

National parliaments in EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have been reckoned as the neglected institutions for a very long time. After occupying the major field of debates over the democratic deficit throughout the EU, National Parliaments have been granted the unique and quite complex space in EU governance of security and defence policies with later one being full of obscurity. Transcending the formally intergovernmental status of CFSP/ CSDP, National Parliaments through the inter-parliamentary conference ('IPC') displayed supranational and multi-layered parliamentary scrutiny elements. According to this, I suggest that different scrutiny mechanisms and constitutional traditions of parliamentarism in member states, affect the performance of national parliaments across the inter-parliamentary cooperation. Therefore, Paper further develops the idea that parliaments as chief negotiators have predetermined win-sets set by parliamentary scrutiny and they can't have any leeway to manoeuvre as already being constrained domestically, by pre-emptive scrutiny process