

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies
Department of International Relations

**Foreign Policy of Australia in the Asia-Pacific Region:
Major Influencing Factors**

Master's thesis

Author: Josef Dašek
Study programme: International Relations
Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Jan Karlas, M.A., Ph.D.
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Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
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3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on May 19, 2020

Josef Dašek

References

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on Australian foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The research target of this thesis is to identify the major factors that influence Australian foreign policy towards Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War period with a focus on power and identity. Each of these factors is examined with a different theoretical approach. The concept of power is framed by realism. Specifically, while analysing the role of power in Australian foreign policy practice, the concept of defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz is applied. The concept of identity is framed by constructivism. Concretely, while analysing the role of identity in Australian foreign policy practice, the insights from David Campbell's interpretative approach and Alexander Wendt's structural constructivism are applied. The analytical part of the thesis is divided into two parts (chapters). The first part analyses whether Australian foreign policymaking is guided by the intentions of Waltz's defensive realism. In this part the Australian alliance with the U.S. is presented as well as the rise of China. The second part analyses whether Australian ideas, values and norms are the major constitutive elements of its foreign policy behaviour. In this part the middle power diplomacy is presented as a distinctive practice of Australian foreign policy. The conclusion reflects findings of the research and suggests future challenges for Australia.

Abstrakt

Diplomová práce se zaměřuje na australskou zahraniční politiku v asijsko-pacifickém regionu. Cílem práce je identifikovat hlavní faktory, které ovlivňují australskou zahraniční politiku vůči asijsko-pacifickém regionu po skončení studené války se specifickým důrazem na moc a identitu. Každý z těchto dvou faktorů je zkoumán odlišným teoretickým přístupem. Koncept moci je rámován realismem. Konkrétně je v případě zkoumání role moci v australské zahraniční politice aplikován koncept obranného realismu Kennetha Waltze. Koncept identity je rámován konstruktivismem. Konkrétně je v případě zkoumání role identity v australské zahraniční politice aplikován interpretativní přístup Davida Campbella a strukturální konstruktivismus Alexandra Wendta. Analytická část práce je poté rozdělena na dvě části (do dvou kapitol). První se zabývá tím, zda se tvorba australské zahraniční politiky řídí Waltzovým obranným realismem. V této části je zmíněna aliance mezi Austrálií a Spojenými státy i mocenský vzestup Číny. Druhá část se zabývá tím, zda jsou australské ideje, hodnoty a normy těmi hlavními ustavujícími prvky její zahraniční politiky. V této části je zmíněna diplomacie střední mocnosti (*middle power*) jako charakteristická praxe australské zahraniční politiky. V závěru jsou reflektována zjištění výzkumu a naznačeny budoucí výzvy pro Austrálii.

Keywords

Australian Foreign Policy, Australia, Asia-Pacific, Identity, Power

Klíčová slova

australská zahraniční politika, Austrálie, asijsko-pacifický region, identita, moc

Title

Foreign Policy of Australia in the Asia-Pacific Region: Major Influencing Factors.

Název práce

Zahraniční politika Austrálie v asijsko-pacifickém regionu: hlavní faktory, které ji ovlivňují.

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Introduction

The following pages are dedicated to foreign policy of Australia and the major factors that influence Australian behaviour in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War period. After the shocks from the Second World War, the world has been divided into two parts – the ‘Western’ (democratic) bloc led by the United States of America (U.S.) and the ‘Eastern’ (communist) bloc led by the Soviet Union. Between these two blocs, a Cold War broke out and through a series of ‘outsourced’ conflicts and under the omnipresent risk of the nuclear war, it was not the end of 1980s till it has ended. During this period, Australia was part of the Western bloc having close relations to its former colonizer, the United Kingdom, and building close ties with the U.S. as its increasingly more important strategic partner in the region of Asia-Pacific.

With the collapse of the Berlin wall, a new chapter of the international relations (IR) had begun. The liberal-democratic world has won, and the communist bloc has lost. The famous hypothesis about the ‘end of history’¹ was formulated by the American political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, and Western way of modernization seemed to be the only viable option for states around the world. However, with the constant economic growth of the People’s Republic of China² in the last thirty years³ and its growing assertiveness at the international level (especially under current Chinese President Xi Jinping⁴), the end of history seems to become less likely. Instead, China shows to the world that you do not have to be a liberal democracy to prosper and shows another possibility of political regime to states. Furthermore, the rise of China and other states in the region of Asia-Pacific especially in the post-Cold War era, resulted into shifting the attention of the world policymakers to this region.

Australia, sharing its past and present with the West⁵ and building its future with the Asian states, was among the states that has been adapting to a new geopolitical dynamic. A continental state located in between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean while sharing a

¹ FUKUYAMA, Francis, “Konec dějin a poslední člověk.” 2002.

² Further in text the abbreviation “PRC” and “China” are used interchangeably.

³ The economic growth in terms of GDP. (World Bank, “China Overview,” [online] (n.a.))

⁴ Some analysts claim that China under Xi Jinping (who has become a President of China in 2013) changes its post-Mao Zedong’s trajectory from ‘soft power’ to ‘sharp power’. Also, due to the reinforcement of Xi’s competences, thanks to which he may rule China as long as he wants, The Economist described his style of governing as dictatorship. (CARDENAL, Juan Pablo, KUCHARCZYK, Jacek; MESEŽNIKOV, Grigorij and PLESCHOVÁ, Gabriela, “Sharp Power – Rising Authoritarian Influence,” p. 6; The Economist, “How the West got China wrong,” [online] 2018.)

⁵ As to define what do I mean by referring to West, we can apply the definition of Petr Drulák: “In geopolitical terms, the West roughly corresponds to NATO, the EU, Australia and neutral European Countries. However, if the West is defined in terms of the production of political concepts, then it narrows down to a network of English-language leaders, universities, and publishers that are based in the USA and, to some extent, in the UK.” (DRULÁK, Petr, “Introduction: For a Global Dialogue,” p. 13, in: DRULÁK, Petr, MORAVCOVÁ, Šárka and KRATOCHVÍL, Petr, Non-western reflection on politics, 2013.)

land border with no other state.⁶ While being geographically close to Asia, Australian history, language, culture, economics, religion or politics find its base in British colonization. However, an increasing economic dependence on Asian countries (especially China), the incoming ‘Asian century’ or growing Asian population in Australia forces Australia to balance carefully its historical affiliations with the new realities – especially in terms of its strategic and trade interests. Also, it might lead to a resolution of an Australian foreign policy divide between those who pursue the reinforcement with the major strategic ally (U.S.) and those who call for greater engagement with Asian countries.⁷ My work analyses the main interests of Australian foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region and how is Australian behaviour influenced by the two major factors – power and identity.

The first chapter is devoted to the theoretical framework. I frame my analysis by two different theoretical perspectives – realist and constructivist. In the realist part, I focus on the concept of balance of power. Specifically, I apply the neorealist approach of Kenneth Waltz and his concept of defensive realism.⁸ Additionally, in the Australian case, Michael Wesley shows that realism has its specific characteristics.⁹ On the other hand, I apply the constructivist approach as a contrasting lens to realism and as offering a different explanation of the post-Cold War development. Alexander Wendt, a prominent figure of constructivism, claims that major streams of international relations theory struggled to explain the end of the Cold War.¹⁰ I further develop the constructivist approach with David Campbell’s interpretative approach that questions fixed identity of states in terms of their foreign policy.¹¹ I argue that the contrast between realist approach (which I relate to the power balancing) and constructivist approach (which I relate to the construction of Australian identity) offers a valuable explanation of the Australian behaviour towards Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era.

In the second chapter, I present the methodology of the work. I clarify my analytical technique and describe the assessment of the role of power and the role of identity in the Australian foreign policy. To do so, three key concepts are elaborated in the methodological part – power, identity and foreign policy. In case of power, I draw upon the definition of Joseph

⁶ GYNGELL, Allan, WESLEY, Michael, “*Making Australian Foreign Policy*,” 2003, pp. 9-10.

⁷ GYNGELL, Allan, WESLEY, Michael, 2003, p. 12.

⁸ WALTZ, Kenneth N., “*Theory of International Politics*,” 1979.

⁹ WESLEY, Michael, “*The Rich Tradition of Australian Realism*,” 2009.

¹⁰ WENDT, Alexander, “*Social Theory of International Relations*,” 2005, p. 4.

¹¹ CAMPBELL, David, “*Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*,” 1998, pp. ix-x.

Nye.¹² In case of identity, I build on the definition on David Campbell's interpretation. In case of foreign policy, I explain the operationalization of the term.

To understand the clash between the power and identity in Australian foreign policy, it is necessary to explain its historical development. Thus, the third chapter of my work is devoted to the history of Australian foreign policy from 1940s onwards. A brief overview of the previous developments is presented to better understand the post-Cold War Australian foreign policy. It would be misleading to take the post-Cold War period since the fall of Berlin wall – this event rather explains the end of the Cold War in Europe. As Hugh White mentions in his article, the end of the Cold War in Asia is related to the deal between Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong in 1970s which meant that “*America would recognise the communist government in Beijing and, in return, China would cease to contest America’s strategic leadership in Asia.*”¹³

The general context of historical development in Australia is mainly based on the work of Australian historian Stuart Macintyre¹⁴, while the evolution of the Australian foreign policy is drawn upon the work of Alan Gyngell¹⁵, Australian expert on the international relations. In this sense I use Gyngell's claim that the sovereign Australian foreign policy begun in 1942. However, as Michael Wesley suggests, even before this date there were signs of initiative foreign policy in Australia.¹⁶

The analytical part of my work is divided into two chapters. I argue that power and identity are two major factors that influence Australian foreign policymaking. Thus, the fourth chapter is devoted to the role of power in the Australian foreign policy. In other words, how does the defensive realism reflect in the Australian foreign policy behaviour. In the fifth chapter I elaborate the role of identity in the Australian foreign policy. In other words, how does the identarian aspect that is mainly related to the concept of middle power reflect in the Australian foreign policy behaviour. Having two major factors implies that my hypotheses are also two. First, that Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its power position. The second hypothesis is that Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its identity. Both hypotheses should help to answer my research question: *What explains Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region?*

Before I proceed to theoretical framework of my work, I explain why I have decided to focus on the Asia-Pacific region and the period after the Cold War. Although I am using the

¹² NYE, Joseph S., Jr., “*The Future of Power*,” 2011.

¹³ WHITE, Hugh, “*Power shift: rethinking Australia’s place in the Asian century*,” 2011, p. 82.

¹⁴ MACINTYRE, Stuart, “*Dějiny Austrálie*,” 2013.

¹⁵ GYNGELL, Allan, “*Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World Since 1942*,” 2017.

¹⁶ WESLEY, Michael, “*Reading Room: Fear of Abandonment*,” [online] 2017.

term ‘Asia-Pacific’, the concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’ is also used among scholars and policymakers to delimit this part of the world. The theoretical background for Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific relates to John Mackinder and Alfred Mahan. Meanwhile Mackinder stressed in 1904 in his strategy “*the land element of the Asia-Pacific*,” Mahan, on the other hand, stressed in 1890 the importance of the naval element embodies in Indo-Pacific concept.¹⁷

In the Australian context, the concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’¹⁸ started to gain on the importance. The concept implies that with the rise of India and China, it better reflects the distribution of power in the region. The implementation of Indo-Pacific into the strategic thinking of Australia was mentioned for the first time in a white paper ‘*Australia in the Asian Century*’ from 2012.¹⁹ Since then, the governmental white papers frame Australian position in Indo-Pacific. However, since I am focusing mainly on the ‘Pacific’ side of the region, I stick with the Asia-Pacific delimitation.²⁰

The Asia-Pacific covers a large area, including “*the states of North America, Australasia and Northeast and Southeast Asia.*”²¹ The region is very diverse, and it would be a mistake to think about the Asia-Pacific as homogenous and integrated region. As Michael Yahuda argues: “*The regional identity of the Asia-Pacific may be said to derive from geopolitical and geo-economic considerations rather than from any indigenous sense of homogeneity or commonality of purpose.*”²² Unlike Europe, where integrating approach was pursued after the Cold War, the major aim of Asian countries was to enhance sovereignty and increase economic growth. Also, the region of Asia-Pacific includes countries among with profound differences among them in terms of economy, religion, politics, language, ethnicity or history. The region (re)gained importance in international politics with the (re)emergence of the Asian countries in the past decades and it is highly influenced by the great power politics.²³

The region is crucial for Australia, not only politically but also economically since it includes all the major agents of the global affairs. Among those agents are U.S., Australia’s crucial strategic ally, China, as the biggest trading partner for Australia,²⁴ or Japan, former ‘arch enemy’ of Australia, which nowadays belongs to its major economic partners and became its

¹⁷ DOBELL, Graeme, “*Indo-Pacific Versus Asia-Pacific As Mackinder Faces Mahan*,” [online] 2018.

¹⁸ The Australian government defines Indo-Pacific region as “*the region ranging from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia, including India, North Asia and the United States.*” (The Commonwealth of Australia, “*2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*,” 2017, p. 1.)

¹⁹ The Commonwealth of Australia, “*Australia in the Asian Century*,” 2012, p. 74.

²⁰ DOBELL, Graeme, 2018.

²¹ YAHUDA, Michael, “*The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific*,” 2004, p. 10.

²² YAHUDA, Michael, 2004, pp. 5-6.

²³ YAHUDA, Michael, 2004, pp. xiii, 6-7, 11; MENON, Jayant, “*Asia yet to earn its future*,” 2013, p. 3.

²⁴ TAYLOR, Brendan, TOW, William T., “*Crusaders and Pragmatists: Australia Debates the American Alliance*,” 2017, p. 77.

important partner in shaping the Asia-Pacific regionalism.²⁵ Furthermore, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)²⁶ is located in the region, mainly Indonesia which is one the closest Asian neighbour that is rapidly developing and with which Australia finally – after nine years of negotiations – signed a historic bilateral trade agreement in 2019.²⁷²⁸ Moreover, there is New Zealand,²⁹ one of Australia's closest allies (historically, politically, or in terms of security issues) with whom it had a long-term cooperation under ANZUS³⁰, and within the Five Eyes network³¹, and the Pacific region where Papua New Guinea (geographically closest country to Australia and its former colony³²) is located together with the Pacific islands such as Fiji, Vanuatu or Tonga where Australia traditionally enjoys large influence.³³

The Asia-Pacific region is an area of perhaps the most acute flashpoints in the world. Professor Brendan Taylor mentions the four major ones in his book. The first one is a long-standing conflict on Korean Peninsula, the second is a possible conflict over Taiwan, a dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is the third one and a conflict in the South China Sea involving all the major actors within or outside the region (including Australia) is the fourth one.³⁴

Additionally, it is a region of a possible great power rivalry between China and the U.S. which suggests that the power balance in the region is very delicate. Thus, one of the key questions of the past decade is what impact will Chinese rise have on the presence of the U.S. in the region? With an increasing confidence of the Chinese President Xi Jinping and the

²⁵ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 183.

²⁶ The ASEAN was established in 1967 and is focusing mainly on economic, cultural and social development in the region. It consists of ten member states: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. It is based on the principle of non-interference into other member state's internal affairs. One of the reasons why it was established was to integrate Indonesia into formal regional body. (ASEAN, "About ASEAN," [online] (n.a.); GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 37.)

²⁷ Associated Press, "Indonesia and Australia Ink Free Trade Agreement," [online] 2019.

²⁸ The full name of the bilateral free trade agreement is '*Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement*' and it was signed 4th of March in 2019. (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "*Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement*," [online] (n.a.))

²⁹ The foundation of "*the closest of Australia's international relationships*," in other words a close cooperation and consultation on issues such as politics towards Pacific, post-war settlement in the region or defence matters was the ANZAC Pact (1944), the first treaty adopted by the Australian government without Great Britain. (GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 21.)

³⁰ ANZUS refers to the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America. However, since the 1980s, the alliance is rather between Australia and the U.S. (for further explanation see subchapter 3.2).

³¹ The Five Eyes network represents "*the formal intelligence-sharing relationship between U.S., the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.*" (O'NEIL, Andrew, "*Australia and the 'Five Eyes' intelligence network: the perils of an asymmetric alliance,*" 2017, p. 530.)

³² GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 38.

³³ SCHULTZ, Jonathan and WALTIS, Joanne, "*Australia in the Pacific,*" p. 174, in: BALDINO, Daniel, CARR, Andrew, LANGLOIS, Anthony J. (eds.), *Australian Foreign Policy: Controversies and Debates*, 2014; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 40.

³⁴ See TAYLOR, Brendan, "*The Four Flashpoints: How Asia Goes to War,*" 2018.

impulsive behaviour of the U.S. President Donald Trump the question becomes even more apparent.

Furthermore, as data from 2018 shows, the growth in a world military spending was mainly influenced by the U.S. and China. However, even other Asia-Pacific countries contributed to this and the overall spending in North America, Asia and Oceania in total was around two thirds of the world total military expenditure. Also, four out of nine countries that possess nuclear arms are in the Asia-Pacific (the U.S., China, Russia, and North Korea) and two other countries (India and Pakistan) are in the close surround. All of this suggests that a potential conflict would be a disaster.³⁵

Regarding the economic, geostrategic, political and security importance of the Asia-Pacific region for Australia, it is crucial in my opinion to understand Australia's foreign policy within it.

I frame this work by the period from 1990s onwards. This period is mainly connected with the end of the Cold War and the profound changes that it has brought at the global level (collapse of the Soviet Union, rapid development of China, the U.S. domination in the realm of world politics etc.) as well as at the domestic level in Australia (Australia went through important economic reforms and became more engaged in the regional affairs). All these changes meant a "*qualitative change in world politics.*"³⁶

In terms of the theoretical debates, the debates shifted towards the debate between the rationalists and constructivists. The dominant rationalist theories – (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism – were criticized for being unable to explain the post-Cold War changes in IR, the influence of non-state actors etc. That is also reason why I chose to focus on the post-Cold War developments and included the constructivist approach into my analysis.³⁷

Moreover, the end of the bipolar world led to an increasingly complex and uncertain situation of a world politics which has been related to a growing interdependence among states, a rapid technological advancement and a new shift in a balance of power in the region.³⁸ However, it is necessary to bear in mind, to put it in David Campbell's words, that certain developments "*have been represented in ways that do not depart dramatically from those dominant during the cold war.*"³⁹ In other words, it would be misleading to think that with the

³⁵ SIPRI, "SIPRI Yearbook 2019: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Summary)," 2019, p. 6; GREEN, Michael J., DEAN, Peter J., TAYLOR, Brendan and COOPER, Zack, "The ANZUS Alliance in Ascending Asia," 2015, pp. 6-7.

³⁶ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. 7; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 191.

³⁷ REUS-SMITH, Christian, 2001, pp. 209, 216.

³⁸ YAHUDA, Michael, 2004, p. xii.

³⁹ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, pp. 7-8.

end of the Cold War, a completely new epoch had begun. Thus, in the third chapter, a longer history of the Australian foreign policy is presented for a better understanding of its post-Cold War developments and the changes brought by the end of the Cold War are elaborated in a more profound way.

1 Theoretical Framework

In the first part of this chapter, I present the theoretical framework, which is based on realist approach and constructivist approach. Two different theoretical lenses are applied to analyse Australian foreign policy from two different perspectives. I chose these two approaches because they offer the opposing views on formation of the two major independent variables of my work – power and identity (both concepts are further explained in the next chapter).⁴⁰

I do realize there are other influential theories and approaches (such as liberalism, Marxism or others) that might have been used for my analysis. However, after careful considerations I have decided to apply realism and constructivism to underline the contrast in how the Australian foreign policy towards Asia-Pacific region is driven. Also, there would not be enough space in my work to cover all possible approaches available in the theory of international relations.

1.1 Realism in International Relations

One of the most prominent schools of international relations is realism. Realism finds its roots in the historian of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides. He noted that the growing power of Athens caused fear in Sparta which consequently led to the war between them. This notion laid down the base for later realist scholars.⁴¹

Realist scholars argue that they describe the world as it is, not as it should be and consider politics and society as being “*governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.*”⁴² Additionally, realists are pessimistic about the human nature, specifically about the extent to which they can shape the world around them.⁴³

Power represents a key concept for realists. As Joseph Nye puts it: “*Realists come in many sizes and shapes, but all tend to argue that global politics is power politics.*”⁴⁴ The distribution and management of power in an anarchical international system is crucial⁴⁵⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Alexander Wendt developed a social theory of international relations. Nevertheless, it has been stressed (even by Wendt himself) that constructivism remains rather a method than a fully-fledged theory. (See WENDT, Alexander, 2005, p. 7; CHECKEL, Jeffrey T., “Review: *The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,*” 1998, p. 325.)

⁴¹ THUCYDIDES, “*History of the Peloponnesian War,*” 1972, p. 49 (Book I).

⁴² MORGENTHAU, Hans J., “*Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace,*” 1993, p. 4.

⁴³ TOW, William, T., “*Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security,*” 2001, p. 3; BURCHILL, Scott, “*Realism and Neo-realism,*” p. 70, in: BURCHILL, Scott, DEVETAK, Richard, LINKLATER, Andrew, PATERSON, Matthew, REUS-SMITH, Christian, and TRUE, Jacqui, *Theories of International Relations*, 2001; WESLEY, Michael, 2009, p. 326.

⁴⁴ NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011, p. 19

⁴⁵ NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011, p. 19; MORGENTHAU, Hans J., 1993, p. 5; BURCHILL, Scott, 2001, p. 70.

⁴⁶ Hans Morgenthau argues that power characterizes the autonomy of the political sphere, that political realists think “*in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth.*” (MORGENTHAU, Hans J., 1993, p. 13.)

because in an anarchical realm, states “*seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends.*”⁴⁷ Moreover, realists build on the presumption that states are unitary rational actors pursuing their interests in the anarchical system of IR “*through acquiring and exercising power.*”⁴⁸ Realism includes all kind of streams ranging from classic realists (e.g. H. J. Morgenthau or E. H. Carr), historical realists (e.g. H. Kissinger or the representatives of the English school – M. Wight and H. Bull) to neorealists (e.g. Kenneth Waltz or John J. Mearsheimer).⁴⁹

The major reason why I have decided to apply the realist theory is dual. Firstly, it is because of its status as perhaps the most significant theory to study IR.⁵⁰ The second reason is that the strategy advocated by realists dominated security politics of Asia-Pacific after the Cold War has ended.⁵¹ In a concrete case of Australia, some scholars argue that there is a distinctive form of realism emerged in the Australian tradition and there is a debate whether realist approach should be the driving force behind the Australian foreign policy.⁵² To narrow down my argument in the realist part, the major focus will be on Kenneth Waltz’s defensive neorealism and his conception of the balance of power. However, a brief overview of the development of the concept of balance of power is necessary to be explained at the first place.

1.1.1 Balance of Power

An important part of the realist approach is the concept of the balance of power. Hans Morgenthau argues that the strive for power of individual states leads to the need to establish the balance of power.⁵³ He claims that the international balance of power is an inherent and desirable part of the international system and if it is missing, it is due to the particular circumstances not because of its erroneous.⁵⁴ Morgenthau then continues with defining two leading patterns of the balance of power. First is the pattern of direct opposition, the second one is the pattern of competition.⁵⁵ Four methods of preserving the balance of power that builds on

⁴⁷ KEOHANE, Robert O., “*Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,*” p. 7, in: KEOHANE, Robert O. (ed.), *Realism and Its Critics*, 1986.

⁴⁸ TOW, William, T., 2001, p. 3.

⁴⁹ For more detailed description of developments, divisions and debates within realism see BARŠA, Pavel, CÍSAŘ, Ondřej, “*Anarchie a řád ve světové politice,*” 2008, pp. 29-149.

⁵⁰ As Robert Keohane puts it, “*without understanding it [realism], we can neither understand nor criticize our own tradition of thinking about international relations.*” (KEOHANE, Robert O., 1986, p. 4.)

⁵¹ TOW, William, T., 2001, pp. 2-3.

⁵² For the distinctive features of Australian realism see WESLEY, Michael, 2009, pp. 325-327. For the debate, see BURCHILL, Scott, and GRIFFITHS, Martin, “*Theory and Australian Foreign Policy,*” pp. 3-18, in: BALDINO, Daniel, CARR, Andrew, LANGLOIS, Anthony J. (eds.), *Australian Foreign Policy: Controversies and Debates*, 2014.

⁵³ MORGENTHAU, Hans J., 1993, p. 183.

⁵⁴ MORGENTHAU, Hans J., 1993, p. 183.

⁵⁵ MORGENTHAU, Hans J., 1993, pp. 188-192.

the outlined patterns are further specified by Morgenthau. The methods are (1) divide and rule, (2) compensations, (3) alliances, and (4) armaments⁵⁶, where the first three methods are part of the pattern of competition and the fourth method is part of the pattern of direct opposition.⁵⁷

Inis Claude, whose book deals with the management of power⁵⁸, sees the balance of power as an ambiguous concept, criticizing Morgenthau for presenting it simultaneously as a fact and normative ideal.⁵⁹ Meanwhile Morgenthau offers 4 different meanings of the balance of power,⁶⁰ Claude criticizes Morgenthau and systematizes various meanings of the term into three broader categories: (1) balance of power as a situation, (2) balance of power as a policy, and (3) balance of power as a system.⁶¹ The concept of balance of power is further developed by Kenneth Waltz as part of his defensive neorealism which serves as a base for my realist theoretical framework.

1.1.2 Kenneth Waltz: Balance of Power and Defensive Neorealism

With Kenneth Waltz came an important shift in the realist theory towards neorealism (or structural realism), a naturalistic, more sophisticated and theoretically even more rigorous version of realism.⁶²

The contribution of Waltz's neorealism lies in its focus on systemic level. His systemic approach suggests that it is the anarchical ordering of IR that forces states to struggle for power. In such a state of anarchy, it is natural for men as well as for states that violence occurs and therefore it is rational to defend themselves. An example of such rationality is shown by Waltz on Rousseau's example of stag hunt which says that in a situation of a collective hunting where we do not know the intentions of the others and we are insecure, it is more rational to escape the cooperation and give a preference to relative gains instead of absolute ones.⁶³

⁵⁶ MORGENTHAU, Hans J., 1993, pp. 194-197.

⁵⁷ BARŠA, Pavel, CÍSAR, Ondřej, 2008, p. 68.

⁵⁸ Concretely, he deals with three concepts that concern the management of power: balance of power, collective security, and world management. (CLAUDE, Inis L., "Power and International Relations," 1962, pp. 6, 8.)

⁵⁹ CLAUDE, Inis L., 1962, p. 13; BARŠA, Pavel, CÍSAR, Ondřej, 2008, p. 75.

⁶⁰ Morgenthau distinguishes balance of power "*(1) as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, (2) as an actual state of affairs, (3) as an approximately equal distribution of power, (4) as any distribution of power.*" At the same time, he adds that if qualification of the term is not stated, "*it refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality.*" (Both citation from MORGENTHAU, Hans J., 1993, p. 183.)

⁶¹ CLAUDE, Inis L., 1962, p. 13; BARŠA, Pavel, CÍSAR, Ondřej, 2008, p. 74.

⁶² BURCHILL, Scott, 2001, p. 88; BARŠA, Pavel, CÍSAR, Ondřej, 2008, p. 132; WALTZ, Kenneth N., "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," 1990, pp. 29-34.

⁶³ WALTZ, Kenneth N., 1979, pp. 39-40, 102; BURCHILL, Scott, 2001, p. 90; BARŠA, Pavel, CÍSAR, Ondřej, 2008, pp. 86-88.

Furthermore, it supports Waltz's claims that without the organizational authority, the international system is the self-help system where a key explanation for the behaviour of its units is the distribution of capabilities (power).⁶⁴ A general motivation for the states in such system is to preserve or strengthen their existence through means available (e.g. through forming alliances) and these efforts of individual states establish the balance of power.⁶⁵

Waltz sees the balance of power theory as developing his systemic theory.⁶⁶ For balance of power theory to predominate, two conditions need to be met: the anarchic nature of international order and the existence of units within such order that want to survive.⁶⁷ The survival of the units in the anarchical order is provided by power which is not, in Waltz's case, seen as an end to dominate others (as in case Morgenthau⁶⁸ or later John Mearsheimer⁶⁹) but rather as a mean to guarantee state's security. Consequently, instead of accumulating the power at the expense of the others, it seems more rational for Waltz to balance the power of the others and preserve status quo. That is why his approach is being labelled as *defensive realism*.⁷⁰

Regarding the balance of power theory, it is necessary to mention two aspects. Firstly, Waltz did not develop his theory to study the behaviour of individual units in the international realm, the foreign policy respectively, but to study structure of the system in which states operate. Waltz even distances himself from the behaviouralist tendencies of realism.⁷¹ Secondly, due to the power diffusion among increasing number of non-state actors (transnational companies, terrorist groups etc.), it is getting hard to measure balance of power.⁷²

Since I am focusing on the behaviour of an individual state, Australia, within the structures of IR, Waltz's concept needs to be carefully applied. However, I argue that certain notions and insights derived from Waltz's theory are useful in studying foreign policy. For example, those related to the efforts to maintain the balance of power while not striving for the

⁶⁴ WALTZ, Kenneth N., 1990, p. 31; WALTZ, Kenneth N., 1979, p. 111.

⁶⁵ WALTZ, Kenneth N., 1979, pp. 117-118.

⁶⁶ WALTZ, Kenneth N., 1979, p. 123.

⁶⁷ WALTZ, Kenneth N., 1979, p. 121.

⁶⁸ In the third out of his six principles of political realism, Morgenthau states: "Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement." (MORGENTHAU, Hans J., 1993, p. 11.)

⁶⁹ John J. Mearsheimer formulates a theory of offensive realism. (MEARSHEIMER, John J., "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics," 2001, pp. 4-12, 21-22.)

⁷⁰ WALTZ, Kenneth N., 1990, p. 36; MEARSHEIMER, John J., 2001, p. 18.; BARŠA, Pavel, CÍSAŘ, Ondřej, 2008, p. 136.

⁷¹ WALTZ, Kenneth N., 1979, pp. 64, 72, 123.

⁷² NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011, p. xiii.

accumulation of power, which would be possibly contradictory and unwanted, serve as a good basis of how to explain Australian behaviour in a complex Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, as Shibley Telhami wrote: “*The drive for security, so essential in neorealist theory, and the importance of relative power in explaining the degree of opportunity that states have in the conduct of foreign policy, are important factors in understanding any state’s foreign policy.*”⁷³

Shibley’s words are confirmed by Michael Wesley who argues that Australia developed its own tradition of realism. This tradition has three distinctive characteristics – experientialism (focusing on Australian international position), systemic pessimism (concerns about international stability), and pragmatism (stressing concrete results of politics). As such, unlike the realist tradition coming from Europe and the U.S., it preoccupies with the powerlessness, the cautiousness about the political bargaining, the avoidance of instability, and the practicality of IR theoretical models. Furthermore, Australian behaviour in the international system emerges from the fact that Australia “*has always been a rich, isolated, status quo state.*”⁷⁴ These characteristics are important to consider when to analyse Australian foreign policy, particularly its power position. Thus, the hypothesis related to the realist approach is that *Australia’s foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its power position.*⁷⁵

1.2 Constructivism in International Relations

Theory of (neo)realism is being criticized for its rigid perception of identity, its pessimism about human nature, its negligence of international norms, its focus on systemic level, or its inability to explain the post-Cold War dynamics.⁷⁶

According to the critics, the inner dispute of neorealism (whether it is defensive or offensive) demonstrates the need for further explanation of state’s behaviour. One such critical position offers constructivism which considers the ideas as a constitutive (not just regulative) element in the international realm. Due to the emphasis on ideas, constructivist approach is closer to the idealist part of the spectrum of IR theories which contrasts with structural realism and bears specific characteristics.⁷⁷

Unlike the mainstream theories of IR, the constructivist school sees international politics as a social construct that is being established and preserved by the discourses and practices of the agents of IR. Such construct is guided by two major principles. The first principle is that

⁷³ TELHAMI, Shibley, “*Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy,*” 2002, p. 170.

⁷⁴ WESLEY, Michael, 2009, p. 325.

⁷⁵ WESLEY, Michael, 2009, pp. 326-327.

⁷⁶ See BURCHILL, Scott, 2001, pp. 92-93; WENDT, Alexander, 2005, p. 376; FINNEMORE, Martha, SIKKINK, Kathryn, “*International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,*” 1998, p. 889.

⁷⁷ Alexander Wendt classifies constructivism as Structural Idealism. (WENDT, Alexander, 2005, p. xiii.)

shared ideas, not material forces, are the most influencing factor in establishing the structures of human interrelation. The second principle emphasizes the constructive nature of these shared ideas in terms of the identities and interests of the agents which are thus not exogenously given, but rather “*constructed by these shared ideas.*”⁷⁸ Therefore, the onset of constructivism is related to the turn from objectivism (a core of realist and liberal schools of thought) to intersubjectivism (interactions between subjects). Such approach contrasts with that pursued by rationalists.⁷⁹

By the first principle, constructivism stresses its idealist and social dimension opposing the materialistic view of realism, meanwhile the second principle questions the views that reduces social structures to individuals. Although Wendt admits that the anarchical system may lead to a competitive power politics, it is not always the case and the system might be influenced by interests and identities of its units.⁸¹

In any case, both guiding principles demonstrates a crucial difference compared to neorealism. Neorealists operate with the given human nature and presume that the intentions behind the behaviour of humans or states are driven by material gains. Consequently, they presuppose that states prefer (in a state of insecurity about others’ intentions) relative over absolute gains. Such behaviour is influenced by the logic of anarchy. On the other hand, constructivist approach implies the logic of appropriateness under which states consider norms which guides their behaviour in a particular moment.⁸²

1.2.1 The Construction of the International System

The debate about whether structure (IR system) influences agents (states) is central for constructivism. Although Waltz’s and Wendt’s approaches are both focusing on the structure of the system Wendt claims that there is no such thing as the “logic” of anarchy concerning the structure of IR as the neorealists claim and the “*anarchy is what states make of it.*”⁸³

⁷⁸ WENDT, Alexander, 2005, p. 1.

⁷⁹ BARŠA, Pavel, CÍSÁŘ, Ondřej, 2008, p. 295; DRULÁK, Petr, “Teorie mezinárodních vztahů,” 2010, p. 123.

⁸⁰ As for an illustration, Wendt juxtaposes “those who take identities and interests as given (rationalists) and those who do not (constructivists),” where (neo)realists and (neo)liberalists are considered as rationalists. (WENDT, Alexander, 2005, p. 33.)

⁸¹ WENDT, Alexander, 2005, p. 1; CHECKEL, Jeffrey T., 1998, p. 326; WENDT, Alexander, “*Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,*” 1992, pp. 395-396.

⁸² Jeffrey Checkel argues that unlike (neo)realism or (neo)liberalism, constructivism moves norms from intervening to independent variables that explain states’ behaviour and their identity and interests. (CHECKEL, Jeffrey T., 1998, p. 326-328) For more on logic of appropriateness, see MARCH, James G., OLSEN, Johan P, “*The Logic of Appropriateness,*” pp. 478-497, [online] in: GOODIN, Robert E. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, 2011.

⁸³ WENDT, Alexander, 1992, pp. 394-395.

Furthermore, constructivists argue that the structure and agents are equally important and interdependent.⁸⁴ They do not exclude the units' values, beliefs, interests or ideas from their analysis, stress their impact on the structure of IR and imply that the crucial component in such structure is a distribution of knowledge or ideas, not solely a material power (as in case of realism).⁸⁵

Additionally, among significant elements of constructivism are interpretation and interaction. By distinguishing ourselves from the others, friends from the foes, or allies from our enemies, we give our actions a collective meaning. Through the participation in a collective meaning, agents of the system establish their identities which implies that the identities are relational (to our role).⁸⁶

1.2.2 David Campbell: The Interpretation of Danger

Among scholars that further develop the interpretative approach is David Campbell. His analysis, which moves from Wendt's structural constructivism to post-structuralism⁸⁷, offers the profound understanding of what is behind the construct. In other words, of what we currently understand as 'state', 'danger', 'threat', or 'foreign.' Campbell analyses security issues through questioning the fixed character of the identity of states with a focus on foreign policy which represents an important part of security practices and that (re)establishes the identity of state. In short, he offers a discursive analysis of the historical (trans)formation of the states' identity and the construction of foreignness.⁸⁸

Campbell does not take the conventional understanding of foreign policy – which is seen as the 'outside' action of the state with predetermined identity⁸⁹ – as sufficient and presents his own understanding. Firstly, he defines 'foreign policy' which refers to a process of differentiating objects as 'foreign.' Secondly, he distinguishes the 'Foreign Policy' which

⁸⁴ As Wendt argues "*it is impossible for structures to have effect apart from the attributes and interactions of agents*" (WENDT, Alexander, 2005, p. 12.)

⁸⁵ WENDT, Alexander, 2005, pp. 12, 20; REUS-SMITH, Christian, "Constructivism," pp. 216-217, in: BURCHILL, Scott, DEVETAK, Richard, LINKLATER, Andrew, PATERSON, Matthew, REUS-SMITH, Christian, and TRUE, Jacqui, Theories of International Relations, 2001.

⁸⁶ WENDT, Alexander, 1992, p. 397.

⁸⁷ Due to such shift, Campbell is being considered as post-structuralist, post-modernist, deconstructivist, or critical constructivist. To illustrate a difference between constructivism and postmodernism, the latter is regarded as being more radical claiming that the 'truth' is only temporarily constructed at certain time and space. (ACHARYA, Amitav and BUZAN, Barry, "Why is there no non-Western international relations theory? An introduction," pp. 9-10, in ACHARYA, Amitav and BUZAN, Barry (eds.), Non-Western International Relations Theory, 2010.) Also, the 'classic' constructivism is closer to the positivism of 'classic' science meanwhile critical constructivists consider "*theory as constitutive*." (PRETORIUS, Joelen, "The Security Imaginary: Explaining Military Isomorphism," 2008, p. 107.)

⁸⁸ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, pp. ix-x.

⁸⁹ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. 68; LAFFEY, Mark, "Location identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State Action," 2000, p. 430.

reflects the conventional understanding of this term and which is explained by Campbell as a reproduction of subjective meanings of a certain state in the international realm that have been delimited by the ‘foreign policy.’ To put it in Campbell’s words: “*It is the objectification of the self through the representation of danger that Foreign Policy helps achieve.*”⁹⁰

In other words, Campbell’s view challenges the settled conceptions of the foreign policy and rejects the basic assumptions of the mainstream theoretical approaches of the international relations. Instead of treating state as a unitary actor with pre-given interests which are reflected through its foreign policy actions, he refers to the subjectivity in states’ action. It is why I argue (along with Mark Laffey) that Campbell’s analysis contributes to a discussion about what does create our well-established ways of thinking and acting.⁹¹

Moreover, Campbell shows how all the layers of state are interconnected and influence its identity and its resulting discourse. Such identity is rather temporary than settled forever, and the discourse implies what is seen as the inside and the outside.⁹² This suggests that constitution of identity is dependent on specific language used during the process of its formation. Consequently, it produces the boundaries within which state (or individual) operates. Therefore, we cannot consider for example danger as “*an objective condition,*” which would exist “*independently of those to whom it may become a threat.*”⁹³ In short, an interpretation is what matters.⁹⁴

The constructivism helps to see Australian behaviour towards Asia-Pacific from a different perspective. We will see that such behaviour is related to Australian identity that is based on being an active agent of the international system (which relates to overcoming its isolated position) while pursuing the middle power diplomacy. These two interrelated pillars of the Australian identity, its efforts to overcome its isolation and its middle power status, are further developed in the methodological part. Also, we shall see in the analytical part that the language matters e.g. in a case when Australian government decided to define its region as Indo-Pacific rather than Asia-Pacific. Such behaviour is related to the challenges of Asian century mainly posed by the rise of China. Therefore, my second hypothesis states that *Australia’s foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its identity.*

⁹⁰ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, pp. 68-69, 71.

⁹¹ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. x; LAFFEY, Mark, 2000, p. 430.

⁹² In his argumentation, Campbell uses a sociomedical discourse using the example of bipolarity of normal and pathological as moral concerns naturalizing “*the self (as normal, healthy, civilized, or something equally positive) by estranging the other (as pathological, sick, barbaric, or something equally negative).*” (CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. 89.)

⁹³ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. 1.

⁹⁴ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. 73.

2 Methodological framework

This chapter deals with the methodology and basic terms and concepts that are further thoroughly explained. Methodology links the theoretical part with the empirical data and reveals a concrete process of the analysis and the way how are my hypotheses tested. For the purposes of my work, a qualitative method will be used as a main technique of the research. Specifically, the co-variation approach in which “*causal inferences are drawn on the basis of observed co-variation between causal factors (independent variables) and causal effects (dependent variables)*.”⁹⁵ Such an approach suggests that I search for the causal effects between variables.

In my thesis, a case study focusing on Australia is examined. Concretely, the Australian foreign policy in the region of Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War period. Since I have already explained why I focus on Asia-Pacific and the post-Cold War era, it is necessary to present how I define foreign policy and the two crucial concepts of my thesis – power and identity. The power position of Australia and Australian identity represents independent variables. On the other hand, as the dependent variable, I consider the behaviour of the Australian foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region and the interests of Australian foreign policy. The major goal of my analysis is to find out *What explains Australia’s foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region?*

The analysis is based on the combination of thorough study of the primary and secondary literature with a reference to the statements of the representatives of states. The primary sources represent the base for my arguments. Leading experts in the field, such as Allan Gyngell, Hugh White, or Michael Wesley are included in my analysis. The access to these sources has been easier since I have spent a semester at the Australian National University (ANU). During my time at ANU I had an opportunity to do a research of the primary sources, to attend many conferences and debates discussing foreign policy issues of the Asia-Pacific, to talk with the experts on international relations (not only) in the Australian context or to work at the Embassy of the Czech Republic where I have dealt with the current foreign policy issues of Australia.

Furthermore, I have analysed the governmental white papers that are devoted to Australian foreign policy and defence. Especially two of them, ‘*Advancing National Interest*’ (2003) and ‘*2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*’, because they cover Australian foreign policy

⁹⁵ BLATTER, Joachim, and BLUME, Till, “*In Search of Co-variance, Causal Mechanisms or Congruence? Towards a Plural Understanding of Case Studies*,” 2008, p. 318.

in its complexity. Such analysis is supported by the elaboration of certain proclamations of the representatives of state. Of course, both analyses are done carefully since either the governmental white papers or proclamations of the representatives of state might be far from reality.

2.1 Power

Power is an ambiguous concept. As outlined above power is a key concept for realists so that the definition in my work is mainly based on those of realist scholars. Inis Claude characterizes power in concrete terms, in military capabilities⁹⁶, Morgenthau sees power as an ultimate goal and defines it as a control over “*the minds and actions of other men,*”⁹⁷ Waltz sees power as a mean to reach states’ security and considers mixed capabilities of a state as decisive⁹⁸, and Mearsheimer distinguishes latent power (based on wealth and population of a state) and military power (based on military capabilities).⁹⁹ The struggle for power is then considered by the proponents of the state-centric view of the international politics as a significant part of politics between states.¹⁰⁰

As the abundance of definitions indicate, power is difficultly measured and defined. Joseph Nye argues that in terms of measuring power, it “*depends upon human relationships that vary in different contexts,*” and in terms of defining power, the definition varies and reflects people’s “*interests and values.*”¹⁰¹

Nye presents a multi-layered pattern of the distribution of power, he distinguishes military power (in this sense, our world is unipolar because of the U.S. domination¹⁰²), the economic power (where the world is multipolar with U.S., Europe, Japan and China as the major agents¹⁰³) and the power of transnational relations (which includes non-state actors such as terrorist group, but also the transnational challenges like climate change). All these patterns are part of Nye’s definition of power.¹⁰⁴

Nye continues with the differentiation of *power as a behaviour* and *power as resources*. He further depicts the power behaviour on a spectrum where the use of force (command power,

⁹⁶ CLAUDE, Inis L., 1962, p. 6.

⁹⁷ MORGENTHAU, Hans J., 1993, p. 30.

⁹⁸ WALTZ, Kenneth N., 1990, p. 36.

⁹⁹ MEARSHEIMER, John J., 2001, p. 57.

¹⁰⁰ NYE, Joseph, S. and KEOHANE, Robert O., “*Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,*” 1971, p. 329.

¹⁰¹ NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011, p. 5.

¹⁰² As the yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows, the United States dominates the world in terms of military spending. In 2018, it even increased its military budget to \$649 billion which is 2.6 times more compare to the second highest spender, China. (SIPRI, 2019, p. 6.)

¹⁰³ See World Bank, “*GDP Ranking,*” [online] 2010.

¹⁰⁴ NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011, p. xv.

coercion, and threat), payment and agenda-setting based on these, fall into the category of hard power. On the other hand, agenda-setting, attraction and persuasion that can further lead to co-optation are part of the soft power¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁶:

HARD Command → Coerce Threaten Pay Sanction Frame Persuade Attract ← Co-opt SOFT

Hard power as well as soft power have their specific resources. Hard power includes mainly material factors such as military force and wealth. In contrast, soft power implies rather normative factors such as ideas, culture, values or institutions. However, the strict delimitation is impossible so that, regarding the context and application, the power resources related to hard power behaviour can lead to soft power behaviour and vice versa. It also depends on the perception of the agents involved.¹⁰⁷

Within realism, we can see the shift that is related to the concept of power with neorealists. As Nye suggests, “*a pragmatic or commonsense realist takes into account the full spectrum of power resources, including ideas, persuasion, and attraction.*”¹⁰⁸ However, neorealism does seem to stress what Finnemore and Sikkink names “*utility maximization*” and think mainly in material terms which is related to the inputs from economics at the time when neorealism has been establishing.¹⁰⁹ As such neorealists (unlike many classical realists) drew away their focus from soft power to hard power capabilities.

As was implied, neorealism particularly concentrates on hard (military) power. Therefore, in the analytical part of my thesis when I speak of the ‘role of power’ I mean the Australian power position in the international system and its (relative) hard (or military) power capabilities. The dynamics of Asia-Pacific where China is being more assertive and the U.S. position is being questioned, we can argue that Australia will tend to defend its position while increasing these hard power capabilities to balance the other powers in the region. Specifically, I look for the answer on the questions of whether Australia strives for hard power as a mean to secure its position in the region and if (and possibly how) it is being used to balance the power in the Asia-Pacific?

¹⁰⁵ The table was copied from Joseph Nye’s book. As Nye notes, a behaviour depicted on the spectrum overlaps. For example, what was at certain point established by hard power (e.g. institution) might be later on a basis for a soft power behaviour. (NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011, pp. 21, 243.)

¹⁰⁶ The spectrum shows the basis for hard power and soft power: “*Command power (...) is the basis for hard power – the ability to get desired outcomes through coercion and payment. The co-optive power (...) contributes to soft power, the ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda-setting, persuasion, and attraction.*” (NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011, p. 16.)

¹⁰⁷ NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011, p. 21.

¹⁰⁸ NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011, p. 19.

¹⁰⁹ FINNEMORE, Martha, SIKKINK, Kathryn, 1998, pp. 889-890.

2.2 Identity

The identity of agents and its influence on their behaviour or the structure of IR respectively, is central for constructivists. Meanwhile realists take the identity of state as exogenously given, constructivists argue, that the identity of state is constructed through interactions.¹¹⁰

According to David Campbell, identity is “*constituted in relation to difference*” (and vice versa).¹¹¹ The constitution of one’s identity is performative and a subjective notion of ‘us’ is created through a discourse which prescribes the distinction between an ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’ a ‘self’ and ‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign.’¹¹² Therefore, states’ identity is far from settled and is in the continual “*process of becoming*.”¹¹³ In other words, since the construction of state identity is always in process, states cannot reach their final and settled identity because it would mean its extinction.¹¹⁴ As such, identity changes over time under various circumstances, e.g. with a change of government which inscribes new meanings or creates new roles of a state.

In this sense, foreign policy is one of the practices of a state that through inscribing certain meanings of a danger threatening its security, contributes to the establishment of states’ identity. As a result, “*boundaries are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged, and alternatives marginalized.*”¹¹⁵

Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that identity is similarly ambiguous and blurred concept as power. Roger Brubaker and Frederick Cooper claim that it is mainly because of its “*multivalent, even contradictory theoretical burden,*”¹¹⁶ when the term is being applied by scholars. In case of constructivist scholars, they would argue that the concept of identity (as a unifying concept) might simplify complex terms or constructs such as race, ethnicity etc. Thus, they propose to go beyond identity. Regarding the constant ‘*process of becoming*’ of states’ identity, about which David Campbell is talking, it would be unclear for Brubaker and Cooper why the word identity is being used as an analytical category to describe author’s argument. They mark such application of identity as a “*weak understanding of ‘identity’*”, which implies multiplicity, fluidness, fragmentation or construction of the term.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁰ WENDT, Alexander, “*Collective identity Formation and the International State,*” 1994, p. 385.

¹¹¹ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. 9.

¹¹² CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. 9; LAFFEY, Mark, 2000, p. 431.

¹¹³ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. 12.

¹¹⁴ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. 12.

¹¹⁵ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, pp. 61-64.

¹¹⁶ BRUBAKER, Roger, COOPER, Frederick, “*Beyond “Identity”*,” 2000, p. 8.

¹¹⁷ BRUBAKER, Roger, COOPER, Frederick, pp. 9-11.

Wendt argues that social identity may remain “*relatively stable in certain contexts.*”¹¹⁸ In Australian case, I presume that two interrelated factors influence its identity making it relatively stable. It is its geographic isolation and its ‘middle power’ status. The geographic isolation is related to what Allan Gyngell calls ‘fear of abandonment’ which characterizes Australian foreign policy in its refusal of isolationism.¹¹⁹ Such fear led to an active international engagement of Australia which combined with Australian relative power (its defence budget, its alliance with the U.S. etc.) are part of Australia’s middle power status. Although the definition of ‘middle power’ is not settled, it serves as a useful analytical tool in case of Australia.¹²⁰ Middle power status stresses multilateralism, promoting international legal norms and active diplomacy to reach certain outcomes. In the post-Cold War era, the concept has been revived by the Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who was vehement in promoting the concept to recognize specific features of the Australian diplomacy. In his interpretation, the middle power diplomacy usually took form of “*coalition-building with other ‘like-minded’ countries.*”¹²¹ Although the concept itself was rather pursued by Labor governments, I argue that its features were part of the whole post-Cold War era. Also, as we shall see, the concept is of an older age in the Australian foreign policy practice. Therefore, in the analytical part of my thesis when I speak of the ‘role of identity’ I mean the Australian middle power status with all its features. Specifically, I look for the answer on the question whether Australian identity is decisive in its foreign policy towards Asia-Pacific?¹²²

2.3 Foreign policy

This work focuses on the *foreign policy* which is to reflect the behaviour an individual state (a unit behaviour in the system of IR) – Australia. Although I do not focus much on the systemic features of IR, it is important to note that relationship between foreign policy of an individual state and international politics as the whole is, as Wendt puts it, “*complementary rather than competitive.*”¹²³ Moreover, as Campbell suggests, foreign policy plays historically a constitutive role of a state and interstate realm that divides and unites the domestic and international realms of states.¹²⁴ Finally, Nye claims that even though the indirect structural

¹¹⁸ WENDT, Alexander, 1994, p. 385.

¹¹⁹ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 18, 289.

¹²⁰ CARR, Andrew, “*Is Australia a middle power? A systemic impact approach,*” 2014, pp. 70-71; JORDAAN, Eduard, “*The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers,*” 2003, pp. 165-166.

¹²¹ UNGERER, Carl, “*The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy,*” 2007, p. 539.

¹²² UNGERER, Carl, 2007, pp. 538-540.

¹²³ WENDT, Alexander, 2005, p. 11.

¹²⁴ CAMPBELL, David, 1998, p. 60.

influences are important “*for policy purposes we also want to understand what actors or agents can do within given situations.*”¹²⁵

Campbell divides the ‘foreign policy’ and ‘Foreign Policy,’ where the former forms and deepens our understanding of the practices and outcomes of the latter.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, when I refer to ‘foreign policy’ I operate with the conventional understanding of the foreign policy which is considered as the “*dimension of public policy that deals with the outside world.*”¹²⁷ It represents country’s responses to the outside world – to foreign governments, to international organizations, to transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations, terrorist groups etc. The major task is to form the international environment that is helping to carry through state’s national interests and values.

However, in the analytical part I still bear in mind Campbell’s argument that points out to the fact that it is important to analyse what do states mean by ‘the outside world’. Also, the term should not be confused with the foreign relations, which is a result of the process of foreign policy, or with diplomacy, which is used as the mean to enforce the foreign policy.¹²⁸ Considering Allan Gyngell’s words that “*foreign policy always involves others*” and Australia’s geographic position, I have narrowed my focus down to Australia’s engagement with the region of Asia-Pacific as it has been explained in the introduction.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011, p. 6.

¹²⁶ The ‘foreign policy’ refers to “*all practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion that constitute their objects as ‘foreign’ in the process of dealing with them,*” and represents the framework in which the ‘Foreign Policy’ (understood in the conventional sense) works. (CAMPBELL, David, 1998, pp. 68-69.)

¹²⁷ GYNGELL, Allan, WESLEY, Michael, 2003, p. 9.

¹²⁸ GYNGELL, Allan, WESLEY, Michael, 2003, p. 9; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 11.

¹²⁹ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 11-12.

3 Australia's Foreign Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region

I argue that Asia-Pacific presents a crucial region for Australia not only because of the current developments (rise of China, Australian relations with Indonesia, the tensions over the situation on the Korean Peninsula or in the South China Sea etc.) but also due to historical developments. Thus, this chapter briefly presents history and major hallmarks of the Australian foreign policy towards Asia-Pacific. It also reveals the foundation of Australian foreign policy as a sovereign practice and the definition of the Australian foreign policy which will be analysed in the following chapters.

3.1 The Roots of the Australian Foreign Policy

With the *Immigration Restriction Act* in 1901, Australia became an independent country. However, in terms of its foreign politics, it has continued to be dependent on Great Britain. The major differences in the foreign policy interests started to occur which was given among other factors by the distinct geographic position of Britain and Australia. Thus, meanwhile Australia was worried about the naval ambitions of Japan that were reinforced by the Japanese win in the Russo-Japanese War, Britain made an alliance deal with Japan.¹³⁰

Although there had not been an absolute consensus on the foreign policy matters, with the outbreak of the First World War Australians proved to be a loyal ally and fully supported the British Empire. Together with the New Zealand troops, they had created *Australian and New Zealand Army Corps* (ANZAC). Over 330 000 men of a population 5 million at that time served overseas and 60 000 men died fighting alongside their Western allies.¹³¹

After the First World War, the British Empire was transformed into the British Commonwealth of Nations (today's Commonwealth of Nations). This transformation was a step towards greater autonomy of the British dominions (including Australia) in a foreign policymaking and "found legislative form in the 1931 Statute of Westminster."¹³²¹³³

Also, the Australian colonial possession of Papua New Guinea and the world events of 1930s (the rise of fascist and Nazi forces in Europe, or the Japanese aggressive expansion in Asia) showed the need for Australian self-reliance in the international affairs. Consequently, in

¹³⁰ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 15; BALDINO, Daniel, CARR, Andrew, LANGLOIS, Anthony J., "Introduction: A guide to Australian Foreign Policy," p. xv, in: BALDINO, Daniel, CARR, Andrew, LANGLOIS, Anthony J. (eds.), Australian Foreign Policy: Controversies and Debates, 1st edition, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2014.

¹³¹ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 15; MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, pp. 119, 125.

¹³² GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 15-16.

¹³³ With the decolonisation of India, the British Commonwealth of Nations renamed to the Commonwealth of Nations. (GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 75.)

the 1940s, the Statute of Westminster was ratified by John Curtin's¹³⁴ government, which meant formal legal autonomy on Britain, and Australia set its first diplomatic missions. Additionally, it is worth to mention that Australia is part of the Commonwealth of Nations till nowadays.¹³⁵

According to Allan Gyngell, after the ratification of the Statute of Westminster, there were three possible scenarios for the emerging Australian autonomous foreign policy: (1) continuation in the alliance policy with the powerful allies (with Britain, as well as with U.S.); (2) enhancing the engagement in the surrounded region (mainly Asia and the Pacific); and (3) actively supporting and influencing the rules-based international order.¹³⁶

These scenarios are presented in Gyngell's book as responses addressing Australia's fear of abandonment. Although one might question whether such fear is the true 'driving force' behind the Australian foreign policymaking, they serve as an intelligible framework of the post-war trajectory of Australian foreign policy.¹³⁷

Firstly, with Britain steadily leaving its positions in the Asia-Pacific after the Second World War, Australia (together with New Zealand) did strengthen its strategic relations with the U.S. by signing the ANZUS Treaty in 1951.¹³⁸ Although the 'turn to America' came already during the Second World War because of the Japanese aggression and the lost Battle of Singapore by the British. The Treaty is still in force, providing Australia security guarantee and access to the U.S. military, intelligence or scientific capabilities since 1950s.¹³⁹

The Australian-U.S. relations were rather cautious at the beginning. However, after the process of confidence-building (demonstrated for example by Australia's engagement in the major wars of the Cold War – Vietnam War and Korean War – alongside the United States' troops) and capacity-building (demonstrated for example by Australia's willingness to provide a space for the U.S.-operated nuclear defence facilities) both countries became close and

¹³⁴ John Curtin was an Australian Prime Minister. [For the full list of Australian Prime Ministers see Appendix no. 2: List of Prime Ministers of Australia]

¹³⁵ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 17-18; EDWARDS, Peter, "History and foreign policy," p. 5, in: MEDIANSKY, F. A. (ed.) Australian foreign policy: into the new millennium, 1997; BALDINO, Daniel, CARR, Andrew, LANGLOIS, Anthony J., 2014, p. xvi.

¹³⁶ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 18.

¹³⁷ The fear of abandonment is a name and a key concept of Allan Gyngell's book. In the review of Gyngell's book, Peter Edwards mentions that the 'fear of abandonment' is usually related to the first theme of the Australian foreign policy, the alliance-building policy with powerful allies. Thus, using the fear of abandonment as an underlining concept also for the other two themes might be, according to Edwards, a bit misleading since they rather reflect confidence and creativity. However, Edwards admits that firstly the more appropriate name "The Evolution of Foreign Policy" was already taken and secondly, in the background, the fear of abandonment might be truly the underlining concept of the Australian foreign policy. (EDWARDS, Peter, "From the bookshelf: 75 years of Australian foreign policy," [online] 2017.)

¹³⁸ For the full text of the ANZUS Treaty see Appendix no. 1: ANZUS Treaty.

¹³⁹ DIBB, Paul, "U.S.-Australia Alliance Relations: An Australian View," 2005, p. 1; ROWLAND, Michael, "Fall of Singapore anniversary: How a military defeat changed Australia," [online] 2017.

strategic allies. Australian alliance policy finds its base in the Australian concerns about possible threats coming from Asia. Either it was from Japan during the World Wars (and even after the Second World War), Asian Communism during the Cold War or now from rising China.¹⁴⁰

Secondly, Australia showed a deep interest in the international settings after the Second World War and its focus turned to Asia. With the decolonisation of Asian states and the withdrawal of European allies from the region, Australia saw the need of change in their engagement towards their neighbouring states of Southeast Asia or Southwest Pacific but also towards Japan. Australia actively participated on the post-war relieve aid program for Asia – the Colombo Plan.¹⁴¹ Australia has engaged in the process of Indonesian independence; it administered its colony, Papua New Guinea, which turned up to be a potential flashpoint among Australia and Indonesia that claimed the territory. Also, Australia took part in reducing tensions in Malaysia in 1950s which was a sign of a shift in Australian military strategy which Robert Menzies'¹⁴² government marked as 'forward defence', meaning that potential conflict is better to be managed outside of the Australian soil.¹⁴³ We can continue with an Australian attempts in defence area when it played part in establishing 'Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation' (SEATO)¹⁴⁴, or in developmental area when it proposed (within the ANZAC Pact framework) the establishment of the 'South Pacific Commission' (SPC) which aimed to stabilize the Pacific region after the Second World War and which is active till nowadays under the name 'Pacific Community'.¹⁴⁵ The SPC was reflecting the 'middle power' status of Australia as the regional power with extended diplomatic, military and economic capabilities. Finally, Australia began

¹⁴⁰ GYNGELL, Allan, WESLEY, Michael, 2003, p. 10; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 19, 80, 86; EDWARDS, Peter, 1997, pp. 3, 6; MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 159.

¹⁴¹ The Colombo Plan represented "*the first multilateral Asian aid scheme engaging the Asian countries themselves,*" and "*a well-planned and coordinated Australian initiative to shape the region.*" (GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 75)

¹⁴² Robert Menzies was a former Prime Minister of Australia. He led the country during the Second World War from 1939 to 1941 and after the war from 1949 to 1966. He also took the responsibility for the external affairs' office at the beginning of 1960s. (MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 245; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 33.)

¹⁴³ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 29.

¹⁴⁴ The major goal of SEATO was to establish a collective defence body in Southeast Asia together with major stakeholders in the area like France, Great Britain or the United States. SEATO also served as part of the Washington strategy to contain communism in the area. However, SEATO did not last and the organisation disintegrated in 1977. (GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 53-54).

¹⁴⁵ The South Pacific Commission was founded in 1947 in Australia. By signing Canberra Agreement, six major colonial powers in the Pacific Islands region – Australia, France, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States – have committed "*to assist in administering their dependent territories and to benefit the people of the Pacific.*" (The Pacific Community, "History," [online] (n.a.)) In 2016, organisation renamed to 'Pacific Community' which enables 26 member states and territories to effectively cooperate on issues such as climate change, disaster risk management, food security, human rights etc. (The Pacific Community, "About Us," [online] (n.a.))

to develop and extend its economic relations with Japan, signing the Commerce Agreement in 1957.¹⁴⁶

Finally, Australia wanted to engage not only within the Asia-Pacific region but with the whole world. Therefore, the representatives of the Australian foreign policy were actively participating in establishing the international rules-based order after the Second World War. It was – and still is – important and advantageous for Australia to actively participate in international institutions and regimes since it is not enough powerful to pursue its interests unilaterally (as for example the United States). Thus, Australia was one of the major proponents of giving a weight to smaller states so that it would not be only great powers that would shape the international order. Concretely, within the United Nations (hereafter UN), the efforts of Australian diplomats led to the expansion of the UN's economic and social competences and to the equalization of the General Assembly with the Security Council “*on ‘any matters within the scope’ of the Charter – except those currently before the Council.*”¹⁴⁷¹⁴⁸

This was mainly thanks to the enthusiasm and hard work of the Minister for foreign Affairs, Herbert Evatt¹⁴⁹, who “*was the acknowledged leader of the smaller powers and established a reputation for Australia,*” and who introduced the concept of ‘middle power’ into Australian foreign policy practice, stressing the regional importance and interests of the smaller states. The performance of Australian representatives at the San Francisco conference in 1945 showed that Australia wants to play a vital part of the newly emerging international rules-based order, that it wants to influence the outcomes of such order and wants to actively pursue its national interests.¹⁵⁰

As outlined above, Australia was prepared to take its part in shaping the international environment after the Second World War. Its efforts were fuelled by the fear, as Gynell suggests. By the fear of not being heard at the international stage, by the fear of being left by its ‘great powerful friends’¹⁵¹, or by the fear of Japanese imperialism to return or Asian Communism to spread behind Australian borders. Such fear led to a fact that Australia has been from the beginning a participative member of the post-war international order.

¹⁴⁶ UNGERER, Carl, 2007, p. 541; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 21-22, 82-83; BALDINO, Daniel, CARR, Andrew, LANGLOIS, Anthony J., 2014, p. xvii.

¹⁴⁷ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 18, 71; WESLEY, Michael, 2009, p. 233.

¹⁴⁸ By the Charter here it is meant the Charter of the United Nations.

¹⁴⁹ For the full list of Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs see Appendix no. 3: List of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Australia.

¹⁵⁰ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 71; UNGERER, Carl, 2007, pp. 540-541.

¹⁵¹ Famous quote of the former Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies. (GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 18)

3.2 1970s and 1980s: A Transformative Period

In the 1970s and 1980s, Australia faced profound changes in the world. The Asia-Pacific region dealt with the consequences of the Vietnam War; the U.S. President Richard Nixon established, under the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ the diplomatic relations with PRC¹⁵² (Australia recognized China in 1972¹⁵³) which, as mentioned in the introduction, led to the end of the Cold War in Asia; the crisis of East Timor showed the limits of Australian diplomacy; the human rights issue as well as environmental issue appeared on the Australian political agenda. Furthermore, the global economy underwent a transformation with Nixon’s closure of the golden window (the end of U.S. dollar convertibility to gold)¹⁵⁴ and two oil shocks (one related to Yom Kippur War, the other to Iranian revolution¹⁵⁵).

Although the direct consequences of the oil shock in 1973 were limited (since Australia was able to secure most of its energetic needs), the indirect consequences were enormous. The economic growth of Australia has dampened and together with other developed industrial states it underwent a situation of ‘stagflation’ – stagnation of production combined with a high level of inflation. The turbulent economic reality in the 1970s led to a new economic order which meant for developed countries like Australia to make structural changes and reflect the digital revolution. The digital revolution enabled faster and cheaper possibility to expand beyond borders which resulted into increasing pressure on more isolationist economies to become part of the global markets. As Macintyre suggests, this development has forced Australia to rediscover itself.¹⁵⁶

Three major figures led Australia throughout this turbulent period. First was Edward Gough Whitlam, a Prime Minister (PM) of an Australian Labor Party. His government established diplomatic relations with China, declared the independence of Papua New Guinea or finally dropped the rest of the *White Australia Policy*.¹⁵⁷ During Whitlam’s government,

¹⁵² In 1949, Communists led by Mao Zedong won the Civil War with the Kuomintang’s government that has been forced to flee to Taiwan. Due to the Cold War and American containment of communism, the government of the Chinese Communist Party was not internationally recognized. It changed after the discrepancies between the Soviet Union and China. Thus, at the beginning of 1970s PRC took the Taiwan’s seat in the UN and its diplomatic isolation has ended. (DILLON, Michael, “Contemporary China: An Introduction,” 2009, pp. 16, 215-216, 218.)

¹⁵³ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 88.

¹⁵⁴ ZOELLER, Christoffer J. P., BANDELJ, Nina, “Crisis as Opportunity: Nixon’s Announcement to Close the Gold Window,” 2019, p. 1.

¹⁵⁵ MACALISTER, Terry, “Background: What caused the 1970s oil price shock?” [online] 2011.

¹⁵⁶ MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, pp. 178, 180, 181.

¹⁵⁷ White Australia Policy was part of the *Immigration Restriction Act* from 1901. In short, it was a racially biased principle that was part of the immigration policy and that privileged a Caucasian race. After the Second World War, Australia was steadily leaving the principle of White Australia and selective criteria related to immigration. However, it was not until Gough Whitlam when the *Racial Discrimination Act* (1975) was introduced, and Australia abandoned the discriminatory approach towards migrants. (GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 43, 91; MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 177.)

Australia began to react to the changes of the global economy. However, to a large extent, Whitlam ignored economic advices from his own cabinet and his government reacted late. After the crisis and dramatic circumstances around the dismissal of the Whitlam's government, the Liberals have won the elections.¹⁵⁸

Whitlam was replaced by Malcolm Fraser. Although representing a Liberal party, he followed up with Whitlam's agenda in many ways. However, in his opinion, Whitlam neglected power realities. Under Fraser's government, Australia supported the deepening of cooperation among the U.S. and Australia as well as expanding American bases on the Australian soil.¹⁵⁹ Also, Fraser supported China's and Japan's free accession to ASEAN to contain the influence of the Soviet Union in the region. Although during the Whitlam's and Fraser's term an increasing focus was given to human rights issue, which contributed to a better reputation of Australia, they both failed to react to Indonesian's increasing aggression. Additionally, with Whitlam's and Fraser's governments the greater self-reliance of Australian foreign policy was more apparent, demonstrated by the closer cooperation with the ASEAN countries or Japan.¹⁶⁰

Finally, the third figure that led the country through this transformative period was Robert James Lee Hawke (Labor party), known as Bob Hawke, who replaced Fraser as a PM and for whom the major challenge continued to be the economy. Concretely, to tame an uncontrolled increase of salaries and a high rate of unemployment. The new government not only found a common ground with unions, but they also made steps towards opening of the Australian market to foreign companies and investors: "*The main principle of the Australian Convention, a strong state protecting the standard of living, was to give way to the free market.*"¹⁶¹ Furthermore, from the 1980s, Australia became exposed to the effects of globalization and had to adopt market-oriented reforms. Interestingly, Australia underwent those reforms during the Labor government which has adopted a policy of the New Right while preserving social dimension of economic policies, such as minimum wage or the support for those in need, were preserved.

The economic changes did reflect in the Australian foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific. In 1984, the trade exchange within this region surpassed the transatlantic trade exchange. With Japan, the initial strengthening of the economic relations among both countries

¹⁵⁸ MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 179; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 88; TAYLOR, Brendan, and TOW, William T., 2017, p. 80.

¹⁵⁹ Interestingly, in 2014 Fraser published a book '*Dangerous Allies*' where he warns before too much of a dependency on the U.S.

¹⁶⁰ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 89, 94, 96, 102, 107-108; MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, pp. 188-189.

¹⁶¹ MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 184.

resulted in growing understanding of what impact a closer *political* cooperation between Australia and Japan can have on the region of Asia-Pacific. Although in the 1980s the old reminiscences occurred, the Japan-Australian relations continued to grow. Furthermore, the trade relations with Indonesia were given the priority despite Indonesian aggression in East Timor and its province of New Guinea.¹⁶²

Australia continued in deepening its relations with the U.S. Apart from the dispute at the end of Whitlam's government, which was related to the American facilities at Pine Gap, Australian representatives were supportive towards the alliance with the U.S. as for example the conflict between the U.S. and New Zealand showed.¹⁶³ The cooperation has been strengthened to react to Britain accession to European Economic Community (ECC) in 1973, to contain the Soviet (nuclear) threat and to have "*access to the American technology and intelligence.*"¹⁶⁴

The major theme of the 1970s and 1980s was the world economy. After this transformative period, Australia became more open to the foreign capital and thus exposed to the international economic environment. As Ken Henry argues, the economic policy might be described as 'Australian mercantilism', focusing on 'international competitiveness'.¹⁶⁵ Australia implemented the reforms that were needed to react effectively on the process of globalisation.

In terms of international politics and security, Australian concerns were related to a Soviet power and a fear from Asian communism. Due to limited capabilities it was important to maintain the key alliance with the United States. Despite New Zealand's membership in the alliance being dismissed, the relations between the U.S. and Australia were deepening. With Britain joining the ECC and the United States' shock from the Vietnam War, Australia also had to move towards greater self-reliance. The final years of 1980s meant the very end of the Cold War but instead of Fukuyama's end of history, new challenges were ahead.

3.3 1990s: Post-Cold War Development

In 1990, Bob Hawke was replaced by Paul Keating who argued that the future Australian success lies in Asia. He broadened Hawke's *enmeshment* with Asia to *engagement* with Asia.

¹⁶² GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 108, 143; MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 189.

¹⁶³ In the mid-1980s, ANZUS rather became 'AUS' after the refusal of the New Zealand to allow the American nuclear-powered ships or ships with possible nuclear armaments to enter its ports. Subsequently, U.S. froze the New Zealand's membership in the alliance although New Zealand has never formally withdrawn. (DIBB, Paul, 2005, p. 5; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 112; MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 190.)

¹⁶⁴ MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 190; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 88, 145.

¹⁶⁵ HENRY, Ken, "Australia in the Asian Century," 2016, pp. 132-133.

Keating's engagement “encompassed a strong dimension of identity,”¹⁶⁶ because Australia would have to bring a different story about itself. As an illustration serves a debate about the head of state who, according to Keating, should be an Australian and that Australia should transform into a republic. He saw an opportunity to use foreign policy as an instrument to make Australia a modern state and among his foreign policy priorities was pursuing multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, supporting international trading system and building relations with neighbouring countries. Unlike Hawke, who has seen the international relations based on personal connections, Keating focused on the structure.¹⁶⁷

These priorities were actively advanced by Gareth Evans, a Minister for Foreign Affairs (and Trade) in Keating's government. He was also one of the major proponents of the middle power concept. Although it was not Evans' original idea, he believed that middle power approach can distinguish Australia's position in international affairs. Although it is arguable whether size of a state does really matter in this manner, “*having middle-ranking economic, military and diplomatic capabilities and actively pursuing a middle power approach to international affairs does offer some insight into what certain states can do.*”¹⁶⁸ We could have seen such an active approach in Evatt's efforts to constrain the excessive influence of the great powers over the UN, in Bill Hayden's¹⁶⁹ engagement in the process of peace settlement in Cambodia, or in Evans' strive for nuclear disarmament.¹⁷⁰

According to Samuel Huntington, Keating's and Evans' efforts were a sign of Australia being a torn country (placed culturally in the West but geographically in the East) whose representatives at that time believed that “*in shaping the future of the nation, economy prevails over the culture.*”¹⁷¹ Such torn of Australia is reflected in Martin Griffiths' contribution to a debate on Australian foreign policy where he speaks about ‘geopolitical anomaly’ of Australia in the region. The anomaly lies in a fact that Australia is far from any union to join with its Western allies on the one hand and due to its ‘Western’ character “*it will not be accepted,*” Griffiths argues, “*as a fully fledged Asian member into any future East Asia union.*”¹⁷²

Keating's successor John Howard (Liberal party), who had ended thirteen years of Labor's government, came with a different vision. Howard's government did not share

¹⁶⁶ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 161.

¹⁶⁷ KEATING, Paul, “*Speech by the Prime Minister, the Honourable P J Keating Australia and Asia: Knowing Who We Are,*” [online] 1992; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 161-162, 167.

¹⁶⁸ UNGERER, Carl, 2007, p. 539.

¹⁶⁹ Bill Hayden was a Minister for Foreign Affairs in Hawke's government.

¹⁷⁰ MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 190; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 133; UNGERER, Carl, 2007, p. 538.

¹⁷¹ HUNTINGTON, Samuel, P., “*Střet civilizací: Boj kultur a proměna světového rádu,*” 2001, p. 173.

¹⁷² BURCHILL, Scott, and GRIFFITHS, Martin, 2014, p. 13.

Keating's opinion that Australian future success lies in Asia and rather stressed "Australian distinctive culture and tradition."¹⁷³ His government pursued Australian national interest which is reflected in two governmental white papers on foreign policy '*In the National Interest*' (1997)¹⁷⁴ and '*Advancing National Interest*' (2003). At the same time, the government stressed rather bilateral than multilateral relationships and insisted that there was no dilemma for Australia to choose between the historical bonds (the U.S.) or economic partnership (China).¹⁷⁵

The work of John Howard's government was highly affected by the terrorist attacks on September 11 in the U.S. John Howard was personally in Washington during the attacks, commemorating fifty years since the signing of the ANZUS treaty. The attacks led to historically first invocation of the ANZUS treaty. After that, Australia not only tightened up its stance towards immigrants, joined the War on Terror, but also followed the U.S. to Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia again proved to be a loyal ally to its closest strategic partner which was also given to the fact that John Howard got on well with the American President George W. Bush. The war has appeared once again among central topics of the Australian government.¹⁷⁶

Since the Liberals governed for a long time, the problems had started to pile up. Although the foreign policy did not play the main role in 2007 elections, some issues are worth to mention. The controversies around a treatment of migrants and a hard stance towards them together with the governmental scepticism about the climate change (Howard's government refused to ratify the Kyoto protocol) and unresolved issues of indigenous Australians (Aborigines) led to the defeat of Liberal party in the elections. Thus, after eleven years of ruling, Coalition government was replaced by the Labor party.¹⁷⁷¹⁷⁸

The next six years of Labor government relates to Kevin Rudd and the first woman PM Julia Gillard. Meanwhile Rudd's diplomatic career signalized the importance of the foreign policy in his agenda, Gillard focused more on the domestic issues and the domestic perspective was also reflected in dealing with foreign policy.¹⁷⁹

Rudd followed up Evans' pursuit of 'good international citizenship' of Australia while stressing the importance of the institutions. He also continued in the engagement with Asia wanting Australia to become a bridge between 'the East' (Asia) and 'the West' (Euro-Atlantic).

¹⁷³ MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 200.

¹⁷⁴ *In the National Interest* is the first white paper on Australia's foreign and trade policy in its history.

¹⁷⁵ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 204-205; • The Commonwealth of Australia, "*In the National Interest. Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper*," 1997, p. iv.

¹⁷⁶ MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, pp. 203, 213-214; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 10, 205-206, 214; DIBB, Paul, 2005, p. 2.

¹⁷⁷ Coalition is a political alliance composed of the Liberal party and the National party of Australia.

¹⁷⁸ MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, pp. 215-218; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 238.

¹⁷⁹ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 243, 252.

Gillard on the other hand was closer to John Howard with her approach to IR, “*linking domestic issues like education to the changing external environment.*” However, a white paper ‘*Australia in the Asian Century*’ (2012) has been released under her government, reflecting the changes in the near north.¹⁸⁰

Labor party has lost the elections in 2013 after decisive winning for the Coalition and Tony Abbott became the Australian PM. Abbott’s foreign policy agenda followed the conservative approach of the Liberal party (of Coalition governments). He stressed the importance of close relations among the English-speaking world, namely the United Kingdom, the U.S., Canada, Australia, and India. Coalition government worked on the bilateral relations with its neighbouring countries, particularly Indonesia (although the relationships between Australia and Indonesia deteriorated during Abbott’s term¹⁸¹). Among Abbott’s priorities were the national security issues which were related to an increasing terrorism in the world. With activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Abbott’s rhetoric, there was a threat of Australia being involved in another conflict in the Middle East. Moreover, as Matt McDonald argues in his article, some foreign policy issues like asylum and climate change were seen through the domestic politics.¹⁸²

After two years in the office, Tony Abbott lost party leadership ballot to Malcolm Turnbull who then became the new PM. The contrast after the change of PM was striking. Turnbull was a social liberal while Abbott was a conservative traditionalist. Unlike Abbott, he accepted human influence on climate change and supported gay marriage. Also, Turnbull was against deeper military involvement of the Australian troops in fights against ISIS.¹⁸³

In his foreign policy agenda, Turnbull focused on closer engagement with Asia. In formulating it, he drew upon Julia Gillard’s white paper ‘*Australia in the Asian Century*’ seeing many opportunities in Asia for Australia. As an example, the relations with Indonesia improved and an approach towards China has changed under Turnbull. At the same time, Turnbull’s government promised to strengthen the ANZUS alliance (e.g. through the United States Force

¹⁸⁰ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 243, 252.

¹⁸¹ The deterioration of mutual relations between Australia and Indonesia was due to Australian decision to return boats with migrants that were coming to Australia back to Indonesia – and Indonesia complained about the intrusion of its waters by Australians – and the recall of ambassadors from each country. (TYLER, Melissa Conley, “*Malcolm Turnbull’s foreign policy: The first six months,*” [online] 2016.)

¹⁸² GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 264-266; MCDONALD, Matt, “*Australian Foreign Policy under Abbott Government: Foreign Policy as Domestic Policy?*” 2015, pp. 658-659.

¹⁸³ BBC, “*Australian PM Tony Abbott ousted by Malcolm Turnbull,*” [online] 2015; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 283-284.

Postures Initiatives that supports the defence interoperability between two states) or to defend Australia from Chinese foreign interference and espionage.¹⁸⁴

Together with Marisa Payne his government formulated ‘*2016 Defence White Paper*’ and with Julie Bishop Turnbull’s government formulated a ‘*2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*’ – the first complex foreign policy white paper in fourteen years since ‘*Advancing National Interest*’ of Howard’s government which was released in 2003. Nevertheless, Turnbull’s style of government was too liberal for some conservatives within the Liberal party. Thus, his end as the PM was similar to Abbott’s. He was overthrown in the ballot for party leadership by Scott Morrison who has become the 30th (and latest) Australian PM.¹⁸⁵¹⁸⁶

Unlike Australian economy, which has been growing steadily for more than 25 years¹⁸⁷ (surviving Asian financial crisis in the 1990s and the world financial crisis in 2008 without greater consequences), the politics seemed to represent a greater issue in the post-Cold War period. From 1983 to 2007, Australia had three Prime ministers (Bob Hawke, Paul Keating and John Howard) but since 2007 none of the Prime ministers have finished his or her term in the office and Australia had five of them (Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull and Scott Morrison). This makes harder for individual governments to advance a coherent foreign policymaking towards Asia and might deepen to what Ken Henry named “*an episodic engagement*” of Australia with the region.¹⁸⁸

Australia has been an active agent of the international relations right from the beginning of its sovereign foreign policy practice. Australia actively participated on the establishment of the post-war international rules-based order. At the same time, the U.S. has become a crucial ally replacing Great Britain as number one ‘great powerful friend’. Australia again proved to be a loyal ally, fighting alongside the U.S. troops in major wars during the Cold War and even after. Moreover, Australia seek to engage with Asia. Overall, a continuity rather than changes is characteristic for Australian foreign policy.¹⁸⁹ However, Australia found itself in a different world since 1990s. Australia has been dealing with an ascending Asia (mainly China) finding

¹⁸⁴ Department of Defence, “*United States Force Posture Initiatives*,” [online] (n.a.); MEDCALF, Rory, “*Australia And China: understanding the reality check*,” 2019, p. 110.

¹⁸⁵ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 283-284; TYLER, Melissa Conley, [online] 2016.

¹⁸⁶ Scott Morrison served in Abbott’s government as the minister for immigration and border protection who has been ‘stopping the boats.’ In Turnbull’s government he has become a Treasurer (ministerial position providing key economic analyses related to budget, taxation, foreign investment etc.). After the leadership spill, he became the 30th PM of Australia. (GREENE, Andrew, “*Scott Morrison: From ‘stopping the boats’ to Prime Minister, ‘ScoMo’s’ often controversial rise to the top job*,” [online] 2018; ROJAS, Rick, “*Scott Morrison Is a New Kind of Australian Prime Minister: An Evangelical Christian*,” [online] 2018.)

¹⁸⁷ The Economist, “*Aussie rules. What Australia can teach the world*,” [online] 2018.

¹⁸⁸ HENRY, Ken, 2016, p. 138.

¹⁸⁹ MCDONALD, Matt, 2015, p. 656.

ways to increase regional cooperation and at the same time maintaining close alliance with the U.S. In this sense, all Australian governments in the post-Cold War era needs to find a balance between their economic and strategic interests. To conclude the post-Cold War era in terms of Australian foreign policymaking I will use the words of Allan Gyngell from his analysis where he claims in the spirit of the famous HBO series Game of Thrones that “*Policy-making is becoming far more complicated. The easy days are over. Winter is coming.*”¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰ GYNGELL, Allan, “*Asia-Pacific: Game of Thrones in our Backyard?*” [online] 2018.

4 Role of Power

The first part of my analysis deals with the role of power in Australian foreign policy. Concretely, whether Australian behaviour towards Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War period is driven in the intentions of Waltz's defensive realism. In other words, if Australia acts in terms of balancing an increasing power of the major agents in the Asia-Pacific region for the defensive purposes or not. Thus, the first hypothesis that *Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its power position* is being tested.

As we know from Waltz, the major motivation in behaving in the intentions of the defensive realism is to use the power to guarantee state's security and to balance the power of others for keeping the status quo instead of dominating others. Arguably, such guarantees and the preservation of status quo would be done in a line with the neorealist 'utility maximization' that stresses the importance of hard power capabilities. In a fast-developing environment of Asia-Pacific where China is being more assertive and the U.S. position is being questioned, I argue that Australia will tend to defend its position while balancing the power in the region. In practical terms that would mean to balance Chinese growing power by making the U.S. to remain active in the region and help to preserve the status quo in Asia-Pacific and to raise Australian hard power capabilities. If such assumption will prove correct, the first hypothesis will confirm, and the realist theory would prove correct in analysing Australian foreign policy towards Asia-Pacific.

4.1 The U.S.-Australia Alliance

After the Second World War, the U.S. established and pursued the San Francisco System¹⁹¹ in Asia-Pacific. The system is based on bilateral agreements and plays a crucial role in the distribution of power in the region up until today. It serves to prevent a major conflict in the region and to enhance the defence capabilities of the U.S. allies. The U.S. have its bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines or in Australia.¹⁹²

Today, the U.S. military expenditure is the highest in the world. It represents over 3 per cent of its GDP. According to SIPRI, the U.S. share of world military spending was more than one third and after seven years, its military expenditure raised in 2018 to reach nearly 650 billion

¹⁹¹ Also known as the 'hub-and-spoke' system where the U.S. is the 'hub' and its allies Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia are 'spokes'. (PARK, Jae Jeok, "The US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific: hedge against potential threats or an undesirable multilateral security order?" 2011, p. 138.)

¹⁹² TOW, William T.; LIMAYE, Satu, "What's China Got to Do With It? U.S. Alliances, Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific," 2016, p. 11.

dollars. With Donald Trump in the White House, the increase is expected to continue, and the defence budget should get over 700 billion dollars in 2020.¹⁹³

The alliance with the U.S. represents a crucial element of Australian international power and of its foreign policy. Such awareness has been projected into the Australian foreign policy white papers. In the white paper '*Advancing National Interest*' from 2003, the government states that the links with the U.S. are "*fundamental for [Australian] security and prosperity,*" and the mutual partnership is "*essential for advancing [Australian] national interests.*"¹⁹⁴ Fourteen years later, in '*2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*', Turnbull's government sees the alliance as "*central to Australia's approach to the Indo-Pacific,*" claiming that without the U.S. engagement "*power is likely to shift more quickly in the region and it will be more difficult for Australia to achieve the levels of security and stability,*" and pledging that "*the Government will broaden and deepen [Australian] alliance cooperation, including through the United States Force Postures Initiatives.*"¹⁹⁵ Of course both of these white papers were released under the Coalition government which might give an impression that it is the agenda of the Liberals and Nationalists, but if we look at the Defence white papers that has been released under Labor government we will see a similar attitude.¹⁹⁶

Although the alliance with the U.S. is very important, it does not mean that it is not being discussed. The common theme of this foreign policy debate is not whether to be an ally with the U.S. or not (although there are minor voices saying that Australia should abandon the alliance¹⁹⁷) but rather to what extent Australia should tie its foreign policy with the one of U.S. In other words, the debate is about whether to establish a greater degree of autonomy on the U.S. as a security guarantor or to intensify the cooperation under the alliance. William Tow and Brendan Taylor name those camps the Pragmatists (for greater independence) and the Crusaders (pro-intensification). Professor Tow during his lectures specified this division into four camps as those who see Australia as a loyal ally, an activist ally, an independent ally and a promiscuous

¹⁹³ World Bank, "*Military expenditure (% of GDP) – United States,*" [online] (n.a.); SIPRI, 2019, p. 6. SELIGMAN, Lara, "*Pentagon Eyes Windfall as Trump Seeks \$750 Billion Defense Budget,*" [online] 2019; MCCARTHY, Bill, "*Trump exaggerates spending on U.S. military rebuild,*" [online] 2020.

¹⁹⁴ The Commonwealth of Australia, "*Advancing National Interest,*" 2003, p. xvi.

¹⁹⁵ The Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, p. 4.

¹⁹⁶ See for example the defence paper released by Paul Keating's government in 1994, where the government claims that Australia's "*alliance with the United States remains a key element of [Australian] defence policy,*" (The Commonwealth of Australia, "*Defending Australia – Defence White Paper 1994,*" p. 157.) or the defence paper released during Gillard's government in 2013 where the alliance with the U.S. is marked as "*the most important defence relationship.*" (The Commonwealth of Australia, "*Defence White Paper 2013,*" p. 56.)

¹⁹⁷ TAYLOR, Brendan, and TOW, William T., 2017, p. 83.

partner.¹⁹⁸ Overall, such debate is not new. It is present among foreign policy experts since the signing of the ANZUS treaty.¹⁹⁹

The debate recently intensified in 2010 with a provocative text of Hugh White published in Quarterly Essay discussing how Australia should position itself between the U.S. and China.²⁰⁰ White argues in the line with the Pragmatists, claiming that the U.S. should share the power with the rising China to prevent the danger of a direct conflict. White's claims show the core argument for Pragmatists which is a fear of Australia being entrapped by Washington into conflict that is not in its interest. Part of the Pragmatist group are also for example Bob Carr, former foreign minister, or Dennis Richardson, former diplomat, who summarised his opinion on Australian relationship with China and the U.S. as "*friends with both, allies with one.*"²⁰¹

On the other hand, Crusaders camp asserts that Australia should join the U.S. efforts "*to balance against China's rise,*"²⁰² for example to counter its assertive behaviour in the South China Sea. Among those who belong to Crusaders camp are for example Peter Jennings or Andrew Shearer. They advocate the necessity of the U.S.-led order in the region of Asia-Pacific to keep preferred balance of power there. Furthermore, they promote closer cooperation with the U.S. and its allies in terms of military, intelligence and coordination of the like-minded partners, e.g. India. However, in this manner, the U.S. did not hear out earlier proposals of its allies (Australia, Japan and Canada) to develop "*multilateral security mechanisms*" which would reflect the post-Cold War dynamics and brought a change in the bilateral system set by the U.S. after the Second World War.²⁰³

The need for revaluation of the San Francisco System becomes apparent in the ascending Asia. Concretely, the U.S. needs to react on the geopolitical changes in the region and decide whether to maintain the strategy based on bilateral security agreements or to move towards the multilateral security arrangements or to encourage allies in the region to cooperate beyond bilateral agreements.²⁰⁴ Meanwhile the administration of the former (Democratic) U.S. President Barack Obama (2009-2017) tend to strengthen multilateralism with its allies in the region (mainly Australia, Japan or South Korea), supported ASEAN countries (attending all

¹⁹⁸ TOW, William, "*Lecture on the ANZUS alliance,*" 2018.

¹⁹⁹ TAYLOR, Brendan, and TOW, William T., 2017, pp. 77-79; BALDINO, Daniel, CARR, Andrew, LANGLOIS, Anthony J., 2014, p. xvi.

²⁰⁰ Hugh White sparked the discussion in his article *Power Shift: Australia's Future between Washington and Beijing* which he has later elaborated in *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power*.

²⁰¹ TAYLOR, Brendan, and TOW, William T., 2017, pp. 86-87; RICHARDSON, Dennis, "*The 2015 Blamey Oration: The strategic outlook for the Indo-Pacific Region,*" [online], 2015, p. 11.

²⁰² TAYLOR, Brendan, and TOW, William T., 2017, p. 84.

²⁰³ TAYLOR, Brendan, and TOW, William T., 2017, pp. 84-85; TOW, William T., LIMAYE, Satu, 2016, p. 11.

²⁰⁴ TOW, William T., LIMAYE, Satu, 2016, p. 12.

East Asia Summits except one²⁰⁵) or promoted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)²⁰⁶ (as a key part of Obama's 'Pivot to Asia'), it is unclear what the current (Republican) President Donald Trump intents to do.

Trump's politics in this manner appears chaotic and contributes to the decrease of U.S. influence. He cancelled the efforts to keep TPP on track to admit later that he may get back to it, not risking an increase of Chinese influence in the region.²⁰⁷ His administration scales back the presence of the U.S. on Asian regional summits. As an illustration of such trend serves the East Asia Summit (EAS)²⁰⁸ to which Trump's Vice-President Mike Pence was sent in 2018 and in 2019 Wilbur Ross, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, and Robert O'Brien, Trump's National Security Advisor, were the head of the U.S. delegation.²⁰⁹ On the other hand, while Trump neglects the Asia regional summits, he is meeting and "*falling in love*" with the North Korean Dictator Kim Jong-un.²¹⁰ Trump's politics towards the region suggests that he is abandoning Obama's Pivot to Asia and rather realizing what Michael Wesley aptly labelled as the "*Pivot to Chaos*."²¹¹ Trump's presidency even resonates among the public. As the Lowy Institute Poll 2019 shows, 76 per cent of respondents does not have too much confidence or none at all in Donald Trump.²¹² Finally, an unpleasant phone call between President Trump and Malcolm Turnbull showed a potentially new dynamics of the 'New Special Relationship' as has been the U.S.-Australian relations labelled by Bates Gill and Tom Switzer.²¹³

²⁰⁵ PANDA, Ankit, "US to Downgrade East Asia Summit Participation in 2019," [online] 2019.

²⁰⁶ A trade deal between 12 Pacific countries including the U.S. that would have become the largest free trade agreement in the world and served as an economic counterweight to rising China. (MCBRIDE, James; CHATZKY, Andrew, "What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?" [online] (n.a.) [updated 2019-01-04].)

²⁰⁷ The reason behind Trump's changing his mind might be the fact that Australia, Japan and South Korea – all U.S. allies – have suggested that they would eventually join the Sino-centric Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership which does not count with the U.S. (BAKER, Peter, "Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama's Signature Trade Deal," [online] 2017; BBC, "Trump to reconsider joining TPP trade pact," [online] 2018; BOOT, Max, "Donald Trump's Pivot Through Asia," [online] 2016.)

²⁰⁸ East Asia Summit is a "meeting of 18 regional leaders for strategic dialogue and cooperation on the key political, security, and economic challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region." It includes 10 ASEAN countries and 8 countries outside ASEAN structures – Australia, China, Japan, India, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States. (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "EAS Factsheet," [online] (n.a.).)

²⁰⁹ ROGERS, Katie, "Trump to Skip Meetings in Asia as He Keeps a Distance With Allies," [online] 2018; PANDA, Ankit, [online] 2019.

²¹⁰ CLENCH, Sam, "Donald Trump says he and Kim Jong-un 'fell in love,'" [online] 2018.

²¹¹ WESLEY, Michael, "The Pivot to Chaos," 2018, p. 7; EVANS, Gareth, "Australia in an age of geopolitical transition," 2018, p. 13.

²¹² KASSAM, Natasha, "Lowy Institute Poll 2019," 2019, pp. 7, 25.

²¹³ The full transcript of the phone call between President Trump and Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is available here: MILLER, Greg; VITKOVSKAYA, Julie; FISCHER-BAUM, Reuben, "'This deal will make me look terrible': Full transcripts of Trump's calls with Mexico and Australia," [online] 2017. The term 'New Special Relationship' was used by Bates Gill and Tom Switzer in their article from 2015. (GILL, Bates; SWITZER, Tom "The New Special Relationship," [online] 2015.)

As it has been argued in the previous paragraphs, the U.S. is the major power in the region since the Second World War. However, the dynamics in the region changes and the U.S.-led order is declining in many ways. As an important factor serves a change in a White House where current President Donald Trump does not seem to be keen on engaging with Asia-Pacific region unlike his predecessor, Barack Obama. Nevertheless, Trump's government released the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report in which the U.S. Department of Defense marked the Indo-Pacific as the "*the single most consequential region for America's future.*"²¹⁴ Another factor, even more important represents the rise of China. Thus, the key issue and a potential threat to the ANZUS alliance are the challenges posed by the Chinese rise. As Tow and Limaye write in their article: "*the balance of cooperative behavior in United States security ties with regional allies and partners will largely depend on how Chinese strategic behavior evolves.*"²¹⁵ Related to that is a potential major power conflict between the U.S. and China and a possibility of the U.S. military engagement in the war in Asia which would presumably lead to an Australian involvement in it. Although the rise of Chinese power is not a matter of the recent times, under the current president, Xi Jinping²¹⁶, China became more assertive and the phase of 'peaceful development' is being replaced by advancing the concept of 'Chinese dream' which is connected with an idea of a 'great rejuvenation' of a country.²¹⁷

4.2 The Rise of China

Chinese growing assertiveness is connected with the current President Xi Jinping and it is reflecting on Chinese behaviour towards Asia-Pacific. Concretely we can name increasing tensions in South China Sea (mainly with ASEAN countries and the U.S.) where China is building artificial islands and increasing its influence²¹⁸, East China Sea where it has dispute

²¹⁴ The Department of Defense, "*Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,*" 2019, p. 1.

²¹⁵ TOW, William T., LIMAYE, Satu, 2016, p. 10.

²¹⁶ Among the reasons explaining why China is more assertive under Xi Jinping is that his predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, came from a different generation of Chinese presidents. Unlike Xi, both were chosen by Deng Xiaoping, both were technocrats, and both shared the view on Chinese international interests. On the contrary, Xi represents the so called 'fifth generation' of Chinese leaders which has been more exposed to the foreign influence and better educated. (LANTEIGNE, Marc (2016), pp. 24-25, 27.)

²¹⁷ DIBB, Paul, 2005, p. 3; LANTEIGNE, Marc, "*Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction,*" 2016, p. 8; ACHARYA, Amitav, "*Coping with the changing world order,*" 2017, pp. 3-5; JAKOBSON, Linda, "*What does China want?*" 2017, p. 60.

²¹⁸ See for example HYER, Eric, "*The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements,*" 1995; or FELS, Enrico and VU, Truong-Min, "*Introduction: Understanding the Importance of the Disputes in the South China Sea,*" pp. 3-23 in: : FELS, Enrico; VU, Truong-Min (eds.), *Power Politics in Asia's Contested Waters: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea*, 2016.

with Japan over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands²¹⁹, in a cross-strait with Taiwan²²⁰ or the pursue of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) across the states in the region and beyond.²²¹

In terms of economy, China represents the second largest economy in the world, the first according to some measures respectively. Chinese economy is growing continuously for the past decades. In fact, since Deng Xiaoping introduced economic reforms in 1970s, Chinese GDP growth is 10 per cent on the average which represents the most rapid sustainable development in world history. Furthermore, already for some time in relative terms Chinese economy has been bigger to American economy “*than the Soviet Union ever was during the cold war.*”²²² In 2007, China became Australia’s biggest trading partner and its major interest lies in the natural resources, agriculture or services. China replaced Japan in the position which meant that “*for the first time in its history, its [Australian] major economic partner was not part of the same alliance system.*”²²³

Chinese economic miracle from the past thirty years also reflects on military spending of the country. According to SIPRI, China is the second largest spender on military. Although the U.S. military budget is 2,6 times higher than the Chinese, Chinese military expenditure in 2018 grew by 5 per cent compared with 2017 and since 2009 China increased its defence budget by 83 per cent. Also, meanwhile the U.S. increased its budget after seven years of decline, Chinese expenditure on defence “*have grown by 15 per cent annually over the past two decades.*”²²⁴ The Australian Defence Paper from 2016 indicates that China is about to equalize the U.S.’s military spending in 2035, however, Sam Roggeveen suggests that unlike the U.S., China will concentrate its power and defence capabilities “*in a single region.*”²²⁵

Increasing military expenditure combined with a growing assertiveness in the region represent a challenge for the Australian foreign policymakers and at the structural level to the U.S.-led order in Asia-Pacific whose dedicated part Australia was and still is. Also, we can see that the economic growth of China did not go hand in hand with a greater democratization of a country as may have been expected. Instead, the change of the Chinese constitution guarantees to President Xi Jinping to rule as a president until decides to step down or die.²²⁶ Furthermore,

²¹⁹ See for example SEOKWOO, L., “Territorial Disputes among Japan, China, and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands,” 2002; or The Japan Institute of International Affairs, “Japan’s Territorial Issues and the Historical Understandings of the Concerned Countries,” 2014.

²²⁰ TAYLOR, Brendan, 2018, pp. 133-170.

²²¹ KUO, Lily, and KOMMENDA, Niko, “What is China’s Belt and Road Initiative?” [online] (n.a.).

²²² WHITE, Hugh, 2011, p. 82; World Bank, “China Overview,” [online] (n.a.).

²²³ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 231.

²²⁴ SIPRI, 2019, p. 6; GREEN, Michael J., DEAN, Peter J., TAYLOR, Brendan and COOPER, Zack, 2015, p. 6.

²²⁵ The Commonwealth of Australia, “2016 Defence White Paper,” 2016, p. 49; ROGGEVEEN, Sam, “China’s New Navy: A short guide for Australian policy-makers,” 2018, p. 3.

²²⁶ The Economist, [online] 2018.

China has established the rival organizations such as for example the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) established in 2016 and promotes the economic cooperation in the region under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.²²⁷

However, China is part of the international order, participating in the institutions, such as World Bank or International Monetary Fund and thus contributes to the international system that has been established by the West. Chinese activity and willingness to cooperate within those organisations suggests that China do not depart far from the foreign policy objectives embedded in ‘peaceful development’ and that China in fact only wants to change its role within the system, not the system itself.²²⁸ Also, in case of largely populated rising powers, such as China or India, we should bear in mind that what matters is the usage of their reinforced capabilities and their ability to convert their economic and military resources “*into strategies that will produce preferred outcomes.*”²²⁹

As Hugh White suggests, the representatives of Australia began to realize the geopolitical change in 1990s. It started with Paul Keating’s politics of engagement with Asia. He visited to Beijing in 1993, which was the first visit of Australian prime minister since 1986 and expressed the support to China in participating in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Continuing with John Howard, who “*increasingly acknowledged China’s growing strategic weight,*”²³⁰ which was followed by the negotiations of a China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA). Howard’s administration described the mutual relationship with China as “*an economic strategic partnership,*”²³¹ guided by a pragmatic approach, and at the same time it claimed that Australia does not have to choose between the U.S. and China. White’s initial claim is supported by Allan Gyngell who points out to the fact that China was getting higher on the list of foreign policy priorities during 1990s.²³²

The word that would characterize Australian relationship towards Asia during the era of Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard would be an opportunity. Rudd ambitious was to make bridges – between Asia and the West, between the U.S. and China. He spoke openly towards Chinese audience even addressing them in fluent Mandarin. Unlike Howard, his initial intention was not

²²⁷ Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, “*About AIIB – Introduction,*” [online] (n.a.); BOOT, Max, 2016.

²²⁸ THOMAS, Neil, “*New and old: foreign policy under Xi Jinping,*” 2018, p. 17; WHITE, Hugh, “*The new security order,*” 2013, p. 9.

²²⁹ NYE, Joseph S., Jr., 2011., p. 10; THOMAS, Neil, 2018, p. 16.

²³⁰ WHITE, Hugh, 2011, pp. 82-83;

²³¹ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 191.

²³² GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 181-182.

to set aside the differences, but to reconcile “*Chinese and Western world views*. ”²³³ However, as Gyngell argues, during the process of settling down the mutual discords between China and Australia, Rudd’s behaviour suggested a comeback to Howard’s pragmatic way of dealing with China. Although Julia Gillard rather focused on the domestic politics, during her term in the office, the annual meeting between Australian and Chinese prime ministers was established.²³⁴ Also, her government released the white paper which stressed the opportunities brought by the Asian century to Australia, marking ascending Asia as “*the defining feature of the 21st century*. ”²³⁵

Tony Abbott focused, similarly as John Howard, on the economic relations with China. During his term in 2015, the ChAFTA was signed representing one of the most ambitious trade deals between China and other country. Also, Abbott wanted to balance Chinese rise through the cooperation under the QUAD (with the U.S., Japan and India) and to strengthen ties between the English-speaking countries.²³⁶

With Malcolm Turnbull came, to use the term of Rory Medcalf, a ‘*reality check*’ concerning the Australia-China relations. His administration had to react on an increasing Chinese foreign interference which connected for example with a Labor senator Sam Dastyari, whose suspicious links with China cost him a seat in Senate²³⁷, or with a release of a controversial book of Clive Hamilton in 2018 named *Silent Invasion*, describing increasing systematic Chinese influence in Australia.²³⁸ Therefore, Turnbull’s administration introduced legislative reforms that aims to tighten up the interference from abroad.²³⁹ Moreover, Turnbull’s government introduced the ‘*2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*’ that fully embraces a concept of Indo-Pacific region which is partly seen as a response to Chinese increasing ambitions in Asia. As Rory Medcalf argues, such move “*endorsed a multipolar Indo-Pacific strategy of deepening and diversifying other partnerships to complement the US alliance*. ”²⁴⁰

As we see so far from this chapter, Australia is aware of the increasing importance of Asia as well as growing ambitions of China in the region. Australia profits from China being its biggest trading partner. However, Chinese economic rise combined with its increasing

²³³ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 233-234.

²³⁴ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 280.

²³⁵ The Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, p. 1.

²³⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “*China–Australia Free Trade Agreement*,” [online] (n.a.); GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 281.

²³⁷ YAXLEY, Louise, “*Sam Dastyari and the murky links with Chinese businessmen that ended his political career*,” [online] 2017.

²³⁸ HAMILTON, Clive, “*Silent Invasion*,” 2018.

²³⁹ MEDCALF, Rory, 2019, pp. 109, 117.

²⁴⁰ MEDCALF, Rory, 2019, p. 112.

military budget and growing assertiveness under the current President Xi Jinping might get Australia into an unpleasant situation of having to choose between its major trading partner and its major strategic partner.

4.3 Australian response

Australian response to the power shift in Asia-Pacific has been partly described in the previous paragraphs. However, some aspects need to be added to see the whole picture. Among those are Australian military spending and how it corresponds to the changes in the region, current state of the alliance with the U.S. and to what extent is the Australian foreign policy independent.

Australia belongs among the top 15 countries with the highest military spending. Its military spending is little over 1,9 per cent of its GDP. Such number does not represent a big difference compare to the previous years in the post-Cold War era.²⁴¹ However, in terms of the concrete amount of money, we can see an increase in 2019 by 2,1 per cent compare to the previous year and by 23 per cent compare to 2010.²⁴² Although the defence spending increased, it still did not get over the promised 2 per cent of GDP which is expected to be the goal of today's government of the PM Scott Morrison since Australia promised to hit 2 per cent in 2020-21. Interestingly, there is a bipartisan agreement on such pledge.²⁴³

As indicated in the previous sub-chapter, a crucial part of Australian defence is the alliance with the U.S. whose military personnel and intelligence service personnel (visiting or rotating) are both present in Australia. The U.S. intelligence service personnel are part of the Joint Defence Facilities in Pine Gap which is seen as "*perhaps the most important United States intelligence facility outside that country.*"²⁴⁴ The military personnel are present in Darwin. Eight years after Barack Obama's proclamation that the U.S. and Australia intend "*to build on this relationship in a staged way to a full force of around 2,500 personnel,*"²⁴⁵ this goal has been reached last year. In 2019, the force of 2,500 US Marines rotated for the first time in

²⁴¹ See World Bank, "Military expenditure (% of GDP) – Australia," [online] (n.a.); SMITH, Emily, O'BRIEN, Kristy, "US Marines arriving in Darwin in record numbers to focus on Indo-Pacific stability," [online] 2019.

²⁴² TIAN, Nan, KUIMOVA, Alexandra, DA SILVA, Diego Lopes, WEZEMAN, Pieter D. and WEZEMAN, Siemon T., "SIPRI Fact Sheet: Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2019," 2020, p. 8.

²⁴³ HELLYER, Marcus, "Boring is the new black: Defence budget 2019–20," [online] 2019.

²⁴⁴ TANTER, Richard, "Pine Gap – an introduction," [online] 2016. Furthermore, the Australian Defence Paper from 2016 sees Pine Gape as making "*a critical contribution to the security interests of Australia and the United States, delivering information on intelligence priorities such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and military and weapons developments, while contributing to the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.*" (The Commonwealth of Australia, 2016, p. 122)

²⁴⁵ OBAMA, Barack, "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard of Australia in Joint Press Conference," [online] 2011.

Darwin and trained alongside the Australian Defence Force.²⁴⁶ Such military build-up is expected to continue as “*a new port facility just outside Darwin*” should serve better for the Australian-U.S. troops to operate in Indo-Pacific region. According to the observers, the military build-up is an answer on Chinese growing assertiveness in the area.²⁴⁷ It is also a proof that even that the head of state in the U.S. has changed, Trump is fully aware of a strategic importance of Australia and a special relationship among both countries.

Apart from the U.S., Australia is also developing strategic relationships with other major powers in the region – with Japan and India. Such relationship is developing under the Quad. The Quad is “*an informal strategic dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia and India,*” and has been initiated after the devastating tsunami in Southeast Asia more than fifteen years back and promoted by Australian PM John Howard (with Alexander Downer, his Minister for Foreign Affairs), American Vice President Dick Cheney, Japanese PM Shinzo Abe and Indian PM Manmohan Singh.²⁴⁸

With the change of an Australian PM²⁴⁹ and a Japanese PM, the dialogue has been suspended. It continued after the 2017 ASEAN Summit with re-elected PM Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull, Indian PM Narendra Modi and Donald Trump as the President of the U.S. All of them agreed “*to revive the dialogue so as to promote peace and stability in the region, which was being disrupted due to China’s assertive behaviour.*”²⁵⁰ However, the present situation does not bring any signals of the Quad being formalized. Japan is rather focusing on trilateral agreement with South Korea and China, India is rather choosing a cooperative approach towards China (being part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or BRICS²⁵¹), Donald Trump does not seem to be willing to establish a multilateral agreement with Asia-Pacific states (see above) and finally Australia has to carefully balance its economic and strategic priorities. Also, South Korea or states of ASEAN as the important agents in the region are left out from this grouping. Although the Quad does not look like being formalized now, in the future it might serve for the agents involved (including Australia) as a counterweight

²⁴⁶ SMITH, Emily, O’BRIEN, Kristy, [online] 2019.

²⁴⁷ GREENE, Andrew, PARK, Michael, “*Secret plans for new port outside Darwin to accommodate visiting US Marines,*” [online] 2019; ROBSON, Seth, “*US military presence in northern Australia will grow, former defense official says,*” [online] 2019.

²⁴⁸ RAI, Ashok, “*Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 2 (Quad 2.0) – a credible strategic construct or mere “foam in the ocean”?*” 2018, pp. 138-139.

²⁴⁹ John Howard (Liberal party) was replaced by Kevin Rudd (Labor party).

²⁵⁰ RAI, Ashok, 2018, p. 139.

²⁵¹ Multilateral association between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

to China. As Gyngell points out, “*it would be naive to claim that Australian efforts to engage more deeply with Japan, India and Korea do not have an element of balancing China.*”²⁵²

Such claim is supported by an ongoing process of building strategic bilateral relationship between Australia and Japan. Both countries are formalizing the intelligence sharing or exchange the defence technology. Additionally, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue between Australia, Japan and the U.S. has been established as part of the U.S. “*minilateral alignments*” focusing on building security capacities of the developing states in Asia-Pacific.²⁵³ Apart from the fact that such behaviour is encouraged by the U.S., the will comes from both countries as well. Such claim supports the events from few years ago. In 2017, Malcolm Turnbull stressed that “*Japan is a close friend of Australia and a bedrock economic partner and a dependable security partner in our region.*”²⁵⁴ Furthermore, in 2018, PM Shinzo Abe made a historical visit of Australian city Darwin and paid his tributes to those who were killed during the air strikes in the Second World War.²⁵⁵ Therefore, although the QUAD does not seem to institutionalize in the near future, the increasingly closer relations between Australia and Japan suggests that both countries are willing to counterbalance Chinese growing power at least bilaterally.

Last points that should be mentioned in the Australian response to power shifts in the region is that Australia performs its own independent foreign policymaking. The dilemma outlined in the previous sub-chapter suggests that Australia stands before a crude choice that needs to be resolved to satisfy one side or the other. In fact, Australia acts a sovereign country with an independent foreign policy.

As such, Australia did join in 2016 the AIIB, although being discouraged by the U.S. or Japan, it did rent a Darwin port to a Chinese company for ninety-nine years, by which it has upset the U.S. President Barack Obama for not being consulted. On the other hand, it did send a freedom of navigation patrols to a South China Sea, where it has been challenged by the Chinese navy, or it accused China of targeted cyber-attacks and evaluated the participation of the Chinese companies (such as Huawei or ZTE) on building the National Broadband Network as a possible risk.²⁵⁶

²⁵² RAI, Ashok, 2018, pp 145-146; GYNGELL, Allan, “*The Company We Keep,*” 2017a, p. 43.

²⁵³ TOW, William T., LIMAYE, Satu, 2016, p. 19.

²⁵⁴ TURNBULL, Malcolm, “*Remarks at bilateral meeting with His Excellency Mr Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan,*” [online] 2017.

²⁵⁵ TOW, William T.; LIMAYE, Satu, 2016, p. 13; SMITH, Emily, “*Shinzo Abe arrives in Darwin for first visit by Japanese leader,*” [online] 2018.

²⁵⁶ TAYLOR, Brendan, and TOW, William T., 2017, p. 82; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 279, 283.

Additionally, Australia belongs among the major proponents of the Indo-Pacific concept. On the one hand it might be only because it reflects better its position between the two oceans, on the other hand we might also see it as signal to China for not being the only great power in the region. This of course does not please Chinese representatives.²⁵⁷

Australia has been among the most loyal allies of the U.S. and to a large extent it is dependent on its defence capabilities. However, in practice Australia was “*actively seeking and successfully exercising a remarkable degree of independence within the bounds of this alliance relationship,*”²⁵⁸ which is supported by the examples stated above. Apart from those recent examples, a historical one can be mentioned – an Australian behaviour towards New Zealand after being suspended from ANZUS by the U.S. Regardless of that, Australia continued to remain close defence ties with New Zealand.²⁵⁹ Nevertheless, such independence within the alliance with the U.S. might be more challenging if the situation in Asia-Pacific worsen and Australia would have to choose between its strategic and economic interests.

Notwithstanding, it is a fact that the San Francisco System endured over 70 years which not only suggests that the Trump presidency might be only ‘an episode’ in it, but also goes against the logic of power balancing theory as it is described by the international relations theory since it “*anticipates that once the original threat that initiated an alliance network weakens or changes, alliance dissolution becomes more probable.*”²⁶⁰ In the post-Cold War period we may be witnessing the weakening of the U.S. position in the region but not weakening of the U.S. alliances network. Especially not the one with Australia. It might be caused either by the fact that the power balancing theory cannot sufficiently explain current Australian behaviour in the region or that a new ‘threat’ occurred and needs to be counterbalanced. I argue that a new ‘threat’ embodied by the Chinese rise has occurred and still demands a close cooperation. However, the factor of ‘shared values’ by the U.S. and Australia is not reflected by the balance theory.

To sum up, the major concerns to Australian foreign policymaking are related to the rise of China and its growing assertiveness. On the one hand, Australian representatives are trying to accommodate Chinese power through its support in participating in the international institutions or by avoiding the direct ‘choice’ between its economic or strategic interests. On

²⁵⁷ MEDCALF, Rory, 2019, p. 114; DOBELL, Graeme, [online] 2018.

²⁵⁸ TAYLOR, Brendan, and TOW, William T., 2017, p. 88.

²⁵⁹ BROINOWSKI, Alison and CURRAN, James, “*The US Alliance,*” p. 131, in: BALDINO, Daniel, CARR, Andrew, LANGLOIS, Anthony J. (eds.), Australian Foreign Policy: Controversies and Debates, 1st edition, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2014.

²⁶⁰ TOW, William T.; LIMAYE, Satu, 2016, p. 7.

the other hand, Australia confirmed its commitment to increase its military budget, it steadily builds bilateral relations with regional major powers, such as Japan and strengthen its relations with the U.S. by “*deepening institutionally and broadening into new areas of cooperation such as cyber security, ballistic missile defence, space cooperation and new measures to combat terrorism.*”²⁶¹ In addition to that, Australia started to prefer to frame its region as Indo-Pacific and Australia-China relations underwent a ‘reality check’ to tackle Chinese increasing interference in Australian politics. However, I argue that such Australian behaviour is not driven by the intentions to dominate others but rather to preserve current status quo. Thus, Waltz’s theory of defensive realism offers a significant contribution in explaining Australian behaviour towards Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, such behaviour is not based merely on power but also its identity.

²⁶¹ TAYLOR, Brendan, and TOW, William T., 2017, pp. 81-82.

5 Role of Identity

The second part of my analysis deals with the role of identity in Australian foreign policy. Concretely, whether Australian ideas, values and norms are the major constitutive elements of its behaviour towards Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War period. In other words, if Australian identity serves as a base for the articulation of its foreign policy and how does it influence it.

I argue that two factors make Australian identity, in Wendt's words, relatively stable. Its geographic isolation and its 'middle power' status. Interestingly, Australian geographic isolation did not lead to an isolationism but rather the opposite. Australia has always been an active agent – regionally as well as internationally. After the Second World War, Australia has become an active participant of the international relations contributing to establish the international rules-based order. At the global level, Australia established close ties with the U.S. within ANZUS framework and it has been promoting the need to give a weight to smaller powers to shape international order and to share the responsibility for it. In terms of the latter, Australian effort reflected "*in expanding UN's economic and social remit and in giving the General Assembly equal authority with the Security Council.*"²⁶² At the regional level, Australia engaged with its Asian neighbours. Building the relations with Indonesia, administering Papua New Guinea as its colony, developing trade relations with Japan, or establishing the Pacific Community. Australian active engagement at the global level as well as at the regional level helped to establish its reputation within international community.

Australia's active international engagement together with its relative power (its military budget, its alliance with the U.S. etc.), makes Australia the middle power. As Andrew Carr suggests, "*claiming middle power status has a long tradition in Australia,*"²⁶³ dating back to the roots of Australian diplomacy that are related to Herbert Evatt. Middle power diplomacy stresses multilateralism, promoting international legal norms and active diplomacy or engagement in the international affairs to reach certain outcomes. In Australian case it is to make sure, that the voice of 'small' and 'middle' powers will be heard in the realm of international relations.

The focus on Australian identity in relation to these two aspects of it should help us to decide whether the second hypothesis that *Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its identity* proves correct.

²⁶² GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 70-71.

²⁶³ CARR, Andrew, 2014, p. 76.

5.1 Overcoming the Isolation and ‘Fear of Abandonment’

Overcoming the isolation, whether geographic (which is given by the fact that Australia is a continental island that does not share land-borders with another country) or political (which is related to gaining formal autonomy on the Great Britain), has been part of Australian foreign policy since the 1940s. According to Allan Gyngell, these efforts are “*to address the nation’s fear of abandonment.*”²⁶⁴

Australia has always been actively engaged with the outside world. In 1990s, Gareth Evans pursued the concept of ‘good international citizenship’. As Gyngell explains, the term defined “*the different reasons a country like Australia concerned itself with issues such as arms control, disarmament, the protection of the global environment, the defence of human rights and the struggle against apartheid and racism.*”²⁶⁵ It reflects Australian vision of the foreign policy where not only great powers shape the international environment and where ‘small’ and ‘middle’ powers share the responsibility for current state of things in the world. It also suggests the realization of an interdependent world and the need for international cooperation on certain issues.

As an example of a good international citizenship of Australia, we can name its contribution to arms control and disarmament. The activity and diplomatic effort of Australian diplomats led to a success of the Chemical Weapons Conventions, signed by 130 countries in 1993. In the following years, Australian effort stood behind prolongation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Australia was deeply involved in the negotiations around the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.²⁶⁶

Regional efforts of the Australian good international citizenship reflected in the establishment of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and its leaders’ meeting. APEC was founded in 1989 and represented “*the first trans-Pacific governmental organisation,*”²⁶⁷ promoting economic cooperation and trade liberalisation in Asia. To pursue actively the agenda of APEC, the APEC leaders’ meeting – an annual gathering of leaders of the member countries – has been added by Paul Keating to the structures of APEC. The establishment of APEC belongs to a proof of an active and initiative Australian foreign policymaking contributing to Asia-Pacific regional grouping. Despite the opposition from some Asian states, namely

²⁶⁴ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 18.

²⁶⁵ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 176.

²⁶⁶ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 177-178.

²⁶⁷ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 145.

Indonesia or Malaysia (especially in the 1990s), it supported Australian efforts to become more engaged with Asia, bringing leaders of the major powers of Asia-Pacific to one table.²⁶⁸

Apart from pursuing good international citizenship, Australia has been overcoming its fear of abandonment by being a loyal ally. First to Great Britain whose role diminished after the Second World War, and then to the U.S. that replaced Britain as the major strategic partner. However, Australia still preserves a close relationship with Britain. Australia is still part of the Commonwealth. Australian flag as well as the celebration of the Australia Day clearly reflects former colonial ties with Britain. Since the colonial times are over for a while, there are debates of whether it would not be better for Australia to become a republic. Not only that it would support its independence, but according to Paul Keating it might even lead to a better position for Australia within Asia-Pacific. Although the choice towards becoming a republic might appear logic it seems that the historical ties and a fear of being abandoned by ‘great powerful friend’ are rooted in Australian identity.²⁶⁹

The alliance with the U.S. was described in the previous chapter, however, an important factor in the mutual relations has been left out – shared values. The Lowy Institute Poll 2019 shows that a large majority of Australians sees the alliance as a natural extension of shared values and ideas.²⁷⁰ Both countries are democratic, both countries are English-speaking, both countries fought side by side in my wars, and both countries take an active part within current international system. Mutual relations are at the level that some analysts label it (as we know from the previous chapter) ‘the new special relationship’. According to Geoffrey Barker, such special would even survive the potential end of ANZUS. He claims that both countries “*would remain close, linked by language, history and democratic values.*”²⁷¹ Thus we can see that the U.S.-Australian relations goes beyond ANZUS.

However, according to John McCarthy, those shared values should not provide unquestionable “*support for the US policies, where these policies are not in Australia’s overall interest.*”²⁷² In this sense, ANZUS might represent a certain danger for Australian interests in Asia-Pacific by ending up entrapped in a conflict that is not in its interest. Thus, the hypothetical end of ANZUS would be costly for Australia especially in terms of military spending, but it

²⁶⁸ BISLEY, Nick, FULLILOVE, Michael, KEATING, Paul, “*Paul Keating in Conversation,*” 2017, p. 17; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 145, 163–165; MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 193.

²⁶⁹ KEATING, Paul, 2017, p. 17; CATSARAS, Andrew, “*Adolescent Australia’s road to adulthood,*” [online] 2014.

²⁷⁰ KASSAM, Natasha, 2019, p. 10.

²⁷¹ BARKER, Geoffrey, “*A post-ANZUS world?*” [online] 2015.

²⁷² MCCARTHY, John, “*The values conundrum in Australia’s foreign policy,*” [online] 2017; BARKER, Geoffrey, “*Has ANZUS passed its use-by date?*” [online] 2015.

would make the country less dependent on the U.S., potentially increase its status within the region and it might protect Australia from “*alliance entrapment*”²⁷³ in a conflict e.g. with China.

The fear about entrapment might be reinforced by a look to the recent past. Part of Australia being a loyal ally is that it has been involved in many wars. In fact, Australia was part of almost all the major conflicts of the 20th and 21st century, ranging from the Boer War in South Africa across the two World Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War to became part of the alliance declaring War on Terror – following the U.S. to Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, war “*has been central to the development of the Australian identity*,” and its military capabilities and strategic ties have been part of Australian middle power status.²⁷⁴

The fear of abandonment is being overcome by Australia through its close strategic ties with the ‘great and powerful friends’ – the Great Britain in the past and the U.S. today – which is supported by a considerable military capabilities (as mentioned in the previous chapter) and Australian active engagement in the regional and international affairs. All these factors combined make Australia a ‘middle power’.

5.2 Middle Power Diplomacy

The base for middle power diplomacy has been laid by Herbert Evatt whose performance during the San Francisco peace conference in 1945 showed Australian commitment to be an active member of the emerging international rules-based order. In the post-Cold war era, Gareth Evans followed up Evatt’s legacy and promoted middle power diplomacy. In 1994 Defence White Paper, the government explicitly mentions Australian commitment to multilateralism, support to international institutions (namely UN), agreed international norms etc.: “*As a middle power, we have a particular interest in fostering an orderly international system in which agreed norms of conduct constrain the use of force, and in supporting international institutions which give us important opportunities to shape that system.*”²⁷⁵

Evans has been following it until today. In his article from 2015 he calls for the leadership of Asia-Pacific regional middle powers to initiate the collective security within the region. Apart from APEC and its annual leader’s meeting, he mentions the contribution of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which Australia joined in 1994 and where Australia was

²⁷³ A term I borrowed from Shamsul Khan. (KHAN, Shamsul and DAVISON, Rémy, “*ANZUS and the Rise of China*,” p. 151, in: BALDINO, Daniel, CARR, Andrew, LANGLOIS, Anthony J. (eds.), *Australian Foreign Policy: Controversies and Debates*, 2014.)

²⁷⁴ GYNGELL, Allan, WESLEY, Michael, 2003, pp. 10-11.

²⁷⁵ The Commonwealth of Australia, 1994, p. 16.

among its proponents, and the EAS²⁷⁶, which Australia joined in 2005. Australian participation in such organisations supports the claim of an active and initiative Australian foreign policymaking. Apart from Australian activity in institution-building, Australia actively pursued its middle power diplomacy in “*agricultural exports (the Cairns Group), chemical and biological export controls (the Australian Group) and regional peace-keeping (the Cambodian Peace Plan)*.”²⁷⁷

Howard’s government distanced itself from the ‘middlepowerism’ of the previous governments. According to Alexander Downer, the middle power concept signified mediocrity. Instead it argued that Australia should rather be a ‘pivotal power’. However, the concept of pivotal power did not resonate much, as Ungerer suggests “*the pivotal power thesis has not been repeated by either Howard or Downer.*”²⁷⁸

The scepticism of Liberals about regional groupings and to a middle power diplomacy of the previous government resulted in the hesitation about Australia joining the EAS. Howard was mainly doubtful about the act of non-interference which is a key principle of ASEAN.²⁷⁹ However, the external pressure from other states (and we can presume from the overall rise of Asian nations) convinced the government to become a founding member of the EAS despite its initial proclamations.²⁸⁰

Additionally, although Howard criticized the efforts of the previous Labor governments to deepen the relationship with Asian countries, his government signed a free trade agreement with Thailand and Singapore and began negotiations about such agreement with China, Japan and Malaysia. Also, as we know from the previous chapter, Howard’s government initiated the Quad group for a coordinated help to Indonesia after tsunami and during his term Australia. Regionally, Australia engaged with Pacific countries, notably in the intervention to Solomon Islands in 2003 which it has initiated with the Pacific Islands Forum countries and led the regional assistance mission to Solomon Islands.²⁸¹²⁸²

²⁷⁶ According to Evans, East Asia Summit “*has the potential to be the most significant grouping, not only because it has all the key regional players around the table, but because (unlike ARF) it meets at the highest level, and (unlike APEC) it can address both geopolitical and economic issues.*” (EVANS, Gareth, “*Time for the middle powers to step up,*” 2015, p. 8.)

²⁷⁷ EVANS, Gareth, 2015, pp. 7-8; UNGERER, Carl, 2007, pp. 547-548.

²⁷⁸ UNGERER, Carl, 2007, p. 550; MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 200.

²⁷⁹ EAS is part of ASEAN’s external relations and includes key agents of Indo-Pacific region.

²⁸⁰ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 229-230; MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, pp. 212-213.

²⁸¹ UNGERER, Carl, 2007, p. 550; MOORE, Clive, “*The End of Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (2003-17),*” 2018, pp. 164-165.

²⁸² Apart from the South Pacific Commission, Australia is part of the Pacific Islands Forum, a regional political and economic organisation established in 1971. (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “*The Pacific Islands Forum,*” [online] (n.a.))

What has changed under Howard government was the stress on domestic politics and Australia acting in the ‘national interest’, which is reflected in both foreign policy white papers that have been released at that time. Notwithstanding his government stressed the national character of Australia – its culture and tradition – it has continued to deepen the economic relations with Asian countries (though bilaterally) and had to react to the regional as well as world developments. As a reaction to that, Howard government released a white paper that has focused solely on Australian overseas aid programme by which Australia wanted to tackle poverty in its close region and support Millennium Development Goals²⁸³ that have been set up by the United Nations.²⁸⁴

After 9/11, Australia joined the coalition under the U.S. leadership declaring ‘War on Terror’ which by itself required a closed cooperation, e.g. of intelligence services, as well as military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. On top of that, with an increasing deepening of the relations between Australia and China, Australia started to realize a possible danger of being ‘entrapped’ in the conflict which might not be in its interest. That is also why in 2004, Downer claimed that the ANZUS treaty “*would not extend to a Taiwan Strait contingency,*” and ten years later, similar claims were repeated by the Defence Minister David Johnston in relation to the possible conflict in the East China Sea, a conflict which would also involve Japan and Taiwan.²⁸⁵

Therefore, although Howard and Downer refused to continue in ‘middlepowerism’ of the previous Labor government, the foreign policy practice shows that they embraced its features – among others the active diplomacy or engagement in the international affairs. Furthermore, it shows that even when we stop explicitly using the label ‘middle power’, key features of its practice will not disappear. Interestingly, however, in the post-Cold War period, the explicit commitment in the governmental white papers to middle power diplomacy is rather connected with Labor governments. Either it was during Keating’s government, or during Gillard’s government. None of the Coalition governments have mentioned it in the official white papers.

With Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard and Bob Carr (all of them members of the Labor party), the multilateral successes were seen to come back, however, as Andrew Carr points out, they failed to meet the expectations. Such failure might be given not only by their “*poorly planned*

²⁸³ Millennium Development Goals represented a concrete list of targets to tackle an extreme poverty with a deadline of 2015. (The United Nations, “*Millennium Goals. Background,*” [online] (n.a.))

²⁸⁴ The Commonwealth of Australia, “*Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability,*” 2006.

²⁸⁵ GREEN, Michael J., DEAN, Peter J., TAYLOR, Brendan and COOPER, Zack, 2015, p. 7.

or sustained efforts" but also because they did not spend a long time in the office.²⁸⁶ This has been also the case of the Coalition governments of Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull that came after. The fluctuation of the Australian representatives together with changes of the international affairs brought by global financial crisis or the rise of China found the claims for Australia's behaviour as the middle power weaker than in the 1990s.²⁸⁷

Kevin Rudd's foreign policy continued in Evans' concept of Australian good international citizenship and at the same time reflecting the arrival of an Asian Century (or as Rudd puts it Asia-Pacific century). In other words, Rudd advocated the middle power diplomacy practice and criticized Conservatives for "*inward looking Australia*" approach and concretely Tony Abbott for his claim that "*future lies in the Anglosphere*".²⁸⁸ Although criticizing Conservatives, or Abbott respectively, under the pressure of domestic politics, Rudd government "*retreated from strong action on action on climate change, suspended a more 'humanitarian' approach to asylum-seekers and held back on delivering its own promised aid increases.*"²⁸⁹

Rudd has been also aware of the rise of Asian countries, especially China, and the need to respond to this. However, as White points out, although Rudd knew China well and was aware of what does the Chinese growth (of economy and power) means – not only for Australia but for the whole region – he was not able to explain it properly. On the one hand, he claimed to pursue middle power diplomacy and wanted Australia to become a bridge between the 'Western' tradition and 'Eastern (Asian)' tradition, on the other hand he has avoided the crucial task of how to accommodate Chinese power in the region even though such task should be crucial part of middle power diplomacy.²⁹⁰

The increasing importance of Asian countries and the necessity to react on the upcoming Asian century was reflected in the white paper '*Australia in the Asian Century*' which has been released under Julia Gillard. The paper reacted on the growing numbers of immigrants coming from the Asian countries – especially China and India – and transforming Australian society (already for some time). It stresses Australian cultural diversity and openness and

²⁸⁶ CARR, Andrew, 2014, p. 74.

²⁸⁷ CARR, Andrew, 2014, p. 74; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 242.

²⁸⁸ RUDD, Kevin, "*ALP National Conference – The Australia we can all be proud of,*" [online video] 2011.

²⁸⁹ MCDONALD, Matt, 2015, p. 664.

²⁹⁰ WHITE, Hugh, 2011, pp. 83, 91; WHITE, Hugh, "*Rudd's China policy,*" [online] 2009.

describes Asian century as an opportunity for Australia in which “*tyranny of distance is being replaced by the prospects of prosperity.*”²⁹¹²⁹²

Furthermore, the paper considers Asian century in a broader context of Asia-Pacific, or even Indo-Pacific by which it implies that it does not understand the Asian century solely as Chinese century. As already explained, the Indo-Pacific concept is a maritime concept connecting oceans that surround the shores of Australia. On top of that, it is also understood as a concept that contemplates the distribution of power in the region, reflecting the rise of India and the persisting strategic influence of the U.S. In this sense, the white paper serves as the turning point because since that, Australia refers to its region (in the official documents) as Indo-Pacific. Moreover, according to Rory Medcalf, “*an Indo-Pacific strategy transcends a narrow ‘China choice’*,” by offering new opportunities for Australian diplomatic efforts and reflecting the multipolarity of the region.²⁹³

Another important action has been brought by Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard and that is the election of Australia as the non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2012. The election reflected strong diplomatic efforts of both Labor governments and “*Australia’s commitment to the UN and the multilateral system generally.*”²⁹⁴

With Tony Abbott in charge, although the focus on Australian engagement with Asian countries was high on the agenda, the Coalition government neglected Gillard’s white paper on Asia.²⁹⁵ Abbott’s first overseas trip was to Indonesia following his proclamation of ‘More Jakarta, less Geneva’, by which wanted to dismiss the criticism from the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) based in Geneva and express his commitment to bilateral relations. The criticism of UNHCR was aimed on Abbott’s government pledge “*to stop the boats*”²⁹⁶ coming to Australian shores deploying the military personnel and returning them. However, Jakarta was similarly unhappy about Abbott’s foreign policy because those boats were mostly returned to Indonesia.

²⁹¹ The Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, pp. 1, 77, 99.

²⁹² It should be mentioned that the term ‘tyranny of distance’ was used by Geoffrey Blaine to refer to “*the distance from what Australians regarded as the centres of their civilisation – Britain, more recently Europe, for some the United States – and to Australia’s great internal distances.*” (Citation from EDWARDS, Peter, 1997 p. 3.)

²⁹³ The Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, p. 49; MEDCALF, Rory, “*Australia’s Place in the ‘Asian Century’*,” [online] 2012; MEDCALF, Rory, 2019, p. 111.

²⁹⁴ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 273.

²⁹⁵ Though it was not only by Abbott’s focus on the Anglosphere. The white paper has been criticized “*as statements of the bleeding obvious or contradictory manifestations of potentially incompatible strategic and economic priorities.*” (BEESON, Mark, “*Is this the end of the ‘Asian century’?*” [online] 2013.)

²⁹⁶ MCDONALD, Matt, 2015, p. 659.

On top of that, with Snowden incident, it turned out that Australian intelligence were spying on Indonesian President Yudhoyono.²⁹⁷

In reality, Abbott emphasized the Anglosphere, stressing the importance and contribution of the English-speaking countries to international order. Also, Abbott's foreign policy was based on the domestic politics and his major topic was the national security. Whether it was related to international terrorism or to Australian border protection. Governmental practice that have seen the asylum-seekers as a threat, damaged Australian international reputation "*as a country committed to human rights and international law.*"²⁹⁸ Also, it damaged the relations with Indonesia and caused concerns of human rights groups and the UNHCR. Furthermore, as Matt MacDonald argues, Abbott's style of foreign politics meant a turn away from "*bipartisanship on foreign policy and a tendency to sacrifice a foreign policy vision for short-term political gain.*"²⁹⁹

Such shift, however, did not confirm with the next Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull. With his liberal, open and cooperative attitude towards the global issues, "*the language of optimism returned.*"³⁰⁰ Also, Turnbull stressed the importance of Indo-Pacific region and Australian engagement with it. In one of his first speeches, delivered to Lowy Institute, Turnbull argued that it is the Asian region where "*the opportunities are most abundant*" and "*the need for consistent, constructive and creative Australian engagement is greater than ever before.*"³⁰¹

Apart from Turnbull it was Julie Bishop, the Minister for Foreign Affairs that served under Abbott and Turnbull, that has reversed "*a long-term decline in the nation's diplomatic footprint.*"³⁰² She was active in the UN Security Council (e.g. pushing Australian interests in case of the MH17 incident), became one of the major proponents of the Indo-Pacific concept or advocate liberal values.³⁰³ On the other hand, she 'inherited' the difficult relations with China. And she was not soothing the difficulties. Not only she has been loudly promoting the Indo-Pacific concept, but Turnbull's government introduced "*new drafts of laws on foreign influence, interference and espionage*" reacting predominantly on Chinese interference into Australian politics.³⁰⁴ Nick Bisley characterizes the relations with China during this era as a

²⁹⁷ TAYLOR, Ross, "*Less Geneva, but not so much more Jakarta,*" [online] 2015; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 255-256.

²⁹⁸ MCDONALD, Matt, 2015, p. 660.

²⁹⁹ MCDONALD, Matt, 2015, p. 664; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 265-266.

³⁰⁰ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 284.

³⁰¹ TURNBULL, Malcolm, "*The 2016 Lowy Lecture: The Prime Minister of Australia, Malcolm Turnbull,*" [online] 2016.

³⁰² BISLEY, Nick, "*The Bishop Era,*" [online] 2018.

³⁰³ BISLEY, Nick, [online] 2018; GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, p. 274.

³⁰⁴ MEDCALF, Rory, 2019, p. 110.

failure of the Coalition government, Rory Medcalf on the other hand, argues that such period was a necessary ‘reality check’ of Australia in the mutual relations with China.³⁰⁵

In 2017, the Australian government released a complex foreign policy white paper that marks Australian engagement with the world as “*essential to our [Australian] future security and prosperity,*” and whose major component is Australian adherence to “*political, economic and religious freedoms, liberal democracy, the rule of law, racial and gender equality and mutual respect.*”³⁰⁶ Reaching the security and prosperity and pursuing Australian values and interests should be through “*agreed rules rather than one based on the exercise of power alone.*”³⁰⁷ Those rules must be anchored in the international law and respected by all states – including the major powers such as the U.S. or China.³⁰⁸ Thus, the White Paper declared Australian commitment to preserve a rules-based order.

Such commitment has also been demonstrated by Australian activity at the multilateral forums. Despite the general scepticism about multilateralism of Coalition governments and initial criticism of seeking the election for the place in UN Security Council, Australia played an active role in the Council under Abbott and later under Turnbull. Australia’s distinctive contribution has reflected in investigating the shooting down of the Flight MH17 over Ukraine, securing humanitarian relief in Syria or emphasizing the violation of human rights in North Korea. As Gynell suggests, “*it was the UN’s role in establishing and sustaining the rules-based order that mattered to Turnbull.*”³⁰⁹

The overall commitment to the rules-based international order can be considered as a guiding line in the Australian foreign policy behaviour. Whether it was Labor or Coalition government there was a bipartisan agreement on the need for rules-based international order. However, the way how to pursue it differs. The explicit acknowledgement and practice of the middle power diplomacy is rather a Labor foreign policy construct and thus changing with the government. Nonetheless, the middle power diplomacy practice is implicitly present in the Coalition governments as well, whether it is the engagement with the outside world or vibrant diplomatic activity at the multilateral forums such as the UN. In this sense, the middle power diplomacy might well frame Australian post-Cold War foreign policy practice.

Moreover, what supports Australian middle power status is its military budget (and its ability to project it overseas) and the strong alliance with the United States. Australia did join

³⁰⁵ BISLEY, Nick, [online] 2018; MEDCALF, Rory, 2019, p. 109.

³⁰⁶ The Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, p. 2.

³⁰⁷ The Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, p. 7.

³⁰⁸ The Commonwealth of Australia, 2017, pp. 1, 7.

³⁰⁹ GYNGELL, Allan, 2017, pp. 273-274.

the global War on Terror, which has been accompanied by its military engagement in Iraq or Afghanistan or intervene to Solomon Islands and led the regional assistance mission. With Asia-Pacific getting more and more prominent place in the international relations, Australia increasingly seems to stand before a different fear – a fear of entrapment. In other words, due to Australian close defence and military capabilities and its close strategic relations with the U.S., it might find itself entrapped in a conflict that is not in its interest. Such shift is also related to the geopolitical dynamics since Asia-Pacific is getting into the centre of the world interest due to Chinese growing assertiveness in the region, India's increasing power, or North Korean active and dangerous missile program. Thus, Australia is increasingly gaining on importance as an American ally and it is among the most important tasks for Australian foreign policy not to end up in a conflict that is against its interests and to handle the accommodation of (especially) Chinese power in the region.³¹⁰

In terms of Australian identity, the affiliation of the concept with Labor party shows the instability of a concept at first sight, disappearing with every election. However, to pose the same question as Andrew Carr asks, does Australia stop being a middle power when the government is not explicitly using it? Does the nation's power change with it?³¹¹ The previous paragraphs show that it is not the case. As an example, we can name the efforts of John Howard's government related to APEC, ARF and EAS or the Australian activity in the UN Security Council during Abbott's and Turnbull's term. Those would belong to a range of an active middle power diplomacy, although not being explicitly linked with the concept.

However, there is a fundamental problem with the analytical power of the concept of middle power itself. The characterization of it rather fits on Western countries that are neither too small nor too powerful such as Canada, Sweden, or Australia. As such, the Australian behaviour towards the region within the concept of middle power might only serve as a support to its "*commitment to the [international] status quo*," rather than serve as generally applicable to other states of similar size and power.³¹² On top of that, Kishore Mahbubani argues that "*middle power complex*" prevents Australia to develop deeper relations with smaller (but important) Asian countries such as Singapore.³¹³³¹⁴

³¹⁰ GREEN, Michael J., DEAN, Peter J., TAYLOR, Brendan and COOPER, Zack, 2015, pp. 7-8; AYSON, Robert, "Australia-New Zealand," p. 138, in: TAYLOR, Brendan (ed.), Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional Power, : Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008.

³¹¹ CARR, Andrew, 2014, pp. 76-77.

³¹² CARR, Andrew, 2014, pp. 74-75.

³¹³ MAHBUBANI, Kishore, "*Time for Australia to emerge from its foreign-policy adolescence*," [online] 2014.

³¹⁴ Eduard Jordaan tried to overcome this inconsistence by distinguishing traditional middle powers and emerging middle powers. However, in his article from 2017, he proposes to see middle powers as "*international stabilisers*" supporting the "*liberal hegemonic project*," and because a lot of emerging middle powers have counter-hegemonic

To avoid potential ‘ideological trap’ of a concept, Carr suggests “*a systemic impact approach*,” which defines middle powers “*through their ability to alter or affect specific elements of the international system in which they find themselves.*”³¹⁵ By applying such definition, Carr comes to a conclusion that Australia is a middle power. However, his approach is connected with Australian ability to influence the international system. With the rise of China, India, Indonesia and other countries in Asia-Pacific region, the challenges towards current international system are apparent and as such is the Australian role as a middle power. Such position is in line with the constructivist claim that structure and agents are equal and interrelated. In other words, the middle power status is valid to that extent to what Australia can affect the international environment. Furthermore, it supports Campbell’s claim identity of states is always in process when it needs to react to surrounding circumstances such as the arrival of the Asian Century.

To sum up, Australian fear from isolation is overcome by its affiliation to ‘great and powerful friends’. Such affiliation wither with Great Britain, or nowadays with the U.S. is not based only on pragmatic alliance politics but also on shared ideas, values and norms. These are subsequently reflected in a middle power diplomacy which serves as a ‘tool’ for Australian foreign policy. Although such tool is being used mainly the Labor governments, I argue that it is implicitly present in the Coalition governments as well. Middle power diplomacy implies two important features. Firstly, a Western tradition in Australian foreign policymaking towards Asia-Pacific. Secondly, the considerable military capabilities which with the fact that Asia-Pacific is becoming central to international relations might intensify a fear of being entrapped in a war that is not in Australian interest. Both features suggest that Australian approach towards the region needs to focus on how to overcome what Ken Henry named ‘episodic engagement’ and how to find its place in the current Asian Century not to become just “*a bystander.*”³¹⁶ The middle power diplomacy (though imperfect) offers a way, reflecting Australian independent and active engagement with the world, as Carl Ungerer argues, “*the middle power concept is perhaps the closest that Australia has ever come to articulating a self-conscious theory of foreign policy.*”³¹⁷ However, with the Asian century and a possible decline of the U.S. power

tendencies, Jordaan proposes to drop the adjective ‘emerging’ and to classify as middle powers only states that actively support “*the liberal international order.*” (See JORDAAN, Eduard, 2003; JORDAAN, Eduard, “*The emerging middle power concept: Time to say goodbye?*” 2017, pp. 396, 405).

³¹⁵ Carr’s approach “*defines middle powers through the outcome, rather than the intention, of their actions. This includes both their military capacity for self-defence, as well as their diplomatic capacity for effecting specific international changes.*” (All citations from CARR, Andrew, 2014, p. 79.)

³¹⁶ ROGGEVEEN, Sam, “*Does provincialism matter?*” [online] 2014.

³¹⁷ UNGERER, Carl, 2007, p. 550.

in the region, the concept should be adjusted to possible changes in a world status quo. Thus, identarian aspect of Australian foreign policy offers a significant contribution in explaining Australian behaviour towards Asia-Pacific region while being rather complementary than contradictory with my first hypothesis.

6 Conclusion

The research target of my work was to identify the major factors that influence the Australian foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War period. In my analysis I focused on two major factors – power and identity – and how they influence Australian behaviour in Asia-Pacific. I argue that these two factors are important in understanding Australian foreign policymaking towards the region. Focusing on power explains Australian response to the power shift in Asia-Pacific that has been mainly related to the balancing rise of China – either through the regional engagement (e.g. joining EAS, or building strategic relations with Japan) or strengthening ties with the U.S. Focusing on identity helps us to understand the intentions behind Australian behaviour. In other words, how does Australia think about itself as a country (as a middle power), how does Australia use its position in the international system (to maintain the liberal rules-based order in the region of Asia-Pacific), or that the relations with the U.S. are not only pragmatic but also based on shared values.

Those two factors were based on two different theories – realism (neorealism of Kenneth Waltz) and constructivism (Alexander Wendt and David Campbell). The realism was applied because of its prominent position in analysing the international relations in Asia-Pacific and to explain the role of power in Australian foreign policymaking. The constructivism, on the other hand, was applied to reflect the identitarian aspect of Australian foreign policymaking. The analysis should have helped to answer the research question: *What explains Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region?*

Two hypotheses were tested in my analysis. First hypothesis claims that *Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its power position*, whereas the second that *Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its identity*.

The first hypothesis relates to the role of power in Australian foreign policymaking. It was tested through the neorealist theory, concretely through the balance of power theory of Kenneth Waltz and his concept of defensive realism. Australia is balancing its strategic and trade interests. The strategic interests are related to its alliance within ANZUS with the U.S. and the fact that Australia prefers current international status quo. Also, Australia is strengthening its relations with Japan which we might perceive as a proof of Australian pragmatic approach in balancing the rise of China. Especially if we consider that among the major reasons why ANZUS has been signed was to guarantee protection of Australia from Japan. The trade interests are related to the rise of China and the fact that China is Australian major trading partner. Due to this balancing of interests, it is argued by Hugh White that

Australia is standing before a crude choice between China and the U.S. However, Australia is choosing every day through its foreign policymaking, whether it is to join the AIIB or to send a freedom of navigation patrols to a South China Sea. Also, starting to frame the region as Indo-Pacific signalizes a decisive step to see the region in a broader geopolitical context. In this sense, I argue that Australian behaviour is not driven by the intentions to dominate others but rather to preserve current status quo in Asia-Pacific. However, the neorealist theory is missing important qualitative features of Australian behaviour that are connected with its identity. Thus, although Waltz's theory of defensive realism offers a significant contribution in explaining Australian behaviour towards Asia-Pacific region, an identitarian aspects of it cannot be left out.

The second hypothesis relates to the role of identity in Australian foreign policymaking. It was tested through the constructivist theory, concretely through the insights from Alexander Wendt and David Campbell. Both authors offer the valuable observation of the qualitative changes in the post-Cold War period. In Australian case, its affiliation to 'great and powerful friends' is not based only on pragmatic alliance politics but also on shared ideas, values and norms that are subsequently reflected in middle power diplomacy which is a distinctive practice of the Australian foreign policy. Interestingly, such practice (although not explicitly) has been present in Australian foreign policymaking of Labor governments as well as Conservative governments. These shared values and the fact that Australia is a middle power also implies a Western tradition in Australian foreign policymaking towards Asia-Pacific. As such, it shows Australian dilemma of a Western culture in the Asian environment and suggests a crucial task for Australia which is to find its place in Asian Century. Thus, although there are objective systemic reasons for Australia to behave in terms of defensive realism, such behaviour stems from Australian identity that is adjusting to the new realities.

As we see rather than excluding one hypothesis and confirmed the other, both hypotheses have proved to be correct and have partially provided the answer to the research question. Thus, the answer on the research question is not unequivocal. On the one hand, we see that the Chinese rise (and overall ascending Asia) is among the major concerns for Australian foreign policymaking in the post-Cold War period and Australia is balancing power in the region in order to preserve international status quo and to protect its interests. On the other hand, we see that Australia is not just merely balancing power, but it actively pursues its distinctive middle power diplomacy (although often implicitly) in the region while projecting its ideas and values and stressing the importance of the current international rules-based order.

In the post-Cold War period, Australia has been adopting to many new realities. Firstly, to a fact that its biggest trading partner is the Asian state. Secondly, to a fact that it has been

strengthening its ties with Japan. Thirdly, to a fact that the U.S. primacy in Asia-Pacific is not granted. Fourthly, to a fact that ‘Indo-Pacific’ better reflects Australian position in the region. Finally, to a fact that the next century is the Asian century.

In terms of my analysis, the biggest challenges for Australian foreign policy in the future are linked with the great power rivalry – especially related to the U.S.-China relations – in the region and a potential entrapment in a conflict that is not in Australian interests. As mentioned in my work there are many potential flashpoints that might lead to a severe conflict in Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, many countries in the region, including China, developed rapidly under the current international order which gives a chance for finding a common solution to avoid potential conflict. Another challenge for Australia is its episodic engagement with Asia which remains important to overcome in order to find its place in the Asian Century. Based upon the fast development of Asian countries and the overall dynamics of the whole region, we can presume that the changes of the international order will be profound and the adjustment to those changes would become crucial. Ultimately, there are also other challenges that were not given the attention in my analysis such as the global warming issue, the migration or, as we are witnessing lately, an outbreak of global pandemic.

7 Summary

This thesis examines the Australian foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The research target of the thesis is to identify the major factors that influence Australian foreign policy towards Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War period with a focus on power and identity. Having two major factors implies two hypotheses. First, that Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its power position. The second hypothesis is that Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its identity. Both hypotheses should help to answer the research question: *What explains Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region?*

Each of these factors is examined with a different theoretical approach. The concept of power is framed by realism. Specifically, while analysing the role of power in Australian foreign policy practice, the concept of defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz is applied. The concept of identity is framed by constructivism. Concretely, while analysing the role of identity in Australian foreign policy practice, the insights from David Campbell's interpretative approach and Alexander Wendt's structural constructivism are applied.

In terms of methodology, a qualitative method is used as a main technique of the research. Specifically, the co-variation approach which suggests a search for the causal effects between variables. The thesis treats power and identity as the independent variables and the behaviour of Australia towards the Asia-Pacific region as the dependent variable.

The analytical part of the thesis is divided into two parts (chapters). The first part analyses whether Australian foreign policymaking is guided by the intentions of Waltz's defensive realism. Thus, the first hypothesis is being tested here. In this part the Australian alliance with the U.S. is presented as well as the rise of China. The second part analyses whether Australian ideas, values and norms are the major constitutive elements of its foreign policy behaviour. Thus, the second hypothesis is being tested here. In this part the middle power diplomacy is presented as a distinctive practice of Australian foreign policy.

The conclusion reflects findings of the research which suggest that both hypotheses have proved to be correct and have partially provided the answer to the research question. On the one hand, we see that Australia is balancing power in the region to preserve international status quo and to protect its interests. On the other hand, we see that Australia is not just merely balancing power, but it actively pursues its distinctive middle power diplomacy in the region while projecting its ideas and values and stressing the importance of the current international rules-based order. Finally, the conclusion contains possible future challenges for Australia.

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Appendix no. 1: **ANZUS Treaty** (Full Text)³²⁰

**DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CANBERRA**

**Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America
[ANZUS]**

(San Francisco, 1 September 1951)

Entry into force generally: 29 April 1952

AUSTRALIAN TREATY SERIES

1952 No. 2

Australian Government Publishing Service

Canberra

(c) Commonwealth of Australia 1997

**SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

THE PARTIES TO THIS TREATY,

REAFFIRMING their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

NOTING that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

³²⁰ AustralianPolitics.com, “*ANZUS Treaty – Full Text*,” [online] c1995-2019; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “*Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America*,” [online] (n.a.) [last update on 2012-05-24].

RECOGNIZING that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

DESIRING to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

DESIRING further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

THEREFORE DECLARE AND AGREE as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

[1]

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.

FOR AUSTRALIA:

[Signed:]

PERCY C SPENDER

FOR NEW ZEALAND:

[Signed:]

C A BERENDSEN

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

[Signed:]

DEAN ACHESON

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

ALEXANDER WILEY

JOHN J SPARKMAN

[1] Instruments of ratification were deposited for Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America 29 April 1952, on which date the Treaty entered into force.

Appendix no. 2: List of Prime Ministers of Australia (table)³²¹

#	Name	Party	Term		
30	Scott Morrison	Liberal	2018-		
29	Malcolm Turnbull	Liberal	2015-2018		
28	Tony Abbott	Liberal	2013-2015		
-	Kevin Michael Rudd	Labor	2013		
27	Julia Eileen Gillard	Labor	2010-2013		
26	Kevin Michael Rudd	Labor	2007-2010		
25	John Winston Howard	Liberal	1996-2007		
24	Paul John Keating	Labor	1991-1996		
23	Robert (Bob) James Lee Hawke	Labor	1983-1991		
22	John Malcolm Fraser	Liberal	1975-1983		
21	Edward Gough Whitlam	Labor	1972-1975		
20	William (Billy) McMahon	Liberal	1971-1972		
19	John Grey Gorton	Liberal	1968-1971		
18	John McEwen	Country	1967-1968		
17	Harold Edward Holt	Liberal	1966-1967		
-	Robert Gordon Menzies	Liberal	1949-1966		
16	Joseph Benedict (Ben) Chifley	Labor	1945-1949		
15	Francis Michael Forde	Labor	1945		
14	John Curtin	Labor	1941-1945		
13	Arthur William Fadden	Country	1941		
12	Robert Gordon Menzies	United Australia	1939-1941		
11	Earle Christmas Grafton Page	Country	1939		
10	Joseph Aloysius Lyons	United Australia	1932-1939		
9	James Henry Scullin	Labor	1929-1932		
8	Stanley Melbourne Bruce	Nationalist	1923-1929		
7	William (Billy) Morris Hughes	Labor	National Labor	Nationalist	1915-1923
-	Andrew Fisher	Labor		1914-1915	
6	Joseph Cook	Commonwealth Liberal		1913-1914	

³²¹ MACINTYRE, Stuart, 2013, p. 245; Museum of Australian Democracy at Old Parliament House, “*Prime Ministers*,” [online] (n.a.).

-	Andrew Fisher	Labor	1910-1913
-	Alfred Deakin	Commonwealth Liberal	1909-1910
5	Andrew Fisher	Labor	1908-1909
-	Alfred Deakin	Protectionist	1905-1908
4	George Houston Reid	Free Trade	1904-1905
3	John Christian Watson	Labor	1904
2	Alfred Deakin	Protectionist	1903-1904
1	Edmund Barton	Protectionist	1901-1903

Appendix no. 3: List of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Australia (table)³²²

#	Name	Party	Term
Ministers for Foreign Affairs			
39	Marise Payne	Liberal	2018-
38	Julie Bishop	Liberal	2013-2018
37	Robert (Bob) John Carr	Labor	2012-2013
36	Kevin Michael Rudd	Labor	2010-2012
35	Stephen Smith	Labor	2007-2010
34	Alexander Downer	Liberal	1996-2007
-	Gareth Evans	Labor	1993-1996
Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Trade			
33	Gareth Evans	Labor	1988-1993
-	William (Bill) George Hayden	Labor	1987-1988
Ministers for Foreign Affairs			
32	William (Bill) George Hayden	Labor	1983-1987
31	Tony Street	Liberal	1980-1983
30	Andrew Peacock	Liberal	1975-1980
29	Donald Willesee	Labor	1973-1975
28	Edward Gough Whitlam	Labor	1972-1973
27	Nigel Bowen	Liberal	1971-1972
26	Leslie Bury	Liberal	1971
-	William (Billy) McMahon	Liberal	1970-1971
Ministers for External Affairs			
25	William (Billy) McMahon	Liberal	1969-1970
24	Gordon Freeth	Liberal	1969
23	Paul Hasluck	Liberal	1964-1969
22	Garfield Barwick	Liberal	1961-1964
21	Robert Gordon Menzies	Liberal	1960-1961
20	Richard Casey	Liberal	1951-1960
19	Percy Spender	Liberal	1949-1951
18	Herbert Vere Evatt	Labor	1941-1949

³²² AustralianPolitics.com, "Australian Foreign Ministers Since 1901," [online] c1995-2019.

17	Frederick Stewart	United Australia	1940-1941
16	John McEwen	Country	1940
15	Henry Gullett	United Australia	1939-1940
-	William (Billy) Morris Hughes	United Australia	1937-1939
14	George Pearce	United Australia	1934-1937
13	John Latham	United Australia	1932-1934
12	James Henry Scullin	Labor	1929-1932
11	Stanley Melbourne Bruce	Nationalist	1923-1929
-	William (Billy) Morris Hughes	Nationalist	1921-1923
<i>Portfolio functions under the office of the Prime Minister 1916-21</i>			
10	Hugh Mahon	Labor	1914-1916
9	John Andrew	Labor	1914
8	Patrick Glynn	Commonwealth Liberal	1913-1914
7	Josiah Thomas	Labor	1911-1913
-	Lee Batchelor	Labor	1910-1911
6	Littleton Groom	Commonwealth Liberal	1909-1910
5	Lee Batchelor	Labor	1908-1909
-	Alfred Deakin	Protectionist	1905-1908
4	George Reid	Free Trade	1904-1905
3	William (Billy) Morris Hughes	Labor	1904
2	Alfred Deakin	Protectionist	1903-1904
1	Edmund Barton	Protectionist	1901-1903

Univerzita Karlova
Fakulta sociálních věd
Institut politologických studií

Diploma thesis project

Foreign Policy of Australia in the Asia-Pacific Region: Major
Influencing Factors



Name: Josef Dašek
Academic advisor: doc. PhDr. Jan Karlas, M.A., Ph.D.
Study programme: Politologie (N6701)
Year of project submission: 2018

Introduction to the topic

The topic of my diploma thesis is the foreign policy of Australia and the major factors that influence its behaviour in the Asia-Pacific region from the end of the Cold War. While analysing such a complex topic, I have narrowed it down to focus on the Australia's engagement with the region of Asia-Pacific. Moreover, I will analyse the main interests of Australian foreign policy (or rather its behaviour) in that region and how it is influenced by two major factors – identity and power.

Furthermore, in the fast-changing world of today where we are witnessing the shifting of power with unpredictable results, Australian case might be helpful in finding the balance between the state's identity on the one hand and power balancing on the other. Also, Australia's position lying between the Asia-Pacific, Indo-Pacific or 'Western' tradition is making the Australian case unique and interesting at the same time. Finally, I believe that there is a lack of work done about the Australian foreign politics in the Czech Republic.

Research target, research question

The research target of my thesis is to identify the major factors that influence the Australian foreign policy with a particular focus on identity and power. Such target will be tackled by the analysis of the causal relationship between these factors and how they influence or constitute Australian behaviour in the region of Asia-Pacific. The key research question that needs to be answered is then: *What does explain the Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region?*

The major reason why I have decided to focus on the power and identity of Australia is its ambivalent position that lies between two superpowers, the United States (hereafter U.S.) on the one hand and the People's Republic of China (hereafter China) on the other hand. Meanwhile the U.S. belongs to the Australia's closest allies, particularly in terms of the security, but also in the cultural terms (speaking of cultural similarities I should not forget to mention British roots of the vast of Australians of course). Alongside this security and cultural areas, we have China as the Australia's biggest trading partner. Such position between the identity affiliation and (economic) interests represents one of the major dilemmas in the Australian foreign policy. Additionally, with the election of Donald Trump as the President of the U.S. and Chinese growing power in the Asia-Pacific region, there is also an undergoing discussion about the independent foreign policy of Australia.

Literature review

A comprehensive overview of the development of the Australian politics will be given in the first place. The book of Allan Gyngell³²³ offers an insightful view on the evolution of the Australian foreign policy. Also, Gyngell focuses mainly on the world affairs and areas where the Australian participation and action influenced the outcomes. As a complementary but very useful reading for the overview I am going to elaborate on the book edited by Daniel Baldino, Andrew Carr, and Anthony Langlois³²⁴ about the current debates and controversies in the Australian foreign policy. This edition offers the discussions over the range of topic from the theoretical frameworks, across the influence of media to the U.S.-Australia alliance.

A theoretical part consists of the realist, and the constructivist perspective. In the realist part, a concept power will be analysed with the particular focus on the balance of power. Inis Claude³²⁵, or Kenneth Waltz³²⁶ will be among the authors whose work will serve as the base for the theoretical part. Claude sees the balance of power as a possible way how to handle the growing military power in the realm of international relations. In Waltz's neorealist perspective, the balance of power represents the essential mechanism regulating the anarchical nature of the international relations. The specifics of the realist tradition in the Australian case will be described with the Wesley's article on characteristic framework of the Australian realism. The constructivist part draws upon the book of David Campbell³²⁷ where he presents how identity can be based on the interpretations of danger. Particularly, he focuses on the case of the U.S. and the problem of subjectivity in making foreign policy (mainly) in the security area. Moreover, the Wendt's article on collective identity formation and problems of collective action³²⁸ is going to serve as the basic overview of the core of constructivist approach together with his 'founding' article constructivism.³²⁹ As the secondary source for the theoretical part, a comprehensive book of Pavel Barša and Ondřej Císař³³⁰ will be elaborated. Their book offers a theoretical overview, summarizing the major streams of international relations.

³²³ GYNGELL, Allan, "Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World since 1942," 2017.

³²⁴ BALDINO, Daniel; CARR, Andrew; LANGLOIS, Anthony J. (eds.), "Australian Foreign Policy: Controversies and Debates," 2014.

³²⁵ CLAUDE, Inis, "Power and International Relations," 1962.

³²⁶ WALTZ, Kenneth, "Theory of International Politics," 1979.

³²⁷ CAMPBELL, DAVID, "Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity," 1998.

³²⁸ WENDT, Alexander, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," 1994.

³²⁹ WENDT, Alexander, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," 1992.

³³⁰ BARŠA, Pavel; CÍSAŘ, Ondřej, "Anarchie a řád ve světové politice," 2008.

The Australian-U.S. relations and alliance is one of the key elements of the Australian foreign policy. Therefore, I will include the readings analysing the relationship between these two long-standing allies. Among others, the overview of the U.S.-Australia alliance delivered by the article of Paul Dibb³³¹, or the debate about a challenge posed by Chinese rise analysed in the chapter of Brendan Taylor and William Tow³³² in the book of Michael Wesley. On the rise of China, a book of Hugh White³³³ will be examined. White poses crucial questions in his book on the China-U.S. rivalry and its possible impact on the region.

Also, part of the Australian distinctive identity in the post-Cold War world is the concept of ‘middle power’ which should be considered. Foundation and development of this concept in the Australian case is traced by Carl Ungerer.³³⁴

Conceptual and theoretical framework, research hypotheses

The theoretical framework of my thesis involves the realist approach and constructivist approach. In the realist part, the major focus will be on the concept of power. Concretely on the balance of power which in my opinion ideally reflects Australia’s balancing between two superpowers, the U.S. – a long-standing ally on whose military capabilities and presence is crucial for Australian defence politics – on the one hand and China – the rising superpower, according to some measures the strongest economy in the world and the biggest trading partner of Australia – on the other. As suggested in the literature review, a specific Australian case in the realist tradition will be considered. Among the key authors for analysing this part will be Kenneth Waltz, Inis Claude, or the article of Michael Wesley etc.

In the constructivist part, the major focus will be devoted to the creation of the Australian identity in the area of international relation and to the articulation of the Australian major interest in the Asia-Pacific region. The constructivist part is going to be draw upon the book of David Campbell which presents how the identity can be based on the interpretations of danger. In my opinion the area of security is in Australian case one of the major factors influencing the foreign policymaking. The situation in the South China Sea, possible withdrawal of the U.S. from the region of Asia-Pacific, alliance politics, tensions over the Chinese rise and its growing influence, war on terror etc. – they all represent the current challenges that Australia is facing. Furthermore, the Wendt’s article on collective identity formation and problems of collective action will be covered.

³³¹ DIBB, Paul, “U.S.-Australia Alliance Relations: An Australian View,” 2005.

³³² TAYLOR, Brendan, and TOW, William T., “Crusaders and Pragmatists: Australia Debates the American Alliance,” 2017.

³³³ WHITE, Hugh, “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” 2012.

³³⁴ UNGERER, Carl, “The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy,” 2007.

I believe that for understanding profoundly the clash or complementarity of Australian identity and its interests in the region, it is firstly important to consider the objective reality of the possible conflict between the U.S. and China, and then the distinctive behaviour which is from my perspective, a matter of construct.

As mentioned in the part about the research target, one of my major tasks is to identify what is the Australian behaviour towards the Asia-Pacific region and how does it comply with its identity. As part of this complex task, the major influencing factors are going to be identified and analysed. Time framing of my thesis suggests that it is not my goal to come up with the historical analysis of the changes in Australian behaviour in the region throughout the past. I rather focus on its changes in the recent past and at present. Moreover, the regional specification of Asia-Pacific indicates that not Indo-Pacific, or even worldwide focus will be applied.

The integral part of the conceptual section will be definition of terms, such as the power, identity, or interest and what do they mean in the Australian case. Furthermore, the time framing as well as regional framing will be explained. Also, justifying my selection of the ‘major factors that influence Australia’s behaviour’ is going to be covered in this section.

My tentative hypotheses are two. Firstly, that *Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its power position*. The second hypothesis is that *Australia's foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is affected by its identity*.

Since the end of the Cold War and the commencement of the ‘Asian century’, states became – whether they like it or not – more entangled with the Asian countries. Chinese rise represents the biggest challenge to the regional order and put some states into position of changing their orientation from the liberal, rule-based order for the illiberal order represented by the Chinese state. From this point of view, I assume that the stronger base for explaining the Australia’s behaviour towards the Asia-Pacific region is in its identity. Australia preserves its own identity based on its liberal values and the trust in the rule-based order. At the same time, Australia steadily creates its distinctive foreign policy in which it incorporates transnational context. Especially the rise of China, or the possible withdrawal of the U.S. from the Asia-Pacific region under the new President Donald Trump signalize the careful consideration of power shifts and therefore the dynamic characteristic of trade relations or security issues in the region.

Empirical data and analytical technique

Rather than quantitative methods, the qualitative methods will be used as the main technique in my research. A case study focused on Australia is examined in my thesis.

Concretely, the Australian foreign policy is examined in the region of Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War period. A comparative-analysis of the Australian relation with two global superpowers – China and the U.S. – is part of my research.

The major focus will be given to two independent variables – power position of Australia and Australian identity. As the dependent variable, I consider the behaviour of the Australian foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, the interests of Australian foreign policy respectively.

The primary sources represent the base for my arguments. In theoretical part, where the main intellectual figures such as Claude, Waltz, Wendt, or Campbell will be covered, as well as in the part devoted to Australian foreign policy. Leading experts in the field, such as Allan Gyngell, Hugh White, or Michael Wesley will be included in my thesis. The access to these sources is easier since at the time of writing my diploma thesis project, I am on the exchange in Australia at the Australian National University.

Furthermore, the importance will be given to the governmental ‘White papers’ devoted to the formulation of the Australian foreign policy. Analysis of the governmental publications will be followed up by the careful consideration of the relevant proclamation of the representatives of state.

Other valuable sources for my thesis are the individual journals with particular focus on Australia, such as the ‘*Australian Foreign Affairs*’ or ‘*Australian Journal of Politics & History*’. Moreover, the relevant publications released by Australian think tanks, such as the Lowy institute or Australian Strategic Policy Institute may be the covered. Additionally, the relevant articles in journals with broader focus of interest will be considered, such as the Diplomat, Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs magazines, or the Atlantic and the Economist.

Planned thesis outline

Introduction (including the literature review)

1. Australia’s foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region (descriptive part with a historical overview)
2. Theoretical and methodological framework
3. Role of power position
4. Role of identity

Conclusions

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