

Abstract

The thesis analyses two modern surprise attacks - the 1982 Falklands War between Argentina and Great Britain; and the 2016 April War (also known as the Four Days War) among Azerbaijan, Armenia, and *de facto* Republic of Nagorno Karabakh. Using literature of the Theory of Surprise, the study tries to determine the reasons why states chose the strategy of surprise, and how did they decide on the timing of the wars. It also displays the shortcomings inherent in the strategy of surprise, and points out where the mistakes, false assumptions of the belligerents in these two cases studies lay. Finally, a comparative study of the cases highlights the ideas that can improve a state's preparedness and hopefully avoid surprise attacks in the future.

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