

The Explicit and the Implicit in Husserl

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Gewidmet meinen Lehrern,
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How will you search for it, Socrates, when you have no idea what it is? What kind of thing from among those you are ignorant of will you set before yourself to look for? And even if you happened exactly upon it, how would you recognize that this is what you didn't know?

Plato, *Meno*, 80d

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Table of Content

Introduction.....	1
0.1 Subject and Method.....	1
0.2 Secondary Literature	5
0.3 Etymology of Explicit and Implicit.....	7
0.4 Short Outline of the Historic Uses	10
1. The Meaning of Explicit and Implicit in <i>Ideas I</i> and <i>Experience and Judgement</i>	16
1.1 The Expressed and the Unexpressed.....	16
1.2 The Logically Implied.....	20
1.3 'Explication' in the sense of <i>Experience and Judgement</i>	25
1.4 The Directly and the Indirectly Given.....	41
a) Perception and Intuition	45
b) Intentionality	51
c) Temporal horizons.....	54
d) Meaning.....	57
2. Reading <i>Ideas I</i> with the Explicit and the Implicit.....	65
2.1 Intentional Acts and their Background.....	68
Gradual Attentional Changes	72
Temporal Horizons.....	75
2.2 Reflection	78
Reflection on the Non-Intentional.....	80
The Adumbrations and the transcendent Thing	86
Conclusion and Outlook.....	89
References.....	95
Note on the Citing.....	95
Primary Literature	95
Secondary Literature	96
Statement.....	97
Endnotes.....	98

Introduction

0.1 Subject and Method

It is possible to understand phenomenology as the discipline which studies the way the phenomena appear. While this might seem to be trivial many times, a thorough analysis is often able to disclose unexpected relations and dimensions. In this sense, for instance, phenomenology, and more concretely its founder, Edmund Husserl, have established that not only the sky is limited by a horizon. Rather, as any physical thing which appears to us has a limit, this limit can be understood as a horizon. The metaphorical notion of the horizon points here to the fact, that every object is given in a certain context, that is, that the limit of the thing is not the limit of the world: it points to a beyond, which is still unseen. In this horizon, it is possible to finally detect the whole world. As one can read in §8 of Landgrebe's introduction to *Experience and Judgement*, "[...] *the structure of the known and of the unknown is a fundamental structure of world-consciousness, correlatively, a structure of the world as horizon of all individual real things capable of being experienced*" (E+J, §8, p.37)ⁱ.

The aim of this thesis is to propose a new concept which might prove to be fruitful in describing and analysing phenomena associated to the notion of horizon, and by that furthering the understanding of 'givenness' in a phenomenological context. The concept which is to be proposed is that of an explicit-implicit relation. Husserl has not developed a defined concept which would correspond exactly to this relation; the only notion he does present is that of *Explikation*. However, the thesis proposed here is that Husserl's own uses of the terms explicit and implicit correspond to a certain meaning which is clearly deviant from the concept of *Explikation* or any other philosophically developed notion. In order to propose this concept, and then examine the usefulness of this conceptual structure and the possibilities of its employment, this thesis pursues two objectives. In the first part of this thesis, the goal is to show how Husserl himself employs the respective terms, namely by means of a formal textual analysis of a selected part of Husserl's works, *Ideas I* and *Experience and Judgement*. In the second part of this thesis, the goal is to further develop a certain conception of the terms explicit and implicit, by applying these terms to certain phenomenological descriptions. Those applications, while on one hand exemplifying the concept which will be proposed, on the other hand help to sharpen the conceptualised relation itself, highlighting certain characteristics and raising questions concerning others.

Hence, the first part is a strict analysis of Husserl's textual employment of the terms explicit, implicit and their derivatives, such as implication or explicable. The aim of this hermeneutical exegesis is, first of all, to understand what Husserl refers to when employing the terms explicit and implicit, that is, what sense can be ascribed to them. For this purpose, the quotations analysed will be given, their general context will be described shortly, and it will be attempted to interpret the respective term in such a form that it is integrated sensibly into its context. In this sense, while the analysis can often follow concrete criteria such as the grammatical function of the term, finally the result of the analysis remains interpretive, such as it is dictated by the nature of the question itself. Moreover, other important characteristics of Husserl's employment of the terms which should be worked out are the frequency of use, the general association of one or several terms to a certain subject or method and the different relations between the terms.

Given that there are, up to date, 42 volumes of Husserl's works published, and still thousands of pages of manuscripts more awaiting publication, it is neither feasible nor necessary to analyse all employments of the terms explicit and implicit in Husserl's writings. For this thesis, it has been decided that in the formal analysis, a more detailed examination of each passage will make up for a more limited scope of texts analysed. The most important question, namely, if Husserl does use the terms explicit and implicit in a certain definable sense, and if so, in which one, should be answerable already by means of the analysis of the two texts selected. The first of these two texts is the first book of Husserl's *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, published originally in 1913 and commonly referred to as *Ideas I*. This book, the only volume finished of a work which should have consisted, following Husserl's original plans, in three volumes, is a general introduction to phenomenology. Given that it is the first extended work published after the so-called transcendental turn 1905, it is generally seen as a central work for the understanding of transcendental phenomenology. Its high usefulness for this thesis is justified, in addition, by the wide scope of phenomenological fields and problems which are presented in this book, and giving hence the possibility to find potential associations of the terms explicit and implicit to certain parts of phenomenological studies.

The second work by Husserl which will be used for the textual analysis of his employment of the terms explicit and implicit is *Experience and Judgement*. The reason for this choice is the fact, that in this book, the concept of *Explikation* is developed, the only example for an expressed use of a concept connected to the terms explicit and implicit. This

concept will be presented and analysed in its own section in the first part, in order to compare it to the other employments of the terms explicit and implicit and their meanings. Moreover, the book will be used as well for the general analysis of the term implicit and its derivatives, given the particular opportunity of observing its relation to the concept of *Explikation*.

It has to be noted that unlike *Ideas I, Experience and Judgement* has not been published by Husserl himself in his lifetime, but only posthumously in 1939 by Husserl's assistant Ludwig Landgrebe. The work on this book had started already in the twenties, and in 1928, ten years before Husserl's death, Husserl instructed Landgrebe to put in order and systematise the existing manuscripts belonging to the topic of 'Transcendental Logic', as Landgrebe himself notes in the Foreword.¹ A first draft elaborated by Landgrebe, in which he did not only adjust the texts from the manuscripts to each other, but also wrote introductions and transitions, was revised by Husserl and, in light of the recently published *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, reworked by Landgrebe again to result in a second draft in 1930. This draft was revised once more by Husserl, but he did not have the time to publish the work himself, as other works were more pressing. In 1935, Husserl decided to allow Landgrebe to incorporate his comments and to revise the text by himself and publish it on his own. Following Landgrebe, the only main change which has taken place in the draft since that moment was the incorporation of the introduction, §§1-14. He mentions as well, however, that he had the possibility to orally discuss the draft for this introduction with Husserl.² Moreover, it is mainly based on manuscripts from the years 1919-1934 and Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*.

Given this complicated history of edition, and the lack of a critical edition as yet, precaution is important when working with *Experience and Judgement*, most of all in the case of a formal analysis of the employment of certain terms. Generally, it is possible to understand the main part of *Experience and Judgement*, that is, §§15-98, as re-edited by Landgrebe and Husserl together, that is, it can be seen as authorised.³ In addition, with the help of the table Lohmar has published in his paper *Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil*, many quotes can actually be assigned to a certain Husserlian manuscript. In this way, many times any doubt on

¹ C.f.: E+J, Foreword, p.5

² C.f.: *ibid.*, p.7

³ C.f. Lohmar, D. (1996). *Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil*. *Husserl Studies*, 13, p. 31-71, p.34

the authenticity of a passage can be cleared out. Moreover, the general consistency of the text, between its different chapters, but also in relation to other works in which, for instance, the concept of *Explikation* also appears, would seem to be enough to consider the general conception of *Explikation* presented in *Experience and Judgment* as reliable.

More problematic are references to single passages, and the exact meaning of every term in it, in the part of the book which has not been revised thoroughly by Husserl, namely the introduction. However, Lohmar has noted that even though he has not looked for any congruencies between these paragraphs and the Husserlian manuscripts, he still found some by chance, and would expect to find even more.⁴ Therefore, even passages from the introduction might very well give hints on how to understand Husserl's employment of explicit and implicit. However, as the origin of every passage will be duly indicated always, it will be easy for the critical reader to identify quotes which possibly have not been authorised by Husserl, and to exclude them from the argumentation here presented. The amount of such passages in the textual analysis is almost negligible.

After establishing in the first part, thus, the sense or the senses in which Husserl employs the terms explicit and implicit, and concluding if one can claim any systematic employment of these terms by Husserl, in the second part of this thesis, a concept of the explicit and the implicit shall be derived from this Husserlian employment and will be exemplified by being applied to certain areas of Husserlian phenomenology. The second part will have a notably different character than the first one, hence: While in the first one, a formal text analysis is performed to show the certain meanings of certain terms in the Husserlian works, this meaning will then be used to analyse and characterise some phenomenological notions. There is thus an important distinction to be made in the framework of this thesis, between, on one hand, the mere terms explicit, implicit, and their derivatives, which appear in many different texts, also in Husserl's writings, and can potentially have different meanings, and a conceptualised explicit-implicit relation which has a determined meaning and which can be applied in order to characterise whatever may be susceptible to it.

The second part of this thesis will then apply this preliminary conceptualisation to certain areas of Husserlian phenomenology, in order to exemplify, develop and sharpen the concept. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, this application does not aim at anything like

⁴ C.f. *ibid.*, p.34-35

completeness. Rather, it will use only examples from *Ideas I*, and aims at nothing more than showing generally that such an application of the proposed conceptualisation to phenomenological questions is feasible. Hence, it has to remain, even regarding the concrete examples presented, on the level of a mere outlook on possible applications, sketching first problems and questions which would arise when applying the explicit-implicit relation to phenomenological problems.

While there has been no academic analysis of the terms explicit and implicit in Husserl, and even on the concept of *Explikation* there is effectively no relevant material, the applications of the conceptualisation proposed, dealt with in the second part of this thesis, will be contextualised by means of references to secondary literature; for it will be possible to find several different approaches which show an overlapping with this conceptualisation of the explicit-implicit relation. While the exact establishment of similarities and differences between those approaches and the explicit-implicit relation proposed will take place in the second part, a first overview over the secondary literature used will be given subsequently. After this overview, the introduction will conclude with an etymology and a short outline of the historical uses of the terms explicit and implicit before and besides Husserl.

0.2 Secondary Literature

Asking for the terms of explicit and implicit in the work of Husserl, the most promising paper would seem to be *Phenomenology of the implicit*, written by Steven Bartlett in 1975. Bartlett starts by rendering that what he understands as 'the defining properties of Husserl's position' in analytical terms by means of a transformation schema. He concludes that the aim of reflective philosophy, including Husserlian phenomenology, is to make explicit the implicit structure of possible or actual experience.⁵ This explication is done by reflection, in which the given phenomenon and a potentially modifying attentional character can be differentiated.⁶ However, Bartlett argues that already the distinction between something explicit and something implicit is always relative to a context, which he calls the 'reflexive standpoint'. Separating the findings from this context, that is, establishing the results obtained in reflection as being valid independently from this reflexive standpoint, would lead to something Bartlett calls a 'projective misconstruction'.⁷ Quoting some lines from §§35, §78 and §79 of *Ideas I*, Bartlett claims to show that Husserl does indeed forget the

⁵ C.f. Bartlett, S. (1975). *Phenomenology of the implicit*. *Dialectica*, 29(2/3), S. 173-188. p.185; he borrows the terms explicit and implicit from Ricœur.

⁶ C.f. *ibid.*, p.187

⁷ C.f. *ibid.*, p.187

embeddedness of his descriptions in the phenomenological framework. He distinguishes the discipline of phenomenology, in this sense, from geometry, in which the geometer would never claim the validity of a finding outside the corresponding framework.⁸ While it is not necessary to reply to these arguments here, for the purpose of this thesis the following can be noted: the terms explicit and implicit are understood by Bartlett as that which appears and that which still does not appear, but is the condition of possibility of the former. Moreover, it is claimed that it is only possible to validly establish the distinction between explicit and implicit when a certain frame of reference, a standpoint is given.

A more thorough analysis of Husserl, namely of his concept of horizon is given in Roberto R. Walton's book *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*, published in 2015. Interesting is most of all, that he tries to establish the concept of horizon as a central problem throughout Husserl's work, claiming that it plays a fundamental role in the relation between world and consciousness of the world. Moreover, the deepening of the investigation of the phenomenon of horizon would lead Husserl from his static phenomenology to the later genetic approaches.⁹ Of importance for this thesis is, in addition, that he establishes a nexus between the concept of horizon and the opposition explicit-implicit. To what extent this understanding of the explicit and the implicit will coincide with that developed in the second part of this thesis, will be described in more detail there.

A similarly far-reaching work is Gurwitsch's *The field of consciousness*, published first in its French version in 1957. His aim is to analyse the phenomenon of context with a phenomenological approach; he thus draws a lot on Husserl's theories as well, besides using, in this work, findings of Gestalt theory. For this purpose, he distinguishes in the field of consciousness between the theme, its thematic field and the margin.¹⁰ He claims that every theme refers always to its thematic field, and is, moreover, conjunct with the margins of consciousness, given their temporal simultaneity.¹¹ The conjunction between theme and thematic field is understood by Gurwitsch in a merely descriptive sense, in a given act of experience; the thematic field does not, then, correspond to any ideally possible thematic field.¹² These relations will be worked out further in the second part as well, in which they will be compared with the concept developed there. It can be pointed out already, however,

⁸ C.f. *ibid.*, p.188

⁹ C.f. Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.12

¹⁰ C.f. Gurwitsch, A. (2010). *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) (Volume III. The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin)*. (R. M. Zaner, & L. Embree, ed.) Heidelberg London New York: Springer. p.4

¹¹ C.f. *ibid.*, p.343

¹² C.f. *ibid.*, p.313-314

that the terms explicit and implicit appear in his analysis of context too, but in the context of the constitution of the perceptual thing.¹³

Another interesting perspective on the problems approached in this thesis provides Anastasia Kozyreva's paper *Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty*, published in 2018. In this paper, she tries to understand the unconscious as a non-representational dimension of the consciousness which renders the representational experience meaningful. For that purpose, she refers, amongst others, to Husserl's notion of an affective past-horizon of sedimentation established in his *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis* and to Merleau-Ponty's idea of the unconscious as a background which makes possible actual perception. This paper will be equally discussed in more depth in the second part.

Finally, it can be noted that Ricœur, in his *Etude sur les «Méditations Cartésiennes» de Husserl* published in 1954, characterises the Husserlian way of analysis as making explicit the implicit. He justifies this claim by interpreting Husserl's special focus in the analysis of the potentiality of the intentional life: Husserl always asks, following Ricœur, for the revelation of the horizontally given *Mehrmeinungen*, in order to integrate them into the already given sense.¹⁴ To be sure, following Ricœur, Husserl himself concludes from this continuous overflow the impossibility of an absolute 'seeing'.¹⁵ In this sense, Ricœur employs the terms of explicit and implicit to characterise the connection between the further stream of consciousness and the entailed mutability of the already explicit sense. As there is no deepening of this idea, however, this reference to Ricœur rather remains a side note in the framework of this thesis.

0.3 Etymology of Explicit and Implicit

Both explicit and implicit are terms present in most of the European languages (French: *explicite/implicite*; Spanish: *explicito/implicito*; Italian: *esplicito/implicito*, Czech: *explicitní/implicitní* etc.), and notably also in German as *explizit/implizit*, in the form Husserl used them. This repetition of the same root in different languages is due to the Latin origin of the terms as they can all be traced back to the Latin verbs *explico/implico*, and their corresponding participles *explicitus/implicitus*. In this section, a basic etymology of the Latin origin of explicit and implicit, including a presentation of their related verbs, nouns and

¹³ C.f. *ibid.*, p.276

¹⁴ C.f. Ricœur, P. (1954). *Etude sur les «Méditations Cartésiennes» de Husserl*. *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 52, p. 75-109. p.93

¹⁵ C.f. *ibid.*, p.99

adverbs will be given. The main source for this etymology will be the classic dictionary by Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short which, regardless of its seniority, can still be considered a standard work and proves to be helpful by, for instance, also covering Medieval Latin. This etymology will be complemented by a short outline of the historical uses amongst some selected writers and traditions from Antiquity until the 20th century.

The verbs *explico* and *implico* are both compounded of the verb *plico* and a prefix, *ex-* and *im-*, respectively. Following the Latin dictionary by Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short,¹⁶ *plico* can be translated as “to fold, to lay or wind together, to fold up, double up”. This Latin verb in turn has its origin in a Greek one, namely πλέκω (plékô), which can be translated as “to plait, twine, twist, weave, braid”.¹⁷ While the connection between both significations is clear, it would seem that *plico* is slightly more abstract than πλέκω.

In Latin, what is used as the prefix *ex-* can also stand alone as a preposition, that is, as *ex*. In this function, according to Lewis and Short, it can be translated as ‘out of’, or ‘from within’ in various contexts, including space, time and substance. As a prefix in a composition, *ex-* denotes most of all motions that move ‘out’ or ‘forth’, moreover also motions in an upward direction. In this way, the prefix takes the metaphoric signification of a change ‘out of’ a given nature. Due to this meaning of change, Lewis and Short explain that “*ex* comes to denote privation or negation”. Furthermore, it also indicates something throughout, thoroughly, completely.

The prefix *im-*, in contrast, is the result of the shift from *n* to *m*, as the original prefix *in-* adapted to the labial consonant *p* that follows in the verb *implico*. The actual prefix that manipulates the meaning of the verb *plico* is thus *in-*. This prefix, too, has a corresponding preposition, *in*, which can be characterised as being the opposite of *ex*. It thus, following Lewis and Short, “denotes either rest or motion within or into a place or thing” and can be translated as “in, within, on, upon, among, at; into, to, towards”. In composition with a verb “it conveys the idea of existence *in* a place or thing, or of motion, direction, or inclination *into* or *to* a place or thing”, dependent on the verb which can be either one of rest or of motion. It is possible to observe, thus, that the opposition in the meanings of *ex-* and *in-* is parallel in

¹⁶ Lewis, C. T., & Short, C. (1879). A Latin Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Accessed on May 18, 2020 from Perseus Digital Library:

<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aalphabetic+letter%3DA>

¹⁷ Liddell, H. G., & Scott, R. (1889). Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon: “πλέκω”. Accessed on May 8, 2020 from An Intermediate Greek Lexicon (Summer 2018): <http://perseus.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.15:2351.MiddleLiddell.1690008>

different dimensions: While both denote a movement on the most concrete level, either out of/from something or into/towards something, this translates into the opposition between change/movement indicated by the prefix *ex-* and continuing/resting indicated by *in-*.

This parallelism is logically reflected in the opposition between the resulting compounds *explico* and *implico*. Insofar the compound *in-plico* would translate as “to fold into”, Lewis and Short list as literal significations of *implico* “to infold, involve, entangle, entwine, inwrap, envelop, encircle, embrace, clasp, grasp”, complemented by the metaphorical meanings “to entangle, implicate, involve, envelop, engage” and furthermore “to attach closely, connect intimately, to unite, join”, finally in its passive form, “to be intimately connected, associated, or related”. Whereas *plico* just had the meaning of a production of a reversible structure, possibly connecting two or more different beings, winding them together, there is now an asymmetry inside this plurality, as the subject of the sentence is described as being entwined, enveloped into a passive aggregate that is not directly focused on. In addition, in the further significations, there is an abstraction from the spatial sense, leaving the emphasis on the connection itself. This connection of the subject with the context it is connected to is not a simple connection though, but as well an asymmetrical one, the subject being connected or adhered either completely or in a complicated way.

Ex-plico as a compound, in contrast, would translate as “to fold out of”, that is, to unfold. As Latin verb, it signifies indeed “to unfold”, alongside other translations given by Lewis and Short such as “to uncoil, unroll, unfurl, spread out, loosen, undo” but also “to spread out, stretch out, extend, deploy, display” or finally “to disentangle, set in order, arrange, regulate, settle, adjust anything complicated or difficult”. It becomes clear that *explico* can be seen as the antonym to *implico*, insofar as the actions described by *explico* undo the connections and entanglements that can be created through actions referred to by *implico*.

From both verbs can be derived several further terms: for instance, the participle of the perfect tense in passive voice and masculine nominative for *explico* would be, following Lewis and Short, *explicatus* or *explicitus*. The latter can be translated as “disentangled” or “free from obstacles”, that is, as an adjective. The former was used as a noun, standing for “an unfolding, stretching apart”, or more specifically “an explication, exposition”. In parallel, the same participle of the perfect tense in passive voice and masculine nominative of *implico* gives us the forms *implicatus* or *implicitus*. The former one has its own meaning and fulfils the function of an adjective, translating as “entangled, perplexed, confused, intricate”. There

is thus a further dimension in the spectre of meanings here, with the dichotomy clarity/confusion. This dichotomy is also reflected in the neuter vocative forms of the perfect participle in passive voice, commonly used as adverb: while *explicare* translates as “clearly”, the same form of *implico*, namely *implicite*, is translated by Lewis and Short as “intricately”.

The last clear parallelism between the two word families are the derived nouns *explicatio* and *implicatio*. The literal meaning of *explicatio* is “an unfolding, uncoiling”, opposed directly to *implicatio* which refers to “an entwining, interweaving, entanglement”, furthermore also to “an involvement, embarrassment”. In addition, *explicatio* can be used, again, in the context of speech, similar to *explicatus*, translating as “an unfolding expounding, an explication, exposition, explanation”.

Finally, there should be a mention of further terms connected with *explico/implico*, but lacking a parallel term in the other word family: most interesting for the purpose of this work is the verb *implicito* (to entwine, interweave) which seems to specify a particular meaning covered by *implico*. In addition, there are *implicamentum* (an involvement, entanglement) and *implicatura* (an entangling), furthermore *impliciscor* (to become confused, disordered). Connected to *explico*, one can find the adjective *explicabilis* (that may be explained, explicable), the adverb *explicanter* (intelligibly, plainly) and the noun *explicator* (an expounder, explainer). One can thus observe further developments of the different meaning covered by *explico/implico*, for example with respect to the notions of the clear and plain that contrasts with the confused and disordered.

0.4 Short Outline of the Historic Uses

Having observed this close relationship between *explico* and *implico* and their derived terms, in which both undo each other, it is now very interesting to see how different authors in the philosophic traditions have used these terms and which relations between the explicit and the implicit have resulted from their interpretations. This account of historic uses cannot claim any completeness – that is not its aim, either. Rather, besides trying to draw a rough development of the terms, there shall be a concentration on uses that can be compared to the different applications of the terms by Husserl in *Ideas I* and *Experience and Judgement*.

The first important philosophic appearance of one of the two terms, namely, of ‘implication’, is to be found in a translation of Aristotle: As Rosier shows¹⁸, it is Boethius

¹⁸ C.f. Libera, A. d., Rosier, I., & Nef, F. (2004). Implication. In B. Cassin (ed.), *Vocabulaire Européenne des Philosophies* (p. 583 - 588). Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert.

who translates the lines 23b 25-27 of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* by means of the term 'implication': The Greek philosopher characterised the sentence 'The good is bad' as an συμπελεγμένη (sympeplegmegménê), as the term 'bad' includes the meaning 'not good'. συμπελεγμένη is derived from the verb συμπλέκω (symplékô) which is translated by Rosier as "lying together" and is compounded by the verb πλέκω (plékô) and the prefix σγμ- (sym-). The term thus refers back to the same root as the Latin *plico*. Like that, it seems to be reasonable that Boethius, in his translation from about 510/512 renders συμπελεγμένη as *implicita*,¹⁹ translating the Greek prefix σγμ- as *im-*. It has to be taken into account here, that the meaning of *implicita*, which by its grammatical form, namely as an adjective derived from the participle, should correspond to the modern "implied", seems to be slightly different: The whole sentence 'The good is bad' is an *implicita*, an entangled, "complex"²⁰ sentence, because, as Boethius remarks himself, it contains another statement, namely, that 'the good is not good'. Peter Abelard later comments on this translation, claiming that *implicita* here means that the sentence 'The good is bad' "is implying 'the good is not good' in itself and in a certain manner containing it".²¹ Here, the Latin verb *implico* which Abelard uses to explain Boethius' use of *implicita* acquires the sense of 'referring to a necessary presupposition', to a statement that is somehow contained inside the entangled sentence.

From this particular translation results the typical logical use of *implicitus* in Scholastics: Following Rosier, from the second half of the 12th century on it is common to characterise certain sentences as *propositio implicita*, e.g. "*homo qui est albus est animal quod currit*". These sentences contained two so called *explicitae*, that is, two separate logical statements that can be exposed. Thus, the adjective *explicitus* is used with a different meaning, here in its female plural form as a noun, to define the logical statements that result from the analysis of such a *propositio implicita*. That the two terms refer to each other is very clear. In addition, contained statements that qualified the *propositia*, as conditions, were called *implicationes*.

In parallel, Nobis points out that *explicit* was used mostly to mark the end of a tractate, as an image originating from the uncoiled scroll. Just as the scroll, the topic had been

¹⁹ "Illa vero quae est 'quoniam malum est quod est bonum' implicita est; et enim quoniam non bonum est necesse est idem ipsum opinari" (quoted *ibid.*)

²⁰ "complex" is the term used by J.L. Ackrill to translate συμπελεγμένη in his 'Aristotle's *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*' (c.f. *ibid.*)

²¹ "implicans eam in se, et quodammodo continens" (quoted *ibid.*); the given English quote is the authors translation from Rosier's French translation: ("c'est-à-dire impliquant <'le bon n'est pas bon'> en elle-même, et d'une certaine manière la contenant")

developed in its totality.²² Etymologically, according to Lewis and Short, *explicit* was probably an abbreviation of *explicitus*. Nobis further indicates that the topic of the tractate was seen correspondingly as an ‘implication’ of the written text. Later on, *explicatio* came to indicate a certain kind of exegesis of a text, distinguished from a commentary, as for instance Aquinas’ *Explicatio libri Boethii de Trinitate*. In this sense, the word families connected to explicit and implicit had received several different meanings from the Scholastic tradition in both logical and linguistic fields, mostly expressing the opposition between something given and clear, and something entangled and still oblique. Both the logician’s and the writer’s task was, amongst others, to make explicit the implicit.

The terms can be found in this sense still in the 18th century. Nobis quotes the article ‘explicite’ from Walch’s philosophical lexicon with “Explicite [...] is used, if one wants to show the immediate connection of one matter with the other clearly and expressly; is the connection, however, mediated, in a way that it has to be shown and explained through a new idea, then one uses the term implicite [...]”²³. Explicit is here then the obvious and direct relation, while an implicit relation is one which has to be further elaborated. Not much later but quite different, as Gabriel shows, Immanuel Kant defines an *Explikation* as the indication of characteristics of an empirically given concept with the sole purpose of distinguishing it from other concepts.²⁴ According to Gabriel and Precht²⁵, Rudolf Carnap, in contrast, coins the term *Explikation* as the specification of a vague word of everyday or scientific language. The result from such an exact specification is the *Explikat*, the word that had to be specified is called *Explikandum*. Such an explication thus takes an important role in the mediation between a formal scientific system and the everyday world. One scholar developing further this conception of explication was, as Precht indicates, the linguist Dieter Wunderlich. He claims that the explication cannot only be applied to words, but also to natural phenomena as actions, pieces of art or gestures. The purpose of this explication would be either to understand the semantic sense, or to reconstruct the rules on which the production of the phenomenon is based. Here appears thus the idea of explicating certain phenomena that are

²² C.f. Nobis, H. M. (1972). Explizit/implizit. In J. Ritter (ed.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (p. 876 - 877). Basel: Schwabe & Co.

²³ The terms ‘*explicite*’ and ‘*implicite*’ were not translated by the author of this thesis from the German original: „Explicite [...] braucht man, wenn man den unmittelbaren Zusammenhang einer Sache mit der anderen deutlich und ausdrücklich zeigen will; ist aber der Zusammenhang mittelbar, daß er erst durch eine neue Idee muß gezeigt und erklärt werden, so braucht man das Wort implicite [...]“ (quoted *ibid.*)

²⁴ C.f. Gabriel, G. (1972). Explikation. In J. Ritter (ed.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (p. 876). Basel: Schwabe & Co.

²⁵ C.f. Precht, P. (2008). Explikation. In P. Precht, & F.-P. Burkard (ed.), *Metzler Lexikon der Philosophie* (p. 176). Stuttgart: Carl Ernst Poeschel Verlag.

not strictly linguistic – but explicating them renders it possible to integrate them into a formal scientific language.

Similarly, there are two major philosophic areas of the 20th century in which, instead of `explication`, the terms `implication` or `implicature` are central. The first one is modern logic, following the Scholastic tradition and influenced by its use of the term `implication`. Generally speaking, the relation in which one statement follows logically from another one is called a logical implication.²⁶ Frequently, this implication is solely characterised through certain truth values, and is called material implication: Given that, if A is true, B is true too, one can say, A implies B.

As a good example to show which role implication can play in logic, one can take the perspective of C. I. Lewis, as he has been focusing on the concept of implication: He introduced a second kind of implication which he called `strict implication`. An implication is strict if B can be deduced a priori from A, that is, in a tautological manner. Lewis claims furthermore, that all formal logic and even math is constructed only upon strict implications; for although it can be accidental that the truth value of two propositions coincides which results in them being connected by a material implication, all sentences in a logical system are deduced a priori, that is, strictly: “Nothing is ever asserted in a truth-value system unless it is a tautology”²⁷, as C. I. Lewis claims in his work *Symbolic Logic*, written together with C. H. Langford. Logic, thus, would be only the science which works out in which way statements are implied, that is, contained in certain premises. In addition, following Lewis, one of the reasons for giving the idea of strict implication such a central position is the fact that the term relates to intensional qualities. That means that the implied properties are attached to the concept itself, instead of being assigned externally, that is, extensionally.²⁸

Complementary to this concept of logical implication which usually seeks for a strict inference, one can point out Paul Grice’s account of `implicature`. The English linguist defines this term as the act of meaning or implicating something by uttering something else.²⁹ In this context, conversational implicatures have to be distinguished from conventional ones: On one hand, saying “the tank is empty” can be a conversational implicature as it depends on the context if it implicates, for example, that it is not possible to go on driving, or that one is

²⁶ C.f. Metschl, U. (2008). Implikation. In P. Prechtel, & F.-P. Burkard (ed.), Metzler Lexikon Philosophie (p. 264). Stuttgart: Carl Ernst Poeschel Verlag.

²⁷ Lewis, C. I., & Langford, C. (1959). *Symbolic Logic*. New York: Dover Publications. p.240

²⁸ C.f. *ibid.*, p.120

²⁹ C.f. Davis, W. A. (1998). *Implicature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.5

expressing the wish to buy petrol, or something else. Uttering on the other hand “I like even math” implicates by reason of the meaning of the word ‘even’ that the speaker also likes something else than math.³⁰ Both forms of implicature are different from the logical implication inasmuch as the relation between the explicit statement and the corresponding implicature is not a necessary one; rather, it is dependent on conventions and intentions of the interlocutors. Following Grice himself, implicatures can be understood by the cooperative principle which claims that all interlocutors try to participate in a conversation in a cooperative way, that is, to communicate meaningfully and effectively.³¹ The US-American linguist Wayne Davis criticises, in contrast, Grice’s attempt to explain every kind of implicature by principles. At the end of his work *Implicature* in which he exposes Grice’s theory in order to than dismiss it partially, he writes: “In sum, Gricean theory fails because speaker implicature is a matter of intention, sentence implicature is a matter of convention, and neither is calculable from or generated by psychosocial principles”³². Moreover, it is interesting to notice that Davis, additionally, distinguishes another form of implication of speech acts, namely what he calls implications in a ‘natural sense’: Every speech act implies not only something the speaker intends to say, but also that the speaker is alive, that he is not mute, that he speaks the respective language, etc.³³ Such implications in a natural sense differ widely from the concept of implicature, as it would seem that they do not depend on anything like convention, context or intention. Rather, the uttering is taken as a natural phenomenon belonging, and hence characterising the speaker.

Before concluding this section on different applications of the concepts explicit and implicit, it is interesting for our purposes to notice that Husserl’s professor, Franz Brentano has made use of the terms too. At one point in the attachment to the second volume of his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, published in 1911, he describes the possibility of relating to ‘secondary objects’ that accompany the ‘primary object’ incidentally, in the background. As an example, he takes perception: “Not everything which is apprehended is apprehended explicitly and distinctly. Many things are apprehended only implicitly and confusedly”³⁴. This is valid for physical phenomena, for instance for “[...] the notes combined in a chord and the color-elements of a compound color [which] are always really

³⁰ C.f. Nef in: Libera, A. d., Rosier, I., & Nef, F. (2004). Implication. In B. Cassin (ed.), *Vocabulaire Européenne des Philosophies* (p. 583 - 588). Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert.

³¹ C.f. Davis, W. A. (1998). *Implicature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.11

³² Davis, W. A. (1998). *Implicature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.190

³³ C.f. *ibid.*, p.7

³⁴ Brentano, F. (1995). *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. (A. C. Rancurello, D. Terrelland, & L. L. McAlister, transl.) London: Routledge. p. 216

apprehended, but often not distinguished”³⁵. On the other hand, this also holds for perceptions of the inner psyche, as we have “mental activities which are not explicitly perceived in all of their parts”³⁶. It does not become clear in the short attachment, if it were possible to make explicit all that which is perceived implicitly. It would seem though, that while there is no comment on the physical phenomena, he denies that possibility for the psyche, as he judges that “[i]nner perception is, rather, confused [...]”³⁷. Much more than Wunderlich or Davis, thus, Brentano applies explicit and implicit to non-linguistic phenomena, namely, to direct perception.

Concluding this section, we can firstly retain that there is a wide range of historical uses for the two word families derived from *explico* and *implico*. In this context, explicit and implicit have marked the distinction between states of simple physical substances, for example of a scroll, but furthermore between contents already explained and others still to be put into words, between formally or informally given language and its contained meanings. Even the distinction between clear perception and its unclear background has been described by Brentano with the terms explicit and implicit. Even though not every philosophical account has actually made use of the opposition between the two terms, often only using one of them, as seen with the examples of *Explikation* in Carnap, implication in Modern Logic and implicature in Grice, usually there is no difficulty to identify an opposed term, even though it is not defined as such: for instance, one can characterise the *Explikandum* as implicit, or a given logical statement and the exact meaning of a sentence as explicit. In this manner, it can be claimed that there is, notwithstanding the diverse possibilities of application, a common form of the relation between explicit and implicit in all these contexts: The explicit characterises the open, directly accessible form of the implicit. That means, that the given is always given inside an implicit context that has to be made explicit in order to understand the given completely; the given is only complete when seen inside its context, for instance inside that of its tautological inferences. With the possible exception of Brentano, it is thus possible and desirable, in order to enhance the understanding, to make explicit that which is still implicit.

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ *ibid.*

1. The Meaning of Explicit and Implicit in *Ideas I* and *Experience and Judgement*

Passing over to Husserl, it is now the task to work out in a formal text analysis what meaning he gives to these terms. With the exception of the concept of *Explikation* in *Experience and Judgement*, Husserl does not define explicit, implicit or connected words, nor does he use them as technical terms. It would seem reasonable then, that when he applies them, he does so in the common sense of the words. In order to check this supposition, it will be necessary to show the use of the corresponding word in its context, showing the sense it fulfils therein. This analysis cannot claim certainty, of course, as the context only serves as indication, not as definition, and is thus dependent on an interpretation which tries to understand the terms in a sensible manner. The aim of these interpretations is to expose to what extent Husserl's uses of the terms are similar to those employments before and besides him, and if he coins them with a diverging sense. It can be said already, that the terms are being used in various different senses, and will be classified roughly.

1.1 The Expressed and the Unexpressed

If one asks oneself about the Modern, everyday sense of the words explicit and implicit, one would usually think first about language. As the Oxford Learner's Dictionary defines it, the adjective explicit characterises a "statement or piece of writing" which is "clear and easy to understand, so that you have no doubt what is meant"³⁸. Implicit, in contrast, refers to something "suggested without being directly expressed"³⁹. This meaning, distinguishing the directly and clearly expressed from the merely suggested resembles the use in linguistic theory as it was shown in the example of Grice's theory of Implicature. Husserl does use the terms explicit and implicit in a similar sense, namely in the following parts:

Starting with *Ideas I*, the clearest example is to be found in §64. Here, Husserl explains in what way it is possible to continue living in the natural world, while researching under the conditions of phenomenological reduction: Husserl claims that it is only necessary that "as a part of the method for ascertaining the truths which are to be entered in the registry book of phenomenology, [...] we prescribe for ourselves the norm of phenomenological reduction which is concomitantly related to our empirical factual being and prevents us from entering any proposition which contains, explicitly or implicitly, natural positions of that

³⁸ Oxford University Press. (2020). explicit. Accessed on June 5, 2020 from Oxford Learner's Dictionary: <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/explicit?q=explicit>

³⁹ Oxford University Press. (2020). implicit. Accessed on June 5, 2020 from Oxford Learner's Dictionary: https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/implicit#implicit_sng_1

kind” (Hua. III, §64, p.149)ⁱⁱ. “Explicitly or implicitly” just make clear, here, that natural positions have to be excluded from lasting phenomenological accounts in any form, even when they are not expressed directly.

Similar is the description of the attempt of doubt in §31. Husserl writes: “Someone who attempts to doubt some ‘being’ or other, or predicatively explicated, a ‘that exists,’ a ‘that is how it is,’ or the like. The sort of being does not matter” (Hua. III, §31, p.58)ⁱⁱⁱ. The verb ‘explicate’, derived from explicit, refers to the act of making something explicit. “Explicated” here is even accompanied by the adverb “predicatively”, thus indicating clearly that action is to be performed by means of predicates, of objectifying words. Explicating thus is the act of expressing with words, in this context the concrete position which is to be doubted.

Another clear example is to be found in §24. Here, he describes the condition of a statement expressing an ordinary presentive perception: “Every statement which does no more than confer expression on such data by simple explication and by means of significations precisely conforming to them is [...] actually an absolute beginning called upon to serve as a foundation [...] (Hua. III, §24, p.44)^{iv}. “Explication” is thus not used in the technical sense defined in *Experience and Judgement*, but rather as a simple nominalization of the verb ‘to explicate’. The sense that results is that of the act of making something explicit, that is, ‘conferring expression’.

A very similar example can be found in §127, in which Husserl discusses the different possibilities of indirect expressions of judgements, that is, phrases that do not claim to be a judgement. He writes: “There are at all times a *number of possibilities of indirect expressions* with ‘periphrases’. To the essence of any objectivity as objectivity [...] there belong various possibilities of relating explication” (Hua. III, §127, p.302)^v. Again, it suggests itself that explication cannot be understood in the sense of *Experience and Judgement*, as in that sense, explication is distinguished from any kind of relating, as will be seen later. Rather, Husserl points out that there are many possibilities of expression, many times hiding the original phenomenon in some derived predication, which precisely creates the problem of finding doxic statements in them.

Another variant of the word family of explicit, namely ‘explicative’, can be found in §20. Husserl argues here against the naturalistic claim, that all axioms are empirical: “And, above all, it is not natural science that speaks when they try to make us believe that general

truisms such as all axioms express [...] are indeed expressions of experiential matters of fact; whereas we know with full insight that propositions such as those give explicative expression to data of eidetic intuition” (Hua. III, §20, p.39)^{vi}. Once again, the accompanying term, here “expression”, shows clearly that “explicative” refers to an act of explication by means of language.

The next example opposes the explicit with the confused; Husserl, in §125, seeks to show how logical statements are to be clarified, and distinguishes the clarification of, “on the one hand, [...] the signification-stratum, the specifically logical itself [and] on the other hand, the founding substrata” (Hua. III, §125, p.298)^{vii}. He employs the term explicit in order to characterise the clarified logical acts: “We call attention to the fact that essential supplementations are needed by our earlier discussions about the *method of clarification* with respect to the proposition, which is the element of life in science. It is now easy to designate what needs to be done in order to come from confused thinking to genuine and fully explicit cognizing, to distinct and, at the same time, clear effectuation of acts of thinking: In the first place, all “*logical*” acts (*those of signifying*), in so far as they were still effected in the mode of confusion, are to be converted into the mode of originary, spontaneous actionality; thus perfect *logical distinctness* is to be established” (ibid.)^{viii}. While Husserl refers to “explicit cognizing”, it is clear that he moves already in the sphere of articulated propositions, that is, of language.

The next example does also establish an opposition between the explicit and the confused. From the first glance, it is not that clear anymore, though, that it concerns an explicit linguistic expression. It is taken from *Experience and Judgement*, from §26 that distinguishes elucidation of the anticipated horizons from the analytical elucidation of a judgement: “We speak of analytical elucidation in every judgement, in every judicative meaning *qua* predicative. An act of judicative meaning can be confused; and, according to what is meant in it, it can be ‘elucidated’. It thus becomes an act of explicit judgement, an act of judgement ‘in the proper sense’” (E+J, §26, p.126)^{ix}. The judgement is explicit inasmuch as it is not confused anymore. A proper act of judgement seems to differ from a mere judicative meaning by being explicit, by being established as a ‘proper’ act. It seems sensible to assume that this difference between a confused ‘meaning’ and a proper, explicit act of judgement lies precisely in a linguistic expression.

Again in *Ideas I*, in §59, Husserl argues that phenomenology is independent of formal logic and other disciplines of formal mathesis, as it is based on mere description of intuition.

By showing this purity of the phenomenological methodology, Husserl claims that “[a]t the same time we thus acquire the explicit knowledge that a descriptive phenomenology is essentially independent of all those disciplines” (Hua. III, §59, p.137)^x. It is then knowledge, or *Erkenntnis* in German, which becomes explicit here. It is not necessary, in the context of the Husserlian conception of language, that this knowledge be expressed, even though, as a matter of fact, Husserl wrote down the arguments he refers to here. It is imaginable, in contrast, that Husserl acquired the explicit knowledge of the independence of the phenomenological method even before putting these thoughts into words.

Not entirely clear is also an example in §117, in which Husserl shows that all acts of consciousness are positing acts, and thus refer back to doxic modalities. Concluding this argumentation, Husserl writes that “*Every act, or every act-correlate, includes in itself, implicitly or explicitly, something ‘logical’*. It is always to be explicated logically, namely by virtue of the essential universality with which the noetic stratum of ‘expressing’ allows of being attached to everything noetic (or that of expression to everything noematic)” (Hua. III, §117, p.282)^{xi}. As the author of this thesis understands this paragraph, all acts are ‘logical-in-quotation-marks’ because they can be shown to be, at least implicitly, a doxic proposition, that is, the affirmation of something which has certain ‘logical’ properties. For instance, Husserl, earlier in the paragraph, mentions the possible analogy between logic and ethics which is founded on the fact that all of them are based upon doxic positing acts. In this sense, attaching “the noetic stratum of ‘expressing’” would be, first and foremost, expressing that the respective noetic act is one of expression, that is, of proposition itself. Thus, whatever one feels or thinks, by explicating it “logically”, one acknowledges that it is one’s own affirmation, one’s own expression. Again, this acknowledgement is not necessarily linguistic. Moreover, this acknowledgement may or may not be necessary, depending if the ‘logical’ element already lies bare, explicitly, in the act, or is still implicit and has to be “explicated”.

Passing again to *Experience and Judgement*, one finds the last example in §93⁴⁰. Husserl here considers the complexities of free variation in order to obtain the region ‘thing’, and the importance of taking into account the inevitable relativities, caused for example by the human embodiment: “It is only when all relativities are displayed and brought into contemplation of the essence that the idea arises of the regional essence of a thing in general [...]. Every contemplation of essence which is on a lower level and remains stuck in an

⁴⁰ This whole paragraph is based upon Husserl’s manuscript A I 33: 127a - 129b, following Lohmar: Lohmar, D. (1996). *Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil*. Husserl Studies, 13, p. 31-71.

implicit relativity is not, on that account, without result; but it is *abstract* and, in what concerns the sense of the result, has an imperfection which presents grave dangers” (E+J, §93b), p.363)^{xii}. In the German original, Husserl uses ‘unexplizit’ instead of implicit; implicit should be understood here, thus, as mere negation of explicit. As the relativities of human contemplation are the ones remaining non-explicit in the context of free variation, it is not necessarily a linguistic expression that Husserl demands here. It is enough of taking them into account consciously.

Generally speaking, it can be concluded that Husserl does use explicit and implicit, in addition to connected terms, in a broad linguistic sense, to show that something is expressed in words or not. This use is neither systematic, nor very frequent, and seems to be based simply on the everyday signification associated to the terms. Beyond the scope of these linguistic implications, the terms can be found in logical sense in Husserl. The difference, corresponding to that between linguistics and logics, lies in the status of the implication: While a linguistic implication is dependent on factors that are supposed to be contingent, as the conversational context, the different meanings attached to a word, the speaker’s supposed intention, etc., logical implications are by definition necessary, corresponding to the ideal terms and properties formal language attempts to symbolise.

1.2 The Logically Implied

Such a necessary relation between the explicit and the implicit appears, as it was shown above, in Scholastic as well as in Modern logic. The central concept here is that of implication, allowing to establish a valid possibility of inference. According to that, it cannot surprise that most of the examples with a logical meaning contain a word connected to implicit, rather than to explicit – while this latter was overrepresented in the last chapter concerning the linguistic sense of the terms.

Again, it seems advisable to start with the clearest examples, those that refer directly to logical disciplines. In §72 of *Ideas I*, Husserl describes geometry and its properties as a material eidetic science in order to compare it to his conception of phenomenology. He characterises geometry by pointing out its logical property of being a definite manifold, thus “[w]e can also say that such a manifold has the distinctive property being ‘*mathematically-exhaustively definable*.’ The ‘definition’ consists of the system of axiomatic concepts and axioms; and the ‘mathematically exhaustive’ consists of the fact that the defining assertions involve the greatest conceivable prejudgement [*Präjudiz*] concerning the manifold: nothing

remains undetermined” (Hua. III, §72, p.163)^{xiii}. Here, Kersten translated *implizieren* as “involve”, showing that the term refers to the logical containments of the defining assertions. Husserl’s point lies exactly in this implication, claiming that the axioms proposed by geometry only have to be developed logically to render the totality of the discipline.

In §79 of *Ideas I*, Husserl attempts to reject sceptical arguments brought forward against the possibility of observation of lived experience. In response, Husserl writes: “All genuine skepticism of whatever kind and persuasion is indicated by the essentially necessary countersense that, in its argumentations, it implicitly presupposes as conditions of the possibility of its validity precisely what it denies in its theses” (Hua. III, §79, p.185)^{xiv}. Here, Husserl implicitly takes one of the most classic significations, the implication of countersense, due to certain necessary presuppositions that are not expressed explicitly. Inasmuch they are necessary presuppositions of the described, they are implicitly present though.

This same signification of implicit appears again in *Experience and Judgement*, in appendix II⁴¹, when Husserl depicts Hume’s conception of ‘matters of fact’ and the impossibility of inducing laws in this sphere. He writes “The denial of a causal relation and, correlatively, the denial of any natural law, no matter how certain, does not imply the slightest absurdity” (E+J, Appendix II, p.392)^{xv}. That is, even though it might seem like it, following Husserl there is no implication of a countersense here. Nothing in denying the validity of natural laws entails their actual, presupposed validity.

Another clear example is found in *Experience and Judgement*, in §97⁴², a passage in which Husserl describes certain logical properties of concepts. Namely, he talks about predications belonging to these concepts: “To be completely general: *if one concept is contained in another, then it is true of the corresponding predication that they are contained in one another*, that is to say, that universally every subject which has the last concept as a predicate must also have the first [...]. As in our example, so in general we obtain general states of affairs brought out in a pure *a priori*, states of affairs which have as their form an

⁴¹ As Landgrebe writes himself at the end of the introduction to *Experience and Judgement*, he has taken Annex II from an unedited draft of a modification of the VI. Logical Investigation, written, following Landgrebe, in 1913 (E+J, Editor’s foreword, p.7). The text appears already, though, in Husserl’s lectures on Logic and Epistemology held in the winter semester 1906/1907 in Göttingen, printed in Hua. XXIV, §51 e), as Lohmar indicates. In addition, Lohmar points out that this paragraph is to be found in the A-Manuscripts, in I 41: Lohmar, D. (1996). *Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil*. Husserl Studies, 13, p. 31-71, specifically p.46.

⁴² Following Lohmar, the §94-§97 are almost entirely based upon manuscript F I 29, from 91b until 98b, including the lines quoted here which are taken from 97a: Lohmar, D. (1996). *Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil*. Husserl Studies, 13, p. 31-71.

implication, an into-one-another, a being-included-in-one-another. Proceeding from the lowest, absolutely concrete concepts, which arise from individual repetition and from their concrete partial concepts, and ascending to concepts of a higher level of generality, we can always determine such connections of *a priori* implication anew; [...]. Furthermore, for these constructions of *a priori* universal judgements of implication, just as for the previous constructions of *a priori* particular judgements, we have the absolute certainty that whenever we wish to produce these structures [...] we must also find the same relations of inclusion” (E+J, §97, p.376-377)^{xvi} As Husserl is talking here about a priori implications of pure concepts, the logical sense of the word is clear: It is a necessary containment of formal terms.

Just one paragraph before⁴³, Husserl uses the terms explicit and implicit as a pair, in order to define what he understands as plural terms of particularity: “By this we understand precisely such phrases as ‘some *A* or other in general,’ ‘some *B* or other in general,’ and so on, in each of which is accomplished that peculiar positing of an indeterminate particular of a conceptual universal. In addition, each plural term of particularity intentionally harbors – explicitly or implicitly – a plurality in itself and, in the case of an indeterminate plural, an indeterminate plurality of terms of particularity” (E+J, §96 a), p.368)^{xvii}. That is, even if it is not stated explicitly in the logical language of a plural term of particularity, at least implicitly it does refer to a plurality.

Even stepping out of Husserl’s direct descriptions of logics as discipline and certain logical properties of terms, one can still find clear examples of implications in the logical sense. Still in *Experience and Judgement*, in §65⁴⁴, Husserl presents the different forms of constituted objectivities of understanding. As these objectivities of understanding are ideal, they have an ‘objective sense’, a *gegenständlicher Sinn* in the Husserlian sense. Husserl points out, that “[...] it is possible, however, for objects to stand in relation to sense in still another way, so that in themselves, in their intended and true being, they exhibit *sense as a predicate*, as a determination coming to them in truth, belonging to their being-itself. This is the case with those real objects in which, as bearers of signification, irrealities have their mundane, spatiotemporal occurrence. A very familiar example is provided by the words of a language, the letters, even a complete work [...]. There is here a remarkable implication. The wording and the ‘sense’ belong to the objective sense of a declarative sentence. [...] The *objective sense* corresponding to such an object is, consequently, a *sense of sense*, a second-

⁴³ These lines appear as well in manuscript F I 29, namely on the pages 93a-95a, following Lohmar: *ibid.*

⁴⁴ Following Lohmar, this part is taken from manuscript B III 12, 106a - 106b: *ibid.*

level sense” (E+J, §65, p.268)^{xviii}. The “remarkable implication” here consists exactly in this sense of a sense, an implication resulting from the two propositions, first, that every object has its objective sense depending on its determinations, and second, that the determination of some ideal objects is their possession of sense.

Another example, stretching the concept of logics already, can be found in §49⁴⁵ of *Experience and Judgement*. Husserl explains here the interconnection between the analytically distinguished layers of objectifying operations, namely between receptive experience and predicative spontaneity. For instance, Husserl writes that “[i]f, for example, in a judgement of perception of the simplest form, *S is p*, we determine this particular object of perception as red, then, in this ‘being-determined-as-red,’ there is already contained implicitly, in virtue of the generality of the signification ‘red,’ the relation to the general essence ‘redness,’ although this relation need not become thematic, as occurs, for example, in the form ‘this *is* a red object.’ It is only in this case that we can *speak of conceptualizing thought in the proper sense* and hence legitimately distinguish it from merely determinative and relational thought as such, in which the relation to generalities is contained only implicitly and has not yet become thematic” (E+J, §49, p.204-205)^{xix}. It is important to notice here, that judgements of perception, following Husserl, are not linguistically expressed yet, that is, he is not talking about the logical statement *S is p*. That is why the relation to the essence of the colour red is implied here, and does only become explicit in the next layer of objectification, that is, predicative spontaneity. Thus, the implication observed here is not a logical one in the classic sense, as that which implies something is not put into words. Rather, the essence of the redness which is, at this point, only perceived in one particular stance, possesses a generality, implies its generality, but this generality is not taken notice of. One could see this implication as a logical one in a different sense, as it is here a judgement of perception, not a logical term which implies another statement.

Implications which could be characterised as ‘logical’ can be found as playing an important role in proper Husserlian thought, as already shown in the last example. Furthermore, in §12 of *Ideas I*, Husserl presents a part of his eidetics, distinguishing higher and lower level of universality in essences belonging to genus and species. “*These* eidetic relationships designated by Genus and Species (not the relationships among classes, i.e., sets) are such that, in the particular essence, the more universal essence is ‘immediately or

⁴⁵ This paragraph, being one of the introductory paragraphs to the second part of the book, seems to be redacted by Landgrebe, as Lohmar found almost no corresponding manuscripts to §§47-49.

mediately *contained*' - in a determined sense, the character of which can be seized upon in eidetic intuition [...]. The eidetically singular essence [*eidetisch Singulare*] thus implies collectively the universals lying above it and which, for their part, level by level 'lie one inside another,' the higher always lying inside the lower" (Hua. III, §12, p.25)^{xx}. Different from classic logic which is based upon statements, Husserl proposes an eidetic logic, in which certain necessary implications are to be found in the essences, and more specifically, the genus is implied by the species.

The next example is taken from a similar context. In §4 of *Ideas I*, Husserl claims the ability of phantasy to exemplify the eidos, the essence without any necessity of a connection to factual reality. He writes: "*Positing of and, to begin with, intuitive seizing upon, essences implies not the slightest positing of any individual factual existence; pure eidetic truths contain not the slightest assertion about matters of fact*" (Hua. III, §4, p.11)^{xxi}. Husserl claims here, that there is no valid implication of an eidetic truth to a matter of fact. Thus, he is not talking inside the sphere of classical logic, but rather determining philosophically the properties of his eidetics.

The last example is far less clear. In §8 of *Experience and Judgement*, that is, in the introduction redacted by Landgrebe, in which the preconditions for the act of *Explikation*, namely the horizontality, is described, appears this quote: "This means that everything given in experience has not only an internal horizon but also an infinite, open *external horizon of objects cogiven* (therefore, a horizon of the second level, referring to the horizon of the first level and implying it)" (E+J, §8, p.33)^{xxii}. The most reasonable supposition is to understand that the horizon of the second level implies the one of the first. Formally, this would indeed be a logical implication, as a second level implies the first level. It seems more probable though, that this implication is rather founded on the proper structure of the external horizon; in what sense this is exactly the case, is not explained here though.

Besides parts in which Husserl refers to the logical discipline itself, it was possible to observe here that Husserl does use the concept of implication in order to express a necessary connection between two structures. This second sense, in its various instances, can be seen thus as an application which is parallel to the traditional logic sense. An important position here takes Husserl's eidetics, in which the interconnections and even implications between essences, and their generalities and particularities, are described.

1.3 'Explication' in the sense of *Experience and Judgement*

Besides the traditional uses of terms connected to explicit and implicit which have been shown above, it is part of the claim of this thesis that Husserl employs the terms in a new and creative way. The clearest example of such a creation of a new sense for a word belonging to the pair explicit-implicit can be observed in the concept of 'explication', developed most prominently in *Experience and Judgement*, specifically in the second chapter of part 1, *Simple Apprehension and Explication*.

Even though this work was only published posthumously, many of the texts used for *Experience and Judgement* have been written between 1910 and 1930. As Landgrebe writes in the foreword, the basic text and ideas for the work originate from lectures on Genetic Logic held the first time in the winter semester 1919/1920 in Freiburg.⁴⁶ Lohmar, pointing out that Husserl did not hold any lectures of this kind in the winter semester 1919/1920, identifies the lectures Landgrebe talks about as the lectures on transcendental logic from the winter semester 1920/1921, proven clearly by the texts which can be found in *Experience and Judgement*.⁴⁷ One of the manuscripts deriving from these lectures is F I 39, which will appear sometimes in this chapter to present Husserl's concept of explication. The concept can be traced back to an even earlier origin, though, given that Lohmar mentions that it appears already in Ms. A I 14 from autumn 1911.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the word *Explication* appears again in a comment which describes Ms A I 11, p.136-146 from 1920/1921 as one of the topics of the manuscripts which are in addition characterised as an important supplement to the lectures from 1920/1921.⁴⁹ Finally, the manuscripts A I 34 start with the crossed out title *Explication*, and have been written, following Lohmar, 1928/1929 as complementary supplements for Landgrebe's first version of the book, in order to be incorporated by Landgrebe.⁵⁰ As the reader will be able to see, many quotes from lines in *Experience and Judgement* which can be traced back to these manuscripts will be used in this chapter. In the frame of this investigation, there has been no work with the manuscripts themselves, though, as the focus does not lie on the chronological development of the concept of explication, but rather on Husserl's employment of it, that is, the way Husserl understands it.

⁴⁶ C.f. E+J, Editor's Foreword to the 1948 Edition, p.5

⁴⁷ C.f. Lohmar, D. (1996). *Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil*. Husserl Studies, 13, p. 31-71, p.45.

⁴⁸ C.f. *ibid.*, p.46.

⁴⁹ C.f. *ibid.*, p.48

⁵⁰ C.f. *ibid.*, p.50

Besides quoting lines which are based evidentially on original manuscripts written by Husserl, the depiction of the concept of explication in this chapter will also make use of quotes which might have been redacted by Landgrebe himself. As noted already in the introduction, one can suppose that §15-98 have been re-edited by Landgrebe and Husserl together, and can be seen thus as being authorised by Husserl.⁵¹ For the introductory paragraphs, there is no such a comfortable situation, as Husserl did not have the chance to read their final version. Still, there was still an oral discussion on it, as Landgrebe points out in the foreword, and, moreover, it is based in part on earlier versions of the introduction co-edited by Husserl, in part it paraphrases Hua.VI and Hua. XVII.⁵² Furthermore, Lohmar mentions that he did not look for manuscripts corresponding to the introduction, but did still find some by chance, and would expect to find more if one looked for it.⁵³ Given this situation, it seems to be legitimate to not only make use of the §15-98, but also, for instance, of §8 in order to understand the concept of explication thoroughly, as it has been done here. While it is not proven that every quote from this paragraph has been authorised by Husserl, it seems to be an account which is close enough to Husserl's thought to make use of it. At worst, one can see parts of §8 as an interpretation by Landgrebe of Husserl's concept of explication, a source which still seems to be closer to the original concept than, for instance, an extrapolation by the hand of the author of this thesis.

Experience and Judgement, generally speaking, attempts to present a complete theory of the experiential origins of logical judgements. That is, Husserl's intention is to show how all logical thought is based upon a pre-predicative sphere of experience, and can be derived from it.⁵⁴ Thus, it can be read as a critique on the rationalistic tradition of Early Modernity, and its successors. The concept of explication, or *Explication* in German, takes an important position in the development of the account of the pre-predicative experience. As it is located precisely on the pre-predicative level, explication is not performed by means of language, and has to be distinguished, thus, from expression.

The very possibility of explication lies in the universal conditions of perception, namely its horizontality. That means that all experience, even simple apprehension, exceeds itself, as it can be read in §8: “[T]here is no experience, in the simple and primary sense of an experience of things, which, grasping a thing for the first time and bringing cognition to bear

⁵¹ C.f. *ibid.*, particularly p.34

⁵² C.f. E+J, Editor's Foreword to the 1948 Edition, p.7

⁵³ C.f. Lohmar, D. (1996). *Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil*. *Husserl Studies*, 13, p. 31-71, particularly p.34-35 and p.44

⁵⁴ C.f. *ibid.*, particularly p.31.

on it, does not already 'know' more about the thing than is in this cognition alone. Every act of experience, whatever it may be that is experienced in the proper sense as it comes into view, has *eo ipso*, necessarily, a knowledge and a potential knowledge [*Mitwissen*] having reference to precisely this thing, namely, to something of it which has not yet come into view. This preknowledge [*Vorwissen*] is indeterminate as to content, or not completely determined, but it is never completely empty" (E+J, §8, p.31-32)^{xxiii}. In this sense, all simple apprehension of an object, as opposed to the explication of its properties, is not only incomplete, but is also understood by the subject as incomplete.

Thus, "[t]his implies that every experience refers to the possibility – and it is a question here of the capacity [*Ver-möglichkeit*] of the ego – [...] of explicating, step by step, the thing which has been given in a first view" (E+J, §8, p.32)^{xxiv}. Focusing on this thing, and determining its properties by looking closer, one would thus enter its internal horizon. But on the other hand, the current experience "has not only an internal horizon but also an infinite, open *external horizon of objects cogiven* [...]. These are objects toward which I am not now actually turned but toward which I can turn at any time [...]" (E+J, §8, p.33)^{xxv}. Any of these real things which can be anticipated in this manner thanks to the external horizon "[...] are known as real objects (or properties, relations, etc.) *from* the world, are known as existing within the one spatiotemporal horizon" (E+J, §8, p.33)^{xxvi}. In other words, there is one last spatiotemporal horizon of the world, which includes all real things that can be anticipated in an external horizon.

Given the ability of entering into either the internal or the external horizon, one can observe a parallelism between both, reflected as well in the point that both affect the contemplating subject, even though the power of affection of the internal horizon is stronger (c.f. E+J, §33, p.149-150)^{xxvii}. To these affectivities of internal and external horizon corresponds an anticipatory intention, as one can read, still, in §8: "This original [...] anticipation turns out to be a variant mode of originally constitutive [*stiftender*] activities of cognition, of an activity and an original intention, therefore of a mode of 'intentionality' which anticipatively aims beyond a core of givenness" (E+J, §8, p.33)^{xxviii}. The experiential horizons are thus not merely given from the objective side, but also anticipated by the subject, they consist in a certain modified intentionality.

That which is anticipated, in the context of explication namely determinations of the object, is given implicitly before the act of explication itself, in the anticipatory horizon. It is noteworthy that in §8 the anticipated is called precisely 'implicit': "The real thing is known in

thematic perception in that, as the experience is extended [...], this real thing is continuously presented as being itself there, being displayed thereby in its particular characteristics, its quidditative elements [...]. Everything which reveals itself in this way, and which is already implicitly there before the explication of the perceived, essentially passes for that which, derived from this real thing *really* attains perception in this perception. This real thing itself is more than that which at any given time attains (and has already attained) actual cognizance” (E+J, §8, p.35)^{xxix}. The text thus distinguishes here ‘real perception’ on one hand and ‘actual cognizance’ on the other. The real thing, the perceived thing, exceeds the actual cognizance still before the beginning of the act of explication, as that which is to be explicated is already there in a certain sense, implicitly. It becomes clearer with the example that is given subsequently: “[T]he side that is seen is a side only insofar as it has sides which are not seen, which are anticipated and as such determine the sense” (E+J, §8, p.35)^{xxx}. The side which is not seen forms part of the perceived real thing inasmuch as it characterises the seen side as precisely a side. In this way, for instance apprehension of a spatial object as spatial object is possible.

Hence, an anticipated quidditative element is already given, even before it is explicated. Its implicit givenness is defined, though, by a determined indeterminacy, that is, if the anticipated is envisioned, its variability is always conscious, for “[...] every such an anticipatory envisionment of the ‘*a priori*’ which must be ascribed to this real thing has the essential characteristic of indeterminate generality” (E+J, §8, p.35)^{xxxi}. In other words, “[e]very anticipatory envisionment takes place in a flowing variability which is copresent to consciousness and which allows consciousness to fix the variants [...]” (E+J, §8, p.35-36)^{xxxii}. This variability is fixed, it is limited by characterisation of the object as typical, anticipating thus possibilities which would belong to this certain type. That means, “[...] we remain in the unity of the anticipation, namely, that of the color of the back side of the thing; but, as an anticipation, it is indeterminate and general; the determination is anticipated in terms of a type, an element of familiarity” (E+J, §8, p.36)^{xxxiii}. One can observe here the relevance of the already known for anticipations and their corresponding bestowal of sense.

Instead of envisioning the anticipated, that is, imagining that which might be found in the horizon following a certain pre-given typicality, there is the possibility of explicating the anticipated, given that the anticipations point at real objects. “[...] [E]ach explication [...] can [...] be characterized as an *elucidation* and clarification, as a more precise determination of

what is indeterminate in the horizon-form, of what is implied therein” (E+J, §26, p.124)^{55xxxiv}. Besides noting once more the use of a term connected to implicit for that which is to be explicated, the main point here is, that the role of explication is to fulfil the anticipatory intentionality: “Every entering into a real explication gives this the intentional character of an explication fulfilling and realizing the horizon-intention (as an empty anticipation), realizing it in determinate steps by means of which various unknown determinations are determined and henceforth known” (E+J, §8, p.38)^{56xxxv}. In this sense, as every explication fulfils the empty anticipations, it is guided by them. It does not find something totally new, but only aims at elucidating something already pre-given vaguely. In other words, in the process of explication, “[...] the interest follows the direction of the expectation which has been awakened” (E+J, §22, p.105)^{57xxxvi}. These expectations are not awakened by chance, though. As “[t]he object is present from the very first with a character of familiarity[,] it is already apprehended as an object of a type more or less vaguely determined and already, in some way, known. In this way the direction of the expectations of what closer inspection will reveal in the way of properties is prescribed” (E+J, §24 a), p.113)^{xxxvii}. The already recognised type of the object does not only determine the anticipations, but also the movement of explication attempting to fulfil them.

Correspondingly, the movement of explication in general is defined by Husserl as “[...] *penetration of the internal horizon of the object by the direction of perceptual interest*” (E+J, §22, p.105)^{58xxxviii}. It is nothing more than the realisation of the possibilities embodied in the internal horizon in the moment of simple contemplation. In the process of this realisation, the given anticipations may be fulfilled or dismissed: “In the case of the unobstructed realization of this interest, the protentional expectations fulfill themselves [...]; the object reveals itself in its properties as that which it was anticipated to be, except that what was anticipated now attains original givenness. A more precise determination results, eventually perhaps partial corrections, or – in the case of obstruction – disappointment of the expectations, and partial modalization” (E+J, §22, p.105)^{xxxix}. These are the two possibilities, either confirmation of the anticipated, or revelation that it was mistaken, resulting in the modification, the correction of the expectations.

⁵⁵ Following Lohmar, this part is taken from A I 34, 13a: Lohmar, D. (1996). Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil. Husserl Studies, 13, p. 31-71.

⁵⁶ Following Lohmar, this page is taken from A I 34, 11a-b: *ibid.*, p.70.

⁵⁷ Following Lohmar, this part of the phrase can be found in A I 34, 23b: *ibid.*

⁵⁸ Following Lohmar, this definition is also taken from manuscript A I 34, 23b: *ibid.*

In spite of this first penetration and realisation of the anticipations of the internal horizon, the process of explication is not finished. Actually, it cannot be finished, for the result of an explication, the explicate “[...] supplies only a partial clarification, insofar as an *unclarified residual horizon* remains” (E+J, §26, p.125)^{59xi}. Explication thus remains a continual, even perpetual process. Furthermore, there is the possibility of turning towards the external horizon. This happens “[...] when the interest is not satisfied with the explicative penetration into the internal horizon of the object but makes the objects which are copresent in the external horizon, which are with it in the field and which at the same time affect it, thematic and considers the object in relation to them” (E+J, §22, p.105)^{xli}. Thus, generally speaking, there will always remain an unclarified residual horizon which is the precondition for the possibility of further explication.

It is now the moment to pass on from the conditions of possibility of explication to the process itself, and how it works. What explication does, effectively, is to explicate the parts of an object. In this sense, it is opposed to mere contemplation, in which the “[...] object appears without its different internal characteristics being made prominent, and [by which] hence recognition of its particular features does not become possible” (E+J, §22, p.104)^{60xlii}. Explication, in contrast, does distinguish different features of the object, as it is a “[...] *developing contemplation*, a unity of articulated contemplation” (E+J, §24 a), p.113)^{61xliii}. It develops the object, *entfaltend* as Husserl writes in the original, faithful to the etymologic origin of explication, *ex-plicare*. That which is thus developed or unfolded here, are the properties of the object. In the terms of the text itself, in the context of explication, “[...] the ‘object’ of explication is presented to us in the sense-form ‘substrate’ and [...] the moments explicated are presented in a wholly different form, namely, as ‘*properties*,’ as ‘*determinations*,’ of the object, in such a way that we can speak of an *explication*, of a development of *S* in its determinations, and say that it is *the S* which is determined as α , as β , and so on” (E+J, §24 a), p.114)^{xliv}. An object which is being explicated is thus a substrate, and it is explicated in its determinations. It is actually only in the process of explication, that the determinations of a substrate become known. Furthermore, this means that the properties of a substrate do not only have to be discovered, but they have to become conscious precisely as properties of the substrate, that is, they have to be assigned to the substrate. Such an assignment is possible because the explication consists in “[...] a chain of individual

⁵⁹ This quote can also be traced back to manuscript A I 34, to pages 13a-14a, as Lohmar did: *ibid*.

⁶⁰ Following Lohmar, this part is also taken from A I 34, 23a-23b: *ibid*.

⁶¹ This part is taken from F I 39, 13a-14a, following Lohmar: *ibid*.

apprehensions, of individual acts, in a discrete succession of separate steps which, bound internally to one another, form a *polythetic unity* of the individual theses” (E+J, §24 a), p.112)^{xlv}. This creation of a polythetic unity in the process of explication then results in a double formation of sense, in “[...] a *twofold constitution of sense* [*Sinngebung*] [...] realized in it; ‘object as substrate’ and ‘determination *α...*’” (E+J, §24 a), p.114)^{62xlv}. Both dimensions are determined simultaneously, as the substrate is being determined by determining one of its properties.

This is only possible thanks to the synthesis of overlapping. Generally speaking, overlapping appears whenever the ego passes from one object to the next, as the ego “[...] plays a continually active role through the series of steps run through; in the second, it is still directed toward the object of the first; it is directed, therefore, in spite of the privileged position of the new object of primary apprehension, on both of them together [...] The succession of the rays of attention and of apprehension has become a *single double ray*” (E+J, §24 b), p.115)^{63xlvii}. Overlapping is hence the general precondition for the possibility of comparing two objects of apprehension, for eventually determining their similarity and their differences. It is only one particular kind of synthesis of overlapping, though, which does correspond to the act of explication: “If we now take the case of the synthesis ‘thing and property of the thing’ and, in general, the synthesis ‘object and objective property,’ then a completely unique synthesis of the coincidence of identity confronts us here” (E+J, §24 b), p.116)^{64xlviii}. This explicative coincidence is a synthesis of coincidence, but it does not correspond to any kind of total identity. Rather, as we have seen, the explicated property is distinct from its substrate, but still belongs to him.

How can this special kind of synthesis of coincidence of identity be characterised? Concretely, during the operation of explication, the ego runs over, so to say, different details of the contemplated object. “While we apprehend the singularities in particular, we actively carry out afresh particular orientations and apprehensions which cause what is apprehended to stand out in a privileged way” (E+J, §24 c), p.117)^{xlix}. Thus, these partial apprehensions are the content of the act of explication. But at the same time, the substrate which is being explicated stays thematic, even though the subject is focussing on one of its properties. In this particular form of staying thematic, “[...] the active apprehension of the whole does not remain in the original form which first gave it life but is a *maintaining of the activity in an*

⁶² This part is taken again from A I 34, 19a: *ibid.*

⁶³ Following Lohmar, this part is taken from manuscript F I 39, 15a-b: *ibid.*

⁶⁴ Following Lohmar, this is taken from manuscript F I 39, 15a-b: *ibid.*

intentional modification, precisely as a still-retaining-in-grasp” (E+J, §24 c), p.118)^l. The most interesting characteristic of this still-remaining-in-grasp in the context of explication is that the substrate is modified continuously in the process. This means, that the substrate which is being explicated is changing its intended content, “[...] thanks to constantly new partial coincidences, it is an always different having-in-grasp. In every step, what is gotten hold of as singular is incorporated by the coincidence into the sense content of the substrate. The individual graspings are transformed [...] into *modifications of total grasp*, in other words, into enrichments of its content” (E+J, §24 c), p.118)^{li}. One could speak, thus, of a dynamic interrelation between the substrate and its properties, as every explicated property modifies the substrate, while it is itself determined as forming part of this transforming substrate.

From this particular interrelation results as well the dependency between both entities. The substrate is nothing behind its determinations, it has no autonomous being. Rather, it is to be found precisely in its determinations: “Substrate and determination are constituted originally in the process of explication as correlative members of a kind of coincidence. [...] In every explicative determination of *S*, *S* is present in one of its particularities; and in the different determinations which appear in the form of explicates, it remains the same, but in conformity with the different particularities which are its properties” (E+J, §24 b), p.116)^{65lii}. It is in this sense, as well, that the act of explication, which aims at the substrate’s properties, determines the substrate itself. Hence, “[e]very explication of an object is an explication of its sense; every explicate, or predicate essentially its own, determines the object by moments of sense essentially its own” (E+J, §65, p.267)^{66liii}. The objective sense of the substrate can only be shown by explicating the substrate, by depicting its properties.

Thus, we are now able to draw a coherent picture of the concept of explication as described in *Experience and Judgement*. The possibility of explication lies in the horizontality of apprehension, that is, in the fact that the subject always anticipates more than it actually sees. These horizons have a passive side, as the horizons affect the subject, and an active side, as the subject intentionally anticipates the expected. There is, moreover, the possibility of fulfilling the anticipations by entering the horizon, resulting either in confirmation or disappointment of the anticipated. In the case of the internal horizon of an object, the realisation of the horizontal anticipation corresponds to the act of explication. By explicating, the subject observes the object to distinguish its features; developing and unfolding it in order

⁶⁵ This part is taken from A I 34, 24a, following Lohmar: *ibid*.

⁶⁶ Following Lohmar, this quote is taken from B III 12, 106a-b: *ibid*.

to disclose its determinations. For this purpose, it is necessary that the subject realise a twofold constitution of sense, as the determinations have to be understood as determinations of the substrate, thus determining it. Formally, this explicative coincidence is achieved by creating a polythetic unity which connects the explicated properties to the substrate and to each other. Concretely, this kind of synthesis is possible thanks to a still-remaining-in-grasp of the substrate in the course of the explication. The substrate which is held on to does not remain exactly the same though, as it is determined precisely by the explicated properties – thus, the substrate is being modified continuously in the process of explication. Finally, this explication does not finish in itself, as there always remains an open, unclarified residual horizon of features still to be explicated. In reality, thus, explication stops when the interest of the subject in it ends. The explicit, in the sense of *Explikation*, hence refers to a property already pointed out by the operation of explication, and does, according to this, differ from the explicit in the sense of the expressed and the explicit in the logical sense.

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the concept of explication appears at least as early as 1911 in Husserl's work. Therefore, it is not that surprising that the technical term of explication in the sense described in *Experience and Judgement* can be found already in *Ideas I*, published for the first time in 1913, and quite frequently. Husserl does not explain the concept there, but from the context it becomes clear that he uses it in the sense of an operation to determine the properties of an object. Mostly, it appears in something one might want to call phrases, used by Husserl in order to refer to a whole inventory of possible operations. For instance, in §37 of *Ideas I*, Husserl describes the relation between intentionality and objectivation, and writes “[...] ‘objectivated’ objects [...] are then, for their part, capable of serving as substrates for explications, relations, conceptual apprehensions, and predications” (Hua. III, §37, p.77-78)^{lv}. Thus, in this example, the term explication appears amongst a certain group of operations such as relating or predicating which are all possible once an objectivation has taken place. Hence, there is no special interest in the operation of explication, it is just mentioned for completeness. Similar examples, in which explication or derived terms are mentioned for completeness, together with other operations, can be found in §11, p.23^{lv}; §19, p.36^{lvi}; §28, p.53^{lvii}; §69, p.156^{lviii}; §77, p.176^{lix}; §88, p.214^{lx}; §110, p.260^{lxi}; §118, p.284^{lxii}; §124, p.295^{lxiii}; §127, p.303^{lxiv}; §130, p.312^{lxv}; §133, p.318^{lxvi}; §134, p.319^{lxvii}.

Furthermore, the term does appear alone as well. In these cases, it is not as clear anymore if the term still has the same signification of an operation on the pre-predicative level

to develop the properties of an object, that is, the signification which is explained in *Experience and Judgement*. Here, only the cases which do indeed seem to belong to this defined sense, rather than having some deviant meaning, will be considered. The first of these examples is to be found in §80, in which Husserl tries to depict the pure ego. He writes: “Aside from its ‘modes of relation’ or ‘modes of comportment,’ the ⟨Ego⟩ is completely empty of essence-components, has no explicable content, is undescrivable in and for itself” (Hua. III, §80, p.191)^{lxviii}. One can indeed understand “explicable” here as referring to the ability to be explicated, that is, the possibility of determining properties of the substrate – Husserl’s point would be, that there are no properties which make up the content of the pure ego. However, one could perfectly well understand explicable as possible to express, too, or as possible to make present, or in some other sense.

Another unclear example which appears in *Ideas I* is found in §121, in which Husserl transfers doxical syntactical forms onto the emotional sphere. In one point, he writes: “Each time it is a matter of essentially possible turnings of one’s regard and of the co-included positional and synthetical-doxic procedures for fashioning a new act on the basis of an emotional act in which we wholly live, so to speak, only emotionally, thus without actualizing the doxic potentialities – a new act in which the only potential emotional objectivity for the present is converted into an actual doxic and possibly expressly explicit ⟨objectivity⟩” (Hua. III, §121, p.290)^{lxix}. In the German original, explicit is *explizierte*, that is, the past participle of the verb to explicate. Thus, a connection to the concept of explication seems probable. What seems to point to this possibility, is that Husserl makes a distinction between actual, *aktuell*, doxic explicit and possibly expressly explicit. Thus, assuming that there is no redundancy here, there is a difference between explicit and expressed, and a difference between explicit and actual, *aktuell*. It would seem then, as the logical sense of explicit makes no sense here, that Husserl employs explicit indeed in the sense of *Experience and Judgement*. Hence, the doxic explication of the emotional objectivity, that is, the clarification and determination of the properties of its being posited, is possibly also expressed.

We have seen, then, that the technical term of explication and its derivations can be defined clearly, and discovered in other parts of Husserl’s work. The term does not only have a distinct sense, but even refers to a precise act which is found in a certain context, the context of originary contemplation of a real object in order to determine its properties, being opposed to “relational contemplation, which goes beyond the object” (E+J, §33, p.149)^{lxx}, which enters the external horizon. However, Husserl himself confers to the term some meanings that point

beyond the strict definition of explication described until now. In this context, it seems to be probable that the main emphasis on the role of explication in the determination of properties of a substrate is due to the aim of *Experience and Judgement*, to give an account on the experiential foundation of logics, that is, to explain the pre-predicative conditions for the assignation of properties to a substrate. Following this argumentation, Husserl does see some possibilities for the employment of the concept of explication beyond this narrow practical context, but does not develop them because they do not matter for the point of the book. In this last part of the chapter, the clearest indications for a possibility of widening the concept of explication in *Experience and Judgement* are to be discussed.

Until now, all description of explication has centred on explication of spatial objects in the direct perception. However, in a first argument for widening the concept of explication, there is a clear indication that explication is possible not only in perception, but also in the spheres of empty intentions, phantasy and memory. In the case of the first, explication of empty intentions, it would seem that the text actually tries to distinguish it from the normal explication, given that it speaks of an ambiguity in the term of elucidation used to describe the concept of explication: “If [...] all explication can be viewed as elucidation, it must be remembered that in ordinary usage ‘elucidation’ has another sense. That is, this ‘elucidation’ of explication is not to be confused with what is so called in the proper sense of the term, i.e., with *analytical elucidation*, which, to be sure, also represents a kind of explication, but an *explication in empty consciousness*, while in our study we have always moved in the domain of intuition” (E+J, §26, p.126)^{lxxi}. The distinction made here is one between elucidation as in the realisation of anticipatory horizons, and analytical elucidation. In contrast, the explication corresponding to analytical elucidation does represent a kind of explication – the difference would then seem to be just one of context, as for the purpose of the text it is more important to emphasise the perceptive explication. Explication in empty consciousness is just located in a different sphere, namely, the predicative sphere.

It has to be taken notice of, correspondingly, that in the same context of the quote above appear the following sentences: “An act of judicative meaning can be confused; and, according to what is meant in it, it can be ‘elucidated’. It thus becomes an act of explicit judgement, an act of judgement ‘in the proper sense’” (E+J, §26, p.126)^{lxxii}. This quote has been examined above, in order to establish that “explicit” here refers to being clearly expressed. This does not, however, speak against the claim just made that the analytical elucidation, for instance of a judgement, can be seen as a kind of explication in the sense of

Experience and Judgement. It rather shows, that the choice of words, explication and explicit, is no coincidence: In the case of an explication of empty intentions, that is, as an analytical elucidation, the product of the explication is not only explicit qua having been explicated, but it is also explicit because it is being expressed. In the predicative sphere, a confused judicative meaning can become the substrate. By entering the internal horizon of the confused meaning, the determinations of the judicative meaning can be distinguished and defined, that is, explicated. The result is a judgement whose properties are unfolded, an explicit and expressed “act of judgement in the proper sense”. This, of course, is not shown in the text – it can be derived, though, from the claim that an analytical elucidation is an explication too.

For the other two spheres, phantasy and memory, it will be easier to show that the text itself establishes the possibility of explication. In the case of phantasy, one can read, that “[...] an object can also *be explicated in an anticipatory way* on the basis of a kind of intuitive picturing in the imagination, a picturing in which memories of objects already given of the same or related types play their joint role” (E+J, §27, p.127-128)^{lxxiii}. It is important to notice here, that there is a distinction between the way the anticipated is given as a horizon before the actual explication starts, and an explication in phantasy. While both the horizon and the explication in phantasy rely on a given familiar type, only in the second case there is an actual picturing of that which would appear in the process of explication, if it was started. The anticipatory horizon, in contrast, is given as a determined indeterminacy, it is not imagined. In addition, one can observe then, that when it was mentioned above that the anticipatory horizon is ‘envisioned’, this envisioning is actually already an explication, precisely an explication in phantasy. Moreover, this explicative envisioning in phantasy could, in a sense, even be seen as the explication of the anticipatory horizon itself, disregarding the object of external perception which was to be explicated.⁶⁷

A different situation appears in the case of memory. While it is possible to remember a substrate which has been explicated, an act in which the substrate shows itself precisely as an explicated one, following the text it is even possible to explicate a substrate which has not been explicated while being directly perceived: “An object can have been given *originaliter* in one grasp in perception, and we may begin explication after it is no longer itself given. [...] It is an explication in memory, on the basis of what has been given *originaliter* in a simple apprehension” (E+J, §28, p.129)^{lxxiv}. It would seem, that this case is located midway between

⁶⁷ Gurwitsch calls the process of explicating the anticipatory horizons “explicitation”: C.f. Gurwitsch, A. (2010). *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) (Volume III. The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin)*. (R. M. Zaner, & L. Embree, ed.) Heidelberg London New York: Springer. p.276

explication in the above seen sense and explication in phantasy, given that there is no material obstruction to explication, the lack of time being the only reason that explication was not performed in the 'normal' way.

Besides these possibilities of explication independent of external perception, it is also possible to explicate a determination itself. The most interesting case of this scenario is given, when the interest in the original substrate is given up: "The ego *abandons its original substrate* instead of continuing to hold it in grasp, while it retains in active apprehension what has just been characterized as explicate" (E+J, §28, p.130)^{lxxv}. That means, "[t]he explicate [...] thus loses its particular character as explicate; it is *rendered independent* as an object for its own sake, that is, it becomes a proper substrate for a continuing act of cognition, for the exposition of its own properties. The previous *S* then sinks into the passive background [...]" (E+J, §28, p.130)^{68lxxvi}. Given that this process of explicating the explicate, and hence transforming it into a substrate, is repeatable at will, that is, the explicate of the explicate of the original substrate can be explicated too, "every explicate, at no matter how high a level, can become thematically autonomous" (E+J, §22, p.132)^{lxxvii}.

The consequence of this observation is, that there is no per se difference between a substrate and an explicate, "[t]he distinction between substrate and determination thus shows itself at first as purely relative" (E+J, §29, p.132)^{lxxviii}. It depends on the situation, that is, on the interest of the subject what is to be taken as the substrate, and hence to be explicated: "We can make a substrate [...] of whatever can enter into attentive regard, and from this we can form the idea of a substrate in general and of the difference between substrate and determination" (E+J, §29, p.133)^{69lxxix}. However, "[...] as soon as we inquire from the genetic point of view about the operations of experience from which, in original self-evidence, this separation of substrate and determination arises, this arbitrariness no longer holds true" (E+J, §29, p.133)^{lxxx}. In this perspective, one can thus speak of absolute substrates, namely "substrates which do not arise from substratification" (E+J, §29, p.134)^{lxxxi}. The point here, in the context of genetic inquiries in the phenomenological field, is that all relative substrates are only the result of an explication. But before the performance of any explication, necessarily there were absolute substrates which led intuitively to their explication, as this operation is not learned. "*An absolute substrate, therefore, is distinguished in this way, that it is simply and directly experienceable, that it is immediately apprehensible, and that its explication can*

⁶⁸ Following Lohmar, this part is taken from A I 34, 29a: Lohmar, D. (1996). Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk *Erfahrung und Urteil*. *Husserl Studies*, 13, p. 31-71.

⁶⁹ Following Lohmar, this quote can be traced back to Ms. F I 39, 28a: *ibid*.

be immediately brought into play. Individual objects of external sensuous perception, that is, bodies, are above all what is immediately apprehensible and are therefore substrates in an exemplary sense” (E+J, §29, p.134)^{lxxxii}. There is hence no unlimited relativity of the distinction between substrate and explicate.

In the concrete, practical sense, however, the relativity of the distinction between substrate and explicate can be maintained. Proceeding from this relativity, it can be noticed as well, that each body is “[...] in a unitary context which, finally and universally understood, is that of the world” (E+J, §29, p.137)^{lxxxiii}. From this necessary location of the object in the context of the world, the text concludes: “Thus universal sensuous experience, conceived as proceeding in universal accord, has a unity of being, a unity of higher order; the existent of this universal experience is the totality of nature, the universe of all material bodies. We can also direct ourselves to this whole of the world and make it a theme of experience” (E+J, §29, p.137)^{lxxxiv}. The outcome of such an interest would be a new kind of explication, that is, “[*t*]o the finitude of the experience of individual bodies is contrasted the infinity of world-explication, which exhibits the being of the world in the infinity of the possible progression of experience from finite substrates to other, always new ones” (E+J, §29, p.137)^{lxxxv}. The result is a transformation of the concept of explication itself. It can be performed in reverse, so to say, given that every substrate, besides unfolding into explicates, “[...] has determinability as being-in-something, and this is true *in infinitum*” (E+J, §29, p.137)^{lxxxvi}. In this sense, all contemplation and explication can be performed as world-explication, for all real objects form part of the world.

This possibility of a world-explication is possible because the consciousness directs its interest to the world as a whole, and makes it the theme of experience. Such a formation of the substrate which is to be explicated by means of the interest of the ego is possible also on a lower level. Husserl writes that “[...] we can [...] colligate every object, every autonomous substrate, with other objects, and then make the collection as a whole into a theme [...]” (E+J, §29, p.133)^{70lxxxvii}. After this step, the text continues by claiming that it is possible to enter into the members of a collection “[...] by explication, in this way exhibiting the whole by determining it, so that each of the formerly independent object-substrates henceforth acquires the character of explicate; or it can from the first be a collection, consisting of substrates independent in themselves, affecting us as a whole in the same way as an individual object” (E+J, §29, p.133)^{lxxxviii}. Thus, the qualification of the limitation of the concept of substrate is

⁷⁰ Following Lohmar, this quote is based upon Ms. A I 34, 33a: *ibid.*

reinforced once more: If something is a substrate susceptible to explication is not a question of the real object, but only one of the thematic interest of the consciousness, or even of the way the objects affect consciousness passively. On the other hand, the normal case is one in which “[...] the unity of configuration is apperceived from the first as existing in a pluralistic way, as a plurality of objects [...]” (E+J, §24 d), p.120)^{71lxxxix}. Thus, if the consciousness does not chose to see a configuration as a unitary whole, but rather as precisely a configuration, explication is not possible, for “[...] the plurality is *not a goal of effective activity*; it is not a goal of knowledge gained through experience” (E+J, §24 d), p.121)^{72xc}. The substrate which is being defined, although it is dependent on the ego’s interest, is essential for the operation of explication.

Until now, explication seemed to be limited mostly to real objects. The text claims though, that “it belongs to the original sense of every object [...] not only to be purely and simply a something in general but, from the first and *a priori*, something *explicable*; it is originally constituted according to its most general type with a horizon of indeterminate determinability” (E+J, §52, p.222)^{xc}. That means, that ideal, hence unreal objects can be explicated too. One example for this possibility, once more highlighting the role of the consciousness in defining the substrate of explication, is to be found in the case of objectivities of understanding (c.f. E+J, §63, p.250). These objectivities are characterised by being constituted by means of “[...] *predicative activity of the ego* as a spontaneous operation” (E+J, §63, p.251)^{xcii}. Now, an ideal object does not have physical parts which could be depicted as its properties; in contrast, as seen above, explication also discloses the objective sense of the substrate (c.f. E+J, §65, p.267). This is valid to such an extent that even “[s]ense as sense (the intended content as such) [...] falls under the broadest concept of something in general, which in conformity with its essence is an explicable something. It can become the substrate of a judgement and a judicative act of identification and explication” (E+J, §65, p.269)^{xciii}. It becomes clear, hence, that the focus on real objects in the presentation of the concept is rather due to its intuitiveness – the concept does, in contrast, apply to any kind of objectivity.

One last interesting instance of ideal objectivities of understanding are states of affairs. These states of affairs are founded upon ‘situations’ which in themselves have to be understood as nothing more “[...] than passively constituted relations, which themselves need

⁷¹ Following Lohmar, this quote is taken from A I 34, 16a-b: *ibid*.

⁷² Following Lohmar, this quote is also taken from A I 34, 16a-b: *ibid*.

not yet to be objectified [...]” (E+J, §59, p.240)^{xciiv}. As objectivities of understanding, states of affairs are constituted in predicative judgements, by expressing the given situation (c.f. §60, p.243). In this sense, it is possible that there be “[...] *relational situations*”, which, as the text continues, “are explicable in relational states of affairs” (E+J, §59, p.240)^{xciiv}. The claim that situations are being explicated in states of affairs, does actually appear more than once (c.f. also E+J, §59, p.239 and p.241). The question that arises here is, if ‘explicating’ is used just as a synonym for expressing, for predicating; or, if it is rather meant in the particular sense of *Experience and Judgement* explained in this chapter. In this latter case, one could observe here the proof that explication is not bound to one sole object, not even to configurations, but can be applied to relations too, determining them by means of relative characteristics, once that a relational situation as such becomes affective. Given that the state of affairs, the objectivity of understanding here is only the result of the explication, it would be necessary to conclude that a relational situation itself can be the ‘substrate’ of an explication. In this way, the distinction between relational and explicative contemplation of an object (c.f. E+J, §33, p.149), as established above, would be qualified too.

Concluding the discussion, it has been shown that the concept of explication, as presented in *Experience and Judgement*, has a wider signification than it would seem at first glance. While explication is mostly described in a certain context, that of contemplation of objects in the external world, it can be employed beyond this context. The text itself established that substrates in empty intentions, phantasy, memory and the realm of ideal objectivities can be explicated. In this sense, the claim in §52 that every object, *a priori*, is explicable, can be read strictly. In addition, even the importance of the substrate has shown to be relative. The text does insist that one can only speak of explication when the ego does identify a certain substrate which is being determined in the process of explication. This substrate is almost totally arbitrary, and does depend only on the ego’s interest, or the way the ego is affected. It can be the explicate of some explication, it can be a collection which is seen as a unit, it can even be the world as such. Importantly, a relational situation, that is, a relation between two objects, can also become a substrate. In this sense, the definition of an explication as the realisation of the internal horizon, as distinguished from the external one, seems to lose some of its importance, as the relation itself can become the goal of the interest, that is, the substrate whose internal horizon is unfolded. It follows that while on the theoretical level a substrate is a necessary precondition for an explication, concretely this is rather a question of the subject and its thematic interest, than a question of that which is being explicated.

One aspect of explication, in this sense, would be, then, essentially a certain approach of the subject, confronted with whatever kind of objectivity. Such a focus does omit the other aspect of explication, namely the point that it determines the properties of the substrate – however, for the purpose of this thesis, as the reader will see, this focus on the first aspect of explication would be very interesting. Explication as approach could be characterised as the attempt of a practical realisation of the anticipatory intentions with regards to a still indeterminate substrate, an elucidation of the horizon of that which is defined by the subject as substrate. This substrate is not yet known, but it is classified at least in a minimal sense and according to this type, there are expectations of it which guide the explication. As seen above, the horizon which is realised by explication is thus dependent on both, the way the object affects and the subject's expectations.

1.4 The Directly and the Indirectly Given

Now that it was possible to elaborate and establish the concept of explication as described in *Experience and Judgement*, the question for the connection between it and the meaning of the terms derived from the pair explicit-implicit can be posed. First, it has become clear already, that in *Experience and Judgement*, the concept does not only appear straightforward in the word 'explication', but also in derivative terms such as explicable or explicit which are being used in the same sense. Furthermore, it has been noted that that, which is to be explicated, has been called implicit, in §8, and implied, in §26. To find out in a more precise sense how to understand the relationship is the first task of this chapter. For that purpose, all quotes in which terms connected to implicit appear in relation to the act of explication will be examined here.

Repeating, first of all, the quote from Landgrebe's §8 of *Experience and Judgement*, it can be read: "The real thing is known in thematic perception in that, as the experience is extended [...], this real thing is continuously presented as being itself there, being displayed thereby in its particular characteristics, its quidditative elements [...]. Everything which reveals itself in this way, and which is already implicitly there before the explication of the perceived, essentially passes for that which, derived from this real thing *really* attains perception in this perception. This real thing itself is more than that which at any given time attains (and has already attained) actual cognizance. It is provided with a sense which continuously confers on it its 'internal horizon'; the side that is seen is a side only insofar as it has sides which are not seen, which are anticipated and as such determine the sense" (E+J, §8, p.35)^{xvii}. In the situation previous to the act of explication, that which "attains perception" but

not “actual cognizance” is “already implicitly there”. This implicit, at the same time, seems to be the sense provided by the internal horizon. That is, the very fact that there is an implicit ‘more’ to the actual cognizance, in this example the unseen side, provides sense to the actually cognized.

A similar picture can be seen when passing to §26⁷³ and the actual process of explication: “[...] [E]ach explication, as it takes place in original intuition as the explication of a newly experienced object can [...] be characterized as an *elucidation* and clarification, as a more precise determination of what is indeterminate in the horizon-form, of what is implied therein. Every real *explication has the intentional character of an explication which fills the horizon-intention (as an empty intention)*, realizing it in definite stages, in which the various unknown determinations become corresponding determinations that are henceforth known – known in the manner of an elucidation of what was implied in the horizon in an indeterminate way. Precisely by reason of the apprehension of the object (and also the other apprehensions according to region, kind, type, and the like), a certain implication has acquired a particular sense, that of something already included therein, but ‘without delimitation,’ ‘vague,’ ‘confused’; the explicate set forth is that which clarifies the corresponding confusion” (E+J, §26, p.124)^{xcvii}. Here, it is expressed clearly that the implicit is that which is implied in the horizon. This implication is dependent on the given apprehension of the object, on the way it is being categorised, corresponding to certain expectations which result from this apprehension. These anticipated implications are indeterminate though; Husserl here looks for a way to express it, seeking rescue in the metaphors of “‘without delimitation,’ ‘vague,’ ‘confused’”. It is then precisely the operation of explication which is able to clarify the confusion, which fills the empty horizon-intention, that is, which makes explicit the implicit.

Partly, this conception of explication of the implicit is found again in §27⁷⁴ of *Experience and Judgement*: “The point of departure is naturally that of *original explication*: an object is determined for the first time. But, as we have seen, it is always apprehended apperceptively in advance in such and such a way as an object of this or that type. The sense of apprehension from the first implies determinations which have not yet been experienced with this object but which nevertheless are of a known type insofar as they refer back to earlier analogous experiences concerning other objects” (E+J, §27, p.127)^{xcviii}. The

⁷³ Following Lohmar, this part, with the exception of the sentence starting with “Every real *explication...*” and ending with “...in an indeterminate way”, is taken from A I 34, 13a-14a: Lohmar, D. (1996). *Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk Erfahrung und Urteil*. *Husserl Studies*, 13, p. 31-71.

⁷⁴ This quote is based almost entirely on Ms. A I 11, 137b, following Lohmar: *ibid*.

importance of earlier experience for the classification of the object, and the correlated implications, is emphasised once more. The implications are the product of the way the object is apprehended and understood before it is properly investigated.

Interesting, in addition to this description of original explication, is the following quote, still in §27: “Still another mode of accomplishment of an explication is the *return to an object already explicated* and, following that, if the occasion should arise, the deployment of the previously determined object in its determinations. What was known implicitly is brought once more to explicit knowledge and is, therefore, actualized anew” (E+J, §27, p.128)^{xcix}. It has to be taken notice of that, while the opposition explicit-implicit is presented once more, the situation here is different: The substrate had been determined before already. The implicit is not found in an unknown horizon that only bespeaks itself through the detour of similar past experiences. In fact, the implicit here had been explicit to the same ego before, it had been explicated already. The necessary conclusion from this is that after being determined, the properties of the object, though already explicated, become again implicit. Hence, the same determinations become susceptible to a new explication, which, admittedly, will be different from the first, as the implications present will be influenced by the knowledge gained in the first explication (c.f. E+J, §27, p.128-129). It results, moreover, that there is a distinction to be made between ‘explicated’ and ‘explicit’. While something might have been explicated already, it may not be explicit anymore, but already implicit again.

Another quote which might help to distinguish clearly the meanings of having been explicated and explicit, is to be found in §24 a)⁷⁵: “The process of explication in its originality is that in which an object given at first hand is brought to explicit intuition” (E+J, §24 a), p.114)^c. While again it is confirmed that explication results in the object becoming explicit, it is the intuition which is being described as being explicit. Hence, it seems that, as Husserl employs the term here, it would suggest that the way the object becomes conscious can be either explicit or implicit. The operation of explication, as described above, would be one possibility of making explicit something which is still only implicitly given.

There is one last example of a term connected to implicit used in the direct surroundings of the description of explication, again in §24⁷⁶. Describing the continuity of the intentionality directed on the substrate, Husserl writes: “This continuity is a permanent synthesis of coincidence which concerns the content of apprehensions as well as the activities

⁷⁵ Following Lohmar, this quote is taken from A I 34, 19a: *ibid.*

⁷⁶ Following Lohmar, this quote is taken from A I 34, 15a-b: *ibid.*

themselves: the active apprehending and being-directed toward the 'whole,' or, to speak more precisely, the being-directed toward the substrate S , is implicitly 'co'-directed toward the α , ...; and, in the 'emergence' of the α , it is the S which is apprehended and displayed 'in its relation to' α ' (E+J, §24 c), p.119)^{ci}. Clearly, the term implicit is used in quite a different sense from the examples above. While the apprehending would be explicitly directed to the substrate which is being explicated, there is a 'co'-direction which aims at the determinations α , β , etc., given that the substrate, as seen above, is explicated precisely in its determinations. This 'co'-direction is a mere 'co'-direction because the subject is actually not interested in the properties, but rather in the substrate itself; only that the interest in the substrate entails an interest in its properties. It does not become entirely clear if the meaning of implicit here refers to the subject not noticing, not having explicit the 'co'-direction, or if Husserl rather tries to point out a parallelism to a logical relationship, as the explication of a substrate makes necessary the explication of its properties.

In any case, it did become clear that even in the direct context of the description of the concept of explication in *Experience and Judgement*, the terms derived from explicit and implicit do not refer simply to the distinction between something already explicated and something still not explicated. The relationship is more complex, even though it has been seen that the explicated can be called explicit, and that which is to be explicated can be called implicit. As, furthermore, the meanings of explicit and implicit here do not correspond to their linguistic or logical significations, it is proven that they are being employed in another, still different sense. This sense, rather than being distinct from the three other ones worked out until now, would seem to be a more abstract one, englobing the other ones. Proposing a first thesis of what this more abstract signification may be, relying mostly on the examples from §24 and §27 recently discussed, it might be possible to say that something is explicit if it is directly given, directly present, while the implicit would be whatever is given in an indirect way. The term 'given' is to be understood in a very general way, in an attempt to not specify in what kind of situation or context it would be given, in what mode it would be given or to whom it might be given. The question which does arise necessarily, though, is how the 'indirectness' of the given in the case of the implicit can be understood. While a response has to be elaborated in the further parts of this thesis, it can be pointed out already, that something that is indirectly given is quite distinct from something not given. Rather, it would seem reasonable that the only way something indirectly given can be given would be precisely by means of something directly given.

Instead of further speculating on terms and their meanings, the next task is to investigate the other employments of the terms explicit and implicit in the two works which are being discussed here, *Ideas I* and *Experience and Judgement*; for there are still many quotes which could not be categorised in any of the first three significations presented until now. These quotes will be commented now, ordered roughly by the thematic field they belong to. The aim is to establish a definition which is able to fit them, as Husserl did not, in contrast to the concept of explication, define them himself.

a) Perception and Intuition

Probably the most prominent appearance of the word pair explicit-implicit in Husserl's work is found in §35 of *Ideas I*.⁷⁷ In this paragraph, Husserl starts to describe the way the consciousness works, that is, to observe the structure of the ego's stream of mental processes. Amongst the first properties that he takes notice of, is that "[e]very perception of a physical thing has [...] a halo of *background-intuitions* [...], and that is also a '*mental process of consciousness*' or, more briefly, '*consciousness*,' and, more particularly, '*of*' all that which in fact lies in the objective '*background*' seen along with it" (Hua. III, §35, p.70)^{cii}. Husserl now continues elaborating on the halo, and the possibilities it offers: "In it [...] there is the fact that certain modifications of the original mental process are possible which we characterize as a free turning of '*regard*' - not precisely nor merely of the physical, but rather of the '*mental regard*' [*geistigen Blickes*'] - from the sheet of paper regarded at first, to the objects appearing, therefore intended to '*implicitly*' before the turning of the regard but which become explicitly intended to (either '*attentively*' perceived or '*incidentally heeded*') *after* the regard is turned to them" (Hua. III, §35, p.71)^{ciii}. "Intended to", in both cases, is a translation from *bewußt*, which also could be translated as '*conscious of*' in English. That is, what is distinguished here by Husserl are two forms in which something can be conscious, in which it can be intended to: If something is still not perceived directly, if the ego is not turned toward it, it may still be conscious in the background, meaning that the ego can turn its mental regard to make it explicitly conscious. The implicit is given in a certain sense, but it still lacks the ego's attention.

A hint, how this implicitness can be understood can be found in a second quote, still from §35. Husserl continues by claiming that the description of the structure of consciousness does not only hold for perception in the real world, but also for memory and phantasy: "We

⁷⁷ It has been quoted, for instance, by Steven Bartlett: Bartlett, S. (1975). Phenomenology of the implicit. *Dialectica*, 29(2/3), S. 173-188. p.185

recognize then that, to the essence of all such mental processes – these always taken in full concreteness – there belongs that noteworthy modification which converts consciousness in the *mode of actional* [aktueller] *advertence* into consciousness in the *mode of non-actionality* [Inaktualität] and conversely. At the one time the mental process is, so to speak, ‘explicit’ consciousness of its objective something, at the other time it is implicit, merely *potential*” (Hua. III, §35, p.71-72)^{ciiv}. Thus, the distinction explicit-implicit is equalised here with the distinction between *aktueller* and *inaktueller*, that is, potential, advertence. The original term for advertence here is *Zuwendung*, matching the notion of the turning regard in the quote before. While a more thorough description of the opposition *Aktualität – Inaktualität* will be a topic for the second part of the thesis, it can be stated already that there is a certain reference to action here: The explicitly given is that which is perceived in the present act of consciousness, in the actional advertence. The implicit, in contrast, is given as something which could be perceived in a potential act of perception or intuition, that is, the ego is conscious of the present possibility of making the implicit thematic, of perceiving it explicitly.

While in these first two cases the implicit consisted in an ‘external’ background which surrounded the explicitly given, the next example is more abstract. It is to be found in §153, the very last paragraph of *Ideas I*, in which Husserl tries to conclude and to give an outlook on the possibilities of his phenomenological philosophy. For instance, he claims that phenomenology should be able to question and eventually confirm the syntheses of the sphere of ‘reason’. In respect to these syntheses, Husserl writes: “Moreover, underlying the operations are acts which are partly intuitional, partly non-intuitional, or else quite confused, of lower and higher levels of Objectivation. In the case of obscurity or confusion, one can set out to clarify the synthetically ‘produced formations,’ to raise the question of their possibility, of their resolution by means of ‘synthetical intuition;’ or also the question of their ‘actuality,’ of their being resolved by means of explicit and originarily presentive synthetical acts, or by way of mediate ‘inferences’ or ‘proofs.’” (Hua. III, §153, p.368)^{cv}. As Husserl refers himself to explicit acts here, it is clear that the term explicit cannot be meant either in the logical or in the linguistic sense. Moreover, the act of explication can be disregarded as well, as it is its product which was characterised as being explicit there – not the act itself. What means Husserl then, when he writes ‘explicit’? As the purpose is to show how to clarify acts which are still obscure and confused, explicit and originarily presentive acts are neither obscure nor confused. In addition, supposing there is no redundancy here, explicit refers to something different than ‘originarily presentive’, *originär gebend*: the act, besides giving its content in

the most originarily possible manner, is explicit. While there is no explanation to this word here, it would seem reasonable to take explicit acts as clear, straightforward acts, acts that are not obstructed in any sense. Given that the paragraph continues with the sentence “Phenomenologically, all of these types of synthesis [...] are to be submitted to investigation” (Hua. III, §153, p.368)^{evi}, it could be concluded at least, that making explicit the syntheses on which objectivities of understanding are founded, is part of the phenomenological task.

The ‘explicit act’ in the last example did only possibly refer to perception of the external world, given that the kind of act which can confirm or put into doubt the syntheses of the sphere of reason depends on the particular case, and could also be, for instance, an act of phantasy. The implicit, that is, that which is not given explicitly, would seem to have been rather an abstract possibility of whatever the subject may intuit. This characterisation becomes clearer in an example from §46 of *Experience and Judgement*, which establishes the possibility of determining something by contrast without necessarily performing the corresponding comparison. It says: “Two members of a relation need not always actually be present in the unity of an intuition as in the cases of comparative determination discussed hitherto. [...] They can remain in the background and still be coeffective for the determination. For example, a tall man can be present as being tall without, in general, there needing to be people who are short in our field of vision. The man *contrasts* with ‘normal’ men, examples of whom may be vaguely ‘called up’ without an explicit comparison made” (E+J, §46, p.194)^{evii}. The hypothetical comparison here is made in a pre-predicative sphere, which means that once more, the employment of explicit here differs from the three given definitions in the chapters above. Interesting is that there is, on one side, no other real person to compare, but neither is there a recall of the memory of a ‘normal’ person and its height. Both forms of givenness of the missing comparative person would, as it seems, transform the comparison into an explicit one. This fits to the first sentence, which claims that the members of relation do not have to be present in one same intuition. Presence in the intuition could be achieved as well by remembering - hence, an explicit comparison is explicit when both members are somehow given in the intuition, based on whatever mode of intuition. If this is not the case, as in the example, a member of the comparison can remain in the ‘background’, and still affect the comparison. This background here has a different meaning from the perceptive background; but it is, once more, contrasted with the explicit.

Another, similar example, which is located in mere intuition, namely in the sphere of judgement, can be found in §67 b) of *Experience and Judgement*. In this paragraph, the

question posed is how to test and reactivate empty judgements by means of the renewal of their accomplishment. In this context, one can read: “The accomplishment can be an original activity ‘through and through.’ This not only from the fact that every step of judgement is explicitly accomplished anew, but also because the judicative substrates are brought anew to self-giving or presentifying intuition” (E+J, §67 b), p.280)^{cviii}. Hence, the proposition made here is to accomplish every step of judgement anew, and in an explicit manner. Judging is a mental faculty, and that means that accomplishing it anew refers to the fact, that the subject has to make present the situation it judges and the decisions it takes once more. Explicit here thus refers to the process of judgement being completely and directly given to the subject, intuited by the subject, as, in this way, the validity of the judgement can be confirmed.

As the last example, the next one is also taken from the context of mental faculties. It is taken from §93⁷⁸, still in *Experience and Judgement*. Husserl reflects in this paragraph upon the difficulties of obtaining high genera by means of free variation, exemplified by an attempt to work out the region ‘thing’. In this context, Husserl assesses: “But there is the difficulty here that the thing intended in the exemplary initial intuition – the first, preliminary intuition, finite and self-contained, with which we must begin – indeed, as ‘this thing itself,’ but still provided with an open infinity, only implicitly includes theses ‘infinities’ in its intention, and in fact in such a way that each of these infinities, moreover, is entwined in a multiplicity of *relativities*” (E+J, §93 a), p.362)^{ciix}. The problem Husserl observes here is that the intention of the thing, the way the thing is intended, can only include the open infinity in an implicit way. In other words, there is an explicit understanding of the thing intended, but this understanding is finite; moreover, this same intention does refer to further possible ways of intending the same thing explicitly, but as there is an infinity of these possibilities, the thing will never become entirely explicit. Hence, also the term implicit is employed in the context of non-perceptive intuitions, as here in the case of imagining the thing.

Another phenomenon which can appear in an explicit way in consciousness is association. In §16 of *Experience and Judgement*, the structure of the field of passivity is described, including the associative processes. While these associations remain unnoticed many times, “[...] this relationship is itself capable of being shown phenomenologically. [...] [O]ne of the elements is characterized relative to consciousness as that which evokes, the other as that which is evoked. To be sure, association is not always given at first hand in this

⁷⁸ Following Lohmar, almost the entire paragraph is taken from Ms. A I 33, 127a-129b: Lohmar, D. (1996). Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk *Erfahrung und Urteil*. *Husserl Studies*, 13, p. 31-71.

way. There are also cases of mediate association, wherein the intermediate members are skipped over; it is thus an association in which the intermediate members and the immediate similarities which obtain among them do not explicitly come to consciousness” (E+J, §16, p.75)^{cx}. It is quite clear, that explicit here refers to being present in a conscious way, to being noticed. According to this, one could say that if these intermediate members are not explicit, they remain implicit – implied by the necessity of association itself, that there be a path in which association moved.

Two different kinds of employments can be found in the next example, in §21 a)⁷⁹, still in *Experience and Judgement*. Husserl describes here, how protentional expectations can conflict with the following perception, and how this conflict is reproduced in memory. “[J]ust as the anticipated ‘new’ and ‘other’ blankets the protentionally prescribed sense ‘red and spherical’ in the earlier train of perceptions and nullifies it, the like also takes place *retroactively* in the totality of the preceding series. [...] The earlier apperception, which was attuned to the harmonious development of the ‘red and uniformly round,’ is implicitly ‘reinterpreted’ to ‘green on one side and dented.’ This implies essentially that if we would make intuitive in an explicit recollection the retentional complexes, [...] we would find in all of its horizons, in conformity with memory, not only the old prescription with its old structure of anticipation and fulfilment as it was then originally motivated, but also, built up over it, the appropriately modified prescription [...]” (E+J, §21 a), p.89)^{cx}. First, it has to be noted that “implied” is a translation of the original *liegt darin*, and presents here clearly a logical sense. But, starting with the implicit reinterpretation of the form of the object, the point here is, that this reinterpretation is not an active decision. While the consciousness does actively take notice of its mistaken protention, it does not deal with the past train of perceptions which still includes the wrong anticipation. As the reinterpretation takes place, however, and can be proven in a possible act of recollection, Husserl decides to call this unnoticed change implicit. Its process does not appear to consciousness, does not become present to the ego. In contrast, the product of the reinterpretation is noticed by the ego, in an active and conscious recollection, it does become intuitive because it becomes explicit. Exactly the dimension that is actually opposed between these two events, the passive reinterpretation and the active recollection of the retentions, is the one expressed by the opposition explicit-implicit. That is, the terms in this quote describe the way in which something is given to consciousness.

⁷⁹ Following Lohmar, the majority of §21 a), including the entirety of this quote, is taken from F I 37, and in addition published in Hua. XI, p.29-31: *ibid*.

The way explicit has been used in this last example, is repeated once more in the next one from the same paragraph, this time under letter b)⁸⁰. Husserl continues describing the possibility of doubt and conflict, in the context of a reinterpretation of a positing, and its influence on the content becoming conscious even in presentification: “In these phases, too, the univocal consciousness disintegrates into an equivocal consciousness, i.e., the fact of being split [...] is continued in retentional consciousness. If we then explicitly realize the presentification of the perceptual field which precedes the doubt, it is now no longer present like an ordinary recollection in its univocality but has taken on the same doubling [...]. By means of a regressive ray back into retention, and thereby into the explicit recollection, a modalization [...] takes place in it” (E+J, §21 b), p.94)^{cxii}. We can hence confirm what has been about the example above: while the retentions are reinterpreted in the process of correction of the positing, the subject only becomes conscious of it in explicit recollection. If not, the retentions, including their inner transformations remain only implicit.

In the last example of this section, one can observe another operation of consciousness which is not taken notice of, and hence remains implicit. In §50 of *Experience and Judgement*, the text explains in what sense the operation of explication is a necessary precondition for predication. Already before, in §49, it had been shown that both operations are, in fact, closely entwined, and can be separated only analytically (c.f. E+J, §49, p.203). If they are distinguished, though, it can be claimed that in predication, “we do not again carry out a merely contemplative explication but an activity of predicative identification [...]. The action of determinative identification goes from the spontaneous apprehension of *S* as subject to *p*: the apprehending regard lives in the apprehension of its being determined as *p*. In the activity of explication, the object is already implicitly ‘determined’ as *p*, i.e., it is clarified and made explicit as such, but the ‘being-determined-as’ is not apprehended. It is first apprehended in the repeated active accomplishment of the synthesis, an accomplishment which presupposes the preceding explication“ (E+J, §50 a), p.208)^{cxiii}. In this sense, while explication is an active operation performed by the subject to determine the substrate, it is not able to apprehend the result of the explication, that is, it is not able to apprehend the substrate as expressly determined in its determinations. Another level of activity is necessary to become conscious of the made determinations, and conserve them – precisely the level of predication. Before predication, even though the determinations are “made explicit“, in German *verdeutlicht*, the object is only “implicitly determined“, because the ego is conscious of *p*, but

⁸⁰ Following Lohmar, this quote is taken from Ms F I 37 and has also been published in Hua. XI, p.35-36: *ibid*.

not conscious of this determination *p* as a determination. The possibility of noticing this determination is inherent, but not realised, it is only implied.

What is common to all the examples listed until now, is their location on what one might call the 'subjective side'. This is not always directly linked to activity, as for instance in the first examples from direct perception that which is perceived just becomes explicitly or implicitly conscious – activity does play a role, though, in the sense that the ego turns its regard to an object, and thus makes it appear explicitly. In most of the other examples, it is an act, an intention, an accomplishment which includes something explicitly or implicitly. Generally speaking, the distinction between explicit and implicit seems to be mostly one between the subject taking notice of something, paying attention to something, having intuition of it, or not. This something, however, can come about in any case, even if the subject does not engage with it. Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that this quite abstract distinction has been shown to appear in very diverse spheres and kinds of activity of the ego, stretching from perception over phantasy and memory until judgement and association. One more dimension will be discussed in the next section, focusing upon that what Husserl calls the *cogito*.

b) Intentionality

In this section, the focus will lie on the dimension of intentionality which pervades all intuition, following Husserl. In its direct characterisation, the terms explicit and implicit appear as well, for instance in order to define his concept of *cogito* in §115 of *Ideas I*: “Taken universally, the cogito is explicit intentionality. The concept of any intensive mental process whatever already presupposes the opposition of potentiality and actuality and, more particularly, in the universal signification of these terms in so far as we now, in the transition to the explicit cogito and in the *reflection* on the mental process not made explicit along with its noetic-noematic components, are able to recognize that it includes in itself intentionalities or noemas which are peculiar to it. Thus, e.g., with regard to consciousness of the unobserved, but subsequently observed, background in perception, memory, etc. The explicit intensive mental process is an ‘I think’ which is ‘effected’. But the same ‘I think’ can be converted into a ‘non-effected’ one by way of intentional changes” (Hua. III, §115, p.272-273)^{exiv81}. That is, while for instance the unobserved background in perception is indeed part of the “intensive

⁸¹ It is important to notice here, that Husserl, in his handwritten comments to the published edition from 1913, has crossed out *explizit* all four times it appears in this quote, substituting it with „sozusagen patente“, „aktuellen“, „aktuelle“ and „aktuelle“, respectively (c.f. Husserl, E. (1976). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: Erstes Buch (Vol. 2)*. (K. Schuhmann, ed.) *Husserliana III/2*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. p.511)

mental process”, these mental processes do not form part of the explicit intentionality, the *cogito*. The “intentional changes”, in the German original *attentionale Wandlungen*, that is, changes in attention, can transform an explicit, effected intentionality into one which hides itself in the background, and in which the *cogito* does not live. Again, as in the examples above from §35, this distinction between explicit and implicit seems to parallel the distinction between actuality, *Aktualität*, and potentiality, *Potentialität*. This parallelism is reinforced by the fact that Husserl, in a handwritten comment to the published edition, substituted the term *explizit* for *aktuell* (c.f. footnote).

This claim, that the current intentional *cogito* can be characterised as explicit, is found another time in §84 of *Ideas I*. Husserl, again, characterises the notion of intentionality, writing: “Under intentionality we understand the own peculiarity of mental processes ‘to be consciousness of something.’ We first of all encounter the marvellous ownness, back to which all rational-theoretical and metaphysical enigmas lead, in the explicit *cogito*: [...] In every actional cogito a radiating ‘regard’ is directed from the pure Ego to the ‘object’ of the consciousness-correlate in question [...]” (Hua. III, §84, p.200)^{cxv}. Again, intentionality in its active, directly given form is an “actional”, that is, *aktuell*, or “explicit” *cogito*.

However, the relation between the explicit and the *cogito* is not always that straightforward. In §57 Husserl reflects on the question if the pure ego has to be excluded in the transcendental reduction. For this question, he assesses one way in which the ego is shown, namely, by being the subject to whom all mental processes belong. He writes: “Let us reduce to the stream of pure consciousness. In reflection every cogitatio effected takes on the explicit form, cogito. Does it lose this form if we exercise the transcendental reduction?” (Hua. III, §57, p.132)^{cxvi}. Supposing that not only *cogito*, but also *cogitatio* corresponds to the sense given above, referring to actional intentionality, (c.f. Hua. III, §35, p.72) the term “explicit” here refers to a different distinction. Given Husserl’s aim in this passage, it seems to be probable that the point made is that *cogito* is the first person singular form of the verb ‘to think’ in Latin, while *cogitatio* is just the thought or thinking process in general. Hence, through reflection on the thought, what is shown is that it is my thought, it is my ‘I think that...’. Hence, in this way the quote suits to the first two definitions of explicit *cogito*, as something does become actionally intended, explicit, namely the very fact that the intentionality reflected upon belongs to the ego, is an act of the ego.

The next two quotes from Landgrebe’s introduction to *Experience and Judgement* are located in a quite different problem area. However, they are connected directly to the concepts

of intentionality, and the possibility of reflecting on it. In §11, the text attempts to show in which sense phenomenology, in contrast to psychology, is able to work out the experiential foundations of, for example, logics. The clue to do that lies in the apprehension of the world of idealisations as a sedimentation of intentionality: “Now these are *also* sedimentations of subjective intentional operations, but the intentionality of these operations does not lie open to the view of reflection but is only *implied* in the sedimentations which refer to it. [...] [I]t is a *retrogression to a hidden subjectivity* – hidden, because it is not capable of being exhibited as present [*aktuell*] in reflection in its intentional activity but can only be indicated by the sedimentations left by this activity in the pre-given world” (E+J. §11, p.48)^{cxvii}. That is, while in the quotes before the ego was able to make explicit the intentionality which belongs to it, here it can only attempt to reconstruct the original intentional operations based on the sedimentations they left. Such an endeavour is possible because the intentionality is implied, it is implicit, as the sedimentations refer to their ‘cause’, their origin. In the words of the text, the sedimentation indicates, refers to the intentionality. In this sense, the implication here might even be understood as a sign, a meaning; such kind of implications will be investigated in depth in a later section of this chapter.

There is a second reference to an implication in this same paragraph §11 of Landgrebe’s introduction to *Experience and Judgement*, which specifies the role of transcendental subjectivity in the investigation of sedimented intentionality: “We then understand ourselves, *not as subjectivity which finds itself in a world ready-made, as in simple psychological reflection, but as a subjectivity bearing within itself, and achieving, all of the possible operations to which this world owes its becoming*. In other words, we understand ourselves in this revelation of intentional implications, in the interrogation of the origin of the sedimentation of sense from intentional operations, *as transcendental subjectivity [...]*” (E+J, §11, p.49)^{cxviii}. Again, there are intentional implications, that is, intentionality is implied in the sedimentation of sense, as it has its origin in intentional operations. These implications can be revealed, that is, the intentionality can be reconstructed, and become explicit.⁸²

⁸² Both quotes on implied intentionality are taken from the introductory paragraphs of *Experience and Judgement*, and have not been traced back directly to any manuscript written by Husserl. There is, however, a similar claim of the possibility of explicating the intentional implications found in the sense of the world, namely in text 15 in the Husserliana volume XXXIV *Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion*, from the end of 1930. Husserl writes: „Hinsichtlich meines Nicht-Ich [...] betrifft meine Frage die allgemeine Struktur der mir als seiend geltenden Welt auf Grund [...] der Art, wie diese Geltung stufenweise zustande kommt; d.h. mit welchem relativen Seinsinn jeder Stufe, [...] die eingeht in die höherstufige Seinsgeltung bis zum vollen Seinsinn der Welt, während dieser alle diese Fundierungen in sich verborgen, intentional impliziert trägt. Diese Implikation

What has become clear in this section, is that there can be found a certain parallelism between intentionality as *cogito*, as *aktuelle* intentionality, and its characterisation as explicit. Husserl makes this connection in different paragraphs of *Ideas I*, and it, moreover, fits well to the conclusion from the section before, namely, that explicit characterises something the subjectivity is directly conscious of, something it pays attention to. Finally, there are certain products of intentionality, for instance the sense of the world, which imply that there has been an intentionality creating it. Hence, this implied intentionality, that is, intentionality that is not directly given, can be made explicit by the ego, just as in the case of the perceptive background.

c) Temporal horizons

Time and the structure of temporality have been topics of continuous reflection for Husserl. While in both works used in this thesis time is not investigated into depth, still there are several quotes in which he characterises structures associated to time as explicit or implicit. The first example is found in §99 of *Ideas I*, a paragraph in which Husserl analyses the influence different modes of givenness have on the appearing of the noema. In this context, he writes on reproduction: “Presentation⁸³ refers back to perception in its own peculiar phenomenological essence; e.g., as we have already noted before, remembering something past implies ‘having perceived;’ thus in a certain fashion the ‘corresponding’ perception (perception of the same sense-core) is intended in the memory, although it is not actually contained in it” (Hua. III, §99, p.244)^{cxix}. It is the very nature of remembering, that that which is remembered, is intended as having been perceived. If it were not supposed to have been perceived, it would not be reproduction. In this sense, by its “peculiar phenomenological essence” it refers to perception, it implies past perception.

A similar example of a temporal property which is essential to the concept itself is found in §82 of *Ideas I*. In this paragraph, Husserl continues explaining the temporal horizons, and finally describes simultaneity as a horizon as well. He writes: “In a unitary way this horizon enters into the modes of the past. As a modified Now, every Before implies for every mental process in view, whose Before it is, an infinite horizon embracing everything which belongs to the same modified Now; in short, it embraces its horizon of ‘what was

wird durch die phänomenologische Methode umgewandelt in Explikation“ (Husserl, E. (2002). *Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926-1935)*. (S. Luft, ed.) Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media. Text 15, p.231)

⁸³ Kersten, the translator of *Ideas I*, has decided to translate *Vergegenwärtigung* here as “presentation“. It has to be noticed, that this English term, and its derivatives, refers exactly to the same concept as ‘presentification’ used by Churchill and Ameriks to translate *Experience and Judgement*, and preferred by the author of this thesis.

simultaneously'” (Hua. III, §82, p.196)^{cxix}. The temporal structure, while flowing, conserves certain relations, such as succession, or precisely simultaneity. Interesting is that Husserl concludes that this conserved relation of simultaneity results in an implication: that is, every moment, in its dimension of being a moment in time, refers to this certain moment in time, and hence refers to everything else that happened in that same moment in time. The temporal structure here is not described as a self-given objective reality, but rather as an apprehended structure of certain abstract interrelations which are conserved. The way the different moments relate to each other could be described precisely as implication; the subject is able to make these implications explicit by realising what belongs to the same moment in time as the “Before” in question.

Besides its simultaneity, the continuity of time is also one of its central properties. This means, for instance, that all temporal moments are connected by one timeline. In §141 of *Ideas I*, Husserl investigates the right of mediate evidence, for instance evidence given in memory. One important dimension he considers in this context is the way the memory is connected to the now: “In a *certain* mode, any clear *memory* has original, immediate legitimacy [...] With respect to what memory presentiates, a past event, let us say, there is inherent in it a relationship to the actual present. It posits the past event and along with it necessarily posits a horizon, even though in a vague, dark and indeterminate way; made clear and positionally distinct, it must allow of being made explicit in a complex of positionally effected memories which would terminate *in actual perceptions, in the actual hic et nunc*” (Hua. III, §141, p.338)^{cxxi}. There is, thus, a horizon to each memory, a horizon posited in “a vague, dark and indeterminate way”; this horizon can be made explicit, and it will reveal a complex of memories which will re-establish the continuity until the now. But normally, the horizon, the link between the memory and the now, will remain vague, it will just be implicit in the very nature of memory, as it essentially entails its being posited on one continuous timeline with the now.

The characterisation of the possibility of making visible this horizon as exactly a making it explicit is reiterated once more in the same paragraph, as Husserl writes: “If, however, the explication is carried out to the *actual now, then something of the light of perception and its evidence shines back upon the whole series*” (Hua. III, §141, p.338-339)^{cxiii}. It is interesting to ask here, if one could see explication here not in the sense of the operation of explication described in *Experience and Judgement*. It is true, that what is performed is the clarification, the elucidation of a horizon, even though it is questionable if

one would characterise it as an internal horizon. But the question which would arise too is: What would be the substrate determined here? If the memory itself is taken as the substrate, stretching thus the variability of the definition of a substrate, the temporal position of this memory, including its ultimate location on the same timeline as the now, would be interpreted as an inner determination of that memory. This interpretation is actually viable, as the substrate is 'still-remaining-in-grasp' in this passage, given that the aim is to determine if the memory has a weight of evidence or not. Hence, this example either shows that Husserl employed the operation of explication in a very wide sense, or that he uses the term in a signification that is deviant from the concept described in *Experience and Judgement*, but still conserves many similarities.

Another reference to the fact that memory implies its temporal link to the present can be found in §42⁸⁴ of *Experience and Judgement*. In this paragraph, the topic is precisely the temporal unity of all objectivities of one streaming consciousness. In this context, Husserl writes: "If, e.g., while I perceive my material environment, a flash of memory comes to me and I devote myself entirely to it, this world of perception does not then disappear; no matter how much this world may lose its 'actuality,' may 'withdraw from me,' perceptively it is always there, perceived, in the broader sense of the term. The memory in which I now live furnishes me a time for what is remembered, which is implicitly oriented toward the present of perception" (E+J, §42 a), p.175-176)^{cxixiii}. Again, the link between any remembered moment and the present moment is described, a link which may not be directly conscious, but is given in a sense, implicitly, and can be made explicit. It is emphasised here, that actually in the very essence of a memory lies its connection to the present moment, even its orientation to it. As an essential quality, this link is always given, even if the subject does not pay attention to it.

One last temporal horizon, even though in a complex manner, is to be found in §18 of *Experience and Judgement*. In this paragraph, attention to an intentional object is described, even defined. One of its characteristics is, that it refers beyond itself. Its "[...] beginning indicates the direction of a further synthetically unified process of realization [...]. The beginning, therefore, has an intentional horizon; it points beyond itself in an empty mode, which is filled only subsequent realizations. It refers implicitly to a continuous synthetic process (one or another of the directions to be followed possibly remaining indeterminate in

⁸⁴ Following Lohmar, this part is taken from Ms A I 22, 9b: Lohmar, D. (1996). Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk *Erfahrung und Urteil*. *Husserl Studies*, 13, p. 31-71.

the multidimensionality of possible processes), throughout which extends a continuous uniform tendency” (E+J, §18. P.80-81)^{cxixiv}. Attention, described in this way, is exactly the precondition for the operation of explication defined just some paragraphs later: When paying attention to an object, the ego starts expecting certain things from the process, amongst which stand out a certain anticipation of its potential properties, and the supposition that the own “synthetic process”, with its tendency towards the object, that is, the payment of attention itself, will go on. This latter protentional expectation is called implicit here, as, when paying attention to the object itself, the ego does not consider consciously the way of continuing this attention – it does ‘know’ it though in a certain sense, implicitly. Interesting in this example is, moreover, the comment on the “multidimensionality of possible processes”; the implicit is, once more, the still indeterminate. While it is known that one of the expected possible outcomes will arrive, the ego does not know yet, which one.

In conclusion, it was possible to show that temporal horizons appear in many different ways, and that Husserl himself often characterises them as implicit, or possible to make explicit. Abstracting, it could be claimed that temporality, as a structure in which *Erlebnisse* are given, always refers to its own order: Every event in time is characterised by relating in a certain manner to other, simultaneous, past or future events. One could describe this ‘localisation’ in time as a ‘contextuality’, as every event is apprehended in its temporal context. In this way, it could be claimed that the event, while it is itself intuitively present, that is, explicit, is always accompanied by implicit temporal horizons. In this sense, there is a certain analogy to the potential, that is implicit, background in direct perception.

d) Meaning

Until now, the focus has remained on different kinds of explicit intuitions and on what one might call different dimensions which co-determine intuition, such as intentionality and temporality. As we have seen above, however, the explicit-implicit pair is normally employed in linguistic or logical contexts, that is, in contexts in which one could speak of relations of meaning, as the implicit is always implied by something explicit; that is, the explicit ‘means’ more than it says. Now, abstracting from these contexts, and understanding ‘meaning’ in a wider sense, as something referring beyond itself, such relations of ‘meaning’ can be found in Husserlian phenomenology too, inside the specific phenomenological perspective and its vocabulary. By examining these examples, the investigation of the use of explicit and implicit in Husserl will be concluded.

The first example is found in §95 of *Ideas I*. Here, Husserl transfers the idea, that to every specific noetic operation corresponds a specific noema, to the context of value-judgements. For this purpose, he starts to distinguish the object and its value: “We shall speak of the mere ‘thing’ which is valuable, which has a value-characteristic, which has *value-quality*; in contradistinction, we speak of *concrete value* itself or the *value-Objectiveness* [*Wertobjektivität*]. [...] The value-Objectiveness involves its mere materially determinate thing [*Sache*]; it introduces, as a new Objective stratum, the *value-quality*” (Hua. III, §95, p.232)^{cxxv}. Here, “involves” has been used to translate the original *impliziert*; already a cue, that the use of the verb ‘implying’ here resembles a logical sense. The “value-Objectiveness”, which has been defined by Husserl here, is an objectivity in itself, as the consciousness can intend it specifically. It, however, by essence refers to the *Sache*, the object in a wide sense which is described by it, which is valued. Hence, it essentially makes necessary the existence of this object, and its connection to it; without the object, the value would not be able to exist.

A similar implication, a certain ‘essential’ implication, is found in §149 of *Ideas I*. In this paragraph Husserl takes the region ‘Material Thing’ as an example to show the different phenomenological problem areas which are to be tackled. In this description, he also points out that the material thing itself cannot be given adequately, for any direct perception of the thing falls short. In contrast, “[...] we still seize upon the ‘idea,’ Physical Thing, with evidence and adequately [...]. We first of all seize upon the unfulfilled idea of the physical thing as something which is given ‘so far,’ precisely as far as the harmonious intuition ‘reaches,’ but thereby remains determinable ‘*in infinitum*.’ The ‘etc.’ is an evident and absolutely indispensable moment in the physical thing-noema (Hua. III, §149, p.358)^{cxxvi}. The question which arises here, is how the infinity, the “etc.” is given in the idea “Physical Thing”. A first cue gives the fact, that the determinable infinity remains beyond the reach of the intuition; hence the situation is similar to the way the background is given in perception, which is to be found at the limit of current intuition too. Husserl goes on to claim that “each property belonging to the eidetic content, and, above all, each *constitutive* ‘form,’ is an idea” (Hua. III, §149, p.359)^{cxxvii}. He then describes concretely the temporal, extended and material nature of the idea Thing, to finally conclude: “Thus *all* components of the idea of the physical thing are themselves ideas; each one *implies* the ‘and so forth’ of ‘infinite’ possibilities” (Hua. III, §149, p.359)^{cxxviii}. The *eidōs* Thing essentially entails the possibility, that a thing may endure forever, that it may move in infinite ways, that it may be part of an infinite possibility of causal complexes. These properties cannot be observed empirically, they cannot even be intuited in an explicit way; but they are implicitly present, they are implied in the idea Thing.

Here, it makes sense to take a look back to an example from §93 of *Experience and Judgement*, examined above (p.48). There, Husserl described free variation, and also confronted the problem that the thing, as it is intended, implies infinities. The difference, however, is the 'localisation' of these infinities. While above, it is the intention of the thing, that is, the way the subject posits the thing, which implies infinities, here, it is the eidon of the region Material Thing itself which implies the infinities. One could conclude here that the ego's positing leads to the establishment of ideas; it is interesting for the purpose of this thesis, however, that even in the same context, the implication can be seen as occurring on the subjective or on the objective side.

The next example goes along with the just exposed. In §8 of Landgrebe's Introduction to *Experience and Judgement*, the text establishes the conditions of possibility of the operation of explication, amongst them the way the anticipations, founded upon the type of the current experience, are given. One can read: "In the clarification of this typical generality in the form of determinate 'possibilities' open to the real being of this color, the realm [*Spielraum*] for these possibilities is given as the explicit 'extension' of the indeterminate generality of anticipation" (E+J, §8, p.36)^{cxix}. Hence, while the horizon itself, the anticipations themselves, in their potential infinity, remain indeterminate, implicit, it is possible for the subject to know the extension of the possibilities there are. The unseen side may be rough, or smooth, or anything in between, but it has to exist in some form. The anticipations remain indeterminate and general, but inside a certain realm which is determinate.

The next quote is taken from the same context, that is, a description of the way the indeterminate generality of anticipation is given and limited. It is found, however, in §21 c)⁸⁵ of the same work, in which Husserl describes the way an open possibility is given. He claims there, that "[...] the general indeterminateness has a field of free variability; what falls within it is in the same way implicitly included but still not motivated, not positively prescribed. It is a member of an unbounded field of more precise determinations which can be accommodated to this framework but which, beyond this, are completely uncertain. This constitutes the *concept of open possibility*" (E+J, §21 c), p.98)^{cxix}. Hence, in order to explain the idea of an open possibility, Husserl makes use of the concept of free variability; whatever is inside its field, is possible. The question arises however, how such a field can be intuitively

⁸⁵ Following Lohmar, this quote, as most of the paragraph, is taken from F I 37, also printed in Hua. XI, p.39-42: Lohmar, D. (1996). Zu der Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk *Erfahrung und Urteil*. *Husserl Studies*, 13, p. 31-71.

apprehended. What Husserl claims is, that while not every possible member can be imagined explicitly, all of them are included, intended implicitly; a claim that can be confirmed by the fact that, if any of them would be actually observed, they would not surprise the subject.

In the same paragraph⁸⁶, just some lines below, it is possible to find another quote interesting for this investigation. Husserl writes, that as in the open possibility no alternative has a particular weight, “[...] the modalization consists in this, that an indeterminate general intention, which itself has the mode of certainty, in a way bears implicitly in itself a stratification of its certainty with reference to all conceivable particularities. If, for example, a color flecked with spots is required with certainty in an indeterminate generality, [...] every particularity of this type fulfills this requirement in the same way” (E+J, §21 c), p.98)^{cxviii}. It has been shown in the quote above, that the relation between the “indeterminate general intention” and its particularities is one of implication. However, the term “implicitly” here refers not to the particularities, but to the way the stratification of the certainty is borne. This is meant in the sense that, as no particularity stands out, the certainty is stratified on all of them, that is, in the case any of those particularities would be realised, the intention would be fulfilled. Correspondingly, the certainty is applying to all of them, as a whole, at once. The subject is certain that any of the particularities can be realised, but one will be realised for sure. None of the particularities is thus intuited explicitly as certain, but every particularity is not only intended implicitly, but does in addition bear the certainty implicitly.

The next example is taken from a quite different context. In §85 of *Ideas I*, Husserl introduces his distinction between hyletic data and intentional forms. Describing the former, and explaining how they relate to intentionality, Husserl writes: “We find [...] concrete really immanent Data as components in more inclusive concrete mental processes which are intensive as wholes; and, more particularly, we find those sensuous moments overlaid by a stratum which, as it were, ‘animates,’ which *bestows sense* (or essentially involves a bestowing of sense) – a stratum by which precisely the concrete intensive mental process arises from the *sensuous, which has in itself nothing pertaining to intentionality*” (Hua. III, §85, p.203)^{cxviii}. The translator has rendered the original *implizierende* as “involves”. The point in question is, hence, the relation between the stratum by which the intensive mental process arises when laid upon the sensuous moments, and the bestowal of sense. Husserl inserts these brackets in order to limit the direct relation between both, indicating that there is

⁸⁶ Following Lohmar, this quote, as most of the paragraph, is taken from F I 37, also printed in Hua. XI, p.43: *ibid.*

the possibility that the new stratum does not directly bestow sense upon the sensuous moments; however, by its essence, it makes it possible and maybe even necessary, that sense be bestowed upon the hyletic data. One possible interpretation of this slight distinction could be the claim that the stratum in question is itself still not intentional – it only gives rise to the intentional function.

Finally the last example is found in §60 of *Experience and Judgement*. Husserl distinguishes in this paragraph state of affairs and the judicative propositions which constitute them. In this context, it is possible that new judicative propositions describe the same state of affairs in a different way, or, as Husserl puts it: “Every explicit theme can become, not only the substrate of explicit judicative operations, but also the substrate of the modified linkage of acquisitions resulting from former operations. This does not alter the state of affairs, which is constituted thematically, but it does alter *how* it is meant. In this *how*, the state of affairs is the thematic product, not only of the present judgement, but also of implied judgements. The explicit thematic product thus has a frieze of configurations which each time refer to implicated judgements – configurations which, naturally, can be resolved into their original form, the form of their original accomplishment” (E+J, §60, p.243-244)^{cxviii}. It has to be taken notice of here, that all three times “explicit” appears here, Husserl wrote originally *aktuell*. Moreover, Churchill and Ameriks translated *eingewickelte Urteile* as “implicated judgements”. This means, that the only term belonging to the pair explicit-implicit in the original is “of implied judgements”, *implizierter Urteile*. It is quite interesting to observe, then, that Churchill and Ameriks use these terms for their translation. For Husserl, the only implicit judgements are the ones which, as acquisitions from former operations, co-define the way the state of affairs is meant, together with the present, *aktuell*, judgements. The implicit judgements are then implicit, because their influence can be discovered in the “*how*” of the state of affairs, but they are not presently accomplished. These same implicit judgements are also characterised as *eingewickelt*, excluding hence any possibility of a logical or linguistic meaning of the description. The translators, more ambiguously, opted to show this difference only by using “implicated” instead of “implied”. More importantly, the direct contrast created in the translation between the *aktuell* judgements and the implicit ones, by translating *aktuell* as explicit, that is, by characterising the current judgements as something given directly, actually suits the sense of this passage well: the *aktuell* judgements are directly conscious to the ego which is accomplishing them in this moment, in contrast to the implicit ones. In the last chapter, this possibility of reading *aktuell* as explicit will be examined in more depth.

This section had been titled 'meaning'. It has become clear that the meanings described here are no linguistic or logical meanings. Rather, the topics were certain essences or objects which appear in the phenomenological context, and which make necessary or refer to something else: Amongst them 'ideas' or concepts which by definition include more than it is possible to intuit and objectivities which presuppose their fundament, their origin, or their function. In this sense, while in the other sections the implicit resembled a potentiality of the subject, here, the implicit was rather located on the objective side, as a property of the object in question. If one still tried to employ once more the metaphor of the context developed at the end of the section before, it could be said that all explicit appearances, beyond their temporal and spatial context, also may have a certain conceptual or functional context, often by definition. In this way, they can refer beyond themselves even if the subject is not conscious of it.

Concluding, in addition, the chapter and the first part of this thesis, first it has to be noticed that the categorisation of the different meanings in which Husserl used the terms has shown to be useful in order to structure the passages roughly, but cannot claim stringency. The limits between the different meanings of explicit and implicit are not clear-cut. In addition, it has to be reiterated that Husserl does not define the terms expressly; hence, all classifications are based upon an interpretation of the term inside its direct context, in reference to its function for the syntax and the content. All interpretation, *per se*, is unable to reach final exactitude; in addition, there were several examples in which the terms seemed to allow more than one possible interpretation. Moreover it has to be highlighted that Husserl uses the terms in an enormous diversity of contexts, from comments on the methodology over exact descriptions of phenomenological observations to certain functional relations between concepts. None of these themes seemed to have been particularly susceptible to be described by means of the explicit-implicit pair. Given the mentioned difficulties of defining the exact sense of the term, in addition to the general rather low frequency and the inconsistent use of the terms – sometimes being used in different senses inside the same paragraph – it would be unreasonable to infer any kind of supposed systematic employment of the terms connected to the explicit-implicit pair by Husserl from the analysis of the texts used, namely *Ideas I* and *Experience and Judgement*, with the exception of *Explikation* in the latter work. It can be concluded, hence, that Husserl's use of the explicit-implicit pair and the related terms beyond the operation of *Explikation* is mostly metaphorical, with the exception of some few examples in which the terms are used in a strictly logical sense.

However, even though Husserl did most probably not have any corresponding intention, the way he uses the terms metaphorically, precisely in the context of phenomenology, is interesting and can be understood in a certain sense. While his aim was probably just to be intuitively understandable, most frequently the terms are used by Husserl in significations which are deviant from any technical definitions, including his own concept of the act of *Explikation*. Importantly, in these metaphorical employments of explicit and implicit and their connected terms, it is possible to exhibit a certain structure of meanings; precisely this exhibition was the purpose of this last chapter. The point of departure was the framework of the act of *Explikation* as described in *Experience and Judgement*, in its widened sense, that is, including the effective arbitrariness of the substrate. Accordingly, it has been shown that the term 'implicit' appears as a characterisation of something still not explicated; it does not, however, simply designate the exact opposite to the explicated. Rather, in the first three sections of this chapter the term implicit was used to designate something which does appear to the ego as a potential: the potential of becoming conscious, of being payed attention to. It could be well englobed by the notion of horizon. The explicit, in contrast, was used to characterise something already completely conscious. In the last section, moreover, it would seem one could speak of an employment of the terms which is closer to logical definitions of implication than to the concept of *Explikation* from *Experience and Judgement*: Rather than showing a certain horizontality of the consciousness connected to the ego's potentiality, certain phenomenological concepts were described as implying, in themselves, certain relations. However, it would seem to the author of this thesis that such an opposition would be misleading, as the essences described in that section can only be theoretically separated from the subject who intuits them. In any case, it can be claimed with certainty that Husserl employs the terms for both sides, the subjective activity, and the apprehended objectivity.

It results, that there is a roughly clear meaning which could be used to englobe most of the 'deviant' metaphorical uses of explicit and implicit in the two investigated works. The term 'explicit' and its derivatives have been used in these passages to express something directly intuitive, *anschaulich*, to the consciousness. 'Implicit' and its connected terms, in contrast, correspond to a certain horizontal givenness, that is, to something which does not appear, but is 'known' by the ego in its 'indeterminate determinability'; in other words, the ego has the at least theoretical possibility of making it appear intuitively. In addition, it has to be mentioned that the terms were also used, though less frequently, to characterise the necessary properties of an idea or concept, such as function, origin or fundament. This said there can be no claim that it would be possible to induce certain concepts from these different

metaphorical uses of the terms; accordingly, it will not be possible to presuppose any of the meanings just proposed when reading these terms in Husserl. But even if some of the examples used in this chapter may have been interpreted mistakenly, or may not express exactly Husserl's intention, by the sheer number of cases that Husserl uses the terms in a sense similar to the ones described, it is possible to claim that the structure itself, which is depicted by these meanings, does appear in Husserl's descriptions. In other words, while the terms cannot be seen as concepts, that which they delineate, namely a certain reference of intuited contents beyond themselves as in the example of horizontality, is present in the two works investigated.

Such a structure of explicit content which refers beyond itself to something implicit is, furthermore, nothing alien to the other traditional definitions of the explicit-implicit pair. Rather, it would seem to be the common denominator englobing the logical and the linguistic definition, just as the concept of *Explikation* in which the contemplated substrate refers 'beyond' itself to the existence and determinability of its properties inside its internal horizon. As seen in the introduction, the proposition of such a kind of structure has not received much prominence inside the field of phenomenological studies. After having analysed, as a preceding foundational step, the way Husserl himself employs the terms explicit and implicit, this thesis has the additional aim of giving an approximate outlook on the areas in which such a structure, which might be described by means of the terms explicit and implicit, could be found inside the Husserlian framework, and in what sense it might become a fruitful concept.

2. Reading *Ideas I* with the Explicit and the Implicit

In the framework of this thesis, and considering its limited length, it will only be possible to give a first outlook on the possibilities of employing the explicit-implicit structure in Husserl's thought. Given the previous focus on only two of Husserl's works, and the central position *Ideas I* takes due to its attempt to present a general introduction to the different fields and dimensions of phenomenology, it suggests itself to reread precisely *Ideas I* to show in which function the explicit-implicit structure might be found. Such an examination of the possibilities of application will have to stay preliminary, as not even *Ideas I* will be treated in its entirety; the focus will rather be on certain concepts and relations which serve as examples for the structure proposed.

This structure has been worked out and abstracted to the point that it englobes all other significations of explicit and implicit. In the resulting proposition, the terms are not interpreted as standing in a direct opposition; rather, the explicit and the implicit function in a complementary contrast. The explicit is given directly, immediately, in its most present form: in linguistics, this corresponds to the uttering, in logics to the written statement, in the context of *Explikation* from *Experience and Judgement* to the substrate such as it appears in the first contemplation. In all of these cases, and also regarding the conscious intuitions and the given essences or ideas shown in the last chapter, the explicit refers beyond itself; the puzzling fact here is of course, that that which it refers to is not explicit, is not given equally directly. It does appear, however, implicitly and is actually able to codetermine the explicit. Even the appearance of an object in space is co-defined by its background at least by contrasting against it, and by standing in a spatial relation with it. In this sense, the implicit is not really "beyond" the explicit, but rather a defining part of it. It is, however, not present as the explicit is present; it is rather given as the possibility, the potential of precisely being made explicit. The relation between both forms of givenness, being given explicitly or implicitly, could be called 'implication'. Everything explicit thus demonstrates implications, it discloses itself in its implications. Given this level of abstraction, even the mentioned difference between the implicit as subjective potentiality and the implicit as an essential objective property is integrated entirely. However, it is necessary to stay alert with regards to this distinction.

The description of such a structure is not entirely new. It has been mentioned in the introduction that some scholars have developed similar concepts, finding at least inspiration in Husserl. Before starting to examine the possibilities of application of the explicit-implicit structure in *Ideas I*, some of these concepts will be shortly presented, namely the

conceptualisation of horizon by Roberto J. Walton, the relation theme-thematic field in the thought of Aron Gurwitsch, and the understanding of unconsciousness as described by Anastasia Kozyreva in one paper.

Walton, in one chapter of his book *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*, identifies various oppositions in Husserl's works which are associated to each other and to the opposition foreground-background in which the idea of horizon consists.⁸⁷ The first amongst these oppositions in the field of experience contrasts unity and multiplicity, for instance the unity of the intentionality which apprehends the object, as opposed to the multiplicity of aspects belonging to this object, as for example its different sides.⁸⁸ Further associated opposites include the *actual*, or *aktuell* in German, on one side and the potential on the other side,⁸⁹ in which the former is accessible immediately, while the latter remains mediated.⁹⁰ Interestingly, based on a quote from Husserl's *First Philosophy*, Walton characterises the way the immediate refers to the mediate as an *Ineinander*, that is, as a multiplicity which is inherent, as opposed to notions of succession or juxtaposition.⁹¹ Moreover, in accordance with the notion of mediacy, Walton refers to Husserl's distinction between "[...] a *distance from* and a *nearness to the Ego*" (Hua. III, §84, p.200)^{cxv}, in order to understand the difference which defines the horizon as a gradual one.⁹²

Gurwitsch, in his work *The Field of Consciousness*, attempts to describe and determine the phenomenon of context. For that purpose, he distinguishes three domains inside the field of consciousness, namely the theme, its thematic field and the margin.⁹³ While the theme is simply that which stands in the focus of the subject's attention, it can only appear inside the thematic field, it can only emerge out of it, pointing necessarily to it.⁹⁴ This close relation between theme and thematic field distinguishes the latter from the margin, which is characterised by not having any relevancy to the theme and hence only being conjunct through temporal connection.⁹⁵ It can be noticed that Gurwitsch, in his development of the thematic field, refers to William James' concept of 'fringes' as established in his *Principles of*

⁸⁷ C.f. Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.117

⁸⁸ C.f. *ibid.*, p.119

⁸⁹ C.f. *ibid.*, p.37 and p.121

⁹⁰ C.f. *ibid.*, p.130

⁹¹ C.f. *ibid.*, p.127

⁹² C.f. *ibid.*, p.122

⁹³ C.f. Gurwitsch, A. (2010). *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) (Volume III. The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin)*. (R. M. Zaner, & L. Embree, ed.) Heidelberg London New York: Springer. p.4

⁹⁴ C.f. *ibid.*, p.311-312

⁹⁵ C.f. *ibid.*, p.343

Psychology, which, following James, are a halo of references which surround every topic and which remain inarticulate.⁹⁶ Moreover, and of importance for this thesis, Gurwitsch does not suppose the theme to be simply appearing in itself. Rather, drawing on Husserl's theory of adumbrations and on Gestalt theory, he claims that the perceived thing appears only under one certain aspect, in one adumbration, but presents itself as being perceivable in various ways.⁹⁷ These various aspects which Gurwitsch calls constituents are hence implied, as he himself notices, but still codetermine the sense of the genuinely present perception. Though not explicit, these implicit parts of the general perception "[...] can be submitted to a *process of explicitation*"⁹⁸ in which the perceptual meaning is unfolded.

Gurwitsch refers to Merleau-Ponty and his *Phenomenology of Perception* to show how the French philosopher has taken a similar position on the issue of the multiplicity of aspects of one sole object. He paraphrases Merleau-Ponty to point out that due to a certain organization of the different appearances of one object, all aspects signify, or imply each other, being at the same time determined by the others.⁹⁹ Anastasia Kozyreva, in her paper called *Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty* as well refers to Merleau-Ponty as an example of thinking the relation between representational and non-representational content in perception. For instance, she claims that he defines the unconscious in the *The Visible and the Invisible* as the background against which objects are seen, that is, as the way the uncertainty in perception is filled.¹⁰⁰ More generally, Kozyreva investigates the thesis that conscious experience becomes possible to be interpreted and invested with meaning thanks to non-representational, implicit unconsciousness.¹⁰¹

It is then clear, that a structure of implication, in different forms and contexts, has been proposed already by other authors. To compare these different approaches to each other does not fit into the scope of the present work. However, in the course of specifying the structure proposed above by applying it to concrete fields and dimensions inside the phenomenological framework, there will be made reference to the perspectives presented in these three works. In this way, the proposed interpretation can be complemented or contrasted

⁹⁶ C.f. *ibid.*, p.302

⁹⁷ C.f. *ibid.*, p.273

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p.276

⁹⁹ C.f. *ibid.*, p.287-288 and p.293

¹⁰⁰ Kozyreva, A. (24. December 2016). Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 17, p. 199-224. doi:10.1007/s11097-016-9492-9. p.207

¹⁰¹ C.f. *ibid.*, p.218

with the different schemes already worked out. Again, the applications will be organised by the corresponding field of application and are mostly oriented on Husserl's organisation of *Ideas I* but should not be seen as a rigid distinction.

2.1 Intentional Acts and their Background

Already in §27 of *Ideas I* in which Husserl describes life in the natural attitude, the 'field of perception' and its limits appear. However, its limits do not become problematic. The world, and the objects that are familiar to the subject are still there, even if the subject does not heed them: "[...] [I]t is not necessary that they, and likewise that other objects, be found directly in my *field of perception*. Along with the ones now perceived, other actual objects are there for me as determinate, as more or less well known, without being themselves perceived or, indeed, present in any other mode of intuition" (Hua. III, §27, p.51)^{cxxxv}. Moreover, the world still surpasses this co-present sphere, as that "[w]hat is now perceived and what is more or less clearly co-present and determinate (or at least somewhat determinate), are penetrated and surrounded by an *obscurely intended to horizon of indeterminate actuality*" (Hua. III, §27, p.52)^{cxxxvi}. While the subject is able to "[...] send rays of the illuminative regard of attention into this horizon [...]" (Hua. III, §27, p.52)^{cxxxvii}, such an attempt of elucidation remains always incomplete, as the "[...] indeterminate surroundings are infinite, misty and never fully determinable horizon is necessarily there" (Hua. III, §27, p.52)^{cxxxviii}. In this sense, it can be shown that the explicit and intuitive perception is already surrounded and complemented by an implicit sphere of co-presence, and, moreover, an infinite horizon of potential determinability which, even though undetermined, accompanies as an empty implicit possibility all perception. These implicitly co-present contents and their horizons do not, hence, coincide with Gurwitsch's thematic field or margin. All of the field of consciousness, for Gurwitsch, consists in the totality of co-present data, that is, everything which is simultaneously experienced, not including sedimented knowledge.¹⁰² In this sense, the field of consciousness, which is also called field of perception by Gurwitsch himself, corresponds to what Husserl calls field of perception here.

Once performed the phenomenological reduction, Husserl continues to analyse the field of perception in concrete examples. For instance, while there is a field in my vision, I seize upon only one object in it: "In perceiving proper, as an attentive perceiving, I am turned toward the object, [...] I seize upon it as this existent here and now. The seizing-upon is a

¹⁰² Gurwitsch, A. (2010). *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) (Volume III. The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin)*. (R. M. Zaner, & L. Embree, ed.) Heidelberg London New York: Springer. p.2

singling out and seizing; anything perceived has an experiential background” (Hua. III, §35, p.70)^{103cxxxix}. The objects in this experiential background are perceived, but not properly, they do appear, but are not posited in themselves: “Every perception of a physical thing has, in this manner, a halo of *background-intuitions* (or background-seeings, in case one already includes in intuiting the advertedness to the really seen), and that is also a ‘*mental process of consciousness*’ or, more briefly, ‘consciousness,’ and, more particularly, ‘of all that which in fact lies in the objective ‘background’ seen along with it” (Hua. III, §35, p.70)^{cxl}. In this way, the consciousness surpasses that which is seized-upon concretely. This seizing upon, moreover, depends on the heeding of the ego; “[...] certain modifications of the original mental process are possible which we characterize as a free turning of ‘regard’ - not precisely nor merely of the physical, but rather of the ‘*mental regard*’ [‘*geistigen Blickes*’] [...]” (Hua. III, §35, p.71)^{cxli}. It depends on the direction of the mental regard, then, which object is seized-upon, and which objects stay in the background.

Here, it has to be taken notice of that Husserl makes an important distinction between seizing-upon something, *etwas erfassen*, and being turned towards something, *zu etwas zugewendet sein*: “[...] the ‘directedness to,’ the ‘advertedness to,’ which distinguishes actionality [*Aktualität*] does not (as in the preferred – because the simplest – examples of sensuous objectivations) coincide with that heeding of Objects of consciousness which *seizes upon them and picks them out*” (Hua. III, §35, p.72)^{cxlii}. Husserl specifies a bit further, that “[t]he seizing-upon in the broadest sense is equivalent to noticing [the object], whether in being especially attentive or in heeding it incidentally [...]” (Hua. III, §37, p.76)^{cxliii}, and explains that in the course of this seizing-upon, “[...] its intentional Object is not just any object whatever of consciousness and in view as something to which the mental regard is directed; it is rather an Object seized-upon, heeded” (Hua. III, §37, p.76)^{cxliv}. To exemplify this distinction, Husserl writes that “[t]o a physical thing [...] we cannot be turned otherwise than in the manner of seizing-upon [...]. However, in the act of valuing, we are turned to the valued; in the act of gladness to the gladsome [...] but *without* seizing upon any of them” (Hua. III, §37, p.76)^{cxlv}. Seizing-upon as a concept is thus limited here to the acknowledgement of a thing as thing. When characterising this thing, the object of intention is not the thing itself anymore, because the mental regard is turned to its characteristic.

¹⁰³ Gurwitsch refers to exactly this quote, pointing out that “[...] *per-cipere* may be characterized as *ex-cipere*”. He defines the background in which the perceptual theme appears as the thematic field: C.f. *ibid.*, p.312

In this sense, the seizing-upon is present always, but often not in the focus of the ego: “*In any act some mode of heedfulness dominates. But whenever the act is not simply consciousness of a thing, whenever there is founded on such a consciousness a further consciousness in which ‘a position is taken’ with respect to the thing, then thing and full intentional Object (for example: ‘thing’ and ‘value’), likewise heeding and having the mind’s eye on, seperately arise*” (Hua. III, §37, p.77)^{cxlvi}. The thing is seized-upon, but the regard is not turned toward the thing, it is turned toward its how. Therefore, a second intentionality is built upon the first one, “[...] correspondingly, <there is> a *dual intentio*, a two-fold advertedness. [...] Not only the *objectivating of the thing* but also the *valuing of the thing* which includes the objectivating, has the mode of *actionality*” (Hua. III, §37, p.77)^{104cxlvii}. Husserl hence emphasises that the mental regard is not limited to the mere noticing of something physical; rather, the subject is turned toward its object, which may very well be something only founded upon the physically seen. There is hence a specific sphere which is characterised by the directedness of the ego, and can be called the sphere of actionality, or *Aktualität* in German, that is, the current, present sphere (c.f. Hua. III, §35, p.72 + §37, p.76)^{cxlviii}.

This actionality is synonymous to the ‘cogito in the pregnant sense’: “Precisely these [actionalities], when contrasted with non-actionalities, determine with the widest universality [...] the *pregnant* sense of the expression ‘cogito,’ ‘I have *consciousness* of something,’ ‘I effect an *act* of consciousness.’” (Hua. III, §35, p.72)^{cxlix}. Given this wide sense of actionality, corresponding to whatever the subject is conscious of, it is not limited to direct perception, but appears in the same structure in memory, phantasy and presentification in general: “Physical things are intended to not only in perception but also in memories and in presentiations similar to memories as well as in free phantasies. [...] We recognize then that, to the essence of all such mental processes – these always taken in full concreteness – there belongs the noteworthy modification which converts consciousness in the *mode of actional [aktueller] advertence* into consciousness in the *mode of non-actionality [Inaktualität]* and conversely” (Hua. III, §35, p.71)^{cl}. Above in the last chapter (p.50-51), it has been already shown that exactly this actionality, this cogito is characterised by Husserl as explicit.

¹⁰⁴ While not the topic of this section, there is a different kind of implication present here, namely the way the “valuing of the thing“ “includes“ the objectivation of the thing itself. To value something implies to first accepting it as an object which can be valued. It is similar to an example from Hua. III, §95, p.232, in which Husserl actually describes this relation with the verb *implizieren* (c.f. above, p.58)

In the last quote, Husserl speaks of a conversion of the actional into the potential, and conversely. This shows that the sphere of actionality should not be understood as something static; correspondingly, the background perceived behind the actional is not a mere passive frame. Rather, the subject is acting, it is turning its regard, it is effecting acts of consciousness. That means that it is acting to make actional something which had remained in the background until this point. The background can be understood as a field of potential filled with other objects which might become actional. This is why actionality is not only opposed with non-actionality by Husserl, but equally with potentiality, with the field of potentiality: “[...] [W]hile we are now adverted to the pure object in the mode of ‘cogito,’ all sorts of objects ‘appear;’ they are ‘intended to’ intuitively, they flow together into the intuitive unity of a conscious field of object. It is a *potential field of perception* in the sense that a particular perceiving (an attentive cogito) can advert something which thus appears” (Hua. III, §84, p.200)^{cli}. Besides its actional, current perception, the subject is conscious of the fact that it could, if it chose so, turn its regard and perceive something from the background.¹⁰⁵ This holds true not only for perception, but as well for presentification, as it has been seen; all modes of intuition appear together with a halo of further appearances which can be actionally intuited. This consciousness of the Ego’s potentiality can be called its field of freedom: “[The non-actional mental processes] ‘belong’ to <the pure Ego> as ‘its own’ <mental processes,> they are *its* consciousness-background, *its* field of freedom” (Hua. III, §80, p.191)^{clii}. Such an understanding of the background as a potential foreground, a potential of the ego, corresponds as well with the idea of undetermined determinability, that appears not only in *Experience and Judgement*, but also in *Ideas I*: “It should be mentioned that *what is given at any particular time is usually surrounded by a halo of undetermined determinability [...]*” (Hua. III, §69, p.157)^{cliii}. The halo of the given is still undetermined, but this lack of determination entails the very possibility of determining it: there is something, a certain emptiness, so to say, which needs to be filled in a certain way.¹⁰⁶ In this sense, as Gurwitsch emphasises, the indeterminateness is never total, as it is always inside the limits of a certain typical structure, delineated with anticipation.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Gurwitsch’s idea of a thematic field consisting in ‘potential themes’ corresponds to this field of potentiality: C.f. Gurwitsch, A. (2010). *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) (Volume III. The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin)*. (R. M. Zaner, & L. Embree, ed.) Heidelberg London New York: Springer. p.356

¹⁰⁶ C.f. Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.134

¹⁰⁷ C.f. Gurwitsch, A. (2010). *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) (Volume III. The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin)*. (R. M. Zaner, & L. Embree, ed.) Heidelberg London New York: Springer. p.274 + p.330

Gradual Attentional Changes

The opposition between actionality and potentiality is associated, moreover, with a difference of attention. Husserl writes that “[i]n our preparatory chapters we spoke repeatedly of a species of remarkable changes in consciousness which cut across all other species of intentional events and thus make up a quite universal structure of consciousness having its own peculiar dimension: We spoke metaphorically of the pure Ego’s ‘mental regard’ or the ‘ray of its regard,’ of its advertings toward and turning away from. The relevant phenomena stood out unitarily for us with perfect clarity and distinctness. Wherever ‘attention’ is spoken of originally, they play a major role without being separated phenomenologically from certain other phenomena; and, mixed with these others, they are usually designated as modes of attention. For our part, we mean to retain the word and, moreover, to speak of *attentional changes*, but with exclusive reference to the events *we* have separated distinctly and the groups of phenomenal changes still to be described more precisely in what follows” (Hua. III, §92, p.222)^{cliv}. Hence, Husserl does not identify the difference between actionality and potentiality with the differences of attention but admits that attention “plays a major role” in the passing from one to the other. Moreover, he calls the transformation of something from only staying in the potential field to become the actional object an attentional change. Actionality and attention are in this way closely associated, but not congruent. While Husserl does not specify the distinction between both concepts, Walton claims that the difference lies in the different kinds of backgrounds: Following him, the attentional background is only the external horizon of the object, that is, the field from which the object emerges. In contrast, actionality and potentiality also apply in the context of apprehension, in which the seen adumbration can be distinguished from the additionally apprehended unseen sides of the same object.¹⁰⁸ This differentiation between a potentiality of apprehension and a potentiality of attention will be elaborated below.

Anyway, Husserl specifies further that generally speaking any noema is susceptible to the described attentional changes: “In this context it is a question of a series of ideally possible changes which already presuppose a noetic core and the characterizing moments of various genera which necessarily belong to it; of themselves, <these possible changes> do not alter the correlative noematic productions, but, nevertheless, exhibit alterations of the *whole* mental process with respect to both its noetic and noematic sides” (Hua. III, §92, p.223)^{clv}.

¹⁰⁸ C.f. Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.122-123: For that claim he refers to §25 from Husserl’s *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, p.55 in the German edition, in which Husserl distinguishes the background of *Aufmerksamkeit* and of *Auffassung*.

That is, the noematic core stays the same, if the object be actionally perceived or it remain in the potential field. However, the mental process as a whole changes, when the subject turns its regard to an object, or its attention to it slips away. Such a conservation of the noematic core presupposes, that the noema be apprehended already before the mental regard brings it into the actional sphere. This is indeed the case,¹⁰⁹ as Husserl reiterates that the field of potentiality is already intentional: “[...] [P]henomenological reflection teaches that this [...] Ego-advertence, this being-busied-with-the-correlate-object *actionally*, this being-directed-to-it [...] is not to be found in every mental process: even so <the mental process> can still include intentionality within itself. Thus it is clear, for instance, that the objective background, from out of which the cognitively perceived object is singled out by virtue of the fact that the distinctive Ego-advertence is allocated to it, is, as a mental process, actually an *objective background*” (Hua. III, §84, p.200; c.f. also: Hua. III, §36, p.73; Hua. III, §115, p.273)^{clvi}. It is hence confirmed that consciousness, even in the widest sense, is based upon intentionality.

Husserl justifies this claim of speaking of intentionality in case of non-actional acts as following: “Thus the cogito designates in fact [...] the act *proper* of perceiving, of judging, of liking, etc. On the other hand, however, the whole structure of the mental process in the cases described, with all its positings and noematic characteristics, is the same even when this actionality of the cogito is lacking to it” (Hua. III, §115, p.273)^{clvii}. It is in this sense, that the attentional changes appear as mere modifications of a noematic core which in itself remains equal. He continues, “[i]t is to that extent that we separate more distinctly *effected acts* and *non-effected acts*; the latter are either acts which ‘have fallen out of effectuation,’ or that are *act-arousals*” (Hua. III, §115, p.273)^{clviii}. While it seems reasonable to suppose that acts which had been actional once still conserve their noematic structure, the notion of intentional act-arousals seems more obscure.¹¹⁰ Elsewhere, Husserl writes: “There belong here, moreover, mental processes of the actionality-background, such as the ‘arousal’ of likings, of judgements, of wishes, etc., at different distances in the background [...]” (Hua. III, §84, p.200)^{clix}. Husserl insists, that even though these arousals are not effected, “[...] [w]ith respect to their own essence these non-actionalities are likewise already ‘consciousness of something’” (Hua. III, §84, p.201)^{clx}. Given that there is hence no discrete difference between actional and potential acts of intentionality, it makes sense that Husserl even suggests a

¹⁰⁹ Husserl even mentions expressly that the apprehension of the potential content is previous to the turning of the regard: C.f. Hua. III, §84, p.200

¹¹⁰ This is for instance the opinion of the scholar Luis Román Rabanaque, who, in his paper *Campo de Trasfondo y Dato Hyletico*, calls the notion of “arousal”, *Regung*, obscure: Rabanaque, L. R. (1993). *Campo de Trasfondo y Dato Hyletico*. *Agora*, 12 (2), p. 7-21.: p.5

gradation of the background,¹¹¹ speaking of “a *distance from* and a *nearness to the Ego*, since the actional pure Ego living in the particular cogitations is the point of reference” (Hua. III, §84, p.200)^{clxi}. Correspondingly, the actional sphere would just be characterised by being at maximal nearness to the ego.

Understood in a strict sense, this gradation of the background also signifies that the whole reality, as a potentially conceivable reality, is included in the ego’s field of potential perception, at least in a horizontal sense. All real being is already motivated, in a certain degree, in the current actional sphere: “It is inherent in the essence that anything whatever which exists in reality but is not yet actually experienced can become given and that this means that the thing in question belongs to the undetermined but *determinable* horizon of my experiential actuality at the particular time. This horizon, however, is the correlate of the components of undeterminateness essentially attached to experiences of physical things themselves; and those components [...] leave open possibilities of fulfilment which are by no means completely undetermined but are, on the contrary, motivated possibilities *prelineated with respect to their essential type*” (Hua. III, §47, p.107)^{clxii}. This explains, how something ‘unknown’ can be given, even intentionally given, for the whole field of potentiality is already intended: The still not known world is never totally unknown, as it exists as a horizon which, again, is a correlate of the currently seen; all potential, unknown content is implicit in the actional, explicit intentional content, it is even already prelineated by it. Gurwitsch sees in such a reference to an outer horizon the phenomenological root for the consciousness of “[...] the world as a universal all-embracing background [...]”¹¹².

Finally, the relation between actional and potential sphere has to be understood dynamically, that is, if all potential acts of the ego are included in its potential field, any turning of regard will result in the ego’s passage from an actional object to a still potential one, and, correspondingly, will transform a potential object into an actional object. In this way, the stream of mental processes consists precisely in the movement between actional and potential sphere: “[...] [I]t is of the essence of a waking Ego’s stream of mental processes that the continual unbroken chain of cogitations is continually surrounded by a medium of non-actionality which is always ready to change into the mode of actionality, just as, conversely actionality is always ready to change into non-actionality” (Hua. III, §35, p.72-73)^{clxiii}.

¹¹¹ C.f. Walton, mentioned already above: Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.122

¹¹² C.f. Gurwitsch, A. (2010). *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) (Volume III. The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin)*. (R. M. Zaner, & L. Embree, ed.) Heidelberg London New York: Springer. p.359

Following Walton, the very streaming of this stream is made possible thanks to 'signifying beyond' itself of the actional, that is, the fact that there is always something remaining undetermined.¹¹³ In this sense, one can analyse the interplay between the actional and the potential also from the point of view of the temporal dimension.

Temporal Horizons

Temporality is a special dimension of the phenomenological inquiry. Just as there are special works by Husserl which focus upon the givenness of a spatial object, such as the lectures on *Thing and Space*, one can name different works which focus upon the structure of temporality, for example the lectures on *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* or the *Bernauer Manuskripte*. However, even in *Ideas I* the most general characteristics of temporality such as it is experienced are presented. In it, it is possible to find certain relations of implication.

First of all, already in the natural attitude the infinite horizon of indeterminateness is not only extended spatially, but equally temporally: "This world, on hand for me now and manifestly in every waking Now, has its two-sidedly infinite temporal horizon, its known and unknown, immediately living and lifeless past and future" (Hua. III, §27, p.52)^{clxiv}. Just as in a spatial sense every object implies its behind, which again has its spatial behind, every temporal moment implies a before and an after, resulting in two infinite temporal horizons in both future and past. This can be explained inside the phenomenological framework, as it can be shown that "[e]ach Now of the mental process, be it even the beginning phase of a newly appearing mental process, necessarily has its *horizon of Before*. But of essential necessity that cannot be an empty Before, an empty form without content, a non-sense. Of necessity it has the signification of a past Now which comprises in this form a past something, a past *mental process*. [...] However, every Now of the mental processes has its necessary *horizon of After*, and that one is also not an empty horizon" (Hua. III, §82, p.195)^{clxv}. A mental process, as a temporal being, implies a mental process before and after it, at least as an undetermined determinability. As "[e]ach actual mental process [...] is necessarily an enduring one[,] [...] it belongs to *one* endless 'stream of mental processes'" (Hua. III, §81, p.194)^{clxvi}. In this way, while one moment stays identical with itself, and does not change, it is being pushed backwards and hence integrates into the temporal sequence: for the different points in time refer to each other to constitute a streaming. Husserl in this sense talks about "[a] phase, impression, as the limit-phase of a continuity of retentions which, however, are not on an

¹¹³ C.f. Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.124

equal footing; they are instead *to be related to one another continuously-intentively* – a continuous complexity of retentions of retentions” (Hua. III, §81, p.195)^{clxvii}. The term translated as “complexity” is originally *Ineinander* – hence exactly the term Walton uses to describe the way horizontal implications relate to each other. While in objective time, the moments lie behind each other, differentiated as if they would be drawn out in space, in the subjective experience of time they rather constitute a complex in which they relate to and imply each other. As Husserl puts it: “The essential property, which the term temporality expresses for any mental process whatever, not only designates something universally belonging to every single mental process, but also a *necessary form of combining mental processes with mental processes*” (Hua. III, §81, p.194)^{clxviii}.

In addition to the implications of succession of every mental process, there is a third implied dimension, namely that of simultaneity.¹¹⁴ Husserl claims it to be an eidetic law, that “[...] every mental process in an essentially self-enclosed concatenation of mental processes is not only considered in view of temporal *succession* but in view of *simultaneity*. That means that every *Now* of a mental process has a horizon of mental processes which also have precisely the originary form of ‘Now’ and, as ‘Now,’ make up an *originary horizon of the pure Ego*” (Hua. III, §82, p.196). These horizons of simultaneity are also conserved in the retentive modifications, that is, accompany the mental processes even when remembered (c.f. Hua. III, §82, p.196). Such a relation, just as the one of succession, can be seen as implication, hence. Furthermore, as noticed already in the last chapter, “[p]resentation refers back to perception in its own peculiar phenomenological essence; e.g., as we have already noted before, remembering something past implies ‘having perceived;’ thus in a certain fashion the ‘corresponding’ perception (perception of the same sense-core) is intended to in the memory, although it is not actually contained in it” (Hua. III, §99, p.244)^{clxix}. This means that part of the very meaning of a memory is its implication of having been present. If a memory would not be understood as having been present in the past, it would not be a memory.

Finally, in the realm of temporality, it can be noted that Kozyreva asks the question how the past relate to the present if it is by definition transcendent to the present consciousness. She claims, in this context, that Husserl develops the notion of sedimentation

¹¹⁴ Exactly this temporal simultaneity is the conjunction that constitutes the implication of the domain which Gurwitsch calls the ‘margin’: C.f. Gurwitsch, A. (2010). *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973)* (Volume III. *The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin*). (R. M. Zaner, & L. Embree, ed.) Heidelberg London New York: Springer. p.343

in his *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis*. This sedimentation of the past would allow the constitution of a horizon, that is, a potentiality which accompanies the present and is able to affect it. This past horizon can again be divided into closer and more distant pasts, losing correspondingly its affective force.¹¹⁵ In this way, not only the directly connected moments of before and after, but also more distant temporal moments are related to each other through a horizontal implication; Walton, referring himself to the same text, and *Experience and Judgement*, even characterises this passive past as implicit, which, in this way, is able to affect the active ego through associations.¹¹⁶

Having presented the way Husserl describes the relation between the actional and the potential field in *Ideas I*, we can conclude this section and suggest to what extent the terms explicit and implicit are useful even beyond Husserl's occasional employment of them. While he, as shown in the chapter before, characterises the actional field as explicit, just as he defines the 'cogito in the pregnant sense' as 'explicit cogito', these ways of explicit givenness can be related to their corresponding implicit counterparts. This holds, first of all, for the central distinction between explicit, actional sphere, and the implicit, potential sphere. Inasmuch as it has been shown that the potential or implicit sphere demonstrates gradations, different implications of the same explicit appearance can be distinguished. First of all, there is an objectivated, that is, intentional background or halo to any intuition: for instance, any object which appears as spatial object refers, in its being spatial, to its behind, its next to, etc., that is, to a spatial background. The case is similar with regards to time, as every moment is surrounded by its temporal horizons. Moreover, any founded consciousness, for example a judgement or a wish, has an intentional background too. These backgrounds, in turn, do as well imply their own background; in this way, the implicit field of potentialities extends beyond any concrete background into an undetermined, infinite horizon, to which Husserl makes allusion in the description of the natural attitude in §27. Hence, one might even speak of a stratified field of the implicit, in which the layers imply each other, resulting in the end in an infinite horizon which is infinite precisely because it continues implying something beyond, and finally includes all potentially conceivable reality. If the maximal nearness to the ego corresponds to the actional field, the maximal distance from the ego would be materialised in this undetermined horizon. One additional consequence of these observations would be, that there is no clear limit between the still somewhat known field of co-present

¹¹⁵ C.f. Kozyreva, A. (24. December 2016). Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 17, p. 199-224. doi:10.1007/s11097-016-9492-9. p.213

¹¹⁶ C.f. Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.116

potentiality, and the undetermined infinite horizon, precisely because the horizon is never totally undetermined.

Agreeing with Walton's understanding of these implications as an *Ineinander*, opposed to any kind of juxtaposition or succession, the implicit, in whatever distance, would not only referred to by the explicit, but rather a co-defining part of it. Just as the sense of a logical statement is given in its relations of implication to other statements, one could claim that anything explicitly given to the consciousness, if an intuition, a judgement or a feeling, can only be understood properly inside its own context of implications. To be sure, this context of implications would not be something given apart from the explicit: It is the actional that opens the field of potentiality that, in itself, carries this implied field of potentiality. Without the corresponding potentiality, the actional could not be determined as actional. Even when Husserl talks about seizing-upon as a singling-out, it would seem that it results in a counter-sense if one would postulate that the actional is singled-out from the potential field: If the 'potential field', in general, is given before, it is neither implicit nor potential; rather, the given field of vision would be actional and explicit, and imply the potential of singling-out one object, by turning to it and making it alone actional, while the rest of the field sinks back into implicit potentiality.

Finally, once more the question has to be raised if the implication should be located on the active or on the passive side, that is, so to say, if the object perceived implies its implications, or if it is the anticipation of the subject which results in the implications. On one side, it has been said that the field of potentiality is exactly the field of freedom of the ego, that is, it is the ego's spontaneity which decides to turn its regard into this or that direction, and hence modify the attentional modes of the corresponding noema. On the other side, Husserl has characterised the horizon as the correlate of the experience of the physical objects, that is, as an essential part of them. Moreover, the appearance of any kind of implicit background has been claimed to be necessary, and not be open to the ego's free decision. In the opinion of the author, it would suggest itself to see the fact of implication neither on the objective, nor the subjective side, but rather interpret it as the very outcome of the relation of both. This question will be discussed in more detail, however, in the conclusion.

2.2 Reflection

Until now, the focus has lain on the way transcendent contents can appear implicitly in the background of the explicit cogito, as in the case of intuition, and moreover in feelings

or judgements, which are at least founded upon something transcendent. However, Husserl in addition draws an analogy between the possibility of entering the external, spatial horizon of a perception, and the possibility of reflection on mental processes. After even defining the latter through the possibility of being perceived through a turning of the mental regard, that is, through reflection, he writes: “‘All mental processes are intended to:’ This signifies, then, that in the specific case of intensive mental processes not only are they consciousness of something and present as consciousness of something when they themselves are the Objects of a reflecting consciousness, but also that they are there already as a ‘background’ when they are not reflected on and thus of essential necessity are ‘ready to be perceived’ in a sense which is, in the first place analogous to the one in which unnoticed physical things in our external field of regard are ready to be perceived” (Hua. III, §45, p.98-99)^{clxx}. This being accessible horizontally to reflection is characterised as pre-reflexivity by Walton.¹¹⁷ Such a horizontal background is not only analogous, in a way, to the external horizon in which physical things appear, but even more so to memory, as both are reproductions based on a turning of the mental regard whose very existence is dependent on that possibility (c.f. Hua. III, §45, p.99)^{clxxi}. In addition, for both reflective and reproductive horizon it holds true, that their original mode, that is, being something non-reflected, and not present, is only given through their implicit horizontal appearance which precedes their reflection or their reproduction.

The difference between the implicit field of pre-reflexivity and the physical background of perception lies in the limitedness of the physical background: “Physical things can be ready to be perceived only in so far as already, as unnoticed things, they are intended to and this signifies: only if they are appearing [...]: the ‘field of attentive regard’ embracing everything which appears is not infinite” (Hua. III, §45, p.99)^{clxxii}. While Husserl does claim that every thing is “[...] essentially *capable of being perceived* [...]” (Hua. III, §45, p.99)^{clxxiii}, this essential capability has a different access to the thing than in reflection: “That the unperceived physical thing ‘is there’ means rather that, from my actually present perceptions, with the actually appearing background field, *possible* and, moreover, continuously-harmoniously *motivated* perception-sequences [...] lead to these concatenations of perceptions in which the physical thing in question would make its appearance [...]” (Hua. III, §45, p.99)^{clxxiv}. In this sense, it seems like the difference lies in the existence of a undetermined infinite horizon of perception which extends beyond the immediate surrounding world, while

¹¹⁷ C.f. Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.298

in reflection, a mental process is defined by its principal implicit givenness in the pre-reflective background, which, in turn, would seem to be defined as finite.

In this way, the very possibility of reflection presupposes a pre-reflective givenness. In addition, however, another consequence is the proposition that 'living' the mental process, this mental process itself is not explicitly conscious: "When living in the cogito we are not conscious of the cogitatio itself as an intentional Object" (Hua. III, §38, p.78)^{clxxv}. That is why the possibility to reflect upon the cogito appears, namely "[...] in the form of a new cogitatio that, in the manner proper to a cogitatio which simply seizes upon, is directed to it. In other words, any <cogitatio> can become the object of a so-called 'internal perception' and in further succession the Object of a *reflective* valuation, an approval or a disapproval, etc." (Hua. III, §38, p.78)^{clxxvi}. To illustrate this better, there is a difference between seeing a tree, and reflecting upon seeing the tree. While "living in the cogito", the subject is able to seize upon certain characteristics of the tree, its colour, its shape, and so on. However, if the subject reflects upon this cogitatio directed to the tree, it might perceive the way the seeing is performed, and might, for example, doubt the validity of the vision.

In this way, any mental process can be reflected upon, and hence becomes the intentional object of a new reflective cogitatio. Moreover, this reflective regard is able to enter into the implicit horizons of the mental process which is the object of reflection: "When the pure regard of the Ego reaches any mental process by reflecting and, more particularly, by seizing upon it perceptually, the possibility then exists of the regard turning toward other mental processes *as far as* this concatenation reaches [...] [A] mental process which has become an Object of an Ego-regard, which therefore has the mode of being made an object of regard, has its horizon of unregarded mental processes; a mental process seized upon in a mode of 'attention' and possibly in unceasing clarity, has a horizon of inattention in the background [...]" (Hua. III, §83, p.197)^{clxxvii}. In this way, in the reflection the horizons of perception are reproduced as well. Just as there is a field of potentiality into which the subject can enter when perceiving, the reflecting cogito has the potential to determine the horizons of indeterminateness of the reflective regard.

Reflection on the Non-Intentional

It is now interesting to notice, that these potential horizons of the mental process which stands in the focus of reflection extend into even more dimensions than the original mental process. For instance, the reflecting subject is able to turn its regard to the components of the mental process: "Any mental process [...] can, with respect to ideal possibility, become 'regarded;' [...]. The situation is the same in the case of possible Ego-regards directed to the

components of the mental process and to its intentionalities” (Hua. III, §77, p.174)^{clxxviii}. With these “components”, Husserl refers to the really inherent, *reell* parts of the mental process: “What do we find really inherent in ⟨the perception⟩ as pure mental process, contained in it as the parts, the pieces and the moments not divisible into pieces, of a whole? We have, on occasion, distinguished such genuine really inherent component parts by the names *stuff*-component parts and *noetic* component parts” (Hua. III, §97, p.237)^{clxxix}. In this sense, Husserl for instance describes the possibility of reflecting upon adumbrations: “Let us reflect on sensations, on adumbrations: we then seize upon them as evident data and, in perfect evidence, changing the focus and direction of attention, we can also relate them and the corresponding objective moments, cognize them as corresponding [...]” (Hua. III, §97, p.237)^{clxxx}. Hence, it becomes clear that the horizons of the reflective regard do not consist only in already intentionally constituted contents, as it was the case above. Accordingly, it becomes clear what Walton was referring to (c.f. above, p.72) when speaking of the internal horizon of apprehension, as opposed to the external horizon of attention.¹¹⁸ The background of apprehension is not only dependent on a difference of attention, but also on a difference of attitude,¹¹⁹ presupposing reflection. If one wanted to exemplify this change of attitude, one could for instance mention that any adumbration in normal perception appears as part of a stream of adumbrations in which the object appears; reflecting on the adumbration itself, it is taken outside the stream, imagined as ‘unchanging’ or ‘remaining’.

However, the main question which has to be responded, is how it is possible that contents which by definition are non-intentional, can become the object of a reflective regard. Connected is the question, what consequences this non-intentionality has on the way the really inherent contents appear in the horizon of the reflective regard. With regards to these questions, Husserl proposes, generally, that every reflection upon a mental process modifies precisely this mental process: “[...] [O]ne must make it clear that ‘*reflection*’ of any kind has the characteristic of being a *modification of a consciousness* [...]. We speak here of modification because any reflection is, according to its essence, the consequence of changes in attitude whereby an already given mental process or really immanent Datum thereof (one not modified reflectively) undergoes a certain transmutation precisely into the mode of

¹¹⁸ It should be noted, to be sure, that this opposition between internal and external horizon as corresponding to apprehension and attention, cannot be generalised, given that Husserl in *Experience and Judgement* refers to an internal horizon which can be explicated through simple perception, and not reflection (c.f. above, p.29)

¹¹⁹ What has been translated in the last quote from Hua. III; §97, p.237 as “changing the focus and direction of attention”, reads originally *in der Einstellung und Aufmerksamkeitsrichtung abwechselnd*. Hence, the point is the possibility of alternating between both directions of attention and both *Einstellungen*, attitudes, which are independent of the attentional dimension.

consciousness (or object of consciousness) reflectionally modified” (Hua. III, §78, p.178)^{clxxxix}. To exemplify, there is a difference between lived rejoicing, and rejoicing which is regarded in a reflective turn (c.f. Hua. III, §77, p.176)^{clxxxii}. With respect to the really immanent data, Husserl adds that those data do change their way of appearing: When for instance analysing hyletic data, “[...] it is not meant [...] that the material contents, let us say the adumbrative color-contents, are present in the perceptual mental process in just the same way in which they are present in the mental process of analyzing. To mention only one <difference,> in the former they were contained as really inherent moments, but they were not perceived therein, not seized upon as objects. But in the analyzing mental process they are objects, targets of noetic functions which were not present before. Although these stuffs are still laden with their presentive functions, even these have undergone essential changes (to be sure, of other dimensions)” (Hua. III, §98, p.240)^{clxxxiii}. It is the reflective modification, then, which transforms dependent really inherent moments which can only appear in the apprehended whole into intentional objects which can be perceived in themselves.

Regarding the other kind of really inherent moments, namely the noetic functions themselves, Husserl is less clear. It would seem that inside the parallelism which exists between noema and noesis, in the way they appear, the former implied the latter. Husserl writes for instance, that “[i]n itself the perception is a perception of *its* object; and to every component which is singled out in the object by ‘objectively’ directed description there correspond a really inherent component of the perception; but, note well, only in so far as the description faithfully conforms to the object *as it ‘is there’ in that* perception itself. Moreover, we can designate all those noetic components only by appealing to the noematic Object and its moments: thus saying, for example, [...] perceptual consciousness, *of* a tree trunk, of the color of the trunk, etc.” (Hua. III, §97, p.238)^{clxxxiv}. The justification for stating the existence of a noetic moment is always found, hence, in the noematic component it constitutes. Even the designation of the noetic functions is only possible by detour through the noema. It can be understood in this sense, that Husserl writes that “the Eidos of the noema points to the Eidos of the noetic consciousness” (Hua. III, §98, p.241)^{clxxxv}, that is, that that which is intended implies the intention directed to it. Thus, just as in the case of the hyletic data, it is only the reflective turn which discloses the noetic functions underlying the noematic appearance. In both cases, there is hence a discrete change of attitude which is able to make explicit the really inherent moments which had remained implicit until that point. This also responds the question how something non-intentional can become an object of consciousness: It is the change of attitude in which reflection consists which leads to the formation of new noetic

functions that target the really inherent contents and result in the constitution of the contents as intentional object.

The need for such an intentional constitution leads to a clear distinction between this 'reflective background' and the background of other intentional objects described above: While the turning of the perceptual regard, for example, did also modify the implicit object when making it explicit, the whole structure of the mental process, including its noematic characteristics, did not change, following Husserl (c.f. p.73). It was possible, hence, to speak of a gradual difference of attention, in which the explicit, actional givenness only corresponded to the maximum level of attention. The modification effected by reflection, in contrast, leads to "essential changes", including precisely the really inherent or intentional character. Hence, the limit between the explicit givenness and the horizontal, pre-reflective givenness is discrete. The scholar Rabanaque, in the conclusion of his paper *Campo de Trasfondo y Dato Hyletico* even claims that this distinction between an intentional and a non-intentional background can be analysed within the context of the opposition between active and passive constitution, and hence, as pointing to the difference between static and genetic phenomenology. While the intentional background can be analysed with the tools of static phenomenology, the challenge of the non-intentional horizon would lead necessarily into a genetic problematisation.¹²⁰

Moreover, a question which might arise in consequence of the claim that really inherent data are modified when reflected upon, is that of the validity of such reflective observation. That is, if really inherent contents originally only appear as parts of an intentional whole, and if they become themselves intentional objects when reflected upon, how is it possible to observe and describe their essence of precisely being really inherent? Husserl's answer seems to be, that though being modified, every modified content refers back to its originary mode: "[...] [S]tarting from any mental process already characterized as such a modification, and which then *in itself* is always characterized as that <modification>, we are led back to certain primal mental processes, to 'impressions' which *absolutely originary* mental processes exhibit in the phenomenological sense" (Hua. III, §78, p.179)^{clxxxvi}. It is in this sense, that Walton claims that every intentional modification is an intentional implication: the modification does not make disappear the modified; rather, the result of the modification always still refers to its unmodified origin.¹²¹

¹²⁰ C.f. Rabanaque, L. R. (1993). *Campo de Trasfondo y Dato Hyletico*. *Agora*, 12 (2), p. 7-21.: p.20

¹²¹ C.f. Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.129

While such an answer is satisfying with regards to modifications of mental processes, as in the example of a memory which leads back to the originary mental process which occurred in the Now, it seems to be difficult to apply in the example of really inherent moments, as they never appeared in an “absolutely originary mental process”. Moreover, Husserl argues many times, that the claim of invalidity of reflection in order to make statements on the reflected is a sceptical contradiction in itself: for the only way of knowing about the existence of a ‘non-reflected mental process’ is to derive it from the reflection upon it (c.f. Hua. III, §45, p.99; Hua. III, §78, p.180; Hua. III, §79, p.186).^{clxxxvii} This argument, however, does not apply to doubts concerning the existence of really inherent data, as their existence has been claimed only in the analytical questioning performed by Husserl: While sceptics criticising the reliability of reflection on mental processes admit the existence of these mental processes, somebody challenging the evidence of really inherent moments would deny their existence altogether. The point which is to be made here is not, that one should doubt the existence of really inherent moments. Instead, what is to be shown is that in the case of really inherent data, the burden of proof lies on its implicit way of appearing, and even heavier than in the case of non-reflected mental processes: When reflectively demonstrating the existence of hyletic data and noetic functions, it is only in their implied, non-reflected mode that they exhibit their original character as being precisely really inherent moments of a constituted whole. That is, one could conclude that by essence, really inherent moments can only appear as really inherent moments implicitly.

Having in this sense analysed the way really inherent moments appear in reflection, to conclude this section a last special case will be preliminarily examined. This is the problem of the givenness of the transcendental ego. Such an examination has to remain preliminary, as other important works dealing with the givenness of the transcendental or pure ego, such as the *Logical Investigations* or *Ideas II*, are not taken into account here. The aim, as in the other sections of this chapter, is to exemplify how the explicit-implicit relation might be used to interpret Husserl’s thought.

Generally, this transcendental ego has to be distinguished from the ‘personal ego’, which disappears with the reduction. The transcendental ego rather lives in every of its acts: “Each ‘cogito,’ each act in a distinctive sense, is characterized as an act of the Ego, it ‘proceeds from out of the Ego,’ it ‘lives’ ‘actionally’ in the act” (Hua. III, §80, p.190)^{clxxxviii}. In this sense, the transcendental ego appears in relation to, inside its acts: “the ‘being directed to,’ the ‘undergoing,’ the ‘suffering from,’ *necessarily* includes in its essence this: that it is precisely <a ray> ‘emanating from the Ego’ or, in a reverse direction of the ray, ‘toward the

Ego' - and this Ego is the *pure* Ego; no reduction can do anything to it" (Hua. III, §80, p.191)^{clxxxix}. The fact that the pure ego be not reducible is due to its special form of being present as accompanying every act, but not being a content of a mental process itself: "[...] the pure Ego would, however, seem to be something essentially necessary; and, as something absolutely identical throughout every actual or possible change in mental processes, it *cannot in any sense be a really inherent part or moment* of the mental processes themselves" (Hua. III, §57, p.132)^{cx}. Again, the way of givenness of the pure ego does not only differ from that of a normal mental process, but as well from that of its really inherent moments. Being independent to such an extent of any contents the subject is conscious of, Husserl even concludes that the pure ego is 'empty' in a certain sense: "In these peculiar combinations with all of 'its' mental processes, the Ego living in mental processes [*das erlebende Ich*] is not something taken *for itself* and which can be made into an Object *proper* of an investigation. Aside from its 'modes of relation' or 'modes of comportment,' the <Ego> is completely empty of essence-components, has no explicatable content, is indescribable in and for itself: it is pure Ego and nothing more" (Hua. III, §80, p.191)^{cxci}. This is the paradox situation which arises: The ego is accompanying every act, it is actually that from where the ray 'emanates'; but such an ego-act can never have precisely this pure ego as its object.¹²² For instance, if the subject reflects upon its mental processes, "[...] a new cogito is alive, one that, for its part, is not reflected on and thus is not objective for me" (Hua. III, §28, p.54)^{cxcii}.

However, Husserl does claim, that the transcendental ego, in certain limits, can be seen as phenomenologically demonstrated content: "[...] [O]nly in so far as its immediate, evidently ascertainable essential peculiarity and its givenness along with pure consciousness extend do we propose to count the pure Ego as a phenomenological datum" (Hua. III, §57, p.133)^{cxci}. Even if one does not understand the term 'explicatable', in German *explikabel*, in the sense of the conceptualisation proposed in this thesis, it suggests itself to view the givenness of the pure ego here as an implicit one: Even more than the really inherent moments, which were modified when made explicit, the pure ego suffers the impossibility of becoming the intentional object of a subject. However, its existence, following Husserl, is proven by its 'givenness along', in German *Mitgegebenheit*, by accompanying every act as precisely the pole by which the act is enacted. Inasmuch as Husserl talks here about both, an "evidently ascertainable essential peculiarity" and a *Mitgegebenheit*, the question would arise if the implication of the pure ego is rather intuitive, as if it was the unseen side of every act,

¹²² This problem will continue busying Husserl, for instance as well in the *C-manuscripts*, as Mensch shows: Mensch, J. R. (2010). *Husserl's Account of our Consciousness of Time*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. C.f. for instance p.155-156

which however, has to be there, or if the implication would rather resemble a logical, essential implication, in the sense that every act, by essence, requires the existence of an active subject. Inside the framework of *Ideas I*, it would seem as this question could not be answered finally.

The Adumbrations and the transcendent Thing

In the last example presented before concluding this thesis, the adumbrations which have been prominent already above as really inherent moments will be examined once more, this time in their relation with the intentional object they co-constitute. Husserl often uses the example of the concrete spatial thing to show the properties of intentional objects generally, and this path will be followed here.

Generally, the thing appears in perception. Such a perception of a thing, however, is not done in one instant. Rather, the thing appears as identical in a flow of 'perceptual multiplicities': "Whereas the physical thing is the intentional unity, the physical thing intended to as identical and unitary in the continuously regular flow of perceptual multiplicities which interpenetrate and change into one another, the perceptual multiplicities themselves always have their *determinate descriptive composition essentially* coordinated with that unity" (Hua. III, §41, p.88)^{cxciiv}. This coordination of the unitary object with its perceptual multiplicities is due to the fact that "[...] *there belongs to any 'all-sided,' continuously, unitarily, and self-confirming experimental consciousness [Erfahrungsbewußtsein] of the same physical thing a multifarious system of continuous multiplicities of appearances and adumbrations [...]*" (Hua. III, §41, p.87)^{cxcv}. Hence, a physical thing, as identical, is a unity to which corresponds a certain system of adumbrations. If one turns a sheet of paper, it will be apprehended as one and the same sheet of paper only if it shows its thin side before showing its backside. In this sense, Walton speaks of the opposition of unity and multiplicity in relation to horizontal givenness: The intention of one unitary object has its horizon of further adumbrations which belong to the same object.¹²³

Moreover, as the intentional object has 'its' system of adumbrations, it is never given in perfect adequacy: "A physical thing is necessarily given in mere 'modes of appearance' in which necessarily a *core of 'what is actually presented'* is apprehended as surrounded by a horizon of '*co-givenness, which is not givenness proper*, and of more or less vague *indeterminateness*" (Hua. III, §44, p.94)^{cxcvi}. While it is possible to determine some of these horizons, the horizon of "co-givenness" as such always remains, as the adumbrations can

¹²³ C.f. Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.119

never be given all at once. However, given that the thing fulfils itself in certain adumbrations being interconnected in its system of perceptual multiplicities, “[...] the indeterminateness necessarily signifies a *determinableness which has a rigorously prescribed style*” (Hua. III, §44, p.94)^{cxvii}. Hence, it can be claimed that what appears in the natural attitude simply as a given thing, through reflection on the adumbrations shows itself to be actually a system of multiplicities united by its sense – one might also say, an explicit X which refers implicitly to an infinite system of adumbrations in which it appears. More concretely, what appears to the subject in the natural attitude is the intentional object, but it appears precisely in the adumbrations it perceives. As the subject apprehends not the adumbrations, but the unity of the thing, this identical X implies the possible adumbrations which can appear in continuation.

It would then be a different question, if one asked if the adumbrations themselves, not in the natural attitude but as examined in reflection, would imply the intentional object which appears in it; that is, how is it to be understood that the thing appears *in* its adumbrations? Husserl, with regards to this question, insists in *Ideas I* that the adumbrational appearance of an object should not be understood as an image or a sign which refers to its object. While he does characterise the spatial thing as something transcendent, he claims that it is “[...] still something perceived, given ‘in person’ in the manner peculiar to consciousness. It is not the case that, in its stead, a picture or a sign is given” (Hua. III, §43, p.92)^{cxviii}. He explains that in depictive or signitive objectivation “[...] we intuit something in consciousness as depicting or signitively indicating something else; having the one in our field of intuition we are directed, not to it, but to the other, what is depicted or designated, through the medium of a founded apprehending” (Hua. III, §43, p.93)^{cxix}. In contrast, in “immediately intuitive acts we intuit an ‘in itself’” (Hua. III, §43, p.93)^{cc}. That is, a sign refers beyond itself to something which might be intuited in a more original way; contrarily, the perception “makes present, seizes-upon an it-itself in its presence ‘in person.’ Perception does this according to its *own peculiar sense* [...]” (Hua. III, §43, p.93)^{cci}.

In this way, Husserl tries to express that while the physical thing is never given adequately, that is, it always refers to a further multiplicity of adumbrations, this is precisely the way physical things appear. There is no other way. This necessary way of appearing originally, however, is characterised by Husserl himself by means of metaphors which do evoke signitivity. For instance, he distinguishes “[o]n the one hand, essences of formations belonging to consciousness itself; on the other hand, essences of individual affairs

transcendent to consciousness, thus the essences of those individual affairs which only become 'manifested' in formations belonging to consciousness which become 'constituted' in the manner peculiar to consciousness by virtue of sensuous appearances" (Hua. III, §61, p.140)^{ccii}. "Manifested" here is a translation of the German term *bekundet*. Even clearer is the evocation of signitive metaphors in the following description: "The sensuously appearing thing, which has the sensuous shapes, colors, odor- and taste-properties, is thus anything but a sign for some *other* thing; rather it is, so to speak, a sign *for itself*" (Hua. III, §52, p.121)^{cciii}.

It would seem then, that from the point of view of the conceptualisation of the explicit-implicit relation, it would be possible to say that the intentional object, and correspondingly further adumbrations, are implied in its given adumbrations; given a reflective attitude, a subject could notice that actually it is only adumbrations which appear explicitly. It has to be noted, in that context, that such an implication has to be distinguished, following Husserl, from the way a sign refers to its or an image refer to some object. While a thorough examination of this distinction is not possible in the framework of this thesis, it seems to suggest itself that the main difference is one of the grade of presence. While the object is given "in person", *in Leibhaftigkeit*, a sign or an image would actually point to the possibility of such a maximum givenness. One might than want to claim that an image or a sign are able to imply a fantasised intuition of the object, which, in turn, would imply its further adumbrations. In a different attitude, however, the subject might not be directed to that which is depicted, but to the image in itself: the arising implication might than be, for instance, that of a next image below the seen image. Moreover, a further distinction between a sign and an adumbration would seem to suggest itself: namely, that a sign might be seen as an arbitrary symbol which is only defined as referring to a certain real object. In contrast, the adumbration, one might want to claim, refers 'naturally' and necessarily to its intentional object. While this claim will neither be supported nor denied here, corresponding question is interesting, namely: What is it that gives rise to an explicit-implicit relation? That is, how is the implicit implied in something explicit is determined? This question, given the limited scope of this thesis, will only be formulated more precisely as a problem awaiting its answer in the conclusion.

Conclusion and Outlook

To conclude the present thesis, it can be stated that thanks to describing generally the etymology and the historical uses of the terms in question, namely explicit, implicit and their derivatives, it was possible to show that Husserl, in the two works examined here, does employ the terms in a way which is different from the common use in other areas of philosophy. While he sometimes refers to logical or linguistic significations when writing 'explicit' or 'implicit', already when analysing the concept of *Explikation* as defined in *Experience and Judgement* it has become clear that Husserl uses connected terms in a new and autonomous sense: In the act of explication, a substrate which attracts the subject's interest becomes determined by means of the ego entering into the substrate's internal horizon; explication is hence the precondition for predication.

However, by analysing further passages in *Experience and Judgement* and *Ideas I*, it became clear that not every appearance of the term explication and its derivatives, including explicit, points to the operation of explication: While it is true that something which had been explicated is characterised by Husserl as being explicit, those meanings did not coincide; for instance, something already explicated could become implicit again, and was susceptible to a new act of explication. In addition, even given the widening of the concept of *Explikation* far beyond the context of external contemplation in which it was introduced, the terms explicit and implicit appeared many times in a sense which differed not only from the logical and the linguistic meanings, but was also not associated to the operation of *Explikation*.

By determining the meanings of the terms in these passages, by means of an analysis of their direct context, the attempt was made to understand what their signification was. In this process, it was possible to discover that while that which was characterised as explicit was often given in a direct or plain form to the consciousness, the term implicit was used to refer to different structures in different domains of phenomenology: In this way, it often described a background which surrounded an intuition, a potentiality of the ego and its faculties, a horizon which referred beyond itself as, for instance, temporal horizons, or finally essential properties of ideas or objectivities, to name the most frequent appearances. Trying to elaborate in which sense it was possible to see a distinction between something explicit and something implicit in all this examples, it was proposed to understand the term explicit as a kind of direct, immediate givenness. Furthermore, that which was given explicitly, referred in itself, by some of its dimensions or properties, to something which was not given explicitly as yet. This reference turned out to be characterised many times as a potentiality of the ego,

sometimes it even seemed to exist merely due to the ego's anticipations. However, as the question for the 'cause' which founded the implication was omitted, it could even be claimed that the resulting interpretation of the explicit and the implicit showed itself to be abstract enough to englobe the linguistic and the logical meaning of the terms, as well as the concept of *Explikation*.

It has to be repeated that this understanding of Husserl's employment of explicit and implicit remains interpretative, however. Moreover, it has not been possible to establish that Husserl uses the terms in a systematic way: This is the conclusion due to the, generally speaking, low frequency of the appearance of the terms, their inconsistency, as the same phenomenon sometimes is described by them, sometimes not, and even their mutation of sense in one and the same paragraph. The most reasonable conclusion would be, that Husserl employed the terms explicit and implicit in *Experience and Judgement* and *Ideas I* mostly in a metaphorical way, supposing that the reader will intuitively grasp their meaning in their particular context. An obvious exception is given with the passages in which Husserl employs the terms in connection to the concept of *Explikation* as described in *Experience and Judgement*.

Still, in the opinion of the author of this thesis, the meaning associated to the factual employments of the terms is interesting enough to propose a development of the explicit-implicit relation as a concept, notwithstanding the fact that Husserl probably did not have this intention. Such a development could not be done in a systematic way in the scope of this thesis; instead, the aim of the second part was to exemplify the proposed explicit-implicit relation in order to give a rough outlook to what extent it might be useful, and to specify it a bit further. For reasons of convenience, the examples dealt with remained limited to Husserl's general presentation of phenomenology and its areas of application in *Ideas I*. They touched upon topics as wide-ranging as external perception, temporality, intuition, intentionality, reflection and apprehension. The outlining of what seemed to fit, in the context of these different dimensions, to the characterisation of the explicit and the implicit, was moreover complemented by the comparison with other approaches which have proposed and developed similar structures, such as the concept of horizontality developed by Roberto Walton, the field of consciousness conceptualised by Aron Gurwitsch or the notion of the unconscious reinterpreted by Anastasia Kozyreva.

Concretely, it had been shown already in the first part that Husserl characterises the actional sphere, the cogito in the pregnant sense sometimes as explicit. It was argued that this

characterisation remains reasonable when interpreted in the sense of the proposed explicit-implicit relation: the actional, that is, the explicit cogito refer to perceptions, intuitions and other ego-acts such as judgements or desires which are directly given, to which the mental regard is turned to at present. In this sense, it has to be distinguished from mere seizing-upon, which is limited to the case in which a physical thing becomes actional, and from attention, although actionality and attention are related phenomena. Husserl even admits that the turning of the mental regard is strongly correlated to attentional changes. Correspondingly to the idea of attentional changes, it could be established that there is only a gradual difference between the actional and the potential sphere as long as the background is already intentional. This is indeed the case in most of the examples Husserl himself describes with the terms actional and potential.

However, it has been shown in addition that explicit mental processes can imply something which is not intentional. Here, really inherent data, such as hyletic and noetic data, and the pure ego itself were given as examples. These phenomena lack intentionality, but can be characterised as implicit in the sense that the subject 'knows' about its potential to reflectively enquire into the constituents of its mental processes. In addition, even when these really inherent data, or the transcendental ego, are turned into the intentional object of reflection, they do not appear explicitly in their original being. Rather, that which becomes actionally conscious is only a modification of the non-intentional phenomena, but by its essence refers, implies its original mode. An important conclusion which had been drawn from these observations is that Husserl needs to resort to an implicit way of givenness in order to prove the very existence of non-intentional contents, such as really inherent data or the transcendental ego. Moreover, one of the questions which result from these observations is that of the characterisation of the reflective background: Given that the implicit 'phenomena' in question only become intentional objects in the moment of reflection, that is, when made explicit, how can it be understood that these phenomena be implied even before being an object?

At this point, nothing more than hypotheses can be proposed. Given that Husserl mentions the contrast between the limitedness of the, already intended to, field of potential perception and the potential infinity of the perceivable world, one could attempt to identify this latter with the obscurely intended to horizon of indeterminacy which surrounds the field of perception in the natural attitude. That is, one could establish in both intuition and reflection a distinction between a 'closer', intentional field of potentiality which, however, is

surrounded by an obscure horizon which points to a 'further on', a beyond which is not intentional anymore. While the intentional field of potentiality is characterised by gradation, the outer horizon of indeterminacy marks a discrete limit. A similar distinction, namely between the background of still apprehended objects and an empty horizon which corresponds to the limit case of zero differentiation, is made by Walton.¹²⁴

The main question which remains, however, is how the fact that the implicit is implied in the explicit can be understood, that is, how does the implicit codetermine the explicit? In the last chapter, attention has been drawn to Husserl's distinction between the way an intentional object appears in his adumbration and the way a sign refers to its meaning. However, the term 'implication' itself has a strong association with the notion of signified meaning, as shown with Grice's theory of implicature, and, in a wider sense, also with the logical conception of implication. Moreover, it has been seen that Gurwitsch¹²⁵ and Kozyreva¹²⁶ claim that it is in part thanks to the implicit that the directly perceived is bestowed with 'meaning'. It has to be noted though, that this notion of meaning is not the meaning a sign refers to, but rather 'the perceptual meaning', that is, the way the perceived data are apprehended. Still, Gurwitsch mentions that James, in his theory of fringes which are defined as accompanying every topic, claims that the very phenomenon of meaningfulness, that is, that for example words are understood as having a meaning, is explained by an "[...] 'added consciousness' [which] is conveyed by the fringes surrounding the sound or image"¹²⁷. Given that in the end of the first part it has been claimed that the explicit-implicit relation englobe the notions of implicature and logical implication,¹²⁸ it would seem that it would be possible to show that while the explicit does not function as a sign for the implicit, signs are able to refer to their meaning because of the explicit-implicit relation. Such an endeavour, of course, has to await further investigations.

¹²⁴ C.f. Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.123 + p.126

¹²⁵ C.f. Gurwitsch, A. (2010). *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) (Volume III. The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin)*. (R. M. Zaner, & L. Embree, ed.) Heidelberg London New York: Springer. p.276

¹²⁶ C.f. Kozyreva, A. (24. December 2016). Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 17, p. 199-224. doi:10.1007/s11097-016-9492-9. p.218

¹²⁷ C.f. Gurwitsch, A. (2010). *The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973) (Volume III. The Field of Consciousness: Theme, Thematic Field, and Margin)*. (R. M. Zaner, & L. Embree, ed.) Heidelberg London New York: Springer. p.304

¹²⁸ Gurwitsch actually claims that logical relationships are only possible given the phenomenon of context, that is, because a proposition is seen inside its pertinent logical system: C.f. *ibid.*, p.322

Another possible way of attempting to understand how the explicit implies the implicit is through the notion of the implicit as the subject's potential. That which is explicitly given, actionally given, is that which is presented in a current act of consciousness. Subjective activity could be understood, in this sense, as precisely the 'having-explicit-the-intentional-object'. Correspondingly, the subject has consciousness of a further 'I can' of other acts: it is able to turn its regard, to reflect, to remember, etc. That is, this consciousness of its own freedom is given before acting, and applies even to thinking processes – seeing, explicitly, two equations to solve, the subject is conscious that there are at least two potentialities implied: while it chooses to start with the one equation, it could have started with the other one too. As Husserl says, the field of potentiality is the subject's field of freedom. In the case of constituents in apprehension, Gurwitsch agrees that it depends on the subject's decision how to actualise the potentialities, following its interest. He adds that to determine the given undetermined determinability, there is always motion of the own body involved.¹²⁹

If it be admitted that in this way the subject is able to conceive its own freedom precisely inside and thanks to its implicit potentialities which accompany the given actionality, once more the question of the way the implications are determined poses itself: for the field of potentiality is then also the limit of the subject's freedom. This question seemed to offer mainly two alternatives, for the implications are either seen as essential qualities of the explicit, objective phenomena, or as subjective anticipations and associations. While this question will not be decided here, some first comments can be made. Gurwitsch claims that what he calls Husserl's 'egological' perspective might be questioned, referring to the suggestion that subjective activity is not able to arbitrarily determine the distinction between thematic field and margin, that is, to relate any theme to any thematic field.¹³⁰ He does admit, however, the importance of the perspective, or orientation of the theme for the definition of the limit between thematic field and margin, between relevant and irrelevant implications.¹³¹ Given this preliminary account, one might conclude that following Gurwitsch, the implications which arise depend on the subjective perspective, but this perspective is not totally arbitrary; it is rather dependent to a certain extent on material relations.

Agreeing with Gurwitsch or not, one could in addition ask how the subject's attitude or perspective is determined when turned to something. For, many times, the subject does not choose consciously a certain perspective in order to relate to the explicit; rather, the

¹²⁹ C.f. *ibid.*, p.278-279

¹³⁰ C.f. *ibid.*, p.341-342. He adds, anyway, that he does not enter into a detailed discussion in this book.

¹³¹ C.f. *ibid.*, p.350

perspective is chosen without noticing it, and can only be deduced from the implications which arise. How these implications, this hidden perspective could still be understood, in a sense, as egological, is pointed out by Walton. He refers to Husserl to claim that there is an 'associative proto-legality' which consists in an approximate passive delineation of the future, of the anticipations to be made.¹³² Hence, Walton suggests that the implicit potential field is determined through passive associations, and would thus not be objectively defined; however, in its passivity, it would not really be subjected to the ego's free will either. If such a passive constitution of the implications would be supposed, another arising question would be, if that what Husserl calls 'associative proto-legality' actually follows strict, determinable laws. A big problem for the response is posed here in the difficult accessibility of this passive sphere; for it is only implied in the existence of implications.

This amount of further, open questions seems to show that the concept of the explicit-implicit relation, as presented in this thesis, does indeed prove to be fruitful. The focus on the way the explicit and plain appears and is given to consciousness, points to the question of that which is precisely not given explicitly, but is still given somehow. The most promising way of describing this relation would seem to be the term *Ineinander* used by Husserl, an interweaving which has to be distinguished from juxtaposition or succession. For the implicit is not something 'beyond' or 'behind' the explicit, it is rather 'given along', it takes part in the same appearance, it highlights further possible motions. Moreover, this implicit sphere has shown to be diverse, for it could be quite determined, as the objective background in perception, or almost totally undetermined, as the merely supposed empty horizon of the determinable reality. It might be seen as pointing to the whole sedimented past, the still non-reflected non-intentional components of a mental process and any possible adumbration of a physical object. While such a wide understanding of the implicit might seem to qualify the notion that the implicit co-determines the explicit, understood strictly, it just highlights the fact that every explicit appearance is unique, for its implicit context is unique; it is the way the explicit relates and refers to its context that determines its full 'sense'. In addition, supposing that only in the interplay with a consciousness the explicit relates in this way with an implicit universe, the conclusion would be that conscious experience is only sensible to precisely a consciousness.

¹³² Walton, R. J. (2015). *Intencionalidad y Horizonticidad*. Bogotá: Editorial Aula de Humanidades. p.145; for that claim Walton cites the *C-manuscripts*.

From the mentioned questions, it has become clear already that this thesis poses more problems than it is able to solve. It should be noted, in addition, that there are many further areas whose relation with the explicit-implicit structure has to be examined thoroughly. Amongst these areas figure Husserl's understanding of eidetics and its laws, or his notions of evidence and primordial givenness. Furthermore, it would seem that the embodiment of consciousness might be of particular importance for understanding and explaining the explicit-implicit relation. In this way, this thesis cannot be conceived as anything more than a first step towards a proper understanding of the explicit-implicit relation.

References

Note on the Citing

The citing of the primary literature is indicated by the bracket after the citation. A reference to *Ideas I* is marked by 'Hua. III', a reference to *Experience and Judgement* is marked by the abbreviation 'E+J'. After the indication of the work follows the paragraph and the page number of the English edition which has been used. The end note refers to the German original of the quote, which is again marked through the same abbreviation, and in addition indicates the page number in the German edition.

The page numbers of the German quotes from *Ideas I* follow the Husserliana-pagination as reproduced in the edition used, namely: Husserl, E. (2009). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: Erstes Buch* (Vol. 1). Husserliana III/1. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.

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Statement

I declare that I have created the thesis by myself. All sources and literature used have been duly cited. The work was not used to obtain another or the same title.

Praha, the August 2020

Endnotes

- ⁱ „So ist eine Fundamentalstruktur des Weltbewußtseins, bezw. in korrelativer Prägung der Welt als Horizont aller erfahrbaren Einzelrealen, die Struktur der Bekanntheit und Unbekanntheit [...]“ (E+J, §8, p.33)
- ⁱⁱ „[...] für die Feststellungen, die in das Grundbuch der Phänomenologie einzutragen sind, geben wir die Norm, die es uns verwehrt, einen Satz einzutragen, der explizite oder implizite derartige natürliche Setzungen enthält“ (Hua. III, §64, p.137).
- ⁱⁱⁱ „Wer zu zweifeln versucht, versucht irgendein „Sein“, prädikativ expliziert ein „Das ist!“, „Es verhält sich so!“ zu bezweifeln“ (Hua. III, §31, p.62).
- ^{iv} „Jede Aussage, die nichts weiter tut, als solchen Gegebenheiten durch bloße Explikation und genau sich anmessende Bedeutungen Ausdruck zu verleihen, ist [...] ein absoluter Anfang“ (Hua. III, §24, p.51)
- ^v „Allzeit gibt es mehrfache Möglichkeiten indirekter Ausdrücke mit 'Umwegen'. Zum Wesen jeder Gegenständlichkeit als solcher [...] gehören vielerlei Möglichkeiten der beziehenden Explikation“ (Hua. III, §127, p.293-294)
- ^{vi} „[...] daß dergleichen Sätze Gegebenheiten eidetischer Intuition zum explikativen Ausdruck bringen“ (Hua. III, §20, p.45)
- ^{vii} „Einerseits betreffen sie die Bedeutungsschicht, die spezifisch logische selbst, andererseits die fundierenden Unterschichten“ (Hua. III, §125, p.289)
- ^{viii} „Das hat eine höchst wichtige methodologische Bedeutung. Wir werden darauf aufmerksam, daß unsere früheren Erörterungen über die Methode der Klärung mit Rücksicht auf die Aussage, die das Lebenselement der Wissenschaft ist, wesentlicher Ergänzungen bedürfen. Was not tut, um vom verworrenen Denken zum eigentlichen und vollexpliziten Erkennen, zum deutlichen und zugleich klaren Vollzug der Denkakte zu kommen, ist nun leicht zu bezeichnen: Zunächst sind alle „logischen“ Akte (die des Bedeutens), soweit sie noch im Modus der Verworrenheit vollzogen waren, in den Modus der originären spontanen Aktualität überzuführen, also es ist vollkommen logische Deutlichkeit herzustellen“ (Hua. III, §125, p.289)
- ^{ix} „Von analytischer Verdeutlichung sprechen wir bei jedem Urteil, jeder Urteilsmeinung als prädikativer. Ein urteilendes Meinen kann verworren sein, und es kann nach dem in ihm Gemeinten „verdeutlicht“ werden; es wird damit zu einem expliziten, einem „eigentlichen“ Urteilen“ (E+U, §26, p.142)
- ^x „Wir bringen uns damit zugleich zu expliziter Erkenntnis, daß eine deskriptive Phänomenologie von all jenen Disziplinen prinzipiell unabhängig ist“ (Hua. III, §59, p.127)
- ^{xi} „Jeder Akt, bzw. jedes Akt-Korrelat birgt in sich ein „Logisches“, explizite oder implizite. Er ist immer logisch zu explizieren, nämlich vermöge der wesensmäßigen Allgemeinheit, mit der die noetische Schicht des „Ausdrückens“ sich allem Noetischen (bzw. die des Ausdrückes sich allem Noematischen) anschmiegen lässt“ (Hua. III, §117, p.271)
- ^{xii} „Erst wenn alle Relativitäten auseinandergelegt und in die Wesensbetrachtung einbezogen sind, erwächst die Idee des regionalen Wesens eines Dinges überhaupt [...]. Alle darunter liegende, in einer unexpliziten Relativität stecken bleibende Wesensbetrachtung ist darum nicht ergebnislos, aber abstrakt“ (E+U, §93b, p.441)
- ^{xiii} „Die „Definition“ liegt im System der axiomatischen Begriffe, und das „mathematisch-erschöpfende“ darin, dass die definitorischen Behauptungen in Beziehung auf die Mannigfaltigkeit das denkbar größte Präjudiz implizieren – es bleibt nichts mehr unbestimmt“ (Hua. III, §72, p.152)
- ^{xiv} „Aller echte Skeptizismus, welcher Art und Richtung er auch ist, zeigt sich durch den prinzipiellen Widersinn an, daß er in seinen Argumentationen implizite, als Bedingungen der Möglichkeit ihrer Geltung, eben das voraussetzt, was er in seinen Thesen leugnet“ (Hua. III, §79, p.174)
- ^{xv} „Die Leugnung eines ursächlichen Verhältnisses und dementsprechend die Leugnung irgendeines noch so sicheren Naturgesetzes impliziert nicht den geringsten Widersinn“ (E+J, Annex II, p.473)
- ^{xvi} „Ganz allgemein: ist ein Begriff in einem anderen enthalten, so gilt für die entsprechenden Prädikationen, dass sie ineinander enthalten sind, nämlich, daß universell jedes Subjekt, daß den letzteren Begriff als Prädikat hat, auch den ersteren als Prädikat haben muß. [...] Wir gewinnen, wie im Beispiel so überhaupt, allgemeine Sachverhalte im reinen Apriori herausgestellt, Sachverhalte, die eine Implikation, ein Ineinander, ineinander Beschlossensein als Sachverhaltsformen haben. Ausgehend von den niedersten, absolut konkreten Begriffen aus individueller Wiederholung und ihren konkreten Teilbegriffen, und emporsteigend zu den Begriffen höherer Allgemeinheitsstufe können wir immer wieder solche Zusammenhänge apriorischer Implikation feststellen; [...]. Dabei haben wir für diese Bildungen universeller apriorischer Urteile der Implikation, ganz so wie für die früheren Bildungen apriorischer partikulärer Urteile die absolute Gewißheit, daß, wann immer wir diese Gebilde erzeugen mögen, [...] wir auch die gleichen Verhältnisse der Eingeschlossenseins finden müssen“ (E+J, §97, p.457-458)
- ^{xvii} „Darunter verstehen wir eben solche Stellen 'irgendein A überhaupt', 'irgendein B überhaupt' usw., an deren jeder jene eigentümliche Setzung einer unbestimmten Einzelheit eines begrifflich Allgemeinen vollzogen ist. Jeder plurale Terminus der Partikularität birgt dabei – explizite oder implizite – intentional in sich eine Vielheit, und beim unbestimmten Plural eine unbestimmte Vielheit von Terminis der Partikularität“ (E+J, §96, p.447)

^{xviii} „Nun kann es aber sein, daß Gegenstände zu Sinn noch in anderer Weise in Beziehung stehen, derart, daß sie in ihrem vermeinten und wahren Sein Sinn als Prädikat an sich tragen. Das ist der Fall bei jenen realen Gegenständen, in denen als Träger von Bedeutung Irrealitäten ihr weltliches, zeiträumliches Auftreten haben. Ein nächstliegendes Beispiel sind Wortlaute, Schriftzeichen, ja ein ganzes Werk [...] Dabei besteht eine merkwürdige Implikation. Zum gegenständlichen Sinn eines Aussagesatzes gehört der Wortlaut und der „Sinn“. [...] Der einem solchen Gegenstand entsprechende gegenständliche Sinn ist daher ein Sinnes-Sinn, ein Sinn zweiter Stufe“ (E+J, §65, p.322-323)

^{xix} „Wenn wir etwa diesen Wahrnehmungsgegenstand hier als rot bestimmen in einem Wahrnehmungsurteil der einfachsten Form S ist p, so ist in diesem „Als-rot-bestimmen“ vermöge der Allgemeinheit der Bedeutung „rot“ schon implizite enthalten die Beziehung auf das allgemeine Wesen Röte, wenn auch diese Beziehung noch nicht thematisch zu werden braucht, wie es etwa in der Form geschieht: dies ist ein roter Gegenstand. Erst in diesem Falle können wir von einem begreifenden Denken im eigentlichen Sinne sprechen und von ihm daher mit Recht ein bloß bestimmendes und beziehendes Denken scheiden als ein solches, in dem die Beziehung auf Allgemeinheiten nur implizite enthalten, aber noch nicht thematisch geworden ist“ (E+J, §49, p.240-241)

^{xx} „Zu diesen durch Gattung und Art bezeichneten Wesensverhältnissen (nicht Klassen-, d.i. Mengenverhältnissen) gehört es, daß im besonderen Wesen das allgemeinere `unmittelbar oder mittelbar` enthalten ist – in einem bestimmten, in der eidetischen Intuition seiner Eigenart nach zu erfassenden Sinne. [...] Das eidetisch Singulare impliziert also die sämtlichen über ihm liegenden Allgemeinheiten, die ihrerseits `stufenweise ineinander` liegen“ (Hua. III, §12, p.30-31)

^{xxi} „Damit hängt wesentlich zusammen, Setzung und zunächst anschauende Erfassung von Wesen impliziert nicht das Mindeste von Setzung irgendeinen individuellen Daseins; reine Wesenswahrheiten enthalten nicht die mindeste Behauptung über Tatsachen“ (Hua. III, §4, p.17)

^{xxii} „Das heißt, jedes erfahrene Ding hat nicht nur einen Innenhorizont, sondern es hat auch einen offen endlosen Außenhorizont von Mitobjekten (also einen Horizont zweiter Stufe, bezogen auf den Horizont erster Stufe, sie implizierend), von solchen, denen ich zwar im Augenblick nicht zugewendet bin, denen ich mich aber jederzeit zuwenden kann als von dem jetzt erfahrenen verschiedenen oder ihnen in irgendeiner Typik gleichen“ (E+J, §8, p.28)

^{xxiii} „[U]nd so ist es zweifellos, daß es keine Erfahrung im ernstlich-schlichten Sinne einer Dingerfahrung gibt, die, erstmalig dieses Ding erfassend, in Kenntnis nehmend, nicht schon von ihm mehr `weiß`, als dabei zur Kenntnis kommt. Jede Erfahrung, was immer sie im eigentlichen Sinne erfährt, als es selbst zu Gesicht bekommt, hat eo ipso, hat notwendig ein Wissen und Mitwissen hinsichtlich eben dieses Dinges, nämlich von solchem ihm Eigenen, was sie noch nicht zu Gesicht bekommen hat. Dieses Vorwissen ist inhaltlich unbestimmt oder unvollkommen bestimmt, aber nie vollkommen leer [...]“ (E+J, §8, p.26-27)

^{xxiv} „Darin liegt: jede Erfahrung verweist auf die Möglichkeit, und vom Ich her eine Ver-möglichkeit, [...] das Ding, das im ersten Erblicken Gegebene, nach dem dabei eigentlich Selbstgegebenen schrittweise zu explizieren“ (E+J, §8, p.27)

^{xxv} „Das heißt, jedes erfahrene Ding hat nicht nur einen Innenhorizont, sondern es hat auch einen offen endlosen Außenhorizont von Mitobjekten [...], von solchen, denen ich zwar im Augenblick nicht zugewendet bin, denen ich mich aber jederzeit zuwenden kann [...]“ (E+J, §8, p.28)

^{xxvi} „[A]lle jeweils zugleich antizipierten oder auch nur mit im Hintergrunde als Außenhorizont bewußten Realen sind bewußt als reale Objekte (bezw. Eigenschaften, Relationen etc.) aus der Welt, als in dem einen raumzeitlichen Horizont seiende.

^{xxvii} E+J, §33, p.172

^{xxviii} „Diese ursprüngliche `Induktion` oder Antizipation erweist sich als ein Abwandlungsmodus ursprünglich stiftender Erkenntnisaktivitäten, von Aktivität und ursprünglicher Intention, also ein Modus der `Intentionalität`, eben der über einen Kern der Gegebenheit hinausmeinenden, antizipierenden [...]“ (E+J, §8, p.28)

^{xxix} „In der thematischen Wahrnehmung wird [das Reale] bekannt, indem es sich während der Strecke des Erfahrens [...] als selbst da kontinuierlich darstellt, sich dabei in seine einzelnen Merkmale, seine Wasmomente auslegend [...]. Alles, was sich so zeigt und schon vor der Explikation des Wahrgenommenen implizit da ist, gilt wesensmäßig als das vom Realen, was in dieser Wahrnehmung eigentlich zur Wahrnehmung kommt. Es selbst ist mehr als das jeweils zu aktueller Kenntnis Kommende und schon Gekommene [...]“ (E+J, §8, p.30-31)

^{xxx} „[D]ie gesehene Seite ist nur Seite, sofern sie ungesehene Seiten hat, die als solche sinnbestimmend antizipiert sind“ (E+J, §8, p.31)

^{xxxi} „Jede solche Vorveranschaulichung des `apriori` diesem Realen Zuzurechnenden hat aber die Wesenseigenheit unbestimmter Allgemeinheit“ (E+J, §8, p.31)

^{xxxii} „Jede Vorveranschaulichung vollzieht sich in einer mitbewußten flüssigen Variabilität, im Bewußtsein Varianten fixieren zu können [...]“ (E+J, §8, p.31)

^{xxxiii} „Im Schwanken der Vorveranschaulichung [...] bleiben wir in der Einheit der Antizipation, nämlich derjenigen von der Farbe der Rückseite, die aber als Antizipation unbestimmt allgemein ist, in typischer Weise Bestimmtes als typisch Vorvertrautes antizipierend“ (E+J, §8, p.31-32)

^{xxxiv} „Im Hinblick darauf kann jede Explikation, wie sie in ursprünglicher Anschaulichkeit als Explikation eines neu erfahrenen Gegenstandes sich vollzieht, auch charakterisiert werden als Verdeutlichung und Klärung, als Näherbestimmung des in der Horizontform unbestimmten, darin Implizierten“ (E+J, §26, p.140)

^{xxxv} „Jedes Eingehen in wirkliche Explikation gibt dieser den intentionalen Charakter einer die Horizontintention (als Leerantizipation) erfüllenden, verwirklichenden; verwirklichend in bestimmten Schritten, wodurch aus den gewissen, unbekanntem Bestimmungen die entsprechenden bestimmten und von nun ab bekannten werden“ (E+J, §8, p.34)

^{xxxvi} „Geht nun die Betrachtung in Explikation über, so folgt das Interesse der Richtung der geweckten Erwartungen“ (E+J, §22, p.114)

^{xxxvii} „Der Gegenstand steht von vornherein in einem Charakter der Vertrautheit da; er ist als Gegenstand eines bereits irgendwie bekannten, mehr oder weniger vage bestimmten Typus aufgefaßt. Dadurch ist die Richtung der Erwartungen hinsichtlich dessen, was sich bei näherer Betrachtung an ihm als Eigenheit ergeben wird, vorgezeichnet“ (E+J, §24 a), p.125)

^{xxxviii} „Explikation ist ein Hineingehen der Richtung des Wahrnehmungsinteresses in den Innenhorizont des Gegenstandes“ (E+J, §22, p.115)

^{xxxix} „Im Falle der ungemessenen Auswirkung des Interesses erfüllen sich [...] die protentionalen Erwartungen, der Gegenstand erweist sich in seinen Eigenheiten als das, als was er antizipiert war, nur daß das Antizipierte jetzt zu originaler Gegebenheit kommt; es erfolgt Näherbestimmung, eventuell partielle Korrektur, oder – im Falle der Hemmung – Enttäuschung der Erwartungen, partielle Modalisierung“ (E+J, §22, p.115)

^{xl} „[D]ie ursprünglich völlig vage, ungeschiedene Einheit des Horizontes besetzt sich durch diese Erfüllung mit dem ihn klärenden, jeweils zutage getretenen Explikat, einem freilich nur partiell klärenden, insofern als ein ungeklärter Resthorizont verbleibt“ (E+J, §26, p.141)

^{xli} „Eine weitere Stufe von Wahrnehmungsleistungen ist es, wenn das Interesse sich nicht mit dem explizierenden Hineingehen in den Innenhorizont des Gegenstandes begnügt, sondern wenn es die im Außenhorizont mitgegenwärtigen Gegenstände, die zugleich mit ihm im Felde befindlichen und affizierenden, mit thematisch macht und den Gegenstand der Wahrnehmung in Beziehung zu ihnen betrachtet“ (E+J, §22, p.115)

^{xlii} „[E]s kann dabei bleiben, daß in der kontinuierlichen synthetischen Identifizierung `der` Gegenstand ohne Abhebung innerer Unterschiede erscheint und keine Sondererkenntnisnahmen ermöglicht“ (E+J, §22, p.113)

^{xliii} „Der Prozeß ist eine entfaltende Betrachtung, eine Einheit gegliederter Betrachtung“ (E+J, §24 a), p.126)

^{xliv} „Es sind also die intentionalen Funktionen zu beschreiben, die es ausmachen, daß der `Gegenstand` der Explikation uns in der Sinnesform des `Substrates` entgegentritt, und in einer ganz anderen die explizierten Momente, nämlich als `Eigenheiten`, `Bestimmungen` des Gegenstandes, derart daß wir von einer Explikation sprechen können, einer Entfaltung des *S* in seine Bestimmungen, davon daß sich das *S* bestimmte als α , als β usw.“ (E+J, §24 a), p.127)

^{xlv} „Das [...] Betrachten würde zu einem bloßen Anstarren, wenn es sich nicht absetzte und in eine Kette von Einzelerfassungen, von Einzelakten überginge, in eine Diskretion abgesetzter Schritte, die, innerlich verbunden, eine die einzelnen Thesen verknüpfende Einheit bilden“ (E+J, §24 a), p.124)

^{xlvi} „Seine Strukturanalyse muß zutage bringen, wie sich in ihm eine zweifache Sinnbildung vollzieht: `Gegenstand als Substrat` und `Bestimmung α ...`“ (E+J, §24 a), p.127)

^{xlvii} „Das Ich fungiert als kontinuierlich tätiges durch die Folge der Schritte hindurch, es ist beim zweiten noch auf den Gegenstand des ersten gerichtet; es richtet sich also trotz der Vorzugsstellung des neuen, als primär erfaßten auf beide in eins [...]. Das Nacheinander der Aufmerksamkeits- und Erfassungsstrahlen ist zu einem Doppelstrahl geworden“ (E+J, §24 b), p.128)

^{xlviii} „Nehmen wir nun den Fall der Synthesis von Ding und Eigenheit des Dinges und überhaupt von Gegenstand und gegenständlicher Eigenheit, so tritt uns hier eine ganz eigenartige Synthesis der Identitätsdeckung entgegen“ (E+J, §24 b), p.129)

^{xlix} „Während wir die Einzelheiten besonders erfassen, vollziehen wir immer neue aktive Sonderzuwendungen und –erfassungen, die das Erfasste vorzüglich hervortreten lassen“ (E+J, §24 c), p.130-131)

^l „[Z]war sind und bleiben wir auch erfassend auf das ganze Objekt gerichtet [...] aber es ist nicht ein Verbleiben der aktiven Erfassung des Ganzen in der ursprünglichen und urlebendigen Form, sondern ein Sicherhalten der Aktivität in einer intentionalen Modifikation, eben als Noch-im-Griff-behalten“ (E+J, §24 c), p.131)

^{li} „[D]as Im-Griff-haben des in der Explikation stehenden Objektes ist nicht ein inhaltlich unveränderliches Im-Griff-haben [...], vielmehr vermöge der ständig neuen Partialdeckungen ein immer wieder verschiedenes. In jedem Schritt wird das einzeln Ergriffene durch die Deckung dem Sinngehalt des Substrates einverleibt. Die einzelnen Ergreifungen verwandeln sich nicht in bloß behaltende Einzelgriffe, wie beim Noch-behalten in der schlichten Betrachtung oder im Übergang zu einem neuen Gegenstand, sondern sie verwandeln sich in Modifikationen des Gesamtbegriffs, bezw. in Bereicherungen seines Inhaltes“ (E+J, §24 c), p.132)

^{lii} „Substrat und Bestimmung sind im Prozeß der Explikation ursprünglich konstituiert als Korrelatglieder einer Art Deckung. [...] In jeder das *S* explizierenden Bestimmung ist das *S* in einer seiner Besonderheiten, und in den

verschiedenen als Explikate auftretenden Bestimmungen ist es dasselbe, nur in verschiedenen Besonderheiten als seinen Eigenheiten“ (E+J, §24 b), p.129-130)

^{liii} „Jede Explikation des Gegenstandes expliziert seinen Sinn, jedes Explikat, bezw. eigenwesentliches Prädikat bestimmt den Gegenstand durch Momente des ihm eigenwesentlichen Sinnes“ (E+J, §65, p.322)

^{liv} „Zugleich gehört aber zum Wesen dieser fundierten Akte die Möglichkeit einer Modifikation, durch welche ihre vollen intentionalen Objekte zu beachteten und in diesem Sinne zu `vorgestellten` Gegenständen werden, die nun ihrerseits fähig sind, als Substrate für Explikationen, Beziehungen, begriffliche Fassungen und Prädikationen zu dienen“ (Hua. III, §37, p.77)

^{lv} Hua. III, §11, p.29

^{lvi} Hua. III, §19, p.43

^{lvii} Hua. III, §28, p.58

^{lviii} Hua. III, §69, p.144

^{lix} Hua. III, §77, p.164

^{lx} Hua. III, §88, p.203

^{lxi} Hua. III, §110, p.250

^{lxii} Hua. III, §118, p.274

^{lxiii} Hua. III, §124, p.285

^{lxiv} Hua. III, §127, p.294

^{lxv} Hua. III, §130, p.301

^{lxvi} Hua. III, §133, p.306

^{lxvii} Hua. III, §134, p.307

^{lxviii} „Von seinen `Beziehungsweisen` oder `Verhaltensweisen` abgesehen, ist [das Ego] völlig leer an Wesenskomponenten, es hat gar keinen explikablen Inhalt, es ist an und für sich unbeschreiblich“ (Hua. III, §80, p.179)

^{lxix} „Jederzeit ist es Sache besonderer, wesensmöglicher Blickwendungen und mitbeschlossener thetischer oder synthetisch-doxischer Prozeduren, aus einem Gemütsakte, in dem wir sozusagen nur gemütvoll leben, also ohne die doxischen Potentialitäten zu aktualisieren – einen neuartigen Akt zu gestalten, in welchem die vorerst nur potentielle Gemütsgegenständlichkeit sich in eine aktuelle, doxisch und ev. ausdrücklich explizierte verwandelt“ (Hua. III, §121, p.280)

^{lxx} „So haben wir [...] der explizierenden, hineingehenden Betrachtung die hinausgehende, beziehende Betrachtung gegenübergestellt, deren Analyse wir uns nunmehr zuwenden“ (E+J, §33, p.171)

^{lxxi} „Wenn in dieser Weise alle Explikation als Verdeutlichung angesehen werden kann, so ist daran zu erinnern, daß die gewöhnliche Rede von Verdeutlichung terminologisch einen anderen Sinn hat. Nämlich diese `Verdeutlichung` der Explikation ist nicht zu verwechseln mit der im eigentlichen Sinne so genannten, der analytischen Verdeutlichung, die allerdings auch eine Art Explikation darstellt, aber eine Explikation im Leerbewußtsein, während wir uns bei unserer Betrachtung immer im Bereich der Anschaulichkeit bewegen“ (E+U, §26, p.142)

^{lxxii} „Ein urteilendes Meinen kann verworren sein, und es kann nach dem in ihm Gemeinten „verdeutlicht“ werden; es wird damit zu einem expliziten, einem „eigentlichen“ Urteilen“ (E+U, §26, p.142)

^{lxxiii} „Es kann aber auch ein Gegenstand, bevor er noch selbst gegeben ist, antizipatorisch expliziert werden aufgrund einer anschaulichen Ausmalung in der Phantasie, wobei immer Erinnerungen an gegeben gewesene Gegenstände desselben oder verwandten Typus mit ihre Rolle spielen“ (E+J, §27, p.144)

^{lxxiv} „Ein Gegenstand kann originaliter wahrnehmungsmäßig in einem Griff gegeben gewesen sein, und es kann erst zur Explikation übergegangen werden, während er schon nicht mehr selbst gegeben ist. [...] Es ist eine Explikation in der Erinnerung, auf Grund dessen, was zuvor in einem schlichten Erfassen originaliter gegeben wurde“ (E+J, §27, p.146)

^{lxxv} „Das Ich läßt sein ursprüngliches Substrat fahren, anstatt es weiter im Griff zu behalten, während es das, was sich soeben als Explikat charakterisierte, in aktiver Erfassung hält“ (E+J, §28, p.147)

^{lxxvi} „Das Explikat [...] verliert damit seinen eigentümlichen Charakter als Explikat, es wird verselbständigt zu einem Gegenstand für sich, das ist zu einem eigenen Substrat für eine fortgehende Kenntnisnahme, für die Herausstellung seiner Eigenheiten. Das frühere *S* sinkt dann in den passiven Hintergrund zurück [...]“ (E+J, §28, p.147)

^{lxxvii} „Solche Verselbständigung ist natürlich auf jeder beliebigen Stufe der Explikation möglich, jedes noch so hochstufige Explikat kann thematisch verselbständigt werden“ (E+J, §28, p.150)

^{lxxviii} „Der Unterschied zwischen Substrat und Bestimmung erweist sich damit als zunächst rein relativer“ (E+J, §29, p.151)

^{lxxix} „Was immer in den aufmerkenden Blick treten mag, wir können es zum Substrat, speziell zum Hauptsubstrat machen und daran die Idee eines Substrates überhaupt und den Unterschied von Substrat und Bestimmung konzipieren“ (E+J, §29, p.151)

^{lxxx} „Aber sobald wir genetisch nach den Erfahrungsleistungen fragen, aus denen in ursprünglicher Evidenz die Scheidung von Substrat und Bestimmung entspringt, gilt diese Beliebigkeit nicht mehr“ (E+J, §29, p.151-152)

^{lxxxi} „Wir kommen dabei schließlich und notwendig auf Substrate, die nicht aus Substratisierung entsprungen sind“ (E+J, §29, p.152)

^{lxxxii} „Ein absolutes Substrat zeichnet sich also dadurch aus, daß es schlicht geradehin erfahrbar ist, unmittelbar erfaßbar, und daß seine Explikation unmittelbar in Gang zu setzen ist. Schlicht erfaßbar und damit Substrate in einem ausgezeichneten Sinne sind vor allem die individuellen Gegenstände der äußeren sinnlichen Wahrnehmung, also Körper“ (E+J, §29, p.153)

^{lxxxiii} „Jeder [Körper] ist Körper in einem einheitlichen Zusammenhang, der, letztlich und universal gesprochen, der der Welt ist“ (E+J, §29, p.156)

^{lxxxiv} „So hat die universale sinnliche Erfahrung, in universaler Einstimmigkeit vor sich gehend gedacht, eine Seinseinheit, eine Einheit höherer Ordnung; das Seiende dieser universalen Erfahrung ist die All-Natur, das Universum aller Körper. Auch auf dieses Ganze der Welt können wir uns als auf ein Erfahrungsthema richten“ (E+J, §29, p.156)

^{lxxxv} „Der Endlichkeit der Erfahrung von einzelnen Körpern steht gegenüber die Unendlichkeit der Weltexplikation, in der sich das Sein der Welt auslegt in der Unendlichkeit möglichen Fortgangs der Erfahrung von endlichen Substraten zu immer neuen“ (E+J, §29, p.156-157)

^{lxxxvi} „Jedes endliche Substrat hat die Bestimmbarkeit als In-etwas-sein, und für dieses gilt das abermals, in infinitum“ (E+J, §29, p.157)

^{lxxxvii} „[...] [W]ir [können] auch jeden Gegenstand, jedes selbständige Substrat mit anderen Gegenständen kolligieren und dann die Kollektion als Ganzes zum Thema machen [...]“ (E+J, §29, p.151)

^{lxxxviii} „[...] in ihre Glieder explizierend eingehend, so daß wir damit das Ganze bestimmend auslegen, und jeder der früheren selbständigen Substratgegenstände nun den Charakter des Explikates erhält; oder es kann von vornherein eine Kollektion, bestehend aus lauter in sich selbständigen Substraten, als ein Ganzes affizieren, ebenso wie ein einzelner Gegenstand“ (E+J, §29, p.151)

^{lxxxix} „Aber der Normalfall ist der, daß im voraus die konfigurative Einheit als mehrheitlich seiende, als Mehrheit von Gegenständen apperzipiert [...] wird“ (E+J, §24 d), p.134)

^{xc} „Im jetzigen Falle ist aber die Mehrheit, so sehr sie als einheitliche Konfiguration ursprünglich anschaulich erscheint, kein Ziel aktiver Tätigkeit, kein Ziel erfahrender Kenntnisnahme“ (E+J, §24 d), p.135)

^{xcii} „Sie beruht auf der Universalität des Begriffes ‘Gegenstand überhaupt’ und darauf, daß es zum ursprünglichen [...] Sinn jedes Gegenstandes gehört, nicht nur schlechthin Etwas überhaupt zu sein, sondern von vornherein und a priori explikables Etwas; er ist ursprünglich seinem allgemeinsten Typus nach konstituiert mit einem Horizont unbestimmter Bestimmbarkeit“ (E+J, §52 b), p.263)

^{xciii} „Die Weise ihrer ursprünglichen Vorgegebenheit ist ihre Erzeugung im prädikativen Tun des Ich als einer spontanen Leistung“ (E+J, §63, p.300)

^{xciiii} „Sinn als Sinn (Vermeintheit als solche) [...] fällt unter den weitesten Begriff des Etwas überhaupt, das seinem Wesen nach explikables Etwas ist. Er kann Substrat eines Urteils und eines urteilenden Identifizierens und Explizierens werden“ (E+J, §65, p.324)

^{xciv} „Auf Grund dieser Sachlagen, unter denen, wie ohne weiteres ersichtlich, zunächst noch nichts weiter zu verstehen ist als passiv konstituierte Verhältnisse, und die noch nichts selbst vergegenständlicht sein müssen, können prädikative Urteile in verschiedener Richtung gebildet werden“ (E+J, §59, p.286)

^{xcv} „Bei hinausgehender, beziehender Betrachtung sind die Beziehungsglieder Quellen von Relations-sachlagen, die sich in Relations-sachverhalten explizieren“ (E+J, §59, p.286)

^{xcvi} „In der thematischen Wahrnehmung wird [das Reale] bekannt, indem es sich während der Strecke des Erfahrens [...] als selbst da kontinuierlich darstellt, sich dabei in seine einzelnen Merkmale, seine Wasmomente auslegend [...]. Alles, was sich so zeigt und schon vor der Explikation des Wahrgenommenen implizit da ist, gilt wesensmäßig als das vom Realen, was in dieser Wahrnehmung eigentlich zur Wahrnehmung kommt. Es selbst ist mehr als das jeweils zu aktueller Kenntnis Kommende und schon Gekommene: es ist mit dem Sinn, den ihm sein ‘Innenhorizont’ ständig mitteilt; die gesehene Seite ist nur Seite, sofern sie ungesehene Seiten hat, die als solche sinnbestimmend antizipiert sind.“ (E+J, §8, p.30-31)

^{xcvii} „Im Hinblick darauf kann jede Explikation, wie sie in ursprünglicher Anschaulichkeit als Explikation eines neu erfahrenen Gegenstandes sich vollzieht, auch charakterisiert werden als Verdeutlichung und Klärung, als Näherbestimmung des in der Horizontform unbestimmten, darin Implizierten. Jede wirkliche Explikation hat den intentionalen Charakter einer die Horizontintention (als Leerantizipation) erfüllenden, verwirklichend in bestimmten Schritten, wodurch aus den gewissen unbekanntem Bestimmungen die entsprechenden bestimmten und von nun ab bekannten werden — bekannt in der Weise der Verdeutlichung des im Horizont unbestimmt Implizierten. Diese Implikation hat eben vermöge der Gegenstandsauffassung (und auch der sonstigen Auffassung nach Region, nach Art, Typus u. dgl.) einen besonderen Sinn erhalten, den eines vorweg schon, aber „unabgegrenzt“, „vage“, „verworren“ darin Beschlossenen; das herausgestellte Explikat ist das Klärende für eine entsprechende Verworrenheit“ (E+J, §26, p.140)

^{xviii} „Der Ausgangsfall ist natürlich der der ursprünglichen Explikation: ein Gegenstand wird ganz neu bestimmt. Immer ist er aber, wie wir sahen, im voraus apperzeptiv so und so aufgefaßt, als Gegenstand dieses und dieses Typus. Der Auffassungssinn impliziert von vornherein Bestimmungen, die an diesem Gegenstand noch nicht erfahren worden sind, die aber gleichwohl einen bekannten Typus haben, sofern sie auf frühere analoge Erfahrungen an anderen Gegenständen zurückweisen“ (E+J, §27, p.143)

^{xcix} „Ein Neues wiederum ist das Zurückkommen auf einen schon explizierten Gegenstand, und daran anschließend eventuell das Auseinanderlegen des schon früher bestimmten Gegenstandes in seine Bestimmungen. Das impliziert Bekannte wird nochmals zu expliziter, also zu wieder aktualisierter Erkenntnis gebracht“ (E+J, §27, p.144)

^c „Der Prozeß der Explikation in seiner Ursprünglichkeit ist derjenige, in dem ein originaliter gegebener Gegenstand zu expliziter Anschauung gebracht wird“ (E+J, §24 a), p.127)

^{ci} „Diese Kontinuität ist eine beständige Synthesis der Deckung, die sowohl die Auffassungsinhalte betrifft als die Aktivitäten selbst; das tätige Erfassen und Gerichtetsein auf das „Ganze“ oder, richtiger gesprochen, auf das Substrat S ist implizit „mit“-gerichtet auf die a, und im „Auftreten“ des a wird das S „in Hinsicht auf“ das a erfaßt, entfaltet“ (E+J, §24 c), p.133)

^{cii} „Jede Dingwahrnehmung hat so einen Hof von Hintergrundsanschauungen [...] und auch das ist ein ‚Bewußtseinserlebnis‘, oder kürzer, ‚Bewußtsein‘, und zwar ‚von‘ all dem, was in der Tat in dem mitgeschauten gegenständlichen ‚Hintergrund‘ liegt“ (Hua. III, §35, p.71)

^{ciii} „Es liegt aber darin, daß gewisse Modifikationen des ursprünglichen Erlebnisses möglich sind, die wir bezeichnen als freie Wendung des ‚Blickes‘ – nicht gerade und bloß des physischen, sondern des ‚geistigen Blickes‘ – von dem zuerst erblickten Papier auf die schon vordem erscheinenden, also ‚implizite‘ bewußten Gegenstände, die nach der Blickwendung zu explizite bewußten, ‚aufmerksam‘ wahrgenommenen oder ‚nebenbei beachteten‘ werden.“ (Hua III, §35, p.72)

^{civ} „Wir erkennen dann wieder, daß zum Wesen all solcher Erlebnisse jene merkwürdige Modifikation, die Bewußtsein im Modus aktueller Zuwendung in Bewußtsein im Modus der Inaktualität überführt, und umgekehrt. Einmal ist das Erlebnis sozusagen ‚explizites‘ Bewußtsein von seinem Gegenständlichen, das andere Mal implizites, bloß potentielles“ (Hua. III, §35, p.72)

^{cv} „Den Operationen liegen dabei teils anschauliche, teils unanschauliche, ev. ganz verworrene Akte niederer und höherer Stufe der Objektivierung zugrunde. Im Falle der Dunkelheit oder Verworrenheit kann man darauf ausgehen, die synthetischen ‚Gebilde‘ zu klären, die Frage ihrer Möglichkeit, ihrer Einlösung durch „synthetische Anschauung“ aufwerfen; oder auch die ihrer ‚Wirklichkeit‘, die ihrer Einlösbarkeit durch explizite und originär gebende synthetische Akte, ev. auf den Wegen mittelbarer ‚Schlüsse‘ oder ‚Beweise‘“ (Hua. III, §153, p.357)

^{cvi} „Phänomenologisch sind alle diese Typen von Synthesen in Korrelation zu den in ihnen ‚konstituierten‘ synthetischen Gegenständlichkeiten einer Untersuchung zu unterziehen“ (Hua. III, §153, p.357)

^{cvii} „Nicht immer müssen, wie in den bisher besprochenen Fällen vergleichender Bestimmung, beide Beziehungsglieder wirklich in der Einheit der Anschauung präsent sein. [...] Sie können im Hintergrund bleiben und doch bei der Bestimmung mitwirken. Z. B. ein großer Mensch steht als groß da, ohne daß überhaupt in unserem Gesichtskreis kleine Leute sind. Er kontrastiert mit dem „normalen“ Menschen, von welchem Exempel dunkel „erregt“ sein mögen, ohne daß es zu expliziter Vergleichung kommt“

^{cviii} „Der Vollzug kann „durch und durch“ ursprüngliche Aktivität sein. Nicht nur, daß jeder Urteilsschritt erneut explizit vollzogen wird, es werden auch die Urteilssubstrate erneut zur selbstgebenden oder vergegenwärtigenden Anschauung gebracht“ (E+J, §67 b), p.337)

^{cix} „Nun liegt aber die Schwierigkeit darin, daß das in der exemplarischen Ausgangsanschauung — der ersten, vorläufigen, endlich abgeschlossenen, mit der wir beginnen müssen — zwar als „es selbst“, aber doch mit einer offenen Unendlichkeit vermeinte Ding in seiner Meinung diese „Unendlichkeiten“ nur implizite in sich schließt, und zwar so, daß jede dabei in eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Relativitäten verflochten ist. Es ist nicht so, daß die einstimmige Erfahrung vom Ding eine gerade, einlinige Unendlichkeit (offene Endlosigkeit) besagt, mit einer Kontinuität von Selbsterscheinungen des Dinges, in denen sich in der Einheit eines übersehbaren Stiles synthetisch Einheit einer Selbsterscheinung konstituiert“ (E+J, §93 a), p.439)

^{cx} „Und dieses Verhältnis ist selbst phänomenologisch aufweisbar. Es gibt sich in sich selbst als Genesis; das eine Glied ist bewußtseinsmäßig charakterisiert als weckendes, das andere als gewecktes. Nicht immer ist freilich Assoziation in dieser Weise originär gegeben. Es gibt auch Fälle mittelbarer Assoziation unter Überspringung von Zwischengliedern, Assoziation also, in der die Zwischenglieder und die zwischen ihnen bestehenden unmittelbaren Ähnlichkeiten nicht explizit zu Bewußtsein kommen“ (E+J, §16, p.78)

^{cx} „Freilich erfolgt dabei eine gewisse Verdoppelung im gesamten Sinnesgehalt der Wahrnehmung: so wie das erwartete Neue und ‚Andere‘ den im bisherigen Wahrnehmungszuge protentional vorgezeichneten Sinn ‚rot und kugelförmig‘ überdeckt und nichtig macht, so geschieht Entsprechendes auch rückwirkend in der ganzen bisherigen Reihe. D. h. der Wahrnehmungssinn ändert sich nicht bloß in der momentanen neuen Wahrnehmungsstrecke; die noematische Wandlung strahlt in Form einer rückwirkenden Durchstreichung zurück

in die retentionale Sphäre und wandelt ihre aus den früheren Wahrnehmungsphasen stammende Sinnesleistung. Die frühere Apperzeption, die auf konsequent fortlaufendes "rot und gleichmäßig rund" abgestimmt war, wird implicite "umgedeutet - in "an der einen Seite grün und eingebeult-. Wesensmäßig liegt darin, daß wenn wir die retentionalen Bestände, also die noch frisch bewußte, aber völlig dunkel gewordene Erscheinungsreihe, in einer expliziten Wiedererinnerung anschaulich machen würden, wir an allen ihren Horizonten nicht nur die alte Vorzeichnung in der alten Erwartungs- und Erfüllungsstruktur, wie sie damals ursprünglich motiviert war, erinnerungsmäßig finden, sondern darüber gelagert die entsprechend gewandelte Vorzeichnung, die nun durchgehend auf "grün und eingebeult" verweist" (E+J, §21 a), p.96)

^{cxii} „Auch in ihnen zerfällt das einsinnige Bewußtsein in ein mehrsinniges: d.h. das Zwiespältigwerden mit seiner apperzeptiven Überschiebung setzt sich in das retentionale Bewußtsein hinein fort. Vollziehen wir dann explizite Vergegenwärtigung der dem Zweifel vorangegangenen Wahrnehmungsstrecke, so ist sie nun nicht mehr wie eine sonstige Erinnerung in ihrer Einsinnigkeit da, sondern sie hat dieselbe Verdoppelung angenommen [...]. Vermöge der Rückstrahlung in die Retention und damit in die explizierende Wiedererinnerung vollzieht sich auch in ihr Modalisierung" (E+J, §21 b), p.102)

^{cxiii} „[W]ir vollziehen nicht wieder eine bloß betrachtende Explikation, sondern eine Aktivität prädikativer Identifikation, und das ist ein erfassendes Bewußtsein nicht einstrahliger, sondern mehrstrahliger (polythetischer) Aktivität. Von der spontanen Erfassung des S als Subjektion geht die Aktion als ein bestimmendes Identifizieren zu p: der erfassende Blick lebt im Erfassen des Sichbestimmens als p. Schon vorher im Explizieren „bestimmt" sich das Objekt implizite als p, nämlich es klärt und verdeutlicht sich als das, aber das „Sich-bestimmen als" ist nicht erfaßt. Es wird erst erfaßt im erneuten aktiven Vollzug der Synthesis, der die vorherige Explikation voraussetzt" (E+J, §50 a), p.245-246)

^{cxiv} „Das cogito überhaupt ist die explizite Intentionalität. Der Begriff des intentionalen Erlebnisses überhaupt setzt insbesondere schon den Gegensatz von Potentialität und Aktualität und zwar in der allgemeinen Bedeutung voraus, als wir nun im Übergang zum expliziten cogito und in der Reflexion auf das nicht explizierte Erlebnis und seine noetisch-noematischen Bestände zu erkennen vermögen, daß es Intentionalitäten in sich berge, bzw. Noemen, die ihm zu eigen sind. So z.B. hinsichtlich des Bewußtseins vom unbeachteten aber nachträglich beachtbaren Hintergrund bei der Wahrnehmung, Erinnerung, usw. Das explizite intentionale Erlebnis ist ein „vollzogenes“ „Ich denke“. Dasselbe kann aber auch auf dem Wege attentionaler Wandlungen in ein 'unvollzogenes' übergehen" (Hua. III, §115, p.262-263)

^{cxv} „Wir verstanden unter Intentionalität die Eigenheit von Erlebnissen, „Bewusstsein von etwas zu sein“. Zunächst trat uns diese wunderbare Eigenheit, auf die alle vernunfttheoretischen und metaphysischen Rätsel zurückführen, entgegen im expliziten cogito [...]. In jedem aktuellen cogito richtet sich ein von dem reinen Ich ausstrahlender 'Blick' auf den 'Gegenstand' des jeweiligen Bewußtseinskorrelat, auf das Ding, den Sachverhalt, usw.“ (Hua. III, §84, p.188)

^{cxvi} „Reduzieren wir auf den Strom des reinen Bewußtseins. In der Reflexion nimmt jede vollzogene cogitatio die explizite Form cogito an. Verliert es diese Form, wenn wir die transzendente Reduktion üben?" (Hua. III, §57, p.123)

^{cxvii} „Es sind auch Niederschläge subjektiver Leistungen, intentionaler Leistungen — aber einer Intentionalität, die nicht offen daliegt für den Blick der Reflexion, sondern die nur impliziert ist in den Niederschlägen, die auf sie verweisen. Diese intentionalen Implikationen und damit die Geschichte der Welt selbst enthüllen, in der sich das Subjekt der Psychologie bereits als einer fertigen findet, besagt also auch Rückgang auf Subjektives, durch dessen intentionales Leisten die Welt diese Gestalt gewonnen hat; aber es ist Rückgang auf eine verhüllte Subjektivität — verhüllt, weil nicht aktuell in der Reflexion in ihrem intentionalen Leisten aufweisbar, sondern nur indiziert durch die Niederschläge dieser Leistung in der vorgegebenen Welt" (E+J, §11, p.46-47)

^{cxviii} „Und wir verstehen uns damit selbst als die Subjektivität, die sich nicht, wie in der einfachen psychologischen Reflexion schon in einer fertigen Welt findet, sondern die alle diese Leistungen, denen diese Welt ihr Gewordensein verdankt, als mögliche Leistungen in sich trägt und vollbringt. M. a. W. wir verstehen uns in dieser Enthüllung der intentionalen Implikationen, der Befragung der Sinnesniederschläge der Welt auf ihren Ursprung aus intentionalen Leistungen, als transzendente Subjektivität" (E+J, §11, p.48)

^{cxix} „Die Vergegenwärtigung weist zurück auf Wahrnehmung in ihrem eigenen phänomenologischen Wesen: z.B. das Sich-erinnern an Vergangenes impliziert, wie wir schon früher bemerkt haben, das „Wahrgenommenhaben“; also in gewisser Weise ist die „entsprechende“ Wahrnehmung (Wahrnehmung von demselben Sinneskern) in der Erinnerung bewußt, aber doch nicht wirklich in ihr enthalten" (Hua. III, §99, p.233)

^{cxx} „Einheitlich geht dieser Horizont in die Vergangenheitsmodi ein. Jedes Vorhin, als modifiziertes Jetzt, impliziert zu jedem ins Auge gefaßten Erlebnis, dessen Vorhin es ist, einen endlosen Horizont, all das umspannend, was zu demselben modifizierten Jetzt gehört, kurzum seinen Horizont des 'gleichzeitig Gewesen'" (Hua. III, §82, p.196)

^{cxxi} „In gewisser Weise ursprüngliches, unmittelbares Recht hat jede klare Erinnerung [...]. Hinsichtlich dessen, was sie vergegenwärtigt, sagen wir eines Vergangenen, liegt in ihr eine Beziehung zur aktuellen Gegenwart. Sie setzt das Vergangene, und setzt notwendig einen Horizont mit, wenn auch in vager, dunkler, unbestimmter

Weise; zur Klarheit und thetischer Deutlichkeit gebracht, müßte dieser sich in einem Zusammenhang thetisch vollzogener Erinnerungen explizieren lassen, welcher in aktuellen Wahrnehmungen, im aktuellen hic et nunc, terminieren würde“ (Hua. III, §141, p.326-327)

^{cxxii} „Ist aber die Explikation bis zum aktuellen Jetzt durchgeführt, so strahlt etwas vom Licht der Wahrnehmung und ihrer Evidenz auf die ganze Reihe zurück“ (Hua. III, §141, p.327)

^{cxxiii} „Wenn z.B., während ich meine dingliche Umgebung wahrnehme, ein Erinnerungseinfall über mich kommt, und ich mich ihm gar zuwende, dann verschwindet nicht diese Wahrnehmungswelt; wie sehr sie auch ihre „Aktualität“ verlieren, sich „von mir entfernen“ mag, perzeptiv ist sie immerfort da, in dem weiteren Sinne wahrgenommen. Die Erinnerung, in der ich nun lebe, bietet mir für das Erinnernte eine Zeit, die implizite orientiert ist zur Wahrnehmungsgegenwart“ (E+J, §42 a), p.205)

^{cxxiv} „Der Anfang zeichnet eine Richtung eines weiteren, synthetisch einheitlichen [...] Vollzugsprozesses vor, in dem sich Phase für Phase die ihm vom Einsatz und den bisherigen Vollzügen zugewachsene Tendenz erfüllt, aber zugleich tendenziös sich forterstreckt und vorweist auf neue Erfüllungsstadien. [...] Der Anfang hat also einen intentionalen Horizont, er weist über sich hinaus in einer leeren, erst in nachkommenden Verwirklichungen anschaulichen Weise; er verweist implizit auf einen kontinuierlichen synthetischen Prozeß (eventuell unbestimmt irgendeine der einzuschlagenden Richtungen einer Mehrdimensionalität von möglichen Prozessen), durch den eine kontinuierlich einheitliche Tendenz sich hindurcherstreckt“ (E+J, §18, p.85)

^{cxxv} „Wir sprechen von der bloßen `Sache`, die werte ist. Die Wertcharakter, Wertheit hat; demgegenüber vom konkreten Werte selbst, oder der Wertobjektivität. Ebenso parallel vom bloßen Sachverhalt, bzw. der bloßen Sachlage, und dem Wertverhalt, bzw. der Wertlage, nämlich wo das Werten ein Sachverhaltensbewußtsein als fundierende Unterlage hat. Die Wertobjektivität impliziert ihre Sache, sie bringt als neue objektive Schicht herein die Wertheit“ (Hua. III, §95, p.221)

^{cxxvi} „Andererseits erfassen wir doch mit Evidenz und adäquat die `Idee` Ding. [...] Wir erfassen so zunächst die unerfüllte Idee des Dinges, und dieses individuellen Dinges, als etwas, das `so weit` gegeben ist, als die einstimmige Anschauung eben `reicht`, aber dabei `in infinitum` bestimmbar bleibt. Das `usw.` ist ein einsichtiges und absolut unentbehrliches Moment im Dingnoema“ (Hua. III, §149, p.347)

^{cxxvii} „Wie das Ding, so ist dann jede seinem Wesensgehalt zugehörige Beschaffenheit und vor allem jede konstitutive `Form` eine Idee [...]“ (Hua. III, §149, p.347)

^{cxxviii} „So sind alle Komponenten der Dingidee selbst Ideen, eine jede impliziert das „und so weiter“ „unendlicher“ Möglichkeiten“ (Hua. III, §149, p.348)

^{cxxix} „In der Auslegung dieser typischen Allgemeinheit in Form bestimmter Möglichkeiten ergibt sich der Spielraum der Möglichkeiten als expliziter „Umfang“ der unbestimmten Allgemeinheit der Antizipation“ (E+J, §8, p.32)

^{cxix} „M.a.W. die allgemeine Unbestimmtheit hat einen Umfang freier Variabilität; was in ihn hineinfällt, das ist in gleicher Weise implicite mit umspannt und doch nicht positiv motiviert, positiv vorgezeichnet. Es ist ein Glied eines offenen Umfangs von Näherbestimmungen, die dem Rahmen einpaßbar, aber darüber hinaus völlig ungewiß sind. Das macht den Begriff der offenen Möglichkeit aus“ (E+J, §21 c), p.107)

^{cxixi} „Die Modalisierung besteht hier darin, daß eine unbestimmt allgemeine Intention, die selbst den Modus der Gewißheit hat, in gewisser Weise eine Abschtichtung ihrer Gewißheit implicite hinsichtlich aller erdenklichen Besonderungen in sich trägt. Ist z. B. in unbestimmter Allgemeinheit eine gefleckte Farbigkeit in Gewißheit gefordert, so ist die Erfüllung insofern gebunden, als es eben `irgendeine` Farbigkeit mit `irgend` geformten Flecken sein muß; und jede Besonderheit dieses Typus erfüllt diese Forderung in gleicher Weise“ (E+J, §21 c), p.108)

^{cxixii} „Wir finden dergleichen konkrete Erlebnisdaten „als Komponenten in umfassenderen konkreten Erlebnissen, die als Ganze intentionale sind, und zwar so, daß über jenen sensuellen Momenten eine gleichsam „beseelende“, sinngiebende (bzw. Sinngebung wesentlich implizierende) Schicht liegt, eine Schicht, durch die aus dem Sensuellen, das in sich nichts von Intentionalität hat, eben das konkrete intentionale Erlebnis zustande kommt“ (Hua. III, §85, p.192)

^{cxixiii} „Jedes aktuelle Thema kann zum Substrat nicht nur für aktuelle Urteilsleistungen, sondern zugleich zum Substrat der modifizierten Anknüpfung alter Leistungserwerbe werden. Das ändert nicht den Sachverhalt, der thematisch konstituiert wird, aber es ändert den Modus, wie er gedacht ist. In diesem Wie ist er thematisches Produkt nicht nur des jetzigen Urteils, sondern implizierter Urteile. Das aktuelle thematische Urteil hat also ein Rankenwerk von Gestaltungen, die jeweils zurückweisen auf eingewickelte Urteile – Gestaltungen, die sich natürlich auflösen lassen in ihre ursprüngliche Form, die Form ihres ursprünglichen Vollzuges“ (Hua. III, §60, p.290-291)

^{cxixiv} „Hierher gehören ferner Erlebnisse des Aktualitätshintergrundes [...], oder wie wir auch sagen können, der Ichferne und Ichnähe [...]“ (Hua. III, §84, p.189)

^{cxixv} „Es ist aber nicht nötig, daß sie, und ebenso sonstige Gegenstände, sich gerade in meinem Wahrnehmungsfelde befinden. Für mich da sind wirkliche Objekte, als bestimmte, mehr oder minder bekannte,

in eins mit den aktuell wahrgenommenen, ohne daß sie selbst wahrgenommen, ja selbst anschaulich gegenwärtig sind.“ (Hua. III, §27, p.56-57)

^{cxv} „Das aktuell Wahrgenommene, das mehr oder minder klar Mitgegenwärtige und Bestimmte (oder mindestens einigermaßen Bestimmte) ist teils durchsetzt, teils umgeben von einem dunkel bewußten Horizont unbestimmter Wirklichkeit“ (Hua. III, §27, p.57)

^{cxvii} „Ich kann Strahlen des aufhellenden Blickes der Aufmerksamkeit in ihn hineinsenden, mit wechselndem Erfolg“ (Hua. III, §27, p.57)

^{cxviii} „Die unbestimmte Umgebung ist im übrigen unendlich. Der nebelhafte und nie voll zu bestimmende Horizont ist notwendig da.“ (Hua. III, §27, p.57)

^{cxix} „Im eigentlichen Wahrnehmen, als einem Gewahren, bin ich dem Gegenstände [...] zugewendet, ich erfasse es als dieses hier und jetzt Seiende. Das Erfassen ist ein Herausfassen, jedes Wahrgenommene, hat einen Erfahrungshintergrund“ (Hua. III, §35, p.71)

^{cxl} „Jede Dingwahrnehmung hat so einen Hof von Hintergrundanschauungen (oder Hintergrundsschauungen, falls man in das Anschauen schon das Zugewendetsein aufnimmt), und auch das ist ein ‚Bewußtseins Erlebnis‘, oder kürzer, ‚Bewußtsein‘, und zwar ‚von‘ all dem, was in der Tat in dem mitgeschauten gegenständlichen ‚Hintergrund‘ liegt“ (Hua. III, §35, p.71)

^{cxli} „Es liegt aber darin, daß gewisse Modifikationen des ursprünglichen Erlebnisses möglich sind, die wir bezeichnen als freie Wendung des ‚Blickes‘ - nicht gerade und bloß des physischen, sondern des ‚geistigen Blickes‘ [...]“ (Hua. III, §35, p.72)

^{cxlii} „Ähnliches konstatieren wir an beliebigen cogitationes [...] für alle Erlebnisse des Denkens, des Fühlens und Wollens, nur daß, wie sich [...] herausstellen wird, das ‚Gerichtetsein auf‘, das ‚Zugewendetsein zu‘, das die Aktualität auszeichnet, nicht wie in den bevorzugten, weil einfachsten Beispielen sinnlicher Vorstellungen sich deckt mit dem herausfassenden Achten auf die Bewußtseinsobjekte“ (Hua. III, §35, p.73)

^{cxliii} Im weitesten Sinne deckt sich das Erfassen mit dem Auf-etwas-achten, es bemerken, sei es speziell aufmerksam sein oder nebenbei beachten [...]“ (Hua. III, §37, p.75-76)

^{cxliv} „Tut er das, so ist sein intentionales Objekt nicht nur überhaupt bewußt und im Blick des geistigen Gerichtetseins, sondern es ist erfaßtes, bemerktes Objekt“ (Hua. III, §37, p.76)

^{cxlv} „Einem Dinge freilich können wir nicht anders als in der erfassenden Weise zugewendet sein, und so allen ‚schlicht vorstellbaren‘ Gegenständlichkeiten [...]. Im Akte des Wertens aber sind wir dem Werte, im Akte der Freude dem Erfreulichen [...] zugewendet, ohne all das zu erfassen“ (Hua. III, §37, p.76)

^{cxlvi} „In jedem Akt waltet ein Modus der Achtsamkeit. Wo immer er aber kein schlichtes Sachbewußtsein ist, wo immer in einem solchen Bewußtsein ein weiteres zur Sache ‚stellungnehmendes‘ fundiert ist: da treten Sache und volles intentionales Objekt (z.B. ‚Sache‘ und ‚Wert‘), ebenso Achten und Im-geistigen-Blick-haben auseinander“ (Hua. III, §37, p.77)

^{cxlvii} „[W]ir müssen zwischen der bloßen ‚Sache‘ und dem vollen intentionalen Objekt unterscheiden, und entsprechend eine doppelte intentio, ein zwiefaches Zugewendetsein. [...] Nicht bloß Sachvorstellen, sondern auch das es umschließende Sachwerten hat den Modus Aktualität“ (Hua. III, §37, p.76)

^{cxlviii} C.f. Hua. III, §35, p.73 + Hua. III, §37, p.76

^{cxlix} „Eben die letzteren [Aktualitäten] bestimmen in der weitesten Verallgemeinerung, die über den Kreis unserer Beispiele hinauszuführen ist, und in der vollen vollzogenen Kontrastierung mit den Inaktualitäten den prägnanten Sinn des Ausdrucks ‚cogito‘, ‚ich habe Bewußtsein von etwas‘, ‚ich vollziehe einen Bewußtseinsakt“ (Hua. III, §35, p.73)

^{cl} „Dinge sind wie in der Wahrnehmung, so auch bewußt in Erinnerungen und in erinnerungsähnlichen Vergegenwärtigungen, auch bewußt in freien Phantasien. [...] Wir erkennen dann wieder, daß zum Wesen all solcher Erlebnisse – dieselben immer in voller Konkretion genommen – jene merkwürdige Modifikation gehört, die Bewußtsein im Modus aktueller Zuwendung in Bewußtsein im Modus der Inaktualität überführt, und umgekehrt“ (Hua. III, §35, p.72)

^{cli} „D.h. während wir jetzt dem reinen Gegenstand in dem Modus ‚cogito‘ zugewendet sind, ‚erscheinen‘ doch vielerlei Gegenstände, sie sind anschaulich ‚bewußt‘, fließen zu der anschaulichen Einheit eines bewußten Gegenstandsfeldes zusammen. Es ist ein potentielles Wahrnehmungsfeld in dem Sinne, daß sich jedem so Erscheinenden ein besonderes Wahrnehmen (ein gewahrendes cogito) zuwenden kann“ (Hua. III, §84, p.189)

^{clii} „[Die inaktuellen Erlebnisse] ‚gehören‘ zu ihm als ‚die seinen‘, sie sind sein Bewußtseins hintergrund, sein Feld der Freiheit“ (Hua. III, §80, p.179)

^{cliii} „Zu erwähnen ist ferner, daß das jeweilig Gegebene zumeist umringt ist von einem Hof von unbestimmter Bestimmbarkeit [...]“ (Hua. III, §69, p.145)

^{cliv} „Wir haben in unseren vorbereitenden Kapiteln schon mehrfach von einer Art merkwürdiger Bewußtseinswandlungen gesprochen, die sich mit allen anderen Arten intentionaler Vorkommnisse kreuzen und somit eine ganz allgemeine Bewußtseinsstruktur eigener Dimension ausmachen: Wir sprechen im Gleichnis vom ‚geistigen Blick‘ oder ‚Blickstrahl‘ des reinen Ich, von seinen Zuwendungen und Abwendungen. Die zugehörigen Phänomene kamen uns zu einheitlicher, vollkommen klarer und deutlicher Abhebung. Sie spielen,

wo immer von 'Aufmerksamkeit' die Rede ist, die Hauptrolle, ohne phänomenologische Absonderung von anderen Phänomenen, und mit diesen vermengt werden sie als Modi der Aufmerksamkeit bezeichnet. Wir unsererseits wollen das Wort festhalten und zudem von attentionalen Wandlungen sprechen, aber ausschließlich mit Beziehung auf die von uns deutlich abgetrennten Vorkommnisse, sowie auf die im weiteren noch näher zu beschreibenden Gruppen zusammengehöriger phänomenaler Wandlungen“ (Hua. III, §92, p.211)

^{clv} „Es handelt sich hierbei um eine Serie von idealiter möglichen Wandlungen, die einen noetischen Kern und ihm notwendig zuständige charakterisierende Momente verschiedener Gattung schon voraussetzen, von sich aus die zugehörigen noematischen Leistungen aber nicht verändern, und die doch Abwandlungen des ganzen Erlebnisses nach seiner noetischen wie noematischen Seite darstellen“ (Hua. III, §92, p.211-212)

^{clvi} „Nun lehrte aber die phänomenologische Reflektion, daß nicht in jedem Erlebnis diese [...] Ichzuwendung zu finden ist, dieses aktuelle Sich-mit-dem-Korrelatgegenstand-zu-schaffen-machen, Zu-ihm-hin-gerichtet-sein [...], während es doch Intentionalität in sich bergen kann. So ist z.B. klar, daß der gegenständliche Hintergrund, aus dem sich der cogitativ wahrgenommenen Gegenstand dadurch heraushebt, daß ihm die auszeichnende Ichzuwendung zuteil wird, wirklich erlebnismäßig ein gegenständlicher Hintergrund ist“ (Hua. III, §84, p.188-189)

^{clvii} „Das cogito bezeichnet also in der Tat [...] den eigentlichen Akt des Wahrnehmens, Urteilens, Gefallens usw. Andererseits ist aber der ganze Bau des Erlebnisses in den beschriebenen Fällen, mit all seinen Thesen und noematischen Charakteren, derselbe, wenn ihm diese Aktualität fehlt“ (Hua. III, §115, p.263)

^{clviii} „Insofern scheiden wir deutlicher vollzogene Akte und nicht vollzogene; die letzteren sind entweder 'außer Vollzug geratene' Akte oder Aktregungen“ (Hua. III, §115, p.263)

^{clix} „Hierher gehören ferner Erlebnisse des Aktualitätshintergrundes der Art wie Gefallens'regungen', Urteilsregungen, Wunschregungen, usw. in verschiedenen Stufen der Hintergrundsferne“ (Hua. III, §84, p.189)

^{clx} „Ihrem eigenen Wesen nach sind diese Inaktualitäten gleichwohl schon 'Bewußtsein von etwas'“ (Hua. III, §84, p.189)

^{clxi} „Hierher gehören ferner Erlebnisse des Aktualitätshintergrundes [...], oder wie wir auch sagen können, der Ichferne und Ichnähe, da das aktuelle, in jeweiligen cogitationes lebende reine Ich der Beziehungspunkt ist“ (Hua. III, §84, p.189)

^{clxii} „Im Wesen liegt es, daß, was auch immer realiter ist, aber noch nicht aktuell erfahren ist, zur Gegebenheit kommen kann, und daß das dann besagt, es gehöre zum unbestimmten, aber bestimmbareren Horizont meiner jeweiligen Erfahrungsaktualität. Dieser Horizont aber ist das Korrelat der an den Dingerfahrungen selbst wesensmäßig hängenden Unbestimmtheitskomponenten, und diese lassen – immer wesensmäßig – Erfüllungsmöglichkeiten offen, die keineswegs beliebige, sondern nach ihrem Wesenstypus vorgezeichnete, motivierte sind“ (Hua. III, §47, p.101-102)

^{clxiii} „Zum Wesen des Erlebnisstromes eines wachen Ich gehört es aber nach dem oben Gesagten, daß die kontinuierlich fortlaufende Kette von cogitationes beständig von einem Medium der Inaktualität umgeben ist, diese immer bereit, in den Modus der Aktualität überzugehen, wie umgekehrt die Aktualität in die Inaktualität“ (Hua. III, §35, p.73)

^{clxiv} „Diese jetzt, und offenbar in jedem wachen Jetzt, für mich vorhandene Welt hat ihren zweiseitig unendlichen zeitlichen Horizont, ihre bekannte und unbekante, unmittelbar lebendige und unlebendige Vergangenheit und Zukunft“ (Hua. III, §27, p.57-58)

^{clxv} „Jedes Erlebnisjetzt, sei es auch das der Einsatzzphase eines neu auftretenden Erlebnisses, hat notwendig seinen Horizont des Vorhin. Das kann aber prinzipiell kein leeres Vorhin sein, eine leere Form ohne Inhalt, ein Nonsens. Notwendig hat es die Bedeutung eines vergangenen Jetzt, das in dieser Form ein vergangenes Etwas, ein vergangenes Erlebnis faßt. [...] Jedes Erlebnisjetzt hat aber auch seinen notwendigen Horizont des Nachher, und auch das ist kein leerer Horizont“ (Hua. III, §82, p.184)

^{clxvi} „Jedes mögliche Erlebnis [...] ist notwendig ein dauerndes [...]. Das sagt zugleich: es gehört einem unendlichen 'Erlebnisstrom' an“ (Hua. III, §81, p.182)

^{clxvii} „Eine Phase Impression als Grenzphase einer Kontinuität von Retentionen, die aber nicht gleichstehende, sondern kontinuierlich-intentional aufeinander zu beziehende sind – ein kontinuierliches Ineinander von Retentionen von Retentionen“ (Hua. III, §81, p.183)

^{clxviii} „Die Wesenseigenschaft, die der Titel Zeitlichkeit für Erlebnisse überhaupt ausdrückt, bezeichnet nicht nur ein allgemein zu jedem einzelnen Erlebnis Gehöriges, sondern eine Erlebnisse mit Erlebnissen verbindende notwendige Form“ (Hua. III, §81, p.182)

^{clxix} „Die Vergegenwärtigung weist zurück auf Wahrnehmung in ihrem eigenen phänomenologischen Wesen: z.B. das Sich-erinnern an Vergangenes impliziert, wie wir schon früher bemerkt haben, das „Wahrgenommenhaben“; also in gewisser Weise ist die „entsprechende“ Wahrnehmung (Wahrnehmung von demselben Sinneskern) in der Erinnerung bewußt, aber doch nicht wirklich in ihr enthalten“ (Hua. III, §99, p.233)

^{clxx} „Alle Erlebnisse sind bewußt', das sagt also speziell hinsichtlich der intentionalen Erlebnisse, sie sind nicht nur Bewußtsein von etwas und als das nicht nur vorhanden, wenn sie selbst Objekte eines reflektierenden

Bewußtseins sind, sondern sie sind schon unreflektiert als 'Hintergrund' da und somit prinzipiell wahrnehmungsbereit in einem zunächst analogen Sinne, wie unbeachtete Dinge in unserem äußerem Blickfelde" (Hua. III, §45, p.95)

^{clxxi} „Daß die reproduktiven (und retentionalen) Modifikationen der Erlebnisse die parallele, nur entsprechend modifizierte Beschaffenheit haben, ist selbstverständlich“ (Hua. III, §45, p.95)

^{clxxii} „Diese [Dinge] können nur bereit sein, sofern sie schon als unbeachtete in gewisser Weise bewußt sind, und das heißt bei ihnen, wenn sie erscheinen [...]: mein Blickfeld der Aufmerksamkeit, das alles Erscheinende umspannt, ist nicht unendlich“ (Hua. III, §45, p.95)

^{clxxiii} „Prinzipiell Wahrnehmbares ist auch das Ding, und erfaßt wird es in der Wahrnehmung als Ding meiner Umwelt“ (Hua. III, §45, p.95-96)

^{clxxiv} „Das 'es ist da' besagt vielmehr, es führen von aktuellen Wahrnehmungen mit dem wirklich erscheinenden Hintergrundfelde mögliche, und zwar kontinuierlich-einstimmig motivierte Wahrnehmungsreihen [...] weiter bis zu denjenigen Wahrnehmungszusammenhängen, in denen eben das betreffende Ding zur Erscheinung und Erfassung käme“ (Hua. III, §45, p.96)

^{clxxv} „Im cogito lebend, haben wir die cogitatio selbst nicht bewußt als intentionales Objekt“ (Hua. III, §38, p.77)

^{clxxvi} „[...] [Z]u ihrem Wesen gehört die prinzipielle Möglichkeit einer 'reflektiven' Blickwendung und natürlich in Form einer neuen cogitatio, die sich in der Weise einer schlicht-erfassenden auf sie richtet. Mit anderen Worten, jede kann zum Gegenstande einer sog. 'inneren Wahrnehmung' werden, in weiterer Folge dann zum Objekte einer reflektiven Wertung, einer Billigung oder Mißbilligung usw.“ (Hua. III, §38, p.77)

^{clxxvii} „Trifft der reine Ichblick reflektierend, und zwar perzeptiv erfassend, irgendein Erlebnis, so besteht die apriorische Möglichkeit, den Blick auf andere Erlebnisse, soweit dieser Zusammenhang reicht, hinzuwenden. [...] Danach hat ein Erlebnis, das zum Objekt eines Ichblickes geworden ist, also den Modus des Erblickten hat, seinen Horizont nichterblickter Erlebnisse; das in einem Modus der 'Aufmerksamkeit' und evtl. in steigender Klarheit Erfasste, einen Horizont hingergündlicher Unaufmerksamkeit mit relativen Unterschieden der Klarheit und Dunkelheit, sowie der Abgehobenheit und Unabgehobenheit“ (Hua. III, §83, p.185-186)

^{clxxviii} „Jedes Erlebnis, das nicht im Blicke ist, kann nach idealer Möglichkeit zum 'erblickten' werden, eine Reflexion des Ich richtet sich darauf, es wird nun zum Objekt für das Ich. Ebenso verhält es sich mit den möglichen Ichblicken auf die Komponenten des Erlebnisses und auf seine Intentionalitäten (auf das, wovon sie evtl. Bewußtsein sind)“ (Hua. III, §77, p.162)

^{clxxix} „Was finden wir reell in ihr als purem Erlebnis, in ihr so enthalten, wie im Ganzen seine Teile, seine Stücke und unabstückbaren Momente? Wir haben solche echten, reellen Bestandteile schon gelegentlich hervorgehoben unter den Titeln stofflicher und noetischer Bestandteile“ (Hua. III, §97, p.226)

^{clxxx} „Vollziehen wir die Empfindungsreflexion, die auf die Abschattungen: so erfassen wir sie als evidente Gegebenheiten, und in vollkommener Evidenz können wir, in der Einstellung und Aufmerksamkeitsrichtung abwechselnd, sie und die entsprechenden Momente auch in Beziehung setzen, sie als entsprechende erkennen [...]“ (Hua. III, §97, p.226)

^{clxxxii} „Man muß sich hierbei zunächst klarmachen, daß jederlei 'Reflexion' den Charakter einer Bewußtseinsmodifikation hat, und zwar einer solchen, die prinzipiell jedes Bewußtsein erfahren kann. Von Modifikation ist hier insofern die Rede, als jede Reflexion wesensmäßig aus Einstellungsänderungen hervorgeht, wodurch ein vorgegebenes Erlebnis, bzw. Erlebnisdatum (das unreflektierte) eine gewisse Umwandlung erfährt, eben in den Modus des reflektierten Bewußtseins (bzw. Bewußten)“ (Hua. III, §78, p.166)

^{clxxxiii} C.f. Hua. III, §77, p.164

^{clxxxiii} „Also ist es z.B. nicht gemeint, daß die stofflichen Inhalte, etwa die abschattenden Farbinhalte, im Wahrnehmungserlebnis ebenso vorhanden sind, wie sie es im analysierenden Erlebnis sind. Dort waren sie, um nur eines zu erwähnen, enthalten als reelle Momente, aber sie waren darin nicht wahrgenommen, nicht gegenständlich erfaßt. Im analysierenden Erlebnis sind sie aber gegenständlich, Zielpunkte noetischer Funktionen, die früher nicht vorhanden waren. Obschon diese Stoffe noch weiter mit ihren Darstellungsfunktionen behaftet sind, so haben doch auch diese eine wesentliche Veränderung (freilich eine solche von anderer Dimension) erfahren“ (Hua. III, §98, p.229)

^{clxxxiv} „In sich selbst ist die Wahrnehmung Wahrnehmung von ihrem Gegenstande, und jeder Komponente, die die 'objektiv' gerichtete Beschreibung an dem Gegenstande heraushebt, entspricht eine reelle Komponente der Wahrnehmung: aber wohlgemerkt, nur soweit die Beschreibung sich getreu an den Gegenstand hält, so wie er in dieser Wahrnehmung selbst 'dasteht'. All diese noetischen Komponenten können wir auch nur so bezeichnen, daß wir auf das noematische Objekt und seine Momente rekurrieren; also etwa sagen: Bewußtsein, näher Wahrnehmungsbewußtsein von einem Baumstamme, von der Farbe des Stammes, usw.“ (Hua. III, §97, p.227-228)

^{clxxxv} „[D]as Eidos des Noema weist auf das Eidos des noetischen Bewußtseins hin, beide gehören eidetisch zusammen“ (Hua. III, §98, p.230)

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- clxxxvi „Umgekehrt werden wir von jedem Erlebnis aus, das schon als solche Modifikation charakterisiert, und dann immer in sich selbst als das charakterisiert ist, zurückgeführt auf gewisse Urerlebnisse, auf 'Impressionen', die die absolut originären Erlebnisse im phänomenologischen Sinn darstellen“ (Hua. III, §78, p.167)
- clxxxvii C.f. Hua. III, §45, p.95; Hua. III, §78, p.168; Hua. III, §79, p.174
- clxxxviii „Jedes 'cogito', jeder Akt in einem ausgezeichneten Sinne ist charakterisiert als Akt des Ich, er 'geht aus dem Ich hervor', es 'lebt' in ihm 'aktuell'“ (Hua. III, §80, p.178)
- clxxxix „Das 'Gerichtetsein auf', 'Beschäftigtsein mit', 'Stellungnehmen zu', 'Erfahren, leiden von' birgt notwendig in seinem Wesen dies, daß es eben ein 'von dem Ich dahin' oder im umgekehrten Richtungsstrahl 'zum Ich hin' ist – und dieses Ich ist das reine, ihm kann keine Reduktion etwas anhaben“ (Hua. III, §80, p.179)
- cxci „Demgegenüber scheint aber das reine Ich ein prinzipiell Notwendiges zu sein, und als ein bei allem wirklichen und möglichen Wechsel der Erlebnisse absolut Identisches, kann es in keinem Sinn als reelles Stück oder Moment der Erlebnisse selbst gelten“ (Hua. III, §57, p.123)
- cxci „Bei diesen eigentümlichen Verflochtenheiten mit allen 'seinen' Erlebnissen ist doch das erlebende Ich nichts, was für sich genommen und zu einem eigenen Untersuchungsobjekt gemacht werden könnte. Von seinen 'Beziehungsweisen' oder 'Verhaltensweisen' abgesehen, ist es völlig leer an Wesenskomponenten, es hat gar keinen explikablen Inhalt, es ist an und für sich unbeschreiblich: reines Ich und nichts weiter“ (Hua. III, §80, p.179)
- cxcii „Bin ich das, so ist ein neues cogito lebendig, das seinerseits unreflektiert, also nicht für mich gegenständlich ist“ (Hua. III, §28, p.59)
- cxci „Aber nur soweit, wie die unmittelbare evident feststellbare Wesenseigentümlichkeit und Mitgegebenheit mit dem reinen Bewußtsein reicht, wollen wir das reine Ich als phänomenologisches Datum rechnen, während alle Lehren über dasselbe, welche über diesen Rahmen hinausreichen, der Ausschaltung verfallen sollen“ (Hua. III, §57, p.124)
- cxci „Während das Ding die intentionale Einheit ist, das identisch-einheitliche Bewußte im kontinuierlich geregelten Abfluß der ineinander übergehenden Wahrnehmungsmannigfaltigkeiten, haben diese selbst immerfort ihren bestimmten deskriptiven Bestand, der wesensmäßig zugeordnet ist jener Einheit“ (Hua. III, §41, p.85)
- cxci „In Wesensnotwendigkeit gehört zu einem 'allseitigen', kontinuierlich einheitlich in sich selbst bestätigenden Erfahrungsbewußtsein vom selben Ding ein vielfältiges System von kontinuierlichen Erscheinungs- und Abschattungsmanigfaltigkeiten [...]“ (Hua. III, §41, p.85)
- cxci „Ein Ding ist notwendig in bloßen 'Erscheinungsweisen' gegeben, notwendig ist dabei ein Kern von 'wirklich Dargestelltem' auffassungsmäßig umgeben von einem Horizont uneigentlicher 'Mitgegebenheit' und mehr oder minder vager Unbestimmtheit“ (Hua. III, §44, p.91)
- cxci „Die Unbestimmtheit bedeutet ja notwendig Bestimmbarkeit eines fest vorgeschriebenen Stils“ (Hua. III, §44, p.91)
- cxci „Das Raumd Ding, das wir sehen, ist bei all seiner Transzendenz Wahrgenommenes, in seiner Leibhaftigkeit bewußtseinsmäßig Gegebenes. Es ist nicht statt seiner ein Bild oder Zeichen gegeben“ (Hua. III, §43, p.90)
- cxci „Bei diesen Vorstellungsarten schauen wir etwas an im Bewußtsein, daß es ein anderes abbilde oder signitiv andeute; das eine im Anschauungsfeld habend, sind wir nicht darauf, sondern durch das Medium eines fundierten Auffassens auf das andere, das Abgebildete, Bezeichnete gerichtet“ (Hua. III, §43, p.90)
- cc „In den unmittelbar anschauenden Akten schauen wir ein 'Selbst' an“ (Hua. III, §43, p.90)
- cci „Die Dingwahrnehmung vergegenwärtigt nicht ein Nichtigewärtiges, als wäre sie Erinnerung oder Phantasie; sie gegenwärtigt, sie erfaßt ein Selbst in seiner leibhaftigen Gegenwart. Das tut sie ihrem eigenen Sinne gemäß, und ihr anderes zumuten, das heißt eben wider ihren Sinn verstoßen“ (Hua. III, §43, p.90-91)
- ccii „Auf der einen Seite Wesen von Gestaltungen des Bewußtseins selbst, auf der anderen Wesen von bewußtseinstranszendenten individuellen Vorkommnissen, also Wesen von solchem, was sich in Bewußtseinsgestaltungen nur 'bekundet', sich z.B. durch sinnliche Erscheinungen bewußtseinsmäßig 'konstituiert'“ (Hua. III, §61, p.131)
- cciii „Das sinnlich erscheinende Ding, das die sinnlichen Gestalten, Farben, Geruchs- und Geschmackseigenschaften hat, ist also nichts weniger als ein Zeichen für ein anderes, sondern gewissermaßen Zeichen für sich selbst“ (Hua. III, §52, p.113)