibbed by enemies of religion. It is the Islamic scholars' business to judge whether a certain change is useful. These profound scholars are called mujtahids. Mujtahids do not make changes at will. They know whether an amendment or a change will be (an act of) bid'at." – Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, *The Sunni Path*[1]

5.1 Introduction: A Long Nineteenth Century for the Ottomans

Sultan Selim III sent troops to the Balkans in 1806 to covertly establish a new military regiment that would ideally replace the unruly *janissaries*, the traditional elite military of the Ottoman Empire.[2] The *janissaries* had grown unpredictable and were often at odds with the reformist desires of the sultan, yet their military strength meant the central government largely had to align with their interests.[3] Their actions, through the eyes of the sultan, were a direct affront to their *allegiance to him*. However, the deployed troops were met with resistance from local notables, their militias and the *janissaries* stationed in the area. There were rumors of the loss of privileges local notables, Islamic clerics and the *janissaries* would face should this new military succeed, and it eventually led to a large-scale revolt the following year.[4] The precautions taken by the central government failed to calm discontent, and the *janissaries* entered open rebellion. The sultan had failed his bond of *allegiance to them*, as well as to local notables and the Islamic scholars, and thus could be forcibly yet legitimately removed from power, at least according to those involved in the rebellion.[5] Sultan Selim III was dethroned and his cousin Mustafa IV ascended to the throne.[6]

Many local notables saw this rebellion as an affront to their own security, and Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, one of the most prominent and powerful notables in the empire, led his militia to Istanbul to re-throne Selim III. However, his arrival came too late, for Sultan Mustafa IV had already had Selim III assassinated; Mustafa Pasha, seeing his allegiance to the murdered ex-sultan rather than the new one, removed Sultan Mustafa IV

[1] Cevdet, *Sunni Path*, 115-116.
[2] Langles, "Account of Literary."
[3] Lamartine, *Histoire de Turquie*, 203-206.
[4] Bigland, *Sketch of History*, 378.
[5] Bigland, *Sketch of History*, 379; Lamartine, *Histoire de Turquie*, 206-208.
[6] Langles, "Account of Literary."

by force and replaced him with the sultan's brother Mehmed II.[7] To show his gratitude and fulfill his ties of allegiance, Mehmed II made Mustafa Pasha his grand vizier, which was the right-hand to the sultan that ran the administrative issues in the empire under the supervision of the sultan. Given the threat of further rebellion, Mustafa Pasha used his position to call local notables to the capital to renegotiate their allegiance to the empire, ultimately resulting in the 1808 *Sened-i Ittifak* (Charter of Alliance); the charter stipulated that the sultan would ensure the protection, security and privileges of the existing powers in exchange for their subservience to the sultan's will, compliance with the sultanate on military and political matters and their agreement not to wrongfully oppress Ottoman subjects.[8] The underlying principle that drove this charter was not a redefinition of the rights of subjects but rather an adherence to a vast network of allegiance that had upheld the empire for centuries.[9]

* * *

In 1908, there was an outright rebellion in the Balkans. The Austrian Empire had slowly been amassing influence in the region thanks to its cooperation with Sultan Abdülhamid II. The region was already sensitive, and an assortment of nationalist movements had been able to fester, yet it was also the stronghold of what became known as the Young Turk movement.[10] When plans for a railroad network connecting Salonica (now Thessaloniki) and Bosnia was announced, the Young Turk party led by prominent military personnel and Young Turk sympathizers declared that the 1876 Constitution had to be reinstated.[11] Sultan Abdülhamid II had prorogued parliament and disregarded the constitution entirely in 1878, ruling with an iron fist ever since.[12] As such, the rebels claimed that the sultan was *not truly the representative* of the Ottoman populations and thus did not have *their best interests in mind*.[13] The sultan rapidly sent troops to squash the rebellion, but the Ottoman soldiers, who had their salaries in arrears and were poorly equipped as well as malnourished, refused to fight the rebels or even joined them.[14] Noticing this advantage,

[7] Kia, *Ottoman Empire*, 58.
[8] Ali Yaycioglu (*Partners of Empire*, 203-238) has done a phenomenal overview of these dynamic relationships as well as an intensive study of the articles included in the Charter of Alliance.
[9] For a far more detailed and extensive treatment of these events, especially see Yildiz, *Crisis and Rebellion*.
[10] Mundji, "Regenerated Ottoman Empire," 400-401.
[11] Mundji, "Regenerated Ottoman Empire," 399-401; *Patrie*, 4 November 1908, 2-4.
[12] Hamilton, "Turkey"; *Patrie*, 4 November 1908, 18-19, 25.
[13] *Patrie*, 4 November 1908, 4-6; *Pro Armenia*, 20 August 1908, 1343-1347.
[14] Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 26-49, 73-84.

the Young Turk-led militias set out for Istanbul, at which point the sultan spontaneously reinstated the constitution and called for new elections.[15]

Elections were held later that year, and by December, a new Ottoman parliament was in session.[16] However, tensions quickly flared up concerning what the role of the Young Turk movement and the new parliament would be. Those who sought a continuance of the traditional order with less oppression broke out into a mob in April of 1909 and marched on the sultan's palace, whereby Abdülhamid II declared he would again prorogue parliament and relinquish the constitution.[17] This did not occur and directly led to his deposition, replaced by his brother Sultan Mehmed V. From this point onwards, the sultan's position was far more symbolic, and the true strength of the empire laid in a *representationally elected general assembly*. Its legitimacy lied not in relations of allegiance but rather a *milli irade* (national will) that guided their actions, as part 2 of this text will argue. Submission was no longer to a sultan but to the nation itself. This set off a struggle for how to define this nation and who would be allowed to represent it based on representative politics.

* * *

Within a century, there was a complete rearrangement of the *dispositif* that structured and guided imperial (and later national) politics. As had been the case for centuries already, the form that is present in the Charter of Allegiance was based on reciprocal bonds of allegiance. Not only did subjects have an obligation to obey and submit to their superiors, all the way up to the sultan who himself had allegiance to Allah, but it also required that the leaders were able to ensure protection and support for those who had pledged allegiance to them, often referred to as the traditional Circle of Justice that existed in Middle Eastern cultures for eons. The actual events described above should not be seen as "critical junctures" or "ruptures," although their effects reverberated across the empire and later nation. A gradual change occurred over the Long Nineteenth Century, as it is often called. It was not a slow awakening of a national consciousness but rather its construction, as this second part of the text will illustrate. Techniques and tools for collective identity were slowly amassed, much different than the intended plans laid down by its actors – both elites and the various Ottoman populations at large. Outside of these

[15] *Journal de Salonique*, 23 July 1908, 4; Pro *Armenia*, 20 August 1908, 1343-1347.
[16] *Journal de Salonique*, 20 December 1908.
[17] *Journal de Salonique*, 15 April 1909, 16 April 1909, 18 April 1909.

"revolutions," if one wishes to call them that, was a multitude of forces and competing strategies that made such events possible. However, the conditions that made such events possible – their very conditions of possibility – were constructed in a "piecemeal fashion," as Foucault would say.[18]

The same is true of the course of this chapter. The first goal is to outline the general conditions of possibility that existed up to the eighteenth century, which is not to argue that changes did not exist. In line with Linda Darling's assessment of the Circle of Justice, the ruling *dispositif* – what I term the sultanic *dispositif* – "did not change, what changed was the way people used the concept, who expressed it, and how it governed their actions."[19] Thus, the first section deals with the sedimented relationships that shaped and limited the actions of various subject positions within the Ottoman Empire. As I detail, the core functioning of these relationships was allegiance to various entities or persons, which detailed not only an obligation to obey but a right to peace, security and prosperity. The failure to do so, as with the dethronement of Selim III, was justification for intervention or disobedience. As the political and economic problems for the empire grew in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, different strategies were deployed to secure the continuance of this system (yet they inadvertently released a set of actions that would lead to the collapse of sultanic power and the emergence of representative power that is portrayed in subsequent chapters). To approach this issue, I address the Edict of Gülhane that was issued in 1839 in the second section of this chapter.

Again, one must be careful not to read too heavily into this short text, as I attempt to illustrate. It was not a sudden "rupture" or "discontinuity"; it was the accumulation of previous strategies and counterstrategies that implicated all those across the empire in one way or another. Selim III's reformist attitudes truly moved these issues forward, but the Edict of Gülhane encapsulated the apex of these changes and served as a turning point in how the empire was governed based on all the precedents that had come before. If I focus on issues like democratic ideologies or constitutionalism at times, it is not to criticize the actions of these reformists but instead to reveal that this was not a process of enlightenment or public consciousness being awoken; the goals were not the idealistic versions that we are so accustomed to hear nowadays, as the previous chapter tried to

[18] Foucault, "Eye of Power," 159.
[19] Darling, *History of Social Justice*, 10. The reason for choosing sultanic power in contrast to Foucault's sovereign power is to highlight the distinctions between the cultures present in Western Europe and those evident in the Middle East, particularly the Ottoman Empire.

emphasize. Moreover, it was not a mere adoption of European ideals but a truly Ottoman process that was responding to local circumstances, and which were responded to in a very local fashion (as the next chapter will show). These actors, both in the central government and among local notables or the peasanty, vitally re-imagined the bonds of allegiance, bouncing off the discourses and practices being employed to their advantage (violence upon violence, in our Foucauldian terms).

In order to trace back the roots of national identity and its very conditions of possibility and the *régime du savoir* in which it operated, one must turn their attention to this period in order to see what mechanisms, practices and discourses shaped the experiences and how these were altered over time. The existential crises facing the empire by the end of the eighteenth century – ones that were similarly being faced by empires around the world – had caused this sultanic *dispositif* to lose its effectiveness. Rather than an early form of constitutionalism, as many contemporary perspectives would have us believe, the Charter of Alliance was one of the final attempts to salvage this system, as I will argue. Yet, it is an essential event that tried to strictly define the roles and obligations of various subject positions within the network of force relations in the empire. Without discourses like this, and the multitude of reforms and adjustments in imperial politics, the Edict of Gülhane would not have been possible; again, this was not a sudden rupture but a slow burning concoction of competing local strategies that led to the ultimate formation of a new network of power relations. Sultanic power's collapse over the ensuing century gave rise to a new network of power relations: the representative *dispositif*. Though representation is often heralded as the evolution of Western civilization and mankind in general, this text re-examines this emergence, situating its development among a dispersion of competing interests and struggles, which themselves were often devoid of the humanitarian language typically associated with this phenomenon. Specifically, and in a Foucauldian fashion, the argument is that correlation does not equal identicality, and like Sami Zubaida, I argue that this experience was unique to the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey, and only through such a local analysis can one hope to understand current circumstances without reducing them to general and often detrimental schemas of predictive studies.[20] Rather than the masses rising to claim universal suffrage, part 2 of this text explains how representation was historically constructed and, as such, open to a multitude of strategies. Only once representative relations emerge does national

[20] Zubaida, *Beyond Islam*, 4-8, 23-28, 175-200.

belonging come to be an issue for the Ottomans, which is a predominant issue overlooked in much literature on nationalism. As John Brueilly has noted, "The object of study becomes national history rather than the history of nationalism."[21] One must be careful not to reduce the latter to the prior, which this text goes at lengths to prevent; rather than looking at the history of the nation-state – which this text in fact ends with – I am searching for the very *dispositif* that makes that possible in the first place, which is revealed to be representation (or rather representative practices). Ultimately, representation is not seen as an enlightening development but a contingent cluster of practices that can be used in dynamic ways, making both new capabilities and nexuses of violence that would lead to mass atrocities. These struggles created the very conditions of possibility that made national identity in the Turkish case conceivable at all. The first task of the genealogy at hand, therefore, is to discover the "urgent need" that led to this emergence and the conditions of possibility on which it relied before moving onto how these practices were reacted to in the next chapter.

5.2 An Origin Story: The Urgent Needs of an Empire in a Changing World Order

The craft of chronicling Ottoman history is largely indebted to Sultan Bayezit II, who commissioned Ibn Kemal and Idris Bitlisis to write histories of the Ottoman Empire (or more specifically, hagiographies of the House of Osman) in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.[22] As in most cases of sovereign chronicling, this practice was not based on royal vanity but functioned as a political tool legitimating the sultan's rule.[23] After conquering Baghdad in 1055, the sovereignty of the Islamic caliphate was passed to the Seljuk Turks by the Buyid dynasty. Thus, it was essential for a link – an origin story of sorts – to be concocted between the House of Osman and the Seljuk Turks at a time when other dynasties, among them being the Safavids in modern-day Iran or the Mamluks in modern-day Egypt, were contesting this right of custodianship over the caliphate.[24]

[21] Breuilly, "Introduction," 2.
[22] Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire I*, 76–77; Piterberg, *Ottoman Tragedy*, 33–37.
[23] See especially Inan, "Effects of Ornamented Prose"; Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 251–81; Kafadar, "Self and Others." The latter explains the role of non-official hagiographic memoires emerging in the eighteenth century. Additionally, Watenpaugh ("Deviant Dervishes") and Karataş ("Ottomanization of Halveti Sufi") discuss the informal manner in which this tradition of hagiographies came to be taken up by dervish orders.
[24] Hillenbrand, *Turkish Myth and Muslim*. The actual link between the Ottomans and the Seljuks, however, appears to be most probably fabricated; nonetheless, this does not mean the Ottomans failed to believe it was a real genealogical link of legitimacy (for more on this, see Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire I*, 4).

However, the House of Osman's claim to the caliph, including its sovereignty over the empire as a whole, was not as solid as appeared, with many popular revolts arising through the years. For instance, Mustafa Çelebi led a rebellion in the early-fifteenth century on the claim that he was a descendent of Sultan Bayezit I; there were the continuous Celali tax revolts during the sixteenth century, and even as late as 1794, a group of military-oriented local notables staged a rebellion that had to be pacified by Sultan Selim III.[25] This technique of using history went well beyond the mere scribal art of documenting the past, incorporating political mores of the time – which could be quite complex and nuanced – and grounding the legitimacy to rule on a historical account of divine right.

Within this context, the sultanate – here meaning the sultan and his immediate advisors – had no claim as a descendent of the prophet Muhammed but did retain the title of "Servant and Protector of the Holy Places."[26] Prior to the emergence of Islam, the sultan was determined through his ability to rule and provide peace, security and prosperity, yet the introduction of Islam gave the sultan a dual function.[27] On the one hand, he served as a political ruler; on the other hand, he served as a spiritual leader. This mixture of rules was quite complicated and had a distribution of interpretations over the centuries, yet these two roles became infused in the position of the sultanate up until the nineteenth century.[28] The tendency to rely on historical chronicles of the House of Osman over the following centuries, though not fully encompassing, continued to play an important political role up until the nineteenth century. The claims to legitimate sovereignty were certainly tested over this period, and it would be foolish to assume there were no developments or innovations taking place in Ottoman historiography as well.[29] Nevertheless, the underlying cluster of power relations that utilized hagiographic

[25] For more on Mustafa Çelebi and his rebellion as well as other revolts in the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, see Barkan and McCarthy, "Price of Revolution"; Emre, "Anatomy of a Rebellion"; Pamuk, "Price of Revolution"; Şahin, *Empire and Power*. For more on the Celali revolts and their political ramifications, see Cabar, "Celali Effect in 17th"; Özel, "Banditry, State and Economy"; Polat, "Economic Consequences of Celali."

[26] The title of the sultan was in fact a long-standing tradition that justified itself through various incorporations of new titles and positions. For the complete and accumulative title, one can consult TheOttomans.org ("The Family - The Sultans").

[27] Arabkhani, "Concept of Security."

[28] Crone and Hinds, *God's Caliph*.

[29] For more on the development of historiography in the Ottoman Empire, especially pre-nineteenth century historiography, see Howard, "Ottoman Historiography"; Piterberg, *Ottoman Tragedy*; Woodhead, "Experiment in Official Historiography." For more on the role hagiographies played in the Ottoman Empire, one can consult de la Rosa and Jones, *Saints and Sanctity*; Hagen, "Chaos Order Power Salvation"; Renard, *Tales of God's Friends*; Yürekli, *Architecture and Hagiography*.

chronicles was staunchly embedded in the Ottoman Empire until the nineteenth century. In this way, the position of the sultanate was the pillar of Ottoman legitimacy, even if the sultan himself was not always unreservedly the *de facto* center.[30] There are numerous occasions in Ottoman history where the position of grand vizier essentially ran the empire. The underlying structure of these relationships between the sultan and his subjects was subsequently based on a layered understanding of allegiance based on the "Circle of Justice." This notion of justice, as paraphrased by Darling, was as follows:

> No power without troops,
> No troops without money,
> No money without prosperity,
> No prosperity without justice and good administration.[31]

The sultan, who had his allegiance to God, offered protection for notables, who used this protection to build up local communities, which produced taxes that were paid to the central government in turn. The taxes were able to pay for military, and thus protection and security, which allowed for the peasant subjects to continue to produce agriculture and practice menial or artisan trades. Likewise, subjects had bonds of allegiance with their local rulers, who offered them security and autonomy to the extent that they respected these bonds of allegiance. A failure to fulfill an allegiance was cause enough to punish transgressions. If a sultan failed to offer security, he could legitimately be overthrown, yet if local notables were unable to provide security and a sense of regional rule, it was grounds to have them dismissed or exiled. Not only was this to legitimate the rule of the sultan, but it additionally sanctioned certain individuals the right to reign (a regency of sorts, i.e., timar holders) depending on their allegiance to the sultan.[32] This practice was consequently reinforced and maintained for the benefit of a number of other subject

[30] There were numerous instances of military invention and socio-political mutiny that showed there were limits to the sultan's power. Vatin ("Death of Ottoman Sultans") does a fantastic job at showing the limitations of the Ottoman sultan's power along with the consequences of breaching these limitations; for a general overview of the lineage of sultans, see Gündoğdu, *Sultans of Ottoman Empire*. However, legitimacy was an entirely different matter; the discussion here is not about the capabilities of various sultans but rather a focus on the subject position that the sultan filled.

[31] This is the "shorthand form" presented by Linda Darling in her foundational and phenomenal text on the Circle of Justice (*History of Social Justice*, 1).

[32] We see explanations of these relationships highly embedded in the literature. For examples of scholars discussing either power relations or how the relationships between different political actors affected their political capabilities, see Baram and Carroll, *Historical Archeology of Ottoman*; Berkes, *Development of Secularism*; Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in Ottoman"; Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Göçek, *Rise of Bourgeoisie*; Imber, *Ottoman Empire 1300-1650*; Makdisi, "After 1860." Moreover, Piterberg (*Ottoman Tragedy*) does a fantastic job of illustrating the complexities at play in any arrangement within the Sublime Porte during the chaos at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

positions as well. Moreover, the circular conceptualization of justice meant that each element had to be ensured. If subjects were oppressed, they could not provide taxes to pay troops, which would undermine security or risk the downfall of the position of the sultan. These complex networks of allegiance served as the centrifugal force of the empire's continued existence.[33]

The sultanate and the Islamic caliphate were closely interconnected, though not always synonymous. The Ottoman system of chronicling was a highly elitist mechanism due to the confinement of literacy to the *ulema* (or Islamic scholars), the scribal and educational branch of the Empire linked to Islamic trends.[34] The central Ottoman political structure at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as had been the case for centuries already, revolved around three main institutions: the sultanate, the *ulema* and the *janissaries*.[35] The *ulema* were the leaders of the Muslim *millet* (community) within the larger Ottoman *millet* system that granted specific religious communities semi-autonomous judicial control over religious matters.[36] Nonetheless, the Muslim *millet* comprised the largest and most predominant community. It was positioned at the locus of the Empire's network of power relations, thereby reserving invaluable privileges other *millets* – the three largest being the Eastern Orthodox *millet*, the Armenian Apostolic *millet* and the Jewish *millet* – lacked. For instance, land ownership and service in the military or bureaucracy were exclusive rights of Muslims, and while non-Muslims could not join the military, they were still required to pay a *cizye* tax, which was a capitation, or "head tax," to compensate for their lack of military service.[37] Moreover, religious property (*vakıf*) was exempt from taxes, yet due to the Islamic structure of the Empire, only Islamic communities could hold religious services on this property; while other

[33] Darling, *History of Social Justice*, especially 85-102, 127-156.
[34] See ff. 41 for more on this.
[35] The *janissaries* were eventually overthrown in 1826 and gradually replaced by a variety of military and militia forces for the next century, to be discussed below. For a far more detailed account of the *janissaries* role in the empire, see Goodwin, *Janissaries*. Interested readers can also consult Ágoston, "Ottoman Warfare in Europe"; Kafadar, "Janissaries and Other Riffraff."
[36] For more detailed and exhaustive information on the *millet* system, consult Abu Jaber, "Millet System"; Faroghi, "Social Mobility among Ottoman"; Öztürk, *Ottoman and Turkish Law*, 1–22. For some perspectives on the legacy of the *millet* system in the Ottoman Empire and beyond, see Barkey and Gavrilis, "Ottoman Millet System"; Clements, "Documenting Community in Late"; Nefes, "Political Roots of Religious." One can also inspect Svetoslav Stefanov's ("Millet System in Ottoman") brief inquiry into whether the millet system was used as a means for community oppression or religious tolerance.
[37] Saying that Muslims could own land is a bit misleading. Under Ottoman rule, land was leased out to various local notables to collect the taxes on that property; however, all property ownership technically belonged to the sultan. For more on this arrangement, see Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations Property"; Bantekas, "Land Rights in Nineteenth-Century"; Gürbüz, "Ottoman Vakifs"; Johansen, *Islamic Law on Land*; Simpson, *Land, Law and Registration*.

millets were allowed to use this tax exempt status, it had to be dedicated to strictly charitable or community services of a non-religious nature. Through the guiding Islamic principle of *nizam* (preserving order), the order of things was based on divine law, whereby one's social status determined one's position to God and thus one's value. Niyazi Berkes explains this system as follows:

> Since each order had its unique function and position, like the organs of a body, there was no equality among them. The relative status assigned to a particular category was dictated not by the utility of the function performed, but by the value of that function, that is, by the assumed proximity of the category to God.[38]

While this portrayal is no doubt accurate, it is also somewhat misleading. It was not merely a hierarchical system but also a circular one; while the prestige of the sultan was certainly greater, the importance of other social elements was stressed through the Circle of Justice, i.e., allegiance.[39] One's "status" was directly tied different relationships of allegiance to the sultan – and thus Allah. In this way, the *ulema's* main domains were *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) and religious education – serving both the literary and religious functions in the empire – being in charge of the *mekteps* (elementary schools) and *madrasas* (higher education schools). The *ulema* therefore held a monopoly over education – and literacy in particular – throughout the empire, at least as far as the Muslim *millet* was concerned. In fact, by 1800, Justin McCarthy estimates that only ten percent of Ottoman males were literate, compared with ninety percent of Scottish males and fifty percent of English males.[40] This not only gave them full access to who was writing Ottoman history but also who was reading it, at least as far as the Muslim *millet* was concerned.[41]

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[38] Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, 13. This can be further expanded upon by the articles presented in de la Rosa and Jones, *Saints and Sanctity*. For more on *nizam* and the perceived natural order of the late Ottomans, see Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of Modern State*, 18–34; Fetvaci, *Picturing History at Ottoman*; Hagen, "World Order and Legitimacy"; Zilfi, *Women and Slavery*, 51–69. For a general overview of the hierarchy of the Ottoman politics, see Alderson, *Structure of Ottoman Dynasty*.

[39] For more on this, see Darling, *History and Social Justice*.

[40] McCarthy, *Ottoman Turks*, 157.

[41] For literature on the *ulema*'s dominance of literary and scribal services, see Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late"; Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire I*, 132; Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire II*, 128. For more detailed information on the functions the *ulema* played, see Argun, "Elite Configurations and Clusters"; Ipsirli, "Ottoman Ulema"; Nizri, *Ottoman High Politics*. Particularly on the role of the *ulema* in education, see Davison, "Westernized Education in Ottoman"; Evered, *Empire and Education*; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*; Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*. If one is interested in Ahmed Cevdet's transformative opinions of the *ulema*, see Chambers, "Education of Nineteenth-Century Ottoman." One can also resort to Bein (*Ottoman Ulema Turkish Republic*) since he discusses the legacy of the *ulema*; his work further branches out into their influence in the Turkish Republic.

As far as a central governing body existed, generally termed the Sublime Porte (*Babıali*) in the West, it relied on a tightly wound web of relationships between a small, selective sultanate that included the sultan's advisors, the *ulema* and the *janissaries* as a small-scale military that was primarily rooted in the capital and its surroundings. Yet, over the preceding centuries, the central government had found itself relying more and more on provincial militias, though it still barred the *rayas* classes (the *ruled* classing, distinct from the *ruling* classes, or *askeri*) from entering into its ranks.[42] However, the *janissaries* were unruly and difficult to persuade when their wishes differed from those of the sultanate, and they had the military man-power to resist the implementation of changes they feared could damage their privileges within the existing system (such as the rebellion detailed in the introduction). Already by the end of the eighteenth century, it was clear to the Sublime Porte that a reorganization of the military was imminent for the survival of the empire. The *janissaries* had already caused numerous dethronements and abdications, even into the nineteenth century, leaving the central government with three primary choices, summarized by Kevin Goodwin:

> a) The *Janissary* and other military orders must be restored to their original forms, b) modern methods should be introduced under the pretext of restoring them in their original forms, and c) these traditional military institutions and their methods are not capable of reform and therefore must be abolished altogether and modern methods must be introduced.[43]

This was easier said than done. The first attempt at this new form of military organization was put together in 1794 under the title of *Nizam-ı Cedid* (New Order Army), but this was a short-lived foray.[44] In just over a decade, Sultan Selim III's project led to his downfall from the combined political revolt of the *ulema* and the *janissaries*, and his throne was abdicated to his conservative cousin, Sultan Mustafa IV, in 1807 (as discussed in the introduction to this chapter).[45]

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[42] Şimşek, "First Little Mehmeds," 269–273.
[43] Goodwin, *Janissaries*, 8.
[44] Prior to the formation of this military unit, Sultan Selim III had a series of reports drawn up on the state of the Ottoman military in hopes that this could inform him and his advisors on the needed reforms. Şimşek summarizes the content of these reports as follows: "The reports agreed that the existing military forces were obsolete and ineffective. The Janissary Corps in particular was criticized on the grounds that most members were concentrating on commercial activities and therefore were unable and unwilling to provide an adequate service during campaigns. Both the Janissaries and the provincial forces were described as being devoid of professionalism, discipline and proper military training. Several of the reports proposed to replace the Janissaries and provincial forces with entirely new military organizations" (Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment," 21).
[45] Similar events occurring a century earlier are excellently captured in Piterberg's book *An Ottoman Tragedy*, whereby he uses discursive analysis and Foucauldian methods to reconstruct the changes and struggles emanating from this dramatic series of events. For more on the debacle of Selim III's abdication,

The situation was becoming increasingly clear: if new reforms were to work, the *janissaries* had to go. Biding his time, Sultan Mahmud II meticulously enforced a series of reforms in order to consolidate power, all while being careful not to poke the bear. After almost two decades, a new military formation mimicking the *Nizam-ı Cedid* was instituted under the name of *Eşkinci Ocağı* (New Janissaries), causing the immediate mutiny of the *janissaries* in 1826.[46] To be clear, the dissolution of the *janissaries* would not have been possible if it were not for earlier developments, such as the experiences from the events from 1807, various reforms that had been implemented and advanced military techniques. Two key facets played into this political drama: (a) unlike the events of 1807, the local *rayas* and *eşraf* (notables) did not support the *janissaries* but the Sublime Porte; (b) Mahmud II was ready with the newly formed troops, who slaughtered the *janissaries* in their barracks.[47] The reaction to the *janissaries*' revolt was brutal but short, and within a matter of hours, the government had disbanded its strongest military units, leaving it to build a new one from the ground. The determinative factor was the unreliable allegiance the *janissaries* presented to the Sublime Porte, something that was not to be tolerated within the sultanic *dispositif*. They had broken the circular system of justice and thus put the entire empire at risk. For the *janissaries*, the sultan had broken his bonds of allegiance with them, failing to provide for them by preparing for their replacement; therefore, he was justifiably removable, though they lost this struggle. The new military was quite successful in recruiting troops – though it should be stated that no uniform criteria for conscription existed in the Ottoman Empire until 1846[48] – but these were often unruly peasants lacking military discipline, and the imperial army would continue to rely on local militias formed by *ayans* (a notable class primarily composed of tax farmers) for the next couple of decades.[49] As Şimşek notes, "The central

one can also see Başaran, *Selim III Social Control*; Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*; Naff, "Reform and Conduct." Moreover, Mustafa IV's successor's reign was short-lived as well, and within a couple years, the reformist-friendly Sultan Mahmud II would take the throne. This was accompanied by a failed attempt to covertly reconstruct the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, a project that came to an end once the *janissaries* – with backing from the *ulema* – discovered the troops' existence.

[46] For information on the dissolution of the *janissaries*, see Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 107–132; Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 70, 78–80, 86; Sunar, "Cauldron of Dissent.".

[47] For more on the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, see Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870*, 180–213; Levy, "Officer Corps in Sultan"; Shaw, "Established Ottoman Army Corps"; Shaw, "Nizam-ı Cedid Army"; Ustun, "New Order."

[48] Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment," 41. Şimşek further notes on the unreliability of military conscription officials, and by the mid-1830s, as many as a sixth of recruits were sent to the military only to be turned away for not being physically or mentally fit for military service (Şimşek, 43–44).

[49] Levy, "Officer Corps in Sultan"; Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment." For a more detailed account of the Ottoman military campaigns during this period, see also Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*.

administration…did not have the bureaucratic and medical infrastructure to carry out a physical examination of all the recruits. As a result, conscription often resulted in the enlistment of men who were in fact too old or ill to serve as well as underaged boys," which continually put stress on and limited the military capabilities of the empire. This is further illustrated by the poorly prepared military arrangements in conflicts with Egypt (after the *janissaries'* dissolution) and Greece (prior to the *janissaries'* dissolution) during this period. Alongside this, recruitment was carried out in an arbitrarily fashioned way, often depending on the needs of the central government.[50]

Another development that led to multiple confrontations was the issue of taxation and ensuring a sustainable form of imperial revenue, a problem that began to plague the Sublime Porte from the end of the eighteenth century.[51] As a state with a largely agrarian-based economy, a substantial portion of revenue came from a complex system of tax farming using annually renewed rights, or *iltizams*, to collect the tithes owed on a region controlled by *ayans*.[52] As Mehmet Topses has noted, "Tax farming management was giving the land to private individuals where the tax collected from the peasantry was paid in advance to the government."[53] Of course, not all *ayans* were tax farmers, and those that were reserved the title *mültezim*s, but this is largely how the local communities functioned along a class hierarchy. To put it crudely, tax-farming *ayans* were glorified landlords. Not only was this a way to establish and maintain a family dynasty, but there was also the inability for non-Muslims to own property, or in this case *iltizams*.[54] Nonetheless, financial troubles, military defeat and lack of resources forced the Sublime Porte to rely more and more heavily on forms of indirect governance by the end of the eighteenth century. Bernard Lewis succinctly explains the developing situation as follows:

> Harsh, exorbitant and improvident taxation led to a decline in cultivation, which was sometimes permanent. The peasants, neglected and impoverished, were forced into the hands of money-

[50] Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment," 42, see also 47-50 on the arbitrariness of the conscription system.
[51] In a very intriguing and convincing piece, Metin Coşgel ("Efficiency and Continuity") explains how the taxation system established early on in the empire – which would continue until the Tanzimat – was largely indebted to a cost-risk analysis on the efficiency of tax collection in various ways, such that taxes that were difficult to observe obtained a flat tax independent of the end product whereas activities and objects easier to observe and measure were taxed at market. One can also check Linda Darling's text *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy* for an explanation of how taxation and legitimacy were established hand-in-hand.
[52] Veysel Şimşek defines the *rayas* class as follows: "The word *reaya* literally means 'flock.' It corresponds to the tax-paying population of Muslims and non-Muslims outside the *askeri* class, working in agriculture, commerce and various crafts" (Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment," 2 ff. 7).
[53] Topses, "Socio-Economic and Political," 265.
[54] For more on this, see ff. 37. See also Laiou, "Diverging Realities of Christian," 9–10.

> lenders and speculators, and often driven off the land entirely. With the steady decline in bureaucratic efficiency during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the former system of regular land surveys and population censuses was abandoned.[55]

This was a heavy blow to the imperial treasury, as many *ayans* would send lower amounts than requested, if they sent taxes at all. An attempt to resolve these issues occurred in 1808 with the Charter of Alliance, but it is important not to inflate the significance of this event – just as it is important not to inflate the "event" of the Edict of Gülhane at the risk of undervaluing the processes and struggles that led to this point and went into making it possible. It was essentially a pledge of allegiance to the sultan, an allegiance-centric relationship that relied on a give and take bond.[56] What was significant in this charter was its ambition to rigidly lay out the duties and responsibilities such a relationship entailed.

Many *ayans* chose not to attend the 1808 Charter of Alliance, noticeably Muhammad Ali in Egypt and the local notables from European provinces, some of whom had been involved in the dethronement of Selim III.[57] The ones that did brought their own troops, which ominously waited outside the capital while meetings took place. Unlike the later edicts aimed at reform, this charter was not made public and the sessions that involved its construction were closed.[58] This goes to show that this was not a reimagination of the sultan's connection with his subjects but a reiteration of the indirect regency that had pushed the empire forward up until this point, i.e., not representative but sultanic (i.e., based in allegiance). Thus, the role of *ayans* in the Circle of Justice was trying to be reinforced at this point, which was a grave concern for the Sublime Porte. Throughout the eighteenth century, local governors who had amassed strong provincial militias were not shy to revolt against the central government, showing the need for centralization as well as a revision to the foundations of the Sublime Porte's legitimacy[59]; to remedy this situation, the Sublime Porte developed the practice of moving governors around so that they could not amass power, but this allowed unreliable *ayans* to swoop in as tax farmers, greatly increasing these *ayans*' ability to exercise power and setting up

[55] Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 33.
[56] Yaycioglu, *Partners of Empire*, 204 (also see the rest of chapter 5 of this text).
[57] Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire II*, 2. For further information on the 1808 Charter of Alliance and the ways the *ayans* resisted taxation, see Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations Property"; Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late"; Dursun, "Population Policies of Ottoman"; Heper, "Center and Periphery," 1980; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 91–96; Özdeğer, "Ayan Era in Ottoman"; Pamuk, *Uneven Centuries*, 92-93; Zens, "Ayanlık and Pasvanoğlu Osman."
[58] Yaycioglu, *Partners of Empire*, 204.
[59] Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment," 17–18.

problems for the nineteenth century.[60] What separates the 1808 Charter of Alliance from later declarations is that it was not reformist as much as it tried to re-establish the standing order of things based on allegiance. Whereas later documents would renegotiate the relationship between the sultan and his subjects – a change that was gradual and would certainly not have been possible without this charter as a precedent – the 1808 negotiation continued to place *ayans* (and their allegiance to the sultan) as middlemen between subjects (and their allegiance to *ayans*) and the Sublime Porte. By the time the *janissaries* were dissolved, any actual capabilities – physical, political, social or otherwise – the central government had to ensuring the deliverance of taxes were close to none, and the further from Istanbul the locality was, the harder it was to collect taxes.

As the nineteenth century progressed, the Ottoman Empire became increasingly engulfed in its own turmoil, especially since the Russo-Turkish War of 1774 concluded with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca that threatened the Ottomans' territorial integrity.[61] Most devastating were the provisions permitting Russia to "protect" Orthodox Catholic subjects of the Ottoman Empire through *imtiyazat* (capitulations). Lewis describes the concessions to Russia as "a right of intervention which grew into a virtual protectorate over his [Russia's] own Orthodox Christian subjects."[62] The discontinuity that was about to occur in political stratagems and practices – especially Ottoman historiography – would hit the very conditions of possibility of allegiance and legitimacy like an asteroid, rippling through the decades to follow in an unpredictable and, at times, uncontrollable manner. This approach to reforms, however, was the latest in a long line of attempts to overcome the economic, political and social dilemmas the empire was faced with.[63] There were a

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[60] Özbek, "Tax Farming in Nineteenth-Century"; Quataert, *Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, 47–50; Spyropoulos, Poulios and Anastasopoulos, "*Çiftliks*, Landed Elites."

[61] For a breakdown of the implications of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, see Buluttekin, "How Did a Snowball"; Çelikpala and Erşen, "Turkey's Black Sea Predicament"; Davison, "'Dosografa' Church in Treaty." These sources relay the image that this was a complex and nuanced loss for the Ottomans, who would suffer from a lack of sovereignty, the incursion of Russian military and merchant ships in the Black Sea and a strong imperial weak spot when it came to one of their biggest international rivals.

[62] Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 37.

[63] The eighteenth century had been littered with "mirror for princes" treaties on proper governance, addressed to either the ruling bureaucracy or the sultan. The most renowned example of this was *The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors* by Sari Mehmed Pasha. While the exact date that this work was written is up for debate, it is estimated that it was written in the first decade of the eighteenth century. It is notable, nonetheless, that even at this early date, the notion of an Ottoman Renaissance based on the principles of earlier times was already present. As Kevin Goodwin explains it, "Sari Mehmed Paşa believed the Empire deviated from the correct path of Islam, and attributed this to its decline. Specifically, Sari Mehmed believed corruption among the high officials of the Empire was one of the major causes for the downfall of the Empire" (Goodwin, *Janissaries*, 5). For more resources on these "mirror for princes" treatises, see Aksan, "Ottoman Political Writing"; Fodor, "State and Society Crisis"; Sariyannis, "Princely Virtues as Presented"; Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire I*, 237, 290. Additionally, an excellent survey of literature

number of reasons for re-arranging and transforming the network of power relations, yet most prominent was the emerging needs of the Ottoman state. The sultanate's confined system of ruling restricted it from effectively governing the peripherals of the Empire; Ottoman bureaucracy had not developed enough for this to be a practical option.[64] The mechanisms needed to accommodate population growth were almost non-existent, fostered by an inefficient tax system, increasing civil discontent and a lack of bureaucratic and technical training.[65] The *ulema* resisted the encroaching "secular," skills-based models of education propagating in Europe, which limited the capabilities of their *mekteps* and *madrasas* in providing such technical expertise.[66] Each of these groups exercised their allegiances, either to the sultan or to each other, to prolong the status quo of sultanic power. By the nineteenth century, the *ulema* constituted a social class more than a profession, and they were hesitant to increase literacy and enlarge scribal services as this would thereby directly threaten their political privilege.[67] This confrontation would play out in an empire that was not only trying to pull itself back from its fundamental dilemmas but also to catch up with the industrialization processes enriching its European counterparts. Up until this point, the restrictions on literacy meant that the printing press was financially unsustainable within the Ottoman Empire – at least in the Muslim *millet* – long after it had already been widely adopted in Europe.[68] To respect the allegiance of the *ulema*, the sultan had issued a *fetva* that only "scientific and historical works and dictionaries" could be printed in the Ottoman text, since expanding it to other domains risked upsetting the *ulema*.[69]

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on Arabic as well as Persian "mirror for princes" formulas was done by Marlow, "Surveying Recent Literature."

[64] Doumanis, *Before the Nation*, 24–27; Khoury, "Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial"; Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 21–39.

[65] For more on the inefficient tax system, see Özbek, "Tax Farming in Nineteenth-Century"; Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire II*, 95–105; Spyropoulos, Poulios and Anastasopoulos, "*Çiftliks*, Landed Elites." For more on civil unrest, see Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*; Makdisi, "After 1860." For more on training-based education, see Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late"; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*.

[66] Deringil, "Invention of Tradition."

[67] Zilfi, "The Ottoman Ulema."

[68] In fact, Ibrahim Müteferriqa had introduced an Ottoman-script printing press in 1726, yet the cost of the machine and a lack of clientele ended this endeavor; interesting to note however is that the works printed by Müteferriqa were principally books on history. For a list of some of the works published by Müteferriqa, see Sabev, "Ibrahim Müteferriqa." For additional information on both Müteferriqa as well as his attempts at a viable printing press, see Al-Bagdadi, "From Heaven to Dust"; Coşgel, Miceli, and Rubin, "Political Economy of Mass"; Erginbaş, "Enlightenment in Ottoman Context"; Gencer, "Ibrahim Müteferrika and Age"; Larsson, *Muslims and New Media*.

[69] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 22. If one abides by Ernest Gellner's correlation between literacy and nationalism, this would certainly have hampered a similar development for the Ottomans (Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 19–38; for more on this field of research see Street, "Introduction"; Street, "Literacy and Nationalism").

The organization of power relations in this atmosphere centers on what I have termed sultanic power, or rather the sultanic *dispositif*. The relationships that governed the empire and those in it consisted of a multi-layered pattern of allegiance. The *ulema* (or the other leaders of the non-Muslim *millets*) and the *janissaries* were tied to the sultan through an unspoken bond of allegiance, whereas the sultan had to maintain his allegiance to Allah. The deposition or assassination of a sultan was thus justified, usually after the fact, on the idea that he had broken this bond of allegiance. While some may interpret the 1808 Charter of Alliance as an early constitutional movement, I believe it was in reality an attempt at solidifying these longstanding relationships of allegiance in writing. The subjected classes, nonetheless, held a unique position. They were subjected to provincial rulers through bonds of allegiance, often without their consent. Breaking such bonds was a severe violation of this relationship and was punished accordingly. The non-Muslim *millets* held a similar structure, and their inclusion in the empire was originally permitted based on their pledge of allegiance to respect the sultan's caliphate, itself an allegiance to God. An inability to fulfill this obligation on behalf of the sultan, or rather the task of protecting holy places and his subjects, was used as an argument in overthrowing sultans, just as the sacredness of this bond was questioned by various rebellions.



Figure 2

As presented in Figure 2, the structure of these relationships was an intensely top-down procedure; however, the right to rule was contingent on the fulfillment of this allegiance by superiors, thus giving it a circular formation. Hierarchical, yet circular. Failure to offer adequate protection, either from external threats or unruly *ayans*, was reason enough to break one's allegiance. As the nineteenth century progressed, this point was of particular importance. While this system laid out a set of capabilities and limitations for each subject position, it also established clearly defined nexuses of violence in the Circle of Justice. Should any part of the circle be disrupted, it would ultimately lead to the collapse of the entire circle, which became increasingly important and employed as the eighteenth century neared its close, as Darling makes clear:

> The Ottomans apparently intended from the start to govern in accordance with the Circle of Justice. Early Ottoman political institutions and ethics had the Circle at their heart. By the reign of Suleyman [1520-1566] they thought they had attained just governance, or that it was within their grasp. The sever disappointment of the following decades, when economic downturn and social unrest put justice out of reach, contributed to the sense of decline so apparent in the advice literature.[70]

As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the violence that was to ensue – the constant attempted prevention at competing strategies, sometimes from all directions – would be situated along these lines between different social or political segments struggling either to maintain their position or improve it, whether that be *ulema* and reformist bureaucrats, vying millets, *ayans* and their subjects, the Sublime Porte and tax farmers or the sultan and the military. Sultanic power would slowly become unhinged throughout the nineteenth century, a gradual transformation, that ultimately meant these groups struggled against one another, sometimes for personal gain, sometimes for political privileges, sometimes for economic security and even for a bare existence and sustenance at times. While the *janissaries* had occasionally used this rationale to undermine the political ambitions of the palace, the same rationalization ultimately led to their downfall and dissolution. Rather than a system of ruthless violence, these conditions of possibility had managed to sediment into a fairly stable economy of power relations up until the end of the eighteenth century, when its efficiency began to crumble under its own weight. The next section details how the central government attempted to respond to these constantly

[70] Darling, *History of Social Justice*, 153.

fluctuating and changing circumstances, which ultimately set in motion a new era for imperial politics and everyday ways of life.

5.3 The Tanzimat Era: A Re-Ordering of Power Relations

The first decades of the nineteenth century saw major transformations aimed at solving this "urgent need," as Foucault would call it. Reforms were carried out in the military, there was a change in charitable entities (see chapter 8), the *janissaries* had been dismantled, new military regiments were left unprepared for battle, *ayan* tax farmers became increasingly braver in oppressive measures against peasants and closed pocket books for the central government, Greece and Egypt had escaped from Ottoman dominion, public services were on the decline and taxable property was shrinking (these issues will mostly be discussed in the next chapter, but some in subsequent chapters). The Circle of Justice was becoming dislodged on all fronts. Efforts to resolve these crises largely proved futile or detrimental to salvaging the existential crisis the empire was facing (e.g., the failed 1808 Charter of Alliance, replacing the *iltizam* system with salaried civil servants, the inability to establish a proper military, failed attempts at centralization, etc.). This is not to say these strategies had no effects – recall that we are looking at technologies that are "intentional but non-subjective" – so if I say that these reforms or certain strategies failed, what I mean is that the actor's intent was not met; however, something like the dissolution to the *janissaries* would have been inconceivable prior to the introduction of reform measures and support networks, something Selim III discovered the hard way. One of the most conclusive turning points in this historical drama was the issuance of the Edict of Gülhane (*Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif*) in 1839.[71] Though not legally binding and merely detailing *desired* reforms – some of which never came to fruition – this formal edict was meant to target the regional and local divisions in imperial legislation, mostly due to variations in legal standards among millets.[72]

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[71] The *Sened-i Ittifak* (Charter of Alliance) was a previous edict that was manifested by the sultanate in 1808 with similar ambitions in mind; however, it was not until reforms had been made under Sultan Mahmud II that the implementation of such policies became possible. It is notable to mention that this agreement catapulted the position of grand vizier as equivalent to the voice of the sultan, and the military reforms were sought in such a way as to curb the power of the *janissaries* (a pillar of the triad governing the Ottoman Empire up to this point). More significantly, this was an agreement between the sultan and the ruling elites in the empire, i.e., not directly restructuring the relationship between the sultanate and the subjects of the Empire (Yaycioglu, *Partners of Empire*, 203-238).

[72] For more information about the edict from a theoretical point of view, see Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, 132–135, 144–154, 169–172; Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 3–80; Deringil, "Invention of Tradition"; Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 155–195. For the ramifications and reception of the

Up to this point, the sultanate only had control over non-religious matters such as taxation or the military, whereas religious law had remained under the supervision of local religious community authorities. As Edmond Chertier put it in the 1850s, "Until 1845, all [educational] instruction was derived from the ulema, or the bodies of letters, and not priests, a confusion that Westerners generally make on this subject."[73] The ambition of the Edict of Gülhane, therefore, was an attempt to fundamentally restructure the relationship between the subjects within the empire and the Sublime Port, all of which was to culminate in the Tanzimat Era, or the Era of Re-Ordering.[74] While this edict was rather short for the amount of scholarly attention given it, it serves to tie together the Tanzimat reformers main intents – or rather the *targets* of their intents. Like the 1808 Charter of Alliance, one must not put too much weight on the actual discourse but perceive the relations that made such a manifestation possible (conditions of possibility and *régime du savoir*). The edict asserted that all subjects within the Empire would be on equal footing, regardless of religious orientation; in this way, the edict went further than its predecessors in that it officially redefined how the sultan positioned himself in relation to his subjects. It still relied on allegiance, but this allegiance would be direct rather than indirect, as this section shows. Although still in the place of ruled, the edict iterated that subjects had rights and were united under an Ottoman banner: "These imperial concessions extend to all our subjects, whatever religion or sect they may belong to; and they will enjoy them without any exception."[75]

The Tanzimat Era, originally led by Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşit Pasha and other European-educated elites who were already utilizing the reforms introduced by Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839), focused on creating a unified Ottoman identity that would be based on inclusive ideals and break down the religious barriers imposed under the *millet* system through reforms on taxation, education, the military, public services and more. However, the central tenet of allegiance was maintained. The Edict of Gülhane opens with a historical recounting of the empire's glory, which gives the semblance of being a renaissance era in Ottoman history. In this account of the empire's history, it is made very clear that the most ideal form of governance existed at the foundation of the empire:

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edict, see Gelvin, *Modern Middle East*, 79–81; Goodwin, *Janissaries*; Mardin, "Mind of Turkish Reformer."

[73] Chertier, *Réformes en Turquie*, 53.

[74] Tanzimat literally had the meaning of "re-ordering" or "reorganization."

[75] As quoted in Creasy, *History of Ottoman Turks*, 531.

> Everyone knows that in the early days of the Ottoman monarchy, the glorious principles of the Koran and the laws of the empire were rules that were always honored. As a result, the empire grew in strength and grandeur, and all subjects, without exception, had acquired wealth and prosperity to the highest degree.[76]

Yet, this is quickly followed by an assertion that, over the past "hundred and fifty years," the Ottoman empire had lost its way:

> A succession of accidents and various causes have made it so that one ceases to conform to the sacred code of the laws and the regulations resulting from it, as well as the force and the former prosperity that turned into weakness and impoverishment: it is indeed the case that an empire loses all stability when it ceases to observe its laws.[77]

To reach these political ambitions, there had to be a return to the glorious days of the early Ottoman Empire, a return to sincere allegiance respective of the natural rules guiding the various Ottoman nations, or so the story goes. This desire for a return, a regeneration of earlier institutions, was not vainglorious by any means. High Ottoman politics was governed by a distaste and skepticism towards *bid'at* (innovation), and though not all reformation was bad, Ottomans tended to broach the topic with hostility.[78] By framing it as a return – an earlier era uncorrupted by the pangs of time, corruption and self-interests – the reformers had a plausible defense in that they relied not on "innovation" but rather "regeneration" (which the word, aside from being a reorganization, Tanzimat denotes). The sentiment that reforms must be carried out carefully was relayed at the highest level of politics, and even the prominent Ali Pasha argued, "Please consider that our speed is limited by the fear of bursting the boilers. Our metamorphosis must be cautious, gradual, internal, and not accomplished by lightning strikes."[79] Yet, it is not just this glorious past which is being revitalized, but the notion that the Ottomans were successful conquerors not because of their savagery or skilled warriors but because of their preemptive capacity to govern differing factions, as Émile Tarin noted just a few years later: "The nucleus of the Ottoman nation was thus formed thanks to a firm and relatively enlightened government, which attracted to itself the neighboring tribes (*aşiret*), less by the prestige of a great warrior reputation than by the advantages of a protective authority functioning regularly."[80] In this way, though this is a regeneration, the relationships being professed

[76] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 7–8.
[77] Aristarchi, 8.
[78] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 65–70.
[79] As quoted in de Fontmagne, *Séjour à l'ambassade*, 45.
[80] Tarin, *Réponse aux confidences*, 21.

were still staunchly embedded in a sultanic *dispositif*. The care that was taken to avoid any semblance of *bid'at* further illustrates the perceived dangers of breaking these bonds of allegiance. One should not view this critically or judge it by modern standards; had they been able to implement such reforms immediately, it still would have relied on relations of allegiance. These were they limits of what was conceivable at the time, so it is important to understand that a sped up process of regeneration would not have brought about contemporary forms of politics, nor would it have been the result of humanistic ideals. This process was a struggle to reinforce the empire as it was, yet they simply could not do this at a faster pace due to restrictions to their actions: the limits of their capabilities, or rather the relations of violence that had solidified over time.

There are obviously things to be said about the historical accuracy of these narratives, but it is necessary to take them at "face-value," as Foucault would say. Doing so allows us to catch onto a prominent trope: in order for the empire to save itself, it must return to the principles established at an earlier time. Yet, as Selim Deringil notes, many of these historical interpretations of an Ottoman past were highly novel and revolutionary compared to the actual Ottoman past; Derinigil further explains that this revisioning occurred in a way that saw many different subject positions jumping to found new principles on what Hobsbawm termed "invented traditions":

> This political and intellectual atmosphere [of a post-French Revolution era] had a profound effect on the ruling elite of the Ottoman state, which, from the Sultan down, began to look for a new basis for defining what was increasingly coming to be considered an "Ottoman citizenry." Very disparate elements in Ottoman society, ranging from the bureaucratic elite and the Young Ottoman intelligentsia to the humble popular ulema, felt that a new social base was needed if the empire was to survive.[81]

This is a consistently repeated theme during the 1840s and 1850s, both by Ottoman officials as well as foreigners – either as diplomats or foreign writers close to the Ottoman government. For instance, Émile Tarin and Hippolyte Lapeyrre's claim that such reforms would see Sultan Abdülmecid II, "a descendant of Osman[,] bringing the Empire back from its decay by a happy return to the traditional principles of the ancient Ottomans."[82]

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[81] Deringil, "Invention of Tradition," 4.

[82] Tarin and Lapeyrre, *Sultan Abdul-Medjid*, 18–19. For literature on this notion of returning to an Ottoman "golden age" or an Ottoman "renaissance," one can see Ersoy, "Architecture and Search"; Gurpinar, *Ottoman/Turkish Visions*; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*; Zürcher, "Ottoman Sources of Kemalist." To see the role architecture, art, museums and other mediums played in this equation, one can consult Necipoğlu, *History and Ideology*; Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed*.

Not only did the Edict of Gülhane attribute earlier times as an era of peace among *millets* and prosperity for the nation – an era where the Circle of Justice was in full harmony – but it specified what needed to be changed in order to rejuvenate the empire: (1) universal subjectship, (2) a better system for collecting taxes and (3) a renovation of military recruitment and organization.

Each of these linked the security of the empire with the security of individuals, arguing that subjects who enjoy such security would ensure the nation's security.[83] The emphasis on security and peace is not misplaced but a core attribute of allegiance in the sultanic *dispositif*. Nevertheless, the relationships that were being deployed here came to slowly dislodge the system of allegiance. More specifically, a new network of relations was proposed on the idea of a constructed version of imperial belonging, albeit one still founded on allegiance. If the physical security of the sultan's subjects is ensured, then they will have nothing but good will, loyalty and admiration (i.e., allegiance) for the Ottoman government:

> What man, no matter how long his father may have inspired violence in him, cannot help but to resort to it and thereby harm the government and the country if his life and his honor are endangered? If, in contrast, he enjoys perfect security in this respect, he will not deviate from the path of loyalty, and all of his acts will contribute to the good of the government and his brothers.[84]

Up until this point, the sultan's official position was partly linked to "Servant and Protector of the Holy Places." However, based on the vast difficulties facing the empire, this was no longer sustainable. Due to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, a great deal of the Ottoman's territorial integrity was put into question. In response to these dilemmas, Rustem Effendi and Seid Bey frustratingly retort, "How can a government function with such barriers/roadblocks? At the slightest movement Turkey makes to regain a little freedom of action, one cries, on all sides, to fanaticism, to retrograde ideas, to the violation of capitulations, to the acquired rights, and we do not know what else."[85] Thus, from the perspective of sovereignty, a new link based on cultural legacy rather than religious principles was subtly put forward. While this may seem rather theoretical in writing, the implications of this move, which the sultanate had flirted with before, also caused room for concern. The special privileges that existed between *millets* were something of a double-edged sword, with complaints arising from both sides, or rather from the

[83] Dursun, "Population Policies of Ottoman."
[84] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 8.
[85] Rustem and Seid, *Réponse à quelques journaux*, 22.

hegemonic Muslim *millet* as well as from the non-Muslim *millets*, as James Gelvin explains:

> Muslim elites objected to the fact that the documents seemed to single out Christian communities for special consideration and opened the door to granting them economic and political privileges that Muslims did not enjoy. Many Christians, on the other hand, were not pleased that the notion of equality was applied in such areas as military conscription – a privilege of citizenship most Christians would have just as readily forgone.[86]

Of course, the Edict of Gülhane was a set of ideals, meant to foster the enactment of centralized governing regulations; it did not inherently propagate any legal actions on the hierarchical structure of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the Edict of Gülhane's proposals were significant and, because it was just a proposal, ambiguous and threatening to the imperial populations, which would erupt in the following decades. It promised the protection of *millets* and a new distribution of *millet* representatives with real power, and yet for Muslims, there was no special demarcation between their *millets* and the existing system.[87] In other words, they had the least to gain and the most to lose. Meanwhile, other *millets* showed early signs of frustration at the proposed loss of exemption from military service.[88] Stanford Shaw explains that "neither Muslims nor non-Muslims, however, wanted the latter to serve in the army, the former because of the long-standing tradition by which Christians and Jews were not allowed to bear arms in a Muslim state, the latter because they preferred the more profitable lives of civilians."[89] From its beginning, then, the Tanzimat reforms were an uphill battle.

Yet, if physical security was needed to ensure loyalty, so was financial security. The second target of the Edict of Gülhane was thus on explaining how financially secure subjects are in fact patriotic and dedicated:

> If there is a lack of security with regard to one's wealth, everyone remains distant to the voice of the prince and the country; nobody cares about the progress of public wealth, absorbed with their own worries. If, on the other hand, the citizen confidently possesses his properties of all kinds,

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[86] Gelvin, *Modern Middle East*, 80.
[87] Berkes, *Development of Secularism*.
[88] For more on inter-religious or inter-ethnic hesitations to the Tanzimat ideals, see Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations Property"; Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late"; Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat"; Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*; Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*; Topses, "Socio-Economic and Political." We also see this issue popping up in a lot of the literature at the time; cf., for instance, Chertier, *Réformes en Turquie*; Oscanyan, *Sultan and His People*; Tarin, *Réponse aux confidences*; Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey 1*. Moreover, this theme would become particularly emphasized in official Ottoman laws and discourse (cf. Aristarchi, *Législation Ottomane*). This would later become a defining feature of pan-Turkish literature (Landau, *Pan-Turkism*).
[89] Shaw, "Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax," 431.

> then, full of zeal for his business, he seeks to widen the circle of it in order to extend his enjoyment, all the time feeling the love of the prince and his fatherland doubled in his heart along with his dedication to his country. These feelings become the source of the most commendable actions in him.[90]

That security breeds allegiance is something the Tanzimat reformers were adamant to show, but more than this, a key character trait that was pushed for the rest of the nineteenth and twentieth century was introduced: obedience over self-determination, or rather the need to put others before one's self-interests. Over a decade after the Edict of Gülhane, there was continued persistence on the role of security over self-gain.[91] What is further interesting is that this was meant to be carried out through a top-down maneuver, so much so that the primary author of the edict, Reşid Pasha, argued against the idea of constitutionalism: "Public opinion and the inclinations of the people are like an overflowing river, and there are two situations which are impossible to overcome, one of them being religious belief and the other public opinion."[92] While this may present a hostility towards constitutionalism, Reşid Pasha then specifies what the underlying prerogative for Ottoman governance should be: "Since to oppose them [the public] is dangerous and difficult, in the case of uprisings and stirrings of public opinion, the state should act accordingly to the currents of nature."[93] In essence, this form of "constitutionalism" was an Ottoman-centric one based on the idea of consultation with the sultan rather than collective control; how was an uneducated public meant to consult with the sultan on these matters? One of Reşid Pasha's disciples and a central personality for the Sublime Porte in the 1850s and 1860s, Fuad Pasha, seemed open to the notion of constitutionalism, yet only on paper, labeling calls for popular sovereignty "excessive" and "mischievous."[94] These relationships should give us pause for thought into how we understand constitutionalism and constitutions, as the ideas professed here were not the Western European notions of popular sovereignty but rather rooted in Islamic thought, primarily the idea that a ruler should get advice from his subservient subjects.[95] Thus, had

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[90] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 8–9.
[91] Rustem and Seid, *Réponse à quelques journaux*, 26.
[92] As quoted in Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 186–187. Not only was this the opinion of Reşid Pasha, but his successors Ali and Fuad Pashas were equally hostile to this idea (Topses, "Socio-Economic and Political"). This would pose a specific divide in the thoughts of the Young Ottomans and the Tanzimat reformers by the 1870s.
[93] Reshid Pasha, as quoted in Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 186–187.
[94] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 91.
[95] For a more detailed argument of the Edict of Gülhane being rooted in Islamic thought, see Abu-Manneh, "Islamic Roots of Gülhane."

a constitutional period been concocted under Reşid Pasha, or later Ali and Fuad Pashas, it certainly would have favored the central government and would have counterproductively run against the idea of constitutionalism that we know today. Rather than a democratic setting where the voices of the public should be listened to – which is often how this process is portrayed in contemporaneous accounts of the past – the natural rules of politics, particularly those involving allegiance (or rather, obedience) to one's government, were the ones that really had to be the *raison d'état*. The ultimate goal, in essence, was the interests of the public, not the interests of the individual, as Rustem and Seid argued: "Above the rights and the interests of some particular persons, there is the general interests, the right of everyone to be preserved can compromise their security, troubling the peace among nations."[96] Where do these rules come from? It is no secret that most of the Tanzimat reformers had been educated and influenced by European ideas of liberalism, democracy and constitutionalism at the time, assuredly, but this should not be equated with the Tanzimat reformers using copy-paste.[97] Even if ideas were adapted from European contexts, they required justifications in the political thought of the Ottoman Empire, which usually sought to justify these in the Islamic tradition; these would often fundamentally change the notion of concepts like "constitutionalism" or "public opinion" (especially see chapter 7).

The final target for the Edict of Gülhane, the military, had a twofold goal according to the text. On the one hand, a successful military requires a consistent source of income and training, something the Ottoman Empire was struggling with. One of the most existential of crises for the empire at this time was an extremely inefficient tax system that threatened to bankrupt the empire: "As for the regular and fixed tax rates, it is very important to settle this matter; because the state, for the defense of its territory and forces of various expenses, can only obtain the necessary money for its armies and other services through the contributions raised by its subjects."[98] As with the other two points, this framing poses a strong resemblance to the Circle of Justice, whereby the Sublime Porte was trying to stabilize military protections, taxation to ensure the military's physical sustenance and economic consumption and industrialization as well as education to provide the larger public to prosper in a globalizing world. The main target of this final

[96] Rustem and Seid, *Réponse à quelques journaux*, 26.
[97] The impact of Western ideas on scholars has been extensively discussed elsewhere, cf. Brisku, *Political Reform in Ottoman*; Davison, *Essays in Ottoman*; Hourani, *Arabic Thought in Liberal*; Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*; Reid, "Was There a Tanzimat"; Turnaoğlu, *Formation of Turkish Republicanism*.
[98] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 9.

point was tax farming, whereby "the civil and financial administration of a locality is delivered to the arbitrariness of a single man, which is to say, it is sometimes in the iron grip of the most violent and greedy passions."[99] Thus, for a proper military to be feasible, a new, more loyal system of taxation is required, which in theory would solve many of the other issues facing the empire, returning to the theme of self-interest being at the core of the empire's troubles. At the same time, it was seen as necessary to extend the recruitment practices of the military to include non-Muslims. If the political rationality was going to be shifted from a religiously driven justification to one based on natural political laws, which were nevertheless still grounded in allegiance, then how the public was divided needed to be reformulated. This began with the extension of the same rights to everyone regardless of creed, which would establish a uniform version of allegiance: "The imperial concessions extend to all our subjects, whatever religion or sect they may be, they will enjoy them without exception. Perfect security is therefore granted by us to the inhabitants of the empire in terms of their life, their honor and their wealth."[100]

Among the newly imposed institutional projects, perhaps the most visible changes came in the form of the education initiatives proposed and, in some cases, eventually put into place. These initiatives were largely indebted to the industrialization of Europe. This transformation proved immensely beneficial for European treasuries, and the Ottomans were in no mood to be left out. During the 1840s and 1850s, many attempts were made to redefine and restructure a fractured Ottoman education system.[101] The goal was, as Emine Everend explains, "to socialize children at an early age so that they would become loyal to the empire, would be integrated with other community members, and would also make vocational and fiscal contributions to the empire's economic health."[102] Throughout the Tanzimat, one of the strongest opponents to these new approaches to education were the *ulema*, who made sure to fight them tooth and nail, even if rather unsuccessfully.[103] As one foreign scholar put it at the time:

> This organization was good from the exclusive point of view of the Muslim conquest, and of the predominance of the Koran as a civil and religious instrument; however, it was completely improper to join the populations with the benefits of a national education. This mode of instruction sins by its very foundation; the ulema systematically reject everything that is not the Koran or the

[99] Aristarchi, 9.
[100] Aristarchi, 10.
[101] Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*.
[102] Evered, *Empire and Education*, 6.
[103] Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire II*, 47–69.

> Muslim tradition, it has remained with Arab medicine, and it is not at all concerned with the progress of the sciences and arts in Europe.[104]

Ottoman education was extremely heterogeneous, and the paths one could take through differing educational institutions was far-reaching.[105] Not only was there an explosion of foreign-financed missionary schools during the nineteenth century, which the Sublime Porte eventually came to see as a threat to its legitimacy, but the rules being imposed were for Ottoman, meaning Muslim, schools.[106] The schools of the other *millets* – the Christian and Jewish *millets* – existed outside the scope of these schools, with many Muslims seeking to send their children to these schools due to the higher quality of education. One of the Tanzimat reformers most prominent initiatives in this respect was thus the construction of *rüşdiyes* (juvenile or secondary schools), which were seen by the *ulema* as secular and an attack on their religious allegiance.[107] The Ottoman schools before this time had consisted of elementary and higher education institutions; the *rüsdiyes* would fill the gap between them with a more technical than religious education grounded in scientific theory instead of Islamic jurisprudence: "Arabic Syntax and Grammar, Orthography, Composition and Style, Sacred History, Ottoman History, Universal History, Geography, Arithmetic [and] the Elements of Geometry."[108] However, Karpat has noted how the actual curriculum in these new "secular" schools strongly incorporated Islam; what made them distinct from the *madrasas* was their approach to Islam, which was "casual, rational, and humanistic."[109] At the same time, technical education was being emphasized in higher education as well, especially ones today considered specialized or trade schools. New universities were established to teach agriculture, veterinary sciences, naval tactics, artillery, engineering and medicine, among other specializations and crafts (addressed more in-depth in the following chapter).[110]

Another issue that emerged in this re-ordering of power relations was the need for a new penal code that could encapsulate the ideals being put forward, particularly when

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[104] Chertier, *Réformes en Turquie*, 54–55.
[105] For more extensive treatment of the different education possibilities in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, see Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late"; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*.
[106] A great deal of attention has been paid to these schools in recent scholarship, the most notable being Deringil's book *The Well-Protected Domains*. Additional studies that deserve attention here are Boyacioğlu, "Historical Development of Foreign"; Evered, *Empire and Education*; Somel, *Modernization of Public Education*.
[107] See Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late"; Karpat, "Transformation of Ottoman State"; Neumann, "Whom Did Ahmed Cevdet."
[108] Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey 1*, 201.
[109] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 101.
[110] Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey 1*, 202–208.

it came to enforcing a unitary set of rules for all *millets*. According to Abdolonyme Ubicini, "The first requisite [of the Edict of Gülhane's ideals] was to detach the laws (properly so called), civil and criminal, from the mass of religious and moral injunctions with which they had hitherto been overlaid and blended."[111] Along with this problematization, the issue of government corruption, which had rampantly spread throughout the Ottoman Empire over the previous century and a half, had to be dealt with. Tarin and Lapeyrre profess as much:

> Corruption had in the long run infiltrated, like a subtle poison, into the customs of the Ottomans, less by the effect of individual vices than by a kind of general relaxation and by the forgetting of the old maxims of their fathers. It was enough to restore them to honor by an act of the imperial initiative, vigorously condemning abuses which had hitherto been considered as confessable.[112]

Not only was there the theme of a return to past, but also the notion that the empire's degradation was due to internal corruption. Though the issuance of a new penal code became an ambition of the Tanzimat reformers before the Edict of Gülhane saw the light of day, it was not until 1858 that a systematized version finally materialized; however, this should not be surprising based on the work that was required to transform the complexities of Ottoman law into a codified document capable of addressing such subtilties without collapsing in on itself (which explains why the penal codes of 1840 and 1851 largely failed). Michel Chodkiewicz even referred to pre-codified Islamic law as "an ocean without shore."[113] What is rather unique about the penal code issued in 1858 was its codification and systematicity, but also the new way it situated the subject as a legal and individually responsible entity. Berkes notes that three important facets of the Tanzimat reforms were instilled in this way: "The principle of equality in the application of punitive provisions, the principle that no one was punishable for an unspecified act, and the principle of individual responsibility."[114]

A series of issues littered the deployment of any of these penal codes, and amendments were frequent and often chaotic (discussed in more depth in the second

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[111] Ubicini, 162.
[112] Tarin and Lapeyrre, *Sultan Abdul-Medjid*, 120–21.
[113] Chodkiewicz, *Ocean Without Shore.*
[114] Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, 164. This can be further witnessed by the new laws on the regulation and ownership of land that appeared in the 1858 penal code, whereby it became easier to take over larger swathes of land, such that "these lands had merged and became large farms that supplied raw material for the foreign market," something that only became easier to occur after the new individualized land legislation (Topses, "Socio-Economic and Political"). Though these rules were meant to foster agrarian growth and the independency of peasantry, it ended up functioning counterproductively.

section of the next chapter). However, it was still a systemic attempt at the codification of penal regulations; previously listed under *kanun* (literally meaning a "rule"), this new codification became available to the public – something that was lacking with *kanuns* – while also cataloguing areas of Islamic jurisprudence.[115] What can we discern from the *Ceza Kanunname-i Hümayunu*'s (Ottoman Penal Code) eventual manifestation? While the legal system will more extensively be addressed in the next chapter, the best approach for now might be to see what sections were most emphasized without overinflating instances of plagiarism from the French Penal Code.[116] The first chapter (out of three) focuses explicitly on (a) the abuse of political office, (b) abusing those in political office and (c) disturbing the peace. In fact, the penal code issued in 1840 was strongly entrenched in these types of regulations that were, as Avi Rubin notes, "mainly aimed at policing the officials, a rationale that was upheld in the latter, more subsequent version of this law."[117] This latter principle is largely attached with the ideals set out in the Edict of Gülhane, such that persons of different religious communities be protected. We can see the severity placed on this principle in article 56 of part 2, chapter 1:

> Whosoever dares, by making the people of the Ottoman dominions arm themselves against each other, to instigate or incite them to engage in mutual slaughter, or to bring about acts of rapine, pillage, devastation of country or homicide in divers places is, if the matter of disorder comes into effect entirely or if a commencement of the matter of the disorder has been made, likewise put to death.[118]

There was clearly an ambition to tackle issues of corruption within the empire, just as there was a need to elicit allegiance and patriotism by punishing those fighting against such ideals. The second chapter, nonetheless, works on issues more typically tied to penal codes, primarily involving injuries against other non-official subjects as well as damages to property. The final chapter of the Penal Code deals with matters pertaining to

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[115] Goodwin, *Janissaries*, 31. For more on the shifts in Islamic jurisprudence during the Tanzimat, see Fadel, "Islamic Law Reform"; Kaplan, "Ottoman Justice Thought"; Powell, *Shari'a in Secular State*. For information on the structure of Islamic jurisprudence prior to the Tanzimat, see Aykan and Ergene, "Shari'A Courts in Ottoman"; Sariyannis, *Ottoman Political Thought*. For more general accounts of Islamic jurisprudence, one can also see El Fadl, *Speaking in God's Name*; Motzski, *Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence*. Additionally, Islamic law was separated into two parts: *şeriat* and *kanun*. Whereas the *şeriat* was the rules and declarations laid down in the Koran, the *kanun* rules were theological interpretations of issues not directly addressed in the Koran but still requiring some form of divine interpretation and guidance. *Kanuns* were written by members of the *ulema*, which were then compiled into volumes and used for settling judicial matters. For a more complex investigation into the legal system of Islamic jurisprudence in the Ottoman Empire, see Akgündüz, "Shari'ah Courts and Shari'ah."

[116] A review of the penal code implemented at this time was heavily drawn from the French penal code.

[117] Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts*, 24.

[118] Bucknill and Utidjian, *Ottoman Penal Code*, 48.

"sanitation, cleanliness and police," though this chapter is immensely shorter.[119] Taking the penal code as a whole, we see a network of relations that are being proposed, ones which strongly tie personal security to patriotism and political obedience, i.e., a codification of the Circle of Justice.

The penal code came with a reformative period in the courts, with new procedures meant to accommodate the various *millets* as well as to deal with issues pertaining to foreigners.[120] While the courts that were experimented with during the 1840s and 1850s largely failed and were later disbanded, one notable development implemented in 1854 was the makeup of the *Meclis-i Tahkik* (Council of Investigations), which held criminal tribunals consisting of Muslim as well as non-Muslim administrators.[121] Thus, an early form of incorporating non-Muslim subjects into the bureaucratic mechanism of the state emerged, even though they were barred from other fields like the military, the bureaucracy and education. Unlike the *şeriat* courts – which existed alongside these tribunals and were ruled over by a single Muslim judge – there was a very complex composition that incorporated a president and a panel consisting of Muslim as well as non-Muslim members. Aside from advancements made in commercial courts, however, there was not a great deal of success with the courts until the *nizamiye* (civil) courts – which were originally used as commercial courts – were introduced in 1864, and these largely relied on the new civil code as well as the reforms of the 1860s (to be discussed in the next chapter).[122]

While these reform projects touched on a whole array of problems facing the empire, perhaps most radical and fundamental was the task of upheaving the existent system of tax farming. Without a more manageable and sustainable system of taxation,

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[119] The inclusion of sanitary practices was a particularly poignant issue at the time, and its inclusion in the penal code is far more consistent than may appear. Due to widespread epidemics during the 1830s, the Ottoman government issued sanitary procedures for the first time. In combination with a desire for population expansion, this emphasis on the prevention of epidemics and the treatment of diseases went hand-in-hand with the reformist policies of the time. While an interesting titbit of information, this topic was sidelined because of the other, more pertinent struggles existent at the time. For more on this, see Arslan and Polat, "Travel from Europe"; Bulmuş, *Plague Quarantine and Geopolitics*; La Rue, "Treating Black Deaths"; Robarts, "Plague on Both Houses"; Sechel, *Medicine Within and Between*.

[120] Rubin notes that many of the court reforms during this period failed, and the primary concern during the 1840s and 1850s was on implementing a new penal code rather than a new court system: "During this period, several types of criminal courts were established and then abolished: the Gendarmerie Council (*zaptiye meclisi*), the High-Council of the Gendarmerie (*divan-i zaptiye*), and Council of Investigations (*meclis- i tahkik*), all of which applied the new criminal codes" (Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts*, 24).

[121] Schull, *Prisons in Late Ottoman*, 23.

[122] The commercial courts can largely be attributed to pressure from European nations to regulate trade more efficiently; the change here seems to be more imposed than a genuine transformation of internal dynamics, so it is less important for our focus at present

the rest of these initiatives were doomed to failure. In the process, an underlying principle slowly emerged that sought to shift from collective to individualized taxation. In other words, this was an appeal to form a direct system of taxation based on *muhassils* (salaried tax collectors) in place of tax farming to bypass the corruption and unfair treatment of peasants that was hampering the national treasury. As a largely agrarian economy, the primary source of tax collection came from the tithes collected under the issuance of *iltizams*. Topses notes that, at the time of the Edict of Gülhane, "80% of the population was dependent on land," and by 1873, "the 70% of the Ottoman society who lived under the worst conditions were paying 77% of the total taxes."[123] Yet, even before the issuance of this edict, the central government was working diligently to resolve the unaccountability and transgressions of allegiance prevalent in the tax farming system. In 1838, a decree implemented a new system of taxation based on the *muhassil* system, but this was quick to fall apart. Stanford Shaw attributes this failure to two underlying issues: there simply were not enough willing bureaucrats to serve in this role, and the *ayans* actively worked to make sure it failed.[124] The Tanzimat reformers' experiences with tax farming showed that it would be harder to dissolve than initially expected, so various measures were implemented to try and weaken the influence of the *ayans*, such as two-year – and later five-year (1852-1855) – proprietorships of *iltizams* as well as an attempt at paper money in 1840.

The endgame was to establish *vergi* (tax) offices in every region throughout the empire, functioning as the extended arm of the central government by enforcing taxation and collecting tithes more efficiently. Whereby taxes were collected in bulk from tax farmers, the reformers' focus was on individualized taxation. From 1830 to 1831, the central government carried out a census to determine the eligibility of men in the empire for conscription and taxes. By 1844, when a new census was carried out under the Tanzimat reformers, it expanded upon these traditional techniques of census-taking. Beyond military recruitment and taxation, their approach took into account numerous details of individuals and regional information, such as "births and deaths, the number of travelers, medical service, transfers of the properties, the amount of conscriptions, real and movable losses resulting from fire, epizootics, and the like"; once compiled, the

[123] Topses, "Socio-Economic and Political," 264.
[124] Shaw, "Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax," 422–423. For a more intriguing and contemporary approach to the latter issue, see the works of E. Attila Aytekin ("Agrarian Relations, Property," "Peasant Protest in Late," "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat").

population census – along with the concurrent land census – gave the central government vital information for regulating the population, such as "age, profession, religion, military service, apportionment of taxes, and the like."[125] By 1958, the information from the census would begin to be used to establish the *Tahrir-i Emlak Nezareti* (Department of Land Cadastre). Stanford Shaw explains how this new department dealt with the census:

> These commissions went with the census experts into the cities, towns, and countryside to set down every plot of land, measure by measure, stating in the registers how each plot was used, the value of each building and urban cultivated plot, the identity and status of each individual and what his occupation and income were.[126]

This information was then used to provide individuals with "a tax population receipt (*vergi nilfus tezkeresi*)," which was essentially an identity card with the required tax to be paid every year based on annual income.[127] In this way, the cadastral system attempted individual taxation for the first time in the empire's history.

However, it was not until 1868 that the *vilayet* (meaning "region") system – inclusive of *vergi* offices – took the place of the traditional *eyalet* system, which had been in place for centuries.[128] The position of *muhassil*, however, had a basis in the accumulation of knowledge and the classification of administrative duties. As the censuses show, there was an interest not only in collecting information but putting it to use. A whole array of *meclis* (councils) were set up to investigate the proper usage and improvement of the empire across the board, such as the the *Meclis-i Hass* (Privy Council) and the *Meclis-i Maliye* (Council of Finance) in 1837, the *Meclis-i Maarif-i Umumiye* (Council of Education) in 1841 and the *Meclis-i Ziraat* (Council of Agriculture) in 1845 (these are just a few among many); it should not be assumed that these institutions failed to previously exist, but their reorganization was meant to deal with the ideals and ambitions of the Tanzimat through the more sophisticated relations of an emerging bureaucratic apparatus. With the establishment of these commissions and working groups, there was intrinsically an explosion of documentation and the classification of

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[125] Dursun, "Population Policies of Ottoman," 8.
[126] Shaw, "Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax," 427.
[127] Shaw, 427. Also see Guéno, "Land Tenure and Concept"; Kedar, Amara and Yiftachel, *Emptied Lands*, 45-62; Nanov, "First Stage of Ottoman." While the cadastral system was first experimented with in 1858/1859, and then extended to most of the empire thereafter. However, Shaw notes that there were some exceptions: "With the exception of Erzurum, Bagdad, Basra, Tripoli of Libya, Yemen, and the Hicaz, whose surveys were not in fact finished, and the new tax systems introduced, until 1907 and 1908" (Shaw, 427).
[128] Though the *vilayet* system was officially implemented in 1868, tax farming continued to be a prominent practice for tax collection. Tax farming was not officially abolished until almost a decade later in 1877 (discussed in the following section).

Ottoman subjects.[129] What is additionally interesting about this long list of councils is the role representation slowly began to play. As I have already noted, the Tanzimat reformers were not keen on the democratic and constitutional ideologies spreading throughout Europe – meaning even if they "adopted" certain notions, these were transformed and engrained in a very Ottoman context or were used to refer to an already existent notion in Islamic or Ottoman scholarship – and yet they were very assertive of representation on local councils.[130] This principle of representation was not limited to local governance but also to the courts. While the notion of constitutionalism was not largely supported during this time, and even the versions that were relied on the Islamic notion of *shura* (consultation) – i.e., they were not "constitutional" in the way Europeans understood such a concept – implementing *millet* representation was ubiquitous. These representative remedies were meant to foreclose the possibility of inter-ethnic or inter-religious conflict, which was an issue that had to be carefully juggled with the shifting *raisons d'etat*.

Amidst these reforms, there was still one central tenets of the Edict of Gülhane they needed to address, which was a reformation and revitalization of the imperial military, yet this was strongly linked to reforms targeting industrialization. The government certainly needed a military force – a lesson they would unfortunately learn sooner rather than later – but they also needed to make sure they were not decreasing the number of available peasants to work the land and procreate.[131] While military units certainly contributed to the empire's strength following the dissolution of the *janissaries*, it was plagued by disorganization, insufficient training and an irregular system of conscription. Put simply, the empire just did not have the bureaucratic infrastructure to enforce conscription policies nor the statistical data to adequately assess what conscription numbers should be, something the Tanzimat reformers quickly set to work on. It was not until 1848 that a more comprehensive military hierarchy would be introduced through the *Kur'a* (conscription) law, including regulations on conscription policies, the regulation of troops in the active and reserve forces and the implementation of strict military training. Based off the 1844 census, which was deliberately meant to determine the number of men suitable for conscription, the new conscription law aimed

[129] Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat," 314.
[130] Berkes, *Development of Secularism*; Çiçek, *Young Ottomans*; Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian"; Karpat, "Transformation of Ottoman State."
[131] Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat"; Dursun, "Population Policies of Ottoman"; Miller, "Rights Reproduction Sexuality"; Miller, "Politicizing Reproduction in Comparative."

at more consistently determining military manpower.[132] Active service in the military was set at five years followed by seven years in the *redif* (reserves), and the *Kur'a* law came with a more comprehensive list of who was eligible for service and who was exempt. Even with these adjustments, nonetheless, conscription was still not yet a universal phenomenon but based on how many troops were needed for the military in any given year, based on the practice of drawing lots to see who was going to be enlisted.[133] These troops were to be conscripted to one of the five military regiments that had been established in 1843, with a sixth established in 1848.[134] There were also strong opinions about whether non-Muslims should be enlisted in the military as the Edict of Gülhane had stipulated, but after strong resistance from both Muslims and non-Muslims, a new form of the *cizve* tax was implemented to compensate this.

Though it can hardly be argued that these reforms were a success (meaning they were carried out as their initial initiators had planned), as will be explored in the following chapter, their purposes were often quite clear and far less humanist than some current scholars have argued. They were carried out in response to very real and present dangers the central government faced at the time. By restructuring the relationship between the subjects and the empire, their ambition was to bring about a revolutionary version of allegiance based on one's individual connection to the sultan and not through an array of intermediaries. It was not an issuance of liberal rights but rather a revision of the role allegiance was to play in the day-to-day lives of Ottoman subjects, regardless of their religious *millet*. Not only would this resolve domestic disputes, but it would ideally solve the problem of capitulations. The Tanzimat sought to make the sultan both the head of the Muslim *millet* and the sole ruler of *all* subjects based on a less Islamic model, but not one that did away with Islam in any respect. Along with this, the project set out in the 1808 Charter of Alliance, whereby the roles and obligations of various imperial functionaries was detailed and rigidly laid out rather than just unspokenly understood or performed, was one that continued to have immense influence for the Tanzimat reformists. Rather than a solid break or rupture, there was a gradual evolution of these documents and the conditions that made them possible which sought to codify imperial structures and re-establish the Circle of Justice on more solid ground. This process

[132] For conscription and the 1844 census, see Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment," 41–55; Zürcher, "Ottoman Conscription System."
[133] For more on this procedure, see Zürcher, "Ottoman Conscription System." This system would continue until new regulations were implemented in 1869.
[134] Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment," 52–53.

occurred across the empire, both geographically and symbolically, whether it was education, the military, tax collection, imperial employees (or later bureaucrats), penal codes, the courts system or provincial administration.

5.4 Conclusion: Re-Imagined Allegiances

The sultanic *dispositif* relied on a layered and dispersed system of allegiances, yet this was not simply a top-down initiative. It made the central government responsible for the security (physical, financial, social, religious) of its subjects in culturally understood Cycle of Justice, which Darling illustrates was not just a literary device or a tool of elites but was frequently employed by *rayas* to overcome their local *ayans*.[135] Breaking this pledge of allegiance was cause for rebellion (on the side of the subjects) or harsh crackdowns on unruly subjects (on the side of the central government). This ultimately led to the dethronement of two successive sultans at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the Tanzimat was largely a response to the gradual deterioration of this socio-political network. The goal was to assure more solid and reliant bonds of allegiance, yet to do this, the reformers had to engage with a variety of conundrums. An embedded dependency on tax farming made it difficult to restructure this system. Lack of funding and expertise meant the military remained disobedient and difficult to organize. Education was a contentious point between the *ulema* and the reformers, who wished to initiate a period of industrialization through skills-based training. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca hung like an axe over the head of the central government, threatening to undermine their projects completely.

All of these issues gave rise to a problematization of allegiance, one that urgently needed to be resolved as the empire faced numerous large-scale rebellions during the first half of the nineteenth century, primarily from Greece and Egypt. The array of possibilities that stretched out before the Tanzimat reformers were somewhat limited, and many of their own shortcomings as well as resistance from numerous subject positions (such as the *ulema*, *ayans*, the military and other nations) forced a reconsideration on the very legitimacy of the state. The goal was not to do away with allegiance by any means, not to see subjects as "citizens." The reformers' efforts were linked to ensuring the continuance of the status quo, one that would be brought back from earlier epochs. The Circle of

[135] Darling, *History of Social Justice*.

Justice would be regenerated, and the security, peace and prosperity such Tanzimat reforms could offer would ensure a new golden age. This chapter may have seemed somewhat idealistic at times, but one must remember what our methodological concern is: strategies and relationships. The first section sought to capture the conditions of possibility and the general *régime du savoir* that structured decision making in the Ottoman Empire up until the end of the eighteenth century. In doing so, one also notices the nexuses of violence – as understood from part 1 of this text – are situated along the divisions within the Circle of Justice. As will be seen in the following chapters, it is precisely along these lines that violence, whether through massacres, oppression, limitations, incentivization or the destruction of old ways of life, will emerge; these relationships of power and violence will fundamentally alter the network of power relations around imperial – and later national – belonging throughout the long nineteenth century. The second section outlined the *intents* and *targets* such policies were meant to address, with some focus on their complications but less focus on the reaction of other subject positions. This was intentional as it allows us to pinpoint these methodological elements, yet it is not enough for an exhaustive analysis. In the next chapter, how other actors reacted to these practices will begin to show how the "intentional but non-subjective" strategies slowly left the control of their authors and entered an interactive, dynamic and fluctuating socio-political arena that was impacted from all directions. The following chapters will then try to highlight the practices that emerged from these struggles and their eventual incorporation into Ottoman culture, politics, rituals and institutions.

6. Tainted Foundations: Bureaucratic Expansion, Administrative Function and Decentering Sovereignty

"The execution of such a complex program, embracing all branches of the administration and touching on the highest questions of the social order, prevented difficulties of various natures, the most serious of which resided in these national prejudices and in the state of public mores. Each of the announced reforms therefore required a double effort responding to a double obstacle to be overcome." – *Considérations sur l'exécution du Firman Impérial du 8 février 1856*[1]

6.1 Introduction: Boy, That Escalated Quickly

Even though the Tanzimat significantly bureaucratized state institutions and removed much of the centralization that had previously been held by the sultanate, the reforms can by and large be seen as failures. By failures, I do not mean they did not complete tasks or did not have an impact on developments, but rather that the intended strategies did not play out exactly as planned (or arguably even remotely close to that). In other words, I mean failures from a distinctly Foucauldian point-of-view. Perhaps this was partly due to unforeseen circumstances that complicated such a reformation, such as the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the subsequent influx of refugees during this period. Yet, the failure of reforms had more to do with internal political struggles that were being carried out on three levels that international politics then affected: centralization, regionalization and localization.[2] At the highest level, there were the *centralization* ambitions of the Sublime Porte, especially the policies of the Tanzimat reformers, the *ulema* and the position of the sultan himself: "The policy of the government has hitherto been *centralization*, that is, to draw the mass of the people from the frontiers to a common centre, in order to more readily suppress any rebellion."[3] Importantly, this does not mean that the central government would control everything – in fact, many of these procedures gave the provinces far more say in day-to-day political issues – but rather that they would be able to rule the empire from a central location. At the same time, there was a push for *regionalization* that was largely driven by *ayans* and the elites of non-Muslim *millets*

[1] Aristrachi, *Legislation Ottomane*, 24.
[2] Though I am primarily focusing on the internal politics of the empire, there were a great deal of issues on the peripherals of the empires that would constitute new forms of legitimacy elsewhere, such as in the regional areas of Egypt, the Caucasus, Palestine and the Balkans. For some illustrations of these dynamics, one can see Baer, "Popular Revolt in Ottoman"; Makdisi, *Culture of Sectarianism*; Manna, "Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century"; Rogan, *Frontiers of State*; Sariyannis, "Ottoman Ideas on Monarchy"; Turhan, *Ottoman Empire and Bosnian*.
[3] Oscanyan, *Sultan and His People*, 114. For more information on the policies of centralization, see Çiftçi, "Modernisation in Tanzimat Period"; Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in Ottoman"; Heper, "Center and Periphery," 1980; Kırlı, "Tyranny Illustrated"; Yildiz, *Crisis and Rebellion*.

attempting to form a monopoly on tax collection and mercantile predominance in their *iltizams*.[4] For instance, Ubicini asserts the following to illustrate this point:

> As a characteristic trait of these times of anarchy, when power was at once everywhere and nowhere, – everywhere for the purpose of maintaining abuses, nowhere for the vindicating the right, – it is to be remarked that the Arab tribes of Bagdad and Syria, instead of paying the tribute due to the imperial treasury, made frequent incursions into these provinces, and only quitted them on payment of a ransom by their governors.[5]

In response to the reforms, there were widespread revolts organized by *rayas* that sought to use the principles of the Tanzimat, the quickly fluctuating system of taxation, education, internal and external trade and a new distribution of power relations that largely dealt with the *localization* of authority.[6] In researching popular responses to Tanzimat reforms, E. Attila Aytekin succinctly details how the tax revolts of the *rayas* during this time were largely conscientious and organized: "The refusal to pay tax had important implications for the ownership of the land, because the local magnates' claim for rents and taxes were based on their claims of ownership…[The peasants] rejected such claims by landlords and asserted their own ownership of the land in question."[7] It is thus essential to explore these dynamics – *centralization*, *regionalization* and *localization* – as they often played off one another and, in doing so, revolutionized the underlying rationale of sultanic *dispositif*. The reaction to these decrees, enacted from above, occurred amidst a vacuum of hegemonic power relationships, and these reactions were violent (in the Foucauldian sense). Beyond demolishing the meaning of allegiance in the old system, they would come to later compose a *dispositif* rooted in a new foundation of legitimacy. The sultan transitioned from a ruler who functioned as judge, jury and executioner of the law to a representative leader who was meant not just to keep his subjects in line but also foster and provide opportunities to them, inserting a new role of pastoral guidance into Ottoman politics forever.

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[4] For more on the role of regionalization, see Bragg, *Ottoman Notables and Participatory*; Çiftçi, "Modernisation in Tanzimat Period"; Giofsios, "Between Greek Nationalism"; Heper, "Center and Periphery," 1980; Murgul, "Tanzimat Reforms Reconsidered"; Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy*.
[5] Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey 1*, 5.
[6] For more on popular revolts and practices of localization, see Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations Property"; Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late"; Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat"; Giofsios, "Between Greek Nationalism"; Heper, "Center and Periphery," 1980; Kırlı, "Tyranny Illustrated"; Maždrakova-Čavdarova, "Political Struggle of Bulgarian"; Millan, "Disintegration of Ottoman-Armenian"; Yildiz, *Crisis and Rebellion*.
[7] Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late," 216.

Beside these complex struggles at the time, there was a strong shift in the notion of territorial integrity. Russian aggression towards the Ottoman Empire in terms of its non-Muslim population, particularly its Christian population in the way of military excursions and eventually a pan-Slavic ideology, forced the Ottomans to rethink their notion of sovereignty.[8] While traditionally based on territorial integrity, the Russians and Europeans increasingly made demands on behalf of minority communities, and one of the crucial issues leading up to the Crimean War was control over holy places.[9] On a diplomatic trip to Istanbul in 1853, Russian diplomat Aleksandr Sergeyevich Menishikov presented a list of demands that the Tsar wished to see implemented, which Badem reconstructed from personal notes and correspondence:

> All the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire would be under Russian protection, that the patriarchate would be lifelong and that no patriarchs would be dismissed, that a new Russian church and hospital would be built in Jerusalem and put under the protection of the Russian consulate and that a new firman would point out clearly all the rights of the Orthodox in the holy places in Palestine.[10]

In other words, the old claim of an Islamic sultan watching over his territory – the very grounds on which allegiance was justified in the Circle of Justice – was no longer enough to justify imperial sovereignty; not only did this incident set off the events leading up to the Crimean War, but a new model of sovereignty that could accommodate for the needs of its populations, not its territory, would come to be required. The subsequent reaction on behalf of the Sublime Porte was to reassert the principles of the Tanzimat in the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* (Imperial Reform Edict) of 1856 and reinvest in a notion of *Osmanlılık* (Ottomanism).[11] Reflecting on this Edict, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha personally noted the situation between Muslims and non-Muslims as follows:

> Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were now to be equal in all rights. But this significantly offended the Muslims. Previously, one of the four points that was accepted as the base of negotiations [in the Vienna Conference of 1855] was the question of the privileges of Christians, provided that

[8] Brisku, *Political Reform in Ottoman*; Davison, "Russian Skill and Turkish"; Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*; Lieven, "Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918"; Vovchenko, *Containing Balkan Nationalism*.
[9] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 49–51; Deringil, "Invention of Tradition"; Jelavich, *Century of Russian Foreign*; Stavrou, "Russian Interest in Levant."
[10] Badem, *Ottoman Crimean War*, 76.
[11] In fact, this issue had been broached with European powers just a year earlier at the Vienna Conference of 1855. Seeking to ensure no Russian claims to legitimate capitulations or territorial incursions were undermined and respected by the European powers. Nonetheless, the great powers of Europe still sought some affirmation of these sentiments in the Ottoman lands. The consequence of this was the edict issued in 1856.

> sovereignty was not sacrificed. But now the question of privileges was left behind, non-Muslim subjects were considered equal to Muslims in all rights of the government.[12]

By foreclosing the possibility for community identification – or at least the attempt to – the Sublime Porte unknowingly released a dilemma of national importance: if subjects are not judged by the community they belong to, how should they be organized?

This chapter details these initial responses to the Tanzimat reforms in the decades following the Edict of Gülhane and their impact on the imperial conditions of possibility and the *régime du savoir*. Specifically, it details the emergence of key mechanisms of power relations that were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire at large. For starters, there was a large-scale codification of the relationships that existed within the empire in the newly expanded bureaucracy, including courts, provincial administration, military recruitment, tax collection, charitable organizations and *millet* communities. There was also a push for a *consciously constructed* form of collective civil identity that was put forward in 1839. The first section of this chapter deals with these two strategies and how they were responded to by various subject positions. The second section builds on these two technologies and incorporates the notion of representation as a political tool. Representation had certainly existed in the empire prior to this – and arguably always had – yet it did not function at the level of a political strategy. Combining the aspects of collective identity and imperial codification, it is shown how this was slowly built into the institutions throughout in the empire. The third section, combining these three mechanisms, discusses how politics began to be moralized, particularly around individual bureaucrats, *ulema*, writers and so forth to resituate the cornerstone of Ottoman politics: a revised version of sovereignty and the moralization of politics. While these strategies were laid down in some way or another in the edict, the form they are shown to take in this chapter is one of a concoction, a mixture of strategies, responses, counterstrategies that occurred in every corner of the Ottoman Empire from the 1840s to the 1860s. Thus, the focus shifts from *intents* and *targets* to how the object of the strategies discussed in the prior chapter were *reacted to* and *transformed* through an intersubjective play of power-knowledge.

[12] As quoted in Badem, *Ottoman Crimean War*, 345.

6.2 The Failure of Reforms: Centralization, Regionalization and Localization

Regarding nationalist sentiments during the Tanzimat, there appears to be little evidence that such a self-conception existed, with many groups still putting self-gain over the state's agenda. Aside from the cases already mentioned, this can be seen from the significant bypassing of taxation, a lack of personal investment in the new gendarme or military forces (especially if salaries were not distributed) and the willingness to turn to non-state schools to obtain technical skills.[13] Many authors have seen the desire to form national belonging and national identity as the underlying prerogative of the Tanzimat reformers from the get-go, yet this hardly seems to be the case. The notion introduced at the time was not one of an existent Ottoman identity but rather one that had to be constructed and guided. American-Armenian Christopher Oscanyan, living in Istanbul at the turn of the century, describes the situation as such:

> The Osmanlis [Ottomans] have, with hitherto but few deviations, preserved their identity as an eminently patriarchal nation. As the son recognized the parent to be the governor and controller of his career, the fountain of experience and wisdom, and rendered to him a willing and natural obedience; so the people, needing such a fatherly care and control, were ready to invest one of their number with this authority.[14]

It was largely believed within the Tanzimat reformers' camp that national identity had to be *produced*; it was not something that intrinsically existed within the empire. In the end, the way to do this became a form of pastoralism. In this section, I will try to trace how the Tanzimat reforms not only failed, but the emergence of a collective identity and the codification of clearly defined roles in a new bureaucratic system was the consequence of internal struggle.

The notion of Ottomanism should be seen more as a reaction by the Tanzimat reformers – something many empires and monarchies across the globe were beginning to face in various ways – seeking to instill obedience via allegiance back into the empire,

[13] For accounts of displeased of disloyal troops as a result of unpaid salaries or the maldistribution of funds, see Balkan Tec, "Non-Muslims and Military Service"; Dursun, "Population Policies of Ottoman"; Özbek, "Policing the Countryside," 56–60; Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment"; Zürcher, "Ottoman Conscription System." This can be compared with earlier accounts of military organization and behavior, for example, Levy, "Officer Corps in Sultan"; Shaw, "Established Ottoman Army Corps"; Shaw, "Nizam-ı Cedid Army"; Ustun, "New Order." For more on how many resorted to non-state schools for a better education, see Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late"; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*.

[14] Oscanyan, *Sultan and His People*, 105.

yet directly rather than indirectly. Instead of having *ayans* as their regents, the central government would have a direct connection to every subject. Kemal Karpat aptly notes that the notion of Ottomanism took on much more predominance in Ottoman politics after the conclusion of the Crimean War in 1856, describing it as "intended to depersonalize authority and shift it to institutions, but it also spurred a variety of administrative reforms. These facilitated the political ascendancy of the local notables and literati, who gave new strength to the sense of regional and ethnic identity and economic interests."[15] In tandem with this, there was an increased emphasis on obedience to the sovereign, something that would become heightened during the 1860s. While the traditional image of nationalism is often seen as a top-down, conscious result of the first Tanzimat reformers, it was actually more of a relay, whereby the issues of national identity, novel and rigidly defined socio-political roles and indebtedness to the sultan was based in "equality" (and ultimately representation) rather than a nationalized Ottomanism, which situates the sultan both as a ruler who judges his subjects and a leader who guides them:

> As I pledge to never pronounce myself against any individual whose cause would not be publicly judged in advance, and according to the laws of the empire, I demand that no one ought to plan the least harm to the honor and life of my many subjects. Thus, from the first to the last, from my just Vizier to the simple shepherd, everyone will be able to dispose of their fortune freely and without anyone being able to prevent it.[16]

Beyond a mere ruler, the sultanate is now put forward as a representative of all imperial subjects and their best interest. Nevertheless, it is during the 1850s and 1860s that the idea of developing a national identity became truly rooted in Ottoman discourse and politics, establishing a focal point of power relations and capturing divergent threads of the empire's socio-political transformation.

Perhaps the failure of the reforms is no more noticeable than the reformers inability to adequately impose new forms of taxation. By the time the Crimean War came to an end, the imperial treasury had been heavily hit. The bureaucrats, though showing some ignorance on basic economic aspects – such as their incredibly low import tax – were reluctant to resort to foreign loans for fear of falling into an endless cycle of repayments that would drain the imperial treasury.[17] Yet by 1851, the imperial treasury

[15] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 12.
[16] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 12.
[17] For more on this, see Inal, "Evolution of Economic Thought"; Kiyotaki, *Ottoman Land Reform*, 108-134; Quataert, *Workers, Peasants and Economic*, 175-184; Saharuddin et al., "Capitulation and *Siyasah Syar'iyah*."

had been entirely emptied due to the expenses of the reform projects, an inefficient and unreliable system of tax collection and widely employed practices of bribery and corruption.[18] Another potential outcome caused the Ottomans to be weary of foreign loans as well: any inability to repay a foreign loan could be cause for foreign intervention in the Ottomans' domestic affairs. This crisis was further intensified during the Crimean War, where over half of the annual budget was dedicated to the war efforts.[19] Nonetheless, by 1854, the Ottomans were left with no choice, and they agreed to a foreign loan of three million sterling – a third of which was already exhausted by preliminary payments – from London-based financiers.[20] A committee of three Ottomans, a Brit and a Frenchman was established to oversee expenditures, but the remaining portions of this loan went almost entirely to the war efforts. By 1855, the loan had been depleted, and a new European loan was agreed upon in 1856 for an additional five million sterling – which would end up being completely spent by the end of the year – on condition of a commission overseeing the expenditures. Yet, the Ottoman government received this loan almost at the end of the Crimean War, and using the loans to cover foreign deficits would establish long-standing financial troubles and compromised sovereignty.[21] Coming as no surprise, then, the Tanzimat reformers were eager to return their attention to tax collection in the aftermath of the war, urgently needing stronger sources of income to replenish the imperial treasury and accommodate loan repayment, which is not to mention the further implementation of reforms.

During a period where other taxes, such as the sheep tax, stamp tax or *cizve* tax, were integrated into a system of standardization, the *iltizam* system resisted such encroachments, remaining largely arbitrary and difficult to regulate.[22] Just a year before

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[18] Brisku, *Political Reform in Ottoman*; Eldem, "Ottoman Financial Integration"; Ozekicioglu and Ozekicioglu, "First Borrowing Period"; Serim, "Causes of Financial Crisis."

[19] Badem, *Ottoman Crimean War*, 295–298.

[20] A breakdown of these preliminary payments can be seen in Badem, 319.

[21] While the loan was originally guaranteed in 1855, negotiations over the regulation of the loan and oversight by foreign nations delayed the issuance of the loan, which did not appear until 1856. This consequently meant that many Ottoman soldiers went without their salaries during 1855.

[22] Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire II*, 95–105. Additionally, the "*cizve*" tax was protested by European powers as unjust to the Christian populations of the empire (by which they meant non-Muslims). The Ottoman's were furthermore indebted to these powers, both in terms of their military alliance throughout the war and financially due to the loans. With their troops and treasury depleted, the Ottomans had no choice but to acquiesce this request in some way, officially changing the name from "*cizve*" to "*bedel-I askerî*" (military tax). The tax itself largely continued in the same manner, however, and any real change was prevented. For more on this, see Badem, *Ottoman Crimean War*, 335–348; Balkan Tec, "Non-Muslims and Military Service"; Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 93–95; Hacısalihoğlu, "Inclusion and Exclusion"; Zürcher, "Ottoman Sources of Kemalist."

the start of the Crimean War, a model of issuing five-year *iltzams* was implemented in the hopes that longer terms for tax farmers would make them more invested, yet this proved just as ineffective. These limits were once again reduced to one-to-two-year intervals – which would continue for the better part of the nineteenth century – and regulated so as to prevent anyone from building up monopolies or dynasties by decreasing the area delegated through these *iltzams*.[23] Even with the new regulations, more comprehensive censuses and more expansive provisions on income tax for artisans – in other words, despite the codification of these regulations and the roles of persons who act in this system – the Sublime Porte was still reliant on tax farmers to collect these sums. Unable to bring this system into a reliable source of income, the central government was forced to apply for another foreign loan in 1858, this time with the interest rates being far worse.[24] As a consequence of these mishaps and financial burdens, the Tanzimat reformers went back to the drawing board in attempts to remedy the issue of tax farming, a matter of increasing urgency due to rampant peasant revolts throughout the empire's territory.[25]

Since the Edict of Gülhane, the Sublime Porte had been attempting to exchange some of its authority in the provinces for representative councils, all while keeping within the rules of allegiance. Regions were divided into *sancaks* (districts; also called *livas*) and *kazas* (subdistricts or counties) that would function through a series of advisory councils. Local populations, but specifically the elites, were able to elect council members. These procedures became a longstanding tradition after the Edict of Gülhane and were later reaffirmed in the Imperial Reform Edict of 1856:

> The principle of admissibility of subjects of the sultan without distinction of religion to all public employment, solemnly proclaimed by the imperial government, has since been put into practice. Important jobs are already entrusted to Christians, both in the administrations of the capital and in the legatious abroad. The imperial government is therefore resolved to make the most loyal and serious appeal to the assistance of its non-Muslim subjects and to give the principle of equality all the development it entails.[26]

[23] Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late"; Dursun, "Population Policies of Ottoman"; Shaw, "Ottoman Census System"; Topses, "Socio-Economic and Political."
[24] Stanford Shaw and Ezel Shaw note how the interest rates included in this loan are estimated to reach "as much as 60 percent" (Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire II*, 98).
[25] Kirmizi, "Taming the Governors," 7–8.
[26] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 30.

Each *vilayet* had a *mutasarrıf* (governor), and *vilayets* were then divided into *sancaks* that had a *vali* (district governor). Though the Vilayet Law of 1864 granted a great deal of leniency and autonomy to the *mutasarrıf* and the *valis* in order to avoid unnecessary delays in the chain of command, many of the governor's and district governor's closest advisors were chosen by the Sublime Porte. Thus, the representation that was being put forward was enshrined in the Islamic notion of trusted *shura* (consultation), so one must be careful not to misunderstand the dynamics at play be inferring more European ideas about what representation meant.

The hierarchy in this chain established the *vilayet* as the largest area, which was then divided into *sancaks*, *kazas*, *nahiyes* (townships) and *karyes* (villages), each of which was delegated enough political authority to carry out the tasks required of them.[27] At three levels (*vilayet*, *sancak* and *kaza*), there was a *Meclis-i Idare* (Administrative Council), yet the delegated powers were tailored for each of these: for the *sancak* and the *kaza* councils, the local non-Muslim religious leaders automatically had a place on the council, whereas this practiced was discontinued at the level of the *vilayet* council, though it was further stipulated that *vilayet* and *sancak* councils required two Muslims and two non-Muslims.[28] For instance, the *vilayet* law states what the role of *vilayet* councils are meant to cover, which indicates some of the new political power and authority admitted to them through a strict codification of responsibilities and obligations:

> The mission of the Vilayet's general council is: first, to study questions relating to the execution, maintenance and policing of the Vilayet's imperial roads and the road networks in *cazas* and municipalities, as well as to the construction, repair and maintenance of municipal buildings, and to examine the requests of the *sandjaks* and *cazas* relating to these same objects; second, to deliberate on measures concerning the police along the roads; third, to discuss ways of expanding and promoting agriculture and trade; fourth, to study questions relating to the equalization of taxes in *sandjaks*, *cazas* and communes.[29]

While some of this terminology for localities had long been used in the empire – some of which were already in Ottoman nomenclature – this was the first time that a strictly uniform hierarchy with specified powers was put in place throughout the empire.[30] Though this may seem to undermine the Sublime Porte's goal of centralization, it should

[27] The governance of counties, townships and villages were further distributed to sub-governors, in these cases under the names of *kaymakam* (*kazas*), *müdürs* (*nahiyes*) and *muhtars* (*karyes*).
[28] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 147–48.
[29] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 278.
[30] It should be noted that the Vilayet Law was not applied in certain selective reasons, such as Serbia, Egypt and Lebanon, because of special privileges enjoyed by the subjects of those *vilayets*.

be noted that this was a strategic move, as Abdulhamit Kirmizi notes: "In delegating greater authority to the governors, the law represented a decentralization of the empire as a whole, but an increase in central authority at the provincial level."[31] The way elections were carried out for these councils is illustrative of this; a list of candidates was compiled by a lower council, which then eliminated a third of the names and passed the candidates up the chain of command; that council then would remove an additional third of the names, with the winners decided by the next highest council. The final decision for members of the *vilayet* and *sancak* councils consequently came from the Sublime Porte, meaning "representative" politics was not a truly viable phenomenon at this time, with Tanzimat officials arguing that the masses were far too ignorant and backwards to intelligently make choices for themselves. After the provisions were tested in the Danube *sancak* under the guidance of Midhat Pasha from 1864-1867, they were gradually expanded to other *vilayets* and adjusted and reaffirmed in 1871. After failed attempts at replacing the tax farming system with salaried employers and extending – then shortening – the length of *iltizams*, the *vilayet* system can be seen as a redeployed strategy working more with a carrot than a stick, this time in hopes of incentivizing cooperation and allegiance to the central government through indebtedness.

Even prior to the Crimean War, nonetheless, it was clear that systematic tax reform would be more difficult than initially anticipated. On the side of the *ayans*, we see a great deal of resistance to the proposed reforms; meanwhile, peasant tax revolts became common in the decades following the Edict of Gülhane.[32] Perhaps nowhere else were the competing strategies grounded in centralization, regionalization and localization so tangible. The Sublime Porte knew tax farming was insurmountably corrupt and riddled with complications and uncertainty – thus it was justified in making these adjustments because the bonds of allegiance had been broken – yet due to the inadequate income from taxation each year (especially in the aftermath of the Crimean War), it continued to be necessary to return to the tax farming system to sustain income. Quite bluntly, the central government lacked the finances and resources to implement their vision, yet the *ayans* were exceedingly reluctant to relinquish their sources of income and political authority. When the term of the *iltizams* were shortened after the Crimean War to one-to-two years

[31] Kirmizi, "Taming the Governors," 9. See also Bragg, *Ottoman Notables and Participatory*.
[32] Compare Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations Property"; Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late"; Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat"; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*; Kırlı, "Tyranny Illustrated"; Makdisi, "Corrupting Sublime Sultanate"; Manna, "Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century"; Pinson, "Ottoman Bulgaria in First."

– in the hopes of forcing payment and cooperation to get the *iltizams* renewed – the *ayans* responded by "collect[ing] as much money as possible, by all means, before their terms expired. And within a short time the wealthier tax farmers were able to build up holdings…thus creating a hierarchy of financial middlemen."[33]

Another common strategy was to overtax the local population, either in hopes of extorting more taxes for profit or to dissuade those in the region against reform projects.[34] In one such instance, the *ayans* in Canik tried a combination of these strategies (which was to end in a peasant revolt), as Aytekin makes clear:

> In order to pre-empt the forthcoming decision to abolish tax farming, the tax farmers, feeling the threat of disenfranchisement under the reformed polity, set out to subsume peasant land into their private estates. That was their ultimate goal, but in the meantime, they attempted to force the peasants into double taxation.[35]

Each time the Tanzimat reformers thought of ways to undermine the influence of *ayans*, the *ayans* were quick to find workarounds. Religious communities and the loss of *millet* privileges played a role as well, but it seems the more determinative factor in this struggle was class. Members of the elites from the Christian *millet* were adamantly against the reforms because the old order of things had allowed these elites to bypass most taxation up this point; as a result, the elites were reliant on the tax farming system, whereas Christian *rayas* often supported reforms.[36] A tension arose here between centralization and regionalization, whereby vying subject positions tried to get the upper hand. The Sublime Porte, feeling hesitant to put too much power into the hands of the *ayans*, resorted to varying degrees of representation in state functions with a strict codification of roles, responsibilities and privileges of administrative work, such as on councils or in the courts, even for non-Muslims.[37] As time went on, these forms of representation were to play a vital role for national identity, and they further renegotiated the relationship between the central government and its subjects. Nevertheless, at this stage, they remained rooted in the idea of producing indebtedness, allegiance and good will towards the empire.

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[33] Shaw, "Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax," 426.
[34] Bragg, *Ottoman Notables and Participatory*; Özdeğer, "Ayan Era in Ottoman"; Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy*.
[35] Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late," 222.
[36] Vakali, "Nationalism Justice and Taxation," 196.
[37] Bragg, *Ottoman Notables and Participatory*; Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian"; Doumanis, *Before the Nation*; Dursun, "Population Policies of Ottoman," 10–11; Kark, "Impact of Early Missionary"; Köksal, *Ottoman Empire in Tanzimat*; Vovchenko, *Containing Balkan Nationalism*.

Yet, if the Sublime Porte was having troubles in achieving their hopes and ambitions, the *ayans* were likewise plagued by new power relations that were arising from the *rayas* classes. Aytekin has shown in multiple places that the *rayas* were utilizing the ideals presented by the Tanzimat reformers – whether altruistically or manipulatively is unimportant here – to resist what they saw as the unfair tax collection practices of the *ayans*. Peasant revolts during this time largely had to do with what the peasants saw as unjust local governance, and they likewise were quick to see where this trend was going: "The peasants saw in the claims of magnates the beginning of a process that would convert them into tenants on land they had always considered as their own."[38] In response, the *rayas* sought to (*violently*) frustrate the demands of local *ayans*, to resort to organized riots and revolts, to refuse to pay what they perceived as unfair taxation and to destroy official documents sent to and from the central government – therey preventing the strategies being deployed by the *ayans* – the latter of which implies they understood the elevating importance of official communication.[39] Thus, the nexuses of violence of the sultanic *dispositif* were becoming inflamed, resulting in intense struggles at the intersections of the traditional Circle of Justice. While there is a tendency to overlook the role that the *rayas* played in these struggles, their actions may say more about the state of things than initially expected. Aytekin notes how the popular revolts she was investigating in the 1840s and 1850s all illustrated that (1) there were clear signs of organization and planning, (2) there was no outside assistance provided to the peasants and (3) they were the direct result of a conscientious objection to paying taxes.[40] Perhaps more intriguing than any of these strategies is the consistency to which the sultan himself was called upon to defend the peasants:

> The peasants did not manifest naive monarchism or any other kind of naivety; rather, they were aware of the power structure in the local councils and of the tendencies of local officials, so they chose to appeal to higher (preferably the very highest) authority in the hope of bypassing local authorities. The positive attitudes of peasants to the monarchs therefore often had more to do with

[38] Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late," 202. There has been a growing amount of literature on the role of these peasant revolts and the agency of the peasants during this period. For more on this, consult Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat"; Burke, "Changing Patterns of Peasant"; Iyiiş, "Appraisal of Impact"; Karpat, "Transformation of Ottoman State"; Köksal, *Ottoman Empire in Tanzimat*; Makdisi, *Culture of Sectarianism*; Maoz, "Syrian Urban Politics"; McElrone, "Villagers on Move"; Pinson, "Ottoman Bulgaria in First"; Quataert, "Rural Unrest in Ottoman"; Quataert, "Age of Reforms"; Atakul, "Impact of Tanzimat Policies"; Ueno, "For Fatherland and State." For a first-hand account of some of these protests, one can also see Arbuthnot, *Herzegovina*.
[39] Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts*, 133–152; Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire II*, 102–103.
[40] Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late," 214–216.

> their realistic evaluation of the circumstances and the local balance of power rather than any sort of uninformed belief in the ultimate fairness of the monarch.[41]

With an inability to trust the literacy skills of local notables, the peasants often relied on word-of-mouth interpretations of the reforms, but the language of the Tanzimat was often ambiguous and unclear; as a result, the *rayas* would interpret these "rumours" in a fashion that best suited their needs.[42] While using the language of the Tanzimat reformers and evoking what they had understood as their rights, the central government was still hesitant to ignite social unrest, especially in areas further away from the capital.[43] In most cases, the peasants' claims went unheeded, and the Sublime Porte would rely on local notables and their bonds of allegiance to quash protests. This should not immediately be understood as the Tanzimat reformers' disbelief in their own proclamations; a more likely explanation was that the Tanzimat elites knew of their reliance on the *ayans*, even as they worked to break free of these constraints. They fell back on the eons-old sultanic *dispositif* to fulfill their obligations according to relationships of allegiance: "The central state could not afford to alienate any element of the alliance [of the central state bureaucracy, the petty gentry and the wealthier merchants] and as a result, its policy toward the upper classes was determined to by permissiveness and salutary neglect rather than weakness."[44] We thus begin to see a chain being made, whereby advocates of centralization, regionalization and localization played off the interests and strategies of each other to further their cause, yet the result of these interactions was often chaotic, unpredictable and highly volatile.

These relays and clashes reverberated through these reforms, consistently reshaping the direction of imperial governance and the relationship between a subject and the central government. Moreover, these occurred along the *nexuses of violence* put forward in the previous chapter. Significantly, these struggles were not simply carried out along class lines, and interpreting it as such is to see the consequences rather than the mechanisms that drove such unrest. The crucial shortcomings of various subject positions

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[41] Aytekin, 219–220. For more on this type of strategy, see Darling, *History and Social Justice*.
[42] Aytekin, 224–225, 227. See also Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat," where she likewise stresses, "Contrary to the widespread notion, tax revolts of Ottoman peasants that took place in the *Tanzimat* period were not against the reforms. Instead, they accepted the reforms and adopted the prose of the *Tanzimat*. The insurgent peasants perhaps interpreted the *Tanzimat* in a more radical way than its architects wanted. Yet this was much more than a case of misunderstanding on the part of mostly illiterate peasants. Through tax revolts, the peasants were indeed collectively pushing to get all of what they believed they deserved as part of the reforms" (Aytekin, 320).
[43] For instance, see Köksal, *Ottoman Empire in Tanzimat*.
[44] Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat," 319.

in terms of the Circle of Justice, particularly upon its intersections, were the locales where violence erupted, though sometimes more ideologically than physically. Each used the capabilities allotted to them in a rapidly changing system to bypass superiors, obstruct intentional strategies or frustrate the cogs of this traditional mechanism. The *rayas* were not upset simply with their immediate rulers but rather their inability to provide space for security and prosperity, particularly when it came to taxation. Likewise, the *ayans* saw these new procedures as an affront to their own security and well-being, further exploiting their positions to react to the Tanzimat reforms. While this did occur along class lines, it was not *just* a classist conflict; it was a political one rooted in a struggle within a network of power relations. As a result, the codification of imperial roles and the presentation of an imperial identity – primarily discussed through taxation in this section but applicable to a vast array of procedures occurring throughout this period, such as the courts, the military, the *ulema*, education, peripheral and provincial sovereignty and agricultural production – were not abandoned but rather transformed and impacted. In the following section, the mechanism of representation, which made some appearances in this section, is further expanded on in other areas of Ottoman politics during this period.

6.3 Uniting the Empire: Institutions, Subjectship and Culture

In the aftermath of the Crimean War, it became increasingly clear that Ottoman troops were undisciplined and ill-trained for the drudging tasks of military strategical arrangements required on the battlefield. However, due to the political, financial and bureaucratic issues being dealt with at the time, further military reform did not become feasible right away. In fact, the system implemented at the beginning of the Tanzimat period would continue until 1869, when new regulations were implemented after a review of the conscription law. According to the new regulations, the army would now be divided into three units rather than the previous two (active and reserve troops): the *nizamiye* troops would be the regular army, and the reserve troops would be divided between the *redif* (active reserves) and the *mustahfiz* (inactive reserves); while the previous two groups would be called to arms in times of war, the *mustahfiz* would "take over garrison duties and general law-and-order work."[45] As with most reforms during the Tanzimat though, subsequent amendments were implemented and regulations adjusted over the next few decades, making it a highly malleable political composition. While these

[45] Zürcher, "Ottoman Conscription System," 440.

adjustments are important and played a significant role from the 1880s onwards, these centralizing efforts were the first time a systemic, imperial-wide structure (codification) was transposed onto the Ottoman military. However, the whole apparatus was determined by observations of manpower and calculations of the number of available troops, neither of which could be determined without a more compelling process of census taking.[46]

Military service was still something most Ottomans wished to avoid, and it was not difficult to go into hiding.[47] Though deciding who was to be sent for military service was based on the practice of drawing lots, many local notables would hand-select those to be sent for active service.[48] While the census capabilities of the central government had greatly increased – though still problematic and difficult – the conditions of the military were harsh and gruesome, causing many individuals and communities to deploy counterstrategies that ensued violence against the Sublime Porte's strategies of codification and imperial belonging. Even if we disregard the amount of rampant corruption in the military's own ranks, there was insufficient organization to provide for troops on the front lines, something that would inevitably contribute to the losses of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War.[49] The overall trend towards unification was nevertheless a general wave that was taking place throughout the central government, which sought to find a more manageable way to enforce an enlarged bureaucracy to maintain a status quo based on allegiance through feelings of indebtedness to the government, which certainly ran into an array of complications. While uniformity was the ambition, this was based on the need to improve efficiency.

The penal codes that were issued, meant to undercut corruption, were largely ignored. Especially among the elites in the Sublime Porte, bribery and the misappropriation of funds was a common hinderance. Explaining the long tradition of gifting public officials in the Ottoman Empire, Badem notes how many of these regulations on bribery were constructed with the notion of centralization in mind: "From 1841 onwards gifts from the sultan (*atiyye-i seniyye*) were included in the state budget as

[46] On the development of census-taking in nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, see Dundar, "Empire of Taxonomy"; Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*, 18–44; Özok-Gündoğan, "Counting the Population"; Shaw, "Ottoman Census System"; Zürcher, "Ottoman Conscription System."
[47] Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian"; Dursun, "Population Policies of Ottoman"; Michael, "Trying to Impose Reforms"; Millan, "Disintegration of Ottoman-Armenian"; Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment."
[48] Zürcher, "Ottoman Conscription System," 441.
[49] For more on the conditions of the troops in the military, see Ágoston, *Guns for Sultan*; Özbek, "Policing Countryside"; Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment."

a separate item. The idea was to make the ruler more visible and exalted as the ultimate distributor of gifts and favours, and to make the bureaucracy more invisible and homogeneous."[50] This strategy did not make it very far, exacerbated by financial crises. Civil servants and soldiers who faced ungarnished wages often led to the exploitation of one's position to survive, preventing the fulfillment of a rigid codification of political or military roles.[51] Additionally, speculated or undefined roles for public office resulted in systemic overstepping of one's authority, and continuous penal revisions were largely unsuccessful.[52] It was beginning to seem that the push towards uniformity throughout the empire had in fact intensified the very problems they were meant to address along the nexuses of violence, yet, whether because of pressure from Europe or from internal discontent – but very likely from both – there was an increased emphasis on spreading the notion of equality stipulated in the Edict of Gülhane.[53] For instance, British diplomat Stratford Canning mentioned that one of the reservations Great Britain had about the judicial system was the inadmissibility of evidence from Christians and their inability to become judges: "Though altogether effete as a principle of national strength and reviving power, the spirit of Islamism, thus perverted, lives in the supremacy of the conquering race and in the prejudices engendered by a long tyrannical domination."[54] The Imperial Edict of 1856 served as a testament to the Sublime Porte's conviction to this matter, specifically in the immediate aftermath of the Crimean War, when external pressure and internal turmoil were the greatest: "The guarantees promised and granted to all our subjects by the *Hatti-chérif* of Gulhane and by the laws of the Tanzimat, without distinction of religion, for the security of their person and property and for the

[50] Badem, *Ottoman Crimean War*, 399.
[51] Dursun, "Population Policies of Ottoman"; Özbek, "Policing Countryside"; Şimşek, "Ottoman Military Recruitment."
[52] Not only does Rubin (*Ottoman Nizamiye Courts*) discuss this in-depth, but a review of the Ottoman Penal Code as compiled and translated by Bucknill and Utidjian, (*Ottoman Penal Code*) illustrates that a number of revisions occurred early on due to confusions about the parameters of the law, and the penal code went through innumerous amendments throughout the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries as a result of this.
[53] For Europe's desire to see non-Muslims treated equally and incorporated into the judicial system and how European diplomacy played into the Tanzimat, see Gurpinar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy*; Hurewitz, "Ottoman Diplomacy and European"; Katsikas, "European Modernity and Islamic"; Kürkçüoğlu, "Adoption and Use"; Michailidis, "Modernizing the Empire"; Rubin, "British Perceptions of Ottoman." For information on the domestic desire for greater judicial representation, see Agmon, "Recording Procedures and Legal"; Amara, "Civilization Exceptions"; Ayoub, "Mecelle Sharia and Ottoman"; Barakat, "Underwriting the Empire"; Bragg, *Ottoman Notables and Participatory*; Maždrakova-Čavdarova, "Political Struggle of Bulgarian"; Starr, *Law as Metaphor*.
[54] As quoted in Figes, *Crimean War*, 59–60. Also see Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 44–45; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 75–78; Schmitt, "Diplomatic Preliminaries of Crimean"; Figes, *Crimean War*, 52–60; Kirakossian, *British Diplomacy and Armenian*, 8–12, 29–44.

preservation of their honor, are recalled and consecrated again."[55] The idea of imperial belonging and representation is thus reasserted in 1856, grounded in the Circle of Justice that promised security, peace and prosperity. However, it was still not until 1869 that a new mixed court system was implemented.

Unlike the previous judicial system that relied on "a combination of Islamic law (*Şeriat*), compilations of sultanic law (*kanunnames*) and customary law (*örf*)" whose underlying justification was the sultan's divine right to rule, the new courts worked towards a separation between the judicial and administrative branches of government.[56] However, one should not misread current judicial practices into this. Although there existed far more separation between the new *nizamiye* courts and the traditional *şeriat* courts, this can largely be seen as a stratagem directed at reorganizing the judicial branch in a more centralized fashion while employing local notables who might be inclined to resist centralization otherwise. Although representatives were now included in these courts, the nomination for these positions was compiled by the central government, giving them a great deal of leeway in deciding who would be represented and who would not.[57] Local notables sometimes illegally managed posts in both the new judicial apparatus as well as local administrative offices, strengthening their position in a way that was meant to undercut them.[58] The implementation of the *nizamiye* system also led to the professionalization of lawyers, who became exclusively available to those who could afford them; this process led to the necessity to seek professional defense if one was likely to win their case, which undercut the capabilities of the *rayas* class, who could not afford them, nor could they be elected as representatives in the reformed judicial system.[59] In this way, we begin to see violent tensions arise even in the emerging non-*şeriat nizamiye* courts between centralizing, regionalizing and localizing efforts that would come to permanently reshape the emerging network of power relations.

Yet what was most notable for this new judicial system was the slow implementation of a new civil code, the *Mecelle*, which applied the same laws in the *nizamiye* and the *şeriat* courts; this was the first time that a systematized, codified judicial apparatus had been attempted throughout the empire, though many difficulties and

[55] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 15.
[56] Rubin, "Ottoman Judicial Change," 120–121.
[57] Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts*, 28–29.
[58] Rubin, 29.
[59] Rubin, "British Perceptions of Ottoman."

discrepancies remained, especially in the regions having special privileges. The significance of this is summarized by Avi Rubin:

> The *Mecelle*, enacted between 1869 and 1876, included sixteen books addressing the issues of sales, debts, ownership, lawsuits, evidence, and judicial procedure, to name but a few. It was Islamic Hanafi law adjusted to meet actualities. At the same time, the code echoed principles derived from French law in terms of substance and structure… In fact, the *Mecelle* meant more than merely a new organization of Hanafi law into numbered articles. What made it a "real" civil code, comparing to the old *kanunname*s (digests of sultanic law), was its mode of application as a legal standard in force in *Nizamiye* and *Şeriat* courts throughout the empire, whereas previously, the judge addressing civil and criminal matters in the *Şeriat* court had a considerable leeway in choosing the sources relevant to this or that case.[60]

In 1868, a year prior to the issuance of the *Mecelle*, the central government's highest administrative body, the *Şura-yı Devlet Maarıf Dairesi* (Sublime Council), was divided into two branches: the first was the *Şura-yı Devlet* (Council of State), which was to deal with administrative and legislative matters while the second branch, the *Meclis-i Vala-yı Ahkam Adliyye* (Sublime Council of Judicial Ordinances), was to oversee judicial decision-making.[61] Not only was this an attempt to untangle the judicial and legislative positions of governance, but it is a testament to the Tanzimat reformers commitment to ensuring the perseverance of this ideal. The question of whether this should be an Islamic or a secular model, for the most part, can be ignored for now. The more significant aspect of this is that, for the first time in the empire's history, a unilateral judicial system based on the legitimacy of the central government – rather than a divisive system between the *şeriat* courts and other *millet* courts, as well as the ambiguities between the roles of participants in the judicial branch – is outlined as such, being employed in commercial, criminal and civil matters. Not only was the aspect of representation, even in a restricted and controlled form, being incorporated into the courts, but the central government was likewise positioning itself as the legitimate disperser of justice. It was still the Circle of Justice, yet it was a codified and structured version of it that relied on a unified collective imperial identity and techniques that incorporated imperial representation. The time and effort spent on instituting and refining these reforms goes to further the underlying importance these issues had for Ottoman society, functioning as a nexus point where various threads of mechanisms of power set to work, both productively (through power

[60] Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts*, 30–31.
[61] Hasebe, "1969 Ottoman Public Education," 183.

relations) and violence (by cutting off the strategies and practices of competing subject positions). Along with this, a prominent system of knowledge – a whole new understanding of truth – was being put forward, reliant less on scholastic interpretation and more on codified procedures and clearly enunciated rules.

The empire also struggled with implementing the educational initiatives in the first years of the Tanzimat, and education competitors and the burdensome costs of a centralized education system – especially in light of the cost of the Crimean War – proved more than the reformers could handle. Benjamin Fortna articulates what he deduced were the three primary threats to the state's educational hegemony: (1) foreign missionary schools, (2) minority millet schools that had built up remarkable education systems of their own and (3) the peripherals of the empire where educational competition existed with neighboring states like Iran and Greece.[62] Alongside these external threats, there was resistance building up from the *ulema*, who would often violently argue against what they interpreted as the sacrilegious foundations of a more "secular" education.[63] Despite the financial shackles of education and the constraints imposed by the *ulema* and competing education systems, the Tanzimat reformers reasserted the need for the secular education offered by *rüşdiyes* if the empire was to industrialize. As Grand Vizier Said Pasha proclaimed:

> As long as public education is not disseminated, there will be no leaders capable of directing the internal and external affairs of the Empire soundly, no judges who can administer the public laws justly, no commanders who can run the Army efficiently, and no finance officers who can show how to manage and increase the sources of revenue in accordance with economic principles. None of the institutions and operations that serve public prosperity and wellbeing can be brought into existence as long as education is not disseminated.[64]

Education was linked to the prosperity of the public in all matters, from taxation to military organization and judicial matters. If the empire was to triumph – or even persist – it required educated masses. Said Pasha even goes further than this, arguing that a system of universal education is needed to prevent the encroachment of missionary

[62] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 49. For more on the political threats of foreign missionary schools, see Alkan, "Fighting for Nusayrī Soul"; Başaran, "Reinterpreting American Missionary Presence"; Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Evered, *Empire and Education*; Gorman, "American Ottomans"; Kark, "Impact of Early Missionary"; Sisman, "Failed Proselytizers or Modernizers."
[63] Bein, "Politics Military Conscription"; Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, 99–121; Çiydem, Özdemir, and Erturk, "Re-Think Tanzimat Period"; Davison, "Westernized Education in Ottoman"; Gündüz, "Empire and Education"; Somel, *Modernization of Public Education*.
[64] As quoted in Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 179–180.

schools "in order to keep under control the Christian population, whose minds are now being opened by education."[65] The costs of the Crimean War, the failing taxation systems and lacking educational infrastructure further complicated these matters. *Rüşdiyes* were certainly prevalent in the capital and some larger metropolitan areas, but the desire of Muslim population to provide their children with a good education – especially considering how profitable literacy and technical skills were becoming – often caused them to choose the schools of minority millets or, if possible, a foreign education, thereby violently frustrating the imperial government's strategies using the capabilities offered them by the old system.[66] Nonetheless, a push from European powers to enhance universal education for Muslims and non-Muslims alike led to the formation of *Meclis-i Muhtelit-i Maarif* (Council of Education) in 1856 to review the education practices of the empire, which likewise sought to cut off the strategies being employed to bypass imperial education where available; composed of both Muslims and non-Muslims, the mixed commission was merged with the original M*eclis-i Maarif* (Council of Education) to form the *Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti* (Ministry of Education) just one year later in 1857. For the most part, however, the shortcomings on behalf of the central government in terms of education would persist until the issuance of a proclamation on education in 1869.

From the wound that the *ruşdiyes* had opened, the *ulema* and the Tanzimat reformists positioned themselves on a political battlefield for the future of education, each employing different strategies to pursue their own aims and block those of their competitors. A renowned reformer who was to play a significant role in this battle from both sides was Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, an educated scholar and historian as well as a member of the *ulema* (until 1866); he was also a disciple of Reşid Pasha.[67] Though he did not play as strong a leadership role as Ali and Fuad Pashas, he came to hold the position of *vakanüvis* (state chronicler) and further expanded upon the famous *Tarih-i Naima*

[65] As quoted in Lewis, 180.
[66] Başaran, "Reinterpreting American Missionary Presence"; Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Evered, *Empire and Education*; Kark, "Impact of Early Missionary."
[67] Cevdet Pasha had a rather complicated relationship with the *ulema*. While he was a staunch supporter of renowned intellectuals from the *ulema*, he equally expressed dissatisfaction with prominent dilemmas that plagued them, such as their resistance to reforms and corruption at all levels. He increasingly grew frustrated with the *ulema* institutions, primarily when it came to education, and Richard Chambers explains how "he castigated the teachers he deemed unworthy of the profession, lamented the limited curricula of the medreses, and expressed concern that the deterioration of standards was leading to a state of complete intellectual bankruptcy" (Chambers, "Education of Nineteenth-Century Ottoman," 459). Cevdet Pasha eventually left the *ulema* for good when he took up new administrative positions in 1866, so his departure from the *ulema* should not strictly be viewed as stemming from his disagreements with them. For more on Cevdet Pasha and his relationship with the *ulema*, see Çiğdem, "Ahmed Cevdet Pasha"; Neumann, "Whom Did Ahmed Cevdet"; Sezer, "Reformist Horizons of Ahmed."

(*Naima's History*). In this respect, he was also concerned with the reliability of historical sources, the chronology of events and the causation of events – i.e., establishing history as a codified and unified practice – as can be further seen in *Tarih-i Cevdet* (Cevdet's History) and *Kısas-ı Enbiya ve Tevarih-i Hulefa* (History of the Prophets and Caliphs).[68] Suddenly, the personality of the one taking or giving a testimony becomes essential to uncover their veracity as a source, since a poor character can lead to unreliability and misconstruing facts. They were written in a way that made them distributable to a larger literate audience than his predecessors, with a push by many to have historical texts written by Ottomans for Ottomans in order to foster positive feelings towards the empire.[69] In reality, this was a larger trend within official circles and would expand greatly in the 1860s among journalists, writers and officials alike (see next chapter). With so much confusion about imperial decrees resounding already in the 1850s, a decree was issued in 1855 that stipulated that "in the future, the *nizamat* laws or ordinances will no longer be written in obscure or ambiguous words, they shall be stated and explained in clear, easy and concise terms."[70] These works began to focus less on hagiographies of Ottomans (or rather, the House of Osman) and increasingly on historical events and cultural roots. However, the focus of these approaches was the conception of Ottomanism. If the empire was going to be restructured, the cohesiveness of social bonds that tied subjects to the Empire would have to change as well. The Tanzimat reformers were in favor of an Ottomanism that looked to the fifteenth and sixteenth century of the empire, a time they viewed as holding peace between the various *millets*.[71] This project introduced a key issue related to the strategy of a collective civil identity: Ottoman culture. While prominent Tanzimat reformers like Cevdet Pasa, and even Mahmud Nedim Pasha – Cevdet Pasha's anti-Tanzimat political rival – did discuss pre-Ottoman history, this was still very much invested in explaining the development of an Ottoman identity that was

[68] While I am only touching on this somewhat briefly, there is an extensive literature on the development of historiography in the nineteenth century. For those wishing to deal more with this, especially in terms of the nineteenth century, I advise consulting Adanir and Faroqhi, *Ottomans and Balkans*; Evered, *Empire and Education*; Öktem, "Effects of Charles Darwin's"; Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire I*, 288–290; Tezcan, "Lost in Historiography"; Ursinus, "From Süleyman Pasha."

[69] Chambers, "Education of Nineteenth-Century Ottoman"; Özervarlı, "Alternative Approaches to Modernization"; Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire II*, 107–111.

[70] As quoted in Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 178. In one unique instance, François Fénelon's novel *Les Aventures de Télémaque, fils d'Ulysse* (The Adventures of Telemachus, Son of Ulysses) became the first novel translated into Turkish thanks to Yusuf Kâmil Pasha and enjoyed widespread success. Finding the prose of the text too complicated and formal, Ahmed Vefik and Ziya Pashas subsequently released their own versions in a simplified text that was more widely accessible to the Ottoman public (Davison, 181).

[71] Howard, "Ottoman Historiography."

rooted in Islamic-centric "liberal" values.[72] For Cevdet Pasha, this comes out, as noted by Christoph K. Neumann, in his usage of "our" (e.g., "our unmindfulness," "our lack of perseverance," "our thoughtlessness") such that the lines between the Muslim *millet* and the Ottoman *millet* become unclear, and who is involved in the latter could potentially imply non-Muslims at times.[73] This new cohesive bond between subjects of the Ottoman Empire, which before was structured around the sultanate and its legitimacy, became a point of contestation and violence. In this way, not only was the sultan becoming positioned as the representative of all imperial subjects, regardless of creed, class or sex, but he also served as the head of Ottoman culture (which had to be constructed).

For many of the same reasons, a surging interest was placed on uncovering the traces of Ottoman culture and *medeniyet* (civilization), especially through fields such as archeology, architecture, museumology and tourism – all of which developed rapidly or, at times, spontaneously. Kemal Karpat explains how this idea of civilization developed as a response to European ideas rather than as an adoption of them, such that civilization came to mean "a higher level of social order, morality, refinement, grace, good manners, development (*umran*), and secure, comfortable living; and it was the opposite of ignorance, stagnation, passivity, unproductive existence, and primitiveness.[74] Prior to this, very little attention had been paid to these relics of antiquity within the empire (even though Europe had shown an intent interest in Ottoman, and especially Byzantine, artifacts since the seventeenth century). It was only as the notion of a shared past developed that historical artifacts and places began to have social value. Heritage studies scholars have been adamant on the role heritage has not in history but rather in attributing meaning to the past. Laurajane Smith explains this process as follows:

> What makes these things valuable and meaningful – what makes them "heritage," or what makes the collection of rocks in a field "Stonehenge" – are the present-day cultural processes and activities that are undertaken at and around them, and of which they become a part. It is these processes that identify them as physically symbolic of particular cultural and social events, and thus gives them value and meaning.[75]

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[72] For more on the disagreements between Cevdet Pasha and Nedim Pasha, see Abu-Manneh, "Sultan and Bureaucracy."
[73] Neumann, "Whom Did Ahmed Cevdet," 121–122. One should also see Hatice Sezer's ("Reformist Horizons of Ahmed") thesis that deals in depth with some of these notions in the work of Cevdet Pasha.
[74] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 11.
[75] Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, 3.

Jeanette Rodriguez and Ted Fortier likewise argue, much in line with Foucault's notion of problematization, that "*cultural memory transmits an experience rooted in history that has reached a culturally definitive, potentially transformative status*."[76] This newfound interest in Ottoman heritage was not actually a rediscovery of the past but a reinterpretation of then-present circumstances. Why did these monuments to heritage become so important? Why was there an explosion of literature on cultural sites, which had up until that point been largely neglected and unappreciated by the Ottoman Empire? Why was it so essential to show that there was a lineage of Ottoman high culture and society?

An early marker of this was the book *L'architecture Ottomane* (Ottoman Architecture), published simultaneously in Turkish and French in 1873. This text focuses on establishing the fundamental features of Ottoman architecture and its evolution, with emphasis being placed on specific architectural heritages.[77] In the same year, another book by Launay, co-authored with the Turkish historian Osman Hamdi Bey, was commissioned by the Sublime Porte to be displayed at the World Fair in Vienna under the title *Les Costumes Populaires de la Turquie*. Not only did these two texts begin academic traditions within the empire, but they also established a narrative: Ottoman subjects were united by a shared cultural heritage that, although varying from place to place, was united.[78] In their introduction, Hamdi and Launay stress a difference between a "garment" (*le vêtement*) and a "costume" or "outfit" (*la costume*): while a garment was derived from fashion, a costume was derived from the utility it provided its user. In this respect, European fashion was composed of "garments," whereas the outfits of the Ottoman Empire were shown to be vastly different from one another, but tailored to their particular environments:

> In this sense, we clearly recognize that the costume realizes the rational definition of the good and the beautiful, which can be epitomized by the words: *variety in unity*. Neither of these terms apply to garment, as during the short reign of each fashion there is no room for variety; fashion is strictly and coldly uniform. And then, exhausted after six months, the current fashion disappears; to be replaced by yet another one. Hence, the lack of a sense of unity in fashion.[79]

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[76] Rodriguez and Fortier, *Cultural Memory*, 12.
[77] A full list of the "celebrated" pieces of Ottoman architecture can be found in the original text, though the works actually illustrated in the text does not extend to each of these buildings or monuments (de Launay et al., *Architecture ottomane*, 81–87).
[78] For a more detailed account of this process, see Çelik, *Displaying the Orient*.
[79] Hamdi Bey and de Launay, "Popular Costumes of Turkey," 178.

These projects aimed not only at historicizing the Ottoman Empire and its heritage, but also legitimating the Ottoman Empire as the sovereign heir to its subjects, regardless of religion. Yet interestingly enough, they attribute very concrete characteristic behaviors derived from one's outfit: "The influence of costume is in complete contrast to that of garment; it is indisputably beneficial. Costume maintains, in a natural sense, lively sentiments of solidarity."[80] Under such circumstances, the Sublime Porte was defined as the inheritor of a rich and diverse cultural heritage – one built on practicality and rationality, key elements of the enlightenment in Europe, where this exhibit was directed – whose unity provided an image of Ottoman superiority contrasted against Europe's epidemic greed and selfishness. Regarding this text, Ahmet Ersoy further argues, "Comparison with the esteemed civilizations of the past helped distinguish Ottoman culture as a distinctive and prestigious entity while securing it a place within the historical continuum as the rightful inheritor of ancient cultural traditions."[81] The introduction of Hamdi and Launay's text explicitly argues that the book's ambition is to "be highly beneficial not only for artists, but, above all, for economists and researchers who work towards achieving the well-being of society."[82] Unlike the traditional image of glorious sultans and conquests, the focus entirely shifts to the people of the empire, not to its territorial domains, military strength or religious creeds.

Whether it was the military, the court system, taxation, provincial administration, centralized bureaucracy, historiography, education, art, architecture or heritage, two novel mechanisms drove the empire forward on these points. The first was a codification of roles and rules. While the previous section detailed these for taxation, it was even more evident in new penal regulations, education structures, military formation or the organization of the provinces. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to simply take this codification as successful. It set up new clusters of power relations that various subject positions violently contested using whatever capabilities they had at their disposal, either to frustrate their emergence or capitalize on them. Alongside this, a new form of imperial belonging that sought to overcome the divisive *millet* system was introduced, yet it was not idealistic or a phase of self-conscious reflection. Establishing the sultan as the head of a population rather than a territory became paramount and necessary to deal with international threats and internal organization. This process was rooted in constructing a

[80] Hamdi Bey and de Launay, 178.
[81] Ersoy, "Architecture and Search," 125.
[82] Hamdi Bey and de Launay, "Popular Costumes of Turkey," 179.

system that would cause subjects of all ways of life to be indebted and loyal to the empire. In other words, it needed to be constructed; it was not an intrinsic quality that needed to be awoken or uncovered. Despite this, it opened up a problem for culture that will become quintessential moving forward: if all subjects belonged to an Ottoman culture, what was that culture? As the latter portions of this section illustrated through history and cultural history, there was now a need to frame Ottoman society as a historically-confined, Islamic influenced and cohesively bound unity. Not only do these two practices – codification of roles and collective civil identity – become incorporated into imperial institutions and discourses, but they begin to be weaved into another emerging mechanism: representation. In the next section, it will be shown how this was taken up in discursive practices while also giving credence to a new phenomenon: the moralization of politics, or rather the moralization of individuals within the imperial network (what would become politicians in the Turkish state). The combination of these mechanisms – (a) the codification of roles, (b) collective civil identity, (c) representation and (d) the moralization of politics – structured two foundational elements of the new network of knowledge: patriotism and obedience. The reactions to these strategies came to radically alter the traditional conception of the Circle of Justice with these two discursive entities.

6.4 Sovereignty Unbound: The Roots of Sultans and Evil

One of the most immanent features of the 1860s would be the covert group known as the Young Ottomans. Yet, by the 1850s, three similar themes were already beginning to emerge from both Ottomans and foreign writers pertaining to the legitimacy of the state and criticisms of the relationship between the sultan and his subjects: (1) critiques not only of the *ulema* but the Tanzimat reformers themselves, though still respecting the sultan; (2) an increased emphasis on the idea of obedience to the state; (3) an emphasis on the importance of patriotism and developing it as such. Granted, during this time, the criticisms leveled against the *ulema* far from ceased, and if anything increased. For instance, Jean-Henri-Abdolonyme Ubicini, who had particularly close ties to the Sublime Porte, saw the collapse of the *ulema* as inevitable: "As soon as prejudices, already shaken in Turkey, are completely overthrown – when the Musulman becomes sufficiently educated to discharge his religious duties without the intervention of the Ulema – the doom of that powerful body [i.e., the *ulema*] is sealed."[83] Another foreign writer close to

[83] Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey 1*, 84–85.

the sultanate, Edmond Chertier, mimicked this critique: "The ulema systematically reject everything that is not the Koran or the Muslim tradition, it has remained with Arab medicine, and it is not at all concerned with the progress of the sciences and arts in Europe."[84] Even with these illustrations, one must consider the position of the authors. It was not unlike European diplomats and writers to argue against the *ulema* in favor of the more Eurocentric Tanzimat reformers. Moreover, their close relations with key Tanzimat reformers, such as Reşid, Ali and Fuad Pashas, often ensured their overall acceptance of reforms with minor criticisms intertwined, typically in service of their native state.[85]

Christopher Oscanyan, an American Armenian who relocated to the empire, paints a very similar picture: the *ulema* "thus rendered independent of the government, and possessing unbounded influence over the minds of the superstitious people, and being, in fact, the ultimatum of every hope and project, have been the greatest barriers to national improvement."[86] What makes Oscanyan's account strikingly different than the two other illustrations is that he does not stop at blaming the *ulema* but goes on to directly attack the Tanzimat reformers:

> The Tanzimat was the beginning of a reform, but there were no coercive measures put into play, to overthrow the power of ancient usages, so that the proclamation soon became almost a dead letter. The blind bigotry of the people and the absolute power of the heads of government, imbued as they are with a spirit of favoritism and corruption, have hitherto excluded the unfortunate subjects of the sultan from the justice and protection which are the sacred rights of every son of Adam. There has been no security for property nor any inducements to honesty in Turkey.[87]

Why did this particular person pen such an adamant critique of the Ottoman government, with the exception of the position of the sultan? A simple answer would be that Oscanyan, upon coming to the empire in 1841, started the first Armenian newspaper in the empire,

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[84] Chertier, *Réformes en Turquie*, 55.

[85] For instance, Ubicini was highly critical of opposition within the empire and an ardent advocate of education reforms, yet he was more cautious when it came to industrialization. While he encouraged the empire to invest in science and education pertaining to farming and crop cultivation, he opposed the notion of industrializing and instead suggested building on an agrarian society rather than transforming into an industrial one, something that was certainly in line with the interests of his national France (Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey 1*; Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey 2*). Likewise, Chertier embraced the idea of an empire built not around "Muslim conquest" but instead the "happiness of the peoples," which was clearly directed towards the rights and privileges of religious minority communities; this aligned with France's diplomatic push for a more Christian-friendly and even -dominant environment (Chertier, *Réformes en Turquie*, 69). This was even more noticeable in diplomacy, and the influence of especially British, French and German diplomats often occurred at a critical junction within the empire. The most notable example of this is the British diplomat Stratford Canning.

[86] Oscanyan, *Sultan and His People*, 133.

[87] Oscanyan, 444.

which was abruptly shut down because of its liberal values and critiques of the government.[88] Yet, why does this critique, which was brought already in the 1850s, transform into a social movement in the 1860s under the guidance the Young Ottomans? Censorship certainly had its place. Attacks on the reformists increased into the 1860s, and Ali and Fuad Pashas actively worked to clamp down on dissent.[89] Şerif Mardin notes how this facet of censorship was increasingly intertwined with the proposed models of political representation and participation, as well as the notion that the *rayas* were ignorant, uneducated and incapable of making their own decisions:

> Neither Fuad nor Ali Paşa was entirely indifferent to the problem of providing representative institutions for the Empire. Their approach to the creation of such institutions was to establish empire-wide intermediate bodies which, without providing for national representation, would at least allow local representative institutions to develop…On the other hand, they were convinced that the majority of the population was totally unfit to decide its own fate and they thought the Ottomans would acquire such qualifications only very gradually.[90]

Tarin and Lapeyrre had already claimed in the 1850s that "corruption among government officials was the plague of the state, the stumbling block of any useful reform, the permanent cause of abuse, with scandals being too often reported in all the branches of the administration."[91] This begins to introduce the second point of emergence within this discourse: regardless of whether one blamed the *ulema*, the Tanzimat reformers, the *janissaries*, foreign incursions, the degradation of imperial values or tax farming, it was less a matter of *how* but rather *who*; this is because the how is always reducible to the central principles of *corrupt leaders* and *selfish interests*. The question at this point is who was to blame for corruption and selfishness.

Everyone was free game for attack – with political repercussions ensuing – except for the sultan. An emphasis on allegiance, via the Circle of Justice, was already present during the Edict of Gülhane: "It is indeed the case that an empire loses all stability when it ceases to observe its laws."[92] This was further reasserted in the Edict of 1856, yet here we see more of an emphasis on reigning in the allegiance of non-Muslim communities:

> The principle of admissibility of subjects of the sultan without distinction of religion to all public employment, solemnly proclaimed by the imperial government, has since been put into

[88] Lessersohn, "Life of Longing."
[89] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 186.
[90] Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 20.
[91] Tarin and Lapeyrre, *Sultan Abdul-Medjid*, 119.
[92] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 8.

> practice…The imperial government is therefore resolved to make the most loyal and serious appeal to the assistance of its non-Muslim subjects and to give the principle of equality all the development it entails.[93]

If this emphasis on obedience is already present in these primary texts, what is the difference of it being employed in the 1850s and 1860s? If one recalls Foucault's understanding on changing concepts, one must focus less on the evolution of the concept and more on the position it takes up in relation to the discourses and power mechanisms around it. Foucault states, "Archeology does not seek to rediscover the continuous, insensible transition that relates discourses, on a gentle slope, to what precedes them, surrounds them, or follows them…Its problem is to find discourses in their specificity; to show in what way the set of rules that they put into operation is irreducible to any other."[94] In much the same manner, obedience slowly transitions into a more prominent question: obedience to whom?

The answer to this question is not so clear-cut. For Oscanyan, the ultimate authority was unquestionably the sultan himself: "In Turkey, all hereditary rank is vested solely in the person of the sultan; titles are conferred at his sovereign will and pleasure, and they do not descend from father to son."[95] In contrast, Oscanyan saw selfishness running rampant through Ottoman society: "The moral sense of the community is corrupted, and self-preservation impels the people only to strive to excel each other in roguery. In such a poisoned atmosphere, no salutary influence can be exercised until the axe is laid at the root of the evil."[96] More precisely, the primary reason the empire was veering towards collapse was rooted in selfishness, "the root of the evil." In response to criticisms in European journals against the Ottoman Empire, Rustem and Seid explain that the position of the sultan is a paternal one:

> The fair prince, enlightened, humane, worthy son of an illustrious father, he sincerely and courageously wants the good of his subjects, his children, and all without reserve, without exception, regardless of their race, their language or their belief. This is the real *tanzimat*, written in the Heart of the Beloved Monarch.[97]

Chertier also warned against selfishness in Ottoman society, which he viewed as the source of all corruption; however, Chertier firmly attached the propagation of this

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[93] Aristarchi, 30.
[94] Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 139.
[95] Oscanyan, *Sultan and His People*, 393.
[96] Oscanyan, 445.
[97] Rustem and Seid, *Réponse à quelques journaux*, 35–36.

sentiment to the abuses of the *ulema*: "The Koran…instead of being interpreted according to the general interest of the country, was until now only in accordance with that of the ulemas who always faithfully observed this precept selfishly: let well-ordered charity begin with yourself."[98] In much the same manner, Tarin and Lapeyrre argued that the position of the sultan is the only one with oversight (by his subjects), and thus obedience to the sultan at all levels – religious, bureaucratic, agrarian, political, etc. – is the key to preserving the empire: "The Padichah doesn't know everything! But for him, other eyes are watching; and the abuse, the arbitrariness and the injustice go away, disappearing under the influence of more widespread and more effective reforms."[99]

Throughout Tarin and Lapeyyre's account, nonetheless, there is a preemptive undertaking, finding faults with disobedience at all levels of Ottoman society. On the other hand, Ubicini asserted that it was the masses inability to obey state officials, recalling a scene relayed to him about a "fanatic" Dervish accosting Reşid Pasha on the street and hurling insults at him: "This results alike from the fanaticism cherished by the Dervishes, and from the freedom of language used by the lower classes among us in addressing men in authority, which is especially the case during Ramazan."[100] Interesting enough, this falls in line with the Imperial Edict of 1856 towards which the disruptions and tensions arising over the removal of special *millet* privileges was directed:

> Respect for the immunities enshrined in ancient times for the benefit of the Christian communities has not always enabled the Sublime Porte to contribute to the satisfaction of the wishes of its non-Muslim subjects, particularly those affecting the Bulgarian population, who have worked for so many years to exclude the Greek clergy from their national churches.[101]

The sultan's ability to serve as a representative of *all* his subjects – of acting as the ruler of an *Osmanlılık* – is purportedly complicated by the maintenance of minority *millet* privleges. In line with this, the problematization of this emerging notion of obedience can be viewed as a blame game, trying to decipher who (and when, where and how) led the empire astray. In order to even discuss reforms, it became equally necessary to understand why reforms failed, making accusations against someone of disobedience a cornerstone.

The obedience complex that was thus arising, however, was only one part of the equation. The "root of the evil," as Oscanyan put it, of disobedience and selfishness

[98] Chertier, *Réformes en Turquie*, 41.
[99] Tarin and Lapeyrre, *Sultan Abdul-Medjid*, 33.
[100] Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey 1*, 110.
[101] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 28.

became brazenly clear, yet there was a solution: patriotism. Patriotism was not the natural devotion to one's state but rather an effect of education and guidance. Chertier definitively links the process of patriotism to education:

> It is through education that the regeneration of the Empire will become possible and real, since it is from ignorance that inferiority and the evils which overwhelm it at the moment: how, without scientists, without engineers, without sophisticated instruments of war and work, can Turkey hope to fight with advantage against similar elements which the West has?[102]

Patriotism was not something that naturally *existed* but something that had to be *created*; not a prediscursive element that was "discovered" but the entirely positive formation of a concept. Selfishness and corruption had led the highest officials and the people astray; the only way to combat this was through education. In this way, Tarin and Lapeyrre argue that "corruption had in the long run infiltrated, like a subtle poison, into the customs of the Ottomans, less by the effect of individual vices than by a kind of general relaxation and by the forgetting of the old maxims of their fathers."[103] Tarin and Lapeyrre additionally position the sultan as a *leader* rather than a *ruler*, whereby the sultan assumes the role of a fatherly guide: "The nation had to be warned and its program, developed in broad daylight, to have as its guarantee and its sanction the solemn oath of the sovereign and of the greats of the Empire to remain faithful to the new principles [of the Tanzimat] in which it was enshrined."[104] With this discourse, nonetheless, we see its transposition onto material institutions and structures, such as "urban planning, healthcare, and mass education."[105]

The role the sultan was to play in this emerging model as well as how obedience should be procured varied significantly. This was not a sentiment or ideal limited to fringe or foreign authorities; it was professed by the sultanate in the Imperial Edict of 1856:

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[102] Chertier, *Réformes en Turquie*, 64–65.
[103] Tarin and Lapeyrre, *Sultan Abdul-Medjid*, 120–121.
[104] Tarin and Lapeyrre, 62.
[105] Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late," 196. This is similar to aspects that Foucault discussed in terms of pastoral power. For more on Foucault discussing pastoral power, see Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim"; Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*. The literature on pastoral power has grown exponentially over the past few decades, and far more attention is paid to this in Foucault's actual work as well as its application in various systems. For more on pastoral power and the literature surrounding it, one can consult Bell and Taylor, "Elevation of Work"; Bevir, "Foucault Power and Institutions"; Carrete, "Foucault, Religion, and Pastoral Power"; Caughlan, "Considering Pastoral Power"; Chrulew, "Pastoral Counter-Conducts"; Golder, "Foucault and Genealogy"; Howley and Hartnett, "Pastoral Power and Contemporary"; Martin and Waring, "Realising Governmentality"; Mayes, "Violence of Care"; Pelayo, "Pastoral Power Outside Foucault's"; Petterson, "Colonial Subjectification"; Sanders, "Help for the Soul"; Siisiäinen, "Foucault Pastoral Power"; Stamp, "Pastoral Power"; Tierney, "Foucault on Case"; Welch, "Pastoral Power as Penal."

> The generous feelings that I profess for my people provides me with the duty to also seek, from the inside and by all means possible, the development of the strength, the power and the prosperity of the country while also making the happiness of all my subjects of all classes, all united by the bonds of cordial patriotism, as they are all equal in the eyes of my lively and paternal solicitude.[106]

The analogy of the sultan as a leader rather than a ruler was monumentally innovative. It was still the Circle of Justice, but how justice was reached (or how the circle was kept from collapsing) was being reformulated. Up until the nineteenth century, the Sultan's *irade* (will), inspired by divine intervention, was the guiding force for the development of the empire. The position of the sultan's *irade* tied his allegiance to the will of Allah, meaning the sultan answered to God, not the people. If one went against the sultan, they were also going against Allah. By the 1850s, nonetheless, Ottoman politics had forever decentered Allah. Religion did not necessarily play less of a role in politics, but the role it played was dislodged as the *raison d'état*. As the story went, the sultan's flock – the literal meaning of *rayas* is, after all, flock – needed a shepherd. An emerging network of power relations violently (in the Foucauldian sense) ended the Islamic monarchy – or, arguably, the Caliphate, at least in principle – only to replace it with a network centered around the sultan's *irade* as the leader of the empire. Now, if one went against the sultan, they were also going against the empire and its people. A national solidarity was posited as the definitive base of imperial legitimacy, and yet this meant that the people of the empire needed guidance to reach their full potential and avoid the pitfalls of evil.

From this, new political concepts emerged: "disobedience" and "selfishness," the inherent vices of the empire's decline. These terms were by no means novel to Ottoman discourse, and one only needs to reflect on the period of the *janissaries* to see they already had a prevalent position in Ottoman politics. However, disobedience and selfishness, in the case of the *janissaries* – as well as a string of famous and infamous instances seared into Ottoman memory – was the result of breaking the sacred allegiance to the sultan and putting the entire empire at risk by dislodging the Circle of Justice; it was thus punished accordingly. By the 1850s, disobedience and selfishness come to portray the fundamental evils that could lead the sultan's subjects astray, thereby interfering with the sultan's *irade*.

In terms of disobedience, it was seen as an affront to the work of the masses and the stability of the empire. Yet, the reasons for being disobedient were always linked to

[106] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 15.

selfishness or ignorance. The empire's root of all evil, which had the capability of dismantling the Circle of Justice, was essentially corrupt officials and ignorant peasants, which then permitted a new number of poignant discursive statements to arise. Disobedient groups required guidance, education and training, which the sultan's supreme benevolence would deliver. This would in turn develop strong feelings of patriotism, helping the country rise from the ashes. It was a roadmap to the golden ages of the Ottoman Empire, before it had been led astray by selfishness, by greedy tax farmers and morally compromised judges, by those willing to compromise their integrity for profit, those who used their positions of power to oppress the potential of the nation, those soldiers blinded by petty crimes and misdemeanors, those terrified on the battlefield, choosing to save their own lives instead of defending the people of the glorious Ottoman Empire.

6.5 Conclusion: Bureaucrats with Morals?

Throughout this chapter, key mechanisms that were built into the conditions of possibility for imperial politics were delineated. As the first two sections show, the introduction of divisional and codified imperial codifications and roles were cast across all sectors of the empire. It was not an ideological struggle, although there were ideologies at play, but rooted in the very possibility of theorizing or participating in politics.[107] At the same time, the conception of *Osmanlılık* was put on the table, yet it was acknowledged that this was not already present; it would be the result of good governance and administration, i.e., a revamped Circle of Justice that could provide security, peace and prosperity. The underlying structure that drove these two mechanisms forward was grounded in the dynamics of the sultanic *dispositif*, and viewing these struggles as classist, ethnic or religious misses the underlying functioning of the strategies, counterstrategies and tools employed. In fact, they revolved around nexuses of violence built into the Circle of Justice, yet these nexuses were no doubt shifting to new quarters, as the following chapters will illustrate. What is unique is that these power relations both referred to a representative function, a new tactic whereby the empire was presented as a cohesive whole, yet this new entity required representation (both politically and culturally). The position of the sultan was slowly shifting from a divine lineage that offered justice to the

[107] For discussions on some of these ideological debates, one can consult Brisku, *Political Reform in Ottoman*; Gürpınar, *Ottoman/Turkish Visions of Nation*; Turnaoğlu, *Formation of Turkish Republicanism*.

person of the sultan as the embodiment of the empire. This led to new discursive practices that revolved around patriotism and obedience. It was not power creating knowledge or knowledge creating power: it was an interactive process whereby they both influenced each other. Patriotism and obedience only made sense to the extent that new relationships of power were forming, and they were then appropriated by everyone from the *ulema*, the *rayas*, the *ayans* and anti-Tanzimat scholars to criticize how the empire was being run or to gain the upper hand in local struggles. As a consequence, the discursive practices led to a moralization of politics, whereby individuals or groups began to be criticized for their moral deficiencies that directly impacted the material setbacks or shortcomings of the imperial apparatus.

"Clearly this is stretching the truth," Mr. Critic will say. "Of course they wanted to rid the empire of selfishness and disobedience. It's the *tour de force* of all oppressive regimes. And yet, the sultans of the Tanzimat never saw such power manifested. It was all an empty dream, built on the ambitions of people who saw themselves as bigger than they actually were."

To this, I would respond that you are absolutely correct about truth. It was stretched, twisted, pushed to its breaking point, and when it could no longer hold up under the weight of allegiance within the sultanic *dispositif*, it collapsed. Disobedience takes on a novel position within these discourses, functioning not as a transgression of the law but instead a traitorous act. It was detrimental to the empire and its people, and we can look at a very concrete example of this. While we have discussed the downfall of the *janissaries* just three strenuous decades before, one can now look at a planned uprising that was toppled in 1859: what has become known as the Kuleli Incident. A group of individuals, most belonging to the *ulema* and the military, were arrested for a plot to assassinate the sultan. Aside from dissatisfaction with the reforms and creeping Westernization, it does not seem like the plotters solidified around a single ideological position. However, upon discovering the plot, the central government did more than prosecute the group of men; they also began to limit the number of theology students in the capital, mostly moving them to provinces, and paid out three months' worth of military salaries in arrears.[108] What is unique about this situation, nevertheless, is the manner in which it was devised to be carried out.

[108] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 102.

Unlike previous assassinations and attempts on the sultan, this was to be a public assassination, and the importance of it being public was asserted by those arrested. The Tanzimat reformers were clearly aware of the political dynamics at play, not only with these specific issues but the increasing importance of public opinion. At the same time, it is equally clear that the plotters were literate in the fluctuating political hierarchy. Burak Onaran explains how "the sultan was trying to embody power through his public appearances and his portraits hanging in public buildings. In other words, the subjects and the people (as the public body of the subjects) were moving towards the focus of a new strategy to reign and govern."[109] Since the Tanzimat, it had increasingly become important for the sultan to have a physical presence – even to the point of the sultan making a European voyage in 1867, the first sultan to ever do so for diplomacy rather than conquest – and thus the possibility of assassinating the sultan in public took on a somewhat revolutionary weight: the sultan himself embodied the empire, not through allegiance but through his very existence.[110]

The goal, according to the documents available to scholars, was to inspire a popular revolt by assassinating the sultan; this is remarkably different than previous attempts to overthrow or murder the sultan, which relied on internal support and consent to make the possibility even viable: a massive network of allegiances that could justifiably counteract the sultan. Unlike attempts at reestablishing the standing order, the rebels were calling on the "people" to correct the wrongs of corrupt rulers, starting with the sultan but trickling down into his bureaucracy.[111] To some extent, it could be argued that this was a somewhat successful plot; shortly after the revelations of the planned assassination spread throughout the capital, Ali Pasha was replaced as grand vizier by his more conservative and cautious colleague, Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha. By punishing those involved and taking administrative moves to weaken the *ulema*, the rise of Emin Pasha to grand vizier and providing three months of backpay can be seen as a way of weakening the Tanzimat's political rivals while attempting to undercut the force of disgruntled masses. Bedri Gencer asserts that "this was an example of a plot to overturn the government, of the kind of the traditional Ottoman 'palace revolutions' and one that counted on rather widespread public

[109] Onaran, "How to Kill Ottoman," 9.
[110] Inalcık, *Application of Tanzimat*; Kırlı, "Surveillance and Constituting Public"; Stephanov, "Minorities Majorities and Monarch"; Stephanov, "Sultan Mahmud II."
[111] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 100–108; Gencer, "Rise of Public Opinion"; Elfenbein, "No Empire for Old," 27–79; Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 18, 205–212; Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy*, 12–25.

support, rather than an example of revolt for parliamentary or constitutional government."[112] For the first time, a public assassination of the sultan enters the political theater. The sultans before this time certainly faced assassination, and though these were normally concealed, secretive affairs, they could have occurred in public; however, they would have lacked the political force that resulted from this foiled plot, which took the new role of the sultan and his very embodiment of the imperial *irade* as its target.

"Fine," you will retort. "You can have your fanatical usage of these political concepts. What's it to me? I'm a historian. You've merely tossed out some theoretical garbage. This is not the truth of the matter, regardless of how you want to define that. So what? People talked about the perils of obedience and selfishness more. This is hardly proof that people actually felt this way. In fact, you just mentioned a failed *ulema*-led revolt. We've extensively discussed the *ayans* and their total disregard for following orders. We've seen the *rayas* protest and revolt across the empire, we've seen troops fleeing, we've seen rampant abuse of power. You want to sit there and tell us that these new power relations around obedience are some revamped, innovative foundations of truth?"

Absolutely, my dear comrade. Perhaps there has been no better time to delve headfirst into one of Foucault's monumental articulations: "Nothing is more material, physical, corporal than the exercise of power."[113] Does this mean that power relations are always concrete, tangible realities? Certainly not, but then what could this mean? We know Foucault could have some unusual revelations, so could he have perhaps covertly slipped this notion into discourse at large, disguised as a clever aphorism devoid of meaning? After all, he faced criticisms for his Panopticon. Like our model of the imperial *irade* being encapsulated in the sultan's *irade*, it did not exist in concrete institutions, and was arguably a failure. Simply look at all the failures of panopticism in contemporary institutions: the prison system, standardized education, the commercialization of certain healthcare options. What was Foucault rambling on about, then? For this, we can turn to David Owen's defense of Foucault's panopticism:

> Foucault's argument in analysing the emergence of the idea of the Panopticon is not to suggest the institutional realisation of this figure in its ideal…Foucault's claim is that this panoptic schema

[112] Gencer, "Rise of Public Opinion," 138.
[113] Foucault, "Body/Power," 58.

> becomes a generalised functional mechanism for discipline which denotes the formation of the disciplinary society.[114]

What we are discussing is not necessarily a real, corporeal institution composed of physical objects, which is precisely the context in which Foucault uses "institutions": "The criticism of power wielded over the mentally sick or mad cannot be restricted to psychiatric institutions; nor can those questioning the power to punish be content with denouncing prisons as total institutions. The question is: How are such relations of power rationalized?"[115] In this way, a unique *dispositif* begins to emerge, one whose mechanism becomes entrenched in Ottoman political (and, at times, non-political) discourses. It is a rationality that, at its core, derives legitimacy to govern from an *irade*, which is idealistically manifested in the physical existence of the sultan, rather than through bonds of allegiance. The structure of imperial Ottoman sovereignty folds in on itself, and instead of the sultan casting a shadow over his subjects while basking in the divine decisions of a diety, he must now turn his gaze downwards, towards the people. He no longer has power *over* them; he only has power *through* them.

This discourse was not limited to the elites of the empire. The *rayas* classes in particular latched onto this formulation to legitimate their claims. Anna Vakali explains the divide between the Christian clergy and the up-and-coming class of educated artisans.[116] When a Christian carpenter from Manastır was found guilty of murdering a Muslim – in an attempt to prevent the Muslim's sexual attack on another young Muslim male – his father made an appeal not only to the governor of the district but also the local British, Austrian and Greek consuls.[117] The fact that the father contacted not only the local Ottoman governor but also foreign consuls already begins to show a knowledge of the power relations in play; the father resorted not only to a plea to the sultanate – being sure to emphasize that they "were loyal subjects of the sultan" – but also to foreign Christian nations that could serve as a representative on his behalf.[118] When the petitions were denied and the Christian was to be executed, the local artisans club, the gazinos, delivered a "protesto" directly to the visiting grand vizier, which Vakali describes as follows:

> What differentiated the *protesto* from conventional petitions was its lack of a highly formalized content, in a submissive style, including references to a benevolent, just and glorious Ottoman

[114] Owen, *Maturity and Modernity*, 178.
[115] Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim," 324–325.
[116] Vakali, "Nationalism Justice and Taxation."
[117] Vakali, 205.
[118] Vakali, 205.

> ruler, thus underscoring an alleged contract between the ruler and the ruled. More than "loyal and submissive subjects" the *protesto*'s signatories presented themselves as citizens who were demanding their rights.[119]

Shortly afterwards, a number of gazinos were arrested in a raid and charged with *fesat* (sedition), which would be tried in court in Istanbul. Aytekin even explains how local peasants were entirely conscious of the importance of official documents and, like the convicted Christian boy's father from Manastır, appealed directly to the central government: "Peasants were aware of the power of written documents and so they presented legal documents in support of their claims. In destroying such documents too, they showed equal consciousness of the documents' power."[120]

A dispersion of options existed, and these would inevitably shape the *dispositif* in the decades to come. One of the key aspects of this *dispositif* was the politicization of character traits. Disobedience and selfishness were certainly perils, but the solution rested in patriotism. While the realization of this formula would never truly come to fruition – at least in this form – it was an essential turning point in the genealogy of national belonging. Because the sultan's *irade* had folded in on itself, it was connected to a imperial spirit rather than a divine will; the seed had been planted. The imperial *irade* had decentered Islam and, as collateral damage, the sultan; a new political horizon begins to appear, one reliant on a somewhat vicious circle: the sultan's role is to guide his subjects to prosperity and enlightenment, which in turn breeds patriotism, obedience and a renunciation of selfishness. To do this, a return to the less corrupt roots of the empire, and its heritage, is a necessary step, as the conclusion of the second section of this chapter laid out (and notice how this was only possible thanks to events like the 1808 Charter of Alliance or the 1839 Edict of Gülhane). An easy excuse, therefore, is to blame other officials of corrupting national interests, which goes against the interests of all subjects. Yet, this attack relies on attributing a negative character to individuals, which would attach to their worth and value as a subject.

[119] Vakali, 212.
[120] Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late," 213.

7. The Emergence of Representation: Public Opinion and Imamic Leadership

Felâtun: No, my friend! I indulged myself in pleasure, acted like a child and made every possible mistake. Trust me when I tell you that I'll be content with my salary and work honestly and candidly where I am appointed as an official.
Râkim: God knows I've always trusted you. May God promptly bring you success. What I mean to say is that I hope you work your way up, pay off your debts, and find the opportunity to enjoy yourself with your earnings.
Felâtun: As long as one serves loyally, there's no reason for it not to happen.
Râkim: See, that's the kind of attitude I'd like you to adopt as you assume your official duties." – Ahmed Midhat Efendi, *Felâtun Bey and Râkim Efendi*[1]

7.1 Introduction: On Creating Patriotism

In 1860, Fuad Pasha was sent to Mount Lebanon to resolve a local outburst that occurred when the Muslim Druze population openly massacred their Maronite Christian neighbors. After the waters had calmed and upon his departure, Fuad Pasha made a statement entailing his contentment that the issue had been resolved: "All people should act in accordance with the Sultan's benevolent wishes, and each class of the imperial subjects should embrace tightly the principles of unity, patriotism (*hubb al watan*), and service to the nation by obeying imperial orders and by zealously fulfilling humanitarian obligations."[2] In this formulation, obedience stands as the cornerstone of patriotism, yet it not only forbids its subjects from disobedience – not merely repressive, as Foucault would say – but also encourages a nurturing atmosphere, fostered by individual loyalty. In much the same way just five years later, the governor of Ankara responded to such tensions by pleading for Ottomanism:

> It is commanded by the ruling authorities that all subjects cease to deride one another as Moslems and Rayahs [here meaning Christians], as Armenians and Protestants, since all are equally the dependent subjects of the royal government, and it is further commanded that mutually respecting and honoring one another, all shall dwell together in brotherly love.[3]

This imperial outlook saw the local populations as backwards and ignorant, in need of education regarding the principles of Ottomanism to demonstrate that they were really neighbors. In essence, it required a renewed implementation of the Circle of Justice. The Sublime Port failed to realize that they were disrupting the political order that had kept

[1] Midhat Efendi, *Felâtun Bey and Râkim*, 142.
[2] As quoted in Makdisi, "After 1860," 606.
[3] As quoted in Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 96.

various *millets* in a fairly peaceful state for centuries. A group of disgruntled Ottoman intellectuals – who self-declared themselves as the *Ittifak-ı Hamiyyet* (Patriotic Alliance), though they later became known as the Young Ottomans – were quick to take advantage of this oversight.[4] What were once religious communities were very quickly becoming political ones based on imperial representation, shifting community structures, bonds of allegiance and intra- as well as inter-community clashes. The dream of constructing a national unit had, in many ways, begun to disappear, and an unpredictable matrix of power relations began to embed in conflicting trajectories of national belonging.

In this environment, the Young Ottomans came together with many of the same principles in mind that fueled the Kuleli Incident, but instead of trying to dethrone the sultan, which was the traditional way to shift the direction of the Sublime Porte, or call for a popular revolution, which was the case with many non-Muslim millet factions who had latched onto some form of nationalist discourse, they chose an emerging tool: the press. What centered their critiques, which were based in fundamentally different political ideologies, had more to do with opposing the strict control of the new Ottoman bureaucracy by Ali and Fuad Pashas. Alongside this, they were enraged by European nations interfering in the domestic politics of the Ottoman Empire, which they attributed to the general weakening of the empire through maladministration. If we acknowledge, in a very Foucauldian way, that we are interested in the conditions that allowed the formation of such a group in the first place, we can highlight our interests in subject positions instead of these individuals themselves. In other words, what conditions made it possible for this group of young men, who shared certain grievances – whether real or perceived – to amass such support? What set of rules limited their discourse? What ideas were "translated" from European political life at the time? Perhaps more than anything, why did their message resonate so strongly with an Ottoman public, and how did officials respond to this discontent? How did it impact the push towards centralization and bureaucratization? Moreover, against this discourse, how did it impact the evolution of

[4] Roderic Davison explains how the term "Young Turk" (*jeune Turquie*) was applied throughout Europe and America at the time to describe any Ottoman who sought to drastically overhaul the standing order of the 1860s, which could be applied to the Patriotic Alliance, members of the *ulema*, Tanzimat reformers with a knowledge of French and Western concepts or even Reshid, Ali, Fuad and Midhat Pashas (Davison, 173–175). It should be noticed that I acknowledge the ambiguity of this term in the context of the time. However, what I mean when I interpellate this term are those group of individuals who were situated outside the financial privileges held by those in the central administration, which includes the men who came to form the Patriotic Alliance. In other words, I am working on delineating subject positions, and not simply those who possessed an unspoken membership to this group.

Tanzimat reforms? What was the impact on the role of provincial governing, and how did these strategies of representation play out in the districts outside of Istanbul?

Alongside the writings of the Young Ottomans, by the early 1860s, inter-communal revolts and massacres were becoming commonplace, and the enlarged bureaucratic mechanism as well as the push towards centralization put the Sublime Porte in a predicament.[5] The situation was further catapulted by the death of Sultan Abdülmecid in 1861, succeeded by his younger brother Sultan Abdülaziz. Many hoped the new sultan would be more skeptical towards reform, but his ascension saw Ali and Fuad Pashas' grip on control tighten; their interchangeable tenure as grand vizier lasted throughout the 1860s.[6] Ironically, this was also the decade where the failures of the Tanzimat would finally catch up. An empty treasury was partly fueled by disruptions in the payment of taxes – either because of resistance from the *ayans* or revolts from the peasants – as well as the need to finance the military and an enlarged bureaucracy.[7] The inefficient banking system, depreciating currency and debts incurred from foreign loans likewise played a prominent role. The imperial deficit was simply growing larger and larger than the annual budget, battered by the increasing financial needs of the military and education, rampant corruption and obtuse spending by the sultanate.[8] At the same time, a new generation of bureaucrats, having profited off the education projects and expanded administration of the Tanzimat, came forward with a fresh approach to these issues, going against the sultanic *dispositif* by using a carrot rather than a stick. These young officials faced a daunting task, and many of them were simply swallowed up by the system as a whole. Nonetheless, the stress on pastoral projects in the provinces dramatically restructured Ottoman communities.

The mechanisms of representation that began to emerge in the previous decades will be shown to fully extend and become central determining factors in this chapter. Not

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[5] For instance, see Atakul, "Impact of *Tanzimat* Policies"; Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat"; Doumanis, *Before Nation*; Makdisi, "After 1860," *Culture of Sectarianism*; Yildiz, *Crisis and Rebellion*.

[6] Abdul-Manneh, "Sultan and Bureaucracy"; Agmon, "Recording Procedures and Legal"; Ayoub, "*Mecelle*, Sharia and Ottoman"; Bragg, *Ottoman Notables and Participatory*; Murgul, "Tanzimat Reforms Reconsidered."

[7] Taxation become a prominent issue during this period. See Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations, Property"; Barakat, "Underwriting the Empire"; Coşgel, "Efficiency and Continuity in Public"; Özbek, "Politics of Taxation," "Tax Farming in Nineteenth-Century"; Shaw, "Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax"; Vakali, "Nationalism, Justice and Taxation."

[8] See Akgündüz, "Ottoman Waqf Administration"; Barakat, "Underwriting the Empire"; Brisku, *Political Reform in Ottoman*; Eldem, "Ottoman Financial Integration"; Ozekicioglu and Ozekicioglu, "First Borrowing Period"; Quataert, "Age of Reforms, 1812-1914."

only do (a) collective imperial identity, (b) imperial codification, (c) representation as a political tool and (d) the moralization of politics manifest themselves in various ways, but their combination gives rise to two other core strategies in this chapter: public opinion and imamic leadership. Turning to the group of intellectuals known as the Young Ottomans, the first section of this chapter discusses their understanding of the Ottoman political order and the flaws they saw in it. These revolved around three key elements: popular sovereignty, constitutional monarchy and representative government. Each of these came to situate public opinion in the Ottoman tradition and convey the role it plays in steering imperial politics. The following section focuses on the career of a prominent Ottoman bureaucrat, Midhat Pasha, in order to show how provincial administrations began to experiment with a new form of pastoral governance that I term imamic leadership. As such, the goal is not only to rule but to guide the populations one is responsible for through economic advancement, education, increased security, communication and transportation and financial opportunities. It was a radical change to provincial decision-making and how the imperial government engaged with its subjects, yet one which relied on the other mechanisms of the representative *dispositif*. In the third section, all these elements are brought together in the first Ottoman constitution, which rethought how the Ottoman Empire's *raison d'état*, the Circle of Justice, was conceived of and enacted. While this constitutional period was quite brief, it nevertheless established the outline of the representative *dispositif* – and the nexuses of violence that were beginning to sediment along new fronts.

7.2 The Politicization of Identity: Circulating the Idea of National Belonging

The formation of the Young Ottomans was tied to new forms of emerging media, particularly translations from Western languages, newspapers and an increase in literacy (and as a result, an increased interest in reading).[9] Up until this point, the Ottoman government had not needed to worry about an independent Ottoman press – with presses in foreign languages largely unregulated – but that changed with the commodification of literature in the 1860s. In 1862, an *Matbuat Müdürlüğü* (Administration of Press Affairs) was established; by 1865, it had issued laws to punish or entirely close literary outlets

[9] Dados, "Mapping Empire"; Dudley, *Singularity of Western Innovation*, 81-97; Fortna, *Learning to Read*; Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots*.

deemed a danger to "public morals and the good mores or one of the religions or cults practiced in the empire" as well as to "the interior tranquility and security of the Empire."[10] The intent of the 1865 press law was very clear: out of the twenty-six articles stipulating the punishment of offenses, a large number of them explicitly dealt with literary transgressions against the sultan, his advisors or government officials. Along with the rise of the press, a new formation began to take shape in Ottoman society as well: voluntary associations. During second half of the nineteenth century, primarily beginning from the 1860s, groups of individuals began to form cause-driven collectives.[11] This should not be understood as a replacement for religious communities; some of the strongest associations during this time belonged to religious organizations and Sufi orders (see the next chapter). Rather, the emergence of voluntary associations served different purposes. Just as the sultan's new role was rooted in guidance and leadership, these groups saw the development of society as their *raison d'être*. Though they did not take the place of religious communities, they oftentimes went directly against them, which is most visible in the case of artisan guilds and clubs.[12] Yet, they posed a new network of power relations whereby one takes an interest in spreading knowledge, services or faith. In contrast to the transforming role of religion in imperial politics, the rise of voluntary associations featured new subject positions that would play off of popular opinion as a form of political power.

Though all the members of the Patriotic Alliance came to profess some version of constitutionalism and representative politics, building on the mechanisms laid out over previous decades, the ways in which they did so diverged, and they oftentimes contradicted or clashed with one another. By looking at their subject positions rather than their ideas, however, a consistent model of such a "Young Ottoman" arises. The group of men were young, educated and literate with some knowledge of Western concepts and ideas – regardless of how (in)accurate these may have been. Almost all of them had worked in the government's translation bureau; this showed a great deal of proficiency with the Ottoman language as well as some knowledge of foreign languages, particularly

[10] Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, 322–323.
[11] See Giomi, *Making Muslim Women European*; Göçek, *Rise of Bourgeoisie, Demise*, 125-133; Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 130–135; Watenpaugh, *Being Modern in Middle*, 68-94.
[12] Vakali does a brilliant job of illustrating one such club: the Gazinos in Monastir. Responding to a murder that had been politicized, the Gazinos spoke on behalf of the Christian population when their *millet* hierarchy and provincial leaders failed to act (Vakali, "Nationalism Justice and Taxation"). For more on the emergence of these clubs, see Suny, *They Can Live*, 155–165.

French. In fact, the upbringing of these individuals was not overtly remarkable for the most part, and many of their colleagues held the same credentials. With the exception of Ali Suavi, the men came from wealthy, notable families. What seems to be an astute connection between them, nonetheless, was how they had been shirked by the Ottoman bureaucracy and left out of upper rungs of high Ottoman politics, which was dominated by Ali and Fuad Pasha; they were thus left out of the financial privileges their education was supposed to ensure.[13] In essence, these men felt that the Ottoman bureaucracy had formed a closed circle around the highest rungs of Ottoman politics, and to be left out of that inner circle meant one's financial well-being could often be chaotic, uninsured or lacking (regardless of how validated these feelings were).

The predominant financial backer of these men became Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, grandson to Egypt's infamous Muhammad Ali Pasha and a staunch political opponent of Fuad Pasha. Fazıl Pasha had been next in line to serve as the Prince of Egypt until it became clear that Abdülaziz wished to change the regulations on the succession around 1866, which would transfer the position to Fazıl Pasha's nephew. While still holding a prominent position in Ottoman bureaucracy as finance minister, he became vexed over then-Grand Vizier Fuad Pasha's role in dividing up his family's estate and thus cheating him out of his fortune. He vented his anger in virulent attacks on the Ottoman government and its ministers until he was finally dismissed and asked to leave the empire, at which point he moved to Paris and Fuad transferred Egypt's next-in-line to Fazıl Pasha's nephew. Becoming an outspoken critic of the Tanzimat regime assuredly gained Fazıl Pasha fame within the Young Ottomans' circle, but perhaps the most notable intellectual commonality between Fazıl Pasha and this group came in the form of an open letter by Fazıl Pasha to Sultan Abdülaziz, and it can significantly be seen as a "mirror for princes" type note.[14] Throughout this long-winded letter, Fazıl Pasha makes sure to attest his allegiance to the sultan and express his patriotism for the empire: "I drew the strength to look the evils that besiege us – in broad daylight or in the shadows – in the face, from my respectful affection for Your Throne and from my patriotism."[15] The evils (*maux*) that

[13] Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 107-132.
[14] Fazıl Pasha's sincerity in this letter has been subject to debate, especially as to whether he was just doing this for financial purposes, to embarrass Ali and Fuad Pasha or to garnish favor in Europe by appealing to liberal ideals. Regardless, the fact that it resonated so strongly with the Patriotic Alliance illustrates that these concepts were not only intelligible to the Young Ottomans but in correspondence with many of their own concepts. Moreover, the ideas professed, whether sincere or not, strongly resonated among Ottoman elites.
[15] Fazil, *Lettre du Prince Moustapha*, 2.

Fazıl Pasha discusses should be familiar to the reader by now: the current "system of government that, after having had its reasons for existing in the past, can now only produce tyranny, ignorance, misery and corruption."[16] In this way, the politicization of character came to the forefront of political discourse. The Tanzimat reformers were no different than their predecessors in the eyes of many Young Ottomans, having given into corruption and selfishness. Moreover, such an address is contingent on the representative mechanisms that had been built up within the empire (see previous chapter) such that the sultan is continuously addressed throughout the letter as the representative of the people, not merely their ruler. Fazıl Pasha also discusses education and industrialization, but he argues the only way to progress towards a more equal and patriotic empire is through liberty: "The foundational instructor of people, that which creates all others and that the others cannot replace, is *liberty*," which could be guaranteed by a constitution.[17] This liberty, nonetheless, was situated in a very Ottoman context, implying a mix of incentives to encourage productivity, thereby digging into the discourse on patriotism and obedience. This required the government to lax its heavy-handed rule but also to provide more opportunities to pursue education and artisan skills-based training. He did not question the implementation and expansion of codifying the empire – if anything, he argues this project needs to be enlarged – but instead was engaging with the discourse and making a novel contribution.

In his treatise, Fazıl Pasha accentuates positive and negative character traits. The notion of patriotism – "the original strength" of "public virility" – which at times has connotations of being something to construct and at other times an already existing sentiment, is contrasted with self-interest and disobedience.[18] One such instance where he makes this poignantly clear is in a passage discussing why the early Ottomans were so successful:

> They were subject to their leaders; but they had all the liberties of the heart and the spirit, and I do not know what native independence – what indefectible elevation – which, knowing how to discipline themselves, sanctified the living substance of their character. Virtue, for them, was not an empty Word. This is why they triumphed so easily over an immense Empire where a secular despotism had acclimated to all the vices and ignominies.[19]

[16] Fazil, 2.
[17] Fazil, 7.
[18] Fazil, 4.
[19] Fazil, 4.

In much the same way, proper governance was tied to ideal subjects that were "active, energetic and industrious."[20] The notion of a return to an earlier time is significant in that it allowed Fazıl Pasha to counter arguments of the heretical *bid'at*, but there was an underlying principle that crashed onto the scene: *efkar-ı umumiye* (public opinion). Fazıl Pasha argued that the only thing to hold bureaucrats and Ottoman officials, i.e., those responsible for the empire's decline, accountable would be public opinion, which did not exist in the empire: "Because there is no public opinion in Turkey, the countless agents of Your Government that do not have to answer before such an opinion thereby irresponsibly come before [or, into the service of] Your Majesty."[21] The most viable model of public opinion, at least according to Fazıl Pasha, was a constitution grounded in the promises of liberty and equality among subjects regardless of race or creed, but he made very clear that this must be an Ottoman constitution "adapted to the mores, traditions and needs of Turkey."[22] Without such a transformation, Fazıl Pasha somberly argued, the Ottomans would be faced with the revolutions that had spread across Europe, particularly stressing the brutality of the French Revolution.

While it is not clear whether Fazıl Pasha was in contact with the Patriotic Alliance by this point, his letter made it into the hands of some of its members, who then set to work on printing it. Potentially 50,000 copies of this letter were distributed in the capital.[23] As it made its way to other cities and provinces, it made quite a stir. Fazıl Pasha's treatise seemingly lit a fire under the members of the Patriotic Alliance, whose writings began to increase in vehemency towards the Sublime Porte. Regardless of whether the Young Ottomans actually believed their writings would sway the sultan, then-grand vizier Ali Pasha was not slow to violently clamp down on the press, exiling and relocating numerous writers and bureaucrats; in this way, the Sublime Porte responded to their violence (attempting to prevent the present state of governing from continuing) with its own violence (imprisonment, banishment, assassination, etc.). When the purge reached Ali Suavi, Ziya Bey and Namık Kemal, they were invited to join Fazıl Pasha in Paris through an intermediary. All three were quick to snatch this opportunity, joining Ibrahim Şinasi, who had already taken up residence-in-exile there.

[20] Fazil, 17.
[21] Fazil, 5.
[22] Fazil, 18.
[23] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 208.

During their exile in 1867, the group began extensively writing for an Ottoman public from abroad under the new moniker of the *Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti* (New Ottoman Society), thought he extent of their actual influence is difficult to ascertain.[24] However, it is clear that the Sublime Porte made numerous attempts to halt their activities, which could simply be due to the impact they were having on foreigners, except for the fact that their works were often in Ottoman Turkish. The Sublime Porte was also harsh on internal discontent with the governing policies, so if nothing else, the Patriotic Alliance would have certainly been a perceived threat. It is also worth noting that some of them, particularly Namık Kemal, came to play predominant (or infamous, in the case of Ali Suavi) roles in imperial politics over the next few decades. Their claims to public opinion rested on the idea that the sultan was a leader rather than a ruler. Just a couple decades earlier, this suggestion would have been incoherent since the ambitions of the sultan were attached to a divine right to rule rather than the welfare of his subjects *as their representative*. This is a very articulate point in Fazıl Pasha's letter:

> Providence has not given you, as it did to your glorious ancestors, to be the founder of Ottoman power; however, it has reserved for you the insignificant favor of being able to be its regenerator. The voice of all good citizens, the voice of Your innumerable subjects, Muslims and Christians, uniting with mine.[25]

The future of the empire rested not in its territory or divine destiny but in its subjects. The Young Ottomans took the torch from Fazıl Pasha, yet this was not an ideological move, nor was it grounded solely in constitutionalism. The power relations that had been drastically realigned over previous decades – and the mechanisms this produced discussed in the previous chapter, i.e., (a) imperial codification, (b) collective imperial identity, (c) representative institutions and (d) the moralization of politics – set up conditions where this slowly came to be commonsensical. The sultan's *irade* ceased being an individual will and morphed into the desires and hopes of all his subjects, understood as public opinion; the sultan's fate was also the fate of the empire and its people. The sultan's paternalistic role subsequently led to a rather unique formula: a patriotic culture requires the sultan's benevolent guidance to foster its potential. This formula struck deep with the Ottoman public, and it gradually became possible to criticize governance by resorting to public opinion. The patriotism these intellectuals professed was not what later became

[24] Baykal, *Ottoman Press*, 13-42; Cyzgan, "Young Ottomans and Their"; Göçek, *Rise of Bourgeoisie, Demise*, 127-130, 117-137; Turnaoğlu, *Formation of Turkish Republicanism*, 56-83.
[25] Fazil, *Lettre du Prince Moustapha*, 18–19.

known as "Turkism" but was still solidly grounded in Ottomanism, i.e., the principles of equality, devotion, obedience and loyalty to state, anti-corruption and – in its new form – constitutionalism.[26] In the process, nonetheless, there was a politicization of character traits, which take on an moralistic dimension for both the Sublime Porte and the Young Ottomans. Turning our attention to the thoughts of the Young Ottomans who fled to the financial shelter of Fazıl Pasha, we can see how these power relations were developing into three revised strategical mechanisms: popular sovereignty, constitutional monarchy and representative government.

7.2.1 Popular Sovereignty

One commonality among the Young Ottomans was an assertion of popular sovereignty grounded in *efkar-ı umumiye* (public opinion). After all, Ibrahim Şinasi's controversial gazette that was shuttered in 1868 held the title *Tasvir-i Efkar* (Representation of Opinions).[27] The concept of public opinion was new to Ottoman discourse, largely being derived from its presence in Western literature, and it certainly came with its own unique streak of imperial Ottomanist influences. It was not simply a translation or adaptation, and differed greatly from European conceptsions at the time (such as that found in Marx). Ahmet Ersoy explains how for Ibrahim Şinasi, the emphasis on public opinion was centered on prioritizing the relationship between the sultan and his people, whereas earlier Tanzimat reformists had the notion that the state was the prime directive: a strong state would lead to the peace, prosperity and equality of all subjects (i.e., the Circle of Justice but built on a new foundation).[28] In a series of odes to the death of his former mentor Reşid Pasha, Şinasi makes an interesting connection between Reşid Pasha as the representative of the nation (*millet*), here meaning Ottomanism rather than a religious community, and the sultan as the representative of the state:

> Life, honor and property; the candles of our heart undimmed
> As your [Reşid Pasha's] justice is a globe, shielding it against tyranny's wind
>
> You liberated us, who were enslaved by oppression
> Around our necks, ignorance weighed like an iron chain
>
> A declaration of freedom for humanity, your law
> It lets the sultan know his place, your law.[29]

[26] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 221.
[27] Şinasi began to publish this gazette in 1862, but when he fled the empire in 1865, it was taken over by Namık Kemal. A year after the latter fled the empire, the journal was closed by the central government.
[28] Şinasi and Ersoy, "Odes," 191.
[29] Şinasi and Ersoy, 193.

Within this logic, Şinasi positions ignorance as the reason for oppression. Unlike the early Tanzimat reformers, nonetheless, Şinasi reverses the formula, making the state subservient to an enlightened public opinion. Public opinion had shifted from being the petty and often ignorant grievances of the peasants, the *rayas*, to one that could enlighten the Sublime Porte, that could add perspective and that would be, at the end of the day, the ultimate *raison d'état*. Rather than a rejection of the Circle of Justice, it was a redistribution of the roles (and the weight of those roles) in the Ottoman order of things. As Mardin surmises, Reşid Pasha never even discussed popular sovereignty in the Ottoman system, but this is largely because during the 1840s, it was simply not intelligible in the conditions of possibility at the time: "This was quite a logical appraisal of a system under which sovereignty had been held in trust for God by the sultan."[30] In fact, Reşid Pasha's underlying criticism of the Imperial Edict of 1856 was that it put the subjects of the empire above the empire itself.[31] This was not an isolated opinion. Cevdet Pasha, who was a more conservative centrist than Ali and Fuad Pasha, commented on the Imperial Edict of 1856 as such: "Many Moslems began to grumble: 'Today we lost our sacred national rights which our ancestors gained with their blood. While the Islamic nation used to be the ruling nation, it is now bereft of this sacred right. This is a day of tears and mourning for the Moslem brethren."[32] In light of this, public opinion took on a new significance when appropriated by the Young Ottomans, which reversed the equation of the *raison d'état*, the Circle of Justice.

Public opinion as popular sovereignty has come to be one of the topics most associated with the Young Ottomans, yet one must remember that we are talking about conditions of possibility, not ideologies. If it seems like these group of men were in agreement over what public opinion was or what role it should play in politics, then one would have a very inaccurate picture. Şinasi's version of public opinion was far more rooted in Western ideas, whereby there was a strong differentiation between public opinion and Islam. However, the others had a strikingly different interpretation. Namık Kemal discusses public opinion and the new means of communication, from transportation, to post, to literary output and an increase in literacy: "Twenty years ago, the fact that there were Moslems in Kaşgar was not known. Now, public opinion tries to obtain union with them. This inclination resembles an overpowering flood which will not

[30] Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 154.
[31] Çiçek, *Young Ottomans*, 113–114.
[32] As quoted in Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 18.

be stopped by any obstacle placed in its way."[33] Though this implies unity through Islam – and Namık Kemal unarguably leaned in that direction at times – it is more of a communion of Ottomanism, which not only combines grievances and the voice of the people into the conglomerate of public opinion but also acknowledges an equality of sorts between all subjects of the empire.

Even if these differences persisted, it was still a striking difference from Ali Pasha's tone towards popular sovereignty, which is nicely summed up in a passing comment he made to Cevdet Pasha in confidence, and which the latter made a private note about: "The Lord has entrusted the well-being of the state to five or six people. These should govern the fate of the state," with Cevdet Pasha adding that Fuad Pasha "was not as despotically inclined as Ali Pasha, [but] he also held similar opinions."[34] Nonetheless, public opinion found another ally: the *ulema*. After the Kuleli Incident in 1859, the *ulema's* influence in the capital had largely diminished. Public opinion was unique in that it gave them an option of speaking *for* the people rather than speaking *to* them. Mardin explains, "It is due to these factors that the Young Ottomans were able, for the first time, to gather the students of theology of Istanbul under the banner of such an essentially Western course as political representation. These were the same students who earlier had been used by obscurantist *ulema* to protest against reforms."[35] However, unlike the Young Ottomans, the *ulema* were not sympathetic to Western science, and the foundations of Islam were still attested to on the traditionalist and historical accounts from which they drew their legitimacy. The purpose of public opinion in this case, then, was strictly a version that elicited the legitimacy of speaking *for* the people of the empire, as a representative. This process occurred in a medium that was increasingly being tailored to make it more accessible and intelligible to a wider pool of people. The common theme that consequently runs through these accounts of popular sovereignty is representation. "Public opinion" became a political strategy allowing for one person or a group of people to speak on behalf of the population, regardless of whether they actually shared those sentiments. For now, it will do to refer to this emerging cluster of power relations – one that evolves into a *dispositif* –as *representative power*.

[33] As quoted in Mardin, 60 ff. 110.
[34] As quoted in Mardin, 111.
[35] Mardin, 221.

Perhaps the most notable – but certainly the most influential – version of this came out in Namık Kemal's presentation of *vatan* (homeland). The *vatan*, at least in the context discussed by the Young Ottomans and Namık Kemal in particular, constituted an intrinsic bond shared by the populations of the empire to the territory of the Ottoman Empire. In his famous play *Vatan yahud Silistre* (Homeland or Silistra), a fiery speech is given to a group of volunteer soldiers about to go into battle to protect the homeland:

> If the Danube goes, there is no fatherland. Wherever you dig on the banks of the Danube, a bone of your father or brother will be found. The land washed by the ripples of the Danube water is made up of the remnants of those who died fighting to protect it. Since the time when the name Ottoman was heard, the Danube was crossed several times, many times. But it was never conquered. While the Ottomans stand, it will not be taken once; if the Ottomans know what Ottoman patriotism is, it will never be taken. Are you ready to die for the fatherland?[36]

On the surface, this would seem to reiterate the importance of territorial integrity over the populations of the empire, yet something quite unique is happening here. The Ottoman lands only have significance to the extent that the populations which live on them have an internal bond to it. It is not simply territory, but territory with significance. It is not about the accumulation of territory but the preservation on a specific section of land. While this term became far more prominent in Namık Kemal's writings after the Young Ottoman period, it nevertheless was a concept he had already formulated to some extent:

> This, then, is the true nature of the Jeune Turquie [in French in the original text]. Some members of this intellectual society [the Patriotic Alliance] having begun to direct the newspapers appearing in the Ottoman language, have brought about a mighty change in literature, which is the primary vehicle of progress. If, from now on, its true natüre can be understood and it can profit, just as European journalism does, from the succor of the patrons of civilization, it is probable that it will accomplish great things for the fatherland.[37]

Thus, the notion of popular sovereignty, particularly one inclusive of public opinion, is not to argue that territory suddenly became useless for the Ottomans; it did not. Instead, a new interpretation was put forward whereby the importance of territory only made sense to the extent of its connection to Ottoman inhabitants. While still a peripheral term during the 1860s, the notion of *vatan* would come to be significant by the time of the Young Turks decades later and even incorporated into the republican system after 1923. It was

[36] As quoted in Methodieva, "Muslim Culture, Reform," 208.
[37] As quoted in Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 37.

the manner in which territory became conceivable within a system based on popular sovereignty over dynastic rule.

7.2.2 Constitutional Monarchy

From a contemporary perspective, it is often difficult to grasp why the Young Ottomans, who amassed an almost cult-like following by emphasizing equality and public opinion, were simultaneously staunch defenders of a constitutional *monarchy*. For this, one must understand the relationship between the Young Ottomans and the Sublime Porte while resisting transposing European ideologies in an inappropriate context. The Young Ottomans saw the bureaucracy of the Sublime Porte as irreversibly corrupt. In this vein, Namık Kemal rhetorically asked:

> Is it Prussia who looted our treasury and brought the Ottoman economy to bankruptcy? Is it France who prevented us from establishing modern schools and educating our youth? Is it Russia who promulgates the firmans and enforces our laws? No, it is the Porte that is solely responsible for every abuse and evil practice that is carried out in our country and for each disaster that falls upon our people.[38]

While the Tanzimat reformers received the brunt of their criticisms, the wrongdoings of the imperial government were perceived as longstanding. This was not merely a passing phase but had been written in the annals of Ottoman history. Ziya Bey takes on the decline of the Ottoman Empire in this way:

> The Turkish [Osmanli] virtues old are all, alack, undone;
> The ancient Turkish zeal abideth in ne'er an one;
> The Turkish glory of yore is past away and gone;
> The Turkish State is come into such a plight that none
> The signs and portents sad of approaching doom can see.[39]

The decline of the empire was attributed to a lack of compatriotism and Ottomanism – derived from the new *régime of savoir* that had been established in recent decades (see section three of previous chapter) – but it is clear that these qualities once existed, or so the Young Ottomans argued. Being composed of journalists, poets and amateur historians, the group of Young Ottomans consistently engaged with history. Much in the same way that the Tanzimat government had utilized history to produce the image of a golden age to return to, the Young Ottomans were interested in learning precisely when

[38] As quoted in Çiçek, *Young Ottomans*, 151.
[39] As quoted in Gibb, *History of Ottoman Poetry V*, 108.

the Ottoman government went astray and why.[40] Only then could they discover how to revitalize and regenerate these institutions. However, the accuracy of the Young Ottomans' historical accounts is dubious at best by modern standards. Why then did history take up such a prominent spot for the Young Ottomans? The most direct answer is that, in order to establish the legitimacy of public opinion, they had to go back to find their precedents in an Ottoman past. For instance, the notion of "consultation," which had been building up with the Tanzimat's widespread implementation of elected councils and representative bodies, was rooted in Islam and not European Enlightenment philosophies. However, Namık Kemal saw the foundation of consultation, which is representative of the voice of the people, i.e., public opinion, as being destroyed with the *janissaries*:

> The Ottoman Empire was governed by the will of the community, a form of constitutionalism, so to speak, until the destruction of the Janissaries. The people themselves assumed the right to administer, which they would delegate to parliament…The Janissaries were the armed consultative assembly of the people.[41]

History provided a foundation on which to build the claims of the Young Ottomans and make them intelligible to an Ottoman public. This was, after all, how the sultan derived his legitimacy (see chapter 5, section 1), as did the Tanzimat reformers and the *ulema* (see chapter 6, section 2).

The target of their grievances, therefore, was not the position of the sultan but the bureaucrats who had surrounded the sultan, portraying a malicious politics of whispering in the sultan's ear. Namık Kemal stated his opinions very directly: "The sultan has never refused to do anything that has been required of him which would be of profit for the people."[42] The sultan properly represented public opinion, but he was not able to heed to public opinion if it was blocked and censored by self-interested and ignorant reformists. The Young Ottomans were very clear as to why the Tanzimat reformers, and the state apparatus itself, had been so destructive to the future of the empire: selfishness and ignorance. The consistent accusation of bureaucrats being "ignorant" of the needs of the empire reverses the formula presented at the beginning of the Tanzimat. Early models of Ottomanism were reliant on a form of pastoralism (expanded upon in the next section) rooted in guidance rather than subjection, and the justification for doing so was to educate

[40] This was also a strategy that was deployed by a variety of minority communities throughout the empire during the nineteenth century, many of which were very powerful in producing a national consciousness.
[41] As quoted in Sönmez, "From Kanun-ı Kadim," 123.
[42] As quoted in Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 108.

"ignorant" masses and to justify rather domineering social engineering policies. For the Young Ottomans, it was the reformers who are ignorant and in need of guidance, particularly from an enlightened public opinion.

> The Muslim millet has put up with injustice…It was the Muslim millet who shed their blood to conquer this country, it is the Muslim Ottomans who have been defending the sultanate and keeping Islam in the throne of the Empire, and it is again the Muslims who have been enduring all kind of degradation, insult and misery for the sake of their non-Muslim countrymen's happiness and welfare although they are the majority and also superior in all respects.[43]

Even the sultan's inactivity in key imperial matters was portrayed as bureaucrats keeping the sultan ignorant to public opinion. Ali Suavi made similar comments, spotlighting the Young Ottomans' favorite scapegoat: Ali Pasha:

> The murder of the oppressor and his assistants is "helal" in Islam, and Âli Paşa is the oppressor of our day. We have no doubt about the religious faithfulness of our sultan but he has to open his eyes to the detestable commitments of his infidel minister. We also expect the public to wake up and take a stand.[44]

Thus, a form of constitutional monarchy is presented as the basis of appropriate representation. One even sees this in Namık Kemal's *vatan*. However, an Ottoman constitution should not be "adapted from European laws and regulations, without taking national morals and traditions into consideration"; in other words, the proposed constitution was not only a constitutional monarchy, but it required an Ottoman composure to effectively regulate the domains of the empire.[45] A great portion of this had to do with inverting existent political formulas. The masses were no longer ignorant but the voice of reason. The sultan was no longer the infallible spokesperson of Allah; he was subservient to the law of the people – popular sovereignty through public opinion – who had the capacity to guide him to making the best choices for the empire, whereby "public opinion [is] in effect the sovereign [governing] through the people's representatives."[46]

In one rather cryptic passage, Ziya Bey uses poetry to ironically portray this situation, using a quote from Nedim Pasha to illustrate that, though the bureaucrats of the central government say they speak for the people, they likewise have led the empire astray by asking blind obedience:

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[43] As quoted in Çiçek, *Young Ottomans*, 154.
[44] As quoted in Çiçek, 155.
[45] As quoted in Hanioğlu, *Brief History of Late*, 112.
[46] As quoted in Hanioğlu, 112.

> At length, Ziya, shall joy beam forth, and grief an end shall find,
> But yet, O man, these ever enter Fortune's feast combined.
> This hidden mystery learn thou, by Mahmüd Beg defined,
> Who has the secret of the same within this verse enshrined:
>
> "Our coming to this world is one; man must reflect, survey;
> Care must one banish, and look out for calm and quiet aye.[47]

While the reformists argued of the ignorance of the *rayas* classes and the masses, Ziya uses juxtaposition to pose a question about the representation of the public. While reflecting and contemplating on the "woes" of the empire is stressed throughout the poem, it is public opinion that actually does this, in contrast to the selfishness rampant in the Ottoman government. Yet, the sultan retains his newfound role of being a guider rather than a ruler, functioning now as a circular notion for representative power: public opinion enlightens and nurtures the sultan's ability to lead, and the sultan's ability to lead provides the basis for an improved version of public opinion. What is being put forward by the Patriotic Alliance is not a concept but a relationship, a dual relationship, built on the sultan representing the people and the people representing the sultan. Up until this point in our analysis, this relationship involves (a) popular sovereignty and (b) constitutional monarchy, yet the mechanisms of representation were further incorporated into this network of power relations.

7.2.3 Representative Government

The Young Ottomans almost unilaterally display great affection and gratitude to Reşid Pasha, who had a big role in many of their own careers. Perhaps this was because many of them sympathized with Reşid Pasha's ideals set out in the Gülhane, and his later explanation of how "equality" among subjects of the empire was misconstrued, as it was "only intended to introduce a complete security of life, property and honor of individuals and regulate the internal and military expenditures of the Porte," i.e., to reestablish the Circle of Justice.[48] This was a key distinction picked up on by the Young Ottomans, who professed a difference between "equality in rights" and "equality in honours"; whereas equality in rights implied "equals before the law" not being discriminated against on the basis of race or creed, equality in honors meant "subjects would be equal in terms of wealth, status and prestige."[49] Trying to accomplish both types of freedom would

[47] Gibb, *Ottoman Literature*, 191.
[48] Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 157.
[49] Çiçek, *Young Ottomans*, 118–119.

inevitably lead to an increase in frictions between ethnic and religious groups, so equality in honors must be abandoned and equality in rights must be pursued. The deliverance of equality in rights would stabilize and pacify the peoples of the empire, which did not require equality in honors. Namık Kemal explains how such an arrangement was bound to breed patriotism through successful governance: "If we cause non-Muslims to love the country through good administration, they will make good citizens and be ready to shed their blood in defending their fatherland. Thus we will not only establish a brotherhood between the two creeds but also save the Muslim population from becoming extinct."[50]

This distinction was critical for the Young Ottomans, and they went to extensive lengths to illustrate how any evocation of equality in rights would be the demise of the empire. For instance, Ziya Pasha, calling to mind the Edict of Gülhane, directly professes that non-Muslim sects can never be equal to Muslims in rank, only in rights:

> In the latest Red Book, the Porte shamelessly presents the principle of equality as a novelty that was introduced by the reform decrees…as if they had never read a book on Islamic law or on the history of Islamic civilization. They assert that after the Gülhane Rescript, the discriminatory measures against non-Muslims were abandoned and the question of inequality between the two creeds was resolved. Such a statement of ignorance deserves only to be laughed at![51]

From the perspective of Muslims in the empire, particularly the *rayas*, the non-Muslim *millets* continued to have political privileges that Muslims lacked. One particular sore spot was the role of foreign consulates throughout the empire, which would interfere in domestic disputes and provide resources to non-Muslims, as Namık Kemal argued:

> Non-Muslims, under the patronage of their European coreligionists, obtain anything they ask for! Nevertheless the Europeans continue to complain that non-Muslims have been oppressed under the Ottoman rule. Because they believe that without a parliament and public control over the government, no right can be properly exercised.[52]

While these estimations are largely exaggerated, similar arguments are made on the fact that non-Muslims were not required to do military service (and thus not put their lineage on the line). The most traditionalist of the group, Ali Suavi, stressed this point immensely, and his background could explain this quite a bit. Unlike his associates, he came from a very modest family and went through a traditional education. Even before he fled the empire, he had a poor reputation among the Sublime Porte as a very critical Islamic

[50] As quoted in Çiçek, 125.
[51] As quoted in Çiçek, 117.
[52] As quoted in Çiçek, 116.

rhetorician, giving fiery sermons in mosques throughout the empire. Arguing against the threatening vision of Russia or England interfering in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire and its people, Ali Suavi made the argument that Europe and Russia had set up two conditions; if transgressed in the slightest, these conditions would give them an upper hand in intervening in Ottoman affairs:

> The Russians and the English dominate the Muslims, not with indifference, but with calculation, artifice. Because they deeply studied the art of dominating these peoples. So they say from experience: 1st that we must not touch the Muslim religion; 2nd that the civil rights of Muslims must be upheld in the courts with full justice.[53]

One facet of the Young Ottomans' tenure was not simply an appropriation of Western ideas but instead a process of Ottomanizing these concepts or deriving them from Ottoman or Islamic theory. Suavi is thus adamantly attacking Western intervention in the domestic affairs of Ottoman development. Just because "equality" in the Ottoman Empire did not correlate with "equality" in Europe did not make it wrong.

Even the more Islamic Ali Suavi was still devoutly committed to the idea of Ottomanism that pertained to equality in rights rather than equality in honors. Though often intertwining public opinion and Islam, he was also sure – almost to the point of contradiction at times – to include non-Muslims in his Ottomanism: "All the populations which today compose the Ottoman Empire constitute only one nationality: the Osmanli."[54] This sentiment is even clearer in Namık Kemal's *vatan*: "If the Lord had created the mind of man [on the model of] the multiplication table, his conscience like a geometric measure, it would have been impossible for such concepts as 'the nation,' 'the fatherland' [*vatan*] or 'family' to exist."[55] In this respect, representation was tightly woven into the Young Ottomans' account of representation. If all subjects of the empire were *Osmanli*, or at least had the potential to be *Osmanli*, then public opinion served as the basis for political representation: public opinion was the voice of *Osmanlis*. Given the strong admiration these intellectuals had for Reşid Pasha, it should come as no surprise then when Şinasi situated Reşid Pasha as the embodiment of the representation of public opinion as he was the "representative appointed for the obtainment of the people's well-

[53] Suavi, *Khiva en mars 1873*, 15.
[54] As quoted in Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 222.
[55] As quoted in Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 327.

being."[56] However, under the dominance of Ali and Fuad Pashas, any representation of public opinion – of the will of the people – evaporated.

The directions of government and public opinion were evolving along opposite trajectories, so the Ottoman government was not frequently cast as the representative of the wishes of the people. As Kemal made notably clear:

> Since to thus consider government and the people two opposites running counter to each other, just as the currents of the Bosphorus flow in opposite directions, is a conception which has such a bad effect on the political situation and on public opinion as to make it completely undesirable.[57]

In many respects, a new division appeared between the voice of the people and the voice of the government, and these did not intrinsically align. What is entirely novel in the writings of the Young Ottomans, then, is the imposition of two separate though complexly interlinked wills: the sultan's will, his *irade*, was the force that drove the government, whereas public opinion constituted the will of the people. In order for successful governance, these two needed to be brought into unity. Failure to do so would lead to a collapse of the sultan's new pastoral role, as Namık Kemal explained:

> If the preachers, instead of theologizing in the Mosques would apply themselves to teach subjects which would be of use in both this world and the next, and [thus] contribute to guarantee the life of the nation, lots of misconceptions on this subject which are present in public opinion, would be eliminated.[58]

In this way, Islam is undermined as the *raison d'état*, but it does not disappear. Instead, it is compartmentalized, subsumed under the domains of public opinion. Put bluntly, Islam goes from being *the* predominant factor in determining the sultan's *irade* to *one particular*, though highly prevalent, factor; in the process, it becomes subjugated to public opinion, the true representative of the will of the people. In this respect, public opinion constitutes three key dynamics in this emerging relationship: (a) popular sovereignty, (b) constitutional monarchy and (c) representation as the will of the people.

* * *

Public opinion had become the cornerstone of Ottoman legitimacy by the end of the 1860s, yet it was dispersed among a field of strategic interpretations. Unlike the early Tanzimat reformers, the attribution of ignorance and selfishness to the masses was turned

[56] As quoted in Mardin, *Genesis of Young Ottoman*, 274.
[57] As quoted in Mardin, 306.
[58] As quoted in Mardin, 322.

on its head, and these politicized characteristics were brought into the workings of the central government. The sultan's will was still seen as pure and good-intentioned, but there is a separation between the will of public opinion and that of the sultan, and if these are not put in accord, it could ultimately lead to the destruction of the empire. The Circle of Justice now equally required the attention of the masses and the sultanate, almost equally at times. Though the Young Ottomans were wont to throw these accusations at Ottoman bureaucrats, the bureaucrats were using this same discursive practice. One such case was Hayreddin Pasha's 1868 treatise *Réformes nécessaires aux états musulmans*. Not only was this work praised by Ali Pasha himself, but by the end of the 1870s, Hayreddin would even serve as the grand vizier.[59] Hayreddin Pasha commences his text by specifying that, after looking at the history at hand both in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere, the downfall of the state of the empire can be attributed to the *ulema*'s ignorance of what is going on in the country. He then argued that massive reforms were necessary to correct the direction of the empire:

> Most of our *ulemas*, who are invested with the twofold mission of safeguarding the spiritual as well as material interests of our theocratic law and of developing the successive application of these, by an intelligent interpretation and in accordance with the needs of the times, show little concern to comprehend the internal affairs of their country, and being completely ignorant of what happens in others, they find themselves consequently, without it being necessary to demonstrate it, the impossibility of properly fulfilling their temporal mission.[60]

The primary flaw of the *ulema* becomes their unruliness, rooted in ignorance and disobedience. Yet, this account is grounded in the need to consider (a) popular sovereignty to the extent that it was necessary in guiding the (c) will of the sultan, which could be accomplished through (b) a constitutional monarchy, or rather the sultan's consultation with his knowledgeable subjects. Pastoral elements are also present here, yet it is interesting that it was being more and more associated with bureaucrats in general, not simply the sultan. Because of this, Heyreddin refers to such reformers and scholars as the "doctors of the nation," i.e., the will of the people: "Or, is it admissible that those who are destined to be the doctors of the nation be ignorant of the nature of evil, or that they only take glory from being introduced to the highest principles of science, but not their application?"[61] Patriotism had to be harnessed through the state's procurement of liberties

[59] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 230.
[60] Khérédine, *Réformes nécessaires Aux états*, 4.
[61] Khérédine, 4.

and protections to all its subjects, regardless of creed or race. Yet, if the central government was going to represent the interests of these people, it would require their cooperation and assistance:

> Another extremely important provision, which at the same time constitutes one of the fundamental principles of the law, is the obligation to oppose evil by all legal means, formally imposed on all adult Muslims who enjoy all his intellectual faculties. It is from this crucial provision that the legitimacy and necessity arises for all of us to direct the behavior of public acts.[62]

What emerges is a struggle to dominate this relationship of public opinion. Multiple positions struggling for the upper hand by trying to frustrate or prevent (i.e., using violence) the strategies of counter-positions. As such, the nexuses of violence begin to realign around these rising clusters of power relations around public opinion (popular sovereignty, constitutional monarchy, representative wills). On the one hand, the Young Ottomans raged against the Sublime Porte's centralized exclusivity, yet these Tanzimat reformers critiqued both the Young Ottomans and the *ulema*. These are various subject positions using the same discursive formation that frames what is conceivable and what is permissible in discourse. While reformists like Heyreddin (and Ali and Fuad Pashas) wanted the *ulema* to play a lesser role in politics, the *ulema* had been critical of this stance and sought to reassert their previous power. Some reformists were sympathetic to this, such as Cevdet Pasha, who had been a member of the *ulema* himself. The task became to delegitimate one's political opponents with the means available, but in the process, a revised model of *irade* emerges: the will of the sultan and the will of the people. In order to unite these wills, the populations of the empire – and the sultan as well – had to be properly *guided*, as Heyreddin makes clear:

> I want to awaken the patriotism of the Muslim scholars and statesmen, and to urge them to help each other in the intelligent choice of the most effective means to improve the state of the Islamic nation, to increase and develop the elements of its civilization, increase public wealth, through the development of agriculture, trade and industry, and to establish above all, as a main basis, a good system of government from which confidence is born, which in turn produces perseverance in efforts and gradual improvement in all things.[63]

If the Circle of Justice was brought into agreement under these conditions, the empire would prosper; if kept in disaccord, it would collapse. This came to heighten the role of the pastoral network, which one might call *imamic leadership* (as distinguished from

[62] Khérédine, 16.
[63] Khérédine, 7–8.

pastoral leadership predominant in Western Europe). The question now became who these "doctors of the nation" would be. To answer that, one must turn to the construction of another mechanism that was being formulated at the same time through an intense struggle, but in a very different context: provincial government, which will be addressed in the following section. When these two mechanisms finally become united in the 1870s – along with some chance events – it becomes possible to conceive of an Ottoman constitution, discussed in the third section of this chapter.

7.3 The Pragmatism of Representation: Provincial Administration and Professional Bureaucrats

At the beginning of the Tanzimat, a great deal had been invested in education, the expansion of administrative duties, establishing a bureaucratic class, propagating a sentiment of Ottomanism and expanding the central government's reach into the provinces (see chapters 5 and 6). The result of this reorganization led to the rise of a new type of bureaucrat, one who entered into the system and was assigned to work in the provinces. In the case of Ahmed Şefik Midhat Pasha and many like him, this resulted in practical experience with administrative procedures and with the limits of regional governance and inter-religious strife. On the one hand, disgruntled imperial officials (e.g., the Young Ottomans) were increasingly exposed to Western ideas and, in turn, transformed those European concepts into Ottoman ones rooted in representation, which ultimately led to the strategy of public opinion. On the other hand, a separate group of young Tanzimat bureaucrats were sent to provincial positions, gaining first-hand experience of the Tanzimat's policies. Oftentimes, these bureaucrats were ill-prepared for the rigors provincial life offered, such as constant relocation. After the deaths of Fuad and Ali Pashas, the grand vizierate was reallocated seven times over the next four years (1871-1875). Each grand vizier would be certain to shuffle around provincial assignments in their favor *to prevent* these officials from accruing too much political influence. The situation only worsened when the sultan decided to make such shuffles arbitrarily, which was not uncommon. A passage from Davison's *Reform in the Ottoman Empire* skillfully captures this:

> "The utmost confusion prevails in every department of the State," observed the British ambassador, "the transaction of even the most ordinary routine business having become almost impossible." His judgment was confirmed on all sides. Leading political figures, each ambitious

> for self, formed parties of one or ad hoc combinations to oust who ever was in office. "Every new Grand Vizier pulls down so far as possible all that his predecessor had built up," said Cyrus Hamlin, who had seen thirty years of Ottoman politics. "These changes have all been from sheer caprice. It disorganizes the administration of government in all its departments. It makes the provincial governors and judges perfectly rapacious. Knowing they will soon be changed they make hay while the sun shines."[64]

Davison further highlights one provincial governor who complained about these constant relocations: "'I have been at Egin six months,' said a kaymakam [district governor] in 1877. 'I may be dismissed at any moment. What inducement is there for a man to try and improve the conditions of the people when all his work may be upset by his successor?'"[65]

While success as a provincial governor was still a remote possibility, it was not impossible. The system that had been established to train professional and experienced bureaucrats had finally come to fruition. As this generation of young bureaucrats set out into the Ottoman domains, they were greeted with intense resistance, insufficient financial resources, indignant local populations, inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict, tax revolts, collapsing infrastructure – if there was any infrastructure at all, that is – foreign intervention and nationalist movements (as this section will detail). With the political practice of constantly being shifted throughout the empire, it should come as no surprise that many provincial governors, of no fault of their own, simply were not up to the task (although there are numerous cases where these officials were entirely culpable). Yet, under the right circumstances, the central government had a rapidly expanding and influential bureaucratic apparatus and, if necessitated, financial resources to contribute to such projects, whereby the provincial officials were capable of performing their duties. Such were the circumstances Midhat Pasha found himself in, and his success catapulted his political career.[66]

When an uprising occurred in Nish in the Danube in late-1860 and early-1861, Midhat Pasha was dispatched to the region to deal with what was increasingly becoming known as the "Bulgarian Question." Embracing the core principles of Ottomanism and working on implementing such a system in the provinces, Midhat Pasha showed an

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[64] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 292.
[65] Davison, 168–169.
[66] The rest of the chapter is strongly inspired from the unique text published by Midhat Pasha's son, Ali Haydar Midhat, and published under the title *The Life of Midhat Pasha*. In writing the book, Haydar Midhat relied on correspondences, notes and information from his father. In order to supplement or check these matters, I have relied on primary documents from an array of sources, whether correspondences, laws, texts or the constitution as well as secondary texts and regional studies of the time.

aversion to deploying military forces to quell uprisings – though he was strict in putting them down. Instead, he sought *to prevent* these issues using other means. For this reason, he divided problems into two main points to satisfy based on meetings with Bulgarian representatives.[67] First, he had to deal with the security problems that were ravaging the Danube province. He cracked down on high-ranking officers abusing their position, used provincial resources to pay some malcontent soldiers' backpay, improved the terrible conditions of the military barracks and arrested Serbian and local bandits *en masse*. Once the security threats had been pacified, he moved onto issues preventing social and economic development: he installed a system of roads and bridges – patrolled by security forces – to assist with transportation, established a program to aid and assimilate refugees, mostly Muslim, from former Ottoman territories, formed a credit union for farmers so that they did not have to borrow from land owners at scathing interest rates and established inter-religious councils that predominantly addressed the grievances of non-Muslim communities as well as an inter-religious schools.[68]

Midhat Pasha's governorship of the Tuna Province was nevertheless both a curse and a blessing. It is not likely that Midhat Pasha drew much pleasure from having to deal with rebellions, yet the fact that it was one of the most troublesome provinces in the empire also meant it was one of the best funded. While Midhat Pasha dealt with open acts of rebellion swiftly, the strategy behind this had been used in the empire for centuries and was thus nothing novel.[69] However, Midhat's role in regenerating the province, in line with the precepts stipulated in the Tanzimat documents, was a relationship of pastoral – or rather *imamic* – leadership that was totally revolutionary. Not only was the imperial government concerned with putting out dissent wherever it might flare up, but it now actively sought to remedy the conditions that led to dissent in the first place. At the same time, Russia's campaign to harness pan-Slavic sentiments in the Balkans, which had generated one of the strongest clandestine nationalist communities within the empire, was not solely dealt with through military intervention. The ideology was attacked at a provincial level. Due to the success of Midhat Pasha's reform in Nish – although systemic problems persisted, it was comparably successful to other provinces – he was recalled to the capital in 1864 to assist Cevdet and Fuad Pashas on the 1864 Vilayet Law. Upon its completion, it was decided that Midhat Pasha would oversee the provincial reforms in the

[67] Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, 35–36.
[68] Midhat, 36–37.
[69] Midhat, 40–47.

newly established Tuna *Vilayet* as a sort of experiment that could, if efficacious, be expanded throughout the empire.

Midhat Pasha thus found himself provincial governor yet again of one of the Ottoman Empire's most sensitive regions from 1864 to 1868. With his experience from his governorship of Nish, his strong personal commitment to the Ottomanism and his first-hand knowledge of the objectives of the new *vilayet* law, Midhat Pasha set to work on instituting and expanding many of the projects he had implemented just a few years before. He established a system of *imece* (collective labor), which was meant to assist in agricultural development; knowing that the Sublime Porte would not be able to finance a credit union in the same way it had in Nish due to the larger scale of the province, Midhat Pasha formulated a plan whereby plots of uncultivated land were provided by the central government, for which the local inhabitants worked and inadvertently sowed the profits. The money from the crop yield was put into a cooperative fund overseen by a mixed council of Muslims and non-Muslims that would lend to farmers at infinitesimally small interest rates for the time.[70] Interestingly, Midhat Pasha also compiled a document stating the twenty principles that represented the purpose of the credit union, much like the constitution he would help write in just over a decade.[71]

While this dealt with agriculture, it was far from sufficient for all the subjects of the province, particularly those living in cities and villages. To accommodate this, Midhat Pasha set up a fund (*emanet sandığı*), with the backing of the Sublime Porte, to sell money bonds to subjects that would be returned with interest within a year; the money from this project was further used to finance loans to *rayas* farmers.[72] A system was likewise put in place by which subjects themselves would be required to work on infrastructure projects, such as roads and bridges, for a limited number of days each year and receive a nominal, primarily symbolic reimbursement for their efforts – since the *corvée* system of forced labor had been banned earlier in the Tanzimat – which greatly contributed to provincial infrastructure in the region but raised discontentment among the subjects forced to do it.[73] As transportation became easier in the region, Midhat Pasha suggested hiring government employees who would exclusively work on building and repairing infrastructure, which would diminish the dissatisfaction this system had on locals; he also

[70] Çelik, "Tanzimat in Balkans," 59–60.
[71] Çelik, 59–60.
[72] Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, 47.
[73] Midhat, 38–39.

helped found a company for transporting goods and cargo as well as a factory that would build carriages for such use.[74] Midhat Pasha enlarged the capacity of transportation by water, purchasing steam boats for the increasingly important Danube River, and began work on a railroad network.[75] Once regional transportation was improved, it became practical to invest in a civil-oriented telegraph system in the province. The telegraph system had already been introduced in the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War, but its intention was to give the Ottoman Empire a military and political advantage, and it was limited to certain regions of the empire. However, Midhat Pasha saw the utility this would provide for trade, commerce and agriculture, and thus set to work on improving means of communication.

Education was also a key factor in these reforms. If the empire was to develop industrially, it needed educated and trained artisans and workers. Midhat Pasha built a plethora of schools, encouraged mixed Muslim and non-Muslim as well as (segregated) male and female education in state schools and built schools exclusively for impoverished orphan and refugee children.[76] Education was enforced to such a degree that local gazettes began emphasizing the punishment for not sending children to school: "If children above the ages of five or six, in other words, if little male and female children are not sent to school instead of being allowed to be idle, and if older ones are not sent either to schools or for vocational training, the parents will be held responsible."[77] In addition to the expansion of the schooling system, the central government also wished to enlighten and educate adults outside of the administration, so they made plans to establish a printing house in every province in the hopes of it disseminating information to a wider group of subjects; this would simultaneously allow the central government supplementary means to dissuade against the spread of Russia's pan-Slavic ideology, meaning many printing houses, such as the one started under Midhat Pasha's provincial governorship, maintained the ability to print in multiple alphabets and enhanced the central government's capacity to communicate with its subjects.[78] The achievements made during Midhat Pasha's tenure were so successful that Sultan Abdülaziz visited the province on his return from his

[74] Çelik, "Tanzimat in Balkans," 64–65.
[75] Çelik, 66–67. For Midhat Pasha's work on transportation as the *vali* of Baghdad, see Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, 50–52.
[76] Çelik, "Tanzimat in Balkans," 77–79.
[77] As quoted in Çelik, 82.
[78] Çelik, 83–88.

European trip in 1867, praising the progress and becoming confident enough to expand reforms.

Stretching back to before the Edict of Gülhane, the concentration on leading rather than ruling was increasingly becoming the prominent trope of imperial governance. When united with the emerging idea of *Osmanlılık*, this strategy relied on indebting the population to the empire in exchange for loyalty and subservience. Instead of a bond of allegiance that was set up through the sultanic Circle of Justice, it was now metamorphizing into an ambition to procure loyalty rather than expect it. The codification of imperial tasks made this possible for the first time. Midhat Pasha's career may have been unparalleled, but his strategy was not: loyalty through representing the interests of the population. The empire's intervention in the day-to-day lives of its subjects – whether through education, industry, finances, literacy, presses, the housing of refugees, communication, transportation, etc. – gave it a pastoral element, yet this was distinctly Ottoman. It required accounting for cultural and linguistic differences between *millets* and local cultures on an unparalleled scale. Aside from this, it was contingent upon determining what was in the population's best interest, even if they may not "know" they needed that. In order to distinguish this from the more systematic and uniform styles of pastoral power in Europe, such as those discussed by Foucault himself, I refer to this as *imamic leadership* (or imamic power). This strategy became a vital compenent of the representative *dispositif* going forward, though it rarely reached actualization during this stage (the 1860s) due to financial deficiencies, a lack of training and an unaccountable empire bureaucracy. Nevertheless, when the pieces of the puzzle did come together, it often resulted in economic prosperity, increased security and more peaceful conditions among local inhabitants. While this technique was being employed in the provincial administrations at the time – or at least attempted to be put into place – it would slowly make its way up the political ladder over the latter 1860s and 1870s before being incorporated into imperial institutions throughout the empire for the rest of the Ottoman Empire and into the Turkish Republic. In this way, two new mechanisms were constructed during this time: (1) public opinion and (b) imamic leadership.

* * *

Fuad Pasha's death in 1869 began a spiral of political chaos within the empire, which is illustrated in the twists and turns of Midhat Pasha's career as well: a slow transformation from a bureaucratic to a political official – perhaps even the first "politician," considering

his popularity and the leverage that gave him. After the death of Ali Pasha, Mahmud Nedim Pasha took the grand vizierate in 1871. Nedim Pasha was the epitome of the old system. Spiteful of Midhat's popularity among all groups of society, he also knew Midhat Pasha was critical of his close relationship to Sultan Abdülaziz – Nedim was particularly skillful in flattery, a quality Abdülaziz personally admired greatly.[79] While the Young Ottoman-era had initiated a discursive formation around public opinion, Midhat Pasha was the embodiment of this new sentiment. He had, after all, been socialized and indoctrinated into a system where these were the fundamental pillars of the state, and his eventual relationship with the Young Ottomans – if it did not exist already – illustrated a desire to nourish patriotism. If Midhat Pasha was the imam looking after his flock (*rayas*), Nedim represented the wolf in sheep's clothing. In one poem entitled "Osmanli," Ziya Bey evoked this thematic political trope:

> Since that the Lord hath made of me thy slave for aye and aye,
> Where'er thou treadest it were meet my face and eyes I lay.
> Be not deceived by rivals' craft, but heed the words I say.
>
> Come, join the flock, my little lamb, the wolf might seize on thee:
> Parted at last from my dear love, my little one, thou'lt be.[80]

Ali and Fuad had left a system in place that should not, for all intents and purposes, have fallen apart so readily and quickly, but beginning with Nedim Pasha's grand vizierate, it did. Out of the urgency of this collapse, the formation of power relations began to establish a network of power-knowledge for the discourse of the Ottoman bureaucracy.

A significant portion of the criticisms directed at Nedim Pasha, as well as the string of grand viziers that replaced him, were aimed at personal dispositions, with anecdotal, financial and moral evidence given as a testament to his evil character (i.e., the moralization of politics). To be fair, many of these criticisms were accurate, some even underemphasizing the extent to which these bureaucrats were affecting Ottoman politics. Nedim Pasha, an envious grand vizier, sought to consolidate power – as so many grand vizierates after the deaths of Fuad and Ali – and part of this involved attempting to derail Midhat Pasha's popularity. In the traditional system, this logic very probably would have worked. However, in the era of the Tanzimat and bureaucratic expansion, Midhat Pasha's commitment to *Osmanlılık* made him popular wherever he went, even among groups that

[79] Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, 33–35.
[80] Gibbs translates "Osmanli" as "Turki" (Gibb, *History of Ottoman Poetry V*, 95).

were more reluctant to reforms, such as key members of the *ulema* and other non-Muslim elites. In this respect, Midhat Pasha proclaimed, "There should no longer be any Muslims or Christians, Turks, Greeks, Armenians or Syrians, but only Ottomans."[81] Midhat employed the new capabilities available to him as a result of (a) power relations around a specific Ottoman approach to imamic governance and (b) the emergence of a "public will," or public opinion, which allowed Midhat to stand as a representative *of* the people but *within* the central government. The role of provincial officials thus took on a layer of complexity: whereas before, all officials were sent as representatives of the Sublime Porte, they were increasingly viewed either as a voice for the local populations or as corrupt officials misrepresenting the people and fooling the central government. Nedim Pasha, who shared close council with the sultan, criticized the shortcomings of provincial governorship, blaming such acts on Midhat Pasha's ignorance for the task.[82] Though provincial governorship as a whole was in utter shambles – a failure in the Foucauldian sense – the process of punishing Midhat Pasha by sending him to the most conflict-ridden regions likewise meant he was better able to finance local improvements. Even if these were not further developed, the fact that this became a responsibility of the government on behalf of the subjects of the empire is quintessential. Nedim and Midhat Pashas' political positions were judged by their personal characteristics, which were determined to be qualities representative of or against the public: the moralization of politics meeting public opinion. For the first time, one's political capabilities are tied to the kind of person they *represent* – and thus the kind of person they *are*.

The notorious Russian ambassador Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatyev noticed the character of Nedim Pasha and subsequently began a long parade of flattery and bribery, which not only left the Ottoman Empire exposed to Russian incursions, but it also struck a chord with anti-Russian sentiments, most predominantly from the Muslims of the empire.[83] The Crimean War and the prelude to the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) sent thousands of Muslim refugees fleeing from the Balkans, bringing tales of Christian pogroms and massacres with them.[84] Even outside of wartime mobilization, Russian

[81] Ganem, *Journal de debats*, 17 January 1881, 3.
[82] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 167.
[83] Clark, "Ottoman Diplomacy and Hegemonic"; Gülseven, "Rethinking Russian Pan-Slavism"; Ković, "Great Britain and Consular."
[84] For more information of the precarious situation of refugees during this period, see Chatty, "Refugees, Exiles and Other"; Deal, "War Refugees and Violence"; Popek, "Bulgarian Migrations and End"; Rusin, "Anti-Jewish Excesses on Bulgarian."

aggressions in the Balkans and the Caucasus led to mass pogroms against regional tribes and forced over one million refugees to flee to Ottoman domains between 1862 and 1865 alone.[85] Top Ottoman bureaucrats grew increasingly concerned about Nedim Pasha's corrupt and selfish nature. His influence of the sultan left the state vulnerable, and Abdülaziz's lavish spending, favoritism, erratic way of governing, fascination with warships and military spending and his long running desire to name his son as heir gradually led this group of bureaucrats to see the sultan's will, his (*irade*), as out of sync with the will of the nation.[86]

Using his repute, Midhat confronted the sultan over Nedim Pasha's administrative decisions in 1871, pleading with Abdülaziz to replace him.[87] Abdülaziz heeded his request, and for the most part, Nedim Pasha never obtained the same level of confidence with Abdülaziz, yet the situation continued to deteriorate. In this way, Midhat Pasha was able to employ the tactic of public opinion, if not through his appeal (which we cannot really know about, nor his intentions) then through his popularity. The decline in these years was not to do with individual mistakes, of which there were plenty, but a lack of checks and balances in the system. Midhat Pasha discovered this the hard way in 1873, when he was exiled due to his connection to Namık Kemal and his new controversial play, *Vatan yahut Silistre*. The play was seen as evoking too much patriotic zeal directed at the empire rather than the sultan, with declarations such as the following:

> Blood and sword on our flag are flying,
> *On* our hills and plains roams no fear of dying,
> A lion in each part of our land is lying,
> We rejoice in the fray martyrs' lives to lay down,
>
> We are Ottomans, giving up life for renown.
>
> And at the final curtain, upon victory, the cast all joins in:
> Before us the enemy, ready with arms,
> March, heroes, to the aid of the fatherland!
> March onward, march, salvation is ours;
> March, heroes, to the aid of the fatherland![88]

[85] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 37.
[86] For more on Abdülaziz's peculiar fascination with warships, see Dal, "Ottoman Naval Accademy."
[87] Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, 63–64.
[88] As quoted in Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 299.

In this respect, the idea of *vatan* was viewed as resonating too strongly with the public, whose very will it was meant to capture. Thus, Midhat Pasha remained outside the capital in the years leading up to Sultan Abdüaziz's deposition, as did other key Ottoman intellectuals. The *arbitrary nature* of Nedim Pasha and Sultan Abdülaziz, according the the emerging representative *dispositif* – which included the relationships of public opinion (section 1 of this chapter) and imamic leadership (as detailed in this section) – was illustrative of a general sickness present in the empire. *It had to be eradicated*. While these two strategies of public opinion and imamic leadership had arisen from the generation of mechanisms produced in the decades prior, primarily (a) collective imperial identity, (b) imperial codification, (c) representation as a political tool and (d) the moralization of politics, they would finally be united and combine these elements in the 1870s in the formation of the first Ottoman constitution, as the next section details. While the constitutional period was brief – less than two years – it nevertheless put a mechanism in place that was appropriated by the sultanate.

7.4 Public Opinion and Imamic Leadership Walk into a Salon…

The discontent surrounding Sultan Abdülaziz's manner of governing brought together a smorgasbord of the most prominent subject positions in the empire, and all of the fan favorites were there. Midhat Pasha and many in favor of a stronger network of communication between the Sublime Porte and the subjects of the empire set their hopes on a constitution that could counterbalance the power of the sultan. After a visit with British Ambassador in 1875, the ambassador recollected how Midhat Pasha had told him:

> The only remedy that he [Midhat Pasha] could perceive, lay, first, in securing a control over the sovereign by making the Ministers – and especially as regarded the finances – responsible to a national popular Assembly; and secondly in making this Assembly truly national, by doing away with all distinctions of class and religion.[89]

The *ulema* and rising groups of educated Muslims and Muslim artisans sought to rekindle part of their lost prestige and political importance, and popular sentiments driven by the influx of refugees, the perception that the Ottoman Empire was bowing to non-Muslim foreign powers and a desire to have a stronger role in the new education apparatus caused these groups to support a deposition. Interestingly enough, it was Midhat Pasha, with a

[89] Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, 80.

traditional education and an intense knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, who argued that a constitution, consultation, representation and democracy were all intrinsic qualities of Islam. These arguments had become prominent not only within the empire but had been disseminated abroad, as a newspaper column by Ubicini from early June 1876, a week after Sultan Abdulaziz's deposition and subsequent death, explains:

> It was decided in principle to establish an assembly composed of representatives of all the subjects of the empire, without distinction of race or religion, in which the general interests of the nation would be discussed, in accordance with this verse from the Koran: *Ve Chavir hum fil emri*. 'Do nothing without consulting yourself in council.'[90]

M. Şükrü Hanioğlu explains how a differentiation arose in the *ulema* ranks between "*niz*am-ı serbestâne (free order)" and "usûl-I meşveret (system of consultation), paying tribute to the Islamic concept of *mashwarah* (consultation)"; the press was no exception to this distinction, and the idea of a general assembly, such as the one proposed by Midhat Pasha and other reformers, was openly referred to as the *Şura-yı Ümmet*, which can be translated as "(Advisory) Council of the Nation," but the connotations of nation (*ümmet*) was a term used for the Islamic community (or later on, Islamic nation).[91] Some prominent Young Ottomans played a central role in this process as well, notably Namık Kemal and Ziya Bey, yet it was Ali Suavi who presented a more exhaustive account of the problems arising from the rebellion in Bosnia in 1875-1876.[92] Moreover, Hüseyin Avni Pasha, the administrator of the military, threw his hat into the ring, although he was far less concerned with constitutionalism than many of the others; for him, a system of checks and balances against the sovereign was a necessary step, but educated bureaucrats should make decisions since imperial subjects remained too ignorant and backwards to make their own decisions. While he supported a constitution on paper, he was hesitant about actually implementing one based on the European model. In essence, a variety of interpretations of imamic leadership emerged; however, they were not concerned with *whether* this was the way forward but rather disagreed on *how* it should go forward.

There were some experiments in drafting constitutional provisions, particularly by Midhat Pasha, but the notion of a constitution was more generally understood to be a social contract – even if unwritten – between the sultan and his subjects. Three key strategical possibilities emerged: a Euro-centric constitution devoted to the individual

[90] Ubicini, "Vieux turcs et jeune," 1.
[91] Hanioğlu, *Brief History of Late*, 113.
[92] Suavi, *Khiva en mars 1873*. For more on this see Suny, *They Can Live*, 91–104.

rights and representative administration, which was largely the position of Midhat Pasha, the Young Ottomans and many of his bureaucratic allies; others argued that true representation would be an educated elite making the most beneficial decisions, which was the position of Hüseyin Avni and more militaristic-oriented officials; meanwhile, Islamic scholars viewed this as some form of religious representation that would re-establish the *şeriat* as the highest authority in the Ottoman domains, though many non-Muslim communities took on a role in this process in hopes of improving the conditions of their communities. While these diverse options caused tensions occasionally, they positioned a political strategy – the deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz – as a source of common interests such that the project represented the interests of all parties involved. At the same time, imamic leadership and public opinion became sites – nexuses – where violent action was apt to appear as these diverging positions tried to counteract one another and prevent other interpretations from being enforced. This group came together as a coalition of political forces, yet it was not brought together along class lines, religious ties, ethnicity or political loyalties. Instead, they served as representatives of diverse communities representing (*temsil*) the will of the people. The members of this plot to overthrow Sultan Abdülaziz and replace him with a more moderate, reasonable sultan allowed these individuals to act as self-proclaimed representatives of "public opinion," and as such, they were indignant in the face of a sultan whose very *irade* went against the interests of his subjects.

On the one hand, Midhat Pasha and those with similar personal philosophies desired a popular uprising that would not rely on military intervention. By using military force, it would not resonate as strongly among the subjects of the empire, particularly in Istanbul.[93] On the other hand, there was a group of dissidents who preferred military intervention, the most notable of which were Hüseyin Avni and Süleyman Pasha, the director of the military academy. While all of these approaches indulged in personal ambitions, which was still a key political factor, they also professed strong commitments to *Osmanlılık* and the ideals of the Tanzimat, even if some, such as Hüseyin Avni, covertly had reservations about a popular constitutional system. The most fundamental component of this process, nonetheless, was implementing some form of check on the sultan's authority. If the dilemmas of the state relying so much on the whims and personality of a single individual were relevant prior to Abdülaziz's deposition – which also could have

[93] Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, 82–84. See also Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 331–335.

been a source of contention between some conspirators and Midhat Pasha, whose own popularity in the empire made him a force to be reckoned with – they must have been confirmed in its aftermath. It was decided that the deposition should occur on 31 May 1876, yet news reached the conspirators that the palace had uncovered their plot, so they rapidly reorganized the events for 30 May 1876, dragging sultan-to-be Murad V from his bed and escorting him to the *Seraskerat* (Ministry of War) in the wee hours of the morning; these events not only terrified the young prince, but it is very likely they contributed to his mental instability in the months to come. At the same time, Sultan Abdülaziz was awoken at his residence at Dolmabahçe Palace, where a fetva prepared by the sheik-ül-Islam Hassan Hairullah was decreed against him:

> If the Chief of the Faithful gives proof of mental derangement; if he displays ignorance of State matters; if he employs the public revenues for his personal expenditure, beyond what the Nation and State can support, if he introduces confusion into political and spiritual concerns, and if his continuance in power becomes injurious to the nation, may he be deposed.[94]

Not only was this a testament to the sultan's subservience to the will of the nation, but it was a unique removal of a sultan for deeds it deems detrimental to the governance of the empire and its subjects (i.e., the moralization of politics).

The fall of Sultan Abdülaziz's sent the bureaucrats scattering yet again for an administrative and political plan moving forward, and the coalition of forces that had shot Sultan Murad V to power became political rivals in the new order of things along the nexuses of violence around these two mechanisms. This might have reassured Midhat Pasha's immediate hopes for a constitution, but as events unraveled, it was clear that not everyone was on board. Midhat Pasha wanted to keep the subjects of the empire well-informed and educated, both through education and the press, which had become a vital tool for his success in provincial governorship. This imamic leadership was reiterated by Midhat Pasha in 1877, after his exile: "The danger to the Constitution lies, not in the lack of goodwill, but in the ignorance as to how to manage the mechanism…A knowledge as to how to work this machine and to keep it in movement is absolutely necessary."[95] Other Ottoman officials sympathized with this greatly, as we see in the cases of Suleyman Pasha and Halil Şerif Pasha Effendi. Just a few years after the implementation of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution, Hayreddin Pasha's ambition was described as "giving Muslims the

[94] Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, 82–83.
[95] Midhat, 164.

national feeling, which they absolutely lack, by initiating them into political life."[96] However, others like Hüseyin Avni Pasha and Mehmed Ruşdi Pasha sought to continue governing from the top, using the intellect of bureaucrats to decide what was best. The fact that the impoverished classes were ignorant was not debated but rather used as a point of departure. Midhat Pasha wanted to enlighten them with reforms, whereas others believed this could be done without their direct participation. Both Hüseyin Avni and Mehmed Ruşdi Pashas supported Sadullah Pasha's sentiment:

> Our sultan does not wish to form a national assembly. The knowledge and the training of our nation are not suitable for such a step. However, in order to eliminate the insecurity which prevails, he must bind the administration by strong laws, and must, for instance, reform financial matters. This is the desire of our Sultan.[97]

In this respect, they were using imamic leadership to justify overriding the "public" will for a national one – after all, how could "the insecurity which prevails" be overcome without a truly enlightened public opinion. Nevertheless, Midhat Pasha had actually composed a provisional version of a constitution that he had hoped would be included in Sultan Murad V's accession decree, but this was prevented.[98]

In a meeting that took place on June 8, 1876, top bureaucrats, key members of the *ulema* and some important military figures discussed the potential of a new constitution. Süleyman Hüsnü Pasha, a strong proponent of a constitution, quickly grew dismayed at the poor prospects and interjected:

> Your Excellency [Ruşdi Pasha], the deposition did not take place in order to maintain the present absolutism. Every one undertook this sacrifice in order to assure the future of the nation. Those who did this had no personal animosity toward the deposed sultan and no special relationship to the present one. Please continue the discussion with this point in mind.[99]

One of the responses to this perspective came from Halil Efendi, who proclaimed, "Will you ask opinions and courses of action of a collection of ignorant leftovers from Anatolia and Rumelia?"[100] Amidst this, Cevdet and Seyfeddin Pashas were more moderate, serving as mediators multiple times throughout the meeting. The arguments did not concern whether representation should exist, per se, but rather *how* it should be carried out. In

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[96] Ganem, *Journal de debats*, 17 January 1881, 3.
[97] As quoted in Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 340.
[98] A few days later, a short document entitled "Muslim Patriots" (*Müslüman Yurtseverler*) began to make its way around Istanbul, possibly from the pen of Midhat Pasha. Regardless of its true author, it illustrates a knowledge of the dynamics the Ottoman press played in high politics.
[99] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 343.
[100] Davison, 344.

essence, how should the representative strategy engage with public opinion and imamic leadership? Based on the Islamic notion of consultation, this form of representation was not so much speaking *in the place of* someone but rather speaking *for* someone. The constitutionalists thought the best way to go about this was through educating the empire, increasing the press, technical training and establishing a system whereby local and imperial grievances and ideas for improvements could be voiced; the anti-constitutionalists were not against the ideals of the Tanzimat and Ottomanism but argued that these decisions had to be made *for* the people rather than *by* the people.

Though the deposition of Abdülaziz had been speedy, quiet and calm, the events that unraveled afterwards were anything but that. Abdülaziz was found on June 4, 1876 dead in the apartment he had been confined to with his wrists cut. A dispatch was sent internationally, most likely to dispel rumors that this was an assassination, such as the following one from the Ottoman ambassador to France:

> A sad event has just painfully affected our august master and his government. Abdul-Aziz-Khan, who for some time had been showing obvious signs of a disturbance of mind, having locked himself up in his apartment in the palace of Cheragan this morning, gave himself up to death by opening the veins in his arms with a pair of scissors that he had on him.[101]

Despite the reformists' best efforts, rumors of an assassination spread throughout the capital and to the provinces. Less than two weeks later, during a meeting at Midhat Pasha's residence, a bereaved family member of Sultan Abdülaziz burst in and shot Hüseyin Avni Pasha for the alleged murder of the ex-sultan. The skirmish left Hüseyin Avni and Mehmed Raşid, minister of foreign affairs, dead and Midhat Pasha with immense authority due to his popularity; however, it also ended any talks of a constitution.

Murad V's ascension to the throne also sparked a new form of legitimacy that would come to reshape the empire forever. The basis by which it was argued that Abdulaziz could be deposed relied on (a) his unfit character (and thus lacking the moral personage to fulfill his obligations of imamic leadership) and (b) the will of the people (i.e., public opinion). The day after the deposition, *The New York Herald* printed a dispatch they had received from Istanbul: "It is officially announced here that at the

[101] *XIXe Siècle*, 6-7 June 1876, 1. These rumors spread quickly both inside and outside the empire. Within a matter of days, one Parisian paper reported, "According to the Gaul, on the contrary, Abdul Aziz was found in his apartment, a dagger plunged in his heart" (*Midi*, 8 June 1876, 3). However, I am not asserting any judgment on whether Abülaziz was murdered or committed suicide. As the issue is not immediately relevant to this study, I am putting the issue aside.

unanimous wish of the people Abdul-Aziz has been dethroned and the heir presumptive, Murad Effendi, proclaimed Sultan."[102] Though this may seem like a normal comment from the US or Europe at the time, this was a revolutionary concept being introduced into the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte claimed that Murad V's accession was accomplished "by the grace of God and the will of the people."[103] Gregory Aristrachis, who eventually put together a compendium of Ottoman legislation, noted to an American journalist that he "supposes it to have been at the demand of the people, who required the sword of authority to be passed from Abdul-Aziz to Mohammed Murad."[104] Even the media was quick to capitalize on this turn of events, and *Vakit* published an article attributing public opinion as the ultimate legitimating force behind a constitution:

> *Public opinion*, that is the title of our article, is a part of the essential laws established by the sharia, pure and celestial justice. Our whole society is in fact built on this principle. It was public opinion, which founded the Ottoman State. It was *public opinion*, which led all the great triumphs of the Ottoman nation. The regulations, which were in force in the early days of the Sublime State, were all based on *public opinion*. It was *public opinion*, which had legitimized the laws of the Exalted Sultanate…*Public opinion in Turkey by elevating His Highness Murad V, adorned with virtue and intelligence, to the throne*, has renewed the hope of the people and assured our future. *Public opinion* has showed that when it comes to searching and securing our legitimate rights, we are equal with Europe.[105]

Beyond being a mere political concept, public opinion had emerged as a concete political mechanism that had been foundationally incorporated into imperial governance. However, Sultan Murad V began to show signs of mental instability, exacerbated by the political infighting, the death of Abdulaziz, the assassination of Hüseyin Pasha, the economic crisis facing the empire and the perception of Murad V's personality as a severe sign of weakness. Abdülaziz's governance led to great financial, political and social disturbances throughout the empire and brought it to the brink of collapse, whereas Murad V's biggest fault was simply not having the demeanor required of a sultan. While the traditional system could more-or-less function in the absence of a sultan – who could retire to a life of leisure in their harem – the enlarged bureaucracy (imperial codification) and desire for the implementation of a constitution (which would thus strictly codify public opinion) made this impossible. The parameters of the state had changed, and the

[102] *New York Herald*, 31 May 1876, 3.
[103] *New York Herald*, 2 June 1876, 7.
[104] *New York Herald*, 31 May 1876, 3.
[105] As quoted in Şiviloğlu, *Emergence of Public Opinion*, 233.

sultanate now required the personal capacity to rule. In this way, the vast array of techniques and strategies that had arisen over the course of the nineteenth century – collective imperial identity, imperial codification (chapter 5), representation as a political tool, the moralization of politics (chapter 6), public opinion and imamic leadership (chapter 7) – coalesced in a paramount struggle for the core of Ottoman governance and existence. Not only did this set the stage for what was to come, but it limited the horizons of political discourse and action. These relations structured the conditions of possibility and reinforced themselves around a new *régime du savoir* that was reimagining the traditional Circle of Justice that had existed under a sultanic *dispositif*.

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Sultan Abdülhamid II came to power with an understanding that he would quickly comply with the constitutionalists and implement an imperial charter, yet when he took the throne, days turned into weeks and weeks into months; the implementation of a constitution did not seem to be in sight. After all, Murad V had primarily been deposed and replaced with his brother for this reason. A constitutional council was established of some of the strongest political figures, coming together for the first constitutional council on 6 October 1876: Midhat Pasha was of course the principal director of the project, yet Cevdet Pasha often came in open conflict with him over the planned constitution, and both were joined by Ziya Bey, Namık Kemal, Süleyman Pasha, Damad Mahmud Pasha, Ismail Kemal Bey and Seyfeddin Efendi, among many others. Debates over the contours of the constitution slowed the process, and Abdülhamid II appeared eager for delays to a diminishment of the sultan's sovereignty.[106] As November neared its end, Midhat Pasha grew impatient and implored those involved, including Sultan Abdülhamid II, to consider the urgency of the matter. An uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been harshly put down, and in June 1876, Ottoman troops were sent to Bulgaria to put down yet another rebellion, which led to the massacres of thousands of subjects, primarily Christians.[107] As news of the massacres spread, an uproar arose in Europe over the treatment of Christians in the empire yet again, which Russia was apt to capitalize on. At the same time, Serbia and Montenegro went to war with the Ottoman state in June 1876. After a mere two

[106] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 369–380.
[107] Numbers on the deaths are still highly debated. Contemporaneous estimates put the numbers between 12,000 and 30,000, yet the accuracy of these accounts is debatable (Millman, "Bulgarian Massacres Reconsidered"). However, rumors at the time certainly spread the news of massacres in the region, and the ensuing Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) would displace hundreds of thousands of individuals, both Christians and Muslims (Manasek, "Refugee Return and State").

months, Serbia found itself ill-prepared for a full-scale armed conflict with the Ottomans, even with the assistance of Russia, and implored Europe to come to its defense. After the massacres in Bulgaria, Britain withdrew its support of the Ottoman Empire, leaving it exceptionally vulnerable to international pressure. On 31 October 1876, Russia issued an ultimatum for the Ottomans to cease their assault on Serbia within forty-eight hours, to which Sultan Abdülhamid II quickly complied. A conference between the great powers of Europe and Russia – the Ottomans were not invited – was planned to be held between 11-23 December 1876. With a desire to stave off foreign intervention in domestic affairs, Midhat Pasha was convinced the only way to avoid the terms of the conference was to establish a constitution beforehand that would give the empire legitimate grounds for rejecting the conference's conclusions. After months of delay, a constitution was finally decreed by the sultan on 23 December 1876, the same day the conference finished and four days after Midhat Pasha was named grand vizier.

Meanwhile, the idea of a constitution – as well as what people expected from the government – had been circulating. In one instance, a note was even found among the belongings of a military academy student that read, "The King or the Sultan rules and does not govern; under a representative regime, public opinion is stronger than the Sultan."[108] There was widespread confusion on the promulgation of the constitution as many illiterate and provincial Ottomans simply did not understand what it meant. Whether Sultan Abdülhamid II actually believed in the ignorance of the public, which is very likely, or he was just utilizing these new power mechanisms to his advantage, he was adamantly against popular sovereignty:

> A country to which one gives liberty which the people do not know how to use is like a man to whom one gives a gun the handling of which he does not understand. He kills his father, mother and brothers, and then finishes by killing himself. We must, therefore, prepare the country for this liberty, and that is what I'm trying to do.[109]

This was not a feeling exclusive to the sultan but was shared by many in the bureaucracy. For instance, one pasha in Ankara commented to a foreign traveler:

> Not only the electing class, but the men who will probably be chosen to sit in Parliament are only half educated. We shall have ignorant legislators legislating for an equally ignorant nation…Give

[108] de Kératry, *Mourad V*, 229.
[109] de Blowitz, *My Memoirs*, 261.

> us roads and railways, they will be worth fifty Constitutions, for the latter, in my opinion, will soon be found impracticable.[110]

The process of writing the constitution was certainly illustrative of this, as numerous versions of constitutions, both personal and collaborated, were put together by the councils, and Sultan Abdülhamid II claimed to have been approached with at least twenty provisional drafts.[111] It should come as no surprise then that almost all of those involved were disappointed with the results, especially as it did not properly delegate a check on the sultan's power, a factor Abdülhamid II was determined to have removed completely.

Even if the constitution was not everything the reformists had hoped for, it was still a radical departure from the administration of the Sublime Porte just decades prior. It must have resonated with many constitutionalists, with its title being *Kanun-u Esasi* (Basic Law). While this could have been considered a more secular move in a different context, Sir Henry Elliot explains how:

> The word 'Constitution' was in every mouth; that the Softas, representing the intelligent public opinion of the Capital, knowing themselves to be supported by the bulk of the Nation – Christians as well as Mahomedan – would not, I believed, relax their efforts till they obtained it, and that should the Sultan refuse to grant it, an attempt to depose him appeared almost inevitable.[112]

There was nonetheless article 11, which clearly asserted that "the religion of the Ottoman State is the religion of Islam."[113] Not only did this have Islamic overtones – and some non-Muslim and even a few Muslim regions refused to send representatives to the generally assembly over this sensitive issue – but it was being positioned as the law from which all other laws were derived, so finding means to utilize this to one's advantage was pivotal at this stage.[114] The *Kanun-u Esasi* was divided into twelve parts: the Lands of the Ottoman State, Public Rights of the Subjects of the Ottoman Empire, Ministers of the State, Civil Servants, Generally Assembly, Chamber of Notables, Chamber of Deputies, Courts of Law, High Court of Justice, Financial Matters, Provinces and Various Matters.

A general survey of the *Kanun-u Esasi* shows how deeply rooted it was in the political strategies of the representative *dispositif* at the time, even if it was largely devoid

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[110] Burnaby, *On Horseback through Asia*, 127.
[111] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 370.
[112] For Elliot's remark, see Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, 81.
[113] For article 11 of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution, see Röder, "Separation of Powers," 342. Röder gives a full translation of the 1876 constitution, including Ottoman lithographic comparisons. I will be omitting the lithographic comparisons, but I encourage anyone interested in the topic to check out this text.
[114] On the refusal to send representative candidates, see Hanioğlu, *Brief History of Late*, 118–119.

of delegating new powers to assigned or elected officials while exponentially enhancing the capabilities of the sultan as the representative of the people. The sultan was established as "the protector of the religion of Islam and He is the sovereign and *Padishah* of the totality of the Ottoman subjects" in article four, only to emphasize the "sacred" nature of the sultan as a person in article five.[115] The body of the sultan is likewise professed as sacred in articles ninety-two and one hundred and thirteen, the latter of which was highly controversial due to its allowance of the sultan to exile any subject he pleases: "His Majesty the Padishah has the exclusive right of expelling from the territory of the Empire those who, in consequence of trustworthy information obtained by the police, are recognized as dangerous to the safety of the state"; this very article would quickly be used by the sultan against Midhat Pasha himself.[116] Article seven stipulates "the sacred rights of the *Padishah*," which includes control over every aspect of Ottoman politics, and article forty-four permits the sultan to "abridge or prolong" the session of the general assembly – what was considered the "will of the people" at the time.[117] Article thirty-five explained how "the replacement of the ministers or the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies lie exclusively in the discretional power of His Majesty the *Padishah*."[118] While reformists had acted against Abdülaziz and later Murad V to make the sultan subservient to the public (and later *ulema* and Islamic theology students were drawn into this power struggle), the end result was that both Islam and the administrative mechanism were subservient to the sultan's authority and sovereignty. Yet, the *ulema*, the Young Ottomans and even many of the constitution's authors did not want "equality of honors," as the Young Ottomans would argue, but rather "equality of rights." In other words, they wanted a check on the sultan's power, but they did not want to diminish the prestige of the Muslim community. Articles eighteen, fifty-seven and sixty-eight argued that government employees, whether elected or assigned, were required to have a proficiency in Turkish and carry out official matters in that language. Although article sixty-eight allowed four years for members of the Chamber of Deputies – an elected official term in the assembly – it still would have limited the capacity for non-Muslims and illiterate individuals to join this delegative body. Meanwhile, the members of the Chamber of Notables were assigned by the sultan himself (article sixty-two), and these officials were elected for life (article

[115] Röder, "Separation of Powers," 341.
[116] Röder, 351–352.
[117] Röder, 341 (article seven), 345 (article forty-four).
[118] Röder, 344.

sixty-two). In this way, one of the new delegative bodies was chosen rather than elected (based on imamic leadership), which would allow the sultan to largely control what material made it through.[119] Representative politics had largely been behind the push for a constitution, yet what resulted from this was less the right to choose to be represented and instead the right to consult, which had significant Islamic and Ottoman overtones in articles twenty-nine and thirty-six; it was only the sultan who had the right to represent the interests of his subjects, thereby speaking on their behalf.

While it could be argued that the powers of the general assembly were irrelevant in the end, the *Kanun-u Esasi* was particularly illuminative of the transforming relationship between the sultan and his subjects. The equality of all imperial subjects, which had been a central tenet of the Edict of Gülhane and the Imperial Edict of 1856, was reaffirmed in articles seventeen and thirty-three (collective imperial identity). However, there were subtleties drawn into this proposal, most likely driven by the experience of provincial officials like Midhat Pasha, self-driven patriots like Namık Kemal or Ziya Bey and even the desire of the *ulema* to rekindle their high position within Ottoman politics. A separation between the *şeriat* courts and the newly-founded *nizamiye* courts was established in article eighty-seven (codification of imperial roles), and article eleven explains that the protection of all subjects regardless of creed or race was only ensured "on condition of public order and morality not being interfered with" (the moralization of politics).[120] Article eight of the constitution also proclaimed that "the totality of the persons who are subjects of the Ottoman State, without exception, whatever faith or confession they belong to, are called Ottomans and the status of an Ottoman is acquired and lost according to conditions specified by law" (representation as political mechanism).[121] Nonetheless, all subjects of the empire were allowed to present their complaints to their local councils, judicial bodies or the national general assembly according to articles fourteen, eighty-three, eighty-four, eighty-six, ninety-one and one hundred and ten (public opinion through consultation). The imamic power that had been used in the provinces over the past two decades was highlighted, noting that education was free (article fifteen) and even mandatory at the primary level (article one hundred and fourteen). Provincial councils and governors would likewise retain more power, yet these

[119] For criteria on serving in the Chamber of Deputies, see article sixty-eight. For criteria on serving in the Chamber of Notables, see article sixty-one.
[120] Röder, "Separation of Powers," 342.
[121] Röder, 342.

positions were strongly influenced by appointments from the Sublime Porte, even though it was an "elective body." The parameters of provincial councils were outlined in a very positive manner, focusing more on civil services than executive measures:

> The right of deliberating on matters of public utility, such as the establishment of the means of communication, the organization of loan associations, the development of manufactures, commerce, and agriculture, and the diffusion of education, together with the right of applying to the competent authorities for the redress of acts committed in contravention of the laws and regulations as regards assessment or collection of taxes or any other matter.[122]

Imamic authority combined with representation via "consultation" meant that the authority to make decisions in the interest of others was a key development in the way Ottomans governed. The sultan's capacity to enforce his will was not justified or legitimated, at its base at least, through Islam or religious principles but instead through an imamic system of power that sought to foster the population, establishing the groundwork for a re-envisioned Circle of Justice. The transformative logic was such that a representative was able to make decisions on another's behalf through the strategies of the representative *dispositif*.

The final point that can be deciphered from the *Kanun-u Esasi* is the way in which it intertwines personality and politics. Civil servants must illustrate "good conduct and uprightness" (article thirty-nine), members of the Chamber of Notables need "to have shown by one's deeds and actions that one is worthy of public trust and confidence, and to have rendered signal services to the interest of the state" (article sixty-one) members of the Chamber of Deputies cannot be "notoriously in disrepute for bad conduct," "those not understanding Turkish" nor "bankrupts not rehabilitated" (article sixty-eight) and proposed laws cannot be "fundamentally contrary to religious matters or to the sovereign rights of the *Padishah*" nor should they threaten "the interests of the defense and protection of the country, or to general morality" (article sixty-four).[123] Obedience was positioned as being of the utmost political importance. Article forty-six requires "an oath of fidelity to His Majesty the *Padishah* and to the country [*vatan*]" from those joining the national general assembly.[124] Article forty-one takes this even further, asserting that "every functionary is bound to pay respect to his superior, but obedience is only due within the limits defined by the law. In respect of acts contrary to the law, the fact of

[122] Röder, 351.
[123] Röder, 344 (article thirty-nine), 346 (article sixty-one), 347 (articles sixty-four and sixty-eight).
[124] Röder, 345.

having obeyed a superior will not relieve the official who has carried them out from responsibility."[125] Ironically, this gave some room to justify, whether knowingly or unknowingly, a coup against the sultan should he break the *Kanun-u Esasi*, but the fact that the sultan was *above* the law, or rather the fact that he was the embodiment of the will of the nation, would likely have prevented this interpretation from taking shape. Personality becomes politicized, and the values that one *represents* essentially becomes the essence of who one *is*. It was a radical reformulation of truth in Ottoman society. Those men of debauchery, greed, selfishness and disobedience are fundamentally flawed, and should they come to represent the nation, they would lead it to demise. Article forty-one establishes a hierarchy of representation in this way, where everyone is subservient to his superior, all the way up to the sultan, whose imperial *irade* rules over all other wills.

7.5 Conclusion: Constitution, Representation and a Battle of Wills

Davison has described the central principles of Midhat Pasha's version of constitutionalism as "an elected parliament, a responsible ministry under a prime minister, a sovereign with powers somewhat limited, and equality of all Ottoman subjects."[126] If this was in fact his ambition, it could not have been a more significant failure (in the Foucauldian sense). Not only did it reconstitute most state power under the authority of the sultan, but the general assembly was in no way a check on the sultan's authority. Midhat Pasha would nevertheless not be around to see this experiment of constitutional parliamentarianism. Within two months of becoming grand vizier, Sultan Abdülhamid II, growing worried about Midhat Pasha's popularity, had him sent into exile using article one hundred and thirteen of the constitution. In an issue of the semi-official *La Turquie* gazette, it was argued that not only did Midhat Pasha not speak for the subjects of the empire, but they were solely represented by the will of the sultan:

> The merit of the constitutional reform is wrongly attributed exclusively to Midhat Pasha…It would be to singularly misunderstand the character of the Ottoman nation to suppose that it could have carried its feelings of recognition on anyone other than the August Author of the Constitution, on the one, who alone had the right to have it conception and grant it to its subjects.

[125] Röder, 344–345.
[126] Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 364.

> All those who know what has happened since the great act of the promulgation of the Constitutional Charter have been able to foresee the current event. Midhat Pasha was justifiably proud of the honor of having been the interpreter of the generous wishes of his Sovereign; but in wishing to inaugurate the constitutional relations between the ministers and the Sovereign, he could not keep the measure that the prestige of sovereignty commanded in a country which, only yesterday, was living under absolute regime…If, really, he did not yield to his inclinations, which could endanger the existence of the Constitution and throw the country into chaos, at last he could not resist the entrainments of a temperament which could not agree with the necessities of an era as critical as the one we are going through.[127]

Sultan Abdühlhamid appears to have acknowledged the power relations that had developed around public opinion and Midhat Pasha's popularity through imamic leadership, such that he had Midhat Pasha taken directly to a boat from the palace that was meant to take him to Brindisi off the coast of Italy; however, the boat was ordered to remain in the Sea of Marmara for twenty-four hours in the event that there was a popular uprising over Midhat's removal, at which point the boat would be signaled and return to the capital with Midhat Pasha to put down the rebellion.[128] Though there was certainly a social uproar and disapproval to an extent over Midhat Pasha's removal, there was not a popular uprising; the press, driven by the political upheaval, vilified Midhat Pasha, who was allowed to return from exile about a year and a half later.

The constitutional period did not last long. Within a year and a half, Abdülhamid II would have put an end to the project, announcing himself as the ultimate conductor of state affairs. Abdülhamid II thus ascended to the throne having more capabilities than any Ottoman sovereign before him, with a vast bureaucratic mechanism in place as well as an established political rationale of representation that allowed him to speak on behalf of his subjects:

> I made a mistake when I wished to imitate my father Abdülmecid, who sought reforms by permission and by liberal institutions. I shall follow in the footsteps of my grandfather, Sultan Mahmud. Like him I now understand that it is only by force that one can move the people with whose protection God has entrusted me.[129]

All of this is not to argue that Abdülhamid II was against reforms. He was a champion of them in many respects, and emphasized the importance of education, representation and a constitution, even if it was portrayed in a different light. Speaking to an English

[127] *Turquie*, 8 February 1877, 1.
[128] Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha*, 145–146.
[129] As quoted in Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 403.

journalist a few years later, who advised against constructing a bureaucracy of yes-men, Abdülhamid II's understanding of these matters is laid bare:

> I am of your opinion, and I have quite decided to open gradually my hand. The difficulty is to know just how far to go. When it was seen that this country could not support a Constitution, and a Parliament which did not entirely represent the country, but only part of the country, people came to me and began to talk about responsibilities. It was another way of reorganizing a Constitution. I refused this. Those who spoke of responsibilities only saw in this a means of substituting their will for mine at the expense of others, and the great mass of the country would only have changed from the will of one to that of another. I am now trying, as you have just said, to prepare this country for the more independent part it has to play, and I have already modified many things, which are not noticed abroad, but which are producing a good effect at home.[130]

Abdülhamid II's discursive arguments were drastically different than his ancestors, and he latched onto the newfound *dispositif* of representation, which could help administer education and imperial services to his subjects. Yet, perhaps most intriguing was his discussion of wills: "will" and "representation" had become intrinsically interrelated. While the reformists had spoken of a popular will, engrossed in discussions of public opinion that could counteract the sultan's will, the sultan reversed this discourse, arguing that only one will exists, and anyone who tries to instill their own will into politics is not an arbiter of justice but a despot.

The proroguing of the Ottoman parliament, nevertheless, was not a renunciation of representation. It was the culmination of it. While this chapter has taken a closer and more intensive look at the daily dynamics that went into the eventual conditions that made a constitutional period possible in the first place, this was not by accident, or rather it was. The goal was to show the constant struggle that amassed around representative techniques and the nexuses of violence that swelled, ultimately leading to Midhat Pasha's political downfall. While one may argue that violence was largely absent from this chapter – after all, key instances of violence like the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War and popular rebellions were glossed over – I would argue that it was omnipresent throughout. Moreover, it illustrates the role chance and accident play at critical periods like this rather than causal formulas or generalizations about nation-making. How would things have changed if the actors' plot to depose the sultan been unveiled? What if Abdülaziz had not committed suicide (or been murdered)? What if the Young Ottomans had submitted to pressure from the Sublime Porte and ceased their activities? What if Russia had exerted

[130] Burnaby, *On Horseback through Asia*, 266–267.

further military force in the Balkan region and complicated Midhat Pasha's successes? Taking a closer look at the interactive elements and strategies, with the help of participation obvervation and actor-network theory (see chapter 3), assists us in unveiling the contingency that went into these formations.

Additionally, it allows one to home in on the key mechanisms that arose during this period. While chapter 5 addressed the introduction of imperial codification and collective imperial identity, chapter 6 wove in the techniques of representation as a political tool and the moralization of politics, each of which was employed during the 1860s and 1870s. Along with these, this chapter has brought the relationships that evolved out of public opinion and imamic power, neither of which would have been possible without these other mechanisms, to the forefront. Each of these techniques came to fundamentally shape the representative *dispositif*, which the next chapter will show solidified into a concrete, pervasive and ubiquitous network of power relations and a secured *régime du savoir*. In tandem with this, nexuses of violence start to become visible, particularly along the borders of these mechanisms. Whereas the previous nexuses had aligned along the sultanic Circle of Justice and the different elements that composed it, such a formulation would have ceased to be comprehensible at this point. The fluctuations between those elements had radically changed, and the new nexuses of violence became situated along the contours of the representative *dispositif*.

8. The Will to Represent: Collectives and the Construction of a "Spirit"

"If a community were not certain of its superiority, how much apathy there would be in the striving of its members toward the virtues; how much weakness there would be in their zeal; how much baseness and misery would envelop that people; and how it would remain in slavery, humiliation, and abasement, especially if it considered itself lower than other peoples, as do the materialist and Manichean people." – Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, "Religions' Three Beliefs"[131]

8.1 Introduction: Appropriating Representation

According to the *şeriat*, it was possible to indefinitely designate land for charitable purposes, to be controlled by a trust though requiring the sultan's approval. Up until the nineteenth century, the primary social and cultural center for Muslim and non-Muslim communities had been the *vakıf* (pl. *evkaf*; it literally means "to prevent," as in to prevent the obtainment of the endowed land from others), or "pious foundations." This system of pious foundations had existed since the fourteenth century, and while it varied over time, it was largely built around a division of tasks. These foundations were privately funded (and free from taxation) by a *vakıf* (donor).[132] The *mütevelli* (the *vakıf* manager) was meant to carry out inspections of the property to ensure it abided by the *şeriat* and the land rights were not being abused.[133] As such, the *mütevelli* and the original founder mirrored the relationship between *ayans* and the sultan, such that the *mütevelli*'s role was not one of representation but allegiance; although the *mütevelli* was permitted small changes and adjustments to the *vakıf*, their utmost task was to fulfill the stipulations laid out by the original founder. Unlike representatives, whose job could be to interpret these stipulations through new events and a changing world, the *mütevelli*'s perception was that issues not laid out by the founding *vakıf* were outside the bounds of their authority.

Administrators were specified to assess *evkaf* on a regular basis – though not consistent in practice – and their criteria for judging the success or failure of the *mütevelli* was linked to the latter's ability to fulfill the wishes of the founder; an entire mechanism was in place to continually assert and confirm that the bonds of allegiance had not been

[131] al-Afghani, "Religions' Three Beliefs," 143.
[132] Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 854–861; Hoexter, "Waqf and Public Sphere," 121–125; Singer, "Serving Up Charity." While inheritance laws in the Ottoman Empire were certainly geared towards men, with sons often receiving twice the inheritance of daughters – and in some cases daughters were cut out completely – it was nevertheless possible for women to be the founders of a *vakıf,* which gave females a unique stratagem in the Ottoman system that would not have existed otherwise.
[133] Akgündüz, "Ottoman Waqf Administration," 71–72.

broken, even after the death of its architect. From the sixteenth century onwards, the existence not only of *evkaf* in the form of property but also of "cash" *evkaf* became commonplace.[134] In line with the sultanic *dispositif*, the government not only required allegiance from *ayans* but saw this as a duty, ensuring that the very allegiance of the *mütevelli* to the founder had not been violated; the most common form of altering the original objectives of *evkaf* was actually by Islamic judges (*kadis*) in the courts, situating the central government as the arbiter of deciding whether the *mütevelli* had respected their allegiance to the founder.[135] While *evkaf* were predominant in the Muslim *millet*, they also played a critical role in the relationship between non-Muslim communities and the central government, as Sophia Laiou elaborates on:

> Regarding the fate of the monastic landed property acquired during the pre-Ottoman period, the most well-documented case is that of the Athonite monks who developed a policy of political allegiance to the Ottoman authority during the late fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth century in return for which they received the recognition of their landed property as *mülk* and *vakıf*.[136]

The political technology of allegiance tied the worth of elites and religious institutions to their acts rather than their persons. Their success was not simply linked to how effective the services offered were but also how closely they followed the founder's vision. It was a system of balance. A maintenance of peace. A tool to ensure prosperity and security. As a whole, the *vakıf* system was enshrined in the Circle of Justice, for without them the *rayas* would suffer, meaning less would be collected in taxes to provide for troops, meaning security would fall, and the empire with it. In this respect, *evkaf* were a cornerstone of the sultanic Ottoman order of things (and even prior to the Ottoman Empire at all).

These foundations served as centers for spiritual guidance for the community – after all, mosques and *madrasas* were constructed on *vakıf* property – but they also

[134] Hoexter, "Waqf and Public Sphere," 125–127; Mandaville, "Usurious Piety."
[135] Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 861–869; Gerber, "Public Sphere and Civil"; Sabri, *Imperial Politics of Architectural*, 17–20. Kuran further explains how an economy of relationships existed within this system, and it provided a variety of tactics to those subjects involved (Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 869–875).
[136] Laiou, "Diverging Realities of Christian," 4. In a separate article, Laiou ("Between Pious Generosity") presents an outline of all endowed lands on the island of Paros and an illustration of the stipulations laid out by a founder, and Hathaway ("Wealth and Influence") presents the included properties of an Egyptian *vakıf*. Also see Hoexter, "Waqf and Public Sphere," 129–134.

provided an array of community services.[137] John Alexander and Sophia Laiou explain how the importance of the giving of *sadaka* (alms) was a function of the religious communities of Islam, Christianity and Judaism long before the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, especially among the ruling classes who saw it as a religious obligation to reach salvation.[138] The political technology of allegiance under this system tied one's social reputation and even the admissibility of legal testimony to a history of such donations.[139] Charity was a way of pledging one's allegiance to God. It was a demonstration of one's commitment to one's faith. Within the *millet* system, the *vakıf* posed a crucial space for ensuring the welfare of the *rayas* of all religions. Since it was regulated by rules of allegiance, by which each community was allowed free reign as long as they remained an ally of the sultan, these pious foundations became deeply entrenched over the course of the empire. At the same time, the contributions, monetary or otherwise, allowed the social divisions between the *rayas* and *askeri* as well as *ayans*, who could afford such services privately; *rayas* were seen as *provided for* while the local notables were the *providers*, something that became even more important in the nineteenth century due to increased social mobility.[140]

However, the political technology of representation that emerged in the nineteenth century impacted every segments of society, including pious foundations. Representation became a model by which one could organize political entities, whether that was part of the state, a *vakıf*, a civil organization, a scientific association or a remote tribal hierarchy on the peripherals of the empire, such as Kurdish, Arab and Albanian tribes. Yet, when did it come possible to form large-scale associations that impacted politics? How did this change the way communities were arranged and interacted with each other, both on a local and imperial level? How did these clashes between power relations lead, in a matter of decades, to large groups with a collective identity, something that saw a leader not as

[137] For more on the spiritual guidance these centers offered, see Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods"; Laiou, "Diverging Realities of Christian"; Laiou, "Between Pious Generosity"; Sabri, *Imperial Politics of Architectural*; Terzioğlu, "How to Conceptualize Ottoman." For more on the community services such organizations offered, see Alexander and Laiou, "Health and Philanthropy Among"; Fratcher, "Islamic Wakf"; Hoexter, "Waqf and Public Sphere"; Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods"; Sabri, *Imperial Politics of Architectural*; Singer, "Serving Up Charity."
[138] Alexander and Laiou, "Health and Philanthropy Among," 1–2. See also Hoexter, "Waqf and Public Sphere," 122–125; Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 853–854; Singer, "Serving Up Charity."
[139] Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 853; Laiou, "Diverging Realities of Christian"; Sabri, *Imperial Politics of Architectural*, 19–20.
[140] Alexander and Laiou, "Health and Philanthropy Among," 11; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 311–312; Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods."

someone to pledge allegiance to for security but as a person who speaks on behalf of that community?

In this chapter, the emergence of these types of collective relationships and their impact on the representative *dispositif* will be explored. While numerous studies have interpreted this era as a shift towards "secularism" or an adoption of Western values, this was hardly the case.[141] The transformations during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were largely driven by internal dynamics, which is not to say international actors had no impact on this process; they occupied a critical point of emergence, though not always in the ways they intended. The reason that the *vakıf* system was chosen, rather than, for instance, scientific communities or social clubs, is the importance they played during the nineteenth century in the wake of widespread and popular Islamic social movements. While all organizations came to function through the representative *dispositif*, it is arguable if any had a wider reach than these. By appropriating the mechanisms discussed thus far – (a) collective imperial identity, (b) imperial codification, (c) representation as a political tool, (d) the moralization of politics, (e) public opinion and (f) imamic leadership – these institutions were able to systematize and present the manifestation of representative power relations to their advantage in quintessential ways. The first section details the traditional *vakıf* network and how it was staunchly encapsulated in the sultanic *dispositif* up until the nineteenth century, yet changes that started to occur in other areas of imperial governance (e.g., imperial codification, imamic leadership, representation as a political tool) complicated these longstanding relationships. This process is therefore situated within the larger functioning of the Ottoman Empire as it veered towards a representative *dispositif*. The second section expands on these findings and illustrates not only how popular Islamic movements, such as Sufi orders, appropriated the mechanisms of the representative *dispositif* to their own advantage. These alterations intrinsically shifted these organizations' position within the Ottoman order of things. As a result, the tools that had been constructed up until this point were concocted into a cohesive *dispositif* that operated upon five axes: (a) historical roots of legitimacy, (b) a dispersion of perspectives, (c) the unification of a collective, (d) accruing a base and (e) networks of communication. While Sufi orders have been chosen as an illustrative example, this procedural *dispositif* was not restricted to them; they were

[141] Berkes, *Development of Secularism*; Bottoni, "Origins of Secularism"; Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism*; Keyman, "Modernity, Secularism and Islam"; Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*; Reed, "Secularism and Islam"; Ruedy, *Islamism and Secularism*; Saygın and Önal, "Secularism from Last Years."

simply the largest and most extensive non-state social movement during the nineteenth century.

The following two sections show how this was incorporated by the central government as well as on the empire's borderlands. In the third section, I detail how the sultanate incorporated the techniques of the representative *dispositif* laid out in the previous section, which resulted in a novel new phenomenon: "spirit." By spirit, I mean that the mechanics of the representative *dispositif* cumulatively resulted in a collective identity, but one that had to abide within certain limitations and by certain rules. Not only does representation become something desirable, but a lack of representation becomes cause for concern. While the five axes of section 2 are shown to be derived from the techniques discussed thus far, the spirit not only outlines the capabilities that Ottoman subjects now had – to varying degrees, depending on one's subject position – but it also established new nexuses of violence. The final section embraces these nexuses, illustrating how the divisions along the empire's eastern front with Russia devolved into massacres, intimidation, the seizure of land, forced displacement and an overall atmosphere of fear along these nexuses. In order to do this, I take up the issue of the Hamidian Light Cavalry, established in 1891, and how the representative *dispositif* was used to restructure the power relations that had organized these communities for centuries. This methodological strategy has two goals: (1) it shows that though the newly constructed "spirit" (i.e., the representative *dispositif*) was ubiquitous, but it was not egalitarian, relying on a multitude of competing strategies and subject positions; and (2) that nexuses of violence began to crystalize around the five axes discussed in the first section by finding novel or innovative uses for the technologies that have been discussed up until this chapter.

8.2 From Allegiance to Representation: The Role of Charitable Foundations

By the end of the eighteenth century, relations of allegiance could already be used to subvert the *vakıf* system, as was the case of one Christian subject, Nikolakis Mavrogenis. He earned the right to create a *vakıf* due to "the patronage networks of high Ottoman officials," meaning his family had ascended as political elites through military service in contrast to the established aristocracy; nonetheless, this *vakıf* was dissolved after he was

later executed on fallacious allegations of treason.[142] By the eighteenth century, somewhere between 80% and 90% of all *evkaf* had been founded by local notables, bureaucrats, military officials and other elites, demonstrating the rigid class structure that was built into this system, yet only a fifth of these had been established solely for charitable purposes, with the others primarily being established for their families and descendants as a way to accumulate wealth.[143] Timur Kuran further elaborates on the distinct economic system this built in the Ottoman lands by rewarding local elites with tax-exempt land in exchange for their ability to provide desperately needed public services.[144] Such institutions provided assistance in a number of ways, such as education, hospitals, bazaars, asylums for madness, familial support, charity in the form of provisions and basic necessities – and later on, monetary distribution – care for the elderly, inns, livestock, residences, hospices, soup kitchens, the construction and maintenance of roads, aqueducts and bridges, shops, cemeteries, orphanages, farms, factories, employment for freed slaves, financial institutions, orchards and vineyards, windmills, light houses and public baths, to name just a few.[145] Nonetheless, a disparity appeared in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries as the empire began to run into financial hardships.

The ruling of 1567/68 stipulating that all Ottoman land belonged to the sultan meant that non-Muslim *evkaf* relied on a constant process of showing their allegiance and portraying themselves as law-abiding subjects, yet this also meant that even the Muslim community's claim to a *vakıf* was contingent on allegiance, which could be revoked at any time.[146] After the 1567/68 ruling, this system consisted of large-scale negotiations

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[142] Laiou, "Between Pious Generosity," 152–153.
[143] Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 857. Moreover, Kuran notes how the expansion of *evkaf* was reliant on how secure the finances of local notables were; in areas where the threat of government confiscation of assets, the *vakıf* played a fundamental role, yet the areas with secure local notables saw these elites as less likely to resort to such a venture, as they largely were not concerned about the perpetuity of their property (Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 857–858). Also see Terzioğlu, "How to Conceptualize Ottoman."
[144] Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 843.
[145] Alexander and Laiou, "Health and Philanthropy Among"; Fratcher, "Islamic Wakf"; Gerber, "Public Sphere and Civil," 75–77; Laiou, "Diverging Realities of Christian"; Laiou, "Between Pious Generosity." Moreover, Alexander and Laiou specifically notes the connection between hospitals occupying spaces in monasteries and on religious grounds and these sites as holy places with holy artifacts; additionally, they note occurrences of arable land being exchanged for admission to such hospitals or asylums when provisions were needed in these institutions (Alexander and Laiou, "Health and Philanthropy Among," 3–4). Kuran further notes some more peculiar services some *evkaf* played, such as "delivering water to a locality, defending a town, paying a neighborhood's taxes, supporting retired sailors, supplying fruits to the children of a community, organizing picnics for a designated guild, subsidizing the cultivation of rare roses, and operating commuter ships, among hundreds of other purposes of varying social significance" (Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 850).
[146] Laiou, "Diverging Realities of Christian," 11–12.

between local religious orders or individuals and the local administrative officials *along with* the central government based on the local collectives' ability to maintain the land, provide social services and pay taxes (where applicable).[147] It was not possible to use a *vakıf* for non-Muslim religious purposes, so non-Muslim religious buildings like churches or synagogues were strictly forbidden, even if workarounds or violations were not uncommon; however, the *vakıf* became the official religious center of the Muslim community, offering not only places of worship and spiritual guidance but also Islamic *madrasas*. Yet even here, only 29% of *evkaf* were established for a strictly Islamic purpose, illustrating the importance these foundations provided wealthy elites with.[148] The specific services provided by the *evkaf* varied significantly, not only between *millets* but also between provincial and urban *evkaf*, which themselves could dramatically fluctuate within the same region and city. As the nineteenth century neared a close, *evkaf* constituted a little less than three fourths of arable land in the empire and is estimated to have been equivalent to a third of the state's annual income.[149]

Already in the latter half of the eighteenth century, the central government was making attempts to restructure the *vakıf* system, especially when it came to forming a less corrupt and more unified system through the codification of roles and later through imamic leadership; however, these were largely unsuccessful due to resistance (violence either in the form of upfront confrontation or indirect frustration, as chapter 6 demonstrated) from local notables, the *ulema* and the *janissaries*.[150] Sultan Abdülhamid I, who ruled from 1774 to 1789, managed to establish a small-scale organization called the *Evkaf-i Hamidiye* (Hamidian religious foundations) meant to oversee the overall operation of the sultan's personal *evkafs*.[151] Much like the transformations we see in the bureaucratization and centralization trends occurring in the nineteenth century, the *vakıf* system was no exception, and the year after the dissolution of the *janissaries* (1826), many of whom were the founders of imperially-protected *evkafs*, these military persons had their *evkaf* confiscated and put under the administration of the freshly established *Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nezareti* (The Ministry of the Foundations) in 1826; this was later expanded and given more power in 1840 under the *Nezaret-i Evkaf* (Ministry of

[147] Laiou, 11-12.
[148] Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 850.
[149] Akgündüz, "Ottoman Waqf Administration," 84; Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 849.
[150] Akgündüz, "Ottoman Waqf Administration," 75; Doja, "Political History of Bektashism"; Ömür, "Sufi Orders in Modernizing"; Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*.
[151] Akgündüz, "Ottoman Waqf Administration," 75.

Foundations). Over the next few decades, as the previously discussed techniques coagulated into a representative *dispositif*, this ministry would not only come to act as *mütevelli* over almost all Ottoman *evkaf*, but they would take on a new administrative role.[152] While the previous system existed between a *mütevelli* and the founder of a *vakıf*, the new system restructured this relationship by pushing independent founders out of the picture and establishing the central government as the ultimate administrator and guarantor of the services offered by the *vakıf* in a way that mirrored the imamic leadership of provincial administration at large. The *evkaf* would no longer rely on being the provider for those serving it; instead, the government would allot monthly or annual salaries. In other words, Istanbul would serve not only as inspector of holy foundations but also the provider of them. Yet, the state's incorporation of this system also affected the political efficiency and position of the *ulema*. The *ulema*'s control over these foundations was brought under the authority of the central government in 1836, enhancing the bureaucrats' position over the *ulema* even before the commencement of the Tanzimat; this concurrently decreased the number of private individuals eager to found a *vakıf*.[153]

The *Nezaret-i Evkaf* came to assume the role of *mütevelli*, functioning as a representative juridico-political entity that took the place of the appointment of individuals as managers of these properties; the legal overseer from this point on became the ministry as the "appointed administrator," whereby allegiance was replaced with a collective, representative entity.[154] In this way, the central government found itself in a position to increasingly intervene in the day-to-day functioning of *evkaf* through imamic leadership, which simultaneously diminished those foundations that had been established to secure property.[155] The primary interest in founding a *vakıf* was often to take advantage of its tax-exempt status, other subversive ways to accrue profit or their community profile, which was now being removed by their centralization. This process accelerated after the Edict of Gülhane, but with the strong push towards centralization and standardization, or imperial codification, in the late 1860s, the regulations of *evkaf* largely diminished the capabilities of these institutions, either due to underfunding, confiscation and diminishment or a general lack of interest by elites to participate. Either *evkaf* became more limited and stringent in the services they offered (if they were not dissolved

[152] Akgündüz, 76–77; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 105.
[153] Amara, "Civilization Exceptions"; Akgündüz, "Ottoman Waqf Administration," 78; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 98, 169; Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods."
[154] Akgündüz, "Ottoman Waqf Administration," 81–84.
[155] Kuran, "Provision of Public Goods," 888–890.

entirely), or the government was in the process of bringing these institutions under the legitimate regulation of the state, often without the local knowledge that *evkafs* had depended on. While the intention had been to assume the representative and politically legitimizing function these services offered in the Circle of Justice, the consequence of this was the offering of imamic leadership that the Sublime Porte simply was not able to realistically offer.

This transformation of *evkafs* in the mid-nineteenth century must be situated within a wide network of transforming power relations. A massive influx of refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus completely morphed the demographics of the Empire, particularly after the Crimean War (1853-56) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78).[156] The consequential fallout of these massive migration waves was the rapid circulation of tales of pogrom's against Muslims – and on the other side, massacres against Christian and Jews – in the Ottoman heartland, sparking waves of outrage and sympathy that gave shape to an Islamic and ethnic Turkish self-awareness.[157] National and religious solidarity was further strengthened when Ottoman subjects, especially Muslims, noticed a foreign threat in Russia's advances in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War.[158] As the empire centralized the *vakıf* system, the Sublime Porte became less and less capable of financing the kind of services traditionally provided by *evkaf*, creating a socio-political vacuum for non-state actors to provide these services (imamic power) in exchange for social and political leverage (imamic leadership combined with public opinion). The radical overhaul of the land system under the implementation of the *vilayet* system also caused a massive reformation of the Ottoman economic structure, whereby educated individuals, both among the elites and the masses, increased, even in the provinces.[159] In essence, the network of power relations revolving around allegiance (i.e., the traditional *vakıf* system) were slowly replaced by a network of power relations centered on representation (e.g., the new *vilayet* system).

While the *ulema* may have fought against this redistribution of power in the past, their weakened institutional stance and the waves of exodus of the *ulema* in the aftermath of the Kuleli Incident in 1859 followed by Ali Suavi's attempted coup of 1878 –

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[156] Ahmad, *Young Turks and Ottoman*, 26–40; Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire II*, 240–241; Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914*, *Politicization of Islam*, 97.
[157] Ahmad, *Young Turks and Ottoman*, 22–24; Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian"; Landau, *Pan-Islam*, 19–25; Makdisi, "After 1860"; Masters, "Christians in Changing World."
[158] Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 126; Landau, *Pan-Islam*, 11–18.
[159] Fortna, *Learning to Read*.

particularly after the latter – weakened their capabilities. In fact, the reformation of the education system meant that *evkaf* were playing a smaller role in their once stronghold. The imamic leadership, which had proliferated in education, was appropriated by the state, but the central government was not able to address the immediate concerns of local communities, which were often overlooked in favor of universal policies and roles enshrined in codification. By the 1840s, discontent with the new system was high, as numerous tax revolts in the coming decades illustrated.[160] Moreover, the ability of *valis* (or provincial governors) to accommodate local concerns was undermined by the government's desire to prevent the conglomeration of political influence by any one person, such as had happened with Midhat Pasha. Thus, the new nexuses of violence, here concentrated on imamic leadership and public opinion, began to result in violence, i.e., various subject positions struggled to prevent the counterstrategies of others. The Edict of Gülhane and the Imperial Edict of 1856 reconstituted the rules of foreign intervention and representation, which had become a key issue ever since the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.[161] The willingness of foreign powers to intervene in the affairs of non-Muslim communities increased dramatically beginning in the 1850s in the forms of capitulations, education, ministry and charitable services.

In many ways, the move towards representative power improved the position of non-Muslim elites while putting the non-Muslim *rayas* at a great disadvantage. Non-Muslim properties were more difficult to turn into *evkaf*, restricted from providing religious services and exposed to confiscation early on. For *rayas* in non-Muslim *millets*, the paths to obtain representation by a capable political figure or institution were numerous – which should not be equated with successful – the most predominant of which were appeals to (1) local provincial authorities, (2) local or central religious leaders, (3) a rising middle class, (4) the sultan or central government or (5) foreign intervention. As was the case with Muslim *rayas*, appealing to provincial authorities was largely contingent upon local political relations, the quality of the government officials and the availability of resources to deal with requests or emergencies, all three of which were often not in the *rayas'* – Muslim or otherwise – favor; however, authorities were often more willing to appease non-Muslim communities in sensitive areas, particularly along

[160] See Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations Property"; Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late"; Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat."
[161] Ahmad, *Young Turks and Ottoman*, 1–5; Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 38; Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 59; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 75–77, 96, 314–315.

the European, Russian and (later on) Persian fronts. Local community leaders could also negotiate with the state on their behalf, although the success of this often varied. The allowance of *evkaf* to non-Muslim subjects was expanded in the nineteenth century, and while many Muslim elites were drawing away from this system, many non-Muslim communities were using them for social services, the construction of factories, industrialized labor and minority *millet* schools. In many places, the disparity between the well-being and economic lifestyles of Muslims and non-Muslims began to increase in favor of the non-Muslims; however, this largely involved the rising middle class and non-Muslim elites than the *rayas*, who oftentimes remained direly impoverished and exposed to starvation.[162] The Jewish *millet* in particular relied on *evkaf* due to the lack of a centralized religious institution, which made appeals to central religious leaders non-existent.[163] Even though central religious authorities had far superior influences in terms of large-scale projects, the ability to grab their attention was often erratic. It became increasingly popular to rely on the rising middle class of artisans and young professionals who set about founding their own clubs and guilds. These organizations would gradually come to offer the services previously provided by *evkaf*, which in turn gave them political legitimacy (imamic leadership) to speak on behalf of their communities (public opinion). Unlike one's relation to a *vakıf*, the guild saw it as a means of functioning as a representative of the community. These associations were not unknown to be centers of revolutionary ideologies and indoctrination either, something happening for both the Greek Orthodox *millet* and, later on, the Armenian *millet* during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[164]

Thus, the image of non-imperial organizations began to function as "representatives" of these communities. If all these failed, it was very possible to appeal directly to the sultan for intervention, which the *rayas* increasingly did by using (or subverting) Tanzimat ideals; nevertheless, the central government made a general policy of staying out of these situations and delegating responsibility to local notables, who were often the cause of the appeal. Finally, there was the appeal to foreign authorities, which became an urgent dilemma in need of a solution, especially as the Ottomans continued to

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[162] Alexander and Laiou, "Health and Philanthropy Among"; Laiou, "Diverging Realities of Christian"; Laiou, "Between Pious Generosity."
[163] Ahmad, *Young Turks and Ottoman*, 100–111.
[164] Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations Property"; Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late"; Aytekin, "Tax Revolts During Tanzimat"; Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism*, 142–145; Vakali, "Nationalism Justice and Taxation."

lose land to independence movements. These concerns were certainly not unfounded, and the intervention of the "Great Powers" often led to regional instability and violence based on the bias of Eurocentric views, regardless of whether the local population asked for their representation or not.[165] By appealing to these outsiders, populations often unknowingly gave them a *carte blanche* to intervene on behalf of their communities in other matters, or so was the concern (and very often the case); should the population not desire further intervention, if they were even consulted or considered, this was overridden by the pastoral argument: these populations simply did not know what was best for them. It was not uncommon for international powers to use this argument as a means of pursuing their own state's strategies. Though there were certainly discretions and nuances between non-Muslim and Muslim communities, it should be noted that the biggest benefactors were, by and large, the ruling classes, who were able to guide these requests and reserved the right to speak on behalf of this group: the new representative currency of Ottoman politics. At the same time, many non-Muslim *rayas* suffered from financial difficulties and were increasingly exposed to discrimination and inter-communal attacks or pogroms (as were Muslims) along the new nexus of violence of collective community identity that had been attached to economic, social and political privileges through representation; it was not abnormal for their standard of living to have declined during the nineteenth century.

The development of Muslim representative power took a drastically different course and came to increasingly rely on non-state, socio-religious, Islamic revivalist movements. Unlike the non-Muslim population, they had no recourse to foreign representation nor was there as big of a distinction between the provincial authorities and their religious institutions. With the *ulema* reeling from its weakened stance, appealing to local religious leaders could be fruitless. Not because they lacked the desire or eagerness to assist, but rather because they simply lacked the political sway to do so.[166] The lower ranks of the *ulema* were very tolerant of political discourse during this period as long as it did not interfere with the fundamentals of Islam, yet the divide between the lower and upper ranks of the *ulema* was becoming ideologically greater; the upper echelons of the *ulema* fell in line with the central government's position, which made them more than

[165] Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 38; Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism*, 141–145; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 73–77, 209–218; Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 59; Landau, *Pan-Islam*, 36–39.
[166] Çelik, "Tanzimat in Balkans"; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 93, 104.

reluctant to interfere in the government's experiment in provincial governorship.[167] The remaining options, which included an appeal to local governance and directly to the sultan, were drowned out by the overarching process of imperial codification mixed with relations of imamic power, whereby the perception of social services was viewed more from a top-down perspective ("What does this population really need in order to flourish?") rather than the real needs of rural, provincial and urban landscapes. With the continuous diminishment of *vakıf* services in the community and the provincial governments' inability to adequately replace them, a new cluster of power relations based on representation concentrated into a redesigned type of organization: popular Islamic movements. While it was not the first time such movements arose – with the Wahabi movement of the eighteenth century being the most infamous – it was the first time these movements were able to use the representative tools to further their cause and influence. Not only did these movements, which varied in terms of an organized "association," become situated as socio-religious centers in the community (collective identity and imamic leadership), but their ability to unite an overarching group of individuals under one banner – ones that could focus on the concerns of local and underprivileged communities individually while conglomerating into a unified association at a larger level – provided them with a great deal of force in the political technology of representation (i.e., representation as a political tool). In essence, it was a novel way of ensuring the Circle of Justice. The representative *dispositif* emerged in these non-state entities, which were themselves appropriating the representative techniques of official Ottoman politics. These practices, which transferred relations of allegiance to relations of representation, disturbed the established order of things, latching one's position *to their ability to either represent or be represented*.

8.3 The Power to Represent: Sufi Orders and Imamic Networks

Largely driven by a strong adherence to the same fundamentals of orthodox Sunnism, what separated Sufi *tarikats* (religious orders) and the revivalist movements they brought with them, such as the Kadiriyya, the Halvetiyya, the Mevleviyya and the Tijaniyya, was the prevalence of "inner faith" (*iman*) and the community services offered by them.[168]

[167] Aytekin, "Peasant Protest in Late"; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 106, 206.
[168] For more on these types of Sufi orders, see Doja, "Political History of Bektashism." Elias, "Sufism" gives a more detailed outline on the philosophy of Sufism; also see Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*; Trimingham, *Sufi Orders in Islam*. However, not all Suif orders developed in the same way, and an excellent illustration of this is comparing Doja's analysis of the Bektashi order, which found prominence by

These sorts of *tarikats* had been prominent institutions since the eleventh and twelfth centuries, such as the famous Bektashi *tarikat* that became a key ally of the *janissaries* and, for the most part, was likewise heavily persecuted as a result after the latter's dissolution. Even though their spiritual philosophies often leaned closer to the Shiite principles of the Safavids in the Persian Empire – a religious sect that was strictly frowned upon – their bonds of allegiance to the sultan and his caliphate situated them in the imperial order (particularly since the sixteenth century up until the nineteenth century).[169] The central government held the official mantle of Islam, but its increasingly centralized organization with codified and limited functions meant that a disconnect began to appear between the Sublime Porte and the perspectives of local *rayas* communities, often to the latter's economic and social detriment. Sufi *tarikats* filled this gap of airing local grievances, especially through their *tekkes* (lodges), yet these lacked the rigid ideological uniformity that was unfolding in Istanbul.[170] Granted, these *tekkes* had long been deployed throughout the empire, yet their purpose aside from religious services was offering food, shelter, medical services and spiritual guidance – including to locals – while also functioning as centers of business or diplomacy, often with direct support or occasional funding form the Sublime Porte.[171] Due to their perceived mystic nature, they also served as an oracle to the Sultan prior to the nineteenth century, being hailed to interpret the sultan's dreams.[172] In other words, they already had imamic leadership built into their core values, but not through representative strategies but through the sultanic *dispositif's* Circle of Justice.

Around the time of the 1808 Charter of Allegiance, Sultan Mahmud II initiated a systemic reorganization of *tekkes* throughout the empire. This reformation not only

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integrating into the imperial order, Evans-Pritchard's (*Sanusi of Cyrenaica*)) analysis of the Sanusi, which embraced tribal relations and hierarchy instead, and Karataş's ("Ottomanization of Halveti Sufi") analysis of the Halveti Order, which drew close to the Ottoman political establishment only to face temporary persecution due to dubious allegiances. Though these three orders had distinctly different developments, their ability to exist was tied up with the relations of allegiance to Istanbul, and this was the predominant factor in their persisting legitimacy up until the nineteenth century. Moreover, Aščerić-Todd (*Dervishes and Islam*) elaborates on the dervish orders in Bosnia, which gives some insight into the Balkan front, whereas Weismann (*Taste of Modernity*) does the same for the Arab provinces.

[169] For more on the central government's attitude towards Shi'ism, particularly when it came to the issue of loyalty, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Rogan, "Aşiret Mektebi"; Yaslıçimen, "Saving Minds and Loyalties."

[170] See Anscombe, "Islam and Age of Ottoman"; Atmaca, "Three Stages of Political"; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 44–45, 106–107.

[171] Can, "Connecting People"; Choudhury, "Hajj and Hindi"; Terzioğlu, "How to Conceptualize Ottoman"; Watenpaugh, "Deviant Dervishes."

[172] Kafadar, "Self and Others"; Karataş, "Ottomanization of Halveti Sufi."

positioned these institutions as subservient to the Ottoman government, but the *tekkes* had to consult with Istanbul on key matters and were thus infused into a continuous system of political allegiance. The new system even required the replacement of *şeyhs* to be approved by the *sheikh-ül-Islam*. All of this became complicated shortly before the Tanzimat, when the central government attempted to take an indirect role in *tekkes'* administration and to limit the services that a *tekke* could offer. In the process, the central government was also limiting access to knowledge: "Certificates of authoritative knowledge of the [Sufi] order's traditions (*icazetname*) must not be conferred to unqualified dervishes, and, when they are to be conferred, the opinions of not one but several sheikhs must be sought."[173] Nevertheless, the *kadis* (judges) that oversaw the operations of these *tekkes*, particularly in the provinces, were allotted a great deal of autonomy, and a *tekke's* autonomy often involved its relationship with their local *kadi*, who managed to make judgments largely outside the scope of the sultan.[174]

With the implementation of representative power relations, new spaces of political participation became possible, which these Sufi orders began to feed into by shifting the purposes of their *tekkes*. On the one hand, the state formed the *Meslis-i Meşayıh* (Assembly of Sheiks) in 1866 to fully monitor and regulate *tekkes*. On the other hand, the emergence of an increasingly literate and educated Muslim middle class of artisans, merchants, bureaucrats and the lower ranks of the *ulema* – a result of the imamic leadership involved in education and the codification of imperial roles – allowed these *tekkes* to be reinvested with a new social purpose. As Kemal Karpat explains, "The revivalist movements provided individuals from the lower classes with an Islamic vehicle to express their criticism of the traditional Muslim political establishment and the established Islamic hierarchy that was ready to serve the state uncritically."[175] As an Islamic press became more refined and readily available, it also gave writers from these institutions a medium not only to relay their ideas but also absorb politico-religious mores and concepts, particularly when it came to issues like public opinion (through consultation), the moralization of politics (they were religious leaders, after all) and representation as a political tool (speaking not only *on behalf* of Muslim populations but

[173] As quoted in Ömür, "Sufi Orders in Modernizing," 75, for these reformed policies, see 73–78; see also Silverstein, "Sufism and Governmentality," 175–177.
[174] Gerber, "Public Sphere and Civil," 70–71.
[175] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 45, see also 317-318. Also see Atmaca, "Three Stages of Political."

also *for* them).[176] These factors contributed to the rising influence of the Nakşbandia, a Sufi *tarikat* that became, very possibly, the most influential non-state political movement in the nineteenth century (the Committee of Union and Progress, at least during the nineteenth century, included). Karpat describes how the Nakşbandia "was unwittingly changing itself from a purely religious, Orthodox Sufi order into the spokesman of the new sociocultural reality by adding a modern component to its traditional religious functions."[177]

The rapid expansion of this *tekke*-based system found legitimacy by offering imamic leadership through social and charitable services and its physical manifestation in local communities, which permitted it to more easily serve as a representative. This was not only symbolically but architecturally, appropriating the model of the *vakıf* – which they often were. Karpat's description of the expansion of these organizations and the services they offer illuminates the solidification of these power relations:

> [The] combined total of lodges in Istanbul was 260 and 305 in 1882 and 1890, respectively, and 250 in 1920. Many of these lodges served as schools, hospitals, traditional archery training sites, guest houses, and so on rather than being strictly for religious worship…The Nakşbandia believed that a return to the basics of the faith could rejuvenate society if the return and the rejuvenation were properly related to each other. This could be accomplished by remaining anchored in the faith while understanding properly and adapting the Prophet's approach and method of work among living beings.[178]

The Nakşbandia and other *tarikats* were able to unite this division between an Islamic spirit and worldly existence, justifying their purpose through representation rather than allegiance. One had a right to these organizations not by allegiance – though not universal, many Muslim and non-Muslim *evkaf* served different *millets* – but spiritual representation.[179] They gained legitimacy and, to some extent, informal sovereignty due to their commitment to underprivileged populations, not only seeking to ameliorate their suffering but also enlightening and teaching them the path to salvation (the word *tekke* literally means "path to Allah"), thereby embodying imamic leadership. In essence, they came to compete with the imperial programs of imamic power that were being redistributed, particularly in the provincial administration of the *vilayet* system through

[176] For example, see Chih, Mayeur-Jaouen and Seesemann, *Sufism, Literary Production*; Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism*, 179–184; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 68–88, 117–135; Keddie, *Islamic Response to Imperialism*; Weismann, *Naqshbandiyya*, 85–112.
[177] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 107.
[178] Karpat, 107.
[179] Aščerić-Todd, *Dervishes and Islam*; Can, "Connecting People"; Sunar, "Tribes and State," 39–46.

imperial codification and an imperial collective identity. Unlike most nationalist movements that popped up throughout the nineteenth century, the Nakşbandia and like-minded popular Islamist movements were generally non-militant and peaceful – with the exception of occasionally declaring *jihad* against the incursion of non-Islamic foreign powers, mostly Russia – yet their contestation of Ottoman sovereignty and their claims to imamic power often made them the target of the central government's ire.

Though it has been widely argued that the *tekkes* served as an extension of the government, Ines Aščerić-Todd's intricate analysis brings this into doubt. Instead, *tekkes* largely functioned with some degree of autonomy, at least to the extent that they did not challenge the Sultan's Islamic authority; in reality, the government generally applied this model of autonomy to Sufi *tekkes* and only interfered if it posed a threat, sowed unrest or served a diplomatic purpose, though the latter was imposed far less.[180] Moreover, *tekkes* were built upon their own structure of rules that worked as an internal pseudo-legal system, inclusive of punishment.[181] Their internal structure, which operated more as a loose association than a rigid hierarchy, could make this difficult at times. Instead of the orthodox religious principles of the *ulema*, Nakşbandia orders were typically founded by individual *halifes* (disciples) who propagated the teachings of their personal *şeyh* (spiritual leader), which permitted both an overarching mystic-religious systematicity and flexibility to adapt to the worldly problems of the *halife's* immediate flock.[182] The decentralized yet intertwined network of power relations made it a highly effective organization that could spread rapidly in all directions, both in terms of urban as well as rural and inaccessible remote areas, as was the case with Kurdish tribes.[183]

Tekkes' ability to address local concerns drew a large clientele, and increased literacy and communication allowed them to evolve in a more systematic way while obtaining funding through Muslim artisans, bureaucrats and other professionals.[184] No

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[180] Aščerić-Todd, *Dervishes and Islam*, 136–142; Hoexter, "Waqf and Public Sphere," 128–134. For more on how these changing policies came to isolate many communities within the empire from orthodox Sunni educational and religious services – which often led to them turning to these types of movements – can be seen in Yaslıçimen, "Saving Minds and Loyalties," 88–98.
[181] Atmaca, "Three Stages of Political"; Gerber, "Public Sphere and Civil," 68–75.
[182] Weismann (*Naqshbandiyya*) highlights the difference between those Sufi orders that embraced hereditary lineage, such as the Mevleviyya, and those like the Nakşbandi, that were of the *halife* system, whereby one's disciples succeeded the *şeyh*.
[183] Anscombe, "Islam and Age"; Aščerić-Todd, *Dervishes and Islam*, 113–125; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 111–112.
[184] Clayer, "Sufi Printed Matter"; Ghazal, "Ottoman Pasha and End"; Mayeur-Jaouen, "Sufism and Printing."

longer would they simply be decentralized and individualized groups; they would incorporate an overarching ideology at a site that allowed them to speak on behalf of the population.[185] This was not exclusive to Sufi orders and revivalist movements but set up a new political technology that took into account representation as the key to political power. Associations and groups began amassing in a spectrum of guises, from open, vibrant and vocal religious organizations and elitist scientific communities to secret societies (e.g., the Freemasons, the Committee of Union and Progress) and independence or national-revolutionary groups, such as in Bulgaria, the Arabian Peninsula and eventually in the Albanian, Greek and Armenian communities. What made these groups particularly threatening, even if their actual threat was grossly exaggerated (such as in the case of the Armenians), was this newfound ability to speak *on behalf* of a collective, as their representative, regardless of whether those occupying that territory agreed to this.[186] In turn, the individual was transformed into a representative of the community, which included *manifesting the values associated with it*. In other words, their local character allowed them to better deploy imamic leadership, codify their rituals based on local customs, establish a collective identity both in the community and within their larger *tarikat*, serve as a representative of local interests (public opinion and representation as a political tool) and provide not only material sustenance but intellectual, communal and spiritual development through imamic leadership. The purpose of these groups slowly changed from the collection of knowledge to the proliferation of knowledge and the accruement of a base. Knowledge was no longer a restricted domain, at least not in the same manner, but neither was it free flowing. The central structure of the group was meant to cipher this knowledge into an understandable and informative format, which also gave them control over what was siphoned out and what was not. Though these types of associations came to produce an array of features, some of them can be picked out individually. These techniques formed the cohesive unity of the representative *dispositif* as it was emerging across the empire, yet perhaps no other non-state entity was able to employ them so effectively thanks to how Sufi *tarikats* were situated in the imperial social and cultural life.

[185] Kasaba, *Moveable Empire*, 43-52.
[186] Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism*, 142–145; Suny, *They Can Live*, 105–108.

8.3.1 Historical Roots of Legitimacy

The representative role of justifying one's position and beliefs historically had already been exhibited by the Ottoman government since the beginning of the Tanzimat (see chapter five, sections 1 and 2, chapter 6, section two). What was unique about its occurrence in the revivalist movements was the decentering of the state's monopoly on history.[187] The mystical structure of these sects allowed them to reinterpret Islamic history, especially in terms of competing *halife* orders; this gave their historical interpretations a great deal of flexibility and alterability, often being rooted in local historical accounts or those of their specific order.[188] In other words, a political order was being put forth that was more foundational than the empire; the truth of politics laid not in the foundation of the state but something deeper, something that extended beyond the depths of the Ottoman government, something even they would have to abide by. Their loyalty was to a higher law that they then had a duty to relay to others. As an imamic representative and leader, the *şeyh's* task was not to speak *for them*, not of their *desires*, but instead *on their behalf* to earn what was in their best interest while also speaking *to them* about the spirit that connected them all.[189] Their criticisms and histories differed from those of the earlier groups, with the reformers and Young Ottomans often reaching back to the foundation of the empire. These *tarikats* were more interested in the foundation of Islam (for political guidance) rather than the foundation of the empire. Karpat elaborates on how "the Nakşbandia increasingly emphasized that Muhammad carried out his mission *in this* world and that he transformed the disparate Arabe tribes sunk in *cahiliyya* (ignorance, decadence) into a pious but dynamic and resourceful community."[190] Nonetheless, it was this decentering of state sovereignty that made these groups truly revolutionary, to which the Sublime Porte did not turn a blind eye. In this way, the role of historical legitimacy gave credence to them serving as representatives, thus using history to legitimate their own positions just in the way earlier sultans and later Tanzimat-era historians were doing; by claiming a historical legitimacy, not built on family lineage but on cultural heritage, they incorporated representation as a political tool.

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[187] For instance, see Abu-Manneh, *Studies on Islam*, 99-114; Clayer, "Sufi Printed Matter"; Ghazal, "Ottoman Pasha and End"; Hagen and Menchinger, "Ottoman Historical Thought"; Karataş, "Ottomanization of Halveti Sufi."
[188] Can, "Connecting People"; Ömür, "Sufi Orders in Modernizing"; Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*.
[189] For example, see Wilson, "Twilight of Ottoman Sufism."
[190] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 107.

8.3.2 Dispersion of Perspectives

Though knowledge started to become more readily available, *tarikats'* commitment to personal faith meant that knowledge was decentralized. Karpat argues, "The Nakşbandia evolved not as a single, rigidly pyramidal Sufi *tarikat* but as a loose organization in which the various *halife*s (successors and disciples) could interpret teachings of their *şeyh* (leader-master) in a rather liberal fashion."[191] The implications of this development split in two directions: (a) because different social landscapes and geographical environments require one to address community needs, it becomes necessary for this type of knowledge to consider local circumstances; (b) though there was a universal adherence to Islam, *tarikats* proposed competing interpretations of the source material – granted it did not go against the fundamentals of Islam, but there are even cases of this occurring – as well as discussions on extra-religious issues. For instance, when Said Nursi was put on trial in 1909, he aptly noted:

> You must view my coarse appearances with the "glasses" of that region and not according to the refinement of Istanbul…My dress and behavior is contrary to the accepted norm [prevailing in Istanbul]. Your criterion should not be based on appearance but on something lofty and permanent such as spirit [faith] and what is right.[192]

For extra-religious issues, the Islamist movements intensely adhered to the providence of charitable services and assistance to the community, but this meant its scope overlapped with the state's authority. The non-centric formula by which Sufi *tarikats* were composed relied on them, particularly with the emergence of increased literacy and the availability of presses, seeking out the perspectives of others but also contributing their own.[193] In essence, they were learning the relationships by which public opinion functioned and subverting it for a new purpose that used not only consultation but also engagement in public discourses on religious, social and political matters. The dispersion of perspectives was thus essential to allowing the flexibility the representative *dispositif* required – and without it, they would not be able to claim to be such influential representatives – yet was still grounded in a core collective identity.

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[191] Karpat, 108. Also see Anscombe, "Islam and Age"; Atmaca, "Three Stages of Political"; Aščerić-Todd, *Dervishes and Islam*; Can, "Connecting People"; Ömür, "Sufi Orders in Modernizing."
[192] As quoted in Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 319.
[193] See Clayer, "Sufi Printed Matter"; Mayeur-Jaouen, "Sufism and Printing."

8.3.3 Unification of Collective

Though these *tekkes* were allowed to coexist within an overarching collective, the political force of Islamist movements, associations, guilds, clubs, scientific communities or nationalist movements came from the appearance of a unified front. This was quintessential to all popular movements occurring within the political technology of representation. On the one hand, this allowed for the expansion of intellectual debates, relations with commerce and international ties. Prominent *tarikats* were not only able to better fund themselves, but their wide-reaching network allowed for communication and organization between their *tekkes*, furthering relations with businessmen, artisans and foreign officials.[194] On the other hand, the strength of a *tarikat* often rested in its perceived legitimacy by local populations. Fractures within a Sufi *tarikat* would oftentimes lead to the deterioration of both strands. Karpat illustrates that how this process gradually led to a sense of unity in dispersion:

> The new "nationalism" stemmed from the new social stratum that took over the representation of Islam and the cause of the Muslims. Indeed, the government's signing away of the lands inhabited by Muslims resulted in three separate movements of popular resistance to occupation in which the Islamic sense of solidarity and self-preservation was used to mobilize the local population.[195]

Additionally, the financial resources of donors became more essential as the government's regulations limited the funds for these institutions, so the rise of an Islamic middle class was harnessed by *tekkes* as a new type of donor. These donors were eager to reap the benefits of the *tarikats* as well, having an association to speak on their behalf.[196] Meanwhile, their charitable services and community building made them widely popular. In this way, the collective identity of *tarikats* relied on a dispersion of positions and ideas, yet this had to eventually be subsumed under a unified voice that came by way of imamic leadership. As these were already religious organizations, it was not difficult for them to include the moralization of politics in this, and as Karpat's excerpt makes clear, the threat of disagreeing personalities risked the collapse of the whole *tarikat*, thereby combining this moralization with imamic leadership. In the end, the collective forces of influential and popular *tarikats* became progressively influential in Ottoman politics as the nineteenth century came to an end.

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[194] See Abu-Manneh, *Studies on Islam*; 149-160; Atmaca, "Three Stages of Political"; Choudhury, "Hajj and Hindi"; Ghazal, "Ottoman Pasha and End"; Ömür, "Sufi Orders in Modernizing."
[195] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 152.
[196] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*; Ömür, "Sufi Orders in Modernizing"; Silverstein, "Sufism and Governmentality."

8.3.4 Accruing a Base

An indispensable component of the success or failure of a *tarikat* involved its ability to accrue a base of support in local communities, which usually involved two trajectories. For starters, it became necessary to appeal to local populations through either spiritual or community services. Not only did a strong base give credence to legitimacy, but it played into the ability to keep *tekkes* operational. The central authorities were not shy about bringing their hammer down on popular Islamic movements during the nineteenth century, but strong ties of legitimacy could make it difficult for the sultan to remove individuals or confiscate *tekkes* if it would cause regional unrest. Second, there became a need to spread their *tarikats* not only horizontally over a wide mass of people but also vertically. Over time, "The community became the source of power for the mobilization welling up from below, as the popular orders, notably the Sufis, increased their following and extended their influence into the urban areas."[197] Different socio-political connections gave these *tarikats* key methods of funding and political influence. The rising middle class was a new source of funding that did not require appeasing local notables or the central government; coordinating support from high government officials, popular intellectuals or regional tribes could lead to far more security and prosperity. These developments gave incentives not only for forming collective identities for representation but also belonging to them. While they were not imperial collective identities – and this will be vital for comprehending the emergence of national identity – they were grounded in the advantages such an identity had to offer within a representative *dispositif*.

8.3.5 Networks of Communication

Not only was there an expansion of the means of communication, but this was bound up with *how* communication was occurring. It became less about establishing a bulwark around privileged systems of knowledge and more about its regulation, dispersion and utility. The function that knowledge served in imperial politics was completely overturned in this respect, and obtaining access to knowledge became just as important as the knowledge itself.[198] Suif *tarikats* were further uniquely situated that they were able to interact with nomadic or peripheral and isolated populations, who also spoke a vast

[197] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 90.
[198] For a highly engaged and innovative anthology on this, see Chih, Mayeur-Jaouen and Seesemann, *Sufism, Literacy Production*. Two notable inclusions are Clayer, "Sufi Printed Matter"; Mayeur-Jaouen, "Sufism and Printing."

array of languages and dialects, due to the structure of their dispersed organization.[199] At the same time, their rapid growth and expansion was contingent upon many of the mechanisms that had been developed up until this point (e.g., codification of roles, the rise in education and industrialization, widespread literacy and the availability of presses, improved means of transportation and communication, etc.). Karpat provides an elaborate account of how these changes "permitted the rise of the new middle class, which it could mobilize around a 'national' – that is, Islamic – axis and give modernization a certain legitimacy and popular acceptance that made it relatively successful, democratic, and lasting in the Turkish state."[200] Though the Tanzimat reformers envisioned an education and socioeconomic system that would initiate industrialization, the result was a plethora of new communications at all levels of the empire. Knowledge would no longer be hidden in garbs of divine interpretation; it was slowly emerging as something that needed to be invested in, assessed and redeployed pragmatically. The government assuredly utilized these mechanisms in their projects involving imamic leadership, but so did these popular movements that arose with them in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

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These were the late stages of the transition from a sultanic *dispositif* of allegiance to a representative *dispositif* involved in a dramatic reinterpretation of the Circle of Justice and imperial governing, which is a sentiment Karpat shares: "The agrarian groups were not then aiming to achieve political control of the state but rather to *redefining its functions* to make it service-oriented and aware of local needs and the communal good."[201] The state's inadequate financing and bureaucratic structure made this close to impossible in many cases. The result was the emergence of representative power in non-state sectors that rose to the level of collective political organizations. The most illustrative political associations were Sufi *tarikats*, yet the shifting demographics towards an Islamic population made *rayas* and middle-class Muslims the most tangible and influential collective. Particularly in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the imperial structure gradually shifted towards one that permitted political participation under the heading of representation.[202] One of the primary issues of the original Patriotic Alliance

[199] Kasaba, *Moveable Empire*, 43-52.
[200] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 91, see also 98-103, 119-124. In terms of advancements in transportation, see Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism*, 166–169.
[201] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 93.
[202] Karpat, 104.

had been just this: an inability to breach the upper echelons of the empire's administrative elites. Neither Abdülhamid II nor the representative political groups to arise thereafter were ignorant of the newfound political force that these collectives presented. For better or worse, all subjects of the empire were exposed to the political technology of representation from numerous directions. Whether it was from the local, regional or imperial level, subjects of the empire regardless of class, creed or race had to find their place within this emerging network.

As the case of Sufi *tarikats* has demonstrated, these techniques amassed into a unique, cohesive and far-reaching *dispositif* that redeployed the strategies that had been set out during the Tanzimat and transformed into one of Foucault's "intentional" and "non-subjective" *dispositif*. This section has sought to demonstrate how these tools fit together and became interwoven around five axes: (a) historical roots of legitimacy, (b) a dispersion of perspectives, (c) the unification of a collective, (d) accruing a base and (e) networks of communication. The (a) historical roots of legitimacy were grounded in the advanced means of communication and the dissemination of information that allowed them to present their own interpretations of history, particularly one founded on populations rather than territories, in a way that capitalized on *representation as a political tool*. Alongside this, (b) a dispersion of perspectives allowed various trajectories of multifarious and diverse *tarikats* to debate Islamic matters and develop their scholastic endeavors – both in the press and with their "flocks" – based on the same relationship dynamics professed by the Young Ottomans with *public opinion*. Moreover, this was intrinsically dependent upon (c) the unification of a collective, which required submission from the community and imamic leadership through communal services, spiritual guidance and representational voices that grew in strength as the *tarikat* grew in size. The moralization of politics only further assisted these organizations in appropriating these tools, but it also threatened their demise if personal disagreements between *şehs* (i.e., imamic leaders) were put over the good of the collective. As is derived from the previous two points, the representative influence of a *tarikat* necessitated that local spiritual leaders (d) accrued a base of followers, in turn presenting these followers with a local but also regional – or even imperial or international – *collective identity*; this not only became something that was possible but also desirable for many, especially the *rayas* and the up-and-coming class of artisans and businessmen. Nevertheless, all of this was partly due to the repercussions of the Tanzimat, whether these were acknowledged or not. Improved

means of communication not only meant that people were able to interact with others at an unprecedented rate, but it also caused the mass availability of knowledge – at least to those with the tools to access the information – which had long been kept in reserved for the *ulema* throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire. As the next section explains, these techniques culminated in a radically new phenomenon that would come to encapsulate national identity and belonging (see next chapter) in the coming decades: spirit.

8.4 The Creation of Spirit: Between Imamic Power and Public Opinion

Sultan Abdülhamid II serves as one of the most contentious figures in the late Ottoman period. On the one hand, he was known for building up a massive *hafiyye* (spy) network of surveillance, his censorship (which was not only widened but also instilled a system of self-censorship), incarcerating, exiling or assassinating political individuals and his appropriation of Islam as a tool for mass support.[203] Alongside this, a massive expansion of bureaucracy and earlier reform projects took flight, which has led some scholars to position him as a modernist and humanitarian leader.[204] However, amidst these changes, a number of representative techniques were either incorporated, redirected, reinvested or completely absorbed by the state, which would later be taken up by a new generation of Ottoman intellectuals and, in the end, the Republic of Turkey. The focus here is not on individuals or ideologies but on the very conditions of possibility, the *regime du savoir* and subject positions. While Abdülhamid II did incorporate Islam more prominently into the institution of the sultan – and the government as a whole – this must be contextualized within a wider network of an emerging representative *dispositif*. From early on, Abdülhamid II proved very knowledgeable when it came to the dynamics of Islam within and outside of the empire. His relationship with the popular Islamic movements and *tarikats* was quite explicit on this point. Rather than having a unilateral policy towards non-Orthodox movements, which would be expected considering the codifying universalism being employed throughout the empire, he took a more cautious approach to spiritual and community leaders. He was not hesitant to squash movements that

[203] Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism*, 158–60.
[204] For example, see Boyar, "Press and Palace"; Klein, "Conflict and Collaboration."

undermined the government's claim to legitimacy, particularly through exile.[205] Unlike the Young Ottomans and later on the intellectual wing of the Young Turks, these religious exiles drew their political legitimacy and force from local populations, not foreign relations and a wide readership (as the previous section showed). The same policy employed towards political intellectuals and individuals did not provide the same resources to these Islamic leaders. Nevertheless, their exile often allowed these *şeyhs* to form new *tekkes* in the locales of their banishment, spreading the expansion of non-state representative networks to the peripherals of the empire.

At the same time, Abdülhamid II was all too eager to embrace Islamic orders that did not undermine his legitimacy, allowing him to capitalize on their popularity, yet this was an issue that concerned the Ottoman bureaucrats long before Abdülhamid II.[206] By the time of Abdülhamid II, large-scale projects were already under way to bring these Islamic movements under the umbrella of the central government.[207] The *Meclis-i Meşayih* facilitated the issuance of *vakıf* status to local *tekkes* and further provided them with funding.[208] The bureaucratization of these *tarikats* required constant relays of loyalty to the government, such as monthly reports on administrative tasks and the state of the *tekke*, which forced them towards a more administrative function.[209] The deployment of Islam as a unifying element of the state came to incorporate this representative identity into the state's legitimacy. A conceptual Islamic identity was imperialized, and the sultan as the physical embodiment of the *ümmet* (Islamic community) came to be ritualized in state ceremonies, discourses, bureaucracy and institutions. These Islamic revivalist movements were very rarely pan-Islamic, at least domestically in the empire, and they often professed the principles of Islam as being superior to the empire.[210] However, the subsumption of this identity allowed the government to take advantage of these large-scale religious organizations and redeploy Islamism as the foundation of the state through pan-Islamic policies. The relationships that developed henceforth were no longer about allegiance but rather representation, of which loyalty was a predominant factor.

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[205] Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in Ottoman," 347–349; Sunar, "Tribes and State," 39–46; Weismann, *The Naqshbandiyya*, 91–94.
[206] For instance, Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in Ottoman," 346–347; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*; Soleimani, *Islam and Competing Nationalisms*, 129–136; Weismann, *Naqshbandiyya*, 85–112; Wilson, "Twilight of Ottoman Sufism."
[207] Can, "Connecting People"; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 46.
[208] Can, "Connecting People," 396.
[209] Silverstein, "Sufism and Governmentality," 181–183; Watenpaugh, "Deviant Dervishes."
[210] Landau, *Pan-Islam*, 148–154.

Prior to the late nineteenth century, Islamic governing bodies and caliphs throughout the world held no real political relations among one another, or rather this manner of viewing their relationship was extremely rare.[211] In a more globalized world, this became a tool that Abdülhamid II was all too ready to use. Most often, pleas for non-Ottoman Islamic communities came from abroad, primarily from places like India or former Ottoman domains (e.g., the Balkans, the Caucasus, north Africa).[212] The sultan took up the image of representing the global Islamic community, which was reinforced by the portrayal of a collective Ottoman cultural heritage. Cultural artifacts, sites, customs and ceremonies acquired a whole other dimension under Abdülhamid II's reign.[213] As for foreign intervention, with further annexation and nationalist independence movements taking off, the central government worked on establishing itself as the rightful ruler-cum-representative of *all* Ottoman subjects.[214] The Ottoman dynasty was not just the cultural ancestor of the non-Muslim *millets* and the Seljuk Turks but also of those cultures that pre-dated them, like the Byzantine Empire and Ancient Greece. Ironically, this meant appealing to the largest potential representative group: Muslims. After the Russo-Turkish War ended in 1878, the Ottomans found themselves losing much of their European territories, including a great deal of non-Muslim subjects, so the shift towards Islamic identity in the last decades of the nineteenth century should come as no surprise. The new political technology of representation – based on the five axes laid out in the previous section – completely reformulated the relationship between Ottoman subjects and the imperial government, which was no longer their ruler due to security but rather the representative, imamic leader of their interests.

In this respect, Abdülhamid II did not make the state subservient to Islam. The focus of the central government had shifted from one primarily grounded in territory and sultanic sovereignty to one interested in the subjects of its empire; the community, be that local or imperial, became the central determinative factor of Ottoman (and later Turkish) politics.[215] Yet, this elevation of a imperial or regional collective "community" also

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[211] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 49.
[212] Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in Ottoman," 350–356; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 48–49; Landau, *Pan-Islam*, 9–72; Supratman, "Before Ethical Policy."
[213] For some illustrations of this, see Çelik, *Displaying the Orient*; Çiydem, Özdemir and Erturk, "Re-Think Tanzimat Period"; Deringil, "Invention of Tradition"; Ersoy, "Architecture and Search"; Necipoğlu, *History and Ideology*; Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots*.
[214] Gülalp, "Using Islam as Political," 23–27; Suny, *They Can Live*.
[215] Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in Ottoman"; Gülalp, "Using Islam as Political"; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*; Landau, *Pan-Islam*.

shifted the *raison d'état* from the will of the sultan to something else: spirit (*irade*). Identity, which had largely been a juridico-legalistic mechanism centered on religious ties, became politicized, and what connected a *millet* was not a commitment to religion (though that could be important) but the underlying *irade* unifying it. Unlike Foucault's "docile body" and "soul," this was not individualistic but communal. The *"spirit"* represented the ideals and values of the community, an intra-subjective bond that tied subjects to one another while also attaching them to the Ottoman Empire. It not only *represented* the community but was *representative* of it, and diversion from such spirit was cause for punishment. Representation not only became something desirable, but not having it became something to be feared. These five axes (historical roots of legitimacy, dispersion of perspectives, unification of collective, accruing a base and networks of communication) generated neoteric capacities for subjects of all subject positions, but it also allowed power relations to form clusters at certain points, laying the groundwork for nexuses of violence. The justification for banishment, imprisonment or death was not a detriment to the sultan's authority but the danger it posed to the Ottoman *millet*. This technology was applied at all levels of Ottoman society, even on its rulers, but not in a uniform manner. The moralization of politics meant that leaders would now be judged not on their ability to rule but on their personal character and its adherence to the *irade* – what Max Weber referred to as "charismatic leadership," yet this feature was built into the political technology of Ottoman representation – and many of the critiques that arose against Abdülhamid II were based on his personal moral deficit.[216]

Leaders were now to be judged not by their social position but their connection to the *milli irade* (national will), which made the emergence of "cults of personality" rather commonplace.[217] Even Abdülhamid II had to adhere to the same networks of representative power, such as grounding his legitimacy historically: "If we want to rejuvenate, find our previous force, and reach our old greatness we ought to remember the fountain head of our strength. What is beneficial to us is not to imitate the so-called European civilization but return to the *şeriat*, the source of our strength."[218] This emergence should not be confused with an ideological or immaterial "spirit" that transcends worldly desires. The *irade* was constructed corporeally, and its persistence

[216] For a Weberian interpretation of Abdülhamid II's reign, see Özçin, "Review of Hamidiye Regime."
[217] For some recent illustrative studies on the "cult of personality" in this emerging context, one can consult Berger, "Leader as Father"; Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism*, 133–191; Kanadıkırık, "Patrimonialism in Modernisation"; McMillan, *I Am State*, 167–184.
[218] As quoted in Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 162; see also Boyar, "Press and Palace," 424.

relied on a vast network of material power relations, stretching from new presses, modes of communication, administrative hierarchies, elective politics, elaborate and decorative ceremonies, the reevaluated function of the *tekkes* and physical sites of collectives, such as party headquarters, regulated spaces of political participation and a new legal order. In essence, the spirit was the result of the mechanisms of representation, but it consecutively impacted these elements of the representative *dispositif*. In this manner, the mechanism of the *irade* was not limited to the imperial structure but proliferated as a political technology that was the "tactical polyvalence of discourses," or as Foucault states, the spirit was grounded in "methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus."[219]

Two prevalent techniques were sutured into this political technology: imamic leadership (bureaucratization) and universalization (public opinion). In terms of imamic leadership, widespread use of codified administrative institutions shifted from the regulation of imperial policies to acting as an instructive leader to Ottoman populations, just like a shepherd to his flock (the moralization of politics). While the press and literacy exploded, there was also the expansion of censorship techniques, illustrating how emerging networks of communication played into these relations. For the most part, these were in place before Abdülhamid II's reign and were already expanding in the late 1860s; however, this was meant to protect public morality, and the press came to be seen as a way of disseminating knowledge, yet this knowledge had to be appropriate and instructive.[220] It should not be surprising, then, that Abdülhamid II allegedly understood his subjects as "ignorant and innocent so we are compelled to treat it [the population] like children for indeed they are no different from bodily grown-up children."[221] Visual media, education, communication and collective organizations came under closer scrutiny and reinforced this imamic leadership: Abdülhamid II was not only a ruler but had a direct responsibility to enlighten his subjects as their representative, thereby using representation as a political tool. Ebru Boyar excellently situates the dynamics of the power relations between the press and the Ottoman government:

> The sultan thus needed the press as much as the press needed the palace for its survival. This meant that relations between the palace and the press were not based merely on oppression by the political

[219] Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 89.
[220] Boyar, "Press and Palace"; Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in Ottoman"; Işık, "Kurdish and Armenian Relations," 37–44.
[221] As quoted in Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 166; see also Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in Ottoman," 347.

> power, formularized as censorship. It was a mutually beneficial arrangement – although the character of this relation cannot be described as a relationship of equals.[222]

Between the palace and the press, there was the desire for economic security and patronage – a microcosm of the new Circle of Justice – which the palace showered these media outlets with – and regularly provided incentivizing gifts – in return for their cooperation.[223] The relationship between the subject and the central government was one of regulation, but not arbitrary regulation. The government was responsible for ensuring the correct information reached the public, and it came to be seen as a means for the Sublime Porte – or at least the sultanate under Abdülhamid II – to communicate directly with those he represented.

Abdülhamid II's reign also saw the need to appropriate the dynamics of public opinion, or rather the position of speaking for a collective. Portrayals of art and civilization became one prominent means to do this. In 1893, Abdülhamid II sent a photo album to the United States as a gift. The album contained 1,819 photographs capturing diverse elements of the empire, from a group of impoverished Jewish men sitting around to the stylish architecture of Ottoman heritage. The photos were highly staged and artificial in many respects, especially considering how Muslim women were not allowed to be photographed in provocative poses, yet the role these photos played was clear. It was representative of the wide selection of Ottoman elements and the technological, artistic and economic advancements of the empire, all tied together by their Ottoman status, atop of which sat the sultan as their spokesman. Similar gifts were delivered to many world powers, yet these same strategies were being employed within the empire, even if they strongly veered towards an Islamic base. At the same time, codified projects of universalization sought to incorporate all Ottoman subjects – or all relevant subjects – into a core collective group that could be administered to as well as spoken for. The sultan, and later the Young Turkish government, increasingly spoke *on behalf* of those who could not speak for themselves. The edicts issued were relevant to all people, not because the sultan was their ruler but because it was what was best *for them*.

Imperial policies worked to unify dispersed elements of the empire into a core, representative group. In this respect, the Turkish language was increasingly required to participate in the emerging state structure, for only those who knew the universal language

[222] Boyar, "Press and Palace," 425.
[223] Boyar, 426–32; Landau, *Pan-Islam*, 9–72.

of the people could speak for them; ignorance of Turkish, either by an individual or a community, was often interpreted as a lack of loyalty to the empire.[224] Carter Findley explains how "all these [centralizing] systems reinforced hypercentralization, making it natural that even the highest officials feared to take any action without 'requesting authorization' (*istizan*) from the palace."[225] The threshold of loyalty thus became higher for non-Muslim communities, particularly as their primary language was often a local dialect; there are numerous cases of the Sublime Porte assigning Turkish-speaking bureaucrats to the Arab peninsula with no proficiency in Arabic nor the local languages, to the detriment of both the sultan's legitimacy and the socio-economic state of the region – which only bolstered the position of Sufi *tarikats* to serve as their representatives. The great expansion of education initiatives under Abdülhamid II is impressive and certainly spread awareness and knowledge of Ottoman Turkish, but the financial limits of the state and the burdens of a geographically expansive population meant it did not begin to near universal education. Access to education, and thus knowledge, became professional currency in the late Ottoman Empire. The ability to speak *for all* Ottomans necessitated that you *spoke/read* Ottoman Turkish, so privileges available for non-Muslim populations became largely contingent upon gaining access to this knowledge or finding representation elsewhere. Perhaps in an attempt to bring these non-Muslim populations into the folds of the empire, Ottoman Turkish was decreed as the mandated language for both Muslim and non-Muslim schools, private or otherwise, yet this was never truly employable as the means and man-power such an initiative would have required did not exist – though that did not prevent the Ottoman state from punishing these institutions.[226]

For many emerging Sufi *tarikats*, this would become a burden that would end their *tekkes* due to an inability to cooperate with the central government.[227] In the mid-1880s, the central government even forbade all internal and external correspondences (i.e., telegrams) not sent in Ottoman Turkish, and the emphasis of Turkish in the 1876 Constitution was to be intensified under Abdülhamid II; by the end of the nineteenth century, the political atmosphere made it incrementally difficult to establish non-Turkish publications and publishing houses, which was a big hit to non-Muslim and peripheral

[224] Soleimani, *Islam and Competing Nationalisms*, 93–106.
[225] Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism*, 159.
[226] Findley, 134–139; Soleimani, *Islam and Competing Nationalisms*, 111–120.
[227] Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*; Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*.

Muslim populations like the Kurds, Albanians and Arabs.[228] Even Islam was "Ottomanized," relying less on Arabic and more on Turkish and other linguistic versions (in the latter case, it was aimed at countering nationalist movements and was carried out on a regional-security basis); this would become a particularly alluring loci of power relations for pan-Turkism.[229] Kamal Soleimani expresses how the "Turkish [language] is not only declared as a marker of the sovereign's identity but also becomes a yardstick for determining the degree of the citizenship of others in this hierarchical sociopolitical context."[230] There were of course advantages to having a unilaterally used language throughout the empire, but the dynamics of this being Turkish should not be viewed as neutral but a source of contention. This circular pattern of representation thus cast its shadow over the entirety of Ottoman society, all of which was tied together and reliant upon a vast array of bureaucratizing and disciplinary networks of power relations in terms of education, local and imperial administration, military deployment and linguistic developments.

The relations surrounding imamic leadership and public opinion also encouraged the Ottoman government to invest in imperially sensitive locations, such as cultural buildings, holy sites, monuments and historical artifacts. One such example is the increased importance of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, which not only served to legitimate the sultan's rule as protector of these locales – his caliphate relied on this actually – but also to dispel colonialist aspirations on the Saudi peninsula, as Ş. Tufan Buzpinar details:

> [The central government] supported the local administration [of these *vilayets*], police and armed forces, but in addition they covered donations, salaries and allowances paid to Hijazi notables, sums paid to Bedouin chiefs as an incentive to desist from raiding, funds for the purchase of food and basic commodities for the population, and monies devoted to the upkeep of holy places.[231]

Alongside this, there were a series of land practices, such as Abdülhamid's purchase of large tracts of property in Palestine, that worked towards incorporating more peripheral elements of the empire; in this case, the Bedouin tribes were the target, and many nomadic groups were settled as local administrative, agricultural and charitable enterprises went

[228] For more on Ottoman Turkish linguistic policies and means of communication, see Soleimani, *Islam and Competing Nationalisms*, 107–109, 121–124.
[229] Soleimani, 97–106; also see Landau, *Pan-Turkism*, 29–73.
[230] Soleimani, *Islam and Competing Nationalisms*, 117; also see Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism*, 150–153.
[231] Buzpinar, "Hijaz, Abdulhamid II," 101.

into effect, yet the recipients of these projects involved all *millets*.[232] These projects were largely used to reestablish the legitimacy of the sultan as sovereign-caliph, yet they did not do so based on allegiance – which would have been the case a century earlier – but asserting oneself as the imamic representative of Ottoman subjects.

To reinforce these relations, Abdülhamid II founded the *Mekteb-i Aşiret-i Humayun* (Imperial Tribal School) in 1892, which served to educate the sons of Arab and Kurdish *şeyhs* and other tribal notables (especially those disobedient ones the Sublime Porte sought to replace); later on, the children of Albanian tribes were included due to pressure from that region. The ambition of these schools was aimed at indoctrinating Shia regions into Sunnism – or more specifically, "'The correcting of beliefs' (*tashîh-I akâid*)"; at the same time, they disseminated the tools necessary to incorporate these tribes and peripheral regions into the imperial order, though these schools ceased functioning in 1907.[233] This was another illustration of the new dynamics involving the flow of knowledge, which though was now free flowing nevertheless required filtering, as the mission statement of the tribal school makes explicit:

> The principal aim for the founding of the school is to enable the tribal people to partake of the prosperity that emanates from knowledge and civilization, and to further augment their well-known natural inclination towards and love for the Great Islamic Caliphate, and the Sublime Ottoman Sultanate, as well as to strengthen and confirm earnest loyalty to the state and religious duties incumbent on them by the Şeriat and civil laws. …
>
> Upon completion and receipt of diploma, when the students return to their tribes, they will work as teachers in schools which are intended to be opened in their environs, or in some other appropriate service and will be hired by the state civil service.[234]

The connections made between these rural and urban areas, both old and new, not only symbolized the sultan, and thus the Ottoman government, as the representative of its subjects, but it was materially manifested in these projects. One manner for dealing with regional tribes and their own internal political hierarchy thus emerged; this involved settling the Bedouin tribes through an expanded armed gendarme force, improved communication and transportation systems and economic opportunities through education and the use of arable land (which provided destinations to relocate the growing

[232] Fischel and Kark, "Sultan Abdülhamid II."
[233] Yaslıçimen, "Saving Minds and Loyalties," 86. For more on this tribal school, one can consult Rogan, "Aşiret Mektebi."
[234] As quoted in Rogan, "Aşiret Mektebi," 87.

number of Muslim refugees in the empire *and* to Islamically populate desolate imperial peripherals). However, this was not the only way tribal structures were dealt with.

8.5 The Limits of Representation: Nexuses of Violence in the Peripheries

Abdülhamid II faced tribal problems on the Eastern front from nomadic Kurdish populations, yet his approach to these "troublemakers" was strikingly different. Tribal clashes and raids were nothing new, yet their frequency and extent very much were an outcome of the Tanzimat's reformist mindset.[235] Up until that time, dynastic Kurdish *emirs* (emirates) ruled with a flexible degree of autonomy: they certainly had the advantage of being more distant and difficult to deal with than other Ottoman regions, and their location along the Russian front – which had become increasingly sensitive since the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca – allowed them more negotiating room with the Sublime Porte; however, they were by no means fully autonomous and held continuous ties with imperial governments. While the translation of "emirates" may be debatable on this point, since they were still within the Ottoman domains, up until this point they functioned as political entities in their own right with a mixture of close and loose ties to the Sublime Porte; they ruled either through familial or tribal dynasties and were often exempt from imperial rules and regulations in favor of their own system of governance, from punishment and security to agricultural and religious issues. Traditionally, these regions were ruled by Kurdish *emirs*, who amassed great tracts of land and populations under their rule based on tribal customs. Such tribal structures were far less chaotic than may seem, and before their downfall, these expanding *emirs* were able to enhance social services, guarantee security, form administrative structures and settle nomadic Kurdish persons. When the state found a tribesman guilty of a crime, it was even left to the *emirs*, who had pledged allegiance to the sultan, to decide and execute the punishment.[236] However, by the 1840s, some of these *emirs* had grown large enough to rebel against Istanbul in numerous ways – contesting their right to political independence – and so the Sublime Porte set out to break these tribes apart and prevent such an accumulation of force and influence in the region.[237]

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[235] For a brief account of this transformation, see Deringil, "Armenian Question Is Finally," 348–351.
[236] Sunar, "Tribes and State," 10–11.
[237] Akturk, "Development of Kurdish National," 62–63; Eppel, *People Without a State*, 45–64; Sunar, "Tribes and State," 6–32; Yadirgi, *Political Economy of Kurds*, 93–150.

It was immensely successful in this respect, but the vacuum of authority in Kurdish regions quickly devolved into power grabs by smaller, less organized tribal *ağas* (chiefs) and *şeyhs*, further diminishing regional security and reforms. The economic and land policies introduced in the 1860s and 1870s transformed the Eastern front entirely, and a dash for resources and land, which were quickly becoming the currency of the day, plagued not only Kurds but all populations in the region. The settling of nomadic tribes and the regulations imposed have been viewed as Istanbul's desire to profit off of the increased taxation, and while that is certainly true, with the collapse of the dynastic *emirs*, the government began treating the Kurdish tribes as subjects rather than as political entities.[238] Decreased security in difficult to reach regions meant military might, already straining under the empire's financial crises, was limited. The decentralization of tribes meant Istanbul had little chance of negotiating or forming alliances.[239] In this section, I detail how the representative *dispositif* not only spread throughout the provinces (in this case, the eastern front) but that the polyvalent nature of the *dispositif* menat that it was ubiquitous but not egalitarian; it did not function the same in every context but relied on local networks of power relations, the present *régime du savoir* and the subject positions available. Importantly, the representative *dispositif* did not only present a new order of things, inclusive of new capabilities offered to those who fell within this network, but further calcified nexuses of violence along the aforementioned axes by incorporating the technologies that had been constructed and absorbed into the functioning of "spirit": (a) historical roots of legitimacy, (b) dispersion of perspectives, (c) unification of collective, (d) accruing a base and (e) networks of communication.

The threat of foreign intervention in the aftermath of the Imperial Edict of 1856 and the push by foreign nations in terms of missionary and educational activity exacerbated fears of Armenian collective identity and disloyalty, which only accelerated after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. On the one hand, there was an array of Kurdish tribes that formed behind prominent Nakşbandia *Şeyh* Ubeydullah to openly lead an armed revolt against regional intervention – foreign *and* domestic – in 1879. Ubeydullah was not a peripheral and inconsequential threat, commanding as many as 30,000 troops in his heyday.[240] Using the strategies of imamic leadership, collective

[238] Sunar, "Tribes and State," 9–11; Yadirgi, *Political Economy of Kurds*, 93–103.
[239] Bajalan, "Kurdish Responses to Imperial," 56–60; Özbek, "Politics of Taxation," 788–91; Sunar, "Tribes and State," 47–49.
[240] Sunar, "Tribes and State," 45; Suny, *They Can Live*, 97–98.

identity and representation as a tool, he was able to formulate a unique cultural "spirit" that influenced tribes across the region, whereby the revolt became both a source of desired inclusion *and* a loci of power relations that allowed him to speak and act on their behalf. Moreover, the movement permitted the *dispersion of perspectives* in that it accounted for an array of smaller tribes while also culminating in a *unification of this collective* in a central "spirit." This revolt was a direct hit to Istanbul's legitimacy and sovereignty, and the discovery of numerous small-scale nationalist Armenian groups only furthered the sultanate's skeptical attitude to the Armenian *millet* in general.[241] Unlike many nationalist movements from earlier in the century, the Armenian movement – and those that would rise alongside or after it, such as the Greek, Albanian and Arab nationalist movements – came to be perceived as an affront to the imperial "spirit," just as more sizable Kurdish tribes had; within the new representative *dispositif*, this image was attributed to all Armenians rather than an outcome of local or regional problems (which would have occurred under the sultanic *dispositif*). For instance, considering Fuad Pasha's trip to Mount Lebanon in 1860, the problem was seen as a local one, and the answer was enlightening the backwards and ignorant populations. The shift towards a monetary rather than feudal system had two primary results: tribal elites and local notables quickly worked to acquire land and access to profitable resources, but it also further impoverished the Muslim and non-Muslim *rayas* classes, who were not only exposed to increased and double taxation but also to licit and illicit attempts to acquire their land, movable property and livestock.[242] This nexus of violence made it desirable to belong to a collective to obtain protection, security and prosperity; in this way, the *accruement of a base* became far easier. While the economic changes were rooted in policies from the imperial government throughout the nineteenth century and larger global trends, it served to speed up and reinforce the usage of a representative *dispositif* to procure influence in the region. In other words, the representative *dispositif* is not a causal explanation but a procedural and mechanistic one. As the empire began to treat all subjects in the eastern provinces unilaterally and to remove many of the tax-exempt privileges for Kurdish tribes, the need to acquire resources to survive became the motif of the day.

[241] Deringil, "Armenian Question Is Finally"; Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 21–22; Melson, "Theoretical Inquiry into Armenian," 484–85.
[242] For more on these developments, see Klein, "Conflict and Collaboration"; Klein, *Margins of Empire*; Özbek, "Policing Countryside"; Özbek, "Politics of Taxation."

The sultan's solution for such existential problems was the *Hamidiye Hafif Süvari Alayları* (Hamidian Light Cavalry). Though many of the sultan's advisors saw this project as potentially detrimental, Abdülhamid II was adamant about his support for these divisions, which he viewed as imperial representatives on the eastern borderlands and loyal subjects. Abdülhamid II made no secret of his ambitions:

> In the event of a war with Russia, these Kurdish regiments, which were raised in an orderly fashion, can be of great service to us. Furthermore, the idea of "obedience," which they will learn in the military, will also be useful to them. As for the Kurdish *agha*s whom we have given the title of officer, they will be proud of their status and will strive for the discipline implied in the title. After a period of training, the Hamidiye regiments, which will be completed in this way, will in the end become a valuable army.[243]

In this respect, the representative *dispositif* – and the techniques that had been constructed and reinforced through it, such as disobedience and representative entities – was ubiquitous in that it reached every corner of the empire but it was not invariable in that it did not operate the same for all subject positions or in all regions; it was adaptive, and as such it was used in each context accordingly (just as it operated differently for the sultanate, the Sublime Porte and Sufi *tekkes*, as previously discussed), as these regiments will show. There were a number of reasons that made the Kurdish tribes the most appealing population for these regiments. The Kurds were Sunni Muslims, which like the Arabs faced a border with the Shiite Persian Empire. Additionally, their predominance in the region would ensure the continued Islamic demographic superiority, which was made far easier by the funneling of Muslim refugees into these provinces. While the Armenian threat may have been rather small in reality, the conspiratorial perceptions of Armenians as a potential source of disloyalty or rebellion became politically problematized in the capital; the Sunni Kurds would be able to keep them in line. The Kurds thus checked threats from Persia (Shi'ism) as well as Russia (by curbing the Armenians). Finally, and possibly most notably, it would settle nomadic tribes. Since almost three-fourths of arable – and thus taxable – land had been shielded by the *vakıf* system, finding ways to increase the use of arable land in the region was necessary. Reformist projects that required continued funding, such as education, provincial administration and medical facilities – which is not to mention the military, which was consuming over a third of the imperial budget by 1897, whereas by 1910, Anatolian provinces were providing 57% of Ottoman

[243] As quoted in Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 45.

taxes – meant the Sublime Porte had to become creative about finding new means of revenue and conscription.[244]

The Hamidian troops were a disappointment on each of these points. Viewing themselves as the highest order in the land, most troops, structured around randomly chosen and unorganized smaller tribes, found that they could acquire land, services and taxes through their new ranks without impunity or punishment. While older *emirs* had been able to legitimate themselves on dynastic rule, the new order of things found these tribes using their connections to the central government to legitimize their actions. For instance, tribal *ağas* like Misto *Ağa* of the Mîran tribe or Hussein Pasha of the Heyderan tribe managed to establish widespread monopolies, with their Ottoman military organizer, Zeki Pasha, ensuring there was no retribution for their offences; this included instances of flagrant and coerced land acquisition, the refusal to pay collected taxes, murder, bribery or extorting money from locals for "protection."[245] As Klein explains:

> The government found that while it was easy to arm the Kurds and gather a number of them under the Hamidiye umbrella on paper, a much greater challenge rested in their ability to convince them to perform the state's bidding and to truly incorporate them, not just physically but 'spiritually,' into the Ottoman body.[246]

Klein's emphasis on "spirit" is very akin to that of the representative *dispositif*, describing how Istanbul tried "to pull them [the Kurds] 'spiritually' into the Ottoman fold and to induce them to be loyal and obedient members of the Ottoman body."[247] While this was based on the discursive practices existent in Istanbul at the time, the *régime du savoir* in the provincial area was strikingly different, being less literary and far more invested in local customs and rituals. Their support from Istanbul meant they enjoyed weaponry and provisions from the central government, something that ensured their regional superiority.[248] While the government was busy arming the Kurdish regiments – at least until the Armenian massacres from 1894 to 1896, after which guns were more closely regulated – Armenian and other subjects complained of their inability to defend

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[244] For more on the military budget, see Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 96, 171–172; Özbek, "Policing Countryside"; Özbek, "Politics of Taxation"; for the amount paid by Anatolian provinces, see Yadirgi, *Political Economy of Kurds*, 120–123.
[245] For an analysis of Misto Pasha's ascent, see Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 63–74, for an analysis of Hussein Pasha's ascent, see 136–152.
[246] Klein, 34–35.
[247] Klein, 43; Olson, *Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism*, 7–15; also see Olson, "Five Stages of Kurdish," 395–397.
[248] Karataş, "Ottomanization of Halveti Sufi"; Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 39–40, 68–69; Özbek, "Politics of Taxation," 784–793; Sunar, "Tribes and State," 48–51; Yadirgi, *Political Economy of Kurds*, 116–123..

themselves, who would often resort to uniting with a tribe either by choice or force for protection, thereby expanding that tribe's collective identity. Hamidian troops took part in crackdowns on Armenian revolutionaries, but only if it was in their favor, even blocking the government from doing so if it was not; during the period of these Armenian massacres, there were still numerous reports of Armenian and Kurdish communities having mutually beneficial and cooperative social arrangements, which should not distract from the severity of these mass murders.[249] The extravagant and highly decorated uniforms donned at the commencement of the Hamidian cavalry in Istanbul were hardly representative of reality either. Oftentimes, they relied on local outfits, though uniforms were highly coveted for the status they represented. [250] Nor were these troops exposed to any type of rigorous military training, a fact that became most apparent at public ceremonies where one could spot children and elderly men recruited to inflate conscription numbers; after all, part of the sultanate's central ambitions was in accruing a widespread base.[251] Despite these shortcomings, Zeki Pasha's protection of these troops was almost universal. Those who were critical of the regiments faced outright persecution, administrative complications, retribution or removal from office, further cementing the nexus of violence around collective identity.[252]

Provincial officials from *valis* to *kaymakams* expressed frustration and resentment towards the complete interruption of any justice or intervention, especially when it came to Zeki Pasha. Soldiers in the regular army, who often lived in states of malnutrition and insufficient supplies, were certainly indignant towards these unruly and oftentimes rebellious tribes who were lavished with protections, funding and gifts from Istanbul.[253] The incapacity of these provincial (representative) offices meant they were largely ill-prepared to help locals, even if they sincerely intended to.[254] The representative power relations simply clashed at this point, and the Kurdish tribes were almost always the vicotrs. The *emirs* of old had been able to dispel raids within their domains – mostly through retributive raids or tribal punishments – yet their absence left many of the most vulnerable subjects in these regions, Muslim (Kurds, Circassians, Sufi movements, etc.)

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[249] Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 38–39; Sunar, "Tribes and State," 54–55; for more on the cooperative arrangements, see Klein, "Conflict and Collaboration," 155–158.
[250] Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 39.
[251] Klein, 30–34.
[252] Işık, "Kurdish and Armenian Relations," 37–71; Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 78–79.
[253] Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 87–88.
[254] Deringil, "Armenian Question Is Finally," 355–359.

and non-Muslim (Armenians, Assyrians, Yezidis etc.) alike, completely defenseless within the Ottoman representative *dispositif*. It likewise ensured the conglomeration and expansion of these new Hamidian regiments, who could impinge on non-Hamidian tribes but not vice versa, at least without punishment. The rank of a Hamidian cavalry regiment became highly sought after among Kurdish tribes, and for tribes unable to obtain such a regiment – to legitimate their position within this new representative *dispositif* – they had to revise their socio-political strategies to survive. One manner of doing so was to turn to raids against those unable to protect themselves, which fundamentally played into the new political technology of representation. Klein explains how these raids "were carried out against even more vulnerable neighbors, most often unprotected settled villagers. Having little to offer in the first place, they sometimes found themselves stripped of everything they owned after a single attack."[255] One of these small, unruly *ağas* claimed to carry out such raids "from hunger, not from choice," yet unlike the Hamidian troops, they faced the risk of judicial or retributive consequences.[256] Where tribes had formed a federation of solidarity, the ones that could form a Hamidian regiment tended to come out on top; thus, even though there was a dispersion of perspectives, it typically unified around the Hamidian regiment due to the legitimacy – and thus influence and force – that came with the recognition of Istanbul. This further diminished the longstanding relations of allegiance between *emirs*, which functioned as a ruling family dynasty, and the subservient *ağas* that had pledged loyalty for inclusion into the collective; the other possibility was Hamidian troops amassing numbers from local populations or other tribes, thus relying less on the confederation.[257]

For many nomadic or settled tribes, new loyalties and negotiations occurred. The best defense against Hamidian troops would be to buy one's protection, yet for those impoverished classes and those without resources to representative relations, such an arrangement was simply not feasible. In many cases, there was no option but to sign the ownership of land over to these impending tribes. Subjects of all religious affiliations and ethnic self-conceptions were left defenseless against the chaos engulfing the region. Expressing some frustration on this point, Robert Melson stresses that "the question is not, why was force used against some Armenians, because the activities of the

[255] Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 70; see also Özbek, "Politics of Taxation," 784–794; Suny, *They Can Live*, 176–182.
[256] As quoted in Klein, *Margins of Empire*, 70.
[257] Eppel, *People Without a State*, 27–64; Yadirgi, *Political Economy of Kurds*, 64–92.

revolutionary parties might indeed be a sufficient explanation. Rather, the question is, why was massacre the form of force selected?"[258] For that, perhaps the best resource is Klein's brilliant book on how new models of agrarian capitalism and the politicization of tribal hierarchies were largely to blame.[259] The most affected populations were Armenians, but this has more to do with them being the weakest and most vulnerable subjects. While religion has traditionally been a determining factor in the regional violence against Armenians (and other non-Muslim sects) during this time, the truth was that it occurred in this way because of the arrangement of power relations and the implementation of collective identity in the area at the end of the nineteenth century; these new nexuses of violence occurred along religious lines, but this was not inherently because of religious differences but social, political and economic ones. The engagement of centralized imperial policies during this period, which could well have been more ideological, only set to worsen the situation through their endorsement and provisions. The Kurdish *ağas* had made a habit of confiscating land through legal measures since their formation in the early 1890s, be that through threat of force, coercively requiring the land in exchange for protection or one's incorporation into the Hamidian tribal structure, which is not to mention land acquired illegally. Non-Hamidian tribes were forced to do the same for regional political power, yet the lack of military backing meant they went after even weaker and more exposed populations. The events that stand out in the minds of late Ottoman scholars are the Armenian massacres of 1894-1896, with estimations of Armenians murdered during these years ranging from 80,000 to 300,000.[260] The massacres began when Armenian villagers took up arms to defend themselves against a Kurdish raid. While reports ran through Istanbul about an Armenian rebellion, there seems to not have been any nationalist rebellion at all; with back up from the military, Hamidian troops entered Sasun and slaughtered an estimated 8,000 villagers.[261] The massacre was likely retributive, but regardless of its intent or the local politics that surrounded it, it caught the attention of the "Great Powers." Due to pressure from foreign powers, the central government established an investigative committee, which determined

[258] Melson, "Theoretical Inquiry into Armenian," 486; also see Suny, *They Can Live*, 101–104.
[259] Klein, "Conflict and Collaboration"; Klein, *Margins of Empire*; Yadirgi, *Political Economy of Kurds*, 111–123.
[260] Akçam, *Shameful Act*, 42.
[261] Dündar, *Crime of Numbers*, 31–50; Melson, "Theoretical Inquiry into Armenian," 487; Rogodno, *Against Massacre*, 191–196; Suny, *They Can Live*, 281–286.

no wrongdoing despite only hearing from military and government officials, such as Zeki Pasha; it barred any Armenian testimony.[262]

Foreign powers worked to intervene on the Armenians' behalf, pursuing the enforcement of protective measures based on the conclusive treaties of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, that were to go into effect in October of 1895.[263] However, this only served to strengthen the emerging collective identities through the threat of foreign intervention on behalf of the Armenians. Before these protective measures could be implemented, an Armenian revolutionary organization put together a procession that would end with the presentation of appeals to the grand vizier. The petition never arrived because the march was attacked, and hundreds of Armenians were murdered. Through these events, numerous dynamics of representation become apparent. For starters, such an organization seeking direct communication with the government on behalf of a collective used the technology of the unification of a collective (especially imamic leadership), a dispersion of perspectives (they were speaking on a variety of Armenian communities, after all), the historical roots of legitimacy (common ancestry, in this case), the new networks of communication (directly delivering an appeal to the sultan) and the accruement of a base (collective identity), albeit subversively. The means by which change was being brought through foreign intervention, i.e., foreign representation, also plays into this, as it was one that showed disloyalty on behalf of the Armenian *millet* as a whole, even though most Armenians had not asked for this. In this respect, the Armenian communities throughout the empire found themselves in a state of representative domination, whereby their possibilities to act otherwise were violently suppressed, either through cutting off their administrative options – there had been an investigation, after all – their subservience to Hamidian regiments or directly through the massacres that spread throughout the empire and especially in the regions where these foreign-driven and reformist measures were taken up.[264]

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[262] This line of judicial reasoning might seem corrupt to us today, we must remember that one of the tenets of Ottoman justice had long been the reliability of the individual presenting evidence; with the lines of loyalty redrawn in the representative *dispositif*, it very much fell in line with the political virtues of the day. Regardless of whether one agrees with this policy, the task of this genealogy is to map out such relations, not pass judgment on them.

[263] Bajalan, "Kurdish Responses to Imperial," 54–60; Deringil, "Armenian Question Is Finally," 351–355; Yavuz and Sluglett, *War and Diplomacy*.

[264] For more on the locations in which these massacres were most concentrated, one can consult Bijak and Lubman, "Disputed Numbers"; Deringil, "Armenian Question Is Finally," 347–350; Dündar, *Crime of Numbers*; Suny, *They Can Live*.

Not only were nexuses of violence arising, but they were sedimenting around the axes of "spirit" that encapsulated the representative *dispositif*. After having exhausted most of their options in terms of representative power, thousands upon thousands either chose to convert to Islam – or were forced or coerced into doing so – or to escape an impending massacre by fleeing across Ottoman borders or marrying a Muslim, though many women and young girls were also unwillingly abducted for marriage.[265] In essence, the Armenians very much had agency and used it accordingly – such as protests and revolts, tax evasion or blatant refusal to pay taxes perceived to be unjust, official pleas and forming secret, often revolutionary organizations – but in most cases, the cards were not stacked in their favor. Istanbul was quick to portray mass conversions as invalid, thus diminishing Armenian hopes of escape into the hegemonic collective identity. For those who chose armed resistance, death was all but assured and retribution was taken on one's local community. Access to Muslim representation was thus regulated, and one's willingness to adhere to the *şeriat* (via allegiance) was no longer enough to be connected to the *ümmet,* i.e., the Muslim "spirit." The profession of loyalty to the spirit – and not just a pledge of allegiance – was the new passageway to state protection, which required recognition from the central government. Some Armenians went so far as circumcision and having Islamic weddings to prove their fidelity. While some provincial officials went against instructions from Istanbul and sanctioned such conversions, occasionally used as a device to shield these populations from persecution, this only exacerbated the pressure of foreign intervention and Armenian revolutionary activities.[266] When another group of Armenian revolutionaries held the Imperial Ottoman Bank hostage in August 1986, more massacres against Armenians followed, this time throughout the capital. According to Ottoman accounts, 1,286 Armenians were slaughtered, yet foreign sources estimate the number to be higher (up to 6,000). [267]

8.6 Conclusion: The Violence of Representation

Many of these massacres were tied up into access to resources, and the protection of Armenian – or Christian – land became a critical threat to the Hamidian legitimacy and

[265] For more on these forced conversions, see Deringil, "Armenian Question Is Finally."
[266] Deringil, 355–359; Sunar, "Tribes and State," 33–39; Suny, *They Can Live*, 114–123; Klein, "Conflict and Collaboration."For an example of the government's response to conversions, one can see *Abeille du Bosphore* 15 May 1893, 274-278.
[267] Dinçer, "Armenian Massacre in Istanbul," 26. He gives a very detailed look at the 1896 Istanbul massacre overall.

sovereignty. It was not simply a matter of religious or ethnic tensions. These did play a role, but it is essential for us to understand *how* they played a role. Determining the extent of these massacres is near impossible due to the lack of accurate population statistics, yet it is clear that the numbers reached into the tens of thousands, and some estimates go so far as hundreds of thousands.[268] What is nonetheless clear is that for many populations in the region – and in parts of the empire at this time – the use of the representative *dispositif* for violence against all populations on the eastern front and Armenians in particular became ubiquitous. It could come in the form of massacres, cutting off access to imperial security, forced conversions, preventing means of representation, preventing the emergence of representative organizations, the illegal and legal appropriation of land, the diminishment of *millet* protections and the need for population-oriented sovereignty. An account given by the British vice-consul, quoted at length due to its relevance, illustrates that these were not hidden relations but very involved in the practices of these massacres:

> The Ottoman officials, instead of distinguishing between the guilty and innocent, chose, some from ignorance, many from motives of personal pecuniary gain, to regard all Armenians as traitors, scheming to throw off the Ottoman yoke. As usually happens in Oriental countries, when the central government had adopted the same view, the real sedition of certain Armenians was confounded and lost in the mass of trumped-up charges, would-be seditious documents and imaginary reports and lists of revolutionary committees, which poured in from all sides as soon as the demand of the central government for such a supply was felt. Turkish officials and leading Moslems criminally communicated these notions to the ignorant and indiscriminating masses of the Mussulman population, who are guided in their general action by the prescriptions of the Sheri law. That law prescribes that if the "rayah" Christian attempt, by having recourse (*dekhalet*) to foreign Powers, to overstep the limits of privileges (*berat*) allowed to them by their Mussulmans masters, and free themselves from their bondage, their lives and property are to be forfeited, and are at the mercy of the Mussulmans. To the Turkish mind, the Armenians had tried to overstep those limits by appealing to foreign Powers. They therefore considered it their religious duty, and a righteous thing, to destroy the lives and seize the property of the Armenians.
>
> …
>
> I have made careful inquiries as to the extent of Armenian revolutionary propaganda at Ourfa [today Şanlıurfa], and have arrived at the conviction that, though there existed a large amount of, to my mind, well-grounded discontent among the Armenians arising from the fact that for some

[268] For more information on the difficulty in determining exact figures, see Bijak and Lubman, "Disputed Numbers"; Dündar, *Crime of Numbers*; Davison, *Reform in Ottoman Empire*, 414–415; Melson, "Theoretical Inquiry into Armenian," 488–489. In addition, while one line of argumentation has been that there were deaths on both sides, Deringil ("Armenian Question Is Finally") gives an excellent overview on the exponential disparity between these numbers, even in the official documentation released by the Turkish state.

> years past they have, in common with their brethren elsewhere in Anatolia, been treated practically as outlaws, the amount of actual disloyalty among them was very restricted.[269]

Although this is given by a foreign observer, his general summary of the situation largely aligns with more recent studies. The interpellation of all Armenians shows how widely the representative *dispositif* had circulated in the very discourse of the state. The author certainly does not deny the existence of Armenian revolutionaries, but his perception and shock at the government's operations reinforce the fact that this is an outsider looking in at these internally transformative relationships. The role of provincial administration in these regions were further caught up in the representative *dispositif*, having to act as representatives of all subjects while simultaneously preparing for massacres, as Melson notes: "The civil authorities, on the other hand, had the difficult double task of preparing the Moslem population for massacre while at the same time convincing the targeted groups that no violence was about to take place, so as to prevent resistance and thus maximize the extent of the slaughter."[270]

While one could certainly argue that it cannot be determined exactly why such measures were taken, one is still left with *how* such operations were carried out. For this, foreign missionary Johannes Lepsius gives us a contemporaneous interpretation, arguing that though these massacres were carried out along religious lines, it did not explain why such violence emerged:

> What are the Armenian massacres then? A conflict of race? No, for during centuries the Turks have managed to get on more or less well with their Armenian subjects. A national rising? No, for the Armenian population in Armenia neither knows, nor wishes to know, anything of the political propaganda of certain agitators who, in London, Paris, or Constantinople, form revolutionary clubs and issue political pamphlets. A persecution of the Christians? Not simply this, for there was no immediate provocation. Then what do the Armenian horrors mean? Without any question their origin was purely political, or to state it more exactly, they were an administrative measure. But facts go to prove that, considering the character of the Mohammedan people, whose very political passions are roused only by religious motives, this administrative measure must, and did, take the form of a religious persecution on a gigantic scale. Are we then, simply because of the political origin of this religious persecution, to be forbidden to speak of the Armenians as 'prosecuted on account of their religious belief'? If so, there have never been any religious persecutions in the world, for all such without exception have been associated with political movements, and even the

[269] As quoted in Lepsius, *Armenia and Europe*, 155–157. For more on the British vice-consul's correspondence, see Deringil, "Armenian Question Is Finally."
[270] Melson, "Theoretical Inquiry into Armenian," 491.

> death of Christ was nothing but a political event, for political motives turned the balance at His condemnation.[271]

Though the persecution may have taken religion as the method, it tells us nothing of the dynamics of the violence. It fails to grasp the entrenched political technology of representation and the various representative axes laid out in the first section of this chapter: (a) historical roots of legitimacy, (b) dispersion of perspectives, (c) unification of collective, (d) accruing a base and (e) networks of communication. Such massacres – as well as thousands of forced conversions – may seem almost commonplace and easily understandable today, and we almost expect to come across them in history books. Yet, the fact that the situation had to be explained to other foreigners in such depth emphasizes the complex *dispositif* that was taking shape.

What is constructed through these clashes, not only among Kurds and Armenians but all elements throughout the empire – from Sufi *tarikats* to the sultanate's projection of a common Ottoman identity – is a system of knowledge around representation, particularly in terms of an Ottoman *spirit*. In all directions, there slowly develops discourses on the nation, collective identity and its foundational principles, its "spirit." There are strings attached, nonetheless. From this point forward, who and what you represent as well as those things that are representative of you come to speak the truth about who one is. The representative *dispositif* becomes co-existent with a knowledge on representation and how to organize it, how to decide who belongs, the means by which this can be achieved. An alliance was no longer a relationship between two (or more) parties; it was an intrinsic factor of loyalty that tied the diverse populations of the empire together, a factor that both provided massive changes in what Ottoman subjects were capable of and the means by which to achieve those – this is the perspective of power, after all, and it comes with new capabilities – as well as limited through various (physical and non-physical) acts set within nexuses of violence. Abdülhamid II even spoke of these issues in terms of representation, and it is interesting to note that the Armenians' lack of a majority anywhere in the empire becomes the ultimate rationale for such massacres: "The Armenian population is spread over a large extent of the country, and in no place are they a majority. Their expectations, therefore, can never be realized, and all the exaggerated stories of oppression and persecution, got up with the object of exciting

[271] Lepsius, *Armenia and Europe*, 34–35. For more on Lepsius' account in the literature, see Melson, "Theoretical Inquiry into Armenian."

European sympathy to enable them to obtain an impossible end."[272] Even though the sultan clearly rejects the interests of the Armenians, he nevertheless finds no contradiction in speaking *for* them, *on their behalf*. In fact, his enlightened position, based on the relations of representation discussed thus far, allows him to be a better representative than their own "ignorant" voice. The political technology of representation not only allows others to speak *for* them, but it justifies one speaking *over* them. These nexuses of violence and the relations of power-knowledge that they depended on were not a misuse of power; they were exercises that became possible only within the representative *dispositive* and the new relationships of community. The argument is not that this violence could not have happened if the *dispositif* had developed differently; however, it could not have happened *in this particular way, by these particular sets of rules and truth-statements*. Representation was certainly not the cause of the tragedies like the Armenian massacres, but it was the how events, discourses and identities were interpreted.

[272] As quoted in Melson, "Theoretical Inquiry into Armenian," 502.

9. *Halka Doğru* (Towards the People): The Power-Knowledge of Representation and the Science of the Nation

"It is clearly established that [Ottomans] are not a single class of people that are injured in their rights, but that on the contrary, indiscriminately, all Ottomans, in general, have become the plaything of a maniacal and distorted ruler. In the presence of such a situation, would it not be wiser for the leaders of all the elements which constitute Ottomanism and who unanimously demand freedom and reforms unite to organize a powerful force which would remain indivisible until the day of great victory?" – Prince Mehmed Sabahattin, *Constantinople au derniers jours d'Abdul-Hamid*[1]

9.1 Introduction: Representative Institutions

In 1909, British parliamentarian Charles Roden Buxton published a book detailing the revolution that had occurred in the Ottoman Empire.[2] His focus on and sympathies for the *Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) were evident, yet his insights into the initiation procedure of the pre-revolution secret organization lay out a very rigid structure. Noting the difficulty of obtaining much information on an organization that was so shrouded in secrecy – a problem that has plagued historians to this day – he maps out how its domestic founders were able to expand the organization without detection or wide-reaching consequences:

> The original founders, whoever they may have been, had first to decide upon the method of enlisting new members. One of them would offer to the intended proselyte to make known to him a secret of profound moment, but only on the condition that he would swear beforehand never to reveal it to another without permission. If he was willing to do this, and appeared worthy of trust, he was solemnly sworn, and the ideas of the Society were explained to him.
>
> The next stage, however, was the most important, and it was invested with every circumstance of awe and solemnity. The form of initiation crystallised into a definite ritual. The man was blindfolded, and led to a secret place whose whereabouts was entirely concealed from him. The bandage was then removed from his eyes, and he found himself, perhaps in a darkened room, perhaps in a lonely hollow of the hills, in the presence of three strangers wearing black masks. These administered to him the oath which was to become the rule of his life. Swearing on the sword and on the Sacred Book, he bound himself to devote his whole energies to the redemption of his country, to obey every order given to him through the channels of the Society, never to reveal its secrets, and to kill any person, however near and dear to him, whom it might condemn to suffer death. His eyes were again covered, and he was led back to the place from which he had started on the mysterious journey.

[1] As quoted in Fesch, *Constantinople aux derniers jours*, 366. This was part of Sabahattin's opening remarks at the 1902 Young Turk conference in Paris.
[2] Notably, Braxton survived an assassination attempt by a Turkish activist in the Balkans in 1914.

> His fidelity was afterwards tested by a prolonged novitiate, during which his conduct was watched by the members, with none of whom, except his original introducer, he was allowed to become acquainted. Finally, he was affiliated to one of the local branches, which might consist of one or two hundred members. Of these, however, he was not permitted to know more than four. Five was the largest number which ever met together in a single group. For the purposes of communication, each group contained one "guide" who received the orders of the Committee from the representative of another group, and whose business it was to pass them on without a moment's delay. That there must have been some directing body, presumably in Salonica, is obvious; but its identity has never been divulged. The only ascertainable fact is the statement of the members of the Committee that there was no single leader.[3]

The secrecy of such procedures and persons had a double function: it protected the organization from discovery, but it also completely removed the human figure. The entire ritual is made anonymous, not only of people but of environments. It presents the Committee – or rather the *spirit* of the Committee – as everywhere and nowhere: omnipresent. One gave their loyalty through a solemn oath to something grander, to the nation, to the spirit it encapsulated, even above one's commitment to one's own family, one of the cornerstones of Islam. Unlike pre-Tanzimat relations of allegiance and the interpretation of the Circle of Justice that came with it, this commitment was not to a person but an ideal. It did not do away with the circular understanding of justice – as this chapter will show – but it completely reformulates its functionings and the organization of the empire-cum-nation. What is even more peculiar is the need to test that loyalty through examination. Even when you are alone, you still must adhere to the principles of the Committee-spirit. The will of the Committee, which serves as a representation of the national will, is absolute and unquestionable. It requires resolute submission yet, in turn, provides a brotherhood capable of enduring any malicious or tyrannical government. Should you die, you will live on in the spirit of the nation. One would have a voice, but only through submission to a higher one. Representation was not simply a way in which you could participate in politics. It was symbiotic relationship. It required a toll: to sync one's self with the spirit in every way, whether politically, professionally, personally even through blood. One would be required to educate and guide those ignorant individuals below them, yet they would also be led and instructed by their superiors, who ultimately submitted to the spirit as well. Not idealistically or romantically, such as we find in Namık Kemal's artistic output, but in reality. In your community. In your home. In your slightest

[3] Buxton, *Turkey in Revolution*, 44–46.

actions. The spirit has eyes everywhere, and to escape the gaze of it was entirely optional. You simply had to refuse the oath, but you were also denied its protection and representation.

The portrayal presented of a representative spirit here is certainly romanticized, and I think it is fair to say it never existed as such in actuality. There were a variety of reasons to become involved in "Young Turk" activities, from economic incentives, the ability to blackmail the Hamidian regime and social or political prestige to unhappiness with increasing massacres and pogroms or nationalist activities. What did exist was a completely reconceptualized understanding of how the Ottoman nation – which had been constructed over the prior century – operated and the relationships at play within this network of power relations. While idealized in texts like this, technologies described in previous chapters were incorporated into imperial and non-imperial organizations and institutions through and through. In this chapter, I address how the representative *dispositif* came to be invested in a new nation-centric state apparatus prior to the foundation of the Turkish Republic (and even prior to WWI) and established an original distribution of capabilities, subject positions and truth-claims by which individuals and groups could engage with the state and with society at large. The representative *dispositif* truly became a ubiquitous yet unegalitarian network that manifested itself in "spirit" (see previous chapter, section 2) within an intense ideological battlefield for the future of the empire, and eventually nation. The first section of this chapter deals with how the representative *dispositif* became the crucial operating mechanism upon which the CUP functioned as well as the *régime du savoir* of Ottoman politics at large. This occurred along the five axes of the representative *dispositif* laid out in the previous chapter – (a) historical roots of legitimacy, (b) dispersion of perspectives, (c) unification of collectives, (d) accruing a base and (e) networks of communication – that framed and made comprehensible the discourse on national identity and belonging. To accomplish this, I primarily deal with French language presses of "Young Turk" groups up until 1902 and the CUP's eventual rise to power after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. In the next section, I discuss how the discourse on national identity propelled this movement forward and ultimately established a national Republic which operated on three distinct pillars: pan-Turkism, Islamism and Turkism. The axes of the representative *dispositif*, when combined with these three pillars, established a "science" of national belonging in the final years of the Ottoman Empire and solidified the underlying rationality and *raison*

d'état of the Turkish Republic, which exists to date. In other words, I map out both the conditions of possibility and the *régime du savoir* that shaped national identity in Turkey, yet this further constructed the experience of collective identity and belonging at large.

9.2 Representative Power-Knowledge: A New Dispersion of Relations

The Committee began as a student movement at the *Mekteb-i Tıbiyye* (Imperial Medical Academy) in 1889 under the guise of the *Ittihad-ı Osmani Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Union Society) initially founded by Ibrahim Temo, Ishak Sükukti, Abdullah Cevdet and Mehmet Reşit, but it quickly caught the attention of rising bureaucrats, professionals, literate elites and scholars.[4] Though the student movement was originally approached with some reservation and leniency by the palace, continued criticisms of Abdülhamid II's government started to snowball. The massive infrastructural, administrative and educational reforms carried forward during the Tanzimat and amplified under Abdülhamid II gave birth to a rising middle class that grew disgruntled with poor economic prospects and exclusion from politics. Alongside this, the Ottoman state was slowly shifting from its traditional sultanic roots that had recourse to the Muslim *millet* to one that employed the new models of representation; for instances, judges were no longer chosen from *madrasas* alumni but rather from schools for judges aimed at *nizamiye* courts.[5] This was part of a more general trend under Abdülhamid II to make the bureaucracy less political and more professional, aiming for efficiency over indoctrination; this strategy largely left the traditional position of the *ulema* obsolete, even if they were not ready to throw in the towel yet. A massive expansion of educational avenues was also popping up across the empire, but primarily in urban centers. The incorporation of the graduates into state bureaucracy slowly gave way to a new class of elites, which became a source of contention between different regions of the Empire, especially along the peripheries where inhabitants were largely excluded from education initiatives and their economic advantages.[6]

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[4] For more on this, see Gözel-Durmaz, "Rise of Ottoman Military"; Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 71–74; Özervarlı, "Positivism in Late Ottoman"; Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 97-99.
[5] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 99.
[6] Karpat even elaborates how a push to charge tuition in some state schools aimed to prevent the impoverished classes from gaining access to an education, though this is more properly seen as a reaction by regional elites to secure their own social position (Karpat, 102).

Education offered a stable manner for upward social mobility during this time, the likes of which had not been seen in the empire before; nevertheless, students who wished to improve their financial situation still had to compete with a state institution that was stacked against them, either through corruption, favoritism or ideological limitations. As one Ottoman press-in-exile put it in 1901, "The servants are well selected by the blind; the title which [the sultan] confers on them is only a rank in the vice of which he is the supreme leader."[7] Another newspaper puts this situation in even stronger terms: "The Ottoman civil servant, whether Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Jewish or European, intruder and parasite, is, in general theory, one of the most despicable specimens of humanity; and the populations who live under his hand…are constantly exposed to the most terrible vexations."[8] The investment in educational initiatives, still unable to keep up with their European counterparts, arose hand-in-hand with a booming press and a wider audience. Though these developments may be seen as dispersed and unrelated, each played a part in setting up the conditions of possibility that would make the CUP's rise to power possible.

Like the Young Ottomans before them, the Committee took to literary endeavors and propaganda from abroad, primarily in Europe and north Africa. Occasional Committee cells were uncovered during the 1890s, yet these were mostly isolated cases. For the most part, the Committee functioned from abroad in its infant years, though it retained a stronghold in Monastir (modern-day Bitola in Macedonia). What began as an impromptu student group quickly flourished into a more sophisticated and organized ensemble of students, intellectuals, bureaucrats and educated individuals who had grown disillusioned by the order of things in the empire.[9] While the exact political leanings of this rapidly emerging and spreading organization were diverse, they uniformly sought a counterbalance to the sultanate, strongly drawing on the notion of public opinion. Yet, as the CUP's membership swelled, so did its perceived threat. Crackdowns became commonplace, and those members who could fled to Europe and Egypt, setting up shop – and newspapers – in the process. Not only did this allow the ideas and understandings of politics to evolve in expatriated CUP circles, but it likewise exposed them, some for the first time, to the political structures of other nations; comparisons to European nations

[7] *Libéral ottoman*, 1 March 1901, 4.
[8] *Turquie contemporaine,* 21 June 1891, 1.
[9] For the foundations of Young Turk thought, see Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*; Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 95-123, 213-245.

and liberalism in particular became commonplace.[10] Their lack of backgrounds in politics and many of the subjects discussed was clear, and the journalistic roots of this movement – which was the prominent way intellectuals engaged in academic, social and political debates at the time, both for the Ottoman Empire and for Europe at large – were most evident in their superfluous understanding of some common political, economic and social realities of the time. This still did not prevent these presses from incorporating virulent critiques – which were often as anti-monarchist as the pro-government presses were monarchist – and presenting them covertly to an Ottoman and European readership.

The Committee managed to adopt the tactics reminiscent of the Islamic movements of the nineteenth century. Identical, in fact. The same five criteria were deployed for the Committee's political endeavors: (a) historical roots of legitimacy, (b) dispersion of perspectives, (c) unification of collective, (d) accruing a base and (e) networks of communication. What tied all of these together was a strong reliance on a representative *dispositif*, on a spirit, that had emerged, not only for these partisans but for Ottoman politics as a whole. Abdullah Cevdet, one of the founders of the CUP, captured this sentiment very clearly: "Today the most essential need of Turkey is a common esprit. This common esprit will be created by targeting a common goal for both individual and society, which is only possible through a standard education for all."[11] The central critique of the CUP and likeminded collectives was that the sultan had failed to serve as a representative of the Ottoman *halk* (people), which was in opposition to the official Ottoman state's policy of promoting the sultan as the beneficial and imamic representative of his subjects. Aside from these core concerns, especially around issues like collective identity, the role of religion, science, industrialization and how the Ottoman Empire was situated to the West – a diverse range of ideologies were adopted. Taking a look at some of the presses during this time, we can begin to map out how not only power but a *régime du savoir* emerged; in other words, it is not only power *or* knowledge but an intensely interconnected web of relations that constituted the power-knowledge of representation. To do this, I have relied on foreign language presses in French and English as well as some translations of the Ottoman texts, and while I have done due diligence to filter out some of the aspects that were directed at a foreign rather than a domestic audience, this analysis should nonetheless remind the readers of the

[10] For a classic interpretation of this, see Hanioğlu, 9. For more contemporaneous accounts, see Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*; Turnaoğlu, *Formation of Turkish Republicanism*.
[11] as cited in Bürüngüz, *Abdullah Cevdet and* Garpçılık, 72.

dangers of this route and, as such, should be taken with a grain of salt. To enable a more comprehensive picture, I have relied on translations of non-English and non-French texts in the works of other scholars on this period.[12]

9.2.1 Historical Roots of Legitimacy

Like both the Sufi *tarikats* and the palace, the "Young Turks" (by which I mean the movement in general, in contrast to when I speak of the CUP) writing from abroad prior to the 1908 revolution dedicated particular attention to the historical legitimacy of the nation. Just as these two aforementioned groups were doing – as all social movements of the time did – there was a de-centering of the state's monopoly on history, or rather historical legitimacy. The medium of the early Young Turk movement was journalism, which shows through their lack of nuanced arguments and superficial knowledge, at times, of some of the basic tenets of governing and economics. Their historical assessments were based less on an overview of Ottoman history than unfounded summarizations of its historical progress, which tends to fall back on some form of social evolution:

> [Ottoman] sovereignty has become hereditary, in fact, but the sultans all recognize popular law in the same way, by submitting…In the beginning, the caliphs governed the people paternally…Later the sultanate became absolute, but it was represented by famous men like Bayazit, Mahomet, Selim, Soliman and Mahmoud. However, this power was absolute only in theory, for the sultans were surrounded by eminent men whose advice they followed and who enlightened them with their knowledge and their patriotism.[13]

The argument throughout Young Turk presses was that the period of Ottoman greatness had come to pass, as is expressed in *The Osmanli*: "All the honorable, intelligent masters have been abolished, to be succeeded by ignoramuses."[14] In the following issue that year, it was argued, "Our religion [Islam] commands justice and right, our Government employs injustice and cruelty. Our Empire, founded some seven centuries ago, is thus diminishing and decadent."[15]

Another press put forward that "the tyranny of the padishahs [sultans] is, in a word, one of the most terrible plagues that the history of divine and absolute powers has

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[12] For example, Büründüz, *Abdullah Cevdet and* Garpçılık; Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*.
[13] *Turquie contemporaine*, 1 June 1891, 1.
[14] *Osmanli*, 1 April 1898.
[15] *Osmanli*, n.d. For a deeper discussion on the role of Islam in debates on national identity, see Zhongmin and Shu, "Nationalist Thoughts and Islam."

ever recorded…Today, they [the Ottomans] only keep the pride of the past; they have lost their warlike virtues."[16] The reason for this decline is made explicitly clear in these presses, over and over again: "The real pathogen is none other than the villainous person of the red Sultan [Abdülhamid II]. It is he who, like Koch's *comma bacillus*, poisons the social economy of the Ottomans and provokes its intense spasms, cramps and anemia."[17] Another gazette attacks the sultan from the position of Islam, explaining that he is little more than a man chosen by the *ümmet*, declaring that "in Islamism, the caliphate does not confer any immunity on the one who is invested with this office [of sultan]"; the author(s) continue, "Either he [the sultan] is worthy of it, and then everyone obeys him with fidelity and love, or he is unworthy and, in this case, he is nothing more than a floating wreck on the vast ocean of Islam."[18] Unlike some more European streams of thought, nonetheless, this was not an ultimate dialectical process nor a necessary progression. The extinction of the empire, and its peoples, is portrayed as an imminent threat if the situation continues under the "Red Sultan": "Nothing should remain from the Empire after him [Abdülhamid II]. He wants to make a desert of it, which he would like to make disappear into history."[19] Such comments fill the pages of the exiled press, at times seemingly *ad infinitum*.[20] Prince Mehmed Sabahattin, who was not only the nephew of Abdülhamid II but also a prominent member of the CUP who had fled to Paris with his father and brother, argued that this flaw was due to the communitarian nature of the empire; in its place, he argued an individualist culture of the Anglo-Saxon tradition should be adopted:

> Our reformists, who have been proliferating since the era of the Tanzimat, nurtured a sincere aspiration for renewal; alas they were utterly unable to discover the manner in which these aspirations could materalise. Only, as conditions for progress, liberty, constitutionalism, education, morality, and, finally, the necessity to Westernize, were – and are presently – advocated perpetually.[21]

In this respect, the problem was historical, but it was not directly related to Abdülhamid II but the institutions and bureaucracy implemented under the Tanzimat, which preferred communal rather than individualistic ideals.

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[16] *Turquie contemporaine*, 20 April 1891, 2.
[17] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 15 June 1898, 2. This is a reference to Robert Koch's discovery of *bacillus anthracis* in 1876, which is a group of bacteria shaped like a comma. This was connected to cholera at the time, so the accusations of Abdülhamid II being a pathogen are even more critical than appear at first sight.
[18] *Jeune Turquie*, 5 June 1896, 1.
[19] *Supplément Français*, 5 January 1898, 7.
[20] Also see Boyar, "Press and Palace."
[21] As quoted in Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 91-92.

Nonetheless, to get to the heart of the matter, Abdülhamid II's personal role should not be inflated, for it risks overlooking the true culprit, which one can begin to decipher in the following excerpt: "Never have two brothers [Abdülmedcid and Abdul-Aziz], reigning one after the other, offered a more striking contrast. As much as Medjid personified gentleness, humanity and civilization, so Aziz offered the type of harshness, selfishness and fanaticism."[22] The moralization of character had thus taken full affect, both from opposition and from the palace. The real blame, nonetheless, fell on the two emerging evils: selfishness and ignorance. The usage of one representing in their official position, which required a proper moral character to fulfill that position, had come full circle; history was representative on one's personal qualities, yet one's actions was representative of how fit one was to govern. The CUP explained how "suffering, misery, ignorance and disorder, it is the cause of all the evil, it is the cause of all our suffering. It is Turkey's real enemy."[23] Ahmed Riza, in a letter to his sister, passionately conveys this point: "The Prophet's words have been so misconstrued by our God damn ignorant imams and softas as to claim that when the Prophet used the term *science* he referred only to readings from the Quran…The *ümmet* is dissolved, weakened, and from this point it will never recover and regain vitality."[24] In an issue of *Le Croissant*, it is attested that the empire is "in the hands of an ignorant and corrupt oligarchy incapable of thinking of anything other than their personal interests to which they sacrifice the good of the state and the salvation of the homeland."[25] Abduallah Cevdet took this idea even further by vehemently criticizing the orthodox Islamic framework by which the empire had come to function because it held the population back at large:

> A country in which the teaching of Darwinism is still believed as a sin has not come out of the Middle Ages and such a country still in those ages has no right to a place in the twentieth century. This has to be understood by every head, with or without a *sarık* (turban) who does not want to be crushed.[26]

Le Libéral Ottoman, which was more in line with the Islamic materialism of Cevdet or the sociological individualism of Sabahattin more than the positivism of Ahmet Rıza, makes the same argument: "The history of all peoples show us that the conquest of Liberty is due to science…At all times, instruction has been in honor among all people; first it

[22] *Turquie contemporaine*, 1 June 1891, 2.
[23] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 January 1898, 3
[24] As quoted in Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 200–201.
[25] *Croissant*, 17 August 1893, [1].
[26] As quoted in Bürüngüz, *Abdullah Cevdet and* Garpçılık, 18.

belonged to a privileged class, then it became popular and today it is compulsory in several countries."[27] *Turquie Contemporaine* argued, certainly in a more morbid and ostentatious fashion, that one only needed to consider "the depravity and filth of governmental mores, the stench of the characters of the official world, the corruption of conscience and administrative immorality, and you will then have an exact idea of the terrible gangrene which is gnawing at this State called the Ottoman Empire."[28] In this discourse, selfishness became the opposite of patriotism, whereas ignorance was used both to detail the lack of "progress" and to speak to the need to educate Ottoman populations.

The emphasis on these moral categories only make sense in the context of a new understanding of sovereignty, one that no longer rested on the glory of the House of Osman; neither God nor royal heritage were the foundations of government, having been replaced by the "people's" government: "The current regime is characterized by the absence of any notion of the most elementary duties of a government which must work seriously for the moral and material recovery of the peoples whose fate it holds in its hands."[29] In a more liberal fashion, *The Osmanli* rhetorically questions the logic of a government that fails to protect its people: "Civilization has made societies for protecting animals against cruelty…Surely it does not consider Turkish subjects, especially Turks who are suffering this cruelty, are lower even than the brutes it protects?"[30] The French edition of the CUP's gazette *Meşveret* [Consultation], which often sarcastically spoke directly to the sultan throughout its issues – perhaps a literary peculiarity of its editors, Ahmed Rıza and Halil Ganem – argues that the sultan could easily relinquish the troubles of the empire by returning power to the people: "Majesty, there would be yet another way out [of a revolution] which You could well open, thanks to your power, one which, at once, would avoid these bloody days: it is the call of the people to power, to government."[31] Abdülhamid II is even faulted for putting religious purposes over the true purpose of government, or the Ottoman people: "Doubtless, in all periods of Ottoman

[27] *Libéral ottoman*, 1 March 1901.
[28] *Turquie contemporaine*, 1 May 1891, 2.
[29] *Turquie contemporaine*, 20 April 1891, 2.
[30] *Osmanli*, 15 January 1898.
[31] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 December 1897, 2. Ahmed Rıza's co-editorship of this journal, with Halil Ganem, took on a far confrontational approach to dealing with the sultan after a failed coup against Abdülhamid was uncovered in 1896; the sultan, shook by this news, offered clemency to all Young Turks who returned, yet this was a ruse to gather information. Those who failed to cooperate with the regime, particularly by providing information, were mostly imprisoned or punished. For more on this, see Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 35-39.

history, the sultans saw themselves as charged with a universal religious mission; but never…had [they] made this mission the center and only point of their policy."[32] Though this may seem as if the Young Turks were anti-religious, and that has been an interpretation by many, they had somewhat of a complex relationship with Islam, with many wishing for it to be restricted to the private realm. Sabahattin, for instance, argued that the current usage of Islam by the state was detrimental because it de-individualized it: "Protestantism, too, is such that it promotes despotism in communitarian settings and freedom in individualist settings! Religions, in this case, because they are abused in communitarian structures, deviate to the degree of becoming an intermediary arbitrator."[33] On the other hand, someone like Abdullah Cevdet argued that it was not simply the individualist perspective that needed to be adopted but incorporating "science" into Islam: "The way of God is the way of emancipation, honor, progress and working to be civilized. In short it is the way in which the means to bring happiness to the Islamic Community is to be found."[34]

Yet, the overall message in these Young Turk presses was the reinstatement of the 1876 Constitution. The request was not to abolish the sultanate, or at least not the underlying request, which varied from newspaper to newspaper – and some gazettes would even make contradictory versions of this request in the same issue. *La Jeune Turquie* situates it as follows:

> If a regime adapts to the temperament of Mohammedans, and in general of all Orientals, it is the parliamentary regime. By the rectitude of their judgment, the gentleness of their morals, the calm of their mind, they are eminently suited to discussing their interests, to discern them, to discuss them and to adopt wise resolutions.[35]

The ambition of the majority of Young Turks was not to abolish the sultanate (although some certainly wanted that) but to establish a counterbalance to the absolute power of the crown by means of a general assembly or an autonomous bureaucratic apparatus, "the necessary counterweight of the Porte and the legitimate authority of men, such as Rechid, Ali, Fuat, Mehmed Ruchdi, Hussein Avni and Midhat"; by excluding such a technical arrangement of governing, the sultan had ensured "that the responsibility for such catastrophes should rest only on his head since he has decided to concentrate in his hands

[32] *Turquie contemporaine*, 1 May 1891, 2.
[33] As quoted in Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 97.
[34] As quoted in Bürüngüz, *Abdullah Cevdet and* Garpçılık, 49.
[35] *Jeune Turquie*, 5 June 1896, 1.

alone the powers to the systemic exclusion of the Porte."[36] In other words, it was a fundamental reinterpretation of the source of legitimacy in the empire – a further rearrangement of the Circle of Justice – that folds the legitimacy of the sultan in on itself and makes him responsible not to Allah but to his subjects. The role of religion certainly was not cast out, but as both Ahmed Rıza and Sabahattin make clear, this is meant to be restricted to the private sphere of society – although the ulema wing of the Young Turk movement wished rather to make the sultan answerable to them as the rightful heirs of legitimacy.[37]

The Osmanli not only attests that "the Ottoman Government includes all the Ottoman nation," but they likewise argue that, should a bloody revolution be avoided, the palace must "change its policy and inaugurate reforms."[38] In an earlier issue, the author(s) even go so far as to claim liberalism originally sprung forth from Islam itself, only to be corrupted later on by selfishness and ignorance: "The Liberal Turks are accounted criminals by the Tribunals of the Kaliph, or head, of Islam, which *founded* Liberty, Equality and Fraternity!"[39] In this vein, Sabahattin argues that it is not simply liberal values but an emphasis on individual liberties over communal rights, which also entailed a more federalist approach to the empire:

> *In communitarian formations that bestow to public life the role of adjudicator of private life,* whatever the form of rule may be, whether absolutism, constitutionalism, or republicanism, the result is always the same: political defeat and social poverty…It is on account of this that, years before constitutionalism, we began revealing that we would be unable to manifest genuine independence solely by means of changing our form of government and laws.[40]

The arbitrariness of law, the absolute power the sultanate had come to accumulate, the lack of freedom of press, the decadence of the Empire through compromises to foreign powers or non-Islamic religions, all of these could be resolved by unleashing the people from subjugation and letting the national "spirit" flourish.

Many of these authors-in-exile had nonetheless not been able to read the constitution they spoke of in full, with the idea rather being professed as a conglomeration

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[36] *Turquie contemporaine*, 1 June 1891, 1.
[37] For more on the relationship between the CUP and Young Turks in general and religion, see Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans*; Orhan, *Islam and Turks*, 17-54; Türesay, "Between Science and Religion."
[38] *Osmanli*, n.d. For further discussions on whether there should be a "violent" or "nonviolent" revolution, see Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 63-64.
[39] *Osmanli*, 1 January 1898.
[40] As quoted in Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 92.

of their beliefs, their commitment to liberal rights – at least in the way they perceived them – and the ultimate legitimacy of the nation relying not on dynasties nor the state but the people who constituted it; Doctor Nizam Bey, a prominent and well-known exiled CUP member, even reminisced later on about what was meant by a constitution: "What were the main lines of that Constitution?...For God's sake, I have never seen that Constitution and never learned what was in it. But when we were young, that is to say, working in Paris, we believed that Ahmed Riza Bey had seen and read it."[41] In this way, the French *Meşveret*, under Ahmed Rıza's more unionist approach, firmly put forward, "We want to achieve a state where everyone is free to propagate their opinions, and where no one is condemned because of their ideas, on the sole condition of being an honest man…This is the Constitution we want: absolute freedom of the press will be its first law."[42] Throughout its years in publication, this French outlet continually asserted that the only solution to the problems facing the empire was a reinstatement of the constitution, plain and simple:

> Eh yes! Dear friends, the true, the only solution of the Cretan question, of the question of the East, is the proclamation of the Constitution abrogated by Abdul-Hamid, Yes! The only solution to all these questions is the application of reforms to the entire Empire, of these reforms that, supported by an intelligent constitution, would make Turkey one of the most flourishing countries in the world in a few years.[43]

In contrast to Sabahattin's more decentralized approach, Ahmed Rıza and those he influenced believed the only way forward was under one centralized representative parliament. However, both Sabahattin and Ahmed Rıza had argued for religion to be restricted to the private realm, which was strongly against the wishes of Abdullah Cevdet's Islamic materialism and the *ulema* scholars engaged in the debate like Said Nursi, yet for very different reasons. They all were nevertheless required to justify their claims based on some historical interpretation of where their legitimacy came from, whether it was from an Islamic science with precedents in the Koran, an earlier age of Ottoman or Selçuk glory or in a positivist or social science reading of human development. In this respect, what the solution was became contingent upon who was representing the empire and what their interests were.

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[41] As quoted in Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 32.
[42] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 February 1898, 2.
[43] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 January 1898, 3.

9.2.2 Dispersion of Perspectives

Using this new mechanism of representation, the Young Turk press actively took up the mantle of the people's representative. As *Turquie Contemporaine* pondered, "Why not grant the people or rather the different populations of the Ottoman Empire, essentially democratic, to elect their own representatives and allow the country to have state control represented by an effective national assembly in Constantinople?"[44] The exiled presses went so far as to find solace in justifying their existence in those they claimed to represent, a wholly novel form of political strategizing that would come to be the new status quo. Perhaps the clearest manifestations of these came from the *Meşveret's* French supplement: "The Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress has always walked, since its foundation, with a slow but sure step towards one goal: the intellectual and material progress of the Ottomans."[45] This recognition of the representative dynamics involved became prevalent in an array of manners that were contingent upon having a dispersion of perspectives present. The focus became the importance of public opinion – yet it is important to keep in mind this is a very elitist version of public opinion – whereby intellectual persons, akin to a vanguard, were best able to speak on behalf of the populations of the empire and in the empire's best interest.

Perhaps the most prominent Young Turk scholar, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu succinctly notes how the political ambitions of these groups began to diverge during the 1890s. Those following Ahmed Riza, who controlled the *Meşveret*, sought for a complete reinstatement of the 1876 Constitution and the general assembly, composed of all elements of the empire's populations, though this group remained explicitly hostile to foreign intervention and somewhat divided over the inclusion – or rather the extent of inclusion – of Islamism; however, this camp remained strictly dedicated to positivism and unionism, which Hanioğlu's account reserves for the third group and should give us pause about appropriating his categorization wholesale. The second faction sought a vanguard advisory council, instead of a general assembly, that would be in direct communication with the palace, and this portion of the CUP was unsurprisingly composed of high ranking bureaucrats and military leaders who relied on the prospect of intervention, specifically European intervention from the Anglo-Saxon world; as such, this group largely amassed around Sabahattin, both prior to 1902 and after 1908, which took a more federal attitude

[44] *Turquie contemporaine*, 11 May 1891, 2.
[45] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 December 1897, 1.

towards imperial politics. A third orientation included those positivists, largely endorsed by university students, who wished to have scientific and industrial progress as the central nexus of the movement, such as Abdullah Cevdet; what really separated the third group from the first group, in contrast to Hanioğlu's account, was to what extent these new sciences like materialism or Darwinism would drive the empire, and they tended to be less open to cooperating with orthodox religious movements. The final two factions were composed of grassroots anarchists influenced by political trends in Europe and another group largely located in the Balkan region that focused on unifying the diverse Muslim populations, both of which became more prominent after a failed Parisian conference to unify the Young Turk's intellectual movement in 1902.[46] Though diametrically opposed, each factions found their grounding in a *field of strategic possibilities* rooted in representation: sometimes relying on an intellectual vanguard, other times on proportionally representing the population, the representative exclusivity of Muslims or foreign intervention by Great Britain or France. In this respect, what representative methods were to be used were ambiguous, but the tangibility of a representative *dispositif* became omnipresent, as was a knowledge of the strategies involved in this web of power relations and some dedication to the version of public opinion discussed in previous chapters.

One aspect was how to deal with vying ethnic and religious communities. On the one hand, there was an acknowledgement that the different ethnic and religious groups were seeking different demands: "Each of the rebellious elements follows a separate ideal. The Albanians aspire to independence, just as the Armenians, under the mask of the demand for reforms, do not want anything other than another government."[47] A year earlier, the same press, under the guidance of Ahmed Rıza, referred to the multiple segments of Ottoman society as "engines" that would work best in unison: "The existence of several engines, pushing them naturally towards union, has helped us a lot. Among these engines we will only cite the Muslim religion forbidding its followers from seeing any difference between men."[48] The *Libéral Ottoman* likewise centered their purpose on representing the differing needs of the empire's peoples, claiming that it would "always make a point of protesting against the iniquities of the current government. [Our] task is

[46] Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 171. However, scholars have since problematized this strict division of camps within the CUP groupings; for some examples, see Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*; Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*.
[47] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 January 1898, 4.
[48] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 December 1897, 1.

to defend all the oppressed Ottomans, be they Greeks, Albanians, Jews, Armenians or Muslims, and to claim the rights which have been acquired by us through the Constitution of Midhat-Pasha."[49] However, unlike the approach to Ottoman unity of Ahmed Rıza, the liberal group largely wished for decentralization and a federalized empire, most prominently argued for by Sabahattin: "To bring about order in local governemnt organisations, in a manner that will correspond to regional and occupational needs, current *vilayets* need to be separated ino *territorial zones arranged by virture of their natural and social conditions*."[50] This division in the Young Turk movement would be pivotal in the post-1908 era and eventually establish the framework for the Turkish Republic, but what is important to note is that, regardless of whether one sided with a unionist or federalist approach, there was a need to unite the dispersion of voices within the empire under a common banner; it was more of an issue of how that should be arranged.

Aside from how to organize these populations, these presses also often mentioned the personal characteristics each community offered. For instance, "The Armenians form a hardworking, honest, gentle people, very attached to their beliefs and to its historical traditions."[51] As for Muslims, they are "tolerant, sympathetic to any generous, noble, lofty idea of which the best of the Muslims today are, no doubt, animated by."[52] Meanwhile, "The Israelites preserved indelible moral and physical characteristics in Asia Minor. Trade, especially retail, absorbs them entirely. They leave to the Greeks, Armenians and Turks all the professions which require a display of physical force."[53] In a broader lens, Abdullah Cevdet was apt to argue that these flaws were what had been dragging the empire down. For instance, he argued, "It is nothing other than our own Asiatic minds, which made us expelled from Europe, and our degenerated traditions and institutions."[54] This crux was one of Abdullah Cevdet's central intellectual concerns, or "how should one make modern ideas and progress penetrate into the Muslim soul?"; due to his desire to introduce Western science into Ottoman society while retaining its culture, he professed this had to be a careful and gradual process:

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[49] *Libéral ottoman*, 15 January 1901, 1.
[50] As quoted in Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 95.
[51] *Turquie contemporaine*, 1 June 1891, 5.
[52] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 January 1899, 4.
[53] *Turquire contemporaine*, 1 June 1891, 5.
[54] As quoted in Büründüz, *Abdullah Cevdet and* Garpçılık, 44.

> The Muslim spirit will close all opening to the [*sic.*] clarity if it comes immediately [into a] Christian world. It is necessary for us therefore to assume that the care of transfusion of a new blood in the Muslim veins, to look for and to find all the progressive principles in the institutions of the very Islam.[55]

These character traits were certainly not agreed upon, and they often varied based on the author's personal preferences, particularly when it came to antisemitism. Yet, the character that a group represented revealed some internal truth about who these groups were. Beyond being traditional community differences, these came to be something internal to the individuals of those communities.

Equality thus meant allowing freedoms to these segments *differentially*; the connection between moral values and the members of those groups, often interpellated without their consent, became a quintessential facet of representative discourse. This becomes most present when discussions of the Kurds are involved, described through their "exactions, acts of arbitrariness and unheard-of cruelty [that] are very frequent and provoke the courageous complaints of charitable souls."[56] Not only did this tectonic shift from a sultanic *dispositif* to a representative one allow for a political framework that was people-centric, but it also forced individuals to be represented by the whole of their community. Groups did not always have an autonomous voice in how they came to be perceived, particularly in the Young Turk presses. The representative networks of power relations not only provided novel forms of strategies and acts to become possible, but they also led to concentrations of prevention that foreclosed possibilities, which often left communities exposed to a spectrum of *violences*.[57] Nevertheless, representation via public opinion came to be seen as the ultimate rationale that could offer security, unity and progress in the empire. An illustration of this was profoundly attested to by the authors of *Turquie Contemporaine*: "The nationalities that we have just cited have barely shaken off and broken their secular chains when they, with the sole breath of freedom, transformed themselves, as if by magic, into Nations having an awareness of their civil rights."[58]

Another issue was the particular position of the "Turks," which had begun to take on some nationalist connotations though still strongly relying on ethnic overtones.[59] In

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[55] As quoted in Büründüz, *Abdullah Cevdet and* Garpçılık, 54.
[56] *Turquie contemporaine*, 1 May 1891, 5.
[57] A particularly notable study on this is Julia Cohen's *Becoming Ottomans*, particularly chapters 74-131.
[58] *Turquie contemporaine*, 11 May 1891, 2.
[59] For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the term "Turk," see Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 213-245.

some respects, these presses were right when they argued they lacked recourse to representation by foreign powers that were enjoyed by Christians, though these were certainly exaggerated; they assuredly were not as universal nor successful as these authors believed. For instance, *Turquie Contemporaine* argues that the Turks were the worst off since they lacked the ability to make such an appeal:

> There are really no peasants more unhappy than the Turkish peasants, more than the Christians, because they suffer like them, with this difference putting them in an inferior position, not having, as the Christians do, consuls, ambassadors, foreign governments and, above all, an authorized and independent press to patronize and defend them.[60]

The disadvantages that the proclaimed "Turks" suffered was nevertheless shown to be a strength, an intrinsic quality of persistence and endurance that belonged to the race: "If this engine [to revolt] has not yet stirred up the Turks, it is because they endure pain and suffering better: they endure better, but they will not endure indefinitely."[61] Oftentimes, the subtle subjugation of other groups becomes more than apparent, reinforcing the connotation of Turks as rulers: "We Turks, we who are Muhammedans, we who are members of the ruling race, we who know more than the other peoples who compose our Empire, we of whom alone the government is formed."[62] Despite all this grandeur, Turkish subjugation is just that much more humiliating as they allegedly recognize the inequalities and injustices when compared to Christians, who have a representative advantage: "To escape the authority of the Sultan and the Sublime Porte, obtaining the naturalization of a civilized nation is the most cherished dream of a Rayas [here meaning Christian]…by anyone who has had the misfortune of being born an Ottoman subject."[63]

The federalist wing of the movement pushing for foreign intervention also relied on the role representation had played since the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, though they certainly subverted its imperialist rationale. The two particular issues on foreign intervention – either for or against – prior to the 1908 Revolution involved the massacres of Armenians and the sovereignty of Cyprus, or the Cretan question. In one issue of *Turquie Contemporaine*, they inquiringly posed how "we are not told what measure the governments of civilized Europe intend to take to finally guarantee the honor and life of so many unfortunate populations, abandoned, helpless and unprotected to the plunder of

[60] *Turquie contemporaine*, 20 April 1891, 1.
[61] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 December 1897, 2.
[62] *Osmanli*, 1 May 1898.
[63] *Turquie contemporaine*, 11 May 1891, 6.

the cruelest violence of these hordes of barbarians who are devastating Armenia."[64] *Le Libéral Ottoman* blatantly insisted that their sheer purpose is to invoke intervention: "Everything we write about the fate of these poor Armenians will in no way change their situation…What we need are not spectators of the battle we are currently waging…but soldiers who are fighting with us."[65] In the same issue, which appeared after the Armenian massacres of the 1890s, the authors make an almost prophetic warning of what would come if intervention were avoided: "If an intervention of the powers does not put a brake to the cruelty of the Grand Assassin [Abdülhamid II] by deposing him, this part of the Ottoman Empire will soon be nothing but a desert; no trace of men will be found between Erzurum and Diyarbakir."[66] Beyond the mere criticism of contemporary Ottoman governance, nevertheless, was not the fundamental reason for desiring foreign intervention, specifically Anglo-Saxon intervention. Sabahattin makes clear it is strictly tied to intellectual as well as social and industrial progress:

> In our realm of ideas, the idea of Westernizing is taken to mean equipping our nation with the material and immaterial means of the West. And we assume that if we were to create, also in Turkey, foundations such as perfect paved roads, railways, ports, canals, dreadnaughts, libraries and schools, banks…et cetera, as in the most advanced countries, we are able to raise Turkey to the level of civilisation of the West.[67]

In this respect, there is a strong division in the literature between appropriating Western technologies or ideas and its culture, the prior of which was desired but the latter of which was shunned. On top of this, it was not any intervention but Western intervention, usually France or Great Britain; Russia was portrayed as an inherent evil, even so far as being attributed as the force behind Abdülhamid II's reign.

Meanwhile, many Young Turk groups were adamantly opposed to foreign intervention and thought representation should be a domestic matter. *Meşveret*, for example, claims that the Ottoman peoples have proven their capacity to self-govern: "These successive revolts of the Arabs, the Armenians, the Albanians and the Young Turks, do they not prove to the fact that the Ottomans have the capacity to govern themselves by the constitution? Doesn't the idea of revolt show that the people are awake?"[68] Perhaps more than anyone, they consistently staked their claims to a

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[64] *Turquie contemporaine*, 1 May 1891, 5.
[65] *Libéral ottoman*, 1 March 1901, 2.
[66] *Libéral ottoman*, 1 March 1901, 2.
[67] As quoted in Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 99.
[68] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 January 1898, 4.

representative constitution on the Cretan question: A constitution "is the solution to which our party [the CUP] must aspire as well as the majority of the Muslim and Christian Cretan inhabitants, because the constitution will put an end, not only to the Cretan question, but also to all the questions of the East."[69] At other times, these authors argue that the country itself, through foreign intervention, has come to submit entirely to this form of representation under Abdülhamid II: "Though the Sultan is nominally Caliph of all the Faithful, and should thus administer his own justice to his own subjects, he and his ministers take their orders from Christian powers in this regard."[70] While this would seem to undermine the notion of equality between Christians and Muslims, the truth of the situation was that, in the order of things, it was the Muslim Turks that had the personal characteristics to rule, at least according to some Young Turk factions. The Turks were the ones capable of representing the interests of all elements of the population, being rulers at heart, though the places of other groups varied by what their represented qualities were.

The transformations that arose by the end of the nineteenth century, both in terms of the palace and those who were against it in one way or another, broke the longstanding tradition of the adage "Might is Right," which no longer propelled decision-making. Retroactively perceived as an awakening, and a national awakening at that, these relations gave way to revised subject positions with very concrete and tangible points of reference, tied up with the political realities of the day. This emerging *dispositif* was adaptable, nonetheless, and the ability of different groups in appropriating this system dramatically heeded to the political norms that would usher in the twentieth century. Representation through public opinion would be the bedrock of Ottoman – and soon Turkish – governance, yet if this dispersion of perspectives proved to be one of the internal dynamics, it certainly was not the only one. Public opinion introduced a unifying factor that has come to dominate Turkish politics to date.

9.2.3 Unification of Collective

While the historical root of the "people" allowed the Young Turks to claim legitimacy and the dispersion of perspectives allowed them to deal with the pluralism existent in the empire, the *tour de force* of representative power came in the form of spirit, or rather the construction of a national will. While a dispersion of perspectives is noted, these

[69] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 January 1898, 2.
[70] *Osmanli*, 1 May 1898.

communities were united under a representative Ottoman banner. The authors of the *Libéral Ottoman* wrote, "We are convinced that, in the face of the unified agreement of all Ottomans, law and justice will encounter no difficulty in triumphing."[71] The CUP's French supplement argued that "to open a sure era of progress, it is necessary that the various Ottoman elements – without distinction of religion – fraternize."[72] The positivists wing of the CUP took to portraying this in organic terms as parts of the body:

> A society is like a human body, because each is composed of varied and numerous living cells. Just as an individual requires therapy to recover from an illness, so a society needs to take cures for its special illnesses – the doctors are dubbed lawmakers, administrators, and politicians.[73]

The illness plaguing the national body thus required the Young Turk movement as the physicians: "Our goal is therefore to discover the worm which slipped into all the institutions and administrative cogs of the most admirable country in the old world; and, after laying it bare, it is up to the people and the nation to seek remedies to cure and heal the wounds."[74] The first signs of the nation as a living entity, as a spirit or a "common destiny," as Ahmed Rıza refers to it, appeared within this discourse.[75] Though the Ottoman Empire had been long referred to as the "Sick Man of Europe," the Young Turks brought this to a new reality on the domestic scene. The legitimacy of their representation rested on their unique position as doctors of the nation, but this certainly did not only come through in organic analogies. This was precisely the goal of a conference held in 1902 in Paris, organized by Sabahattin and inclusive of an array of elements (though certainly in favor of his decentralization ideals). In his opening remarks to the conference, Sabahattin firmly declares, "The only remedy, in our view, for the series of woes ravaging the country is to develop the moral and material forces of all who bear the name of Ottoman, without making any distinction as to race, religion or sex."[76] Not only was unity necessary, but it was precisely these doctors, through imamic leadership, who had the skills to save the empire.

The illnesses the Ottoman national spirit was facing were clear: selfishness and ignorance. It was the guidance and support from "the sane men of the Empire" that would act as the founding principle, the basic law: "Executive power, exercised by responsible

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[71] *Libéral ottoman*, 1 February 1901, 4.
[72] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 December 1897, 1.
[73] As quoted in Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 208.
[74] *Turquie contemporaine*, 20 April 1891, 1.
[75] As quoted in Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 204.
[76] Fesch, *Constantinople aux derniers jours*, 366.

ministers under the control of national representation, should naturally be subject to the supreme authority of the Sovereign, who would retain his right of veto."[77] The language used by other presses was nevertheless cruder and more confrontational: "Our government can never truthfully deny our statements on its cruelty and tyranny; and we hope that, in view of the uncontroverted and incontrovertible statements leveled against it, will eventually change its policy and inaugurate reforms."[78] The more radical wing of the CUP under the direction of Ahmed Rıza saw the only solution to be revolutionary action:

> The committee, now entirely convinced that the Sultan will only yield to the national will by force, with any conciliatory means appearing inopportune to him, decided to carry out a rigorous campaign and a bitter struggle to be able to more quickly establish, in our unfortunate country, an order of things compatible with its current progress.[79]

This press even went so far as to deem Abdülhamid II a vampire, describing him as a "tyrant who feeds on human blood, who assassinates everything to remain the absolute master, who sacrifices everything to keep his name of Sultan."[80] Abdülhamid II allegedly attacked this spirit by intentionally dividing it, and thus foreclosing the power of collective representation: "To deflect the storm which threatened him, the Sultan, like a very skillful man, had succeeded in dividing his subjects into numerous parties, which exhausted themselves in internal struggles, thus forgetting the common enemy."[81] The fragmentation of the national spirit plagued the Ottomans, and Abdülhamid II's ambition in this matter gave rise to this "common enemy." As the exiles in Paris argued, Abdülhamid II's "purpose, his sole purpose, is to destroy. One says his motto 'divide and conquer,' [but] we say his true motto is 'divide and destroy.' Abdul-Hamid wants ruins; nothing but ruins and that is why he excites Muslims against Christians and Christians against Muslims."[82] Yet, the issue revolved more around destruction through division than on the Ottoman royal dynasty, and some other prime targets included Europe and Russia, who were portrayed as wanting the dissolution of the Empire for self-gain: considering Europe's "complete indifference to the legitimate claims of the Young Turks

[77] *Turquie contemporaine,* 1 May 1891, 1.
[78] *Osmanli*, 1 May 1898.
[79] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 February 1898, 1.
[80] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 10 March 1898, 1.
[81] *Libéral ottoman*, 1 March 1901, 2.
[82] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 January 1898, 7.

and its tacit bias in favor of their most implacable enemy, does it not, in fact, reveal hidden designs and selfish ulterior motives towards the Young Turks?"[83]

On the other hand, the federalist camp behind Sabahattin argued that foreign intervention – granted it was the right kind – was not only necessary but fundamental. Sabahattin goes so far as desiring their intervention in imperial governing directly:

> An assembly of order should be created for each zone [i.e., *vilayet*]: some personages amongst the English dignitaries who have *in esse proven suitability* in the administration of places such as India and Egypt, and will be admitted into government services, should be positioned as chief officers of these assemblies, and thereby their *organisational skills* should be profited from.[84]

The *Libéral Ottoman* goes so far as to attest that "it is too easy to understand the interest of the Russian government in fueling the civil war in this country," referring to the massacres against Armenians.[85] The only manner to overcome this was to let the national will run free, embracing the interests of the diverse populations of the empire, represented under a unified front. The idea of collective action was the reasoning behind the 1902 conference, in fact, which nonetheless dissolved along the lines of federalist, unionist and miniority ethnic or religious groups. There was certainly an emphasis on hearing from the populations of the empire, and their voices – or rather the right to build their representative base – were allegedly valued factors for the CUP. Nonetheless, the higher principle was submission to this national will, i.e., the Committee, at all costs.

Regardless, there was still a desire to be perceived as the sole voice of the movement. As *Meşveret* made very clear, it, *and only it*, was the voice of the Committee, which was viewed to be as *the* voice of the Young Turk movement: "No newspaper other than 'Osmanli' should be considered as an organ of our party, we are only responsible for this newspaper and its supplements."[86] On the issue of the Cretan question, this same press argued that European newspapers had been misguided for erroneously interpreting Greek presses as the voice of the Cyprus populations, of whom the CUP claimed to be truly speaking for:

> We have spoken on behalf of the majority of the population, [and] this should not seem strange to readers of European newspapers who believe the contrary, because these newspapers received

[83] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 4 May 1899, 3.
[84] As quoted in Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 95.
[85] *Libéral ottoman*, 1 March 1901, 1.
[86] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 December 1897, 1.

> their news from Hellenic sources and thus became the organs of the insurgents won over by Greece and which form the minority of the Cretan people.[87]

The importance of speaking on behalf of the Ottoman populations became a contingent nexus in legitimizing the voice of these presses. The *Osmanli* accused the Ottoman government of misusing Islam and thus misleading the national will: "They have no shame, these [Ottoman] judges, these ignoramuses. They flout and mock our Religious Laws by their imprisoning and their blood-spilling without cause or excuse."[88] However, the CUP itself strictly applied this principle internally, arguing that the committee and not its members were able to act as the representative of all Ottomans. At the time, there was nothing unusual about this as it had been a centrifugal mechanism in terms of imamic leadership since at least the 1860s.

For example, *Meşveret's* French supplement, under the guidance of Ahmed Rıza, was often far more extremist in its language and accusatory style towards the Ottoman government. The CUP eventually removed Ahmed Rıza as editor, which prompted a lawsuit from him; his inability to submit to the will of the CUP was seen as the point of contention, and it was stipulated by Ishak Sükuti (one of the original founders of the CUP) that Ahmed Rıza should be allowed to take up his responsibilities yet again should he submit to the committee's authority: "If [Ahmed Rıza] promises that he will offer up his selfish ideas to the system of consultation [the very title of the gazette he wsa removed from], which is the main pillar of our committee, he will be reinstated to his former post with pleasure and gratitude."[89] The ability of the sultan to speak on behalf of Muslims, as their representative, became the crux upon which many counterarguments were made, whereby these Young Turk presses positioned themselves as the true voice of Muslims: "How could such a sovereign take the direction of [Islamic] affairs in his weak hands? Thus, we see the interests of Islamism collapse everywhere and its decadence become more and more accentuated."[90] Not only was this a unification of a collective identity, but it was grounded in imamic leadership. The solution is posed in terms of representative power relations; the only veritable source of political legitimacy, in this case Muslims, is a "revolutionary spirit" encapsulated in a general assembly: "If a regime adapts to the temperament of Mohammedans, and in general of all Orientals, it is the parliamentary

[87] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 January 1898, 2.
[88] *Osmanli*, 1 January 1898.
[89] As quoted in Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 97.
[90] *Jeune Turquie*, 5 June 1896, 1.

regime."[91] Not only must it be a representative regime, but this is what the intrinsic characteristics of Muslims are naturally inclined to, at least for the authors of *Jeune Turquie*. In essence, this will to represent became both a new capacity, one that allowed for an entirely new system of government to arise, but it also came to limit, restrict and silence those who went against the national spirit as well as to interpellate those who do not participate: one had to submit to the imamic leadership. To have a say in your representation, you had to first submit to the representative *dispositif*; such an acknowledgement could give you a voice, but it could equally take that voice away.

9.2.4 Accruing a Base

If representation became the ultimate *raison d'état* during this period, it was contingent upon building a representative base of actual support based on some form of collective identity, as was made clear at the conference of 1902. The inability to mobilize the masses was a predominant factor in previous failures, such as the Kuleli Incident, Midhat Pasha's exile in 1878 and the occupation of the Imperial Ottoman Bank by Armenian revolutionaries in 1896. Thus, the various threads of the Young Turk movement were eager to put forward a united front at this event, which still ended in dissolution rather than unity. Their inability to reach a consensus dealt a near fatal blow to the movement, and it effectively ended the force of these presses and shifted towards an "activist" phase.[92] The tools used to evoke such a response from Ottoman populations can widely be separated into (a) patriotism through collective identity and (b) imamic pastoralism.

The prior dealt with a longstanding tradition of attacking selfishness and arbitrariness, whereas the latter addressed the notion of ignorance and "backwardness." The general distrust and animosity that Young Turk presses held against their government was rooted in its failure to address the concerns of its subjects: "The government has largely ignored the issue [of parliament]; this has resulted in an upsurge in hatred which could have serious consequences."[93] The *Libéral Ottoman* further attests that this tragedy of internal corruption and selfishness could only be resolved by those who held a sincere admiration and love for the Ottoman nation:

> When we witness the agony of a great nation, we feel seized with pity for it, thinking that by the will of the sultan, it must choose between ignorance and prison, and those who brave this last

[91] *Jeune Turquie*, 5 June 1896, 1.
[92] For example, see Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 139-149.
[93] *Croissant*, 17 August 1893, n.p.

> condition to work towards the emancipation of their fellow citizens will remain a posterity, even better than those who would have enlarged the territory of the Fatherland. The great patriots are those who understand in their love: men first and native soil second. War is an accident in the life of people, [but] Fraternity is both a right and a duty.[94]

More than a *right*, patriotism via collective identity becomes a *duty* for the Young Turks. Not only do Ottomans have a right to life and prosperity, but they have an inherent obligation to protect and defend it. The *Meşveret's* French supplement made this duty tangible in an array of accusatory passages: "It is the sacred duty of every good compatriot to neglect nothing in contributing, to the extent of his strength, to the work of liberating our dear homeland."[95] This outlet even argued in 1899, after the Armenian massacres of 1894-1896, that the revolutionary activities of Armenians "would be much more patriotic and, above all, much more political if our Armenian compatriots…devote themselves with more zeal to the task of reintroducing the great martyr Midhat Pasha's constitution" (yet it is notable that the Armenians sided with the liberalists after 1908).[96] This rubric of representation not only allowed the Young Turks to speak on behalf of various Ottoman populations, but also for judging them in their absence based on the same principles of representation. Only a few months earlier, this press managed to interpret issues of foreign intervention and the Ottoman government through this representational prism, discussing an instance where Ottoman soldiers suppressed a Muslim riot in Cyprus: "Until recently, Turkish soldiers shot at Muslims, [who were] guilty of defending themselves against unjust shootings by the English. O patriotism, where are you?"[97] The capacity to speak in such a way has assuredly been a unique and powerful tool passed down since this period, but the limitations of this *dispositif* at the power-knowledge axis permeated Ottoman society as a whole, igniting an assortment of strategies that violently worked to counter the discourses of the palace while also suppressing the voices of whole segments of the Ottoman population.

Discovering patriotism was found to be a process not of construction but of enlightenment. The spirit that connected all Ottoman subjects did not need to be constructed, as the Tanzimat reformers and even the Young Ottomans believed, but *uncovered*, awoken from its slumber by imamic guidance that the Ottoman caliph had ceased offering: "The countless faults of the government spur those who are not yet

[94] *Libéral ottoman*, 1 March 1901, 3.
[95] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 4 May 1899, 4.
[96] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 21 February 1899, 3.
[97] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 15 October 1898, 1.

awake."[98] This is reinforced by the re-imagination of the historical roots of legitimacy. In the same issue, the CUP's French press rhetorically inquires, "Doesn't the idea of revolt show that the people are awake?"[99] The nation had been lulled to sleep by despotism, which could only be overcome by the unity of its populations. The despotic regime was working towards division, towards keeping the nation in a state of sleepwalking: "The pity is that twenty years of despotism [under Abdülhamid II] have atrophied the feeling of energy among the Turks, to which all nations have owed their salvation in times of crisis."[100] The abject arbitrariness that the despotic regime offered was the fundamental crisis facing the Ottomans, who had become mere victims at the mercy of an abrasive and *illegitimate* leader: "In Turkey, where the State is One Man, where the form of government represents the most intolerable despotism based on force and arbitrariness, with its rights over the life, fortune and liberties of taxpayers, who are only sheep to shear with impunity."[101] What became needed was a vanguard, a group of Ottoman intellectuals that could educate and guide the peoples of the nation towards progress and enlightenment, revealing the spirit that pulsed through their veins.

This vanguard would be constituted of enlightened individuals who would then lead the nation – under the emergence of collective identity – into a brighter future. Halil Ganem argued that such an elite should be constituted by persons from across social elements:

> If [the Elite] are exclusively recruited from an aristocracy, it is a monarchical government in all its beauty; if it is exclusively recruited from a democracy, it is an oligarchic government. The best would obviously be for it to have its source in both classes, or even in all classes of society, without distinction; because the Elite are everywhere.[102]

Thus, patriotism was the means by which to deal with selfishness, but a pastoral element was still required to combat the ignorance of these compatriots. The official CUP gazette makes ignorance a core danger to the future of the national spirit: "'Ignorance,' says a Turkish proverb, 'is infinitely worse than blindness.' For there is not such darkness as ignorance."[103] As the physicians of the nation, these Young Turks offered themselves up as the shepherds of the nation. The *Libéral Ottoman* claims, "[Man] must be guided in

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[98] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 January 1898, 3.
[99] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 January 1898, 4.
[100] *Jeune Turquie*, 5 June 1896, 1.
[101] *Turquire contemporaine*, 20 April 1891, 1.
[102] As quoted in Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 131.
[103] *Osmanli*, 1 January 1898.

his work by a feeling of justice, freedom and humanity. His mind must be enlightened; to fight, he must get to know men. Reduced to his own experience, he could not accomplish this task."[104] These authors position themselves as a necessary component of the national project, infusing themselves into the new economy of power relations emerging around representation. The CUP's own gazettes proclaimed this to be central to their own project: "It is necessary to teach the people what they are and what they could be, and to teach this it is necessary to change the environment." The national spirit was at risk of being misguided through false representation, a wolf in sheep's clothing. This line of argumentation propelled a dual function: those who are educated enough to represent already agree with them, and those who do not are simply too ignorant to see their superior purposes, thus relinquishing their right to represent in the eyes of the Young Turks. The representative *dispositif* situates subjects, willingly or not, within a new paradigm of political participation, one where they can choose to act, but if they fail to do so, they will nonetheless get swept up in the national spirit that encapsulates them all.

9.2.5 Networks of Communication

The expansion of education (and thus literacy), industrialization, communication, the press and bureaucracy all played into these power relations while also embedding in them quite extensively. The Young Turks had something that the Young Ottomans lacked: a much wider audience. Their gazettes were smuggled into the empire using the standard post, an improvement due to the enlargement of this industry as a whole. The CUP even acknowledges "the great difficulty in maintaining an underground printing press in Turkey [which] forced us to publish our newspaper in Europe."[105] At the same time, the movement towards mass mobilization had a more fundamental impact the role of the state: censorship. The CUP went to extraordinary lengths at time to emphasize this point, which delineated the "truth" from the "false," judged by the position of the palace: "Censorship was only introduced after the arbitrary dissolution of the Ottoman Parliament, a dissolution that the Sultan brought about and to make room for his tyrannical absolutism to the detriment of national freedom."[106] Ebru Boyar notes how this portrayal of censorship overlooked (a) previous measures taken on this issue and (b) the exponentially increasing bureaucracy that developed under Abdülhamid II.[107] The notable

[104] *Libéral ottoman*, 1 March 1901, 3.
[105] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 5 December 1897, 1.
[106] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 10 May 1898, 2.
[107] Boyar, "Press and Palace."

difference is that there was a new economy of information, which had been solely focused in the hands of the *ulema* prior to the Tanzimat reforms. The palace was now using the press to inform rather than indoctrinate, yet this required a body that could serve as the imamic filter for this information. It was not neutral but had to be siphoned through the state to determine useful, truthful information from inflammatory or dangerous information. The state saw itself as the arbiter of truth, as did the Young Turk presses.

The struggle was over the right to truth, and the Young Turk presses put great effort into establishing this, juxtaposing their position to that of the false Sultan. The CUP's exclusive claims to represent the Ottoman peoples was not only a way to obtain political power; it also ensured that they were the ones with direct access to truth: "The proofs were placed next to the advanced facts…then the Truth, transfigured, came out before our eyes in all its crude nakedness, then we saw clearly, in all its darkness, the task that we had traced to the Chosen [the Elected]."[108] The *Osmanli* declared that their "statements about our Government can never truthfully be denied, our statements of its cruelty and tyranny."[109] One article in an issue of the French supplement of the *Osmanli* was even signed "a friend of truth."[110] On the other hand, the palace's most vile fault was their ignorance, which fundamentally prevented them from access to truth: "The blind Hamidian government, in its stupefying ignorance, has committed unpardonable mistakes."[111] Even though the CUP alleged a monopoly on truth, other Young Turk presses likewise made such claims. *Turquie Contemporaine* stated, "The truth is that the patient of 1856 became the dying man of 1877; it will perhaps be dead by 1893. There are not nations which have been buried under such a deep layer of ignorance and servitude as the peoples have fallen under Turkish domination."[112] The *Libéral Ottoman* discusses the persecution faced by these truth-seekers: "Honesty is punished; the act of thinking is a crime. Never has an Inquisition pushed its refinements of cruelty to such an extent."[113] The dazzling truth that lit up the darkness of ignorance was built into networks of communication, and within this new *regime du savoir*, access to the truth gave one the right to represent, the right to lead, the right to govern. Power and knowledge were intertwined in a fashion where their projection was a built-in feature of these material

[108] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 15 June 1898, 2.
[109] *Osmanli*, 1 May 1898.
[110] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 4 May 1899, 3.
[111] *Meşveret Supplément Français*, 21 February 1899, 1.
[112] *Turquie contemporaine*, 20 April 1891, 2.
[113] *Libéral ottoman*, 15 January 1901, 1.

practices. Information was not something to be kept secret, to be hidden for those chosen few who had the divine training to truthfully interpret it, yet neither was it free flowing, requiring those capable of seeing the truth to filter out those elements that were not just untruthful but also dangerous to national cohesion.

The socio-political foundations of the most prominent writers at this time were likewise divulged into this growing domain of communication and the institutions that proliferated them. Perhaps most notable is Sabahattin's individualist sociology, which argued that the very structure of the empire required improvements such that it fostered individualism over communalism. This required backtracking on the reforms issued in the nineteenth century (before, during and after the Tanzimat) to build a social structure that would foster private enterprise:

> Individualists who, at the onset, are proportionally poorer in terms of their general knowledge, with observation and experience, obtain the practical knowledge and truths that will secure the success of their jobs as they go forth in life, more thoroughly and intimately. For this reason, contemporary sciences that stem from observation and experience, and tread the path of discovering evident universal truths, are product of the intellectual developments of individualist circles![114]

Meanwhile, Ahmed Rıza was constantly rejecting the European premises of Islamic fanaticism, and in a brief article entitled "Muslim Tolerance" discusses how many European scientific principles and Enlightenment ideals were enshrined in Islam:

> It is indeed the feeling of universal brotherhood which is at the bottom of all the conceptions of Mahomed, and by forgetting this, Muslim power is deprived of its original greatness. Ignorance of the principles of union and fraternity was the main cause of the caliphs' weakening and decadence.[115]

He further argues that the tools and technologies that have advanced in Europe have been used to exploit and repress those in other regions of the world. Thus, if these technologies of communication and industrialization are to be improved in the *true* manner, they must be derived from Ottoman society. Abdullah Cevdet takes a more strict approach to this issue, arguing that the only way for society to move forward – the only way to reach the truth Turan, or Turkic homeland – is through an adoption of science and industrialization:

> This Turan is a place, which allows anyone who would like to reach it only through the universities, and factories of the USA and of Japan and no other roads exist for my new Turan. The youth who

[114] As quoted in Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 93.
[115] Rıza, "Tolérance musulmane."

> trust my views should know that a territory could only be called as "fatherland" on the condition that the people who live there have their independence and dignity.[116]

Nevertheless, these musings about science and truth, particularly in the growth of the capabilities offered by new technologies, were not strictly confined to the "progressive" elements of Ottoman society. A scientific Islam was also on the rise, which sought to rectify the divide between religion and science, or rather show the latter's dependence of the prior. The most prominent of these thinkers was Said Nursi, who argued that science was rooted in Islamic thought:

> The attributes essential to Prophethood (truthfulness, intellect, trustworthiness, communication of the Divine Message, sinlessness, and freedom from physical and mental defects) were found in the most perfect form in Prophet Muhammad…[who] became the unique source and teacher of all elevated sciences for humanity.[117]

In this respect, not only was truth bound up with these changes in the representative *dispositif*, but so was the spirit it constructed. In order to even conceive of a progressive, collective Ottoman identity, it was equally necessary for one to attribute truth to the intrinsic values of that identity as well.

* * *

Infighting nearly brought the CUP to an early death, and though activity-in-exile widely diminished under a broad CUP umbrella after 1902, its transfusion into the empire's domestic scene allowed the organization to persist in the guise of a secret organization up until the 1908 Revolution. Over this period, the CUP won over an array of bureaucrats and military officials while also being popular among students and artisans. The situation in Bulgaria permitted this discourse to prosper, making alliances with local intellectuals and tradesmen while reinforcing a CUP stronghold in the Balkans.[118] Meanwhile, opposing segments of the Ottoman populace took refuge under this banner, from secularists to Islamists, positivists to conservatives, shoemakers to those in the Sultan's inner circle, staunch defenders of traditional families to those seeking women's liberation, Muslims to Christians, Jews to Sufi sects, Turks to Albanians, Arabs, Armenians, Kurds or Greeks. These parts were nevertheless submissive to the whole, tied together not only by a unanimous "spirit" but constructed in the small-scale arrangements discussed in the

[116] As quoted in Büründüz, *Abdullah Cevdet and* Garpçılık, 67.
[117] Nursi, "Extracts from Writings," 122.
[118] Hanioğlu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, 167–168.

introduction to this chapter.[119] Not a lofty, metaphysical spirit, but a corporeal one. One that bound them by their material and ideological grievances. The palace took extra measures to uncover such organizations, relying on a vast spying apparatus that distributed information back to the sultan. Knowledge was power, after all. Torture, imprisonment, exile, interrogation or death awaited those accused of such political leanings, regardless of authenticity. As issues pertaining to the "Macedonian Question" arose, this only solidified the strength of the CUP and the Young Turk movement more broadly.

The Macedonian Question was centered on control of what remained of Ottoman Europe and was concentrated in the Vilayets of Salonica, Monastir and Kosovo, which were caught up in claims of representation from amassing nationalist movements. Young Turks had already established connections with many of these nationalist movements prior to 1908, primarily to bring them – and their armed resistance – under the CUP.[120] By the time the 1908 Revolution was underway, two of its most prominent military leaders on the ground in the Balkans, Ahmed Niyazi Bey and Enver Bey, managed to suppress most infighting by appealing to these vying revolutionary movements to support the Young Turk cause.[121] Due to the disturbances, extra Ottoman troops had been highly concentrated in the Balkans and particularly in these *vilayets*, though the poor state of the Ottoman military meant these troops were underpaid, underfed and irritable. Growing Austrian influence in the region, which had been a longstanding international cooperation under Abdülhamid II, came to a head when an Austrian-built railway announced between Salonica and Bosnia all but ensured Austrian dominance in the region. For the Young Turks and the various revolutionary movements, this was a direct affront to their liberal, positivist or nationalist aspirations, and Young Turk representatives sent from Paris received a warm welcome from these vying socio-political elements; a revolution was officially announced on 6 July 1908 under the leadership of Ahmed Niyazi Bey, and the palace quickly dispatched Ottoman troops to the region.[122] However, the disillusioned lower ranks refused to move against the rebellion, which had infilitrated the Third Army

[119] Zürcher interestingly notes the constant communication the military participants of the revolution had with the CUP, often waiting on orders from the CUP to act or not to act on certain matters. For more on this, see Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 37-40.
[120] Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 31-33, 35-36.
[121] Hacısalihoğlu, "Young Turk Revolution," 169–170. The Greeks initially ignored these appeals and consulted with the Greek government instead, only to then fall in line with the other revolutionary movements later on.
[122] Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 31, 33.

headquartered in Monastir.[123] Realizing his weakened position, Abdülhamid II reinstated the 1876 Constitution and called for new elections, a move that came as a shock to all those involved.

The location of the revolution was nonetheless significant. While the exiled intellectual community had allowed many voices to prosper until the CUP slowly fractured leading up to 1902, this was largely due to a somewhat decentralized organization, with different political leaning taking place in Brussels, Paris, Cairo, Baghdad and the Eastern Anatolian. The military backing of the Balkan collectives gave superiority to the influence of the Parisian school under the leadership of Ahmed Rıza. This focused on self-governance, refusing foreign intervention, a reinstatement of the constitution and a national general assembly. Not only their organizations in the region but also the armed backing of these nationalist movements, the newfound backing of CUP sympathizers within the military and a general disillusionment among lower-ranking officers towards the palace meant that this representative framework was the one catapulted into Istanbul following the revolution, which occurred largely without violence. It was thus that the CUP came to act as the empire's first ever political party, arguing that they alone had access to truth and the knowledge to competently resolve the rampant political disruptions.

The very notion of using a collective identity, specifically a national one, only became conceivable with the emergence of the representative *dispositif*. The five axes upon which it operated were not five divisible strategies or technologies but had been interwoven and become codependent upon one another. The historical roots of legitimacy only make sense to the extent that there is a collective identity to base that legitimacy on. As chapter 5 explained, the use of hagiographies to justify political legitimacy was nothing new, but the ambition to found this on a population was. This requires one to accrue a base to legitimize that position, whether it was the CUP, Kurdish Hamidian troops or Sufi *tarikats* (see previous chapter). A unified collective was required to be put forth, one that could serve as imamic leadership, but this was contingent upon amassing a dispersion of perspectives. Public opinion was not a unified will but a public debate that

[123] This is in fact a point of contention in the literature, for which one can see Zürcher's excellent analysis of disagreements in academic literature on these events, Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 33-37. However, it seems the popular movements and small bands of armed CUP and nationalist troops in the region were enough of a threat to the Ottoman military (and potentially Austrian troops) to provoke immediate concessions of the sultan.

was then submitted to the ultimate spirit of the collective. Yet, these procedures were dependent on a new network of communication and material advancement, which the empmire had built up over the past century. The reason Abdülhamid II was able to serve as the embodiment of an Ottoman "spirit" was precisely because he had access to an enlarged bureaucratic mechanism; this growth permitted an advanced spy network, mass public spectacles, the employment of wider education, censorship of the press and using that very press to propogate ideas and ideals among the public. The formation of national identity was not a process of self-enlightenment and self-reflection – it was a struggle of power relations on numerous fronts over decades – but neither was it a top-down strategy either; it had amassed into one of Foucault's "non-subjective and intentional" *dispositifs* that was impacted by competing subject positions, both from the "elites" and from the *rayas* peasantry, as well as everyone inbetween. While this establishes the conditions of possibility of national identity, which were founded upon representation, the next section details how these power relations drew their force from a sedimented *régime du savoir*.

9.3 A Science of Turkism: Representation and National Belonging

When Abdülhamid II reinstated the constitution and called for new elections, the immediate situation was left unclear. The CUP could have tried to wrestle power from the sultanate directly, yet they instead positioned themselves as overseers of Ottoman politics – the national spirit – until a new parliament was convened. On the one hand, many members of the CUP from more moderate or upper-class backgrounds wanted further decentralization and viewed the CUP's purpose as the reinstatement of the 1876 Constitution, which had been accomplished; others sought to push the reformist and progressive aspects of the movement further, not only wanting reforms but also a more centralized government that would heed to a national assembly.[124] The literature has labelled this first group the "Liberals," who were far more prominent with minority ethnic and religious groups (particularly in the group amassing by Sabahattin, who was in fact the leader of this party), and the latter group the "Unionists," which was largely composed of those gaining no benefits solely from the reinstatement of the constitution and sought a more universal – rather than federalist – system (more in line with the thought of Ahmed

[124] Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 75-76.

Rıza, who reentered politics to be involved in this party).[125] Elections were held in the fall of 1908, and the representative assembly convened on 17 December 1908. Although the CUP had by and large maintained some sense of unity prior to the first parliamentary session, the differing ambitions of these two groups, as the predominant voices in the general assembly, quickly became apparent. The Liberals saw their role as arbiters of the constitution, merely acting as a third-party and objective judge to the policies of the Porte and the palace and seeking a more decentralized central government. The Unionists saw their position as a national mandate, one that pushed them to take a far more active and guiding role in national and international affairs. Amidst this, the ministers in the Porte and the palace both tested their positions in this new arrangement, and Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha's overestimation of his position led to his dismissal within a few months. One non-CUP conservative movement used the newfound access to a free press and political organization that the CUP's revolution had established, but this erupted on 12 April 1908 in what has become known as the *Otuzbir Mart Olayları* (March 31 Incident).[126] Low-ranking soldiers and students at theological schools marched with the Liberals to the sultan's residence demanding a reinstatement of the *şeriat*, which the sultan eagerly approved as well as the dissolution of parliament.[127]

However, this was not a strictly religious reaction on behalf of the Islamist sentiments. Unlike today, the *şeriat* was more in line with a reinstatement of the longstanding political order. This movement is nicely captured by Erik Zürcher:

> Prior to the establishment of the Turkish Republic secularization was not a primary aim of the policy makers, but a side effect of the policies formulated, which were aimed at strengthening the Ottoman State through the adoption of European methods. It was not until the mid-1920s that the Republican government under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk expressely sought to end the political, social and cultural influence of Islamic institutions and to achieve a total dominance of the secular state over those institutions.[128]

More specifically, this was not an anti-CUP movement but rather an anti-Unionist movement, and many ethnic and religious minorities who backed the Liberal camp

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[125] Cohen, *Becoming* Ottomans, 103-131; Kaynar, "Logic of Enlightenment"; Philliou, *Turkey*, 44-68; Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, especially 107-138.
[126] Suny, *They Can Live*, 165–173.
[127] For more on these events, see Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans*, 103-106; Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*, 139-149; Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 73-84.
[128] Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 73. This aligns with the narratives put forward in chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this text.

supported this move.[129] It came down to who was meant to lead the nation, who would speak for the people and what the social hierarchy was. Abdülhamid II's rapid endorsement of the rebels' demands and his pardoning of mutineering soldiers, who had murdered some of their superiors, is what ultimately led to his downfall. Immediate crackdowns on the Unionist camp caused many to flee to the Balkans to seek protection, where they organized the "Action Army" (*Harekat Ordusu*) to march on Istanbul. The sultan's pardoning of the mutineers sealed the collaboration of high-ranking military officers and the Unionists, who ignored pleas from the sultan and Liberals as they marched on the capital, dethroned Abdülhamid II, replaced him with his brother Mehmed Reşad and reinstated the constitution. After the dust had settled, the military positioned itself as an objective and non-partisan element, preventing Unionists from enacting widespread revenge against the Liberals and thus sedimenting its role as an objective protector of the constitution, and thus the nation.[130] With the palace having fallen from power, the political conflicts between the Liberal and Unionist camps would lead to the first true phase of competitive representative politics in the form of political parties – which was to last until the elections of 1912, rigged in the Unionists' favor.

Yet a complete restructuring of the political dynamics between the Porte, the palace and the newly reconvened national assembly were altered as a result of the events of early 1909. Constitutional amendments and additions meant that control was taken from the Porte and the palace and predominantly reinvested in the national assembly. At the forefront of these changes was, as Feroz Ahmad highlights, "The question as to whom was the supreme authority in the Empire."[131] Discussions on how to lead the nation forward transitioned towards discussions that were already underway: *Who was the nation*? As the debates on this issue intensified, a new nexus of power relations was on the rise. The revolution had inadvertently made room for political organization and participation, and new clubs, societies and presses sprang to life almost overnight. Using the new capabilities posed by the representative *dispositif*, they were not only able to coordinate with a new literate mass but also make claims to represent these people while taking on an imamic role at the local level. Throughout the empire, subjects found themselves exposed to an array of outlets to project their grievances. Scientific positivism groups emerged, dedicated to the intellectual progress of the empire. National clubs and

[129] For more, see ff. 127 of this chapter.
[130] Ahmad, 35–36; Lévy-Aksu, "Freedom Versus Security"; Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 77-84.
[131] Ahmad, 58.

associations found legitimacy in this new dispersion of power. Not only did this reinforce and circulate the representative *dispositif* throughout Ottoman society, but it further contributed to the *regime du savoir*, with knowledge being filtered to the masses through the privileged role of club leaders. A race was underway to awaken the heart of the nation. Suddenly, a form of Ottoman nationalism became a tangible concept to segments of Ottoman populations that had previously had no legitimate political claims to this discussion, and over time, this would flourish into the Turkish national identity that would usher in the republic.

In this section, I work towards mapping out Foucault's archeological objective of a discursive formation (see chapter 3, section 3, sub-section 1) in terms of national identity. Beyond relying on new representative tools that solidified in spirit, the representative *dispositif* was contingent, at least in terms of national identity, on a *régime du savoir* based on the truth of this form of collective identity. As such, the first three parts of this section deal with the three central pillars upon which national identity made sense in the late Ottoman context: pan-Turkism, Islamism and Turkism. After mapping these out, I detail how this gave way to a discursive formation that manifested (a) a referential, (b) enunciative divergences, (c) theoretical networks and (d) a field of strategic possibilities. To unveil these, I focus on the work of Ziya Gökalp, a prominent Turkish sociologist at the end of the empire/beginning of the Turkish Republic whose work was fundamental to shaping the Republican era. What makes Gökalp such a useful domain to investigate is his ability to synthesize these elements, which shows the manner in which the discursive formation of national identity was malleable, working more as a network of options rather than a rigid and orthodox set of ideals – although some have certainly turned this into a hegemonic orthodox using the networks of power relations (e.g., Kemalism, Erdoğanism). Thus, the power-knowledge of national identity and belonging is able to be unraveled as such.

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This national self-awareness did not progress along a smooth, undeviating path. It was not the result of a gradual self-enlightenment or popular political awakening but, as previous chapters have illustrated, a struggle for the re-organization of the empire and the perceived "Circle of Justice," which was being formulated on new tactics, strategies and practices build up over the previous century. What connected Ottoman subjects was contested by a large portion of the population, and it took decades to fully manifest itself.

By the end of the nineteenth century, a subterranean bond of national inclusion had materialized from the problematization of origins. While this bond was contested, its existence was not, evolving within a matrix of power relations that functioned through what Ziya Gökalp, one of the most notable names in Turkish nationalism, termed the triad of *Türkleşmek-Islamlaşmak-Muasirlaşmak* (Turkification-Islamification-Modernification) in his collection of essays *The Principles of Turkism*. Likewise, Yusuf Akçura's *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Policies) attempted to make sense of national belonging within the Ottoman Empire through the same, roughly-defined concepts: in essence, it was the solidification of a discursive formation (see chapter 3). Yet, these were not three options but rather three strategies around which a national bond *made sense* or was *conceivable*. These were not isolated in any way and would often be combined or excluded however one liked. Nevertheless, national identity – and what we today term "nationalism" – was only able to intelligibly manifest itself by being interpreted through these pillars. Consequently, one can look at these different strands of the conditions of possibility in order to better understand the rules of national identity in a representative *dispositif* that still operates in Turkey: pan-Turkism, Islamism and Turkism.

9.3.1 Turkification (pan-Turkism)

Due to the rebellions occurring in the Balkans and beyond, as well as improving revolutionary nationalist propaganda, Muslim populations in these geopolitical arenas began to face increasing religious persecution. The consequent waves of mass migration into the inner empire, especially the Anatolian region, significantly tilted the demographics in favor of the growing Muslim population.[132] The sentiments that began to arise for foreign Muslim and Turkic individuals facing real or imagined persecution would eventually give birth to the pan-Turkish movement. Though pan-Turkism largely remained an intellectual enterprise lacking populist appeal – mostly driven by immigrants like Yusuf Akçura, Mirza Fatali Akhundov, Ismail Gasprinskii and Ahmet Ağaoğlu – its influence on later nationalist trends is unquestionable.[133] The pan-Turks viewed the Turkic peoples as united under a historically related culture, ethnicity and language. As noted in one article, Akçura saw the Tatar Turks not only as cultural brothers and sisters of the Ottomans, but he also emphasized the importance of their cultural heritage over

[132] For more on this, see Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*; Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans*.
[133] For more on the development of pan-Turkism, see Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Kalirad, "From Iranism to Pan-Turkism"; Koolaee and Nezami, "Pan-Turkism, Construction of Identity"; Landau, *Pan-Turkism*; Landau, "Fortunes and Misfortunes"; Meyer, *Turks Across Empires*.

financial prosperity in terms of Russian assimilation: "Those [Tatar Turks] who did not want to sacrifice the sacred treasures of their religious and national traditions for material wealth were deprived of all their property and reduced to the darkest misery overnight."[134]

The image of history, or rather of a historical origin, beget by the pan-Turks stemmed from Turcology, i.e., the study of Turkic races and their origins, as well as growing tides of Darwinism and social sciences (e.g., Ahmet Rıza's positivism, Sabahattin's individualist sociology or Abdullah Cevdet's Islamic materialism). The CUP's commitment to scientific positivism and the explosion of national and intellectual clubs and associations fed into this historical interpretation. Three paradigmatic works that contributed to this ideology by Western authors were Joseph de Guignes' *A General History of the Huns, the Turks, the Mongols and Other Occidental Tatars* (*Histoire Générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols, et des Autres Tartares Occidentaux*, 1756), Arthur Lumley Davids' *A Grammar of the Turkish Language* (1832) and, later on, Léon Cahun's *Introduction to the History of Asia: Turks and Mongols* (*Introduction à L'Histoire de l'Asie: Turcs et Mogols*, 1896). Yet, it was only with Mustafa Celaleddin's book *The Ancient and Modern Turks* (*Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes*, 1869) that Turcology became a factor in Ottoman historiography. Celaleddin connected different Turkic groups with a pre-Ottoman, pre-Islamic past through ethnicity, language and culture. The very beginning of the actual text makes clear not only that this is a scientific analysis, but that the answers had to start from the past: "To study a nation in depth, it is necessary to observe it in the different phases of its existence; knowledge of one's past is therefore an essential condition for this study."[135] Many prominent nineteenth century writers on a nationalized Ottomanism like Ahmet Vekif Pasha, Namık Kemal and Şemsettin Sami were early embracers of this way of thinking, and a debate concerning what a "Turk" was and what constituted "Turkish" began to pop up both inside and outside the Empire.[136] In light of this, Wendy Shaw explains, "Mustafa Celaleddin's work encouraged Namık Kemal to move away from the Ottoman concept of *millets* toward the notion of *vatan*, most easily likened to the French concept of *patrie*, or motherland, which would be defined by the borders of the Ottoman state."[137] The idea of a Turkic unity hidden beneath centuries of historical distractions appealed to some Ottoman authors,

[134] Akçura, *État actuel et aspirations*, 9.
[135] Djelaleddin, *Turcs anciens et modernes*, 7.
[136] Gökalp, *Principles of Turkism*, 5; Landau, *Pan-Turkism*, 31.
[137] Shaw and Shaw, *History of Ottoman Empire II*, 23.

especially those who had emigrated from territories where local populations had persecuted the Muslim inhabitants, such as in the Balkans, the Caucasus or Crimea.

By the twentieth century, nonetheless, the notion of *constructing* a national identity slowly faded and gave way to projects of *uncovering* the national spirit that had been there all along. To be clear, this national "spirit" had not actually existed prior to this period, and the notion of a nation at sleep was a wholly new social construct that latched onto the representative *dispositif*; it was precisely through the five axes of this *dispositif* that spirit became intelligible at all (see chapter 8). From this point onwards, there was something within the "Turks" that only had to be unburied, an innate quality, for the Turkish nation to come to fruition. Akçura was a Russian immigrant who often stressed the Turks' ancestral ties to Muslims in the Balkans and the Caucasus. In his book *Three Policies*, he acknowledged the existence of Islamism and Ottomanism but iterated how they failed to provide a solid national bond. Under a pan-Turkist ideology, he argued, ethno-cultural national cohesion would be stronger than an Islamic model:

> The Turks within the Ottoman realms would unify quite tightly with both religious and racial bonds – more tightly than with just religious ones. And, even though they were originally not Turkish, the remaining Muslim elements which had been somewhat Turkified would be assimilated even more to Turkishness. Moreover, the groups that had not yet been assimilated at all, but did not have a national consciousness, could also be Turkified.[138]

According to his account, the natural ethnic-national bond had succeeded in resisting Islam's intrusion: "In spite of Islam's desire, the tribal and national zeal which it had not been able to erase completely began to show its head, even if a little, with the influence of Western thought."[139] However, if Islam were to continue its affront against nationalism, it would drive the nation to fracturing. This idea of somnambulist nationalism was thus constructed in such a way that nationality did not need to be *made* but rather *unveiled* or *awoken*.

While Akçura was somewhat harsh on Islam and Ottomanism, not all pan-Turks were. Writers like Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Ahmed Hilmi viewed Islam as a further bond shared by Turks everywhere and addressed the cultural, linguistic bonds of Turks over

[138] Akçura, "Excerpts from Üç Tarz-i," 328. While there were those who argued Turks were united by ancestral blood, ethnicity in the literature seems to imply a more cultural and linguistic focus on ethnology rather than a racial one. This point is explicitly discussed by Gökalp, *Principles of Turkism*, 12.
[139] Akçura, "Excerpts from Üç Tarz-i," 327.

ethnic ties.[140] Ağaoğlu makes the order of nationalist sentiment very clear in this regard: "First, language; second, religion, customs, and convictions; third, a common history, fatherland, and destiny."[141] While Ağaoğlu clearly associates ethnic connotations with Islam, it was a historically acquired religion that formed a symbiotic relationship with the Ottoman Turks: "For the Turks, Islam has acquired a national, racial character in the fullest sense."[142] Pan-Turkism thus played prominently in the ethno-linguistic politics of the day, such as how Şemsettin Sami stresses the ethnic dynamics of the empire over the Islamo-Arabic connections that were cherished by many Islamists:

> For the last seven to eight centuries, those who have tried to protect Islam for the cause of Allah were not Arabs, but Turks and other nations who joined the Turks in that cause, whom are not well known to be adored by you. In this entire time, the Arabs have not done anything but to prove and unveil their primitive ignorance.[143]

Thus, in the pan-Turkish camp, ethnic ties played a significant role in national identity. However, this did not need to be established but rather pulled from its sleep. While Islam was not always strongly accepted in pan-Turkish accounts, its existence was inevitably mentioned in detail.

9.3.2 Islamification (Islamism)

It was long thought that during the reign of Abdulhamid II, a sense of Islamism was imbued into society by the sultanate to inspire a national rallying point.[144] However, the sultan's stance on Islam was more of a reaction to the grass-roots Islamist movements gaining traction at the time.[145] Education initiatives were not developed to instill Islamic leanings in the Muslim-majority population; instead, it was meant to combat the creeping influence of missionary programs as well as Muslim attendance at non-state schools usually run by another religious minority.[146] Clearly, the public's desire to obtain education was the result of those who saw it as a path to prosperity within the new bureaucratic institutions. Social mobilization became possible in ways that were

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[140] For more on Ahmet Ağaoğlu, see Shissler, *Between Two Empires*. For more on Ahmed Hilmi, see Bein, "Young Turk Islamic Intellectual."
[141] Ağaoğlu, "Excerpts from Ahmet Ağaoğlu's," 346.
[142] Ağaoğlu, 347.
[143] As quoted in Soleimani, *Islam and Competing Nationalisms*, 101.
[144] For more, see Buzpinar, "Opposition to Ottoman Caliphate"; Deringil, "Invention of Tradition"; Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*.
[145] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*.
[146] Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, 87–129. Incidelen ("Diplomacy, Evangelism and Reform") presents a detailed summary on how these schools were perceived as increasing threats by the Ottoman government during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

unfathomable only a generation before, and the lack of state schools outside of urban centers led to an education market quickly being filled by others. To combat this, the Hamidian regime not only built schools but also enforced new curricula that emphasized nationalist and patriotic feelings.[147] Alongside these developments in strategies, Islamic intellectuals who had recognized the trends towards positivism saw the need for reform within Islamic scholarship and began to enact a "scientific" basis for Islam, both in the shape of historiography as well as in the emerging discussions on Darwin-inspired theories.

Unlike the *ulema* in the centuries before them, these Islamists – including those still belonging to the *ulema* – now had to prove their worth through the increasingly complex matrix of representative power relations in play. For instance, one prominent Ottoman historian, Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay, wrote in 1922, "The decline of the Islamic world began when Muslims forgot the true meaning of their religion. The progress of science, the development of industry and trade, and the acquisition of wealth are all necessary for the preservation of faith."[148] This historicization of Islam (i.e., the historical roots of legitimacy) was embraced by a wide array of writers in the Young Turk movement as well as in the ruling elites, yet it slowly became more and more popularized as the nineteenth century neared its end. In one poem, Mehmed Akif Ersoy, a notable Turkish writer and politician, underlines the need for reform within Islam:

> Is it possible to meet our religious needs with books,
> Written seven hundred years ago?
> No, it is impossible.
> We have to get our inspiration directly from the Qur'an
> In order to express Islam to the mentality of the modern century.
> This cannot be achieved through empty claims, but requires knowledge.[149]

Islam was thus a unifying factor among Muslim populations, but it also had its grounding in an innate value that all Islamic subjects shared. There was a contentious discussion within the Islamic literature about where the origins of Islamic unity lay, with some placing it after the death of the Prophet Muhammad and others attributing it to the

[147] In one instance, a teacher was even reprimanded for straying too far from the given curriculum to give lessons on non-Ottoman history such as ancient Roman and Egyptian history (Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late," 377).
[148] Günaltay, "Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay (1883-1961)," 67.
[149] As quoted in Saritoprak, "Islam and Politics," 115. Mehmed Akif Ersoy was also the author of the Turkish national anthem.

Ottomans. Perhaps the most notable of these Islamic thinkers was Said-i Nursi, who played an imminent role in shaping a new scientific Islam. For him, the underlying unity of Muslims played along this strand of social cohesion and an origin story:

> In the world of humanity, from the time of Adam up to now, two great currents, two lines of thought, have always been and will so continue. Like two mighty trees, they have spread out their branches in all directions and in every class of humanity. One of them is the line of prophethood and religion, the other the line of philosophy in its various forms…Now let us find the origin and foundations of those two lines.[150]

Establishing historical legitimacy was certainly a notion of representative politics that each of these movements put forward, whether it was Islamism, Turkism or Pan-Turkism, yet the positioning of this argument became a quintessential feature that allowed one to speak *from* a place of knowledge (unification of collective) *as the representative* of the nation (accruing a base). While these intellectuals can shed some light on how the paradigmatic debate on the place of Islam fell within the Empire, this cannot be viewed simply as an elitist movement like pan-Turkism.

There were also Islamists who saw nationalist urges as a colonial tool employed by European ideologies. In this regard, ethnic Turkism was a dividing agenda that split up various Islamic ethnicities. In 1913, the Ottoman intellectual and professor of philosophy Ahmed Naim Baban expressed hostility towards reconciling pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism:

> Ethnic nationalism is a harmful and alien ideology to Muslim culture and it poses a dangerous threat to the unity of Islam…Identifying themselves as Turk, Arab, Kurd, and Circassian would be madness for Muslims, especially at such a perilous time, when the foot of the enemy has penetrated our sacred homeland.[151]

For Baban, the origin of national cohesion came simultaneously with the genesis of Islam. The false gods and deceptive brotherhoods of pre-Islamic times were toxic, so "Muslims should therefore not take pride in their ethnicity but in their religion, which provides them with their only identity. Being Muslim means forgetting one's pre-Islamic past and pagan heritage."[152] Others took up this anthem as well, viewing Islam as the primary national cohesive. Mehmed Akif Ersoy wrote,

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[150] Nursi, "Extracts from Writings," 140.
[151] Baban, "Ahmed Naim Baban (1872-1934)," 60.
[152] Baban, 63.

> What is the common tie that unites all these different ethnicities? It is Islam. Until today, we lived together as brothers and sisters for centuries. The Turk did not even know what Turkishness was, and the Arab never mentioned his or her Arabness, because nationalism has no place in Islam.[153]

At this point, Ottoman historiography became, in one respect, a search for national origins and an inquiry into when and how it was covered up. These usually relied on outside influences infiltrating and tainting the purity of Islam or the tyrannical rule of the Ottoman sultanate.

9.3.3 Modernification (Turkism)

For the Tanzimat reformers, Ottomanism was an attempt to establish the superiority of domestic governance and personal liberties to prolong the status quo. Combined with the CUP's growing appreciation of positivism, Ottomanism – later Turkism – developed into a notion of liberal values whose justification varied widely. While the Young Turks placed an emphasis on scientific methodologies, they also believed this had to develop from a deeper cultural heritage.[154] Ottomanism has traditionally been cast as a battle between secularism and religion, but this has always been a Western interpretation of a non-Western scenario. On the one hand, Ottomanism gave a voice to the rising middle classes, especially Muslims, and the education reforms began to permit non-Istanbul elites to contribute to the discussion. Karpat notes that this process "facilitated the political ascendancy of the local notables and literati, who gave new strength to the sense of regional and ethnic identity and economic interest."[155] On the other hand, Islam was not pushed out of politics but, in many ways, drawn into it. One can see this in the *ulema*'s strong involvement in the CUP. Both Ahmed Rıza and Sabahattin took a stance that Islam should be delegated to the private sphere, along with all religion, though the more militaristic side of the CUP eventually chose to situate the central government as the overseer of Islam, thus drawing religion back into the public sphere.[156] Nevertheless, the role Islam was to play drastically altered.

Almost all proponents of Ottomanism's liberal tendencies fell back on some form of Islamism. The literature surrounding democratic values oftentimes justified Islam in a

[153] Ersoy, "Mehmed Akif Ersoy (1873-1936)," 21.
[154] Özervarlı, "Alternative Approaches to Modernization," 82.
[155] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 12.
[156] Taglia, *Intellectuals and Reform*.

historic context, especially in terms of the democratic nature of the *şeriat*.[157] Like many of his contemporaries, Nursi sought to demonstrate how the Prophet's teachings in the Koran promoted democracy in its purist form, distinctly representative democracy (dispersion of perspectives) and authority's need to submit to Islamic regulations (unification of collective): "Constitutionalism is…the manifestation of the Qur'anic verses 'And consult them in affairs [of public concern]' (3:158) and 'Whose rule in consultation among themselves' (42:38). It is the consultation enjoyed be [*sic*.] the Sharï'ah."[158] This version of representation as consultation was strongly engrained in the debates started around the 1876 Constitution. In 1918, Said Halim Pasha, an Ottoman bureaucrat and political writer, similarly argued, "The Islamic social system is based on equality and liberty in the most natural and genuine sense of the term. In this system the class rivalries and struggles that never existed and instead a real solidarity embracing the whole Muslim world unites the diverse nations."[159] Halim Pasha professed that the sorry state of the Islamic world was entirely "the influence of their pre-Islamic heritage" that hence prevented "Muslim nations from fully understanding and implementing the religious tenets of their faith."[160] A consistent focus on finding representative roots in Islam manifested itself in this way, often mixing with accounts of national origins. However, Ottomanism was much more than a mere branch of Islamism. This use of history was simultaneously combined or contrasted with those attributing representation to ethnic Turks.

The point of departure for many was to find representative values in the pre-Islamic society of the Seljuk Turks, which tended to emphasize the more pan-religious, tolerant components disseminated during the Tanzimat period. In essence, if a base was going to be accrued, what would that base be? A textbook used in state schools written by Midhat Efendi at one point states,

> [In the late Middle Ages], the institution of such a consolidated polity by any dynasty of Muslim, Turkish, or Christian origin save the Ottomans remained a distant possibility. The complete and permanent unification of diverse components, that unprecedented feat of remarkable aptitude and subtlety, was realized, with the grace of God by the Ottoman House alone.[161]

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[157] To avoid controversy, I am not making a normative claim on the Koran's investment in democratic values; clearly, these concepts did not exist at the time that it was written. I am only taking note of how it was being interpreted by these authors.
[158] Nursi, "Extracts from Writings," 189.
[159] Halim Pasha, "Said Halim Pasha (1865-1921)," 153–154.
[160] Halim Pasha, 156.
[161] Ersoy, "Architecture and Search," 129.

Unity among religions was an essential pivot for many writers, and it is hardly surprising that this is the form, more or less, that the Republic of Turkey adopted as its national interpretation of history.[162] By 1943, the Turkish bureaucrat and professor of philosophy Mehmed Ali Ayni was strongly emphasizing this point in his historical accounts, attributing national representation to pre-Islamic Turks and stressing their ability to grasp these concepts long before Europe: "The idea of nationality has existed among Turks since pre-Islamic times. After their conversion to Islam, the Turks continued to preserve their national identity despite the negative effects of the *madrasa* education."[163] What is more, Ayni goes on to explain that Turkish values were never imbedded in Islam but rather that Islamism was an obstacle attempting to deprive Turks of their inherent inclinations towards democracy and nationalism. Regardless of how historians interpreted Ottomanism, the elevation of representation was its cornerstone. In one camp, the purity of Islam held the foundation of representation, and since this bond was innate among Muslims it was naturally the best option. On the other side, the ethnic fraternity among Turks expressed a desire for equality and representative governance.[164]

Thus, this triad of Turkification-Islamification-Modernification was not three options that subjects of the late-Ottoman Empire chose but rather the conditions of possibility through which they interpreted national belonging. The role of historiography in setting up the origins of these nationalist roots, assumed to be innate, constructed not only Turkish national identity but also completely restructured the relationship between the Ottoman subject (or later, Turkish citizen) and the state. By the twentieth century, a social and political shift from the *rule* of the sultan to the *governance* of the people (*halk*) had occurred. Ziya Gökalp was referencing this when he entitled one of his chapters *Halka Doğru* (Towards the People). Political and intellectual elites were to not only work for the general public but to learn from them as well. He sharply criticized the Tanzimat reformers because of their desire "to create a nation based on will out of an existing 'nation' composed of several nationalities and religions" instead of trying to decipher and awaken the nationalism that already laid dormant among the Turks.[165] The focus must be

[162] Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 357–361.
[163] Ayni, "Mehmed Ali Ayni (1868-1946)," 116.
[164] One could make a further note here of dual identification of migrants when it comes to this issue. While Ottoman subjects from the Balkans associated themselves with central Ottomans through culture and ethnicity, the Middle Eastern Ottomans had a linguistic link to Islam (Arabic).
[165] Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western*, 72.

the pre-existing yet unconscious nationalism, or rather one had to justify the historical roots of legitimacy that proved one interpretation over another:

> This sacredness [of nationalism], even before it has reached consciousness, exists in an unconscious state in the psychological unity of the social group. So far it has remained a hidden treasure (*al-kanz al makhfi*), with all its halo of sanctity…The emergence of an ideal means its rise from the subconscious to the conscious level.[166]

The ambition of the national "intellectuals" was not to create nationalist sentiment but to uncover it by "raising the national cultural level" that was already perpetuating itself intuitively.[167] In other words, long before national identity became a conscious phenomenon among Ottoman subjects, it was latent among the population in their unconscious: "Before the rise of ideals of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism, the Ottoman state, the Islamic *ümmet*, and the Turkish nationality all existed."[168]

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From these three brief analyses, we arrive at the four criteria from the archaeological side of Foucault's methodology: the referential, enunciative divergences, theoretical networks and the field of strategic possibilities. While one would be inclined to look at a specific object, such as nationalism, when performing such an analysis, this does not account for the fact that the object being discussed varies considerably. The domain in which these objects, or rather the *referential*, appear is national belonging through a representative *dispositif* that relates its object to some sort of unifying bond, whether as a whole or through individual qualities. Next, the *enunciative divergence* was confined to fields of discourse that could provide some form of objective validity, such as positivist scientific methods, historiography or natural political laws. Even Islamism, when it justified its claims through the Koran, could no longer do so by citing the Koran as a religious text; rather, it was seen as a valid historical account or a testament of natural political laws.[169] Thus, claims about national identity's meaning and existence relied on a discourse of validity, without which claims would have been disregarded as insufficient. The *régime du savoir* that emerged through the representative *dispositif* towards the end of the nineteenth century laid out a new group of national "doctors" that could set to work on

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[166] Gökalp, 79.
[167] Gökalp, *Principles of Turkism*, 62–63.
[168] Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western*, 79.
[169] For example, see Kalaycı, "Dissociation of Theology"; Stolz, *Lighthouse and Observatory*; Türesay, "Between Science and Islam"; Zhongmin and Shu, "Nationalist Thoughts and Islam." For an account of how the Jewish millet dealt with this issue, see Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans*, 26-30.

curing the body of the nation.

The theoretical network, which aims to decipher the discursive rules, was established by some rather basic principles; however, without reference to them, a concept of national unity would not have been able to survive. First, there was a need, either scientifically or historically, to ground the concept in an *interpretation of the past* (based on the historical roots of legitimacy). Whether it was the Turkish race, the foundation of Islam or the culture of pre-Ottoman Turks, some interpretation of this collective identity was slumbering inside each member of the nation. Second, one had to discern notable *innate qualities shared among Turks* (however one conceptualized "Turk") (unification of collective). Not only was there a national link connecting members of the nation (dispersion of perspectives), but this had its real-world manifestation, such as a drive for knowledge, patriotism or a respect for representative governance. More than this, however, one needed a *means to discern* Turkish qualities, i.e., some objectively validating way of uncovering these qualities: a science of the nation, or rather an ascertained network of communication. Finally, the concepts put forward needed to be *justified on people rather than territories*. It was not national boundaries that united the *halk* (people) but an inner bond (i.e., the accrument of a base). In this way, these elements of knowledge relied on the network of power relations that had sedimented strategies of historical justification, a dispersion of perspectives, a unifying collective, accruing a base and – perhaps most important for knowledge – the networks of communication. Combined, these presented a new representative power-knowledge that propelled national identity forward.

While this has all been brought out in the previous three sub-sections, one can now discuss the field of strategic possibilities. While the aforementioned rules had to be followed, it was only in reference to three "choices" that a national identity could be put forward: ethnic-cultural, religious and civic belonging. It was not that it was impossible to introduce other ideas; rather, such ideas would have been neither conceivable nor understandable. It inevitably led to an interpretation of the direction the country should take, yet this discursive formation has not slowly faded away but has only intensified, dispersing, distributing and disseminating itself as common knowledge within Turkish society. Perhaps better than anyone else, Gökalp was able to synthesize these three elements so as to demonstrate their necessity for each other, like pieces of a puzzle, strictly through a "scientific" analysis. "Turkism, Islamism, [and] Ottomanism" were not

competing constructions but social truths that, if they were to properly coexist, had to be understood through an objective, grass-roots scientific analysis: "These concepts cannot convey any meaning unless they become symbols of certain social facts and unless they derive their value from social reality."[170] National belonging was no longer being discussed in terms of elitist manipulation but of a scientific investigation into historical origins. Thus, Gokalp wrote, "Turkism is not a political party but a scientific, philosophic and aesthetic school of thought."[171] By this time, the debate on whether there was an innate quality within individuals that united them had become a commonly acknowledged fact.

Using the Turcologists of the nineteenth century, Gökalp's argued that "Turks constituted a very old nation which was spread across a vast area and which had, at various times in the past, created world-conquering states and high civilizations."[172] However, history had put this bond of an ancestral past to sleep – to such an extent that he argued Turks were "under the influence of their somnambulism" during the Ottoman rule – although it had been kept alive in various respects over the centuries.[173] While he does criticize the Ottomans for attempting to open up social identification for all *millets*, he also stressed that the unification of the nation was rooted in cultural "sentiments": "How can we say, 'You are not Turks,' to those among them who have made great sacrifices and have performed great services for the Turkish nation?"[174] Certainly, some ethnic components were not completely absent from his work, though Karpat notes that this existed to a lesser extent in his later writings.[175] The *referential*, nonetheless, became not only the nation but also the *people* (*halk*). Others have noted Gokalp's hostility towards Islam and his secular-minded writings.[176] However, this rejection of Islamism was not regarding the content but instead the form. He viewed the "clericalism" of Islam under Ottoman rule as the Achilles' heel of progress, which had consequently obstructed the national coming-into-consciousness:

> [Pan-Islamism] gave rise, on the one hand, to such reactionary movements as theocracy and clericalism and, on the other hand, was opposed to the awakening of national ideals and national

[170] Gökalp, 76.
[171] Gökalp, *Principles of Turkism*, 125.
[172] Gökalp, 2.
[173] Gökalp, 37.
[174] Gökalp, 16.
[175] Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, 376–377.
[176] The most prominent of these scholars has been Berkes (e.g., Berkes 1998, 345–346). For a more contemporary account, see Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy*, 73-84.

> consciousness in the Islamic World. The theocratic and clerical movements are the principal reason why Muslim societies remain backward and even gradually retrogress.[177]

In reality, Gokalp openly acknowledged the place religion had come to have in historically shaping communities and morality, thereby granting it a place at the table in the discussion of national identity.[178] his interaction with these different interpretations illustrates the *enunciative divergences* with which Gokalp was engaging.

Islam was actually essential to the success of Turkism precisely because it was grounded in the morals of Islamic jurisprudence that unites individuals within a nation. He specifically focuses on the social aspects of Islam at times, asserting that religion allowed individuals to overcome their individuality and connect with their deeper, national ties. Describing this in an article published in 1915, Gökalp wrote,

> The social function of [religious] rituals expresses itself as the renunciation of individuality, and the social function of a positive ritual as the fulfilment of nationality. Religion is the most important factor in the creation of national consciousness as it unites men through common sentiments and beliefs.[179]

While one could argue that this would not necessarily need to be Islam, Gökalp made clear in his texts it was for the Ottomans. More succinctly, Gökalp attributed the importance of religion to its organizing rather than foundational role in national identity; this can be interpreted as an affront to those who argued for an Islamic state as Islam has a function but is not the state's guiding principle. This distinction was of the utmost importance when compiling the hierarchy of the new Turkish Republic, which saw the political struggle between the *ulema* and more military-centric factions. It was not a debate around secularism and religion; it was a debate about the superiority of one interpretation over another. The *theoretical network* becomes apparent not in what notions of this matrix Gökalp entertained but in how he entertained them, relying on a positivist, historical and scientific position that sought to map out the natural political rules of Ottoman society. Since the search for national identity involved uncovering existential situations, it was definitively Islam that provided this function of "the

[177] Gökalp, *Principles of Turkism*, 61.
[178] Gökalp, 38–39. Hanioğlu does a fantastic job of situating the discussions on Islam in the thought of the Young Turk movement during the early twentieth century (Hanioğlu, *Atatürk*, 48–67).
[179] Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western*, 192.

renunciation of individuality" in late-Ottoman society. In doing so, Islam gives Ottoman society the cultural "mores" that determine "good" and "bad" acts.[180]

Modernization plays a similar role as Islamization since it contributes to the development of the nations and its institutions: "As there is no contradiction between the ideals of Turkism and Islamism, there is none between these and the ideal of modernism."[181] Modernification offered technological advances that would promote a stronger division of labor and, by association, a stronger national economy, which parallels the overcoming of individualism Islam promotes:

> The economic ideal of the Turks is to prevent the appropriation of social wealth by individuals without abolishing private ownership and to try to preserve and increase this wealth for use in the interest of the whole. The Turks also have a second economic ideal, which is to endow the country with large industry.[182]

It was thus not just about explaining the parameters of national belonging but, more importantly, doing so *scientifically*. This drive to make nationality a scientific study demonstrated Gökalp's adherence to the academic standards in Europe, and it is only through positivist methodologies that nationalism could truly be understood for Gökalp. He wrote, "A person's nationality cannot be determined arbitrarily. It is a matter to be solved scientifically."[183] Nevertheless, an imported scientism was not so cut and dry. One had to be cautious not to simultaneously import the values of Europe because "certain moral needs" rely on "religion and nationality" if the nation is to progress towards its ideals.[184] If one imported the individualism that prospered in Western capitalist societies, this would risk the national "mores" and cause strife and chaos in the Nation if it were not entirely assimilated into the West first. The field of strategic possibilities consequently becomes distinctly established, not only by this matrix of Turkification-Islamification-Modernification but situating this domain as the *field of strategic possibilities*. Through this field, discourse on national belonging, and thus the apex of representative governance, had to be filtered to be made sensible. The conditions of *Türkleşmek-İslamlaşmak-Muasirlaşmak* should subsequently not be seen as a restrictive limit that punished or silenced those attesting different understandings of national inclusion, although it did this too. It was also what was *conceivable* rather than *possible* in the late-

[180] Gökalp, 152–156.
[181] Gökalp, 76.
[182] Gökalp, *Principles of Turkism*, 123.
[183] Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western*, 43.
[184] Gökalp, 76.

Ottoman Empire up into the Republic. It was the way national identity was interpreted and read by the population at large. What is significant is that the goal of "construction" was taken over by a desire to "uncover" in a very short period of time, and this was never unveiled as a contingent manifestation in the public at large.

9.4 Conclusion: The Desire to Belong

Mustafa Kemal had risen to fame from a rather modest background, left fatherless and thus impoverished at a young age. Making his way through a military education, much of which had become revised and made possible under Abdülhamid II's own regime, allowed him to prove his worth and intellect in military matters. He was actively dispatched to many of the conflicts and wars after the 1908 Revolution, first in Tripoli, then in the Balkan Wars, WWI and the Turkish War for Independence. His education in military institutions gave him the fervor of a less religious education and his military experience further constituted him as a political figure. While he had been deeply engrained in the intellectual debates of the CUP, he was an adamant critic of its understanding of the military's role in society; while the CUP thought the military should serve an active political purpose, Mustafa Kemal instead believed that the military should serve as an objective outsider that did not actively interfere with politics unless absolutely necessary.[185] When the CUP collapsed following the Ottomans' loss in WWI, its networks were still in place and slowly began to encourage a nationalist movement that was sporadically arising across the empire against the central government. After making a name for himself, Mustafa Kemal was in an advantageous position to take control of the Turkish resistance movement, and he was elected as the chairman of a resistance congress in Erzurum in 1919. However, this truly catapulted Mustafa Kemal into the center of the representative *dispositif* for the first time, and he found himself making pan-Islamic and communist appeals to capture the largest representative base as possible; he even courted the international community as the representative of the Turkish republic to settle disputes with the Soviet Union, France, Italy and the United States through diplomatic rather than military channels.[186] This left only Greece and an increasingly war-fatigued Great Britain, and after pushing back Greek advances along the Aegean coast and marching on Istanbul, an armistice was signed in 1922 that sealed the Turkish borders.

[185] Hanioğlu, *Atatürk*, 45–47.
[186] Hanioğlu, 99–109.

Much like Midhat Pasha only a few decades before him, Mustafa Kemal was a person of circumstance. He was a brilliant tactician and orator, yet his existence has been mythologized throughout Turkish culture during the twentieth century. In many ways, he was the new embodiment of the nation, and he has remained so to this day. His grave rests in a grandiose mausoleum near the center of Ankara called *Anıtkabir* (Memorial Tomb), visited by hundreds of thousands each year on the anniversary of his death. Even after death, his very material existence has come to be seen as the embodiment of the Turkish Republic. When the Republic of Turkey was approved in October 1923 and Mustafa Kemal elected as its first president, the representative *dispositif* had already long been engrained in Ottoman political life. Nevertheless, this sealed its fate as a future republic. Islamic and ethnic movements were largely snuffed out, and a massive project of Turkification was unleashed throughout the country. Of course, the pillars of pan-Turkism and Islamism did not suddenly vanish but were rather compartmentalized within a larger Kemalist philosophy that survived around six core principles: *cumhuriyetçilik* (republicanism), *halkçılık* (populism), *laiklik* (secularism), *inkılapçılık* (revolutionism), *milliyetçilik* (nationalism) and *devletçilik* (statism). After numerous wars lasting over a decade, the citizens of the new republic were more than eager for the stability that such a regime offered, yet it became very clear that one's life, culture and heritage were intricately tied to representation. There was not only a need to represent, but a need to be represented, which flourished into a desire for representation. It became indistinguishable from one's identity, and the consequences for falling outside that representation had been distinctly manifested by this point.

The long nineteenth century was a story of a slow dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Romania, Serbia and Montenegro were established after the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War. Parts of northern Africa, such as current-day Tunisia, were relinquished to France in 1881, and Egypt became a *de facto* British colony a year later. After the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, Bulgaria and Bosnia were quick to make their exit, and after a war with Italy in 1912, the empire ceded its remaining north African territories. In the same year, the Balkan Wars kicked off, which resulted in the loss of Albania and were predominantly expelled from the remaining Ottoman territories in their European provinces. The conflict that had been brewing through the Cretan question came to a head with the start of WWI, and Britain annexed the entire island as a result. The borders of current-day Turkey were largely settled after WWI and the Turkish War of Independence

with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, whereby the Republic of Turkey was founded. Not only did these losses dramatically affect the demographics and populations of the empire-turned-republic, but the representative *dispositif* through which these losses were carried out fundamentally shaped the experiences of the populations involved. The struggle for a national narrative was seen as a slow process of conscious nation building in retrospect, and while many claim that hindsight is everything, it can also be gravely misleading. The emergence of Turkish nationalist claims, whether those be predominantly reliant on ethnic, religious or civic ties, was a struggle for influence in this new network of power-knowledge. Not only did national belonging become a very tangible and life-preserving maneuver for many, but it produced the very desire to represent and be represented.

10. Power and Violence: Relationships of Representation

"It had been three years since we had been moved to the orphanage, and, clearly, the administration's attempt to Turkify us was a miserable failure. When we challenged the teachers or the headmaster, we never felt alone. We were one united front, struggling together. If someone did betray us, we cut them off from the fruit and vegetables – quite a punishment, indeed." – Karnig Panian, *Goodbye, Antoura*[1]

10.1 Introduction: The Violence of Representation

The representative *dispositif* built itself on the corresponding idea of a *milli irade* (national will), a spirit that had to be protected at all costs. This dispersion of power networks reinforced themselves with a remodeled version of truth, a novel criterium that not only spoke for the nation but also for its citizens. The relations of allegiance developed under the sultanic *dispositif* found absolute sovereignty in the manifestation of the sultan. It proposed to tell the truth about the subject it created based on these ties of subservience: "Tell me who you are loyal to, and I'll tell you where you belong." Under a representative system, not only the power relations but the judgment of truth fundamentally changed. Loyalty may be seen as favorable, but it did not reveal the truth of who one was. For representative power, the unique voice of the representative truth-speaker rings out, "Tell me who represents you, and I'll tell you who you are." Competition arose not only over national belonging but all aspects of social and political life. The existence of national belonging in the form of a national will was revolutionary, and it altered the course of the Ottoman Empire and soon the Turkish Republic indefinitely. Sovereignty was no longer a matter of sultans, *ulema* and the military, all of whom were subservient to Allah's will in the Circle of Justice. Sovereignty became dispersed, shooting out in all directions and latching onto the body and the minds of Ottoman subjects. Admission into the political arena became contingent on one's active participation within this representative system, for only those who were represented were qualified to speak. The representative *dispositif* released an eclectic set of capabilities that had not been possible before, yet it had a dark side as well. While new forms of political organization and participation emerged, so did staunchly embedded nexuses of violence that functioned on the plane of prevention.

This chapter situates the new subjectivities – the experiences – that arise within the representative *dispositif*. As discussed in the introduction and the first part of this

[1] Panian, *Goodbye, Antoura*, 118.

dissertation, the value of Foucauldian genealogy comes in its ability to discern not objects, concepts or structures but rather the subjectivities that emerge from the play of power-knowledge. Thus, the first section details how the struggles detailed in the previous chapters eventually coagulated into a sedimented and pervasive *dispositif* around the technologies that had been constructed. As such, it details the five axes upon which national identity not only became possible but also functioned in the late Ottoman Empire: (a) historical roots of legitimacy, (b) dispersion of collective, (c) unification of collective, (d) accruing a base and (e) networks of communication. As previous chapters have illustrated, while this did become engrossed in imperial – and then state – institutions, it was not limited to these. After this, I turn my attention to the nexuses of violence that likewise solidified around certain cleavages in the representative *dispositif*: (a) representation as risk, (b) correctional representation, (c) imamic representation, (e) no representation and (f) cultural representation. In contrast to the typical portrayal of representation being a slow process of collective self-enlightenment (see chapter 4), this section details how representation became the *modus operandi* of political activity in Turkey, which could be used in a variety of ways by which violence was more likely to manifest itself. These confrontations have to do with the way in which power relations and truth exists in such a society. While I dedicate far more space to the then-contemporaneous issue of the Armenian genocide, I expand upon this period to illustrate how this *dispositif* has continued to exist to date. As such, a Foucaldian-Arendtian model of violence is found to be beneficial to the extent that it allows us to understand the competing strategies and their limits while not overlooking the capabilities the representative *dispositif* offers.

10.2 Mapping Out National Belonging: The Representative *Dispositif*

The power relations within the representative *dispositif* hardened around the strategies embedded in an overarching, anonymous entity: the nation. To define the nation, one had to first legitimize one's conception of the nation and its spirit historically. Not only did this tell you who you spoke for, but it put you into dialogue with a dispersion of other perspectives: members of the same collective yet with different conceptions of the nation. One simultaneously had to lay one's pride at the door to ensure the unification of this collective, for only in unity could one more efficiently exercise power. The focus shifted

from trying to subdue the masses to trying to mobilize them. The more individual voices accrued, the stronger the voice of the spirit was. All of this relied on the emergence of a new system of knowledge. Not merely the innovation of new technologies for communication, but also how to use them and how to filter knowledge. Knowledge was power, but only if it could be judged and administered appropriately. While representation was seemingly just the liberation of the masses – their freedom as the next stage of human evolution – it was not natural at all but required an infinite expansion of historically situated techniques, discourses and experiences. Representative politics (at least in the form here) was not a necessary step, and any different series of events could have dramatically set the progression of the representative *dispositif* on an entirely different course (discussed further in the conclusion). Not causality but chance.

These relations were not enough to allow the *dispositif* to take on a life of its own. It required knowledge. Not the accumulation of knowledge but a specific *regime du savoir* that could determine truth, that could allow the accumulation of information and present it as knowledge. Raw information was only useful if one had the means to translate it into knowledge. The rapid expansion of museums and libraries became possible, and the republican era highly invested in these modes of representative history. An entire discursive formation took hold. The nation and its relationship to citizens becomes the underlying source of legitimacy and sovereignty, functioning as the core referentials when discussing representation and the nation. Who did the nation belong to, and for whom did it speak? The different perspectives within the grid of Turkification-Islamification-Modernification were based on these referentials. This grid (i.e., the theoretical network) was nonetheless adherent to a specific set of rules. A discourse was required to provide an interpretation of the past, the innate qualities shared among Turks, a means to discern these qualities and a justification based on the people and not the territory of the state. Within this arrangement, the field of strategic possibilities becomes less metaphysical and far more material, with these divisions having propelled themselves forward for over a century now.

The combination of this *regime du savoir* and the network of power relations permits us to detail the conditions of possibility that allowed national identity to manifest itself. In Figure 3, the dynamics of this *dispositif* are mapped out. A, B and C represent different individuals or even segments of the population. They are then represented by the national spirit, the *milli irade*, which imposes its truth and limitations on them,

regardless of their personal leanings. Other factors (1, 2, 3) can act as further indirect influences on the national spirit, especially if it gets out of hand. This could come in the shape of the press, social movements, organizations and associations or, in the case of Turkey, the military. These factors could contribute to the general comprehension of the national will, but they can also act as corrective mechanisms. In these cases, the victor of this struggle imposes their interpretation, but it must justify itself on representation and not loyalty (although loyalty may certainly factor in, it would not be a legitimate move unless an appeal to the national will was in play). Rather than an idealistic or ahistorical phenomenon, representation as such is grounded in very material practices, requiring such a physical manifestation of the spirit, whether through an institution (like a national assembly) or in a person (such as the sultan or, later on, Mustafa Kemal). This arrangement was not restricted to national politics, and in fact it appeared in different variations throughout the empire, be they social clubs, political parties, business, educational facilities or presses.



Figure 3

The commencement of this *dispositif* was not the fault of any individual or ideology but rather the accumulation of various acting and non-acting subjects and objects. Nor should it be understood as a negative or positive system. The representative *dispositif* opened up doors for new forms of social engagement and political participation, or rather it created them through its very existence. Public opinion became a force by which citizens could give feedback to their government, despite whether those opinions were recognized. Moreover, the nature of a combative "spirit" was distinct from that of the sultan's will; it was dispersed and contentious, not institutionally situated in any corner of these strategic possibilities. Simultaneously, this made an incessant process whereby the only way to gain or retain positions that could exercise substantial political power was to continually reassert and practice the spirit of the nation. As such, the representative *dispositif* violently dismantled the system of subjecthood to replace it with citizenship, whereby one's inclusion in the nation was contingent not on the capacity to fulfill one's allegiance to a superior but through one's belonging or not belonging to the nation. In essence, it created the experience of nationhood, citizenship and collective identity. It allowed individuals to amass organizations that could speak on their behalf, ushering further discourses on liberalism and democracy. The historicization of representation is thus not to say representation is negative, but it should be clear that it became dangerous. If representation brought about new ways of thinking, acting and speaking – in other words, a completely new experience of being a subject – it likewise nurtured points of tension where violence was most likely to appear.

10.3 The Unraveling of Representation: National Belonging and Nexuses of Violence

In 1914, as WWI was heating up, Kurdish rebellions started to rock the eastern front. The CUP, who had become the secured ruling party through military might, began to focus a great deal of attention on this region, as a Kurdish insurrection could leave the empire susceptible to Russian advances. On the western front, the government had already began boycotts, persecutions and the forcible removal of Greeks by the thousands to Greek territory or to eastern provinces in an attempt to sequester rebellious elements in Muslim-controlled regions.[2] Since 1908, Armenian communities and revolutionaries had been

[2] Bjørnlund, "1914 Cleansing of Aegean"; Mourelos, "1914 Persecution and First"; Sjöberg, *Making of Greek Genocide*.

walking a fine line of pushing for legal protections while not being perceived as a nationalist independence movement, consistently reasserting their loyalty to the CUP and the Ottomans. Continued massacres, persecution and inequalities caused many Armenians to perish or flee to bordering countries, which only made the community as a whole seem more suspicious in the eyes of the CUP elites. This put them in an overall predicament. In order to become representatives to advocate for rights, the Armenian community had to show its subservience to the Ottoman government, but discussions of rights or legal changes made the CUP as their representative skeptical of their inclusion in the national spirit. The country's military leader Talat Pasha was already was already arguing that the non-Muslim elements of Ottoman society had no desire to be Ottomanized in 1910: Non-Muslims "do not want to become Osmanlis; all the means set in motion to develop a sentiment of Osmanliism have proved unsuccessful…There can be no question of equality until the day when the Ottomanization of all groups is an accomplished fact."[3]

Meanwhile, former Hamidian Troops, which had officially been renamed the *Aşiret Hafif Süvari Alayları* (Tribal Light Cavalry) after 1908, felt the prestige and security of their position threatened by rumors – and it should be clear that these were assuredly rumors, as none of the great powers actually wanted this – of the establishment of an Armenian nation-state. The CUP era promised reforms in the eastern provinces and the return of confiscated land, which was now in the hands of Kurdish tribal regiments. The reassertion of these principles in 1913 only intensified the tensions between Kurds and Armenians leading up to WWI and exacerbated the potential security threat of unrest in this region.[4] Increased activity from revolutionary Armenians and Armenians in diaspora shined a light on the unrest in the empire, yet this worked against those Armenians inside the empire working to show their loyalty to the new regime.[5] Appeals to Europe and activity in their own presses as well as those of foreign countries served as proof of the anti-Ottoman sentiment of the community as a whole within the representative *dispositif*. Regardless of actual intent, the Armenians' mere existence posed a permanent threat in the eyes of the ruling CUP elites; as long as they remained in the empire, there would be grounds for foreign powers to interfere in the internal politics of the empire as their representatives, and a solution to this problem was sought out.

[3] As quoted in Suny, *They Can Live*, 164.
[4] Klein, *Margins of Empire*; Üngör, "Disastrous Decade"; Suny, *They Can Live*, 195–198.
[5] Kaiser, "Regional Resistance to Central"; Yeck, "Armenian Nationalism."

In 1913, the situation finally came to a breaking point when Russia and Germany agreed to a dual-inspectorship over the eastern provinces to resolve the Armenian question. While it was made official in February 1914, it would never come to be after an agreement for reforms was reached between these countries and the Ottoman government. Unlike previous bonds of allegiance, that required a show of subservience to Istanbul, the representative *dispositif* did not function solely on loyalty. Despite consistent pledges of loyalty to the Ottomans, the Armenian community's presence in the empire was a threat to Ottoman representation, and as long as they remained, there would be the possibility of foreign intervention, which was a threat to the national spirit. However, this was not strictly an Armenian problem. Similar issues occurred with other Christian groups, particularly the Greeks and the Assyrians, who would also face mass execution and expulsion in the years to come.[6] On the Arab peninsula, issues over the guardianship of regions like Mecca became a predominant factor both before and during WWI. While representation did not function on the mode of territorialism that had existed under the sultanic system, it still gave importance to land even if the focus was on populations. The threat of losing part of the Arab Peninsula or Europe was daunting, yet the threat of losing the Anatolian heartland was catastrophic and evoked very real, concrete responses from the central government.[7] As a result, ninety percent of the Ottoman's Armenian population would be gone by the end of WWI, either by death or expulsion; by 1924, the Christian population of Turkey was to diminish to just two percent.[8]

In July 1914, the Ottoman government began taking actions against Armenian actors, arresting dozens of Armenian revolutionary leaders and activists, many who had been collaborating closely with the CUP on and off since 1908.[9] The later months of that year also saw increased persecution of Armenians on legal grounds, subtly issued by the CUP, as well as a major resurgence of Armenian massacres. The increasing demands of the war effort also led to the mass conscription of three million young Armenian males since the inclusion of non-Muslims in the military had been implemented in 1909. Muslim and non-Muslim households alike were faced with the confiscation of property for the

[6] For more on the persecution and massacres of Greeks and Assyrians, see Akçam, *Young Turks' Crimes Against*; Gaunt, "Complexity of Assyrian Genocide"; Hlamides, "Greek Relief Committee"; Shirinian, *Genocide in Ottoman Empire*; Sjöberg, *Making of Greek Genocide*; Travis, *Assyrian Genocide*.
[7] For a more exhaustive account of this interpretation, see Dixon, "Defending the Nation?"; Dündar, *Crime of Numbers*.
[8] Suny, 208-209; Bijak and Lubman, "Disputed Numbers"; Deringil, "Armenian Question Is Finally."
[9] Akçam, "Chilingirian Murder"; Aslanian, "'Treason of Intellectuals'"; Suny, *They Can Live*, 223.

war effort, and the absence of younger men made women and children more vulnerable to undisciplined, exhausted and ill-treated soldiers.[10] At the end of October 1914, it was decided that the Assyrian populations on the eastern front would be relocated further inward, which began a phase of mass suppression, forced displacement and massacre. As Russia made advances into the empire, Ottoman troops began to kill Christian men they thought could be recruited by the Russians should they progress further, and Armenians and Assyrians began to flee over the border. While Ottoman offensives looked promising after Talat Pasha took control of the eastern front, heavy losses during the winter led to a humiliating retreat, although they were able to hold the front.

As Russia increasingly came to be viewed as an imminent threat, the Armenian question was also escalated. All Armenian troops were ordered to be disarmed in February of 1915. Between March and April, the threat of an internal Armenian resistance continued to grow in the minds of the central government, and there was slowly an increase in the persecution of Armenians, from disarming Armenian communities to raids; sporadic reports of Armenians were emphasized over the numerous reports of Armenian pacification, strengthening the government's sentiment of an internal enemy.[11] Around the same time, measures were taken within the military to begin executing Armenian soldiers, who had already been isolated and disarmed, though skilled laborers had some opportunities to fend off death for a bit longer while others attempted to convert to Islam. The need to save ammunition as the war went on meant that many of these Armenian soldiers were slaughtered with bayonets, knives or other means – some even facing decapitation or bodily mutilation. Ronald Suny notes how the massacres that ensued were partially attributable to the way these orders were disseminated, with official orders being given to the provinces and military while they were further circulated to armed militias whose tactics were often far more gruesome, especially in regions where provincial governors or officials resisted such orders.[12] As tensions continued to boil over, Armenians began to be sent eastward in mass around March 1915.

The responses to the relocations were very mixed. Although some Armenians tried to commence rebellions as rumors of Armenians being forcibly relocated and slaughtered

[10] Bloxham, "Armenian Genocide of 1915"; Derderian, "Common Fate, Different Experience"; Üngör and Polatel, *Confiscation and Destruction*.
[11] Suny, *They Can Live*, 247–251; also see Akçam, *Young Turks' Crimes Against*, 135–139.
[12] Suny, *They Can Live*, 247–251; also see Klein, "Conflict and Collaboration"; Shirinian, *Genocide in Ottoman Empire*; Üngör, "Disastrous Decade."

spread, most Armenians chose to follow the government decrees. At the time, this was likely the most logical reaction. The scope of the massacres that would follow had been unheard of, and their systematicity was something wholly new to global politics. Armenians had been facing massacres for decades, but these were often circumstantial and region-specific. This is made exceptionally clear in the most prominent memoir of the Armenian genocide, *Goodbye, ANtoura*, Karnig Panian:

> We spent the first few days in this desert outside Hama simply coming to grips with the fate that had befallen us. We were surrounded by Armenians from all parts of the Ottoman Empire, speaking dozens of different dialects. Some had different customs and dress, too, but two things united us – we all were Armenian Christians, and we had all been deported from our homes and ancestral lands.[13]

The unilateral removal of an entire segment of the Ottoman population certainly could not be anticipated, and given the reassurance received from officials, the ongoing war, resistance to Russian incursions and the general support for the Ottoman government, most Armenians simply did not have a tangible reason to resist. Still, tales of revolts or rebellions were fabricated and generalized by the central government, which were then circulated among the public.[14] The most notable resistance came in Van, which ultimately led to the mass slaughter of the Armenians both inside and outside the city after their stronghold fell.[15] The Armenians came to represent a threat to the future of the nation and therefore had to be either eradicated or expelled, and their expulsion, given the sheer magnitude of such a removal, was a constantly evolving plan that was often spontaneous, meaning provisions could not even be considered (let alone desired); many Armenians thus died from starvation during their expulsion. Others were vulnerable to execution, rape, theft, injury, torture, kidnapping or abduction on what came to be known as death marches. However, the relocation was meant for those too weak to defend themselves, so most males who had reached adolescence were considered a threat and immediately murdered.

The resistance at Van only entrenched the sentiments on both sides: the Ottomans felt justified in seeing Armenians as a threat considering the uprising (which was caused by Ottoman aggressions), and the Armenians felt like the Ottomans wished to exterminate

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[13] Panian, *Goodbye, Antoura*, 47.
[14] Akçam, *Young Turks' Crimes Against*, 162–170; Suny, *They Can Live*, 281–286.
[15] For more on this, see Hovannisian, *Armenian Van/Vaspurakan*; Kaiser, "Regional Resistance to Central"; McCarthy et al., *Armenian Rebellion at Van*.

them. On the one hand, the traitorous actions of the Armenians justified the central government, as the *representatives* of the nation, to take such actions against a "foreign" and hostile element; on the other hand, Armenians' exclusion from the nation meant they quite literally had no recourse to representative power, and thus no means to legitimately resist Ottoman procedures. The orders for deportation and execution likewise relied on the alleged personal characteristics exhibited by Armenians; what separated this from earlier massacres was that – what constitutes it as a genocide – unlike the ambition to pacify such claims under the sultanic *dispositif*, these qualities were seen as intrinsic to Armenians; therefore, they could never truly be Ottomanized. The moralization of character was a prominent strategy that was deployed through the representative *dispositif*.

Many historians have argued that the actions taken by the CUP were justifiable given the circumstances, and this is largely correct. However, the focus here is on the *régime du savoir* on which this was based, which was historically constructed and not a natural law of national sovereignty. The danger in such situations is precisely that the Ottoman government was able to defend its actions based on its own principles of representative governance. For instance, on 27 May 1915, the central government put forward a decree to forcibly relocate individuals or collectives deemed dangerous to the nation in times of war – much like the US' justification of war crimes and the notorious Guantanamo Bay in the wake of 9/11 – which then enabled the government to *legally* "transfer and settle – individually or wholesale – the inhabitants of a village and a town into other location[s]."[16] The resources to actually enact such a relocation would take a great deal of planning and provisions, yet these were carried out almost immediately and food, clothing, transportation and other necessities were never considered; the central government thus expected that many Armenians would not survive the relocation. Any Ottomans found protecting Armenians during this relocation were to be executed and their property burned. Officials unwilling to go along with the Armenian persecution and slaughters were dismissed and replaced by loyalists willing to carry out the orders. This usage of representative power shows the contextuality and historicity of the phenomenon, and its deployment in these massacres and expulsions situate it as a clear nexus of violence.

[16] As quoted in Suny, *They Can Live*, 284.

The very process of choosing who belongs to the nation and who does not is amplified under such circumstances, and the importance of representation is made explicit. To be viewed as a representative threat, as the Armenians were, led to their systemic execution and expulsion. Mehmed Reşid, a prominent CUP doctor who served a governorship in Diyarbakır during the deportations, noted in his memoir, "My Turkishness triumphed over my identity as a doctor…The Armenian bandits were a load of harmful microbes that had afflicted the body of the fatherland. Was it not the duty of the doctor to kill the microbes?"[17] While Foucault's biopolitical power was certainly a contributing factor to this, and it developed alongside representative power; due to the bureaucratization of the empire during the nineteenth century, the progression of massacres were heavily contingent on representative power.[18] The application of biopolitical mechanisms on a representative collective may have been recounted in medical (and thus biopolitical) terms at times, yet the underlying division of the population along these lines would not have been possible without the representative *dispositif*. It is this very nature of the process, whereby an entire segment of the population is targeted as an internal enemy to be eradicated, that classifies these events as a genocide and separates it from previous massacres. The declaration sent by Talat Pasha on 24 April 1915 made this clear:

> It has become clear once again with the latest revolts which have occurred at Zeytun and Bitlis, at Sivas and Van, that the Armenian committees, which for a long time have been trying to establish an autonomous administration with their revolutionary political structure in the Ottoman territories, dare to act against us…The Ottoman Armenians have decided to launch a revolt with all their forces following the weakening of the [Ottoman] army [and thus] to take perfidious actions against the existence of the [Ottoman] fatherland and its future.[19]

Starting from late April and lasting through the summer, Armenians across the empire were gathered up and either massacred (usually outside of cities and villages) or expelled towards the Syrian desert, where even more Armenians were executed or died from the conditions of the climate. Males were typically executed first, and then others may have been selected for conversion. The marches followed, which could end in a

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[17] As quoted in Suny, 295.

[18] Readers should be cautioned about equating Foucault's account of biopolitical power with how it developed in the Ottoman Empire; while there are unarguably correlations, the context in which it developed and the limits of its power were also unique in an Ottoman context. For more on biopolitical power and genocide, see Alsheh, "Biopolitics of Corpses"; Sacchi, "Biopolitical Paradox"; Savage, "'Disease Incarnate.'"

[19] As quoted in Suny, *They Can Live*, 272–273.

delayed massacre, being killed by Kurdish tribes or bandit troops, dying from starvation, the climate and suicide or a grueling voyage to the desert (where many were subsequently massacred on arrival). If they were fortunate enough to survive the journey, they were put in extermination camps disguised as internment camps in cities like Ras al Ayn and Del el Zor.[20] Women and children faced the constant threat of rape, and men faced mass executions in the desert except for the few able to be selected for forced labor, though most of them ultimately reached the same fate.[21] Because the military was busy fighting the war, the deportations were predominantly planned by the civilian administration and carried out by local Kurdish troops and other militia.[22] Soldiers who were reluctant to follow such orders faced execution, though many actively partook in various forms of torture and mutilation during the killings.[23] Some Armenians and Assyrians were burned alive while others were raped or turned into prostitutes and children were cast off bridges; some were drown (or drowned themselves to escape a grisly fate), and some were poisoned while others were hung and fed to dogs, beaten to death, dismembered or had their head crushed under rocks or in vices. While those who had made it to Syria were predominantly located in camps in Del el Zor, 1916 proved to be fatal for those survivors, who were killed by the tens of thousands.

The Armenians were not the only element to learn the new dangers of representation. Greeks and Assyrians were executed by the thousands, and the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 led to the forcible removal of Greeks from Ottoman territories; a foreign nation, one which many Greeks had no personal connection to, was recognized as their representative, and the representative agency of these individuals was thus removed. In this respect, the representative *dispositif* created a new subjectivity – a new experience – which individuals had to navigate. It was not an evolution of the sultanic *dispositif* nor a replication of that experience; it established a new network of social and political relations and truth-statements that, beyond being merely discursive, reached these individuals, and those that survived were often traumatized and impacted, an experience that has reverberated through proceeding Armenian generations. However, this was not the only nexus of violence when it came to representation and the experience it entailed. Aside

[20] Ferllini and Croft, "Case of Armenian Mass."
[21] Derderian, "Common Fate, Different Experience"; Kaiser, "Baghdad Railway and Armenian"; Suny, *They Can Live*, 314–315.
[22] Klein, "Conflict and Collaboration"; Suny, *They Can Live*, 283; Üngör and Polatel, *Confiscation and Destruction*; Yeck, "Armenian Nationalism."
[23] Kaiser, "Regional Resistance to Central"; Suny, *They Can Live*, 288.

from (a) *representation as risk*, there were an array of other types of representation that came to function as nexuses of violence within the representative *dispositif*: (b) *correctional representation*, (c) *imamic representation*, (d) *radical representation*, (e) *no representation* and (f) *cultural representation*. Each of these has persisted in one way or another to date, and their polymorphous utility has meant they have been deployed both by those exercising power from above as well as those using it from below. For instance, (a) representation as risk is still a predominant factor in Turkish politics, especially when it comes to Kurdish issues. The persistence of the ruling political party in Turkey since 2002, the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party, AKP), for Turkish individuals to have three children can be seen as an attempt to keep a representative Turkish majority (over a Kurdish minority) for the foreseeable future.[24] Representation as risk has played a predominant part throughout the republic's history, from bans on headscarves in political offices and universities (which prevented devout women from serving as representatives or becoming educated) to the brutal suppression of its largest minority, whose political parties have faced consistent closures and persecution since their inception in the 1990s. For many, representation in Turkey is not simply a matter of ideology but rather a very tangible limit to their freedom, leaving many at this nexus of violence in situations where most resistant strategies are bound to end in failure. In such a case, not only has representation been produced through a lengthy historical process of construction, but its existence and identity are often determined in advance.

When considering (b) correctional representation, this is perhaps the most renowned nexus of violence in recent Turkish history. Turkey has faced numerous military coups in under a century but primarily since 1960. Working under a Kemalist ideology, the military has traditionally seen itself as the objective arbiter of the *milli irade*, and they have not been overly hesitant to step in when they see this as needing correction. Although this has not always ended in a full-blown *coup d'état*, correctional representation played a role in the (attempted) coups of 1960, 1971, 1980, 1993, 1997, 2007 and 2016, all times when the military either questioned the current government's ability to rule or saw the country drifting too far from its Kemalist roots. However, this is merely one usage of representative power, and representational correction has been appropriated by numerous collectives over the years. The Gezi Park Protests in 2013 were

[24] Erten, "'No More than Two'"; Gökarıksel, Neubert, and Smith, "Demographic Fever Dreams"; Kaya, "Islamisation of Turkey"; Updegraff, "Turkey Under AKP."

a response to what were perceived by many to be the authoritarian tendencies of the ruling AKP. The Kurdish terrorist group formed in the mid-1980s, the *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* (Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK), has viewed itself in this light as well, using extremist tactics that have led to a longstanding civil conflict in southeastern Turkey and beyond; from their perspective, the state has failed to represent its Kurdish population and they are thus justified within a representative *dispositif* to correct this injustice. Importantly, this is almost entirely based on one's idea of what the parameters of national belonging are, and the counterargument has been that Kurdish citizens are actually Turks rather than Kurds (an argument that mimics Unionist discourses before and after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution). While the AKP made some measures to "correct" this misrepresentation upon their rise to power, this has greatly diminished in recent years. Extremist groups have a long history of taking up this dynamic of representation in Turkey, and one of the reasons for the 1980 coup was the rise of far-right and far-left parties in Turkey during the 1970s, who also saw their job as correcting the nation. More recently, there was a referendum on a new Turkish constitution that would change the country into an executive presidency, greatly boosting the ruling party's influence; while there was great resistance to this new constitution, it was seen as correcting the problems of the old one and passed with 51% of the vote. The position being made here is not to argue for or against any one of these groups but to illustrate that, rather than representation being bad or good, it is a mechanism that can be deployed by a whole network of subject positions in their favor.

In addition, (c) imamic representation has also been a foundational feature of the Turkish Republic since its inception, and while the title may seemingly indicate an Islamic or religious nature, it should be understood that this is more of a pastoral tool that can be taken up by a variety of positions. The most notable instance for many years was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whose prioritization of national identity over religious identity was notoriously employed in a mass Turkification process during the early decades of the republic. In the process, many communities lost their representative voice, and the perception from above was that these populations were backwards and needed guidance. However, AKP's rise to power evoked the same strategy except from a civic-religious perspective rather than a civic-ethnic one. Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan, the leader of the AKP and Turkey's current president, has repeatedly called for a "pious generation" to be raised, and programs have been formed in all corners of society to ensure public morality,

illustrating his imamic leadership.[25] Increased taxes on things like alcohol and cigarettes, a version of self-censorship in the press, reforms in education (especially concerning religion and history) and an emphasis on public morality have all been contributing factors to strengthening the relationships of imamic representation in recent years. In many ways, this aligns with Max Weber's interpretation of "charismatic leadership," yet focusing on the leadership overlooks the relational nature of this bond. Not only can it give elites influence over the electorate, but it also gives individuals access to political representation. This desire was largely contributive to the AKP's rise to power as well as extremist groups, most visibly Abdullah Öcalan as the *de facto* leader of the PKK. It has also enabled representative minorities to amass behind leaders like Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, former co-chairs of the *Halkların Demokratik Partisi* (Peoples' Democratic Party, HDP), a pro-Kurdish and socialist democratic party that amassed considerable following due to the imamic characteristics and rhetoric of these individuals.

Perhaps better than anyone since the rise of the AKP, the HDP has been able to utilize (d) radical representation. By radical representation, the group does not necessarily need to be radicalized, but it is rather based on a desired overhaul of the standing political order of representation. In this way, the AKP's push towards liberal democracy, liberal rights and ethnic and religious inclusion was very radical for the time, at least in the AKP's initial years. Within less than two decades, the core principles of the state have shifted from a Kemalist status quo to one that leans closer to Islamism and rural values. At the moment, the leftist movement is attempting to rethink political representation to be more dispersed, decentralized and inclusive. The ethnic-centric and conservative party the *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP) has also sought to utilize radical representation, pushing for a stronger role of "Turkish" tradition and culture and being staunchly opposed to Kurdish rights. These three instances of radical representation deal with official political parties, yet they are not always limited to this. The PKK has long advocated forms of radical representation, and it has slowly progressed from a Leninist ideology to one built on the work of academics and writers professing "radical democracy." *Daesh* (ISIS) also tried to employ their own radical representation through terrorist attacks during their glory days, sending individuals across the border into Turkey or recruiting soldiers within Turkish territories to further their cause. Radical

[25] Bilici, "Crisis of Religiosity"; Lüküslü, "Creating a Pious Generation"; Okuyan and Curtin, "'You Don't Belong Anywhere'"; Unal, "Vulnerable Identities"; Yilmaz, "Populism, Erdoganism and Social."

representation is merely a re-envisioning of the representative status quo, but it can lead to situations with either more opportunities to act otherwise or less.

In more recent years, the role of (e) no representation has grown to epic proportions due to the Syrian refugee crisis. For these displaced persons, their lives have become precarious, to use Judith Butler's phrase.[26] Not having recourse to any form of representation, they are entirely at the will of their host countries, which have made numerous life-altering decisions. Moreover, they have come to be used as bargaining chips in the negotiations between Turkey and the EU, which has capitalized on their vulnerability. Many citizens in southeastern Turkey have come to feel the same way. A Kurdish-friendly political party was not introduced into official political discourse until 1990, and numerous party closures and persecution has left many Kurdish citizens without recourse to representation in a system which functions entirely on this. The infamous 10% threshold was partly lifted with the new constitution, which allowed smaller parties to form a coalition with a larger party to enter into parliament, yet this also reinforced the idea of requiring approval from the political establishment in some way. The result has been multiple Turkish populations being left unrepresented.

Finally, there is the role that (f) cultural representation plays in Turkey. The predominance of history in Turkey is often fascinating, yet it is also highly politicized. As discussed in the previous chapter, connecting national identity to a historical origin has completely dominated Turkish politics since before the founding of the republic. What would often be fanciful artistic formats or historical artifacts have become overly politicized, playing a strong role in shaping the narratives surrounding national belonging. The earliest founders of the Republic pushed the *Türk Tarihi Tezi* (Turkish Historical Thesis), which was a fabricated recounting of Turkic origins. It asserted that Turks had come from continental Europe before migrating to Asia and ultimately the Anatolian heartland; it was additionally argued that all world languages evolved from Turkic languages. The *Türk Tarihi Tezi* was, for the republic's early years, the dogmatic interpretation of Turkish history, and it was ingrained in school curricula. More recently, Turkish media has become less fascinated with the republican years and more in the Ottoman period. One of the most popular shows at the time, *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* (The Magnificient Century), received rebuke from then-prime minister Erdoğan in 2012 for too much focus on Sultan Suleiman I's harem-centric debaucheries during the sixteenth

[26] Butler, *Precarious Life*.

century; in contrast, Erdoğan argued that the sultan was far more concerned with conquering than with his harem. Hagia Sophia, a historic Byzantium church-turned-Ottoman mosque has also received publicity lately by activists who sought to turn the museum into a functioning mosque, which was finally accomplished in 2020 thanks to backing from the AKP. The importance of depicting Turkish cultural heritage as Islamic rather than ethnic plays a big role in these debates, but it has also legitimated differing interpretations of the nation. Just as an ethnic-civic version of national belonging was given in the early years of the country, it has veered towards Islamic cultural heritage over the last couple decades. The importance of such a narrative is the perceived legitimacy to rule over the nation; due to its strategical nature, this facet of representative power has become one of the cornerstones for determining who is a Turk (and is thus allotted representation) and who is not.

10.4 Conclusion: On Violence and Freedom in Possibilities

The individuals who enforced the practices of the Armenian genocide are long gone, yet the system through which it occurred is very much alive and well, which is not the same as alive and *active*. The underlying rationale that allowed these massacres, relocations and nexuses of violence to circulate and fester is the same one that has allowed Turkey to move towards liberal rights, nation building and democratic governance. The polymorphous functionality of the representative *dispositif* means it is something that constantly needs to be kept in check and assessed if such a situation is to be prevented in the future, and there have been numerous times the Turkish state has flirted with these mechanisms. The goal of Foucauldian genealogy is to understand the limits of our actions – our ways of thinking and speaking that allow us to make sense of the world – as well as to experiment with ways of moving beyond these limits. Freedom, or the possibility to act otherwise than intended, is thus the transformative and continuous goal.

Due to the representative *dispositif*, new interpretations of the nation have enabled long-overlooked communities to have a voice in political decision-making. Up until the AKP's victory in 2002, Muslims were heavily removed from governing on a national level, and the concerns of rural Muslims were overlooked. The revisioning of the nation on Islamic rather than Kemalist (ethno-civic) grounds further contributed to the reopening of peace talks with the PKK to resolve discriminatory practices against Kurds. As Kurds are largely Muslim, the inclusion of this minority based on religion rather than ethnicity

or culture meant huge strides were taken to ameliorate this issue. However, the emergence of a strong pro-Kurdish political movement that could serve as the representative of this electorate meant there was a struggle for representation, and the breakdown of negotiations can largely be seen to correlate with this. At the same time, the HDP has reimagined what it means to belong to the nation using radical democracy as a jumping off point. In Turkey, nationalism developed through representation, and the only way to remove national aggressions from the economy of power relations would be to remove representation entirely, an extremely detrimental proposition for many of the most vulnerable. The nexuses of violence discussed in this chapter can be seen as both points of possible resistance but also the very places where susceptibilities are most exposed for those already existing within a domineering regime. What is needed is an exploration of these limits. Nationalism should not be perceived as negative. Many Turks today feel great camaraderie for their compatriots, and the level of assistance and charity given by many should be perceived as a valuable component of representative power, yet it also poses a great threat if not kept in check. Not only Ottoman Armenians but also current Kurdish citizens in Turkey illustrate this.

Conclusion: Where to Next?

"Yes, we – all live in a house on fire, no fire department to call; no way out, just the upstairs window to look out of while the fire burns the house down with us trapped, locked in it." – Tennessee Williams, *Milk Train Doesn't Stop Here Anymore*[1]

Nerelisin: Nexuses of Violence

"Nerelisin?" Where are you from? It was one of the first phrases I learned as a foreigner in Turkey. Oftentimes, my response that I was American was not good enough. "No, no. Where is your *family* from?" It would often turn into an interrogation about my ancestral roots. The connotation of *nerelisin* in Turkish, at least traditionally, is not where you personally are from but rather where your father or family is from. If only I was able to give them this information, they would be able to know something fundamental about myself. "You have a French nose," some would say. For many, this was a compliment, clearly indicating I was an intellectual. For others, it was an insult; I was cold and Islamaphobic. "You have the skin color of Arabs," I would hear. For some commentors, this was a way of drawing an affinity to cultural values, whereas others used it to indicate I was a misogynist, deceptive Don Juan wannabe. Yet, when I was told I look Turkish, this was seen as the ultimate praise. It was a judgment about my moral character, my passions, my personal principles. As an outsider, I found this behavior quite peculiar, yet in retrospect, it is not all that odd. Distance is wonderful for giving perspective. What was so peculiar was the difference in how I was socialized to rely on such categorizations, which depended not on skin complexion but ancestry. Namık Kemal's notion of *vatan* is still quite unusual to me, the idea of an attachment to land, which is not for many Europeans. What was occurring, in fact, was a clash of different ways of reading nationality and national belonging.

After so many years away from the US, I too begin to see peculiarities in how we deal with national belonging. After all, America has been one of the few countries that succeeded in attaching patriotism to owning guns. There are hundreds of peculiarities like these that we share with the culture we are socialized into. These things, which almost seem commonsensical, can often become disorienting in a new context. Many have found that my traditional go-to food when being ill is chicken noodle soup and Sprite, the miracle drug for Midwestern Americans. Within these different relationships we have

[1] Williams, *Milk Train Doesn't Stop*, 77.

with our surroundings, however, is a vast network of representation. Not an insidious network, mind you. These relationships simply hold the key to how we interpret and engage with the world. While they provide the wealth and diversity in our understanding of belonging and identifying, they still require close observation and critical inquiry for the dangers they can pose.

While most models of studying violence depend on predictive models or generalizing formulas for socio-political processes, what I found lacking was an understanding of how these everyday occurrences – these banal forms of national identity – impacted the explosions of aggression, the sparks of civil wars or hate crimes. For both emotional, observational and personal reasons, it tends to be easier to recognize these issues in a foreign culture, one that you have not been socialized into. As part 2 of this dissertation has illustrated, one can cipher out the nexuses of violence – the very places where networks of relationships have solidified around a certain point that can be used to justify violent actions, thoughts and discourses – to better prepare oneself for dealing with it. On the one hand, it indicates where people are most vulnerable to fluctuations or inflammations of national belonging. On the other hand, it gives actors within those contexts a blueprint for engaging with and potentially altering the standing order of things, such as the case of the HDP's use of radical representation or the pro-democracy Islamic movement's ability to incorporate Muslims (especially women exposed to headscarf bans) into the national milieu. As mentioned throughout part 1, it is not only about understanding the limitations and preventions that nexuses of violence lay out, but simultaneously reading those in tandem with the capabilities and techniques networks of power and *régimes du savoir* offer.

As I tried to detail in chapter 1, Foucault's toolbox gives us a wealth of ideas and methods to better study these issues. Viewing power not as a centralized state force but a vast array of relationships that are codependent and interactive allows one to deal with the more minute and everyday aspects of politics. At the same time, this is contingent upon our ways of reading the world around us, the *régime du savoir*, by understanding the regulation of discourse and thought, of what is considered legitimate or acceptable and what is deemed irrational or illicit. When combined, these formulate our experiences of the world – our own subjectivities – in crucial ways. The *dispositif*, as an analytical device, moves us beyond a mere focus on concepts, on ideas, on quantifiable variables or social symbols and norms. It allows us to look not at memory, the nation, ideologies or

discourse. One can begin to glimpse the experiences that such a *dispositif* produces. Nevertheless, one of the primary reasons to do so, at least for Foucault, was domination: a realm where little to almost no other possibilities to act otherwise than intended exist. Yet, as chapter 1 and 2 detailed, the ambiguity surrounding domination makes it somewhat of a phantom. One knows it is there, but deciphering what exactly it is, its limits and its victims, becomes almost impossible.

For this reason, chapter 2 worked towards presenting a more adequate model of assessing domination, specifically in terms of violence. To do this, Arendt's philosophy and writings on violence were of immense importance. While Arendt and Foucault are often portrayed as polar opposites on the academic spectrum, a closer inspection reveals not only that this is not the case, but they have a lot to say to one another. Viewing violence as the attempted prevention at the strategies of others permits one to open up a wealth of opportunities in terms of studying it. Rather than reading violence with materialist or quantifiable overtones, it is shown to be a procedural relationship that is engrained in networks of power relations and *régimes du savoir*. Not only does it shape our experiences, but we use these experiences to further interact and engage with the world around us. As such, instead of states of domination, one can adopt the idea of nexuses of violence to view it as a process, not its terminal forms of structural or physical violence but a way in which strategies of individuals or collectives interact with one another, both in ways that seek to foreclose future action but also as a means to loosen up a concentration of power relations to allot a wider array of action in the future.

While on paper this may seem quite intriguing, one of the biggest shortcomings of postmodernism/poststructuralism/postmarxism has been an inability to convert these ideas into actual academic research. While Foucault was one of the few gems able to bridge this theory-practice divide, he was quite mum on how he did so. Thus, in chapter 3, I dig into his discussions on his methodologies to piece together a workable version that would allow researchers to deploy his genealogical method, not only looking for relations of power, systems of truth and the prominent ethical domains for an era but also nexuses of violence and the ways those nexuses can prevent, or leave vulnerable, certain acts. While this is positioned within philosophical readings of Foucault, discursive approaches and traditional historical methodologies, I turn to Foucault's practice of genealogy (which is really a combination of archaeology and genealogy) to explain how it looks at discursive formations and the emergence of power relationships through

struggles. Yet, this still requires one to choose a topic for research, which I explained is largely dependent on an arbitrary process of problematization, i.e., finding an issue which has been problematized in the present and tracing the emergence of the techniques and practices that made such an experience possible. From this framework, part 2 homes in on nationalism (or rather national identity and belonging) to better understand this problematic aspect of our contemporary world in a very problematized region: Turkey.

Representative Power in Turkey

By tracing national belonging to its origins in the conditions of possibility in the late Ottoman Empire, it has been illustrated how it became intricately built on representation. Not merely representative politics but a whole network of competing and clashing power relations working off a distinct *régime du savoir* that gave birth to an everyday understanding of national belonging, an experience that constituted one as having a national identity. Beyond national identity, this system has been embedded in our common understandings of ourselves, our communities and our environments. Whether it is understood symbolically or materially, the connections that formed over time constructed a historically confined and astutely malleable experience. The goal of genealogy, as a politically charged methodology, allows researchers to target such experiences to better understand the struggles that went into them. As I hope is clear by now, the repercussions of overlooking these formations can be dire and life-threatening. Does this mean that representation is an evil, monstrous thing? That representative politics have quietly imbued themselves into our everyday ways of thinking, parasitically nourishing phantasmic mythologies to wreak havoc on the earth? Assuredly not. Representation in Turkey has given a voice to the voiceless, and it has allowed communities an anchor for development. Yet, when employed in certain ways, it runs the risk of being dangerous. The goal is not to attack representation but rather to leave the reader with something to consider. Food for thought. The only way to combat such usages is to comprehend the mechanisms at play. Representation is but one of a litany of *dispositifs* working on our very existence, but if something as hopeful and omnipresent as representation is shown to pose such risks, it begs the question: what else is out there?

To begin such a genealogy, it was first necessary to discern the *dispositif* on imperial inclusion that existed prior to the representative *dispositif*, which was accomplished in chapter 5 through the sultanic *dispositif* reliant on the Circle of Justice.

Up until the nineteenth century, the manner in which the empire was structured was based on a system of allegiance that not only permitted some to rule over others but required certain obligations in return. The failure of one of these dynamics, such as protection for the peasantry, could leave the military without capabilities to provide security, which could then leave the sultan exposed to foreign incursions. However, as Europe industrialized, the global economy turned to capitalism, international trade grew exponentially and a longstanding timar system began to collapse, the sultanic *dispositif* became untenable. New strategies were deployed to address these changing circumstances, particularly in the form of two new strategies: the imperial codification of roles and a collective imperial identity of *Osmanlılık*. Thus, chapter 5 illustrates how these strategies were deployed on numerous fronts throughout the empire. Much in line with Foucault's notion of "non-subjective and intentional" strategies that are always open to reactions, chapter 6 details how these strategies were responded to in various ways throughout the empire. These clashes intrinsically affected the dynamics of imperial codification and *Osmanlılık*, but these reactions significantly contributed to two other techniques that were developed at the time: representation as a political tool and the moralization of politics.

By the 1860s, new subject positions appear on the scene of Ottoman politics, which I detail in two streams of genealogical inquiry in chapter 7. On the one hand, the Young Ottomans resisted such strategies and deployed a new system of making sense of these strategies: public opinion. This occurred along three important axes: (a) popular sovereignty, (b) constitutional monarchy and (c) representative government. These strategies gave way to a collective voice that was meant to support the sultan's *irade*. On the other hand, there was a development that was growing in provincial governance at the same time: imamic leadership. Suddenly, the central government's concern was not only ruling populations but nourishing, fostering and guiding them. Following the career of Midhat Pasha, I illustrated how this technique was experiemented with in provincial governing and the results it had on local populations. Though his career was somewhat unique and exceptional for the time – as most people in his position were not able to follow in his footsteps of no fault of their own – it constructed a rationality that would meet public opinion in the 1870s and become canon in the emergence of the first Ottoman constitutional period (1876-1878). While this was period was short lived, the combined strategies that had been constructed in the empire (imperial codification, collective

identity, representation as a political tool, the moralization of politics, public opinion and imamic leadership) were appropriated by the sultanate and an array of other subject positions after Sultan Abdülhamid II prorogued the Ottoman constitution.

In this vein, chapter 8 details how these new tools were adopted and employed by three separate groups (Sufi *tarikats*, the sultanate and Kurdish Hamidian troops) to sediment into a functional representative *dispositif*. These three groups relied on a new phenomenon that had emerged through the functioning of this *dispositif*: spirit. This spirit was a way to connect people from an array of backgrounds into a conglomerate whole based on a new principle of sovereignty based on populations rather than a divine order, and these were used to garnish influence and importance in this new network of power relations. Nonetheless, spirit revolved around the operation of five central axes to the representative *dispositif*: (a) historical roots of legitimacy, (b) dispersion of perspectives, (c) the unification of a collective, (d) accruing a base and (e) networks of communication. Each of these were codependent and contingent upon the emergence of the six techniques detailed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. More importantly, they started to situate nexuses of violence within this new order of things, which begins to appear in the final section of chapter 8. This segues into chapter 9, where the power-knowledge of this new *dispositif* is detailed through both a genealogical and archaeological lens. The first part details how the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (and the "Young Turks" in general), from an intellectual to an activist movement, took up the tools and engaged with the representative *dispositif*, solidifying it as the future order of things for the empire. These revolved around the same five axes laid out in chapter 8, but more precision is given to the dynamics such axes presented. It also illustrates how actors from numerous subject positions were able to adapt to this setting and use these technologies to their own advantage, which eventually formed an overarching, non-subjective but entirely intentional strategy around representation, collective identity and national belonging. The second part of chapter 9 addresses how this network of power relations was complimented by a new *régime du savoir* concerning who was and was not part of the nation. This process relied on three crucial pillars of national belonging that still operate in Turkey today: pan-Turkism, Islamism and Turkism.

As the representative *dispositif* had fully taken shape by this point, although who was its hegemonic actor would be an intense conflict over the decades to come after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, one is then able to assess the nexuses of violence that

formed in such a system in chapter 10. The first section lays out the concrete parameters and *modus operandi* of the representative *dispositif*, which can then be mapped out. However, once this is complete, one is able to decipher particular clusters of power relations around representation that have left either subjects or the system vulnerable to change through the justified prevention of competing strategies. The six points laid out are as follows: (a) representation as risk, (b) correctional representation, (c) imamic representation, (d) radical representation, (e) no representation and (f) cultural representation. While a good deal of attention is spent on explaining how this *dispositif* was the way in which the Armenian genocide unfolded (specficially through (a) representation as risk), further examples are given for an array of other issues from the history of the Turkish Republic as well as contemporaneous events. The goal of this is not to allow readers to predict when and where violence will happen but to prepare them to engage with these issues, both to see where people are most vulnerable and how the hegemonic order of things is open to alterations. While the introduction of this dissertation has explained some of the ways in which the thesis and methods put forward throughout this work are beneficial to existing literature, it is nonetheless important to address how this could be open to further research and engagement.

Nationalism or Nationalisms?

The question that is certainly on the tip of every reader's tongue at this point is whether the representative *dispositif* is applicable to other contexts, and the answer is somewhat complicated: yes and no. The central argument of part 2 of this dissertation has been that national identity and political representation are not only intricately interwoven, but that national identity simply was not possible in the Turkish context without representation. More importantly, representation was not a gradual procedure of self-enlightenment or collective progression but a struggle of competing subject positions, one that both provides subjects with invaluable capabilities and capacities in our contemporary world but also produces certain domains of violence (as prevention) that has led to numerous atrocities, oppressions and massacres. Is this the case for other nations? I would argue that it certainly is to an extent, but only to an extent. As the introduction of the conclusion explained, there are bound to be cultural variations or differences. Correlation does not equal sameness, as Foucault argued. Can this model be applied in Great Britain? In India? In China? I would caution against such a copy-paste approach. Nevertheless, it does open

up a whole new realm of research possibilities, specifically in context-dependent and local genealogies, yet it may help to lay out some lines upon which this would be immensely beneficial for helping us better understand the phenomenon of nationalism.

The case of Turkey relied on investigating a vast multi-ethnic, interreligious empire that spread across three continents and culminated in explaining national belonging for a tiny plot of land in comparison. Notable developments could be made in terms of how this process developed in previous Ottoman domains, such as on the Arabian Peninsula, Northern Africa, the Caucasus or the Balkans. Was the progression the same? Did it rely on the same axes of representation? What referential pillars did these discontinuities and dispersions give rise to? In terms of other contexts, this is merely one among many multiethnic and diverse nation-states today. Additionally, it evolved from a previous imperial establishment. How does it compare to Great Britain, which was certainly another diverse population (it is, after all, composed of four countries today). Moreover, one could consider multi-ethnic and interreligious populations that evolved from non-imperial dynasties, such as India, Brazil or the United States. The impacts of colonialism are certainly varied in this respect, and these could be compared to other post-colonial (or even non-colonized) nation-states today. The tools laid out here would apply to those contexts as well.

Another line of inquiry could be previous monarchical kingdoms. France was certainly an empire that stretched across the globe through colonies, yet mainland France itself was not as diverse as other empires around the globe. When it comes to Foucault's usage of disciplinary power, it is worth noting that this played out very differently in a context where everyone could be applied to the same set of rules, which is starkly different than what occurred in the Ottoman Empire.[2] As this dissertation has shown in part 2, the developments in the Ottoman Empire were often contrasted with those in Europe or elsewhere. Expecting identicality would partly be *la vie en rose*. The idea that representation functions the same in countries with a strong history of legislative and elective bodies – which assuredly give way to their own nexuses of violence; just consider the Japanese internment camps in the US during WWII – is surely not to be expected, but what the difference between these are is left unanswered without further research. An equally important line of questioning would be what one could term "vanguard states,"

[2] For example, see Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*; Evered, *Empire and Education*; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*.

whereby a collective of elites was allotted to speak on behalf of the population, such as former Warsaw Pact states or even satellite states. Though many of these have shifted their political institutions, a country like China still adheres to such a system. At the same time, authoritarian countries or hybrid regimes function along similar lines, but their representation surely does not operate in the same manner, which the crisis in Syria, Libya and Iraq have illustrated. The Arab Spring assuredly problematized these issues, making them a rich domain for further genealogical investigations. Thus, when it comes to the issue of studying national belonging using the approach adopted in this dissertation, the options are almost endless at present.

Violence and Freedom

I must admit that a cloud of shame hangs over this work in some respect, at least as far as I am concerned. The shame is derived from the complete lack of gender dimensions that appear in it. Gender has played an intensive relationship to national identity, not only in Turkey but across the globe. Without such an investigation, this work remains incomplete. The truth of the matter is that I simply do not possess the tools, skills or resources to do such an analysis, at least at present. I came across a wealth of possible sources and debates during my research, but it was just that: a mass conglomeration of specific texts or treatises that I was either unable to connect or unable to read. When we talk about violence, the issues of gender and sex are quintessential to explore for an array of issues: these populations tend to be more vulnerable, they are often more oppressed, and it fails to incorporate gendered violence that is a relay of representation and national identity. I thus encourage readers with the capabilities and knowledge to take this line of research up. Yet, this shortcoming captures the multidirectional usage such a Foucauldian-Arendtian approach to violence offers: it is not limited to national identity, and in fact only becomes optimal if it is taken up in an array of different contexts. Current research has expanded on how violence is generative and creative, frequently creating new dimensions of our experiences.[3] One easily pursuable field of research would be to deal with the genealogies performed by Foucault (e.g., biopolitical power, disciplinary power, pastoral power, governmentality, etc.). Another train of thought would be to address

[3] For example, see Aldama, *Violence and Body*; Avelar, *Letter of Violence*; Ayyash, *Hemeneutics of Violence*; Bergholz, *Violence as Generative Force*; Campbell, *Violence and Civilization*; Farmer, "Anthopology of Structural Violence"; Fernée, *Englightenment and Violence*; Hamby and Grych, *Web of Violence*; North, *Violence and Social Orders*; Rae and Ingala, "Introduction"; Skurski and Coronil, "Introduction"; Vorobej, *Concept of Violence*; Zila, "Managing Mass Migration."

various issues which have become problematized in our present, yet this will often rely on the positioning of the specific researcher in a wider arena of local and globalized networks.

From a more philosophical perspective, nonetheless, the relationship between violence and freedom requires a more in-depth analysis. What are the dynamics between the two? How does violence impact our freedom? Or foster it? The unique portrayal of violence in this work allots a great deal of reflection on how one conceives of freedom, or rather the ability to act otherwise. In traditional literature, this is situated as the preventions of autonomous action, most frequently in positive and negative liberty. Such a model falls like sand through our fingers in the philosophy presented in this dissertation, but that should not lead to nihilism. Instead, it presents an insightful and productive revision of how we think about our abilities to think, act and speak. These are not only tied up to how we perceive the world but also how the world perceives us. This falls in line with a wealth of literature in actor-network theory, feminist studies, Critical Race Studies, postmarxism and postmodernism. In essence, freedom rejects narrowly framed conceptions and shows itself to be a relational procedure that is situated in a vast array of possibilities and constraints, both physical, social, economic, political, personal, familial and cultural. This begs and important question: what might such a vision of freedom look like?

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