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**ARCTIC DEFENCE DIPLOMACY:
COMPARATIVE DOCUMENT AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE ARCTIC SECURITY
STRATEGIES OF THE 'ARCTIC FIVE'**

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Supervisors: Ondrej Ditrych & Luca Anceschi

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Abstract of Master's Dissertation, Submitted 28 July 2017:

Arctic Defence Diplomacy: Comparative Document and Discourse Analysis of the Arctic Security Strategies of the 'Arctic Five'

The aim of this dissertation project is to investigate the prevalence and potential for the application of defence diplomacy within the Arctic region. The primary documents of analysis for this study were the five Arctic strategies produced by the littoral nation states of the Arctic Ocean: Canada, Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland); Kingdom of Norway; Russian Federation; and the United States of America.

As the Arctic remains a trapped within the security dilemma, due to its changing geography, previous research has supported the development of defence diplomacy as an active stabiliser to the region's uncertain environment. For this reason, the author further investigated the potential of regional defence diplomacy through document and discourse analysis of the national Arctic security strategies. In alignment with previous research, the security strategies were first analysed individually and then in a comparative study. The individual analysis produced critical background information and analysis on the Arctic states' perceived abilities and intentions to participate in defence diplomacy. The comparative study further analysed the defence diplomacy themes within codes of structural, visual, and textual, to offer additional supporting analysis to the content and discourse of the Arctic strategies and the plausibility of supporting the variables of defence diplomacy.

On the basis of the results of this research, it can be concluded that regional defence diplomacy can provide stability to the security dilemma of the Arctic. Analysis proved that regional defence diplomacy is currently prevalent in the publication of Arctic security strategies, through cooperative search and rescue efforts, regional military exercises, and defence forums. The monograph further provides recommendations for the expansion of Arctic defence diplomacy for regional collaboration on maritime safety & navigation; anti-piracy & trafficking; tourism & outdoor recreation; as well as language and cultural education.

War then, is a relation - not between man and man but between state and state and individuals are enemies only accidentally not as men, nor members of their country, but as its defenders. -

Jean Jacques Rousseau

Acronyms

ABR	Arctic Bridge Route
ASFR	Arctic Security Forces Roundtable
BEAC	Barents Euro-Arctic Council
BRC	Barents Regional Council
CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organisation
DoD	Department of Defence
ECS	Extended Continental Shelf
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ENPI	European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
EOPs	Enhanced Opportunity Partners
EU	European Union
GIUK	Greenland Iceland-UK
IHO	International Hydrographic organisation
IPY	International Polar Year
IW	Informational Warfare
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LRIT	Long Range Identification and Tracking
MILDEC	Military Deception
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
NORA	Nordic Atlantic Cooperation
NSAR	National Strategy for the Arctic Region
NSES	National Strategic End State
NSR	Northern Sea Route
NTI	Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated
NWP	Northwest Passage
OE	Operational Environment
SAR	Search and Rescue
SAREX	Greenland SAR Exercise
TSR	Transpolar Sea Route
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Chapter I: Introduction

The Arctic region, which covers more than a sixth of the Earth's total land mass and the Arctic Ocean, is quickly evolving to a new and heightened level of geostrategic importance. As the natural environment of the High North experiences changes to its physical construct, the region is emerging as a lucrative economic zone for the sovereign nation states of the Arctic. While conflicting territorial claims still leave much to legal debate, the littoral states surrounding the Arctic ocean are hedging their national interests through the defensive build up of their armed forces within the region. The repercussions of such have led the Arctic zone to a future of uncertainty.

Elevated global temperatures are directly affecting the makeup of the Arctic, with symptoms exhibited at a more rapid pace than any other region on the planet. Regional temperature increases continue to result in significant environmental changes, including but not limited to, a reduction of sea ice; shifting and melting permafrost; melting glaciers; changes in storm frequency; an increase in water levels; changes in ocean currents; changes in marine mammal and seabird migration; and an increase in the rate of coastal erosion. These environmental changes create repercussions for the way in which humans currently are, and will, interact within the Arctic region.

The ongoing physical alterations of the High North support the prospect for new or increased economic activity across the region. Reduction in sea ice offers an environment where shipping, fishing, resource extraction, tourism, and their supporting industries can thrive. A decrease in sea ice allows for greater maritime navigation throughout the Arctic waters than what is currently navigable. Prominent shipping lanes of the High North will include the Northwest Passage, Northern Sea Route, Transpolar Sea Route, and the Arctic Bridge Route. With a shorter distance to travel, these Arctic navigational routes may offer economically feasible alternatives to current international maritime trade routes which transit through the Suez and Panama Canals. Easier navigation of the Arctic sea lanes also allows for increased access to cruise line operations that tour the Arctic scenery and opens the region to new fishing grounds and mineral deposits. While

much research is still needed to verify the extent, current scientific estimates claim the Arctic is perhaps host to up to thirty percent of the world's undiscovered gas resources and ten percent of undiscovered oil resources (Denmark, 2011: 9). Arctic states have taken to the prospect of economic gains and increased their national investments into critical infrastructure projects and an educated Arctic workforce. Infrastructure projects across the Arctic include new roads, airfields, pipelines, ports, and an assortment of hospitable structures. As the economic potential within the Arctic is vast and near, Arctic governments have sought to provide security on their critical investments and future demographics.

Security threats in the High North can come as a consequence of natural or man made actions. If hurricanes, rogue waves, and tsunamis are to make contact with human activity, the result could be disastrous. Additionally, non-state actors including terrorists, pirates, criminal gangs, and drug, weapons, and human traffickers may also become increasingly active in the region. One can only assume that current threats in other parts of the world, will soon make their way to the Arctic.

Although the extent of the Arctic is defined differently amongst 'Arctic States,' it is now deemed a region of national security to all the nation-states which hold territorial rights to the Arctic under international law. The 'Arctic Five' have produced the following Arctic security strategies:

Canada: *Canada's Northern Strategy- Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*

Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland): *Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020*

Kingdom of Norway: *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy*

Russian Federation: *Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020*

United States of America: *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region*

The aforementioned security strategies serve as instruments to prioritise elements of national security and as communicational tools to inform audiences of a state's concern for their national

security within the Arctic region. Each one of the five strategies is strategically designed and published in a variety of manners. There are wide variances in the time of publication, authoritative publishers, document length, the language of the text, visual content, and textual topics. Depending upon the audience, the documents may be perceived as elements of diplomacy or deception. Because of this significant uncertainty and their nonbinding nature, the future of the region's stability is unknown.

Conflicting territorial claims of the Arctic landscape have left the region legally unsettled for the five littoral nation states adjacent to the Arctic Ocean: Canada; the Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland and Faroes); the Kingdom of Norway; the Russian Federation; and the United States of America; collectively known as the 'Arctic Five.' For these nation states, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea remains the greatest extent of an Arctic legal authority. Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States have all signed it; all except the United States have ratified it. These Arctic states are utilising the legal framework and mechanisms to submit or wait on submitting in the case of the United States, territorial claims to secure the rights to land's extensive resources. Because geographical mapping and soil samples from the continental shelf assist in evidence based claims, Arctic states have already invested heavily in Arctic exploration and research. While there is still much to be known about the region, past expeditions have controversially resulted in the planting of national flags on the ice sheet and bottom of the sea bed at the North Pole.

The Arctic has long been host to defensive assets, be it nuclear submarines, missile defence systems, surveillance equipment, or a number of other military instalments and personnel. However, since the end of the Cold War, the region has experienced relatively stable cooperation. Intergovernmental forums, such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation and the Arctic Council, have supported the facilitation of regional cooperation and coordination on issues of regional importance. However, both of the bodies refuse to address hard security issues of the Arctic. Interaction between the Arctic states regarding defence issues have been limited to interaction through the Northern Chiefs of defence Forums, Arctic Security Forces Roundtable,

Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and a number of bilateral and multilateral exchanges and military exercises including NANOOK, ARCTIC EAGLE, ARCTIC ZEPHYR, VIGILANT SHIELD, SAREX, COLD RESPONSE, and ARCTIC EDGE. Without international bodies adapting to address hard security issues, defence diplomacy will remain left to the willingness of the individual nation states to work together within the Arctic region.

The realist theories of international relations suggest that the Arctic is host to anarchic nation states, which are developing defensive assets for their own security. In the self-help system of the High North, sovereignty is secured by those who can protect and preserve it. In the process of these strategic developments, the exertion of sovereignty for the security of one nation, creates a rising insecurity for others, resulting in a security dilemma. Regardless of intention, militarisation creates uncertainty, which if misjudged, can lead to armed conflict. To diffuse risk and maintain stability across the region, inter-state communication and verification are necessary. Regional defence diplomacy and its qualities of peaceful military cooperation may offer the international system a solution to an escalating security dilemma within the High North.

The region's stability is further impacted by ongoing developments being made across the Arctic, including, but not limited to; the new Fairbanks Declaration signed by the Arctic states in May of 2017; the anticipation of a United States - Russia Arctic meeting in the coming months; the prospect for new land claims to be submitted to the United Nations within the year; the expectancy of new national Arctic security strategies to be published within the coming years; and the increasing impact of climate change.

Current research and existing literature suggest that the Arctic is indeed changing at a rapid pace. Defence experts agree that the region's current arms race is creating a regional security dilemma, making the future of the Arctic region uncertain. Previous individual and comparative studies have shown that the Arctic security strategies produced by the 'Arctic Five,' provide vital information pertaining to their national security interests and intentions. Additional studies have

exhibited a level of optimism for the region's stability, citing recent, foundational developments in activities of regional defence diplomacy.

Based on the most appropriate theoretical basis for investigation, the Arctic security strategies will be individually and then comparatively analysed for the presence of a multitude of variables to which can be considered valid to answer the research question. As the 'security dilemma' is founded on self-help militarisation, the identification of national strategic interests and defensive military developments initiates the study. An individual inventory and analysis will further support the identification of perceived intentions to cooperate through peaceful interactions with neighbouring Arctic defence forces. In order to have success in regional defence diplomacy, a number of key variables that have been identified: an alignment of partners' aims; cultural competence; mutual understanding and empathy; equal material skills; and shared language comprehension (Rolfe, 2015: 4-5). A comparative document and discourse analysis of the Arctic strategies, through codes of external, visual, and textual, will further provide analysis on the current activity of defence diplomacy and provide a recommendation for areas where peaceful cooperation can be achieved into the future.

The purpose of this research project is to build upon the previous works of Arctic security experts and provide another link in the chain of understanding the security environment of the High North. Through individual and comparative analysis of the content and discourse of the Arctic security strategies of the 'Arctic Five,' this research project will assess the extent to which the region supports regional defence diplomacy as a countering force to the perceived threats of the security dilemma. If the Arctic is indeed entrapped within the spiralling security dilemma, then regional defence diplomacy can offer a plausible outlet to avoid an unintended conflict and maintain regional stability.

Chapter II: Literature Review

In order to understand the major issues and controversies surrounding the topic, the purpose of this literature review is to provide an overview of existing literature and additional sources. Gaining additional viewpoints and identifying gaps in current subject matter knowledge, is a vital aspect of the research process. If the Arctic is indeed entrapped within a spiralling security dilemma, then regional defence diplomacy can offer a plausible outlet to maintain regional stability and avoid an unintended conflict.

This literature review is organised into three critical parts, which outline and provide valuable insight into issues relevant to the research project:

1. The emergence of the Arctic region to a new level of geostrategic importance
2. The formation of an Arctic security dilemma
3. The prospect of regional defence diplomacy to provide regional stability

Part One: The emergence of the Arctic region to a new level of geostrategic importance

As the Arctic region is quickly emerging as a focus point of international discussion and interest, many literary works have been produced on the topic of the region's history, changing characteristics, and impact on the international system. Identifying the region's significance to the global community remains the first task of the research.

Tim Marshall provides a short, but well-written chapter of his 2015 book, *Prisoners of Geography*, highlighting the geographical importance of the region. Even without the new levels of activity, Marshall explains a region of geostrategic importance. 'Of course geography does not dictate the course of all events. Great ideas and great leaders are part of the push and pull of history. But they must operate within the confines of geography' (Marshall, 2015: 238). Beginning with the first recorded expedition in 330 BC by a Greek mariner called Pytheas of Massilia (Marshall, 2015: 225), Marshall speaks to the historical events taken by states to

explore and claim territory across the region. Providing a quick overview of region's special interests, Marshall highlights the region's new economic potential due to the changes in the region's geography (Marshall, 2015: 229). Marshall goes on to state that, 'All the sovereignty issues stem from the same desires and fears - the desire to safeguard routes for military and commercial shipping, the desire to own the natural resources of the region, and the fear that others may gain what you lose' (Marshall, 2015: 235). In this 'New Great Game,' Marshall states the important role and developments of the 'Arctic Five' nation states. Focusing on the developments of their military assets, Marshall outlines their priority of utilising defence capabilities to protect their national interests (Marshall, 2015: 232-234). However, Marshall argues that the Arctic states need to co-operate; 'there are five and a half million square miles of ocean up in the Arctic; they can be dark, dangerous and deadly. It is not a good place to be without friends. They know that for anyone to succeed in the region, they may need to co-operate, especially on issues such as fishing stocks, smuggling, terrorism, search and rescue and environmental disasters' (Marshall, 2015: 236). Citing meaning from the international relations theories of liberal institutionalism and democratic peace, Marshall declares that, 'This race has rules, a formula and a forum for decision making. The Arctic Council is composed of mature countries, most of them 'democratic' to a greater or lesser degree. The international laws regulating territorial disputes, environmental pollution, laws of the sea and treatment of minority peoples are in place' (Marshall, 2015: 235). But leaves the discussion open, pondering that, 'Perhaps the Arctic will turnout to be just another battleground for the nation states - after all, wars are started by fear of the other as well as by greed; but the Arctic is different, and so perhaps how it is dealt with will be different' (Marshall, 2015: 236).

Another work, written prior by Scott G. Borgerson in 2008, *Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming*, outlines a scramble for territory and resources among the five Arctic powers. Citing economic interest as the push factor, Borgerson highlights lucrative emerging opportunities including; Arctic fish, timber, lead, magnesium, nickel, and zinc, fresh water reserves, fossils fuels, and shipping routes (Borgerson, 2008: 67). In opposition to the liberal institutionalism, Borgerson seems to side with that of a realist viewpoint, citing that

the financial stakes and political controversies surrounding the region's developments are at a level of uncertainty. 'The Arctic has always been frozen; as ice turns to water, it is not clear which rules should apply. Diplomatic gridlock could lead the Arctic to erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources' (Borgerson, 2008: 72). In this legal no man's land, Borgerson describes a region where states are pursuing their narrowly defined national interests by laying down sonar nets and arming icebreakers to guard their claims (Borgerson, 2008: i).

In 2011, Dr Lassi Heininen authored an important piece of work on the Arctic, *Arctic Strategies and Policies Inventory and Comparative Study*. Dr Heininen provides an inventory and comparative study on the Arctic strategies of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland and Faroes), Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United States of America, as well as the European Union. Heininen's publication was a first of its kind and provided groundbreaking discussion relevant to Arctic security. Heininen argues that 'A significant and rapid environmental, geoeconomic and geopolitical change has occurred in the Arctic...the region's geo-strategic importance is increasing, and consequently, the region is playing a more important role in world politics' (Heininen, 2012: 79) Heininen declares that 'As a soft-law instrument, the Arctic Council is still the major forum for both intergovernmental and other cross border cooperation on Arctic affairs' (Heininen, 2012: 79). 'On one hand there is a multilateral international cooperation within the Arctic Council as well as cooperation with and between indigenous peoples' organisations, other international organisations and forums, in addition to bilateral inter-state relations. On the other hand, cooperation is functional within certain fields, for example between academic institutions on higher education, civilian organisations on environmental protection, and civil societies on regional development and culture' (Heininen, 2012: 5). Speaking on the strategies, Heininen claims that, 'some of them also cover the military, or a sphere where military force is not entirely out of the picture but might also be used in a variety of more 'peaceful' ways' (Heininen, 2012: 66). It is here that defence diplomacy is exposed. Further findings from the paper's analysis identified that 'sovereignty and national security are among the main priorities and policy objectives of the strategies and state policies of the five littoral states' (Heininen, 2012: 80). However, Heininen concludes that 'The

Arctic region in the early-21st century is stable and peaceful without armed conflicts or the likelihood thereof' (Heininen, 2012: 79), due to the Arctic states willingness to utilise mechanisms of international law settle disputes.

Later in 2012, Dr Lassi Heininen again, this time with Alyson JK Bailes co-authored *Strategy Papers on the Arctic or High North: A comparative study and analysis*. Their written work offers facts, analysis, and stimulus surrounding the strategies of the founding members of the Arctic Council (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, USA) and the European Union. Their study builds upon the prior work of Dr Heininen and looks deeper into the size of the countries, 'how large, medium-sized (Canada) and small states look at one and the same agenda' (Bailes, 2012: 5). Through the application of the small state theory, the two sought to answer if, 'the weaker players in such a constellation should seek solutions through protection from larger powers, and/or in institutionalised 'shelters' plus the promotion of legal and normative codes to ensure a peaceful and level playing-field....Are the small players of the Arctic in fact developing such strategies? If so, what concrete answers can they find within this region's idiosyncratic, still only part-formed environment of power relations and international governance?' (Bailes, 2012: 6). Their research identifies the difference in state approaches, based upon their relative position in the international system.

When speaking to theory of strategy, 'they echo tradition insofar as they cover the field of international relations where military force is not entirely out of the picture, and where military assets might also be used in a variety of more 'peaceful' ways (for instance for search and rescue, data acquisition and monitoring)...Like earlier military strategies, these documents are about mapping future uncertainties and preparing both guidelines and instruments to deal with them. They are designed not just to inform, but to mobilise, steer and coordinate the national or multi-state communities that they cover' (Bailes, 2012: 21). It is here that we find the necessity of understanding not only the content but also the discourse of the strategies. The two go on to highlight the changing characteristics of defence by citing, 'The fact that these documents are drafted and designed to be published, where a traditional military strategy would have been most

effective when kept secret, fundamentally alters the nature and balance of their function' (Bailes, 2012: 24). This statement further supports the dissertation project by exposing a new face to defence.

Throughout their research, two theories were analysed in relation to the contents of the strategies: realism and institutionalism. On one side, 'the strategies of the five littoral states are all to some degree favoured by Realist thinking and associated state-based, competitive and zero sum conception of security...Military power is identified especially clearly in the US and Russia strategies as the ultima ratio for securing these national interests'(Bailes, 2012: 102). Regarding the assessment of 'institutionalism' for national interests, 'all these nations also refer to the need to maintain the Arctic as a zone of peace; the importance of respect of law; and the need for international cooperation between states and through institutions...Especially for smaller states, where multilateralism can protect the smaller actors through international law and good governance, and provide an outlet for equality (Bailes, 2012: 102-104).

In 'Part One' the researcher came to understand the emergence of the Arctic region to a new level of geostrategic importance and its significance within current, international discussion. Recent changes to the Arctic's physical environment have created a number of major issues and controversies between the Arctic states, economically, politically, and militaristically. Previous literature unanimously supported the Arctic as an important geostrategic region. No literature could be found which supported an argument of non-importance. Marshall made it clear that the region's geography is changing and that in order to operate in the harsh environment, cooperation is required. Borgens further echoed that of Marshall, in his descriptions on the economic and security implications of global warming, and the reactionary buildup of military assets. Heininen and Bailes pointed out that as an element of strategy or diplomacy, the 'Arctic Five' states have declared their national interests and published them to the world in the form of Arctic security strategies. The credible literature reviewed, supported the notion that the published national security strategies of the Arctic, are indeed of great importance to international system and thus this dissertation research project. Supporting evidence agreed on

the reactionary of Arctic states to utilise the build up of defensive forces to secure their potential economic resources. Supporting evidence regarding regional cooperation cited the use of international forums and interactions between sub-national authorities. It is in this fielded region of cooperation, is where defence diplomacy arises. The previous research was also found to be organised into a suitable format of individual and comparative analysis, which provided strength to their research project. As such, it provided a framework to replicate in this dissertation research project.

Part Two: The Formation of an Arctic Security Dilemma

Having come to understand the background of the Arctic region and the applicable theories of realism and institutionalism, it was decided that further investigation into the Arctic security dilemma was needed. In 2010, Rob Huebert, PhD and Fellow of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, wrote *The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment*. Huebert claims:

the Arctic states are seemingly contradicting the intent of their statements as evidenced by their current actions. All of the Arctic states have begun rebuilding their military forces and capabilities in order to operate in the region. Personnel are undertaking Arctic training exercises; submarines that can operate in ice are being developed or enhanced; icebreakers are being built; and so forth. The catalyst for the Arctic states' efforts appears to be a recognition that the Arctic is critically vital to their interests and they will take the steps necessary to defend these interests. The consequence of these efforts is that notwithstanding the public statements of peace and cooperation in the Arctic issued by the Arctic states, the strategic value of the Arctic is growing. As this value grows, each state will attach a greater value to their own national interests in the region. The Arctic states may be talking cooperation, but they are preparing for conflict (Huebert, 2010: i).

Huebert goes on to state that 'Despite the claims made by most of the Arctic states that their military's role in the region is only for constabulary roles such as enforcement of environmental standards, fishery patrols or search and rescue capabilities, most of the Arctic states are now developing combat capable forces' (Huebert, 2010: 23).

Later in 2014, Kristian Atland wrote, *Interstate Relations in the Arctic: An Emerging Security Dilemma?*. Citing that the theory of 'security dilemma' may be, 'a useful analytical tool for scholars and decision makers attempting to understand and improve the dynamics of Arctic interstate relations' (Atland, 2014: 152), Atland argues that:

The Arctic coastal states seem to find themselves in a classic security dilemma; if they do not uphold or strengthen military (or homeland security) capabilities in the region, there is a risk that other and more powerful actors may try to exploit their weakness and threaten their economic and/or security interests in the region, on the other hand, if they do strengthen their military capabilities in the Arctic, there is a risk that their neighbors may feel intimidated or threatened by their measures, and eventually initiate similar ones. This may, in turn, necessitate additional measures and heighten the level of military tension in the region' (Atland, 2014: 146).

Atland also conducted a comparative study of the Arctic strategies of the 'Arctic Five' nation states (updated to 2014). Resulting from the research, Atland provided remedies to the situation through an increase in: arms control measures; confidence-building measures; NATO-Russia dialogue in Arctic security; strengthening of the Arctic governance system; and settlement of unresolved boundary and jurisdiction issues (Atland, 2014: 146).

Then in 2015, Andreas Osthagen authored *Arctic Security: Hype, Nuances, and Dilemmas*. Citing that while military activity in the Arctic is at the highest point since the cold war, 'Increased military activity does not, however, imply that an Arctic standoff is imminent. The prevailing argument for why there would be a conflict over the Arctic is the region's energy and mineral

resources. Yet, when examining the location and accessibility of these resources, it becomes apparent that they are predominantly located in what are already the economic zones of the Arctic coastal states' (Osthagen, 2015). Supporting the need for cooperation in the High North, 'the Arctic states are struggling to exploit their own riches, with limited or no petroleum and mineral activity commencing. Instead of inspiring a so-called scramble for the north, the Arctic states are actually mutually dependent on a stable environment to develop the potential of their northern riches' (Osthagen, 2015).

'Part Two,' further educated the researcher on the international relations theories relevant to the Arctic region and supported claims from 'Part One,' of the unbreakable relationship between diplomacy and security. The notion that Arctic states are now developing combat capable forces, leads the researcher to agree on the need for confidence-building measures. As solutions for regional stability were prescribed in the research, this research project will also seek to produce areas where defence cooperation is opportune.

Part Three: The Prospect of Regional defence Diplomacy to Provide Regional Stability

In 2013, Corneliu Bjola wrote, *Keeping the Arctic 'Cold': The Rise of Plurilateral Diplomacy?*, which argues for 'Plurilateral Diplomacy.'

At a time when the Arctic region faces significant climatic transformations, a triple governance gap threatens to fuel major diplomatic tensions among regional actors over natural resources, navigation rights, and fishery management... a plurilateral diplomatic approach could help close these gaps by establishing an effective 'web of contracts' involving institutional networks defined around the Arctic Council as the central node of Arctic governance and NATO, the International Maritime organisation (IMO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) / the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as supporting agencies (Bjola, 2013: 347).

Speaking on defence matters, Bjola states, 'military competition in the Arctic is a real possibility, not an overstated speculation' (Bjola, 2013: 353) and goes on to explain that, 'the military buildup in the Arctic is, arguably, tantamount to regional actors casting a vote of nonconfidence in the capacity of the Arctic Council and UNCLOS to manage the challenges facing the region as a result of climate change' (Bjola, 2013: 354).

After looking for additional discussion surrounding military diplomacy, Jim Rolfe's 2015 strategic background paper was located. Although Rolfe's work *Regional defence Diplomacy: What is it and what are the limits?*, is written from the Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand and providing examples to the Asia-Pacific region, we can draw information which can support the possibility for application into the Arctic region. Rolfe defines defence diplomacy to include, 'the range of non-warlike activities undertaken by the armed forces of any country, intended to develop in the international community a positive attitude towards and trust in the country undertaking the activities' (Rolfe, 2015: 1). Rolfe goes on to state that, 'The activities have moved from being an end more or less in themselves to being a means to wider national ends' (Rolfe, 2015: 2).

The underlying assumption in defence diplomacy is that the interactions are positive for each participant and more beneficial than military force, hard power, in achieving political ends, whether those ends are stability, security, influence, status or something else... There are at least nine broad outcomes or intentions for military cooperation processes, whether the cooperation is between armed forces or between armed forces and civilian agencies: Reduction in hostility or tensions; Symbolic positioning by signalling a willingness to work with and trust interlocutors; A more competent armed force with a commitment to accountability mechanisms; Transparency in terms of capacity and intentions; Development and reinforcement of good relationships with partners; Changing perceptions of each other; Confidence building; Encouragement through incentives and rewards; and Building a domestic constituency for the armed forces (Rolfe, 2015: 3).

Rolfe further defines a few necessities to support regional defence diplomacy and foster trust between one another: the need for each partner in the defence diplomacy to consider 'partner' to be paramount; an alignment of partners' aims; cultural competence; mutual understanding and empathy; equal material skills; and shared language comprehension (Rolfe, 2015: 4-5). This dissertation project will seek to incorporate his list of regional defence diplomacy into its analysis.

In 2014, Gregory Winger wrote *The Velvet Gauntlet: a theory of defence diplomacy*. Winger's work further outlines the qualities and end goals of defence diplomacy. Winger states that:

defence diplomacy has emerged as one of the most important tools of military statecraft amid this effort to move past the use of force. Although the exact definition of defence diplomacy, sometimes labeled military diplomacy, remains uncertain, it is generally considered the nonviolent use of a state's defence apparatus to advance the strategic aims of a government through cooperation with other countries...defence diplomacy is thus not cooperation for its own sake, but actually the method of bringing the strategic thinking of one country (the recipient) into harmony with another (the practitioner). This nonviolent use of military institutions to convince officials from the recipient government that they actually want what the practitioner wants is the essence of soft power' (Winger, 2014).

In alignment with the themes of this dissertation research project, Winger's notion of bringing the strategic thinking of one country into harmony with another, serves this project well and will be further analysed between the Arctic Five.

To further define defence diplomacy, we turn to Cottey and Forster's *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance*. The two claim that:

The concept of defence diplomacy encapsulates the idea that armed forces and related defence infrastructures have the potential to contribute to international security, not only by deterring and if necessary fighting wars, but also by helping to promote a more cooperative and stable international environment. Defence diplomacy is not an alternative to the more traditional roles of armed forces or to other foreign and security policy instruments, but rather a supplement to them (Cottey and Forster, 2010: 77).

Cottey and Forster also declare specific activities that are characteristic to the peaceful intentions of defence diplomacy:

Bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian defence officials; Appointment of defence attaches to foreign countries; Bilateral defence cooperation agreements; Training of foreign military and civilian defence personnel; Provision of expertise and advice on the democratic control of armed forces, defence management and military technical areas; Contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits; Placement of military or civilian personnel in partner countries' defence Ministers or armed forces; Deployment of training teams; Provision of military equipment and other material aid; Bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes (Cottey and Forster, 2010: 7).

The list of defence diplomacy characteristics will be utilised during the individual and comparative analysis of the Arctic strategies.

Focusing specifically on defence diplomacy in the Arctic, in 2012, Heather Exner-Pirot, wrote, *Defence Diplomacy in the Arctic: the search and rescue agreement as a confidence builder.*' Exner-Pirot addresses the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic 2011. Highlighting the occasion as, 'the first legally binding instrument developed under the auspices of the Arctic Council, the intergovernmental forum established in 1996; and the first international legal agreement developed for the Arctic since the Polar Bear

Agreement of 1973. The agreement itself is not overly impressive....however, it does provide an opportunity for collaboration between the Coast Guards and militaries of the Arctic, something that is needed and welcome' (Exner-Pirot, 2012: 195). Citing that nation states exist in a realist and anarchical international system, she notes Kenneth Waltz's argument for defensive buildups and goes on to highlight the resulting, 'security dilemma' which arises from such defensive actions.

Exner-Pirot advocates that the, 'search and rescue agreement can thus provide a platform by which states can pursue what's termed defence diplomacy – the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure as a tool of security and foreign policy' (Exner-Pirot, 2012: 195). Exner-Pirot points out that Arctic Council was not created, and intentionally left out, matters related to military security. But due to the recent changes resulting from climate change, a new need for security discussions has arisen, and 'the Arctic Council has not been in a position to address them' (Exner-Pirot, 2012: 196). However, Exner-Pirot argues that:

broadening of the Arctic Council mandate to address military matters would probably not help that goal. Such a conclusion has more to do with the structure of the Arctic Council than with any inherent problem in discussing Arctic security multilaterally. Were formal discussions on military and traditional security matters to occur, it would likely be in the form of a working group in the Arctic Council - which heretofore have been largely bureaucratic, with limited practical significance and marginal funding (Exner-Pirot, 2012: 203).

Rather she advocates for Arctic Coast Guards and armed forces to seize new opportunities for defensive cooperation. Agreeing with Exner-Pirot, this dissertation project seeks to evaluate the application of defence diplomacy and expose new areas for peaceful, defensive cooperation.

In 'Part Three,' the literature review assessed the current prospect of regional defence diplomacy to provide regional stability to the Arctic's security dilemma. Backing claims from parts one and

two, it further supported the need for cooperation and communication in an unstable environment. It was argued that the military developments in the Arctic are an extension of non-confidence in the capacity of current international bodies to manage the challenges facing the region. As the region experiences a rise in pluralistic diplomacy, defence diplomacy stands out as a plausible interstate activity, citing research that exposed the already present levels of defence diplomacy activity.

Literature Review Conclusion:

Through critically analysing the previous literary works published on issues relevant to Arctic security, this researcher was able to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the new geostrategic environment in the Arctic region, the Arctic security dilemma, and the application of 'regional defence diplomacy' as a possible stabilising activity. The literature review developed insight pertaining to the relationship between Arctic defence diplomacy and the wider subject area of Arctic security.

The research examined a multitude of sources to find the necessary information to understand the extent to which the national security doctrines extend regional defence diplomacy in the Arctic. It was not difficult to find information pertaining to Arctic security, as there are many pieces of personal opinion and accurate analysis dedicated to the topic. Discerning what was reliable and relevant to the research project, was an important task at hand. Information was gathered through academic studies, published books, and online articles. Although the Arctic region is changing quite rapidly, the examined literary works remain very relevant to Arctic academia.

The researcher agrees with credible sources on the importance of defence diplomacy and further seeks to test those claims and expose new areas of peaceful military cooperation. Through document and discourse analysis of the Arctic strategies, an assessment of the qualities and characteristics of defence diplomacy can be made.

Although there are a variety of arguments put forth by academic and military scholars, describing the diplomatic and security dimensions of the Arctic, significant research gaps are identified. There appears to be no updated literature produced on the topic of comparative document and discourse analysis of the national security documents of the ‘Arctic Five,’ since the United States released their most recent doctrine in December of 2016. Furthermore, while there have been many works produced on the emerging geostrategic importance of the Arctic region, regarding the environment, economic potential, and increasing military presence when it came to analysing the regional defence diplomacy of the Arctic, sources were insufficient. The researcher investigated print and digital materials from the archives of think tanks, educational institutions, and consulting firms to no avail.

As such, the researcher is justified his attempt to build upon the foundation of existing knowledge and ideas already produced on the Arctic and fill that void through this dissertation research project. As this research project serves only to add to global understanding, future research must be conducted to challenge the ideas herein, expand upon such research through new and innovative structures, and continue to ensure updated discussion.

Chapter III: Research Methods & Methodology

This dissertation project sought to expand upon and utilise the themes and issues of the dual masters' programme: Masters of Science in International Security, Intelligence, and Strategic Studies & Masters of Arts in International Security. The methodology chosen for the research project was that of document and discourse analysis. The study was both qualitative in the manner of document and discourse analysis to investigate the extent of 'defence diplomacy' within the individual security strategy documents, and quantitative through the collection and comparative analysis of a multitude of national security strategies.

Documents of Analysis

The following Arctic security strategies serve as the primary documents of analysis throughout the research project:

Canada: *Canada's Northern Strategy- Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*

Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland): *Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020*

Kingdom of Norway: *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy*

United States of America: *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region*

Russian Federation: *Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020*

The aforementioned documents are the most up to date, overarching strategies published by their respective nation states, in reference to the Arctic region. The strategies themselves all appear to be valid representations of their countries, having been released by organisations of government. The sample size of this study will consist of the littoral nation states of the Arctic Ocean, also known as the 'Arctic Five.' Their inclusion was based on their geographical location, participation in Arctic Forums, previous research, and inclusion in Arctic security issues. Additional Arctic strategies have been produced by the 'Arctic Five' nation states, as well as by a number of other Arctic actors. However, these strategies were excluded from this study based on

the fact that those strategies were not overarching and that those actors lack national territory adjacent to the Arctic Ocean.

Measures

In order for the research project to be successful, there remains a necessity of defining the criteria of analysis and outlining the meaning of certain terminology.

For this research project, the working definitions of ‘document analysis’ and ‘discourse’ were clarified. Document analysis was defined as a 'systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material. Document analysis is an efficient and effective way of gathering data because the documents are manageable and practical resources. As 'non-reactive' data sources, they can be read and reviewed multiple times and remain unchanged by the researcher’s influence or research process' (Bowen, 2009: 31).

‘Discourse’ was defined as, 'all the phenomena of symbolic interaction and communication between people, usually through spoken or written language or visual representation' (Bloor, 2007: 6). Discourse analysis will examine the structural, visual, and textual contents of the Arctic strategies. Where the text is accompanied by images, maps, and/or figures, multimodal discourse, is analysed. Multimodal discourse was defined as, 'discourse which relies on more than one mode of communication. A great deal of discourse relies on multi-modal resources, particularly as modern technology enables us to access visual information so easily' (Bloor, 2007: 7).

It is understood that a country’s national security policy or strategy is, 'determined by many factors, including external threats, geography, political culture, military capabilities, economic needs, elite opinion, popular opinion (in democracies) and its leaders’ perceptions of the country’s interests. This last factor frequently manifests itself in what has been called a foreign

policy or national security ‘doctrine.’ A national security doctrine serves as a guide by which leaders conduct the foreign policy of a country. At its most effective, a national security doctrine is the organizing principle that helps statesmen identify and prioritize their country’s geopolitical interests’ (Sempa, 2004).

To define ‘defence diplomacy,’ we will draw from previous meditations which state 'defence diplomacy has emerged as one of the most important tools of military statecraft amid this effort to move past the use of force. Although the exact definition of defence diplomacy, sometimes labeled military diplomacy, remains uncertain, it is generally considered the nonviolent use of a state’s defence apparatus to advance the strategic aims of a government through cooperation with other countries...defence diplomacy is thus not cooperation for its own sake, but actually the method of bringing the strategic thinking of one country (the recipient) into harmony with another (the practitioner). This nonviolent use of military institutions to convince officials from the recipient government that they actually want what the practitioner wants is the essence of soft power' (Winger, 2014).

The themes of defence diplomacy were set to be ‘the need for each partner in the defence diplomacy to consider ‘partner’ to be paramount; an alignment of partners’ aims; cultural competence; mutual understanding and empathy; equal material skills; and shared language comprehension (Rolfe, 2015: 4-5). Examples of defence diplomacy could include:

Bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian defence officials; Appointment of defence attaches to foreign countries; Bilateral defence cooperation agreements; Training of foreign military and civilian defence personnel; Provision of expertise and advice on the democratic control of armed forces, defence management and military technical areas; Contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits; Placement of military or civilian personnel in partner countries’ defence Ministers or armed forces; Deployment of training teams; Provision of military

equipment and other material aid; Bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes (Cottey and Forster, 2010: 7).

The intended outcomes of defence diplomacy may appear in the ‘Reduction in hostility or tensions; Symbolic positioning by signalling a willingness to work with and trust interlocutors; A more competent armed force with a commitment to accountability mechanisms; Transparency in terms of capacity and intentions; Development and reinforcement of good relationships with partners; Changing perceptions of each other; Confidence building; Encouragement through incentives and rewards; Building a domestic constituency for the armed forces’ (Rolfe, 2015: 3) to support in countering and de-escalation of the security dilemma.

Parameters were set in order to make the dissertation research project feasible for the researcher and meet the requirements of the academic program. Due to researcher’s physical location outside of the Arctic region, inability to travel to the Arctic, lack of funding for the research project, and time constraints to conduct the research project, the primary documents of analysis were appropriately chosen. By making the security strategies the documents of analysis, the information provided within was the only source of information. See Chapter VI: Discussion for additional reasoning and critique.

Research Design

The research project applied ‘document and discourse analysis’ and was conducted and presented through individual and comparative analysis.

The documents were first read through in their entirety to become acquainted with their contents. In the process of doing so, it was discovered that there were similar traits included in all five of the strategies, relevant to the research question and defence diplomacy characteristics outlined in the literature review. This discovery supported the decision to conduct a thematic approach to the research. Because the literature review provided context into the features of defence diplomacy,

it was decided to analyse the content and discourse of the strategies for their inclusion of such, as interpreted by the researcher.

Thematic analyses, 'require more involvement and interpretation from the researcher. Thematic analyses move beyond counting explicit words or phrases and focus on identifying and describing both implicit and explicit ideas within the data, that is, themes' (Guest, 2012: 10). 'Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns within data' (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 79). The analysis sought to expose the key variables of defence diplomacy as outlined in the literature review. Approaching thematic analysis in a deductive manner, the coding and theme development were directed by existing concepts or ideas.

In order to conduct comparative document and discourse analysis, the research was also divided into three codes: External, Visual, and Textual. 'External' assessed the overarching construct and presentation of the strategic publications; 'Visual' assessed the graphics and images included within the Arctic strategies; and 'Textual' assessed the rhetorical content of the Arctic strategies.

The analysis was conducted to support the research question and identify information within the Arctic security strategies pertaining to the key themes of the research project. The methodologies included here within were deemed appropriate, and the individual and comparative study was designed and formatted to be intentionally similar to that of the previous studies addressed in 'part one' of the literature review. Additional discussion on the process is noted in Chapter VI: Discussion.

Procedures

The process of deductive thematic analysis was applied in a seven phase process:

1. Locating the Documents: The core documents of analysis had to first be located (See Appendix I: Documents of Analysis). As the Russian Arctic strategy was not found to be

officially published in the English language by the government of the Russian Federation, a translation had to be located. The validity of the translation is further discussed in Chapter VI: Discussion. Once the documents were acquired online, they were printed out in their entirety.

2. Familiarisation with the Documents of Analysis: This phase involved reading and re-reading the Arctic strategies of the ‘Arctic Five,’ to become completely immersed and well familiarised with their content. During this phase, an inventory was created in order to establish a basic background on the strategies which included the date of publication, publishing authority, length of the document, published language(s), overarching strategies, priorities of the state, end goals, as well as the prevalence of images, geographical maps, and data sets (See Appendix III: Individual Analysis).
3. Reviewing Themes: This phase involved double checking the candidate themes (characteristics of defence diplomacy) against the documents of analysis, to determine if they would indeed support the research project. During this phase, evidence of the themes prevalence was identified, thus confirming them to be applicable to the question at hand.
4. Searching for the Themes: This phase involved examining the documents and collated data to identify the significant themes. It involved collating data relevant to each candidate theme so that the researcher could then work with the data and review the viability of each candidate theme and its relation to the research question.
5. Coding: This phase involved generating succinct sections that identified important features of the documents of analysis, relevant to answering the research question. It involved coding the entire strategies into three sections (External, Visual, and Textual). This was done to the individual strategies, so as to be made available for the later stages of comparative analysis. ‘External’ assessed the overarching construct and presentation of the publications; ‘Visual’ assessed the graphics and images included within the

strategies; and ‘Textual’ assessed the rhetoric of the strategies (See Appendix III: Individual Analysis & Appendix IV: Comparative Analysis).

6. Comparative Study: In this phase, a comparative analysis of the Arctic security strategies was conducted. The data collected from the previous phases were combined and cross referenced in order to expose elements and potentiality of defence diplomacy.
7. Write Up: This final phase involves weaving together the analytic narrative and data extracts, and contextualising the analysis in relation to existing literature. Searching for areas of current defence cooperation, areas for interstate contention, and opportunity for future defence diplomacy.

Data Analysis

In alignment with the international relations theory of realism, the hypothesis assumed that self interest and self preservation is a priority for the Arctic states. This hypothesis was tested by gathering and analysing key information from the priorities of the Arctic security strategies in relations to self preservation through hard power militarisation. The prevalence of a security dilemma was assessed by the cited military developments within the Arctic security strategies.

Testing the research question: Do the Arctic security strategies of the ‘Arctic Five’ support defence diplomacy as an outlet for providing stability in the region. To further assess the research question, an individual and comparative analysis sought to analyse current areas collaboration and confrontation, as well as expose opportunities for future activities of regional defence diplomacy.

Chapter IV: Arctic Security Doctrines of the ‘Arctic Five’

This chapter introduces the reader to the security strategies of the ‘Arctic Five’ by providing an inventory and individual analysis of the doctrines. The inventory includes the date of publication, publishing authority, length of the document, published language(s), overarching strategies, priorities of the state, end goals, as well as the prevalence of geographical maps and photographic images. In alignment with the themes of the project, the individual analysis exposes critical information on the state’s geostrategic interests, militarisation, and potentiality for employing defence diplomacy across the Arctic region.

The individual analysis is conducted in alphabetical order of the ‘Arctic Five’ nation states.

Canada: Page 32

Kingdom of Denmark: Page 38

Kingdom of Norway: Page 42

Russian Federation: Page 46

United States of America: Page 50

Comparative analysis of the content and discourse of the Arctic security strategies is then provided in Chapter V: Comparative Analysis.

Canada: *Canada's Northern Strategy- Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*

Canada's Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians released the Arctic security strategy, *Canada's Northern Strategy- Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*, in the year 2009. It is forty pages in length and includes side by side translation into three different languages- English, French, and Inuktitut. The text is accompanied by a variety of maps and photographs pertaining to Canada's northern territories.

The strategy is very well organised and includes a depth of information on a number of topics including elements of Canada's defensive developments for national security; aspects of the Canadian national identity, language, and culture; national commitment to understanding neighbouring interests; intentions to align national aims with its international partners, and potentiality for increasing activities of defense diplomacy.

Because the Arctic strategy was produced on behalf of the Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, and not a hard security authority it expresses a more comprehensive approach to Arctic security matters. This broad security agenda is prevalent in the Northern Strategy's four priority areas: 'Exercising our Arctic sovereignty; Promoting social and economic development; Protecting the North's environmental heritage; and Improving and devolving northern governance, so that Northerners have a greater say in their own destiny' (Canada, 2009: 2). However, as exercising national sovereignty remains the first priority of the Canadian state, a realist perspective would support the notion of Canadian defence forces will play an important role in Canada's northern territories; thus creating a security threat to its Arctic neighbours.

Canada's clear vision for the North includes:

self-reliant individuals live in healthy, vital communities, manage their own affairs and shape their own destinies; the Northern tradition of respect for the land and the environment is paramount and the principle of responsible and sustainable development anchor all decision making and action; strong, responsible accountable governments work together for a vibrant, prosperous future for all- a place whose people and governments are significant contributing partners to a dynamic, secure Canadian federation; and we patrol and protect our territory through enhanced presence on the land, in the sea, and over the skies of the Arctic (Canada, 2009: 2).

The vision further communicates Canada's commitment to its local populations and willingness to retain national sovereignty and protect national developments through defensive assets on land, sea, and air. Speaking of the local population, the strategy includes much content on the national identity and the cultural history of Canada's indigenous peoples, even going as far to say that their national sovereignty is 'longstanding, well-established and based on historical title, founded in part on the presence of Inuit and other Aboriginal peoples since the time immemorial' (Canada, 2009: 9). The name Inuit actually means 'people' in the local language of Inuktitut and it said that those people have occupied Canada's Arctic lands and waterways for millennia' (Canada, 2009: 3). In addition to the Inuit, other Aboriginal peoples such as the Dene, Gwich'in, Cree and Metis also stated to occupy Canada's northern territories (Canada, 2009: 4). As such, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich'in Council International, and the Inuit Circumpolar Council all have a strong presence and influence in Canada's Arctic region (Canada, 2009: 13). The inclusion of this cultural information and photographs of cultural activities supports intercultural competence between the littoral Arctic nations, a foundational requirement for success in defence diplomacy. As building a domestic constituency for the armed forces, the indigenous peoples are also an important aspect of the national security forces.

The Canadian strategy emphasises the presence of their military forces the North, in order to ensure that they remain prepared to protect and patrol the land, sea and sky of their sovereign Arctic territory. It transparently states and pictures Canadian intentions of 'putting more boots on

the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-in-the-sky' (Canada, 2009: 9). The Arctic strategy exhibits a level of transparency when speaking on Canadian military capacity and intentions to develop new defensive capabilities. It further states that significant investments are being made for the development of an Army Training Centre at Resolute Nat on the shore of the Northwest Passage, to expand land capabilities. The Centre intends to support the modernization of the Canadian Rangers, 'a Reserve Force responsible for providing military presence and surveillance and for assisting with search and rescue in remote, isolated and coastal communities of Northern Canada' (Canada, 2009: 10). Defensive developments are not limited to land components as the strategy also highlights defensive maritime developments.

Maritime assets are described and pictured within the security strategy. It specifically and transparently states that maritime investments are to be made for a new deep-water berthing and fueling facility in Nanisivik and the procurement of a new polar icebreaker, which will be the largest and most powerful icebreaker ever to serve in the Canadian Coast Guard fleet (Canada, 2009: 10). The fueling facility and icebreaker are to be supported by the expansion of Canada's Arctic-capable fleet, which the strategy shares intentions for investing in new patrol ships that are capable of sustaining operations in first year sea ice and be able to patrol the entire length of the Northwest Passage during its navigable season and even conduct year round approaches (Canada, 2009: 10). In addition to land and maritime assets, the strategy includes a photo of a satellite and speaks about Canadian space developments.

The Arctic is no exception to the comprehensive need for technology to adapt to the insidious threats in today's day and age. The strategy shares Canada's engagement in the utilisation of the Polar Epsilon, Canada's space-based wide area surveillance and support program, in order to provide Canadian Forces with greater capacity to monitor Canada and its Maritime Boundary from the RADARSAT II (Canada, 2009: 10). Citing aspects of their material skills in outer space also exposes additional elements where defensive collaboration could be applied. While the strategy does declare a national intent to protect Canada's own on land, sea, and air, it does not leave out overwhelming commitment to work with its Arctic partners for shared defence efforts.

The development and reinforcement of good relationships with partners seems to be a Canadian goal. When speaking on an alignment of partners' aims, the strategy declares the Arctic Council has played a key role in developing a common agenda among Arctic states and remains an important international forum for deepening global understanding of the Arctic region (Canada, 2009: 35), thus reinforcing current commitments to accountability mechanisms. The strategy also mentions the United Nations, the International Maritime Organisation, and the World Meteorological Organisation. Canada's strategy further expresses understanding and empathy for its Arctic neighbours by noting a few interstate disagreements.

Although the majority of Canada's sovereignty over its Arctic territories is undisputed, the strategy mentions specific disagreements between Canada and its Arctic neighbours in regards to Hans Island and the legal status of waterways within Canadian territories. Hans Island is an island claimed by both Canada and Denmark, but the disagreement does not include an adverse opinion on the surrounding waters (Canada, 2009: 13). There also remains 'managed disagreements' between Canada and Denmark over the maritime boundary in the Lincoln Sea and between Canada and the United States regarding the boundary in the Beaufort Sea and the legal status of the various waterways which construct the Northwest Passage (Canada, 2009: 13). However,

All of these disagreements are well-managed and pose no sovereignty or defence challenges for Canada. In fact, they have had no impact on Canada's ability to work collaboratively and cooperatively with the United States, Denmark, or other Arctic neighbours on issues of real significance and importance...Cooperation, diplomacy, and international law have always been Canada's preferred approach in the Arctic...We continue to work closely with our Arctic partners to achieve our common goals for the region as we advance our priorities at home (Canada, 2009: 33).

In regards to defining Canada's territory, the strategy states that Canada's North is a vast region

has still yet to be fully studied and mapped. As a result of the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Canada is in the process of conducting scientific studies to determine the full extent of [their] continental shelf as defined under UNCLOS' (Canada, 2009: 12). While this statement provides uncertainty, it does express commitment to previous agreements and international law. Confidence building remains a critical variable to defence diplomacy. In an additional statement on the UNCLOS continental shelf claims, the strategy states that 'This process, while lengthy, is not adversarial and is not a race' (Canada, 2009: 12), further symbolising terms of national intentions and commitment to mutual understanding and empathy.

Citing specific military partnerships, Canada's strategy mentions collaboration with its Arctic neighbours. 'The United States remains an exceptionally valuable partner in the Arctic. Canada and the United States share a number of common interests in the Arctic, such as environmental stewardship, sustainable resource development and safety and security - including effective search and rescue services' (Canada, 2009: 34). Beyond search and rescue efforts, the strategy speaks to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), a bilateral defence command between Canada and the United States (Canada, 2009: 11). Furthermore, when speaking to other actors in the area the strategy claims Canada has 'common interests with, and things to learn from, our other Arctic neighbours - Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland' (Canada, 2009: 35). Another attempt to open dialogue for bringing the strategic thinking of Canada into harmony with its Arctic neighbours. Non-arctic states are also mentioned in the strategy; a foreshadow to their emerging influence in the region.

The analysis of *Canada's Northern Strategy- Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future* has made clear that Canada's military forces are a defensive necessity of national security and will play an important role in the future of Canada's Northern Territories. The buildup of defence forces is interpreted as the repercussion of climate change, need to protect the region's human and economic assets, and to counter neighbouring defence developments. In alignment with the themes of the project, the individual analysis exposed elements of Canada's defensive material

skills; aspects of the national identity, language, and culture; understanding for neighbouring interests; as well as intentions to align national aims with its international partners. The analysis concludes that defence diplomacy is currently an active part of their national foreign and security policies and holds great potential to increase within the Arctic region.

Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland): *Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020*

The Kingdom of Denmark, along with the Government of Greenland, and the Government of Faroes, put forth their Arctic Security Doctrine, *Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020*, in the year 2011. The doctrine is fifty-eight pages in length, published in the languages of Danish, Kalaallisut, English, and is further supplemented with maps and images.

The strategy includes a depth of information on a number of topics including elements of the Realm's defensive developments for national security; aspects of their shared identity, language, and culture; commitment to understanding neighbouring interests; intentions to align national aims with international partners, and potentiality for increasing activities of defence diplomacy.

The main chapters of their doctrine are titled; Introduction; A Peaceful, Secure, and Safe Arctic; Self-Sustaining Growth and Development; Development with Respect For the Arctic's Vulnerable Climate, Environment, and Nature; Close Cooperation with Our International Partners; and Implementation and Follow-Up.

It states that the purpose of their strategy is to focus attention on the Kingdom's strategic priorities for future development in the Arctic towards 2020, with the aim of strengthening the Kingdom's' status as a global player in the Arctic' (Denmark, 2011: 11). Putting national interests first, the strategy supports a realist perspective of the international system. Although the strategy covers a comprehensive list of security topics, it does explain the presence, tasks, and goals for the Realm's armed forces across the region.

Sovereignty enforcement is the primary task of the Danish Armed Forces in the Arctic and the level of presence in the area is determined accordingly. Units from the army, navy and air force carry out tasks in the Arctic. They undertake surveillance and enforcement of sovereignty of Greenland and Faroese territorial waters and airspace, as well as the Greenland exclusive economic zone and the fishing zones to ensure no systematic violations of territory can take place. Likewise, the Sirius Patrol

oversees the National Park in Northeast Greenland and enforces sovereignty there' (Denmark, 2011: 21).

While the Kingdom of Denmark is an area of the Arctic which is covered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's Article 5 regarding collective defence, 'the enforcement of sovereignty is fundamentally a responsibility of the Realm's central authorities' (Denmark, 2011: 20). In this self-help system, the strategy cites specific defence developments. 'The Armed Forces North Atlantic command structure will be streamlined by the amalgamation of the Greenland Command and the Faroe Command into a joint Service Arctic Command; the establishment of an Arctic Response Force; risk analysis of the maritime environment in and around Greenland is to be conducted; and a comprehensive analysis of the armed force's future tasks in the Arctic' (Denmark, 2011: 20). As the armed forces of the Realm consist of personnel from within the three governments, it is tasked to build up a domestic constituency for the Realm's armed forces. The strategy highlights these national intentions in works and photographs:

The Danish defence aspires, as other public institutions, to reflect the surrounding community. Indeed, it is a Danish-Greenland hope that citizens in Greenland can be increasingly involved in the tasks of the armed forces and with that, participate in a wide range of training opportunities, whether they be basic training, civil/military specialist and management training programs, or customised further education at all levels. The armed forces will thereby also greatly benefit from Greenland local knowledge (Denmark, 2011: 21).

Building a domestic constituency for the Realm's armed forces is also a characteristic defence diplomacy. As personnel are not the only an element of defensive assets, the strategy further includes photographs of aircraft, sea vessels, and animals. The images refer to the 'Challenger CL-604 patrol aircraft,' an 'Offshore patrol vessel and patrol vessel,' as well as the the 'Sledge patrol' providing information and transparency to the state's defensive material skills. While the

strategy transparently outlines attributes of national security, it also expresses intentions for regional defence diplomacy with its Arctic neighbours.

Regarding international partners, the Realm's security policy approach is 'based on the overall goal of preventing conflicts and avoiding the militarisation of the Arctic, and actively helping to preserve the Arctic as a region characterised by trust, cooperation, and mutually beneficial partnerships' (Denmark, 2011: 10). The Arctic strategy specifically cites the importance of international bodies including the United Nations, Arctic Council, European Union, Nordic Council of Ministers, International Maritime organisation, International Hydrographic organisation, Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission, World Trade organisation, Nordic Atlantic Cooperation, and the West Nordic Cooperation. 'International law and established forums of cooperation provide a sound basis for conflict resolution and constructive cooperation in the development of the Arctic' (Denmark, 2011: 13).

In equal partnership between the three parts of the Danish Realm, the Kingdom will work overall for: 'A peaceful, secure, and safe Arctic; with self-sustaining growth and development; with respect for the Arctic's fragile climate, environment, and nature; in close cooperation with our international partners' (Denmark, 2011: 12). The strategy specifically cites current areas of cooperation to include sea rescue, continental shelf claims, and environmental protection. As outlined in the literature review, sea rescue is a foundational element to the Arctic Council and regional defence diplomacy.

The Realm's strategy also exposes other areas of defence diplomacy to include topics of military alliances, shared military bases, and maritime cooperation. Expanding upon the previously mentioned NATO participation, the strategy cites the Thule base, claiming that it may play a greater role in regards to the tasks of the armed forces in and around Greenland in cooperation with other partner countries. 'Thule Air Base is, with its deep water port, airport and well-developed infrastructure (including tank and storage capacity, workshop, hospital, quarters, support and office facilities), a unique capability in the Arctic region north of the Arctic circle'

(Denmark, 2011: 54). In regards to maritime collaboration, 'Confidence building and studies on potential cooperation between the Danish and Russian defence, particularly in the maritime area' (Denmark, 2011: 54). The strategy also mentions non-Arctic states as actors to be engaged with for international collaboration.

Individual analysis of the *Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020* shows that the defensive forces of the Kingdom of Denmark, Government of Greenland, and the Government of Faroes, will play a significant role in the future of security of Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroes. In alignment with the themes of the research project, the individual analysis of the Realm's strategy provides critical information on its defensive material skills; aspects of the tri-governmental identity, language, and shared culture; understanding and empathy for neighbouring interests; as well as intentions to align aims with its Arctic partners. The buildup of defence forces is interpreted as the repercussion of climate change, need to protect the region's human and economic assets, and to counter neighbouring defence developments. The analysis concludes that defence diplomacy is currently an active element of the Realm's foreign and security policies and has a high potentiality to increase within the Arctic region.

Kingdom of Norway: *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy*

The Kingdom of Norway published their seventy-three page Arctic Security Doctrine, *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy*, in 2006. The Arctic strategy is extremely comprehensive and is made available in Norwegian, English, German, French, and Russian (See Appendix I: Documents of Analysis). The text is also supplemented with maps and photographic images.

The strategy includes a depth of information on a number of topics including elements of the Norway's defensive developments for national security; aspects of national identity, language, and culture; commitment to understanding neighbouring interests; intentions to align national aims with international partners, and potentiality for increasing activities of defence diplomacy.

The main political priorities for the Government's High North strategy are as follows:

We will exercise our authority in the High North in a credible, consistent, and predictable way; We will be at the forefront of international efforts to develop knowledge in and about the High North; We intend to be the best steward of the environment and natural resources in the High North; We will provide a suitable framework for further development of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea, and will seek to ensure that these activities boost competence in Norway in general and in North Norway in particular, and foster local and regional business development; We intend the High North Policy to play a role in safeguarding the livelihoods, traditions and cultures of indigenous peoples in the High North; We will further develop people-to-people cooperation in the High North; and We will strengthen our cooperation with Russia. (Norway, 2006: 7-9).

The security doctrine is further divided into a number of separate chapters- A New Dimension of Norwegian Foreign Policy; Knowledge generation and competence building; Issues relating to indigenous peoples; People to people cooperation in the north; The environment; The

management and utilization of marine resources; Petroleum activities; Maritime transport- safety and emergency response systems; Business development; and Follow Up.

The Arctic strategy further exhibits a number of self-help qualities paired with intentions for defence diplomacy.

It is important to maintain the presence of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the High North both to enable Norway to exercise its sovereignty and authority and to ensure that it can maintain its role in resource management. The presence of the armed forces increases predictability and stability, and is decisive for our ability to respond to emergencies in the High North...One of the primary tasks of the armed forces is to provide background information for national decision making through up to date surveillance and intelligence (Norway, 2006: 19).

Offering transparency into the location of an element of the defensive forces, the Arctic strategy claims that 'The army's activities are to a large extent concentrated in North Norway, and nearly all training of national servicemen now takes place there. The Army has key units in Troms, which will continue to play an important role in the future, and South Varanger Garrison in Finnmark is another high priority unit' (Norway, 2006: 20). The strategy states that the majority of the challenges in the Arctic are cross-sectoral, and require cooperation between national civilian and military authorities. 'The armed forces have an important role to play, because they have a clearly defined leadership structure and chain of command, and other capacities that can be put to use as required' (Norway, 2006: 19). Establishing a connection with civilian authorities supports the building a domestic constituency for the armed forces.

Additional elements of the national defences are to be developed to:

Examine the need for a new, ice-class research vessel with a view to increasing year-round Norwegian presence in northern waters; introducing a mandatory system

requiring the employment of local people with thorough knowledge of the waters around Svalbard to pilot vessels sailing in these waters; continue Norway's engagement in efforts to ensure nuclear safety and emergency preparedness in the High North; further develop the active dialogue with neighbors, partners, and allies on High North issues; raise the profile of Norway's High North policy in regional and international forums and ensure that this is done in a coordinated manner; the Government will also encourage geological surveys in the High North (Norway, 2006: 9-10).

Citing ongoing elements of defence diplomacy, the strategy outlines a number of examples with its Arctic neighbors:

'For many years we have been cooperating closely with allied countries on military activities in the north, mainly in the form of joint exercises and training. These are valuable because they make our allies familiar with the conditions in the north, and ensure greater general coordination in allied operations. The Government will seek to maintain our allies' and partners' interest in the north, and will encourage increased participation in military exercises and training in the region (Norway, 2006: 9-10).

The Norwegian strategy spends a great deal of focus on its intentions to engage with the Russian Federation, a state advisory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation:

Defence cooperation between Norway and Russia is also building mutual trust and increasing our capacity for joint problem-solving. The Kursk and Elektron incidents demonstrated how valuable established contact between regional military authorities is when emergencies or delicate situations arise... strengthen cooperation with the authorities in Russia and other countries in the fight against illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing in the Barents Sea; draw up proposals for an economic and industrial cooperation zone, which would include both Norwegian and Russian territory in the border areas of the High North; identify further measures to facilitate border crossings

between Norway and Russia; and develop closer cultural cooperation in the High North, especially with Russia (Norway, 2006: 9-10).

Additionally, the strategy states 'We will make active efforts to intensify our defence-related dialogue with Russia... The cooperation between the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Russian Coast Guard will also be further developed in order to ensure optimal coordination of the fisheries control in the Barents Sea' (Norway, 2006: 20). It is clear that the Norwegian strategy seeks to change perceptions of each other and development and reinforcement of good relationships with its partners.

Individual analysis of *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy* clearly exhibits evidence in support of the defensive forces of the Kingdom of Norway to remain a significant actor in the future of Norway. In alignment with the themes of the dissertation project, the individual analysis of the Norwegian strategy exposed elements of defensive material skills; aspects of the national identity, language, and culture; national understanding for neighbouring interests; as well as intentions to align national aims with its international partners. The buildup of defence forces is interpreted as the repercussion of climate change, need to protect the region's human and economic assets, and to counter neighbouring defence developments. The analysis concludes that defence diplomacy is currently an active part of the Norwegian national foreign and security policies and provides foreshadowing of positive potentiality in the development of defence diplomacy across the Arctic region.

Russian Federation: *Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020*

The Security Council of the Russian Federation (Совет Безопасности Российской Федерации) published the security doctrine, *Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020*, on behalf of the Russian Federation in 2009. The document is eight pages in length, written in the Russian language, and contains no supplemental images or maps.

The document is divided into six sections: I. General Provisions II. National Interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic III. The Main Goals and Strategic Priorities of the National Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic IV. The Main Tasks and Measures for Implementing the National Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic V. The Main Mechanisms for Implementing the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic VI. The Implementation of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. Within these chapters lay information pertaining a multitude of topics including elements of the Russian Federations defensive developments for national security; aspects of national identity, language, and culture; commitment to understanding neighbouring interests; intentions to align national aims with international partners, and potentiality for increasing activities of defence diplomacy.

The basic national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic are:

the use of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic base of the Russian Federation that provides for the solution of task for the social and economic development of the country; the maintaining of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation; the preservation of the unique ecological systems of the Arctic; the use of the Northern Sea Route as a national unified transportation line of communications of the Russian Federation in the Arctic (Russian Federation, 2009: 2).

In order to fulfil such interests, it is a national security demand to develop defensive forces within the zone. The strategy further outlines the role in which the Russian forces will play. Militaristically, the security forces of the Russian Federation are to:

defend and safeguard the state border of the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation; and, to provide for favorable operational capabilities of general purpose formations of troops (forces) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and of other troops, military formations and organisations in this region' (Russian Federation, 2009: 2).

It is the demand of these Russian Federation that these security forces are able to provide for national security under various conditions of military and political situations (Russian Federation, 2009: 4). Highlighting entry points and border security as a critical element, it cites national intentions for developing technical controls for the bay zones, river entrances and estuaries of the Northern Sea Route lines (Russian Federation, 2009: 4). The strategy highlights the national goal of creating:

a function system of coastal defence to support in the combating of terrorism at sea, interdiction of contraband activity, illegal immigration, and protection of the aquatic biological resources; development of the border infrastructure of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and re-equipping the border authorities; creation of a system of comprehensive controls over the maritime surface situation, strengthening state control commercial activities in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation' (Russian Federation, 2009: 5).

In order to do so, the strategy further states Russian intention to:

Introduce modern information and telecommunications technologies and resources (including mobile ones) of communications, television and radio service, management

of vessel traffic and aviation flights, remote Earth sounding, the conduction of area photography of the ice cover, as well as systems for providing hydrometeorological and hydrographic services, and providing for scientific expeditionary research... to create a reliable system for rendering navigation, hydrometeorological and information services providing effective control for economic, military and ecological activities in the Arctic, as well as for the forecasting and warning of extraordinary situations and the minimizing of damage in the event of their occurrence, to include those derived from the use of the GLONASS global navigation satellite system and multirole space system (Russian Federation, 2009: 5).

While the strategy transparently outlines attributes of national security, it also expresses intentions for regional defence diplomacy with its Arctic neighbours. In the sphere of international cooperation, the Russian Federation intends to ‘provide for conditions of mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and Arctic-bordering states based on international treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party’ (Russian Federation, 2009: 2). Consistent with intentions for the commitment to accountability mechanisms and confidence building the strategy states a national goal:

To strengthen the good-neighborly relations of Russia with Arctic-adjacent states on a bilateral basis and within the framework of regional organisation, including the Arctic Council and the Barents/Euro-Arctic Region Council, and to activate economic, scientific and technical, and cultural interactions and border cooperation, to include those in the area of effective exploitation of national resources and in the protection of the surrounding natural environment in the Arctic... To promote participation of Russian state institutions and social organisations in the work of international forums dedicated to Arctic problem sets, including inter-parliamentary interactions within the framework of the Russia-European Union partnership (Russian Federation, 2009: 3).

The individual analysis of the Arctic strategy of the Russian Federation exposes a national security demand for Russian military forces to take an active role in Russia's Arctic zone. As the *Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020* was published by the Security Council of the Russian Federation (Совет Безопасности Российской Федерации) it is further interpreted as a direct act of defence diplomacy. In alignment with the themes of the project, the individual analysis of the Russian strategy exposed elements of Russia's defensive material skills; aspects of the national identity, language, and culture; understanding for neighbouring interests; as well as intentions to align national aims with international and regional actors. The buildup of defence forces is interpreted as the repercussion of climate change, need to protect the region's human and economic assets, and to counter neighbouring defence developments. The analysis concludes that defence diplomacy is currently an active element of Russian national foreign and security policies and holds great potential to increase within the Arctic region.

United States of America: *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region*

The United States constructed their Arctic Security Doctrine, *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region* in 2016 and it was later publicly released in 2017. The doctrine builds upon the 2009 National Security Presidential Directive 66/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, *Arctic Region Policy*, and the 2013 *National Strategy for the Arctic Region* (NSAR).

The strategy is organised into chapters: Executive Summary; US Military Objectives in the Arctic in Support of National Interests; Description of Operational Plans and Military Requirements; Operational Seams and Unity of Effort; The Arctic Region Security Environment; Military Ways and Means Required to Implement Strategy; DOD Arctic Capability and Resource Gaps; Assessment of Military to Military Cooperation with Partner Nations; and Conclusion. Within these chapters, the strategy includes a depth of information on a number of topics including elements of defensive developments for national security; aspects of national identity, language, and culture; commitment to understanding neighbouring interests; intentions to align national aims with international partners, and potentiality for increasing activities of defence diplomacy.

The objectives and four overarching priorities of the United States strategy in the Arctic are:

Enhance the capability of the U.S. forces to defend the homeland and exercise sovereignty; Strengthen deterrence at home and abroad; Strengthen alliances and partnerships; Preserve freedom of the seas in the Arctic; Engage public, private, and international partners to improve domain awareness in the Arctic; Evolve DoD Arctic infrastructure and capabilities consistent with changing conditions and needs; Provide support for civil authorities, as directed; Partner with other departments, agencies, and nations to support human and environmental security; and Support international institutions that promote regional cooperation and the rule of law... working with allies

and partners to safeguard peace and stability; making decisions using the best available scientific information; pursuing innovation partnerships to develop needed capabilities and capacity over time; and following established Federal and DoD tribal consultation policy as applicable' (United States, 2016: 2-4).

The strategy was analysed for the themes of defence diplomacy and was found to provide key information into the material skills; aspects of the national identity, language, and culture; understanding for neighbouring interests; as well as intentions to align national aims with international and regional actors. In this self-help system the strategy cites specific unilateral defence developments are a requirement to provide 'assessments of the capabilities and limitations of potential adversaries' (United States, 2016: 12) and 'conduct Freedom of Navigation operations to challenge excessive maritime claims when and where necessary' (United States, 2016: 11).

Referring the Arctic Region Policy, 'U.S. national security interests include such matters as missile defence and early warning; deployment at sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight' (United States, 2016: 3). These interests are based on the results of 'a needs-driven process that identifies, assesses, validates, and prioritises joint military capability requirements while considering the full range of material and non-materiel solutions' (United States, 2016: 4). The United States plans to conduct 'Robust observations, remote sensing capabilities, and modelling of the space, air, sea surface, ice, and ocean environments that affect operations in the Arctic are key aspects of domain awareness and safe operations, particularly in a remote and harsh region' (United States, 2016: 11).

The strategy further outlines the national need for 'Forward-deployed air, land, and sea capabilities to secure and advance U.S. national security interest and permit the United States to respond rapidly to emerging crises in the Arctic and elsewhere around the globe' (United States, 2016: 9). With a long list of national security demands in the High North, the strategy outlines

the need for domestic support. When speaking to building a domestic constituency for the armed forces, civilian forces comes in the form of the Alaska National Guard. In the event of an Arctic situation, the Alaskan Guard may be the first military force which will respond. While national interests were among the priorities of the strategy, it also provided information on how the United States intends to work with other Arctic actors.

When speaking to the attributes of the consideration of ‘partner’ to be paramount, the Arctic strategy claims that 'Alliance and strategic partnerships remain the centre of gravity in achieving DoD’s desired end-state and ensuring that the Arctic remains a secure and stable region' (United States, 2016: 3). Building upon the previous strategy of the Arctic which states the United States ‘seeks to maintain the Arctic region as stable and free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation’ (United States, 2016: 3). The strategy directly highlights the desire for defence diplomacy, 'Security cooperation activities and other military to military engagements continue to shape and maintain international relations and partnerships that are necessary to reduce the potential for friction and miscalculation' (United States, 2016: 14). Elements of defence diplomacy were also identified in the strategy when addressing bilateral and multilateral exercises:

Bilateral and multilateral training and exercises enhance interoperability through the development and practice of common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for extreme cold weather operations both in the Arctic region and near-Arctic regions such as the southern approaches to Greenland Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap...Bilateral and multilateral defence relationships; exchanges of lessons learned and best practices in collaborative forums such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), ARCTIC EAGLE, and ARCTIC ZEPHYR series of tabletop exercises; information-sharing to enhance domain awareness; and coordination of military and civilian responses to natural and man-made disasters (United States, 2016: 6).

The American strategy also exhibits a level of mutual understanding and empathy for other Arctic neighbours. 'As ice recedes and resource extraction technology improves, competition for economic advantage and a desire to exert influence over an area of increasing geostrategic importance could lead to increased tension. These economic and security concerns may increase risk of disputes between Arctic and non-Arctic nations over access to Arctic shipping lanes and natural resources' (United States, 2016: 6). The strategy further states that the greatest disagreements with its Arctic neighbours are the way in which 'Canada and Russia regulate navigation in Arctic waters claimed under their jurisdiction. The United States has protested these excessive maritime claims as inconsistent with international law and does not recognise them. This will likely remain an issue on which the United States and a number of other nations will continue to disagree with Canada and Russia' (United States, 2016: 6). The United States' Arctic strategy also list short summaries of foreign interests in the region from Russia, Canada, The Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, The Kingdom of Norway, The Kingdom of Sweden, Non-Arctic States (United States, 2016: 7-9).

The individual analysis of the *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region* exposes a national security demand for the prevalence and development of defensive military forces within the Arctic region. As it was published by the United States Department of defence it is further interpreted as a direct act of defence diplomacy. In alignment with the themes of the project, the individual analysis further highlights elements of the state's defensive material skills; aspects of its national identity, language, and culture; understanding and empathy for neighbouring interests; as well as intentions to align national aims with regional actors. The buildup of defence forces is interpreted as the repercussion of climate change, need to protect the region's human and economic assets, and to counter neighbouring defence developments. The analysis concludes that defence diplomacy is currently an active element of the American national foreign and security policies and holds great potential to increase within the Arctic region.

Chapter V: Comparative Analysis

Following the individual analysis of the content and discourse of the Arctic security strategies of the Arctic Five, a comparative analysis was conducted. The comparative analysis consisted of three main parts:

External: Page 55

Visual: Page 59

Textual: Page 62

In relation to defence diplomacy, 'External' assessed the overarching construct and presentation of the strategic publications; 'Visual' assessed the graphics and images included within the Arctic strategies; and 'Textual' assessed the rhetorical content of the Arctic strategies. The comparative study sought to further identify and analyse the key characteristics of defence diplomacy, as defined in the literature review, and the prevalence and prospect for increased diplomacy across the Arctic region. Further discussion on the individual and comparative analysis is provided in Chapter VI: Results.

Part I: External

Each of the five doctrines are written in different styles and contain different content. (See Appendix IV: Comparative Analysis). 'External' assessed the overarching construct and presentation of the strategic publications in relation to defence diplomacy. Variables were identified pertaining to; the timing of publication; publishing authority; inclusion of quotes, forwards, and signatures; the length of strategies, and the language in which they were published.

There are wide variances in the timing of publication of the Arctic strategies. The most recent strategy publication of the overarching national strategies consists of the Kingdom of Norway 2006; Russian Federation 2009; Canada 2009; Denmark 2011; and the United States 2016. This information provides info on the most recent overarching national strategies; additional reports have also been published relevant to Arctic security issues on an annual basis or from sub-national authorities. Based on the years of publication, an assessment can give info as to how the strategies relate to one another. The publications can be designed to build upon previous publications from their perspective states, in order to further elaborate on or change their national aims; inform on new developments; assess the status of previous developments; as well as act as a response to the contents of the previously published strategies by other Arctic states. The timing of publications is also dependent upon the funding the goals of the current governmental administrations.

The governing state body that authored the doctrine can further provide detail into who is responsible and/or involved in the political administration of the Arctic region as well as the inclusion of defence: Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians); Kingdom of Denmark (Gov't of Denmark, Gov't of the Faroes, Gov't of Greenland); Kingdom of Norway (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Russian Federation (Security Council of the Russian Federation); and the United States of America (United States Department of defence). The United States and the Russian Federation

are the only strategies to be two produced by security administrations; the other three Arctic strategies were not.

The reasoning behind the variances in publishing authorities may relate to the status of the United States and the Russian Federation within the international system; the United States is the largest contributor and strongest military state within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Russian Federation remains the only 'Arctic Five' nation state that is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. As such, it would be deemed appropriate for the United States to take the hard-security lead on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty organisation and Russia to represent its national hard-security interests. As nonviolent and non-warlike activities undertaken by the armed forces of the United States and the Russian Federation, it was interpreted that these Arctic strategies were direct representations of defence diplomacy.

The Arctic strategies also include forewords, signatures, and quotes by relevant individuals from these Arctic states. Forwards are included in strategies of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Norway, with accompanying signatures in the strategies of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of Norway. Quotes are included in the strategy of Canada. The inclusion of these could seek to add a human element to the content and discourse of the Arctic strategies. This human element further identifies important individuals relevant to Arctic security issues within the respective states, provides an authoritative stamp to the strategies content, and gives a voice to the nations. The inclusion of such also exposes that these are elected officials and the audience must note that with new administrations come new agendas. This human element also gives a diplomatic and soft touch to the strategies, reminding its audience that states are not merely areas defined on a map, but the organisation of people.

Another external characteristic of the Arctic strategies was its length. The length of the security strategies may also give context to what is trying to be communicated: Canada (forty pages); Kingdom of Denmark (fifty-eight pages); Kingdom of Norway (seventy-three pages); Russian Federation (eight pages); and the United States of America (seventeen pages). Deciding on what

to include within the Arctic security strategies and what to withhold is assumed to be very carefully and deliberately decided upon. As national security has become more comprehensive, both broadened and deepened, the inclusion of additional thematic information regarded as elements of national security, should be taken seriously. While providing content focused to hard-security issues, the Russian Federation and the United States produced the strategies with the least amount of pages. This could be a reflection of the authoritative publishers or could mean that they intend to lead foreign policy within Arctic with a hard security approach. However the content may supersede quantity, the dedication of the Russian Federation and the United States to produce content relative to Arctic hard security matters should be welcomed by the international community as an exemplary address. The inclusion of additional security content beyond that of hard security issues by Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, and the Kingdom of Norway, their security strategies also support defence diplomacy. The inclusion of information pertaining to their cultures help build cultural competence between the Arctic nations, reduces tensions, and helps develop mutual understanding and empathy for one another.

The language in which the security strategies are published in is also up for analysis, as shared language comprehension is a foundational pillar to defence diplomacy. The publications were produced in a multitude of languages: Canada (English, French, Inuktitut); Kingdom of Denmark (Danish, Kalaallisut, English); Kingdom of Norway (Norwegian, English, French, German, Russian); Russian Federation (Russian); and the United States of America (English). The language of the strategy informs provides critical insight into the languages of the local populations as well as other external factors.

In the Canadian doctrine, the prevalence of the three languages takes meaning from the diversity and respect to the populations within the Canadian Arctic. English and French are the official languages of Canada and Inuktitut is that of the indigenous peoples. Including them all in one document, rather than three separate documents, further, implies unity of their peoples and the governing bodies of Canada's High North. The Kingdom of Denmark published their security strategy in Danish, Kalaallisut, English. As the Realm contains that of Denmark, Greenland, and

the Faroes, the publishing in three translations provides insight into the Kingdom's' population and role in the international system- Danish for the Kingdom of Denmark; Kalaallisut implies the importance of Greenland to the Realm; and English solidifies its connection to the international system. The Norwegian strategy was produced in separate Norwegian, English, French, German, and Russian translations. As Norwegian is the national language and most broadly spoken across the country, it is expected. However, while English, German, Russian, and French are also spoken in Norway there may be more meaning behind such publications. English and French are also the official languages of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Perhaps there is a symbolic message in the strategies publications of Canada and the Kingdom of Norway, exhibiting the state's commitment to the defence alliance. And the inclusion of Russian translation to further express a willingness to acknowledge the partner's culture and status in the international system.

The most common printed language of the security doctrines is English, to the knowledge of the researcher only the Russian Federation does not provide an official English translation. Choosing to publish in the Russian language only, sets the Russian Federation apart and indicates the importance of the Russian language to the state and shows of defiance to the other Arctic states. As the Russian Federation seeks to be identified as an equal to the United States, it is perhaps appropriate that it only parallels the United States' choice of choosing only one language. The languages provide information into the operational environment of the Arctic region. This is especially important when conducting military operations or multinational training exercises. Because the Arctic is home to many indigenous peoples, publishing in local languages also supports the build up of a domestic constituency for the armed forces. While English may be a common international language, it by no means should be the only language of communication.

By analysing the 'External' overarching construct and presentation of the strategic publications in relation to defence diplomacy a number of variables were identified for their relationship to defence diplomacy. As the timing of publication; publishing authority; inclusion of quotes, forwards, and signatures; the length of strategies, and the language in which they were published in all give critical information relating to defence diplomacy, other codes must also be assessed.

Part II: Visual

The Arctic strategies also contained variances in the prevalence of visuals (See Appendix: Figure II), which can be analysed in relation to defence diplomacy. ‘Visual’ assessed the graphics and images included in the Arctic strategies for their relationship to defence diplomacy. Visuals included geographical maps and photographic images.

Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, and the Kingdom of Norway included geographical maps in their Arctic strategies; the Russian Federation and the United States provided no maps within their national Arctic strategies. Because Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, and the Kingdom of Norway provided such maps, key information on the physical layout of the Arctic; territorial, national, and international boundaries; populated areas; and important geographical locations can be identified. If the maps are indeed valid representations and not an element of misinformation, then their willingness to provide such maps further supports transparency in terms of national capacity and intentions.

Canada’s Arctic strategy includes maps relating to treaties of the Arctic and mineral deposits. The treaty maps exhibited could represent a symbolic representation of their commitment to diplomacy and rule of law, two critical aspects of defence diplomacy. Rule of law is important to accountability mechanisms and the rules of engagement in conflict. Canada also includes mineral maps, providing information in into the discovered natural resources of the Arctic and extraction activity. Citing exploration of the region and level of understanding to the mineral contents give evidence of scientific research and the economic value of the region, further exposing their national interests. The Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of Norway also include transport maps in their strategies, providing critical information to infrastructure, navigation, and economic and human activity in the Arctic. Arctic states could rely on this transparency to support in the understanding of the economic activity and operational environment of the Arctic, as well when designing and orchestrating bilateral or multilateral military exercises. Because the

Russian Federation and the United States provide no maps within their national Arctic strategies, they intentionally limit the amount of information they share with their Arctic neighbours.

Photographic images are also included within the Arctic strategies and can be noteworthy and important to the development of Arctic defence diplomacy. Images are included in the strategies of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, and the Kingdom of Norway (See Appendix IV: Comparative Analysis). The United States and the Russian Federation do not include any images in their security strategies.

Images included in the strategies included of scientists, security forces, students, indigenous peoples, animals, sea vessels, aeroplanes, outer space, weapon systems, construction, resource extraction, tourism, and recreational sports. The images deemed interesting for defence diplomacy included that of security forces, indigenous peoples, animals, sea vessels, aeroplanes, outer space, and weapon systems. Photographic images of security forces and indigenous peoples are included in the Arctic strategies of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of Norway. Images of the security forces identify their presence in the region and the photos of indigenous peoples expresses local culture. The Arctic apparel and equipment in their possession may further provide information to material skills, information on equipment that is capable of operating in the severe weather environment, and additional insight into the operational environment. Animals, sea vessels, aircraft, and satellites are also included in the photographic images of the Arctic strategies and provide information on the material skills, operational environment, and host culture. The images could have been included for self-interest strategies of misinformation or as transparent gesture of providing information on the material skills of the state.

By analysing the ‘Visual’ aspects of the strategic publications a number of variables were identified for their relationship to defence diplomacy. Geographical maps and photographic images provide critical information relating to the Arctic states employment and intentions to

participate in defence diplomacy. As such, the “Textual’ content must also be comparatively analysed.

Part III: Textual

As security has become more comprehensive, there were wide variances in the textual contents of the five Arctic strategies (See Appendix IV: Comparative Analysis). The textual comparison sought to identify and analyse the relationship between the varying textual contents and the states' commitment to present and future elements of defence diplomacy.

Each of the five Arctic states listed a number of economic interests deemed vital to their respective state. In order to protect the land, water, airspace, and exclusive economic zones, the main priorities of the 'Arctic Five' all support protecting their sovereignty through the development of defensive capabilities. As outlined in the literature review, the 'security dilemma' is present within the region because even defensive forces are considered a threat to foreign nations.

All of the Arctic strategies provided some level of information pertaining to new developments for land, sea, air, and outer space defensive assets and capabilities. Additionally, the Arctic security strategies cite the need for defensive cooperation in this volatile environment and mention a number of bilateral and multilateral military exercises which have been conducted across the region in the past. Furthermore, defence diplomacy was identified to be active in search and rescue, maritime cooperation, the stationing of military personnel at foreign bases, and in military exercises including NANOOK, ARCTIC EAGLE, ARCTIC ZEPHYR, VIGILANT SHIELD, SAREX, COLD RESPONSE, and ARCTIC EDGE. The peace and stability of the Arctic region will be contingent upon the ability of the 'Arctic Five' to maintain and expand upon activities of defence diplomacy.

All five of the Arctic strategies included information pertaining to the identities and bodies of their indigenous peoples. The indigenous bodies of the Arctic include the Aleut International Association (AIA), Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich'in Council International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North

(RAIPON), and the Saami Council (SC). Intentions for building a domestic constituency for the armed forces was also mentioned in the strategies be it in coordination with national guard elements, civilian authorities, or educating the local populations to participate in defensive forces. Engaging the local populous and sharing national cultural identity supports defence diplomacy efforts.

Throughout the Arctic security doctrines, there were a multitude of international bodies and forums mentioned. International bodies and forums included the United Nations, European Union, Arctic Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation, Nordic Council of Ministers, World Meteorological organisation, International Maritime organisation, World Trade Organisation, West Nordic Cooperation, and the International Hydrographic Organisation. Out of all of the aforementioned, only the Arctic Council was included in all five of the Arctic strategies. It has already been utilised as the forum to create the search and rescue agreement. However, in addition to the Arctic Council is the Barents/Euro-Arctic Cooperation, which was included within the strategies of the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation. Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, and the United States did not mention it in their strategies. As such, it is expected that the Arctic Council will continue to play the most prominent role in negotiations and conflict resolution of Arctic matters.

All five of the Arctic strategies expressed intent to work with Arctic partners on both areas of disagreement and collective defence. Conflict in opinion included that of interpreting the legal status of waterways, proper environmental codes, as well as territorial disputes. The Arctic security strategies also acknowledge and highlight the fact that there have been many international agreements and treaties established between the Arctic nations. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 stood out. Commitment to international law and bilateral and multilateral agreements helps reduce regional tensions through the commitment to accountability mechanisms. As military to military cooperation becomes increasingly needed, treaties can support defence diplomacy through binding agreements.

The Comparative analysis of the Arctic security strategies of the 'Arctic Five,' further produced a number of findings as to where defence diplomacy can be expanded upon, including search and rescue; maritime safety & navigation; anti-piracy & trafficking; tourism & outdoor recreation; scientific research; as well as language and cultural education. (See Chapter VI: Discussion).

Chapter VI: Discussion

Summary

As a result of increased global temperatures, the physical environment the Arctic has changed, resulting in the emergence of Arctic as a region of geostrategic importance. Steps taken in response by the 'Arctic Five' nation-states (Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Kingdom of Norway, Russian Federation, and the United States of America), to protect their national interests, has created a security dilemma in the Arctic system. Through the individual and comparative content and discourse analysis of the Arctic security strategies of the 'Arctic Five,' a number of significant findings were made in relation to the prevalence and prospects of regional defence diplomacy.

The individual analysis provided an understanding of the national interests of the 'Arctic Five' nation states. It is clear that all five of the Arctic states deem the region to be an important aspect of their national security and intend to continue to develop and invest in Arctic military assets and capabilities. In the international self-help system, it is understood that their interests can only be protected through the exertion of their national sovereignty. However, the individual analysis also exposed the Arctic states' intention to pursue regional defence diplomacy in order to maintain stability across the region.

Comparative analysis of the strategies exposed important revelations into the Arctic Five's interrelationship. The Arctic region remains trapped within the security dilemma, as the Arctic states continue to militarise the region in response to the buildup of military capabilities taken on behalf of their Arctic neighbours. However, through comparative content and discourse analysis it was discovered that regional defence diplomacy is already prevalent within the region and is further supported by claims for extended cooperation. Thus, through the increase of regional defence diplomacy within the Arctic, the Arctic Five can support de-escalation to the current security dilemma.

Conclusions

The Arctic is expected to remain a strategic region for geostrategic importance, citing political, economic, and military interests. Increases in the effects of climate change, advancement of technologies, and patterns of human migration will allow for more opportunities for interaction between the Arctic nation states.

The Arctic security strategies produced by the 'Arctic Five' play a major role in Arctic diplomacy and security, and remain influential and necessary documents for regional stability. Proper understanding of the strategies' content and discourse, allows for an increased understanding of the region's new level of geopolitical importance; the intention for states to increase their defensive military assets and capabilities across the Arctic region; and the opportunities for regional defence cooperation.

Individual document analysis produced critical information as to the intentions of the Arctic states. Every one of the strategies of the 'Arctic Five' prioritises national sovereignty and the exertion of defence force buildups as a critical pillar of their national security. The publication of the security strategies by the Russian Federation and the United States serve as direct representations of regional defence diplomacy, while the Arctic strategies of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, and the Kingdom of Norway contain elements of defence diplomacy.

The comparative research model was very appropriate to the themes of the course, the techniques utilised by the Arctic states, and to the benefit of comprehending a very complex situation. All five Arctic countries were found to be willing to cooperate with one another. The security strategies exposed activity of defence diplomacy within the publication of Arctic security strategies, through cooperative search and rescue efforts, collaborative information sharing efforts, regional military exercises, the stationing of military personnel at foreign bases, and defence forums.

In agreement with the reviewed literature, these research results imply the need for greater cooperation within the Arctic region amongst national defence forces. Areas for increases in defence diplomacy can exist in regards to multilateral efforts for; search and rescue; maritime safety & navigation; anti-piracy & trafficking; tourism & outdoor recreation; as well as language and cultural education. The continued collaboration on areas of mutual interest should be pursued, and the respectful communication on areas of disagreement continued. Ensuring peace and stability across the region will be the responsibility of all nations.

War then, is a relation - not between man and man but between state and state and individuals are enemies only accidentally not as men, nor members of their country, but as its defenders. -

Jean Jacques Rousseau

Critique of the Research Project

There were a number of limitations, challenges, and decisive factors involved in the research project.

Due to the researcher's elementary Russian language skills, a translated document was relied upon for analysis of the Arctic security strategy of the Russian Federation. Having been published by an internationally respected think-tank (AspenInstitute), the translation was deemed valid and reliable; however, there is the chance for translation error. A misunderstanding in the translation risks compromised material content. The researcher is ambitious to gain a comprehensive understanding of the Arctic languages and cultures, so as to respect the strategies and their intended meaning. It should further be noted, that there was a requirement to publish this academic writing in the British style of the English language. This requirement was fulfilled the best of the researcher's knowledge of British English.

The independent dissertation research project was further hindered by the process in which it was conducted throughout the academic programme. Students within the dual master's International Security, Intelligence, and Strategic Studies were given the assignment to write a 'Research Design and Methodology Paper.' The first part of the paper was structured on background knowledge of writing a good research paper and the second part was a mock up dissertation proposal. The course could have been better orchestrated to have the students write this proposal on their actual dissertation topic. Additional challenges to the project included the orchestration a dissertation project where the university programme point of contact changed multiple times, changes were made to the guidelines and grading rubric, and the students received conflicting information regarding the submission of the dissertation project. However, it is the belief of the researcher that the programme coordinators acknowledge such feedback and will do their best to learn from it and go forth to improve the process for the next academic class. As such, the researcher is very optimistic for the future of the academic programme and extends his gratitude to all of those involved for their hard work and dedication to the development of this international programme.

Additionally, the researcher would have liked to incorporate more open source collection and analysis into the project. There are a variety of analytical structures which could have been applied in document analysis. The researcher would have liked to incorporate the analytical structure of PMESII-PT into the individual analysis of the strategies. PMESII-PT is an acronym for Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical, and Time. Simply put, it would have changed the dynamics of the thematic analysis and provided an analytical starting point which could have supported the understanding of the Arctic from more of a defensive perspective. However, in order to meet the requirements of the academic cohorts which are directly involved in the grading of this paper, it was decided to not incorporate the useful analytical tool and pursue a more traditional and academic approach. In the course of the dual master's programme, it was quite apparent that there is a cultural wall between European academics and European defence officials. It is the belief of the researcher that if you are going to incorporate security studies into an academic environment and have both scholars and military

officers teach the courses, then there should be more latitude to incorporate both academic and practical approaches to research. Further comparison of the presented analysis, to current regional analysis, would have supported revelations into the true interests, capabilities, and intentions of the 'Arctic Five' nation states and their willingness to conduct regional defence diplomacy.

Furthermore, it must also be noted that the researcher is a citizen of one of the five littoral Arctic states. While attempts were made to eliminate any external biases and approach the research project from a neutral perspective, there are always unintended repercussions of inherent biases.

The researcher's goal was to learn about the realm of Arctic security, produce an interesting contribution to the international discussions at hand, and provide content for future researchers to critique and expand upon. Overall the dissertation research project was a great learning experience for the researcher and one in which he hopes to build upon in the future.

Recommendations for Defense Diplomacy

Search and Rescue:

Due to the ice, low temperatures, extreme weather, and risk of a ship grounding search and rescue collaboration remains an important task for the Arctic states. An agreement on search and rescue was adopted at the Arctic Council Foreign Ministers meeting in May of 2011. The pivotal agreement brings the coast guards and militaries of the Arctic into greater contact with one another. As noted in the literature review, this is a foundational element of regional defence diplomacy. As the physical environment changes and more significant human activity is conducted in the region, joint search and rescue capabilities could be built upon to ensure enhanced communication and faster response. The current search and rescue agreement should be analysed. As a foundation of defence diplomacy, it could be an excellent case study to evaluate for success and critique for better implementation of a binding agreement.

Maritime Safety & Navigation:

As outlined in the Arctic strategies, the landscape of the Arctic region is changing and with it access to shipping routes. The Arctic is host to the Northwest Passage, Northern Sea Route, the Transpolar Sea Route, and the Arctic Bridge Route. As an alternative to current international shipping routes that travel through the Panama and Suez Canal, around the unstable Middle East, and pirates of the South China Sea, Malacca Straits, and the Gulf of Eden, it may become more economically feasible to transit by way of these emerging northern routes. As such multilateral collaboration efforts could benefit from shared data on nautical charts, water depths, surveillance of maritime traffic and satellite based, long range identification and tracking systems, standards for ship and crew training, weather reports, and buoying.

Anti-Piracy & Trafficking

As the physical landscape of the Arctic changes, new opportunities for maritime activity will be opened. As the region gains more maritime traffic from shipping, fishing, and tourism, the region and its vessels will increasingly become more vulnerable to illegal activity. Acts of piracy could include the attack or robbery of Arctic sea vessels and their contents. It is common practice in other parts of the world to take hostages, demand ransoms, or steal assets for sale on the black market. Once the Arctic gains new levels of traffic, illicit trafficking may increase by means of drugs, contraband, or humans. The indigenous communities of the Arctic may increasingly become a targeted population and risk of being trafficked for servitude in labour or sexual acts. Defence cooperation to thwart off pirates, contraband and human traffickers could be a welcomed element of defence diplomacy. The Arctic defence forces could conduct defence diplomacy through communicating piracy threats, sharing anti-piracy defensive weapons systems, conducting anti-piracy training operations, and developing a collaborative system for piracy response.

Tourism & Outdoor Recreation:

Tourism is a growing economic sector in the Arctic region. Cruise ships carry thousands of visitors around the region annually. As the Arctic has been host to military activity for years, the

opening up of legacy military installations for tourism could be symbolic to decreasing old feuds and increase civil-military relations. In regards to outdoor recreation, defence forces could establish Arctic sporting competitions between the Arctic forces as well host events open to public attendance. There a number of international military competitions which take part around the world every year. These competitions can support defence diplomacy through interaction between defence personnel, share best practices, and support intercultural competence amongst the competitors. Additionally, defence forces could establish avalanche awareness courses and winter survival training courses for a public audience. This could further support defence diplomacy through civil-military interaction and assist in the creation of domestic military forces.

Language and Culture:

As pointed out in the previous analysis of the national security doctrines, there are a number of active languages spoken across the Arctic region. The most prevalent languages, appear in the publishing text of the Arctic strategies. Defence diplomacy can be included the critical exchange of military personnel and units for defence language and cultural development. Learning the languages of the region could enable military personnel to communicate with one another effectively. Communication is a necessity for understanding an operational environment and critical to ensuring the stability of the region. Arctic nation states could ensure that the languages of the High North (English, French, Norwegian, Russian, Danish, Kalaallisut, and Inuktitut) are appropriately incorporated into regional military exercises and that of language military schools.

Recommendations for Future Research

Further analysis could be conducted on the impact of a number of actors and publications on regional defence diplomacy within the Arctic zone.

Arctic States

The interests and influence of other Arctic actors such as Iceland, Finland, Sweden, and the European Union, could be analysed. Additionally, if the trend continues, more nation states will gain ‘observer’ status at Arctic forums and seek to invest in Arctic industries. Currently, the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council allow a variety of non-arctic states, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organisations, both global and regional, and non-governmental organisations to conduct observer relations with their Arctic forums.

The Arctic Council currently has thirteen non-arctic states, thirteen intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organisations, and thirteen non-governmental organisations (www.arctic-council.org). The thirteen non-arctic states which already been granted observer status at the Arctic Council consist of France, Germany, Italian Republic, Japan, The Netherlands, People’s Republic of China, Poland, Republic of India, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (arctic-council.org). The Barents Euro-Atlantic Council hosts nine nation states, one non-governmental organisation, and one inter-parliamentary organisation, as ‘observers’ (www.barentscooperation.org). The members of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council beyond the Arctic Five include Finland, Iceland, Sweden and the European Commission. Observers to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council consist of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom, and the United States of America (www.barentscooperation.org).

Intergovernmental Organisations

Future research could also seek to analyse the role in which intergovernmental security organisations will play in the Arctic region. As the more states find interest in the area and become observers to the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, their security alliances are then factors to address. The ‘Arctic Five’ are members to a number of military alliances, most notably the North Atlantic Treaty organisation, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Additional research could assess the rise of a military-political adversary to North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Arctic.

Indigenous Peoples

The organisations of indigenous people will continue to play an impactful role in the future of Arctic defence. Currently, the Aleut International Association (AIA) Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich'in Council International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), Saami Council (SC) are permanent members of the Arctic Council (www.arctic-council.org). The Barents Regional Council also unites fourteen member countries and a representative of the indigenous peoples in the northernmost parts of Finland, Norway and Sweden and north-west Russia. These counties include; Kainuu, Lapland, Oulu, Pohjois-Karjala (Finland); Finnmark, Nordland, and Troms (Norway); Arkhangelsk, Karelia, Komi, Murmansk, and Nenets (Russia); and Norrbotten, Västerbotten (Sweden). Indigenous peoples in the Barents region include the Sami of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia and the Nenets and Veps of Russia (www.barentscooperation.org). Additional research could assess their militia intentions and ability to participate in regional defence efforts.

Private Sector

Additionally, key actors from the private sector will impact the defence relationships of the High North. Most notable, corporations from the energy, defence, insurance, shipping, and fishing sectors will play an important role. While there are many energy companies interested in the Arctic, a number of specific ones were cited within the Arctic strategies, Cairn Energy (Scotland), NUNAOIL (Greenland), DONG (Denmark), Maersk Oil (Denmark), ExxonMobil (U.S.), Chevron (U.S.), Husky (CAN), Cairn Energy (UK), PA Resources (SVE), ConocoPhillips (U.S.), Shell (NL), Statoil (NOR), GDF Suez (FRA) and Petronas (Malaysia).

Cooperation between the defence industries will also have an important role in the Arctic and their impact should be analysed. A number of the northern states contain socialist aspects of the state which have nationalised defence corporations or created joint stock companies. Large defence corporations that are either privately held or state owned maintain significant influence in the international system, including the Arctic. Their collaboration and competitive

characteristics help drive innovation, reduce costs, and support intercultural and interstate relations.

Furthermore, there are many news outlets including but not limited to; Yukon News; Arktik; Petroleum News; The Independent Barents Observer; World Oil; Sputnik; High North News; Bellona; KTOO; Iceland Review; Canadian Mining Journal; Pravada Report; Ottawa Citizen; Norway's English News; Juneau Empire; Alaska Journal; Arctic Deeply; USNI; Rig Zone; Nunatsiaq; The Arctic Journal; TASS; Alaska Public; Iceland Monitor; Climate Home; AINA; and the Arctic Sounder. Future research could assess corporate interests and influence on defence diplomacy within the Arctic region.

Educational Institutions and Think Tanks

There are many educational institutions and think tanks which comment on and analyse the development of the high north. Their ability to produce new research, organise collaborative efforts and events, and inspire global attention to the Arctic, should not be overlooked. The Alfred Wegener Institut, Arctic Forum Foundation, Arctic Institute, Norwegian Polar Institute, Swedish Polar Research, Arctic Dialogue; Arctic Portal; Arena Centre for European Studies; Arctic Frontiers; Center for strategic and international studies; Energy Research Institute of the Russian Federation; Fritjof Nansen Institute; Geopolitics in the High North; German Institute for International and Security Affairs; Grid Arendal; University of Alberta; University of Fairbanks; Gubkin Russian State University; International Arctic Social Science Association; Moscow State Institute of International Relations; Murmansk State Technical University; Nordic Centre for Spatial Development; Norsk Polarinstitutt; Northern Network on Climate Change; Northern Arctic Federal University; Northern Research Forum; Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute; Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies; Russian State Hydrometeorological University; Scott Polar Research Institute; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; The Swedish Institute of International Affairs; Universitetet i Nordland; University of Greenland; and the University of Tromsø, are all examples of actors which could impact the security of the Arctic region.

Non-State Actors

Other non-state actors, such as organisations of organised crime and terrorism will no doubt play an impactful role in the future of the Arctic region. Identifying and analysing the current prevalence of, and future potential for terrorists, pirates, criminal gangs, and drug, weapons, and human traffickers to operate in the Arctic region is of research interest.

Additional Security Documents

Furthermore, sub national and annual security publications relevant to the Arctic could be studied to expose their relationship to regional defence diplomacy and the Arctic system as a whole. The five Arctic strategies examined here within are not the only publications produced by the respective nation states. While one can assume they strive to present an overarching understanding and portrayal to the needs and direction of the interests associated with the Arctic region, there remain many different agendas and perspectives which need to be taken into account. Within a nation state, the military defence agenda may differ from that of the state's environmental authority, or the economic authority. Being able to balance those different perspectives is a challenge in itself. Follow up document analysis and comparative study will need to be conducted upon the publication of any new government Arctic security strategy.

Military Exercises:

As the 'Arctic Five' build up their Arctic capable forces, analysing their training exercises outside of the Arctic could also be beneficial to understanding defence diplomacy. There are a number of mountain warfare schools and cold weather training exercises that occur around the world beyond that of the Arctic's NANOOK, ARCTIC EAGLE, ARCTIC ZEPHYR, VIGILANT SHIELD, SAREX, COLD RESPONSE, and ARCTIC EDGE.

Climate Change

Scientific research and the pursuit of greater regional knowledge has been a collective endeavour in the High North. As climate change will continue to impact the region, additional research

could be conducted to identify the most important climate factors relevant to hard security. Possible studies could focus on the impact of repositioning established military infrastructure (existing detection and warning infrastructures) due to climate effects, the impact on the implementation of weapon systems to icebreakers, challenges to building Arctic capable technologies and combat forces in extreme cold weather environments of -60 degrees Fahrenheit / -51 degrees Celsius, and/or advances in satellite and terrestrial communications above 65 degrees north. As outlined in the aforementioned analysis, there is a demand for enhanced knowledge on the current physical characteristics of the Arctic environment as well as projections for how the environment will be affected by global climate change.

Additionally, it is the recommendation of the researcher that more government funding, private sector investments, and scientific research be directed into the Arctic region. In regards to the academic study of the region, think tanks should work together on producing a centralised area for discussion on the world wide web and in person. Furthermore, it is the opinion of the researcher that international youth should be better incorporated into the discussions and proceedings of Arctic affairs.

Appendix I: Documents of Analysis

Canada: *Canada's Northern Strategy- Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*

Available at: <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/>

Available at: <http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns.pdf>

Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland): *Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020*

Available at: <http://um.dk/en/>

Available at:

<http://canada.um.dk/en/focus-areas/arctic-nation/kingdom-of-denmark---strategy-for-the-arctic-2011-2020/>

Kingdom of Norway: *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy*

Available at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/>

Available at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/strategien.pdf>

Available at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/strategy-for-the-high-north/id448697/>

Russian Federation: *Russian Arctic Strategy Until 2020*

Available at: <http://scrf.gov.ru/>

Available at:

<https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/upload/29%20Russian%20Arctic%20Strategy%20Until%202020%20BW.pdf>

United States of America: *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region*

Available at: <https://www.defence.gov>

Available at:

<https://www.defence.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Arctic-Strategy-UNCLAS-cleared-for-release.pdf>

(See Bibliography for full citations)

Appendix II: Variables of Defence Diplomacy

Requirements for Defense Diplomacy

- the need for each partner in the defence diplomacy to consider ‘partner’ to be paramount;
- an alignment of partners’ aims;
- cultural competence;
- mutual understanding and empathy;
- equal material skills;
- and shared language comprehension

(Rolfe, 2015: 4-5)

Examples of Defence Diplomacy

- Bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian defence officials;
- Appointment of defence attaches to foreign countries;
- Bilateral defence cooperation agreements;
- Training of foreign military and civilian defence personnel;
- Provision of expertise and advice on the democratic control of armed forces, defence management and military technical areas;
- Contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits;
- Placement of military or civilian personnel in partner countries’ defence Ministers or armed forces;
- Deployment of training teams;
- Provision of military equipment and other material aid;
- Bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes

(Cotter and Forster, 2010: 7)

Intended Outcomes

- Reduction in hostility or tensions;
- Symbolic positioning by signalling a willingness to work with and trust interlocutors;
- A more competent armed force with a commitment to accountability mechanisms;
- Transparency in terms of capacity and intentions;
- Development and reinforcement of good relationships with partners;
- Changing perceptions of each other;
- Confidence building;
- Encouragement through incentives and rewards;
- Building a domestic constituency for the armed forces

(Rolfe, 2015: 3)

Appendix III: Individual Tables

Canada: External

'Arctic Five'	Year Written	Author	Length (pages numbered)	Language(s)	Image(s)	Geographical Map(s)	Data Set(s)
Canada	2009	Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians	40	English, French, Inuit	Yes	Yes	Yes

Canada: Visual

Visual	Geographical Map(s)	Treaty Map(s)	Mineral Map(s)	Transport Map(s)
Canada	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Visual	Scientists	Security Forces	Students	Indigenous	Animals
Canada	Yes	No	yes	Yes	Yes

Visual	Sea Vessels	Construction	Recreational Sport	Resource Extraction	Weapon Systems	Tourism	Infrastructure	Environment	Outerspace
Canada	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Canada: Textual

	United Nations	Arctic Council	Barents/EuroArctic	NATO	European Union	Indigenous Bodies	Partners States	Non-Arctic States	Nordic Council of Ministers
Canada	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

	International Maritime organisation	International Hydrographic organisation	Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission	Specific Private Sector Companies	World Meteorological organisation	NORAD	World Trade organisation	NORAD	West Nordic Cooperation
Canada	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No

Kingdom of Denmark: External

Arctic Five'	Year Written	Author	Length (pages numbered)	Language(s)	Image(s)	Geographical Map(s)	Data Set(s)
Kingdom of Denmark	2011	Gov't of Denmark, Gov't of the Faroes, Gov't of Greenland	58	Danish, Kalaallisut, English	Yes	Yes	Yes

Kingdom of Denmark: Visual

Visual	Geographical Map(s)	Treaty Map(s)	Mineral Map(s)	Transport Map(s)
Kingdom of Denmark	Yes	No	No	Yes

Visual	Scientists	Security Forces	Students	Indigenous	Animals
Kingdom of Denmark	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes

Visual	Sea Vessels	Construction	Recreational Sport	Resource Extraction	Weapon Systems	Tourism	Infrastructure	Environment	Outerspace
Kingdom of Denmark	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Kingdom of Denmark: Textual

	United Nations	Arctic Council	Barents/EuroArctic	NATO	European Union	Indigenous Bodies	Partners States	Non-Arctic States	Nordic Council of Ministers
Kingdom of Denmark	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	International Maritime Organisation	International Hydrographic Organisation	Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission	Specific Private Sector Companies	World Meteorological Organisation	NORA	World Trade Organisation	NOR A	West Nordic Cooperation
Kingdom of Denmark	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Kingdom of Norway: *External*

Arctic Five'	Year Written	Author	Length (pages numbered)	Language(s)	Image(s)	Geographical Map(s)	Data Set(s)
Kingdom of Norway	2006	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	73	Norwegian, English, French, German, Russian	Yes	Yes	No

Kingdom of Norway: *Visual*

Visual	Geographical Map(s)	Treaty Map(s)	Mineral Map(s)	Transport Map(s)
Kingdom of Norway	Yes	No	No	Yes

Visual	Scientists	Security Forces	Students	Indigenous	Animals
Kingdom of Norway	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Visual	Sea Vessels	Construction	Recreational Sport	Resource Extraction	Weapon Systems	Tourism	Infrastructure	Environment	Outerspace
Kingdom of Norway	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Kingdom of Norway: *Textual*

	United Nations	Arctic Council	Barents/EuroArctic	NATO	European Union	Indigenous Bodies	Partners States	Non-Arctic States	Nordic Council of Ministers
Kingdom of Norway	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	International Maritime Organisation	International Hydrographic Organisation	Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission	Specific Private Sector Companies	World Meteorological Organisation	NORAD	World Trade Organisation	NOR A	West Nordic Cooperation
Kingdom of Norway	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No

Russian Federation: *External*

Arctic Five'	Year Written	Author	Length (pages numbered)	Language(s)	Image(s)	Geographical Map(s)	Data Set(s)
Russian Federation	2009	Security Council of the Russian Federation	8	Russian	No	No	No

Russian Federation: *Visual*

Visual	Geographical Map(s)	Treaty Map(s)	Mineral Map(s)	Transport Map(s)
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Russian Federation	No	No	No	No
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Visual	Scientists	Security Forces	Students	Indigenous	Animals
Russian Federation	No	No	No	No	No

Visual	Sea Vessels	Construction	Recreational Sport	Resource Extraction	Weapon Systems	Tourism	Infrastructure	Environment	Outerspace
Russian Federation	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Russian Federation: *Textual*

	United Nations	Arctic Council	Barents/EuroArctic	NATO	European Union	Indigenous Bodies	Partners States	Non-Arctic States	Nordic Council of Ministers
Russian Federation	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No

	International Maritime Organisation	International Hydrographic Organisation	Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission	Specific Private Sector Companies	World Meteorological Organisation	NORAD	World Trade Organisation	NORCA	West Nordic Cooperation
Russian Federation	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

United States of America: *External*

Arctic Five'	Year Written	Author	Length (pages numbered)	Language(s)	Image(s)	Geographical Map(s)	Data Set(s)
United States of America	2016	United States Department of defence	17	English	No	No	No

United States of America: *Visual*

Visual	Geographical Map(s)	Treaty Map(s)	Mineral Map(s)	Transport Map(s)
United States of America	No	No	No	No

Visual	Scientists	Security Forces	Students	Indigenous	Animals
United States of America	No	No	No	No	No

Visual	Sea Vessels	Construction	Recreational Sport	Resource Extraction	Weapon Systems	Tourism	Infrastructure	Environment	Outerspace
United States of America	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

United States of America: *Textual*

	United Nations	Arctic Council	Barents/EuroArctic	NATO	European Union	Indigenous Bodies	Partners States	Non-Arctic States	Nordic Council of Ministers
United States of America	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

	International Maritime organisation	International Hydrographic organisation	Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission	Specific Private Sector Companies	World Meteorological organisation	NORAD	World Trade organisation	NORNA	West Nordic Cooperation
United States of America	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No

Appendix IV: Comparative Tables

Arctic Five'	Year Written	Author	Length (pages numbered)	Language(s)
Canada	2009	Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians	40	English, French, Inuktitut
Kingdom of Denmark	2011	Gov't of Denmark, Gov't of the Faroes, Gov't of Greenland	58	Danish, Kalaallisut, English
Kingdom of Norway	2006	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	73	Norwegian, English, French, German, Russian
Russian Federation	2009	Security Council of the Russian Federation	8	Russian
United States of America	2016	United States Department of defence	17	English

(Arctic Five: External)

Arctic Five	Geographical Map(s)	Treaty Map(s)	Mineral Map(s)	Transport Map(s)
Canada	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Kingdom of Denmark	Yes	No	No	Yes
Kingdom of Norway	Yes	No	No	Yes
Russian Federation	No	No	No	No
United States of America	No	No	No	No

(Arctic Five: Maps)

	Scientists	Security Forces	Students	Indigenous	Animals
Canada	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kingdom of Denmark	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Kingdom of Norway	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Russian Federation	No	No	No	No	No
United States of America	No	No	No	No	No

(Arctic Five: Visual)

	Sea Vessels	Construction	Recreational Sport	Resource Extraction	Weapon Systems	Tourism	Infrastructure	Environment	Outerspace
Canada	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kingdom of Denmark	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Kingdom of Norway	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Russian Federation	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
United States of America	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

(Arctic Five: Visual)

	United Nations	Arctic Council	Barents/Euro-Arctic	NATO	European Union	Indigenous Bodies	Partners States	Non-Arctic States	Nordic Council of Ministers
Canada	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Kingdom of Denmark	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kingdom of Norway	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Russian Federation	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
United States of America	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

(Arctic Five: Textual)

	International Maritime organisation	International Hydrographic organisation	Arctic Regional	Specific Private	World Meteorological	NORAD	WTO	NORA	West Nordic

			Hydrographic Commission	Sector Companies	organisati on				Cooperat ion
Canada	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Kingdo m of Denmar k	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kingdo m of Norway	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Russian Federati on	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
United States of America	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No

(Arctic Five: Textual)

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