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FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

**Master's Thesis**

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**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

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Department of Security Studies

**UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s: Evaluation of the  
outcomes of second-generation operations with Chapter  
VII mandates**

Master's thesis

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Year of the defence: 2020

## **Declaration**

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 30.7.2020

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## References

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## **Abstract**

This Master's Thesis is devoted to the United Nations peacekeeping, particularly second-generation operations in the early 1990s and their evaluation. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate the (lack of) success of the selected missions, which were the first examples of operations authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The theoretical part focuses on the concept of peacekeeping itself, historical development, types of peace operations and literature review, as there are various criteria on how to evaluate peacekeeping missions. For the purpose of this thesis, the work examines three peace operations - the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the United Nations Missions in Somalia (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The case studies provide a brief overview of the conflict, the main roots of the conflict, a response from the international community, deployment of the mission and its evaluation according to the selected framework. Furthermore, the supplementary discussion regarding the development and situation in the country in the aftermath of the mission's withdrawal enriches the case study. The thesis concludes with the evaluation of the outcomes of second-generation operations with Chapter VII mandates and aims to reveal the fundamental deficiencies.

## **Abstrakt**

Tato diplomová práce se věnuje operacím na udržení míru druhé generace pod záštitou Organizace spojených národů na počátku devadesátých let a jejich hodnocení. Práce si klade za cíl zhodnotit (ne) úspěch vybraných misí, jež byly prvními příklady operací s mandátem podle kapitoly VII Charty OSN. Teoretická část práce se soustřeďuje na samotný koncept peacekeepingu, historickému vývoji tohoto konceptu, typům mírových operací a přehled dostupné literatury, která se věnuje tomuto tématu, jelikož existují různá kritéria, jak tyto mise hodnotit. Pro naplnění cíle této diplomové práce byly pro hodnocení vybrány následující tři operace na udržení míru. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) v Bosně a Hercegovině, United Nations Missions (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II) v Somálsku a United Nations Observer Mission (UNOMIL) v Libérii. Tyto případové studie jsou následně

zkoumány stručným přehledem konfliktu, hlavními příčinami konfliktu, reakce of mezinárodního společenství, nasazení mise, samotným hodnocením dle vybraného evaluačního rámce a doplňující diskuzí a nastíněním vývoje a situace v zemi po stáhnutí vojsk operace. V závěru tato práce hodnotí celkové výsledky zkoumaných misí a pokouší se odhalit jejich případné nedostatky.

## **Keywords**

Peacekeeping, The United Nations, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Liberia, evaluation, use of force

## **Klíčová slova**

Peacekeeping, Organizace Spojených Národů, Bosna a Hercegovina, Somálsko, Libérie, hodnocení, použití síly

## **Title**

UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s: Evaluation of the outcomes of second-generation operations with Chapter VII mandates

## **Název práce**

Operace na udržení míru OSN na počátku 90. let 20. století: Hodnocení výsledků operací druhé generace s mandáty kapitoly VII

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## **Introduction**

Peacekeeping, as one of the tools of conflict resolution, emerged during the Cold War period and became the most visible activity of the United Nations. Notwithstanding the existence of peacekeeping since the 1950s, there is no comprehensive definition of what peacekeeping is and which activities should perform. Thus, there are different opinions resonating among scholars, practitioners and international organizations. The diverse perceptions depend on the author's subject opinion associated with the classification of peace operations and their particular activities. Additionally, the traditional conception of the phenomena rests on the Holy Trinity principle encompassing the crucial elements of peace operations – consent, impartiality and non-use of force except self-defence. These elements were, however, revised due to new challenges which peacekeepers have been facing.

Initially, peacekeeping missions were deployed in interstate conflict, in order to monitor ceasefire agreement and create a physical barrier between combatants. Nevertheless, after the period of proxy wars and competitive nature of the international environment between the United States and the Soviet Union, the new world order brought new challenges for the United Nations peacekeeping as well. Hence, after the end of the Cold War, conflicts were present predominantly within states rather than between them, and the multidimensional causes lied in resources distribution, ethnic, race or religion diversity and grievances. Despite these challenges which peacekeepers were not experienced with, peace operations expanded in the post-Cold War period aiming to resolve the disputed and restore peace and security. However, in the aftermath of a series of disasters to resolve the complex roots of the conflict resulting in the mass killing of civilians, the efficiency of peacekeeping was questioned. Hence, many scholars and practitioners strived to evaluate (un) success of peace operations and potential reasons for their failures.

Similarly, as there is a lack of a unified definition of peacekeeping, there is no cohesive evaluating method on how to assess the operations either. The reason for the diversity of evaluation approaches stems from the different perception of what constitutes success. Nonetheless, the topic of peacekeeping effectiveness and its evaluation attracts many scholars and is very common in the academic field.

### *Thesis Objectives and Methodology*

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the (lack of) success of peace operations based on the most extensively developed framework selected from a review of relevant literature. I consider the qualitative research as the most beneficial, as the evaluation is based on the analysis of case studies. The research question is, therefore, following: How successful were the first UN second-generation peacekeeping operations with Chapter VII mandates?

Specifically, the thesis focuses on the evaluation of the following missions: the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operating in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995; the United Nations Missions in Somalia (UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II) operating in Somalia from 1992 to 1995 and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) operating in Liberia from 1993 to 1997. These peacekeeping operations were selected on the following common characteristics: a) are examples of the second-generation peacekeeping operation; b) are the first “experiments” of use of force, thus authorized to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; c) were deployed shortly after the end of the Cold War (first half of the 1990s); d) are already concluded which provides a better evaluation of their (lack of) success. Additionally, I consider the evaluation of peace operations authorized to use of force interesting, as these missions practically went beyond the fundamental principles of peacekeeping.

The thesis is divided into six parts. The first chapter introduces the concept of peacekeeping and presents various definitions developed by authors and scholars, focusing on the problematics. Also, the common aspects of these definitions are illustrated. Furthermore, this chapter tracks historical development of the concept, since the first peacekeeping mission deployed to the Middle East in the 1950s until the post-Cold War development and challenges linked to the changes arisen with the new world order. Furthermore, the chapter explores the use of force in peace operations, with the particular focus on Chapter VII of the UN Charter and its applicability on the field. In this regard, the changes in the use of force in the post-Cold War period is comprised as well. In addition, the chapter includes a brief overview of civil wars as the new type of conflict and the major causes. I consider this part appropriate to include, as all of the examined operations in this thesis were operating in intrastate conflicts.

Last part of this chapter covers types of peace operations and the different views on the division. There are various criteria on how to distinguish missions, for instance, in time perspective or by specific activities performed on the ground.

The second chapter focuses on the literature review in order to obtain an extensive grasp of the problematics on evaluating peace operations. Thus, various approaches are presented, including their limitations. Moreover, this chapter encompasses the selection of the most suitable framework and set of criteria which will be applied for the purpose of this thesis. Also, the selected framework is presented in detail to reveal the process of further evaluation.

Chapters three, four and five deals with the selected missions and their evaluation. The outline for these chapters is identical. Firstly, it provides a brief overview of the conflict and the main causes. The aim is to address the most important roots of the conflict in order to be able to evaluate their resolution. The factors are divided into internal factors, external factors and contributing factors. Subsequently, once the causes are determined, the chapter focuses on the response of the international community, such as peace efforts, including mediation, negotiation and other peaceful means of conflict resolution. The mandate and the course of the particular mission are presented through reports and resolutions submitted by the Security Council. Thereafter, the peace operations are evaluated according to the chosen framework and criteria. The last chapter summarizes the obtained assessments and evaluates the outcomes of second-generation operations with Chapter VII mandates

The primary source used in the thesis, grasping conceptualization of peacekeeping, its historical evolution and types of peace operation is book *Understanding Peacekeeping* by Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams. Another primary source is a book written by one of the first authors focusing on the problematics Paul Diehl, called *Peace Operations*. Also, as the primary source I will use a book by authors Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman called *Evaluating Peace Operations*, which covers the extensive approach of evaluation and at this time, it encompasses the most complex dimensions of evaluation. Other sources are consisting of the United Nations reports and resolutions of the Security Council, specialized articles focusing on peacekeeping missions and their assessment, reports of the non-governmental organizations and other additional sources.

# **1. The Concept of Peacekeeping: Conceptualizing, Historical Development and Types of Peacekeeping Operations**

The nature of conflicts has changed over the last few decades. Rather than interstate conflicts, instigated by the new territory acquisition, resources or national prestige, the intrastate conflicts over religion, ethnicity or government mistrust have emerged. Moreover, these conflicts are often blurred because of the boundaries between politically motivated violence, as it cannot be separated from ethnic, economic and political interests. Due to the new challenges arising in the field of international affairs, the warring manner has transformed as well. Through this transformation, combatants are rather focusing on unarmed, defenceless civilians, than on fight between the militaries of each participating state, as we know it. Therefore, this shift required diverse strategies and methods on how to settle these clashes, achieve peace, protect innocent civilians affected by the conflict and prevent any further dispute from recurrence. Through history, diplomacy was always an effective option of how to end the war. However, it was not an efficient tool in avoiding any conflict to arise in the future. Consequently, states tended to use more coercive measures in order to ensure the state's sovereignty and eliminate threats to peace and security. For instance, the most frequent strategies were based on alliance formation, deterrence or even direct use of force. Thus, the subsequent expansion of the international organizations in the twentieth century has brought new possibilities in the field, aiming to fill the gap and provide states opportunity for more moderate manners by persuading them that taking coercive measures is not a necessary option (Diehl, 2008: 1). Among the new possibilities, the concept of peacekeeping emerged, carrying out extensive tasks in conflict management missions.

## **1.1. Conceptualizing Peacekeeping**

The increased attention on peace operations was mainly visible in the 1990s, accompanied by the articles, books, journals and academic papers aiming to expound the concept of peacekeeping and its activities. Although many peace operations were deployed since World War II, there is, however, no comprehensive definition of peacekeeping, universally accepted

by the international community (Bureš, 2007: 407). Indeed, there are many definitions of peacekeeping among scholars, practitioners, governments and organizations. Peacekeeping, as a technique of establishing peace and ending the conflict, has been mainly associated with the United Nations since 1945. Moreover, the organization was awarded in 1988 Nobel Peace Prize for its activities (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 1). The United Nations thus refers to peacekeeping as “one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries to navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace” (United Nations, a). Although peacekeeping itself is not mentioned in the UN Charter, peace operations are defined according to their activities and methods executed in order to achieve its mandate’s purpose, which mostly lies between Chapter VI and Chapter VII. Dag Hammarskjöld, the former UN Secretary-General, referred to placing peace operations in Chapter Six and a Half, as it comprises traditional peaceful measures in conflict resolution and forceful manners described in Chapter VII (United Nations Information Service).

Furthermore, the UN definition stresses the strengths of the concept, including “[...] legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates” (United Nations, a). In addition, the UN peacekeeping has three core values, often called the “Holy Trinity of Peacekeeping”<sup>1</sup> consisting of impartiality, consent of the parties and non-use of force except self-defence and defence of the mandate (United Nations, a). Marrack Goulding, the former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Peacekeeping Operations, defines peacekeeping as “[f]ield operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary” (Goulding, 1993). There is another approach developed by Ronald Hatto, who defines peacekeeping at the two-level analysis – tactical and strategic levels. From the tactical perspective, peacekeeping encompasses operations established by member states of the United Nations or by regional organizations and are based on the deployment of soldiers, often in cooperation with the

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<sup>1</sup> The Holy Trinity of Peacekeeping will be examined further.

auxiliary personnel, including police officers and specialists and usually with the consent of conflicting parties, in order to mitigate, prevent or restore peace between actors concerned. On the other hand, at the strategic level, peacekeeping initially aims to stabilize and regulate international society. Thus, peace operations have served in maintaining or restoring state's sovereignty is threatened by external effects (Hatto, 2013: 498).

In book *Understanding peacekeeping* Alex J. Bellamy emphasizes the understanding of the role which peacekeeping constitutes in global politics, in order not to omit the political nature of peacekeeping. Moreover, Bellamy distinguishes between Westphalian and post-Westphalian order and the role that peacekeeping plays within it, regarding commitment to ideas about liberal peace (Bellamy et al., 2010: 13). Therefore, in the conception of Westphalian ideas, the role of peacekeepers should be limited to ensuring the creation of space for the resolution of clashes between states in a peaceful way. Additionally, ideological or political affairs within the country should not be peacekeepers' concern, in order to fulfil the norm of non-intervention and sovereignty. The post-Westphalian conception, on the other hand, assumes that democracies do not fight each other, thus the role of peacekeepers is to reduce the possible disputes between states through spreading liberal democracy. In addition, this approach is not limited in maintaining peace between states but rather focusing on peace inside of states (Bellamy et al., 2010: 13). Consequently, the Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions show tensions within the international law and the UN Charter, considering whether the security of states or human security should be preferred.

Definition of peacekeeping by Paul Diehl, as one of the earliest authors focusing on the problematics, refers to “the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved” (Bellamy et al., 2010: 174).

Moreover, Virginia Fortna uses the term peacekeeping to refer to the “deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security in the aftermath of war” (Fortna, 2007: 4-5). Furthermore, Fortna emphasizes that the definition includes both traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in her work, as it is possible to apply the effect of peacekeeping on the duration of peace on both types of the missions. However, she uses the

distinction between them as *consent-based peacekeeping* and *peace enforcement missions* or *Chapter VI* and *Chapter VII missions*, if required (Fortna, 2007: 5).

There are many attempts of defining peacekeeping and reveal the most precise option of how to describe this concept. Nonetheless, it encounters many difficulties as well. For instance, many of these definitions omitted the significance of the diversion among peace operations (various types and generations), ranging from their scope, size, goals, means to issues they have face to. Thus, as it is not entirely appropriate to generalize all operations and call them peacekeeping while neglecting these dissimilarities, on the other hand, some of the definitions are simplifying the concept as all activities carried out in the pre-conflict to post-conflict periods and delineate methods of conflict management and conflict resolution (Bureš, 2008: 20). The definitional distinction of peacekeeping among scholars is, therefore, interweaved with the classification of peace operations<sup>2</sup> and the author's perception of methods and activities executed by the mission.

Nonetheless, authors focusing on peacekeeping, generally concur in the vision of peacekeeping being a valuable tool in conflict resolution. Selection of the most suitable definition of peacekeeping is complicated, as the concept suffers from the proper theoretical base and most importantly, from the more current definition, which would include contemporary peace operations and evolutionary changes. Nevertheless, I elaborate on Marrack Goulding's definition of peacekeeping. However, it also has its limits. Through history and peacekeeping evolution, the components of the definition were not completely adhered. For instance, the consent of parties concerned with the deployment of the mission was disrupted, as the UN deployed various operations without the consent of actors, impartiality has been influenced by democratic principles, and the use of force was also revised. Despite these limits, I consider it as the most suitable option of how to describe the UN peacekeeping for the thesis' purposes.

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<sup>2</sup> The classification will be examined further in more detail.



## **The Holy Trinity of Peacekeeping**

The United Nations peacekeeping is based on three main principles – consent; impartiality and non-use of force except cases of self-defence. These principles were introduced, in regard to the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) by the former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, subsequently affirmed and reaffirmed in many UN documents, for instance in the Agenda for Peace or in the Brahimi Report, in which these principles refer to remain the “bedrock values” of the UN peacekeeping (UN General Assembly, 2000). However, the UNEF report emphasized the importance of the parties’ consent, “[...] UNEF has been necessarily limited in its operations to the extent that consent of the parties concerned is required under generally recognized international law. It followed that, while the General Assembly could establish the force, subject only to the concurrence of the States providing contingents, the consent of the Government of the country concerned was required before the Assembly could request the force to be stationed or to operate on the territory of that country” (UN General Assembly, 1958).

Moreover, Hammarskjöld stressed that UNEF has neither military objectives nor other military functions beyond their duties. Thus, the military functions of the mission were limited, as they were mainly obligated to secure peaceful conditions while all parties are willing to cooperate and take into consideration the recommendations constituted by the General Assembly. Also, the impartiality of peacekeepers is a crucial element and might have further implications, especially for cooperation reluctance or even consent withdrawal. Through the lenses of the United Nations itself, the core values of peacekeeping are described as follows. Consent of the conflicting parties is crucial in order to obtain the necessary freedom of action in carrying out the mandate of the mission. Also, it requires a mutual willingness of the actors to resolve the conflict and achieve peace. Nevertheless, giving consent with peace mission deployment might not meet with the consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties are struggling in control and command as well.

Additionally, the absence of such consent may put peace operation in a role of another compote of the conflict, however, permitting the mission is significantly complicated if the mission is present in a hostile environment with the presence of armed groups or other spoilers which are not subordinated to one of the actors involved in a conflict (United Nations, b). Impartiality, as the second fundamental principle of the UN peacekeeping, is crucial for the willingness of parties to cooperate and maintain their consent with the mission operating on the territory. However, while dealing with conflicting actors, peacekeepers should be impartial to all sides, but should not be too defensive or inactive. Simultaneously, peacekeepers should not tolerate any actions committed by the parties which should disrupt peace process or international principles which the United Nations assert.

Thus, it is crucial for peace operation to develop and maintain good relations with actors involved and avoid any activities which would further undermine their impartiality image. Failure to do so might cause loss of the mission's credibility, trust or even its withdrawal (United Nations, b). The third principle is non-use of force except the cases of self-defence or defence of the mandate. Therefore, peacekeepers should avoid any violent conflict with parties, unless the mission is authorized by the Security Council to use all "necessary means" to protect civilians against both psychical and physical attacks, deter any attempts of political process disruption or assist authorities to maintain public order. Such authorizations for the use of force are given mostly to missions which have robust mandates and execute extensive tasks on the field.

Nevertheless, peacekeeping operations should use of force only in compliance with the primary rule – to use it at the necessary minimum in order to achieve the desired objectives while maintaining the consent of parties crucial for further presence of the mission and most importantly, it should always be used as a measure of last resort. Furthermore, while concerning to use of force, there are many impacts which need to be considered first. For instance, humanitarian impact; security and safety of personnel; public perception and local and national impact to the consent of the mission (United Nations, b). These principles have been, however, challenged and contested regarding the efficacy of peacekeeping, especially in the post-Cold War period, with the shift in nature of conflicts. Thus, diverse characteristics of conflict have brought some concessions in adherence to these principles.

### *Consent*

Consent of the parties is predominantly significant in order to respect the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. Thus, the deployment of peace operation within a state and in the absence of consent would mean the violation of this principles and might cast a light of hostile foreign force upon a mission, aiming to interfere in its affairs. Moreover, the UN would lose its moral authority in the eyes of the local public. Hence, host state consent is the first prerequisite for the presence of peace operation. Nonetheless, peace enforcement did not require consent from the parties involved or the host state for their deployment, as the aggressor(s) has(ve) been already designated by the Security Council and use of force was consequently permitted (De Coning, 2017). Therefore, the difference between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions is apparent. Peace enforcement operations are deployed against an already designed enemy of the international society and against whom will be particular coercive actions taken. To conclude, the requirement to obtain the consent is a foundation for traditional peacekeeping missions, however, through the evolution of the threats peacekeepers have to deal with, the consent of parties was revised in cases of peace enforcement missions which do not require consent as a necessary condition for their deployment.

### *Non-use of force*

Traditional peacekeeping missions build on the premise of non-use of force or at last a minimum, if necessary. However, similarly, as a consent of the parties, this principle was revised in many cases, in order to react to the new challenges. Moreover, there were cases in which the use of force was permitted in response to the actual situation on the field and the mission's mandate was modified by the additional resolutions (ONUC, UNAMSIL). Simultaneously, the ability to use force is the most visible in peace enforcement missions or missions authorized under Chapter VII. Furthermore, “[a]n important distinction is that where peacekeeping is essentially defensive in nature, peace enforcement provides for offensive action“ (De Coning, 2017). Although some of the UN operations departed from these rules in history, namely for instance in Congo, Korea or Somalia, these principles remain to be the core values of the UN peacekeeping. As it was mentioned, the Brahimi report reaffirmed the importance to follow these principles. Moreover, “[w]hat the report also does is to adopt an

integrated view of these principles. They are not viewed anymore as independent indices but as interconnected principles supporting each other“ (Tsagourias, 2006).

### *Problems with the Holy Trinity*

Nevertheless, as peace operations went through an evolution, the concept of the Holy Trinity evolved as well. Initially, the consent of the host state was requisite for mission’s deployment in order to respect state’s sovereignty, however, as the peace operations changed and had to deal with more complicated conflicts, sovereignty was less viewed as a barrier for the deployment. For instance, in Somalia, where the consent was impossible to obtain as it was a failed state. The use of force went through the most significant change. Originally, according to the traditional peacekeeping, there was no another occasion to use force except self-defence, however, further peace operations which carried out even more tasks such as civilians’ protection, required to be larger in military capabilities and flexible in the use of force (Diehl, 2008: 57–58). The principle of minimum use of force is still relevant and desired. Nonetheless, it now also includes necessary offensive actions and tactics in order to achieve the mission’s objectives. The third component of impartiality has transformed as well. Impartiality refers to impartial behaviour of peacekeepers, however, peace operations have supported democratic forces over the de facto government (Haiti) or government forces over the rebel groups (Diehl, 2008: 57).

## **1.2. Historical Development of Peacekeeping**

The activities of contemporary peacekeeping can also be observed in history, although in a preceding form, since the idea that great powers are obligated to maintain international peace and security, arose. Initially, ensuring international peace served as a pretext for the ability to interfere in foreign affairs and enforce national interests. The fundamental example is the idea of civilization and modernization of the “backward societies” developed by the European powers in order to legitimize their colonialism. Subsequently, after the terrors experienced in the First World War, leaving over the twenty million casualties behind, the creation of the international organization, asserting peace and avoidance of any war recurrence was inevitable (Bellamy et al., 2010: 75–76). Regarding increasing number of casualties and human suffering

during the years of the World War I, President Woodrow Wilson proposed the creation of a universal association of states whose purpose would be to enhance the security of naval routes and avert any war triggered by the violation of agreed norms of the organization (Kissinger, 1996: 235). Subsequently, Wilson introduced “the program of the world’s peace” in the American congress in 1918, consisting of fourteen points. The crucial points encompass the open diplomacy, freedom of navigation upon the seas, disarmament, removal of the economic and trade barriers, impartial adjustment of all colonial claims and most importantly – the creation of a general association of nations under specific conditions, affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity which later led to the formation of the League of Nations in 1919 (Wilson, 1918). The key covenants of the League of Nations refer to resolve any dispute between its members peacefully; any threat of war affecting any of the Members is perceived as a matter of concern to all members of the League, and immediate action is required in order to provide the peace of nations; adhere universal norms, obligated for all the Members, and their violation will be deemed as an act of war against other Members (Bellamy et al., 2010: 77).

The provision of the collective security concept<sup>3</sup> was the major function of the League of Nations. However, the organization’s principles omitted the fundamental characteristics of the collective security ideal model, embracing certainty, inclusivity and utility. Furthermore, the procedures of collective security were not tested until the Japanese attack on Manchuria in 1931. Although China urged the Council to take necessary measures against this illegal occupation, the only action was the Council’s recommendation to withdraw Japanese troops from Manchuria, as Japan would potentially veto other coercive action. Another test of the efficiency of the collective mechanism of the League of Nations took place in Ethiopia in 1935, when Italy attacked and conquered that country. In response, the League of Nations imposes economic sanctions on Italy. However, the failure of the organization to react was visible by British and French willingness to recognize Italian sphere of influence over parts of North Africa, as both countries pursue their national interests in the region, hoping for advantages and gaining a valuable ally against rising Nazi Germany. Therefore, the major powers preferred

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<sup>3</sup> Author’s note: The collective security concept rests on the adoption that the security of one is the concern of all members, thus the members’ involvement is required in order to react to any potential aggression and ensure its prevention. Additionally, members pledged to solve the disputes peacefully; they are obligated to follow the interests of the international community and build on mutual trust.

their national interests ahead of the organization's ones, which triggered tensions in the international community and subsequent failure of the League of Nations (Diehl, 2008: 32). The League of Nations' achievements and failures would be a subject of further discussion, nevertheless, it is not the main concern of this diploma thesis.

The United Nations was established at the San Francisco conference in 1945, as the successor of the failed League of Nations, endeavouring to avoid prior deficiencies and mistakes. The fundamental purposes of the United Nations are anchored in its Charter, particularly in Chapter I, refers to maintain international peace and security, thus "[...]take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace" (Charter of the United Nations). Additionally, in case of any conflict emerging, Chapter VI and VII specify the measures which should be implemented in order to maintain or restore international peace and security, encompassing negotiation; mediation; conciliation; arbitration or other peaceful means. Also, to give the United Nations right to use of force, if it is necessary to fulfil the main purpose of the organization and peaceful means failed (Charter of the United Nations). Although the concept of peacekeeping is not explicitly defined in the UN Charter, we may distinguish peacekeeping operations according to distinct activities defined in Chapter VI and VII and its articles.

From the perspective of the United Nations, the first peacekeeping mission was deployed shortly after the end of World War II, in 1948 to the Middle East, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The role of unarmed military observers was to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Nonetheless, most of the authors focusing on the concept of peacekeeping, claim, that the first peacekeeping mission carried out by the United Nations is the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) deployed in 1956, in order to address the Suez crisis. "The mandate of the force was to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire" (United Nations, c).

Despite the mandate's limitations, UNEF I was a breakthrough in conflict resolution procedures and rendered a significant role of the international soldiers, performing specific functions in interstate conflicts. Furthermore, Diehl refers to the "golden age" of peacekeeping since the UNEF I was deployed in 1956 until the deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978, regarding the greatest number of peacekeeping operations in the Cold War (Diehl, 2008: 43). This era, however, witnessed the most significant deviation from norms according to the traditional peacekeeping operations were established. The United Nations Operation in Congo was established in 1960, in response to the internal clashes after Congo gained its independence from Belgium who was colonizing the country for many decades. The "year of Africa", as it is frequently used, regarding decolonization of the continent, brought chaos and unstable domestic environment in many African countries, left at the mercy of new unknown challenges they had to face after the colonizer power withdrawal. Thus, Congo was not an exception, and shortly after gaining its independence, the Congolese army revolted, causing many civil unrests, including attacks against Belgian citizens. Simultaneously, Congolese politician Moïse Tshombé declared the independence of Katanga, province abundant in natural resources (Aksu, 2003). Hence, the Congolese authorities called upon the UN for assistance, and the initial mandate of ONUC was to assist in maintaining order and law, provide technical support and ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces. However, the mandate was subsequently transformed and included tasks such as maintaining the territorial integrity, preventing the potential occurrence of civil war in the country, removal of all paramilitary personnel and mercenaries and maintaining political independence of Congo.

Moreover, while executing such extensive tasks, ONUC was authorized by Resolution 161 to use force, if necessary, to fulfil the purpose of the mandate (United Nations, h). Therefore, the use of force authorization and actual usage on the field went against the core principles of traditional peacekeeping which ONUC diverged from. In addition, this mission had substantial consequences for UN peacekeeping. For instance, the UN was capable and willing to operate in intrastate conflicts even before the 1990s. Although the UN was dealing with the clashes induced by the Westphalian systems of governance and border retention, the UN refused to allow any political solution is contrary to the territorial integrity of the state (Bellamy et al., 2010: 87). Consequently, as the mission completely deviated from the traditional peacekeeping, it is considered a peace enforcement operation. Although from a time

perspective, this mission might be classified as the first generation together with other traditional peacekeeping missions, it is necessary to take into consideration the ONUC's uniqueness and permission to use of force. Other examples of traditional peacekeeping operations in this period are United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF, 1962-1963); United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL, 1958) or United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM, 1963-1964). Subsequently, however, many areas, in which would be operations eligible (Afghanistan, Panama), were excluded due to competing between the superpowers during the Cold War period, as all members of the Security Council are able to use their veto, thus the operation would not be authorized. This decline Diehl called the "lost decade" (1979-1988), as in this period no new UN peace operation was deployed. Moreover, the Cold War superpowers' tensions and dissatisfaction with ongoing operations made peacekeeping non-desirable option in this period (Diehl, 2008: 48). Additionally, during the Cold War era, peacekeeping operations were limited in their duties, constituting the intermediary forces whose purpose was to separate combatants, thus discourage them from other armed engagements, monitor cease-fires, provide medical assistance or clear transportation routes. In addition, these early operations were deployed almost exclusively in interstate conflicts (Diehl, 2008: 44).

### **The post-Cold War Evolution and Emergence of Civil War**

Since all of the selected cases for the purpose of this thesis are peace missions operating in civil wars, I consider beneficial to understand civil war, its origins and the logic of violence within. Defining civil war is complicated without any ad hoc coding rules which differentiate whether civil war or other types of political violence happens. Nonetheless, "[t]he main distinction they drew between civil (internal or intrastate) war and interstate or extrastate (colonial and imperial) war was the internality of the war to the territory of a sovereign state and the participation of the government as a combatant" (Sambanis, 2004: 816). Furthermore, according to Stathis Kalyvas, the definition of civil war is following "[...] *armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities*" (Kalyvas, 2006: 17). However, the common characteristics in determining civil war, which resonate among authors, are following. First, the conflict occurs primarily on the territory of a sovereign state within its boundaries.



Nevertheless, intrastate conflicts can also spread abroad, primarily due to the refugee flows, seeking sanctuary. The refugee flows as a consequence of civil wars may cause severe economic, political, social and other inconveniences to neighbour states and may produce rising tensions in the region (Iqbal and Zorn, 2007). Moreover, scholars and journalist focusing on the civil wars, consider violence against civilians as one of the crucial characteristics of these combats (Weinstein, 2007: 5). Second, the government of a state concerned is one of the main protagonists, as civil wars are often made against the government. Furthermore, some authors<sup>4</sup> define civil wars according to the annual death threshold, for instance, of 1,000 deaths.

### *Causes of the Civil War*

Civil wars can be fought from a wide range of diverse reasons. The departure point exploring the outbreaks of civil wars is the dissimilarity among society within a country which produces discontented entities with a current situation they found themselves. Therefore, several dissimilarities such as political interests, power acquisition, religious reasons or ethnical diversity constitute the main triggers of the conflict igniting. Nonetheless, these causes may affect each other, and there are certainly other factors as well such as an unfavourable economic situation in a country, political instability and feeling of insecurity and discrimination which further deteriorate the dissatisfaction and accelerate any insurgency emerging. The political situation in the country plays, however, a critical role. Hence, the assumption resonating among researchers is, that weak states are prone to civil wars and the type of regime matters. Thus, democracies are presumed to be more likely immune to revolution, and secessionist tendencies remain low, as the democratic peace offers equality of rights and civilians' participation on a political process, non-violent forms of protests and potential clashes are resolved through peaceful means (Burg and Shoup, 2000: 5).

On the other hand, the non-democratic states most often do not allow citizens to participate on the political and electoral process and lack of any sustainable plan for economic development providing the people better job opportunities and living conditions in general.

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<sup>4</sup> Small and Singer, 1982 in Sambanis, 2004: 817.

“Similarly, regime instability, another aspect of weak states that facilitates civil war onset by providing opportunities for the rebel to mount an armed challenge against the state, remains as an important predictor of war onset [...]” (Gurses and Mason, 2010: 151–152). The violence in intrastate conflict is conducted in order to pursue actor(s) intentions and goals, depending on the primary purpose, there are various uses of violence in the civil war. For instance, publicity; demoralization; demonstration; intimidation; enforcement or disruption of control; polarization; the mobilization of forces and resources; the elimination of opponent’s forces; repression or radicalization of the public (Kalyvas 2004: 98).

The post-Cold War evolution is crucial regarding this thesis, hence, it will be examined in more detail. The expansion of the peace operations occurred mainly in the 1990s, counting almost seven new operations per year. The reasons for expansion, particularly in this period might be attributed to the increase of intrastate conflict and certainly, to the end of the Cold War and the end of the superpowers’ spheres of influence. Regarding the „New World Order” after the end of the Cold War, peace operations were considered as the „recipe for a better world” (Kobi et al., 2009: 2). Moreover, military professionals, scholars and journalist focusing on future warfare development, stressed the importance of “clean and safe wars” which are technologically based, precise and almost bloodless. Simultaneously, conflicts were characterized by unconventional struggles and the world was marked by the proliferation of insurgencies. Furthermore, these conflicts had key characteristics – dispersion as they were dispersed in place and time, often led by guerrilla warfare norms, blur as there were no visible boundaries between war viewed as politically motivated violence or wars in which is the national inseparable from ethnic, economic or criminal ones and unpredictable fluidity which refers to the unclear definition of their beginnings and ends (Kobi et al., 2009: 3).

Moreover, in a five-year period between 1988 and 1993, the concept of peacekeeping faced a triple transformation (Bellamy et al., 2010: 93). First, the *quantitative transformation* was related to the greatest number of peace operations carried out by the United Nations in the five-year period, which was more peacekeeping operations than it had been conducted since the UN existence. In addition, the UN was requested to perform activities that required more experiences and resources than the UN was able to provide (Bellamy et al., 2010: 93). Second, there was a *qualitative transformation*, constituting more complexity in peace operations. The UN thus involved extensive activities such as state-building programmes,

delivery of humanitarian aid, an element of peace enforcement combined with fundamental peacekeeping strategies. Moreover, these missions were also larger in scope and financial demanding than their predecessors. The third transformation was *normative*, broadening the competencies of peacekeepers, to include the promotion of liberal-democratic peace in the post-Westphalian sense (Bellamy et al., 2010: 93). Thus, the UN deployed both traditional peacekeeping operations and new, more complex and more extensive operations as well. Simultaneously, the “New World Order” after the end of the Cold War demanded the UN respond.

Therefore, the former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali prepared a report known as *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, which combined optimism and enthusiasm about accomplishing the new tasks in peace operations. The report aimed to outline recommendations in order to invigorate the new broader UN mandates encompassing the preventive diplomacy<sup>5</sup>, peacemaking<sup>6</sup>, peace enforcement authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, wider peacekeeping practices involving both military and civilian elements and peacebuilding procedures, including election supervision, economic recovery and human rights protection. Nevertheless, the widening of missions’ activities and complex tasks created a gap between the demands placed on peacekeepers and the means which were given to them in order to accomplish the mission’s purpose.

Therefore, although the report is optimistic about carrying out the new challenges effectively, Ghali also addressed the importance of resources inputs, as an imperative condition of how to achieve each of the missions’ goals. Nonetheless, the report did not provide a coherent and effective plan for future peacekeeping operations, hence “[...] giving the UN more tasks without the material or doctrinal resources needed to fulfil them was a recipe for disaster” (Bellamy et al., 2010: 103). The initial euphoria over the new peacekeeping missions, as the effective tool in resolving the disputes in the advent of New World Order period, suddenly brought a disillusionment in the form of the well-known tragedies in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia. These failures are consequences of the conjunction of newly constituted ambitious tasks in a hostile conflict environment, while peacekeepers were still expected to adhere to the core

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<sup>5</sup> Defined in the report as “[...] is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (United Nations, 1992).

<sup>6</sup> Defined as “[...] is action to bring hostile parties to an agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations” (United Nations, 1992).

principles of traditional peacekeeping. Furthermore, these failures are even more multidimensional, as the issues also refer to the lack of political will, in compliance with their commitments with material and personal resources. Thus, it resulted in a poorly equipped peacekeeping missions, using the old techniques which were not able to adapt to new different conditions and challenges.

Consequently, the UN did not have enough funding to fulfil ambitious mandates authorized by the Security Council, thus operations were funded by bank loans and lacked essential equipment. Moreover, the UN had insufficient institutional capacity, incapable of managing all of the complex missions. Lastly, the UN lacked experiences on which template would be the new complex missions established. Thus, among different missions, military and civilian contingents also differed in doctrine, training, funding and equipment (Bellamy et al., 2010: 109–111). Consequently, these events triggered the beginning of the contraction era of the UN peacekeeping, accompanied by a significant decrease of the Blue Helmets operating all over the world and reduction of the UN peacekeeping budget.

Moreover, the UN member states were hesitated to send their troops or even participate on further missions, which was also influenced by argument developed by Edward Luttwak “give war a chance”<sup>7</sup> through which he explains why the UN could not do much in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda (Bureš, 2008: 44–45). The new position of peacekeepers was, however, later re-considered, in regard, to the mentioned disasters. After the contraction period, which lasted to late 1999, the revitalization era occurred (Bureš, 2008: 45). Furthermore, it was accompanied by the important document by the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi who evolved the future direction of the UN peacekeeping, known as the *Brahimi report*. The Brahimi report was introduced to the Security Council members in 2000 and contained recommendations for the future peace operations, proposed by its Working Group. The recommendations included a need of transparent, clear credible, achievable and robust mandates, extended use of force in necessary cases<sup>8</sup> and the important role of

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<sup>7</sup> Author’s note: The argument is built on the assumption that war is a valuable way how to resolve conflict and, in some cases, war is better option than third side interference.

<sup>8</sup> The report stressed that the role of impartiality, consent of the parties and use of force only in cases of self-defence as the main cores of peacekeeping, however, all of these aspects should be more flexible and responding to the current situation and conflict. Thus, the use of force should not be so limited and should be used in regard to the need of the operation’s mandate. Furthermore, the troops should be bigger, better equipped in order to be able to deter (UN General Assembly, 2000: 10).

peacebuilding mission deployment after peacekeeping operation (UN General Assembly, 2000). Simultaneously, due to the tragedies in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia, the United Nations currently emphasizes the protection of civilians affected by the conflict and the Brahimi report has become a crucial document in the further development of peacekeeping operations. In order to prevent any mass killings witnessed in the past, the Brahimi report reinterpreted the minimum use of force to encompass the use of force in defence of the mandate of peacekeepers themselves. Moreover, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), based on Brahimi report, has developed in 2009 concept called the robust peacekeeping, described as “[...] a political and operational strategy to signal the intention of a UN mission to implement its mandate and to deter threats to an existing peace process in the face of resistance from spoilers“ (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009). The three core principles of peacekeeping guide the concept, however, it also requires credible military postures. At the tactical level, this concept enables peacekeepers to use of force, if it is inevitable in defence of the mandate. Thus, defending mandate might be connected to the protection of civilians, as it is the primary purpose of peace operations, but also the way how to deter any potential spoilers.

Moreover, peacekeeping missions use force in a defensive manner, as self-defence, protection of civilians or mandate. In comparison, peace enforcement missions use force in an offensive manner, in order to eliminate any spoilers occurring. In regard to the robust peacekeeping, the use of force is proscribed to the tactical level and limited only as defensive, impartial activity and the use of force is not authorized in for all missions in contemporary operations (Hunt, 2017). In reality, nevertheless, the line between defensive and offensive use of force is often blurred, thus in some cases, robust peacekeeping involves more offensive measures against spoilers. In particular, the United Nations mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was authorized for offensive action against militias sympathizing with President Laurent Gbagbo. However, the real reason was to protect the local population who supported his proponent Alassane Ouattara from potential attack (Hunt, 2017). Recently, the shift in deployment in more aggressive and proactive peace operations has occurred, increasingly willing to use force in order to ensure the protection of civilians. Nonetheless, the difficulty is to distinguish to what extent is the use of force related to actual necessary civilian protection and when are the coercive measures exceeded. In addition, as the protection of civilians (POC)

has been the main concern of the UN peacekeeping missions, it has also been connected with the concept Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which emerged as a global principle after the adoption of the UN World Summit Outcome Document in 2005. “The Responsibility to Protect – known as R2P – is an international norm that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The concept emerged in response to the failure of the international community to adequately respond to mass atrocities committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s” (Global Centre For the Responsibility to Protect). Currently, the UN Department of Peace Operations is leading 13 peacekeeping operations, mainly in Africa (United Nations, d).

### **1.3. Types of Peacekeeping Operations**

Since the first launch of peace operation in the 1950s, the nature of threats to international peace and security has changed. Hence, it required more extensive measures and functions executed by peacekeeping missions in order to eliminate the risk of any further conflict escalation and recurrence. Therefore, the evolution of peace operations, their functions, size, characters or mandates is described as “generations of peacekeeping” among scholars and practitioners. Nonetheless, there are diverse approaches of such categorization, ranging from the chronological approach, which distinguish „traditional peacekeeping“ in the period of the Cold War and “new peacekeeping“ in the post-Cold War era to approaches which encompassing different peacekeeping activities in their classification (Bureš, 2007: 409). Additionally, several approaches refer to classify peace operations according to the operation’s activities and tasks or according to the role they represent in global politics.

Furthermore, Alex Bellamy claims that UN peacekeeping has not evolved in a linear manner with a simple division between the Cold War and post-Cold War missions. Moreover, he emphasizes the ambiguity in the peace operations determination and proposes seven types of operations, based on the goals which they should achieve - the „intended ends” (Bellamy et al., 2010: 7). Hence, he identifies *preventive deployments* whose purpose is to prevent any violent conflicts arising and to eliminate any potential threats to civilians. Moreover, these operations are usually deployed with the consent of the host country. *Traditional peacekeeping*

missions take place between a ceasefire agreement and political settlement. Thus, the task of these operations is to facilitate a political dialogue of the belligerents through building confidence between all actors involved and creating a space necessary for negotiations in order to achieve a political settlement.

*Wider peacekeeping* aims to enable and implement a settlement agreed between the disputed actors. Subsequently, operations are endeavouring to accomplish tasks of traditional peacekeeping and simultaneously to achieve additional ad hoc tasks developed in response to the actual situation on the field. These operations will be examined further. *Peace enforcement* operations are the closest example of collective security concept, the core assumption of the organization. Thus, these operations aim to enforce the will of the Security Council upon states involved in a conflict (Bellamy et al., 2010: 8).

Another type of peace operations Bellamy labels as the *assisting transitions* occurring after a ceasefire and a political agreement were accomplished. These missions are considered as multidimensional, engaging military, police and civilian personnel whose primary concern is to assist with the implementation of a political settlement. Thus, peacekeepers as external actors have mediatory and peacemaking roles. *Transitional administrations* as another type of multidimensional operations execute many various tasks ranging from protecting civilians, keeping peace and enforcing peace agreements to supervising over the border of a territory, enforcing the law, managing schools, hospitals and infrastructure, regulating media to administrating judicial system in the country. These missions are deployed after a peace agreement and are characteristic for a sovereign authority exercised over a specific part of the territory.

Finally, *peace-support operations* strive to establish liberal-democratic societies in order to maintain international peace and security. In addition, these missions integrate robust military capabilities and civilian, political and humanitarian tasks (Bellamy et al., 2010: 8–9). Michael Doyle, on the other hand, suggested three generations of peacekeeping, based on its activities on the field. “They include not only the early activities of Chapter VI (or so-called six and  $\frac{1}{2}$ ) “first-generation” operations, which call for interposition of a force after a truce has been reached, but also a far more ambitious group of “second-generation” operations that focus on political reconstruction and that rely on the consent of parties and an even more ambitious

group of “third-generation” operations that function with Chapter VII mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the acquiescence of the parties” (Bureš, 2007: 409).

In addition, Diehl and Druckman (2010: 1) differentiate *traditional peacekeeping*, *robust peacekeeping*, *peacebuilding* and *peace observation*. For the purpose of the thesis, however, the author elaborates with the following differentiation.

### **Traditional Peacekeeping**

Traditional peacekeeping, also known as “first-generation” peacekeeping is constituted on the premises of the “Holy Trinity” of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force. These missions involve military personnel to monitor, supervise and compliance with ceasefires; troop withdrawals; creating a buffer zone between combatants and civilians and between both sides of the belligerents to separate them. Nonetheless, these tasks are carried out without enforcement powers, as peacekeeping is an instrument of conflict prevention, management as resolution, hence, traditional peacekeepers are aiming to be enablers rather than enforcers (Findlay, 2002: 4–5). Traditional peacekeeping missions are deployed in the period between a ceasefire and political settlement in order to establish mutual trust and confidence among actors involved in the conflict and thus, create a space for political dialogue, negotiations and coveted political settlement. However, it is conditional on the following assumptions: “[...] the primary belligerents are states; the combatant units are hierarchically organized, Clausewitzian militaries; and the protagonists wish to end the conflict and search for a political resolution” (Bellamy et al., 2010: 174).

The first example of a traditional peacekeeping mission was the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) deployed in 1956, responding to the Suez crisis, became the guiding template for further traditional peacekeeping operations. The other examples of the first generation missions are the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) deployed in 1958 in order to “[...] to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders“ (United Nations, e). The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which is still active since 1964, initially deployed to prevent any further violence escalation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. In addition, the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea



(UNSF) in 1962, whose purpose was to monitor the ceasefire and help ensure law and order (United Nations, f).

### **Wider Peacekeeping**

After the end of the Cold War, peace operations were deployed in evermore challenging hostile environments. Thus it required to evolve innovative approaches how to respond to the changing conditions, as peacekeepers had to face situations in which were unarmed civilians the main target of the armed groups; the social, economic and political infrastructure was destroyed, and significant part of the population was displaced (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010). Moreover, the international community had to react to threats of famine, racial, ethnical or religious exploitation, even genocide and failed states. Therefore, wider peacekeeping or also second-generation peacekeeping is distinct from the first-generation peacekeeping because these missions operate within the state, rather than between states. Second-generation peacekeeping is often referred to as “Chapter 6 and a half” peacekeeping, as it belongs between “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” described in Chapter VI and enforcement measures expressed by “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches to the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” anchored in Chapter VII (Bellamy et al., 2010: 194).

Moreover, Bellamy suggests six key characteristics of wider peacekeeping. First, second-generation operations are deployed within a context of ongoing violence and despite an agreed ceasefire. Thus, compared to the first-generation missions and assisting transitions, which are deployed after the ceasefire is agreed, wider peacekeeping is implemented either if the agreements are likely to collapse or either if there is entirely the absence of them. Second, these missions operate during the “new wars” which have the intrastate character, rather than typical conflict between states in the Westphalian sense, even despite external involvement which occurred in Rwanda or Bosnia, for instance. Third, peacekeepers deployed in wider peacekeeping missions are expected to execute tasks beyond traditional peacekeeping, ranging from protecting civilians and UN personnel, providing and securing humanitarian aid, guaranteeing freedom of movement, organizing elections to disarming the belligerents, separating of forces, monitoring ceasefires and enforcing no-fly zones. Furthermore, the British

doctrine identifies the following tasks of the second-generation peacekeeping: conflict prevention; military assistance to civilian agencies; the guarantee and denial of movement; demobilization and humanitarian relief (Bellamy et al., 2010: 196). Fourth, these operations had to coordinate their activities with the humanitarian community, as the number of such communities increased rapidly. In comparison to the traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeepers have to cohabitate with many governmental and non-governmental organizations persuading their goals, which creates coordination problems. Fifth, mandates of the second-generation missions are frequently changing. Lastly, wider peacekeeping operations are ambitious and supposed to execute many various and extensive tasks, however, they are not sufficiently equipped or financed. Thus, there is a problem between expected achievements of the mission, and provided available means how to accomplish them (Bellamy et al., 2010: 194–195).

Nonetheless, although wider peacekeeping operations involve more comprehensive tasks and have to react to the nature of “new wars”, they are guided by principles draw on the principle of the “holy trinity”. The consent of the belligerent actors is crucial for the distinction between wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The examples of wider peacekeeping are the United Nations Observer Missions in Sierra Leone, UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL, firstly deployed in 1998 to monitor the security situation in the country, assist with demobilization and disarmament procedures and monitor respect international humanitarian law. Certainly, there is the fundamental example – the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), deployed in 1993, originally established to help with the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, UNAMIR is one of the UN’s greatest failure, resulting in the mass killing of Tutsi ethnic group.

### **Robust Peacekeeping**

After the catastrophic experiments with peace enforcement mandates in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda and inability to protect the civilian population, the UN peacekeeping required a fundamental change in tactics and means of how the future peacekeeping missions will be carried out, in order to avoid any similar disasters. Thus, the safety of civilians and peacekeepers came at the forefront in peacekeeping operations. “Robust peacekeeping moves peace operations further toward the coercive end of the use-of-force scale. Such operations involve a

larger number of troops than standard operations, and those troops have the greater military capability, with weaponry well beyond the traditional rifle or side arms carried by traditional peacekeepers” (Diehl, 2008: 56). Moreover, robust peacekeeping or multidimensional peacekeeping as Virginia Fortna refers to, have larger civilian components to monitor the election, monitor human rights, provide military and police training or even temporarily administer the country (Fortna, 2004: 270). Apart from the traditional missions whose primary goal is to create an effective buffer zone between belligerents, robust peacekeeping aims to ensure security in the country and encompasses infrastructure reconstruction, the rebuilding of institutions, reconciliation, public order or protection of civilians and human rights. Hence, it combines various types of tasks, including civilian, military and political executed by significant civilian components in combination with military force.

### **Peace Enforcement**

In comparison to the traditional types of peacekeeping, peace enforcement operations are concerned with activities specified in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus, the Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council to use necessary measures, including interruption of economic relations, cutting various means of communication, enforce sanctions and most importantly “[...]it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Charter of the United Nations). In practice, however, the boundary between the implementation of Chapter VII or a particular section of the resolution which are or are not considered as part of Chapter VII is blurred. Moreover, the fundamental idea of peace enforcement lies in the collective security concept, as the system’s participants should cooperate to preserve shared values by peaceful means or by the use of force, if necessary. However, there are several issues among these operations. For instance, the UN has been forced to establish the collective security system by giving the other entities authorized to use of force, as there are no armed forces. Additionally, there is a gap between the theoretical provision for using enforcement measures and the lack of UN capabilities. Recently, the UN still has no units authorized to perform peace-enforcement missions (Bellamy et al., 2010: 217–218).

## **Peace Support Operations**

These operations combine robust military forces and civilian components in order to assist the affected country on its path of recovery from the dreads of war into preferably liberal democratic societies which are capable of sustaining stable peace and avoiding any recurrence in future. Peacekeepers deployed in such operations have to face several issues, for instance, the dissension between sticking with the concept of Holy Trinity of peacekeeping – consent and impartiality regarding use of force in order to assure all demands; the gap between means and mandate and the position of military units within peace operation led by civilians (Bellamy et al., 2010: 280). Furthermore, the task of military forces is to provide public security, thus ensure the disarmament of the combatants and support the effective implementation of the peace agreement. Peace support operations overcome the gap between means and ends (mandate's purpose) as the missions are able to effectively react to and eliminate spoilers which tend to disrupt peace process due to religious, political or other reasons (Bellamy et al., 2010: 279). Moreover, these operations are rather to be in the domain of Western peacekeepers, as their purpose is to create a baseline for further establishment of functioning, liberal democratic state which requires infrastructure reconstruction, public order maintaining and national reconciliation. Additionally, the concept of peace support operations stems from the following sources. First, the British peacekeeping doctrine, according to which are these operations multi-functional, aiming to achieve long-term political settlement and humanitarian goals engaging diplomatic agencies and military forces. Second, the Brahimi report emphasizes the peacekeepers' professionalism and effectivity. Thus, the units have to be capable to protect and defend mission's objectives, its components and indeed, they have to be able to defend their lives (Bellamy et al., 2010: 279–280).

### **1.4. The Use of Force in Peace Operations**

#### *Peace Operations with Chapter VII Mandates*

In order to grasp the problematics regarding use of force in peace operations and turn in the UN's in a hesitancy to use military power, the contrast between the Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter concerning maintaining international peace will be presented. Apart from Chapter VI under which are traditional missions mandated, Chapter VII engages more coercive

activities in order to ensure international peace and security. “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes” described in Chapter VI guides parties of any emerging conflict, which has a potential to jeopardize international peace and security, to seek for peaceful resolution of their dispute, for instance, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, enquiry or judicial settlement. Moreover, the Security Council is allowed to investigate any dispute arising, consider and determine its severity and impacts to the international security and peace. Indeed, the Member states may bring any dangerous situation to the attention of the Security Council and should provide assistance to the parties affected on their path of suitable peaceful resolution (United Nations, i). In regard to the use of force, missions mandated under Chapter VI were allowed to employ it only in self-defence, according to the Holy Trinity of peacekeeping, nevertheless, force may be used only as a last resort and should not be initiated as a punishment or retaliation of previous attacks.

In comparison, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter refers to the “Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” and consists of thirteen articles (United Nations, o). The first articles assign the Security Council to determine any threat to peace emerging and decide what measures will be used in order to restore and maintain international peace and security. These measures are further specified in Articles 41 and 42. Article 41 suggests the Members of the United Nations take necessary steps and implement non-military measures embracing severance of diplomatic relations, partial or absolute interruption of economic relations and any kind of communication. On the other hand, Article 42 proposes to involve action necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security, if the non-military measures outlined in Article 41 failed or were not as effective as expected. For instance, these measures include blockade, demonstration and sea, land or air forces of the UN Members (United Nations, o). In addition, further Articles specify the obligation of the UN Members to take actions and participate in the adequate measures defined according to the Security Council decision, provide its capabilities and military forces, if required.

Initially, traditional peacekeeping was very consistent on the Holy Trinity principles and operations mandated under Chapter VI by the Security Council were deployed with the consent of all involved parties and in terms to use of force, these missions were limited only to self-defence use of force or in other cases, however, after the permission of the parties involved. In

comparison, Chapter VII missions are authorized to use of force even beyond self-defence purposes in order to achieve and at some point, to enforce peace and other mission's objectives. Nevertheless, resolutions submitted by the Security Council never explicitly mention the use of force. Instead, PKOs are mandated to use "all necessary means" or "all measures necessary". Therefore, the Chapter under which is the mission authorized plays a significant role in its way of the mission's accomplishment. During the first half-century of the existence of the United Nations peacekeeping, the missions mandated as enforcement operations and authorized use of force, if necessary, were rare. The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s, which was already described above, is one of the examples. Nonetheless, the early 1990s has brought both new challenges to peacekeeping and consequently, a new dimension of peace operations – the use of force in order to enforce peace (Arbuckle, 2006: 109).

#### *The Use of Force After the Cold War*

As it was mentioned above, the traditional missions were mostly operating in interstate wars, permitted to use force only in cases of self-defence and the use of force was mentioned in regard to its absence rather than presence. Nevertheless, the long-term inability of PKOs to fulfil their mandate arouse a need for change which was accompanied by sudden freedom of the Security Council vetoes, changing environment and new world order by the ending of the Cold War, which, however, brought new challenges and thus way much extensive tasks for peacekeepers to accomplish. Consequently, the ambitious nature of new missions started to resonate among public debates, concerning whether, how, and to which extent should the UN use force in peace operations. The Security Council mandates the use of force in PKOs as the outcome of the preceding political process. However, "[t]he situation has been complicated since the end of the cold war by the tendency of the Security Council to afford Chapter VII mandates to what have been perceived essentially as peacekeeping operations" (Findlay, 2002: 8). As a result, some peacekeeping operations initially deployed with the Chapter VI mandate have received, due to the difficulties on the field, revised mandate authorized under Chapter VII, in order to strengthen the ability of self-defence (Findlay, 2002: 9). The first of the operations in the post-Cold War period employing armed peacekeepers which reopened the question about the use of force in PKOs and had a crucial impact on further reconsideration was the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the United Nations Protection Force

(UNPROFOR), the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)<sup>9</sup>.

## **2. Evaluating Peace Operations**

Evaluating the success of peacekeeping operations is not an easy task. Moreover, the criteria used for evaluation are subjective, as there is a diverse perception of what success constitute among researchers. Therefore, one may assess the operation as successful, however, the other author would consider it as a failure based on their different sets of criteria. Hence, there are no universal factors of evaluation which would be applicable to all peacekeeping operations. At the most general level, however, one might ask whether the mission contributed to conflict containment, limitation of violence and protection of civilians, thus being successful. However, some might seek for great achievements ranging from cause of the conflict reveal and creation of a sustainable environment for a stable peace. Thus, there is also a distinction between short term and long-term perspective.

### **2.1. Literature Review**

Fundamentally, the United Nations specified factors which are necessary for the mission's success, specified in its Capstone Doctrine from 2008. The factors encompass the holy trinity of peacekeeping, emphasizing the consent of the parties and another three factors of success: legitimacy, credibility and local ownership. The legitimacy of UN PKOs stems from its unique position in the UN Charter and the Security Council authorization, thus in the internal law of the organization. Additionally, legitimacy is fragile when perceived that the UN mission is serving the national or regional interests and fails in local ownership security. Also, PKOs often lost their credibility due to unfulfilled expectations by the local community (De Coning, Detzel, Hojem, 2008: 2). Furthermore, according to Darya Pushkina, the success is based on limiting

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<sup>9</sup> Certainly, these are not the only operations deployed promptly after the Cold War. There were, for instance, the ONUMOZ in Mozambique or the UNMIH in Haiti and so on. However, these missions are larger in scale apart from the others in the period and are the first experiments with the new approach towards use of force in PKOs.

violent conflict in the host state which is the main concern of peacekeepers, hence, assessing this criterion, it is necessary to analyse whether PKO succeeded in reducing violence including sustaining ceasefire agreements; reducing the number of casualties associated with the conflict and implementing the disarmament programmes. The second criterion refers to reducing human suffering, thus peacekeepers should prevent any attacks against civilians; reduce human rights abuse and assist refugees and displaced persons. Furthermore, the crucial criterion is to avoid and prevent the spread of conflict beyond the object state's border. The potential spread causes the refugees flows, competition over the resources and insufficient life conditions. In order to evaluate this criterion, one should focus on the intact sovereignty of neighbouring countries. Finally, there is a promotion of conflict resolution, thus the mission's ability in creating a sustainable environment, rare to recurrence (Pushkina, 2006: 134-135).

Concerning the criteria presented by Pushkina, the first issue we might find is the fusion reducing the number of casualties and the success of disarmament programmes. At first glance, we may conclude that this criterion is complicated to evaluate objectively. In particular, if we are able to conclude based on some empirical evidence that the mission was successful in casualties' reduction but unsuccessful in disarmament programme, we are not able to assess the criterion objectively, as covers diverse activities with diverse importance. The second criterion regarding reducing human suffering and attack against civilians is quite deceptive as well. One must consider the diversity of the mandates and types of peace operations. Therefore, it is not possible to evaluate peace operation mandated to use the only minimum of force with the robust mission, authorized to use of force on a larger scale. The third criterion regarding the spill-over effect is relevant, however, it does not cover foreign troops already operating in the country or its borders.

According to Duane Bratt, the success of the mission might be evaluated based on four criteria: completion of operation's mandate; facilitation of conflict resolution; containment of the conflict and limitation of civilians; combatants and peacekeepers casualties (Bratt, 1996: 64-81). Nonetheless, this approach suffers from the assessing the operation's success on the mandate fulfilment assumption is insufficient, as the purposes of the mandate are unique, ranging from the provision of suitable political space for negotiation to exaggerated complex tasks. Moreover, mandates may change during the mission's deployment.



Paul Diehl, as one of the first authors concerning PKOs evaluation, developed several approaches for evaluating an operation's success. Firstly, he focuses on whether the purpose of the mandate was fulfilled. However, Druckman and Stern argue that "[t]his criterion is useful to the extent that the mandate is clear but clarity itself is often used also as a criterion of success. The specific accomplishments of the mission such as the number of people fed, disasters avoided, and cease-fires achieved is useful but leaves open the question of just how many accomplishments are needed to qualify as successful. A third criterion is the impact of the operation on the local population" (Druckman and Stern, 1999). This approach also has its deficiencies. Apart from those mentioned by Druckman and Stern, the third criterion regarding the impact on the local population is quite difficult to obtain. It would require extensive resources, both financial and human and the research would be time-exacting, as the actual impact is visible in many years after the operation's withdrawal.

Steven Ratner promotes impacts to the host state and on the implementing of the UN, as another option for evaluation. Regarding the host state, it is vital to consider the time horizon for the impacts. On the other hand, the UN has to consider the opportunity costs. Moreover, he stresses the gaps in evaluating missions through the achievements of their mandates' goal, as the external factors might hamper the accomplishments (Druckman and Stern, 1999). According to Johansen and Fetherston, peacekeeping operations contribute to larger values. For Johansen, the larger values are justice, world peace and reduction of human suffering. Thus, his criteria for success consist of contribution to reducing conflict and achieving peace. For Fetherston, the larger values regard to the need of people affected by war, living in a hostile environment. Thus, she addresses the needs of societies rather than military and governmental interests (Druckman and Stern, 1999). The issue of this approach is that it does not take into consideration various types of peace operations and its capabilities. Thus, in the evaluating process, there might be diverse outcomes while evaluating robust mission with observer mission. Hence, it does not sufficiently cover other essential indicators of success.

Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman have developed another approach to evaluate peace operations. The authors evaluate PKOs at the level of five dimensions – the *stakeholders*, *time perspectives*, *baselines*, *lumping* and *mission types* (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 11). Regarding the level of *stakeholders*, they emphasize that the often omitted yet crucial question – success for whom? The stakeholders in peace operations constitute the *international community* by that

the authors mean international organizations, non-governmental organizations and states participating in the mission as third-party actors. Certainly, the desired goals and indicators of success may vary according to the different actors' perception. In the case of the international community, for example, may seek conflict containment and protection of human rights while individual states seek to pursue their private interests.

Therefore, the success of one actor could mean failure in the eyes of another actor. In addition, as the interests of primary protagonists are diverse, adherence of ceasefire, for instance, might be double-edged. The reason is that one actor aims to achieve a ceasefire agreement in order to stop fighting and thus reduce casualties. However, another actor seeks a ceasefire in order to rearm and prepare for further combats (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 12–15). Furthermore, while defining success, the outcome will differ in regard to the *time perspective*, whether, one focuses on a short-term or long-term perspective. The achievements of goals during the peace operation, such as improvement of living conditions and medical care; starvation mitigation or generally fulfilment of the mandate, refer to the short-term perspective. From the long-term perspective, one must assess the conditions for more than a few years after the mission's withdrawal.

Thus, to observe further development and conditions occurring in the country and improvement of life expectancy. In addition, Diehl and Druckman (2010: 15–18) point out, that even though the operation was assessed as a success from the short-term perspective, it could fail in the long-term success perspective. The long-term perspective has, of course, its limitations. For instance, there is no time window determining a period of time, suitable for evaluations of the outcomes. Nevertheless, although both perspectives deviate from each other, they have a lot in common. Mostly, the failure of peace operation to accomplish short-term goals thwarts understanding of their impact on a long-term perspective. Subsequently, the *baseline* specification is essential, in order to be able to answer the question - compared to what is the mission successful? All of the baselines have, however, their limitations. The better-than-nothing standard compares the situation, in which no action was taken with the presence of PKO. Nevertheless, this standard is quite difficult to measure due to the limitation of comparing the absence of reaction with the actual effort to improve the situation in the country, in the form of a peace operation.

Consequently, the PKO might be considered as successful, due to the improvements and brings the distorted view on the real outcome. Another standard investigates the effectiveness across PKOs, rather than longitudinal attitude. For instance, the successful operation might be the one, in which fewer shooting incidents occurred (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 18–21). By *lumping* Diehl and Druckman understand the composition of particular peace procedures and processes which PKOs consist of. For example, size; training of peacekeepers; strategy; clarity of mandate; the involvement of civilians and other features. Therefore, the question would be whether a particular factor within the approach makes a difference among the selected cases or contexts (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 22).

Finally, different *types of peacekeeping missions* might influence the criteria for evaluating success because of their diverse set of characteristics and the role peacekeepers play within. Most frequently, the main goal of PKOs is to reduce violent conflict. However, others have more specified tasks, including human rights protection or election supervision. Thus, for instance, considering enforcement operations, peacekeepers play a primary role, nonetheless, if the mission's purpose is to monitor, observe ceasefire or supervise elections, it moves peacekeepers on the position of the third-party actor. Consequently, one must take into consideration the diverse goals of each mission and modify it in the evaluation as the dimensions of missions has a significant impact on the way how to evaluate success effectively.

Diehl and Druckman present the following three sets of goals of peace operations.

### **Core goals**

- Violence abatement
- Conflict containment
- Conflict settlement

The core goals of peace operations refer to the primary goals and represent standards which the missions aim to achieve.

### **New mission's goals**

- Election supervision
- Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration
- Human rights protection
- Democratization
- Humanitarian assistance

Apart from the core goals, these goals are mission(mandate)-specific and are associated with “new peacekeeping” or “second-generation” missions as they execute activities beyond traditional peacekeeping.

### **Post-conflict peacebuilding**

- Local security
- Rule of Law
- Local Governance
- Restoration, Reconciliation and Transformation

Compared to the previous two sets of goal which are associated with the traditional and new peacekeeping, this set of goals focuses on peacebuilding activities or “creation of a new environment” in which peacekeepers are involved as well. Nevertheless, these activities are usually performed by successive peacebuilding operations, hence, for the purpose of this thesis, this set of goals will be excluded.

### **Additionally, the accomplishments will be broadened by the discussion of:**

1. Various actors' perceptions regarding (the lack of) success
2. Short-term and long-term perspectives and developments
3. Mandate fulfilment

#### 4. Unintended consequences<sup>10</sup>

##### *Evaluating Goals*

Diehl and Druckman present sets of goals and specific criteria on how to evaluate them and thus how to evaluate (the lack) success of a peace operation. Firstly, they distinguish fundamental goals which every peace operations should achieve. The core goals are *violence abatement*, *conflict containment* and *conflict settlement*. *Violence abatement* refers to the complete elimination or reduction of armed violence since the deployment of the operation, thus it is considered as the most fundamental goal of a peace operation. Moreover, the concern of peace mission is to prevent and violent conflict from reoccurrence. In order to assess the fulfilment of violence abatement as one of the core goals are to consider the following key questions and measures on how to resolve them. First and the most fundamental question - Is violence still present in the country? “The absence of violence would signify complete success and eliminate the need for any further assessment of the dimension of violence abatement” (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 32). Nonetheless, the measures of the progress of this question are peace duration (days or months without war), and new crisis or armed disputed emerging. The second question would ask – Have violence levels decreased? The measures for the question consist of conflict-related casualties – civilians/disputants, peacekeepers casualties and shooting incident, however, regarding “[...] sniper fire and other deliberate uses of firearms directed at the protagonists by one another or at the peacekeepers” (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 34).

*Conflict containment* refers to preventing the spill-over effect abroad and avoid any involvement of additional actors in the combat, thus, peace operations aim to restrict the scope of violence. The conflict containment can be divided into geographic and actor-based dimensions. On the geographic level, peace operation strives to confine violence in isolated locations in order to eliminate any further spread, which would affect other parts of the country. Hence, the success of preventing the spread of the conflict in geographic dimension is to

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<sup>10</sup> “The intended consequences are not part a part of the mandate, but can have major impact. Unfortunately, peacekeeping operations do not only generate positive intended outcomes. They can also have negative consequences – increase in criminal activities, shady economic activities and human rights violations by peacekeepers” (Chyiuki et al., 2007).

observe locations of violent incidents and a number of square kilometres added in the demilitarized zone (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 37). On the actor-based dimension, the additional actors, such as states, or groups, might significantly influence the level of violence. Thus, an increased number of actors simultaneously increases the possibility of violence occurrence by weaponry supplies or financing the combatants. Hence, the measure appears to be precise – count a number of additional actors who intervene in the conflict. Nonetheless, it has its limitations. For instance, the identification and conviction of new actors who committed some kind of aggression are difficult. Moreover, local forces mostly do not wear uniforms, thus it is ambiguous to identify those responsible for violent activities (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 38–40). The success of conflict containment goal thus lies in the ability of peacekeepers to reduce the number of actors involved in the conflict and the weapon flow limitation in the country, measured by number and types of weapons.

*Conflict settlement* involves resolution over the disputed issues and position between the conflicting actors. Peacekeepers endeavour to mitigate hostile conditions and create space for the settlement. Therefore, the conflict settlement goal evaluation encompasses the negotiation and mediation efforts, but most fundamentally, removal of the roots of the conflict. Although peace operations might achieve mitigation of violence or even complete absence, it does not guarantee the forestall violence in the future if the causes of the conflict are not resolved. Therefore, the prerequisite of conflict settlement is to bring conflicting sides to the negotiation table and assist them to find a solution to the roots of their dispute. The progress of these efforts might be measured by the UN reports by the UN Secretary-General's office (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 42–45). The second set of goals are activities beyond traditional peacekeeping goals and are characteristic for second-generation missions: election supervision; democratization demobilization, humanitarian assistance; disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and human rights protection.

### *Election Supervision*

Election supervision is often part of the peace agreement hence, this task occurs mostly in the aftermath when the agreement is reached. Moreover, the role of peacekeepers rests on the maintaining ceasefire and ensuring a minimum of conflict effects, including intimidation, in the period of pre-election and on the election day. Holding the elections is a crucial element in post-

conflict reconstruction, as it represents a new fresh start for the war threaten country and way of transition to sovereignty restoration. Nevertheless, holding the elections might trigger another wave of violence, especially in fragile states such as Haiti, Angola or Burundi. Thus, the role of peacekeepers in assisting the electoral procedures is both important and perilous (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009: 21). Furthermore, the outcomes of the election have a crucial significance in the long-term perspective, due to the legitimacy of the process and underlining the long-term resolution attempts. Therefore, in the evaluation process, one must ask: Was the elections fair and free?<sup>11</sup> The elections cannot be considered as free and fair, if the voters are unable to participate due to their ethnical or religious distinction, for instance.

One of the indicators, how to assess the (un)success of the function, is a number of registered voters and registered voters who at the end participated on the polls. The measure of success is, therefore, the number of voters' registrations and real turnout (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 64–67). The number of voter registration might signify that the international attempts to hold fair election are on the right path, however, the actual turnout may decrease as a consequence of the problems of voters' intimidation which undermines the principle of free and fair elections.

### *Democratization*

The task of democratization promotion is linked to the election supervision described above. Therefore, apart from the assistance with the electoral process, peace operation engages more procedures such as norms development and institutional building involving the essential component of the democratization process – citizens of the country and their participation on the political decision. However, no ethnic/racial or other minority cannot be excluded from these processes. The success of the democratization process requires a long-term perspective of evaluation, such as a number of years of free elections held in the country, the number of various politically engaged NGO or surveys of public attitudes toward democratic principles (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 67–70).

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<sup>11</sup> “Free” elections refer to open access allowing voters to participate on polls, violence did not influenced the voters' decisions and the election result constituted the will of people. “Fair” refers to the equal opportunities for parties and candidates involved in elections (Diehl and Druckman: 2010: 64).

### *Humanitarian Assistance*

“Humanitarian concerns were involved in all of the complex peacekeeping missions of the 1990s, and humanitarianism cannot be discounted as a motive in any of the cases” (Marten, 2004: 75). In peace operation, peacekeepers were charged with facilitating humanitarian assistance, for instance, protect food or medical supplies and deliver them to the threatened population. Thus, in order to assess the goal, one has to focus on whether the humanitarian aid distribution was protected. One of the indicators of protection effectiveness is to look at the conditions essential for the distribution. For instance, peacekeepers’ concern is to secure areas from landmines and bombs, thus clearing the locations has a positive impact on the movement of people and humanitarian convoys (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 71–73). Furthermore, the reduction of human suffering is also a valuable indicator. Thus, one of the options is to observe health figures of refugees encompassing diseases and deaths associated with malnutrition.

### *Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration (DDR)*

Demobilization and disarmament are often anchored in a peace agreement, simultaneously reintegration of combatants to the society. DDR process aims to avoid any tensions among disputants by reduction of potential risks warfare renewal and ensure (at least partially) peaceful development in future. In evaluating the success, Diehl and Druckman designed two questions. First concerns with the withdrawal of soldier from the designated areas which often requires the creation of a buffer zone between warring actors and reduce any tensions. The efficiency of peacekeepers in achieving this goal might be assessed by the provided reports submitted by the third parties and the mission’s personnel. Nonetheless, as the tasks seem quite simple, it has its limitations. For example, combatants are likely to hide, and the groups often convert from uniformed military troops into ununiformed forces (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 74–75). The second question deals with the disarmament of the combatants. Therefore, the indicator stems from the number of collected weapons by peacekeepers and auxiliary agencies during the disarmament process. Regarding the reintegration process, the crucial concern is whether were the ex-combatants reintegrated into society, thus one must consider the number of ex-combatants repatriated (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 76).



### *Human Rights Protection*

Protection of civilians is the fundamental goal of every peace operation, as the unarmed civilians have become the main target of violence, hence, to ensure their safety is crucial. Thus, peacekeepers are obligated to protect the groups by creating buffer zones and areas in which are civilians protected from attack. At the baseline, the success of the goal accomplishment lies in the ability of peacekeeper to prevent, avoid or to stop genocide and actions defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide<sup>12</sup>. Consequently, one must count the number of abuses belonging to the category but simultaneously consider the linkage between attacks and the particular ethnic/religious/race groups which might be threatened the most as the identification of genocide to occur (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 77–78). Moreover, the reduction of human rights abuses is also a relevant indicator of success. Thus, the comparison of a number of incidents regarding human rights abuses prior to and after the peace operation deployment is determinative.

Based on the literature review, I consider the evaluation framework developed by Diehl and Druckman the most beneficial for the purpose of the thesis. The approach provides the most appropriate baseline on how to evaluate peace operations in a far more detailed way, apart from the other examined approaches, which are contemporary focusing on the assessing peace operation's success problematics. Each of the peace operations is, however, unique. Therefore, I decided to evaluate each of the operations separately and subsequently observe common features among all assessed PKOs, in order to obtain an appropriate view on (the lack of) success of second-generation missions with Chapter VII mandates.

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<sup>12</sup> Actions defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide include killings, forced transfer, physical and psychological harm and other abuses (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 78).

### **3. The Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Deployment of UNPROFOR (1992-1995)**

The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has a long historical development, nevertheless, scrutinizing a whole process which led to the outbreak of the Bosnian war is not the main purpose of this thesis. Therefore, the following sub-chapter will be focusing only on a brief overview of the conflict and emphasis of the most crucial origins of the Bosnian war, in order to obtain a clear, intelligible view, necessary for evaluation of the outcomes of the United Nations Protection Force. The Bosnian war was a result of the turmoil prevailing in the region due to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Thus, as there was no longer a “uniting” regime, the separatist tendencies based on the historical identities had a greater opportunity to erupt. Consequently, the claims to statehood stemming from overlooked dissimilarities among actors produced clashes between international norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity and state formation based on the power and violence due to differentness of actors involved (Burg and Shoup, 2000: 4). The critical reversal in the Yugoslav crisis came with the elections in 1990. Both in Slovenia and Croatia were elected independence-minded governments, and Bosnian election won nationalist parties.

#### **3.1. Origins and Circumstances of the Bosnian Civil War**

The Bosnian civil war in 1992–1995 is considered as the bloodiest and vicious conflict in Europe since the Second World War, known for “ethnic cleansing” which left behind over 100,000 casualties and missing persons with 40 percent consisting of civilians (Ball et al., 2007). In this section, I will aim to describe the main contributors and causes of the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although capturing a clear view of the causes is complicated due to the contradictory perceptions of actors involved. Indeed, there are some internal and external factors which are interweaved and mutually affect one another.

### 3.1.1. Internal Factors

#### Political Environment

In 1945, the “new Yugoslavia” was established under the communist regime. More surprisingly, the Communists were able to transform post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina into multi-ethnic, multicultural coexistence, providing guarantees that the security of the present entities was jeopardized. Furthermore, the Communist ability to gain power in Bosnia was even enhanced by the idea of Yugoslav unity, brotherhood, and communist ideology, hence the pro-Yugoslav orientation caused the elimination of nationalist separatist attempts. By the time of the Titoist<sup>13</sup> era, the Muslim entity in Bosnia strived to gain a greater political representation, as they felt disadvantaged and discriminated over the Serbian domination in leadership. Thus, the Muslim political elites, encouraged by the social advancement and equality which communist Yugoslavia offered, had risen in 1970. Later, the process was completed by the recognition of Muslim nationality and its involvement in political affairs (Burg and Shoup, 2000: 40–41). Subsequently, however, in 1974, the power of federal institutions weakened, and the centralized power of states increased, based on the assumption of the loyalty to ethnic identities.

Consequently, over 200 new political parties were founded in Yugoslavia between 1987-1990 (Rabrenovic, 1997). Moreover, at the end of 1988, the polarization of Bosnian society gained on its intensity, even more in months of upcoming elections in 1990 which were influenced by the events in Slovenia and Croatia, who installed the independence-minded governments' moths before. The elections in Bosnia provided a substantial power to the Muslims, although they relied on the support from other parties. The nationalist parties pledged to cooperate, however, the diverse views produced clashes from the beginning and inability of the coalition to take action. Concurrently, the nationalist parties did not consider cooperation beyond the extend of non-nationalist parties, a democratic or former communist. The elections held in 1990 generated divided political system had a crucial impact on the further development. Furthermore, as the war started in neighbouring Croatia, Serbs and Croats from Bosnia joined the riots and “[t]he Croats began training Muslims for war in Bosnia. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) trained and armed Serb reservists throughout Bosnia” (Burg and Shoup, 2000:

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<sup>13</sup> Josip Broz, known as Tito was the communist leader and main figure in Yugoslavia during the period.

62). The clashes also emerged on the Bosnian political scene, and new nationalist leaders revived the grievances, jealousy and competition among ethnic diversity which were partially suppressed by the former communist regime. Although Bosnian elites believed that the war would bypass Bosnia, the descent into war and violence was inevitable.

### **Ethnicity**

Ethnicity is undoubtedly one of the most contributing causes which triggered clashes in the multinational state of Bosnia. In 1991, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of three nationalities of which were 43,7 % Muslims, 31,4 % Serbs and 17,3 % Croats (Burg and Shoup, 2000: 27). The intergroup antagonism rooted in history; ethnic inequality; electoral or political domination of one ethnic group; claims to authority over territory; existing foreign support for extremist politics or perception of ongoing competition as a zero-sum game are aspects contributing to the ethnic conflict emergence. Moreover, conflicts that further resulted in the disintegration of multinational state are mostly produced as implications including ethnic, territorial and political power motivations. In the case of Bosnia, the issue of ethnicity has a long history, influenced by the geographic position of the country as a Balkan state. It represents an imaginary “intersection” between continents, diverse religious traditions and ethnic entities. Through history, Bosnian society had been segmented by communities of Muslims, Croats and Serbs whose peaceful coexistence depended on external factors and stable political environment.

Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina gained a political weight and increased administrative autonomy due to the persistence of national boundaries over time. This process led to the shared economic life of all ethnic communities living on the Bosnian territory and developed common cultural characteristics among the entities. Bosnians shared a common ethnic origin, way of life and even common language, thus the conflict over ethnicity was not a standard in the country. Nonetheless, this coexistence was disrupted and destroyed by the breakup of Yugoslavia, which gave a room to questioning about self-determination among nationalities living on the territory. There is, indeed, the mixture of Bosnian society itself affected by ethnic, class and regional rifts and external factors contributing to the disaster of the war of each against all instigated by ethnic lines (Burg and Shoup, 2000: 16–17).

Unfortunately, both international and domestic actors lacked the ability or willingness to prevent any inconveniences stemming from the disintegration of Yugoslavia and forestall the conflict from becoming violent. There were several reasons for national leaderships to mobilize their communities, which, however, later culminated into a catastrophic scenario for their people. First, through history, the contest over defining rights in the country, regarding whether they should be understood on the collective level as ethnic communities or the individual one, was not resolved. Second, there was an issue over “national question” unleashed by the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The essence of the term national question lies in defining rights to claim state-constitution status held by the ethnic majority, which provides political rights on the entity and control over the state, and defining the rights left to the minority of ethnic group (Burg and Shoup, 2000: 5). Although the concept of national question was common through states of Eastern Europe, it constituted the fatal importance for Bosnia in which none of the ethnic group could claim the state-constitutional status, based on simple counting its national number.

Thus, the rivalry among all three ethnic communities over the status achieving arose in the country. Furthermore, the rivalry was even intensified due to Bosnia powerful neighbours, national states of the groups involved in the issue – the Serbs and the Croats, contesting over the rights within the country. Thus, the matter of national question could be resolved without the involvement of Croatia and Serbia. Third, the engagement of national states of Croatia and Serbia accompanied by the disintegration of Yugoslavia required response from the international community. Nevertheless, actors participating in the conflict had different opinions on the presented issues, and each of the parties stressed as a fundamental problem for the international community, which attempted to mitigate the conflict through mediation.

**Figure 1: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Yugoslavia, 1991**



Source: The University of Texas Libraries, a. <https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/yugoslav.jpg>.

### 3.1.1.1. External Factors

#### **The Fall of Communism and Disintegration of Yugoslavia**

The “first” Yugoslavia known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was established in 1918, uniting nationalities of Serbs, Slovenians, Croats and included the territory of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina. During World War II was Bosnia and Herzegovina occupied by the Axis powers, Germany and Italy which conducted to the first outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in 1941, resulting in massacres and ethnic cleansing. Nonetheless, despite the violence committed, the Yugoslav idea of unity persisted. The military victory of the Communist Partisans, who gained support during the war especially from the Muslim elites, led to the subsequent foundation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia integrating Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Kosovo, as an autonomous province of Serbia, joined Yugoslavia in 1974. Nonetheless, in 1980, after Tito’s death, the future of Yugoslavia was uncertain and consequently unleashed intense debates about the further direction of the federation. The diversity among the ethnic groups in Bosnia was clearly expressed by different views on the federation’s future, as Serbs demanded constitutional reforms in order to place more power to the federal government. In comparison, Slovenia and Croatia were convinced that the status quo would be the best option. However, their economic, political and ethnic interests instigated the idea of a confederation of sovereign republics (Burg and Shoup, 2000: 69–70).

After series of economic and political reforms, in the late 1980s, which aimed to prove that the Soviet Union will no longer interfere into domestic affairs of states of the Eastern Block, the revolutions and decline of communism began, and in the 1990s communism was about to collapse. In Bosnia, the Communist Party lost the elections and consequently triggered the nationalist ideas. Therefore, the Yugoslavia was again divided into camps holding different views. Croatia and Slovenia persisted on the idea of a loose confederation which Serbian president Slobodan Milošević rejected and followed the idea of one united state. “Milosevic's proclamation of Serbian nationalism undermined the unique constitutional arrangement which invested sovereignty not only in the federal republics but in the “nations” as well” (Sil, 1994). The independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 continuing by the independence Macedonia and finally Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 was the outset of dissolution of Yugoslavia and war. In Bosnia, however, Bosnian Serbs opposed the independence of the country and preferred



to remain as part of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, due to the failure of their intentions, they pursue to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into three parts and attempted to their ethnic domination and control over the territory. Hence, the Bosnian Serbs, influenced by Milošević's propaganda, conducted genocide against Bosnians, predominantly Bosnian Muslim ethnic group, but also other non-Serbs communities. The purpose of their brutality was the ethnic cleansing of Serbian territory, especially in the eastern of Bosnia, culminated by the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995. In addition, if the dissolution of Yugoslavia was eventually avoided, and the federation survived, the issue of self-determination had not arisen (Burg and Shoup, 2000: 17).

#### **3.1.1.1.1. Contributing Factor**

##### **Propaganda**

The role of propaganda had critical importance in the Bosnian war, as it was used as a tool in pursuing the vision of the Great Serbia. The Serbian propaganda machine led by Milošević aimed to conquer hearts and minds of Serbian people, started controlling the independent press, using both legal and illegal measures and through Serbian media endorse its interests. Milošević employed the grievances occurred during World War II connected with many Serbian casualties and Serbian exploitation, thus it attempted to convince Serbs to revenge the losses in the massacres committed decades ago. Additionally, the propaganda renewed the diversity among entities living on the territory, which is no longer sustainable (Bećirević, 2014). In particular, the main group targeted was the Bosnian Muslims who, according to the propaganda, strived for a great Muslim state with the Islamic religion and traditions. However, each side of the conflict found the "motivation" for violence. The Croat-Serb relationship was deteriorated by the seizure of one-third of Croatian territory by Serbs, thus Croatia demanded the regain the territory and consolidate its influence in the parts of Bosnia. Additionally, good relations between Bosnian and Croatia had a critical significance for Bosnia, as it provided a guarantee that the country would not be partitioned (Burg and Shoup, 2000: 198).



### **3.2. The Response of the International Community and the Deployment of UNPROFOR**

#### *The response of the international community and peace efforts*

Initially, the international community hesitated to respond to the Yugoslavian crisis as it was not the priority enough due to the collapse of communism in Europe, bringing countries on the crossroad of future direction. Moreover, the negotiation about the transformation of the European Community to the European Union kept the European leaders busy. The European powers did not know how to respond to the crisis effectively and the proposed solution differed. The ability to find the right solution for the crisis was undermined by the lack of guidelines on how to react and conceptual turmoil of the international system caused by the end of the Cold War. France, the UK and Russia were siding with Serbs, as they viewed the country together as the most suitable option. Germany, Hungary and Austria were on the side of Croats and Slovenes, as they were for decades. Nonetheless, despite of their different opinions, the European Community attempted to resolve the conflict through mediation, the International Conferences and Arbitration Commission. However, none of them was very successful, due to the discrepancy of Milošević objections and even fuelled clashes on the ground. Furthermore, the European peace efforts resulted in the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan<sup>14</sup> is signed by all three entities in 1992, however, failed even before its implementation because president of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović withdrew its signature (Harland, 2017). After this peace plan collapsed, the Bosnia and Herzegovina descend into war in full-scale.

#### *The Deployment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and its Mandate*

The United Nations Protection Force was established by the Security Council resolution 721 in 1991. Initially, UNPROFOR was deployed in Croatia, in order to create a space for negotiation and achieve peace and security through the settlement of Yugoslav crisis, specifically, was

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<sup>14</sup> The Carrington-Cutileiro Plan proposed that “Bosnia would be independent, without changes to its borders; the country would be divided into "cantons", each dominated by one or other of the ethno-religious communities; and there would be power sharing between the three communities through a weak central government” (Harland, 2017).

deployed in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) consisting of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina and ensure demobilization, protection of civilians, living in those areas, from violent attack and return of displaced people back to their homes in UNPAs (United Nations, j). Moreover, from June 1992 to April 1993, peacekeepers should monitor the ceasefire between Croatia and Serbia<sup>15</sup>, which was a task of traditional peacekeeping. The mandate of UNPROFOR operating in Croatia, however, went through several enlargements, for instance, by 762 resolution (1992) authorized the mission to monitor the “pink zones” – areas in Croatia controlled by Yugoslav People’s Army inhabited predominately by Serbs (UN SC Resolution, 762). Nevertheless, experiencing UNPROFOR in Croatia insinuated that the traditional peacekeeping mission would produce partitioned unstable republic. Later, as the mission when transferred to Bosnia faced a humanitarian disaster, ethnic cleansing committed by Bosnian Serbs produced 500,000 refugees at the creation of UNPROFOR and death rate increased as well to almost 50,000 (Bellamy et al. 2010: 200). Despite all efforts to negotiate a ceasefire, the clashes between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims on one side and the Bosnian Serbs on the other became even more hostile. Furthermore, the Security Council imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia (by that time consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) by resolution 757 (1992) acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as another attempt how to moderately resolve the conflict (UN SC resolution 757).

Furthermore, peacekeepers had an additional task to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid by international organizations and NGOs. In order to fulfil the request of the Security Council, UNPROFOR started negotiating with the conflicting parties to stop fighting around the Sarajevo airport and enable its reopening for humanitarian purposes. As a follow up the negotiations, the Council strengthened the mission’s capacities by the resolution 758 and 761 (1992), deploying more UN personnel on the field in order to ensure the security of the airport which was reopened for the humanitarian airlift. Moreover, to establish security corridors between the airport and the city to ensure safe movement and delivery of humanitarian aid (UN SC resolution 758; 761).

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<sup>15</sup> The agreement endeavoured to ensure six months of absence of violence between the state of Croatia and Croatian Serb militias fighting together with the Yugoslav People’s Army. Moreover, the Croats and Serbs approved the creation of the UN Protected Areas which should be free from violent attacks (Bellamy et al., 2010: 198–199).

Nevertheless, the fighting in Sarajevo area continued, and protection of humanitarian convoys was complicated as they were targets of looting. Therefore, in August 1992, the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR in its resolution 770 (1992), acting under Chapter VII, to take all necessary measures in order to facilitate humanitarian assistance into wherever needed parts of the country (UN SC resolution 770). Followed by the 776 resolution, the mandate of the mission was enlarged, and peacekeepers were charged to protect the of convoys, upon the International Committee of the Red Cross request. In addition, the no-fly zones over Bosnia and Herzegovina were determined, banning the military fighting in the airspace, except supporting fights of UNPROFOR. In order to enable monitoring no-fly zones, the mission was strengthened by 75 military observers (UN SC resolution 781; 786). Regarding continuing violence in the country, UNPROFOR created “safe areas” of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Tuzla in order to provide security to civilians. Although the cities were under the control of the Bosnian government, the Bosnian Serbs besieged them and systematically targeted civilians, escalated by the violation of no-fly zone in 1993, attacking villages near Srebrenica. Therefore, the Security Council in its resolution 819 (1993) strongly condemned these attacks, demanded to treat Srebrenica and its surrounding as a safe zone; withdrawal of the Bosnian Serb paramilitary troops and urged Yugoslavia to stop supplying the paramilitary forces (UN SC resolution 819).

Furthermore, the resolution 836 extended the ban on military fighting and authorized the mission “[...]acting in self-defence, to take necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys” (United Nations, j). Despite all efforts, the conflict intensified and erupted in central Bosnia due to fighting between former allies – Bosnian Croats and Muslims, which substantially limited the freedom of movement of the mission and most importantly, it blocked the routes for humanitarian assistance. The tense situation raised fear in neighbouring countries, including Macedonia, whose president asked for the creation of a peace mission on Macedonian territory to prevent any spill over effect from Croatia or Bosnia. Thus, UNPROFOR was further enlarged to Macedonia with a preventive mandate.

In September 1993, the attention of the Security Council focused on Croatia due to the operation’s criticism, urged a political settlement and cooperation. Consequently, the Security

Council extended the mandate for six months and took action and authorized the operation to act in self-defence, take a necessary measure, including use of force, thus act under Chapter VII of its Charter, in order to ensure the security of the mission and its freedom of movement (UN SC resolution 871). Additionally, the Security Council called for an immediate ceasefire between the Croatian government and the local Serb in UNPAs, including restoration of communication, water and electricity supplies in those areas. In Croatia, peacekeepers did succeed in agreeing on a ceasefire, at least temporarily. Nevertheless, in Bosnia, although many ceasefire agreements were reached, none of them was implemented. Therefore, the situation in the country continued to worsen by their violation, led to the increased military activity, which seriously endangered the security of civilians. The bombardment of Sarajevo in 1994 by the Bosnian Serbs resulted in an enormous number of civilian casualties. In response, the Bosnian Serbs were, under the ten days ultimatum, forced to withdraw, regroup and placing under UNPROFOR control all heavy weapons. Although the operation was under the pressure of the international audience criticizing its inability to produce any valuable success, fulfil the crucial parts of the mandate, the mission's duration was further extended in September 1994, for another six months and strengthen in its personnel capacities by additional troops (UN SC resolution 947).

Despite the fact that the situation on Croatia seemed stable, the crisis in Bosnia even deteriorated by attacks in safe zones, perpetrated mainly by the Bosnian Serbs. Many of diplomatic efforts failed and fighting in the safe zone of Bihac pocket erupted between the Bosnian Serbs, later supported by so-called Krajina Serbs and cooperation of the Bosnian Croats with the Bosnian government army. In reaction, NATO launched airstrikes while UNPROFOR aimed to negotiate a ceasefire. This action, however, brought another significant number of civilian casualties. UNPROFOR mandate expired in March 1995, although the operation was still present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From March till December 1995, UNPROFOR experienced the worst times of its deployment, contending with incessant attacks, which escalated in July by the massacre in Srebrenica considered as the most dreadful war crime since World War II. The Bosnian Serbs slaughtered about 8,000 of the Bosnia Muslims and the UN forces were unable to effectively intervene and avert the attack, due to their insufficient equipment and monitoring position (Arbutina, 2017). Nonetheless, after the attack, the British and French deployed a rapid reaction force (RRF) consisting of more robust rules of

engagement, followed by NATO Operation Deliberate Force which together sustained air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs. Bellamy (2010: 202) refers to the end of wider peacekeeping in Bosnia and the start of peace enforcement. Finally, the war ended within a few months, and after a series of failed agreements, the Dayton peace agreement was signed in December 1995.

### **3.3. Evaluation of the United Nations Protection Force**

According to the framework by Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman, the mission will be evaluated as follows. Firstly, I will be focusing on the success of achieving the core goals of the mission – violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement.

#### **3.3.1. Core Goals**

Violence abatement is the primary goal of peace operation's, thus the first key question is the presence of violence after the mission's deployment. One of the indicators for evaluating this question will be days without war, and the emergence of new crises and militarized disputes. The violence was still present after the mission's deployment. The Bosnian civil war erupted within of month after the UNPROFOR's authorization to operate in the country. Moreover, a new crisis between actors arisen, for instance, between the former allies – Bosnian Croats and Muslims which complicated the mission's tasks in Central Bosnia. The second indicator of (un)success would be the question of whether the level of violence decreased. The indicator might be assessed by war-related casualties during UNPROFOR presence in the country, thus 1992-1995. During this period, the war claims about 97,000 casualties of those 40 percent of civilians (Research and Documentation Center, according to the Srebrenica Massacre, 2007).

Furthermore, although many ceasefires<sup>16</sup> were agreed, none of them noticeably lasted, and hostilities continued despite the establishment of the UNPAs by peacekeepers, resulted in the attack in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. Hence, UNPROFOR was not able to either decrease the level of violence, prevent any crisis and attacks, stop the violence entirely and avoid genocide.

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<sup>16</sup> Altogether, there were thirty-four ceasefires failed (Hartwell, 2019).

Therefore, from the short-time perspective, we can conclude that achieving violence abatement was not successful and hostilities persisted for the mission's duration. Nonetheless, after the Dayton agreement in 1995, which ended the Bosnian civil war, no war reoccurred. Hence, from the long-time perspective, it might be evaluated as quite successful, as the operation helped to prevent larger violence emerging in the future. Regarding the operations' ability to prevent spill over effect of conflict abroad and new geographic regions and prevention of new actors' involvement - conflict containment, the evaluation process focuses on the geographic expansion of the conflict, decrease or increase the number of new actors involved and external support of warring sides. The outbreak of war in Bosnia was affected by clashes in Croatia, and the subsequent development of Bosnian war brought fighting to the areas of Croatia, the Bosnian war did not directly involve any other states, either Macedonia which was feared the most. Nonetheless, peacekeepers were not able to prevent the conflict from spreading geographically within Bosnia and Herzegovina or from limiting the conflict only on one part of the country (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 178).

Moreover, the conflict spread overall part of the country, including Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Goražde, Brčko, Mostar and moved to the central Bosnia due to the clashes between the Croats and Muslims. Therefore, the success in preventing the spreading of the conflict is only partial. The war did not spread abroad to the neighbouring countries but did spread geographically to the other part of Bosnia. Furthermore, considering the actors involved, Serbia has driven by the vision of the Great Serbia, provided supplies and warfare to the Bosnian Serbs to fight in the war, including heavy weapons to conduct sieges and attacks of Bosnian cities, for instance, in Sarajevo. Moreover, the significant part of the officer corps of the Yugoslav People's Army consisted of Bosnian Serbs, thus Bosnian Serbs and rebels fighting in Bosnia were equipped and supported by the army which provided an advantage in fighting (Burg and Shoup, 2000: 102). The mission was not able to stop these flows and external support, thus in this regard, the mission failed.

Furthermore, in order to provide a clearer view of the ability of the mission to contain the conflict, the data regarding casualties are implemented. Based on the codebook available regarding the datasets, the following data from particular years involve casualties related to the Bosnian civil war. Hence, I used data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study

of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Particularly, I used the Georeferenced Event Dataset because it provides the most comprehensive data on the casualties caused by the conflict. These events of war-related fatalities are described as “[a]n incident where armed force was used by an organised actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death at a specific location and a specific date” (Högbladh, 2020). Nonetheless, it is needed to say, that there are also casualties related with the combat in every case, for instance, due to insufficient humanitarian aid, food, medical care or any kind of diseases. These data are, however, difficult to embrace because of the inaccessibility in the conflict threatened countries.

Furthermore, due to lack of uncertainty of available reports from the field and in order to obtain the most reliable numbers, the report provides three estimates regarding the casualties - the low, best and a high estimate<sup>17</sup> of deaths. The following figure provides a lucid overview of these numbers.

**Figure 2: Summary of the three estimates of casualties in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>
<b>Low estimate</b>	7048	5156	2568	9296
<b>Best estimate</b>	7629	5812	3137	9755
<b>High estimate</b>	10218	8747	6729	12301

Source: Author according to Sundberg and Melander, 2013.

Based on the overall number of casualties described above, we may conclude that the mission was not able to contain the conflict, and the number of deaths did not significantly decrease through the operational deployment. Furthermore, the highest number of casualties in all three estimates is observed in 1995, mainly due to the Srebrenica massacre. Therefore, the mission did not prevent and did not decrease the number of war casualties. Furthermore, in evaluating

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<sup>17</sup> The low estimate encompassing the most conservative estimate of deaths that is identified in the source material. The best estimate consists of the most reliable estimate of deaths. The high estimates containing the highest reliable estimate of deaths identified in the source material (Högbladh, 2020)

this goal, the areas of the mission deployment and increased/decreased number of casualties in these areas might be another indicator of the operation’s (lack of) success in this regard. Thus, in case of Bosnia, as it was mentioned above, UNPROFOR peacekeepers were operating mainly in the worst threatened part of the country and created the UN Protected Areas of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Bihac in 1993, which supposed to remain areas free from any attack. The following figure displays the UNPAs placement in Bosnia.

**Figure 3: UN Protected Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina**




Source: Kingsley, 2018 (<http://militarycaveats.com/20-betrayal-barbarism-in-bosnia-the-unprofor-operation-national-caveats-genocide-in-the-srebrenica-un-protected-area/>).

However, based on the following map of casualties and missing persons, it is evident that despite the creation of safe zones by peacekeepers, the numbers of war-related deaths and missing people remained to be the highest in the country and the mission was not able to protect them. Furthermore, the spread of armed hostilities to other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina is



visible. From the northern and eastern parts of the country, the fighting also shifted to the central area of Bosnia. The failure of the mission regarding the conflict containment, at least at the local geographic level, is apparent.

**Figure 4: Geographical Illustration of Casualties and Missing People in Bosnia and Herzegovina During the Civil War**



Source: The University of Colorado, Boulder  
 ([https://ibs.colorado.edu/waroutcomes/maps/BiH\\_deathPntsEthnic.jpg](https://ibs.colorado.edu/waroutcomes/maps/BiH_deathPntsEthnic.jpg)).

Regarding the third of the core goals - conflict settlement, the evaluation of success lies in the resolution of the main of disagreements between disputing parties. In the case of Bosnia, the disputes encompass the question of further political order after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and territorial issues regarding the representation of diaspora in particular areas of the country. Although there were many attempts, plans and agreements<sup>18</sup> on the conflict resolution, which might be considered as a success, as the parties were present at the negotiating table, none of the efforts was effective, did not resolve the main disputes and only reflected the unwillingness of the parties to make concessions. Yet, the Dayton Agreement signed in 1995 is a turning point in the success of conflict settlement. The agreement encompasses the major territorial issues, by setting the boundary between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, arbitration of disputed Brčko area, conditions for democratic elections, recognizing human rights of refugees and displaced persons and recognition of the sovereignty of each state (The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995). Thus, as the Dayton Agreement represents the end of the Bosnian war, it is a success after the long-time failed efforts.

Moreover, as the Dayton Agreement was signed years ago, the evaluation of the (lack of) success of the implementation is now better observable. According to the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, observing the implementation from 1995-2005, the score for the implementation is 93.06 percent (Kroc Institute, a). The Dayton Agreement consists of the following provisions: *ceasefire*, demanding the parties to the cessation of hostilities and cooperate with the international personnel; *powersharing transitional government* creating the Parliamentary Assembly of two chambers – the House of Peoples and House of Representatives with equal division of ethnic representation; *presidency reform* consisting of three members – Croat, Bosniak and Serb; *boundary demarcation* which set the line between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska and the arbitration of disputed Brčko area; *electoral and political reform* encompassing the provision of free and fair elections and the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) within the process; *mutual recognition* of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as sovereign independent states; *federalism and decentralization* determining the

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<sup>18</sup> For instance, the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia in London, The Carrington-Cutileiro Plan, The Vance-Owen Plan.

responsibilities and relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities; *establishment and deployment of resolution committee* including the deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia whose task was to supervise and enforce military arrangements of the Dayton Agreement; *prisoner exchange* referring to the transfer of civilians and combatants; *human rights provision* addressing the highest level of recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms and securing of these rights by the Parties; *amnesty* regarding returning refugees and displaced persons charged with a crime which is not related to the conflict; *refugees and displaced persons* should be return to their homes safely and restore or compensate their properties deprived due hostilities; *economic and social development* enhancing the damaged economy and infrastructure reconstruction (Kroc Institute, a). The implementation of the particular arrangements was sometimes quite a long-time process, and some of them were never implemented on a full scale as it shows a subsequent figure.

**Figure 5: Implementation of Provisions of the Dayton Agreement 1995-2005**

<b>Provision</b>	<b>Fully Implemented</b>	<b>Year of Full Implementation</b>
Ceasefire	Yes	1996
Powersharing Transitional Government	Yes	1996
Presidency Reform	Yes	1996
Boundary Demarcation	Yes	1996
Electoral and Political Reform	Yes	2001
Mutual Recognition	No, only intermediate <sup>19</sup>	---
Federalism and Decentralization	Yes	1996
Establishment and Deployment of Resolution Committee	Yes	1995
Human Rights Provision	No, only intermediate	---
Amnesty	Yes	1999
Refugees and Displaced Persons	Yes	2003
Economic and Social Development	Yes	2002
Prisoner Exchange	Yes	1996

Source: Author, according to the Kroc Institute, a (<https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-framework-agreement-for-peace-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina>).

<sup>19</sup> According to the Kroc Institute, “an intermediate level of implementation implies that the process is likely to be completed by the end of the following year, if continued at the current pace and including achievements thus far” (Joshi, Madhav, Jason Michael Quinn & Patrick M. Regan, 2015).

Based on the prior summary of the provisions’ implementation, we might observe that most of the provisions were fully implemented or are “on the right path” to full implementation. Thus, the conflict settlement goal is successfully achieved due to signing the Dayton Agreement and its further installation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The following figure summarizes UNPROFOR’s accomplishments of the core goals evaluated according to the framework by Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman.

**Figure 6: UNPROFOR - Evaluation of the Core Goals**

Goal	Evaluation
Violence abatement	Failure, until the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, which ended the hostilities
Conflict containment	Partly successful on the geographic level, failure on the level of actors involved
Conflict settlement	Successful due to the Dayton Agreement

Source: Author according to the framework by Diehl and Druckman.

**3.3.1.1. New Mission Goals**

One of the new tasks of the second-generation mission is election supervision. As it was mentioned above, this task occurs in the aftermath of the peace agreement has been reached.

*Election Supervision*

In Bosnia, holding the general elections was the part of the Dayton Agreement, within six months after the Agreement enters into force or postponed, but no later than nine months after. The elections in Bosnia were held in September 1996. In the evaluation process, the indicator refers to the participation of citizens in the election, thus the first indicator is a number of voters registered to the elections. In parliamentary elections, the data are quite confusing, as it shows that over 112 percent of the voting-age population was registered for the parliamentary

elections and real turnout was 46 percent (IDEA, a). These facts might indicate manipulation with the registration of voters and questioning the validity of results. Furthermore, the International Crisis Group reported that the conditions of free and fair elections were not established, for instance, reintegration of refugees did not occur, the freedom of movement was limited, and belligerents still had their power of influence in the process (International Crisis Group, 1996) Moreover, thousands of voters were prevented from voting, for diverse reasons, for instance, some of the voters were disenfranchised by the errors in the registration process and the voter lists and some the voters were discouraged from voting due to fears of their security.

In addition, the International Crisis Group announced that the elections should not be considered as free and fair (International Crisis Group, 1996). Also, in the pre-electoral period, fear and need were the driving factors, and the serious violation occurred (OSCE, 1996). Nevertheless, according to the Provisional Election Commission (PEC), established by OSCE, the elections were not substantially affected by the violation and the results were verified which cannot be contested. In presidential elections, the number of registered voters is about 93 percent and real turnout about 60 percent. Additionally, the report submitted by the Coordinator of International Monitoring refers to the lesser cases of violation (International Crisis Group, 1996). Nonetheless, considering the registration figures, voters' turnout and merely absence of any protests after the elections were held, suggest the success of this goal.

### *Democratization*

The success of democratization might be at first glance assessed by the absence of coup and regime change. In Bosnia, no coup or insurgencies was aiming to overthrow the government. Furthermore, the success of democratization is interwoven with the elections in the country. Thus, one of the indicators of success is the fair competition among the political parties, hence the increased number of competing groups might signify the right path towards democratization. In 1990, the elections in Bosnia were distributed into three nationalist parties – the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Serb Democratic Party (SDS). Although the number of political parties increased in Bosnia, which would suggest the competitive nature of the political system, the elections are still

dominated by the nationalist parties – Party of Democratic Action, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats and SDS-NDP-NS-SRS<sup>20</sup> (Election Guide, 2018). Thus, the dominance of the nationalist parties based on ethnicity limits the space for fair competition among other political subjects. The second indicator of the democratization (un) success is increased or decreased participation of citizens in the following elections. The following figure will provide a clear view of the citizens' participation in the subsequent seven general elections period.

**Figure 7: General elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

	1998	2000	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
<b>Registered Voters</b>	81.59 %	82.15 %	73.69 %	77.83 %	104.05 %	108.77 %	103.92 %
<b>Voter Turnout</b>	70.74 %	63.70 %	55.45 %	54.94 %	56.49 %	54.54 %	54.03 %

Source: Author according to IDEA, a (<https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/57/40>).

Based on the voter turnout in the subsequent seven elections period, we might observe a decline in three election periods and further sustainable voter turnout, although the participation is not as favourable as expected. Moreover, the registration figures might suggest manipulations with votes, especially the registration of voters living abroad (Novák, 2018).

In addition, the democratization level is examined by the Freedom House<sup>21</sup>, whose annual global report is concerned with civil liberties and political rights which are obtaining from numerical rating and texts on the chosen country. The methodology of the report is built on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it is composed by 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators and related questions which are further evaluated by a maximum of four points (Freedom House, b). Nowadays, at the level of political rights, Bosnia obtained 19 out of 40 points and at the level of civil liberties 34 out of 60 points. Therefore, altogether, Bosnia and Herzegovina received 53 out of 100 points and is rated as

<sup>20</sup> Serb Democratic Party, National Democratic Movement, Our Party, Serbian Radical Party of Republika Srpska.

<sup>21</sup> The organization stresses against the threats to democracy, aims to empower citizens to exercise their rights and produces researches and analysis on the democratic development in the world (Freedom House, a).

“partly free” (Freedom House, c). In the report, the fewest number of points the country received in regard to the functioning government, particularly due to prevailing corruption and lack of transparency in the government processes and operations. Consequently, the judiciary is weak in practice; judges are often under pressure by politicians and their interference and targets of intimidation and exploitation (Freedom House, c). In addition, according to the Transparency International corruption perceptions index, while 0 means that the country is highly corrupt and 100 signify “clean” of corruption, Bosnia and Herzegovina received 36 points out of 100. Furthermore, the rank of the country’s position compared to other examined states, Bosnia is placed on 101st position out of 180, while 180 is the worst threatened country by widespread corruption (Transparency International, a).

#### *Humanitarian Assistance and Human Rights Protection*

During my research, I ascertained that there are no comprehensive data available on human rights abuses which would indicate the potential reduction of such abuses caused by the presence of the mission. The number of human right abuses, including rape, detention without charge, interrogation or execution is not often available due to restricted access to the conflicting areas. Hence, I aimed to provide the most precise information from annual reports of several organizations focusing on human rights, implement them into all case studies and search of any improvement of the human right during the mission’s deployment. For instance, reports from Amnesty International, The Human Rights Watch (HRW) or The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Also, I assessed this goal by further supplementary criteria.

The assessment of this goal lies in the ability of peacekeepers to protect the humanitarian aid and safely deliver to the people in need. UNPROFOR succeeded in creating routes for delivering humanitarian assistance. However, the convoys using the routes were the object of looting and aggression from the warring parties, as they were able to control the routes and the delivery often depended on bribing of warlords. Moreover, the UN Refugee Agency facilitating the humanitarian aid complained about being under fire because of the presence of UNPROFOR (Cutts, 1999). Furthermore, the operation also failed in facilitate access of



humanitarian aid into enclaves besieged by the Bosnian Serbs, thus the humanitarian aid often did not reach the most vulnerable population.

Achieving human right protection is narrowly connected with humanitarian assistance and often also with disarmament activities. At the most basic level on evaluating human rights protection, this task might be evaluated based on the ability of the mission to avoid any act of genocide. Indeed, this is the UNPROFOR's greatest failure, as the mission was not able to avoid massacre in Srebrenica, qualified as genocide (Diehl and Druckman, 2010: 184–185). Moreover, there was a persisted inability to protect civilians in safe zones or enforce no-fly zones over the country due to insufficiently equipped peacekeepers. Another indicator of achieving this goal lies in the reduction of human rights abuses. The Human Rights Watch report in 1993 stressed the Serbian policy employed in the country, which involved arbitrary detention, deportation, systematic torture, execution, creation of detention camps and disappearance of citizens based on their nationality and ethnic origin. Also, Serbian forces intentionally shot at civilians, bombed villages and brutal sexual abuses and rapes on women were very frequent, especially throughout Serbian-controlled areas. “In the latter part of 1992, “ethnic cleansing” in Serbian-controlled areas of eastern Slavonia increased despite the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping troops to the region” (HRW, 1993).

The collection of evidence and scale of human rights abuses was aggravated by the media reports which manipulated the data, minimizing the abuses conducted by their forces and maximize the number of abuses committed by their opponents (Amnesty International, 1993a). Despite these facts, the majority of the attacks, especially against Muslims, were conducted by the Serbian side. In 1992, the number of prisoners in detention centres was about 8,500 people who experienced inhuman, degrading treatment, torture, interrogation and intimidation (Amnesty International, 1993b). According to the International Committee of The Red Cross report in 1993, estimated 350,000 civilians were living in deteriorated conditions due to Sarajevo bombardment, and about 1,300,000 people were displaced within the country (ICRC, 1993). Through 1994, conditions of human rights abuses continued to deteriorate, and non-Serbs were “cleansed” from their homes, followed by the Srebrenica massacre in a year after (HRW, 1995a). The ambiguity in (lack of) success is thus erased as it shows the greatest failure of UNPROFOR efforts.

## *DDR*

Regarding the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, UNPROFOR was mandated to disarm and demilitarize, in order to prevent any hostilities from recurrence. The process supposed to be implemented in the UNPAs and “pink zones” established by the mission but none of these efforts was successful due to constant siege of the zone by the Bosnian Serbs who later attacked the areas. Nonetheless, the mission was not able to accomplish this goal, due to non-cooperation of local Serbian forces which refused to disarm in areas under Serbian control and UNPROFOR was not able to force these troops to compliance with the disarmament procedures. Consequently, the police force in Serbian controlled UNPAs persisted Serbian and thus, the mission’s plan could not be further implemented, and the mission lacked measures how to enforce the disarmament of combatants (HRW, 1993). The crucial concern was the “legitimization” the result of ethnic cleansing, hence, the international community aimed to bring the war criminals to the negotiating table rather than to justice.

Also, UNPROFOR faced the unwillingness of parties involved to give up on their interests and thus provide an advantage to the other side. There is no indication of successful effort regarding disarmament, although it was a subject of peace negotiations, attempts to create demilitarized safe zones and to monitor no-fly zones. Nonetheless, the situation slightly enhanced after the Dayton Agreement was signed, and in the mid-1996 the estimated number of 300,000 out of 400,000 to 430,000 soldiers left their forces voluntarily (Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess, 2009). Due to the significant lack of governance, the two ethnic entities were unable to ensure assistance with the reintegration of their ex-combatants. Thus, the former soldiers, frequently affected by the traumas of war and uneducated, had to seek any employment opportunities by their owns. In response, the World Bank’s International Development Agency developed the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project in order to help and assist former soldiers, refugees, war victims, widows and disabled persons in a job and educational opportunities. In this respect, UNPROFOR was not successful in achieving this goal until the Dayton Agreement, which provided a foundation of the DDR process.

**Figure 8: UNPROFOR - Evaluation of the New Mission Goals**

Goal	Criteria	Assessment
Election supervision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Voter turnout</li> <li>• Voter registration</li> </ul>	<p>Success</p> <p>Success</p>
Democratization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fair competition among parties</li> <li>• Voter turnout</li> <li>• Absence of coup</li> </ul>	<p>Failure</p> <p>Prevailing success</p> <p>Success</p>
Humanitarian assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability of humanitarian aid protection</li> </ul>	<p>Prevailing failure</p>
Human rights protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Genocide avoidance</li> <li>• Protection of designated areas</li> <li>• Reduction of human rights abuses</li> </ul>	<p>Failure</p> <p>Failure</p> <p>Failure</p>
DDR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability to demobilize and disarm combatants</li> </ul>	<p>Failure until the Dayton Agreement</p>

Source: Author according to the framework by Diehl and Druckman.

### **3.3.1.1.1. Supplementary Discussion**

The evaluation of (the lack of) success of the mission depends on the diverse perceptions of actors involved. Thus, from the perspective of the international community, including states, NGOs and international organizations. The fundamental goal of the international community is undoubtedly human rights protection and security, thus conflict containment and abatement. In Bosnian case, UNPROFOR was partially successful in containing conflict from spreading abroad, however, was not able to prevent the conflict from spreading to other areas within the country. Regarding violence abatement, the mission was not successful during its presence in 1992-1995, until the Dayton Peace Agreement was reached in 1995. Additionally, human rights protection is related to both previous goals of the international community. Hence, as the operation was unable to mitigate or even stop the violence, which was even spreading to new areas, the protection of human right could not be ensured. Therefore, in regard to these fundamental goals of the international community, the mission was unsuccessful. From the perspective of the main protagonists, who entered the conflict to win, none of the outcomes of the mission is sufficient for all parties.

Furthermore, from a short-time perspective, the mission was not successful as it was not able to stop the violence, protect civilians, effectively and ensure humanitarian aid. Nevertheless, the mission assisted with the Dayton Peace Agreement which represents a success rather from the long-time perspective, as all parties aim to adhere conditions anchored in the Agreement and there was no war recurrence, although the ethnicity-based tensions persist. The mandate of UNPROFOR was often enlarged and extended. Nevertheless, peacekeepers were not able to fulfil its purposes due to the unclarity of the tasks and insufficient equipment.

Concerning unintended consequences of the mission, according to Menšíková, peacekeepers were involved in cooperation of warlords. The cooperation might be direct or indirect, induced by the nature of the mission or intended activity by peacekeepers, including drug smuggling, shady business practices or human trafficking. UNPROFOR soldiers faced the decision regarding delivering humanitarian aid. The decision was whether negotiate and bribe with warlords and thus be able to safely deliver humanitarian aid, as the convoys were frequently targets of looting or remain impartial at the cost of lack of aid for people in need. Thus, peacekeepers mostly decided to cooperate with local warlords who were controlling the routes and consequently supported the warring side. Moreover, members of the mission,

particularly of the International Police Task Force were accused of participation in human trafficking and forced prostitution (Menšíková, 2011).

### **3.4. Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Aftermath of UNPROFOR**

Peace operations might have a significant impact on further development in the country, both positive and negative. Hence, I consider the post-conflict situation observation as beneficial in order to obtain a comprehensive view of the effectiveness of the peace mission.

Since the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the discussion dealing with political violence and the role of ethnicity in democratic systems arisen, searching for a possibility to overcome such clashes and create stable democracies. Nevertheless, the political system in Bosnia is still dominated by the nationalist parties divided among their ethnicity lines. In the aftermath of signing the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, the international community focused on the implementation of the Agreement, in order to prevent any resumption of the conflict. Thus, the Implementation Force (IFOR) under NATO authorization was established to separate conflicting parties and collect weapons within the country. Moreover, it was successful as it was well organized, resourced, and its capabilities were about 60,000 soldiers (Keil and Perry, 2015). The political reconstruction, including re-building of infrastructure and establishing political institutions, conducted mainly by the United States and main European powers, was not, however, as easy as the military tasks.

Furthermore, ethnic cleansing continued, although, on a lesser scale, the main political parties were not willing to cooperate, and local resistance substantially slowed the return of refugees. In response to these complications, in 1997 the major powers involved in peacebuilding activities in the country gave the High Representative extended power, including the right to dismiss Bosnian officials who would obstacle the implementation of the Agreement. Consequently, in the period between 1998 and 2006, the state-building activities were under the control of the High Representative, encompassing citizenship legislation; border security system reforms; new tax reform; removal of officials from their offices as they were perceived as an obstacle in peace implementation and recognition of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats as constituent people in Bosnia (Keil and Perry, 2015). Nonetheless, these efforts were not sufficient in creating a functional Bosnian state. The reasons might be found in the inability to

overcome the dominance of the major nationalist parties and their diverse views on the future direction of Bosnia and unwillingness to cooperate and power-sharing. Therefore, these issues brought the country in a stalemate, with no political, economic or social progress.

#### **4. The Conflict in Somalia and the Deployment of the UNOSOM I and II (1992-1995)**

Somalia is frequently used as an example of a failed state<sup>22</sup> which has been tossed in long-lasting civil war since 1991. During the colonization era in Africa, the north-west of Somalia, later known as Somaliland, was a British protectorate from 1887 until 1960 when united with the south and east of the territory. The rest of the territory was colonized and parcelled into Ethiopia, France and Italy. Although Somalia gained its independence, it remained fragmented. In 1969, Mohammed Siad Barre took control over Somalia, driven by the vision of “the Great Somalia” and with the assistance of the Soviet Union established a revolutionary government. The increased influence of the Soviet Union, however, made the government more dictatorial apart from the initial idea of a prosperous state of educational and business opportunities (Jones et al., 2006). Consequently, the relations between Somalia and the United States deteriorated and in 1974, the US interrupted ties with the Siad Barre government. Further, Siad Barre invaded neighbouring Ethiopia using a pretext of the liberation of Somali citizens in Ogaden which significantly harmed Somali relations with the Soviet Union supporting Ethiopia.

Nevertheless, this turn caused the restoration of Somali-US relations and financial assistance, focusing on Somali agriculture and health care. Moreover, the international organizations and NGOs such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Doctors Without Borders, The International Committee of The Red Cross or World Food Programme began to operate in the country (Jones et al., 2006). The military clashes initiated by the Somali National Movement (Isaq clan) in 1988, foreshadowed the beginning of the civil war.

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<sup>22</sup> Author’s note: failed state refers to the state lacking functioning government, issued in provide fundamental needs for its citizens, for instance, to ensure security or basic welfare. Moreover, these states are likely to be afflicted by violence and hostilities.

## **4.1. Origins and Circumstances of the Civil War in Somalia**

The civil war in Somalia erupted in 1991 by the overthrow of Siad Barre regime leaving the country fragmented with no central government, ruled by various warlords. Without an enemy, the formerly allied clans started to fight with each other, led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi who subsequently competed for control over Mogadishu. Moreover, the former British territory, known as Somaliland, unilaterally declared its independence in 1991. Somali wars are linked to territorial and governmental claims, however, there are multidimensional origins of the outbreak of still ongoing conflict in Somalia rooted in social and political transformation over the decades, which escalated in the devastating conflict which in a combination of widespread famine left over 500,000 casualties and over 3.5 million of displaced people behind (Ploughshares).

### **4.1.1. Internal Factors**

#### **Resources and Power**

Power and resources are tied up, thus in this regard, resources are one of the most frequent roots of conflicts. In case Somalia, the competition over resources and power was a leading cause of the war among militia groups and clans, as the disputes over the resources, especially water, resonated among Somali clans long in history. After the Somalian independence, a political leader focused on control of water resources in the countryside rather than control of foreign aid or recruitment of civil servants. The intentions behind the turn in its objectives were the awareness that whoever rules the country would also control the resources available in the country. Consequently, political leaders frequently misused their competencies as they tend to install members of its clans into all department of the government, encompassing segments of state power and economic sector (Elmi and Barise, 2010). Thus, the motivation over the acquisition of the resources caused widespread corruption and outlawed the opposition.

### **The clan identity**

The clan identity is connected with the competition of resources in the country. Although the Somali society is language and religiously homogenous, it is based on traditional principle, rather than of modern state rules. Thus, the society is composed by affiliation groups based on the structure of clans in which individual identity stems from the rules of the particular group, including collective objectives prevailing over individual ones, sharing resources and protection against other groups (Marangio, 2012). The culture of clans was challenged in the colonial period due to establishment of bureaucracy to control the territory and its economic potential and benefits for clans resulting from a willingness to cooperate with colonizer powers. Hence, it divided clans and groups into collaborators and opponents of the foreign powers. Subsequently, Siad Barre's regime focused on the removal of clan structure in the country and replaced it with a family rule. In the aftermath of Somali defeat in Ogaden, Siad Barre implemented cleansing measures toward rebel clans, in order to ensure the security of his clan and maintain his power.

However, since every social group was perceived as enemy and threat to the Siad Barre's regime, the need for self-defence arisen rather than offence. "Thus, the attempt to substitute traditional social structures forcefully and artificially with more modern ones led to the breakdown of social cohesion, creating a vacuum with regard to common legitimizing paradigms and rules for political competition" (Marangio, 2012). Furthermore, the diversity among clans' interests and goals was reflected in the mobilization of forces. For instance, the opposition leaders mobilised forces through emphasizing inclusive identities and grievances between clans. The clan identities became an instrument of mobilization, nonetheless, did not cause the war by themselves (Elmi and Barise, 2010).

### **Political Environment**

As it was mentioned before, Somalian citizens experienced repressive military state during the Siad Barre's dictatorial regime (1969–1991). In this regard, people were not able to express their discontent with the government, as the opposition was suppressed through the use of force and collective punishment. For instance, in 1978, military officers attempted to change regime, nevertheless, the coup failed as Siad Barre used the national army and other military forces to



punish the initiators – Majerteen clan, resulting in the civilian killing, mass abuses and destruction villages inhabited by the clan. Another attempt in 1981 was conducted by the opposition entity – the Somali National Movement established by the Isaq clan, nonetheless, the military government reacted by the punishing civilians (Elmi and Barise, 2010). Consequently, Siad Barre started to cooperate with non-Isaq clans to fight the Somali National Movement in the north. The clashes escalated by many civilians' casualties due to the destruction of towns of Hargeisa and Burao in 1988. Subsequently, these incidents led to the consolidation of opposition amongst Isaq clans, thus the regime of Siad Barre had lost control over the north-west territory, in 1990 and collapsed a year after (Walls, 2009).

#### **4.1.1.1. External Factor**

##### **Competition of Superpowers**

The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War period, was expressed by the superpowers' engagement in conflicts, underpinned by reinforcement of power in the international arena. Moreover, Somalia was, due to its geographical position, an attractive target of such intentions. Shortly after Somalian independence in 1960, the United States tied cooperation with the country, providing material and funding assistance. Furthermore, since the Siad Barre's regime, Somalia was also supported by the Soviet Union. Both superpowers competed to arm the dictator, thus the United States and the Soviet Union were the major sources of weapons for the regime. The Somali opposition forces were armed by the neighbouring state of Ethiopia (Elmi and Barise, 2010). However, the end of the Cold War simultaneously represented the end of competing activities, thus termination of support of the Siad Barre's regime, which was consequently paralysed and likely to yield the opposition forces.

**Figure 9: Map of Somalia**



Source: The University of Texas Libraries, b. <https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/somalia.html>.

#### **4.1.1.1.1. Contributing Factors**

##### **Youth Crisis**

The unemployment and lack of education force youth to engage in the drug trade and shady businesses, committing violence including murders or intimidation of political opponents, looting, rape, forced prostitution and many other activities in order to earn money to survive, as many of them are living on the streets. Thus, it has a detrimental effect on society, as in many poor countries, for instance, in Sierra Leone, the crisis of youth represents serious issues in domestic affairs (Peters, 2011). In the 1980s, Somalia's government was not able to deal with an increased number of youth population and provide them educational or employment opportunities. Consequently, many men were in a problematic situation aggravated by elites pursuing their interests while exploiting the grievances stemming from the inability to assure the opportunities, in a context of a collapsed state which further fuelled the conflict (Elmi and Barise, 2010).

In addition, famine and droughts in the country also had a contributory effect, as it accelerated a need for regime change.

## **4.2. The Response of the International Community and the Deployment of UNOSOM I**

### *The Response of the International Community and Peace Efforts*

In the early 1990s, the UN believed that the conflict between warlords might be resolved through means of political mediation, which omitted the non-cohesive nature of Somali society affected by alliances formation due to changing opportunities. Simultaneously, in regard to widespread famine, droughts and worsening conflicting situation, the international community decided to provide humanitarian relief, thus "[...]six main United Nations organizations at work in Somalia coordinating overall humanitarian efforts: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF,

the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WFP and the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, more than 30 NGOs were working in Somalia as "implementing partners" of the United Nations“ (United Nations, k). These humanitarian reliefs, however, became targets of armed clashes and looting, thus these humanitarian operations required more security. Regarding the need for more security for humanitarian mission operating and continuing hostilities in the country, the Security Council urged to the ceasefire and implemented an embargo on weapon and other military equipment supplies to Somalia. The United Nations cooperated with the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). These common efforts resulted in Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire in March 1992 and allowed implementation of the UN security components for humanitarian convoys and deployment of military observers, monitoring ceasefire in Mogadishu (United Nations, k).

#### *The Deployment of the UNOSOM I and its Mandate*

The Security Council reacted to the Secretary-General’s recommendations and adopted in April 1992, resolution 751 (1992) which established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and Special Representative for the UN affairs in Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun. The resolution also required to deploy 50 observers to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu (UN SC resolution 751). Furthermore, the Special Representative in Somalia urged to undertake some necessary steps such as recovery programmes and institution building. However, the primary focus comprised humanitarian assistance in order to mitigate starvation in the most affected areas of civil war. Nonetheless, the humanitarian delivery faced many security obstacles and attacks, including looting by heavily armed groups and assaults on ships and airports. Consequently, UNOSOM was enlarged by resolution 775 (1992) and strengthened by additional forces to protect humanitarian convoys (UN SC resolution 775).

In September 1992, after the approval of a plan submitted by the Secretary-General, the operation’s total strength was 4,219 personnel (United Nations, k). Additionally, the humanitarian assistance was further emphasized by the creation of the “100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance” which aimed to develop an effective plan to prevent famine and high level of related deaths. Nonetheless, despite all efforts, the

situation in Somalia deteriorated again. There was no central government to negotiate with, and the Somali de facto authorities rejected to give consent with the deployment of additional UN troops which would secure a humanitarian aid delivery in the most affected areas. Therefore, these deliveries, representing the vital importance for many civilians, remained to be objective of robberies, mugging and shooting. Moreover, in Mogadishu, UNOSOM troops were fired up, and their vehicles and weapons were stolen. In response, the Security Council aiming to resolve the situation and end violence, adopted resolution 794 (1992) in December, authorizing the mission under Chapter VII, thus use all necessary means to establish a secure environment in order to ensure effective delivery of humanitarian relief in Somalia. In addition, such actions supposed to be performed by the unified command and control of the military forces (UN SC resolution 794).

The decision provided the creation and subsequent deployment of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) comprise of 37,000 troops led by the United States. Intentionally, UNITAF supposed to establish a secure environment for urgent humanitarian deliveries and through force deter any potential attack committed by Somali warlords against the UN personnel and other organizations operating in the country. UNOSOM cooperated with UNITAF but remained fully responsible for humanitarian and political aspects in Somalia. The Unified Task Force was viewed as successful, as it secured main centres in the country, and thus the humanitarian aid was safely delivered (United Nations, k).

In May 1993, the mandate of UNITAF expired, and the future of peacekeeping operation was the primary concern. Hence, the Secretary-General proposed the transition of UNITAF into UNOSOM II. Also, he stressed, that despite UNITAF had positive effects on the security on the country, the current situation still did not meet the requirements of a secure environment, as there is no functioning government and state institutions and violence is still present. Furthermore, “[t]he mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure” (United Nations, k). In order to accomplish such extensive tasks, UNOSOM II supposed to be authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter thus obtained the right to use of force.

### *The Deployment of UNOSOM II and its Mandate*

In March 1993, UNOSOM II was established based on the resolution 814 (1993) authorized under Chapter VII and enlarged both size and mandate of former UNOSOM I. The revised mandate covered the provision of humanitarian assistance; assistance with political and economic recovery; promotion of national reconciliation and political settlement; assistance to refugees and displaced persons; reestablishment of national and regional institutions; assistance in the restoration of peace and security, stability and order; assistance in mines removal and creation of conditions under which Somali society would participate on political process and settlement (UN SC resolution 814). Moreover, military tasks of the mission included monitoring ceasefires and other agreements; preventing any recurrence of violence through taking appropriate action, if necessary; maintaining control of heavy weapons; securing ports and routes necessary for humanitarian delivery; protecting personnel and equipment of the UN and other organizations in the country through any forceful action (United Nations, 1). In regard to the creation of a secure environment in the country, the Special Representative of the UN, representatives of LAS, OAU and OIC and leaders of 15 Somali political movements negotiated and signed an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia in Addis Ababa 1993. This agreement consisted of four parts – disarmament and security; restoration of property and settlement of disputes; transnational mechanism<sup>23</sup> and rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II did not get along without any inconveniences. Hence, disarmament attempts resulted in increasing tensions and violence committed by General Aidid's forces which attacked UNOSOM II troops and killed or wounded about 90 peacekeepers. In response, the Security Council adopted resolution 837 (1993), condemning the assault, approving the additional forces to meet 28,000 men and reaffirming to take necessary action (UN SC resolution 837). Furthermore, based on the resolution, UNOSOM II initiated a military retaliation by many air and ground military actions in south Mogadishu. Nonetheless, the disarming efforts continued, accompanied by the deployment of the Quick Reaction Force and the United States Rangers deployed to arrest the

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<sup>23</sup> Transnational mechanism included responsibility of central administrative departments of reestablishment of social, economic and humanitarian affairs; creation of regional and district councils and creation of transitional national council serving as political authority with legislative functions during the transitional period (United Nations, 1).

suspects of attacks in June, in which the forces succeeded, however, soldiers were attacked during the mission, and many of them lost their lives.

In the aftermath of these events, the Security Council review the role and purpose of the UN in Somalia, putting the humanitarian tasks as a priority again due to increased numbers of displaced persons and constant famine casualties. Accordingly, UNOSOM II re-established police stations, although not in the most needed areas of north-west, where no UN personnel had been deployed; decreased famine level but the malnutrition levels increased in the fighting areas.

In 1994, the mandate of UNOSOM II was revised by 897 (1994) resolution, underlining the fundamental importance of the mission. In March, a declaration of national reconciliation was signed between Mr Ali Mahdi and General Aidid in Nairobi. “The Somali faction leaders repudiated any form of violence as a means of resolving conflicts and committed themselves to implement a ceasefire and voluntary disarmament. They also agreed to restore peace throughout Somalia, giving priority wherever conflicts existed“ (United Nations, 1). Nonetheless, the violence outbreak again in June 1994 between clans and sub-clan entities. Moreover, the National Reconciliation Conference was postponed again, which dashed any hopes of reconciliation. In addition, several assaults against peacekeepers occurred, hence UNOSOM II was downsizing its numbers and eventually withdrew from Somalia in 1995.

### **4.3. Evaluation of UNOSOM I and II**

According to the framework by Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman, the mission will be evaluated as follows. Firstly, I will be focusing on the success of achieving the core goals of the mission – violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement.

#### **4.3.1. Core Goals**

The core goals of UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II are evaluated altogether, as both missions have, unfortunately despite strengthened mandate and capabilities of UNOSOM II, the same outcomes in accomplishing these goals. Regarding violence abatement, the mission should contribute to a reduction or elimination of armed violence in a host country. Focusing on the

key question is the presence of violence after the mission's deployment, the indicators would be days without war and the possible emergence of new crises and militarized disputes. At this level, one might observe, that violence persisted after the deployment of the mission as there was no peace to keep. The UN in cooperation with regional organizations negotiated a ceasefire at the beginning of 1992, followed by the deployment of fifty UN observers to monitor the ceasefire, which was the inadequate number regarding the demands on peacekeepers. The agreed ceasefire might be considered as a success, however, it did not have a much positive impact on stopping the violence. Consequently, any ceasefire was violated and armed clashes continued. The second indicator referring to the emergence of a new crisis and disputed is thus clear. Peacekeepers were not able to prevent any militarized disputes, moreover, the escalated and the UN personnel became the target of many assaults (United Nations, k; 1). Simultaneously, constant hostilities led to the increasing number of civilians' casualties, including peacekeepers fatalities. Therefore, the mission failed in this regard.

Conflict containment symbolizes the ability of the operation to prevent geographically expansion of the conflict and new actors' involvement. In the case of Somalia, the conflict was limited to the south and south-east parts of the country, especially around Mogadishu and Kismayo. The north of Somalia remained relatively peaceful. Moreover, the conflict did not spread to neighbouring countries either. Despite these facts, it is difficult to evaluate the mission's contribution to the relative stability in the north due to its steadiness stemming from the colonial era. In regard to actors involved, Ethiopia played a significant role in the conflict by supporting the presidential opponent General Aideed. Subsequently, when Aideed acquired power, Ethiopia shifted its support to Ali Mahdi (Elmi and Barise, 2010). In addition, one might argue that UNITAF also involved a new actor, as the mission was led by the US.

Similarly, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the data on casualties, according to the UCDP datasets, will be provided. In the case of Somalia, the data on fatalities are lower than in the case of Bosnia. However, the numbers did not substantially decrease during the mission's deployment, and there were more casualties regarding the widespread famine in Somalia and the mission's inability to provide humanitarian aid and medical care to the most threatened population, which will be discussed further in new mission goals. Furthermore, one year prior, the mission's deployment is included in order to observe the increase or decrease of casualties after the mission's deployment.



**Figure 10: Summary of the three estimates of casualties in Somalia**

	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>
<b>Low estimate</b>	7630	4729	476	624	437
<b>Best estimate</b>	8455	4729	483	626	444
<b>High estimate</b>	9460	13398	554	1052	897

Source: Author according to Sundberg and Melander, 2013.

Regarding the conflict settlement as the third core goal, there were many efforts and negotiation of the ceasefire agreement, and political settlement, conflict in Somalia has never been resolved as it never sufficiently emphasized the main grievances existing in the country, particularly among clans. The ceasefires (if agreed at all) were violated, and national reconciliation efforts were thwarted due postponing by the main actors of war. The United Nations organized the national reconciliation meeting in Addis Ababa in 1993, on which the main clans even did not participate, although they were invited. This meeting brought agreement concerning a process of the Transitional National Council formation as a prime political authority; affirmed to settle disputed by dialogue and other peaceful means; affirmed the compliance with UNOSOM forces with disarmament process and reaffirmed its adherence to ceasefire agreed in 1993, under threat of sanctions imposed to those who violate it (United States Institute of Peace). None of these components was, however, implemented or adhered. Another attempt by the UN to resolve the dispute was in 1994 in Nairobi, and there were more participants compared to the previous meetings. Nevertheless, they belonged to one of the two alliances. “The international community was unable to engage fresh leaders or persuade the factions to be represented by unified bodies” (Saalax and Xildhiban, 2010). Therefore, the evaluation and data regarding the (lack) success of provisions implementation as it was made in case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

are not possible in case of Somalia, as there has been no sustainable peace agreement achieved. Hence, the failure of the mission to address the crucial causes of the conflict and assist the parties with the resolution is evident.

**Figure 11: UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II – Evaluation of the Core Goals**

Goal	Evaluation
Violence Abatement	Failure
Conflict Containment	Failure at the level of actors’ involvement, Partial success at the geographical level
Conflict Settlement	Failure

Source: Author according to the framework by Diehl and Druckman.

**4.3.1.1. New Mission Goals – UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II**

UNOSOM I was initially mandated to achieve tasks of traditional peacekeeping, for instance, to monitor ceasefire with respect to the Holy Trinity Principles. Nevertheless, the mission was later modified to carry out a new role of humanitarian assistance with the provision of more enforcement action in order to achieve the new task. Furthermore, regarding new mission goals, UNOSOM I will be evaluated on the basis of humanitarian assistance, as it was the only task of new mission goals. Certainly, applying the indicator of success – whether the aid distribution was protected, the failure of the mission is apparent. Peacekeepers were struggling with the delivery of humanitarian aid since the task was assigned. There was a lack of capabilities to secure the relief, even if the mission was later mandated to use of force. In addition, there was no precise manual according to which could peacekeepers proceed with the implementation of coercive measures and chaos among cases of self-defence. Additionally, the inability to provide humanitarian assistance is interwoven with the human rights protection, as it put many civilians in danger, either in regard of starvation or forced displacement, aggravated by the hostile environment in the country.

The further discussion focuses on UNOSOM II, as it was mandated to fulfil more extensive tasks than its predecessor and was authorized to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter since the beginning of its deployment.

### *Election Supervision and Democratization*

Concerning elections supervision, for instance, the Secretary-General stressed the need to hold the general elections, installation of the Government and fully implement the Addis Ababa Agreement in order to create a security environment which was the main purpose of the mandate (United Nations, l). Nevertheless, UNOSOM II was not directly mandated to supervise the election, due to non-existence of sustainable agreement which reflected unwillingness of warring parties. Fundamentally, the main purpose of the operation was to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance, completed by disarmament and reconciliation, which may include holding the election anchored in reconciliation efforts (United Nations, m). Additionally, the potential elections could be held in regard to the agreed process of the Transitional National Council formation as political authority in Somalia, as it was negotiated in Addis Ababa in 1993, nonetheless, as it is mentioned above, this arrangement was not implemented during the presence of peacekeepers. Therefore, the evaluation of election supervision is not possible in this case.

Regarding democratization, one of the indicators stems from the subsequent free and fair elections in the aftermath of the mission's withdrawal. Indeed, there have been no elections in Somalia since the mid-1980s, thus it indicates failure in this regard. Although there were limited and indirect elections on which foundation was the Federal Government of Somalia established in 2012, it cannot be considered as free and fair elections which would allow citizens to participate on the process as there are subjects of intimidation and violence. Hence, political affairs are dominated by the division of clans (Freedom House, d). Moreover, Somalia remaining to be an insecure failed state with impunity of human rights abuses conducted by both state and non-state actors. Furthermore, according to the Freedom House index, Somalia is rated as "not free" receiving 7 points out of 100, specifically, at the level of political rights, the country obtained only 1 point out of 40 and at the level of civil liberties 6 out of 60 points (Freedom House, d). In a more detailed view, the crucial issues lie in the absence of free and

fair elections and the blurred electoral process. Essentially, there is no realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase their support and gain power through elections as President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as Farmaajo was facing of an accusation of votes manipulation in order to install the president allies in the office (Freedom House, d). Indeed, political decisions and procedures are affected and stimulated by widespread corruption. According to the Transparency International and corruption perceptions index, Somalia's score is 9 out of 100, while 0 means that the country is highly corrupt and 100 is viewed as "clean". Moreover, the rank referring to the position of the country compared to all countries included in the index, thus Somalia is placed on 180th position out of 180 examined countries which indicates the worst corrupt situation (Transparency International, b).

#### *Humanitarian Assistance and Human Rights Protection*

After the experiences with the UNITAF mission, which was successful in delivering humanitarian relief, the spirits of enthusiasm and hope were embedded in UNOSOM II accomplishing this goal. Due to widespread famine in Somalia, food aid was vital for the country. Nonetheless, food and other humanitarian aid deliveries were frequently subject of looting, and it was used as one of the resources of warring parties or provided other advantages for each side. Moreover, food aid became an informal currency in the country (Ahmad, 2012). These attacks on humanitarian convoys could not be mostly fended off, due to the blurred definition of "all necessary means" and situations in which the means can be used. Furthermore, the mission was disturbed by focusing on disarmament process and political settlement, which should ensure a safe environment for humanitarian relief, however, neither of these attempts were successful, hence, the safe environment had not been established, and the task of humanitarian assistance was not fulfilled.

The crucial concern of peace missions is to the protection of human rights. One might ask whether human rights abuses have been reduced. In the case of Somalia, there are some disturbing reports on human rights abuses and suffering, although the fragmentation of the country hindered the documentation of precise numbers of incidents. In 1992, according to the Amnesty International report, over 300,000 refugees fled from Somalia to Kenya and thousands more to Yemen and at least 300,000 people died of starvation caused by a breakdown of the

government, fighting, famine and obstruction of the international aid delivery (Amnesty International, 1993 a). The deployment of the UN operations, however, did not bring any significant improvements. “Since before the U.N. intervention, and still currently, abuses by agents of Somalia's de facto authorities have included killings of civilians through the indiscriminate use of heavy weapons, the deliberate, targeted killing of civilians, execution-style killings of captives, rape and other cruel and degrading treatment, and forced displacement and controls on freedom of movement. All of these abuses appear in patterns that reflect discriminatory treatment along clan lines” (HRW, 1995 b). In many cases, the only way for Somalis how to survive was to escape, however, only minority succeeded. More than half of respondents who experienced the war were victims of more than six negative consequences of war, including both physical and psychological harms. Furthermore, respondents lost their homes, their family was killed, they were victims of rape, also the food was stolen from them, houses were looted, or they became victims of torture, kidnapping or forced to join the combatants in order to save their lives (ICRC, 1999).

The crucial factors in the failure of fulfilling the human rights protection goal might be seen in the ignorance of the critical role of human rights abuses constituted in creating famine at the beginning of the 1990s but also intentional abuses committed by warlords in order to maintain their power and influence. Moreover, UNOSOM operations focused on the humanitarian aid delivery but did not consider the human rights abuses behind. The failure of human right protection supports a fact, that “[...] the U.N. should have helped restore guarantees of Somalis' basic human rights so that they could fully participate in rebuilding their society. The U.N. did not, however, consider human rights monitoring or protection to be among its mission priorities in Somalia” (HRW, 1995 b).

### *Disarmament*

Disarmament was one of the crucial concerns of UNOSOM II, which was transitioned from UNITAF mission. Based on the Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia, engaged parties pledged to disarm within 90 days. The Security Council demand to the disarmament of the parties in many resolutions, which escalated in

UNOSOM II pursuing coercive measures encompassing the active patrolling, weapons confiscations. The new mandate, however, represented a challenge to General Aideed power based on the arms of his supporters (Patman, 1997). Thus, when UNOSOM II attempted to implement the disarmament procedures, it resulted in increasing tensions and violence conducted against peacekeepers, as described above. Nonetheless, even these efforts were not sufficient as there was not any recognizable authority, thus the disarming was elusive. Consequently, armed attacks persisted, which indicates a failure in the disarmament task.

To conclude, it is difficult to evaluate new mission tasks, as most of them could not be fulfilled. The main priority for both UNOSOM I and II was to provide humanitarian assistance in which both failed, similarly in regard to human rights which is closely related. Later, UNOSOM II was mandated by new mission goal – disarmament, however, despite all moderate and coercive attempts, the mission was not able to effectively disarm the combatants, thus armed clashes have been still present in the country. Lastly, UNOSOM II was mandated to provide assistance to Somalis with the country's reconstruction. At this point, we can observe a little progress, as the mission re-established several police offices in the country and attempted to establish the Transitional National Council. However, the extensive accomplishment of the task was not possible due to combatants' unwillingness to participate in a political settlement and peacekeepers' inability to guide the parties toward stable peace agreement resolving their disputes.

#### **4.3.1.1.1. Supplementary Discussion**

In assessing (the lack of) success of a peace mission, it is essential to do so from various actors' perspectives. Thus, from the perspective of the international community, including the UN, NGOs who participated on humanitarian relief and other (regional) organizations, whose primary interest is to restore or maintain security and provide of human rights, the operation undoubtedly failed. During its three years of presence in the country, the peace mission was not able to either restore peace either protect civilians. Furthermore, evaluating success from the perspective of civilians, the mission is also a failure as it was not able to provide their security and basic needs, reduce abuses, forced displacement or exploitation.

UNOSOM I and II were not successful either from short term perspective, as they were unable to stop violence and human suffering, either from a long-time perspective as the war still occurs in Somalia. In the light of mandate fulfilment regarding humanitarian assistance, peacekeepers initially supposed to create a secure environment allowing to deliver the relief safely, nonetheless, UNOSOM could not ensure such environment. Lastly, the missions had several unintended consequences. The UN military efforts to enforce disarmament brought many civilian casualties, moreover, combatants used civilians as human shields, thus it was difficult to identify combatants from civilians. Furthermore, due to the lack of food supplies and economic opportunities, women and children are forced to sell their bodies for prostitution in exchange for food, to survive (The Nordic Africa Institute, 2009). In addition, the inability to protect humanitarian relief which has been looted or stolen, provided benefits to warlords, as they could exchange these supplies for weapons, thus gained more power.

#### **4.4. Somalia in the Aftermath of UNOSOM I and II**

After the withdrawal of UNOSOM II forces from Somalia in 1995, many NGOs ceased their operations and evacuated their personnel due to security. The separated entities of Somaliland and Puntland with a high degree of autonomy hindered to the unification of Somalia, and successful governance has been ensured through the rule of clans. With the lack of central government and terrorists, warlords, militias controlling the ground and pirates controlled the sea, fighting in the country continued to the early 2000s. Based on the Nairobi Peace Accords the Transitional Federal Government was established in 2004, nevertheless, it fell apart a few years later due to infighting and factionalism. The plan of these formations was built upon the power-sharing principle, aiming to mitigate tensions between clans. Although this might be a success, the clashes between the Islamic nature of the government and Christian-dominated West. Furthermore, Ethiopia entered the conflict, which even escalated the situation.

However, the opposition against new government resulted in armed conflict in 2006, the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts restored order and law in Mogadishu by disarming combatants, removing roadblock which made the city safe, since the 1980s (Paul et al., 2014). Consequently, the African Union Mission in Somalia was created in 2007 in order to establish and maintain peace and is still present in the country. Nonetheless, AMISOM did not prevent

the emergence of the Islamist extremist group al-Shabab constituted major insurgent group in Somalia which controlled the important part of the country. AMISOM troops increased their capabilities, but al-Shabab remains control some part of Somalia. In June 2013, the UN mission called UNSOM was established in order to the assistance of the Federal Government of Somalia (Eklöw and Krampe, 2019). Recently, the United States, during their mission targeted members of al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda by airstrikes, however, it resulted in two killed civilians (Aljazeera, 2020). Additionally, in 2020, the elections were scheduled on November which would constitute a milestone on the Somali was to security. Nevertheless, the elections were postponed because the “[...] political differences, insecurity, flooding and COVID-19 have hampered the commission’s work schedule” (Maruf, 2020). Thus, the elections were rescheduled to 2021.

## **5. The Conflict in Liberia and the Deployment of UNOMIL (1993-1997)**

In the nineteenth century, Liberia became the homeland for freed slaves from the United States and one of the oldest states in Africa. Nonetheless, the integration of the former American slaves had critical consequences to the local society, due to their domination stemming from gained experiences overseas. In this regard, Liberia has experienced several coups as a demonstration of dissatisfaction, oppression and tense relationship between both entities. Hence, in 1980, William R. Tolbert’s government, was after nine years overthrew in a bloody coup, initiated by Samuel K. Doe, in order to end the domination of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy, ruling the country for many decades (Sesay, 1996).

Thereafter, Doe became the first indigenous president of Liberia, and the euphoria over the end of the rule of Americo-Liberian dominance was prevailing. However, the following years were defined by many putsch attempts, due to Doe’s military regime, characterized by reign of terror, economic decline and widespread corruption. In 1985, the Doe’s military regime was compelled to hold the elections, by both domestic and external pressures, expressing their long dissatisfaction with his rule. The results were, however, manipulated in favour of Doe, who was elected as a new civilian leader. Consequently, it led to another coup attempt, conducted by General Thomas Quiwonkpa. Nonetheless, the attempt was repulsed by the



Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and resulted in the brutal murder of Quiwonkpa and his ethnic kinsmen. Moreover, Samuel Doe disposed the opposition and thus forestalled any potential assaults against his rule, hence, this counter-insurgency strategy was a sign of other years of terror and brutality in Liberia (Toure, 2002).

### **5.1. Origins and Circumstances of the Civil War in Liberia**

In 1989, a hope lightened when Charles Taylor and his rebel group the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded the country. In response, the AFL with Doe in charge, resorted to cruel assaults against civilians in Nimba Country, home of the NPFL rebels. This decision was, however, retaliated by the NPFL and produced mass killing of Krahn and Mandingos<sup>24</sup> civilians, thus from the initial purpose to overthrow Doe's regime, the civil war based on ethnic diversity emerged. Furthermore, Taylor had captured over 90 percent of the country, the attacks were still prevailing, and the number of casualties increased. Hence, the West African Force (WAF) decided to intervene in order to bring peace in Liberia. However, the WAF was immediately engaged in fighting and was not able to prevent torture and murder of one of the main protagonists – Samuel Doe in 1990. Nevertheless, a ceasefire negotiated in Mali represented the first step to the peace agreement, the Yamoussoukro IV Accord<sup>25</sup> signed in 1991. The Yamoussoukro Accord was violated within a year when Taylor attacked and besieged Monrovia (Sesay, 1996). The origins of Liberian civil war are multidimensional and rooted in unresolved questions in history, thus, it is not possible to determine one cause, which led to the outbreak of the war. However, I will strive to outline the most significant of them.

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<sup>24</sup> Author's note: Samuel K. Doe was member of the Krahn ethnic group. Further, Mandingos was considered as the main group supporting Doe's regime.

<sup>25</sup> The agreement was signed in Yamoussoukro, supervised by the Committee of Five of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and included a plan for encampment of the troops and disarming procedures (Derecho Internacional, 2010).

### **5.1.1. Internal Factors**

#### **Ethnicity and Social Diversity**

In the case of Liberia, ethnicity, which affected social diversity, had a crucial role in the Liberian civil war. As it was mentioned before, the American Colonization Society<sup>26</sup> viewed Liberia as the new home for freed slaves returning to Africa, later called the Americo-Liberian. Since then, the tensions between the local population and the black immigrants occurred. The Americo-Liberians were influenced by the Western traditions and culture which discriminated the local population, as they were perceived as backward. Affected by the Western principles, the Americo-Liberians established their dominance in the colony and demanded more autonomy, which resulted in the creation of the Republic based on the American example. Therefore, the social, political and economic aspects in the country were under the control of the Americo-Liberian elite, until 1980. During the period of the Americo-Liberian rule, the local population was oppressed and exploited (Van Walraven, 1999). They were essentially discredited to participate in the political process due to strict qualification of right to vote based on their properties. Furthermore, in the 1970s the economic situation due to the oil crisis and long-term issues of the oppressed indigenous population triggered dissatisfaction in the country, which escalated in a coup in 1980. In addition, the clashes among ethnic diversity prevailed, and the civil war was fought based on the ethnic group selection.

#### **Political Environment and Economic Situation**

The coup conducted by Samuel Doe in 1980 was perceived as a new hope for the indigenous Liberian population, new opportunities and termination of the dominance of the Americo-Liberian elites. Nevertheless, Doe created a military regime, in which there was no equality as expected because he favoured merely members of the same ethnic group. Hence, there was no opposition, as any attempt was brutally punished. The putsch in Liberia and widespread corruption discouraged foreign investors from cooperation with Doe's government and consequently led to the flourishing criminal activities in the country. Furthermore, the close

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<sup>26</sup> Author's note: the American Colonization Society was an organization established to provide assistance with voluntary migration of freed American slaves back to Africa.

relationship between Liberia and the United States worsened as well, however, in the light of the Cold war, the US remains Liberia's largest donor of financial aid despite the image of the country (Sesay, 1996). The corrupted government brought the country bankruptcy and, in spite of the US efforts to restore the Liberian economy, the United States abandoned Liberia. Moreover, the US approach continued after the overthrow of Doe's regime, as Charles Taylor's intentions were dubious.

#### **5.1.1.1. External Factor**

##### **The Role of the US Involvement**

The involvement of the United States was already described above, hence this paragraph will cover additional facts. The United States has played a significant role in Liberia's economy and politics since its establishment. The settlers were proud of their American heritage, including Christianity, culture and American-style governmental institutions which differentiate them from indigenous "tribal" people. Also, the gained independence which makes Liberia the oldest Africa's republic under the umbrella of diplomatic protection from the United States, helped the country to outlast colonial partition. Another crucial development for politics came with the 99-year lease. Moreover, the American investments, for instance, the lease of land for rubber plantation represented one of the primary sources of state's incomes. Nevertheless, Liberia's government was later criticized for its imprudent spending on imported good which ensured elites to aspire to an American lifestyle, instead to invest into infrastructure or education in rural areas (Ellis, 1999: 49). Further, "US interests in Liberia have always been tied to the large military and intelligence apparatus based there: satellite communications installations and a radio relay station. Liberia's Freeport also served strategic purposes for US Marines and naval vessel" (Sesay, 1996). Thus, the impact of the United States is apparent.

#### **5.1.1.1.1. Contributing Factors**

##### **Youth Crisis and External Support**

Youth crisis and inability of the government to provide chances on the youth's participation in ordinary social life was an uncommon issue among most of the African countries. Many young men, dissatisfied with the situation in the country which did not provide them with any opportunities and social status, were influenced by left-wing radical learning and instigated their escape in order to seek for better conditions (Van Walraven, 1999). In the case of Liberia, many young men fled to neighbouring states which recruited them and even children for a guerrilla war against Samuel Doe. Also, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso provided them military training, education, weapons and money. On the other side, Nigeria and the United States were providing covert support to Samuel Doe (Sesay, 1996).

## **5.2. The Response of the International Community and the Deployment of UNOMIL**

### *The Response of the International Community and Peace Efforts*

The response of the international community was not like expected. Based on the good relationship between Liberia and the United States, were anticipated to intervene even before the war erupted in the country, as a pre-emptive action. Nevertheless, the US stated, the Liberian war required no direct intervention, as it is subject to internal affairs. Hence, in August 1990, a few of the ECOWAS countries decided to intervene in Liberia, which was highly supported despite no ECOWAS experiences with the peacekeeping mission. The siege of Monrovia prompted ECOWAS reaction and started with the role of mediator aiming to negotiate a ceasefire and a political resolution. Consequently, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established in order to monitor a ceasefire and keep the peace after such agreement. The operation was composed of forces from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Gambia (Adibe, 1997). The mandate included both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. "ECOMOG's overall strategy was for its conventional military force to intimidate the three

factions while an interim government tried to resolve political differences and prepare Liberia for peaceful elections” (Howe, 1996). The impartiality of ECOMOG forces is arguable as they intervened against opposition from Taylor, who perceived the mission as invasive and vowed to attack it, thus the force could no longer remain neutral.

Hence, the deployment of the mission was then viewed as a “rescue attempt” of Doe’s regime. The negotiating efforts resulted in two landmarks. Firstly, the interim government of Liberia was established, although its power was limited. Secondly, signing the agreement Yamoussoukro IV Accord, mentioned above, which was, however, violated by Charles Taylor and his rebel group. Nonetheless, ECOMOG did not bring any substantial progress in peace effort in Liberia due to the lack of experiences and financial support. Additionally, a several issues were leading to failure of the mission – it was deployed without the authorization of the Security Council, which jeopardized the UN primacy of the field of PKOs; it was deployed without consent of conflicting parties; the impartiality of ECOMOG was doubtful regarding Nigeria’s participation on the mission, as one of the supporters of Doe’s regime (Bellamy et al., 2010: 316).

#### *UNOMIL Deployment and its Mandate*

The Liberian conflict came to a stalemate. Thus, the United Nations decided to take action in 1992 and resolution 788 (1992) called upon parties involved to an immediate ceasefire and imposed an embargo on weapon deliveries in the country under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Subsequently, the Secretary-General proposed three main areas in which could the United Nations assist in Liberia: humanitarian assistance, electoral assistance and political reconciliation. In June 1993, many of civilians were killed in attack near Harbel city. The Security Council condemned the assault and stressed the solution of the conflict. A month after the massacre, the Cotonou Peace Agreement was signed in Benin, in August 1993, revising the outcomes of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, stressing ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization and holding the elections. Moreover, the Agreement settled the establishment of the Liberian National Transitional Government, provision of general elections within seven months, delivery of humanitarian assistance through Liberia and ensure the return of refugees and their reintegration facilitated by the UNHCR (United Nations, n).

UNOMIL was established in September 1993 by resolution 866 (1993), to cooperate with ECOMOG in supervising the implementation of Cotonou Agreement; monitor and verify the electoral process; assist in humanitarian assistance activities (UN SC resolution 866). The strength of UNOMIL was over 300 military observers, volunteers and international staff. After the mission's arrival to Liberia, the Committees on Ceasefire Monitoring was created and besides ceasefire monitoring, cooperated with ECOMOG on the research required for further planned demobilization and disarmament procedures. Furthermore, in December 1993, Liberian parties resumed to the negotiation regarding the creation of the transitional government, but they were unable to agree on division ministerial posts and beginning of the demobilization, disarmament and encampment. Nonetheless, the strengthening both UNOMIL's and ECOMOG's capabilities brought progress in consultation on the date for disarmament, the transitional government was installed with the set a date for elections and UNOMIL developed plans for the reintegration of the ex-combatants into society and demobilization procedures which later commenced. Moreover, "[i]t was reported that the total number of combatants of all factions was approximately 60,000 soldiers. In the first month of disarmament, more than 2,000 combatants, from all parties, were disarmed and demobilized" (United Nations, n).

Despite a little positive progress on institutional building and disarming and demobilizing programmes, fighting in the country still occurred. The dispute among ethnic lines arose in ULIMO<sup>27</sup> and resulted in the outbreak of violence in the western and eastern part of the country, which significantly affected a peace process, all efforts to end hostilities were not successful. The warring parties refused to participate on disarmament. In three months since the beginning of the demobilization process, only 3,192 combatants had been demobilized (United Nations, n). The situation even deteriorated, as fighting shifted in the south-east region, the harassment of civilians and the unarmed UN military observers and there was the increasing number of displaced people. Nonetheless, a cooperation of UNOMIL and ECOMOG brought warring parties to the negotiation table and as a result, the Akosombo Agreement, urging immediate ceasefire and reinforcing the Cotonou Agreement, was signed in September 1994. For the Akosombo Agreement was no progress toward its implementation, thus the fighting it

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<sup>27</sup> The United Liberation Movement was established to remove Taylor and its rebel group from Liberia.

the country continued, warlord strived to acquire more territory to add to their power claims, which resulted in many civilian casualties, insecurity and cessation of humanitarian aid which was impossible to deliver.

Consequently, UNOMIL was not able to pursue the mandated activities, and ECOMOG could not ensure its security. Hence, UNOMIL personnel was evacuated except the team operating in the Monrovia area, and the UN capacities were reduced. The Security-General, nevertheless, emphasized the importance of the UNOMIL presence in the country and extended its mandate by resolution (UN SC resolution 950). In addition, the humanitarian situation in Liberia was alarming due to insecurity in the country. In June, an estimated number of people in need was 1.5 million of which 1.1 were receiving humanitarian assistance, and by August, the estimated number increased to 1.8 people in need (United Nations, n). In regard to a peace negotiation, which would end human suffering in the country, the Accra Agreement was signed, clarifying the Akosombo Agreement and pledging parties to ceasefire. However, the prevailing fighting caused the extension of UNOMIL mandate by resolutions 972, 985 and 1001 (1995) which stressed the embargo acted under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter imposed on all military supplies to the country, anchored in resolution 788 and, in addition, expressed hope of implementation of Accra Agreement as soon as possible.

Furthermore, another peace agreement was signed in Abuja in August 1995, covering comprehensive ceasefire, DDR programme and the humanitarian situation consequently improved, as it provided reopening of closed routes and cut-off locations. Also, there was an increasing number estimated 50,000 to 60,000 of disarmed and demobilized combatants (United Nations, n). In the aftermath of a positive period of several improvements, the situation in Liberia worsened again due to implementation of the Agreement being behind its schedule and serious ceasefire violations. Therefore, the UNOMIL mandate was extended again, in order to assist with the Liberian peace process, DDR programmes and humanitarian assistance. In 1996, was the Abuja Agreement revised and signed again. Therefore, UNOMIL and ECOMOG prepared a complete plan for elections, which were held in June 1997, and the new government has been installed. Thereafter, UNOMIL terminated.

### **5.3. Evaluation of UNOMIL**

Before I proceed the evaluation of (the lack of) success of UNOMIL operation, it is necessary to note, that the outcomes will be affected by the ECOWAS-UN close dependent partnership, as UNOMIL mission was dependent on ECOMOG capabilities and enforcement measures. Also, there is no particularised list of activities strictly performed by the UN or ECOWAS.

#### **5.3.1. Core Goals**

Violence abatement will be firstly assessed according to the presence of violence in the country after the mission's deployment, thus peace duration and emergence of the new crisis. UNOMIL was deployed in September 1993, two months after the Cotonou Agreement was signed and in which was the UN heavily involved. In April 1994, the new crisis occurred within the leadership of ULIMO and their dispute over the ethnic lines (United Nations, n). Although the peace duration was somewhat longer in comparison to the examined cases, the conflict spread to the other part of the country, involving and killing more civilians. Moreover, during the UNOMIL deployment, the crises reoccurred as the mission was not able to effectively implement peace agreements in order to enable sustainable ceasefire. Hence, due to ceasefire violations, the fighting, attacks against civilians and their exploitation persisted.

Conflict containment at the level of actors, there were initially the AFL and NPFL fighting for their objectives. Nonetheless, in some time, the NPFL forces have started to split into fractions based on their ethnicity, pursuing slightly diverse objectives. For instance, the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO); the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) or Lofa Defence Force (LDF). Thus, the number of involved actors increased. Furthermore, at the geographic level, the conflict spread from Monrovia to the western and eastern part of the country. The geographical spread might be connected with the emergence of additional fractions composed according to the ethnic lines, as the specific ethnic group lives in a different part of the country. Furthermore, the conflict-affected the neighbouring countries, for instance, in 1995, "[...] the conflict between the LPC and NPFL spread to Cote d'Ivoire. Dozens of people were killed, including Ivorians, and between 16,000 and 35,000 refugees fled into Cote d'Ivoire to escape from the fighting" (Amnesty International, 1996). Simultaneously, the civil war in Liberia had a contributory impact on the eruption of the war in Sierra Leone in 1991 (Jang, 2012).



Figure 12: Map of Liberia



Source: United Nations, Map of Liberia (<https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/liberia.pdf>).

Regarding the related casualties, the data will be provided as well as in the previous cases. Furthermore, one year prior, the mission’s deployment is included in order to observe the increase or decrease of casualties after the mission’s deployment. In the case of Liberia, one might observe, that the number of casualties did not significantly decrease during the UNOMIL presence, however, the turn came in last year of the mandate, in 1997.

**Figure 13: Summary of the three estimates of casualties in Liberia**

	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>
<b>Low estimate</b>	453	2569	4166	2290	1438	13
<b>Best estimate</b>	453	2569	4167	2290	3091	13
<b>High estimate</b>	2109	2793	5165	2329	4096	13

Source: Author according to Sundberg and Melander, 2013.

Conflict settlement as the last of the core goals refers to the mission’s ability to resolve the conflict. In Liberia, many peace efforts occurred, however, the peace agreement was never fully implemented. A significant success was the second Abuja Agreement, according to which the elections were held in the country, and the new government was installed (United Nations, n). Nonetheless, the success of the Agreement was only short-lived, as it did not bring a complex political resolution and the second Liberian war erupted in 1999. Therefore, similarly as in the case of Somalia, there is not possible to evaluate provisions implementation and supplementary data, as there was no long-lasting agreement during the mission’s deployment which would address all grievances and disputes between the parties. According to Armon and Carl (1996), peace efforts and agreements in Liberia failed because of several reasons. Firstly, the accords were seeking to accommodate the requirements of the parties rather than focus on

flourishing the civic and political institutions. Thus, the accords have been vulnerable regarding the arising new and proxy factions. These factions usually have not been signatories of any agreement, hence, they were not obligated to adhere to any arrangements resulting from agreements. Secondly, all agreements omitted to stress the vested interests benefiting from the anarchic status quo, which could be prevented by the establishment of mechanism monitoring embargoes on illegal trade. Thirdly, post-Cotonou peace efforts were misguided as with provided increased power to factions in executive processes of the transitional government, and the parties hesitated to establish a mechanism to resolve their disputes over the ambiguity of the provisions' interpretation. In addition, parties were reluctant to disarmament processes in order to protect their interests, which was fuelled by lack of the international condemnation of faction leaders and shortfalls and delays of the deployment of military observers in Liberia (Armon and Carl, 1996). Nevertheless, it is needed to say that in 2003 was signed the Accra Peace Agreement, which ended the second Liberian war. The overall implementation score after ten years is, according to the Kroc Institute, 87.65 percent (Kroc Institute, b).

**Figure 14: UNOMIL - Evaluation of the Core Goals**

<b>Goal</b>	<b>Evaluation</b>
Violence Abatement	Prevailing failure
Conflict Containment	Failure
Conflict Settlement	Failure

Source: Author according to the framework by Diehl and Druckman.

**5.3.1.1. New Mission Goals**

Apart from the tasks of traditional peacekeeping such as monitoring ceasefire, UNOMIL mandate in cooperation with ECOMOG included the new mission goals covering the election supervision, provision of humanitarian assistance and DDR.

### *Election Supervision*

Holding the elections was anchored in several peace agreements, however, the elections were often postponed. Finally, based on the Abuja Agreement, were held in July 1997. UNOMIL electoral mandate was to observe and verify the whole electoral process in cooperation with ECOWAS. The first team of peacekeeping observers were deployed to observe the preparation of political campaigns and voter registration procedures carried out by the electoral authorities in different parts of Liberia. Also, about 200 international personnel were deployed to observe the elections itself (United Nations, p). Furthermore, UNOMIL and ECOWAS have created a Joint Coordination mechanism to conduct following tasks: “1) to ensure that all operational requirements are met and that the process itself remains operationally on track; 2) coordinating the deployment, logistics, and security arrangements for international observers; 3) identifying gaps and needs in the electoral process; and 4) jointly certifying whether the election is free and fair” (United Nations, p). Apart from the initial mandate, the mission helped with all logistical and coordination support to Liberia’s Independent Elections Commission and provided civic information about the electoral process and voters registration. Additionally, the Secretary-General specified the criteria for the Liberian elections to be free and fair, encompassing the security and freedom from movement and intimidation; unrestricted access of all political parties to the media; the secrecy of the ballot and the credibility regarding the voter education campaign. Moreover, to ensure credibility and efficiency of the Independent Elections Commission, including successful completion of ballots in time; proper distribution of ballots to cover the voting population and accuracy of the count.

In the assessment process, the indicator refers to the participation of citizens in an election. The number of registered voters was estimated about 750,000 and the voter’s turnout by over 80 % (CNN, 1997). Fourteen parties competed in the elections, however, the official results refers to the victory of the National Patriotic Party (NPP) by 75.3 %, followed by the Unity Party (UP) by 9.6 %, the Alliance by 2.6 % and the United People’s Party (UPP) by 2.5 %. Also, Charles Taylor was elected as president of Liberia by 76 % (The Carter Center, 1997). Furthermore, according to the Carter Center, no clashes, attacks or intimidation occurred during the elections, hence these elections are perceived as one of the most legitimate, free and fair.

## *Democratization*

Democratization might be evaluated based on the voter's participation in successive elections in the country. After the election in 1997, Taylor's regime slowly became autocratic and erupted in the second Liberian war in 1999. The war ended in 2003, and other elections were held in 2005. The number of registered voters was about 90 % and turnout 74.9 % of registered voters (The Carter Center, 2017). By results, the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC), the Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia (COTOL) and the Liberty Party (LP) were the major parties who won the elections (African Elections Database). Furthermore, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected as president of Liberia, as the first woman president in Africa. In the subsequent election in 2011, the turnout was 71.6 % of registered voters, and the results brought a victory and mostly represented in the House of Representatives to the Unity Party (UP); the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) and the Liberty Party (LP) (The Carter Center, 2017; African Elections Database). Last elections held in 2017, obtained turnout by 72.5 % and the victory of the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC); The Unity Party (UP) and Independents (The Carter Center, 2017). Moreover, Liberia cooperates with the US programmes providing assistance on institution building and reforms, enhancing the country's economy. In addition, the euphoria over free and fair elections and potential step forward in democratic process prevail among voters (The Carter Center, 2018). One might observe, that although many political parties are participating in elections, they are dominated by major three recurring parties.

According to the Freedom House index, Liberia is nowadays rated as "partly free" with 60 points out of 100, consisting of 27 points out of 40 regarding political rights and 33 points out of 60 regarding civil liberties (Freedom House, e). The lowest-rated component concerns the issue of human trafficking for prostitution and forced labour, predominantly children working on the harsh conditions in diamond mines. In addition, the problems are visible also at the level of corruption, especially the independent judiciary and police forces affected by political interference and bribes.

In the light of the Transparency International corruption perceptions index, Liberia’s score is 28 points out of 100, while 0 means that the country is highly corrupt and 100 is viewed as “clean”. The rank referring to the position of the country compared to all countries included in the index, Liberia is placed on 137th position out of 180 examined countries which indicates the worst corrupt situation (Transparency International, c). Also, 53 % of public service users paid a bribe in the previous year.

Lastly, one might also take into account the absence of a coup attempt which indicated the success of democratization. In this case, however, the coup to overthrow president Taylor caused the second Liberian war erupted, two years after the mission’s withdrawal. Therefore, according to the criteria by Diehl and Druckman, fulfilling the goal of democratization is a prevailing failure.

**Figure 15: General Elections in Liberia**

	<b>1997</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2017</b>
<b>Registered Voters</b>	N/A	92.29 %	94.01 %	94.14 %
<b>Voter Turnout</b>	Est. 80 %	74.9 %	71.6 %	72.5 %

Source: Author according to The Carter Center, 2017; 2018 and IDEA,b (<https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/173/40>).

*Humanitarian Assistance and Human Rights Protection*

UNOMIL and ECOMOG had to deal with a serious humanitarian crisis in 1994. Estimated number of people in need was 1.5 million, later increased to 1.8 million, and only 1.1 million people were receiving humanitarian assistance (United Nations, n). Also, the slow pace of the peace process affected displaced persons and refugees who were not able to return to Liberia. Further, the situation was even worsened when the warring parties cut-off locations from the

humanitarian aid and interrupted the critical roads for its delivery. There were no sufficient capabilities to protect and facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid. Additionally, due to a slow peace process, ceasefire violation and continued fighting, the mission was not able to protect civilians.

In 1993 annual report submitted by the Amnesty International, the organization stressed the wide range of human right abuses were committed in Liberia by various parties, including arbitrary killing, execution, detention without charge and torture. Civilians in Monrovia were subjected to harassment and looting by ULIMO and AFL parties, resulting in execution thousands of civilians and many more were taken and imprisoned, including children (Amnesty International, 1993 a). Furthermore, the Amnesty International report concerned continuing deliberate killings of civilians committed by all parties involved in the civil war. In June 1993, forces allied with the interim government massacred about 600 people, mainly children, women and the elderly (Amnesty International, 1994).

These forces also conducted hundreds of extrajudicial executions, continued to beat, detain, rob and kill civilians without any punishment. Displaced people seeking for shelter were often killed or imprisoned, tortured and otherwise ill-treated based on their ethnic origins and (un)willingness to join the armed group. The fighting increased in 1994, hence the incidents and civilians killing increased simultaneously, cases of cannibalism; ritual killings and torture by burning with a heated machete were reported (Amnesty International, 1995).

Furthermore, many cases massacres of civilians persisted, based on their ethnic origins and suspicion of supporting the opposition parties, many of them were beaten, raped or used as slaves to labour. Moreover, the Human Right Watch Report claimed in 1994, that “[u]nfortunately, the U.N. is reluctant to discuss human rights abuses, for fear of derailing the peace process. [...] By avoiding the human rights issues, the U.N. is failing to discharge its mandate in Liberia” (HRW, 1994). Since 1989 until 1995, the estimated number of deaths caused by the civil war in the country was about 150,000 and about 700,000 people were uprooted from their homes (Amnesty International, 1996). In 1995, the light of new hope for Liberia ignited with the Abuja Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, attacks on civilians continued, fighters abused them, burned their villages and prevented them from receiving humanitarian assistance which caused that 43 percent of children under the age of eleven suffered from malnutrition in several parts of the country in 1995 (HRW, 1996). Furthermore, in the following

year, the humanitarian situation was still grave, and progress in implementation of the peace agreement arrangements was uncertain and still postponed by actors involved.

### *DDR*

The official UN document concerning the issues, challenges and lessons learned of DDR practices emphasized the importance of building trust and confidence between warring parties and struggles blocking the political will. Moreover, in the absence of any peace agreement, the attention must focus on strategy development between the parties and in remaining hostile environment aim to reveal the motivation of the actors to hold arms (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010). The demobilization and disarmament processes faced with the long-term struggle of their implementation, which was caused by persisting insecurity in the country and unwillingness of the parties. However, there were two DDR processes in the ten-year period in Liberia. The first series of attempts was initiated in 1994 regarding the Cotonou Agreement signed in 1993, nonetheless, the process was shortly aborted due to resumed violence between Charles Taylor and his former allied factions.

In the subsequent period of almost two years, the intensive fighting continued in Liberia, until the Abuja Agreement in 1995 which simultaneously brought some hopes for renewed DDR programmes anchored in the agreement. UNOMIL was mandated to assist with demobilization and disarmament procedures, however, the implementation hampered the difficult situation on the field, including some logistical and financial constraints. Consequently, as these processes were depended on the donors' support, which took a long time to proceed and granted, the offices concerning the DDR programmes and database were looted and destroyed, thus the process of implementation was delayed. Finally, "[t]he 1996 DDDR program was implemented in three stages. The first stage involved disarming, registering, interviewing and counseling ex-fighters. Stage two involved the absorption of disarmed combatants into "bridging activities" (that is, work and training programs) to help them gain employable skills. The final stage was reintegration, a longer-term and more complex process" (Jaye, 2009).

Furthermore, weapons and munition were exchanged with ex-combatants for food coupons, rice and canned food. The DDR process was completed in three months, although it



had some weaknesses, for instance, the program focused on gun-carrying combatants which excluded children and women involved; it lacked accountability measures and commitments of leaders to adhere DDR process. Nonetheless, altogether, UNOMIL and ECOMOG achieved disarmament of 20,332 fighters from estimated 33,000 (61.61 %) and about 9,570 weapons, and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were surrendered, during the official disarmament period from November 1996 to February 1997 (United Nations, n). Despite some little positive developments in DDR processes, the situation in Liberia continued to remain very hostile, and war resumed shortly after the victory of Charles Taylor in general elections. The second attempt of DDR procedures was initiated in 2003, based on the Accra Peace Agreement.

**Figure 16: UNOMIL – Evaluation of the New Mission Goals**

Goal	Criteria	Assessment
Election supervision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Voter turnout</li> <li>• Voter registration</li> </ul>	<p>Success</p> <p>Success</p>
Democratization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fair competition among parties</li> <li>• Voter turnout in successive elections</li> <li>• Absence of coup attempt</li> </ul>	<p>Prevailing failure</p> <p>Success</p> <p>Failure</p>
Humanitarian assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability of humanitarian aid protection</li> </ul>	<p>Prevailing failure</p>
Human rights protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduction of human rights abuses</li> <li>• Protection of designated areas</li> </ul>	<p>Failure</p> <p>Failure</p>
DDR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability to demobilize and disarm combatants</li> </ul>	<p>Neither success either unsuccess</p>

Source: Author according to the framework by Diehl and Druckman.

### 5.3.1.1.1. Supplementary Discussion

Diehl and Druckman stressed the importance of success perceived differently among various actors. In the case of Liberia and from the perspective of the international community, this was the first UN mission which cooperated with the regional organization. For the United Nations, UNOMIL objectives were successfully achieved by the installation of government and elections, thus fulfil its mandate. Charles Taylor and his rebel group viewed the mission as invasion and direct aggression against him. Nonetheless, Taylor frequently shifted his opinions and decisions, especially regarding external interference. From this point of view, for Taylor, the mission might be seen successful, as he gained legal authority through elections and became president of Liberia. It is necessary to mention that the usefulness and role of UNOMIL was often challenged due to the parallel tasks with ECOMOG, hence UNOMIL was perceived as purposeless (Adibe, 1997). From the short-time perspective, the operation was not able to stop violence and hostilities. Furthermore, the war recurred within two years. Nevertheless, from the long-time perspective, it brought the Abuja Agreement, which later served as a base for a future political resolution, elections and institutional building.

Similarly, as in the cases above, the presence of peacekeepers contributed to sexual exploitation and abuses. The impact can be exemplified by the rising criminal activities, drug incidents and health costs. Women, who found themselves in a critical situation due to their economic situation, at the edge of starvation and other depressing living conditions, force them to transactional sex in order to survive. Moreover, “[p]eacekeepers’ participation in transactional sex and abusive sexual relationships has resulted in the ‘Ecobabies’ and ‘UNOMIL babies’ phenomenon, whereby over 30,000 children have been fathered by officers and civilians from the ECOMOG and UNOMIL missions” (Aning and Edu-Affil, 2013). The unintended consequences were visible also on the Liberian economy during the mission, as the peacekeeping money circulation increased imports of alcohol, rice and other goods, which deviated the balance of the Liberian trade.

#### **5.4. Liberia in the Aftermath of UNOMIL**

In 1999, within two years after UNOMIL withdrawal, the second civil war erupted in Liberia. The causes of war recurrence are accounted to the failure of transitional activities – disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and inability to react to the roots of the first civil war. These failures were fuelled by Taylor’s regime, full of rights violation, violation of civil liberties, economic and social issues. Hence, the support of Taylor’s regime significantly declined, and the tensions between the regime and the rival warlords simultaneously increased (Kieh, 2009). Subsequently, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) initiated the war. In 2003, Taylor fled to Nigeria and the peace agreement was later signed in Accra. Thereafter, the United Nations Mission in Liberia was established in 2003 in order to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and assist in a peace process and terminated in 2018 due to proven security situation. Furthermore, in 2012, Charles Taylor was jailed for fifty years as “[h]e was found responsible for aiding and abetting some of the most heinous and brutal crimes in recorded history” (Escritt and Deutsch, 2012). Nowadays, Liberia is one of the poorest countries in the world, depended on foreign investments.

### **6. Evaluation of the Outcomes of Second-generation Operations With Chapter VII mandates**

The presented cases of the peacekeeping operations essentially deployed right after the end of the Cold war were the first “trials” dealing with new challenges, encompassing types of conflicts, warfare and strategy. Nevertheless, the new challenges required revision of the UN procedures and measures, which was often underestimated or inconveniently employed. The examined peacekeeping operations were facing complex deeply rooted causes of the conflict, for instance, ethnicity, historical grievances of fighting over resources. In the final evaluation of the outcomes of these missions will be proceeded by obtained assessment, according to success in goal accomplishment, designated by Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman.

## **6.1. Evaluation of Core Goals**

### **Violence Abatement**

Overall evaluation of violence abatement through the examined missions is not positive. Regarding the case of Bosnia, the civil war in the country broke out within a month after the UNPROFOR deployment in Croatia, thus the violence was not merely present, and it even increased its intensity. Peacekeepers were not able to effectively monitor and supervise the agreed ceasefire, thus they were violated promptly, and hostilities persisted even within the UNPAs. Nonetheless, the Dayton Agreement raised hopes of the final ending of the violence, which was more or less fulfilled. Furthermore, the Somali case is even more dissatisfactory. Peacekeepers were deployed to the country in which there was no peace to keep, essentially. Although several ceasefire agreements were negotiated, they were immediately violated or were not implemented at all. Therefore, the new crises emerged, resulting in an increased number of human rights abuses and civilian casualties. Moreover, the UN personnel was frequently attacked by warring parties which eventually escalated in fatalities of peacekeepers. Hence, the failure to decrease the level of violence or even achieve total absence is visible. In the case of Liberia, the mission was the first example of the UN cooperation with a regional organization in peacekeeping tasks. The UN operation was already involved in negotiating efforts which resulted in the Cotonou Peace Agreement before its presence in the country. Moreover, after the mission's deployment, there was a period without any greater crisis. This might indicate a little success compared to Bosnia and Somalia, however, the immense crisis emerged within a few weeks and Liberia fell into mass violence again. Additionally, despite the Abuja Agreement which brought lesser fighting, the second civil war erupted within two years, and hostilities continued.

### **Conflict Containment**

Concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR was at the level of actors involved did not prevent Serbia from supplying the Bosnian Serbs who gained an advantage in fighting. At the geographical level, hostilities did not reach other states, such as Macedonia which was afraid

of spreading the conflict on its territory. Nevertheless, the war spread across Bosnia, when into the protected areas by the United Nations. Thus, the success is only partial in regard to the geographic level, as the war did not spill over to the neighbouring states. Regarding the missions operating in Somalia, geographically, the Somali conflict was limited mostly in the south part of the country. The north of the country remained relatively stable, due to declared independence and local autonomy. Notwithstanding, the geographic limitation of the conflict, the impact of the UN missions is disputable. Furthermore, UNOSOM I and II did not prevent Ethiopian interference in the conflict, supporting General Aideed. Finally, in Liberia, new actors emerged as the initial conflicting parties fragmented because of their diverse objectives and ethnicity lines. Simultaneously, the disputed spread from the capital of Liberia to the western and eastern parts of the country. Hence, the mission was not successful in regard to the conflict containment.

### **Conflict Settlement**

Bosnia and Herzegovina has experienced several peace efforts, negotiations, ceasefires which were not successful until the Dayton Peace Agreement, which predominantly ended the greatest hostilities in the country. Thus, the Agreement represents success after the failed attempts, moreover, the war has not reoccurred in Bosnia, which can also indicate the success of the conflict settlement. In addition, most of the arrangements resulting from the Agreement were successfully implemented. In comparison, conflict settlement in Somalia was an apparent failure. Notwithstanding the peace efforts, the country never achieved a satisfactory peace agreement which would resolve all the roots of the civil war in Somalia. Nonetheless, if the Agreement was signed, the process of implementation has never been fulfilled as the conflicting parties hesitated to its installation. The Liberian case, the peace efforts resulted in several peace agreements, nonetheless, none of them was fully implemented either. The Abuja Agreement was viewed as a success but merely short-lived as the war resumed within a few years later. Thus, the mission was not able to fully undermine the roots of the conflict and resolve them.

Hence, the overall evaluation of the accomplishment of core goals across the examined missions in prevailing failure. Although there are some successes regarding ending the worst mass

violence through many peace agreements or preventing spreading of violence, these successes were often just short-lived, and the hostilities continued or at worst, war reoccurred.

## **6.2. Evaluation of New Mission Goals**

Apart from the traditional tasks of peacekeeping missions, the examined second-generation operations shared common new mission goals. For instance, election supervision; democratization; humanitarian assistance; human right protection; demobilization; disarmament and reintegration.

### **Election Supervision**

Apart from the other examined cases, the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were successful. Although some doubts were challenging the fairness of the elections, the results of the first elections in the aftermath of the civil war, the number of voters registered to vote, and real turnout of voters was a success. Furthermore, despite some serious disputes, intimidation and manipulative practices, the Provisional Election Commission declared, that these violations did not affect the electoral process, thus the results were verified. In Somalia, last elections were held in 1969, thus the evaluation is not relevant in this case. Nonetheless, despite that Liberian elections were postponed several times, they were finally held in 1997. The numbers of registered voters and real turnout were high. Moreover, the elections were based on the report free, fair and without and hostilities. Thus, the elections were successful in Liberia.

### **Democratization**

Concerning the absence of coup in Bosnia, which is one of the indicators, the assessment here is a success. Nevertheless, the competition among political parties in successive elections did not occur as the elections in the six following years were dominated by the nationalist parties. Similarly, the number of registered voters was often over a hundred percent, which indicates a potential manipulation with votes. Moreover, there is widespread corruption occurring in the

country. Hence, the process of democratization is dubious. In Somalia, the assessment of democratization lack of indicators for evaluation, as there were no elections or any other determinants. Nonetheless, the country is rated as “not free”, extensively undermined by widespread corruption in the country, no transparency of political process and lack of possibilities for citizens to participate in the process. In comparison, in the case of Liberia, the first indicator – the presence of coup signifies failure in case of Liberia, as the war erupted again in 1999 due dissatisfaction with the regime of Charles Taylor. The successive elections were a success in the regard of the number of registered voters and turnout, however, there were only three main Liberian parties rotated. Also, the country is rated as “partly free” obtaining more points than Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance.

### **Humanitarian Assistance and Human Rights Protection**

UNPROFOR in Bosnia failed in all aspects of evaluating the success of the provision of humanitarian assistance and human rights protection. The indicators consisted of the ability of humanitarian aid protection, genocide avoidance, protection of designated areas and reduction of human rights abuses. Across these determinants, the mission failed as it was not able to protect the majority of the humanitarian aid and safely deliver to the threatened areas, it did not avoid genocide as thousands of the Bosnian Muslims were killed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica massacres, which were, in addition, protected areas designated by the United Nations in order to protect the civilians. Therefore, human rights abuses could not be significantly reduced. Similarly, the case of Somalia does not represent any success in a humanitarian assistance or human right protection. Humanitarian aid was also a target of looting and thefts by warlords and their forces. Moreover, the routes ensuring the delivery were often blocked, thus the relief did not reach the most threatened people, who simultaneously suffer from famine. In addition, the mission was disrupted by focusing on DDR procedures in order to make a safe environment for humanitarian delivery. Additionally, neither UNOMIL was successful in completing this task. The number of people in need was still increasing, and the protracted peace process unenabled refugees and displaced persons to return to Liberia. Hence, it prolonged their poor living conditions and suffering. Additionally, many of critical routes of the humanitarian



delivery were blocked as well in Liberia and UNOMIL had no needed power to obviate the obstacles.

## **DDR**

UNPROFOR was mandated to disarm and demilitarize which supposed to be especially implemented in the UNPAs and “pink zones” established by the mission in order to protect civilians. Nonetheless, of these efforts were successful and the zones were besieged by the Bosnian Serbs who later attacked the areas. Furthermore, local Serbs were not willing to cooperate with the UN forces, which substantially hampered fulfilment of the goal. UNOSOM II was mandated to disarm the combatants, and the expectations of achieving the goal were high. Nonetheless, the efforts of implementation only triggered tensions among parties which escalated in a brutal assault against peacekeepers. Thus, the disarming was elusive, consequently, armed attacks persisted, and any other attempt was accompanied by the deterioration of the situation, which indicates a failure in the disarmament task. In regard to the demobilization and disarmament processes faced with a long-term struggle in their implementation. Although the mission in cooperation with ECOMOG disarmed and demobilized former combatants, the situation remained hostile and later escalated in the second civil war in Liberia. Thus, there is no unambiguous success or unsuccess.

Putting all together, the examined peace operations were rather unsuccessful. Regarding the core goals, missions were not able to effectively prevent or decrease the level of violence, contain the conflict in order to maintain the conflict on the limited area with no additional actors. Also, the conflict settlement was often insufficient, and wars reoccurred as the main roots were not addressed and resolved.

The new mission goals put peacekeepers in new and distinct roles compared to the activities executed in traditional peacekeeping operations. Based on the cases evaluated above, the biggest failure across the missions with the critical consequences was the accomplishment of the humanitarian assistance and protection of human rights. UNPROFOR, UNOSOM I, II and UNOMIL extensively failed in this regard. On the other hand, one might observe a relative success across the missions in holding the elections with a high number of voters participating

in the electoral process. In addition, the (lack of) success among the examined missions is summarized in the figures below.

**Figure 17: Overall Evaluation of Core Goals**

Goal	Missions	Evaluation
Violence Abatement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNPROFOR</li>   <li>• UNOSOM I and II</li> <li>• UNOMIL</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure, until the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, which ended the hostilities</li>   <li>• Failure</li> <li>• Prevailing failure</li> </ul>
Conflict Containment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNPROFOR</li>   <li>• UNOSOM I and II</li>   <li>• UNOMIL</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partly successful on the geographic level, failure on the level of actors involved</li>   <li>• Failure at the level of actors' involvement, Partial success at the geographical level</li>   <li>• Failure</li> </ul>
Conflict Settlement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNPROFOR</li>   <li>• UNOSOM I and II</li> <li>• UNOMIL</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Successful due to the Dayton Agreement</li>   <li>• Failure</li> <li>• Failure</li> </ul>

Source: Author according to the framework by Diehl and Druckman.

**Figure 18: Overall Evaluation of New Mission Goals**

Goal	Missions	Evaluation
Election Supervision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNPROFOR</li> <li>• UNOSOM I and II</li> <li>• UNOMIL</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Success</li> <li>• N/A</li> <li>• Success</li> </ul>
Democratization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNPROFOR</li> <li>• UNOSOM I and II</li> <li>• UNOMIL</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevailing success</li> <li>• Failure</li> <li>• Prevailing failure</li> </ul>
Humanitarian assistance and human rights protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNPROFOR</li> <li>• UNOSOM I and II</li> <li>• UNOMIL</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure</li> <li>• Failure</li> <li>• Failure</li> </ul>
Demobilization, disarmament, reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNPROFOR</li> <li>• UNOSOM I and II</li> <li>• UNOMIL</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure</li> <li>• Failure</li> <li>• Neither success either unsuccess</li> </ul>

Source: Author according to the framework by Diehl and Druckman.

## **Conclusion**

This master's thesis concerned with the frequently discussed topic of the (lack of) success of peacekeeping missions and their evaluation. There are diverse approaches and criteria among scholars and academics on how to assess the missions' success. Therefore, the first chapter presented the concept of peacekeeping and ambiguity of its definition, the historical development of peacekeeping, use of force in peacekeeping missions and types of peacekeeping operations. The second chapter consisted of a literature review encompassed the available approaches and criteria of missions' evaluation. Based on this review, I decided to evaluate the examined cases by the framework from Paul Diehl and Daniel Druckman as it provided the most extensive factors and fields of the assessment. The following chapters evaluated the selected cases – UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNOSOM I and II in Somalia and UNOMIL in Liberia. All of the cases were examined by the conflict overview, the crucial factors and causes of the conflict, the response from the international community, a timeline of the mission's deployment and the evaluation itself. The last chapter of the thesis concerned with the evaluation of the outcomes of the examined operations, which was the objective of this thesis. The analysis above indicates that there was a prevailing unsuccess of the peace operations mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in the early 1990s. Especially in regard to carrying out the new extensive tasks which required more resources, capabilities and experiences. Hence, the lack of success of these operations stems from many causations resulting from the changing environment of the international system after the end of the Cold War accompanied by the new challenges and types of conflicts that peacekeepers had to face.

In particular, there was a gap between expectations and capabilities. The capabilities-expectations gap refers to the disproportionate relation between ambitious tasks and inadequate given resources to achieve such tasks. After the end of the Cold War, there was ubiquitous euphoria about the end of the era of competitive proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union which have been affecting the rest of the world. Simultaneously, the decline of the superpowers' veto at the Security Council led to the expansion of peace missions aiming to enhance security situation and manage all crisis which arises as consequences of the new world order. Also, the new missions were charged with more extensive tasks and goals to achieve.

Nonetheless, the international community was not prepared to manage complex conflicts as the United Nations remained without appropriate capacities to fulfil the new given tasks effectively. In addition, the expansion of newly established mission, caused the lack of resources, hence the question regarding “who will pay the bill” was overriding. Therefore, the gap between expectation of providing a resolution on contemporary conflicts when there was “nothing in the way” and the underestimated capabilities and resources caused by the expansion of peace operations sadly had critical consequences on the deployed missions and suffering of many people in conflicting countries.

In the 1990s, peacekeepers were facing many new challenges, diverse types of conflicts compared to the previous conflict they were used to operate within and, additionally, they were deployed in an even more hostile environment. Due to these new mission tasks performed by peacekeepers, it required more clarity from the Security Council how the specific activities should be implemented and carried out by the mission, as the UN personnel lacked experiences in the newly gained roles. Therefore, the vaguely worded mandates arisen questions about the interpretation of the and way how should be the activities executed in order to fulfil the purpose of the mandate. Most importantly, as these missions were mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, there was no clear definition of what “all necessary means” signify and which activities are beyond this term. Also, the specific tasks anchored in mandate should be explicitly designated to be carried out by enforcement measures. In addition, the ambiguity in the use of force might lie in the poor planning of the mission, which consequently leads to deficient decisions of use of force. The use of force in peacekeeping operations requires precise planning of the mission, including command relations, administrative and logistic components, standard operating procedures and intelligence management. Precise specification and plan for the mission would thus avoid any misunderstanding and chaos.

## List of Acronyms

UN	United Nations
US	United States
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force
ONUC	United Nations Operation in Congo
UNAMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNOCI	United Nations mission in Côte d'Ivoire
POC	Protection of Civilians
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
UNMIH	United Nations Operation in Haiti
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
UK	United Kingdom
UNPAs	United Nations Protected Areas
SC	Security Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
IFOR	Implementation Force
PEC	Provisional Election Commission
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
SDA	Muslim Party of Democratic Action
SDS	Serb Democratic Party
NDP	National Democratic Movement
NS	Our Party
RSR	Serbian Radical Party of Republika Srpska
ICRC	International Committee of The Red Cross



UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHRC	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	World Food Programme
LAS	League of Arab States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
WAF	West African Force
ECOWAS	Committee of Five of the Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement
LPC	Liberian Peace Council
LDF	Lofa Defence Force
NPP	National Patriotic Party
UP	Unity Party

UPP	United People's Party
CDC	Congress for Democratic Change
COTOL	Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia
LP	Liberty Party
HRW	Human Rights Watch
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
UNIS	United Nations Information Service

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