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Praha, Sept. 05, 2020

**Report on the Bachelor Thesis by Mr. Julian Lünser on
The Explicit and the Implicit in Husserl**

1. Presentation

For his thesis on the relationship between *explicit* and *implicit*, the author has chosen what at first glance appears to be a narrowly defined topic, but which, as the course of the investigation shows, leads to the center of Husserl's phenomenology – and even beyond. The work is divided into two main parts with an introduction and a concluding section. In the following I will only refer to the main line of the investigation.

In the introductory section the author explains his project, presents his methodology and reflects the research situation. Strangely enough, the Husserl research has so far devoted very little attention to the pair of terms 'implicit' and 'explicit'; here the author's study is doing pioneering work. Afterwards, the author gives a short etymological outline of the pair of terms and mentions the most important definitions that have been given to them in the philosophical tradition. In his analysis the author focuses on two central books by Husserl, the first volume of *Ideas For a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* and the volume *Experience and Judgement* edited by Ludwig Landgrebe.

The first main part is an exact evaluation of the main references in the two mentioned works. It serves to show the use of the pair of terms in their respective exact context. This is particularly necessary since Husserl, with the exception of the term "explication" in *Experience and Judgement*, did not define 'explicit' and 'implicit' and related words and therefore did not use them as technical terms. The author shows that Husserl uses the field of this terminology in a new sense by expressing how a thing affects the subjective turning to it, so that explication becomes a condition for predication here. 'Explicit' means a kind of direct, immediate given that refers to something that is not (yet) explicitly given. While this reference concerns the field of potentiality, the attention to this field can be described as explicit acting in the meaning of actualization.

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The second main part builds on this material basis, and in such a way that the functionality of the structure of explicit-implicit is now considered as such. Realizing this program, the author turns again to the text of *Ideas I*. He incorporates the most important results of other researchers who have explained the structure of horizon implication in Husserl, such as Roberto Walton, Aron Gurwitsch and Anastasia Kozyreva. The first result is that the terms explicit – implicit do not form a mutually exclusive, but rather complementary opposition. What becomes important is the insight that the explicit refers to that which is not given just as directly; that which is not given in this way appears implicit and is conversely also capable of co-determining the explicit. This expresses that the implicit is not really beyond the explicit, but rather is a determining part of it. The relation between these two forms of the given can be called ‘implication’, so that everything explicit reveals itself in its implications.

If, according to this first result, actuality is not opposed to the potential, the potentiality of the ego can be determined as its *freedom*: The potential is a possible reservoir for active affection, is, in Husserl’s words, “determinable indeterminacy”. The world as a network of horizons is not absolutely unknown; a continuously marked path leads to the extreme of the as yet unknown via the nesting of horizons. This movement between actuality and potentiality can be described as dynamic, which at the same time indicates its temporal character. As a result, the network of spatial-temporal horizons refers not only to the field of the present, but also to all achievements of consciousness, especially to the area of sedimented meanings of the past.

The fact that one potential horizon points to the next makes it possible to speak of an unlimited horizon stratification, of a stratified field of the implicit in which layers imply each other. Since the horizon is never completely indeterminate, it is not possible to draw a clear line within this horizon stratification between the known field of the co-present potentiality and the (determinable) indeterminate infinite horizon. In this sense, one could speak with Walton of an interweaving (*Ineinander*) of implications that are not only related to the explicit but are a co-determining part of it. This context of implications is not independent of the explicit, because the actual opens the field of the potential, so that one can say that it carries the potential as implicit.

In a further step, the author no longer focuses only on the intentional implicative, but also treats the implication in relation to the non-intentional as well as the hyletic data of experience, and above all in relation to the experiencing really inherent (*reell*) act itself, which only comes to light in a reflection on these elements. Husserl’s opinion regarding the reflection on the really inherent noetic act can be clearly derived from two statements that the author quotes from *Ideas*: “When living in the cogito we are not conscious of the cogitatio itself as an intentional object. (§38, p. 78) If the subject then refers reflectively to his or her mental processes, “[...] a new cogito is alive, one that, for its part, is not reflected on and thus is not objective for me” (§28, p. 54).

The author names very precisely the problem that arises here: If the implication is a really inherent fact, but if, on the other hand, the explication takes place via the reflective thematizing, the intentional act – so that the reflexive modification transforms the really inherent moments into intentional objects – then the non-intentional really inherent becomes thematic in a medium foreign to itself, so that the question arises how it is possible that contents that are by definition non-intentional can become the object of reflective analysis. The author rightly observes that Husserl does not provide a conclusive answer to this question. In reflection, the noematic apparently encompasses the noetic, so that the phenomenal ex-

plication of the noetic ultimately only takes place in the noematic. If really inherent contents originally appear only as parts of an intentional whole and become intentional objects as soon as they are reflected, they 'show' their original character as really inherent moments only implicitly, in an unreflected way. The author interprets this, in turn, quite rightly as the problem of the condition of the transcendental ego in general, which is noetic in the factual concretion of its experiences. An indication of this is already offered by the fact of the "pure I" that accompanies all experiences without being able to become an object itself.

If one accepts that implicit elements are made explicit at the moment of reflection by becoming intentional objects, the question remains how to understand that they are already implied before they become objects. As an answer, the author suggests that one can make a distinction between a narrower, intentional field of potentiality and a surrounding dark horizon that points to a beyond that is no longer intentional. While the intentional field of potentiality is characterized by gradation, the outermost horizon of indeterminacy marks a border. However, the question remains virulent, how the implicit is implicated in the explicit in such a way that it co-determines the explicit. With respect to the process of perception, the perceived identical thing in its manifold adumbrations can be thought in such a way that this intentional object is implied in the given adumbrations.

The final paragraph discusses above all two further aspects that can follow here: (1) If one concedes that the subject is able to grasp its own freedom thanks to its implicit potentialities that go hand in hand with the given actuality, the question of how the implications are to be determined arises once again: For the field of potentiality is not only the basis for the freedom of the subject, but at the same time marks the limit of this freedom, so that the question can be asked to what extent the positionality and perspectivity of a subject are pre-formed by this. The combination of such, which is explicitly given, with such, which is not, but is nevertheless given, can best be described with the mentioned notion of the *Ineinander*: The implicit is not something that lies beyond or behind the explicit; rather, it is given with it, and predetermines further possible movements, including the entire extent of a sedimented past. (2) The author also sees clearly that the perspectival given of reality and the possibilities of subjective dealing with it point to corporeal relations of the living body, which are of particular importance for the understanding of the explicit-implicit relation, but which can no longer be treated in the context of the present thesis.

2. Evaluation

(1) The thesis is structured with all desirable clarity and is consistently executed in its individual sections. The introduction provides detailed information about aspects relevant to the topic, and the subsequent structure of the main part is convincing with its consistent sequence of steps. It is very admirable how here, with very high thoroughness and very great skill, the leading theme is treated, in the development of which the problem becomes increasingly complex, strictly from the point of view of the subject areas examined. The author also looked with great care for secondary literature. His knowledge of Spanish in particular offered the advantage of being able to consult original publications by Roberto Walton and his disciple Luis Román Rabanaque, of which there are still no translations.

(2) It is particularly surprising how the inconspicuous relationship between explicit and implicit in the treatment of (philosophical) reflection touches the limits of Husserl's transcen-

dental phenomenology which appear there, where the author deals with the problem of the explicability of the noetic elements and ultimately the transcendental ego in general.

(3) The author thus opens up an important field that even goes beyond Husserl's phenomenology. Of course, this is not developed in this work, but its special merit lies in the fact that the author works out two aspects which offer a direct springboard for this: At two points in his thesis, he touches on the question of the boundary of the horizon. First, where he notes that the implicit field of potentialities extends to an infinite network of interweaving horizons that mark a determinable indeterminacy, although their motivation for determination is gradually subject to an increasing weakening. The second point concerns the problem of how to make the really inherent explicit when explication can only be done by intentional means. Here the author refers to the possibility of a horizon of a special kind, whose beyond that is no longer intentional. It was precisely this topic that was the driving force behind the further development of Husserl's phenomenology by early Eugen Fink and Michel Henry.

(a) *The infinite horizon and its limit.* As far as Fink is concerned, his critical question addressed to Husserl refers precisely to the concept of horizon. Already Husserl was of the opinion that living in interweaving horizons, which characterizes the subject's mundane attitude, must be transcended in order to explicate the implicit function of this net of horizons. The transcending is done through reflection in the radical form of phenomenological epoché and reduction, which is radical because it places itself above the world horizon, as Husserl expresses in his *Krisis* book. For Husserl, then, the implicit movements of the world horizon become explicable only when the mundane reference to this horizon, the "belief in the world", is inhibited. Husserl clearly sees that with this phenomenological step something remains implicit once again, namely the act itself, which explicates the implicit function of the world horizon. For this reason, he commissioned Fink to write the *VI. Cartesian Meditation* as a "phenomenology of phenomenology", as a phenomenological explication of the phenomenological inhibition of world belief, which up to that point remained implicit in its execution.

One could now say that reduction, by explicably exceeding the *infinite* horizon implied in world life, operates in a *transfinite* way in this respect. However, if one adds that the reducing act itself remains implicit again, a regress of infinite explication becomes apparent. Fink counteracts this in the *VI. Meditation* by formulating, subsequent to Cantor and Oskar Becker, an explicit conception of the transfinite, which says that here iteration is factually possible, but after the third stage essentially does not produce anything new. The iterative regress is thus bent into the open transfinite infinity of phenomenological enlightenment, which does not follow the unfruitful business of chasing its own shadow, but successively explicates implicit elements of the transcendental constitution.

The difference between Husserl and Fink becomes concrete where Fink makes the limit of the explicability of these elements a subject of discussion. Fink sees this boundary in the fact that – similar to the difference between the intentional and the really inherent – there is an indissoluble hiatus between the ontifying attitude of the phenomenologist, who despite the reduction remains bound to the mundane ontifying language logic, and the non-ontic transcendental subjectivity that constitutes all ontic being. While Husserl does not see any particular difficulty in the transition from mundane implication to transcendental explication, Fink points to a limit of explicability. For him, the solution consists in a "*me-ontic*" conception, which says that in the inner-worldly realm, from which we cannot absolutely escape,

the quite different of transcendental subjectivity (or in the late work of "World") can only be explicable in a meontic way.

(b) *The absolute really inherent.* Michel Henry's criticism of Husserl starts exactly at the point where the author emphasizes the incongruence of noetic elements and intentional explication. Henry's criticism of Husserl's conception is that he has transformed factual real subjectivity into an intentional one, while the reason for transcendental subjectivity, its genuine really inherent movement in itself as "absolute self-affection", is not only pre-intentional, but lies beyond all intentionality. This, too, points to a limit of horizon reference, beyond which there is no longer any horizon-ness, since it is only transcendently generated. Since phenomenology cannot authentically explicate this movement, a leap is needed to describe it, which here expresses the paradox again to explicate such what is actually not possible with the means of explication which always already operates in horizons.

The remarkable thing about these two examples of 'going beyond' or 'below' Husserl's phenomenology is that they both make explicit a – if one wants to call it that – general implication of Husserl's phenomenology, namely the assumption that everything is reductively-intentionally explicable. In this sense, one could say that the questioning of the relationship between implicit and explicit still concerns Husserl's phenomenology itself and brings it, from the explicit contents of the phenomena explained here in this thesis, into a consistent relationship with versions of their further development. The consideration of this line, which the author opened up with his thesis, allows, with regard to the borderline problems of the horizon and the relationship between really inherent and intentional, to read the movement of the phenomenologies as such of the relationship between implicit and explicit – and not merely as an arrangement of viewpoints that have more or less common intersections. One could therefore say that the thesis of Vf. *implies* this entire perspective.

A few remarks in detail:

(1) P. 74: "The still not known world is never totally unknown, as it exists as a horizon which, again, is a correlate of the currently seen ..." It is somewhat unusual to call a horizon the correlate of a thing's view. For Husserl, correlation means the relationship between subject and object. The horizon is a halo and, precisely because of its potentiality or passivity, is not in a correlation relationship with the (active) subject. (Also p. 78: "Husserl has characterised the horizon as the correlate of the experience of the physical objects ...".)

(2) Concerning the freedom one could possibly differentiate: (a) freedom in the grasping of potentialities through actualization (borderline case: the freedom emphasized by Husserl for the epoché); (b) the realm of potentialities itself as a prior free space. Actualization is only possible because something has already 'opened up' before, albeit in a graded manner of the determinable indeterminacy. This original free space would be the *Ineinander*, which makes any movement possible in the first place, but obviously finds its limit at the border of the (world-) horizon and the (not intentionally graspable) really inherent. Then questions can arise such as: How does the non (intentionally) explicable of the really inherent determine me in contrast to the (in principle) explicable of my hidden history of meaning?

(3) With respect to the impossibility of grasping through intentional explication, the impossibility of objectifying the pure ego should be more clearly distinguished from the impossibility of grasping subjective acts and the really inherent in general. What is the common, what is


the difference? Is the pure ego still transcendent in relation to its really inherent act, but certainly in a different way than the transcendence of things?

(4) Regarding the relationship between the identical thing and its adumbrations: For Husserl the shades are motivating for the constitution of the identical thing. In this sense, one could say that the experienced adumbrations imply the passive constitution of the unified thing, but this also applies *vice versa*, as the author has made clear. In this context there is also a connection via genetic phenomenology to the explicative genealogy of meaning sedimentation (example is Husserl's analysis of the genesis of scientific objectivism in the *Krisis* book).

These few points of criticism and/or inquiries do not diminish in any way the author's outstanding achievement, as also the above remarks are only to show, which possible dimension of thinking was revealed with this exceptional investigation.

This excellent thesis, whose format would be worthy of a Master's thesis, deserves the best rating. I give it the grade

"1" (with distinction).



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