

# CHARLES UNIVERSITY PRAGUE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of International Studies



**Master thesis**

**2018**

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**Same, but different?**

**A comparison of the integration experiences of  
refugees and guest worker migrants in Germany**

*Master thesis*

Prague, Spring 2018

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Academic Year: 2017/18

# Same, but different? A comparison of the integration experiences of refugees and guest worker migrants in Germany

## *Abstract*

The increasing number of asylum seekers arriving in Germany over the past years have not only sparked an emotional public debate on immigration and societal membership, but have also proven to be a major challenge for policy-makers. Although the volume of refugee migration is indeed unprecedented in Germany, the country has had significant experience with receiving and integrating newcomers in its recent past: the post-war economic boom has led to the recruitment of millions of foreign workers, so-called *Gastarbeiter*. A non-negligible share ultimately settled permanently, but their integration process was not without its challenges. This paper argues that Germany's guest worker experience offers valuable insight into current integration processes in the German context. To make this existing knowledge accessible, this work uses a historical approach to identify the main elements that have shaped the integration experiences of guest workers in Germany, tied in with an econometric examination assessing the main factors in turn associated with the economic integration of the current refugee cohort. Comparison of the results suggest that a range of obstacles faced by guest workers and their descendants are also in the way of refugees today. Both groups face legal insecurity as an obstacle to socioeconomic integration. The legal status, in turn, proves relevant for human capital investments for both populations under review. Finally, a strong link between societal segregation and socioeconomic marginalization is found for the *Gastarbeiter*, and the analysis of labor market outcomes of refugees provides initial evidence that similar tendencies are observable for refugees in the German labor market

## *Keywords*

refugee migration, labor market integration, ethnic segregation, human capital investment, German immigration history, guest workers

# Institute of International Studies

Master thesis proposal

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<b>Academic year:</b>	<b>2017/2018</b>
<b>Dissertation title:</b>	A comparison of the integration of refugees and guest workers in Germany
<b>Expected date of submitting:</b>	<b>11 May 2018</b>
<b>Head of the Seminar:</b>	<b>Doc. PhDr. Jiri Vykoukal</b>
<b>Supervisor:</b>	<b>Dr. Lucia Najslova</b>
<b>Title:</b>	<b>MA</b>
<b>Short description of the topic:</b>	<b>Which individual and structural factors determine the labor market outcome of refugees in Germany? The guest worker experience shall serve as a ground for a thorough analysis of main obstacles to socioeconomic integration. Recent survey data on recognized refugees in Germany furthermore shall be applied to trace their present-day integration process on the German labor market. Historical material on the Gastarbeiter experience is thus combined with an econometric analysis of novel survey data on the current refugee cohort.</b>
<b>Proposed structure:</b>	<b>Analyse secondary historical material on guest workers Identify main elements that shaped their integration processes Analyse determinants of the labor market integration of refugees Compare their integration outcomes</b>
<b>Sources (basic selection):</b>	<b>BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014 BAMF 2016, Schlüsselzahlen zu Asyl Wobs et al., 2016 (BAMF): Asyl - und dann? Abadan-Unat, 2011: From Guest Worker to Transnational Citizen Bade, 1993: Ausländer- und Asylpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Grundprobleme und Entwicklungslinien Brubaker, 1992, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany Chin, 2007, The Guest worker question in Postwar Germany Faist, 1994, How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse Friedberg, 2000, You can't take it with you? Immigrant Assimilation and the portability of human capital Göktürk et al., 2007, Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration, 1955-2005 Herbert, 1986, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland 1880 bis 1980: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter</b>

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## *List of Abbreviations*

FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GRC	Geneva Refugee Convention
ECC	European Economic Community
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
FDP	Free Democratic Party
CSU	Christian Social Union in Bavaria
AfD	Alternative for Germany party
BA	Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal Agency of Employment)
BAMF	Bundesagentur für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Agency of Migration and Refugees)
GRC	Geneva Refugee Convention
TCN	third-country nationals

# Same, but different? A comparison of the integration experiences of refugees and guest worker migrants in Germany

## 1 *Introduction*

In 2015 and 2016, over three million women, men, and children arrived in Europe, fleeing wars and protracted conflicts in Asia and the Middle East. The number of globally displaced people has significantly increased every year since 2011, and in 2017 alone, 2,800 people have lost their lives crossing into Europe via the Mediterranean Sea (UNHCR 2016, 2017a, 2017b). The soaring arrival of people from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other crisis-ridden countries have presented a challenge to governments across Europe, and European societies have experienced a period of heated debates on economic realities, national identities and social security concepts. Germany in particular has received a large number of asylum seekers, exerting increasingly high pressure on German policy makers and public authorities. With reference to the increased number of refugees arriving in Europe, German Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) famously stated: “we can do this” in August 2015, initiating what was soon discussed as Germany’s new ‘open border’ policy towards refugee migration. The chancellor pointed out the exceptional conditions at Europe’s borders and the acute state of emergency, conflicting with Europe’s humanitarian values. In September that same year, refugees stranded in Hungary were allowed into Germany, and the Dublin procedure, an EU regulation determining the EU member state responsible for the asylum procedure where the asylum seeker first entered the Union, was practically abandoned (Die Zeit 2015). Ms Merkel gained international recognition for her humane attitude towards people in need, but soon saw her popularity within Germany drop by drastic levels. On the other hand, right-wing forces, like the newly founded party Alternative for Germany (AfD), as well as right-of-center politicians like Horst Seehofer (Christian Social Union in Bavaria, CSU) gained increasing support (Die Welt 2015). The ‘fear of ‘islamization’ became an often-employed scenario of politicians from the right-wing spectrum (Die Zeit 2016), calls for border fences and controls grew louder, and the number of registered attacks on asylum shelters grew from 199 in 2014 to over a thousand in 2015 (Reuters 2016). The cost associated with the accommodation of the newcomers and an annual limit of asylum grants (*Obergrenze*) were dominant issues in the public debate up until after the parliamentary elections in 2017 (Die Zeit 2017a; Der Tagesspiegel 2017). In short, the huge increase in asylum seekers in Germany prompted an emotional debate on the country’s immigration regime, and the design of integration policies for newcomers posed a huge challenge to policy-makers.

In displaying the 2015-16 refugee surge as an unprecedented migratory crisis, national and international debates tend to neglect one important aspect, however: Germany’s recent immigration history. As will be argued in this paper, the recent past offers invaluable insight in the consequences of integration policies and immigration schemes. The Federal Republic has traditionally been a popular destination for migrants since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and today, more than one in five citizens (or 22,5%

of the population) has a migratory background – that is, she does not hold a German passport or was born to citizens of non-German origin (Destatis 2017a). Population data of the Federal Statistical Office shows an average arrival of 627,000 foreigners annually since 1955, resulting in consistent growth of the foreign population in Germany (Destatis 2015). The German economy has since relied on foreign workers, and three in four small and medium-sized German enterprises employ foreigners (Leifels and Schwartz 2017).

European countries have traditionally been the main sending countries. Immigration from EU member states and other economically developed countries, such as the United States, tends to be high-skilled or of entrepreneurial nature (Münz 1997; Mahroum 2001), and economic and societal integration of these immigrants is largely described as unproblematic (Kogan 2006). At the same time, the recent immigration experience of the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) has been shaped by the invitation of foreign workers in the early years after the Second World War. The integration of the so-called *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) and their descendants proved more problematic (Liebig 2007, among others). A booming post-war economy had caused labor shortages that encouraged the immigration of largely low-skilled workers, mostly from Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. The immigration of foreign workers had been designed as temporary, so their incorporation into society was not perceived as a key task of policy-making. Notwithstanding the initial plan, a large share of the temporary workers eventually settled in Germany, and Cologne, Berlin, or Stuttgart became the new homes of guest worker families. Approximately four million *Gastarbeiter* and their families moved to Germany until 1973 (see Figure A3 in the appendix). Importantly, approximately 40% of those still in the country today have arrived after the recruitment stop in 1973 (Fertig and Schmidt 2001, see also Akgündüz 1993). German governments throughout the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century would nevertheless highlight the extraordinary character of that phase of inward migration, denying the country's immigration reality for more than five decades. Today, guest worker migrants and their children fare much worse in schools and on the labor market, a finding that is particularly pronounced for people of Turkish descent (Bildungsberichterstattung 2016; Granato and Kalter 2001). Even children and grandchildren of foreign workers today (the so-called second and third generation) are at a higher risk to lose their jobs and to remain in unemployment compared to German passport holders and EU immigrants. Major cities like Berlin report geographical segregation tendencies (Ohliger and Raiser 2005), and Friedrichs and Triemer (2009) describe a strong link between social segregation and ethnic segregation in German cities like Cologne or Frankfurt. In short, the deficient socioeconomic integration of guest worker families and its consequences have since challenged policy-makers and are subject to a large body of studies.

Policy-makers also struggle with finding an appropriate policy approach to deal with the currently arriving refugees. Although the educational profiles of the newcomers vary greatly, the large share of individuals with little schooling or job training yet again bears the risk of societal and economic marginalization. Institutional barriers to economic self-sufficiency, such as employment bans or

insecure legal titles, have the potential to aggravate and reinforce dependence on state support, which in turn fuels polarization tendencies and the disapproval of the newcomers by the host population. While a variety of concepts and approaches towards integration exist in European countries and are discussed among scholars, it is largely agreed upon that employment constitutes a major aspect of socio-economic integration. Having a job and getting paid for it enhances self-esteem and provides financial and social capital to participate more broadly in society. For a policy-maker interested in facilitating the societal integration of migrants, it is therefore crucial to understand the dynamics and mechanisms behind the employment chances of the newcomers. This paper will provide such an understanding by relying on past experiences. It seeks to compare the integration experiences of *Gastarbeiter* to the integration processes of current refugee cohorts in Germany. More precisely, this work addresses the following question: is the economic integration of recently arrived refugees challenged by similar factors that have hampered the incorporation of *Gastarbeiter* migrants in the past 60 years?

The country's past experience with the integration of foreigners offers valuable insight for today's policy-making. In Germany, the integration of migrants into the labor market and the society is not a novel challenge. More than 60 years ago, in 1955, the FRG started to invite foreigners to work in German factories and construction sites. Labor was the primary migratory goal of the guest worker generation – but the course of many into permanent settlement eventually rose the issue of societal integration that policy-makers throughout the party spectrum have struggled to address. The past 60 years hence offer a rich set of data that enables us to identify main obstacles to socioeconomic integration that *Gastarbeiter* families have experienced. Such an analysis will deliver valuable insight to understand present-day integration mechanisms of refugees. Although current refugee cohorts and former guest worker generations arguably differ in many ways, and so do a range of external conditions, main mechanisms of integration are arguably still in place.

To test this hypothesis, the approach of this thesis is twofold. In a thorough analysis of secondary historical material, the integration processes of *Gastarbeiter* and their descendants will be examined. In a descriptive analysis, key elements that framed the trajectories of this migrant group will thereby be identified. As will be seen, legal insecurity, disincentives to human capital investment and social segregation are three major elements that shaped the integration processes of *Gastarbeiter*. The second part of this thesis then turns to the current refugee migration to Germany and assesses whether these features also characterize the early integration experiences of recently arrived refugees. After describing the legal and institutional setup, which determines the societal and economic participation of recently arrived refugees, the paper will turn to an inferential analysis of their economic integration. Based on novel refugee survey data, it will be tested in two separate econometric models which individual factors are associated with the labor market integration of recognized refugees in Germany. Namely, the chances to be employed as well as the probability to be overqualified will be predicted in two probit models. In view of the findings for the *Gastarbeiter* migrants, special attention will be paid to the role

of legal security, human capital investment and local networks. The following questions will guide the empirical enquiries:

1. Is insecure legal status still a potential obstacle to economic integration?
2. Is the investment in host-country human capital a relevant factor for successful economic integration, as the guest worker experience has suggested?
3. Does the link between ethnic segregation and disadvantageous labor market positions prevail?

The separate analyses of the integration of guest worker cohorts in a descriptive historical approach and the econometric analyses of the economic integration of the current refugee cohort enable us to compare the two integration experiences and eventually assess whether the present-day integration processes of refugees are characterized by similar challenges that the *Gastarbeiter* families have faced. The historical approach offers an examination of long-term consequences that is not feasible with recent data on the current refugee cohort. An understanding of the deeper mechanisms of the integration of guest worker migrants will hence sharpen our view on the integration outcomes of refugees. Addressing the labor market outcomes of refugees in econometric analyses in turn delivers detailed insight as to which factors are relevant for the economic integration of refugees today. This is how, ultimately, a comparison of the integration experiences of refugees and guest worker migrants can be undertaken.

The analyses suggest that for guest workers, a prolonged denial of legal security and societal membership impeded educational investments and introduced social cleavages that shape the biographies of guest worker descendants until today. Similarly, for refugees on the German labor market, legal security is an important factor for the quality of employment. Furthermore, legal insecurity of guest workers and their families discouraged investments in the own educational status, locking them into their marginalized position in society. In that vein, for refugees it can be confirmed that human capital investment is still an important factor today that shapes their labor market outcomes. Skills acquired in Germany are found to be much more important than pre-migration qualifications on the German labor market. Finally, societal segregation tendencies marked the deficient socioeconomic integration of guest workers. Being “needed, but not wanted” (Stadtentwicklungsreferat München 1972, 113), the societal incorporation was not specifically targeted by policy-makers and a retreat in co-ethnic communities was facilitated. The employment outcomes of refugees also strongly relate to local networks, with ethnic segregation being linked to lower employment chances. The results of this thesis therefore provide evidence for the hypothesis that a range of mechanisms identified for guest worker migrants are still in place today. Firstly, just as for *Gastarbeiter*, the denial of legal security already now poses an obstacle for refugees to unfold their full economic potential. As an important factor of integration outcomes the investment in host-country specific resources can be confirmed for both groups, depressed by vague future prospects. Finally, the link between ethnic segregation tendencies and economic integration of recently arrived refugee cohorts resembles the retreat into ethnic networks that characterizes the integration processes of guest workers. Despite prevailing differences, major elements hence characterize both the integration experiences of *Gastarbeiter* families and current

refugee cohorts. As the *Gastarbeiter* experience has shown, the marginalization of the migrant groups can ultimately endanger social cohesion. Policy-makers are hence encouraged to consider Germany's recent immigration history when designing immigration and integration schemes towards refugee migrants.

## 2 *Conceptual considerations on the categorization of migrants*

Before delving into the integration experiences of migrants in Germany, the categorization of ‘migrants’, and the terminology of ‘refugees’ in particular, deserves some attention. The usage of the terms in the media, by politicians, scholars and societal actors seems to suggest a common understanding of who these terms refer to, but such seemingly clear-cut categorization also bears scope for effects that are less apparent. Migrant categories and the assigned terminology must be seen in context. As Irena Kogan argues, the diverse use of terms ranging from ‘immigrants’ to ‘foreigners’ and ‘ethnic minorities’ in different countries and contexts reflects the “variety in immigration histories and policies, integration rationales and the general consensus on the issue of immigration in each particular country” (Kogan 2007, 32). This indicates that migrant labels carry normative as well as symbolic content, and ultimately reduce individuals to a limited set of characteristics. A few words on these issues are necessary before setting off for the exploration of the integration of guest workers and refugees in Germany.

No matter the employed definition and terminology, any ‘migrant’ label comes with one attribute: it defines the ‘Other’. It draws a line between *us* and *them*, in the words of Bridget Anderson (2013). Physical borders as well as metaphorical borders reflect and produce such divisions, creating “specific types of social, political, and economic relations” between insiders and outsiders, who define each other “through sets of relations that shift and are not in straightforward binary opposition” (Anderson 2013, 2). Who should be included, and who stays outside? Is it the same eating habits, a shared religion, a common set of values that makes an insider, is it the color of the passport, or the city of birth? Statistical offices in different countries use different demographic information to draw the line against outsiders, commonly the nationality or the country of birth (Kogan 2007, 32), with additional criteria such as the duration of stay or the subjectivity to immigration controls (see Anderson and Blinder 2015). ‘Asylum seekers’ are distinguished against ‘foreign workers’, ‘family unification migrants’ or ‘international students’, based on the reported migratory motive. Such categorization does describe the legal status and formal membership of an individual, but no matter the aim or practical purpose of the categorization, it is not only descriptive but, essentially, normative at the same time. “Immigration and citizenship are not simply about legal status, but fundamentally about status in the sense of worth and honor – that is, membership of the community of value” (Anderson 2013, 4). In other words, categories of citizens and migrants not only describe a formal status, but also indicate moral status and the worthiness of belonging. Such contours of *us* and *them* can also follow the logic of economic contribution, that is, self-sufficiency and hard work as the defining feature. The description of someone’s legal status (such as ‘asylum seeker’) can therefore be associated with ascriptions of dependency and free-riding on the costs of the hard-working (the insiders). Formal categories and moral ascriptions “easily collapse into one another, legally and metaphorically” (Anderson 2013, 6). Immigration debates bleakly uncover the outlines of a society’s national identity and its understanding of membership, Honig (2009) concludes. Making use of such *normative content* of migrant categories, group tags can also unfold strong *symbolic power*. For the German context, Faist (1994) for example describes the immigration debate in the 1980s

and 1990s as a *meta-issue* that served manifold functions in the partisan context. The restriction of the number of foreigners in the country and the generous legal ground for asylum dominated the debate, and Faist argues that political forces from the conservative and right-wing spectrum used the image of ‘the asylum-seeker’ (*Asylant*) and ‘the foreigner’ (*Ausländer*) to in fact address a variety of domestic issues, such as distributional conflicts and rising unemployment. Generating an image of the outsider as competitor or “welfare cheater” in the economic sense and as a threat to German identity, the categories of labor migrants and refugees were soon associated with welfare abusers and intruders, depicted as culturally distant from the German society (Faist 1994, 61). The ascription of these features conflated Turkish guest workers and asylees from developing countries into an indistinct foreign ‘Other’ (ibid., 62), and illustrates the symbolic power the categorization of social groups can unfold. In addition to the normative content, the symbolic meta-content that migrant categories carry must be considered when they are employed in scientific analyses.

At the same time, while a categorization is useful and sometimes necessary for meaningful analysis, it should be kept in mind that the defining lines are by definition arbitrary and will never grasp the whole set of characteristics associated with one group set up against another. Instead, a categorization by a limited number of features (e.g. the primary ‘migratory reason’ or the region of origin) reduces the individual to precisely these characteristics and highlights her membership to a certain group over other qualities. For instance, asylum-seekers that arrive in Europe are not a homogeneous group of people, as media and scientific representation often suggests. Rather, they vary widely in terms of educational attainment, cultural background or food preferences, for example. Nevertheless, political use of the term ‘refugee’ often enough seems to create a proto-type refugee, nurturing the idea of a group of people with similar characteristics (e.g. poor, dependent, unskilled) and a common culture, identity, and community belonging (Malkki 1995). Importantly, features such as the ‘migratory reason’ can only tell half the story, as has been argued before (Castles 2014). Although recruited foreign workers set off to new grounds to earn money in the first place, they still carry hopes and necessities that cannot be restricted to the economic realm only. At the same time, people fleeing wars and conflicts presumably migrate to save their lives in the first place, but material decisions (such as providing for the living of the family) arguably also play a role in leaving a crisis-ridden region. “It is difficult to separate economic from social, cultural and political causes of migration”, Castles (2014, 26) emphasizes.

Demarcation lines between groups of migrants are thus not as clear-cut as they suggest to be. The feature of refuge is, for instance, only one aspect out of many characterizing the concerned individual (Malkki 1995). Instead, it is legitimate to assume that a resettlement from one location to another, that is, migration, has a range of common effects no matter the main migratory reasons put forward. “Migration is a process which affects every dimension of social existence, and which develops its own complex ‘internal’ dynamics”, Castles (2014, 27) writes. The loss of the local societal network, for example, or the confrontation with another cultural or societal context characterizes a student’s year abroad as well as the Mexican engineer’s career in Stuttgart or the flight of a Kurd into Europe. In short, while the

classification in migratory categories is helpful for analysis and policy-making purposes, scholars, observers and politicians should be aware of the limits of such terminology. Most importantly, caution must be paid to the ascription of pre-defined characteristics based on the refugee label or any migrant label someone is tagged with.

Especially in the case of refugees, the dichotomy between "those who move because they have to and those who move because they want to" (Baker 2017, 9) is problematic. It implies a distinction between categories of protection deservedness and "fails to capture the complexity and multiplicity of ways that people can become displaced and endangered today" (ibid.). The application of the term 'refugee' as such generates an ignorance towards the main flight causes, excluding victims of generalized violence, climate change or poverty. Beth Baker (2017, 5) argues that such categories of migrants seem to create hierarchies of suffering, defining people who deserve legally protected mobility more than others. Malkki (1995) therefore urges the student of migration to lessen the focus on the label 'refugee', and to more seriously take into account the whole set of characteristics, the background and biographic history that a person carries.

For the exploration of the integration trajectories of *Gastarbeiter* and refugees in Germany, this work will necessarily have to distinguish between 'migrants' and 'non-migrants', as precisely the societal membership and non-membership will prove to play an important role in the integration experiences of *Gastarbeiter* in Germany. *Gastarbeiter* migrants describe the group of individuals that arrived in Germany after 1955 as foreign workers in German firms. Also, the children and grandchildren of guest workers, so-called second-generation and third-generation migrants, are distinguishable groups that are important to look at: being born in Germany, their biographies are yet shaped by their parents' migration experience. Finally, the umbrella term of 'refugee' will be employed in a way commonly used by international actors and researchers, referring to "individuals and groups forced to leave their country of origin because they were politically excluded" (Long 2013, 6). This includes a person's condition that she "can not return 'home' or access rights guaranteed by a meaningful state-citizenship relationship" (ibid., 22). Regardless of the receiving state's evaluation of the worthiness of her protection, a person involuntarily leaving her home country is characterized by a range of distinct features (such as the lack of protection from her home state, the forced migration experience and a biography disrupted by forceful external factors, such as violence and war). These features inevitably affect the person's future within the receiving society, be it by lacking home institutions to issue documents necessary to start a university career, or by more complex issues, such as mental distress (Phillimore 2011). In the context of Germany as a receiving state this terminology includes asylum seekers, formally recognized asylum seekers and refugees under the Geneva Refugee Convention

(GRC), as well as rejected but ‘tolerated’ individuals<sup>1</sup> (*Geduldete*), including their family members. Any other narrower understanding of migratory categories would not be helpful in grasping the manifold and complex mechanisms underlying integration processes<sup>2</sup>. The following analyses will show that *Gastarbeiter* and refugees differ in a range of characteristics, but at the same time they share similar elements that have shaped their integration experiences in past and present Germany.

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<sup>1</sup> despite the rejection of the asylum claim the individual is not deported for personal or humanitarian reasons, see 4.1.1.

<sup>2</sup> With integration, again a range of different interpretations circulate. Given the holistic view this paper takes on the integration of *Gastarbeiter* and refugees in Germany, the term is applied both to reflect the structural-functional level, as well as the cultural-identificational level of integration as a process of incorporation of an individual into a societal system (Böhning 1995; Löffler 2011). This is to say that both external aspects of incorporation, such as participation on the labor market, as well as internal processes of identification with the system are understood as elements of ‘integration’.

### 3 *Germany's guest worker experience*

“Guest worker is a term I love. When I encounter it, I always picture two people; one is just sitting there as a guest, and the other is working”

*Emine Sevgi Özdamar, writer and theatre director in Germany, from “Black eye and his donkey”, in: Göktürk, Gramling, and Kaes (2007, 398)*

On the 20<sup>th</sup> December of 1955 the FRG signed its first labor recruitment agreement with Italy in order to meet the labor demand of its booming post-war economy (*Wirtschaftswunder*). Many more similar contracts were to follow with Spain and Greece (1960), with Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968) in the subsequent years. Nine years after the guest worker program was initiated, the one millionth recruited worker arrived in Cologne. Armando Rodrigues de Sá from Portugal was welcomed by the press, with many photographers and a brand-new Zündapp motorbike as a present. This story ended in a tragic irony of history: unnoted by the media, Senhor Rodrigues de Sá died of a stomach tumor in June 1979, after 15 years in Germany, unknowing that he would have been eligible for sickness benefits (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2004).

The story has symbolic character for Germany's approach towards its foreign workers during the second half of the 20th century. Praised for their economic contribution but invited as ‘guests’ for a period of maximum three years, many foreign workers ultimately settled in Germany, often united with their families, and lived an unnoticed life at the margins of society. For more than four decades, their incorporation into societal, political and administrative structures was markedly not an area of policy-making, stubbornly clinging to the initial idea of the deal's temporariness. Keeping the ‘return option’ vivid and the path to naturalization closed, the discrepancy between the de jure and de facto immigration situation increased further. Non-immigrant worker programs instead served as a “substitute for illegal immigration and comprehensive immigration policies” (Hönekopp 1997, 1), manifesting the taboo of integration as a self-contained sphere of social policy (Bade 2017).

The coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens (1998 – 2005) that succeeded the Kohl administration (1982 – 1998) initiated a notable turn towards immigration and integration policies and the political discourse moved towards the reluctant acceptance of being an immigration country. Policy paradigms only change slowly, however, and Germany's guest worker history delivers valuable insight into the traditional policy approaches the Federal Republic has taken towards immigration. A historical review of Germany's guest worker experience with special attention to the German notion of national identity and societal belonging will lead us to identify elements that have characterized German policy-making towards foreigners. With Turkish citizens being the largest group of guest worker immigrants still residing in the country, special attention will be paid to them.

### 3.1 *A historical review*

#### 3.1.1 *'Wirtschaftswunder' and the recruitment of foreign labor*

After the Second World War, roughly 12 million ethnic Germans from East Europe and the former Soviet Union migrated to Germany as expellees (*'Aussiedler'*). Until 1961, three million refugees from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had arrived in Germany (Anil 2005). At the same time, the FRG experienced an economic boom that surprised many. Rebuilding the country and the industry required labor that soon could no longer be provided domestically. In addition to the low birth rates of the war cohorts, a range of factors decreased domestic labor supply. The founding of the German army in 1955 withdrew a large number of potential workers from the labor market (Deutscher Bundestag 2016). Also, the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 stopped immigration from the GDR abruptly, ceasing (partly high-skilled) labor supply. The German labor force additionally shrank as a consequence of socioeconomic development and the expansion of the welfare state: higher education expanded, and a bigger share of students remained in higher schooling. A more generous pension system induced earlier retirements of employees. Further, labor unions had succeeded in reducing average weekly working hours from 48 to roughly 40 in the 1960s. Finally, less and less women sought work on the job market (Martin 2004; Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009; Herbert 2001; Abadan-Unat 2011). Altogether, an increasing labor demand faced decreasing labor supply, so the government turned to the import of foreign labor in the second half of the 1950s.

Officially titled 'foreign employees' (*ausländische Arbeitnehmer*), one million so-called guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) had taken up employment in Germany by 1964. At its peak of 2.6 million in 1973 foreign workers made up 12% of the German workforce, mostly employed in agriculture and in industrial assembly lines (Herbert 1986). The *Gastarbeiter* protagonist is usually depicted as a young man, and women were portrayed as companions to their working husbands (Mattes 2005). It is worth noting, however, that a non-negligible share of contracted foreigners were in fact female. By 1970, more than half a million *Gastarbeiterinnen* were employed in West Germany, predominantly in industrial manufacturing in the fields of textile and food and in the service sector, representing 30% of the foreign workers by that time (BA 1973). Germany's economic success increased socioeconomic standards, so German employees were increasingly reluctant to take up low-wage and low-status employment associated with risks and little chances of upward social mobility. This reinforced the demand for foreign workers, who continued to be concentrated in unskilled and low-skilled occupations (Münz et al. 1997, Völker 1975).

By 1971, Turkish workers came to be the dominant group among foreign workers (Herbert 2001, 201). Official recruitment agreements had underlined the temporary character of labor import, that is, the return of workers was stipulated. Also, a 'rotation principle' (meaning the replacement of each worker after a certain period of time) was the original idea of policy-makers and employers so as to stimulate circular migration and to prevent permanent settlement. *'Integration auf Zeit'*, temporary integration,

was the motto (Heckmann et al. 2009; Martin 2004). The aversion to permanent settlement of foreign workers constituted itself in the 1965 Foreigners Law, drawing a clear line between Germans and citizens from the European Economic Community (ECC) against third-country nationals (TCNs). For the latter group, residence permits were linked to work contracts and issued for one year, with no legal entitlement to renewal (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009).

Yet, in practice, work and residence permits were extended, and family unification was permitted under the immigration regime, thwarting the temporary character intended by the German government (Abadan-Unat 2011; Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009). The ‘rotation principle’ was barely operated, as employers soon recognized the higher productivity of trained and socialized workers, given the adaptation and socialization cost of newcomers (Jamin 1998). Finding a way into the host society was largely left to the worker herself. As will be further elaborated below (in chapter 3.2), the state understood its role towards foreigners based on the concept of an ‘ethnic nation’: refugees and expellees of ethnic German origin (*Aussiedler*) were supported with policies meant to further their social, political and economic equality and integration. Also, the *Aussiedler* were a relevant group of voters. Other foreigners in general held a less legitimate claim of full-fledged societal membership, and, based on the understanding that ‘Germany is not an immigration country’, foreign workers were offered little state assistance in their societal integration (Herbert 2001; Heckmann et al. 2009). Support for labor migrants in their new ‘temporary’ homes rather focused on strengthening ties to co-ethnics and to the home country by promoting foreign associations and providing services in their native languages (Abadan-Unat 2011, 12f). Exemplarily, Ill. A1 in the appendix shows a list of radio and TV shows for foreign workers in their languages, published by the Federal Employment Agency (BA).

### ***3.1.2 Guest worker settlement in a non-immigration country***


The temporary design of the recruitment scheme at first tallied with the motives of most of the guest workers. Their primary aims were not simply to improve their living standards but also, in many cases, to save money for launching small businesses at home upon return. Socioeconomic integration into the German society was not a major goal, hence their readiness to take jobs at the lower ends of the occupational spectrum. Housing was modest, lives to a large extent took place isolated from the ‘host’ society, centered around industrial areas close to the work place, and the idea of return remained vivid (Herbert 2001, 1990; Chin 2007). Over time, however, work and life experiences in Germany created new expectations and habits (e.g. concerning saving and consumption behavior). Family unification increasingly offered an alternative to starting a family business in the home country, and specific return plans started to dissolve (Hönekopp 1987).

This trend was, ironically, reinforced by attempts of German policy-makers in the early 1970s to limit the number of foreign workers and their relatives in the country. In a general phase of economic restructuring, and especially during the 1973 oil crisis, foreign workers were among the first to lose their jobs (Martin 2004). Active return policies prominently returned to the political agenda, and in 1973 the

Social-Democrat led government halted labor recruitment completely (*Anwerbestopp*) (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009). Yet, these measures did not halt nor decrease immigration, and Faist (1994, 52) described them as symbolic rather than effective policies. Illegal labor, tourist visas and asylum applications were now increasingly employed ways to circumvent the new regulations (Renselaar et al. 1976; Abadan-Unat 2011). Also, as many foreign workers faced unsatisfying perspectives in their home countries, many instead brought their families to Germany and settled permanently (Bauer 1998; Bade 2017). For Sackmann (2013, 74), the decision to finally stay is an indicator that the life orientations of guest worker immigrants had shifted from their country of origin to the country of residence. “In short, many of the foreign workers and their families who had entered the Federal Republic as guests were now (de facto) immigrants” (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 96; see also Heckmann et al. 2009).

### 3.1.3 From *Gastarbeiter* to ‘*Problemtürke*’

By 1975, the foreign population was comprised by 50% of family members. The reform of child subsidy payments to guest workers had, against its goals, seen birth rates rise, most notably in Turkish families (Abadan-Unat 2011), thereby increasing social costs in education and health care (Wilpert 1977). The ‘*Problemtürke*’ (‘problematic Turk’) became the narrative commonly employed in the public dialogue, and major newspapers started to link unemployment rates and extensive social expenditure with the guest workers (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 98). In the summer of 1973, the news magazine *Der Spiegel* titled its cover story “The Turks are coming – run for your lives!” (Der Spiegel 1973), illustrating the sensational media representation of the attempts to restrict the number of foreigners in the country (see Ill. 1). Herbert (2001, 234f) summarizes four major fields of concern that were discussed: the housing situation (including ghettoization), jobs and labor market aspects, family unification and second generation issues and, finally, the relation of foreigners and Germans. Some early studies financed by state institutions already pinpointed the disadvantaged position of guest workers in the areas of housing, schooling, job training and political participation. For instance, *Gastarbeiter* families were found to pay higher rents for lower housing standards (Zieris 1971; Schöfl et al. 1972), and a quarter of foreign children at compulsory school age did not visit school in 1972 (Stadtentwicklungsreferat München 1972). At the work place, in



Ill. 1 „Die Türken kommen – rette sich, wer kann!“

*Spiegel* cover, 1973, ‘Ghettos in Germany – one million Turks’, story titled ‘The Turks are coming – run for your lives!’

1968 only 4% of the guest workers had ever participated in job training schemes with their employers, as the Federal Employment Agency reported (BA 1969), and they were not granted voting rights for work councils (BA 1965). Such studies also explicitly pointed to the potential of social conflict the marginalization of the foreign worker families bares (Peters 1972). A study by the department of municipal development of Munich from 1972 gives a clear-cut description of the disadvantageous legal and political position of guest worker families:

“They are needed, but not wanted. This contradiction hinders them to decide for or against a permanent stay in the FRG. They live in a constant state of uncertainty and are thereby prevented from long-term planning, which would facilitate full-fledged societal incorporation” (Stadtentwicklungsreferat München 1972, 113, author’s translation).

Reflecting the strictly economic reasoning of the first two decades of guest worker recruitment policies, opinion polls between 1978 and 1982 showed how the disapproval of foreign workers increased in times of economic contraction. Prominent voices started to call for active integration and citizenship reforms in recognition of Germany’s immigration reality, most influentially the 1978 memorandum of the Commissioner of Foreigner Affairs Heinz Kühn (see Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 101ff). Giving credit to the growing resentments against the foreign population, however, anti-immigrant sentiments served as political capital to the newly elected Conservative government under Helmut Kohl (CDU, 1982 – 1998). The ‘no-immigration-country’ baseline explicitly found entry into the government’s coalition treaty (Herbert 2001, pp.249), and the emphasis on the temporariness and extraordinariness of the guest workers’ migratory situation was renewed. Accordingly, the policy focus remained on measures of immigration restriction and return, albeit ill-functioning. This included, for example, financial incentives for return, less liberal family unification (for instance, the maximum age for children to follow a parent was lowered from 18 to 16), and a prolonged waiting period for working permits of spouses and children (Herbert 2001, 247). Shifting immigration policy-making from the ministry of labor to the interior ministry signaled, according to Herbert (2001, 250 among others), the dominance of regulative policies over social policy aspects. The discourse on integration markedly shifted away from “how best to facilitate integration and toward the question of whether guest workers possessed the *capacity* to integrate”, Rita Chin (2007, 153) observes.. The renowned German migration scholar Klaus J. Bade describes the 1980s as a “lost decade” for immigration and integration policy:

„Being confronted with the long-denied reality, party politics fled into self-inflicted paralysis [*Selbstlähmung*] through mutual accusations in fear of the electorate. Outrage from ‘below’ met a lack of conception from ‘above’, until politics at times was under pressure by excesses on the streets to the extent that Chancellor Kohl got the impression that the country could become ‘unreignable’ [*unregierbar*] over the party political discourse on immigration and asylum issues” (Bade 2017, 27, author’s translation).

Turkish guest workers and their families, the most visible group of foreigners, were the most common rhetoric target in the media and political discourse, which often pointed at the ‘otherness’ of the Islamic

culture and fundamentalist tendencies therein (Abadan-Unat 2011, 26). In line with the concept of an 'ethnic nation', the quest for homogeneity dominated the discourse on identity, and not least manifested itself in the strongly regulated access to German citizenship (further elaborated in chapter 3.2). Addressing concerns regarding identity and belonging, Ruth Mandel observes an intimate entanglement of the discourse "with a vision of alterity, specifically with the perception of Turkishness as a threat to a supposedly stable German essence" (Mandel 2008, 7).

### ***3.1.4 Immigration situation without immigration country***

Although the restrictive measures had not, as promised, reduced the number of foreigners in the country nor decreased social tensions, the revised 1990 Foreigners Law in essence underlined anew the continuation of the baseline principles of policies towards foreigners. Herbert (2001, 261f, 282f) describes an increasing awareness among policy-makers that the majority of foreign workers and their families had indeed come to settle. Yet, the fear of losing votes at the ballots hindered effective legal and institutional reforms. Additional pressure stemmed from the arrival of an increasing number of refugees as well as expellees in the early 1990s (following the fall of the Iron Curtain, the war in Yugoslavia and ethnic conflicts in Turkey). Had in sum 480,000 asylum seekers arrived between 1980 and 1987, this figure amounted to 438,000 in 1992 alone (BAMF 2017e, see also Figure A3 in the appendix)<sup>3</sup>. Policies towards asylum seekers resembled the approach toward guest workers: reducing their numbers was a primary goal, together with the attempt to prevent their permanent settlement and their 'seeping' (*Einsickern*) into the German society. The focus on immigration control "turned into a substitute debate on two issues, on rights and membership in the welfare state, and the regulation of immigration without really addressing immigration as an issue", Faist (1994, 61) argues. Measures were thus deterrence policies such as restricted freedom of movement, strongly limited access to the labor market (i.e., a waiting period of 5 years), and modest housing in camps until the end of the asylum process (Herbert 2001, 265). Their isolation from society, their forced dependency on the state and the resulting high public cost heated the public debate. It culminated in open xenophobia and violent attacks against asylum seekers and other immigrants throughout the 1990s. The political debate had now moved away from reducing the number of guest workers and instead centered around the design of the asylum legislation, but the risen aversion against foreigners in general also affected the *Gastarbeiter* families and their marginalized position in the German society (Abadan-Unat 2011, 185f).

Also, with the debate focusing on immigration control and return, the development of legal and societal integration measures for guest workers in Germany was largely neglected. Despite being the foreigners group with the largest duration of stay on average, the Turks at large did not enjoy safe legal residence. In 1997, more than half of the Turks had lived in Germany for over 15 years (Beauftragte der

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<sup>3</sup> Despite dominating the medial discourse, refugees made up a much smaller share in overall immigration to Germany than family unification immigrants, expellees (*Aussiedler*) and immigrants from EC countries (Herbert 2001, 276, 288).

Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1999). Having worked and lived as ‘guests’ for more than a decade on average, former *Gastarbeiter* had in fact become de facto immigrants (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 96; Heckmann et al. 2009). Yet, out of 2.1 million Turks, only roughly a third (764,000) had an unlimited residence status and, hence, legal security over their future stay. Other groups of (former) foreign workers from non-EEC countries and their families, such as Yugoslavs or Poles, shared similarly precarious situations (Herbert 2001, 291). The numbers of foreigners acquiring German citizenship rose towards the end of the millennium but remained low in comparison to other Western European countries (see chapter 3.2.2). Given their unchanged position at the lower occupational and social level, their increased vulnerability to economic shocks and to sector transformations cemented their status as ‘buffer material’ in German economic cycles.<sup>4</sup> Whereas the Spanish and Yugoslavs had roughly converged to overall unemployment rates, in 1997 the unemployment rate of foreigners altogether was twice the rate of the overall population (20% in contrast to 10,7%), with the Turks reaching 24%. Herbert (2001, 292) interprets this as an indicator of the different levels of integration of the different groups of foreigners, including education and qualification levels.

### ***3.1.5 Germany’s guest worker experience in a nutshell***

Having been invited as guests, foreign workers in the 1950s and 1960s in Germany concentrated in co-ethnic networks and maintained strong bonds to home. Similarly, the state understood its role as a short-term host, and an incorporation of the ‘guests’ into the society was not part of the plan. Instead, the return option was kept vivid; the ethnic clustering of the *Gastarbeiter* and their structural and local separation from the German society was not only tolerated but in parts even supported (e.g. with the provision of camps close to industrial areas). In contrast to the initial concept, a large portion of the *Gastarbeiter* de facto settled in Germany and reunited with their families until long after the recruitment stop in 1973. Although it soon became evident that the temporary and circular character of the initiated labor import was nothing but an illusion, governments throughout the party spectrum from Social Democrats to Liberals and Conservatives<sup>5</sup> remained paralyzed by the fear of a furious electorate that felt ‘overrun’ by foreigners and betrayed by politics. Having framed the recruitment of foreign labor as a temporary exception to Germany’s immigration history, firstly, fed the expectation that the guest workers would return home soon, and secondly, placed the incoming ‘guests’ at the margins of society. Neither the public was prepared for the *Gastarbeiter* to spend the rest of their lives in Germany, nor were the guest workers themselves prepared through respective support from the state. This hands-free

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<sup>4</sup> *Manövriermasse*, (‘buffer material’) (Sackmann 2013; 74, 96) or *Konjunkturpuffer* (‘economic shock absorber’, Hollifield 2004, 895): these terms express that the labor market does not adapt to immigration, but rather do labor migrants adapt to developments on the labor market (i.e. economic booms and downturns, structural changes such as increased automatization, or a changing composition of the domestic work force)

<sup>5</sup> but not so much the Greens (Die Grünen), founded in 1980, who made their embracing approach towards asylum and immigration one of their major unique selling points.

approach facilitated the ethnical and societal segregation of the 'guests' from their 'host' society. For temporary guests, mastering the host's language is generally not a key concern, nor is the development of bonding ties to host society's members. Not being invited to join the host community, the retreat into co-ethnic communities is the most viable option. Investments into the improvement of the own status (such as education, job training, relocation to other areas or non-ethnic networking) seem irrational given the prospected return in the near future.

Consequently, guest workers were locked into their low economic and social status. They helped the FRG overcome its shortage in unskilled labor in the early phase of economic restructuring after the Second World war. With the economy's progress and transformation, the socioeconomic standards increased for large parts of the German society, but foreign workers and their relatives for their most part did not possess the conditions to participate in this progress. This put them into competition with Germans at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum, including unemployed and low-income families, who are dependent on the state. When circularity proved not to dominate guest worker immigration as promised, irritation arose in society and was picked up by the media. Especially when the *Wirtschaftswunder* (post-war economic boom) faded out, and when the global recessions of 1967/68 and 1973 hit German industries and jobs, the foreign population was viewed as an unnecessary burden on society and the welfare system. By then, the immigration reality had already shifted away from being temporary, that is, returning home had become only a very distant idea.

Nevertheless, the government deemed it politically impossible to acknowledge the failure of the circular migration concept and the obsolescence of the non-immigration-country baseline. Measures to strengthen the position of long-term guest workers in Germany (now de facto immigrants) were highly unpopular, so the focus remained with immigration control and return. Although the unchanged high numbers of foreigners in the country proved the failure of these policies, politicians stuck to them and left the door to inclusionary measures closed. This cemented and worsened the precarious situation of the guest worker immigrants and their families: the intentional separation of foreign kids in school, for example, left them strongly disadvantaged to compete on the German labor market (Pagenstecher 1995). Insecurity over the future legal status was another obstacle to upward social mobility, consolidating their vulnerability to economic shocks and their increasingly isolated position in society. The image of the *Sozialschmarotzer* (social parasite) was thereby increasingly nourished and tied the hands of policy-makers. It was only 50 years after signing the first labor recruitment agreement that the German government came to officially revise its policy approach towards foreigners in the 2005 *Zuwanderungsgesetz* (immigration law), ultimately recognizing that *Germany is a country of immigration*.

## 3.2 *German citizenship and national identity: ‘We would rather be among our own kind’*<sup>6</sup>

### 3.2.1 *The ethnonational identity concept*

The reluctance of politics and society to recognize Germany’s immigration reality is more easily understood in the context of the German idea of nationality and societal belonging based on ethnic heritage. For such a nationhood concept based on blood, Mandel (2008, 206) describes an “ideal of an organic community, that is, of belonging to a common people bound by language, history, and tradition”, regardless of geographic aspects. Civic concepts of nationhood and citizenship, in contrast, define culture and values as main characteristics for belonging (Brubaker 1992), and France is a popular example. Whereas newcomers can choose to adapt French culture and habits, having German family roots or not is not a question of choice, Brubaker famously argued. Although a strict classification into countries with ethnic in contrast to civic citizenship concepts would be an oversimplification of the complex issue of national identity (see Reeskens and Hooghe 2010 for a discussion), scholars agree that the German approach to national identity carries strong elements of the *law of the blood* (James 1989; Göktürk et al. 2007; Martin 2014a). The preamble of the German Constitution (*Grundgesetz*) reflects an understanding of national membership explicitly being rooted in *Volkszugehörigkeit* (Basic Law §116a), a term that literally translates to ‘folk-belongingness’ or ‘people-belongingness’. It expresses ethnicity-defining characteristics such as language, customs, history, as well as self-identification with the German people (Mandel 2008, 207ff.), and privileges membership “based on shared cultural and historical ties” over membership “based on actual residence and direct contributions to civic and economic life” (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 23). The traditionally ethnonational approach to citizenship thus embraces *Aussiedler* (expellees) and displaced minorities of originally German origin that were deprived of their membership earlier, independent of their place of residence or birth (Levy 2002, 222).

Such identity concepts translate into legislation, and manifest themselves most visibly in legal approaches towards foreigners (Brubaker 1992). Until the late 1990s, nationhood and political membership were discussed under the terms of such a shared ethnicity (see e.g. Kay Hailbronner, 1989, 72, 75, scholar of migration policy and law and political adviser to the Conservative government in the 1980s and 1990s), contrasted against the notion of nationhood of “immigration countries” (such as the United States or Canada), whose identities are based on immigration and heterogeneity. In 1989, two Federal States (Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg) granted local voting rights to aliens residing in the country under certain conditions, but they were unanimously stripped off by the Constitutional Court. The Court reinforced the notion of belonging being rooted in *Volkszugehörigkeit*, arguing that

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<sup>6</sup> ‘Wir bleiben lieber unter uns’, Rainer Münz in *Die Zeit* (2004) about the German identity concept

“[s]ince according to the conception of the Basic Law the quality of being German is the connecting point for belonging to the Volk as the bearer of state authority, then this quality is also a precondition for voting rights” (83 BverfGE,51, as cited in Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 27).

Also after the German unification that had unveiled a certain dissonance of the two German identities (Falter 2006), strong “efforts to prevent the permanent settlement of foreigners and to define and regulate their stay as temporary” dominated the policy-making towards foreigners (Herbert 1990, 27). As a consequence, the German society was largely unprepared to deal with the ever more clearly evolving immigration reality in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and still less “for a future of more, rather than less, immigration” (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 31).

### **3.2.2 German ‘Leitkultur’ and the quest for homogeneity**

In the new millennium, a timid reconsideration of the ethno-based notion found its way into the German discourse on national identity. In 2000, the Federal Republic of Germany reformed its naturalization law, liberalizing access to German citizenship and introducing *jus soli* elements.<sup>7</sup> Concepts of national identity evolve over generations, however, and habits, traditions, expectations, and attitudes towards migrants are unlikely to be overhauled by two law reforms. “The idea that the *normal* citizen was of German ethnicity or blood lineage had persisted through two empires and two republics”, Göktürk et al. (2007, 152, emphasis in original) describe, and Mandel (2008, 216) adds in 2008 that “views of the unchangeable nature of foreign groups survive in contemporary Germany, albeit in less virulent forms”. The recently revived discussion on a German *Leitkultur* (‘leading culture’ or ‘guiding culture’) vividly reflects the continuing dominance of ethnonational identity ideas in Germany. The idea of a *Leitkultur*, made it into the Conservatives’ party manifestos (CDU and CSU) in 2001 and was prominently brought back into the public discourse by the Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière (CDU) in 2017. Who belongs to the German people, who is a German? “Not everyone who resides in our country for a certain time period is part of our country”, is his answer. In ten theses he developed ‘Germanness’ to be rooted in German habits (such as shaking hands and not wearing burkhas), in virtues (such as assiduity), in a common inherited history (both the Nazi past and the soccer world championship), in culture (referring to composer J.S. Bach and poet J.W. von Goethe) and a common Christian origin (see de Maizière 2017). Some commentators dismiss the high-profile resurrection of *Volkszugehörigkeit* arguments in the national identity debate by the German Interior Minister as ballot box agenda shielding against a strengthening political right (see e.g. Biermann 2017). Their revival nevertheless reflects the unbroken relevance of the ethnonational identity concept in shaping the German approach towards naturalization, immigration and integration policy-making.

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<sup>7</sup> *jus sanguinis*: law of the blood. Citizenship based on parentage, *jus solis*: law of the land. Citizenship based on the place of birth

An important element in the ethnic nationhood concept is the notion of a homogeneous society. Newcomers, by definition characterized by otherness, bare the potential to influence the host society, in its ideal state marked by homogeneity (Tietze 2008, 255). Such an understanding contrasts, for instance, against the United States, whose national identity is inherently built upon immigration (Martin 2014b), or against France’s civic identity concept, strongly marked by its republican heritage and by an “early willingness to accept foreigners as settlers, immigrants, and citizens” (Hollifield 2014). When politicians expressed a certain comprehension for attacks against foreigners sparking in the 1990s, this only underscored the boundary lines of belonging and non-belonging based on ethnical grounds that had evoked *Überfremdungssangst* (fear of foreign infiltration) (Chin 2007, 260; Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 155). Evidence of such a homogeneous understanding of the *Volk* can be found throughout German integration policy, which is characterized by the request to assimilate rather than by embracing multiculturalism. Acquiring German citizenship continues to be linked to “the expectation of assimilation and suppression of cultural difference” (Klimt 2002, 136), and *Integrationsverweigerer* (immigrants refusing to integrate) have to fear a hard hand, as former head of CSU and current Interior Minister Horst Seehofer termed it (Der Spiegel 2010). Cultural proximity continues to be employed as a major factor of integration: “it is obvious that immigrants from other cultural areas such as Turkey and other Arab countries have a harder time” to settle in Germany, from which Seehofer concludes that no additional immigration from other cultural areas is needed (see Der Spiegel 2010, author’s translation).

Table 1. Average duration of residence, 2016  
by citizenship (Top 10 countries of origin), in years, source: Destatis, 2017a

Turkey	28,8
Austria	28,8
Former Serbia and Montenegro	27
Italy	27
Greece	24,7
Slovenia	24,3
Switzerland	23,9
Netherlands	23,1
Portugal	22,3
Bosnia and Hercegovina	22,1

At the same time, the constant referral to the economic contributions of newcomers is a constituent element of the German understanding of immigration (Hell 2015, 168). “Of course Germany needs immigrants – but those that benefit Germany”, Markus Söder, now Bavarian head of state, agrees (Der Spiegel 2010). The British historian Harold James, who studied more than two centuries of the German identity debate between 1770 and 1990, observed that economic achievement has always been a strong pattern to justify membership. In times of economic downturns, cultural and political nationalism would commonly return to the debate about German self-understanding, and societal membership to outsiders would be denied (James 1989). Thilo Sarrazin’s (SPD) book “*Deutschland schafft sich ab*” (“Germany is doing away with itself”), published in 2010 in the wake of

the financial crisis, was sold out within days. His call for a highly restrictive immigration policy, explicitly shielding against Arab and Turkish migration, resonated strongly with the public debate, giving it another spin towards foreigners being perceived as an existential threat to German cultural identity and, ultimately, existence. Reluctantly recognizing its immigration reality, in Germany “immigration has come to play an important role in social and economic development but is not part of the process of nation building” (Hollifield et al. 2014, 3).


The strong reliance on ‘Germanness’ in constructing German identity is also reflected in the modest naturalization rates of the past decades. After a peak in the 1990s, when ‘ethnic Germans’ held back by the Iron Curtain finally sought German citizenship, naturalization rates dropped to levels well below EU average (see Figure 1). The largest number of naturalized citizens are of Turkish origin (16,290 persons or 14,75% of all naturalizations in 2016, Destatis 2017a). Together with Austrians, Turks are the group with the longest average duration of stay in Germany (28,8 years, see Table 1). Naturalizations come slowly, however: almost half of the Turks naturalized in 2016 (46,7%) have been in the

Fig. 1. naturalization rates, EU-28, 2015  
*number of naturalizations relative to foreign population, in %*  
*source: Eurostat, 2017*



country for 20 years or more (Destatis 2017a). Possible explanations are the unbroken denial of dual citizenship, but also the decade-long exclusionary political approach towards immigrants that prevented their “self-identification with the German political culture” (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 205ff.). As a consequence, the “presence of a large population of long-term, lawfully settled aliens combined with a highly restrictive naturalization policy

Fig. 2. Naturalization rates  
1981 - 2016  
*number of naturalizations relative to foreign population, in %. source: Destatis, 2017b*



had created a near permanent subclass of residents without voting rights that extended across generations” (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 24) And although naturalization is seen to serve integration in some European countries, Mandel concludes for Germany that “even if the newly German Turks gain suffrage, the color of their new passports is no guarantee of overcoming prejudice, discrimination, and social marginality” (Mandel 2008, 223).

In short, the German understanding of national identity is characterized by a strong reliance on ethnic descent, and societal membership is strongly defined by the contribution of newcomers. These features are important for a coherent understanding of the policy approaches towards foreigners that shape their integration experiences. If the influx of newcomers is potentially viewed as a threat to social homogeneity, policy-makers are likely to highlight the foreigners’ duties in assimilating to host society processes, and formal membership in terms of citizenship or unlimited residence will be granted rather reluctantly. The promotion of return policies for guest workers in the 1980s, for instance, was termed as a “way to avoid discussions of membership and citizenship of settled migrant labor” by Faist (1994, 51). As will be argued in the following chapter, these elements have strongly framed the integration experiences of *Gastarbeiter* and their families in Germany.

### 3.3 Main challenges to the integration of *Gastarbeiter*

The previous chapters closely analyzed Germany’s recent experience with the immigration and integration of guest workers and traced the country’s notion of national identity and belonging. This exercise was carried out based on the assumption that past experiences provide valuable insight for decisions taken today. Which story can the FRG’s recent immigration history tell? From the analysis of secondary historical material, we can now conclude on main elements that characterized the integration experience of *Gastarbeiter* and their descendants in the past six decades. Most importantly, governments of all colors denied the permanent character of the guest workers’ immigration throughout the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. This paradigm manifested itself in the continued insecure legal status of many, despite years

and decades of residence in the country. Consequently, investments in host-country specific resources (such as education and local networks) were delayed, if not dropped. Thereby, the economic productivity was hampered, and the social mobility of guest worker families was jeopardized. Speaking with the sociologist Hoffmann-Nowotny (1981), Abadan-Unat (2011, 113) describes the immigration of guest worker families to Germany as a process of structural marginalization, whereby the newly entering social class of migrants enables the receiving society to increase social and economic status, leading the guest workers to stay “at the edge of societal life” (ibid.). The evolving societal marginalization, illustrated by “little Turks”, such as the early Kreuzberg district in Berlin (ibid.), at the same time evoked tensions with the host society that increasingly perceived the disintegrated foreigners as a burden and a confounder to ostensible German homogeneity. These developments have serious consequences until today, so a thorough understanding of the underlying mechanisms is important in order to avoid similar trends in the future. Let me therefore briefly elaborate on these elements of the integration experience of *Gastarbeiter* families before turning to the current debate on refugee integration in present-day Germany.

The major characteristic of German policy-making towards *Gastarbeiter* was the continued emphasis on the “*Gast*”: Turks, Yugoslavs and Poles were continuously treated as *guests* by their *host* society. This made an incorporation of the foreigners seemingly not necessary; anyways, they were expected to leave after a certain time. As has been described above, this did, however, not reflect reality. A large share of the *Gastarbeiter* reunited with their families and de facto settled in Germany. No matter the party in power, the governments from the early 1960s to the end of the millennium did not break with the country’s conception of not being a country of immigration. Although major political actors both from the Conservative and the Social-Democratic spectrum had vowed for a re-assessment of this paradigm, the governments in power seemed to fear a strong rejection by the electorate. This may be explained by two factors: firstly, admitting that the rotation principle had never been properly operated would be the confession of a huge policy failure that no government dared to be held accountable for. A second relevant issue in this respect is the German idea of a homogeneous society elaborated above. Issuing unlimited residence permits or German passports to foreign workers and their children or granting them equal political participation rights (such as suffrage or the right to found a party), would constitute a potential threat to the seeming homogeneity of the German society. Despite the reform of the citizenship law in 2000 that introduced *jus soli* elements for naturalization, “old notions of who is ‘really’ a German have persisted among ethnic Germans” (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 45). Such beliefs among the German society, including policy-makers, may have contributed to the long denial of the country’s immigration reality.

The negation of Germany’s immigration reality had three major consequences. On the one hand, it led to prolonged states of legal uncertainty. The probability of return or deportation strongly affects decisions on further qualification measures, as such investments of time, money and effort only pay off in the long run (Rooth 1999). Without a secure residence status, investment into the improvement of the

own status (such as education, job training, relocation to other areas or non-ethnic networking) seems irrational. The children's good performance in German schools is not a major concern; nor is the participation in job training measures that can improve one's occupational status. Legal uncertainty also scares off employers and increases odds of precarious employment in terms of contract duration and occupational status: employers refrain from endowing important tasks on employees with limited legal prospects and avoid the investment in their training (Bakker et al. 2017). Such host-country-specific human capital would, however, constitute an important factor for better labor market outcomes (De Vroome and Van Tubergen 2010, among others), and is particularly important in Germany's highly specialized economy.

Secondly, the strongly restricted access to societal membership is also reflected in the attempt to restrict the recruited workers to their economic role. The setup of foreign immigration as a temporary measure resulted in an inactivity in the design of self-contained integration measures for the newcomers. The children of guest worker migrants with deficient German skills, for example, were placed in *Sonderschulen*, schools for slow learners, instead of receiving adequate support in picking up the language and continue on the standard educational track (Abadan-Unat 2011, 117). Leaving such obstacles to societal incorporation unaddressed, the concentration in co-ethnic networks was encouraged (Bade 1993). Being locked into their marginalized economic and social status, 'guests' increasingly cemented their ethnical and societal segregation from the 'host' society (Abadan-Unat 2011). Until today, children and grandchildren of former guest workers show low levels of social mobility, a phenomenon that is especially pronounced for people with Turkish background (Bildungsberichterstattung 2016).

And thirdly, the described constraints on upward social mobility put guest worker migrants into competition with citizens at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum, including unemployed and low-income families, who are dependent on the state. This evoked societal tensions: when circularity proved not to dominate guest worker immigration as promised, irritation arose in society and was amplified by the media. Especially when the *Wirtschaftswunder* (post-war economic boom) faded out, and when the global recessions of 1967/68 and 1973 hit German industries and jobs, the foreign population was viewed as an unnecessary burden on society and the welfare system (Herbert 1990). Increased family unification, encouraged by changes in the social benefits system and the 1973 *Anwerbestopp*, had changed the structure of the foreign resident population, soon comprised of a smaller work force, a higher number of children, and a dominant share of non-Europeans, especially Turks (Castles 1985).<sup>8</sup> These changes were grist to the mill of political parlay based on *Überfremdungsangst* (fear of foreign infiltration). Open hostility against foreigners peaked in harsh anti-immigrant discourses and violent attacks against foreigners in the 1980s and 1990s, and the division lines between asylum

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<sup>8</sup> favorable economic and political situations in Italy and Spain had encouraged re-migration to these countries, while the number of asylum seekers from non-European countries considerably increased in the 1980s, see Castles 1985, 520ff.

seekers and *Gastarbeiter* blurred into one image of the unwanted 'Other'. With foreign workers being perceived as a threat to the own socioeconomic position, most notably lower status groups are prone to express strong rejection of aliens in times of crises. Especially in the context of the relatively generous German welfare system the immigration debate during the Kohl era (1982 – 1998) soon centered around terms like '*Sozialschmarotzer*' ('social parasite') and '*Asylbetrüger*' ('asylum fraudsters'). At the same time, not being granted full-fledged access to society left second or third generation migrants dissatisfied on their part, encouraging unintended coping strategies such as the romanticized rediscovery of the former motherland identity of guest workers' children (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Süßmuth 2006). Mutual skepticism between the host society and foreign fellow citizens increased, and xenophobic tendencies in the 1980s and 1990s in Germany impressively illustrated the disruptive power the development of disintegrated social groups can unfold. The proper integration of newcomers is hence not only an issue of economic productivity, but it also has a strong dimension of social cohesion.

In sum, from the historical analysis it can be concluded that legal insecurity, neglected human capital investment and tendencies of societal segregation were major features of the integration experience of *Gastarbeiter*. Do these features also characterize the integration of current refugee cohorts? Although long-term consequences can as a matter of fact only be assessed with certainty in the future, a first analysis of the factors associated with the labor market success of refugees already allows an early assessment as to whether current refugee cohorts are likely to face obstacles similar to the *Gastarbeiter* integration experience.

#### ***4 The integration of the current refugee cohort in Germany***

Let us now move to the context of current refugee migration in Germany and examine their integration experience. Based on the findings from the guest worker analysis, special attention will be paid to factors concerning legal residence, human capital investment and societal cohesion. In order to understand which institutional and individual elements are important for the labor market integration of refugees, firstly, the legal and institutional context of refugee integration in Germany will have to be introduced. Then we will turn to the econometric analysis of the labor market outcomes of refugees in Germany. Which factors are linked to good or bad chances on the German job market? And in particular, which role do legal status, educational investments and social networks play? Ultimately, these results will be reviewed in the context of the major elements that have shaped the *Gastarbeiter* integration experience: are the identified key concerns still an issue for the integration of refugees today? We will find that the economic integration of recently arrived refugees is challenged by similar factors that have characterized the incorporation of *Gastarbeiter* migrants and their descendants in the past 60 years.

## ***4.1 The legal and institutional context of refugee migrants***

Before the labor market outcomes of recently arrived refugees can be examined empirically, this chapter will provide a basic overview of the settings and conditions that frame the economic and societal integration of asylum seekers and recognized refugees in Germany. I will briefly touch upon the issues of formal labor market access, the role of the legal status, the quality of asylum procedures, access to labor market services, family reunification, and housing.

### ***4.1.1 Legal status and access to the labor market***

Chances to participate in the labor market are largely determined by the legal status of an individual. As a general rule, persons obliged to reside in a reception facility provided by the state (residence obligation, *Wohnpflicht*) are not entitled to work. Four main groups can be distinguished:

1. asylum seekers: the asylum procedure is still in process
2. recognized refugees (including individuals that have been granted asylum<sup>9</sup>)
3. individuals, who have been granted subsidiary protection (for humanitarian reasons)
4. former asylum seekers: rejected but ‘tolerated’ (deportation was suspended for technical, humanitarian, or personal reasons)

The legal title determines the type of residence permit. Asylum seekers (group 1) are still awaiting the decision on their asylum claim and hold a temporary residence permit for the time of the procedure (*Aufenthaltsgestattung*). After a 3-month waiting period asylum seekers may gain access to the labor market under certain conditions. First, only applicants with so-called ‘good prospects to stay’ can apply for a work permit. This regulation is described in Box 1. Secondly, applicants from countries defined as a ‘safe country of origin’ cannot apply for a work permit and are obliged to stay in state facilities for the entire duration of their asylum process. Law reforms in 2014 and 2015 declared Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo as ‘safe countries of origin’, restricting rights and benefits for citizens from these countries, and banning them from the labor market. Thirdly, a work permit for an asylum seeker is subject to a case-by-case decision by the Federal Employment Agency (Kalkmann 2017, pp.65; BAMF 2017d). The applicant has to provide evidence of a concrete job offer and a respective job description from the employer (Kalkmann 2017, 66). Especially for low-skilled occupations, where labor is more easily replaceable, this may pose a technical barrier to asylum seekers aiming for work (Thränhardt 2015). Before 2016, the Employment Agency carried out checks on whether a German or another EU citizen is suitable for the job an asylum seeker aspires during her first 15 months in Germany (so-called priority review). This constraint has been suspended in August 2016 for three years.

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<sup>9</sup> The recognition as asylee for political prosecution is barely practiced anymore; instead, refugee status is granted based on the GRC.

Recognized refugees and persons with subsidiary protection (groups 2 and 3) have successfully passed the asylum procedure and receive a time-limited residence permit for 3 years and 1 year, respectively (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis*). This permission can subsequently be renewed and may result in a permanent residence if certain conditions including integration efforts are met (*Niederlassungserlaubnis*). Groups 2 and 3 are exempt from residence obligations and are entitled to work without legal restrictions. Individuals of group 4 hold residence titles of different validity (generally less secure than for groups 2 and 3). The deportation of these individuals was not executed for various

Table 2. 'tolerated' individuals: duration of stay in Germany, 2016  
source: Bundesregierung, 2017b

more than 3 years	33%
more than 4 years	26%
more than 5 years	22%
more than 6 years	18%
more than 8 years	15%
more than 10 years	13%
more than 12 years	11%
more than 15 years	8%

reasons, so their legal status is based on different legal grounds. Since 2014, 'tolerated' individuals can apply for a work permit under the same conditions that apply for asylum seekers. Yet, their "obligation to leave is executable" and the focus of administrative measures remains with the execution of this obligation and the actual return to the home country" (Bundesregierung 2017d, 2, own translation).<sup>10</sup> This also applies to individuals who entered vocational training or education (ibid.).<sup>11</sup> The executable character of the deportation contrasts against the factual application practice: the latest data shows that more than a fifth of all 'tolerated' people have been in the country for more than five years, and more than a tenth for over 12 years (see Table 2), resembling the insecure legal status of a non-negligible share of *Gastarbeiter* migrants (see chapter 3.1.4). The legal phenomenon called 'chain toleration' (*Kettenduldung*) for rejected asylum seekers has repeatedly been criticized by civil society organizations and was addressed in a legal reform in 2015. Lawmakers established a residence title for 'tolerated' persons based on long-term residence and 'good integration'. The interpretation of the clause and the evaluation of an individual's situation is largely left to the public servant in charge, and the expected effects stayed away: although the government claimed that some 33,000 persons were eligible, until 2017 less than 6,000 people benefited from the law reforms (Bundesregierung 2017b, 2017a; Flüchtlingsrat Berlin 2017). Almost 60% of all refugees with a 'toleration' are below the age of 30 (Bundesregierung 2017b, 36).

<sup>10</sup> "Bei geduldeten Personen handelt es sich um vollziehbar ausreisepflichtige Personen, bei denen der Fokus behördlicher Maßnahmen grundsätzlich auf die Durchsetzung der Ausreisepflicht und die tatsächliche Rückkehr in den Heimatstaat gerichtet ist"

<sup>11</sup> An increased number of deportations of 'tolerated' persons in education, especially Afghans, in the run-up to the 2017 elections have fueled a controversial public debate (WDR 2017). Employers as a consequence repeatedly vowed their disapproval of this practice and expressed their rising uncertainty to train refugees given their instable legal status (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2017).

In general, hence, two main groups can be distinguished in terms of labor market access: individuals with unrestricted access and a relatively secure legal status (groups 2 and 3) and individuals with conditional or no access and a relatively insecure legal status (groups 1 and 4). The share of refugees currently residing in Germany with restricted vs unrestricted access to the labor market roughly divides half and half, (Bundesregierung 2017b; see also Hohlfeld 2017). Figure 3 shows the increasing share of insecure status holders since 2011 (34%, 2016: 49%), largely due to the increased number of asylum seekers as a result of aggravating conflicts and civil wars (in 2016 Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis and Eritreans made up 65% of all asylum seekers, see BAMF 2016) and due to the declaration of six Balkan countries as ‘safe countries of origin’. Each of these countries ranged under the top 10 sending countries at least once between 2007 and 2016 (see appendix Table A2). Expanding the list of ‘safe countries of origin’ with selected Balkan countries in 2014 and 2015 was an important element in tightening the asylum law for asylum seekers with low chances to be accepted (through quicker refusals and lower benefit payments), but in turn improving conditions of refugees with a ‘good perspective to stay’ (Box 1, see also Gesley 2016). The definition of *per se* ‘safe countries of origin’ is a legal discriminatory institution that seeks to lower public costs by accelerating asylum procedures of individuals with a low chance of being recognized as a refugee, but also serves as a measure of immigration control via deterrence

Fig. 3. Labor market access of refugees: legally restricted vs unrestricted access, 1997-2016  
 shares in % of total  
 source: Bundesregierung 1998-2017





Fig. 4. Legal titles, 2008 - 2017  
 Source: BAMF 2017e



(Engelmann 2016). In sum, the legal access to labor market participation is strongly linked to the residence status and has to be taken into account when analyzing labor market outcomes of refugees.

#### **4.1.2 The quality of asylum procedures and overburdened authorities**

When discussing legal security as a factor of economic integration it is essential to also look at the quality of legal procedures. The abruptly rising numbers of asylum applications in 2015 and 2016 exerted enormous political pressure on the government and the concerned authority, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). Expected to deliver visible results, a range of measures were taken to accelerate the decision procedures. In addition to the extension of the list of safe countries of origin,

##### **Box 1. The ‘good prospects to stay’ decree**

*The access to a range of rights and services for asylum seekers depends on the overall recognition rate of their country of origin. This practice was introduced first in 2015.*

Only if the recognition rate of asylum seekers from country X was above 50% in the past half year, the applicant from country X is generally entitled to participate on the labor market, to take part in language courses and to access integration services by the Federal Employment Agency. This policy reflects the new approach of the government to improve conditions for refugees most likely to stay in the short run (e.g. Syrians) and discourage immigration from countries with a high rejection rate (e.g. Albania, see Box 1 in the appendix on main policy changes). On that ground, for 2017 the BAMF assumed asylum seekers from Syria, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, and Somalia to have ‘good prospects to stay’. Asylum seekers from other countries were largely excluded from a range of rights and services (most importantly, labor market access, language courses and integration courses).

**Example Afghanistan:** *Asylum applicants from Afghanistan were the second largest group of asylum seekers in 2016 (see Table A1 in the appendix). 50,7% of the claims were rejected in 2015, which as a consequence impeded access to the labor market and to labor market services for the entire group of Afghani asylum seekers in 2016 (Bundesregierung 2016). The rejection rate of 50,7% includes, however, also formal decisions, such as the withdrawal of an application and Dublin cases: excluding those cases, only 26,1% Afghani asylum seekers were rejected in the last quarter of 2015 (ibid.). Also, a non-negligible share of asylum seekers is rejected but granted a residence permit nonetheless (group 4)\*. Afghani asylum applicants nevertheless were evaluated to have ‘bad prospects to stay’ and remained excluded from participation rights and integration services throughout 2016 and 2017. This is especially relevant given that the waiting period between arrival and asylum decision was on average roughly 20 months for Afghanis in the third quarter of 2017 (latest available data, Bundesregierung 2017c, 3, 15) – more than one and a half years of wait-and-see.*

The decree is also applied on minor refugees and unaccompanied minor refugees. Their chances to stay are higher than for adults – in 2017, they were accepted in 60% and 80% of the cases, respectively (Bundesregierung 2017e, 13). Yet, their ‘prospects to stay’ are not assessed separately. So, unless they are from Syria, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran or Somalia, they remain in a waiting position throughout the asylum process, which on average took more than 1 year and 3 months in the third quarter of 2017 (ibid., 6).

\*In a considerable number of cases the rejection of the asylum claim does not automatically translate into departure. Instead, titles are awarded *ex-post* based on humanitarian reasons, family reasons or simply on a long duration of stay (for instance ‘chain tolerations’, see Table 2) Almost half (46,1%) of the rejected asylees still in the country in 2014 did hold a legal residence title by 2016. In 2015, this share was 26,6% (Bundesregierung 2017b, 68ff.). The ‘good prospects to stay’ decree is thus criticized by a range of civil society actors. They refer to its discriminatory character and the factual suspension of the individual evaluation of the flight reasons. Also, the long time periods that are lost for effective integration are subject to criticism (e.g. Idler and Mantel 2017).

additional staff was employed and the procedures were adjusted (see Box A1 in the appendix on main policy changes). Yet, a range of actors in the field have observed a decreasing quality of procedures associated with the undertaken changes. A memorandum by civil society organizations (Idler and Mantel 2017) highlights that the understaffed and in part insufficiently qualified BAMF personnel (officials as well as interpreters) has caused error-prone decision-making.<sup>12</sup> Also, new rules particularly introduced for the shortened procedures (for ‘safe-country-of-origin’ applicants) have exacerbated the insufficient access of asylum seekers to rights such as basic legal information and independent legal advice on the asylum procedure, the authors of the memorandum claim (see also Weinzierl 2017, 10).<sup>13</sup> Especially the separation of the hearing of the application and the decision-making in newly introduced decision-making centers is subject to criticism.

A lower quality of the asylum decision process is furthermore indicated by rising numbers of filed suits against rejections by asylum applicants and a large portion of them leading to the revision of the former decision. The ratio of filed complaints to the number of asylum decisions increased from 25% in 2016 to almost 40% in the first half of 2017 (Bundesregierung 2017c), exerting additional pressure on the executive authorities and courts. The high success rate of revision claims from Afghans and Syrians is interpreted by critics as evidence for the decreasing quality of the asylum decision procedures under pressure to deliver visible results (Idler and Mantel 2017; see also the investigative report in Lobenstein 2017): in 2017, law suits of Afghans and Syrians led to a revision of the decision in 60% and 79% of the cases, respectively. Also, the political goal to accelerate asylum procedures and to reduce the number of pending cases has not been fulfilled. Despite the considerable retrenchment of the rights of ‘safe-country-of-origin’ applicants, meant to shorten asylum procedures, the average duration increased from 7,1 months in 2016 to 10,8 months in 2017 (Bundesregierung 2017c, 2017f, 20).<sup>14</sup>

In light of the relevance of legal security for the labor market integration of refugees these developments are a non-negligible factor for scholars and policy-makers concerned with the successful economic integration of refugee newcomers in the German labor market.

#### ***4.1.3 Access to labor market related services: integration courses and the recognition of foreign qualifications***

Legal status not only determines access to employment *per se*, but also affects the eligibility to labor market related services. In the context of the 2001 and 2005 integration law reforms the state designed a range of measures to target the labor market integration of recently arrived refugees. Most importantly,

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<sup>12</sup> The case of an erroneously rejected Afghan asylum seeker deported in September, who subsequently had to be brought back to Germany, prominently entered the media discourse as an exemplification of the overburdened authorities (Die Zeit 2017b)

<sup>13</sup> These shortcomings are not entirely new and have already been highlighted in a 2005 Memorandum (“Memorandum zur derzeitigen Situation des deutschen Asylverfahrens” 2005)

<sup>14</sup> The variance between countries of origin is however remarkable: While Albanians had to wait 3,8 months on average in the third quarter of 2017, applicants from the Russian Federation waited 14,3 months on average (Bundesregierung 2017c, 3).

an ‘integration course’ was designed that combines language courses with so-called orientation classes. The program is comprised of around 700 lectures à 45 minutes and aims to provide participants with a B1 German language level. The course is mainly targeted at refugees with issued residence permits (individuals with refugee status and humanitarian protection as well as reunited family members). Asylum-seekers and ‘tolerated’ people have subordinate access to the courses. Importantly, their participation depends on their ‘prospects to stay’ (BAMF 2017c, 2017b, see Box 1). In addition to standard German courses, the BAMF offers job-specific language training. Since 2016, complementary elements are brief vocational training, internships and visits in firms to apply the acquired language skills in practice. Participation requires A1 German level and a work permit (BAMF 2017a). Kosyakova and Sirries (2017) found that participation in one of the courses is positively related to subsequent employment. Especially the labor market oriented programs are associated with the likelihood to find a job, although the authors strongly emphasize that the group of participants is highly selective and has a range of unobserved characteristics (they mention, for instance, levels of motivation and work aspirations, Kosyakova and Sirries 2017, 269).

For all programs, the agencies can oblige individuals to participate, with non-compliance potentially resulting in benefit cuts. This instrument reflects the approach of the German government since the new 2001 and 2005 immigration laws, summarized as *Fördern and Fordern* (“support and demand”) (BAMF 2017a, pp.115, 131). Integration is understood as a twofold responsibility of both the host society and the newcomer. While the German society is obliged to offer an institutional and societal setting that guarantees equal access to all important economic, political and societal spheres, immigrants are expected to learn the language and to respect important societal values (Federal Ministry of the Interior BMI 2014, 51). With the introduction of integration as a public task into the immigration laws a considerable policy change was ignited: *Gastarbeiter* had not received state support for their integration in the form of language courses, for example. Public assistance towards foreign workers was subsumed under general support measures towards employees or towards the unemployed (see chapter 3.3). The provision of language and integration courses for certain refugee groups therefore represents a major policy change.

A final important element of labor market integration is the recognition of existing qualifications. As will be described below (see chapter 4.2.2), the educational attainment of the current refugee cohort is very heterogeneous and includes a considerable share of medium- and high-skilled individuals.<sup>15</sup> The 2012 Recognition Act (*Anerkennungsgesetz*) aimed at facilitating the recognition process of foreign qualifications. Until 2015, 64% of all recognition applications were ruled positively, dominated by occupations of medical and elderly care (Ministry of Education and Research 2017). However, as a large number of occupations (such as engineers or teachers) fall under the regulative competences of the 16

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<sup>15</sup> Guest workers tended to be low-skilled and essentially migrated to Germany to carry out low-skilled jobs, so the recognition of home-country qualifications was not a major concern (Herbert 2001).

Federal States, the recognition processes have shown to lack uniformity and transparency (Müller-Wacker 2017).

#### ***4.1.4 Housing, mobility and family unification***

Ultimately, conditions concerning the conduct of life essentially shape economic participation. The analysis of the guest worker integration experience has shown that their geographical segregation from the host society strongly links to their societal marginalization that has taken place. Klusmeyer and Papademetriou (2009, 206) describe that

“substantial economic and social marginalization of immigrant communities from the fabric of German society, combined with an exclusionary approach to immigrant political integration, has also contributed to physical segregation. This segregation is reflected in patterns of community formation, political mobilization, and transnational political association networks”.

Housing conditions, as well as possibilities to reunite with the family and legal restrictions to move within Germany are therefore important elements to be taken into account for the integration of refugees, too. As has been mentioned before, asylum seekers and individuals from ‘safe countries of origin’ are obliged to stay in state facilities (*Wohnpflicht*). Once granted asylum or subsidiary protection, the individual enjoys freedom of movement in Germany, but since 2016, stricter regulations concerning the choice of the place of residence exist. Authorities may oblige individuals to reside in a specific federal state or even municipality, but this law is not applied in all German states (*Wohnsitzauflage*, see Schlothuber and Röder 2016). Labor agencies generally offers support in terms of qualification, training and recognition of qualifications to recognized refugees (Kalkmann 2017). Residing in peripheral regions with poorly equipped civil authorities yet complicates the recognition process of foreign qualification and the access to other labor market related services for refugees and asylum seekers, typically equipped with little financial and material resources (Schlothuber and Röder 2016). Furthermore, holding a legal residence title (a temporary *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* or a permanent *Niederlassungserlaubnis*), recognized refugees (group 2) can apply for the reunification with their family, that is, for their spouse or children to join them in Germany. As a condition, the applicant must provide sufficiently large housing and income to independently support the family. Yet, for people under subsidiary protection (group 3) the option to reunite the family is suspended since March 2016. The suspension of family unification for individuals under subsidiary protection must be seen in the context of the policy decision in 2016 to more often grant subsidiary protection instead of refugee status (see Figure 4: the share of subsidiary protection decisions spiked from 1,2% in 2015 to 37.5% in 2017). The growing reluctance to recognize full-fledged refugee status mainly targeted Syrian asylum applicants who in 98,7% of the cases were recognized as refugees in the first quarter of 2016 (Bundesregierung

2016).<sup>16</sup> The non-eligibility to family unification includes unaccompanied minor refugees with subsidiary protection. In February 2018, the government decided on the continued suspension of family unification for refugees with subsidiary protection until July 2018; after that, a contingent of 1,000 family unification cases per month is planned (Deutscher Bundestag 2018). The efforts to restrict new arrivals of asylum seekers and family members resembles the struggle of policy makers in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s to restrict the number of foreigners in the country by tightening the conditions for family unification and by providing incentives for return migration (see Box A1 in the appendix).

## **4.2 Descriptive analysis: recognized refugees in Germany**

With this institutional setup in mind that frames the integration experience of refugees in Germany, we will now turn to the exploration of the factors that are associated with the economic integration of the recently arrived refugee cohort. For my analysis I will rely on recently published survey data by the BAMF. In order to prepare the inferential analysis on the labor market outcomes of refugees a thorough description of the population under review (namely recently recognized refugees in Germany) is necessary. In the following I will therefore briefly describe the survey design and provide an overview of the main characteristics of the sample that are relevant for the analysis. Given the emphasized research interest in the role of legal status, human capital investment, and social cohesion I will give an overview of the population features in terms of demographics, occupation, human capital and levels of societal integration. I will then move on to the econometric modelling of the labor market outcome of the described population. Two probit estimations (*probability unit* models) will test two main labor market outcomes: the likelihood to be employed at all on the one hand, and the chance to be overqualified for the job carried out on the other. The latter is an important indicator of the quality of employment recognized refugees find in their first years after arrival, so the analysis will shed some first light on major factors that are associated with the successful economic integration of refugees in Germany.

### **4.2.1 Data: the BAMF refugee survey (2014)**

In 2013 and 2014, 2,805 individuals who were granted asylum or refugee status in Germany between 2008 and 2012 were surveyed on their lives in Germany. The representative sample was drawn from the German Central Register of Foreigners and includes individuals from the six most common countries of origin of asylees, namely Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka and Syria (see Table 3). The paper-based questionnaire was sent out by post (in German and four additional languages), so illiteracy of potential respondents (i.e. the inability to read or write in any of the offered languages) may possibly have introduced a bias. Despite this pitfall the survey includes a non-negligible share of respondents who have not attended school (16,4%) and who had sought help to answer the questions. Also, a phenomenon sometimes termed *Behördeneffekt* may have interfered in the randomness of the sample: a

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<sup>16</sup> See Figure A2 in the appendix for a figure showing the relative frequencies of different legal decisions over the years (including rejections which increased from 29% in 2016 to 47% in 2017).

questionnaire from the authority (*Behörde*) responsible for the issuance of residence and work permits may affect the given answers as to not risk anything concerning the own status. Also, by definition, a survey of that kind relies on the faithfulness of the answers and on subjective evaluations of the respondents, e.g. concerning their language skills. Yet, a postal survey is a commonly applied measure to gather information on a certain population in a cost-efficient way, and the large sample also permits testing for abnormalities in the data. In order to obtain survey data that is representative for the population under study, the authors provide a statistical weight to adjust for potential biases introduced by the sample design (causing different selection probabilities) as well as to redress the data according to main features of the population (weights were calculated based on the characteristics sex, year of birth and country of origin). Table 3 reports the shares of respondents by country of origin with and without the combined weights applied. The following analyses will use weighted data if not stated differently in order to increase the validity of statements on the overall population of recognized refugees in Germany.

Table 3. BAMF Refugee Survey (2014): sample by country of origin  
*weighted and unweighted shares, in %*

	number of observations (n)	%, weighted	%, unweighted
Afghanistan	391	8%	14%
Eritrea	351	5%	13%
Iraq	532	52%	19%
Iran	499	22%	18%
Sri Lanka	414	4%	15%
Syria	618	9%	22%
total	2805	100%	100%

It is important to note that the data includes neither individuals currently in the asylum procedure nor rejected or ‘tolerated’ individuals, nor individuals granted subsidiary protection. The survey, carried out by the BAMF as an office located within the Ministry of the Interior, follows the logic of the ‘prospects to stay’ decree (Box 1): it focuses on the integration outcomes of individuals who have

been granted a residence perspective of more than one year (42,4% of the sample hold a permanent residence title, see Table 5). Also, the sample selection excludes refugees from countries such as from the Balkans, who have been target to substantial law changes recently (see chapter 4.1 and Box A.1 in the appendix). The authors of the survey claim that the group of refugees with the best legal conditions to participate in the German society are the core subject to the study, given their better perspectives to stay in the FRG. This is unfortunate given the non-negligible number of *ex-post* residence grants: by 2016, 46,1% of the rejected asylum seekers from 2014 (the year when the survey was published) in fact did hold a legal residence title for humanitarian reasons, for family reasons or as a measure to end their chain toleration status (Bundesregierung 2017b, 68, see also Box 1). Just as asylum seekers and ‘tolerated’ persons, these individuals have only subordinate access to integration measures. This may cause integration outcomes that substantially differ from the group of refugees with a safer legal status, but the 2014 BAMF data only allows an analysis of the integration outcomes of individuals with a more secure status. Examining relevant integration factors for that group will nevertheless shed some light on

the integration processes of refugees in Germany. To start with, the next section provides an overview of the sample characteristics of the refugee population under study in terms of demographic characteristics, occupation, human capital, and levels of societal integration.

**4.2.2 Sample characteristics**

**Demographics:** The BAMF survey shows that the refugee population differs substantially from the host society in demographic terms, but to some extent resembles the guest worker migrants. The average age of the representative sample is 35, and the group of the 18 to 34-year-olds make up more than 60% of the sample (Figure 5). This in part reflects the age structure in the countries of origin (CIA 2017), but may also reflect self-selection mechanisms of migrant populations (Chiswick 1999) that has also characterized the *Gastarbeiter* immigration. Just like first generation guest workers, the refugee population is significantly younger on average than the German population (which was 44 years old on average in 2014) and slightly younger than the migrant population in Germany (39 years on average in 2014) (Destatis 2017c). Note that these figures still underestimate the age difference between the German and the refugee population as the refugee survey does not include minor refugees.

In terms of gender, in general more men than women arrive in Germany as refugees. The sample divides roughly 65 to 35%. The dominant male share is another typical feature of forced migration (OECD/European Union 2016, 11). It has also characterized the *Gastarbeiter* migration to Germany before family unification cases came to dominate the picture from the 1970s onwards.<sup>17</sup> The gender spread of the current refugee cohort also differs by country of origin: while slightly more Eritrean women than men arrived in Germany until 2012, the opposite is true for refugees from Sri Lanka (see Figure 6).

Fig. 5. Age by country of origin  
BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014, n = 2805,  
weighted





Fig. 6. Gender by country of origin  
BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014,  
n = 2804, weighted



<sup>17</sup> by 1968, 29,5% of the guest workers were women, with the largest female workforce coming from Italy and Greece (BA 1969)

Furthermore, the guest worker analysis has suggested the importance of legal status for successful integration. Table 5 shows the different legal titles that the refugees in the sample hold. Not surprisingly, German nationality is held only by a minor share of the sample. Permanent residence used to be granted after 3 years (column 3 in Table 5), but this waiting period has been increased to 5 in 2016. This explains the low share of Syrians holding permanent residence titles given their rather recent arrival in Germany: 57% of the Syrians in the sample arrived after 2010. In contrast, three quarters of the representative sample have arrived in 2010 or before. Especially the arrival of the majority of refugees from Sri Lanka and Iraq is dated further back than the average (see Table 4). Since the 1980s, Tamils from Sri Lanka have represented a major refugee group in Germany as a consequence of the civil war that would endure for three decades (Baumann and Salentin 2006), while the Iraq war beginning in 2003 had Iraqi refugee arrivals in Europe increase starting by the beginning of the millennium.

On average, respondents have been in Germany for at least 5 years at the time of the interview, so the survey clearly serves research interests on the recently arrived population (see Figure 7 for the approximate duration of stay by years). The survey asked for the year of asylum application, so the calculation of the duration of stay is an approximation only. Given the length of their stay and their status as accepted refugees only a minor share lives in state facilities: 83% live in an own or rented house or flat.

Table 4. Year of asylum application by country of origin  
*BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014, n = 2523, weighted, in %*

	Afghanistan	Eritrea	Iraq	Iran	Sri Lanka	Syria	Total
before 2011	63,8%	78,2%	83,8%	68,1%	83,8%	42,9%	74,7%
2011-2012	36,2%	21,8%	16,2%	31,9%	16,2%	57,1%	25,3%

Table 5. Residence titles by country of origin.  
*BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014, n = 2376, weighted, in %*

	recognized asylum	refugee status	permanent residence title	other residence title	German citizenship	
Afghanistan	14,9%	50,0%	27,2%	7,3%	0,7%	100%
Eritrea	18,1%	31,8%	45,4%	4,3%	0,4%	100%
Iraq	15,4%	16,7%	54,9%	12,6%	0,5%	100%
Iran	18,2%	40,5%	33,5%	6,7%	1,1%	100%
Sri Lanka	21,4%	41,0%	33,2%	3,8%	0,6%	100%
Syria	19,1%	66,0%	11,3%	3,4%	0,2%	100%
Total	16,7%	31,1%	42,4%	9,2%	0,6%	100%

**Occupation:** Interested in the economic integration of refugees, a look at the respondents' current occupations gives a first idea. More than a third of the representative sample is in employment (38%). Furthermore, 42% of those who were searching for work or vocational training at the time of the interview have worked in Germany before. Looking at employment shares by country there is reason to believe that the duration of stay plays a role for employment outcomes: Sri Lanka and Syria hold the largest and smallest share of job holders of the sample, respectively (see Figure 9, for approximate arrival year refer back to Table 4). Also, occupation differs substantially by gender: while more than half of the surveyed male refugees are in employment, only 12% of their female counterparts hold a job. In more than half of the cases (51%), the female respondents referred to housekeeping and parenting instead. This answer is strongly associated with the number of children in the household that have to be taken care of (own calculations based on BAMF 2014 data, not reported, see regression analyses below). Women with one child or more are also less likely to be in job training or to be searching for vocational training. For men, no such correlations can be observed. Looking at women with no children in the household the employment share rises to 17%, but still falls far behind the male labor market participation of 51%. Participation in integration and language courses is also higher for men than for women (83% and 76% have finished at least one course, respectively). Interestingly, these figures equal out if we look at women who do not have to take care of children in the household. The share of women with intermediate German skills (B1 certificate) then increases from 1 in 3 to 1 in 2, surpassing the share of men with the same certificate (43%, see Table 6). These findings may reflect the more traditional family roles of the refugee population (e.g. Tamils in Germany, see Baumann and Salentin 2006), but they are also a first indicator of the importance of institutional settings such as child care and individually tailored consultation services for different refugee groups. In order to test for the statistical significance

Fig. 7. Approximate duration of stay in 2014  
 BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014, n = 2523,  
 % of sample, weighted




Table 6. successful course participation by gender and childcare obligations  
 BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014, weighted

	women		men		sample sizes (n)	
	all (= 100%)	w/o child (= 100%)	all (= 100%)	w/o child (= 100%)	all	w/o child
any course	76%	84%	83%	83%	2277	999
B1 certificate	33%	47%	40%	43%	2419	1036
A2 certificate	15%	13%	17%	14%	2419	1036
job-specific German	25%	31%	33%	31%	1478	697

of these findings the empirical analyses below will specifically examine the interaction effect of being a woman and having to care for at least one child in the household.

Fig. 8. Occupation by country of origin  
*BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014, n = 2681, weighted*





Fig. 9. Occupation by gender  
*BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014, n = 2681, weighted*



**Human capital:** Another important aspect of economic participation is the level of education and job qualifications. While schooling levels of guest workers did not play a significant role for their recruitment, the representative BAMF refugee survey shows a very heterogenous picture of educational statuses. Overall, 29% of the sample reports to have intermediate, bad or no writing skills in their mother tongue. Again, literacy levels vary widely across countries of origin, however. 92% of the Sri Lankan respondents have a high literacy level, and Iranian refugees as well as Eritreans reach above 80%. Syrians and Iraqis range well below the average (half of the Syrians report bad or no writing skills in their mother tongue, see Figure 9). As the authors of the survey point out, however, it must be considered that the maternal language of the Syrians and Iraqis in the sample is Kurdish in 55,8 and 38,6% of the cases, respectively (Worbs et al. 2016, 222). Their literacy in Arabic remains thus non-assessable.

Fig. 10. Literacy: subjective writing skills

BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014, n = 2805, weighted





Fig. 11. Years of schooling, % of sample

BAMF Refugee Survey, 2014, n = 2805, weighted



The overall literacy levels roughly correspond to the reported schooling experience. Roughly a quarter (24%) has visited school for four years or less. On the other side of the spectrum, more than half of the sample (53%) went to school for 10 years or more (see Figure 10). 30% furthermore report to have learned a job or to have studied before they came to Germany, but only a third of that group holds a formal job qualification. This contrasts against the high share of individuals who in fact have pre-migration job experience (62%). Several explanations are possible: in some of the cases, employment before leaving the home country might have been low-skilled work. At the same time, it must also be considered that the German system of formal job qualifications is not very common in most of the countries of origin, and informal job qualifications (without certificates) are likely. Finally, especially in war- and crisis-torn countries like Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, employment and education biographies are likely to be disrupted and graduation documents may not exist or are not accessible (Brücker et al. 2016). These circumstances add to the difficulties migrants in general face concerning the transferability of their human capital (Friedberg 2000; Konle-Seidl et al. 2015). This is also reflected in the low number of applications for the recognition of foreign qualifications: more than half (51%) of the respondents with a university or job qualification certificate have not initiated a recognition process, while those who have were relatively successful (16% of the recognition applications were rejected). The effects of the 2012 Recognition Act supposed to facilitate the recognition of foreign qualifications cannot yet be reliably tested with the available survey data.

Especially in face of these obstacles for refugees to collect returns from pre-migration human capital, the acquisition of *host-country* human capital is likely to be an important factor for successful labor market participation (Ferrer and Riddell 2008; Dumont and Monso 2007; Nielsen 2011). Given the short period of stay of the respondents, the number of refugees with German qualifications is rather low. While 9,3% were in schooling or vocational training at the time of the interview, 5,8% of the sample already completed their highest school degree or job qualification in Germany. 12% have participated in retraining measures. As the guest worker analysis suggested human capital investments to be an

important channel for successful integration, further below it will be statistically tested whether efforts of refugees to acquire skills in the FRG already pay off in terms of labor market participation.

***Societal Integration:*** the inquiry with guest workers has shown that economic integration cannot be assessed separately from societal aspects of integration. Societal segregation has proved to be a decisive feature of the integration experience of guest worker cohorts, so the analysis of the economic integration of refugees should pay attention to aspects of societal incorporation. Although the focus of the BAMF survey was on labor market participation, the data provides some idea of network sizes and societal participation of recognized refugees as well as on discrimination experiences. Survey responses concerning the frequency of reaching out to different societal networks and communities are a rough indicator of network densities and levels of societal integration. The questionnaire divided between German and non-German contacts, so proxies for segregational trends can be designed.

Research has shown that not only host-society networks are important for socioeconomic integration, but also that ethnic networks are an important factor (Tegegne 2015; Koenig et al. 2016). The BAMF respondents seem to frequent German and non-German networks in a similar way. Slightly less than half of the sample sees both German and non-German friends once a week or more often. Effects may be ambiguous, however: Tegegne finds that ethnic networks may speed up the process of finding employment but may be associated with lower earnings and occupational prestige in the long run. Such effects are highly context-specific and deserve careful testing if the data allows it. In the survey 17,8% of the respondents had relatives or friends in Germany before their arrival. Furthermore, for 51,5% of the representative sample German is the language most frequently used outside the house, while it is the maternal language for a share of 12,8%. In the analyses further down this information can be employed as an indicator of a strong ethnic community, possibly associated with geographic or social segregation tendencies.

Secondly, 17,1% of the sample are members in a societal organization, mostly religious associations or sports clubs. Such formal networks can take an important role in the socioeconomic integration of the newcomers. 81,8% of the interviewed refugee sample states that they want to stay in Germany forever, corresponding to the goal of 80% to apply for German citizenship. A large share (45,9%) reports, however, to have experienced discrimination in at least one situation. Discriminating treatment is most often reported for interactions on the housing market, the labor market and when searching for vocational training. Separating the sample by country of origin it is noteworthy that Iranians report significantly more often to have been subject to discriminating treatment (72,6% of all Iranian respondents), while Iraqis fall far below the average (35,2%). Despite these measures being subjectively reported they may nevertheless serve as an indicator for discriminatory practices especially on the labor markets.

### 4.3 *Econometric analysis: Determinants of labor market outcomes of refugees*

Now which factors are associated with the employment outcome of recently recognized refugees? As the inquiry with the *Gastarbeiter* experience has shown, legal security and a lack of educational investment as well segregational trends have characterized the integration of guest workers. An econometric analysis of the labor market outcome of refugees will help us assess whether the economic integration of recently arrived refugees is challenged by similar factors that framed the incorporation of *Gastarbeiter* in the past six decades. Based on the results from the guest worker analysis, the econometric examinations will in particular assess the following questions:

1. Is *insecure legal status* still a potential obstacle to economic integration?
2. Is the lack of *investment in host-country skills* a potential channel that hampers integration success, as the guest worker experience has suggested?
3. Does the link between *ethnic segregation* and disadvantageous labor market outcome prevail?

As the descriptive analysis revealed a strong gender gap in the employment rates of refugees, the econometric models will additionally assess the role of gender and family obligations for labor market participation. Based on the BAMF Refugee Survey introduced above, two measures of economic participation will be applied: firstly, a model will be designed to explain whether an individual is employed or not, regardless of the type of job carried out. Given that the refugees in the sample arrived only very recently, being employed at all is an important aspect of self-reliance and other dimensions of socioeconomic integration. The integration trajectories of guest workers have shown, however, that the quality of employment is crucial: staying in precarious employment has seriously affected, for instance, social mobility or the schooling outcomes of second-generation migrants. An important aspect of such employment quality is whether a person carries out a job according to her skill level: making use of existing skills increases economic productivity and counters the depreciation of human capital. Analyzing the labor market outcomes of refugees, the second outcome variable will thus be overqualification, tested in another multivariate regression analysis.

The BAMF survey is a one-point-in-time observation, so we cannot trace integration processes. Instead, main drivers of employment outcomes at the time of the interview will statistically be assessed. This also implies that we can only very limitedly control for cohort effects (that is, certain characteristics of the arriving migrant cohorts) or for the socioeconomic context (such as labor market conditions or legal settings). Also, the results should generally be interpreted as correlations rather than clear indicators of the direction of the measured effects, as only an observation over time could explicitly rule out bi-directional causality. Given the scarce data availability on refugees as a migrant subgroup in Germany and Europe as a whole, the analysis of static factors will nonetheless deliver valuable insight as to which aspects are associated with the successful economic integration of refugees. Given the unhalted critical situations in the countries of origin it is likely that, for one, return migration will be limited, and, secondly, that more people seeking refuge will make their way to Germany. A basic understanding of the factors underlying socioeconomic integration is therefore crucial, not least to maintain social stability

in the long run: the guest worker experience has illustrated the disruptive power deficient socioeconomic integration can unfold over time.

### 4.3.1 Labor market participation

The first outcome variable at test, *Emp*, will be binary, taking the value 1 if individual *i* is employed and 0 otherwise. To model this dichotomous outcome, a probit model will be specified. Fitting a maximum-likelihood model the probit estimation enables us to obtain the predicted probabilities of outcome  $Emp = 1$  to occur (i.e., the outcome for individual *i* to be employed instead of not being employed) as a function of a set of explanatory variables. Calculating average marginal probabilities, the estimation yields a value between 0 and 1 for each one-unit change of each independent variable (holding all other explanatory variables constant). Relying on survey data we can test for factors on the individual level, with a special focus on aspects concerning the role of legal residence, human capital and social networks. In addition, the model will take into account the commonly employed set of explanators that studies on the labor market outcome of migrants test for (e.g. Chiswick et al. 1997; Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003; Kogan 2006, 2007; Nekby et al. 2008; Buzdugan and Halli 2009; Pichler 2011; Kalter and Kogan 2014; Koenig et al. 2016). The baseline model includes a set of variables *u* concerning demographic characteristics of individual *i* (gender age, marital status, children, and country of origin, summarized in the model as *demographics*), but also factors *v* displaying aspects of legal status (i.e., duration of the asylum procedure, the type of residence permit, and duration of stay, summarized as *legal\_status*), as well as a set of variables *w* each measuring an aspect of pre-migration human capital (literacy, level of schooling, foreign job experience, job qualification and the recognition of foreign qualifications *premig\_HC*), and variables *z*, representing measures of post-migration human capital (German skills, retraining in Germany, *postmig\_HC*). A summary table of the included variables can be found in the appendix (Table A2). As the descriptive analysis suggests, women with children in the household that have to be taken care of are much less likely to be employed. To test this hypothesis, an interaction term of gender and a child dummy (taking the value 1 if there is at least one child in the household that has to be taken care of) will be included ( $female_i \times child_i$ ). The baseline model for the multivariate regressions hence runs as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(Emp = 1) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1(female_i \times child_i) + \sum_{u=1}^U \beta_u demographics_{ui} + \sum_{v=1}^V \beta_v legal\_status_{vi} \\ & + \sum_{w=1}^W \beta_w premig\_HC_{wi} + \sum_{z=1}^Z \beta_z postmig\_HC_{zi} + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Survey weights are applied, and robust standard errors are used.  $\varepsilon_i$  denotes the error term,  $\beta_0$  is the intercept. *U*, *V*, *W* and *Z* are sets of independent variables for each of which a coefficient  $\beta$  will be yielded. The  $\beta$ -coefficients serve to identify the sign of the relationship of each explanatory variable

with the employment outcome (i.e., whether dependent and independent variable are linked positively or negatively). The results are displayed in Table A4 in the appendix. For an interpretation of the size of the effects of each regressor refer to Table 7 and Table 8 which show the computed average marginal effects, i.e. the increased or decreased probability of employment per one-unit change of each regressor. The graphical representations provided below offer a more straightforward understanding of the main factors' effects.

Table 7. Factor variables: probabilities to be employed  
by interaction term components (#) or variable categories, regression results in Table A4 in the appendix, col. 5

	margin	std. error
<b>gender#childatall (interaction term)</b>		
male#no child	0.583	0.029
male#child	0.566	0.043
female#no child	0.352	0.048
female#child	0.130	0.032
<b>Age</b>		
1. < 35	0.523	0.024
2. 35-50	0.442	0.028
3. 50+	0.304	0.056
<b>Country of origin</b>		
1. Afghanistan	0.481	0.037
2. Eritrea	0.531	0.044
3. Iraq	0.494	0.031
4. Iran	0.408	0.040
5. Sri Lanka	0.757	0.030
6. Syria	0.352	0.033
<b>Education (years of schooling)</b>		
0-4 years	0.440	0.043
5-9 years	0.515	0.033
10+ years	0.476	0.027

Table 8. Binary regressors: marginal effects on the probability to be employed  
regression results in Table A4 in the appendix, column 5

	marg. effect <sup>1</sup>	std. error
<b>Demography, legal status</b>		
married	-0.089**	0.037
asylum process>12m	-0.029	0.041
permanent residence	0.017	0.036
duration of stay	0.019***	0.006
<b>Human capital</b>		
literacy	0.004	0.043
job in home country	0.063	0.043
job qualification or studied	-0.002	0.048
formal job qualification	0.122**	0.052
German skills	0.059***	0.022
retraining in Germany	-0.089*	0.051
recognition of foreign qualification	0.065	0.067

<sup>1</sup> average marginal effect for a discrete change of the independent variable from 0 to 1.


\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The inferential analysis confirms that women, and even more so women with at least one child in the household to take care of, are significantly less likely to work. A child decreases the likelihood for women to work by more than 20%, while for men this does not make a significant difference<sup>18</sup> (see

<sup>18</sup> See Table 7: while women without children in the household show a likelihood of 35.2% to work, this figure drops to 13.0% once one or more children to be taken care of are reported. The margins of interaction term components should not be interpreted as the effect the interaction has. Instead, the

Figure 12: the probability to be employed is plotted on the x-axis, while gender by child category is depicted on the y-axis, the arrows indicate the 95% confidence intervals of each point estimate). The gender effect holds true after also including all other factors from the baseline model (equation 1). Religious or cultural beliefs such as traditional gender roles may play a role here (Hobfoll 2001). It must be

Figure 12 Predictive margins of gender and children  
95 % confidence intervals




considered that the refugee population under review is in the country for only six years on average, so concentrating resources on one main earner to find employment may also be a common option. The results are in accordance with earlier studies that highlighted the caring work these women carry out for the family Fleischmann and Höhne (2013). Other studies (OECD/European Union 2016, 19ff.) attribute the lower activity of female refugees to lower education levels, compared to their male counterparts and other migrant groups. This explanation does not find direct confirmation in this analysis, however: the effects of gender and family obligation remain significant and largely unchanged in magnitude even after taking into account human capital variables (see specifications 4 and 5 in Table A4). Higher obstacles to activate the female refugee work force can hence not uniquely be attributed to their educational level or job experience, but instead their family roles seem important in determining their labor market participation. The results also show that the youngest age cohort (18 to 34 years) has the highest chances to find a job. The chances drop by 8.1% for people aged 35 to 50 and by another 13,8% for people over 50 (see Figure 14 for an illustration by age and sex: moving to a higher age category on the x-axis decreases the probability to be employed, which is plotted on the y-axis).

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margins of each of the interaction combinations (in gender#childatall) can be compared to each other as the different probabilities to be employed. Likewise, for the factor variables (age, country of origin, education) the average marginal effects of the respective categories of each variable can be compared to each other.


As the *Gastarbeiter* results have suggested that legal security plays an important role for socioeconomic integration, the model also tests for the role of the legal status. For the refugee population at test, the significance of the residence title (with a permanent status increasing employment chances) in fact disappears once approximate duration of stay is included in the analysis (Table A4 in the appendix, columns 2 to 3, see also Figure 13). Question 1 posed above asked whether insecure legal status is still a potential obstacle to economic integration: for now, a direct relevance of the legal status for the chance to be employed can thus not be confirmed. The result that the duration of stay matters, is in line with earlier findings that employment participation of migrants improves with time spent in the host country (Chiswick et al. 1997). An observation of the current refugee cohort over long-term time periods will have to reveal whether the importance of the legal residence title found in other studies can be confirmed (e.g. Bakker et al. 2013). Interestingly, effects of the length of the asylum procedure found by De Vroome and Van Tubergen (2010) cannot be verified, who found the stay in asylum centers to negatively affect socioeconomic integration, moderated by human capital depreciation. Again, these effects may become visible over a longer time period, and also, they may play a role for the quality of employment rather than employment as such, as examined below.

Figure 13 Predictive margins of approximate duration of stay 95% confidence intervals



The analysis of the integration processes of the *Gastarbeiter* in Germany has furthermore suggested that a lack of investment into schooling and job training (discouraged by insecure residence status) significantly affected the disadvantageous positions of guest worker families on the labor market. Which role does the investment in human capital play for current refugee cohorts? The data analysis demonstrates that for refugees, pre-migration human capital does not directly translate into success on the labor market. Neither studies nor job experience in the home country is associated with a higher probability to be employed nor do years of schooling seem to matter. The only pre-migration human capital indicator that proves important in

Figure 14 Predictive margins of gender by age categories 95% confidence intervals



the analysis is whether an individual had a formal job qualification before coming to Germany, providing another hint towards the importance of formal job certificates on the German job market. On the other hand, qualifications achieved *after* arrival, and German skills in particular, seem to be highly relevant for employment outcomes. Good German skills improve the chance to be employed by 5.9% (Table 8). At the same time, the recognition of foreign qualifications does not have a significant impact on employment chances, so holding a formal job qualification may reflect other aspects left out in the analysis such as a higher adaptability or job search skills that an individual owns. Counterintuitively, having participated in retraining measures in Germany has a negative effect on employment chances and is significant at the 10% level. Given the focus on refugees in the country for less than 8 years it is likely that people just ended the participation in a training measure and are at the beginning of the job search period, so having absolved a training may correlate negatively with being employed in the short run. As the timing of the training was not asked for in the survey it cannot be control for this. Another explanation could be that refugees who are difficult to place on the labor market are also more likely to be ascribed to training measures (after all, this removes them from the unemployment statistics), so the training variable may in fact rather reflect a higher difficulty to gain ground on the German labor market. Overall, the results confirm earlier findings on the low transferability of human capital for migrants: Chiswick et al. (1997) found for the United States that migrants experience smaller human capital rents from education and job experience obtained before migration, while the acquisition of host country human capital (such as language skills and job experience in the country) is relatively more important. Relating to question 2 posed above, the results hint at a relative importance of host-country human capital investment. In view of the findings for *Gastarbeiter* families, who have shown low levels of human capital investment that translated into disadvantageous socioeconomic positions, the results for refugees are encouraging because they provide a first indicator that post-migration investment pays off in terms of labor market success.

Also, dummies for the country of origin show a significant effect for coming from Syria and Sri Lanka, in line with the descriptive analyses that showed exceptionally high employment rates for refugees from Sri Lanka and below-average employment rates for Syrians. This may, however, also be an indicator that the duration-of-stay measure is imprecise, as the survey asked for the year of asylum application rather than year of arrival. Waiting periods for placing an asylum claim were a non-negligible issue especially at the time the survey took place, so measurement errors must be considered. The country dummies may hence rather reflect that Syrians had arrived only very recently, while the majority of the refugees from Sri Lanka had arrived before 2011 (see above). Note that the number of observations decreases significantly with more explanatory variables added to the specification giving missing information, but a robustness check using only the observations from model 5 does not considerably change the results (see appendix Table A5). Changes in the results of the multivariate regression are hence unlikely to be driven by missing values for the included variables.

Finally, the guest worker analyses have highlighted the potential of societal segregation that can accompany the arrival of newcomers (question 3). In an additional set of analyses, I therefore test network variables to assess the role of host society networks as well as ethnic networks in the economic integration of refugees. The meeting frequencies with non-German and German neighbors and friends, respectively, enter the model as an indicator of network strength. The categorical variables can take 6 values from never (1) to daily (6). Also, respondents were asked which language they use most often outside the house. If this was their mother tongue, we can assume their ethnic network in Germany to play a rather strong role. This network indicator enters the model as a dummy (i.e., no or yes). Also, the refugee survey asked whether friends and family in Germany or any kind of co-ethnic network played a role for the decision to come to Germany. Again, this variable takes the value 1 if any of this was answered with yes, and 0 otherwise, and serves as a proxy for the existence of a co-ethnic network in Germany that an individual in principal has access to. Two additional dummies are included which take the value of 1 if the respondent reports discrimination experience in at least one of the eight societal interaction situations asked for in the survey (e.g. at the workplace, in the job search, in public transport or with public authorities). Descriptive statistics of the network proxies can be found in the appendix (Table A3). A separate probit model is run for each of the network indicators, based on the model specified in equation 1. Table 9 presents the marginal effects for each of the network proxies.

The results indicate that frequenting German network members (friends or neighbors) is associated with higher chances to be employed. The existence of a co-ethnic network in Germany also enters the model positively. Using the mother tongue as the language most often used outside the household is in turn correlated with a 13.8% decrease in the chance to hold a job. Taken together, these findings can be interpreted in a way that ethnic networks can provide an advantage in job searches, but a strong ethnic segregation may be harmful. Clearly, the results do not allow a conclusion on the direction of the effects – being in employment undoubtedly affects the size and composition of networks (e.g., working in a local firm provides the individual with contacts to resident employees), so an interpretation of the results as causal links would not be appropriate. Overall, however, the results indicate that ethnic segregation negatively links to integration outcomes, answering question 3 in confirming the tendency that has been found for guest workers earlier in the paper. Finally, the discrimination measures do not show any significant relationship with employment success, which may either be due to the weakness of the indicators, or the discrimination experiences are in fact not directly linked to employment successes.

Table 9. Network strength: Marginal effects on the probability to be employed  
*baseline model including one network indicator at a time in separate estimations*

network indicator	marginal effect <sup>1</sup>	std. err.	sample size n
<b>Meet friends</b>			
German	0,029**	0,011	961
Non-German	0,003	0,011	961
<b>Meet neighbors</b>			
German	0,024**	0,012	1045
Non-German	0,004	0,011	1045
<b>Ethnic network strength</b>			
friends/co-ethnic network reason to come to Germany	0,093**	0,042	1174
mother tongue most frequently used outside the house	-0,138**	0,064	930
<b>Discrimination experience</b>			
often	-0,025	0,490	1188
seldomly	0,20	0,549	1188

<sup>1</sup> average marginal effect for a discrete change from 0 to 1. For included control variables refer to baseline model eq. (1).

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

In sum, the analysis, for one, highlights the lower employment probability women show vis-à-vis men. This gap enlarges further with children in the household that need to be taken care of. This is a feature that the refugee cohort does not share with the first generation of guest workers: female *Gastarbeiterinnen* were even more likely to work than their German counterparts (Mattes 2005). Answering the questions posed above, it was found that the importance of legal security that framed the integration experience of Gastarbeiter could not directly be confirmed in my analysis. For the time being, the effect of legal security is overridden by the duration of stay. Secondly, the acquisition of German skills is indeed an important factor, while skills obtained in the homeland proved not to be highly relevant for employment outcomes. Pre-migration schooling and job experience is rather irrelevant for the employment outcome of recognized refugees in Germany in the short run; instead, the investment in human capital in Germany seems to be relevant for the long-term integration of refugees. As argued above, legal residence and human capital investments may play a stronger role for the *quality of employment* rather than the mere chance to find a job, which will be tested below. And thirdly, sizes and composition of social networks seem to be correlated with employment outcomes. The results suggest that the link of ethnical segregation and integration outcomes that could be found for the guest worker cohorts are likely still in place. The same enquiries will now be addressed in the analysis of overqualification in the next chapter.

### 4.3.2 *The probability of overqualification*

As the guest worker experience has shown, socioeconomic integration is not only an issue of participating in the labor market at all, but also has to do with the quality of employment. Contributing to the host society and carrying out a job according to the individual skill level are important factors of societal belonging and shape the personal integration experience of migrants (Ager and Strang 2004). The lower rents from pre-migration qualification that can be collected by migrants on the host labor market, and by refugee migrants in particular, is well documented in literature (the so-called ‘refugee gap’, Connor 2010; Bakker et al. 2017). Overqualification is a potential outcome of this ‘refugee gap’, with the underlying hypothesis that refugees face a range of obstacles in finding employment that properly makes use of their pre-migration job experience, job qualification or educational attainment - especially in their first years after arrival. In the following analysis I will therefore test which factors are associated with a higher likelihood to be employed but at the same time be overqualified for the job. Again, special attention will be paid to the role of legal security, to human capital and to network effects that the guest worker analysis suggested. I do not test labor market outcomes of refugees against a reference group such as other migrants or non-migrants in general as this is beyond the scope of this paper, but an understanding of the factors that link to the overqualification of recently arrived refugees in Germany provides a first understanding as to which obstacles prevail and deserve the attention of the policy maker.

To decrease the chances of omitted variable bias, the analysis will be restricted to full-time employed respondents. If mini-jobbers as well as part-time employees were included, too, the model would be unlikely to depict the range of different explanations that are possible for the level of overqualification (consider e.g. people in education or job training, carrying out a low-skill part-time job to sustain their schooling expenses, or individuals who decided to contribute only marginally to the household income because other household members are employed on a full-time basis). The outcome variable again is a dummy. It equals 1 if the individual is employed and holds a formal job qualification but carries out an unskilled job. Naturally, the number of observations decreases, but a sample of more than 500 individuals is still a suitable size to deliver valuable estimates. In particular, this model will test the role of *host-country* specific human capital: the guest worker analysis suggests that a lack of human capital investments has contributed to the socioeconomic immobility of guest worker migrants, thereby hampering their integration outcomes in the long run. To test whether this is also a valid claim for the current refugee cohort (question 2), another binary variable is included in addition to the regressors in the baseline model. It equals to 1 if the individual has obtained her highest education in Germany. Network effects are examined, too: this will assess whether socialization effects towards ethnic networks that were found to characterize the integration experience of *Gastarbeiter* can be expected for refugees as well (question 3). More precisely, the specification will test the hypothesis that ethnic networks may help to find a job to start with, but decrease wage and occupational status outcome over time, relative to

peers who did not rely on ethnic networks, as other studies suggest (Tegegne 2015). The marginal effects are reported in Table 10 and Table 11, the full regression table can be found in the appendix (Table A6).

Table 10. Factor variables: probabilities to be employed by interaction terms or categories, estimation results from Table A4, column 6

	margin	std. error
<b>Age</b>		
1. < 35	0,619	0,024
2. 35-50	0,566	0,03
3. 50+	0,635	0,059
<b>Country of origin</b>		
Afghanistan	0,688	0,057
Eritrea	0,763	0,057
Iraq	0,75	0,022
Iran	0,403	0,054
Sri Lanka	0,665	0,051
Syria	0,434	0,077
<b>Education (years of schooling)</b>		
0-4 years	0,695	0,076
5-9 years	0,689	0,051
10+ years	0,563	0,021

Table 11. Binary regressors: marginal effects on the probability to be overqualified estimation results from Table A4, column 6

	marg. effect <sup>1</sup>	std. err.
<b>Demography, legal status</b>		
female	-0,153**	0,052
married	0,058	0,045
asylum process>12m	-0,043	0,029
permanent residence	-0,226***	0,04
duration of stay	0,036	0,006
<b>Human capital</b>		
literacy	0,035	0,056
job in home country	-0,172***	0,065
formal job qualification	-0,102***	0,033
German skills	-0,004	0,026
retraining in Germany	-0,004	0,038
recognition of foreign qualification	-0,246***	0,057
highest education in Germany	-0,54***	0,082
<b>Social capital</b>		
meeting German friends	-0,091***	0,014
meeting non-German friends	0,034**	0,014

<sup>1</sup> average marginal effect for a discrete change from 0 to 1

The multivariate probit regression reveals that for overqualification, the legal status now indeed plays an important role, as the analysis of the guest worker experience has suggested (Table A5, column 5 and 6 in the appendix). Holding a permanent residence title as opposed to a temporary title significantly decreases the probability to be overqualified by 22,6% (see Table 10 and Table 11, and also Figure 16 for a graphic interpretation of the effect). Furthermore, human capital aspects now show high explanatory power. While former job experience did not prove significant for finding employment overall, it is an important factor for the *quality* of employment in terms of overqualification. Also, a formal job qualification obtained abroad decreases the likelihood of overqualification by 10,2% (see Figure 15). The effect of being able to read and write (literacy) loses its high significance once job

experience in the home country is included. Again, it is likely that having acquired a formal job certificate may also indicate better job search skills etc., which may explain these findings. Importantly, these human capital resources that date from before their arrival in Germany, have a much weaker effect than skills that were acquired in Germany. Having finished the highest education in Germany is strongly associated with a lower probability of overqualification. A German certificate (in terms of schooling or job training) decreases the likelihood to be overqualified for the job carried out by more than 50%, while job experience in the home country does so by less than 20% (compare Figure 17 and Figure 18: on the y-axes the probability to be overqualified is plotted, taking a

value between 0 and 1. For an individual with a German degree as compared to having no German degree we can observe a drop in the probability to be overqualified that is much larger than the drop that is associated with job experience. Furthermore, the confidence intervals for the margins of pre-migration human capital almost overlap, so the difference between having or not having job experience in the home country is close to not being significant). In this respect, also the recognition of formal qualifications shows now a significant and negative relationship to the measured employment outcome. That is to say, an effective recognition procedure is linked to a more favorable labor market outcome

in terms of the fit of employment and skills. Comparing the marginal effects of pre- and post-migration human capital, the trend that earlier empirical literature has found can be confirmed: the marginal effects of qualifications obtained in Germany are considerably larger than the effects of job experiences or formal job qualifications that the respondent held *before* coming to Germany. Hence, in answering

Figure 16 Predictive margins of a formal job qualification  
95% confidence interval





Figure 15 Predictive margins of a permanent stay  
95% confidence interval



question 2, investment in host-country skills is indeed a relevant factor for successful economic integration, as the guest worker experience has suggested.

Figure 17 Predictive margins of post-migration human capital  
95% confidence interval





Figure 18 Predictive margins of pre-migration human capital  
95% confidence interval



Several explanations are possible. For one, it can be assumed that host-country schooling increases the match of skills with host labor market needs. Secondly, a host-country certificate facilitates administrative processes and lowers transaction costs, and on the employer side the employability of the refugee can readily be assessed. Also, if the person successfully completed vocational training with a company, this is likely to result in proper employment with this employer – meaning that the refugee has a job according to her skill level. Yet again, note that we cannot ultimately conclude on the causal direction of the effects, as people who are overqualified for their jobs are presumably those with a higher qualification, which in turn decreases the likelihood to enter schooling in Germany again. From the guest worker experience it could be concluded that the non-investment in post-migration human capital can be detrimental for the overall socioeconomic integration of newcomers. For the current refugee cohorts, this tendency can be confirmed: the analysis highlights the importance of human capital acquisition in the host country, suggesting that skills obtained in Germany are much more relevant for employment quality than skills the person had before. This may also be because the effects of German qualifications are more directly measurable than skill sets a person acquired before migration.

Lastly, the guest worker experience highlighted the link between ethnic segregation and deficient integration outcomes (question 3). The analysis of the labor market outcomes of recognized refugees in Germany provides strong evidence for the hypothesis posed by scholars that ethnic networks may facilitate the initial job search but have a detrimental effect on the subsequent employment quality. People who meet more frequently with German friends are 9.1% less likely to be overqualified, while meeting with non-Germans shows a negative yet smaller effect. Note again that the causal direction cannot ultimately be concluded on, as overqualified employment in presumably low-skilled sectors may in turn decrease the likelihood to get in touch with Germans, while it may be associated with more

contact to other migrant groups concentrated in the low-skilled sectors. Overall it can be concluded that social capital effects are context-dependent, encouraging further research into the role of bonding and bridging social capital for the labor market outcomes of refugees, preferably over a longer time period. The results indicate the importance of avoiding ethnical segregation and to take measures towards the societal integration of newcomers, assuming that more frequent contact with local networks is associated with more favorable labor market outcomes. These findings are in line with the *Gastarbeiter* experience that vividly demonstrated the detrimental effects of ethnical segregation.

### ***4.3.3 Conclusions from the empirical analyses***

Summing it up, this examination did not only look at employment as such, that is, whether a recognized refugee has a job or not, but also at the quality of employment (in terms of overqualification). Thereby the analyses deliver some valuable results for understanding the labor market integration of newcomers in Germany. While at first sight educational levels and job qualifications do not seem to play a role, they do become important for the *quality* of employment. This may find its reason in the fact that the majority of refugees find their first employment in the lower occupational spectrum, and only a small share finds a job requiring an academic qualification (Worbs et al. 2016). Similarly, legal security does not affect the chances to find a job, but it matters for the level of overqualification. Finally, a first link between ethnic segregation and a disadvantageous labor market position was found. Before specifically relating the results to the analysis of the guest worker experiences, let me briefly comment on the findings for the refugee cohorts.

In line with earlier findings (see e.g. Fleischmann and Höhne 2013), the analysis carried out based on refugee survey data confirms a persistent gender gap in terms of economic participation. Women, and even more so women with care obligations for children, are much less likely to work. Family obligations play a crucial role also for the participation in integration and language courses, as the BAMF survey has shown. For women without children in the household the gender gap disappears in terms of course participation: they are just as likely as men to participate in job-specific training, and they are even more likely than men to finish with a medium-level German certificate (B1) (refer back to Table 6). Also, in the regression analysis the effect of gender remained intact even when human capital factors were included, so the lower employment probability of refugee women cannot be explained by lower education or a lack of job qualifications. And yet, even women without children in the household are significantly less likely to work, confirming gender as a crucial element of social stratification that can be found for Western labor markets in general, including Germany, albeit less pronounced (see Destatis 2011). The empirical results are hence a strong indicator of the potential female labor force that the refugee population offers to the German labor market. To activate this potential, policy-makers may consider measures such as better access to child care facilities, but also systematic advisory schemes to specifically target female refugees, tailored to their specific needs.

Second, the results highlight the relevance of skills acquired in Germany. This refers to German language skills, but also to German job qualifications, retraining measures and the attendance of school in Germany. This set of host-country specific skills not only increases employment chances, but also significantly increases the skill-fit with the job carried out. The analysis on overqualification has even shown that these elements of post-migration human capital have significantly larger effects than pre-migration human capital, such as the level of schooling in the home country, a foreign degree and job experience in the home country. These findings are encouraging insofar as they suggest that policy measures towards the qualification of newcomers have a chance to pay off, eventually overriding the effect of formal and informal skills an individual owns beforehand. The investment into schooling and vocational training of recently arrived refugees is likely to translate not only into higher economic participation of refugees but also into skill-suited employment, the analysis suggests. It is fair to assume that in the long run, a better fit of skills and employment increases the productivity of the refugee workforce and facilitates the societal integration of refugees. In short, the investment in host-country human capital is a relevant factor for the successful economic integration of refugee migrants.

Such educational investment, however, may depend on the legal status of a refugee. While it could not be confirmed that the residency title has a direct effect on being employed, it does show a link to employment quality. A permanent residence instead of a temporary title sees the probability of overqualification drop by more than 20%. A secured legal stay increases the planning reliability for job seekers on the one hand and for potential employers on the other. It can further be assumed that staying prospects affect decisions on gathering qualifications and skills relevant for the German job market. This is in line with preliminary analyses of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey on refugees in Germany that was made available for researchers just recently: Kosyakova and Sirries (2017) confirm the importance of legal status security, not only for employment as such but also for the quality of employment in terms of contract type (i.e., full- or part-time jobs as opposed to internships and mini-jobs). Recognized refugees with a relatively secure legal status not only have a significantly higher chance to enter the labor market, but also are they more likely to enter proper employment, as compared to asylum seekers or rejected (that is, ‘tolerated’) persons. Although the BAMF survey employed in this paper does not include ‘tolerated’ individuals nor asylum seekers, the empirical results can confirm that a permanent residence title (*Niederlassungserlaubnis*) that recognized refugees are eligible for after 3 to 5 years is associated with better labor market outcomes than a less secure residence title (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis*). As the analysis also controlled for the duration of stay, better labor market outcomes are not only a result of being in the country for a longer time – the effect of legal security prevails. As for *Gastarbeiter*, insecure legal status is still a potential obstacle to the economic integration of refugees. Overall, the negative link of legal insecurity and economic participation suggests that long waiting periods for asylum decisions as well as extended periods with insecure legal status are harmful for a refugee’s employment biography. Scholars have argued that educational investment strongly depends on the probability of return migration and is commonly delayed until permanent residency is granted, if not

ceased completely. A formal title providing legal security is hence an important element to kick off incorporation processes and investments in host-society specific resources, such as job skills (Rooth 1999).

Another dimension of host-society resources are local networks. The empirical examination therefore tested the role of local networks and revealed a strong link to employment outcomes. The analysis distinguished between contact with Germans and non-Germans. It additionally included a measurement of the strength of the ethnic community and a proxy for ethnic clustering. German networks are associated with better chances to find employment, suggesting that host-country social capital is an important resource for newcomers. Also, the empirical examination tested the importance of ethnic ties. Having access to an ethnic network showed to be correlated with better job chances. The effect of ethnic networks is significantly larger than the effect of contact to Germans, so ethnic ties can be assumed to facilitate the job search, too. At the same time, contact to non-Germans is associated with a higher probability to be overqualified, while German networks decrease this probability. Even more so, strong ethnic clustering, which was proxied by the mother tongue used most frequently outside the household instead of another language, is correlated with lower employment chances. Geographical concentration around ethnic peers increases the likelihood of being overqualified for the job carried out. Hence, while both German and non-German networks seem to facilitate initial job searches, strong ethnic ties and especially ethnic segregation tendencies are associated with lower employment quality. These findings underline the complex mechanisms behind networks and societal integration: ethnic networks offer knowledge on the host labor market and on the institutional and cultural settings (Gold 2007). Also, they may well provide the individual with job opportunities outside the mainstream market, as Wilson and Portes (1980) have suggested. At the same time, a job search relying on ethnic ties may also pose constraints as to the type of job (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). The ethnic network may, for instance, serve to recruit workers who accept lower wages and less favorable working conditions (Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Also, Tegegne (2015) points towards the lower employment quality (in terms of earnings and occupational prestige) that the respective migrant community may have on average.

Concludingly, while maintaining contact to both ethnic and non-ethnic social networks is an important factor for newcomers to participate in the labor market, a strong concentration of societal bonding and job search efforts within ethnic communities can be detrimental for the quality of economic participation on the long run. The link between ethnic segregation and disadvantageous socioeconomic position that was found for *Gastarbeiter* migrants can hence be confirmed. Lower wages decrease the resources available for societal participation and social mobility, and a clustering around ethnic circles can increase social cleavages between host and migrant communities. A more profound analysis on the ethnic networks that refugees have access to is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the empirical results already suggest that network mechanisms should be considered when designing policy measures towards the integration of refugees. A housing policy and refugee location strategy that avoids ethnic

segregation is in the interest of policy-makers aiming at the long-term labor market integration of the recently arrived refugees in Germany.

#### 4.4 *The integration experience of guest workers and refugees: similar challenges?*

Finally, we will now refer back to the *Gastarbeiter* experience elaborated on above and compare the key elements of their integration processes with the insights on the economic integration of the current refugee cohorts. Interestingly enough, the integration experiences of refugees and *Gastarbeiter* families in Germany share a range of similar features. In view of the findings for guest worker families, the analysis of the labor market success of refugees has provided further evidence to the importance of host-country specific human capital. Also, it can be concluded that the legal status continues to be an important factor for the success on the German labor market. Finally, local networks have not only been an important element in the integration of *Gastarbeiter*, but they also affect the labor market integration of present-day refugees.

Despite increased awareness of the need for integration policies most policy designs are based on the assumption that refugees will return to their home countries once the situation overseas permits it. This approach is reflected in the high share of ‘tolerated’ individuals who have resided in the country for years but face the “executable obligation to leave”, or in the decision to increasingly grant subsidiary protection to Syrians instead of refugee status. Also, the waiting period for a *Niederlassungserlaubnis* (a permanent residence) was increased from 3 to 5 years, including minors. This resembles the situation many *Gastarbeiter* and their families faced: their admission to stay in the country depended on the work situation even after years in the country, and although being born in the country, the children of guest worker migrants (so-called second-generation migrants) faced the unchanged reality of a vague future. Legal security, however, strongly determines participation chances, such as taking up vocational training or advisory schemes on vocational training to start with, and also strongly affects the motivation for putting effort into formal qualifications. The probit regressions have shown that insecure residence status is strongly associated with a higher chance of refugees to be in overqualified employment. In González Méndez de Vigo et al. (2017) social workers from Berlin impressively describe how the insecurity about their future stay also despairs young refugees who are rejected by potential apprenticing companies or who are refused the public financial support to pick up higher education. Such lack of legal security hence also marks the integration experience of newly arrived refugees, resembling the situation of guest worker immigrants, who were repeatedly required to renew their work and residence permits. Differences prevail in the initial settlement intentions, however: while at the initial stage most guest workers planned on their return in the foreseeable future, the overwhelming majority of recently arrived refugees came to “stay forever” (Worbs et al. 2016, 268).

The finding that legal insecurity is a persistent pattern of the integration of newcomers until today is especially relevant given the fundamental role of post-migration human capital that the examinations have found for the labor market success of refugees. The regression analyses showed that the effects of

skills acquired in Germany are much more pronounced than pre-migration education.<sup>19</sup> The guest worker experience has shown that institutional disincentives (such as legal insecurity) to invest in human capital can create social classes that face serious difficulties to maintain pace with an advancing society. Recruited to fill vacancies in unskilled occupations, the group of guest worker migrants was not encouraged to participate in the transition of the German economy that was increasingly in demand of medium- and high-skilled labor. As to refugees, waiting periods of inactivity caused by employment bans or overloaded authorities decelerate or block the acquisition of host-country relevant capital (such as local networks and job-related German knowledge), leaving refugees in dependence from the state and aggravating their disadvantaged position on the German job market. Such precarious conditions contributed to xenophobic tendencies and *Überfremdungsängste* (fear of infiltration) in the 1980s and 1990s, when the societal and geographical segregation of the disadvantaged guest worker cohorts from the 'host' society turned into an undeniable truth. The results of the recent refugee cohort similarly indicate that already few years after arrival, strong ethnic clustering translates into lower employment quality: refugees placed within an ethnically condensed surrounding (proxied by the mother tongue being the language most frequently used outside the house) are less likely to be employed. The causal link presumably runs into both directions: unskilled positions offer less possibilities to develop non-ethnic networks, while a focus on the ethnic community impedes the acquisition of relevant skills. Unemployment, in turn, lowers the chances of getting in touch with non-ethnic networks that may provide better employment opportunities (Tegegne 2015). Policy-makers are therefore well advised to consider the consequences such segregational tendencies had on the integration of guest workers and their descendants, introducing social division lines that mark the biographies of second-generation migrants until today. Especially with regard to the overly young age of the newly arriving refugees (more than 60% are under the age of 35), strong efforts to prepare them for long-term economic participation may pay off not only economically, but may also contribute to social cohesion in the long run.

The persistent hesitance to facilitate societal membership (in terms of legal security, for instance) also has to be seen in the context of the overall reluctance to accept newcomers who, by definition, carry new cultural elements – especially if they are perceived as culturally distant, such as of Muslim religion, and with visible differences in their physical appearance (Abadan-Unat 2011, 124). With a rapidly increasing Turkish foreign population in Germany in the 1970s, their visibility in German cities increased, and the construction of mosques in German cities, for instance, soon heated the public debate (Allievi 2003). The aversion to allow such discernible symbols of 'Otherness' accompanied the guest workers' incorporation attempts and exemplifies how the notion of a homogenous German society shaped the country's policy approach towards foreigners. The controversial debate on 'Germanness' and societal belonging again gained momentum during the so called 'refugee crisis', illustrated by the

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<sup>19</sup> An aspect linked to that is the difficulties to have foreign qualifications recognized, and the analysis indicates that a successful recognition significantly decreases the likelihood of overqualification.

slogan “Islam does not belong to Germany” of right-wing AfD (Neuerer 2016) or the *Kopftuchdebatte*, the discussion on the use of head scarves in public space (Joeres 2018). Arguably, the strong ethnonational understanding of societal membership has not only shaped the lives of *Gastarbeiter* but also is an element that accompanies the settlement experience of refugees in Germany. It is reflected in policy approaches that highlight the responsibility of the newcomer to adapt to the German context, most importantly the *Fördern und Fordern* approach (“support and demand”, see 4.1.3) established in the 2001 and 2005 immigration laws. Although the reform of the citizenship law remarkably liberalized the access to naturalization, German policy-making is still shaped by the understanding of a rather closed identity concept.

In sum, comparing the German *Gastarbeiter* experience with the economic integration of refugees a range of important similarities can be found. For one, for both groups a prolonged denial of legal security delays investments that would be crucial for an effective economic integration. This curbs economic productivity and locks migrants in precarious positions, leaving them more vulnerable to economic shocks and exposing them to being labeled as a burden in times of crises. Finally, linked to that, the refusal of societal membership endangers social cohesion by marginalizing disadvantaged migrant groups. The analysis of current refugee integration has shown that these aspects are all the more relevant today. Highly selective participation in integration measures and lengthy administrative procedures (see chapters 4.1.2 and 4.1.3) carry the potential to create yet another disintegrated social group. The overrepresentation of young people among newly arriving refugees and their largely shared desire to provide for their own existence (see BAMF refugee survey, Worbs et al. 2016, 6) should provide an imperative to the German government to employ these potential resources not only to the advantage of the migrants themselves but also to the advantage of the German economy and society as a whole. As the enquiry with both guest workers and refugees has shown, educational investment is crucial for the productivity of the migrant work force in the long run, especially for the group of low-skilled individuals who face an increased risk to be trapped in precarious employment in Germany’s highly advanced economy in need of skilled labor. This risk has vividly been illustrated by *Gastarbeiter* migrants and their descendants. Expected to return home at one point, they were discouraged to invest in their occupational status and proved low socioeconomic mobility also in the second and third generation.

## 5 Conclusion

This paper has taken the challenge to compare the immigration experience of the German guest worker period to the present-day integration of refugee migrants in Germany. The major goal of this undertaking was to make knowledge available from past experiences that can sharpen the understanding of mechanisms and developments today. To be precise, the *Gastarbeiter* experiences are a valuable set of data to understand and predict the integration processes of current refugee cohorts in Germany. These efforts were based on the enquiry that policy mistakes towards guest workers are at risk to be repeated in immigration and integration policy-making today. This exercise therefore followed a two-stage process: firstly, I identified major elements that framed the socioeconomic integration process of guest worker families. In a second step, I traced the conditions for the socioeconomic integration of the current refugee cohort by exploring the institutional framework and the empirical determinants of their labor market integration. The strength of this approach is, on the one hand, that the historical review of Germany's recent immigration history enables us to retrospectively assess the long-term consequences of policies that marked the approach towards foreigners. On the other hand, the employment of recently released survey data of refugees in Germany delivers topical and up-to-date information on the current conditions framing the societal and economic integration of refugees that arrived after 2008.

The comparison of the integration processes has delivered a range of noteworthy findings. In short, it can be concluded that major challenges have not decreased in relevance. Although refugee cohorts and guest worker cohorts in parts differ essentially in some characteristics, key challenges to economic integration seem to originate from similar grounds. The historical and econometric enquiries of this paper suggest that legal security continues to play a crucial role in the effective integration of newcomers in the host society. The residence status in turn matters for the acquisition of host-country relevant human capital: legal security can encourage or discourage investment in education and qualification and thereby strongly links to the productivity of the migrant population. The hesitance of German politicians to liberalize access to permanent residence as well as to naturalization must be seen in context of the strong ethnonational identity concept that has traditionally characterized policy-making towards foreigners: the idea that being a constituent and rightful part of society is in large parts determined by German ancestry is surprisingly persistent in the FRG, a country located in the center of Europe that hugely benefits from the European integration and the growing economic and political dependencies. The last parliamentary elections in Germany saw conservative and nationalist forces winning, re-approving the ethnic understanding of societal membership that tends to reject dual-citizenship schemes and liberalized political rights for foreigners. Yet, significant changes can be recorded for the labor market access. In recent years the job markets were partially opened not only to rejected asylum seekers with short temporary residence permits, but also to asylum seekers. These formal deregulations still contrast against practical obstacles that prevail for unsecure status holders. Another discriminatory legal framework was established with the 2014 'prospects to stay' decree. The high number of people that is allowed to stay in Germany despite being rejected, equipped with an insecure residence status and with

little support to enter a self-determined life in Germany, does not only represent lost potentials for the German society (most notably in terms of a disactivated or less productive work force), but also, this group of migrants is at special risk to be marginalized from society. Separation tendencies of guest worker families with little chances of social upward mobility have demonstrated the potential such constellations have to disrupt social cohesion and to worsen social cleavages. An advancing German economy in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw a middle class rise and shifted labor demand towards the medium- and high-skilled. The largely unskilled foreign workers and their descendants participated in these developments only very marginally, which is manifested for instance in the significantly worse outcomes of second-generation migrants in schooling and on the German labor market today. Likewise, the analysis of the labor market integration of recognized refugees has indicated negative consequences of ethnical segregation tendencies for the new cohort.

If policy-makers are eager to avoid such outcomes in the future, they are well-advised to study long-term consequences of the deficient integration of *Gastarbeiter* families in the past 60 years. This includes a reconsideration of the assumption that most of the arriving refugees will leave the country earlier or later. Based on this supposition, investments in the integration of the newcomers are taken rather hesitantly, and full-fledged access to society is seriously delayed. The war in Syria going into its seventh year is only a recent example providing reason to believe that Syrian refugees have indeed come to stay, as a large majority has indicated in the BAMF refugee survey. A denial of the permanent character of *Gastarbeiter* immigration has vividly demonstrated how the omission of timely and well-tailored integration measures has generated a disadvantaged social class that not only stays behind its economic and societal potentials, but also has shown a strong capability to aggravate social cleavages. Located in the center of Europe, Germany has an ample experience of ineffective immigration control. That is to say, that the FRG can barely control who crosses into the country to the extent that Canada can, for example, as advocates of the North American point-systems tend to forget. Policy-makers are therefore well-advised to adjust immigration and integration policies accordingly and to instead take the integration of newcomers seriously: as a challenge, but also as a chance.

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
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## 7 *Appendix*

Figure A1	% of population with migratory background by Federal States
Figure A2	Asylum decisions: Legal titles and rejections
Table A1	Initial asylum applications (Asylerstanträge), 2007-2016
Table A2	Summary statistics: demographics, legal status
Table A3	Summary statistics: network variables
Table A4	Probit regression: Determinants of employment
Table A5	Probit regression: Determinants of employment, restricted sample
Table A6	Probit regression: Determinants of overqualification
Ill. A2	foreigners by country, as % of population
Box A1	Germany's recent immigration history (1949 – 2016)

Fig. A1, % of population with 'migratory background' by Federal States  
*first and second generation migrants, German or foreign citizenship*  
*source: Destatis, 2016*



III. A2, foreigners by county, as % of population  
*light: below 5%, dark: above 13%*  
*source: Destatis/BA/BAMF 2017*




Table A1. Initial asylum applications (Asylerstanträge), 2007-2016  
Top 10 countries of origin

source: BAMF 2017. *Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2016, p.19*

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Afghanistan		657	3375	5905	7767	7498	7735	9115	31382	127012
Albania								7865	53805	14853
Bosnia and Hercegovina						2025		5705		
Eritrea							3616	13198	10876	18854
India	413	681								
Iraq	4327	6836	6538	5555	5831	5352	3958	5345	29784	96116
Iran	631	815	1170	2475	3352	4348	4424			26426
Kosovo		879	1400	1614	1395	1906		6908	33427	
Libanon	592									
Macedonia				2466	1131	4546	6208	5614	9083	
Nigeria	503	561	791							12709
Pakistan					2539	3412	4101		8199	14484
Russian Fed	772	792	936	1199	1689	3202	14887			10985
Serbia and Montenegro	1996	729		4978	4579	8477	11459	17172	16700	
Somalia				2235			3786	5528		
Syria	634	775	819	1490	2634	6201	11851	39332	158657	266250
Turkey	1437	1408	1429	1640	1578					
Unknown									11721	14659
Vietnam	987	1042	1115							
<b>Total</b>	<b>11305</b>	<b>14133</b>	<b>16458</b>	<b>29557</b>	<b>32495</b>	<b>46967</b>	<b>72025</b>	<b>115782</b>	<b>363634</b>	<b>602348</b>

Fig. A2 Asylum decisions: Legal titles and rejections, in % of total, 2008 - 2017

excluding formal decisions (e.g. Dublin cases)

source: BAMF 2017, *Aktuelle Zahlen zu Asyl*




Table A2 Summary statistics: demographics, legal status

Variable	N	mean	std. dev.	min	max	description
gender	2805	1.33	.470	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if female
child	2804	.353	.478	0	1	dummy, equal to 1 if individual has at least one child in the household that has to be taken care of
married	2770	.529	.500	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if married
age (cat.)	2805	1.58	.680	1	3	age categories, 1: below 35, 2: 35 to 50, 3:50 or older, refer to Fig. 10b
age (years)	2805	35.8	10.4	18	69	age in years
asylum process	2593	.359	.480	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if duration of asylum process longer than 1 year
permanent residence	2500	.345	.475	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if residence title permanent
duration of stay	2523	5.10	3.08	2	29	approximate duration of stay, difference of year of asylum application and year of interview
literacy	2670	.766	.424	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if individual has good or very good reading skills
years of schooling	2634	2.39	.792	1	3	education: years of schooling, 1: 0-4 years, 2: 5-9 years, 3: 10 years or more
job in home country	2698	.659	.474	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if individual has job experience in home country
formal job qualification	2166	.148	.355	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if individual has a formal job qualification
German skills	2790	-.008	.888	-3.3	2.0	standardized index of subjective German skills (reading, writing, speaking, understanding)
retraining in Germany	2598	.131	.337	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if individual has taken job training in Germany
job qual. or studied	2166	.415	.493	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if individual has learned a profession or studied
recognition of foreign qualification	2157	.051	.220	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if foreign qualification was successfully recognized in FRG
highest educ. in Germany	2298	.060	.237	0	1	dummy, equals to 1 if highest degree was obtained in FRG

Table A3. Summary statistics: network variables

Variable	N	mean	std. dev.	min	max
Meeting frequencies, 1: daily, 6: never					
German friends	2250	3.96	1.82	1	6
non-German friends	2272	3.89	1.73	1	6
German neighbors	2530	4.06	1.81	1	6
non-German neighbors	2503	3.72	1.82	1	6
Ethnic network strength (dummy, equals to 1 if yes)					
friends/co-ethnic network reason to come to Germany	2741	.183	.389	0	1
mother tongue most frequently used outside the house	2133	.160	.367	0	1
discrimination experience (dummy, equals to 1 if often or seldomly)					
often	2805	.280	.449	0	1
seldomly	2805	.471	.499	0	1

Table A4. Probit regression: Determinants of employment  
BAMF Refugee Survey 2014, weighted data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>gender*child (ref.: male#nochild)</b>					
male#child	0.172 (0.113)	0.112 (0.122)	0.121 (0.126)	0.0602 (0.152)	-0.0519 (0.160)
female#no child	-0.923*** (0.105)	-0.808*** (0.116)	-0.801*** (0.118)	-0.729*** (0.151)	-0.678*** (0.164)
female#child	-1.479*** (0.135)	-1.414*** (0.142)	-1.413*** (0.147)	-1.397*** (0.185)	-1.531*** (0.195)
married	-0.394*** (0.0913)	-0.412*** (0.0982)	-0.409*** (0.102)	-0.374*** (0.121)	-0.301** (0.127)
<b>age (ref.: 35-49 years)</b>					
< 35	0.100 (0.0839)	0.114 (0.0912)	0.168* (0.0974)	0.291** (0.116)	0.265** (0.124)
> 49	-0.680*** (0.138)	-0.714*** (0.147)	-0.761*** (0.158)	-0.540*** (0.187)	-0.469** (0.211)
<b>legal status</b>					
asylum process: 12+ months		0.145 (0.0883)	-0.0292 (0.105)	-0.102 (0.127)	-0.0988 (0.140)
permanent residence title		0.280*** (0.0861)	0.192* (0.0979)	0.156 (0.116)	0.0583 (0.123)
duration of stay			0.0561*** (0.0174)	0.0561*** (0.0200)	0.0637*** (0.0208)
<b>country of origin (ref.: Afghanistan)</b>					
Eritrea			0.104 (0.144)	0.0901 (0.173)	0.165 (0.188)
Iraq			-0.187 (0.127)	-0.0184 (0.150)	0.0413 (0.167)
Iran			-0.160 (0.130)	-0.263* (0.158)	-0.241 (0.177)
Sri Lanka			0.799*** (0.128)	0.948*** (0.158)	1.019*** (0.173)
Syria			-0.410*** (0.118)	-0.361** (0.144)	-0.428*** (0.157)
<b>pre-migration human capital</b>					
Literacy				0.0945 (0.139)	0.0138 (0.145)
years of schooling (ref. 0-4 yrs)					
5-9 years				0.243 (0.168)	0.256 (0.177)
10+ years				0.190 (0.172)	0.124 (0.186)
job in home country				0.161 (0.137)	0.213 (0.146)
job qualification or studied				0.0116 (0.138)	-0.00747 (0.163)
formal job qualification				0.434*** (0.154)	0.414** (0.178)
<b>post-migration human capital</b>					
German skills					0.200*** (0.0757)
retraining in Germany					-0.301* (0.174)
recognition of foreign qualification					0.219 (0.229)

Constant	0.406*** (0.0862)	0.246** (0.107)	0.124 (0.160)	-0.414 (0.253)	-0.373 (0.272)
Observations	2,211	1,882	1,882	1,328	1,188

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Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A5. Probit regression: Determinants of employment,  
BAMF Refugee Survey 2014, weighted data, sample restricted to N=1,188

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>gender*child (ref.: male#nochild)</b>					
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
male#child	0.0876 (0.155)	0.0641 (0.158)	0.0636 (0.163)	0.0118 (0.161)	-0.0519 (0.160)
female#no child	-0.818*** (0.149)	-0.799*** (0.151)	-0.780*** (0.156)	-0.699*** (0.163)	-0.678*** (0.164)
female#child	-1.516*** (0.184)	-1.532*** (0.182)	-1.542*** (0.193)	-1.515*** (0.199)	-1.531*** (0.195)
married	-0.395*** (0.125)	-0.399*** (0.126)	-0.381*** (0.132)	-0.347*** (0.128)	-0.301** (0.127)
<b>age (ref.: 35-49 years)</b>					
< 35	0.221* (0.114)	0.224* (0.115)	0.298** (0.123)	0.329*** (0.125)	0.265** (0.124)
> 49	-0.463*** (0.178)	-0.466*** (0.180)	-0.461** (0.194)	-0.496** (0.201)	-0.469** (0.211)
<b>legal status</b>					
asylum process: 12+ months		0.0781 (0.110)	-0.0836 (0.136)	-0.0988 (0.141)	-0.0988 (0.140)
permanent residence title		0.274*** (0.106)	0.141 (0.121)	0.0987 (0.121)	0.0583 (0.123)
duration of stay			0.0667*** (0.0204)	0.0668*** (0.0208)	0.0637*** (0.0208)
<b>country of origin (ref.: Afghanistan)</b>					
Eritrea			0.197 (0.179)	0.136 (0.185)	0.165 (0.188)
Iraq			-0.0223 (0.155)	0.0259 (0.163)	0.0413 (0.167)
Iran			-0.0966 (0.156)	-0.301* (0.173)	-0.241 (0.177)
Sri Lanka			0.970*** (0.157)	0.948*** (0.170)	1.019*** (0.173)
Syria			-0.314** (0.145)	-0.409*** (0.155)	-0.428*** (0.157)
<b>Pre-migration Human Capital</b>					
Literacy				0.0774 (0.144)	0.0138 (0.145)
years of schooling (ref. 0-4 yrs)					
5-9 years				0.291* (0.175)	0.256 (0.177)
10+ years				0.212 (0.182)	0.124 (0.186)
job in home country				0.201 (0.143)	0.213 (0.146)
job qualification or studied				0.0824 (0.152)	-0.00747 (0.163)
formal job qualification				0.375** (0.173)	0.414** (0.178)
<b>post-migration Human Capital</b>					
German skills					0.200*** (0.0757)

retraining in Germany					-0.301*
					(0.174)
recognition of foreign qualification					0.219
					(0.229)
Constant	0.367***	0.216*	-0.0928	-0.545**	-0.373
	(0.113)	(0.131)	(0.192)	(0.269)	(0.272)
Observations	1,188	1,188	1,188	1,188	1,188

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A6. Probit regression: Determinants of overqualification,  
BAMF Refugee Survey 2014, weighted data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>demographics</b>						
female	-0.412	-0.365	-0.368	-0.123	-0.598	-2.308**
	(0.477)	(0.495)	(0.520)	(0.602)	(0.650)	(0.899)
child	0.709*	0.955**	0.614	-0.231	-0.210	0.120
	(0.385)	(0.430)	(0.437)	(0.537)	(0.577)	(0.601)
married	-0.959***	-0.873**	-0.849**	-0.452	-0.505	0.880
	(0.342)	(0.378)	(0.384)	(0.417)	(0.475)	(0.669)
<b>age (ref.: 18-35 years)</b>						
< 35	0.423	0.356	0.687*	1.189***	1.294***	-0.742
	(0.314)	(0.358)	(0.390)	(0.419)	(0.485)	(0.613)
> 49	-0.115	-0.233	-0.360	-1.009*	-0.469	0.250
	(0.572)	(0.542)	(0.526)	(0.611)	(0.716)	(0.867)
<b>legal status</b>						
asylum process: 12+ months		-0.694*	-0.356	-0.512	-0.456	-0.646
		(0.362)	(0.469)	(0.482)	(0.551)	(0.444)
permanent residence title		-0.780**	-1.302***	-1.072***	-1.226**	-3.411***
		(0.323)	(0.369)	(0.390)	(0.477)	(0.674)
duration of stay			0.0171	-0.0214	0.0529	0.550***
			(0.0535)	(0.0553)	(0.0743)	(0.133)
<b>country of origin (ref.: Afghanistan)</b>						
Eritrea			0.503	0.371	0.441	1.021
			(0.687)	(0.755)	(0.884)	(1.049)
Iraq			1.101**	0.662	0.610	0.817
			(0.529)	(0.581)	(0.572)	(0.720)
Iran			-0.677	-1.016	-1.132*	-3.078***
			(0.570)	(0.642)	(0.609)	(0.922)
Sri Lanka			0.735	0.696	0.366	-0.253
			(0.568)	(0.636)	(0.623)	(0.828)
Syria			-0.642	-1.275*	-1.207	-2.723**
			(0.611)	(0.764)	(0.746)	(1.298)
<b>Pre-migration human capital</b>						
Literacy				-1.623***	-0.872*	0.526
				(0.494)	(0.488)	(0.873)
years of schooling (ref. 0-4 yrs)						
5-9 years				0.0503	0.188	-0.0750
				(0.761)	(1.008)	(1.273)
10+ years				0.821	-0.138	-1.803
				(0.645)	(0.790)	(1.168)
job in home country				0.174	-1.324**	-2.602***

				(0.534)	(0.672)	(0.966)
formal job qualification				0.215	-0.298	-1.544***
				(0.409)	(0.436)	(0.557)
<b>post-migration human capital</b>						
German skills					-0.0168	-0.0604
					(0.344)	(0.398)
retraining in Germany					0.0169	-0.0662
					(0.405)	(0.570)
recognition of foreign qualification					-0.959*	-3.709***
					(0.531)	(1.132)
highest education in Germany					-3.276***	-8.167***
					(0.928)	(1.607)
Network: meeting frequency						
German friends						-1.379***
						(0.333)
Non-German friends						0.513**
						(0.235)
Constant	-0.119	0.551*	0.190	0.867	2.670**	9.017***
	(0.249)	(0.289)	(0.498)	(1.108)	(1.310)	(2.402)
Observations	602	593	593	587	571	560

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Box.A1 Germany's recent immigration history (1949 – 2016)			
Declaredly no country of immigration, Germany has seen constant immigration since shortly after the Second World War. A revision of the no-immigration-country approach came 50 years after the first foreign labor recruitment contract in 1955. Historical review of Germany's immigration experience (non-exhaustive), based on Martin (2002), Klusmeyer and Papademetriou (KP, 2013), Bade (1993), Abadan-Unat (2011) and Herbert (2001)			
	year	novel regulations and policy developments	context and background
phase I recruitment of foreign labor	1949	German Basic Law (Constitution) entitles 'refugees or expellees of German ethnic origin' (Basic Law, art. 116) to German citizenship	entry and residence status of foreigners not regulated by law
	1955	Labor recruitment agreement with Italy	
	1960	Labor recruitment agreement with Spain and Greece	
	1961	Labor recruitment agreement with Turkey	
	1963	Labor recruitment agreement with Morocco	1960 to 1963: real GDP growth of 13% (BA 1965, 6)
	1964		1 mio. guest workers in Germany (4,5% of overall workforce: biggest group: Italians, 31%, share of female guest workers: 22%), quasi-full employment of domestic workforce, 681,000 vacant jobs (BA 1965,4-5, 7)
	1965	Labor Recruitment agreement with Tunisia	
	1965	Foreigners Law: regulates foreigners' entry and residence, dependent on national interests. EC nationals now equal to nationals on labor market	family reunification, the social and political rights of foreigners, and issues of societal integration remain unaddressed
	1966/ 1967		recession; temporary drop of foreign employment from 1,3 mio. in 1966 to 0,9 mio in 1967 (6,1 and 4,3% of overall workforce, respectively, BA 1969, 3)
	1968	Labor recruitment agreement with Yugoslavia	
1973		2,6 mio. guest workers in Germany, providing 12% of the work force	
phase II guest worker restriction efforts	1973	oil crisis, recruitment stop ( <i>Anwerbestopp</i> ), active return policies initiated	labor recruitment declines, but foreign population grows by another million until 1980 (permanent settlement, family unification)
	1975	restriction for non-EC nationals not to move into cities with a foreign population over 12%	Turks comprise 27% of the foreign population (largest group) the understanding of policy-makers that the circular labor recruitment scheme has failed does not translate into an adapted immigration model (KP 98)
	1977	joint Federal and State Commission recommends return incentives to reduce foreign population, naturalization remains measure of exception (KP 98, 99)	return policies to counter growing foreigner resentments, neglecting ghettoization, the marginalization of second generation migrants and the socioeconomic immobility of foreign residents
	1978	new regulations: <i>Aufenthaltserlaubnis</i> (residence permit) after 5 years, <i>Aufenthaltsberechtigung</i> (residence right) after 8 years	reform efforts by SPD-FDP coalition on a comprehensive integration policy strategy without success
	1979	Kühn Memorandum (first Commissioner for Foreigner Affairs, <i>Ausländerbeauftragter</i> ), calling for the recognition of Germany as de facto immigration country and the development of an integration strategy	none of the recommendations (e.g. naturalization und unrestricted access to education of second-generation migrants, suffrage for long-term foreign residents) turns into a policy. Focus remains with return policies

Box.A1. ctd. (ii)			
	<i>year</i>	<i>novel regulations and policy developments</i>	<i>context and background</i>
<b>phase III</b> <i>Überfremdungsangst paralysis</i>	1982		CDU/CSU dominated Bundesrat blocks SPD/FDP initiated law reform entitling second generation migrants to citizenship
	1982	Heidelberg Manifesto by 15 professors, warning from <i>Überfremdung</i> (foreign infiltration) and suggesting measures of strict reduction of the foreign population	Emerging debate on ‘multiculturalism’ centers around identity and <i>Überfremdungsangst</i> (fear of foreign infiltration), but misses social and legal dimensions of integration (KP 103)
	1982	CDU/CSU (1982–1998) succeeds SPD/FDP coalition in government	electoral campaigns dominated by immigration restriction and reduction of the number of foreigners in the country, issues of integration remain unaddressed
	1983	foreign worker departure bonus program right-wing alliances (Republicans, National Democratic Party NPD, German People’s Union, DVU) challenge Conservative government	Moderate wing of CDU (Heiner Geißer, Rita Süßmuth) cannot establish more liberal <i>Ausländerpolitik</i> (policy on foreigners) and integration policies
	1986		SPD, now in opposition, without success advocates for <i>jus soli</i> citizenship that it failed to introduce during its reign (1969–1982)
	1989	strongly restrictive Foreigners Law reform proposal dismissed by public media, civil society actors and opposition, including CDU members	revised proposal still does not embrace integration as a policy. Bade: 1980s “lost decade” for immigration and integration policy
<b>phase IV</b> <i>asylee restriction efforts</i>	1991	New Foreigners Law: more security for settled foreigners, higher restrictions on newly-arriving foreigners, facilitated conditional naturalization for foreigners born in Germany and long-term settlers	political and social participation of long-term settlers not addressed (communal voting rights, dual citizenship), immigration experience still phrased as exceptional event and potential threat (Bade 1993, 61)
	1992		record number of 438,000 asylum seekers (see Figure A3 below)
	1993	28 May: Asylum law reform (‘Asylum compromise’): more restricted legal basis for asylum claims, ‘third safe country’ and ‘safe country of origin’ concepts are introduced, <i>Aussiedlers’</i> privileges curtailed.	Evolving public debate on multiculturalism and Germany’s immigration reality is not picked up by the reform
	1993	29 May: Solingen arson attack: 3 children and 2 adults of Turkish origin die (no asylees)	increased border controls and tightening asylum procedures are preferred over addressing the threat resulting from the foreigners’ continued marginalization (Herbert 2001, KP 151, 154)
	1994	CDU/CSU reelected, <i>Ausländerpolitik</i> no priority issue in electoral campaigns	unsuccessful proposals by SPD, FDP, and Greens to substantially reform citizenship law (dual citizenship, <i>ius soli</i> right for second generation migrants, shorter waiting periods for long-term residents)
	1995	Schengen agreement	German calls for a common EU immigration policy (in particular, asylum) of ‘burden-sharing’ remain unheard
	1997	Dublin Convention comes into effect	

Box.A1. ctd. (iii)			
	<i>year</i>	<i>novel regulations and policy developments</i>	<i>context and background</i>
<b>phase IV</b> transition towards country of immigration	1998	red-green coalition replaces Kohl government (CDU/CSU)	
	2000	reform of citizenship law, jus soli for immigrant descendants, conditional citizenship right for long-term residents (8 instead of 15 years waiting period), 'options right'	conceding to CDU/CSU-led <i>Länder</i> the reform introduces 'options right' (decide for <u>one</u> citizenship at the age of 23) instead of dual citizenship, discouraging especially migrants of Turkish origin to apply for a German passport
	2000	Green card program for 20,000 highly skilled foreign workers in the IT sector, residence permit for 5 years	CDU counter slogan ' <i>Kinder statt Inder</i> ' ('Children instead of Indians') does not convince voters (KP 230) until end of program (2004) only 17,900 Green cards are issued (BAMF, 2006)
	2001	<i>Süssmuth Zuwanderungskommission</i> report (cross-party Independent Commission on Immigration) calls for paradigm shift towards accepting immigration reality and the need of integration policies	Major recommendations of the commission for novel migration law do not survive the 2001 to 2004 tug-of-war between red-green government and CDU/CSU opposition
	2001	<i>Zuwanderungsgesetz</i> (immigration law) based on the recommendations is passed but voting procedure is successfully challenged by CDU/CSU opposition	Bill rejected in follow-up voting: CDU/CSU demand stronger elements of ethnic national membership, immigration control and security
	2005	<i>Zuwanderungsgesetz</i> passed: first comprehensive law regulating non-EU immigration and embodying integration measures (" <i>Fördern und Fordern</i> ")	<i>Süssmuth</i> recommendations to introduce dual citizenship and point system for highly-skilled workers are dropped; instead, more restrictive immigration control measures (e.g. lower age limit for family unification, easier deportation) (Stüwe 2016)
	2008		record low of 28,000 asylum seekers (see Figure A3 below)
	2009	partial opening of labor market and related services to 'tolerated' individuals, shorter waiting period (15 instead of 48 months) to qualify for educational support, eligibility to enter vocational training, new prospects of legal residence conditional on integration efforts	Subordinate eligibility of 'tolerated' individuals to language courses and other training measures remains. 2009 - 2013: only 615 applications to take up vocational training; obstacles such as legally restricted mobility, lack of financial resources, deficient public advice, lengthy formal procedures and disadvantageous housing in state facilities prevail (Schreyer et al., 2015)
	2012	2012 Recognition Act to improve recognition of foreign qualifications	no combination with programs to support the individual adjustment/extension of existing qualifications to the German labor market (Müller-Wacker), no alternative to formal qualification (> Sweden)

Box.A1. ctd. (iv)			
	<i>year</i>	<i>novel regulations and policy developments</i>	<i>context and background</i>
<b>phase V asylee restriction efforts</b>	2013		110,000 new asylum applications, see Figure A3 below, Top 5 countries of origin: Russian Federation, Syria, Serbia, Afghanistan, Makedonia
	2013	reduced waiting period for ‘tolerated’ individuals to apply for work permit (9 months instead of 1 year)	Between 2012 and 2015, more than 40% of work permit applications of ‘tolerated’ individuals were rejected (kA 2015, Drks. 18/6267)
	2014	declaration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia as ‘safe countries of origin’	173,000 new asylum applications, see Figure A3, Top 5 countries of origin: Syria, Serbia, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Albania
	2014	weakening of the position of ‘safe-country-of-origin’ asylum-seekers vis-à-vis the regulative bodies (accelerated asylum procedures, the legal presumption is the unfoundedness of the asylum claim, shorter time period to lodge an appeal against a rejection, deportation is possible while the appeal is still proceeded)	25,5% of asylum applicants are from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia, recognition rate: 0,4% (BAMF, 2015) Ratio of pending asylum decisions to new asylum claims increases from 36% in 2007 to 83% in 2014
	2014	conditional access to the labor market for individuals with ‘toleration’	
	2014	reduction of the waiting period for asylum-seekers and ‘tolerated’ individuals to apply for a work permit to 3 months (9 months before November 2014, 1 year before September 2013)	
	2014	suspension of the ‘priority review’ for work permit applications of asylum seekers and ‘tolerated’ individuals in 133 out of 156 districts	share of rejected work permits for priority reasons drop from 49% in 2014 to 9% in 2017 (data for Jan.-Jun. 2017, BT-Drks. 18/6267, 18/11388)
	2015	declaration of and Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo as ‘safe countries of origin’	442,000 new asylum applications, highest share from Syria (36%), share of asylum seekers from Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina drops from 30% to 8% in Dec. 2015 (BAMF 2016, press release)
	2015	law reform to facilitate access to a residence title for ‘well-integrated’ ‘tolerated’ minors and long-term ‘tolerated’ refugees (residence in Germany for 8+ years, or 6+ years for individuals with children)	1,000 instead of an estimated 33,000 individuals profit from the new access to residence until 2016 (BT-Drks. 18/11388, 27)

## Box.A1. ctd. (v)

<i>year</i>	<i>novel regulations and policy developments</i>	<i>context and background</i>
2015	'good prospects to stay' ( <i>Bleibeperspektive</i> ): new decree determines labor market access and integration course participation entitlement of asylum seekers (Box 1)	Merkel: "Wir schaffen das" ("We can do it") in reference to increasing refugee arrivals, internationally referred to as Germany's new 'welcome culture' ( <i>Willkommenskultur</i> )
2016	Integration law: access to integration courses for asylum-seekers and 'tolerated' individuals with 'good prospects to stay'	722,000 new asylum applications, Top 5 countries of origin: Syria (39%), Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Eritrea
2016	changed decision-making practice upon asylum applications (BAMF): more subsidiary protection, less refugee recognition suspension of family reunification for individuals with subsidiary protection	net protection rate (refugee status, subsidiary or humanitarian protection excl. Dublin cases) of Syrian applications 98,7%, Afghanistan 63,7%, Iraq 95,0% (Bundesregierung, BT-Drks 18/8450, 4)
2016	waiting periods for permanent residence ( <i>Niederlassungserlaubnis</i> ) extended from 3 to 5 years for individuals granted refugee protection, now bound to conditions such as economic self-reliance and German skills	average duration of asylum procedure: 7,1 months, waiting period to pose asylum claim increases to six months on average, (Bundesregierung, BT-Drks 19/185)
2016	Suspension of the freedom of movement restriction ( <i>Residenzpflicht</i> ), but introduction of the residence restriction ( <i>Wohnsitzauflage</i> ): restriction upon the place of residence for recognized refugees, decided upon by regional authorities	
2016	Suspension of family unification for individuals with subsidiary protection, including minors	
2016	'tolerated' individuals can apply for a residence title for the time of their vocational training if they have picked it up during the asylum process	the deportation of refugees in vocational training or schooling continues to unsettle employers
2016	'EU-Turkey statement': EU money for Turkey in turn for increased Turkish efforts to minimize refugee movement towards Europe, including the deportation of refugees in Greece back to Turkey	observers doubt the reconcilability of the deal with EU human rights standards and EU asylum law (see e.g.
2017	obligation to stay in state facilities extended to 2 years for people with low 'perspectives to stay' (see Box 2) new method to use mobile phone data to verify the identity of asylum seekers	average duration of asylum procedure: 11,7 months, waiting period to pose asylum claim: 4,5 months (Bundesregierung, BT-Drks. 19/185) The number of new refugee arrivals decreases to 207,000 (see Figure A3)
2017	Bundestag elections; CDU/CSU/SPD coalition confirmed	right-wing forces gain popularity (Alternative for Germany, AfD: 12%)
2018	plans of so-called 'anchor centers' for asylum seekers in state facilities, announcement to significantly increase the number of deportations	with Seehofer (CSU) as new Interior Minister restrictive approaches towards immigration and integration will dominate the new Merkel government

Figure A3a. Asylum applications 1953-2017

source: BAMF 2017, Aktuelle Zahlen zu Asyl  
 note: displays new arrivals





Figure A3b. Foreign residents, selected countries of origin 1950 - 2001 (in thousands)

source: Sautter, 2004  
 note: displays no. of residents in Germany from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, Spain, Austria, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal



## Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that she compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague, 10 May 2018

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