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**The Role of the Military and Religion in
the Political Regimes of Iran and
Turkey**

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Abstract

In the Middle East region, Iran and Turkey are influential powers, and both countries have relatively stable regimes in the Middle East countries. The two countries have chosen different paths after their political transformation. After reviewing the political practice of the two countries, due to different political environments, the two armies and religions have played prominent but different roles. After the Islamic revolution in Iran, the army was the protector of the regime, while religion played a leading role. After Kemal Ataturk established power, Turkey took a completely secularized road. The Turkish army was the defender of the secularized path independent of the government in the Turkish regime, while Islamic religion tried to exert influence as a political party. In addition, the article discusses whether it is based on complete secularization or is derived from Islamic religious tradition, which is a feasible way to modernize Islamic countries. At present, since Islam still has considerable influence, only by adapting Islam to the needs of modern society and making modernization the internal needs of Islam can Islamic countries be successfully modernized.

Abstrakt

In the Middle East region, Iran and Turkey are influential powers, and both countries have relatively stable regimes in the Middle East countries. The two countries have chosen different paths after their political transformation. After reviewing the political practice of the two countries, due to different political environments, the two armies and religions have played prominent but different roles. After the Islamic revolution in Iran, the army was the protector of the regime, while religion played a leading role. After Kemal Ataturk established power, Turkey took a completely secularized road.

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Klíčová slova

Iran, Turkey, military, religion, political regime, modernization

Keywords

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Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague ... **21.05.2020**

Jifu Wei

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Institute of Political Studies

Master thesis proposal

Topic Characteristics / Research Question(s):

The thesis will discuss the following general research question: How does the military power relate to the religious power in shaping the current political regimes in Iran and Turkey.

After WWII, Muslim countries in the Middle East began their own political transition one after another. In recent decades in some of these countries, especially in Iran (since the Islamic Revolution of 1979) and Turkey (since the consolidation of the power of Recep Erdogan), the interplay between religion and the military played a crucial role in shaping the unique form of political regime which defines itself by reference to the religious traditions of Islam, but in practice relies also heavily on the backing of the military. Since the Iranian and the Turkish regimes are very different - for variety of reasons, the Sunni-Shia ideological divide being just one of them - I will use throughout the thesis comparative historical method - comparing the historical and cultural roots of these two political regimes, as well as the current social and economic conditions which make these regimes relatively stable and apparently enjoying a wide popular support.

Working hypotheses:

1. The role of religion in the Iranian and Turkish political regimes is prominent but different.
2. The role of the military in the Iranian and Turkish political regimes evolved in a very different political circumstances and is also in both places 'prominent but different'
3. The Iranian and Turkish patterns of the relation between the military and religion are not universal patterns that can be discerned across the Muslim world, therefore one cannot argue that the Iranian and Turkish regimes are an embodiment of a Muslim political regime

Methodology:

The thesis is predominantly a work in comparative politics, therefore I will use the comparative historical method to compare the interactions and the struggle between military and religious political forces in the process of the formation of the current political regimes of Iran and Turkey. However, since one of the questions I will be addressing is: to what extent the current political regimes are a species typical to the "Muslim political tradition", my work will involve some theoretical/philosophical section and therefore will employ arguments typical to political philosophy.

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List the most important papers/books you are going to use (specify at least 5 relevant references).

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Introduction

Turkey and Iran are countries with Islam as their main belief, and both countries play an essential role in the Middle East today. At the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire disintegrated and Turkey gained national independence and started the process of political modernization by the led of Mustafa Kermal Atatürk. As a country with a long history in the Middle East, Iran's overall route was completely different from Turkey's. In 1979, the Islamic Revolution led by Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew the former Pahlavi regime and established the current Iranian regime. Turkey has adopted the political framework of Western democracy, in other side, Iranian regime took a political system based on Islamic principles. Both the military and religious forces in the regime of each of the two countries have a significant influence on the regime.

Turkey was the first country in the Middle East to transform from authoritarian to democratic politics and has achieved political, economic and social development to a certain extent. Turkey was also the first country to realise a multiparty democracy in the Western sense. Islamic religious groups participated in national politics as a political force. As a result, Turkey has long been regarded as a successful model of political transformation and modernization in the Muslim world.

Compared to Turkey, Iran seems to have taken the opposite path. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran's Islamic religious groups have been an important force in the regime. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards, on which the Iranian regime relies, are more important than the regular army. As the target of long-term Western attacks and sanctions, the Iranian regime seems to show no sign of wavering. Although in recent years the dissatisfaction of Iranian society with the deep religious colour of its existing regime often led to protests and demonstrations, the Iranian regime is still stable.

It is worth mentioning that despite Turkey's transition to democracy, the Turkish army has played an important role in it. As the militant group led the national independence and political transformation movement, Turkey's regime is under the shadow of the military. Therefore, similar to the situation in Iran, the Turkish military has become an important force in Turkish political activities. In particular, the military coups interspersed throughout Turkey's political history have played an important role in correcting the direction of Turkey's political transformation.

Generally, Iran and Turkey, as two influential powers in the Middle East, have very different regimes. The Iranian regime began with the Islamic Revolution. Religious forces, as the dominant force, influence international politics. Although Iran's military forces also influence the political situation, they are in a subordinate position to a certain extent. In addition to the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the conventional military organizations inherited from the Pahlavi dynasty have long been beware of the regime. In contrast to Iran, since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment and operation of Turkey's political power have been based on the leadership of military personnel. The military coup led by its troops is also believed to have safeguarded Turkey's political system to some extent. Under Turkey's political system, religious forces, as one of the political forces, conduct political activities like other political parties.

Therefore, Iran and Turkey are two influential and politically stable regimes in the Middle East, and their similar but different military-religious dualism is worth studying as two paradigms. One is a secular military-influenced model with Turkey as the template and the participation of religious forces. The other is a theocratic country with Iran as the template and religious theocracy as the leading factor, in which the military plays an auxiliary role for the regime.

However, with the political turmoil in the Middle Eastern countries in recent years, although the influence on Iran and Turkey is far from that of Egypt and Syria,

subtle changes have taken place in the political situation in the two countries. After defeating the military coup against him, Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is attempting to restore the important position of religion in Turkey and its society and actively intervene in the surrounding situation, attempting to make Turkey a regional power. Iran started to ease its control after many protests against its regime. Iran's military force, represented by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has played an important role both within and outside Iran in recent years. With the killing of the important Iranian figure Qasaem Soleimani by the United States, Iranian society seems to have become stronger under the influence of anti-American sentiment. Therefore, this article focuses on the religious and military forces within the political framework of Iran and Turkey with the aim of determining how these two forces affect the political systems of Iran and Turkey respectively.

Chapter 1

1. Theoretical background, research status review and research method

Both Iran and Turkey are countries that mainly believe in Islam. Moreover, they are both influential regional powers. In addition, Iran and Turkey still maintain the relative stability of their regimes, unlike the politically unstable countries that mainly believe in Islam. Therefore, the study of the regimes in Iran and Turkey has a certain reference significance for the development of regimes in Islamic countries. In the regimes of Iran and Turkey, the army and religion play a role that cannot be ignored. Consequently, examining the roles of the army and religion in the regimes of Iran and Turkey can reveal the different modes of their respective regimes.

Turkey was the first country to transform into democratic politics. It has successfully achieved political, economic and social development. Turkey was also the first country to realize multi-party democracy in the Western sense. Islamic political forces can participate in the political life of the country and form a government successfully in elections. Therefore, Turkey is regarded as a successful model of democratic politics in the Muslim world. Still, American political researcher Alfred Stepan realized that Turkey's political Islamic movement and the so-called Turkish pattern of democratic transformation cannot be applied to all Islamic countries. He deliberately distinguished the social foundation and political conditions of different countries and proposed religious and secular. This concept requires religious individuals and groups to respect and tolerate the results under a democratic mechanism, that also protects the legitimate and democratic rights of religious individuals and groups (2013).

Unlike Turkey, Iran established a regime with Islamic Shariah principles as its core after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and embarked on a completely different

path from Turkey. Different from Turkey, the Iranian regime has long been regarded as an autocratic regime and is not appreciated by the outside world. However, despite occasional outbreaks of contradictions in Iran, the Iranian regime can still maintain its stability and social cohesion under external sanctions and pressure. Moreover, Iran has established the path of Islamic modernization and organized a political framework that is completely different from those of Western democracies.

Turkey is often seen as the ideal path for the modernization of Islamic countries in the studies that have been conducted and well researched, with mainstream research focusing on religious and secular relations, as well as military and political relations in the countries concerned. Most studies have focused more on Islam as an extreme and conservative political force that impedes modernization and political stability than on Islam itself.

In addition, there are different sects of reform and conservatism in Islam and the possibility of Islamic-dominated modernization. Samuel P. Huntington pointed out in his research on military politics that the purpose of military intervention is to deal with the threat of regime subversion (2008: p.21). In previous studies, the analysis of the military is generally divided into two types: one is to discuss the relationship between the military and the opposition in domestic politics, and the other is to consider the military as a whole as a secular force in national politics. From the political practice of Iran and Turkey, this correspondence is not permanent, and the Islamic reformists are the main force in the modernization of the Iranian regime. The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution represents the regime's conservative wing, and amid popular calls for reform, the Iranian regime is showing signs of easing. In Turkey, the military has always been the face of secular power, while religious forces are traditionally conservative. However, since the recent failure of a military coup, the army's role as the guardian of Turkey's secular path

has faded, and it may be losing its power in the purges that followed. Turkey's path to secularization is therefore uncertain.

The modernization of the Islamic world in the Middle East originated from the impact of the West. Since the 16th century, the traditional agriculture-based society has gradually declined in the western Christian world. With the formation of a unified nation-state, the practice of mercantilism and the completion of the industrial revolution, the western Christian world rose rapidly and its strength soared. In contrast, the historical process of the Islamic world in the Middle East is at a standstill and the agricultural society has continued for a long time. The rise of the West and the relative stagnation in Middle East history have led to an imbalance in the balance of power between the Christian world and the Islamic world. The rise of the western Christian world undoubtedly marks the birth of modern civilization. The stagnation of the Islamic world in the Middle East has its specific connotation in the deep-rooted traditional order. The great gap between different civilizations led to the historical wave of western shock, and the modernization process gradually extended from the western Christian world to the Islamic world in the Middle East. Entering the 19th century, the threat of war from western powers prompted the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Iran to commit themselves to a top-down New Deal. The modernization process of the Islamic world in the Middle East began and the traditional society began to loosen.

In this article, through the study and comparison of the military and religious roles in the regimes of Iran and Turkey, I aim to confirm the following hypothesis: the roles of religion in the regimes of Iran and Turkey are prominent but different, and the military forces of the two countries have shown their prominent but different roles in the regimes due to their different political environments. Furthermore, by comparing the regime structures and political practices of Iran and Turkey, it can be

concluded which model has the potential to become an Islamic political pattern to achieve modernization.

Secularization originates from the Christian world, especially the depoliticization of religion and the nonreligious of politics, emphasizing the principle of separation between religion and politics. The mainstream view usually refers to the historical experience of the European Christian world, cites the modernization model of the European Christian world, regards the dualistic system of religion and customs as the typical feature of the traditional political model, and regards the depoliticization of the religious field and the depoliticization of the political field, i.e. the separation of religion and customs, as the unique form of modern politics, emphasizing the universal synchronization and inevitability between modernization and secularization, with traces of western centralism.

However, secularization is not a unique phenomenon in the Christian world. The top-down secularization reform has long accompanied the modernization process of the Islamic world in the Middle East. The secularization reform of the Islamic world in the Middle East originated from the historical era of the impact of western religions and has a strong westernization color. Its main measures include the introduction of western secular laws, the establishment of western-style secular education, the closure of religious courts, the banning of religious schools, the deprivation of religious real estate, the weakening of the autonomous status of religious organizations and the overcoming of the centrifugal tendency of religious forces. Compared with the secularization process in the European Christian world, the secularization reform in the Islamic world in the Middle East does not strictly follow the principle of separation of religion and politics, but emphasizes the absolute control of the state and government over the religious world, which is manifested in the bureaucratization of religious institutions and the formalization of religious ideology. The secularization reform of the Islamic world in the Middle

East often lies in the extension of authoritarian politics from secular to religious fields, which runs counter to the political process of democratization. Bureaucratic religious circles and institutions are under the control of the government. They have not separated from the political field and lost their political functions, but have become tools of authoritarian politics.

U.S. sociologist Theda Skocpol believes that comparative history can generally be used to refer to studies related to the parallel development of two or more nation-states, system complexes or civilizations (2015). In the research on social revolution, Theda Skocpol chose specific historical fragments as the unit of comparison under the macro historical background to identify and confirm the causes, instead of simply describing the history.

This article will discuss the roles of the army and religion in the two countries' regimes by using the method of comparative history, specifically, in the context of the modernization of Iran and Turkey, the roles of the army and religion in the two regimes will be compared, thus identifying the similarities and differences between the two regimes. Although Iran and Turkey, which are mainly Islamic countries, have relatively stable regimes, their modernization paths are quite different, in which the military and religion have played prominent roles; however, their roles are not the same. First, this article will briefly introduce the historical background of the two countries' regimes and compare the two factors of the military and religion to determine whether the two different models can become the general political model of Islamic countries.

Chapter 2

2. Overview of Iranian and Turkish political regimes

Iran and Turkey, as two Middle Eastern countries with a long history, have certain representativeness in their regime pattern also political transformation process, namely Turkey's political transformation dominated by secularization and Iran's political transformation dominated by Islam power. In order to discuss the current regime issues in Iran and Turkey, it is necessary to review the process of political transformation in Iran and Turkey, the Iranian Islamic Revolution initiated by Khomeini and the Republic of Turkey established by Kemal Atatürk, as well as the characteristics of the current regimes in Iranian and Turkish regime.

2.1 Overview of Iranian political regimes

In 1921, Persian Cossack Brigade general Reza Shah Pahlavi staged a coup supported by the British. At the end of 1925, Iran's constitutional conference proclaimed Reza Khan Shah. The Kayga dynasty (1796–1925), which had ruled the Persian region for hundreds of years, came to an end and the Pahlavi dynasty began (Wang, 2019). During the period of more than 50 years that Reza Khan and his son, Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, ruled Iran, they both committed themselves to establishing a secular state modelled on Western countries. Islam, which has influenced Iran for thousands of years, seems to be losing its social influence. Even the religious scholars, who have long been respected in history, have become the target of ridicule by some young people. During the reign of Pahlavi, he made it clear that Iran would not take the Islam or socialism, but would carry out a 'White Revolution' and follow the example of the West towards what he believed to be a true modern civilization. Pahlavi continued his father's strategy and tried to curb the influence of Islamic culture by reshaping the national spirit of ancient Persia. In 1971, to celebrate the 2500th anniversary of the birth of the Persian Empire, Pahlavi held a

grand celebration to prove the historical continuity and legitimacy of the royal power.

The problems triggered and exposed by the White Revolution allowed discontent to continue to spread in all sectors of Iranian society. Although the Shah managed to maintain the apparent stability for more than ten years with his army and high-handed policies, the foundation of the royal power had been weakened. In 1976, the United States changed its policy towards Iran, forcing Pahlavi to carry out a liberalization movement. Furthermore, Iran's economic tightening policy led to a sharp rise in the unemployment rate, which had slowed down the economic development driven by a sharp increase in oil revenues. Many people believed that Ayatollah Khomeini, a religious figure living in exile, could save Iran from its predicament. In the eyes of the bourgeoisie, Khomeini was an old enemy of dictatorship and a protector of private property, traditional values and struggling businessmen. In intellectual circles, although he was a religious scholar, he was also a nationalist full of fighting spirit, which could liberate Iran from the double oppression of imperialism and despotism. In the eyes of city workers, Khomeini would realize social justice and redistribution of wealth; in the eyes of the rural people, he would implement all the material contents promised by the White Revolution but not realized. Khomeini met the expectations of different strata of Iran for a leader at that time, and therefore guerrillas, nationalists, liberal parties and religious figures formed a united front under the banner of Islam, which eventually triggered the huge Islamic Revolution and replaced the Pahlavi dynasty.

Although the Iranian army had suppressed the opposition forces in the country, before and after the Islamic Revolution, it lost its due role, which led to the success of the Revolution. After the Revolution, Iran established a regime with Islamic Sharia as its core. The enactment of Iran's Islamic Constitution ensured the guidance of Islamic principles for the country in the name of the Constitution. Khomeini's

idea of governing the country by Islamic government and Islamic jurists, which he constantly expounded during his exile in Iraq, was put into practice, and the Shiite political ideal was transformed into a constitutional system within the framework of a modern state.

2.2 Overview of Turkish political regimes

Since the 19th century, Turkey's ruling elites have been deeply embedded in secularism in all previous reforms, which laid the groundwork for the further secularization of modern Turkey (Göle, 1997: p. 46-58). As a force with a high degree of modernization and secularization, the army, relying on its monopoly on powerful means and supervision of bureaucracy, is affecting the development of modern Turkey. After the success of the revolution, Kemal Atatürk started Turkey's radical secularization. Under the principle of secularization, the secularization reform is mainly reflected in three aspects, namely excluding the participation of religious power in politics, removing Islamic law in law, and abolishing religious schools in culture and education (Ha, 2010: p. 59).

The secularization of modern Turkey mainly separates the influence of religion from all levels of the country. On the political level, Turkey's secularization is mainly reflected in the abolition of the caliphate system. The caliphate system was a combination of Islam and political power. In 1924, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) announced the abolition of the caliphate system, and members of the royal family were deported. The Turkish government set up a special organization to manage religious affairs – the Religious Affairs Bureau. In fact, the government controlled religious affairs and Islamic religious personnel were monitored strictly by the government. The so-called separation of church and state had become a model of political interference in religion (Zan, 2011). For example, the government stipulated that religious symbols could not appear in the political field. In September 1925, Turkey issued a decree requiring government

officials not to wear any religious accessories (White, 2002). Due to strict restrictions on the space for activities, Islam could not form an organized group, let alone an Islamic political party. As far as education is concerned, Islam has had a far-reaching influence on education in history. The secularization of education aimed to sever the close ties between Islam and cultural education. The government ordered the closure of religious schools, cancelled religious courses and took over educational institutions. In view of the natural connection between Arabic and Islam, the the Grand National Assembly passed legislation to Latinize the Turkish language and stipulated that Arabic letters should not appear in public. All texts of Islamic classics were written and printed in Latin letters. Religious believers used Latin Turkish for their prayers. The achievements of secularization reform in other fields, such as the political and educational aspects mentioned above, were guaranteed by the enactment of special laws. The most important change in the law lies in the extreme Westernization. The Sharia law, which originated from Islam, was abolished and the legislative power was transferred to the legislature, the Grand National Assembly. The Turkish government studied and introduced the legal systems of European countries. The radical secularization reform after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey laid the foundation and established the direction for the country's political development. All the secularization achievements had not only the institutional guarantee, but also the army that adhered to the principle of secularization as a solid backing.

In 1924, Turkey promulgated a constitution and established a republic. According to the Constitution, Turkey's legislature is the Grand National Assembly, the members of which are elected by universal suffrage. The President of the Republic is elected by the Parliament and serves as the Supreme Military Commander of Turkey. The Parliament's bills must be signed by the president and take effect. The president appoints the prime minister to form a government cabinet, which is accountable to the Parliament. The Constitution does not clearly stipulate party

politics. Since Kemal Ataturk's Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) had a very high reputation, it led the Parliament and the government without any dispute in the early days after the establishment of the government. After the Republican People's Party came to power, Turkey entered a one-party authoritarian era. The army was Kemal's solid backing for various reforms. In the early days after the founding of the Republic of Turkey, many officers had dual identities. Twenty per cent of the members of the Parliament were soldiers, and military officers were responsible for one third of government departments (Cook, 2007: p. 30). As far as the Republican People's Party itself is concerned, many of its members came from military camps. Therefore, Kemal Ataturk's policy measures were consistent with the will of the Republican People's Party and received strong support from the military. In addition, there was no party politics when the Republican People's Party was in power. Apart from the Republican People's Party, there were no other political parties in Turkey as opposition parties to supervise and balance the Republican People's Party during this period. The society was dissatisfied with the political environment at that time, and different voices appeared within the Republican People's Party, expressing dissatisfaction with Kemal Ataturk's radical reforms. Despite the formation of opposition parties, they were banned and failed. Kemal believed that the situation in Turkey is not fit the opposition party (Mango, 2002: p. 20). After the outbreak of the Second World War, Turkey experienced a labour shortage. The state budget increased the proportion of military expenditure and correspondingly reduced investment in economic development. Turkey's national economy stagnated and the people at the bottom of the society were heavily burdened. During this period, all types of contradictions in Turkey continuously intensified. Opposition to authoritarian politics continued to rise in Turkey, and the situation of political opposition gradually increased. Under great pressure, in November 1944 the Turkish government promised to implement the democratic system, lift the party ban and grant the opposition a legal status. The Republic of

Turkey transformed from an authoritarian system to party politics and parliamentary politics (Kamel, 2015: p. 192).

Chapter 3

3. The role of the military in the Iranian and Turkish political regimes

The influence of the military and religion on Iran and Turkey's political practice cannot be ignored. Both will play an important role in future political transformation. As an essential component of a country, the army is worth studying. In this chapter, we will discuss the role of the military in the two countries and assume that its role is prominent; however, the different political environments in the two countries lead to different roles and positions.

The characteristics of the army are important variables that affect its role in domestic politics. In this paper, the characteristics of the army are divided into two modes: autonomy and dependence. Autonomous mode refers to an autonomous army meaning that it is not controlled by the state ruler, while dependent mode refers to an army under the state ruler's strict control.

First of all, in the mode where the ruler controls the army, the ruling group's control mode over the autonomous army is characterised by respect for the autonomy of the army's hierarchy and operation, and adopting a *laissez-faire* policy, or buying and pleasing the army. Although the autonomous army formally obeys the leadership of the country's rulers, in practice it is difficult for civilian leaders to get involved in the actual commanding of the army, and the actual command within the army is controlled by military personnel. In contrast, the ruling clique has strong control over the internal affairs of the dependent army and is deeply involved in the army.

Secondly, to the extent that the army intervenes in domestic political struggles, the performance of the autonomous army and the dependent army also have certain

differences. The dependent army, because it is tightly controlled by the ruling group, is an important tool for the ruling group to suppress political opposition and safeguard its own rule. The dependent army's involvement in domestic political struggles is very deep. For autonomous troops, the situation is more complicated. Since the autonomous army occupies an important political position in the country, it is bound to be involved in political affairs, including domestic political struggles. However, its autonomous nature allows the army to make adjustments voluntarily according to the particular situation. The autonomous army avoids becoming a tool used by a certain ruling group. In addition, in terms of military identity, an autonomous army tends to generate an identity independent from civilian political leaders, due to the army's long-term isolation from government affairs and strong professionalism. The main feature of this autonomous identity is the separation between the state and the government or ruling group. In the identity of the autonomous army, the country takes higher precedence over any specific government, which is only an administrative body composed of civil servants and political parties. The government will change with the political cycle and the ruling situation, while the country is eternal and stable. Therefore, the army's defence of the country does not necessarily mean defending the government. It is precisely because the army is the defender of the country that it is also obliged to supervise the government. The autonomous army checks the power of the government. Once the government is in power, the army will act if they feel the government has acted wrongly, and step in to seize power. In the case of a dependent army, although the army is nominally subordinate to the state, it is actually only a vassal of the ruling group. In these countries, military loyalty to the country is synonymous to loyalty to leaders, and political leaders do not allow the army to form its own independent identity. The army can only be an instrument.

In the following discussion on the roles of the Iranian and Turkish militaries, these two modes are clearly distinguishable in the two militaries' differing statuses.

3.1 The role of the military in Iranian political regimes

In the Iranian regime, the army is not a single object. Unlike other countries, Iran has the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in addition to its normal regular army. Therefore, the Iranian army will be discussed separately below.

In 1925, Reza Khan Pahlavi established Iran's Pahlavi dynasty. It adopted a series of strategies to divide, disintegrate and tightly control the army, which eventually led to the Iranian army to become an army with obviously dependent characteristics. Under the Pahlavi regime, the Iranian army was not allowed to show any overt autonomy. The army was always part of the Shah-centred state apparatus and was ruled by the king with an iron fist. In order to control the army, the Pahlavi kings deeply intervened in the internal affairs of the army and took measures to create divisions within the army. This can be seen from their choice of generals. In order to ensure their own rule, the Pahlavi Shahs adopted the strategy of dividing and ruling the personnel of the army to ensure that the Iranian army in the Pahlavi era never formed its own organisational interests or believed that it represented the interests of a certain class, and only belonged to the Shah himself. Through careful selection of its senior generals, 'the army can only act collectively under the leadership of the Shah of Iran. They will not use collective actions to oppose the Shah of Iran, nor will they act collectively for their own interests or the interests of other organisations.' (Arjomand, 1986: p. 387). In order to prevent a strong military leader, the Pahlavi Shahs preferred to promote mediocre but loyal individuals to be generals, rather than strong military leaders. In addition, during the Pahlavi period, the army was an important tool for the Shah to assert his rule, so the regime repeatedly used the army to suppress domestic dissidents. The army, together with other bureaucracies, was regarded as an important cornerstone for safeguarding the Shah's rule (Hoveyda, 1980: p. 101). As an instrument of the regime, the army was often used to suppress dissent. In 1963, the Shah, supported by the army, suppressed the

riots, arrested Khomeini and exiled him. On 8 September 1979, the Iranian army shot at protesters again, killing dozens of people. Finally, the Iranian army is essentially a vassal of the Shah. Although the Iranian army is nominally the defender of the country, its essence is only the Shah's private militia. The army has always been loyal to the Shah and its identity as a servant of the Shah has also been formalised and institutionalised in the Iranian army through a series of ceremonies. According to relevant information, during the Pahlavi era, the Iranian army had to swear allegiance to the Shah every morning (Ward, 2014).

After taking office in 1925, Pahlavi's rule in Iran lasted for 54 years. In 1979, a political revolution led by the Islamic group broke out in Iran and overthrew Shah Pahlavi. They established the Islamic Republic of Iran, and realised political transformation. In the process of Iran's political transformation, Iran's army, which seemed to be extremely powerful during the Pahlavi era, was easily tamed by the new political forces. As a typical dependent army, although some groups had fought against the new regime (Hoveyda, 1980: p. 204), these Insurgent groups did not succeed because of their low level of autonomy. Besides, due to the strong ties between the Iranian army and the Shah, the army was unable to win public support when Pahlavi's regime fell. In addition, as a vassal of the regime, the Iranian army was not able to take a neutral political stance during Iran's political transition. Therefore, after the Islamic Revolution, the new regime distrusted the Iranian army. The new regime subsequently purged the army. Also, Khomeini's regime established the Islamic Revolutionary Guards loyal to itself, separate from the regular army, thus further limiting the influence of the Iranian army (Ward, 2014).

After the victory of the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran's ruling clique with Khomeini at its core faced the grim practical problem of how to consolidate the regime further. In the early days of the Islamic regime, the social order in Iran was unstable. The remnants of the former regime continued to create disturbances

throughout the country. Organisations such as Mojahedin and Fadayin incited popular unrest everywhere. Armed forces in Balochistan also held dissenting views against the new regime (Ward 2014).

At the beginning of 1979, under the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Council, the Iranian government gradually began to reorganise the various armed forces in the country. At that time, there were four armies in Iran. The armed forces made clear their support for Khomeini's regime. In April 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was formed from the four armed forces (Alfoneh, 2013: p. 6-10). On 22 April 1979, the Iranian government announced the formal establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

From the perspective of organisational structure, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is under the leadership of the supreme leader, who appoints the commander-in-chief to direct the troops to fight (Forozan, 2016: p. 55). The primary duty of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is to safeguard Iran's national sovereignty and prevent foreign enemies from invading (Iran Constitution, 1979). Secondly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is also responsible for suppressing social unrest and maintaining public order. In Iran, the Basij militia under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will co-operate with security forces to suppress civil unrest. In addition, the security work of key government departments such as television stations, radio stations, newspapers, courts and other institutions is also entrusted to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is also responsible for security checks at airports, railway stations, long-distance bus stations and other transportation hubs.

After the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, Iran's internal order gradually stabilised. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps turned to political election work and was later given economic power. It became an armed force with power over security, politics and economics, and its influence increased daily. In the field of security, the

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has an important responsibility to safeguard the internal and external security of Iran. Internally, it is responsible for resolutely cracking down on separatist forces, suppressing riots, uniting social identity and ensuring the stability of social order. Externally, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards assume the Iranian government's responsibility to 'export revolution', support 'the world is the freedom movement that oppressed the people' and expand the influence of the Islamic revolution (Forozan, 2016: p. 169). In Iran, the Basij militia under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard is an important force to safeguard the social order of Iran. It has played an irreplaceable role in intelligence gathering, cultural propaganda and suppressing social unrest (Wang, 2019). On the external front, US-Iran relations have become more hostile since 2019. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards will frequently launch military exercises in the Gulf region to demonstrate their military capabilities. It can be seen that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps plays an important role in maintaining Iran's internal and external security.

Politically, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard's stance is biased towards conservatives and the militia willingly participates in elections, although during the reign of Supreme Leader Khomeini, military forces were strictly prohibited from entering the political arena. However, after Khamenei succeeded the supreme leader in 1989, it was difficult to control the overall situation. Therefore, he acquiesced and allowed the entry of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards into the political field. In the 2005 presidential election, Revolutionary Guard officers were accused of interfering in the election (CNN, 2005). In Iran's 2009 presidential election, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and its affiliated Basij militia actively canvassed for Ahmadinejad to help him win re-election (Saha, 2014: p. 113).

Economically, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Force has seized the opportunity to participate in Iran's post-war reconstruction, and its economic strength has continued to grow. After the Iran-Iraq war, Rafsanjani's

government encouraged the Islamic Revolutionary Guards to fend for themselves in order to reduce fiscal expenditure. Against this background, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has been actively involved in various economic fields in Iran. GHORB (Khatam al-Anbiya), the co-operative foundation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the co-operative foundation of the Basij militia, and other large companies and foundations have been established one after another, mainly in real estate, banking, retail, oil and gas resources development and other industries (Iranwatch, 2020).

In short, as an armed force with multiple roles in Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' core goal is to defend the regime of the Islamic Republic. As an important manifestation of Iran's national sovereignty, it will certainly play a key role for a long time. At the same time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' multiple roles have laid a solid foundation for its expanding influence in Iran and abroad.

Although the Islamic Revolutionary Guard has its own voice, considerable autonomy and has penetrated all fields in Iran, it is still a dependent army as a whole. In Iran's current regime, the supreme leader holds not only the highest political power, but also is the religious leader and commander-in-chief of the national armed forces (Iran constitution, 1979). Given the religious nature of the Islamic Republic regime, it is difficult for the Revolutionary Guards to have sufficient legitimacy and voice if they attempt to launch a coup. Although Iranian society is currently facing different degrees of a social identity crisis, the thoughts of Supreme Leaders Khomeini and Khamenei are still influential in Iranian society. Khamenei often praises the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in public (Wang, 2019). The supreme leader also controls the Islamic Revolutionary Guards through various means to ensure their loyalty. The supreme leader has the power to appoint and dismiss senior officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, further strengthening his control over

the army (Iran constitution, 1979). Therefore, in terms of political stance, the Revolutionary Guard will maintain a high degree of agreement with the supreme leader. Whenever there is a political difference between the supreme leader and the elected president, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard always expresses its support for the former. In addition, the supreme leader can effectively balance the relationship between various political factions in Iran, including the relationship between the Revolutionary Guard and the government, and curb excessive competition between the two. The supreme leader has long acquiesced in the involvement of military forces in the economic field, but he will take a stand should he see that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' excessive behaviour in the commercial field has aroused the dissatisfaction of many political elites and the public (The Paper, 2018).

Their involvement in politics is in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard's own interests. During Iran's 40 years of political development, whenever a reformist government came to power, it would carry out substantial reforms and often clashed with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. In response, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps must take various measures to protect its own interests. However, the contradiction between the two is always measured, and no large-scale military conflict has broken out. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards is politically motivated, but they respect the authority of the supreme leader very much. Successive governments have often won the support of the general public. Therefore, the atmosphere and opportunities for direct political work are relatively scarce.

In terms of identity, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Force takes defending the legitimacy of Faqih's system as its own duty; this was also the original intention of Khomeini and the founding elites in establishing this army. Therefore, for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, there is no difference between defending the regime and defending the country, and there is also a lack of awareness of independent identity. This is exactly what distinguishes the Iranian army from the Turkish army.

In addition, both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and the government need to obey the supreme leader. There is no difference in safeguarding the current political system. The presidential candidates examined and approved by the Guardian Council must be people who support the guardianship system of sharia scholars. As long as the president does not deviate from this political direction and core principles, and obeys the leader during his term of office, the army has no reason to overthrow the government with administrative functions.

Moreover, the dual military structure of the regular army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Force is mutually restrictive and can effectively prevent one side from being too powerful. Judging from the structural characteristics of Iran's military system, the regular army, as an armed force parallel to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, can play a supervisory and preventive role for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, which in fact also reflects the mutual checks and balances of Iran's dual political structure. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard represents the interests of religious groups and conservative camps, whereas the political stance of the regular army is relatively neutral. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps undertakes the function of safeguarding the internal security of the country and generally establishes bases in cities. The regular army is mainly used for foreign operations and must be stationed on the outskirts of cities. It is also responsible for guarding the national border (Iran constitution, 1979). In terms of Iran's defence expenditure, the Revolutionary Guards account for two thirds of the defence budget. Their weapons and equipment are better than that of the regular army. However, regular troops outnumber the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, totalling 350,000 or so (Saikal, 2019: p. 149-150). The Iranian government can influence the regular army through financial allocation and other means. In short, the existence of the regular army has a certain restraining effect on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. It is very difficult for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard to launch a military coup. This military system will obviously increase the internal friction between Iran's military forces,

but it can effectively prevent the Revolutionary Guards from losing control. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards must maintain a rational and restrained attitude towards the government and can only choose appropriate compromise when there are major conflicts with the government.

3.2 The role of the military in Turkish political regimes

Modern Turkey was established in 1923 under Kemal Ataturk's leadership. In the subsequent development of Turkey, the Turkish army has gradually formed strong autonomous characteristics. The autonomy of the Turkish army is first reflected in the Kemal Ataturk's control mode over the army after the founding of Turkey. This control mode fully guaranteed the autonomy of the army, which lay the groundwork for the Turkish army to repeatedly pose as the defender of Ataturk's spirit to interfere in the regime. Unlike Iran's army during the Pahlavi dynasty, the Turkish army's autonomy came first from Kemal Ataturk's absolute trust in the chief military officer. Consequently, the ruler did not become too deeply involved in the army's internal affairs, thus maintaining the army's autonomy. After the founding of Ataturk's regime, Chief of General Staff Fevzi Ccedil gained Ataturk's absolute trust. He served as the army's chief of general staff for 22 years, and his position and related management were carried out independently from the Turkish government cabinet. After Ataturk, the pattern of 'weak control' of the Turkish army continued (Hale, 1994). The autonomy of the Turkish army in the control mode during this period is reflected in the following aspects.

First, in terms of personnel, Ataturk's Chief of General Staff retained that position for a long time and did not retire, due to age and pressure from Western allies, until the outbreak of World War II (Hale, 1994). During Cakmak's tenure as chief of general staff, the Turkish government fully respected his autonomy in running the army. At the same time, Cakmak also expressed public support for the ruling authorities on several occasions, forming a relationship of mutual loyalty

(Hale, 1994). Secondly, after Cakmak retired, the Turkish government tried to contain the army's over-strong autonomy, by reducing the political status of the general staff. They wanted the position to report to the Minister for Defence rather than directly to the president. However, this attempt was firmly opposed by senior military officials. Therefore, the government had to compromise: the general staff of the army reported directly to the prime minister, ranking higher than other cabinet departments. Since making this adjustment, the Turkish army manages its own affairs and is still rarely interfered with by the civilian government (Hale, 1994). At the same time, Turkey implemented military control and promulgated martial law throughout the country during World War II, which also enhanced the autonomy of the army from one aspect.

Secondly, the Turkish army is less involved in political affairs than Iran's army. In the early days of modern-day Turkey, Ataturk advocated that the army should be isolated from politics. He believed that linking the army with politics damaged the army. Therefore, Ataturk demanded that his followers must choose either a political or military position, but not both (Ulus, 2011: p. 11). Under Ataturk, military officials were not only forbidden from entering parliament, but also from voting in elections and reading newspapers (Ulus, 2011: p. 11). Due to its isolation from political affairs, the Turkish army has gradually established a sense of independence from specific political parties, which has played an important role in its road to power in political transformation. In the process of its construction, the Turkish army was shaped as the guardian of the country and its national interests. In this process of identity building, the army and the whole country are combined to shape the army into a spokesman and defender of the country's fate, beyond specific government agencies and parties (Cook, 2007: p. 95). Secondly, the army is linked to the reconstruction of Turkey's national history. After the founding of the Republic of Turkey, in order to build a new national identity, Turkey has rebuilt its existing history on a large scale and constructed a modern Turkish identity by rewriting its

history. The identity construction of the Turkish army has also become an important part of the overall national identity construction. The Turkish army has been shaped into an “ultra-historic” ideal form and is part of Turkish culture (Altınay, 2004: p.29).

Thirdly and finally, it should be noted that the Turkish army’s constructed identity attaches great importance to being the “vanguard” and “guardian”. For example, although the Turkish army is required to stay away from actual political affairs, it is also considered to have the mission of spreading modern civilisation and leading Turkey's national progress. Since then, whenever the Turkish regime is in turmoil or deviates from the existing track, the Turkish army will bring the development of the Turkish regime back on track through a military coup.

Most of the coup and seizure of power by the Turkish army was carried out by senior military officials, participate and take part in an open ultimatum. The coup and seizure of power launched by the Turkish army started after careful planning and organisation, and was considerably successful. At the same time, many coup attempts by the Turkish army have shown a very high degree of co-ordination. Secondly, due to the long-term construction of the Turkish army's identity as the guardian and vanguard of the country and its lack of involvement in the country's political affairs, the Turkish army can more easily interpret the coup as an action to safeguard the national interests and Ataturk’s political direction. There have been many coups in Turkey since the first coup in 1960; defending Kemalism and Turkey’s national interests has become the main reason for the Turkish army to launch a coup. At the same time, the Turkish army's seizure of power has also won strong support from the public. According to data provided by the U.S. investigation in 2010, despite four coups, more than 72% of Turks believe that the army has played a positive role in Turkey (Pew Center, 2010). These polling data all reflect the success of the Turkish army's discourse power construction. Finally, judging

from the rules presented by the Turkish military's previous interventions, the military will not take the initiative to provoke the civilian government when the government ruling performance is good and is popular. The military will only launch a coup when there are huge problems (such as political polarisation and social unrest) with the civilian government. From Turkey's political transformation in 1945, the Turkish army has always taken the stance of supporting a civilian government. Even if there were some worries and criticisms within the military about the Democratic government's violation of Kemalism, they were quickly suppressed by senior military officials (Hale, 1994). The army decided to seize power only when the Democratic Party came into power in 1960, triggering serious social crisis and public protest (Yang, 1990). There is no doubt that this rule is related to the long-term autonomy of the Turkish army not to intervene in political affairs. This flexibility is the important reason why the Turkish army can maintain a high public support rate in the coup.

As a strong independent force, the Turkish army has successfully conducted political affairs through previous military coups and maintained the stability of the Turkish regime. However, in the latest coup against Erdogan, the coup ended in failure due to Erdogan's replacement of senior military officials and the rise of Islamic ideology in society. It can be imagined that under the new situation, the Turkish army has gone through another purge and its ability to maintain secularism is questionable.

Chapter 4

4. The role of religion in the Iranian and Turkish political regimes

From the analysis and comparison of the roles of military organisations in the regimes of Iran and Turkey, we can see that the military organisations of both sides have evolved into different models due to their different political environments. If we do not consider the religious nature of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and regard it as part of Iran's military power, we can indeed concur with the previous hypothesis, that the roles of Iran's and Turkey's armed forces in their political systems are “prominent but different”. As we all know, the religious forces of Iran and Turkey also have important positions in their countries, so they cannot be ignored. In Iran, its 1979 Islamic revolution was a social change led by religious groups. In Turkey, although it has established a modern western democratic system, the role of religious forces in politics cannot be ignored. Here we assume that, like the military forces of the two countries, the role of religious forces in Iran and Turkey is prominent but different, and discuss it in this chapter.

4.1 The role of religion in Iranian political regimes

The Koran is the most important legal source of Islamic law. Studying the status of the Koran in Iranian law is an important aspect of studying the influence of Islam on Iranian politics. After the Islamic revolution, in order to establish the basic form of government and the state, an expert constitutional assembly was established. The vast majority of its members were religious figures, who were responsible for revising and reviewing the draft constitution and submitting it to a referendum after revision. Finally, on 31 March 1979, the Islamic government issued a new constitution. Iran's new constitution stipulates that ‘the form of the Iranian regime is

the Islamic Republic. Iran's state religion is Islam of the twelve Imams among the Shiites. The Koran is the supreme law.' (Iran constitution, 1979) All civil, criminal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, defence, political and other law and regulations must be based on Islamic norms, and this principle applies to all articles of the constitution and other laws (Iran constitution, 1979). In Iran's constitution, politics and religion are closely combined. Religious forces occupy a vital position in the political system, which fundamentally guarantees the Shiite theocracy of the combination of politics and religion. Therefore, this is a constitution with Islamic ideology.

Iran's new constitution has apparent characteristics of Islamic law. In principle, human beings have no real legislative power: only God has real legislative power. The Koran is the revelation of God and the legislation made by God for humankind. It has never changed. Even if there are no specific and certain provisions in the Koran due to the development of society, the rules and regulations formulated by the state and the government in order to adapt and promote social development and deal with new situations cannot be regarded as legislation strictly, but as specific policies. Moreover, the policies cannot violate the spirit and principles of the Koran and Islamic precepts. To sum up, in Iran, the Koran is supreme at the national legislative level, in Islamic law tradition or in daily life.

Any government or political power must demonstrate its legitimacy. After the success of the Islamic revolution, Khomeini focused on "the form of Islamic government" in his book *Islamic Government*. He believes that the Islamic government is a constitutional government different from any existing form of government. The fundamental difference between Islamic government and constitutional monarchies or secular republics lies in the fact that the power to legislate and make laws and regulations in the Islamic world can only belong to Almighty God. The Islamic government is a government ruled by law. Law is God's

will and command. Islamic law has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. Therefore, the Islamic government can be defined as ruling people according to divine law. Governing by Islamic principles is governing by law. Those who know the law well, or more precisely and those who know religion well, such as moralists, must be responsible for guiding how they function. They must guide all administrative affairs and all planning of the country. From Khomeini's exposition, it can be seen that the Islamic government he advocates is a government ruled by law, that is, ruling according to sacred Islamic law. The logical result is that those who possess such legal knowledge and can implement it fairly should be in charge of the government. Therefore, Fakih's guardianship or the rule of a Shariah scholar is necessary and legal. It should be said that Khomeini's argument has its own logic. This has a reasonable explanation at the level of legality, and it is a very reasonable explanation for Muslims or the vast majority of Iranian citizens (according to statistics, 98.8% of Iranian residents believe in Islam) (Chinese embassy in Iran, 2018).

For Iran, a theocracy, religious leaders have absolute authority and have been institutionalised and systematised in the two constitution-making processes. The Fajih system has become the core of Iran's political system. Its status and role have a significant impact on the speed, scope and nature of Iran's political modernisation process to a certain extent. After the victory of the Islamic revolution in 1979, at the beginning of the drafting of the constitution, there was a great controversy in Iran over whether the bill "Islamic government is led by the authority of Sharia scholars" should be included in the constitution. However, in order to stabilise the political situation and prevent a split, Khomeini's personal charm became a symbol of national unity, and the Islamic government of Iran with the authority of the Sharia scholars as the core was established. The key lies in a series of subsidiary organs set up under the authority of the leader, which have played an extremely important role in ensuring the foundation of the Islamic revolution and the effectiveness of the

authority of the leader. The combination of this kind of authoritative leadership and many institutions in Iran's political system has formed a huge Fajih system, which controls the distribution of power among various political factions in the country and dominates the evolution process of Iran's political system (Jiang & Han, 2007).

According to the constitution, the government of the Islamic Republic implements a presidential cabinet system. The president is the country's highest leader, after the religious leader. In the implementation of the constitution, the president is responsible for co-ordinating the relationship between the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of government. At the same time, the president is responsible for the matters that religious leader is not. Although the constitution does not set any specific restrictions on the conditions for Iranian presidential candidates, in the actual process of election, presidential candidates must unconditionally be loyal to the Islamic government's Faqeeh principles and abide by leader Khomeini. Also, the presidential candidates in the Islamic Republic must be approved by the Guardian Council before the presidential election. Religious leaders have the right to participate in matters related to the nomination of presidential candidates, and also have the power to approve presidential elections, or according to the consideration of the interests of the country, and swear in the president of the Supreme Court of the Republic. Should the incumbent president be found guilty of dereliction of duty and immorality, and the parliament considers the president to be politically inactive, it makes the decision to dismiss the president. Therefore, in the Islamic Republic, the president is not the most powerful leader in the whole country.

On the contrary, Islamic religious leaders have the highest decision-making power. In Iran, religious leaders command the entire country's armed forces; appoint and remove heads of the army, public security, justice and other important departments; and comprise nearly half the members of the Guardian Council. At the same time, they also control the country's intelligence agencies, and television and

radio networks, and have the overall power to decide on the country's foreign policy and guidelines.

Judging from the provisions stipulated in the Iranian constitution, the Islamic Republic implements constitutional government and the rule of law. However, in actual political life, Iran strictly implements Islamic law in the judicial field, abrogates all secular laws such as secular civil and commercial laws and criminal laws, and quickly establishes religious courts, while training Islamic judicial personnel to implement them.

The influence of Islam on the specialisation of Iran's political functions is manifold. In general, Islam has taken the initiative in administrative, legislative and judicial fields. However, Islam's strict control over all aspects of Iran's national political life has also aroused opposition from reformers in the government and some Iranian citizens, thus bringing about new changes in Iran's politics. For example, the establishment of the National Interest Committee and the increase of secular presidential power can be said to be the objective reaction of Islam's strict control over government politics, thus to some extent prompting Iran's politics to become rational and promoting Iran's political transformation in the future.

4.2 The role of religion in Turkish political regimes

After the founding of the Republic of Turkey, radical secularisation reforms have greatly restricted the political space of religious groups. During the period of the two-party system, the Turkish government once gave a moderately loose space for religious activities, but it still did not form a political force. A few organisations with traditional religious ideology tried to form political parties, but due to their lack of support, they could not enter the grand national assembly and thus could not greatly influence society.

With Turkey's shift to neo-liberalism and the development of a multi-party system, the political Islamic movement is gradually rising, and Islamic parties have officially entered the Turkish political arena. Islam has permeated the entire history of Turkey. Modernisation has not erased Turkey's Islamic nature, and the Islamic faith is still deeply rooted in the hearts of the Turkish people. The Turkish people's moral outlook and lifestyle are full of religious flavour. Ataturk's revolution has also won the support of Islamic organisations. Although Ataturk had written Islam into the constitution as the state religion, in fact Islam was strictly controlled by the government, and the space for religious organisations was limited to the people. Muslims were deprived of their rights to a large extent and did not have the right to express political demands except for engaging in faith-related activities. By the early 1960s, the transition from a one-party system to a multi-party system had become a turning point in the development of political Islam in Turkey. With the development of a multi-party system, the political atmosphere in Turkey is obviously looser than in the past. Various political trends have begun to become active and the degree of political pluralism has gradually increased. Since Turkey's secularisation reform focuses on cities, the economic policies of the ruling authorities have not penetrated deeply into rural areas, and Islamic farmers and craftsmen have been able to maintain great influence in rural areas.

Generally speaking, thanks to the improvement of the political environment in the early stage of the development of the multi-party system, the space for Islamic activities has been expanded, and political Islam in this period is brewing. Islamists are attached to major parties and have not yet formed an independent political force. In the late 1960s, political Islam gradually emerged in Turkey, and political parties with Islamic backgrounds began to emerge. In the early 1970s, the National Order Party, a political party with strong Islamic overtones, was established. In the late 1960s, Turkey's economy suffered a serious decline. In the eyes of Islamic parties, the disorder of the domestic political situation was due to the radical secularisation

ongoing since the Kemal era, which led to the loss of Turkey's beliefs and morals, and was the root of the country's chaos. Only by re-establishing the central position of Islam in Turkish society and retrieving the lost identity of the Turkish people can the severe test currently facing Turkey be solved. Therefore, the National Order Party advocates restoring the official religious status of Islam, replacing secular laws with Islamic law, and opposing the establishment of a Western-style capitalist country. The National Order Party was established under a relatively loose political environment during the multi-party system. The opening of political space has released long-suppressed emotion, so the National Order Party represents relatively radical Islamism.

Although the court banned the one-year-old party with “the basic principle of anti-secularism” (Guo, 2015: p. 5), the political Islamic movement did not stop. Shortly after the National Order Party was banned, the Islamic political party made a comeback. Compared with its predecessor, the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party in 1972 was much more moderate in its religious stance. In 1979, the influence of Iran's Islamic revolution spread to the entire Muslim world, and the Islamic extremist forces in various countries in the Middle East were greatly encouraged. Under this circumstance, the National Salvation Party abandoned its earlier relatively moderate stance and responded to the call of Islamic extremism, openly declaring that it would launch a holy war to overthrow Turkey's secularism. As a defender of secularism, the military could not tolerate the threat of the National Salvation Party, so the military exiled the imprisoned leader of the National Salvation Party to Switzerland. The Constitutional Court banned the National Salvation Party on the grounds of violating secularism. It can be seen from this that even in the multi-party system political parties and organisations with extremely conservative Islamic positions cannot obtain legal status to enter the formal political system. Since then, various Islamic political parties have gradually gained a position in the Turkish regime with the continuous development of society through moderate

Islamic propositions and overtures to secular parties. The current Turkish President, Erdogan, is from the Justice and Development Party, has an Islamic background, and was initially supported by the Gülen Movement, which is also an Islamic political force. However, Erdogan later tried to crack down on the Gülen movement and started his own Turkish path. Although the Turkish army did something, its action was defeated. It can be seen that, under the current circumstances, Turkey may develop towards Islam and deviate from the secular path the Turkish army has been insisting on.

Chapter 5

5. The question of the Islamic modernization

Islam has a tradition of reform in the name of restoring ancient ways. Modern Islamism is different from the traditional religious concept of Islam and has a strong color of religious politicization. It emphasizes that real Islam is not a personal belief and rigid theological theory far from politics, but an embodiment of revolutionary ideology and public interests. Its core content is to advocate the modern political principles of equality and democracy by returning to the religious form of the early Islamic tradition. Modern Islamism looks like restoring ancient ways. It actually emphasizes the expansion of people's political participation and shows an obvious tendency to challenge secular authoritarian politics. Its ideological connotation is far from the traditional religious ideas of Islam and undoubtedly falls into the category of modern political ideas. The rise of modern Islamism is rooted in the social development in the modernization process of the Islamic world. It reflects the struggle between democracy and autocracy under the condition of secular authoritarian politics, and marks the beginning of political culture with the aid of religion.

The political concept of modern Islamism has the dual attributes of popularity and democracy. Its ideological connotation seems to be different from that of modern secular democratic politics, but in fact there is no fundamental opposition. Its ideological purpose is to expand popular participation and realize free democracy. The so-called confrontation between religion and secularism is not a problem of modernization or a conflict between tradition and modernity in Middle East countries, but a struggle between democracy and authoritarian politics. It is wrong to regard the rise of modern Islamism as the return of tradition or opposition to modernization.

Generally, the changes in the modern Islamic world were as follows: empire declined, colonized, revolutionized, and modernized. In these four processes, the interaction of different factors does not move in a simple 'challenge-response' or 'traditional-modern' way. It has not yet been determined how Islamic countries can benefit to develop the economy and realize modernization with the established national strength. With half a century of development since the Second World War, various Islamic countries have made some achievements; however, Islam is still an important factor that affects national politics and the Muslim world outlook.

The modernization history of various Islamic countries has four characteristics in general: the great changes in the West in several centuries have been compressed into rapid changes in a short period of time; It is a continuous process of destruction and development, the change of religious tradition is carried out on the basis of religious tradition; It transited to the modern industrial society and entered the modern world through many roads; Islam is not only a theory, but also a belief system in the process of modernization. It is also reflected in politics, economy, law, education and all aspects of social life.

The common feature of modernization in Islamic countries is the distinctive Islamic features in the process. Since no fundamental changes have taken place in the social structure, most people still live in tradition. Therefore, in order to gain broad support, no matter what the government has goals and ideas, they try their best to use Islam, the traditional authority, as an important basis for the legitimacy of the rule, and often make the modernization process of the country show distinct Islamic characteristics and tendencies. In the official religious policy, the regime's use of Islam is more flexible and closer to the modernist ideas. It mainly emphasizes the principles of equality and justice contained in Islam and does not stick to rigid doctrines. The realistic need to lead and manage a modern country, that is, the need to speed up the modernization process of the country, enables the rulers to

understand and interpret Islam only with a relatively open mind. It is obviously biased to deny the secularization of Islamic countries based on the secularization mode of western Christian countries, especially the current form after secularization of the relationship between politics and religion. The complete separation of church and state certainly aims at the withdrawal of religion from the public political sphere, but even in secular countries this is not always possible. In addition, in the modernization process of all Islamic countries, almost all of them pay attention to showing their Islamic identity in the field of international relations, strengthening ties with other Islamic countries, even actively participating in pan-Islamic activities, establishing Islamic international organizations, etc. One of their aims is to win foreign aid to promote the modernization process of their countries.

Regarding religion and modernization, many people believe that the two are opposite to each other. In reality, especially in Islamic countries, the problems of religious tradition and modernization are very complicated. Although Islamic countries have undergone changes of the times and social changes, Turkey has become a secular country, and other countries have also implemented some secular policies. On the whole, however, to date, the wave of modernization has not shaken Islam's appeal to Muslims. Islam still plays its role as an ideology and a norm of Muslim life. As far as the external relationship between Islamic revival and modernization is concerned, it is opposite. First, the current modernization movement sweeping the world can be seen as a phenomenon that originated in the late period of the scientific and technological revolution. This modernization can be called Westernization (Marion, 1966). Moreover, although modernization and Westernization cannot be equated, in a sense, modernization means the modern Western culture of Christianity. However, Islam is obviously the relationship between two different cultures. Furthermore, since modernization and religious culture each have the characteristics of the times and nationalities, there is a deep conflict between Islam and Christianity in the opposing relationship between Islam

and modernization. Second, modernization is an external alien force for nations and countries with different religious and cultural traditions. Therefore, only when one's own cultural tradition collides with this alien force can one stimulate the source vitality of one's own mother culture and find the medium to transform traditional culture into modern culture, and can modernization become one culture's own internal requirements and realize modernization.

In fact, the internal relationship between religious tradition and requirement of modernization is unified. Historically, it is an inherent tradition of Islam to constantly adjust the contradiction between belief and secularism. Islam has few choices in how to respond to the challenges of modernization. The best choice seems to be to make the necessary self-adjustment to adapt to the process of modernization. It is necessary to explain Islam and its teaching methods to adapt to modernization, to carry out appropriate reforms in the teaching methods, and to adjust Islam in a timely manner so that it has certain adaptability and transcendence, thus maintaining strong vitality.

Although for Islamic countries modernization means accepting Western technologies and ideas, how to turn them into internal changes with Islamic characteristics instead of simply rejecting exclusion is a problem Islamic countries are facing in the process of modernization. Different modernization programmes have emerged in Islamic countries, namely Turkey's complete secularization and Iran's modernization with Islam as its core. Although the mainstream believes that Turkey's model is the standard model for the modernization of Islamic countries, Turkey seems unable to remain on the path of complete secularization because of the trend of the revival of religious forces in recent years. Compared to Turkey, although Iran's modernization is slow and tortuous and is often hindered by conservative forces in the country, as an inevitable trend that cannot be stopped, if the Iranian regime can find a symbiotic method between the Islamic core and

modernization and transform modernization into a spontaneous development trend under Islam, then the Iranian regime's model will be more likely to realize the modernization of the Islamic version and provide a paradigm for other Islamic countries.

In addition to the Iranian and Turkish pattern that can be observed as a model, Egypt, another country in the Middle East region, is used here as a comparison with these two countries. Egypt's model can be summarized as an integration model provided by the nationalists headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein, that is, to take advantage of Islam's secular modernization path. Similar to Turkey, during Egypt's struggle for independence after World War II, the Egyptian army, as a modern organization, assumed the responsibility of national independence. With the efforts of Nasser's Free Officers Movement, Arab Republic of Egypt was established in 1952. Since it overthrew Egyptian Muhammad Ali dynasty and later recovered its territory, the Egyptian army has gained a high reputation in politics.

To some extent, Nasser and the army did not take the western-style constitutional system as an option for the future construction of the republic system after the July revolution. Nasser and the military had a negative impression of the system based on the failed constitutional attempt in Egyptian history. The attempt to establish a constitutional monarchy in Egypt in 1923 did not get very good results, so the Free Officers Movement, which had received western education and was relatively progressive in ideology and political position, was determined to overthrow the rule of the Muhammad Ali dynasty and expel the British influences. But for the political system implementation after the revolution, Free Officers Movement did not put forward a clear idea. The chaotic parliamentary and party struggles since 1923 have made Nasser and others feel that western-style democracy is chaotic and inefficient and that parliamentary and party politics are not feasible in Egypt (Wang, 2014).

Nasser's rejection of parliament and political parties indicates that the political system of new Egypt will tend to authoritarian system after the revolution.

The Revolution Command Council, established after the revolution and led by the military, has in fact become Egypt's highest authority. The Council abolished the 1923 Constitution and declared Egypt to enter a three-year transitional period. All party activities are banned. the Revolution Command Council will establish military rule in Egypt, bringing Egypt into the military regime. The Egyptian army occupied the government department, in fact, it turned the military into the civilian system. It was not until the Revolution Command Council promulgated the interim constitution in 1956 that Egypt entered the stage of political institutionalization. According to the constitution, Egypt has established a formal liberal democracy. In the 1970s, although Egypt was still under military control and began to ease its control over political parties, the regime still imposed restrictions on party politics.

Apart from Nasser's completely secularized pattern, Egypt has another political power that cannot be ignored, which is the Society of the Muslim Brothers that advocates Islamic tradition. As an organization with certain strength before the revolution, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military is coexistence of cooperation and struggle. After the establishment of the regime, Nasser took a repressive attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood and cooperated with the more moderate Muslim factions in the country to unite Muslim groups. Since then, the Muslim Brotherhood has been hit by the regime. However, the Muslim Brotherhood has won the support of the public and society, and has united the pro-democracy group against the secular authoritarian rule of the Egyptian military. After the “Arab Spring”, the Muslim Brotherhood was given a chance to take power, replacing the rule of the Egyptian military. However, the Muslim Brotherhood regime was replaced again in the subsequent military coup and declared terrorism.

Using the definition of autonomous and dependent to define the Egyptian military does not fit the two modes. Although similar to Turkey, the Egyptian regime is basically an authoritarian government composed of military personnel, and the military is not independent of politics. The Muslim Brotherhood, as a political Islam, turned to gentleness in the long-term struggle and put forward democratic ideas, winning the support of the public. In short, both sides began to adapt to each other's existence in the political exchanges between political Islam headed by the Muslim Brotherhood and secular authoritarianism in Egypt. Political Islam has embarked on a path of winning the right to speak through parliament, while secular authoritarianism has been able to tolerate moderate forces of political Islam to a large extent. This shows that radical actions and principles are not the best option for the development of political Islam in Egypt, and Islamic centrism may become a successful path for political Islam in the process of social transformation.

Both patterns in Iran and Turkey, also in Egypt, are still at the development stage, and therefore it is difficult to say which one can become a model for the modernization of the Islamic world. However, considering the influence and status of Islam in these countries, it will be extremely difficult to completely eliminate Islam instead of compromising to adapt to the trend of modernization. In other side, the Islam power have to learn how to coexist with the Secularization and modernization trend. To sum up, the modernization of Islamic countries is an inevitable requirement for the survival of the regime. How to solve the contradiction between Islam and modernization with Western colour is a problem that the Islamic regime must solve.

Conclusion

Through the role and political practice of the Iranian and Turkish armies and religions in their regimes, it has been proved that religion and the military play prominent but different roles in the political construction of Iran and Turkey. Islamic politics has become the core of the Iranian regime through the Islamic Revolution launched by Khomeini, enabling Iran to embark on the path of Islamic modernization. Although the mainstream believes that Iran's path is retrogressive, it is undeniable that Iran has opened up its own unique path in its political practice since 1979 and is gradually becoming a modern country in the continuous struggle between conservatives and reformers in the country. Different from Iran, Turkey has been committed to the path of complete secularization since its founding, attempting to separate the influence of Islam from Turkish politics. With the continuous development of Islamic political parties in Turkey, the influence of Islam has gradually appeared in Turkish politics. However, under the regulation of the Turkish army, which is a staunch supporter of Turkey's secularization, Turkey's Islamic forces have been under the suppression of secular forces. Nevertheless, with Erdogan's coming to power and the failure of the latest military coup, Turkey's path to modernization is likely to be tinged with Islam.

The regular army of the Iranian army, as a form of army attached to the regime, did not acquire a detached position independent of the regime after the Islamic Revolution. Although the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, also attached to the regime as the guardian of the current regime, has more autonomy, it is limited to Iran's political system. Under the mediation of Iran's supreme leader, it does not have the ability to conduct political affairs. Moreover, unlike the Turkish army, the Iranian army plays a conservative role. In addition, the dual system of mutual containment with the regular army makes the Iranian army subordinate to the regime at present. The Turkish army has been the backbone of Turkey's modernization and

secularization since before the establishment of the government. Since the establishment of the government, it has also maintained the secularization path of the Turkish government for several times. Its transcendent position determines that the Turkish army has become an important political force of the Turkish government. However, with the rise of Islamic thoughts in Turkish society and the rise of the Islamic Justice and Development Party, Turkey's past secularization path may be changed.

Generally, the Iranian regime started from Islam and gradually moved towards a unique path of modernization. As a conservative, the Iranian army made Iran move slowly on the path of reform. Turkey has been committed to complete secularization since its inception. The army is its staunch supporter. Under the activities of Islamic parties, the strength of the army has been weakened. It is possible that the Turkish regime, which has always been a model of modernization in Islamic countries, will be able to embark on the Islamic path.

Among many Islamic countries, Iran and Turkey, as two relatively stable models, deserve to be seriously discussed. At present, Turkey's secularization mode is still the political model considered by the mainstream. However, since modernization is an inevitable requirement for the continued existence of Islamic regimes, and modernization itself has certain Westernization factors, how to solve the contradictions between Islam and Islam and how to give full play to Islam's strong adaptability is a topic worthy of further discussion. The complete secularization represented by Turkey and the Islamic religious rule in Iran both have their rationality and have the potential to change now. Therefore, to solve the problem of the coexistence of Islam and modernization, we can take the lead on the path of modernization. Referring to the modernization process of the Western Christian world, religion has not yet been completely withdrawn and the influence of Christianity has not diminished automatically. Perhaps the common mode of

modernization in Islamic countries is to replace various functions of religious organizations by political power, strengthen the control of religion, and gradually limit the influence of religion on the spiritual field. This issue deserves further exploration and discussion.

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