My first report focused on three points. I criticized that
- the presentation of the dissertation is suboptimal,
- the theoretical rationale is not well developed in the over-arching theoretical chapter and the arguments put forth in the three applications should be improved, and that
- the dissertation suffers under some methodological weaknesses.

**Presentation:** The presentation has greatly improved. The title of the dissertation is now formulated in a grammatically correct way, and the revised version is a much nicer read that avoids, by and large, ambiguous and overly dense statements. The dissertation also relies in its second iteration on a more complete literature review. Note, however, that the last name of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is Bueno de Mesquita, not de Mesquita. More importantly, the author offers a more convincing presentation of what his work is about through an early definition of the concept of “interventions”. I nevertheless did not find it particularly pertaining that the dissertation focusses on military interventions without clearly delineating what possible substitutes (or complements) of this foreign policy tool are. Military interventions are costly and unpopular in many cases. Why should governments use them if there are less controversial alternatives? The focus on one type of instrument is not uncommon, but it trivializes the decision-making process.

**Theory and literature discussion:** The over-arching theoretical argument is now presented in a more convincing fashion. I still have my qualms about the discussion of the meta-theories as we cannot learn much from them for the political economy kind of arguments that are developed later. Some of the discussion remains too general. The readers does, in my view, not learn a great deal from the discussion of social scientific concepts for which Gary Goertz and others are cited. The strong defense of realism as an over-arching theoretical point of reference does not convince me as corporations and other business interests do not play a role in standard realist approaches.
It would have been more convincing to argue that a political economy framework is used and to drop this “ontological discussion” altogether. The issue of endogeneity is now discussed in a sub-section in Chapter 3. This is not an optimal solution as endogeneity concerns are of a broad theoretical nature that goes beyond this single application. The response of the author cites in this context “selection effects”. Although endogeneity and selection bias can overlap, they are not the same. The main solution offered in Chapter 3 is the inclusion of four variables. Adding controls does, however, not necessarily reduce the selection (or the endogeneity bias); this remedy might reduce omitted variable bias. In fact, the inclusion of additional regressors could even enlarge the endogeneity problem. The endogeneity issue also pertains to Chapter 4 as the two applications have, as stated in my earlier report, a very similar design. The authors should have discussed how the new version addresses these concerns in a more general way.

Research designs: The author has now included some qualifications to his research designs. Mr. Klosek states in his response that the data set includes 721 military intervention and states that no double counting takes place. This might be correct, but it would have been worthwhile to distinguish between the onset of interventions and their continuation. Lumping these intervention years together might not be unproblematic, See McGrath’s examination in Political Analysis for instance on this topic. Also, when a coalition intervenes, are all coalition members counted individually? The memo is not clear on this issue.

In Chapter 4, I have criticized the cumulative arms supply indicator. It is not still clear to me in the present version whether the regression of supplies in the future on present day interventions is avoided. Mr. Klosek states on p. 129 that the “year of intervention is included in the calculation”. The example with South Africa seems to indicate that for every interventions the main arms suppliers are identified. The regression then limits the variance by focusing on the main arms supplier, equalizing the proxy states that diversify the imports across countries with those that rely on a very or only a single supplier. I could not follow what the response to my query about interaction effects means and look forward to receiving further clarifications on what has changed here and where these tests are reported. The memo is unfortunately not very precise in this regard.

I notice some changes in the more qualitatively oriented last application. The memo does not discuss my point about how one can measure indirect interventions.

Conclusion: I note that the dissertation has improved. There are, however, still a couple of major issues that the author has to address before he turns the remaining chapters into articles or the dissertation into a research monograph. I recommend that this dissertation is accepted nevertheless.