CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

Master's Thesis

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Demise and Disintegration of Nationalist Terrorist Groups

Master's thesis

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Declaration

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References

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Abstract

The thesis is focused on the process of demise and disintegration of nationalist terrorist groups. The case studies of terrorism in Northern Ireland and Basque region in Spain demonstrate and analyze the development of local terrorist organizations from the beginning to the cessation of violent actions. An emphasis is put especially on the end of armed campaign and transformation of nationalist activities within a legal framework. In the case of Northern Ireland, the focus is put on the activities of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) from the beginning of the Troubles to the Belfast Agreement in 1998. The research in this thesis includes the influence of affiliated political parties – Sinn Féin in this case – on the process of negotiations and the continuation of Northern Irish nationalism after the end of armed campaign. The Basque case is devoted to the development of Basque nationalism since the beginning of the 20th century, the creation and development of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and its terrorist campaign within both the Francoist regime and Spanish democracy. An emphasis is put on the development of the organization until its official dissolution in 2018, activities of the political parties of the Nationalist Left affiliated to ETA and the attitude of Spanish authorities to conflict resolution.

Abstrakt

Práce se zabývá procesem zániku a dezintegrace nacionalistických teroristických skupin. Na příkladech teroristických konfliktů v Severním Irsku a Baskicku popisuje a analyzuje vývoj tamních teroristických skupin od jejich vzniku až po ukončení jejich činnosti. Zvláštní důraz je kladen především na ukončení teroristických akcí a transformaci nacionalistického terorismu do legálního rámce. V rámci Severního Irska se zaměřuje především na průběh činnosti Prozatímní Irské Republikánské Armády (PIRA) od vypuknutí nepokojů na konci šedesátých let do podepsání Velkopáteční dohody v roce 1998. Zkoumá také vliv přidružených politických stran – v tomto případě Sinn Féin – na průběh mírových jednání a pokračování severoirského nacionalismu po ukončení teroristické kampaně. V rámci Baskického regionu je kladen důraz na vývoj Baskického nacionalismu od počátku 20. století, vznik a vývoj skupiny Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) a její teroristické kampaně v rámci frankistického režimu i demokratického Španělska. Pozornost je věnována vývoji skupiny až do jejího rozpuštění v roce 2018, aktivitě politických stran Nacionální levice sympatizující s ETA a přístupu španělské vlády k řešení baskického konfliktu.

Keywords

Nationalism, Separatism, Terrorism, Northern Ireland, Basque, Terrorist Organizations

Klíčová slova

Nacionalismus, Separatismus, Terorismus, Severní Irsko, Baskicko, Teroristické organizace

Title

Demise and Disintegration of Nationalist Terrorist Groups

Název práce

Zánik a dezintegrace nacionalistických teroristických skupin

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Introduction

Nationalism has a long tradition in the history of the development of the international environment. It was the dominant driving force in the creation of nation-states and the establishment of the majority of post-colonial states in the 19th and 20th centuries. It was also the force behind the creation of states after World War I. The idea of a nation-state – the key element of nationalism – has a variety of forms, depending on the approach to the term *nation*. The most common is the idea of a nation as a society of people who share the same region, origins, history, language, identity, and culture. However, in some states emerged groups, that did not share all those attributes with the rest of the state. This resulted in secessional tendencies and tensions among the groups. The sentiment of grievances and inequality of some groups in favour of the others was often a source of conflict. The conflicts were in some cases peacefully resolved, in some they emerged into either insurgency and open military conflicts (mostly civil wars) or large terrorist campaigns.

Although nationalist terrorism represents only one particular type of terrorism – among the others are religious, far-right, far-left, sectarian, environmental, pro-life, etc. However, they all use common techniques to reach the desired objectives. The most common are mass shootings, bombings, suicide attacks, assassinations, kidnappings, rioting, or vanguardism. Nationalist terrorism was one of the most significant forms of terrorism in the 20th century. Terrorist groups seeking territorial gains or secession of regions expanded to all parts of the contemporary world. The campaigns of these groups caused remarkable disruptions world's society and brought worldwide attention. The most mentioned examples of nationalist terrorist campaigns are the campaigns in the Basque region in Spain (1959-2018) and Northern Ireland (1968-2005).

In Northern Ireland, the sectarian violence between the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority emerged to a long and intensive campaign for the secession of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and reunification of Ireland. The terrorist organization – Irish Republican Army – stemmed from the Republican movement, which origins have roots in the Easter Rebellion in 1916 and civil war in Ireland. The main target of the campaign was the security forces, most dominantly local police, the British army, and local Protestant militias, which also conducted a violent and lethal campaign against the Republicans. In Basque, the organization was built on Basque nationalist sentiment. The Basque population considered itself as a historical nation, which was conquered and oppressed by the Spanish government, and thus it has an undoubted right for its national state. Although it has reached little autonomy, after the Civil War the new-established authoritarian centralized regime refused any form of self-

determination for the Basque. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna was created by the radical movement of Basque students, who demanded an independent state and were not reluctant to use violence against the regime. Despite Franco's death in 1975 and subsequent transition to a democratic region followed by little autonomy for the region, the terrorist campaign for independent Basque persisted until the 21st century.

The main objective of this thesis is to determine how nationalist terrorist campaigns end. The elementary premise is that terrorist campaigns of the same type – nationalist, far-left, religious, etc. – share common factors in their developmental dynamics. This premise is consent with Rapoport's (2001) theory about waves of terrorism. Due to this shared developmental dynamic, the organizations should have a similar pattern of both establishment and demise. However the dynamic relies on various factors, that cause differences and may produce different outcomes. The main emphasis is put on the process of demise of the terrorist campaign, the approach of the government towards the terrorist organization, and the eventual continuation of the nationalist struggle after the demise of the terrorist campaign, since there are other means of conducting a nationalist campaign with the use of the conventional democratic pathway.

1. Literature review

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and highlight the recent level of scholar knowledge. The long-lasting campaigns of both groups received worldwide attention and became a popular topic for many researchers and journalists. Thus the following introduction represents only a margin of literature dedicated to the topic of terrorism. However, there are many possible approaches to research on terrorism and only a part of them focus on the phenomenon of the demise of the organizations. The following chapter provides a brief outlook of the literature dedicated to the demise and disintegration of terrorist groups.

There exist many approaches on how to study terrorism. However, not many of them focus on the general nature of terrorism since terrorism in general is hard to define. Instead, they focus rather on specific phenomena related to terrorism e.g. combination of terrorism and psychology (e.g. Horgan, 2008, 2009; Silke, 2003 etc.), terrorist communication (e.g. Waldmann, 1977, 2003; Schmid, 2011), suicide terrorism (Bloom, 2006; Moghadam, 2006) or root causes of terrorism (Bjorgo, 2005; Horgan, 2005; Crenshaw 1979, 1981). Or they explore terrorism from the war-like perspective. The approaches mentioned above do not suit well the purpose of this thesis, since they do not fully reflect the developmental dynamics of the groups and the driving force of terrorist campaigns. After excluding these approaches, there is not too much left – Rapoport's (2002) *Four waves of terrorism theory* presents understands the campaigns as a reflection of the current wave of terrorism – anarchist, nationalist, Marxist, and religious. The theory regards terrorism as a single-generation issue, thus fails to explain the longevity of nationalist groups like IRA and ETA. Theories of small group dynamics do not fit the purpose either, since IRA and ETA were large and influential organizations at their peak. The theories of social movements appear to be too broad for the study of terrorism. The instrumental and organizational theories of terrorism by Marta Crenshaw (1987) provide an overview of group dynamics from different perspectives. The biggest advantage of her work is that it explains the logic of the operation of a terrorist group from the beginning until the end. It explains the logic of its creation as well as the campaign and its dissolution. Furthermore it provides slight implications for possible counterterrorism strategies. However the two approaches presented in Crenshaw's work are not the only possible approaches to counterterrorism. But most of the approaches consider the terrorist campaign as an open military conflict. These approaches are also not relevant for the research in this thesis – the campaign of neither of the groups emerged to the extent, that application of war-like measures was necessary. Criminalization of terrorist activity with a high level of prosecution according to the *enemy criminal law* is also a viable

approach (Duhart, 2019), although it may be easily abused for political prosecution. Another important publication for the purpose of the research in this thesis is *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement* edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, who use empirical data and provide number of case studies to present possible ways of disintegration of both organizations and individuals.

Regarding the topic of demise and disintegration of terrorist groups, the common approach towards this area is rather quantitative, using statistics and possible models, each of them including various, yet ultimately similar variables. The findings developed in contemporary literature serve as a background for the development of a theoretical framework of this thesis. Statistical models as presented by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013) present factors, that may influence the length of survival of a terrorist organization. They mention size of the organization, its primary focus (i.e. religious, far-right, far-left, etc.), number of home bases, diversity of attacks conducted, area of operation as well as specific country (democratic or non-democratic) and present specific counterterrorism recommendation. Furthermore Clauset and Gleditsch (2012) use group-level static and dynamic analysis to develop a certain mathematical model recording and predicting aspects of development of a terrorist organization. However, the dynamic of demise remains to a large extent unknown, as they conclude, the phase of demise is less predictable than the phase of development. Daxecker and Hess (2012) predict, according to their research, that in a democratic state, coercion and repression from the state towards the terrorist organization may have opposite outcomes, as the public will refrain from support to the regime and the legitimacy of the state will be weakened. Chenoweth et al (2009) uses the rational choice theory and organizational model of terrorist organizations to evaluate and comment on existing claims regarding the dynamics and development of terrorist groups.

Jones and Libicki (2008) present in their book *How terrorist groups end: lessons for countering al Qa'ida* possible ways of termination of terrorist groups. The five major ways presented in their book are: policing, politics, splintering, military defeat, and victory. Weinberg (2011) distinguishes only three – defeat, success, and transformation. Cronin in her publication *How terrorism ends* (2009) developed a typology consisting of six possible ways: decapitation, negotiations, success, failure, repression, and reorientation. Gvineria (2009) presents eight: substantial success; partial success; direct state action, including repression; disintegration through burnout; loss of terrorist leaders; unsuccessful generational transition; loss of popular or external support; and the emergence of new alternatives for terrorism. Regarding the transformation, Weinberg and Pedazhur (2003) in their publication *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups* focus on the transformation of the terrorist organization into a political party

and describe the dynamics of the process from the perception of selected terrorist groups, among them both IRA and ETA. They also describe the inner processes and attitudes of the leading figures of the organizations.

Regarding the literature dedicated to both case studies of IRA and ETA, many various scholar works were devoted to the description or timetable of events preceding the definite demise and disintegration of both groups. From the many, works of Murua (2014, 2017) describing the narratives of government and ETA elites regarding the demise of ETA, and compilation of authors *ETA's Terrorist Campaign: From violence to politics 1968-2015* present a detailed and structured overview of the campaign of the Basque group. The Irish campaign for unification is well presented in biographies of Brendan O'Brien (2003) and Jan Frank (2005). O'Brien's book provides a detailed overview of the campaign of both Sinn Féin and IRA with further links and communication channels. The aftermath of Good Friday Agreement is presented e.g. in Frampton's article: *Dissident Irish Republican Violence: A Resurgent Threat?* (2012) and works of Morrison (2018). Many of the scholar works considering the demise of terrorist campaigns were published before the end of ETA and resurging waves of violence in Northern Ireland; this work attempts to evaluate and update the remarks of these works to recent days.

2. Methodology

The target of this research is an analysis of the process of demise and disintegration of nationalist terrorist groups. Nationalist terrorist groups are chosen from a wide range of organizations due to their statistically larger endurance and their propensity to maintain their objectives through entering the political process after the expected defeat (Gaibulloev 2013, 2014). The research consist of a two-case study of the groups studied separately. However, for better understanding of the development of nationalist terrorist organizations within specific cultural regions, the discussion of similarity is found necessary and it is a subject of one of the concluding chapters. Regarded to be the most remarkable examples of nationalist terrorist groups of recent times, IRA and ETA serve as the best objects for case studies. The demise and disintegration of both groups is analysed and evaluated according to some set of criteria selected from contemporary scholar literature dedicated to the area of research and presented in the literature review. In both cases, the biggest emphasis is put on the development of the organization and factors contributing to the demise and transformation of the organization to a political party.

The objective of the research is to provide answers to the following research questions:

1. Which factors appear to be the most essential for a nationalist terrorist organization to enhance its survival?

2. From the governmental perspective, what is the best way to terminate the existence of a nationalist terrorist organization?

3. Under which circumstances is a transformation of a terrorist group to a political party acceptable by the ruling authority?

The first question focuses on the ways, how nationalist terrorist campaigns end. The elementary premise of the research is, that there is no universal way of termination of terrorist campaigns. Terrorism ends due to a combination of factors and convergence of similar ways. For IRA, the 1998 Belfast agreement and subsequent disarmament process are considered as the end of the campaign. ETA officially disbanded in 2018, however, the end of the campaign can be traced further in the past to the 2010 ceasefire. The two points are the last examples of political violence on both sides. The factors contributing to the demise are essential to avoid in order to enhance the group's survival. The second question regards the approaches to the core of terrorism itself. The understanding of the nature of terrorism provides the government with the possibility of conducting a suitable anti-campaign. The third question relates to the possibility

of giving up arms and attend political process to pursue the desired objectives with more suitable and less risky means.

Apart from the analysis of the development of the terrorist group, an outline of discourses and narratives of the relevant actors – i.e. the terrorist organization, the governmental offices, the political parties, and public society are introduced in the thesis. The discourses and narratives provides contribution to understanding of the nature of the conflict and the attitudes of both sides of the conflict to potential conflict resolution. The discourses experienced significant development during the history of both conflicts, as the positions of the actors changed over time, thus the modification of discourses and narratives suggests the change in the environment and indicates the steps in the process of developmental dynamics of the organizations towards the demise of the terrorist campaign. The outline of discourses and narratives thus contribute to the mapping of the process of disengagement in terrorism.

The combination of historical analysis and discourse outline provides detailed insight into the process of demise of terrorist campaigns and enables evaluation of possible ways of termination. Nationalist terrorist groups follow a similar pattern of development however the cultural and political differences of both regions can produce different outcomes and nuances. The data derived from the analysis are evaluated and compared to existing scholarly literature regarding the demise of terrorist groups. The evaluation may contribute to further research on the demise of terrorism groups by providing new insights and approaches.

3. Theoretical background

The further chapter provides a theoretical background suitable for this research. The chapter is divided into specific areas of research – the approach towards terrorism, the ways of terminating terrorist groups, and factors influencing the duration of terrorist actions. The background provides a basic overview of possible ways of termination of terrorist groups and factors contributing to the demise, which is further applied to selected terrorist groups.

3.1. The approaches towards terrorism

There exist many possible ways to think about terrorism. Each way emerges from various assumptions and shapes its specific way to eliminate its presence by using different means. For this work, the approaches presented by Marta Crenshaw (1987) were selected as the most beneficial for the understanding of the nature of terrorist organizations. The first one is instrumental, which derives from the assumption that terrorism is a deliberate choice by a political actor; it is a means of policy responding to specific actions, mostly taken by the government (Crenshaw, 1987). The second one focuses on relations and inner coherence of the organization as a whole, with its primary goal being survival of the organization. The organization reacts as a unitary object to threats or opportunities with incentives to enhance its presence (Crenshaw, 1987). The following chapters will thus consist mostly of an introduction to Crenshaw's approaches to terrorism.

3.1.1 Instrumental approach

This approach sees terrorism as a means to a political end. Political violence is seen as intentional bargaining means in order to reach an advantage in the conflict with the government. Both actors influence each other's behaviour by using violent strategies. Terrorism is not the prime and only way to act to achieve a political goal. In this case, terrorism emerges as the best option, regarding the costs and benefits calculation. When there may appear an alternative, with terrorism being likely to fail, the organization does not rely solely on violent actions but may apply different ways of coercion as well. The terrorist action may not appear until there appears an opportunity to strike given by a lack of preparation from the government, making it easier to strike first. The success of the organization is measured in terms of obtaining its political goals. If the organization fails to do so, it is more likely to disintegrate. The inner disputes in the group are only related to the difference in political goals or strategy, otherwise, the group acts as a unitary actor.

From the instrumental perspective, the way to eliminate a terrorist group is to make it face a constant state of failure. Rising the cost of terrorism combined with lowering the opportunities to strike makes terrorism less likely. Instrumental terrorism often follows an action-reaction logic, with violence serving as a response from the government. The opportunities are promoted by rising vulnerability and availability of the targets or from the supply of resources by third actors. Regarding current technical and strategic innovations, the opportunities and means for violent attacks have experienced significant growth since the second half of the 20th century. However, as they all became once used and familiar to government agencies and intelligence services, they ceased to surprise. Surprise is considered as the most powerful factor of violent attacks – the more prepared the adversary is, the higher is the cost of such an attack. Furthermore, the scale of opportunities, is limited by the ideological factor, since the organization is unlikely to conduct an attack, which may in turn alienate its supporters.

From the perspective of the government, there may appear two possible ways how to prevent terrorist violence – defence and deterrence. Defence indicates using force to prevent further attacks. The use of force shall be both passive defence (guiding objects and targets vulnerable to attacks) and tactical offensive actions eliminating the networks of the organization. The offense may be either pre-emptive (facing imminent threat of attacks) or preventive (facing intended threat). Both offensive measures require extraordinary intelligence since the demand for information is exceptional in this case. Running an offence without perfect information may lead, in case of failure to serious harm to the credibility of the government. The strategy of deterrence is based on raising the costs of terrorism to influence the actions of the organization. The effective communication of threat towards the terrorist is necessary to prevent the terrorist from the attack. Deterrence may have several forms. The first one is deterrence by denial. It is the weakest form of deterrence, since the simple denying of the possible gains is very difficult and may not appear very credible. The second type – deterrence by punishment – is widely recognized. The principle of this type lays in the threat of retaliation with the use of military force. The possible response may be far more aggressive towards the terrorist than the terrorist attack. Following the simple logic, the losses exceed the gains, which makes the conduct of the attack less attractive. The issue with this strategy relates to the threat of further escalation and the outbreak of an open conflict.

Crenshaw (1987) summarized the principles of the instrumental terrorism in the following points:

- The act of terrorism represents a strategic choice.
- The organization using terrorism acts as a unit, on the basis of collective values.

- The means of terrorism are logically related to ends and resources; surprise compensates for weakness.

- The purpose of terrorism is to bring about change in an actor's environment.

- The pattern of terrorism follows an action-reaction process; terrorism responds to what the government does.

- Increasing the cost of terrorism makes it less likely; decreasing cost or increasing reward makes it more likely.

- Terrorism fails when its practitioners do not obtain their stated political objectives.

3.1.2 Organizational approach

The organizational process theory focuses on the internal processes of the organization. The basic objective of an organization is its survival. The inner dynamics in the organization thus tend to maintain a secure position and avoid threats of dismissal. However, the leaders of the organization think further than just the security of the group, they appeal to strengthen the organization by enlargement and promotion. To survive, the organization needs to provide incentives to its members to maintain their loyalty. The incentives for joining a terrorist organization may vary – the sense of belonging, social status, reputation, excitement, ideology, material gains, etc. Within the terrorist organization, ideology is not the core of their existence, it just contributes to the image of the group. According to the theory, the objective causes of grievances leading towards terrorism are permanent whereas the acts of violence are not. Thus the critical factor for terrorist activity in the state is not the presence of grievances or hostile ideologies as the instrumental approach suggests, but the creation of the organization itself. This organizational maintenance provides a viable explanation of the persistence of the terrorist organization, even if it faces evident failure to achieve its political purposes. A further factor that may influence the behaviour of the group is the presence of other similar groups serving as competitors. The activity of these groups may enhance the organization's activity to achieve its position in the business.

Similar to other types of organizations, terrorist groups may face the threat of factionalism and inner incoherence as well. The inner dynamics of the groups is highly influenced by the intentions of the leaders, who can disagree over the goals and strategy. Terrorism may serve only as an outcome of this dynamics. The tensions within the group may be utilized to dissolve the organization. From the perspective of members of the group, there are only two possible ways how to deal with discontent within the group – to voice or exit. In a highly centralized and secretive terrorist organization, there is not too much space to voice. The signs of dissent

are harshly prosecuted, on the other hand, if the attitude towards dissent is benign, broad inner disagreement maybe eventually destructive to the group due to inner splintering. Relating to the success of voice, there may further appear exit strategy. Exit may flow into either joining a rival group or creating a new organization or completely withdraw from terrorist activity. The threat of massive leaving may lead to further radicalization of the group – the moderate majority may consent to radicalization in exchange for group cohesion. The group may prevent exit strategies by enhancing loyalty – through massive indoctrination or enhance the cost of joining the group. Following this logic, a higher cost of initiation into the group forces the members to invest more energy into joining the organization and make them reluctant to leave the group. The initiation cost often consist of an illegal act ensuring that the member does not leave the underground. This logic secures that even if the organization would face defeat and the dissatisfaction with the situation of the organization rises rapidly, the combination of frustration and impossibility to leave enhances aggression and encourage more violence rather than force the members to withdraw.

Approaching terrorist organizations from the organizational perspective, the most viable way to combat these organizations is to encourage disintegration without escalating violence. According to this theory, the creation of non-violent incentives to leave, promoting opportunities to express disagreement within the group or to abandon terrorism and providing rewards for exiting are the best policy options. With regards to various incentives forcing the members to join the organization, various rewards for leaving the group shall be customized according to these incentives. If those incentives are ideological, the substitution is difficult. Those people may find accommodation in non-violent organizations or political parties. An essential addition to this approach is prevention from joining such organizations with the application of counter-terrorism policy.

According to Crenshaw (1987), the core of organizational approach towards terrorism consist of followings:

- The act of terrorism is the outcome of internal group dynamics.
- Individual members of an organization disagree over ends and means.
- The resort to terrorism reflects the incentives leaders provide for followers and competition with rivals.
- The motivations for participation in terrorism include personal needs as much as ideological goals.
- Terrorist actions often appear inconsistent, erratic, and unpredictable.

- External pressure may strengthen group cohesion; rewards may create incentives to leave the group.
- Terrorism fails when the organization disintegrates; achieving long-term goals may not be desirable.

Each of the approaches mentioned above may cover specific types of organizations. The instrumental approach is simpler and broader, thus found more appealing. However the second theory shows the complexity of collective behaviour and implies human factors. The ideal approach to the issue of terrorism is to combine both approaches and focus on both ideological, environmental, and organizational factors.

3.2. Possible ways of termination

Jones and Libicki (2008) define five major ways of termination of terrorist groups – policing, military defeat, splintering from within, joining politics, and victory. Cronin (2006; 2009; 2010) names six – decapitation, negotiations, success, failure, repression, and reorientation. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2014) further merge these ways into three groups – disintegration from within (includes inner splintering), defeat by force (includes policing and military defeat) and joining the political process (includes victory as well -in case of victory, the organization becomes dominant political power in the system). In the following chapter, those ways are categorized and explained in detail.

3.2.1. Disintegration from within

Inner splintering of the group may happen as a result of the break of inner cohesion of the group, by either internal or external factors. Both types of factors are described in further details in following chapters, however in short internal factors relate to display of inner disputes and disagreements among members – mainly as a reaction to deterioration of group's environment, whereas external factors stem from the functioning of groups from the outside – government or rival organization. Terrorist groups often compete for resources, publicity, and support among themselves as well as with the government. Groups that fail to secure a sufficient amount of resources and support simply cease to exist as the members became part of other organizations (Jones, 2008).

The risk of inner splintering is statistically higher in small organizations. Also with a higher number of rival organizations the risk of splintering is higher (Gaibulloev, 2014). Individuals abandon the groups due to disillusionment stemming from disagreements over desired tactics, political differences, the incongruence between initial expectations and experiences with reality

or change of personal priorities. They further seek fulfilment in either rival organization, disengagement[1] , or physical abandonment of the group (Horgan, 2008). Members tend to create factions, that compete for power and resources within the group to shape its policy, further weakening the group's cohesion and power (Cronin, 2009). The tendencies to abandon the organization is higher, when the organization is facing an imminent threat of failure (Horgan, 2008; Cronin, 2008). However, the issue with splintering is that the disintegration of the group by splintering does not necessarily indicate the end of terrorist activity by its members – they may simply join another group and keep their commitment to terrorism (Jones, 2008).

Unsuccessful general transition indicates that the activity of the group is only short-term and after the death/caption/withdrawal of the leaders there is no successor of the leadership of the organization and it slowly dissolves – e.g. Red Brigades, Red Army Faction or The Order (Cronin, 2006; 2009). The main reason is the group's inability to articulate a clear vision about the orientation of the group and the direction of its activities for the future generation of activists to further build on (Cronin, 2008). Groups pursuing specific political goals, such as ethno-separatism or religion have a better chance to successfully overcome general transition, as their goal is more likely to attract various social groups (Cronin, 2009). In the other cases, the activity is viewed as rather trending and generation-specific. The leaders of these groups further struggle with attracting new members and preserve its policy (Weinberg, 2012), This correlates with Rapoport's theory about waves of terrorism, which sees terrorism produced in specific waves, that last no longer than a generation. With changes in demands and grievances characteristic for each generation, the attraction to specific forms of political violence diminishes (Rapoport, 2002).

Terrorist groups also disintegrate after attaining victory – the desired objectives are achieved, with or without the contribution of the terrorists (Jones, 2008). However, only about 5 % of the groups achieve their desired objectives (Cronin, 2010). In contrary to achieving success, terrorist groups end after accepting the failure of their goals. Failure is considered as a state of terminal inability to achieve the objectives of the organization. However, failure in this connotation does not relate directly to oppression from the government, but rather to self-inflicted causations (Weinberg, 2012). These include loss of operational support – due to inner tensions (which may be to some extent caused by state counterterrorism policy) the organization progressively loses control over their members and their actions. When the members push their

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[1] Disengagement is not necessarily equal to physical leaving, since the term may refer to a state, when the individual moves from a certain role in the organization to another and change its engagement to more subversive activity (Horgan 2008).

actions too far, they are more likely to make mistakes and produce counterproductive outcomes of their actions (Cronin, 2009; 2010). Being too violent and making mistakes results in the loss of popular support. Public support is the biggest source of legitimacy for terrorist groups (Weinberg, 2012). Terrorist groups rely on both passive and active[2] support from the public to the group. Terrorist organizations gain support by preserving a good reputation[3]. The group enhances its popular reputation by the provision of public goods, great positive media coverage, and affiliation with a legal actor in the system, often a political party (Togdemir, 2016). On the other hand, by overusing coercive tactics with abuse of force, such as forced recruiting and force support, the exercise of extreme violence and coercion focused on children – either targeting children for attacks or recruiting them to enhance negative reputation for the organization (Togdemir, 2016). The supporters are also easier to revoke support for the group either for personal reasons or due to counterterrorism policies (Cronin, 2009). Another way to end an engagement in the group is to accept amnesty from the government, if the government offers any. The promise of amnesty is indeed attractive for the members – being offered at the right time means a big step for the government to lead the organization towards demise (Cronin 2009; 2010; Weinberg, 2009). The last way to disintegrate for a terrorist group is to fade away, as the ideology and objectives of the group becomes no longer relevant. This happens as a result of a long-term inability to achieve a noticeable goal in its policy (Cronin, 2009).

3.2.2. Defeat by force

Terrorist groups may also terminate due to defeat by force. Defeat by force means either policing or military actions. Policing consists of the use of police and intelligence to penetrate the organizations and eliminate the leaders. The members of the groups shall then be penalized due to the criminal justice system. To adequately criminalize actions that may be related to terrorism (even financing or recruiting) can subsequently lead to retaining necessary support and resources to the group. Since terrorist groups are reliable on popular support, cutting financial and ideological subsidies may cause serious harm to the organization. This system presumes an advanced law enforcement system and developed anti-terrorism legislation (Jones, 2008).

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[2] The term „*passive support*" consists of refusal to cooperate with police, sending money to organizational funds, ignoring signs of group activity, whereas „*active support*" stands for active participation in the group (Cronin, 2009).

[3] For this purpose, the groups often focus on other than just terrorist activities – they support education or charity and connect it with their ideology (Weinberg, 2009).

Long-term repression may also challenge civil liberties, human rights, inner coherence of the government, and popular support (Cronin, 2006). Harsh coercion tactics from the government may undermine the legitimacy of the government, limit civil cooperation in counterterrorism efforts, and reduce the overall support for the government. These effects on legitimacy may lead to backlash effects in democracies – actual lengthening of the duration of terrorist groups (Daxecker, 2013). For reasons described above, repression works more effectively in authoritarian regimes, where repression is not condemned by the public, thus it is not expected to hurt the reputation and legitimacy of the ruling authority (Daxecker, 2013).

A more offensive and complex way to eliminate terrorist groups is the use of military force. This includes deploying military forces to capture or kill key members of the group or to hit the bases of the groups or to strike against other actors supporting terrorism. It can involve the use of airstrikes, special forces on the ground forcing the terrorist to permanently move their bases (Jones, 2008). The key core of successful military offense against a terrorist organization is to shift the asymmetric violence typical for such organizations to another form, which is more favourable to the state. It may take two forms – intervention (to terrorist group abroad) or repression (domestic group). Use of military power is efficient in some cases – for example against Shining Path. In some cases it is rather controversial – it is often considered as ineffective or provoking spillover effects. These tactics also require advanced intelligence and resources (Cronin, 2006; 2009).

One of the sub-categories of military defeat is the successful implementation of a so-called decapitation strategy. This strategy consists of the assassination or arrest of key leaders of the organizations (Jones, 2008). The assassination may further lead to the splintering of the group for dispute about the future of the group or loss of popular support connected with the personality of the leader (Cronin, 2006). However, the strategy is effective only in strongly hierarchical organizations in which the leaders operate as the dominant means of mobilization. Other significant factors influencing the success of the decapitation are the availability of a successor, political context, reaction of the audience of terrorism and whether the leaders are killed or imprisoned (Cronin, 2009).

3.2.3 Transformation of terrorist group

The last alternative way to end the terrorist activity of the group is its transformation. Transformation allows terrorists to either enter the political system or reshape and focus on the application of different measures to achieve its goals.

One of the possible ways to end terrorism is to change its motivation from mostly political objectives to primary focus on gaining material resources (Gupta, 2008). In that case, a terrorist group becomes a criminal organization (Cronin, 2009). This change is a good sign for the state, since its capabilities to deal with these activities within the legal framework are advanced (Cronin, 2009). The tactics of organized crime, such as kidnappings, extortions, robberies or murders are common for both types of organizations (Weinberg, 2009), however the biggest difference of both illegal activities is the capability to achieve popular support – organized crime groups are disadvantaged in gaining good reputation, mainly because they often cease to pursue its political objectives (Cronin, 2009). The activity of the group remains the same – terrorism and organized crime are intertwined, since terrorist groups often use criminal tactics to collect resources and finance its activities (Weinberg, 2009). However, the terms transformation and collaboration should not be confused, since the latter is no sign of the demise of the terrorist group. Terrorist groups can merge, or strongly affiliate to crime organizations to enhance its income of resources, thus it indicates rather enhanced activity than demise (Gupta, 2008). Another way to end a terrorist activity, which is far less favourable for the state is the transformation of a terrorist organization to an insurgency group. This happens after the terrorists become strong enough that it does no longer relies upon terrorism and can afford adopting more effective means, such as guerrilla tactics, insurgency, or even conventional warfare (Cronin, 2009). The perception of this transformation is also a matter of semantics – the insurgents are often viewed as honourable fighters in contrast to terrorists and are more likely to achieve popular support (Cronin, 2010). State is therefore forced to apply more extraordinary measures to counter the activity of the group (Cronin, 2009).

Another path towards transformation is to change the means of achieving political objectives in a more legal way by transforming to legal political actors and entering politics. Joining the system can be achieved either as a result of negotiations or as a unilateral act of the organization. The allowance for negotiations is seen as the first step to reduce tensions. They do not need to be formalized and only leadership-oriented. The outcome of negotiations is dependent on a wide range of factors – the nature of the organization (hierarchical or decentralized), the nature of leadership (strong or weak authority), popular support for the cause, and the negotiable aims (Cronin, 2006). The organization may also join politics after its victory.

From the government perspective, the calculation of cost and benefits connected with the negotiations is necessary. The government shall foresee, whether opening of negotiations leads to decline of terrorist activity or not (Cronin, 2006). The government may offer an opportunity for compromise by providing members with amnesty and creating an environment for

reconstitution as a peaceful political party (Weinberg, 2009). From the terrorists' perspective, the agreement to negotiations often comes when the organizations' tactics face failure and non-violent political means emerges to appear more effective to achieve political objectives (Jones, 2008). On the other side, the creation of political wings allows the organization to conduct both terrorist and legal actions to maintain its political goals (Weinberg, 2009). Although the negotiations may be successful, the threat of inner splintering and disagreements between factions that either support negotiations or oppose it (Cronin, 2006).

Weinberg (2003) names two types of accession to the political process. The first type consists of complete disarmament, abandoning violence and turning to party politics in order to gain popular support and succeed in the elections. The second type represents the creation of a political wing to gain position as a legitimate political actor for propaganda or other political purposes.

According to the statistics, the probability of a group joining the political process is higher in landlocked countries, where the organizations are more prone to compromise due to a lack of possible affiliates from abroad. Also with the rising duration of the conflict, the likelihood of compromise rise as well. Among the types of groups, nationalist and radical right-wing and left-wing terrorist organizations are most likely to end their violent campaign by joining politics (Gaibulloev, 2014). For a peaceful resolution and creating a new political system with new political actors, the creation or restoration of a stable democratic political environment is necessary (Weinberg, 2009).

3.3. Factors influencing survival

The following section examines factors that determine whether the longevity of a terrorist group is reduced and how. Each terrorist organization is affected by various sets of factors (Mehta, 2016). For better distinction of suggestible and unsuggestible factors, the suggestible factors are further label as *policies*. The policies are either internal (the disintegration activities comes from the inner circle of the organization) or external (the organization is forced to change its policy). Unsuggestible factors relate to circumstances, that influence longevity of the organizations, but are often geographically determined and are mostly hard to change.

3.3.1. Internal policies

Internal factors are connected to inner initiatives and decision-making processes that lead to the disintegration of the groups and their aversion from violent actions. These factors pose a serious threat to the inner cohesion and functional capability of the organization. Due to the

development of modern technologies, terrorist groups have developed more efficient communication channels, thus it is easier for them to gain support of other groups or to become victims of rivalry among the groups (Mehta, 2016). The following section describes tendencies inside terrorist organizations that may lead to disruption of inner cohesion and weakening the overall position of the group.

Splintering tendencies of the members affect the groups and may be, in general, fatal to their existence. The members themselves do a cost-benefit analysis to decide if their persisting activity in the organization is still favourable. This individual suspicion emerges due to either convergence of similarly oriented groups or competition among such groups. Large losses in number may cause a radical shift in policy orientation to either radicalization and escalation of violence or disengagement from terrorism (Mehta, 2016).

As previously described in the section above, members of the organization tend to join mainstream politics, either after they achieve or need a major change in policy to achieve its objectives. The key variable in this issue is the likelihood of success with the current terrorist policy. Inner discussions about attending elections then contributes to inner disruption of the organization (Mehta, 2016). The goal itself is also an important variable in the decision process – e.g. terrorist groups that aim to regime change are unlikely to dissolve due to attending mainstream politics (Gaibulloev, 2014).

The last internal factor which deals with decision making is the possibility of the creation of a global terrorist network. Merging terrorist group has both positive and negative consequences. Terrorist groups can help each other by sharing resources or know-how, thus enhancing survival. On the other hand, building larger terrorist entities attract more attention from the government, which then would aim to eliminate the groups. The level of cooperation is a key variable for this factor – if the organization profits from the network, its longevity is enhanced, if it loses, the risk of demise of the group is higher (Mehta, 2016).

3.3.2. External policies

This section focuses on steps taken from exogenous actors that affect the longevity of terrorist organizations. The actors may represent government, non-state actors, rival terrorist groups, etc. The initiatives of these actors may lead to the organization's shift from violence.

The first factor represents types of regimes, in which the terrorist groups operate. As Daxecker and Hess (2013) state, in authoritarian regimes it is easier to use repressive measures against terrorists, since there exists no backlash possibility. However, long-term repression may trigger popular discontent with policy and further insurgencies even in non-democratic regimes

(Mehta, 2016). In democracies, only selective counterterrorism policies are acceptable, according to limits of policing (Daxecker, 2013). Government's policies may either support recruitment or donations to terrorist action or eradicate it according to their suitability and intensity (Mehta, 2016).

Another factor relates to the attitude of the government to potential compromises with the organizations. The possibility of transition of the organization from violence to peaceful policy may depend on the settlement between the organization and government. Alliances and treaties with the government can help the organization to easily achieve some of its political goals. Terrorist groups often seek public attention to further attain political recognition. The position of the government is thus complicated, as any sort of compromise may undermine the nation's social and political standards (Mehta, 2016). Any violation of these standards harms the legitimacy of the government and can indirectly lead to unintentional reinforcing of terrorism. Furthermore it creates an unwanted precedent about using terrorist tactics to obtain political objectives (Mehta, 2016).

The third factor contributing to the demise of terrorist groups is the capability of the government to use force against them. From the variety of coercive tactics using force, policing appears to be the best tactic in democratic regimes for a variety of reasons (Jones, 2008). First, employing police to eradicate terrorist violence in a particular area does not make too much harm to the legitimacy of the government, regarding the perspective of ordinary citizens than using military (Daxecker, 2013). Second, police officers have better knowledge about the particular area and its citizens due to their experience with local patrols and dealing with crime. On the other hand, the military possesses a wider range of resources and skills to destroy the organization physically in a relatively short amount of time.

To physically destroy the whole organization is not necessary, although it is one of the viable options. According to the analysis of characteristic networks of terrorist organizations, members of terrorist organizations can be divided into three levels – high level, middle level and bottom level (Ou, 2017). Alongside physically eliminating the whole organization, there is also a possibility to hit every single level of the organization. Hitting the highest level of decision-makers eliminates the management and operational capabilities of the organization. The middle level represents both the backbone of the organizational headquarters and the conductors of the attacks. Thus by eliminating those people, governments get rid of the organisers of terrorist attacks. And by hitting the bottom level, the organization loses the foundation and source of the majority of terrorist activities (Ou, 2017). However, the members of the middle and bottom level are less likely to be present in a close radius than the high level,

thus eliminating the highest level seems to be the easiest way, whereas elimination of middle and bottom level requires advanced intelligence (Jones, 2008). On the other hand, the costs of hitting the highest level of organization are way higher (Ou, 2017).

3.3.3. Unsuggestible factors

Unsuggestible factors represent circumstances that are unlikely to change, however, they are highly probable to influence the survival of the group. They often trace the core of the organization and may provide key recommendations to its elimination. First, a higher number of bases enhances survival, since governments need to split its counterterrorism activities across the land, making them less efficient (Gaibulloev, 2013, 2014). Second, the higher number of members in the organization, the higher is the chance to survive. A higher population in the country contributes to survival as well, since the members are more likely to disperse among the local population. Third, the presence of similar rival groups within the country or concrete counterterrorism policy promotes inner splintering and makes the organization more prone to dissolution. Fourth, the location of the base country of the organizations – states of the Middle East, North Africa have different prospects for survival compared to European or Asian states. (Gaibulloev, 2013, 2014) Fifth, the type of government – democratic or non-democratic also affects the prospects of survival, since each type imposes different counterterrorism measures. Sixth, geomorphological factors influences survival as well – lands with mountains or jungles provide more opportunities to hide. Terrorist groups in landlocked countries are disadvantaged in moving resources or personnel compared to coastal countries. Finally, the political orientation of the organization matters as well. Each type of terrorist organization is vulnerable to different types of demise, e.g. religious terrorists are more likely to end due to inner splintering over nuances in confessions, whereas nationalist groups are most likely to join political process (Gaibulloev 2013, 2014).

3.4. Summary

This chapter provides possible ways of termination of terrorist organizations. There is no exact link between types of terrorist organizations and the way they demise, although some of them are statistically more likely to end in a certain way. It is important to highlight, that the demise of a terrorist group is a combination of factors, that influence the cohesion of the groups and contribute to disintegration. As explained in the chapter dedicated to Crenshaw's approaches to terrorism, states may use different approaches to apply counterterrorism measures. The following chapters focus on the analysis of demises of selected nationalist terrorist

organizations with emphasis put on both internal and external factors influencing groups' behaviour as well as on the way of disintegration of each group.

4. Irish Republican Army

This chapter describes and analyses the process of the demise of the IRA terrorist campaign. To actually understand the whole long process that started in 1994 and officially lasted until 2005, but has not been fully completed, it is necessary to introduce at least brief history of the conflict in Northern Ireland to identify key events and factors that led to the adoption of Good Friday Agreement and demilitarization of IRA members. The key role in the process, as shown below, was played by the political wing of IRA, Sinn Féin. The cooperation and communication channels between these two actors shaped the IRA's position in the negotiations and its attitude towards proposals from other actors involved in the process – either national governments, loyalists, or third-party actors. The process of adoption of the Belfast agreement deserves special attention, since it was the breaking point of the process as an agreement acceptable to all interested parties with no major obstacles. The campaigns and statements of both sides are analysed, the major factors of demise identified, and compared to the theoretical background. In the end, the development of Northern Ireland after IRA's demise is introduced, initiating debate over the completion of the process of disintegration.

4.1. Introduction to Northern Irish Troubles 1969-1994

4.1.1 Origins of tensions in Northern Ireland

To completely understand the origins of Northern Ireland problems, there is no need to go through history in too much detail. To introduce the origins of the IRA armed campaign, the beginning of The Troubles in the late '60s is the initial point of focus. Although the struggle for uniting the island into one Irish Republic is dated to the adoption of Home Rule, which passed the British Parliament in 1912 and Eastern Uprising 1916 and British-Irish War in years 1919-1921, which resulted in special status for Northern Ireland (Frank, 2006). Since then, the autonomous region of Northern Ireland, consisting of six counties in the north, inhabited by predominantly Protestant and pro-British population exists, despite the significant effort of the Republicans to merge it with larger and predominantly Catholic rest of the island. The position and legal status of Northern Ireland is the biggest source of tensions across the island. The UK-backed Protestant majority in Northern Ireland discriminated against the Catholic minority, leading to worse conditions to obtain jobs, education, or political representation (Forest, 2018). With a deep understanding of worldwide sentiments of the late 60's there is no surprise of emerging human rights movement on the Catholic side of Norther Irish population, which demanded the Protestant-led provincial government to eliminate economic, political and social

inequalities between the Protestant majority and Catholic minority (Weinberg, 2009). Between 1968 and 1969, civil unrests and violent clashes associated with human rights marches between the protestors and counter-protestors and police were common in the region (Morrison, 2018), culminating in August and June 1969 in Derry, turning the city into a battlefield (Frank, 2006; Morrison, 2018). The biggest adversary for mostly young Catholics attending the marches was the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), consisting of the major part from Protestants resulting in a high number of casualties on the Catholic side and rising civil unrest (Frank, 2006). Being accused of anti-Catholic bias and inability to maintain order, RUC was in late 1969 replaced by British troops, that were deployed in the biggest cities of Northern Ireland to cease down the violence (Cronin, 2006). However, the British presence in Northern Ireland, despite being initially focused on preserving Catholic minority from Protestant attacks, was soon recognized as misusing its original mandate to display British dominance over Northern Ireland and legitimizing violence (Frank, 2006; Morrison, 2018) and even allowing Protestants to violently mob into Catholic areas (Forest, 2018). These events are widely considered to be the initiating moment of the Troubles in Northern Ireland.

4.1.2 The first splintering – the birth of PIRA

From the foundation of the Irish Republic, the Irish Republican Army was nothing, the British should have been feared of. The organization was not ready to help the Catholics in the north, facing prosecution from the loyalists and British security forces. In 1969 the human rights campaign provoked a new sentiment for independence from the United Kingdom. The Republicans in the north hoped for help from either the Irish Republic or Irish Republican Army with supplies of financial resources or weapons, but nothing came (O'Brien, 2003). The pre-1969 Marxist-oriented Irish Republican Army, based in Dublin had no intentions to turn back to violence or abstentionist policy, the leadership rather intended to align with similarly left-wing parties to actively participate in Irish politics (Morrison, 2018). The fact, that no sign of support from Ireland came, left a strong disappointment in Northern Irish Republicans, that resulted in disobedience and disloyalty to Dublin-based IRA (O'Brien, 2003). The Belfast branch of IRA was forced to provide resources to volunteers, who wanted to actively participate in the protection of the Catholics and eventually conduct an offense (Frank, 2006). The new leadership of Belfast IRA ceased connections with headquarters in Dublin and initiated preparations for armed campaign. The split of so-called Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was finished in December 1969, following the debates between the radical Republicans and moderate Marxists, where the Republicans were overpowered by the Marxist, who wanted

to apply political means instead of armed struggle (Frank, 2006). Among the leading figures in the split were Gerry Adams, Martin McGuiness, or Ruairi O'Bradaigh (O'Brien, 2003). Shortly after the split in IRA, the political wing of the organisation – Sinn Féin – experienced a similar split (Frank, 2006).

The Marxists later adopted the name Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) and continued with their moderate Marxist-oriented struggle[4] until 1972, when it introduced a unilateral ceasefire and transformed itself in the socialist Workers' Party (Frank, 2006; Rekawek, 2008). Its activities were broadly perceived as the false Republicans, since the intentions of the original IRA were continuing rather by the policy of the Provisionals (Rekawek, 2008). Any long-time competition between the Officials and the Provisionals was also devastating for the Officials, since they have lost the majority of popular support in favour of the Provisionals – the Officials' obsession with politics was widely associated with military weakness and betrayal. Furthermore, the connection with Marxism also provoked a significant decline in support (Weinberg, 2009; Rekawek, 2008; Perkoski, 2019). After the ceasefire in 1972, a splinter group within the OIRA emerged, due to inner disagreements over the ceasefire and the nature of possibly achieved socialism. After the OIRA refused to change its official policy, the Irish National Liberation Army, the far-left paramilitary group splintered from the Officials and conducted several serious attacks in Northern Ireland (Frank, 2006; Perkoski, 2019).

After the splintering in 1969, the Provisionals started to gain wide popular support among the Catholics in Northern Ireland (Forest, 2018). Despite widespread support, PIRA was unable to gather a significant amount of resources to start a larger coordinated campaign (Cox, 2018). Although facing troubles with limited resources, PIRA was able to develop tactics, that were successful in the mobilization of volunteers and donations. PIRA started with provocative actions against members of RUC and British soldiers to force them to withdraw from Northern Ireland (O'Brien, 2003)[5]. The rising number of attacks resulted in the creation of Protestant militias – Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and Ulster Defence Force (UDF) – and enhanced violence from the British side towards the Catholics, which resulted in a further escalation of violence (Weinberg, 2009). The response from the Northern Irish government, with support from Great Britain was the introduction of internments of terrorism suspects with no prior legal trial. The internments were not successful. The authorities arrested only a few active

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[4] The Officials, however did not fully refuse violence. Their members often participated in actions of local militias and violent clashes with RUC and British Army (Frank, 2006).
[5] Until 1971, the attacks were primary conducted on material targets to cause high financial losses. The first British soldier was shot dead in February 1971 (Frank, 2006).

Republicans, instead, they created indignation among the Catholic population and rising tensions in the areas (Frank, 2005). The clashes culminated in January 1972, when British troops opened fire during an unarmed demonstration in Derry. This resulted in 14 dead civils, many of them shot in the back, when escaping from the shooting (Frank, 2005; Morrison, 2018). The incident, later named "Bloody Sunday" deteriorated the relations between Catholics and Northern Ireland authorities and increased the nationwide support for both PIRA and OIRA (Frank, 2005). The deteriorating situation insured the government in London, that Belfast authorities are no longer capable of maintaining the situation and applied the Direct Rule, allowing the Westminster government to dismiss Stormont and administer the territory directly through the authority of a British secretary of state (Weinberg, 2009; Cronin, 2006). The provision did not bring peace to the territory; in fact it did not aspire to do so. On one hand, the British presence was perceived as another sign of British dominance and unwillingness of the British to actually solve the issue of Northern Ireland. On the other hand, the fall of Stormont, as a sign of Protestant abusive dominance in the region brought additional attention to the issue and depicted the status of Northern Ireland as an opened, unsolved issue that requires special attention (Frank, 2005).

Activities of PIRA during the rest of the '70s were oriented on anti-British attacks, not only territorially limited on the area of Ulster – several attacks were conducted in Britain and even in other European countries, especially Benelux states (Frank, 2005). The British soon started to establish secret talks with PIRA in 1974, however, both sides failed to reach any reasonable outcome of the peace talks. The conditions of the Republicans were too effusive for the British to even think about. British ideas of establishing in Northern Ireland something like constitutive democracy was unacceptable for both Republicans and loyalists in Northern Ireland (Weinberg, 2009; Cronin, 2006). The situation in Northern Ireland and assassinations conducted by IRA brought attention to various actors around the world – most notably the Irish American community in the USA[6], which later proved to be an influential actor in the peace process (Cochrane, 2007). On one side, various peace initiations emerged, which called for a cessation of violence[7], on the other side Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi or member states of Eastern Bloc provided PIRA with training and military equipment (Frank, 2005; Cox 2018). The

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[6] One of the main actors in bringing the topic of possible peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland to the United States was J. Hume, leader of Social Democratic Labour Party (SLDP) – the most popular Republican party of Northern Ireland, who conducted series of lectures across the USA, introducing the problematic and emphasizing the necessity of a peaceful resolution and allowing the Catholics to participate on the executive (Frank, 2005; Cochrane, 2007).

[7] Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan, founders of the Northern Ireland Peace Movement even received Nobel Peace Prize in 1976 (Cronin, 2006).

strengthening of British anti-terrorism policy, deterioration of both public and international support combined with the belief, that violence is the momentum, that forces the British to negotiate led the PIRA to change its strategy to long-war strategy. In the *Green Book*, a handbook for all PIRA volunteers, PIRA expresses the need to eliminate all the British forces from Ulster and mentions that PIRA and Great Britain are in a long permanent war and all means of violence are acceptable, however, they need to be sufficiently expressed to the public (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005). However the key notion is not a speedy victory but rather the war of attrition, which will cause unbearable (mostly material) damage to the British and force the public to demand the withdrawal of British forces (Morrison, 2018). The key shift in the strategy was based on territorial change. The headquarters were split between south and north, with the northern receiving more attention, prestige, and resources, for being in the centre of the "war zone" (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005; Morrison, 2018). The operational headquarters were moved to Belfast, which resulted in tougher discipline among the members and reducing the units to four members only to counter British counterterrorism policy (Frank, 2005; Morrison, 2018).

4.1.3. Ballot and bullet. PIRA and Sinn Féin

At the beginning the 80's PIRA changed its tactics once again, due to two main events of that time. First, Gerry Adams and his adherents climbed up the PIRA's hierarchy and Gerry Adams became the vice-president and later president of Sinn Féin. Adams' tactics were based on tighter cooperation between PIRA and Sinn Féin.[8] However, Sinn Féin was still practicing the policy of abstentionism until 1986,[9] thus there was not enough space to do much politics, as Adams wanted to (O'Brien, 2003). The main focus was to achieve concessions from Great Britain by application of politics and utilization of elective office and conventional mass media communication (Weinberg, 2009). Second, in 1980-1981, a series of hunger strikes eventuated in British prisons. The key issue was the status of convinced PIRA fighters as political prisoners, which the British refused to grant to the prisoners. One of the leaders of the strike, Bobby Sands was even elected as an MP in British Parliament, bringing worldwide attention to the strike. Despite wide pressure from the international community and public, the British government was firm in its position and refused to grant members of IRA any special status and

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[8] Although Gerry Adams refuses his membership in PIRA, however according to many scholars, simultaneous membership in both organizations was very common (Richards, 2001). It is believed that it was the successes of PIRA operations in Ulster brought Adams to high ranks in Sinn Féin (O'Brien, 2003).
[9] The end of abstentionism policy led to another split in PIRA/Sinn Féin, when the wing of supporters of the former leader Ruairi O'Brádaigh left the organization and established Republican Sinn Féin (O'Brien, 2003).

led the hunger strike to continue (Frank, 2005, Morrison, 2018). This position resulted in the death of Bobby Sands and nine other political prisoners (O'Brien 2003). The hunger strikes provided IRA and Sinn Féin with anti-British sentiment,[10] they could build their future steps on and displayed popular support for the Republicans, as it could be seen by the election of Bobby Sands (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005) On the other hand, the British authorities were given extra credit for its firmness in the struggle with violent extremists (Frank, 2005). The key outcome of this situation was a complete change of PIRA's strategy, called as *the Armalite and ballot box* (Weinberg, 2009; Forest, 2018) or *by bullets and ballots* (Frank, 2005).

The adaptation of the *Armalite and ballot box* strategy opened a new space for the Republicans to operate. A combination of political engagement and financial attrition forced the British to abandon its firm opposition and allowed talks with the Irish government about the status of Northern Ireland, resulting in Anglo-Irish agreement in 1985.[11] (Frank, 2005). The talks had significant consequences for all involved actors – for the Republicans it meant only a little success, for the unionists the core realization of the talks and possibility of an *Irish dimension* was perceived as a betrayal from the British (Frank, 2005). Although the acceptance of Anglo-Irish agreement had a significant impact of the relation between these countries and was to some extent promising to the possibility of peaceful resolution, the situation after the agreement was frozen to a stalemate, with no end of violence in sight (O'Brien 2003; Frank, 2005; Morrison, 2018). However secret talks between the biggest Republican political parties - Sinn Féin and SDLP – about the conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. John Hume believed that there was a possibility to maintain peace and organize negotiations with Great Britain, but only if PIRA will cease its armed campaign and focus on political activities for the most part (Morrison, 2018). From the end of the '80s the leaders of PIRA seemed to leave the idea of full victory in Northern Ireland; on the other hand, the British did not create viable options for them to cease violence. The same perception of the stalemate was accepted by British authorities (Frank, 2005). On the Republican side, SDLP maintained the leading position in negotiations among Republicans, unionists, and the British. SDLP as the most popular political party, officially recognized by the British government and especially Hume was the strongest voice of Republican tendencies to conflict resolution. (Frank, 2005). Sinn Féin published in 1992 document called *Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland*; in that document Sinn Féin counted on

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[10] The attitude of British authorities, according to PIRA displayed British selfish interests in Northern Ireland and zero interest in conflict resolution (O'Brien, 2003).

[11] These talks took place between 1982 and 1985. The Irish government recognized Northern Ireland as an independent unit in exchange for a consultative role of Ireland in the affairs of the region (Weinberg, 2009; Frank, 2005; Cronin, 2006).

the cooperation with British and Irish government, which both should play a constructive role in the process. The biggest obstacle in peaceful resolution between Catholics and Protestants was the Protestant veto in the region, which disabled any attempt to change the status of the Northern Ireland (Sinn Féin, 1992). The British were not keen to accept any of the points, since the conservative government of John Major was dependent on the unionist support. However due to increased activity of Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, both governments published *Joint Declaration*. (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005; Cronin, 2006; Morrison 2018). The document was important, because both parties ceased their territorial demands towards Ulster, Great Britain stated that it has no selfish strategic, economic and political interests in Northern Ireland (O'Brien 2003; Cronin, 2006; Morrison, 2018). Without expressing the phrase of the absence of British interests, the conflict resolution would be much harder to achieve, since this was the most expressive accusation of the British presence in Northern Ireland (Cox, 2018).

4.2. Ceasefire and Belfast agreement

The Joint Declaration provided no solution to the issue of Northern Ireland,[12] but it was somehow promising to the Republicans, that the conflict can result in a viable outcome. The back-channel discussions among Irish and British government, Sinn Féin and SDLP, American brokerage, and willingness to cooperate led to the announcement of the ceasefire in 1994 (O'Brien, 2003). PIRA announced, "*complete cessation of military operations*" and expressed willingness to secure "*a just and lasting settlement*" (PIRA, 1994). Nearly two months later, loyalist paramilitaries called a ceasefire as well (Weinberg, 2009; O'Brien, 2003). In 1995 the *Framework documents* were introduced; the documents legitimated the creation of an Irish Dimension, the share of power between Catholics and Protestants on a proportional ethnic principle (Frank, 2005; Morrison, 2018).

One of the key obstacles in reaching negotiations was the danger of PIRA paramilitarism. Although PIRA declared a ceasefire, it was still in possession of large weapon stocks. To start with creating peace accords with Sinn Féin present, Britain demanded complete disarmament of PIRA before the negotiations to demonstrate the intentions towards a lasting settlement (Frank, 2005). The disputes about the demands were forwarded, due to U.S. brokerage to Sen. George J. Mitchell and his newly established international commission on arm decommissioning (Frank, 2005; Cronin, 2006; Cochrane, 2007). Mitchell recommended a dual-track approach – the processes of negotiations including Sinn Féin and decommissioning of

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[12] It was dismissed by PIRA, but after several weeks, which indicates, that PIRA was not sure about its attitude to negotiations at all (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005).

weapons. Furthermore, he introduced six principles (labelled as *Mitchell principles*) of nonviolence (Cronin, 2006). However, after the British government supported unionists' proposition of creating the *Northern Ireland Forum*, leading to further delays in negotiations, PIRA unilaterally denounced the 1994 ceasefire, blaming British PM John Major of "*squandering this unprecedented opportunity to resolve the conflict*" due to placing his „*selfish party political and sectional interests in the London parliament*" before the rights of Irish people (PIRA, 1996). This resulted in renewed violence in the streets, bombings, and elimination of Sinn Féin from the political process. The Forum was unable to adopt any resolution and the situation remained blurred until 1997 (Frank, 2005). This year brought personal changes in both executions, with the election of Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern. Both governments express willingness to continue with the negotiations including Sinn Féin (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005); which later resulted in restoring the ceasefire in 1997 (PIRA, 1997).

The outcome of the negotiations was the adoption of the *Good Friday Agreement (*or *Belfast Agreement*) in April 1998.[13] The notion of the agreement consisted of following key points: (1) the sovereignty of Northern Ireland and the right for determination for its citizens; (2) denouncement of territorial demand of both states; (3) creation of Northern Ireland's legislative and executive institutions; (4) establishment of North/South Ministerial Council; (5) establishment of British-Irish Council; (6) decommissioning; (7) security guarantees; (8) release of some Republican prisoners (NIO, 1998). The agreement was later endorsed by the overwhelming majority in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (Cronin, 2006).

The implementation of the agreement was successful due to several factors. First, the content of the agreement. The power-sharing among the actors was an offer acceptable for the Republicans, who already stopped believing in British withdrawal. For the British, it was an acceptable sacrifice (Frank, 2005; Goddard, 2012). Second, the timing of the agreement was accurate. After reaching a mutual stalemate and deterioration of public support for mutual exercises of violence, the need for a peaceful resolution was imminent (O'Brien, 2003; Goddard, 2012). Third, almost no spoilers (actors undermining the peace process) emerged during the negotiations. All parties kept declared intentions to avoid violence, with the only exception of denounced ceasefire in 1996-1997. The Republican movement let the moderates (politicos) in Sinn Féin to determine the form of conflict resolution (O'Brien, 2003; Goddard, 2012). The situation however changed after the agreement.

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[13] The main protagonists of the unionists and nationalists – David Trimble and John Hume – were later awarded by Nobel Peace Prize in 1998, for their efforts in the negotiations (Hancock, 2008).

4.3. Post-Belfast Irish Republicanism

4.3.1. PIRA

From the perspective of the Provisionals, the Belfast Agreement was an underachievement. The British presence in Northern Ireland was not going to end and access to power for the Catholics in Ulster was not institutionalized how the Provisional thought it would be. However in the stalemate this was the only possible way forward. In April 1998, Gerry Adams stated, that "*while our goals and principles must not change, our strategic objectives, strategies and tactics must be constantly reviewed and rooted in objective reality*" and that „*the British government can play a positive role before leaving by trying to redress some of its wrongs and by helping to create the conditions for a peaceful transition to a just settlement*" (Adams, 1998) implying, that the Republicans already stopped believing in British withdrawal and tried to reach the maximum of the possible (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005).

Sinn Féin's approach towards the agreement – firm opposition on the outside, but latent satisfaction inside the party – combined with declared complaisance for decommissioning led to increased popularity for the party and electoral successes (Frank, 2005). Motivated by the electoral gains of Sinn Féin and realizing the inability of future progress, PIRA started to complete the decommissioning process, that ended in 2005 to the satisfaction of most parties (Weinberg, 2009). PIRA eventually step further by a declaration of the end of its armed campaign the same year (PIRA, 2005). However, even after the termination of the armed campaign, some of the members of PIRA were found guilty of engaging in criminality and vigilantism (Morrison, 2018). Furthermore, the termination of the armed campaign does not necessarily imply the complete disintegration of the group – the structures of the group remain active, however, they are *"deeply committed to the peace process"* (Morrison, 2018).

4.3.2. RIRA

The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) emerged after a split in the PIRA in 1998. The emergence of RIRA is a result of inner splintering due to disagreements about the strategy before the Belfast agreement between the politically oriented centre of Adams and McGuiness and the hard-liners of McKevitt's. The key disagreement laid upon the continuation of armed struggle. The radicals were reluctant to abandon violent tactics and thus opposed the Mitchell principles of non-violence (O'Brien, 2003; Perkoski, 2019). At the beginning of its existence, it adopted the organizational structure of PIRA, however, lacked capacities to conduct an expressive campaign (O'Brien, 2003). Despite this, RIRA was able to conduct a deadly attack

in Omagh in April 1998. The action received worldwide condemnation by the international public and even by other Republicans (O'Brien, 2003; Weinberg, 2009; Morrison, 2018). The fresh structure of RIRA was unable to handle the pressure by legal and police forces put on them and their activity was almost ceased (O'Brien, 2003). A further wound to the organization came in 2001 by the arrest of the leader, Michael McKevitt. Cronin (2005, 2006) claims, that this was the breaking point, that led to the end of the group. However, this seems to be far from true, since information about the activity of RIRA, although mostly marginal can be traced even in recent years (Horgan, 2011; Frampton, 2012; Morrison, 2016). In 2012, RIRA merged with another Republican organization, *Republican Action Against Drugs* (RAAD) to form a group, referred to as a *New IRA* (Morrison, 2016). The paramilitary activity thus continues, but it lacks enough popular support and resources to resurge the era of violent struggle.

4.3.3. CIRA

The Continuity Irish Republican Army emerged in 1986, after a period of inner tensions about the policy of abstentionism, which culminated in the departure of former Sinn Féin president O'Bradaigh and establishment of Republican Sinn Féin (Tonge, 2004). Republican Sinn Féin served as a political wing of CIRA, however, it remained unengaged in paramilitary violence until the mid-'90s (Horgan, 2011). Part of CIRA members are believed to be involved in the Omagh bombings in 1998. Ironically, the pressure put on RIRA as an aftermath of the bombing widely hit CIRA as well and contributed to its later stagnation (Horgan, 2011). The organization still exists, however, its activity is slowly declining, furthermore, it was overshadowed by the emergence of other Republican organizations, as ONH[14], RAAD, and New IRA, responsible for several incidents in recent past (Morrison, 2016; New IRA, 2019).

4.4. IRA and Sinn Féin

Regarding the long history of such a complex conflict, as the Troubles in Northern Ireland, it is important to stress the role played by the existence of Sinn Féin. For the long history, Sinn Féin was widely accepted as a political wing of IRA (later PIRA) (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005). It is also necessary to stress, that Sinn Féin, as a political wing, was subordinate to the paramilitaries, not vice versa. (Richards, 2001). The political decisions made by Sinn Féin, such as acceptance or rejections of documents or proposals were not possible without prior approval by the Military Council of PIRA. Sinn Féin was a very important actor in brokering negotiations

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[14] Oglaigh na hEireann, Irish term for Irish Republican Army; in fact, more mutually independent organization (splinter groups from both RIRA and CIRA) claim this name (Horgan, 2011).

and communication of PIRA actions – emphasizing successes and eliminating failures (O'Brien, 2003). Although the leading members of Sinn Féin reject membership in the IRA, dual membership in both organizations was very common (Richards, 2001; O'Brien, 2003). At least Adams and McGuiness know a lot about the structure, weapons, and resources, however, there is no evidence of their simultaneous membership (Richards, 2001; Frank, 2005).

PIRA determined the strategy of Sinn Féin since the infiltration of the party in 1949 (Richards, 2001). As a political front, Sinn Féin has justified the use of violence to achieve political ends. Corresponding with IRA's handbook, *Green book*, Sinn Féin has denied the legitimacy of the government of both states (Richards, 2001; O'Brien, 2003). Many of combatants of PIRA were also on ballots of Sinn Féin in several elections (Richards, 2001; O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005). Prior to the elections, PIRA adapted its violent strategy and reduced numbers of attacks, to eliminate possible losses for Sinn Féin in the elections. This strategy appears to pay off, since the election results were outstanding, considering the attempts to politically marginalize the party and refusals of contact (McGrath, 2014). Prior to the 1998 elections, the strategy of PIRA was to fill the ballots with as many rebels as possible, indicating the intentions to use Sinn Féin as a liaison for the radicals to participate in the legislative process (O'Brien, 2003).

One of the research questions of this thesis is focused on the circumstances, under which is the transformation of a terrorist organization to a political party acceptable by the ruling authority. In the case of Northern Ireland, there was no such transformation. Sinn Féin was incorporated in 1949, almost twenty years before the start of the Troubles. Although there is sufficient evidence of dual membership, these two organizations were officially two separate actors in the process (O'Brien, 2003). Thus there is not enough evidence to state, Sinn Féin was created to participate in the elections. More probably, the purpose of political initiatives of Sinn Féin was focused on the evaluation of support for Republican paramilitaries. The key change occurred at the end of the '70s and the start of the '80s, when PIRA received worldwide attention due to its campaign and hunger strikes and realized the possibility of utilization from conventional means of mass political communication and public attention (Frank, 2005). For the British government, the existence of Sinn Féin was also beneficial. Relying on unionist support, the harm for popular support for the government would be deteriorated, if the government would publicly negotiate directly with the paramilitary. The exposure of secret talks between the British government and Sinn Féin from 1972 deteriorated relations between the British government and loyalist parties (Frank, 2005). With Sinn Féin as a legitimate party of both parts of the island, entering the negotiations was slightly easier, but still full of tensions (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005). The existence of Sinn Féin proved to be the key factor of the

success of Irish Republicanism, thereto in a country with such a long democratic tradition as Great Britain.

4.5. British counterterrorism approach

It is very difficult to determine, which of the approaches presented by Crenshaw (1987) did the British authorities take to counter paramilitary violence. If taking the instrumental approach, the British would completely fall to fulfil their objectives. There was no sign of deterring the Republicans from conducting violence and increasing the costs of potential attacks. The acts of retaliation, as Crenshaw suggests, were from the large part not conducted by British officers, but more commonly by the members of loyalist militias. However, campaigns of British intelligence focused on large part to counter arms trafficking, shoot-to-kill individual assassinations, and persuading Republicans to provide information about the armed campaign of PIRA (Frank, 2005; Shanahan, 2009).[15] That suggests the utilization of internal group dynamics and focus on the individuals as well as rewarding the double agents in the organization; thus in the mixture of the approaches, the organizational approach prevailed.

There are found some misconceptions, that do not fully correlate with the utilization of only one of the approaches. First, there is the firm approach towards political prisoners. Instead of offering amnesty or pardons to the prisoners to increase incentives to abandon terrorism, British authorities enhance external pressure on incarcerated Republicans and declined special status for the prisoners (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005). This later resulted in hunger strikes and a wide medialization of the issue of Northern Ireland. Thatcher's government was later widely criticized for its approach (Frank, 2005). Second, despite applying means of anti-terrorist defence British authorities did not imply policing as the prime counterterrorism force as it is widely suggested. Instead the main force was the RUC, accused of anti-Catholic bias and support for rioting, later supported by the British army (Frank, 2005).

4.6. Discourses and narratives of both sides

The following section describes the discourses and narratives utilized in the Northern Irish conflict. It focuses on discourse practices of the Republican side – both PIRA and the government of Ireland – and the loyalist side – British government and unionist parties. The discourses of these actors shaped the conflict to the most extent. From the beginning of the Troubles, PIRA presented itself as a defender of the Catholic minority against harsh

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[15] The Republicans convinced of collaborating with the government were later forced to conduct suicide attacks by driving cars filled with explosives (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005).

discrimination and violence from the Protestants. Through the period of sectarian violence and internment of Catholics, culminating during "Bloody Sunday", the discourse proved to be very effective, according to the rapid increase of volunteers (Frank, 2005). After the fall of Stormont, PIRA was able to blame for the instability of the region to British "biased" forces, which fall to their objectives of fair-minded resolution. The wild and sometimes preposterous violence soon started to receive negative reception of the population and provoked massive retaliation from the British side (O'Brien, 2003).

During the 1970's PIRA aspired to change its communication with the public – the violence is necessary however each action should be effectively explained to the public (The Green Book). IRA identified itself as a successor of *Dáil Éireann* from 1918, thus legal representative of the Irish Republic. The governments of Ireland and Great Britain were labelled as illegitimate for constant violations of citizens' rights (The Green Book). British army was designed as a main target of operations. PIRA and Britain were in an 800 years long war, during which the British were constantly exploiting Ulster (The Green Book). The radical anti-British discourse was important to emphasize to strengthen an anti-British sentiment of the volunteers, so they would be less likely to desert or collaborate with British intelligence (Frank, 2005). Generally in every occasion PIRA attempted to delegitimate the British policy and its actors. During the hunger strikes in 1980, PIRA blamed the British for discriminate mistreating of its prisoners and make them responsible for the death of Bobby Sands and other strikers. Since the strikes, Thatcher was extremely unpopular in Ireland even between ordinary public opposing violence (O'Brien, 2003). Bobby Sands served as a martyr within the Republican movement and PIRA utilized on the worldwide attention by introducing the *ballot and bullet strategy* (Frank, 2005). Due to emerging political participation, PIRA was forced to limit the narrative of legitimate armed violence and focus on the promotion of democratic way to conflict resolution. However it did not abandon the demand for withdrawal of British forces, although the Republicans slowly stopped hoping in doing so (O'Brien, 2003). However, the international attention resulted in higher activity of the Irish government to reach a settlement and promote the *Irish dimension*, strongly advocated especially by John Hume and SDLP (Frank, 2005).

At the end of the 1980's PIRA almost stopped believing in the military resolution of the conflict and started to develop scenarios for possible peace, conditioned by British withdrawal in an acceptable period, and allowing Sinn Féin to play a strong role in the process. Also regarding the issue of unification of the island, PIRA abandoned its firm position and acknowledged the right of citizens of Northern Ireland to decide; however British government should convince them to agree with unification with Ireland (Frank, 2005). By announcing a ceasefire in 1994

PIRA proved its openness for negotiation, however, it demanded a much stronger influence on the process than it was given. PIRA reacted by blaming the British sides for selfish interests and undermining of the peace process. PIRA demonstrated its ability to keep its campaign for several future years as well as did the British, however, the continuation of violence made no sense for both sides anymore. To keep the nationalist agenda open, PIRA did not publicly endorse the Good Friday Agreement. The agreement concluded the military phase of the struggle, which ended in a stalemate and started a political struggle represented by Sinn Féin. However, the demands of Republicans were not fulfilled. The Good Friday Agreement did not end the campaign, but PIRA has stepped aside and started to pursue a peaceful resolution through disarmament and political process. The splinter groups seeking violence ale labelled as "traitors", who betrays the ideology of Irish Republicanism – by that move, the Provisionals are presented as the archetypal type of Republicanism and denounce support for further paramilitary violence (Whiting, 2012).

The relations between PIRA and the Irish government were not good since the beginning of the Troubles. PIRA did not recognize the government in Dublin as a legitimate actor and on the other hand, the Irish government – regardless if Fianna Fáil or Fina Gael were in force[16] – tried to undermine its position in the Republic (O'Donnell, 2008). However the Irish government could not ignore the nationalist issue in Northern Ireland. Facing the instant domestic pressure on one side and reluctance of Britain to cooperate on the other, the government needed to reinterpret the nationalist policy without creating more tension (Hayward, 2004). According to Hayward (2004), the process of re-definition of Irish nationalism contributed to an agreement with Great Britain. Irish government largely cooperated with SDLP in developing sustainable moderate nationalist policy in Northern Ireland (O'Donnell, 2008). The change in the notion of Irish nationalism in official discourse is visible in the agreements between governments. Ireland has abandoned the idea of unilateral unification, abnegated territorial demands on Ulster, and recognized the right of self-determination of the Ulster population. Assessing the moderate approach towards the conflict and higher legitimacy, the Irish government emerged to play a key role in peaceful conflict resolution.

British government attempted to take the position of a neutral facilitator of conflict resolution between Catholics and Protestants. Reforms implemented directly from Britain – not Stormont – helped to decrease tensions in the region for a short period. After the fall of Stormont, the position shaped to a guarantee of stability in Northern Ireland, thus it did not have to rely on

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[16] According to O'Donnell (2008), Fiana Fáil enjoyed significantly better relationship with PIRA – it was build on Republican fundaments and expresses more nationalist views than Fina Gael.

impartiality anymore. Territorial demands were strictly refused, as Britain argument with popular support stemming from the Protestant majority. However British authorities were well aware of the need for conflict resolution and attempted to pursue a settlement. The proposals presented by the British government contain limited variations of Irish dimension, but they failed due to aversion of either Republicans for lack of powers in the system or loyalists for their reluctance to accept power-sharing with Catholics (Weinberg, 2009). After all, Britain was forced to allow Ireland to take part in the decision-making process. Despite diverse attitudes towards the Irish dimension, both governments acknowledged the necessity of peaceful and democratic resolution. By accepting the right for self-determination, the British proved, they are obliged to – in an extreme case – sacrifice Northern Ireland for peaceful resolution. Towards PIRA, Britain kept a hard-line approach with no intention for official negotiations or concessions, as was shown during the hunger strikes – unless PIRA disarms completely. However, it was still able to reach a settlement, which met some of Republican demands on one side and did not cost too much from the perspective of London (Frank, 2005). Protestant unionists were less happy about the outcome of the negotiations in 1998. The loss of dominant position in the politics of Northern Ireland and allowance for the Catholics to participate in government were a bitter pill for Ulster loyalist forces. Radical unionists strongly relied on their position and were reluctant to make any concessions.

4.7. Reflection of PIRA campaign

The campaign of the Provisional Irish Republican Army was the largest and most influential campaign of the second half of the 20th century. The organization utilized the beginning of the Troubles and inability of the official headquarters in Dublin to provide security to the Catholic minority from the retaliatory actions of the Protestants and RUC (Frank, 2005). In a relatively short period, PIRA evolved into a fully armed paramilitary organization able to conduct a large number of attacks. It also received wide international support and supplies of resources, which allowed it to create a wide and stable organizational structure, able to counter British counterterrorism strategy. The most influential international donors were NORAID, Libyan regime, and member states of Eastern Bloc (Cox, 2018). The issue of Northern Ireland even received attention from the most influential actor of the Western hemisphere – the United States, thanks to large Irish American lobby (Cochrane, 2007). With such a mass internal and external support, PIRA was a very important player in the conflict.

During the history, the Irish Republican movement has experienced several occasions of inner disagreements and splintering. The splintering stemmed from the most part from disagreements

over intense strategy and means. The first splintering resulted in the emergence of PIRA and OIRA, with the latter remaining active for merely two years until announcing a ceasefire (Rekawek, 2008). The second splintering resulted in the creation of CIRA; the contribution of this group to conflict resolution was not high. The third splintering created RIRA – a group that almost jeopardized the position earned after the Belfast agreement (O'Brien, 2003). The last remarkable splintering happened inside the splinter groups. A similar situation was experienced in Sinn Féin. Every organization considers itself as the true Irish Republican Army, the only organization representing Irish Republicanism. Although the splintering tendencies did not cause the end of PIRA's campaign, the splintered groups contributed to the cessation of the Irish armed struggle (O'Brien, 2003; Frank, 2005).

After a stalemate reached in the '90s, the public support for both sides of the conflict decreased. In the situation, when there was almost no chance for British withdrawal, entering the negotiations was the only viable outcome. Furthermore, the Republicans already realized the power of public pressure and vulnerability of the British government by the violence and war of attrition. PIRA ceased its campaign after reaching the maximum possible, although the final version of the Belfast agreement was a bit disappointing for the Republicans (Frank, 2005). Crucial for the Republicans was the existence of Sinn Féin. Despite not being the largest and most popular nationalist party, it enabled PIRA to maintain the best position to further actions, compared to its splinter groups (Morrison, 2016).[17] The existence of Sinn Féin enabled the leaders of PIRA to join the political process and shape the politics in Northern Ireland with peaceful means.

From the history of the Republican movement in Northern Ireland, only three factors aspire to explain the termination of Irish armed struggle – inner splintering, loss of popular support, and transformation into a political force. Inner splintering led to remarkable, although not fatal, weakening of the group. The last splintering in 1998 and bombings in Omagh proved that violent campaign in Northern Ireland is no longer relevant (O'Brien, 2003). The popular support was deteriorating with the duration of the conflict and number of casualties, although neither Republicanism nor Unionism was about to decline. The politicization of the campaign was described above to detail. The other factors appear to be irrelevant for PIRA. The campaign was neither success nor failure – not all objectives were met, however, several concessions have been made (Frank, 2005). British anti-PIRA strategy was not sufficient to eliminate the organization – both sides of the conflict declared the ability to continue the struggle for an

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[17]Both splinter parties – the Workers Party and Republican Sinn Féin are only marginal, compared to Sinn Féin (Rekawek, 2008; Morrison, 2016).

indefinite time. The situation ended rather in a stalemate than the military preponderance of one actor (Weinberg, 2009). Thus every factor suggesting defeat by force may be excluded from the discussion. The struggle for the unification of the island can be traced back at least to the beginning of the 20th century and nationalist sentiments are still present on the island. Nationalist groups still operate in Northern Ireland and the situation is not yet stable and peaceful (Frampton, 2012). This suggests that the relevance of the nationalist agenda persisted until today and nationalist struggle is not just an issue of one generation. Some of the groups referring to the Irish Republican legacy were convicted of criminal activity and violence (Morrison, 2016).

4.8. Conclusion

The case of the Provisional Irish Republican Army proved the thesis presented by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2014), that nationalist terrorist organizations are more likely to end their campaigns by joining the political process. It necessary to mention, that PIRA did not cease to exist; it only stopped its armed campaign. The ongoing violence in the region by newly emerging Republican groups suggest, that the situation in Northern Ireland is far from peaceful. The Provisionals ceased their campaign by a combination of factors – the possible way to joining political process through its political wing, Sinn Féin; the offer to take part in the negotiations about peaceful conflict resolution; decreased support for the never-ending circle of violence by Republican and loyalist paramilitaries and British forces. Both parts of the conflict as well as influencing international actors (most notably the U.S.) accepted PIRA as a negotiator through legitimizing Sinn Féin. This fact demonstrates the strength of the organization within the Republican movement. Existence of Sinn Féin, international support as well as the long British democratic tradition, that made many of possible counterterrorism measures impossible. Although the British assumed the right approach, focusing on individuals and disrupting inner cohesion, many of its steps were counterproductive and ineffective – most notably too firm approach towards Republican prisoners and unfortunate form of policing by relying mostly on the army and controversial RUC.

5 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

The following chapter is dedicated to the campaign of Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna. The structure of the chapter is similar to the previous one and the research is conducted in the same way. A brief historical background is necessary for an understanding of the developmental dynamics of the group. According to the theory, the development of ETA should be similar to the Irish cause, however, the cultural and political differences of both states produced different outcomes. The further parts are dedicated to negotiations between the parties, the relationship between the organization and its political wings, *Herri Batasuna*. The final parts consist of an analysis of public discourse and the discussion about the future of Basque nationalism.

5.1. Historical background

5.1.1. Birth of Basque nationalism

The underlying issue that stems as a deep root for the existence of ETA's violence is Basque nationalism. The inhabitants of the seven lands in Spain (Vizcaya, Alava Guipuzcoa and Navarra,) and France (departments of Labourd, Basse Navarre and Soule) possess a distinctive culture and language (Weinberg, 2009). The feeling of the Basque population as being an exceptional entity, often labelled as "*the mobilising myth of Basque nationalism*" (Whitfield, 2015). The distinctive language and culture were the root of demands for greater autonomy or even independence from Spain (Duerr, 2017). From the perspective of the Basque population, the originally long-time sovereign and independent area was conquered by Spain and transferred into a colony. Its independence was then essential for the existence of the nation (Fernández, 2017). The process of seeking independence, initiated during the 19th century[18] led to the promise of greater autonomy within Spain in the 1930s. This promise was the cause, why Basque nationalists fought side by side with the leftist republican government during the Civil War (Weinberg, 2009).

The defeat of Republicans during the civil war was a huge harm towards Basque nationalism. Basque population was labelled as traitors by Franco and suffered from repression and higher centralization of the state (Weinberg, 2009; Murua, 2014). The centralization was soon followed by the prohibition of Basque national political and cultural symbols – flag, language. The grievance among the population rose, while the regime was strengthening and earned

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[18] One of the initiating moments was foundation of the Basque nationalist party (PNV) in 1895 (Murua, 2014)

recognition and support of international powers – the diplomatic way of PNV to achieve autonomy by discreditation and fall of the regime failed. Another defeat forced the followers of the Basque nationalist movement to take a different, more aggressive approach towards the state.

5.1.2 Franko's rule (1952-1975)

ETA originated in a group of nationalist students associated with PNV, who were secretly meeting since 1952.[19] (Weinberg, 2009; Murua, 2014). The first stage of its evolution is characterized by inner disputes about the strategy of the position towards the centre. ETA originated as an opposition to the non-violent strategy of PNV. Opposite from PNV, ETA aspired to form a progressive, secular, socialism-oriented nationalist group inside the Basque territory (Murua, 2014). Although wide criticism for the strategy of PNV, ETA at first stage did not present itself as necessarily violent (Weinberg, 2009), however, it did not preclude using armed resistance, when necessary (Leonard, 2017). The first years of *Ekin* were dedicated to gaining knowledge of the Basque nation to form a coherent program and public support (Murua, 2014).

ETA originated in 1959 not as a political party but rather as a nationalist movement. The very beginning of ETA's campaign was focused on propaganda and sabotage activities[20], but declared willingness to go beyond these activities (Fernández, 2017). The first publicly noticed attack of ETA took place in 1961, when the activists attempted to derail a train with veterans celebrating the anniversary of the 1936 fascist coup. However the attack was not successful, the regime applied strong repressions to Basque nationalists (Murua, 2014; Leonard, 2017).

During the 1960s several ideological and strategical assemblies of ETA took place. The assemblies shaped the policies of the organizations as well as its strategic objectives. Among these objectives were: full independence of Basque country, social liberation[21], democratic principles, that should have been reached through armed struggle by gaining support by utilization of the principle *action – repression – action* and profiting on the regime's repressions. In that time, the world has been experiencing actions of several clandestine nationalist actions, which provided the radicals with a wide spectrum of inspiration. One of the assemblies adopted the tactics inspired by Algerian FLN, by provoking over-reaction and

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[19] The first stage is commonly known as *Ekin,* named after the bulletin presented by the organization (Murua, 2014).

[20] E.g. public displays of Basque symbols, small detonations on industrial facilities etc. (Murua, 2014)

[21] The second half of the 1960's are characteristic by a significant shift to more Marxist position, influenced by radical nationalist movements around the world (e.g. Cuban Revolution) (Murua, 2014)

repression by a series of attacks, thus declining the loyalty of the local population towards the regime (Weinberg, 2009).

The outbreak of violence by ETA is dated to 1968. It started with the death of a Spanish police officer and one of the ETA members during a casual traffic stop and subsequent murder of another police officer (Murua, 2014; Leonard, 2017). Before the first victims, ETA attempted several bank robberies to compensate for the limited subsidies from its supporters, however, the results were disappointing (Fernández, 2017). The regime answered to the killings with increased brutality and a huge wave of arrests and maltreatment of civilians. The repressions resulted in increased hostility towards the regime and thus increased support for the nationalists (Fernández, 2017). On the other hand the leaders of the organization were either arrested or forced to escape to France[22] (Weinberg, 2009; Murua, 2016). The organizational setbacks caused by the repression led to further radicalization of the nationalists. The regime miscalculated the situation and organized a public trial with members of ETA – so-called Burgos trials. Franco's goal was to set an example of the trial and publicly present the trial with the presence of the press. The opportunity to publicly display the oppression – limited access to attorneys and effused demand for the death penalty for all accused – ignited widespread anger and dissatisfaction not only in Spain but also in rest of western Europe (Weinberg, 2009; Murua, 2014; Fernández, 2017). The death penalties for convinced activists were later commuted, due to public and international campaign of anti-Franco forces, consisting of stoppages, strikes, and demonstrations. The dictatorship, publicly denounced during the process, reacted too late (Fernández, 2017). The process became a catalyst for the nationalist movement – the process provided the organization with a huge number of recruits, due to increased popularity, that it became capable of engaging Spanish security during the following years (Murua, 2014). Even many actors outside Spain regarded ETA's armed struggle against the regime as applicable and demonstrated support for the organization (Woodworth, 2001).

One of the first peaks of ETA's struggle came in 1972-1973, when the group conducted the highest amount of attacks so far. The campaign culminated in December 1973 with the assassination of Louis Carrero Blanco (Weinberg, 2009). At the time, when the end of Franco's regime seemed imminent, Carrero Blanco was a symbol of the continuity of the regime and hard-line policy against the nationalists. As a prime minister, Blanco was supposed to become a direct successor of Franco (Weinberg, 2009; Murua, 2014; Whitfield, 2015). The assassination was a great strategic success for ETA, however on the other hand it led to inner

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[22] France was not engaged in exchanging prisoners back to Spain during Franco's reign (Murua, 2014).

tension and disputes in the group. After the attack it seems obvious, that the post-Franco Spain will turn into a constitutional monarchy (Weinberg, 2009; Kern, 2017). Thus the biggest source of inner tension was related to the future nature of the group and its campaign in a democratic environment (Murua, 2017b). The year 1974 saw a split in the organization into a political branch and military branch.[23] The political branch (commonly labelled as ETA-pm) sought to combine armed struggle – selective violence – with political participation, whereas the military branch (ETA-m) decided to continue with military means. The majority of activists joined the political branch, which offered continuing mass struggle with Marxist-Leninist party orientation (Murua, 2014, 2017; Fernández, 2017).

5.1.3. Transition to democracy (1975-1998)

Following Franco's death in 1975, King Juan Carlos I. came to power, declaring willingness to contribute to the transition of the country to a democratic state (Murua, 2014; Kern, 2017). However, the process of transition was not smooth and was accompanied by increased political violence (Weinberg, 2009). The complex process included ratification of a new constitution in 1978, amnesty for several political prisoners, legalization of several opposition parties (including Communist Party) as well as efforts for decentralization, culminating by a new statute of autonomy in 1979 (known as Guernica statute) providing the Basque territory with its parliament (Weinberg, 2009; Murua, 2014; Fernández, 2017). The regime was wrong in its prediction that ETA shall eliminate its actions, once the demands for autonomy would be met (Murua, 2014). For the militants, nothing apart from absolute independence was acceptable. On the other hand, the majority of the Basque population was satisfied with the outcome. The process of transition declined the support for ETA from both international and internal environment – the position of opposition to the regime became irrelevant and the living conditions of Basque population was improving (Kern, 2017). The new pro-regime sentiments could be sufficiently displayed on the results of the referendum regarding the acceptance of the Guernica statute – although ETA urged the civilians not to attend the referendum, the statute was accepted by the majority of the population[24](Murua, 2014).

The decreasing support led to a change in ETA's policy. The ETA-pm continued its campaign based on political participation, however, it soon split into several factions, that merged with Basque leftist parties (Weinberg, 2009; Murua, 2014). After negotiating an amnesty agreement

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[23] There was already a split in the organization in the beginning of the 1970's between ETA (V) and ETA (VI). The latter eventually declined and split in several leftist organizations (Murua, 2014; Fernández, 2017).
[24] Although the attendance was around 59 % (it was still enough to consider the referendum as valid), 94 % of voters voted affirmatively (Murua, 2014).

with the government and in return, laid down its arms in the early 1980s (Kern, 2017; Murua, 2017b). Some of its members underwent "social reintegration" and participated in socialist parties (Weinberg, 2009), whereas the members of the other part of the organization remained active but were soon absorbed by ETA-m (Fernández, 2017). Since the merge, the nationalist movement can be linked to one ETA again. ETA-m continued its armed struggle however it was, due to deteriorating support from the public, forced to shape its tactics. Instead of relying on mass mobilization, ETA adopted a *war of attrition strategy*. This strategy consist of conducting a high number of attacks, focused rather on material losses in order to make the campaign against the nationalists too costly for the government. After weakening the government, it should have been more compliant to negotiate. (Murua, 2014). At the end of the 1970s, a nationalist coalition *Batasuna*, later known as a party with close links to ETA, was established. At first, its members refused to take their seats as they renounced the legitimacy of the government (Weinberg, 2009). However, the coalition was not as crucial for the success of a group as Sinn Féin for the IRA.

The beginning of the 1980s was the most tragic period in the history of ETA. During the whole decade, the organization continued its attacks, but had to deal with declining support on Basque territory, especially on the political level (Murua, 2014). Between 1983-1987, anti-terrorist paramilitary group *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* (GAL) operated in the streets. Their goal was to prevent terrorist attacks by carrying deadly attacks against Basque refugees in France and prominent nationalists in Basque. Those dead squads were state-sponsored, cohesive, and well-organized. The outcome of the campaign, besides the spiral of unnecessary violence, was the change in French policy towards Basque nationalist. Aware of the spillover of violence, France abandoned its reluctance to collaborate with Spanish authorities in repressing refuged ETA militants (Murua, 2014). Following the change in border policy, ETA lost its safe haven and was forced to adapt its strategy. The late 1980s meant the beginning of talks between the Spanish government and ETA culminating in the first ceasefire in January 1989 and subsequent negotiations in Algiers (Murua, 2014; Ubasart-Gonzalez, 2019). However, the ceasefire was broken nearly three months after (Strmiska, 2001). The negotiations were limited only in technical issues, such as the position of prisoners, however, the political issues were not discussed at all (Murua, 2014).

Despite the failure of negotiations in Algiers, ETA did not intend to abandon the negotiations policy. Olympic Games in Barcelona and Universal Exhibition in Seville, scheduled to take place in 1992, offered an opportunity to put enough pressure on the government to negotiate – the state would be in scope of the rest of the world. Afraid of attacks and attempts to gain

publicity led the Spanish government to tighter cooperation with France (Muro, 2017). The result of an increased effort to prevent terrorist attacks was *Operation Bidart*, during which the entire leadership was arrested (Murua, 2014; Whitfield, 2015; Muro, 2017). Bidart was a nearly fatal blow to the organization and one of the breaking points in the history of the conflict. Although the terrorists were able to survive and further reorganize, the intensity of their activity never returned to the pre-1992 phase (Murua, 2014). The disaster of Bidart forced the nationalist to apply major changes in the strategy, since the continuation of the war of attrition strategy seemed unrealistic, considering the conditions of the organization (Murua, 2014; Whitfield, 2015). Facing the real threat of both military and political failure, ETA changed its strategy to *"socialization of suffering"*[25] (Whitfield, 2015). The key notion of this strategy was the change of targets. Since ETA did not counter Franco's regime anymore, it had to identify new adversaries. The members of security forces were replaced by prominent non-nationalistic actors – politicians, academics, local authorities, businessmen, journalists, etc. (Whitfield, 2015). Those assassination attempts were accompanied by *kale borroka* – a large number of street rioting, including fights, vandalism, graffiti, etc. (Murua, 2014). The growing prominence of ETA's victims[26][27] and the number of unintended casualties among civil population enhanced mobilization of civil society against the violence of ETA and further led to the popularization of pacifist movements in Spain – most notably *Elkarri*, created by sympathizers of Basque nationalism promoting dialogue and peaceful resolution (Strmiska, 2001; Whitfield, 2015).

5.1.4. Changes in policy (1998-2004)

During the last years of the 1990s, ETA was afraid of its decreasing influence on Basque nationalism. This resulted in another major shift in ETA's policy. ETA decided to strengthen its political potential by enhancing communication with other Basque nationalist parties and the Spanish government (Strmiska, 2001). The political realization of the peace process appeared to be very difficult. In 1996, 23 senior officers of Herri Batasuna were arrested and sentenced to terms in prison for collaboration with the armed terrorist group (Weinberg, 2009). The new leadership around Arnaldo Otegi[28], who came in charge of the party soon after focused

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[25] It is a term used by members of Herri Batasuna inspired by a document *Oldartzen* developed in 1994-1995 (Murua, 2014; Whitfield, 2015).
[26] ETA attempted to assassinate e.g. José Maria Aznar, leader of *Partido Popular* and Spanish Prime Minister or king Juan Carlos.
[27] Victims of ETA attacks were e.g. Gregorio Ordońez, member of *Partido Popular*; Fernando Múgica, member of Socialist Party or Miguel Ángel Blanco, local leader of *Partido Popular*, whose kidnapping and murder received wide attention (Murua, 2014, Ubasart-Gonzalez, 2019).
[28] Thanks to his role in Herri Batasuna and Basque peace negotiation often nicknamed „Spanish Gerry Adams"

on enhancing the role of Herri Batasuna[29] in the process. Members of Herri Batasuna, together with other nationalist parties, such as PNV, signed a political agreement Estella-Lizarra Declaration in 1998, declaring shared objective to seek resolution through dialogue (Whitfield, 2015). Soon after the declaration, ETA announced a second unilateral ceasefire (Murua, 2014). The ceasefire was followed by another round of negotiations between ETA and the government. However, it became evident, that no side was eager to compromise. First, the government did not intend to grant full independence for the region. Second, ETA did not fully abandon its violent actions – although it stopped with targeted assassinations, it continued with *kale borroka* and *revolutionary taxes*[30] (Strmiska, 2001). The negotiations finally broke down in 1999 and ETA soon returned to its armed campaign (Weinberg, 2009).

Another major blow for the campaign was the 9/11 attacks. The campaign of ETA was very turbulent in the first months after the ceasefire. The attacks changed the perspectives on terrorism – they became global enemies, regardless of their motivation. The starting global war on terror enabled the Spanish government to develop new anti-terrorism policies (Murua, 2014; Whitfield, 2015). One of the key laws, that passed national parliament was the Law of Political Parties in 2002 that allowed the authorities to outlaw political organizations with links to terrorist groups. One of the consequences of the law was the cut of public funding for the organization (Muro, 2017). According to the law, Batasuna and its predecessors EH and EB were outlawed in 2003. The law included provisions forbidding the reorganization of Batasuna under another name. The headquarters were closed, many of its members were prosecuted. Despite being illegal in Spain, Batasuna did not go underground and act as it was still legal (Murua, 2014). After Batasuna was outlawed and ETA faced a serious offensive from the state, other nationalist actors proposed ideas for peaceful resolution.[31]

5.1.5 Decline (2004-2011)

In 2004, terrorist attacks in Madrid resulted in 191 deaths and thousands injured. The attacks occurred only three days before Spanish general elections. The government, led by *Partido Popular*, built its campaign on a hard-line approach towards ETA, promptly blamed ETA for the attacks. Although it soon became evident, that the real perpetrator of the attacks was Al-Qaeda, the government stuck to its story (Whitfield, 2015; Duerr, 2017). The real motive for

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[29] Later named Euskal Herrirratok (EH) and Batasuna until its dissolution in 2003.

[30] Often demanded from rich business actors. Refusal to pay often resulted in kidnappings, assassinations or bombings of the bussiness (Murua, 2014).

[31] Especially from Baque government led by Juan José Ibarretxe. The government even attempted to hold a regional referendum about peace process and further political status of the region, but unsuccessfully (Murua, 2014).

the attacks was the Spanish support for intervention in Iraq. The dissatisfaction of the public resulted in PSOE winning the elections (Whitfield, 2015). The new government led by Zapatero showed willingness to rearrange regional policy and negotiate with ETA, although it continued with hard-line antiterrorism policy. The measures applied to all forms of terrorism – both nationalist and religious. The post-2004 era could be characterized by alternating waves of violence and ceasefires, since ETA suffered significant losses in material and human resources and thus was unable to conduct a sustainable campaign (Alonso, 2008; Ubasart-Gonzales, 2019). Both sides of the Basque conflict agreed on a two-track approach towards conflict resolution. ETA should discuss technical issues – prisoners and disarmament – whereas Basque political forces – namely PNV, PSOE, and Batasuna – should negotiate a framework for Basque territories (Murua, 2017b). The process was overviewed by international negotiators. However, ETA did not fully renounce its influence on the negotiations – its opposition to a draft promoted by the parties led Batasuna to oppose its ratification, although the attitudes of ETA and Batasuna were not the same. Furthermore ETA broke a ceasefire in 2006 by bombings in Madrid with two casualties. The government declared an end of the peace process but following pressure from international actors convinced Zapatero to continue with the negotiations (Murua, 2014). Unfortunately, the lack of trust among the actors led to complete failure of the process (Murua, 2017b).

The failure of negotiations resulted in splintering inside ETA but also between ETA and Batasuna. While ETA still advocated armed struggle, Batasuna started to promote a solely political way out of the conflict (Murua, 2017b). The nationalists missed the last opportunity to lay down its weapons and negotiate some exit options. ETA was slowly getting marginalized and lost contact with ordinary Basques (Murua, 2017b). Furthermore Spanish government increased its pressure on ETA and nationalist Left. The leader of Batasuna, Arnaldo Otegi was imprisoned only days after the end of the ceasefire in 2007. He was soon followed by other high-ranking members of Batasuna and ETA fighters. While being out of prison between 2008-2009[32], Otegi was able to achieve international contacts which later continued with the supervision of other nationalist actors. In 2010 the Brussels Declaration signed by various international public figures called on ETA to declare a permanent and variable cease-fire (Whitfield, 2015; Ubasart-Gonzales, 2019). By 2010, the actions were taken almost entirely by Batasuna. Its member tried to participate in elections by putting their names on ballots of various parties, although many of them were promptly banned by the Supreme Court, the

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[32] In 2009, Otegi was imprisoned again for attempts to reorganize Batasuna (Whitfield, 2015).

nationalists were able to win some seats in coalition with the Communists (Murua, 2014). In September 2010 ETA stopped its armed actions and in January 2011 announced a permanent ceasefire (Kern, 2017). However both the government and the public remained skeptical until finally in October 2011 ETA announced a complete cessation of its armed activity (Whitfield, 2015; Kern, 2017). Meanwhile Batasuna was able to form eligible political parties, that were not outlawed according to Law on Political Parties – *Sortu* and *Bildu*[33]; these parties openly oppose political violence, but did not abandon nationalist leftist policy (Whitfield, 2015). The success of these parties in elections resulted in the resurgence of nationalism in politics. (Kern, 2017). However, Basque nationalist violence has not returned to Spain. ETA finished the process of disarmament in 2017 and in 2018 it declared its absolute dissolution and apologized to the victims (Ubasart-Gonzales, 2019).

5.2. Ceasefires and negotiations between ETA and Spanish government

Many times in its history ETA announced ceasefires and declared willingness to negotiate. However many of its ceasefires were called "infinite", however were broken in a short time. Except for the last ceasefire, almost no cessation of violence lasted for more than a year (Murua, 2014). The ceasefires were accompanied by attempts of negotiations with ruling authorities. The negotiations were possible only in a democratic environment since Franco's regime was not tightly relying on public opinion. The opposition to the autocratic regime provided ETA with increased domestic and international support, potential attendance on negotiations would delegitimize efforts of the organization (Murua, 2014; Fernández, 2017). The democratic regime was willing to negotiate, as it was demonstrated in the early 1980s, after negotiating demise of the political wing of ETA, offering it a social reintegration and political participation (Weinberg, 2009).

ETA has attempted negotiation several times, but it was not successful. The organization was not able to reach any political compromise with the government. Although both sides of the conflict found themselves in a situation of mutually harming stalemate (Kerr, 2017), when significant progress in conflict resolution appeared to be necessary no agreement was reached for several reasons. First, the organization announced a ceasefire almost exclusively when it faced a serious threat of failure. The first ceasefire in 1989 was called after the end of the *Dirty War* and subsequent change in French policy – therefore the destroying of safe haven in France and related organizational struggles (Murua, 2014). The second ceasefire in the 1990s followed

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[33] Bildu was in the first place oulawed by Supreme Court, but the Constitutional Court overturned the decision (Murua, 2017b).

the Operation Bidart and subsequent organizational weakening of the organization combined with deteriorating public support (Murua, 2014). The ceasefires during the 2000s came after another weakening of the organization, cuts in public funding, and other counterterrorism measures adopted by the government (Fernández, 2017). Second, there were no credible commitments for peaceful resolution. The cessation of armed campaign was in many cases not complete. For example during the 1998 ceasefire ETA did not abandon *kale borroka* and revolutionary taxes (Strmiska, 2001), and the 2006 ceasefire was disrupted by bombings of Madrid airport, although formally the ceasefire was still on (Muro, 2017). It is also necessary to state, that the Spanish authorities also conducted several actions that undermined the peace process. The actions were mostly taken by the Spanish judiciary – it deliberately resurrected old cases from the archives and pursued high ranks of prosecutions (Zulaika, 2017). Third, no side showed willingness to compromise. The government was compliant to compromise in technical issues, regarding the prisoners, amnesty, or criminal prosecution, but did not want to make any concessions in political issues. The attitude of the government was *"first peace, then politics",* although the attitude of ETA was *"first politics, then peace"* (Zulaika, 2017). ETA was reluctant to lay down arms before reaching any negotiable settlement. The attitudes of both sides were so different, that there was almost no chance of reaching an agreement; it appears that the negotiations itself were the maximal possible outcome. The failed negotiation attempts resulted in deteriorating public support for both ETA and the government, regardless of the ruling political party (Murua, 2014; Whitfield, 2015).

5.3. ETA and Herri Batasuna

One of the objectives of this paper is to focus on the relationship between the terrorist organization and its political wing. Regarding the history and the cessation of violence in the Basque region, the political wing did not play a key role in the process as Sinn Féin did in Northern Ireland. Whereas in Northern Ireland both the organization and its political wing were united in its means and objectives in Spain, Herri Batasuna (later known as EH or Batasuna) and ETA were divided in its objectives and Batasuna later conducted actions on its own, ensured that without a major change in strategy the Basque nationalist objectives would end in a complete failure (Murua, 2017b). There may be some reasons identified for an explanation of the unstable relationship between the two actors.

First, there is a relatively short history of democracy in Spain. With a highly centralized autocratic regime there was not much space to develop stable party organizations allied with the clandestine organization. Furthermore, the electorate supported rather the more moderate

PNV (Murua, 2014). The terrorist did not have the time to develop effective structure and communication channels, so it could conduct a sustainable and effective campaign as it was the case of IRA and Sinn Féin. Second, the Spanish government was able to respond to the possibility of the existence of an active political wing by passing suitable legislation. Especially the Law on Political Parties extremely limited the opportunities for political actions. The nationalist activist was forced to seek eligible spots on the ballots of various parties not directly linked to the nationalist agenda.[34] By precluding the voters to demonstrate support, the government made ETA loss some of its legitimacy (Murua, 2014). Furthermore the party could not provide the organization with financial support (Muro, 2017). Third, the parties were not tightly personally linked. Even in ETA, there can be found cases of membership in both organizations[35], although in the majority of cases there is a lack of evidence (Murua, 2014). But the tighter personal interconnection would have prevented the ideological and strategical diversity that occurred after 2000. There used to be direct linkages and the attitude of ETA shaped the policy of Batasuna – the party often refused to condemn political violence of ETA and renounced agreements that ETA did not found suitable for its policy (Murua, 2017b). Fourth, ETA did not appear to be a useful partner in politics for Batasuna at all. In the electoral years, the intensity of political violence was increasing, which resulted in a decrease in popular support and undermining the electoral results of Batasuna. The violent strategy of bringing the public to cast the ballots and support Basque nationalists did not pay off at all (McGrath, 2014). Fifth, ETA was unable to react to tensions within the Nationalist Left (a group of nationalist socialist parties which included Batasuna), which has suffered the most following the failure of the negotiations in the years 2005-2007. The state repressions on nationalist parties led the Nationalist Left to reshape its power structure. ETA was later unable to reassess the relationship and lost the decisive power, Batasuna later decided on its own to pursue the process of democratization and changes of the distribution of power within the nationalist movement, which implied the end of armed struggle, that ETA was reliable on (Zulaika, 2017). In the end, Batasuna decided to sacrifice the armed entity to preserve its political legacy and enable to continuation of a post-ETA nationalist policy.

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[34] The ballots mostly belonged to leftist or Communist parties (Murua, 2014).
[35] For example Arnaldo Otegi was sentenced to prison for kidnappings conducted by ETA in 1980's (Charvát, 2018).

5.4. Spanish counterterrorism approach

To effectively describe the Spanish anti-terrorism policy, there has to be a clear distinction in particular stages of the development of the regime. The approach of Franco's centralized regime is different from the Spanish democratic state and even during the period of Spanish democracy, the policy has experienced several changes, especially after the 9/11 attacks. To match these phases with particular approaches provided in the theoretical chapter, the dominant policies of the government need to be taken into account.

The authoritarian regime utilized on applying extraordinary pressure on the group by allowing harsh prosecution, death penalties and aggressive repression, which did not affect only the terrorists, but civil society as well. The group utilized on this action-repression policy by gaining support and building legitimacy (Fernández, 2017). On the other hand, the hard-line approach should have affected the means and resources of the group, since many of the Basque terrorists had to seek asylum abroad – especially in France. By hard repressions and attempts to limit the capacity of the group, the regime expected to increase the cost of large campaigns and thus limit it. The human capacity was compensated by waves of recruits, due to the regime's discriminatory policy (Murua, 2014). After Franco died in 1975, the new democratic regime initiated a policy that can be rather linked to organizational approach – the government conducted legislative actions, that to some extent fulfilled the demands of the part of nationalists. Its social-friendly policy, releasing of prisoners, and promises of limited autonomy of the region created splits within the nationalist movement. While some of the nationalists were satisfied with this outcome, the hard-liners decided to continue the campaign (Weinberg, 2009). Furthermore the inner disputes did not regard solely the issue of independence, but the leftist agenda as well; however there is no proof of a direct involvement of the government in the creation of these disputes (Fernández, 2017). Things changed when the conservative government of Aznar's Partido Popular came into office. The simplified hard-line approach suggested a setback to the pre-transition period. Such measures are hard to defend in a democratic society, however, the public support for ETA decreased significantly over time and the post-9/11 global war on terror made hard counterterrorism policy acceptable (Murua, 2014). The post-9/11 anti-terrorism policy fits neither of the approaches presented by Crenshaw. Instead it would be better described by the term "*enemy criminal law*" (Duhart, 2019). The enemy criminal approach justifies applying extraordinary measures on "non-persons" – non-compliant, regime-challenging "others" (Duhart, 2019). The Spanish policy emphasized criminal law enforcement (Van Sliedregt, 2010), broadening of the concept of ETA as a

complex terrorist organization enabled the government to incorporate non-violent separatist groups, *herriko taberna*[36] networks and political parties as well (Duhart, 2019). The strategy proved to be very effective in weakening the group's infrastructure and damaging its strategy – the leadership even envisaged defeat (Alonso, 2018) It relied mostly on large-scale policing and tight cooperation with jurisdiction, enable to penalize active members of a separatist movement. This approach however attempts to combat terrorism by force and does not aspire to engage in a conflict resolution by eliminating the core causes of political violence (Duhart, 2019). Spanish government managed to only eliminate a group however did not manage to focus on the root causes of nationalist terrorism, that persisted and soon re-emerged in Catalonia.

5.5. Discourses and narratives from the actors

The following part addresses the discourses and narratives of the actors of the conflict – ETA, the Spanish government, Spanish civil society, and international society. The changes in policy and related discourse as well as public documents and opinion polls are taken into account in this chapter. From the beginning ETA utilized historical connotation and the reference to the Spanish Civil War, which served as a moral imperative for Basque nationalists to struggle against the regime that is responsible for the prosecution of Basque population and responsible for the current situation (Valera-Ray, 2013). The reminiscence of the Civil War was a common argument after the fall of the regime as well, especially when Partido Popular was in office – the socialists were often presented as the inheritors of the Republican side (Maskaliūnaitė, 2007). ETA as a representative of the Basque population, oppressed by the Spanish government adopted the discourse of legitimate opposition to the government. After the fall of the regime, ETA blamed the regime for oppressing the Basque right for full independence – the regime was merely a continuation of Francoism (Murua, 2014). The territorial demands were dominant during the transition period. The position of ETA became even more stable after the dirty war – ETA was able to utilize on the state-sponsored terrorism and present itself as a victim of oppression (Maskaliūnaité, 2007; Murua, 2014). The violence used by ETA is therefore legitimized, as it serves primarily for defence against Spain and France as the aggressive actors. Further, the moderate groups as PNV, EA, or ELA were added on the list of adversaries. Reliance on territorial gains and reluctance to give up its arms were the key notions of the discourse of the organization (Valera-Ray, 2013). Similar discourse can be seen in Herri Batasuna. The party publicly support the armed campaign of ETA and permanently rejected

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[36] Herriko tabernas refers to bars, popular among the members of nationalist Left. The revenues of these bars were often used as financial support of ETA.

any political resolution against the organization and refused to condemn political violence (Murua, 2017b). The breaking point in political discourse is the end of the peace process in 2007. The failure of negotiations led the party to shape its discourse and engage in the democratic process (Zulaika, 2017).

From the end of the Civil War in 1936, the regime repressed the peripheral nationalisms by declaring Spain as one united entity based on Castilian origins (Maskaliūnaité, 2007). Thus no effort for regional independence was acceptable in authoritarian and centralized Spain. During the transition period and the creation of the Constitution, the demands of nationalism were marginalized – although the regions were granted limited autonomy (Maskaliūnaité, 2007; Murua, 2014). The majority of the Basque population was satisfied with this move, which led to the deterioration of popular support (Kern, 2017). The government was able to win the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens, but It failed to win the full support of Basque civilians and international society, for its reluctance to treat the Basque issue as a conflict with the intention to provide a peaceful resolution (Zulaika, 2017; Mahoney, 2018). Every Spanish Prime Minister since the transition promised there would be no negotiations with ETA (Zulaika, 2017). The conflict of the Basque region was labelled as merely "territorial problems" or "territorial debate" (Maskaliūnaité, 2007). The actions of ETA were efficiently presented as criminal activity, terrorists were not labelled as terrorist, but rather as enemy criminals, to whom extraordinary prosecution is acceptable (Duhart, 2019). Later the discourse of the Spanish government broadened not only to ETA itself, but also to its non-violent sympathizers and politicians of the Nationalist Left (Maskaliūnaité, 2007; Murua, 2014; Zulaika, 2017). Furthermore the Partido Popular also used the victims of ETA's violence as an argument to veto any attempts for negotiations,[37] and to add a moral dimension to its firm approach (Alonso, 2008; Whitfield, 2015).

The support of a local population was relatively high during the first phase of the existence of the group. As a firm opposition against Franco's regime, ETA fighters were treated as freedom fighters. The transition period is the splitting point in the development of popular support – not all were satisfied with the regime change (Murua, 2014). The popular support for the organization significantly decreased over time – due to the extraordinary violence during the 1970's – 1980's campaign, the Dirty War with GAL, the treating of victims of kidnappings, *kale borroka* etc. (Cronin, 2010; Weinberg, 2012; Murua, 2014; Kern, 2017). The state repression was no longer a justifiable argument for defensive terrorist violence for a majority

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[37] The policy of PP is believed to be largely influenced by the victims' organizations (Whitfield, 2015).

of the population (Murua, 2017b). The democratic system was stable, the revolutionary references declined, and ETA lost its justification for political violence (Murua, 2014). Most notably the kidnapping and murders of non-nationalist politicians and speakers of pacifist movements provoke nationwide dissatisfaction with the situation – both ETA and Spanish government shared guilt for the situation (Murua, 2014). According to the *EuskoBarómetro* statistics, since the beginning of the century, ETA did not enjoy much of a popular support, although the desire for independence, nationalism, and social issues were still largely present within the Basque population (Kern, 2017; EuskoBarométro, 2019). Despite refusing terrorist violence, the majority of the population (around 80 %) supported negotiations between the government and ETA (Zulaika, 2017), however, conditioned the negotiations with disarmament (Kern, 2017). The international environment was from the beginning loyal to Basque nationalists, as it represented the struggle against Franco. However, after the transition, the support for political violence significantly decreased (Murua, 2014) – the most remarkable evidence is the change of French policy towards Basque activist (Mahoney, 2018). International actors attempted to broker a peaceful resolution of the conflict, following the case of Northern Ireland – international observers took place in the negotiation in Geneva in 2007. After the failure of the negotiations, they pressured ETA into disarmament and initiation of transparent peace talks (Whitfield, 2015; Leonard, 2017; Ubasart-Gonzalez, 2019).

5.6. Reflection of ETA campaign, discussion

After several years of marginalization, ETA officially ended its terrorist campaign in 2018. Some would say, the campaign ended due to the imminent failure of the group to reach its political objectives – the Basque independence. In the assessment of the end of the group, a combination of factors can be observed. First, effective policing and criminalization of the campaign led to a significant limitation of resources for the group (Muro, 2017, Murua, 2017b). Second, during its existence, ETA was for several times victim of the decapitation strategy – most notably Operation Bidart may serve as an example of decapitation. This operation led ETA to the edge of its existence – the group did not completely recover from this defeat (Murua, 2014). Third, ETA lost popular support and legitimization of its armed struggle. However the majority of the Basque population is in favour of independence, the violent campaign resulted in a rapid decrease in popular support (Murua, 2017b). In the end ETA ceased to be the dominant actor of the Basque separatist movement in favour of the parties of the Nationalist Left (Mahoney, 2018). Fourth, through the undisputable military defeat, ETA was able to transform the struggle for independence to a non-violent campaign. This factor is one of the

reasons, why ETA, as well as some scholars, regard the end of the campaign as a political success (Murua, 2017b) – the government won the war, but ETA won the peace (Zulaika, 2017). The nationalist sentiment is still present within the Basque population; the electoral results of Bildu in recent years support this argument (Murua, 2017b). Fifth, despite not being the primary cause of disintegration, ETA experienced several inner splintering during its existence. Inner disputes regarded its socio-political orientation, means of campaign, and attitude towards negotiations (Weinberg, 2009; Murua, 2017b). The other possible ways of termination do not appear relevant in the case of ETA. The organization existed for almost 60 years – it is too long time to fit the claims about unsuccessful generational transition or irrelevance of its objectives. The Basque nationalist campaign transformed itself into a political campaign – there are no signs of criminalization of the group or culmination of the campaign into an open insurgency. Furthermore, there has been no open conflict with the need to use large military forces – Spanish anti-terrorism policy with exceptional intelligence was sufficient to eliminate the campaign (Muro, 2017).

5.7. Conclusion

The Basque nationalist terrorist organization ETA may serve as another contribution to the claim of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2014) about the end of a nationalist terrorist group by joining politics. Nationalist sentiments are still present not only in Basque (EuskoBarómetro, 2019) but also in other Spanish regions. Basque nationalist campaign did not lose its relevance, however, the means used by the terrorist became unacceptable for the majority of the population (Kern, 2017). The decrease of popular support in combination with effective policing strategy contributed to the end of a military campaign and the continuation of a peaceful political process for reinforcement of Basque autonomy. Political initiatives of the Nationalist Left played a key role in the process of transformation. It is necessary to state, that the parties did not conduct its campaign for peaceful political participation on behalf of the terrorist group, but rather despite the terrorist initiative. Furthermore, the inability and unwillingness of the Spanish government to treat the situation in Basque as a conflict and thus aspire for peaceful conflict resolution resulted in preservation or even enforcement of nationalism in the regions.

Conclusion

So how do nationalist terrorist campaigns end? The cases of Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Basque insist, that 1) nationalist campaign have a similar pattern of development; 2) the end of a terrorist campaign is not one-way, but rather a combination of factors. Both organizations support the claim about the end of nationalist groups by entering politics (Gaibulloev, 2014). However, the path towards the transition was different, mostly due to the cultural differences between both countries. IRA utilized the long tradition of British democracy, that made applications of extraordinary measures almost impossible, whereas ETA was born in the middle of the Francoist authoritarian regime, which was not afraid to apply harsh repressions against its population. The complete assessment regarding all possible ways of termination for both groups is presented in Table 1.

There can be several similarities observed in the development and cessation of campaigns. First, both organizations end their terrorist campaign by entering the politics. Both groups utilized on the existence of affiliated armed wing to continue their campaign through democratic means. Second, both organizations conducted their campaign in a complex environment, in which optimal solution was impossible to find – although the Basque problem "*appears to be easier to solve compared to the sectarianism in the Irish Troubles*" (Leonard, 2017). The complexity of the environment persists until today, keeping the objectives of the campaigns still relevant even after generations of combatants. Third, none of the organizations was able to overpower the state, attain military or political victory, or transform the conflict to full insurgency. Fourth, the long-time campaign led the terrorists to state of hurting stalemate and slow but stable decrease of popular support. This forced the groups to seek other than military solution.

Apart from similarities, there are also remarkable differences in the campaigns. First and most notably, there was a significant difference in the anti-terrorism approaches of both countries. Spanish authorities refused to treat the situation in Basque as a conflict; instead, they applied hard-line prosecution and criminalization of the nationalists. This produced short-term successes in limiting ETA's capacity but did not provide a long-term framework for conflict resolution. On the other hand, the British policing focused on breaking internal cohesion, recruitment of double-agents and discreditation of the group. Second, the authorities in Basque were able to utilize the decapitation strategy and neutralize several times both the terrorist group and its political wing. Third, the assessment of ETA's campaign is commonly presented as a failure as the group was unable to reach any kind of settlement with the government despite the high number of ceasefires and negotiations.

	IRA	ETA
TABLE 1. Relevance of possible ways of termination of terrorist groups		
Total dissolution	Not official	YES
Victory	NO	NO
Failure	NO	YES
Loss of popular support	YES	YES
Amnesty and dissolution	NO	YES – the case of ETA-pm
Military defeat	Stalemate	Stalemate
Policing	NO	YES
Decapitation	NO	YES
Inner splintering	YES – OIRA, CIRA, RIRA	YES – ETA(V), ETA-pm
Irrelevance of the topic	NO	NO
Unsuccessful generational transition	NO	NO
Entering the political system	YES – through Sinn Féin	YES – through Nationalist Left
Criminalization	Partial by splinter groups	NO
Insurgency	NO	NO

The campaigns of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and Euskadi Ta Askatusuna in Basque belong to the biggest terrorist campaigns of the 20th century. The nationalist campaigns of terrorists against state authorities stemmed from strong nationalist sentiments, which are still present within the population of the regions. Large-scale bombing campaigns, kidnappings, assassinations received worldwide attention. The nationalist conflicts lasted for decades and left many human and material losses. However, both campaigns came to an end after years of long conflict. The strategy of attrition and strategic failures of all actors led both organizations to hurting stalemate and a significant decrease in popular support. Whereas the Provisionals in Ireland were able to reach an agreement and achieve several concessions from the British government and Northern Irish Protestant, the Basque nationalists in Spain were not able to reach any political objectives, despite many negotiations attempts.

The Provisional Irish Republican Army started its campaign after the eruption of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. The Catholics were oppressed from the Protestant majority and the organization provided protection and later claimed territorial demands for the withdrawal of British forces and allowance for the Catholics to participate in government. The long-lasting campaign *de facto* ended in 1998 by signing of Belfast Agreements, when some of the demands of the Republicans were met. PIRA later ceased its armed campaign and decommissioned in 2005. The nationalist campaign continued in the political process, due to the successful transformation of the organization into a stable legal political party. The existence of Sinn Féin as a political wing of the organization proved to be essential – it enabled changes in nationalist strategy, a framework for negotiations, and legal continuation of the campaign.

The creation of the Basque nationalist terrorist group stemmed from the oppression of Basque culture from the ruling Francoist authoritarian regime. From the beginning the organization was not violent, it focused rather on propaganda and provocative actions. The first victims in 1968 resulted in the persecution of the Basque population and wide support for the nationalists. The campaign persisted through the period of transition to democracy after Franco's death in 1975. The concession from the new democratic governments towards the regions and improving the socio-economic situation in combination with violent campaigns led to the deterioration of popular support. ETA declared several ceasefires and attempted negotiations but was unable to reach any concession from the government, which strictly rejected any ideas of self-determination of the Basque population. Instead of relying on negotiations, the Spanish government adopted the policy of criminalization and effectively prosecuted – with the help of France – the members of terrorist organizations to sufficiently limit human and material resources and organizational capacities. Although the political wing of ETA, Batasuna, was illegal since 2003, it was able to reach some kind of settlement, which resulted in the dissolution of ETA and allowance of nationalist political forces into the political process.

Both organizations follow a similar pattern of demise of campaigns. The ends of the campaign can be characterized as a combination of ways – the transformation into a political party, the inner splintering due to disagreements over ideology and means. To avoid these processes within the groups is essential for the groups to survive. The democratic regime provided more opportunities for the campaign, due to a lack of counterterrorist policies suitable in the democratic environment. On the other hand, political violence in a democratic state is less acceptable and has a significant influence on popular support for the groups. The biggest difference in the development of the organizations is the approach towards the groups from the ruling authority. British government adopted a more liberal approach towards terrorism which

focused on breaking inner cohesion and delegitimization of the group. The incentives for the double agents and liberal approach towards political prisoners (except the period of hunger strikes) created incentives for the nationalists to leave the organizations corresponding with Crenshaw's organizational theory. On the other hand, Spanish authorities adopted a less liberal approach relying on strong criminalization of the campaign and prosecution of the members. This approach led the group to the state of facing the imminent threat of failure but failed to facilitate any settlement and helped to preserve nationalist sentiments within the population. Regarding the transition to politics, the authorities were favourable to this possibility. The British accepted Sinn Féin as a legitimate party and allow it to take part in negotiations after PIRA denounced violence. Spanish authorities illegalized parties of Nationalist Left after 2003, however, after the last permanent ceasefire, it allowed nationalist coalition Bildu – which strongly condemns violence – to take part in the elections. The end of terrorist campaign does not indicate the end of nationalism in any country at all, but it enabled to continue the struggle with peaceful democratic means.

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Diploma thesis proposal

Demise and disintegration of nationalist terrorist groups

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Introduction to the topic

Through the 20th century, many terrorist organizations have operated all over the world. They had, to some extent, remarkable influence on the policies of the states and international organizations. However, majority of them did not endure for long time. Regarding the impact of the anti-colonial wave, nationalist groups were one of the most plentiful type of terrorist organizations. But similarly to the other groups, their focus was merely disposable, and they disseminated relatively quickly. However, there have been remarkable exceptions and some of the groups endured for decades.

This thesis will focus on the demise and disintegration of nationalist terrorist groups. The aim is to analyse ongoing processes within these organizations and identify participation on both inner processes inside the group and governmental counter-terrorist policy on the disintegration of the group. Findings from this thesis should provide recommendations towards targeting of counter-terrorism policy by constructing a general pattern of actions. As examples of this two-case study, IRA and ETA were chosen, because of their long and remarkable history through the 20th century and since their activity was successfully ceased by reaching an agreement with government and declaration of ceasefire. This thesis will focus on the events and context of occurrences leading to the demise of these organizations.

Research target

This thesis will put an emphasis on the process of disintegration considering both possible approaches towards the existence of terrorist groups – instrumental and organizational. Each approach provides a specific contribution towards the field of terrorism studies. Whereas the instrumental approach sees terrorism as an instrument for obtaining political goals, when insufficient obtaining of the organization's goals leads towards the disintegration of the group, the organizational approach employs the structure of organization, which is similar to every existing organization – each organization works through conflicts of interests, when personal gains of the members influence the behaviour of the organization even more than political objectives.

Regarding to the fact, that various types of terrorist organizations have various periods of endurance – considering different factors that will be described further – nationalist groups were chosen as a suitable object of this research. Nationalist groups have also one significant

advantage for similar research, regarding their ability to transform into nationalist political party and thus preserve their participation in the political process.

Serving as one of the most obvious examples of a terrorist groups, that has already disintegrated, Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) were chosen as cases for this study. The aim is to demonstrate the factors necessary to eliminate terrorist activities including both inner and outer factors e.g. popular support, counter-terrorist activities of the government, financial and human resources of the organization, mechanisms of internal communication etc. The thesis will be a two-case study with IRA and ETA studied separately while focusing on the same phenomena. Since both organizations have successfully disintegrated, while their agenda is still advocated by several political organizations, all phenomena shall be austerely observed using these two examples. Both cases should provide an evaluation for the general criteria of disintegration of terrorist groups.

Literature review

The phenomenon of development and disintegration of terrorist groups has been examined recently with means of quantitative research. Using statistical methods, scholars such as Clauset and Gleditsch or Gaibulloev and Sandler used statistical methods to research relations between the frequency of terrorist acts, resources of the organizations, number of the basis and the development and dynamics of terrorist groups. Their findings can be used to determine factors necessary for survival of terrorist organizations.

Gaibulloev and Sandler claim that survival of terrorist organization depends on number of home basis, overall size of the organization, region of their activities and involvement of transnational members. They also claim, that religious terrorist organizations have better chances to survive than far-right, far-left and nationalist organizations. They, however, do not provide much implications for counterterrorism policies in order to force the organization to demise.

In their another article, together with Sandler and Gaibulloev submit three possible ways of demise of terrorist organization – disintegration from within (splintering from internal factors), defeat by force (military or political) or joining the political process (either by transformation to political party or victory of the group). Regarding this diversion, they claim that various types of groups tend to disintegrate in characteristic way – thus nationalist terrorist group is most likely to end by entering the process, but when their goals are not too broad.

Chenoweth and et al. in the article *What makes terrorists tick* evaluate existing claims about development of terrorist groups, that have been developed in accordance to organizational

model and rational choice theory. Their critique should contribute to the research with better understanding of terrorist behaviour.

Daxecker and Hess focus on the influence of coercive means of state. They consider the role of state apparatus on the demise of terrorist groups, claiming that repression works better in authoritarian regimes rather than in democracies for producing backlash in the system and enhancing the lifespan of the terrorist groups.

However most of presented sources operate with quantitative methods and do not fully cover the area of nationalist terrorism of 20ᵗʰ century. They rather focus on general theory of terrorist organizations. Therefore, sources focusing on the two selected cases shall be used in the thesis. Murua in his thesis about demise of ETA provides narratives from both media and engaged actors and provides a complex overview of the situation at the end of existence of ETA. On the other hand Anthony Richards in the article *Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: The IRA, Sinn Fein, the Peace Process and Democracy* describes the splintering of IRA, creation of heritage groups and cooperation with political party Sinn Féin.

The sources listed above should provide an important contribution to the topic of demise of nationalist political parties and their transformation. Additional sources important for the research are listed below.

Conceptual and theoretical framework

According to presented literature, there can be identified three basic ways of disintegration of terrorist group – disintegration of within, defeat of the organization or transformation to the political party. The aim of the thesis is to identify, which way is most likely for nationalist terrorist group and what factors share the most participation on the process of disintegration. Since most authors mention mostly the factors important for enhancing of survival, these will be taken as recommendations for counter-terrorist policy.

This thesis will focus on factors essential for both demise and survival of a terrorist group. These factors will be extracted from existing literature and applied on the cases of IRA and ETA and following qualitative research will evaluate the compliance of these theoretical findings with described processes of demise of both groups separately.

Since the presented literature claim, that most likely ending for nationalist terrorist organization is its transformation into a political party, this process will be evaluated as well, considering the position of headquarters of the organization in the negotiations, attitude of governmental authority, public support, legal processes, public statements etc.

This thesis will work with following research questions:

1) Which factors appear to be the most essential for a nationalist terrorist organization to enhance its survival?

2) From the governmental perspective, what is the best way to terminate the existence of a nationalist terrorist organization?

3) Under which circumstances is a transformation of a terrorist group to a political party acceptable by the ruling authority?

Following the research question, at the end, the thesis should provide contribution towards the scholar area of development and disintegration of terrorist groups, towards the counter-terrorism policy making and towards the agenda-setting for the deradicalization and disarmament of such organizations.

Empirical data and analytical technique

The data essential for the research will be drawn from official documents of both governments – UK and Spain, as countries in which both organizations operated, public statements of leaders, databases of terrorist attacks, memoires of leading members of the organizations and other scholar sources focusing on the topic. Emphasis will be put on the size of the organizations, internal development of the cooperation, public resources and governmental actions. These data will be compared with theoretical framework drawn from scholar literature focusing on the general theory of disintegration of terrorist groups.

Since there has been no official public declaration of demise from both organizations – only unilateral declaration of ceasefire from both organizations – the sign of demise would be considered as the declaration of ceasefire with no following withdrawal from the peace process (thus the actions of IRA in 1990s before the Belfast agreement would not be considered as demise and following resurrection), since this could be considered as the breakpoint common for both organizations. Information about the size of organizations and total amount of resources should be drawn from scholar literature, since numbers from both sides may tend to be skewed in favour of opposite groups.

As support to this data, an analysis of public discourse from both sides (terrorist and government) will be used as well. Cognitive discourse analysis, according to T. A. van Dijk should be applied in this thesis, with emphasis put on the macro-level approach studying rather public speeches and policy-making process. Attitudes of both sides, values, political ideologies, norms and principles of either side should be taken into account in the analysis.

The main focus will be put on inner splintering, governmental actions, steps taken from both sides to achieve position in negotiations and preparation of position towards following transformation. Main points to be focused on in the analysis consist of willingness to negotiate, statements regarding progress in negotiation and peace process, future plans of actions and threats of future attacks. Rather qualitative content analysis should be used in order to explain progress and continuation of situation and changes in discourse.

Planned thesis outline

The thesis should have following outline, regarding complexity of both cases and amount of existing literature. The outline shall appear as following:

1) Introduction to the topic
2) Two possible approaches towards the life of a terrorist organization and its comparison for future research.
   a. Instrumental approach – the increased cost of terrorist actions makes terrorism less likely. When the objective is not obtained, the organization disintegrates.
   b. Organizational approach – terrorism is not only about political gains, but personal goals as well. The increased pressure from outside can make terrorism more likely, terrorist group is likely to disintegrate from within.
3) Introduction to possible ways of termination of terrorist groups
   a. Disintegration from within
   b. Military defeat
   c. Entering the political process
4) Factors influencing survival of terrorist group
   a. Factors contributing to the demise
   b. Factors enhancing survival
5) Case 1: IRA
6) Case 2: ETA
7) Remarks and discussion regarding previous findings
8) Conclusion

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