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**Securitising Nuclear Energy: Analysis of speech acts
related to the possible construction of a new reactor at
the existing Dukovany Nuclear Power Station**

Master's thesis

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Year of the defence: 2021

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 5.1.2021

Simon Dytrych

References

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Abstract

This Master's thesis dealt with securitization attempts related to the planned construction of a new reactor at the Dukovany NPP. Therefore, its aim was to find, analyse and explain securitization speech acts associated with the planned reactor, in the period from summer 2015 to December 2020 using the critical discourse analysis approach. The results show that securitization speech acts of this kind do appear in the Czech public sphere and are articulated mainly by four groups of actors: representatives of Austria, Czech environmental NGOs, Czech governmental representatives, and Czech political opposition. These actors have different goals: to stop the construction of the reactor, to implement the construction of the reactor, or to influence the way in which the construction will be implemented. One case of successful securitization was found in the outcome: The Czech government was able to enforce extraordinary measures that deviated from standard democratic processes using security-based arguments. Their goal was to implement the construction of the reactor. It remains to add that the research also revealed three important functional actors who co-created the discourse: the BIS secret service, the SÚJB nuclear safety office and the company ČEZ.

Abstrakt

Tato diplomová práce se týká pokusů o sekuritizaci v souvislosti s plánovanou výstavbou nového reaktoru v JE Dukovany. Jejím cílem proto bylo najít, analyzovat a vysvětlit řečové akty spojené se sekuritizací plánovaného reaktoru v období od léta 2015 do prosince 2020 s využitím kritické analýzy diskurzu. Výsledky ukazují, že projevy sekuritizace v české veřejné sféře existují. Formulují je zejména čtyři skupiny aktérů: zástupci Rakouska, české nevládní environmentální organizace, vládní představitelé a politická opozice. Tito aktéři sledují různé cíle: zastavit stavbu reaktoru, realizovat stavbu reaktoru, nebo ovlivnit způsob, jakým stavba proběhne. Ve výsledku byl nalezen jeden případ úspěšné sekuritizace: Česká vláda dokázala pomocí bezpečnostních argumentů vynutit mimořádná opatření, která se odchyľují od standardních demokratických procesů. Jejich cílem bylo realizovat výstavbu reaktoru. Zbývá jen dodat, že výzkum odhalil i tři důležité funkcionální aktéry, kteří se podíleli na tvorbě diskurzu: tajná služba BIS, Státní úřad pro jadernou bezpečnost a společnost ČEZ.

Keywords

Securitization, Copenhagen School, Dukovany NPP, nuclear energy, energy security, political security, environmental security, critical discourse analysis, discourse on nuclear energy

Klíčová slova

Sekuritizace, Kodaňská škola, JE Dukovany, jaderná energie, energetická bezpečnost, politická bezpečnost, environmentální bezpečnost, kritická analýza diskurzu, diskurs vůči jaderné energii

Title

Securitising Nuclear Energy: Analysis of speech acts related to the possible construction of a new reactor at the existing Dukovany Nuclear Power Station

Název práce

Sekuritizace jaderné energetiky: Analýza řečových aktů vztahujících se k možné výstavbě nového reaktoru v areálu stávající elektrárny Dukovany

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List of abbreviations

ANO – Aliance nespokojených občanů (English: Alliance of dissatisfied citizens)

BIS – Bezpečnostní informační služba (English: Security Information Service)

CAS – The Czech Academy of Sciences

CGN – China General Nuclear Power Group

CNNC – China National Nuclear Corporation

COPRI – Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

ČSSD – Česká strana sociálně demokratická (English: Czech Social Democratic Party)

EIA – Environmental Impact Assessment

FPÖ – Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (English: Freedom Party of Austria)

IR – International Relations

ISS – International Security Studies

KDU-ČSL – Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová (English: Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party)

KEPCO – Korea Electric Power Corporation

KSČM – Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (English: Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)

MF – Ministerstvo financí (English: Ministry of Finance)

MPO – Ministerstvo Průmyslu a obchodu (English: Ministry of Industry and Trade)

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NPP – nuclear power plant

ODS – Občanská demokratická strana (English: Civic Democratic Party)

ÖVP – Österreichische Volkspartei (English: Austrian People's Party)

PR – public relations

SNPTC – State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation

SPD – Svoboda a přímá demokracie (English: Freedom and Direct Democracy)

SÚJB – Státní úřad pro jadernou bezpečnost (English: State Office for Nuclear Safety)

1. Introduction

The Czechs love nuclear energy. This statement is based not only on many discussions with my friends, family and colleagues, but also on long-term observation of opinion polls, in which more than 60% of the population regularly support the operation of existing reactors and the construction of new ones (ČTK, 8.12.2020).

Under these conditions, it may seem that the decision to build a new reactor at the existing Dukovany NPP will only be a formality and will be quickly approved and implemented by the political representation. After all, the Czech Republic is a democratic country whose leaders should reflect views of the population.

It comes as no surprise that, in reality, building new reactors is anything but simple. First, the Czech Republic does not exist in a vacuum. On the contrary, it is part of the European Union and maintains intensive economic, diplomatic and cultural relations with neighbouring countries. The decision regarding a strategic project, which the nuclear power plant undoubtedly is, must therefore be advocated abroad first.

Moreover, even within the Czech Republic, agreement on the use of nuclear energy is not enough. During the preparation of the whole project, many groups with different opinions on the form of the tender for a new reactor would certainly be formed. Subsequently, the opinion groups would certainly compete with each other for the influence on the form of the tender, so that the project reflected their ideas. This could slow down the construction of a new nuclear unit by many years.

There is a reason to believe that many of those who want to influence the construction will resort to securitization of certain aspects of the project, or the project as a whole, because: *“The appeal to security has always played a key role in legitimizing the use of armed force, and more generally opened the way for the state to mobilize or introduce extraordinary measures to prevent existential threats”* (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 2005, p. 31).

The aim of this Master’s thesis was to examine the speech acts that have appeared in the public sphere of the Czech Republic during approximately the last five years, concerning the securitization of the project to build a new reactor at the existing Dukovany NPP. More precisely, the goal was to find, analyse and explain these speech acts and then to determine

what a securitizing actor pursued through their articulation and whether they managed to achieve their goals.

To achieve the research goal, I first introduced the theoretical framework of this thesis. I explained the theory of securitization as understood by its founders from the Copenhagen School of IR (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde). Their book “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” helped me the most. Subsequently, I also presented some critics of the authors of the book, who tried to improve their approach. Specifically, it was mainly Thierry Balzacq and Matt McDonald. At the end of the theoretical section, I introduced the three areas of security that were most important for this thesis: environmental security, political security and energy security.

This was followed by a relatively brief description of the history of discourse on nuclear energy in the Czech Republic. I divided the history into three main stages. The planned unit at the Dukovany NPP, which is the topic of this Master’s thesis, then forms the fourth stage. These stages were: atomic optimism of the communist era and the construction of Dukovany NPP (1950–1989); liberalization of the Czech public sphere in the 1990s and the construction of Temelín NPP (1987–2002); and announced and cancelled tender for the completion of additional unit in Temelín NPP (2007–2014).

Subsequently, I introduced a methodology that determined the form of the empirical section of this thesis. Specifically, I focused on describing the method of critical discourse analysis and its application in the study of securitization. Then I set out several research questions and hypotheses that were directly related to the overall topic of the analysis. The following was a description of the sources from which I drew, what method I used to do it, and how I sorted the collected data.

Finally, I performed the discourse analysis itself. It begins with the publication of the "Update of the State Energy Concept" and the “National Action Plan for the Development of the Nuclear Energy in the Czech Republic”. Within them, the possibility of building a new reactor at the existing Dukovany NPP was officially seriously considered for the first time. The end of the analysis is then limited by 31.12.2020 – simply because Master’s theses must be submitted no later than 5.1.2021. The analysis itself focused mainly on media articles that cited relevant securitizing and functional actors. However, there were also relevant press releases and government documents included as well as documents

issued by other institutions of the Czech Republic. Finally, I provided a comprehensive conclusion of the entire research.

2 Theory: Description of securitisation and relevant sectors of analysis

As an analytical and epistemological framework of this thesis, I chose the Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation. The following chapter's goal is to explain what led me to this decision. In other words, the aim is to clarify the theory to reveal why and how is it relevant for the purpose of this Master's thesis. Moreover, the chapter explains which concepts of security form the framework of this thesis.

2.1 Copenhagen school's approach to security

Regarding the ISS, the end of the Cold War was a watershed moment. Since the end of World War II until the beginning of 1990s, the first and foremost source of inspiration for ISS research was great power politics¹ and technology, meaning nuclear deterrence in particular. Mainstream of ISS was called strategic studies, influenced by realist IR theory and linked to public policy questions. The research approach of its scholars was mainly state-centric and focused on military aspects of security (Buzan, Hansen, 2009, p. 98–100).

After 1989, the world witnessed a sharp decline in the number of major inter-state military conflicts (Anthony et al. 2016, p. 4). Moreover, with the end of the Cold War and the related bipolarity and nuclear rivalry, many were concerned about the survivability of ISS field if nothing is done to rearrange its area of research (Buzan, Hansen, 2009, p. 184–185). This development, however, did not imply that the world all of a sudden became a peaceful place without any security threats to study.

On the other hand, new types of conflicts appeared, which had to be incorporated into the ISS. The notion of security that only concerns states, great power politics and nuclear deterrence could no longer be sustained.

Moreover, other developments existed that prompted the radical change within the ISS. In general, classic IR methods of analysis were extended by elements of other scientific disciplines. Examples include linguistics, critical philosophical approaches, anthropology or historical sociology. Another input was the development of modern communication technologies, such as the Internet. (Buzan, Hansen, 2009, p. 225).

¹ Especially the conflict between USA and USSR

Obviously, some scholars had noticed the basic principles of the field were disintegrating. (Buzan, Hansen et al. 2007, p. 135). Consequently, they started moving their research perspective away from the logic of traditional theories of ISS (Buzan, Hansen, 2009, p. 224). Over time, these changes have been institutionalized (Buzan, Hansen, 2009, p. 225).

Already in 1985, the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research was established in Copenhagen. Later, it was renamed as Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI). It became one of the driving forces of change within the ISS (Huysmans, 1998, p. 479–480).

In a relatively short period of time, COPRI scholars were able to devise their own approach to studying security, which differed from the traditional understanding in at least two respects. Their approach is characterized, firstly, by widening and deepening of security, and secondly, by understanding security as a purely social construct. In the next section, I will describe both the elements of the Copenhagen School approach.

2.1.1 Widening and deepening of ISS

COPRI scholars have noticed the unwillingness of some states to participate in the realism theory driven IR concepts of the epoch. For example, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (2005, p. 79) noted:

“Neither the EU nor Japan, as regional powers capable of becoming militarily involved, have the will to do so, nor do their constitutional rules allow them to do so.”

Nevertheless, researchers knew that the relative disappearance of interstate armed conflicts (and the decision not to being involved in them) does not imply a world in which everybody is safe. They started to acknowledge that the never-ending disorder in the anarchical world of international relations also emanates from other types of conflicts, motivated by various causes, such as social identities, access to food or water resources etc. (Anthony et al. 2016, p. 5). Logically, they sought to make the discipline relevant to contemporary concerns (Buzan, Hansen et al. 2007, p. 135).

Therefore, they started to talk about security in “extended” sense. In particular, extended in two ways: vertically and horizontally. The former term refers to including not just states, but also humanity as a whole, social and economic groups or individual human beings as a referent object². The latter term refers to including not just military security, but also other

² “Referent object” is explained in section (2.1.2)

areas of interest (e.g. economic, environmental, political or social) within which a referent object may be endangered (Buzan, Hansen et al. 2007, p. 2).

Eventually, the classical theory of security complexes, oriented exclusively on states and military issues, has been overcome (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 25).

2.1.2 Security as a social construct

Vertical and horizontal extending of security was just one of two major changes. The second one was the shift of the perception of security as objective reality to the perception of security as subjective feeling.

“We go beyond the classical theory of security complexes in yet another way, which is an explicitly constructivist approach to understanding the securitization of topics,” Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde point out in their book (2005, p. 28).

Later on, they even describe their approach to security as *“radically constructivist”* (p. 234). According to them, security is not objective reality, but a kind of human or societal reasoning and behaviour. They argue that security issues do not exist per se, but are created by the process of “securitisation” (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 234).

This method of analysis is not concerned about if something really is a security issue. According to its authors, objective evaluation of security issues should not be part of their work. And vice versa: They claim that alleged security threats, perceived by certain group of people as real ones, cannot be eased by just saying, "I'm an expert and I'm telling you, you're actually safe." (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 46–47). In sum, researcher’s job ought not to identify threats, but to analyse other actors’ attempts to identify threats.

Regarding securitisation, COPRI identifies three types of units that altogether form a security issue (p. 48):

1. **Referent object** is an entity, that is being labelled as existentially threatened and can therefore claim its right to survive (for example a state, nation, business company, human individual etc.).
2. **Securitising actor** labels referent objects as existentially threatened. Hence, they are the driving force of securitisation.
3. **Functional actor** is anyone who further influences the process without being any of the above.

With this in mind, one essential question arises: How do securitising actors identify referent objects? Securitisation theory scholars claim that one underlying condition exists, that help to turn an issue into a security issue. The condition is an articulation of a *speech act*.

As Ole Wæver explains (in Buzan, Hansen et al. 2007, p. 73):

“With the help of language theory, we can regard security as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering security, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”

What is the motivation of a securitizing actor? They seek to gain the attention and support of large enough part of their audience to legitimize their following steps, that usually deviate from standard political procedures. And they do this by labelling a phenomenon as a security issue (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 42–45). A securitisation scholar aims to understand this process to *“be able to influence the interaction between actors, and thus blunt the edge of security dilemmas.”* (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 43)

Before moving to the following section, there is one more thing to be clarified. The over usage of various forms of the word “security” in the whole thesis is evident, although necessary. Surprisingly, however, the articulation of the word itself is not a condition of securitization process, but only a correlation.

Let me further clarify this by using words by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (2005, p. 46):

“Importantly, the securitization of certain topics is a specific form of political action that takes place between actors and their audiences. Entities doing so do not necessarily have to operate with the word "security", and conversely, its explicit use does not yet create a securitisation act.”

There are several essential and underlying conditions, that help us to discern a successful speech act with securitisation intention: A securitising actor seeks to identify and highlight existential threats that require extraordinary intervention or measures. Their audience subsequently accepts their reasoning and suggestions (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 38).

If securitization is implemented successfully, the public will most probably lose some of its influence over politics. In democracies, therefore, sooner or later there must be a moment when there is a public debate about whether or not a given topic is articulated as a security problem legitimately (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 39). At the same time, not every securitisation attempt is successful and result in securitisation of a given topic (ibid. p. 35–37).

In contrast, securitization (or efforts to achieve it) can be reversed by de-securitization. In this case, actors try to get some topics out of security intentions or keep them out of security intentions (Buzan, Hansen et al. 2007, p. 75–76).

2.1.3 Critics and limitations of Copenhagen School

Although there are many authors who, from a more or less critical point of view, follow the Copenhagen School, in my Master's thesis I deal with only two, which I consider being the most relevant – Thierry Balzacq and Matt McDonald.

Thierry Balzacq (2011, p. 1–28) offers a slightly different view on securitisation and related concepts. To distinguish his approach, he describes Wæver and other pioneers of securitization theory as proponents of the “philosophical approach”.

Afterwards, he defines another approach to studying and understanding securitisation, which he labels as “sociological”. In his opinion, proponents of this approach are interested not only in speech acts themselves, but also in the overall context of a phenomenon, practices connected to it and power relations that characterise the construction of threat images (Balzacq, 2011, p. 1).

According to him, “*Securitisation is better understood as a strategic process that occur within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.*” (Balzacq, 2011, p. 1–2)

To put it another way, he argues that the old "philosophical" view lacks several important paths that can be used to perform analysis. In short, he claims that securitisation can equally emerge from practices, whose initial aim was not to securitise. He therefore sees the whole concept as way more intersubjective and audience-dependent than Wæver or Buzan.

The success of any securitization effort, as viewed by Balzacq, “*is highly contingent upon the securitizing actor’s ability to identify with the audience’s feelings, needs and interests.*” (Balzacq, 2005, p. 184) To put it simply, the success is determined by audience’s readiness to be convinced.

Matt McDonald in his text *Securitization and the Construction of Security* (2008) criticises the original Copenhagen School view of securitization from multiple perspectives.

- **Beyond speech:** Matt McDonald criticizes the one-sided conception of a speech act. He argues that we need to analyse not only the speech itself, but also the related body language or various images, videos and other carriers of meaning.
- **Beyond speech act:** He further argues that it is not possible to examine the speech act without taking into account the environment (social, economic, cultural, etc.) in which it is articulated or the particular personality who articulates it.
- **Beyond dominant voices:** The author does not like the fact that within the traditional concept of securitization, political leaders, who can reach a wide audience, are preferred. According to him, this results in further marginalization of already disadvantaged actors (women, minorities, the poor, etc.). According to him, the Copenhagen school thus resembles the traditionalists from which it tries to distinguish itself.
- **Beyond the “moment”:** McDonald denies that securitization occurs in a limited time during which an actor articulates a speech act. He argues that securitization of topics can happen over time through multiple speech acts, or even outside of speech acts in the “minds” of securitization actors.
- **Beyond threats?:** Finally, he rejects COPRI’s adoption of Schmitt's perception of threats, in which (simply put) a threat becomes part of a collective identity. McDonald points out that within one social group (e.g. a nation) where securitization takes place, several different people may perceive a threat completely differently. Or they may not perceive it as a threat at all.

Both the examples that form this section are very simplified, which is a result of the limited scope of this thesis. However, it is clear now that although the original concept of securitization (the Copenhagen School’s one) cannot be described as completely critical, later authors fully integrated critical elements into it. In sum, this section explained the theory of securitisation – its roots, development, aims and the overall logic. In the

following section, I reveal its relevance for analysing speech acts related to the planned Dukovany NPP reactor.

2.2 Relevant sectors: Energy, political and environmental security

To further clarify theoretical elements of the empirical section (5), let me return to the vertical and horizontal extending of security.

Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (2005) divide security issues horizontally into four research sectors:

1. Military security
2. Environmental security
3. Economic security
4. Social security
5. Political security

Regarding the discourse analysis (section 5), the environmental and political sectors of analysis appear to be the most important. Unfortunately, the book does not mention “energy security” per se, although it the concept is of equal relevance. Therefore, I will describe the concept by mentioning other authors.

In the following three sections, I define what do environmental, political and energy security mean and how is the understanding of the concepts relevant for my research objective. This is an important step towards deep understanding of the issue of the future reactor at the Dukovany power plant and related securitisation speech acts. Without an understanding of the concepts, it is not possible to determine whether the actors securitize within them. Consequently, it would be impossible to fully understand the securitization process.

2.2.1 Environmental security: complicated to turn it into a securitized issue

One of the first authors to successfully securitise the environment was Rachel Carson and her famous book “Silent Spring” (1962). She drew attention mainly to agriculture-related pollution and its effects on animals, vegetation and waters. In consequence, her book influenced the US policy, because the federal government completely banned the use of DDT insecticides in 1972 (Hough, 2014, p. 6).

After Carson, relatively many IR scientists have incorporated environmental issues into their research. Security threats associated with the environment have even been addressed by some authors, whom we consider to be classic authorities in the field of IR (see Ullman, 1983, p. 133; Kennan, 1985, p. 216). Moreover, especially since the end of the Cold War, many states reflect environmental security in their strategic documents (see USA, 1994, p. 1; MPO, 2020, p. 5–7). Nevertheless, securitisation of the environment is closely connected to the widening, broadening and deepening of security at the beginning of 1990s and the advent of various critical theories.

In general, the environmental security concept is quite vague. Each researcher perceives it slightly differently and includes different topics in their research agenda. Thus, the term itself is used for a number of different issues (Martinovský, 2016, p. 30). Some authors have even criticised the very idea of studying security of the environment (see Deudney, 1990; Levy, 1995). Even Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde recognized that securitizing the environment can be very difficult:

“The environmental lobby, by its very nature (...) aims to change the way society works before nature itself does so on the basis of a natural disaster. Although this strategy includes a number of securitization steps, the vast majority of them ends up being only politicized. Although the agenda is fruitful in this respect, most threats sound too distant to be successfully securitized” (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 100). This is evident, for example, in the securitization of the environmental impacts of nuclear energy use, as I show in the empirical part (section 5).

Apart from the environmental lobby (environmental NGOs in particular), scientists have always had a large share in securitization of environmental issues. Nevertheless, these two groups are far from being the only actors (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 88–89).

Regarding securitisation of the environment, scholars differentiate two main types of referent objects. The Copenhagen School mainly understands the concept as being focused on the environment itself. In other words, it is the nature or our environment who is being threatened as a referent object (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 91).

At the same time, there are other authors who think differently. Liberals (Pluralists), Critical Theorists and Social Constructivists perceive human individuals as being a referent object of environmental security. The logic behind it is that we as humans are those who shall fear the consequences of environmental degradation (Hough, 2014, p. 23–26).

2.2.2 Political security: different definitions and their meaning

The political security agenda has been a topic of ISS and IR research for a very long time. The problem, however, is that many authors define it differently (see Jahn, Lemaitre and Wæver, 1987; Ayoob, 1995, but also Arendt, Easton, Parsons, Schmitt etc.). If I were to describe all understandings of political security, I would write a hundred pages. Therefore, I only define the COPRI approach. Barry Buzan (1991, p. 118) defines it as follows:

“Political threats attack the organizational stability of a state. Their purpose can range from putting pressure on the government to promote a certain political direction, supporting separatist sentiments or disrupting the political structure of the state. (...) The usual target of political threats is the idea of the state, (..) and also the institutions through which this idea is expressed.”

Virtually anyone can securitize political security, but most often they are representatives of a state whose political security is threatened (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 174–175). This is also evidenced by the empirical analysis in section 5.

To conclude this section, I want to clarify that in my Master’s thesis I follow the Copenhagen school approach. Their conception of economic and political security is best suited for the analysis of my chosen topic.

2.2.3 Energy security as a separate concept

Energy security as a separate and self-contained concept is arguably even more complicated than environmental security. It is very often intertwined with other security research areas. For example, we cannot think of energy security without considering the climate change, therefore environmental security. Some authors even think that energy security is just one aspect of environmental security (Floyd, Matthew et al. 2013, p. 248).

Despite certain level of vagueness, energy supply as a security referent object has a relatively long tradition in the IR. Nevertheless, its perception used to be much more limited than it is today. Until WWII, the whole concept was closely connected to the supply of fuel for the military (Anthony et al. 2016, p. 135). After, energy security continued to be linked primarily to oil, particularly in the context of the oil crisis of the early 1970s (ČEZ, 2008, p. 9). As described, the concept was understood for example by Henry Kissinger (Stulberg, 2007, p. 3) and other authors (see Klare, 2012; Stokes and Raphael, 2010).

However, in the second half of the 1980s, other elements were added to this limited understanding of energy security. The stimulus was the accident at the Chernobyl NPP. After that, states began to seriously address the security of nuclear resources. Soon after, the climate change became a significant political issue (Floyd, Matthew et al. 2013, p. 254).

Adam Simpson (in Floyd, Matthew et al. 2013, p. 257) also adds to these elements the availability of energies for human individuals:

“In applying critical perspective to energy security, the referent object shifts from the state to the individual, and individual energy security becomes the goal, provided it is not at the expense of other aspects of environmental security or the environmental security of other members of the political community.”

This vertical extension of included referent objects also works vice versa. Local problems, such as security of one particular nuclear power plant, have far-reaching global implications. Any eventual major accident will have consequences at least in a regional, but rather in a global perspective, as was the case with the Fukushima disaster (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 104). Thus, the whole humanity becomes a referent object.

After a brief introduction to the development of the concept and the definition of possible referent objects, it remains to be described how energy security can be ensured. Pascual and Elkind et al. (2010, p. 121–130) define the conditions as follows:

1. **Availability:** First and foremost, energy security stems from the availability of energy goods and services. Demand for energy commodities is constantly rising worldwide. Although technology is evolving, helping to extract raw materials from previously inaccessible deposits, in the future, resource scarcity can become a global problem.
2. **Reliability:** This concept describes the extent to which energy services are protected from interruption. Stable flow of energy is essential for almost any type of economic activity. Reliability is also concerned with avoiding price volatility.
3. **Affordability:** Energy that people cannot afford is useless. But it's not just about them. Price shocks can also paralyze the economies of developed countries, such as the US during the oil crisis in the early 1970s. However, low prices also stimulate consumption, which may result in availability problems. State regulations on energy prices generally have a significant impact on a country's overall economy. A

well-thought-out pricing policy is therefore an absolutely essential part of energy security.

4. **Sustainability:** In the past, sustainability usually was not a part energy security. Its integration into the concepts relates to concerns over the climate change and human environment.

To summarize, energy security can include a number of different referent objects. However, the discourse analysis (section 5) shows that in the case of the planned reactor at the Dukvany NPP, the traditional referent object – the state – is the most articulated one, followed by energy security of individual citizens.

The discourse analysis also shows that energy security is, under certain conditions, easier to securitize than, for example, environmental security, because the consequences of a possible threat are much more immediate. To put it very simply: The fact that the temperature rises by half a degree scares people much less than the idea that they turn on the kettle in the morning and it won't work. This may not be a general rule, but it follows from the discourse analysis (section 5).

2.3 Conclusion: Implications for the research objective of the thesis

In the preceding sections, I clarified theoretical aspects of this thesis. First, I define the theory of securitisation. This theory serves my goals the best, because it describes security purely as a social construct. Moreover, it incorporates the vertical and horizontal extensions of security.

Second, I describe three security research areas related to my thesis. In particular, I briefly describe the history of environmental, political and energy security concepts and their understanding by various authors. I also define which referent objects do they usually involve and whether it is (compared to others) easy or not to achieve successful securitization of each one individually.

Regarding the securitization of the environment, I concluded that this is a relatively new phenomenon, evident only since the 1960s. Moreover, it is a phenomenon with a relatively vague definition, which many actors (NGOs, scientists) are trying to securitize, but few succeed.

Regarding political security,

Finally, I dealt with energy security. It has a long tradition compared to environmental security, but the understanding of the concept has undergone considerable development over the last 30 years, which has resulted in an expansion of its agenda. It now includes many different referent objects from human individuals to all of humanity. I also concluded that it is easier to securitize energy issues, because the consequences of a materialized threat are usually much more imminent for most people than in the case of the other two concepts, and it is therefore easier for securitizing actors to influence public affairs.

The preceding section therefore serves as a theoretical basis for the following section. Without a theoretical insight, it would be very complicated to understand the process of securitisation of the planned reactor in the Dukovany NPP.

3. History: Discourse on nuclear energy in the Czech Republic

Although the topic of this Master's thesis concerns the present, the roots of the chosen topic go back several decades deep in the past. For the reader, it would be impossible to understand the discourse analysis, which forms the main part of the Master's thesis, if they were not familiar with what are the roots of nuclear energy discourse in the Czech Republic. Therefore, I will now briefly describe history while focusing on the relevant aspects, i.e. discourse, not technical information.

I divided the history of discourse in the Czech Republic into three main stages. The planned unit at the Dukovany NPP, which is the topic of this Master's thesis, then forms the fourth stage.

These stages are:

- atomic optimism of the communist era and the construction of Dukovany NPP (1950–1989);
- liberalization of the Czech public sphere in the 1990s and the construction of Temelín NPP (1987–2002);
- announced and cancelled tender for the completion of additional unit in Temelín NPP (2007–2014).

A few words about this division:

Although in the communist era the discourse had been changing slightly over the years, the positive view of atomic energy promoted by the state apparatus and the Communist Party persisted. The fall of the communist regime and the end of censorship of the public space gave way to various organizations, entities or foreign states to significantly influence the discourse. There is a gap in the division in the years 2003–2007. At that time, the public debate in the Czech Republic took place, but nothing particularly interesting happened in terms of discourse. The last stage (opening and cancelling the tender) is then closely linked to the topic of the following discourse analysis, because then similar arguments appeared as now.

3.1 Atomic optimism of the communist era (1950–1989)

In the 1950s, both the government and nuclear physicists were convinced of the need to educate the citizens about the opportunities of nuclear energy. The main impetus for the Czechoslovak government to start the popularization of nuclear energy was undoubtedly the offer of assistance with the construction of a NPP from the USSR in January 1955 (Šmidrkalová, 2019, p. 13). The goal of the popularization was to show that atomic energy can be used for positive development of humanity (ibid. p. 16).

At the time, the political regime was trying to convince the citizens to look forward to the so-called “atomic age” that was to come in the foreseeable future. This atomic age was portrayed almost as a utopia with emphasis on its peaceful and socialist dimensions. In addition to NPPs, nuclear fission was to power locomotives, aircraft, and even passenger cars. At the time, people were being convinced that nuclear energy was coming as a major turning point in human history, when “we would finally tame nature to serve us”. This enthusiasm began to decline in the early 1960s, when it became clear that people would not experience such a development anytime soon (ibid. p. 54–87).

It is interesting that the “American atomic age” was also mentioned in the public sphere as a counterpart to the socialist atomic age. However, it was perceived as dangerous, causing death and disease (ibid. 56–57).

The only nuclear dream that ultimately turned into reality in Czechoslovakia was the construction of a NPP. As early as the beginning of 1956, negotiations between Czechoslovakia and the USSR started officially. In March, the efforts resulted in the signing of an agreement on assistance with the construction of a NPP. Optimists estimated commissioning as early as 1960, and around 1975, NPPs were to become the main supplier of electricity. However, in the 1960s, more realistic scenarios began to emerge, estimating the launch of the first NPP sometime after 1980 (ibid. p. 87–91).

In the second half of the 1960s, realistic views began to prevail. Although nuclear energy was still being perceived positively, the media or politicians have not dreamed of nuclear passenger cars and locomotives anymore. There has even been criticism of the Czechoslovak nuclear program. This all ended with the onset of 1970s and the process of

normalization³. Any doubts about the use of nuclear energy were suppressed by the then political regime. Although the debate never returned to the optimism of the 1950s, the importance of building NPPs was constantly being emphasized in the public sphere (ibid. 98–103).

Nevertheless, Czechoslovak households have not received atomic energy until the 1980s. Construction of the Dukovany NPP began in 1978. The first reactor unit was put into operation on 4.5.1985, the last fourth unit on 20.6.1987 (Blažková, 2008).

However, the end of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia was approaching. The debate on nuclear energy was soon to change fundamentally.

3.2 Liberalization of the Czech public sphere and the construction of Temelín NPP (1989–2002)

The end of the Czechoslovak authoritarian regime's censorship and the introduction of constitutional protection of freedom of speech marked a major shift in the debate on nuclear energy. Potential securitization actors, that the state apparatus had not previously allowed into the public debate, began to speak out.

Major disputes arose mainly around the Temelín NPP. Its construction began in 1986 and originally was intended to include four Soviet reactors. When the political regime changed in 1989, construction became more complicated and the new democratic government subsequently decided to halve the planned number of reactors (Marek, 2000, p. 24). The completion of the two reactors was not formally approved by the government until 1993 (ČEZ, 2004, p. 4). Although the reactors remained the original, Soviet ones, ČEZ eventually decided to complete the contract with the help of the American company Westinghouse, with which it also eventually signed a contract in 1993 (Böck, Drábová, 2006, p. 11). The fission reaction at the power plant finally began in 2002 (ibid. 27).

Between 1989 and 2002, many voices spoke out against the commissioning of the new NPP. This was a significant difference from the unified debate directed by the communist regime before 1989. After, there were many groups who opposed the completion. However, in my Master's thesis I will focus on the two most vocal, whose opinion and (to

³ Normalization is a name commonly given to the period following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and up to the "glasnost" era that began in 1987. It was characterized by the restoration of the conditions prevailing before the Prague Spring reforms of 1968.

some extent) influence persisted even after the Temelín NPP was launched (which they could not prevent). These (securitising) actors are:

- Austria (its politicians, NGOs and public)
- Czech environmental NGOs

I will now briefly focus on both of these groups' discourse.

The entire development of interstate relations between Austria and the Czech Republic regarding energy industry and, in particular, the construction of the Temelín NPP in a given period of time is described in the publication "Rizika přesahující Hranice: případ Temelín"⁴ by Helmut Böck and Dana Drábová (2006):

Already in 1989, few months before the political regime collapsed, the then Austrian chancellor Vranitzky opposed the construction and pushed for a resistance against the NPP using economic instruments (p. 10).

The very next day after the fall of the communist regime, Austrian Minister of the Environment called for a friendly settlement of all mutual disputes, including Temelín. In the following years, a broad coalition was formed in Austria against Temelín. The loudest were the representatives of the federal states of Upper and Lower Austria, which share borders with the Czech Republic (ibid. p. 10).

In early 1994, an Austrian delegation travelled to Washington, USA, to lobby against the completion of the plant. Among other things, it requested an Environmental Impact Assessment (ibid. p. 11) Austria also wanted to make the abandonment of the construction a condition for the Czech Republic's accession to the EU.

It is notable that all the main political parties there opposed the Temelín NPP. Therefore, they did not prevent Austrian activists from starting the anti-Temelín blockades of the border with the Czech Republic in 2000. These lasted intermittently until 2007. On 12.12.2000, efforts to resolve the disputes resulted in the signing of the so-called Melk Protocol, which was to settle some of the most fundamental disputes. Nevertheless, the quarrel continued. Many negotiations took place at the local and EU level, the result of which was the so-called Brussels Protocol (signed 29.11.2001), which was equally supposed to settle the matter (equally unsuccessfully). Even after the commissioning in

⁴ „Risks Across Borders: The Temelín Case” in English

2002, Austrian efforts continued in a moderated form. Gradually, however, it subsided and the Temelín NPP is fully operational to this day (ibid. p. 13–27).

The Austrian arguments had a security dimension from the beginning. Representatives of the country argued that *"states should have a role to play in protecting their citizens from an environmental catastrophe originating in another state"* (ibid. p. 15).

It is also interesting in this context that de facto the entire Czech political scene, on the contrary, supported the Temelín NPP. Moreover, opinion polls have shown that up to 80% of the Czech public supported the opening of the power plant (ibid. p. 16).

The protest against the Temelín NPP in the Czech Republic was therefore (with a few exceptions) limited to the level of environmental NGOs. The description of the opinions of all environmental organizations is beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, I chose a publication, on the example of which (as a case study) I described their argument, because in my opinion it contains all the most frequently mentioned ones. Its name is “Proč je třeba zastavit JE Temelín: historie, fakta a souvislosti projektu jaderné elektrárny Temelín”⁵ and it was written by representatives of Hnutí Duha⁶ NGO in 2000.

Their main arguments are divided into five parts (p. 8–30):

1. **Political problems:** Hnutí Duha claims that disputes with neighbouring Austria and problems in joining the EU are not worth completing the power plant.
2. **Legal issues:** The activists criticize the fact that the main part of the domestic decision-making process took place in the early 1990s, when there was no reliable legal and regulatory framework in the Czech Republic due to the rapid political regime change.
3. **Environmental impacts:** Radioactive waste, uranium mining and greenhouse gas emissions from the construction of the NPP are criticized.
4. **Economic problems:** The NGO claims that the construction would not be economically worthwhile and that the financial loss would be paid by taxpayers.

⁵ “Why it is necessary to stop the Temelín NPP: history, facts and context of the Temelín nuclear power plant project” in English

⁶ Hnutí DUHA (translated to English as The Rainbow Movement) is an environmental movement. The movement has been a member of the Friends of the Earth International since 1994.

5. **Technical problems:** Environmentalists think that Soviet and American technologies cannot work together, which is a security risk. In addition, they refer to some research that points to other alleged technological imperfections.

On the other side of the imaginary barricade stood the state apparatus with the support of public opinion. In addition to the politicians themselves, the arguments for the completion were most often articulated by the semi-state energy company ČEZ, which participated in the construction.

The most frequent arguments of these groups concerned the provision of energy security in the Czech Republic in the future. The nuclear power plant under construction was perceived as an emission-free and safe source of energy, which also makes financial sense. They even relativized the problems associated with radioactive waste (Marek, 2000, p. 25–65).

In addition to giving the reader insight into the context, the Temelín case has several implications for the discourse analysis. It proves that most of the arguments we hear in connection with the completion of the Dukovany NPP are nothing new. Public opinion in the Czech Republic still supports nuclear energy, as are the vast majority of politicians and the state apparatus in general. On the other hand, Austria, together with environmental organizations, still protests and points out to alleged security risks and environmental threats. Furthermore, the Czech Republic still has to deal with the EU and consult with it on the procedure. In fact, the only significant change in the perception of threats today is the debate over the exclusion of Russia and China from the current Dukovany tender. This will be discussed in more detail in discourse analysis (section 5).

3.3 Announced and cancelled tender for the completion of additional unit in Temelín NPP (2007–2014)

In August 2009, ČEZ launched a tender for the construction of two more units in the Temelín NPP. Subsequently, three foreign companies applied – the American Westinghouse, the Russian Atomstrojexport and the French Areva. At the end of October 2011, those interested in the completion of the Temelín NPP received tender documentation from ČEZ. On 2.6.2012, three applicants submitted a bid: Westinghouse, Areva and the Russian-Czech MIR. 1200 Consortium, consisting of Škoda JS, Atomstrojexport and Gidropress companies (Klobouček, 2015, p. 19–22).

Another event within the tender took place on 5.10.2012, when ČEZ announced that Areva did not meet the requirements of the tender and was therefore excluded. Allegedly because the French offer did not guarantee a fixed price. However, the contracting authority did not officially publish the real reasons (ibid.).

In July 2013, ČEZ issued a statement asking the Czech government for some form of support for the completion of the Temelín NPP and stating that the completion of Temelín NPP without guaranteed purchase prices is not currently profitable and therefore not even possible. However, this did not happen and on 10.4.2014, ČEZ cancelled the tender (ibid.).

From the point of view of discourse, the unfinished tender did not cause too many changes. However, its failure has further intensified the debate on the energy security of the Czech Republic, which will allegedly be threatened in the future by the lack of installed capacity. This intensification is clearly visible in the empirical part (section 5).

Moreover, the early start of preparations for the announcement of the Dukovany NPP tender proves that in the case of Temelín the reason for cancellation was not a disagreement with the idea of new reactors per se, but rather a disagreement with the way in which the tender was prepared.

3.4 Conclusion: Relevance for the research objective of the thesis

In explaining the discourse concerning the Czech (formerly Czechoslovak) nuclear program, I chose a chronological approach. First, I described the enthusiasm of the communist era, which perceived fission as the power source for the future. Then I moved on to post-1989 events, when censorship ended, the debate was liberalized and many actors (Austria, NGOs) began to oppose the Czech nuclear program. I finished the section with a description of the announced and subsequently cancelled tender for the construction of two new reactors at the Temelín NPP.

This section forms the last part that is essential for the subsequent understanding of the discourse analysis of the securitization of speech acts related to the completion of the new unit at the Dukovany NPP. Without an understanding of the history of the discourse on nuclear energy in the Czech Republic, it would not be possible to grasp a number of facts or narratives, which I describe in more detail in the empirical part (section 5).

4. Methodology: discourse analysis within the theory of securitization

The aim of this chapter is to present the methodological framework of this Master's thesis. Without a well-managed methodological framework, no research can be carried out reliably.

4.1 Topic of the research

The main goal of my research was to find, explore and analyse the speech acts that actors articulate in the Czech public sphere with an (possibly unconscious) intention to securitize the planned construction of a new reactor at the Dukovany NPP. More specifically, I used discourse analysis to examine all speech (including written) acts that were relevant to this thesis in the period from 6.8.2015 until the end of 2020.

The research builds on several previous academic theses (Khrushcheva, 2013; Minin, 2020; Radtke, 2020), which deal with securitization of energy industry related topics in foreign (i.e. not Czech) countries in a similar way as this thesis. The aim of my research was to verify whether efforts to securitize energy industry related issues (specifically the construction of a new reactor at the Dukovany NPP) can be observed in the Czech Republic and which exceptional measures securitising actors are trying to achieve by securitising (nuclear) energy industry related issues.

4.2 Research strategy – critical discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is a qualitative research method of social sciences, whose main subject of interest is discourse. Discourse can be understood as a process of time-scattered events and statements, which interact with each other and are connected by a certain object. The whole matter formed by them does not have to be coherent, but it is possible to find certain thought patterns and argumentation strategies. More simply, discourse means how a certain topic is viewed and discussed. The significations and categories that are related to the topic of discourse are socially conditioned and constructed (Cholt, 2006, p. 18-19).

Discourse analysis is intended to examine speech activities by which actors defend their views on a given topic. Hendl defines discourse analysis as "*an approach to the analysis of language expression and another type of discourse that emphasizes ways of creating social reality through language*" (Hendl, 2005, p. 388). The critical analysis of discourse differs

in that it also focuses on social, political and cultural contexts. Moreover, it is interpretive and explanatory (Dijk, 2003, p. 252).

In the case of my Master's thesis, the aim is to critically analyse the discourse related to the securitization of the planned reactor at the Dukovany NPP.

4.3 Research questions and hypotheses

The main research target of this thesis was to analyse the speech acts articulating the security risks related to the possible (and probable) construction of a new reactor at the current site of Dukovany Power Station while conducting discourse analysis within the theory of securitisation framework.

To successfully fulfil my goal, I outlined 7 research questions and 18 research hypotheses related to it:

- RQ1: Can patterns of manipulation by certain interest groups, competing for influence over the reactor construction process, be found in the speech acts related to it?
 - H1: In the Czech public sphere, there are speech acts connected to the to the possible (and probable) construction of a new reactor at the current site of Dukovany NPP.
 - H2: At least some of these speech acts are being securitized in a sense of the Copenhagen School of IR.
 - H3: At least in some cases, securitization efforts are successful and result in extraordinary measures being adopted.
- RQ2: In case H2 is proven, who are these securitizing actors?
 - H4: Securitization speech acts are articulated by foreign states
 - H5: Securitization speech acts are articulated by Czech expert community
 - H6: Securitization speech acts are articulated by companies involved in the tender.
 - H7: Securitization speech acts are articulated by environmental NGOs
 - H8: Securitization speech acts are articulated by Czech political representation
- RQ3: If H2 is proven and if any of H4 to H8 are proven, what is the goal of the securitizing actor(s)?

- H9: Their goal is to cancel the plans for building a new reactor.
- H10: Their goal is to build a new reactor.
- H11: Their goal is to influence the future tender for the construction of the reactor in another way.
- RQ4: Are the publicly articulated risks the most serious and pressing risks?
 - H12: The speech acts tend to neglect at least some real security risks associated with the possible (and probable) construction of a new reactor at the current site of the Dukovany Power Station.
- RQ5: Why is the public debate focusing on other than really serious and pressing risks?
 - H13: Effects of a proven H12 constitute a threat to the energy security of the Czech Republic.
- RQ6: If H3 is confirmed, does it have a rather positive or negative impact on the future of the Czech Republic?
 - H14: Overall, a proven H3 has a rather positive impact.
 - H15: Overall, a proven H3 has a rather negative impact.
 - H16: It is not possible to say whether the impact is positive or negative.
- RQ7: How does the discourse regarding the planned reactor differ from the past discourse described in section 3?
 - H17: The discourse is different.
 - H18: The discourse is not different.

Finally, I want to stress that the scope of this thesis is not to assess the role of nuclear energy in the overall energy transition to carbon-free sources.

4.4 Definition of research material

As indicated in my Master's thesis project, I interpreted speech acts published in official documents and newspaper articles. The speech acts analysed were articulated by relevant business, governmental, NGO and other important actors. The result of my analysis provides an interpretation of the securitization efforts associated with the future construction and operation of the planned Dukovany NPP reactor.

First, I gathered data from the press, television, radio and the internet. The subject of analysis were predominantly Czech-based broadsheets and other respectable media outlets

that are concerned with economics, politics, energy industry and environment. In particular, I drew the most information from these:

- ČT (national public television network, funded by the public via television licence),
- ČTK (national public press agency – very influential, controlled by ČTK Council members who are elected by the Parliament, funded by selling of news),
- **denikn.cz** (website of independent daily newspaper Deník N, crowdfunded, journalist-owned), and
- **iHNED.cz** (news website of influential national business daily, published by Economia, owned by Czech businessman Zdeněk Bakala).

Second, I analysed official documents and press releases issued by Czech institutions. To mention a few, I focused on the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Security Information Service, Committee on Economic Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies and State Office for Nuclear Safety.

Third, I also researched press releases issued by Czech environmental NGOs:

- Zelený kruh (“*Green Circle*”),
- Calla,
- Hnutí DUHA (“*Rainbow Movement*”),

and by relevant business companies (mainly ČEZ).

Finally, as indicated in my Master’s thesis project, I tried to reach relevant people and ask them about their opinions and comments. Unfortunately, mainly due to the COVID-19 related crisis I did not succeed, because any face-to-face meeting became impossible. Moreover, all the relevant actors were very busy addressing the COVID-19 crisis and did not have any time to discuss the topic.

Concerning the time range, I limited the period of collected data from the present back to 2015. In 2015, two official documents were publicly issued: the "Update of the State Energy Concept" and the “National Action Plan for the Development of the Nuclear Energy in the Czech Republic”. Within them, the possibility of building a new reactor at the existing Dukovany NPP was officially seriously considered for the first time. The time period ends in December 2020 simply because Master’s theses must be submitted no later than 5.1.2021. However, I do not see this fact as a disadvantage, but as an opportunity for a possible future continuation of the research.

4.5 Method of data collection

The research involved working with a large number of diverse qualitative contents. To simplify the selection and sorting of research material, I used an online service – the energyhub.eu website.

Since I worked for this PR company for several years, monitoring the Czech media, I have access to its database. The database of the energyhub.eu portal includes de facto all articles that have appeared in the Czech media space since 2007 and are related to energy industry or the environment. In the database of the website, it is possible to search by keywords, filter selected media, or include only some topics in the research selection using tags. It is also possible to limit the search to news from a certain time period only. For more information, see appendix C.

As for the documents and press releases issued by Czech state institutions, NGOs and companies, the method of data collection was simply done by searching their webpages and analysing everything that was relevant.

It is possible that I inadvertently omitted some sources while applying this method. However, this cannot be considered a limitation of this thesis, because, as Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (2005, p. 206) claim:

„If we focus on key security debates, we should come across the most important securitizing efforts, waging fierce battles for privileged positions. It is therefore not necessary to analyse all textual sources, especially documents of dubious origin.”

4.6 Method of sorting the data obtained

After I had finished the initial research, I opted for a chronological approach. More specifically, I decided to divide the whole period (May 2015 – December 2020) into three shorter time periods. These sections are bounded by events that have fundamentally changed the debate on the subject. Nevertheless, these sections do not, of course, form separate units, but are interconnected.

However, for the sake of clarity of the analysis, it was more appropriate to proceed with this division. Moreover, the time periods I define prove that discourse and public debate have not been the same over the course of almost five years, but have changed and evolved according to the specific topics articulated by the actors involved.

These time periods are:

1. since the update to the State energy policy (May 2015);
2. since the introduction of the New Statute of Standing Committee for New Nuclear Build (February 2019);
3. since the adoption of proposals for two agreements between the Czech government and the ČEZ energy company on the construction of a new nuclear unit in Dukovany NPP (April 2020).

The end of each period is the beginning of the following period. The time length of individual periods varies quite significantly – each is shorter than the previous one. However, in terms of the volume of information, they are comparable (only the last period contains disproportionately more information), which proves that over time, the debate (and thus the discourse) has intensified.

I have chosen the starting points for these periods, because after initial research, it is clear that, as a direct or indirect consequence of these events, public debate has changed. I wrote more details about the division in the analysis itself.

Within these time periods, I introduced and explained speeches and speech acts of individual actors, whose securitisation speech acts I had managed to find. In order to achieve a higher degree of clarity, I divided speech acts according to which specific groups articulate them. This gave me a greater awareness of the development of the discourse of particular securitising actors.

These groups are:

- foreign actors,
- expert community (on security and nuclear energy),
- Companies and industrial sector associations,
- NGOs,
- Czech political representation.

Actors within these groups do not always have the same discourse. I categorized them in this way because they play (or ideally should play) a similar role regarding the research topic and there are frequent interactions within the groups.

Although some authors (see Vultee, 2011, p. 77–93) emphasize the role that the media themselves play in securitization, I have chosen not to examine their speech acts as a separate category. There are several reasons for this. First, the media do not form a unified group, but their discourse differs depending on how ideologically oriented they are. This makes it practically impossible to examine and describe a distinctive media discourse. Second, media outlets are always greatly influenced by their owner. It is therefore debatable whether speech acts of the media themselves exist or whether it is, in fact, the owner who is trying to securitize. Third, it is equally not possible to distinguish between attempts to securitize by an individual journalist or the media as an entity. Fourth, after initial research, it turned out that there were practically no significant speech acts in the media that would have any observable consequences.

I ended the description of each time period with a short conclusion, in which I put the speeches and speech acts of the individual securitizing actors into broader context. Subsequently, I described how the overall discourse on the researched topic differed from the previous period (this, of course, does not apply to the first period).

Limitations of research

From the ontological point of view, critical discourse analysis is a way of learning about social reality, with the help of which a whole range of phenomena of social world can be explored. In other words, it is possible to map the way people perceive and co-create the meaning of the world around them. This perception can then be interpreted and explained in detail. It is therefore a flexible and creative approach that can be applied in a relatively unrestrained way (Beneš, 2008, p. 120–121).

On the other hand, discourse analysis has several limitations. Problematic, for example, is the very concept of discourse, which is practically impossible to be precisely defined. Another disadvantage is its limitation to the analysis of text and spoken word, which neglects other bearers of meaning, such as the tone of voice or body language. The complexity of resources is also a complication. Discourse analysis requires a large number of resources that are difficult to process and understand correctly (Beneš, 2008, p. 121–122).

Another limitation was the completion of research by the end of 2020. If research continued, it is quite possible that the conclusions of this thesis would change

fundamentally. On the other hand, this disadvantage can be seen as a call for further research.

Perhaps the most significant limitation was the COVID-19 pandemic and associated limitations. This made it practically impossible for me to address the relevant actors to ask them to comment on the topic of the thesis.

To summarize: During the research, I could not avoid a certain vagueness that arises from the use of the method of discourse analysis. Moreover, the relevance of the conclusions is reduced by the limitation of the examined material to the spoken and written word and the impossibility to meet the relevant actors in person.

All of the above facts reduce the validity of research, because “*validity means the requirement that research methods really measure what we intend to measure*” (Scherer, 2004, p. 34). Nevertheless, the conclusions of this Master’s thesis still provide insight into the researched topic and could easily become a basis for more extensive, more detailed research.

4.7 Ethical issues of research

The research was carried out in accordance with the principles of ethics of social science research. However, much of the potential ethical responsibility in this research is not relevant because (mainly due to the COVID-19 situation) the subject of research were publicly available materials, not humans. The materials were processed as accurately and honestly as possible, so as not to construct a lie or misinformation.

5 Empirical research: Critical discourse analysis of speeches related to the possible construction of a new reactor at the Dukovany NPP

After initial research, I defined the following three main topics of securitization:

- energy security of the Czech Republic and its citizens,
- environmental security of the Czech Republic and neighbouring states, and
- political security of the Czech Republic.

Furthermore, the above-mentioned topics were articulated by the following actors:

- **Foreign actors** (mostly *Austria*, but also the *EU*) have emphasized environmental security. According to them, it could be disrupted by the construction of a new NPP.
- Most vocal members of the **expert community** were the following two institutions:
 - *SÚJB* has mainly mentioned energy security of the Czech Republic, which would allegedly be endangered by a possible cancellation of the process leading to the construction of the power plant.
 - *BIS* has mainly dealt with the political security of the Czech Republic. It could allegedly be disrupted if countries that do not have a democratic regime took part in the future tender.
- **Companies and industrial sector associations** (mainly *ČEZ*) have mainly articulated within the framework of energy security of the Czech Republic. They have used very similar arguments to *SÚJB*.
- Regarding **NGOs**, the main actor was the *Zelený kruh* association, which includes (among others) two relevant organizations (*Calla* and *Hnutí DUHA*). NGOs have dealt with environmental security (similar arguments as *Austria*), but mainly energy security. In comparison with other actors, they have perceived it in the opposite way. According to them, the possible construction of the power plant will turn out to be significantly more expensive and, as a result, will endanger the energy security of the Czech Republic and its citizens.
- **Czech political representation** can be divided into two sub-groups:
 - *The parties associated with the government* (*ANO*, *ČSSD* and *KSČM* who props-up the minority cabinet) have mainly articulated within the

framework of energy security of the Czech Republic. They have used very similar arguments to SÚJB and ČEZ.

- *Opposition parties* (KDU-ČSL, ODS, Piráti, TOP 09) have dealt mainly with the political security of the Czech Republic. They have used very similar arguments to BIS.
- I do not mention the SPD party, which also belongs to the opposition, as I have not found any relevant speech.

It is important to add that in the empirical part itself I mentioned several other individual actors who fell into the above categories. However, from the point of view of this thesis, they were of only minor importance. Now follows the discourse analysis itself, in which I described and analysed the speeches of all relevant actors, while looking for signs of securitization. In the end, I provided a comprehensive conclusion on the topic.

5.1 First period: initial phase

In December 2014, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic introduced an update to the State energy policy, which the government approved in May 2015. The update (MPO, 2014, p. 14) states:

“Within the time frame of the State Energy Policy what is important in terms of dependence on predicting the balance of production and consumption is the construction of additional nuclear power units to produce around 20 TWh by 2035, extending the lifetime of the existing four units in the Dukovany power plant (50 to 60 years) and later the possible construction of another unit to compensate for the decommissioning of the Dukovany nuclear power plant.”

Subsequently, in May 2015, the government introduced yet another document called National Action Plan for the Development of the Nuclear Energy Sector in the Czech Republic. Not even a month later the government approved it. The Plan (MPO and MF, 2015, p. 57), among other similar statements, very clearly states:

„The objective of activities being performed on the site is to build one new EDU 5 unit.”

Initially, the government considered addressing eight possible suppliers (Lidovky.cz, 6.5.2016):

- Areva (France)

- Rosatom (Russia)
- Westinghouse (USA)
- Mitsubishi (Japan)
- Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO, South Korea)
- China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN, China)
- State Nuclear Power Technology Company (SNPTC, China)
- China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC, China)

After years of inactivity, it began to finally be apparent that the government was really serious about the construction of the new nuclear unit. Given the significance of the decision and huge investment related, the public sphere of the Czech Republic immediately began to be overwhelmed with various statements on this topic.

5.1.1 Foreign actors

Very soon, the traditional opponent of the Czech nuclear energy programme – Austria (for more information, see section 3) – began to speak against the new reactor of the Dukovany NPP.

In October 2016, Austrian Environment Minister Andrä Rupprechter criticized the Czech government in Luxembourg for planning the new reactor. Moreover, he expressed a clear protest against the nuclear energy itself and submitted a petition to the Czech Minister of the Environment, Richard Brabec. In the petition, more than 80,000 citizens of Lower Austria rejected the Czech plan (ČTK, 17.10.2016).

Furthermore, he said (ibid.):

"In our opinion, nuclear energy is not a sustainable energy source, but a very risky technology."

This can be considered a securitization effort. The referent object here is the environment and the human security of Austrian and in general European citizens, which may be endangered by the construction of the reactor. The aim of securitization is to cancel the official Czech plans, which can be considered an extraordinary measure. Up to date, the securitisation effort is not successful as the process leading to the start of the construction still continues.

Austria maintained the continuity of its approach even after the 2017 legislative elections (ČTK, 20.12.2017).

It is interesting to note that the EU have not shared Austria's view. In the period under research, according to an article by news portal Politico (22.2.2018), which had a wide response in the Czech media, concerns about the political security of the Czech Republic prevailed in the EU in connection with the growing influence of Russia if Rosatom won the tender.

5.1.2 Expert community

As for SÚJB, its head Dana Drábová mentioned the planned reactor several times. She addressed the security of the project from the technological perspective. On the other hand, she refused to address the political security aspect of the issue. She twice mentioned to ČT that from the (technological) security point of view, all the possibly bidding companies were comparable and there was nothing to worry about (ČT 30.1.2017 and 23.10.2018).

At the same time, Drábová chose the energy security of the Czech Republic as a referent object. She mentioned for ČT (23.10.2018) that without a new reactor it would probably not be possible to maintain it in the future. The aim of this speech act was to speed up the construction of a new reactor. However, this was not exactly a securitization effort, because no particular call for extraordinary measure was part of the speech act. Therefore, SÚJB took the role of a functional actor.

BIS commented (albeit indirectly) on the security aspect of the planned Dukovany unit in its annual reports. Already in the report for 2015 (2016, p. 4) BIS pointed out:

“Considerable caution must be exercised when communicating with foreigners, whose business activities are linked to power interests of foreign states, especially to the activities of foreign intelligence services (e.g. Russian or Chinese).”

Similar concerns were repeated by BIS two years later in its Annual Report for 2017 (2018, p. 6):

“Foreign companies from countries, where their strong ties to local state administration had to be expected, were constantly interested in important projects of the Czech energy sector. That caused risks linked to their potential participation in such projects because

their participation could be used to promote foreign-political goals of their countries of origin, contrary to the interests of the Czech Republic.”

Although BIS did not explicitly mention the Dukovany NPP, the context clearly showed what the secret service implied. It connected the future reactor with security agenda (warning against the influence of Russia and China) and thus put itself in the role of a functional actor. Note that I do not label it as a securitization actor, as there is a complete lack of any particular call for extraordinary measures.

5.1.3 Czech companies and industrial sector associations

A particularly interesting speech act was articulated by the Alliance of Czech Suppliers for Nuclear Power Plants. In their statement for ČTK (7.12.2018a), the Alliance expressed the wish that the government should decide on the construction of the unit by the end of the year. According its members (Škoda Praha, Škoda JS, Doosan Škoda Power and Sigma Group⁷), the decision was necessary for maintaining the country's energy security, i.e. competitiveness and sustainability. The Alliance stated (ibid.):

"Failure to decide on the construction of new nuclear sources will inevitably lead to the variant of gas use and its negative effects – high import dependence, high and highly volatile electricity prices, non-compliance with climate and decarbonisation targets."

This clearly forms a securitization attempt. The Alliance chose the energy security of the Czech Republic as a referent object. It claimed that if the government did not start building a new reactor quickly, the energy security of the Czech Republic would be endangered. It even requested an extraordinary measure in the form of starting the construction process by the end of the year. As this did not happen, this securitization attempt remains unsuccessful.

Within the given period of time, also the representatives of ČEZ articulated several interesting statements on the issue. Petr Závodský, currently the Chairman of the Board of Directors of ČEZ, and a long-term employee of the Temelín NPP (1994–2006), gave an interview to Deník N (29.11.2018). In the interview, the journalist asked him what would happen if the final decision on the new reactor was delayed until 2025. Závodský answered:

⁷ Companies operating in the Czech Republic, part of whose business is nuclear energy.

“At the very least, we will lose control of future electricity prices. We will be dependent on future gas prices, because renewables in the Czech Republic will not cover our needs in the next decades. This is very unpleasant for the population, but even more so for large consumers, for industry. It is essential for them to plan electricity costs for years to come.”

In short, he claimed that abandoning the process leading to the construction of the reactor would endanger the energy security of the Czech Republic. However, he only demanded the preparation of the tender to proceed as quickly as possible and according to plan, which cannot be described as an extraordinary measure. Therefore, I do not label his speech as a securitisation attempt.

A similar speech (also without specific demands) was made by the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of ČEZ, Pavel Cyrani, in the program “Otázky Václava Moravce”⁸ on ČT (14.10.2018). He said: *“The worst scenario is that we do not build the power plant at all and spend the money on something else.”* According to him, this would endanger the energy security of the Czech Republic. It is clear from both speeches that ČEZ decided to adopt the role of a functional actor in this period.

However, it cannot be said that ČEZ's discourse was completely uniform in the given period. Although the majority of ČEZ shares on the stock market are owned by the Czech state, a smaller percentage is owned by other, private shareholders. A significant amount of them is often represented in the media by Michal Šnobl⁹. This group is partially critical of the construction. Its members fear that problems in the construction process will lead to financial destabilization of ČEZ and, therefore, to a stock price drop.

5.1.4 Czech NGOs

In December 2016, representatives of the environmental NGO Hnutí DUHA argued in the exact opposite way to ČEZ. In a statement for ČTK (11.12.2016), they claimed that the construction of a new reactor at the Dukovany NPP would not pay off financially, as a result of which electricity prices would rise sharply, which would endanger the Czech Republic's energy security. In consequence, they demanded the government to change the State energy policy. This can clearly be labelled as a securitisation attempt, because a

⁸ Václav Moravec's questions in English

⁹ ČEZ stakeholder, economist and advisor to the J&T investment group

specific extraordinary measure was demanded. Nevertheless, the attempt remains unsuccessful.

Almost exactly a year later, environmental NGOs repeated their demand (ČTK, 7.12.2018b). The association of environmental organizations Zelený Kruh (of which Hnutí DUHA is a part) called on the chairmen of government political parties (ANO and ČSSD) to change the State energy policy. Instead of pointing out to the possible disruption of energy security, however, they argued that the state's environmental security would be endangered. In their opinion, nuclear energy generates significant greenhouse gas emissions and also creates a problem in the form of radioactive waste. However, this securitization attempt also remains unsuccessful.

Very similar arguments as the ones articulated by Hnutí DUHA in 2016 were used by the environmental NGO Calla in its press release (26.3.2016). It as well claimed that the construction of a new reactor would jeopardize the Czech Republic's energy security in the future. However, there was no demand in their press release. I do not therefore consider it a securitization speech act.

5.1.5 Czech political representation

Representatives of the Czech Republic as well linked the construction of the planned reactor to security issues. However, unlike Austria, they have not argued that it was the environmental security that was at stake (ČTK, 7.7.2016).

On the other hand, they have emphasized threats of a different kind. On the public ČT, an episode of the “Události, komentáře”¹⁰ programme was broadcast on 20.6.2018. Among others, two former ministers of industry and trade took part in the debate: Martin Kuba (ODS) and Milan Urban (ČSSD). Although Kuba is a member of an opposition party and Urban is a member of a party forming the current government, they agreed on what were the security threats associated with the construction of the reactor. Both claimed that abandoning the plans would endanger the Czech Republic's energy security in the future. In addition, Kuba warned about Russia's possible influence on Czech political security, although he did not explicitly say that Rosatom should not get the contract (ČT, 20.6.2018).

¹⁰ News, comments in English

The then chairman of the “Zelení” party¹¹, Petr Štěpánek, also took part in the debate. He claimed (similarly to environmental NGOs) that another reactor would lead to a rapid increase in the price of electricity in the future, which would, in consequence, endanger the energy security of the Czech Republic (ČT, 20.6.2018). However, as can be seen further below, the Zelení party remains the only (at least somewhat relevant, albeit not parliamentary) Czech political party to oppose the planned reactor.

Kuba was the first but definitely not last politician to publicly articulate concerns about Russia’s negative influence. Just two days after his speech, on 22.6.2018, the Czech government issued a (initially secret) document in which it dealt with the project from the point of view of the political security of the Czech state. The document eventually leaked to the public.

One of the points of the text was the establishment of the so-called security group at the Ministry of Industry, which was to include representatives of the secret services and several ministries. According to the document, their task was to prepare a report that would assess the security aspects of the entire contract (Czech government, 2018). According to the weekly Respekt, this report was later created, demanding the exclusion of Russian and Chinese companies from the tender. However, as the weekly pointed out, the group's recommendations had no real consequences in the form of change of policy or strategy (Respekt, 15.5.2019).

From this time period, this was the securitization attempt with the most important implications for the future. Government representatives labelled the political security of the Czech Republic as a referent object, which could be jeopardised by the participation of Russian and Chinese companies in the tender. They therefore called for an extraordinary measure, namely the removal of these companies from the tender. Moreover, the whole securitization attempt shows signs of deviation from the standard political procedures, as the document was not intended for the public, who therefore lost the right to co-decide.

5.1.6 Summary of the period

During this time period, several securitization attempts were apparent. Firstly, I introduced Austria which sought to securitize the planned reactor as a threat to the country's

¹¹ The Green party in English; non-parliamentary

environmental security. However, this ended without the desired result (cancelling the planned tender).

Then I described the discourse of the relevant expert community, which could be divided into two main entities – SÚJB and BIS. However, none of them attempted to securitize, although they co-created the discourse and can therefore be referred to as functional actors.

Particularly interesting speeches could be observed in the case of ČEZ. These were made more important by the fact that majority of ČEZ is owned by the Czech state. This fact makes the company a much more important actor from the point of view of securitization theory (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 123). However, the speeches of company representatives cannot be described as securitization because they do not involve calls for special measures.

Next in line are NGOs, which surprisingly have not (by majority) chosen the environmental but energy security of the Czech Republic as a referent object. This can be explained by the fact that they wanted to counter ČEZ's and government's arguments, which have been articulated within the framework of energy security. However, their securitization attempts remain unsuccessful.

Regarding the Czech political representation, there can be seen the beginning of a discussion that will be increasingly important in the next two periods and the most dynamic in terms of discourse. It is the discussion on whether Russia and China should be excluded from the planned tender for security reasons. Although the first attempt to securitize these states did not succeed, the debate was far from being over.

Overall, this was the initiation phase, where actors defined and articulated their discourse, often without significant securitization attempts that would differ from standard political procedures. However, the debate was soon to intensify.

5.2 Second period: Intensification of discourse

The beginning of this period is circumscribed by the appointment of Jaroslav Míl¹² as the Government Plenipotentiary for Nuclear Energy in January 2019 (ČTK, 7.1.2019). In few weeks, Míl proved he intended to be more active than his predecessor, Ján Štuller, and stated that he would do everything in his power to sign the relevant agreements with ČEZ

¹² Former Chairman of the Board of Directors and CEO of ČEZ (2000 to 2003)

and then finish the tender by 2024 at the latest. At the same time, he stated that he did not want to exclude either the political opposition or ČEZ's minority shareholders from the debate (ČTK, 21.2.2019).

Moreover, on 18.2.2019 the Ministry of Industry and Trade changed the name of the Standing Committee for Nuclear Energy to the Standing Committee for New Nuclear Build (MPO, 8.4.2019). This was to imply that the whole process leading to the construction of the reactor was to be accelerated. In consequence of these events, the public debate has changed for the months to come.

Although this section is shorter in time, a comparable number of speeches was articulated during it. Thus, it is clear that the discourse has generally intensified.

5.2.1 Foreign actors

From the end of August to October 2019 (i.e. around Austrian legislative elections), Austrian representatives articulated several important speeches; also because, among other things, the planned nuclear unit in Dukovany NPP received a positive EIA on 30.8.2019.

"It is completely inconceivable that new nuclear reactors can still be built today. A nuclear power plant is not the technology of the future, it is not clean, it is not climate-friendly, it is not cheap and, above all, it is dangerous," said former Austrian Minister of the Environment Elisabeth Köstinger (ČTK, 30.8.2019).

Köstinger and the Deputy Governor of Lower Austria, Stephan Pernkopf, subsequently stated that they did not rule out a lawsuit against the Czech Republic at the EU level (ČTK, 1.9.2019). Eventually, the European Commission was addressed by the Austrian federal state of Upper Austria with a request to examine the Czech Republic's plans to expand a NPP (ČTK, 22.10.2019).

Even at the state level, the Austrian struggle against Czech NPPs have continued. Before the elections, which took place on 28.9.2019, both parties of the future coalition (the ÖVP and Die grüne Alternative parties) mentioned the Czech reactors as a threat (ČTK 4.9.2019 and 28.9.2019). After the election, they formed a government, thus preserving the Austrian discourse.

To summarize, Austrians have maintained the overall direction of their discourse. Only its intensity has increased as they took a real step towards achieving their goal – they

complained to the EU. Nevertheless, they have not achieved the desired extraordinary measure – the cancellation of the Czech tender for a new reactor unit. Thus, their securitization efforts were unsuccessful. Moreover, their efforts can be attributed to the election campaign and it is questionable whether they would articulate such sharp statements outside the election period.

5.2.2 Expert community

Energy and/or security experts have generally spoken much more often about the construction of the new reactor. For example, Vladimír Wagner from the Nuclear Physics Institute of the CAS spoke on the possibility of not building the reactor (ČTK, 23.10.2019):

“It is very likely that it will not really be possible to import electricity from anywhere at a time when the sun is not shining and the wind is not blowing, and prices may rise dramatically. At the same time, however, at a time ideal for wind and solar energy production, Germany will have large surpluses. New photovoltaic and wind sources intended for grid production will thus hardly contribute to solving our situation.”

Moreover, ČEPS¹³ issued a report called “Evaluation of the source adequacy of the electricity infrastructure of the Czech Republic until 2040”. The report outlined two future scenarios in which no new reactor would be built (2019, p. 12–26). Chairman of the Board of ČEPS Martin Durčák concluded (MPO, 21.10.2019):

“The resulting balance for the Czech Republic is significantly in deficit in both scenarios, so from 2030 the Czech Republic would gradually begin to become dependent on electricity imports from abroad. Due to the decommissioning of conventional sources, there would be a fundamental change in the balance compared to the current situation, when we export electricity.”

In other words, ČEPS claimed: In case no reactors are built, the energy security of the Czech Republic will be endangered.

SÚJB mentioned the situation from a similar perspective. In its National Report for 2019, it stated (2019, p. 139):

¹³ A transmission system operator of the Czech Republic, owned by the state

“Regarding the construction of new nuclear power plants on the territory of the Czech Republic in accordance with the strategic assignment defined in the State Energy Concept, it is desirable to immediately begin preparations for the location and construction of one nuclear power unit in the Czech Republic: one unit at the Temelín NPP and one unit at the Dukovany NPP.”

The report therefore implied that cancelling the future construction would be something undesirable that would endanger the energy security of the Czech Republic.

In its Annual Report for 2018 (2019, p. 15–16) BIS stated:

“The identification and assessment of risks that might arise from links of economic entities active in the Czech Republic to foreign powers therefore became an important topic. It was confirmed that the less democratic system there is in the country, from which the capital originates, the higher the risk of misuse of resources for foreign-political goals. Authoritarian countries are by their nature more successful in advocating their influence in private companies more effectively. By using a range of formal and informal measures, they are able to force these companies to suppress their own economic interests and give priority to state political, military or intelligence goals when needed. These goals can be in conflict with the interests of the Czech Republic e.g. in the area of the protection of key technologies or the information and energy security.”

It is evident that when BIS mentioned “authoritarian countries”, it meant Russia and China in particular. In essence, the report followed up on the reports from previous years, which I dealt with in the previous section (5.1.2). However, unlike in previous years, this statement sounds much more urgent. Moreover, it is longer. This reflects the increase in the intensity of the debate and the overall escalation of it. However, BIS still remains "only" a functional actor. Its speech is informational and does not constitute a speech act.

The statements by Nuclear Physics Institute of the CAS, ČEPS and SÚJB all imply the same thing: The energy security of the Czech Republic will be endangered if new reactors are not built. Thus, like BIS, these organizations are in the role of a functional actor. Their statements cannot be called speech acts, as they lack any call for extraordinary measures. In result, nevertheless, they significantly influence the overall debate on this topic, as securitizing actors such as politicians or NGOs draw on their conclusions.

5.2.3 Czech NGOs

The Association of Environmental NGOs “Zelený kruh” issued a statement on 18.3.2019, in which it opposed the construction of the planned reactor. Its representatives claimed that the construction posed an economic risk and its completion would jeopardise the energy security of the Czech Republic. Therefore, they continued their securitisation efforts in the same way as in the previous time period.

More interesting from the point of view of discourse is the reaction by Edvard Sequens from Calla, who responded to the ČPES report mentioned in the previous section (5.2.2). He said that ČEPS was operating with extreme scenarios and in fact there was no need to worry about abandoning the process of construction. This is therefore a case of desecurization and an effort to keep the topic out of the security rhetoric (solarninovinky.cz, 1.11.2019).

Compared to the previous section (5.1.4), environmental NGOs have been less active, which is a difference compared to other actors, whose discourse has intensified. There are two possible explanations for this: First, it is possible that the more certain the construction of the new reactor became, the less it was worth focusing on this subject. Rather, they have preferred to focus on things that they still could affect. The second explanation is that the time period examined is shorter, and so NGOs have articulated less statements. However, neither of these two explanations can be considered certain. Nevertheless, it is clear that the discourse of NGOs has not developed significantly in the given period.

5.2.4 Czech political representation

The Czech political representation, specifically government officials, have continued to securitize the planned reactor, choosing the energy security of the Czech Republic as a referent object. For example, just a few weeks after his appointment as the Government Plenipotentiary for Nuclear Energy, Jaroslav Míl said (ČTK, 21.2.2019): *"The aim of the (planned) contract is to ensure energy security."*

A very interesting statement was articulated by Prime Minister Andrej Babiš in October 2019. At a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on European Affairs, he said that the Czech Republic must enforce the construction of new nuclear units, even if it would have to violate European law while doing so. According to him, failure to finish the tender could jeopardize the country's energy security (ČTK, 16.10.2019).

This was a call for far-reaching extraordinary measures. Babiš went so far as to promote violations of EU laws in order to protect the energy security of the Czech Republic. Moreover, it was a call for a complete violation of ordinary political procedures. It therefore forms a typical case of a securitization attempt. However, it has not been successful so far, because the Czech Republic has not yet violated EU laws (at least on this topic).

As well as the debate on ensuring the energy security of the Czech Republic, the debate on the possible involvement of Russia and China in the forthcoming tender has intensified. According to Deník N (26.4.2019), Jaroslav Míl wanted to reverse the conclusions of the report prepared by the security group at the Ministry of Industry (mentioned in section 5.1.5) regarding the exclusion of Russia and China from the tender. He thus proposed desecurization of the involvement of the authoritarian regimes as he sought to keep the debate at the economic, not the security level. This political pressure, which certainly deviated from standard political procedures, was later addressed by the Senate (Deník N, 29.4.2019).

It is clear from this episode that political tensions over the involvement of Russia and China have escalated. Although there has been no clear securitization attempt in this regard during this period, this was soon to change.

5.2.5 Summary of the period

During this period, Austria's discourse has remained essentially unchanged, although it has intensified. The country has articulated the same topics as in the past. The intensity of its discourse increased especially in the period around the legislative elections in the period from August to October 2019. This could be related to the campaign before the elections, when the public debate in democratic countries always intensifies.

Interestingly, no ČEZ's statement could be found that would include at least a hint of a securitization related discourse. However, this can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that ČEZ is a majority state-owned company and its role as a securitizing actor can therefore be represented by the government. After all, ČEZ takes over the opinions and views of the government quite often.

The essence of the discourse of the expert community has not changed, it has only become sharper. Dana Drábová and SÚJB were joined by other functional actors with a similar

discourse (Nuclear Physics Institute of the CAS and ČEPS). The BIS has also maintained a similar discourse. It could be said that in the case of the expert community, a certain increase in the intensity of their communication could be observed. This can be explained by the fact that the political representation dealt with the topics articulated by them (possible threats from China and Russia and energy security) relatively intensively. Therefore, experts may have felt that politicians took their words seriously. This would make sense especially in comparison with the blunter discourse of NGOs, whose articulated topics were not so intensively addressed by politicians.

The discourse of NGOs has become blunter. It is possible that it is caused by the division of the analysed material, when each time period is shorter than the preceding one. In my opinion, however, the reason is different. It became clear to environmental NGOs that the tender would continue, so they stopped concentrating on stopping it when it was obviously almost impossible.

The discourse within the Czech political representation has changed the most. First, the securitization of energy security has intensified significantly, escalating to the Prime Minister's statement that he intended to build the reactor, even if it was to violate EU law.

Second, the dispute over the involvement of Russia and China has escalated. There was a visible trend within which the opposition (in the Senate) demanded the government to transparently remove both countries from the tender, which the government refused to do. On the contrary, it has pressured experts to withdraw their warnings about the authoritarian regimes. This trend is to become the most pressing point of contention in the last period examined.

In general, the positions of the individual actors have further been defined during this phase. Above all, however, it has become clear which points of contention will be the most important in the future and which topics, on the contrary, have become blunter and the securitization attempts associated with them are likely to never be successful.

5.3 Third period: An attempt to securitize is successful for the first time

The beginning of this period falls in March and April 2020. On 25.3.2020, ČEZ applied to SÚJB for permission to build a new nuclear reactor at the Dukovany NPP site (ČEZ, 25.2.2020). A few weeks later it received the permission (SÚJB, 17.4.2020). The same month, the government approved two out of three contracts with ČEZ on the fifth unit of

Dukovany. Among other things, they also agreed that the price of electricity would be based on the costs of building the nuclear unit plus a reasonable profit, not on market electricity prices. Thus, the state basically guaranteed the purchase prices of electricity to ČEZ. This step was crucial since the state had resisted to agree on this for many years (ČTK, 27.4.2020).

This development meant that the construction of the new reactor became practically certain. Moreover, it provided another impetus for public debate, which was soon to be changed significantly. However, several things have delayed this transformation. First, the COVID-19 pandemic has continued. Information about it have occupied most of the public sphere. Then began the summer and holiday season. In September, another wave of the disease broke out in the Czech Republic. Therefore, this period has been relatively quiet. The real information storm began when the situation around the pandemic calmed down a bit in November. The publication of the BIS Annual Report for 2019, which is discussed in more detail in the sections below, can be considered the starting point of this storm.

Moreover, concerns about stable energy supplies were to give rise to the first and only successful securitization within this analysis.

5.3.1 Foreign actors

Austria reacted negatively to ČEZ's agreement with the state. The FPÖ opposition party was particularly critical (ČTK, 29.7.2020).

This was the only relevant statement in that period. This may be due to the pandemic of COVID-19, as a result of which the Austrian state apparatus has dealt with other topics. On the other hand, it also confirms my theory: The more certain the construction became, the less critical were the voices opposing it, because they could no longer reverse the Czech decision. Therefore, they were looking for another approach.

5.3.2 Expert community

Dana Drábová, head of SÚJB, decided for the first time to seriously discuss the project from the point of view of political security. She was probably prompted to do so by the BIS report that had a strong response in political representation. I deal with the BIS report itself below in this section. She told Deník N (3.12.2020):

“Nuclear security is not the only security that will need to be considered when choosing the best offer. (...) The second very important thing is for us to sign a contract with a partner who recognizes law enforcement and is able to meet it. That is, the enforceability of the obligations to which it is subscribed in that contract. Probably, undemocratic regimes cannot ensure that.”

The BIS secret information service issued its annual report on 10.11.2020. It dealt much more extensively than usual with the topic of protection of major economic interests. In particular, the BIS report states (2020, p. 5):

“In 2019, the BIS paid increased attention to phenomena threatening strategic projects, whose importance for the security of the Czech Republic reached beyond the scope of the country’s major economic interests. These projects concerned mainly energy and information and communication technology.”

And it continues (p. 6):

“The most substantial threat common to all monitored cases was the potential participation of problematic entities with the capability as well as motivation to abuse their position in the projects to reach their own particular interests or act in the interest of third parties, e.g. foreign powers, against the interests of the Czech Republic. (...) the risks can also include possible dependency on the supplier after the end of the project, leading to undesirable consequences (vendor lock-in). The problematic entities (...) are considered to predominantly originate from countries, where state administration has the potential to assert its foreign-political aims, irrespective of the economic interests of local companies, even if they are in private hands. (...) The investor being from an authoritarian state is one of the important factors in the risk-level assessment of particular investments.”

The BIS report shows how important this civilian counterintelligence service is as a functional actor. Although BIS again did not explicitly mention any country in the report, the overall meaning of the text was much clearer than in previous research periods of this Master’s thesis. Moreover, the Secret Service devoted much more attention to the whole affair than before. As a result, the report significantly influenced and intensified the debate focused on the political security side of the construction of the new reactor in Dukovany. This could also be seen in the change in the SÚJB discourse, whose head Dana Drábová seriously dealt with the political aspects for the first time. Moreover, a lot of other actors mentioned below in this section (5.3) reacted to the BIS report many times.

5.3.3 Czech companies and industrial sector associations

On 26.11.2020, the head of ČEZ, Daniel Beneš, appeared on the ČT's Interview ČT24 programme. He was invited, inter alia, in connection with the BIS report. It followed from his speech that from the point of view of ČEZ, he refused to deal with the political security of the project. He claimed that from the point of view of economic rentability, neither China nor Russia should be excluded from the tender. Furthermore, he emphasized that he did not see an economic threat in their possible participation. On the contrary, he saw a threat in not building a new reactor, which, according to him, would endanger the energy security of the Czech Republic (ČT, 26.11.2020).

ČEZ reaffirmed its position in a document obtained by journalists from Hospodářské noviny. In it, the company pointed out that it could not exclude anyone from the tender, that this must be done by political representation (iHNed.cz, 2.12.2020). However, ČEZ was not completely united on the issue. The group of minority shareholders with an alternative opinion has long been represented by the already mentioned Michal Šnobl. He mentioned in the given period that he did not agree with the construction and demanded that it be stopped (ČT, 18.5.2020).

Thus, on the one hand, ČEZ has completely refused to deal with the project from the point of view of political security, but on the other hand, it has taken on the role of a functional actor when it drew attention to the consequences of a possible cancellation of the tender for the completion of the power plant. However, it has not articulated any securitization speech act on this topic during the given period of time and thus remains a functional actor.

5.3.4 Czech NGOs

The already mentioned association of environmental organizations "Zelený kruh" released two press releases in May 2020, which dealt with the planned reactor from the point of view of energy security. "Zelený kruh" criticized the guaranteeing of electricity purchase prices to ČEZ and claimed that the unprofitable project of the new Dukovany NPP unit would endanger the Czech Republic's energy security in the future (Zelený kruh, 19.5.2020 and 28.5.2020).

The BIS report was analysed in detail and interpreted by the non-governmental think-tank “Evropské hodnoty”¹⁴. As the NGO’s report from December 2020 concluded, BIS really do think that if Russia and China are allowed to join the tender, Czech Republic's political security will be negatively affected. The think-tank further implied that this should result in the exclusion of these countries from the tender (Evropské hodnoty, 2020, p. 4). A public demonstration of civic initiatives, which took place a few weeks earlier and was attended by about 20 people, had the same demand as this think-tank (ČTK, 25.11.2020).

In the case of environmental NGOs, it is clear that the trend observed in the previous section (5.2.3) has continued. They have given up calls for any extraordinary measures, only continuing with a general critique of nuclear energy. Energy security, which was allegedly threatened by too expensive atomic energy, still served as their main referent object. Thus, environmental NGOs have completely moved from the role of a securitizing actor to the role of a functional actor.

Regarding the think-tank, it can be said that the situation is to some extent the opposite. While the BIS cannot (or at least should not) have the role of a securitizing actor, this restriction did not apply to an NGO that interpreted its conclusions. “Evropské hodnoty” has therefore decided to take on the role of a securitizing actor and, based on the BIS annual report, identify the political security of the Czech Republic as a referent object for the protection of which they demanded an extraordinary measure: excluding Russia and China from the tender.

5.3.5 Czech political representation

First, (in the chronological order I promised to keep), however, follows a description of what happened before the BIS report was issued, because during this time period, excluding Russia and China from the tender was not the only securitisation attempt by the political representation.

To be more specific, concerns about energy security forced the government to accept ČEZ's condition, which it had long rejected: a guarantee of the purchase price of electricity from the new reactor (ČTK, 27.4.2020). The Minister of Industry and Trade Karel Havlíček (for ANO) said for (iHNed.cz, 27.4.2020):

¹⁴ European Values in English

“We need to be self-sufficient in terms of energy supply, while addressing the abandonment of coal and the EU’s requirement for carbon neutrality. The current situation around coronavirus also shows that self-sufficiency and security issues are primarily our issues, we have to rely mainly on ourselves. That’s why we need new nuclear resources. That is why we are currently dealing with Dukovany II.”

When approving the contracts with ČEZ, the government (More precisely the Ministry of Industry and Trade) also published a draft law on the transition to low-carbon energy, which would, among other things, provide a legal framework for the future purchases of electricity from ČEZ.

The proposal also included an explanatory memorandum, which further revealed why the state decided to accept ČEZ’s (previously rejected) condition. This report defined several energy industry development scenarios based on data and information provided to the government by experts in the past. The explanatory memorandum concluded that the only scenario in which the energy security of the Czech Republic would be reliably ensured were the ones that included the construction of a new reactor unit at the Dukovany NPP (MPO, 2020, p. 11–33).

When enforcing contracts with ČEZ and the law on electricity purchase prices, the government has taken several measures that deviated from standard democratic political process. As pointed out by Deník N (19.5.2020), but also by other media, the government, for example, has not discussed draft agreements with the opposition, contrary to promises from the past (see section 5.1.5). For example, members of opposition were not addressed in the Standing Committee for New Nuclear Build, in which the opposition parties had five representatives. Nevertheless, a discussion should have taken place when such an important matter was being discussed, as the new reactor was also to be addressed by the following governments. Among other things, this lack of transparency was made possible by the fact that the country was in a state of emergency at the time because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Moreover, the government itself has not been allowed to comment fully on the draft law. It has been discussed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade in a special regime in the government and in the Parliament, without expert discussion and without amendments being able to be attached to the proposal. The discussion on the law was limited to only 13 days and the group of those who could influence it was limited to the Ministry of Justice,

Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, the Head of the Office of the Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Environment (Deník N, 20.5.2020).

Many members of the government have disliked this (Deník N, 15.6.2020). Moreover, the opposition demanded the contracts to be officially published before signing (ČTK, 20.6.2020). However, this have not delayed the whole process. At the end of July, the government approved the model for financing the reactor unit in Dukovany (ČTK, 20.7.2020a) and a few days later signed agreements with ČEZ (ČTK, 29.7.2020).

The described approach of the government (and especially of the Ministry of Industry and Trade) as a securitizing actor can be understood as the first successful case of securitization within this thesis. The energy security of the Czech Republic and its citizens as a referent object was labelled as threatened and subsequently used to enforce certain extraordinary measures (guarantee of the purchase price of electricity for ČEZ). What is more, as a direct result, the public lost some of its influence in politics, as much of the political representation and experts were prevented from intervening in the preparation and enforcement of these extraordinary measures. This is one of the distinctive features of securitization (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 2005, p. 39).

As Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde further explain the conditions of the process of securitisation (2005, p. 40): *“A security problem is to be seen as so serious that it should be removed from the normal process of political negotiation and compromise; the priority decision on its solution should be entrusted exclusively to the highest political elites.”*

After careful consideration, taking into account section 2, I came to the conclusion that the above case really fulfils all the necessary features of a successful securitization. This is the only successful attempt within this Master’s thesis. In the given period of time, however, there was another significant attempt to securitize, namely to exclude Russia and China from the tender. I now turn to that in more detail.

Some important information in this regard came before signing the agreements with ČEZ and approving the related law. The government allegedly approved a secret document that would exclude Russia and China from the planned tender in advance. A source related to the government, who did not want to be named, told Deník N (17.5.2020): *“There are security related conditions that should guarantee that someone who would be a strategic*

risk will not be awarded the contract. It's easy, it's Russia and China.” However, the government have not officially endorsed the document.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security therefore recommended a few weeks later that the government should officially exclude applicants from countries that do not respect the sovereignty of the Czech Republic and its interests in the Dukovany affair (ČTK, 9.6.2020). In this context, the Committee drew attention to the activities of Russia and China. Subsequently, the opposition parties in the Chamber of Deputies came up with essentially the same demand (ČTK, 30.6.2020).

Then the opposition's pressure on the government eased for a few months, only to return with even greater intensity after the publication of the aforementioned BIS report.

“It is simply scandalous that the deputies in the Security Committee would not have a chance to discuss whether the government takes sufficient account of security risks in the preparation of the tender,” said the chairman of the Pirate party, Ivan Bartoš. The opposition made a statement at a joint press conference that day about that it wanted to discuss the low-carbon law, which guarantees the electricity purchase prices, at the Security Committee of the Chamber of Deputies (ČTK, 19.11.2020a). However, the government did not comply with this request and subsequently started to discuss the law in the Chamber (ČTK, 20.11.2020).

In the Chamber of Deputies, the members of the opposition then tried to push for the law to directly include a security guarantee that Russia and China would not participate in the tender. For example, MP Helena Langšádlová (TOP 09) noted that *“ČEZ wants to build a new reactor in Dukovany with the help of a safety exception in the Public Procurement Act.”* (ČTK, 20.11.2020). However, a few days later, the Chamber of Deputies also completed the second round of deliberations on the law and put it into final reading without reflecting the security related demands of the opposition (ČTK, 26.11.2020).

The Senate was also active on the issue. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security claimed that PM Andrej Babiš acted in violation of the law when he refused to provide the Committee with information on the security of the tender for the new reactor in the Dukovany NPP. The Committee called on the government to submit a tender dossier to it by 9.12.2020, incorporating security guarantees (ČTK, 18.11.2020)

“It is undesirable for companies from states that treat NATO countries as hostile or whose representatives are on the EU sanctions list to be involved in the strategic construction of a nuclear power plant,” the committee said in a resolution (ibid.).

The Senate Committee reiterated the request about a month later (ČTK, 15.12.2020), and another two days later the Senate adopted a resolution stating (ČTK, 17.12.2020):

“The Senate calls on the Czech government not to invite candidates from the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, i.e. from countries can be described as a security threat in accordance with the strategic documents of the state.”

To be fair, the participation of Russia and China was also addressed by governmental institutions. A working group at the Ministry of the Interior, which consists of representatives of the secret services, the National Office for Cyber and Information Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recommended in a 17-page document to the government to exclude both countries from the tender in advance. Although the text did not mention specific companies or countries considered risky, it referred to the 2018 resolution of the government (see section 5.1.5). Unfortunately, the document was never fully published (ČTK, 19.11.2020b). The exclusion of China and Russia from the tender in advance was later supported by Foreign Minister Tomáš Petříček (ČSSD) (ČTK, 2.12.2020).

The pressure from all the mentioned politicians had only one result so far: At the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on 9.12.2020, Andrej Babiš (ANO) admitted that he may be willing to exclude Russia and China from the tender in advance (Deník N, 9.12.2020). Relatively interesting (and not yet mentioned) in this regard was the position of President Miloš Zeman, who constantly opposes the view that Russia or China might pose a danger (ČTK, 20.12.2020).

I do not consider the story of the effort to exclude Russia and China from the tender to be a successful securitization (at least for now). Many politicians (the Opposition in the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, some ministries, or the Foreign Minister Tomáš Petříček himself) have taken on the role of a securitizing actor here. They have identified the political security of the Czech Republic as a referent object, which could be endangered by the participation of Russia and China in the tender for the construction of a new unit at the Dukovany NPP. To protect political security, they have demanded the adoption of an

extraordinary measure that would result in a deviation from the standard processes (exclusion of these two potential bidders).

However, the government has completely refused to reflect on their efforts, at least officially. I do not consider it relevant that perhaps (according to the media) the government has issued some secret documents that made it impossible for Russia and China to participate in the future tender. For logical reasons (I do not have access to these documents), I cannot prove this information. I equally do not consider the statement of Andrej Babiš (ANO) from 9.12.2020 (that he is willing to exclude both countries from the tender) a successful securitization, as this is not a binding statement. Speech acts aimed at excluding Russia and China from the tender therefore remain unsuccessful for the time being.

5.3.6 Summary of the period

This was the last period under examination. Although the shortest in time, by far the most relevant events and speeches took place.

The Austrian discourse has become blunter. This could be due to three things, or a combination of them: First, the coronavirus pandemic has kept Austrian officials completely busy. Second, the period under study was too short for the Austrians to react to the situation in the Czech Republic. Third, it is possible that they have considered the construction of the reactor inevitable, and therefore it was not worth wasting too much effort to stop it. In any case, in this section they only have the role of a weak functional actor.

On the contrary, the expert community has strengthened the importance of its role as a functional actor. This was particularly evident in the case of the BIS, whose annual report prompted politicians to intensively discuss the exclusion of Russia and China from the tender.

ČEZ has made great efforts to strengthen its role as a functional actor, emphasizing the protection of the Czech Republic's energy security. In this way, the company has probably tried to gain a better position in negotiations with the state and convince the public of the need to build a new reactor.

On the contrary, environmental NGOs, as a functional actor, have weakened and have already completely resigned themselves to the role of a securitizing actor. Their statements against the planned reactor had little to no effect.

The most interesting development so far can be seen in the extra-long section 5.3.5 regarding political representation. I described the first and only successful attempt of securitization (regarding this thesis), when the energy security of the Czech Republic was used as a referent object securitized by the government to enforce extraordinary measures (contracts with CEZ, law on guaranteed electricity purchase prices) under conditions, which deviated from standard political process (exclusion of much of the political representation from the debate; the decision was made during the state of emergency).

On the other hand, the securitization of the participation of Russia and China in the tender (which should allegedly endanger the political security of the Czech Republic) failed despite a significant effort. However, since the relevant discussion will continue to take place in 2021, i.e. after the end of the period under research, it is possible that this securitization will eventually become successful.

5.4 Conclusion: answering research questions

In this section I answered all the research questions I defined in section 4.3. Moreover, I confirmed or refuted all the hypotheses associated with them. If any of the hypotheses cannot be confirmed or refuted, I mentioned why.

5.4.1 RQ1

Can patterns of manipulation by certain interest groups, competing for influence over the reactor construction process, be found in the speech acts related to it?

H1 proved to be true, because in the discourse analysis devoted to the topic of the planned reactor at the Dukovany NPP, many speech acts appeared, which were articulated by many actors. Equally, **H2** turned out to be true, as some of these actors (mainly Austria, environmental NGOs and the Czech political representation) tried to securitize the topic in a sense of the Copenhagen School of IR. I also confirmed **H3** in the final part of the research (section 5.3.5), as the Czech political representation managed to successfully securitize the new reactor and enforce extraordinary measures (contracts with ČEZ and law on guaranteed electricity purchase prices) that deviated from standard democratic

procedures. The government justified the measures by alleged threats to the Czech Republic's energy security. To answer the RQ1 itself: Yes, certain patterns of manipulation were found.

5.4.2 RQ2

In case H2 is proven, who are these securitizing actors?

Since H2 was proven, I proceed with H4–8. Securitization speech acts were articulated by a foreign state, Austria in particular. Although in sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 the speeches of the local political representation were relatively sharp, this sharpness had a decreasing trend and in the last section 5.3.1 Austria found itself in the role of a functional actor. None of its speech acts were successful. Nonetheless, **H4** was proven.

On the other hand, **H5** could not be confirmed because the expert community was proven to be a functional, not a securitizing actor.

H6 was proven, although the main company analysed (ČEZ) remained in the role of a functional actor. However, the securitizing actor was the Alliance of Czech Suppliers for Nuclear Power Plants from section 5.1.3 that unsuccessfully attempted to securitize.

There were many securitizing NGOs, especially environmental ones. **H7** was therefore confirmed. However, as their attempts at securitization have always failed, their discourse gradually became blunter, and in section 5.3.4 they eventually became a functional actor.

The political representation (**H8**) was the most active securitizing actor. Its attempts concerned two levels: the exclusion of Russia and China from the tender due to concerns about the political security of the Czech Republic (opposition parties unsuccessfully tried to securitise this) and the accelerated implementation of the reactor construction, which was being (successfully) securitised by the government (section 5.3.5).

5.4.3 RQ3

Since it was possible to confirm H2, H4, H6, H7 and H8, I move on to the description of **H9**. It can equally be confirmed, because the goal of some actors was really to prevent the tender from taking place. More specifically, these actors were Austria and environmental NGOs.

Identically, **H10** was confirmed, because the construction of the reactor was sought by the political representation and the mentioned Alliance of Czech Suppliers for Nuclear Power

Plants. Likewise, **H11** was proved, because the political opposition and to a lesser extent the government tried to influence the future tender (elimination of Russia and China). This could be seen mainly in section 5.3.5.

5.4.4 RQ4

H12 could not be proved, and therefore even RQ4 cannot be answered. Its incorporation into the methodology framework was a mistake I made before fully understanding how securitization theory works. As it only deals with the social construction of threats, nothing like "real security risks" can be examined within it, and an attempt to do so would not fall within the scope of this thesis.

5.4.5 RQ5

Since H12 could not be proved, **H13** could not be proved either, and RQ5 could not be answered.

5.4.6 RQ6

I can't confirm **H14** or **H15**, so **H16** must be true. I honestly did not even expect to be able to answer the question of the overall effects on the Czech Republic. This RQ is rather a call for further research, which, if it takes place in a few years, can possibly answer it. At present, it is too early to make any conclusions about H14 and H15.

5.4.7 RQ7

H17 turned out to be true, so I can't confirm **H18**. In general, the discourse remained in many ways similar to that of the 1990s and early 2000s. To put it simply, Austria and environmental NGOs were still fighting against nuclear energy, while the Czech political representation and ČEZ were supporting its development. However, the main difference was the pressure to exclude Russia and China from the tender, which I describe in detail in sections 5.2.4 and 5.3.5.

6 Conclusion

The aim of this Master's thesis was to examine the speech acts that have appeared in the public sphere of the Czech Republic during approximately the last five years, concerning the securitization of the project to build a new reactor at the existing Dukovany NPP.

I first introduced the theoretical framework of this thesis. I explained the theory of securitization as understood by its founders from the Copenhagen School of IR (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde). Subsequently, I also presented some of its critiques (Thierry Balzacq and Matt McDonald). At the end of the theoretical section, I introduced the three areas of security that were most important for this thesis: environmental security, political security and energy security. It turned out that a lot of literature on the subject exist. Thus, several times, in order to maintain a reasonable length of the Master's thesis, I proceeded to simply refer to certain books as a whole instead of mentioning their specific parts.

This was followed by a relatively brief description of the history of discourse on nuclear energy in the Czech Republic. After writing this history of discourse and analysing the current discourse in the empirical part, I came to an interesting conclusion: The discourse on nuclear energy in the Czech Republic has changed little since 1990. The same securitizing actors still articulate the same topics and use similar arguments. Neither functional actors nor referent objects changed significantly. In general, the only significant change was the debate over the exclusion of Russia and China from the upcoming reactor tender. It could not be found before 2015, and after 2015, on the contrary, this topic became one of the main ones.

Subsequently, I introduced the methodology that determined the form of the empirical section of this thesis. In it, I (among other things) set out several research questions and hypotheses. Unfortunately, it turned out that compared to the Master's thesis project, I had to modify them quite significantly. Their erroneous initial determination was caused by insufficient knowledge of the securitization theory. I have realised that several hypotheses about "real threats" would certainly turn out to be false, which was subsequently confirmed. In order to provide useful research conclusions, I have therefore developed several new research questions and related hypotheses. I have focused on their goal being to capture the securitization discourse of the relevant actors.

Finally, I performed the discourse analysis itself. Within the theory of securitization, I applied a critical analysis of discourse to examine the speech acts associated with the planned reactor at the Dukovany NPP. The more general aim of this approach was, in the words of Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (2005, p. 243) to “*draw attention to the responsibility that politicians, analysts, agitators or lobbyists voluntarily impose on themselves when opening up the security discourse.*”

And now the most interesting thing: the conclusions of my research. The analysis itself showed that there were many speech acts in the Czech public sphere, which aimed to adopt extraordinary measures in connection with the planned construction of the reactor. However, only one was successful. The main securitizing actors were:

- representatives of Austria,
- Czech environmental NGOs,
- Czech governmental representatives, and
- Czech political opposition.

Representatives of Austria and Czech environmental NGOs have two things in common: First, they oppose the construction of the new reactor. Second, their discourse became increasingly blunt as it became clear that the reactor would be built. Although this finding may be a mere correlation, not a causality (blunting may have been caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, for example), it does not change the most important consequence of this fact: Their securitization efforts have failed. On the other hand, there was a detail in which the discourse of the two actors differed. While Austrian officials have argued only on the basis of environmental security, Czech environmental NGOs have mainly used the energy security framework. In the case of Austria, the reason is clear: The rejection of nuclear energy as an environmental threat can be considered part of their culture and ideology. In the case of Czech environmental NGOs, the tendency to articulate energy security can be explained by the fact that many other actors, to whose discourse these NGOs reacted, argued in this way, which, in result, influenced the discourse of Czech environmental NGOs.

Equally, the Czech government and the opposition had two things in common: First, they both support the construction of the new reactor. Second, their discourse became sharper as it became clear that the reactor would be built. Here (unlike in the case of Austria and NGOs) I managed to prove that there was a causality between time and the sharpness of

the discourse, because the actors were responding to important procedural events related to the construction, on the basis of which their discourse was being gradually sharpened. On the other hand, it is again true that the discourse of the two actors differed in one basic matter: The speech acts of the government officials have mainly concerned the energy security of the Czech Republic. According to them, it would be endangered by the failure to implement the tender for the construction of the reactor. The political opposition then have emphasized mainly the political security aspect of the construction of the reactor. According to them, the political security of the Czech Republic would be disrupted by the possible participation of companies from Russia and China in the mentioned tender. It is important to add that three important functional actors have played an important role in the securitization efforts of the government and the opposition: ČEZ, SÚJB and BIS.

While the opposition's securitization efforts have (so far) failed, government officials were the only actors within the research to successfully securitize. They were able to enforce two important special measures: the contracts with CEZ and the law on guaranteed electricity purchase prices. In doing so, they took steps that deviated from the standard democratic process. Their argument can be summarized as follows: If we do not build the reactor quickly, the energy security of the Czech Republic will be significantly disrupted in the future.

In the previous paragraph, the two words "so far" in parentheses are important. Perhaps the most obvious conclusion of this thesis is that the securitization efforts associated with the construction of the new unit at the Dukovany NPP are far from being over. On the contrary, they have only just begun. Therefore, I see a call for further research here, which can take place in a few years, once the winner of a likely future tender has been selected.

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
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List of appendices

Appendix A

Czech mix of main sources used in electricity production in 2019 (in TWh)



Source: IEA, 2020, available at: <https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics?country=CZECH&fuel=Electricity%20and%20heat&indicator=ElecGenByFuel>

Appendix B

NPP in the Czech Republic, number of reactors and their installed capacity

Name of NPP	Reactors	Total installed capacity
Dukovany	four VVER 440/213 (510 MW)	2040 MW
Temelín	two VVER 1000 (V 320, 1125 MW)	2250 MW

Source: ČEZ, 2020, available at: <https://www.cez.cz/cs/o-cez/vyrobni-zdroje/jaderna-energetika/jaderna-energetika-v-ceske-republice/edu/technologie-a-zabezpeceni> ; and at: <https://www.cez.cz/cs/o-cez/vyrobni-zdroje/jaderna-energetika/jaderna-energetika-v-ceske-republice/ete>

Appendix C

Search method on energyhub.eu

Search

Enter the search text <input type="text" value="dukovany"/>	Date range <input type="text" value="01-08-2015 00:00 - 22-12-2020 23:59"/>	Language <input type="text" value="cz"/>	Order <input type="text" value="By date descending"/>		
Categories					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Novinky <input type="checkbox"/> Témata pod Lupou	<input type="checkbox"/> PRO ENERGY Magazin <input type="checkbox"/> PR články	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ČTK			
Tags					
<input type="checkbox"/> AKU-BAT <input type="checkbox"/> automotive <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> bezpečnost <input type="checkbox"/> budovy <input type="checkbox"/> ceny <input type="checkbox"/> doprava <input type="checkbox"/> dotace	<input type="checkbox"/> elektřina <input type="checkbox"/> emise <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EU <input type="checkbox"/> infrastruktura <input type="checkbox"/> investice <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> jádro <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> justice	<input type="checkbox"/> klima <input type="checkbox"/> kovy <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> legislativa <input type="checkbox"/> odpady <input type="checkbox"/> OZE <input type="checkbox"/> OZE biomasa <input type="checkbox"/> OZE slunce	<input type="checkbox"/> OZE vítr <input type="checkbox"/> OZE voda <input type="checkbox"/> paliva <input type="checkbox"/> personálie <input type="checkbox"/> petrochemie <input type="checkbox"/> plyn <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> politika	<input type="checkbox"/> regulace <input type="checkbox"/> ropa <input type="checkbox"/> smart <input type="checkbox"/> strategie <input type="checkbox"/> technologie <input type="checkbox"/> teplárenství <input type="checkbox"/> trhy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TZ <input type="checkbox"/> účinnost <input type="checkbox"/> uhlí <input type="checkbox"/> úspory <input type="checkbox"/> věda a výzkum <input type="checkbox"/> zemědělství <input type="checkbox"/> životní prostředí
<input type="button" value="Search"/>					

Univerzita Karlova
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Institut politologických studií

Diploma thesis project

Securitising Nuclear Energy:

Analysis of speech acts related to the possible construction of a new reactor at the existing Dukovany Nuclear Power Station.



Name: Bc. et Bc. Simon Dytrych

Academic advisor: Mgr. Jitka Holubcová M.A.

Study programme: Bezpečnostní studia (International Security Studies)

Year of project submission: 2020

Introduction to the topic

This thesis analyses the security risks associated with the potential construction of a new reactor at the existing Dukovany Nuclear Power Station. More specifically, it seeks to examine the speech acts of various important actors in the field, and discern which potential risks they prefer to emphasize and why. After, the final step will be an analysis of the issue of neglecting some security risks while emphasizing others, and assessing the potentially negative effect of this process on the selection, construction, operation of a nuclear power plant and as well as the overall Czech energy security.

Presently, the nuclear energy is a highly controversial subject of international debate not only in the European Union (EU). One side of the argument supports nuclear energy as a stable, long-lasting, safe and zero-emission energy source, which should be included in the EU's strategy of transition to a carbon-free energy industry. Conversely, the other side of the argument considers nuclear energy too expansive, outdated and dangerous because of radiation.

According to various public opinion polls, the Czech society favours nuclear energy by an overwhelming majority. Correspondingly, majority of the country's political representation holds the same view and included nuclear in the long-term energy plans. This is manifested by the ongoing process leading to the construction of a new reactor. It will probably be constructed on the current site of Dukovany Power Plant, but there are still other options at play (the existing Temelín Power Plant or a completely new nuclear power plant).

Although there is broad agreement on the purpose of the construction, little academic space is devoted to analysing the security risks of possible (and highly probable) future construction. It is important to realise this investment will cause significant expenditures, covered at least partly from the national budget, for decades ahead.

Therefore, many different groups compete over the control of the construction process and the funds related to it. For this purpose, they will most probably try to pursue their interests by emphasizing some of the risks, related to the process of construction as well the subsequent operation, while neglecting others. This can, in result, cause a wide range of different problems for the Czech state.

Although this thesis focuses on the Dukovany Power Station, its conclusions can be possibly applied on other potential or ongoing nuclear reactors constructions worldwide. Moreover, the thesis will also contribute to the international (not only) academic debate focused on the issue of including nuclear energy into carbon-free energy transition plans.

Research target, research question

The main research target of this thesis is to analyse the speech acts articulating the security risks related to the possible (and probable) construction of a new reactor at the current site of Dukovany Power Station while applying the theory of securitisation.

To successfully fulfil my goal, I outline three research hypotheses:

- H1: In the Czech public sphere, there are speech acts connected to the to the possible (and probable) construction of a new reactor at the current site of Dukovany Power Station. At least some of these speech acts are being securitized in a sense of the Copenhagen School of IR.
- H2: The speech acts tend to neglect at least some real security risks associated with the possible (and probable) construction of a new reactor at the current site of the Dukovany Power Station.
- H3: Effects of a proven H2 constitute a threat to the energy security of the Czech Republic.

This being stated, my research questions are:

- RQ1: Can patterns of manipulation by certain interest groups, competing for influence over the reactor construction process, be found in the speech acts related to it?
- RQ2: Are the publicly articulated risks the most serious and pressing risks?
- RQ3: If not, why is the public debate focusing on other than really serious and pressing risks?
- RQ4: Could this process have a negative impact on energy security of the Czech Republic?

Finally, I want to stress that the scope of this thesis is not to assess the role of nuclear energy in the overall energy transition to carbon-free sources.

Conceptual and theoretical framework, research hypotheses

The conceptual and theoretical framework that I have chosen for my thesis is the concept of “securitisation” as developed by the Copenhagen school of International Relations. The concept of securitisation was first articulated by Ole Wæver in his famous article “Securitisation and Desecuritisation” (1995). Then, in 1998, this concept was elaborated

more in-depth by Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde in their book “Security: A New Framework of Analysis”.

Securitisation is a process-oriented conception of security, which stands in contrast to materialist approaches of classical security studies. Classical approaches of security focus on the material dispositions of the threat including distribution of power, military capabilities, and polarity, whereas securitization examines how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security. Moreover, the securitization act, to be successful, must be accepted by the audience, regardless of the subject matter being a real threat.

In my thesis, I will apply the concept of securitisation to the debate on the possible (and probable) construction of the new reactor at the current site of Dukovany Power Station. I will try to distinguish, which threats are “real” meaning “material” in the sense of classical security studies and which are not “material” but only securitized in order to possibly adopt some extraordinary measures or to simply promote interests of a particular group. This means that I will try to interpret official documents, newspaper articles and speeches of the relevant business, governmental and other important actors to provide a deep interpretation of the possible securitization associated with the future construction and operation of the reactor.

Any nuclear power plant construction is a highly complicated process that, in fact, only a tiny sample of any population can actually understand. Moreover, it is a process in which a huge amount of money is at stake. Naturally, this leads to a lot of hard to fact-check opinions of various groups in society competing for influence on construction. These lobby groups subsequently publicly articulate many false risks created to mobilize the public in order to promote and adopt a particular policy based on particular interest. This is especially the case concerning democratic regimes, such as Czechia is, where the public has the possibility to influence the “res publica”. In contrast to securitized risks, I also expect to find several “real” or “material” ones.

Since I have not yet started the research, I cannot determine exactly which interest groups I will analyse when writing the thesis. But I have certain expectations. Firstly, the companies from abroad competing for the procurement e.g. Rosatom, Westinghouse, KHNP or EDF. Secondly, Czech companies that could possibly profit from the procurement e.g. ČEZ or

Škoda JS. Thirdly, all Czech major political parties, especially those that make up the current (2020) government.

Empirical data and analytical technique

There will be several types of sources of data that will be used in my thesis. Firstly, I will gather data from (most probably not only) the books mentioned in the last section of this research design.

Secondly, I will gather data from the press and the internet, predominantly the Czech-based, media. To mention a few, I am going to focus on the on-line media Aktuálně.cz, iHNed.cz or e15.cz and the Hospodářské noviny, Právo and E15 newspapers.

Thirdly, I will analyse documents released by the Czech as well as international institutions. To mention a few, I will focus on the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Czech Republic), Ministry of the Environment (Czech Republic), institutions of the European Union, International Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency,

Fourth, I will try to reach relevant people and ask about their opinions and comments. But this cannot be confirmed in advance as majority of important persons do not have much time and it is possible that I will not be able to reach them. In addition, the COVID-19 crisis may possibly make any face-to-face meeting impossible. As an alternative solution, I can use any form of electronic communication.

Concerning the discourse analysis, I will limit the period of collected data from the present back to 2015. In 2015, the "Update of the State Energy Concept" was issued, in which the possibility of building a new reactor at the existing Dukovany Power Plant was officially seriously considered for the first time. However, if I find an older document suitable for my thesis, I may use it.

As a technique to analyse the data, I chose the discourse analysis approach, more precisely the contextual analysis approach. This will allow me to distinguish between what information explicitly says and what it actually means. Considering the above-stated issues, this distinction is particularly important as various lobby or other interest groups can articulate misleading information in order to promote their interests.

All this will allow me to carry out a case study focused on the risks of possible construction of a new reactor at the current site of Dukovany Power Station. This case

study will also include some comparative aspects, as I will focus on similar issues related to the construction of other nuclear power plants mainly in Europe, but possibly worldwide.

Planned thesis outline

- Introduction
 - Definition of the topic and events that led me to choose this particular topic
 - List of the most common problems of current nuclear power plants construction
 - Assessment of the likelihood of these problems occurring in case of the possible construction.
- Methodology
 - The concept of securitisation and its implications for my thesis.
 - The concept of discourse analysis and the way of how to use it for the purpose of my thesis
- Practical part
 - Discourse analysis of the securitisation related to the case of possible construction of a new reactor at the existing Dukovany Nuclear Power Station.
 - Analysis of the research hypotheses 1, 2 and 3
 - Assessment and evaluation of the hypotheses analysis
 - Assessment of the impact on energy security should H3 proves to be correct.
- Conclusion
 - The overall outcomes of my thesis

Literature review

BÖCK, Helmuth a Dana DRÁBOVÁ. Rizika přesahující hranice: případ Temelín. 1. vyd. Praha: Česká nukleární společnost, 2006. ISBN 8002017943;9788002017943.

This book analyses the perception of the risk arising from the construction of the Temelín nuclear power plant. It focuses in the differences between Czech and Austrian perception of the issue. This book will help me to understand different perceptions of the nuclear power.

BUZAN, Barry, Ole WAEVER a Jaap de WILDE. Bezpečnost: nový rámec pro analýzu [online]. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005 [cit. 2020-04-20]. Současná teorie mezinárodních vztahů. ISBN 80-903333-6-2.

This title examines security and securitisation. It will help me to understand the securitisation process, which I will then apply to examine the debate on the possible construction of the new reactor in at the current site of Dukovany Power Station.

DRULÁK, Petr. Jak zkoumat politiku: kvalitativní metodologie v politologii a mezinárodních vztazích. Praha: Portál, 2008. ISBN 978-80-7367-385-7.

Publication by Petr Drulák will help me to master the formal aspects of my thesis. It will provide me information about the concept of the case study, which I will then use as a methodological framework for my thesis.

ELLIOTT, David et al. Nuclear power: past, present and future. San Rafael [California] (40 Oak Drive, San Rafael, CA, 94903, USA): Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 2017. ISBN 9781681745053;1681745054;1681745070;9781681745077.

This book explores the long history of using atomic fission as an energy source. Its main question is: “Can nuclear power overcome the problems that have emerged?” This question concerns the increasing expansion of the renewable energy sources market on the one hand and the subdued (at least in Europe) nuclear power market on the other. It will help me to understand the most recent problems associated with the use of nuclear energy.

FINDLAY, Trevor. Nuclear energy and global governance: Ensuring safety, security and non-proliferation, 2010. ISBN 020383450X;9780203834503.

This title considers the implications of the nuclear energy use for the international relations and security. It will help me to connect the topic of my thesis to the academic field of the international relations.

HANSLÍK, Eduard. Impact of Temelín nuclear power plant on hydrosphere. 1. vyd. Prague: T. G. Masaryk Water Research Institute, 1997. ISBN 9788085900132;8085900130.

Analysis of a specific threat posed by another nuclear power plant in Czechia. There is a reason to believe that similar threats could emerge during the possible construction of the new reactor at the current site of Dukovany Power Station. Literature on more specific threats is likely to be included.

HEZOUČKÝ, František a České vysoké učení technické v Praze. Strojní fakulta. Technické problémy při uvádění Jaderné elektrárny Temelín do provozu. Praha: České vysoké učení technické, 2005. ISBN 8001031926;9788001031926.

Yet another analysis of a specific threat posed by another nuclear power plant in Czechia. There is a reason to believe that similar threats could emerge during the possible construction of the new reactor at the current site of Dukovany Power Station.

Mezinárodní agentura pro atomovou energii. Nuclear security: global directions for the future: proceedings of an International Conference on Nuclear Security. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2005. ISBN 9201059051;9789201059055.

This book, published by the most important international institution in the field of nuclear energy, investigates the terrorist threats related to Nuclear power stations. It is yet another specific threat to be discussed in the thesis.

SOVACOOL, Benjamin K. a Scott V. VALENTINE. The National Politics of Nuclear Power: Economics, Security, and Governance [online]. Florence: Routledge Ltd, 2012. ISBN 9780415688703;0415688701;0203115260;9780203115268.

This is yet another title which considers the implications of the nuclear energy use for the international relations and security. It will also help me to connect the topic of my thesis to the academic field of the international relations.

TERÄVÄINEN, Tuula, Markku LEHTONEN a Mari MARTISKAINEN. Climate change, energy security, and risk—debating nuclear new build in Finland, France and the UK. Energy Policy. 2011, vol. 39, no. 6, s. 3434-3442. ISSN 0301-4215.

This article provides an analysis of the risks associated with several recent nuclear power plant construction projects. Such an analysis of European countries and their approaches to this subject will be very useful during my own research.

Possible gaps in the existing literature can be found during the creation of this thesis. Most likely, this gap will be related to the specific risk that I will have to address in my thesis, but the related literature will not be available. But hopefully this will not happen.