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**Globalization: From Unknown to Known? An Analysis
of the Academic Debate about the Concept**

Master's thesis

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Year of the defence: 2020

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on May 19th, 2020

Barbora Chaloupková

References

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Abstract

Globalization is a concept that manages to attract both academic and mainstream attention and it became an important reference point of many contemporary conversations. However, there is a surprisingly little genealogical research on globalization. This thesis seeks to contribute in this area by analyzing part of the overall academic debate about this concept from the year 1990 to 2012 and by reconstructing the debates and arguments through which the concept was shaped. It breaks the chosen time frame in two periods (1990-2000 and 2001-2012) and conducts a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the debate in four leading academic journals, each of them grounded in different discipline. The thesis finds that key reference points of the debates about globalization in both periods of the time were the terms “market” and “state” and the relationship between them. Globalization as a phenomenon that was said to alter the nature of this relationship posed a particular challenge to social science paradigms that operated with state-centered frameworks. A dimension in which globalization was discussed the most was in both periods the economic one; however, we also saw a rise of social dimension in the second period indicating a shift in attention beyond the economics. Furthermore, this work finds that while globalization was normatively contested in the second analyzed period, the contestation was more subtle than the thesis expected; linked to specific issue areas and it did not use “megaterms” like antiglobalization.

Abstrakt

Globalizace je koncept, který na sebe váže velkou míru pozornosti nejenom v akademické komunitě a který se stal důležitým referenčním bodem mnoha současných debat. Překvapivě málo výzkumu bylo nicméně provedeno v oblasti genealogie tohoto konceptu. Tato práce si klade za cíl přispět v tomto kontextu analýzou akademické debaty o globalizaci, která byla vedena v letech 1990 až 2012, konkrétně pak rekonstrukcí jednotlivých debat a argumentů použitých ve čtyřech předních akademických časopisech. Každý z těchto časopisů reflektuje jiné disciplinární ukotvení. Zvolený časový rámec práce rozděluje do dvou období (let 1990-2000 a 2001-2012), ve kterých provádí kvantitativní a kvalitativní analýzu. Práce dochází ke zjištění, že klíčovými pojmy, k nimž se jednotlivé debaty o globalizaci nejčastěji vztahovaly v obou zkoumaných obdobích, byly “stát” a “trh” a vztah mezi nimi. Globalizace byla vnímána jako fenomén zásadně proměňující

podstatu tohoto vztahu, a jako takový se stala výzvou pro paradigmaty společenských věd operující se státocentrickými strukturami. Klíčovou dimenzí, v níž byla globalizace diskutována, byla v obou sledovaných obdobích dimenze ekonomická, v druhém období pak dochází k nezanedbatelnému nárůstu sociálních témat, který naznačuje rozšiřování tematického záběru. Práce dále též dochází k závěru, že v rámci zkoumaného vzorku a časového období sice najdeme případy normativně vedeného vymezení se vůči globalizaci, nicméně neděje se tak za použití „megatermínů“ jako např. antiglobalizace, nýbrž jemnějšími způsoby a mnohdy skrze jednotlivá témata.

Keywords

Globalization, debate, genealogy, scholars, content analysis, 1990s, state, market, social science.

Klíčová slova

Globalizace, debata, genealogie, akademici, obsahová analýza, 90. léta, stát, trh, společenské vědy.

Title

Globalization: From Unknown to Known? An Analysis of the Academic Debate about the Concept

Název práce

Globalizace: Z neznámého ke známému? Analýza akademické debaty o tomto konceptu

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Introduction

“Are economists responsible for Donald Trump’s shocking victory in the US presidential election?,” kicks off Harvard economist Dani Rodrik his 2017 book *Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy* and follows:

“Economists might only wish they have the kind of power it takes to determine elections. But even if they may not have caused (or stopped) Trump, one thing is certain: economists would have had a greater—and much more positive—impact on the public debate had they stuck closer to their discipline’s teaching, instead of siding with globalization’s cheerleaders.”¹

It is a refrain Rodrik has stuck to for the past two decades. He has been arguing that economists have not been upfront about the downsides of globalization and global trade in particular for fears that they would embolden “protectionist barbarians.”² This reluctance cost economists credibility and more so – fed narratives of the “barbarians” themselves, he says.³

Trump’s victory and his unapologetic bashing of free trade and other components traditionally associated with the economic globalization brought this topic to the forefront of academic but also mainstream debate. Coupled with other current issues such as the environmental sustainability of practices of an interconnected world or the security aspects of global supply chains, there is a growing understanding that many key areas constituting globalization are more open-ended than possibly previously thought.

Yet, this thesis does not analyze the future but the past. There is a popular argument, one also the former president Barack Obama used⁴ that Trump is a “symptom” of America’s ills not their cause. To see what the debate about globalization truly looked like in the years preceding Trump’s entry to the politics but also motivated by my deep interest in the ways arguments and debates are structured and evolve, I decided to conduct a content analysis of a part of the debate academics had on globalization. Such state of the

¹ Dani Rodrik, *Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018), [9].

² *Ibid.*, 138.

³ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴ Guardian News, “‘Donald Trump is a symptom, not a cause’: Obama urges big turnout for midterms”, YouTube video, 0:52, September 7, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EGqchOW1TEs>.

art analysis could help us see through which debates the concept of globalization was forged; whether there was a normative contestation of globalization or its perceived downsides and if so, in which areas. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to analyze individual debates and arguments as well as whether there were certain connotations the concept of globalization was taking on itself that would gradually come to be automatically seen as its characteristics. The thesis thus seeks to analyze some of the history of the idea of globalization.

My analysis will deal with a fragment of the overall academic debate since it will study the topic only in four academic journals. As such the work could represent a case study of the academic debate. However, I will subject the coverage of the chosen journals to both qualitative and quantitative content analysis in order to comprehend the nature of their coverage of globalization as fully as possible.

Obviously, globalization is not only about economics, and I had that in my mind while choosing the concrete journals. Thinking about Manfred Steger's famous use of the Buddhist parable of blind scholars encountering single parts of elephant (i.e. globalization) and mistakenly believing they knew its nature,⁵ I attempted to capture the evolution of the globalization concept from a multi-disciplinary perspective. But admittedly, the main perspectives I will focus on are political, economic and sociological. The four journals I will work with are the *Annual Review of Political Science*, the *Annual Review of Sociology*, the *Review of International Political Economy* and *Daedalus*. Each of them is a leading academic journal from a different disciplinary background, and thus these choices reflect the attempted multi-disciplinary approach to the analysis.

Through an analysis of the academic debate we can also come to a better understanding of how the concept of globalization itself has been constructed. As Jens Bartelson argued in his work on social construction of globality, the "sociopolitical world is accessible to knowledge and intervention only by means of concepts" and it is through the analysis of historical emergence of the concepts that we come to understanding how our world has been constituted.⁶ In line with this reasoning and in order to better

⁵ Manfred B. Steger, *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*, Very Short Introductions 86 (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013), 32.

⁶ Jens Bartelson, "The Social Construction of Globality1: Social Construction of Globality," *International Political Sociology* 4, no. 3 (September 6, 2010): 220, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2010.00102.x>.

understand how the concept of globalization was constructed, I will draw on genealogical perspectives as articulated by Michel Foucault and many others.

Genealogy as a critical historical method provides us with tools for how to approach and think about a process of emergence of a concept and its construction. Adopting a denaturalizing perspective, it seeks to show historicity and temporality of the analyzed subject⁷ and to recover discursive contexts in which and through which it was moulded.⁸ A genealogist “writes chronicles of [*the*] struggles”⁹ that accompany an emergence of concept, Thomas Biebricher says, and that is what this thesis attempts to do – to chronicle the academic debates and discussions through which globalization concept took on its contemporary meaning(s).

Zygmunt Bauman in his 1998 book *Globalization: Human Consequences* placed globalization alongside many vogue words sharing similar fate: “the more experiences they pretend to make transparent, the more they themselves become opaque.” In an attempt to elbow out and supplant “orthodox truths” they themselves turn into “no-questions-asked canons,” he said.¹⁰ Obviously, Bauman himself believed there is a lot to be unpacked,¹¹ as he shows in the book; yet, he captured a sentiment associated with globalization. That sentiment is probably more lay than professional one but an important association nevertheless. Based on the genealogical reasoning showed above, an orthodox truth would be a prime example of a notion that genealogy seeks to problematize. Bauman’s quote, therefore, signals that a genealogical study of globalization could significantly enhance our knowledge of the subject.

Yet, there is a remarkable vacuum of genealogical research of globalization. Up until now, there has been only one coherent attempt to deploy a genealogical perspective on globalization and that is a Manfred Steger and Paul James’ book *Globalization: The Career of a Concept* from 2015. “Although ‘globalization’ mediates and frames how we

⁷ Scott Hamilton, “A Genealogy of Metatheory in IR: How ‘Ontology’ Emerged from the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” *International Theory* 9, no. 1 (March 2017): 138, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971916000257>.

⁸ Srdjan Vucetic, “Genealogy as a Research Tool in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (2011): 1300.

⁹ The original says “chronicles of these struggles,” see Thomas Biebricher, “Genealogy and Governmentality,” *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 2, no. 3 (2008): 366, <https://doi.org/10.1163/187226308X336001>.

¹⁰ Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 1.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

understand our increasingly interconnected world, there exists no comprehensive genealogy and critical history of its meaning formation in the English language,”¹² place Steger and James their book within the existing research. Yet even they do not conduct a genealogical inquiry in the contexts in which globalization emerged similarly like, for example, Bartelson does in his genealogy of society¹³ but instead they interview a dozen of scholars whose work was seminal in the globalization studies.

Therefore, there is a huge untapped potential in the research that would deploy genealogical perspectives to analyze the contextual path that led to an emergence of globalization as an important concept of the contemporary world – and academia. While in this thesis I will not conduct a full-scale genealogy, both for the reasons of a scope and my capabilities, I seek to fill part of the research vacuum by a small-scale analysis of the various debates in which globalization as a concept was forged by the academic community.

The scope of the analysis I will conduct in this thesis will be limited by the aforementioned choice of the journals but also by the time frame in which the analysis will be taking place: between the years 1990 and 2012. The 1990s was a decade in which globalization as a concept truly took off in the academic community as well as in public discourse, as Steger and James show in their research.¹⁴ While globalization used to be discussed in waves also in the 1980s and episodically even in decades before, the 1990s were the first decade that saw globalization entering the academic debate on large scale. The year 2012 might seem arbitrary but it is reflective of practical difficulties I have in accessing some of the chosen journals. My goal is to analyze the debate prior Donald Trump’s victory and since I am unable to access all the journals up until the year 2016, I decided not to distort my results by incorporating only some journals and will stop my analysis in 2012.

To analyze and recover various contexts in which globalization was discussed and which shaped the concept itself, I will conduct quantitative analysis using Atlas.ti, an automated content analysis program. I will analyze the number of occurrences of the term

¹² Paul James and Manfred B. Steger, “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization’: The Career of a Concept,” *Globalizations* 11, no. 4 (July 4, 2014): 418, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2014.951186>.

¹³ Jens Bartelson, “Towards a Genealogy of ‘Society’ in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 41, no. 4 (October 2015): 675–92, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210515000194>.

¹⁴ James and Steger, “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization,’” 419.

globalization paired with terms from a dictionary I will create that represent certain trends in the debate. This part will be followed by a qualitative analysis reflecting gathered statistical data that will offer a more detailed reconstruction of the debate.

I will divide the chosen time frame in two periods, the first one covering the decade from 1990-2000 and the second one covering the following twelve years. While analyzing the evolution of the debate, this thesis will work with two hypotheses. The first hypothesis assumes that while in the 1990s the debate would focus on questions of nature of globalization and its key characteristics, in the second analyzed period of time it would broaden its scope and move to issues that stayed largely outside academic attention in the 1990s. The second hypothesis then assumes that as the debate on the nature of globalization partially settles by the end of the 1990s, we would see a growth of normative contestation of globalization in the second period.

The work will consist of five main parts. The first chapter will introduce genealogy as theoretical underpinning of this thesis. This part has two subchapters; the first one will draw on genealogical work of Michel Foucault and others who implemented this perspective into their research and it will present an overview of some of the basic tenets of the method that have a particular relevance for the topic of this thesis. The second subchapter will then present results of James and Steger's research on genealogy of globalization.

The second chapter will be composed of a literature review. It is an important part since it offers a broad overview of major works and arguments made about globalization many of which will be later reflected in the analyzed articles. I will organize this chapter in five parts that correspond with major issue-areas in the debate; those are economic globalization, spatio-temporal dimension of globalization, globalization and the nation-state, globalization and the international system and antiglobalization. Besides the works and individual authors that shaped the debate within each category I will also draw on major handbooks of this topic, most importantly on Scholte's *Globalization: a critical introduction*.

The third chapter is a methodological section that will in a greater detail present the selected journals and methods and rules I will follow while conducting the quantitative and qualitative analysis. This chapter will also cover both of my hypotheses.

The fourth chapter presents results of my quantitative analysis and it will offer a brief discussion about the major trends in both analyzed periods of time.

The fifth chapter will build on the previous one with a qualitative analysis and will be composed of three subchapters. The first and second subchapter will present results of my qualitative analysis for the two analyzed periods of time. Each subchapter will be divided into parts that reflect the structure of my quantitative analysis. Third subchapter will link my findings to the theoretical foundations of this work and will offer a brief discussion about possible further genealogical research.

1. Theoretical Foundations

Is globalization “here to stay?” Is globalization an idea “whose time has come” as several authors in different times claimed? And is globalization “increasingly omnipresent?”¹⁵ These are just few questions that repeat themselves in the vast troves of research on globalization. The questions contain notions of urgency or omnipresence that are associated with the globalization concept and oftentimes thought to capture part of the core of its meaning. They are not the only ones – others are described more in detail in following chapters – and the importance scholars ascribe to them varies at different points of time. It is the case with all phenomena, not just globalization, that there is a set of notions and connotations (which can change over time) that are thought to constitute an essential characteristic maybe even an ultimate definition of the phenomenon. How do scholars end up taking these positions? Through what (thought) processes do these notions crystallize into a seemingly commonsensical knowledge? Applied specifically to the topic of this thesis, how has the knowledge on globalization been formed? What is the history of the idea of globalization?

On the one hand, I do not argue that globalization presents a phenomenon that is conceptualized in a commonsensical fashion across the academic community. More of the opposite, even though there are some characteristics more agreed upon than others, as the next chapter shows, academics have been arguing vividly about even the basic tenets of globalization. Thus one of the conditions for a genealogy to be effective: “focus on a 'problem' – a social phenomenon that appears (seems, feels) normal or true (commonplace, natural, intuitive) and then turns it into a question, that is, it asks how it came about,” as listed by Vucetic, is not fulfilled.¹⁶

On the other hand, we can still use insights of genealogy as a critical perspective and a tool to gain a better understanding of how the concept itself has been constructed. One of the purposes of genealogy, according to Vucetic, is “to demonstrate the diversity

¹⁵ See Joseph Stiglitz, “Globalization and Development,” in *Taming Globalization: frontiers of governance*, ed. David Held et. al. (Cambridge: Polity Press: 2003), 222, David Held and Anthony McGrew, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 1 and George Ritzer, *Globalization: The Essentials* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 2.

¹⁶ Srdjan Vucetic, “Genealogy as a Research Tool in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (2011): 1301.

and specificity of battles between different interpretations of social items.”¹⁷ There are “temporal, spatial and cultural domains in which the regimes of truth are made,” he argues.¹⁸ Therefore, this thesis seeks to describe such domains in their relation to an emergence of globalization concept. By describing them, we can track the process of knowledge formation, its evolution and eventually the establishment of the “truth regimes” albeit probably fractured ones. The rest of the chapter proceeds first with a brief characterization of genealogy and then it moves on to an analysis of existing literature that either applied a genealogical approach to the globalization concept or at least examined its emergence.

1.1 Genealogy

Genealogy is a critical historical method. However, the word “critical” does not stand for any normative prescription encouraging resistance, as Biebricher points out,¹⁹ and history is evoked here in a specific understanding of the word (“history differently practiced” meaning distant from traditional historiography, as Saar says).²⁰ First articulated by Nietzsche, it was Michel Foucault who ignited a wave of academic interest in this method. Given Foucault’s own inconsistent usage of the term, many scholars concede that it is difficult to precisely outline his concept of genealogy.²¹ I will, therefore, present an overview of basic tenets of the method with a greater focus on concepts that are particularly relevant to the topic of this work, such as path of emergence, discourse or history.

Michael Saar defines genealogy as following: “Genealogies are stories told about the historical emergence and transformation of concepts, practice or institutions that relate to the making of selves by influencing their self-understanding and way of conduct.”²² Drawing also on Nietzsche’s work, Saar highlights several important characteristics that overlap with features also underlined by other authors.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 1299.

¹⁹ Biebricher, “Genealogy and Governmentality,” 370.

²⁰ Martin Saar, “Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the Self,” *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 2, no. 3 (2008): 297, <https://doi.org/10.1163/187226308X335976..>

²¹ Biebricher, “Genealogy and Governmentality,” 365.

²² Saar, “Understanding Genealogy,” 307.

Firstly, according to Biebricher's working definition, genealogy views history as a process that is characterized above everything by contingency and discontinuity.²³ It seeks to find history where it is not supposed to be, as Foucault says, in places "we feel are without history."²⁴ The main point of genealogy is to adopt a denaturalizing perspective and uncover existing histories behind the "foundations of our naturalized style of thinking,"²⁵ to emphasize "historical contingency in the social construction of norms"²⁶ and to show that what we conceived as universal or obvious is temporal and historical.²⁷ Hamilton suggests that it is by the process of problematization how genealogy begins: by a selection of "commonsensical or naturalized truth" which is to be problematized.²⁸ As explained earlier, this is one of the conditions for genealogy to be truly effective, as listed by Vucetic. Perceiving history of the globalization concept as everything but obvious or natural is a starting premise of this thesis that allows us to dive into the debate.

To Foucault, it was important to stress out that genealogy is not about a search for origin; on the contrary, it opposes itself to it.²⁹ Genealogy rejects a notion of a singular starting point of history³⁰ and an assumption that it is possible to trace ideas back to their founding moment.³¹ Instead, it focuses on a concept of emergence, "moment of arising," and details accompanying it.³²

Each concept has its own path of emergence, its genealogical history, which can be traced.³³ Emergence is always produced through a set of forces, Foucault argues,³⁴ and the emerging historical phenomena are results of various struggles, Biebricher explains. "The

²³ Biebricher, "Genealogy and Governmentality," 366.

²⁴ Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. D. F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 139.

²⁵ Hamilton, "A Genealogy of Metatheory in IR," 138.

²⁶ Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," *International Organization* 49, no. 1 (1995): 87, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300001582>.

²⁷ Hamilton, "A Genealogy of Metatheory," 143.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 144.

²⁹ Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 140.

³⁰ Biebricher, "Genealogy and Governmentality," 367.

³¹ Larry Shiner, "Reading Foucault: Anti-Method and the Genealogy of Power-Knowledge," *History and Theory*; Middletown, Conn. 21, no. 3 (January 1, 1982): 387, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1300330829?pq-origsite=summon>.

³² Biebricher, "Genealogy and Governmentality," 367.

³³ Richard L.W. Clarke, "Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' (1971)," LITS3304 Notes 11B: 2, downloaded from <https://www.scribd.com/document/62278797/Foucault-Nietzsche-Genealogy-History> (accessed May 11th, 2020).

³⁴ Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 148.

genealogist writes the chronicles of these struggles,” he says.³⁵ Just as genealogy opposes a “search for origin” and perception of knowledge as a form of “discovery or re-discovery,” an emergence of concept should not be seen as a final stage of historical development but only as a current “episode in a series of subjugations,” says Foucault.³⁶ Thus, he draws our attention to the role power plays in genealogy. History should be understood as an endless process of “violent or surreptitious appropriation” of values, norms, meanings, systems of rule, etc., by force.³⁷ Exercise of power is, therefore, a conflict over interpretative truths.³⁸ A focus on the path of emergence of globalization concept allows us to better comprehend episodic dominances of various means of its conceptualization.

Crucial to understanding the importance of power struggles for Foucaultian genealogy is the establishment of a mutually constitutive relationship between knowledge and power: knowledge, truth and any other systems of signification are standing in a circular relation with power, says Biebricher.³⁹ Foucault rejects an idea that knowledge and power could be separated.⁴⁰ Power to Foucault is diffused (it is not a sole possession of those in the positions on the top) and exists only in its exercise. Therefore, he proposes to focus on power relations as a form of governance that structures actions of others.⁴¹ It creates a web of relations affecting various aspects of our lives and a prominent position among the products that power creates belongs to knowledge. As the relationship between power and knowledge is mutually constitutive, Foucault merges these two terms in one. The term “power-knowledge” is reflective of a thesis that there can be no power relation without a related constitution of a field of knowledge. At the same time knowledge always presupposes and constitutes power relation.⁴² “Genealogy is the analysis of how one constellation of power-knowledge relations is displaced by another,” summarizes Larry Shiner, pointing out discontinuity that is characteristic for genealogy.⁴³

Besides power, another important analytical tool genealogy often employs is discourse. Understood as “theoretical statements that are connected to social practices,”

³⁵ Biebricher, “Genealogy and Governmentality,” 366.

³⁶ Clarke, “Michel Foucault,” 2.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁸ Price, “A Genealogy of Chemical Weapons Taboo,” 88.

³⁹ Biebricher, “Genealogy and Governmentality,” 369.

⁴⁰ Shiner, “Reading Foucault,” 390.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 390–391.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 392.

⁴³ Shiner, “Reading Foucault,” 387.

discourses serve as tools through which certain behaviors and conditions are produced, “normalized” and politicized – some more than others. It is through a production of discourse that a type of power Foucault calls “disciplinary” is exercised. The disciplinary power of discourse lies in its ability to define what is normal and natural and what is not.⁴⁴ Those notions are precisely what genealogy should problematize and, as Biebricher says, “writing history involves deciphering the links between changes in discourse...and dynamics of societal struggles lurking behind.”⁴⁵

Thus while studying the history of globalization concept I accept a Foucaultian idea that “history is the recovery of discourses and discursive contexts.”⁴⁶ An analysis of the various interpretations and conceptualizations of globalization throughout past decades allows us to see not only through which processes the concept has taken its contemporary form(s) but also the power struggles behind its formation. Therefore, this thesis is using genealogy as a theoretical framework for its attempt to analyze how the concept of globalization was forged out of the different discursive contexts while having in mind that our present understanding of globalization is far from being settled.

1.2 Literature on Genealogy of Globalization

There will probably never be a consensus on a chronology of globalization. The answer depends on the extent to which one is willing to stretch the causation line (here the debate also varies in relation to what is taken as a driver of globalization), as Steger suggests,⁴⁷ and one can encounter both theories claiming that globalization has been here for centuries and ones locating its origin only few decades ago. The debate about chronology is inseparable from a question whether globalization presents a continuity of existing trends or a change, rupture with previous development, which is a discussion Scholte, for example, engages with in length.⁴⁸

However, despite the intense academic and mainstream attention given to globalization, there has been a remarkably little critical historical research on the formation

⁴⁴ Price, “A Genealogy of Chemical Weapons Taboo,” 87.

⁴⁵ Biebricher, “Genealogy and Governmentality,” 369.

⁴⁶ Vucetic, “Genealogy as a Research Tool,” 1300.

⁴⁷ Manfred B. Steger, *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction*, Very Short Introductions 86 (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013), 37.

⁴⁸ Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd edition (Basingstoke, Hampshire New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 19.

of the concept itself. There is a “genealogical vacuum,”⁴⁹ say Manfred Steger and Paul James, authors of *A Genealogy of Globalization: The Career of the Concept*. Hirsch and Fiss arrive to a similar conclusion in their paper titled “The Discourse of Globalization: Framing and Sensemaking of an Emerging Concept.” While they do not approach globalization concept from a genealogical perspective, they too are interested in “discursive struggles over the interpretation of globalization.” As they point out, there has been a substantive research on globalization as a “structural process” focusing on changes in international economy. Much less attention, however, has been given to globalization as a “symbolic discourse.”⁵⁰

Steger and James’ work, therefore, remains the only one more elaborate attempt to approach globalization from the genealogical perspective. In their book from 2014, Steger and James interview twelve leading scholars on this topic who have been dealing with globalization over the past decades with an intention to gain a better understanding of how the concept came to its contemporary meaning, how some meanings associated with globalization became more important than others, how globalization took off so quickly as a concept, who its principal codifiers were, etc.^{51, 52}

What is remarkable, Steger and James observe, is the speed with which the concept of globalization took off at the end of 20th century. The “discursive explosion” in the use of globalization in the 1990s was extraordinary because the concept remained relatively obscure for most of the century.⁵³ In 1961, the term entered the first general dictionary, *Merriam-Webster Third New International Dictionary*, although the concept had been used already three decades previously, by a Scottish educator William Boyd, to describe a universal and holistic view of education.⁵⁴

While it took until the last decades of the 20th century for the concept of globalization to become widely used, already during the second half of the century there were other processes going on that led to deep changes in people’s sense of the social whole. Processes such as postmodernization, (de)nationalization or globalization itself

⁴⁹ James and Steger, “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization,’” 418.

⁵⁰ Peer C. Fiss and Paul M. Hirsch, “The Discourse of Globalization: Framing and Sensemaking of an Emerging Concept,” *American Sociological Review* 70, no. 1 (2005): 32.

⁵¹ James and Steger, “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization,’” 420.

⁵² I could not access the book; however, the authors provide a summary in their article.

⁵³ James and Steger, “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization,’” 419.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 425.

(without being contextualized in its contemporary meaning and as a separate phenomenon)⁵⁵ transformed ideational landscape across the world⁵⁶ and eventually paved the way for the concept of globalization to take root. Notions and images of “global” were gaining in popularity since the early 20th century as popular symbols long before globalization became embedded in general vocabulary. A “global imaginary,” underpinned in a sense of global interdependence, was in many areas gradually overlaying previously dominant “national imaginary.”⁵⁷

Tracing the globalization concept genealogically requires a critical perspective of whether authors use it to denote its contemporary meaning. In the case of globalization, it is, according to Steger and James, authors of the *A Genealogy of Globalization*, “the expansion and intensification of social relations and consciousness across world-space and world-time.”^{58,59} Even though research they present in the book shows that around the middle of the 20th century globalization remained an idiosyncratic term that was rarely used, there were several occasions in which the term’s use was consistent with today’s meaning. An American sociologist Paul Meadows in his 1951 article defined globalization as a process where the following happens:

“...With the advent of industrial technology, however, this tendency toward cultural localization has been counteracted by a stronger tendency towards cultural universalization. With industrialism, a new cultural system has evolved in one national society after another; its global spread is incipient and cuts across every local ethos...”

Meadows was probably the first scholar who used globalization in its contemporary sense but his article has remained forgotten in the vast troves of literature on the topic of globalization.⁶⁰

How did the concept of globalization eventually become so present in our everyday vocabularies? How did globalization become – in the words of Freedman – a “core concept,” a “powerful signifier at the center of a political belief system”? Steger and James argue that there are four “layers of meaning formation”: ideas, ideologies, imaginaries and

⁵⁵ Ibid., 421.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 423.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 422.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 426.

⁵⁹ This is a definition Steger and James use for globalization and thus a benchmark against which they assess whether use of the word “globalization” in different periods of history corresponds to its contemporary meaning.

⁶⁰ Paul Meadows in Steger and James, “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization’,” 429.

ontologies, and the concept of globalization became embedded in all of them. Globalization penetrated existing ideological systems and became a way of articulating a “particular political understanding of the world” and related agendas and programs.⁶¹

Since the 1980s, the concept started appearing in academia, journalism and other fields that were all mutually contributing to its increasing popularity.⁶² Hirsch and Fiss, who analyze the emergence of globalization discourse in the American media, place the emergence of the concept in the early 1980s with the first significant spike of popularity in its usage around 1989-1990.⁶³

As the scholars interviewed by Steger and James recall, most of them do not remember their first encounter with the concept; it was somehow “already there.” “I cannot remember the exact moment when it happened. All I know is that I found myself at some point using it,” says Saskia Sassen.⁶⁴ Concepts gain a salience once they are able to comprehend human conditions in their deepest sense and globalization was able to capture the essence of ongoing shifts in space, time, and other dimensions of our lived realities that were seen as fundamentally changing the world.⁶⁵

The paradoxical lack of research that would shed some light on the epistemological and genealogical origins of globalization and the forces that brought the concept to the spotlight are reflective of both the nature of the globalizing world and the state of academia, Steger and James contend. First, exploring the process of formation of the concept had to give way to a more urgent need to explain the phenomenon. Second, the rise of popularity of the concept coincided with a trend in academia de-emphasizing utility of generalizing “grand theories.” Globalization began to be studied in a period where hopes for an all-encompassing general theory capable of explaining the phenomenon in its relation to “social whole” were effectively being abandoned.⁶⁶ The following chapter puts Steger and James’s thesis about neglected epistemological and genealogical anchoring of the concept of globalization to the test by analyzing the key books that were written on the topic during the past three decades.

⁶¹ Steger and James, “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization’,” 423.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 431.

⁶³ Fiss and Hirsch, “The Discourse of Globalization,” 37.

⁶⁴ Steger and James, “A Genealogy of ‘Globalization’,” 430.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 432.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 420.

2. Literature Review

The volume of research and books dealing with this phenomenon is vast. It is so vast that it somewhat funnily leads authors to outright indicate that they are aware of the rest of the field and suggest that they would offer a valuable new contribution, see for example Bhagwati's "Does the world need yet another book on globalization?"⁶⁷ or Scholte's "Not another book on globalization!"⁶⁸ At the same time, however, if there is one thing the majority of scholars studying globalization would probably agree on, it is a persistent vagueness and ambiguity of the concept. Despite the troves of literature on globalization written over the last three to four decades, a clear and concise understanding of what globalization as a concept stands for seems still beyond our reach. Globalization has become the "big idea of our times,"⁶⁹ yet despite – or because of that – it is "in danger of becoming, if it has not already become, cliché of our times,"⁷⁰ as Held and McGrew suggest. To borrow Scholte's words, "ideas of globalization tend to remain as elusive as they are pervasive."⁷¹

A very narrow characteristic or feature of globalization, one the majority of scholars would agree on and that has been used across disciplines, represents a notion of "flows" which was popularized by sociologist Manuel Castells. Globalization can be understood as forms of connectivity and flows⁷² or "objects in motion," as Appadurai says.⁷³ The notion of flows implicitly indicates certain instability or continuous flux. This sense was strongly manifested in the work of the late Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, who talked about "liquidity," a concept that came to be frequently used in globalization studies. Liquidity, standing in opposition to solidity, presumes a process of melting of what used to be solid, thus making it hard to fix phenomena in space and time. Using both concepts of flows and liquidity, Ritzer theorized globalization as "set of processes involving increasing liquidity and growing of multi-directional flows of people, places,

⁶⁷ Jagdish N. Bhagwati, *In Defense of Globalization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1.

⁶⁸ Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, 2nd edition (Basingstoke, Hampshire New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1.

⁶⁹ David Held, *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities* (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 27.

⁷⁰ David Held and Anthony G. McGrew, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, 1999th ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, n.d.), 1.

⁷¹ Scholte, *Globalization*, 52.

⁷² Steger, *Globalization*, 23.

⁷³ Arjun Appadurai, ed., *Globalization* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 5.

objects, information as well as structures they encounter.”⁷⁴ The concept of flows itself is at times criticized for its alleged sense of inevitability or for creating new dichotomies (such as liquid versus solid) while claiming to make all existing dichotomies redundant.⁷⁵ The aforementioned core assumptions are widely accepted by the majority of scholars; still, some see the heart of globalization lying elsewhere⁷⁶ or emphasize an unevenness of various flows.⁷⁷

The idea of flows, however, oftentimes constitutes only an initial assumption for the various conceptualizations of globalization. The phenomenon has been, on the one hand, theorized to affect almost all areas of social reality. We have the so-called hyperglobalizers calling it the most important development in modern history only to find skeptics on the other side denying even its existence. Between those two groups there is a rich work of “transformationalists” who acknowledge that globalization is an important phenomenon of modern history but only one of many.⁷⁸

Given the aforementioned differences in characteristics of globalization including even its basic ontology, there are numerous ways one can organize the vast volumes of knowledge and literature written on this topic. A popular organizing principle is to structure the arguments based on their association with three schools of thought: realism, liberalism and structuralism. These schools are associated mostly but not exclusively with the field of international political economy. However, as, for example, Thomas Oatley pointed out, even though these schools have traditionally organized the debate, they are “largely self-contained” interpretative frameworks that tend to not only neglect certain important aspects from other schools but also have a greater evaluative than explanatory function.⁷⁹ While an association of some the authors presented below with one of these schools clearly reveals itself in their arguments, I chose not to structure the following debate along these lines and opted for categories reflecting different topic areas instead.

⁷⁴ George Ritzer, *Globalization: The Essentials* (Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 2.

⁷⁵ James H. Mittelman, *Whither Globalization? The Vortex of Knowledge and Ideology*, Rethinking Globalizations 1 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2004), 30.

⁷⁶ Ritzer, *Globalization: The Essentials*,

⁷⁷ Appadurai, *Globalization*, 5.

⁷⁸ For a more detailed discussion of these positions see for example Scholte or Held and McGrew.

⁷⁹ Thomas H. Oatley, *International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy*, 3rd ed (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2008), [12].

I organized my literature review in five subchapters in which each of them discusses globalization in relation to a different issue area or concept, so I present as broad a range of topics to which globalization relates as possible. Topics of the subchapters are: economic and spatio-temporal dimensions of globalization, globalization's impact on the nature of nation-state and international system and finally an anti-globalization as a phenomenon normatively contesting globalization. I admit that it is still a highly selective slice that was further limited by my inability to access some books. Also, some could make very reasonable arguments in favor of adding other topic areas; however, I attempted to keep the areas I chose as broad as possible so various additional subtopics were covered within those categories (e.g. some social aspects of globalization or globalization's impact on developing countries are briefly discussed in subchapter dealing with economic globalization etc.).

2.1 Economic Globalization

Starting with the notion of flows, economic globalization could be defined as an intensification and stretching of economic connections across the globe in the form of flows of goods, capital, extension of markets, etc.,⁸⁰ says Steger. While he argues in favor of a broad definition of globalization going beyond its economic aspect, he concedes that focus on economy has been prevalent.⁸¹ Economists were among the first ones announcing a “new era.”⁸² Economic globalization is one of the areas where the chronology debate is important, as depending on what one sees as constituting the key characteristic of globalized (or globalizing) economy, one could argue that economic globalization has been going on for at least two centuries or even longer. Proponents of this “longue durée” view could be split into two groups, those understanding history of economic globalization as linear, i.e. continuum, and those opting for a cyclical perspective proposing several periods of globalization with ruptures in the meantime.

However, there is an agreement that from the 1970s/1980s onwards, we have been witnessing a period of economic globalization marked by at least quantitative if not

⁸⁰ Steger, *Globalization*, 33.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁸² Jonathan Friedman, ed., *Globalization, the State, and Violence* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2003), 8.

qualitative changes. As Osterhammel suggests, this was a period of accelerating liberalization of trade followed by rapid expansion of international finance accompanied by “de-nationalization” of multinational companies, growth of some Asian economies and advances in technology and communication.⁸³ Dani Rodrik, telling a similar story but with more institutional flavor, links a qualitative shift in economic globalization to the end of Bretton Woods regime and the replacement of GATT by WTO. He sees the economic globalization as a byproduct of shared economic growth that was propelled by equilibrium between state-directed economic opening and domestic needs of different societies.⁸⁴ Such a system was famously dubbed by John Ruggie as “embedded liberalism.”⁸⁵

Based on this conceptualization, some authors see imperative qualities of economic globalization. Understanding globalization as “*inexorable (emphasis added) integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before,*”⁸⁶ Thomas Friedman compares globalization to Golden Straitjacket, which inevitably forces countries to adopt a set of economic policies he calls golden rules (such as privatization, deregulation, tariff elimination, etc.).⁸⁷ Those, he says, will make “economy grow and politics shrink.”⁸⁸ While Rodrik disputes the growth aspect,⁸⁹ he willingly accepts constraining effects that globalization supposedly impose on the politics of states. His own version of inescapable tension globalization poses vis-à-vis national democracies is summed up in a concept of trilemma proposing that out of hyperglobalization, nation state and democratic politics, you can choose only two.⁹⁰

While Rodrik and Friedman would disagree in their normative assessments of deeper economic globalization, they agree that it is intrinsic to economic globalization to constrain the nation-state. The imperatives globalization is said to impose on the nation-

⁸³ Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, *Globalization: A Short History* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005), 143–44.

⁸⁴ Dani Rodrik, *The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2011), 72.

⁸⁵ John G. Ruggie, “Taking embedded liberalism global: the corporate connection” in *Taming globalization: frontiers of governance*, ed. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (Cambridge, UK: Malden, MA: distributed in the USA by Blackwell Pub): 94.

⁸⁶ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 1st Anchor Books ed (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 9.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 104.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁸⁹ “Friedman was wrong to presume that deep integration rules produce rapid economic growth,” he says, see Rodrik, *Globalization Paradox*, 189.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 201.

state are numerous and they are explored in greater detail in the subchapter dealing with nation-state. Staying in the field of economics, there are numerous debates about the impact globalization has on factors such as poverty, inequality (within both developed and developing countries), and overall development. Probably the most renowned proponent of globalization's positive effects on development has been Jagdish Bhagwati. For Bhagwati, globalization simply means opening up to international trade, which always contributes to economic growth; however, it is the job of a country's politicians to ensure they enact "good policies" to make sure benefits of the opening are enjoyed across society.⁹¹ Joseph Stiglitz, on the other hand, takes more critical stance. "I saw firsthand the devastating effects globalization can have," he said and emphasized the need to "manage" globalization properly if it is to be a "force for good."⁹²

The Friedman-Rodrik-Bhagwati debate highlights at least two broad concepts with which globalization is oftentimes conflated: liberalization and internationalization. The former conceptualizes globalization as a process of removing artificially imposed constraints on movements of all kinds of resources with the aim to create an open and borderless world economy. The latter understands globalization as a dispersion of objects and experiences across the world which leads to homogenization (or "flatness of the world" if we are to use Friedman's famous phrase).⁹³ Linking globalization to already existing concepts means adopting a narrow understanding of the phenomenon, which simply presumes a greater speed, depth or intensification of other concepts (a case in point is Bhagwati's argumentation with free trade). Such approaches could be criticized as "redundant knowledge," and Scholte does so, since according to him they don't offer any analytical added-value and fail to open new insights.⁹⁴ These conceptualizations are criticized as failing to account for what globalization causes that is really new since tendencies towards greater liberalization and universalization have been going on for centuries. Critics also point out their political undertones since they seem to imply that the

⁹¹ Bhagwati, *In Defense of Globalization*, 1 and Bhagwati in Dani Rodrik, *The Globalization Paradox*, 122.

⁹² Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, 1st ed (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), [9].

⁹³ Thomas L Friedman and Olga Kovářová, *Horký, zploštělý a přelidněný: proč potřebujeme zelenou revoluci* (Praha: Nakladatelství Academia, 2010), 43.

⁹⁴ Scholte, *Globalization*, 56.

only way to achieve a global world is through an adoption of one set of (economic) policies.⁹⁵

An understanding of globalization as being inseparable from a certain set of economic policies is clear when one discusses a relationship between neoliberal ideology and globalization. To say that the contemporary era is marked by a “bundling of neoliberalism and globalization” is, according to Mittelman, among the little common grounds we can find today.⁹⁶ If one falls for the definition of globalization as economic liberalization, the debate about globalization is reduced to discussing contemporary neoliberal macroeconomic policies, says Scholte.⁹⁷

Indeed, if one takes a look at the list of policies Friedman gives as constituting his Golden Straightjacket,⁹⁸ many fit the neoliberal prescriptions. Neoliberalism, understood as a policy framework leaning heavily on classical liberal arguments in favor of free-markets in relation to an economy that has become more global, has been normalized and morphed into a dominant ideology which prescriptions are “commonsensically” and widely accepted.⁹⁹ It became a new orthodoxy, argues David Harvey.¹⁰⁰ Bundling of neoliberalism and globalization “extols virtues of individuals, efficiency, competition and minimal state intervention in the economy,” says Mittelman,¹⁰¹ pointing to an idea of globalization as a force relying on instruments of deregulation, economic liberalization and privatization while attempting to achieve greater market integration.¹⁰² Those who accept separation of markets and nation-states (and argue for substitution of the latter by the former) then understand globalization as a constitutive force behind an emergence of governing political-economic structures that more than being a product of history marks its endpoint.¹⁰³ Assessments of neoliberal globalization and linked policy prescriptions have varied significantly and become a subject of heated debate, part of which is addressed in the subchapter dealing with anti-globalization movements.

⁹⁵ Scholte, 56–57.

⁹⁶ Mittelman, *Whither Globalization?*, 56.

⁹⁷ Scholte, *Globalization*, 56.

⁹⁸ See the full list in Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 105.

⁹⁹ Scholte, *Globalization*, 38.

¹⁰⁰ David Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism* (London ; New York, NY: Verso, 2006), 15.

¹⁰¹ Mittelman, *Whither Globalization?*, 5.

¹⁰² Friedman, *Globalization, the State, and Violence*, 5.

¹⁰³ Terence Turner, “Class Projects, Social Consciousness and The Contradictions of Globalization” in *Globalization, The State, and Violence*, 62.

The debate about neoliberalism leads us to even broader discussion about the relationship between globalization and capitalism. Authors associated with neo-Marxism especially focus on interplay between globalization and capital accumulation. Globalization is inseparable from the contemporary working of capital on a global scale and basis, Appadurai argues,¹⁰⁴ and for John Glenn it constitutes (together with technology) one of the underlying causes of globalization that actually made the phenomenon possible. Given that capitalism sees capital as a necessary condition to compete and there is a limit to capital accumulation in every country, the system inevitably pushes outwards and encourages a global expansion.¹⁰⁵ Driven by a necessity to reduce costs and reach the economy of scale, capitalist mode of production has inevitably contributed to trends towards globalization.¹⁰⁶ For the critics of capitalism, this has contributed to a transmission of ills of capitalism on a global scale.

2.2 Spatio-temporal Dimension of Globalization

There is a broad stream of research arguing that the phenomenon of globalization poses a methodological and theoretical challenge and cannot be addressed by traditional sociological concepts. Those authors propose an understanding of globalization that goes beyond the self-evident manifestations of what constitutes global (such as global institutions and formations) and includes processes that do not scale on the global level yet are part of it. Globalization challenges social scientists because it takes place within territories and institutions that used to be conceptualized in national terms.¹⁰⁷ Thus traditional temporal and spatial conceptions may lose their ability to fully capture the nature of globalizing world. Among the concepts that are said to be compromised by globalization, the territorial nation-state occupies a prominent place. As Mittelman proposes, “Given myriad pressures on territorial state from above and below, globalization is about a quest for an appropriate temporal and spatial scale for social organization.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Appadurai, *Globalization*, 4.

¹⁰⁵ John Glenn, *Globalization: North-South Perspectives* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007), 4.

¹⁰⁶ David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 98.

¹⁰⁷ Saskia Sassen, *Sociology of Globalization*, 1st ed, Contemporary Societies Series (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 6.

¹⁰⁸ Mittelman, *Whither Globalization?*, 19.

Saskia Sassen identifies two key assumptions of social science that become contested if we accept the notion that under globalization “the global partly inhabits the national.” Firstly, the assumption of nation-state as a container of social processes is compromised. Secondly, national territory no longer corresponds with the national, meaning that processes happening within the national territory (or institution) may not be in their character national.¹⁰⁹ Globalization thus requires abandoning the practice of “methodological nationalism,” a habit of approaching problems with a framework of the nation-state. James Rosenau points to a process of fragmentation caused by globalization that stretches across the foreign-domestic boundaries.¹¹⁰ Foreign-domestic is only one of many traditional dualities (the others can include, for example, global-local or national-global) that are increasingly irrelevant in the current globalized/globalizing world¹¹¹ and that cannot be treated as mutually exclusive.¹¹² Therefore Held’s conceptualizing of globalization as “a spatial phenomena, lying on a continuum with ‘the local’ at one end and ‘the global’ at the other end”¹¹³ is telling of efforts scholars of globalization have undertaken to connect local and global dimensions of globalization. One of the key concepts in this context is the term “glocalization” coined by Roland Robertson who sought to emphasize an impact global trends have on local communities.¹¹⁴ Sassen’s study of global cities, “subnational places where global circuits intersect,”¹¹⁵ could serve as an example of a “glocalized” place that is embedded in both national and global dynamics and structures.¹¹⁶

Global and local are not the only categories that are said to have been transformed by globalization. Perhaps even greater attention has been given to time and space whose alleged compression (leading to a situation where “events in one part of the world affect faraway locations”) constitutes, according to many authors, the defining characteristic of globalization.¹¹⁷ The phrase “space-time compression,” coined by geographer David

¹⁰⁹ Sassen, *Sociology of Globalization*, 3.

¹¹⁰ James N. Rosenau, “Governance in a New Global Order,” in *Governing Globalization*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2002), 74.

¹¹¹ Sassen, *Sociology of Globalization*, 3.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 32.

¹¹³ David Held, *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities* (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 28–29.

¹¹⁴ Roland Robertson in Osterhammel and Petersson, *Globalization*, 7.

¹¹⁵ Sassen, *Sociology of Globalization*, 20.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹¹⁷ Mittelman, *Whither Globalization?*, 4.

Harvey, took hold among many globalization scholars. Harvey drew on Marx's notion of "annihilation of time and space" and argued that resulting from the development of new media, new ways of information transmission and transportation revolutions, the importance of time and space as obstacles to social interactions have diminished.¹¹⁸ Through these channels, globalization contributed to a creation of a new sense of "immediacy and virtual togetherness" and a world of social relations where the "effective distance" is smaller than geographical one.¹¹⁹

The notion of compression led many to picture a world that is shrinking and in which people are exposed to the same media coverage at the same time. An influential yet contested concept speaking to this sentiment is for example McLuhan's "global village." On the one hand, the concept draws attention to a world that people increasingly conceive as a single social space.¹²⁰ To many, on the other hand, it is a misleading phrase because it conceals the unevenness of globalization effects and discrepancies between winners and losers.¹²¹

An intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole is an important characteristic of globalization processes.¹²² However, as the abovementioned critique of the term "global village" shows, there has been a significant push against assumptions that the processes behind spatio-temporal compression should be equated with a universalization or homogenization of experience and practices.¹²³ Robert Allen shows in his work how globalization combined with technological development unevenly impacted the American labor market and contributed to increasing segregation of the American population that is not only economic but increasingly geographic as well.¹²⁴ In agreement, David Harvey argues that uneven geographical development is a norm within a capitalist mode of production and describes mechanisms reproducing the unevenness in economic and political fortunes on a global level.¹²⁵ Geographers in particular pushed hard against the notion that new spatialities created by globalization should render space irrelevant or

¹¹⁸ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 98.

¹¹⁹ Osterhammel and Petersson, *Globalization*, 8.

¹²⁰ Scholte, *Globalization*, 73.

¹²¹ Mittelman, *Whither Globalization?*, 7.

¹²² Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*, Theory, Culture & Society (London: Sage, 1992), 8.

¹²³ Scholte, *Globalization*, 57.

¹²⁴ Enrico Moretti, *The New Geography of Jobs* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), 78.

¹²⁵ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 71–77.

“flat.”¹²⁶ Many echo work of Zygmunt Bauman, who emphasized the unevenness of globalization impacts. To him, globalization connects and divides at the same time. Place plays an important role in his understanding of globalization as he – drawing on Robertson – argues that process of glocalization is at heart of polarization of societies that are increasingly divided between globalized or exterritorialized elites and localized majorities. Under conditions of the spatial-temporal compression, distance becomes a socially constructed product that offers unprecedented levels of freedom to some but also traps many in their local places.¹²⁷ Terence Turner broadens this argument to include categories of class and social consciousness that are, according to him, unjustifiably overlooked in the globalization literature. Linking globalization to neoliberal policies that supposedly weaken the sovereignty of nation-state, he describes a polarization of middle class between its elite, part associated with transnational capital, and the rest of the class, which remains anchored (“trapped” in Bauman’s words) within national economies.¹²⁸

Many globalization scholars decided to focus on its spatial-temporal dimension as they believe it is in this area where the phenomenon alters the social world the most. Globalization not only problematizes customary categories such as domestic and global but it also creates new forms of spatiality such as supraterritoriality or transplanetary connectivity.¹²⁹ These new forms of spatiality and temporality are among the most important effects of globalization, Sassen argues.¹³⁰ Place, therefore, remains an important arbitrator and one of channels through which the uneven and polarizing effects of globalization processes manifest themselves.¹³¹ The pushback against universalistic conceptions of globalization comes from the emphasis on uneven impacts of these processes.¹³² There is also an ideational difference between both concepts, where universalization implies a wish or intent to change the world into a better place but

¹²⁶ Friedman’s concept of flatness has been contested by many, see, for example, Steger, *Globalization*, 23 or Harm J De Blij, *The Power of Place: Geography, Destiny, and Globalization’s Rough Landscape* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), [10].

¹²⁷Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalizace: důsledky pro člověka* (Praha: Mladá fronta, 2000), 3, <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/54967509.html>.

¹²⁸ Turner in *Globalization, the State, and Violence*, 52.

¹²⁹Scholte, *Globalization*, 60.

¹³⁰ Saskia Sassen, “Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a theorization,” in *Globalization*, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 262.

¹³¹De Blij, *The Power of Place*, 3.

¹³²Scholte, *Globalization*, 82.

globalization refers to unintended effects and processes happening “to” us, says Bauman.¹³³

2.3 Globalization and Nation-state

The previous subchapter indicates few of the many challenges globalization has posed vis-à-vis the nation-state. Why the nation-state ceases its ability to function as a container of social processes, as Sassen claims, is described above. Implications of such reconceptualization span across various fields of study, and it is no surprise that the assumption that globalization in some way challenges the importance or viability of the nation-state is widely accepted among scholars.¹³⁴

There is a debate about whether globalization, and that of the economic kind in particular, has caused a decline of the nation-state. Proponents of this thesis mostly point out to a rapid growth of market power undercutting the ability of nation-states to set their own economic policies and, tax rates, and to maintain robust welfare state provisions.¹³⁵ Skeptics, on the other hand, argue that states are the ones who drive globalization and thus facilitate domestic economic interest.¹³⁶ If one concedes that the role of the nation-state was either weakened or simply altered by globalization, it opens up a debate about various implications of such transformation. A lot of scholarship has been devoted to what the impacts of a possibly weakened commitment to welfare provision on the side of nation-states mean for the relationship they have with its citizens. Osterhammel argues that it results in weakened legitimacy of the states,¹³⁷ a thesis backed up by Turner who claims that as states responded to pressures of globalized markets by reorienting their policies from needs of their national communities they broke a link between them and their citizens.¹³⁸

It is not only through a weakened welfare state that globalization contributes, according to some authors, to a rethinking of what citizenship means in a globalized world. David Held claims that economic globalization presents a “threat” to democratic

¹³³Bauman, *Globalizace*, 3d chapter.

¹³⁴Osterhammel and Petersson, *Globalization*, 6.

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Mittelman, *Whither Globalization?*, 9.

¹³⁷Osterhammel and Petersson, *Globalization*, 6.

¹³⁸Turner in *Globalization, the State, and Violence*, 56.

citizenship as it renders the practice of self-governance virtually impossible since the processes affecting people's lives are happening outside their reach.¹³⁹ Just as Sassen claims that the nation-state can no longer comprehend today's global formations, Held argues that the nation-state can no longer be understood as a "locus of political power."¹⁴⁰ Because of the separation of many of the fundamental economic and political forces from a politics located inside nation-states, "the idea of self-determining national collectivity can no longer be located within borders of a single nation-state," he argues.¹⁴¹ A Westphalian type of state built on a principle of sovereignty exercised over a territorial state is, therefore, no longer accurate.¹⁴² This debate inevitably connects to a broader discussion about how (or whether) globalization alters nature of governance and international system. The following subchapter addresses these issues.

2.4 Globalization and International System

Many afore-discusses themes, be they the growth of economic flows and cooperation, rescaling and an emergence of new spatialities or the transformation of the role of the nation-state, intersect at the debate about changing nature of the international system due to globalization.

In their influential work *Power and Interdependence* from 1989, Keohane and Nye did not talk about globalization as such (beyond a brief reference to the notion of "global village"), yet their arguments about interdependence, and economic interdependence in particular, fundamentally altering the nature of the international system laid grounds for further academic debates. An increased interdependence, which according to Nye and Keohane involves costs and restricted autonomy,¹⁴³ alters a behavior of states but it is at the same time shaped by their actions. States, they argued, create so called "international regimes," "sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence."¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Held and Koenig-Archibugi, *Taming Globalization*, 3.

¹⁴⁰ Held, *Cosmopolitanism*, 36.

¹⁴¹ Held and Koenig-Archibugi, *Taming Globalization*, 36.

¹⁴² David Held and Anthony G. McGrew, eds., *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance* (Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2002), 7.

¹⁴³ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed, Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown Series in Political Science (Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman, 1989), 9.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Nye and Keohane's work sparked a wave of research into implications of this process of sovereignty sharing. The nation-state has been conceptualized as an entity lying at the intersection of multiple international regimes and organizations managing international cooperation.¹⁴⁵ The altered position and role of the nation-state within the international system and accompanying explosion of all kinds of international organizations caused many observers to point out fragmentation of the international governance system and multiplication of its forms.¹⁴⁶ Questions of who is in charge and actually governs globalization thus became common. Just as globalization problematized customary categories in social science, it poses a similar challenge to international relations theory as its key concepts reflect principle of territoriality. As Mittelman points out, a emergence of "nonterritorial region" challenges those categories and hence the assumptions about international system as well.¹⁴⁷

To many authors, the new type of global governance propelled by globalization processes is qualitatively distinct from previous arrangements. As suggested above, the key characteristic is the relocation of authority between various layers of governance.¹⁴⁸ Given overlaps of various jurisdictions and ambiguities about where to place political sovereignty and responsibility, there are no easy answers to the question, "Who is in charge?"¹⁴⁹ Therefore, some resort to the phrase "governance without government." To Stiglitz, an absence of a global government that would help manage deep transformations of the global economy (an equivalent to what national economies used to do) is troubling. Furthermore, institutions that are in place (such as International Monetary Fund and World Bank) have been dominated by the interests of West and failed to utilize a potential for good that globalization offers, he argues.¹⁵⁰ The discrepancy between markets that want to globalize and institutions that remain local inhibits not only efficiency but also equity and legitimacy, warns Rodrik.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁵ Held and Koenig-Archibugi, *Taming Globalization*, 6.

¹⁴⁶ Rosenau, *Governing Globalization*, 78.

¹⁴⁷ Mittelman, *Whither Globalization?*, 10.

¹⁴⁸ David Held and Anthony G. McGrew, eds., *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance* (Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2002), 19.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁵⁰ Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, 22.

¹⁵¹ Dani Rodrik, *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 196.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri offer in their *Empire* a different way how to conceptualize new forms of sovereignty and how to potentially overcome lack of equity. They agree that globalization has caused a decline of the sovereignty of the nation-state; however, they claim that this in no case means an overall decline of sovereignty as such. Sovereignty, they argue, has taken a new form in a proposed concept of Empire. Hardt and Negri acknowledge that a globalized capitalist mode of production leads to deterritorialization;¹⁵² however, as they conceptualize Empire as “encompassing spatial totality”¹⁵³ it does not have to rely on territorial boundaries.¹⁵⁴ Empire to them is a form of political order that governs globalization – processes that cause various forms of destruction and oppression. However, Hardt and Negri suggest that only through globalization and by embracing its processes one can break through and reorganize the whole system for good.¹⁵⁵ Thus forces of globalization are seen as both a source of current ills and also the only solution how to overcome them. Their proposed concept of multitude, which refers to autonomous global classes, brings us directly to a discussion about a role of global society and proposed alternatives to contemporary world order. The globalization processes have not only blurred a distinction between domestic and international but also opened a space for an emergence of a new “global public domain,”¹⁵⁶ “global politics,”¹⁵⁷ and most importantly “global consciousness”¹⁵⁸ as well. The last subchapter thus deals with this aspect of globalization and subsequently with movements opposing globalization, which perhaps paradoxically often build on a globally shared sentiment.

2.5 Globalization and Anti-globalization

Due to globalization, social relations have been undergoing deep changes. A compression of the world and a simultaneous formation of new spatialities have manifested themselves through a global consciousness, which Scholte defines as a situation where people conceive of a world as a single space and express their social relations through

¹⁵² Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), 326.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, [15].

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, [12].

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, [15].

¹⁵⁶ Ruggie, *Taming Globalization*, 116.

¹⁵⁷ Held and McGrew, *Governing Globalization*, 19.

¹⁵⁸ Robertson, *Globalization*, 1.

transplanetary and supraterritorial terms.¹⁵⁹ These types of connectivities are historically unprecedented, he argues, for they are no longer rooted in conceptions defined by territorialistic geography.¹⁶⁰ With spatial frontiers of states losing their role of cultural markers and units of identity, social consciousness is undergoing a transformation.¹⁶¹ Another characteristics differentiating the contemporary form of global consciousness from historical types of global connectivities is its density, argues Scholte, pointing out various channels through which globality manifests itself such as modern means of communication, travel, environmental and economic links, transworld solidarities, etc.¹⁶²

Global consciousness, or in other words a tendency to “think globally,”¹⁶³ is not a condition that would be cutting across societies to the same degree. There is a difference between those whose living experience and social realities are touched by globalization and those who actually engage in an outlook seeking to go beyond territorially or ethnocentrically rooted identities. Osterhammel calls the latter group “cosmopolitan minorities”¹⁶⁴ by which he emphasizes not only their still relatively small numbers but also the cosmopolitan outlook they oftentimes adopt. Cosmopolitanism according to Friedman indicates an ability of a person to “distance oneself from one’s place of origin” and at the same time to build one’s self-identity through a consumption of culturally different products which is part of the lives of elites.¹⁶⁵ Different parts of society experience globalization differently, he argues. Globalization, according to Friedman, creates both “felicitous cosmopolitan ecumenism and the nasty kind producing poverty and causing ethnic and other kinds of conflict.”¹⁶⁶ Such vastly divergent experiences (which lead to parts of society to see globalization as an ideology of freedom while for those at the opposite side of power hierarchy it can represent outright oppression, Friedman says)¹⁶⁷ necessarily produce also a broad spectrum of attitudes to globalization as such.

Globalization, therefore, became a hugely contested phenomenon and even though anti-globalization protesters have had only limited success in, for example, blocking

¹⁵⁹ Scholte, *Globalization*, 73.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Turner, *Globalization, the State, and Violence*, 56.

¹⁶² Scholte, *Globalization*, 70–73.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 73.

¹⁶⁴ Osterhammel and Petersson, *Globalization*, 9.

¹⁶⁵ Friedman, *Globalization, the State, and Violence*, 14.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Mittelman, *Whither Globalization?*, 47.

various trade agreements, they managed to alter the nature of debate about globalization.¹⁶⁸ Dissatisfaction or an outward resistance to globalization can have different motivations. Stiglitz identifies a disagreement with “market fundamentalism” which pushes economics (oftentimes in its neoliberal form) above anything else;¹⁶⁹ others emphasize for example a sense of loss of control in the face of growing influence of market forces at the expense of the nation-state.¹⁷⁰ Some authors take issue with the term “anti-globalization” since they understand a resistance to globalization more as an inherent part of the phenomenon than as a separate force.¹⁷¹ Drawing on Karl Polanyi’s concept of double movement, for example Mittelman sees resistance to globalization as a form of self-protective movement¹⁷² – the other side of the same coin.

¹⁶⁸Rodrik, *One Economics, Many Recipes*, 237.

¹⁶⁹Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, 221.

¹⁷⁰Mittelman, *Whither Globalization?*, 15.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁷²Mittelman, *Whither Globalization?*, 16,

3. Methodology and Hypotheses

The goal of this thesis is to analyze the academic debate about globalization in four academic journals from the year 1990 to 2012. While investigating how the academic debate about globalization evolved in this time frame, this paper works with following two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Since the 1990s were a decade in which globalization was for the first time extensively debated and analyzed, questions concerning a nature of the phenomenon were dominant. In the second period, the debate largely abandoned those questions and moved on to cover areas that were in the 1990s seen either as unrelated to globalization or did not feature prominently in the overall academic debate.

Hypothesis 2: A partial settlement of the debate about the nature of globalization in the first decade opened up a space for normative contestation of the phenomenon; therefore, the number of occurrences of the terms rejecting or contesting globalization rose in the second period.

To prove or disprove the hypotheses, this thesis conducted both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the coverage of this phenomenon in four leading academic journals. The body of analysis is composed of articles from the Review of International Political Economy (RIPE), the Annual Review of Sociology (ARS), the Annual Review of Political Science (ARPS) and Daedalus. These are journals with high impact and belong to first quartile in their subject categories: ARS, ARPS and RIPE in Sociology and Political Science, while RIPE also features in the first quartile for Economics and Econometrics and Political Science and International Relations. Daedalus in 2018 belonged to the first quartile in both Political Science and International Relations and Arts and Humanities (which also signals a different perspective its articles would take compared to the other social science journals).¹⁷³ Each of the journals is grounded in different disciplinary backgrounds, which allows for a cross-disciplinary analysis. Nevertheless, it is a selective sample and results I will be presenting and working with may not apply to debate beyond these four journals – but they can certainly suggest broader trends at minimum.

The main problem I encountered and that, I admit, reduces the quality of my analysis was an unevenness of publishing periods of the journals. I chose year 1990 to be

¹⁷³ Classification of journals was retrieved from <https://www.scimagojr.com>.

the starting point of my analysis since the previously presented research shows that the 1990s was the first decade when the concept of globalization truly took hold in academia and became commonly used in various contexts. However, RIPE was founded in 1994 and ARPS started publishing only in 1998. I added articles from these journals to the sum of articles published in *Daedalus* and *Annual Review of Sociology* that were founded prior the year 1990. I end my analysis in the year 2012. Main reason for choosing this somewhat arbitrary year was my inability to access articles from some of the chosen journals past this year and I did not want to distort my analysis more by incorporating articles only from some journals. Given those limitations, I decided to analyze the debate in two periods: from the year 1990 – 2000 and from 2001 – 2012 and then compare the results. Therefore, I created two bodies of documents composed of articles from these four journals to analyze.

I included into the sum of articles every article that contained the word “globalization” or “globalisation” either in its title, keywords, in the abstract or in the first paragraph (if an abstract was missing). Following these criteria, I ended up with 67 articles for the first period and 122 for the second period.

I conducted the quantitative analysis by tracking occurrences of the word “globalization” or “globalisation” in combination with words from a dictionary I constructed based on my previous study of the articles. I created five broad categories (economic, cultural, social, geographical and legal globalization) and within those categories I defined several terms that I considered important or telling of certain trends of the debate. To track the word-combinations, I used Atlas.ti, an automated content analysis program.

Since each of the two analyzed periods contains a different number of articles, it is the proportionate representation of the terms that has the greatest relevance for my research. Also similarly, as each of the five categories contains different number of terms I focus more on developments within those categories as they are shown by comparison between the two periods than on comparison between categories. Therefore, two most important aspects I focus on are the number of occurrences of individual terms and the developments within categories. I also identified several terms that carry elements of normative contestation of globalization, those being antiglobalization, alterglobalization and resistance. To prove or disprove the second hypothesis about rising contestation of

globalization, I did not conduct a tone or sentiment analysis but I tracked number of occurrences of these three terms.¹⁷⁴

Some words from my dictionary can be spelled differently (e.g. neoliberalism and neo-liberalism or labor and labour) and my analysis accounted for these variations. If some words contained the same core (e.g. capital/capitalism or financial/financialization/financial crisis), I deducted the number of occurrences of the longer word(s) from those of the shorter one. Similarly, in individual cases where I noticed that the terms I was searching for in combination with globalization could give me unintended matches, such as “United States” as a match for the term “state”, I coded the longer term separately and then again deducted the number of its occurrences from the total results for the searched term. There is one exception to this and that is the term “welfare state” which I coded twice under the terms “welfare” and “state” since it strongly relates to both of these terms.

¹⁷⁴ I tracked number of occurrences for each term in combination with the word globalization (or globalisation). The terms antiglobalization and alterglobalization, however, were exempted from this rule and I tracked occurrences of those terms on their own without pairing them to globalization/globalisation.

4. Results of the Quantitative Analysis

Table 1 presents the results of the quantitative analysis and it shows the number of occurrences of each term and its proportionate representation. More than anything else the results reveal a strong continuity both in terms of words that have the highest number of occurrences and also in terms of proportionate representation of the words that oftentimes remained very similar. In both analyzed periods, “state” remained the most often used term (11.8% in the first period and 8.8% in the second one), followed by “market” (9% and 7.6%). “Labour”, “democra” or “develop” also exhibited high number of occurrences in both periods. In terms of developments within categories, the major trend is the rise of terms from the social globalization in the second period. The category grew by almost 6% (from 15.5% to 21.3%) with the biggest spike for the terms “inequal” and “welfare” which grew by 1.2 and 1.1%.

The conducted quantitative analysis gives us a general overview of the basic trends; however, it is not sufficient by itself. Given the topic of this thesis, it is necessary to probe the possibility that the terms themselves have undergone inner transformation and changed their meanings. Quantitative analysis is also a method that is unable to capture a context in which these terms were discussed. Therefore, I use the data as indicators of broader trends and build on this part with a follow-up qualitative analysis, which allows me to better interpret the data and prove or disprove my hypotheses. I work mostly with the same volume of articles I used for the quantitative analysis; however, if some article was particularly relevant but did not fulfill the aforementioned criteria, I still use it in the qualitative analysis.

TABLE 1: RESULTS OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

1990 – 2000			2001 – 2012		
Category/Term	Number of occurrences	Percentage results	Category/Term	Number of occurrences	Percentage results
Cultural globalization	291	8,3%	Cultural globalization	388	7,2%
anti-globalization	1	0,0%	anti-globalization	7	0,1%
alter-globalization	0	0,0%	alter-globalization	2	0,0%
cosmopolitan	8	0,2%	Cosmopolitan	32	0,6%
cultur	162	4,6%	Cultur	207	3,8%
identit	85	2,4%	Identit	54	1,0%
resist	35	1,0%	Reset	86	1,6%
Economic globalization	1386	39,7%	Economic globalization	2139	39,8%
capital	136	3,9%	Capital	203	3,8%
capitalis	209	6,0%	Capitalis	165	3,1%
compet	100	2,9%	Compet	140	2,6%
develop	184	5,3%	Develop	208	3,9%
financ	95	2,7%	Financ	168	3,1%
financial cris	13	0,4%	financial cris	30	0,6%
financiali	8	0,2%	Financiali	4	0,1%
growth	68	2,0%	Growth	102	1,9%
liberalization	29	0,8%	Liberalization	106	2,0%
market	313	9,0%	Market	409	7,6%
MNCs	3	0,1%	MNCs	4	0,1%
neoliberal	76	2,2%	Neoliberal	150	2,8%
protection	20	0,6%	Protection	57	1,1%
tax	21	0,6%	Tax	56	1,0%
TNCs	3	0,1%	TNCs	2	0,0%
trade	108	3,1%	Trade	335	6,2%

1990 – 2000			2001 – 2012		
Category/Term	Number of occurrences	Percentage results	Category/Term	Number of occurrences	Percentage results
Geographical globalization	335	9,6%	Geographical globalization	380	7,1%
communicat	23	0,7%	Communicat	70	1,3%
distance	18	0,5%	Distance	19	0,4%
information	44	1,3%	Informatik	72	1,3%
local	111	3,2%	Local	122	2,3%
localization	42	1,2%	Localization	10	0,2%
regional	72	2,1%	Regional	55	1,0%
regionalization	25	0,7%	Regionalization	32	0,6%
Legal globalization	933	26,8%	Legal globalization	1323	24,6%
autonom	29	0,8%	Autonom	73	1,4%
border	67	1,9%	Border	112	2,1%
citizen	30	0,9%	Citizen	95	1,8%
democra	124	3,6%	Democra	223	4,1%
governance	72	2,1%	Governance	103	1,9%
justice	4	0,1%	Justice	23	0,4%
multilateral	7	0,2%	Multilateral	21	0,4%
state	410	11,8%	State	475	8,8%
regionalism	11	0,3%	Regionalism	23	0,4%
regulat	131	3,8%	Regulat	128	2,4%
sovereign	48	1,4%	Sovereign	47	0,9%
Social globalization	542	15,5%	Social globalization	1147	21,3%
class	63	1,8%	Class	90	1,7%
environment	35	1,0%	Environment	90	1,7%
migrat	43	1,2%	Migrant	63	1,2%
inequal	24	0,7%	Inequal	101	1,9%

1990 – 2000			2001 – 2012		
Category/Term	Number of occurrences	Percentage results	Category/Term	Number of occurrences	Percentage results
labour	177	5,1%	Labour	260	4,8%
modern	75	2,2%	Modern	125	2,3%
norms	16	0,5%	Norms	39	0,7%
poverty	7	0,2%	Poverty	46	0,9%
rights	25	0,7%	Rights	76	1,4%
standardization	3	0,1%	Standardization	6	0,1%
standards	11	0,3%	Standards	42	0,8%
welfare	35	1,0%	Welfare	112	2,1%
worker	28	0,8%	Worker	97	1,8%
Total	3487	100,0%	Total	5377	100,0%

5. Results of the Qualitative Analysis

5.1 1990–2000: Beyond the Nation-state

1990s were a decade that came to grapple with the phenomenon of globalization on all fronts and social science was forced to, oftentimes painfully, reevaluate its methodologies and practices that were coming to be seen as outdated and not meeting the moment. A preface to the first issue ever of the *Review of International Political Economy* from 1994 aptly summarized this sentiment as follows:

“First, we recognize that we are living in an age of extraordinary social change in all realms of human activity. One crucial common denominator of this social turmoil has been the process of 'globalization'. Second, there has been a crisis of the social science disciplines in their treatment of this massive social change.”¹⁷⁵

It is for these reasons, the editorial claimed, that academia needed a new journal (“badly” as Susan Strange argued in the summer issue).¹⁷⁶ Globalization played a unique role of a phenomenon that was reshaping social reality to such an extent that it led to a crisis of a discipline. “Established orthodoxies within the various disciplines were left wanting in the face of such massive change,” the editorial continued as it put forward a thesis about a “confrontation between orthodox social science theory and a changing global reality.”¹⁷⁷

Such assertions went not unchallenged as one might expect given their explicit ambition to induce a “paradigm shift.”¹⁷⁸ In its first volume, the *Review of International Political Economy* presented one type of pushback against the argument that globalization represented a crucial alteration of social order by giving a space to a polemic between Susan Strange and Stephen Krasner. While Krasner was arguing that “globalization is not new” and that “the fundamental problems of international politics and international political economy are enduring, so are the theoretical perspectives that we use to

¹⁷⁵ “Editorial: Forum for Heterodox International Political Economy,” *Review of International Political Economy* 1, no. 1 (March 1994): 2, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692299408434264>.

¹⁷⁶ Susan Strange, “Wake up, Krasner! The World Has Changed,” *Review of International Political Economy* 1, no. 2 (June 1, 1994): 209.

¹⁷⁷ “Editorial,” 2.

¹⁷⁸ Kathleen C. Schwartzman, “Globalization and Democracy,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 24, no. 1 (1998): 160, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.159>.

understand them,”¹⁷⁹ Strange was pushing back in an article tellingly called “Wake Up, Krasner! The World *Has* changed” where she was blaming Krasner and others for “suffering with a degree of myopia” when it comes to the world around them and for their inability to critically reexamine old paradigms in the face of changing world.¹⁸⁰

An outright rejection of globalization as a novel phenomenon or even a phenomenon (a position taken by critics of the “globaloney talk”)¹⁸¹ was not the only type of pushback. Some authors who constructively engaged with the argument and further corroborated it were, nevertheless, hesitant as to whether the changes would have a lasting impact or whether they represented only a temporary “passing phenomenon.” These questions were sometimes extended into a discussion about the impact of the 1980s, a decade in which, according to many, globalization started accelerating both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, a consensus on whether the 1980s was “an aberration” or a longer trend signaling “the return to policies favoring markets over states” (and thus making the post-war order the aberration) was not settled.¹⁸²

It is this aspect of the debate, the relationship between markets and states that constituted a key point of reference in discussions about globalization in this decade. As my data show, “state” and “market” were by far the most often used terms (11.8% and 9%) and the qualitative analysis I conducted confirms that the crucial theme, a thread running through many of the debates, concerned the globalization’s impact on the nature of the relationship between states and market. And it is the change in the relationship that was seen as such a challenge to then-existing practices and methodologies of social science that it amounted to a growing sense of the “paradigm shift.”

Globalization was seen as having a disrupting effect on social science disciplines and paradigms that had in their center nation-states as a framework of analysis. Globalization was problematizing the idea that institutions, politics, economy, culture etc. could be analyzed only within the boundaries of individual states. “The principal intellectual challenge is to link domestic processes with global ones,” wrote Kathleen

¹⁷⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, “International Political Economy: Abiding Discord,” *Review of International Political Economy* 1, no. 1 (1994): 13.

¹⁸⁰ Strange, “Wake up, Krasner! The World Has Changed,” 209.

¹⁸¹ Susan Strange, “Globaloney?,” ed. P. Hirst et al., *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no. 4 (1998): 704.

Schwartzman in 1998.¹⁸³ Globalization thus forced social science to incorporate both a global and structural perspective and frameworks. “Contemporary scholarship,” Schwartzman argued, was compelled “to consider theoretical or methodological approaches that are comparative or even global” meaning transcending explanations based on country-specific perspectives.¹⁸⁴

Debates focusing on the changes in the relationship between markets and states induced by globalization were important, one could say even foundational, since once the relationship was established it served as a basis for the other debates. This does not mean that the relationship itself was not reconceptualized throughout the debates. However, the increasingly accepted idea that the relationship is at stake is where the globalization’s impact on the debate was the most profound. It, therefore, largely confirms those parts of my first hypothesis, which expected the debate to focus on questions of nature of globalization phenomenon.

5.1.1 Economic Globalization

Nowhere was the argument that state-centered social science practices were outdated made with a greater urgency than in the field of economics. Review of International Political Economy was founded on the premise that globalization was “in its historical specificity” a force that required “a new IPE” that would account for developments in economy with a proper framework. It was nothing else than “the creation of global economic order” that came to represent “a defining feature of our age,” the journal argued.¹⁸⁵

Economic dimension of globalization was the prevalent one in the 1990s debate as is clear from my data where terms under the category economic globalization accounted for 39.7% of the total count. As I state in the methodological section, since each category contains different number of terms a comparison between the categories is more indicative than definitive; however, economic globalization is also the only category with three terms whose usage crossed the 5% threshold (“market” with 9%, “capitalis” with 6% and “develop” with 5.3%), which further strengthens the claim about prevalence of this dimension in the debate.

¹⁸³ Schwartzman, “Globalization and Democracy,” 161.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 160.

¹⁸⁵ “Editorial,” 2.

The term “market” was the second most used overall and as already suggested above, together with the term “state” constituted a key reference point for the discussion about globalization. “We live in the age of markets,” claimed *Annual Review of Sociology* in 1997 and followed with a description of a society where markets dominated not only political but everyday discourse as well and thus marked the end of Cold War binary between communism and market capitalism by the victory of the latter.¹⁸⁶ While globalization was sometimes seen as a process driven partially by the market expansion itself,¹⁸⁷ other authors emphasized the impact globalization had on the relationship between expanding markets and states. The old paradigm that states and markets were separate entities had been disrupted already before by theories such as world-systems theory and new approaches to international political economy that were emerging in the 1990s moved even further away. Oftentimes echoing the work of Karl Polanyi, they put forward an argument that states and markets “were embedded in each other and constructed in interactions with each other.”¹⁸⁸ Globalization was, however, seen as changing the equilibrium between global markets and states that used to be embodied by the system of embedded liberalism.¹⁸⁹ It did so by taking away the breathing room states had in controls on global economic flows and by forcing them to simultaneously choose between responding to needs of local communities and global markets.¹⁹⁰ Various implications these processes had on states are discussed later in other subchapters, however, from an economic point of view ideas that globalization produced a “single world market for goods, capital labor and services” and that world was “single in macroeconomic sense” were by the end of the decade widely accepted.¹⁹¹

It is not an accident that the term with the second highest number of occurrences was capitalism and its derivatives (6%). A capitalist economy reliant on a market-based type of exchange was on numerous occasions proclaimed a winner of the Cold War. “Actually existing communism’ lies in ruins; even socialism (including its democratic

¹⁸⁶ John Lie, “Sociology or Markets,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 23 (August 1997): 341, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.23>.

¹⁸⁷ See, for example, Susan Strange, “The Defective State,” *Daedalus* 124, no. 2 (March 1, 1995): 60.

¹⁸⁸ Seán Ó Riain, “States and Markets in an Era of Globalization,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 187.

¹⁸⁹ Ó Riain, “States and Markets,” 200-201.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 188.

¹⁹¹ Suzanne Berger, “Globalization and Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 44.

kinds) is on the defensive,”¹⁹² said Stephen Rosow in 1994. The end of the Cold War was seen as a final removal of barriers to further globalization of capitalism.¹⁹³ However, to those arguing in favor of “longue durée” understanding of globalization, the spread and deepening of capitalism was associated with globalization throughout its whole history.¹⁹⁴

Such perspective was conducive to arguments that processes linked to globalization like an increase in trade and capital flows but also for example financial crises were only “part of bigger pattern stretching back to birth of global capitalism in 1840s.”¹⁹⁵ Countering perspectives argued that in the 1990s, globalization and deepening of global capitalism was not only quantitatively but also qualitatively distinct and as such posed novel dilemmas.¹⁹⁶ One of the key questions posed in this regard concerned the viability of various models of capitalism that were all facing seemingly same structural developments caused by globalization.¹⁹⁷ National varieties of capitalism, e.g. institutional modes and ways “in which national economies organize their resource creation and deployment,”¹⁹⁸ became an intensely analyzed topic partially in response to an argument about “homogenizing” or “converging” effects of globalization. While the inclusion of institutional and historical context into a mainstream economic analysis was by itself a significant development, as Bruno Amable pointed out,¹⁹⁹ the debate about viability of distinct modes of capitalism remained unresolved. There were authors arguing that “no generalized patterns of convergence can be expected,”²⁰⁰ others pointing to lessening of national differences,²⁰¹ and a third group of opinion standing in the middle with findings supporting both convergence in certain areas and perseverance of differences in others.²⁰²

¹⁹² Stephen J. Rosow, “On the Political Theory of Political Economy: Conceptual Ambiguity and the Global Economy,” *Review of International Political Economy* 1, no. 3 (1994): 465.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Samir Amin and David Luckin, “The Challenge of Globalization,” *Review of International Political Economy* 3, no. 2 (1996): 216.

¹⁹⁵ Robert Wade, “Wheels within Wheels: Rethinking the Asian Crisis and the Asian Model,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 111.

¹⁹⁶ Riain, “States and Markets,” 200.

¹⁹⁷ Hugo Radice, “Globalization and National Capitalisms: Theorizing Convergence and Differentiation,” *Review of International Political Economy* 7, no. 4 (December 1, 2000): 720.

¹⁹⁸ John H. Dunning, “Governments and the Macro-Organization of Economic Activity: An Historical and Spatial Perspective,” *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no. 1 (1997): 43.

¹⁹⁹ Bruno Amable, “Institutional Complementarity and Diversity of Social Systems of Innovation and Production,” *Review of International Political Economy* 7, no. 4 (2000): 646.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 645.

²⁰¹ Radice, “Globalization and National Capitalisms,” 738.

²⁰² Henry Wai-chung Yeung, “The Dynamics of Asian Business Systems in a Globalizing Era,”

Finally, third term from this category that also scored very high in terms of its usage was “develop” (5.3%). Topics focusing on developing countries or overall economic development were naturally linked to previously discussed themes of markets or capitalism – and their potential promises for both the developed and developing world. “Over the past decade, the liberalization of trade, finance and investment across the world has opened vast new territories to dynamic economic actors. The rise of incomes in developing countries has created large new consumer markets,” said Berger in 2000 linking developing countries to the process of market globalization.²⁰³ Also with the case of development, we can see how the argument about the changing relationship between states and markets impacted the debate with Ó Riain claiming that “paths to economic development are determined by the variety of ways in which these tensions (*between state, market and society*) are reconciled.”²⁰⁴

5.1.2 Legal Globalization

Lagging behind economic globalization by almost 13%, legal globalization was the second most often discussed category with 26.8% of all terms belonging there. Term with the highest number of occurrences in this category and also across the whole dictionary was “state” with 11.7% followed by “regulat” (3.8%) and “democra” (3.6%).

As it was already stated above, questions about globalization’s impact on the state crucially formed the whole debate on globalization in the 1990s. After all, it was precisely the changing role of state that was said to force entire disciplines to reexamine their practices and methodologies. In 1995, *Daedalus* devoted an entire issue titled “What future for the state?” to this question including essays such as “The Defective State,” “The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in The Loss of Economic Power” or “The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State” that just by their title suggest a nature of the argument they’d be making. As Matthew Watson put it in 1999, “to get to the heart of understanding the globalization phenomenon revolves not so much around asking questions about what globalization is, but about what it is perceived to be,” he argued

Review of International Political Economy 7, no. 3 (January 1, 2000): 424.

²⁰³ Berger, “Globalization and Politics,” 43.

²⁰⁴ Riain, “States and Markets,” 191.

provocatively and offered his own observations that “it perhaps matters most that globalizing tendencies are thought to limit contemporary state actions.”²⁰⁵

The discussion about impacts of globalization on states was a logical extension of the debate about contested relationship between markets and states because economic globalization was treated as the primary cause of the changes states were undergoing. Economic globalization was said to have varied implications for the states’ functions and powers for while the locus of economic activity moved away from national economies to internationally organized markets, states remained organized on national, territorial basis.²⁰⁶ This disjunction resulted in changes in nature of competition between states in international system and in type of powers they were able to exercise towards their populations.²⁰⁷ As with the debate about globalization and capitalism, some authors pointed out that fears of globalization undermining powers of nation-states had been articulated already during a period of internationalization before the First World War.²⁰⁸ While the argument that states were undergoing some type of transformation was in general not disputed at all, the real division in literature, as also Suzanne Berger noted, lied between those who argued that states, albeit transformed actors, remained in charge of the process of globalization²⁰⁹ and those seeing their powers diminished (of whom some even professed “the death of the nation-state” or at least a “graceful retirement”).²¹⁰

The term “regulat” (3.8%) whose derivatives refer to various types of regulations or regulatory powers highlights how the category of state intertwines with many others. Alan Hudson links the afore-mentioned debate about impacts of the process of disembedding economic activity from national territories to the question of regulatory powers as follows: “The globalization of economic activity and the following mismatch with the states’ basis of political authority makes the provision of territorial regulations by individual states

²⁰⁵ Matthew Watson in Charlie Dannreuther and Rohit Lekhi, “Globalization and the Political Economy of Risk,” *Review of International Political Economy* 7, no. 4 (January 1, 2000): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/096922900750034554>.

²⁰⁶ Riain, “States and Markets,” 201.

²⁰⁷ Strange, “The Defective State,” 55.

²⁰⁸ Berger, “Globalization and Politics,” 44.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

²¹⁰ Michael Mann, “Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying,” *Daedalus* 122, no. 3 (June 1, 1993): 115.

problematic.”²¹¹ Globalization of financial markets in particular was seen as crippling states’ abilities to regulate since it ensured that investors can get the same returns everywhere and “national regulators were obliged to cede controls to global regulators,” argued Vincent Cable in 1995.²¹² What was at stake, according to these voices, was nothing less than state’s sovereignty (a term, which accounted for 1.4% of the total count).

These grim assessments of declining regulatory powers of states translated into arguments about states’ reduced ability to provide welfare²¹³ or onset of neoliberalism, which was particularly often equated with the process of deregulation. Neoliberalism (a term from the economic globalization category, which made up 2.2% of the total) played an important role for those who wanted to draw attention to what they saw as a political dimension of a globalization phenomenon.²¹⁴ For some authors neoliberalism was also a way to bring back the state since they argued that quite contrary to the image of states helplessly succumbing to the waves of globalization they were crucial in enacting and supporting policies that allowed globalization to take on the speed it did, an argument that Eric Helleiner, for example, makes in his text about financial globalization.²¹⁵ Thus these few examples of contexts in which the term regulation appeared underscore some possible implications of globalization inducing change of the state-markets relationship.

Besides the regulatory powers of states, another important topic rising from the intersection of globalization and states concerned democracy, as indicated by my quantitative analyses where in the legal globalization category the term “democra” was the third most used one (3.6%). Worldwide democratization that was happening during the 1990s, the “notion of wave,” was among the reasons behind the disciplinary push to shift framework of analysis away from the national-level.²¹⁶ Globalization could have helped to promote democratic convergence across the world thanks to structural changes such as

²¹¹ Alan C. Hudson, “Reshaping the Regulatory Landscape: Border Skirmishes around the Bahamas and Cayman Offshore Financial Centres,” *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no. 3 (January 1, 1998): 540, <https://doi.org/10.1080/096922998347516>.

²¹² Vincent Cable, “The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power,” *Daedalus* 124, no. 2 (March 1, 1995): 29.

²¹³ Axel Hulsemeier, “Changing ‘political Economies of Scale’ and Public Sector Adjustment: Insights from Fiscal Federalism,” *Review of International Political Economy* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 90, <https://doi.org/10.1080/096922900347054>.

²¹⁴ Riain, “States and Markets,” 206.

²¹⁵ Eric Helleiner, “Explaining the Globalization of Financial Markets: Bringing States Back In,” *Review of International Political Economy* 2, no. 2 (June 1, 1995): 315, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692299508434322>.

²¹⁶ Schwartzman, “Globalization and Democracy,” 159.

spread of technology and communication or growth of global working class, some authors argued.²¹⁷ However, the abovementioned argument of loss of sovereignty of states was oftentimes directly extended into an argument about erosion of democracy. The disjunction between global markets and powers of nation-states was said to cause an “unbundling” of sovereignty away from citizens of democracies and as such could have sparked “popular resistance and democratic opposition” against what was perceived as manifestation of globalization.²¹⁸ Such developments were also theorized to result in an overall crisis of legitimacy of nation-state, an argument expressed for example by Habermas who spoke about a “double crisis.” The first one was the crisis of “rationality” where the state cannot protect its citizens in ways they used to expect followed by a crisis of “legitimation” where the state cannot any longer rely on the loyalty of its citizens.²¹⁹ Some authors, therefore, proposed that given the imbalance between the locus of economic and political power, “a meaningful democracy” can only be sustained on an international level: “The only plausible way that citizens can defend themselves and their nation against the forces of globalization is to link their own interests cooperatively with the interests of other peoples in other nations of its citizens,” said Rupert in 1995.

5.1.3 Social Globalization

Only one term from this category climbed above the 5% threshold and it was the term “labour” and its derivatives, which accounted for 5.1% of all terms. The category of social globalization overall made up for 15.5%. Most of the terms did not cross 1.5% threshold (with the exceptions of “modern” with 2.2% and “class” with 1.8%) suggesting that – if ever – social aspects of globalization were mostly discussed as complementary topics than as key areas of focus.

However, the term “labour” did play an important role in the overall debate and as in many other cases, its usage reflected the argument about the change in the states-markets relations that was induced by globalization. “The outcome (*of globalization*) is to strengthen market forces, meaning those institutions and corporations that organize circuits

²¹⁷ Ibid., 165.

²¹⁸ James Anderson and James Goodman, “Regions, States and the European Union: Modernist Reaction or Postmodern Adaptation?,” *Review of International Political Economy* 2, no. 4 (September 1, 1995): 624.

²¹⁹ Cable, “The Diminished Nation-State,” 43.

of labour, money and products,” argued Philip McMichael in 1997.²²⁰ Many feared the strengthening of markets was happening at the expense of labour since globalization was understood to be changing equilibrium of powers of states, capital and organized labour.²²¹ A traditional Marxist distinction between labour and capital was refashioned in a light of an observation that in the globalizing world, labour unlike capital remained largely immobile and thus disadvantaged.²²² This further tilted the balance of power in the direction of capital since a threat (or just a possibility) of capital outflow made governments more receptive to the needs of capital.²²³ Strange argued that globalization’s impacts manifested themselves particularly visibly in the area of labour and class (the third most used term for social globalization category) relations since while a “transnational company can move its plant” a “worker cannot move to another country” which, according to her, “robbed labour unions in industrialized countries of their power.”^{224, 225} Going back to the afore-discussed topic of varieties of capitalism, the argument about weakening position of labour was also raised in relation to the questions whether more social-democratic oriented models, which give a greater say to labour, can preserve themselves or whether they represent a “luxury that cannot be afforded.”²²⁶

5.1.4 Geographical Globalization

Admitting disciplinary bias of my journal sample, my quantitative analysis indicates that geographical dimension did not belong among the key ones in the 1990s. The most often used term, “local” and its derivatives, made up only 3.2% of the total and it was followed by the “regional” with 2.1%. The relatively low representation of terms from this category in the results is surprising given importance spatiality plays in the overall argument about globalization. As I state throughout this chapter, the major theme of the 1990s debate concerned the relationship between states and markets and globalization’s

²²⁰ Philip McMichael, “Rethinking Globalization: The Agrarian Question Revisited,” *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no. 4 (October 1, 1997): 645, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09672299708565786>.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 707

²²² Cable, “The Diminished Nation-State,” 43.

²²³ Berger, “Globalization and Politics,” 51.

²²⁴ Susan Strange in Cable, “The Diminished Nation-State”, 43.

²²⁵ This is one of the areas where globalization’s impacts on social relations in developed countries were discussed first, a trend which intensified in the second period.

²²⁶ Colin Hay, “Globalization, Social Democracy and the Persistence of Partisan Politics: A Commentary on Garrett,” *Review of International Political Economy* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 138, <https://doi.org/10.1080/096922900347072>.

role behind its transformation. Globalization as a force disembedding markets from their national and territorial constraints, affecting fates of labor across countries or possibly leading to a rise or fall of different types of political arrangements is, therefore, a phenomenon that fundamentally restructures space in societies. And as some commentators pointed out, the process of restructuring of social space goes hand in hand with restructuring of power relations and societal hierarchies.²²⁷ However, it seems that this argument was only more implicitly built in the broader narrative or not taken into account at all – possibly also because there is no single “catch-all” term that would cover this dimension like the terms state or market do in other categories.

When geographical globalization was discussed, it was mostly in relation to its local dimension. If we combine terms local and localization, we get a category with a more than 4% usage, which indicates quite a substantial attention in this direction. Since the binary divisions between national and international or domestic and foreign were increasingly seen as irrelevant given the decreasing ability of states to serve as a buffer between those dimensions, some called for a more interactive approaches that would equally link local, national and global dimensions and processes that were happening within them.²²⁸ One of the novel approaches that gained some popularity in the 1990s was the concept of “glocalization” as a way how to reconcile the global and local dynamics. This concept was often used in booming studies of global cities, which became to be seen as sites of novel respatialization driven by processes of globalization of capital and regionalization or localization of state territorial organization, Neil Brenner argued.²²⁹ Some, however, criticized glocalization as constrained by old paradigms and not capturing “qualitatively new forms of governance.”²³⁰ Besides debates like these that were trying to reconceptualize links between various spatialities, we can also see that geographical dimension of globalization had more subtle yet important impact on other categories that were embracing some of these new spatialities as their framework of analysis. As an example, we can take a look at the question of development on regional and local levels

²²⁷ Hudson, “Reshaping the Regulatory Landscape,” 535.

²²⁸ Riain, “States and Markets,” 190.

²²⁹ Neil Brenner, “Global Cities, Glocal States: Global City Formation and State Territorial Restructuring in Contemporary Europe,” *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no. 1 (January 1, 1998): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1080/096922998347633>.

²³⁰ Roger Keil, “Globalization Makes States: Perspectives of Local Governance in the Age of the World City,” *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no. 4 (January 1, 1998): 621, <https://doi.org/10.1080/096922998347408>.

and growing disparities between them where globalization started providing an important point of reference.²³¹

5.1.5 Cultural Globalization

Even though cultural globalization was a category with proportionately the lowest number of occurrences, the term “cultur” was a sixth most used term (4.6%) across all categories. Several terms from this category indicate normative contestation of globalization, e.g. anti-globalization, alter-globalization or resistance; however, as the data show their usage was either very small or the terms were even not used all, such was the case for alterglobalization. Even though we could draw seemingly straightforward conclusions that themes of outright rejection or contestation of globalization were present only on very small number of occasions, my qualitative analysis suggests that such conclusion would be partially misleading. At times, globalization was contested in this period but in a more nuanced way through the usage of some other terms. An example could be the term neoliberalism that was by some authors said to represent an ideological foundation behind some of globalization’s processes (“neoliberalism masquerading as global momentum”)²³² and its usage in many contexts contained a veiled criticism of its implications. Therefore, I would argue that while it is certainly the case that themes of anti- or alterglobalization did not shape the debate in the 1990s almost at all, there were places where one could find criticism of globalization – but in more nuanced or implicit forms.

Despite relatively high usage of the term “cultur”, Roger Keil pointedly noted that “cultural aspects are sometimes mentioned, but mainly considered secondary to the hard facts of economic expansion.”²³³ Culture was rarely the key theme of articles I analyzed and as Kell said, it served more as a complementary argument, a dimension added to the more important ones. If we are to pick one theme that was particularly present in more substantial discussions about culture and globalization it was the potential homogenization or universalization of it. “By effectively removing territorial separations between people, globalization has indeed facilitated certain tendencies towards cultural convergence,”

²³¹ Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “The Development of Development Theory: Towards Critical Globalism,” *Review of International Political Economy* 3, no. 4 (December 1, 1996): 557, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692299608434373>.

²³² *Ibid.*, 555.

²³³ Keil, “Globalization Makes States,” 620.

Scholte said in 1996.²³⁴ “Worldwide hybrid culture” was only one of many terms used in attempt to encompass implications process of globalization had on culture.²³⁵

5.2 2001–2012: Embracing the Social Dimension

“Globalization is one of the most contested topics in social science,” claimed Marco Guill’en in 2001 issue of the *Annual Review of Sociology*.²³⁶ Intense debates and scrutiny of the previous decade when globalization “became a term on everyone’s lips,”²³⁷ seemed to mean very little at the beginning of the new century when it came to clarifying the concept. As Scholte pointed out in 2002, there was still remarkably little agreement on what globalization actually was and academics worked with “particular rather than agreed definitions.”²³⁸ However, as Nancy Brune and Geoffrey Garrett claim, “it would be wrong to suggest that we have not made any progress toward better understanding globalization and its impact.”²³⁹ Some debates that divided academics in the 1990s were settled by the beginning of the 21st. century; others were not and new points of contestation emerged.

When Guill’en titled his 2001 article “Is globalization civilizing, destructive or feeble?” he hinted on one of the crucial debates about globalization concerning the nature and extent to which it was impacting structures of the modern world. Five key debates in the globalization literature at the turn of the century were, according to him, the following: “Is it (*globalization*) really happening? Does it produce convergence? Does it undermine the authority of nation-states? Is globality different from modernity?” and “Is a global

²³⁴ Jan Aart Scholte, “The Geography of Collective Identities in a Globalizing World,” *Review of International Political Economy* 3, no. 4 (December 1, 1996): 565, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692299608434374>.

²³⁵ Elmar Altvater and Birgit Mahnkopf, “The World Market Unbound,” *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no. 3 (January 1, 1997): 455, <https://doi.org/10.1080/096922997347706>.

²³⁶ Riain, “States and Markets,” 235.

²³⁷ Walter Korpi, “Welfare-State Regress in Western Europe: Politics, Institutions, Globalization, and Europeanization,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 29, no. 1 (2003): 602, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.095943>.

²³⁸ Ben Rosamond, “Babylon and on? Globalization and International Political Economy,” *Review of International Political Economy* 10, no. 4 (November 1, 2003): 668, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290310001601920>.

²³⁹ Nancy Brune and Geoffrey Garrett, “THE GLOBALIZATION RORSCHACH TEST: International Economic Integration, Inequality, and the Role of Government,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (2005): 419, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085727>.

culture in the making?”²⁴⁰ By the end the decade, at least some of these questions lost part of their acuteness, for example, there was a widespread agreement that globalization was actually happening and scientists moved more to study its consequences.²⁴¹ Nevertheless, as already suggested above, globalization remained a contested topic. Attempts to shed some light on the concept were so numerous that in 2005, more than a decade after it had become a commonplace term in academia, studies of globalization were still “a growth industry.”²⁴² As Brady, Beckfield and Zhao concluded in 2007: “Because there is no shortage of controversy in need of further conceptual and empirical scrutiny, globalization seems poised to remain on the sociological agenda.”²⁴³ I would not hesitate to extend this statement onto other social science disciplines as well.

Just like a decade earlier, globalization kept challenging social science practices and paradigms albeit in different areas. For the field of international political economy, globalization remained a central phenomenon the discipline coalesced around. “Many of the claims about the distinctiveness of IPE as a field of enquiry are bound up with what are commonly understood to be the key processes and effects of globalization,” argued Ben Rosmond in 2003 issue of the *Review of International Political Economy*,²⁴⁴ a journal that was founded on the premise of centrality of globalization to the field.²⁴⁵

However, economics was by no means the only discipline that was coming to terms with the fact that globalization was increasingly understood as a force reshaping structural environment and boundaries social science used to take as given. Not just economic relations but “the embeddedness of social relations in particular communities and places” was thought to be destabilized by globalization.²⁴⁶ There was an overall trend in the studies of globalization to direct “analytical attention away from a sole focus on demographic structures, organizational forms, and symbolic politics in a single geopolitical unit and

²⁴⁰ Mauro F. Guillén, “Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates in the Social Science Literature,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 27, no. 1 (2001): 235, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.235>.

²⁴¹ David Brady, Jason Beckfield, and Wei Zhao, “The Consequences of Economic Globalization for Affluent Democracies,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 33, no. 1 (2007): 314, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131636>.

²⁴² Brune and Garrett, “The Globalization Rorschach Test,” 400.

²⁴³ Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao, “The Consequences of Economic Globalization for Affluent Democracies,” 327.

²⁴⁴ Rosamond, “Babylon and On?,” 661.

²⁴⁵ “Editorial,” 2.

²⁴⁶ Zsuzsa Gille and Seán Ó Riain, “Global Ethnography,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 28, no. 1 (2002): 271, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140945>.

toward larger political processes.”²⁴⁷ The assumption of “disembedded social,” meaning a process of delinking spatial and social, posed a challenge to many fields including, for example, ethnography (or anthropology), a discipline claiming “to understand social relations by being there.”²⁴⁸ Globalization as a “new empirical phenomenon” that was destabilizing established hierarchies led some to concluding that even the concept of “social” needed to be redefined,²⁴⁹ an implication going far beyond just the field of ethnography.

Increased attention given to social dimension of globalization was the most important trend in this period my quantitative analysis showed and my qualitative analysis confirmed. Social globalization was the only category that grew, and it did so by 5.8%. Even though terms “state” and “market” remained by far the most used ones, in both cases their usage declined. I would argue that these two trends need to be interpreted together. As my data show, social globalization grew as a category without one term being particularly dominant, which indicates that the changing relationship between states and markets remained the most important one in the debate about globalization; however, unlike in the previous period the debate focused more on its impact on social issues. This, therefore, largely confirms my first hypothesis that expected the debate in the second period to move away from questions concerning the nature of globalization towards discussing its implications beyond the narrow frame of states and economy (but using it as a main point of reference).

My second hypothesis assumed that in the second analyzed period, usage of the terms rejecting or contesting globalization would increase. This indeed happened but only on a small scale. Term “resist” grew by 0.6% but it still did not cross even the 2% threshold and terms anti- or alterglobalization remained almost not used at all. Later on, I discuss an increase in usage of neoliberalism by 0.6%, which, I argue, could be considered as a term containing a veiled criticism of globalization; however, it does not make up for the low usage of those other terms. I believe there are three possible explanations for these results. First, that the hypothesis was wrong and globalization was barely contested in this period. Second, that globalization was contested but it was done by different terms than the

²⁴⁷ Valerie Jenness, “Explaining Criminalization: From Demography and Status Politics to Globalization and Modernization,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 30, no. 1 (2004): 161, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110515>.

²⁴⁸ Gille and Riain, “Global Ethnography,” 271.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 274.

ones I have in my dictionary. And third, that normative contestation of globalization was more present in the debate than in the previous decade but it remained fractured and was associated with individual subtopics (like some from the social dimension) and as such was hard to capture by few specific terms. Based on the qualitative analysis I conducted, I would argue that the third explanation has the greatest relevance as I attempt to demonstrate in the following subchapters.

5.2.1 Economic Globalization

Economic globalization was again the most often used category with a miniscule growth by 0.1% to 39.8%. Usage of the dominant term from this category, “market”, dropped from 9% to 7.6% but it was still high enough to confirm the centrality of markets within the category and economy as the most important dimension of globalization. Debates focusing on the process of construction of global markets explored until then overlooked or simply previously nonexistent areas. Articles from journals I worked with show for example that a quite novel area scholars focused on concerned the process of globalization of law and the legal construction of global markets,²⁵⁰ which was becoming to be understood as inseparable from the economic dimension²⁵¹ (however, since I have not worked with law-oriented journals this observation may not be transferable).

Despite disagreements about the degree and evenness of the global markets impact, it was widely accepted that markets were likely to be “the most widespread of all historically made connections.”²⁵² As Kenneth Galbraith noticed in 2003, “most of the world's political leaders have embraced economic globalization on two grounds: that open markets and transnational production networks are unstoppable; and that the benefits will surely flow out to all the world's people, rich and poor.”²⁵³ Doctrine of globalization, he observed, contained “the curious assumption that the global market is itself beyond reproach.”²⁵⁴ Yet as he was quick to notice, not everyone shared that sentiment and

²⁵⁰ My data show a slight increase in the usage of the term „standards“ paired with globalization which suggest one of the dimensions through which globalization of law might have been happening.

²⁵¹ Terence C. Halliday and Pavel Osinsky, “Globalization of Law,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 32, no. 1 (2006): 447, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.32.061604.123136>.

²⁵² Craig Calhoun, “Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Social Imaginary,” *Daedalus* 137, no. 3 (2008): 112.

²⁵³ James K. Galbraith, “A Perfect Crime: Inequality in the Age of Globalization,” *Daedalus* 131, no. 1 (2002): 11.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

markets in particular were oftentimes discussed in relation to terms and processes signaling downsides of globalization.

Terms such as neoliberalism (whose usage increased by 0.6%) or liberalization (with an increase by 1.2%) were oftentimes firmly paired or even equated with markets. Liberalization, a reduction or a complete removal of man-made barriers between individual states and markets, was seen as a “key vehicle” for the spread of a market-based system.²⁵⁵ Impacts of the deepening economic liberalization were discussed in numerous areas including the ongoing debate about the nature of the relationship between democracy (whose usage increased by 0.5% to 4.1%) and economic globalization. For example Milner and Mukherjee concluded their 2009 study stating that “evidence for the claim that democracy fosters trade and capital account liberalization is robust but that empirical support for the predicted positive effect of economic openness on democracy among developing countries is weak.”²⁵⁶

Linking globalization solely to a process of economic liberalization also opened the doors to a growing critique of neoliberalism or in the words of Galbraith: “a magic of the marketplace preached to the poor.”²⁵⁷ Of all the ideologies globalization has been associated with, neoliberalism has been the most prominent one.²⁵⁸ Globalization was “intellectually facilitated” by neoliberalism, Yan Kong argued.²⁵⁹ For some authors, neoliberalism was such a constitutive feature of the time that they did not shy away from phrases such as “neoliberal era.”²⁶⁰ An analysis of social protests against what was dubbed “technocratic consensus around neoliberal policies” and overall critique of neoliberal

²⁵⁵ Aseem Prakash, “The East Asian Crisis and the Globalization Discourse,” *Review of International Political Economy* 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 137, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290010010290>.

²⁵⁶ Helen V. Milner and Bumba Mukherjee, “Democratization and Economic Globalization,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2009): 177, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.110507.114722>.

²⁵⁷ Galbraith, “A Perfect Crime,” 24.

²⁵⁸ Heikki Patomäki and Teivo Teivainen, “Critical Responses to Neoliberal Globalization in the Mercosur Region: Roads towards Cosmopolitan Democracy?,” *Review of International Political Economy* 9, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 40, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290110101144>.

²⁵⁹ Tat Yan Kong, “Labour and Globalization: Locating the Northeast Asian Newly Industrializing Countries,” *Review of International Political Economy* 13, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 104, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290500396727>.

²⁶⁰ Kenneth M. Roberts, “The Mobilization of Opposition to Economic Liberalization,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 341, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053006.183457>.

ideology thus formed an important part of the debate about impacts of globalization²⁶¹ and served as an example of a context where usage of neoliberalism implied a contestation of globalization.

Two most noticeable trends within this category are the rise of “trade” and fall of “capitalis.” While I discuss trade more below in its connection to social globalization, the decline in usage of capitalism and its derivatives by 3% is an important development. A decline in usage is harder to explain than an increase and the answer I offer is partly speculative; however, I believe that the lower usage of capitalism could be indicative of a broader trend of shifting attention away from the post-Cold War themes of the 1990s. The binary between communism/socialism and capitalism as opposing forms of economic systems had possibly given way to a focus on capitalism’s inner processes. Theme of varieties of capitalism remained strongly present also in this decade, as I show more below. It is also possible that the term capitalism was partially replaced by others in discussion about globalization – two examples could be trade or neoliberalism, both saw increase in their usage.

As I said, varieties of capitalism were discussed also in this period and we can see attempts to bring more nuances into the debate about particular national responses to what was in 1990s oftentimes seen as a rolling Anglo-Saxon/neoliberal form of globalizing capitalism. *Daedalus* in an attempt to go beyond the national scale devoted its 2001 issue solely to Italian industrial districts that used to be seen as “alternatives to large-scale modes of production and as more humanly satisfying forms of social order.”²⁶² “Different patterns of response to globalization are not mere way stations along a common route, but may represent deep and enduring forms of social and economic organization,” Berger and Locke argued.²⁶³

Confirming my point about rising salience of social dimension and its pairing to terms and topics from other categories, a significant part of the debate on varieties of capitalism focused on how globalization through different models of capitalism impacted welfare provision (the term “welfare” grew by 1.1% in this period). Korpi offered a detailed counterargument to previously made conclusions that models with robust state-

²⁶¹ Milner and Mukherjee, “Democratization and Economic Globalization,” 163.

²⁶² Suzanne Berger and Richard M. Locke, “Il Caso Italiano and Globalization,” *Daedalus* 130, no. 3 (2001): 91.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 102.

provided welfare provisions were automatically weakened by globalization. He argued that one needed to differentiate between direct social transfers or service expenditures and government policies supporting full employment²⁶⁴ and that only the latter case represented an aspect of welfare state where the role of globalization in causing the retrenchment had been significant.²⁶⁵ Other authors pointed out that possibly the greatest impact globalization had on the weakening welfare state was a political discourse surrounding it where globalization served as a device “that legitimates calls for efficiency and undermines calls for egalitarianism.”²⁶⁶

5.2.2 Legal globalization

State remained the most used term across all categories also in the second period of time, however, its usage declined by almost 3% from 11.8% to 8.8%. I identify three broader trends in this category, which might at least partially explain this decline. The first one confirms the broader trend of a penetration of terms from social globalization into other categories. I already highlighted this above with the case of welfare in the context of varieties of capitalism; however, this term has a particularly strong connection also to the term state because of the concept of the welfare state. Since the concept contains words “state” and “welfare” it was coded twice under those two terms. I used Atlas.ti to find out how many times the matches for combination of globalization and “welfare” contained the whole term “welfare state” and out of 112 matches it was 79 times, i.e. 70%. Therefore, we see that when globalization and welfare were discussed, the link ran mostly through state. The qualitative analysis I conducted thus shows that the question of the role of the state in the globalizing world did not lose salience even though the usage of the term declined; however, it was more firmly paired to the debates about various socio-economic implications of globalization.

The second trend I identify concerns the decline of term “sovereign” (by 0.5%) and simultaneous growth of the term “autonom” (by 0.5%). I would draw here on Hendryk Spruyt who distinguishes between autonomy of states – which, according to him, had been

²⁶⁴ Full employment, as Korpi argued, represented a cornerstone of the postwar European welfare state, see Korpi, “Welfare-State Regress in Western Europe,” 606.

²⁶⁵ Korpi, 605.

²⁶⁶ Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao, “The Consequences of Economic Globalization for Affluent Democracies,” 319.

drawn into question by globalization and underwent transformation²⁶⁷ – and principle of territorial sovereignty, which remains a “constitutive principle of international relations.”²⁶⁸ “Although interdependence and globalization have diminished the capacity of governments to act autonomously, the principle that states have governments that are supreme within their borders ... remains the key feature of the state and international relations today,”²⁶⁹ he said. Were it the case that Spruyt’s argument captured a broader consensus among academics, it offers a plausible explanation of why the academic attention shifted away from sovereignty – seen as unchanged by globalization – to areas where globalization’s impact was thought to be more profound, such as an issue of states’ and governments’ autonomy. However, from an overall perspective these two terms did not play a major role in neither of the two analyzed periods and they are more indicative of subtle developments within the category.

The third trend in the discussion about legal globalization concerns a debate about transformation of states in relation to the international system and a debate about the role of states within it. Both implicitly and explicitly connected to these debates was a critique of inadequate capacity of the existing system to effectively deal with problems of the 21st. century world. Given a depth of the global economic integration, the “global public goods and externalities have taken on increasing importance” and a need for “more collective action” grew, so went the argument. “But political globalization,” found Stiglitz, “has not kept pace with economic globalization.”²⁷⁰

Some authors went a step further and argued that global governance was insufficient not only because of the depth of economic globalization but also in the face of emerging “global civil society” that was seen as a new domain in an ever-more complex world system.²⁷¹ Intimately linked to an idea of global civil society was the concept of transnational citizenship. The term “citizen” grew by 0.9% in this period confirming a rising interest in this topic. Linking the argument back to manifestations of glocalizing processes, Fox citing Bauböck argued that “the new challenge for political theory is to go

²⁶⁷ Hendrik Spruyt, “The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 5, no. 1 (2002): 142, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.101501.145837>.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 127.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 146.

²⁷⁰ Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Evaluating Economic Change,” *Daedalus* 133, no. 3 (July 1, 2004): 25, <https://doi.org/10.1162/0011526041504551>.

²⁷¹ Stanley Hoffmann, “World Governance: Beyond Utopia,” *Daedalus* 132, no. 1 (2003): 28.

beyond a narrow state-centered approach by considering political communities and systems of rights that emerge at levels of governance above or below those of independent states or that cut across international borders.”²⁷²

To further strengthen the argument that there was an increase in attention given to states’ standing in the international system or themes of global society, I would link the debate here to cultural globalization, especially to the term “cosmopolitan,” which grew by 0.4% in this period. Cosmopolitan outlooks embedded in visions of “global totality,” which were signaling a direct connection between individual and the world²⁷³ transcending ties to one country,²⁷⁴ crystallized into theories of “cosmopolitan democracy.” The most prominent proponent of this theory was David Held who argued that globalization was forcing societies to rethink the type of political community in which they wanted to realize ideals of democracy.²⁷⁵ However, some pushed back against the theory for its alleged tendency to skew eurocentric²⁷⁶ and many others expressed a sentiment of uncertainty²⁷⁷ or even overt skepticism about the probability of the world moving towards a durable fulfillment of some of these ideas.

5.2.3 Social Globalization

The rise of social globalization was the most important trend in this period. The category grew by 5.8% and accounted for 21.3%. What is interesting is that since term “labour” slightly declined compared to the first period, no term from this category crossed 5% threshold. This, I believe, indicates that the debate about social impacts of globalization gained in importance not because of a single issue but as a dimension on the whole. Some authors criticized this scholarship precisely for not putting forward concepts

²⁷² Jonathan Fox, “Unpacking ‘Transnational Citizenship,’” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (2005): 173, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104851>.

²⁷³ Calhoun, “Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Social Imaginary,” 109.

²⁷⁴ Pheng Cheah, “What Is a World? On World Literature as World-Making Activity,” *Daedalus* 137, no. 3 (July 1, 2008): 26, <https://doi.org/10.1162/daed.2008.137.3.26>.

²⁷⁵ Patomäki and Teivainen, “Critical Responses to Neoliberal Globalization in the Mercosur Region,” 38.

²⁷⁶ Patomäki and Teivainen, 38.

²⁷⁷ Fox, “Unpacking ‘Transnational Citizenship,’” 26.

that would offer “distinctive or original contribution” on social impacts of globalization and revolved around concepts of poverty or inequality instead.²⁷⁸

These findings also confirm first hypothesis of my paper expecting the debate to move beyond questions of nature of the globalization phenomenon and embrace more questions of its implications in areas that stood outside the main debate in the 1990s. As I already discussed in previous subchapters, states and markets remained the key points of reference in discussion about globalization. Growing numbers of occurrences of terms referring to social globalization were, therefore, oftentimes paired to these two concepts and served to highlight their social impacts including the frequent emphasis on the negative ones. “Markets do not lead to efficient outcomes, let alone outcomes that comport with social justice,”²⁷⁹ conceded Joseph Stiglitz in a 2004 essay arguing that globalization did not inevitably lead to progress and an enhancement of well-being. Economic globalization was in his opinion not the only evolutionary path. “Much of the political and social struggle going on today is an attempt to change that path,”²⁸⁰ he said.

The term with the greatest increase in its usage was “inequal,” which grew from 0.7% in the previous period to 1.9% in this one. The debate about potentially negative impacts of globalization on inequality, which used to focus more on developing countries, was extended also onto the affluent and developed ones.²⁸¹ Aseem Prakash in writing about the U.S. found that growing inequality in the country “reinforces the perception that globalization is benefitting only a small section of society.”²⁸² Some authors focused in their explanations of patterns of inequality on trade (as my data show, usage of trade in the context of globalization increased significantly by more than 3%) and process of deindustrialization of the “global North.”²⁸³ Others, however, emphasized more, for

²⁷⁸ Peadar Kirby, “Theorising Globalisation’s Social Impact: Proposing the Concept of Vulnerability,” *Review of International Political Economy* 13, no. 4 (October 1, 2006): 633, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290600839915>.

²⁷⁹ Stiglitz, “Evaluating Economic Change,” 20.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

²⁸¹ Christopher Kollmeyer, “Consequences of North–South Trade for Affluent Countries: A New Application of Unequal Exchange Theory,” *Review of International Political Economy* 16, no. 5 (December 16, 2009): 804, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290802665662>.

²⁸² Aseem Prakash, “Beyond Seattle: Globalization, the Nonmarket Environment and Corporate Strategy,” *Review of International Political Economy* 9, no. 3 (January 1, 2002): 518, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290210150707>.

²⁸³ Kollmeyer, “Consequences of North–South Trade for Affluent Countries,” 821.

example, technological change.²⁸⁴ Nevertheless, as Guill'en noted, the precise nature of relationship between globalization and inequality within and across countries remained one of the most controversial aspects of the whole debate.²⁸⁵

The term with the second greatest increase in number of occurrences was welfare. Since it strongly relates to and intertwines with other categories, I already discussed it throughout previous subchapters. Therefore, I will highlight here only few contributions that show how the debate was changing compared to the 1990s. We can see an important change especially in rise of counterarguments to conclusions that globalization made redistribution of wealth more difficult²⁸⁶ and also a weakening of a majority consensus among economists that "openness to international economy constraints governments from intervening in the domestic economy."²⁸⁷ It became increasingly accepted that the impact of globalization on national welfare systems was at least partially contingent on national institutions and political interventions.²⁸⁸ The overall pattern in the literature, Brady, Beckfield and Zhao found in 2007, "appears to be that globalization is probably not the dominant influence on welfare states and plausibly has less influence than established political forces."²⁸⁹

Another significant increase happened in the usage of "poverty" and "environment" (both grew by 0.7%). There is a strong pro-globalization argument in some discussions about poverty and globalization, which Kirby summarizes as follows: "Central to this argument is the claim that countries which have strongly increased their participation in global flows of trade and investment...have seen their incomes increase and poverty fall to the point where they are beginning to catch up with the world's richer countries."²⁹⁰ Others, nevertheless, explored potential causalities between growing economic openness and poverty (or inequality).²⁹¹ Even though the true causal relation between globalization and poverty remained contested, poverty became an issue many protestors against

²⁸⁴ Brune and Garrett, "The Globalization Rorschach Test," 416.

²⁸⁵ Guillén, "Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble?," 247.

²⁸⁶ Raphael Kaplinsky, "Is Globalization All It Is Cracked up to Be?," *Review of International Political Economy* 8, no. 1 (2001): 61.

²⁸⁷ Brune and Garrett, "THE GLOBALIZATION RORSCHACH TEST," 401.

²⁸⁸ Korpi, "Welfare-State Regress in Western Europe," 603.

²⁸⁹ Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao, "The Consequences of Economic Globalization for Affluent Democracies," 319.

²⁹⁰ Kirby, "Theorising Globalisation's Social Impact," 641.

²⁹¹ Kaplinsky, "Is Globalization All It Is Cracked up to Be?," 46.

globalization raised – which was also the case for environment.²⁹² Environment can serve as a case example of a trend of bringing social issues into already established debates as Bechtel, Bernauer and Mayer show in their discussion about importance of environmental concerns in forming opinions on free trade and globalization. By treating the environment as an important variable they broadened the debate in this area, which until then focused mostly on the issue of expected income effects of trade policies.²⁹³

We see also quite significant (in terms of developments within category) growth of the terms “rights” (by 0.7%) and “standards” (by 0.5%). As Guill’én observed, cross-border advocacy for rights (human, environmental, women’s, etc.) constituted one of the multiple ideologies of globalization.²⁹⁴ In a similar vein, Fox in his discussion about transnational citizenship argued that rights-based citizenship was one of the two main ways to conceptualize it (the second one being the membership-centered definition).²⁹⁵ However, the issue of rights also occurred in contexts more similar to the 1990s debate like trade union or labour rights as Wills’ study on international agreements and labour rights show.²⁹⁶ Rights and standards were linked together in articles discussing, for example, labour and working conditions,²⁹⁷ however other authors focused more on novel takes on the issue of standards such as Allison Loconto and Lawrence Busch who focused on construction of “tripartite standards regime” as a network facilitating international trade.²⁹⁸

Finally, despite the slight decrease in its usage, “labour” remained the term with the highest number of occurrences in this category (4.8%). It was used in a variety of contexts ranging again from debate about varieties of capitalism, where Tan Kong analyzed what

²⁹² Jane Wills, “Bargaining for the Space to Organize in the Global Economy: A Review of the Accor-IUF Trade Union Rights Agreement,” *Review of International Political Economy* 9, no. 4 (2002): 676.

²⁹³ Michael M. Bechtel, Thomas Bernauer, and Reto Meyer, “The Green Side of Protectionism: Environmental Concerns and Three Facets of Trade Policy Preferences,” *Review of International Political Economy* 19, no. 5 (December 1, 2012): 837, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2011.611054>.

²⁹⁴ Guillén, “Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble?,” 236–37.

²⁹⁵ Fox, “Unpacking ‘Transnational Citizenship,’” 171.

²⁹⁶ Jane Wills, “Bargaining for the Space to Organize in the Global Economy: A Review of the Accor-IUF Trade Union Rights Agreement,” *Review of International Political Economy* 9, no. 4 (2002): 675–700.

²⁹⁷ Luc Fransen and Brian Burgoon, “A Market for Worker Rights: Explaining Business Support for International Private Labour Regulation,” *Review of International Political Economy* 19, no. 2 (May 1, 2012): 237, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2011.552788>

²⁹⁸ Allison Loconto and Lawrence Busch, “Standards, Techno-Economic Networks, and Playing Fields: Performing the Global Market Economy,” *Review of International Political Economy* 17, no. 3 (August 20, 2010): 507, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290903319870>.

type of countermeasures were needed to complement labour market reforms for a country to maintain key specifics of its model, to debates about international labour market protections²⁹⁹ or impact of China's entry on global markets.³⁰⁰

5.2.4 Geographical globalization

We see a drop by 2.5% for this category in this period and the term “communicat” was the only one that increased its usage (by 0.6%). This data confirms that just like in the 1990s, the geographical dimension of globalization was of peripheral importance (at least for the selected journals). Lowering costs of communication and other developments related to it were understood as important contributors behind the rise of free movement of goods and services³⁰¹ and advances in communication were further seen as an important factor behind the rise of transnational social movements of which many challenged globalization.³⁰² To link the debate here to the following category of cultural globalization, Heath, Fischer and Smith argued that “the greater ease and speed of communication between countries” was one of the developments behind the “emergence of global culture,” which is how they defined globalization.³⁰³

5.2.5 Cultural Globalization

Cultural globalization as a category declined in this period by 1.1% and also the “leading” term “cultur” dropped by 0.8% to 3.8%. Most of the time, just like in the previous decade, cultural themes were of secondary importance in the overall debate. However, on few occasions, globalization served as a framework for more cultural-sociological topics that did not occur in the 1990s at all, such as, for example, its role in political economy of sexualities³⁰⁴ (again, as said above this might be due to disciplinary orientation of my selected journals).

²⁹⁹ William E. Scheuerman, “False Humanitarianism?: US Advocacy of Transnational Labour Protections,” *Review of International Political Economy* 8, no. 3 (January 1, 2001): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/713780169>.

³⁰⁰ Kaplinsky, “Is Globalization All It Is Cracked up to Be?,” 56.

³⁰¹ Stiglitz, “Evaluating Economic Change,” 18.

³⁰² Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao, “The Consequences of Economic Globalization for Affluent Democracies,” 324.

³⁰³ Anthony Heath, Stephen Fisher, and Shawna Smith, “The Globalization of Public Opinion Research,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (2005): 297, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.090203.103000>.

³⁰⁴ Joshua Gamson and Dawne Moon, “The Sociology of Sexualities: Queer and Beyond,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 30, no. 1 (2004): 49, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110522>.

As I already stated at the beginning of this chapter, interestingly, usage of terms referring to rejection or contestation of globalization increased only by small margins: “alterglobalization” was used only twice, “antiglobalization” grew by 0.1% and the term “resist” by 0.6%. For example, Roberts argued that “social resistance has thus punctured the aura of inexorability that surrounded the trends toward economic liberalization and globalization in the waning decades of the twentieth century.”³⁰⁵ Aspects of globalization that provoked resistance across societies were numerous, to name a few: “capital account liberalization,”³⁰⁶ “mass media consumption,”³⁰⁷ or “globalization of production.”³⁰⁸ As I tried to show throughout the previous subchapters, the low incidence of terms contesting globalization does not mean the critique of it was not present in the debate; however, it was either more implicit or its authors used different ways to express it.

5.3 Final Discussion

As I went over the debate and dived into its developments, both big and small, it became clear that in the two analyzed decades, globalization was certainly an object of many questions and heated discussions. Authors lamenting ambiguity of the phenomenon would probably find it hard to disagree with the charge of opacity Bauman made and I quoted at the beginning of this work. Yet, besides the shifts and trends, I described above, my results also revealed a great deal of continuity. Therefore, it seems that although globalization was continuously a contested phenomenon, to great extent it remained contested along the same lines. Such continuity (in disagreement) suggests that the phenomenon of globalization, just like others, obtained a set of basic characteristics or connotations.

Concepts bear characteristics and “baggage” of the time when they arose, Bartelson suggested in his praised genealogy of society.³⁰⁹ My analysis started in the 1990s and even though this is not the first time concept of globalization appeared, it is the time when it became widely discussed across the academic community. The key connotation globalization acquired in this decade – and importantly, one that it retained in the

³⁰⁵ Roberts, “The Mobilization of Opposition to Economic Liberalization,” 328.

³⁰⁶ Milner and Mukherjee, “Democratization and Economic Globalization,” 177.

³⁰⁷ Guillén, “Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble?,” 252.

³⁰⁸ Gille and Riain, “Global Ethnography,” 280.

³⁰⁹ Bartelson, “Towards a Genealogy of ‘Society’ in International Relations,” 984.

following decade as well – concerned its impact on the relationship between states and markets and the presumption that the nature of this relationship was being altered. It is; therefore, appropriate to raise a question of how this conceptualization was conditioned by the historical specificities of the decade in which globalization as a concept was gaining salience. I will certainly not offer definitive answers here but merely suggest a direction in which such discussions could go.

The 1990s was a decade that was coming to terms with the fact that some of the most important ideational contours of the post-war order were no longer in place. Probably the most famous take on the zeitgeist of the decade provided Francis Fukuyama in his essay (followed by the whole book) on the end of the history, which he saw approaching.

“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”³¹⁰

If we were to take Fukuyama’s account as representative of a broader sentiment (which some could disagree with) the question would be how it shaped the process of the globalization concept formation as the sentiment was constituting its particular historical and discursive context. The choice of states and markets as key sites where globalization’s impacts could be observed corresponds with Fukuyama’s emphasis on “economic and political liberalism” and its “unabashed victory” due to “exhaustion of alternatives” to it.³¹¹ Downstream from this, it is also telling that the discipline in which the topic of globalization resonated most was the international political economy. Therefore, I believe that further study of the historical context in which the concept of globalization was forged could provide some explanations of why it is that globalization’s connection to states and markets acquired such an importance that it became its key characteristic – at least in the decades and journals I studied.

³¹⁰ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), 1.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to analyze the academic debate about globalization and by doing that to examine in which contexts the concept itself was formed. As globalization is a concept experts have continued to argue about, I sought to chronicle these struggles and look at how the major discussions evolved. Furthermore, it was my aim to go beyond the individual debates and to see whether there were certain notions that came to be associated with globalization more or less automatically. Mindful of the genealogical perspectives emphasizing that concepts reflect the contexts in which they are forged, I analyzed a small fragment of the history of the globalization idea as captured by four journals whose coverage I chose to study.

I conducted both qualitative and quantitative analysis in two selected periods of time, the first from the 1990-2000 and the second covering the following twelve years. My analysis looked at the evolution of the debate in the chosen academic journals and it tested two hypotheses. The first assumed that while in the first analyzed period of time questions concerning the nature of globalization would dominate, the debate would move away from them in the second period and we would see a broadening of the specter of topics globalization was discussed in relation to. The second hypothesis presumed the rise of terms contesting or rejecting the phenomenon from the year 2000 onwards.

My findings showed a great deal of continuity in the debate but also some quite significant shifts. The 1990s were the first decade that came to seriously debate globalization as a phenomenon with potentially significant implications. Some social science disciplines, political economy in particular, were openly voicing opinions that globalization was a phenomenon of such an importance and also one which workings were so different from others that it caused a crisis of the disciplines. Practices and methodologies of social science were seen as unable to capture the type of the phenomenon globalization was understood to be, and therefore the momentum was ripe for a paradigm shift, according to some. Such calls obviously did not go unchallenged and I illustrated in my work on the case of specific debates that at least at the beginning of the decade there were still serious discussions about whether globalization truly represented anything new. Yet by the end of the decade it was clear that globalization was not going anywhere. While skeptics possibly provided an important corrective to those who tended to carry the

argument too far, eventually they lost. Globalization established itself as an important phenomenon with implications for practices of the social science.

The main reason why globalization was thought to fundamentally challenge existing practices and methodologies of social science concerned its disruption of nation-state-centered frameworks that many disciplines and paradigms used. Globalization was conceptualized as a phenomenon problematizing the idea that various dimensions of social reality, economy, institutions, society, etc., could be analyzed only within a national framework. This argument is supported by results of my quantitative analysis, which showed that the term state was the one that was paired with globalization the most often in the first decade (11.8% from the total results).

The second most often used term was the market (which accounted for 9%) and if we put these two terms together we get the most important characteristic of globalization that was formed in this decade – and even more importantly, one that persisted in the following period of time as well. The relationship between states and markets was thought to be altered by globalization since due to its workings states were losing their abilities to act as buffers between global markets and national economies, many authors argued. Economic activity was disembedding itself from the territorial constraints of national economies and was increasingly organized on international level. This does not necessarily mean that states were becoming weaker actors vis-à-vis markets or that distribution of power between states and markets was a zero-sum game in which if one gains the other one necessarily loses – even though those arguments were definitively present as well. The crucial underlying argument, however, lies in recognition that the nature of the relationship between states and markets (domestic and global ones) – i.e., the depth of the mutual interconnectedness, the power equilibrium between states and markets or the locus of power – was where globalization's impact was the most significant. Downstream from this, paradigms using state-centered frameworks were increasingly seen as no longer appropriate.

Therefore, as my first hypothesis put forward, in the 1990s, the debate revolved mostly around issues of nature of the globalization phenomenon, its conceptualization and impacts that were at that time seen as the most fundamental ones. My hypothesis also presumed that in the second period, the debate would broaden its scope and start covering novel areas. As my qualitative analysis showed, there was indeed a growing recognition

that not only in the economics with the case of markets but in other disciplines too globalization was a force reshaping structures and boundaries social science used to take as given. Validity of the hypothesis was also confirmed by the gathered data, which revealed the growth of the social dimension of globalization as the most significant trend in the second analyzed period (the category grew by 5.8%). While the most often used terms remained the state and the market – which confirmed a centrality of this relationship in the debate – they were oftentimes paired with the terms referring to social dimension of globalization. We saw a significant spike in the usage of terms like inequality, welfare or poverty signalling a growing interest in social impacts of the reshaped states-markets relationship.

The afore-mentioned increased attention given to social implications of globalization indirectly links to my second hypothesis, which presumed that number of occurrences of terms contesting or rejecting globalization would grow in the second period. That proved not to be true at least in the very narrow way my hypothesis put it. The data I gathered did not show significant growth of terms antiglobalization or alterglobalization; more of the opposite, their usage remained almost negligible. The term resistance and its derivatives grew by few tenths of percentage point, but it still did not shape the overall debate in any significant way. Nevertheless, I argued that there was a normative contestation of globalization but in more implicit manner.

One way in which we could see contestation of globalization was, as already said above, through pairing it to negative social outcomes, such as inequality, welfare or environmental issues, to name only a few. Secondly, I also argued that there were some terms (the most important of which was neoliberalism) that contained implicit contestation of globalization and served as a bridge to discussions about social protests against globalization or to broader debates about downsides of globalization. Therefore, while measured only quantitatively, the degree of contestation of globalization would be minimal; however, a more detailed qualitative analysis showed that there was indeed an additional layer of contestation that was linked to specific issue areas. These findings suggest that criticism of globalization was present in the second period but in a more nuanced way and did not constitute a broad encompassing argument that would rely on over-reaching terms such as alter- or antiglobalization.

Finally, I suggested that historical explanations might be behind some of the developments we saw in the analyzed discussion of globalization. Besides important shifts in the debate, my analysis also showed a great deal of continuity and the greatest continuity of all was in the attention given to the relationship between states and markets. I argued that further genealogical research which would study the specific post-Cold War discursive contexts of the 1990s in which the concept of globalization was forged could help explain why it was that states and markets were the key terms in the debates about globalization. Such research would be a valuable contribution to our understanding of the development and history of the concept.

Findings of this thesis, while being limited in their scope and transferability, nevertheless tap into a line of argument some critics of contemporary globalization make. My analysis started in the 1990s, a decade in which, according to Rodrik, globalization (in his understanding, mostly economic integration) “took a wrong turn.” The mistake was in putting domestic economies in service of the global one and thus making globalization a question of ends and not means, he argued in 2019. “Economists and policymakers came to view every conceivable feature of domestic economies through the lens of global markets,” he said.³¹² An emphasis on the market and the dominance of the economic dimension of globalization shown in my analysis suggests that Rodrik may not have been mistaken in his argument that economics stole the spotlight in the globalization debate. These findings therefore raise a question of what was lost in the debates that focused so much on the states and the markets. In line with Rodrik’s criticism that states, while racing for more economic globalization, neglected other areas that were affected by this process, my small-scale analysis suggests that the academic debate partially copied this trend and dimensions other than economic one were slow to catch up – and when they did, it was oftentimes still related to the question of states and markets. As I emphasized throughout the thesis, concepts evolve and future research could analyze whether the trends from second period, such as growing attention given to social dimension or contestation of globalization, gained a more prominent place in the years past 2012.

Interestingly, Rodrik argued that “at least half of the transition to hyperglobalization [*the wrong turn*] was the change in the frame of mind...a cognitive

³¹² Dani Rodrik, “Globalization’s Wrong Turn,” *Foreign Affairs* (July 9, 2019), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-06-11/globalizations-wrong-turn>.

transition...in what governments thought *[they]* should be doing.”³¹³ The precise number is certainly debatable but largely irrelevant. What he aimed to emphasize was the importance, power and real impact of the ways we structure and narrate social reality and academic debate is an important space for these processes. As research from cognitive science convincingly showed, how we frame our debates matters as it directs our attention to selected issues and diverts it from others.³¹⁴ A debate operating with markets and states as its most important point of reference – one of the key conclusions this thesis came to – is one that partially sidelines other dimensions (even as they were slowly finding their way into the debate). While Rodrik would probably not be surprised by these conclusions, they might be of use to further deliberations how to lead a debate about globalization that would more fully account for various aspects of this phenomenon including those spurring the current backlash against globalization. These aspects seem to ensure the debate is not going anywhere in the near future.

³¹³ Dani Rodrik, “Karl Polanyi and Globalization’s Wrong Turn,” Opening of the Vienna part of the International Karl Polanyi Conference 2019 “Karl Polanyi for the 21st Century,” (Vienna, May 3d, 2019), transcript downloaded from <http://www.karlpolanyisociety.com/2019/12/16/dani-rodrik-karl-polanyi-and-globalizations-wrong-turn/>.

³¹⁴ See, for example, David Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Choices, Values and Frames,” *American Psychologist* 39, no. 4 (1984) or George Lakoff, *Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate: The Essential Guide for Progressives* (White River Junction, Vt: Chelsea Green Pub. Co, 2004).

Summary

Globalization represents an important phenomenon of our current world. It is also one of those topics that resonate both with academic community and policymakers or broader public. And as recent developments – such as election of Donald Trump who took unapologetically critical stance towards many aspects traditionally constituting globalization – showed, it is also a phenomenon whose future now seems more open-ended than many thought few decades ago.

Therefore a study of history of the concept could bring valuable insights to our current and future debates. This paper, guided by genealogical perspectives emphasizing the importance of historical contexts in which concepts emerge and take shape, opted for a study of academic debate. The goal of this thesis was to analyze the development of part of the overall debate as it was captured by coverage of globalization in four leading academic journals from the year 1990 to the year 2012 and to see through which arguments and debates the concept of globalization was taking form as well as whether there were certain connotations that would become gradually associated with globalization. It also sought to find out whether the phenomenon of globalization was normatively contested.

The thesis divided the chosen time frame in two periods (1990-2000 and 2001-2012) and in those periods of time it conducted quantitative and qualitative analysis with an aim to describe and compare various developments and trends. It sought to prove or disprove two hypotheses. The first presumed that we would see a shift away from questions concerning the nature of globalization in the first period, towards a broader spectre of issues globalization would be discussed in relation to from the year 2000 onwards. The second hypothesis expected a rise of normative contestation of globalization in the second analyzed period of time.

Both quantitative and qualitative analyses the work conducted show that the terms “state” and “market” were the most prevalent ones in discussions about globalization in both periods. Globalization was seen as a phenomenon altering the nature of the relationship between states and markets and while the precise nature of the changes was subject of discussions and controversies, many debates operated with a presumption that this represented an area where globalization’s impact was significant. In terms of the categories that dominated the debate, the analysis showed that economic dimension was the most

talked one in both periods of time. The most significant development in the second period represented the rise of social dimension. Even though it did not challenge the primacy of economics in the overall debate, it signaled a shift in attention. Therefore, it confirms the first hypothesis of this thesis expecting a broadening of the scope of topics.

The thesis came to mixed conclusions in terms of validity of the second hypothesis. The analysis clearly did not confirm a significant usage of terms such as alter- or antiglobalization (i.e., terms explicitly signalling a contestation of globalization) in any of the two periods. However, especially in the second analyzed period we see that contestation of the phenomenon was present in the debate but in a more nuanced manner. It was linked either to specific social issues perceived as downsides of globalization or tied to few terms containing implicit contestation of globalization process such as neoliberalism, for example.

Therefore, this thesis suggests that based on the small-scale analysis it conducted we could argue that the concept of globalization obtained in the 1990s a key characteristic – its impact on the relationship between states and markets – which was preserved also in the second analyzed period. There was a growing attention given to social impacts of globalization and also some degree a contestation; however, these dimensions were slow to catch up and oftentimes constituted an offshoot of the debates about states and markets. Finally, this thesis argues that further genealogical research on specific discursive context of the 1990s could shed some light on why it is that states and markets became the key points of reference in the debates about globalization.

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ZÁVĚREČNÉ TEZE MAGISTERSKÉ PRÁCE NMTS

Závěrečné teze student odevzdává ke konci Diplomního semináře III jako součást magisterské práce a tyto teze jsou spolu s odevzdáním magisterské práce do SIS předpokladem udělení zápočtu za tento seminář.

Jméno:

Barbora Chaloupková

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Specializace (uved'te zkratkou)*:

SAS

Semestr a školní rok zahájení práce:

LS 2018

Semestr a školní rok ukončení práce:

LS 2020

Vedoucí diplomového semináře:

Lucie Kýrová, M.A., Ph.D.

Vedoucí práce:

Mgr. Ing. Magdalena Fiřtová, Ph.D.

Název práce:

Globalization: From Unknown to Known? An Analysis of the Academic Debate about the Concept

Charakteristika tématu práce (max 10 řádek):

Globalizace představuje koncept, který na sebe váže velkou míru pozornosti a stal se důležitým referenčním bodem mnoha současných veřejných debat. Je také konceptem, na kterém sice v mnoha ohledech v rámci akademické komunity nepanuje shoda, zároveň se s ním ale pojí řada silných tvrzení a argumentů. Naplno globalizace pronikla do akademické debaty v 90. letech, a ačkoliv byla příležitostně diskutována již v předešlé dekádě, až právě během 90. let se koncept etabloval v rámci společenských věd jako fenomén, který je třeba seriózně reflektovat. Práce si klade za cíl analyzovat část akademické debaty o globalizaci tak, jak ji zachytily čtyři přední akademické časopisy v letech 1990-2012 (která rozdělí na dvě období, aby mohla komparovat hlavní vývojové trendy) a za pomoci kvantitativní a kvalitativní analýzy popsat, skrze jaké linie a argumenty se debata vyvíjela, a zda lze vysledovat i nárůst normativně vedeného vymezování se vůči tomuto fenoménu.

Vývoj tématu od zadání projektu do odevzdání práce (max. 10 řádek):

Práce prošla několika změnami, ty nejdůležitější se týkaly výběru vzorku, na kterém bude vývoj debaty zkoumán, a omezení časového rámce. Práce se odklonila od svého původního záměru analyzovat vývoj akademické debaty skrze knihy, které byly k tématu publikovány, primárně kvůli šíři materiálu, kterou by musela obsáhnout, a také kvůli nedostupnosti některých titulů. Místo knih práce zvolila cestu případové studie analýzy pokrytí tématu v několika časopisech. Tento postup také umožnil snazší aplikaci kvantitativních metod a práce tak mohla být jak kvantitativní tak kvalitativní analýzou. Druhou zásadní změnu představovalo omezení rokem 2012 (a nikoliv rokem 2016, jak práce původně plánovala, aby obsáhla akademickou debatu předcházející nástupu Donalda Trumpa do úřadu) jako konečným bodem analýzy z důvodu nedostupnosti některých časopisů za tento rok.

Struktura práce (hlavní kapitoly obsahu):

První kapitola se zabývá teoretickými východisky, primárně genealogií, a představením literatury, která již genealogickou perspektivu na téma globalizace aplikovala. Následuje přehled literatury a shrnutí některých nejdůležitějších argumentačních proudů a titulů, jež byly k tématu napsány. Dále práce již pokračuje vlastním výzkumem: třetí kapitola vysvětluje použitou metodologii a představuje hypotézy výzkumu a ve čtvrté kapitole

následuje stručné shrnutí výsledků provedené kvantitativní analýzy. Na tuto kapitolu navazuje závěrečná pátá kapitola, která na výsledcích kvantitativní analýzy buduje analýzou kvalitativní. Pátá kapitola je rozdělena do třech podkapitol, dvě kopírují sledovaná období (1990-2000 a 2001-2012), v rámci kterých popisují a komparují hlavní vývojové trendy. Kapitulu zakončuje krátká diskuze opřena o teoretická východiska práce.

Hlavní výsledky práce (max. 10 řádek):

Práce dochází k závěrům, že v obou dvou zkoumaných obdobích hrály hlavní roli v debatě o globalizaci pojmy trh a stát. Kvantitativní analýza ukázala, že právě tyto dva pojmy se ve spojení s globalizací v debatě objevovaly nejčastěji a následná kvalitativní analýza tento závěr potvrdila. Vztah mezi trhy a státem jako oblast, v níž dochází kvůli globalizaci ke změnám, byl argument, který tvořil základ pro mnohé další debaty, jakkoliv platí, že názory týkající se konkrétní podoby proměny tohoto vztahu se vyvíjely. Práce dále zjišťuje, že v druhém období (od roku 2000 dále) dochází k poměrně výraznému nárůstu pozornosti věnované sociální dimenzi globalizace a zastoupení termínů spadajících do kategorie sociální globalizace vzrostlo o 6%. Práce také zjišťuje, že oproti původnímu očekávání v druhém sledovaném období nedochází k nárůstu použití termínů explicitně se vůči globalizaci vymezujících (jako např. antiglobalizace). I přesto však bylo normativně vedené vymezení se vůči globalizaci přítomné, dělo se tak však většinou více implicitně a ve spojení s individuálními tématy.

Prameny a literatura (výběr nejpodstatnějších):

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Etika výzkumu:**

Jazyk práce:

angličtina

Podpis studenta a datum

20. 5. 2020 Barbora Chaloupková

Schváleno

Datum

Podpis

Vedoucí práce

Vedoucí diplomového semináře

Vedoucí specializace

Garant programu		
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* BAS – Balkánská a středoevropská studia; ES – Evropská studia; NRS – Německá a rakouská studia; RES – Ruská a eurasijská studia; SAS – Severoamerická studia; ZES – Západoevropská studia.

** Pokud je to relevantní, tj. vyžaduje to charakter výzkumu (nebo jeho zadavatel), data, s nimiž pracujete, nebo osobní bezpečnost vaše či dalších účastníků výzkumu, vysvětlete, jak zajistíte dodržení, resp. splnění těchto etických aspektů výzkumu: 1) informovaný souhlas s účastí na výzkumu, 2) dobrovolná účast na výzkumu, 3) důvěrnost a anonymita zdrojů, 4) bezpečný výzkum (nikomu nevznikne újma).