

**Charles University**

**Faculty of Science**

**Geography**

**Global Migration and Development Studies**



Bc. Kristýna Kvasničková

The Inclusion of Syrian Refugees in the Jordanian Labour Market

Inkluze syrských uprchlíků do jordánského pracovního trhu

Master thesis

Supervisor: doc. RNDr. Josef Novotný, PhD.

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### **Prohlášení**

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Bc. Kristýna Kvasničková

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## **Abstract**

This thesis aims to look at the inclusion of the Syrian refugees in the Jordanian labour market. By using a theory of planned behaviour as a framework combined with other development theories, the thesis defines three research questions: What are the livelihood strategies of the Syrian refugees? What are the intentions of the Syrian refugees to obtain a work permit? And what are the obstacles the Syrian refugees face in the Jordanian labour market? After addressing these question, the thesis looks at the main project of the Jordnanian and international cooperation, for including the Syrian refugees into the labour market (“The Jordan Compact”) and examines it through three chosen development approaches that focus on the individual development though different objectives: The Basic Needs Approach, Human-Rights Based Approach, and the Capabilities Approach. The data has been collected through a qualitative research conducted in Jordan in August 2019 and in February 2020. Through 18 interviews with the Syrian refugees and five additional interviews with the local researchers, and UNHCR and ministry workers. The results show that the Syrian refugees asked in the interviews showed a small intention to obtain a work permit and preferred one of the other livelihood strategies, especially staying in the informal sector. The obstacles the Syrian refugees face in the labour market were collected and divided into topical categories.

**Key words:** refugees, refugee crisis, Jordan, development theories, inclusion

## **Abstrakt**

Tato diplomová práce se zaměřuje na začleňování syrských uprchlíků na jordánský trh práce. Práce se opírá o teorii plánovaného chování a další rozvojové teorie. Definovány byly tři výzkumné otázky. První se ptá po tom, jaké jsou strategie obživy syrských uprchlíků. Druhá zkoumá záměry syrských uprchlíků získat pracovní povolení. Poslední otázka se táže, jakým překážkám čelí syrští uprchlíci na jordánském trhu práce. Práce se zaměřuje na hlavní projekt jordánské a mezinárodní spolupráce (“The Jordan Compact”), který se věnuje začleňování syrských uprchlíků na trh práce. Definovanou spoluprací zkoumá prostřednictvím tří zvolených rozvojových přístupů (“The Basic Needs Approach”, “Human-Rights Based Approach” a “The Capabilities Approach”), které se zaměřují na individuální rozvoj jednotlivce, a jehož je dosahováno prostřednictvím výše uvedených přístupů. Sběr dat byl proveden kvalitativním způsobem v Jordánsku v srpnu 2019 a v únoru 2020. Provedeno bylo osmnáct rozhovorů se syrskými uprchlíky a pět dalších rozhovorů proběhlo s místními výzkumníky a pracovníky Vysokého komisaře pro uprchlíky (UNHCR) a ministerstvem vnitra. Překážky, kterým syrští uprchlíci čelí na trhu práce, byly rozděleny do tematických kategorií. Výsledky ukazují, že nad možností získání pracovního povolení syrští uprchlíci upřednostňují další možnosti, konkrétně setrvání v neformálním sektoru.

**Klíčová slova:** uprchlíci, uprchlická krize, Jordánsko, rozvojové teorie, inkluze

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

There are over 75 million people worldwide that have been forced to flee their homes, 26 million of those are recognized as refugees by the UNHCR, and over 45 million of those are internally displaced (UNHCR, 2019). This poses new challenges on the international community as well as on the countries hosting the refugees, and of course, on the refugees themselves.

Only about 25% of all the refugees however live in refugee camps, where even though the standards are very low, basic assistance is provided to the refugees. The other 75% of the refugees need to support themselves without the reliance on humanitarian assistance (CGD, 2017). There are many challenges refugees and forced migrants face, especially during the initial years of their displacement. To figure out how to provide for themselves and for their families is one of the key issues. It also is a key issue for the hosting countries that face the challenge of including refugees, especially if they are coming in higher numbers into their labour market (Mencutek, Nashwan, 2020a).

Jordan is one of the countries that has been a hosting country for years for many refugees from the region, and since the Syrian war, has become one of the major hosting countries for the Syrian refugees. Jordan has developed a different approach to the Syrians and their inclusion in the labour market, with a major step undertaken in 2016 with the implementation of the Jordan Compact that allowed the Syrian refugees to obtain work permits (ap. 2) for specific sectors with a reduced cost for the permit. It has been four years since the initial start of the project, and since it is one of the major pilot projects of the international community to address the refugee crisis in a new approach, this thesis aims to look at how successful the first four years of the implementation have been (European Commission, 2016).

The aim of this thesis is to look at the inclusion of Syrian refugees in the Jordanian labour market through the perspective of the Syrian refugees themselves. Through qualitative research and 18 semi-structured interviews with the Syrian refugees and five additional interviews with the local researchers, UNHCR and Ministry workers, conducted in Jordan in two visits last year, the thesis would like to address some of the major challenges the Syrian refugees face in the context of the labour market and as they try to sustain a livelihood for themselves as well as for their household or families. The focus of the thesis is solely on the

urban settled refugees, as most of the research is focused not on them but is instead focused primarily on the refugees living at refugee camps.

The first question will seek to understand the strategies to sustain a livelihood among the Syrian refugees. As there is not much assistance available to them living outside the camps, what are the paths and decisions they make to create an income.

1. What are the livelihood strategies of Syrian refugees?

To follow up this question and connect it to the ambitions of the Jordan Compact, the second research question will seek to understand what the intentions are of the Syrian refugees to obtain a work permit now that they have become available for them as well.

2. What are the intentions of the Syrian refugees to obtain a work permit?

And the last research question will try to look at the experiences the refugees have had so far with the labour market in Jordan and map the challenges and obstacles they face while trying to sustain their livelihoods.

3. What are the obstacles The Syrian refugees face in the Jordanian labour market?

For the construct of the research and the framework for the interviews, a combination of theories and approaches were used. First, the Sustainable livelihood approach by Chambers is wildly popular in analyzing the refugee's income-creating activities and how it impacts their well-being (Scoones, 1998). The framework of this theory inspired the structure of the research and of the interviews and focused the questions on the topic of livelihoods rather than just the simple labour market inclusion.

Second, the theory of planned behaviour by Ajzen (1991) was the main framework of the preparation of the research and the questionnaire (ap. 1). The theory analyzes the intentions of individuals that lead to an action that is influenced by 3 main factors: the attitude, social norms and the perceived behaviour control. Each of these aspects of this theory are a part of the questions asked to the Syrian refugees to better understand their decision-making when it comes to obtaining the work permit.

As the Jordan Compact represents a shift from the humanitarian approach in assistance to the refugees to the development approach (Lenner, Turner, 2019, Al-Mahaidi, 2020, CGD, 2017, Zetter, 2019), a part of the discussion will be given to an evaluation of the Jordan

Compact through chosen development theories: The Basic Needs Approach, The Human-Rights Based Approach, and the Capabilities Approach. All these theories, even though using different objectives and strategies, look at the individual's development. The aim will be to propose a conversation about different approaches on how to view a development that puts the individual in the center, in this case the refugees themselves. Acknowledging that this is just one part of the development focus, and that the development of the hosting countries needs to be acknowledged as well (Betts, col., 2017). However, since the Jordan Compact does focus on the inclusion of the Syrian refugees into the formal sectors of the Jordanian labour market (European Commission, 2016), it seems fitting to start the conversation here.

Employment is a crucial topic for the refugees, as well as for the hosting countries, and indirectly for the whole international community as part of figuring out the durable and sustainable solutions to deal with the situation and support the refugees along the way (Mencutek, Nashwan, 2020b, Betts, col., 2017).

## 2. JORDANIAN RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS AND EFFECTS ON THE LABOUR MARKET

### 2.1. BACKGROUND

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, which followed the Arab Spring Uprisings, 5.6 million Syrians have left the country to look for safety all around the world. However, most of the Syrians look for refuge in the neighboring countries of Syria (UNHCR, 2020). Turkey hosts around 3.5 million Syrians, more than any other country hosting Syrian refugees. It is followed by Jordan and Lebanon which are, nevertheless, two countries hosting the most Syrian refugees relative to their own population. They are also the two countries with the most Syrian refugees among the Arab countries (UNHCR, 2020). At the same time, 95% of all the Syrian refugees stay solely in five countries including Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt (Amnesty International, 2015) (See table 1). Each country in the region has taken specific measures to deal with challenges associated with the large populations of Syrian refugees. The massive influx of refugees presents political, social, economic and other challenges.

Jordan is not only one of the major hosting countries for the Syrian refugees, but it also received refugees from other countries in the region. Together with Lebanon, Jordan has, in large amounts, received Palestinian refugees after wars in 1948 and 1967, and Iraqi refugees that came after the wars in 1991 and 2003 (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020). These past experiences and especially the prolonged stay of the Palestinian refugees have shaped the country's policies and openness toward newly arriving refugees. A significant number of Palestinian immigrants are still till today recognized as refugees under the protection of UNRWA, which has been created with the sole purpose to handle the Palestinian refugee crisis. Besides these massive arrivals, Jordan also hosted the Lebanese during the civil war in Lebanon from 1975 to 1990 and Syrians after the massacre that took place in Hama in 1982 (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020). Despite the comparatively lower level of economic development, Jordan with its relatively stable political situation has been an attractive destination country for migrants from the region. With some simplification, Jordan, as well as Lebanon, has symbolized the “safe haven” of this region.

Nowadays, Jordan hosts around 4 million "persons of concern" of whom 747,000 are registered as refugees (UNHCR, 2019). This puts Jordan next to Lebanon with the highest

number of refugees per capita in the world, 86 refugees per 1000 citizens to be exact (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020). This creates enormous pressure on the government when it comes to resources like water and electricity, as well as employment possibilities.

These high numbers of refugees and persons of concern in Jordan might be seen as a “paradox”, since Jordan is not a signatory of the Refugee Convention from 1951 nor the Protocol from 1967, that bids the signatory states to protect individuals fleeing a conflict or persecution. Jordan does not differentiate between refugees and “non-refugees”, all of them all treated the same, as “foreigners” under the Law No. 24 of 1973 concerning “*Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs*” (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020).

To address this issue of not having defined protection, rights, nor status of the refugee population in Jordan, Jordan and UNHCR signed, in 1998, a Memorandum of Understanding, which became the legal framework for the conduct toward the refugee population in Jordan. The major step was the recognition of refugees as individuals in need for a treatment based on the international merits, and on the “*non-refoulement*” (Article 2 of the Memorandum of Understanding), which promises the refugees not to be forcefully returned to the country of origin if he or she is seeking asylum (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020). Another significant change that this Memorandum of Understanding brings is in the Article 1 of this document that provides a similar definition for a “refugee” to how it is given in the Refugee Convention from 1951, and Article 5 provides for a commitment of Jordan’s side to the protection of the refugee according to the international standards (Frangieh, 2016).

This Memorandum of Understanding, however also has its limitations, and this agreed protection and recognition is limited to the time frame of 6 months, after which Jordan claims the right to come up with a suitable *durable* solution. This solution may include the possibility of repatriation and return of the refugees (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020). These limitations were especially felt after the major refugee influxes, like from Iraq in 2003 and the Syrian crisis in 2011 (Frangieh, 2016). When it comes to non-refoulement, the government keeps the option to deport any refugees with expired stay, however the practise of the government has been more to “look the other way” and be more flexible in this manner. Even though some deportations were reported, the main issue is the constant uncertainty the refugees find themselves in, the fear of being caught (Frangieh, 2016). However, it is hardly imaginable that the Government of Jordan would organize any massive deportation at this point.

The other limitation of this memorandum is in the lack of legal framework in the topic of employment of the refugees. Their entrance to the Jordanian labour market stays very limited to self-reliance and continual dependency on the aid provided for them by the UN agencies, WFP, and other NGOs working in this area (Frangieh, 2016).

Table 1: Total Persons of Concern by Country of Asylum

Location name	Source	Data date		Population
Tukey	Government of Turkey	2 Jul 2020	64.70%	3,594,981
Lebanon	UNHCR	31 May 2020	16.10%	892,310
Jordan	UNHCR	5 Jul 2020	11.90%	658,028
Iraq	UNHCR	30 Jun 2020	4.40%	245,421
Egypt	UNHCR	30 Jun 2020	2.30%	130,042
Other (North Africa)	UNHCR	31 Jan 2020	0.60%	31,657

Source : UNHCR, 2020

## 2.2. DEVELOPMENT OF JORDANIAN RESPONSE TOWARD SYRIAN REFUGEES

The response of Jordan to the Syrian crisis, as well as the responses of other Syrian neighboring countries were not formed in the vacuum and reflect the pre-war relationship between these countries (Turner, 2015). Syria with a strong economy, trade market, and industry created many political-economic ties with the countries in the region. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate on these ties in detail, it is important to keep in mind that economic but also cultural and historical relations in the region have shaped both the migration flows and responses to the Syrian crisis.

Due to open relations with Syria, when the conflict started in Syria in 2011, Jordan kept the “*Open Door Policy*” (which allowed Syrians to travel freely without the possibility to enter the formal labour market in Jordan) for another two years. However, in June 2013 Jordan decided to close all the informal western border crossings and installed checkpoints to the formal ones. Even though it was at this point still possible to travel, controls began and travel documentation was required. For undocumented migrants the following two scenarios were possible. The first option was that they could be placed by the Jordanian officials into one of the refugee camps by the Syrian border (the first Refugee Camp Zaatari was built in 2012). The second option was that they could be denied entrance and left at the demilitarized zone on the

Syrian side of the border called “*the berms*” (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020). These events especially started to accrue in 2014 and 2015 when the violence of the Islamic State escalated and Jordanians started to feel less keen on accepting Syrian refugees as they started to perceive them as a threat to the security inside of the kingdom. In response to this violence and a fear of the infiltration of the IS soldier into the refugee camps in Jordan, Jordan closed the borders with Syria completely in June 2016 (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020) and reopened it relatively recently again, in November 2018 (Jordan Times, 2018).

Within the context of securitization of the Syrian refugees a series of agreements and policies were passed by the Government of Jordan in order to create a framework within the Syrian crisis that can be managed. Table 2, at the end of the chapter, shows a timetable in chronological order of how and which policies were created when and in what circumstances. While the text will further continue to talk about these policies, the table is to give an overview and help with the orientation in the text that follows.

In 2014 one of the first major national responses was formed in the National Resilience Plan. The plan primarily focused on the impact of the Syrian crisis on the hosting communities. With the help of developmental and humanitarian agencies a budget was created to support the development in the sectors that include education, water and sanitation, employment, the distribution of electricity to avoid electricity cuts in certain areas, etc. (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020).

During this time also the Jordan Response Platform for the Syrian Crisis emerged to coordinate the efforts to design the Jordan Response Plans 2015 and 2016. The first plan had a duration planned for one year, and the second one divided into two with a duration of two years each. With the Jordan Response Plans we can start talking about the shift in the Jordanian approach to the Syrian crisis. Until this point, the approach was based on humanitarian aid to cover the basic needs of the refugees. This response is commonly the first step when it comes to relief of all different kinds of disasters, however long term it is unsustainable and a shift toward a more durable, sustainable approach based more on development is needed. The Jordan Response Plans represented this shift for Jordan. The collaboration between different national and international entities was formed (primarily the UN with the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC)). The Jordan Response Plans was created on three principles: “*mitigate the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities, sustain socio-economic stability, and safeguard the development gains made in recent years*”

(Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020, p.51). This response was not designed from scratch but built on a plan that was previously used for the response of the Human Rights Committee Unit (HRCU) that was in use during the Iraqi refugee crisis. The goal of Jordan Response Plans is to enhance trust and cooperation among the actors of the response: UN agencies, ministries, NGOs, universities, and others, yet Jordan Response Plans face often the criticism of not being enough development-oriented, and the majority of its focus is placed on the refugees, whereas the needs of the hosting country are being overlooked. As this is still in progress, the additional changes are still in the process (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020).

The need for making the response to the Syrian crisis based on international cooperation has been becoming clearer as the crisis prolongs itself and as different approaches are being tested. Jordan, in 2018, joined the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan where it partners with other hosting countries in the region. It is a target of, again, much criticism, however it is another attempt from Jordan not to be “left alone” in this situation. The construction of more refugee camps in Jordan could also be seen as a “tactical” move, despite the fact that majority of Syrian refugees live in the urban areas (less than 20% of Syrians in Jordan live in the refugee camps) (UNHCR, 2019), to make the issue more internationally recognized, especially by the media. In the context of the refugee crisis, this is a common practice, also called the “*visualization imperative*” (Landau, 2014, p. 141), to highlight an issue that could be overlooked and bring more donors interested to help with the solutions.

The major shift in the “*globalized thinking*” (Lenner, Turner, 2019, p. 67) to the response in Jordan came in 2016 when the Jordan Compact brought many different-level actors representing different agendas together. It also shifts the approach further on the development-oriented scale when it comes to refugee response and also becomes a showcase of the so called win-win-win situation, where the needs of the refugees, hosting country and the donors are all recognized (Krause, 2017).

Table 2: Jordanian Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, Timeline

TIMELINE	2011-2013	2012	2013	2014 March
POLICY	Open-door Policy	Opening of the Zaatari Camp in Mafraq	Syrian Refugee Camp Directorate (SRCD)	Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD)
TIMELINE	2014 June	2014 September	2015	2016
POLICY	the National Resilience Plan	the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis	Jordan Response Plan 2015	Jordan Response Plan 2016-2018
TIMELINE	2016	2018	2018	
POLICY	Jordan Compact	Jordan Response Plan 2018-2020	Jordan signs Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)	

Source: Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020

### 2.3. JORDAN COMPACT

An agreement, called the Jordan Compact, was signed between Jordan and the European Union (EU) on the 4th of February 2016 at the London Pledging Summit. The agreement states that if Jordan opens its labour market to the Syrian refugees the EU will lift some of the barriers for Jordanian products to enter the EU market (European Commission, 2016).

Jordan has pledged to create up to 200, 000 work permits for Syrians in the next three to five years in the specific labour market sectors that include manufacturing, construction and agriculture. It does not include the “protected professions” (see table 3) that are safeguarded for Jordanians only. The way of allowing the refugees to obtain work permits is through raising the costs for those permits. Instead of the previous 700 JD for a permit, a Syrian refugee will only pay 10 JD for a work permit that is valid for 12 months (Beaujouan, Rasheed, 2020; Betts, Ali, Memişoğlu, 2017). The agreement also changes the bureaucratic administration so that no legal documents like driving licenses or passports are needed when Syrians apply for these permits (ILO, 2017).

The benefits that this agreement represents for Jordanians reside in two domains. Firstly, it represents a renegotiation between the EU and Jordan when it comes to Jordanian access to the European markets. The EU will allow free access to the EU market for certain products from Jordan, under the condition that those companies will be employing a certain

percentage of Syrian refugees and that the production happens in the “Special Economic Zones” (total of 18 zones) and within the specified product categories (total of 52 product categories) (Betts, Ali, Memişoğlu, 2017). As export creates a significant income for the Jordanian market, the support of the special economic zones and the renegotiation between the EU and Jordan plays a significant role in the possible growth of products that qualify for export to the EU. The main issue, or a barrier, so far between these two entities were “the rules of origin”, which because of their narrow description did not allow many products from Jordan to qualify (Lenner, Turner, 2019). The rules of origin, thanks to the Jordan Compact, also changed and this development in the legislation allowed more products to qualify for the EU market by fulfilling the requirement of “*only 30% value addition within Jordan*” (Betts, Ali, Memişoğlu, 2017, p.10).

As mentioned earlier, the Jordan Compact has been presented as a “win-win situation” for all the parties involved in the deal (Lenner, Turner, 2019; Morris, 2020), in some reports even referred to as the “triple-win” solution (Krause, 2011), where it recognizes the needs of the Syrian refugees to obtain a sustainable livelihood and brings up opportunities to make refugees be less dependent on humanitarian aid. It recognizes the economic needs of Jordan, as a hosting country that faces many challenges connected to the high unemployment and other socio-economic challenges as well as dealing with environmental challenges, among others. And finally it recognizes the side of the donor parties, and brings possibilities forward that make this agreement more of a partnership rather than “just” aid (Krause, 2011).

Despite the big hopes about the project, since the launch the Jordan Compact faces many criticisms from the academic researchers as well as the agencies that play a role in executing the project. Lenner and Turner point out, as do many other researches, that the Jordan Compact creates work permits for the Syrian refugees, however that does not mean it is linked to employment, especially not to employment that would guarantee a decent pay rate, safe environment, and worker protection (Lenner, Turner, 2019). Other criticism points out, for example, that the Jordan Compact does not provide clear information about the possibilities of and rights to employment for the Syrian refugees, often leaving them on their own to figure out their own journey to a sustainable job (Al-Mahaidi, 2020).

The Jordan Compact, however, does mark a milestone in the approach that the international community has done, and it would be naive to assume problems would not occur. For being a “poster project” of this size, it is essential to look at it and evaluate it properly

before it will be implemented to other regional contexts facing similar situations (Lenner, Turner, 2019).

The Jordan Compact is not standing alone and there are also other refugee compacts that are important to mention. On the country level, Ethiopia launched an Ethiopia Jobs Compact later in 2016 and is still in the middle of implementation. The goal was to create 100,000 new jobs in two newly built industrial parks that would employ the locals as well as the pledged 30% of refugees. It is a concept similar to the Jordan Compact with the focus put on the labour opportunities for the refugees. In Lebanon, the Lebanon Compact does not address the issue of labour, but instead the education inclusion that is trying to reach all Lebanese and Syrian children, and was implemented for the first time in 2013 (CGD–IRC, 2017).

#### 2.4. JORDANIAN LABOUR MARKET

According to the latest estimates, over 1,4 million immigrants are working in the Jordanian formal labor market. (ILO, 2017). These numbers put Jordan into a situation where they have to figure out a system to ensure work positions to the Jordanians, as well as to the non-Jordanians. The Ministry of Labor has been actively trying to provide a solution to the unemployment of the Jordanians and the non-Jordanians. The situation is even more complicated due to the different types of migrants - the ones that came deliberately from their countries to find a job there and settle in Jordan, and those that were forced due to their (mostly political) situation back home. The stability that the regime provides, even though the access to some of the liberties might be questionable, has been a draw for many from this region (ILO, 2017).

Jordan, even-though geographically close, does not belong to the “oil-rich countries” in the region, nor is it an owner of any other significant amount of the natural resources. The challenges that high immigration creates are not trifling and do not ask for simplistic solutions. The impact the migrants have on Jordan is holistic and touches the sociocultural, environmental, political, and economic areas (Al Shoubaki, Harris 2018). Since the economic crisis in 2008, the GDP of Jordan, as well as the wages and employment rates, started to decline (ILO, 2017). Nonetheless, Jordan continued to accept migrant workers despite increasing problems of unemployment. Before the Syrian conflict escalated in 2011, there were, according

to the ILO, 335,000 migrant workers officially employed, where 90 percent of those foreign workers were illiterate. Most of the foreigners were Egyptians, which represented about 75 percent of all the foreign workers (Steve, Hillesund 2015).

To regulate the influx of migrant workers, the government passed a law to specify the number of work permits issued in each field of the labor market that the migrants were allowed to work in. The ministry of Labor uses this “*quota system*” to segregate the Jordanian labor market in a way that the Jordanians would not be losing their highly skilled jobs to the migrant workers (Steve, Hillesund 2015). This is to address one of the challenges of the high unemployment numbers among the Jordanian university graduates (Betts,col., 2017).

After 2011, with Syrian refugees coming in, the government faced new issues of maintaining the already fragile labor market. The unemployment in Jordan was high even before the Syrians came in. Before the conflict, the rate of unemployment was 15 percent, in 2019 it reached 24 percent (Lenner, Turner 2019). This creates new challenges for the Jordanian government, one of them being raising frustration among the Jordanian population, which sees the cause of the problem in the influx of Syrian refugees that take away their jobs (Steve, Hillesund 2015).

One of the ways the Jordanian government tries to protect job opportunities for the Jordanians is closing certain professions to foreigners. In 2016 the Jordanian Ministry of Labour announced the list of closed professions that can be found on their website. Since then the list has been slightly modified, clarifying and adding professions over time (Jordan Times, 2019). But this original list still presents the majority of the professions kept only for Jordanians.

Table 3: Closed professions

	The list of the closet professions
1	Administrative and accounting professions
2	Clerical work including typing and secretarial work
3	Switchboards, telephones and connection works
4	Warehouse work
5	Sales works, including all groups
6	Decoration works
7	Fuel selling in main cities
8	Electricity professions
9	Mechanical and car repair professions
10	Drivers
11	Guards and servants
12	Medical professions
13	Engineering professions
14	Hair Cutting works (coiffeur)
15	Teaching professions
16	Loading and unloading workers in malls and supermarkets
17	Cleaning workers in private schools and hotels
18	Regional offices for foreign companies

Source: MoL, 2016 in UNHCR, 2017b

Currently, there are three possible opportunities for the Syrian refugees to enter the formal sector of the Jordanian labour market. The first, created by the Jordan Compact, are the work permits, already discussed, issued for one of the three sectors: manufacture, construction, and agriculture.

The second option is for the Syrian refugees to register their own business. For a Syrian refugee to be able to register a business, three things need to happen first: to have valid documentation, like a passport; to be able to deposit a minimum of 50,000 JD; and to have Jordanian business partners (Al-Mahaidi, 2020). All three requirements are complicated and most Syrians are not able to afford the deposit, often they do not possess their travel documentation, and there is a lack of protection of the Syrian partners within the partnership with the Jordanians (more of the challenges in the empirical part of this thesis).

The third option for the Syrian refugees is to obtain a volunteering agreement with a local organization. Again, the challenges of this type of employment will be further discussed in the empirical part of the thesis. However, as the type of employment suggests, it doesn't provide a financial compensation big enough to be considered a regular employment, therefore the literature on the employment of the Syrian refugees does not include this type of involvement in the formal sector.

With the complications of establishing a business and the lack of financial retribution from the volunteering contracts, the primary form of being formally employed in Jordan as a Syrian refugee is through work permits.

### 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 3.1. HUMANITARIAN - DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

When addressing the refugee crisis, both from the perspective of the public as well as the policy maker, the topic of humanitarian aid comes to mind. Since World War II, the international community, with the lead of the United Nations, has been addressing the displacement issue through humanitarian aid (Betts, col., 2017) and focuses on the protection and human rights, while neglecting the development opportunities and challenges it yields (Zetter, 2019).

The problem is that the prolonged conflicts do not last months, but years, and often decades. The Humanitarian approach is not sustainable then, as it puts a huge pressure on the hosting countries as well as the international community with resources that are not often available. Three challenges, often highlighted, are as follows. Firstly, when the time period of protection is considered, it is often unrealistic for hosting countries to extend the protection for the refugees to the time needed, which often rises far above a five year period, increasing the host countries' fear of the infinite settlement (Betts, col., 2017, Zetter, 2019). Secondly, this approach mostly addresses the refugee as an “object” of the aid rather than an “actor” which would create more space for the better targeted solutions (Betts, col., 2017, Zetter, 2019). Thirdly, the humanitarian aid focused on the refugees does not take into consideration the economic activities of the refugees that creates one of the major gaps when trying to come up with a more sustainable solution (Betts, col., 2017, Zetter, 2019)

While the approach so far has been mainly humanitarian, there have been attempts to shift the focus to the developmental approach. And a big part of the change in thinking has been because of the over a decade-long conflict in Syria, that pushed the global community to these changes and the concept Humanitarian-Development Nexus started being used as a way to address the shift (Zetter, 2019). It does not represent a solid framework to follow, rather it stays in the experimental phase at this point. Nonetheless, the shift can be observed in some of the newer international responses like the Global Compact on Refugees and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. The Jordan Compact is also a product of this shift of thinking in the global community on a regional level (Zetter, 2019).

*“In general terms, the Humanitarian-Development Nexus tackles three enduring challenges in refugee crises. The first is to mediate the impacts of protracted forced displacement on receiving countries and communities; the second is to address the longer-term livelihood needs of the displaced themselves in sustainable ways. The third, although understated, is particularly relevant in contemporary political rhetoric—the containment of refugees and other forcibly displaced people in their regions of origin.”* (Zetter, 2019, p. 4)

The focus that this nexus brings helps to acknowledge and address development challenges as well as the opportunities the refugee crisis brings to the international community, as well as hosting countries and the refugees themselves (Zetter, 2019). Which is what the goal of the Jordan compact is, to address all three groups, but it also brings back the theoretical approach of the “refugee economics” that highlights the importance to address the livelihoods of refugees together with the impact they have on the development of the hosting countries (Betts, col., 2017).

One of the ways this thinking influenced Jordan, as a hosting country, is that it reformulated which countries will be allowed to get financial help through the International Development Association (a branch of the World Bank) and Jordan was included in the list of the receiving countries, even though it’s considered a middle-income *country*, which would normally disqualify it for the assistance (Zetter, 2019). The goals of how to make Jordan benefit economically from hosting refugees through the implementation of the Jordan Compact were described in the previous chapter. This thesis acknowledges the impacts the refugees make, however focuses primarily on the developmental consequences on the Syrian refugees as a part of the approach.

The humanitarian-development nexus points out the importance of acknowledging the refugees as actors in the policies the global community creates in finding solutions to their vulnerable situations, moving away from seeing them simply as a subject to the policies.

### 3.2. REFUGEES AND DEVELOPMENT

The impact of migration on development is a well-studied topic. The forced migration plays a specific role in this nexus through specifications of migrants. These specifications impact the lives of the forced migrants, as well as the hosting countries they flee to. First, the time and initial plan to move differ, which makes a further impact on the migrating individuals later in the process (Piguet, 2018). The framework of push and pull factors in the place of origin and the destination (Greenwood, 1991; Lee, 1966; Passaris, 1989 in Castels, de Haas, Miller, 2014) in the migration studies also apply to the forced migration, however the push factors, which are often connected to political or economic reasons, play the major role within the context of the acute refugees, while the pull factors will become more relevant and significant to the refugees that have time to anticipate the move (Johansson 1990 in Piguet 2018). Either way, the push and pull factors do help to categorize and better understand the factors that influence the decision-making of vulnerable populations that decided to move in order to protect themselves from harm. When addressing the topic of inclusion, all these factors will have an impact on how well and how fast the migrants, or forced migrants are included in the society, the labour markets, and how they themselves are able to participate in the process.

For the forced migration, the experiences of loss and trauma, and the impoverishment as a consequence of the situation they were forced to leave, also impact the state the migrants find themselves in and influence their overall capacity and capital, social and financial, that they can dispose after the arrival. Losses that increase the possibilities of impoverishment of the forced migrants include *“the expropriation of land, loss of wage employment, and of housing, cultural space, cultural space, and common property assets.”* (Cernea, 1997 in Jacobsen 2014, p. 102). All this significantly influences the capital the refugees are able to start with.

Further, especially for the political and war refugees, the loss goes beyond the materialistic and touches the personal loss of loved ones, family members, a loss of feeling of safety and of belonging (Cernea 1997 in Jacobsen 2014). These all are burdens the forced migrants have to deal with, on top of the regular challenges of entering a new society and labour market. These differences cause implications for the vulnerable groups once they arrive in the host countries.

Karen Jacobsen (2014) mentions another two issues that concern the forced migrants and makes them furthermore stand out from the economic, voluntary migrants. Firstly, the

political and legal issues that the forced migrants experience in the host countries. Each country adopts different policies and so this issue varies significantly, however the restriction on the forced migrant to obtain a work permit and get legal documentation, represent themes that forced migrants deal with. The question of forced encampment as well further influences their chances on establishing their livelihoods. And secondly, unlike regular migrants, the forced migrants are often the recipients of humanitarian aid, which can have just as many indirect negative effects as positive ones (Jacobsen, 2014).

When comparing the unemployment among the economic migrants and the forced migrants, differences are being observed, as already indicated above. The term “refugee gap” used in the study from 2010 by Phillip Connor describes this challenge that the forced migrants face. And it focuses on the differences and the factors that influence and widen “the gap”. The study looks at the different starting points of these two groups of migrants, and also points out that the gap decreases over time, which is something worth considering while preparing policies and programs designed to assist the forced migrants in the initial years of the settlement. Even though there have been studies before that point out the differences between these two groups, for example by Richmond in 1988 (Mencuttek, Nashwan, 2020b). Some of these factors are already mentioned in the paragraphs above. In the study called “Refugee economic adaptation” Miriam Potocky-Tripodi (2008) explores the predictors of the adaptation of refugees to the hosting economies. This study supports the findings of previous findings that demographic characteristics like education, gender, and household composition majorly impact the adaptation to the host economies.

Another study by Betts and Collier (2015) follows up on a previous study by Karen Jacobsen, emphasizes the importance of connecting the impact of refugees on the hosting countries together with the refugee livelihoods. He argues that there is a need to look at the impact of the refugees and the refugee livelihoods from a wider angle. The study suggests that the livelihoods of the refugees is important to understand, as well as a study of the impact the refugees have on the development of the hosting country (Betts, Collier, 2015; Al-Mahaidi, 2020). Connected to these studies, the Jordan Compact stands out among different approaches because of how it focuses on the development of the hosting country, Jordan, as well as the livelihood possibilities of the forced migrants, in this case the Syrian refugees (Al-Mahaidi, 2020).

Employment, as an economic activity, represents a major issue to the refugees as they find themselves in an immersive life and an insecure situation. Without much or often any external protection, employment of any sort often helps the refugees to sustain themselves and their families. Employment is, undoubtedly, a major topic not only for refugees but for the hosting countries, and local governments as well. It presents the host countries with a giant challenge to address the issue of employment especially as the time of the settlement prolongs (Mencutek, Nashwan, 2020b).

### 3.3. DEVELOPMENT THEORIES

Development itself is a wide topic that can be understood in many different ways and focus on different objectives as well as following different paths to get to the end goal. For this purpose, a selection of development approaches was chosen to further study and analyze this situation.

From the development theories, the Basic Needs Approach, the Human-Rights Based Approach and the Capabilities Approach are chosen for comparison and for a constructive evaluation of the approach Jordan took in addressing the Syrian refugee crisis. These theories in development all focus on the well-being of an individual, but through different objectives. They represent a criticism of the *top-down* approaches to development that yield from disillusion about their functioning (Navratilova, 2013). Because they all have the individual's well-being as the end goal, there is a potential to compare and analyze the refugee response of Jordan through them, looking at the development consequences on Syrian refugees.

#### BASIC NEEDS APPROACH

The Basic Needs Approach to development could be considered as the starting point in assistance to vulnerable groups as it focuses on fulfilling the most basic needs by providing the minimum of needed goods and services. The Basic Needs Approach is based on a consensus that basic physical, intellectual and psychological needs are important for all people and their fulfillment is a basic prerequisite for a fulfilled life (Navratilova, 2013, p. 100). UNHCR's definition of the Basic Needs Approach is "*a way to enable refugees to meet their basic needs and achieve longer-term well-being through means to survive and services based on their socio-economic vulnerabilities and capacities.*" (UNHCR, 2017a, p.1)

Anna Navratilova highlights four categories identified by Hunt (1989), in which the basic needs are fulfilled: First, the minimum requirements for personal consumption (like food, shelter, clothing). Second, the access to basic services such as drinking water, sanitation, transport, health and education. Availability of adequately paid work for everyone who wants to work. Third, the needs of a more qualitative nature, such as a satisfying environment and fourth, the need of participation in decisions affecting life and personal freedoms. However, when used in practice the focus shifted primarily on the first two of these four points (Navratilova, 2013)

### HUMAN-RIGHTS BASED APPROACH

The Human-Rights Based Approach emerged in the second half of the 90s' and became widely used within the global community and international organizations and an official approach to the UN programs by 1997 (UNFPA, 2014). The Human-Rights Based Approach is a conceptual framework based on promoting and protecting human rights according to the international human right law and integrates the standards and practices of the international human right law to development (Al-Mahaidi, 2020).

Compared to the Basic Needs Approach, the Human-Rights Based Approach moves away from the charity approach in development, and instead of focusing on the needs of “beneficiaries”, as the Basic Needs Approach does, it focuses on the fulfillment of human rights, as those can be enforceable (UNFPA, 2014). It demands that the human right would be respected by promoting the rights to be realized and by holding the governmental and non-governmental organizations accountable to protecting these rights. The principles the Human-Rights Based Approach follows include participation, empowerment, non-discrimination, accountability and legality (Al-Mahaidi, 2020, p. 7).

The access to fair and decent work is recognized by the international law as a human right and the access to the labour market as a way to protect individuals' human dignity, which also applies to the refugees in the hosting countries. In the context of the labour market the HRBA role is to promote the rights to work and help the refugees to realize and fulfill the right to work. (Al-Mahaidi, 2020, p7)

## CAPABILITY APPROACH

The Capabilities Approach first introduced by the economist Amartya Sen and later advocated by Martha Nussbaum is an attempt to move away from income-oriented development to development that advocates for multiple end approaches. It advocates for the need of human freedoms being included in the material resources and that both are needed for the individual to achieve a life that they have a reason to value (Sen, 1999).

The emphasis is put on the individual's conception of their own well-being. This is where the approach differs from the Human-Rights Based Approach, that puts the focus on the legalistic, normative understanding of human rights in the norms that are internationally agreed on. Sen's understanding of rights and freedoms are self-realized. The Human-Rights Based Approach focuses on the protection of the rights in the political sense, it is more achievement oriented than the Capabilities Approach, which also includes people's personal choices. To say it simply, the Human-Rights Based Approach addresses the protection of rights, and the Capabilities Approach will identify the things that individuals value the most- in terms of being and of doing (OHCHR, 2006, Sen, 1999).

Since the focus is put on what an individual value the most, there are some challenges that come up with measuring the achieved freedoms and it creates a greater need for participatory methods in evaluation (Frediani, 2007).

The Human Development Report from the year 2000 points out, however, how these two approaches are complementary to each other. Foremost, because of the legalistic nature of the HRBA, it helps the Capabilities Approach with providing a legal framework, where the Capabilities Approach can function better in advocating for the individual's freedoms and choices (UNDP, 2000).

## SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS APPROACH

The Sustainable Livelihood Approach emerged around the same time as did the Capability Approach and shares some of the similar ideas. The Approach focuses on participation, multidimensional conceptualization of poverty, and empowerment. It looks at the potentials of individuals, their strengths in the context of their risks, vulnerability, and insecurities, and how these strengths can translate into their sustainable livelihoods. These strengths, or as the approach called it "capital," are both material and social resources the individual possesses (or the household, if that is the aim of the study). Accumulation of capital is called the "stock of

capital” which includes physical, financial, human, social, and natural capital (Moser, Norton, 2001).

### 3.5. THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR (TPB)

This thesis is structured with the help of the psychology theory of planned behaviour. As it looks at the decision-making process of an individual, it allows other theories to be included and therefore is easy to use in the combination of other development theories and concepts chosen for this thesis. The framework, used to structure the interviews as well as the empirical part of this thesis, is further described below.

This theory by Icek Ajzen (1991), an extended version of the theory of reasoned action, looks at the intention as the main factor that impacts an individual's actions. According to the theory, this intention is influenced by three general types of factors: First, perceived social norm regarding the work in the formal sector; second, one's own attitudes to the issue of working in the formal sector; and third, perceived control of this behaviour (graph 1).

The theory of planned behaviour helps to take these challenges refugees face and put them in the framework of decision-making, where the challenges are just one of the factors that influence the intention to work, that then leads to the actions. These factors are attitudes, the social norm, and the perceived behaviour control. The last factor, perceived behaviour control, is the one factor that takes from the challenges that refugees face or their perception of these challenges.

TPB assumes other factors associated with the specific local context of the issue (eg political, economic and social) or with individual characteristics (eg demographic factors, education, previous work experiences etc.), which operate through these three factors mentioned above (Ajzen, 1991). Icek Ajzen describes these factors in his paper about the Theory of Planned Behaviour from 1991:


*“The first is the attitude toward the behaviour and refers to the degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in question. The second predictor is a social factor termed subjective norm; it refers to the perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform the behavior. The third antecedent of intention is the degree of perceived behavioral control which, as we saw earlier, refers to the perceived ease*

*or difficulty of performing the behavior and it is assumed to reflect past experience as well as anticipated impediments and obstacles (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188).”*

Generally speaking, when the attitudes and the social norms are positively aligned to the behaviour, it will also positively influence the perceived control and make the perceived (and even actual) challenges decrease. Intention, that is the outcome of the three factors mentioned above, show the motivation of an individual, how much he or she is going to put effort into executing the chosen behaviour (Ajzen, 1991).

However, this is not the only theory that talked about the abilities (for example the behaviour control) and motivation (for example the intention). This theory proved over time to be practical and flexible enough to include other factors that might further influence the attitudes and social norms and also flexible enough to combine it with other integration and development theories.

GRAPH 1: Components of the Theory of Planned Behaviour



Source: Ajzen, I. (1991)

#### 4. DATA AND METHODS

The topic of this thesis is focusing on the challenges connected to a Middle Eastern context, of which I do not consider myself to be fully prepared on and to personally understand enough to be able to write a thesis on my own. For this reason, before I planned my first field research, I contacted the University of Jordan in Amman with the hope to gain access to research done in Jordan and possibly to connect with researchers and academics specializing in this topic. The Prince Hussein School of International Relations and the Center of Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan have been a crucial part of this process of gaining access to local academic literature and helped me to understand the approaches from the local point of view, which I have found to be essential throughout the field research. The University of Jordan has also connected me with the Research Center of Forced Migration of the Yarmouk University in Irbid, which has as well helped me to gain access to local research materials. The literature review also recognizes authors based outside of Jordan and the Middle East region that have been studying the topics related to refugee integration and labor inclusion in Jordan as well as in other countries around the world.

The field research was conducted in two separate visits to Jordan in August 2019 and February 2020. The purpose of the first visit was to learn about the context of the Syrian refugee situation in Jordan in general and establish connections with the local universities and research centers. During this first visit I had a limited interaction with the Syrian communities in Jordan. The focus was on discussions with the local academics and experts who have had direct experience with the Syrian situation in Jordan as well as with the Jordanian legislative approach addressing the current state of Syrian refugees in Jordan. This included interviews with the researchers, the representatives of the Ministry of Labor, and UNHCR workers.

From my connections made during this time I also asked a Syrian University student for collaboration on this research, who filled the role of a fixer, helping me to connect with the future informants, and also the role of a translator during these interviews, as in most of the cases the Syrians felt more comfortable to speak in their own language.

Between the first and the second visit, the time was spent in preparation for the interviews; looking for the informants that included men and women, those employed formally, informally, and unemployed. During this time and after the literature review a decision was made to specify the informant's group in the form of the time spent in Jordan and in the type

of the settlement, which makes the research more focused and allows it to highlight certain aspects of the experience of workplace inclusion.

During the second visit in February 2020, the primary focus was to conduct the prepared interviews with the Syrian refugees. During the timeframe of three weeks, I managed to conduct twenty interviews where 18 fulfilled the criteria to be included in this thesis. The field research took place in three cities, Amman, Irbid, and Mafraq. The cities were chosen because of the density of the Syrian population living in these areas. These cities represent three out of four provinces in Jordan, where most of the Syrians live, which allows them to draw a clearer image of the experiences of Syrians living not only in the capital city, Amman, but in the whole region. This, in my opinion, helps to better interpret the approach of the Jordanian government to the Syrian situation.

The semi-structured approach was chosen for the interviews. This approach involves the combination of open and closed questions and allows the participants to answer in their own words with the length of their answers fitted to the needs of the informants. The questions were divided into three main areas according to a chronological order of the events the questions were referring to. Within these areas the questions follow a structure borrowed from the theory of planned behavior to highlight the participants' attitudes and intentions, as well as social norms as understood by the participants. This scheme still allowed me to navigate the interviews in a natural, approachable way to allow the participants to focus on what they found most significant from their own experiences. This division of questions also helped later on with the coding and analyzing.

The material from the interviews was later transcribed and coded manually by the open coding system. The data from these transcripts and coded interviews was also combined with the notes from a diary that was kept during the whole time of conducting this research.

It is also important to mention that the interviews were mostly held in Arabic and the practice of a back translation during the interviews thus occurred regularly. This means that my English questions were first translated into Arabic by my Syrian colleague, I mentioned before, and then translated from Arabic back to English. We tried our best to get the most exact translation in both parts, however, this is something that I would like for the reader to keep in mind that some alterations might have occurred during these translations.

Throughout the literature review that preceded the field research, constant changes and specifications were formed for the sampling strategies of the research. In the end, the specifications were formulated regarding the time period spent in Jordan, the age of the Syrian refugees, and the type of settlement.

For the time period, the informants that came to Jordan before 2013 were preferred. This specification allowed this research to focus on the development of the Jordanian response to the acceptance of the Syrian refugees through time and gives a background to the present behaviour of the informants.

Age was taken into consideration to address the issues of the “working age” of the Syrian refugees. For this reason, the informants between the age of 20 to 36 were preferred, however a couple of interviews with older informants were later added as a reference group. With this age specification, two major groups of informants formed, one where the informants had previously worked in Syria and the other one that was still in school in Syria and their first work experience occurred in Jordan. These specifications were taken in consideration when forming the factors that influence the informant’s attitude toward work in Jordan.

A decision was made that the research will solemnly focus on the Syrian refugees living in the urban areas in Jordan, therefore there were no interviews conducted among those Syrian refugees living at the refugee camps in Jordan. The decision was based on three main reasons. Firstly, the literature review on this topic made it clear that most of the research done among the Syrian refugees has been done at the refugee camps and so I did not feel the urge to further discuss a topic that has already drawn the attention of the national, Jordanian, and international scholars. Secondly, it is not as simple as it might seem to do qualitative research at a refugee camp. This is not so much an issue of administrative constraints that would be manageable. However, as I was informed, people in the refugee camp often don't feel comfortable to speak freely with a stranger about the life within the borders of the camp. The camps are run by the Jordanian government, and UNHCR, which creates tension inside of a camp among the refugees when people from outside come to ask questions that could have an impact on their life within the camp. Therefore, the answers given by the Syrian refugees to the researchers during the interviews are often distorted to “keep the managers of the camp happy” and do not reflect reliably the reality the refugees experience. Lastly, these two experiences, living in the city and living at a refugee camp, are connected to so many specifications that it would be

problematic to conclude the research that would sufficiently describe the experience of both groups.

Syrian refugees interviewed for this research, the informants of this research, are in greater detail described in the next chapter in table 4. They were interviewed all in the same format, through semi structured interviews based on the TPB theoretical framework.

More interviews with academics, researchers, ministry and NGO workers are not included here, as these interviews did not follow the same form and structure. There interviews include specifically two interviews with researchers from the University of Jordan, and one interview with a researcher and former head of the Forced Migration center at the Yarmouk University in Irbid; further an interview with a UNHCR work; an interview with the Refugee Affairs Coordinator at the Ministry of Interior in Jordan; an interview with a Czech consul in Amman and an interview with a Belgian researcher from the Free University of Brussels-VUB. These interviews took the form of an open conversation rather than a structured interview. Nonetheless, the conversations were very helpful and important in putting this thesis together, especially at the beginning stage of trying to form the right questions and to gain a deeper understanding of the researched topic.

## 4. FINDINGS

### 5.1. LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES OF SYRIAN REFUGEES

Syrian refugees, in general, as well as the informants of this research, are diverse and skilled individuals that are facing difficult life situations that are putting their lives and the lives of their families in danger. After arriving in Jordan, different paths emerged for each to deal with the vulnerable situations. The most basic need was to figure out an income-based activity that would provide for them to survive. The NGO's like UNHCR try to provide and help out with some of these needs, however, those are not sufficient and so other strategies need to be formed. The livelihood strategies are here understood as activities that are directly or indirectly linked to livelihood opportunities.

The refugees interviewed for this research came to Jordan at the beginning of the conflict and so their move was motivated by similar situations they found themselves in. Also, according to the migration laws, it is usually the upper-middle class and middle class that moves first, and during the interviews this was also confirmed that the socio-economic backgrounds of the informants were similar, corresponding with the middle-class description.

Another similarity is the regional background the informants came from to Jordan. As they all arrived at the beginning of the war, the main reason for leaving was the rising aggression of Bashar Assad's regime and the heavy urban areas of the East and North East Syria. As these informants represent the urban middle class of Syria other certain specifications that were shared among the respondents were also observed. For example, a similar lifestyle, family background, and education trajectories. Even though some of the informants were too young to finish higher education before fleeing Syria, the clear intention to continue in higher education was implied, which also provides information about the characteristics of this group of informants. The urban background implies that there are certain job-related experiences that the informants are less likely to be exposed to. For example, and this will play a significant role in the employment intentions after the arrival in Jordan, all informants said they had zero prior experience of work in agriculture, construction or manufacturing.

As these are the only three open sectors for Syrians in the Jordanian labour market, it will clearly impact their decision-making about the involvement in the labour market, which will be further discussed in following chapters.

During the interviews different themes about the strategies of sustaining their livelihoods were discussed. Some of them are more obvious than the others. After the transcripts and analysis of the interviews, six major livelihood strategies that repeated themselves the most in the interviews were identified. These are: Work in the formal sector, work in the informal sector, family support and social networks, NGO support, resettlement to third countries, and the return back to Syria.

For most of the informants one of the strategies would take the place of a primary strategy and others would be considered as supportive or alternative to the first one. Diversification of the livelihoods, however, was present in the lives of most of the informants. Table 4 shows the characteristics of the informants that are relevant to their employment choices.

Table 4: Informants

	Name	Age	Gender	Governorate	Occupation in Jordan	Occupation in Syria	Type permit	of	Livelihood strategies
1	Obada	25	Male	Daraa	Freelancer	Student	Volunteer Ag. / No Permit		1. Formal 2. Resettlement
2	Lara	38	Female	Damascus	NGO Founder	Accountant	Stakeholder		1. Formal 2. Resettlement 3. Return
3	Ammar	24	Male	Homs	Business Start Up Founder	Student	Volunteer Ag. / No work permit		1. Resettlement 2. NGO 3. Informal
4	Fayhaa	37	Female	Damascus	Graphic Interior Designer	Graphic Interior Designer	No work permit		1. Return 2. Resettlement 3. Informal
5	Rania	36	Female	Damascus	Hairdresser	Hairdresser	No work permit		1. Informal Sector
6	Sarah	28	Female	Damascus	Officer at Private Company	Student	No work permit		1. Informal 2. Family 2. Resettlement
7	Elham	50	Female	Daraa	Sweets Shop Assistant	Stay Home Parent	No work permit		1. Informal

8	Ammar	34	Male	Rural Damascus	Journalist	Journalist	No work permit	1. Informal 2. Resettlement
9	Mahmood B	60	Male	Damascus	Business Owner / Pastry Shop	Business Owner	Stakeholder	1. Informal
10	Mahmood	22	Male	Aleppo	Selling Homemade Goods	Student	No work permit	1. Informal 2. Resettlement 3. NGO
11	Hossam	30	Male	Damascus	IRC Staff	Medical Student	Work permit	1. Formal 2. Family 3. Resettlement
12	Yazan	28	Male	Damascus	Graphic Design / Carpenter	Student	No work permit	1. Informal 2. NGO
13	Median	26	Male	Damascus	Home Decoration Business	Student	Used to have a permit	1. Informal 2. NGO
14	Aref	30	Male	Hama	Construction / Teaching	Student	Used to have a permit	1. Informal 2. Resettlement
15	Eyad	28	Male	Damascus	Student	Student	Volunteer Ag. / No work permit	1. Informal 2. NGO 3. Resettlement
16	Muhand	24	Male	Daraa	Researcher	Student	Work permit	1. NGO 2. Informal
17	Limara	27	Female	Sweida	Officer at Private Company	Student	Volunteer Ag.t / No Permit	1. NGO 2. Family 3. Informal
18	Nwaf	30	Male	Homs	Student / Sale Assistant	Business Owner	Work permit	1. Informal 2. NGO

Source: Own research

### 5.1.1 INFORMAL SECTOR

First and foremost, the primary strategy for the Syrian refugees is staying in the informal sector of the labour market. All of the Syrian refugees interviewed are currently involved in the informal sector or have been for the majority of the time they have spent in Jordan.

An important part of providing for themselves and for their families is found in the informal sector of the Jordanian labor market. Even though this is not the desired solution for the Jordanian government, it continues to be the most common solution for the Syrian refugees on how to get work and provide for their families. For this reason, the obstacles of getting a

job and staying in the informal sector are included as it is essential to the self-provision of the Syrian refugees for themselves.

*“My mom makes eggplant at home and me and my two brothers then sell it in the streets. That is our main income.”* Mahmood

### 5.1.2. SUPPORT FROM FAMILY

A natural way to provide for one's self in the Middle Eastern context is the providence and closeness to the nuclear family as well as distant family members. Families, especially in vulnerable settings, live together, and so the cost of living and housing are shared among the members. It is also common that within the more traditional families it will be the male members that will be providing for the whole family financially, whereas the female members would stay home to take care of the household. Even though this is common, it is not a rule, and there are many families where the income is shared between both male and female members. Either way, the family and connections that family members have bring other possibilities of sustaining a livelihood for one's household.

*“I live with my parents and my sisters. I am the oldest one, so I help my dad with the income for the family. I mean I do now, first when we came it was them that supported me to finish university here first. And the job I do now, I got thanks to my dad's friends. I am happy. I help with some of the bills.”* Sarah

*“When we first came with my family to Amman, in 2012, we thought we would stay just for a couple of weeks, nobody could know we would stay for so long. When we first came, we stayed with our uncle in his house. But soon more and more people started to come and wanted to stay with him, so he had to figure out something else. He helped us to get this place where we live now. The whole family does.... Now I am the only one working in the family. My mom makes “magduz” and I sell it on the streets. This is our only income right now.”* Mahmood

An interesting example of the family's connections is the “vasta”, which are the connections to the officials in the government often through a family, a clan, or the place of origin. Even though it does not guarantee an access to the resources or direct financial support (however it might eventually lead to that), the main advantage it provides is the favoritism among the government officials.

Family support however cuts both ways, and as individuals can benefit from it, it also comes with responsibilities. Most of the Syrian refugees still have some family members in Syria and are bonded to them by their support of those members. This support can be financial, through remittances.

*“I send money to Syria for my family. If I make here 10-20 JD I know I can send it to my family in Syria and it will count for a lot, because the Jordanian money is now good in Syria, better than here in Jordan. It makes me happy to know that I can help my family in Syria.”* Fayhen

Alternatively, Syrians may also refuse job offers in Jordan to protect their family members in Syria.

*“My husband was offered a job in one of the Jordanian TV stations. It would be a good job, but they openly criticized the regime in Syria. He asked them if he could work for the station secretly but they said no. So he could not accept. It would put our family in Syria in danger. The police and the “shabiha” pay attention to these things and it could hurt them.”* Fayhen

### 5.1.3. RESETTLEMENT

As there is no possibility of the naturalization of the Syrian in Jordan, and without even the status of a “refugee”, the Syrians are “stuck” with the status of an “asylum seeker” recognized by the UNHCR, which provides only very limited rights to the Syrians.

*“Can you imagine for 9 years working illegally without any hope for the future that it could get better. Even with driving the car. I cannot do it, because I am not allowed to have a driving license here so every day, I drive a bicycle to work, because I am too afraid the police would stop me and ask me about my driving license. If I was in any western country, for example, America, I would have not only had the status of a refugee but by now I could even have a long term visa or apply for citizenship, but here I have been the whole time just an asylum seeker, not even a refugee.”* Ammar J.

As a coping strategy for this situation and the feeling of being “stuck”, the resettlement provides at least a glimpse of hope to find a way to sustain livelihoods for the individuals and whole families.

*“So, if I get a work opportunity outside of Jordan, I will take it and leave Jordan. There is no future for me.” Ammar (Journalist)*

*“I have applied to go to the US. I have completed everything and now I am just waiting for the call. I hope it will come soon. It took us three years to go through the whole process, it was not easy but this would be the best possibility for my future.” Ammar*

#### 5.1.4. SUPPORT FROM NGO

As a part of the discussion about the different approaches to development, from basic needs approach to the rights-based approaches, I was wondering how efficient the support of the local and international NGOs is, when it comes to the sustainable livelihoods of the Syrians. In most of the interviews, Syrians highlight the benefits of the support from the UNHCR programs at the beginning of the stay.

*“At the beginning we received cash assistance from the UNHCR but they cut it about three years in. And the assistance we got for taking care of my brother stopped after a while.” Ammar*

*“I didn't take any assistance from the UNHCR, I didn't look for any help because I could always support myself with the sessional jobs.” Aref*

*“It was really helpful at the beginning. JD was stronger a couple of years back and we could buy more for 1 JD. It was mostly meeting all our needs to cover food for the month. Now, it's very little and it does not help with what we need. After we registered, we started getting the food coupons from the WFP. First it was 24 JD per person but later it got reduced to 13 JD per person (for one month). From 2016 the coupons decreased to 13 JD,” Mahmood*

Another way how the NGOs support the livelihoods is in providing training and requalification courses that aim to prepare Syrians to do a new profession in Jordan; or to provide training that leads to future self-development in the fields the Syrians are interested in, even though they are not connected to a profession. The main problem with the courses and training is that they are not linked directly to employment, and often leave Syrians without a job after the training is over.

*“I did a couple of vocational training by different organizations, I finished it and it was all nice, but how is it really useful if I cannot find a job anyway? I asked them if they would help me get a job, they said no. So why did I do this training in the first place. They always ask me to come back and do interviews and be in pictures because to them I am the “success story” but really what kind of success that is if I am still without a job. I hate that they do that. I don’t want to be in their pictures. They did not really help me.”* Fayhan

Similar to the family support, the NGO support was mostly used at the beginning stages of the settlement in Jordan and addressed the basic needs of Syrians at that time. Here are mentioned things such as food coupons, the project of the World Food Programme, however there have been more projects similar to this, like for example the winter package by UNHCR that provided Syrians with clothing for the winter season. It offered basic support but to this point has not been able, for different reasons, to efficiently support Syrians in sustaining their livelihoods

However, an interesting livelihood strategy connected to the support of the NGOs for the Syrians is connected to the academic scholarships offered to the Syrian university students in Jordan. Most of the Syrian refugees that enrolled at University are supported by some kind of scholarship, mostly from overseas organizations, university corporations and other international students that have created specific programs for support of the Syrian refugees. When it comes to NGO support, this made the most significant impact on the lives, especially of the young refugees, after the initial financial support.

In the table 4, where livelihood strategies are categorized for each of the informants according to their priority, when the NGO support is mentioned it is without exceptions referring to these scholarships offered to university students.

#### 5.1.5. RETURN TO SYRIA

Repatriation and voluntary return migration are seen as the desirable and durable solution to the refugee crisis by many countries. From the point of view of the refugees, it is a much more complicated topic that combines personal desires and longings with the analytical calculations of risks and benefits.

When asked by all the informants during the interviews, all Syrians said they would prefer to go back to Syria “someday”, however when asked about a specific timeline of months, years or even a decade, they were not able to imagine they would actually be able to return “that soon”. The return to Syria was seen as the last option after all other coping strategies fail.

Bashar Assad was named every time as the number one reason why Syrians do not consider returning to Syria yet. However, other issues came up as reasons why Syrian refugees don’t see Syria as a place for living.

*“Bashar Assad is not the only problem in Syria. There are more sides, about 200 of fractions that try to be in control. It's hard to understand all the actors in the conflict. If there was some kind of stability and safety we would consider going back. “ Nawaf*

*“So, for my cousin it was not a problem to go back because he does not have a problem with the regime. So, if he finds a better job in Syria than in Jordan he can go back. For me this is not an option. The regime would not allow me to just return so I have to figure out how to stay in Jordan no matter how difficult it will get. Maybe I will need to start working in a grocery store, but I will have to figure out something.” Ammar J*

Especially by the male Syrians, one of the main concerns was the compulsory military service.

*“I would come back if Assad would leave. If I had the money, 8000 Syrian pounds, I could pay the government not to go to the military service. Otherwise I would still have to do 1,5 years and I don't want to go. It's very harsh you know. Normally the army would not be a problem but there is war right now. I don't want to fight for Assad in the war. Until I am 45 years old. Even when I went to university I would still need to go to the university. If I went to the army, I would become an officer because I have a degree. I don't want to be an officer because I don't want to tell someone to kill someone else.” Aref*

The move back to Syria stays as the last possible coping strategy for the Syrians at this moment. The situation - financial and material, however, may force the Syrians to consider going back, nonetheless. Fayhan and her husband have struggled for years to find decent work in Jordan, without any long-term positive outcome. They are both artists and interior designers as well as graphic designers, which does not lead to employment in Jordan as those are the closed professions for foreigners. Fayhan put it this way herself:

*“We want to come back to Syria soon. My mom is in Syria, she is older, she is 70 years ago and on her own. She lives in rural Damascus and I feel like we should go back to take care of her. Because we cannot find a job here, it really makes no sense that we are staying here. So, we might go back soon. Maybe I will first just go back and see how life is there like. And if I can get a job there, I would consider all of us to move. It all depends where I can find a job. If I find it here, I will stay in Amman and if in Damascus I will go back to work there and take care of my mother. Of course, I know it’s not safe for us to return, many of my family members were killed by the regime, but there are no other options, are they?”* Fayhan

#### 5.1.6. FORMAL SECTOR


There is not much involvement in the former sector from the side of the Syrian refugees. It is still understood to be unreachable by many of the Syrian refugees due in part to their experiences and policies, but also due to the lack of their interest in the sectors the Jordanian ministry of labour opened up for Syrians. Using the Theory of Planned behaviour, the next chapters will look at the factors that impact the lack of the interest in the side of the Syrian refugees.

## 5.2. INTENTIONS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES TO WORK WITH THE WORK PERMIT

### 5.2.1. FRAMEWORK

For exploring the intentions and the factors that impact the intention of Syrian refugees to work with the work permit, the framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour was used. The framework looks at the intention, that in this case is “the intention to obtain a work permit for the purpose of getting a job”, and is analyzed through three factors: Attitudes toward the work permits, social norms regarding the work permits, and the perceived behaviour control over obtaining the permit and being able to work with it.

Graph 2: Components of the Theory of Planned Behaviour in the context of work permits



Source: Own interpretation of the Theory of Planned Behaviour components

### 5.2.2. INTENTION AND ACTION

During the interviews the lack of interest in the formal sector, with the current limitations, was very obvious. The Syrian refugees interviewed look for different ways to sustain livelihoods but their intention to do that through the work facilitated by the work permits was not one of them. The intention to obtain a work permit was low, even with the individuals who were talking about getting the work permit, when asked about what steps they have already taken in

order to obtain it, there were mostly no steps taken. Those that used to own a work permit did not plan to renew it, with the exceptions of using it for different reasons than for the work itself.

Among the informants, three were the current holders of work permits, and two were former work permit holders, however only two of the five used the work permit for the purpose of work. This suggests the low intention among the Syrian refugees to work with the work permit in the open sectors.

### 5.2.3. ATTITUDES

The attitude of the individual toward the work permits were not enthusiastic when the topic was brought up. Many Syrians were surprised this was even a question and made it clear it was not on the list of their priorities. Sometimes they even needed to be told about what these work permits are.

*“I have heard about them before. But I really don’t know anything about how they work or how to get them. I think I would need to pay something, right? But I don’t think I could do any job I would like to do. It’s all construction, I think.”* Ammar

Often the attitude would be dismissive about the work permits, as seen in the phrases beginning with “Yes, I would like to work legally, but...”. The attitude to work in the legal sector is not strong enough for Syrians to be willing to make another step in order to find out how the work permits actually work.

*“I would like to have a legal job in Jordan, but not the job that a work permit lets me have. I have never worked in construction or on the field as a farmer before. I don't know anything about how to do this job. I want to do what I was trained for and what I am passionate about.”* Ammar J.

*“I want to do what I was trained to do; I don’t care if it’s formal or informal. I don’t care for a contract. I just want to make sure I do something that I am good at and that I get paid for it at the end.”* Mahund

*“I don’t care about a work permit. It’s so stupid. I used to have one but it is easier to get a job in the informal sector. I can get a better paycheck in the informal sector. And there is always a job to be found”* Aref

*“I want to be a businessman; I do not need a work permit. It’s not for me.” Ayed*

It is important to acknowledge the difference between the attitude to work in the formal sector though the work permits and the attitude toward obtaining a work permit itself without the intention to actually be employed within one of the three sectors opened to the Syrian refugees with the work permits (construction, manufacturing, and agriculture).

There are benefits of owning the work permit even without the actual employment, and Syrian refugees are often well aware of these benefits. The price for the permits is so far kept low, and so they are now being pursued with other intentions than for getting employment. Among the reasons for getting a permit is the formalization of the stay in Jordan that allows the Syrian refugees to travel outside of the country without the fear of not being able to return:

*“However, I might renew my permit in two months because I am planning to go to Turkey, and I need it to be able to travel.” Aref*

*“I missed a conference in Lebanon last year, because I was afraid if I go, I would not be able to return to Jordan. So I think next time I will first get the work permit to make sure it would be ok for me to go.” Limara*

Even without the plans to travel outside of Jordan, the work permit legalizes the stay of the Syrian refugees in Jordan and provides for them this sense of security that they will not be deported at the will of a police officer or another authoritative figure without a proper reason:

*“I have a permit for agriculture, but I don't know how to work in agriculture. In Syria I lived in the city not in the village, so I don't know this work. I got it because it was for free, just 10 JD, that's why I got it. When I travel from Mafraq to Amman for example and the police stops me and asks me where my permission is, I tell them I work in agriculture. They just let you go then and don't ask too many questions. This is why I keep my agriculture permit and renew it every year. I will never work as a farmer, I do not know anything about farming, but for these encounters it is worth it.” Nawaf*

*“From the benefits the permits give me, the most important to me is the protection, to be here legally. I don't care too much about social insurance because I would have to work at one place for at least 10 years to have any benefits. And with health insurance I don't even know how it works here. I don't think it would be so easy to get anyway. So the protection. Especially I worry about my mother. She is very old and what would happen to her if I lose my*

*job and can not work here or if they sent me back to Syria? Who would take care of her then?"*

Rania

Rania is an example of a refugee with the attitude toward work permits for the reasons mentioned above, yet she is not planning (intention) to change her profession for it. Instead she is planning and already discussing this with her employer, that she would keep her profession (of being a hairdresser) but her work permit would state that she is a cleaner, which is an open profession for the Syrian refugees.

#### 5.2.4. SOCIAL NORMS

When asked about the family pressures or family expectations about obtaining a work permit, the responses were similar to the attitudes of the Syrians asked at the interviews.

*"I don't know anyone from my family or friends that would have the work permit. I once thought about getting it but it did not make sense, because the job I wanted to do is not allowed with the permit."* Limara

*"My parents do not care if I have a permit or not. The important thing is that I can help with paying the monthly rent. This is all anyone cares about, really."* Sarah

*"It's my father and I who are once working in the family and neither of us has the work permit. It doesn't matter to us."* Ammar

*"Why would they want me to have it? I don't understand the question. I mean it's not that I would have a better job or get more money, it doesn't work like that."* Eyad

It was even surprising to many of the refugees that they were asked about it. The informal sector is well established in Jordan, especially with the involvement of the foreign workers. Syrians that came to Jordan seven to eight years ago have had enough time to plug into the structure of the informal sector, and through family connections and social networks they have been able to figure out an alternative livelihood. Even though that there are many frustrations among them about the wages and the conditions they often have to work in, in their eyes (their attitudes) but also in the eyes on their family members, and people around them, the work permits do not present a solution to this issue and is not therefore attractive enough to make it interesting for them.

### 5.2.5. PERCEIVED BEHAVIOUR CONTROL

Perceived behaviour control plays an instrumental role in the decision-making and in forming the intention, therefore will be given a separate chapter that will discuss the perceived control of working with the work permit through the lens of the obstacles that the Syrian faces when trying to obtain it or afterward when trying to use it in the workplace.

### 5.3. OBSTACLES IN THE LABOUR MARKET

The Jordan Compact promised to create work permits for Syrian refugees in order to be able to enter the formalized labour market. The obstacles in obtaining and using the permits are described in this chapter. It follows up on the previous research question that was looking into the forming of intentions to work with the work permit in Jordan. This part will give an insight in greater detail about the obstacles that impact the perceived behaviour control of the Syrian refugees over the decision.

After the interviews, the obstacles mentioned and described by the refugees were sorted and categorized for better understanding. There are four categories most obstacles fall into: economic, bureaucratic, informational asymmetries and individual or social obstacles connected to the work environment of the formalized market.

This part of the chapter refers to the obstacles and therefore the perceived control the Syrians feel they have over this situation of working with the work permit that directly includes their intention and their action in getting further involved in the formal market through work permits.

It was pointed out in the previous chapter that, from the informant group interviewed for this research, there were not many people interested in the work permits and even less people interested in finding employment in one of the sectors designated for the Syrian refugees through the work permits. Therefore, the second part of this chapter will look into the obstacles the Syrian refugees face when trying to sustain their livelihoods through other forms of employment- as an investor in the formal sector, or in working in the informal sector. These obstacles are more general and apply also to the situations when working with the work permit.

The categories of the obstacles faced by the Syrian refugees while obtaining the work permit or trying to sustain their livelihoods differently are shown in table 5.

Table 5: Obstacles in categories

	Work Permit	Sustainable Livelihoods
Economic	Low wages	Low wages
Bureaucratic	Closed professions Needed documentation Training required Missing paths from requalification	Challenges for investors Driving license Missing paths from education
Informational	Lack of Information Misleading information	
Individual / Social	Lack of trust Competing with the Jordanians Uncertainty	Exploitation Discrimination of Syrians

Source: Own research

### 5.3.1. OBSTACLES REGARDING THE WORK PERMITS

The work permits for Syrians are the main “product” of the Jordan Compact, which has a direct impact on the refugee’s livelihood of entering the formal sector. The next chapter points out the complications Syrians face, that are connected to the form of employment that is most preferable by the Jordanian government.

#### 5.3.1.1. ECONOMIC

##### Low wages & low conditions

When going through so many loops in order to get a formal job, the expectation would be to have a promise of better wages or better work conditions. However this is not the case when it comes to the experience of the work permits with the refugees. Often these jobs are worse paid than informal jobs. The work permit does not guarantee a better work environment or conditions and does not create assistance that would allow the refugees to file complaints about

their work situation. The work permit, solely, opens a door to the sectors where the jobs can be found, but does not provide any other assistance that would help to protect the refugees.

### 5.3.1.2. BUREAUCRATIC

#### Closed professions

Regularly mentioned by the Syrian refugees during the interviews was their frustration from the small range of professions they are allowed to choose from when entering the labor market with work permits.

The professions opened to Syrians are in agriculture, manufacturing and construction. However, these are not prominent jobs, and often do not incite interest in the Syrian refugees to enter a low paid job that does not guarantee year-long earnings (as often jobs in these sectors are offered seasonally.)

Refugees that live in the urban areas and came during the first years of the war, as mentioned before, came from a middle class Syrian society and often had their careers or a path for a career prepared, in the case that they were still at a university when they were forced to flee.

*“The first time I heard about the work permits on social media, so I went to the ministry of labor to ask about the permits. I wanted to hear which professions I can get the permit for. And here is the problem, I come from Aleppo, it’s an industrial city and most people work in the factories, or commerce or services. But none of these professions are available for Syrians. I used to do marketing in Syria, but I cannot do it here.”* Mahmood

When someone has spent years in education for a profession or has already practiced a higher qualified profession, it is against the nature of that individual to be willing to access a low skilled job just because it’s offered to them. Especially, and we get to it in greater detail later, when the possibility or the idea of a possibility to practice your career, even informally, is still on the table. As explained by a Syrian doctor that is a refugee living in Amman:

*“Even though I was not allowed to work here as a doctor I made an agreement with a local doctor that he will let me practice medicine. I wanted to do it, so if I came back to Syria, I would not lose my practice.”* Hossan

However, this often leads to exploitation by the employers, as addressed here in the same interview with the doctor:

*“...but it was not a paid job. You know, I am not allowed to work here as a doctor, so it was not a contract but more like an informal agreement between us. I work 10 hours for 10 JD. That is very low. I worked like this for more than one year.”* Hossan

Another example of a Syrian that wanted to perform her job even though it was a closed profession to her is Rania. Rania is a hairdresser, and she was also trying to figure out how to stay in her chosen field that would not require her to learn something different from the beginning. Her employer issued her a permit that stated that she was doing a different job, that is legally open to Syrians in Jordan, even though she continued to work as a hairdresser:

*“The owner could not give me a permit for a hairdresser so what he offered is that I would get a permit as a cleaner of the salon. That’s what the permit would say that my work is. But I would still work as a hairdresser. I do not care about what the permit says that my work is, as long as I have a legal permit...”* Rania

The same strategy was chosen by a journalist from Syria who wanted to benefit from the social and health insurance that are connected to the work permit jobs. However, even he is trying to find a way to keep the profession he started before he came to Jordan:

*“And my contact is not connected to any benefits like health or social insurance. So, there is no protection in this way either. The organization is working to figure out how to give Syrians a proper contract, but the accountant says it’s impossible because it’s a close profession, open only for the Jordanians. We are now trying to figure out if the contract could say I was a consultant, maybe it would work.”* Ammar J.

Closed professions are often the deal breaker for the Syrians refugees, the reason why they will not pursue the work permit at the first place. Going through all the other different challenges named below, knowing that in the end there is a job waiting for them that they are not interested in, that does not even insure them an income that would be sustainable for their needs is simply not worth it.

### Documentation

To obtain a work permit, the application process comes with its own set of challenges. The most commonly noted by those refugees interviewed that obtained a permit or had it in the past

was the problem with the lack of clear directions of how to apply and obtain a permit. On multiple occasions the refugees were going from office to office to ask for advice on how to apply.

*“I wanted to get a work permit in 2018, to work regularly and legally. There was no instruction of how you should apply. So I first went to the Al Abdabi area, but it was for the Egyptian workers, Then I went to the Hussein area but it was for the shop owners, then to another office but it was only for restaurants, then someone told me the area where I have to go to get the permit for construction. So, I went there but it was after the open hours of the office, so no one was there. There was no information how you should apply. It was all very foggy. No one tells you the steps that you are supposed to take.”* Median

This is just an illustration of a problem that was felt in most of the interviews. That is, the absence of a formal and clear information flow that would help the refugees to orient themselves in the formal steps in obtaining the work permits.

Partially this role is fulfilled by the UNHCR, that collects information and through social media and text messages tries to provide information relevant to the Syrian population in Jordan

#### Training requirements, requalification and missing a path to employment

Frustration builds among the refugees that went through the training offered by the government or the NGOs in Jordan that are focused on requalification to help the refugees get employed with the work permits. These training are not linked with specific job openings and often, after the training is over, Syrians still find themselves without employment.

*“Three years ago, I got a work permit. After the training from a vocational school I got my permit. The school told us we cannot get the work permit before we get the training, because we need to be trained in the work. But that was not true because many people get work permits without any training. I got the work permit in decoration. (It’s the construction sector, ed. note) The training in vocation is in 4 days. I didn't learn anything there. I didn't have to pay for the school. They paid me 4 JD for each day I went to school. I had it just for one year. I didn't renew it because two years ago I could not get any job with the permit. It was really bad. And so I worked mostly from home, so nobody cared if I had it or not.”* Aref

*“I did a couple of vocational training by different organizations, I finished it and it was all nice, but how is it really useful if I cannot find a job anyway? I asked them if they would help me get a job, they said no. So why do I do this training in the first place. They always ask me to come back and do interviews and be in pictures because to them I am the “success story” but really what kind of success that is if I am still without a job. I hate that they do that. I don’t want to be in their pictures. They did not really help me.”* Fayhan

*“I have taken part in over 40 trainings since I came here. It was all different types from learning how to do accounting to PR and public management for example. I was very informative, and I think it was very helpful, yes. ... but did I get a job thanks to these training sessions? No, I did not.”* Muhand

### 5.3.1.3. INFORMATIONAL

#### Lack of information about the possibilities and misleading information

Many misconceptions are surrounding the topic of work permits among the refugees. From being afraid to lose the food coupons from the World Food Programme (WFP) that offers 20 JD per person per week, to being afraid of losing a status of an “asylum seeker” altogether. Lara, the Syrian stakeholder that employs 70 Syrian women in her company and has to face these misconceptions daily says:

*“Some of the Syrians are afraid that if you have a permit you cannot receive the support from the UNHCR. That is not true, but some Syrians don’t know that and that’s why they will not try to get a permit. They don’t trust anyone.”* Lara

This is an example of answers that would often show up in between the lines in many of the interviews. Even though ILO and UNHCR try to give the proper information to Syrians through social media and text messages, the lack of trust and untrue ideas about the work permits slows the possible process of more Syrians applying for the permits.

Some of the Syrians did not even know about this possibility of the work permits, even though this was more of a rare occasion. More often partial information was missing, for example the cost of the permit, who pays for the permit (the refugee himself, the employer, or is it not paid for at all), who qualifies or what training one needs to have before applying. All

these questions that are not easy to find clear answers complicates the decision for the Syrians to go ahead and present themselves during the interviews.

*“I am not sure how it would even work. Who would tell me how to apply? Every time I heard something else. Once it’s me who needs to pay for the permit and once its the company or the employer? I am good with the work I have; I do not want to complicate it even more”*  
Sarah

#### 5.3.1.4. INDIVIDUAL / SOCIAL

##### Lack of trust in the system

One of the advantages of the Jordan Compact is that it provides for the refugees’ access to social and health insurance through legal employment. The paperwork, again as it is with getting the permit itself, is however not clear and many employers are providing misleading information to the refugees.

*“It’s better to have workers without the permit because I don’t have to pay the taxes for them. The permits themselves are not the problem, they are not so expensive. Only 8 JD per year. That is nothing. I have to pay the government if I have Syrians working for me with the permit.”* Lara

##### Competing for the same work with the Jordanians

The uncomfortable experience of having to “compete” for the same jobs with the Jordanians, creates more tension in a society that is already very sensitive to the topic of employment, or to be more precise, unemployment. This tension accumulates in the formal as well as in the informal jobs and can have a significant consequence on the refugee’s psychology.

*“The problem with the attitude toward the Syrians is worse when it comes to the professions that Syrians and Jordanians both compete for. These people have a much more negative approach to Syrians in Jordan.”* Ammar J.

##### Uncertainty

Work permits are issued for the fixed time period of one year. After that they need to be applied for and paid for again. Even though the price of the work permits for Syrians are lowered to

the minimum, at this point thanks to the agreement of Jordan Compact, there is no certainty for how long the price will be kept low. This uncertainty is making the refugees feel less willing to invest into a new type of employment without knowing if they will be able to afford it again the next year.

The work connected to the work permits is often issued for even shorter time periods than one year. The reasons can differ for why the employer decides to do this. One of them is that the type of work is often seasonal and thus the employers hire Syrian refugees when they need them. Other reasons can be that the organizations of companies hiring refugees are also unsure of how long they will be able to afford workers and solve this problem through creating shorter contracts.

*“My contract here I have always only for 4 months and every 4 months it’s renewed. It always depends on the situation in Syria. If they close the program, I will lose my job. I am not safe and there is a risk in living here.”* Hossan

### 5.3.2. OBSTACLES REGARDING THE SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS

#### 5.3.2.1. ECONOMIC

##### Low wages

A less common, yet still state-supported, way of formalized work is a contract between a Syrian refugee and an NGO with a volunteering contract. This contract provides mostly the covering of costs of transportation and is not therefore a proper income generator for the refugees. The benefits of this contract include the possibility to work in more sectors than just those opened for the work permit.

*“There is an outsourcing contract that we can sign. It says how many hours I have to work. It does not cover any health insurance unfortunately. It gives you a limited salary, there is a ceiling to the salary, and you cannot get more than this amount. Maybe it is not a contract, but it is more like an agreement. Another thing that is good is that I can take a day off, but of course I am not being paid for these days. But I am not an employee, you know, I am a volunteer. The bad thing is that I am not allowed to ever get promoted. I have to stay in this same position forever. I can never move ahead.”* Ammar

### 5.3.2.2. BUREAUCRATIC

#### Obstacles for the investors and business owners

One of the three ways to enter the formal sectors in Jordan for Syrians, other than the permit, is to become an investor or a business owner of a small to medium business. The costs of this are however too high for the vulnerable group of refugees. For this reason, this is not a common place of involvement for the Syrian in the labour market.

*“They told me I can register our work, but when I went to the ministry of the industry they told me you can register if you have 50,000 JD in the bank you can take a job and register it by my name. But If not, I can’t. Even when I go to the body of investment, so I told him the story. They tell me if you don't have a Jordanian partner, you must put 100 000 JD in the bank.”*

Lara

Another challenge is that a Syrian can start a business in Jordan only with a Jordanian business partner. All the papers are written on the Jordanian partner, and therefore there is no protection for the Syrian owners, which creates tension and exploitation of Syrian business partners.

*“He called me to tell me “now it's my company and you cannot do anything.” Yes, yes. It was that easy. You can imagine how I felt. I went to the police and I told him the story that this man stole my company. And then ask me, there's no contract between you and I. I said no. So they tell me they can't do anything. This broke me down and I think it's the end of everything...”* Lara

#### Driving license ban

The ban on driving licenses for the Syrian refugees aggravates the working situation and working opportunities even more. Especially in a city like Amman, where even within the city the distances are big, this creates an issue of getting to and from work. The problem only multiplies with the workers that commute to work (or university) from different cities. The Syrians are not allowed to own or drive a car in Jordan. The penalty ranges from getting a fine to being threatened with deportation.

*“This is really hard for me, because I have to commute to work every day for at least 30 minutes and if there is even more traffic. I have to take a taxi and that costs me about 5 JD. That's all the money I made that day.”* Obada

*“The public transportation is not good here. I have to take a taxi every time I need to go somewhere.” Hossam*

*“I have lived in Jordan before the war and it was not so bad before the conflict. They were not so strict with the documentation like they are now. Now we cannot even own or drive a car. How am I supposed to run a business without a car? That is impossible. Of course, I drive. I just cannot get caught.” Mahmood B.*

#### Obtaining a high school or University diploma

Struggles to finish high school or university and to find work after university include challenges that require their own research, as it is a very complex problem for the Jordanians to figure out. It does impact the ability of people to pursue work they would be interested in, even if just in the informal sector, and creates a feeling of hopelessness.

*“I studied for my bachelor’s degree in journalism in Syria. I had only one subject left from graduating, when I had to leave Syria. I went to university here again, for journalism, but I had to start from the beginning, nothing from Syria counted here.” Ammar J.*

*“I was finishing high school in Aleppo right before we had to leave very quickly to Jordan. We all thought it would be only for two weeks or maybe two months. When we realized it would take longer I wanted to do the final exam from high school here in Jordan but they told me I have to enter the last grade and go to school for a year. But the school year has already started, so they don’t have to wait for a year. So, I did. The next year there was a problem that I was too old to go back to school so they told me to wait again so that they would figure out something else. It has been 8 years and I still don’t have my high school diploma. The sad thing is, that I left Syria two weeks before my final exam was due there.” Mahmood*

#### 5.3.2.3. INDIVIDUAL / SOCIAL

##### Exploitation by employers and discrimination towards Syrians

The prejudice toward Syrian refugees in Jordan is also creating obstacles for the Syrians to enter a workplace that would represent a safe working environment. Here are examples of the experiences the Syrian refugees had:

*“The problem is not to find work, especially before in the informal sector, the problem is to be paid for the work that you did. You cannot complain anywhere because you work illegally. This is Arabic country; you can file a complaint, but it will not help you.” Aref*

*“I always work the longest hours at the shop. I have to. I am the only Syrian there, so if someone does not want to do something or it’s a holiday and somebody needs to stay longer in the shop it would be me. I am not paid as much as the other ones there, but it is still the best job I could find right now. I am ok with it.” Nwaf*

*“I try to fit in. I try to speak Jordanian accent and I would try not to take the Syrian clients because I don’t want anyone at work to think that I am collaborating with other Syrians. I just say it in a friendly way to some of my coworkers “you take them”. I don’t want to generalize. I like the Jordanians and Palestinians here. I think most of them genuinely don’t care, but I have heard some remarks about Syrians before. Sometimes when people don’t know I am a Syrian, they would tell me I hate Syrians. I was shocked and very sad, but I didn’t tell her anything.” Rania*

*“I don’t feel left out in the sweet shop where I work. I think everyone is very happy working there. There are more foreigners, so nobody cares that I am Syrian. But I do try to speak more of the Jordanian accent still, just in case.” Elham*

*“I used to work in a fashion shop. The job was ok. I knew the owners so there were no problems. Only I was not allowed to say to anyone that I am Syrian or that other Syrians worked in the shop. The owners were afraid people would stop coming in. You know, people don’t trust the refugees, they say they are thieves. I really don’t understand why. I have not had a bad experience personally for treating me badly, but those are just the things I would hear at work.” Eyad*

Especially where the Jordanian and the Syrians compete for the same work positions, the tension is felt stronger. However, from the interviews, the Syrians mostly expressed gratitude for the Jordanians and for the possibilities they were provided in Jordan. These experiences, even though they are concerning to them, do not create an overall negative feeling towards Jordanians.

## 6. DISCUSSION

### WHAT ARE THE DEVELOPMENT CONSEQUENCES OF THE JORDAN COMPACT?

The first research question, that is found under the chapter “livelihood strategies,” tries to answer the question: what are the strategies and the paths Syrian refugees identify for themselves as they are trying to sustain a livelihood? The socio-economic situation, as well as demographic specifications, previous education and also their set of soft skills will impact these paths or strategies to reach sustainable livelihoods. The research identified 6 major paths that seemed to be the most significant ones. The involvement in the informal sector played the most significant role in the strategies of the Syrian refugees, and for most of them, represented the first choice in the strategies. Others, like resettlement, family support, support through different NGOs (mostly scholarships for university students), were also heavily present in their responses and usually were combined with one another to provide sustainable income for the individual or for the whole household. The return to Syria was viewed as one of the least desired options, however in some situations it was considered a realistic strategy to the economic deficits the Syrians are experiencing in Jordan right now. What was found to be problematic was the strategy that touches the involvement of the formal sector in Jordan.

The chapter about the livelihood strategies is describing these strategies in greater detail, including the voices of the refugees themselves. It is important to state that what is talked about here as “strategies” does not refer to concrete plans for the future, rather as some sort of directions the Syrian refugees are more likely to consider. There is no sense of much planning among the refugee community. Another observation made from the interviews, while discussing the strategies and perceived possibilities of the Syrians, was that a sense of hopelessness and feeling stuck was present in many of the interviews. In the words of one of the refugees interviewed: *“I don't have any plans. I don't have a plan for tomorrow. I don't know what I am going to do or what job I will be able to do.”*

From the observation and the interviews conducted, it seems that due to their status as asylum seekers, Syrians don't feel included in the greater society, and with the lack of opportunities for them to integrate long term, there is this feeling of being “trapped”, as it is explained in much of the literature focusing on the lives of refugees written for example by Betts, col (2017) or Jacobsen (2014), as being a very present feeling.

This research question tried to look at the livelihood strategies from a long-term point of view, but it would be helpful to research further the coping strategies in the short term, with the psychological aspects as well. As it was for example studied among the Sudanese refugees in Khawaja, White, Schwitzer, and Greenslade (2008), analyze the traumatic experiences of the refugee, prior and post migration, and what role faith plays in the experience. Being able to reframe the situation and other cognitive strategies to help with the everyday functioning in the society would be an interesting enrichment of livelihood strategies that are impacted by these everyday coping strategies. This was based on Research focused on Syrian women and their coping strategies with the trauma of war by Culcasi (2019). However, most of this research focuses on the refugees living in the refugee camps, where the experiences and coping and livelihood strategies highly differ from those living in the urban areas on their own, as it was also discussed by Bakewell (2000) bringing up this issue of self-settlement of refugees in Zambia, and many other authors that focus on the refugees studies like Black (*Putting Refugees in Camps*, 1998), Jacobsen (*The Economic Life of Refugees*”, 2005) and many others.

More studies like these could help with the inner obstacles of the Syrian refugees that, according to the Jordan Health Aid Society, “refugees struggle with mental health issues like grief, worry, fear, and the feeling of embarrassment and depression from not finishing their education” and this has impact on their well-being in general as well as their ability to initiate inclusion (Amjad, col., 2017).

The second research question tried to address further the issue of the lack of interest in the formal employment from the refugees’ perspective. Using the framework of the planned behaviour theory, the intention to obtain a work permit was studied with the factors that influence it. Attitudes of the informants, the (perceived) social norms that surround them, and the perceived control they feel they do or do not have in order to act toward the desirable outcome, in this case obtaining the work permit in order to get a job.

Even though this was intended to be the major question of the research a priori the interviews with the Syrians, it turned out to be very different from my expectations. It came as a surprise at first, how little the Syrian refugees that were interviewed knew or cared about the possibility of work permits. It was not seen as a way to improve their livelihoods or their standard of living and from the interviews. The attitudes as well as the social norms concerning the work permits (but even the work in the formal sector in general) were showing no interest

in this topic. There was just a very small variability in their intentions to work with the work permit in Jordan. While discussing these factors as well as the livelihood strategies, it became clear that other sources of income became easier to access with a better financial compensation.

The perceived behavioural control was addressed in a separate chapter that in greater detail described the obstacles the Syrian refugees face in their attempts to obtain the work permit and find a job within the labour market sectors opened for the Syrians. Three categories of obstacles were identified during the interviews. These obstacles are connected to economic factors, the bureaucracy, and the informational asymmetries. The major issue, however, regarding the work with the work permits, are the open sectors that these permits are issued for. This is where the greatest “gap” between the design of the Compact and the reality that Syrian refugees live in every day. As Lenner and Turner (2018) point out, the informal sector of the Jordanian labour market is too rooted in the economy and it would take more to change it than one decree. For Syrians it makes no sense to plan even short term to change work professions if it does not guarantee at least some improvement for their personal life.

Since there are other options than just the work permit, for how to be involved in the labour market in the formal or informal sector, the chapter further continues with the obstacles Syrian refugees face in the other parts of the labour market in relation to their pursuit of livelihoods.

These three chapters aimed to answer the three research questions asked at the beginning of the thesis: What are the livelihood strategies of Syrian refugees living in Jordan? What are the intentions of Syrian refugees to obtain a work permit? And what are the obstacles the Syrian refugees face in the labour market? The desire was to understand better the impact the Jordan Compact had on the lives of the Syrian refugees in Jordan and on their human development.

As the Jordan Compact connects the approaches and brings multiple actors together, there are still practices that would be interesting to look at through the lens of the development theories listed and shortly introduced in the theoretical part of the thesis.

As development is a wide topic, there are many ways to address it and understand it. Over time different approaches emerged to help guide policies and development programs primarily to help those in need the most. The Basic Needs Approach addresses the assistance through resources and services and treats the targeted group as “beneficiaries” that play more

of a passive role. This approach seems to be adopted and executed by the presence of the UNHCR in Jordan, that provides resources and services to the refugees on the basic needs level. This includes the food coupon assistance done by WFP. But other services that like using platforms on social media to spread needed and helpful information among the Syrian refugees has been many times pointed out by the refugees themselves as a very helpful and practical service that helps them orient themselves though the legal changes and new opportunities that emerge.

The Human-Rights Based Approach focuses on protecting and promoting the rights of individuals and treats them as actors that have their rights as well as responsibilities. It follows five principles: participation, empowerment, equality, non-discrimination, accountability, and transparency (OHCHR, 2006) Looking at the Jordan Compact through the lens of the Human-Rights Based Approach, that could be relevant for a discussion of the Compact and suggest some improvements for the future implementations.

The first principle, participation, could be a missing piece of the implementation. The Jordan Compact focuses on the development of Jordanian economy as well as the development of regarding the well-being of the Syrian refugees. However, it seems that it treats the refugees still as “beneficiaries” rather than “actors” in the process. The realization of rights, in this context at least the right connected to decent work opportunities, could be a part of the implementation of the Jordan Compact rather than just simply promoting the work permits, that are not even directly linked to a job opportunity. It seems like there is a gap that could be filled in with a better cooperation between the refugees themselves and the Jordanian government.

Empowerment is also a concept that recently has been widely promoted among the researchers and the organizations working with the refugees. It is used as a replacement for integration endeavour. However, I would argue that empowerment at its core is a great initiation, but it will only bring deeper frustration among the Syrian refugees if not combined and supported by rights and freedoms, and the possibility of future legalization of refugees in Jordan. Syrian refugees have lived in Jordan often for over 8 years, and the only status given to them is by the UNHCR, thanks to the Memorandum of Understanding, that attributes them the status of “Asylum seeker” (Beaujoun, Rasheed, 2020). To however be considered an asylum seeker for this period of time, without the future possibility of legalization on some level (understanding that naturalization in the situation Jordan finds itself in is not realistic in

the near future) would, in my opinion, solve many of these problems. Including the problem that also needs to be addressed, the closed professions that Syrians are not legally practicing even though they have all the qualifications and certificates from the Jordanian universities.

The Capabilities Approach emphasizes the development through realization of rights and through encouraging freedoms that would enable individuals to live their life to their potential in a way that they would value it the most (Sen, 1999). It moved from the legalistic understanding of rights (even though this is where the Capabilities Approach needs the assistance from the Human-Rights Based Approach to legally demand for universal rights to be respected (UNDP, 2000)). How this approach challenges the Jordan Compact in its narrow understanding of the access to the work in the formal sector. For most of the Syrian refugees interviewed, the work offered to them was humiliating and they felt ashamed to accept a job that was below their standard of pay as well as below their education. The pride in the Syrian refugees, in a positive meaning of the word, has not allowed them to take a job that does not reflect their capabilities and they would prefer to struggle on their own than to try to “fit the system”.

It is understandable that the Jordan government is fighting many battles, one of them being a big unemployment rate among the Jordanian citizens, that also needs to be addressed. Probably, the question is whether the Syrians are a real threat to the Jordanian economy or perhaps an opportunity to slowly restructure the labour market that already is not functioning.

The development theories provide some guidelines on how to look at one issue from different perspectives, and if anything, to start or continue a conversation that would normally be lost in bureaucracy and stereotypical thinking. This thesis tried, through the research questions and interviews with the Syrian refugees, to be a part of this conversation about the new outlook on the durable solutions for the Syrian refugee crisis.

## 7. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I tried to examine the inclusion of the Syrian refugees into the Jordanian labour market. Through semi-structured interviews done in three cities, Amman, Mafraq, and Irbid, in two visits- one in August 2019 and one in February 2020, I tried to bring the experiences of the inclusion into the Jordanian labour market of the refugees themselves.

As most of the Syrian refugees live outside of the refugee camps in the urban areas of Jordan, this thesis focused only on refugees with this type of settlement. The questions were designed in a way that would allow the Syrian refugees to express themselves and include their own experiences of challenges and obstacles that they found to be essential to them. The desire was to bring their voice to the topics and political decisions that directly impact their lives and livelihoods.

The structure of the questionnaire (ap.1) was designed with the help of the framework of the theory of planned behaviour to include different factors that play a role in the way Syrian refugees think and make decisions about their participation in the labour market. Since much of the previous research about the refugees inclusion in the labour market follows the sustainable livelihood approach introduced by Chambers, that includes many important aspects of the inclusion and addresses the main issue of sustainable livelihoods of the refugees (Scoones, 1998). Also, this approach was acknowledged in the preparation of the research and the questionnaire itself. Even though it does not address all the aspects of this approach it loosely follows the structure and addresses parts of this approach that felt to be most relevant to this research - the livelihood strategies of the Syrian refugees.

The three research questions focused on the experiences of Syrian refugees with the labour market in Jordan and on their decision-making about their involvement in the formal sector through the work permits, and about their livelihood strategies.

The final chapter, discussion, aimed to consider some of the development consequences of the Jordan Compact through three development theories that are focused on the individual's development.

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## APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Interview questionnaires

Appendix 2: Work Permit

## Appendix 1

### Interviews questionnaires

<p>Introduction Questions</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What name we can use for and during the interview and research?</li> <li>2. How old are you?</li> <li>3. Which city/area do you come from Syria?</li> <li>4. When did you arrive to Jordan?</li> <li>5. What is your education level? (Are you still studying or planning to continue your education? Explain.)</li> <li>6. What made you decide to move to Amman (Irbid) and start working here?</li> <li>7. <b>Have you been part of an interview before?</b></li> </ol>
<p>Current work situation:</p> <p>to understand their personal story. What are they doing, intentions, norms, barriers</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What is your job that you do <b>now</b>? Can you please describe it to me?</li> <li>2. What kind of employment do you have?             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Do you have any contract?</li> <li>2. What benefits does your contract have?</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. <b>How satisfied do you feel doing this job? How stable do you feel with your job? (financial)</b></li> <li>4. Do you feel you are overqualified for the job you have now?</li> <li>5. What do you spend most of the money on? (categories: housing, food, providing for other family members)</li> <li>6. Tell me about problems you encountered to get a job in Jordan.</li> <li>7. How long was this process of getting started and who has been your biggest help over the time?</li> <li>8. What about your family? Do they all live here, do other member of your family work? Do they expect you to provide for them? <b>Is there any expectation from our family members that you should get a permit in Jordan?</b></li> </ol>

<p>Knowledge about <b>legal</b> work possibilities in Jordan:</p> <p>Where is the “gap” between the “plan” and the “reality”</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Do you know what if any possibilities there are for a legal work in Jordan for Syrians?</li> <li>2. Would you be interested in obtaining the permit in the future? Why/Why not? Have you started the process yet?</li> <li>3. <b>Would it be possible right now for you to get a permit if you decided to? Why yes /Why do you think no?</b></li> <li>4. Do you know how to get a work permit? Do you know how much it costs?</li> <li>5. What about your family? Do they all live here, do other member of your family work? Do they expect you to provide for them? <b>Is there any expectation from your family members that you should get a permit in Jordan?</b></li> </ol>
<p>Current life situation:</p> <p>influenced by the work possibilities. Human development...</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Do you feel your work can provide for all the (financial) needs you have right now?</li> <li>2. <b>With the work situation you are in right now, how much control do you feel you have over your decisions/life/work/well-being of your family? (compared to before)</b></li> </ol>
<p>Journey to current job “gap in assistance”?</p> <p>from aid to development</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Can you tell us about the journey when you first left your home country and your journey to Amman/Mafraq/Irbid?</li> <li>2. Who provided you with information/ financial aid/ integration “skills”?</li> <li>3. Did you attend any “training / course”? Did you follow up with a job offer?</li> </ol>
<p>Job and Life situation in Syria</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>What Job did you have in Syria? How long have you done that job?</b></li> </ol>
<p>Plans for the future</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Where would you like to do in one year/ in five years? (stay here, move to somewhere else, go back to Syria - what would it take for you to go back to Syria?)</li> <li>2. What would you like to do in one year (<b>job</b>)?</li> </ol>

Appendix 2

Work permit

