

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Institute of Political Studies
Department of International Relations

**Russia as a rising power in multilateral
institutions**

2020

Ekaterina Ananyeva

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies
Department of International Relations

Ekaterina Ananyeva

Russia as a rising power in multilateral institutions

Dissertation Thesis

Prague 2020

Author: **Ekaterina Ananyeva**

Supervisor: **Michal Parízek, Ph.D.**

Year of the defence: 2020

References

ANANYEVA, Ekaterina. *Russia as a Rising Power in Multilateral Institutions*. Praha, 2020. 144 pages. Dissertation thesis (PhD.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Department of International Relations. Supervisor Michal Parížek, Ph.D..

Keywords: Russia, multilateral institutions, sentiment analysis, Russian foreign policy

Klíčová slova: Rusko, multilaterální instituce, analýza sentimentu, ruská zahraniční politika

Length of the work: 358132 characters, 54866 words, 156 pages

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 16.08.2020

Ekaterina Ananyeva

Acknowledgment

I express my gratitude to Michal Parízek, Ph.D., for his intellectual and patient guidance, encouragement, and advice. I have been fortunate to have a supervisor who cared a lot about my work and responded promptly to all my questions.

I would like to express my gratitude to both reviewers for taking the time and effort necessary to review the manuscript. Their insightful comments that enabled me to revise my dissertation in a comprehensive manner.

Also, I would like to thank my family, who has supported me throughout my life and believed that everything is possible. I wish to extend my special thanks to my husband for his continued support and understanding.

Table of contents

Introduction.....	9
The research targets and questions	11
The theoretical argument.....	12
Data and Methods	13
Structure of the dissertation.....	14
Chapter 1. Literature overview	17
1.1. Multilateral institutions.....	17
1.1.1. Multilateralism	17
1.1.2. Multilateral institutions	18
1.1.3 (Neo-) liberal institutionalists.....	19
1.1.4. Constructivists and social constructivism.....	21
1.1.5. Realist criticism	22
1.2. Rising powers.....	24
1.2.1. Rising powers: definition.....	24
1.2.2. Rising powers in multilateral institutions	30
1.2.3. Attitude patterns of rising powers towards multilateral institutions	31
1.3. Russia as a rising power and its foreign policy.....	33
1.3.1. Russia as a rising power	33
1.3.2. Russian multilateralism	35
Chapter 2: Theory and concepts.....	39
2.1. Rational functionalism – the theoretical framework of this work	39
2.2. Rising powers and Russian place among them.....	43
2.3. Russian foreign policy: its interests, goals, and approaches.....	45
2.4. The hypothesis of the current research.....	47
Chapter 3. Research framework of the dissertation	51
3.1. Quantitative analysis	52
3.1.1. Dataset.....	52

3.1.2. Text as data.....	55
3.1.3. Diplomatic language and its specificities.....	56
3.2. Content analysis	62
3.2.1. Steps and rules in content analysis	64
3.4. Sentiment analysis.....	66
3.4.1. Emotions, sentiments, and attitudes.....	67
3.4.2. Dictionary-based computer-aided content analysis	72
3.5. Qualitative Part – case studies	76
Chapter 4. Quantitative results.....	80
4.1. Dataset overview	80
4.1.1. Defining independent and control variables.....	81
4.1.2. Dataset construction.....	83
4.2. The first outcome - “not interested” attitude pattern.....	84
4.3. Patterns and trends outcomes.....	85
4.3.1. Picturing institutions in full.....	85
4.4. Text sentiment.....	88
4.5. Type of issue area	89
4.5.1. Outcomes for the key variable: Establisher/ joiner category	93
4.6. Time category: during and after the Cold War	96
4.6.1. During the Cold War.....	97
4.6.2. Post-Cold War	98
4.7. Trends in dataset with control variables soft/ hard and territorial scope.....	99
4.7.1. Hard issues and territorial scope.....	100
4.7.2. Soft issues and territorial scope	101
Chapter 5. The case study of the OSCE	105
5.1. Overview of the OSCE.....	106
5.1.1. Main principles and spheres of work.....	106
5.1.2. The structure of the OSCE and decision-making	107
5.2. Russian accession to the OSCE and first years of participation	108
5.3. Russian attitude towards the OSCE in 2001 – 2015	111

5.3.1. The first rise: 2004-2005	113
5.3.2. The second rise of 2008-2010	115
5.3.3. The third rise of 2014-2015.....	119
5.4. Topics covered by the Russian governmental bodies regarding the OSCE	122
5.5. Summary.....	123
Chapter 6. The case study of the SCO.....	125
6.1. Reasons behind Russian involvement in the SCO	126
6.2. SCO structure.....	127
6.2.1. Russian position in the SCO.....	128
6.3. Russian attitude towards the SCO.....	129
6.3.1. Possible reasons behind sentiment fluctuations	133
6.3.2. Main topics covered by the Russian government	135
6.4. Summary.....	136
Chapter 7. The case study of the WTO.....	138
7.1. Reasons behind Russian involvement in the WTO.....	139
7.1.1. History of the WTO establishment.	139
7.1.2. Structure and decision-making of the WTO	140
7.2. Russian accession to the WTO	143
7.2.1. General accession rules	144
7.2.2. Russian accession to the WTO	144
7.3. Russian attitude towards the WTO in 2001 – 2015	146
7.3.1. Sentimental rise of 2002 – 2006.....	149
7.3.2. The rise of 2011 – 2014	153
7.4. Main topics covered by Russian governmental bodies regarding the WTO	157
7.5. Summary.....	158
Conclusion	160
List of references	165
List of appendices.....	192
Appendix 1	192

Introduction

With the proliferation of multilateral institutions, they became an ordinary actor of global governance and an arena for all kinds of states to voice their position. An opportunity to be heard is especially relevant for so-called rising powers – states that transformed their economic growth into ambitions of being represented and recognized globally. For the current world order in general and multilateral institutions in particular, the inclusion of rising powers is a challenge, as they aim to gain more decision-making power internationally (Kahler, 2013; Narlikar, 2014; Stephen, 2012; Terhalle, 2011).

While some institutions adapt to the emergence of rising powers and others retain the existing rules, there is also the question of how these states react to multilateral institutions. Often, institutional reluctance to accommodate emerging powers leads to states' dissatisfaction and later revisionist behavior (Mazarr 2017; Rapkin and Thompson 2003; Schweller 2011).

This dissertation looks at the attitude that Russia – a unique example of a rising power – has towards multilateral institutions and factors that influence its choice of this attitude. Russia remains a special case due to its previous experience of having been one of the two superpowers during the Cold War, losing this status after the dissolution of the USSR and re-emerging as a rising power.

The research asks the question of *what attitude* does Russia hold towards MIs and *what explains the choice of patterns of deviations?* Regarding the first question, it aims to explore the Russian position in multilateral institutions across all issue areas. In order to answer this question, I combine theories of rising powers with that of Russian foreign policy. While the former enables me to look at the deviations in attitude patterns within an institution, the latter allows for a cross-institutional comparison of positions Moscow has.

The second question refers to independent variables. Its target is to explain the choice of the attitude patterns by the Russian Federation, depending on the position of power that Moscow has within an institution. My overarching hypothesis is relatively simple. I argue that Russian attitude depends to a large extent on its position within the multilateral institutions. In the case of a weak position, Russia remains a by-sitter in an institution that it joined. In such institutions, Russia is expected to be predominantly passive or negative. When Russian finds itself in a strong position, it co-established an institution and enjoys control within the decision-making bodies of it. In such cases, it is likely to be much more active and positive.

I also check for the types of issues in which an institution engages. Hard issue area covers spheres of economy, energy, and security, while the soft one – human rights, the environment, and other easily accessible by the population (Johnston and Wronski 2015). I also look at the period of establishment. Although in the Cold War, multilateral institutions played a minor role compared to inter-state relations, the Russian position within those in which it participated was strong. The end of the Cold War is characterized by the rise in establishing multilateral institutions parallel to the fall of the Soviet institutions. For Russia, it meant facing a need to join the West-led institutions on their terms (Lo 2015; Weiss and Wilkinson 2014).

I find that Moscow responded to its changed status, by being an active supporter during the accession period to the West-led institutions. Once it becomes a member, Russia switches to a passive attitude combined with mostly neutral or negative comments.

Additionally, I empirically observe the dichotomy of territorial scope. There, I divide institutions into global and regional. As argued in the literature on rising powers, regional ones are the basis for the states aiming at changing their status quo in world affairs (Hurrell, 2006; Stephen 2016; Schirm, 2010; Kahler, 2013). After gaining the leading position in the respective regions, these states speak on their behalf in global multilateral institutions. Global institutions also act as providers of voice for the countries seeking to change their current status.

With this framework, I intend to engage myself with foreign policy analysis and theories of rising powers and multilateral institutions that altogether will provide an answer to the problem of attitude dimension in the study of multilateral institutions. This approach shall give a better understanding of what can determine the choice of attitude within an institution. In particular, I show that by embracing the existing theory regarding the influence of the state's control position in institutions, one can trace member-states' preferences for participation in a given institution. Adding the dimension of foreign policy enables a more profound comprehension of processes behind renegotiation of the existing world order. Also, taking into consideration an attitude that rising powers hold vis-à-vis multilateral institutions, allows us to better understand their vision on the position they desire to achieve globally.

The empirics support the argument and applies the proposed concepts. As will be described in the relevant chapter, the empirical part of the dissertation builds a comprehensive overview of Russian participation in all multilateral institutions it is a member of.

The rest of the introductory part is devoted to the description of the research problem, argumentation developed in the research and structure of the dissertation.

The research targets and questions

This research aims to map and explain Russian behavior in the international arena through its participation in multilateral and cross-regional organizations. The dissertation comprises the broader topics of cooperation and representation. In particular, as stated earlier, it attempts to shed light on two main broad questions:

- What is the attitude of the Russian Federation towards multilateral institutions?
- What explains the choice of deviation in the patterns of attitude by Russia?

In order to answer both questions, I turn to a synthesis of two broad literature strings that have previously developed independently from each other: rising powers and Russian foreign policy. Emerging powers are perceived by many (Gaskarth, 2015; Hurrell, 2006; Mazarr, 2017; Stephen, 2014), including myself, as states with enough material and non-material resources to challenge their status quo and to pursue their goal to be perceived as an equal to well-established major powers. Some of the authors (Hurrell, 2006; Mazarr, 2017; Stephen, 2014; Terhalle, 2011) suggest that rising powers act as a social group seeking an equal status like other well-established powers (e.g., the United States) on the global arena. This approach focuses on their interactions with other states bilaterally or in multilateral institutions.

This cluster of authors suggests three main positions that rising powers can take in institutions: active member, neutral, and spoiler (revisionist) (Culp, 2016; Kahler, 2013; Schweller, 2011; Stephen, 2012). There are two main additions that I can make with my research. Firstly, the existing literature is based mainly on the data taken from the economic sphere, while I am introducing data from other hard issue areas, such as security and energy. In addition, I contribute to the existing studies by covering soft issues, such as human rights or the environment that I include in my research. Secondly, I add another pattern: staying not interested. This attitude refers to remaining in an institution, but not being active in it, nor indicating its interest in an official position.

Additionally, there is another branch of academics working on rising powers that focuses on China (Ikenberry 2008; Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Nel, Nabers, and Hanif 2018). Based on this country, some of them generalize its characteristic features on other emerging states or use it as the primary example (Gaskarth 2015; Ikenberry 2010; Legro 2007; Rapkin and

Thompson 2003). Omitting other players and especially Russia leads to overlooking explanations of the current situation in the global affairs, where Moscow is present in almost all significant alliances. Therefore, the literature on Russian foreign policy is the second building stone for this dissertation.

In general, most of the scholars working within the area focus on Russian relations with each of the world regions separately (the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia). Yet, concentrating on its bilateral relations, they miss the multilateral dimension of Russian foreign policy, which became relevant after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gvosdev and Marsh 2014; Lo 2002; Mankoff 2009). The Russian attitude towards some organizations is taken into account, but most researchers focus on the most visible institutions with a broad range of agenda issues, such as NATO, the EU, the UN (Hedenskog 2005; Lo 2015; Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009). There is also a set of studies of regional multilateral institutions (Konyshev and Sergunin 2014; Pourchot and Stivachtis 2014), but none that would unite Russian attitude across regional and global levels. This dissertation changes this approach and embraces both regional and global institutions.

The theoretical argument

While the first research question is primarily descriptive, the second is deeply theoretical. I outline here briefly my theorizing on the second research question, regarding possible reasons behind the preferred attitude of Russia in a multilateral institution. Based on the literature gaps, I developed a hypothesis that can be presented as follows:

H₁: When Russia holds a strong position, it is supportive of those multilateral institutions.

H₂: When Russia does not have control over decision-making processes in multilateral institutions, it acts as a challenge.

This is a simple, parsimonious hypothesis, but it complements well the existing studies on the determinants of states' behavior in multilateral institutions, focusing on a number of factors, e.g., on their design. I argue that with a strong institutional position, Russia can develop a supportive attitude with fluctuations in attitude. The strong position refers to a strong negotiation position that a country has when co-establishes an institution. The challenger position covers situations of a weak negotiation position, when a state does not have control over decision-making within an institution, as in the case of joining well-established institutions.

In addition to the two hypotheses mentioned above, I introduce a distinction between the institutions that Russia co-established as a superpower during the Cold War and those that it set up after the loss of this status. A sub-hypothesis of H₁ suggests that Moscow is an active supporter whose attitude depends on institutional policies of multilateral institutions established during the Cold War, in which it has strong positions as a co-establisher. In the cases of multilateral institutions established after the Cold War, Russia in the role of rising power, holds a strong position due to its co-establishing position, leading to Moscow's continuously supportive attitude.

Data and Methods

I expect that Moscow's strong position leads to fluctuations in emotional connotations of entries in the recently released online archive of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When Russia finds itself in a challenger position, I expect its attitude to transform into mostly neutrally and negatively connotated entries.

Based on the literature, I theorize and further support through the empirical evidence that Russia is an active supporter of institutions engaged in hard issues it co-established during and after the Cold War. The data also supports the sub-hypothesis relating to the proposition that Moscow is revisionist in West-led institutions working with hard issues that it joined after the end of the Cold War.

This dissertation's quantitative core consists of a comprehensive dataset of Russian participation in all multilateral institutions of which this country is a member. The main goal of the dataset is to mark the Russian attitude towards an institution based on the data taken from the online archive in the observational period of 2001-2015. Apart from the information on the Russian position, it also notes institutional features, making an overview as extensive as possible.

As mentioned above, the primary source for the quantitative part is the recently released online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. According to Article 80 of the Constitution of 1993¹, the President directs foreign policy, but it is the Ministry that puts the presidential decisions into practice. The online archive comprises all statements, fact sheets, press releases, speeches, commentaries, and interviews of Russian

¹ The observation period of this research covers the years 2001-2015, when the previous Constitution was still in operation.

officials (sometimes also interviews of high foreign officials), given to the domestic and international press from the 1990-s until today. As mentioned, the dissertation focuses on the period of 2001-2015. The years before 2001 has sufficient data gaps, while the years after 2015 were still being completed at the start of the current research.

As for the qualitative part of the dissertation, its findings deepen the quantitative section. Each of the institutions chosen for the closer, in-depth analysis, represents the typical case of the three hypothesized situations. To focus only on the institutions that are politically most significant for the Russian Federation, I take those with the biggest number of entries in the online archive. Each of the case studies were chosen from the list of all multilateral institutions that Russia is a member of and is the best case of the hypothesis it portrays.

The first case study – the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – stands for the first hypothesis, when Russia is an active supporter of an institution set up before the Cold War, in which it has a strong position as a co-establisher. The second case study – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – represents the second hypothesis, when Russia is an active supporter of an institution it co-established after the Cold War, in which it has a strong position. The third case study – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – indicates the third hypothesis: Russia is a challenger when joining a West-led institution after the Cold War.

All case studies look at the governmental attitude towards the institutions. My perception of government encompasses several administrative bodies that are responsible for the implementation of international agreements. In essence, I refer to both houses of the Russian Parliament (the Federation Council and the State Duma), the President and the Prime Minister. Their attitude towards the relevant institutions is taken from the official websites (all have online archives) of the respective bodies.

All in all, by having a qualitative level, I can compare and contrast the policies that Russia follows in each of the case studies.

Structure of the dissertation

In order to provide the full answer to both the research question and lead a reader through the argumentation, I start with the outline of the theoretical and methodological frameworks of the dissertation in Chapters I and II. The chosen theory – rational functionalism, enables combining Russian preference of realism in its execution of foreign policy with recognition of

complex world structure and especially, the role of institutions. Moreover, in the same chapter, I discuss possible alternative frameworks, such as institutionalism and realism, along with schools within these broad IR theories.

The second chapter presents the methodological approach that combines qualitative and quantitative data analysis. While the former is based on the classic case study analysis, the latter on the computer-aided quantitative content analysis. Given that at the point of the start of this dissertation, there was no free content analysis software available that was able to work with the emotives of the Russian language, I co-developed one².

The data for the content analysis is drawn from the recently released online archive of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Until now, this source remains one of the most under-researched in the sphere of IR. One of the main reasons is that the Russian version of the archive covers more entries in comparison to the English one.

The third chapter is devoted to the quantitative empirical results of the dissertation. These are presented in the form of a comprehensive dataset covering Russian attitude towards all multilateral institutions this country is a member of. It gives a broad overview of correlations existing between the independent variable (Russian position of dominance in an institution), the dependent one (Russian attitude), and scope conditions (territorial scope, type of issue area, and period of establishment).

The qualitative chapters (four to six) introduce three case studies. Chosen on the basis of the highest number of entries, each of the cases represents a part of the hypothesis. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the OSCE) illustrates the situation when Russia is supportive of a hard-issue institution, which it co-established during the Cold War and in which it holds a strong position. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (the SCO) provides an in-depth analysis and data for the sub-hypothesis of Russia being an active supporter of a hard-issue institution, which it co-established after the Cold War and in which it holds a strong position. The World Trade Organization illustrates the situation in which Russia has a challenger position towards a hard-issue West-led institution, that it joined after the end of the Cold War.

² Can be found at <https://github.com/DrUlysses/KateProg2>

Overall, the qualitative part of the dissertation draws a cross-case variation of the Russian attitude that allows looking deeper into the data and analyzing the state's attitude patterns as well as its factors in more detail.

Altogether, by having a complete dataset including all multilateral institutions supported by in-depth case study analyses, I find correlations in Russian attitude towards the hard-issue multilateral institutions, depending on their institutional features and the Russian position there. The existing literature regarded the same research questions, either from the point of view of rising powers in general or Russian foreign policy in particular. This dissertation changes this approach and suggests several possibilities based on quantitative and qualitative data. It proves that a state's weak or strong position within an institution influences its attitude.

Chapter 1. Literature overview

This dissertation aims to provide an answer to the question of what the Russian attitude towards multilateral institutions is and what determines the choice of attitude patterns. These questions encompass several themes that need to be taken into account:

- Multilateral institutions
- Rising powers
- Russian foreign policy

This chapter discusses how these issues were addressed in the literature and identifies the gaps that this dissertation can fill. It is divided into the relevant sub-chapters that cover global governance, multilateral institutions, global power shift, and Russian foreign policy.

1.1. Multilateral institutions

As the main arena for multilateral activities and negotiations, institutions provide states with opportunities to voice their interests and preferences, form alliances, and promote their visions. Growing economic interdependence and globalization has been the main challenge for the states since the end of the Cold War. One solution for this, was intergovernmental cooperation realized through multilateral institutions, which strengthened and institutionalized it (Held and McGrew 2002).

1.1.1. Multilateralism

Before proceeding further, one needs to define multilateral institutions. Both parts of the concept will be considered first separately and then put together. This approach will enable differentiating several understandings of multilateralism and to draw a distinction between organizations and institutions, thus, allowing finding the most suitable definition for this dissertation.

“Multilateral” has different features depending on the sphere it is used within. Given that the behavior of a single state is in the center of this work, Ruggie’s (1992) and Keohane’s (1990) perception of multilateralism as an action or practice of states seems most suitable. Both understand multilateralism as coordination of relations among three and more parties according to certain principles. Keohane (1990) refers to ad hoc or institutional arrangements through which multilateralism is carried. Ruggie (1992), in his turn, suggests multilateral

principles to include indivisibility, non-discrimination, and diffuse reciprocity. While it is clear what is meant as non-discrimination, the other two concepts need explanations.

Indivisibility refers to a social construct – the states decide on an issue and adhere to their decision. For instance, in the case of collective security, participants behave as if the peace was there and thereby make it (Ruggie 1992). For Caporaso (1992), indivisibility is “the scope (both geographic and functional) over which costs and benefits are spread, given an action initiated in or among component units” (Caporaso, 1992: 602). The second element – diffuse reciprocity – originates in the works of Keohane. Reciprocity is considered to be a standard of appropriate state behavior and is best observed in international regimes (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane 1986; Keohane and Nye 1985).

Alternative definitions of multilateralism look at the concept as opposed to other approaches. Van Oudenaren (2003) perceives multilateralism through comparison with unilateralism. For him, a multilateral approach is most visible in the economic sphere and is defined as a non-discriminatory attitude towards other member-states within an alliance. The author mentions universal international agreements as examples of multilateralism effectiveness.

1.1.2. Multilateral institutions

Overall, multilateralism can take three forms: international orders, international regimes, and international organizations. Given that Ruggie uses the concept “organizations” and not “institutions” (which are the focus of this research), one needs to distinguish between the two (Ruggie 1992).

Early analyses were devoted to formal alliances only, which make well-established organizations, such as the United Nations, most researched. Then, regime theories flourished and contributed to bias in definitions. The scholars started to use “institutions” and “regimes” interchangeably. This fusion provided a new understanding of institutions that are perceived as sets of norms and rules governing states’ behavior (Carlsnaes, Risse-Kappen, and Simmons 2002).

Ruggie (1992) and Caporaso (1992) define international organizations as formal entities with headquarters, permanent staff, and administration. There are two main issues in the relationship between multilateralism and international organizations. First, international organizations are not always necessarily multilateral (e.g., Comintern). Second, the adjective “multilateral” presupposes specific rules of voting and negotiations that are not always

followed by international organizations. Ruggie (1992) suggests that multilateral organization is a separate concept that refers to the institutionalized behavior with generalized voting and consensus procedures.

By adding “multilateral” to “institutions,” one suggests that multilateralism is an institutional form coordinating relations between three and more actors based on principles of conduct. Their main aim is to specify an appropriate set of actions without taking into account particularistic interests or strategic exigencies of the member-states (Ruggie 1992). Keohane (1990) is more specific in his definition, stating that multilateral institutions have persistent sets of rules, which differentiate them from regimes or ad hoc meetings. The scope of institutions – global or regional – is not the defining factor of the concept. As discussed earlier, international regimes, orders, and organizations are not necessarily multilateral.

Both – multilateralism and multilateral institutions – face numerous problems that can be allocated in two broad groups. First, not all states believe that institutions can foster their well-being and help pursue their interests. Second, peoples of the respective states do not feel represented by the institutions. They perceive these organizations as the club of the mighty governors without accountability to the public. In response to the first group of problems, states adopt different behavioral patterns: the establishment of private-public alliances by global or regional means and setting-up groupings within the criticized institutions (Held and McGrew 2002). It is also the first group of problems that is in the focus of this work.

Overall, characteristic features, functions, and roles of multilateral institutions depend on the theoretical lenses that one uses. The following part of this chapter considers the main scholarships and their views on the world system as such, along with the role of states and multilateral institutions in it. Each of the discussed theories has its explanatory gaps that speak in favor of the chosen approach. At the same time, they provide a broad overview of the alternatives to the theoretical framework of this dissertation – rational functionalism.

1.1.3 (Neo-) liberal institutionalists

Liberal and neoliberal institutionalists hold the most positive view of their importance. This tradition gave rise to further theoretical developments that focus on multilateral institutions. It presumes that growing complex interlinked relations between states will lead to problems that they will not be able to master alone. In this situation, even most powerful states depend on others and choose to establish or to join multilateral institutions over the self-help principle (Rittberger and Zangl 2006).

Another issue is undoubtedly the question of why states are interested in institutional membership. Even when they can act alone, they tend to seek institutional legitimation of future actions. As discussed earlier, the number of institutions already suggests a rising interest in their existence. In search of states' willingness to participate in multilateral institutions, Abbott and Snidal (1998) turn to institutional functions that cannot be performed by states. They emphasize two broad categories of features – centralization and independence – that are then sub-divided into further features of multilateral institutions.

By centralization, they mean the stability of the organizational structure and supportive administrative apparatus. The benefits foremost include support for direct state interaction. A well-established organization is able to serve not only as a negotiating platform, but also as one able to shape the context of states' interactions. A formal organization embodies the terms of these interactions, while its institutional structure influences the evolution of member' cooperation. However, as Abbott and Snidal state, such organizations may not be able to adapt to changing power conditions within. Therefore, rising powers tend to be suspicious of these institutions due to their difficulty as adjusting emerging powers. The second benefit is managing substantive operations, such as pooling, joint production, norm elaboration and coordination. These activities are similar to those performed by corporations and their stakeholders.

Independence for Abbot and Snidal is the ability to act with a degree of autonomy within defined areas and the capacity to act neutrally in disputes. That is the main reason behind the rising powers' belief in the credibility of international organizations. This characteristic is beneficial thanks to supporting direct state interaction and the substantive operations it provides. However, as the Russian case shows, rising powers can also act as spoilers if disappointed with the limiting of their sovereignty by an institution.

Abbott and Snidal also outline other functions that international organizations might perform: being a community representative and manager of enforcement. The first one relates to representing member-states as an entity, being a whole body (UN General Assembly), or representative body, or a community institution (EU). The second one embraces the ability of an institution to perform as an autonomous actor with the member-states (Abbott and Snidal, 1998).

Axelrod and Keohane (1985) state that there are two main motivating factors for countries to cooperate on an institutional level. First, if payoffs are high enough, members are likely to

play according to the rules. This approach also influences the position within an institution. For instance, in the case of Russia, one speaks of the state's interest in power increase translated into adapting to the institution. Secondly, when members are directly involved in the work of an organization, they are interested in effective reciprocity and prevention of or battle against defection. For rising powers, an institutional framework proves to be beneficial as it grants them a voice, while constraining the most powerful states (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Hurrell 2006). In general, this means that institutions are structured hierarchically, and one of the goals is not to impose rules on states' interactions, but to provide information to them so that countries change interaction patterns themselves under the motivation of other member-states.

1.1.4. Constructivists and social constructivism

In the broad field of international relations, the subject of the constructivist scholarship is a construction of social objects and practices. Its focus is on how conditional factors influence political reality. For constructivists, ideational dimension is the critical factor shaping human interactions and the main reason behind establishing institutions. Adopters of this theory in the realm of multilateral institutions, state that shared beliefs help to shape actors' interests and identity. According to them, the creation of institutions depends on the presence or absence of shared values and norms (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Gutner 2017; Rittberger and Zangl 2006).

Among various theories and divisions of constructivism, one of the most relevant as an alternative to the chosen theoretical framework is social constructivism. In the center of it are institutions as societies driven by normative issues. Their role is perceived as two-fold. On the one hand, non-governmental organizations can use institutions to promote the relevant norms domestically. A state in which this NGO operates, signed an agreement recognizing specific values and norms which it does not follow, allowing for the NGO to draw the domestic public's attention to the state's non-compliance and thus, put pressure on the government. On the other hand, the institution's administration can support the NGO, which in turn, uses this support to inform the public of its state's non-compliance (Rittberger and Zangl 2006).

Overall, by focusing on the role of norms, values, and ideas, this scholarship suggests a far-reaching status for multilateral institutions. They can execute their influence on member-states directly, or through the domestic public, or via NGOs. Moreover, by engaging in

relations with local actors, institutions can change the state's interests, shape their actions, and alter their identities.

Finnenmore, as the best example, looks at Western culture as the driving factor of globalization and the institutionalization that followed. It is also expected that the continued growth of normative culture will lead to an increase in the number and influence of international organizations. The long-time core of social constructivism - detailed process-tracing and focus on Western rationality – cannot be adopted within this research, as it embraces both agency and structure.

It also sees states as shapers of an institution, also able to choose these institutions. Moreover, it is not the goal of this research to focus on the inner political reasons of Russian behavior in multilateral institutions. Therefore, the main limitations of this research as related to social constructivism include culture, norms, and internal bureaucracy of an institution (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Finnemore, 1996).

An additional variable in a state's choice to join a multilateral institution is its domestic regime. Democracies are more likely to join international organizations as compared to authoritarian regimes. Early democracies that are still in the democratization process are more likely to enter a high number of international organizations so that signed agreements could prevent them (and future governments) from rolling back into authoritarianism (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006).

1.1.5. Realist criticism

Realist scholarship in its critique of the approaches mentioned above, is based on the assumption that states are the only actors able to influence international relations. Institutions in this framework are a mere reflection of power distribution. Like functionalists, realists believe that the states' institutional participation rests on the calculations of their self-interests. However, they focus on great powers only by stating that they are the ones who decide on the establishment and directions of institutions (Mearsheimer 1994; Rittberger and Zangl 2006).

Classical realists do not encounter institutions as effective actors. Instead, they prefer to focus on the leading role of power relations. On the one side, these scholars often refer to negative or zero influence of multilateral institutions (for example, the UN, GATT, the IMF) during the Cold War. On the other side, they recognize institutions as political players. However, their

establishment is guided by hegemonic powers that seek to legitimize and prolong their status (Carlsnaes et al. 2002).

The realist camp is in no way homogeneous. The two divisions – offensive and defensive realists – perceive the world differently. For the former, institutions are merely a reflection of power distribution with minimal effect on states' behaviors. According to him, great powers establish institutions to pursue their own goals. Due to a constant feeling of threat from all sides, states are driven by a self-help attitude. Alliances and institutions are thus, merely forums of discussion, arenas for great powers to realize their ambitions or entities formed against a mightier actor. Additionally, they indicate the (im)balance of powers in the world and do not carry independent functions (Mearsheimer 1994).

Institutions play a slightly different role within the framework of defensive realism. According to defensive realists, it is not the distribution of power that predicts the possibility of conflict (and ultimately governs the states' relations), but states' capabilities to implement particular strategies. This in turn, influences the security dilemma that characterizes the world system: the actors become more prone to avoid conflicts (Taliaferro 2001).

Another difference between offensive and defensive realists is that the latter recognizes the possibility of cooperation between the states. The former argues for it to be more likely in situations when aggressive behavior brings higher costs and risk of losing sovereignty. Defensive realists grant a vital role to the central governmental figures, as it is often they who make decisions based on their perception of relative power and capabilities of another state. This thinking is also applicable to the cases of “great power concerts” that are aimed at preserving a specific power distribution by establishing an institutionalized agreement or a treaty (Rendall 2006; Taliaferro 2001).

Though defensive realism might have been an alternative framework for this dissertation, its focus on power relations among the states undermines the role of institutions that can influence states' behavioral patterns.

Neoclassical realism is one of the alternative theoretical frameworks since it considers the dependence of a state's foreign policy (including behavior in international institutions), on domestic and international levels at the same time. Compared to defensive and offensive realism, which see a direct causal relationship between internal politics and foreign policy ignoring international factors, neoclassical realism takes account of external variables. It

argues that the foreign policy of a state depends on its place in the international system and its relative material power capabilities (Rose 1998).

Grieco (1988) criticizes institutionalism for its lack of interest in relative gains of states from cooperation. He stresses the difference between the two scholarships in the perception of the state's top priority: for realists, it is survival, for liberals and neo-liberals (institutionalists) – well-being. This leads to another point of criticism: neoliberal and liberal institutionalists believe that the worst possible outcome is lost opportunity to cooperate, whilst realists can indicate more dangers.

From his point of view, realism offers the most comprehensive understanding of international cooperation. This assumption is based on the situations, to which the two scholarships hold different hypotheses: cases of cheating and cooperation (Grieco, 1988).

Overall, the core idea of realist and neo-realist vision on multilateral institutions is that institution building represents the national interests of the current hegemons and the current power relations. Thus, the power distribution becomes the defining factor in multilateral relations and guides the choice of the behavioral pattern by the actors.

1.2. Rising powers

1.2.1. Rising powers: definition

The notion of a rising power is relatively new and derived from the context of power discussions —debates over power rest on disputes about the diffusion of power and emerging powers. The three main questions of grasping the notion of power derive from that: where is power shifting to? What is power? Power for what? These questions provide different answers depending on which we build our perception of a rising power. Therefore, I will start with the definition of power.

Since the times of Carr (1946) with his famous “The Twenty Years Crisis,” the notion of power has been attributed to a realist tradition. Generally, power was perceived as the ability of one actor to make another do what he usually would not. Carr goes further and makes power measurable and more concrete. He adds the ability of a state to use its material resources to pressure the other and follow its commands. This definition suggests several assumptions: first, power is a relational concept. Second, it is relative: apart from noting one's capabilities, one needs to account for the opponent's power (Baylis and Smith 2014).

This notion brings up a discussion on how to understand capabilities. The classic work of Waltz (1979) sees capabilities as “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence” (Waltz, 1979: 131). As shown by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Second World War, these resources become vital when converted into power. Both countries managed to convert their capabilities into influence and eventually become winners. This situation opens a question: what resources generate influence, which then is converted into power? The answer depends on the historical epoch we are looking at: while the conquest of new territories mattered till the end of the 19th century, economic might gained its role in the post-Cold War world (Nye 1990). Nevertheless, it remains clear that the official explanation of power relates to having the necessary resources and being able to use them in order to exercise influence on other actors’ behavior.

Criticisms of realist assumptions focus on the emphasis of their opponents on the relative power and relative gains. In this case, power is understood as being necessarily exercised over another actor and, thus, power equates to domination. They also point out assumptions about power affecting actors’ interests, which inevitably leads to a perception of interests as monolithic, without any conflict between them. Another main criticism of the realist vision, is that it implies simplistic binary power relations. They concentrate on relations between the two states, thus, ignoring relations that might arise among several countries simultaneously (Lukes 2004).

While liberals, institutionalists, and constructivists tend to focus on one set of reasons behind international outcomes, social constructivists try to develop an alternative view on power. They see it as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate” (Barnett and Duvall 2005). This explanation goes along two analytical dimensions. The first one is the kinds of social relations through which power works. It constitutes power either as a mean of particular actors or as a social process contributing to their identity. The second dimension refers to the specificity of social relations: either they are direct and socially specific or indirect and socially diffuse (Barnett and Duvall 2005).

Current discussion within the rationalist approach suggests a mid-way. Mainly, it explains the states’ positions within multilateral institutions, which is vital for this research. This approach distinguishes between three types of power. The first – structural – refers to the ability of an

actor to use outside options. Formal power – another type – consists of legal tools providing control over an institution: voting rules, veto power, membership in institutional bodies, and specialized agencies. The third type of power is informal. It refers to practices outside of legal becoming part of the institutional framework (Stone 2013).

Realists and adherents to their assumptions about power focus on states, whereas their opponents broaden the range of actors that can hold and exercise power. Nevertheless, both approaches had to deal with power shift from states to non-state actors that became an extended discussion in the post-Cold War world. The reasons behind this are multiple: the rapid rise of technologies, globalization, democratization, the diminishing role of governments and their inability to handle collective action problems. Another relevant issue, is change in the role of international institutions: they moved from a forum of member-states to a more independent position (Mathews 1997). Alternative vision on power shifts in its move from the US to other actors (Armijo and Roberts 2014a; Ikenberry 2010). For the purposes of this work, I will focus on the latter.

The main question associated with the power shift from the US is where it is moving. According to some, it is shifting to non-state actors (Castells 2008; Ikenberry 2010; Nanz and Steffek 2004). Their arguments are based on the following assumptions. First, states are no longer able to resolve global collective on their own. Second, the role of NGOs is growing as they are sharing more issue-areas with states and international institutions. Third, non-state actors give platforms for more active and direct participation of peoples in decision-making, thus, trying to solve the problem of democracy deficit.

Another set of scholars argues that power is shifting to rising or emerging powers (Haass 2017; Kahler 2013; Mazarr 2017; Schirm 2010). Starting as an economic observation, diffusion of capabilities moved to the political sphere. Realist tradition suggests that a shift in material power inevitably threatens the ability of major states to exert their will. Neoliberal institutionalists mainly agree with this but stress that in order for a power shift to happen, it needs to be present on the institutional level (since institutions are cementation of the existing world order) (Armijo and Roberts 2014a).

The idea of power shifts is not new, as some have argued for historical cycles in which a dominating power loses its role for a rising one. For example, the beginning of the twentieth century was marked by the rising United States that then replaced Great Britain (Nye 1990). However, there is no agreement on how to define rising powers.

Jim O'Neil popularized the concept in his report to Goldman & Sachs, where he argued that the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) are characterized by fast economic and population growth that leads to their rising influence worldwide and inevitable shift of power to them (O'Neil 2001). However, this concept does not fully correspond to the term of rising power, as it focuses on their growing economies and fundamentally lacks the whole picture painted by other material and non-material abilities along with political ambitions (Narlikar, 2014; Ferguson, 2015). Although there is no agreement on what rising powers are precisely, scholars define a set of features that are common for such states. Before moving to my definition of this concept within the current research, I first discuss the existing literature and then, based on it, present my definition.

There is a general vision that they share a generally cautious attitude towards globalization, control over their economies, and leadership in the respective regions. In economies, rising powers tend to retain state control or at least involvement. Thus, according to some, they form integrated state capitalism that is understood as a non-liberal domestic economy and restrictive trade policies projected on the outside (Kennedy, Ashwani Kumar, & Messner, 2011; Stephen, 2012). Apart from economies, their domestic level is characterized by growing human capital and working conditions (Buitter and Rahbari 2011).

Rising powers are also leaders in their regions. They rely on the backing of the neighboring states and often serve as representatives of the regions on a global scale. The support of the neighbors does not follow automatically from their agreement on a rising power as a leader, but is maintained by material incentives or shared ideas. For the neighboring countries, it becomes beneficial to follow a rising power. Thus, an emerging power can gain leadership position only when it provides material benefits for others, forms and promotes shared ideas and interests, and respects the positions and preferences of its followers (Schirm 2010).

Emerging states also share a confident attitude towards globalization and global governance. As shown in the example of the economy, they are skeptical about everything that implies external control, especially that of the United States (Hurrell 2006; Kahler 2013). Some suggest that adherence to rising powers to restrictive trade policies was one of the main factors contributing to the failure of the Doha Round (Stephen, 2012). Thus, their position in the world is an in-between one: they are neither fully integrated nor riding free on their own. This position motivates them not to adopt West-led patterns blankly, but to either choose what suits them most, or even develop their own (Hurrell 2006).

Though still a subject of discussion, the main goal of rising powers is being recognized as peers of great powers and even replace them at some point. Though they can proclaim themselves as equals to great powers, there is still a need to be accepted as such by the broader international society (Culp 2016). Studies based on social psychology suggest there is a particular conceptual “we” – “they” distinction, that rising powers seek to overcome with the help of the socialization process (Terhalle 2011).

Nevertheless, the behavior of the dominant powers can be one of the borders for rising powers. Other limitations include their perception of the permeability of the elite club of great powers and legitimacy and stability of the status hierarchy.

The study by Larson and Shevchenko (2010) showed the evolution of behavioral strategies of the rising powers, based on the social identity theory. On the example of Russia and China, they find that both countries first applied the strategy of implementing Western norms and rules, but were denied the acceptance of the Western liberal community. This motivated these rising powers to turn to the maintenance of their peculiarities and developing cooperation among like-minded states (Larson and Shevchenko 2010). Thus, in order to become part of the elite, emerging powers need to be effective multilateralists.

Based on the discussed features and power debates, in this research, I apply the following definition of a rising power:

Rising power is a state with enough material and non-material capabilities to challenge the status quo and to pursue its goal to be perceived as an equal to other well-established great powers.

Relations between great and rising powers can take one of the three scenarios. First, there is a possibility of great power conflict, in which emerging powers are spoilers. Their goal in this situation is to revise the world order and overtake the power. The second option suggests a concert of great powers, where rising powers play the role of supporters. Here, emerging powers are among the responsible stakeholders of the global order, but do not share the great powers' understanding of global governance, preferring not to follow costly international commitments, as they might influence their domestic situation. The third option is characterized by entropy. The world is chaotic and rising powers are conflicting states without a single identity. They are constantly changing their identities, depending on the issue and targeted public (Schweller 2011).

The features mentioned above – suspicion about globalization, control over their economies, leading positions in the respective regions, shared aim to have a fairer global order based on equality and multilateralism – form a shared identity of rising powers. The core elements of it include a fight for a world order, characterized by multipolarity, non-intervention into domestic affairs of another state, and respect for international law. Part of the core interest that determines the identity is reforming global governance in such a way, that it institutionalizes social claims of rising powers (Mielniczuk 2013).

Another problem is the configuration of rising powers and which states to include in this group. The historical approach provides examples of single emerging and often revisionist states, for example, Prussia of the nineteenth century or Japan in the late twentieth. Nevertheless, today's reality dictates a different setting – groups of rising powers (Cooper and Flesmes 2013). As mentioned, international interest was awakened by the report of O'Neil, where he analyses fast-growing economies of the BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India, and China (O'Neil 2001).

What differentiates the current setting of rising powers from their predecessors is their ability to change and form agenda, to build coalitions promoting shared interests, and act as “brokers” in negotiations (Cooper & Flesmes, 2013: 949). This difference is crucial for distinguishing between purely economy-based features and a broader set of attributes. As for the existing examples of groups of rising powers, there is no agreement on the countries.

Some follow O'Neil (2001) and advocate for the BRIC. Despite losing the speed of economic growth (and some entering declining process), this group retains its global ambitions and deepens inter-group cooperation by establishing its institutions. In order to remain viable, the BRIC is also considering broadening the membership (Armijo and Roberts 2014a).

Another cluster of scholars looks at the IBSA – India, Brazil, and South Africa. Despite the main features that it shares with the BRIC – membership is based on shared interests, agenda-setting, and coalition building as the main tools to pursue the goals on the institutional level; divergent interests of the members – this grouping bases its discourse on the values of middle powers. Moreover, the IBSA lacks an institutional body that would try to deepen its integration. Together with power asymmetries and divergent interests of member-states, it limits their abilities to negotiate successfully globally based on shared preferences (Flesmes 2009).

Others focus on China only and state that it is the only state that can be called “rising” and be perceived as a challenge to the existing world order. Their argument is based on China’s unique constant fast economic growth, that is translated in its trade and peace initiatives (the most famous examples: One Belt One Road and aid provided to African countries) (Ikenberry 2008; Legro 2007; Rapkin and Thompson 2003). It also enables Beijing to have more outside options to pursue its interests than are available to other BRIC states.

The number of examples of what to perceive as the main rising power or group of such states is not exhaustive to the BRIC, the IBSA, and China. Other suggestions include sets with, for example, South Korea, Mexico or Indonesia.

1.2.2. Rising powers in multilateral institutions

Multilateral institutions provide the best platform for pursuing an equal status: they constrain the great powers that might block actions of the rising powers, provide voicing opportunities, give negotiation platforms, enable gathering information about positions of other states on all kinds of issues, moderate power asymmetries and create and supervise norms and rules (Hurrell 2006; Keohane and Nye 1985; Ruggie 1992).

In this work, I am using the definition of multilateral institutions suggested by Keohane. He sees multilateral institutions as a generic institutional form in international relations that coordinates relations among three and more states based on agreed principles of conduct that specify appropriate actions and behaviors for a set of issues, regardless of particular interests of involved parties (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane 1988; Ruggie 1992). For rising powers, multilateralism gives a forum for accomplishing their goals, so that there will be no need to confront the US and general Western prevalence directly.

Despite the general perception of institutions as initiatives of great powers, emerging and other states are interested in participation for various reasons. To name a few, institutions provide their members with public and club goods and lower transaction costs of decision-making. Moreover, they have clear-cut structures that embody the power hierarchies (Larson and Shevchenko 2010). At the same time, studies suggest that weaker states have more control formally, whilst great powers tend to be compensated by informal control of the institution (Stone 2013). In this situation, rising powers with their fast-growing capabilities can adjust their strategies within institutions accordingly.

1.2.3. Attitude patterns of rising powers towards multilateral institutions

Dissatisfaction with the current prevalence of the US-led world order and desire to preserve their sovereignty (meaning independence from interference into their domestic rules and affairs) motivate emerging powers to follow one of the two main strategies. First, they can form coalitions and promote their shared interests via them. They can also lobby particular preferences outside of coalitions as well. In this case, speeches, declarations, statements, and other agenda-setting tools are used (Biersteker & Moret, 2015; Hurrell, 2006).

Second, rising powers can establish new institutions (Culp 2016; Mazarr 2017). If the first approach (forming a coalition within an existing institution) is chosen, but emerging states remain dissatisfied with the existing rules and norms, they can make collective agreements more difficult. In this case, multilateral institutions need to act and adapt to new members; otherwise, they will use exit options (Stephen, 2014; Zürn & Stephen, 2010).

Overall, the attitude of rising powers within an institution depends on the type of institution and its features. Participation in a well-established multilateral institution can be difficult due to structural constraints, such as decision-making rules that favor individual states over the others (e.g., the veto power of the P5 in the UN Security Council) (Karns and Mingst 2004; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Overall, the growing influence of rising powers globally calls for their integration into multilateral institutions (J. Ikenberry, 2008; Stephen, 2012).

Those in favor of integrating emerging states base their argument on the following reasons. First, well-established institutions are interested in maintaining their relevance in new issue domains. Second, one of their goals is to maximize impact in the issue-area of their focus. To fulfil these goals, institutions need the engagement of not only old member-states, but also of the new ones that can provide new visions and bring their resources. Thirdly, there is a need to secure financial resources, to which rising powers can contribute (Biersteker & Moret, 2015).

Multilateral institutions can adopt emerging powers across various dimensions. Ideational one includes granting them a more prominent role in agenda-setting and strategic planning. This approach is often chosen by well-established institutions, for example, the WTO or the WIPO. Another option includes undergoing structural reforms so that rising powers will have equal opportunities in agenda-setting and decision-making (Biersteker & Moret, 2015; Ferguson, 2015).

The second option is rarely used by the old institutions but is advocated by scholars as an ideal approach. They make several suggestions. First, there might be a sort of bargaining: rising powers can share in the sphere of international responsibilities, like humanitarian aid and peacebuilding, in return for a more prominent voice in global governance. Secondly, studies based on social psychology propose that inter-group (great powers and rising powers) interactions will lead to agreements that gradually end in institutional reforms. Thirdly, rising powers can reach a higher position within an MI (multilateral institution) via “personalized interactions.” This approach suggests that informal structures such as the G20 promote this type of diplomacy, but due to difficulties in gathering empirical data, the area remains under-researched and mainly speculative (Mazarr 2017; Narlikar 2014; Terhalle 2011).

The question is whether rising powers should be integrated and eventually become part of the liberal world, or be recognized as peers that provide an alternative to the prevailing norms (Acharya 2016a). Those in favor of rising powers’ individualism, refer to the need for supporting multilateralism without any overarching idea. They indicate that by retaining their vision, emerging states do not bandwagon current great powers, but balance them. By remaining in an institution, rising powers seek ways to reform it so that their core interests (such as equal voice, access to the club goods, and multipolarity) will be institutionalized (Hurrell 2006; Kahler 2013; Mielniczuk 2013).

The second vision suggests that rising powers adopt the existing norms and rules, and as time passes, integrate their interests and preferences into the global whole. They become another set of great powers and lose the identity of a rising one. Those favoring this approach towards rising powers often base their assumptions on economies (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006).

The third approach stands aside from the discussed ones and describes the situation of member-states that are not content with their status quo in a multilateral institution as “contested multilateralism.” It appears when actors are not satisfied with an existing institution and either shift to another one or establish their own with competing goals. The phenomenon of contested multilateralism presupposes a coalition of actors within a multilateral institution that is not satisfied with the existing order and aims to change it. They do not question the institutional form as such, but rather, a particular institution. Typically, united dissatisfied actors have outside options and use them as a threat to the existing institution. In this case, if a threat is credible, the institution tries to adopt them, because alternative institutions would harm its authority. If this approach is successful, then contested

multilateralism is prevented. Nevertheless, their adaptation may still fail if veto players (or just a group of most influential actors) decide to block the changes due to their interests (Morse and Keohane 2014).

However, if the coalition cannot make credible promises to switch to an alternative institution, it undertakes actions that lead to contested multilateralism. Morse and Keohane (Morse and Keohane 2014) differentiate between two main types of their actions. First, there is regime shifting. Dissatisfied actors switch to another institution that has preferred rules and reflects their preferences. Secondly, they can go for competitive regime creation – establishing their institution or informal multilateral cooperation that challenges the status quo of the institution they are leaving behind.

Overall, rising powers are understood as states with material and non-material capabilities to pursue their political ambition being recognized as peers to the established powers such as the US. Although there is a grand vision to refer to rising powers as specific groupings (e.g., BRIC or IBSA), this assumption is based predominantly on economic and demographic factors, thus omitting their non-material capabilities and political ambitions. In this work, I am using the definition of rising powers as states having enough material and non-material capabilities to challenge the status quo, in particular, to be recognized as peers of the well-established powers.

1.3. Russia as a rising power and its foreign policy

1.3.1. Russia as a rising power

Using the definition of a rising power as a state with enough material and non-material capabilities to challenge their status quo and pursue the goal of being recognized as a peer of well-established major powers, there has been discussion of Russia - with its post-end of Cold War uneven economy and demography – belonging to the group of emerging powers. However, I argue that despite sharing many features with other rising powers, this country represents a special case due to its superpower history. As it was one of the great powers during its imperial times and one of the two superpowers during the Cold War, the ambitions of Moscow have always been to return to its great power status rather than remain a regional one (MacFarlane 2006).

Re-emergence as a great power, is what makes Russia a rising power in the current multipolar world that the country seeks to strengthen, suggests Glebov (2017). According to him, the

Kremlin belongs to the group of rising power thanks to its recent history of superpower. Moscow managed to re-appear in the global arena after the end of the Cold War and subsequent domestic crises as a member of G-8. Another distinguishing feature, is its successful usage of soft power that Moscow showed in the Ukraine crisis.

Although the country's economic growth has been uneven in the last decades, its soft power directed to the representation of Russia as an alternative to the West is only rising. As argued by Pieper (2019) and shown on the example of Russian participation in the Syrian conflict, this inevitably leads to norm diffusion and contestation. Within the context of security, Moscow proposes the notions of sovereignty, border stability, and non-interference into domestic affairs as an alternative to the existing norms. Thus, Russia corresponds to the concept of a rising power despite some of its material pre-conditions.

Burilkov and Geise (2013) support this vision, adding that passive power indicators (demography or production levels) do not necessarily translate into material capabilities. According to them, military spending offers a better ground for cross-state comparison. As the authors suggest, with the continuous improvement of technology and overall growth of military spending, Moscow can engage more in the international arena and therefore, enhance its image as a peacemaker globally.

Chatterje-Doody (2015) goes further and proposes that Russian adaption of multi-role and multi-direction approach in its foreign policy strengthens its role globally and contributes to its status of a rising power and challenger of the Western hegemony. The author distinguishes between three main areas, in which Russia successfully challenges the well-established powers and promotes structural changes in global governance that would favor rising powers.

Applying an approach of looking at rising powers as a social group enables making generalizations about their ambitions and strategies at the global level despite individual peculiarities of each rising state. Their goals include achieving a position equal to the one of the US', gaining a decisive voice in multilateral institutions dealing with economy and security issues, regional leadership and political and economic independence from external influences (Culp, 2016; Gvosdev & Marsh, 2014; Mankoff, 2009; Stephen, 2016). At the same time, Russia has its own peculiarities that make it stand out of the group: imperial past, the status of a former superpower, up-and-down development of the economy.

As mentioned earlier, achieving a new, multipolar world is among priorities for rising powers. The leading advocate for this is Russia, the legal successor of the USSR. The end of the Cold War also meant the victory of the United States that remained the only great power after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as rising powers gained material capabilities (such as economy and military), they started questioning and challenging the unipolar model (Cooper and Flemes 2013; Lesage and Graaf 2015).

Transferring unilateral US-led world order into a multipolar system, was the Russian long-term aspiration after Moscow lost its superpower status. The main goal was Washington's acknowledgment as an equal in the post-Cold War world (Lo 2015; Mielniczuk 2013; Morozov and Makarychev 2011). Despite attempts of the first Yeltsin's government to realize this goal, the US-led coalition undertook unilateral actions in Yugoslavia, while completely ignoring the Russian position there. The second pivot of Moscow aimed at re-establishing effective relations with Washington, during Putin's first presidency. However, like under Yeltsin, this was not successful, as the "color revolutions" allegedly supported by the US started in the post-Soviet countries – the traditional sphere of Russian influence (Gvosdev and Marsh 2014; Lo 2002, 2015; Trenin and Carnegie Moscow Center 2001).

1.3.2. Russian multilateralism

Lack of success in gaining equal status by establishing positive and productive bilateral relations with the US motivated Russia to turn to other means, i.e., promoting the multipolar world. As stated previously, this model presupposes that the international system has several "power poles" that attract middle and weaker states to follow the chosen pole. As the formative concept of Russia's foreign policy, it refers to a structure similar to the 19th century Concert of Europe, in which this country was among the core participants (Makarychev and Morozov 2013; Mankoff 2009).

This concert suggests negotiations among the most powerful states and thus, aimed at reflecting power hierarchy and relations in the world. The best example is the UN Security Council, where five powers have a veto that enables them to influence the decision-making process of the UN (Lee 2010). The idea of multipolarity as an ideal international system started for Moscow in the second term of Yeltsin with the bombings of Kosovo by the Western coalition. Later, it was documented in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2008) as an emerging trend. Already the next concept proclaimed the end of a unipolar world and the establishment of a multipolar one (2013).

As related to Russia, its role in the multipolar world consists of counterweighting dominance of Western democratic norms – the goal it pursued during the Cold War. The Kremlin will not be satisfied with any order that excludes it from decision-making, or at least not endorsed by it. This aim translates into leading the co-called Eurasian center of attraction. Its main feature is reliance and emphasis on sovereignty as non-interference of outside actors into internal affairs and foreign decisions of a state (Makarychev and Morozov 2013; Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009).

Russia promotes and supports this vision within its regional sphere of influence – the post-Soviet space. As stated earlier, it is typical for rising powers to be regional hegemons and to represent respective areas globally (Hurrell 2006; Kahler 2013; Schirm 2010). In the case of Russia, its interests in the area are multiple. First, Moscow aims at maintaining its influence over the post-Soviet states and prevent them from swaying to the West. The reasons behind this are numerous, and it is not the aim of this research to go into this deeply. To name just a few: post-Soviet states are still perceived as part of Russia (not soon, but the long term); there is a need to have a “buffer zone” with the West; expansion of pro-Russian regimes; shared culture and history (Cadier and Light 2015; Mankoff 2009).

Second, the Kremlin seeks not only to secure its position in the post-Soviet area, but also to convert the governments of its neighbors into pro-Russian regimes. This goal is closely connected to two main concerns: securing its position and providing an alternative to Western ideas. In the former case, authoritarian states like Russia seek ways to protect themselves from any cross-border pressure and having allied with standard domestic regimes, raises the likelihood of being recognized. The latter reason behind the promotion of non-liberal visions refers to the desire mentioned above to suggest an alternative way of governance. Moreover, the process cannot be characterized as one-way only; instead, it is multiple. Non-democracies themselves are interested in cooperating, as it gives them negotiating leverage over the predominant liberal vision (Ambrosio 2009; Hall and Ambrosio 2017).

To achieve these goals, the Kremlin uses two main types of tools: policy of managed stability and instability. While the former aims at maintaining the Russia-friendly government in relevant countries, the latter seeks to destabilize the situation. In pursuing either of the policies, Moscow uses direct and indirect tools of involvement. Indirect tools refer mainly to economic means, such as investing into economies, sanctioning pro-Western governments of post-Soviet states (e.g., sanctioning import of wine from Moldova or Georgia when the

countries changed their foreign policy directions), rising gas prices (e.g., the case of Ukraine after the Orange revolution), and demanding repayment of state loans. Direct tools include stationing of Russian military (e.g., in Belarus under the agreement on the Union State), open support of pro-Russian candidates (e.g., Ukrainian then-candidate for the presidency Yanukovich) (Tolstrup 2009).

The main arena where Russia (together with the like-minded actors) can promote its vision of the international system, is multilateral. As discussed earlier, multilateralism refers to the coordination of relations between more than three parties based on indivisibility, non-discrimination, and diffuse reciprocity. In reality, this often means that states transfer part of their power and authority to multilateral institutions. Therefore, one needs to look at what role Russia attributes to this type of institution.

As discussed previously, economy and security are among the top priorities for rising powers, and they seek to gain a chair among decision-makers in the leading institutions working in these spheres. The distinctively non-liberal character of rising powers' economies and their unexpected success in the early 2000s, motivated them to try to integrate into the existing Bretton Woods system, without substantial domestic reforms. As shown by Stephen (2012), the restrictive trade of rising powers was among the main contributing factors that led to the failure of the Doha Round and reform of the WTO. For rising powers, it meant a window of opportunity to build their institutions like the BRICS Development Bank.

In the sphere of security, rising powers tend to rely on the UN Security Council, whose sanctions are perceived by some (most often by Russia and China) as the "ceiling." In contrast, for others (often Brazil, Turkey, and India) it is a minimum. When it comes to nuclear proliferation, rising powers respond negatively to any unilateral actions, be it Iran or North Korea. They are signature parties to all major non-proliferation treaties (from the IAEA to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) (Gaskarth 2015).

As one of the central nuclear powers, Russia participates in all non-proliferation talks and negotiations over nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. Apart from natural interests in non-proliferation of unstable states, Russian engagement in the topic can be explained by its desire to maintain the status quo of one of the few nuclear superpowers. Moreover, participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime presents Russia as a valuable and reliable member of the international community. Given that it often acts as a mediator in the talks with

Iran and North Korea, its negotiations leverage is also growing (Lo 2015; Ven Bruusgaard 2016).

The importance of the Security Council for Russia has been extensively discussed (Cadier and Light 2015; Hedenskog 2005; Lee 2010; Lo 2002, 2015; Mankoff 2009; Trenin and Carnegie Moscow Center 2001; Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009). It remains the significant multilateral body in the sphere of international security and is the only one whose decisions are recognized as legitimate by the international community. Having a veto there means that Russia has a direct influence in the security sphere. When it comes to other institutions within this area, Moscow prefers to abstain due to its lower position there as compared to the UN Security Council.

Another branch of multilateral institutions is regional. As part of its post-Soviet hegemony, Russia actively participates and promotes all regional integration projects in which it participates (Wilson 2017). Apart from viewing local Russian engagement as part of its continuous, direct influence on its former dependents, there is a more complex vision. It divides the post-Soviet space into two main parts: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, where in each of which, there is a conflict of interests. In this situation, Russia plays the role of a third power that everyone is comfortable with (Molchanov 2015; Naarajärvi 2012; Pourchot and Stivachtis 2014).

Overall, with rising powers as states with enough material and non-material sources to challenge the status quo and pursue the aim of being recognized as equals by the well-established great powers, the Russian case stands out of the group due to the country's history as one of the two superpowers during the Cold War. Its engagement with multilateralism is rooted in Moscow's goal to secure its position internationally, which is entirely consistent with the desires pursued by other rising powers. In this constellation, multilateral institutions play an important role as global governors attracting members that challenge the current world order – rising powers (Prakash and Potoski 2010).

Chapter 2: Theory and concepts

The main aim of this chapter is to provide insight into theoretical milestones that form and frame the argument of the dissertation, to place it into the greater discussion of the existing literature. Therefore, the structure of the current chapter mirrors the former one. I start with the theoretical framework that is at the core of this research; then, I move to the main concepts and their definitions. Together, the two chapters set the scene for the research hypothesis introduced at the end of this chapter.

2.1. Rational functionalism – the theoretical framework of this work

As discussed in the previous chapter, despite existing alternative theoretical frameworks, this research applies rational functionalism. The main reason behind the choice of this theoretical approach is its respect for multilateral institutions as independent actors while recognizing the equal importance of states (Martin & Simmons, 2002). Coming from the neo-realist and liberal institutionalist camps, rational functionalism is best suited for the Russian case. As discussed above, this country's choice of MIs to participate in is based on rational functionalism. At the same time, after joining a MI, the state becomes subject to rules and norms governing there.

As a member of about a quarter of all multilateral initiatives (22% of all multilateral institutions), Russia is subject to institutional rules and norms. Moreover, rational functionalism recognizes the role of an individual state's choice, which plays one of the leading explanatory roles in the Russian case (Blake & Payton, 2015; Wendt, 2001).

Before moving further to rational functionalism, one needs to recall its origins. Functionalism in its original form, suggested that a problem arising because of interdependent relations between the actors inevitably leads to the emergence of some organizational form intended to solve it. Its successor – neo-functionalism – agrees on the form follows function assumption.

Rational functionalists proposed a different view at the relations between a state and an institutional arrangement. They emphasize the actors' perception of the structure: whether or not it suits their preferences and interests. States, according to them, choose attitude patterns – the dependent variable of this research design – based on their assumption about the consequences' optimality given the current interests (Carlsnaes et al., 2002; Held & McGrew, 2002).

Due to the focus of this work on Russia – an interest-driven state that chooses an institution depending on possible benefits – it is appropriate to turn to a more detailed description of rationalism. As mentioned earlier, this research profits from the focuses of this theoretical framework on a states' vision of multilateral arrangements, states' cooperation out of self-interest and their relations with institutions through the principal-agent lenses.

The broad explanatory framework of rational functionalism is particularly interested in explanatory designs that seek to shed light upon relationships between states and institutions. One of them is a rational choice design, which derives from liberal and neoliberal scholarships. Neither of the two schools has been homogeneous. Although they both agree multilateral institutions exercise influence in political, economic, and social outcomes, there is no agreement on how they do it (Gutner, 2017; Snidal, 2002).

One such sub-group is rational choice institutionalism, that perceives states as self-interested, rational actors that follow their preferences and can be “given” (exogenous) and stable. For multilateral institutions, this means that their role is to provide the framework for fruitful cooperation of their members. They are perceived as actors shaping the strategic context in which states make their choices (Gutner, 2017). According to the principal-agent model (PA), member-states transfer part of their powers to institutions to lower transaction costs of policy-making. For this research, it means respecting the reasons behind the choice of MIs and further transfer of power to MIs.

The principal-agent model has been extensively used in a high number of studies. For instance, Hawkins (2006) studies delegation of power by the United States to various international development banks. In his work, he does not concentrate on the US as a single actor, but sees it as a collective principle that consists of various groups (e.g., lobbies, Congress, the President). His work shows that by focusing on the state as a single unit, one may easily fall into a bias of missing diverse single groups that stand behind. Therefore, the case study part of this research looks beyond the state as a unity and addresses qualitatively the governmental structures of Russia one by one.

Reykers & Smeets (2015) look at Russian behavior in the UNSC decision-making during the Libya case. In their work, they suggest three-level delegation that consisted of the delegation of members to the UNSC, then from the UNSC back to members or regional MIs, and, finally, from members to NATO. By deconstructing the delegation, the authors show how Russia tries and fails to oppose NATO intervention by the P3 (France, Britain, and the US).

They also provide insights on the institutional drawbacks, including loss of control over the resolution once it was passed. With the insights of the PA, their research presents the importance of analyzing the initial positions that members hold and the influence of states' control over institutional decision-making.

Overall, scholars working with rational choice generally share the following assumptions: First, they assume that actors have a fixed set of interests and preferences, based on which they develop consciously calculated strategies of behavior. Secondly, they emphasized the incentive structure that influences the actors' choice of strategy (Carlsnaes et al., 2002; P. A. Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Rational functionalist scholarship suggests several behavioral patterns for the member-states that, according to Stein (Stein, 1990), depends on the state's character type. First, states can be conservative, which means that regime survival is their top priority. Second, countries can choose a risk-accepting path and accept chances when choosing between possible gains or losses. For the Russian case – the focus of the current research – this means accounting for the regime specifics that can influence the state's attitude towards MIs.

Another dimension of states' behavior in multilateral institutions is coordination or cooperation. The latter is most likely when members share common interests or, surprisingly, misinterpret each other's strategies and aim for a better outcome. Coordination is mainly the result of frequent aversions (Stein, 1982, 1990).

While rational functionalism adopts realist focus on states as major actors, it respects the role of multilateral institutions and regimes. This scholarship perceives institutions as both constraints of states' anarchic behavior and objects rationally chosen by individual countries. For those working within this theoretical realm, institutions wave short-term incentives of states to change their mind and enable them to concentrate on the long-term benefits of multilateral cooperation (Martin & Simmons, 2002).

The world system, according to rational functionalists, is complex. It is characterized by rising political and economic interdependency, a growing number of treaties, agreements, and all types of institutions. At this point, rational functionalism goes beyond its realist and liberal fathers and seeks to answer the question: "Why do states decide to transfer some of their power to multilateral institutions?" This question is close to the issue of the Russian choice of MIs to participate in. In this query, adopters of the two approaches and their colleagues'

rational functionalists refer to the realist and neo-realist dilemma of international collective action and suggest institutions as a solution (Gutner, 2017; Rittberger & Zangl, 2006).

In answering the posed question, adherents of rational functionalism go beyond the prisoners' dilemma primarily discussed by their predecessors. They suggest and discuss another set of problems. Each division of the set refers to institutions and suggests their role in problem-solving. Collaboration problems are comparable to the prisoners' dilemma. When searching for a solution, partners need to adopt a proper strategy, they assure preference of the long-term benefits, and rely on centralized mechanisms (low transaction costs) (Martin, 1992; Martin & Simmons, 2002).

Coordination problems present several equilibria, among which participants can choose. In this case, institutions, again, save the transaction costs. Another type is suasion problems appear when a hegemon attempts to pressure the others, and they seek to constrain his power. The fourth kind – cooperation – comes in the case of too many participants with diverse interests. This situation is characterized by a high number of incentives to cheat, defect, or renege. Assurance problems exist in cases of unequal access to decision-making and lack of transparency (Martin, 1992).

Multilateral institutions can minimize problems related to collaboration, coordination, suasion, cooperation and assurance. For rationalists and functionalists, institutionalized structures are states' responses to these problems. Partners deliberately establish institutions to solve the discussed problems. However, when particular challenges arise, there are two possible responses. First, institutions may act on their own as an individual entity. Second, member-states may decide to modify them (Koremenos et al., 2001).

That is the standard choice, which rising powers face when they develop a negative attitude towards MIs. For Russia (a member of a broad range of institutions), this means either building a coalition with the like-minded, or using an institutional structure for its benefit.

The same authors (Koremenos et al., 2001) analyze how certain institutional features reflect the number of member-states, their interests, and the world system. The features include membership rules, the scope of issues covered, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institution and the flexibility of arrangements. Variations within these independent variables indicate the reasons behind institutional design. One of the core ideas of their research, is that the design and effectiveness of multilateral institutions (given that an arrangement is

negotiated to solve particular problems) depends on the features of their member-states and generally, on the state of global affairs. It is then logical to suggest that there exists a relationship between a state's attitude towards an institution and institutional features.

In their work, Kosov and Griбанова (2016) use rational functionalism to look at the cooperation between the Baltic Sea states, the EU, and Russia within the Strategy for the Baltic Sea region. The authors focus on how Russia changed its attitude from negative to positive in this regional multilateral initiative in the Baltic Sea. Due to Moscow's uneasiness towards this project and its importance for problem-solving in the region, member-states of the strategy suggested dealing with external actors via already existing regional organizations that include Russia.

Summing up, this dissertation bases its hypothesis and argumentation on rational functionalism. This framework was chosen due to several reasons. First, it absorbs assumptions most relevant for the study of the multilateral side of Russian foreign policy: choosing an institution to join based on the costs and benefits; interdependent relations between members and institutions. Second, the rational functionalist approach recognizes the importance of both – states and institutions – and looks at their interdependent relations. Third, it suggests a relationship between institutional features and choice of strategies by the states. In this argument, the chosen framework differs from the classical liberal institutionalist vision that states' interests, identities, and preferences are fixed (Martin and Simmons 2002).

Based on the discussion over defining multilateral institutions, in this work, I refer to them as an institutional form coordinating relations between two and more states based on agreed principles of conduct. Rational-functionalists and institutionalists broadly discuss this term. According to them, what starts as cooperation reflecting everyone's interests, then evolves into a pooling system, which reduces transaction costs and enables concentration on decision-making (Held and McGrew 2002). Therefore, multilateral institutions are bodies, to which states delegate some of their powers in order to achieve mutual benefits.

2.2. Rising powers and Russian place among them

Rising powers, as discussed in the previous chapter, share many features – from being leaders of their regions, to maintaining their sovereignty from external intervention in all spheres and control over their economies (Culp, 2016; Kahler, 2016; Stephen, 2014). In my definition, I unite some of the features that are most suitable for this dissertation. Within it, I refer to rising

powers as states with enough material and/or non-material resources to challenge the status quo. As their goal is to be recognized as equals by the well-established great powers, emerging powers pursue representation on the global level.

As broadly explored in the previous chapter, rising powers seek to use multilateral institutions for their benefit: be it access to private goods previously available to the club members only, or voice opportunities. As of the beginning of the 21st century, the institutional level is still dominated by well-established institutions that were set after the Second World War and reflect the global order of that time with the prevalence of the United States. Based on material capabilities, emerging powers seek options to gain the same status as the US. Their behavior is also displayed through the attitude – the focus of this research (Culp 2016; Narlikar 2014). Before proceeding to the hypothesis, I first discuss the existing literature debate over the different strategies that rising powers apply to pursue the goal of recognition as peers.

First, in case of satisfactory functioning of an MI (multilateral institution), rising powers are active members of multilateral institutions. They build coalitions based on shared interests and use existing voice opportunities while representing this coalition. The question remains, whether they shall accept governing norms and rules promoted by Western countries, or provide alternatives to that (Culp 2016; Kahler 2016).

The second option appears when emerging states are not satisfied with the institutional structure (e.g., decision-making or/ and agenda-setting rules). In this case, they can take a revisionist position (also referred to as a spoiler) within an institution. Thirdly, rising powers can use outside options and build their institutions with similar (or the same) functions (e.g., New Development Bank by the BRICs) (Acharya 2016a; Kahler 2016; Schweller 2011).

As for Russia, which is the case study of this dissertation and a special case of rising power, it is sceptical towards globalization and ideas promoted by this process. Instead, Moscow strengthens regional integration processes and together with other rising powers, seeks to form an alliance that is able to counterweight the United States. Secondly, Russia still holds the leading position in the post-Soviet region: it presides in all regional integration initiatives and promotes further liberalization of trade. Thirdly, like other rising powers, Moscow successfully preserves full control over its economy while trying to prevent it from any external influence.

The following part of the chapter will be devoted to Russian national interests that motivate Moscow to pursue the strategies described in the previous chapter.

2.3. Russian foreign policy: its interests, goals, and approaches

Most scholars agree that Russian foreign policy behavior can be characterized as one of an “instrumental multilateralist.” The Concept of Foreign Policy refers to the Russian rationalist attitude toward choosing engagement in multilateral institutions when it suits its goals. It closely relates to Moscow’s general assertiveness in foreign policy – selecting what is best respecting the current situation and core national interests. Scholars have different visions about what constitutes this attitude. Some (Shelling 1997) suggest that reasons are hidden in the Russian perception of multilateralism as coordination of actions, rather than promoting and adherence to prevailing norms. Others (Tsygankov 2010, 2014) think that it is domestic conflicts among the political elite that resulted in the victory of the so-called “military cohort” with its focus on realist world visions.

Generally, one distinguishes the following recurring themes. Firstly, the primacy of sovereignty and territorial integrity is one of the main topics for all rising powers. They perceive it not only as of the state of non-war or lack of military threat from external powers, but also as non-interference into their internal affairs in the form of investment into civil society (non-governmental organizations, movements, events, sometimes even election monitoring) (Terhalle 2011). For Russia, this topic became highly relevant after the “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet countries that were supposedly supported by the United States. The National Security Concept (2009) names the country’s sovereignty among the two most important foreign policy interests. It is also repeated in the most recent version of the Concept of Foreign Policy (2016) and the National Security Strategy (2015).

Secondly, the prevalence of international law is vital for rising powers in general, as it guarantees the sustainability of the current peaceful world order. Although they challenge the existing system, they do not question its legal basis, but try to use it for their benefit (Acharya 2016b). Russian Foreign Policy Concept from its beginning (1993) centers on the international law and criticism of the Western countries that continuously violate it in their actions. The most recent amendments to the Constitution³ confirm the prevalence of Russian

³ Amendments were proposed in March 2020 and approved during the people’s voting on July, 1, 2020.

Constitution and Russian public legal order, over decisions of international courts and inter-governmental institutions (Art.79, art. 125 5.1b).

Thirdly, pragmatism or assertiveness of rising powers was broadly discussed previously. This group of states tends to determine its choice of diplomatic approach (bilateral, unilateral, or multilateral) based on the current situation and their preferences at the moment (Kahler 2013). First mentioned in 2000, this concept is being transferred onwards and is then cemented in the official discourse overall. In general, pragmatism refers to following Russian national interests, realizing them and building coalitions when it is beneficial (Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2016).

Fourthly, the promotion of Russian worldviews through soft power tools is perceived as fair, given the long-time prevalence of the Western idea. Although the 1990s and Putin's presidency at first were characterized by a lack of any clear alternative to liberal world order, Russia in the 2000s re-emerged with its vision of the world. While pursuing a direction of re-establishing itself as a great power, Moscow suggested and started promoting the system based on sovereignty principles that are not necessarily democratic or liberal. However, it adopts the same tools used by Western countries – think tanks, non-governmental organizations, foundations, and research centers (Cadier & Light, 2015; Concept of Foreign Policy, 2016).

Apart from the discussed main interests in foreign policy, Russia has recurring themes that dominated its discourse. First, is the status of the country. It is a joint agreement now among the political elite that the fall of the Soviet Union was the catastrophe that led to the loss of the premier place in the world (President, 2005). The economic successes of the 2000s enabled claims to international recognition as a great power, which entered Russian official documents around the same time and continue dominating governmental rhetoric since then (Cadier and Light 2015; Lo 2015).

Secondly, Russian multilateral engagement remains in low politics (social and financial issues). This dealing often results in dead-end negotiations with often only symbolic results. Thirdly, Moscow prioritizes bilateral relations, which is most visible in the example of the European Union, where Russia has a web of bilateral agreements (Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009).

Despite general preference to bilateralism, Russian multilateralism has its peculiar features as well. Firstly, Moscow prefers its efforts to be acknowledged by leading states. Respected studies are proving Russian willingness to receive economic or political capital in return for its multilateral efforts (e.g., the Kremlin expected economic benefits in return for freezing its trade with North Korea). Overall, Moscow is more a devoted bilateral actor, which is seen in its financial contributions (Zagorski, 2009), because it hopes that its input will be noticed.

Secondly, the normative dimension of multilateralism often provokes a negative reaction of Russia. This issue is closely connected to Moscow's adherence to low politics and its intolerance of any involvement in its domestic affairs. Thirdly, Russia seeks to defend its spheres of influence that are believed to remain in its ownership after the fall of the Soviet Union (Cadier and Light 2015; Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009). For example, Russian officials often refer to the broadening of the NATO eastwards as an act of aggression, which goes against the promise given to Gorbachev on the eve of the end of the USSR.

2.4. The hypothesis of the current research

The above discussed concepts – multilateral institutions, rising powers, and Russian foreign policy – seek to answer the research question of Russian attitude towards multilateral institutions and to provide explanations of the state's behavioral patterns.

Rational functionalism – the theoretical framework of this work – presupposes that states are self-interested actors following their goals and preferences in their behavior. For multilateral institutions with a high number of member-states, this means that participants who are not great powers can either free ride, or seek renegotiation of the existing agreements (Acharya 2016b; Koremenos et al. 2001).

In the case of rising powers, the situation is complicated by their choice of multilateral institutions in which to participate. In general, emerging powers tend to avoid membership in costly international commitments that might lead to interference in their domestic politics and possible control over their economies. Nevertheless, membership in leading multilateral institutions is key to gaining the desired status in the global arena along with recognition of the “significant others” (Culp 2016; Schweller 2011; Terhalle 2011).

The question remains what attitude rising powers hold vis-à-vis multilateral institutions in which they participate. As discussed above, their behavior can take several forms depending on current preferences and goals. As a broadly satisfied member of an institution, rising

powers can form coalitions based on shared interests and preferences in order to promote them within the institution. As a dissatisfied member, they can complicate collective decision-making, turn to outside options, or establish new institutions (Culp 2016; Gaskarth 2015; Hurrell 2006; Mazarr 2017).

Behind the attitude of rising powers is their institutional position. As argued by Rapkin & Thompson (2003), the institutional hierarchy and the aim of emerging powers to control or change rules and norms governing a MI that they join, can lead to potential conflicts with the establishing members, if the institution does not adopt them. The inability to realize this goal and constant dissatisfaction with an institution might also lead to using exit options – establishing of MIs in which they are the ones deciding on governing rules and norms (Acharya, 2016a; Stephen, 2014).

As for the choice of multilateral institutions (to join and to establish), rising powers prefer those working with hard issues over institutions working with soft issues. The main reasons for this argument are the following: firstly, rising powers are believed to favor hard issues, since they are situated among their core national interests (Hallding et al. 2013; Terhalle 2011). Within this research, I adapt the concept of hard issues from political psychology that refers to them as technical issues, close to the core of national interest. It is political elites who draw the link between the two. Soft (“easy” according to political psychologists) issues, on the contrary, find an immediate response with the general public (Johnston and Wronski 2015; Pollock, Lilie, and Vittes 1993).

Secondly, as emerging powers gained negotiating capital in the relevant spheres, they are more reluctant towards soft issues, that furthermore, might cause changes in the domestic regimes (Acharya 2016b; Kahler 2013).

When it comes to Russia – a specific member of the rising powers group – the most recent Concept of the Russian Federation lists predominantly hard issues (economy, national security and sovereignty, strengthening of Russian position globally) among the core national interests. Besides, many explain its preference for such issues by Soviet heritage, when Moscow abstained from participation in soft-issue institutions, as it feared involvement in its internal affairs (Cadier & Light, 2015; *Koncepciya Vneshney Politiky Rossiyskoy Federacii*, 2016; Thorun, 2009).

Based on the existing studies, this research hypothesizes that

H₁ When Russia holds a strong position in a multilateral institution established after the end of the Cold War, it leads to the country's support for the IO.

H_{1.2} When Russia is among the co-establishers of an institution established during the Cold War and maintains a strong position there, this contributes to the supportive attitude.

H₂ When Russia holds a weak position in a multilateral institution, this leads to its challenger position within the IO.

Within the H₁, I also consider the distinction between the establishment period of the institution that resulted in a sub-hypothesis. When Russia – one of the two superpowers – co-established multilateral institutions during the Cold-War, the country held a very strong or dominant position in the decision-making since the start of its functioning. With the fall of the USSR, Moscow co-founded institutions as one of the rising powers. Although the new status still granted a strong position in the decision-making, the characteristic features changed.

Being a co-founder, Russia became one of several other emerging states despite its special position. As the former superpower during the Cold War, the country lost its status afterwards. In the Post-Cold War, it had an uneven development period compared to other rising powers – members of such groupings as BIC or IBSA. Yet, Moscow has never abandoned the goal of re-emergence as a great power, which the country actively pursued due to risen material and non-material capabilities (Chatterje-Doody 2015; Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Pieper 2019).

Moreover, multilateral institutions can be divided by those established before and after the Cold War. Together with switching the roles within them, the distinction on their establishment aims at providing information on Russian behavioral patterns.

Overall, I intend to contribute to the rich literature of rising powers and Russian foreign policy by answering the question of what is the attitude of Russia towards multilateral institutions and what explains the choice of its patterns of deviations by testing the above-discussed hypothesis. While Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001) in their famous research were among the first to suggest that the design of an institution depends on its member-states, I turn to another side of the question and test how an attitude of a member-state depends on an institution and state's position in it.

By focusing on the hard issue institutions, while taking into account other control factors like establishing period or territorial scope, I aim at drawing a full picture of Moscow's participation in multilateral institutions as a unique example of rising powers' group.

Chapter 3. Research framework of the dissertation

This chapter is devoted to the methodological endeavors of the dissertation. It deals with how the empirical data is approached. As mentioned above, this research seeks to answer the questions: what is the attitude of Russia towards multilateral institutions and what factors contribute to it? The research hypothesis suggests that Moscow is either a supporter or a challenger of a multilateral institution. The attitude depends on its position of dominance in an institution.

Based on my theoretical framework, I expect Russia to be an active supporter in cases when it holds a strong position in an institution (co-establisher or founder) and to be a challenger when in a weak position (in case of joining a West-led institution).

This framework is tested in two ways – quantitatively and qualitatively.

The quantitative part consists of a large-scale automated text analysis mapping Russian attitude across several dozen IOs. In empirical terms, an active supporting position can be interpreted from the positive/fluctuating sentiments of a large number of these entries. As for the challenger position (situations in which Russia is passive or revisionist), it is presented by the opposite: entries with predominantly neutral or negative text sentiments. In the qualitative case studies on OSCE, SCO, and WTO, the attitude of Russia is captured more broadly, based both on public statements of Russian officials and on specific behavior and actions taken by Russia.

Since this work uses a mixed-method approach, I will follow its structure in laying down the concepts and methods used in the research. In it, I test my hypothesis quantitatively and qualitatively. First, a quantitative approach was used to grasp Russian participation in multilateral institutions. Then, qualitative case studies are undertaken to provide a better overview of Russian behavior in the chosen institutions. Due to work with textual data, I will focus on linguistic literature that was the first to suggest relevant methodological approaches.

I will start with the introduction of the main methodological concepts and approaches applicable to the textual data. Then, I will explore the approaches used in this study and their alternative. After that, I will proceed to the case study analysis, the choice of the case studies and a deeper description of the data and will discuss the research design.

3.1. Quantitative analysis

This part of the chapter deals with the quantitative data gathered about the Russian attitude towards multilateral institutions. It consists of several steps, starting with a dataset of all multilateral institutions that Russia is a member of. Then, sentiment analysis of the online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation was conducted. The subchapter is organized in the subsequent order and starts with the description of how the dataset was prepared, with the discussion of it following in the subsequent chapter. Then, I proceed to the presentation of data collection, which is done with content analysis.

3.1.1. Dataset

The first step of the data analysis consists of comparing multilateral institutions in which Russia participates with the dataset by Blake and Payton (Blake and Payton 2015) that was based on the Correlations of War project (COW). While the COW focuses on membership changes over time (starting from the 19th century until 2014), Blake and Payton do not take this variable into account and build their argument around voting rules. As I am more interested in the current constellation of multilateral institutions, I rest the main list of institutions from the dataset of Blake and Payton.

They consider the period after the Second World War and organizations with a minimum of three members, a permanent secretariat and regular plenary sessions at least once in 10 years. This makes it 334 organizations established after 1943, as Blake and Payton (2015) arguably do not include four institutions established by colonial powers on behalf of dependent states. However, after double-checking their dataset, several institutions were found to no longer exist (e.g., Entente Council). Overall, this made it to 323.

As the next step, I turned to the avoidance of further biases. These moves included the exclusion of the UN family (e.g., the International Rice Commission, International Seabed Authority) and World Bank-related (e.g., Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) institutions. The reduction was made in order to have only those institutions remaining that do not intersect in their aims and goals since institutional features play a vital role in the research hypothesis of this study (more on features will follow in the chapter devoted to the dataset). In the case of the UN, I excluded UN funds, programs, departments, and offices, as they cross in their functions and goals, e.g. UNFPA and UNICEF or UNSSC and UNITAR. Thus, the dataset includes only UN specialized bodies, which act autonomously from the UN, and work

with this umbrella-institution via negotiated agreements (e.g., FAO, ICAO, or ILO). After the described subtraction, 66 institutions in which Russia participates were left.

APEC	International development association	North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission
Arctic Council	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
Black Sea Economic Cooperation	International Finance Corporation	Nuclear Suppliers Group
CIS	International Hydrographic Organization	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Collective Security Treaty Organization	International Maritime Organization	OSCE
Common Fund for Commodities	International Mobile Satellite Organization	Paris Club
Council of Europe	International Nickel Study Group	Partnership for Peace
Council of the Baltic Sea States	International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund	Permanent Court of Arbitration
EBRD	International Olympic Committee	Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications
Eurasian Economic Community	International Org. Legal Metrology	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	International Organization for Standardization	The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering	International Organization of Vine and Wine	Universal Postal Union
Gas Exporting Countries Forum	International Plant	WFTU

	Genetic Resource Institute	
General Confederation of Trade Unions/ International Confederation of Trade Unions	International Seabed Authority	World Bank
Group on Earth Observations	International Sugar Council	World Customs Organization
IBRD	International Telecommunication Satellite Organization	World Economic Forum
ILO	International Telecommunication Union	World Intellectual Property Organization
IMF	International Whaling Commission	World Meteorological Organization
International Atomic Energy Agency	Inter-Parliamentary Union	World Tourist Organisation
International Chamber of Commerce	Interpol	WTO
International Civil Aviation Organisation	Joint Insitute for Nuclear Research	Zangger Committee
International Court of Justice	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	

All of them were subsequently checked for the availability of data in the online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation – the main source of primary quantitative data of this research. As many of them do not gather attention (in technical terms transformed into any entries, i.e., statements, press releases, fact sheets, and alike), they were subtracted from the dataset as well. This action lowered the number of overall observations to 53.

This difference indicates Russian indifference towards some of the organizations in which it participates. In other words, its membership does not translate into press releases, facts sheets,

or any other type of diplomatic statements related to any activity in an institution – and relates to the attitude pattern “not interested.”

In my dataset, I turn only to those institutions that Russia is a member of and which are mentioned in the ministerial entries. As noted in the methodological chapter, in the definition of a multilateral institution, I share some features (minimum of three members with agreed principles of conduct) revealed by the COW project and Blake and Payton. At the same time, I transfer the COW dataset v.3 with Blake and Payton annotations into my research. Thus, while I adopt their list due to one of the most exhaustive datasets of international organizations, I added multilateral institutions that were not mentioned in their work, but fall into the concept and of which Russia is a member.

3.1.2. Text as data

Since the primary data of this research is textual, some explanation on its peculiarities is needed. This part is devoted to the description of what is understood under “text,” how it is analyzed and alternatives to the chosen research design.

Text as a concept originated in linguistics, where there is no unity on how to define it. Earlier scholars put texts within generative grammar and saw them as no more than a string of sentences. However, since the 1970s, it became accepted that purely formal principles are not enough for a definition of a text, as they make it semantically meaningless. At the moment, a dominant point of view exists that for a text to be called such, it needs to have “referential” (small units, often nominal groups, throughout the text refer to the same mental referent throughout the text) and “relational” (there is a connection between text segments, often clauses) coherence (Brown and Anderson 2006, vol2, p. 599).

Overall, a text can refer to “[...] any extended and contextually situated and functional piece of language behavior” (Bateman 2014: 13). Generally speaking, texts can take spoken and written forms, but this research focuses on the latter. This approach is supported by Matthews (2007), who recognizes the existence of an alternative point of view that the oral form of text exists. According to him, a text is an interchange that involves two or more participants and stretches of writing.

As mentioned above, it is textual data that is at the core of the quantitative part of the current research. The data for this research is taken mainly from the online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The archive consists of all types of documents

uploaded there: official statements made by the state representatives, press releases, fact sheets, interviews given to the home and foreign media, speeches, briefings, articles written to home and foreign media and commentaries. For practical reasons, a generalization of “entries” will be used instead of listing all the types.

The choice of the source is based on the goal of the research – to provide an elaborated picture of Russian state behavior in multilateral institutions, which is represented in multilateral institutions by its government. Although the presidential office also makes statements and issues press releases, their online archive (kremlin.ru) crosses with the ministerial one and does not cover the same time period.

Moreover, according to Article 80 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the President directs Russian foreign policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implements it. Therefore, the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for data gathering is a relevant choice.

3.1.3. Diplomatic language and its specificities

The main peculiarity of the archive used in the current research is the language of diplomacy. Therefore, one needs to define diplomatic language and its features. According to Burhanudeen (2006), Slavik (2004), and Sofer (1997), there are five distinctive features of diplomatic language:

- Emphasis on what ought to be said instead of ought to be avoided
- Language as a tool of peace-, promotion, making, and building
- Avoid potentially aggressive, offensive, and destructive language
- Tactful and tactical communication
- Constructive perspective for one’s expression

More than 4000 years ago, the first diplomatic letter already contained the features that today are associated with diplomacy – neutral in its essence; it was written in the lingua franca of its time. Over the course of human history, as the interactions between the states grew, so changed the diplomatic language. It rose from bilateral to multilateral relations and has to take cross-cultural differences into account. As a result, diplomatic language started to rely more on symbols so that diplomats can recognize and understand each other (Oglesby 2016). Before proceeding further into constituent parts of diplomatic language, I would like to describe the context in which it exists.

One of the reasons why diplomats had to adopt this language is their role in society. A diplomat has more extensive relationships as compared to other people, yet at the same time, personal relations are not relevant. Diplomatic protocol prescribes a sense of estrangement for diplomats. Although they are among equals, diplomats find themselves in a unique social situation, where they represent national interests and not themselves. One of the possible explanations lies in the European history of diplomacy. Diplomats were the ones responsible for post-conflict phases overall and negotiating peace treaties in particular, while passionate monarchs went into wars with each other. Therefore, diplomats cannot exercise friendliness or empathy (Hofstede 2004; Oglesby 2016; Sofer 1997).

For that reason, diplomatic etiquette promotes controlling one's feelings. On the technical part, diplomatic language provides diplomats with words and expressions that broadcast anticipated content without insulting an opponent. It guarantees them the right to be understood by the professional community (Slavik 2004). Indeed, a diplomat acts within an institution placed in a broader governmental structure. In the case of Russia, this is the above mentioned Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Generally, the bureaucratization of diplomatic relations, their institutionalization means subordination of diplomatic agencies to states' governments that set goals and provide support. Individual employees and representatives of diplomatic services are limited in their work by the organizational structures. Apart from administrative work and implementation of foreign policy directives, ministries of foreign affairs fulfill three main functions: gathering information, policymaking, and memory keeping (Faizullaev 2014).

This principal-agent hierarchical structure of relations suggests a two-level game in which domestic politics influences the state's international relations. At the national level, a party seeks to win the highest governmental position in the country. It forms a government and sets foreign policy goals that are to be exercised by the ministry of foreign affairs. Parallel to that, national leaders try not to disappoint their domestic voters in the international arena. The same complexity is felt by the state's opponents. Therefore, the ministry and its representatives are not independent in either its decisions or in its activities (Hawkins 2006; Putnam 1988).

I also consider personal psychological changes that happen with diplomats once they start working for the ministry and represent a country internationally. In this role, they not only transmit the vision of a particular state but are also part of the same-minded diplomatic


community existing in the institution (Schmitt 2020). As the archive was composed (and continues to be) by the professional diplomats, it is relevant to look at peculiarities of their personalities that influence the language they use. The internal changes that diplomats undergo have been studied by social psychologists since the end of the Second World War. The most famous work was done by the research group of Tajfel (1974), who developed the social identity theory (SIT) that sought to dissect a group and find out about their self-perception. This is especially relevant for my research, as their results uncover how a member can identify itself with a group and consequently, share the same feeling. Their primary finding (relevant for the framework of the current research) was that every group exists only within the context of other groups so that features of social group identity are acquired in comparison with the others. Moreover, their experiments proved that members of a group identified themselves with it so profoundly that they preferred their ingroup members to the others, adopted groups' perceptions.

Further research was done by Tajfel's followers and developed the SIT into the self-categorization theory (SCT). The SCT focused more on the move from personal identity to a group one. Although the two theories share the basis, the SCT looks more at the individual level and the processes that take place there. The main category that distinguishes this theory from the SIT is depersonalization – perceiving oneself as an interchangeable group member. The group identity does not only describe what it is to be a group member, but also prescribes behavior, emotions, and attitude in a particular context. Belonging to the group becomes a determining feature of a person. Sometimes, they identify themselves more with the ingroup than a non-member of another group (Hornsey 2008; Sasley 2011).

Overall, the ministry of foreign affairs consists of many individual diplomats that implement foreign policy goals set by the state's leadership. They fulfil the job by communicating with other states' ministries of foreign affairs. As indicated earlier, due to its specificities, diplomatic language serves as a guarantor of successful cross-cultural communication.

The work of a diplomat consists of several stages: gathering information, transmitting via signals and decoding the signals. For the current research, I will focus on the second only. To be more specific, that is diplomatic communication, which is perceived through theoretical lenses of communication theory. This approach implies various models of how communication works depending on the goals of the researcher. In short, diplomatic

communication, like any other type of communication, can be pictured as following (Cioffi-Revilla 1979):



This graph represents the basic one-way model only. Derived from the Shannon-Weaver model, it consists of: the source – the foreign policy decision-maker; message – intended product of the decision-maker, transmitter – actor translating the message into signals (the message cannot be passed to another actor in its original form for a variety of reasons); (possible) noise from the third source of communication; receiver gets the signal but needs to decode it (and remove noise if necessary) before it reaches the intended destination (Cioffi-Revilla 1979).

The model shows perfectly at which stages diplomatic language is used: starting from the transmitter – as it aims at hiding senders’ original goals – ending with the destination when the message is decoded. Moreover, the model highlights the features of diplomatic language that have already been discussed at the beginning of the current subchapter – emphasis on what shall be said instead of what ought to be hidden; avoidance of destructive, passionate, or offensive language; tactful and tactual communication; a constructive way of expression (Burhanudeen 2006).

This definition presupposes that diplomats are also decoders of ambiguous messages that they give each other. Despite the necessity to transmit the content, there is a need to hide national secrets and have some flexibility. In practice, ambiguity leads to the duplicity of meanings and, as a consequence, more time spent on formulations. However, it does not refer to the prepared communication only (e.g., press-releases or official statements). As the SIT and SCT suggest, group features become constituent parts of its members. Even in interviews – a genre of speech presupposing answers without preparation – diplomats tend to answer in the same ambiguous manner, although this is the realm of public diplomacy (Graham 2014; Jonsson and Hall 2003).

The current perception of a diplomat as an estranged person, developed during the Renaissance and is based on the rationalist philosophy that separated emotions from rationale. A diplomat was believed to be a transmitter of decision-makers' ideas and thoughts and therefore, not entitled to have his or her feelings. Although diplomacy is understood as an art of communication, it has to take new technologies into account and is no longer reserved for the closed circle of diplomats (Jonsson and Hall 2003; Slavik 2004).

Linguists look at diplomats in comparison with politicians, as from their point of view, the two share many functions in terms of language. Firstly, actors engaging in political or diplomatic communication are highly professional; they have their language that corresponds to the goals of communication and is understood by all its users. Secondly, diplomatic and political types of language share semantic factors: abstract and broad meanings, vague borders of meanings, ideological polysemy (Terentii 2010).

The difference becomes apparent in the qualitative part of the current research. It looks at the statements, speeches, and other forms of communication executed by both parties involved in decision-making and realization of foreign policy – Russian diplomats and politicians.

There is an interdependence between peculiarities of diplomatic language and the way diplomacy functions. Firstly, one should pay attention to the social factor – a relatively small circle of people exercising diplomacy. Secondly, although the receiver side is more extensive than it used to be before the 20th century and consists of the media and broader public, this calls for combining information dissemination, agenda-setting, and projection to future and past. When it comes to communication with peers, diplomatic language aims at informing and motivating action. The two goals are realized by high formality, rituals, content novelty, relevancy and adequacy of information presentation (Terentii 2010).

Overall, the institutionalization and ritualization of diplomacy call for diplomatic language to be mainly neutral in its connotation, as it is vital for the outcomes of communication (Jonsson and Hall 2003). Therefore, I focus on deviations from neutrality – positive and negative emotions (more on this issue below).

i. Positivity

Generally, positiveness implies confidence, effectiveness, determination, absoluteness and full certainty. In the context of communication, positiveness to the attitude, result, dynamics

of potential, person, the form of communication and its genre (Anon 1994b; Hornby and Wehmeier 2009; Leontovich 2014; Matthews 2007; Summers 1993).

Compared to the English sources, Russian dictionaries are more limited in their description of “positive.” It is either based on facts or affirmative. However, if one looks at the synonym of the Russian “*позитивный*” – “*положительный*” – the line of associations comes close to the English one (Lopatin and Lopatina 1993; Ozhegov and Svedova 1995).

The National Corpus of the Russian language suggests that the concept of positivity can be combined with the following: tendency, dynamics, whole, economy, result and assessment (Kutuzov and Kuzmenko 2017). Overall, positivity in the Russian natural language is associated with affirmative, favorable, supportive, encouraging, optimistic, effective and constructive. As for components of the concept, they include positive intentionality, adaptation to the conversation companion, empathetic listening (Leontovich 2014).

ii. Negativity

Negativity is defined as bad, harmful, refusing, prohibitory, doubting and not constructive. The concept is most often associated with equity, evidence, feedback, income, instance, pole, proposition and virtue (Anon 1994b; Hornby and Wehmeier 2009; Matthews 2007; Summers 1993). Dictionaries of the Russian language do not give a precise description of “*negative*” – “*негативный*” – and explain the word via its synonym “*отрицательный*” – “*adverse*.” According to the Russian sources, “*negative*” refers to refusing, bad, possessing bad qualities, malign (Lopatin and Lopatina 1993; Ozhegov and Svedova 1995).

The National Corpus of the Russian language suggests that the concept of negativity is combined with the following words: instability, factor, decline, assessment, media, frequency, consequence, and toughening (Kutuzov and Kuzmenko 2017).

Overall, as compared by the dictionary meanings, the perception of negativity in Russian is close to that in English.

iii. Neutrality

Neutrality is often perceived as a lack of emotions – positive or negative (Belyaeva 2011). The current research looks at neutral emotions and relevant entries from the same point of view. Within its framework, neutrality is understood as abstention from emotions and the attempt to be as uninvolved as possible.

As discussed above, neutrality is a standard state of diplomatic language for a variety of reasons – above all, its high ritualization and institutionalization.

3.2. Content analysis

Due to the focus of the current research on texts and what is hidden in them, there are two major methods that can be suitable – discourse and content analyses. Since the current study is more interested in the analysis and categorization of text and not the process of communication, discourse analysis did not seem to be an option.

Content analysis as an approach of text analysis is conventional among social and human scientists. However, there is a point of view that text analysis is a part of content analysis, since text analysis studies only are written forms, while content analysis is also occupied with non-written forms of content (Neuendorf 2017).

Overall, along with testing hypotheses about texts (Bernard, Wutich, and Ryan 2017). The main difference between content and text analyses is that content analysis “[...] goes beyond syntactic analysis to semantics [and] is only minimally concerned with conversational protocols [...]” (Carley, 1994: 725).

As for the strategies, linguists point out to the three main ones existing in their sphere of knowledge. First, there is conceptual analysis referring to discovering what concepts are present in a text. Here, one differentiates between explicit and implicit analysis. While the former works with concepts (and their frequency) that are clearly in the text, the latter has to uncover implicit concepts first before proceeding to frequency location (Carley 1994).

The second strategy is the procedural analysis used mostly for automation purposes. It differs from the conceptual in the way that the sentence order is essential. The reason behind this is that the focus of this type of analysis is on the action and decision sequences of the author of a text. Like in the above-discussed conceptual analysis, there are two approaches in the procedural analysis. On the one hand, there is a decision-based procedural or protocol analysis aimed at detecting rules used by the single author to perform specific tasks. On the other hand, there is a plot-based procedural analysis focused on the story by multiple actors (Carley 1994).

The relational analysis is another strategy on how to analyze concepts. It looks at them as independent units and searches for relations between them. Within this analysis, there are numerous techniques – affect extraction, proximity analysis, assorted cognitive mapping. The

first one refers to the emotional evaluation of explicit concepts in the text. The second one is counting of explicit concepts within a pre-determined window of text. Cognitive mapping is more complex and is based on mental models as internal representations with a language as the key to it. These models can be represented by numerous schemes (e.g., conceptual structures and semantic planning nets) (Carley 1994).

As a research technique, it is an analysis of important matter (in most cases, texts) that is valid and replicable. It consists of human (or manual or hand-coded) and computer-aided text analysis (Krippendorff 2013; Neuendorf 2017).

The popularity of content analysis grew with the rise of knowledge in and quality of technology. In the early history of content analysis, its methods were not as developed, the best example of which is the study of American newspapers done by Wilcox at the beginning of the 20th century. The study of political propaganda during the Second World War initiated a new period in the history of content analysis, as the new methods started to be used. By the mid-1950s, content analysis became an established method in political science (Bernard et al. 2017; Krippendorff 2013; Neuendorf 2017).

What differentiates content analysis from other types of text analyses (discourse analysis or narrative analysis⁴) is its eagerness to meet scientific standards. This goal translates into meeting the following standards:

- Intersubjectivity, as objectivity is perceived as attainable in the context of texts, since they are written by many scholars.
- Combination of deduction and induction, where the steps of analysis are differentiated according to practical reasons (e.g., computer coding and dictionary are set *a priori*)
- Reliability
- Validity
- Generalizability
- Replicability

⁴ Type of analysis with the focus on the text as a story or experience. The researcher takes into account the context – historical events, setting, writer’s personality – in which the text was written. In a sense, narrative analysis lies on the borderline between linguistics and literature (Carley 1994; Robert and Shenhav 2014)

- Hypothesis testing based on theory (Neuendorf 2017)

3.2.1. Steps and rules in content analysis

Deducing from the scientific nature of the content analysis, its typical process that meets the above-described criteria can be presented as follows:

- 1) Preparatory steps include preliminary work with:
 - a) Existing knowledge and content. One prepares one's concepts, hypotheses, and research questions.
 - b) Conceptualization - deciding on what variables will be used.
 - c) Operationalization. The chosen measures shall match conceptualizations.

Preparatory steps of my research meant preparing a list of institutions from which the data shall be taken from the online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Parallel to that, concepts of positivity, neutrality, and negativity in diplomatic language were developed. Also, they found their empirical matches in the number of entries vis-à-vis the hypothesis.

- 2) Process of inference that can be differentiated into:
 - a) Human (or hand-) coding that includes developing a coding form and a codebook with all measures fully explained.

At this step, a sentiment dictionary (Appendix 1) was prepared. It consists of words and word structures that bear positive, neutral, and negative connotations. Three Russian native speakers coded 30 randomly chosen entries from the corpus under observation. The procedure consisted of extracting words and word structures from the 30 entries that according to coders, indicate positive, negative, or neutral sentiments. Then, their commonalities were gathered in the sentiment dictionary, as, for example, the word *удовлетворены* [udovletvoreny] indicating positive sentiment.

This is also the step at which types of entries were differentiated based on the responses of coders. If there is no identification of the type of document, it is identified as a press release, because it is an official statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its online archive that can be used by a broader audience. In the case of a document with two identifications – the first one is noted for coding purposes.

If a document has a two-part name (commentary and answers to questions), then only the first identification is noted.

- b) Computer-aided text analysis (CATA), in which a codebook with full explanations is still needed, but there exists a possibility to use internal dictionaries that go with applied software. An alternative solution is the creation of a custom dictionary – one created from frequencies from the researcher’s text sample.

This step consisted of trying the sentiment dictionary (Appendix 1) from 2a. on the software that processed each entry⁵. The choice was made due to the unavailability of sentiment dictionaries on the Russian diplomatic language.

- 3) Sampling is done in order to have a representative subset of the population. In other words, sampling aims at the generalizability of the found patterns.

In the current research, the subset of institutions directly related to the UN family (or other institutions already listed, e.g., UNDP) is excluded.

- 4) Training and initial reliability is done when one needs statistics of possible content. During such sessions, coders find variables, on which they all agree and in an independent test note the intercoder reliability of each variable. The procedure falls into two main phases: designing and refining the coding procedure.

This step was united with 2b in order to form the sentiment dictionary (Appendix 1). Coders’ responses that differed from each other were noted in the alternative sentiment dictionary for the intercoder reliability test that follows in the sixth step.

- 5) Coding step can be taken differently depending on whether it is a manual or CATA process.

- a) At least two coders are doing the coding independently, with at least a 10% overlap. When it comes to their qualifications, they should be able to work repetitively and monotonously. Also, the coders need to understand the concepts they work with, as well as the coding instructions. Therefore, it is advisable to take coders from similar cultural/educational/ professional backgrounds. An alternative way to secure coder reliability is manifest coding, which was broadly

⁵ All the documents can be found at <https://github.com/DrUlysses/KateProg2>

used in the early history of content analysis. In this technique, one codes words and phrases in the text that point to a particular theme. Over time, with the technical and statistical developments, latent coding became more popular. It relies on taking context into account and aims at indicating themes that are present in the text (Bernard et al. 2017).

- b) Applying prepared dictionaries to the samples for having per-unit frequencies for each dictionary.

The 5b is the approach chosen in this research, as it seems most appropriate for the goals of the study – to capture sentiments in the diplomatic language, which differs from the regular one in its functions and expression. Application of prepared dictionary also allows processing large numbers of observations, which is the case of this research with more than 15.000 documents.

- 6) Intercoder reliability is done in case one opts for manual (or hand-) coding. It is normally calculated during the coding process with a reliability figure, such as Cohen's kappa.

For the sake of comparison, several intercoder coefficients are calculated for comparison reasons. This action prevents falling into a limitation of any of them.

- 7) Reporting that can take different forms depending on the needs of the researcher (Krippendorff 2013; Neuendorf 2017).

3.4. Sentiment analysis

Emotional or sentiment analysis as defined as taking into account that emotion is “internal mental condition rather than external or physical conditions, are clear cases of states of being rather than frames of mind, and have a predominant referential focus that is affective rather behavioral or cognitive” (Carley, 1994: 729).

In the field of international relations, sentiments are relatively under-researched due to the scholarship's focus on reason and rational behavior. However, this part of human behavior is involved in all stages of decision-making. Emotives bear the illocutionary and perlocutionary forces that contribute to the influence of a speaker to mobilize a listener. The former type refers to the ability of a speaker to assure a listener in their ability to pursue the articulated policy. Perlocutionary force relates to the ability of a speaker to affect a listener (Ariffin 2016).

Yet, when it comes to inter-state relations within a multilateral institution, there is a link between emotions and social as well as power markers, as Coicaud (2017) shows on the example of the UN. Although all UN members are equal according to the UN Charter, non-democracies tend to have lower status within it, not least because of the hegemons that bear democratic norms and values. This difference between the regime types can be seen on the emotional content translated by the members. One of the main examples, is disregard of Iraq's sovereignty when the Iraq War was launched by the Anglo-American coalition.

Yet, the impact of emotions does not refer to international relations in the sense that they might be reasons for war or peace (with the possible exception of dictatorships). Rather, as discussed by Ariffin (2016), attitudes translated through emotions or sentiments bear cognitive and behavioral components can lead to certain follow-up policies. Here, the perfect example would be President Bush's speech in 2002 in which he referred to Iraq as a threat promoting a negative attitude towards this country among the audience. In this way, emotives the President employed are not only part of foreign policy agenda, but were also used to facilitate collective action (Anglo-American invasion in Iraq that started in 2003).

In their work, Larson & Shevchenko (2014) trace the emotions of Russia in Moscow's recent foreign policy (from the Yeltsin's presidency in the 1990s until the Ukraine crisis) and their influence on foreign policy decision-making. The authors suggest that anger from non-recognition by the West as an equal and status grievance after the end of the Cold War are among the driving emotions of Russian foreign policy that is aimed at reinstating the great power status of the country. On the regional level this is marked by Russian anger over the color-revolutions, for which Western influence was blamed, and the war with Georgia – the country that openly stated its willingness to join the West and NATO to Moscow's displeasure. On the global level, Snowden's refuge in Russia and later intervention in Syria on the side of Assad were used by the Kremlin as showcases of prestige and self-representation of an alternative to the US.

Before proceeding to the short history and a broader discussion of sentiment analysis, I would like to go deeper into the concepts of emotions, sentiments, and attitudes and how they differ from each other.

3.4.1. Emotions, sentiments, and attitudes

Emotion – a unit of study in sentiment analysis – is a complex concept that is hard to grasp in the definition. Thelwall, Wilkinson, and Uppal (2010) suggest dividing an emotion into

psychological and sociological definitions. The former focuses on the “human” dimension of emotions and proposes that they are often felt in combinations of each other. Moreover, this definition differentiates emotions into basic (e.g., fear or anger) that can be supplemented by physical signals and their perception is culture-specific and fundamental.

The second type of research that preoccupies itself with emotions is a sociological one. From this point of view, emotions are understood in the framework of the social network. In other words, the sociological approach looks at the role of sentiments in various interaction situations (e.g., ritual, cultural, or symbolic interactionist). It emphasizes how the expression of people’s emotions may be influenced by context and previous experiences. The main distinction between psychological and sociological approaches is that while the former focuses on the individual as the one expressing emotions, the latter looks at groups of people (Thelwall et al. 2010).

When it comes to the focus of this research – international relations, each of the international relations’ theories, understand the place of emotions on its own. While neorealists deny their existence, their fathers – classical realists – recognize the significance of emotions. Rational choice theory, which is often used in the case of Russia, focuses on the demands of cost-benefits and self-interests and respective emotional dimensions (Bozhilova and Hashimoto 2010; Coicaud 2017; Gel’man 2004).

There is also a point of view that emotions in politics are unavoidable, especially when it comes to judgments, values, identities, and forming necessary relations. Apart from that, emotions are believed to shape the perception of decision-makers and their thoughts of an object (Graham 2014).

The main remaining question is how such big units as nations or multilateral institutions have emotions. One can differentiate between three main approaches to answer this question. Firstly, one can look at the state as a single actor. Nevertheless, this way of thinking would not provide much room for empirical research on the state’s emotions, as it is unclear whether emotions matter. Secondly, one can look at state leaders as the representative of the country and the primary decision-makers. However, they are not the only participants in international relations. Thirdly, a scholar can look at a state as a group. This method came to the sphere of international relations from social psychology and focuses on group experiences (Sasley 2011). Given the primary source of data of this research – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation – the third approach seems to be the most suitable.

In the case of states, they can be perceived as human groups of a particular kind. Deriving from social psychology, the term “nation” can be defined as a sovereign human group that holds a unique identity shared by its members. This term refers to the self-identification of each person and a broader community (Cox, Low, and Robinson 2008).

Since it is states that are the focus of international relations, emotions become an integral part of it. In other words, international relations themselves are nothing more than “[...] the sum of the intersubjective relations on which they depend (and of which they eventually are composed)” (Roy, 2016: 83). International relations may look at interactions between soldiers on the battlefields as well as at state representatives negotiating a peace treaty. However, both types of actors are representatives of particular nations and become constitutive particles of international relations (Coicaud 2017).

Sentiment as the concept is sometimes used interchangeably with emotions relying on the social definition of emotions (Driscoll 2015; Thelwall et al. 2010). Sentiments share the appraisal’s features with emotions – they are motivated by some object. However, their nature is multidimensional, as this includes actions (e.g., seeking and accepting information about the object of affection) and various behaviors to which sentiments might lead. The primary feature that sets sentiments aside from emotions and attitudes is that they include concerns – “[...] internal representations of the preferred state that serve as standards against which the actual states of the world are tested” (Frijda, Mesquita, and Van Goozen 1991: 213).

Overall, sentiments have the same structures as emotions; like passionate emotions, they can motivate actions (perlocutionary force), but on the deeper level, sentiments are dispositions, while emotions are incidental. There is also a relationship of interdependency between emotions and sentiments, as one can arise from another. Emotions can give birth to a sentiment, e.g., love that may start from joy and satisfaction or emotions arising from disappointment with oneself (Frijda et al. 1991).

Sentiments are the central units of sentiment analysis. Apart from words like *awful*, *satisfactory*, or *marvelous*, they can take the form of phrases or idioms. In order to prepare a lexicon, one can take a dictionary-based or a corpora-based approach. The former is based on manual compiling a sample of sentiments and broadening it by adding more their synonyms from dictionaries and thesauruses. The latter approach type takes into consideration that the same sentiment words, phrases, etc. can change their tone depending on the context (also to take conjunctions into account) (Zhang and Liu 2017).

Within the frames of this study, I will not differentiate between sentiments and emotions, since my focus does not go beyond the distinction between positive, neutral, and negative scale that exists in both concepts. Therefore, I will use the terms sentiment and emotion interchangeably.

As for the concept of attitude, I will look at it through the use of sentiments (positive, negative, or neutral – without particular specification, e.g., fear). As emotions are reactions to particular events and situations, they can influence the behavior of an actor in this particular context. Additionally, as discussed above, emotions bear illocutionary and perlocutionary forces motivating the emergence of action readiness and (sometimes temporarily) “belief changes”(Frijda et al. 1991).

Within the sphere of international relations, the influence of sentiments has been broadly studied in conflict management and negotiation, international law. As noted by Roy (2016), international relations presuppose intersubjective relations that, in their turn, include sentiments. He also refers to interstate relations within the sentiment paradigm, seeing them as relations between nations consisting of real people. Coicaud (2017) agrees with this argument and adds that sentiments are an inevitable part of interstate relations that accompany the material side (e.g., power hierarchies).

In social sciences, overall, sentiment analysis is used interchangeably with opinion mining (Driscoll 2015; Pang and Lee 2008; Zhang and Liu 2017). Yet, within this research, the term sentiment or emotional analysis will be used, since the unit of research interest is an emotion translated through sentiments (positive, negative, or neutral).

As the name suggests, the goal of this type of analysis is to extract and analyze judgments from the text. This goal might be split into two parts – detecting the part of the text containing the sentiment and the strength of the emotion (sometimes also their polarity) (Thelwall et al. 2010; Zhang and Liu 2017). However, this research focuses on the first part only.

Emotional analysis, if intended, is beneficial as it uncovers the author’s hidden goals, expectations, indicate the status of interpersonal relations, influence thematic structures that appear in memory. For the researcher, emotional analysis poses specific problems, the biggest of which are the categorization of emotions, choice of those to be analyzed, and their operationalization. Although universal dictionaries already exist, they all differ in their categorization approach (Carley 1994). Another difficulty concerned with the choice of using

an existing dictionary is that most of them are not available for the Russian diplomatic language – the focus of this research.

There are two main levels of analysis, amongst which the scholars differentiate sentiment analysis. First, it is a document sentiment classification. It focuses on the positive-negative division only and is often classified as a supervised learning problem with two classes. In other words, this is an analysis focusing on the division into two classes only and is based on the pre-processed material (Zhang and Liu 2017).

An example of a corresponding study was done by Mueller and Rauh (2018), who used supervised machine learning to predict armed conflicts based on the newspaper articles. They used a multi-step process. Firstly, they use the overall and the within models to make a forecast about conflicts based on the information available to a decision-maker. Here, they refer to binary classification problem – outcomes are either positive for the start of a conflict or negative for the opposite. As for the data, the newspaper articles are analyzed with the topic model that presupposes that a text consists of some topics. The last step of their analysis brought the previous ones together and presented their results.

There are also unsupervised methods that can be applied to document sentiment classification. One of them is the usage of sentiment or opinion words, and another one is adopting a lexicon. It applies a set of prepared opinion words and phrases with appropriate scores together with an aggregation scheme to classify the sentiments. The main problem of the supervised methods is that they depend on the source. The lexicon that was effective in one case might be ineffective in another case study (Zhang and Liu 2017). That is one of the main reasons against using them in this research that embraces the whole archive, while using a lexicon or sentiment from another source might bias the results.

As Denny and Spirling (2018) note in their study that unsupervised machine learning still lacks concrete guidance. In the same work, they compare various approaches of unsupervised machine learning and conclude that wordfish, for example, might produce different results depending on specifications that one gives.

The second level of analysis is a sentence sentiment classification. In this type, a sentence is considered as hosting information like a short document. Indeed, this poses a problem for analysis, as there might be purely informative (meaning lack of any emotions) or neutral sentences. One of the solutions for these problems is taking into consideration the type of the

analyzed sentence, e.g., conditional (often consisting of clauses dependent on each other). The distinction between subjectivity and objectivity poses another problem. Whilst as a rule, objective sentences contain only facts, they can subtly convey an author's sentiments towards a fact. Subjective sentences may contain subjective expressions with clear positive or negative sentiments but without any clear emotions of their own (Zhang and Liu 2017).

3.4.2. Dictionary-based computer-aided content analysis

Despite limitations, a supervised lexicon-based approach seems most suitable for the current study due to peculiarities of the diplomatic language, that is predominantly neutral and various types of documents that are in the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the main source of data of this research. It presupposes, taking into account the distance between the sentiment and its object in the sentence. It uses the sentiment dictionary (consisting of sentiment words, expressions, and idioms, see Appendix 1), a set of rules for various languages and sentence types, and a sentiment aggregation function to find a sentiment for each target (Zhang and Liu 2017).

One of the best-known works dealing with sentiment analysis was the one by Young and Soroka (2012), who looked at the tone of the media (the *New York Times*). This is also the research that comes closest to the aims and goals of this one. The main difference to this study lies in the data – Young and Soroka (2012) focus on the media that has a wider variety of tonality, whilst this research looks at the diplomatic language that is predominately neutral. Yet both studies base their work on self-developed dictionaries, that grant them a comparative advantage since the dictionary derives from the language used in the research to which it is applied.

In their study, the authors focus on the overall tone of the article – positive, negative, and neutral. The unit of analysis was the whole article, and coders assigned the tone to the whole unit, not to a paragraph or a sentence. Manual coding was compared with the automated done based on the Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary. By engaging both hand- and computer-coding, the authors provided a comparison that proved strong with professional coders. In my research, I replicated some of their steps to ensure the validity and reliability of my approach.

A similar (in its methodology) study was conducted by Burscher, Vliegenthart, and Vreese (2016), who use automatic sentiment analysis to recognize tone and theme prevalence in the news coverage of the nuclear debate over time. Both studies – one by Young Soroka and

(2012) and the one by Burscher et al. (2016) – are based on the assumption that the media emphasizes certain aspects of an issue covered and, thus, shapes public opinion about it.

Although the primary method of Burscher et al. (2016) is cluster analysis, they apply manual content analysis on a sample to validate the results of the computer analysis. In this work, I rely on the CATA while securing reliability by turning to manual content analysis of a sample from the overall dataset as well. This approach secures the validity of the quantitative analysis and allowed further step – case study analysis of the institutions from the dataset.

Like Young and Soroka, Burscher et al. (2016) base their study on the existing lexicon – SentiWordNet (SWN), as it has the highest coverage known. The authors of the lexicon suggest that positive and negative take the central role, while neutral is perceived as the rest (Gatti, Guerini, and Turchi 2016). Due to the peculiarities of diplomatic language, I adopt the same procedure that enables me to focus on the deviation from neutrality.

In both mentioned studies, the authors focused on the media as the source for their data, which limits the replication of their methodologies in the current research that is based on the high bureaucratized and institutionalized diplomatic language. As mentioned earlier, the focus of this research is the recently released online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Its language peculiarities were not grasped by either existing dictionaries (e.g., Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary), or lists of sentiment words and expressions that exist for everyday Russian. Moreover, neither of the mentioned alternatives takes into account peculiarities of the diplomatic language – high institutionalization, low emotional coloring and professional wording.

Preparing a dictionary of emotives for the current research consisted of the following steps:

1. Three Russian native speakers manually (or hand-) coded 30 randomly chosen entries from the corpus under observation. As discussed above (chapter 3.3.1), they extracted words and word structures that, from their point of view, indicate positive, negative, or neutral sentiments.
2. The coders' answers were compared and the commonalities summarized in the dictionary of sentiments. For example, *укрепление* [ukrepl'enije] indicating positive sentiment, *неблагоприятный* [neblagoprijatnyj] – negative sentiment, and *выступает* [vystupajet] – neutral sentiment.

3. An alternative dictionary consisting of all responses was saved and used later for inter-coder reliability.

As the online archive consists of a broad range of documents – press releases, statements, fact sheets, commentaries, articles (journal or newspaper), laws, speeches, press conferences, along with interviews of officials and representatives given to domestic and foreign media; I refer to them as “entries.”

Once an entry is downloaded from the online archive, it is assigned to one of the multilateral institutions depending on the archival search engine.⁶ For instance, the entry named as OSCE01.08.2001 was in the archive as *О Реализации Рамочного Документа Организации по Безопасности и Сотрудничеству в Европе «О Лёгком и Стрелковом Оружии» и о Порядке Предоставления Российской Федерацией Информации, Предусмотренной Этим Документом* [O Realizacii Ramochnogo Dokumenta Organizacii po Bezopasnosti i Sotrudnichestvu v Evrope „O Legkom i Strelkovom Oruzhii“ i o Poryadke Predostavlenija Rossijskoj Federavijej Informacii, Predusmotranoj Etim Dokumentom]. After downloading, I re-named it according to the institution’s name and the date of the document’s issue. Since the entry appeared under the OSCE in the archive, it was assigned to a relevant multilateral institution.

After that, each entry is analyzed with the help of the content analysis software⁷ and indicates its emotional connotation. It does it in several steps. Firstly, the software calculates a mean of words in a sentence across the document. Then, the researcher enters the name of the multilateral institution she is interested in and uploads the sentiment dictionary (Appendix 1) that is applied to the text of the entry. The list of emotional words and expressions is based on the designs described by Neuendorf (2017) and Krippendorff (2013).

Entering the institutional name commits two functions. Firstly, it is needed for the mentioned calculation of the mean between an emotional word or expression and the institutional name (main word). This step prevents the analysis from indicating sentiments that do not refer to the institution under investigation. Secondly, with this step, I also double-check the document if it contains the name of the institution under observation.

⁶ The online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (mid.ru) enables one to search for entries by the name of a country or a multilateral institution. A document can be then downloaded freely in .pdf format.

⁷ The documents can be found at <https://github.com/DrUlysses/KateProg2>

The software⁸ focuses on the link between the name of a multilateral institution and an emotive from the uploaded dictionary. As described above, based on the calculated mean of sentence length in an entry, the software provides information on the number of emotional words and structures connected to the multilateral institution of interest. In other words, it uses a bag-of-words approach⁹, in which grammar is disregarded for the sake of multiplicity (Young and Soroka 2012). However, it shows only those words and structures that are situated within the distance of the previously calculated mean. Thus, with the example OSCE01.08.2001 mentioned above, the software indicates the average of nine words in a sentence and suggests nine positive sentiments and three neutral. After calculating the mean of sentiments in this entry and the percentage of each sentiment found (75% of positive and 25% of neutral), the text is noted as positive.

In short, the overall coding procedure was done according to the process described by Neuendorf (2017). After conceptualizing emotions, I operationalized them by turning to the words and word structures in entries done by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which I analyzed with the help of the self-developed software (computer-aided text analysis or CATA) based on the codebook (hand-coded/ manually coded)¹⁰. As described above, the coding proceeded in a per-unit frequency. Then, the final reliability intercoder check (consolidated dictionary of sentiments versus an alternative one) was applied in such a way that an alternative dictionary (the one including all responses of the coders) was used on the massive of the data.

Percent agreement (number of agreements divided by the total number of cases) of the dataset is $PA_0 = A/n$. A here stands for the number of agreed observations between the coders, n – the overall number of observations.

The result of this research is $PA_0=17465/19535=89\%$

Cohen's kappa ($\kappa = (PA_o - PA_e)/(1 - PA_e)$) is another test for the reliability of the data based on the agreement between the coders. In the formula, P_o refers to the proportion of observed

⁸ The necessary documents can be found at <https://github.com/DrUlysses/KateProg2>

⁹ The “bag-of-words” approach and its variants are concerned with the frequencies of words or n-grams (or phrases) without taking syntax into consideration (Monroe and Schrodt 2008).

¹⁰ The necessary documents can be found at <https://github.com/DrUlysses/KateProg2>

agreement, PA_e – the hypothetical probability of chance agreement. The latter is calculated by bringing together the probabilities of coders agreeing and disagreeing (Neuendorf 2017).

$(0,89 - 0,0415) / (1 - 0,0415)$ of this research dataset is 0,89, which makes the strength of agreement between the dictionaries almost perfect.

The empirical results in the dataset and statistical tests of the discussed variables are discussed in more detail in the following chapters that summarize and apply the information presented in the current one.

3.5. Qualitative Part – case studies

This part is devoted to the presentation of the core methodology of the qualitative part of the dissertation. It starts with an overview of the case study as a method, and then explains how the case studies were chosen. Based on the research hypothesis, each of the case studies represents one of its elements. All of them were chosen based not only on the sentiment average but also on the highest number of entries (signalling attention paid) to focus only on those that are most politically significant

Given the goal of the study – Russian attitude towards multilateral institutions – this method was chosen as it enables tracing the correlations in the state's attitude over the observational period on several case studies. Apart from the tracing function, it enables an in-depth analysis of each institution that provides a more extensive picture than one with the quantitative analysis only.

To secure the representativeness of the case studies, I pursue unveiling causal mechanisms. The procedure in the causal investigation starts with finding a correlation by statistical means that is then further analyzed in a case study (Gomm, Hammersley, and Foster 2000). This is the course of action undertaken in the current research. Firstly, the quantitative part reveals the correlations that are later examined in the relevant qualitative parts.

Generally, case study research can be distinguished into intrinsic, instrumental, or collective. The first refers to the study of a case out of interest in the case per se. The second type – researcher chooses a case based on the theory or research question, and the case is aimed at bringing more insight. The last type – collective – refers to looking at several cases that build a collective understanding of an issue (Simons 2009). According to this classification, the current research falls into instrumental, since the case of Russia can bring more insight into how rising powers behave in multilateral institutions. Moreover, the cases themselves were

driven from the hypothesis based on the broader pool of literature on rising powers and multilateral institutions.

Gomm, Hammersley, and Foster (2000) go deeper and suggest their classification that depends on the character of how cases are written up. Firstly, there is a configurative-idiographic study that aims at „understanding“ (*Verstehen*), but when this is attained, the results cannot be quantified and, therefore, generalized. The second option is a disciplined-configurative study that is closely linked to the chosen theory of an inquiry. The main obstacle for using this type is that the theory used presupposes only a specific case to be applied. Another type is heuristic case studies that are based on a sequence of inquiry used for theory-building. The fourth option is a crucial case study used for theory-testing. What is vital for this type of study is that a case fits a theory as closely or as far as possible.

The fourth type seems most suitable for the current study since the research hypothesis can be applied to any of the observed institutions, while only three were chosen to test it. Also, other types fail to serve the goal of this research; for instance, a heuristic case study suggests that by confronting theory with other cases, the researcher amends it. The only possible option would have been configurative-idiographic study, but instead of “understanding” only, this research aims at testing the hypothesis. Moreover, the idiographic study lacks systematic methods of collecting and processing data, since the type of study is non-deductive (Gomm et al. 2000).

The cases for this research were chosen based on several factors. Firstly, as indicated above, each of the case studies represents a part of the hypothesis – a typical case of it. The reason behind going for a typical case selection is that it focuses on causal mechanisms governing in the hypothesis (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Secondly, each of them holds the highest number of entries in the online archive. If I based my case selection on the text sentiment average, there would have been a chance to end with cases consisting of an insufficient number of entries for an in-depth case study. Moreover, the number of entries indicates institutions that are most significant for Russia, towards which the country pays most of its attention.

The biggest sentiment average rests with the regional multilateral institutions established by Russia – CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union – which puts their usage as a case study into question due to the hegemonic position that Moscow holds in both. The second place is taken by institutions like the IMF that have a low number of entries. However, this

underrepresentation in the archive disables concluding from their analysis or generalization of outcomes onto the overall dataset.

H₁ has the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (the OSCE) as an institution with the biggest number of entries in the given set of features¹¹. H_{1.2} was a difficult choice since the Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS), which Russia co-established, has the most significant number of entries. Nevertheless, this institution has a clear pro-Russian character and is therefore, biased towards this state. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Russia co-established in 2001, comes second. H₂ presupposes the World Trade Organization (the WTO) as an institution best representing the set of features mentioned above¹², as translated into the number of entries.

To provide an encompassing in-depth analysis of the case studies, I systematically read all dataset entries made for the relevant institutions and indicated as statements (about 15% of case studies' entries in this group), interviews (about 45%), or speeches (44%). There, I focused only on the entries made by the governmental figures responsible for decision-making and realization of foreign policy: The President (16,6%), the foreign minister (78,5%), and state representatives in global MIs such as the UN (3%). The choice was made to go deeper into the attitude of the core governmental structures that represent Russia multilaterally. This approach allowed me to validate my argument in qualitative chapters and have a closer look at the textual data from the dataset.

Apart from the primary data from the dataset entries, I also turn to alternative primary sources: online archives of both houses of the Russian Parliament and presidential. They provide insights into and a broader context for the attitude of Russian governmental structures towards the chosen MIs.

The case studies provide a broader picture of within-case variations, as they allow looking deeper into the data and taking into account changes over time. From the technical side, the focus lies on the analysis of the textual data described above. Thus, if the quantitative chapter looks mainly at patterns on the general level, the qualitative part of the research concentrates on particular elements of the hypothesis. It seeks to prove and trace Russian attitude patterns

¹¹ H₁ suggests that Russia supports for multilateral institutions when it holds a strong position within an institution.

¹² H₂ suggests that Russia is a challenger when it is in a weak position within an institution.

of deviations with the help of original data on the country's study chapters. I consider the attitude of all relevant governmental bodies (both houses of Parliament, the President, and the prime-minister apart from the discussed Ministry of Foreign Affairs) engaged in the implementation of international agreements. The data is drawn from the relevant official websites that have their online archives.

By having a mixed-method analysis, I intend to provide the broadest possible overview of Russia's behavior in multilateral institutions. While the quantitative chapter gives an overall picture, qualitative parts aim at supplying a more profound vision of case studies that stand for each of the Russian attitude patterns – supportive or challenger. On the one hand, the dataset outcomes provide rich information on Moscow's overall preferences and interests in multilateral institutions. On the other hand, there are case studies that go deep into each of the chosen multilateral institutions and give insights on the Russian changing governmental attitude towards them and explain the pattern of these deviations.

Chapter 4. Quantitative results.

This chapter is devoted to presenting the quantitative empirical results in the form of the dataset. It thus provides the first part of the answer to the research question, of the attitude of Russia towards multilateral institutions. The data presented below support the hypothesis of the Russian attitude being dependent on the state's position (weak or strong) in an institution. The empirics also side with the theorization of the Russian inclination towards hard-issue organizations over those engaged in soft issue areas. All the correlations between the data are organized in a dataset and discussed in detail below.

Based on the data from the recently released online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a comprehensive picture of Russian attitudes towards all multilateral institutions it's a member of can be drawn. It encompasses all types of entries present in the archive: press releases, fact sheets, official statements and interviews by Russian governmental officials given to national and foreign media.

The chapter discusses and explains the features of the dataset that also play the role of control variables. Another focus is text sentiment (neutral, positive, or negative) – empirical representation of the Russian attitude towards multilateral institutions. Structurally, the chapter is subdivided accordingly and starts with an overview of the dataset's constituent elements, then moves to the presentation of the “not interested” attitude pattern that was briefly described above. Afterward, I continue with the data patterns, such as sentimental peaks in the online archive. The chapter is subdivided according to the control variables that condition the Russian attitude towards multilateral institutions.

4.1. Dataset overview

As described in the methodological chapter, the dataset is designed to test the research hypothesis suggesting the influence of the Russian position in an institution (that of strong or weak) on the country's attitude towards the institution. It also includes institutional features that represent control variables. These are issue-area of the institution (hard or soft), territorial scope (global or regional), and establishment period (during or after the Cold War). The position that Russia chooses in an institution depends upon several issues that are measured by Russia being a joiner or an establisher in the institution – independent variable.

4.1.1. Defining independent and control variables

The reasons behind the choice of these features are their importance for the research hypothesis as explanatory and control variables for the behavior of rising powers. The importance of an issue area for rising powers is described by many in terms that these powers are more inclined towards so-called hard issues. This preference is partly based on the ability to achieve positive results and recognition within hard issue areas faster when compared to the soft issue areas. Moreover, the former spheres are in most of the cases among the core national interests for rising powers (Acharya 2016a; Gaskarth 2015; Hurrell 2006).

Another reason for the preference of hard issues by the rising powers is their influence on the development. For instance, these countries are highly dependent on natural resources, the production of which is becoming more regulated due to environmental concerns. Naturally, this situation causes conflicts between rising powers and leading developed countries (such as the US or France) (Hallding et al. 2013).

I base my definitions of hard and soft issues on the studies of political psychology, where the distinction between the two is based on the public's perception and attitude towards these issues. According to Johnston & Wronski (2015), hard issues are "technical and more often involve debates over means rather than ends" (Johnston & Wronski, 2015: 3). In other words, this type of issue is closer to the states' national interests. It is political elites who draw the connection between them and national interests and ideology. In this constellation, elites act as "cultural entrepreneurs," explaining the importance of hard issues for society (Pollock et al., 1993: 31). Overall, hard issues embrace institutions working within the economy sector, security and military cooperation.

Soft issues – laying beyond core national interests – in contrast, are non-technical and end-oriented, rooted in symbolic conflicts over values related to every-day experiences. The symbols and policies behind these issues are part of public cognition without political engagement. The main examples consist of human rights, environment protection, and judicial matters. The public also reacts to these issues, irrespective of their interest in or knowledge of politics (Johnston and Wronski 2015; Pollock et al. 1993). Altogether, this generalization enables a dichotomy of soft versus hard issues that acts as an umbrella for a number of issue areas.

Another control variable that is included in the dataset as an institutional feature is a regional/global dichotomy. The inclusion of this feature is based on the argument that rising powers

are hegemons in their respective regions. Therefore, on the global level, they act as representatives of these regions and the sphere of their influence (Cooper and Flesmes 2013; Gaskarth 2015; Hurrell 2006). The argument about rising powers being hegemons in their regions is particularly valid in the case of Russia, as noted by both camps of scholars – those focusing on Russian foreign policy only, and those working with rising powers (Cadier and Light 2015; Gaskarth 2015; Valeriano and Maness 2015).

An additional institutional feature is a distinction into new and old multilateral institutions. The borderline was set to the end of the Cold War, i.e., the formal establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991. Within the literature on Russian foreign policy, there is an argument that through participation in newly established institutions, Russia can drive away from cooperation in old institutions when it disagrees with other powers there (Cadier and Light 2015; Culp 2016).

As for the state-in-an-institution dimension, a weak/strong dichotomy derives from the broader argument of rising powers' satisfaction with multilateral institutions they participate in. Most of the well-established institutions governing hard issues (that rising powers are most interested in), were set by the winners of the Second World War. They cemented their dominance in the economy. Emerging powers had to join and adopt the rules and norms existing there, meaning that they do not enjoy the same status of norm-makers (Cooper and Flesmes 2013; Gaskarth 2015; Stephen 2017). Those who joined an institution fell under institutional constraints of the norms and rules governing in the institution executed through institutional rewards and punishments (Hafner-Burton 2006).

The bargaining power that participation in institutions afford rising powers consists of: economic/market power, bargaining skills and information, domestic constraints, voting power, and institutional power within an institution. Due to the weaker negotiation position as compared to the establishers of multilateral institutions, rising powers can act as a single front and might complicate collective agreements. Although there is a discussion on the need for institutions to adapt to rising powers due to their growing contributions and overall importance in global governance, this study focuses on describing the current state of affairs and not prescribing the solution (Cooper and Flesmes 2013; Drahos 2003; Gaskarth 2015; Stephen 2017).

When it comes to the case of Russia, the best-known example of the difficulty in accession to a well-established institution is Moscow's long-term process of joining the WTO. As the

biggest and most powerful institution acting in trade, it had attracted Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. However, due to economic and legislative reasons, the country could not have been accepted to the institution earlier than 2012. Apart from apparent reasons laid in the institutional rules, Russia's application was used as a bargaining matter against its foreign policy (e.g., the Georgian War) (Stone 2011). Therefore, the case of the WTO represents several issues in one: firstly, the willingness of Russia to be a member of an institution with binding legislation in the hard issue area of its core national interest. Secondly, complications in joining an institution after it was established.

As for the observation period – 2001 to 2015 – the choice was made for practical reasons. Although the data for some of the institutions are available earlier than 2001, the gaps in the period before this year do not allow taking it any year prior to it. As for the end date, it was chosen due to the ongoing process of adding entries to the online archive by the Ministry and the start of compiling the dataset by the researcher.

4.1.2. Dataset construction

As the second step of the analysis, the features above – the type of legislation, issue area, territorial scope, establishing period, and state's position within an institution – were then added to the dataset along with noting down Russian membership in each of the institutions. The information about Russian membership was taken from the CIA World Factbook and IndexMundi – both are the data portals providing factual information about all countries in the world.

As a result of the second step, an overview of the overall Russian presentation in multilateral institutions was prepared. It is a member of 22% of world institutions, including regional organizations around the globe. If they are taken away from the dataset, the percentage falls to 19%, which remains a high number given that the US – the only remaining great power after the end of the Cold War – is a member of 25% of all the world institutions (CIA World Factbook, 2018).

The majority of institutions that Russia participates in (85%) are global, which signifies its interest in global politics, rather than remaining a regional power as it was considered in the 1990s. The period following the fall of the USSR was devoted mainly to the integration of Russia in the Western world and building an identity of a “good global player.” However, this was mainly the achievement of Kozyrev – the first foreign minister, as his successor Primakov changed the direction of Russian foreign policy from the international arena to

regional affairs. Later, as Putin took the Presidential seat, foreign ministers seized their powers to those described in the Constitution of 1993 – merely realizing the goals set by the President (Cadier and Light 2015; Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009).

Another possible explanation comes from the literature on rising powers that indicate the willingness of these states to participate in global multilateral institutions in order to be visible internationally and be perceived by the “significant others” as equals. In the case of Russia, this translates into participating in institutions across all issue areas around the globe and not focusing on the post-Soviet region only.

4.2. The first outcome - “not interested” attitude pattern

The third step was checking Russian membership in multilateral institutions against the availability of data in the online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As discussed above, this step provides an overview of the “not interested” attitude pattern of the research hypothesis. After updating the Blake and Payton dataset to the goals and needs of the current research and checking Russian membership in MIs, I turned to the availability of entries for the MIs under observation. This action enabled me to detect institutions without Russian attention. As mentioned above, they constitute 19,6% of all MIs of which Russia is a member.

The next step in determining the “not interested” pattern, was extracting institutions with minimum entries. In order to do so, I listed all the institutions with the sum of their text sentiments (translated into the number of entries, which is the goal of observation). Then, the descriptive statistics function in Excel gave an overview of the mode, minimum, maximum, and the mean. Based on this information, the borderline of 10 entries in absolute terms was used. Overall, this gave 18,5% of all multilateral institutions (10 in absolute terms)¹³. Only 23% of all entries within the group fall into the hard issue category. A striking finding was that all institutions that Russia was not interested in were global. In 23% of cases, the country was a joiner in 20% - among the establishers, while there is no information available regarding the rest.

Therefore, a possible explanation of Russia not being interested in these institutions is their soft issue area and global territorial scope.

¹³ The institutions include World Economic Forum, Permanent Court of Arbitration, International Mobile Satellite Organization, Group on Earth Observations, International Nickel Study Group, International Whaling Committee, International Organization of Legal Metrology, International Organization of Vine and Wine, and International Plant Genetic Resource Institute

4.3. Patterns and trends outcomes

Moving to the broader picture, I searched for patterns starting from the overall dataset (the sum of all independent variables), with a gradual move to the variable-by-variable investigation. This enables constant comparison across the data and against the levels of comparison. Technically, this was done in Excel’s pivot tables. Firstly, I will discuss the overall patterns that represent an overview of the data. Then, I will move to the features that proved to support the research hypothesis the most according to the t-test.

4.3.1. Picturing institutions in full

The first level of the dataset analysis is general; it consolidates all features and gives a composite overview of their influence on the number of entries as well as the spectrum of text sentiments. They are all assembled in the graph format (Figure 1). The horizontal axis pictures years, while the vertical one depicts the number of entries that can be neutral, negative, or positive.

Although, as awaited, the majority of entries are neutral¹⁴, there is a deviation in their number. There is an overall drop in entries in the period of 2004-2007 that never returns to the same degree. A variety of factors can explain this attitude.




Figure 1

¹⁴ As discussed in the methodological chapter, mainly due to the diplomatic language of the archive, which is highly bureaucratized.

One of the possible explanations is that during the first presidency of Putin (2001-2004), there was a peak of Russian multilateral activity. These actions then led to the stabilization of activities that translated into a lower number of entries. The situation was similar to the one during the Gorbachev era. It showed a picture of a new young leader and subsequently, a country that is ready to change with the world and enter the millennium as a global power, not a used-to-be superpower. Another explanation of the steady rise in the period of 2001 – 2003 was the generally pro-multilateral direction of Russian foreign policy of that time. After unsuccessful attempts of Yeltsin to make his country heard internationally, Putin realized this goal by establishing friendly terms with leading Western politicians (e.g., G.W. Bush) (Cadier and Light 2015; Lo 2002). Moreover, with growing prices on hydrocarbons – the main export product of Russia that contributes to the lion’s share to the state’s budget – the Kremlin obtained sufficient material sources to pursue its foreign policy goals (Thorun 2009).

Moving to the drop in the number of entries that happened in 2004-2007, there is no unified explanation for it either. However, as many (Lo 2015; Stone 2011; Tsygankov 2014) agree, the US unilateral actions in Iraq signalled that Washington was still not ready to share their powers to the disappointment of Russia, that wanted to re-emerge from being a regional power. The high point of this period was the Munich speech of the Russian President, in which he voiced his concerns related to the unipolar world and the US dominant position in or control of multilateral institutions (President of Russia 2007). This point marked the Russian return to the post-Soviet region and regional institutions in general.¹⁵

Also, due to the Russian preference of bilateralism over multilateralism in regional affairs, the data does not and cannot capture the pivot to the neighborhood in its full. Bilateral relations are the core of the Russian approach to the post-Soviet space due to different regimes and foreign policy intentions of post-Soviet countries. While, for example, Georgia aims at joining NATO – a rival institution, Kazakhstan’s goal is to maintain the status quo and develop its regional ambitions (Ambrosio 2009; Molchanov 2015; Morozov and Makarychev 2011).

¹⁵ Here, I differentiate between the two: post-Soviet region and just regions. The first refers to what used to be the USSR (Ambrosio 2009; Gel’man and Marganiia 2010), while the latter take a broader form of other regions around Russia (e.g. Asia) that have their multilateral institutions (mainly but not exclusively trade) in which Russia participates (Ethier 1998; Gibler and Wolford 2006).

As compared to the overall dataset, the regional subset (Figure 2, axes remained the same) has three peaks (subtracted from the average number of entries): 2003-2005, 2009-2010, and 2014-2015.




Figure 2

The attention paid to regional multilateral institutions in these periods happened in the context of several external and internal events that took place¹⁶ during the observational period. The first peak, 2003-2005, was marked by the start of the Iraq war and still ongoing Chechen War. The two conflicts led to a general disappointment in global multilateral institutions and subsequent turn to the regional domain. The peak of 2009-2010 was marked by the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the first BRICS summit, and the August war with Georgia. The years of 2014-2015 were marked by the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict and Russian intervention into the Syrian civil war.

In all these events, Russia was actively engaged in regional institutions comprising the majority of post-Soviet states. Through these initiatives, Moscow sought to acquire legitimacy as a peace-keeper and peace-broker as an addition to its hegemon role in the region. For instance, during the ethnic clashes in Kyrgyzstan after the revolution there, CSTO members called Russia as negotiating moderator. Another reason for more regional institutional

¹⁶ I will not focus on the text sentiments of the regional multilateral institutions, since fluctuations of positive entries replicate the changes of the neutral curve.

activity, lies in their active promotion among the members as a counter-weight to the West (Morozov and Makarychev 2011).

Apart from the exogenous events discussed, the internal ones shall not be underestimated. The above mentioned marked periods include the start of Putin's second presidency, terrorist attacks on civilians¹⁷ followed by strengthening of the anti-terrorist law, elimination of mayor elections, and establishment of the "vertical of power" (Acharya 2016b; Cadier and Light 2015; Mendras 2012).

The explanations regarding the rise in entries in the described periods lie in the area of "two-level games"; in other words, domestic politics and international affairs influencing and interfusing with each other (Putnam 1988). As Hagan (1995) continues, domestic scenery presupposes that after winning the top leadership positions, the main goal for a decision-maker is to stay in power. Therefore, after acquiring enough political resources, those in leadership positions begin executing various strategies to remain in power as long as they can. Given the ever-growing role of Putin as the President, once he took the chair in 2000, his actions talk in favor of this theory. However, all the same, Hagan (1995) warns the influence of domestic politics is limited and is mainly the source of power for the government to pursue the foreign policy they aim for.

Summing up, the overall dataset suggests two peaks (2003-2005 and 2014-2015) of Russian attention paid to multilateral institutions, which can be explained by external and internal factors proposed by the "two-level games" theory. Compared to the general picture, regional multilateral institutions have the third peak in 2009-2010. As for the text sentiment, the proportion of positivity is the same in both sets (around 30%). At the same time, the curves replicate each other in their moves.


4.4. Text sentiment

As for the text sentiment of the entries, fluctuations are visible across positive and neutral sentiments, while negative dimension remains almost unchanged. Although, as expected, the majority of entries are neutral – more than 70% - positive ones hold 28%. Given this disproportionality of sentiments, in the qualitative chapters I turn to the case study of most

¹⁷ Terrorist attacks were: the Red Square Suicide bombing (9.12.2003), Beslan hostage terrorist crisis (1.09.2004), the Nevsky Express bombing (27.11.2009), suicide bombings in Moscow underground (29.03.2010) (TASS, 2013; RIA Novosti, 2008).

typical institutions in each part of the hypothesis. This approach allowed me to observe the sentiment fluctuations more deeply.

To investigate the quantitative data more, the connotations were transformed into numeric equivalents: neutral – (0), positive – (1), negative – (-1) and summarized in the Excel Pivot Table



Average of sentiments per year

The maximum lies by 0,315, which makes 2005 the most sentiment year in the online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The minimum lies by 0,211 and indicates 2015 as the least emotional year. This observation shows that the foreign policy of the first presidency of Putin is more emotional as compared to the third one. In order to find more explanations for that, I turn to the independent variables of the research hypothesis.

4.5. Type of issue area

As discussed above, the type of issue area is among the control variables. As shown earlier, the mean score for hard issue institutions is higher (0,3) than that for soft issue ones (0,23).

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances		
	<i>soft issues</i>	<i>hard issues</i>
Mean	0,22966014	0,29740458
Variance	0,21401358	0,272087115
Observations	9710	9825

Hypothesized Difference	Mean	0	
df		19309	
t Stat		-9,606108	
P(T<=t) one-tail		4,2148E-22	
t Critical one-tail		1,64493255	
P(T<=t) two-tail		8,4295E-22	
t Critical two-tail		1,96008685	

Figure 3 (below) pictures the subtraction of hard-issues sentiment average from the full dataset. The vertical axis shows the absolute number of emotionally colored entries over the years under observation (horizontal). Overall, its moves are similar to that of the graph picturing all hypothesized features influencing Russian attitude towards multilateral institutions. The curve for hard issues alone differs from the general one by positive entries coming close to neutral ones.




Figure 3

These outcomes agree with the theory of rising powers' high interest in institutions working in hard issues that, in empirical terms, translated into positivity. As compared to soft issues, positive entries are also more common among this category (33% of all hard issue entries as opposed to 25% of all soft entries).

Below is the graph presentation of soft issues' sentiment average (Figure 4) subtracted from the full dataset. The vertical axis shows the percentage of emotionally colored entries over the years under observation (horizontal)




Figure 4

However, as the data suggests, Russia is not less interested in soft issues. They account for half of all entries. The most significant difference between the data on soft and hard issues is text sentiment. Russia has a clearly more positive attitude towards institutions working in hard issue areas, which translates into the number of entries in the relevant category. This, together with the general agreement of rising powers' literature regarding these states' preference of hard issues over the soft ones, calls for the focus of the dissertation on the hard-issue institutions.

Comparing soft and hard issues along the text sentiment dimension, one finds its impact not only on the overall number of entries, but in changes over time as well. Both curves have a drop in 2007 – a year before the financial crisis and the Russo-Georgian War. However, since the same is to be observed in the full dataset, similar explanations are applicable in this case as well. In order to examine positive changes in more detail (percentage of positive entries from the overall number of entries – vertical axis), appropriate subtractions from the hard and soft subsets were made. Their outcomes are pictured in Figure 5 and Figure 6 below.




Figure 5




Figure 6

Thus, the peak of positive entries among organizations working with hard issues (Figure 6) was around 2003, while for those working with soft issues (Figure 5) – a year later. Moreover, as the positivity curve for soft issues steadily goes down or remains at the same level afterward, the hard one hit another peak in 2014. Several factors can explain the two events.

Firstly, positive entries in hard and soft issues peak in the same period of 2003-2004 with the following fall, as was seen in the full dataset above. Similar explanatory factors can be held accountable. They include preference of multipolarity as an approach to global governance and “manual control” of the President governing in foreign policy, including multilateral institutions (Dmitrii Trenin and Lo 2005).

Secondly, when it comes to the positive curve of hard issues having a peak in 2014, the main institutions that attracted ministerial attention were Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the OSCE), the Eurasian Economic Union (the EEU), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (the CSTO), the World Trade Organization (the WTO), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (the APEC), and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (the OPCW). Overall, these institutions can be divided into regional (those dealing with European or Eurasian themes) – the OSCE, the EEU, the CSTO, the APEC – and global taking the rest. Given the nature of these organizations, they were all involved in discussions of the Russian role in either the Ukrainian crisis or the Syrian conflict. Naturally, this calls for the response from Moscow’s side that translated into the higher number of entries as compared to the number concerning institutions dealing with soft issues.

4.5.1. Outcomes for the key variable: Establisher/ joiner category

As stated above, the category is central to the research hypothesis and proved to be reliable.

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances		
	<i>establisher</i>	<i>joiner</i>
Mean	0,334064	0,166181
Variance	0,291583	0,161368
Observations	11405	7901
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	19208	
t Stat	24,75563	
P(T<=t) one-tail	1,6E-133	
t Critical one-tail	1,644933	
P(T<=t) two-tail	3,3E-133	
t Critical two-tail	1,960087	

The overall dataset consists of three possibilities: establisher (58% of overall entries), joiner (40% of overall entries), and unknown (1% of overall entries). The unknown or the rest cannot be determined due to the inavailability of data about the Russian role in the setting up process. However, if one compares the absolute number of entries to the number of multilateral institutions, the picture will be different since Russia participates in more institutions that it joined (25) than it does in institutions that it co-established (20).

The graph below (Figure 7) represents a subtraction from the overall dataset of those entries that speak of Russian attitude when it is a joiner (axes preserved). When it comes to changes over time, the joiner category shows a high rise in 2003-2004, followed by a fall.




Figure 7

The establisher category presents a slightly different picture (Figure 8, subtracted from the full dataset, axes preserved). There, one sees two peaks: in 2003-2005 and 2014. Moreover, while the joiner dimension is predominately neutral, positivity holds only 18%, the establisher one has 37% of positive entries.




Figure 8

Overall, the data speaks in favor of the research hypothesis proving that Russia supports those institutions in which it holds co-establisher status and is relatively passive towards the ones that it joined. As stated in the methodological chapter and shown above, empirically, this translates into a predominant number of neutral entries coupled with negative ones in case of a joiner position. A co-founder status led to a significant number of neutral with fluctuations in favor of positive entries.

Preferring founding institutions over joining them is in accordance with the argument that rising powers are more interested in those multilateral institutions that they have co-established. The dependency of emerging powers' interest upon co-establishment of an institution is also proved if one adds the hard issue dimension and compares the data with that of the joiner category. In the first case, there are 6567 entries, while in the latter, their number differs by half. Being more favorable towards those multilateral institutions that Russia co-set up as compared to those that it joined, characterizes its interest in the first category.

If one looks deeper into distinctions and what might influence the fluctuations, one adds a hard issue dimension and breaks down the dataset into multilateral institutions. There are only

13 institutions¹⁸ in the set of hard issue areas where Russia is among the establishers. In the case of switching to other variations within the sets (e.g., soft issue areas and Russia being among joiners), the number changes only by one depending on the feature (hard or soft issue area, establisher or joiner position of Russia).

As for the text sentiments, their fluctuations also depend on the set-up of features. In the case of the establisher plus hard issue area, one observes 33% of positive entries and 63% of neutral ones with 3,8% taken by the negative. Soft issues in case of the establisher features attract 41% of positive entries of all entries of the relevant setting and 55% of neutral ones. As for the joiner dimension, which is predominantly neutral, the number of positive entries in the combination of soft issue areas does not surpass 8% of all entries in the relevant setting, while neutral take 91%. Institutions dealing with hard issues and Russia being among joiners there attract 32% of positive entries from all entries of the relevant setting and 66% of neutral ones. Thus, if hypothesized, the combination of soft issue area and Russia being among joiners attracted the least emotional diversity, while hard issues and/ or being among the establishers provided sentiment diversity.

4.6. Time category: during and after the Cold War

The feature of time establishment shows a very positive result in the t-test with new institutions receiving more sentiment fluctuations. The category refers to the Russian position as great or rising power within an institution.

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances		
	<i>during CW</i>	<i>post-CW</i>
Mean	0,189535	0,355056
Variance	0,200873	0,283577
Observations	10626	8762
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	17158	
t Stat	-23,1168	
P(T<=t) one-tail	9,4E-117	

¹⁸ Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Eurasian Economic Union, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Gas Exporting Countries Forum, International Hydrographic Organization, International Monetary Fund, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, The Council of Baltic Sea States, Zangger Committee

t Critical one-tail	1,644942	
P(T<=t) two-tail	1,9E-116	
t Critical two-tail	1,960102	

The following two parts focus on the fluctuations of data depending on the chosen time period (before or after the Cold War). The goal is to show sentiment fluctuations vis-à-vis other control variables: issue area of an institution and Russian position within an institution.

4.6.1. During the Cold War

As discussed earlier, this period is described as the bipolar world with two superpowers: the USA and the USSR (later disintegrated into several independent states, one of which is the focus of this research). Due to this world structure, most of the institutions founded in this time are global – 87% of the overall number of multilateral institutions were established during the Cold War. Below (Figure 9) is the graphic representation of changes that took place in 2001-2015 (horizontal axis) within hard-issue institutions established during the Cold War. The data is subtracted from the full dataset.




Figure 9

As suggested by the H₁, the strong position Russia holds thanks to its co-founder role in these hard-issue MIs, led to mostly neutral entries with positive fluctuations. To be more precise, the majority of entries are neutral, with a decreasing space between positive and neutral in 2012-2013: 30% and 37% as compared to around 55% in the two previous years. Overall, the data indicates two peaks in text sentiment: in 2002-2006 and 2012-2014. In this representation, the set of features differs from the above discussed (the overall picture, typer of issue area, and joiner/ establisher) that were characterized by more than two peaks in text sentiment (the exception being joiner category).

4.6.2. Post-Cold War

After the end of the Cold War and the loss of the superpower status, the Russian attitude towards multilateral institutions changed. With the new status of rising power, the country started co-establishing institutions which it did on both regional and global levels: half of all multilateral institutions with entries in the period of observations are labelled as regional and half as global.




Figure 10

As the graphic representation above suggests (Figure 10, subtracted from the full dataset, axes preserved), in the case of the post-Cold War institution, the number of sentiment peaks is twice as high compared to the institutions established during the Cold War. With the average

difference between neutral and positive of 43%, the maximum difference between the neutral and positive is observed in the first two and the last years of the observational period.

As for the falls in the number of entries, they follow the same patterns as in the previously discussed data. The first drop in the number of entries happens around 2005, which is explained by the domestic issues taking over the agenda of the Putin's second presidency (Legvold 2007a). The second one – in 2011, after the Kremlin turned to the internal public with the start of anti-governmental protests¹⁹.

On the whole, the time category enables me to compare Russian attitudes towards institutions depending on their establishment. Hard-issue institutions set up after the Cold War attract a more diverse text sentiment as opposed to those established in the bipolar world. One of the possible explanations is an empirical one – the number of multilateral institutions. While in the post-Cold War time, there were established ten institutions found relevant for the current research²⁰, there were 16 institutions set up during the Cold War.

If one adds the joiner/establisher category to the set, the data will expectedly result in Russia joining 40% more institutions after the end of the Cold War. Above all, this signals Moscow's willingness to participate in West-led hard-issue institutions, since over the years, they acquired the leading position in global governance. By doing so, Russia acts as a rising power that seeks to benefit from joining well-established institutions in the sphere of its core national interest (Schirm 2010; Stephen 2012). Consequently, this resulted in the attitude that Moscow later developed towards these institutions, as described by the H₂.

4.7. Trends in dataset with control variables soft/ hard and territorial scope

Despite the focus of this research on hard issues, one needs to look at the category of hard as opposed to soft in order to observe possible fluctuations and tendencies.

¹⁹ After the Parliament Elections, when the pro-governmental party United Russia faked the results in its favour, Russian opposition activated. Parallel to that, Medvedev – then the President – announced that his Prime Minister – Putin – would run for the Presidency again (according to the Russian Constitution, one can be the Russian President not more than twice in a row (art. 81.3)). These events led to the post-electoral protests that culminated in mass protests that inevitably draw governmental attention from other issues (Gel'man 2015).

²⁰ Meaning that they were established after the Cold War and Russia is a member of them.

4.7.1. Hard issues and territorial scope

Hard issues show considerably different pictures when one compares the respective institutions along the territorial dimension. Figure 11 and Figure 12 below depict the respective subtractions from the overall dataset.



Figure 11




Figure 12

While 57% of all entries related to global institutions working with hard issues occur before 2007 with the peak of 2003, regional institutions dealing with hard issues have their peak in 2014 with more than half of entries in the period of 2009-2015. Moreover, the overall number

of entries differs significantly: regional institutions have more than twice as many entries as global ones.

This standing is explained by many arguing that rising powers are more satisfied with regional institutions where their voice is heard as compared to global multilateral institutions established by the Western powers and controlled by them. In this stance, emerging powers deal with under-representation in global institutions and “clubs” politics reigning there, by concentrating on regional counterparts (Parížek and Stephen 2020; Stephen 2016; Terhalle 2011; Valeriano and Maness 2015).

Another reason for so much attention paid to regional institutions dealing with hard issues was noted above and lay in the argument of rising powers being hegemons in the respective regions. Regional leadership enables these countries to pursue higher status in the global arena and represent their regions. Moreover, membership in regional institutions secures the realization of core national interests that compile hard issues (Hurrell 2006; Iseri and Ozdemir 2017; Wilson 2017).

4.7.2. Soft issues and territorial scope

Soft issues, in their turn, show a different pattern. The number of entries accounting for regional institutions (shown in Figure 14) working with soft issues is ten times bigger than the number of entries concerning global institutions of the same issue area (pictured in Figure 13). Both strings of literature – rising powers and Russian foreign policy – agree on the preference of regional institutions over global.




Figure 13




Figure 14

A clear difference between regional and global institutions that the data shows is the maximum number of entries. For global institutions, it was in 2014, whilst for regional it was in 2003. This difference can be explained by the set of institutions that are hidden behind the curve. A late peak in the case of global institutions is related to the institution that received most of the attention in the online archive – International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). Given the outbreak of the active phase of the Ukrainian crisis on the Russian border in 2014, more entries devoted to the ICRC in the same year is logical (Cadier and Light 2015; Legvold 2007b).

An earlier peak in the case of regional institutions is related to the character of institutions. There are two – the CIS and the Council of Europe – that contributed the most to this result. Both were in the focus of Russia’s foreign policy at this time. The CIS played an essential role since the pivot from the international arena back to the post-Soviet space in the mid-1990s. As for the Council of Europe, it gained ministerial attention in 2003 due to the 11th EU-Russia Summit in St. Petersburg and the beginning of the case against the YUKOS oil company.²¹ The latter led to a long-term discussion between the Council of Europe and the Russian Federation regarding violation of human rights not only in the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky but of Russian prisoners generally (Bowring 2009; Casarini and Musu 2007).

As for the text sentiment of the entries, they are predominantly neutral (73%) like all entries, yet a quarter is occupied by positive ones, which is significantly more as compared to global institutions working with soft issues (19%). Given a small number of regional multilateral institutions dealing with soft issues, one can trace which institutions attracted the broadest response. The CIS and the Council of Europe cause all three sentiments for the reasons described above.

Overall, this chapter presented a quantitative overview of Russian participation in multilateral institutions. It analyzed Russian membership in all multilateral institutions that the country officially participates in and in which it voiced its position. By doing so, this part of the current dissertation presents an extensive outline of Russian multilateral behavior. It allows conclusions about the general Russian attitude towards multilateral institutions and indicates trends in sentiment fluctuations.

In particular, the chapter gave a broad vision of how the Russian attitude depends on the country’s position, the issue area of an institution, its territorial scope, and institutions’ period of establishment. By applying the methods described in the methodological part, this chapter reports the correlations and interpretations that matter for the research hypothesis about the dependency of the Russian attitude on the country’s position within an institution and conditioned by the institutional features. The data, presented in detail here, also supports the above-described hypotheses suggested by the rising powers’ scholars of Russia being more interested in institutions engaged in hard issues than in those working in soft issue areas.

²¹ The case against the Yukos oil company (the biggest independent oil company of that time) is an unfortunate lawsuit of the Russian government to the businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky. He was accused of illegal actions during privatization process in the 1990s and sentenced for 9 years of prison (Prozorov 2006).

Despite providing a comprehensive overview of the Russian attitude across all multilateral institutions and indicating the trends, this N-large study cannot trace causal links between attitude and particular external or domestic events. Therefore, the case-study analysis in the next chapters was chosen to fill this gap. It concentrates on typical cases representing each part of the hypothesis and gives an in-depth insight into factors explaining the attitude.

Chapter 5. The case study of the OSCE

This chapter discusses the case study of the OSCE that represents the H₁: a hard-issue institution set up during the Cold War when Russia was still a superpower and in which it behaves as an active supporter due to the strong position of Moscow²².

As indicated in the methodological chapter, this organization was chosen due to the highest number of entries in the online archive given the variables described in the H₁. To have a more in-depth view of the Russian attitude towards the OSCE, I also systematically read all archival entries indicated as OSCE in the dataset and made by the policy-makers (the President, prime minister, foreign minister, and both houses of the Parliament)²³.

The chapter opens with an overview of the OSCE aimed at providing a vision of what role the institution plays for Russia and why the country is still interested in it. By looking at institutional aims, principals, and structures, I show its importance for Moscow. Being amongst establishers grants Russia a central role in decision-making, that it then uses for its benefit. Therefore, by looking at what decision-making consists of, one can better understand the Russian attitude towards this institution.

Then, I turn to the history of Russian participation in the OSCE that provides information on the country's developing interests and changing attitude towards the institution. Moreover, it sets the scene for the observational period (2001-2015), as it cannot be analyzed in a vacuum.

After that, I proceed to the analysis of this dissertation's period under observation: 2001 – 2015. Here, I discuss the changes in Russian attitude, the main peaks of Russian attention paid to the OSCE, and what constitutes them. The last subchapter is devoted to the main topics raised by the Federation Council²⁴. Looking at them allows me to understand the differences in attitude towards the OSCE existing between the Federation Council, the President as the

²² Within this research, I refer to the dichotomy of strong and weak positions within the context of negotiating positions. As opposed to the weak position, strong one concerns states that can exercise control over the decision-making process and influence the results of distributional bargaining (Schneider 2011).

²³ For the transparency reasons, the entries to which I refer in this chapter are indicated by their code names, de-coding of which can be then found in the attachment containing the dataset. The exact documents can be found on the archival website mid.ru using their data in the search engine.

²⁴ The Upper House of the Russian Parliament that has its own online archive (council.gov.ru), from which the data was taken.

one who directs foreign policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – responsible for policy implementation.

5.1. Overview of the OSCE

This part is devoted to the overview of the OSCE – the case study of this chapter. The aim of this section is to understand the influence of the establishment history and institutional structure on the attitude Russia holds towards the OSCE.

5.1.1. Main principles and spheres of work

The establishing parties signed the text of the Helsinki Final Act of the then Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, including the Soviet Union (more discussion on the issue of the USSR signing the treaty below) in 1975. As the conference's name suggests, the central sphere of interest for signature parties was security. Within the relevant part of the Final Act, they agreed on the following principles that remain the core of the institution until today:

- respect of sovereign equality of the member-states and territorial integrity
- refraining from the use of force
- non-intervention in each other's internal affairs
- peaceful settlement of disputes
- respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
- equal rights and self-determination of peoples
- cooperation among the member-states
- fulfilment of the obligation under international law.

Given the core interests of the Russian Federation laid down in its Foreign Policy Concept – also falling within the hard issue area – the objectives of the OSCE coincide with them fully. To achieve the realization of the organization's principles, the parties agreed to notify each other about military manoeuvres, invite observers to exercises and make efforts towards the common goal of disarmament (Anon 1975, Anon 2016a).

Although the economy is not among the priorities for the OSCE, member-states see it as part of security. To achieve shared norms and standards for economic behavior, a particular instrument was set up – the Economic Forum (later – the Economic Environmental Forum) (Anon 1975; Kemp et al. 1999).

The Economic Forum became a product of the end of the Cold War and initially assisted in the economic transition of former socialist countries to the market economy. Later, environmental activities were added to the body, and it re-emerged as the OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum. The reason for maintaining the economy within the secretariat of the security-focused institution remains the same: perceiving the issue as part of a broader security sphere. Further areas include humanitarian, science, technology, transportation, education, and culture (Anon 1975; Kemp et al. 1999).

Overall, the principles and goals of the OSCE are quite general, stretching from human rights to the economy. What unites this dimensional diversity is security in its broad understanding – a hard issue area that is placed within the H₁ and is a focus of this research.

5.1.2. The structure of the OSCE and decision-making

The structure of the OSCE is typical for a regional program organization that has a limited number of members that constitute operational, executive, and decision-making bodies along with several add-ons (Rittberger and Zangl 2006).

The secretariat provides operational support for the OSCE and is directed by the Secretary-General appointed by the Ministerial Council. The Chairmanship is responsible for executive action and coordination of the OSCE institutions' work (OSCE, 2019; Kemp et al., 1999).

As for the decision-making bodies, the power is divided between Meeting of Heads of Governments/ States (Summits), the Ministerial Council, the Permanent Council, the Forum for Security Co-Operation (FSC), and the Senior Council (practically lost its power in favor of the Permanent Council and the Economic and Environmental Forum). The Ministerial Council consisting of the ministers for foreign affairs of the member-states, takes the central decision-making role between the summits, being a bridge between the decisions taken at the summits and the OSCE day-to-day activities. Meeting weekly, the Permanent Council is the principal consultative body, consisting of permanent representatives to the OSCE (OSCE, 2019; Kemp et al., 1999).

The highest arena on which decisions are taken are periodic summits, at which heads of the member-states set priorities and guidelines. The decisions are taken by consensus resulting in final declarations and final documents²⁵ (Kemp et al., 1999; OSCE, 2019).

²⁵ The timeline of declarations consists of the following: Helsinki in 1975 (founding declaration), Paris in 1990 (start of the CSCE institutionalization, marking the Cold War end), Helsinki in 1992 (suspension of Yugoslavia as

Additional bodies participating in decision-making include the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Parliamentary Assembly (PA), Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFM or the Representative), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. (*CSE Helsinki Document 1992*, 1992; OSCE, 2019; Kemp et al., 1999)).

While the PA, the ODIHR, the HCNM, and the RFM cannot set off national or international proceedings concerning relevant issues, the Court was established specifically for judicial goals. However, as Ackermann notes, the procedures adopted with the establishment of the Court do not work. The Convention of Stockholm that set the Court was ratified by 34 states only (including Russia) and has never been used (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg / IFSH 2010).

Overall, since in legal terms the decisions taken within the OSCE are not binding for its members, this makes implementation dependent on the will of the participants. As a consensus-based organization, it grants veto power to each member-state, thus prolonging the decision-making process. Moreover, the members do not fully control other bodies with their own mandates (with independent ratification and decision-making procedures). Together with a higher number of Western states (with 30 out of 57 being NATO members), this creates certain limitations for Russia in terms of pushing its interests. However, as Moscow is present in all administrative bodies, this provides the country with a certain amount of negotiation capital, securing a strong Russian position within the institution (Kropatcheva 2012).

5.2. Russian accession to the OSCE and first years of participation

This part deals with reasons behind the Soviet decision to sign the Helsinki Final Act that led to the establishment of the OSCE and Moscow's strong role within its decision-making for years and decades to come. The position the country acquired at the beginning predetermines Russian attitude towards this institution.

a member-state, establishment of the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the FSC together with the Economic and Environmental Forum), Budapest in 1994 (change to the OSCE), Lisbon in 1996 (outlined the security challenges and cooperation possibilities, statements on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem), Istanbul in 1999 (expansion of policing activities and intensification of cooperation with international organizations), Astana in 2010 (reaffirmed member-states' adherence to the OSCE principle of European security, voice support for Georgia and restoration of the OSCE presence in the "frozen conflict" areas) (OSCE, 2019; *Astana Commemorative Declaration. Towards a Security Community*, 2010).

As part of the USSR, Russia is the establishing member of the OSCE and the signing party to the Helsinki Final Act (HFA) of 1975. There is no unified position among scholars on why the Soviets decided to become a signing party to the HFA. Hurlburt (1995) suggests the weakening position of the USSR that they sought to improve by engaging in the CSCE/OSCE. He also suggested that by participating at the Conference, Moscow stressed its Europeanness, while at the same time, did its best to reduce American influence in Europe.

Another point of view considers a trade-off between the two blocks existing at that time: the Soviet Union wanted recognition of the post-war order, while the Western states aimed at binding Moscow with human rights clauses and bringing the socialist countries closer to Europe (Zellner 2005).

Whilst in the beginning the CSCE/OSCE was more of a dialogue between the two blocks, its role grew as the USSR moved towards its dissolution. At the end of the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev²⁶ became the first Soviet leader who was the most engaged in the relations with the OSCE. Moreover, he proclaimed the idea of a “common European home.” The Socialist Block started to fragment, East and West re-approached and the Paris Declaration reflected these changes, responding to them by institutionalizing the CSCE (Kropatcheva 2015). By doing so, he pushed the Soviet role in the organization from mere participants to one of its drivers.

After the end of the Cold War, Russian engagement with the CSCE and its attitude towards the organization was at its most positive, as Moscow hoped for the dissolution of NATO and the CSCE replacing it in Europe. For Russia, this change would have been logical, since as a security organization, the CSCE could have taken the functions of NATO on a regional level. However, as the conference started interfering in the post-Soviet affairs by close work with them (especially with Baltic countries²⁷), the Kremlin slowly moved from being its active supporter and taking on a more critical stance vis-à-vis the CSCE. For instance, The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated multiple times that the region was a zone of particular interest for the Kremlin. Moscow (represented by the President and the foreign minister) explained such an attitude towards the post-Soviet states by the right of Russia being a great power that has to defend its status and interests (Gheballi 2005; Truscott 1997).

²⁶ Functioning as the head of the USSR: 1985 – 1991

²⁷ Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia – all three used to be part of the USSR according to the Hitler-Stalin/ Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939.

Despite this conflict, the Kremlin – interested in maintaining its strong position within the institution – lobbied for the conference taking a more significant role in regional peacekeeping, its further institutionalization, and, most importantly, establishing an executive organ. The proposal was discussed during the Budapest Summit of 1994 when the CSCO was transformed into the OSCE. However, Western states were more interested in deepening existing security alliances (e.g., NATO), whilst Russia had to deal with the first Chechen War. As a result, Moscow’s proposals were rejected (Kropatcheva 2015; Truscott 1997).

The two following summits – in Copenhagen (December 1997) and in Istanbul (November 1999) voiced support of the Russian proposition to strengthen the role of the OSCE in European security, despite worsening relations between the Kremlin and the Western countries²⁸. On the whole, the summits of the late 1990s marked several issues. Firstly, that was the first time when the OSCE members disagreed on the core moments. Secondly, the final documents after the summits stated disapprovals of the Russian actions in the post-Soviet region, which for Moscow meant intrusion into its sphere of national interests. Thirdly, the adoption of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty²⁹ intended to discard the principle of hard power balancing in Europe and replace it with peaceful cooperation. In reality however, the CFE turned out to be useless, as Russia moved further beyond its borders and did not withdraw from the “frozen conflicts.” Nonetheless, these disagreements did not influence the overall support that the Russians held for the organizations (Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009).

As a particular case of rising power, Russia sought to strengthen its position in the region by all means after losing its superpower status in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War. With the OSCE – the leading organization uniting all European states in the security sphere – Moscow embraces its strong position within the institution and takes an active role there, benefiting from its participation. Therefore, despite the lack of support for its initiatives within the OSCE, the Kremlin relies on “collective leadership of leading states” by securing help from the major members on a bilateral basis (Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009).

²⁸ the two disagreed over the Kosovo crisis, in which they were involved on opposite sides

²⁹ Russia adopted the CFE in 1999, never ratified it and withdrew from the work within it due to NATO actions (OECD, 2015; *Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, 1999).

5.3. Russian attitude towards the OSCE in 2001 – 2015

The disappointment that Russia had with the OSCE at the turn of the Millennium was left for the new administration that came to the Kremlin in the early 2000s. It only deepened as Moscow was continuously criticized for its involvement in the “frozen conflicts.”³⁰ The Russian government of that time was torn between its willingness to re-emerge as a global great power, lack of material resources to do so, and the inability of the Kremlin to deal with ethnic conflicts in North Caucasus (the First Chechen War). The OSCE reaction to the Russian involvement in Chechnya³¹ was negative, as well as the Russian counter-response to it.

As the Russian economy started to rise and its overall foreign policy changed, its attitude towards the OSCE altered to regard it as a pro-Western organization, especially after the “color revolutions,”³² which the organization supported in its public statements³³. This perception translated into policy-output driven relations with the OSCE: when the institution criticizes Russian actions, Moscow responds with neutral or negative comments; a favorable tone of the institution is met with an equal reaction.

On the whole, according to the data gathered from the online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the OSCE accounts for 18.5% in 2001-2015 of the overall entries related to multilateral institutions, with 60% of them being neutral entries, 35% - positive, and the rest – negative. The figure below (Figure 1) pictures fluctuations of the Russian attitude (vertical axis is responsible for the actual number of entries) towards the OSCE over the years (horizontal axis).

³⁰ Together with Zellner (2005), I refer here to the Nagorno-Karabakh (started in 1988) and Transnistria (started in 1992).

³¹ The OSCE referred to violation of human rights over the course of the first Chechen War (Froese 2010)

³² “Color revolutions” are Georgian Revolution of Roses (2003), Ukrainian Orange Revolution (2004), and Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005)

³³ For Georgia, I refer to the Post-Election Interim Report by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission from 3-25 November 2003. For Ukraine, I refer to the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report of the Presidential Election 2004 (ODIHR.GAL/33/05). For Kyrgyzstan, I refer to the OSCE/ODIHR report on the Parliamentary Elections dated by 20.05.2005 (Warsaw).




Figure 1: OSCE overview

The organization is important for Russia in many respects. As discussed above, Russia co-established the OSCE as one of the superpowers of that time and still aims at using it to maintain its great power status. As systematic in-depth analysis of the entries made by those responsible for the decision-making and realization of foreign policy (the President, prime minister, foreign minister, and other state institutions) indicates, Moscow tends to refer to the OSCE's potential for broadening its sphere of responsibility and the OSCE's role as one of the major conflict mediators active in the region.

Concerning the research hypothesis, the overall data³⁴ supports the links between territorial scope, type of the issue area, Russian position and the attitude this country has towards the OSCE.

The second graph (Figure 2) below represents changes in text sentiment more accurately. It pictures the number of average sentiment (vertical axis presents emotionally colored entries)

³⁴ As mentioned previously, the T-test for the territorial scope (regional as opposed to global IOs) equals -3,60092; the two-sample one suggests regional institutions scoring higher (0,25 compared to 0,22). The T-test for the issue-area is also positive showing -9,606108. The two-sample test suggests that hard issue area scores higher (0,297) compared to soft (0,23).

across the years (horizontal axis covers the observation period of 2001 – 2015) and mirrors the fluctuations indicated in Figure 1.




Figure 2

Given the average number of entries and the average text sentiment, there are three peaks of Russian attention to the OSCE: 2004-2005, 2008-2010, and 2014-2015. Each of them is discussed in more detail below.

5.3.1. The first rise: 2004-2005

As briefly discussed above, the first peak relates to the “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet countries that were recognized and supported by the ODIHR to the disappointment of the Kremlin. After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia perceived its former republics as its sphere of interests; a sentiment voiced by both Kozyrev – former foreign minister – and Yeltsin – the first Russian President. Therefore, the OSCE’s disregard of Moscow’s position relating to the issues concerning them was perceived as a violation of Russian core national interests (Galbreath 2009; Kropatcheva 2015).

As for the text sentiment of this peak, although the majority of entries (56%) are neutral, the number of positive ones is also unexpectedly high – 40%, given the context in which it takes place. The dispersion of entries in 2004-2005 shows the priority given to 2005 when the number of positive entries is highest. The negative attitude has a reverse distribution: 2004 has a bigger number of entries (13% of the overall number in 2004) than 2005 – 8% (of the overall number in 2005).

Systematic analysis of the entries from the dataset that were made by the Russian major political figures, shows that the country is particularly interested in the OSCE as an authoritative institution. This is despite its need to reform and recognize views of the non-EU members (especially that of Russia) (OSCE20.11.2004, OSCE17.08.2004).

One of the possible explanations for the contradiction of positivity despite the context, is the OSCE loss of power to the European Union as it welcomed new member-states (former members of the socialist block) and became a new point of criticism for Moscow. At that point, another function, for which Russia used the OSCE to argue its position in spheres of Russian interest in this period, was the authority of this institution in conflict prevention and conflict management. Moscow referred to the institutional decisions and recommendations in minority issues directed to the Baltic countries – former members of the USSR that became EU-members. As noted by the foreign minister (OSCE02.01.2005, OSCE28.06.2005), violations of the Russian-speaking minority's rights in Latvia and Estonia do not comply with the EU norms in this sphere.

Furthermore, as the Revolution of Roses proceeded, the OSCE recognized its results. Besides, the OSCE mission on the ground had to deal with the Russians giving Russian passports to the South Ossetians³⁵ after the unrest³⁶ (Stöber 2011). Both the foreign minister and the President constantly refer to Russia being a conflict mediator and an OSCE-member, subject to rules and norms of this institution. Also, they note the historical presence of Moscow in the region that prevents conflict negotiations done without Russia (OSCE18.02.2005(3), OSCE18.02.2005).

The OSCE and its bodies (that were indirectly involved in the events that were later labelled as “color revolutions”) have been present in the region long before the “color revolutions” took place. All three countries also profited from the expertise of the stationing OSCE and ODIHR (Galbreath 2009). Together with the continuous Russian presence in the region, the OSCE activity in the post-Soviet space enables Moscow to secure its position there even more, due to its role as a single actor and as a member of the OSCE.

³⁵ South Ossetia was (in 2008 it is a self-proclaimed independent country, de facto disputed state) a part of Georgia (Nußberger 2013; Wilmshurst 2012)

³⁶ due to the policy of combating “Russification” proclaimed by the newly elected President

In one of his rare mentions of the OSCE in this period, President Putin criticized the organization for double standards in election recognition. During the big press conference for Russian and foreign journalists in 2004, he also voiced his disappointment with the institutional inability to influence the behavior of the main actors (the United States), who do not comply with the OSCE norms (Putin, 2004).

Federation Council (FC)³⁷ agrees with the presidential criticism of the OSCE. In 2004, a member of the FC Commission on international issues sharply criticized the organization for double standards regarding young democracies of Eastern Europe and the OSCE low effectiveness in conflict zones. Also, he stressed the strong role that Russia used to play and still holds in the OSCE (Sovet Federacii 2004b). The foreign minister supports these accusations of the OSCE and conveys them to the international public in statements and interviews uploaded to the ministerial archive (OSCE22.02.2005, OSCE24.06.2005).

Clearly, while the qualitative focus is mainly on the reaction to the OSCE's criticism of Russian actions, the quantitative data from alternative sources (archives of the relevant state structures) suggest continuous support of institutional actions. Several issues can explain the difference between qualitative and quantitative data.

Firstly, for Russia (including the post-Soviet states that are members of the OSCE), strong position and active membership in the OSCE meant support of the domestic regime by the organization. In other words, by supporting the organization's actions, they received recognition of their systems. Secondly, the OSCE represents the only alternative to NATO in Europe. Thirdly, the organization is an essential symbol of Russian adherence to Western norms and values. It is also a forum for negotiations on transnational threats and an organization in which Moscow can attract Western attention to the problems of the post-Soviet region³⁸ (Galbreath 2009; Haekkerup 2005; Hedenskog 2005; Kropatcheva 2012).

5.3.2. The second rise of 2008-2010

The second peak of Russian attention towards the OSCE happened in 2008-2010 and is related to the war with Georgia and the Corfu Process. Both became examples of the policy-

³⁷ According to the article 95 of the Russian Constitution, the Upper house of the Russian Parliament that together with Duma (lower house) constitute the Parliament

³⁸ Examples of such problems include Tajik-Afghan border control, environmental issues, inter-ethnic clashes (Kropatcheva 2012).

dependent attitude that Russia holds towards the OSCE. When the institution is critical towards Russian actions, the country responds with abstention or a negative reaction.

The war in Georgia relates to the military clashes between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 (the August War) and the follow-up condemnation from the OSCE. In this situation, Russia acted mainly unilaterally based on its leadership position in the post-Soviet sphere, which is typical of rising powers – representatives of their regions.

The military actions began on August 7 2008, but the preconditions are still contested. The Georgian side blames Russia for invading its sovereign territory. Moscow explained its steps as a need to protect a small nation (South Ossetia), most of whose members were Russian passport holders, from a possible genocide by the Georgians. As for the reports issued by the third parties, they vary in their evaluation of events (Toal 2017).

The OSCE was neither successful in conflict prevention, nor in conflict resolution, once it broke out. The tensions between South Ossetians and Georgians were known long before August 2008. The conflict started in 1992 when South Ossetia proclaimed its independence and voiced its willingness to merge with North Ossetia, which would mean becoming part of the Russian Federation. At that time, Russia (as the legal successor of the USSR) and Georgia agreed on establishing an OSCE Joint Control Commission (JCC) and a Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) in South Ossetia³⁹. The organization became the only credible mediator between the two, to whom they both referred to positively (Stöber 2011).

Parallel to the established OSCE groupings, in the same year, on the invitation of the Georgian side, the OSCE started its mission that continuously expanded. Nevertheless, after the Revolution of Roses, hostilities between the autonomy and Georgia only grew. At the same time, Russia supported the former conflict party, and the OSCE proved to be unable to resolve the growing conflict. (Stöber 2011).

As noted above, the active phase of the Russo-Georgian conflict emerged in August 2008 and lasted for five days. The response of the OSCE intended to extend its mission despite Russian opposition to it. As the conflict escalated, the OSCE representatives unsuccessfully tried to mediate it. The mission was refused and with the end of its mandate in December 2008, finished its 20 years-work in Georgia. At the same time, top figures of the OSCE member-

³⁹ Both consist of Russian, Georgia, South and North Ossetian representatives. This was done for maintaining stability in the region.

states were more fortunate in this realm (e.g., France who presided in the EU in 2008). One of the possible reasons for the OSCE failure is the willingness of the organization to act as an independent actor (Saari 2014; Stöber 2011).

These autonomous actions on the ground were later used against the negotiating parties, as the media claimed that some of the OSCE findings could have prevented the conflict. Nonetheless, President Medvedev positively assessed the role of the organization as a negotiation platform due to its credibility and objectivity (Medvedev, Sarkozy, and Barroso 2008; President Rossii 2008).

Manual analysis of the data from the ministerial archive indicates that Russia continues to use OSCE recommendations and its membership in the OSCE as a legitimization for criticizing Georgian authorities and its continuous presence in the region (OSCE20.05.2008(2), OSCE03.10.2009). For example, the foreign minister transmits the Russian view of being the only side following the OSCE norms and rules in the military conflict with Georgia (OSCE23.04.2009).

The second event that determined the peak in the number of entries in 2008 – 2010 was the Corfu Process. It started with the proposal of the Russian President Medvedev in 2008 (before the August War) to strengthen the OSCE security arrangements. As discussed above, Russia (willing to re-assert its strong position within the institution) stated the need for a new deal a decade earlier. Still, as compared to the previous one, that one received a positive response from the OSCE member-states due to several reasons. One of them was that despite signing the CFE in 1999, Russia never implemented it. Also, the OSCE and Moscow never agreed on what happened in the early 2000s in Ukraine and Georgia. For the Western countries, that was a transition to democracy. At the same time, the Kremlin called both events “color revolutions” and blamed the West (including the OSCE) for involvement in its sphere of influence (Kropatcheva, 2012, 2015; Stöber, 2011).

As mentioned above, the Russian decision-makers started calling for reforms in the OSCE already in 2004-2005 (OSCE20.11.2004, OSCE17.08.2004). The period of 2008-2010 continues this trend. The main argument is the institution’s inability to compete with other actors active in the region – the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe. Within this period, the Russian foreign minister referred to the inability of the OSCE to handle conflicts and its need to become a powerful institution (OSCE31.01.2008, OSCE02.10.2009, OSCE16.02.2009).

Nevertheless, by 2008, there was a common understanding among the involved parties that a new arrangement was needed. The August War that happened in the same year proved the argument that Europe strived for a new security settlement. In order to secure the proposal's acceptance, the Russians discussed it first with the EU member-states and moved to the OSCE afterward (Cliff 2012; Zagorski 2010). That is a typical rising powers' approach. They are ready to share responsibility with other member-states when reforming multilateral institutions on equal terms with other powers that they perceive as great (Narlikar 2014).

The Russian studies literature suggests another explanation for Moscow negotiating the proposal with each of the EU members bilaterally first, and only then going to the OSCE. They indicate that the Kremlin holds a pragmatic vision in its foreign policy, which means that Russia applies the principle of alliance building and power building. From that point of view, securing the support of more powerful EU members that are the OSCE members at the same time before moving to the OSCE level was a pragmatic choice (Hedenskog 2005; Legvold 2007b).

The core principles of the Russian proposal included equal security⁴⁰, arms control, non-offensive defense, abstention from permanent stationing of additional combat forces outside of the country – all under the auspices of the OSCE. Thus, the principles recognized the inclusion of all organizations active in Europe (above all, NATO and the CSTO) and sought to ensure cooperation and the equivalence between them in the future (Cliff 2012; Zagorski 2010). On the whole, Russia used its role as a co-establisher to promote the reform proposal that developed into the Corfu Process.

The third event that explains a rise in the number of sentiment average and the overall number of entries related to the OSCE is the organization's (ODIHR and PA) decision not to monitor Russian presidential elections in 2008. The reaction of the Russian government was sharply negative. For instance, during one of the press-conferences, the foreign minister reminded the OSCE of Russian compliance with the institutional norms and rules regarding election monitoring. He also pointed out the lack of a unified approach towards invitation of election observers among the member-states and that many well-established Western democracies do not follow this practice (OSCE31.01.2008).

⁴⁰ No security at the expense of the others, actions of military alliances undermining common security, and no military alliance at the expense of the others.

Members of the Federation Council stated that by not monitoring the elections, the OSCE assessed the elections as nondemocratic in advance. Some of the FC members called the organization's actions interference into the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Others stated that this was an example of double standards related to Eastern European young democracies, and in the current case, it was aimed to sink Russian initiatives of the OSCE reforms (Sovet Federacii 2008b).

All in all, the second peak (2008-2010) was caused by the policy-output driven attitude of Russia towards the OSCE – Moscow demonstrated a favorable position towards the organization when the OSCE did not criticize Russia. That is evident by the Russian governmental reaction to the OSCE's unwillingness to monitor the elections in Russia and supported by quantitative data with the majority of neutral entries and high fluctuation in negative ones, as compared to the previous period.

5.3.3. The third rise of 2014-2015

The third peak of the actual number of entries and the average text sentiment in the online archive takes place in 2014-2015 and is connected to the Ukrainian crisis. Despite a number of crises in the world, that was the only one in the given period in which both OSCE and Russia were engaged. Although the conflict itself broke out in 2014, the preconditions were set before. When the Ukrainian President refused to sign the association agreement with the EU in November 2013, he faced the unrest in the center of the country's capital. After military suppression of the uprising that led to deaths among civilians, the President had to flee the country for Russia (Averre 2016; Wang 2015).

The revolution began in the capital Kyiv, with the disappointment with Yanukovych and his government soon moving to the rest of the country, including the regions dominated by the Russian-speaking population⁴¹. Clashes between supporters of the new regime and separatists broke out in the early spring of 2014 and were highlighted in the Russian annexation of Crimea in March of the same year, to the condemnation of the global community. Confrontations in eastern Ukraine transformed into an armed conflict with the involvement of

⁴¹ They have been living there for many historical and cultural reasons that cannot be fully described within the framework of this dissertation. As of 2001, there were 17,3% who identified themselves as Russians. Since, the country is inhabited by nine ethnic groups, Ukrainian and Russian are used as languages of inter-ethnic communication (Hajda and Yerofeyev 2019).

Moscow to the discontent of Kyiv and the international community (Averre 2016; Wang 2015).

For the OSCE, the Ukrainian crisis, became another test of its conflict resolution capabilities, as there had not been a comparable situation since the Yugoslav wars. By request of the Ukrainian government and by the consensus decision of all member-states, the OSCE's unarmed civilian Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) was established. The goals of the SMM are to reduce tensions, foster peace and security, as well as to secure implementation of the OSCE principles on the ground (Anon 2014b).

Parallel to the specially established mission, OSCE bodies – PA, ODIHR, OCNM, and RFM – started working in the country. They all aimed for the same goals as the SMM: conflict resolution, monitoring the situation and organization of contacts between Russian and Ukrainian high officials (Anon 2015). Overall, the OSCE work in Ukraine after the outbreak of the conflict aimed at easing the government's relations with the Russian-speaking population, supported by Moscow and with the Kremlin directly (especially after the annexation of Crimea and start of the military actions in the South-East of Ukraine). Although Russia disregarded the obligations it had within the OSCE, the presence of the organization on the ground prevented Moscow from further active involvement in the domestic politics of Ukraine.

The above-discussed events, the active engagement of Russia as part of the OSCE (together with its bodies and specially established SMM) and alone, contributed to the attention Moscow paid to the OSCE in 2014-2015 in terms of the actual number of entries and average sentiments. Both are the highest compared to other peaks in the observed period (2001-2015). Several factors can explain the leading position of the last years of investigation.

Firstly, due to shared history⁴², Ukraine holds historical importance for Russia. As a result, there was no way Moscow would not have been involved in its domestic affairs or would have let other countries do this. Secondly, by executing power over Ukraine (by annexing part of its territory and supporting paramilitary groups in another region), the Kremlin sees itself as a great power protecting its sphere of influence from the West. Thirdly, having lost Georgia to the West after the August War, Russia tried to stop Ukraine from following the same path.

⁴² Kyiv is the ancient capital for both countries; Kyivan Rus' is the name for a country Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus developed from. Since only Russia became an empire in the course of history, it perceives itself as a successor of the Kyivan Rus' (Hedenskog 2005).

Kyiv remained among the few post-Soviet ones that did not fall to the Western spell⁴³ (Hedenskog 2005; Toal 2017).

The Russian foreign minister referred to the Ukrainian aim of joining Western alliances and thus, threatening Russian borders, as early as 2008 and 2009 (OSCE15.04.2008, OSCE23.04.2009). In both ministerial entries, he mentions the goals of the OSCE that intersect with those of NATO, membership of which is the ultimate goal of Kyiv; whilst neighboring with this, Moscow seeks to prevent. During the Maidan events, the Russian foreign minister already started giving speeches conveying the Russian vision of the situation. While talking about an unconstitutional takeover, he relied on the OSCE framework for sustaining relationships with Ukraine (OSCE01.02.2014).

As for the text sentiment in quantitative data, although the majority of entries are neutral (55,2%), positive constitute 35,4%, making the difference between the two closer than in the previous peak (2008-2010). Without neutral entries, positive make 79% with 2014 being the peak of the period. As for the negative attitude, it remains at the same level in both years. The strong Russian position can explain the two issues within both the region per se and the OSCE. Given active Russian involvement in the OSCE discussions over the Ukrainian crisis and the support Moscow provided to the organization, the proportion of neutral and positive seems logical.

Manual analysis of the same data supports a generally positive attitude towards the institution. The OSCE, according to the ministerial entries within this period, is a valuable actor in conflict mediation (OSCE12.05.2012(2), OSCE09.09.2014(2), OSCE25.08.2014). At the same, as in previous periods, Russia tends to use the OSCE decisions and recommendations to criticize the actions of the Ukrainian government and promote its vision (of the conflict).

For instance, the Russian foreign minister referred to the OSCE roadmap and Ukrainian non-compliance with it to accuse Ukraine in the death of a Russian journalist (OSCE17.06.2014(3)). The Russian Ministerial Authorized Representative for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law's commentary about human rights violations in Ukraine is another example of the aforementioned use of the OSCE for Russian benefit (OSCE14.04.2015).

⁴³ With the exception of the time of the Orange Revolution in 2003-2004.

Apart from criticizing the Ukrainian governmental actions, Russia does not always agree with the position of the OSCE and the issued decisions. For example, in his speeches, the Russian foreign minister pointed out that despite a lack of agreement over the events in Ukraine and the framework of its resolution, Russia agreed to the final decision (OSCE14.03.2014(3), OSCE04.06.2014).

In public speeches and interviews, Putin also supports the organization in its attempts to resolve the Ukrainian conflict. Also, as in the case of the Georgian War, the President talked about the OSCE as the best negotiating platform due to its credibility and non-involvement. That is the approach also visible in the ministerial archive, the entries of which represent Russia as a good multilateralist standing for peaceful resolution of the Ukrainian conflict (OSCE24.02.2015, OSCE18.03.2015, OSCE16.01.2015(2), OSCE13.04.2015).

5.4. Topics covered by the Russian governmental bodies regarding the OSCE

The Federation Council referred to the OSCE in attempts to legitimize the position of Moscow by arguing that the Western states were not entirely consistent with the OSCE's principles. Still, Russia, as distinct, was presented as acting based on the latter. According to the Federal Council, the OSCE, as an institute, has a good potential for resolving crises, particularly in peace-making, its ability to provide objective assessments, and mostly its founding principles. The Council mentioned the OSCE in a wide variety of contexts, such as political issues, security, democracy promotion, economy, science, modern technologies, human rights protection, migration, natural resources, environment, etc. (Anon 2014c, Anon 2014c, Anon 2014d).

When expressing opinions on the relation between Russia and another country, members of the Federal Council repeatedly emphasized the importance of cooperation within OSCE (Anon 2012d, Anon 2013a, Anon 2013c, Anon 2013d).

However, as the Federal Council states, instead of unfolding its resources, the OSCE is mostly used by the Western states to confront Russia. Due to this, many of the opinions produced by the OSCE were in general, deemed to be of an anti-Russian nature (Anon 2013b). Concerning this, a particularly sensitive topic proved to be elections in Russia. According to the Council, the OSCE held a highly arbitrary opinion that had been formed long before the elections took place (*SM Mironov: 'OBSE Sfabrikovalo Mneniye o Vyborah Zadolgo do Nih'*, 200 CE;

Valeryi Fedorov: 'Spravedlivymi i Chetnymi Dolzhny Byt ne Tolko Vybory, no i Ih Ocenka', 2011).

The Council numerously mentioned the need to reform the OSCE; here, the main normative message was to get the organization back to the norms and principles pledged at the times of its foundation. In this context, the Federal Council referred to the period when Moscow had a more powerful status both in the international arena in general and the organization in particular (Anon 2012a, Anon 2012b, Anon 2012c).

5.5. Summary

Overall, all three peaks in Russian attitude towards the OSCE represent its desire to remain in the leading regional security organization and use its strong position (or strengthening it as it was the case before the Corfu Process) within the organization for its benefits. Moreover, Moscow seeks to keep its role as a regional leader and be a voice of the post-Soviet space in multilateral institutions. The President continuously voices his support for the actions of the OSCE, although he does not let the institution interfere into the Post-Soviet area beyond aid activities. Moreover, despite public speeches of support, he prefers to decide the fate of the region with the leading powers (e.g., France and Germany as in the case of Georgia and Ukraine).

All in all, the OSCE represents an example of the H₁: a hard-issue institution, which Russia generally actively supports due to its co-establisher position. As a former superpower in the bipolar world, Russia co-established the OSCE and still holds a strong negotiation position within the institution despite being outnumbered by the Western democracies.

Therefore, on the empirical level, the country holds a policy-dependent attitude towards this institution. The institutional policy output influences the attitude Moscow has towards the OSCE. Accordingly, the Kremlin actions and attitude are mainly reactionary. The reasons for such behavior are manifold. Firstly, Russia seeks to maintain control over the Post-Soviet space as Moscow believes it belongs to the Russian sphere of influence. Secondly, Moscow's foreign policy is based on a realistic approach with one of the strategies in multilateral institutions being reactive. Thirdly, the Kremlin position depends highly on the vision the President holds, as he is the figure determining the directions of Russian foreign policy.

The Russian strong position within the OSCE and willingness to maintain it influenced quantitative data as well. The implications are observed not only in the overall high number of

entries in the archive, but in the average text sentiment during the observational period. Nonetheless, as was discussed above, at times when the data taken from the online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is mainly positive, the President's position (assessed qualitatively based on his rare mentions of the OSCE) can be different from the information provided by the Ministry. The situation of supporting the OSCE only when it suits Russian goals can be explained by the instrumental multilateralism applied by Moscow in its foreign policy.

Chapter 6. The case study of the SCO.

This chapter deals with the case study of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that represents a perfect example of the H_{1.2}: a hard issue institution established after the Second World War, of which Russia is an active supporter due to its strong position⁴⁴.

The Russian Federation has long been perceived as either a spoiler in multilateral institutions, or as the hegemon of regional institutions, as in the case of the post-Soviet space. The SCO is neither of the two, since from its establishment it enjoyed the two regional superpowers – China and Russia – in its governance (Libman and Obydenkova 2013; Mattes and Rodríguez 2014; von Soest and Grauvogel 2017).

Russia and China represent the two main authoritarian regimes that happened to establish a multilateral, regional organization together. By doing so, they not only try to secure peace and stability in the region, but also seek to counterweight overrepresentation of Western multilateral institutions (Ambrosio 2008; Morse and Keohane 2014; Pourchot and Stivachtis 2014).

Moreover, the region still holds importance for Moscow, as it used to be governed by the Russian capital. The SCO is also vital for regional security since other leading regional initiatives are built mainly around the economy – the Commonwealth of the Independent States (the CIS) or the Eurasian Economic Union (the EEU).

The chapter is structured in such a way as to grasp the issues stated above and is organized as follows: First, I discuss possible reasons behind the Russian choice to co-establish the SCO. I then turn to the structure of the institution and the role of Moscow in it. Thirdly, I discuss the importance of the SCO for Russia. Subsequently, I move to the analysis of data on Russian attitude during the observational period: 2001-2015. There, I consider the overall Russian interest in the organization, along with the text sentiment of the entries and possible explanations behind them.

Apart from the quantitative analysis of the dataset data, I make use of systematic reading of the entries marked as made by the Russian governmental actors: The President, the foreign

⁴⁴ Within this research, I refer to the dichotomy of strong and weak positions within the context of negotiating positions. As opposed to the weak position, strong one concerns states that can exercise control over the decision-making process and influence the results of distributional bargaining (Schneider, 2011).

minister, and state representatives to the major MIs, such as the EU⁴⁵. Also, I turn to alternative primary sources – online archives of the President, both houses of parliament and prime minister. By embracing all levels of foreign policy decision-making and implementation, I present an all-inclusive governmental attitude towards the SCO.

6.1. Reasons behind Russian involvement in the SCO

For centuries, Central Asia used to be a far province of the Russian and then the Soviet empire; it absorbed and implemented authoritarian political practices of the capital. The fall of the Soviet Union did not lead to a Russian exodus from the region. Instead, Moscow adopted the Western tools of democracy promotion⁴⁶ for its own purposes, in order to secure its presence in the region. By using Western instruments for its goals, I understand direct and indirect support of pro-Russian political elites in the region along with active usage of soft power (Cadier and Light 2015; Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009).

The main instrument was and remained leading a regional integration. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States came into existence. However, this organization did not transform into a binding institution and remained mainly a platform for a multilateral meeting of the post-Soviet states (Pourchot and Stivachtis 2014). Another significant regional integration initiative sponsored by Russia was the Eurasian Economic Union.

The new entity is officially based on the equal position of all member-states and covers economic issues only. In reality, there is still a discussion about how it functions and if its institutional structure is transparent enough. Popescu (2014) notes in her work that the union is a Russian project aimed at compensating for its falling international status, after the breakout of the annexation of Crimea. Tarr (2016) is less pessimistic and prefers to look at economic benefits that the union brings to its member-states.

⁴⁵ For the transparency reasons, the entries to which I refer in this chapter are indicated by their code names, de-coding of which can be then found in the attachment containing the dataset. The exact documents can be found on the archival website mid.ru using their data in the search engine.

⁴⁶ Within this research, democracy promotion refers to different approaches adopted by leading Western democracies, most notably by the USA or the EU. As suggested by Schimmelfennig, Scholtz, and Schatz (2008; 2006), the main tools used by the Western powers include an offer of beneficial political or economic association, financial aid in the form of rewards for favourable behavior and sanctions in a reverse situation, and support of domestic civil society groups. Those working within the sphere of Russian foreign policy, agree that for the Kremlin the policy of democracy promotion has been perceived as an intervention into internal affairs of sovereign states (Ambrosio 2009; Hall and Ambrosio 2017).

Russia is not the only state interested in the preservation of its role in Central Asia. The rise of China in Central Asia was a logical continuation of its economic growth. The fast-growing economy called for more energy sources and new roads to Europe. Central Asia became a logical solution. Though China develops student grant programs for Central Asian youth and has agreements on military support with selected countries, its presence in the region is limited to the economy (Kim, 2017; Lain, 2016; Vorobyov, 2017).

Moscow, on the other hand, loses its position as the biggest economic partner for Central Asian states. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it could not sustain investments on the same level and was soon replaced by China. Despite loosening economic ties, Moscow retained its role in cultural, educational, and political spheres. Russian language is still official in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and remains the language of inter-ethnic communication in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

The growing involvement of Central Asian countries in bilateral and multilateral agreements with China threatened the already diminishing role of Russia in the region. The SCO became a solution for how to preserve its presence in Central Asia and to monitor Chinese activities there. In his speech in 2002, Putin positively assessed Chinese involvement in the development of the SCO. In this speech, he focused on the war with the “three evils” that constitute the core of the organization and is vital for both China and Russia (Aris 2009; Putin 2002b).

6.2. SCO structure

Despite all the internal differences and individual attitudes towards Russia and China, all Central Asian states united under the auspices of the SCO. By looking at the structure of the organization, I intend to trace what place Russia reserved for itself within the SCO and how it then translated into its attitude toward the institution.

Institutionally, this organization mirrors a classic Western organization. Its supreme decision-making body – the Council of Heads of State – sets the priorities, major issues of functioning, and international interactions of the organization. The second main body – the Council of Heads of Government - meets once a year as well and is responsible for the internal affairs of the organization. It is supported by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Council of National Coordinators (the latter functions more as a coordinator of the day-to-day affairs), responsible for day-to-day activities of the SCO (Al-Qahtani 2006, Anon 2002a).

Like in most multilateral institutions, the SCO's executive organ is the Secretariat, whose head is appointed by the Council of Heads of State. Among the functions of the Secretariat is the technical and organizational support of the organization. Moreover, there are three Deputy Secretaries who are responsible for political, economic, and administrative activities. They report to the above standing bodies and structures with respective functions.

In addition to the described organs, the SCO has a special body –the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (or RATS). Since the main aims of the organization are securing peace and promoting stability in Central Asia, establishing the RATS was a logical step. In practical terms, this means ensuring information exchange among the member-states, coordination of police border control, customs, and national security agencies. As a special body, it has its own Council and Executive Committee. The Council is the decision-making unit consisting of leading figures of various authorities of the member-states. The Executive Committee has classic executive functions. Its director is appointed by the Council of the Heads of State (Al-Qahtani 2006; 'the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism' 2001).

6.2.1. Russian position in the SCO

In order to re-establish the status of great power in the world order after the end of the Cold War, Russia needs to have it publicly accepted by the global society and especially by "significant others." Therefore, it is vital to adopt the rules and norms established in the 1990s by the Western democracies. Embracing Western practices for the willingness to be accepted as equals also refers to setting up institutions (Larson and Shevchenko 2010).

Russian-language literature focuses on similar aspects. Its central argument is based on geopolitical contentions existing between Moscow and the West, in particular, the Russians need to oppose the growing influence of Europe and the United States. Central Asia is one of the regions where this conflict of interest takes place. The attention of the West to this area is depicted differently. Some describe it as an attempt to make a resource appendage out of Central Asia, rather than integrating it into the global economy (Braterskyi and Suzdalcev 2009). Others focus on the need for Western powers to secure peace in the region as it remains one of the primary providers of international terrorism (Konarovskiy 2016).


The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was created based on these two needs – to be accepted as equals and to counterbalance the West in Central Asia. The organization presents a peculiar case of an institution formed by two authoritarian regimes with great power

aspirations – rising powers. As a co-establisher, Russia is present in all of the bodies, and Russian (along with Chinese) is one of the official languages. These issues already signal Moscow’s interest in the institution, as otherwise, it would not have negotiated its strong position in the SCO. Moreover, as a state aiming at regaining the great power status in the international arena, Russia is interested in heading integration movements in its former parts and establishing a peaceful space with its primary challenger – China.

Being among the co-establishers of the SCO and having staff members in all institutional bodies guarantees a strong negotiating position within the institution. This, together with historical importance in Central Asia, provides Moscow with a secure status in the region. Thus, according to the H_{1,2}, the Kremlin’s role within an institution shall positively contribute to Russia’s stable high interest towards the SCO. This empirically translates into policy-driven continuous support of the institution, endorsed by the high numbers of entries in the archive combined with fluctuations of positive and neutral entries.

6.3. Russian attitude towards the SCO

The Figure below (Figure 1) presents an overview of empirical results. It covers two variables: the attitude of Russia towards the SCO and the amount of attention devoted to the organization. Both issues are shown in their change over the period of 2001-2015. The graph depicts how much attention (relative to the overall number of entries in the given year) each type of attitude receives annually. As noted in the methodological chapter, an attitude takes the form of one of the three sentiments: positive, neutral, or negative.



Russia in the OSCE: overview (Figure 1)

Overall, the hypothesis about generally a high number of entries compared to the overall number of IOs was proven. Although the total share of the SCO is 1%, it is 7,3% of all regional institutions, which is the biggest among hard-issue institutions not controlled or sponsored by Russia alone⁴⁷.

Only the years of 2001 – 2005 are marked by twice as many entries compared to the later years. This can be explained by the initial phase of the organization's existence, during which there were active discussions around its overall functioning. The first steps towards the establishment of the SCO were undertaken in 1996. Still, it was not until 2001 when the ‘Memorandum among Governments’ of SCO member-states on the primary goals and directions of regional economic cooperation and launch of the process for creating favorable conditions in the field of trade and investments” was signed and the organization was officially set up. This document brought annual meetings to a new level and established a formal framework for them (Al-Qahtani 2006). During the second meeting of the Heads of Government in 2002 in Saint Petersburg, the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was signed. In the next year, it was ratified.

In his rare statements referring to the organization, the President spoke favorably of the SCO by calling the existing arrangements in security and military cooperation successful and a base for further economic cooperation between the members (SCO14.06.2001). He also focuses on the interests shared by the SCO member-states and in particular, by the regional leaders – Russia and China (SCO19.06.2004).

That is also the vision translated by the foreign minister who described the institution in most favorable terms, speaking of a need for the regional security for which the SCO holds big potential. For him (along with the rest of the Russian government), this institution stands along with the other multilateral security organizations like NATO (OSCE27.02.2003).

In the following two years, the SCO acquired observer status in the UN General Assembly, a number of countries (Iran, India, Pakistan) were granted observer status, and the organization grew from being primarily Central Asian to a more prominent regional structure (Aris 2009). These developments certainly involved negotiations and meetings with following the reports that positively contributed to the status of the institution and Russian attention to it.

⁴⁷ As it is the case of the Commonwealth of the Independent States or the Collective Security Treaty Organization – the institutions with the biggest share of attention established in the post-Soviet region after the end of the Cold War.

An alternative explanation for why Moscow lost interest in the SCO for a short period after 2005 and is supported by the fall of the average number of entries is provided by Frost (2009). He suggests that there was a split between Russia (that tends to pursue self-interest instead of multilateral obligation) and China – together with other Central Asian states – that advocates the principles stated in the charter of the SCO (Frost 2009). The difference between the two sides became even more visible during the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, in which the former Soviet republics did not voice their approval of Russian aggression in their usual welcoming manner.

Another example is the Tulip Revolution and ethnic clashes in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, during which Russia sought to establish its rights over the post-Soviet states, due to the historical ties and left interdependencies. In one of his interviews, the foreign minister speaks of the humanitarian help provided to the country by all member-states and stresses the role of Russia in it (SCO24.05.2010).

The switch to bilateralism concerning the post-Soviet space becomes even more visible if one compares the attention Moscow pays to multilateral and bilateral affairs in the region. For example, in the year 2001, Kazakhstan was mentioned 81 times in the ministerial archive as compared to the SCO's 23 times. The difference in numbers indicates an often expressed idea of Russia being an “instrumental multilateralist” – a country that participates in multilateral initiatives when it best suits its interests, while focusing on bilateral relations most of the time (Molchanov 2015; Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009).

Except for the first five years, the average number of annual entries does not vary much, except for 2013. The stability of attention indicates the continuously active participation of Russia in the SCO and its interest in the organization. As stated earlier, Moscow is interested in this institution for several reasons. First, it allows monitoring the Chinese presence in a traditionally Russian sphere of interest – the Central Asian states. As the Chinese economy rose, it enabled Beijing to invest heavily in the region and continuously replace Moscow there (Naarajärvi 2012; Yuan 2010; Bratersky and Suzdalcev 2009).

Second, as the only hard-issue regional institution that unites two regional powers, the SCO attracts Russian attention as an opportunity to remain in a strong position and control the actions of China in its sphere interests.

Thirdly, it enables the Kremlin to attract the Chinese into the region without the constant fear of falling under their influence, as is the case with the Chinese project One Belt One Road. Additionally, the SCO remains a single joint organization for Russia and China, in which they cooperate in the security realm (Bin 2012). Fourthly, as a joint structure of two regional powers, this organization limits the involvement of the United States and the European Union in the region. This therefore allows the formation and support of a regional security umbrella (Frost 2009).

There are three critical periods in the Russian attitude towards the SCO that are policy-driven and supported by quantitative data. As discussed above, the first period (2001 – 2005) is related to the establishing period, which is predominantly neutral in the first two years (2001-2002). In his speeches related to the SCO, the president speaks mostly neutrally about the membership or the agenda-setting ('Intervyu Kitayskoy Gazete "Zhenmin Zhibao"' 2002; Putin and Nazarbayev 2002; Putin 2002b).


Another peak of Russian interest towards the SCO happens in 2010 and has mostly neutrally connotated entries. One of the reasons was the Kyrgyz revolution in 2010. Since Kyrgyzstan is a member of the SCO and a former Soviet republic, Russian officials gave public statements on the organization and voiced Moscow's official position regarding the Kyrgyz situation multiple times during the year. However, neither of them went beyond neutral, highly bureaucratized words (Medvedev 2010a, 2010c). During bilateral meetings with other members of the SCO within the institutional framework, the President focused mostly on the positive role of the organization as an integrating community in fighting "the three evils" (Anon 2010b).

At the same time, the Federal Council refers to the SCO outside of the Kyrgyz context. For this governmental body, this regional organization is of great importance for not only the Asia-Pacific region, but globally. They continuously emphasize the success this organization has in the sphere of security along with the growing authority of Russia within the SCO (Orlova 2010).

The third peak, as awaited, took place in 2014, with 62% of the difference between positive and neutral entries. During the annual SCO summit and the big press conference, the President honored the positive role of the organization in the Ukrainian conflict. He also stated that the SCO and Russia share the vision on conflict resolution (Putin 2014d, 2014a). Since 2014 was a year prior to the Russian presidency in the organization, the officials

covered this issue in their statements as well. The prime minister agreed with the Federal Council and stated that the SCO is a vital regional integration organization in the sphere of security. For Medvedev, developing relations with other Russian regional initiatives was among the goals for the Russian SCO presidency, as he saw this as a benefit for Moscow and the SCO (Anon 2014e).

Overall, while the Russian attitude towards the SCO generally remains at the same level after 2005, text sentiment changes over the years. As shown on the graph (Figure 2), subtracting positive data (that constitutes more than half of the SCO overall) from the total entries, the number of positive entries continually grows.



Apart from the online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the same connotation is observed in other administrative bodies as well. Representatives of the Federal Council positively assess Russian participation in the SCO and the work of the organization in general. They also talk about the importance of this organization for the global world order, as this is among rare regional initiatives without interference of Western powers (Mironov 2008).

6.3.1. Possible reasons behind sentiment fluctuations

The change in the attitude can be explained by the falling role of China, which according to some, started to lose interest in the SCO once India and Pakistan acquired observer status in the organization. There are several reasons behind Chinese dissatisfaction with the new observers. Firstly, both are nuclear powers that might challenge the bipolar structure of the SCO. Secondly, bilateral relations between Russia and India and Pakistan are better than

between these states and China, which means that if needed, forming an anti-Chinese coalition within the organization would be easier. Thirdly, India and China still have unresolved problems in their relations that can prevent them from sharing intelligence information – one of the keystones of cooperation within the SCO. Moreover, some believe that China was disappointed by Moscow's reluctance towards more financial and economic cooperation with the SCO (Gabuev 2017; Gabuev et al. 2017; Maduz 2018; Naarajärvi 2012; Yuan 2010).

Nonetheless, on the level of public statements, Russia remains positive regarding its relations with China within the SCO. The focus of the officials lies on economic, humanitarian, and security cooperation based on a bilateral and multilateral framework (Anon 2014a; Mironov 2007).

Since this SCO is built mainly by two powers – Russia and China – a fall of one means a rise of the other, which in this case, is Moscow. Therefore, a growing number of positive entries once Beijing loses its interest seems logical.

Another explanation for a stable number of a positive attitude refers to a growing Russian role in the global arena as it seeks to acquire a “great power” status, which is impossible without multilateral institutions. According to Russian-language literature, while China is not interested in conflict prevention outside of its borders, Moscow's attitude is the opposite. As an active member of the SCO, Russia initiates new projects and agreements not only with member-states but with the neighboring countries (e.g., Afghanistan and Turkmenistan) as well (Starchak 2011). Naturally, this calls for providing a positive image of the SCO, whose aim is to fight the three evils of terrorism, extremism, and separatism (Anon 2002a).

Growing positivity is also connected to the type of entries. As the neutral ones are mainly reports (19% of overall entries) and press releases (14%), the positive ones are speeches (12%), interviews (9.54%), and statements (5.54%). On the level of language, reports and press releases represent structured documents that are written according to the well-established patterns that contribute to the neutrality of their text sentiment. Speeches, interviews, and statements are less structured and more disposed to sentiments, as they are a written version of oral language that is full of emotions (Friedl 2006).

Overall, the results have two levels. The first one comprises mainly the overall numbers and shows a continuous Russian interest in the SCO. The second level goes deeper and looks at

the text sentiments of ministerial entries. While the total number of entries fell over the years, their connotation changed from neutral to positive, which can be explained by both political and stylistic (predominance of prepared forms entries such as reports) factors.

6.3.2. Main topics covered by the Russian government

This part deals with the other constituent elements of the Russian government participating in Russian foreign policy and their attitude towards the SCO. They include the Prime Minister, President, the Federation Council and the State Duma (that together constitute the legislature of the Russian Federation). By having all these participants of the foreign policy implementation, I present a comprehensive picture of the official Russian attitude towards the SCO and the issue the administrative bodies are interested in.

The way Russian officials referred to the SCO remained mostly unchanged over the researched period. Although they touched both hard and soft issues, the former received significantly greater attention with regard to the amount of details. Both the presidential office and the parliament referred to stability, security, and economic prosperity as the primary areas of focus of the organization. In their understanding, the SCO took security as a broad concept, and cooperation in the organization was not limited to the military aspect: it also concerned fighting terrorism, extremism, and illicit drug trafficking. Additionally, security and economy were repeatedly interlinked in articulations on the SCO. Officials regularly stressed the organization's focus on economic well-being. More traditional security topics such as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and fighting separatism were touched upon as well (kremlin.ru 2009e, 2009a; Medvedev 2009b, 2010c; Putin 2013b; Putin and Singh 2013; Sovet Federacii 2005, 2007b, 2010a, 2010c).

When it came to explaining the alleged advancement of the SCO, neither the presidential office nor the parliament made bold statements about it as an organization governing affairs of its member states. Instead, it was the individual or coordinated activities of the member states that brought success to the organization. While comparisons were made with the EU, they referred more to the high status of the SCO (as equal to that of the EU) than to the mode of operation. Russian officials primarily positively characterized the SCO as an intergovernmental organization. In general, the SCO was characterized as a respectable, firm, and effective international organization, staying in line with the UN and the CIS. The link between BRICS, the EurAsEc and the SCO was emphasized repeatedly, especially when officials characterized relations between individual member states of the SCO (kremlin.ru

2005a, 2008d, 2009c, 2011a, 2012a, 2014; Putin 2014a; Putin and Karimov 2014; Sovet Federacii 2009, 2011, 2012c, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).

Russia numerously stressed its importance for the SCO and the global prominence of the organization in the modern multipolar world, as well as the great potential of the SCO. By doing this, officials constructed a vision of Russia as a rising power that drove the SCO and asserted influence over the region as exercised through the organization. To complement this, Russian officials positively assessed SCO values: trustworthy partnership within the organization, respect for each other's sovereignty between the member states and unity in approaches towards significant challenges. Rather than showing an ongoing dialogue within the organization, articulations of Russian officials on the SCO demonstrated robust and unified conformity with Russian policies (primarily in the field of foreign affairs). This was especially relevant in cases where Russia was in strong need of international support, such as during and after the war in South Ossetia; concerning this, Russian officials extensively used the SCO as a legitimization element, referring to support of its member states. In addition to this, Russian officials placed the SCO in the same position as the EU, claiming that it was the dominant organization in the region and that it was attractive to many potential joiner states (kremlin.ru 2003a, 2005b, 2008b, 2008c, 2009b, 2009d, 2012b, 2015; Medvedev 2008a; Putin 2013e; Sovet Federacii 2004a, 2006b, 2008a, 2008d, 2010d)

6.4. Summary

This chapter has dealt with changes in the Russian official position towards the SCO – a regional organization Russia built together with China in order to fight the “three evils.” The results proved the $H_{1,2}$ that Moscow is an active supporter of a hard-issue institution in which it has a strong position and which it co-established after the Cold War. As the data suggests, the attitude of Russia is policy-driven. It depends not only on Moscow's position within the institution, but also particularly on external politics and on the view China holds towards the SCO. Additionally, quantitative data suggests terms fluctuations in the number of entries, with twice as much attention devoted to the first five years of the SCO functioning, as compared to the years that follow.

This can be explained by many factors. Firstly, Russia was still in the process of negotiations over the functioning of the organization. Secondly, according to some, after the accession of India as an observer, China lost its interest in the SCO and gave way for Russia to gain influence in the organization. Thirdly, after the successful establishment of the Eurasian

Economic Union and other pro-Russian regional integration projects, the SCO could have lost its attractiveness for Moscow.

After 2005, the Russian attitude towards the organization remains stable, which can be explained by several factors. It indicates the country's interest in the SCO that does not fade over the years and the permanent status of the organization globally and regionally. As for the text sentiments of the entries, they have changed over the years: the first five years were indicated by neutrality, while afterwards, slow growth in positivity set off. Apart from this, there is a distinction to be made in the types of documents: reports, press releases, and other kinds of entries with a formal structure tend to be neutral, while speeches and interviews positive.

Overall, empirical data provides a paradox: whilst in general, the attitude of Russia towards the SCO, remains stably active and supportive depending on policies executed by other member-states (which supports the $H_{1,2}$), the overall number of entries is falling over the years. At the same time, the number of positive entries grows. This chapter accounted for some possible reasons: a Chinese falling interest in the SCO and subsequent rise of the role of Russia, the end of negotiations period over the functioning of the organization, a bigger number of interviews with officials and their speeches that are more sentimental than diplomatic documents.

Chapter 7. The case study of the WTO.

This chapter is devoted to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that fits into the second hypothesis (H₂). The H₂ describes Russia having a challenger attitude when in a weak position within an institution⁴⁸. This translates into high interest in the institution before joining it, followed by indifference after accession.

As mentioned in the methodological chapter, the case study was chosen due to the highest number of entries devoted to it in the dataset within the research hypothesis. It enables working with more significant fluctuations over time, as compared to smaller sets of data and with only those institutions that bear the most political significance for Russia (translated in attention measured by the number of entries).

Regarding the structure of the chapter, it begins with an overview of the WTO. In it, I discuss the history of the institution, its current aims and goals, and reasons for Russian interest in the institution, as well as possible dissatisfaction with it. Then, I move to the overview of the Russian accession that was the longest in the history of the WTO and discuss the reasons that complicated this process. Long negotiation and accession period were among the main factors contributing to the Russian challenger attitude towards the institution.

Thirdly, the attitude of Russia within the observational period of 2001 – 2015 is considered. In this part, I look at how the view of Russian politicians changes within this time, along with the entries' coverage of the WTO in the online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To pursue this, I analyze the data quantitatively and qualitatively. While the former is done similarly as in Chapter 5, the latter is performed by systematic reading of the entries of the President, Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister .⁴⁹

Also, I consider alternative data sources, such as the online archive of both Houses of Parliament, the President, and prime minister. Overall, these steps provide a broad picture of Russian attitude towards the WTO and the motives behind it.

⁴⁸ Weak position is defined by several factors. Here, I refer to their negotiation position meaning that such states are “distributional losers” of international institutions they joined. Upon accession, they had to adapt existing norms and rules, but remain with low influence in decision-making due to less exit options compared to older members or existing regulations (Schneider 2011)

⁴⁹ For reasons of transparency, the entries to which I refer in this chapter are indicated by their code names, de-coding of which can be then found in the attachment containing the dataset. The exact documents can be found on the archival website mid.ru using their data in the search engine.

7.1. Reasons behind Russian involvement in the WTO

7.1.1. History of the WTO establishment.

As noted in the chapter's introduction, before proceeding to the structure of the WTO, one needs to look at its history and trace the development of its goals and principles. By doing so, I intend to shed light on the motivation of Russia to proceed with the accession, despite the long-lasting process of negotiations. In addition, institutional history and structure are necessary to determine the factors contributing to the Russian position within the WTO.

There is a collective agreement in the literature that the idea of a universal trade organization dates back to the interwar period. However, the first ideas of trade regulations can be found as early as the 19th century. The International Trade Organization (ITO) – actively promoted by the British and Americans – became the first real yet unsuccessful attempt to realize these projects (Bagwell and Staiger 2004; Narlikar, Daunton, and Stern 2014).

The Havana Conference⁵⁰ in 1947 became the high point of the ITO negotiations, during which the main principles and goals found in the World Trade Organization (WTO) were laid. They include regulation of international trade, lower economic barriers, free trade as the ultimate goal (in general, referred to as “fair and friendly” international trade) – of all hard issues of core interest to the states. Besides, there was a differentiation of states according to their development (“developed,” “developing,” “undeveloped, or “less developed” (Narlikar et al. 2014; Singham 2007; Toye 2003).

Although a charter on the ITO was developed after extensive negotiations, it has never been ratified. The main reason was that the signing parties are waiting until the United States decide on their position. As for the USSR – one of the superpowers of the bipolar world – it did not join the negotiations but left the right to join the Havana conference, which it never did. Therefore, a string of interim agreements became a solution (Narlikar et al. 2014).

The WTO grew from the GATT, while having later developed the intellectual property agreement (TRIPS) that became one of the WTO foundations; one needs to take a closer look at them. Both proceeded in parallel during ten periodic rounds of negotiations, that aimed at promoting trade liberalization among the members, securing more tariff reductions, and the

⁵⁰ Prior to the Havana Conference, several meetings and conferences took place, but they are of no interest for this study and therefore, are omitted.

removal of non-tariff measures. An additional goal was securing the improvement of existing rules and developing new ones that would cover other areas (Rege 2011).

The closest the world came to the idea of barrier-free trade, was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT managed to attract more members than the ITO but failed to include the Third World – the leading suppliers. Being born in the aftermath of the Second World War, the GATT tried to alter its goals. In the beginning, the priorities were on freezing national tariffs, initiation of gradual elimination of quantitative barriers. Later, the focus moved towards trade liberalization, tariff cuts, the introduction of codes⁵¹, and a sophisticated system of dealing with countries' stratification⁵² (Narlikar et al. 2014; Shukla 2000).

The second agreement included under the umbrella of the WTO is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Sharing principles of the protection of intellectual property rights with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the TRIPS stipulates minimum standards and periods of protection depending on the property right. The signature parties are required not to discriminate against their nationals and foreigners (the most-favored-nation treatment) (World Trade Organization, 2019; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, 2009).

The disappointment of developing countries contributed to several other reasons that led to the creation of the WTO. The goal of the dissatisfied states was to gain a better multilateral safeguard system, since the developed countries could impose restrictions on imports. The Marrakesh Agreement (1994) became the high point of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, as it finally established the WTO. However, since Russia was not a member of the organization yet, it did not participate in the round and applied to the institution after it was formally established.

7.1.2. Structure and decision-making of the WTO

The structure and decision-making of the WTO help us to understand what position Russia currently holds within the institution – in particular, what options it has in case of

⁵¹ These were the first documents that institutionalized some of the GATT work and later led to the transformation of the GATT into the WTO.

⁵² Voiced already during the ITO talks, the members were divided into developed and developing. Each type receives different treatment. Yet, when a member gains certain level of development, it is exempt of the privileges it had but receives more access to GATT rulemaking.

dissatisfaction. Moreover, this subchapter makes an overview of power dispensation across the institution and member-states.

The decision-making power of the WTO is in the hands of several bodies. Firstly, the Ministerial Conference consisting of the member-states' representatives. The second topmost decision-making body is the General Council. It consists of the member-states' representatives (although ambassadors attend its meeting as well) that carries out the same functions between the sessions of the Ministerial Conferences (Anon 1994a; Hoekman and Mavroidis 2016; Narlikar 2005).

Parallel to these two bodies, works the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) and the Dispute Settlement Body. The former acts within the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) and is responsible for reviewing the trade policies of the member-states. As for the latter, the Dispute Settlement Understanding governs the Dispute Settlement Body – the primary unit to which members turn (Anon 1994a; Narlikar 2005; Shaffer 2009)

Three subsidiary councils – for trade in goods, for trade in services, and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights – function under the General Council. Apart from the bodies mentioned above, permanent committees are working in areas ranging from development to agriculture. They are responsible for monitoring the implementation of agreements and passing the information to the Council of Trade in Goods that, in its turn, passes it to the General Council. Moreover, there are working groups, additional councils, committees, and sub-committees that function within the WTO and are open to the members (Rege 2011).

The Secretariat takes the executive or day-to-day activities. Apart from typical tasks like preparing documents for the meetings, some parts of the Secretariat are responsible for gathering independent information on world trends in relevant areas, visiting the countries under the review of the TPRM. The head of the Secretariat is the Director-General who is appointed by the Ministerial Conference. The Director-General chairs non-ministerial council meetings and coordinates the work of the WTO with the Geneva ambassadors (Anon 1994a; Hoekman and Mavroidis 2016; Narlikar et al. 2014).

As a member-driven organization, all decisions in the WTO are taken by consensus⁵³. However, given its size (164 in total) and their unequal development level, various groupings of member-states developed. Such groups include members (Australia, India, Brazil, United

⁵³ When this is impossible, a decision shall be taken by voting (Art. IX.1, Marrakesh Agreement) (Anon 1994a).

States, EU) most interested in the agricultural negotiations, or those (G-6) interested in non-agricultural market access (NAMA) (Janow 2008).

Negotiations within these two groups that took place during the Doha Round (launched in 2001) were not recognized as formal. Other groupings that are active in the WTO and worth mentioning are:

- G-20 led by Brazil, includes developed and developing countries and focuses on agricultural negotiations, plus export competition and domestic support.
- Cairns Group consisting of developing and developed agricultural exporters who call for agricultural reform and trade liberalization (the key members are Australia, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, New Zealand, Malaysia).
- G-33 consisting of mainly developing countries with poor populations. Led by Indonesia, this group demands a special safeguard mechanism for developing member-states, given their concerns about rural development, food security and poverty issues.
- Cotton-4 consists of the four African cotton-producing countries (Benin, Mali, Chad, and Burkina Faso), that demand elimination of export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support for cotton by the developed countries.
- NAMA-11 is a group of developing countries focusing on the NAMA negotiations, demanding lower tariffs and comparable tariff reductions for agricultural and non-agricultural products,
- G-10 consists of developed countries taking a defensive stance on agriculture while going offensive in NAMA and service (Janow 2008; Narlikar 2012).

This is not an exhaustive list of all the groupings that participate in the WTO negotiations, but only the most visible. Yet, a significant number of coalitions cannot successfully perform the functions they are meant for – position aggregation. As recently shown by Parizek (2020), some states participate in several groupings at the same time, signifying shared interests across, that helps form claims.

This approach is especially popular among some of the rising powers. They did not establish a formal coalition during the Doha Round – the most recent one. As discussed in the previous chapters, they became known under the BRICS abbreviation (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and

South Africa) in the early 2000s. However, not all of these countries have been WTO members since the establishment. The most experienced among the five are India and Brazil, who are in the organization since 1947 and have been at the roots of the process for more fairness and differential treatment for developing countries (Narlikar et al. 2014; Vickers 2012).

Moreover, as participants dissatisfied with their status quo and aims of greater representation in decision-making in hard-issue global institutions, rising powers engage in coalition building. Being the longest in the WTO, Brazil and India participate in more alliances than the rest of the BRICS. For instance, during the Uruguay Round, the two led the G10 in its aim to resist trade in services within the GATT (Narlikar et al. 2014; Vickers 2012).

India – another rising power that is a member of the WTO since its establishment, shows that one can side successfully with several camps (alliances with the BRICS, Global South, while showing commitment to the rules established by the Western powers) and benefit from them (Narlikar 2013; Rodrigues Vieira 2016). The Doha Round saw a proliferation of alliances and thus, provided various voicing platforms for rising powers. South Africa led the NAMA-11, in which Brazil and India participate, but the G-20 became the most important, as it united rising powers as well as developed countries (Narlikar et al. 2014; Vickers 2012).

Nonetheless, as the Doha Round showed, the institutional structure of the WTO remains an obstacle for the majority of member-states (along with their domestic problems) to reach an agreement for the distribution of gains and losses. Another contributing factor is time: the longer-lasting negotiations are, the less motivated political actors become (Parizek 2020). Thus, as applied to rising powers, the WTO design flaws lead to the need for institutional reforms.

7.2. Russian accession to the WTO

As shown above, the importance and authority of the WTO in global trade is indisputable. For Russia, after the fall of the USSR, joining this global hard issue institution was among the foreign policy priorities (Åslund 2010; Lo 2002). Having voiced its interest in joining the WTO in 1993, when it formally applied to the then GATT, Russia had to wait for 18 years until it joined the organization in 2012 (Anon 1993). In the following pages, I discuss the reasons why it took the WTO so long to accept Moscow and what implications this process had for the Russian attitude towards this organization before and after the accession.

7.2.1. General accession rules

Any state or customs territory can apply for the WTO membership. Still, all members must agree on the specific terms, which is done through establishing a working group and negotiation rounds. As compared to the GATT 1947 period, the acceptance process became more complicated and unfavorable to newcomers who have to bargain for their accession. Nevertheless, despite the opaque process, the benefits that a country receives from the membership makes the long-lasting process of negotiating to join the WTO worthwhile. Therefore, the demand for accession is not falling.

After a state or a customs territory applies, the accession package⁵⁴ is drafted by the working party that functions parallel to multilateral, plurilateral, or bilateral negotiations over the accession of an applicant. The agreement becomes a document between the WTO and an applicant. Since each applicant negotiates its own acceptance rules with the WTO, academics generally talk about “WTO-plus” and “WTO-minus” provisions. The WTO-plus is the most demanding one, as it addresses commitments not mentioned in the WTO rules that an applicant is obliged to meet. The WTO-minus refers to situations in which an applicant has fewer obligations than the WTO rule implies (Elsig, Hoekman, and Pauwelyn 2017; Janow 2008).

It is up to the WTO to assign the type of provision of an applicant. However, the public does not know the elements of the agreement since the documents are kept closed. Nor is the legal status of the accession protocols clear, as they might deviate from the WTO rules. Thus, the whole accession process is non-transparent; not only to the international public, but to the applicant’s citizens as well. The details become known after a country or a customs territory accedes to the WTO (Janow 2008). That is also the reason behind a spirited discussion regarding accession to the WTO among Russian business.

7.2.2. Russian accession to the WTO

The Russian Federation formally applied to the WTO in 1993, but it took 18 years of negotiations until it was admitted to the organization. One of the main reasons behind the long accession period is that Moscow represents a perfect example of the most demanding, WTO-plus provisions. Overall, there were 30 bilateral agreements with WTO members on trade in services and 57 bilateral agreements on trade in goods. There were approximately 26

⁵⁴ Has to be approved by the General Council and Ministerial Conference; its terms have to be accepted by the applicant’ government (World Trade Organization, 2019).

meetings of the working group in this period (World Trade Organization 2011). Its working group comprised 60 countries and was the largest in the history of the organization at that point in time (Tarr 2007).

The main areas in which Russia agreed to change its policies in order for them to comply with the WTO rules, include import tariffs and expanding trade in services (banking, business, and insurance sectors, plus agriculture) – all in the sphere of economy and trade. As for the institutional changes, they called for signing and implementing about 500 legal measures aimed at bringing Russian law governing international trade to the level of the WTO rules. A bigger goal behind this process is reciprocal commitments that member-states give to the organization and each other within it (O’Neal 2014; Tarr 2007).

As of the whole period of accession, it can be divided into several stages. Firstly, there was the Yeltsin period, during which Russia applied to the WTO. Moscow was in favor of accession at any cost, for several reasons. One of them was the authority this trade regime had globally, while Russia lost the alliance it had built as the USSR during the Cold War (Dmitrii Trenin and Lo 2005; Lo 2002).

Secondly, there was the first presidency of Putin characterized by the Parliament’s (Duma) support and the President’s interest in the WTO. The main reasons behind this, lie in the importance and authority that Moscow put in the institution as it is the core global organization working in the sphere of trade (Åslund 2010; Dmitrii Trenin and Lo 2005).

The Duma’s support did not only mean the adoption of new laws necessary for the accession, but also securing the majority for the President’s party in order for him to continue the chosen track domestically and internationally.

As for the President himself, his initial attitude towards the WTO is best pictured in the speech to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (national legislature) in 2000. Putin called the WTO an instrument for the country to gain influence internationally and join decision-making in the sphere of global trade (Putin 2002a). His statement, thus, supports the above-described argument of Russian initial active support in joining the WTO, due to the institution’s authority in such a hard issue area as global trade. Despite the reforms that are the spirit of the WTO accession, this speech contradicts what would be done during his second term domestically, as will be discussed below.

Thirdly, Putin's second presidency was marked by disappointment in the West in general, resulting in tiredness from the WTO negotiations⁵⁵ (Åslund 2010; Dmitriï Trenin and Lo 2005). In the data equivalent, this translated into negative comments from the officials and an overall fall in the number of entries.

Within the country, there was no unity either. Political and business elites advocated for their interests, among split into pro- and anti-WTO lines. While the government itself switched its position following the presidential line, Russian business was more consistent in its attitude towards accession to the WTO. It was divided into several sectors, according to the industry and the heads of the leading company.

Those in favor of an early (in the late 1990s – early 2000s) Russian accession were oil and steel exporters, plus the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP). Those against an early accession were the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the agricultural sector (although grain exporters stood for the WTO accession), and services. Their primary concerns included intellectual property rights and significant Western exports (Åslund 2010; O'Neal 2014).

7.3. Russian attitude towards the WTO in 2001 – 2015

As noted previously, the observational period starts with the beginning of Putin's presidency, then goes through the accession to the WTO and then the first years of Russian participation in the organization. Putin's administration during his first term was favorable towards negotiations with the WTO. This is reflected in the positive official position of the government and the number of entries in the archive⁵⁶.

The observational period for the most part (prior to 2012 – final accession) takes the period of reforms needed for the Russian accession to the WTO. The reforms included a new tax code, a new customs code, reorganization of the bank sphere, ratification and implementation of foreign exchange regulation and control (Mezhdunarodnyi Torgovyi Centr & Kafedra Mirovoj Ekonomiki, 2012).

⁵⁵ That was the time of rising prices on hydrocarbons and strengthening of Russian self-awareness on the global arena that culminated in the Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 (the document that together with the famous Munich speech proclaimed a turn to a more self-aware foreign policy).

⁵⁶ However, the first year, 2001, is relatively low given the mean of 37 entries.

Overall, although neutral entries prevail (55% of the overall WTO entries), positive ones show a high score of 41%. Moreover, in some periods (e.g., most visibly 2005 – 2008⁵⁷) positive attitude prevails. This view on the WTO can be explained by the Russian willingness to join the universal trade institution despite the prolonged accession process.

Nonetheless, the period between 2006 and 2011 is characterized by an empirical conflict. On the one side, the quantitative level is characterized by the fall in the overall number of entries. Yet, the qualitative analysis shows that the government did not refuse the idea of joining the WTO. President Putin – the head of the state and the one who directs foreign policy – stated multiple times that the country continues the chosen track of joining the universal trade organization (Hedenskog 2005; Medvedev 2008b; Putin 2005a, 2006).

At the same time, the priorities of Russian foreign policy changed to the Near Abroad (Cadier and Light 2015; Hedenskog 2005). On the official level, the rhetoric changed as well. Putin – now the prime-minister (2008-2012) – criticized growing protectionism among the WTO-members that slowed capital moving around the world. The President assured the international public that Russia did not follow the isolationist path and continued to integrate into the global market economy, along with supporting and developing regional trade organizations (RIA Novosti, 2008).

Such a tone could not have developed without rising prices on oil in the mid-2000s – the central part of the income for the Russian budget. As the revenues from the hydrocarbons sector grew, so did the Kremlin's assurance in its financial abilities and independence (Fattouh and Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 2010; Sabitova and Shavaleyeva 2015). The growth had its implications in the public speeches of the officials.

Thus, Putin in his final year as the prime minister (2012), showed scepticism towards the WTO and relied on regional trade organizations. At the same time, his government did not abandon the idea of accession and was very favorable to it in 2011 when it was evident that Russia was to join the WTO. Putin himself reported to the Parliament on the positive state of the economy and its readiness, prior to the accession. However, the Duma opposition voiced its suspicion regarding the preparedness of the country: primarily, car and agricultural industries, to international competition that they had to face after the accession (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2012).

⁵⁷ the number of entries drops, while the difference between neutral and positive rises almost proportionally

The graph below (Figure 1) summarizes changes in Russian attitude pictured in three variations – positive, neutral, or negative – across the years. The vertical axis shows the number of entries devoted to the WTO in a given year. The time is sketched on the horizontal axis. The stacked bar chart allows considering the changes in attitude variations.




Figure 1: WTO overview

The following graph below (Figure 2) summarizes the sentiment average (vertical axis – the absolute number of entries with sentiments) across the observational period (horizontal axis). The plot reflects the main changes depicted in Figure 1. As a result, I merge the two in the structure of this chapter and look at the Russian attitude towards the WTO through the sentiment peaks.

Compared to the changes of the OSCE average sentiment, the WTO one shows a fall in sentiment fluctuations after 2006 that never rose again. It corresponds with the H₃, which quantitatively presupposes a challenger position translated into a passive attitude.




Figure 2

The upcoming subchapters discuss the peaks of Russian attention and the attitude towards the WTO in more detail and show their dependency on the accession. While Moscow tends to support this West-led institution before joining it, the country switches to a challenger mode after becoming a member.

7.3.1. Sentimental rise of 2002 – 2006

The highest peak of the whole observational period takes place in 2002 – 2006, which is the period of Putin’s first and part of his second presidency. As mentioned earlier, the attention Russia paid to the WTO in these years can be explained by the personal interest of the President that translated into pro-Western, integrationist foreign policy (Bukkvoll 2003; Valeriano and Maness 2015). Although the oil prices started to rise at the same time, this did not influence the attitude of the country towards the WTO yet.

Below (Figure 3) is a closer overview of the dispersion of the first peak of text sentiment. It represents the awaited prevalence of neutral entries – 62% of the overall in the given period. Positive entries take 35% of the overall in the same period. Moreover, in 2005 – 2006, their proportion (49%) is higher compared to the neutral (45%).




Figure 3: Russia in the WTO: 2002 - 2006

One of the main reasons behind the high number of entries in this period is the governmental discussions regarding the accession to the WTO. The main supporters of the WTO negotiations in 2002 – 2006 among the business structures were steel exporters⁵⁸, grain exporters⁵⁹, the automotive sector, and foreign investors interested in further modernization of the Russian economy. In the case of the Russian accession to the leading global trade institution, they would be the first to profit from it. However, the anti-trade talks were heard from the rest of the agricultural sphere that saw the WTO accession and inevitable market opening as a threat.

Within the government, there was no unity either. While the President himself was a proponent of the accession at the beginning of his presidency, he lost interest in the organization. Many of the reforms needed for joining the WTO had already been adopted. This meant Russia was as close as ever to entering the WTO. Nevertheless, after Putin's re-election to the second term as President in 2004, his government had a non-reform face that

⁵⁸ As of 2018, Russia ranks as the sixth world's largest steel producer (World Steel Association 2018).

⁵⁹ As of the 2018/19 marketing year, it is about 7% above the five-year average (FAO UN 2019).

prolonged accession process. Also, Putin did not mention the WTO and the aim of joining the organization beyond annual addresses (Åslund 2010; Tarr 2007).

A closer look at the dataset data shows that the major governmental figures generally support the accession (WTO18.01.2002, WTO02.04.2003) As a systematic reading of the entries suggests, during the first presidency, Putin was in favor of accession, though, on Russian terms (WTO18.01.2002, WTO18.02.2002, WTO27.05.2002, WTO10.11.2003(2)).

In his multiple talks with the members of the WTO, the President also hoped for their support in the accession process (WTO06.05.2002, WTO27.05.2002, WTO22.10.2002, WTO09.10.2003(3), WTO18.12.2003, WTO07.12.2004). The topic of the WTO accession is also present, in his meetings with the leaders of the post-Soviet countries (WTO05.05.2003(2), WTO20.05.2003, WTO16.09.2004, WTO28.07.2003). The foreign minister supported this view of the President. For instance, in one of his speeches, the minister referred to the previous year's presidential statement concerning the importance of the US positive contribution in WTO talks with Russia (WTO02.06.2003).

The year 2004 marked the return to the domestic scene and became a turning point for it. Since after the 2003 Parliamentary elections, Putin started to finalize the “power vertical” that meant recentralization and the abolition of regional governors' elections. With growing authoritarianism, the Kremlin sent a mixed message to the international public by imprisoning Mikhail Khodorkovsky – the CEO of the biggest private oil company in Russia. The result was “the business capture” by the state that lowered the chance of Russian earlier admission to the WTO (Gel'man 2015). The reaction of domestic business was logical and was mainly critical. Many refer to the period of the early 2000s as unstable, requiring administrative resources due to the absence of credible governmental institutions (Volchek, Henttonen, and Edelmann 2013).

Nonetheless, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly (the legislature of the Russian Federation) in 2003, Putin called the WTO accession a priority for Russia and listed all the changes and reforms the country had succeeded in within the last ten years (Putin, 2003a). In the same year, the President also tried to influence the perception of the anti-accession coalition with the economy by explaining the benefits of the WTO membership (WTO14.08.2003(3)). The foreign minister supported Putin in these actions and followed his example in the speech for the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (WTO29.01.2003).

In his 2004 speech, the President acknowledged Russian interest in joining the universal trade organization, while adding that it should proceed on terms beneficial for Russia (Putin, 2004). This change from agreeing to any terms at the very beginning of his presidency to starting to claim certain limitations, signals Moscow gaining enough negotiating power in alternative institutions (also in regional ones).

Due to the turn to regional affairs, the President and the foreign minister started talking about the WTO in the context of regional cooperation and mutual benefit from the Russian accession. Lavrov (Russian foreign minister since 2004) speaks of the need to implement norms existing within the WTO in the regional multilateral institutions, in particular, the EEU. Together with further integration within the CIS, this shall accelerate the accession of the participating states to the WTO (WTO27.10.2004).

The data suggests that in 2005 – 2006, the general tone towards the WTO changed to a more favorable one. Despite the unchanged home rhetoric, in the international arena, the President managed to reach an agreement with the USA on the market access for Russia that was needed for Moscow's access to the WTO. Another reason behind the high number of positive entries in these two years is the G8 summit that took place in St. Petersburg in 2006, at which Russia presumably discussed its high hopes for near accession (Åslund 2010).

Despite no mention of the WTO and a general focus on the economic matters of the country in 2005, in his address to the Federal Assembly in 2006, Putin acknowledged Russian willingness to join the WTO but on considering Russian economic interests. The President also complained about double standards existing vis-à-vis Russia, since the accession negotiations should be based solely on the organization's activities (Putin 2005a, 2006).

Since the 1990s, Russia has also been a party to several bilateral trade agreements with leading WTO members: the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the European Community, the US-Russia Bilateral Trade Relations Agreement and Bilateral Market Access Agreement. Ideally, these agreements should have been platforms for Russia's opening to the market and subsequent WTO accession. However, in practice, instead of using judicial measures laid down in the framework of the agreements, Moscow tended to solve disputes diplomatically. Such an approach was unacceptable for the WTO, where there is a dispute settlement mechanism that cannot be overcome (Schewe 2013).

Summing up, the first (and highest) peak of text sentiment reveals two main issues. Firstly, although Russia initially behaved as a supporter, i.e., pro-accession, it then switched to a challenger attitude and turned to domestic politics. Moreover, Moscow shows relative loss of interest in the WTO for its internal use, the speeches directed to the international public continue to support the pre-accession direction. Secondly, despite a long-lasting process of accession (10 years in 2003), Russia did not cede its hopes for membership, as was voiced by the governmental officials

In quantitative terms, a high number of entries with a neutral attitude support the qualitative data. Additionally, on the textual level, the data itself represents all types of entries ranging from press releases (with the highest number of entries and being predictably neutral) to interviews (coming the second in the number of entries with mostly neutral text sentiment).

The WTO, in general, is among a handful of global multilateral institutions which Russia joined despite its weak institutional position. Although Moscow was in an even weaker power position after the end of the Cold War, it did not leave accession negotiations after strengthening its profile internationally and established more regional institutions with similar goals. The long-lasting period leading to the accession indicates the importance of the institutional membership for Russia. Also, the political significance of this institution traced in the analyzed data for the Kremlin cannot be underestimated.

7.3.2. The rise of 2011 – 2014

As for the period after the accession (2011 – 2012), it was marked by the initial slight rise in the attention devoted to the WTO, followed by a passive attitude coupled with rising negative sentiments towards the institution – a challenger position.

In quantitative terms, the picture is characterized by a slight rise in the overall number of entries as compared to the period before it. However, since there are no current negotiations rounds within the WTO, it is hard to account for the position that Russia takes in the organization. Nevertheless, the very structure of the WTO enables its members to execute their wills, be it coalition-building of like-minded members, or contesting the principle of the most-favored-nation (Kerr 2012).

When it comes to those who should have directly profited from Russian accession to the WTO – Russian businesses - their attitude varies. While they found changes at the regulatory level positive, deeper governmental involvement in the technology development and market

launch stages were not met with similar feelings. Many explain this attitude to corruption in government funding distribution. All these issues limit the possibilities of Russian business to internationalize, which is one of the goals of the membership in the WTO (Volchek et al. 2013).

As compared to the above-discussed period, the years 2011-2014 build a different hierarchy of types of entries, with interviews taking the biggest number, followed by press releases and speeches. It represents the overall predominance of unprepared oral expressions at this time.

The graph below (Figure 3) gives a detailed overview of the Russian attitude towards the WTO in this period.




Figure 4: Russia in the WTO: 2011 - 2014

The data represents outcomes slightly different from the previous peak: positive sentiments outweigh the neutral by 1% of the overall number of entries in the observational period. The small difference can be explained by the success of the 18-year long negotiations and support of the organization’s principles and goals, as well as rules that Moscow voiced in its official statements – the core component of the entries (Kerr 2012; O’Neal 2014).

Within this time, the year 2013 was marked by the rise in the average text sentiment, which can be traced to several issues. Firstly, this might be related to the complaints (which is

typical for the first years after the accession) initiated by Russia against its trading partners. The first opponents were the EU, Ukraine, and Moldova. The conflict with the EU related to the issue of natural gas. Disputes with the other two went around Russian alternate embargos on their goods. Moscow is also a respondent in cases brought against it: the EU against the Russian ban on importing livestock and pork, several countries against Russian anti-dumping measures. All the cases mentioned above involved discussions on all levels that inevitably translated into the high number of entries. Moreover, being able to use the WTO framework for solving the conflicts contributed favorably to the number of positive entries (Neuwirth and Svetlicinii 2016; O’Neal 2014).

In one of his interviews, the foreign minister refers to anti-dumping measures and rules that the EU initiated against Russian products against the WTO norms and rules. Lavrov notes that Russia would use all instruments available in the WTO to resolve the dispute.⁶⁰In the same speech, he also mentions discriminatory measures that, according to him, became obstacles for Russian earlier accession to the WTO (WTO01.09.2014).

Another possible reason behind the highest point of entries in 2013, is the first year of its membership in the WTO. This implies a certain status of the country that succeeded in joining the universal trade organization and therefore, its territory became less risky for operating business (Kerr 2012). According to Rakhlis, Skvortsova, and Koptyakova (2014), the banking sector is the one who profited most from the Russian accession to the WTO. Although the investment climate in the country did not change overnight, its improved status in the global financial market enabled the inflow of external actors, especially in medium- and small-size businesses.

The foreign minister also focuses on the accession benefits for all branches of the Russian economy. Apart from the impact on the domestic level, he also speaks of the WTO non-discriminatory norm – now applied to Russia. This allows Moscow to push for less strict ruling against its products, especially on the EU market – the biggest for the Russian economy (WTO16.05.2013, WTO15.10.2013(2), WTO05.12.2013).

In the annual addresses to the Federal Assembly of this period, Putin does not relate to the WTO directly. Yet, he either assesses the Russian economy in general, or trade as its

⁶⁰ In this case, Russia indeed used dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO and most recently won the case over the EU (WTO 2020).

component in a positive light. The accession is an opportunity to develop Far Eastern regions of the country, although according to the governmental report of 2013, the WTO poses a threat to the local agriculture (Pravitelstvo RF 2013). According to the President and the Russian government overall, the Russian economy became part of the international one despite remaining obstacles (Putin 2012a, 2013c, 2014f).

In this period, the foreign minister translates the same message in his speeches and interviews. Within only one year, his statements contain both disappointment with the long-lasting access process, and assurance in its positive outcome (WTO13.12.2011(3), WTO31.10.2011, WTO22.11.2011). He also does not forget about the importance of WTO membership for regional multilateral institutions. In particular, Lavrov speaks of the importance of the Customs Union for the region and reminds that this institution was built according to the WTO norms (WTO31.10.2011, WTO08.04.2011).

As awaited, the overall number of entries fell by 29% in 2014 as compared to 2013 with the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis. Generally, this event contributed negatively to all hard-issue global institutions, the number of which fell by 17% from 2013 to 2014. A deeper analysis of the ministerial entries, reveal that Russia took a similar stance within both the WTO and the OSCE, where membership of these proved advantageous to them in sanctioning clashes with the US and EU. By being able to refer to the shared institutional norms of the organizations rhetorically, Russia could sanction clashes with the US and EU, just as they had sanctioned Russia previously. (WTO26.06.2014, WTO14.10.2014).

Overall, both peaks (2002-2006, 2011-2014) draw a peculiar picture, with the first peak being the biggest in terms of the overall number of entries, while being predominantly neutral. Compared to that, the second one is smaller, but has a more positive connotation. As broadly discussed above, the main reasons for such an attitude are fluctuations of the Russian position vis-à-vis the institution. While in the early 2000s, as a still hoping for soon accession power, Moscow was mostly favorable towards the WTO and was willing to contribute more for its accession; the attitude changed as the process prolonged, in parallel with Russia gaining more weight in other institutions. When the country finally joined the WTO in 2012, the number of entries rose, but not to the level of high hopes. However, the text sentiment of the entries changed towards a more positive stance.

All the discussed issues regarding the WTO are present in the Russian-language literature despite its focus on the advantages and disadvantages of Russian membership in the WTO for

the internal market. Among the pros were more general topics, such as access to international markets, coverage by the WTO rules and law and a better image of Russia as a member of the biggest international trade organization. On the downside, more specific topics related to Russian membership in the WTO were raised: the slowdown of economic growth due to sanction, the uncompetitive sphere of agriculture and inability to attract Western capital for investments (Mudretsov and Tulupov 2015; Sabelnikov 2013; Samarina 2015).

7.4. Main topics covered by Russian governmental bodies regarding the WTO

On the qualitative level, various Russian officials demonstrated good consistency when referring to the WTO with minor exceptions. In general, the WTO was perceived well: it was numerously characterized as a well-established and trustworthy organization with reliable mechanisms and relatively clear benefits for individual member-states.

Overall, Russia benefited from joining the WTO. The great importance of prospective or actual WTO membership for Russia, was numerously stressed both before and after Russia joined the organization. However, a great emphasis was put on the need for an extended dialogue between Moscow and the WTO. Russian officials recognized both shortcomings and benefits of WTO membership (Gosudarstvennyi Sovet, 2014; Putin, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Sovet Federacii, 2007).

The benefits were not elaborated in detail, except for references to expected foreign direct investment increase and open economy. The described dangers of the membership were concerned with Russia's bad competitiveness in the fields of agriculture, communication technologies, aviation and other industries. The Federal Council had a greater tendency to criticize the organization than the Presidential office before 2012, although the essential normative message across the sources was that Russia must become its member-state. However, after Russia joined the WTO, open criticism stopped and the focus shifted to the need to support the industries mentioned above, especially agriculture. Despite certain difficulties, Russia coped fine with the challenges brought with the WTO (kremlin.ru 2003b, 2004b, 2011b; Medvedev 2008b, 2010b, 2011a, 2011d, 2011e; Mironov 2007; Putin 2003b, 2005b, 2012d, 2012b, 2013d; Sovet Federacii 2008c, 2008b, 2010b, 2012a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013a, 2014b, 2014a).

Despite the appreciation of the WTO's potential for Russia, officials also referred in a slightly negative manner to Western states' tendency to use its mechanisms for their own benefit. This

however, was not a moral appeal, but rather a normative message that encouraged Russia to learn to act in the same manner (Medvedev 2011c; Putin 2013a). Even the conditions initially put on Russia by the Western states were unfair, which became the reason of the long dialogue (Putin 2005c). Despite the hopes of some actors within the international community, The President also mentioned that joining the WTO must not be conditional to any political changes in Russia, as whilst Russia wanted to become a WTO member state, this would not be by any means (kremlin.ru 2008a; Medvedev 2011b).

The overall official positive perception of the WTO was underpinned by characterizing Russia's behavior as fully compatible with WTO principles. The same applied to the Eurasian Economic Union; even since 2003, it was emphasized that Russia created the EEU in full accordance with WTO principles (kremlin.ru 2003b, 2009f; Medvedev 2008c, 2009a; Putin 2012c, 2014e, 2014b, 2014g; Sovet Federacii 2012b). In this way, the organization was perceived as a valid basis for the legitimization of Russian policies. When criticizing other states' actions as unfavorable for Russia, officials referred to WTO principles and norms as being violated (Putin 2014h, 2014c; Sovet Federacii 2015d). A reference to a state violating WTO rules was used even against Belarus, which is a non-member state (Putin 2007). Importance of (future) cooperation within the WTO was quoted in multiple instances of the description of the relation between Russia and other countries (kremlin.ru 2003c, 2004c, 2004a, 2005c, 2005d; Sovet Federacii 2006a).

7.5. Summary

Summing up, as compared to the previous case study, the current one, as predicted by the H₂, represents Russia in a challenger position: having a passive, mainly neutral, and negative attitude. The WTO represents an institution engaged in a hard-issue sphere of universal trade. Its comprehensive structure set up after the end of the Cold War seeks to provide voice and decision-making opportunity for all its member-states but fails to do so, leaving them disappointed. Among them is Russia – a country that struggled to join this hard-issue institution for more than a decade.

An alternative explanation of the Russian attitude towards this institution can be found in the constructivist framework. Such an approach suggests that Moscow chose to join the WTO due to its normative values shared by a faction of Russian decision-makers. Existing studies (Headley 2012; Makarychev and Yatsyk 2014; Schmitt 2020) suggest that identity and norms influence Russian foreign policy. For instance, Headley (2012) traces how Russian self-

perception of a European, Eurasian (unique), or great power impacts its behavior in the Council of Europe.

Though the constructivist approach might explain the Russian hope for a fast accession, they do not provide sufficient explanation for the changes that happened after the accession. In its turn, a weak institutional position without an ability to control decision-making is supported by quantitative and qualitative data. Moreover, the overall support of the accession shown by the President also speaks against the argument of self-proclaimed identity.

The Russian government was divided over its view towards the accession to the WTO, as some of its bodies favored it and others stayed against. The business – part of the economy that is directly influenced by the outcomes of negotiations with the international trade organization – was also divided along the line of benefiting from the accession. As for the presidential attitude – the central figure of Russian politics – it changed according to the country's faltering position in the global system: as Russia acquired a stronger position in alternative institutions, the President adopted a firmer negotiation stand on joining the WTO.

Quantitatively, the data shows only two peaks of the average text sentiments that signal Russian support of the WTO in the period of high hopes, when the country did not possess alternatives to this institution or enough weight in other institutions. The second peak happens after the accession and is combined with the neutral entries signifying the success in joining the WTO that was mentioned in official texts – the core data of the current study.

Conclusion

This dissertation looks at the overall attitude of Russia towards multilateral institutions in the period of 2001 – 2015 through the lens of rising powers and Russian foreign policy literature. As a particular case of an emerging state that used to be one of the two superpowers during the Cold War, this country enjoyed a co-establisher status in institutions of its choice. However, Moscow pursued a great power position after the dissolution of the USSR. This brought the country to the status of a rising power.

In my research, I posed two main questions: what is the attitude of Russia towards multilateral institutions? What explains variations in its attitude? While the first one was purely descriptive, the second focused on the factors contributing to the choice of attitude. As suggested by the rising powers' literature, a state generally chooses between a revisionist and supporting stance, depending on its position in an institution. Accordingly, I developed the two parsimonious hypotheses.

In the case of a weak position in a multilateral institution, Russia has a challenger attitude. The country holds a revisionist or passive stance. At the same time, when finding itself in a strong position – co-establishing an institution either as a superpower or a rising one – Moscow supports it. Russia is positive and actively engages in an institution, of which it is a member.

Apart from the position it holds, several institutional factors proved to condition Russian attitude: territorial scope, issue-area and establishment period. Each of them divides institutions into two groups. Organizations are divided into global and regional based on territorial scope. The literature on rising powers suggests that regional institutions are the basis for the emerging states; however, the data shows that the number of global organizations that Russia is a member of, exceeds the number of regional ones.

Issue areas are divided into hard (security, energy, economy) and soft (human rights, environment protection). The data suggests that Russia is predominantly concerned with hard issues, which informed the reason I focused on them in the dissertation. The hard issues area became the core for further data analysis.

In this work, I distinguish between institutions established during the Cold War and those founded after its end. Before the fall of the USSR, Russia held the superpower status that granted it a strong position in institutions. After the Cold War, Moscow (left without pro-

Soviet organizations) had little choice but to integrate into the West-led institutions. Joining them meant accepting a weaker position. An alternative came later when Russia started co-establishing new institutions as a rising power.

All multilateral institutions and their features, plus the Russian position in them, are listed in the dataset – the quantitative core of the dissertation. The primary source for it is the recently released online archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. It consists of official statements, fact sheets, reports, and interviews of Russian and foreign politicians given to the domestic and international media (altogether broadly referred to as “entries”).

Despite the predominance of neutral entries in diplomatic language, computer-aided sentiment analysis shows that fluctuations in text sentiments are present in cases when Russia is supportive of institutions. Conversely, there are cases with negative sentiments that were found when Moscow was a challenger.

Altogether, the dataset – the quantitative part of the dissertation – draws a comprehensive picture of Russian attitude. The qualitative one went deeper into the particular elements of the hypothesis and allowed cross-case comparisons. Each of the case studies was chosen based on the biggest number of entries in the online archive and constitutes a typical case for the relevant hypothesis part.

The OSCE stands for the situation in which Russia is an active supporter, due to the country’s dominant position in an institution inherited from its superpower past during the Cold War. After the fall of the USSR, Moscow maintained its strong position in the decision-making of the OSCE, although the Western members outnumbered it. As it was vital for Russia to continue controlling the post-Soviet countries, the Kremlin did not support any other external involvement in what Moscow perceived as its sphere of influence. This issue became a point of disagreement between the OSCE – a proponent of democratization of the post-Soviet area – and Russia. In these circumstances, Moscow developed a policy-output driven attitude towards this institution that is traceable along the observational period of this dissertation.

The SCO is an example of an organization that Russia actively supported, holding a strong position as a co-founder. With the SCO, Russia sought to secure its presence and role in Central Asia, as its sphere of influence after the fall of the USSR. This was due to both Western countries and China (another emerging state) starting to interfere in this post-Soviet

area. These conditions resulted in a policy-driven attitude, where the Russian attitude towards the SCO remains stably active and supportive during the observational period, despite the falling number of overall entries.

The third case study – the World Trade Organization – portrays the situation of Russia being a challenger when it joined a West-led institution and found itself in a weak negotiation position. As an organization dealing with international trade, the WTO could not help but awake Moscow's interest in it. As a consequence, in the period of high hopes for easy and fast accession, the Russian attitude towards this institution was supportive. However, as the country started acquiring a more dominant position in alternative institutions, its head and other governmental bodies adopted a state of firmer negotiation. They also switched to less positive rhetoric regarding the WTO. Once Russia finally joined this institution, the overall number of entries rises for a short period signifying the success of accession. Yet, the overall neutral sentiment of entries remains.

The two methods of analysis – quantitative and qualitative – provided an all-encompassing picture of the Russian attitude to multilateral institutions in 2001-2015. The literature framework of the study was based on the two strands, to which I aim to contribute to with this dissertation: rising powers and Russian foreign policy.

As broadly discussed previously, those working within the area of rising powers, engage themselves with various topics. They range from discussing the defining features (Gaskarth 2015; Narlikar 2014; O'Neil 2001) to the attitude of emerging states towards their role in the world affairs and in particular, within multilateral institutions, (Hurrell 2006; Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Stephen 2012; Terhalle 2011).

There is a general agreement among scholars that rising powers are dissatisfied with their status quo and sceptical towards external control in global governance. Nevertheless, the aim of being recognized by the “significant others” drives emerging states to choose only those West-led institutions that suit their aims or establish them (Culp 2016; Hurrell 2006; Kahler 2013; Stephen 2012). This dissertation is placed amongst these studies and proves that Russia – as an example of rising powers – prefers to join hard-issue institutions over soft-issue ones.

Multilateral institutions also act as platforms for negotiations between its member-states. For rising powers, it means that their attitude towards an institution (be it dissatisfaction or contentment) and behavior within it, can influence their relations with other participants and

each other (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Morse and Keohane 2014; Schweller 2011). Since the main goal of emerging states is to change their status and gain recognition from the “significant others” – great powers – their attitude towards the institution can take various forms.

With my dissertation, I contribute to the discussion on the attitude patterns used by the rising powers. I share the argument of Schweller (2011), Larson and Shevchenko (2010), Kahler (2013), and Culp (2016) that emerging states can pursue their goals of recognition by being active members, neutral, or spoilers. Plus, I added another pattern – staying not interested – being a member of an institution, but not commenting on it. As these scholars base their assumptions mainly on the data from the economic sphere, I introduced not only other hard-issue areas, such as energy or security, but also soft-issue areas. Doing so allowed me to observe the cross-issue variance in the case of Russia.

Furthermore, many scholars focus either on the whole group of rising powers (Narlikar, 2014; Stephen, 2014; Terhalle, 2011) or discuss their various combinations (Hallding et al. 2013; Jacobs and Van Rossem 2014; Prys-Hansen and Nolte 2016). The others prefer to choose China for their studies (Armijo and Roberts 2014b; Ikenberry 2008; Legro 2007). This dissertation focused on the case study of Russia as a special case of emerging states and contributes to the fraction of scholars writing on Russia within the rising powers’ framework (Glebov 2017; Larson and Shevchenko 2010; MacFarlane 2006).

Therefore, I also turned to the literature on Russian foreign policy to explain Moscow’s preferences in multilateral institutions. As most of the scholars working within this sphere focus on the bilateral relations that this country has with chosen institutions, the current dissertation looks at all multilateral institutions that Russia participates in (Hedenskog 2005; Lo 2015; Pourchot and Stivachtis 2014; Sergunin and Konyshev 2014; Wilson Rowe and Torjesen 2009). I thus analyze Russian attitude in all its multiplicity, that would allow observing the full picture of its institutional membership.

Overall, this dissertation became one of the first examples of testing the existing theories of rising powers’ attitude on a specific case study. This research broadens the understanding of how the attitude patterns are linked to the position of a state within an institution. In so doing, it also throws a bridge to the existing research on relations between institutions and their member-states.

Future studies can start with where this one finished: soft issue areas. This dissertation focused on the hard ones due to their importance for Russia in terms of the significance they have for foreign policy and the general preference of rising powers to participate in institutions working with hard issues. As such, considering the opposite side would provide a complete archive of the Russian attitude. As shown by both types of data, Moscow prefers hard issues to soft ones for a variety of reasons, yet it does not imply its disregard of the latter.

Another topic deriving from this research is the data source. While I focused on the online archives of the governmental bodies of the Russian Federation, future studies can benefit from moving to public opinion or the media. These texts, richer in sentiments and textual data as compared to the diplomatic, can provide the scholars with views on the public perception, regarding Russian membership in general and its role along with governmental obligations, in particular, in multilateral institutions.

Furthermore, one can make a cross-case comparison and look at another rising power. Such a study would thus, allow testing the theory further and gathering data on the behavior of emerging states in multilateral institutions. While China has gathered enough attention so far, the rest of the rising powers group is often left unnoticed or considered as a whole.

List of references

- ABBOTT, Kenneth W., and Duncan SNIDAL 1998. "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1):3–32.
- ACHARYA, Amitav. 2016a. "The Future of Global Governance: Fragmentation May Be Inevitable and Creative." *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 22(4):453–60.
- ACHARYA, Amitav, ed. 2016b. *Why Govern? Rethinking Demand and Progress in Global Governance*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- AL-QAHTANI, M. 2006. "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Law of International Organizations." *Chinese Journal of International Law* 5(1):129–47.
- AMBROSIO, Thomas. 2008. "Catching the 'Shanghai Spirit': How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 60(8):1321–44.
- AMBROSIO, Thomas. 2009. *Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*. Farnham, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. Company.
- ARIFFIN, Yohan. 2016. "Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations." Pp. 207–20 in *Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations*, edited by J.-M. Coicaud, V. Popovski, and Y. Ariffin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ARIS, Stephen. 2009. "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 'Tackling the Three Evils'. A Regional Response to Non-Traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 61(3):457–82.
- ARMIJO, Leslie, and Cynthia ROBERTS. 2014b. "The Emerging Powers and Global Governance: Why the BRICS Matter." Pp. 503–24 in *Handbook of emerging economies, Routledge international handbooks*, edited by R. E. Looney. New York: Routledge.
- ÅSLUND, Anders. 2010. "Why Doesn't Russia Join the WTO?" *The Washington Quarterly* 33(2):49–63.
- AVERRE, Derek. 2016. "The Ukraine Conflict: Russia's Challenge to European Security Governance." *Europe-Asia Studies* 68(4):699–725.
- AXELROD, Robert, and Robert O. KEOHANE. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38(01):226–54.
- BAGWELL, Kyle, and Robert W. STAIGER. 2004. "Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT/WTO." *Journal of International Economics* 63(1):1–29.

- BARNETT, Michael, and Raymond DUVALL. 2005. "Power in International Politics." *International Organization* 59(01).
- BARNETT, Michael N., and Martha FINNEMORE. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization* 53(04):699–732.
- BATEMAN, John A. 2014. *Text and Image: A Critical Introduction to the Visual/Verbal Divide*. London: Routledge.
- BAYLIS, John, and Steve SMITH, eds. 2014. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Sixth edition. Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- BELYAEVA, Maryia. 2011. "'Nejtralnoje' i 'Razgovornoje' v Ustnom Diskurse: Silnaja i Slbaja Sintaksicheskiye Posicii (Na Materiale Nemeckogo Jazyka)." *Izvestija Vyshih Uchebnyh Zavedenij (Povolzhskij Region) Gumanitarnye Nauky* 17(1):123–30.
- BERNARD, H. Russell, Amber WUTICH, and Gery Wayne RYAN. 2017. *Analyzing Qualitative Data: Systematic Approaches*. Second edition. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- BIN, Yu. 2012. "Succession, SCO, and Summit Politics in Beijing." *Comparative Connections* 14(2).
- BLAKE, Daniel J., and Autumn Lockwood PAYTON. 2015. "Balancing Design Objectives: Analyzing New Data on Voting Rules in Intergovernmental Organizations." *The Review of International Organizations* 10(3):377–402.
- BOWRING, Bill. 2009. "Russia and Human Rights: Incompatible Opposites?" *Goettingen Journal of International Law*.
- BOZHILOVA, Diana, and Tom HASHIMOTO. 2010. "EU–Russia Energy Negotiations: A Choice between Rational Self-Interest and Collective Action." *European Security* 19(4):627–42.
- BRATERSKYI, Maxim, and Andrey SUZDALCEV. 2009. "Centralnaya Asiya: Region Ekonomicheskoy Konkurencii Rossii, KNR, SSHA i ES." *Centralnaya Asiya i Kavkaz* 63(3):94–105.
- BROWN, E. K., and Anne ANDERSON, eds. 2006. *The Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics*. 2nd ed. Amsterdam ; Boston: Elsevier.
- BUITER, Willem H., and Ebrahim RAHBARI. 2011. "Global Growth Generators: Moving beyond Emerging Markets and BRICs." *CEPR Policy Insight* (55):1–9.
- BUKKVOLL, Tor. 2003. "Putin's Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy." *Comparative Strategy* 22(3):223–42.
- BURHANUDEEN, Hafriza. 2006. "Diplomatic Language: An Insight from Speeches Used in International Diplomacy." *Akademika* 67(1):37–51.

- BURILKOV, Alexandr, and Torsten GEISE. 2013. "Maritime Strategies of Rising Powers: Developments in China and Russia." *Third World Quarterly* 34(6):1037–53.
- BURSCHER, Bjorn, Rens Vliegenthart, and Claes H. de Vreese. 2016. "Frames Beyond Words: Applying Cluster and Sentiment Analysis to News Coverage of the Nuclear Power Issue." *Social Science Computer Review* 34(5):530–45.
- CADIER, David, and Margot Light, eds. 2015. *Russia's Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- CAPORASO, James A. 1992. "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations." *International Organization* 46(03):599.
- CARLEY, Kathleen. 1994. "Content Analysis." Pp. 725–30 in *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*. Vol. 2. Oxford ; New York: Pergamon Press.
- CARLSNAES, Walter, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons, eds. 2002. *Handbook of International Relations*. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications.
- CARR, Edward Hallett. 1946. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. London: Macmillan & co. Ltd.
- CASARINI, Nicola, and Costanza Musu, eds. 2007. *European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road towards Convergence*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- CASTELLS, Manuel. 2008. "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616(1):78–93.
- CHATTERJE-DOODY, P. N. 2015. "Russia Rising? The Normative Renaissance of Multinational Organizations." Pp. 173–94 in *Rising powers, global governance, and global ethics*, edited by J. Gaskarth. Routledge.
- CIOFFI-REVILLA, Claudio A. 1979. "Diplomatic Communication Theory: Signals, Channels, Networks." *International Interactions* 6(3):209–65.
- CLIFF, Ian. 2012. "The Corfu Process – What Was It All About?" Pp. 65–76 in *OSCE Yearbook 2011*, edited by IFSH. Baden-Baden.
- COICAUD, Jean-Marc. 2017. *Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations*. Place of publication not identified: CAMBRIDGE UNIV Press.
- COOPER, Andrew F., and Daniel FLEMES. 2013. "Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: An Introductory Review." *Third World Quarterly* 34(6):943–62.

- COX, Kevin R., Murray LOW, and Jennifer ROBINSON. 2008. *The SAGE Handbook of Political Geography*. 1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road, London EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- CULP, Julian. 2016. "How Irresponsible Are Rising Powers?" *Third World Quarterly* 37(9):1525–36.
- DENNY, Matthew J., and Arthur SPIRLING. 2018. "Text Preprocessing For Unsupervised Learning: Why It Matters, When It Misleads, And What To Do About It." *Political Analysis* 26(2):168–89.
- Dmitriï TRENIN, and Bobo LO. 2005. *The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making*. Carnegie Moscow Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- DRAHOS, Peter. 2003. "When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization." *International Negotiation* 8(1):79–109.
- DRISCOLL, Beth. 2015. "Sentiment Analysis and the Literary Festival Audience." *Continuum* 29(6):861–73.
- ELSIG, Manfred, Bernard M. HOEKMAN, and Joost PAUWELYN, eds. 2017. *Assessing the World Trade Organization: Fit for Purpose?: World Trade Forum*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- ETHIER, Wilfred J. 1998. "The New Regionalism." *The Economic Journal* 108(449):1149–61.
- FAIZULLAEV, Alisher. 2014. "Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations: Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations." *Negotiation Journal* 30(3):275–99.
- FAO UN. 2019. "GIEWS Country Brief The Russian Federation."
- FATTOUH, Bassam, and Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 2010. *Oil Market Dynamics through the Lens of the 2002-2009 Price Cycle*. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.
- FEARON, James D., and Alexander Wendt. 2002. "Rationalism V. Constructivism: A Skeptical View." Pp. 53–73 in *Handbook of International Relations*. SAGE Publications Ltd.
- FINNEMORE, Martha. 1996. "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism." *International Organization* 50(02):325.
- FLEMES, Daniel. 2009. "India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) in the New Global Order: Interests, Strategies and Values of the Emerging Coalition." *International Studies* 46(4):401–21.
- FRIEDL, Alexander. 2006. "Untersuchungen zur Texttypologie im Russischen anhand von 609 Texten in 13 Textsorten." Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Graz.
- FRIJDA, N. H., SONNEMANS J. Mesquita, and S. VAN GOOZEN. 1991. "The Duration of Affective Phenomena or Emotions, Sentiments and Passions." Pp. 187–225 in

International review of studies on emotion: Volume 1, edited by K. T. Strongman.
Chichester: Wiley.

FROESE, Ursula, ed. 2010. "OSCE Summits in Changing Times."

FROST, Alexander. 2009. "The Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Russia's Strategic Goals in Central Asia." *China & Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 7(3):83–102.

GABUEV, Alexander. 2017. "Bigger, Not Better: Russia Makes the SCO a Useless Club." June 23, Carnegie Moscow Center.

GABUEV, Alexander, Paul HAENLE, C. Raja MOHAN, and Dmitriï TRENIN. 2017. "Shanghai Cooperation Organization at Crossroads: Views From Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi." September 6, Carnegie Center Moscow.

GALBREATH, David J. 2009. "Putting the Colour into Revolutions? The OSCE and Civil Society in the Post-Soviet Region." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25(2–3):161–80.

GASKARTH, Jamie. 2015. *Rising Powers, Global Governance and Global Ethics*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.

GATTI, Lorenzo, Marco GUERINI, and Marco TURCHI. 2016. "SentiWords: Deriving a High Precision and High Coverage Lexicon for Sentiment Analysis." *IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing* 7(4):409–21.

GEL'MAN, Vladimir Jakovlevič. 2015. *Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes*. Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press.

GEL'MAN, Vladimir, and O. Marganiia, eds. 2010. *Resource Curse and Post-Soviet Eurasia: Oil, Gas, and Modernization*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

GEL'MAN, Vladimir. 2004. "The Unrule of Law in the Making: The Politics of Informal Institution Building in Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies* 56(7):1021–40.

GHEBALI, Victor-Yves. 2005. "Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Pan-European Expectations." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18(3):375–88.

GIBLER, Douglas M., and Scott WOLFORD. 2006. "Alliances, Then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship between Regime Type and Alliance Formation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(1):129–53.

GLEBOV, Sergii. 2017. "Russia as a Rising Isolated Power and the W(r)Est: Wrestling Ukraine from the West and the New Euro-Atlantic Puzzle." *Rising Powers Quarterly* 2(1):145–67.

GOMM, Roger, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster, eds. 2000. *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts*. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE.

GOSUDARSTVENNY SOVET. 2014. *Zasedanye Gosudarstvennogo Soveta*.

- GRAHAM, Sarah Ellen. 2014. "Emotion and Public Diplomacy: Dispositions in International Communications, Dialogue, and Persuasion." *International Studies Review* 16(4):522–39.
- GRIECO, Joseph M. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." *International Organization* 42(03):485.
- GUTNER, Tamar L. 2017. *International Organizations in World Politics*. Los Angeles: SAGE/ CQ Press.
- GVOSDEV, Nikolas K., and Christopher MARSH. 2014. *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors*. Los Angeles: SAGE/CQ Press.
- HAAS, Richard. 2017. "World Order 2.0 The Case for Sovereign Obligation." *Foreign Affairs*.
- HAEKKERUP, Hans. 2005. "Russia, the OSCE and Post-Cold-War European Security Introduction." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18(3):371–73.
- HAFNER-BURTON, E. M. 2006. "Power Positions: International Organizations, Social Networks, and Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(1):3–27.
- HAGAN, Joe D. 1995. "Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy." Pp. 117–43 in *Foreign policy analysis: continuity and change in its second generation*, edited by L. Neack, J. A. K. Hey, and P. J. Haney. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- HAJDA, Lubomyr A., and Ivan Alekseyevich YEROFEYEV. 2019. "Ukraine." *Encyclopædia Britannica*.
- HALL, Stephen G. F., and Thomas AMBROSIO. 2017. "Authoritarian Learning: A Conceptual Overview." *East European Politics* 33(2):143–61.
- HALLDING, Karl, Marie JÜRISOO, Marcus CARSON, and Aaron ATTERIGE. 2013. "Rising Powers: The Evolving Role of BASIC Countries." *Climate Policy* 13(5):608–31.
- HAWKINS, Darren G., ed. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- HEADLEY, James. 2012. "Is Russia Out of Step with European Norms? Assessing Russia's Relationship to European Identity, Values and Norms Through the Issue of Self-Determination." *Europe-Asia Studies* 64(3):427–47.
- HEDENSKOG, Jakob, ed. 2005. *Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin*. London ; New York: Routledge.
- HELD, David, and Anthony G. McGREW, eds. 2002. *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance*. Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity.
- HOEKMAN, Bernard M., and Petros C. MAYROIDIS. 2016. *World Trade Organization: Law, Economics, and Politics*. Second edition. London New York: Routledge.

- HOFSTEDE, Geert. 2004. "Diplomats as Cultural Bridge Builders." Pp. 25–38 in *Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy*, edited by H. Slavik. Diplo Foundation.
- HORNBY, Albert Sydney, and Sally WEHMEIER. 2009. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*. 7. ed., [Nachdr.]. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
- HORNSEY, Matthew J. 2008. "Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory: A Historical Review." *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2(1):204–22.
- HURLBURT, Heather. 1995. "Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture'." *Helsinki Monitor* 6(2):5–20.
- HURRELL, Andrew. 2006. "Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?" *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 82(1):1–19.
- IKENBERRY, G. John. 2010. "The Liberal International Order and Its Discontents." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 38(3):509–21.
- IKENBERRY, John. 2008. "The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Can the Liberal System Survive?" *Foreign Affairs*.
- Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg / IFSH. 2010. *OSCE Yearbook 2009 Yearbook on the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.
- ISERI, Emre, and VOLKAN Ozdemir. 2017. "Geopolitical Economy of Russia's Foreign Policy Duality: Lockean in Its East and Hobbesian in Its West." *Rising Powers Quarterly* 2(1):53–79.
- JACOBS, Lindsay Marie, and Ronan VAN ROSSEM. 2014. "The BRIC Phantom: A Comparative Analysis of the BRICs as a Category of Rising Powers." *Journal of Policy Modeling* 36:S47–66.
- JANOW, Merit E., ed. 2008. *The WTO: Governance, Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries*. Huntington, NY: Juris Publ.
- JOHNSTON, Christopher D., and Julie WRONSKI. 2015. "Personality Dispositions and Political Preferences Across Hard and Easy Issues: Personality Dispositions and Political Preferences." *Political Psychology* 36(1):35–53.
- JONSSON, Christer, and Martin HALL. 2003. "Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy." *International Studies Perspectives* 4(2):195–210.
- KAHLER, Miles. 2013. "Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo." *International Affairs*, 711–29.
- KAHLER, Miles. 2016. "Who Is Liberal Now? Rising Powers and Global Norms." Pp. 55–73 in *Why Govern?*, edited by A. Acharya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- KARNS, Margaret P., and Karen A. MINGST. 2004. *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- KEMP, Walter, Michal OLEJARNIK, Victor-Yves GHEBALI, and Andrei ANDROSOV, eds. 1999. *OSCE Handbook*. 3d ed. Vienna: Secretariat of the OSCE.
- KENNEDY, Paul M., Ashwani KUMAR, and Dirk MESSNER. 2011. *Power Shifts and Global Governance: Challenges from South and North*. London; New York: Anthem Press.
- KEOHANE, Robert O. 1986. "Reciprocity in International Relations." *International Organization* 40(01):1.
- KEOHANE, Robert O. 1988. "International Institutions: Two Approaches." *International Studies Quarterly* 32(4):379.
- KEOHANE, Robert O. 1990. "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research." *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 45(4):731–64.
- KEOHANE, Robert O., and Joseph S. NYE. 1985. "Two Cheers for Multilateralism." *Foreign Policy* (60):148.
- KERR, William A. 2012. "Taming the Bear: The WTO after the Accession of Russia." *Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy* 13(2):1–10.
- KONAROVSKIY, Mikhail A. 2016. "Россия - ШОС: Некоторые Элементы Стратегии. Rossiya - SHOC: Nekotorye Elementy Strategii." *Вестник Международных Организаций: Образование, Наука, Новая Экономика* 11(4):149–61.
- KONYSHEV, Valery, and Alexander SERGUNIN. 2014. "Is Russia a Revisionist Military Power in the Arctic?" *Defense & Security Analysis* 30(4):323–35.
- KOREMENOS, Barbara, Charles LIPSON, and Duncan SNIDAL. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55(4):761–99.
- KOSOV, Yu., and G. GRIBANOVA. 2016. "EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: Challenges and Perspectives of International Cooperation." *Baltic Region* 8(2):33–44.
- kremlin.ru. 2003a. "Prioritetnoj zadachej SHanhajskoj organizacii sotrudnichestva yavlyaetsya protivodejstvie terrorizmu i ekstremizmu, zayavil Prezident Vladimir Putin na vstreche liderov stran SHOS." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/28725>).
- kremlin.ru. 2003b. "Vyderzhki iz stenograficheskogo otcheta o zasedanii Gosudarstvennogo soveta po problemam vneshnej politiki Rossii." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24689>).
- kremlin.ru. 2003c. "Vystuplenie na investicionnom forume «Rossiya–Kirgiziya»." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22171>).

- kremlin.ru. 2004a. "Neobhodimo menyat' samo kachestvo i strukturu rossijsko-kitajskoj trgovli." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/31942>).
- kremlin.ru. 2004b. "Sovmestnaya press-konferenciya s Federal'nym kanclerom Germanii Gerhardom Shryoderom." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22406>).
- kremlin.ru. 2004c. "Vladimir Putin vstretilsya s Prezidentom Kazahstana Nursultanom Nazarbaevym." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/31002>).
- kremlin.ru. 2005a. "SHanhajskaya organizaciya sotrudnichestva (SHOS) prodemonstrirovala svoyu zhiznesposobnost', priobretaet avtoritet kak ser'eznaya mezhdunarodnaya organizaciya." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/33697>).
- kremlin.ru. 2005b. "SHanhajskaya organizaciya sotrudnichestva vyshla na novyj uroven' vzaimodejstviya." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/34335>).
- kremlin.ru. 2005c. "Sostoyalis' rossijsko-amerikanskije peregovory." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/32849>).
- kremlin.ru. 2005d. "U Rossii i Meksiki horoshie perspektivy dlya vyhoda na novye gorizonty v torgovo-ekonomicheskom sotrudnichestve." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/33598>).
- kremlin.ru. 2008a. "Interv'yu Dmitriya Medvedeva televizionnomu kanalu «Evron'yus»." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1294>).
- kremlin.ru. 2008b. "Otvety na voprosy zhurnalistov po zavershenii zasedaniya Soveta glav gosudarstv – chlenov SHOS." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/1242>).
- kremlin.ru. 2008c. "Rossiya prinyala predsedatel'stvo v SHanhajskoj organizacii sotrudnichestva." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/44442>).
- kremlin.ru. 2008d. "Zayavleniya dlya pressy po itogam rossijsko-kirgizskih peregovorov." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/1665>).
- kremlin.ru. 2009a. "Dmitrij Medvedev napravil privetstvie uchastnikam special'noj konferencii po Afganistanu, prohodyashchej v Moskve pod egidoy SHanhajskoj organizacii sotrudnichestva." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/3553>).
- kremlin.ru. 2009b. "Interv'yu predstavitel'yam ispanskih SMI." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/3320>).
- kremlin.ru. 2009c. "Rossiya, vperyod! Stat'ya Dmitriya Medvedeva." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5413>).

- kremlin.ru. 2009d. "Stroya rossijsko-amerikanskije otnosheniya." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/3598>).
- kremlin.ru. 2009e. "Vstrecha s ministrami oborony gosudarstv – chlenov SHanhajskoj organizacii sotrudnichestva (SHOS)." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/3912>).
- kremlin.ru. 2009f. *Zayavleniya dlya pressy po itogam zasedaniya Mezghosudarstvennogo soveta EvrAzES*. Minsk.
- kremlin.ru. 2011a. "Ego Prevoskhoditel'stvu gospodinu Almazbeku Atambaevu, Prezidentu Kirgizskoj Respubliki." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/letters/13742>).
- kremlin.ru. 2011b. *Sammit Rossiya – Evropejskij soyuz*. Nizhny Novgorod.
- kremlin.ru. 2012a. "Hu Czin'tao, Predsedatelyu Kitajskoj Narodnoj Respubliki." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/letters/16554>).
- kremlin.ru. 2012b. "Rossiya i Kitaj: novye gorizonty sotrudnichestva." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15547>).
- kremlin.ru. 2014. "Zayavleniya dlya pressy po itogam rossijsko-indijskih peregovorov." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47221>).
- kremlin.ru. 2015. "Nachalo rabochej vstrechi s Ministrom oborony Sergeem Ivanovym." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23148>).
- KRIPPENDORFF, Klaus. 2013. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. 3rd ed. Los Angeles ; London: SAGE.
- KROPATCHEVA, Elena. 2012. "Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A 'Forum' for Dialog or a 'Battlefield' of Interests?" *European Security* 21(3):370–94.
- KROPATCHEVA, Elena. 2015. "The Evolution of Russia's OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 23(1):6–24.
- KUTUZOV, Andrey, and Elizaveta KUZMENKO. 2017. "WebVectors: A Toolkit for Building Web Interfaces for Vector Semantic Models." Pp. 155–161 in *Analysis of Images, Social Networks and Texts: 5th International Conference, AIST 2016, Yekaterinburg, Russia, April 7-9, 2016, Revised Selected Papers*, edited by D. I. Ignatov, M. Yu. Khachay, V. G. Labunets, N. Loukachevitch, S. I. Nikolenko, A. Panchenko, A. V. Savchenko, and K. Vorontsov. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- LARSON, Deborah Welch, and Alexei SHEVCHENKO. 2010. "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy." *International Security* 34(4):63–95.

- LARSON, Deborah Welch, and Alexei SHEVCHENKO. 2014. "Russia Says No: Power, Status, and Emotions in Foreign Policy." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47(3-4):269-79.
- LEE, H. 2010. "Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy: Some Tentative Evaluations." *International Area Studies Review* 13(3):31-49.
- LEGRO, Jeffrey W. 2007. "What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power." *Perspectives on Politics* 5(03):515.
- LEGVOLD, Robert, ed. 2007. *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- LEONTOVICH, Olga. 2014. "Positive Communication: Definition and Constituent Features." *Vestnik Volgogradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Serija 2. Jazykoznanije* (5):121-26.
- LESAGE, Dries, and Thijs VAN DE GRAAF. 2015. *Rising Powers and Multilateral Institutions*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- LIBMAN, Alexander, and Anastassia OBYDENKOVA. 2013. "Informal Governance and Participation in Non-Democratic International Organizations." *The Review of International Organizations* 8(2):221-43.
- LO, Bobo. 2002. *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion, and Mythmaking*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- LO, Bobo. 2015. *Russia and the New World Disorder*. London : Washington, D.C: Chatham House ; Brookings Institution Press.
- LOPATIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič, and Ljudmila Evgen'evna LOPATINA. 1993. *Malyj tolkovyj slovar' ruskogo jazyka: okolo 35 000 slov*. 2nd-e izd., stereotipnoe ed. Moskva: Russkij jazyk.
- LUKES, Steven. 2004. *Power: A Radical View*. 2nd ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- MacFARLANE, S. Neil. 2006. "The 'R' in BRICS: Is Russia an Emerging Power?" *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 82(1):41-57.
- MADUZ, Linda. 2018. *Flexibility by Design: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Future of Eurasian Cooperation*. Center for Security Studies.
- MAKARYCHEV, Andrey, and Viatcheslav MOROZOV. 2013. "Is 'Non-Western Theory' Possible? The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR." *International Studies Review* 15(3):328-50.
- MAKARYCHEV, Andrey, and Alexandra YATSYK. 2014. "The Four Pillars of Russia's Power Narrative." *The International Spectator* 49(4):62-75.

- MANKOFF, Jeffrey. 2009. *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.
- MANSFIELD, Edward D., and Jon C. PEVEHOUSE. 2006. "Democratization and International Organizations." *International Organization* 60(01).
- MARTIN, Lisa L., and Beth A. SIMMONS. 2002. "International Organizations and Institutions." Pp. 326–51 in *Handbook of International Relations*. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications.
- MATHEWS, Jessica T. 1997. "Power Shift." *Foreign Affairs* 76(1):50–66.
- MATTES, Michaela, and Mariana RODRIGUEZ. 2014. "Autocracies and International Cooperation." *International Studies Quarterly* 58(3):527–38.
- MATTHEWS, P. H. 2007. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics*. 2nd ed. Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press.
- MAZARR, Michael J. 2017. "The Once and Future Order. What Comes After Hegemony?" *Foreign Affairs*.
- MEARSHEIMER, John J. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19(3):5.
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2008a. "Interv'yu Dmitriya Medvedeva rossijskim telekanalam." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1276>).
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2008b. "Nachalo rabocheho zasedaniya sammita Rossiya – Evropejskij soyuz." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/564>).
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2008c. *X syezd partii «Edinaya Rossiya»*. Gostinyi Dvor, Moscow.
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2009a. *Interv'yu belorusskim SMI*. Barviha, Moskovskaya Oblast.
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2009b. *Press-konferenciya po itogam zasedaniya Soveta glav gosudarstv – chlenov SHanhajskoj organizacii sotrudnichestva*. Ekaterinburg.
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2010a. *Dmitriy Medvedev Otvetil na Voprosy Rossiyskih Zhurnalistov*. Tashkent.
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2010b. *Vstrecha s rukovoditelyami amerikanskih venchurnyh fondov*. Gorki, Moskovskaya oblast.
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2010c. "Vystupeniye na Zasedanii Soveta Glav Gosudarstv Chlenov Shanghayskoy Organizacii Sotrudnichestva." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/8019>).
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2011a. *Dmitrij Medvedev vystupil na zasedanii Peterburgskogo mezhdunarodnogo ekonomicheskogo foruma*. St. Petersburg.
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2011b. *Interv'yu Dmitriya Medvedeva*. Sochi.

- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2011c. *Poslanie Prezidenta Federal'nomu Sobraniyu*. the Kremlin, Moscow.
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2011d. *Soveshchanie o perspektivah urozhaya i tekushchej situacii na zernovom rynke*. Michurinsk.
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry. 2011e. *Vstrecha s zhurnalistami Central'nogo federal'nogo okruga*. Gorki, Moskovskaya oblast.
- MEDVEDEV, Dmitry, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Jose Manuel Barroso. 2008. *Sovmestnaya Press-Konferenciya s Prezidentom Francii, Predsedatilem Soveta Evrosoyuza Nikol'ya Sarkozi i Predsedatelem Komissii Evropejskyh soobshestv Zhoze Manuelom Barrozu po itogam 22 sammita Rossiya-ES*. Nice.
- MENDRAS, Marie. 2012. *Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State*. London: Horst&Company.
- Mezhdunarodnyi Torgovyi Centr, and Kafedra Mirovoj Ekonomiki. 2012. *Prisoyedinenye Rossii k VTO: Osnovnye Obyazatelstva, Vozmozhnye Posledtviya*. St. Petersburg, Geneva.
- MIELNICZUK, Fabiano. 2013. "Brics in the Contemporary World: Changing Identities, Converging Interests." *Third World Quarterly* 34(6):1075–90.
- MIRONOV, S. M. 2008. "Vystupleniye Predsedatelya Soveta Federacii S.M. Mironova na Konferencii Molodezhnyh Organizacii Gosudarstv-Chlenov Shanghaiskoy Organizacii Sotrudnichestva." Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/21535/>).
- MIRONOV, Sergey. 2007. "Sergey Mironov: 'Otnosheniya Mezhdru Rossiiyey i Kitayem - Primer Istennogo, Otkrytogo Mezhdunarodnogo Partnerstva.'" *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/22652/?hl=%D1%88%D0%BE%D1%81%20%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B9>).
- MOLCHANOV, Mikhail A. 2015. *Eurasian Regionalisms and Russian Foreign Policy*. Farnham, Surrey, UK ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- MONROE, Burt L., and Philip A. SCHRODT. 2008. "Introduction to the Special Issue: The Statistical Analysis of Political Text." *Political Analysis* 16(4):351–55.
- MOROZOV, Viatcheslav, and Andrey MAKARYCHEV. 2011. "Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond: A Menu of Russia's Policy Strategies." *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 17(3):353–73.
- MORSE, Julia C., and Robert O. KEOHANE. 2014. "Contested Multilateralism." *The Review of International Organizations* 9(4):385–412.
- MUDRETSOV, A. F., and A. S. TULUPOV. 2015. "The WTO and Problems of Stable Development of Russia." *Regionalnye Problemy Preobrazovaniya Ekonomiky* 1(51):91–101.

- MUELLER, Hannes, and Christopher RAUH. 2018. "Reading Between the Lines: Prediction of Political Violence Using Newspaper Text." *American Political Science Review* 112(2):358–75.
- NAARJÄRVI, Teemu. 2012. "China, Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Blessing or Curse for New Regionalism in Central Asia?" *Asia Europe Journal* 10(2–3):113–26.
- NANZ, Patrizia, and Jens STEFFEK. 2004. "Global Governance, Participation and the Public Sphere." *Government and Opposition* 39(2):314–35.
- NARLIKAR, Amrita. 2005. *The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
- NARLIKAR, Amrita. 2012. *Collective Agency, Systemic Consequences: Bargaining Coalitions in the WTO*. Oxford University Press.
- NARLIKAR, Amrita. 2013. "India Rising: Responsible to Whom?" *International Affairs* 89(3):595–614.
- NARLIKAR, Amrita. 2014. "Making Room for Rising Powers." *Current History* 113(759):33–35.
- NARLIKAR, Amrita, Martin J. DAUNTON, and Robert Mitchell STERN, eds. 2014. *The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization*. 1. publ. in paperback. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
- NEL, Philp, Dirk NABERS, and Melanie HANIF, eds. 2018. *Regional Powers and Global Redistribution*. S.l.: ROUTLEDGE.
- NEUENDORF, Kimberly A. 2017. *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. Second edition. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- NEUWIRTH, Rostam J., and Alexandr SVETLICINII. 2016. "The Current EU/US–Russia Conflict over Ukraine and the WTO: A Preliminary Note on (Trade) Restrictive Measures." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32(3):237–71.
- NUSSBERGER, Angelika. 2013. "South Ossetia." *Oxford Public International Law*.
- NYE, Joseph S. 1990. "The Changing Nature of World Power." *Political Science Quarterly* 105(2):177.
- O'NEIL, Jim. 2001. *Building Better Global Economic BRICs*. *Global Paper*. 66. Goldman Sachs.
- OGLESBY, Donna Marie. 2016. "Diplomatic Language." Pp. 242–54 in *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*. 1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- O'NEAL, Molly. 2014. "Russia in WTO: Interests, Policy Autonomy, and Deliberations." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55(4):404–21.

- ORLOVA, Svetlana. 2010. "Svetlana Orlova: Znachenije Finansovogo Kontrolya Vosrastayet." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/18630/?hl=%D1%88%D0%BE%D1%81>).
- VAN OUDENAREN, John. 2003. "What Is 'Multilateral'?" *Policy Review* 117:33–47.
- OZHEGOV, Sergej Ivanovič, and Natalija Jul'evna SVEDOVA. 1995. *Tolkovyj Slovar' Russkogo Jazyka: 72500 Slov i 7500 Frazeologiceskich Vyrazenij*. 2nd-e izd., ispr. i dop ed. Moskva.
- PANG, Bo, and Lillian LEE. 2008. "Opinion Mining and Sentiment Analysis." *Foundations and Trends® in Information Retrieval* 2(1–2):1–135.
- PARIZEK, Michal. 2020. *Negotiations in the World Trade Organization: Design and Performance*. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
- PARIZEK, Michal, and Matthew STEPHEN. 2020. "The Representation of BRICS in Global Eco-Nomic Governance: Reform and Fragmentation of Multilateral Institutions." P. 350 in *BRICS and the Global Economy*. Vol. 2, *The Political Economy of the BRICS Countries*, edited by Soo Yeon Kim. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.
- PIEPER, Moritz. 2019. "‘Rising Power’ Status and the Evolution of International Order: Conceptualising Russia’s Syria Policies." *Europe-Asia Studies* 71(3):365–87.
- POLLOCK, Philip H., Stuart A. LILIE, and M. Elliot VITTES. 1993. "Hard Issues, Core Values and Vertical Constraint: The Case of Nuclear Power." *British Journal of Political Science* 23(1):29–50.
- POPESCU, Nicu. 2014. *Eurasian Union: The Real, the Imaginary and the Likely*. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- POURCHOT, Georgeta, and Yannis A. STIVACHTIS. 2014. "International Society and Regional Integration in Central Asia." *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 5(1):68–76.
- PRAKASH, Aseem, and Matthew POTOSKI. 2010. "The International Organization for Standardization as a Global Governor: A Club Theory Perspective." Pp. 72–101 in *Who Governs the Globe?*, edited by D. D. Avant, M. Finnemore, and S. K. Sell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pravitelstvo RF. 2013. "Rasporyazhenye Pravitelstva RF ot 29 marta 2013 g. N466-r Ob utverzhdenii gosudarstvennoy programmy 'Socialno-ekonomicheskoye razvitiye Dalnego Vostoka i Baykalskogo regiona' (utratiло silu)."
- President of Russia. 2007. "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy."
- President Rossii. 2008. "Dmitriy Medvedev i President Finlyandii Tarya Halonen obsudili v telefonnom razgovore voprosy dalneyshey deyatelnosti OBSE v zone gruzinsko-osetinskogo konflikta." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1114>).

- PROZOROV, Sergei. 2006. *Understanding Conflict between Russia and the EU the Limits of Integration*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- PRYS-HANSEN, Miriam, and Detlef NOLTE. 2016. "BRICS und IBSA: Die Clubs der aufsteigenden Mächte verlieren an Glanz." *GIGA Focus Global* (5):1–11.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2002a. *Poslanye Federalnomu Sobranyuyu Rossiyskoy Federacii*. Moskva.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2002b. "Vystupleniye na Vstreche Glav Gosudarstv Shanghayskoy Organizacii Sotrudnichestva." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21628>).
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2002c. "Zayavleniye Dlya Pressy Po Okonchani Vstrechi Glav Gosudarstv Shanghayskoy Organizacii Sotrudnichestva." *Kremlin.Ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21629>).
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2003a. *Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*. Marble Hall, the Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2003b. "Vstupitel'noe slovo na plenarnom zasedanii vstrechi na vysshem urovne Rossiya – Evropejskij soyuz." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24778>).
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2004a. *Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*. the Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2004b. *Press-konferenciya dlya rossiyskikh i inostrannykh zhurnalistov*. the Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2005a. *Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation*. the Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2005b. "Nachalo vstrechi s predsedatelyami Konstitucionnogo Suda Valeriem Zor'kinym, Verhovnogo Suda Vyacheslavom Lebedevym i Vysshego Arbitrazhnogo Suda Antonom Ivanovym." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23258>).
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2005c. "Stenograficheskij otchet o soveshchani s chlenami Pravitel'stva." *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22945>).
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2006. *Annual Address to the Federal Assembly*. Marble Hall, the Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2007. *Stenograficheskij otchet o soveshchani s chlenami Pravitel'stva*. Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2012a. *Address to the Federal Assembly*. the Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2012b. *Press-konferenciya Vladimira Putina*. Moskva.

- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2012c. *Soveshaniye o Sostoyanii i Perspektivah Razvitiya Chernoy Metallurgii*. Magnitogorsk.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2012d. “Vstrecha s gubernatorom Saratovskoj oblasti Valeriem Radaevym.” *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16048>).
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2012e. *Vstrecha s Rukovoditelyami Frakcii Gosudarstvennoy Dumy*. Novo-Ogarevo, Moskovskaya Oblast.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2012f. *Zasedaniye Soveta Bezopasnosti v Rashirennom Sostave*. Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2013a. *Investicionnyj forum «Rossiya zovyot!»*. Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2013b. *Predstavlenie oficerov, naznachennyh na vysshie komandnye dolzhnosti*. the Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2013c. *Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly*. the Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2013d. *Soveshchanie o hode sbora urozhaya*. Krasnodarkyi Kray.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2013e. *Zasedanie Soveta Bezopasnosti*. Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2014a. *Bolshaya Press-Konferencya Vladimira Putina*. Moskva.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2014b. *Delovoj sammit foruma ATES*. Beijing.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2014c. *Interv'yu informacionnomu agentstvu TASS*. Vladivostok.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2014d. *Otvety na Voprosy Zhurnalistov*. Dushanbe.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2014e. *Peterburgskij mezhdunarodnyj ekonomicheskij forum*. St. Petersburg.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2014f. *Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly*. the Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2014g. *Rabochie zasedaniya liderov ekonomik foruma ATES*. Beijing.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič. 2014h. *Zasedanie Mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba «Valdaj»*. Sochi.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič, and Islam Karimov. 2014. *Zayavleniya dlya pressy po itogam rossijsko-uzbekistanskih peregovorov*. Tashkent.

- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič, and N. A. Nazarabyev. 2002. "Press-Konferenciya Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federacii V.V. Putina i Prezidenta Kazachstana N.A. Nazarbayeva." *kremlin.ru*.
- PUTIN, Vladimir Vladimirovič, and Manmohan Singh. 2013. *Zayavleniya dlya pressy po itogam rossijsko-indijskih peregovorov*. Kremlin, Moscow.
- PUTNAM, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42(3):427–60.
- RAKHLIS, Tatyana Pavlovna, Nataliya Vladimirovna SKVORTSOVA, and Svetlana Vladimirovna KOPTYAKOVA. 2014. "The First Experience of Russia in the WTO: The Banking Sector." *Life Science Journal* 11(9):385–88.
- RAPKIN, David, and William THOMPSON. 2003. "Power Transition, Challenge and the (Re)Emergence of China." *International Interactions* 29(4):315–42.
- REGE, Vinod. 2011. *Negotiating at the World Trade Organization*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.
- RENDALL, Matthew. 2006. "Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe." *Review of International Studies* 32(03):523.
- REYKERS, Yf, and Niels SMEETS. 2015. "Losing Control: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Russia in the United Nations Security Council's Decision-Making towards the Libya Crisis." *East European Politics* 31(4):369–87.
- RITTBERGER, Volker, and Bernhard ZANGL. 2006. *International Organization: Polity, Politics and Policies*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- ROBERT, Dominique, and Shaul SHENHAV. 2014. "Fundamental Assumptions in Narrative Analysis: Mapping the Field." *The Qualitative Report* 19(38):1–17.
- RODRIGUES Vieira, Vinicius. 2016. "Beyond the Market: The Global South and the Wto's Normative Dimension." *International Negotiation* 21(2):267–94.
- ROSE, Gideon. 1998. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." *World Politics* 51(01):144–72.
- ROY, Jean-Michel. 2016. "From Intersubjectivity to International Relations." Pp. 80–111 in *Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations*, edited by J.-M. Coicaud, V. Popovski, and Y. Ariffin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- RUGGIE, John Gerard. 1992. "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution." *International Organization* 46(03):561.
- SAARI, Sinikukka. 2014. "The Thin Line between Failure and Success." *Security and Human Rights* 25(2):235–41.

- SABELNIKOV, L. V. 2013. "Vozможnosti optimizacii chlenstva Rossii v VTO." *Rossiyskiy Vneshneekonomicheskiy Vestnik* 2:1–10.
- SABITOV, Nadia, and Chulpan SHAVALEYEVA. 2015. "Oil and Gas Revenues of the Russian Federation: Trends and Prospects." *Procedia Economics and Finance* 27:423–28.
- SAMARINA, V. P. 2015. "ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ENTRY OF RUSSIA INTO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR FERROUS METALLURGY." *Economy in the Industry* (3):23.
- SASLEY, Brent E. 2011. "Theorizing States' Emotions1: Theorizing States' Emotions." *International Studies Review* 13(3):452–76.
- SCHATZ, Edward. 2006. "Access by Accident: Legitimacy Claims and Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Central Asia." *International Political Science Review* 27(3):263–84.
- SCHEWE, Christoph J. 2013. "Russia in the WTO: The Bear on a Leash? Russia in International Trade Disputes and the Added Value of a WTO Membership." *Journal of World Trade* 1171–1201.
- SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank, and Hanno SCHOLTZ. 2008. "EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange." *European Union Politics* 9(2):187–215.
- SCHIRM, S. A. 2010. "Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance." 16(2):197–221.
- SCHMITT, Olivier. 2020. "How to Challenge an International Order: Russian Diplomatic Practices in Multilateral Security Organisations." *European Journal of International Relations* 26(3):922–46.
- SCHNEIDER, Christina J. 2011. "Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations1: Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2):331–55.
- SCHWELLER, Randall. 2011. "Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder." *Global Governance* 17(3):285–97.
- SEAWRIGHT, Jason, and John GERRING. 2008. "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options." *Political Research Quarterly* 61(2):294–308.
- SERGUNIN, Alexander, and Valery KONYSHEV. 2014. "Russia in Search of Its Arctic Strategy: Between Hard and Soft Power?" *The Polar Journal* 4(1):69–87.
- SHAFFER, Gregory C. 2009. "Power, Governance and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach." *SSRN Electronic Journal*.

- SHELLING, Thomas C. 1997. *The Strategy of Conflict*. 16th ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University.
- SHUKLA, Surya Pal. 2000. *From GATT to WTO and Beyond*. Helsinki: UNU World Inst. for Development Economics Research.
- SIMONS, Helen. 2009. *Case Study Research in Practice*. Los Angeles ; London: SAGE.
- SINGHAM, Shanker. 2007. *A General Theory of Trade and Competition: Trade Liberalisation and Competitive Markets*. London: Cameron May.
- SLAVIK, Hannah, ed. 2004. *Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy*. Malta Geneva: DiploFoundation.
- VON SOEST, Christian, and Julia GRAUVOGEL. 2017. "Identity, Procedures and Performance: How Authoritarian Regimes Legitimize Their Rule." *Contemporary Politics* 23(3):287–305.
- SOFER, Sasson. 1997. "The Diplomat as a Stranger." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 8(3):179–86.
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2004a. "Rasshirennoe zasedanie Soveta glav gosudarstv – chlenov SHanhajskoj organizacii sotrudnichestva." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22511>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2004b. "Vstrecha Predsedatelya Komiteta SF po Mezhdunarodnym Delam M.V. Margelova s Elsi L. Hastingsom." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/25053/>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2005. "Sergej Mironov: «Vizit kitajskogo lidera v Rossiyu budet imet' polozhitel'nyj mezhdunarodnyj rezonans»." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/24576/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2006a. "ROSSIYA-YAPONIYA: IZUCHAEM OPYT DRUG DRUGA." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/23682/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2006b. "TOCHKA ZRENIYA SENATORA." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/23889/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2007a. "Pyatnadcataya Sessiya Aziatsko-Tihookeanskogo Parlamentskogo Foruma (ATPF)." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/23289/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2007b. "SERGEJ MIRONOV: «OTNOSHENIYA MEZH DU ROSSIEJ I KITAEM – PRIMER ISTINNOGO, OTKRYTOGO, MEZH DUNARODNOGO PARTNERSTVA»." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/22652/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).

- SOVET FEDERACII. 2008a. "Dvesti dvadcat' chetvertoe zasedanie Soveta Federacii." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/21968/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2008b. "Mneniya i Kommentarii Chlenov Sovetov Federacii." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/22330/>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2008c. "Sergej Mironov: «Rossijskomu agropromyshlennomu sektoru gosudarstvo dolzhno sozdat' takie usloviya, chtoby Rossiya ne nuzhdalas' v importe prodovol'stviya»." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/22207/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2008d. "SERGEJ MIRONOV: «RUSSKIY YAZYK – OSNOVA NARODNOJ DIPLOMATII, KOTORAYA UKREPLYAET SOTRUDNICHESTVO I SBLIZHAET NARODY RAZNYH STRAN»." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/21513/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2009. "SERGEJ MIRONOV V RAMKAH SESSII MPA VSTRETILSYA SO SPIKEROM PARLAMENTA TADZHIKISTANA." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/20753/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2010a. "SERGEJ MIRONOV VSTRETILSYA V ASTANE SO STUDENTAMI I POZNAKOMILSYA S DOSTOPRIMECHATEL'NOSTYAMI KAZAHSTANSKOJ STOLICY." Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/17879/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2010b. "Sergey Mironov: Zakony Dolzhny Rabotat Dlya Lyudej I Na Lyudey." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/17768/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2010c. "Viktor Evtuhov: «Rossii nado vypolnit' mirotvorcheskuyu missiyu v Kirgizii»." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/18828/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2010d. "VYSTUPLЕНИЕ NA 4-M ZASEDANII MEZHPARLAMENTSKOJ KOMISSII PO SOTRUDNICHESTVU SOVETA FEDERACII I VSNP KNR ZAMESTITELYA PREDSEDATELYA KOMITETA SF PO KONSTITUCIONNOMU ZAKONODATEL'STVU ALEKSANDRA SAVENKOVA." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/18237/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2011. "MNENIYA I KOMMENTARII CHLENOV SOVETA FEDERACII." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/17709/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2012a. "GENNADIJ GORBUNOV: «ROSSIYA DOLZHNA POSTAVLYAT' NA MIROVYE RYNKI NE SYR'E, A PRODUKTY»." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/15519/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).

- SOVET FEDERACII. 2012b. "INTEGRACIYA NA POSTSOVETSKOM PROSTRANSTVE NE PROTIVORECHIT EVROINTEGRACII." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/15414/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2012c. "ROSSIYA I KAZAHSTAN BYLI I OStanUTSYA STRATEGICHESKIMI PARTNERAMI." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/15851/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2013a. "I. Umahanov: Neobhodimo podgotovit' sistemnyu programmu po adaptacii ekonomiki regionov k rabote v usloviyah VTO." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/37945/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2013b. "Neobhodimo povyshat' aktivnost' regionov v formirovanii rynka intellektual'noj sobstvennosti – spiker SF." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/36558/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2013c. "V. Plotnikov vystupil za uvelichenie subsidii agrariyam kak minimum do 2 tysyach rublej na hektar." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/34491/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2014a. "Importozameshchenie telekommunikacionnogo oborudovaniya otvechaet trebovaniyam bezopasnosti strany – eksperty SF." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/43380/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2014b. "Mery gosudarstvennoj podderzhki aviacionnoj promyshlennosti budut opredeleny zakonom – Komissiya po monitoringu uchastiya Rossii v VTO." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/41396/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2015a. "BRIKS: Kontury mirovogo poryadka. Stat'ya V. Matvienko k Pervomu Parlamentskomu forumu BRIKS." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/56227/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2015b. "D. Krivickij: Doverie, dialog, dejstvie — klyuchevye pozicii v otnosheniyah mezhdru Rossiej i Kitaem." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/55799/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2015c. "I. Morozov: Novye formy ekonomicheskoy integracii pridayut dopolnitel'nyj impul's regional'nym torgovo-ekonomicheskim otnosheniyam." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/50448/?hl=%D0%A8%D0%9E%D0%A1>).
- SOVET FEDERACII. 2015d. "K. Kosachev: Ekonomicheskoe davlenie SSHA na Evropu protivorechit amerikanskim idealam svobody." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/60419/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).

- SOVET FEDERACII. 2016. "A. Maiyurov Prinyal Uchastiye v Rabote Parlyamentskoy Konferencii po VTO." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/69061/?hl=%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE>).
- STARCHAK, Maxim. 2011. "Shanhajskaja Organizacija Sotrudnichestva: Vozmozhnosti Dlya Rossii." *Centralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz* 14(2):149–59.
- STEPHEN, M. D. 2014. "Rising Powers, Global Capitalism and Liberal Global Governance: A Historical Materialist Account of the BRICs Challenge." *European Journal of International Relations* 20(4):912–38.
- STEPHEN, Matthew. 2016. "India and the BRICS: Global Bandwagoning and Regional Balancing." *VESTNIK RUDN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* 16(4):595–602.
- STEPHEN, Matthew D. 2012. "Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions: The Foreign Policy Orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa." *Global Society* 26(3):289–309.
- STEPHEN, Matthew D. 2017. "Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends in Global Governance." *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 23:483–502.
- STÖBER, Sylvia. 2011. "The Failure of the OSCE Mission to Georgia—What Remains?" Pp. 203–20 in *OSCE Yearbook 2010*, edited by IFSH. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- STONE, Randall W. 2011. *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- STONE, Randall W. 2013. "Informal Governance in International Organizations: Introduction to the Special Issue." *The Review of International Organizations* 8(2):121–36.
- SUMMERS, Della, ed. 1993. *Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture*. Updated rept. Harlow, Essex, England: Longman.
- TAJFELI, Henri. 1974. "Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour." *Information (International Social Science Council)* 13(2):65–93.
- TALIAFERRO, Jeffrey W. 2001. "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited." *International Security* 25(3):128–61.
- TARR, David. 2007. "Russian Accession to the WTO: An Assessment." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 48(3):306–19.
- TARR, David G. 2016. "The Eurasian Economic Union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and the Kyrgyz Republic: Can It Succeed Where Its Predecessor Failed?" *Eastern European Economics* 54(1):1–22.
- Terentii, LIVIU. 2010. "Diplomaticheskyy Diskurs Kak Osobaya Forma Politicheskoy Kommunikacii." *Voprosy Kognitivnoy Lingvistiki* 22(1):47–56.
- TERHALLE, Maximilian. 2011. "Reciprocal Socialization: Rising Powers and the West: Reciprocal Socialization." *International Studies Perspectives* 12(4):341–61.

- THELWALL, Mike, David WILKINSON, and SUKHVINDER Uppal. 2010. "Data Mining Emotion in Social Network Communication: Gender Differences in MySpace." *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology* 61(1):190–99.
- THORUN, Christian. 2009. *Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct towards the West*. Basingstoke [England] ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- TOAL, Gerard. 2017. *Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- TOLSTRUP, Jakob. 2009. "Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the 'Near Abroad.'" *Democratization* 16(5):922–44.
- TOYE, Richard. 2003. "Developing Multilateralism: The Havana Charter and the Fight for the International Trade Organization, 1947–1948." *The International History Review* 25(2):282–305.
- TRENIN, Dmitrii, and Carnegie Moscow Center. 2001. *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Moscow Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- TRUSCOTT, Peter. 1997. *Russia First: Breaking with the West*. London: Tauris.
- TSYGANKOV, Andrei. 2010. "Russia's Power and Alliances in the 21st Century." *Problems of Post-Communism*, 43–51.
- TSYGANKOV, Andrei. 2014. "Russian's International Assertiveness: What Does It Mean for the West?" *Problems of Post-Communism*, December 8, 38–55.
- VALERIANO, Brandon, and Ryan C. MANESS. 2015. *Russia's Coercive Diplomacy: Energy, Cyber, and Maritime Policy as New Sources of Power*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- VEN BRUUSGAARD, Kristin. 2016. "Russian Strategic Deterrence." *Survival* 58(4):7–26.
- VICKERS, Brendan. 2012. *The Role of the Brics in the WTO: System-Supporters or Change Agents in Multilateral Trade?* Oxford University Press.
- VOLCHEK, Daria, Kaisa HENTTONEN, and Jan EDELMANN. 2013. "Exploring the Role of a Country's Institutional Environment in Internationalization: Strategic Responses of SMEs in Russia." *Journal of East-West Business* 19(4):317–50.
- WALTZ, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
- WANG, Wan. 2015. "Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis." *Journal of Politics and Law* 8(2).

- WEISS, Thomas G., and Rorden Wilkinson. 2014. "Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity, Authority, Power, Change." *International Studies Quarterly* 58(1):207–15.
- WILMSHURST, Elizabeth, ed. 2012. *International Law and the Classification of Conflicts*. 1st ed. Oxford, U. K. : London: Oxford University Press ; The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House).
- WILSON, Jeanne. 2017. "The Russian Pursuit of Regional Hegemony." *Rising Powers Quarterly* 2(1):7–25.
- WILSON Rowe, Elana, and Stina TORJESEN, eds. 2009. *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy*. Vol. 15. London: Routledge.
- World Steel Association. 2018. "Global Crude Steel Output Increases by 4.6% in 2018."
- World Trade Organization. 2011. "Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization."
- WTO. 2020. "European Union - Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports from Russia - (Second Complaint) - Report of the Panel."
- YOUNG, Lori, and Stuart SOROKA. 2012. "Affective News: The Automated Coding of Sentiment in Political Texts." *Political Communication* 29(2):205–31.
- YUAN, Jing-Dong. 2010. "China's Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)." *Journal of Contemporary China* 19(67):855–69.
- ZAGORSKI, Andrei. 2010. "The Russian Proposal for a Treaty on European Security: From the Medvedev Initiative to the Corfu Process." Pp. 43–59 in *OSCE Yearbook 2009*, edited by IFSH. Baden-Baden.
- ZELLNER, Wolfgang. 2005. "Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18(3):389–402.
- ZHANG, Lei, and Bing LIU. 2017. "Sentiment Analysis and Opinion Mining." Pp. 1152–61 in *Encyclopedia of Machine Learning and Data Mining*, edited by C. Sammut and G. I. Webb. Boston, MA: Springer US.
- ZÜRN, Michael, and Matthew STEPHEN. 2010. "The View of Old and New Powers on the Legitimacy of International Institutions." *Politics* 30(1_suppl):91–101.
1975. "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Final Act."
1992. "CSE Helsinki Document 1992."
1993. "Accession of the Russian Federation."
- 1994a. "Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization."
- 1994b. *Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language*. New York: Gramercy Books.

1999. "Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe."
2000. "S.M. Mironov: 'OBSE Sfabrikovalo Mneniye o Vyborah Zadolgo do Nih.'" *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/22471/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>)
2001. "the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extrimism."
- 2002a. "Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization."
- 2002b. "Intervyu Kitayskoy Gazete 'Zhenmin Zhibao.'" *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21624>).
- 2010a. "Astana Commemorative Declaration. Towards a Security Community."
- 2010b. "Interview Kitayskoy Gazete 'Zhenmin Zhibao.'" *kremlin.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/9020>).
2011. "Valeryi Fedorov: 'Spravedlivymi i Chetnymi Dolzhny Byt ne Tolko Vybory, no i Ih Ocenka.'" *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/17728/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).
- 2012a. "Sovet Federacii i Parlamentskaya Assambleya OBSE Budut Sovmestno Rabotat v Celyah Reformirovaniya OBSE." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/15007/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).
- 2012b. "Sovet Federacii Schitayet Neobhodimym Stavit Vopros o Modernizacii Arhitektury Evropeyskoy Bezopasnosti." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/15164/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).
- 2012c. "Trista Dvadcat Pervoye Zasedaniye Soveta Federacii." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/15161/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).
- 2012d. "Valentina Matvienko i Sergey Naryshkin Vstretilis so spikerom Medzhliisa Turkmenistana Akdzhoy Nurberdyevoy." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/14953/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).
- 2013a. "I. Umahanov: Parlamentarii Rossii i Shvecii Gotovy Rashirit Vzaimodeystviye na Mezhdunarodnyh Ploshadkah." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/37832/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).
- 2013b. "V. Kulakov: Osennyya Sessiya Parlamentskoy Assemblii OBSE Proydet v Chernogorii." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/33460/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).
- 2013c. "V. Matvienko: Mezhd RF i Avstriyei Nalazhen Nasysheynyi i Konstruktivnyi Parlamentskiy Dialog." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/32455/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).
- 2013d. "V. Matvienko: Neobhodimo Ukreplyat Rossiysko-grecheskoye Mezhparlamentskoye Sotrudnichestvo." *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved
(<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/34972/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).

- 2014a. “19-ya Regularnaya Vstrecha Glav Pravitelstv Rossii i Kitaya.” *government.ru*. Retrieved (<http://government.ru/news/15197/>).
- 2014b. “Decision No. 1117. Deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.”
- 2014c. “Rossyiskiye Senatory Prinyali Uchastiye v Rabote Zimney Sessii Parlamentskoy Assamblei OBSE.” *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/46637/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).
- 2014d. “V. Matvienko: Vse Idet k Prevrascheniyu Ukrainy v Evropeyskiy Blizhniy Vostok.” *council.gov.ru*. Retrieved (<http://council.gov.ru/events/news/42761/?hl=%D0%9E%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%95>).
- 2014e. “Zasedaniye Soveta Glav Pravitelstv Gosudarstv-Chlenov SHOS.” *government.ru*. Retrieved (<http://government.ru/news/16122/>).
2015. “OSCE Response to the Crisis in and around Ukraine.”
- 2016a. “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.”
- 2016b. “Konceptiya Vneshney Politiky Rossiyskoy Federacii (utverzdena Presidentom Rosiyskoy Federacii V.V. Putiny 30 noyabrya 2016).”

All the necessary documentation on the software used can be found at <https://github.com/DrUlysses/KateProg2>

List of appendices

Appendix 1

Positive			
Авторитетная организация	Идеал доступности образования	поддерживают центральную роль	Совпадать
Адаптация стратегий	Идея защиты мира	Поддержка	Совпадающие интересы
Адекватная защита	Известный	Поддержка инициативы	Совпадение интересов
Адекватно оценивать	Известный политик	Поддержка инициированных резолюций	Согласие
Адекватный ответ	Иметь большое значение	Поддержка искусства	Согласиться
Активизировать усилия	Иметь крайне важное значение	Поддержка контртеррористических усилий	Согласиться способствовать
Активизация многостороннего взаимодействия	Иметь огромное значение	Поддержка культуры	Согласованные подходы
Активизация переговоров	Иметь особое значение	Поддержка науки	Согласованные приоритеты
Активизация совместных усилий	Иметь потенциал	Поддержка образования	согласованные программы
Активизация сотрудничества	Иметь преимущество	Поддержка развивающихся стран	Согласованный план действий
Активизация усилий	Иметь принципиальное значение	Поддержка сохранения	Согласованный проект
Активизация экономического и технического сотрудничества	Иметь широкую сеть	Поддержка усилий	Согласовать приоритеты
Активизировать взаимодействие	Инвестиционное сотрудничество	Поддержанная инициатива	Содействие международному развитию
Активизировать диалог	Инвестиционная привлекательность	подтвердили решимость	Содействие науке
Активизировать сотрудничество	Инициатива	Подтвердить благодарность	Содействие обеспечению равноправия
Активизировать усилия	Инициатива укрепления партнерства	Подтвердить важность	Содействие обучению на
Активная дипломатия	Инициативная роль страны	Подтвердить весомое место	Содействие оказывается
Активная поддержка	Инновационный потенциал	Подтвердить готовность	Содействие осуществлению

Активная работа	Интеграционный процесс	Подтвердить намерение	Содействие осуществлению прав человека
Активно выступать	Интегрированный подход	Подтвердить настрой	Содействие повышению качества
Активно действовать	Интегрировать усилия	подтвердить необходимость	Содействие предпринимательству
Активно заниматься	Интеллектуальная и нравственная солидарность	Подтвердить обязательства	содействие претворению в жизнь
Активно предоставлять сведения	Интеллектуальная солидарность	Подтвердить поддержку	Содействие развитию
Активно развиваться	Интеллектуально состоятельный	Подтвердить поддержку деятельности	Содействие развитию образования
Активно содействовать	Интенсивно развиваться	Подтвердить позицию	Содействие развитию Развитие экономики
Активно сотрудничать	Интенсивный диалог	Подтвердить приверженность	Содействие свободе
Активно участвовать	Интересы развития	Подтвердить приверженность приоритетам	Содействие свободе выражня
Активно участвовать в разработке	Искать совместные пути решения	Подтвердить принципиальные позиции	Содействие экономическому развитию
Активное взаимодействие	Исключительная возможность	Подтвердить решимость	Содействовать
Активное подключение	Исключительно интенсивный	подтвердить свою приверженность	Содействовать адаптации
Активное участие	Исключительный успех	Подтверждать практикой	Содействовать налаживанию взаимодействия
Активные шаги	Использование в мирных целях	подтверждены позиции	Содействовать плюрализму
Активный диалог	Использование возможностей	Подчеркнуть важность	Содействовать привлечению
Активный участник	Использовать возможности	Подчеркнуть необходимость	содействовать реализации
Акцентированная поддержка	Использовать потенциал	подчеркнуть решимость	Содействовать реализации инициатив
Антитеррористическая безопасность	историческое значение	Подчеркнуть роль	Содействовать решению проблем
Антитеррористическая структура	Историческое призвание	Подъем регионов	Содействовать созданию
Антитеррористические мероприятия	Историческое решение	Пожелать успехов	Содействовать становлению

Антитеррористическое сотрудничество	Кардинально улучшить	Позволить реализовывать	Содействовать укреплению
Атмосфера обоюдного доверия	Кардинальные внутренние преобразования	поздравил	Содействовать укреплению взаимопонимания
База для развития	Качественная сторона	позитивная динамика	Содействовать укреплению деятельности
Безальтернативность многосторонних подходов	Качественно новый уровень	Позитивная повестка дня	Содержательное многообразие
Безопасность вложений	Качественно новый уровень взаимодействия	Позитивная реакция	содержательность
Безусловный приоритет	Качественно новый этап	Позитивно влиять	Содержательный обмен мнениями
беспрецедентные возможности	Качественный сдвиг	Позитивно отражаться	Содержать ценную информацию
Беспрецедентное вовлечение	Ключевое мероприятие	позитивно оценивается	Созвучие курсов
Благодарить	Ключевой вектор	Позитивно оценивать	созвучность позиций стран
Благодаря	Ключевой вопрос	Позитивное влияние	Создание благоприятных условий
Благодаря активности	Ключевой принцип	Позитивное звучание	Создание более благоприятной ситуации
Благодаря усилиям	Ключевой приоритет	Позитивное сотрудничество	Создание глобальной инфраструктуры
Благоприятная атмосфера	Ключевой союзник	позитивную реакцию	Создание инфраструктуры
Благоприятные условия	Ключевой тезис	Позитивные подвиги	Создание механизмов
Благоприятный	Ключевые вопросы	Позитивные результаты	Создание многосторонних центров
Благоприятный климат	Ключевые государства	Позитивный	Создание независимого государства
Благоприятствовать	Ключевые области	Позитивный пересмотр	Создание новых рабочих мест
Благородная деятельность	Ключевые органы	Позитивный резонанс	Создание организации
Благородные идеалы	Коллективное лидерство	поиск компромиссов	Создание подлинно единой Европы
Благосостояние	Коллективные усилия международного сообщества	Полезный механизм	Создание потенциала

Благотворительность	Комплексно проработать	Политико-дипломатическое урегулирование	Создание рабочих мест
Ближайшая перспектива	Комплексный инструмент	Политическое урегулирование конфликтов	Создание территориально свободного государства
Более эффективный	конкретный	Полно использовать	Создать механизм встреч
Большая открытость	Конкретный план действий	Полное равноправие	Созидательные усилия
Большие возможности	Конкурентные преимущества	Полномасштабная интеграция	Сокращение транзакционных издержек
Большое значение	Консолидация усилий	Полностью подтвердить	Солидарность
Большой инвестиционный потенциал	Конструктивная атмосфера	Полноценное раскрытие потенциала	Солидарный ответ
Большой эффект	Конструктивная работа	Полны решимости	Солидная правовая база
Борьба с актами ядерного терроризма	Конструктивное взаимодействие	Положительно	Соответствовать принципу
Борьба с бедностью	Конструктивное отношение	Положительный опыт и достижения	Соответствовать духу и характеру отношений
Борьба с коррупцией	Конструктивный характер	Положительный сдвиг	Соответствовать нормам и правилам
Борьба с расовой нетерпимостью	Контакты на высшем уровне	Получать выгоды	Соответствовать целям
Брать обязательства	Контроль за вооружениями	Получение практических благ	Соответствующие условия
Бурно развивающиеся процессы	Координировать усилия	Получившая высокую оценку	сосредоточить усилия
Быстрая реакция	Крупнейший	получило вектор развития	Сотрудничество в военной области
Быстрейшее объединение	Крупномасштабные планы	Получить высокую оценку	Сотрудничество в духе стратегической открытости
Быть благодарным	Крупномасштабные проекты	Получить дальнейшее развитие	Сотрудничество с заинтересованными государствами
Быть в курсе	Крупномасштабный национальный проект	Получить поддержку	Сохранение биологического разнообразия
Быть важным	Крупномасштабный основополагающий документ	Получить полную информацию	Сохранение ведущей роли
Быть готовым	Крупные достижения	Получить развитие	Сохранение и расширение

Быть избранным	Крупные проекты	Помогать сохранению и увеличению	Сохранение культурного
Быть открытым	Крупные совместные проекты	Поощрение	Сохранение наработанного позитива
Быть полезным	Крупный донор	Поощрение межкультурного диалога	Сохранение наследия
Быть согласным	Крупный полномасштабный проект	Поощрение развития	Сохранение окружающей среды и всемирного культурного
В деле достижения	Культура мира	Поощрения социальной интеграции	Сохранение приоритетов
В духе мира	Купировать попытки	Поощрять	Сохранение природного наследия человечества
В духе мира, демократии, прав человека и толерантности	Курировать	Популяризация опыта	Сохранение разнообразия
В духе эффективного партнерства	Легитимный	Популяризировать	Сохранение уникального инструмента
В инициативном порядке	Лидирующая роль	посещать	Сохранение экологического
В интересах	Лидирующие позиции	Последовательная реализация	Сохранять важную роль
В интересах мира	Ликвидация кризисных ситуаций	Последовательно выполнять обязательства	Сохранять движение
В интересах образования и культуры	Ликвидация последствий	Последовательно продолжать курс	Сохранять приверженность
В интересах развития	Ликвидация чрезвычайных ситуаций	Последовательно работать	Способствовала повышению авторитета
В интересах российской науки	Ликвидация экспортных субсидий	Последовательно реализовывать	Способствовать
В интересах содействия	Лучшие практики	Послужить повышением уровня	Способствовать активизации
В координации с партнерами	Максимально пользоваться	Постконфликтное миросторительство	Способствовать взаимному пониманию
В кратчайший срок	Максимально эффективный	Постоянно возрастающее число	способствовать выработке
В мирных целях	Максимальное использование	Построение сбалансированной глобальной системы	Способствовать выработке решений
В национальных интересах	Максимальное увеличение	Поступательное продвижение	Способствовать интеграции

В позитивном ключе	Масштабная интеграция	Почеркивать важность	Способствовать повышению результативности
В полной мере	Масштабное мероприятие	Правильно	Способствовать привлечению
В полном объеме	Масштабные меры	Правильность	Способствовать продвижению
В положительном ключе	Масштабные проекты	Правильность решения	Способствовать продолжению курса
В пользу России	Международное взаимодействие	Практические сдвиги	Способствовать реализации
В пользу урегулирования	Международное развитие	Практический вклад	Способствовать росту
В результате усилий	Меры доверия и безопасности	Практический и весомый вклад	Способствовать сближению
В соответствии с принятыми обязательствами	Механизм совместного реагирования	практического сотрудничества	Способствовать соблюдению прав человека
В соответствии с планом	Мир и стабильность	Практическое сотрудничество	Способствовать сохранению
В условиях мира и безопасности	Мирное восстановление	Превысить показатель	Способствовать стабильности
Важная инициатива	Мирное сосуществование	предлагаем сотрудничество	способствовать становлению
Важная составная часть	Миротворчество	Предлагать адекватные политико-дипломатические ходы	Способствовать увеличению
Важнейший документ	Многообещающий	Предлагать кооперацию	Способствовать укреплению
Важнейший инструмент	Многообещающий характер	Предлагать сотрудничество	Способствовать укреплению роли
Важнейший приоритет	Многообразие	Предлать конструктивные альтернативы	Способствовать улучшению
Важнейший фактор	Многополярность	предметный характер	Способствовать усилению взаимопонимания
Важное значение	Многополярный порядок	Предоставить эгиду	Способствовать устойчивому развитию
Важное направление деятельности	Многостороннее управление интернетом	Предоставление полной информации	Способствовать уважению
Важное решение	Многосторонние программы	Предпринимать активные усилия	Способствовать установлению
Важное событие	Многосторонние проекты	Предпринимать шаги	Справедливое общество

Важность	Многосторонние усилия	Предпринять дальнейшие шаги	Справедливый
Важность внешнеполитической работы	Многосторонний	Представлять единственное издание подобного рода	Стабилизационный процесс
Важность доверия	Многосторонняя торговля	Представлять значение	Стабилизация
Важность развития систем	Молодежное сотрудничество	Представлять значительный интерес	Стабильная ситуация
Важность развития сотрудничества	Мощный импульс	Представлять интерес	Стабильно развиваться
Важные зарубежные визиты	На благо	Представлять исключительную ценность	стабильности
Важные направления	На должном уровне	Представлять прямой интерес	Стабильность
Важные события	Наблюдать подъем	Представлять уникальную модель	Стабильный
Важные элементы	Наведение порядка	Предстоящее председательство	Стабилизация рынков
Важный документ	Надежный	Преимущество	Становиться очевидным
Важный результат	Надежное обеспечение	Прекращение конфронтации	Стать важным достижением
Важный фактор	Надежность российских вооружений	Преодоление кризиса	Стать приоритетной
Важный элемент	Надежность российской техники	Преодоление критического положения	Стать приоритетом
Важный элемент формирования системы	Наиболее активный	Преодоление последствий	Стать участницей
Важный этап	Наиболее представительный орган	Преодолеть вызовы	стать хорошей основой
Ведение коллективных переговоров	Найти выход из тупиковой ситуации	Преодолеть кризис	Стимулирование инвестиций
Ведущая программа	Наказание виновных	Претворение в жизнь	Стимулирование инноваций
Ведущая роль	Накопленный опыт	При равноправном участии	Стимулирование роста
Ведущие позиции	Наладить переговорный процесс	Приверженность принципу	Стимулирование экономического роста
Ведущий	Наладить содействие	Приверженность решениям	Стратегическая открытость
Ведущий партнер	налаживание взаимодействия	Приветствовать	стратегический характер партнерства
Ведущие специалисты	Налаживание и развитие взаимодействия	Приветствовать присоединение	Стратегическое взаимодействие

Вектор развития	Налаживание конструктивного взаимодействия	Приветствовать прогресс	Строить мосты доверия
Весомо представлена	Налаживание международного сотрудничества	Приветствовать результат	Существенно возрасти
Весомый вклад	Налаживание отношений	Приветствовать решение	Существенно продвинуться
Вести работу	Налаживание партнерских связей	Приветствовать создание	Существенно расширить
Взаимная выгода	Налаживание работы	Приветствовать успехи	Существенно укрепилась
Взаимная защита секретной информации	Налаживание сотрудничества	приветствовать факт	Существенно укрепиться
Взаимная терпимость	Намерение содействовать	Приветствуем интенсивную работу	Существенно ускорить
Взаимное признание	Намерены сотрудничать	Привлекать	Существенное подспорье
Взаимное согласие	Наметить направления работы	Привлечение и защита взаимных инвестиций	Существенно возрастать
Взаимное сотрудничество	Направить приветствие	Привлечение к участию в деятельности	Существенный вклад
Взаимное стремление	Направить усилия	Придавать большое значение	Существенный элемент
Взаимное уважение	Направленный на развитие	Придание глобального характера	сходные позиции
Взаимный интерес	Направленный на укрепление	Придать большое значение	Считать целесообразным
Взаимный учет интересов	Наращивание вклада	Придать дополнительный импульс	Твердая поддержка
Взаимовыгодная основа	Наращивалось сотрудничество	Придать значение	Твердое отстаивание законных интересов
Взаимовыгодное сотрудничество	Наращивание антитеррористического потенциала	Придать импульс	Твердое следование принципу консенсуса
Взаимодействие с партнерами	Наращивание возможностей	Придать мощный импульс	Тесная координация
Взаимодополняемость	Наращивание возможностей экономик	Придать новый импульс	Тесная координация работы
Взвешенные решения	Наращивание донорского потенциала	Придать существенный импульс	Тесное взаимодействие
Взвешенный курс	Наращивание масштабов	Придать эффективный характер	Тесное международное сотрудничество
Видное место	Наращивание международного содействия	Придерживаться гибкой линии	тесное политическое взаимодействие

Видные деятели культуры и искусства	Наращивание модернизационной и высокотехнологичной составляющей	призвать к сотрудничеству	Тесное сотрудничество
Видный дипломат	Наращивание потенциала	Признать важность	Тесные консультации
Вклад в мировую цивилизацию	Наращивание практического взаимодействия	Признать важность сотрудничества	Техническое содействие
Влиятельный член	Наращивание сотрудничества	признать выгоды	Техническое сотрудничество
Влиять благотворным образом	наращивания сотрудничества	признать достижения	Толерантное сознание
Внедрение российских технологий	Наращивать взаимодействие	признать значимость	Толерантный
Внести большой вклад	Наращивать вклад	признать преимущества	Торгово-экономическое сотрудничество
Внести весомый вклад	Наращивать курс	признать роль	Традиционный авторитет
Внести конструктивный вклад	Наращивать потенциал	признать уникальную роль	Транзитный потенциал
Внести на утверждение	Наращивать участие	Прийти к единому мнению	Транспарентная торговля
Внести существенный вклад	наследия человечества	Принятая резолюция	Транспарентное сотрудничество
Внешнеполитическая координация	Настойчивые усилия	Приносить плоды	Транспарентность
Внешнеполитические усилия	Настоятельно рекомендовать	Принцип коллективности	Транспарентные условия
Вновь подтвердить	Настраиваемся на формирование	Принцип консенсуса	Тщательная работа
Вносить весомый вклад	Насыщенный диалог	Принцип равноправия	у нас много интересов
Вносить вклад	Насыщенный ритм	Принципиальное значение	убедительный
Внутренние преобразования	Научно-технический потенциал	Принципиальное решение	Убедительное подтверждение
Во имя будущего	научно-техническое сотрудничество	Принципы взаимопонимания	Уважать право
Во имя мира, стабильности, процветания	Находить понимание	Принципы полного равенства	Уважение многообразия культур
Возрастающая конструктивная роль	Находиться в сфере внимания	принципы равноправия	Уважение прав работников
Возвращение к мирной жизни	Нацеленный на решение	Принятые конкретные действия	Уважение прав человека

Возглавить	Нацеленный на сотрудничество	Принять активное участие	Увеличена продолжительность
Возглавлять список	Национальное примирение	Принять весомые документы	Увеличение
Возможности доступа	Начата работа	Принять инициативу	Увеличение вклада
Возобновились переговоры	Начать практическую реализацию	Принять необходимые меры	Увеличение вовлеченности
Возобновился экономический рост	Наша поддержка	Принять непосредственное участие	Увеличение выгод
Возобновить действие договора	наши партнеры	Приобрести особую важность	Увеличение доходов
Возобновить переговорный процесс	Не давать сомневаться	Приоритетное направление	Увеличение мобильности
Возобновление диалога	Не допустить раскол мира	Приоритетные задачи	Увеличение объема инвестиций
Возобновление переговоров	Не иметь аналогов	Проведение многовекторной внешней политики	Увеличение объема торговли
Возрастание роли	Не сомневаться	Проведение преобразований	Увеличение объемов
Возрождение страны	Недискриминация	Проведение совместных миротворческих операций	Увеличение финансирования
Возрос	Недопущение двойных стандартов	Проводить взвешенную политику	Увеличение экспорта
Возросшая ответственность	Недопущение использования	Проводить инициативную работу	Увеличит доходы
Воплощать единство	Недопущение проникновения	Проводить линию на политическое урегулирование	Увеличиться
Вопросы решены	незаангажированность	Проводить объединительную политику	Увенчаться успехом
Воспользоваться результатами работы	Независимые средства массовой информации	Прогресс	Увенченные усилия
Восстановление диалога	Независимый	Продвигать позитивную повестку	Уверенность
Восстановление единства	Неизменный член	Продвигать позитивную программу	Уверенные темпы роста
Восстановление жизнеспособности	Немаловажное значение	Продвигать приоритет	Углубление взаимопонимания
Восстановление мирного процесса	Немаловажный	Продвижение взаимодействия	Углубление внешнеполитического взаимодействия

Восстановление отделений	Ненасилие	продвижение достигнуто	углубление диалога
Восстановление экономики	Необходимость активного участия	Продвижение инициатив	Углубление партнерства
Впервые в истории	Необходимый уровень	Продвижение мирного процесса	Углубление политического взаимодействия
Впечатляющие результаты	Необычайно интенсивная программа	Продвижение сотрудничества	Углубление понимания
Впечатляющие цифры	Неоднократно посещать	Продвижение торговли	Углубление сотрудничества
Всеобщее уважение	Неплохие заделы	Продвинуться	Углубление экономической интеграции
Всеобъемлющая архитектура безопасности	непосредственном участии	Проделать большую работу	углубления взаимопонимания
Всеобъемлющая достоверная информация	Нераспространение ядерного оружия	Проделать огромную работу	Углублять взаимодействие
Всесторонне поддерживать	Нераспространенческие обязательства	продемонстрировать единство	Удалось
Вступить в финальную стадию	Несомненный успех	Продолжать способствовать	Удалось выработать
Вывести стороны на прямой диалог	Неукоснительное соблюдение принципов	Продолжение партнерства	Удалось оживить
Вывод из состояния застоя	Новая система взаимодействия	Продолжить совершенствование	Удастся
Выгодное географическое положение	новое качество сотрудничества	Продолжить укрепление	Удовлетворение потребностей
Выдвижение инициатив	Новые задачи	Продуктивно заработать	Уделить особое внимание
Выдвинутые инициативы	Новые направления	Продуктивный диалог	Уделять внимание
Выдвинуть инициативу	Новые рабочие места	Производственная кооперация	Уделять значительное внимание
Вызревание истины	новый импульс	Прообраз взаимосвязанного мира	Уделять особое внимание
Выигрывать	Новый экономический рост	Прорывной	Уделять приоритетное внимание
Выйти за рамки	Нравственная солидарность	Противодействие	Удерживать приоритетное место
Выйти на качественно новый уровень	Обеспечение безопасности	Противодействие вызовам и угрозам	Удовлетворены

Выполнение взятых обязательств	Обеспечение безопасности торговли	Противодействие терроризму	Укоренять
Выполнение задач	Обеспечение безусловного выполнения	Противодействие угрозам	Укрепить позиции
Выполнение обязательств	Обеспечение безъядерного статуса	Противодействие угрозам кибертерроризма	Укрепление
Выполнение плана	Обеспечение военной безопасности	Противодействовать планам США	Укрепление антитеррористического взаимодействия
Выполнение положений	Обеспечение возможностей	Процветание	Укрепление безопасности
Выполнение проектов	Обеспечение всеобщего уважения	процветания	Укрепление вектора
Выполнение резолюций	Обеспечение выполнения задач	Процветающий	Укрепление верховенства законов
Выполнение требований	Обеспечение гендерного равенства	Процесс демократизации	Укрепление взаимовыгодного сотрудничества
Выполненные решения	Обеспечение деятельности	Процесс оптимизации	Укрепление глобальной стабильности
Выполнить	Обеспечение доступа	Прочная база	Укрепление деятельности
Выполнять обязательства	Обеспечение законности и прав человека	Прочно встать на путь	Укрепление доверия
Выправление дисбаланса	Обеспечение коллективной безопасности	Прочно удерживать	Укрепление инфраструктуры
Выработать безопасные варианты	Обеспечение мира	прочные позиции	Укрепление контроля
Выработать единые подходы	Обеспечение надежной основы	Прочный фундамент	Укрепление координации
Выработка новых подходов	Обеспечение национальных интересов	Проявить готовность	Укрепление лидерства
Выразил удовлетворение	Обеспечение основных свобод	Проявление растущего веса	Укрепление международной безопасности
Выразить благодарность	Обеспечение прав	Проявлять большой интерес	Укрепление международной стабильности
Выразить готовность	Обеспечение прав человека	Проявлять встречную готовность	Укрепление международных позиций

Выразить надежду	Обеспечение прочного мира	Работать в сотрудничестве	Укрепление мира
Выразить поддержку	Обеспечение равных прав граждан	Равная и неделимая безопасность	Укрепление многосторонних начал
Выразить признательность	Обеспечение реализации	Равновесия	Укрепление общего экономического благосостояния
Выразить уверенность	обеспечение региональной безопасности	Равноправие государства	Укрепление отношений
Выразить удовлетворение	Обеспечение соблюдения законодательства	Равноправная основа	Укрепление позиций
Вырости	Обеспечение сотрудничества	Равноправное партнерство	Укрепление потенциала
Высказать удовлетворенность	Обеспечение справедливости	равноправное сотрудничество	Укрепление правовых начал
Высказаться в поддержку	Обеспечение стабильности	Разблокирование	Укрепление правопорядка
Высокая активность	Обеспечение условия	Разблокирование переговорного процесса	Укрепление практического взаимодействия
Высокая динамика	Обеспечение устойчивого развития	Развивалась сеть взаимодействия	Укрепление режима
Высокая оценка	Обеспечение участия	развивались противоречиво	Укрепление роли
Высокая роль	Обеспечение физической безопасности	Развивалось взаимодействие	Укрепление связей
Высокая степень доверия	Обеспечение целевой поставки	Развивать взаимодействие	Укрепление системы международной безопасности
Высокие стандарты управления	Обеспечение честности	Развивать двусторонние отношения	Укрепление согласия
Высокие темпы роста	Обеспечивать доступ к передовым методикам	Развивать добрососедские отношения	Укрепление сотрудничества
Высокий показатель	Обеспечивать единство целей и задач	Развивать дружеские отношения	Укрепление стабильности
Высокий ритм	Обеспечить доступ	Развивать опыт	Укрепление стратегических отношений
Высокий уровень	Обеспечить общий контроль	развивать стабильно	Укрепление стратегической стабильности

Высокий уровень интеграции	Обеспечить полноформатное участие	Развиваться в соответствии с принципами	Укрепление торговых связей
Высокий уровень открытости	Обеспечить продолжение переговорного процесса	Развитие взаимовыгодного сотрудничества	Укрепление традиционной дружбы
Высокий уровень транспарентности	Обеспечить реализацию	Развитие взаимодействия	Укрепление экономик
Высоко оценивать	Обеспечить успех	Развитие взаимопонимания и терпимости	Укрепление экономического фундамента
Высоко оценить	Обладать богатыми ресурсами	Развитие глобальных рынков	Укрепление эффективности
Высокое значение	Обладать потенциалом	Развитие диалога культур	Укреплялось понимание
Выстраивание государственности	обладают потенциалом	Развитие договора	Укреплять
Выстроить механизм	Облегчение условий	Развитие идеи	Укреплять связи
Выстроить схему	Облегчение условий торговли	Развитие инфраструктуры	Укреплять сотрудничество
Высший уровень	обмен опытом	Развитие инициативы	Укрупнение связей
Выше среднего значения	Обмен передовым опытом	Развитие международного сотрудничества	Улучшать
Выявление	Обмениваться поздравлениями	Развитие механизмов	Улучшение доступа
Гарантированный доступ	Обоюдная заинтересованность	Развитие мирной атомной энергетики	Улучшение инвестиционного климата
Гармонизация национальных законодательств	Обстоятельно обсуждаться	Развитие мирового сообщества	Улучшение информированности
Гармонизация стандартов	Обстоятельный обмен мнениями	Развитие мирового хозяйства	Улучшение качества образования
Гибкий подход	обсуждаем проект	Развитие мировой цивилизации	Улучшение координации
Гибкий формат	Общая заинтересованность	Развитие многопрофильного сотрудничества	Улучшение отношений
Гибкость	Общая политическая воля	Развитие многосторонних форматов	Улучшение торгового и инвестиционного климата
Главное мероприятие года	Общая решимость	Развитие общих стратегий	Уникальный
Главные составляющие	общей линии	Развитие отношений	Уникальная возможность

Главный приоритет	Общие преимущества	Развитие парламентского измерения	Уникальная общенациональная инфраструктура
Глобальное развитие	Общие цели	Развитие партнерских связей	Уникальная программа
Глубокие реформы	Объединить деятельность	Развитие потенциала	Уникальная роль
Глубоко проработать	Объединительная идея	Развитие правовой базы	Уникальные потенциалы
Готова к кооперации	Объединяющий	Развитие предпринимательства	Уникальные ресурсы
Готовность	Обязаться реализовать	Развитие ресурсов	Уникальный инструмент
Готовность к диалогу	Огромный потенциал	развитие связей	Уникальный механизм
Готовность к поддержке	Одобрение	Развитие современных систем	Уникальный объект
Готовность к поиску компромисса	Одобренная реализация	Развитие сотрудничество	Уникальный потенциал
Готовность к сотрудничеству	Одобренная стратегия	Развитие терпимости	Уплотнить диалог
Готовы к взаимодействию	Одобренное положение	Развитие торгово-экономических связей	Управления социальными преобразованиями
Готовы сотрудничать	Одобренный президентом	Развитие торговых соглашений	Упрочение
Готовый к взаимодействию	Одобрить	Развитие широкого диалога	Упрочение доверия
Гуманитарное сотрудничество	одобрить работу	развитию плодотворного сотрудничества	Упрочение мира
Давать возможность	Одобрять	развития	Упрочение связей
Давать дополнительные возможности	оживились отношения	Развитый	Упрочившееся международное положение
Давать основание	Оживить процесс	Развязки остающихся проблем	Упрощение процедур
Далеко продвинуться	Оживление деятельности	Разделять мнение	Упрощение торговли
Дальнейшая консолидация	Оказание поддержки	Разделяю соображения	Упрощение условий
Дальнейшее взаимодействие	Оказание помощи	разнопланового сотрудничества	Урегулирование
Дальнейшее наращивание отношений	Оказание содействия	Разноплановое сотрудничество	Урегулирование конфликта
Дальнейшее развитие	Оказание срочной помощи	Разработка мероприятий	Урегулирование кризисных ситуаций
Дальнейшее развитие взаимодействия	Оказанная помощь и поддержка	Разрабатывать	Урегулирование проблем

Дальнейшее развития сотрудничества	Оказать поддержку	Разработать единые принципы	Урегулирование региональных конфликтов
Дальнейшее сотрудничество	Оказать помощь	Разработать план	Урегулирование ситуации
Дальнейшее углубление	Оказать содействие	Разработать политические меры	Урегулирование ядерной проблемы
Дальнейшее углубление сотрудничества	Оказывать гуманитарную помощь	Разработать программу	Урегулирование конфликтов
Дальнейшие меры	Оказывать поддержку	Разработка действенных механизмов	Урегулировать взаимные разногласия
Дальнейшие развитие	Оказывать помощь	Разрешение конфликтов	Урегулировать вопросы
Дальнейший прогресс	Оказывать содействие	Разрешимый	Урегулировать до конца
Дать высокую оценку	Окупаться сторицей	Разрешить противоречия	Усиление безопасности
Дать дополнительные возможности	Оперативная работа	Расширение обмена информацией	Усиление интеграции
Дать новый импульс	Оперативно реагировать	раскрыт потенциал	Усиление ответственности
Дать положительную оценку	Оперативное реагирование	Распространение успешного опыта	Усиление поддержки
Дать результаты	Опора на международное право	Растет число единомышленников	Усиление центральной роли
Дать толчок	определяет ориентиры взаимодействия	Растущая роль	Усиливать роль
Действенное средство	Оптимальная ниша	Растущее понимание	Усилия дипломатии
Действенные усилия	Оптимизм	Растущие внимание	Ускоренный запуск
Действовать адекватно	Ориентиры взаимодействия	растущий вес	Ускорить переговорный процесс
Действовать слаженно	Осмысление задач	Растущий вклад	Усовершенствование методов
Действующие механизмы	Особое значение	Расширение взаимодействия	Успех председательства
Делать упор	Остается уникальной	Расширение доступа	Успех реформы
Дело будущего	Осуществление рекомендаций	Расширение доступа к информации	Успешная работа
Демонстрировать высокую динамику	Осуществление инициативы	Расширение масштабов	Успешно
Демонтаж ограничительных мер	Осуществление Конвенции	Расширение отношений	Успешно осуществлять
Диалог высокого уровня	Осуществление мер	Расширение охвата социальной защиты	Успешно осуществляться
Диалог лидеров	Осуществление нормативной деятельности	Расширение просветительской деятельности	Успешно продвигать
Динамично развиваться	Осуществление планов	Расширение рамок	Успешно пройти

Динамичные отношения	Осуществление преобразований	Расширение связей	Успешно развивается
Динамичный	Осуществление программ	Расширение сотрудничества	Успешно развивать
Добиваться	Осуществление проектов	Расширение прозрачности	Успешно развиваться
Добиваться всеобъемлющего мира в регионе	Осуществление сотрудничества	Расширение усилий	Успешно реализовать
Добиваться прогресса	Осуществлять дальнейшие шаги	расширения обмена информацией	Успешно решается
Добиваться реализации	Осуществлять широчайший обмен	расширить сотрудничество	Успешное завершение
Добиваться сотрудничества	Ответственная политика	Расширить участие	Успешное завершение работы
Добиваться эффекта	отвечает долговременным политическим интересам	Расширять круг партнеров	Успешное завершение
Добиться проведения	Отвечать интересам	Рациональное природопользование	Успешное проведение
Добиться четкой фиксации	Отвечать коренным интересам страны	Реагирование на вызовы и угрозы	Успешное развитие
Добровольная основа	Отвечать реалиям	Реализация крупных проектов	Успешное сотрудничество
Доброжелательный характер	Отвечать требованиям мирового развития	Реализация масштабных проектов	Успешные перспективы
Добросовестно выполнять	Отвечать установкам	Реализация новшеств	Успешный опыт
Добрососедские отношения	Отводить особую роль	Реализация передового опыта	Устанавливать конкретные организационные процедуры
Добрососедство	Откровенная атмосфера	Реализация потенциала	Установить контакты
Добротная основа	откровенный политдиалог	реализация права на образование	Установление благоприятных условий
Доверительное партнерство	Открывать возможность	Реализация принципов	Установление тесной связи
Доверительный диалог	Открывать неорганический доступ	Реализация приоритетов	Установление форм взаимодействия
Доверительный политический диалог	Открыта для диалога	Реализовать возможности	Устойчивое развитие
Доводить приоритеты	открыта для конструктивного диалога	Реализовать инициативы	Устойчивое энергетическое развитие

Договориться	Открытая система	Реализовывать национальные интересы	Устойчивость
Долгосрочная перспектива	Открытое общество	Реализовывать потенциал	Устойчивые условия жизни
Доложить руководству	Открытость миру	Реализовывать приоритеты	Устойчивый экономический рост
Донорский потенциал	Открытость политики	Реализовывать проекты	Устранение барьеров
Достигнуто понимание	Открытые обсуждения	Реальное улучшение условий	Устранение неравенства
Достигнуто продвижение	Открыть новые каналы сотрудничества	Реальные плоды	Участвовать в работе
Достигнутые договоренности	Отметить важную роль	региональное экономическое сотрудничество	Учесть в полной мере
Достигнутые межгосударственные договоренности	отметить возможности	Регулярная основа	Учесть приоритеты
Достигнутые результаты	Отметить особое значение	Результативная работа	Учитывать нормы и правила
Достигнутый прогресс	Отметить прогресс	Результативный	Учтены в полной мере
Достигнуть договоренности	Отметить результаты	Рекорд	Учтены все предложения
Достижение	Отметить усилия	рекордные показатели роста	Финансовая безопасность
Достижение итога	Отмечен прогресс	Реструктуризация	Финансовая и материальная помощь
Достижение компромисса	Отношения укрепляются	Решающая роль	Формирование Единого экономического пространства
Достижение компромиссов	Отстаивание международно-правовых принципов	Решение актуальных задач	Формирование партнерских отношений
Достижение лучшего понимания	Отстаивание прав	Решение международных проблем	Функционирование договоренности
Достижение переговорной развязки	Отход от противостояния	Решение проблем	Хорошая основа
Достижение поставленной задачи	Охрана мирового наследия	Российский вклад	Хорошая работа
Достижение универсализации	Охрана прав	Рост товарооборота	Хорошие перспективы
Достижение целей	оценки совпадают	Рубикон	Хороший потенциал
Достичь мирных договоренностей	Очень важный и своевременный	С готовностью воспринять	Хороший сигнал
Достойный труд	Ощутимые результаты	с одобрением	Хорошо известный

Дружеская атмосфера	партнерские отношения	с одобрением отметить	Ценности
Дружеское взаимопонимание	Партнерство	С удовлетворением отметить	Ценности демократии
Дружественный народ	Первостепенное значение	с удовлетворением отмечают	Центральная роль
Дух сотрудничества	Первый в истории	С удовольствием	Центральный документ
Единодушно поддержать	Передовой опыт	С учетом интересов	Цивилизованное русло
Желание обеспечить	Переломить негативную динамику	Самый продуктивный саммит	Честные обсуждения
Жизненно важный	Перспективная область	Сбалансированные результаты	Четкая организация
Жизнеспособный	Перспективная сфера	сбалансированный подход	Четко определять задачу
Задать конструктивный тон	Перспективное направление	сбалансированный характер	Четко прочерчены направления
Задачи на будущее	перспективность сотрудничества	Сближение позиций	Чувство ответственности
Заинтересованно	Перспективные направления	Сблизить подходы	Широкие возможности
Заинтересованное участие	Перспективные тенденции	Своевременный жест	Широкие возможности влияния
Заинтересованный обмен	Перспективы развития	Сдвинуть с мертвой точки	Широкий круг вопросов
Заинтересованный обмен мнениями	Плодотворная беседа	Сдвинуться с мертвой точки	Широкий круг партнеров
Закладывание основ	Плодотворная дискуссия	Сделан шаг вперед	Широкий позитивный резонанс
Закрепить	Плодотворно развивалось	Сделать важный шаг	Широкий спектр
Закрепить обязательства	Плодотворное сотрудничество	Сделать выбор в пользу	Широкий спектр вопросов
Закрепить позиции	Плодотворные переговоры	Сделать шаг вперед	Широко обсуждаться
Закрепление на позициях	плодотворный	Сесть за стол переговоров	Широкое международное сотрудничество
Закреплены ведущие позиции	По инициативе России	Сильная экономика	Эволюция обстановки
Закрепляются права	По нарастающей	системообразующим фактором	Экономические преимущества
Залог перспективности	Победа	Скоординированные меры	Экономический потенциал
Залог успеха	поблагодарил коллектив	Скорейшая реализация	Экономический рост
Заметное место	Поблагодарить	Скорейшее вступление в силу	Экономическое развитие

Заметное развитие	Повысить возможности	Скорейшее вхождение	Экономическое сотрудничество
Занимать прочные позиции	Повысить эффективность	Скорейшее присоединение	Эксклюзивный клуб
Занимать сходные позиции	Повышение дееспособности	Скорректировать положения	Энергично выступать
Заниматься разработкой	Повышение дисциплины	Слаженная координация работы	Энергично содействовать
Занять взвешенную позицию	Повышение жизнеспособности	Следовать предписаниям	Энергичные усилия
Занять сбалансированную позицию	Повышение защищенности	следует усиливать роль	Этап мобилизации усилий
Запуск переговорного процесса	Повышение качества	Сложить оружие	Эффективная деятельность
Запуск переговоров	Повышение качества жизни	Служить интересам солидарности	Эффективная реализация
Запуск процесса	Повышение международного профиля	Смотреть с большим оптимизмом	Эффективные усилия
Запустить механизм реализации	Повышение мобильности	Снижение напряженности	Эффективно противостоять
Заслуживать особого внимания	Повышение осведомленности	Снижение потребительских цен	Эффективно сотрудничать
Защита законных интересов	Повышение предсказуемости	Снизить затраты	Эффективное использование
Защита интеллектуальной собственности	Повышение прозрачности	Снятие пошлин	Эффективное использование политики
Защита информации	Повышение профиля	соблюдение норм	Эффективное партнерство
Защищать интересы	Повышение роли	Соблюдение прав	Эффективное развитие
Значение возрастает	Повышение стабильности	Соблюдение прав человека	Эффективное сотрудничество
Значительно активизироваться	Повышение транспарентности	Соблюдение территориальной целостности	Эффективное управление
Значительно возрости	Повышение уровня жизни	Соблюдение четких и обязательных условий	Эффективность проводимой работы
Значительно вырасти	Повышение уровня знаний	Событие года	Эффективные международные рамки
Значительно продвинуться	Повышение энергоэффективности	Совершенствование	Эффективные меры

Значительно расширить	Повышение эффективности	Совершенствование архитектуры безопасности	Эффективные усилия
Значительно укрепиться	Повышение эффективности работы	Совершенствование деятельности	Эффективный
Значительное достижение	повышенный интерес	Совершенствование законодательства	Эффективный механизм
Значительные результаты	Поддержание мира	Совершенствование интеграционных процессов	Эффективным образом
Значительные успехи	поддержать инициативу	Совершенствование международно-правовой базы	Являться важной задачей
Значительный	Поддерживать	Совершенствование норм	Являться важным
Значительный вклад	Поддерживать активный диалог	Совершенствование отношений	Являться каналом интеграции
Значительный потенциал	Поддерживать контакты	Совершенствование регулирования	Являться основой
Играть балансирующую роль	Поддерживать политический диалог	Совершенствование систем	Являться приоритетом
Играть важную роль	поддерживать продолжение	Совершенствование сотрудничества	Являться стержнем
Играть значительную роль	поддерживать работу	Совершенствовать механизмы помощи	Являться стратегическим ресурсом
Играть инициативную роль	Поддерживать равные контакты	Совершенствоваться	Являться экспертом
Играть роль важного инструмента	Поддерживать стремление	совместное изучение	
Играть существенную роль	Поддерживать тесные связи	Совместный	
Negative			
Агрессия	Линия на слом	отсутствие готовности	Связи с «Аль-Каидой»
Акты ядерного терроризма	Масштабная опасность	Отсутствие прогресса	Сдержанное отношение
Антироссийская орбита	международная обстановка остается сложной	Отсутствие терпимости	Сдерживание России
Антироссийская риторика	международного терроризма	Отягощен	Сдерживать
Антисемитизм	Международные преступления	Отягощенный	Сексуальная эксплуатация
Безлицензионное производство оружия	Международный терроризм	Переговоры приостановлены	Сепаратизм

Безнадзорность	Межэтнический конфликт	переживать кризис	Сепаратистская деятельность
Безработица	Мешать	Переписать историю	Серьезное воздействие
Беспризорность	Навязать	пересмотр	серьезные озабоченности
Биологическое оружие	Навязывание независимости	Период стагнации	Серьезные проблемы
Ближневосточный кризис	Надуманые предлоги	Пиратство	Серьезные риски
Блокада	Наихудшие формы детского труда	Питать враждебные намерения	Серьезные трудности
блокировать	Наркодельцы	Победа в холодной войне	Серьезный кризис
Блокировать разворот	Наркопоток	Подвергнуть критике	Скрытая повестка дня
Блоковая дисциплина	Наркотрафик	Подготовка и вербовка террористов	Сложная обстановка
Блоковая конфронтация	Нарушать положения Конвенции	Подлежать налогообложению	Сложная ситуация
Блоковая политика	Насилие	подменить	Слом стратегической стабильности
Болезненная реакция	Насильственные проявления экстремизма	Подменить международные механизмы	Случаи дискриминации профсозов
Болезненность процесса	не были начаты переговоры	подрыв	Снижение ликвидности
Быть виновным	Не в состоянии	Подрыв межгосударственного характера	Состояние застоя
Быть вынужденным	не в состоянии вести разговор	Подрыв стабильности	Соучастники террористических актов
Быть меньше среднего значения	Не отвечать возможностям	Подстрекательство к террору	сохранялись расхождения
Быть не в состоянии	Не просматривать перспективу	политизация	Сохраняющиеся противоречия
В нарушение	не смог согласовать	Политизация проблем	Социально-экономические проблемы
Взрывоопасная ситуация	не снижается уровень угроз	Политические проблемы	Социально-экономические различия
Внутреполитический кризис	Не считаем необходимым	Помешать	Социальные проблемы
Внутриполитический кризис	Не удалось	помешать принятию	Спад
Возникающие угрозы	Не удастся	Помешать решению	Споры

Возникновение группировок	Неблагоприятная атмосфера	Попытка переписать историю	Споры и разногласия
Возникновение разделительных линий	Невозможно	Попытки размыть	Способствовать распространению терроризма
Волюнтаристская деятельность	Невозможность	Попытки США воспрепятствовать	ставят под угрозу
Вооруженные конфликты	Невысокий авторитет	Пострадавший	ставящие под угрозу
Вооруженный конфликт	Негативно	Потенциальная угроза стабильности	Ставящий под угрозу
враждебные акции	Негативно влиять	Потери гражданского населения	Стереотипы
Враждебный	негативно сказаться	предотвратить принятие решений	Стереотипы войны
Всплеск насилия	Негативно сказываться	Предотвращение	Стихийные бедствия
Вызревание	Негативное влияние	Представлять опасность	Страдания невинных людей
Вызывать опасения	Негативное воздействие	Представлять угрозу	Стратегические проблемы
Вынужденная мера	Негативные тенденции	представляют потенциальную угрозу	Структуры международного терроризма
Выражать озабоченность	Негативный образ	Предъявить исторический счет	Существенный ущерб
выражают озабоченность	Негативный фон	Преступления	Террор
выразить сожаление	Неготовность	Преступность	Терроризм
Выросла задолженность	Неготовность к диалогу	Приверженность идеологии	Терроризма
Высокие затраты	Неграмотность	Применять военную силу	Террористическая деятельность
Высокий инвестиционный риск	Нежелание есовцев	Принизить	Террористическая идеология
Выступить с резкой критикой	Нежелание идти на встречу	Принцип «донор-получатель»	Террористическая угроза
Вытеснение	Нежелание стран НАТО	Приостановить действие	Террористические организации
Героизация нацистов	Независимое усыновление	Природные и техногенные катастрофы	Террористы
Гибель	Незаконный оборот наркотиков	Приходится сталкиваться	Торговля женщинами
Глобальная бедность	Незаконный оборот наркотических средств	Причастный к деятельности	Торговля оружием

Глобальные проблемы	Незаконный оборот психотропных веществ	Проамериканский курс	торможение процесса
Гонка вооружений	Нелегальная миграция	Проблема	Тормозить
Грубо нарушать	Немалые трудности	Проблема безопасности вложений	Тормозить отношения
двойные стандарты	Неоправданные запреты	Проблемные положения	Тормозить преобразование
Депопуляционные процессы	Неоправданные ограничения	Проблемные случаи	Тормозить развитие
Дестабилизирующий	Неоправданные потери	проблемой является	Тормозящий
Деструктивная линия	Неопределенность	Проблемы адаптации	Трагический опыт
Деструктивная позиция	Неприяние	Проблемы в области безопасности	Транзакционные издержки
Деструктивный	непростая ситуация	Провокационные действия	Трансграничная преступность
Детская порнография	Непростое дело	продолжаются потрясения	Транснациональная организованная преступность
Детская проституция	Непростой медийный фон	Проигнорировать решения	Транснациональная преступность
Дефицит доверия	Непростой партнер	Проникновение	Тропический шторм
Дисбаланс	Непростой регион	Проникновение внерегиональных сил	Труднее
Дискриминация отечественных инвесторов	непростой фон	Пропаганда террора	Трудоемкая работа
Дискриминация русскоязычных жителей	Непростые развязки	Просроченные долги	Угрожать
Диспропорции	Неравноправное положение России	Проституция	Угрожать безопасности
Долги населения	Нерегулированность	противодействовать планам	угроза
Долговые кризисы	Несанкционированное приобретение ядерных материалов	Противодействовать попыткам	Угроза агрессии
Долгосрочные проблемы	Несанкционированные приобретение ядерных технологий	противоречивые тенденции	Угроза безопасности
Жесткая критика	Несвоевременный	Противоречивый	Угроза международному миру
Жесткое реагирование	Нестабильность	Противоречить	Угроза существующему международному правовому порядку
Заблокированный	нестабильность неопределенность	Противоречить оборонным интересам	Угроза терроризма

Зависимость	Нести отпечаток идеологии	Противоречить экономическим интересам	Угрозы
Задолженность	Низкий уровень	Противостоящие стороны	Угрозы безопасности
Замедлить динамику	Низкий уровень развития	Прямая угроза	Угрозы здоровью
Замороженные конфликты	низкий уровень развития инфраструктуры	Радикализация	Угрозы компьютерной безопасности
Занимать последнее место	Новые вызовы и угрозы	Радиоактивное загрязнение	Угрозы ракетного распространения
Захват заложников	Нынешняя обстановка	Развертывать систему противоракетной обороны	Угрозы терроризма
Значительное сокращение	Обвиняемые в шпионаже	Разделять серьезные озабоченности	Угрозы террористического характера
Зона вооруженных столкновений	Обострившаяся ситуация	Размещение оружия	Удорожание стоимости
Зона конфликта	Ограничение на передвижение	размыть	Ужесточение
Идеологизированные конструкции	Ограничивать право профсоюзов	Ракетные угрозы	Ужесточиться
Идеологизированный подход	Односторонние планы США	Раскол мира	Узкий круг
Идеологическая поддержка терроризма	Односторонние подходы	Расколоть мир	Упустить момент
Идеологические предрассудки	Односторонние шаги	Расовая нетерпимость	Упущена возможность
Идеологическое противостояние	Озабоченность	Распространение баллистических ракет	Упущенная возможность
Избыточные права	Опасная зона	Распространение лихорадки	Уровень не снижается
Иностранное вмешательство	Опасности	Распространение ОМУ	Установка на «сдерживание»
Инструмент давления	Опасность	Распространение оружия	Утративший силу
Искусственные временные ограничения	Опора на военную мощь	Распространение средств массового уничтожения	Ухудшающаяся ситуация
Исламофобия	Организованная транснациональная преступность	Распространение терроризма	Уязвимый
Использование Интернета экстремистскими группировками	Оргпреступность	Распространение террористической идеологии	Финансирование терроризма

Использование террористами киберпространства	Осложнявшаяся ситуация	Распространение террористической пропаганды	Формирование замкнутых военных альянсов
Использовать для обработки ближайших союзников	Осложняющие элементы	Распространение тяжелого острого респираторного синдрома	Химоружие
Исход переговоров	оставалась сложной	Рассматривать российские озабоченности	Холодная война
Исходящие угрозы	Оставаться сложным	Раствление	Цифровой разрыв
К сожалению	Остающиеся проблемы	Реальная опасность	Чрезвычайные ситуации
Катастрофы	Острые проблемы	Реальная угроза	Широкий конфликт
Киберперступность	Острый кризис	Реальная угроза национальной безопасности	Экологические проблемы
Коммерческая сексуальная эксплуатация	Осуждать	Ревизия истории	Экологические риски
Контрафактная продукция	Отказ от внешнеполитической самостоятельности	Региональные конфликты	Экономические проблемы
Конфронтация	Отказываться	Религиозная нетерпимость	Экспортные субсидии
Коррупция	Отклонить	Реставрация режима талибов	Экстремизм
Кощунственная акция	Отмывание преступных доходов	Реставрация талибского режима	Экстремистская деятельность
Кризисные ситуации	Относиться негативно	Решить без участия России	Экстремисты
Критическая риторика	Отрицательное влияние	Риски	Энергетическая бедность
Критическое положение	Отставать	Сбой в мировой политике	Эпидемия
Крупные проблемы	отстаивать свою линию	Свержение правительств	Этнические проблемы
Крушение	Отсутствовать	Свертывание программы	Ядерные испытания
Ксенофобия	Отсутствие безопасной торговли	сворачивание сотрудничества	Ядерный терроризм
Легализация преступных доходов	Отсутствие возможностей	Сворачиваться	
Neutral			
Активно разяснять	Встреча экспертов	Определять принципы	Приступить к проработке
Анализ взаимодействия	Входить в состав	Определять цели и задачи	Продвигать тематику
Аналогичный	Выводы и предложения	Основываться	Продемонстрировать

Антитеррористическое направление	Выработать рекомендации	осуществить проект	Продолжать курс
Ассоциированные школы	высказать мнение	Осуществлять контроль	Продолжать усилия
Базовое образование	Высказаться в пользу	Отметить результаты	Продолжить работу
Ближайшая перспектива	Глобальная инициатива	Отслеживать ситуацию	Разделять соображения
Быть ответственным	Глобальный характер	Подвести итоги	Рассмотрение действия
В целях углубления	Гуманитарная сфера	Подготавливать для рассмотрения	Рассмотреть
Важно	Дальнейшее расширение	Поддержать инициативу	Расчеты и оценки
Ведение торговли	дать задание	Поддерживать	расширение взаимодействия
Взаимодействие	Дать оценку	Подтвердить благодарность	Ратифицировать
Виды деятельности	дать указание	Подтвердить приверженность	Реагирование
Виды поставок	Делать акцент	Подтвердить решимость	Реагировать на угрозы
Включить в повестку дня	Дополнительного обсуждения требуют	Подчеркнуть	Реализация
Внести изменения	Завершать турне	Получить поддержку	реализация потенциала
Внести предложение	Заложить базу	Поручение президентов	Реализовать
Внести ряд предложений	Занять позицию	Поручить	Следует согласовать
Внимательно присматриваемся	зафиксирована необходимость	Предпринятые усилия	Способствовать
Военная мощь	Иметь отношение	Представлять для рассмотрения	Способствует становлению
возлагать надежды	Иметь представление	Приемные родители	Стабилизироваться
Вопросы создания	лучшее понимание	Призвать продолжать	ставить вопрос
Вопросы сотрудничества	Людские ресурсы	Признавать	Ставить цель
Всемирная встреча	Меры и действия	Признать	Удовлетворены
Всемирное наследие	Механизм внешнего сопровождения	Признать важность	Утвердить
Всемирные конференции	Наделить полномочиями	Прийти к выводу	Участвовать
Всемирный доклад	наращивать курс	Принадлежать	Формироваться
Всесторонний анализ	Находить понимание	Принять к сведению	
Встреча глав государств	Нести ответственность	Принять решение	
Встреча председателей	Оказать поддержку	Принять участие	