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**Preconditions of Democracy:
How forced democratization
depends on transformation and
state-building characteristics**

Master thesis

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Abstract

Military Democratic Intervention is a common strategy of foreign interaction especially since World War II. However, the question why some interventions are successful in implementing democracy and others are still not answered satisfactorily. Whereas the scientific debate so far focused on mission specific characteristics including variables such as personnel or financial equipment of interventions, the underlying assumption of this work is that external democratized countries need to exhibit the same preconditions as countries internally democratized. Therefore, the transition and state-building literature is investigated and five clusters of preconditions for successful democratization is developed. With a Qualitative Comparative Analysis, a dataset comprising 27 cases, eight variables and the outcome variable, the author provides evidence for the significance of all five clusters. Most importantly, the level of human development and modernization as well as the predecessor regime type and the experience with democratic experience stand out. Further, the combination of the variables of high GDP, an ethnically homogeneous society and a democratically ruled neighborhood are identified as variables sufficiently influencing successful democratization after a military intervention. These results confirm the theoretical assumptions of the transition and state building literature which were not tested on external democratized countries so far.

Keywords

democracy, democratization, democratic intervention, military intervention, state-building, transition, transformation

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Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague, 28.07.2020

Michael Kraft



Contens

1. INTRODUCTION	4
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	7
2.1 HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION	7
2.2 DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY	9
2.3 DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION	10
2.4 THE IMPACT OF MDIS	13
2.5 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW	19
3. THEORY	20
3.1 DEFINITIONS	21
3.1.1 <i>Military Democratic Intervention</i>	21
3.1.2 <i>Democracy</i>	23
3.2 TRANSITION LITERATURE	25
3.3 CLUSTERS OF SUCCESSFUL DEMOCRATIZATION	28
3.3.1 <i>Socio-economic Development and Modernization</i>	28
3.3.2 <i>Socio-cultural Factors</i>	31
3.3.3 <i>Type of Predecessor Regime and Transition Mode</i>	32
3.3.4 <i>State Capacity and Nation-Building</i>	36
3.3.5 <i>International Context</i>	38
4. METHODOLOGY	41
4.1 CASE SELECTION.....	41
4.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE METHOD OF QCA	43
5. ANALYSIS	46
5.1 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE VARIABLES	46
5.1.1 <i>Dependent Variable: Democratization</i>	46
5.1.2 <i>Variables of Socio-economic Development and Modernization</i>	49
5.1.3 <i>Variables of Socio-cultural Conditions</i>	56
5.1.4 <i>Predecessor Regime and Transition Mode</i>	57
5.1.5 <i>State Capacity and Nation Building</i>	64
5.1.6 <i>International Context</i>	68
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS	72
5.3 RESULTS	72
5.3.1 <i>Analysis of Necessary Conditions</i>	73
5.3.2 <i>Analysis of Sufficient Conditions</i>	74
5.4 DISCUSSION	84
5.5 LIMITATIONS.....	90
6. CONCLUSION	93
BIBLIOGRAPHY	96
APPENDIX	114

List of Figures

FIGURE 1. <i>FOREIGN IMPOSITIONS OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 1555-1999 (EXCLUDING COUNTER-IMPOSITIONS)</i>	7
FIGURE 2. <i>STRATEGIC QUESTIONS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION</i>	12
FIGURE 3. <i>EMBEDDED DEMOCRACY</i>	24
FIGURE 4. <i>HISTORICAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX FROM 1938 UNTIL 2005</i>	53
FIGURE 5. <i>XY-PLOT DEMOCRACY - VARIABLE 5 INTERVENTION TYPE</i>	74

List of Tables

TABLE 1. <i>MAJOR MODERN REGIME IDEAL TYPES AND THEIR DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS</i>	33
TABLE 2. <i>OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEMOCRACY</i>	47
TABLE 3. <i>DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEMOCRACY</i>	49
TABLE 4. <i>VARIABLE 1 GDP</i>	51
TABLE 5. <i>VARIABLE 2 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</i>	55
TABLE 6. <i>VARIABLE 3 ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION</i>	57
TABLE 7. <i>OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLE 4 PREDECESSOR REGIME</i>	58
TABLE 8. <i>VARIABLE 4 PREDECESSOR REGIME TYPE</i>	60
TABLE 9. <i>OPERATIONALIZATION FOR VARIABLE 5 INTERVENTION TYPE</i>	63
TABLE 10. <i>VARIABLE 5 TRANSITION MODE</i>	64
TABLE 11. <i>VARIABLE 6 DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE</i>	67
TABLE 12. <i>VARIABLE 7 DEMOCRATIC NEIGHBORHOOD</i>	69
TABLE 13. <i>VARIABLE 8 REGIONAL STABILITY</i>	71
TABLE 14. <i>DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES</i>	72
TABLE 15. <i>ANALYSIS OF NECESSARY CONDITIONS</i>	73
TABLE 16. <i>TRUTH TABLE</i>	77
TABLE 17. <i>TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY</i>	79
TABLE 18. <i>TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS INTERMEDIATE STRATEGY</i>	79
TABLE 19. <i>TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS PARSIMONIOUS STRATEGY</i>	80
TABLE 20. <i>PARSIMONIOUS STRATEGY. CONFIGUARTIONS AND COUNTRY MEMBERSHIPS</i>	82

List of Appendices

APPENDIX TABLE 1. <i>REGIME CHARACTERISTICS</i>	114
APPENDIX TABLE 2. <i>REGIONAL STABILITY</i>	129
APPENDIX TABLE 3. <i>DEMOCRATIC NEIGHBORHOOD IN THE YEAR OF INTERVENTION</i>	133
APPENDIX TABLE 4. <i>ROBUSTNESS CHECK 1</i>	135
APPENDIX TABLE 5. <i>ROBUSTNESS CHECK 2</i>	135

List of Abbreviations

ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EU	European Union
GB	Great Britain
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIEF	Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization
HIHD	Historical Index of Humand Development
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMI	International Military Intervention
MDI	Military Democratic Intervention
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America

1. Introduction

Over 600,000 Iraqis lost their lives to the forced democratization effort by the coalition of the willing led by the US from the year 2003 on (Burnham, Lafta, Doocy, & Roberts, 2006). Whereas researchers at the beginning of the 21st century argued for democracy promotion as an international norm (McFaul, 2004), this effort resulted in a deadly situation for Iraqi citizens and a chaotic situation in the country itself and in the region as a whole. The invasion in Iraq can be understood as the peak of a development started in the late 1980s when international democracy promotion by all means significantly increased (Burnell, 2007). This development was fueled by the crumbling of authoritarian regimes around the world changing the zeitgeist in this time (Cederman, Hug, & Wenger, 2008). While autocratic regimes here and there were replaced by (semi-)democratic governments (e.g. Portugal and Ecuador), the international community of liberal democracies thought to help make the spread of democracy happen by conducting military democratic interventions (MDIs) in those countries which rejected the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1993).

Therefore, the Iraqi invasion in 2003 was conducted with an explicit reference to the German invasion back in 1945 in order to point to the just cause and the success such an intervention can have (Grimm, 2010b). However, as history has shown, the outcome of the interventions in Germany and Iraq are not comparable at all despite the fact that the reconstruction milestones in Iraq were reached even faster than in Germany almost 60 years before (CPA, 2004). The reason for this assessment lies in the approach that politics as well as research have followed over decades. In this tradition, it was always a question of equipment whether an intervention could be conducted successfully. The number of deployed military, police and civil personnel as well as the amount of money spent for a mission were conventional variables with which the success of MDIs was examined (Pei & Kasper, 2003). Although the impact of those variables is clear, interventions still fail to build up stable and enduring democracies.

This is why this work sets the focus different than the scientific community has done so far. Instead of emphasizing mission specific characteristics as the amount of money or deployed personnel, the argument of this work focuses on the target country itself and therefore investigates preconditions comprising non-mission specific characteristics.

Therefore, the author attempts to answer the following research question: What is the relationship between military interventions aimed at democratization, preconditions comprising country characteristics and missions' surroundings and successful democratization? The theoretical starting point for the work is the literature on transition and state-building. Research in this area has already developed preconditions for successful democratization which are, however, not applied or tested for forced democratization efforts. The author assumes that democratization - no matter if it is an internally or externally driven process - is dependent on the same variables and preconditions. The conditions for success and failure of installing democracy are the same, whether the own population of a country decides to topple its non-democratic government, or an external power conducts an MDI aimed at democratization. This is why the author assumes that if certain external conditions influence the democratization of countries, then these conditions also influence the success of military interventions aimed at democratization. These external conditions are identified by the transition and state building literature and comprise non-mission specific characteristics.

This relation is tested in a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) research approach. This method is an alternative to purely quantitative or qualitative approaches and bridges the gap between variable- and case-focused analyses (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013; Wagemann & Siewert, 2018). In a multistage process, QCA identifies necessary as well as sufficient conditions influencing the outcome. In this analysis, the success of democratization measured by the democracy levels a target country reaches ten years after an intervention, constitutes the dependent variable. It is then confronted with a total of eight variables identified in the literature as possibly influencing successful democratization. This research design is applied to an original dataset comprising 27 MDIs from World War II until 2008. Whereas the analysis provides no necessary conditions for successful democratization in the course of MDIs, five configurations are identified as sufficient. In addition to three single variables, namely the level of human development, the type of predecessor regime and democratic experience, two further configurations of variables are presented as sufficient. However, only one of the configurations mentioned before, withstands a robustness check. High gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, a low degree of ethnic fractionalization and a democratic neighborhood combined together also sufficiently affect the outcome of democratization positively. In sum, all five identified clusters are covered by the results

of the QCA, confirming the assumption that the variables influencing internal-driven democratization also affect the success of external-driven democratization.


The research work proceeds as follows. After a short introduction to MDIs, the literature on their success and failure is outlined. Whereas parts of the literature try to answer the questions if MDIs are successful or not, other researchers additionally ask why this is the case and present specific variables having an impact on the outcome. Following this, it presents the explanation of the main argument of the paper, including the introduction of the five clusters affecting democratization identified in the transition and state-building literature. The methodological part explains the basics of QCA and leads over to the analysis and consequently the implementation of the QCA. After describing the methodology, the results are presented, interpreted and contextualized. A subsequent section on the limitations dealing with the shortcomings and comprises a robustness check complements the work, before the conclusion in the end sums up the most important findings and provides an outlook for further research.

2. Literature Review

2.1 History of Foreign Intervention

Countries attempting to influence other countries on an institutional level is not a special development of the last 100 years. Since the beginning of the modern era, actions aiming at gaining influence in a neighbor country through the promotion of domestic institutions are a common way of foreign interaction (Figure 1) (Owen, 2002). These findings are generally in line with the argumentation by Hoffmann (2007), stating that from a historical perspective democracies often tried to gain internal legitimization through foreign wars by justifying them for humanitarian reasons or blueprints for lasting peace.

Figure 1. *Foreign Impositions of Domestic Institutions 1555-1999 (excluding counter-impositions)*



Source: Owen (2002, p. 390)

Disregarding the long history of democratization efforts, most research within the field of political science focused on a much more recent time period both because of availability of comprehensive data and the increasing connection of foreign military interventions to democratization. This connection is not only built by a research field using topic-overarching insights but also by policymakers themselves.

US Presidents early started to justify their foreign military interventions with a democratic intention. Wilson's Declaration of War Message to Congress (1917) already contained the statement that "[t]he world must be made safe for democracy". Just a few years before that, Wilson had sent his troops to the US' neighbor country of Mexico "to teach the Mexicans the meaning of democracy" (cited in Schlesinger, 1992, p. 20). Similar, the justification for the participation in the Second World War was based on democratic arguments brought forward by President Roosevelt (Merkel, 2008). Several decades later, Reagan's defending of the US intervention in Lebanon followed this line of argumentation when he asked: "If America were to walk away from Lebanon, what chance would there be for a negotiated settlement producing a unified, democratic Lebanon" (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983, p. 2274 cited in Meernik, 1996, p. 391). Likewise, the intervention in Grenada was justified by Reagan in the same speech as a "military operation to restore order and democracy" (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983, p. 2274 cited in Meernik, 1996, p. 391). Similarly, the actions in Panama and Haiti were vindicated by the US Presidents Bush und Clinton with reference to democracy promotion (Byers & Chesterman, 2000; Carothers, 1994).

Aside from the US, other national and supranational actors also display shifts towards democracy promotion through changes within their structures, the interpretation thereof and more practically through their behavior. While the United Nations (UN) in its first years highlighted the right of self-determination of their member countries, the interpretation moved to actively advocate the democratization of intra- and inter-state relations and the democratic design of political regulatory structures after the decolonization in the 1960s (Franck, 1992). Later, then UN-Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1995, p. 3) developed the idea of democracy being "one of the pillars on which a more peaceful, more equitable and more secure world can be built". Only one year later, the UN under Boutros-Ghali (1996) emphasized its ambitions in the process of democratization within the global scope and highlighted the connection between the two concepts of democracy and peace by publishing "An Agenda for Democratization". Since its foundation, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also builds its democracy promotion efforts on a strong link of democratic values to security (Jawad, 2008). Similarly, the European Union (EU) set a form of democracy promotion on the agenda by formulating the Copenhagen criteria in 1993 and furthermore established the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, trying to

build up relations with the countries in the close neighborhood of the EU on a basis of “mutual commitment to common values such as human rights and democracy” (Kelley, 2006, p. 30).

2.2 Democratic Peace Theory

The question arises, why the Western foreign policy has been marked by a strong connection to the promotion of democracy for several decades? A quote by President Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union Address allows to draw a deduction: “Democracies don't attack each other. Ultimately the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere” (cited in Kegley & Hermann, 1997, p. 93). Clearly, a strong believe in the theory of the Democratic Peace lies behind the foreign policy actions undertaken by US governments especially throughout the 20th century. The theory can be traced back to Kant's elaborations on “eternal peace” in the late 18th century (Kant, 1795/2005). In order to achieve eternal peace, there are three “definitive articles” necessary: first, every state should have a republican civil constitution; second, the law of nations should be found on a federation of free states; and third, national rights need to be transformed into a cosmopolitan right of world citizenship or a universal right of humanity (Merkel, 2008). In modern interpretation, the Kantian term of republics is commonly translated with democracies (Merkel, 2008). In turn, this leads to the general proposition that democracies do not fight wars against each other. This assumption was at the core of the scientific debate for a long time during the second half of the 20th century and is part of one of the most important and convincing findings in the international relations research (Levy, 1989; in Meernik, 1996).

Early research results by Rummel (1983) and Chan (1984) show that especially in the more recent history of foreign relations, the proposition that democracies do not war with each other seems to hold. This is substantiated by the findings of Russett (1995) confirming that between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War the assumption holds that democracies both show relatively few conflicts and do not fight wars with other democracies. The findings by Merkel (2008) allow for an extension of this period of democracies not fighting each other even beyond the end of the Cold War. Regularly emphasized post-1945 cases, disproving the theory of Democratic Peace

cannot serve as counterexamples as they do not constitute full-scale democracies and instead can be categorized rather as defective democracies (Merkel, 2004b).

These findings are traced back to both normative and constitutional constraints keeping democracies back from fighting wars with like-minded states (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999; Cederman, 2001; Davenport, 2004; Doyle, 1997; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Müller, 2008; Russett, 1995; Zinnes, 2004). Both the empirical findings and theoretical explanations can be adduced as evidence for the validity of the Democratic Peace theory, especially for the most recent time period following the end of World War II. Therefore, justifications for MDIs in other countries seem to be based on a compelling argument when referring to Democratic Peace theory. Nevertheless, it seems that the assumptions of the Democratic Peace theory do only apply for full-scale democracies in the time period after World War II. As a consequence, only interventions aimed at democratization reaching the final goal of a mature democracy can take recourse on justifications stemming from the Democratic Peace theory (see Merkel, 2008). Interventions leaving behind target countries stuck in the transition process to democracy cannot refer to Democratic Peace argumentation.

2.3 Different Concepts of Democracy Promotion

The promotion of democracy in other countries can be achieved through different methods. It can be conducted by constitutional, economic, political, cultural and military means applied by the various actors of democracy promotion mentioned before. While the approaches of international organizations as the EU or OSCE are normally understood as a softer one and make use of economic, political and cultural measures, the actions undertaken by individual nation states as the US or Great Britain (GB) are most often quoted as an example for the use of military actions in order to encourage democratic developments in the target country. This research work deals only with those cases of democracy promotion having a military component because those military missions attract attention in both the political decision-making circles and the public opinion (Faust & Garcia, 2013).

Nevertheless, military interventions are at least as diverse as democracy promotion per se. Besides the political decision-makers, research also makes use of different terms for the same concept. Therefore, in addition to broad terms such as (pro-)democratic


intervention and their differentiation of multilateral and unilateral actions, terms as for instance nation-building, state-building, peace operation, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace enforcement are used interchangeably (see e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Grimm, 2010a, 2015a; Gromes, 2011; Pei & Kasper, 2003). This sample of believed-synonyms for military democracy promotion efforts alone indicates that those efforts aim to achieve also other objectives such as good governance, peace and the rule of law (Grimm & Leininger, 2012). However, the synonymous use of those concepts is critical because of their diverging meaning. The terms peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement are borrowed from UN terminology defined in reports at the beginning of the 21st century (United Nations, 2000, 2004). Although they are often mixed up and used interchangeably, their meaning in terms of the equipment and capability applied in the various contexts of military interventions is significant. While peacemaking is generally connected to the deployment of personnel support in the negotiation of a ceasefire agreement or peace treaty, peacekeeping is linked to a military based monitoring of a ceasefire agreement (Grimm, 2010a). Extended possibilities in the context of multidimensional peace missions provide peacebuilding efforts, which supplement the military component with a civilian one and thus also offer the possibility of establishing a kind of transitional administration (Grimm, 2010a). Finally, the comprehensive use of “all necessary means” by a peace enforcement mission allows for active intervention in the fighting (Grimm, 2010a).

Apart from that, the terms nation-building and state-building are used synonymously especially in the English literature on democracy promotion although the concepts of nation and state are not fully congruent (Gromes, 2011). Regarding the building of a nation, one could think more of the establishment of a feeling of common identity within the population of a target country (S. Schmidt, 2015). In contrast to that, the creation of a state comprises the establishment of a state apparatus including political as well as administrative institutions (S. Schmidt, 2015).

Whatever type of military democracy promotion is used, they all share the same basic components. The developed framework by Merkel (2010) therefore asks the question, who promotes democracy where, when, how and with what effect in order to divide a mission into its distinct components (see Figure 2). By asking the question of “who

intervenes?” Merkel (2010) puts the actors of MDIs at the beginning of his analysis. Still, as this leaves room for a broad number of different combinations of actors possibly being engaged in democracy promotion, Merkel (2010) connects the question of “who?” with the interconnected coordination and legitimation problem. Because generally not all actors can be active in the same target country at the same time, the question arises who constitutes the best suited actor constellation and who has the highest legitimation to achieve success (Merkel, 2010).

Figure 2. *Strategic Questions of Democracy Promotion*



Source: Merkel (2010, p. 154). Translated and adapted.

With the second section and the question of “where to intervene?”, Merkel (2010) raises the selection problem. It describes the criteria under which a democracy promoter decides to become active in a certain country and therefore a comprehensive regime and society analysis is required. However, neither the academic analysis nor the practical implementation of democracy promotion provide an answer regarding selection criteria (Merkel, 2010). Instead, the deployed criteria seem to be different, contradictory and non-transparent (Burnell, 2004, 2005; Carothers, 1997, 1999; Schraeder, 2003).

The timing problem connected with the question of “when?” consists also of two dimensions. First, the intervener needs to clarify at what point in time the intervention should take place and second, how long the intervention should last (Merkel, 2010). Furthermore, the intervening actor has to take the situation in the target country into consideration in order to not only time the intervention optimally but also to adapt the best fitting approach to the current situation on ground. So, when to intervene also has an influence on what measures are taken and therefore affects the question of “how to intervene?” and the problem of prioritization (Merkel, 2010).

Finally, the impact analysis and therefore the connection of democracy promotion with effectiveness is labeled by Merkel (2010) as the “cardinal question”. Of course, the impact of any democracy promotion effort is dependent on the solution of the before introduced questions of selection, timing and prioritization.

2.4 The Impact of MDIs

The question of the impact of MDIs is covered broadly within the scientific debate. Because democratization efforts related to military actions is especially found in the US context there is also a high coverage of research on US interventions aimed at democratization. But even just for this special kind of interventions implemented by a single international actor, the identified and investigated cases vary to a significant degree. Meernik (1996) identifies 27 cases in the time period from 1948 to 1990 where US troops intervened and urged the building of democratic institutions. He cannot identify any increased levels of democracy after an US military intervention appeared and instead, the target countries remain on their democracy level as it was before the intervention (Meernik, 1996). This finding also applies despite the implementation of various ways of measuring democratic change. With his first measurement strategy, Meernik (1996) compares the three year average democratic rate before and after the intervention. As with its other two measurement strategies, the level of democracy is derived from the Polity Index. In his second approach, the author draws a comparison between the democracy rate for the intervention year and the average rate in the three years following the intervention (Meernik, 1996). Third, Meernik (1996) refrains from calculating an average democracy value and instead only compares the rating a target country receives in the year of the intervention with the democracy rate the country receives in the year after the intervention. His findings are, nevertheless, in contrast to

his theoretical assumptions, from which he concludes that “if the US military is in a position to dictate domestic policy in another nation, the US government should be able to establish whatever type of regime it desires” (Meernik, 1996, p. 393). However, the overall finding of the paper is limited by further findings providing more-detailed insights in the impact of US military interventions. By comparing target countries of US democratic interventions with countries not experienced an intervention, Meernik (1996) provides evidence that the former group is more likely to undergo a democratization process. Additionally, the analysis supports the assumption that if the US is truly obligated to the promotion of democracy, the efforts seem to be more successful (Meernik, 1996). This finding, nonetheless, should be treated with caution, as Meernik (1996) measures “truly commitment” with presidential statements and whether those contain the obligation for establishing democracy, which is an imprecise measurement method.

Focusing solely on the US as a democracy promoter, Hermann and Kegley (1998) also identify 89 US interventions between the end of World War II and 1992 whereof 64 fulfill the requirements to be labeled as reform-oriented intervention, meaning that they have a major purpose of protecting or promoting democracy. Therefore, while covering almost the same time periods, both Meernik (1996) and Hermann and Kegley (1998) work with a differing set of cases. Because of that, their findings differ too, as the latter ones find out that if a change in respect to the democratic level of a target country occurs it is most likely a change towards liberalization (Hermann & Kegley, 1998). In another study, the authors examined a much smaller time span from 1974 until 1991 and find out that although democratic interveners - in general and not the US as an individual object under investigation - are able to promote democratic reforms in target countries, these reform efforts do not lead to the establishment of stable democratic members of the international community (Kegley & Hermann, 1997).

Besides that, Pei and Kasper (2003) investigate 16 cases of nation building attempts where American policy makers wanted to promote or impose democratic institutions in a target country from 1898 until 2001 which again constitutes a completely different point of departure for further analysis as compared to other authors. In fact, the study of Pei and Kasper (2003) covers the largest time span but at the same time comprises the smallest number of cases. On the one hand, only four of the identified cases are

categorized as successes regarding their effect on democratization of the respective countries. On the other hand, there are eleven cases where US nation-building failed (Pei & Kasper, 2003). Surprisingly, all four cases of success can be found in the post-World War II period. For the remaining case of Afghanistan, the authors are not yet able to present evidence. With said that, Pei and Kasper (2003) conclude that US nation-building efforts exhibit a rather low overall success rate.

Regarding the research on UN missions, Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2011) provide evidence for a high and significant effect of multidimensional peace operations on the democracy level of the target country both two or five years after the end of the conflict. Similarly, the findings on peacekeeping operations (PKOs) by Heldt (2011) covering the time period from 1960 until 2005 reveal significant effects of PKOs on post-civil war transitions to democracy. Interestingly, those missions including democratization commitments have a 30 percent higher effect on democracy in target countries than compared to PKOs lacking such a commitment (Heldt, 2011). Apart from that, democratic interventions conducted by non-UN actors exhibit a significant negative effect on transitions towards democracy (Heldt, 2011).

Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre (2007) on the contrary, do not only focus on one actor of military interventions but include missions conducted by various actors. Their analysis covers the time period from 1960 to 1996. As the authors find out, there is a weak positive relationship between democratic interventions and democratization and this effect is also robust to the applied control variables (Gleditsch et al., 2007). But this is only true for the immediate year after the intervention takes place and therefore, an effect for the following intervention period or even for the aftermath of a military intervention is not identifiable (Gleditsch et al., 2007). Furthermore, those target countries experiencing democratization do not reach the level of mature or full democracy according to the applied Polity Index but instead remain in the middle category between autocracies and democracies, called semi-democracy or anocracy and therefore constitute rather defective democracies (Gleditsch et al., 2007; Merkel, Puhle, Croissant, Eicher, & Thiery, 2003). The success of military interventions therefore is rather short-termed as these semi-democracies are less stable and less durable (Gates & Strand, 2004; Gleditsch et al., 2007).

Pickering and Peceny (2006) - also examining the post-World War II period until 1996 - focus on missions conducted by three individual countries, namely the US, GB and France and missions conducted by the UN. Their results suggest that interventions performed by individual nation states do not promote democracy in the target country but UN Blue Helmets have an effect on the democratization of targeted countries (Pickering & Peceny, 2006). The authors recognize an increased Polity Index value does not automatically imply that the respective country in fact can be labeled a democracy. Therefore, besides their first dependent variable of political liberalization measuring just the movement up or down on the Polity scale, the authors include a second variable setting a threshold for being a democracy according to the used dataset which the country is not allowed to fall under for three consecutive years (Pickering & Peceny, 2006). It is worth mentioning, however, that these statistical results rely on a meager dataset with a relatively small number of cases possibly leading to a big influence of a small number of outliers.

In a comprehensive qualitative analysis, Grimm (2010a) researches military interventions aimed at democratization implemented by various actors in the time period from 1945 to 2008. Out of 27 identified cases, Grimm (2010a) can confirm only seven cases in which the democratization efforts were unrestrictedly successful whereas in four cases a democratic consolidation was not achieved ten years after the intervention. In this case, the research approach stands out as the application of a ten-year measurement for democratic consolidation is not used by other authors so far and allows to check whether democratic interventions have a positive and also long-lasting effect. However, this longer time frame results in the lack of final conclusions for the remaining 16 cases because those interventions dated back less than ten years at the time of data collection (Grimm, 2010a). In a work solely focusing on the time period after the end of the Cold War from 1990 until 2012, Grimm (2015b) summarizes the record of external democratization efforts following military interventions as “mixed at best”.

Yet a similar approach regarding the used time frame of measuring democratic consolidation is adapted by Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) although they find out that democratization efforts rarely promote democracy in the target countries and instead lead to an erosion. With a time period ranging from 1946 to 2001, the authors

aim to provide evidence for the whole post-World War II era. They check for democratization effects after five and ten years because of giving institutional effects enough time to develop (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006). Both time frames provide substantively equivalent results (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006). In addition to varying time frames under investigation, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) also distinguish between different democracy promoters, respectively the US, the UN and any other individual democracy as for example GB or France to ensure the identification of effects specifically belonging to one of the individual actors but also to multilateral combinations of each of the before mentioned actors. Therefore, the authors provide evidence that countries experiencing an UN intervention do not improve their democracy rate and in turn do worse as they would compared to their predicted performance without an UN mission on their territory (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006). Target countries of US interventions and of other democracies at the same time provide statistically similar results regarding their degree of democracy, namely that there is no effect measurable regarding a transition process towards democracy (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006).

Last, Fortna (2009) takes a more moderate stance stating that positive and negative effects of peace operations compensate for each other and therefore those missions have neither a positive nor a negative effect on the transition towards democratization of the target country. Even the analysis of various time spans ranging from one over two to five years or the controlling for different mission types do not lead to any further insights (Fortna, 2009).

Besides the research on the question of whether military democratization efforts are successful or not, there is also a scientific debate about which variables affect the successful democratization. When it comes to the identification of variables possibly influencing the outcome of a military democratic intervention, the works by Dobbins (2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005, 2008a, 2008b) are worth mentioning. His research focuses on military democratic interventions of three major international actors, namely the US, the UN and the European states. The comprehensive analyses investigate 22 cases in the form of comparative case analyses. Dobbins (2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005, 2008a, 2008b) tries to quantify the nation-building efforts and distinguishes between input and output measures. To the former, Dobbins (2003b) includes a personnel

component measured in terms of military and policy presence as well as a financial component, namely the total external support and in relation to the number of inhabitants and the GDP. The latter measures include post-conflict combat deaths, the timing of elections, changes of numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and changes in GDP per capita (Dobbins, 2003b). Quantifying those measures for all the identified cases provides considerable data to compare the individual interventions. The goal, especially of the first works, is the elaboration of lessons learned for the American intervention in Iraq (Dobbins, 2003a, 2003b). However, the later works, especially on the European-led interventions, focus on the identification of criteria of success. 16 of 22 cases are listed as successful intervention cases which can be traced back to a relatively unspecific measure of successful democratization. It is not the reliance on the single Freedom House Index which is problematic. But instead, one needs to pay attention regarding the fixed year of 2007 constituting the year where the Freedom House values for the target countries are found to be determining in order to state whether the intervention was successful or not (Dobbins, 2008a). This proceeding is incomprehensible because some missions already ended decades before the determining year of 2007 and other interventions started just a few years before this predetermined year and have not yet ended. Such approaches can therefore not constitute a valid basis for such analyses.

Furthermore, Hermann and Kegley (1998) find also various factors influencing the success or failure of a military democratic intervention. As their analysis shows, the successful US interventions tend to last less than one year and show extremely distributed numbers of US troops, meaning either few troops or a large commitment of ground troops (Hermann & Kegley, 1998). The successful interventions are also not built on a strategy of gunboat diplomacy and additionally show a high consensus in the American foreign policy elite regarding the necessity of using force in order to achieve democratization (Hermann & Kegley, 1998). Last, the authors find that the missions were successful when the international environment had democracy as the political system of choice (Hermann & Kegley, 1998). Other authors additionally highlight the discussion about whether it makes a difference if the intervention is conducted multi- or unilaterally or by an international organization (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006).

The majority of variables in military democratic intervention research regarding their success are connected to specific intervention criteria. Therefore, the focus of researchers so far was on controllable variables meaning the variables on which the intervening actor has influence (see Dobbins, 2003b). These include for example the personal as well as financial equipment of a mission. But also, other quantifiable measures as the time needed to hold the first democratic elections are gathered. On the one hand, this seems reasonable because it is theoretically proved but on the other hand at least empirically indefensible as the results of the research show no consistency in the findings so far. That is why another approach is needed in order to analyze military democratic interventions and the variables influencing the success and failure of those interventions. This approach is expected to be found in the transition and state building literature.

2.5 Summary of Literature Review

The literature review reveals that the findings are inconsistent as they provide evidence for significant and positive effects of democratic military interventions, negative effects and at the same time no effect at all. Although the literature provides substantive evidence for the validity of the Democratic Peace theorem constituting the point of departure of justifying military democratic interventions in a foreign country, this is not true for the effects of military democratic interventions themselves. The inconsistency of the findings illustrates that the variables examined so far are not sufficient to explain success or failure of military democratic interventions. The research leaves two possibilities: either there are variables influencing the outcome of an MDI which are not observed yet and therefore not investigated in detail or MDIs simply do not share common variables facilitating a democratic transition in a successful manner which could be identified in a scientific analysis no matter if it is quantitative or qualitative. However, before the latter option can be decided upon, the former must be subjected to an examination. Only when all possible variables have been examined regarding their influence on democratization and it has been ruled out that there are any common variables in these interventions that influence success, can the latter possibility be used as a potential explanation.

3. Theory

The work deals with the research question of what is the relationship between military interventions aimed at democratization, preconditions comprising country characteristics and missions' surroundings and successful democratization? Consequently, it is analyzed whether successful democratization after MDIs is affected by preconditions and missions' surroundings. The underlying argument assumes that countries experiencing forced democratization from another actor should not be considered and examined separately from those countries with an internal democratization process. So far, the literature has adapted different theoretical assumptions on the former group of democratizing countries (e.g. Merkel, 2008). The evidence in the literature is, however, not as clear as expected and instead leaves some questions unanswered. Sufficient and necessary conditions for the success and failure of an MDI are not identifiable yet. The argument developed here assumes that this is the reason because research until today focused on the variables that are not most influential for the outcome of a military democratic intervention. Most often, an MDI is highlighted in the democratization process and therefore, those mission variables characterizing the structure and implementation of each mission were in the focus of investigations. The argumentation in this work vindicates the view that the reason for success or failure of an MDI can be found at a much more fundamental level. Democratization processes initiated from outside are not fundamentally different from their counterparts, namely democratization processes initiated from inside the country itself. Literature on the transition of countries towards democracies has already developed variables influencing the success of this internal democratization process on a theoretical basis. Furthermore, it also proved those theoretical assumptions with empirical analyses providing evidence for the importance of those identified variables. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that if conditions identified by the transition literature influence the democratization of countries, then these conditions comprising non-mission specific characteristics should also influence the success of MDIs.

Before the transition literature can be outlined in a detailed manner it is necessary to develop definitions for main terms and concepts. Because researchers investigating military democratic interventions never relied on the same definitions of the key terms of their studies such as intervention and democracy, success and the distinction between

different types of conditions, the different results of the investigations of the almost seemingly identical objects of investigation reflect the possible varying interpretation of the concepts mentioned.

3.1 Definitions

3.1.1 Military Democratic Intervention

In general, lexica of political science understand the term intervention as an interference of a state, multiple states or international organizations in the domestic and/or foreign politics of another state in form of the implementation or threat of the use of military violence and political pressure (M. G. Schmidt, 2010). For Kınacıoğlu (2012, p. 30), the “breach of sovereignty and encroachment of independence” constitute the most important defining criteria within international law. In order to distinguish interventions from other forms of state activities, Rosenau (1968, 1969) identifies two features. On one hand, interventions have a bearing on the relationship between an intervening actor and the respective target country as an intervention constitutes a breach with the dominant paradigm of their mutual interaction (Rosenau, 1968, 1969). On the other hand, an intervention aims at the preservation or substitution of the target country’s political authority (Rosenau, 1968, 1969). Another definition is provided by Pickering (2002, p. 301) bringing in the military component who argues that “when national military personnel are purposefully and overtly dispatched into other sovereign states” one can speak of a military intervention and follows therefore the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset assumptions.

Yet another definitional approach is provided by Chatterjee and Scheid (2003) who develop three criteria determining an intervention. First, the appearance of an outside actor is mentioned what is similar to other definitions of this concept. As a second criterium, the authors highlight the application of pressure, coercion or actual violence (Chatterjee & Scheid, 2003). Because this research work deals specifically with military interventions, the addition of pressure and coercion as defining criteria would be problematic as these two measures need not necessarily be enforced by military means. Most interestingly, however, is the third criterium because Chatterjee and Scheid (2003) point out that actions deployed within an intervention should not be neither desired nor requested by the host country. This seems problematic precisely because *the* host country is in many cases where military interventions take place not

discernible anymore. Conflicts in general and especially civil wars often lead to situations where the legitimate representative of a certain country is not identifiable. Scientists could therefore be faced with the problem that a rejection of intervention measures cannot be detected because legitimate official actors such as a government are not present in the specific target country anymore. This is why Grimm (2010a) proposes to replace the lastly mentioned criteria and instead to include the de facto intrusion into the internal affairs of a state in a definition of the concept of intervention. It means the “externally demanded surrender of sovereignty and the intended exertion of influence on the target country with the aim of bringing about a lasting change in existing conditions” (Grimm, 2010a, pp. 36–37).

Additionally, because this research work deals with military interventions aimed at democratization there is need of the inclusion of a democratic component within the definition of an intervention. According to Grimm and Merkel (2008), a democratic intervention is characterized by the a priori declared goal of an intervening actor to democratize a target country and therefore to overturn a former autocratic regime. Again other authors use the term pro-democratic intervention and define it “as the use of armed force by one state or group of states against another state –the target state– with the intention to change the government of that state in general, and the character of the political and legal institutions in particular” (Kınacıoğlu, 2012, p. 31), apparently in the direction to democracy.

Empirically, Pei and Kasper (2003) apply three criteria to distinguish ordinary military interventions by the US from nation-building efforts which is the term the authors use synonymously to the term of MDI in the work in hand. First and foremost, regime change and survivability are highlighted as the core of any nation-building attempt (Pei & Kasper, 2003). Applied to the general, this means that an intervening actor should aim for either a regime change in the targeted country or support a regime which otherwise would collapse. In order to be able to reach this goal, the second criterion constitutes a long-term commitment and deployment of large numbers of ground troops (Pei & Kasper, 2003). However, the authors do not specify, where they set the threshold in order to define what time is needed to define an intervention time frame as long-term or which amount of military personnel is needed to approve it as large enough. Lastly, Pei and Kasper (2003) identify the simultaneity of a military and a

civilian component of an intervention due to the fact that intervening actors are deeply involved in a target country on an administrative level if the aim of democratization is addressed genuinely.

To summarize, an MDI consists of the following characteristics: (1) an outside actor (unilateral, multilateral, international organization) getting active in another country which is called the target country; (2) deployment of military personnel; (3) a priori aimed at regime change to democracy, supporting a democratic regime which would collapse without the intervening actor or complementing the military component with a civil one aimed at democratization.


3.1.2 Democracy

Furthermore, it is important to define the term of democracy because without knowing what is aimed to influence by the intervention one cannot say anything about the effect of it. For the term democracy as much as for the concept of intervention holds true that there are minimalistic ways of defining it as well as holistic approaches. Dahl's (1998) development of the polyarchy is definitely counted to the former group of definitions. There, democracy is understood as the self-government of the demos on the basis of equality of all human beings (Dahl, 1998). Therefore, democratic rule is characterized by the respect of the freedom of the people, mutual tolerance and recognition (Dahl, 1998). From an institutional point of view, democracy is marked by a political competition for votes and the right for all citizens to participate in political life (Dahl, 1998).

The institutional component of democracy definitions is even more highlighted in modern theories of democracy (Grimm, 2010a). According to this, democratic norms, rules and procedures determining the corridor of political actors' actions constitute the core of democracy (Grimm, 2010a). Three functions of democratic procedures can be identified: (1) they regulate the access to power with holding free and fair elections and control the contest for votes; (2) they regulate the formation of political preferences between elections and make fair decision-making processes possible; (3) they allow for the control of decision-makers through the people (Merkel, 2004b). According to Grimm (2010a), the rule-of-law constitutes an additional core value of modern democracy theories.

Merkel (2004a) developed a concept of “embedded democracy” comprising all those components in a single framework (see Figure 3). In the center is the core regime of free and fair elections. It is embedded in four further sub-regimes: political participation rights, civil rights, horizontal control of powers and an effective government power (Merkel, 2004a). A certain degree of statehood, the existence of a critical civil society and a certain degree of socio-economic development provide a framework for the stable functioning of the before mentioned sub-regimes (Merkel, 2004a). As a consequence thereof, Grimm (2010a) develops five areas central for democratic governance which should be promoted by external actors. These are: (1) the support of developing a democratic constitution which stipulates norms and procedures; (2) a catalogue of fundamental and civil rights, most often part of the constitution; (3) a democratic election regime specified in an electoral legislation and controlled through an independent election commission; (4) the establishment of checks and balances with the formation of executive, legislative and judicative institutions; and (5) a codified legal system including independent courts (Grimm, 2010a).

Figure 3. *Embedded Democracy*



Source: Merkel (2004a, p.8). Translated and adapted.

In summary it can be said, therefore, that a definition of the concept of democracy comprises two necessary areas. On the one hand, democracy consists of an institutional

component including a certain degree of the separation of powers among the key actors and also a functioning electoral system based on certain values. On the other hand, political rights and civil liberties constitute an important factor for the definition of democracy. The absence of one of the two components therefore means that one cannot speak of a fully-fledged democracy. These criteria are strongly related to the definition of success because a military democratic intervention as defined above can only be successful if it achieves the criteria for democracy defined above. Therefore, a successful military democratic intervention is present if the external actor is able to achieve success in the before outlined five areas central for democratic governance. How the concepts can be measured and recorded in figures is explained in more detail in the chapter on operationalization. At this point it should suffice to explain how the concepts are generally understood.

3.2 Transition Literature

The view on external democratization is naturally always oriented towards the external actors and their impact. This, however, stands in contrast to the central notion of political transformation research that democracy is rooted inside a country. According to this view, democracy is a process initiated and implemented from inside the country and is supported by relevant internal political actors (Rustow, 1970). Without an elite settlement, meaning the consensus of the political elite that democracy is the one and only option, a stable democracy is not conceivable (Burton, Gunther, & Higley, 1995). Conversely, these assumptions mean that the influence of external actors is rather minor (Grimm, 2010a). It can also be deduced from this that a thinking of an hour zero after war where a restart without regard to previous history of the target country is not expected to exist (see e.g. Gerhardt, 2005). Rather the opposite is true because after (civil) wars a slow transition from war towards peace is conducted and the political, economic and social system is reconstructed considering the remains of the old regime (Grimm, 2010a). This recourse-taking seems to be particularly difficult in eminently war-torn countries often categorized under the labels of failing or failed states, collapsed states, rogue states or states at risk (see e.g. Rotberg, 2004; Schneckener, 2004; Zartman, 1995). This is the reason why authors have moved on to a closer look at the state-building process and the challenges it poses.

Chesterman (2006) develops five historical-political contexts posing specific challenges to the formation of the state. Starting with the simpler contexts where outside actors are active in state building measures, the author sets the process of decolonization and the resulting independence of states (Chesterman, 2006). However, this does not mean that the transformation of a formerly colonial state in a fully capable independent state is an easy task for external actors. But according to Chesterman (2006), two factors facilitate the building of a functioning state in a decolonization context with which other state building efforts have to deal with: first, independence normally allows for a clear cut between the two conditions the state finds itself (dependence and independence) and second, the desirability of the outcome is universally accepted. Still on the rather easier side of the continuum, Chesterman (2006) sets the state building processes linked to territorial reorganization characterized by a certain degree of necessary clarity for the transformation phase followed by the third context of the administration of a state until it is able to hold elections. Both of these intervention typologies display a temporary component within their structure as the involvement of an external actor in the state building process is already limited in advance through certainly clear events and dates. Coming to the end of the continuum where the more complex state building interventions are located, Chesterman (2006) puts the activity within an ongoing peace process and the administration of a territory not yet designated to a specific end state and finally, a full scale administration mission on a territory where no original state structures are present anymore. For those two lastly mentioned contexts the clarity as an indicator for the complexity of an administration effort is rather low as the intervening countries do not know what to expect in the target country (Chesterman, 2006).

The approach indicates that there are indeed different initial situations for state building efforts of external actors. The challenges for political change in a certain country is historically dependent and provide the external actor with more advantageous or more disadvantageous features. In addition, however, it should not be overlooked that these factors mainly describe the difficulty of state building efforts on an institutional basis as it takes election or independence dates or other rather abstract characteristics into consideration. But in fact, political, economic and ethno-national conflicts occurring in post-war societies are completely neglected in that approach (Grimm, 2010a).

For this reason, Caplan's (2008) outline of five problem areas relevant for external interventions aimed at state building is taken into consideration. At the beginning, Caplan (2008) sets the lack of a public order and a lack of internal security. Therewith, and also with the second field of action which comprises the management of big flows of refugees and the reprocessing of massive displacements the framework gets some additional analytical levels compared to the one mentioned above (Caplan, 2008). Nevertheless, the institutional component is also included by defining the lack of a form of civil administration as a third problem area followed by the challenge of building stable political institutions (Caplan, 2008). Lastly, the problems related with the establishment of a functioning economic sector and developing it are mentioned (Caplan, 2008). The framework therefore comprises additional to the institutional category of problem area an economic and also a form of societal component. Intervening actors are faced with the task to further the development of the target country in these areas. The state of affairs in the target countries vary when it comes to the deterioration within the differing sectors. The level of destruction is highly dependent on the preceded war type but also on the point of departure before the conflict started is important. Both the preconditions and the development within the conflict therefore influence the situation which is to be found immediately when the intervention starts. Although the equipment of a certain intervention effort is decisive for the handling of the state building and democratization process it seems that the prevalent conditions are heavily influential on the outcome.

The centrality of the conception of clarity already outlined with the frameworks by Chesterman (2006) and Caplan (2008) is likewise part of several other approaches within research trying to work out influencing variables of military democratic interventions. Grimm and Merkel (2008) do this with a special focus on civil wars and the way they are coming to an end. A rather high chance of resolving the conflict and therefore providing a stable fundament for state building and democratization have civil wars ending with a clear victory for one side or civil wars ended by a universally respected peace agreement (Grimm & Merkel, 2008). By contrast, if peace negotiations cannot reach an agreement which is supported by the most important actors within the conflict or if the peace agreement is imposed by external actors than the chances for successful democratization are rather low (Grimm & Merkel, 2008). If it is possible to

make a clear cut after the war it seems to support the state building process and paves the way for a successful democratization.

Going one step further, the conditions essential for the functioning of democracy outlined by Brusis and Thiery (2003) comprise also societal factors. Besides the elite settlement over the governance form of democracy without any alternatives the authors mention the ability to choose favorable democratic institutions meaning a parliamentary democracy based on a proportional electoral system (Brusis & Thiery, 2003). Regarding the composition of the society the authors highlight the advantageous effect of an egalitarian social structure together with an ethnically relatively homogeneous and a strong civil society (Brusis & Thiery, 2003). Lastly, a first indication of the importance of the international context is given with the perspective to become a member within a stabilizing regional organization as for example the EU (Brusis & Thiery, 2003). The aspects highlight the dependence of a successful democratization of a post-war state on preconditions of the structure of both the state and the society of the respective target country.

3.3 Clusters of Successful Democratization

A framework comprising the international context as well as the economic, societal and institutional factors is therefore sought. Grimm (2010a) summarizes five “factor bunches” having influence on the success of liberalizing and consolidating war-torn democracies developed by different authors of the transition research (see Croissant, 2002; Merkel et al., 2003). These clusters include all dimensions worked out above and are combined within one single framework which therefore constitutes the optimal basis for the analysis aimed in the work in hand. The categorization is as follows: (1) the socio-economic development and modernization; (2) socio-cultural factors; (3) the type of predecessor regime and transition mode; (4) the degree of state capacity and nation-building; and (5) the international context. In the following, these clusters are described and complemented with findings by the research.

3.3.1 Socio-economic Development and Modernization

The importance of socio-economic factors lies in their effect on the power distribution between different societal groups (Grimm, 2010a). They therefore determine the range of power certain political actors have. A disparate distribution of socio-economic power

resources consequently leads to a disparate distribution of decisive power between varying societal groups (Croissant, 2002). According to Grimm (2010a), structural imbalances in favor of powerful elites emerge in those states where the socio-economic development level and the societal power dispersion is especially low. This in turn, contradicts the notion of democracy in the sense that a low socio-economic development provides certain societal groups with advantages within the democratic decision-making process.

Depending on the temporal extent and general intensity of the conflict it has a varying influence on the situation the intervention is faced with. One must therefore weigh up whether and to what extent such pre-conflict conditions influence the moment of the start of the intervention for each and every case. Vanhanen's (1983) approach of measuring power distributions within a society takes recourse on five variables developed in an earlier work (1979). The proportion of the urban population in the total population, the proportion of non-agricultural population, the number of students at universities and comparable institutions, the literacy rate and the proportion of family farms of the total area of holdings together constitute an index of power resources (Vanhanen, 1983). According to his approach, the socio-economic development level is not decisive alone but instead the distribution of power among different classes is essential what results in his conclusion that also poor countries can provide favorable environments for the emergence of democracies (Vanhanen, 1983).

Regarding the modernization component of the cluster other variables focusing on the economic performance of a target country are taken into consideration. Because of their increased vulnerability for economic crises and as a consequence thereof a higher risk of instability, countries with a lower level of development are more likely to collapse than their counterparts with higher levels of development (Przeworski, Cheibub, Limongi Neto, & Alvarez, 1996). Through a good economic performance, a country can also improve its socio-economic conditions as the middle class is strengthened and the education expands because the demand for skilled labor force increases (Linz & Stepan, 1997). A distinction between input and output factors is carried out by Linz and Stepan (1997) in order to differentiate between factors having an effect on different starting points for democratizing countries and factors stabilizing a newly established democratic system.

Therefore, the level of economic development of a certain country seems to play a decisive role in supporting a democratic system's stability (Lipset, 1959). In order to measure the economic conditions, Lipset (1959) highlights the industrialization, wealth, urbanization and education as indices of economic development. Further, he provides a bunch of operationalization methods for these variables. Wealth is measured with the income per capita, the number of persons per motor vehicle or per physician as well as the number of radios, televisions, and newspapers per thousand persons (Lipset, 1959). Although the concepts of wealth and industrialization are strongly interconnected with each other, in order to measure the latter one, Lipset (1959) looks at the number of employed men in agriculture and the commercially produced energy in form of coal per year. Three variants of measuring the degree of urbanization of a country and the variables of the literacy rate and the enrollment rates in educational institutions distinguished on three different levels complete the analysis (Lipset, 1959). The preliminary evaluation of his operationalization displays that those countries under observation which are categorized as stable democracies show higher values of all those variables than compared to those systems which are labeled as less democratic (Lipset, 1959). The economic development influences the opportunities for lower classes to participate in the democratic system and improves the relationship between the social classes as a whole (Lipset, 1959).

Przeworski et al. (1996) specify the component of the GDP per capita and find evidence for a threshold of less than 1,000 US-Dollar leading to the situation that countries under this value have an approximate life expectancy of only less than five to 12.5 years (Przeworski et al., 1996). Above a GDP per capita of 6,000 US-Dollar, democracies will survive with a high probability no matter what kind of economic crisis is present (Przeworski et al., 1996). "Economic performance, then, is crucially important for the survival of democracy in less-affluent countries" (Przeworski et al., 1996, p. 42). As MDIs are conducted in rather poor countries to a vast majority the economic performance seems to play a crucial role for state building and democratization.

Yet a more recent and comprehensive analysis by Teorell (2010) provides statistical evidence for four socio-economic determinants supportive for democracy: the level of socio-economic modernization, short-term economic growth, oil abundance and freedom of state incursion in the economy. The measures can, as substantiated by large-

N and case-study approaches, hinder recently democratized countries to slide back into autocracy (Teorell, 2010). Therefore, socio-economic modernization characteristics help to sustain democracies once they emerged (Przeworski, 2009).

3.3.2 Socio-cultural Factors

Besides the socio-economic factors, socio-cultural factors comprising characteristics of the social and political culture of a society or to put it differently, the social capital of a country, have an influence on the prospects for a sustainable democratization (Grimm, 2010a; Putnam, 2001; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994). Therefore, a high degree of civil self-organizations, the existence of civil values, attitudes and behaviors as well as a broad and pluralistic network of independent associations respecting the values of the constitutional state are presented as constitutive variables of democracy (Merkel, 2005). Because a consensus within the civil society allows citizens to articulate their interests in a non-violent manner, the social capital is seen as a necessary condition for the acceptance and support of the democratic system (Grimm, 2010a). A high social capital therefore gives rise to a society where values as solidarity, participation and civil engagement are important pillars of its construction (Croissant, 2002).

Post-conflict societies are characterized by a high degree of mistrust among the citizens of different social classes especially when the conflict was driven by ethnic, religious, or cultural differences (Grimm, 2010a; Sisk, 2006). Because of this, Grimm (2010a) sees the possibility that social, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and political-ideological factors can isolate social groups from each other and form insurmountable trenches. From this she reasons that the higher the degree of ethnic and religious fragmentation and polarization, the lower the intra-societal confidence and hence the promoting potential of the social capital (Grimm, 2010a).

Gromes (2011) finds evidence in his case studies on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia that the transition processes towards democracy were in all cases exacerbated by ethnical conflicts parallelly present to the conflict over the establishment of a common state. The same accounts for the intervention in Iraq in 2003 where the US found a various number of fractured ethnic groups where every single group has its own history of oppression in the former country structures (Pei & Kasper, 2003).

3.3.3 Type of Predecessor Regime and Transition Mode

In addition to societal, economic, and cultural characteristics of a society, the structure and character of the predecessor regime and the mode of democratic transition are decisive when it comes to the sustainability of democratization processes. This is mainly due to the fact that both variables create a path dependency influencing the following transformation (Grimm, 2010a).

On the one hand, the predecessor regime affects some variables already captured in other clusters as for example economic or social specifics. Linz and Stepan (1997) distinguish among four types of predecessor regimes: authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian and sultanistic (see Table 1). The typology investigates characteristics of the predecessor regimes with regards on pluralism, ideology, mobilization and leadership (Linz & Stepan, 1997). Whereas the first type is characterized by relatively extensive social and economic pluralism the second predecessor regime type exhibits rather low values when it comes to political and civil society autonomy as well as the rule of law and market autonomy (Linz & Stepan, 1997). The greater the autonomy of civil society, the stronger the rule of law, the more professional the bureaucracy and the more liberal the economy, the more likely, in their view, is a regime transition towards democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1997). Therefore, according to the assumptions by Linz and Stepan (1997), a transition towards democracy is more likely successfully implemented in an intervention's target country with an authoritarian predecessor regime than in a formerly totalitarian state. This is due to the reason that the former one comprises components which are essential for the stabilization of a democratic order as for example an open and pluralistic economy or a strong civil and integrated society.

Table 1. *Major Modern Regime Ideal Types and Their Defining Characteristics*

Characteristic	Democracy	Authoritarianism	Totalitarianism	Post-totalitarianism	Sultanism
Pluralism	Responsible political pluralism reinforced by extensive areas of pluralist autonomy in economy, society, and internal life of organizations . Legally protected pluralism consistent with “societal corporatism” but not “state corporatism”.	Political system with limited, not responsible political pluralism . Often quite extensive social and economic pluralism . In authoritarian regimes most of pluralism had roots in society before the establishment of the regime . Often some space for semi opposition .	No significant economic, social, or political pluralism . Official party has de jure and de facto monopoly of power . Party has eliminated almost all pre-totalitarian pluralism . No space for second economy or parallel society.	Limited, but not responsible social, economic, and institutional pluralism . Almost no political pluralism because party still formally has monopoly of power. May have “second economy”, but state still the overwhelming presence. Most manifestations of pluralism in “flattened polity” grew out of tolerated state structures or dissident groups consciously formed in opposition to totalitarian regime . In mature post-totalitarianism opposition often creates “second culture” or “parallel society”.	Economic and social pluralism does not disappear but is subject to unpredictable and despotic intervention . No group or individual in civil society, political society, or the state is free from sultan’s exercise of despotic power . No rule of law . Low institutionalization . High fusion of private and public .
Ideology	Extensive intellectual commitment to citizenship and procedural rules of contestation. Not teleological. Respect for rights of minorities, state of law, and value of individualism	Political system without elaborate and guiding ideology but with distinctive mentalities .	Elaborate and guiding ideology that articulates a reachable utopia. Leaders, individuals, and groups derive most of their sense of mission, legitimation, and often specific policies from their commitment to some holistic conception of humanity and society .	Guiding ideology still officially exists and is part of the social reality. But weakened commitment to or faith in utopia . Shift emphasis from ideology to programmatic consensus that presumably is based on rational decision-making and limited debate without too much reference to ideology .	Highly arbitrary manipulation of symbols . Extreme glorification of ruler . No elaborate or guiding ideology or even distinctive mentalities outside of despotic personalism . No attempt to justify major initiatives in the basis of ideology. Pseudo-ideology not believed by staff, subjects, or outside world.
Mobilization	Participation via autonomously generated organization of civil society and competing parties of political society guaranteed by a system of law . Value is on low regime mobilization but high citizen participation . Diffuse effort by regime to induce good citizenship and patriotism. Toleration of peaceful and orderly opposition .	Political system without extensive or intensive political mobilization except at some points in their development.	Extensive mobilization into a vast array of regime-created obligatory organizations. Emphasis on activism of cadres and militants . Effort at mobilization of enthusiasm. Private life is decried .	Progressive loss of interest by leaders and nonleaders involved in organizing mobilization. Routine mobilization of population within state-sponsored organizations to achieve a minimum degree of conformity and compliance. Many “cadres” and “militants” are mere careerists and opportunists . Boredom, withdrawal, and ultimately privatization of population’s values become an accepted fact.	Low but occasional manipulative mobilization of a ceremonial type by coercive or clientistic methods without permanent organization. Periodic mobilization of parastate groups who use violence against groups targeted by sultan.
Leadership	Top leadership produced by free elections and must be exercised within constitutional limits and state of law . Leadership must be periodically subjected to and produced by free elections	Political system in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined but actually quite predictable norms . Effort at cooptation of old elite groups . Some autonomy in state careers and in military .	Totalitarian leadership rules with undefined limits and great unpredictability for members and nonmembers . Often charismatic . Recruitment to top leadership highly dependent on success and commitment in party organization .	Growing emphasis by post-totalitarian political elite on personal security . Checks on top leadership via party structures, procedures, and “internal democracy”. Top leaders are seldom charismatic . Recruitment to top leadership restricted to official party but less dependent upon building a career within party’s organization. Top leaders can come from party technocrats in state apparatus .	Highly personalistic and arbitrary . No rational-legal constraints . Strong dynastic tendency . No autonomy in state careers. Leader unencumbered by ideology. Compliance to leaders based on intense fear and personal rewards . Staff of leader drawn from members of his family, friends, business associates, or men directly involved in use of violence to sustain the regime. Staff’s position derives from their purely personal submission to the ruler .

Source: Linz & Stepan (1997, p. 44)

The sultanistic regime type is similar to the totalitarian one but differs regarding the autonomy of the civil society. Here, sultanism displays a higher degree of autonomy because this regime type is not dedicated to interfere in the people's everyday life as much as it is the case in totalitarianism (Linz & Stepan, 1997). Post-totalitarian states compared to fully totalitarian ones in turn can reach higher values for both civil society and economic autonomy as well as a higher state capacity due to an increased autonomy of the bureaucratic machinery (Linz & Stepan, 1997). According to the theoretical assumptions, countries with an authoritarian predecessor regime exhibit the best preconditions for a democratic transition followed by the regime type of post-totalitarianism. Alternatively, the predecessor regime with the most unfavorable preconditions for democratization is a totalitarian one only slightly surpassed by the sultanistic regime type.

On the other hand, the regime transformation process itself is decisive as it builds the first steps in the democratization process after an intervention and therefore inevitably determines the point of departure for all the following decisions and activities. Merkel's (1999) typology derives from the general transition literature and therefore comprises also transformation modes independent from any action undertaken by an external intervener. In fact, only the transition through a regime collapse provoked by a military intervention is linked to an engagement of an external actor. However, as argued by Grimm (2010a), wars and military interventions lie at the crossroads of all modes of transition because they can be both the reason and the cause of a certain transition. Besides regime collapse scenarios, external actors can enforce democratization through their exercise of coercion on the decision-makers (Grimm, 2010a). Nevertheless, the way the interveners behave in a target country to achieve a start within the transformation process, the way they include the local population in the transformation process and the way they are accepted by the local population play a crucial role for the success of the democratization effort.

To begin with, the literature on military democratic interventions already uses classifications of intervention types. At a first glance, however, this variable counts to mission specific characteristics because the choice of intervention type is directly connected to the equipment and implementation of the mission. But the type of intervention does not only display the type of intervention but in fact describes different

ways of transition to democracy. Grimm and Merkel (2008) differentiate between four modes of intervention. The first one covers an endured post-war occupation in order to enforce democracy on the occupied country (Grimm & Merkel, 2008). The backing of an elected government through a military intervention constitutes the second mode of intervention identified by Grimm and Merkel (2008). Already with the first two modes the different ways an intervening actor is active in a target country becomes obvious. The role of an intervener in an occupation differs from an intervener restoring democratic governance. Whereas in the first case one could expect a rather tense relationship between the intervener and the target country's population because the latter considers the activities of the former as illegitimate and malicious, the population of a target country in the second case could be expected to rather welcome the intervening actor trying to restore democracy leading to a completely different relationship between the two. Additionally, regarding the second case, the former government legitimized through an election and therefore with support of a certain share of the population most likely welcomes the help by an external actor while the ruling regime which is getting occupied is not expected to welcome the foreign activities at all. Similarly, this accounts for the transition modes 3 and 4, namely the intervention in ongoing massacres and civil war and the force of democracy in rogue states through war (Grimm & Merkel, 2008). Again, one can imagine different positions for the intervening actor on the perspective of both the target country's population and the ruling regime.

Especially for the way civil wars come to an end, Grimm and Merkel (2008) find out that a clear victory of one side is more likely to produce stability in the following state building process. However, because often civil wars end with some sort of a peace agreement the chances for democratization are higher if the agreement is able to resolve the conflict on a widely accepted basis including all relevant conflict parties (Grimm & Merkel, 2008). Additionally, regarding the end of conflicts, researchers highlight the importance of the war-guilt question and if it can be answered conclusively because this again provides clarity for the relationship between intervening actors and target countries (Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001; Walter, 1997).

In another project, Grimm (2008) classifies her intervention cases according to their preceding war type and therefore differentiates between inter-, intra-, and sub-state

wars. The analysis shows that all the identified military interventions following an inter-state war lead to “clear-cut democratization successes” (Grimm, 2008, p. 534) whereas the results for inner- and sub-state wars is mixed. These results are also traced back to the often-clearer results of inter-state wars producing clear relations between the warring parties and a clear division into winners and losers. However, the mere distinction from the type of the previous war is not sufficient to explain the success or failure of military democratic interventions that is why Grimm (2008) assumes that other factors regarding the structure of a target country are important for successful democratization efforts.

3.3.4 State Capacity and Nation-Building

Summarizing the findings by the transition and state building literature, Grimm (2010a) draws the picture of functioning democratic institutions, the presence of stable statehood and a nation or a political community building a triangle of interdependent characteristics. Statehood in this sense is defined by the tasks as ensuring internal and external security and the guarantee of justice, state institutions including the public administration provide for its citizens (Grimm, 2010a). A functioning statehood that fulfils its tasks for the benefit of the citizens can be said to exist if the state organs have a high degree of decision-making autonomy in the fulfilment of their tasks (Merkel, 1999).

The state fulfils important steering and regulatory functions. It organizes the provision of collective goods such as security, peace, and welfare and, in the best case, ensures the equitable distribution of produced or extracted goods, for example in the form of infrastructure measures and access to education. When statehood is combined with the concept of the rule of law, the state also assumes a guarantee and protective function for the safeguarding of basic and civil rights. And finally, as a nation state it has a legitimizing function, since it provides the political framework for the coexistence of a particular group of people (Grimm, 2010a, p. 91).

Therefore, functioning state institutions provide the basis for a stable state what in turn lays the foundation for a stable democratic state structure. Only if the democratization process can take recourse on a stable and functioning state it has a chance to succeed (Tilly, 2009). Independently thereof, the presence of a nation gives the citizens of a state a feeling of common identity. If the people have the feeling that they belong

together as a social group, the support for a common state is more likely than without. This common identity can be based on the shared history of their community of destiny, the use of one language or on certain guiding principles and myths forming the nation (Grimm, 2010a).

Whereas Linz and Stepan (1997) make a clear conceptual distinction between the state and the nation, the argumentation by Grimm (2010a) highlights that in post-conflict countries where military democratic interventions often take place the two concepts are not that easy to separate from one another. In transitioning countries both the level of state capacity and the question who belongs to a political community are not clarified (Grimm, 2010a). The former leads to an unstable environment for newly established democratic institutions and the latter possibly inflames tensions between different social groups providing the basis for a new conflict. If the state capacity is on a relatively high degree at the point where the intervention takes place it is especially advantageous for the democratization effort as fundamental but therefore even more important tasks are performed by the target country itself. These tasks are the most challenging for intervening actors because they often do not have the needed knowledge over local conventions (Pei & Kasper, 2003).

The review of the literature on the importance of the degree of state capacity and the presence of a nation reveals that the operationalization of this cluster is not easy to implement. The extent to which a country is able to provide basic goods to its citizens is a rather abstract concept. Additionally, although just including the very basic needs to be fulfilled by the state, this comprises a wide array of tasks (Grimm, 2010a). They reach from security, the maintenance of rule-of-law to welfare creation and the preservation of a legitimate order. Therefore, various state institutions as the military, the bureaucracy or the judiciary make their contributions to the overall state capacity. The difficulty of measurability applies even more to the question of the presence of a nation. This is so because firstly, the concept of nation itself is hard to grasp as the literature is not sure which components to include in order to define a nation and which to exclude (e.g. Anderson, 2006; Smith, 2009). Secondly, the presence of a nation is not registered in any annual statistics in an official report but instead is a feeling within the population of the country (Grimm, 2010a). Therefore, it depends much on the subjective perception of each citizen.

The theoretical argumentation used in this work suggests adding a further variable to this third cluster. It is the pre-existing experience in the rule-of-law and experience with democratic procedures outlined in the general transition literature which should also be adapted when it comes to externally forced democratization (Merkel, 1999). Merkel and Gerschewski (2015) expect that once democratic norms and values were internalized by a society in an earlier democratic phase of the country this is expected to support a transition from autocracy to democracy because society can make use of this knowledge in a new attempt of democratization. Similarly, Pei and Kasper (2003) see previous experience with a sort of constitutional rule as a crucial variable because those target countries with such an experience are more likely to undergo successful democratization. The questions for target countries of military democratic intervention therefore are, if the society can take recourse to experience with a democratic system and if so, how intense and formative was this previous democratic experience and how long ago was it?

3.3.5 International Context

Finally, democratization processes are also influenced by the regional and international context. For post-conflict countries this is especially true because external democratization efforts can be either supported or complicated by the close neighborhood of the target country or by global powers finding themselves in a competition with other hegemons (Linz & Stepan, 1997). The immediate environment of post-conflict countries is often less advantageous for democratization efforts as the neighbor countries have to deal with an increased influx of refugees and with illicit trade caused by the war (Grimm, 2010a). This in turn destabilizes those countries and limits their ability to act in terms of supporting a democratic process in their neighborhood. Furthermore, if the country occupies an important position within the international order or if it is of increased geostrategic importance because it contains valuable natural resources, has the control over important infrastructure for international trade or offers a beneficial geographic location, global powers can be interested in to convert an intervention's target country to its column. The underlying assumption under this cluster is, that the more democratic a target country's environment is, the higher the stability of the neighborhood and the higher the strategic importance of the target

country is, than the higher is the chance for a sustainable successful democratization through an external actor.

In her comparison between the earlier external democratic interventions of Germany and Japan and the later democratization efforts throughout the 1980s and 1990s in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, Hippel (2000) finds significant differences when it comes to the engagement of external actors. This is traced back to international context factors (Hippel, 2000). After World War II the intervening and occupying nations had strong incentives to prevent Germany and Japan to reemerge as powerful and aggressive countries and instead aimed at establishing stable democratic countries (Hippel, 2000). With their geographic location both countries presented important players in a post-World War II and then Cold War scenario and therefore were of high interests for all intervening actors. Germany in the middle of the European continent functioned as a bulwark against communism. This is why Germany's stability and integration with the West was central to primarily US foreign policy. The same holds for Japan posing a counterpart to communism in the pacific region. On the contrary, the four interventions conducted later were not seen as vital for the US foreign policy although Bosnia and Kosovo can be regarded as important for the European continent (Hippel, 2000). Thus, those countries got much less attention and the will to democratize and stabilize them at any cost was less marked.

Linz and Stepan (1997) point towards the changing zeitgeist within the international complex. As they state, democracy is much more likely to be achieved through military intervention if there is no contest between opposing ideologies present (Linz & Stepan, 1997). But if the democratic idea has strong contenders in form of other attractive and powerful regime types a democratization is harder to reach (Linz & Stepan, 1997). These theoretical assumptions are substantiated with the results by statistical analyses provided by Przeworski et al. (1996). As they find out, although both the ideology and the neighboring effect are decisive for transition success, the effect of the proportion of democracies on the globe is twice as large as the effect neighboring democracies have on democratizing countries (Przeworski et al., 1996). International diffusion effects and favorable and unfavorable neighborhood effects are therefore strongly influencing variables of countries experiencing forced democratization (Burnell, 2007; Linz & Stepan, 1997). That is exemplified by the US intervention in Iraq seen as a paramount

example for the importance of the neighborhood effect. As Merkel (2008) states, even if Iraq would have been successfully democratized in the year 2003 or immediately afterwards, the chances that a democratic country is able to survive in a fully autocratic environment is highly unlikely. With that said, he rejects the assumption of policy makers claiming that the establishment of an exemplary democratic state in an autocratic neighborhood would somehow lead to a domino effect within this specific region (Merkel, 2008). Actually, the contrary is the case, because although such democracies are able to survive within their antagonistic surrounding their expected lifespan is significantly lower than the life-span of a democracy within a democratic neighborhood (Merkel, 2008).

To sum up, it is recommended for external interveners to take the support of neighboring countries into consideration as well as at least ensure acceptance within the international system for their planned actions (Schraeder, 2003). This is accompanied by the respect of the international law when planning and implementing a military democratic intervention (Schraeder, 2003). This can, in fact, provide the military democratic intervention with an increased legitimacy which is needed in order to establish a democracy and to form a basis for sustainable existence of it.

4. Methodology

4.1 Case Selection

The research on MDIs so far unveils a broad spectrum of cases to include in an analysis. The diversity of datasets of the investigations until today can be traced back to two reasons. These are, firstly, the varying time periods influencing the number of cases under investigation and secondly, the definitions of main concepts underlying each research approach and hence determining which cases are included in the analysis and which are explicitly excluded. Consequently, the case selection criteria are mainly dependent on the determination of the investigation period and the definition of the concept of intervention.

The selection of the time period under investigation is relatively undisputed throughout the research so far, because despite some exceptions, the scientific debate focused solely on the investigations of the time from World War II until today (see Literature Review). This is mainly due to the availability of fine-grained quantitative as well as qualitative data for conflicts, wars, societies, and countries. Further, the comparability of cases is a reason to constrain the investigated time in a certain manner. To include cases in an analysis which are separated by a century or more is ambitious because the comparability becomes more difficult the further apart the cases are in time. Surroundings and epoch characteristics change over time and therefore it becomes more complicated to compare cases from different eras. For the delimitation of such epochs important cuts in history are useful. World War II constitutes one possible fundamental cut but also the collapse of the Soviet Union marking the end of the Cold War could possibly serve as such a turning point within the international relations and thus as possible events to limit the analysis accordingly. Those events are useful as they mark points in time where the functioning of the international system changed significantly. To include cases of the late 19th century and the 1990s in the same analysis requires immense adaptations within the research framework and even by doing this harbors limitations for the interpretation of the results.

The period under investigation in this research work therefore is restricted from 1943 and reaches until the year 2008. Although scientists often make use of such important hallmarks within history and international context like World War II as an orientation

for their analysis, some variations are still identifiable. Some analyses want to include the immediate happenings after those cuts (e.g. Grimm, 2010a), whereas others contrary explicitly try to exclude those cases happening in the direct aftermath of one of these historical events and therefore start their investigation periods a few years later (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006; Fortna, 2004; Heldt, 2011). In this case, the analysis includes also cases marking the end of World War II because the author sees here the beginning of the modern MDIs. This argument is mainly based on the finding that still MDIs in the 21st century are compared to the cases conducted at the end and immediately after World War II which are taken as paramount examples for MDIs and blueprints for new interventions (see e.g. Grimm, 2010b; Hippel, 2000; Licklider, 1999).

Besides variations in time frames under investigation the differing definitions of the concept of intervention play an important role. The underlying definition for this work already outlined in chapter 3.1.1 is based on the approach presented by Grimm (2010a). Her dataset comprises 27 cases in the years from 1943 until 2008 and is taken as a basis for the work in hand due to several reasons: the most important point is the restriction of the sample according to reasonable definitions outlined in detail in the original paper (Grimm, 2010a). In order to develop a dataset on comprehensible grounds, Grimm (2010a) defines which actors implement an intervention, the need for interventions to refer to democracy and the mandate character of an intervention. Regarding the former, only interventions conducted by democratic actors are taken into consideration because only here an actual intension to democratize the target country is to be expected (Grimm, 2010a). The democratic component of an intervention is ensured by the inclusion of cases where the intervention is targeted either to support a democratic elected government or to bring about a democratic regime change (Grimm, 2010a). Additionally, interventions where military deployments are complemented by a civilian component with an identifiable intention to support democratization are taken into consideration (Grimm, 2010a). Lastly, the interventions are tested regarding their underlying mandate and whether it contains an intention for democratization. This is ensured by either a resolution with a mandate issued by the UN Security Council or a peace agreement comprising a deployment order for an external actor or a mandate given by a national parliament (Grimm, 2010a).

However, there is also a reason why the research work does not update the dataset until a more recent date. The end of the investigation period is defined by the 10-year distance between the start of the MDI and the success measurement. The work deals with a rather long interval of measuring success of an MDI because the literature review displayed that only mature democracies contribute to a more peaceful world. The establishment of a mature democracy takes much longer and cannot be captured in the normally applied measuring periods ranging from two to five years after the intervention. Because data for measuring democracy is not available after 2018 the period under investigation needs to end accordingly in the year 2008. In contrast to the analysis by Grimm (2010a), this research work is able to conduct the analysis in a fully available dataset. Whereas the analysis by Grimm (2010a) could only provide clear results for eleven out of 27 cases taking no account of the remaining 16 cases, this work is able both to conduct an analysis with the full sample and to draw conclusions for every case. Additionally, the actual data for the single cases provided by Grimm (2010a) is by far not sufficient for the implementation of a QCA approach. Therefore, the dataset by Grimm (2010a) determines more a structure for the present analysis and is improved and extended at certain points.

4.2 Justification for the Method of QCA

In order to find out how the identified five clusters relate the outcome of military democratic interventions, the method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is applied. Initially thought to represent an alternative for pure quantitative or qualitative research designs, this approach takes recourse on set-theoretic thinking and is understood as a third way of analyzing social phenomena.

Set-theoretic methods are approaches to analyzing social reality in which (a) the data consists of set membership scores; (b) relations between social phenomena are modeled in terms of set relations; and (c) the results point to sufficient and necessary conditions and emphasize causal complexity in terms of INUS and SUIN causes. (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, p. 6)

Regarding the second argument, the author considers that the success or failure of MDIs is best understood when thinking of target countries being members in diverse sets. The method of QCA allows to deal with the clusters as they would constitute sets in which target countries have a smaller or greater membership score. The set relations, meaning

the varying membership scores in the five clusters developed in the theory part, are thought to exert influence on the outcome of MDIs. Countries externally democratized therefore can be categorized in each set with a certain membership score according to observable variables. This makes sense as the work in hand deals with social phenomena rather hard to capture in pure dichotomous measurement strategies. The underlying assumption is that the concepts of democracy, success but also the individual clusters cannot be described properly in a dichotomous approach. Instead, these concepts display a great variety and various gradations which go beyond a binary categorization. Therefore, cases or, in this specific example, target countries of MDIs can be best captured in so-called fuzzy sets. These sets range from 0 to 1, where 0 stands for full non-membership and 1 for full membership in a certain set. The point of indifference (0.5) marks the point whether a country is more a member or more a non-member of a set but should be avoided to assign to a case. The value of 0.6 therefore describes that the case is understood as a partly member of the set. By contrast, the value of 0.4 means that a country is rather a non-member of a set. The QCA approach allows for the consideration of different degrees of the manifestation of a certain concept. These different degrees can be identified through both quantitative and qualitative measurement strategies. For QCA, so-called truth tables are built through collecting the necessary data. This allows the researcher to reason whether necessary or sufficient conditions can be identified within the dataset.

Although generally of secondary importance and subordinate to the theoretical argument, the empirical argument is a further reason for choosing the QCA approach. The method is particularly suitable to mid-sized N datasets. Neither case study approaches nor statistical regression analyses are able to handle an intermediate number of cases. Because this research work deals with MDIs after World War II until 2008, the number of observable cases ranges between roughly 20 and 50 cases. If one wanted to conduct a regression analysis, one would need a rather large number of cases in order to guarantee statistically robust and valid results. This would also cause an extension of the time period under investigation leading to a set of cases not comparable anymore. Comparing MDI target countries of completely different eras would restrict the validity of the results as different era characteristics would be mixed up. Additionally, the data collection for long past cases would be difficult to implement and again the comparability to data collected for cases of today would be rather limited. Case studies

are only available for a certain number of MDIs. Further, as these case studies emerge rather individually, the comparability of the cases is not given because a common foundation for researching the interventions is not present.

The QCA proceeds as follows. In a first step, the variables are identified and operationalized according to a set-theoretic approach. For each variable, the anchor points of 0, 1 and 0.5 are defined. Following that, the collected data is transferred into fuzzy values. Second, necessary conditions are analyzed. For this process, single variables are checked for their relation to the outcome set of successful democratization. An interpretation of those results follows immediately. Third, the analysis of sufficient conditions follows. For this purpose, a truth table is developed, evaluated and finally minimized. This minimization is outlined in three different ways, a conservative, a parsimonious and an intermediate strategy. Those differ from each other in dealing with the problem of limited empiric diversity and therefore in the inclusion of logic remainders in the analysis (Wagemann & Siewert, 2018). In the end, also the results of the analysis of sufficient conditions for successful democratization are interpreted.

5. Analysis

The analysis works with a total of nine variables all coded and collected in an original dataset particularly for this research work. In order to code the variables for the identified 27 cases of MDI, various data sources are examined. In the following paragraphs the data collection for all variables is outlined in detail as the preparation of the data for each variable is of special importance within a QCA approach.

5.1 Operationalization of the Variables

5.1.1 Dependent Variable: Democratization

In the center of the analysis, the dependent variable of democratization is located. As outlined in the definition chapter, democracy is a complex concept and hard to capture in a comprehensive way. In the focus of the democracy definition in this work are two components: firstly, a democracy is characterized by an institutional component including a certain degree of the separation of powers among the key actors and also a functioning electoral system based on certain values. Secondly, political rights and civil liberties are substantive components of a fully-fledged democracy. Therefore, full democracies need both the institutional and value component. For the operationalization of the dependent variable, these requirements need to be taken into consideration.

Furthermore, to separate cases into democracies and non-democracies is rather difficult to implement. This is due to different degrees of characteristics of democracies which are rather different in design than more or less democratic. A dichotomous differentiation of the set of cases in democracies and their counterpart therefore seems not appropriate. Instead, the advantage of fuzzy sets is used as these sets allow for taking into consideration not only differences-in-kind but also differences-in-degree. Consequently, it is not only differentiated between democracies and non-democracies but also the degree of democracy and non-democracy is considered.

For the actual operationalization of the variable democracy, the work in hand takes recourse on two common datasets of political science: the Polity5 Project dataset (Marshall, 2020) and the Freedom House Index (2020). Whereas the former focuses on political regime characteristics and therefore covers the first part of the democracy definition, the latter index highlighting political rights and civil liberties

covers the second part of the used definition. The Polity5 data contains a scale between -10 to +10, where countries between -10 and -6 are labeled as autocracies and countries between +6 and +10 are democracies. Anocracies are located in between the two poles. The Freedom House Index on the other side works with a scale ranging from 1.0 to 7.0. The index is not working with the concept of democracy but instead labels countries as free (1.0 to 2.5), partly free (2.5 to 5.0) and not free (5.5 to 7.0).

For the dependent variable of democracy, a six-value fuzzy set is used. This means that besides the two poles of 1 (full membership within the set of democratic countries) and 0 (full non-membership within the set of democratic countries) there are gradations (0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8) in order to differentiate between different degrees of democracies and non-democracies. In Table 2 it is explained how each of the six levels is created and which values of the Polity5 index and the Freedom House Index need to be fulfilled.

Table 2. *Operationalization of the Dependent Variable Democracy*

Fuzzy Value	Categories according to Polity5 and FHI	Polity5 Score	FHI Score
1.00	democracies + free	+6 to +10	1.0 to 2.5
0.80	democracies + partly free	+6 to +10	2.5 to 5.0
0.60	democracies + not free	+6 to +10	5.5 to 7.0
	anocracies (+) + partly free	+1 to +5	2.5 to 5.0
0.40	anocracies (+) + not free	+1 to +5	5.5 to 7.0
	anocracies (-/0) + partly free	-5 to 0	2.5 to 5.0
0.20	anocracies (-) + not free	-5 to 0	5.5 to 7.0
	autocracies + partly free	-10 to -6	2.5 to 5.0
0.00	autocracies + not free	-10 to -6	5.5 to 7.0
	cases of anarchy	-66	-

Source: Polity5 by Marshall (2020); FHI Score by Freedom House (2020)

Table 3 visualizes the operationalization of the dependent variable. For each of the cases the variable collects data for both the Polity5 score and Freedom House value one year before the MDI took place and ten years afterwards. Additionally, the table shows the democracy label given to the cases by Grimm (2010a) in order to have a direct comparison between both works. The advantages of a fuzzy set approach become clear by the contrasting juxtaposition of the two last columns. Out of the 27 cases, Grimm (2010a) identifies only seven democratic target countries ten years following the MDI compared to twelve non-democracies. Since Grimm (2010a) in 2010 was not able

to provide data for all the cases regarding the t+10 democracy score because the interventions do not date back that long, eight cases are not assigned to either one of the two possibilities. This problem is solved for this project as the intervention in the year 2006 in East Timor was conducted already 14 years ago and therefore both democracy indices provide data also for the last MDI in the sample. Furthermore, because the fuzzy set approach allows for a much more nuanced measurement of democracy compared to the dichotomous approach, in total additionally to the seven democratic target countries identified by Grimm (2010a), a further ten countries is identified as more a member of the set of democratic countries than non-democratic. In contrast, the fuzzy set approach provides four fully non-democratic countries and six further cases constituting members of the set of non-democratic countries.

Table 3. *Dependent Variable Democracy*

Country	Year	Polity5		Freedom House		Democracy acc. to Grimm	Fuzzy Value
		t-1	t+10	t-1	t+10		
Italy	1943	-9	10	-	-	Yes	1.00
Germany (West)	1945	-9	10	-	-	Yes	1.00
Austria	1945	0	10	-	-	Yes	1.00
Japan	1945	1	10	-	-	Yes	1.00
Dominican Republic	1965	0	-3	-	3.5	No	0.40
Grenada	1983	-	-	6.0	1.5	Yes	1.00
Panama	1989	-8	9	5.5	1.5	Yes	1.00
Haiti 1	1993	-7	-2	7.0	6.0	No	0.00
Haiti 2	2004	-2	0	6.0	5.0	No	0.00
Sierra Leone	1999	0	7	4.0	3.0	No	0.80
Namibia	1989	-	6	-	2.5	Yes	1.00
Cambodia	1991	1	2	7.0	5.5	No	0.40
Mozambique	1992	-6	6	5.0	3.5	?	0.80
Rwanda	1993	-7	-3	6.5	5.5	No	0.20
Angola	1995	-1	-2	7.0	5.5	No	0.20
East Timor 1	1999	-	7	-	3.5	?	0.80
East Timor 2	2006	7	8	3.5	3.0	?	0.80
Congo	1999	0	5	6.5	6.0	No	0.40
Macedonia	2001	6	9	3.5	3.0	?	0.80
Liberia	2003	0	6	6.0	3.5	?	0.80
Solomon Islands	2003	0	8	3.0	3.5	?	0.80
Burundi	2004	0	6	5.0	5.5	?	0.60
Ivory Coast	2004	0	4	5.5	4.5	No	0.60
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1995	0	-66	6.0	3.5	No	0.00
Kosovo	1999	-	8	7.0	4.5	?	0.80
Afghanistan	2001	-7	-66	7.0	6.0	No	0.00
Iraq	2003	-9	3	7.0	5.5	No	0.40

Source: Polity5 by Marshall (2020); FHI Score by Freedom House (2020); Democracy acc. to Grimm (2010a)

Note: „-66“ describes according to Polity5 codebook by Marshall (2020) cases of foreign “interruption” and therefore are treated as “system missing”

5.1.2 Variables of Socio-economic Development and Modernization

Variable 1: GDP

The first variable of the socio-economic development and modernization section measures the GDP per capita of an MDI target country. In this case, to compensate inflation fluctuations, the GDP per capita on the constant 2010 US-Dollar level provided by the World Bank dataset is collected. In order to get a picture of the economic situation of the country before the intervention took place, a single year

measurement of the GDP per capita seems not sufficient. Instead, the five-year-average in the years before the MDI is taken into account. Only the cases directly following World War II are not displayed in the World Bank (2020) dataset and instead calculated and adjusted according to data by Harrison (2000) to common inflation on the level of the constant 2010 US-Dollar.

To calculate the continuous fuzzy set values from 0 to 1, a function of the fsQCA statistical program (Ragin, 2017) is used. After determining the thresholds for full membership (1), full non-membership (0) and the cross-over point (0.5) the program develops the fuzzy set values automatically. However, the justification for the determination of the thresholds needs to be a theoretically based one. Firstly, the cross-over point of 0.5 is determined by 1,000 US-Dollar constituting the tipping point for being beneficial for successful democratization according to Przeworski et al. (1996). As a result, countries having a five-year average GDP per capita of more than 1,000 US-Dollar get fuzzy values of more than 0.5 and therefore are labeled as (partly) members of the set of countries with a beneficial GDP per capita. At the same time, countries with an GDP per capita of less than 1,000 US-Dollar have fuzzy values of less than 0.5 and hence can be labeled as (partly) non-members of the set of countries with a beneficial GDP per capita.

For the full membership within this set, constituting the fuzzy value of 1, countries need a five-year average GDP per capita of 6,000 US-Dollar or more. Again, this threshold is determined due to the findings by Przeworski et al. (1996). In their work, they find out that in countries with a GDP per capita of 6,000 US-Dollar and more, democracy is very likely to survive despite external shocks like economic crises or other disruptive events (Przeworski et al., 1996). Finally, the threshold for full non-membership needs to be determined. Because there is a lack of any theoretical assumptions or empirical findings about this special measure, the author adapts a self-developed strategy of determining this threshold. For this special variable it seems to be appropriate to apply the ratio between the value of full membership and the cross-over point also to the ratio between full non-membership and cross-over point. Because the GDP per capita value for the cross-over point corresponds to a sixth of the value for full membership of the set, accordingly the value for full non-membership needs to be roughly 166 US-Dollar.

Table 4 shows the 27 cases, their five-year-average GDP per capita before the MDI took place and their respective fuzzy value.

Table 4. *Variable 1 GDP*

Country	Year	5-year-average GDP per capita before MDI	Fuzzy Value
Italy	1943	5,597.12	0.94
Germany	1945	10,112.36	1.00
Austria	1945	6,869.77	0.97
Japan	1945	4,492.30	0.89
Dom. Rep.	1965	1,391.90	0.56
Grenada	1983	3,282.00	0.80
Panama	1989	4,476.40	0.89
Haiti 1	1993	908.70	0.42
Haiti 2	2004	737.20	0.28
Sierra Leone	1999	316.50	0.08
Namibia	1989	3,709.20	0.84
Cambodia	1991	NA	NA
Mozambique	1992	209.50	0.06
Rwanda	1993	372.00	0.09
Angola	1995	2,237.20	0.68
East Timor 1	1999	2,236.00	0.68
East Timor 2	2006	1,717.20	0.61
Congo	1999	379.20	0.10
Macedonia	2001	3,231.50	0.79
Liberia	2003	613.90	0.20
Sol. Islands	2003	1,297.80	0.54
Burundi	2004	229.70	0.06
Ivory Coast	2004	1,321.00	0.55
Bosn.-Herz.	1995	701.50	0.25
Kosovo	1999	NA	NA
Afghanistan	2001	NA	NA
Iraq	2003	4,149.10	0.87

Source: World Bank (2020), indicator GDP (constant 2010 US\$)

Note: For the cases of Italy, Germany, Austria and Japan, the data for population size and total GDP in 1938 is provided by Harrison (2000) and accordingly calculated inflation-adjusted per capita. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, World Bank (2020) only provides data for the year 1994. For East Timor 1, World Bank (2020) data is taken from Indonesia as East Timor was not independent before 1999 and therefore is not listed in the dataset.


Variable 2: Human Development

The second variable in the section of socio-economic development and modernization is the Human Development. Whereas the first variable displayed solely economic

characteristics of the target countries, this second variable includes components of health care, education and living standard and therefore offers a broader picture of the living conditions and modernization level within each target country. The Historical Index of Human Development (HIHD) by Prados de la Escosura, Leandro (2015) provides data for the human development from 1870 until 2007 and therefore covers all cases in the present analysis. The data is provided for ten year steps at the beginning of the dataset, during the period of both World Wars in an irregular manner and following 1950 in five year steps. Because of that, the value of human development for each MDI target country is taken of the next sample before the year of intervention. This means for the World War II cases, that their level of human development is measured according the values of 1938 as this is the closest year with data provided by the HIHD. For the other target countries, the data of the preceding five year data slot is taken into consideration. This makes sense insofar as the human development in the year the MDI is taking place is not a reliable measurement strategy and it seems to be appropriate to look on the human development before the intervention. This gives a sufficient overall picture over the situation in the country before an outside actor intervened. The attribution of the cases to their data slots and their allocation within the total population of this year is displayed in Figure 4. This visualization of the years and the inherent cases is made because of two reasons. First of all, it shows the rise of human development in the period between 1938 and 2005 with maximum and minimum values as well as the average values of each year. Secondly, and even more important, the visualization of the location of the cases within their respective year helps to understand the calculation of fuzzy values.

The calculation of fuzzy values needs to be conducted differently than compared to the variable of GDP. Whereas the latter had with the constant 2010 US-Dollar level a common basis for all GDP values no matter from which year data was gathered, such a constant is missing for the measurement of human development. Of course, the development only can range between 0 and 1 and therefore one could assume that the HIHD values are comparable in general. However, as Figure 4 shows, the actual minimum and maximum values are changing over time and are not concrete values. These minimum and maximum values together with the average of human development within a respective year are rather the orientation characters and not the overall limiting values of 0 and 1. Kosovo in 1995 with a HIHD value of 0.42 is slightly higher ranked

Figure 4. *Historical Human Development Index from 1938 until 2005*



Source: Historical Human Development Index by Padros de la Escosura (2015). Own depiction.

than for example Germany in 1938 with a HIHD value of 0.41 but both belong to the top four countries within the total sample. Therefore, one could argue that both countries are on the same level of human development and consequently can be pooled with the same fuzzy value of highly developed countries. According to the assumption of this work, this would be not the appropriate strategy for this specific variable. Instead, it is argued that human development is a concept which should be understood relatively not absolutely. This means that high or low human development values are only valid in the respective year and are not directly comparable with the following years or even data for more than 50 years later. As a consequence, Germany is ranked at the very top on the scale of human development in 1938 and takes sixth place in the ranking of developed countries in that year. This makes it easy to understand that Germany therefore gets a rather high fuzzy membership value within the set of developed countries because it belonged to the most developed countries in that time. In contrast, Kosovo which has in the direct comparison an even slightly higher HIHD score, is only ranked on the 74th rank in the measurement year of 1995 and only slightly above the average value of human development in that year. In consequence, Kosovo cannot be in the same category of developed countries like Germany. It means that Kosovo is still above the 0.5 cross-over point, which is determined by the average of the respective year, but not very close to the full membership of developed countries, meaning to have a HIHD value which is very close to the maximum.

According to this example, the three thresholds in order to calculate the continuous fuzzy set for the second variable of human development are determined as follows. The threshold for full membership (1) within the set of developed countries is marked by the maximum value of the respective year a country is assigned to according to the year the MDI took place. In consequence, only countries at the very top of the human development scale in the respective year can reach a fuzzy value of 1. The threshold for full non-membership (0) within the set of developed countries in turn is marked by the minimum value of the respective year a country is assigned to according to the year the MDI took place, meaning that countries at the very bottom of the human development scale in the respective year reach a fuzzy value of 0. The cross-over-point (0.5) is marked by the average value of human development of all countries in the respective year. As a result, MDI target countries which are slightly over the average of human development in the year of investigation are also slightly over the cross-over-point of

0.5 and vice versa. Therefore, because Germany belongs in 1938 to the highly developed countries, it reaches a fuzzy value of 0.94 whereas Kosovo which is located just slightly over the average human development score in 1995 accordingly just reaches a fuzzy value slightly over the cross-over-point with 0.55. Table 5 shows the operationalization of variable 2 Humand Development.

Table 5. *Variable 2 Human Development*

Country	Year	Year of Data Collection in HIHD	HIHD Score	Fuzzy Value
Italy	1943	1938	0.289	0.81
Germany	1945	1938	0.406	0.94
Austria	1945	1938	0.371	0.91
Japan	1945	1938	0.303	0.83
Dom. Rep.	1965	1965	0.237	0.33
Grenada	1983	-	NA	NA
Panama	1989	1985	0.426	0.66
Haiti 1	1993	1990	0.200	0.13
Haiti 2	2004	2000	0.227	0.13
Sierra Leone	1999	1995	0.128	0.06
Namibia	1989	1985	0.331	0.42
Cambodia	1991	1990	0.223	0.16
Mozambique	1992	1990	0.149	0.08
Rwanda	1993	1990	0.133	0.07
Angola	1995	1995	0.147	0.07
East Timor 1	1999	1995	0.354	0.39
East Timor 2	2006	2005	0.252	0.14
Congo	1999	1995	0.148	0.07
Macedonia	2001	2000	0.459	0.58
Liberia	2003	2000	0.229	0.14
Sol. Islands	2003	2000	0.242	0.15
Burundi	2004	2000	0.159	0.07
Ivory Coast	2004	2000	0.217	0.12
Bosn.-Herz.	1995	-	NA	NA
Kosovo	1999	1995	0.424	0.55
Afghanistan	2001	2000	0.116	0.05
Iraq	2003	2000	0.273	0.19

Source: Historical Human Development Index by Padros de la Escosura (2015)

Note: East Timor 1 is represented by data of Indonesia as it was not independent before 1999. Kosovo is represented by data of Serbia as it was not independent before 1999.

4.1.3 Variables of Socio-cultural Conditions

Variable 3: Ethnic Fractionalization

Regarding the socio-cultural factors influencing successful democratization, the literature found out that societies which are highly fractionalized have more problems to become democracies than societies which are relatively homogeneous. For this reason, the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (HIEF) dataset by Dražanová (2019) is taken into consideration. This dataset contains ethnic fractionalization scores for 165 countries around the world from 1945 until 2013. Because the HIEF measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals within a country are not from the same ethnic group the dataset needs to be negated in order to provide scores in the correct direction for the analysis. This means that the negated ethnic fractionalization index ranges from 0, where each individual belongs to his or her own ethnic group and the country therefore is heterogeneous to 1, when there is no ethnic fractionalization and all individuals are members of the same ethnic group and the country is therefore homogeneous.

For this variable, an approach like for the variable of human development where the reference values are taken for every country-year in order to determine the three threshold values to create the fuzzy set is not necessary. This is due to the fact that in contradistinction to the maximum and minimum human development scores changed significantly for the single years under investigation, this is not the case for the HIEF dataset. In fact, the boundary values of individual cases within the HIEF dataset are close to the overall boundary values of 0 and 1 determining the range of the index. As a consequence, the total population is distributed over the whole range for basically all years under investigation. An adjustment of individual year minimum and maximum values would not lead to a significant change of the values by calculating the fuzzy set. The following operationalization of this variable is displayed in Table 6.

Table 6. *Variable 3 Ethnic Fractionalization*

Country	Year	Negated HIEF = Fuzzy Value
Italy	1943	0.97
Germany	1945	0.93
Austria	1945	0.95
Japan	1945	0.99
Dom. Rep.	1965	0.59
Grenada	1983	NA
Panama	1989	0.44
Haiti 1	1993	0.89
Haiti 2	2004	0.90
Sierra Leone	1999	0.20
Namibia	1989	0.28
Cambodia	1991	0.82
Mozambique	1992	NA
Rwanda	1993	0.77
Angola	1995	0.22
East Timor 1	1999	0.14
East Timor 2	2006	0.15
Congo	1999	0.28
Macedonia	2001	0.46
Liberia	2003	0.11
Sol. Islands	2003	0.90
Burundi	2004	0.70
Ivory Coast	2004	0.27
Bosn.-Herz.	1995	0.34
Kosovo	1999	NA
Afghanistan	2001	0.27
Iraq	2003	0.57

Source: Negated Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization by Drazanova (2019)

Note: Italy is represented by data from the year 1945, Germany from 1949, Namibia from 1990 and East Timor 1 from 2002.

4.1.4 Predecessor Regime and Transition Mode

Variable 4: Predecessor Regime

For the third section comprising the predecessor regime and transition mode, again, two variables are developed. The first variable looks at the type of predecessor regime of a country targeted by an MDI. The operationalization process is guided by the typology

by Linz and Stepan (1997). Their four developed predecessor regimes – authoritarian, post-totalitarian, sultanistic and totalitarian – are assigned to the respective target countries and the corresponding predecessor regime. However, there are some cases which are not classifiable as one of the four idealistic regime types. This is mainly due to the fact that these countries are war-ridden and can be rather categorized as failed states. Other countries to the contrary were already democratic or at least slightly democratic before the MDI took place. Therefore, the author decided to create a six-value fuzzy set with the following assignments (see Table 7).

Table 7. Operationalization of Variable 4 Predecessor Regime

Fuzzy Values	Predecessor Regime Type
1	(Limited) democratic
0.80	Authoritarian
0.60	Post-totalitarian
0.40	Sultanistic
0.20	Totalitarian
0	Failed State and/or Civil War

Table 7 shows that the assumption is made that the scale by Linz and Stepan (1997) can be divided in the middle in order to distinguish between beneficial and unfavorable predecessor regime types. This means that authoritarian and post-totalitarian predecessor regimes are more members of the set of beneficial regime types. However, they are topped by (limited) democratic regimes which provide the most advantageous conditions for an external democratization through an MDI simply because the country was in the very last period before the intervention already democratically ruled. It is assumed that the state apparatus, the economy and the civil society are best prepared for democratization if the country experienced such a system already in the years before the intervention takes place. The fuzzy values on the other part of the scale, meaning the unfavorable regime types regarding successful democratization, begin with the sultanistic and totalitarian regimes. After the array of all the four predecessor regime types by Linz and Stepan (1997) in descending order the bottom of the fuzzy set is defined by failed states and/or target countries which experienced civil wars before the intervention took place. Failed states and the causes of civil wars lead to fully destroyed state apparatuses as well as the destruction of the economy as a whole. Additionally, the society is influenced by these circumstances in that way that those regimes which can be categorized as failed states or countries experienced civil wars constitute the most

unfavorable predecessor regime. A precondition for MDI target countries in order to be categorized within this lastly mentioned group with a civil war as the main predecessor regime characteristic is that the conflict is listed in either the Correlates of War dataset (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) or in the New War List (Chojnacki & Reisch, 2008). Only if at least one of the sources lists the civil war than the country can be categorized in the most unfavorable predecessor regime type. If the country could be described as an authoritarian one but it still experienced a civil war in the period before the intervention took place, the country is categorized on the civil war level because it is assumed that the consideration of the worst regime type provides the most valid results in the analysis. A country, its state apparatus, its economy and its citizens are expected to be more influenced by the consequences of a civil war than by the formally present authoritarian ruling characteristics.

The data for categorizing the cases regarding their regime type present before the intervention is collected from primary and secondary literature examining especially the conditions of the countries before the external power arrived (see Appendix Table 1). Because of that, for every case a number between two and five sources is taken into consideration in order to define the predecessor regime on the levels of pluralism, ideology, mobilization and leadership developed by Linz and Stepan (1997). In consequence, the results of the operationalization of variable 4 for the 27 cases is presented in Table 8.

Table 8. *Variable 4 Predecessor Regime Type*

Country	Year	Predecessor Regime Type	Listing in COW Dataset	Listing in New List of Wars	Fuzzy Values
Italy	1943	Totalitarian			0.20
Germany	1945	Totalitarian			0.20
Austria	1945	Totalitarian			0.20
Japan	1945	Authoritarian			0.80
Dom. Rep.	1965	Sultanistic			0.40
Grenada	1983	Authoritarian			0.80
Panama	1989	Authoritarian			0.80
Haiti 1	1993	Sultanistic			0.40
Haiti 2	2004	Civil War + Failed State			0
Sierra Leone	1999	Auth. + Civil War	1991-2000	1991-1996 + 1998-2000	0
Namibia	1989	Indep. + Civil War	1967-1989	1975-1988	0
Cambodia	1991	Auth. + Failed State	1979-1998	1989-1991	0
Mozambique	1992	Auth. + Civil War	1979-1992	1979-1992	0
Rwanda	1993	Auth./Sult. + Civil War	1990-1994		0
Angola	1995	Civil War + Auth./Tot.	1975-1995	1976-1991 + 1992-1994	0
East Timor 1	1999	Indep. + Auth.			0.80
East Timor 2	2006	Indep. + Auth.			0.80
Congo	1999	Auth./Sult. + Civil War	1993-1994 + 1996-1997	1998-2002	0
Macedonia	2001	Limited Democratic			1
Liberia	2003	Auth. + Civil War	2001-2003	2002-2003	0
Sol. Islands	2003	Failed State + Civil War			0
Burundi	2004	Failed State + Civil War	1993-2006	2001-2003	0
Ivory Coast	2004	Failed State + Civil War	2002-2005	2002-2004	0
Bosn.-Herz.	1995	Indep. + Civil War	1992-1995	1992-1994 + 1995	0
Kosovo	1999	Indep. + Civil War	1998-2000	1998-1999	0
Afghanistan	2001	Failed State + Civil War	1992-2002	1989-2001	0
Iraq	2003	Totalitarian			0.20

Source: Predecessor Regime Type classified according to literature findings (see Appendix Table 1). Correlates of War (COW) data by Sarkees and Wayman (2010). New War List by Chojnacki & Reisch (2008).

Variable 5: Intervention Type

The type of intervention constitutes the second variable within the section of the predecessor regime and transition mode and covers the latter part. Although the name of the variable implies that it measures only the type of intervention, the intention of the variable is a different though. The primary reason for choosing the type of intervention as a variable is its significance for the transition mode itself and its clarity.

Grimm (2010a) distinguishes in her analyses between six different intervention types which are characterized as (1) an invasion after an interstate war, (2+3) military interventions aimed at restoring a democratically elected government, (4) international peace missions in order to monitor a peace treaty, (5) humanitarian interventions to end genocide and civil war and (6) democratic interventions in autocratically governed states to force regime change. The labels of the individual categories themselves seem to describe solely mission characteristics but in fact the intervention type also says something about the encountered target country of an MDI and the situation of that country before the intervention. The classification in these six different categories gives insights in the state of conflict which poses the reason for the MDI. Whereas cases of category 1 constitute a long interstate war between both external actor and target country, category 2 and 3 contain target countries which actively asked for support by the external actor. Therefore, the relationship between both external actor and target country are completely different in category 1 compared to category 2 and 3. Whereas the former category is characterized by an antagonistic relationship, the external actor in the latter cases are actively welcomed by the struggling democratic government. Cases of category 1 are characterized by coercion and a comprehensive elimination of the old power elites and therefore make for clear cut between peace and war period but also a clear cut between losers and winners (Grimm, 2010a). The course of interstate wars like in category 1 is to be distinguished from acts of help and support like in category 2 and 3. The fact that all the interstate cases of category 1 are characterized by a clear cut between war and peace including also a clear relationship between winners and losers (the unconditional surrender) provides the MDI with a special foundation. Whereas the war by itself is a crucial part of the MDI for all the other categories of intervention type, this is not the case for category 1. Here, the begin of the MDI is located at the end of the war.

Target countries of category 2 and 3 in turn have a completely different relationship to the external actor what also influences prospects for the later establishment of a stable democratic regime structure. The MDI is based on support, help and assistance for the democratic partner country and therefore includes also acts of war. The opponents of the democratic regime trying to topple the elected government are tried to eliminate by the external actor. Furthermore, a long-term engagement in the target country is very seldom. Compared to the first category, the whole state structures, the economy and the

society in countries of the second and third category are not that much negatively affected. For those countries, the assistance by the external actor arrives relatively quickly meaning that the actors opposing the democratically governed regime do not have time to convert the society, economy and state apparatus as they want.

International peace missions of category 4 again need to be differentiated from the preceding categories. These interventions are implemented in order to monitor a peace treaty which has further implications for the MDI. First of all, comparable to cases of category 1 there is already a kind of clear cut between war and peace in form of a peace treaty which is in need of a monitoring actor. The preceding conflict between two or more actors obviously is brought to a kind of agreement which ends the combat actions and builds an initial step for a post-war order. The external actor is neither a party to the conflict and later occupier as cases of category 1 nor does it actively help to defeat an opponent as cases of category 2 and 3. The external actor implementing the intervention constitutes – as much as it is possible – an impartial third party. The situation is therefore quite different as the cut between war and peace is just marked by a peace agreement posing the possibility for a back fall and the unclear situation between interveners and the conflict parties. Whereas in category 1 the winner of the conflict had the possibility to impose their demands on the target country simply because they won the conflict, this relationship differs in category 4 because here the executor of the MDI was never part of the conflict and is often just seen as an impartial observer.

Cases of category 5 in turn display again a different relationship between target country and external actor. In order to end genocide and/or civil war, the external actor actively intervenes in the conflict and this usually without the permission of the target country (Holzgrefe, 2007). Additionally, the preceding conflict is not solved yet. Instead, the intervention again includes the task not only to democratize the country but in a first step to end the conflict. It is unclear whether the MDI is able to solve both of these tasks at the same time especially when we are talking about genocides reflecting a deeply rooted ethnic conflict.

Democratic interventions of category 6 with the aim of forcing regime change in autocratically governed states are again a special type of intervention because here the actual preceding conflict does not exist. In fact, the intervention itself constitutes the conflict. That means that the external actor actively attacks the target country without

being militarily involved in a conflict with this country. However, diplomatic or economic conflicts between both the intervener and the target country can be present. This means that the conflict is not solved by the time of the start of the intervention because the conflict just starts with the beginning of the MDI.

In summary, not all interveners are also part of the preceding conflict within the target country. This is only true for category 1. To the contrary, external actors in category 2, 3, 4 and 5 were not part of the preceding conflict and cases of category 6 in fact have no preceding conflict because the intervention poses the actual conflict. Also, only conflicts of category 1 are solved and provide a clear cut between peace and war as well as winners and losers. This is not the case for category 2, 3, 5 and 6 where the conflict is not solved and instead is part of the tasks the intervention is expected to solve. The solution of the conflicts of category 4 is present in form of a peace treaty but unsure if it is of long continuance. This categorization is the basis for the operationalization of the variable and the actual assignment to the fuzzy values displayed in Table 9 and Table 10.

Table 9. *Operationalization for Variable 5
Intervention Type*

Fuzzy Values	Transition Mode
1	1
0.80	2+3
0.60	4
0.40	
0.20	5
0	6

Table 10. *Variable 5 Transition Mode*

Country	Year	Transition Mode	Fuzzy Values
Italy	1943	1	1.00
Germany	1945	1	1.00
Austria	1945	1	1.00
Japan	1945	1	1.00
Dom. Rep.	1965	2	0.80
Grenada	1983	2	0.80
Panama	1989	2	0.80
Haiti 1	1993	3	0.80
Haiti 2	2004	4	0.60
Sierra Leone	1999	3	0.80
Namibia	1989	4	0.60
Cambodia	1991	4	0.60
Mozambique	1992	4	0.60
Rwanda	1993	4	0.60
Angola	1995	4	0.60
East Timor 1	1999	4	0.60
East Timor 2	2006	4	0.60
Congo	1999	4	0.60
Macedonia	2001	4	0.60
Liberia	2003	4	0.60
Sol. Islands	2003	4	0.60
Burundi	2004	4	0.60
Ivory Coast	2004	4	0.60
Bosn.-Herz.	1995	5	0.20
Kosovo	1999	5	0.20
Afghanistan	2001	6	0.00
Iraq	2003	6	0.00

Source: Transition Mode by Grimm (2010a)

4.1.5 State Capacity and Nation Building

Variable 6: Democratic Experience

To put the section of state capacity and nation building in concrete concepts possible to measure adequately is challenging. Because state capacity is not measured in any annual data or country report and the presence of the feeling of a nation within the target country's society is also hard to capture the author decided to choose another factor which is nevertheless part of both the degree of state capacity and nation building. For this reason, the democratic experience of target countries is taken into consideration as a proxy variable. If an MDI target country has had a democratic regime already before, the literature expects that another change to democracy is more likely than if the country

and with that the state apparatus, the society and the economy never before had the chance to test democracy (Pei & Kasper, 2003).

A target country which already had a stable democratic system in the past is more likely to experience successful democratization simply because the two factors of this section were already proven to be existent in the specific country. The state apparatus meaning the administration on the national and local level already knows how to function under a democratic regime as well as the civil society already once demonstrated that it was capable of building a nation in order to form a democratically ruled state. In turn, if a target country never had an experience with a democratic state it will become even harder for the external actor to democratize the country. Neither the bureaucratic apparatus nor the society know how to behave within a democratic system and therefore the democratization project is much more vulnerable than in a country with democratic experience.

From 27 cases in this analysis after all only six target countries had experience with democracy before the MDI takes place. Interestingly, none of the cases of category 2 and 3 of variable 4 meaning military interventions aimed at restoring a democratically elected government is part of this small democratic experienced group of countries. The information for the cases is taken from qualitative sources meaning country reports or intervention reports as well as quantitative data of the Polity5 Project. Only one country, the Solomon Islands, had 25 years of fully democratic experience right before the intervention in 2003 was conducted. Macedonia, which was targeted by an MDI in 2001 also had direct experience with democracy, however its system can be rather described as a functioning but nevertheless limited democratic structure. For this reason, the Solomon Islands reaches the fuzzy value of 1 because it is the sole country having direct democratic experience over a very long period providing the best position for an MDI. Because Macedonia also had direct experience with democracy, but its state structures had a sort of limited democratic character it reaches 0.8 on the fuzzy scale. The two central-European countries Germany and Austria had both a 15-year period of democratic experience following World War I. For both countries, this first experience with democracy lasted until 1933. Therefore, in 1945 when Germany and Austria were MDI target countries, both had a history of 12-year autocratic ruling and 15-year democratic ruling. This is why both countries are ranked on the 0.6 value on the fuzzy

scale. Lastly, only the very limited experience with democracy by Japan during the 1920s is taken into consideration for the variable of democratic experience and this also only for the assignment of the fuzzy value of 0.2. Cambodia's very short experience with democratic structures from 1946 until 1952 is too short and too far away to have any positive effects on the success of the MDI conducted in 1991. Because almost two generations ago the short period of democratic experience happened, it is assumed that neither the society nor the state apparatus could take recourse to this first experience. Together with all the other remaining 21 cases, Cambodia receives the fuzzy value of 0 because these countries had no experience with democracy and therefore neither the state apparatus nor the society could take recourse on any already acquired behavioral patterns. This is displayed in Table 11.

Table 11. *Variable 6 Democratic Experience*

Country	Year	Democratic Experience	Fuzzy Values
Italy	1943	no experience	0.00
Germany	1945	1918-1933 Weimar Republic	0.60
Austria	1945	1918-1933 First Austrian Republic	0.60
Japan	1945	very limited experience with Taisho Democracy during 1920s	0.20
Dom. Rep.	1965	no experience	0.00
Grenada	1983	no experience	0.00
Panama	1989	no experience	0.00
Haiti 1	1993	no experience	0.00
Haiti 2	2004	no experience	0.00
Sierra Leone	1999	no experience	0.00
Namibia	1989	no experience	0.00
Cambodia	1991	limited experience from 1946-1952	0.00
Mozambique	1992	no experience	0.00
Rwanda	1993	no experience	0.00
Angola	1995	no experience	0.00
East Timor 1	1999	no experience	0.00
East Timor 2	2006	no experience	0.00
Congo	1999	no experience	0.00
Macedonia	2001	since 1991 functioning, but limited democracy	0.80
Liberia	2003	no experience	0.00
Sol. Islands	2003	already parliamentary democracy since 1978	1.00
Burundi	2004	no experience	0.00
Ivory Coast	2004	no experience	0.00
Bosn.-Herz.	1995	no experience	0.00
Kosovo	1999	no experience	0.00
Afghanistan	2001	no experience	0.00
Iraq	2003	no experience	0.00

Source: Democratic Experience according to literature findings (see Appendix Table 1)

4.1.6 International Context

Variable 7: Democratic Neighborhood

Coming to the last section, the international context, again two variables are gathered. The first one is the democratic neighborhood. For this variable, the regime characteristics of the neighbor countries of MDI target countries are investigated. The data for all 27 cases comprises over 100 neighbor countries which are all measured analogous to the dependent variable of the analysis. Again, for all neighbor countries the values of the Polity5 Project and the Freedom House Index is collected. In a next step, only those neighbor countries with both values over +6 (for Polity5) and values between 1.0 and 2.5 (for Freedom House) are labeled as full democracies and therefore receive the fuzzy value 1. For those countries, where only one index is available, this single value is valid. Accordingly, the operationalization displayed in Table 2 is adopted. In a final step, the average of the fuzzy values of all neighbor countries of a specific case is calculated. This fuzzy value between 1 and 0 constitutes the variable of democratic neighborhood. MDI target countries with a fully democratic neighborhood therefore reach a fuzzy value of 1 whereas MDI target countries with a fully autocratic neighborhood reach a fuzzy value of 0. Whereas all the assignments of the single neighbor countries are listed in the Appendix Table 3, the results of the operationalization procedure for variable 7 are displayed in Table 12.

Table 12. *Variable 7 Democratic Neighborhood*

Country	Year	Fuzzy Values
Italy	1943	0.25
Germany	1945	0.84
Austria	1945	0.40
Japan	1945	0.00
Dom. Rep.	1965	0.00
Grenada	1983	1.00
Panama	1989	0.90
Haiti 1	1993	0.60
Haiti 2	2004	0.66
Sierra Leone	1999	0.30
Namibia	1989	0.32
Cambodia	1991	0.13
Mozambique	1992	0.33
Rwanda	1993	0.10
Angola	1995	0.60
East Timor 1	1999	0.80
East Timor 2	2006	1.00
Congo	1999	0.27
Macedonia	2001	0.85
Liberia	2003	0.27
Sol. Islands	2003	0.80
Burundi	2004	0.33
Ivory Coast	2004	0.64
Bosn.-Herz.	1995	0.20
Kosovo	1999	0.53
Afghanistan	2001	0.10
Iraq	2003	0.30

Source: Own calculation according to Polity5 by Marshall (2020) and Freedom House (2020). For additional information see Appendix Table 3.

Variable 8: Regional Stability

The second variable within the section of international context is the stability of the neighboring region of MDI target countries. For this variable, the same neighbor countries of MDI target countries as investigated in the democratic neighborhood variable are examined with regard to their stability. Stability in this case is measured with the presence or absence of inter- and intrastate wars within the respective neighbor country in the year of the intervention. Neighbor countries which display an inter- or intrastate war in the Correlates of War Project data (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) or in the New List of Wars (Chojnacki & Reisch, 2008) are therefore labeled as unstable (1). Countries not involved in any conflict are categorized as stable (0). The negated average of the neighboring countries for the specific target country constitutes also the fuzzy value for the variable of regional stability (see Table 13). In consequence, MDI target countries with a neighborhood completely entangled in inter- and intrastate conflicts reach a low fuzzy value signaling a low regional stability and respectively providing unfavorable conditions for successful democratization. MDI target countries with a peaceful neighborhood in turn reach a high fuzzy value what indicates that the regional stability is high. Thus, the conditions for successful democratization are advantageous.

Table 13. *Variable 8 Regional Stability*

Country	Year	Fuzzy Values
Italy	1943	0.75
Germany	1945	0.78
Austria	1945	0.40
Japan	1945	0.00
Dom. Rep.	1965	1.00
Grenada	1983	1.00
Panama	1989	0.51
Haiti 1	1993	1.00
Haiti 2	2004	1.00
Sierra Leone	1999	0.51
Namibia	1989	0.40
Cambodia	1991	1.00
Mozambique	1992	0.66
Rwanda	1993	0.75
Angola	1995	1.00
East Timor 1	1999	0.00
East Timor 2	2006	1.00
Congo	1999	0.33
Macedonia	2001	1.00
Liberia	2003	0.66
Sol. Islands	2003	1.00
Burundi	2004	0.66
Ivory Coast	2004	1.00
Bosn.-Herz.	1995	0.51
Kosovo	1999	0.66
Afghanistan	2001	1.00
Iraq	2003	1.00

Source: Own calculation according to Correlates of War by Sarkees and Wayman (2010) and New War List by Chojnacki and Reisch (2008). For additional information see Appendix Table 2.

Note: Panama, Sierra Leone and Bosnia-Herzegovina had originally a fuzzy value of 0.5. As this should be avoided, they were recoded to 0.51.

5.2 Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics shown in Table 14 depicts the mean values of the variables, their maximums, and minimums as well as the standard deviation. Almost all variables are distributed between 0 and 1 meaning that both their maximum and minimum reach the ends of the fuzzy scale. Only V2 Human Development and V3 Ethnic Fractionalization have a smaller range which is still almost consistent with the natural boundaries of the fuzzy set scale. Besides 234 data points where data is collected, eight missing values distributed over three variables are present. The standard deviation ranges around 0.3 for all variables. Regarding their mean values, two variables protrude in the analysis of the descriptive statistics. Both V4 Predecessor Regime Type and V6 Democratic Experience display mean values close to the minimum values of 0 compared to the other variables. This finding could be important for the interpretation of the results later.

Table 14. *Descriptive Statistics of the Variables*

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum	N Cases	Missing
Democracy	0.6148148	0.3524556	0	1	27	0
V1GDP	0.5479167	0.324281	0.06	1	24	3
V2HumDev	0.322	0.29531	0.05	0.94	25	2
V3EthnicFract	0.5475	0.3096133	0.11	0.99	24	3
V4PreRegime	0.2444444	0.3370167	0	1	27	0
V5InterType	0.6222222	0.2629369	0	1	27	0
V6DemExp	0.1185185	0.2735731	0	1	27	0
V7DemNeighb	0.4640741	0.3047799	0	1	27	0
V8RegStab	0.7266667	0.3031318	0	1	27	0

5.3 Results

After the operationalization of the variables and the assignment to the fuzzy sets, there are two remaining analysis steps in QCA approaches. In the first place, the dataset is examined regarding the presence of single necessary conditions and possible configurations of variables constituting necessary conditions (Wagemann & Siewert, 2018). Following that, the second step comprises the analysis of sufficient conditions with the help of a truth table (Wagemann & Siewert, 2018).

5.3.1 Analysis of Necessary Conditions

The analysis of necessary conditions inspects all single variables in their relation to the outcome variable of democracy. A condition can be interpreted as necessary if there are no or relatively few cases in which the outcome occurs without the condition. This perspective thus checks whether those cases in which outcome “democracy” is present also display condition X.

The results of the analysis are presented in Table 15. In order to interpret a condition as necessary, the benchmark of a consistency value of 0.9 has been established in the scientific debate (Ragin, 2006; Wagemann & Siewert, 2018). However, as Wagemann and Siewert (2018) emphasize, the automatic application of this value in the analysis harbors uncertainty because the value of consistency is dependent on the number of cases, the operationalization of the outcome as well as the condition itself or the empiric distribution of data. The case-oriented approach of QCA therefore allows to check in detail whether some outliers falsify the result or if some paradigmatic cases impact the result in a certain way (Wagemann & Siewert, 2018).

Table 15. *Analysis of Necessary Conditions*


Variable	Consistency	Coverage
V1GDP	0.752206	0.849668
V2HumDev	0.511029	0.963939
V3EthnicFract	0.644853	0.748933
V4PreRegime	0.382353	0.896552
V5InterType	0.852941	0.805555
V6DemExp	0.220588	0.937500
V7DemNeighb	0.608823	0.808594
V8RegStab	0.672794	0.619499

Note: Outcome Variable: Democracy

Of the eight single variables none shows a consistency value of 0.9 or higher. Only variable 5 Intervention Type is with a value of 0.85 close to the benchmark. To make sure whether this variable constitutes a necessary condition or not a closer look at the variable is needed. The XY-plot displayed in Figure 5 shows the distribution of observed pairs of values of the dependent variable of democracy and variable 5 Intervention Type. The depicted data pairs show that the assumption that variable 5 could constitute a necessary condition is false. If that would be the case, all the data points need to be located in the lower right half of the XY-plot (colored area). It would

only be allowed to have one or two data points in the other half in order to label variable 5 as a necessary condition. To have no necessary condition identified in the analysis is a legitimate and frequent result in social science data as Schneider and Wagemann (2013) state in their work. Therefore, this first step of the QCA approach provides the result that none of the variables in the analysis serves as a necessary condition for successful democratization.

Figure 5. *XY-Plot Democracy - Variable 5 Intervention Type*



5.3.2 Analysis of Sufficient Conditions

In the centrum of the analysis of sufficient conditions is the truth table containing all logically possible combinations of the examined variables. In this analysis, the truth table consists of eight conditions and therefore includes 256 (2^8) truth table rows. Of these 256 logical combinations, 17 are represented by 21 MDI target countries of the present dataset. Due to some missing values in the dataset, six cases are not displayed in the truth table. The truth table fulfills descriptive as well as analytic functions and is

important because it provides the research process with three important tasks. Firstly, it is the ideal-typical characteristic framework and assigns the specific cases to the condition configuration that best captures the respective case (Ragin, 2000). Secondly, it provides information at a glance about which logically possible configurations have no fitting observable cases and are thus identifiable as logical rudiments (Wagemann & Siewert, 2018). Thirdly, the truth table presents information for evaluating the quality of the subset relationship for each empirically observable configuration with the consistency parameter or the identification of contradictory cases (Wagemann & Siewert, 2018). Following the schedule of a QCA, the truth table is analyzed in two steps. First of all, for each of the 17 remaining combinations, the consistency parameter is observed in order to find out whether and how strong a subset relation between the combination of conditions and the cases with the given outcome is. Following that, in a second step the minimization of the truth table is conducted with the help of the Quine-McCluskey algorithm where a conservative, a parsimonious and an intermediate strategy are applied.

The consistency scores of the remaining 17 logical combinations are reported in Table 16. As a benchmark for the consistency values often 0.8 or 0.75 are mentioned (Ragin, 2006; Schneider & Wagemann, 2013). Generally, consistency values of 0.8 can be interpreted as moderate subset relation whereas consistency values over 0.9 signal a strong relation (Wagemann & Siewert, 2018). Therefore, configurations with a consistency score of 0.8 or higher are marked by a 1 in the democracy column in the truth table whereas all the other configurations falling under this threshold are marked by a 0. In consequence, those configurations of conditions showing a high consistency are identified as sufficient. At the same time, all the other configurations with a low consistency value are labeled by a 0 meaning that they are identified as not sufficient. The second step of the sufficiency analysis consists of the minimization, with the aim of eliminating those explanatory factors which can be considered as redundant.

In QCA, a differentiation is made between three different strategies of minimization. They differ from each other in dealing with the problem of limited empiric diversity and therefore in the inclusion of logic remainders in the analysis (Wagemann & Siewert, 2018). The phenomenon of limited diversity is not a special problem for QCA approaches but here it becomes especially manifest. Logical remainders are such rows

in a truth table with a lack of empirical evidence to be included in the sufficiency analysis (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013). The conservative strategy is the most stringent way to deal with logical remainders because in the minimization process all logical remainders are excluded from the sufficiency analysis. The most parsimonious strategy by contrast includes all logical remainders in the analysis. The intermediate strategy also includes logical remainders but only if they are based on easy counterfactuals based on theoretic assumptions. “Easy counterfactuals are defined as those simplifying assumptions that are in line with both the empirical evidence at hand and existing theoretical knowledge on the effect of the single conditions that compose the logical remainder” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2013, p. 168). In order to present the complete analysis, all three strategies are outlined and listed hereinafter. However, the focus of the analysis lies on the variant where all logically redundant conditions are excluded, namely the parsimonious strategy because this approach constitutes a superset of the intermediate and complex solutions.

Table 16. *Truth Table*

V1 GDP	V2 HumDev	V3 EthnicFract	V4 PreRegime	V5 InterType	V6 DemExp	V7 DemNeighb	V8 RegStab	number	Democr.	cases	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	NAM	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	JAP	1	1	1
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	AUT	1	1	1
1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	ETM1	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	SOL	1	1	1
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	GER	1	1	1
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	MAC	1	1	1
1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	ETM2	0.920863	0.888889	0.888889
1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	ITA	0.908451	0.866667	0.866667
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	CON/ DRC	0.907258	0.765306	0.765306
1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	PAN	0.900901	0.857143	0.857143
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	SIE, LIB	0.896936	0.735715	0.735714
1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	2	0	ANG, IVC	0.778182	0.570423	0.570423
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	IRQ	0.738281	0.361905	0.361905
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	DOM	0.702422	0.455696	0.455696
0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	RWA, BUR	0.686842	0.316092	0.316092
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	2	0	HAI1, HAI2	0.623824	0.230769	0.230769

Note: Set-theoretic consistency of causal combinations as subsets of successful democratization.

Conservative Strategy

The conservative strategy, or in the fsQCA statistical program also called complex strategy, in sum provides eight causal configurations that can be interpreted as sufficient conditions for successful democratization after an MDI (see Table 17). Important to highlight is that no single variable on its own is sufficient. Instead, more or less complex configurations of seven or eight variables are listed in the table. These indiscriminate list of configurations does not help to identify sufficient combinations of conditions. Above all, this is due to the contradictory mention of both the presence and absence of a certain variable. By comparing for example line two and three of the truth table of the conservative analysis, one can see that the presence of a high value in the variable of intervention type (V5) and low values of human development (\sim V2), ethnic fractionalization (\sim V3) and democratic experience (\sim V6) are once combined with low values of the other variables (\sim V1, \sim V4, and \sim V7) and once with high values of the same variables (V1, V4, and V7). Additionally, often only one or two examined cases do have a membership in one of the various configurations, mitigating the validity of the results even more. Although the solution consistency value with 0.937 is rather high, the overall coverage with 0.68 is quite low.

Table 17. *Truth Table Analysis Conservative Strategy*

Variable Configuration	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
~V2HumDev*~V3EthnicFract*~V4PreRegime *V5InterType*~V6DemExp*~V7DemNeighb *~V8RegStab	0.202206	0.0220588	0.922819
~V1GDP*~V2HumDev*~V3EthnicFract *~V4PreRegime*V5InterType*~V6DemExp *~V7DemNeighb	0.271324	0.067647	0.866197
V1GDP*~V2HumDev*~V3EthnicFract *V4PreRegime*V5InterType*~V6DemExp *V7DemNeighb	0.138235	0.0632353	0.944724
V1GDP*V2HumDev*~V3EthnicFract *V4PreRegime*V5InterType*V7DemNeighb *V8RegStab	0.0985294	0.0985294	0.924138
V1GDP*V3EthnicFract*~V4PreRegime *V5InterType*V6DemExp*V7DemNeighb *V8RegStab	0.113235	0.0720589	1
V1GDP*V2HumDev*V3EthnicFract *V4PreRegime*V5InterType*~V6DemExp *~V7DemNeighb*~V8RegStab	0.117647	0.0441177	1
V1GDP*V2HumDev*V3EthnicFract *~V4PreRegime*V5InterType*V6DemExp *~V7DemNeighb*~V8RegStab	0.0705882	0.014706	1
V1GDP*V2HumDev*V3EthnicFract *~V4PreRegime*V5InterType*~V6DemExp *~V7DemNeighb*V8RegStab	0.189706	0.0404412	0.908451
frequency cutoff: 1 consistency cutoff: 0.896936 solution coverage: 0.682353 solution consistency: 0.937374			

Intermediate Strategy

Table 18. *Truth Table Analysis Intermediate Strategy*

Variable Configuration	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
~V3EthnicFract*V5InterType*~V7DemNeighb	0.328676	0.190441	0.873047
V1GDP*V2HumDev*V4PreRegime*V5InterType	0.257353	0.0441177	0.964187
V1GDP*V4PreRegime*V5InterType *V7DemNeighb	0.235294	0.0610295	0.888889
V1GDP*V2HumDev*V3EthnicFract*V5InterType*V 6DemExp	0.147794	0.014706	1
V1GDP*V2HumDev*V3EthnicFract*V5InterType*V 8RegStab	0.315441	0.0536765	0.942857
V1GDP*V3EthnicFract*V5InterType*V6DemExp *V7DemNeighb*V8RegStab	0.147059	0.0286765	1
frequency cutoff: 1 consistency cutoff: 0.896936 solution coverage: 0.722794 solution consistency: 0.910185			

The analysis with the intermediate strategy where some of the logical remainders are included provides six causal configurations that can be interpreted as sufficient conditions for successful democratization after an MDI shown in Table 18. Similar to the results of the conservative strategy, no single variable is identified as sufficient for

the outcome. The five configurations consist of three to six variables what makes the sample of possible combinations smaller but also clearer. Whereas the presence of an ethnically homogeneous society (V3) is identified as an condition that is itself insufficient but nonetheless a necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient combination of conditions (INUS) in truth table rows four, five and six, the opposite is displayed in line 1. Here, the absence of a homogeneous society ($\sim V3$) is identified as a component of a sufficient configuration of conditions. Line two to six all contain the presence of a high GDP per capita (V1) as an INUS condition, too, meaning that it is in all the sufficient configurations a decisive component. Here, the overall solution consistency with 0.910 is again high but the solution coverage value with roughly 0.723 is still low. Furthermore the number of cases having a membership in the respective configuration is higher and reaches a maximum of four cases per variable configuration. The majority of configurations, however, display only two cases making the results less valid. Therefore, similar to the conservative strategy, the results provided by the intermediate strategy are not specific enough to connect them with the theoretical assumptions made in chapter 3. However, the inclusion of some logical remainders helps to make the results clearer than they were with the total exclusion of them.

Parsimonious Strategy

Table 19. *Truth Table Analysis Parsimonious Strategy*

Variable Configuration	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
V2HumDev	0.511029	0.0735294	0.963939
V4PreRegime	0.382353	0.0882353	0.896552
$\sim V3$ EthnicFract* $\sim V7$ DemNeighb	0.373529	0.169118	0.863946
V6DemExp	0.220588	0.0191177	0.9375
V1GDP*V3EthnicFract*V7DemNeighb	0.346324	0	0.867403

frequency cutoff: 1

consistency cutoff: 0.896936

solution coverage: 0.872059

solution consistency: 0.875277

The parsimonious strategy provides five truth table rows (see Table 19). In comparison to the previous conservative and intermediate strategy, it provides three single variables identified as sufficient conditions. These are the level of human development (V2) in truth table row one, the type of predecessor regime (V4) displayed in row two and the level of experience with the system of democracy (V6) in row four in the truth table. Those variables on their own are identified as sufficient conditions by the parsimonious strategy. Not only the consistency values for the single sufficient variables or

configuration of variables displayed in the last column are with minimum 0.864 quite high but also the overall solution coverage and solution consistency reach both values over 0.87. Those numbers already indicate that the validity of the data is robust. Furthermore, the values in the column describing raw coverage has acceptable measures and only the value for truth table row four which is slightly above 0.22 seems to be too low. The value of raw coverage measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained by each term of the solution. On the other side, the column of unique coverage measuring the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained solely by each individual solution term are relatively low and at one point even 0. The latter means that those countries described by this specific condition configuration do not only have membership in this configuration but instead are also members of other sufficient single variables or configurations. This can be seen in Table 20 where the membership of the countries in the identified sufficient conditions and configurations is presented. Two countries have a membership in configuration 5 which corresponds to truth table row five, namely Germany and the Solomon Islands. Their unique coverage is 0 because both Germany and the Solomon Islands have also memberships in other configurations. The case of Germany is not only explainable with configuration 5 but also with configuration 1 and 4. That means, that a high GDP, a homogeneous society and a democratic neighborhood displays a sufficient configuration of conditions but at the same time, Germany's successful democratization can also be described by its high human development level (configuration 1) and additionally because of its earlier experience with democracy during the Weimar Republic (configuration 4).

Table 20. *Parsimonious Strategy. Configurations and Country Memberships*

Cases	Membership in Outcome	Configuration				
		1	2	3	4	5
		V2HumDev	V4PreRegime	~V3EthnicFract *~V7DemNeighb	V6DemExp	V1GDP *V3EthnicFract *V7DemNeighb
Italy	1.00	0.81				
Germany	1.00	0.94			0.6	0.84
Austria	1.00	0.91			0.6	
Japan	1.00	0.83	0.80			
Panama	1.00	0.66	0.80			
Sierra Leo.	0.80			0.70		
Namibia	1.00			0.68		
East Timor1	0.80		0.80			
East Timor2	0.80		0.80			
Congo	0.40			0.72		
Macedonia	0.80	0.58	1.00		0.8	
Liberia	0.80			0.73		
Sol. Islands	0.80				1	0.54

consistency cutoff: 0.896936

solution coverage: 0.872059

solution consistency: 0.875277

At the same time, the alternative sufficient explanation for the Solomon Islands provided by the parsimonious analysis strategy is also its long experience with a democratic system directly before the intervention. On the contrary, the configuration which has only members with no membership in another configuration is number 3 with Sierra Leone, Namibia, Congo and Liberia. All four countries can be described only by this specific condition configuration and with no other one. Hence, this configuration has a relatively high unique coverage value compared to the others with 0.169. The remaining configurations all have unique coverage values of smaller than 0.1.

The level of human development in configuration 1 describes a total of 6 countries including all four World War II cases plus Panama and Macedonia. What needs to be highlighted is that this configuration comprises five out of six countries with a membership score of 1.0 in the outcome. No other configuration describes as many cases as configuration 1 and no other configuration consists of members with such a consistently high membership score in the outcome. Even more interesting is the fact that all World War II cases together can be only described by this configuration. This clustering of cases related to each other is not only visible with this configuration as will be shown in the following.

Configuration 2 comprising the type of predecessor regime describes five cases among them Japan, Panama, Macedonia, and East Timor twice. For this configuration no territorial or temporal cluster can be identified. What needs to be kept in mind is the fact that East Timor is listed two times as a member in this configuration. This is not problematic because the two MDIs in East Timor are consciously included within the sample. However, for the interpretation of the results one clearly has to consider the influence of the first intervention on the second. To include both MDIs as single interventions is therefore reasonable. For the interpretation, nonetheless, it is important to reconsider that the second intervention constrains the validity of the results to a certain point.

Maybe the most surprising condition configuration is the third one which displays a result rather contrary to the theoretical assumptions. An ethnically fractionalized civil society together with the location of the MDI target country in an undemocratic neighborhood is identified as a sufficient configuration of conditions for successful democratization. In total four cases have a membership in this configuration: Sierra Leone, Namibia, Congo, and Liberia. What first stands out is the fact that all four countries are located on the African continent. In particular, these four African countries are the only ones on their continent that can be assigned to a sufficient configuration in the analysis. The other four African countries (Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, and Ivory Coast) are missing in the sufficiency analysis completely. Furthermore, as noticed above, the four countries with a membership in configuration 3 have only one membership and therefore cannot be described with another configuration of conditions. Again, the result of the sufficiency analysis reveals that whenever a country is ethnically fractionalized and at the same time is located between undemocratic neighboring countries than successful democratization is likely to occur. This stands in contrast to the theoretical assumptions for both variables.

Also explaining four countries of the sample, the preceding experience with democracy is to be found in configuration 4. Germany, Austria, Macedonia, and the Solomon Islands were obviously able to draw a connection to their first experiences with the political system of democracy and built up the externally enforced democratization on exactly this previous experience. Of the 27 cases of the sample, only five exhibit experience with democracy and out of those five only four exceeded the cross-over

point of 0.5. Exactly those four countries are not explained by configuration 4. The distribution of the cases should definitely be taken into consideration when interpreting the results.

Configuration 5 is the only one consisting of three single conditions. Nevertheless, it is also the configuration with the lowest number of cases having a membership in it. Only two countries, Germany and the Solomon Islands are members of this configuration. As outlined above, this is the only configuration which has no unique members which have only membership in this configuration. The conditions of a high GDP per capita, an ethnically homogeneous civil society and a democratic neighborhood together are identified as sufficient for successful democratization. However, this is somehow in contradistinction to configuration 3 where the absence of a homogeneous society and the absence of a democratic neighborhood were identified as sufficient for the outcome. With the variable of a high GDP, the effect of both variables of ethnic fractionalization and democratic neighborhood seems to change to the opposite. What needs to be taken into account, too, is the fact that one of the two countries, the Solomon Islands, show a very low membership score of 0.54 in this configuration and therefore is barely even a member.

5.4 Discussion

The QCA of conditions for successful democratization after an MDI provides the following insights. At first, the analysis does not discover any necessary conditions. Also, variables close to the benchmark are tested individually whether the standards are not fulfilled anyway. As this was not the case, the analysis proceeded and focused on the analysis of sufficient conditions. Here, the three strategies of conservative, intermediate, and parsimonious analysis were adopted. Whereas the conservative and the intermediate strategy provided rather ambiguous data with no clear interpretable result, this was not the case for the parsimonious strategy. By including all logical remainders, the parsimonious strategy provides in total five different configurations of variables which can be interpreted as sufficient conditions for successful democratization. However, as the description of the result already showed, some questions are still open how to interpret the different variables and how valid the results are. Wagemann and Siewert (2018) are critical about drawing causal correlations out of QCA results. This is due to the fact that similar to the dictum according to which

correlation is not to be equated with causality, it also applies in QCA that quantity relationships are no more, but also no less than empirically observable relationships (Wagemann & Siewert, 2018).

From a total sample of 27 cases only 21 were included in the analysis by the statistical program fsQCA. This happened due to missing data points in the dataset for some of the cases. The parsimonious analysis strategy than provides sufficient condition configurations which apply for 13 cases. This halving of the sample which is present in the end is not uncommon for QCA approaches, however, it is a fact that needs to be taken into consideration while thinking about the generalization effects. Out of the five sufficient conditions, three are single variables. The one variable with the highest number of cases with a membership in it is the level of human development a country displays before the intervention takes place. In total, six countries are captured by this condition which means that again half of the countries remaining in the analysis have a membership in this condition. The fact that four of the six countries are cases related to World War II is of special importance. Obviously, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Japan all benefited from their high human development level compared to the overall development level of the world at that time. As this variable is part of the socio-economic and modernization cluster, it seems, that this cluster was especially relevant for the democratization efforts following World War II.

The reason for the successful transition to democracy as a result of the MDI because of a high level of human development could be find in the importance of the countries within the international community. Developed and therefore most often also rich countries often play important roles within the international community. They constitute important trade partners and because of that they have more influence in world politics than other countries which are comparably lower developed. As all four loser states of World War II were such highly developed countries, they presumably also played such key roles on the international level. Therefore, a reason for intervening actors to insist on successful democratization processes in those four countries could lie in the intention to prevent future wars and conflicts with those important countries which easily would come back to old strength after the war. As the latter already happened after World War I where Germany, although democratically ruled, quickly occupied its important role on the European continent which it had already before and from this position of strength

changed rapidly into a totalitarian system, this could present a motive for external actors to insist on a successful implementation of a stable and mature democracy. For Panama and Macedonia, the other two countries with a membership for this first configuration, a similar approach can be applied. The high level of human development of Panama can be traced back most likely to the existence of the Panama Canal. As it is one of the most important waterways, Panama occupied an important position within the world's economy. External actors therefore had a high interest in successful democratization of Panama because otherwise this would have implied big losses for the world economy. A stable partner was sought and as the democratic peace theory assumes that democratic countries do not war each other and instead are able to solve conflicts non-violently, the democratization process was pursued consequently.

To adopt a similar approach to Macedonia is more challenging. Sure, the country is a member of the developed countries, compared to the other countries of this configuration, however its membership score is rather low. For this country, maybe not the human development level on its own but instead a prospect for a lighthouse project on the Balkans played a role. After a violent decade in the 1990s, Macedonia with its high development level constituted a promising candidate for an MDI. Especially for the European countries, a beginning stabilization of its neighborhood was targeted and after failures in Bosnia-Herzegovina a more stringent attempt was adopted. The analysis provides the most significant results for this configuration of human development as a sufficient condition for successful democratization. After looking closer into the single cases it becomes clear that not only the human development level itself needs to be the direct influencing variable but maybe other considerations of the external actor and factors are affected by the human development leading to successful democratization. However, as the analysis provides stable figures and numbers for this variable, the human development of MDI target countries should be definitely tested in more detail in specific analyses dealing only with this variable.

The interpretation of the second configuration with the variable of the type of predecessor regime needs to be seen more critical. This is because of two reasons. First of all, not only the number of cases with a membership is smaller here but also both East Timor cases are explained by this configuration. Although those cases are included separately in the dataset it is questionable whether both cases can be considered as two

separate cases or whether the connection between both is actually higher than assumed. Only seven years lie between both interventions what raises first concerns. That both missions do not influence each other is therefore unlikely. Instead, the author proposes to see both cases not as strictly separate but more as one case influencing each other. This further decreases the number of cases with a membership in that configuration to only four. Therefore, and this is also true for the other remaining configurations, one need to be careful with drawing conclusions out of those results. On the other side, the statistical results provide a profound basis for the overall result implying that the configurations are likely to be sufficient for the outcome. As there is neither a temporal nor a geographical pattern identifiable for configuration 2, it seems that this configuration has an impact over the whole sample of interventions. Cases of the 1940s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s are described by the variable of predecessor regime and those cases are distributed over four continents. That the democratically ruled Macedonia is able to transform in a stable democracy is maybe not a big surprise from a theoretical point of view but that former autocratically ruled countries like Japan, Panama, and East Timor display the favorability of an autocratic predecessor regime for democratization is decisive and gives first insights that the theoretical assumptions made by Linz and Stepan (1997) are going in the right direction.

After scaling down the number of cases with a membership for the second configuration, it aligns with the fourth configuration which also comprises four countries, however a slightly different constellation. It is the last single variable which is identified as a sufficient condition on its own. The cases of Germany, Austria, Macedonia, and the Solomon Islands show the sufficient condition of democratic experience in their forced democratic transition. This means that those four countries successfully took recourse on their experience with a democratic political system in order to stabilize the external democratization effort and additionally that the success of those four countries is adequate for labeling the condition as a sufficient one for the sample. However, a restriction for the validity of the variable is the fact that in the whole sample only five countries exhibit democratic experience at all and those four countries surpassing the cross-over point of 0.5 are listed in this configuration. The variable itself was already unevenly distributed possibly influencing the result in that way. To argue that democratic experience is therefore a generally valid condition

influencing successful democratization is difficult. For this reason, further research with the focus on this variable is needed.

The remaining two configurations consist of more than one variable. This is firstly the presence of an ethnically highly fractionalized society with the presence of a non-democratic neighborhood which together are identified as a sufficient condition for successful democratization. Four countries have a membership in this configuration, namely Sierra Leone, Namibia, Congo, and Liberia. Problematic is not only that all four countries are located on the African continent and the MDIs are outlined within almost one decade. The fact that Congo is the only country with a membership value in the outcome of smaller than 0.5 needs to be highlighted. On the one hand, this means that this condition configuration has a locally and temporally limitable impact. On the other hand, it also says that the countries are not full democracies but instead mitigated forms of democratic rule. Why exactly the negated variables of ethnic fractionalization and democratic neighborhood constitute sufficient conditions for successful democratization is unaccountable from a theoretical point of view. In fact, it contradicts the theoretic assumptions that both variables, no matter in which connection between each other, influence democratization if they are present. The open question which cannot be answered by this research work is why and how ethnically fractionalized societies together with an undemocratic neighborhood should sufficiently influence successful democratization. From the theoretical basis for this work, no logical explanation can explain such a configuration. But indeed, it is interesting that three out of four countries with a membership in this configuration managed a transition to democracy more or less successfully even with these assumed unfavorable conditions. A possible argumentation could also be that because ethnically fractionalization and an undemocratic neighborhood are sufficient conditions for some countries of the sample, those variables are not decisive for the outcome. A successful democratization therefore even works if a country is ethnically fractionalized and located in an undemocratic environment. This provides an interesting starting point for future research projects.

This conclusion is, however, contested by configuration 5, constituting also the last sufficient configuration. Here exactly those two variables, ethnical fractionalization and democratic neighborhood together with the variable of GDP per capita influence democratization positively if they are present. This would imply that the impact of those

two variables change by adding the variable of a high GDP per capita. At least from the theoretical point of view, this context does not seem to make any sense. Instead, because the three variables from configuration 5 match the theoretical assumptions of the work, one is tempted to accept this configuration as a valid variable and in turn to question or reject the other one. This would be beyond question a biased proceeding which could not be accepted in transparent research. The contradictory results of configuration 3 and 5 qualify for further in-depth analyses where those variable constellations are examined in detail.

In summary, the results can be classified as follows. That the analysis does not provide any necessary conditions for the outcome of successful democratization after an MDI is nothing to worry about as this happens relatively often in QCA approaches. The parsimonious analysis strategy for sufficiency then provides five configurations. Out of those five configurations, three single variables are identified as sufficient conditions. Here, especially the presence of a high level of human development and the importance of the advantageousness of the predecessor regime stand out prominently. Both configurations display logically reasonable variable constellations and confirm the theoretical assumptions of the work at least partly. Out of eight variables identified in the transition and state building literature, those two seem to have an impact on successful democratization through intervention. The variable of democratic experience is also identified as a sufficient condition. However, it is doubtful whether the link is real or whether it results only from the uneven distribution of the variable itself. Further investigations for this variable are needed.

This is also true for the two sufficient configurations comprising more than one variable. As both configurations slightly contradict each other, here further analyses should be conducted in order to find out if the results depend on a special geographical background or if there are other mission characteristics leading to such at first view contradicting results. Quite generally, the further investigation of the identified sufficient configurations for quite interesting case configurations with the help of in-depth individual case study approaches and process tracing seems to be appropriate. With the help of the results of the analysis, cases can be examined in closer detail which were not connected before simply because they were geographically and temporarily diverse that a collective analysis did not seem logical. The results of the QCA show that

MDIs from World War II until today are indeed in connection with preconditions identified by the transition and state building literature. Therefore, the assumptions made for democratizing countries are also to some degree valid for democratization in the wake of an MDI. However, to identify causal and underlying mechanisms, further research with a focus on the identified variables is needed.

5.5 Limitations

The QCA presenting an intermediate way of variable-oriented and case-oriented research approach is often criticized from both qualitative and the quantitative researchers. Especially the fact that QCA results are very sensitive to the researcher's discriminatory power raises concerns by some researchers (see e.g. Seawright, 2005; Tanner, 2014). The criticism pertains to basically three points. First, the translation of raw data into set membership scores is seen critically because here often the researcher's bias influences the process significantly. As for some variables this process is straight-forward, other variables give the impression of some degree of arbitrariness. Second, the critique while implementing the analysis itself is the often seemingly random frequency threshold of cases linked to the configurations. Third, the choice of consistency thresholds is often identified as crucial for the later results.

Regarding the first point of criticism, the present work deals transparently and openly with its operationalization criteria. For all variables, the translation process from the raw data into the set membership scores for the fuzzy-set dataset is based on pure theoretic assumptions identified in the transition and state building literature. Therefore, the operationalization criteria are chosen that way that the critique proves to be as small as possible. This proceeding, however, does not rule out other possible operationalization strategies which would be also in accordance with the theoretical foundation. All variables would offer the option to adapt the operationalization in one or another way which would possibly also influence the results of the analysis and therefore the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for successful democratization in the course of MDIs. It begins with the measurement of the dependent variable of democracy which is generously designed and could also be operationalized in a much stricter way in order to label only those countries as (partly) members of the democracy set which are also identified as pure democratic. Some other variables are operationalized straight-forward by purely translating the present dataset into the

membership scores. On the other side, variables such as the level of human development or the type of predecessor regime are dependent on a researcher bias. The former set membership score is dependent on the assignment strategy developed by the author in order to adjust for changing standards over the period under investigation. By contrast, the latter is dependent on both the assessment of the predecessor regime type of other researchers used as sources in this work and the imbalance in the identified literature. If a predecessor regime type is identified as authoritarian than this assignment is based on the findings by the more or less restricted scope of literature for each case. The author concedes that the assignment to a certain predecessor regime type could slightly change dependent on the type of literature one uses. Also, the variable of democratic neighborhood contains the possibility for imprecise measurement because only the direct neighbor countries and for islands only the countries next to the island are taken into consideration. If the direct neighborhood is really decisive for the successful democratization in form of an MDI is yet not clear. Maybe other measurement strategies would focus on a whole neighbor region in form of a continent or on important trading partners in the neighborhood or other criteria. These options are present and the author is aware of them. However, the choice of one possible measurement strategy for the conducted analysis is made as transparent and open as possible.

The second point of criticism regarding the choice of threshold for cases linked to certain configurations may be appropriate in some cases but for this research project it is not suitable. The selected configurations should at least capture 75 to 80 percent of the cases. Other thresholds would have excluded a lot of cases from the analysis. That is why the threshold selection was without any alternative.

Lastly, the choice of threshold of the consistency values is often criticized with QCA. According to most of the literature on how to implement QCA approaches, the present work applied the most common threshold of 0.8 for the analysis. As it is recommended by Skaaning (2011), a robustness check is conducted in order to answer this criticism. For this reason, the consistency threshold is increased from 0.8 to 0.9 in order to exclude less consistent configurations from the analysis and instead focus only on the very consistent ones. The sensitivity check presented in Appendix Table 4 and Appendix Table 5 basically confirm the interpretation of the results of the main

analysis. Still, all three single sufficient variables as well as the combination of the variables of GDP, ethnic fractionalization and democratic neighborhood are identified as sufficient conditions in the robustness check. This therefore also includes that the configuration contradicting the theoretical assumptions fails the second analysis, confirming the author's skepticism about the validity of the configuration. The robustness check overall confirms the findings by the main analysis and provides further evidence for the significance of the identified sufficient condition configurations.

6. Conclusion

In the field of political science and security studies, the question why some MDIs are successful while others fail has not been answered comprehensively during the last decades. Especially the interventions during the 1990s which were connected with huge failures of the international community on the European as well as the African continent raised the attention of researchers to study the reasons of success and failure of MDIs. However, as the focus of the literature was often on mission characteristics, the literature failed to develop a blueprint for successful democratization in the course of an external military intervention. This focus on solely mission specific characteristics like the deployed number of military and police personnel and the expenditures for the mission among others happened despite the fact that the literature on democratic transition and state building already developed preconditions for successful democratization, although it did not explicitly include external democratization.

For this reason, the research work developed the clusters of successful democratization from the already existing literature strands. Following that, an original dataset is developed comprising MDIs from World War II until 2008. Besides the dependent variable of successful democratization, the dataset consists of five clusters including in total eight variables possibly influencing the outcome. The cluster of socio-economic development and modernization consists of the variables of GDP per capita in the target country as well as the level of human development before the intervention. The variable of ethnic fractionalization of the target country's society represents the second cluster of socio-cultural factors. The third cluster comprises the predecessor regime type and the transition mode operationalized with the variable of the intervention type. The experience with a democratic system works as a proxy for the cluster of state capacity and the status of nation-building. In the cluster of international context, the variables of democratic neighborhood and regional stability are included.

As a research approach, a fuzzy-set QCA is chosen in order to take into consideration the set-theoretic understanding of the dependent variable as well as of the independent variables. This means that countries cannot be classified in simple dichotomous categories of democracies and non-democracies but instead are more or less members or non-members of the set of democratic or non-democratic countries. This applies

similarly to the remaining variables. Therefore, additional to the differentiation in kind, a differentiation in degree is possible to apply. Whereas the QCA provides no necessary condition configuration, the analysis of sufficiency reveals expedient results.

Altogether, five configurations of conditions are identified as sufficient for the outcome of successful democratization in the course of an MDI. The three single variables of human development, predecessor regime type and democratic experience alone sufficiently influence the outcome. Especially the first variable displays a heterogeneous group of cases with a membership within this configuration leading to a more valid result. But also, the remaining two variables withstand a robustness check setting higher thresholds for consistency values. This is not true for the two sufficient configurations consisting of more than one variable. On the one hand, this is the combination of a highly ethnically fractionalized society and an undemocratic neighborhood which describes cases on the African continent after 1989. As this configuration contradicts the theoretical assumptions, the interpretation of the result remained open. However, as this configuration does not withstand a sensitivity check, the validity of the configuration for the whole sample of target countries of MDIs is highly questionable. On the other hand, the configuration of a high GDP per capita together with an ethnically homogeneous society and a democratically ruled neighborhood is not only identified as sufficient for successful democratization but also withstands the robustness check. In summary it can be said, therefore, that the analysis provides the result that for the five identified clusters, all display sufficiency for the outcome either alone or in combination with another cluster. This confirms the theoretical assumptions of the transition and state building literature which were not tested on external democratized countries so far. However, this is always done against the background that the operationalization of the variables is subject to a certain bias, which can therefore also affect the result.

In order to transfer these results in the practical work of politicians and military responsible persons, several conclusions can be drawn. Although the focus on mission specific characteristics provided the practical work with some insights in the need of equipment for MDIs in certain fields, the focus cannot lie only on them because those cannot guarantee a successful establishment of democracy. Instead, preconditions for successful democratization need to be taken into consideration as the analysis in hand

demonstrates. Whenever the willingness of an external actor to conduct an MDI is present, the focus cannot only lie on the personnel and monetary equipment of the mission itself. In fact, the respective target country needs to undergo a profound investigation whether or not the precondition it provides are favorable for an intervention or not. A special focus should lie on the identified variables constituting sufficient configurations for the outcome. But as the coverage of all the investigated clusters in the analysis shows, a general analysis of the preconditions over all clusters seems to be appropriate. Only by paying attention to both the mission specific characteristics and the preconditions of a possible target country makes a success for the implementation of democracy likely.

What remains to be done in future research projects within this field is to conduct further in-depth studies with the focus on which variables have which impact on the outcome. The QCA in this work only provides a preliminary framework shedding light on those variables so far attracting only limited attention in the scientific debate. For this reason, future analyses can focus on the impact of single clusters in order to detect not only effects but also to identify causal mechanisms. This development of a blueprint for successful external democratization could possibly help to reduce costs of MDI but even more important minimizes suffering of the civil population of target countries which have failed to democratize at the will of mostly Western external actors.

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Appendix

Appendix Table 1. *Regime Characteristics*

Country	Regime Characteristics	Sources
Germany Austria Italy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • years of conflict severely damaged the state's physical infrastructure → later analysis suggests that the damage was not as extensive as first thought • Germany: Some experience with democracy through years of Weimar Republic • Austria: Some experience with First Austrian Republic • Coordinated interaction between terror and propaganda • Fascist Axis Powers Germany, Japan and Italy • State institutions functioned well until the end of the war • Charismatic leadership, obedience and despotism • Totalitarian philosophy of the Nazi-ideology • Poor but not underdeveloped economy in 1945 • Functioning state structures + long administration- and rule-of-law-tradition 	Harrison (2000)
Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic and humanitarian crisis during the war → the emperor still enjoyed the support of the vast majority of Japanese • Bureaucracy, the parliament and the cabinet were intact, functioning and prepared to cooperate • In principle, Japan had a constitutional, but not fully parliamentary and democratic form of government until 1945 • Divided political power among a small set of competing elites • Political parties fought for power with the military, the bureaucracy, the leading industrialists and groups close to the emperor • Representatives of the people could easily be outmaneuvered • Military was not legally subordinate to civilian control • Political freedoms necessary to sustain a democracy were severely curtailed • Army refused to accept new party cabinet → Admiral Saito Makoto became new Prime Minister → cabinet of civil servants, financial elite and upper house Until 1945 no new party cabinet • Ideologic pressure of the military increased • Prime Minister highly dependend on military • New power for decision makers also within the social area → provided for restrictions on personal freedoms, the market economy and parliamentarianism • Uniforms, orders and slogans, military manners, behaviour patterns invented by the military structured the 	Takayoshi (1966) Dähler (2006) Zöllner (2009)

	entire world of life	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No mass base in Japan, no party that conquered the state and used it for its purposes, and no "leader" in an unassailable position of power 	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Denunciation „reputation death squads“ Persons getting into positions of social and political power as a result of the regime Creation of panoptical regime in which no one escaped from the purview of the state (against citizens and civil servants) Quotidian experiences of terror Deep and pervasive culture of terror Culture of fear State repression <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most repressive state during 1950s in that region violent nature of rule → anxiety, fear, and suspicion among Dominicans Regional militias In the aftermath of Trujillo’s death, Ramfis Trujillo returned home from Paris, took control of the armed forces, and led the investigation into his father’s assassination 	<p>Roorda (1996) Derby (2003) Peguero (2010)</p>
Grenada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> autocratic and repressive rule of Eric Gairy, who had dominated Grenadian politics for nearly 30 years Marxist-Leninist People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) that had no intention of restoring the democratic freedoms promised by Bishop and instead took Grenada down a totalitarian path refusal to hold elections, close alignment with the Communist bloc countries, detention of hundreds of people without trial or charge, and closing down non-government newspapers several constitutional changes over the years Premier Gairy acquired a reputation for rigged elections, corrupt financial practices and creation of a secret police force which was used to brutally repress opponents Opposition party allowed Young people were at the forefront of anti-Gairy demonstrations Repression of opposition members In 1974 Grenada became an independent nation in the British Commonwealth might not consider British forms of parliamentary democracy the best political option for the country developed a young, enthusiastic militia and an army, with a vocal armed forces branch of the party party became very select, secretive, and what the leadership referred to as a “Leninist vanguard”3 group both the government and the party made the public suspicious of the NJM’s ideology. Within the Grenadian community, the designation “counter” became a quiet assessment and an unspoken threat. 	<p>Clegg & Williams (2013) Collins (2013) Lewis (2013)</p>

Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ruler combined all security and immigration forces under his control in the Panamanian Defense Forces → began a steady consolidation of power over the country's businesses and the government • Panama's undemocratic government was only the most visible flaw in the political system • Opposition party existed • No rule of law • High corruption rate • Power-sharing arrangements between high ranking politicians • Panama during the period between 1968 and 1981 was characterized by: arbitrary exercise of power under the military leadership of General Omar Torrijos Herrera • Torrijos enjoyed numerous, broad, and important constitutional powers, which granted him power without any significant checks or balances and which, because of their nature, led to the suppression of political activity and severe violations of human rights and basic guarantees • 1987 state of national emergency by executive decree, whereby constitutional guarantees and rights were suspended. • Efficient narcomilitaristic regime • Ruthless oppression of the population • Election fraud • In spite of a democratization impression the control of the state remained in the hands of the commander of the defence forces in Panama • declarations that the chief of state was involved in narcotics smuggling, money laundering for drug cartels • political positions are distributed for henchmen of the leader • imperfect democracy became little more than a façade for a military-dominated authoritarian regime • new constitution that gave the dictator vast civil and military powers • Noriega also deepened the military's role in the economic life of the country • An officer with a position on a firm's board of directors could offer valuable services in advancing the company's fortunes • opponents of the regime would be targeted selectively, individually, or in small groups; harassed and intimidated, incarcerated if need be, in many cases tortured and sexually abused; but killed only in the most extreme cases, such as that of Spadafora 	<p>Phillips (1988) Robinson (1989) Gilboa (1995) Yates (2008) Diaconu (2015) Salas Galindo (2018)</p>
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Haiti under Duvalier was a place of chaos, repression, terror, trauma, and murder • Narcistic and sadistic • Paramilitary organizations to support the regime • Political violence associated with the Duvalier regime 	<p>Merlis (1975) Carey (2005) Rey (2006) Klimovich and Thomas (2014)</p>

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- Reign of terror
 - Unending series of purges
 - Succession of the leading position of the country
 - economic revolution is being fought on the same moral and humanitarian 'level as was the political – revolution
 - booklet that his regime printed and distributed entitled *Le Catéchisme de la Révolution*, which “contained litanies, hymns, prayers, doctrine
 - racio-supremacist nationalism
 - one of the most repressive and terrorizing regimes in modern history
 - paramilitary to intimidate and kill his rivals and anyone who challenged his rule
 - 1990 first democratic elections; but Haitian parliament was corrupt and ineffective, the Haitian bureaucracy weak and incompetent, and the Haitian judiciary almost nonexistent
 - 1991 military coup

Sierra Leone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • neo-colonial state that was fashioned by British colonialism and subsequently shaped by the country’s local ruling class. • central political dimension of the state crisis in Sierra Leone was the cult of the presidency—the entire polity revolved around the priorities of President Siaka P. Stevens, who was aptly described as “prince.” • extra-legal institutions and channels which came to supersede the formal state institutions and fatally undermined them • Stevens regime suppressed the citizens’ political human rights • one-party state • space for political participation shrank for both opposition politicians and the general public • Economically and socially, amid the corrupt accumulation of wealth by Stevens and his supporters, there was mass abject poverty • Stevens selected his military chief, General Joseph Momoh, as his successor rather than allowing his replacement to be chosen through a democratic process • Momoh regime carried on Stevens’s legacy, reflected in continued political repression and economic and social malaise • In patrimonial systems an individual rules by dint of personal prestige and power. Authority is thus entirely personalized, shaped by the ruler’s preferences rather than any codified system of laws • access to resources impossible for non-members; it made membership of the party a <i>sine qua non</i> to get by; exclusion literally meant death by attrition • government functioned poorly + bankruptcy • first experiences with democracy through elections in 1996 although massive corruption was still present 	<p>Williams (2001) Connaughton (2002) Shaw (2010) Brattberg (2012) Kieh (2016)</p>
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	feature of the system	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • typical warlord state • leaders relied on personal patronage to ensure their positions • traditional state apparatus was weak 	
Namibia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1966 and 1975 was a "hit and run" guerrilla war, fought by PLAN fighters against South African infrastructure and personnel within Namibia as well as against traditional leaders who collaborated with South Africa, especially in the Ovambo region • War in and over Namibia was first a conventional guerrilla war between South Africa and a very disciplined rebel movement, and later a violent conflict involving more but still well-structured and professional military actors on both sides • South Africa, meanwhile, had already started to institutionalize a system of racial segregation in Namibia and considered it a fifth province which was governed by a South African "administrator general," • mid-1970s. South Africa started to build an internal government with indigenous administrative structures and a security apparatus in an attempt to create some legitimacy for its continued rule in Namibia • umbrella organization of "ethnic" parties was formed (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, DTA) and elections were held in December 1978 for ethnically-based "Representative Authorities," similar to the South African "Bantustans," The DTA won forty-one out of fifty seats and formed a Council of Ministers in 1979 • Following the resignation of the DTA Council in 1983, the administrator general again took over direct control • extent to which South Africa indeed liberalized its colonial rule over Namibia following 1975 is a matter of debate • during second South African-sponsored "interim" governments (1985-1989), "political space opened up, allowing a new level of organized activity • certainly created an embryonic party system, and at independence, these party leaders could count on considerable governmental and administrative experience • civil war was limited to certain region only • two systems operating in Namibia: the one that functioned under the authority of the South African Administrator-General, Mr. Louis Pienaar, and another that was headed by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Namibia, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, who also held the post of UN Under Secretary-General for Administration and Management • No democratic history and had been occupied by foreign powers for much of its history • South Africa then installed a white-minority regime that ruled through intimidation and violence and discriminated against the majority black population • Decades of armed conflict and discrimination 	Dale (1991) Kanwal (2004) Hartmann (2009)

Cambodia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bureaucracy was fundamentally non-ideological • Civil servants unable to regulate the country's economy • But they were able to intervene in the every-day-lives: collecting taxes etc • State turned in a sprawling and heterogeneous network of ministries, agencies and provincial and local administrations whose members adhered to the rules of patronage • Leadership abandoned its commitment to communist ideology as it groped towards workable policies • No liberal democracy; instead: system of government based on patron-client relationship • Vietnamese presence should not be seen as colonial • Not harshly autocratic → much of debate within the government about state policies • context of a civil war, in the aftermath of the devastating Democratic Kampuchea regime during which up to two million Cambodians died • PRK: Single-party authoritarianism, communist state, backed by Soviet Union • Indigenous government having control over much of the country • Centralized, communist bureaucracy • Lack of viable judicial system • Twenty years of civil war, invasions, outside arms supplies, gross violations of human rights, massive dislocation of its population, and destruction of its infrastructure have rendered the country incapable of governing itself • Limited experience with democracy 	<p>Kiernan (1996) Hughes (2003) Marston (2005) Raffin (2012)</p>
Mozambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mozambican government had lost control of most of the country by the mid-1980s, its power being confined to urban areas • exchanged a single-party regime with a centralized economic policy for multi-party democracy and a market-led economy • long, brutal civil wars characterized by external interference • single-party regime that left no room for political dissent • state-driven economy • Political dissent was discouraged, and the dissenters were re-educated in camps set up in the more remote areas of the country • socialist one-party regime, war emerged once again • Civil war destroyed much of the country's infrastructure • No experience with democracy • After 1975, establishment of a one-party system based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism 	<p>Leão (2007) Sabaratnam (2017)</p>
Rwanda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independence 1962 • new regime systematically attempted to exclude Tutsis from the rule 	<p>Uvin (1999) Barnett (2002) Brattberg (2012)</p>

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- majority Hutus now controlled political power, inferiority complex and all, and the newly installed President Kayibanda was more than willing to use ethnic terror and sow divisions to maintain his rule
 - racial dictatorship of one party
 - oppressive system has been replaced by another one
 - Ethnic violence now became a central feature of Rwanda's politics
 - 1973 military coup
 - 1975 declared that Rwanda was officially a single-party state
 - Reorganization of political life and centralization of control using all means at disposal, including the bureaucracy, the party, the church, and the military
 - tight patronage system
 - informal networks resided the *akazu*, the heart of the power structure,
 - international financial institutions tried to help Rwanda, finding a relatively sophisticated administrative structure and a willing government
 - Fighting a civil war
 - societal pressures demanding political liberalization after nearly two decades of single-party rule
 - multiparty democracy from 1990 onwards

Angola	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independence 1975, soon after plunged into long and brutal civil war characterized by external interference • single-party regime with a centralised economic policy • by gaining independence, a civil war was already being fought by the three liberation movements, funded and supported by their respective international allies 	<p>Krška (1997) Leão (2007) Faria (2013) Jager & Hobuß (2017) Hoekstra (2019)</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • power vacuum in national governance • no legitimate force to hold onto power and hence requiring a transition process prone to competition • inability of the Angolan government to address major domestic factors as corruption, economic management and uneven distribution of wealth ultimately contributed to the breakdown of the entire peace process • Guerilla War + Civil War • freedom gained with independence was thus lost in a new form of hegemonic authoritarianism and repression • new president continued to embody Neto's personalised form of power and his politics of repression and silence • MPLA regime continued to pursue a government by 'disorder and chaos', using the fear of violence it itself helps generate as an excuse to prevent and suppress any further development of the public sphere • while there is considerable public activity with many organisations, institutions, parties and media outlets, the overwhelming majority of these are state controlled • first constitution reflected the MPLA outlook with power centralised in the president and MPLA single party 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> dominance constitution defined features such as the state power structure, the rights and duties of the citizens, the president's competences, and mechanisms of power distributions via the people's assembly distribution of power was based on small party/elite cadres, initially represented by the revolutionary council idea of the people's power remained a decorative construct, because the power was confined at the top and barely filtered through to the bottom 1975 constitution defined what is known as the 1st Republic of Angola, and its characteristic features were the centralized presidency and the MPLA party monopoly 	
East Timor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Occupation by Indonesia since 1975, before colony of Portugal Legacy of distorted justice left by Indonesians Indonesian military, police and judicial personnel left after referendum in 1999 Exodus of Indonesian officials and the post-referendum violence brought about the near collapse of the civil administration Even before the violence, the Indonesian government had not served East Timor well Suppression of newly developed democratic parties after occupation by Indonesia Following annexation, Indonesian military controlled political and administrative affairs Throughout 1990s emergence of some political organizations Suharto's regime was undergoing a process of late-term "sultanization," → dominance of the president, and that of his family and inner circle, became more and more pronounced → the regime was more and more resembling a personalist dictatorship → reduced scope for factional competition within the ruling elite implications for the mode of its collapse and subsequent democratization → Opposition remained poorly institutionalized, deeply divided, and largely ideologically incoherent 	<p>Lowry (2007) Aspinall (2010) Berlie (2018)</p>
Congo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Independence 1960 secessions, insurrections, rebellions, mutinies, invasions (by Congolese with sanctuary in Angola), revolts, and ethnic wars have been part of the political landscape of the DRC Mobutu sent a strong signal early on that opposition would not be tolerated in December 1970, he amended the 1967 constitution to institutionalize the one-party state Institutionalized violence became common as state secret services and the military were used as instruments of terror against opponents of the Mobutu regime Patronage system Mobutu was able to monopolize all sources of revenue and distribute them to his clients as he pleased By the early 1980s, kleptocracy emerged as the mode of 	<p>Kisangani (2012) Murphy (2016)</p>

	<p>governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • political longevity by cracking down on dissidents, concentrating power, developing a cult of personality, and sustaining a patronage system • DRC experienced a multifactional civil war • Weak Congolese state institutions: military, police, administrative offices, and legal branches all needed substantial reform and reconstruction if the country was to be self-governing • State administration often competed with parallel power structures of the militias and those of more ancient provenance • State was unable to provide even the most basic services • No prior experience with liberal democracy and little experience with anything even vaguely resembling self-determined, constitutional rule • Legitimacy of existing political and economic institutions had been eroded by decades of dictatorship • Weak or even nonexistent civil society + rampant corruption 	
Macedonia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independence 1991 • 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia falls in the group of liberal-democratic constitutions • complete democratic reorganization and transfer of the society and the country from a system with deeply enrooted socialist character to a new, democratic system • Constitution affirms in their place the commitment to ownership, political pluralism, and a market economy • principle of division of power, Macedonia as a state with a republican form of rule based on the sovereignty that “derives from the citizens and belongs to the citizens”. • 1991 Constitution introduced the principle of division of power • Highly politicized bureaucracy → changes in government meant major changes in the bureaucracy, too • Corruption as a significant problem • Weak judiciary and subject to meddling from politicians • Overall rule of law as weak • Functioning, but limited, democracy since it gained independence 	<p>Zahariadis (2003) Ambarkov (2016) Macedonian Constitutional Story (2016)</p>
Liberia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • various regimes that managed the Liberian state from 1847 to 1980 failed to promote national unity, human welfare, and democracy • military coup 1980 • During military regime years, contrary to its pledge, the Doe regime committed severe political human rights abuses, including the muzzling of freedoms of association, of the press, and of speech • Even after Doe became the President of Liberia following a controversial election in 1986, his regime failed to establish democracy and promote socio-economic development • First Civil war 89-97, Second 99-03 • In between the wars, abuse of power, corruption, manipulation of state division, abject poverty, alienation, oppression of a large sector of the population, and 	<p>Kieh (2016) Woldetsadik (2019)</p>

hopelessness of the youth were still rampant

- administration of Doe (1986-1990) and Taylor (1997-2003) succeeded in neither democratically reconstituting Liberia nor protecting human rights
- Occasions for leaders of civil society, journalists, labor unions, students, opposing political parties and civilians to be intimidated, arrested, raped and forced to exile were many

Solomon Islands	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Independence and member of British Commonwealth 1978• Around 2000 civil war• Failing state• security and political crisis before intervention• Law and order had broken down, the economy had collapsed, institutions were weak, and the government was paralyzed and had lost legitimacy in the eyes of many Solomon Islanders• Institutions of statehood never firmly took root• question therefore exists as to whether Solomon Islands was ever a properly functioning state• breakdown in law and order• high corruption• government was bankrupt and there was no functioning Cabinet process <ul style="list-style-type: none">• virtually ceased to function as an effective national entity• slow-burning political and security crisis has paralysed the country's capital, stifled its economy, disrupted government, discouraged aid donors, and inflicted suffering and hardship on its people• weak post-independence governments with inadequate revenue bases struggling for legitimacy against older, more deeply rooted political and social traditions• state's role replaced by non-state actors working with or without the trappings of constitutional office. The rule of law collapsing, and the descent into corruption and criminality.• formal machinery of national government had been established, but the capacities and institutions needed for effective government were lacking <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Solomon Islands inherited a very weak state structure in which formal institutions coexisted uneasily with the informal governance structures developed by the people of the islands• Traditional structures relied heavily on personal connections and enabled indigenous leaders to provide patronage and other benefits to their people• After independence, the formal state structures became rife with corruption as leaders used new patronage opportunities to extend their personal political power• Government was simply unable to govern in any meaningful way• Civil servants were involved in corrupt practices• Civil service largely ceased functioning• Government did not completely collapse but it quickly became the object of conflict as the different groups	Wainwright (2003a, 2003b) Glenn (2007)
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> battled for control of government resources and institutions Solomon Islands is a parliamentary democracy but state basically failed to rule 	
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civil War starting in 1993 after assassination of first democratically elected president Until 2005, the whole country was concerned by violence, though at different degrees and periods monarchy survived the colonial period with social strength after killing of Rwagasore, competition over state power between three parties emerged From 1966 to 1993 political and by extension economic power in Burundi was tightly held by three military regimes that used their military might to keep their privileges Almost all positions of importance in Burundi were monopolized by the Tutsi minority (in the party, command structure of the army, police and security forces and judicial system) Small group captured state power with the support of the military High dose of repression Power base rested on fear and repression 1990 begin of slow democratization Elections in 1993 but no support of the military Since September 1993 Burundi has inexorably slid toward total violence 	<p>Uvin (1999) Boshoff (2004) Mercier et al. (2017) Cliff (2018)</p>
Ivory Coast	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ivory Coast's civil war is a product of authoritarian rule and infusion of multi-party democracy 1960 (independence) until 1990 single-party system 1990 multi-party elections But failed institutionalizing transparent and democratic government 1993 undemocratic tactics of ruling president Coup 1999 → chaotic situation afterwards Civil war since 2002 Backed by the French military, the Houphouët-Boigny regime had a carte blanche to design an authoritarian post-colonial state that was subservient to the interests of the French ruling class and its government suppression the political rights and civil liberties of the Ivorian people, including the opposition and civil society, with impunity Bédié (successor of 1st president) continued his predecessor's legacy of political repression and mass alienation from the political process Military coup in 1999 military junta failed to reconstitute the Ivorian state democratically free economy after independence under 1st president weak nature of the state in the 1990s manipulations of the constitution through politicians 	<p>Bah (2010) Keita (2013) Kieh (2016)</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • after death of President in 1993, politicians engaged in a protracted power struggle that culminated in a coup d'état in 1999; after that political leaders struggled to control the country • half of the country controlled by central government, other half was in the hands of the rebels • before conflict, the civil administration functioned better than most West African governments • but no control over police and army violating human rights regularly 	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independence of Yugoslavia in 1992 • Immediately followed by civil war • Had never been an independent, sovereign state in the modern era; Bosnia was subject to external or strong internal authority under occupying countries' governments • Bosnian Croats and Muslims did not want to remain in a Serb-dominated Yugoslav rump state, and the Bosnian Serb leadership took steps toward forming autonomous areas with quasi-state powers • Reminiscent of what happened at the Yugoslav federal level in 1989/1990, all of the republic's institutions and organizations split into ethnic components, including parliament, city councils, factory assemblies, the media, and security forces • Limited strategic interests of Western States on the Balkan in general • Three ethnic groups mistrusting each other • After independence no consensus about the building of a unified state administration • Civil war contributes to erosion of state infrastructure • Para-state structures • Segregated party structure • Through the parastatal structures of the civil war period, the three major parties gained considerable authoritarian power • They did not seek to establish the rule of law and control of powers, but continued the system of personal security forces. Nor did they seek to restrict illegal economic activity • Little democratic experience of the main parties • the single party controls all political decision-making processes, including the allocation of offices and privileges in the executive, legislative and judicial branches → no separation of powers, the results of elections were considered insignificant and critical voices were silenced • Socio-economic situation problematic; infrastructure destroyed through civil war • The new beginning therefore had to start on the basis of a shattered economy and at the lowest socio-economic level • The international community of states had few strategic interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself; rather, the Contact Group focused on the peace and security of the entire region at the gates of the EU 	Grimm (2014) M. A. Smith (2010)

Kosovo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Had no civil administration • 1990s as a decade of Serbia repression, years of mounting civil conflict and 11 weeks of NATO bombing • All elements of the Serbian administration were discredited and most departed with Serbian forces leaving Kosovo without the most basic structures of governance • Rescinded autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 • First elections in 1990 • plebiscitary approval and camouflaged the fact that an authoritarian style of leadership and the political control of the media continued to be commonplace • Unsettled territorial status of Kosovo • After the abolition of the autonomous status in 1989, the Kosovo Albanians established parallel structures of a (quasi-)democratic presidential government system alongside the Serbian administrative authorities • government elected by the Kosovo Albanian population, a parliament, their own schools and a welfare system → but no possibility to rule the Kosovo according to democratic rules autonomously • Overall, at the beginning of the 1990s, daily experience with the repressive Serbian state apparatus and the remnants of Yugoslavian-style communism predominated • Under Serbian repression, standards and behaviour hardly developed under the rule of law; instead, political and social life was organised through patronage and corruption 	M. A. Smith (2010)
Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1990s battles between Kabul regime and opposition • Russian invasion 1979 • 1979 Soviet invasion sparked a period of civil war and unrest that lasted over 20 years • After the Soviets withdrew, various factions occupied and then lost control of the capital, Kabul, until the rise of the Taliban in 1996 • Taliban gained control of the urban areas and most of the countryside and established an Islamic fundamentalist regime under Sharia law • Under this regime, women had no rights; there was no freedom of the press or religion; and the country was ruled by an autocracy • Afghanistan was devastated after 23 years of conflict. The country had a long tradition of weak central government, tribalism, banditry, and ethnic tension • Few state institutions in Afghanistan were functioning at the end of 2002. Decades of civil war had decimated the civil service and government bureaucracy • economy was ravaged by over 20 years of conflict. → country's infrastructure destroyed; roads were in severe disrepair; buildings had been destroyed or become run down through lack of maintenance; the availability of electricity and water was sporadic at best; and there were few employment opportunities for working-age individuals in the country; no stable national currency 	Eliot Jr. (1991) Connaughton (2002) M. A. Smith (2010)

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- when international intervention started in 2001 Afghanistan already experienced 23 years of violent conflict
 - until 2001 considerable gaps regarding internal sovereignty
 - no government after independence in 1919 reached effective territorial sovereignty or to establish a stable, generally accepted unitary state administration
 - under Soviet occupation in 1980s, some local authorities managed to install para-state structures → supported the fragmentation of Afghanistan and harmed the barely existent unitary state authority
 - after decades of violent conflicts with an escalation to civil war after 1992 and most recently the rule of a repressive Taliban regime, viable central government structures were practically non-existent in Afghanistan
 - Experience with civil rights, rule-of-law and democracy was confined on Golden Era (1964-1973)
 - Although attempts of parliamentarism, the political system was king-centered, fragmented along conflict lines and clientelisticly organized.
 - Afghanistan already before the civil war remained on the level of a pre-modern, socio-economic underdeveloped country
 - Taliban did not change anything regarding that situation
 - After the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan thus lacked a viable economic structure and a trained administrative and political elite that would have been willing and numerous enough to support the country's reconstruction.

Iraq	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • politics have always been about authoritarian rule and the settlement of disputes by force • challenges that the United States faces in Iraq can be grouped into those that are specific to Iraq, those that are common to societies emerging from totalitarian rule • two decades of turmoil under Saddam Hussein's dictatorship • nationwide civil administration that is relatively efficient. This administration needs to be rebuilt but not reconstructed from scratch • succession of military rulers, leading eventually to Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime, gave Iraq 45 years of ever-worsening dictatorship • Baathist mismanagement • In Kurdistan two parties controlled a quasi-autonomous Kurdish state, with its own, semi-democratic institutions; nevertheless, clan leaders dictated government decisions from behind the scenes • In the remainder of Iraq, highly centralized regime • All decision-making powers were pushed upwards to the president himself • Baath party, secret police agencies and the clan networks surrounding Hussein were the real sources of power → controlled all areas of government activity • Informal networks of influence of great importance • No more than a democratic façade • Democratic values had never penetrated deeply into the 	<p>Schuster and Maier (2006) Ismael (2008) Feldman (2009)</p>
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Iraqi society → influenced by tribal ties and unelected monarchy

- Several coups eliminated most of the political opposition
 - By the time Hussein took over the presidency in 1979, Iraq was becoming a totalitarian, one party-state, consciously modeled on Stalin's Soviet Union
 - By 2003 even the Baath party itself became a hollow shell → small network of families loyal to Hussein dominated the state
 - The totalitarian system had succeeded in atomizing the population and replacing bonds of social trust and community with the fear of informers and reversion to the more easily manipulated primordial loyalties of clan and tribe

 - Iraq looked back on a long history of heteronomy and authoritarian rule
 - 35 years of dictatorship under the Baath-party (1968-2003), thereof 24 years under the rule of Saddam Hussein
 - Totalitarian societal penetration
 - Tightly organized military, police and security apparatus saving the rule
 - Not yet evolved in a civil war
 - Hussein established a Führer dictatorship on the model of the NSDAP rule under Adolf Hitler in Germany (1933-1945) on the basis of strong secret services, broad mass organizations and the strict repression of any political opposition.
 - Hussein exercised executive and legislative power over magistrates and judges, who were solely accountable to him; the armed forces, police, secret services and Ba'ath Party agents were at his service around the clock; the courts were subordinate to the executive
 - Kurds were able to establish independent state structures and a free press landscape under the protection of the no-fly zone established after the Second Gulf War and democratically elect the Kurdish regional government
 - The history of Iraq in the 20th century offers few right state and democratic resources to which a political re-organization under democratic auspices could draw on
 - Hussein established a "republic of fear" in which everyone distrusted everyone else and everyone constantly had to fear being reported to the secret services even by members of their own family
 - fear of the regime determined daily life and permeated politics and society. Freedom of opinion did not exist, critical thinking and the spirit of contradiction were nipped in the bud
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Appendix Table 2. *Regional Stability*

Country	Neighbor Countries	Interstate War	Intrastate War	Extrastate War	New List of War	Total	Average	1-Average	Fuzzy (raus)
Italy	France	0	0	0	-	0	0,25	0,75	0,8
1943	Germany	1	0	0	-	1			
	Yugoslavia	0	0	-	-	0			
	Switzerland	-	-	-	-	0			
Germany	Netherlands	0	0	1	-	0	0,22	0,78	0,8
1945	Belgium	0	0	0	-	0			
	Luxemburg	-	-	-	-	0			
	France	1	0	0	-	1			
	Switzerland	-	-	-	-	0			
	Austria	0	0	0	-	0			
	Czechoslovakia	0	-	-	-	0			
	Poland	0	1	0	-	1			
	Denmark	0	-	-	-	0			
Austria	Germany	1	0	0	-	1	0,6	0,4	0,4
1945	Switzerland	-	-	-	-	0			
	Italy	1	0	0	-	1			
	Yugoslavia	0	0	-	-	0			
	Hungary	1	0	-	-	1			
Japan	China	1	0	0	-	1	1,0	0	0,0
1945	USSR	1	1	0	-	2			
Dominican Republic	Haiti	-	0	-	-	0	0	1,0	1,0
1965	Puerto Rico	-	-	-	-	0			
	Cuba	0	0	-	0	0			
Grenada	Trinidad & Tobago	-	-	-	-	0	0	1,0	1,0
1983	Venezuela	-	0	-	-	0			
	St. Vincent	-	-	-	-	0			
	Barbados	-	-	-	-	0			
Panama	Colombia	0	1	-	1	1	0,5	0,5	0,6

1989	Costa Rica	-	0	-	0	0			
Haiti 1	Dominican Republic	-	0	-	0	0	0	1,0	1,0
1993	Cuba	0	0	-	0	0			
	Jamaica	-	-	-	-	0			
Haiti 2	Dominican Republic	-	0	-	0	0	0	1,0	1,0
2004	Cuba	0	0	-	0	0			
	Jamaica	-	-	-	-	0			
Sierra Leone	Liberia	-	0	-	0	0	0,5	0,5	0,6
1999	Guinea	-	1	-	0	1			
Namibia	Angola	0	1	-	1	1	0,6	0,4	0,4
1989	Zambia	-	-	-	-	0			
	Zimbabwe	-	1	-	0	1			
	Botswana	-	-	-	-	0			
	South Africa	0	1	0	1	1			
Cambodia	Thailand	0	0	-	0	0	0	1,0	1,0
1991	Laos	0	0	-	0	0			
	Vietnam	0	0	0	0	0			
Mozambique	Tanzania	0	1	-	0	1	0,333	0,67	0,8
1992	Malawi	-	-	-	-	0			
	Zambia	-	-	-	-	0			
	Zimbabwe	-	-	-	0	0			
	South Africa	0	-	0	1	1			
	Swaziland	-	-	-	-	0			
Rwanda	Uganda	0	0	-	1	1	0,25	0,75	0,8
1993	Tanzania	0	0	-	0	0			
	Burundi	-	1	-	1	1			
	DRC	0	0	-	1	1			
Angola	Congo	-	0	-	0	0	0	1,0	1,0
1995	DRC	0	0	-	0	0			
	Zambia	-	-	-	-	0			
	Namibia	-	0	-	0	0			
East Timor 1 1999	Indonesia	-	1	0	0	1	1	0,0	0,0

East Timor 2006	Indonesia	-	0	0	0	0	0	1,0	1,0
DRC 1999	Congo	-	1	-	1	1	0,66	0,33	0,4
	Central African Republic	-	-	-	-	0			
	Sudan	-	1	-	1	1			
	Uganda	0	1	-	1	1			
	Rwanda	-	1	-	1	1			
	Burundi	-	1	-	1	1			
	Tanzania	0	0	-	0	0			
	Zambia	-	-	-	-	0			
	Angola	0	1	-	1	1			
Macedonia 2001	Yugoslavia	0	0	-	0	0	0	1,0	1,0
	Bulgaria	0	0	-	0	0			
	Greece	0	0	-	0	0			
	Albania	-	-	-	0	0			
Liberia 2003	Sierra Leone	-	0	-	0	0	0,33	0,67	0,6
	Guinea	-	0	-	0	0			
	Ivory Coast	-	1	-	1	1			
Solomon Islands 2003	Papua New Guinea	-	0	-	0	0	0	1,0	1,0
	Vanuatu	-	-	-	-	0			
	Fiji	-	-	-	-	0			
	Micronesia	-	-	-	-	0			
Burundi 2004	DRC	0	0	-	1	1	0,33	0,67	1,0
	Rwanda	-	0	-	0	0			
	Tanzania	0	0	-	0	0			
Ivory Coast 2004	Liberia	-	0	-	0	0	0	1,0	1,0
	Guinea	-	0	-	0	0			
	Mali	-	-	-	0	0			
	Burkina Faso	-	-	-	-	0			
	Ghana	-	-	-	0	0			
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995	Croatia	0	1	-	0	1	0,5	0,5	0,6
	Yugoslavia	0	0	-	0	0			

Kosovo	Yugoslavia	1	1	-	1	3	0,33	0,67	0,6
1999	Macedonia	-	-	-	-	0			
	Albania	-	-	-	0	0			
Afghanistan	Iran	0	0	-	0	0	0	1,0	1,0
2001	Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	0			
	Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	0			
	Tajikistan	-	0	-	0	0			
	China	0	0	0	0	0			
	Pakistan	0	0	-	0	0			
Iraq	Kuwait	0	-	-	0	0	0	1,0	1,0
2003	Saudi Arabia	0	0	-	0	0			
	Jordan	0	0	-	0	0			
	Syria	0	0	-	0	0			
	Turkey	0	0	0	0	0			
	Iran	0	0	-	0	0			

Appendix Table 3. *Democratic Neighborhood in the Year of Intervention*

Country	Neighbor Countries	Polity IV	Freedom House	Democracy	Fuzzy	Comment
Italy	France	-9	-	No	0,0	
	Germany	-9	-	No	0,0	
	Croatia	0/-77	-	No	0,0	Yugoslavia, Anarchy
	Switzerland	10	-	Yes	1,0	
Germany	Netherlands	10	-	Yes	1,0	
	Belgium	10	-	Yes	1,0	
	Luxemburg	10	-	Yes	1,0	
	France	4	-	No	0,6	
	Switzerland	10	-	Yes	1,0	
	Austria	5	-	No	0,6	
	Czechslovakia	10	-	Yes	1,0	
	Poland	-2	-	No	0,4	
	Denmark	10	-	Yes	1,0	
	Austria	Germany	-66	-	No	0,0
Switzerland		10	-	Yes	1,0	
Italy		2	-	No	0,6	
Yugoslavia		-7	-	No	0,0	
Hungary		-2	-	No	0,4	
Japan	China	-66	-	No	0,0	No Polity 2 Score, Missing
	USSR	-9	-	No	0,0	
Dominican Republic	Haiti	-9	-	No	0,0	
	Puerto Rico	-	-	NA	-	No Data
	Cuba	-7	-	No	0,0	
Grenada	Trinidad & Tobago	8	1.5	Yes	1,0	
	Venezuela	9	1.5	Yes	1,0	
	St. Vincent	-	2.0	Yes	1,0	
	Barbados	-	1.0	Yes	1,0	
	Panama	Colombia	8	3.5	No	0,8
Haiti 1	Costa Rica	10	1.0	Yes	1,0	
	Dominican Republic	6	3.0	No	0,8	
	Cuba	-7	7.0	No	0,0	
Haiti 2	Jamaica	9	2.5	Yes	1,0	
	Dominican Republic	8	2.5	Yes	1,0	
	Cuba	-7	7.0	No	0,0	
Sierra Leone	Jamaica	9	2.5	Yes	1,0	
	Liberia	0	4.5	No	0,4	
Namibia	Guinea	-1	5.5	No	0,2	
	Angola	-7	7.0	No	0,0	
Cambodia	Zambia	-9	5.5	No	0,0	
	Zimbabwe	-6	5.0	No	0,2	
	Botswana	7	1.5	Yes	1,0	
	South Africa	4	5.5	No	0,4	
	Thailand	-1	5.0	No	0,4	
Mozambique	Laos	-7	6.5	No	0,0	
	Vietnam	-7	7.0	No	0,0	
	Tanzania	-5	5.5	No	0,2	
Zimbabwe	Malawi	-9	6.0	No	0,0	
	Zambia	6	2.5	Yes	1,0	
	Zimbabwe	-6	4.5	No	0,2	

	South Africa	5	4.5	No	0,6	
	Swaziland	-10	5.5	No	0,0	
Rwanda	Uganda	-4	5.5	No	0,2	
	Tanzania	-5	5.5	No	0,2	
	Burundi	0/-77	7.0	No	0,0	Anarchy
	DRC	0/-77	6.5	No	0,0	Anarchy
Angola	Congo	5	4.0	No	0,6	
	DRC	0/-77	6.5	No	0,0	Anarchy
	Zambia	6	3.5	No	0,8	
	Namibia	6	2.5	Yes	1,0	
East Timor 1	Indonesia	6	4.0	No	0,8	
East Timor 2	Indonesia	8	2.5	Yes	1,0	
Congo	Congo	-6	5.5	No	0,0	
	Central African Republic	5	3.5	No	0,6	
	Sudan	-7	7.0	No	0,0	
	Uganda	-4	5.0	No	0,4	
	Rwanda	-6	6.5	No	0,0	
	Burundi	-1	6.0	No	0,2	
	Tanzania	-1	4.0	No	0,4	
	Zambia	1	4.5	No	0,6	
	Angola	-3	6.0	No	0,2	
Macedonia	Yugoslavia	7	3.0	No	0,8	
	Bulgaria	9	2.0	Yes	1,0	
	Greece	10	2.0	Yes	1,0	
	Albania	5	3.5	No	0,6	
Liberia	Sierra Leone	5	3.5	No	0,6	
	Guinea	-1	5.5	No	0,2	
	Ivory Coast	0/-77	5.5	No	0,0	Anarchy
Solomon Islands	Papua New Guinea	4	3.0	No	0,6	
	Vanuatu	-	2.0	Yes	1,0	
	Fiji	5	3.5	No	0,6	
	Micronesia	-	1.0	Yes	1,0	
Burundi	DRC	3	6.0	No	0,4	
	Rwanda	-3	5.5	No	0,2	
	Tanzania	-1	3.5	No	0,4	
Ivory Coast	Liberia	3	4.5	No	0,6	
	Guinea	-1	5.5	No	0,2	
	Mali	7	2.0	Yes	1,0	
	Burkina Faso	0	4.5	No	0,4	
	Ghana	8	2.0	Yes	1,0	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croatia	-5	4.0	No	0,4	
	Yugoslavia	-7	6.0	No	0,0	
Kosovo	Yugoslavia	-6	5.0	No	0,2	
	Macedonia	6	3.0	No	0,8	
	Albania	5	4.5	No	0,6	
Afghanistan	Iran	3	6.0	No	0,4	
	Turkmenistan	-9	7.0	No	0,0	
	Uzbekistan	-9	6.5	No	0,0	
	Tajikistan	-1	6.0	No	0,2	
	China	-7	6.5	No	0,0	
	Pakistan	-6	5.5	No	0,0	
Iraq	Kuwait	-7	4.5	No	0,2	
	Saudi Arabia	-10	7.0	No	0,0	
	Jordan	-2	5.0	No	0,4	
	Syria	-7	7.0	No	0,0	

Turkey	7	3.5	No	0,8
Iran	3	6.0	No	0,4

Appendix Table 4. *Robustness Check 1*

Variable Configuration	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
~V8RegStab	0.419853	0.119118	0.916533
V2HumDev	0.511029	0.0735294	0.963939
V4PreRegime	0.382353	0.0882353	0.896552
V6DemExp	0.220588	0.0191177	0.9375
V1GDP*V3EthnicFract*V7DemNeighb	0.346324	0.0279413	0.867403

frequency cutoff: 1

consistency cutoff: 0.900901

solution coverage: 0.822059

solution consistency: 0.872075

Appendix Table 5. *Robustness Check 2*

Cases	Membership in Outcome	Configuration				
		1	2	3	4	5
		~V8RegStab	V2HumDev	V4PreRegime	V6DemExp	V1GDP *V3EthnicFract *V7DemNeighb
Italy	1.00		0.81			
Germany	1.00		0.94		0.6	0.84
Austria	1.00	0.60	0.91		0.6	
Japan	1.00	1.00	0.83	0.80		
Panama	1.00		0.66	0.80		
Namibia	1.00	0.60				
East Timor1	0.80	1.00		0.80		
East Timor2	0.80			0.80		
Congo	0.40	0.67				
Macedonia	0.80		0.58	1.00	0.8	
Sol. Islands	0.80				1	0.54

consistency cutoff: 0.900901

solution coverage: 0.822059

solution consistency: 0.872075