

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**

**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

Institute of International Studies

Department of Russian and East European Studies

**Master's Thesis**

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**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

Institute of International Studies

Department of Russian and East European Studies

**The analysis of the Russian environmental cooperation  
with the Arctic Council member states**

Master's thesis

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Study programme: International Area Studies

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Year of the defence: 2020

## **Declaration**

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 23.12.2019

Olga Němá

## References

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## **Abstract**

The recently intensifying climate changes enable a large-scale economic development of the Arctic region. This region is characterized by the vast hydrocarbon resources, but also by the unique fragile ecosystem. Therefore, any economic development must be aligned with environmental protection. This protection is encouraged by the leading intergovernmental institution in this area, the Arctic Council. This master thesis aims to analyse Russian environmental cooperation with the Arctic coastal states within the Arctic Council. Its structure follows a theoretical framework, introduced by the liberal intergovernmentalism. Firstly, formation of Russian national Arctic interests is analysed, using the key legal documents. Secondly, Russia's participation in the Arctic Council is studied. Thirdly, bilateral environmental cooperation between Russia and other four Arctic coastal states is analysed. Based on the performed research, the Russian Federation is aware, that reaching its very ambitious plans for economic development of the Arctic is only possible along with improvement of environmental protection. Russia cannot ensure this alone and therefore it actively seeks international cooperation. The research also pointed out, that before the establishment of the Arctic Council, the bilateral cooperation prevailed. Since 1996, this institution took over a dominant role in mediation of multilateral cooperation. The Arctic Council successfully enabled an improvement of cooperation between Arctic states, which were not partners before, such as Denmark and Russia. In specific cases bilateral cooperation persist, such as Russia – Norway cooperation in the Barents region.

## **Abstrakt**

Aktuálně probíhající klimatické změny umožňují široké ekonomické využití arktického regionu. Tento region je charakterizován rozsáhlými zásobami ropy a zemního plynu, ale také unikátním a zranitelným ekosystémem. Jakékoliv ekonomické využití regionu proto musí být v souladu s ochranou životního prostředí. Tuto ochranu také prosazuje hlavní mezinárodní organizace v regionu, Arktická rada. Cílem této diplomové práce je analyzovat ruskou spolupráci s ostatními členy Arktické rady s přístupem k moři v oblasti ekologie. Struktura práce se řídí teoretickým rámcem vycházejícím z teorie liberálního intergovernmentalismu. Nejdříve je za pomoci klíčových právních dokumentů analyzováno formování ruských národních zájmů v Arktidě. Za druhé je zkoumána účast Ruska na práci

Arktické rady. Za třetí je analyzována dvoustranná spolupráce mezi Ruskem a zbylými čtyřmi arktickými státy s přístupem k moři. Z provedené analýzy vyplývá, že Rusko si je vědomo, že dosažení svých velmi ambiciózních ekonomických cílů je možné pouze společně se zlepšením ochrany životního prostředí. Rusko toto není schopno zajistit samo, a proto aktivně vyhledává mezinárodní spolupráci. Výzkum dále poukázal na to, že bilaterální způsob spolupráce převládal v období před vytvoření Arktické rady. Od roku 1996 tato organizace převzala dominantní postavení ve zprostředkování multilaterální spolupráce. Arktická rada úspěšně zajistila zlepšení spolupráce mezi arktickými státy, které dříve nebyly partnery, například Dánsko a Rusko. Ve specifických případech byla dvoustranná spolupráce zachována, například rusko-norská spolupráce v Barentsově moři.

## **Keywords**

Environmental protection, Arctic Council, the Arctic, Russia, liberal intergovernmentalism

## **Klíčová slova**

Ochrana životního prostředí, Arktická rada, Arktida, Rusko, liberální intergovernmentalismus

## **Název práce**

Analýza ruské spolupráce s členskými státy Arktické rady v oblasti ekologie

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## ZÁVĚREČNÉ TEZE MAGISTERSKÉ PRÁCE NMTS

Závěrečné teze student odevzdává ke konci Diplomního semináře III jako součást magisterské práce a tyto teze jsou spolu s odevzdáním magisterské práce do SIS předpokladem udělení zápočtu za tento seminář.

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**Charakteristika tématu práce (max 10 řádek):**

Tématem práce je za pomoci aplikace konceptu liberálního intergovernmentalismu porozumět přístupu Ruské federace k ekologické spolupráci v Arktidě. Cílem je také zjistit, zda v této oblasti převažuje bilaterální, nebo multilaterální vztahy. Za tímto účelem je provedena analýza ruské spolupráce v oblasti ekologie s ostatními členy Arktické rady s přístupem k moři.

Práce se zprvu zaměřuje na zkoumání národních zájmů Ruska v Arktidě prostřednictvím analýzy základních právních dokumentů a prohlášení klíčových vnitrostátních aktérů. Následuje zkoumání ruské spolupráce v rámci Arktické rady, hlavní regionální instituce, která je uznávána všemi státy v Arktidě. V poslední části autor zkoumá konkrétní spolupráci Ruska s jednotlivými arktickými aktéry.

**Vývoj tématu od zadání projektu do odevzdání práce (max. 10 řádek):**

Původně se práce zaměřovala na energetický aspekt spolupráce v Arktickém regionu. Kvůli velkým zásobám ropy a plynu na kontinentálním šelfu Ruské federace, investovalo mnoho regionálních aktérů do energetických projektů v Rusku. Na první pohled se tak zdálo, že bude existovat dostatek relevantních zdrojů k výzkumu tohoto tématu. Po roce 2014 národní vlády donutily státní i soukromé společnosti zrušit své energetické dohody s Ruskem. Spolupráce v této oblasti tak zůstala ve velké části pouze teoretickou a nebyla nikdy realizována.

Jako téma práce proto byla zvolena ekologická spolupráce, na kterou přímo necílily sankce z roku 2014. Potřebnou analýzu je tak možné provést na delším časovém intervalu. Současně došlo ke změně výzkumných otázek. Autor také zúžil a jasně vymezil práci pouze na ruskou spolupráci s členy Arktické rady s přístupem k moři.

**Struktura práce (hlavní kapitoly obsahu):**

1. Úvod
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3. Rusko v Arktidě
4. Arktický institucionalismus
5. Mezistátní spolupráce. Rusko a arktický státy
6. Závěr

**Hlavní výsledky práce (max. 10 řádek):**

Z provedené analýzy vyplývá, že Ruská federace má velmi ambiciózní plány na ekonomické využití Arktidy. Nicméně tato země si je vědoma, že ekonomický rozvoj je možný výhradně společně s rozvojem ochrany životního prostředí. V posledních několika letech Rusko aktivně vyhledává spolupráci v této oblasti. Ta se zaměřuje na několik hlavních oblastí: odstraňování ekologických škod po Sovětském svazu, prevence úniku ropy do moře, udržitelný rybolov, práci s domorodým obyvatelstvem a na službu pátrání a záchrany. Po dlouhou dobu vystupovalo Rusko v rámci mezinárodní spolupráce jako příjemce ekologické pomoci. V posledních několika letech je však rovnocenným partnerem, a to i v oblasti financování.

Bilaterální ekologická spolupráce Ruska byla velmi rozšířena před vznikem Arktické rady. Ta následně převzala hlavní iniciativu v zajištění multilaterální kooperace mezi státy v regionu. Význam dvoustranných dohod se zachoval pouze v několika specifických oblastech, jako je například spolupráce Ruska a Norska v Barentsově moři.

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\* BAS – Balkánská a středoevropská studia; ES – Evropská studia; NRS – Německá a rakouská studia; RES – Ruská a eurasijská studia; SAS – Severoamerická studia; ZES – Západoevropská studia.

\*\* Pokud je to relevantní, tj. vyžaduje to charakter výzkumu (nebo jeho zadavatel), data, s nimiž pracujete, nebo osobní bezpečnost vaše či dalších účastníků výzkumu, vysvětlete, jak zajistíte dodržení, resp. splnění těchto etických aspektů výzkumu: 1) informovaný souhlas s účastí na výzkumu, 2) dobrovolná účast na výzkumu, 3) důvěrnost a anonymita zdrojů, 4) bezpečný výzkum (nikomu nevznikne újma).

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## Abbreviations

ACAP	The Arctic Contaminants Action Program
AMAP	The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program
AZRF	Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation
CAFF	The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EPPR	Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group
LI	Liberal Intergovernmentalism
LNG	Liquefied natural gas
NSR	Northern Sea Route
NWP	Northwest Passage
PAME	The Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Group
RF	Russian Federation
SAR	Search and rescue
SDWG	The Sustainable Development Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US	United States
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

## 1. Introduction

The Arctic is the northernmost region on the Earth covering approximately 30 million square kilometres north of the Arctic Circle. Most of the area is covered by the northern seas and the Arctic Ocean. For many years it was well-known that the territory is extremely rich on natural resources, especially oil and gas. On top of that, there are plentiful fish in the seas. Nevertheless, economic development of the region was limited by the extreme conditions. The Arctic Ocean is covered by thick ice for most of the year, ground is coated with permafrost. Any activity therefore requires specialized high-end equipment and facilities.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century the Arctic region and its role in the global politics changed. What explains such phenomenon? The first and the foremost reason are the recently intensifying effects of the global climate changes, most notably the ice melting. The difference between permanent ice in the region measured in September in years 2005 and 2007 is remarkable, the area has shrunk from 6 million km<sup>2</sup> to only 4.16 million km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>1</sup> The ice melt enables large-scale exploitation of rich natural resources deposits, which stayed hidden under the ice of the Arctic Ocean for years. In time of high energy demand, the Arctic riches attract attention not only of the Arctic states, but also non-Arctic actors.

Currently, the economic development of the Arctic is appealing to many countries. Many of them plan an intensive exploitation of the vast Arctic hydrocarbon resources as well as development of new transportation routes and establishment of new infrastructure. However, the Arctic is unique not only by its resource wealth but also by its endemic and extremely fragile ecosystem. Any economic activities in the region therefore need to take the environmental protection into consideration.

Arctic countries recognize the critical importance of preservation of the natural habitat. Therefore, first initiative for the Arctic environmental protection was implemented already in 1991, when *The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy* was adopted.<sup>2</sup> The further interstate cooperation for the Arctic environmental protection was embodied in 1996 with an establishment of a high-level intergovernmental forum – the Arctic Council. Currently, the Arctic Council is the only institutional body, which bundles all the Arctic nations and encourage them to maintain

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<sup>1</sup> Beitler, Jane. 2012. “Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles At Record Seasonal Minimum”. Online. *National Snow And Ice Data Center*. [Accessed: April 2, 2019] <http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonal-minimum/>.

<sup>2</sup> *Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy*. 1991. Online. Rovaniemi, Finland. [Accessed: March 4, 2019] [http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic\\_environment.pdf](http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf).

cooperation on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic region. The focus of the Arctic Council work resides in the ecological problems and environmental protection of the Arctic.

Possible environmental disasters do not respect state borders. If the development of the Arctic is conducted without reference to the environment, the ecological catastrophe may happen and negatively influence all the Arctic countries. In 2000s all the Arctic nations created legal base for the Arctic and adopted national strategies, which underline main priorities and goals in the region. Each state emphasizes the importance of preserving the Arctic ecosystem and minimizing negative effects of the economic activities.

Russian Federation is one of the key Arctic actors. It has the largest Arctic sector and very ambitious plans for its development. The presence of rich hydrocarbon deposits in the Russian Arctic zone and possibility of their future utilization is crucial for Russian energy-dependent economy. However, any development of the region must be associated with respective environmental actions. This was not the case for Russia for many years, but it is not possible anymore in the current closely interconnected world. This represents a great challenge for Russia.

The environmental protection is currently one of the key Russia's priorities in the Arctic and therefore has a significant impact on its regional actions. This priority is explicitly defined in its national legislation, for example in the *Foundation of the Russian Federation's state policy to 2020 and beyond (2008 Foundations)* mentions the "preservation of unique ecological systems of the Arctic" as a one of four national regional goals.<sup>3</sup> Importance of this target is obvious from Russian pursuit of cooperation with other Arctic countries.

Most of the academic works studying Russia in the Arctic focus in recent years primarily on the Russian role as a militaristic power. Some authors analyse its economic plans and evaluate possibilities of reaching them through cooperation or confrontation among the Arctic states in the region using realistic or liberalist theories. Small attention is, however, paid to the expanding environmental cooperation in the Far North. These activities are extremely important, because there is just one world environment which influence us all. For this reason, this topic should be thoroughly analysed. The aim of this thesis is to provide understanding of the Russian approach to

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<sup>3</sup> Medvedev, Dmitry. "Osnovy Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii V Arktike Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dal'neyshuyu Perspektivu" [Foundations Of The State Policy Of The Russian Federation In The Arctic For The Period Until 2020 And Beyond]". Online. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. (4877) [Accessed: December 2, 2018] <https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html>.

the environmental cooperation in the Arctic region with the coastal Arctic Council members. This detailed analysis can serve as a beneficial contribution for academic discussion.

In this thesis the following research questions will be answered. Firstly, what is the Russia's role in the Arctic environmental cooperation? Secondly, does multilateral cooperation prevail over the bilateral one?

Disciplined interpretative single case study was chosen as a method of research. This method is characterized by its special position between a descriptive case study and an instrumental case study. Similarly, to a descriptive study, it focuses on a thorough investigation of a case emphasizing its uniqueness. On top of that, the work is guided by a theory which was not used for this particular case before. However, in contrary to an instrumental study, a case is not used to evaluate the theory, but the theory is used to guide a scholar to analyse the case. In short, the theory helps the researcher to better understand the processes and variables and as a result to better understand the subject of study.<sup>4</sup>

The main idea of this approach is that a detailed knowledge of an important phenomena is as important as testing any hypothesis between them. From epistemological perspective this can be perceived as interpretative assumption. This method is further associated with an ontological position of superiority of a uniqueness of case over any possible theoretical abstraction.<sup>5</sup>

The Arctic can be studied from different perspectives, as it was already mentioned earlier. Many authors analyse the regional military build-up, scramble for the energy resources, territorial claims and economic development. All these topics can be analysed from both cooperative or confronting points of view. This is not the case for the environment. All the Arctic actors share one joint Arctic environment which can be irreversibly damaged if any of them do an inappropriate action. Therefore, the only possible interaction between the states regarding the environment is cooperation. The significance of this topic is obvious from the fact, that the only well-function supranational organisation connecting all the regional actors – the Arctic Council is dedicated exclusively to this topic.

Full understanding of the phenomenon of the Russian environmental cooperation will be provided using the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. This theoretical framework explains

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<sup>4</sup> Drulák Petr. *Jak Zkoumat Politiku: kvalitativní metodologie v politologii a mezinárodních vztazích*. Praha: Portál, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Odell, John S. 2001. "Case Study Methods in International Political Economy." *International Studies Perspectives* 2, no. 2: p. 163. [Accessed: August 28, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1111/1528-3577.00047>.

the reasons for cooperation between states with diverging and conflicting interests within one organization. Based on the theory the basic framework of study was identified: Russian national interests in the Arctic, its position within the Arctic Council and a bilateral cooperation with other Arctic countries.

Territorial scope of this work is focused primarily on the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (AZFR) as defined in the *2013 Foundations*.<sup>6</sup> Russian actions in the Far North cannot be fully understood without a regional context. For this reason, the scope is partially widened to cover the Russian Federation and the Arctic region – geographical territory, which is located to the north of 66°33' north latitude.

The case of this thesis is analysed in a time period from 1990s. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many bilateral environmental agreements with the Arctic states were signed. As well the beginning of the multilateral cooperation started at that time, such as the establishment of the Arctic Council. The 2000s are important for this thesis, due to the fact, that all the Arctic states adopted their Arctic strategies in that time. The time scope is limited to beginning of 2019. Subject of this study is topical and therefore it was intended to use as contemporary data as possible.

The structure of this work is following: First chapter of the thesis is this introduction followed by a section reviewing literature used in the research. Following chapter is dedicated to the chosen theoretical framework – liberal intergovernmentalism. In the next chapter the Russia's Arctic position is studied. Firstly, the author provides an overview of the Russian Arctic legal framework, and the state's national interests are analysed as a source of national preferences. Following chapter studies the Arctic Council as a leading environmental multilateral institutional body in the region. Main relevant legally binding documents are analysed in detail. At the end of the chapter, the Russian participation in the work of the Arctic Council is studied. Detail analysis of the Russian bilateral environmental cooperation with each coastal member of the Arctic Council is provided in the next chapter. Finally, in the conclusion the findings of the research are summarised and answers to the research questions are presented.

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<sup>6</sup> Medvedev, Dmitry. "Osnovy Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii V Arktike Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dal'neyshuyu Perspektivu" [Foundations Of The State Policy Of The Russian Federation In The Arctic For The Period Until 2020 And Beyond]". Online. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. (4877) [Accessed: December 2, 2018] <https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html>.

## 1.2. Literature review

Much research has been dedicated to the Arctic actors for the last three decades. However, most of the studies focused on the scramble for the Arctic riches and militarization of the region. Research dedicated to environmental cooperation in the region was limited. The only exception are the monographies and articles about the Arctic Council, the leading Arctic environmental supranational institution.

For the analysis performed in this thesis both primary and secondary literature was used. Primary sources were represented by national legislation of the relevant countries, bilateral and multilateral agreements between them, speeches of the key national actors. Main sources of the secondary literature were monographies, academic articles and online newspaper articles. The author used the main European, Russian and the US-based mainstream media, such as The Guardian, Reuters, TASS, RIA Novosti, Rbc.ru, Kommersant, The New York Times. In order to fully understand the topic and avoid any bias or manipulation, both state and private media were chosen.

For providing a general understanding and introduction to the topic secondary literature was mainly used. Several articles, written by Scott G. Borgerson, for example *Arctic Meltdown: The Economic And Security Implications Of Global Warming* were substantial for this work for understanding the impact of the global climate changes on the Arctic region and what opportunities and threats they bring. The role of the Arctic is well described in *The Future History Of The Arctic*, written by Charles Emmerson. It characterizes the Arctic as a main focus of interest in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and a potential arena for competition due to struggle for energy resources, new trade routes and national security issues. This book is essential for understanding that cooperation, rather than confrontation will bring benefits to all the Arctic states.

*The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy* by Elana Wilson Rowe was a core source for this thesis. The book describes Russia's relations with other states within the international organizations, one chapter is entirely dedicated to the Arctic Council and the cooperation in the Arctic. The main contribution of this book is an explanation of the Russia's position within the Arctic Council and a detailed analysis of state's activities since the establishment of this organization. This book was written in 2012 and therefore it does not cover the most recent events. Current information regarding Russian cooperation within the Arctic Council can be found in *Russia's Arctic Policy In The Twenty-First Century: National And International Dimensions*, written in 2019 by Maria Lagutina. It is a comprehensive analysis of

Russia's Arctic policy in two dimensions: national and international. The book provides an overview on Russia's cooperation with the Arctic nations and its position within the Arctic Council.

For the analysis of the actual Russian political posture, state doctrines, legal documents and laws were used. For example, the first substantial document, *Foundations Of The State Policy Of The Russian Federation In The Arctic For The Period Until 2020 And Beyond*, characterizes Russian national interests in the Arctic region and for the first time in Russian history provides a definition of the AZRF. *The Strategy For The Development Of The Arctic Zone Of The Russian Federation And Ensuring National Security For The Period Up To 2020*, defines key priorities of the Russian Arctic development, specify the possible risks and threats and outlines the main mechanisms for the strategy implementation.

Russian national interests were also analysed using the speeches of the Russia's political elite, for example speeches during the International Arctic Forum "Arctic: territory of dialog", speeches of CEOs of the two state-owned energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft and the political statements of the Russian Ministers.

Articles of St. Petersburg University Professors Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev represents secondary literature dedicated to Russia's political actions in the Arctic and to the relations with the Arctic actors. Their book *Russia in the Arctic: Hard And Soft Power?* provides an information about the potential conflicting situations and the opportunities for the cooperation. The book gives a comprehensive overview on the Russia's Arctic national interests and state's relations with the major Arctic players.

To evaluate national interests of other Arctic countries in the region, author mainly used the vast range of their national legal documents and national strategies. Three comprehensive volumes *Arkticheskij Region: Problemy Mezhdunarodnogo Sotrudnichestva (Arctic region: Problems of International Cooperation)* under the editorship of Igor Ivanov provide a detailed overview of the Arctic international agreements, both bilateral and multilateral as well as strategies of the Arctic nations. Those monographies were used for better understanding of the state's national interests in the region, about existing cooperation among Arctic nation and the potential spheres of cooperation.

To analyse the environmental aspect of the cooperation and the activities of the Arctic Council author used monographies and academic articles. The book *Leadership for the North:*

*The Influence and Impact of Arctic Council Chairs* by Douglas C. Nord presents results of a fundamental research of Arctic Council activities in recent years, its legal documents and state's Chairmanships since 2011 until 2019. The main contribution of this book is an overview of the Arctic Council's work in last years and the participation of its permanent members in the Council's work.

Comprehensive work *Implementing International Environmental Agreements in Russia* by Geir Hønneland and Anne-Kristin Jørgensen is used for explaining the Russian bilateral environmental cooperation with the other Arctic states. This book generally describes Russian environmental agreements, there are examples of particular agreements related to the Arctic, such as regarding the nuclear safety, air pollution and fishery regulations.

For a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical concept - liberal intergovernmentalism, which will follow in the next chapter of this thesis, articles and monography written by the originator of this theory, Andrew Moravcsik, were used. The most important source is the monography *The choice for Europe* published in 1998, which most accurately presents the key ideas of the Moravcsik's concept. This theory introduces a detailed framework for analysis of a regional cooperation within a certain international organization. Although the theory was initially developed to study the European Union, it can be used for other cases. In this thesis the theory was applied on Russian cooperation with the five coastal states within the Arctic Council organisation.

## 2. Theoretical framework

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the Russia's environmental interstate cooperation with the Arctic actors within the Arctic Council. Relations between the Arctic states regarding their regional interests are by the most of researchers analysed using the theory of realism and liberalism. Protection of the environment in any region is possible only if all the relevant actors are engaged. For this reason, the only possible interaction between the Arctic states in this sphere can be a cooperation.

The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, which was developed to analyse complex cooperation within the EU, was chosen for this thesis. This basic theory of international relations is well recognised for providing a good explanation of cooperation between states with diverging and conflicting interests within one international organisation. In this thesis, the environmental cooperation will be studied within one international organisation, the Arctic Circle. In short, this theory perfectly fits for the needs of the studied case.

Intergovernmentalism is one of the main theories of international relations, it explains the regional integration processes on an example of the European Union. Main actor in this theory is a state represented by its national government. Stanley Hoffman, author of the intergovernmentalist theory, assumes that a regional integration is not created in form of an alliance for ensuring regional or national security, but as an instrument of member states to pursue their national interests.<sup>7</sup> Important to mention, that intergovernmentalist theory acknowledges the importance of the institutions and the influence of the state's internal politics on governmental behaviour in the political arena. This characteristic distinguishes it from realistic and neorealistic theories of international relations.<sup>8</sup>

Andrew Moravcsik did not consider intergovernmentalist approach sufficient to fully explain the complexity of European Union integration. He believed that more than one approach or theory is required for full analysis of such a complicated organisation. Therefore, at the beginning of 1990s, Andrew Moravcsik developed a theory called the liberal intergovernmentalism (LI). Main ideas of the LI were presented in the article *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach*, which was

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<sup>7</sup> Hoffmann, Stanley. "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe." *Daedalus* 95, no. 3 (1966): p. 883.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, p. 883.

published in 1993,<sup>9</sup> and later in the book *The Choice of Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, written by Moravcsik in 1998.<sup>10</sup>

The new theory was a logical follow-up of the older intergovernmentalism. It used some of its assumptions but provided another new one. In contrast to its predecessor, LI is applying ideas from theories of international political economy: commercial interest is the main reason of the regional integration. Further improvement can be observed in application of liberal theory of international interdependence, which was used to explain national preference formation.<sup>11</sup>

Although LI was developed based on observation of the European integration, the analytical framework is applicable for negotiations not only within the EU, but can be generalized to any international negotiation within one international organisation.<sup>12</sup> As an example of such generalization can serve the work, published by Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo John Rahenville, in which LI theory is used to analyse regional cooperation in East Asia.<sup>13</sup> In this thesis LI will provide a required framework of the work identifying the main areas, which need to be analysed in detail, to assess Russia's environmental interstate cooperation with the Arctic Council states.

LI theory is built on three basic elements: rational state behaviour assumption, a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation. These three factors will be explained in detail.

### *Rational state behaviour assumption*

The first core factor is an assumption that the state acts rationally. State represented by individuals or institutions analytically evaluates costs and benefits of every possible alternative of

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<sup>9</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4: p. 480. [Accessed: January 27, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x>.

<sup>10</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Cornell University Press, 1998.

<sup>11</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4: p. 480. [Accessed: January 27, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x>.

<sup>12</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. 9, Cornell University Press, 1998.

<sup>13</sup> Ravenhill, John. 2002. "A Three Bloc World? The New East Asian Regionalism." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 2, 167–95. [Accessed: August 29, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/2.2.167>.

its decision.<sup>14</sup> Specific action is chosen only if it maximizes state's merits to achieve a predefined goal. Individual decisions are together forming a coherent pathway towards a long-term target.

As can be understood from this description, no decision is made without logical analysis of its consequences. In LI the rationalism serves as a general framework of analysis, it integrates two international relations theories, which are often considered to be contradictory.<sup>15</sup>

### *Liberal theory of national preference formation*

Liberalists believe that foreign policies of national governments mirrors interests of domestic social groups. Clash of various wants and needs in society may influence electoral interests resulting in formation of state's political representation as well as a final national preference of a given country. Government should intend to preserve its power and position and for that reason it adopts opinion of domestic voter and another interest groups, as a measure to secure their support.<sup>16</sup> In short, different interests are aggregated in state institutions.

Four types of domestic players can be identified: common citizens, interest groups (such as business groups), political parties and chief executives.<sup>17</sup> Influence of various groups can differ based on a topic. In general, groups which may lose and gain by a concrete decision the most are also the ones who tend to be the most influential.

Furthermore, political scientist Ronald Rogowski emphasizes significance of domestic policymaking structure as a key environment which defines how the national preferences can be transformed into an official state policy.<sup>18</sup> Even with the same internal interests, different outcome can be expected depending on electoral system or form of government. The dominant aspects identified in this mechanism are the autonomy of government policies, size and integrity of the ruling group.

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<sup>14</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew, and Frank Schimmelfennig. "Liberal Intergovernmentalism." In *European Integration Theory*, 66. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

<sup>15</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4: p. 481. [Accessed: January 27, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x>.

<sup>16</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. 518, Cornell University Press, 1998.

<sup>17</sup> Min-Hyung, Kim. 2014. "Theorizing National Preference Formation." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 1: p. 292. [Accessed: September 1, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2014.936362>.

<sup>18</sup> Rogowski, Ronald. "Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice." In *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, 115–126. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999.

As it was described above, a formation of national preferences is a complex and instable process. The outcome of this process is therefore strongly variable. This instability is significant not only among different states, but also within one state over time.

To understand Russian national preferences in the Arctic, one chapter of this thesis will be dedicated to an analysis of the key domestic actors' interest. Main attention will be focused on the groups which are expected to be the most influential ones: president of the Russian Federation, governmental institutions and biggest national companies.

### *Intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation*

Different countries are entering an interstate negotiation with unlike expectations. This may lead to clash of individual and collective interests. To analyse this process a bargaining theory is used. It identifies two main related analytical problems.

Firstly, the efficiency of the negotiation. On the hand, negotiation creates added value by mediating the process of reaching a mutual beneficial agreement. The process of bargaining itself, on the other hand, represents costs which may hinder the cooperation. So called transaction costs such as identifying issues, negotiating and codifying agreements can be a problem. Parties will be willing to negotiate only if possible, benefits are higher than expected costs, thus only if the process is efficient. Some of these issues can be mitigated by involvement of an international institution.

The second analytical problem is a distribution of the common benefits and cost after an agreement is reached. Moravcsik in his work focuses mostly on this problem introducing assumption that strategic interaction is efficient.<sup>19</sup>

Outcome of the international negotiation accordingly to the bargaining theory reflects relative bargaining power of involved parties. There are three factors defining this power: quality of unilateral alternative solutions; possibilities to form alternative coalitions; and possible linkages such as package deals.

While social factors form the national preferences, it is the intensity of these preferences which determines the necessity to find an agreement and form a cooperation. The elementary requirement for successfully negotiated agreement is the perception of every party that the benefits of a common agreement are higher than theirs best individual alternative. If this condition is not

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<sup>19</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4: p. 499. [Accessed: January 27, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x>.

fulfilled, then there is a risk of non-agreement. Governments with higher potential gains resulting from the cooperation, in comparison to their unilateral possibilities, are more striving to achieve a common compromise.<sup>20</sup> Their unwillingness to fail the cooperation weakens their bargaining power.

Possibility to form an alternative coalition is a significant factor to increase the negotiation power. States without this opportunity are afraid of political isolation and therefore tend to accept even disadvantageous conditions in order to stay part of the cooperation. Issue linkage always creates winners and losers at the particular issues covered. Therefore, it can be effectively used on topics with different importance among states. In such case every government gain in field of high preference for them and lose in area which is not so important. This type of cooperation, as it is associated with some losses, can be negatively perceived within domestic opposition.<sup>21</sup>

Applying this intergovernmentalist assumption on the analysed case, the Russian environmental cooperation will be studied in detail with every costal Arctic Circle member. Particularly, it will focus on the negotiation powers of the involved states such as possibility to create alternative coalition or quality of unilateral alternative solutions.

Liberal intergovernmentalist combines the aforementioned three factors to create a single framework for analysis. It describes international cooperation as a process, which consists of two consecutive steps. Firstly, rational governments define state preferences and then bargain with each other in order to achieve them. Foreign policy of a state is pictured as a result of interaction of demand and supply functions.<sup>22</sup> Societal factors stemming from domestic interest groups represented in political institutions form a metaphorical demand curve, while the international interaction represents the political response and a supply curve. Only when both the aspects are present a full outcome – international cooperation can be expected. Nevertheless, accordingly to Moravcsik complete analysis of international negotiation leading to a close and efficient cooperation can be divided into three steps.<sup>23</sup> Formation of national preferences is followed by interstate bargaining and results in joining of a supranational institution.

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<sup>20</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4: p. 500. [Accessed: January 27, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x>.

<sup>21</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. 904, Cornell University Press, 1998.

<sup>22</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4: p. 481. [Accessed: January 27, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x>.

<sup>23</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew, and Frank Schimmelfennig. "Liberal Intergovernmentalism." In *European Integration Theory*, 66. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

### *Supranational institutions*

When major international agreements are arranged, supranational institutions are established to secure outcomes from future uncertainties. Institutions represent a single authority responsible for monitoring of compliance, they also provide a forum for negotiation, common rules and standards. All these transparent tools reduce the state's uncertainties and so help to increase efficiency of future international negotiations on a related issue.

Theory explains that whenever the transactional costs of negotiation are high, states are more likely to join an international institution to ease the cooperation by reducing uncertainties and by provision of information.<sup>24</sup> States that are afraid that others will not fulfil the agreement are also more willing to join such institution.

The efficiency of cooperation can be further increased by delegating of power to supranational institutions.<sup>25</sup> State's willingness to delegate its power is issue specific. It can be motivated by effort to make a more creditable commitment. On the other hand, concerns about the state's future ability to comply with the decision can arise as a blocking point in the process.


International organisation that will be studied in this thesis is the Arctic Council. This institution was established to facilitate environmental cooperation in the Arctic region. Based on the LI concept, a dedicated chapter will focus on analysing Russian and other member states' perception of this organisation and their willingness to engage multilateral cooperation under its patronage.

Complete analysis of international negotiation as a step process resulting in a close and efficient cooperation accordingly to Moravcsik is for higher clarity summarized in the following diagram.

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<sup>24</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4: p. 508. [Accessed: January 27, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1993.tb00477.x>.

<sup>25</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. 67, Cornell University Press, 1998.



*Figure 1: Three step framework of analysis. Created by the author based on Moravcsik.*

Analysis of the Russian environmental cooperation with the Arctic Council coastal states, that will be performed in this work, will follow the introduced liberal intergovernmental framework. Firstly, it will focus on the Russian national preference formation as a prerequisite for understanding this state's international steps. Later interstate cooperation within the supranational organisation (the Arctic Circle) will be analysed.

### 3. Russia in the Arctic

Russian Federation (RF) is a rightful Arctic state. This statement firstly originates from its geographical position. Russian Arctic itself consists of several northern seas, continental shelf and islands in the Arctic Ocean. Its Arctic coastline runs from the Bering Strait in the west to the Barents Sea in the east covering length of 22,600 kilometres. This represents 58 % of the total Arctic coastline. Russian geographical significance is obvious. Secondly, it dominates not only geographically, but also demographically. Out of 4 million people living inside the Arctic Circle, there is almost 2 million living within the Russian territory.<sup>26</sup> Thirdly, the Arctic has strong symbolic importance for Russia throughout its history. The area occupies significant position in Russian national narrative, it is a part of national pride and mentality.<sup>27</sup> The planting of the Russian flag on the bottom of the North Pole during the Arctic expedition in 2007 also has the symbolism – the claim, that the Arctic belongs to Russians. This strong connection may originate from the fact that the Arctic is an integral part of the RF. This is not the case for other Arctic states: US or Denmark are geographically separated from their Arctic regions, Norway and Canada have different administrative division for indigenous people.<sup>28</sup> Fourthly, the Arctic is economically utilized by Russia. Approximately 20 % of Russian GDP is coming from the Russian Arctic.<sup>29</sup> What is more, it also brings around 99 % of diamonds, 98 % of platinum group elements, 90 % of natural gas, 40 % of oil, 40 % of gold and 50-80 % of rare metals of Russia's total.<sup>30</sup> Arctic provides bio-resources, for example 15 % of seafood.<sup>32</sup> More than a half of total Arctic hydrocarbon resources are located within the AZRF. Being an energy dependent country, it is a crucial factor for Russia.

All the aforementioned factors represent reasons why Russia plans to develop its Arctic territory and further intensify its utilization. In particular, there are several spheres of Russian interest: the development of the Northern Sea Route, the development of hydrocarbon deposits

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<sup>26</sup> Ahlenius, Hugo. 2005 "Population Distribution In The Circumpolar Arctic, By Country (Including Indigenous Population)". Online. UN Environment Program. [Accessed: April 16, 2019] <https://www.grida.no/resources/7009>.

<sup>27</sup> Bērziņa, Ieva. "Foreign And Domestic Discourse On The Russian Arctic". Online. *Arctic Yearbook 2015*, 10. [Accessed: April 14, 2019] [https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2015/Scholarly\\_Papers/15.Foreign-Domestic.pdf](https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2015/Scholarly_Papers/15.Foreign-Domestic.pdf).

<sup>28</sup> Fraser, Whit. 2012. "Inuit View On Canada'S Arctic Sovereignty". Online. Canada's Arctic Journal: Above And Beyond. [Accessed: August 4, 2019] <http://arcticjournal.ca/uncategorized/inuit-view-on-canadas-arctic-sovereignty/>.

<sup>29</sup> Strelkov, Aleksej. "Russian Interests And The Future Of The Arctic". Online. *European Science Review 2014*: 111. [Accessed: February 20, 2019] <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/russian-interests-and-the-future-of-the-arctic>.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 111.

<sup>31</sup> Dobretsov, N.L., and N.P. Pokhilenko "Mineral Resources and Development in the Russian Arctic." *Russian Geology and Geophysics* 51 (2010): 98–111.

<sup>32</sup> Sergunin, Alexander, and Valery Konyshchev. 2014. "Russia In Search Of Its Arctic Strategy: Between Hard And Soft Power?". *The Polar Journal* 4 (1): 69-87. doi:10.1080/2154896X.2014.913930.

and the preservation of the Arctic ecosystem. Legal base for the development is set in the Russian Arctic laws.

### 3.1. Russian Arctic Laws

Legal framework of Russia's Arctic development is formed by several juridical documents. One of them is an international convention, which specifies the territorial scope of the possible development. Remaining are then the Russian national strategies focusing primarily on the subject of the planned expansion.

In comparison to the Antarctica, the Arctic does not have a single explicitly defined international status. Its status is therefore governed by international law, national legislation of the Arctic states and bilateral agreements. Currently, the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)* can be considered as the only legal document, which establishes a division of the Arctic maritime space.<sup>33</sup> The document was created in 1982 as a result of long-time negotiations and came into force in 1994. The Convention established a legal regime for major marine spaces, development of mineral resources of the seabed, scientific research, environmental protection and regulated shipping and fisheries.

Most significant contribution of *UNCLOS* is a clear definition of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It is defined as a sea area located up to 200 nautical miles from a shore. Coastal state has exclusive exploration rights over natural resources within the country's EEZ. It is possible to extend the EEZ by additional 150 nautical miles in case the geology data proves that underwater territory belongs to the state's continental shelf. Having established the limits of EEZs, the convention put a barrier for countries to make unreasonable territorial claims.<sup>34</sup>

The first major step in the modern history of Russia's Arctic development was taken in 1987. In that year, the RF ratified the *1982 UNCLOS*.<sup>35</sup> By this act, Moscow ensured its national interests in the region and secured its right for ownership of potentially rich hydrocarbons deposits within its EEZ.

At the same time with the ratification of the *UNCLOS*, the *Resolution on Determining the Lines of the External Boundaries of the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation* was

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<sup>33</sup>*United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea*. 1982. Montego Bay: United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. [Accessed: March December 14, 2018]

[https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos\\_e.pdf](https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> President of Russia ed. 1997. "Federal'nyj Zakon Ot 26.02.1997 G. № 30-Fz". Online. President Of Russia. 1997. [Accessed: May 28, 2019] <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/10594>.

adopted.<sup>36</sup> It was the first official Russian document over the Arctic, which became a foundation for the Russia's claim to the UN Commission for the expansion of the continental shelf in 2001.

The first comprehensive Russian Arctic vision was created in 2008. Security Council of the Russian Federation organised an offsite meeting on strategic planning at the northernmost outpost in Nagurskaya in Franz Josef Land in September of that year.<sup>37</sup> Following this meeting, President Medvedev adopted *Foundations Of The State Policy Of The Russian Federation In The Arctic For The Period Until 2020 And Beyond (2008 Foundations)* at September 18, 2008.<sup>38</sup> It became the first Russian comprehensive document, which underlines key national objectives, strategic priorities and interests in the Arctic. It also defines mechanisms of realization of the state policy of Russia in the region.

Among other things, this document pointed out a need to prepare general purpose army units for operations in the extreme natural-climatic conditions, to create the coast guard of the Federal security service in the Arctic zone and to optimize the system of the border control at the check points across the state border. The main idea was to create troops and control services in order to ensure military security in various conditions of the military-political situation. Because of these actions, the world expert communities start to perceive Russia's Arctic policies as expansionist and aggressive.<sup>39</sup>

However, the document defines four essential national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic: “1) use of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation providing the solution of problems of social and economic development of the country; 2) maintenance of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation; 3) preservation of unique ecological systems of the Arctic; 4) use of the Northern Sea Route as a national single transport communication of the Russian Federation in the Arctic (further – the Northern Sea

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<sup>36</sup> *Postanovlenie O Poryadke Utverzhdeniya Perechnoj Geograficheskikh Koordinat Toчек, Opredelyayushchih Linii Vneshnih Granic Kontinental'nogo Shel'fa Rossijskoj Federacii*. 1997. Online. Pravitel'stvo Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: January 27, 2019] [http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_120218/](http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_120218/).

<sup>37</sup> Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii. 2008. “Vyezdnoe Soveshchanie Po Strategicheskomu Planirovaniyu «O Zashchite Nacional'nyh Interesov Rossijskoj Federacii V Arktike»”. Online. [Accessed: January 29, 2019] <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/allnews/349/>

<sup>38</sup> Medvedev, Dmitry. “Osnovy Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossijskoj Federatsii V Arktike Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dal'neyshuyu Perspektivu” [Foundations Of The State Policy Of The Russian Federation In The Arctic For The Period Until 2020 And Beyond]”. Online. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. (4877) [Accessed: December 2, 2018] <https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html>.

<sup>39</sup> Larin, Viktor. 2016. Online. U Karty Tihogo Okeana. Centr Aziatsko-tihookeanskih issledovanij IIAE DVO RAN. [Accessed: May 18, 2019] <http://ihaefe.org/files/pacific-ocean-map/45.pdf>.

Route).”<sup>40</sup> To summarise the four targets, Russia would like to introduce a sustainable development of the AZRF in cooperation with another states.

Five years after the *2008 Foundations, The Strategy For The Development Of The Arctic Zone Of The Russian Federation And Ensuring National Security For The Period Up To 2020 (2013 Development Strategy)* was adopted by President Putin.<sup>41</sup> Despite the fact, that the period from the release of the first document (2008-2013) signified many great geopolitical changes, it did not introduce any significant updates.<sup>42</sup> The aim of the document was to further elaborate and specify main tasks of the Russian Arctic policy as earlier defined in the *2008 Foundations*. It represents a concretisation of the national interests of the RF in the Arctic. Furthermore, it identifies associated potential risks and threats in social, economic, scientific, technological and environmental spheres. The *2013 Development Strategy* also provides conditions for effective use and development of the resource base of the AZRF. As a separate paragraph, it emphasizes steps, which have to be done in order to modernize and develop infrastructure of the Arctic transportation system, including the Northern Sea Route. Undoubtedly, the release of this document in the year 2013 signified a major milestone in defining Russian Arctic goals and priorities.

In 2009, Russia adopted *Strategic Program for the Environmental Protection of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation*.<sup>43</sup> The program is aimed at protection of the natural environment of the Arctic and at elimination of the negative environmental consequences of economic activities. It defines goals, and basic measures that ensure environmental protection in the AZRF, considering Arctic’s increasing significance in the regional and global context. In the first part it recognizes the ecological problems and polluted areas in the AZRF. In the second part it determines several levels of required environmental measures: to reduce existing environmental pollution, to improve the quality of the environment and living condition of the Arctic population and to minimize the negative consequences of natural and man-made incidents. The program

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<sup>40</sup> Medvedev, Dmitry. “Osnovy Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii V Arktike Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dal’neyshuyu Perspektivu” [Foundations Of The State Policy Of The Russian Federation In The Arctic For The Period Until 2020 And Beyond]”. Online. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. (4877) [Accessed: December 2, 2018] <https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html>.

<sup>41</sup> Putin, Vladimir. “Strategiya Razvitiya Arkticheskoi Zony Rossiyskoi Federatsii I Obespecheniya Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Na Period Do 2020 Goda [The Strategy For The Development Of The Arctic Zone Of The Russian Federation And Ensuring National Security For The Period Up To 2020]”. Online. [Accessed: December 19, 2018] <http://government.ru/info/18360/>.

<sup>42</sup> Zhuravlev, Pavel Sergeevich. 2013. “Arkticheskaya Strategiya Rossii: Otsenki, Voprosy I Problemy Realizatsii”. *Vestnik Severnogo (Arkticheskogo) Federal’nogo Universiteta* 2013 (No. 3): 159.

<sup>43</sup> *Strategicheskaya Programma Dejstviy Po Ohrane Okrughayushchej Sredy Arkticheskoy Zony Rossijskoj Federacii*. 2009. Online. Moscow: Morskaya kollegiya pri Pravitel’stve Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: August 22, 2019] <https://docplayer.ru/37698590-Strategicheskaya-programma-deystviy-po-ohrane-okrughayushchey-sredy-arkticheskoy-zony-rossiyskoy-federacii.html>.

provides real mechanism of achieving goals, which are named in the document and the deadlines for its realization. Currently it's obvious that the predefined timeline is not followed.

### 3.2. Russian national interests in the Arctic

Russia's *2008 Foundations* define national priorities of the RF in the Arctic. Three most concrete priorities are the development of the Northern Sea Route, the development of hydrocarbon deposits and the preservation of Arctic ecosystem.

Using the liberal intergovernmentalism as guideline for the analysis of the Russian environmental cooperation, the theory suggests to firstly focus on detail analysis of these interests, because they represent key factors in forming the state's international preferences.

#### 3.2.1. The development of the Northern Sea Route

The term Northern Sea Route (NSR) covers several shipping lanes along the Russian north coast. It goes from the Barents Sea in the west to the Bering Strait in the east and so connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific Ocean. The exact route is varying depending on the ice and weather conditions at the moment of voyage. It crosses five seas, which are located in the AZRF: the Chukchi Sea, the East Siberian Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea and the Barents Sea. The route covers some 2,200 to 2,900 nautical miles of ice-bound waters and represents the shortest connection between Asia and Northern Europe.<sup>44</sup> According to the *UNCLOS* and its delimitation rules, the NSR lies within Russia's EEZ and hence it falls under the Russian jurisdiction.<sup>45</sup>

The NSR always attracted attention of the Arctic coastal states and non-Arctic actors particularly because of its short length. When fully operational it could become a convincing competitor to the Suez and Panama Canals in the international transit cargo shipping and so become one of the main traffic arteries. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 shortened the old route from Asia to Europe by 23 % by eliminating passage around Africa, the NSR shortens the distance by another 24 %.<sup>46</sup> For example, shipping from Yokohama to Rotterdam through the Suez Canal is about 11 thousand nautical miles long, while using the NSR takes only 7 thousand nautical

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<sup>44</sup> Liu, Miaojia, and Jacob Kronbak. 2010. "The Potential Economic Viability Of Using The Northern Sea Route (NSR) As An Alternative Route Between Asia And Europe". Online. *Journal Of Transport Geography* 18 (3): 434-444. doi:10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2009.08.004.

<sup>45</sup> *United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea*. 1982. Montego Bay: United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. [Accessed: March December 14, 2018] [https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos\\_e.pdf](https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf).

<sup>46</sup> Buixadé Farré, Albert, Scott R. Stephenson, Linling Chen, Michael Czub, Ying Dai, Denis Demchev, Yaroslav Efimov, et al. 2014. "Commercial Arctic Shipping Through The Northeast Passage: Routes, Resources, Governance, Technology, And Infrastructure". Online. *Polar Geography* 37 (4): 298-324. doi:10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769.

miles.<sup>47</sup> Such a significant distance reduction brings substantial fuel and time savings resulting in an increase of ships turnover. Some experts even add one more advantage: the diminished threat of piracy in the High North in comparison with the southern seas.<sup>48</sup>

The NSR was always a shorter way, however, it was never seriously considered to be an advantageous, economically feasible alternative to the Suez and Panama Canals, mainly because of its geographical location and extreme climate conditions. The Arctic region is covered with perennial ice, that creates inhospitable conditions for the NSR functioning. The ice melts along Russian coast only during the summer period, for 2-4 months in a year.<sup>49</sup> Even during the summer, ice can be present in some parts of the route, for example in the eastern Kara Sea or the western Laptev Sea areas, which could significantly affect the shipping.<sup>50</sup>

This is changing with significant climate changes at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. More visible signs of global warming accelerated debates over the NSR usage. The average Arctic Sea ice between 1979 and 2000 covered around 6-7 million km<sup>2</sup> in mid-September.<sup>51</sup> However, already in 2007 it shrank to only 4.16 million km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>52</sup> Such a rapid ice melt, may significantly affect the maritime traffic.

### *National conditions*

In the past, the NSR has played an important role in domestic supply of goods and food for the northern parts of the Soviet Union. The “severny zavoz” (northern delivery) was provided to the regions, which were not accessible by another means of transport. Ships supported several destinations, mostly in Siberia; raw materials were transported out of the region and required tools and food were imported. Due to the strategic importance, it was for a long time forbidden for foreign ships to use the NSR for commercial transportation. The Russian Arctic in general was considered by the Soviet Government as a significant part of national security system.<sup>53</sup> A large

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Todorov, Andrej. “Mezhdunarodnyj Tranzitnyj Potencial Severnogo Morskogo Puti: Ekonomicheskij I Pravovoj Aspekty”. *Ekonomika: Problemy Nacional'noj Strategii* 2017 (№ 3 (42)): p 150.

<sup>49</sup> Solomonov, A. 2015. “Severnyj Morskoj Put’”. Online. Ria Novosti. 2015. [Accessed: February 11, 2019] <https://ria.ru/20150805/1161664413.html>.

<sup>50</sup> Brubaker, R. Douglas, and Claes Lykke Ragner. 2010. “A Review Of The International Northern Sea Route Program (Insrop) – 10 Years On”. Online. *Polar Geography* 33 (1-2): 17. doi:10.1080/1088937X.2010.493308.

<sup>51</sup> Beitler, Jane. 2012. “Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles At Record Seasonal Minimum”. Online. *National Snow And Ice Data Center*. [Accessed: April 2, 2019] <http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonal-minimum/>.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Liu, Miaojia, and Jacob Kronbak. 2010. “The Potential Economic Viability Of Using The Northern Sea Route (NSR) As An Alternative Route Between Asia And Europe”. Online. *Journal Of Transport Geography* 18 (3): 434-444. doi:10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2009.08.004.

number of military facilities and ships of the Northern Fleet were located in the Arctic Ocean.<sup>54</sup> That is why the NSR was considered as an internal Russian transportation route, but never as a transit route between the two oceans.

Regional shipping between Russian western ports to the Siberian ports drastically increased in 1980s. In 1980s the shipping reached its peak, around 5-6 million tons of cargo were delivered every year. Since then, however, there has been a sharp drop to 1.5 million tons of cargo in Soviet marine traffic in the Arctic.<sup>55</sup> The dissolution of the Soviet Union, further economic and political instability, population decline and drop in industrial production in Russia, negatively influenced the shipping in the NSR.<sup>56</sup>

RF sought to develop and operate both regional and international maritime navigation and cargo shipping in the NSR. International cargo shipping was seen as source of viable income and commercial development of the region. As regards regional shipping, it was planned to be used as main transit artery between Russian ports and remote Russian northern regions and contribute to its development.<sup>57</sup> However, sea traffic remained low since the dissolution of the Soviet Union for more than 15 years until the 2007, when it began to increase again after the Russian government undertook actions for future exploitation of the Arctic region.

Full benefits of this route can be unlocked only in case of uninterrupted year-round operation.<sup>58</sup> The retreat of ice and expectation of the ice-free summers inspired Russia to turn this plan into reality.<sup>59</sup> The Director for the NSR Vyacheslav Ruksha announced company's aim to realize it together with the Russian Ministry of Transport.<sup>60</sup> Nowadays, the year-round operation needs a fleet of icebreakers along with ports and other land infrastructure.

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<sup>54</sup> Noskov, Aleksej. 2018. "Severnyj Morskoj Put' Protiv Sueckogo Kanala". Online. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. [Accessed: February 17, 2019] [http://www.ng.ru/ng\\_energiya/2018-06-19/11\\_7247\\_nord.html](http://www.ng.ru/ng_energiya/2018-06-19/11_7247_nord.html).

<sup>55</sup> Østreng, Willy. 2010. "The Northeast Passage And Northern Sea Route". Online. Arctis. [Accessed: February 16, 2019] <http://www.arctis-search.com/The+Northeast+Passage+and+Northern+Sea+Route+2>.

<sup>56</sup> Pletcher, Kenneth. 2013. "Northeast Passage". Online. Encyclopaedia Britannica. [Accessed: February 4, 2019] <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Northeast-Passage>.

<sup>57</sup> Buixadé Farré, Albert, Scott R. Stephenson, Linling Chen, Michael Czub, Ying Dai, Denis Demchev, Yaroslav Efimov, et al. 2014. "Commercial Arctic Shipping Through The Northeast Passage: Routes, Resources, Governance, Technology, And Infrastructure". Online. Polar Geography 37 (4): 298-324. doi:10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769.

<sup>58</sup> Brubaker, R. Douglas, and Claes Lykke Ragner. 2010. "A Review Of The International Northern Sea Route Program (Insrop) – 10 Years On". Online. Polar Geography 33 (1-2): 30. doi:10.1080/1088937X.2010.493308.

<sup>59</sup> Lekuh, Dmitrij. 2018. "Global'noe Poteplenie Rabotaet Na Rossiju I Stroit Ej "sueckij Kanal"". Online. Ria Novosti. [Accessed: April 11, 2019] <https://ria.ru/20180911/1528243788.html>.

<sup>60</sup> Lvov, Pavel. 2018. "Ruksha: My Dolzhny Stavit' Zadachu Kruglogodichnoj Navigacii Na Smp". Online. The Arctic. [Accessed: March 2, 2019] <https://ru.arctic.ru/infrastructure/20180927/791757.html>.

The amount of cargo transportation along the NSR in 2018 doubled compared to the previous 2017, from 10.7 million tons to 19.7 million tons respectively.<sup>61</sup> According to estimations of Russian Ministry of Transport, in 2019 amount of cargo will be 26 million tons.<sup>62</sup> According to an Executive Order on National Goals, the plan is to increase the cargo volumes transported along the NSR to 50 million tons in 2021 and to 80 million tons in 2024.<sup>63</sup> Those are, however, plans which can differ from reality, as it happened with many postponed or prolonged project in the AZRF.

### *National interests*

*2008 Foundations* define “the use of the Northern Sea Route as a national single transport communication of the Russian Federation in the Arctic”.<sup>64</sup> Further developed *2013 Development Strategy* provides an updated and more detailed information, which concrete steps should undertake Russian Government in order to modernize and develop Arctic transport infrastructure and to transform the NSR into the main transport artery.<sup>65</sup> The importance of the NSR as a main transport corridor was also mentioned in a new national security strategy, which was approved in 2015.<sup>66</sup>

Strong interest in this topic is shared by the main political representatives. Second international forum “Arctic: the territory of dialogue” in 2011 was completely dedicated to the issues of the Arctic transportation system development and ensuring security in this macro-region.<sup>67</sup> Vladimir Putin in his speeches at the Arctic forum was constantly repeating the

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<sup>61</sup>Center for High North Logistics. 2018. “Transit Statistics 2017”. Online. Chnl Information Office. [Accessed: August 22, 2019] <https://arctic-lho.com/transit-statistics-2017/>.

<sup>62</sup>RIA Novosti ed. 2019. “Ob”em Perevozok Gruzov Po Sevmorputi V 2018 Godu Vyros Vdvoe – Do 20,2 Mln Tonn”. Online. Ministerstvo Transporta. [Accessed: February 9, 2019] <https://www.mintrans.ru/press-center/branch-news/1240>.

<sup>63</sup> President of Russia ed. 2018. “The President Signed Executive Order On National Goals And Strategic Objectives Of The Russian Federation Through To 2024”. Online. President Of Russia. [Accessed: January 28, 2019] <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57425>.

<sup>64</sup> Medvedev, Dmitry. “Osnovy Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii V Arktike Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dal’neyshuyu Perspektivu” [Foundations Of The State Policy Of The Russian Federation In The Arctic For The Period Until 2020 And Beyond]”. Online. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. (4877) [Accessed: December 2, 2018] <https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html>.

<sup>65</sup> Putin, Vladimir. “Strategiya Razvitiya Arkticheskoi Zony Rossiyskoi Federatsii I Obespecheniya Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Na Period Do 2020 Goda [The Strategy For The Development Of The Arctic Zone Of The Russian Federation And Ensuring National Security For The Period Up To 2020]”. Online. [Accessed: December 19, 2018] <http://government.ru/info/18360/>.

<sup>66</sup> *Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii Ot 31 Dekabrya 2015 Goda N 683 "o Strategii Nacional'noj Bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii"*. [Accessed: December 12, 2018] <https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html>.

<sup>67</sup> RIA Novosti. “Sevmorputi Dali "zelenyj" Svet Na Arkticheskom Forume”. Online. Ria Novosti. Moscow. [Accessed: February 20, 2019] <https://ria.ru/20110923/442599326.html>.

importance of the two aforementioned goals, emphasizing that “the task is to make the NSR safe and profitable for shippers, attractive both in terms of quality of services and price”.<sup>68</sup>

Further development of NSR is favoured also by particular domestic economic groups, because NSR could be used as a diversified supply route for Russian hydrocarbons to world market.<sup>69</sup> CEO of Russia’s second-largest natural gas producer Novatek, Leonid Mikhelson stated, that the NSR will allow to significantly reduce the cost of transporting LNG, which is delivered via the Suez Canal in winter.<sup>70</sup> What is more, there will be a significant reduce time of delivery of natural gas to Asia from 36 to 19 days and costs for delivery from \$ 2.49 to \$ 1.65 per 1 million British thermal units (MMBTU).<sup>71</sup> According to Sergey Khrushchev, the Director of the Department in Ministry of Natural Resources of Russia, by 2024 the main cargo base of the NSR will be formed by Novatek’s projects: Yamal LNG launched in December 2018 and Arctic LNG-2 which will be launched in 2022 and estimates to provide up to 40 million tons of LNG per year.<sup>72</sup>

### *Challenges*

Further development of the NSR is associated with obstacles, which affect its popularization and monetization. There are legal, environmental disputes and other challenges, such as shallow waters, aging port infrastructure and the lack of maritime infrastructure. All those factors decrease economic feasibility of the NSR.

Alexey Likhachyov, CEO of Rosatom, which is in charge of modernisation plans, declared that a promising development plan requires 735 billion roubles (\$11.7 billion) in investments. State budget will provide one-third of the total investment amount. Rest will provide Russian leading energy companies, such as Rosatom, Rosneft, Gazprom, Novatek and others.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> President of Russia ed. 2019. “Plenarnoe Zasedanie Mezhdunarodnogo Arkticheskogo Forumu”. Online. Saint Petersburg. [Accessed: May 6, 2019] <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60250>.

<sup>69</sup> Putin, Vladimir. “Strategiya Razvitiya Arkticheskoi Zony Rossiyskoi Federatsii I Obespecheniya Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Na Period Do 2020 Goda [The Strategy For The Development Of The Arctic Zone Of The Russian Federation And Ensuring National Security For The Period Up To 2020]”. Online. [Accessed: December 19, 2018] <http://government.ru/info/18360/>.

<sup>70</sup> Chepur, Ekaterina. 2019. “Vsyo Putyom”. Online. Lenta. [Accessed: February 9, 2019] [https://lenta.ru/articles/2019/01/24/north\\_way/](https://lenta.ru/articles/2019/01/24/north_way/).

<sup>71</sup> Podobedova, Lyudmila, and Svetlana Burmistrova. 2019. “Majskij Ukaz Zastryal Vo L'dah: Kak Najti 80 Mln T Gruzov Dlya Sevmorputi”. Online. Rbc. [Accessed: February 4, 2019] <https://www.rbc.ru/business/16/01/2019/5c3dde2f9a79471715920f53>.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Stolyarov, Gleb, Golubkova Katya. 2019. “Rosatom Sees Northern Sea Route Costs At 735 Billion Roubles, Russian Budget To Provide A Third”. Online. Reuters. [Accessed: August 24, 2019] <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-rosatom-arctic/rosatom-sees-northern-sea-route-costs-at-735-billion-roubles-russian-budget-to-provide-a-third-idUSKCN1TP1LB>.

To increase transit volumes along the NSR, Russia needs to develop port infrastructure. There are 18 ports in the AZRF, 6 of them are located along the NSR. There are newly build ports, like Sabetta, which became operational in 2017.<sup>74</sup> However, most of them need to be modernized like Tiksi, Kandalaksha, Indiga or Lavna ports.<sup>75</sup> Even considering the Arctic ice melting, the operation of the NSR is not possible without the icebreakers. Regulations says, that only the Russian icebreakers can provide an escort to vessels in the NSR.<sup>76</sup> In 1980s the country reached its maximum of 38 icebreakers and hundreds of others sea vessels.<sup>77</sup> Nowadays, there are 4 nuclear-powered fully functioning icebreakers: Taymyr, Vaygach, Yamal, 50 Let Pobedy and the container ship Sevmorput and 4 diesel-electric powered icebreakers.<sup>78</sup> Russian Government plans to spend 163 billion rubles on a project called 22220, which will build a new class of nuclear icebreakers in 2020 and construct 3 new icebreakers: Arktika, Sibir and Ural.<sup>79</sup>

One of the important Russian interests in the Arctic is the utilisation of the Northern Sea Route. It is strongly supported by the key domestic political players as well as by important economic groups. However, from presented cargo data it is obvious that the reality does not fully meet the official plans and proclamations. To achieve the goal, huge long-term investments, that are harmonized with environmental policies are required.

### 3.2.2. The development of Russia's Arctic energy resources

The Arctic is an extremely rich region in terms of mineral resources, especially hydrocarbons. The U.S Geological Survey made a comprehensive assessment of undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources in all areas north of the Arctic Circle.<sup>80</sup> The research says, that

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<sup>74</sup> Fadeichev, Sergej. 2019. "Investicii V Proekty Na Yamale Do 2025 Goda Prevysheyut \$100 Mlrd". Online. TASS. [Accessed: September 27, 2019] <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/4517491>.

<sup>75</sup> Gajva, Evgenij. 2019. "Investory Podpisali Soglashenie O Razvitii Porta "Lavna"". Online. Rossijskaya Gazeta. [Accessed: May 5, 2019] <https://rg.ru/2019/04/17/reg-szfo/mintrans-podpisal-soglashenie-s-investorami-o-razvitii-porta-lavna.html>

<sup>76</sup> Ministry of Transport of Russian Federation. 2013. "Ob Utverzhdenii Pravil Plavaniya V Akvatorii Severnogo Morskogo Puti". Online. Rossijskaya Gazeta. Moskva. 2013. [Accessed: February 11, 2019] <https://rg.ru/2013/04/19/pravila-dok.html>.

<sup>77</sup> Østreng, Willy. 2010. "The Northeast Passage And Northern Sea Route". Online. Arctis. [Accessed: February 16, 2019] <http://www.arctis-search.com/The+Northeast+Passage+and+Northern+Sea+Route+2>.

<sup>78</sup> Kazakulova, Galina. 2017. "Ot «Yamala» Do «Tajmyra»: Atomnye Ledokoly V Sostave Rossijskogo Flota". Online. Rbc. Accessed: February 11, 2019] <https://www.rbc.ru/photoreport/05/12/2017/5a2571e29a79473adad40656>

<sup>79</sup> Melnikov, Valerii. 2018. "Na Ledokoly Dlya Arktiki Mogut Potratit' 164 Mlrd Rublej". Online. The Arctic. [Accessed: April 12, 2019] <https://ru.arctic.ru/infrastructure/20180823/787830.html>.

<sup>80</sup> US Geological Survey. "Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates Of Undiscovered Oil And Gas North Of The Arctic Circle". Online. 2008. [Accessed: February 7, 2019] <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf>.

the mean estimates of 90 billion barrels of oil, 1 669 trillion cubic feet (47.3 trillion cubic meters) of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may be found in the Arctic.<sup>81</sup>

Despite the fact, that this prediction is purely statistical and do not considered realistic extraction possibilities or presumable costs of the extraction, the probable petroleum reserves are more than significant. They represent 30 % of world's undiscovered natural gas and 13 % of the world's undiscovered oil supplies. Some experts suppose that estimates could increase along with the increase of knowledge about the Arctic.<sup>82</sup> Important to mention, that the study gives information about probable hydrocarbon resources only in the offshores Arctic territories. The Arctic shelf remained for long time underdeveloped, due to harsh climate conditions and associated high requirements for technologies and infrastructure. There were also sufficient alternative sources of hydrocarbons in other regions. The large-scale extraction of hydrocarbons within the Arctic continental shelf is just starting.

Regarding the onshore Arctic areas, some territories have been explored in Russia, Canada and Alaska. Overall more than 400 onshore hydrocarbon deposits were discovered in volume of 240 billion barrels of oil and oil-equivalent natural gas, which is around 10 % of the world conventional petroleum resources.<sup>83</sup>

### *National conditions*

Hydrocarbons are vitally important commodity for the Russian economy, roughly 20-25 % of the Russian GDP is derived from oil and gas.<sup>84</sup> The Russian economy depends on revenues from the oil and gas sector, half of the federal budget is generated due to fuel and energy industry.<sup>85</sup> However, this fact created a highly energy dependent country, vulnerable to any changes of oil and gas prices on the world market.

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Borgerson, Scott G. 2008. "Arctic Meltdown: The Economic And Security Implications Of Global Warming". Online. *Foreign Affairs* 87 (2): 63- 77. [Accessed: December 22, 2018] <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032581?seq=1>.

<sup>83</sup> Sergunin, Alexander, and Valery Konyshchev. 2014. "Russia In Search Of Its Arctic Strategy: Between Hard And Soft Power?". *The Polar Journal* 4 (1): 71. doi:10.1080/2154896X.2014.913930.

<sup>84</sup> Rekha, Chandra. 2014. "Arctic Region: The New Geopolitical Theater Of Russia". *Air Power Journal* 9 (No. 4): 142.

<sup>85</sup> Majskij, Ravil', Fajrushin, Evgenij. 2018. "Vliyanie Neftegazovogo Kompleksa Na Ekonomicheskie Pokazateli Rossii". Online. *Bulletin Usptu* 1 (23): 82-88. [Accessed: May 27, 2019] <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/vliyanie-neftegazovogo-kompleksa-na-ekonomicheskie-pokazateli-rossii>.

According to the U.S Geological Survey, more than half of the Arctic natural gas reserves and one fourth of oil reserves are potentially located within the AZRF.<sup>86</sup> Huge reserves are expected in just two Russian Arctic Seas - Barents Sea and Kara sea; 84 % of Russian total continental shelf hydrocarbon resources. So far, while every third ton of world's oil is currently extracted at the continental shelf, Russia is hardly developing its continental shelf concentrating primarily on the easily accessible onshore sites.

Nowadays, there are 400 discovered hydrocarbon onshore deposits north of the Arctic Circle, 60 of them are operational, and more than 40 of them are located within the Russian Arctic territory.<sup>87</sup> The Russian onshore Arctic resources are relatively well investigated, there are dozens of oil and gas fields, which were discovered way back in the 20<sup>st</sup> century, and several of them are operational. The first oil deposit Chib'yuskoe was discovered in 1930s in the Russian Arctic Republic of Komi.<sup>88</sup> In 1960s and 1970s the geological prospecting work and exploitation was conducted in the Western Siberian petroleum province and at the Yamalo Nenets Autonomous Okrug.<sup>89</sup> Currently, the north of the West Siberian petroleum province (Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug) is the largest gas producing region in the world and a major oil production centre.

Russian view on the Arctic offshore deposits changed at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. There are three main reasons for increased attention to the Arctic wealth. Firstly, a drastic growth in demand for hydrocarbons among countries with developing economies as well as limited extraction opportunities led to significant increase of price of the energy commodity since 2000s. Despite the decline recently, prices are still high for the period of last 20 years. High demand boosted oil and gas extraction in sooner unimaginable areas; politically unstable areas and in regions, which are difficult to access. Arctic region is not an exception. Secondly, main Russian onshore deposits, for example in Tatarstan and Western Siberia have already been partially depleted. It is therefore crucial to think about alternative deposits for future. According to estimations, with the current rate of oil production, the already discovered fields will last for only

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<sup>86</sup> US Geological Survey. "Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates Of Undiscovered Oil And Gas North Of The Arctic Circle". Online. 2008. [Accessed: February 7, 2019] <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf>.

<sup>87</sup> Ekspertnyj centr Proektnyj ofis razvitiya Arktiki. 2019. "Prirodnye Bogatstva Arktiki". Online. Dobro Pozhalovat' V Arktiku. [Accessed: October 23, 2019] <http://wearctic.ru/prirodnye-bogatstva-arktiki>.

<sup>88</sup> Press-sluzhba Rosnedr. 2010. "80 Let Nazad Bylo Otkryto Znamenitoe Chib'yuskoe Mestorozhdenie Devonskoj Nefti". Online. Federal'noe Agentstvo Po Nedropol'zovaniyu - Rosnedra. [Accessed: February 11, 2019] <http://www.rosnedra.gov.ru/article/3585.html>.

<sup>89</sup> Brooks, Jim. 1990. "Classic Petroleum Provinces". *Geological Society, London, Special Publications* 50 (1): 1-8. [Accessed: February 7, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1144/GSL.SP.1990.050.01.01>.

30 more years.<sup>90</sup> That is why Russia seeks to get access to previously underdeveloped, potentially profitable energy regions. Last reason is the rapid ice melt in the Arctic region, which makes the region more accessible and any activities less technology demanding.

There is one example of relatively successful Russian offshore oil deposit development - Prirazlomnoye. It was discovered back in 1977, during the test drilling in Timan-Pechora petroleum province. Today, this is the only oil field in the Russian Arctic continental shelf, where the oil production began. The project of the first Arctic-class ice-resistant oil platform in the world has so far cost 90 billion rubles.<sup>91</sup> It is operated by the state company Gazprom. First consignment of "ARCO" Arctic oil was shipped from Prirazlomnoye in April 2014.<sup>92</sup> Nevertheless, it took more than 20 year to turn this project into reality, keeping in mind, that the oil field is located 60 kilometres from the shore in a depth of about 20 meters.

### *National interests*

The promotion of the Arctic hydrocarbon resources development was designed at the highest level of the Russian political elite. Pre-eminently, the impetus to turn the Arctic into the strategic resource base was disclosed by the former Russian President Medvedev.<sup>93</sup> As it was already mentioned in previous part, the first comprehensive strategy over Russian Arctic and its development was adopted by President Medvedev in 2008. As a pivotal priority the *2008 Foundations* underline the "usage of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base, allowing the solution of problems of socio-economic development".<sup>94</sup> A year later, the *Energy strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2030* was adopted. This strategy underlines the importance of widening the geography of hydrocarbon production in Russia and realization of innovative energy projects in the East Siberia and Far North, on the continental shelf of the Arctic Seas and Yamal peninsula.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Osadchij, A. 2006. "Neft' I Gaz Rossijskogo Shel'fa: Ocenki I Prognozy". Online. *Nauka I Zhizn'*, no. 7. [Accessed: January 27, 2019] <https://www.nkj.ru/archive/articles/6334/>.

<sup>91</sup> Staalesen, Atle. 2016. "The Champion Of Arctic Oil". Online. The Barents Observer. [Accessed: September 14, 2019] <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry/2016/08/champion-arctic-oil>.

<sup>92</sup> Gazprom. "The Prirazlomnoye Project". Online. Gazprom Neft. [Accessed: February 8, 2019] <https://www.gazprom-neft.com/company/major-projects/prirazlomnoe/>.

<sup>93</sup> Ilin, Aleksej. 2008. "Arktike Opredelyat Granicy". Online. Rossijskaya Gazeta. [Accessed: February 4, 2019] <https://rg.ru/2008/09/18/arktika.html>.

<sup>94</sup> Medvedev, Dmitry. "Osnovy Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossijskoy Federatsii V Arktike Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dal'neyshuyu Perspektivu" [Foundations Of The State Policy Of The Russian Federation In The Arctic For The Period Until 2020 And Beyond]. Online. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. (4877) [Accessed: December 2, 2018] <https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html>.

<sup>95</sup> Institute of Energy Strategy. 2010. *Energy Strategy Of Russia For The Period Up To 2030*. Online. 37. 1st ed. Moscow. [Accessed: January 27, 2019] [http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030\\_\(Eng\).pdf](http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf).

Both 2008 and 2013 doctrines display the Russian interests in the AZRF and enforce the development of the Arctic resources. According to the *2013 Development Strategy*, Russian plan is to create “the reserve fund deposits in the AZRF to guarantee energy security and sustainable development of the energy sector in the long term, the period of substitution of declining production in traditional areas of development after 2020”.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, the *2013 Development Strategy* emphasizes the implementation of infrastructure projects in AZRF, particularly in rich energy regions of Kara, Pechora and Barents Seas and the Yamal and Gydan peninsulas.<sup>97</sup> “Without engaging in the development of hard-to-reach oil reserves to keep the achieved level of production after 2020 will be almost impossible”, that is said in the Strategy for the development of the mineral resource base of Russia until 2030.<sup>98</sup>

Further development of the Arctic hydrocarbon reserves would also be in interest of domestic social and economic groups. However, sooner described significance of the oil and gas industry led Russia in 2000s to start a process of re-nationalization of oil and gas companies. As a result, the largest Russian companies, for example Gazprom and Rosneft, fall under control of Russian authorities. Interests of domestic economic groups are therefore strongly politically influenced.

*Subsoil Law of the Russian Federation*, published in 2008, established the Arctic continental shelf as a territory for exploitation solely by state companies with 5-year experience of work on the shelf.<sup>99</sup> Nowadays, only Gazprom and Rosneft meet these criteria. Those two companies own 90 % of the shelf licenses. With the state support and an unchallenged control over the Russian Arctic, Gazprom and Rosneft enjoy phenomenal monopolistic exploitation privileges. For example, by July 1, 2019 Rosnedra, Federal Agency for Subsoil Management, granted to Rosneft 28 licenses for carrying out geological studies in the Russian Arctic.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Putin, Vladimir. “Strategiya Razvitiya Arkticheskoi Zony Rossiyskoi Federatsii I Obespecheniya Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Na Period Do 2020 Goda [The Strategy For The Development Of The Arctic Zone Of The Russian Federation And Ensuring National Security For The Period Up To 2020]”. Online. [Accessed: December 19, 2018] <http://government.ru/info/18360/>.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> *Strategiya Razvitiya Mineral’no-Syr’evoy Bazy Rossijskoj Federacii Do 2035 Goda*. 2017. Online. Mineral. Moscow. [Accessed: March 1, 2019] <http://www.mineral.ru/Analytics/rutrend/168/557/RF%20MSB%20Strategy%20-%20Project%202017-01-16.pdf>.

<sup>99</sup> *Zakon Ot 21 Fevralya 1992 G. N 2395-1 "o Nedrah"*. 1992. [Accessed: April 17, 2019] <https://rg.ru/1995/03/15/nedra-dok.html>.

<sup>100</sup> Rosneft. 2019. “Shel’fovye Proekty”. Online. Rosneft. [Accessed: April 16, 2019] <https://www.rosneft.ru/business/Upstream/offshore/>.

However, some experts claim, that preference given to the national oil companies prevent the large-scale Arctic development.<sup>101</sup> For example, the government issued 69 licenses for exploration and production of oil and gas, requiring the companies to drill 86 wells in 20 years, by summer 2019 only 5 wells had been drilled. Minister of Natural Resources and the Environment of Russia Yury Trutnev explains the slow development due to lack of competition.<sup>102</sup> As a result of inefficiency with the offshore operations, Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich stood for engaging private companies to participate in Russian shelf development.<sup>103</sup> Heads of main private companies, such as Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, TNK-BP and Bashneft, addressed a letter to Putin, indicating, that the key factors that could have a negative impact on state program implementation is an offshore state monopoly of Gazprom and Rosneft. This idea met opposition from Alexey Miller and Igor Sechin, CEOs of Gazprom and Rosneft, they claim that giving private companies an access to Arctic will challenge the regional security.<sup>104</sup>

### *Challenges*

There are ambitious plans to develop Arctic LNG projects, start developing offshore field, established refineries, however, Russian state-owned companies do not possess developed technologies for exploiting the Arctic fields. Drilling under harsh conditions requires specialized equipment, special environmental policies need to be obeyed.

There is a need for international cooperation. Prirazlomnoye has shown way back in 2000, that the only offshore Russian project became possible with the participation of foreign companies. Gazprom signed a memorandum on cooperation in developing Prirazlomnoye field with German company Wintershall.<sup>105</sup> Later, Gazprom signed a number of agreements with Royal Dutch Shell, Total and Statoil on Russian Arctic development, including an agreement on promising Shtokman gas condensate deposit.<sup>106</sup> Its reserves are estimated at 3.8 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and

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<sup>101</sup> Vavina, Elena, and Vitalij Petlevoj. 2019. "Pravitel'stvo Razreshit Chastnym Kompaniyam Dobychu Nefti I Gaza V Arktike". Online. Vedomosti. [Accessed: August 27, 2019]

<https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2019/08/26/809703-pravitelstvo-dobichu-nefti>

<sup>102</sup> Podobedova, Lyudmila, Dergachev, Vladimir. 2019. "Trutnev Predlozhit Dopustit' Inostrancev Na Shelf' Po Norvezhskoj Modeli". Online. Rbc. [Accessed: November 23, 2019]

<https://www.rbc.ru/business/19/08/2019/5d566ab49a7947078cda33b5>

<sup>103</sup> RBC. 2012. "A.dvorkovich Ne Zhelaet Ostavlyat' Rossijskij Shel'f Bez Goskontrolya". Online. Rbc. [Accessed: February 8, 2019] <https://www.rbc.ru/economics/02/08/2012/5703facc9a7947ac81a6a50e>.

<sup>104</sup> Topalov, Aleksej. 2012. "Shel'f Dlya Svoih Dvoih". Online. Gaze Ru. [Accessed: February 9, 2019] <https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2012/10/18/4816545.shtml>.

<sup>105</sup> Gazprom. "Chronicles Of Gazprom For 2000". Online. Gazprom Neft. [Accessed: February 8, 2019] <https://www.gazprom.com/about/history/chronicle/2000/>.

<sup>106</sup> Gazprom. 2013. "Gazprom And Shell Agree To Jointly Develop Arctic Shelf And Produce Shale Oil In Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Area". Online. Gazprom Neft. [Accessed: February 10, 2019] <https://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2013/april/article159865/>.

more than 53.4 million tons of gas condensate.<sup>107</sup> Rosneft was even more successful in arranging international agreements. The company signed agreements to establish joint ventures with Statoil, Eni and ExxonMobil, including strategic agreement over Kara Sea development.<sup>108</sup> However, most of them were abolished or postponed due to political situation after 2014, the ongoing Ukrainian crisis and the further imposed economic sanctions.<sup>109</sup> For example, without the ExxonMobil participation, Rosneft suspended the exploration of Victory oil field in the Kara Sea.

International economic sanctions negatively influenced the development of the AZRF, however, brought undeniable understanding, that Russia cannot develop the Arctic independently without assistance. Sectoral sanctions targeted the energy sector, prohibiting the access to so needed technology. Russia realized that its plan to turn the Arctic into a “strategic resource base” encounters complications, especially with development and exploitation of offshore fields. Sanctions revealed the difficulties and highlighted the challenges, which became even more problematic without the international help.

However, there is a possibility to solve the problem if Russian authorities allow private Russian companies, with experience in offshore projects to participate in Arctic shelf development. For example, Lukoil was successfully developing Caspian Sea shelf at the beginning of 2000s.<sup>110</sup> Novatek’s LNG project at Yamal peninsula was successfully launched despite sanctions, extreme climate and technological hurdles. This project uses advanced technology that could be crucial for oil and gas production in the Arctic.<sup>111</sup> According to recent news, Russian government will offer the rest 10 % of licenses to distribute among private companies.<sup>112</sup> There is a chance, that the consent between state monopolists and private companies will be achieved.

Russia is a country which is highly dependent on oil and gas export. Vast Arctic hydrocarbon deposits are correctly perceived by the national politics as a way how to ensure countries income when the older sites will be depleted. State-owned companies, however, do not

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<sup>107</sup> Gazprom. “Shtokmanovskoe Mestorozhdenie”. Online. Gazprom. [Accessed: February 8, 2019] <https://www.gazprom.ru/projects/shtokmanovskoye/>.

<sup>108</sup> ExxonMobil. 2014. “Rosneft And Exxonmobil Exploration Drilling In The Kara Sea 2014”. Online. Exxonmobil. [Accessed: February 20, 2019] <https://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~media/global/files/other/2014/kara-sea-fact-sheet.pdf>.

<sup>109</sup> Soldatkin, Vladimir, and Ernest Scheyder. 2018. “Exxon Quits Some Russian Joint Ventures Citing Sanctions”. Online. Houston/Moscow. [Accessed: September 20, 2019] <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxon-mobil-russia-rosneft-oil/exxon-quits-some-russian-joint-ventures-citing-sanctions-idUSKCN1GC39B>.

<sup>110</sup> Lukoil. 2019. Korchagin Field. Online. Lukoil. [Accessed: April 17, 2019] <http://www.lukoil.com/Business/Upstream/KeyProjects/KorchaginField>.

<sup>111</sup> Novatek. 2019. “«Yamal Spg» - Integrirovannyj Proekt Po Dobyche, Szhizheniyu I Realizacii Gaza”. Online. Novatek. [Accessed: September 20, 2019] <http://www.novatek.ru/ru/business/yamal-lng/>.

<sup>112</sup> Vavina, Elena, and Vitalij Petlevoj. 2019. “Pravitel'stvo Razreshit Chastnym Kompaniyam Dobychu Nefti I Gaza V Arktike”. Online. Vedomosti. [Accessed: August 27, 2019] <https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2019/08/26/809703-pravitelstvo-dobichu-nefti>

possess the required technology to fulfil the political targets. Cooperation with the foreign experienced companies is needed to fulfil the extreme requirements (both technical and environmental) of the region. Unfortunately, this was effectively restricted by the economic sanctions.

### 3.2.3. Ecosystems of the Russian Arctic zone

The Arctic is a polar region geographically defined as an area located north above the Arctic Circle (approximately 66°33' north of the Equator). The region is characterized by harsh climate conditions, approximately 15 million square kilometres are covered by polar sea ice and permafrost. During the summer period the ice melt up leaving covered only 8 million square kilometres. However, the melting drastically increased in recent years due to the impact of the global climate changes of 21<sup>st</sup> century.

As for flora and fauna, the Arctic region is a unique ecosystem. Its specific characteristic is the ability to adapt to the dismal conditions of permanent low temperatures, polar nights and the landscape of permafrost and ice. Many types of unique fishes, birds, marine mammals, land animals and plants may be found in the Arctic. Majority of them are endemic species, such as polar bear, arctic wolf, snowy owl or several arctic fishes. There are even ice-specific ecosystems, such as special bacteria, viruses, unicellular algae, diatom chains, worms and crustaceans.<sup>113</sup> All the species had to adapt to the very specific conditions of the region in the past. However, the extreme specialization of the Arctic ecosystem made it vulnerable to any changes to the environment. Even minor environmental changes can endanger the existence of the regional species. Professors at the University of Washington Christopher Krembs and Jody Deming explain the importance of sea ice for the polar marine ecosystems: firstly, it provides a habitat for algae, invertebrates and fish; secondly, natural ice melt favours the water bloom, which is important for microorganisms and the overall productivity of polar seas. Drastic ice melt due to climate changes can therefore be considered as a severe threat to the ecosystem.<sup>114</sup>

Previously abandoned, frozen region became an important topic in the Arctic States policy in recent decades. Besides the rich and specific ecosystem, the Arctic hides enormous natural resources, especially hydrocarbons. Oil and gas attract attention of the counties, particularly in time of high energy demand. The Arctic shipping routes are also attractive as a measure to shorten the traditional trade routes between Asia and Northern Europe. The potential

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<sup>113</sup> Krembs, Christopher, and Jody Deming. 2011. "Sea Ice: A Refuge For Life In Polar Seas?". Online. Pmel Arctic Zone. [Accessed: January 29, 2019] [https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/arctic-zone/essay\\_krembsdeming.html](https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/arctic-zone/essay_krembsdeming.html).

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

economic development of the Arctic, such as intensive exploitation of hydrocarbon resources, development of transport, and the extraction of biological resources may endanger the Arctic ecosystems.

The Arctic nature is much more vulnerable compared to other regions of the world. Human activities should therefore take into account that the ecological systems of the Far North are unstable due to their low productivity. They are easy to damage but then extremely slow to restore after an external influence. Besides, the Arctic ecosystem is not isolated from the other ecosystems. Any negative impact on the region will be easily transferred to the rest of the world. Arctic states are aware of this; therefore, they recognize responsible environmental policies as a precondition for sustainable economic activities of states and transnational companies in the Arctic.

### *National conditions*

The 20<sup>th</sup> century in the Russian Arctic can be considered as an industrial era. The Soviet Union started to develop the Russian Arctic in the 1920s – 1930s. During this period a wide range of government activities was launched to study and develop the Far North. In 1931 the first industrial oil field in the Russian north was discovered, its exploration started just few years later. In 1932 under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Main Directorate of the NSR (Glavsevmorput) was created. This organization was entrusted with economic development of the Arctic and provision of navigation along the NSR from the White Sea to the Bering Strait. The aim to promote shipping along the NSR was successful, the amount of regional supply cargo shipped on this route was eminent.

In 1930s – 1940s, people were forced, using the Gulag system, to work in the Arctic region. During these years, many Russia Arctic ports (Igarka, Dikson, Pevek, Tiksi) and cities (Naryan-Mar, Norilsk, Vorkuta) were build.<sup>115</sup> In 1960s the largest oil and gas fields in the region were discovered: Urengoyskoye (1966), Yamburgskoye (1969), Bovanenkovskoye (1971). The massive construction of the Arctic maritime vessels and nuclear-powered icebreakers started at that time. The development of the region was oriented on raw materials extraction (oil, gas, coal, ferrous and non-ferrous metal ores), which formed 12-15 % of the

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<sup>115</sup> TASS-DOS'E. 2017. "Istoriya Osvoeniya Rossijskoj Arktiki. Dos'e". Online. TASS. [Accessed: February 17, 2019] <https://tass.ru/info/2205534>.

country's GDP and provided about a quarter of its exports.<sup>116</sup> Unfortunately, the environmental protection in the Arctic region was not a priority during the Soviet rule.

Soviet Union formally participated in large-scale environmental agreements. Environmental sphere was one of few possible areas of international cooperation between the USSR and the West. Extend of the cooperation can be demonstrated by the number of agreements Russia inherited in 1990s as USSR's successor state. It became a party to 30 bilateral environmental agreements and to 25 international environmental protection regimes.<sup>117</sup> There were bilateral, trilateral or multilateral initiatives. The reality was, however, different.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Arctic region was strongly hit by the economic crisis. Workers and polar explorers began to leave the region. Many ports, cities and maritime vessels were left abandoned. All the deserted infrastructure and waste were left behind. The AZRF was most economically developed among the Arctic nations and as a result it was also the most polluted one. According to estimates, the Russian Arctic coastal zone still hides up to 4 million tons of industrial and construction debris and few million tons of steel barrels formerly used for oil products.<sup>118</sup>

For example, the Andreeva Bay, located near Murmansk, used to serve as a radioactive waste repository in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The maintenance of the facility was neglected for many years. It remained full of canisters of spent nuclear fuel, which could in case of leakage radioactively contaminate the whole area. The risk was eliminated with an international assistance only in 2017. Dozens of other radioactive waste repositories, ports, mines, nuclear submarines and factories are waiting to be dismantled to prevent an ecological disaster. The large Soviet industrialization of the AZRF left many problems for future generations. Nowadays, Russia and the Arctic states are facing many of these heritages, which must be solved to prevent an environmental catastrophe.

The real environmental cooperation for Russia started only in late 1990s with the establishment of the Arctic Council. In 1996 the first Arctic organization to combat

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<sup>116</sup> Sokolov, Y. 2013. "Arktika: K Probleme Nakoplenno Ekologicheskogo Ushcherba". Online. *Arktika: Ekologiya I Ekonomika* 2 (10): 18-27. [Accessed: September 4, 2019] [http://en.ibrae.ac.ru/docs/2\(10\)/018\\_027\\_ARKTIKA\\_2.pdf](http://en.ibrae.ac.ru/docs/2(10)/018_027_ARKTIKA_2.pdf).

<sup>117</sup> Makarov, Igor A. 2016. "Russia's Participation In International Environmental Cooperation". *Strategic Analysis* 40 (6): 536-546. [Accessed: September 22, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.1224062>.

<sup>118</sup> Sokolov, Y. 2013. "Arktika: K Probleme Nakoplenno Ekologicheskogo Ushcherba". Online. *Arktika: Ekologiya I Ekonomika* 2 (10): 18-27. [Accessed: September 4, 2019] [http://en.ibrae.ac.ru/docs/2\(10\)/018\\_027\\_ARKTIKA\\_2.pdf](http://en.ibrae.ac.ru/docs/2(10)/018_027_ARKTIKA_2.pdf).

environmental pollution in the region was created. The Arctic Council consists of eight Arctic states, which have rights to make decisions within this organization. The work within the Arctic Council Working Groups is focused on the environmental protection of the Arctic region and on cleaning up of the AZRF. Many projects are intended to overcome the legacy of the Soviet Union and to create a legal base for a sustainable economic development of the region under the environmentally friendly conditions. Nowadays, the Council is the only multilateral organization, which encourage Arctic states to protect the fragile Arctic ecosystems.

### *National interests*

Development of the AZRF is often considered by the Russian Government as a megaproject that can become a key driver of the country's future economic growth. Nowadays, intensification of the economic activities in the Arctic is becoming more and more associated with its ecological aspects. Business and political elite recognize that non-conformity with the ecological standards might impact not only the Arctic nature but can have negative impact on the economic development itself, not mentioning the impact on living conditions of the Arctic population.

A healthy ecosystem, preservation of unique flora and fauna, prevention of emergencies in the area of the NSR and in places of natural resources development in the Russian continental shelf are extremely important tasks. They can be secured only by coordinated work of the regional authorities of the Russian North and the state authorities.

Russia's legal base of the intention to protect the environment were underlined in the *2008 Foundations*, which provide the main goals, strategic priorities and mechanisms for implementing the state policy of the RF in the Arctic. "Preservation of unique ecological systems of the Arctic" is one of the main priorities of the Russian Arctic Strategy. *2008 Foundations* then concretize the main goal in the sphere of environmental security as follows: "preservation and maintenance of environment protection of the Arctic, liquidation of ecological consequences of economic activities in the conditions of increasing economic activity and global changes of climate".<sup>119</sup> *2008 Foundations* further provide a special measures for maintenance of environmental security in the AZRF such as monitoring of pollution,

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<sup>119</sup> Medvedev, Dmitry. "Osnovy Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii V Arktike Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dal'neyshuyu Perspektivu" [Foundations Of The State Policy Of The Russian Federation In The Arctic For The Period Until 2020 And Beyond]". Online. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. (4877) [Accessed: December 2, 2018] <https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html>.

elimination of toxic industrial waste, restoration of the nature, or ensuring safe living conditions for the local population.<sup>120</sup>

To ease realization of the Arctic environmental protection the *Strategic Program of Action for Environmental Protection of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation* was released in 2009.<sup>121</sup> This document was developed with an aim to ensure preservation and protection of the natural environment of the Arctic eliminating the negative environmental consequences of economic and other activities in the context of increasing economic activity and global climate change.

According to the LI theory, the national interests are formed under influence of social domestic groups. First two national priorities (the NSR and the hydrocarbons development) presented interests of Russian business groups and political elite, which directly gain benefits from the economic development of the Arctic. The state companies Gazprom and Rosneft, as well as state authorities are highly interested in the development of oil and gas, because of high revenues from this sector. The environmental protection, however, is a completely different topic in Russia.

There are no powerful elite or political groups, which publicly promote the environmental protection over the economic benefits. For example, in 2005 the President of the Centre for Russian Environmental Policy Aleksey Yablokov stated, - “the ideology in Russia is that environmental protection is only for rich countries, and that when Russia is rich, it will be time to solve environmental problems”.<sup>122</sup> Literally, Russian political elite do not consider, that the environment is a primary priority. On the other hand, they recognize, that something should be done to prevent an ecological disaster.

In the last few years the Russian approach is slowly changing. As an example, can serve the Russian initiative to create The International Arctic Forum. The Third Forum, which gathered participants in Salekhard, Russia in 2013 was completely dedicated to environmental safety in the Arctic. Russian authorities started to think about the consequences of the unreasonable economic development, especially when they see how much affords is needed to

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> *Strategicheskaya Programma Dejstvij Po Ohrane Okruzhayushchej Sredy Arkticheskoy Zony Rossijskoj Federacii*. 2009. Online. Moscow: Morskaya kollegiya pri Pravitel'stve Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: August 22, 2019] <https://docplayer.ru/37698590-Strategicheskaya-programma-deystvij-po-ohrane-okruzhayushchey-sredy-arkticheskoy-zony-rossiyskoj-federacii.html>.

<sup>122</sup> Dresen, F. Joseph. 2011. “Economic Growth And Environmental Security In Russia”. Online. Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars. [Accessed: February 9, 2019] <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/economic-growth-and-environmental-security-russia>.

clean up the historically polluted areas. They try to implement measures to prevent pollution in future, while developing new hydrocarbon deposits and operating the NSR.

State authorities realize environmental aspects of the region and they even promote national projects. Since 2012 the project “general cleaning” of the Arctic territory is conducted by the Russian Government. The project has a goal to clean Novosibirsk Islands and the Franz Josef Land, the most polluted area in the Russian Arctic.<sup>123</sup> So far, 80 thousand tons of waste have been removed from the region, said Putin at the plenary meeting of the Fifth International Arctic Forum.<sup>124</sup>

### *Challenges*

Regarding the environmental protection of the Arctic region, Russia faces many challenges which need to be addressed. Firstly, Russian Government needs to solve its old legacy of the Soviet area. After that it can focus on new sustainable development of the area. To do so a comprehensive and practical legal framework for environmental protection will be needed. Finally, Russian environmental obligations are extremely wide, therefore it should be open to international cooperation in this sphere, which would help it to deal with this task.

Firstly, Russia needs vast financial resources to clean up the currently polluted shores of northern seas. The region has large nuclear heritage sites associated with the activities of the military and civil nuclear fleets, as well as other radiation hazardous facilities.<sup>125</sup> A particular problem is the potential contamination of the Russian Arctic by technogenic radionuclides. Ecosystems of the White, Barents and Kara Seas are experiencing a particularly strong anthropogenic impact. The goal for Russia should be to clean the already existing pollution and create conditions and legal base for future, in order to prevent any ecological disaster.

Secondly, Russia has an acute shortage of new competitive and environmentally friendly industrial technologies for the sustainable development of the Arctic. Before proceeding in its economic interests Russia must develop appropriate technologies for the hydrocarbon extraction under the challenging climate conditions. To conduct bulk-scale mining in the region and preserve the regional biodiversity, new technologies for production and

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<sup>123</sup> Lenta ed. 2017. “Na Ochistku Arktiki Ot Musora V 2017 Godu Vydelyat 1,69 Milliarda Rublej”. Online. Lenta. [Accessed: September 7, 2019] <https://lenta.ru/news/2017/08/02/savethearctic/>.

<sup>124</sup> RIA Novosti ed. 2019. “Rossiya Uzhe Neskol'ko Let Provodit General'nyu Uborku Arktiki, Zayavil Putin”. Online. Ria Novosti. Moscow. [Accessed: August 24, 2019] <https://ria.ru/20190409/1552515525.html>.

<sup>125</sup> Solov'yanov, Alexander. 2011. “O Sohranении Prirodnoj Sredy Arkticheskoy Zony Rossijskoj Federacii”. Online. *Arktika. Ekologiya I Ekonomika* 1 (1): 95. [Accessed: September 16, 2019] [http://www.ibrae.ac.ru/images/stories/ibrae/arktika\\_magazine/94-103\\_solovyanov.pdf](http://www.ibrae.ac.ru/images/stories/ibrae/arktika_magazine/94-103_solovyanov.pdf).

transportation are crucial. In 2017 published *Executive Order on the Russian Federation Economic Security Strategy until 2030* reflects that the development of “green technologies” is a challenge for the regional development. Russia is currently not able to create or use green technologies in the Arctic.<sup>126</sup>

Thirdly, many experts point out that there is no appropriate legal framework for the Arctic environmental protection. Deputy Director at Russian Research Institute of Environmental Protection Alexander Solov'yanov in his article says, that Russia adopted about 40 documents intended to protect the environment in the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, most of these documents do not take into account the specifics of the Arctic's natural and climatic conditions.<sup>127</sup> The author underlined that there is no common approach to the permissible anthropogenic impact on the Arctic ecosystems, no reasonable requirements for the activities of economic entities in the Russian Arctic, as well as no environmentally friendly technologies required for the oil and gas extraction. Professors of Law Sergej Bogolubov and Irina Krasnova also point out that, the legal framework for the Arctic region and its environment sector is underdeveloped in Russia.<sup>128</sup> Legal regulations are fragmented, sometimes to resolve the issues, several normative legal acts or individual norms must be implemented. Some aspects of the Arctic natural environment protection generally fell out of the legal system. Authors underline, that the legal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions control starts to be developed, however, the oil spill response is completely out of legal framework.

Finally, Russia is unable to manage its planned economic development with the respect to ecological standards alone. Russia has enormous Arctic territory and it is not able to develop vast natural resources and prevent a damage of the ecosystems without a help of its foreign partners. To conclude, Russia can use international cooperation to solve most of the sooner mentioned challenges. Cooperation can bring so much required funding, new technologies and legislative framework.

To summarise, for many years Russia considered the Arctic region purely as a military and economically area. As a result, the environment of the territory was significantly damaged.

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<sup>126</sup> Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii: *O Strategii Ekonomicheskoj Bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii Na Period Do 2030 Goda*. Online. Moscow: Prezident Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: February 7, 2019] <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201705150001.pdf>.

<sup>127</sup> Solov'yanov, Alexander. 2011. “O Sohranении Prirodnoj Sredy Arkticheskoj Zony Rossijskoj Federacii”. Online. *Arktika. Ekologiya I Ekonomika* 1 (1): 96. [Accessed: September 16, 2019] [http://www.ibrae.ac.ru/images/stories/ibrae/arktika\\_magazine/94-103\\_solovyanov.pdf](http://www.ibrae.ac.ru/images/stories/ibrae/arktika_magazine/94-103_solovyanov.pdf).

<sup>128</sup> Bogolyubov, Sergey. 2018. “Pravo I Spasenie Prirody Rossijskoj Arktiki”. *Aktual'nye Problemy Rossijskogo Prava* 6 (91): 178-190. [Accessed: May 27, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.17803/1994-1471.2018.91.6.178-190>.

Many consequences of the intensive usage during the Soviet era remains up to today. Described way of thinking has changed just few years ago. Actual environmental politics was implemented, and several national projects were initiated. Russia is currently facing many challenges to protect its environment. Most of them can be solved or at least mitigated through an effective international cooperation.

In this chapter, three main Russian Arctic interests were identified: the development of the NSR, the extraction of the hydrocarbon resources and the preservation of unique Arctic ecosystem. First two were considered important for Russia's economy, the third one, however, was neglected for years. Nowadays, Russia recognizes the crucial role of the environmental protection as a basic precondition to turn its other Arctic goals into reality. Unfortunately, Russia is not able to secure the environmental protection alone. For this reason, it seeks international cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally. Multilateral cooperation will be analysed within the Arctic Council.

## 4. The Arctic Institutionalism

With the emerging role of the Arctic in recent decades, a need for institutional body aroused. According to the LI theory, such organization should be welcomed by states, because it makes the cooperation more efficient. It creates a legal framework for functional partnership in the region as well as platform for sharing information. This helps to prevent chaotic scramble for natural resources and shipping routes, to facilitate the conflict resolution of overlapping territorial claims in the region and also to create favourable conditions for Arctic development. One of the essential topics of the Arctic cooperation is the environmental protection and preservation of the unique Arctic ecosystems.

Already in 1990s, the Arctic states started to create bilateral, trilateral and multilateral agreements for the environmental protection, pollution prevention and biodiversity preservation. Further development of the Arctic was influenced by several factors. First one is the beginning of the Glasnost in the USSR and the Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk in 1987, in which he advocated for greater cooperation in the Arctic and for creation of a so-called "zone of peace".<sup>129</sup> Later events, such as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, the catastrophic Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989 urge forward the discussion about creation of a special environmental protection regime in the region. At the meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland in September 1989, eight countries agreed to work together on scientific projects and established mutual affords against environmental pollution and possible environmental disasters, which may happen in the rapidly changing Arctic. For the first time in history Russia, Canada, the United States and five Scandinavian countries undertook an action to launch cooperative activities. *The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (1991 Strategy)* was adopted in 1991.<sup>130</sup> This strategy introduced a creation of a working group - the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), which was aimed to monitor changes in the maritime Arctic environment and ecosystems, and to oversee the anthropogenic pollutants in all components of the Arctic environment.<sup>131</sup> This initiative was further implemented as a Working Group in the later established Arctic Council.

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<sup>129</sup> Nowlan, Linda. 2001. *Arctic Legal Regime For Environmental Protection*. Online. 1st ed.. 7. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, The World Conservation Union. [Accessed: August 24, 2019] <https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/EPLP-044.pdf>.

<sup>130</sup> *Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy*. 1991. Online. Rovaniemi, Finland. [Accessed: March 4, 2019] [http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic\\_environment.pdf](http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf).

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

This *1991 Strategy* was further developed and led in 1996 to establishment of the Arctic Council – the intergovernmental environmental high-level forum. Despite the fact, that an institutional body with legislative, budgetary and supervisory responsibilities was not created within this organization until today, because there is no consensus between all Arctic actors to do so, the Arctic Council should be considered as the most influential Arctic organization. It is also the only body which connects all the regional actors. Because of its exceptional role, Russian cooperation will be studied in this thesis within this international organisation.

#### 4.1. The Arctic Council

The Arctic Council became an outgrowth of the *1991 Strategy*. The involved countries felt a need for expansion of the originally introduced platform for environmental cooperation and therefore, the Arctic Council was established by Ottawa Declaration in 1996 as an intergovernmental high-level forum. It became the only multilateral body to address the environmental changes in the time of the global warming. The military, economic, security and other issues were out of the scope of this organisation and were therefore discussed between Arctic actors on the bilateral level. Nowadays, the Arctic Council is the leading intergovernmental forum, which promotes cooperation between member states in issues of sustainable development and environmental protection.

There are three groups of the Arctic Council participants. Firstly, the group of eight so-called Arctic states: Norway, the United States, Canada, Russia, the Kingdom of Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. First five of them are coastal Arctic states with a direct access to the Arctic Ocean. Last three countries have no access to the Arctic Ocean, however, they consider themselves as the Arctic states thanks to their territorial location within the Arctic Circle and historical belonging to the Arctic territories. The second group consists of several organizations, which represent interests of the Arctic indigenous people. They have a status of permanent Arctic Council participants. Those are: the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North and the Saami Council.<sup>132</sup> The last group can be formed by the non-Arctic countries, intergovernmental, interparliamentary and non-governmental actors, which have status of observers in the Arctic Council. There are currently thirteen non-Arctic states (eight European and five Asian countries), which participate in the Arctic Council meetings without a voting right and without involvement in the Working Groups. The European Union has a pending

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<sup>132</sup> *The Arctic Council: A Background*. 2015. Online. The Arctic Council. [Accessed: May 25, 2019] <https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us>.

observer status, which means, that its representatives must ask for permission to participate in each meeting. The participation of the EU in the Arctic Council met a dissatisfaction of some Council members, due to the EU ban on seals production<sup>133</sup> and a threat of an associated increased impact of NATO on the Arctic affairs.<sup>134</sup>

Every two years since the establishment of the Arctic Council, the Chairmanship of this organization rotates among members. Each country uses the Chairmanship to promote its interests. For example, Canada during its Chairmanship (2013-2015) presented as its main priority an improvement of indigenous people quality of life. Several projects concerning that issue were initiated in that period. During the United States Chairmanship (2015-2017), the Arctic cooperation was strongly promoted. For example, the joint search and rescue (SAR) operations improvement was an important topic, as well as the Arctic tourism development. Finland Chairmanship (2017-2019) advocated for environmental protection. Currently the Chairmanship in the Arctic Council is held by Iceland, it plans to promote sustainable development, use of green energy and strengthening of the Arctic Council role.<sup>135</sup> Russia will be the next to take over the Chairmanship in the Arctic Council in 2021.

The Arctic Council was initially created for environmental protection in the region. However, so far it is the only functional regional body for political cooperation in the region, which bundles all the Arctic states. Countries cooperate on three levels: Ministerial, Senior Arctic Officials and Working Groups. On Ministerial level countries meet every two years to determine future activities and to officially sign arranged documents. On Senior Arctic Officials level countries meet once a year (sometimes more often) to review and monitor progress of the Working Groups. Within the Working Groups meetings are conducted several times a year for regular work.

In order to monitor the ongoing regional trends, six Working Groups were created within the Arctic Council. They meet on regularly basis to solve emerging problems and to create the legal framework for the member states. The Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) focuses on the sustainable development of the region. It aims at protection of the unique culture, health and economies of the Arctic population, which represents the environmental sustainability.

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<sup>133</sup> *Trade In Seal Products*. 2019. Online. European Commission. [Accessed: November 30, 2019] [https://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal\\_welfare/seals/seal\\_hunting.htm](https://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal_welfare/seals/seal_hunting.htm).

<sup>134</sup> Hunter, Tina. 2017. "Russian Arctic Policy, Petroleum Resources Development And The Eu: Cooperation Or Coming Confrontation?". *The European Union And The Arctic*, September, 172-199. [Accessed: April 4, 2019] [https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004349179\\_008](https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004349179_008).

<sup>135</sup> *Together Towards A Sustainable Arctic: Iceland's Arctic Council Chairmanship 2019-2021*. 2019. Online. the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Iceland. [Accessed: October 20, 2019] <https://www.government.is/library/01-Ministries/Ministry-for-Foreign-Affairs/PDF-skjol/Arctic%20Council%20-%20Iceland's%20Chairmanship%202019-2021.pdf>.

The Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) promotes the emission and pollution reduction. Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group (EPPR) provides the basis for cooperation in solving environmental emergencies. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) is a body which was originally created already under *1991 Strategy*. It oversees changes in the maritime Arctic environment and ecosystems. The Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Group (PAME) controls the impact of the state's activities on the maritime environment. The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (CAFF) focuses on biodiversity maintenance.<sup>136</sup> Basically, all those Working Groups are constantly working on joint projects and development of new legal base for the environmental and social cooperation among the member states with aim to create commonly acceptable regulations that will facilitate favourable conditions for the regional development.

From governance point of view, members do not delegate part of their rights to the Arctic Council. Such a close cooperation was still not established among the Arctic actors. Arctic Council is a forum, its members cannot be forced to follow Council's guidance and participation is based on personal accountability of the members. Moreover, the forum had no pre-set budget until recently. Traditionally, the projects are financially supported by member states, international banks or private funds. In 2014 the Arctic Council Project Support Instrument (PSI) was created.<sup>137</sup> This facility finances the climate-related projects for pollution prevention. It is managed by the international financial institution NEFCO. Arctic members can contribute to the fund. Finland, the United States, Iceland and Norway financed the PSI, however, it finally became operational when Russia made a large contribution. In June 2019, the fund comprises of 12 million EUR, out of which 10 million EUR has been contributed by Russia. The primary phase of PSI work focuses on providing support and introduction of environmentally friendly solutions (primarily in AZRF).<sup>138</sup> It is planned to use 40 % of PSI fund on projects related to hazardous waste and persistent organic pollutants and 25 % on elimination of mercury pollution.<sup>139</sup>

One of the reasons, why a closer cooperation was still not formed, is the opposing position of the United States, which stand against giving wide range of rights to the Arctic Council. Furthermore, the United States also stand against the *UNCLOS*, which is the only international law

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<sup>136</sup> *The Arctic Council: A Background*. 2015. Online. The Arctic Council. [Accessed: May 25, 2019] <https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us>.

<sup>137</sup> Boj , Ulf. 2019. "Arctic Council Project Support Instrument Psi". Online. Nefco. [Accessed: May 25, 2019] <https://www.nefco.org/fund-mobilisation/funds-managed-by-nefco/arctic-council-project-support-instrument-psi/>.

<sup>138</sup> NEFCO ed. 2019. "Our Funds And How They Work Together". Online. Nefco. 2019. [Accessed: November 6, 2019] <https://www.nefco.org/fund-mobilisation/our-funds-and-how-they-work-together/>.

<sup>139</sup> TASS ed. 2017. "Ledyanoj Konsilium: Chto My Znaem O Roli Rossii V Arkticheskom Sovete". Online. Tass. [Accessed: March 1, 2019] <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4231363>.

regulating division of the Arctic Ocean maritime spaces. Another reason may be, that the protocols and assessments documents, which are produced by the Working Groups do not indicate offenders or non-compliance with environmental standards. Such work approach is welcomed by the members because it does not raise controversial issues regarding regulations in the Arctic region. Despite those facts, the Arctic Council is pivotal political body for now. Therefore, Arctic states have the only opportunity to conduct multilateral meetings within the Arctic Council.

Development of international legal framework for the real actions for the environmental protection began relatively recently. So far, as a result of co-operative efforts within the Arctic Council, eight member states adopted three major agreements: in 2011 *Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic*, in 2013 *Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic* and in 2017 *Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation*. In the following part, these fundamental documents will be analysed in detail.

#### 4.1.1. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic

Since the rapid ice melt, there is an increase of activities in the Arctic, such as transportation, development of the natural resource deposits, scientific research and data collection and even Arctic tourism. Working and conducting navigation under the challenging climate conditions, people face risks. In case a marine vessel gets stuck in the ice, an ordinary SAR may not handle the rescue mission under the harsh climate. In November 2008, during the Senior Arctic Officials meeting in Norway, the United States came up with a proposal to create an agreement for joint activities over the SAR operations in the Arctic polar spaces.<sup>140</sup>

After a several meeting of the Commission for the negotiating an international cooperation over SAR, an agreement was adopted. *Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (the 2011 SAR Agreement)* was signed under the auspices of the Arctic Council in May 2011, during the Ministerial meeting in Greenland.<sup>141</sup> The agreement determines rights and obligations of the Council's members and specify actions, which should be performed during the SAR operations.

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<sup>140</sup> *Meeting Of Senior Arctic Officials 19-20 November 2008: Final Report*. 2008. 6. Online. Kautokeino, Norway: The Arctic Council. [Accessed: September 21, 2019] [https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/862/ACSAO-NO04\\_Final\\_Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/862/ACSAO-NO04_Final_Report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y).

<sup>141</sup> *Agreement On Cooperation On Aeronautical And Maritime Search And Rescue In The Arctic*. 2011. Online. Greenland: The Arctic Council. [Accessed: May 11, 2019] <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531>.

Several Arctic SAR agreements on a bilateral basis existed before *the 2011 SAR Agreement*. Legal Officer at UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Yoshinobu Takei in his article analyses the common features between previous multilateral and some bilateral agreements and the comprehensive *2011 SAR Agreement* concluding, that much was summarized and transferred from the older documents.<sup>142</sup> In short, the SAR Agreement was created on existed cooperation and provides a general framework for the operations in the region.

The main contribution of this document is the fundamental approach to the SAR operations for the entire Arctic territory and considering participation of all Arctic members. Moreover, according to the agreement, the states are obliged to conduct joint activities. The adoption of this document became a first serious step on the way to strengthen cooperation and coordination in the Arctic region, not only in the environmental sphere. Furthermore, it promotes mutual collaborative actions in spheres such as: exchange of experience, information sharing, joint SAR exercises and trainings, techniques and equipment sharing, personnel sharing and joint research initiatives. Arctic Council officially encourages its members to adopt commonly accepted regulations for the SAR operations, which can be understood as a proof of the increasing importance of the Council in the future Arctic governance.

This multilateral agreement was already put into practice. In its framework, the SAR exercises Arctic Zephyr in October 2015 were conducted. The aim was to test the command and communication among the Arctic states. The joint exercises showed many weaknesses in cooperation, such as underdeveloped mechanism of communication, logistic support and planning.<sup>143</sup> The identified weaknesses should be improved through the EPPR Working Group, which originally developed the document. Since 2017, the joint SAR operations of the Arctic States under the auspices of the Arctic Council are not conducted. States prefer regional and bilateral SAR operations. It is expected that, it will remain so until a more concrete improvements of the agreement will be done and until SAR exercises will become regular. This does not mean that the agreement is useless, time is simply needed for states to understand the advantages of the multilateral SAR over the bilateral one.

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<sup>142</sup> Takei, Yoshinobu. 2013. "Agreement On Cooperation On Aeronautical And Maritime Search And Rescue In The Arctic: An Assessment". *Aegean Review Of The Law Of The Sea And Maritime Law* 2 (1-2): p. 85. [Accessed: September 4, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12180-013-0026-9>.

<sup>143</sup> Sydnes, Are Kristoffer, Maria Sydnes, and Yngve Antonsen. 2017. "International Cooperation On Search And Rescue In The Arctic". Online. *Arctic Review On Law And Politics* 8 (September): 109-136. [Accessed: September 17, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v8.705>.

#### 4.1.2. Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic

Ongoing development of the Arctic hydrocarbons deposits brings certain risks for the environment, for example of oil spills. Such pollution accident may cause a danger to the Arctic ecosystem, destroy marine area, bio-resources and fish stocks. The Arctic Council's member states are aware of this risk and for this reason they created another common agreement with an aim to increase coordination among Arctic actors in protecting the Arctic environment.

During the meeting in Sweden in May 2013, eight member states signed an *Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic*.<sup>144</sup> Previously mentioned EPPR Working Group developed a guideline for this agreement. The final version was then a result of a task force work, in which all the Council members participated. The aim of the document is to strengthen cooperation in communication between Arctic states, which are developing the continental shelf, to prevent the regional oil pollution.<sup>145</sup>

The agreement says that relevant countries are obliged to perform collaborative actions, exchange information with each other, monitor activities and carry out training. The document was finally ratified by all parties in 2016. The protracted ratification, however, was not a hindrance for the joint exercises of oil spill preparedness. The first training was organized by Canada in 2014, second exercise was conducted by the United States in June 2016.<sup>146</sup> The last exercise was prepared by Finland in March 2018.<sup>147</sup> Professors of the St. Petersburg University Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin criticize the agreement for its general character, saying, that it is rather a protocol of intent than a full-fledged international treaty.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> *Agreement On Cooperation On Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness And Response In The Arctic*. 2013. Online. Sweden: The Arctic Council. [Accessed: May 11, 2019] <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/529>.

<sup>145</sup> Trigatti, Larry, Ole-Kristian Bjerkemo, and Mark Everett. 2014. "Agreement On Cooperation On Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness And Response In The Arctic". *International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings* 2014 (1): 1485-1496. [Accessed: September 22, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.7901/2169-3358-2014.1.1485>.

<sup>146</sup> Bruns, Patti. 2017. "Ratification Completed For Agreement On Oil Pollution Preparedness And Response". Online. The Arctic Council. [Accessed: April 22, 2019] <https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/401-mospa-ratification>.

<sup>147</sup> *Agreement On Cooperation On Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness And Response In The Arctic (Mospa): 2018 Table-Top Exercise After Action Report*. 2019. 7,15. Online. Emergency Prevention Preparedness and Response. [Accessed: September 5, 2019] [https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2370/2018\\_MOSPATTX\\_AAR\\_Final.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2370/2018_MOSPATTX_AAR_Final.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y).

<sup>148</sup> Konyshev, Valery and Sergunin, Alexandr. 2014. "The Arctic States' Cooperation On Emergency Situations Prevention And Search And Rescue Operations: Problems And Prospects". Online. *Arktika I Sever*, no. 15: p 13. [Accessed: May 6, 2019] <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/sotrudnichestvo-priarkticheskikh-gosudarstv-v-oblasti-predotvrascheniya-chrezvychaynyh-situatsiy-i-poiskovo-spatatelnyh-rabot>.

#### 4.1.3. Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation

Due to the harsh climate condition, the Arctic is poorly explored. There is no definite information about the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, about precise size of hydrocarbons deposits or about real impacts of the ongoing climate changes. Detailed scientific research is crucial precondition for the future Arctic development.

*Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation* was adopted in 2017 during the tenth Ministerial meeting in Alaska and entered into force in 2018.<sup>149</sup> It is the third legal document of the Arctic Council, which aims on enhance scientific cooperation to increase knowledge about the Arctic and improve scientific data sharing. The main contribution of this document is, that it reduces hindrances to international scientific cooperation, and it creates a legal environment for conducting scientific research in the Arctic region. The negotiation over the document took several years. However, they were successfully completed, regardless the deterioration of the political relations between Russian and other member states after the Crimea annexation in 2014.

The agreement was adopted relatively recently, however, a first joint scientific initiative was already created. The Multidisciplinary drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate (MOSAiC) was launched in September 2019 and will last one year. Aim of the expedition to the Central Arctic is to explore the scarcely studied climate processes in the Arctic and broaden knowledge of global climate models. Expedition studies ice conditions, oceanic waters, atmosphere and ecosystems. It is a perfect example of joint actions of the member state. The project is led by Germany, with a support of the United States. Due to the fact, that the expedition is conducted in winter, Russia, Germany, Sweden and China provide their icebreakers. Scientists from different member states will participate - overall 17 countries are involved.<sup>150</sup>

Despite the launched MOSAiC expedition, the success of functioning of the agreement in practice is not obvious yet. The agreement language, for example “the parties shall use best efforts”, creates a lot of grey area and opportunities to avoid the joint activities.<sup>151</sup> It also allows state to deny access for the foreign scientific researchers to its territory.

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<sup>149</sup> *Agreement On Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation*. 2017. Online. The United States: The Arctic Council. [Accessed: May 11, 2019] <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1916>.

<sup>150</sup> *The Mission Of Mosaic*. 2019. Online. The Mosaic. <https://www.mosaic-expedition.org/science/mission/>.

<sup>151</sup> *Agreement On Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation*. 2017. 3. Online. The United States: The Arctic Council. [Accessed: October 4, 2019] <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1916>.

## 4.2. Russian participation in the work of the Arctic Council

Russian Federation was involved in bilateral environmental relations with the majority of Arctic states already long time before the establishment of the Arctic Council. However, Russia was aware of the need for an organization, which would cover the issue on multilateral level and would unite all the countries. It was commonly understood, that involvement of all Arctic states in joint actions to protect the environment of the fragile Arctic region is necessary, because the ecological disasters does not respect borders and any environmental problems have transboundary character. RF was one out of eight founding member states which signed the *Ottawa declaration* to establish the Arctic Council in 1996.

During the first three years 1996-1999, Russian participation in the Arctic Council activities was quite low, which may be explained by the political and economic instability during that time as well as by 1998 financial crises in the country. Russian involvement was, however, needed for efficient cooperation. Research professor at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Elana Wilson Rowe argues that travel costs of the Russian representatives were often covered by the other Arctic members during that period.<sup>152</sup> Professor in political science at Brescia University College Andrew Chater in his article presents a graph showing Russia's participation and activeness in the meetings in 1998-2000. It says, that Russia made just 21 comments during the meetings (Canada 62, Norway 56, Iceland 30, the US 24), average Russian delegation size was 4.75 (the US 37.5, Canada 16, Norway 7.75, Sweden 2) and it sponsored only 4 projects (Norway 10, Canada and the US 7 each, Denmark and Iceland 2 each). Based on this data, it can be concluded, that Russia's participation in 1998-2000 was similar to Nordic members, and the least active among Arctic coastal states.<sup>153</sup>

Starting 2000, the country became more engaged, although, Russia did not announced any new serious initiatives or funded any new projects.<sup>154</sup> The first proposal of the Russian side was a project of the anthropogenic pollution protection in the AZRF, which would focus on elimination of land-based sources of marine pollution. The project, however, was never implemented, because

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<sup>152</sup> Rowe, Elana Wilson. 2009. "Russian Regional Multilateralism". In *The Multilateral Dimension In Russian Foreign Policy*, Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen, 1st ed., 145. New York: Routledge.

<sup>153</sup> Chater, Andrew. 2016. "Explaining Russia's Relationship With The Arctic Council". *International Organisations Research Journal* 11 (4): p.45. [Accessed: August 24, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2016-04-205>.

<sup>154</sup> Rowe, Elana Wilson. 2009. "Russian Regional Multilateralism". In *The Multilateral Dimension In Russian Foreign Policy*, Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen, 1st ed., 145. New York: Routledge.

of its too inward-looking composition which focused only on the Russian Arctic.<sup>155</sup> In the following years, Russia made several proposals in the Arctic Council, however, its initiatives were rarely accepted. Russian passive approach in the organization led the Arctic Council to grant Russia the Chairmanship in 2004 in order to increase its motivation.

In program of its Chairmanship from 2004 to 2006, Russia focused on protection of health of the people living or working within the Arctic Circle, on further development of social infrastructure and on sustainable management of natural resources.<sup>156</sup> The third agenda point was a continuation of the previously implemented Norwegian initiative. Further priorities were the sustainable development, prevention of environmental pollution, climate changes and a preparation for the upcoming International Polar Year 2007-2008. The main idea of the Third International Polar Year was proposed by Russia. This season focused on promotion of the scientific research in the Arctic region. The idea was developed and further mirrored in the third Arctic Council's *Agreement on Scientific Cooperation*, which was adopted later in 2017.

The Russia's Chairmanship was officially concluded at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Salekhard, Russia in October 2006. The Arctic Council provided a detailed overview of the main activities during the 2004-2006 and the implemented projects. During its Chairmanship, Russia initiated around 70 projects in economic, environmental and social spheres (including medical sphere).<sup>157</sup> Cooperation increased in areas of preventing and eliminating consequences of technological disasters and monitoring the radiation situation. The majority of the Russian actions was focused on the AZRF development, for what the country was criticized. From Russian perspective, the country's thinking about the Arctic was mostly inward-oriented, because of the environmentally hazardous heritage from the Soviet Union which had to be solved.

After its Chairmanship Russia became more active within the Working Groups of the Arctic Council. This phenomenon can be demonstrated using data from the Andrew Chater's analysis of Russia's participation in the meetings in 2007-2009. It is obvious, that Russia's participation significantly increased in comparison with the earlier years. It says, that Russia made

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<sup>155</sup> *Russian NPA Arctic Reports*. 2019. Online. PAME. Akureyri, Iceland. [Accessed: September 23, 2019] <https://pame.is/index.php/component/content/article/51-document-library/russian-npa-arctic-reports/99-russian-npa-arctic-reports>.

<sup>156</sup> *Program Of The Russian Federation Chairmanship Of The Arctic Council In 2004-2006*. 2004. Online. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. [Accessed: May 27, 2019] [https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1766/EDOCS-3390-v1-ACMMIS04\\_REYKJAVIK\\_2004\\_6\\_Russian\\_Chairmanship\\_Program.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1766/EDOCS-3390-v1-ACMMIS04_REYKJAVIK_2004_6_Russian_Chairmanship_Program.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y).

<sup>157</sup> *Report Of Senior Arctic Officials To Arctic Council Ministers. Salekhard, Russian Federation*. 2006. 4. Online. The Arctic Council. [Accessed: May 28, 2019] [https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1554/ACMM05\\_Salekhard\\_2006\\_SAO\\_Report\\_to\\_Ministers\\_En.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1554/ACMM05_Salekhard_2006_SAO_Report_to_Ministers_En.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y).

47 comments during the meetings (Canada 21, the US 31, Norway 34, Iceland and Finland 10 each), average Russian delegation size was 11.8 (the US 10.5, Canada 10.8, Norway 17, Sweden 5.3) and Russia sponsored 13 projects (Norway 16, Canada and the US 18 each, Denmark 3 and Sweden 2). In short, Russia participated in Arctic Council meetings equally with other active member states. However, Russian projects were more inward-looking than the other members.<sup>158</sup>

In 2014 all the Arctic members imposed economic sanctions on Russia. Sanctions did not directly target the functioning of the Arctic Council or the environmental affairs between states, however, the Russia's political actions tainted its reputation and negatively influenced the relations between Arctic Council members. For example, in April 2014 Canada and the United States boycotted several meetings of the Arctic Council in Moscow. Canadian Minister of the Environment Leona Aglukkaq said that Canada won't be attending meetings because of Russia's illegal occupation of Crimea.<sup>159</sup> Despite those facts, Russia attended all the meetings of the Arctic Council and participated in the activities of the Working Groups.

The impact of the sanctions can be demonstrated using the latest Andrew Chater's evaluation of Russia's participation in the meetings in 2013-2015. It says, that Russia made 11 comments during the meetings (Canada 30, the US 8, Norway 16, Iceland 1, Finland 6), average Russian delegation size was 1.7 (the US 5.7, Canada 9, Norway 3.3, Sweden 4) and Russia sponsored 21 projects (Norway 29, Canada 29, the US 32, Denmark 11 and Sweden 5).<sup>160</sup> To summarise, Russia's illegal act had an impact on the functioning of the Arctic Council in general. All countries decreased number of their delegates, Russia being the least represented country. Nevertheless, the overall number of projects significantly increased in comparison with previous years as well as Russia's support for them. By doing that, the country actually increased its participation in the Arctic Council.

Despite of the weakening relations between Russia and the other Arctic countries, there are still active joint projects within the Arctic Council. In 2016 the Arctic Council released the *Pacific Arctic Marine Fishes*, an atlas and guide. The guide became a result of work of the Russian-

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<sup>158</sup> Chater, Andrew. 2016. "Explaining Russia's Relationship With The Arctic Council". *International Organisations Research Journal* 11 (4): p. 46. [Accessed: August 24, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2016-04-205>.

<sup>159</sup> The Canadian Press. 2014. "Canada Boycotts Arctic Council Moscow Meeting Over Ukraine". Online. CBC. [Accessed: October 14, 2019] <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-boycotts-arctic-council-moscow-meeting-over-ukraine-1.2611964>.

<sup>160</sup> Chater, Andrew. 2016. "Explaining Russia's Relationship With The Arctic Council". *International Organisations Research Journal* 11 (4): p.48. [Accessed: August 24, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2016-04-205>.

American Long-term Census of the Arctic (RUSALCA) within the CAFF Working Group. The guide provides documentation of the Arctic Ocean's biodiversity and its distribution.<sup>161</sup>

In 2021 Russia will take over the Arctic Council Chairmanship. Ambassador of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nikolay Korchunov said that Russia is currently preparing its program of priorities for 2021-2023. Korchunov said, that Russia will take into account an opinion of the Russian northern regions and will focus on sustainable development.<sup>162</sup>

As a concluding remark, Russia's participation in the Arctic Council was changing over the years. Right after the establishment of the Arctic Council, Russia was not active member of this organization. Its Arctic policies were mostly inward-looking. With the Chairmanship in 2004-2006 its motivation to participate and to sponsor projects increased, its engagement was comparable with the active members, such as Canada or the US. With implementation of the economic sanction, the cooperation within the Arctic Council was disturbed. All the member states started to send less representatives to the joint meetings. However, the number of the Arctic projects increased. Nowadays, it may be assumed, that Russia is an active member of the Arctic Council, it sponsors domestic and international projects, participates in Arctic Council's initiatives and supports its legal documents. To fully understand the nature of Russian role in the Arctic environmental cooperation an analysis of bilateral cooperation with every other Arctic coastal state needs to be performed.

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<sup>161</sup> Mecklenburg, C. W., T. A. Mecklenburg, and B. A. Sheiko. 2016. *Pacific Arctic Marine Fishes*. Online. 1st ed.. Akureyri, Iceland: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna. . [Accessed: September 23, 2019] <https://caff.is/monitoring-series/370-pacific-arctic-marine-fishes>.

<sup>162</sup> TASS ed. 2019. "Rossiya Gotovitsya K Predsedatel'stvu V Arkticheskom Sovete S Uchetom Predlozhenij Regionov". Online. Tass. Saints Petersburg. [Accessed: October 23, 2019] <https://tass.ru/politika/6316421>.

## 5. Interstate cooperation – Russia and Arctic coastal states

Cooperation between Russia and the other Arctic countries in the region started back in 1990s. Intensity of such cooperation was relatively low at that time; however, it was promising. In 1992 Oran Young in his book *Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North* predicted an emerging role of the Arctic as an international region as well as an area for new forms of international cooperation among governmental and nongovernmental entities.<sup>163</sup> Important to mention, that during the last 30 years, cooperation between Arctic actors was highly influenced by the world political and economic events. Political instability after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 2008 global financial crises, 2014 Russian Crimea annexation and following international economic sanctions which were imposed on Russia, negatively influenced regional development. In current Russian policy, the question of possible partners and allies in the strategically important Arctic region is acute. Are there chances to find such partners at the background of increased interest in the Arctic and rising competition in this region?

In this chapter Russian interstate relations with other Arctic actors, costal members of the Arctic Council will be analysed. Namely, cooperation with Canada, the US, Norway and Denmark will be studied. In each sub-chapter a geographical outline and national interests of the certain country will be shortly described, then state's Arctic position and its relations with Russia will be introduced. Finally, examples of interstate cooperation with Russia at multiple levels will be provided.

### 5.1. Russia and Norway in the Arctic region

Norway is an Arctic coastal state and a member of the Arctic Council. Arctic Norway consists of four separated parts geographically divided from each other by the Arctic Ocean: Norwegian mainland, Svalbard, Bjørnøya (Bear Land) and Jan Mayen Island. Approximately half of the country's territory is located in the Arctic. Population of these territories is about 470 hundred thousand people.<sup>164</sup>

So far Norway has released three legal documents concerning its Arctic policy and Arctic national strategy. In 2006 *High North Strategy* was adopted. It underlines seven national key priorities, the most important ones are: sustainability, environmental and cultural protection,

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<sup>163</sup> Young, Oran R. 1992. *Arctic Politics: Conflict And Cooperation In The Circumpolar North*. Hanover: University Press of New England [for] Dartmouth College.

<sup>164</sup> Svendsen, Bård Ivar. 2015. "Norway". Online. Arctic Council. 2015. [Accessed: September 29, 2019] <https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states/norway>.

encouraging development and scientific activities. Important to highlight that environmental protection was stated as a key priority for the Arctic. Besides, strengthening cooperation with Russia was underlined as a national priority in a separate paragraph.<sup>165</sup> It was stated, that maintaining close bilateral relations with Russia, direct neighbour in the Barents Sea, is crucial. Number of upcoming challenges in the Arctic latitudes may be solved only by participation of Russia, on premises of joint cooperation.

In 2009 Norway released *New Building Blocks in the North, the next step in Government's High North Strategy*.<sup>166</sup> The document continued the trend which was set in the Strategy from 2006: it specifically emphasized environmental protection and the cooperation with Russia. On top of that, protection of sovereignty was explicitly stressed out. In 2017 Norway updated its Arctic strategy. Strategic partnership with Russia and environmental protection remain a priority, however, due to new geopolitical conditions few new priorities have been added.<sup>167</sup> Norway plans to ensure environmentally sustainable business development, create digital infrastructure and promote an innovative and sustainable North Norway. Besides cooperation within the Arctic Council and strengthening of its role as a main institutional body in the region was officially promoted.

Norway is a very active member of the Arctic Council; it initiated significant number of projects and the country promotes strengthening the role of the intergovernmental forum. In 2006, Norway took over Arctic Council Chairmanship and held it until 2009. During this period, it was focussing on ecosystem-based management of the natural resources of the Arctic and climate change, it also supported idea of the common SAR Agreement.

The Arctic region is strategically important for both Russia and Norway. They share common maritime borders in the Arctic, they have same interests and priorities in the region: both the countries seek to develop rich Arctic natural resources and hydrocarbon deposits, both of them utilise fisheries in the Northern Seas. However, both countries also want to expand their continental shelf as it is allowed by *UNCLOS* in order to get more economic benefits from the

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<sup>165</sup> *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy*. 2006. Online. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Accessed: September 29, 2019] <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/strategien.pdf>.

<sup>166</sup> *New Building Blocks In The North: Next Step In The Government's High North Strategy*. 2009. Online. 2nd ed. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Accessed: September 12, 2019] [https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/nordomradene/new\\_building\\_blocks\\_in\\_the\\_north.pdf](https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/nordomradene/new_building_blocks_in_the_north.pdf).

<sup>167</sup> *Norway's Arctic Strategy: – Between Geopolitics And Social Development*. 2017. Online. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Accessed: September 14, 2019] <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/fad46f0404e14b2a9b551ca7359c1000/arctic-strategy.pdf>.

development of their EEZs. This led to overlapping claims over the Arctic Ocean's seabed and could be a cause for a severe conflict.

Russia and Norway are, however, exceptional example of Arctic states, which successfully resolved their territorial dispute peacefully, by signing the *Maritime Delimitation Agreement* in 2010.<sup>168</sup> Although the disagreement started already in 1970s, the breakthrough became possible only in 2000s after adoption of *the Ilulissat Declaration* and *Joint Statement on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean*.<sup>169</sup> In those documents countries expressed their determination to improve good neighbourhood and enhanced cooperation. All the affords culminated in September 2010 when the agreement concerning the *Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean* was signed in Murmansk, Russia, putting an end to the long process of negotiations. The treaty sets rules for development of cross border hydrocarbon deposits and exploitation of fish stocks at the Russian-Norwegian maritime border. Adoption of this document became a significant step on a way to strengthen relations between the two countries and promoting cooperation. In addition, the treaty has become a proof of the ability of the Arctic states to constructively resolve their problems through negotiations based on existing international law removing obstacle to bilateral cooperation.

Another conflicting issue may be the "fishery dispute" in Svalbard. In 1977 Norway established a *Maritime Fisheries Protection Zone* in the Svalbard region. This decision met a disagreement from the Russian side. Nowadays, Norway is strengthening its sovereignty over the Svalbard and it implements further environmental measures. Russia considers these measures a restriction on freedom of economic and other activities on the archipelago. Both countries, however, try to avoid overt conflict and lower tensions in order to preserve cooperation in other spheres like oil spill response, SAR operations and mutual scientific research. In other words, both countries manage to prevent escalation of this situation thanks to mutual interest to cooperate from which both countries benefit.

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<sup>168</sup> *Treaty Between The Kingdom Of Norway And The Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation And Cooperation In The Barents Sea And The Arctic Ocean*. 2010. Online. Kingdom of Norway, Russian Federation. [Accessed: September 29, 2019]

[https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/smk/vedlegg/2010/avtale\\_engelsk.pdf](https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/smk/vedlegg/2010/avtale_engelsk.pdf).

<sup>169</sup> *Joint Statement On Maritime Delimitation And Cooperation In The Barents Sea And The Arctic Ocean*. 2010. Online. Oslo: Kingdom of Norway, Russian Federation. [Accessed: August 9, 2019]

[https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/folkerett/030427\\_english\\_4.pdf](https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/folkerett/030427_english_4.pdf).

### 5.1.1. Russia-Norway environmental bilateral cooperation

Russia-Norway Arctic relations in the environmental sphere on bilateral level began already in 1990s. In comparison with interaction between any other Arctic states, the environmental cooperation between these two countries is the closest and the most advanced one. In the period between 1992 and 2000, several agreements were signed, the most important ones will be described more in detail. The first bilateral agreement - *Memorandum on environmental cooperation with Russia* was signed in 1992. Nevertheless, it is important to mention, that it was only an updated version of the previously signed agreement with the USSR.<sup>170</sup> Based on this document the Norwegian-Russian Environmental Commission was founded. This bilateral organisation coordinates the cooperation by organizing meetings every year and monitoring compliance of the joint projects in the region. Both countries are active in the Barents Sea, conduct resource development and other activities, which pose a risk to unified Barents ecosystem, therefore specialized joint projects over maritime protection, pollution reduction and biodiversity preservation are regularly implemented.

One of the most important areas of the cooperation is mitigation of possible oil industry incidents. In 1994 the *Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation on cooperation to combat oil-spills in the Barents Sea* was signed.<sup>171</sup> The document was adopted as a response for increasing exploration activities in the region. Together with the Agreement the Joint Norwegian-Russian Contingency Plan for Oil Spill Response was adopted. In 2014 the agreement was re-signed at the meeting of the Joint Planning Group in Kirkenes, Norway.<sup>172</sup>

*Memorandum on Russian-Norwegian cooperation in the field of nuclear safety* was signed in 1995.<sup>173</sup> Recognizing that nuclear activities can pose a serious threat to human health and the environment, states agreed to expand and deepen regional bilateral and multilateral

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<sup>170</sup> *Postanovlenie: O Podpisanii Soglasheniya Mezhdru Pravitel'stvom Rossijskoj Federacii I Pravitel'stvom Korolevstva Norvegiya O Sotrudnichestve V Oblasti Ohrany Okruzhayushchej Sredy*. 1992. Online. Pravitelstvo Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: September 28, 2019] [http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&link\\_id=38&nd=102017748&intelsearch=](http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&link_id=38&nd=102017748&intelsearch=).

<sup>171</sup> *Postanovlenie: O Podpisanii Soglasheniya Mezhdru Pravitel'stvom Rossijskoj Federacii I Pravitel'stvom Korolevstva Norvegiya O Sotrudnichestve V Bor'be S Zagryazneniem Neft'yu V Barencevom More*. 1994. Online. Pravitelstvo Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: October 3, 2019] <http://ips.pravo.gov.ru/?docbody=&prevDoc=102106416&backlink=1&&nd=102030192>.

<sup>172</sup> *20-Ya Vstrecha Sovmestnoj Gruppy Planirovaniya*. 2014. Online. Sistemy Promyshlennoj Bezopasnosti. Kirkenes. [Accessed: August 22, 2019] <https://www.vipsyst.com/20-ya-vstrecha-rossiya-norvegiya>.

<sup>173</sup> *Memorandum O Rossijsko-Norvezhskom Sotrudnichestve V Oblasti Yadernoj Bezopasnosti*. 1995. Online. Ministerstvo inistrannyh del. [Accessed: September 13, 2019] <http://www.docs2.kodeks.ru/document/902056511>.

cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety and prevent radioactive contamination from nuclear activities.

More concretely, a bilateral *Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway on cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection in connection with recycling of the Russian nuclear submarines taken out of active service in the Northern region* was adopted in 1998.<sup>174</sup> Important to mention, that as a result of this agreement Norway provided non-repayable aid and free technical assistance to Russia in the form of equipment, technology transfer, financial means and services to facilitate the environmentally friendly and economically feasible disposal of Russian nuclear submarines withdrawn from the Russian naval fleet in the northern region.

The SAR cooperation is also covered by bilateral agreements. In 1995 *Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on SAR cooperation in the Barents Sea* was adopted.<sup>175</sup> The main idea of this document is that the countries will provide an assistance in SAR and set conditions for joint operations. The agreement did not establish any organizational body, however, countries are obliged to conduct joint trainings and facilitate practical measures. Marine Rescue Coordination Centre in Murmansk, Russia and the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre North Norway are responsible for organization of the search activities for missing persons and for rescuing people suffering distress in the Barents Sea.<sup>176</sup>

The cooperation in the SAR was further deepened in 2000 by adoption of *Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on cooperation in SAR operations and warning of incidents*.<sup>177</sup> According to this document the two countries agreed to immediately notify each other in case a serious incident occurs or threatens to occur in water or on land in the Barents region. They furthermore

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<sup>174</sup> *Soglashenie Mezhdru Pravitel'stvom Rossijskoj Federacii I Pravitel'stvom Korolevstva Norvegiya O Sotrudnichestve V Oblasti Ohrany Okruzhayushchej Sredy V Svyazi S Utilizaciej Rossijskih Atomnyh Podvodnyh Lodok*. 1998. Online. Pravitel'stvo Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: September 29, 2019] <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/8318663>.

<sup>175</sup> *Soglashenie Mezhdru Pravitel'stvom Rossijskoj Federacii I Pravitel'stvom Korolevstva Norvegiya O Sotrudnichestve Pri Poiske Propavshih Bez Vesti I Spasanii Terpyashchih Bedstvie Lyudej Na Barencevom More*. 1995. Online. Pravitel'stvo Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: September 29, 2019] <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1901171>.

<sup>176</sup> Sydnes, Are Kristoffer, Maria Sydnes, and Yngve Antonsen. 2017. "International Cooperation On Search And Rescue In The Arctic". Online. *Arctic Review On Law And Politics* 8 (September): 109-136. [Accessed: September 17, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v8.705>.

<sup>177</sup> *Memorandum O Ponimanii Mezhdru Pravitel'stvom Rossijskoj Federacii I Pravitel'stvom Korolevstva Norvegiya O Sotrudnichestve V Poiske I Spasanii, A Takzhe Preduprezhdenii O Ser'eznyh Incidentah*. 2000. Online. Pravitel'stvo Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: September 27, 2019] <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901779301>.

pledged to share all available information in such case. Moreover, countries agreed to facilitate cooperation in SAR operations and conduct joint exercises.

### 5.1.2. Realization of cooperation

Intention of bilateral cooperation in environmental sphere did not remain ink on paper. In accordance with a bilateral agreements Norway helped to prevent environmental disaster in Andreeva Bay in Murmansk Oblast in Russia. This area was used as a storage of used nuclear fuel from submarines during the Soviet era. The mutual project started in 2002 with utilization of a radiation-hazardous facility and was finished in 2017 with a construction of an infrastructure for the nuclear waste repository.<sup>178</sup> Thus, one of the sources of water pollution of the Barents Sea was eliminated. Several other projects were realized at the beginning of 2000s, most of them focused on utilization of the old, withdrawn from service Soviet marine vessels, submarines, radiation-dangerous facility and other facilities potentially dangerous for the environment.

Another example is the joint Norwegian-Russian SAR cooperation, which was developed according to the previously mentioned *1995 SAR Agreement*. Despite the fact, that there were bureaucratic, language and motivational problems (especially from the Russian side) at the beginning, the cooperation gradually improved over the course of time.<sup>179</sup> The successful cooperation within the Agreement is based on annual joint exercises. In comparison with the *2011 SAR Agreement*, which was adopted under umbrella of Arctic Council, the bilateral one is more detailed and targets the cooperation on a certain region – the Barents Sea. In this case, the bilateral cooperation is more efficient, communication between states is more frequent than on multilateral level, because the two countries feel direct responsibility for the region they share.

There is also a trilateral collaborative project between Norway, Finland and Russia conducted in the Pasvik watershed area. This area is contaminated by sulphur from Pechenga nickel mine, which damage the nature around. For this reason, the *Pasvik-Inari Trilateral Park* project was created, oriented on nature protection and sustainable tourism.<sup>180</sup> Countries are working on provisions of air quality control; the aim is to reduce pollution and preserve unique biodiversity of this area.

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<sup>178</sup> Evtushenko, Olga. 2017. “Kak Predotvratili Ekologicheskuyu Katastrofu V Arktike”. Online. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 2017. [Accessed: February 8, 2019] [http://www.ng.ru/ng\\_energiya/2017-06-20/15\\_7011\\_arctic.html](http://www.ng.ru/ng_energiya/2017-06-20/15_7011_arctic.html).

<sup>179</sup> Sydnes, Are Kristoffer, Maria Sydnes, and Yngve Antonsen. 2017. “International Cooperation On Search And Rescue In The Arctic”. Online. *Arctic Review On Law And Politics* 8 (September): 123, 125. [Accessed: September 17, 2019] <https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v8.705>.

<sup>180</sup> *Pasvik–Inari Nature And History Shared*. 2007. Online. Oulo: Pasvik Inari Trilateral Park. [Accessed: September 27, 2019] [https://prosjekt.fylkesmannen.no/Documents/Pasvik%20-%20Inari/Dokument/InariPasvik\\_EN\\_web.pdf](https://prosjekt.fylkesmannen.no/Documents/Pasvik%20-%20Inari/Dokument/InariPasvik_EN_web.pdf).

Both Norway and Russian share plans to develop their offshore hydrocarbon resources. Under harsh climate conditions and with a lack of experience of Arctic offshore exploration, incidents of oil spill may occur. This can be also the case of the oil transportation. Large spills may negatively impact vulnerable Arctic ecosystems. For this reason, already in 1994 Norway and Russia adopted agreement and created a joint cooperation to combat possible oil spills in the Barents region. Nowadays, Russia and Norway show an outstanding example of a stable interstate cooperation, sharing experience in oil spill prevention in the Barents Sea region. Joint exercises and meetings are organised every year. Several joint projects are regularly performed, for example Norwegian Coastal Administration with collaboration with the Murmansk municipal authorities initiated in 2013 a shoreline clean-up and training courses for people working in the oil spill response field in the Kirkenes Area.<sup>181</sup>

When the international economic sanctions were imposed on Russia after the Crimea annexation in 2014, Norway joined them. Despite the fact, that sanctions did not directly target the environmental cooperation, it still negatively influenced political dialog between the states. Joint projects based on bilateral framework or within the Arctic Council slowed down. Important to mention, that Norway does not take such a strong position as the United States, Canada or Denmark regarding sanctions implementation. That is one of the reasons, why communication between the two states continues, although at a slower pace. Norway continues to collaborate in sphere of utilization of facilities, withdrawn from an exploitation in the Russian Arctic, it finances scientific projects and conducts annual bilateral SAR operations and trainings.

The ongoing joint SAR exercises were conducted in June 2018. Countries organized an oil spill operation, using a fake oil for training. Besides cooperation in saving people from a sunken fishing boat was tested.<sup>182</sup> The recent operation was conducted in Barents Sea in May 2019. Russian patrol vessels and Norwegian Coast Guard vessels participated in training of finding people in distress at sea and further oil spill clean-up operation.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Sarkova, Olga. 2014. "20 Years Of The Russian-Norwegian Cooperation On Oil Spill Prevention And Response In The Barents Sea". Online. The Oil Spill Response Competence Center In The Arctic. [Accessed: September 12, 2019] <http://osr-arctic.ru/en/analitika/20-years-russian-norwegian-cooperation-oil-spill-prevention-and-response-barents-sea>.

<sup>182</sup> Nilsen, Thomas. 2018. "After Weeks With Separate War Games, Norway And Russia Again Meet At Sea For Joint Sar Exercise". Online. The Barents Observer. [Accessed: September 23, 2019] <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/node/4006>.

<sup>183</sup> Nilsen, Thomas. 2019. "Norway, Russia Team Up For Search And Rescue Exercise In Barents Sea". Online. Eye On The Arctic. [Accessed: September 14, 2019] <https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2019/05/28/norway-russia-search-rescue-exercise-barents/>.

Another example of continuing project is the originally three years project Ocean-3. It is focused on ecosystem monitoring and was conducted in 2012-2015.<sup>184</sup> Recently, it was decided to be further prolonged for period 2016-2018.<sup>185</sup>

Even after the sanctions new projects have been initiated. In 2016 a new collaborative program to improve state of the environment in the Northwest Russia was launched. Nordic countries (including Norway) and Russia participate in this project. The environment is a mutual interest in which wellbeing of all Nordic countries and Russia is interdependent, continuation of the cooperation is therefore highly pragmatic. The program aims on cutting greenhouse gas emissions, improving biodiversity, cleaning up polluted territories and protecting endangered species. It was funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, which focuses on the environmental and climate issues in the Arctic and Barents regions.<sup>186</sup> The Council also organizes the so called “Nordic Weeks” in Northwest region of Russia. It is an annual program focused on different areas of cooperation, such as green economic growth.<sup>187</sup>

In 2019 Norwegian and Russian Climate and Environment Ministers met in the Norwegian-Russian Environment Commission to declare joint affords to fight plastic pollution in the Barents Sea. Norway offered to financially support the project over three years. During the first stage, states will gather knowledge about the plastic pollution situation in the Barents region. The purpose of the project is not just to clean the existing plastic, but also to develop measures to prevent any new pollution. For Russia, it will be an experience of a cooperation in a completely new sphere. Countries agreed to estimate the problem and develop counter measures for plastic pollution.<sup>188</sup> Both Ministers expressed determination to work for the environmental protection despite the political tensions between Russia and the West. Norwegian

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<sup>184</sup> Titov, Oleg V., and Oleg Korneev. 2015. “Final Report 2012-2015 Joint Russian-Norwegian Monitoring Project - Ocean 3”. Online. [Accessed: September 27, 2019] [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273823641\\_Final\\_Report\\_2012-2015\\_Joint\\_Russian-Norwegian\\_Monitoring\\_Project\\_-\\_Ocean\\_3](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273823641_Final_Report_2012-2015_Joint_Russian-Norwegian_Monitoring_Project_-_Ocean_3).

<sup>185</sup> *Russian Norwegian Bilateral Environmental Cooperation On Joint Monitoring (Hav3)*. 2018. Online. Norwegian Polar Institute. [Accessed: September 30, 2019] <https://www.npolar.no/en/projects/details/?pid=207f3a4c-0757-473b-8bf9-b4f738798425#toggle-id-1-closed>.

<sup>186</sup> Orava, Heidi. 2016. “New Nordic-Russian Co-Operation Programme On The Environment And Climate”. Online. Nordic Co-Operation. [Accessed: August 21, 2019] <https://www.norden.org/en/news/new-nordic-russian-co-operation-programme-environment-and-climate-0>.

<sup>187</sup> Rasmussen, Jens Nytoft. 2018. “Information About The Seven Subprogrammes”. Online. Nordic Co-Operation. [Accessed: September 8, 2019] <https://www.norden.org/en/information/informaciya-o-semi-podprogrammakh-information-about-seven-subprogrammes>.

<sup>188</sup> Finne, Arne F. 2019. “Norwegian-Russian Cooperation Against Plastic Pollution In The Barents Sea”. Online. High North News. [Accessed: September 12, 2019] <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/norwegian-russian-cooperation-against-plastic-pollution-barents-sea>.

Environment Minister Ola Elvestuen emphasized, that Russia is a key partner in protecting the environment in the region and countries must therefore work together.<sup>189</sup>

In conclusion, despite different positions of Russia and Norway on Svalbard, both of the countries have many common interests in the Arctic. Thanks to that a constructive attitude and desire to find compromise solutions dominate. The key point in the cooperation was the adoption of the *Delimitation Agreement and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean*. As a result, the potential of turning the two countries into strategic partners in the Arctic becomes more likely than the prospects for new disagreements and conflicts, which cannot, however, be completely excluded.

Two countries share a common maritime border in the Barents region. This is probably the main reason for closer communication. Strengthening cooperation with Russia is underlined in a dedicated paragraph in the Norwegian Arctic Strategy. It can be summarised, that Norway seeks to cooperate mainly with Russia because of two reasons: firstly, Norway sees an economic benefit in cooperation and development of rich hydrocarbon deposits, which are located within the AZRF; secondly, Norway is afraid of environmental disasters, which may be caused by irrational and unsafe activities in the Arctic region. This would affect unified Barents ecosystem and all the Arctic states.

## 5.2. Russia and Canada in the Arctic region

Canada is a coastal Arctic state with nearly one-third of its territory located within the Arctic Circle. The country possesses 25 % of the Arctic region, it is the second largest Arctic territory after the Russian one. More than 100 thousand people live in the polar territories, majority of them are indigenous people. According to the international law, Canada along with other four coastal states, has a right to develop its 200 nautical miles EEZs, however, Canada has pretensions to additional marine spaces.

Canada has implemented several doctrines and laws, which define Canadian Arctic policy in relation to the region. In 2003 Canada ratified the *UNCLOS*, legal document which established the jurisdiction over maritime natural resources, fisheries and transit.<sup>190</sup> Apparently,

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<sup>189</sup> Finne, Arne F. 2019. "Norwegian-Russian Cooperation Against Plastic Pollution In The Barents Sea". Online. High North News. [Accessed: September 12, 2019] <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/norwegian-russian-cooperation-against-plastic-pollution-barents-sea>.

<sup>190</sup> *Compendium Of Canada's Engagement In International Environmental Agreements And Instruments: UN Convention On The Law Of The Sea (Unclos)*. 2018. Online. Minister of Environment and Climate Change. [Accessed: August 27, 2019] <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/documents/pdf/international-affairs/compendium/2018/batch-5/united-nations-convention-law-sea-2018.pdf>.

the most important document concerning the Arctic was presented by the Canadian Government in 2009: *Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Future, Our Heritage*. Facing new challenges and opportunities in the Arctic, strategy sets out four concrete state's priorities: 1) protection of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, 2) promoting the socio-economic development of the Canadian North, 3) environmental protection and adaptation to climate change and 4) improving and devolving Northern governance.<sup>191</sup> Considering the North as a key factor of the Canadian national identity, strategy focuses on developing the northern territories with respect to the indigenous peoples, who live above the Arctic Circle.

Next legal act followed in 2010 when the *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy* was introduced. This document was based on the previous *State's Northern Strategy*, aiming to promote this strategy abroad.<sup>192</sup> In 2019 Canada released the *Arctic Northern Policy Framework*, which updated two older documents: *2009 Canada's Northern Strategy* and *2010 Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy*. The main idea of this document was to define Canadian vision for development of the region until 2030 and at the same time to strengthen international order, which is based on commonly accepted rules, and to increase engagement with the Arctic and non-Arctic states.<sup>193</sup> Based on all the Canadian Arctic-related documents, it can be concluded, that there are two main Canadian priorities: first is to protect the environment and nature of the unique region, second is to ensure a socio-economic development of the country's northern territories.

The main interest of Canada lies in the prospect of developing oil and gas fields. Along with oil and gas deposits, huge reserves of methane hydrate (reserves may last for several hundred years) lie within the Canadian Arctic zone.<sup>194</sup> However, most hydrocarbon reserves on the Canadian shelf are unmined due to the lack of technologies.<sup>195</sup> Apart from natural resources, Canada sees perspective in the Northwest Passage usage. Due to the global warming and associated drastic ice melt, the navigation on the Northwest Passage may increase, Canada

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<sup>191</sup> *Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*. 2009. Online. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada. [Accessed: September 17, 2019] <http://library.arcticportal.org/1885/1/canada.pdf>.

<sup>192</sup> *Statement On Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty And Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad*. 2010. Online. Ottawa: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Canada. [Accessed: September 13, 2019] [http://library.arcticportal.org/1886/1/canada\\_arctic\\_foreign\\_policy-eng.pdf](http://library.arcticportal.org/1886/1/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-eng.pdf).

<sup>193</sup> *Canada's Arctic And Northern Policy Framework*. 2019, Online. Ottawa. Ministry of Crown-Indigenous Relations. [Accessed: November 20, 2019] <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1560523306861/1560523330587>.

<sup>194</sup> National Geographic ed. 2014. "Why Canada Needs To Unlock The Unknowns Of Its Icy Methane Reserves". Online. National Geographic. [Accessed: September 7, 2019] <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/great-energy-challenge/2014/why-canada-needs-to-unlock-the-unknowns-of-its-icy-methane-reserves/>.

<sup>195</sup> Geological Society of America. 2017. "Methane Seeps In The Canadian High Arctic". Online. Science Daily. 2017. [Accessed: August 24, 2019] <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/04/170413140345.htm>.

claims to control this transportation corridor.<sup>196</sup> When the ice melts enough, this transport artery could be used for international and regional shipping along with the NSR, which lies within the AZRF. The Northwest Passage represents a shorter alternative to the traditional shipping routes and its utilization may therefore bring economic benefits.<sup>197</sup>

Along with the other Arctic nations, Canada is a member of the Arctic Council, the intergovernmental forum for environmental protection. Canada is one of the most active members, it implements initiatives, sponsors different projects and promotes the environmental protection.

### 5.2.1. Russia-Canada environmental bilateral cooperation

Both Canada and Russia are the largest Arctic nations, their participation in the Arctic affairs is directly interconnected with the further Arctic sustainable development. The region plays a crucial role in the identity policies of both countries, and political leaders often advocate for “northern identity” and a need to possess Arctic to attract attention and investments to the regional development. Moreover, the countries have similar specific “northern” mentality as regards the Far North; it goes from the need to protect territory and people in the northern regions from the foreign interference.<sup>198</sup>

Russia and Canada share common interests in the Arctic. Firstly, the resource development, since both Canada and Russia have significant deposits of natural resources in the territory. Secondly, the operation of alternative transport corridors (Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage). Both Russia and Canada consider those routes to belong to their internal waters and having corresponding legal status. This idea, however, encounters disagreement of the EU and the US, which claim the routes to fall under international jurisdiction. Thirdly, both countries adhere to the same principle of dividing the Arctic territory. They prefer the so-called sectoral principle, which ensures their control over the Arctic spaces up to the North Pole (a dividing line is drawn from the North Pole along the meridian to the extreme eastern and western points of the continental Arctic coast of Canada). This idea is disputed by some countries (primarily the United States). Final reason for mutual understanding is the similar position in the

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<sup>196</sup> Ferreras, Jesse. 2019. “Canada’s Northwest Passage Claim Isn’t Settled — But It’s Not ‘Illegitimate,’ Like The U.S. Says It Is”. Online. Global News. 2019. [Accessed: October 2, 2019] <https://globalnews.ca/news/5256532/northwest-passage-canada-us-claim-challenge/>.

<sup>197</sup> Struzik, Ed. 2019. “A Northwest Passage Journey Finds Little Ice And Big Changes”. Online. Yale Environment 360. Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies. [Accessed: September 17, 2019] <https://e360.yale.edu/features/a-northwest-passage-journey-finds-little-ice-and-big-changes>.

<sup>198</sup> Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2016. “Canada And Russia – Toward An Arctic Agenda”. Online. Global Brief. [Accessed: September 17, 2019] <https://globalbrief.ca/2016/09/canada-and-russia-toward-an-arctic-agenda/>.

Arctic Council. Both states are promoting creation of closely integrated intergovernmental body, not just a high-level forum.

In 1990s, political dialog between these two countries was gradually intensifying, this period became a stage of an active development and implementation of joint projects in the Arctic. Cooperation, especially on environmental issues was formed at that time both bilaterally and within the Arctic Council. Joint projects focused also on the field of medicine and education. The legal base of Russian-Canadian relations was the *Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North*, signed in 1992. The document aimed to encourage development between the states and between national governmental and non-governmental organizations, business, scientific organizations, firms and other enterprises.<sup>199</sup>

In 1993, Russia and Canada signed comprehensive bilateral document for environmental cooperation. *Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Canada on environmental cooperation* stated, that the parties agreed on cooperation in following areas: environmental issues, including climate change and its effects; air pollution; meteorology and climatology; the protection of marine resources; prevention of pollution; the protection of ecosystems and environmental technology.<sup>200</sup>

Due to the 1998 default and political instability in Russia, the interest of the Canadian partners in Russia practically disappeared in that time. The beginning of a new round of cooperation was laid by a visit of the newly elected President of the RF Putin to Canada in December 2000.<sup>201</sup> During negotiations, an intergovernmental agreement over the Arctic region was signed. In 2000 *Joint statement by Canada and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the Arctic and the North* the main priorities of bilateral cooperation in the Arctic region were reaffirmed. Specifically, countries reconfirmed their determination to promote environmental protection in the Arctic with an aim to ensure suitable living conditions for the local people.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> *Agreement Between The Government Of Canada And The Government Of The Russian Federation On Cooperation In The Arctic And The North*. 1992. Canada: E100317 - CTS 1992 No.18. [Accessed: September 18, 2019] <https://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=100317>.

<sup>200</sup> *Soglashenie Mezhdru Pravitel'stvom Rossijskoj Federacii I Pravitel'stvom Kanady O Sotrudnichestve V Arktike I Na Severe*. 1993. Online. Pravitelstvo Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: November 8, 2019] <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901724056>.

<sup>201</sup> President of Russia ed. 2000 "Oficial'nyj Vizit V Kanadu: 18 – 19 Dekabrya 2000 Goda". Online. President Of Russia - Website. [Accessed: September 17, 2019] <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/trips/45689>.

<sup>202</sup> *Joint Statement By Canada And The Russian Federation On Cooperation In The Arctic And The North*. 2000. Online. Ottawa, Moscow: Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada. [Accessed: September 17, 2019] <https://canada.mid.ru/web/canada-en/sooperation-in-the-arctic-and-the-north>.

The cooperation in following years was conducted within the Arctic Council, both countries participated in the activities of the Working Groups, supported many environmental initiatives and sponsored projects both in the Russian and Canadian Arctic territories. They actively participated in the creation of the three legal documents of the Arctic Council.

In 2011 Canada and Russia signed *Joint Ministerial Statement on Co-Operation in the Area of Science, Technology and Innovation*. This document underlines the main areas of interstate cooperation in technological, biomedical and energy spheres.<sup>203</sup> In 2018 the head of Federal Agency on Subsoil Usage Evgeny Kiselyov declared, that Russia and Canada were prepared to discuss a possible joint geological project of the Arctic continental shelf examination.<sup>204</sup> Canada is interested also in cooperation in another spheres, especially due to absence of its own icebreakers. The country may invite Russian icebreakers for assistance during the SAR operations or in case of critical environmental situation.<sup>205</sup>

After Ukrainian crisis in 2014, Canadian authorities undertook actions to decrease Russia-Canada political contacts. Economic sanctions were implemented by Canadian authorities against number of Russian politicians and several companies including the companies directly involved in the Arctic development, for example Novatek, Rosneft and Gazprom. The functioning of the Russia-Canada Intergovernmental Economic Commission was suspended, as well as political dialog was halted. Canadian Officials in 2014 boycotted several Arctic Council meetings, which were conducted in Moscow. Since the Crimea annexation in 2014, conservative Canadian government, headed by Stephen Harper, refused to maintain any political connections with Russia until it leaves the Ukrainian territory.<sup>206</sup> Election of Justin Trudeau as a new Prime Minister of Canada in 2015, who intended to continue political dialog over the Arctic, objectively did not bring a change in the relations.

Despite political tensions stemming from conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, Russia and Canada feel the benefits of maintaining working relations in the Arctic region. Pamela Goldsmith-Jones, parliamentary secretary to Foreign Minister of Canada, said in 2016, that

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<sup>203</sup> *Joint Ministerial Statement On Co-Operation In The Area Of Science, Technology And Innovation*. 2011 Online. The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service. 2011. . [Accessed: August 22, 2019] <https://www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca/innovators-innovateurs/136330.aspx?lang=eng>.

<sup>204</sup> TASS ed. 2019. "Rossiya I Kanada Gotovyat Sovmestnyj Proekt Po Izuchenyu Shel'fa V Arktike". Online. Tass. Toronto. [Accessed: October 9, 2019] <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/5014089>.

<sup>205</sup> Webb, Stewart. 2018. "Canada's Lack Of Modern Icebreakers Does Not Only Threaten The Arctic Environment". Online. Defence Report. Vencouver. [Accessed: October 13, 2019] <https://defencereport.com/canadas-lack-modern-icebreakers-not-threaten-arctic-environment/>.

<sup>206</sup> Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. 2016. "Canada And Russia – Toward An Arctic Agenda". Online. Global Brief. [Accessed: September 17, 2019] <https://globalbrief.ca/2016/09/canada-and-russia-toward-an-arctic-agenda/>.

“preventing scientists from these countries from talking to one another is irrational. Our government wishes to be rational”. In short, establishing the relations with Russia, at least on scientific or trade levels should be a priority.<sup>207</sup> Russian authorities also seek to create a “zone of peace and cooperation” in the Arctic.<sup>208</sup> Both countries’ officials and business community see the necessity to continue interstate contacts as it was in previous years. Nowadays, regional cooperation continues at very low level. State officials and business continue regular meetings, concerning issues of the status of indigenous people, delimitation of the continental shelf, environmental and climate issues, fishing and international shipping in the region.

### 5.2.2. Challenge for cooperation

There are bottlenecks, which can potentially even more negatively influence Canada-Russia relations, for example the overlapping territorial disputes between the countries. Along with Russia, Canada claims to expand its EEZ by submitting an application to the UN Commission on the boundaries of the continental shelf in accordance with *UNCLOS* Article 76. Both Russia and Canada seek to expand its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles using the Lomonosov ridge. The Lomonosov ridge is an undersea mountain range between Ellesmere Island and Russia’s east Siberian coast.<sup>209</sup> Literally, there are overlapping claims among the states. 10 years after the Canada’s ratification of the *UNCLOS*, the country finally filed a claim and submit it to the UN Commission in 2013.<sup>210</sup> It took another several years to do additional work to prove that the North Pole truly belongs to the Canadian territory. Updated submission to the UN Commission was filed in May 2019, after the comprehensive research and data collection.<sup>211</sup> Now, Canada claims approximately 1.2 million square kilometres of the Arctic Ocean seabed including the North Pole.<sup>212</sup> Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia

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<sup>207</sup> Sabourin, Clément. 2016. “Canada Seeking To Cooperate With Russia In The Arctic”. Online. Phys.org. [Accessed: October 4, 2019] <https://phys.org/news/2016-10-canada-cooperate-russia-arctic.html>.

<sup>208</sup> Medvedev, Dmitry. “Osnovy Gosudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii V Arktike Na Period Do 2020 Goda I Dal’Neyshuyu Perspektivu” [Foundations Of The State Policy Of The Russian Federation In The Arctic For The Period Until 2020 And Beyond]”. Online. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. (4877) [Accessed: December 2, 2018] <https://rg.ru/2009/03/30/arktika-osnovy-dok.html>.

<sup>209</sup> Associated Press in Toronto ed. 2013. “Canada To Claim North Pole As Its Own”. Online. The Guardian. Toronto. 2013. [Accessed: September 14, 2019] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/canada-north-pole-claim>.

<sup>210</sup> UN: Division for Ocean Affairs and the law of the sea. 2014. “Commission On The Limits Of The Continental Shelf (Clcs) Outer Limits Of The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles From The Baselines: Submissions To The Commission: Partial Submission By Canada”. Online. United Nations. 2014. [Accessed: March 4, 2019] [https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs\\_new/submissions\\_files/submission\\_can\\_70\\_2013.htm](https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_can_70_2013.htm).

<sup>211</sup> Global Affairs Canada. 2019. “Canada’s Arctic Ocean Continental Shelf Submission”. Online. Government Of Canada. [Accessed: October 4, 2019] <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/05/canadas-arctic-ocean-continental-shelf-submission.html>.

<sup>212</sup> George, Jane. 2019. “Canada Submits Its Arctic Ocean Claim To The United Nations”. Online. Nunatsiq News. [Accessed: October 4, 2019] <https://nunatsiq.com/stories/article/canada-submits-its-arctic-ocean-claim-to-the-united-nations/>.

Freeland, declared: “Canada is committed to furthering its leadership in the Arctic. Defining our continental shelf is vital to ensuring our sovereignty and to serving the interests of all people, including Indigenous peoples, in the Arctic.”<sup>213</sup>

While Canada was collecting geological data to prove its claim over the Arctic Ocean’s seabed, Russia was doing the same. Russia first made a scientific submission under *UNCLOS* in 2001, however, it was rejected a year later due to a lack of evidence.<sup>214</sup> In 2015, Russia submitted to the UN a revised application to expand the boundaries of its continental shelf in the Arctic by 1.2 million square kilometres.<sup>215</sup> In April 2019, the UN Commission confirmed that the geological affiliation of the questionable part of the Arctic is a continuation of the Russian continental shelf.<sup>216</sup> However, the final decision may take years to be achieved. Assistant managing editor in “The Verge” Katie Drummond in her article says, that it will take decades to evaluate Canada’s submission, because the Commission evaluates approximately 4 applications per year and there are 40 non-examined applications waiting to be assessed now.<sup>217</sup> According to the Canadian Government, “additional time may be needed to delimit boundaries in areas where Canada’s continental shelf overlaps with neighbouring states.”<sup>218</sup> Adam Lajeunesse, the Irving Shipbuilding Chair in Canadian Arctic Marine Security, says that there is a chance that all countries will provide verifiable scientific evidence, in that case it will be a political resolution, not a decision of the UN.<sup>219</sup>

What does the North Pole mean for Canada and Russia? Political science professor of the University of British Columbia Michael Byers supposes, that the North Pole has a symbolic

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<sup>213</sup> Global Affairs Canada. “Canada Marks Major Milestone In Defining Its Continental Shelf In Arctic Ocean”. Online. Government Of Canada. Ottawa. [Accessed: October 8, 2019] <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/05/canada-marks-major-milestone-in-defining-its-continental-shelf-in-arctic-ocean.html>.

<sup>214</sup> UN: Division for Ocean Affairs and the law of the sea. 2019. “Submissions, Through The Secretary-General Of The United Nations, To The Commission On The Limits Of The Continental Shelf, Pursuant To Article 76, Paragraph 8, Of The United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea Of 10 December 1982”. Online. United Nations. 2019. [Accessed: September 22, 2019] [https://www.un.org/Depts/los/cles\\_new/commission\\_submissions.htm](https://www.un.org/Depts/los/cles_new/commission_submissions.htm)

<sup>215</sup> *Partial Revised Submission Of The Russian Federation To The Commission On The Limits Of The Continental Shelf In Respect To The Continental Shelf Of The Russian Federation: Executive Summary*. 2015. Online. Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. 2015. [Accessed: March 2, 2019] [https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2015/russia-arctic-ocean-continental-shelf\\_20150803\\_execsum.pdf](https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2015/russia-arctic-ocean-continental-shelf_20150803_execsum.pdf).

<sup>216</sup> Komersant ed. 2019. “Podkomissiya Oon Odobrila Zayavku Rossii Na Rasshirenie Shel'fa V Arktike”. Online. Komersant Novosti. 2019. [Accessed: May 27, 2019] <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3932172#comments>.

<sup>217</sup> Drummond, Katie. 2013. “Cold Wars: Why Canada Wants To Claim The North Pole”. Online. The Verge. 2013. <https://www.theverge.com/2013/12/9/5191740/canada-russia-fight-over-north-pole-arctic>.

<sup>218</sup> Global Affairs Canada. 2019. “Canada’s Arctic Ocean Continental Shelf Submission”. Online. Government Of Canada. [Accessed: October 4, 2019] <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/05/canadas-arctic-ocean-continental-shelf-submission.html>.

<sup>219</sup> Quinn, Eilis. 2019. “Canada Files Submission To Establish Continental Shelf’S Outer Limits In Arctic Ocean”. Online. Radio Canada International. [Accessed: September 28, 2019] <https://www.rcinet.ca/en/2019/05/25/canada-files-submission-to-establish-continental-shelfs-outer-limits-in-arctic-ocean/>.

meaning for both Canada and Russia. Moreover, there is no significant oil and gas deposits underneath the North Pole, majority of the resources are accumulated within the states' 200 nautical miles EEZs which is not disputed.<sup>220</sup> In short, Canada considers the North Pole to be historically Canadian, Russia as well sees the North Pole as a symbol of its national pride. It is more about the territory and identity, than a scramble for natural resources in the North Pole.

Nevertheless, a peaceful resolution of the territorial dispute is probable. Both states advocate the resolution of disputed issues through negotiations and on the basis of international law. Besides the fact that Russia and Canada have opposing interests in dividing the Arctic and have overlapping territorial claims, countries still understand the importance and benefits of the cooperation.

As a concluding remark, cooperation between two countries at the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century was fruitful, however political events of 2014 and their consequences, including implementation of the sanctions, crossed out much of what was previously achieved in Russia-Canada relations. Canada suspended the participation in the Russian-Canadian Intergovernmental Economic Commission, which in fact was the main instrument for coordination between the governments of Canada and Russia in the framework of bilateral cooperation. Nowadays we can talk about crisis in bilateral relations in comparison with 2000s, two countries conduct environmental cooperation only within Arctic Council on the ministerial and Working Groups level.

However, there is a huge potential of bilateral cooperation and both countries realize the possible benefits of the Arctic partnership. Moreover, there is a similar Canadian and Russian Arctic posture in terms of identity and interests. Both countries would rather cooperate not only to promote their interests, but to ensure the Arctic will remain a peaceful zone of cooperation and sustainable development. There is a chance for countries to become competitive in case of scramble for resources and shipping routes, however, even with this scenario, considering harsh climate conditions and lack of technologies, countries would rather cooperate in order to maximize the developmental experience in the region.

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<sup>220</sup> Bykova, Alina. 2019. "Canada Makes Substantial Step In Arctic Territory Delimitation, Submits Claim Which Includes North Pole". Online. High North News. [Accessed: October 1, 2019] <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/submits-claim-which-includes-north-pole>.

### 5.3. Russia and the United States in the Arctic region

Before the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the United States did not control any Arctic territory. Beginning of the Russian-American relations in the Arctic can be dated back to 1867 when the Russian Empire sold Alaska and the Aleutian Islands to the United States. Since then, the US became a rightful Arctic state with a direct access to the Arctic Ocean. Administratively, the US Arctic coast runs along the 49<sup>th</sup> US state – Alaska. Its continental shelf, according to estimates made by the U.S. Geological Survey, accounts for about 31 % of the undiscovered oil reserves of the entire Arctic: the Alaskan Arctic coast is supposed to contain at least 27 billion barrels of oil.<sup>221</sup> It is expected that natural gas may be also found at the shelf. United States share a common maritime border with Russia in the Bering Sea and the Chukchi Sea.

During the Second World War and later during the Cold War both the US and the Soviet Union sought to create a military theatre from the Arctic region. The Soviet Union rapidly developed its Northern Fleet including nuclear-powered icebreakers and land infrastructure in the Arctic. The US created from Alaska a safety barrier against Soviets, strong military infrastructure was constructed. Meanwhile in 1970s, the US adopted their first Arctic document - *National Security Decision Memorandum*.<sup>222</sup> It was the first official document, which defined the role of the Arctic in the US national policy. In 1984 the *Arctic Policy Act* was implemented by the U.S. Congress.<sup>223</sup> This doctrine underlined state priorities in the Arctic, such as the environment preservation, international cooperation in the region and national security protection. For the first time, the document posed the state's responsibility for the financial support of environmental and climate research in the Arctic.

The tensions between the USSR and the US lessen with the end of the Cold War. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States has shown limited interest in the Arctic. The country was the least active and the least assertive in comparison with the other Arctic actors. The change in the US political narrative came with the presidency of Vladimir Putin in Russia. Newly

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<sup>221</sup> Borgerson, Scott G. 2008. "Arctic Meltdown: The Economic And Security Implications Of Global Warming". Online. *Foreign Affairs* 87 (2): 68. [Accessed: December 22, 2018] <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032581?seq=1>.

<sup>222</sup> *National Security Decision Memorandum 144*. 1971. Online. National Security Council. [Accessed: October 20, 2019] <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdm-nixon/nsdm-144.pdf>.

<sup>223</sup> *Changes In The Arctic: Background And Issues For Congress*. 2019. Online. Congressional Research Service. [Accessed: September 13, 2019] <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf>.

elected President came up with a plan of the Northern Fleet modernization and a resumption of the strategic aviation flights in the Arctic.<sup>224</sup>

Later, Russian Government organized few expeditions to the Arctic searching for evidence for expansion of the Russian continental shelf according to the *UNCLOS* regulations. Russian expedition to the North Pole *Arktika 2007* and the flag planting on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean beneath the North Pole caused panic in western political circles and media. Four remaining Arctic coastal states, including the US, condemn Russia for expansionist and aggressive actions. Since the mid-2000s, Russia became a main opponent of the United States in the region. Mass media were showing alarmist titles of Russia moving north.

After the adoption of the *Arctic Policy Act*, it took the United States another 25 years to develop its national Arctic Strategy. Its implementation was spurred by the global climate changes and the Russia's assertive Arctic policy. In 2009, the *National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD66) – Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD25)* was adopted, the document emphasized main Arctic priorities of the United States.<sup>225</sup> It aimed at protection of the US fundamental national security interests, prevention of terrorist attacks in the Arctic region and exercising of sovereignty and jurisdiction within the US EEZ. Moreover, in this Directive, the United States underlined its position over the legal status of the Arctic shipping routes (NWP and NSR), which are located within the Russian and Canadian territorial waters. The US oppose Canadian and Russian claims on shipping routes and at the same time they recognize freedom of the Seas and the international jurisdiction of the aforementioned routes.

Obama Administration realized that the US must strengthen its position in the rapidly changing Arctic, especially in global competition with Russia. Russian Arctic military build-up and the modernization of the Arctic infrastructure raised an anxiety in the US political circles. Obama initiated a plan to build new icebreakers in order to exercise US Arctic sovereignty and protect the Arctic zone.<sup>226</sup> As a result the *2009 United States Navy Arctic Roadmap* was created,

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<sup>224</sup> Baev, Pavel. 2012. *Rossiyskaya Politika V Arktike I Modernizaciya Severnogo Flota*. Online. Paris: Centr Rossiya/NNG. [Accessed: February 7, 2019]

[https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri\\_baev\\_arctique\\_rus\\_avgust\\_2012.pdf](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_baev_arctique_rus_avgust_2012.pdf)

<sup>225</sup> U.S. Department of State ed. 2019. "Arctic". Online. U.S. Department Of State. [Accessed: October 4, 2019]

<https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc//index.htm>

<sup>226</sup> Hirschfeld Davis, Julie. 2015. "Obama To Call For More Icebreakers In Arctic As U.s. Seeks Foothold". Online. The New York Times. Seward, Alask. [Accessed: September 2, 2019]

<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/politics/obama-to-call-for-more-icebreakers-in-arctic-as-us-seeks-foothold.html>

which underlines the navy functioning in the challenging Arctic environment.<sup>227</sup> This document was later updated as the *United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030*.<sup>228</sup>

Next significant legal document was adopted few years later in 2013, *National Strategy for the Arctic Region*.<sup>229</sup> The updated strategy aimed at emphasizing the role of the United States in the rapidly changing Arctic environment and it underlines US national interests in the region. The main priorities were the promotion of the security interests, responsible Arctic guidance, and consolidation of the international cooperation.

In June 2019 Trump Administration released a *Report to Congress Department of Defence Arctic Strategy*.<sup>230</sup> It is the most recent document on the US Arctic policy, which updates the list of national interests and possible threats in the Arctic. In this document, the US presents two updated goals: to stand against illegitimate and unwarranted Russian and Chinese territorial claims and to promote cooperation with allies in the region.

To summarise the aforementioned documents, there are three main groups of US national interests and priorities in the region. Firstly, the military interests such as missile defence, the presence of the naval forces and naval operations. Secondly, the domestic security protection and the prevention of the terrorist attacks. Professors of the St. Petersburg University Konyshov and Sergunin in their monography *Arctic international politics* suppose, that this point should not be taken literally; under combating terrorism, the US tries to ensure the future legitimacy of military operations in the Arctic.<sup>231</sup> Thirdly, the political interests, such as expansion of influence and presence in the region and the freedom of the navigation along the transarctic routes are the highest national priority. Important to mention that the environmental goals are covered in the US national policy, but not explicitly emphasized.

To complete the description of the US relation to the Arctic, it needs to be stated, that the United States are the only Arctic country, which did not ratify the *UNCLOS*, the only existing legal

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<sup>227</sup> *U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap*. 2009. Online. Task Force Climate Change. [Accessed: September 17, 2019] [https://www.wired.com/images\\_blogs/dangerroom/2009/11/us-navy-arctic-roadmap-nov-2009.pdf](https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2009/11/us-navy-arctic-roadmap-nov-2009.pdf).

<sup>228</sup> *U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030*. 2014. Online. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. [Accessed: September 18, 2019] <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=756030>.

<sup>229</sup> *National Strategy For The Arctic Region*. 2013. Online. Washington: The President of the United States. [Accessed: October 16, 2019] [https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat\\_arctic\\_strategy.pdf](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf).

<sup>230</sup> *Report To Congress: Department Of Defense Arctic Strategy*. 2019. Online. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. [Accessed: August 22, 2019] <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF>.

<sup>231</sup> Konyshov, V. N., and A. A. Sergunin. 2011. *Arktika V Mezhdunarodnoj Politike: Sotrudnichestvo Ili Sopernichestvo?*. Online. 1st ed. 66. Moscow: Rossijskij institut strategicheskikh issledovanij. [Accessed: December 22, 2018] <https://publications.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share/folder/2ke7smc7xx/direct/80283747>.

document over the Arctic maritime status. Because of that, the United States have no right to submit a claim to the UN Commission to expand its EEZ beyond the 200 nautical miles. Instead of certain small gains when applying the UN rules, Washington can gain more if the principle of the freedom of navigation and economic activity in relation to the Arctic will be implemented. Another possible explanation of the US unwillingness to join the *UNCLOS* is, that the US have the smallest Arctic sector, thus they try to spread the influence in the region by making the Arctic international.

Furthermore, the US Heritage Foundation conducted a research on the US ratification of the *UNCLOS*. It found seven reasons why the US should not do so, the main reason: this step would result in delegation of part of the rights to the international organization (in this case to the International Seabed Authority). Through the international organisation “corrupted and undemocratic nations could influence the US Arctic policy and pose a threat to its sovereignty”.<sup>232</sup> By ratification refusal, the US show distrust to the Arctic Council members and undermine the authority of the international organization itself.

President Obama during his term in office wanted to ratify *UNCLOS*. Despite a constant pressure on Senate, it was not done until today.<sup>233</sup> Supporters of ratification claim, that joining the Convention would facilitate commercial exploration of the offshore resources and bolster the ability to protect national interests. Opponents on the other hand claim, that the ratification would provide no advantages, which are not already available. However, it would bring risks, for example US companies would have to pay extra fees for seabed development. The US are able to develop its EEZ without ratification of *UNCLOS*. Their maritime navigation is also well-functioning under customary international law for many years.<sup>234</sup>

As for the Arctic Council, the United States considers the Arctic Council a forum for discussion. They oppose giving it a status of a full-fledged international organization that could take over some of the rights. This status guarantees that the United States preserve freedom of action. This is welcomed, since most of the time they prefer to act unilaterally. As it was mentioned

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<sup>232</sup> Bromund, Theodore R. 2018. “7 Reasons U.s. Should Not Ratify Un Convention On The Law Of The Sea”. Online. The Heritage Foundation. [Accessed: September 10, 2019] <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/7-reasons-us-should-not-ratify-un-convention-the-law-the-sea>.

<sup>233</sup> Bennett, Mia. 2009. “With Push From Obama, Will Us Finally Ratify Unclos?”. Online. Cryopolitics. Alaska, USA. [Accessed: September 14, 2019] <http://www.cryopolitics.com/2009/07/31/fair-seas-ahead-for-unclos/>.

<sup>234</sup> Bromund, Theodore R. 2018. “7 Reasons U.s. Should Not Ratify Un Convention On The Law Of The Sea”. Online. The Heritage Foundation. [Accessed: September 10, 2019] <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/7-reasons-us-should-not-ratify-un-convention-the-law-the-sea>.

already in *NSPD66 –HSPD25*, the United States are ready to act either independently or in an alliance with other states to protect their national interests.<sup>235</sup>

Despite the US position on the delegation of powers to the Arctic Council, the country is an active Council's member. It participates in meetings and in activities of Working Groups. The United States financially supports many environmental projects within the Arctic Council. It held Council's Chairmanship two times in 1998-2000 and 2015-2017. During these periods the main focus was on scientific cooperation, improvements of living conditions of the Arctic communities, Arctic Ocean safety as well as on addressing the impacts of climate change.

### 5.3.1. Russia-United States environmental bilateral cooperation

Russia and the United States have common maritime border in the Bering Sea. Both of them participate in many environmental initiatives in the Arctic. Important to mention, that after the establishment of the Arctic Council, the cooperation between countries is conducted on multilateral level in the framework of the three legal Council's documents. However, there are several active bilateral agreements on environmental cooperation in the Arctic region.

The first bilateral environmental agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was signed already in 1972, states agreed on cooperation in the environmental protection sphere. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the agreement was resigned with the RF in 1994.<sup>236</sup> *Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States of America on cooperation in the fight against pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas* was signed in 1989.<sup>237</sup> Two countries agreed to develop national systems to detect and prevent incidents causing pollution or damage to the marine environment and to provide support in threat elimination in accordance with their capabilities.

Later in 1993 the US Congress adopted a *Cooperative Threat Reduction Act*. Presidents of the two countries agreed on reduction of strategic nuclear warheads on each side. The main goal

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<sup>235</sup> U.S. Department of State ed. 2019. "Arctic". Online. U.S. Department Of State. [Accessed: October 4, 2019] <https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc//index.htm>.

<sup>236</sup> *Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of The Russian Federation On Cooperation In Field Of Protection Of The Environment And Natural Resources*. 1994. Online. The government of the United States of America. [Accessed: October 8, 2019] <https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/documents/russia-mou-1994.pdf>.

<sup>237</sup> *Soglashenie Mezhdru Pravitel'stvom SSSR I Pravitel'stvom Soedinennyh Shtatov Ameriki O Sotrudnichestve V Bor'be S Zagryazneniem V Beringovom I Chukotskom Moryah V Chrezvychajnyh Situacijah*. 1989. Online. Pravitel'stvo SSSR. [Accessed: October 3, 2019] <http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1900072>.

of this document was to assist Russia in the elimination of nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet and so to prevent any possible radioactive contamination of the region.

Since the Bering Sea is important for both Russia and the United States in terms of fisheries, the *Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Mutual Fisheries Relations* was signed in 1988.<sup>238</sup> The document underlines the common rules for fishing vessels and it also sought to collaborate on preserving living maritime resources. The document is valid until today. In 2013 the United States and Russian signed bilateral *Agreement on Mutual Fisheries*, which focused on maritime boundary in the Bering Sea.<sup>239</sup>

In 2015 two countries signed a bilateral agreement to combat illegal fishing. *Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation for the Purposes of Preventing, Deterring and Eliminating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing* was created as a result of continuous work in this sphere, it aimed at improvement of coordination between two countries on the illegal fishing prevention.<sup>240</sup>

Ongoing climate changes also enabled fishing in bigger distance from the shore of the Arctic territories. According to international law, Arctic states control 200 nautical miles within their EEZ, other maritime spaces may be misused with overfishing.<sup>241</sup> There are no boundaries for fish stocks, if it is unregulated, it can negatively affect fishery resource of the whole Arctic Ocean and so, negatively influence the whole ecosystem. In 2018 Arctic countries signed an *Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Commercial Fishing on the High Seas of the Central Arctic Region*.<sup>242</sup> The agreement basically put on hold fishing in high seas. In other words, it protects the Arctic Ocean from overfishing. Significance of this agreement is also that it is the first official multilateral

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<sup>238</sup> *Agreement Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On Mutual Fisheries Relations*. 1998. Online. Moscow: Government of the United States of America. [Accessed: October 17, 2019] <https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/agreement-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-union-of-soviet-socialist-republics-on-mutual-fisheries-relations-tre-151767/>.

<sup>239</sup> Office of International Affairs & Seafood Inspection ed. 2019. "Bilateral Agreement Between The United States And Russia". Online. NOAA Fisheries. [Accessed: October 3, 2019] <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/international-affairs/bilateral-agreement-between-united-states-and-russia>.

<sup>240</sup> *Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of The Russian Federation On Cooperation For The Purposes Of Preventing, Deterring And Eliminating Illegal, Unreported, And Unregulated Fishing*. 2015. Online. Portland: Government of the United States of America. [Accessed: October 27, 2019] <https://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-the-russian-federation-on-cooperation-for-the-purposes-of-preventing-deterring-and-eliminating-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-tre-160051/>

<sup>241</sup> Kramer, Andrew E. 2017. "Russia, U.S. And Other Nations Restrict Fishing In Thawing Arctic". Online. The New York Times. Moscow. [Accessed: September 18, 2019] <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/europe/russia-arctic-ocean-fishing-thaw.html>.

<sup>242</sup> Government of Canada ed. 2019. "International Agreement To Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries In The Central Arctic Ocean". Online. Government Of Canada. [Accessed: October 4, 2019] <https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/arctic-arctique-eng.htm>.

agreement, which was signed between Russia and its Arctic neighbours after the economic sanctions. The agreement was very well received by the relevant environmental organizations. Deputy assistant secretary for oceans and fisheries at the State Department David A. Balton welcomed, that “states doing something to prevent a problem from arising”.<sup>243</sup> Success of the 2018 Agreement was predestined by a previous bilateral document.

Nowadays, both the US and Russia seek to prevent ecological disaster in the region and pose an Arctic environmental protection as a main national priority. They support the environmental initiatives within the Arctic Council and participated in the creation of three Council’s legal documents, which have become fundamental for the policy realization.

### 5.3.2. Realization of cooperation

The United States initiated a program on reduction of strategic nuclear weapons at the beginning of 1990s under framework of the aforementioned *Cooperative Threat Reduction Act*. As part of this program, two facilities in Russian northern regions were modernized with the financial support of the United States. Those were the “Nerpa” shipyard in Snezhnogorsk, Murmansk Oblast and “Zvezdochka” enterprise in Severodvinsk, Archangelsk Oblast. Under the same agreement, the program *Control of Nuclear Materials* was launched in 1993. The US Department of Energy supplied Russia with required technologies for creation of storages for the used nuclear fuel. On the basis of this program, new storage facilities for nuclear submarines fuel were constructed. In 1996, a following ecological program on radioactive waste utilization was conducted by the United States, Russia and Norway.<sup>244</sup>

Another joint project started in 2004 called the Russian-American Long-term Census of the Arctic (RUSALCA). It was a cooperation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Russian Academy of Sciences.<sup>245</sup> The program was supposed to study the Arctic ecosystem in the Bering and Chukchi Seas by monitoring the fresh and salt water. The RUSALCA initiative enabled Russia and the United States to create the *Pacific Arctic Marine Fishes*, an atlas and guide in 2016. The guide provides documentation of the Arctic Ocean’s

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<sup>243</sup> Kramer, Andrew E. 2017. “Russia, U.S. And Other Nations Restrict Fishing In Thawing Arctic”. Online. The New York Times. Moscow. [Accessed: September 18, 2019]  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/world/europe/russia-arctic-ocean-fishing-thaw.html>.

<sup>244</sup> Ivanov, I. S., ed. 2013. *Arkticheskij Region: Problemy Mezhdunarodnogo Sotrudnichestva, Tom 1*. Online. 1st ed. 164. Moscow: Rossijskij sovet po mezhdunarodnym delam. [Accessed: March 4, 2019]  
<https://mgimo.ru/upload/docs-7/Arctic%20Anthology%20Vol%201.pdf>

<sup>245</sup> Crane, Kathleen. 2015. *Cruise Report: Rusalca*. Online. [Accessed: October 23, 2019]  
<https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/rusalca/sites/default/files/atoms/files/Rusalca15%20North%2C%20South%20expeditio%20Reports%2010%2027%202015.pdf>.

biodiversity and its distribution.<sup>246</sup> Significance of this joint project of Russia and the United States is, that it became possible despite of the weakening relations after the 2014 political events.

Since 2006 the United States Environmental Protection Agency cooperates with Russia on establishment of a mercury recycling system for Russian Navy to prevent mercury release into the Arctic region.<sup>247</sup> Under this program, the United States seek to encourage Russia to introduce ecological standards for marine shipping.

The soft power type cooperation continued even after the deterioration of relations between Russia and its Arctic neighbour in 2014 and a suspension of the military-to-military contacts.<sup>248</sup> For example, the Coast Guard and SAR cooperation between Russia and the United States remained untouched.<sup>249</sup> In 2015 the Arctic Coast Guard Forum was established where all Arctic actors participate.<sup>250</sup> Cooperation in this sphere continues until today, which may be explained by the apolitical characteristic of the SAR Arctic exercises.

Two countries developed an overwhelming legal base for mutual fisheries in the Bering Sea and established the regulations to prevent overfishing. As an example of joint activity against illegal fishery are the joint patrols which were successfully organized by the Russian Federal Security Service Border Guard and the US Coast Guard in summer 2019.<sup>251</sup>

Within the Arctic Council, countries conduct meetings in Working Groups. Nowadays, the multilateral cooperation is more regular than the bilateral one. The US is currently collaborating with Russia via Arctic Council Working Groups on different ecological projects, such as reducing stock of pesticides and on mercury recycling.

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<sup>246</sup> Mecklenburg, C. W., T. A. Mecklenburg, and B. A. Sheiko. 2016. *Pacific Arctic Marine Fishes*. Online. 1st ed.. Akureyri, Iceland: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna. [Accessed: September 23, 2019] <https://caff.is/monitoring-series/370-pacific-arctic-marine-fishes>.

<sup>247</sup> Ankrah, Rodges. 2019. "International Actions For Reducing Mercury Emissions And Use". Online. United States Environmental Protection Agency. [Accessed: September 4, 2019] <https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/international-actions-reducing-mercury-emissions-and-use>.

<sup>248</sup> Østhagen, Andreas. 2016. "Coast Guard Cooperation With Russia In The Arctic". Online. The Arctic Institute. [Accessed: September 13, 2019] <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/coast-guard-cooperation-with-russia-in-the-arctic/>.

<sup>249</sup> Clifford, Richard. 2016. "What Is Obama's Arctic Legacy?". Online. The Polar Connection. [Accessed: August 24, 2019] <http://polarconnection.org/obama-arctic-legacy/>.

<sup>250</sup> Grant, Andrew. 2017. "Us, Other Nations Gather To Work On Arctic Issues". Online. The Boston Globe. [Accessed: April 22, 2019] <https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/03/24/joins-with-russia-and-other-nations-coast-guard-agreement-for-arctic/mVoiUgz5w5Jqwtvos1tDPI/story.html>.

<sup>251</sup> Jones, Bruce. 2019. "Russian Fsb Border Guard And Uscg Start Joint Patrols In Bering Sea". Online. Jane's. London. [Accessed: September 29, 2019] <https://www.janes.com/article/89226/russian-fsb-border-guard-and-uscg-start-joint-patrols-in-bering-sea>.

As a concluding remark, the United States and Russia have fundamentally different point of view on many important aspects of cooperation in the Arctic. The role of the Arctic Council and adoption of the *UNCLOS* can serve as an example. Nowadays the cooperation between Russia and the United States is frozen in strategically important spheres – military and energy. Political events in Ukraine of 2014 and later implemented economic sanctions significantly decreased cooperation between the states.

United States and Russia are two neighbouring Arctic powers and the members of the Arctic Council, as such they cannot ignore each other and live in the conditions of the frozen relations. Both of them want to develop hydrocarbon deposits, conduct mining activities and shipping in the region. Even by isolate development of their Arctic zone, countries more likely affect each other due to closed nature of the Arctic Ocean. Both countries are aware of this. For this reason, cooperation in apolitical spheres such as environmental protection is promoted on both bilateral and multilateral level. The cooperation on fishing is an example of a perfect environmental cooperation in the region.

#### 5.4. Russia and Denmark in the Arctic region

The Kingdom of Denmark is one of the five Arctic coastal states although its mainland territory is located far from the region. It can be counted in this group thanks to an appropriate geographical location of Greenland, the world's largest island and an autonomous territory of Denmark. Greenland is predominantly represented in most of international organizations by Danish delegations and the Arctic Council is not an exception.

Probably the most significant action of Denmark in relation to the territory were taken in 2008, when Denmark initiated a meeting of the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, the United States, Russia, Denmark and Norway) in Ilulissat, Greenland. The meeting resulted with the adoption of the Ilulissat Declaration by the so-called Arctic-5. It declared that the five Arctic coastal states have a duty to take a leading role in the Arctic ecosystem protection due to its geographic location and rights, which were provided to them by the international law. Countries agreed to undertake steps in accordance with international law to ensure the preservation of fragile Arctic environment both on national level and in cooperation among the Arctic-5.<sup>252</sup> By this declaration, Denmark intended to unite all the coastal states in order to find a peaceful solution of the Arctic seabed delimitation. The Danish intention of promoting the Ilulissat

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<sup>252</sup> 2008 *Ilulissat Declaration*. 2008. Online. Ilulissat, Greenland: Arctic Ocean Conference. [Accessed: February 17, 2019] <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2008-Ilulissat-Declaration.pdf>.

Declaration can be understood as deterrent value against Russia's North Pole symbolic claim by a flag planting one year before.

Danish policy in the Arctic region is based on two fundamental documents, the first one is *The Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020* issued in August 2011.<sup>253</sup> This strategy represents first comprehensive study for the whole Kingdom. It defines a long list of national priorities in the region, the most important of them are sustainable development, protection of sovereignty and international cooperation. The international cooperation is a core of the Danish Arctic strategy, its motto is to create a peaceful, secure and safe Arctic.<sup>254</sup> The country seeks to maintain good neighbourhood and cooperation with all Arctic actors, especially with the Nordic countries. Maritime safety and regional cooperation are fundamental priorities. In addition, Denmark promotes the Arctic development with the respect to the vulnerable ecosystem. Moreover, the strategy highlights a target to strengthen Danish status of a global player in the Arctic.<sup>255</sup>

Due to climate change, transformed geopolitical conditions and the development of new technologies, Denmark had to update its strategy, refocusing its priority primarily on research, education and innovation. New Danish Arctic Strategy was published in 2016.<sup>256</sup> This strategy emphasises more the role of Greenland and Faroe Islands in the region. Important to mention, that the document was released in Danish, only executive summary was published in English.

Danish attitude towards the Far North can be also understood from its Chairmanship of the Arctic Council later in 2009-2011. The country's program was focused on Indigenous peoples, climate change, biodiversity and international cooperation in the Arctic.<sup>257</sup> In its eagerness to protect Arctic nature and environment, Denmark follows the common line of all Nordic members states of the Arctic Council. In addition, in compliance with its Arctic Strategy, Denmark promoted the cooperation with Arctic members in every possible form and on every level during its Chairmanship.

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<sup>253</sup> *Kingdom Of Denmark Strategy For The Arctic 2011– 2020*. 2011. Online. 1st ed.. 11. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Accessed: October 5, 2019] <http://library.arcticportal.org/1890/1/DENMARK.pdf>.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

<sup>256</sup> *Strategi For Forskning Og Uddannelse Vedrørende Arktis*. 2016. Online. 1st ed.. Copenhagen: Uddannelses- og Forskningsministeriet. [Accessed: October 21, 2019] <https://ufm.dk/publikationer/2016/strategi-for-forskning-og-uddannelse-vedrorende-arktis>.

<sup>257</sup> *The Kingdom Of Denmark: Chairmanship Of The Arctic Council 2009-2011*. 2009. Online. Tromsø, Norway: Danish delegation to the Arctic Council. [Accessed: October 20, 2019] <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1565>.

The Kingdom of Denmark has fully supported the Arctic Council since its foundation and has been involved in all its activities. It considered this international organisation to be the leading body in solving regional issues. Like other Nordic states, Denmark believed that the Council could help to achieve its strategic goals in the Arctic. However, this expectation was not fulfilled, because for many years the Arctic Council was rather passive in solving regional problems and was more a forum for discussion, than a truly authoritative body.

As for relations with Russia, it seems, that the cooperation was always on relatively low level in all possible spheres. Although environmental protection is one of the leitmotifs of Danish strategy, legal base of such cooperation with Russia are underdeveloped. *Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark on cooperation in the field of environmental protection* signed in 1993 is the only bilateral document in environmental sphere related to the Arctic.<sup>258</sup> This document shortly underlines the common intention to protect nature and environment, prevent maritime pollution. Unfortunately, it does not provide concrete mechanisms of common actions.

In the same year Denmark created a financial facility for Danish environmental assistance (DANCEA). The program targeted several countries in different regions, including the Arctic. The program comprised of several initiatives, one of them was focused on involvement of indigenous people in the AZRF in the protection of the Arctic environment in the region.<sup>259</sup> This can be understood as a first environmental Russia-Denmark cooperation. The aim of the program was to increase the representation of the Arctic indigenous people's interests in the governmental structures and on intergovernmental level.<sup>260</sup>

No other significant bilateral cooperation between the two actors was established. Both sides prefer to cooperate within international organizations on multilateral level. Since the establishment of the Arctic Council, joint Russian-Danish actions on the Arctic environment protection issues are conducted within the organization.

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<sup>258</sup> *Mezhdunarodnye Dogovory I Soglasheniya S Uchastiem Minprirody Rossii*. 2019. Online. Ministerstvo prirodnyh resursov i ekologii Rossijskoj Federacii. [Accessed: October 15, 2019] [http://www.mnr.gov.ru/activity/international\\_agreements/](http://www.mnr.gov.ru/activity/international_agreements/).

<sup>259</sup> Elling, Henrik M. 2016. "Dancea Danish Cooperation For Environment In The Arctic". Online. Climate Policy Watcher. [Accessed: September 22, 2019] <https://www.climate-policy-watcher.org/canadian-arctic/dancea-danish-cooperation-for-environment-in-the-arctic.html>.

<sup>260</sup> *Miljøindsatsen I Arktis 1998: Aktiviteter Støttet Af Dancea*. 2000. Online. 1st ed.. København: Miljø- og Energiministeriet. Miljøstyrelsen. [Accessed: November 1, 2019] <https://mst.dk/service/publikationer/publikationsarkiv/2000/mar/miljoindsatsen-i-arktis-1998/>.

Reasons for cold Arctic Denmark-Russian relations in recent decades can be identified outside this region. In this time, Denmark disapproved many Russian international and national actions such as war in Chechnya, regular violation of the human rights and corruption scandals. It also had environmental concerns regarding the Nord Stream 2 construction in the Baltic Sea. As a result, Denmark was avoiding interaction with Russia in many different spheres such as environment, economy, as well as the Arctic agenda. Meetings of the state officials were a rare occurrence.

The Crimea annexation in 2014 prompted outrage in the global community, a number of countries imposed economic sanction on Russia. Denmark as one of the founding NATO countries and a strong supporter of the alliance endorsed the idea of the sanctions. Nowadays, despite the economic losses, Denmark maintains its position and actively calls for prolongation of the sanctions.<sup>261</sup> Although the sanctions were targeting primarily the economic sphere such as banks and energy sector, Russia's illegal act tarnished its reputation and negatively influenced all spheres of interest and hindered cooperation.

Denmark is strict in supporting NATO and keeping a strong front with Russia which unfortunately hampers even soft cooperation in environmental sphere. This fact is even strengthened by an overlapping territorial claim of Denmark and Russia. The Kingdom of Denmark claims a territory of 895,000 km in the Arctic Ocean, the claim was filed in 2014, some of the parts overlap with the Russia's claim.<sup>262</sup> If the equidistance method of seabed delimitation is used, Denmark and Canada will get the significant territories in the Arctic Ocean. If the sectoral method is used, the Norway and Russia will gain the significant Arctic areas.<sup>263</sup>

Denmark takes a strict policy against Russia in the Arctic in terms of delimiting the Arctic seabed and the military build-up. This position is represented officially by the Danish politicians and media. Denmark's Defence Minister Claus Hjort Frederiksen announced the country's preparedness to protect Scandinavian airspace in case its sovereignty violated by Russia.<sup>264</sup> Greenlandic-Danish writer Nauja Lynge in her article calls a scramble for the North Pole an

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<sup>261</sup> The Local ed. 2015. "Denmark: Eu Should Stay The Course On Russia". Online. The Local Dk. [Accessed: November 1, 2019] <https://www.thelocal.dk/20150107/denmark-eu-should-stay-the-course-on-russia>.

<sup>262</sup> BBC ed. 2014. "Denmark Challenges Russia And Canada Over North Pole". Online. Bbc News. [Accessed: September 21, 2019] <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30481309>.

<sup>263</sup> Konyshchev, V. N., and A. A. Sergunin. 2011. *Arktika V Mezhdunarodnoj Politike: Sotrudnichestvo Ili Sopernichestvo?*. Online. 1st ed. 97. Moscow: Rossijskij institut strategicheskikh issledovanij. [Accessed: December 22, 2018] <https://publications.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share/folder/2ke7smc7xx/direct/80283747>.

<sup>264</sup> Read, Carly. 2019. "Russia Warned By Denmark Warplanes Prepared To Intercept Jets If Arctic Territory Violated". Online. Express. [Accessed: September 19, 2019] <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1130297/russia-vladimir-putin-arctic-denmark-Claus-Hjort-Frederiksen-WW3>.

exciting adventure, “since Putin rattle the sabre, it is a matter of honor and self-determination to answer”.<sup>265</sup>

On the other hand, some Danish authorities sees a cooperation as a key measure how to secure peace in the Far North. Jon-Rahbek-Clemmensen, an Associate Professor at the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College says, that cooperation with Russia is important, but more important is to keep Russia on a peaceful course in the Arctic. It can be done if NATO will not be engaged in the Arctic affaires.<sup>266</sup>

As a concluding remark, Danish policy toward Russia may be called “expectant policy”. On the one hand, Denmark promotes cooperation with every Arctic member in its Arctic strategy. On the other hand, Denmark does not seek cooperation with Russia and support NATO in keeping strong position towards Russia and considering Russia’s violation of international law and further imposed economic sanction.

Denmark-Russia relations are the least active of bilateral cooperation with the Arctic coastal states. Both countries do not show a desire to communicate or cooperate on bilateral level and increase engagement. After the implementation of the economic sanctions state officials rarely meet. Even if they do so, these meeting do not improve cold relations between the states. The cooperation is conducted only within Arctic Council in a form of attendance of Ministerial meetings once in two years and a work within the Working Groups. In general, Danish Arctic policy is quite isolated, even the last state’s 2017 Arctic strategy was not translated into English, it may be concluded, that the country does not seek to unveil its Arctic priorities or find common points for cooperation.

Resumption of cooperation between Denmark and Russia is possible. First possible sign of improvements can be found in September 2019 Russian and Danish Foreign Ministers Sergey Lavrov and Jeppe Kofod meeting. Aim of this encounter was to discuss bilateral relations, including the cooperation in the Arctic.<sup>267</sup> There are few conditions, under which the improvement of the relationship may be expected, such as resolution of the current conflict with Ukraine, limitation of Russia military build-up in the Arctic and a change in Russian domestic

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<sup>265</sup> Lyng, Nauja. 2019. “Jyllands-Posten (Daniya): Bor’ba Za Severnyj Polyus Vstupat V Novuyu Fazu”. Online. Inosmi. [Accessed: October 20, 2019] <https://inosmi.ru/politic/20190319/244767864.html>.

<sup>266</sup> Rahbek-Clemmensen, Jon. 2017. “Is Denmark An Arctic Great Power?”. Online. World Policy. [Accessed: October 19, 2019] <https://worldpolicy.org/2017/02/15/is-denmark-an-arctic-great-power/>.

<sup>267</sup> *Press Release On Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Of Denmark Jeppe Kofod*. 2019. Online. The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of The Russian Federation. [Accessed: October 3, 2019] [https://www.mid.ru/en/arkticskij-sovet/-/asset\\_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/3811032](https://www.mid.ru/en/arkticskij-sovet/-/asset_publisher/0vP3hQoCPRg5/content/id/3811032).

policy. However, the cooperation affords were always on a low level between two countries, therefore there is no guarantee in the increase of bilateral cooperation for environmental protection in the Arctic.

## 6. Conclusion

The Arctic region stayed for many years out of interests of the world political actors. Despite its well-known wealth in natural resources and fish, development of the area was limited. This can be explained by the extremely hostile climate conditions in the northernmost region of the world. Perception of this territory started to change just few decades ago. As the consequences of the global climate changes intensify, interest in the region skyrockets.

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century many Arctic and non-Arctic countries plan to economically utilize the vast potential of the region. All the regional actors are, however, aware that uncontrolled economic development, could irretrievably damage the unique and fragile Arctic ecosystem. Such environmental disasters would be global affecting interests of all the regional actors. Therefore, environmental protection of the Arctic ecosystem is a national priority of all the Arctic actors as well as it is the main subject of regional cooperation.

In order to understand Russian approach to the environmental cooperation in the region this master thesis analysed Russian environmental cooperation with the costal Arctic Council members. Individual steps of this case study were guided by the theoretical framework provided by the liberal intergovernmentalism.

Russia's national legal documents formulate state's interests in the Arctic, the three main areas are: the development of the Northern Sea Route, the extraction of the hydrocarbon resources and the preservation of unique Arctic ecosystem. At first sight it seems that the first two economic interests are the most important drivers of the Russian Arctic development. They are strongly promoted by both the government and the most influential domestic companies. These interests are in spotlight of many conferences, national outlooks and plans.

Nevertheless, from the Russian actions in recent years, it is obvious that significance of the third national interest is rising. There are multiple reasons for this. Firstly, Russia is aware that fulfilment of its vast economic goals in the fragile region is closely watched by all the other regional actors, which are afraid of possible negative impact of an environmentally irresponsible development. Therefore, any economic development, or potential technical cooperation, is possible only in compliance with the strict environmental protection policies. Secondly, Russia is already now facing ecologically hazardous heritage from the Soviet Era which poses threat to the environment and harms country's reputation.

To summarise, Russia's environmental interests are driven by both ecological and economic motives. Based on these characteristics, the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism expects Russia to actively seek environmental cooperation. Moreover, it assumes that multilateral cooperation within one supranational institution will be preferred over bilateral one.

These assumptions were used for an analysis of bilateral cooperation of the Russian Federation with the other costal Arctic Council members: Norway, Canada, Denmark and the United States. Although the aim of the cooperation is always the same – preservation of the ecosystem, it was identified that level of engagement differs significantly in each case. An explanation can be found in the states' general attitude towards the region. On the one hand, there are countries which consider the Arctic as an inseparable part of their territory and culture for many decades. Representatives of this group are Canada and Norway, but also Russia. It is understandable that these countries are highly interested in many international environmental projects and their cooperation with Russia on bilateral level was always advanced. On the other hand, the rest of the analysed countries possess geographically separated Arctic territories and their engagement is therefore limited. For example, the United States are quite sceptical towards any formalized cooperation in the Arctic. They did not ratify *UNCLOS*, as well as they strongly oppose giving additional rights to the Arctic Council. In the national legislation the Arctic region is primarily perceived as militarily strategic area. All these facts are conveyed into the relationship between Russia and the United States.

Next important factor which can influence quality of environmental cooperation are any possible regional disputes. In the Arctic region there are two closely related issues: opposing territorial claims and militarisation of the area. Regarding the first matter, Russia, Denmark, Canada and Norway submitted their territorial claims to UN in accordance with the 76 article of *UNCLOS*. Based on these applications Russia share disputable areas with all the aforementioned countries. Although, the US did not ratify *UNCLOS*, they as well made an opposing regional claim. This fact raises tension between the states and hinders efficient cooperation even in the ecological sphere. Militarisation of the Arctic is the next factor which can negatively influence regional partnership. Especially Russian militarisation of the Arctic is extremely negatively perceived by all the Arctic Council members. Planting of the Russian flag on the North Pole underneath the Arctic Ocean in 2007 was a critical step, which provoked a wide criticism of the regional actors.

Very specific is also the concrete subject of environmental cooperation. Neighbouring states focus mostly on local and very specific issues. To give an example, Russian-Norway

cooperation is specialized on operations in the Barents Sea: joint oil spill response, fisheries regulations, nuclear safety cooperation and joint SAR operations; Russian-American partnership is oriented on Bering Sea: combating illegal fishing and so helping to preserve the natural biodiversity of the region. On the other hand, bilateral cooperation with distant Canada focused mostly on sustainable development of the society and economic conditions of the indigenous people and as such it was not strictly location specific. Cooperation with Denmark was based on only one legal document and was never truly put into practice.

Russian bilateral cooperation with all the coastal Arctic member states shares one common feature. It started to develop in 1990s and stayed dominant even in the early years after the establishment of the main Arctic environmental institution, the Arctic Council, in 1996. The events of 2014 and the subsequent economic sanctions represented a breaking point in this trend. Although the sanctions were primarily focused on the economic and technological activities of the Russian Federation, the reputation of this country was damaged. Consequently, all the analysed countries not only joined the economic sanctions, but also limited the bilateral environmental cooperation. For instance, Canada and Denmark suspended all the bilateral cooperation even in the environmental sphere. Continuation of environmental cooperation was, however, important for Russia. For this reason, it aimed its attention on the Arctic Council, which work was not so strongly impacted by the sanctions.

This fundamental change of Russia's orientation can be supported by performed analysis of its position in the Arctic Council. During the early years of the organisation in 1990s Russia minimally participated in the joint work of the Arctic Council and did not finance any projects if they did not directly benefit the AZRF. This trend has changed after Russian Chairmanship in 2004-2006. During this period Russia became more active and recognized the importance of environmental protection in the Arctic. After the sanctions, Russia supports and finances a number of projects within the Arctic Council and participates in joint trainings and exercises. It is also one of the countries, which are in favour of delegating more decision powers to this organisation. To summarise, Russian Federation is currently actively using the Arctic Council as a tool for environmental cooperation and it seeks further strengthening of this organization. To give an example, environmental cooperation between Russia and Denmark was never successful on bilateral bases, but it exists thanks to the Arctic Council.

In conformity with the expectations, Russia is actively seeking environmental cooperation with the other coastal Arctic states. Especially, during the 1990s there were not equal role of the participant countries. Russia mostly acted as a receiver of environmental help, namely of financing

and know-how. For instance, Norway initiated several clean-up initiatives of the Russian coastal zone and help to eliminate the environmental threat of the old, non-functioning facilities and marine vessels, which were neglected after the Soviet Union dissolution. However, Russian role in the cooperation has changed gradually. Nowadays, it supports and finances many projects in the Arctic Council, it made the biggest financial contribution to the joint Arctic fund called PSI.

Based on the findings of the analysis of the Russian environmental cooperation with the Arctic Council members the early defined research questions can be answered. Firstly, what is the Russia's role in the Arctic environmental cooperation? Secondly, does multilateral cooperation prevail over the bilateral one?

It was identified that Russia feels strong internal needs to engage in the environmental cooperation. This national interest forms its preference to actively seek such cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally. Unfortunately, involvement with some of the Arctic actors does not fulfil its potential due to the economic sanctions. In such situation, Russia actively uses the Arctic Council as a platform for cooperation, which works even during times when the bilateral engagement is restricted. To fully describe Russian role in the cooperation, it is necessary to mention that quite often Russia uses the projects to solve issues located in their AZRF for which it individually lacks financing or technology. Just recently Russia partially changed its position by providing major financial contribution to the common Arctic instrument PSI.

Before the establishment of the Arctic Council all the environmental cooperation was performed on bilateral bases. The newly performed organisation took over the dominant role in setting new legal policies for the region as well as monitoring common exercises. Russian bilateral agreements preserved its sense only in very specific, local cases such as Russian-Norwegian cooperation in the Barents Sea. After the events of 2014 many bilateral connections with Russia were lost. In that time multinational cooperation within the supranational organization secured the continuation of the joint projects.

The assumptions made based on the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism were hence validated. Interests of the key domestic players, such as politicians and oil companies, were transformed into national preferences. Internal needs resulted in Russia's position to actively seek cooperation. What is more, because the transactional costs of bilateral cooperation were too high in the period after the economic sanctions, Russia decided to concentrate on interaction within the supranational Arctic Council.

To summarise, Russian Federation has very ambitious plan for economic development of the Arctic region as well as for associated ecological project. These projects can be efficiently implemented only in cooperation with the other Arctic actors. The identified potential of cooperation is huge. Its full utilization is unfortunately restricted by the damaged reputation of the Russian Federation. The author of this thesis believes that even closer and more efficient cooperation in the Arctic would be beneficial for all the relevant states. Moreover, the examined case is experiencing swift development in recent years. It would be a beneficial contribution for academic society to further analyse this topic and extend it also on another non-traditional Arctic state's with rising influence in the region, such as the EU or China.

## 7. Summary

The Arctic is characterized by its fragile ecosystem, which can be easily damaged by an extensive economic development of the region. All the Arctic coastal actors are aware, that fulfilment of their plans: extraction of natural resources, international shipping and other economic activities in the region should therefore be aligned with strict environmental policies. The fact that any potential environmental issue could spread to the whole region determines that the only reasonable way how to protect the Arctic environment is by cooperation on international level.

This thesis aimed to analyse Russia's role in environmental cooperation with the other Arctic Council coastal members and to investigate if bilateral cooperation prevails over the multilateral one. Andrew Moravcsik's theory of liberal intragovernmentalism was used as a framework for the analysis. It was identified that Russia feels strong internal needs to engage in environmental cooperation. First relevant examples of such partnership were identified in 1990s. Initially, Russia mostly acted as a receiver of environmental help, namely of financing and know-how. In recent years its role has changed. Nowadays, Russia supports and finances many projects in the Arctic Council, it made the biggest financial contribution to the joint Arctic fund called PSI.

Russian Federation is already from the 1990s involved in both bilateral and multilateral environmental cooperation in the Arctic. However, before the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 most of the joint work was performed on bilateral level. The foundation of a dedicated supranational institution united all the five coastal states and empowered the partnership. The Arctic Council encourages all the Arctic actors to cooperate with each other, despite their sometimes diverging interests for the regional development. After initial scepticism, Russia actively uses this multilateral platform to expand the cooperation. The major benefits for Russia are that it enables joint work even with more distant countries, like Canada and Denmark, which had no significant bilateral cooperation with Russia before. Moreover, after the economic sanctions of 2014 Russia's reputation was severely damaged and the Arctic Council remained an only active channel for cooperation with majority of the Arctic states. Nevertheless, in some very specific cases bilateral cooperation prevails. For example, Russia has still active cooperation with its Arctic neighbours Norway and the United States, which addresses special local issues in the Barents Sea and the Bering Sea.

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