

At the beginning of Descartes's *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* we can find a call for secure knowledge which should be the point of departure for all meaningful human activities. The idea of secure knowledge is here gradually taking the form of *universa* } wisdom or 'good mind' (i.e. rationality), of method and *mathesis universalis*, of a doctrine of arrangement and measurement. An example of manifestation of rationality (and, hence, activity) of Cartesian knowledge is the rejection of Aristotelian-scholastic idea of the order of categories of *entia* as a speciously self-evident, immediately given clue to guide the cognitive process. In this context the rejection has also involved the notion of substance as a given absolute and that of accidentals, relative to it ('respecting' it). The old ontology does, however, assert itself in Descartes's method: the 'good mind' acquiring knowledge becomes the 'substance' of the world as being acquired knowledge of; all objects of knowledge, and, as such, of arrangement, 'respect' it, are 'accidental' to it. Nevertheless the 'good mind' acquiring knowledge (making arrangements) is, in its activity, not only the 'substance' (*ousía*) of the world as being acquired knowledge of but, in unity with this, also its principle, *arkhé*, cause. The Cartesian method is therefore not only 'ontology' or 'onto-logy' but it is 'onto-theo-logy' of the world as being acquired knowledge of (or, alternatively, its *onto* = *theo* = *logy*).- The onto-theo-logy of cognition leads at the same time to such a conception of (finite) being (to such a form of the ontology proper) as implies that on the one hand the 'good mind' presents itself as an active, spontaneous substance (*ingenium*) and, on the other, material nature as a passive mathematoid extension.