

## **Abstract**

This thesis compares Norway, Botswana and Venezuela and their sovereign wealth funds. The first two countries are referred to as exceptions to the theory of the resource curse, which explains the phenomenon that shows that countries with a high dependence on income from the export of natural resources have a slower rate of economic, political and institutional development. On the contrary, Venezuela (although it was considered an exception in the past) is severely affected by this phenomenon and thus serves as a negative example in this thesis. The thesis focuses on state sovereign wealth funds and examines whether and under what conditions these funds have an effect on reversing the resource curse. Based on the theoretical part, five key characteristics are identified that the fund must meet in order to function against the negative manifestations of the curse of natural resources – (1) offsetting the effects of volatility, (2) diversifying the economy, (3) budgetary policy, (4) controlling the allocation of expenditure, (5) transparency of funds. Based on these characteristics, it is possible to observe that the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund works best from selected funds as a defense against the resource curse, followed by the Botswana fund and third by the Venezuelan fund. Norway and Botswana thus avoided the resource curse thanks to their responsible policy towards mineral commodities and a system that does not allow the misuse of accumulated funds in sovereign wealth funds. Although Venezuela was on the right path in establishing its sovereign wealth fund, the subsequent rise of Hugo Chávez and the powers he has been able to accumulate through a number of adjustments and "reforms" have prevented it from avoiding this phenomenon. Once the price of oil fell, it could no longer maintain its populist social and economic policies.