

Report on Julian Lünser's Bachelor-Thesis "The Explicit and the Implicit in Husserl"

By doc. Aleš Novák, Ph.D.

The submitted thesis is a rare attempt to address the terms implicit and explicit in Husserl, which is a *desideratum* in the phenomenological discussion and thus there's a lack of secondary interpretations. This makes it both difficult and exciting, because for the obvious absence of relevant material the student can't base his approach and research on any existing guiding help; but on the other hand this is the student's dream: to "discover" an empty lot in the academic discussion of any given author and to claim a sort of primacy or at least originality in finding a new topic which is worth discussing.

Maybe because of the lack of existing literature it was inevitable that the thesis had to be longer than usual, for it needed to establish the contextual frame in which Husserl uses both terms, even if it was based on two of his books only: *Ideas I* and *Experience and Judgement*. It was a good decision to focus on fewer textual sources only, otherwise one would run the risk to get drowned in the gargantuan textual corpus of Husserl. Thus, the first part of the proposed thesis contains an analysis of all passages from the above mentioned books in which Husserl uses the terms implicit and explicit. The result of this textual analysis is, in the student's own words, that "it has not been possible to establish that Husserl uses the terms in a systematic way", that "Husserl employed the terms explicit and implicit [...] mostly in a metaphorical way", and that's why "Husserl's employment of explicit and implicit remains interpretative" (p. 90).

But the student's own contribution lays in the second part of his thesis, in which he aims "to exemplify the proposed explicit-implicit relation in order to give a rough outlook to what extent it might be useful" (p. 90) for the discussion of Husserl's phenomenology in both aforementioned books. This leads him to discuss especially the topics of givenness (*Gegebenheit* in German), intentionality and the ego, action/freedom of the subject, and consciousness. If the student's claim that "Husserl needs to resort to an implicit way of givenness in order to prove the very existence of non-intentional contents" (p. 91) is correct, it leads him to pose the following question: "Given that the implicit 'phenomena' in question only become intentional objects in the moment of reflection, that is, when made explicit, *how can it be understood that these phenomena be implied even before being an object?*" (ib., emphasis by Aleš Novák.)

I'd like to hear an attempted answer to this and a further explanation.

Maybe also a few more words to the promising topic of the subject's freedom in the light of the implicit-explicit relation would be another talking point during the defence of the proposed thesis which is extraordinary, original, well written, well-structured and demonstrates the student's skill and competence.

That's why **I recommend** Julian Lünser's thesis **without any reservations and propose the grade A+ (excellent).**

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