CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

Military Interventions in Civil Wars: The role of Foreign Direct Investments and Proxy Interventions in the Motivation to Intervene

Dissertation Thesis

2019

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Year of the defence: 2019

Abstract

The current international system with its emphasis on state sovereignty was designed to restrain interference in domestic affairs by other states. However, this notion has been repeatedly challenged throughout the past 70 years by states intervening with military instruments in internal armed conflicts. Possible motives that led states to jeopardize the lives of their soldiers and convinced them to bear the costs of interventions have engendered a rich debate in the studies of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies. In this dissertation, two arguments based on the logic of the realist theory of international relations are brought forward to augment our understanding of factors contributing to military interventionism. First, it is shown that economic linkages between states transcend the debate on trade and include the effects of foreign direct investment on their willingness to intervene by force. Corporate investment is shown to significantly raise the willingness of states to intervene when existing FDI is endangered by the dynamics unfolding during internal armed conflicts. Second, great powers are apt to harness other states to alter the conflict dynamics in civil wars. Applying the principal-agent framework in combination with the logic of arms trade allows identifying unequal power relationships between states. The statistical analysis shows that states which are supplied by great powers like the United States and Russia have a higher probability of intervening in a civil war. Two cases studies illuminate the principal-agent relationship by investigating a particular category of proxy interventionism in which an arms recipient intervenes with combat troops in a civil war, whereas the great power only applies indirect military instruments.

Keywords

Military Interventions; Civil Wars; Foreign Direct Investments; Proxy Interventions; Arms Trade; Realism

Length of the work: 76.289

Abstrakt

Stávající mezinárodní systém s důrazem na státní suverenitu byl navržen tak, aby omezil vměšování do vnitřních záležitostí jiných států. Tento předpoklad však v uplynulých 70 letech narušovaly státy vojenskými intervencemi do vnitrostátních ozbrojených konfliktů. Důvody, které vedly státy k riskování životů jejich vojáků a přesvědčily je o potřebě nést náklady takových intervencí, vyvolaly v rámci oborů mezinárodních vztahů a mírových a konfliktních studií živou debatu. V této disertační práci jsou představeny dva argumenty, vycházející z logiky realistické teorie mezinárodních vztahů, které se snaží přispět k lepšímu pochopení faktorů, jež přispívají k vojenskému intervencionismu. Za prvé, práce ukazuje, že ekonomické vazby mezi státy jdou daleko za rámec debaty o mezinárodním obchodu a zahrnují dopady přímých zahraničních investic na ochotu k vojenským intervencím. Provedený výzkum potvrdil, že státy jsou významně ochotnější intervenovat, pokud jsou existující investice jejich domovských firem ohroženy dynamikou vnitrostátních ozbrojených konfliktů. Za druhé, velmoci jsou schopny využívat třetí státy, aby ovlivnily konfliktní dynamiku v občanských válkách. Aplikace konceptuálního rámce vztahu principála a agenta (principal-agent problem) v kombinaci s logikou obchodu se zbraněmi umožnila identifikovat nerovné mocenské vztahy mezi státy. Statistická analýza odhalila, že u odběratelů zbraňových systémů od velmocí, jako jsou USA a Rusko stoupá pravděpodobnost intervence do občanské války. Dva vybrané případy ilustrují vztah principála a agenta rozborem specifické kategorie ,intervencí v zastoupení (proxy intervention), v nichž odběratelé zbraní intervenují v občanské válce nasazením svých ozbrojených sil, zatímco zainteresovaná velmoc uplatňuje pouze nepřímé vojenské nástroje.

Klíčová slova

vojenské intervence; občanské války; přímé zahraniční investice; intervence v zastoupení; obchod se zbraněmi; realismus

Declaration

- 1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
- 2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
- 3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 02.08.2019

Kamil Klosek

Acknowledgments

In 2014, I came for the first time to Charles University in Prague. After earning my master's degree in International Security Studies, I decided to continue my academic development here. Four years have passed since this decision and now I am submitting my dissertation. It goes without saying that these years have proven to have influenced my personality tremendously. During this time, I enjoyed immersing myself in the academic field. I learned how to overcome many challenges but also experienced times that were strenuous and exhausting. This book would have not been possible if there were not people in my life that kept me on the right track and for those are the following sentences dedicated.

Above all, I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who contributed to this work by providing me incredibly valuable feedback, challenged my way of thinking and was always helpful when I needed to exchange my thoughts. Those people include my former PhD supervisor Tomáš Karásek, Vojtěch Bahenský, Michal Parízek, Jan Karlas, Jan Kofroň, Jakub Tesař, Běla Plechanovová, and Vít Střítecký.

Further, I am heavily indebted to my colleagues at the Peace Research Center Prague where I began working on a project about Frozen Conflicts in January 2018. Therefore, my gratitude here goes to Michal Smetana, Jan Ludwig, Paja Blahova, and again to Vojtěch Bahenský. Further, I want to thank Milos, Balaban, Mirka Kortusova, Libor Stejskal, Pavel Micka, Marie Nemeckova, Anna Kopecka and Kyrstof Kucmas.

During the time of the dissertation, I have spent three months as visiting researcher at the University of Coimbra in Portugal, and I would therefore like to thank in particular Daniela Nascimiento who initiated my stay and helped me in the organizational phases. Further, I want to thank Ricardo Sousa from the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa who came all the way to Coimbra for the presentation of one chapter and provided invaluable feedback. I also had the pleasure to stay for two months in Kampala, Uganda, for research purposes. I want to thank Tony Makayu for inviting me to Kampala and Edward Kaweesi from Makerere University for his time.

Special thanks also go the organizers of the BIGSSS Computational Social Science Summer School on Conflicts in Bremen which I had the pleasure to visit in 2018. What started as a research incubator resulted after one year of hard work in the development of a software that simulates civil war dynamics with the inclusion of rebel groups and economic actors. My deep gratitude goes to my coauthors Frances Duffy, Luis Gustavo Nardin, Gerd Wagner. The work with you was incredible intellectually stimulating and has widened my understanding of civil wars.

I also want to thank the Deutscher Akademischer Auslandsdienst (German Academic Exchange Service) who granted a one-year scholarship, the "Jahrestipendium für Doktoranden", from 01.08.2016 until 31.08.2007. The scholarship significantly contributed to the success of the project. Similarly, I want to thank the Grant Agency of Charles University who financially contributed to my project on "Foreign Interventions into Civil Wars: The Role of Business Interests as the motivating factor for third state intervention" (project No. 712218) in the years 2018 and 2019. Here also goes my gratitude to Eva Horníčková who was very supportive whenever I needed help with bureaucratic challenges as well as Jana Krejčíková and everybody from the Center of Doctoral Studies.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family and friends who provided me with a supportive environment without which this dissertation could not have been written. Living in a different country was not always easy for each of us and I am very thankful for all with whom I could maintain contact and friendship in Germany despite the distance. This also relates to all friends whom I made in the Czech Republic. I also want to thank Davit Petrosyan with whom I could always engage in discussions and debates. Our conversations motivated me to work even more diligently on this dissertation.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

Introduction and Outline of the Dissertation

Civil wars constitute a prevalent political phenomenon which has attracted the interests of politicians, diplomats, economists, technocrats in international organizations, business executives, activists, and academics alike. Armed violence within the boundaries of a state confronts the international community with the question if and how to react. One widely used instrument to alter civil war dynamics has been the use of military force. However, it requires the intervener to carefully deliberate the consequences of the use of military instruments as their usage can violate the very norms and values of sovereignty and non-intervention that form the framework of the Westphalian international system and inflict costs on the intervener and intervened alike. Military interventions have been implemented against the threat to be sanctioned by the international community for transgressing international norms. Further, military adventurism in foreign countries can be punished by domestic stakeholders who could withdraw their support for the incumbent leadership in the intervening country if foreign policy objectives are not attained as envisioned or costs are too high to bear. This leads to the fundamental question, namely what contributes to the motivation of a state to intervene. What are the main drivers that define the foreign policy interests which lead to the involvement of military personnel in civil wars?

Existing explanations of military interventions in civil wars emphasize a wide array of factors that influence the political decision-making process within a state. Those factors can be divided into two categories¹. The first category relates to universal pull factors of the civil war onto the potential interveners. Those are understood to be monadic or contextual factors because these factors remain constant in dyadic relationships. From this perspective, attributes of the civil war influence the political decision-making process in countries with the potential to intervene militarily. For instance, humanitarian interventions are construed as a tool to curb human suffering during an ongoing violent

¹ Stojek and Chacha (2015: 229) call those categories "conflict characteristics" and "dyadic ties". An exception of this categorization can be found in Kathman (2010, 2011). In contrast to monadic and dyadic factors, he emphasizes *regional* and *contagious* effects of civil wars on potential interveners which he calls "extra-dyadic factors" (Kathman 2011: 848). Another exception is analysis of Findley and Teo (2006) who analyze whether military interventions in civil wars are conducted as a response to a military intervention by an ally or a rival.

armed conflict as the state embroiled in the civil war cannot protect its citizen from war crimes and atrocities or even morphs into the perpetrator who has to be halted in its actions (Regan 2000; Krain 2005). Another pull factor highlighted in academic literature is the presence of natural resources in the civil war country. Some studies obtain results from which it can be inferred that the presence of lootable natural resource deposits attracts military interventions by outside powers (Ross 2004). Similarly, great powers might be pulled into civil wars to ensure that the potential conclusion of the internal armed interaction does not violate the foreign policy interests of the intervener. Great powers can be inclined to preserve an incumbent government or attempt to forcibly remove it during a civil war (Lemke and Regan 2004).

The second category pertains to studies that focus on dyadic linkages between the civil war country and the military intervener. From this perspective, the relationship between the two countries is characterized along shared dimensions. Each dimension exerts its independent influence on the potentially intervening state and increases his willingness to implement a military intervention. For instance, studies show that ethnic or ideological linkages between groups residing in the civil war country and within the territory of the potential intervener increase the risk to observe an intervention (Saideman 2001). Similarly, civil wars create political, social, and economic ripple effects in their spatial vicinity. Refugee streams (Salehyan 2008) and interrupted supply of goods and raw materials (Stojek and Chacha 2015) can induce the affected state to intervene in the civil war to ameliorate the deleterious effects on its society and economy².

In this extensive debate on motivational factors determining civil war intervention, a particular strand focuses on economic causes. In this domain, prior analysis has produced contradictory results. For instance, in the realm of natural resources and civil wars, several studies were conducted to explore if natural resource presence and natural resource trade can affect political decision-making in the intervening country. Bove et al. (2016) investigate the role of oil and conclude that interveners are more

 $^{^2}$ The dissertation is based on hypotheses that concern the second category with its focus on dyadic relationships. The choice between monadic versus dyadic approaches resides on the concepts behind postulated effects. Human rights violations and war atrocities can have an impact on all existing states, whereas ethnic ties only affect countries who share similar ethnic groups. However, both contextual and dyadic variables are used to control for alternative explanations.

likely to militarily engage in civil wars in which oil reserves, endowments and the number of wildcats (exploration activities) are high during periods of high oil prices. Furthermore, net oil import countries are more prone to intervene in those countries on which their oil trade depends.

In contrast, Aydin (2010) obtains different results according to which the presence of oil deters third states from intervention and argues that oil markets are not easy to penetrate by newcomers. Stojek and Chacha (2015) find a significant relationship between military interventions and civil war countries that are oil exporters. At the same time, counter-intuitively the likelihood of intervening on the side of a rebel group is ten times higher than on the side of the government which hints at the possibility that interveners might desire regime change to receive access to oil deposits. Koga (2011) includes regime type characteristics into the equation but receives no significant effect of oil production sites on the motivation to intervene militarily. Notwithstanding, he finds that autocracies are more likely to intervene in civil wars that feature lootable resources like secondary diamonds, whereas this does not hold for democracies. Along these lines, Findley and Marineau (2015) explicitly focus on lootable natural resources and find that the presence of diamonds and other gems hastens the decision of third states to intervene into a civil war and that interventions are more likely to occur on the side of the opposition.

A similar debate occurred regarding the salience of trade on military interventions in civil wars³. Concerning military interventions organized by international organizations like the United Nations, it appears that major powers are not motivated by trade linkages to contribute peacekeeping forces (Rost and Greig 2011: 180). Kathman (2011) finds that higher dyadic trade volumes adjusted for the economic size of the trading partners decrease the likelihood of military intervention in a civil war, whereas stakes in regional trade increase the willingness to intervene. Stojek and Chacha (2015) assess whether trade linkages affect the decision of a biased intervention in a civil war. Whereas higher total trade volumes increase the probability of an intervention by the trading partner, this effect is almost completely borne by interventions on the side of the government. The authors argue that the dyadic trade variable of Kathmann (2011) produces an artificial result because states with larger economies are more capable

³ Apart of military interventions, Aydin (2012) finds that bilateral trade has an effect on diplomatic interventions in civil wars.

of intervening, but due to the adjustment of trade by GDP, disproportionally higher GDP will lead to lower values of the dyadic trade variable (Stojek and Chacha 2015: 233). Further research by Chacha and Stojek (2016) investigates the effect of colonialism and finds that bilateral economic ties are a considerable driver of the colonial history variable in models estimating military interventions in civil wars.

In the discussion above, a crucial aspect of economic cost-benefit calculations surfaces. For instance, studies of the first category implicitly assume that the presence of lootable resources exerts a uniform effect on all potential interveners. For instance, Stojek and Chacha (2015) and Aydin (2010) use oil as a constant contextual factor in their analysis. Whether the potential intervener is constituted by the United States or Paraguay, the lootable resource variable conceptually exerts the same effect on both countries, namely it increases the probability to observe a military intervention. However, this is highly unlikely since both exemplary countries possess different domestic economies based on varying types of industries, consumption patterns, and home-grown corporations. Countries do not equally benefit from attaining access to oil deposits, and not every country has the potential to incorporate lootable resources in their manufacturing processes.

As a consequence, this leads to "correlation does not imply causation"– arguments. In the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, natural resource deposits are present due to inalterable geological conditions⁴. Similarly, this region is marred by frequent internal unrest due to a broad spectrum of contributing factors and is equally amenable to outside military interventions (Elbadawi 2000). Hence, historically frequent interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa by countries like Cuba, which did not possess the capacity to harness local natural resources, contribute in large-N studies to the identification of a link between natural resource presence and military interventionism. This, however, arguably constitutes a correlational than a causational link.

⁴ For a brief overview, consult African Natural Resources Center (2016).

Research Puzzle: Adding Multi-National Corporations into the equation

Based on the ambiguous findings concerning trade and the inaccurate use of variables measuring natural resources in current research, the following questions arise. Do states engage in military interventions if they can individually benefit in economic terms from the military intervention in the target country, or have economic factors no independent bearing on military interventions when controlled for alternative explanations? Under which conditions contribute economic factors to the motivation of a country to intervene in a civil war? This is the research puzzle which is addressed in this dissertation. Two new arguments based on the dyadic relationship between the potential intervener and the civil war country as well as based on the relationship between the potential intervener and great powers are proposed and briefly introduced in the following paragraphs.

The first proposition is centered on the introduction of a neglected actor in International Relations (IR) theory, namely multinational corporations (MNCs). I argue that the existence of foreign direct investments (FDI) in civil war countries as well as the potential future exploitation of natural resource deposits increases the willingness for military involvement by outside powers. This proposition presupposes a *direct* dyadic effect between the intervening state and the civil war country. Furthermore, two hypotheses test whether the actual possibility to exploit natural resources (oil and uranium) in the civil war country by the potential intervener increases the probability to observe a military intervention. The fourth hypothesis refers to ties between the defense industry of the potential intervener and the armed forces in the civil war country. It tests, whether arms sales from the potential intervener to the civil war country increase the risk to observe an intervention of the former in the civil war of the latter. These hypotheses are analyzed in chapter 3.

The second proposition pronounces the hierarchical power structure within the international community of states and emphasizes the role which great powers occupy. Using a principal-agent framework, I illuminate the triangular relationship between great powers (principal), the intervening country (agent), and the civil war country (target). I theorize that the motivation to intervene cannot be solely identified in the direct interests of the intervener viz-a-viz the outcome of the civil war but is also determined *indirectly* based on the relationship between the intervener and its main ally in the form of

a great power. Great powers harness middle and small powers for military intervention in circumstances in which great powers either benefit from joint interventions or in circumstances in which great powers are too constrained to independently intervene, and therefore delegate the military intervention partially or entirely to other states. Such a conceptual relationship has already been investigated in the case of third state rebel patronage (Salehyan 2011). In these cases, states exploit the existence of rebel groups in rival countries to advance their interests.

In contrast, the proposed argument here assumes that states similarly use other states to alter civil war dynamics. Harnessing existing data on arms trade between a great power and the potential intervener allows for the identification of the principal-agent relationship. Statistical approaches test two related hypotheses and are conducted in chapter 4. I further coin the term *state-to-state* intervention for the particular case in which the principal is invested to a lesser degree militarily in a civil war than the agent. This particular category of proxy intervention is analyzed in chapter 5. It arguably constitutes the most clear-cut observable class of cases related to military proxy interventions in civil wars.

Both propositions are substantiated by the recourse to the realist school of thought in international relations theory. This choice is grounded in the ontological assumptions concerning states and their relation towards MNCs. From the realist perspective, states possess independent agency and derive their interests based on autonomous calculations with regards to their position in the international system (Waltz 2010). Corporations do not alter the political decision-making process through their actions towards the government. Instead, I argue in this dissertation that states include corporations into their calculations to promote and protect existing economic interests (Gilpin 2001; Krasner 1978). This approach is in contrast to alternative explanations like liberalism or Marxism. In a nutshell, the former would emphasize the political influences of corporate actors through lobbying processes (Moravcsik 1997; Stojek and Chacha 2015), whereas the latter assumes that states conduct (foreign) policies in the interests of economic elites (Krasner 1978). According to the realist perspective, corporations do not influence foreign policies through lobbying as state interests are derived independently to enhance the position of a state within the international system. In some cases, security and economic concerns intereset with the interests of corporations, and in other cases, alternative explanations provide more

explanatory power. The theoretical section on foreign direct investments provides a more thorough explanation for the choice to ground the hypotheses on the ontological assumptions of the realist school of thought. To illustrate the conceptual hypotheses empirically, the following two historical military interventions are presented.

Illustrative Cases: Military Interventions in Congo and Oman

After Belgian Congo became independent in 1960, it shortly drifted into disarray. Independence occurred rapidly, and the new political leadership was both unprepared to govern over the whole territory as well as facing mutinies by the local armed forces (Saideman 2001: 37). Katanga, the most affluent province with an abundance of natural resources, attempted to secede and become an independent political entity. Belgium initially supported the independence movement financially as well as with military means. This was in stark contrast to the stance of the United Nations which approved the first peacekeeping mission in its history to stabilize the situation as well as in contrast to American interests which attempted to avoid ceding a leading role in the decolonization process to the Soviet Union (Kaplan 1967). The question arises why Belgium became so selective in its support to this particular secessionist movement and why Belgium did not uphold the territorial integrity of the new Congolese state although facing resistance by the United States?

Belgium's relationship with Katanga was primarily based on economic ties in the natural resource sector as well as the protection of existing white settlements in the region. During the times of colonization, King Leopold established trade linkages between Katanga and Belgium by inviting corporations to invest. When Congo declared independence, the mines in Katanga were already controlled and exploited by Belgian companies (Gleijeses 2010: 61). Financial capital investments and business interests played both a role to induce Belgian policymakers to remain in Katanga and support the local independence movement of Tshombe (Kent 2017). For the Belgian state, it became unacceptable to risk the corporate investments which were at stake after the election of president Lumumba who fiercely opposed Belgian presence in Congo. For Belgian business actors with investments in Katanga, it was of paramount importance to avoid losing their privileges in the natural resource sector. As stated by Hoskyns (1965: 140): "The mutiny of the Force Publique, and the resulting

chaos combined with Lumumba's refusal to call Belgian troops changed the situation completely. Those Europeans who had opposed secession now saw it as the only way of effectively restoring law and order and safeguarding Belgian investment in Katanga". The Belgian case in Congo constitutes a telling case for the importance of foreign direct investments as a crucial motivating factor for military engagement in a civil war.

The following case exemplifies, in turn, the triangular relationship between the actual intervener and a great power which bears interests in the outcome of a civil war. During the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, Oman experienced a rebellion against the rule of the incumbent Sultan Said bin Taimur and later his successor and son Qaboos bin Said (DeVore 2012). The uprising was identified to constitute a communist threat to the Arabian Peninsula and dragged the United Kingdom and the United States into the conflict. Whereas the Soviet Union and China supported the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) and later its successor the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), who openly proclaimed adherence to socialist thought and was perceived as to have operated according to Mao's "Red Book", the US and UK saw their direct interest to be best served in the preservation of the monarchic rule. Therefore, both countries became to a varying degree engaged in the counter-insurgency operation. The UK had vested interests in Oman due to its geostrategic location as a gateway for Iraqi, Kuwaiti and Iranian oil shipments. In addition, Oman and the United Kingdom were bound by historical ties. The British operated a military base in Oman and became active with military advisors and deployments of the Royal Airforce and the British Army in the counterinsurgency efforts. In contrast, the US became mainly involved in 1975 with the shipment of arms and counter-insurgency technology.

One of the reasons for the final victory over the insurgents was due to the military intervention by Iran, then ruled by the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who maintained a close relationship with the United States and the United Kingdom alike (Perkins 1988; Hughes 2015). The UK government's fear of disapproval of the British combat involvement by its domestic constituency due to financial and reputational costs as well as potential casualties and its fear of international condemnation, especially in the wake of the emergence of Arab nationalism, prevented the UK from becoming more intensively engaged in the civil war (Cobain 2016). The entrance of Iran with over 4000 soldiers, who fought on behalf of the Sultanate and the British and American interests, relieved the burden. It proved to be the decisive military tipping point during the civil war in favor of the monarchic rule. As remarked by the commander of Anglo–Omani forces, Major-General Kenneth Perkins:" without effective use of the Iranians [and other allied] manpower and logistic support, the war would inevitably drag into a stalemate." (Perkins, 1988, as cited in DeVore 2012)

While the Iranian intervention was driven by varying motives including security concerns and the use of Oman as a testing ground for its armed forces, without British and US military supplies in the form of arms and training as well as the political approval by both countries, the intervention could not have taken place. The United States used its diplomatic clout to facilitate the deployment of Iranian military personnel in Oman (DeVore 2012: 161). Furthermore, Iran became one of the primary recipients of US and UK arms supplies. As observed by McGlinchey (2013: 231): "According to American estimates, Iran made a transition from a relatively weak client state under a US Cold War security umbrella into an emerging partner of America during the Johnson years." Iran, identified here as the agent, carried out those military incursions and investments which the UK was unable and the US unwilling to commit.

These two historical examples about the Belgian intervention in Congo and the Iranian military intervention in Oman corroborate the statistical results of the dissertation. Concerning the results of existing foreign direct investments in civil war countries, statistical outcomes of random-effect logit models show that an increase in the logged FDI variable increases the probability to observe a civil war intervention. Further, the potential exploitation of oil reserves in the civil war country by an intervener which domestically consumes more oil with its industries than it produces equally raises the probability to observe a military intervention. Arms trade is also significantly correlated with interventionism, whereas the results for uranium are inconclusive. In particular, the outcome of foreign direct investments has a policy-relevant impact on the current debate about the replacement of Official Development Assistance (ODA) by FDI in developing countries (see chapter 6).

The current trends since the 2000s indicate overall rising FDI levels compared to foreign aid spending (UNCTAD 2018: 12). Several global, inter-regional, and bilateral initiatives by actors like the G20, the EU or China encourage economic growth in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) through corporate investment. The assumption that the shift from ODA to FDI will relieve the financial burden from donor states and decrease the political interference in the domestic politics of recipient countries is according to the results of this study not tenable. Accordingly, increased corporate investment inevitably ties the home country to the host country,⁵ and in case of internal political turmoil, the home state might feel compelled to intervene to safeguard corporate investments. The first consequences of this logic can be observed in the case of Chinese corporate expansionism in Sub-Saharan Africa. China became active as a mediator in the South Sudanese Civil War, thereby turning away from their proclaimed "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," which include the norm of non-interference (Hodzi 2019: 54).

The startling results of the proxy intervention analysis demonstrate that more than two thirds (64%) of the annual military interventions recorded in External Support Dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Högbladh et al. 2011) are constituted by interventions in which an agent jointly intervenes in the same civil war as its major arms supplier. This observation indicates that it is not sufficient to comprehend the motivation of interventions solely grounded on the direct interests of the intervening country in the outcome of the civil war. It corroborates studies on coalitional interventions in which one leading state is accompanied by a set of auxiliary supporting interveners (Kreps 2011) and further points that great powers do not only assemble coalitions but act in a fashion that can be described as *leading from behind* (see chapter 5). The following paragraph provides the structure of the dissertation.

In the following section, the prevalence of civil wars in the international system is analyzed to obtain a perspective about the frequency and spatial distribution of civil wars in the post-World War II era. This is complemented by the academic debate related to civil war outbreak and civil war dynamics.

⁵ The "home" country is the country in which the multinational corporation resides with its headquarter. The "host" country is the destination of foreign direct investments conducted by the multinational corporation.

The focus lies on the trajectory of the debate from domestic level factors to transnational explanations of civil wars. The following second chapter proceeds by concentrating explicitly on the current debate about military interventions in civil wars and sets out to define the very term of state intervention. It first delineates the fundamental assumptions of the Westphalian state system to provide the conceptual framework within which military interventions and civil wars take place. After that, the notion of intervention is discussed, and a definition of intervention is provided. This is then complemented by a discussion about the existing explanations on motivational factors of military interventions with a focus on the ontological assumptions of realism.

Chapter 3 then engages in the conceptual and empirical analysis of foreign direct investments and military interventions in civil wars. It includes the methodological choices relevant to the research design of the study. Chapter 4 is designated to test the concept of proxy interventions by states and, similar to chapter 3, is structured by first providing the theoretical background of the expected principalagent relationship and then continues to explicate the research design and provides the results of the statistical analyses. Chapter 5 is concerned with a subset of proxy interventions which are termed stateto-state interventions because they require the participation of both the great power (principal) and a smaller power (agent). The participation is defined by an unequal distribution of burden-sharing according to which the smaller power provides military combat troops, whereas the great power supports the small power with indirect military intervention instruments like intelligence gathering or logistics. Lastly, chapter 6 refers to implications of the results with regards to the academic debate as well as to policy-relevant implications for potential future military interventions in civil wars.

Civil wars in the International System

Within the state-centered framework (Krasner 1999), civil wars occur conceptually within the sovereign territorial boundaries of a state. What constitutes a civil war is a matter of disagreement and has precipitated varying definitions and lists of civil wars. Disagreement exists over the question of the spatial outreach of civil wars, their duration, the goals and ambitions of insurgents and rebel groups as well as which practices have to be implemented (Mundy 2011). Should a civil war count when rebel groups operate outside the territory of the state? Does violence have to occur two-sided and is the use of arms necessary? Is there a minimum threshold of fatalities to be surpassed in a given time-frame? Is it a necessary requirement that rebel groups pursue political objectives or can non-political armed groups also constitute a source for civil war? The choice of answers to these questions can have a profound impact on the analytical results of the study. A comparison of the use of different datasets led Sambanis (2004) to the conclusion that a crucial variable like the effect of ethnic fractionalization is highly dependent on the utilized dataset.

Currently, three major research projects provide distinct lists of recorded civil wars since the end of the Second World War. These three projects are the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)⁶, the Correlates of War Project (COW)⁷ and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF).⁸ All three projects agree that civil wars are at least dyadic, whereas one party has to constitute the government. Furthermore, all three projects emphasize a minimum degree of organization for the nonstate actor. The COW sets as a criterium that to count as a nonstate armed group (NSA), the organization must either contain 100 armed personnel or must suffer at least 25 casualties during battles. For UCDP, the nonstate armed actor must be recognizable by a distinct name and use at least some basic form of armed violence. AKUF does not require any numeric threshold or any additional identification marker. However, what all three projects agree upon is that violence exercised by both actors has to show some patterns of continuity and is not just an accumulation of spontaneous events. The goal of the nonstate actor has to be either to assume control over the government or to gain more

⁶ See Pettersson and Eck (2018); Gleditsch et al. (2002).

⁷ See Sarkees and Wayman (2010).


⁸ See https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereich-

sowi/professuren/jakobeit/forschung/akuf/kriegsdefinition.html.

autonomy or even secession within a state. Lastly, whereas the COW project counts civil wars if they exhibit a cumulative battle-related death toll of 1000, the UCDP project already begins at a much lower level of 25. As before, AKUF does not provide any level of minimum violence.

Civil War Prevalence

It is crucial to obtain an overview of the scope and frequency of civil wars in the international system to obtain an understanding of the relevance of this study. For this purpose, the dissertation relies on data provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) to identify civil wars. Compared to the Correlates of War Project (COW), the UCDP at its core requires only a minimum of 25 annual battle deaths, whereas the COW dataset records mainly instances of 1000 or more annual battle deaths. Compared to the AKUF, the threshold at 25 battle deaths ensures that violence is occurring at a level that can necessitate reactions by third states.






Figure 1-1: Frequency of annual Armed Conflict worldwide. Source: UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset version 18.1.

In general, UCDP requires to meet four criteria to code an annual violent confrontation as internal armed conflicts (Pettersson and Eck 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2002). The four criteria are the following. At least two different actors must be involved in the conflict. One of them must be the government of a state. The dataset identifies the government as the party, which controls the capital of a state and is internationally recognized as the sovereign of the territory on which the armed conflict takes place. The second actor must be a formally organized non-governmental group. These two actors are in conflict because of incompatible interest about either the control government or control over territory or both. The starting year can occur one calendar year earlier if the interest incompatibility precedes the year in which the armed conflict surpasses the aforementioned threshold. This definition excludes interstate wars, extrasystemic wars as well as intercommunal violence. Third states can support each domestic actor in the internal armed struggle.

The relevance of this research project is provided by the sheer ubiquity of observed internal violence in the international system. This type of conflict surged in the 1960s and the 1970s to an average annual ongoing armed conflict level of 33 since 1980 until 2016, meaning that on average 33 internal armed conflicts were ongoing worldwide in a given year after 1979 (see figure 1-1). It was accompanied by the rise in the number of states in the wake of decolonization and the emergence of communist rebel groups in the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Sketching a broad picture based on the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset 18.1, the second half of the 1940s experienced most of its civil wars in South-East Asia in the wake of French decolonization of Indochina as well as the civil war in China. The 1950s were equally dominated by conflicts in South-East Asia with the addition of Myanmar as well as the Philippines and Indonesia. Other conflicts appeared in the Middle East with Israel and Iraq.

In the 1960s, newly independent African states like Congo, Ghana, Chad, and Cameroon followed together with already independent Ethiopia. India and Nepal faced durable insurgencies too. In the 1970s, new conflicts emerged in South America in Colombia, Argentina, Guatemala, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia together with two European countries, United Kingdom and Spain, as well in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Thailand and African conflicts in South Africa and Mauretania. The following decade of the 1980s witnessed new cases like Haiti, Panama, Suriname or Romania and was complemented by an explosion of new civil wars in the 1990s. Those were driven by the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Moldova, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan) and the break-up of Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia). These conflicts, however, mostly receded in the 2000s, but the conflicts in

South America, Africa, South Asia, and South-East Asia have persisted. New conflicts emerged in the 2010s in the wake of the Arab Spring, the disintegration of the Central African Republic, and the conflict in Ukraine.

Breaking down conflict prevalence geographically, it can be seen in figure 1-2 that internal armed conflicts are unevenly spread across different regions. The Asian continent leads with over 700 registered annual armed conflicts, followed by Africa, which includes all countries on the African continent except Egypt. The least amount of violent domestic conflict is recorded in Europe. The Asian conflicts centered around South-East and South Asia with Myanmar, Thailand, India, Vietnam, Cambodia, and China being the central bearer of internal violent strife. In Africa, over half of all newborn states experienced some form of rebellion. Western and Eastern Africa was especially fraught with violence as well as the former Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique.

The two studies of the dissertation on the role of foreign direct investments and proxy interventions cover different periods due to data availability. Hence, the hypotheses related to FDI are tested against a sample covering the period from 2001 until 2009. The most affected continents in this period were in the Global South with South America, Africa and the Southern part of Asia (including Afghanistan) and the civil war in Iraq. In contrast, the proxy intervention hypotheses refer to a sample from 1975 until 2009. In this sample, Central America and the Post-Soviet Space plus the Balkans are additionally present.




Figure 1-2: Cumulative distribution of internal armed conflicts in different regions, 1946-2016. Source: UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset version 18.1.

A comparison between intrastate and interstate wars reveals that interstate wars occur less frequently than intrastate wars. Figure 1-3 illustrates a widening gap between both types of conflict. After the Second World War, no more than five interstate wars have been observed in each year, whereas intrastate wars peaked at 48 in the early 1990s. In general, civil wars constitute a prevalent phenomenon that has afflicted a wide range of countries, especially in the developing world. Concluding, civil wars constitute a ubiquitous and frequent phenomenon concerning each continent in the world. In the following section, an overview of recent scholarship addressing the shift from domestic-level factors to factors considering transnational explanations of civil wars is provided. The former perspective dominated the understanding of civil war dynamics since the 1990s but was complemented by arguments incorporating transnational causes in the 2000s. Since the dissertation is concerned with military interventions, it derives its inspiration and existing knowledge from the latter body of literature and positions itself within the debate on military interventions.




Figure 1-3: Comparison of intrastate and interstate wars in the international system. Source: UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset version 18.1.

Domestic-level Research on Civil Wars

Generally, the study of civil wars has revolved around three distinctive themes (Newman and DeRouen, eds. 2016; Salehyan and Thyne 2017). The most substantial part of intellectual inquiry relates to the questions of factors causing civil wars. The range of explanations is vast and stretches from ethnic-based explanations to questions of poverty, education, and development and continues to include the role of natural resources, regime types, religion, environmental change, and migration. The second field encompasses analyses of the consequences of civil wars. These studies focus on casualties, health epidemics, refugees and IDPs, gender-based violence, and the question of escaping the conflict spiral. Lastly, several studies focus on conflict dynamics. Here, the focus lies on the emergence of war economies, military tactics, conflict duration, and the influence outside mediators possess to foster conflict resolution between the warring parties, or at least conflict cessation and freezing.

However, much of the established literature operates with "closed polity" assumptions (Gleditsch 2007: 295). This means that factors contributing to civil war outbreaks, conflict outcomes, and conflict dynamics are typically attributed to internal factors of a state. For instance, seminal studies like Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003) or Keen (1998) use variables which chiefly measure domestic conditions that can be conducive for civil war. Those encompass economic factors

like GDP growth and GDP per capita as well as social factors that measure ethnic fractionalization within a country, demographic factors like the proportion of young males within the population and geographic factors that take the local terrain into account. Natural resources are construed in how they impact domestic institutions ("resource curse") and how they provide incentives for rebels to stage a rebellion through greed or grievances.

The interest in external factors received momentum at the beginning of the 2000s.⁹ Gleditsch (2007) advocated in the 2000s to consider transnational dimensions of civil wars. Factors which transcend state borders should deserve more attention as they could potentially influence civil war dynamics. In general, such factors have been investigated beforehand but not in a systematic fashion. For instance, the authors propose four different transnational mechanisms based on the idea that adjacent countries with specific attributes increase the risk of civil war outbreak due to spillover effects. First, transborder kin-relationships should increase the chances to observe a civil war because a domestic ethnic group might be receiving external support in resources, and it might also anticipate an intervention on its behalf. Second, countries bordering autocratic countries should also see increased risks of civil war as autocratic leaders are less constrained to intervene or provide support towards domestic opposition groups. Third, countries which are firmly economically integrated into a region should be expected to have lower risks of civil war outbreak as neighboring countries will invest in maintaining trade linkages stable and refraining from disruptive behavior. Lastly, bordering to a country that experiences an ongoing civil war should also increase the likelihood of spillovers like refugee and arms flows that can contribute to civil war outbreak.

Regan already began in the early 2000s to explicitly focus on external interventions in civil wars with the assumption that interveners have the motivation to end the violent dynamics during civil wars. In one of his first of many studies, Regan (2002) found to the contrary that interventions prolong civil wars, in particular when actors intervene on opposing sides of the conflict dyad. Furthermore, it appeared that biased interventions equally prolonged conflict in comparison to interventions with a

⁹ Critique dates already back to 1969 when Rosenau (1969: 150) lamented that: "The factors that foster, precipitate, sustain, channel, constrain, and/or curb intervention simply have not been scientifically explored, with the result that the literature is barren of any established generalizations."

neutral outlook. These results spurred further research with more fine-grained data and based on different conceptualizations of interventions. For instance, Fortna (2004) explicitly focused on peacekeeping missions after civil wars and found support for the assumption that peacekeepers contribute to stability. Cunningham (2010) realized that interventions by outside powers increase the duration of civil war due to the increased numbers of actors who could veto conflict resolution efforts.

Other researchers followed and proposed different mechanisms that connect the external and internal dimension of civil wars. Arguments revolved among topics like the link between regime survival and boom and bust cycles in commodity prices (Smith 2004), the deliberate provision of sanctuaries to rebels from other countries (Salehyan et al. 2011; Salehyan 2011), how refugees can pose security risks for host countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006), under which conditions foreign aid either fuels or dampens the risks of internal violence (Savun and Tirone 2011; Zürcher 2017) as well as the impact of financial donations by diaspora groups to conflict actors (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Regan and Frank 2014). One crucial aspect that separates many studies is the focus on different instruments in interventions, as explained in the following chapter.

Chapter 2 Civil Wars and Military Interventions

The Westphalian system and the concept of sovereignty and military interventions

This section is designed to provide a conceptual understanding of the premises that underlie the discussion of military interventions in civil wars and illuminate the normative and legal framework within which states operate. In the following paragraph, the historical development of the Westphalian system and the concept of state sovereignty are delineated. Civil wars take place within the confines of sovereign states. Hence, interventions are commonly understood as transgressions of territorial boundaries that are nominally under the sovereign control of the state. As will be laid out, the Westphalian system became arguably the dominant ordering principle of the international community of states after World War II. I then proceed with a brief overview of the use of states as basic units of the international system. This is complemented by a discussion of the legal and ethical conditions that surround the question under which circumstances military interventions comply with international law. Lastly, Just-War-Theory (JWT) is briefly addressed as ethical and moral considerations are frequently used to justify military interventions in civil wars within the confines of the legal and normative premises of the Westphalian system.

The first step in understanding military interventions in civil wars is to delineate the international political system based on the Westphalian order, which allows the concepts of civil war and intervention to exist in the first place. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was part of a political development which culminated over several centuries in the strict division of sovereignty over separated territories and people (Krasner 2001b). According to Brown (1992: 12), the Westphalian peace treaties¹⁰ established two fundamental principles. On the one hand, the government of a state is solely responsible for matters of domestic politics and policies. Hence, the government is the only legitimate sovereign over people and territory.

¹⁰ For a critique on the interpretation of the Westphalian peace treaties, see Osiander (2001). His major objection towards IR scholars relates to the acceptance of flawed interpretation of the peace treaties by historians from the 19th and 20th century who are accused to have interpreted the treaties in an attempt to discredit the Habsburg Empire. The peace treaties themselves have neither any reference to new concepts of sovereignty, independence or non-interference which have not existed already before the onset of the Thirty Years' War nor did they grant independence to the Dutch or the Swiss which were de facto at that time autonomous actors vis-à-vis the Holy Roman Empire.

On the other hand, sovereigns of other states are prohibited from interfering into the domestic politics of another sovereign ruler. This explicit norm of non-interference in domestic affairs between states was carried through history beginning in the dealings between the European powers until its codification in the UN Charter. In the wake of the Second World War and the process of decolonization, the world became almost completely compartmentalized in territorial entities with distinct political systems, except ungoverned territories at the North and South of the globe.

All three schools of thought in international relations have as their premise that states operate within the confines of the current Westphalian system. Proponents of realism and its more recent version of neo-realism not just assume that states are the major actors in the international system but that the power distribution among states defines the very structure within which independent states operate (Waltz 2010; Mearsheimer 2014). States here are construed as unitary and rational actors following the logic of consequences, whereas their interests can be derived from their position within the power structure. Advocates of liberalism and neo-liberalism highlight the importance of trade between states, democracy, and institutional membership of states as explanatory factors for foreign policy (Keohane 2005; Russett and Oneal 2001). States are still thought to pursue their goals, either rationally or constrained by bounded rationality. Equally, within conventional constructivism,¹¹ it is recognized that states can exist as distinct ontological actors with their (dependent) interests and agency (Wendt 2010). While neo-realism and neo-liberalism view interests of states to be determined by exogenous factors, constructivists emphasize interest generation through interactions between states and the emergence of uncodified or codified rules and norms that determine states to act according to the logic of appropriateness.

Notwithstanding the challenges faced by states to maintain sovereignty over their territory and people due to new norms of human security, non-state actors, institutionalization and globalization, the fundamental entities which shape the structure of the international system continue to be states (Krasner 2001c, 2001a). The legitimacy to use violent means of power remain within the agency of countries.

¹¹ For a discussion on the meta-theoretical foundations of constructivism and the difference between critical and conventional approaches in constructivism, see Hynek and Teti (2010).

The international economic trade system is determined by state negotiations on tariffs and bureaucratic barriers either in bi- or multilateral settings or through membership in international organizations like the European Union or the World Trade Organization. Only states can acquire membership, and states are responsible for the processes of taxation and welfare distribution on their territory. As observed by Krasner (2001a: 230): "Sovereign states are the building blocks, the basic actors, for the modern state system. Sovereign states are territorial units with juridical independence; they are not formally subject to some external authority. Sovereign states also have de facto autonomy." Finnemore (2003: 50) describes how recognition of Latin American states as sovereign equals allowed those states to participate in the Hague Conferences. In this forum, the newly admitted states lobbied for a change in intervention practices that would prevent the great powers of the 20th century from intervening in their countries in the case of outstanding debt obligations.

After defining states as the principal actors of the international system who are the main actors implementing military interventions, the legalist perspective on military interventions in civil wars is succinctly outlined. For this dissertation, the deliberations focus on the period after the end of the Second World War in 1945. Ware (2018) points out that according to the UN Charter Article 2(4), the use of military force cannot be used if the independence or territorial integrity of the target is jeopardized. This is among other things reaffirmed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) and resolution 2734 (XX), and further by the Declaration on in the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States¹².

However, Ware¹³ also pronounces that there are three particular instances which legally permit the use of military force in a civil war.¹⁴ The first is an intervention authorized and mandated by the United Nations. According to UN Charter Chapter VII, Article 39, the United Nations Security Council is solely responsible for identifying threats to international peace and security. It can then adopt a resolution that mandates member states to intervene with military instruments. In the second case, the

¹² See General Assembly resolution 36/103 (1981).

¹³ For more extensive discussion, see Walzer (2015: 58–63).

¹⁴ Brownlie (1991) includes as a fourth condition the use of force in subjected territories or such in which sovereignty is shared between different states. However, the use of military force cannot change the legal status of the territory.

target country consents to an intervention on its soil. This is also called "intervention by invitation." An arguably recent case is the letter sent by the officially recognized president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, to GCC countries in which he asked for military assistance in his fight against the Houthi rebels (Ruys and Ferro 2016: 66). The last case refers to the use of military means for self-defense. Mapel (2007: 1) defines the right to conduct self-defense as "[...] the right to use necessary and proportionate force against an armed attack or imminent threat on the political independence or territorial integrity of a state." Five GCC countries, apart of being invited by the Hadi government to intervene in Yemen, also invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter (Chapter VII) according to which a military intervention can be implemented on the grounds of collective self-defense (Ruys and Ferro 2016: 67). They then further proceeded to argue that the Arab Treaty of Joint Defense and Arab League Charter (Article 6) justifies a military intervention in Yemen.

In contrast, humanitarian interventions are not legally established and a point of contention by legalist scholars (Ware 2018: 5). The crucial question revolves around two issues. The first point concerns whether humanitarian interventions have become part of customary international law and the second point refers to the necessity of an authorization by the United Nations Security Council. Already in 1948, the United Nations introduced the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which came into power in 1951. It mandated, according to Article 3, to halt and prevent genocide.¹⁵ However, this particular convention addresses only the case of genocide. In the wake of the unauthorized NATO campaign against Serbia in the case of Kosovo in 1999, the Canadian government sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to deliberate a normative framework to address the question whether "systematic violations of human rights"¹⁶ constitute indeed a condition to revoke the rights of state sovereignty (Doyle 2011). This process culminated in the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect framework at the World Summit in 2005. The Outcome Document (GA A60/1) stipulates that in the case of genocide, war crimes, crimes against

¹⁵ Article 2 defines a genocide as "(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.", available at

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en.

¹⁶ See United Nations General Assembly (2000: 35).

humanity and ethnic cleansing, the international community has the right to conduct collective military action if authorized by the United Nations Security Council. The R2P framework requires a case-bycase assessment and is not legally binding.

Complementary to legal considerations, Just War Theory has historically developed a set of ethical criteria for the use of military force in the international system. Criteria concerning the initial decision to use force are subsumed under the category of *jus ad bellum* (Green 2000: 10) and are codified in the UN Charter as well as in several UN resolutions. To illustrate their applicability, Møller (2000) evaluates whether the NATO air campaign against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FYR) adhered to the principles of just cause, just authority, last resort, proportionality, and the probability of success. The just cause argument refers to the concepts above concerning prevention of genocide or self-defense. The second criterion considers whether the authority who conducted the military intervention was entitled to act in this manner. In the case of NATO, it was argued that this principle was violated since UN authorization was lacking. Subsequently, the last resort principle requires to exhaust all non-violent instruments before the use of force is permissible. Further, military means should be used proportionally in relation to the pursued objectives and they should have an acceptable probability of success to achieve these objectives. In his conclusion, Møller finds little justification for the NATO air campaign as well as almost no justification for the case of FYR to act in self-defense.

Further ethical considerations were developed by scholars and legalists. In his seminal book *Just and Unjust Wars*, Walzer (2015) argues based on prior intellectual work of John Stuart Mill that military interventions can be justified to uphold self-determination aspirations of a people who is part of an institutional system which it aspires to leave. Walzer speaks in this regard to "[...] uphold communal autonomy" (ibid. 90). He puts the burden of proof to the intervening country to vindicate that a specific case meets the following criteria. The first qualifying instance relates to the process of secessionism. If a group of people, which can be identified as a separate political community, is engaged in a struggle for "national liberation," then military interventionism on behalf of the secessionists is morally permissible. A second qualifying case is present when a foreign power uses military means on the territory of another state. In this instance, a counter-intervention for balancing can be justified since

the norm of non-intervention has been already violated by another power. The third and last instance refers to humanitarian interventions. When one party to the civil war inflicts human right violations and atrocities onto the other party so that the very survival of the group is at stake, an intervention is permissible.

Doyle (2011: 74–7) takes recourse to justifications provided by different schools of thought and enumerates moral justifications of interventions by realists, socialists, and liberals. From the realist perspective, interventions should occur by the strong against the weak to further their interests. However, the calculation of the effect of a military intervention is debatable and can, therefore, lead to diverging assessments by "soft" realists and "hard" realists (ibid. 74).¹⁷ From the socialist perspective, pre-1914 Marxists disavowed themselves from military interventions for the cause of socialism as they argued that the socialist revolution must be implemented from the inside working class without foreign support. With the establishment of the Soviet Union, the discourse changed as it perceived itself as in the "[...] position as the guardian of the collective interest of the working class worldwide and particularly, of course, within the Soviet bloc" (ibid. 75). The Brezhnev doctrine was one normative output to justify the military interventions in Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Lastly, liberals were staunch advocates for non-intervention as they regarded foreign meddling in domestic affairs as an infringement of human dignity. Similar to pre-1914 Marxists, John Stuart Mill advocated not to support liberal movements in foreign countries as this would undermine their legitimacy and produce a system in which the liberal government would be faced by non-liberal enemies. However, he advanced the moral argument (already mentioned by Walzer, 2015) that intense oppression which jeopardizes the existence of the national liberation group constitutes an exception to the rule of non-intervention.

Concluding, the legalistic and ethical considerations of military interventions are not constituting per se the motivation of a state to intervene, but they create the framework within which states maneuver and justify their actions. The prior deliberations attempted to provide the fundamental

¹⁷ In the example provided by Doyle, the question revolved around the intensity of punishment against an insurrection by Mytilene by Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars. The "hardliner" favored the complete destruction of the Mytilene people, whereas the counter-argument by the "soft" realists emphasized the negative long-term repercussions on other people under Athenian control.

assumptions and ethical discussions that revolve around military interventions in civil wars. The validity and applicability of international law on military interventions remains questionable. For instance, In their study on the military interventionist behavior of the United States, Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom, Tillema and van Wingen (1982: 229) note that: "The military practices of the four major countries after World War II were inconsistent with a strict interpretation of the UN Charter. Statesmen professed commitment to the Charter, but they did not live by its rules. [...] Strictly speaking, the UN Charter has not been effective in controlling major power military interventions." Only around half of all analyzed military interventions between 1963 and 1980 has proven to comply with the UN Charter and international law. Hence, this indicates that at least for the four major powers under scrutiny, international law was relegated in several instances when national objectives were deemed to enjoy higher priority.

This section was intended to provide a general overview of the conceptual basis of military interventions in civil wars. States form the building blocks of the international system and states implement military interventions. However, the interventional system provides legal obstacles to carry out military interventions at will. The UN Charter prohibits the threat or the use of force to interfere in domestic affairs. Several exceptions to this principle like invitation, self-defense, and United Nations Security Council authorization exist. The most disputed exception is the recourse to humanitarian justification. Expert opinions diverge over the question of whether interventions on humanitarian grounds have already become customary international law. The evolution of the concept of Responsibility to Protect is legally non-binding and still requires UN authorization.

Consequently, interventionist states have to decide whether they want to bear the costs by violating the precepts of this legal and normative international framework if their motivation is not justifiable. The act of non-compliance with the UN Charter is a frequent observation and puts into question to which degree international law can constrain military interventions. This leads to a further topic, namely which observable military activities should be regarded as genuine interventions. An extended analysis of the term "intervention" is conducted in the following section to clarify the positioning of the dissertation within the debate on different understandings of this term.

Defining and categorizing Military Interventions

The two main definitional Approaches of Military Interventions

The term "intervention" denotes the dependent variable of this research study. However, in the scientific literature, there is no mutual agreement on the essential parts of which interventions are constituted. Depending on the subject area and the interest of the researcher, diverging notions on interventions have emerged. In general, scholars have approached this question in two ways which will be exemplified in the following paragraphs. Overall, the first approach is to understand interventions in their historical and legal context. Scholars attempt to define concepts of interventions which allow for a changing meaning over time. This is, for instance, an approach raised by advocates of the English School of International Relations or those who subscribe to Constructivism. The term intervention can be then applied to historical periods in which state sovereignty was not the predominant ordering factor. It is time-bound and requires an inter-subjective understanding among participants in international relations.

Finnemore (2003) and Reus-Smit (2013b) provide good examples for the constructivist-postmodern strand of interventions. Finnemore (2003) perceives an intervention as a specific type of use of military force that is distinguishable from the concept of war. To be able to comprehend interventions in different time periods, she advocates perceiving interventions as an intersubjective agreed social practice that includes the use of the military. Depending on prevalent notions about legality and legitimacy on the use of military instruments in the international sphere, interventions constitute a specific class of action. For instance, the practice of states to use military force on behalf of multinational corporations to collect debts from defaulting states in the 19th century became commonly illegal after the signing of the Hague Treaty in 1907 according to which arbitration courts should settle financial claims arrears in the first place.

Similarly, Reus-Smit (2013b: 1065–7) argues that the term intervention possesses four inherent conditions which can be then transferred into International Relations scholarship. First, an intervention can only be identified within a particular systemic order. Reus-Smit analyzes different historical international orders and contends that an intervention has a different meaning if orders are configured

as "[...] heteronomy, suzerainty, empire, or some combination of these" (ibid. 1065). Within the international order of sovereign states, an intervention occurs if the territorial sovereignty of a state is transgressed. Compared to the spatial differentiation of present times, Europe has witnessed for most of its history authoritative spatial overlap but functional differentiation. For instance, in the Middle Ages, both the emperor and the pope exercised control over people in their respective worldly or religious functional domain on the same territory. According to Reus-Smit's understanding, an intervention occurred when the emperor or the pope transgressed the functional domain of the other and claimed authority that he had not possessed before. This leads to the second point, namely that intervention occurs from the outside (exogenous) and transgresses the boundaries of the inside (endogenous processes). Third, an intervention is deliberate and not an act of coincidence. Hence, the act of transgression must have an intention which purposefully aims to alter endogenous processes. For Reus-Smit, it, therefore, becomes critical to understand interventions in social science in the context of the order¹⁸ in which actors are participating. For an intervention to take place both intervener and the target must be separate units with political authority.

The second approach is more interested in the effects of interventions and aims therefore at a higher degree of intentionality¹⁹ which in turn increases precision but lowers the scope of cases under investigation. Interventions are defined with clear boundaries and can be independently observed as political phenomena. Typically, the term is used to analyze the effect of military interventions on target states or the motivation behind the intervention. Whereas earlier scholars referred to interventions as "convention-breaking" and directed to change the "authority structures" of the target state (Rosenau 1969), thus representing extraordinary measures that are not anticipated at a specific point in time, this assumption is not any more prominent in quantitative studies on interventions.²⁰ Contemporarily, interventions with reference to civil wars are any political acts implemented by third states or international organizations that aim to have an influence on civil war dynamics. Since this dissertation

¹⁸ Reus-Smit draws on Bull (2002) in his understanding of order. Accordingly, order translates into "[...] a purposive arrangement of sovereign states, in which the preservation of the society of states, ensuring the territorial independence of individual states, and limiting interstate conflict constitute the underlying purposes, and basic institutional practices, such as diplomacy and international law, [...]" (Reus-Smit 2013b: 1065).

¹⁹ See Sartori (1970) and Goertz (2012).

²⁰ A notable exception is Regan (2000) Who provides an extensive discussion on the operationalization of interventions.

focuses on the motivation of interventions, it is paramount to provide clear boundaries when an intervention can be observed. Hence, the study contributes to this second type of literature with the focus on unilateral military state interventions after the Second World War.

Whereas the constructivist/post-modern approach on the definition of intervention aims to be timeless, more operational and detailed definitions relate to the world order after the Second World War or the de-colonialization period. Interventions are understood in their relation to the sovereignty of states (Macmillian 2013: 1047). Those occur when a state attempts to alter domestic affairs of another state without directly usurping the formal authority over the target. Frequently, researchers only focus on very particular types of interventions, the most prominent being those involving military force, but implicitly operate with the sovereignty frame.

Hence, definitions are more empirically guided and aim to uncover causal patterns. For instance, Tillema (1989: 419–20) lists several types of combat forces (ground forces, airforce, and navy, including commando raids and specifically the use of artillery). Regan and Aydin (2006: 745) focus on diplomatic interventions into civil wars and distinguish between "[...] (1) mediation, (2) international forums, (3), the recall of ambassadors, and (4) explicit offers to mediate by third parties that were not accepted by both sides". To understand the effect of economic interventions, Lektzian and Regan (2016) use the TIES (Threat and Imposition of Sanctions) dataset²¹ which distinguishes between a wide array of different economic instruments like asset freeze, withholding foreign aid, export/import restrictions, blockades, travel bans and suspension of trade agreements. Interventions are then either analyzed to constitute the dependent variable, hence the event that requires to be explained, or constitute an independent variable which measures the effect of interventionism on outcomes of civil war.

²¹ Morgan et al. (2014).

The Dimensionality of Concepts in Social Science

In order to provide a coherent definition suited for this purpose, the conceptual understanding of Goertz (2012) is used as a general framework. Goertz (2012: 6–7) proposes to conceptualize phenomena on three levels. The basic level represents the cognitive anchor around which the concept is built. In political science, such terms have, for instance, referred to war, democracy, corporatism, and sovereignty. On the second tier, the multi-dimensionality and multi-level character of the phenomenon is constituted. In effect, this denotes the ontological aspects on which the concept is based. Lastly, the indicator level corresponds to the empirical content according to which the ontological dimensions are measured.

In this approach, the constitutive elements of the concepts are necessary/sufficient conditions²² which create a set of requirements that a phenomenon has to meet in order to fall into a particular category. In the minimal approach, it is required that the observation conforms to all defined characteristics to be counted positively as being representative of the specific concept. In the maximalist approach, every phenomenon that possesses a range of set characteristics is deemed to be part of the general phenomenon. For instance, it is enough to possess traits X_1 OR X_2 , whereas in the minimalist view, X_1 AND X_2 must be present.²³

The concept itself is therefore grounded on a "[...] causal, ontological and realist view of concepts." (Goertz 2012: 5). It is ontological because several pre-specified dimensions constitute the concept in what it *is*. The phenomenon possesses an essence which unambiguously allows to delimit and confine it with regards to observations that fall outside the definition. It is causal because the ontological dimensions influence the expected hypotheses on the behavior or effect of the phenomenon. This is related to the realist view of this approach. It is assumed that ontological dimensions have a real impact on the social world and can be, therefore, empirically observed and tested.

 $^{^{22}}$ Goertz points out that it is also possible to use fuzzy logic in the combination of different ontological dimensions. However, since this study is not concerned with varying degrees of interventions but conceptualizes those as dichotomous (intervention vs. non-intervention), I do not employ fuzzy logic here. The same argument pertains to weighting. There is no discrimination between different ontological dimensions based on their expected salience.

²³ OR and AND refer here to logical operators in propositional logic.

Goertz (2012: 32) advocates first to define the concept positively and then to confine it with cases at the negative pole. This means that in the first step, the first two tiers of the are constructed by agreeing on the basic level and then to proceed and provide shape to the bare core.²⁴ Subsequently, the negative pole is elaborated by rendering explicit which phenomena cannot be included in the set of positive cases. For empirical purposes, the positive and negative cases constitute the universe of cases which are used to test the hypotheses. Irrelevant cases are sorted out in this approach. This has profound implications for the study of interventions as one needs to determine a priori which dyads between intervener and target state are relevant.

Positive cases then relate to observations in which the pre-defined interventions occur, and which are expected to follow the general theoretical propositions. Negative cases are those in which no intervention occurred but *might* have taken place. Both positive and negative cases of intervention and non-intervention lay the ground for hypothesis testing. Irrelevant cases are then those cases in which neither state intervened nor had the opportunity to intervene. These politically relevant cases decrease the number of cases under scrutiny. The task of the researcher is to define rules that on the one hand rule out irrelevant cases which artificially inflate the universe of cases and on the other hand do not bias the expected results of hypothesis testing. Therefore, the final dataset will only include cases in which a state has the potentiality to intervene with military means. Since the focus on this project lies on military intervention, as delineated more detailed in the research design section in chapter 3, states without military personnel and those with a population of fewer than 500.000 thousand inhabitants are excluded from the set of potential intervening states.

²⁴ The discussion about the operationalization level is conducted in the research design section when appropriate indicators are explored to measure the intervention variable. I assume that indicators render the intervention "to be". This means that if, for instance, a state militarily supports a rebel group during a civil war, a military intervention occurs which in turn constitutes the basic phenomenon of an intervention.

State Interventions in Civil Wars

Following Goertz (2012), the project treats interventions solely from the perspective of how interventions are related to the phenomenon of civil war from a causal perspective. Accordingly, the basic level concept refers to a class of interventions, namely those which are conducted in the context of a civil war. The decision to intervene is the dependent variable, whereas measures of motivation perform as independent variables. The term "motivation portfolio" is used here to denote all possible combinations of different motivations. Here, the basic concept is confined to focus on "state interventions in civil wars" and not "interventions" in their entirety.²⁵ Interventions have been researched in various settings (for instance, in interstate conflicts or interventions in electoral processes), but the core idea has remained the same. Either the intervention occurs as an exogenous effect on an endogenous process within an isolated system or interventions takes place in the context of altering the relationship between two or more actors. A civil war can be viewed as both an endogenous process and as well as an interrelationship between different conflict actors. A civil war intervention aims to influence the endogenous dynamics of a civil war as well as it targets the relationship between the warring parties, typically directed at the government and one or more rebel groups who challenge the authority structure of the government (see figure 2-2).




Figure 2-1: Conceptual schematic outline of military interventions in civil wars.

²⁵ Such an approach conforms to studies who focus on a specific type of democracy (e.g. liberal democracy), war (e.g. interstate war), economy (e.g. liberal-market economy) or civil war (e.g. secessionist civil wars).

Additionally, I follow the reasoning by Vincent (2015), who advocates structuring the definition of "intervention" so that it achieves meaning in the context of international relations. He argues that first and foremost actors need to be defined. This pertains to the question of who counts as an intervener and which entity can be viewed as a potential target. The second step is to delineate which types of interventions are possible. Using Goertz's approach, this means to define the second level of interventions. Furthermore, there must be some purpose behind the intervention in order to separate it from political phenomena that prima facie appear to be interventions but have not an intended effect to truly change an endogenous process or the status quo.²⁶ Lastly, the international context is to be defined. As shown by Reus-Smit (2013b) interventions can and did occur even in pre-Westphalian order where the term intervention is more related to the infringement of the function authorities possess than their spatial-political outreach. This is quite different compared to the current approach to understand interventions from the perspective of state sovereignty (Macmillian 2013: 1047).

Hence, I define the term state intervention in civil war as any unilateral or multilateral action undertaken by an individual state or a group of states during an internal armed conflict over government or secession within the territorial boundaries of another sovereign state. The intervention consists of military engagement on behalf or to the detriment of the government or a rebel group.

A few remarks are needed for clarification of the single units upon which this definition is built concerning the difference between unilateralism and multilateralism. As pointed out by Kreps (2008), there is no sharp understanding at which point intervention is regarded to be unilateral or multilateral. The main fault lines pertain to the degree of cooperation between different states, the number of states involved in the operation, as well as whether the intervention was seconded and organized through an international or regional organization. The use of "multilateralism" here is to highlight that an intervention can be part of a coordinated operation between different countries but is explicitly not organized by an international body. Cases that fall into this realm are, for instance, peacekeeping missions mandated by regional organizations or the United Nations. If a state provides military

²⁶ For instance, states frequently send military personnel to provide safety for foreign national during times of civil war. This however does not have the intended effect to change the course of the civil war or to alter the authority structures of the target state.

assistance as defined in the section on operationalization, alone or in coordination with another state or group of states, then this case is included in the universe of cases. Hence, interventions mandated and organized through IOs are not part of the definition.

The reason for this choice lies in the different motivations that states express through international bodies and the different effects intervention instruments exert if enacted by IOs or unilaterally by states. On the one hand, IOs provide a platform which states can harness to receive gains from interventions that otherwise would not be possible. Furthermore, IOs allow for the deployment of military personnel in distant countries where interests between the sender state and the target are almost non-existent. On the other hand, IOs can induce states to comply with intervention instruments which would not have been supported in the first place. For instance, according to the data from in the case of peacekeeping contributions (Kathman 2013), all top ten contributing countries are developing countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, or Uruguay. This does not mean that they do not participate due to state interest in peacekeeping operations (PKOs), but the motivation is not grounded in a relationship with the target countries.

In contrast, Rost and Greig (2011) show that states engage in unilateral or multilateral peacekeeping missions without seeking prior endorsement by the United Nations when they perceive that their state interests are threatened and in which urgency to act is high. These types of state-based peacekeeping missions are especially pronounced in cases of colonial and ethnic ties as well as for trade links. Specifically, non-major powers engage in this type of intervention when these links exist. In general, IOs can distort the true willingness of states to implement military intervention instruments.

This has the consequence that several military missions are not considered to ensure that state interest is measured vis-a-vis the target state in analysis on foreign direct investments. Exemplarily, the United States together with other states formed a "coalition of the willing" to intervene into the civil war in Syria with the clear aim to curb the expansion of the Islamic State (ISIS) during the civil war. The coordination of efforts did not take place under the umbrella of an overarching international organization but occurred in bilateral and multilateral meetings. Individual states took upon themselves different responsibilities. Hence, such cases are relevant to the study. Another classic example is the intervention by the Multi-National Force (MNF) by the US, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy in the Lebanese Civil War in 1982. Such interventions count on theoretical grounds as relevant cases for this project. In contrast, whereas the French intervention into the civil war in Mali in 2013 is also identified as a civil war intervention, the subsequent mission by the European Union (EUTM Mali) cannot be regarded because the organization and implementation did not rest upon single states. Similarly, the US intervention in Haiti is regarded as state intervention, whereas states that contributed to the following UN mission are not. A more pronounced case is depicted by the interventions during the civil war in DRC from 1998 until 2003. Four states (Rwanda, Angola, Uganda, and Sudan) intervened on behalf of the government or different rebel groups and are relevant for the analysis. The military contributions by EU and UN peacekeeping forces are not included (Rost and Greig 2011: 180).

Military and alternative intervention types

The current scholarship distinguishes between three types of instruments implemented by state actors which are used to alter the dynamics of civil wars. In general, these three types refer to the use of diplomatic means, economic sanctions or indirect and direct military support²⁷ (Taliaferro 2004; Regan and Aydin 2006; Rost and Greig 2011: 172; Lektzian and Regan 2016). In the following paragraphs, the three most widely-used datasets on military interventions in civil wars are juxtaposed and explained by their differences and similarities.²⁸ Each dataset possesses its advantages and disadvantages and. Hence, in the conclusion it will be briefly explained which dataset is most suitable

²⁷ To complete the picture on interventions, diplomatic and economic interventions are also widely used tools in the context of civil wars. Regan and Aydin (2006) record over 438 diplomatic interventions implemented by states and International Organizations. Albeit the United Nations is the most frequent intervener with diplomatic means (89 instances) accompanied by the Catholic Church (30 instances) and the Organization for African Unity (17 instances), individual states like the United States (56 instances), the UK (21 instances) and Tanzania (15 instances) have also frequently used the same instruments. Interestingly, if left with the choice to intervene unilaterally or multilaterally, states predominantly choose unilateral diplomatic activities. Economic and diplomatic instruments were used in unison during the Cold War, but in the decade thereafter diplomatic interventions are the least implemented instrument, and in the decade after the Cold War, the difference between diplomatic and economic interventions has become significant with a difference of over 200 instances.

²⁸ Alternative military intervention datasets exists but are too restrictive for the purposes of the dissertation. Sullivan and Koch (2009) created the Military Intervention by Powerful States (MIPS) dataset which records only military interventions by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (US, UK, France, Russia and China) over the period of 1946 until 2003. Tillema (1989) provides the Overt Military Intervention dataset which covers the time period from 1945 until 1985 which is before the foreign direct investment variable was measured.

for the dissertation project. The section concludes by a discussion of the frequency of military interventions in the international domain.

Three comprehensive datasets on the use of military interventions in civil wars are known to the author and have been commonly used in recent scholarship. The first is the International Military Intervention Dataset (IMI) collected and introduced by Pearson and Baumann (1993) and updated by Pickering and Kisangani (2009). The time coverage of the updated version spans from 1946 to 2005. In its definition, it concentrates on military movements of land, air or naval forces which transgress the borders of the target state. These military movements must be the results of some political dispute between two states or it must address a political issue. Hence, the use of non-state actors like Private Military Contractors (PMCs) or rebel groups is not included in the dataset. Furthermore, the aspect of intentionality is preserved by the dataset. Hence it does not record unintentional border crossings by combat troops. The foremost strength of the IMI dataset is its focus on the motivation of military interventions as it distinguishes between nine different types of motivations.²⁹

The second widely used dataset on military interventions comes from Regan (2000). He specifically focuses on military interventions which occur in the context of a civil war. To count as a civil war, at least 200 battle deaths have to be measured on the territory of civil war state. Once this threshold is surpassed, civil war onset is recorded, and it remains ongoing until a settlement is reached. The end of a civil war is coded when no further violence between the conflict actors occurs for at least six months. The period covers the years from 1944 to 1999. Third-Party intervention is distinguished between military and economic components. In reference to Rosenau (1969), Regan (2000) specifies two criteria to count as an intervention, namely to be "convention-breaking" and "changing or preserving authority structures" (ibid. 9-10). In contrast to the IMI dataset, he also includes types of

²⁹ According to Pickering and Kisangani (2009: 593) the nine motivational aspects are: "domestic dispute issues (intervention to take sides in a domestic dispute); regime or policy change issues (to change target political regime or its core policies); strategic issues (regional power balances, stability, or ideological issues mentioned by the intervener); territorial issues (intervention for acquisition or retention of territory, delineation of frontiers, or specification of sovereign status); rebel pursuit issues (pursuing rebel or terrorist forces across borders); diplomatic protective issues (intervention to protect own military and/or diplomatic interests and property inside or outside the target); economic issues (to protect economic or resource interests of self or others); humanitarian issues (to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation); and social protective issues (to protect a socio-ethnic faction or minority in the target country). Multiple motivating issues can be coded for each intervention."

military interventions that do not require the use of military combat troops (e.g., for instance, the provision of military aid to a conflict actor in the civil war). He further distinguishes the bias of the intervention and provides a measurement of whether the intervention occurred on the side of the government, on the side of the rebels or remained neutral.

Lastly, the third dataset on military interventions in civil wars is provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Högbladh et al. 2011). The External Support Dataset provides observations of states intervening militarily in ongoing civil wars from 1975 until 2009 which are defined by the coding rules of the previously introduced in the UCDP Armed Conflict Data (Pettersson and Eck 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2002). These civil wars require the observation of at least 25 battle deaths in a year over a political issue that is categorized either in the fight over government or in the fight for secessionism. At least one of the conflict actors must be constituted by the government.

The External Support dataset distinguishes between clearly verified interventions and those that are only alleged. Similar to Regan (2000), the dataset differentiates between different types of interventions.³⁰ The advantages of the UCDP External Support Dataset for this dissertation are twofold. First, the compatibility with the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset allows for the highest reliability compared to the other existing datasets. The second advantage is the time coverage, which extends to 2009. As will be explained in chapter 3, reliable foreign direct investment measures before 2001 are difficult to obtain. Hence the UCDP External Support Dataset ensures the most extensive sample against which hypotheses can be tested. To visualize the frequency of military interventions in civil wars, figure 2-1 counts all annual observations according to the UCDP External Support Dataset (Högbladh et al. 2011). As can be discerned, the frequency of military interventions reached its peak in 1990 when 75 different governments and/or rebel groups received some form of verified external military support from third-states.

³⁰ According to the codebook (Version 1.0-2011), the types of interventions consists of combat deployment, the provision of safe havens for rebel groups, the provision of military or intelligence infrastructure, the provision of weapons, the provision of material or logistic facilities, the training of combat personnel and the provision of expertise, financial and intelligence aid. Furthermore, a residual category called "other" is created and in some instances "unknown" support is recorded.




Figure 2-2: Military interventions in civil wars by states worldwide from 1975 until 2009. Source: UCDP External Support dataset.

In general, it can be concluded that the use of either form of intervention is perceived as a viable instrument to foster the interests of individual states regarding countries that are engaged in violent internal conflict. The underlying question arises what motivates states to engage in these types of activities that can be costly for the intervener state in terms of attention, financial and reputational risks as well as even risking the lives of personnel in the case of direct military interventions. The intervening state must have a sense of benefit even if it is not prima facie the stated public reason for intervention. There will seldom be one single motif driving an intervention, but rather a mix of incentives that are based on strategic, economic, but also humanitarian concerns. It can be said that "it is difficult to imagine a case in which a state would commit resources, whether financial or personnel, to a conflict if it has no strategic interest in the intervention. It is also difficult to substantiate based on the historical record. Even parties that appear to have been disinterested had some motivation for participation, whether in side payments, debt relief, international prestige, or coercion." (Kreps 2008: 580). This notion has precipitated a further strand in intervention research, which focuses in particular on the motivational aspects of interventions.

The Motivation Portfolio: understanding simultaneous Factors contributing to Military Interventions

The fundamental question related to the motivation to intervene in civil wars refers to the interests that the intervener pursues through the act of intervention. To quote Finnemore (2003: 56): "even if the principal decision maker had only one consideration in mind (which is unlikely), the vast number of people involved in these operations, often people from different intervening states, bring different motivations to bear on the intervention as it unfolds." Several aspects of Finnemore's observation stand out. First, an intervening state does not necessarily pursue only one objective through his intervention. Varying interests can be pursued at the same time. For instance, Uganda intervened against the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and Acholi rebels in Sudan in the 1990s as the Sudanese government did actively support both rebel groups (Prunier 2004). At the same time, Uganda also supported the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in its fight against the government in Khartoum since it regarded it as a rival (ibid. 364) and on behalf of the United States who attempted to prevent the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the Great Lakes region (Epstein 2017: 25–6).

Second, even though several states intervene in the same target country, each of the interveners can pursue different goals that are compatible or mutually exclusive to each other. This was the case when the United States and the Soviet Union intervened in the Vietnam war and supported the opposite parties to the conflict (Brown 2016: 244). Complementary, Findley and Teo (2006) find that interventions by rivals in a civil war decrease the duration until a counter-intervention. For instance, due to "mission creep" the United States changed its initial mission objective in Afghanistan from rooting out the training camps of Al Qaeda in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to a peacebuilding and counterinsurgency mission (Adams and Murray, eds. 2014). Similarly, whereas Rwanda initially intervened in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo to crack down on Hutu refugees and militant Hutu groups, most notably the Interahamwe, who fled Rwanda after the takeover by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1994 (Breytenbach et al. 1999), the intervention then morphed into an economic endeavor to profit from local lootable resources (Findley and Marineau

2015). Hence, to understand the motivation behind an intervention, it is necessary to identify those interests which existed before the intervention.

I use the expression *motivation portfolio* to highlight that one single motivation is frequently neither sufficient nor necessary to explain the intention and act to intervene.³¹ The Cambridge dictionary provides several definitions of the term portfolio according to the context in which it is used.³² Two separate definitions from the respectively financial and political realm are: "the range of products or services that a company offers, or the businesses that someone owns" and "the particular job or area of responsibility that a member of a government has." In the context of military interventions and this dissertation, the term motivation denotes the interests which incentivize a government to decide to intervene. The term portfolio highlights that there can be several interests simultaneously working on the government.

Every single interest in the motivation portfolio represents an asset which the government pursues to maintain or to extend. For instance, having an allied government in power is an asset from the perspective of a potential intervener (Taliaferro 2004). A hostile government takeover can remove the asset from the portfolio, which is tantamount to a loss. Hence, the potential intervener has the interest to protect the asset in his portfolio and therefore, a higher incentive to intervene in a civil war which jeopardizes the existence of the asset. In turn, another state might be incentivized to intervene to support a hostile takeover because it either could reduce the assets of a rival or it could increase its assets, in the aforementioned context it refers to the number of allies.

Furthermore, the motivation portfolio existing at the time of the intervention accounts for the range of potential explanations which incentivized the intervention in the first place. When the United States intervened in Afghanistan, its motivation portfolio was primarily constituted by the perceived security threat posed by the Al Qaeda network and the demand of the population to react to the 9/11 attacks. Once the United States became entrenched in Afghanistan, its motivation portfolio enlarged

³¹ Alternatively, generally the catch-all term "national interests" is used to justify an intervention. However, as Rosenau (1969: 158) wrote in the late 1960s: "In effect, the national interest becomes a substitute for understanding. Since any behavior can be classified as serving or undermining national interests, the concept cannot provide comprehension of when, how, and why intervention behavior unfolds as it does; instead, it can only offer the comfort that an attempt at explanation has been made." ³² https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/portfolio, retrieved on the 21.07.2019.

and included liberal peacebuilding and the prevention of reappearance of Islamic terrorist groups on Afghan soil.

To analyze the motivation for interventions in civil wars is to infer the cause why states engage outside their domain and alter civil war dynamics so that the outcome conforms with their conception of what is most beneficial for the intervener. In the terminology of positivist research (Kurki 2008: 61–2), the motivation to intervene denotes the "cause," and the intervention constitutes the "effect." According to the Humean understanding, the cause-effect relationship can be identified through an empirical assessment of regularities. When two observations occur in a temporal sequence, and event A always precedes event B, then a causal effect of A to B is ascribed. Knowledge of social laws can be then extrapolated through empirical observations.³³ Popper and Hempel contributed to this epistemological approach with two crucial qualifications (ibid. 66). First, Popper advocated the falsification criterion according to which one has to deductively derive hypotheses from theories and test them against observable data.³⁴ Second, Hempel pointed out that in social sciences, deterministic laws are problematic to discover, but rather probabilistic regularities can be identified (ibid. 66). Hence quantitative statistical methodology in International Relations scholarship strives to uncover relationships between defined variables through a correlational analysis of observations (ibid. 96-97).³⁵

In the context of the military interventions in civil wars, the motivation to intervene is inferred by a correlational analysis of the interests that existed *a priori* to the implemented intervention. It is impossible to understand "the" determinative cause for an intervention in this approach. However, it is possible to infer from the analysis of regularities between the existence of interests and the eventual intervention that individual interests increase the probability to observe military engagement implemented by the intervener. Each interest located in the motivation portfolio of a potential intervener

³³ For a more in-depth discussion which assumptions are presupposed in this epistemological framework and its critique, see Kurki (2008).

³⁴ For his original work on the falsification criterion, see Popper (2008).

³⁵ According to Morgan and Winship (2010), counterfactual research equally aims to uncover cause-effect relationships through statistical methodology but criticizes that in observational data the variables of interest (treatments) are not randomly distributed which introduces bias in the inference. Hence, the goal is either to create experiments with random assignment of the treatment effect or find "quasi-random" assignment through natural (or independent of the dependent variable) processes. Chapter 3 will address this issue more extensively.

independently exerts its positive or negative effect on the motivation to intervene.³⁶ A positive effect increases the probability to observe an intervention, whereas a negative effect decreases this probability. Quantitative studies test a set of competing and complementary explanations to discern the effect of the independent variable that is not driven by alternative factors which can bias the measurement. For instance, Bove et al. (2016)'s explanation of military interventionism concerns the possibility to harness oil wildcats in the target country. In the same analysis, the authors control for alternative explanations like the existence of ethnic ties between the potential intervener and the target or the major power status of the potential intervener.

To identify relevant variables that operationalize interests and to interpret the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, theories constitute a source from which testable hypotheses can be extrapolated. (Neo-) realism, (neo-) liberalism and constructivism can each provide an explanation of interventions into civil wars as they ascribe different processes of generating interests by distinguishing between endogenous or exogenous factors. In the following section, those three strands are introduced in their relation to military interventions. The sections on liberalism and constructivism serve for the purpose to obtain an understanding of the current academic debate on military interventions in civil wars and to make the use of control variables in the empirical chapters intelligible. The section on realism has the additional purpose of identifying its ontological assumptions that are harnessed for the deduction of hypotheses in chatper 3 and 4.

³⁶ This conforms to a *rationalist* understanding of actor behavior. Rationalist actors conduct cost-benefit calculations and operate within a defined framework to achieve their objectives. Keohane (1988) introduced this term in his analysis of actor behavior in international organizations.

Motivational factors based on liberal assumptions

Liberalism in international relations can look back on a historically long trajectory up until the 18th century when Kant famously published his book on perpetual peace. However, in contrast to realism, liberalism per se is not founded on a set of assumptions that would form a core from which all specific branches derive. Principally, liberalists acknowledge the anarchic structure of the international sphere which complicates cooperation between states (Jervis 1999a: 42). The foundational assumptions that distinguish realism and liberalism here are the rejection of the state as a unitary actor as well as the rejection that systemic structures based on power distribution impose interests on states (Doyle 1986; Moravcsik 1997). State preferences are the product of competing influences between domestic and transnational actors. Those actors can consist of individuals as well as organized groups.³⁷

Moravcsik (1997) lays out three core assumptions that form a crucial understanding of liberalism in IR. First, the spotlight in liberalism is cast on societal actors who can act individually or in collaboration with other societal actors. These actors represent and advocate a large spectrum of different interests that can conflict with each other and actors compete over the influence to implement these interests as policies. Second, the final policies implemented by states in foreign affairs are the representation of those domestic societal actors who were able to influence the decision-making process of policymakers. States are a set of institutions, and societal actors vie for influence by competing with each other based on norms, rules, and laws. Therefore, an analysis of foreign policy must include both the preferences of societal actors as well as the institutional framework that allows influencing and channeling of their interests towards politicians.³⁸ The third assumption pertains the realization of individual state interests. Whereas realists argue that the distribution of power determines the outcome of interstate bargaining processes, liberals see their preferences in relation to the preferences of other

³⁷ Neo-liberalism in turn mainly focuses on the interactions of states mediated by international Organizations. The assumptions of state to be rational, unitary actors which attempt to maximize their benefits are the same as in neo-realism. The difference between those two camps is that neo-liberals like Keohane (2005) acknowledge an independent effect of International Organizations in interstate relations. IOs facilitate cooperation and allow for the realization of Pareto-optimal gains through the reduction of transaction costs and the provision of rules and norms as well as instruments to detect non-compliance to international agreements.

³⁸ This is the fundamental assumption behind the "democratic peace theory". Democracies do not fight each other because societal actors who are risk-averse and would bear the costs of war lobby for peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts (Doyle 1983).

states. This means that interests do not have to be inherently conflictual but can result in advantageous mutual outcomes for all involved states.

With regards to interventions, liberalism's explanatory power rests on the strength societal actors possess to translate their interests towards the political decision-making process. Studies so far have focused on the role of societal segments during elections, pressure by NGOs, as well as pressure exerted by ethnic or other minority groups in intervening countries. Pohl (2014), for instance, illustrates how the public in France pressured the candidates during the presidential election in 2007 to commit to intervene in Chad during the genocide in Darfur once they would enter the presidential office. Public pressure also included the involvement of individual celebrities like George Clooney who's demands for a humanitarian intervention resonated with the societal segments of the French civil society. In the same vein, media actors are understood to have had an impact on public pressure towards US president Bill Clinton to intervene in Somalia and Bosnia (Robinson 2006). According to Finnemore (2003), one factor in the explanation of the intervention on behalf of the Greeks in the Greek War for Independence between 1821 until 1827 was the emergence of a Philhellenic movement across Europe.

Transborder ethnic relationship has been the most researched mechanism to understand state interventions. Saideman (2001: 2) argues that: "[...] domestic political concerns of leaders, as determined by the interaction of ethnic ties and political competition, cause states to take one side or another (or both) of ethnic conflict elsewhere." Politicians have to respond to their constituencies, hence being in government can incline politicians who share ethnic ties with groups in civil war countries or politicians who rely on particular ethnic groups as their power base to support explicitly this ethnic group during a civil war. Koga (2011) finds in his analysis that this expectation statistically holds when interveners share ties with rebel groups but not with the government.

Another strand that is connected to the liberal argument is the promotion of democracy through military interventions. Several studies address the effectiveness of interventions conducted by the United States or other democratic interveners (Pickering and Peceny 2006; Hermann and Kegley 1998; Peceny 1995). The results of the studies indicate a cautious positive effect of US interventions but are overall rather pessimistic regarding the effect of military interventionism on liberal peacebuilding (Mesquita and Downs 2006). Furthermore, the question, however, remains, whether the liberal institution building is a genuine motivational factor or just behavior to legitimize the intervention and not just a corollary or *ex-post* justification. For instance, when analyzing the effect of military interventions on democratization processes in target countries, Mesquita and Downs (2006: 639) highlight that: "[...] our concern is with the democratization aftermath of foreign interventions and not their causes or ex ante stated objectives." Explicitly the authors detach the motivational drivers of the intervention from the democratization policies implemented after a successful intervention occurred. Peceny (1995) argues that the promotion of democracy constitutes an instrument of US administrations to gain legitimacy but are not the primary objectives of the interventions themselves. Therefore, it can be argued that democratization incentives are not part and parcel of the motivation portfolio, which underlies the decision to intervente.

Motivational factors based on constructivist assumptions

In contrast to neo-liberals and neo-realists, constructivism is based on a set of different assumptions about interest generation of actors. According to Reus-Smit (2013a), constructivism is based on three central ontological propositions. First, norms, values, and beliefs between subjects create ideational structures within the actors operate. The realist and liberal recourse to the use of material factors as structure generating is qualified by constructivists who object that material factors only affect human behavior insofar as they intersubjectively allocate meaning to material factors based on shared knowledge and beliefs. Second, whereas norms and belief systems shape the identities of the actors, identity itself is crucial to understand the interests an actor possesses. Since norms and belief systems can change (without a concomitant change of the material distribution of power), the change alters identities and hence also their interests. In his seminal work, Wendt (1992: 398) coins this observation by writing that: "Identities are the basis of interests." Third, identities are shaped through mutual practices of interactions between different actors. Changes in belief systems and norms and values do not occur in isolation but through mutually reinforcing practices. Ideational structures shape actor behavior, and actor behavior shapes ideational structures within which the actors are embedded. This ontological commitment on reinforcing practices and the power of norms and values on actor behavior explains the focus of constructivists on the impact of international law on interventions as well as the focus on humanitarian interventions and the concept of Responsibility to Protect. In her seminal book on *The Purpose of Intervention*, Finnemore (2003) illustrates how changes in the legitimacy of interventions affected the reasoning of states to even consider interventions as an instrument to pursue state interests. She deeply analyzes the constitutive process behind the term "intervention" and evaluates at which stages military interventions were perceived as a legitimate instrument in the pursuit of state interests. For instance, the acknowledgment of equal sovereignty between Latin American states and great powers in the 19th century and the codification of military interventions as a relegated tool to collect outstanding debts in the Hague Conventions of 1907 through discussions of legislatively trained representatives led to a substantive decrease of interventions for this particular purpose.

(Critical) Constructivists have criticized the notion to view humanitarian interventions as a debate between the sovereignty rights of a state and the moral justification to transgress state sovereignty in the case of human suffering (Bellamy 2003). Precedents like the UNSC sanctioned intervention on behalf of the Kurdish people in Iraq in 1991, established norms and practices according to which states have a right to use military instruments for the protection of endangered people. The is reasoning based on liberal notions of human rights led to interventions in conflicts like Somalia and Bosnia to prevent mass atrocities (Robinson 2006). Crossley (2018) investigates whether the new norm of R2P has gained legitimacy as a norm and principle in international relations and concludes that as an international practice "R2P remains controversial, despite the advocates' rhetoric of 'consensus'. While something approximating consensus may have been reached in the policy community, at least judging from the pervasiveness of the use of R2P language, a genuine 'consensus' remains much more elusive beyond this sphere, especially in the world of academe, but also amongst civil society organizations and states with a colonial history." (ibid. 431)

Another variant to account for the subjective understanding of legitimate interventions is to focus on the belief systems of leaders. For instance, Byman and Pollack (2001) argue to bring back the

idea of the "first image" and to analyze the predispositions and characteristics of state leaders. Rosenau (1969: 165–7) argues that individual variables are crucial in understanding intervention, at least at par with systemic variables. He discounts pressure from the public to have an impact on political decision-making and argues that pressure generally only appears after the intervention had been implemented. The leadership of a country, therefore, determines the course of action.³⁹ Following this notion, Saunders (2009) argues that the intervention strategy adopted by the intervener strongly depends on how a leader perceives other states. If they believe that the target state's domestic institutions are the source of hostile foreign policy, then an intervention will more likely target authority structures than engage in conflict management.

She discriminates between two ideal types, namely on the one hand those state leaders who perceive the domestic structure as the source a country's malign behavior and on the other hand those who emphasize outside support to be crucial for a country's position in matters of foreign policy. The former leaders pursue transformative approaches in military interventions by attempting to change the internal political structure according to causal beliefs on which structures foster peace and alignment. The latter concentrate on non-transformative approaches and argue that there should be no interference into domestic politics.⁴⁰ Revolutionary states but also states that intervene for the imposition of democratic institutional structures fall into the transformative approach. Owen IV (2002) shows that the imposition of domestic institutions is a constant feature in interstate war and resurged in the 1930s until nowadays.

In contrast, Taliaferro (2004) does not assume a priori a specific belief system of a state leader but argues that regardless of the upheld values, norms and threat perceptions, the decision to intervene into a peripheral country (not necessarily during a civil war) is based on the pronounced fear to lose an ally or non-aligned country to the other camp. Prospect theory highlights that states should be reluctant

³⁹ Roseanau of course omits here the possibility that the leadership of a country anticipates negative reactions by the public in case of an intervention. It is argued that incumbent governments wait until after elections before it commits to a potentially unpopular intervention. However, this explicitly supports the argument of Rosenau since it shows that the government is willing to act against the majority will of its citizens if it deems an intervention to be crucial in securing state interests. ⁴⁰ This argument follows closely the idea of Foreign-Imposed Regime Changes (FIRCs) which are used to transform foes into allies or at least non-aligned, e.g. see Peic and Reiter (2011).

to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries if these countries have been foes or non-aligned beforehand. However, countries that see a detrimental change of the perceived status quo, which is the leadership's reference point, are more risk-prone and therefore more likely to choose a strategy like a military intervention to prevent a potential loss to occur.

In general, constructivism allows for a set of explanations that differ from its counterparts in realism and liberalism. These explanations are based on ontological assumptions that are based on norms, values, and beliefs about the legitimacy and legality of military interventions in civil wars. Being located within a web of social interactions engenders identities to which states adhere to. Interests are shaped by the identities of the actors, and interests lead to the implementation of interventions. Constructivists provide an understanding of at least those interventions which escape the straightforward prediction of realism and liberalism. In particular, humanitarian interventions since the 1990s can be best explained by the belief system leaders of states held with regards to human security and human rights.

The choice for the ontological assumptions of realism

Realist theory is based on a core set of fundamental assumptions. According to Legro and Moravcsik (1999), realists firstly view the international system as anarchic as opposed to a hierarchic system. In an anarchic sphere, there is no higher arbiter or guarantor to resolve interest incompatibilities between actors populating this sphere. Rules and laws are only enforceable if they lie within the scope of interests of the actors. Furthermore, in an anarchic system, actors always must ensure to guarantee their survival as they can ultimately only rely on themselves. The actors are comprised of states⁴¹ that are sovereign over people and property on their territory. States are unitary actors meaning that they ontologically exist as independent actors with their interests that set them apart of non-state actors like citizens, NGOs, MNCs or IOs. Moreover, states are rational. There is no fixed definition of rationality, but it commonly refers to be able to create a list of priorities which are then pursued by implementing strategies (Waltz 2010). Since states operate in an anarchic system, they operate with incomplete information about the true state in the international sphere and act against the backdrop of uncertainty.

⁴¹ This study refers to the time period after the Second World War, when states populate every part of the international system.

The lack of a higher-order power leads to a commitment dilemma which has been thoroughly investigated in particular by game theorists (Kydd 2015).

Secondly, the preferences states have are "are fixed and uniformly conflictual" (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 13). This means that nothing else than the systemic structure determines the underlying interests of states and that those interests are in turn a zero-sum game over scarce resources available in the international sphere. The position of a state in international relations determines boundaries of the behavior of a state and due to the zero-sum condition, once a state gains another state loses in relative terms. Since survival is the most crucial interest a state maintains, a constant power struggle emerges. Several different deductions have been made to refer to the characteristics of inter-state struggle.⁴²

Thirdly and importantly, what determines the position of a state in an anarchic system is the distribution of material capabilities. Those capabilities can be used ultima ratio to coerce other states to implement policies that they would otherwise not prefer to implement. From a bargaining point of view, states with more material capabilities will more easily achieve their preferred outcomes than their counterparts if the gap in material capabilities is wide enough. Prima facie, the discussion of what constitutes power is a hotly debated issue in international relations scholarship. At the very least, it refers to the military capabilities for power projection (Mearsheimer 2014). However, several authors agree that typically two domains have to be included, namely the military as well as the economic dimension (Gilpin 2001; Krasner 1978, 1985).

In relation to interventions, realists ask the crucial question: "What does a state and its citizens get for intervening in a civil war?" (Castellano 2016: 3). However, conceptually realism faces two obstacles. The first is the insistence of states as unitary actors. Interventions into civil wars are aimed at the authority structure of the target state. They can have the goal to either defend an incumbent government like during US intervention in Vietnam or aim to topple the existing government by

⁴² Offensive realists assume that the power struggle forces states to assume hegemonic position in the international system, see Mearsheimer (2014). Defensive realists contrarily expect balancing of power, see Waltz (2010) Several sub-concepts have been developed to explain interstate behavior. For instance, the security dilemma leads states to perceive defensive postures as potential aggressions, see Jervis (1978).

supporting rebel groups as in the Libyan case in 2011. However, since state behavior in international relations is determined by the distribution of power as well as the position within this structure, changing a government should theoretically not translate into different foreign policy behavior. Leading scholars of realism, among other reasons, disapproved the forcible regime change in Iraq and advocated instead to harness deterrence and containment measures (Mearsheimer and Walt 2009). In the same vein, Waltz (2010) objected to US involvement in Vietnam. Waltz attributed the intervention in Vietnam to misguided leadership and the false perception of information (ibid. 172-173).

Second, the assumption that interventions can truly change foreign policy behaviors of states Jervis (1999b: 118) points at the contradiction in realism with regards to alliances and interventions. On the one hand, the emergence of a bipolar structure in the Cold War and the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) guaranteed both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, that they were theoretically never in existential jeopardy in a case of losing an ally or a neutral state to the opposite camp. On the other hand, because there are only two superpowers, each loss of an ally weakened the respective superpower in relation to the other. Although the loss of a third world country in the periphery would not endanger any superpower, once a critical mass was reached, one camp would dominate. Rosenau (1969: 168) interprets the bipolar structure to be more prone to interventions as both superpowers have fewer options to counter-balance each other by allying with middle or weak powers. Therefore, the balance of power is tightly gauged, and the superpowers seek to avoid a situation in which one pole tilts the relative power distribution too much in its favor. Furthermore, although Walt rejected domino theory⁴³ Jervis (1999b: 122) points out that losing states to the adversary camp without generating any effort would have strong reputational effects. In a bipolar structure, where observation and comprehension are easier than in a multipolar world, reputation is an important cue to predict future behavior and to assess cost-benefit calculations of the enemy. This anticipated domino effect can be observed in the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrine⁴⁴.

⁴³ As cited:" anarchy provides incentives for balancing, not bandwagoning" Taliaferro (2004: 181).

⁴⁴ The Truman doctrine and Eisenhower doctrines both referred to the containment of communism and declared military assistance to actors fighting against communist insurgents. According to Graber (1958), the Truman doctrine was rhetorically much wider in scope than the Eisenhower doctrine which spoke specifically about potential Communist subversion in the Middle East and pronounced that the United States will only act if a military intervention and military aid is explicitly asked

Recent literature on interventions harnesses some core concepts of realism despite the inherent contradictions within the realist camp. The most frequently used concepts relate to rivalry, alliance behavior, (regional) hegemonic power, regional stability, and commitment signaling. States often support rebel groups that are fighting a rival government either for the purpose to weaken or distract it or to achieve government turnover (Byman 2007; Salehyan et al. 2011; Salehyan 2011). Here, the notion of internal balancing⁴⁵ occupies a key role. Internal balancing provides the foundation for the exertion of power in international relations. States which are not able to transform societal and economic resources into hard power face difficulties to project power. The theory of realism has nothing to say per se about the transformation process, but it still regards it as essential to comprehend the balance of power. A state has two choices if it finds itself in a security competition with another state. Either the state increases its absolute power through investments and translates available resources into power, or the state forges alliances with other states to balance against the perceived threat, which is called external balancing. As stated by Salehyan (2011: 44): "Foreign rivals may delegate conflict to nonstate actors as a foreign policy tool. [...] Destabilizing neighbors can be a goal in itself, or it can be used to weaken a state to gain the upper hand in international disputes."

The concept of alliances can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, states can intervene on the side of an allied government to protect it against a rebel group which would potentially change the future alliance status of the target state. Findley and Teo (2006) find that the probability of intervening on the side of the government in the target country is three times higher when the intervener and target state were allies. Similarly, being allied with the target country reduces the probability to intervene on the opposition side. On the other hand, rebel groups are supported if intervening states can be confident that the resulting turnover in power will lead to a new ally. Both notions were strongly tied to domino theory during the Cold War (Morgenthau 1965; Merrill 2006). Many civil wars displayed a struggle between communist and non-communist political groups, in particular in the third world.⁴⁶

for. Both doctrines agree that Communism poses a security threat to the United States and that its spread is mainly due to foreign meddling by other communist states, most notably the Soviet Union (ibid. 323).

⁴⁵ See Waltz (2010).

⁴⁶ In several cases, like Somalia and Ethiopia, rebel groups on purpose labeled themselves communist in order to elicit support from the USSR (Schmidt 2013).

Maintaining (regional) hegemony constitutes another motivation for state interventions. Russia intervened in the internal armed conflicts in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan to keep stability in its immediate neighborhood and to maintain its regional hegemonic status. The United States supported several governments in the Americas to fight communist rebel groups or provided assistance to rebel groups that fought communist regimes like in Nicaragua or Cuba. Whereas the United States feared the spread of communism, the Soviet Union, in turn, supported communist governments and rebel groups against "warmongering capitalists" (Finnemore 2003: 85). The same occurred in the case of South Africa supporting or even creating rebel groups in Angola or Mozambique to fight against the communist governments of MPLA and FRELIMO, respectively. Being the regional hegemon means to possess high relative capabilities in comparison to other regional states. This translates into higher guarantees for survival against challenging and rising powers (Mearsheimer 2014).

Another important aspect can be subsumed under the notion of regional stability. States in proximity to civil wars are in purview to experience negative spillover effects regarding refugee flows, transborder movement of rebel groups, and disruptions in trade (Kathman 2011). In contrast to the security dilemma where states perceive each other rivals and interpret increased military spending and activities as aggression, the "insecurity dilemma" points at the instability of states and the unintended repercussions for adjacent countries (Job, ed. 1992). This is especially the case for states with weaker institutional frameworks like those in Sub-Saharan Africa (Buzan and Waever 2010). Rwanda felt compelled to intervene militarily into Eastern DRC and to support the rebel movement against Mobutu because the latter was unwilling and incapable to prevent Hutu militias from using Congo's soil as a staging ground against the Tutsi government of Kagame after the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Epstein 2017).

This study uses the ontological assumptions of realism as the basis for the deduction of the hypotheses to be tested in the following two chapters. States are the major actors in the international system, and their interests are determined by interstate competition. Hence, state interests are neither defined through lobbying by non-state actors like NGOs or Multinational Corporations nor do states give primacy to international law in their pursuit of interests. However, states do view MNCs as part of

their motivation portfolio because MNCs provide economic and security benefits to the state and enhance his position in interstate relations. A set of prior explanations from the liberal and constructivist schools of thought are used as alternative explanations that are controlled for since states can purse different goals at the same time or prioritize some interests over others depending on the civil war country. The task of the following third chapter is to provide the theoretical grounding of the hypotheses regarding direct dyadic economic effects based on MNCs' foreign direct investments and to test those against available data on military interventions in civil wars. Chapter 3 begins with a short prelude to contentious nature of economic factors as determinants of civil wars and then proceeds with the eventual elaborations, the justification, and positioning of the implemented methodology and the eventual analysis of the data.

Chapter 3 Foreign Direct Investments and Interventions in Civil Wars

On the 31st May 2010, German president Horst Köhler announced his resignation from his office after an intense debate in the German society over his remarks on the German military intervention in Afghanistan as well as future military interventions. He received massive critique for his statement that a country of the size of Germany must defend its economic interests in trade and employment with military means in the international sphere. Military interventions are required to provide safe trade routes and regional stability.⁴⁷ Similarly, French President Jaques Chirac spoke in a speech about the use of military means, in particular, nuclear deterrence and the use of force, to protect the core interests of France under which he also subsumed "strategic supplies" to the country.⁴⁸ In the context of the speech, the intended recipient was Iran, which presumably endangered vital oil reserves in the Middle East.⁴⁹ Both presidents referred to the phenomenon that a globalized world based on economic interdependence requires nation-states to actively participate with military force to ensure that the economic interests of states are being protected. Both received hefty critique from civil society to what is perceived as an illegitimate justification for the use of military power in international relations. Those are telling cases in which the rationale of the state appeared to be incompatible with the demands and aspirations of the public.

The question on the legitimacy of the use of military means in the pursuit of economic benefit or the defense of vital raw material and energy supplies is one that in an ever-integrating global economy will stay high at the agenda of policymakers. After a long period of recessions and protectionist measures, the world was poised to experience the liberalization of international trade, the flow of money across borders and the movement of labor in the wake of the Second World War (Coppolaro and McKenzie 2013). This development was underwritten by the belief that an economically integrated international community formed the bedrock of interstate peace (ibid. 163). With the United States promoting the ideas of Kant and Montesquieu this belief-system penetrated over time into every region

 ⁴⁷ Köhler (2010).
 ⁴⁸ Chirac (2006).

⁴⁹ Moore (2006).

of the world that was not directly under the purview of the Soviet Union. The post-war period witnessed the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to name few of the range of institutions mandated to shape international trade. With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the "Unipolar Moment" (Krauthammer 1991) ensued, and the juggernaut of capital movement and trade liberalization overcame even this barrier.

One crucial corollary of this development was the rise of investments in foreign countries by corporations. While the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s experienced modest global FDI outflows below 50 billion dollars (adjusted for 1970 dollar value), the subsequent explosion of foreign direct investments including to developing countries saw FDI being multiplied by a factor of seven (Razin and Sadka 2007: 3). Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are now widely implemented to facilitate investments by foreign corporations with telling success. BITs ensure legal protection for MNCs, which increases investor confidence and reduces associated risks (Salacuse and Sullivan 2009). The world is now looking on China who has coupled its global ambitions with foreign direct investments abroad. From 2005 onwards, according to World Bank statistics, Chinese outward foreign direct investments flows have sharply increased and reached a peak of 216 billion dollars in 2016.⁵⁰

This rise in foreign direct investments does not come without political repercussions. Graham and Marchick (2011) describe at great length how security concerns of the United States relate foreign investments. During the First World War, the United States assets possessed by German nationals or American citizens with German family background were seized on the grounds of the Trading with Enemy Act (TWEA). In 1988, the US Congress enacted the Exon-Florio Amendment with the provision that the president can prohibit the acquisition of US corporations by foreign-owned firms if national security would be jeopardized. Furthermore, foreign direct investments engender not only defensive measures but also have offensive purposes. Looking at the other side of the Pacific, the currently strongest economic competitor to the United States views FDI in a very strategic manner. Yao et al. (2017) find that Chinese foreign direct investments perform two important functions for the Chinese

⁵⁰ https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=CN, retrieved on the 21.03.2019.

economy. First, Chinese FDI is linked with the ambition to create stable supply lines of natural resources and raw materials for further manufacturing or energy production. Second, investments in foreign companies facilitate the transfer from intellectual property and technology back to China.

The explosion in foreign direct investments since the 1990s and their strategic use coincides with an era in which interstate violence became broadly absent, but intrastate violence has not receded. Corporations with investments in unstable regions in the world that experience internal armed unrest face the unpredictability of the security of their assets (Busse and Hefeker 2007). This is, in particular, the case in countries of the Global South which provide essential metals, gemstones, raw materials or other commodities like oil and gas and constitute at the same time the most risk-prone region for internal armed conflict. Since civil wars jeopardize foreign direct investments through the destruction of assets or expropriation, the fundamental question arises whether states are willing to use military means, as suggested by the German and French presidents, to defend the interests of private investors or whether into consideration. In the end, the German president stepped down from his office after the controversy of his remarks. It appears that at least officially German foreign policy doctrine cannot encompass the use of military means for economic benefits.

Foreign Direct Investments and Conflict Studies in academic Literature

Current academic research on the connection between foreign direct investments and internal conflict centers around two focal points.⁵¹ The first strand investigates how civil conflicts affect the propensity of multinational corporations to invest during and after civil wars. The second strand analyzes how FDI changes internal civil war dynamics. It is commonly assumed that periods of violence have a negative impact on the propensity of investment by foreign corporations (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2008; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007; Busse and Hefeker 2007; Witte et al. 2017; Nigh 1985). However, there has been notable research which engages in more nuanced analysis. Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) find that foreign diamond companies with investments in Angola experienced a drop in abnormal returns⁵² due to the ensuing peace in the wake of UNITA rebel leader Savimbi's death in 2002. Both the death of Savimbi as well as the signing of the official cease-fire several weeks later had a negative effect on the outlook on diamond profits. In other words, more stability in Angola was, paradoxically, associated with "bad news" (ibid. 1983) for existing investments in the diamond sector.

Similarly, analyzing greenfield foreign direct investments in developing countries, Witte et al. (2017) show how internal political violence leads to a withdrawal of FDI. However, considering the industry sector and level of diversification of the firm, the resource sector is more resilient and does not experience such kind of downfall. The authors interpret the findings that the resource sector, on the one hand, experiences higher profitability compared to other sectors which renders risk-taking more acceptable and that, on the other hand, its limited choice of location inevitably leads to investments into unstable political environments.

Linking FDI and interventions in various forms is a relatively new approach but not unheard of through work from historians evaluating United States engagement in militarized conflicts in the 20th century (Fordham 2008: 739–40) and more recently by the account by Maurer (2013) on US interventionism in the Americas. Focusing on the United States, he highlights how MNCs have

⁵¹ In contrast to FDI, much more in focus have been trade patterns of countries affected by civil war. This literature is rich and generally comes to the conclusion that civil wars decrease bilateral trade compared to pre-war accounts. Whereas trade is a summary of goods and services exported or imported between states, Foreign Direct Investment looks specifically at the investment behavior of firms.

⁵² Returns exceeding expected returns.

propelled various administrations to intervene diplomatically, economically, and militarily to compensate or reinstate expropriated foreign investment assets. Historically, he argues that before the Second World War, close ties between the business class and the administrations were the main factor in influencing the political decision-making process. This changed in the Cold War era when business leaders tied their property rights with the East-West struggle and claimed that the protection of foreign direct investments is crucial in the fight against communism. He pronounces the importance of these linkages as he also argues that interventions on behalf of the MNCs did frequently not serve strategic geopolitical interests of the United States (e.g., alienating otherwise friendly or neutral countries) and burden the costs of the intervention on taxpayers.

Linking Multinational Corporations and Interventions based on realist ontology

This dissertation argues that multinational corporations play a crucial role to explain the economic motivations of interveners. Studies have found that trade linkages, especially those comprised of natural resources, contribute to the motivation portfolio to become involved in the domestic affairs of other countries (Bove et al. 2016; Stojek and Chacha 2015). However, the results are inconclusive and leave out the most important empirical question, namely how states themselves factually benefit from the economic dimension of civil wars. How is it possible for a state to harness the economic opportunities presented by countries mired in violence? Answering this question means to understand better how the economic domain influences the political decision-making process to intervene in a civil war. This study proposes that MNCs contribute to the expected benefits of interventions. The following section is designed to explain the choice for the theoretical assumption that states view multinational corporations as assets in their motivation portfolio, but multinational corporations themselves do not independently propel states to engage in military interventions based on lobbying.

Krasner (1978) provides a compelling case to separate national interests from particularistic interests within a society as advocated by liberal theorists. In an analysis of policies implementing the nationalization of property in possession of US corporation by countries in the Western Hemisphere, a two-sided picture emerges. On the one hand, the US created and enacted laws in the protection of investors. For instance, the Johnson-Bridges Amendment to the Mutual Security Act (the successor of

the Marshal Plan) required the US government from cutting foreign aid to countries which do not compensate investors in a timely manner. The additional Hickenlooper Amendment in 1962 was included to automatize foreign aid suspension and in future amendments included cases in which not just nationalization but also the nullification of contracts precipitated actions by the US government on behalf of US investors. Other amendments extended the scope and included seized US fishing vessels as well as the prohibition of US banks to provide credits to countries which do not compensate US investors.

On the other hand, several provisions included clauses, which granted the US administration and the president discretion when to apply sanctions in case of non-compliance in cases of investor compensation. Accordingly, the implementation of sanctions "[...] were the exceptions, not the rule, during the 1960s" (ibid. 222). The reason was that US administrations carefully weighted whether the use of sanctions for investor protection was in the national interest or not. In some cases, the economic factor played a decisive role to inflict costs on a non-compliant country, e.g., in Ceylon in 1962 or Peru in 1969, but in some cases like in Zambia in 1969, the US administration decided to remain inactive. Interventions rarely have one single motivation but are composed of different objectives. In the next section, the theoretical argument is made that in the case of investments by MNCs, we should observe an increased willingness to intervene independently of other explanations.

In contradiction to Krasner (1978), Maurer (2013) argues that MNCs have propelled various administrations to intervene diplomatically, economically, and militarily to compensate or reinstate expropriated foreign investment assets. Historically, he argues that before the Second World War, close ties between the business class and the administrations were the main factor in influencing the political decision-making process. This changed in the Cold War era when business leaders tied their property rights with the East-West struggle and claimed that the protection of foreign direct investments is crucial in the fight against communism. He pronounces the importance of these linkages as he also argues that frequently interventions on behalf of MNCs did not serve strategic geopolitical interests of the United States (e.g., alienating otherwise friendly or neutral countries). As a consequence, the costs of the intervention were borne by taxpayers, but the benefits of interventions were exclusively reaped by

MNCs. For instance, cutting off aid to Sukarno by the Johnson administration in the wake of nationalization policies led Indonesia to become friendlier with the Soviet Union, which was perceived to be detrimental to US foreign policy interests.

In general, both authors Maurer and Krasner provide alternative accounts based on case study research. They both provide positive cases to corroborate their narrative (liberal account vs. a realist account) even when looking at the same case. For instance, according to Krasner, the intervention in Guatemala in 1954 to topple Árbenz was implemented to prevent the country from changing into the communist camp (Krasner 1978: 279–86). He dismisses the explanation that the cause of intervention was due to the potential nationalization of United Fruits, the largest MNC operating in Guatemala and one of the largest companies in the Americas. He bases his opinion on three observations. First, before Guatemala, there was not a long track-record of interventions due to nationalizations and in some cases (e.g., Chile, Bolivia, and Mexico), the United States decided to compensate the companies on its own to avoid alienating friendly or neutral states. Second, United Fruits was charged with an anti-trust legal case brought forward by the Department of Justice only a week after the removal of Árbenz. Third, in the case of Bolivia and the nationalization of tin mines, the US recognized the government of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR).

In contrast, Maurer argues that the crucial contribution to the perception of the Árbenz government to constitute a hostile communist regime was provided through lobbying efforts of United Fruits (Maurer 2013: 306). The corporation targeted both the administration as well as the public. It financed a media campaign in different newspaper outlets like the New York Times or the Newsweek to instill the narrative of an illegitimate expropriation conducted by a Communist regime in Central America. Public pressure and concerns raised in Congress propelled the Eisenhower administration to become active. In 1954, it eventually initiated an operation, called PBSUCCESS, in which intelligence operatives and paramilitaries infiltrated the country with the concluding result of Árbenz being ousted from power.

Notwithstanding, in both diverging narratives, the eventual consequence is the same. Economic factors like investor activities in foreign countries matter for policymakers at home. For Krasner,

economic factors play a role when they overlap with national interests, whereas for Maurer, corporate agents take direct influence on the political decision-making process with success and trump national interest. In this dissertation, the conundrum will not be solved, and the reality is that the accurate description of the case is somewhere in the middle. Both positions provide a kernel of truth. Policymakers must be made aware of the corporate investments in foreign countries and the consequences of the loss of property by nationals or corporations which typically occurs through forms of lobbying, hearings, media, or advisory bodies. At the same time, executive policymakers must weight diverging interests, including such that ideally refer to security and economic prosperity of their country.

It is not possible to sharply disentangle private corporate interests from the overall national interest. Those two are not necessarily opposing binaries. In contrast, as explicated in the following section, MNCs play a crucial role in the provision of the economic wellbeing of the home country and their suffering can negatively affect the whole society. Hence, the assumption in this study is that economic factors do independently increase the probability of a state to intervene in a civil war and that the reason for this is that MNCs are part and parcel of the security interests of a country and therefore belong in the motivation portfolio. In the following section, this argument is investigated in more depth, and hypotheses are derived.

Generating Hypotheses – FDI, Natural Resources and Arms Transfers

The prior discussion on the link between realism and interventions in chapter 2 and the previous section highlighted that under this perspective domestic dynamics do not feature into the political decision-making calculations which states conduct to decide whether an intervention is necessary or not. Several realist scholars argue that it is insufficient to understand the strategic interests of a country without taking economic factors into account. The most prominent advocates for this merger are Gilpin (2001) and Krasner (1978). For Krasner, state interests exist independent of domestic politics but are not entirely detached from the well-being of its citizens. In general, states have the goal to increase overall welfare within their territory. Hence, both internal political groups and the international power structure both influence choices in foreign policies. Focusing on the supply of raw materials to the

United States, he views multinational corporations as actors that frequently have overlapping interests with the nation-state but sometimes object foreign policies which endanger their businesses. As Krasner (1978: 17) states: "The drive for security of supply has usually coincided with private goals. American policy-makers have seen security enhanced by extending the control of American corporations; corporations generally have seen such expansion increasing their sales, profits, and market control. Under such circumstances, there will be little antagonism between the state and the private sector."

For Gilpin, the international economic system is based on power competition. In contrast to neoclassical scholars that see market forces as the key drivers of economic cooperation, he argues that "the nature of the global economy will be strongly affected by the security and political interests of, and the relations among, the dominant economic powers [...]" (Gilpin 2001: 12). However, whereas states remain the central actors in international relations, non-state actors influence the political decisionmaking calculus through their influence on economic endowments of a country. As a realist, Gilpin assumes an anarchic system in which power competition not only takes place in the domain of security but also in the economic sphere. Beneficial trading allows states to increase their wealth and security with the United States, Germany, and Japan being prominent historical examples and China a contemporary one. Since international organizations and multinational corporations are part and parcel of post-World War II political economy, they invariably have an impact on the relations between nationstates. "However, in a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favorable to their own national interests and the interests of their citizenry." (Gilpin 2001: 21). Olson (1993) observed that those groups which are able to maximize overall welfare and channel resources for inter-group competition outcompete those who neglect stable and return-generating economic conditions. Therefore, leaders of states are typically willing to protect and invest in entities that increase the wealth of a state overall as those ensure higher revenues through taxation. Luttwak (1990) goes even a step further and argues that competition based on economic means (geo-economics) will replace competition with political or military instruments (geopolitics) in the future. Finnemore (2003: 25) also concludes for realism that: "In an anarchic environment where no higher authority enforces contracts, states must be prepared to help their nationals protect their investments by whatever means at their disposal."⁵³

Along these lines, Gilpin and Krasner further argue that multinational corporations are an extension of interstate competition. Multinational corporations are dependent on a favorable international environment and are incorporated into the political decision-making process. Overall, from their perspective, corporations are the product of the history of a nation, including its social and cultural values (Doremus 1999). The executive board of an MNC is often filled by nationals of the home country, and the domestic market is frequently the primary target for goods and services. Relevant intra-firm departments like Research and Development (R&D), as well as finances, remain in the home country (Gilpin 2001: 299). In addition, MNCs provide important goods for the home economy and support the achievement of prioritized goals like full employment, collective welfare or individual wealth maximization depending on the identity-based interests of a country.

Moreover, as stated before states furthermore define the playing field on which MNCs can operate. The international political-economic framework is created by membership in international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) or through bilateral agreements (Krasner 1976). As highlighted by Gleditsch: "Although it is firms rather than states that engage in exchange, governments can regulate trading opportunities." (Gleditsch 2007: 299) States gauge and protect their companies as far as the international economic regulation allows or sometimes even bent those rules during times of economic or financial crises as one could witness in the 2007/08 financial crisis when states implemented policies to protect "their" corporations.

MNCs can also be seen as an extended version of economic power over other countries. Stopford et al. (1992: 51) advances so far to claim that: "More subtly, the United States has created an alternative form of economic hegemony through the market position of its multinationals." Little and Leblang (2004) argue that foreign direct investments can serve as a substitute for military troop

⁵³ Finnemore refers here to the practice of debt collection in the 19th century. States in the Americas where frequently unable to meet their debt obligations towards private corporations. Home countries used military instruments to coerce repayment of the debts.

deployment in foreign countries. In both cases, the national interests can be preserved vis-à-vis the target country. Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) corroborate this link in the case of the United States but not for other countries. However, their interpretation differs inasmuch that corporations follow US troop deployment ("follow the flag" effect) in their decision to invest abroad. US military personnel creates investment stability, which minimizes risk factors from a corporate perspective. With the forming of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in 1971, the US government created an agency to support foreign direct investments in countries with high political risk factors. As highlighted by Moran (2003: 16), OPIC was founded for economic and political reasons: "The second rationale is that there may be other public purposes - such as national security objectives or other foreign policy goals - that can be secured through the intervention of the public sector." Providing insurance and cofinance schemes, OPIC was geared to support American MNCs abroad to tap into volatile markets. MNCs investments in countries "[...] with U.S. troops or that share the U.S. foreign policy outlook" (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007: 838) are supported with lower interest rates for loans and premiums.

This protectionism and support of home-grown corporations can be traced back far in history. Monarchies saw trading companies as vehicles to enlarge their national power. According to Lipson (1985), European states set the groundwork to protect property rights of alien property in host countries with a series of interstate treaties in the mid-19th century. This process gave later rise to international regimes that outlined international property rights and made them enforceable (Keohane et al. 2012). During the Cold War, the third world attempted to isolate itself from international markets to allow its infant industries to grow and be shielded from competition through the policies of Import-Substitution. It took until the debt crises in Latin America in the 1980s when the Structural Adjustment Programs by the World Bank based on the "Washington Consensus"⁵⁴ were required as a precondition for recipient countries. This engendered the opening of their markets for investments in order to receive loans. Maurer (2013) argues that the United States has defended its corporations abroad against nationalization policies and other political hazards. In several cases, it used either its economic and political leverage to compel states into compensating U.S. MNCs in case of perceived misconduct by the host state.

⁵⁴ US and other Western states had a voting dominance in the WTO Maher (2015: 218).

During the Cold War, only those countries averted US pressure which were close allies of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the US created an international system of institutions to which corporations could appeal to if their rights were violated by host governments.

I argue that this argument of corporate investment protection can also be applied to corporations which conducted foreign direct investments into countries prior to the outbreak of civil wars. One should observe states being more likely to intervene with military instruments in civil wars if foreign direct investments are threatened. For instance, from a perspective of trade relations Aydin (2008) shows that states are more likely to intervene on the side of the country with which they have an extensive trade relationship during Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs). Economic considerations play a significant independent role for decision-makers, a logic that can be extended towards civil wars. According to Finnemore (2003), military interventions to collect outstanding debts of states towards corporations have even been a legitimate practice in the 19th century. In Chile, the United States supported measures to destabilize the government of Allende with one of the aims being to protect American corporate interests which had great investments in the natural resource sector. Therefore, the first hypothesis can be stated in the following way.

H_1 : Third states are more likely to intervene in civil wars if companies registered in the respective third states made foreign direct investments into civil war affected country prior conflict outbreak and held investments during an ongoing conflict

In a similar vein, natural resources appeal to third states as access to cheap and stable raw material inflows that can be used either for re-export to developed countries in the case of developing countries or can be directly used for industrial purposes in developed countries. Krasner (1978) advanced the argument that during the Cold War, one of the primary security goals of the United States was the unhindered supply of raw materials. More recent studies show that ongoing armed conflict has not deterred natural resource extraction corporations from investing in civil war countries. Maher (2015) observed that the United States supported the Colombian government with military aid in its civil war with the National Liberation Front (ELN) and The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Part of the military aid package in 2002 explicitly focused on the security of the Cano Limon pipeline

which is operated by the US oil corporation Occidental Petroleum (OXY) and became a target of guerilla groups.⁵⁵ Further, US Special Forces were used to train Colombian military personnel in the counterinsurgency operations.

Concluding, based on Gilpin (2001) theorizing that states pursue economic interests of multinational corporations if they benefit the home country, one should observe that states which have an industry based on natural resource supplies which cannot be satisfied by domestic production should have a higher incentive to intervene in civil wars with oil reserves that can secure long-term supply. This should be especially the case for resources that form the base of energy production in the third state. In this study, I, therefore, concentrate on oil and uranium reserves since oil is a primary natural resource for economically advanced countries and uranium is an indispensable ingredient for energy production in countries relying on nuclear power plants. According to some scholars, the French military mission Mali in 2013 was partially motivated to prevent the spread of the Tuareg rebellion and the spread of the Islamist insurgency to neighboring Niger from which France imports uranium that contributes to "30 percent of French civilian and 100 percent of French military needs" (Powell 2017: 63).⁵⁶ Hence, hypotheses 2a and 2b are stated in the following way:

 H_{2a} : Third states are more likely to intervene in civil wars if their economies are based on oil imports which can be met by oil reserves in civil war countries

 H_{2b} : Third states are more likely to intervene in civil wars if their energy production is based on uranium imports which can be met by uranium reserves in civil war countries

A further major industry in advanced states is the defense industry. Arms sales constitute an important mechanism to increase the wealth of a country, rendering buyers more dependent on the supplier and ensuring technological expertise in research and development of goods that are intrinsically crucial for the survival of the own state (Kinsella 1998; Sislin 1994). Despite the doctrine of several

⁵⁵ Maher (2015) qualifies his observation that the designed financial help was used to buy military equipment which only has become operational for the protection of the pipeline in 2005. Furthermore, the securitization of the pipeline was conducted in cooperation with local paramilitary groups.

⁵⁶ According to Boeke and Schuurman (2015: 806), the contribution is around 20 percent of required uranium for energy production.

countries like Germany not to sell arms into crisis regions, one should observe an increased willingness of arms-producing states to sell arms to internally volatile countries to ensure stable revenues, supporting a preferred government from collapsing as well as ensuring future positive relations between the supplier and buyer. For instance, according to Levey (2012), Israel followed a dual strategy to convince newly Sub-Saharan African states to refrain from allying with its Muslim counterparts during from the 1960s onwards. On the one hand, development projects and foreign aid were supplied, whereas on the other hand, military hardware was sold and training provided. During the Nigerian civil war in Biafra, Israel supported the government for national reasons and the rebel with light arms due to domestic public pressure. In another case, Israel supported the Congo with military technology and expertise which was used then against various rebel groups during the Simba revolts and Katanga. Equally, in Uganda, the Israeli military was involved in the modernization of the Ugandan army first under Obote and later under Amin until relations soured. For Israel, the support was predicated on political gains but was also financial. It became a strategy to bolster its defense industry by supporting African states which had ongoing internal armed conflicts. Hence, the third hypothesis refers to the motivation of the third state to intervene in a civil war if clear ties between its defense industry and the target state exist.

 H_3 : The larger the volume of arms sales to the civil war country, the higher the probability of the supplying country to intervene

Military Interventions in Civil Wars

The dependent variable is based on the UCDP dataset on external military interventions (Högbladh et al. 2011). It measures eight different types of military-related interventions and distinguishes between verifiable cases and those where support is only alleged. The different indications for military interventions are troop commitment, sharing military and intelligence infrastructure, providing sanctuary, support with either weapon deliveries or material/logistic support, providing military-related training, financing armed conflict or providing intelligence material. I use only recorded instances of military support to guarantee more robustness of the analysis and remove only "alleged" cased of interventions.

Additionally, for further robustness checks the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions Dataset (TIES) is used to measure economic interventions in civil wars (Morgan et al. 2014). This dataset contains all economic sanction threats and impositions in the post-World War II era in dyadic structure. Only imposed economic sanctions are considered and only such which are based on issues that may have relevance to civil war dynamics and foreign direct investments.⁵⁷ The data also provides information on the timing of different sanctions. If there is no clear end year provided when the sanction threat is lifted, then I use the last year of recording when the sanction threat was observable as well as the year of the actual implementation of the sanction. If neither data is available, the year of threat is treated as the last year. The statistical analysis is conducted with a variable solely measuring military interventions as well as with one dummy variable, which indicates whether a military intervention OR (logical) economic intervention is observable.

⁵⁷ Those include: contain military behavior, destabilize regime, release citizen, property or material, solve territorial dispute, deny strategic materials, improve human rights, end weapon/materials proliferation, terminate support for non-state actors, trade practices and implement economic reform.

Foreign Direct Investment

To measure the exposure of financial commitments by multinational corporations in the host country, the main independent variable measures foreign direct investments. The data source for global bilateral FDI relationships is provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The following definition is the complete definition provided by UNCTAD. The international organization refers to foreign direct investments as:⁵⁸

"According to the BPM5, FDI refers to an investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor. Further, in cases of FDI, the investor's purpose is to gain an effective voice in the management of the enterprise. The foreign entity or group of associated entities that makes the investment is termed the "direct investor". The unincorporated or incorporated enterprise-a branch or subsidiary, respectively, in which direct investment is made-is referred to as a "direct investment enterprise". Some degree of equity ownership is almost always considered to be associated with an effective voice in the management of an enterprise; the BPM5 suggests a threshold of 10 per cent of equity ownership to qualify an investor as a foreign direct investor.

Once a direct investment enterprise has been identified, it is necessary to define which capital flows between the enterprise and entities in other economies should be classified as FDI. Since the main feature of FDI is taken to be the lasting interest of a direct investor in an enterprise, only capital that is provided by the direct investor either directly or through other enterprises related to the investor should be classified as FDI. The forms of investment by the direct investor which are classified as FDI are equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and the provision of long-term and short-term intra-company loans (between parent and affiliate enterprises)."

According to UNCTAD, both brownfield and greenfield investments are captured by its FDI measure. Greenfield investments refer to the creation of subsidiaries in a foreign market which is at least controlled to 10 percent by the mother company.⁵⁹ This can inter alia comprise the construction of

⁵⁸ https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Foreign-Direct-Investment-(FDI).aspx, retrieved on the 23.04.2019.

⁵⁹ In joint ventures, the investing foreign corporation has to make a deal with his international and local counterparts in the distribution of shares.

production facilities or the creation of affiliate corporations to penetrate the foreign market. Brownfield investments refer to the acquisition of shares in foreign corporations. In order that the purchase is not just part of a portfolio strategy of the investor, at least 10 percent of the shares of a company had to be acquired. This shall indicate the interest of the investor into a long-lasting relationship due to his obtained influence over management decisions. Concluding, the FDI measure allows for capturing the involvement of home corporations in foreign markets. The indicator proxies expected long-term investments. Greenfield investments are often not mobile and cannot be easily relocated to a different country. Such investments have a long-time horizon typically because the corporation wants to be assured that its property rights are adhered to by the host government.⁶⁰

In measuring foreign direct investments instock, the variable captures the cumulative value of FDI in the host country. The larger bilateral FDI instock is measured, the higher the financial commitment of multinational corporations in the host country. The period covered by bilateral FDI data ranges from 2001 to 2012.⁶¹ Testing for the normality of the distribution by using a Shapiro-Wilk Test leads to a rejection of this assumption. The data is strongly positively skewed, hence to normalize the data it is transformed by taking the logarithm.⁶² After the transformation, the median and mean almost overlap and the skewness is only slightly positive. The log is taken only of positive FDI values, whereas negative FDI instock is recorded as zero.⁶³

⁶⁰ This is a recurring question by those who study the effect of regime type on FDI inflow.

⁶¹ Missing data is a vexing issue with FDI data. As a conservative measure, fata without recording of FDI is treated as having no existent FDI instock available and hence equals to zero.

⁶² Cases with negative or zero FDI instock are changed to a value of 0.999 to allow for the log transformation. The log of 0.999 is approximately zero.

⁶³ Negative FDI instock can occur when the affiliate corporation in the partner country provides a loan to the parent company in the home state which exceeds the equity and loans provided by the parent corporation to the affiliate.

Oil, Uranium and Arms Sales

To test the hypotheses on oil and uranium dependence, I use data provided by British Petroleum in its "Statistical Review of World Energy"⁶⁴ for oil production, oil consumption and oil reserves, whereas the World Bank provides data on nuclear power energy dependence and nuclear power consumption,⁶⁵ and the United Nations provides data on nuclear power production.⁶⁶ The relationship between the intervening country and the target is calculated by the following formulas:

 $Oil_{satisfaction,t} = (Oil_{consumption,b,t} - Oil_{production,b,t}) < Oil_{reserves,a,t}$

 $Oil_{need,t}^{+} = Oil_{reserves,a,t} - (Oil_{consumption,b,t} - Oil_{production,b,t})$

 $Uranium_{satisfaction,t} = Uran_{dependence,b,t} > 0.2 \cap Uran_{production,a,t}$

Both variables *Oil_{satisfaction}* and *Uranium_{satisfaction}* are binary with values 0 and 1. Oil_{satisfaction} measures if a potential intervener, country b, could theoretically satisfy its foreign oil requirements by harnessing oil reserves in the civil war state denoted as country a. For instance, if a potential intervening country consumes 100 million tons of oil per year but only produces 35 million tons, then it has to import 65 million tons. Similarly, for uranium, a dummy variable is created which logically measures if energy production of the potential intervener is dependent to at least 20 percent⁶⁷ by nuclear power and whether the target state produces uranium in the same year. The approach for oil should meet the requirement that the potential intervener does not intervene in a country with oil reserves that are not subjectively perceived as meaningful deposits. In contrast, I do not include such a restriction for uranium since the volume of production is less crucial. Already "small" deposits of single countries contribute enough uranium for nuclear power-dependent states.

Furthermore, I create a continuous variable Oil_{need} measuring whether an increase in oil requirements by foreign oil deposits increases the risk of military intervention. Only cases in which oil

⁶⁴https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html, retrieved on the 01.11.2018.

⁶⁵ https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.NUCL.ZS, retrieved on the 01.11.2018.

⁶⁶ http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=EDATA&f=cmID%3aUR, retrieved on the 19.03.2019.

⁶⁷ Boeke and Schuurman (2015)'s estimate for France's uranium dependency is used as a threshold.

is required are recorded as the hypothesis is unidirectional. In cases in which oil is not requried from foreign sources, the value is coded as 0. Lastly, I also include a variable *arms* sales which measures arms trade based on data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).⁶⁸ The figures for import/export data are provided in Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in millions. Due to the skewed distribution of both continuous variables, I conduct a logarithmic transformation. Arms trade might exert a future effect on the decision of the intervener and is therefore lagged.

Selection Bias and Endogeneity

The use of observational conflict data is not unproblematic. In an ideal case, one would conduct an experiment and randomly administer the treatment to a treatment group and no treatment to a control group and then calculate the unbiased treatment effect. Both groups should be populated with subjects that are drawn from the same distribution to ensure that they are representative of their population. However, observational data is almost always never randomly generated and can, therefore, cause selection bias (Angrist and Pischke 2009: 10–2). This occurs when subjects are not randomly allocated to the treatment or control group, but heterogeneous effects produce self-selection. For instance, Rosato (2003) found in his study on democratic peace no supporting evidence for an effect of domestic punishment against the incumbent leadership, which goes to war. Slantchev et al. (2005) object that due to self-selection processes, democracies only enter such wars that they are certain to win in anticipation of punishment. This leads to a non-random distribution of the treatment, here domestic audience costs.

The heterogeneity effect on self-selection leads to a violation of the assumption that the error term of a regression is uncorrelated with the treatment and the outcome at the same time (Morgan and Winship 2010: 129–36). As a reminder, the treatment in this study is the existence of foreign direct investments in civil war countries, and the outcome variable is a measurement of the occurrence of a military intervention in the civil war country. Foreign direct investment might be non-randomly distributed across civil war countries by the potential interveners due to observed and unobserved heterogeneity effects. Since the subjects are constituted by dyads between the civil war country and

⁶⁸ https://www.sipri.org/databases, retrieved on the 01.11.2018.

potential intervener, heterogeneity effects refer to the non-random assignment of FDI by potential interveners to countries experiencing a civil war.

Since an experiment cannot be implemented as the observational data is given, the second-best option would be to find an instrument which randomly assigns the treatment but is not causally linked with the outcome variable or the error term (Kennedy 2008: 141). However, such instruments are perennially difficult to find and the alternative solution to use a set of instruments that are highly correlated with the treatment make it difficult to assume that they are uncorrelated with the error term (Greene 2012: 232). A further danger is that weak instruments, such that only estimate a small portion of the variance of the treatment, lead to biased estimations (Greene 2012: 249). Hence, this study follows the "standard" approach conducted by prior studies on military interventions in civil wars by using an appropriate set of control variable to reduce the effect of bias due to observed heterogeneity and harnessing the panel data structure of the data by controlling for heterogeneity effects of the dyads.⁶⁹

To address the problem of endogeneity, I include four variables to test for alternative explanations which could be conceptually responsible for increased military interventionism and higher rates of foreign direct investments in the target country and therefore lead to upward bias of the foreign direct investment estimator. Those are alliance, colonial relationship, trade, and military expenditures. These four are deemed to have a potential effect on foreign direct investments and on the probability to observe a military intervention. First, alliance treaties and obligation can influence the decision of an intervener if he expects that a change in government might detrimentally affect existing peaceful and friendly relations. Lemke and Regan (2004) argue that the expectation of future interaction with the civil war country induces states to choose a side in the civil war and actively support it. An alliance might be understood not just in terms of an alliance against an adversary state but an alliance with a government against potential challengers. Their empirical analysis corroborates their expectation with alliance being a positive predictor of intervention propensity in a civil war.

⁶⁹ To date, I found only one study in IR literature by Bussmann (2010) who used an instrumental variable approach in the case of foreign direct investments and conflict. Her outcome variable is the onset of fatal militarized interstate disputes (FDI) and she uses a set of variables as instruments including a lagged version of the foreign direct investment variable.

Similarly, Findley and Teo (2006) find that alliance with a civil war country hastens the decision-making process to intervene. According to their results, alliance increases the likelihood to intervene on the side of the government by a factor of three compared to cases in which no alliance exists. Equally, the probability of siding with rebel groups decreases by almost 50 percent in the case of an alliance. Complementary, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) find evidence that US troop deployment in foreign countries and alliance is correlated with an increase in foreign direct investments. To operationalize alliance status, data from the Correlates of War project is used to account for being a participant in a joint defense pact (Gibler 2009; Correlates of War Project). It is coded as binary with 1 indicating membership in a joint alliance and 0 for no formal defense ties.

Second, being a former colony has been identified to increase the risk of military interventions into a civil war by the former colonial power (Kathman 2011; Findley and Teo 2006; Lemke and Regan 2004).⁷⁰ Chacha and Stojek (2016) attempt to unpack the colonial relationship variable by focusing on political, social, and economic dimensions and find that the colonial effect is mainly driven by economic factors. Colonial history exerts a significant positive effect on the probability of intervention when it interacts with a measure of trade between the prior colonial power and the civil war country. From the other perspective, former colonial relationship increases the presence of foreign direct investment instock (Xu et al. 2017). Makino and Tsang (2011) argue that prior historical ties between two countries have a positive effect on corporate investments. They suggest that prior interactions between states lower the degree of uncertainty for corporate investors as former colonial powers created similar institutional structures compared to their own in colonies (Jones 1996: 39). Further, the existence of cultural, ethnic, and social cross-country relations between the colonized and colonizer allow for facilitated investments (Makino and Tsang 2011: 549). Hence, transaction costs decrease and the legitimacy of corporate investments from the former colonizer increase, which leads to an overall increase in foreign direct investments in country dyads that experienced joint colonial history.⁷¹ The

⁷⁰ Schmidt (2013) inter alia provides several case studies in which France intervened in their African colonies after their nominal independence.

⁷¹ Makino and Tsang (2011) caution that the colonizer effect only holds if both countries are not involved in military interstate disputes.

data to measure colonial relationship between two countries is derived from the Correlates of War project.⁷²

Third, some studies have shown that trade linkages affect the risk of military interventions but the interpretation has been somewhat ambiguous. Kathman (2011) finds evidence that when civil wars jeopardize trade with countries that are located in proximity to a civil war, then a potential intervener has an increased probability to intervene. However, counter-intuitively dyadic trade between the civil war country and the potential intervener decrease the risk of intervention. Contrary, Aydin (2012) finds a positive link between dyadic trade and military interventions in civil wars. Stojek and Chacha (2015) find that established trade linkages increase the probability to intervene on the side of the government but find no significant effect to intervene on the side of the government. They criticize Kathmann (2011) for dividing the dyadic trade volume by the size of the economy of the potential intervener as large economies who frequently project power in the world are less dependent on single trade partners. Chacha and Stojek (2016) identify trade as the primary mechanism behind the colonial relationship variable.

Similar to the diverging findings on the link between trade and military interventions, the relationship between FDI and trade is also contentious. According to a report by the WTO from 1996,⁷³ the increase of trade and foreign direct investment has been treated largely from the question if there is discernible correlation (not causation). If trade and FDI are substitutes or complementary to each other, then it would mean that trade policies would have an impact of FDI in- and outflows. Contrary, FDI is also thought to constitute a mechanism of MNCs to overcome trade barriers between two countries and gain access to the host country's market through local investments. At the same time, regional free trade areas provide an incentive for MNCs to diversify their production processes across several countries.⁷⁴ For instance, Büthe and Milner (2008) find that Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) increase FDI inflow. Similarly, Berger et al. (2010) qualify that the trade agreement effect only holds if favorable institutional rules are mandated. To account for the potential effect of trade on military interventionism

⁷² Correlates of War Project. Colonial Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.1.

⁷³ See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm, retrieved on the 23.07.2019.

⁷⁴ For an overview on different location theories, see Faeth (2009).

and changes in FDI, a log-transformed measurement of the total trade volume between the potential intervener and the civil war country is included as a control variable. The data is derived from Barbieri et al. (2009).

Lastly, several studies use a measurement for military capacity of a state to account for the differences in power projection capabilities. Larger states with relatively high economic power are thought to have more military capabilities than economically less developed countries. Popular measures are the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) which calculates the military strength of a country by a range of security and economic relevant variables (Salehyan et al. 2011; Fordham 2008), the ratio of CINC between two countries in a dyad (Bove et al. 2016; Findley and Marineau 2015; Koga 2011), log-transformed GDP of the potential intervener (Aydin and Regan 2011).

Further, according to UNCTAD (2018) measures of FDI outflow, the major investing countries are countries with relatively large militaries like the United States, China, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Spain, and Germany. Since the outcome variable of the study refers to military interventions, I use as measurement the log-transformed direct military expenditure of the potential intervener. The drawback of the CINC measure is that it measures mainly the latent potential to wage an interstate war. However military interventions in civil wars rarely witness the use of large-scale armies but rather small contingents with specific duties to assist one conflict party. By focusing explicitly on military expenditures, the link between existing military capabilities is more accurately captured. Available data comes from Singer (1987) and Singer et al. (1972).

To address potential selection bias based unobserved heterogenous effect, this study harnesses the panel data structure of the data and uses a random effect models to estimate the probability of a military intervention in a civil war.⁷⁵ Random effect models allow for unobserved heterogeneity of conflict-intervener dyads and assume that the error term is not correlated with the independent variables (Greene 2012: 345). This is a strong assumption, however, can be partially justified as it is not straightforward clear which unobserved heterogeneity that affects both states of a dyad exerts an

⁷⁵ For similar use of random effect models, see Salehyan (2007), Lektzian and Regan (2016), Stojek and Chacha (2015), Chacha and Stojek (2016).

influence on the covariates. For instance, in a dyad "Bolivia-Poland," it is not certain which unobserved idiosyncratic effect for this dyad would affect covariates like trade or alliance. Additional to the random effect model, this study provides results of the pooled logit estimation with and without corrected for temporal dependence (Beck et al. 1998), which however violates the assumption of independence of observations, as well as an estimation with the rare event logit model proposed by King and Zeng (2001) in the appendix.⁷⁶

Alternatively, another modeling process to account for unchanging heterogenous effects would be to use country-specific dummies. For instance, Mesquita and Downs (2006: 639) "[...] attempt to correct for these general selection effects by including country-specific fixed effects to correct for characteristics of each country that do not change over time".⁷⁷ The problem of using fixed effect models with binary cross-section time-series data is that observations without a varying dependent variable are excluded and that time-invariant variables cannot be used in the estimation process (Cook et al. 2018: 2). This constitutes a very serious problem since military interventions are a rare event, and in this study over 90% of all observations would be dropped and variables like major power status or colonial history would be omitted. Using only event experiencing dyads biases the estimates of the independent variables since: "analyzing event-experiencing units alone produces an inflated average estimate of the event risk, as no-event units have a lower event probability than event-experiencing units on average. This, in turn, biases the marginal effect estimates of the predictors which are, in part, a function of these probabilities" (ibid. 2). Beck and Katz (2001: 490) even advise against the use of fixed effect models because of the aforementioned pitfalls and advocate for the use of logit estimation models with correction for temporal dependence and other modeling approaches like proportional Cox hazard models in duration analysis that include a measure for frailty.

⁷⁶ Allison writes that the problem of rare events is rather a problem in small samples, see https://statisticalhorizons.com/logistic-regression-for-rare-events, retrieved on the 22.07.2019.

⁷⁷ The difference to the study here is that Mesquita and Downs (2006) use military interventions as an independent variable and their dependent variable is continuous. Downes and Monten (2013) also use military interventions as an independent variable to explain the success rate of Foreign Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) and use as alternative modeling procedure a matching strategy to account for selection effects.

Before concluding the section, two qualifications have to be made. First, the argument for potentially reversed causality is not present. According to current literature on the link between civil wars and foreign direct investments, ongoing internal armed conflict does not increase FDI in the country experiencing violence (Asiedu 2002: 111) except for investments in the natural resource sector (Skovoroda et al. 2019; Maher 2015). Second, the argument presented here refers to existing foreign direct investments prior the outbreak of the civil war and does to address the question whether military interventions induce foreign direct investments in the target country after the civil war ceased. This hypothesis is not part of this study and necessitates a different research design by looking at the differences of investments prior, during, and after the civil war by a potential intervener.

This section focused on the inherent problem of using observational data for inferential purposes. Since a randomized trial cannot be conducted, potential bias might exist due to the selection effect as foreign direct investments by potential interveners are not randomly distributed across all civil war countries. To address observed and unobserved heterogeneity, two approaches are used. First, a set of endogenous variables are used to control for alternative explanations of observed heterogeneits. Second, random effect modelling assumes unobserved heterogenous effects of the country dyads. Fixed effect modelling proves to be unsuitable to test the hypotheses. However, alternative model specifications with pooled logistic regression and rare events logit will be used for specification checks.

Alternative explanations for military interventions in civil wars: Contiguity, Distance, Rivalry, Ethnicity, Battle Deaths, and Temporal Dependence

Additional to the inclusion of endogenous variables, prior research on military interventions in civil wars has established various causal links. To test for the major alternative explanations, this section introduces the most widely-used control variables and provides a theoretical justification for their use in the subsequent section on hypothesis testing. The first control variable relates to the effect of contiguity on the propensity to intervene. Neighboring countries account for one-third of all interventions in civil wars (Kathman 2010: 992). Measuring contiguity over land borders and sea proximity controls for a range of potential spillover effects of civil wars. For instance, Lemke and Regan (2004: 148) argue that civil wars have the potential to destabilize neighboring states. Therefore, neighboring states are more inclined to intervene than more distant countries.

Similarly, Kathman (2010) points at several other factors that are associated with contiguity. First, spatial proximity provides an easier opportunity to project power in contrast to a distant actor. Second, civil wars rupture connections between states that are typically more pronounced between neighbors than remote countries. Those include economic trade relationships, ethnic linkages across borders, political and security cooperation. Third, recent research points at the destabilizing effect of refugees in neighboring countries (Salehyan 2008). Refugees streams increase the risk to observe militarized interstate disputes. They put a financial burden on the host country, and further can be a conduit for diseases and reduce living standards. Fourth, rebels might attempt to use neighboring internally weak countries as a sanctuary (Salehyan 2007). Lastly, successful internal resistance can engender a "demonstration effect" (Kathman 2010: 992) on potential rebels in neighboring countries.

Kathman (2010) further measures specific types of potential civil war spillovers. He calculates the infection risk, which is based on the intensity of the civil war in the neighboring country. The higher the intensity, the higher the risk of negative spillovers. This variable is accompanied by measures of ethnic and ideological conflict in the neighboring country as it is assumed that they have strong deleterious effects on neighboring countries. All three variables are a significant positive predictor of interventions. Kathman hypothesizes that interventions are conducted to increase the chances of a ceasefire or victory and therefore remove the cause for contagion. Additionally, interventions can be conducted to stabilize borders or signal to a domestic constituency that the state does not tolerate domestic instability. Based on these deliberations and prior research, it is expected that contiguity has a positive effect on civil war interventions. Correlates of War data is used to identify whether states share a border or are in proximity over the sea (Gibler 2009; Correlates of War Project). The contiguity variable is dichotomous equaling to 1 when referring to observe a dyad that shares spatial proximity and 0 to indicate remoteness. This is complemented by a variable measuring the distance between the potential intervener and the civil war country, as increasing distance should theoretically decrease power projection capabilities (Bove et al. 2016; Koga 2011). For this purpose, the distance of the Capital Cities dataset from Gleditsch is harnessed⁷⁸ and log-transformed.

Second, the realist school of thought has identified that rivalries between a potential intervener and a civil war country have consistently shown to be a strong predictor of interventions in civil wars (Lee 2018; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Findley and Marineau 2015). According to Salehyan (2011), states support rebel groups in rival states during a civil war as an instrument to weaken the rival and achieve control over conflict dynamics which can be translated into leverage over previously contentious issues like political incompatibilities or territorial disputes. Opposition groups accept external support only when they are not strong enough to continue fighting without support and not weak enough to pose an attractive option for the potential intervener. Those who have territorial control also appear to be a target of military support by external powers.

Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005) point out that longer rivalries exhibit higher chances to experience interventions. Based on these results, it is expected that an intervention will most likely occur when the dyad consists of two rivals. To control for this assumption, rivalry data from Goertz et al. (2016) is used. This data ranks the relationship between two countries on a five-point scale. Whereas the lowest rank denotes hostile political tensions between the two countries, the highest rank refers to countries with very high trust values. To integrate the variable into the dataset, transitional periods are removed. Furthermore, if a change in the relationship occurred during one year, then I take the value of the new relationship as a representation for the last year of the former rivalry episode. This means that,

⁷⁸ See http://ksgleditsch.com/data-5.html, retrieved on the 23.08.2019.

if for instance, two countries had a cordial relationship in 2013 until August 24th but then changed their position and became hostile, then the final data accounts for this change in 2014. Countries for which there is no relationship coded are treated as being indifferent to each other (negative peace) with a ranking value of 0.5. The majority of dyads have no specific conditions of enmity and amity towards each other and therefore represent the most observed instance of interstate perceptions.

Third, liberal explanations of civil war interventions pronounce domestic pressure groups as main drivers. Hence, ethnic groups residing in the potential intervening country and in the civil war country can increase the risk of a military intervention. Saideman (2001) finds some evidence that ethnic kinship and religious affinity matters. For instance, countries with governments that rely on Muslim constituencies are more likely to intervene in civil wars in which Muslim groups are exposed. Chacha and Stojek (2016) argue that similar cultural disposition between two countries should increase the risk of intervention and find corroborative evidence measured by shared language. Salehyan et al. (2011) focus on rebel group support and find that transnational linkages between two groups in a country dyad increase the probability to observe support for the rebel group in the civil war country. Hence, to account for the alternative explanation of ethnicity, data from the Transborder Ethnic Kin 2018 Dataset (Vogt et al. 2015) is used to identify whether two countries share a similar domestic ethnic group.

Fourth, humanitarian intervention has been conducted to prevent the loss of civilian life during a civil war. Finnemore (2003) describes that in the 1990s, the discourse on military interventions incorporated a discussion of human security during civil wars. Military interventions of the United States in Kosovo, Somalia, and Bosnia cannot be explained with realist or liberal explanations. Therefore, some studies have included measurements of war intensity (Kathman 2011) and refugees (Salehyan 2007). Hence, a measurement for counted battle deaths is included as a control variable to account for humanitarian driven interventions. The data is derived from Pettersson and Eck (2018) and is log-transformed as the distribution is left-skewed.

Lastly, according to Beck et al. (1998), panel data with a binary dependent variable (Binary Time-Series Cross-Section data, BTSCS) is likely to violate the assumption of independent observations. This can lead to too small standard errors, thereby reporting statistical significance where it should not be. However, Beck et al. point out that BTSCS data is equivalent to grouped event history data which means that the observations of the event are grouped in time intervals. In the case of panel data used in International Relations studies, the grouping variable is typically one year. In event history data analysis, the formula using complementary log-log for the dependent variable is for low probabilities of the event happening almost the same as in the case of the logit function. Figure 3-1 illustrates this behavior of both link functions. Since interventions in civil wars are a rare event, the solutions provided in grouped event history data can be implemented in the BTSCS case.

$$cloglog(P) = \log(-\log(1-P))$$

$$logit(P) = log(\frac{P}{1-P})$$




Figure 3-1: Comparison of the logit and cloglog function

The authors propose two remedies which can be implemented in the statistical analysis to use this property of the data to control for time dependence based on the understanding of event history analysis. First, a variable called *last intervention* is included which measures the time in years that passed since the last intervention occurred. It counts annually the amount of preceding annual instances of non-intervention and is, therefore, an annual cumulative count. This allows to control for repeated events in the case when one state intervenes two or more times in a conflict with a break in between the interventions. Second, three natural cubic splines are inserted in the pooled logistic model but not in the random effect model since the random effect model is specified to take heterogenous effect of each year into account. However, as a robustness check, the core model is tested with splines and reported in the appendix.

Operationalization and Dataset Construction

The following steps were implemented to create the final dataset on which the hypotheses are tested. It is based on a dyadic relationship between the (potential) intervener and the civil war country (target). In the first step, I use the armed conflict dataset version 18.1 from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which codes all internal conflicts from 1946 until 2017 (Pettersson and Eck 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2002). This dataset counts observations of causalities above 25 in a given year as a civil war. These instances of violence must occur in a conflict dyad that is comprised of the government and a non-state actor. I only use observations of intrastate or an internationalized intrastate conflict. Generally, civil wars take place on the territory of the target country between a government and a non-state actor. Internationalized intrastate conflicts are such in which the conflict dyad between the government of a country and the rebel group is also present in foreign countries. For instance, the United States is coded as to be in a war with Al Qaeda at various places in the world, or Uganda was fighting against the Lord Resistance Army on the territory of the Central African Republic.

In the next step, I distinguish all those conflicts into unique conflicts based on their conflict ID provided by UCDP. However, conflicts which are interrupted by more than three years of no fighting are counted as distinct civil wars. Conflicts that have breaks of three or fewer years are treated as being in a continuous civil war following Salehyan (2007).⁷⁹ This means that the years between the observed instances of violence are included. This is based on the reasoning that conflicts are sometimes interrupted due to ceasefires which collapse and lead to a relapse of the conflict. This interruption would falsely indicate independence between the conflicts and break the time-dependence component. Then, I derive with the help of the "states" package from Andreas Berger (provided for R) all existing states

⁷⁹ For instance, the Iraqi government fought in four periods against the KDPI (1946, 1966-1968, 1979-1996, 2016). Although there are periods no fatalities between 1988 and 1996, they never exceed more than 3 consecutive years of peace. Hence, the civil war against the KDPI is counted as four different wars.

from the Gleditsch and Ward state system membership list (Gleditsch and Ward 1999). This list is used to identify all potential interveners in a civil war which are coupled for each annual observation of an ongoing civil war.

However, I follow the logic provided by Mahoney and Goertz (2004: 653) who state that: "[...] cases where the outcome of interest is *possible* should be included in the set of negative cases; cases, where the outcome is impossible, should be relegated to a set of uninformative and hence irrelevant observations" [italics in original quote]. Since the dependent variable refers to military interventions, a state needs to possess military capabilities. Furthermore, the state itself must exist as an independent actor that can conduct foreign policy. Therefore, several observations were dropped. First, before coupling each civil war with every single existing state in a given year, I remove all microstates.⁸⁰ I assume that microstates are not capable of projecting military power and their inclusion artificially inflates the dataset. After coupling all civil wars with states, the dependent variable military interventions and economic interventions, as well as the independent variable *logfdi* and the control variables, are merged with the list of observations. Second, I remove all dyads with impossible interventions by using information on the existence of states in time. This means that states which only came into existence after the civil war ended are not taken into consideration as well as states that ceased to exist before the outbreak of the civil war. Third, states cannot intervene within their territory. Therefore these "doubles" are equally removed. Lastly, using the count of available military personnel from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Dataset version 5 (Singer et al. 1972), all dyads are deleted in which the potential intervening state has no soldiers at his disposal.

⁸⁰ States with a population below 500.000 citizens.

Estimation Procedures

The final dataset has the properties of panel data. One dyad consists of the pair between the civil war and a potential intervener. When a civil war takes place longer than one year, observations refer to multiple dyad-years. The grouping variable *iddyad* indicates a dyad (e.g., Canada – Chad) and the time variable *year* is measured annually. Each row in the data describes one year of the relationship between the target country (*gwno_a*) and a potential intervener (*int_code_gw*). The main analysis is based on random fixed effect models to model the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The panel data is unbalanced which means that the frequency of dyads is varying. STATA (version 15.1) is used to conduct logistic regressions (*xtlogit*). The command uses listwise deletion, and this means that missing data in one variable leads to a deletion of the whole observation. This is especially important since the available data for FDI instock is only available from 2001 to 2012 and external interventions only date until 2009. Therefore, the dataset captures the period between 2001 and 2009. In total, there are 41677 observations as annual dyads between civil war countries and potential interveners. The formula of the core model is stated in the following way.

 $\begin{aligned} &\Pr(Intervention_{ij,t}) = \ \alpha + \ \beta_1 ln(FDI\ instock)_{ij,t} + \ \beta_2 ln(Arms\ Trade)_{ij,t-1} + \\ &\beta_3 ln(Oil_{need})_{ij,t} + \ \beta_4 (Uranium_{satisfaction})_{ij,t} + \ \beta_5 (Alliance)_{ij,t} + \\ &\beta_6 (Peaceful\ Relations)_{ij,t} + \ \beta_7 (Contiguity)_{ij} + \ \beta_8 (Last\ Intervention)_{ij,t} + \\ &\beta_9 ln(Capital\ Distance)_{ij} + \ \beta_{10} (Shared\ Ethnicity)_{ij} + \ \beta_{11} ln(Trade\ Volumue)_{ij,t-1} + \\ &\beta_{12} (Colnial\ Relationship)_{ij,t} + \ \beta_{13} ln(Miltary\ Exp.)_{j,t-1} + \\ &\beta_{14} (cumulative\ battle\ deaths)_{i,t} + \ \varepsilon_{ij,t} + \ v_{ij} + \kappa_t \end{aligned}$

The dependent variable measures the probability of an intervention occurring between the civil war country *i* and the potential intervening country *j* at year *t*. The constant term α refers to the intercept of the model. Foreign direct investment, arms trade, oil requirements, uranium, alliance, peaceful relations, contiguity, last intervention, distance, shared ethnicity, trade volume, and colonial relationship are dyadic variables which capture the relationship between the civil war country and the potential intervener. Military expenditure and cumulative battle deaths are monadic variables that remain constant either for the potential intervener or the civil war country, respectively for the entire

observed year. Arms trade, trade volume, and military expenditure are lagged to account for lagging effects.⁸¹ The error term ε captures the unmodelled disturbances. The random effect model further assumes unobserved heterogeneous effects of the country dyad ϑ_{ij} and year κ_t . Robustness checks are conducted and presented in the appendix.

Descriptive Statistics of the Intervention Dataset

Variable	Count	Fraction of total observations
Military Interventions	721	1.7%
Economic Sanctions	140	0.3%
Oil satisfaction	2311	5.5%
Uranium satisfaction	480	1.1%
Contiguity	1842	4.4%
Alliance	2520	6.0%
Shared Ethnicity	3610	8.7%
Colonial Relationship	214	0.5%

Table 3-1: List of binary-coded variables.

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Dev.
Log(FDI)	2450	5.14	2.69
Log(Arms Sales) _{t-1}	698	3.11	1.45
Log(Oil _{need})	10.749	2.71	1.50
Log(Battle Deaths)	36.148	5.79	1.41
Log(Distance)	41.663	8.64	0.71
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}	20.486	3.88	2.50
Log(Mil. Expenditures)	39.257	13.16	2.32

Table 3-2: List of continuous variables (calculated statistics for values above 0).

Variable	Strong Riv.	Rivalry	Indifference	Weak Amity	Strong Amity
Interstate Peace	89	176	41.378	25	9

Table 3-3: Interstate Peace defined as ordinal variable with five different outcomes. Values are counts of annual observations.

⁸¹ Foreign direct investments are also lagged as robustness check and reported in the appendix.

A descriptive account of the most important variables is provided in table 3-1, table 3-2, and table 3-3. The dataset consists of 41677 observations, which are annual measurements between dyads, which represent the civil war country and a potential intervener. Each civil war year is paired with all potential interveners. Hence, each civil war year is multiplied by the number of existing states in the state system. For instance, the civil war in Uzbekistan in the year 2004 has 157 dyads recorded. In total, 721 annual military interventions are observed in the dataset. As defined by the UCDP External Support dataset, these 721 observations include direct troop commitments as well as indirect forms of military interventions like the provision of intelligence or financial aid for rebel groups. 453 annual observations out of the 721 include the use of combat forces. The three major target states are Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by the War on Terror coded as an internationalized civil war between the United States and translational Islamist groups. Hence, the data includes unilateral interventions as well as coalitional interventions.⁸²

Military interventions account for 1.7 percent of all dyads and are five times more likely to occur than economic sanctions which puts into question the assumption that economic sanctions will be a preferred instrument in civil wars since the costs which they entail for the sender state should be significantly smaller than in the case of military interventions are most active with regards to military. Lektzian and Regan (2016) similarly record 1772 observations of economic sanctions implement during a civil war. However, the measurement is based on monthly observations, hence dividing by 12 equals to 147, which almost identical to the sanctions recorded in this study. In 1 out of 20 dyads, the potential intervener could satisfy his oil demands through the deposits located within the target country. In contrast to previous research which investigates existing import/export patterns in oil trade (Bove et al. 2016), the oil variable in this study takes into account the potential to satisfy oil import requirements through the existing reserves in the civil war country.

Uranium_{satisfaction} only accounts for 480 annual observations. Producing countries are China, India, Iran, Niger, the United States, and Uzbekistan. Colonial relationships are only recorded 214

⁸² To address whether results are driven by one of the three wars, the core model is executed with the exclusion of the interventions in Afghanistan and the US War on Terror which is reported in the appendix.

times. The variable measures whether the civil war country and the potential intervener had a colonial relationship in the past. It is mainly driven by the United Kingdom (74) and France (51). Other colonial relationships were defined by Spain (21), Turkey (17), Belgium (16), Russia (11), Italy (10), Portugal (9) and the Netherlands (5). For instance, Russia is recorded for two civil war years to have constituted the former colonial power over Georgia and nine civil war years for being the former colonial power over Azerbaijan. In 4.4% of all observations, the potential intervener shared a border with the civil war country. Mutual defense pacts defined six percent of all recorded dyads. Further, 8.7% of all dyads shared some common sub-national ethnic grouping as defined by Transborder Ethnic Kin 2018 Dataset (Vogt et al. 2015).




Figure 3-2: Density plot of Log(FDI) for all values above zero in the year 2009.

Table 3-2 indicates all continuous variables used in the core model. Figure 3-2 sheds light on the distribution of the log-transformed foreign direct investment instock variable (in the year 2009). The mean is around five, which indicates a mean value of approximately 150 million dollar investment in a civil war country. Some data is missing for battle deaths due to the recording of years between violent episodes as civil wars. For instance, the civil war in Sri Lanka has a one year gap in 2004 in the Battle Death dataset (Pettersson and Eck 2018) but it is still counted as being part of a civil war since the fighting resumed in 2005, hence less than the required three year gap before it would be coded as a new civil war. In approximately one-fourth of all dyads, states were oil consumers and experienced the possibility to satisfy their oil shortage through the reserves of the civil war state. Missing data for distance relate to the dyad between Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The distance between their capitals is less than one kilometer and was therefore recorded as zero. Half of the dyads between the civil war country and the potential intervener trade with each other. Some data for military expenditures is missing for countries like Afghanistan and Iraq who were embroiled in their civil war as well as for some African and Latin American countries like Congo, Liberia, Sudan, Belize or Benin. Investigating the arms sales variable, on average \$1.37 million worth of arms sales are conducted between the dyads in a given year (included are countries with no arms sales).

To test for primary connections between the variables of interest and the propensity to engage in a military intervention in a civil war, frequency tables are provided, and chi-squared tests are conducted. Table 3-4 indicates the joint distribution of military interventions and the oil satisfaction variable. Using the chi-squared test, the null hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between both variables is rejected ($\chi^2 = 145.66$, p < 0.05, df =1) which at first glance corroborates hypothesis 2_a. Contrary to oil, uranium deposits are more scarcely distributed globally. In the period between 2001 and 2009, 35 countries were identified to produce uranium. However, as noted before, only a handful of civil war countries were uranium producers. Table 3-5 shows a less convincing joint distribution of military interventions and uranium satisfaction compared to the oil hypothesis. Only 25 cases of annual interventions are recorded in which the intervener required substantial amounts of uranium for domestic energy production and intervened in a civil war country with uranium deposits. Of those were 24 interventions on behalf of the United States in its internationalized war against Al Qaeda. The remaining intervention refers to French involvement in Niger in 2007. Hence, the uranium variable has to be regarded with caution as the United States mainly drives it, despite the chi-squared test being statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 32.52$, p < 0.05, df =1).

	Oil Satisfaction		
		No	Yes
Mil. Intervention	No = 0	38.759 (94.6%)	2197 (5.4%)
win. Intervention	Yes = 1	607 (84,2%)	114 (15,8%)

Table 3-4: Cross-table between military interventions and oil satisfaction variable. Note: percentages in parentheses refer to row fractions.

	Uranium Satisfaction		
		No	Yes
Mil. Intervention	No = 0	40.501 (98,9%)	455 (1,1%)
Mill. Intervention	Yes = 1	696 (96,5%)	25 (3,5%)

Table 3-5: Cross-table between military interventions and uranium satisfaction variable. Note: percentages in parentheses refer to row fractions.

Alliances are observed in 6 percent of all cases. The joint distribution of being in an alliance with the civil war country is similar to the previous link between oil and military interventions (see table 3-6). The statistical analysis points at a significant statistical relationship ($\chi^2 = 135.7$, p < 0.05, df =1). Using a three-way cross-table (not reported here) reveals that in only 21 annual intervention observations was the intervening country allied with the civil war country which has the potential to satisfy oil requirements of the intervening country's economy. This frequency distribution indicates that alliance and oil satisfaction are two distinct drivers of intervention behavior. The variable interstate peace refers to rivalry (see table 3-7). The mean value of 0.5 is not surprising as only a small fraction of all states within the international system have feelings of enmity or amity towards each other; the majority remains indifferent. In total, weak rivalry is observed in 176 times between the civil war country and the potential intervener, and in 89 observations the enmity is at its peak. Comparatively, in

only 25 observations, there is friendship within the dyad, and in 9 cases there is strong amity observed. Here, I use column percentages to highlight the marginal probabilities within each rivalry category. Considering the category of negative peace in which only 1.6% of interventions occurred, in the case of rivalry the margins are much higher being between 16 and 18 percent. The low amount of observations for positive peace do not yield credence for conclusive inferences.

	Alliance			
		No	Yes	
Mil Intervention	No = 0	38.554 (98.5%)	603 (1.5%)	
Mil. Intervention	Yes = 1	2.402 (95.3%)	118 (4.7%)	

Table 3-6: Cross-table between military interventions and participation in an alliance with the civil war country. Note: percentages in parentheses refer to row fractions

		Interstate Peace					
	-	Severe	Lesser	Negative	Warm	Security	
		Rivalry	Rivalry Rivalry		Peace	Community	
Mil. Intervention	NL 0	73	148	40.706	25	4	
	No = 0	(82.0%)	(84.1%)	(98.4%)	(100%)	(44.4%)	
	Yes = 1	16	28	672	0	5	
	1 cs - 1	(18.0%)	(16,9%)	(1.6%)	(0%)	(55.6%)	

Table 3-7: Cross-table between military interventions and rivalry with the civil war country. Note: percentages in parentheses refer to column fractions.

Figure 3-3 sheds light on the most active countries with regards to military interventions during the period from 2001 until 2009. By far does the United States lead with over 90 observed annual military interventions in nine years. This means that on average, the United States intervened in ten different countries per year in the post-2000 period. This finding bolsters the assumption that the 2000s were structured as a unipolar system in which only the United States had global outreach and capabilities in power projection.⁸³ Countries like the United Kingdom, Romania, Australia, Italy, and Poland are also listed due to their engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sudan primarily intervened in

⁸³ According to Waltz (2000: 13), the biggest danger in a unipolar system is the overstretching and overexpansion of military forces in areas that produce only a few tangible results for the existing superpower.

Chad and Uganda but is also recorded to be involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Eritrea. Pakistan was involved in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka but also supported the United States in its war on terror against Al Qaeda. Eritrea's engagement is observed in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Lastly, France, in contrast, had a global outreach and apart of Afghanistan became active in its former colonies in Africa, namely Niger, Chad, Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic, and Senegal. Although the United States is the primary intervening country in the dataset, the difference is not significant enough to count it as an influential outlier.⁸⁴




Figure 3-3: Intervention observations by countries from 2001 until 2009.

⁸⁴ Inferential statistics for the core model remain robust even when the United States is not included.

Hypothesis Testing – Foreign Direct Investments and Interventions

In this section, the four hypotheses related to foreign direct investments, oil, uranium, and arms trade are tested. The first tests concern military interventions as defined by the UCDP External Support Dataset. It is then proceeded by including economic sanctions as well as focusing solely on pure combat missions. In this way, the postulated effects are related to different types of interventions. Then, the hypotheses are tested in different samples to account for effects that might only occur under specific conditions. The first two samples test the hypotheses in low-intensity, and high-intensity civil wars and the subsequent two samples probe whether civil wars that are fought for secessionist purposes engender different economic effects on potential interveners than those that are fought over government. Various tests for alternative explanations and model specifications are conducted to check for robustness of the results. Lastly, to obtain a feeling for the uncovered effects of the foreign direct investment instock variable as well as for the effects of oil, uranium and arms trade, the substantive effects of the independent variables are provided by calculating the predicted probabilities for a hypothetical state which possesses the most common characteristics in the international system.

As the first step, in table 3-8, all four hypotheses are tested in model 1 and model 2 by using military interventions as the dependent variable and without control variables except a correction for time dependence. In this configuration, military interventions encompass a variety of instruments, including sending combat forces or only providing military training to one of the conflict actors. The difference between model 1 and model 2 is that in model 1, the dummy variable for oil_{satisfaction} is used, whereas in model 2, the continuous variable is tested. All four hypotheses are statistically significant with the expected positive sign. All five measures increase the likelihood to observe a military intervention by a state with economic interests in the civil war country. The measure for rho (ρ) in the random effect model is a measure for the "proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance component" (StataCorp 2017: 272). Hence, rho is measured between 0 and 1 and indicates if panel level variance (between groups) provides additional explanatory power. If panel-level variance would have no additional contribution, then a pooled logistic estimation method would suffice. The high value of above 0.9 is a distinct indicator that there are heterogeneity effects of the different dyads and the panel estimator is a better choice than the pooled regression. Lastly, the Bayesian

Information Criterion (BIC) is used to identify whether the use of additional control variables provides more explanatory power to the model. The increase in parameters lowers the likelihood even if the parameter remains insignificant. Hence, the Bayesian Information Criterion penalizes the use of additional estimators. When comparing two models, a lower BIC indicates a better model fit to the data. Hence, comparing model 1 and model 2, the former with the oil binary measurement, should be preferred. However, due to the lower variance and higher precision of the continuous oil variable, it will be kept for further estimation procedures.⁸⁵

Model 3 includes additional control variables that were deemed in the theoretical section as competing hypotheses to economic explanations. The first observation is that all four economic factors from hypothesis 1 to 3 remain significant and do not change their effect direction. All included control variables perform as expected. Alliances increase the probability to intervene in a civil war. The lower the rivalry between two states, the lower the propensity to become involved in a civil war. Being a neighboring country to a civil war increases the tendency to intervene due to spillover and disruption effects. The further away the potential intervener is localized, the less likely does he intervene in the civil war. Further, if a country dyad shares similar ethnic groups, then this increases the likelihood that the potential intervener eventually intervenes. Accounting for temporal dependency reveals that the more time is passed after an intervention, the less likely a following intervention by the same intervener takes place. Lastly, to account for theories stressing humanitarian interventions, the battle death variable measures the intensity of the war. As predicted, more intense civil wars have a higher likelihood to experience a military intervention.

Model 4 to 6 each introduces one of the endogenous variables (alliance being already introduced in model 3) that should have an impact on foreign direct investments and on the outcome variable theoretically. Indeed, the introduction of trade in model 4 lowers the substantive effect of the FDI variable and is also significant in the expected direction. The higher the trade volume between a civil war country and the potential intervener, the higher the propensity of the potential intervener to decide to intervene. In model 5, the colonial relationship variable is significant with a positive effect on

⁸⁵ Estimating models 3 to 7 with the dichotomous variable does not have a substantial effect on the estimators.

military interventions. However, the colonial relationship variable has only a small impact on the foreign direct investment instock variable compared to model 3. However, measuring military expenditures has a considerable effect on the model. Military expenditures proxy the economic strength of a country as well as its military power projection capabilities. The endogenous nature of military expenditure holds as predicted. Foreign direct investments strongly lose their explanatory power, and arms trade becomes insignificant. This result is not surprising as stronger economies have more multinational corporations that invest abroad and countries with high defense budgets presumably possess a sizable defense industry which also exports arms. In itself, higher military expenditures increase the probability that a state intervenes in a civil war. Surprisingly, the variable measuring shared ethnicities equally becomes insignificant. Model 7 serves as the core model as it accounts for all hypothesized endogenous variables that could introduce selection bias. In this model, foreign direct investments, oil and uranium remain significant predictors of military interventions in civil wars, whereas arms trade provides no additional explanatory power. The results support hypotheses 1 (FDI), 2_a (oil) and 2_b (uranium) but are less clear for hypothesis 3 (arms trade).

Dependent Variable			Mil	itary Interven	tions		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Corporate Hypotheses							
Log(FDI)	0.308***	0.334***	0.360***	0.272***	0.340***	0.151**	0.186***
	(0.0682)	(0.0664)	(0.0710)	(0.0737)	(0.0694)	(0.0641)	(0.0683)
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.257**	0.281**	0.268**	0.239**	0.255**	0.164	0.173
Oila	(0.115) 2.455***	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Oilsatisfaction	(0.482)						
Log(Oilneed)	(0.482)	0.317***	0.277***	0.227**	0.280***	0.403***	0.446***
Log(Offneed)		(0.0834)	(0.0966)	(0.0947)	(0.0956)	(0.0914)	(0.0945)
Uranium _{satisfaction}	2.257***	1.895**	2.242***	1.988**	2.067**	1.732**	1.787**
Cramanisatistation	(0.811)	(0.755)	(0.839)	(0.812)	(0.815)	(0.716)	(0.728)
Control Variables	(0.011)	(*****)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(*****)	(***=*)
Alliance			1.142**	0.966**	1.141**	1.539***	1.673***
			(0.502)	(0.490)	(0.494)	(0.474)	(0.484)
Peaceful Relations			-6.043***	-6.336***	-5.711***	-5.361***	-4.910**
			(2.089)	(2.022)	(2.072)	(1.939)	(1.977)
Contiguity			2.154***	1.762**	1.985***	1.658***	1.851***
			(0.783)	(0.748)	(0.752)	(0.636)	(0.652)
Log(distance)			-0.785***	-0.848***	-0.775***	-1.097***	-1.048***
			(0.249)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.241)	(0.245)
Shared Ethnicity			1.390**	1.155**	1.443**	0.540	0.667
			(0.587)	(0.562)	(0.569)	(0.497)	(0.507)
Temporal Dependency			0 247***	0 274***	0.240***	0 202***	0.2((***
Last Intervention			-0.347*** (0.0467)	-0.374*** (0.0476)	-0.349*** (0.0466)	-0.382*** (0.0478)	-0.366*** (0.0479)
Humanitarian Hypothesis			(0.0467)	(0.0476)	(0.0466)	(0.0478)	(0.0479)
Log(battle deaths)			0.902***	0.895***	0.911***	0.901***	0.912***
Log(battle deatils)			(0.0697)	(0.0697)	(0.0698)	(0.0700)	(0.0701)
Alternative Explanations			(0.00)7)	(0.00)7)	(0.0070)	(0.0700)	(0.0701)
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.157***			-0.108*
				(0.0545)			(0.0586)
Colonial History				()	4.500***		2.388**
5					(1.141)		(1.077)
Log(Military Exp.)t-1					. /	0.660***	0.699***
						(0.0722)	(0.0802)
Constant	-15.67***	-14.07***	-7.423***	-6.434***	-7.583***	-12.65***	-13.87***
	(0.185)	(0.195)	(2.505)	(2.484)	(2.482)	(2.556)	(2.644)
Observations	40,581	40,581	35,056	35,056	35,056	33,920	33,920
Number of iddyad	6,997	6,997	6,986	6,986	6,986	6,919	6,919
rho	0.933	0.914	0,980	0.857	0.862	0.827	0.829
sigma	6.758	5.902	4.636	4.437	4.537	3.963	4.000
BIC	3420	3434	3031	3031	3028	2888	2901
log-likelihood	-1678	-1685	-1448	-1442	-1441	-1371	-1367

log-likelihood-1678-1685-1448-1442-1441Table 3-8: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars, 2001 – 2009.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

In model 8 until 14, the dependent variable represents military and economic interventions combined to test whether both types of interventions are complementary.⁸⁶ The foreign direct investment variable remains significant but compared to model 7, it is recorded with a smaller effect size. Arms trade becomes strongly dependent on the model specification. With the inclusion of trade, it becomes weakly significant (p < .10) and once controlled for military expenditures; it exerts no significant effect. In contrast, oil and uranium remain significant in the expected positive direction except in the case when trade is used as the sole control variable to account for endogeneity. In this case, oil becomes insignificant. To account for the possibility that economic sanctions are used as an intervention instrument by states that perceive too high costs of military interventions, an ordered logit model was implemented with the following coding of the dependent variable: $0 = n_0$ intervention, 1 = 1economic sanction, 2 = military intervention. The results (not reported here)⁸⁷ indicate that the cut-off points from 0 to 1 and 1 to 2 are not statistically significant. Hence the null-hypothesis that economic and military interventions are distinct from each other cannot be rejected. The high frequency of military interventions compared to economic sanctions (ratio of over 6:1) indicates that the salience of civil wars requires states to use military instruments to achieve their objectives and unilateral economic sanctions are regarded as ineffective. This resonates with findings from Lektzian and Regan (2016) who find that unilateral economic sanctions are generally ineffective to influence the course of a civil war and economic sanctions mainly shorten conflicts when they are complemented with economic sanctions by international organizations or are complemented by military interventions.

⁸⁶ Using only economic sanctions as dependent variable renders practically almost all variables insignificant as sanctions are an extreme rare event.

⁸⁷ Only models without control variables showed statistically significant thresholds.

Dependent Variable	Military and Economic Interventions							
Independent Variables	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	
<u> </u>								
Corporate Hypotheses								
Log(FDI)	0.285***	0.303***	0.347***	0.194***	0.324***	0.128**	0.124**	
	(0.0581)	(0.0570)	(0.0631)	(0.0626)	(0.0616)	(0.0548)	(0.0573)	
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.183*	0.190*	0.237**	0.179*	0.224**	0.103	0.0995	
	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.100)	
OilSatisfaction	2.448***							
	(0.426)							
Log(Oilneed)		0.322***	0.205**	0.114	0.211**	0.378***	0.377***	
		(0.0758)	(0.0884)	(0.0846)	(0.0874)	(0.0843)	(0.0877)	
Uraniumsatisfaction	2.134***	1.974***	2.103***	1.570**	1.924**	1.476**	1.414**	
	(0.755)	(0.678)	(0.782)	(0.725)	(0.759)	(0.652)	(0.657)	
Control Variables								
Alliance			1.115**	0.739	1.122**	1.489***	1.487***	
			(0.475)	(0.450)	(0.466)	(0.439)	(0.445)	
Peaceful Relations			-7.235***	-7.674***	-6.852***	-6.232***	-6.070***	
			(1.889)	(1.775)	(1.872)	(1.768)	(1.771)	
Contiguity			2.181***	1.406**	2.056***	1.626***	1.599***	
			(0.692)	(0.626)	(0.668)	(0.545)	(0.559)	
Log(distance)			-0.355	-0.529**	-0.340	-0.796***	-0.774***	
			(0.224)	(0.217)	(0.222)	(0.217)	(0.219)	
Shared Ethnicity			1.740***	1.305***	1.803***	0.747*	0.803*	
-			(0.527)	(0.480)	(0.512)	(0.433)	(0.437)	
Temporal Dependency								
Last Intervention			-0.480***	-0.524***	-0.478***	-0.504***	-0.502***	
			(0.0410)	(0.0417)	(0.0409)	(0.0407)	(0.0412)	
Humanitarian Hypothesis								
Log(battle deaths)			0.787***	0.778***	0.796***	0.779***	0.785***	
			(0.0621)	(0.0621)	(0.0623)	(0.0621)	(0.0624)	
Alternative Explanations						. ,		
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.299***			-0.000564	
- *				(0.0483)			(0.0507)	
Colonial History				. ,	4.901***		2.135**	
·					(0.977)		(0.905)	
Log(Military Exp.)t-1					. /	0.793***	0.773***	
						(0.0698)	(0.0766)	
Constant	-13.58***	-13.86***	-8.664***	-6.591***	-8.966***	-14.81***	-14.85***	
	(0.168)	(0.176)	(2.234)	(2.176)	(2.218)	(2.307)	(2.413)	
						. ,		
Observations	40,581	40,581	35,056	35,056	35,056	33,920	33,920	
Number of iddyad	6,997	6,997	6,986	6,986	6,986	6,919	6,919	
rho	0.915	0.918	0.859	0.838	0.855	0.804	0.804	
sigma	5.946	6.071	4.476	4.120	4.401	3.678	3.676	
BIC	4073	4088	3568	3536	3558	3333	3349	
log-likelihood	-2005	-2012	-1716	-1695	-1706	-1594	-1591	

Table 3-9: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military and economic interventions in civil wars, 2001 - 2009. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dataset from UCDP counts various types of military activity as intervention. To test on-the-ground missions that include the direct participation of military personnel in the civil war, model 15 until 21 use military combat missions as dependent variable. 453 annual observations are recorded, which indicates that over half of all military intervention in the time period from 2001 to 2009 included combat activity by the intervener. The picture here varies from the models that estimate all types of military interventions. First, the foreign direct investment variable remains significant but once controlled for military expenditures, the significance level drops below .05 to .1. Arms trade has no independent explanatory power considering military combat missions. In contrast, oil remains significant with a higher expected effect size compared to the core model 7. This is an indication that securing future oil supplies (as well as uranium) features strongly into the decision-making process of governments and increases the likelihood to observe to use of active military personnel to achieve this objective.

Surprisingly, rivalry loses its explanatory power when tested for pure military combat missions. A potential explanation is that rivals predominately support rebel groups in the civil war country but eschew the use of direct military combat based on calculations that the military encounter would escalate into an interstate war between the two rivals. For instance, in the case of the rivalry between India and Pakistan, an interstate war would constitute an undesirable consequence, hence Pakistan resorts to the sponsorship of non-state actors in Kashmir (Subramaniam 2012). Shared ethnicity also becomes insignificant, which could corroborate the understanding that the support for transnational ethnic kinship mainly occurs through indirect military support like weapons supply or training (Salehyan et al. 2011: 715). Equally, contiguity does not seem to play an independent effect, but this is most likely an artifact due to the frequent military combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan by coalition members. Indeed, implementing the models (not reported here) with the exclusion of Afghanistan and Iraq as civil war countries, considerably increases the effect size of the now significant foreign direct investment variable in the core mode (0.245 vs. 0.151) and also renders the contiguity (as well as the rivalry) variable significant in the expected positive direction.

Dependent Variable	Military Combat Interventions						
Independent Variables	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21
Corporate Hypotheses							
Log(FDI)	0.226***	0.270***	0.313***	0.209**	0.292***	0.153*	0.151*
	(0.0755)	(0.0773)	(0.0916)	(0.0951)	(0.0906)	(0.0877)	(0.0914)
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.189	0.207	0.139	0.0842	0.118	0.0253	0.0181
	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.155)	(0.157)	(0.155)	(0.151)	(0.152)
Oilsatisfaction	3.322***						
	(0.452)		0.5(0++++	0.500****	0.550***	0.505444	0 710444
Log(Oilneed)		0.556***	0.562***	0.509***	0.570***	0.705***	0.710***
TT :	0 510***	(0.0925)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.119)	(0.122)
Uranium _{satisfaction}	2.519***	2.246***	2.634**	2.374**	2.592**	2.416***	2.390**
Control Variables	(0.764)	(0.804)	(1.028)	(1.049)	(1.009)	(0.918)	(0.930)
Control Variables Alliance			3.032***	2.806***	3.045***	2.830***	2.859***
Amalice			(0.626)	(0.635)	(0.626)	(0.656)	(0.668)
Peaceful Relations			-5.155*	-5.585*	-4.570	-3.765	-3.389
I eaceful Relations			(2.946)	(2.859)	(2.976)	(2.943)	(3.036)
Contiguity			0.690	0.387	0.583	0.716	0.671
Contiguity			(1.012)	(1.020)	(1.005)	(0.957)	(0.972)
Log(distance)			-0.759**	-0.855***	-0.772**	-1.044***	-1.032***
Log(distance)			(0.326)	(0.330)	(0.328)	(0.336)	(0.338)
Shared Ethnicity			-0.385	-0.610	-0.352	-0.941	-0.892
5			(0.792)	(0.797)	(0.788)	(0.778)	(0.781)
Temporal Dependency			()	(()	()	
Last Intervention			-0.419***	-0.441***	-0.419***	-0.432***	-0.429***
			(0.0626)	(0.0637)	(0.0627)	(0.0639)	(0.0647)
Humanitarian Hypothesis				· · · · ·	. ,		
Log(battle deaths)			1.802***	1.815***	1.814***	1.804***	1.813***
			(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Alternative Explanations							
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.207***			-0.0128
				(0.0692)			(0.0768)
Colonial History					4.705***		2.729*
					(1.513)		(1.463)
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}						0.673***	0.657***
	1 - /	1	15 (0444)	1400-4-4-4	15 00 444	(0.100)	(0.111)
Constant	-15.67***	-15.55***	-15.62***	-14.83***	-15.89***	-22.55***	-22.72***
	(0.222)	(0.247)	(3.417)	(3.459)	(3.447)	(3.868)	(4.009)
Observations	40,581	40,581	35,056	35,056	35,056	33,920	33,920
Number of iddyad	6,997	6,997	6,986	6,986	6,986	6,919	6,919
rho	0.920	0.916	0.879	0.877	0.878	0.867	0.868
sigma	6.138	5.984	4.898	4.840	4.874	4.637	4.652
BIC	2381	2390	1965	1966	1968	1900	1917
log-likelihood	-1159	-1163	-914.6	-909.9	-910.8	-876.8	-875.3

log-likelihood-1159-1163-914.6-909.9-910.8-876.8-875.3Table 3-10: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military combat interventions in civil wars, 2001 – 2009.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

The question arises whether all types of civil wars have the same effect on economic considerations. High-intensity and low-intensity civil wars might expose potential interveners to different calculations. Collier et al. (2003: 13) find that civil wars engender "development in reverse" as intensive civil wars lead to a destruction of social capital, infrastructure and induce displacement of people. The consequences of civil wars are economic and political legacies that render economic investments difficult. Hence, states might perceive high-intensity civil wars to constitute a higher risk to existing FDI than low-intensity civil wars. Further, high-intensity civil wars might render the civil war country more amenable to grant a potential intervener access to existing raw materials as the high intensity is an indication that the political leadership or the rebels are fighting for either preserving the status quo or for a complete change of government.

Additionally, I test whether secessionist (control over territory) civil wars are different from those civil wars that are fought over the government. Secessionist civil wars should exert higher influence on states that are interested in securing the supply of oil and civil wars over government might increase the effect of foreign direct investment since the risk of expropriation and change in investment policies could be the consequence. Le Billon (2001: 574) hypothesizes that secessionist conflicts are often fuled by the existence of point resources like oil which are distant from the capital. Besides, Le Billon expects that: "the likelihood of political secession increases when 'outsiders' are perceived to extract 'local' resources without sharing the wealth, and when local populations are displaced by the extractive industry or suffer from its environmental costs" (ibid. 574). Hence, the prospect to gain access to oil resources might propel potential interveners to support secessionist movements which embolden the local population to stage an uprising. Models 22 until 28 refer to civil wars with high-intensity conflicts (above 1000 battle deaths) using the Battle Death dataset to distinguish between both types. The coding on the political goals of the rebels is provided by the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset.

Evaluating the results for military interventions in low-intensity armed conflicts shows that foreign direct investment instock remains a driver of interventions. Hence, even minor conflicts propel potential interveners to become active to protect investments. Similarly, uranium also remains a significant predictor of military interventions. In contrast, alternative hypotheses remain more ambiguous. Arms trade has no independent bearing on the explanatory power of the model once controlled for trade, colonial relationship or military expenditures. Similarly, oil becomes statistically insignificant in the core model (model 28) with a negative sign which would mean that oil deposits deter interveners that could benefit from an intervention. An explanation of this behavior can be due to the unequal distribution of oil reserves across low-intensity and high-intensity civil wars.

Calculating the mean value of available oil reserves for all recorded oil reserves in the 2009 across all civil wars of either type and for all civil wars that have nonzero oil deposits, reveals that highintensity civil wars are located in countries that possess twice as high oil reserves (68.5 million tons) than low-intensity civil wars (32.0 million tons). Calculating the mean annual demand for oil by a potential intervener in the year 2009⁸⁸ reveals that an average potential intervener with an oil consuming industry requires 42.6 million tons of oil imports. This demand cannot be met by the average lowintensity civil war country but by the average high-intensity civil war country. Only 30 observed annual instances of interventions are recorded in the low-intensity civil war sample in which a potential intervener intervened when it could satisfy its oil demands out of a sample size of 32.526. In contrast, 84 cases of civil war military interventions are recorded in the high-intensity sample out of a sample size of 9151. The results for the alternative explanations and the endogenous variables show the same picture as for the estimation based on all civil war intensity types.

⁸⁸ The calculation is the difference of the oil production volumes by the potential intervener minus oil consumption by the potential intervener.

Dependent Variable	Military Interventions						
Independent Variables	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28
Corporate Hypotheses							
Log(FDI)	0.389***	0.411***	0.351***	0.221***	0.358***	0.146**	0.166**
	(0.0720)	(0.0780)	(0.0689)	(0.0782)	(0.0781)	(0.0677)	(0.0730)
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.267**	0.251*	0.274**	0.253*	0.227	0.179	0.176
	(0.135)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.149)	(0.134)	(0.134)
Oilsatisfaction	0.780						
	(0.600						
Log(Oilneed)		-0.149	-0.305**	-0.413***	-0.309**	-0.109	-0.0689
		(0.127)	(0.135)	(0.142)	(0.153)	(0.131)	(0.139)
Uraniumsatisfaction	2.453***	2.488***	2.680***	2.476***	2.823***	2.422***	2.401***
	(0.824)	(0.890)	(0.838)	(0.840)	(0.941)	(0.783)	(0.786)
Control Variables			4 9 7 5	1.0.00			
Alliance			1.277***	1.062**	1.532***	1.681***	1.762***
			(0.495)	(0.503)	(0.566)	(0.493)	(0.502)
Peaceful Relations			-6.088***	-6.473***	-5.728**	-5.806***	-5.370***
			(2.144)	(2.110)	(2.354)	(2.042)	(2.057)
Contiguity			2.269***	1.937**	2.776**	1.923***	1.995***
			(0.743)	(0.776)	(1.087)	(0.676)	(0.683)
Log(distance)			-0.228	-0.350	-0.217	-0.607**	-0.546**
			(0.262) 1.760***	(0.271)	(0.308)	(0.266)	(0.267)
Shared Ethnicity				1.494***	2.309***	1.074**	1.217**
Town and Dan and an an			(0.568)	(0.569)	(0.818)	(0.514)	(0.517)
Temporal Dependency Last Intervention			-0.382***	-0.412***	-0.347***	-0.419***	-0.409***
Last Intervention			(0.0603)	(0.0624)	(0.0638)	(0.0606)	(0.0608)
Humanitarian Hypothesis			(0.0003)	(0.0024)	(0.0038)	(0.0000)	(0.0008)
Log(battle deaths)			1.297***	1.274***	1.385***	1.346***	1.369***
Log(battle deaths)			(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.133)
Alternative Explanations			(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.155)	(0.152)	(0.155)
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.228***			-0.0676
Log(Trade Volume)[-]				(0.0682)			(0.0731)
Colonial History				(0.0002)	5.533***		2.945***
					(1.174)		(1.052)
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}					(, .)	0.578***	0.579***
						(0.0832)	(0.0921)
Constant	-12.67***	-13.93***	-12.68***	-11.58***	-15.45***	-16.97***	-17.77***
	(0.222)	(0.220)	(2.695)	(2.819)	(3.191)	(2.870)	(2.974)
	()	()	(()	()	(-···)	()
Observations	31,599	31,599	26,074	26,074	26,074	25,215	25,215
Number of iddyad	6,661	6,661	6,649	6,649	6,649	6,578	6,578
rho	0.881	0.905	0.836	0.835	0.880	0.808	0.806
sigma	4.925	5.601	4.099	4.086	4.919	3.718	3.695
BIC	2156	2156	1883	1882	1888	1783	1795
log-likelihood	-1047	-1047	-875.3	-870	-872.9	-820.4	-816.5

Table 3-11: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military interventions in low-intensity civil wars, 2001 - 2009. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Dependent Variable	Dependent Variable Military Interventions							
Independent Variables	Model 29	Model 30	Model 31	Model 32	Model 33	Model 34	Model 35	
Corporate Hypotheses								
Log(FDI)	0.329**	0.341**	0.381***	0.234*	0.359***	0.0250	0.0744	
	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.137)	(0.139)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.142)	
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.393*	0.422**	0.506**	0.372*	0.506**	0.238	0.304	
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.204)	(0.201)	(0.202)	(0.196)	(0.201)	
OilSatisfaction	5.858***							
	(0.778)	0.41.7****	0.050**	0.000*	0.050**	0.407***	0.454444	
Log(Oilneed)		0.417***	0.250**	0.202*	0.252**	0.407^{***}	0.454***	
T Tura in the		(0.106)	(0.124)	(0.109)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.131)	
Uraniumsatisfaction	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Control Variables								
Alliance			-0.813	-0.724	-0.762	-0.225	-0.221	
			(0.864)	(0.810)	(0.862)	(0.871)	(0.897)	
Peaceful Relations			-6.430*	-6.424*	-6.538*	-5.141	-4.987	
			(3.761)	(3.554)	(3.757)	(3.829)	(3.925)	
Contiguity			1.753**	1.315	1.706*	1.856**	2.176**	
			(0.889)	(0.820)	(0.884)	(0.843)	(0.911)	
Log(distance)			-1.629***	-1.582***	-1.628***	-1.955***	-2.000***	
			(0.380)	(0.351)	(0.380)	(0.397)	(0.413)	
Shared Ethnicity			0.134	-0.0650	0.134	-0.641	-0.618	
			(0.728)	(0.686)	(0.727)	(0.744)	(0.769)	
Temporal Dependency			0.770***	0.000****	0.770***		0.50 (****	
Last Intervention			-0.779***	-0.832^{***}	-0.778***	-0.765***	-0.726***	
			(0.0829)	(0.0851)	(0.0827)	(0.0836)	(0.0857)	
Humanitarian Hypothesis Log(battle deaths)			3.134***	3.165***	3.136***	3.183***	3.160***	
Log(battle deaths)			(0.304)	(0.281)	(0.304)	(0.293)	(0.300)	
Alternative Explanations			(0.504)	(0.201)	(0.504)	(0.275)	(0.300)	
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.223***			-0.158	
(111112				(0.0762)			(0.0962)	
Colonial History				()	2.933		0.877	
5					(1.862)		(1.877)	
Log(Military Exp.)t-1					. ,	0.907***	1.009***	
						(0.135)	(0.164)	
Constant	-14.66***	-13.99***	-14.84***	-15.35***	-14.82***	-25.64***	-26.57***	
	(0.252)	(0.264)	(3.866)	(3.705)	(3.865)	(4.349)	(4.576)	
Observations	8,815	8,815	8,815	8,815	8,815	8,538	8,538	
Number of iddyad	2,828	2,828	2,828	2,828	2,828	8,338 2,777	8,338 2,777	
rho	0.942	0.936	0.826	0.811	0.826	0.819	0.825	
sigma	7.297	6.964	3.958	3.756	3.949	3.863	3.943	
BIC	1639	1648	1384	1386	1391	1291	1305	
log-likelihood	-796.9	-801.1	-637.7	-633.7	-636.6	-586.5	-584.7	
	170.7	Militaria		. 1.:-1. :	050.0	2001 2000		

InstructionInstructionInstructionInstructionInstructionInstructionlog-likelihood-796.9-801.1-637.7-633.7-636.6-586.5Table 3-12: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military interventions in high-intensity civil wars, 2001 – 2009.Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

The sample of high-intensity civil wars encompasses conflicts mainly in Africa (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Angola, Sudan and Chad) as well conflict in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan). The estimated models show that foreign direct investments remain a significant predictor of military interventions unless controlled for by military expenditure. A similar result is obtained for arms transfers. As expected, future potential oil supplies relate strongly to civil wars with high death tolls and constitute an incentive for the potential intervener. For uranium, no results were obtained as there is missing variance between the independent variable and non-intervention (uranium perfectly predicts non-interventions). Alternative explanations for military interventions in civil wars show a very different picture in the high-intensity sample. Alliances have no significant effect on the decisionmaking process as well as rivalry and shared ethnicity and colonial history.

Model 36 until 42 models civil wars that were fought over government, whereas model 43 until 50 relate to civil wars that were fought for secessionist purposes. In both samples, the respective core models (model 43 and 49) show a positive effect for foreign direct investments, but surprisingly civil wars fought over territorial issues has a stronger effect size than those conflicts which are about control over the government. Defense industry ties have no effect once controlled for military expenditures. Uranium remains positively related to military interventions in civil wars. A very surprising result concerns the oil variable.

When the civil war is fought over government, then oil endowments that could satisfy the needs of the potential intervener are positively related to the prospect of a military intervention. However, in the case of secessionists civil wars, the availability of oil deters potential interveners. This contradictory finding could be a sign that potential interveners are wary of the success of the rebel struggle for autonomy and do not intervene to be kept out of the oil market by the gatekeeping government. Such conflicts in which the potential intervener could potentially satisfy its demands and were fought over territory relate to Iran, Algeria, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, Peru, Yemen and the War of Terror by the United States.⁸⁹ This finding warrants further research in the future.

⁸⁹ The results remain the same even without the US War on Terror.

Regarding alternative explanations, alliances seem not to play a role in either sample. Hence neither fighting over government nor fighting for secessionism has an impact on alliance behavior, which is only significant in the combined sample. Rivalries play a very strong role in territorial conflicts, but none in those fought over government. Rival states seem to support rebel groups striving for autonomy in order to weaken the rival, which matches the arguments provided by Salehyan (2010). At the same time, states that share ethnic compositions across borders intervene when the similar kin group is involved in secessionist struggles.

Interestingly, the humanitarian argument to intervene for the safety of the population in the civil war country is not corroborated for secessionist conflicts but only for those that target the political control over the entire country. Looking at the distribution of interventions across civil war types reveals that there is a huge imbalance. Of 721 observations of annual military interventions, only 95 were conducted in civil wars that were fought over territory, and 626 annual military interventions were conducted in civil wars fought over government. This does not reflect the distribution of the types of conflict in general as 42 percent of all observations relate to conflicts over territory and 58 percent are coded as fighting over government. Some structural aspects of secessionist conflicts seem to deter third-states from the use of military instruments.

Dependent Variable	Military Interventions						
Independent Variables	Model 36	Model 37	Model 38	Model 39	Model 40	Model 41	Model 42
Corporate Hypotheses							
Log(FDI)	0.261***	0.285***	0.348***	0.194***	0.319***	0.160**	0.125*
	(0.0801)	(0.0787)	(0.0742)	(0.0751)	(0.0741)	(0.0684)	(0.0716)
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.244*	0.236*	0.197	0.144	0.188	0.103	0.0899
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.123)	(0.123)
OilSatisfaction	2.876***						
I (0'1)	(0.615)	0 471***	0 41 4***	0 225***	0 417***	0 400***	0 1 () ***
Log(Oilneed)		0.471^{***}	0.414***	0.325***	0.417***	0.490***	0.463***
Uranium	2.375**	(0.0895) 2.028**	(0.0938) 2.172***	(0.0893) 1.755**	(0.0939) 2.118***	(0.0919) 1.817***	(0.0936) 1.717**
Uraniumsatisfaction	(0.948)	(0.796)	(0.760)	(0.714)	(0.764)	(0.693)	(0.691)
Control Variables	(0.948)	(0.790)	(0.700)	(0.714)	(0.704)	(0.093)	(0.091)
Alliance			0.612	0.217	0.682	0.911*	0.823*
Amanee			(0.491)	(0.464)	(0.490)	(0.469)	(0.474)
Peaceful Relations			-3.479	-3.787*	-3.485	-2.516	-2.664
			(2.341)	(2.173)	(2.342)	(2.218)	(2.185)
Contiguity			2.242***	1.739**	2.204***	2.197***	2.051***
Contiguity			(0.747)	(0.676)	(0.745)	(0.654)	(0.654)
Log(distance)			-0.764***	-0.835***	-0.745***	-1.019***	-1.005***
			(0.255)	(0.239)	(0.255)	(0.251)	(0.249)
Shared Ethnicity			1.098**	0.819	1.142**	0.446	0.459
5			(0.554)	(0.510)	(0.555)	(0.500)	(0.493)
Temporal Dependency			. ,		. ,	. ,	. ,
Last Intervention			-0.356***	-0.405***	-0.354***	-0.372***	-0.381***
			(0.0526)	(0.0533)	(0.0525)	(0.0507)	(0.0518)
Humanitarian Hypothesis							
Log(battle deaths)			0.959***	0.939***	0.967***	0.927***	0.929***
			(0.0741)	(0.0731)	(0.0745)	(0.0744)	(0.0746)
Alternative Explanations							
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.255***			0.0634
				(0.0552)			(0.0587)
Colonial History					3.678***		1.721
					(1.230)	0.505++++	(1.084)
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}						0.585***	0.535***
	10 (1444	1 1 0 7 4 4 4	7 7 40444	C 01144	7 501444	(0.0730)	(0.0795)
Constant	-12.61***	-14.05***	-7.348***	-6.011**	-7.591***	-12.56***	-11.90***
	(0.212)	(0.217)	(2.690)	(2.476)	(2.695)	(2.659)	(2.688)
Observations	23,122	23,122	19,801	19,801	19,801	19,183	19,183
Number of iddyad	5,065	5,065	5,053	5,053	5,053	4,984	4,984
rho	0.904	0.922	0.825	0.798	0.824	0.787	0.782
sigma	5.563	6.254	3.940	3.601	3.929	3.490	3.437
BIC	2937	2944	2582	2569	2583	2485	2501
log-likelihood	-1438	-1442	-1227	-1215	-1222	-1174	-1172
105 milliou	100	1112				* 1 / 1	

 Table 3-13: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars fought over government, 2001 - 2009.

 Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Dependent Variable	Military Interventions							
Independent Variables	Model 43†	Model 44†	Model 45†	Model 46†	Model 47†	Model 48†	Model 49†	
Corporate Hypotheses Log(FDI)	0.595***	0.586***	0.452***	0.196	0.633***	0.300**	0.334**	
Log(I'DI)	(0.0958)	(0.0945)	(0.109)	(0.190)	(0.134)	(0.120)	(0.145)	
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.613***	0.623***	0.683***	0.261	0.476**	0.0777	0.102	
	(0.181)	(0.183)	(0.214)	(0.199)	(0.208)	(0.192)	(0.198)	
Oilsatisfaction	-2.383***							
	(0.826)	0.221	1 251***	1 703***	1 701***	0 72 (**	0 742**	
Log(Oilneed)		0.331 (0.268)	-1.351*** (0.335)	-1.702*** (0.474)	-1.701*** (0.376)	-0.736** (0.341)	-0.743** (0.364)	
Uraniumsatisfaction	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Satisfaction								
Control Variables				0 = 12	0.400	1 0 0 2 1	1 (0 -	
Alliance			1.474	0.743	0.190	1.803*	1.695	
Peaceful Relations			(1.072) -23.44***	(1.637) -17.94***	(0.949) -21.61***	(0.979) -26.69***	(1.066) -26.86***	
			(3.691)	(3.478)	(3.534)	(4.805)	(4.874)	
Contiguity			2.385***	1.278	3.820***	0.527	0.611	
			(0.920)	(0.977)	(1.064)	(0.918)	(1.031)	
Log(distance)			1.688***	0.319	0.573	0.610	0.678	
Shared Ethnicity			(0.580) 6.190***	(0.725) 5.919***	(0.430) 5.349***	(0.647) 6.274***	(0.707) 6.365***	
Sharea Emmenty			(1.220)	(1.259)	(1.011)	(1.405)	(1.409)	
Temporal Dependency					· /			
Last Intervention			-0.236*	-0.288**	-0.154	-0.327**	-0.317**	
II			(0.131)	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.153)	(0.156)	
Humanitarian Hypothesis Log(battle deaths)			0.175	0.0485	0.155	-0.00388	0.0150	
Log(battle deatils)			(0.164)	(0.181)	(0.168)	(0.166)	(0.172)	
Alternative Explanations			. ,		. ,	. ,	. ,	
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.737***			0.0209	
Colonial History				(0.223)	3.627**		(0.181) 1.256	
Colonial History					(1.436)		(1.444)	
Log(Military Exp.)t-1					(1.100)	1.740***	1.684***	
						(0.341)	(0.339)	
Constant	-16.68***	-16.80***	-21.37***	-14.15**	-13.94***	-35.84***	-36.14***	
	(1.393)	(1.495)	(5.591)	(6.133)	(4.270)	(7.778)	(7.926)	
Observations	17,275	17,275	15,086	15,086	15,086	14,568	14,568	
Number of iddyad	2,689	2,689	2,686	2,686	2,686	2,658	2,658	
rho	0.907	0.909	0.906	0.906	0.925	0.900	0.905	
sigma	5.672	5.721	5.622	5.627	6.373	5.446	5.614	
BIC log likelihood	462 -206.5	468 -209.6	433 -158.9	430 -152.7	436	385 -130	403 -129.6	
log-likelihood	-200.5	-209.0	-138.9	-132./	-155.3	-150	-129.0	

For robustness and specification purposes, the models were run with different variable configurations and different estimation techniques. All results can be found in the appendix in chapter 7. First, the estimation process was run as a pooled logistic regression which disregards the panel data structure and assumes independence between all observations. The standard errors were clustered around the country dyads. The results strongly corroborate hypothesis 1 (foreign direct investments), 2_a (oil), and 3 (arms trade) but not 2_b (uranium). To account for temporal dependence, three splines were included in the logistic pooled regression model, but those do not change the effect of the economic predictors, except that uranium remains insignificant.

Further, a rare events logistic model was implemented including the use of splines (King and Zeng 2001). Foreign direct investments remain positively associated with military interventions as well as arms trade. The oil variable, however, becomes insignificant when controlled for military expenditure. Uranium exerts no significant effect in the rare event model. Second, additional control for fleeing refugees is used to test for the explanation of humanitarian interventions. Similar to the battle intensity variable, it is strongly positively correlated with military interventions but does not change substantively the interpretation of the economic predictors except that the significance of arms trade becomes less robust and is more dependent of the configuration of variables. Some studies control for major power status of the potential intervener to account for global ambitions of states (Pickering and Kisangani 2009; Sullivan and Koch 2009; Kathman 2011; Chacha and Stojek 2016; Gent 2007). Including the control variable does not change the interpretation for foreign direct investments, oil, and uranium but renders arms trade insignificant.

Africa has been identified as one of the most conflict-ridden continents on the globe and a frequent target of military interventions (Schmidt 2013). Implementing the random-effect models on an African sample practically removes all explanatory power of the economic predictors. The major predictors of interventions in the African context are contiguity, shared ethnicity, colonial history, and military expenditures. To account for civil wars that are disproportionally represented in the dataset, models 1 to 7 are implemented in a sample without the US War on Terror. This does not change the interpretation of the foreign direct investment variable. However, oil becomes much more specific to

the model configuration and is only strongly significant in the core model. Uranium becomes an insignificant predictor. When the civil war in Afghanistan is removed, then all economic predictors behave as expected, except for arms trade, which becomes insignificant when controlled for military expenditures. To address alternative hypotheses based on regime types and military interventions in civil wars (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008; Peic and Reiter 2011; Aydin and Regan 2011), data from the POLITY 4 dataset is used to identify democratic and autocratic intervener and civil war countries. Democratic civil war countries do not increase the risk to experience a military intervention.

Further, neither accounting for democratic or autocratic intervener provides additional explanatory power. For potential future effects of foreign direct investment, a lagged log-transformed foreign direct investment instock variable replaced the FDI variable in the core model (model 7) without changing the substantive interpretation of the variable. Lastly, as some studies use random-effect models together with splines (Stojek and Chacha 2015), results are provided for this model specification, too. As a result, splines do not affect the economic predictors which remain positively correlated with military interventions, and only uranium becomes weakly significant (p < 0.1).

To receive a realistic feeling for the results, I specify a baseline model which simulates the predicted probability of a country with mode or median values on its independent variables. Figure 3-4 represents the calculated predicted for the log-transformed foreign direct investment variable based on the core model 7. Control variables are held at their median value based on the ranking for all nonzero observations. For categorical or binary variables, their most frequently observed value is used. This approach mimics a hypothetical country that exhibits the most common features in the international system.⁹⁰ Hence, such a potential intervener has no ethnic ties to a civil war country; it has no historical colonial relationship, it is indifferent to the civil war country and not engaged in a rivalry with the civil war country. Further, it does not share a border with the civil war country and is neither in alliance, nor can it use uranium for domestic purposes. Also, such a country sells arms to the civil war country with a value of around \$18.17 million annually, and the potential intervener can harness 12.3 million tons of oil from the civil war country for its domestic consumption. The potential intervener and the civil war

⁹⁰ A similar approach was undertaken by Salehyan et al. (2011) in relation to rebel support during civil wars.

country have a total trade volume of \$34.81 million, and the distance between both countries amounts to 6124 kilometers. The potential intervener bears around \$48 million annual military expenditures and three years passed since the last intervention.⁹¹ In turn, the civil war country experiences a battle death toll of around 350 fatalities per year. Additionally, the predicted probabilities for arms trade and for the oil_{need} variable are shown in figure 3-5 and figure 3-6, respectively.





Figure 3-4: Predicted probabilities of military interventions based on changes in logged FDI. Note: edges of the grey shades locate the upper and lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval; model 7 serves as estimation model; configuration of independent variables: arms trade = 2.90 (median), oil_{need} = 2.53 (median), uranium_{satisfaction} = 0 (mode), alliance = 0 (mode), peace = 0.5 (mode), contiguity = 0 (mode), last intervention = 3 (median), battle deaths = 5.87 (median), trade = 3.55 (median), former colony = 0, milex = 13.1 (median), distance = 8.72 (median), shared ethnicity = 0 (mode). Median values calculated for non-zero values and mode values are the most frequently observed values for binary or categorical variables.

⁹¹ There is no difference in the shape of the curve for the predicted probabilities when the years are set to 0.





Note: edges of the grey shades locate the upper and lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval; model 7 serves as estimation model; configuration of independent variables: arms trade = 2.90 (median), log(fdi) = 5.05 (median), uranium_{satisfaction} = 0 (mode), alliance = 0 (mode), peace = 0.5 (mode), contiguity = 0 (mode), last intervention = 3 (median), battle deaths = 5.87 (median), trade = 3.55 (median), former colony = 0, milex = 13.1 (median), distance = 8.72 (median), shared ethnicity = 0 (mode). Median values calculated for non-zero values and mode values are the most frequently observed values for binary or categorical variables.




Figure 3-6: Predicted probabilities of military interventions based on changes in arms trade. Note: edges of the grey shades locate the upper and lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval; model 7 serves as estimation model; configuration of independent variables: $oil_{need} = 2.53$ (median), log(fdi) = 5.05 (median), uranium_{satisfaction} = 0 (mode), alliance = 0 (mode), peace = 0.5 (mode), contiguity = 0 (mode), last intervention = 3 (median), battle deaths = 5.87 (median), trade = 3.55 (median), former colony = 0, milex = 13.1 (median), distance = 8.72 (median), shared ethnicity = 0 (mode). Median values calculated for non-zero values and mode values are the most frequently observed values for binary or categorical variables.

The expected probability of foreign direct investments more than doubles relative to an increase from the minimum to the maximum value. However, the confidence interval increases equally as less data is available for higher values of foreign direct investments. The oil_{need} variable shows an almost parabolic relationship with an increase in the probability to observe a military intervention. The marginal effect from the lowest to the highest value leads to a tripling of the predicted probability. Lastly, the wide confidence interval of the arms trade variable represents the uncertainty, which increases after the log value of 2. To assess the effect of the categorical and dichotomous variables, the same baseline model is specified, and the predicted probabilities are calculated for each variable. The results are presented in table 3-15.

Variables	Probability	Increase
Baseline Model	0.009	
Uranium = 1	0.025	+178%
Alliance = 1	0.020	+123%
Peaceful Relations = 0.25	0.015	+67%
(Lesser Rivalry)		
Contiguity = 1	0.022	+144%
Shared Ethnicity = 1	0.011	+22%
Colonial History = 1	0.028	+211%

Table 3-15: Predicted probabilities of military interventions.

Note: model 7 serves as estimation model; configuration of independent variables: arms trade = 2.90 (median), oil_{need} = 2.53 (median), log(fdi) = 5.05 (median), uranium_{satisfaction} = 0 (mode), alliance = 0 (mode), peace = 0.5 (mode), contiguity = 0 (mode), last intervention = 3 (median), battle deaths = 5.87 (median), trade = 3.55 (median), former colony = 0, milex = 13.1 (median), distance = 8.72 (median), shared ethnicity = 0 (mode). Median values calculated for non-zero values and mode values are the most frequently observed values for binary or categorical variables.

The baseline model predicts a probability of 0.9 percent of a median country in the international system to intervene in a civil war. To put this into perspective, such a country has none of the traits like colonial history or shared borders that are commonly associated with military interventions, and it is furthermore over 6000km away to project its power. Once the potential intervener could satisfy its uranium demands from the civil war country, the predicted probability almost triples to 2.5 percent. Alternative indicators like belonging to the same alliance or shared borders more than double the risk of intervention. Shared ethnicity has less explanatory power as it is not a significant predictor once controlled for military expenditures in the core model. Joint colonial history exerts a powerful effect and triples the predicted probability of a military intervention in a civil war country.

Conclusion

Concluding, this chapter has evaluated the economic hypotheses that existing foreign direct investments in the civil war country exert a positive effect on potential interveners and increase the probability to observe a military intervention in the civil war country (H1). It then proceeded to test the hypotheses that the availability of raw materials and their potential use for domestic industries also increases the propensity of a potential intervener to use military instruments in a civil war (H2_a and H2_b). Lastly, the third hypothesis postulated that in the case when the defense industry of a potential intervener sells military equipment to the civil war country, the potential intervener has the economic interest to maintain the defense ties and is more likely to intervene (H3). The results of the statistical analysis paint the following picture.

First, the null hypothesis that foreign direct investments have no effect can be rejected even if controlled for all identified endogenous variables that might have biased the effect. Neither trade, nor prior colonial relationship, nor alliance nor military expenditures render the foreign direct investment instock variable insignificant. The positive effect of FDI instock is robust when tested for different model specifications and configurations of control variables. The effect also holds without the civil wars in Afghanistan, Iraq (not reported) and the War on Terror by the United States. According to the calculated predicted probabilities, for a country with median-level characteristics, an increase of FDI instock from its minimum value to its maximum value triples the expected likelihood to observe a military intervention (conceding a wide confidence interval for high FDI instock values). Hence, FDI instock constitutes a new alternative explanation for the motivation to militarily intervene in civil wars and therefore belongs to the motivation portfolio of states when deliberating the potential use of military instruments in civil wars.

Second, according to Gilpin and Krasner, states use military force to satisfy the needs of their domestic economy and have therefore an incentive to secure stable supplies of raw materials to their countries. The results of hypotheses $H2_a$ and $H2_b$ find corroborative evidence for the former but more tentative evidence for the latter. Whenever a country consumes oil for domestic production on a scale that cannot be satisfied by its oil reserves, then existing oil reserves in a civil war country increase the risk that such an actor will become militarily active and intervene. However, two caveats have to be raised. The oil effect seems to be in particular tied to high-intensity civil wars and the surprising finding that during secessionist conflict the potential use of oil reserves by an intervener actually reduces the risk to commit to a military intervention. The latter deserves more scrutiny in further studies. The effect of the uranium variable is on more shaky ground as the only genuine intervention in a civil war that could be connected to uranium is the French engagement in the insurgency in Niger.

Hence, the oil_{need} variable constitutes a valuable new predictor for the motivation to intervene in civil wars which should become part of the discussion of state interests alongside the debate about the disruptive effects of civil wars on oil trade. Lastly, the variable relating to arms trade rests on a very uncertain foundation. The arms trade is very strongly dependent on the model specification and remains insignificant when controlled for military expenditure, which proxies the power projection capabilities of a country. Hence, more research has to be conducted regarding the links between defense industries and civil war countries before a conclusive verdict can be provided.

This chapter has investigated the direct effect of economic factors in the motivation portfolio of potential interveners. These effects are *direct* because they emanate from the dyadic relationship between the civil war country and the potential intervener. However, as I argue in the fourth chapter, the economic argument has to be extended to include the interests of other states. Within the international system, the relationships between states are not equal. Great powers have substantial diplomatic, political, economic and security leverage over smaller powers to make them act on their behalf. Hence, the argument in the following chapter concerns the interests that a smaller power possesses vis-à-vis a great power in its decision-making process to intervene in a civil war with military instruments. The motivation portfolio has to be extended to incorporate not just direct interests that the potential intervener has in the civil war country but should incorporate the *indirect* interests which it pursues in the civil war country on behalf of a great power.

Hence, in the following section, a prelude introduces with historical empirical examples the concept of indirect effects. It then proceeds to briefly review the existing literature on coalitional military interventions which is mainly concerned to understand under which conditions great powers assemble coalitions of states for military intervention purposes. It then proceeds with the introduction of the conceptual framework of proxy interventions and then explains how principal-agent theory and arms trade can help to shed light to identify unequal relationships between great powers (principals) and smaller power who intervene in civil wars on behalf of the interests of great powers. This is accompanied by the deduction of two testable hypotheses which are then evaluated against the available data. The last section briefly looks into the effect of sanctions to punish agency slack.

Chapter 4 Proxy Interventions: State-to-State Military Interventions Prelude to proxy interventions

In 1964 a violent armed uprising toppled the government of Zanzibar, an island close to the shore of modern-day mainland Tanzania. This event occurred at the height of the Cold War just two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, the US was wary of a communist regime establishing itself in Zanzibar, which could pose an outpost for communist revolts in Eastern and Southern Africa. Constrained by international law and the fear to be viewed as an interventionist country, then-president Lyndon Johnson asked the government of the United Kingdom as the former colonial power to topple the new government in Zanzibar Gleijeses (2010). Although the UK refused this plea, it is not the first and only time when the United States asked another state to intervene on its behalf.

Also in 1964, the "Simba" rebellion in Zaire prompted the Johnson administration to seek help from Congo's former colonial power Belgium Gleijeses (2010: 66–8). After the turmoil of an attempted secession by the Katanga province, the killing of Lumumba, the first president of Congo-Leopoldville, and a suppressed rebellion in the Kwilu province, the country did not come to rest. The "Simba" rebellion started in 1964 and spread from the East to the West within the country. Afraid to lose the pro-American government consisting of Tshombe and Mobutu, the United States sought a military intervention by Belgium to stabilize the government and restore order. Belgium agreed to send military advisors to prop up the national army but refused to deploy Belgian armed personnel.

Winding forwards in time, the United States and Uganda maintain a close diplomatic relationship since president Museveni came into power in 1986. Facing the demise of the government in Somalia and the usurpation of power by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the US pressured Ethiopia and Uganda to intervene into the Somalian civil war in 2006 to install a new government (Epstein 2017: 158). Ethiopia finally agreed and invaded Somalia to remove the ICU and introduce the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), whereas Uganda reached out to secular warlords within Somalia and provided military assistance. After that, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution according to which Ethiopian troops should withdraw, and their military commitment should be

replaced by a military mission of the African Union (AMISOM). Uganda was ready to provide troops to combat Al Shabaab in the wake of receiving prior military aid and training by the US, France and the United Kingdom.

In general, it is assumed that interveners typically follow their national security interests in the case of intervention in a civil war. Less researched, however, is the phenomenon that states can harness the capacities of other states to advance their goals. In the case of the Simba revolt in Zaire, the United States had a clear understanding of its national interests (preventing Zaire to fall into the Communist camp including all its valuable natural resources) but perceived itself to be too constrained by international pressure to intervene with military troops. In the wake of decolonization, it would not have boded well for the US standing in the international community to influence the internal political dynamics of countries which just were released free from colonialism. The Johnson administration resorted to other countries and asked for intervention. In the case of Somalia, the United States could rely on Ethiopia to combat the emerging Islamic threat of ICU and Al Shabaab without deploying American troops on the ground (Epstein 2017). The following section on coalitional interventions presents the latest research and understanding of the conditions when great powers assemble large coalitions of states for military interventions.

Coalitional Interventions in Research

Coalitional military interventions have raised in prominence since the US-led mission operation Desert Storm and Operation Desert Shield in Iraq and Kuwait in 1990. The United States also intervened with a coalition of states in Afghanistan 2001 as well as in Iraq in 2003. These and other multilateral missions like the military intervention in Lebanon in 1982 have spurred an academic debate under which conditions great powers agree to assemble coalitions and under which conditions states accept their participation. This debate serves as a precursor to the debate about proxy interventions in the subsequent section. Two seminal books by Kreps (2011) and Baltrusaitis (2010) provide the most extensive account of coalitional military interventions. In her book *Coalitions of Convenience*, Kreps (2011) analyzes the motivation of the United States to intervene abroad, either multilaterally or unilaterally with military instruments. She discovers that two crucial factors inform the decision to organize an intervention together with an international organization or third states: time horizons and resource-commitment. Leading states of military interventions are more likely to act unilaterally if they perceive the circumstances in which they operate to be more urgent with a shorter future investment of resources. Multilateralism provides the advantages of conferred legitimacy and burden-sharing but carries with it the downfalls of collective action. Decision-making and maneuverability are substantially slowed as the interests of many actors must be factored in. In times, states attract supporters to join interventions to gain legitimacy and burden-sharing. However, according to Kreps, legitimacy should be not understood as being based on a "logic of appropriateness" but as an attempt to preserve the given order which produces overall benefits (e.g., stability). Ultimately, in case of exigencies, however, unilateral interventions prevail.⁹² Similarly, Wolford (2015) analyses military coalition formation in periods of international crises. According to his expectations, states are more willing to accept a state in a coalition when the additional state provides tangible military capabilities, and the divergence in foreign policy interests is low. However, military capabilities enjoy a higher weight in the calculations of coalition formation than interest divergence.

Baltrusaitis (2010) approaches coalitional interventions by juxtaposing hypotheses from International Relations theories, which stress state-centric explanations as well as domestic-level pressures. According to his analysis, states learn through experience whether the benefits of participation in an intervention offset the costs. States are also more inclined to follow the main intervener if both are members of the same alliance and if the target state is perceived as a security threat. The domestic component is based on negotiations between elites of one country and their response to societal pressures. Depending on the government structure, societal and government actors differ in their ability to alter the political decision-making process. Baltrusaitis models the whole mechanism as a two-level game in which the executive leadership of a country must balance sometimes contradicting international and domestic interests.

⁹² For instance, the unilateral French intervention in Mali in 2013 was driven by the goal to halt the expansion of Tuareg, Ansar Dime and AQIM but was then replaced by a EU mission to stabilize the country in the long-term.

What these studies have in common is their focus on great powers' ability to assemble coalitions that support their military endeavor. They show that states discriminate in their choice of partners while facing a crisis or urgency and place emphasis on the already existing relationship and potential consequences in their deliberation to keep coalitions small or to enlarge them. They also stress the importance to understand political processes within coalitional states. Only when the interests of both match, multilateral interventions can be implemented. The most prominent explanatory factor remains membership in the same alliance due to foreign policy intertest convergence of member states and the existence of already coordinated command and control structures (this fact will be used in the statistical analysis to distinguish between coalitional missions and proxy interventions outside alliance systems). The limitation of this research branch is that it assumes that great powers by themselves can intervene but require partnering states for burden-sharing and legitimacy purposes. As however illustrated in the historical cases of Tanzania and Somalia, great powers themselves sometimes face constraints to intervene and require partnering states to execute interventions on their behalf. The delegation of direct military interventions in combination with indirect support is a concern of the following section.

Conceptual Underpinnings of Proxy Interventions

The idea of proxy interventions by states in academic literature was conceptually primarily developed by Dunér (1981) and Dunér (1987) in the 1980s but since then not anymore pursued. This period was characterized by the debate whether Cuba's foreign intervention on the African continent (Angola and Ethiopia), could be understood as a set of independent foreign policy choices or whether the state performed as proxy for the Soviet Union which offered benefits like extended deterrence as well as military and economic aid (in the form of trade). Taking a stance on this matter, Dunér (1987) characterized Cuba's foreign policy as being borne out by national interests, but its interventions would not have been possible without the support of the Soviet Union. Hence, he coined the term "dependent interventionism" (ibid. 44-45) to denote a case in which one power implements an intervention which without external support would have never occurred but still serves the interest of the intervener as well as the enabling state. This notion was later corroborated by archival and interviewed-based historiography by Gleijeses (2010).

In his fundamental paper from 1981, Dunér lays the ground for understanding proxy interventions by states. He devises three dimensions which he treats in exclusionary form: power, interests, and material support (Dunér 1981: 357). These three dimensions can exist either in dual combination or alone the relationship between two states and their inclination to intervene in an ongoing civil war. For instance, power asymmetry can enable state A to coerce state B to act in a civil war militarily. Another potential combination is that both countries have the same interests, but only through support state A enables state B to intervene. Dunér argues that the most likely case exists when a power asymmetry exists which allows state A to create inducements or threaten sanctions for state B to act militarily. Elaborating on this notion, I present three mutually exclusive scenarios under which a proxy intervention by state is possible, and I include the interests which both countries have vis-a-vis the target country.

The first scenario constitutes, as mentioned beforehand, the use of threats and sanctions or inducements to propel a state to intervene. In this case, the intervener only acts because of the high expected costs of non-intervention (or foregone benefits). The foreign policy interests towards the civil war country are non-existent or have not reached a threshold that would induce the state to intervene. The second scenario is that state B intervenes without any active support of state A, but the intervention lies in the interest of both countries. The inactivity of state A can be understood as condoning the intervention since also no challenge is mounted via diplomacy or other means.

However, for this scenario to fall under the notion of proxy intervention, there has to be a specific kind of relationship in place between both countries according to which there could be a potential reaction of state A in the case when state B implements an intervention in deviation of the interests of state A. Therefore, state B has to anticipate the reaction of state A. In the third scenario, not just the interests of state A and state B overlap with regards to the intervention in a civil war but also the aspect of urgency. The more urgent an issue is perceived, the higher the tendency of the state to use military means. In this case, state A uses the military personnel of state B to do the "dirty work" but collaborates with different types of supplies like intelligence, logistic, or armament. This process leads to coordination of foreign policies in which the interests are congruent.

The most difficult to prove scenario is presented by the second type (inactivity) since there is no observable evidence between state A and B, and the argument is based on the counterfactual *whatif* proposition (Morgan and Winship 2010). We do not know how many interventions were deliberated but not implemented due to an anticipated reaction of another state and whether deliberation featured such kind of anticipation. In contrast, the first scenario is best approached by studying the diplomatic interactions between both states and evaluating the decision-making calculus through interviews or process-tracing. The most permissive scenario to observe is type 3, in which another state actively supports the intervening country. Although sometimes obscure, the active participation of countries, especially the supply of armament or provision of goods and supplies, is frequently monitored. This type of proxy intervention signal clear intent on the side of the "other state" which only supports the intervention with supplies but does not commit combat forces.

In general, observations of scenario three would constitute a strong case for the concept of proxy interventions by states as the real number of this phenomenon would be represented by a higher (unobservable) so-called dark figure⁹³ due to the difficulties to observe scenarios 1 and 2. In both, the threat and inactivity scenario, the two states incline to distort their real motivation. No government would like to present itself to be blackmailed or seduced to intervene as it would display an imminent sign of weakness. Furthermore, due to the general norm of non-intervention in international relations states which blackmail other states into interventions or remain inactive would present themselves as impartial observers of events upon which they do not have influence. Especially in the context of great power rivalry, this is important as to prevent a pretext according to which competing rival states intervene in the same civil war but on opposing sides (Findley and Teo 2006).

I argue in the next section that the argument about the three potential scenarios can be best captured from the theoretical framework of principal-agent theory and in the subsequent section I present arms supply as a proxy to measure foreign policy congruence between the principal and the agent concerning the target country. Whereas chapter 4 deduces hypotheses on the overall effect of the principal-agent theory on proxy interventions, chapter 5 focuses on two empirical examples related to

⁹³ A dark figure constitutes in crime the number of reported plus the number of estimated non-reported crimes.

the third scenario in which the great power indirectly intervenes in a civil war and harnesses a smaller power to engage in active combat missions on the ground in the civil war country.

Principal-Agent Theory in State-to-State Interventions in Civil Wars

The principle-agent framework can be harnessed to understand state-to-state relations as it is based on the logic that the principal delegates tasks to the agent. In the case of civil wars, the principal delegates the task of military intervention to the smaller power. Following the logic employed by Salehyan (2010) in his work on rebel patronage and McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) based on principle-agent theory in an institutional setting, four concepts are relevant to understand the relationship between principal and agent. Those are adverse selection, agency slack, police patrol, and fire alarm. The former refers to the appropriate choice of an agent who is thought of to carry out its delegated responsibilities best. The second concept refers to the possibility that the agent follows its interests instead of those of the principal and thereby contradicts or weakens with its actions the goals of its patron. Police patrol is a technique of constant monitoring of the agent by the principal, and fire alarm constitutes an external mechanism that raises awareness of agency slack to the principal. Whereas adverse selection becomes crucial ex-ante, police patrol and fire alarm are designed to provide ex-post information about the agent.

The selection of a potential agent is not part of this study, but comments should be made. Choosing a state to become its ally in the domain of security and foreign policy, the principal needs to gather ex-ante information. To alleviate the burden, states choose partners for practical, historical or ideological reasons. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a staunch supporter of socialist regimes in Cuba under Castro, Ethiopia under the Derg, Angola under the MPLA and Mozambique under FRELIMO (Patman 1990; Schneidman 1978). Similarly, the United States supported its democratic and market-economy based counterparts in Western and Southern Europe as well as South Korea, Japan or Australia in the Pacific as well as counter-movements and governments to the Communist threat in Sub-Saharan Africa like UNITA in Angola, Mobutu in Zaire and Haile Selassie in Ethiopia (Schmidt 2013). In some instances, support for countries is based on practical deliberations like the support of the US towards various Arab countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan due to their strategic location and the occurrence of oil deposits in the Middle East (Painter 2014). Historically, France was a vivid supporter of his former colonies in Francafrique which cannot be explained only by ideological or practical reasoning in each instance but rather the consideration that this region still figures as French "backyard" based on historical, linguistic as well as economic and monetary ties to the former metropole (Le Vine 2004).

The concepts of police patrol and fire alarm serve the principal to identify whether the intervening country violates the foreign policy interests of the principal. Sometimes states go great length to create the appearance that there is no intervention. For instance, Gleijeses (2010) describes how the Cuban leadership purposefully chose dark-skinned Cubans in their intervention during the Simba revolts in Eastern Congo-Léopoldville to mask their presence (an endeavor that ultimately failed, also because Che Guevara himself appeared in Tanzania and later Congo). However, troop concealment is challenging to maintain, and in fact, the UCDP dataset on foreign interventions (Högbladh et al. 16-19 March, 2011) only lists two instances in which it is not clear whether a state intervened with troops in a civil war.⁹⁴ Principals would be alerted either by their diplomatic missions, the occurrence of their weapons in a theater not intended for or through reports and claims by the target country which objects the intervention on its soil.

In summary, adverse selection and non-compliance can be detected straightforwardly. The main question is however how the principal ensures compliance between its foreign policy interests and its chosen agents. According to principal-agent theory, in order to avoid agency slack, it must establish some mechanism that monitors the intervention as well as a mechanism to react towards digressions of the intervener. I argue in the next section that the best and most efficient way to measure this sort of dependence is to examine arms exports stemming from the principal (exporter) to the agent (recipient).

⁹⁴ The alleged cases are the intervention by Burkina Faso in Liberia in 1989 and an intervention by South Yemen in the Ethiopian war against the independence of Eritrea in 1982.

Arms Trade and Hypotheses

I have chosen to focus on arms exports due to four reasons.⁹⁵ First, states do not sell arms to countries which implement foreign policies that are against the interests of the supplier⁹⁶ (Krause 1991; Derouen and Heo 2004). Arms supply to countries which pursue diametrically opposing foreign policy goals can in the worst case even endanger the security of the supplier itself either directly or indirectly through the strengthening of adversaries and rivals. Additionally, arms suppliers have their foreign policy preferences, and countries with antagonistic behavior receive less economic and military aid.⁹⁷ The United States frequently used military aid to countries to signal their "strategic value" for the US without becoming institutionalized allies (McManus and Yarhi-Milo 2017; Yarhi-Milo et al. 2016). Therefore, states take great care to support either allies or countries which pursue policies that are not violating the core security issues of the supplier. Notwithstanding, there can be miscalculations as states can renege on promises due to bluffing or internal dynamics. For instance, Iran has been a major recipient of US and UK arms, but the change in governance after the Islamic revolution in 1979 led to a complete turnover of Iranian foreign policy and the ensuing hostage crisis even created enemies between Iran and the United States.

Second, arms supplies are an enabler for interventions. Especially third world countries but also several mid-level powers are lacking the industrial base and knowledge to produce military equipment. Therefore, there can be a crucial reliance between arms supply for interventions. A classic example is the Ugandan intervention in the DRC and the Central African Republic to combat the Lord Resistance Army (LRA). With US military aid, leaflet campaigns and expertise in the mission Observant Compass, the Ugandan army was able to decimate the LRA to a rump organization in the Central African

⁹⁵ An alternative measure would be to examine foreign aid. Mesquita and Smith (2007) argue that foreign aid is provided by donors to states to receive political concessions. For instance, Wang (1999) finds evidence that the United States are able to buy off votes in the United Nations with foreign aid. However, the drawbacks of using foreign aid are threefold. First, foreign aid is also distributed for humanitarian, developmental and disaster relief purposes Heinrich (2013: 423). Hence, it is crucial to distinguish how and to whom foreign aid is distributed. Second, foreign aid is not just provided bilaterally but frequently distributed through international organizations which can function as complements or substitutes for unilateral donors. For instance, for the period between 2002 and 2011 Lawson (2013) identifies 45 countries constituting providers of foreign aid but also 21 international organizations who performed the same function. Third, data availability is much more sparsely available compared to arms trade data and is often used only for an assessment of Western countries that participate in the OECD, see for instance Mesquita and Smith (2009) and Mesquita and Smith (2007: 270) who speak about a "lack of systematic data" in relation to foreign aid.

⁹⁶ An exception can be US support for Pakistan which in turn is a suspect of supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan through their secret service SIS.

⁹⁷ Derouen and Heo (2004) find an effect for South America and Africa.

Republic. The United States provided over 100 special forces to oversee and advise the ground forces work of the Ugandan army. As stated by Cakaj and Titeca (2017): "The U.S. military mission [...] gave it a boost".

Third, arms exports create a dependency between the recipient and the supplier due to technological reasons (Kinsella 1998). The recipient country needs training and spare parts for military equipment which is typically produced by the arms industry of the arms exporting country. Especially aircraft, ships, submarines, anti-aircraft missile systems or modern arms rely heavily on constant maintenance and professional training among operating units. Therefore, once a state becomes a recipient of arms supplies, it relies on the constant supply of goods and services from the same supplier in the future. Alienating the interests of the supplier, can render the acquired weaponry and vehicles unusable and therefore also very costly to replace.

Fourth, arms exports are subject to government control and can, therefore, be used as a sanctioning mechanism if the recipient country does not comply with the foreign policy interests of the supplier (Sislin 1994). Although it is mostly private or parastatal corporations that supply arms, they are subject to the scrutiny of the incumbent government. Firms require export permissions from the government so that the fundamental foreign policy doctrines of the exporting country are not violated. Once a recipient engages in adverse foreign policy, the supplier can credibly threaten to withhold further supply in future. Due to the aforementioned dependency, recipients can seldom swiftly change their supplier without bearing substantial financial and reputational costs.

Based on these reasons, I contend that arms supply constitutes the most important mechanism for the principal to control the behavior of another state for interventions in civil wars in comparison to foreign aid or commercial loans. Arms recipients are chosen according to their compliance with foreign security policy goals of the supplier. The provision of arms supplies enables the recipient to conduct military interventions, but it is not necessarily the case that the intervener uses the same military material for interventions which it received from his arms supplier. Furthermore, states that provide arms solidify the relationship between the supplier and the recipient for several years into the future due to the technological dependency of the arms receiver vis-à-vis the arms supplier. Further, arms supplies can credibly be used as sanctioning mechanisms to punish agency slack when the arms recipient decides to deviate from the security objectives of the arms supplier.




Figure 4-1: Conceptual relationship diagram between the intervener, target country, and a great power.

Figure 4-1 highlights the relationship between all involved actors. State A intervenes in state B during a civil war. The intervention can be motivated either through interests in the outcome of the civil war in state b or because it serves the interests of the principal state C who in turn supports state A with arms exports and potentially other instruments like foreign aid. State C is typically a great power with the industrial potential to produce and exports arms to state A but also capable of inflicting damage to state A if it is not complying with the foreign policy preferences of its principal. Crucially, state C has vested interests in the outcome of the civil war in state B and is in a principal-agent relationship with state A. If state a would intervene against the interests of state C, then it would lead to a withdrawal of arms supply. Based on the prior discussion on the role of arms supply and state-to-state interventionism, I deduce the following two hypotheses:

 H_1 : Receiving arms supply from a great power (state c) by a potential intervener (state a) increases the probability to observe an intervention by the potential intervener in a civil war (state b)

 H_2 : Increasing the value of arms supply by a great power (state c) to a potential intervener (state a) increases the probability to observe an intervention by the potential intervener in a civil war (state b)

Research Design for the Analysis of Proxy Interventions

In this section, I combine existing data on civil war interventions with relationships between arms suppliers and recipients based on arms export/import data to assess whether the relationship can be an indicator for the phenomenon of proxy interventions by states. In the first step, data from the Upsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is used to determine relevant civil wars (Pettersson and Eck 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2002). Those are all instances in which the battle-threshold of 25 is surpassed, and the conflict is determined to be a civil war or an internationalized civil war. Rebel groups fight either for control over the state or over territorial separation from the country. In the second step, dyads were created between the country in which the civil war takes place in a given year and any other existing state in the international system. These states all constitute potential interveners. This means that a particular observation, for instance, the Russian civil war in Chechnya in 1991, is coupled with all other states in the international system as defined by the State Membership List from Gleditsch and Ward.⁹⁸ The following third step includes data on external interventions from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Högbladh et al. 16-19 March, 2011). This dataset codes all interventions into civil wars since 1975 until 2009 in a dyadic form. External support for a warring party during a civil war (government versus one or more rebel groups) is detailed and distinguishes between direct interventions with troops as well as indirect interventions where one warring party can receive up to nine different types of support like intelligence, access to the territory of the supplier or combat training

⁹⁸ See http://ksgleditsch.com/statelist.html

For the measurement of arms exports and imports, the database from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is used. It provides a comprehensive account of arms sales from 1950 until 2017. Only the years of actual delivery are counted and not the years of request. For a supplier to count as the major arms supplier in relation to the recipient country, it has to provide the largest financial volume based on trend indicator values (TIVs) over the past 20 years before the intervention occurs. The year of intervention is included in the calculation. The following formula describes the calculation of the cumulative arms supply variable.

Cumulatve Arms Supply_{*a,c,t*} =
$$\sum_{i=0}^{19} Arms Supplyac,t-i$$

The measurement of the variable adds all arms transfer from the supplier (c) to the recipient (a) for each great power. For instance, South Africa intervened with troop commitment into the Angolan civil war in 1980. In the preceding 20-years period (1961 – 1980), South Africa received arms sales worth \$252 million from the United States, \$860 million from the United Kingdom and \$3041 million from France.⁹⁹ Therefore, France is coded as the main arms supplier to South Africa. This calculation is conducted for all potential intervening states in the international system. Hence, a categorical variable measures which great power constituted the major arms supplier to a potential intervener and a continuous variable measures the exact cumulative amount of arms supplies for the past 20 years. If a state has existed for less than 20 years, then its cumulative value is calculated since its birth. For the statistical analysis, the cumulative arms trade variable is log-transformed.¹⁰⁰ The interpretation of the categorical variable refers to hypothesis 1, which states that the existence of a great power as major arms supplier increases the risk that the arms receiver intervenes in a civil war. The continuous variable measures the degree of dependence of the arms receiver to the great power. The higher the dependence, the higher the probability to intervene in civil wars as great powers can harness the receiver for intervention on their behalf. The following table 4-1 illustrates with an example the panel data structure.

⁹⁹ The Soviet Union and China did not provide any arms sales to South Africa. The first Russian arms sale to South Africa is recorded in 2014 and the first Chinese arms sale is recorded in 2016.

¹⁰⁰ 0.999 is added to allow the log-transformation of annual observations that record no arms trade.

Year	State B (cw) ¹	State A	Intervention	MAS ²	US c. Arms Supply ³	Soviet U. c. Arms Supply ³
1979	El Salvador	Venezuela	0	USA	815	0
1980	El Salvador	Venezuela	0	USA	750	0
1981	El Salvador	Venezuela	0	USA	809	0
1982	El Salvador	Venezuela	1	USA	846	0
1983	El Salvador	Venezuela	0	USA	964	0
1984	El Salvador	Venezuela	0	USA	992	0
1979	El Salvador	Cuba	0	Russia	0	6969
1980	El Salvador	Cuba	1	Russia	0	7193
1981	El Salvador	Cuba	1	Russia	0	7667
1982	El Salvador	Cuba	1	Russia	0	7256
1983	El Salvador	Cuba	1	Russia	0	7734
1984	El Salvador	Cuba	1	Russia	0	7911

Table 4-1: Illustration of data for United States and Russia without control variables.

¹ CW is an abbreviation for Civil War.

² MAS is an abbreviation for Major Arms Supplier (categorical variable).

³ Cumulative 20-years measure of arms supplies by the United States and Russia to Venezuela and Cuba in millions of dollars.

The table shows a segment from the overall dataset without control variables. The civil war takes place in El Salvador. For illustrative purposes only the years from 1979 until 1984 are shown, the actual civil war is recorded from 1979 until 1991. El Salvador is paired in dyads with all potential intervening states that existed at that particular time in the international system. In the example case, Venezuela and Cuba are depicted. The column intervention indicates whether Venezuela or Cuba intervened in a particular year. The following column *MAS* represents the categorical variable which measures which great power was the major arms supplier of Venezuela or Cuba. In the case of Venezuela, the United States constituted the major arms supplier for the period between 1979 and 1984. In turn, the Soviet Union constituted the major arms supplier for Cuba. If no great power would constitute the major arms supplier, the variable would be coded as "none." The last two right-hand variables constitute the cumulative arms trade volumes over the past 20 years between the United States and the Soviet Union with Venezuela and Cuba. As can be seen, Venezuela has received arms worth \$992 million over the period between 1965 and 1984 but nothing from the Soviet Union. In contrast,

Cuba received \$7256 million from the Soviet Union between 1982 and 1963 but zero from the United States over the same period.

In order to match the expectations of the principal-agent framework and required power asymmetry (Dunér 1981), I mainly concentrate on arms exports by the five member states of the United States Security Council, namely China, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), United States, France, and the United Kingdom. The reasons are twofold. First, those countries dominated great power politics after the end of the Second World War and are at the same time major arms exporting countries. During the Cold War, other arms suppliers like the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany or Czechoslovakia could not supply arms that would violate the foreign policy interests of their respective patrons. Those five countries have defined the historical rivalry cleavages, and smaller power subordinated and aligned themselves in either camp or remained neutral. Second, interventions with troops into an ongoing civil war requires the scrutiny of the UNSC whether the military endeavor violated the principle of territorial integrity and the norm of non-intervention. Proxy interveners could rely on their principal in the UNSC to block resolutions which would subject the intervening state under a sanction regime.

Lastly, several control variables were included to account for competing explanations. As the data structure is the same as in the analysis of the direct effect of economic factors in chapter 3, the same control variables for potential intervening states are kept. This includes a variable indicating an alliance between the potential intervener and the civil war country. Furthermore, to account for spillover effects through spatial proximity a variable controlling for contiguity is included. For both variables, the data is derived from the Correlates of War project (Gibler 2009). Further research has shown that patterns of rivalry between two states can increase the risk of military intervention. In contrast to alliance behavior, a rivaling state is more inclined to support a rebel group militarily. Data is provided by Goertz et al. (2016). As the data is structured in panel format with one dyad between state a and state b recorded annually for each instance of civil war, a variable measuring the last instance of an intervention is included to control for temporal dependence (Beck et al. 1998). Further control variables

are shared ethnicity (Vogt et al. 2015), distance¹⁰¹, colonial history¹⁰², trade volume (Barbieri et al. 2009) and military expenditures (Singer 1987; Singer et al. 1972). Equally, the oil_{need} variable from chapter 3 is included as it provides additional explanatory power for the motivation to intervene in a civil war. Foreign direct investments are included in the core estimation model but it has to be reminded that the lack of data older than the year 2001 leads to a drop of over 35 years of the overall dataset. Similarly, data on battle deaths is only available from 1989 (Pettersson and Eck 2018). The following formulas refer to the use of the categorical variable of arms supply¹⁰³.

Testing hypothesis 1:

 $\begin{aligned} &\Pr(Intervention_{ab,t}) = \alpha + \beta_1(MAS:China)_{a,t} + \beta_2(MAS:UK)_{a,t} + \beta_3(MAS:France)_{a,t} + \\ &\beta_4(MAS:US)_{a,t} + \beta_5(MAS:Russia)_{a,t} + \beta_6(Alliance)_{ab,t} + \beta_7(Contiguity)_{ab} + \\ &\beta_8(Peaceful Relations)_{ab,t} + \beta_9(Shared Ethnicity)_{ab} + \beta_{10}\ln(Capital Distance)_{ab} + \\ &\beta_{11}(Colnial Relationship)_{ab,t} + \beta_{12}\ln(Trade Volumue)_{ab,t-1} + \beta_{13}\ln(FDI instock)_{ab,t} + \\ &\beta_{14}\ln(Oil_{need})_{ab,t} + \beta_{15}(cumulative battle deaths)_{b,t} + \beta_{16}\ln(Miltary Exp.)_{a,t-1} + \\ &\beta_{17}(Last Intervention)_{ab,t} + \varepsilon_{ab,t} + u_{ab} + \kappa_t \end{aligned}$

Testing hypothesis 2:

 $\begin{aligned} &\Pr(Intervention_{ab,t}) = \alpha + \beta_1 ln(Arms \, Supply: China)_{a,t} + \beta_2 ln(Arms \, Supply: UK)_{a,t} + \\ &\beta_3 ln(Arms \, Supply: France)_{a,t} + \beta_4 ln(Arms \, Supply: US)_{a,t} + \beta_5 ln(Arms \, Supply: Russia)_{a,t} + \\ &\beta_6(Alliance)_{ab,t} + \beta_7(Contiguity)_{ab} + \beta_8(Peaceful \, Relations)_{ab,t} + \\ &\beta_9(Shared \, Ethnicity)_{ab} + \beta_{10} ln(Capital \, Distance)_{ab} + \beta_{11}(Colnial \, Relationship)_{ab,t} + \\ &\beta_{12} ln(Trade \, Volumue)_{ab,t-1} + \beta_{13} ln(FDI \, instock)_{ab,t} + \beta_{14} ln(Oil_{need})_{ab,t} + \\ &\beta_{15}(cumulative \, battle \, deaths)_{b,t} + \beta_{16} ln(Miltary \, Exp.)_{ab,t-1} + \\ &\beta_{17}(Last \, Intervention)_{ab,t} + \varepsilon_{ab,t} + u_{ab} + \kappa_t \end{aligned}$

¹⁰¹ See http://ksgleditsch.com/data-5.html, retrieved on the 23.08.2019.

¹⁰² Correlates of War Project. Colonial Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.1.

¹⁰³ A categorical variable can be written as a sequence of dichotomous variables.

Descriptive Analysis of Proxy Interventions

Covering the period between 1975 and 2009 reveals that 2410 annual military interventions were measured (see table 4-1). Of those, 1701 observations were conducted by another country than the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom. This indicates that in more than two-thirds of all annual intervention observations, middle and small powers participated. Troops were deployed on the ground in a civil war in approximately one-quarter of all observed military interventions (629). There have been 775 annual instances in which state a militarily intervened in the same conflict in the same year when its major arms supplier also intervened. These joint intervention observations have to be multiplied by two when to include the major supplier which equals to 1550. Hence, from the perspective of all measured military interventions in the External Support Dataset provided by UCDP, approximately more than one-half of all observations can be understood as combined state-to-state interventions with some form of burden-sharing as in coalitional interventions or proxying whereby the smaller power contributes in a manner that the principal is unwilling to.

In 293 annual observations did the recipient of arms supply involved its own troops. In 46 annual observations, the agent state was directly involved with troops on the ground, whereas the principal participated in the same civil war but without troop commitment. Those are instances of scenario 3 according to which state c sees benefits in state a's combat involvement, but for particular reasons, the great power cannot directly commit itself in a likewise manner. This type of conflicts predominately took place on African soil and was largely played out with France, the Soviet Union, or the United States. Other civil wars took place in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco) and the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen, Oman).

Military Interventions	Annual Observations
Military Interventions: all	2410
Military Interventions: no great power	1701
Military Interventions: Troop commitment	629
Military Interventions: Joint intervention	775
Military Interventions: Joint intervention * Troops (state a)	293
Military Interventions: Joint intervention * Troops (state c)	301
Military Interventions: Joint intervention * Troops (state a) * No Troops (state c)	46

Table 4-2: Combinations of military interventions from 1975 until 2009 for intervening states and major arms suppliers. Source: UCDP External Support dataset and SIPRI. From the perspective of the arms supplying countries, an expected picture emerges. Table 4-2 presents all countries of which one of the great powers constituted the major arms supplier for at least one year. China was in the past the major arms supplier for 22 countries. Those mainly include African and Asian countries like Gambia, Kenya, Pakistan or Bangladesh complemented by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania. The United Kingdom's outreach touches upon South and Middle America (e.g., Surname, Paraguay, Belize) as well as several African countries (e.g., Ghana, South Africa) and Asian countries plus a few European states like its neighbor Ireland. France has a similar mixture of countries, but the central focus expectedly lies in Africa. The United States has a global outreach with the Americas and Europe as their core, but also several Asian and African states are involved too. Russia (and formerly the Soviet Union) was mainly involved with former ideological allies across Northern and Western Africa, South Asia, Balkans, Eastern Europe. Cuba remains an exception in the Americas, whereas former Soviet Republics in Central Asia are also part of Russia's arms export market.

Variable Measurement	Number of Countries	Countries					
Arms Supplier: China	22	Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Ghana, DRC, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, Eritrea, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Cambodia					
Arms Supplier: UK	34	USA, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Guyana, Surinam Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, Ireland, Switzerland, Estonia, Sweden Gambia, Mauritania, Ghana, Togo, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia Zimbabwe, Malawi, South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Kuwait Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Malaysia, Indonesia New Zealand					
Arms Supplier: France	38	Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Ireland, Portugal, Austria, Cyprus, Senegal, Benin, Mauritania, Niger, Cote D'Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Djibouti, Malawi, South Africa, Madagascar, Comoros, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, China, Nepal					
Arms Supplier: US	92	Canada, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, German Federal Republic, Poland, Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Croatia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Slovenia, Greece, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Liberia, Cameroon, Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad, DRC, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Arab Republic of Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Korea, Republic of Japan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand					
Arms Supplier: Russia	69	Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Guyana, Peru, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Macedonia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Rumania, Lithuania, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Benin, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Madagascar, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Arab Republic of Yemen, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, China, People's Republic of Korea, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia					

Table 4-3: Listing of major arms suppliers and recipient countries from 1975 until 2009. Source: UCDP External Support dataset and SIPRI. Figure 4-2 allows a rough comparison of the great powers based on the degree of dependency between them and their potential agents. For instance, observing one annual instance in category "2-4" means that the cumulative value of arms trade (as defined above to measure the worth of 20 years of arms trade) ranges between \$7.39 million and \$54.60 million since the scale is transformed by the natural logarithm. The higher the category of the measurement, the higher the expected degree of dependency of the receiver to the supplier. According to figure 2, China is the least active arms supplier in terms of recipient countries. Furthermore, France, the United Kingdom, and China are rarely represented in the two highest categories of arms exports. In contrast, the United States and Russia are five times more represented in the category representing arms trade exceeding a cumulative value of \$3 billion and are the only two countries that have exported within 20 years over \$22 billion to a single recipient. In the case of the United States, those were the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Russia historically transferred weapons of such value to Libya, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, China, and India.




Figure 4-2: Counts of annual observations of cumulative arms trade between the great power and receiver. Note: x-axis represents a natural log-scale transformed into six categories for the period from 1975 until 2009. Only observations above zero are counted.

Statistical Analysis of Proxy Interventions

In this section, both hypotheses are tested and evaluated for their substantive effects. The created dataset is unbalanced which is primarily due different lengths of civil wars. Some are recorded to persist through the entire 35-year period (e.g. Myanmar) and some appeared for just one year like a brief episode of violence in Gambia in 1981. Observations in which the United States was recorded to constitute a recipient of another great power, here the United Kingdom, were dropped to account for the superpower status of the United States during and after the Cold War. Russia is observed to have none of the four other great powers as the major arms supplier.

Model 1 to model 5 are related to hypothesis 1 in which it is stated that arms supply from a great power like Russia, the United Kingdom, France, the United States or China increases the probability to observe the recipient intervening in a civil war. The dependent variable in these models captures all military interventions without filtering for great power involvement. Hence unilateral as well as multilateral missions are recorded. Due to the panel structure, random effect estimation is used as it was the case in chapter 3. The major arms supplier variable is categorical, and the baseline should be interpreted as having none of these five Great Powers as the major arms supplier. The results corroborate the assumption that China, the United States, and Russia increase the probability of a recipient state to intervene in a civil war. No significant effect is measured for France and the United Kingdom. The control variables perform as expected. Shared borders increase the probability to observe a military intervention by the potential intervener as well as intensified rivalry. Alliance and shared ethnicity have no significant effect when controlled for economic factors from chapter 3, namely existing foreign direct investment instock and the potential to harness oil deposits in the civil war country. As distance increases between the potential intervener and the civil war country, the probability to observe an intervention decreases.

Dependent Variable	pendent Variable Military Interventions					
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	
•						
Major arms suppliers						
i.Arms Supplier: China	1.646***	1.527***	1.265**	1.330**	1.429**	
	(0.281)	(0.343)	(0.626)	(0.596)	(0.599)	
i.Arms Supplier: UK	0.233	0.144	0.878	0.814	0.693	
	(0.320)	(0.382)	(0.698)	(0.693)	(0.703)	
i.Arms Supplier: France	0.463*	0.341	0.631	0.549	0.435	
	(0.273)	(0.334)	(0.676)	(0.666)	(0.672)	
i.Arms Supplier: US	1.498***	1.483***	2.027***	2.052***	1.577***	
	(0.215)	(0.282)	(0.494)	(0.477)	(0.483)	
i.Arms Supplier: Russia	1.351***	1.249***	1.468***	1.476***	1.317***	
	(0.214)	(0.281)	(0.494)	(0.477)	(0.481)	
Control Variables						
Alliance		-0.439*	0.121	0.508	0.972**	
		(0.229)	(0.405)	(0.374)	(0.383)	
Contiguity		2.959***	1.240**	1.331***	1.444***	
		(0.451)	(0.571)	(0.501)	(0.493)	
Peaceful Relations		-3.415***	-4.517***	-4.064***	-3.590**	
		(0.563)	(1.700)	(1.563)	(1.564)	
Shared Ethnicity		1.857***	0.421	0.401	0.236	
		(0.372)	(0.453)	(0.404)	(0.398)	
Log(distance)		-1.095***	-0.952***	-0.797***	-0.803***	
		(0.152)	(0.211)	(0.191)	(0.193)	
Colonial History		5.288***	3.077***	3.284***	2.504***	
		(0.698)	(0.935)	(0.816)	(0.806)	
Corporate and Economic						
Control Variables						
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}		0.0709***	-0.0222	-0.0626	-0.188***	
		(0.0258)	(0.0488)	(0.0457)	(0.0490)	
Log(FDI)			0.170***	0.204***	0.177***	
			(0.0640)	(0.0594)	(0.0583)	
Log(Oilneed)			0.313***	0.206***	0.317***	
			(0.0782)	(0.0707)	(0.0721)	
Humanitarian Intervention						
Log(battle deaths)				0.965***	0.942***	
				(0.0692)	(0.0693)	
Intervention Enabler						
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}					0.386***	
					(0.0664)	
Time Dependency	A 1 10 4 4 4	0.1.50+++	0.1.40	0.1.51.4.4.4	0.1.10.4.4.4	
Last Intervention	-0.142***	-0.158***	-0.142***	-0.151***	-0.149***	
	(0.00718)	(0.00779)	(0.0106)	(0.0106)	(0.0107)	
	12 01 444	0.000	1 475	1 070***	0 ((0+++	
Constant	-13.81***	-0.989	1.475	-4.978***	-9.668***	
01	(0.200)	(1.387)	(2.052)	(1.928)	(2.103)	
Observations	147,650	133,287	34,778	34,778	33,671	
Number of iddyad	14,349	11,488	6,940	6,940	6,876	
rho	0.908	0.856	0.764	0.697	0.681	
sigma	5.690	4.421	3.267	2.750	2.650	
log-likelihood	-5526	-4719	-1374	-1250	-1207	

Table 4-4: Random-Effect Logit Regression; modelling great power arms supply in explaining military interventions from 1975 until 2009.

Note: data for FDI only available from 2001 to 2009 and data available of battle deaths only available from 1989 until 2009. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is not provided due to different sample sizes. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. In contrast, shared colonial relationship remains a significant positive predictor. Humanitarian concerns equally propel potential interveners to use military means in civil wars. Lastly, higher military capacity enables potential interveners to engage in civil wars. Interestingly, trade becomes a negative predictor in model 5. As before in chapter 3, trade becomes highly specific according to the configuration of control variables which raises concerns about the ambiguous nature of existing trade as a predictor of military interventions in civil wars. Depending on the configuration, trade volume either remains a positive predictor or becomes insignificant. When controlled for military expenditures it changes its sign to negative.

Focusing now on the substantive effects of the analysis, model 5 is used to assess the marginal effects of either major arms supplier on the probability to intervene in a civil war by a recipient country. Model 5 was chosen since it includes the relevant control variables and is based on the random effect estimation. A baseline model was specified, which would represent the most frequently observed scenario between the civil war country and the potential intervener. This relationship is defined by having no alliance commitment, no joint border, no shared ethnicity, no prior joint colonial history and neither both countries are politically indifferent to each other (no rivalry or friendship). The last intervention occurred nine years ago, and trade volume adds up to\$23.8 million.

Further, the average distance between the potential intervener and the civil war country is 6568 kilometers, and the potential intervener possesses \$158 million foreign direct investments in the civil war country. Lastly, the potential intervener could harness 13 million tons of oil from the civil war country, and the civil war country experiences an annual battle death toll of 354 casualties. Table 4-4 presents the predicted probabilities for each major arms supplier. The marginal increase refers to a conflict dyad in which none of the five major powers constituted the major arms supplier for the potential intervener.

	Prediction	Standard Error	Change
Baseline Configuration*	.0054	.0024	
Major Arms Supplier: China	.0168	.0063	+211%
Major Arms Supplier: United Kingdom	.0096	.0047	+78%
Major Arms Supplier: France	.0078	.0038	+44%
Major Arms Supplier: United States	.0188	.0047	+248%
Major Arms Supplier: Russia/Soviet Union	.0154	.0042	+185%

Table 4-5: Calculation of predicted probabilities based on model 5.

*Baseline Configuration: no alliance, no contiguity, no rivalry, no shared ethnicity, no prior colonial history and last intervention occurred 9 years ago. All continuous variables are held at their median values calculated for nonzero observations.

According to the baseline prediction, the probability of observing an intervention is 0.54%, which conforms to the results of previous studies. For instance, Salehyan et al. (2011: 730) calculate that an intervention explicitly on behalf of a rebel group in a civil war is 0.19% in their baseline model. The strongest effect is reported with China constituting the major arms supplier with an increase by over 211%, whereas having France as the major arms supplier exerts the lowest effect on the propensity to intervene in a civil war followed by the United Kingdom. The effect of China is largely driven by its military arms support for Pakistan with its military involvement in India, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka but also by its military trade with Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Sudan.

Russia almost triples the probability of a recipient country to intervene. Having the United States as major arms supplier more than triples the probability of observing an intervention of its arms recipient compared to having no great power as arms provider. Russia's most active recipients were Libya, Cuba, China, Syria, the German Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Angola, and Sudan, whereas the United States mainly supported countries like France, Australia, the United Kingdom, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Israel and Belgium. The results, for instance, match with the qualitative assessment by Dunér (1987) that the Soviet Union performed as an enabler of interventionism in particular with regards Cuba. However, one concern that can be raised based on prior research is that possibility that the measured effect is predominately due to extensive coalitional military interventions as great powers rely on their allies to conduct military operations. As explained by Kreps (2011), states use smaller states to gain legitimacy and share the costs of military interventions. At the same time, great powers supply arms to their formal allies as those have the most similar foreign policy and security objectives. To test whether the effect of major power arms supply is mainly capturing alliance behavior, a variable is included in the estimation which measures whether the potential intervener is part of a formal alliance with its major arms supplier (joint alliance = JA).

The measure is then assessed in an interaction term between the categorical variable which measures which great power constitutes the major arms supplier of the potential intervener. Therefore, the interaction term adds to the Major Arms Supplier variable the additional information that the MAS is at the same time an alliance partner. A significant positive result for the interaction term in the case when the dichotomous variable is measured as 1 (affirming alliance with the major arms supplier) would be an indicator for the joint effect of alliance and major arms supply. In contrast, if the interaction term provides a significant positive effect when there is no alliance between the major arms supplier and the potential intervener, then this would indicate the independent effect of arms supply without a distortion by alliance membership. The following formula captures the interaction effect of the joint alliance variable JA, whereas γ_{κ} represents the coefficients for the previously used control variables Z in model 1 to 5.

 $Pr(Military Intervention)_{ab,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 (MAS:China)_{a,t} * JA + \beta_2 (MAS:UK)_{a,t} * JA + \beta_3 (MAS:France)_{a,t} * JA + \beta_4 (MAS:US)_{a,t} * JA + \beta_5 (MAS:Russia)_{a,t} * JA + \gamma_k Z + \epsilon_{ij,t} + u_{ij} + \kappa_t$

The estimated interaction effects are presented in model 6 to 10 in table 4-5. No interaction effects were calculated for China, France, and the United Kingdom because of a lack of variance in the data. There are no instances in which China and the United Kingdom were in a formal alliance with a smaller power which intervened in a civil war. In the case of France, there is no recorded instance in

which a smaller power, which is mainly supported by France with arms and which is part of a formal alliance with France, intervened in a civil war. Hence the effect of China, France, and the UK refer to their overall effect without conditioning by alliance.

The interaction term reveals that there is an effect of joint alliances in the case of the United States but not in the case of Russia. The United States increases the risk of a potential intervener to intervene in a civil war through the provision of arms as well as through the provision of arms and being in a joint alliance. The former result corroborates hypothesis 1 that great powers wield leverage over smaller powers to intervene in civil wars even if controlled for interventions that are conducted as part of an alliance with the great power. The same holds for Russia which shows a significant effect for interventions that are conducted when Russia is the major arms supplier, but it does not hold when Russia as the major arms suppliers shares an alliance with the potential intervener. This provides additional support for the principal-agent approach as it shows that the mechanism of proxy interventions works outside of alliance structures. Control variables behave as in models 1 to 5 without the interaction term.

Dependent Variable	ns				
Independent Variables	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Major arms suppliers					
Arms Supplier: China	2.001***	1.651***	1.458**	1.490**	1.577***
	(0.308)	(0.341)	(0.626)	(0.594)	(0.599)
Arms Supplier: UK	0.516	0.230	0.948	0.892	0.796
••	(0.344)	(0.379)	(0.708)	(0.701)	(0.712)
Arms Supplier: France	0.923***	0.583*	0.851	0.754	0.634
	(0.304)	(0.336)	(0.685)	(0.673)	(0.679)
Arms Supplier: US * NJA ¹	1.906***	1.518***	1.583***	1.610***	1.303**
11	(0.261)	(0.293)	(0.534)	(0.512)	(0.518)
Arms Supplier: US * JA ²	1.359***	1.459***	3.011***	2.966***	2.331***
	(0.286)	(0.325)	(0.544)	(0.522)	(0.530)
Arms Supplier: Russia *	1.822***	1.497***	1.893***	1.893***	1.764***
JJA ¹	1.022	1.477	1.075	1.075	1.704
	(0.251)	(0.285)	(0.516)	(0.493)	(0.500)
Arms Supplier: Russia * JA ²	0.641**	0.388	0.134	-0.0702	-0.136
The supplier reason of	(0.292)	(0.326)	(0.687)	(0.685)	(0.669)
Control Variables	(0.272)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.00))
Alliance		-0.412*	-0.0395	0.338	0.825**
manoo		(0.223)	(0.398)	(0.369)	(0.380)
Contiguity		2.630***	0.939*	1.025**	1.170**
Joiniguny		(0.379)	(0.550)	(0.488)	
Peaceful Relations		-3.296***	-4.425***	-4.001***	(0.485) -3.555**
reaceiul Relations					
		(0.554) 1.551***	(1.652)	(1.525)	(1.533)
Shared Ethnicity			0.642	0.632	0.431
		(0.319)	(0.441)	(0.396)	(0.394)
log(distance)		-1.001***	-1.093***	-0.948***	-0.922***
		(0.139)	(0.208)	(0.190)	(0.191)
Colonial History		4.765***	2.428***	2.671***	2.137***
		(0.673)	(0.910)	(0.800)	(0.793)
Corporate and Economic					
Control Variables					
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}		0.0711***	-0.0477	-0.0871*	-0.198***
		(0.0252)	(0.0478)	(0.0450)	(0.0484)
Log(FDI)			0.161***	0.197***	0.173***
			(0.0624)	(0.0581)	(0.0574)
Log(Oilneed)			0.324***	0.217***	0.316***
			(0.0761)	(0.0691)	(0.0707)
Humanitarian Intervention					
log(battle deaths)				0.965***	0.944***
				(0.0687)	(0.0690)
ntervention Enabler					
Log(Military Exp.)t-1					0.348***
					(0.0663)
ime Dependency					
Last Intervention	-0.146***	-0.163***	-0.146***	-0.154***	-0.152***
	(0.00716)	(0.00776)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)
Constant	-13.02***	-0.764	2.719	-3.668*	-8.188***
	(0.253)	(1.249)	(1.997)	(1.895)	(2.095)
Observations	146,259	132,062	34,555	34,555	33,451
Number of iddyad	14,266	11,428	6,896	6,896	6,833
ho	0.891	0.822	0.750	0.681	0.667
igma	5.184	3.902	3.142	2.649	2.570
og-likelihood	-5496	-4693	-1362	-1237	-1197

 Tog-Intermodul
 -5490
 -14093
 -1302
 -1231

 Table 4-6: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars, 1975 – 2009.
 1
 NJA is an abbreviation for No-Joint Alliance between the potential intervener and the major arms supplier

 2 JA is an abbreviation for Joint Alliance between the potential intervener and the major arms supplier

To assess the substantive impact of the interaction effect, table 4-7 provides the predicted probabilities with the joint alliance variable as interaction term. The great powers China, France, and the United Kingdom provide similar results as in the estimation without the interaction term. Having China as a great power triples the likelihood of the third-state to intervene in a civil war. France and the United Kingdom have a slightly stronger effect when controlled for by the interaction term. In this case, French military arms supply increases the probability of an intervention by 95 percent instead of by 78 percent according to model 5 and British arms supply increase the probability of an intervention by 72 percent instead of 44 percent.

The strongest effects are observed with the United States and Russia. When the United States constitutes the major arms supporter to a country but is not in a formal alliance with this country, then the risk of intervention increases by 191 percent. This result corroborates the expectations of hypothesis 1. However, when the United States constitutes the major arms supplier to a potential intervener and is at the same time member of an alliance with the potential intervener, then the probability that this country will intervene in a civil war increases by 525%. Substantively, these results refer to the coalitional interventions, when the United States assembled a group of states that followed its lead. In the case of Russia, the concept of proxy intervention also receives corroborative evidence. When Russia constitutes the major arms supplier of a country but is not part of a formal alliance with this country, then the risk of intervention increases by over 300 percent that this country intervenes. However, in the case of a joint alliance the probability even decreases by 9 percent, but this result is not statistically significant.

	Prediction	Standard Error	Increase
Baseline Configuration [†]	.0044‡	.0020	
Major Arms Supplier: China	.0158‡	.0059	+259%
Major Arms Supplier: United Kingdom	.0086‡	.0043	+95%
Major Arms Supplier: France	.0076‡	.0037	+72%
Major Arms Supplier: United States * NJA	.0128‡	.0039	+191%
Major Arms Supplier: United States * JA	.0275‡	.0073	+525%
Major Arms Supplier: Russia/Soviet Union *	.0182‡	.0050	+314%
Major Arms Supplier: Russia/Soviet Union * JA	0.0040	.0022	-9%

Table 4-7: Calculation of predicted probabilities based on model 10.

†Baseline Configuration: no alliance, no contiguity, no rivalry, no shared ethnicity, no prior colonial history and last intervention occurred 9 years ago. All continuous variables are held at their median values calculated for nonzero observations. NJA = no joint alliance; JA = joint alliance.

 \ddagger Significant at p < .05.

Before conducting tests for hypothesis 2, the correlation matrix in table 4-7 is calculated to test for collinearity between the different arms supplying countries. The individual variables measure the cumulative arms supply of each great power to the same potential interveners. The results reveal that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have very similar recipient countries. China and Russia have a weak correlation (r = 0.34), but interestingly Russia's and France's recipients also show some overlap. Historically, this is due to Russia's arms provision to many countries located in Francafrique and similar arms recipients in Central America. In contrast, the United States and Russia experience a very slight negative correlation, which is not surprising as during the time of the Cold War both countries supported their client states.

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Arms Supply: China	1				
2. Arms Supply: France	0.13*	1			
3. Arms Supply: UK	0.11*	0.71*	1		
4. Arms Supply: USA	0.09*	0.70*	0.68*	1	
5. Arms Supply: Russia	0.34*	0.45*	0.08*	-0.09*	1
Mean	0.93	2.45	2.79	3.43	2.34
Standard Deviation	2.04	2.68	2.72	3.30	2.26

Table 4-8: Correlation matrix for log-transformed cumulative arms volumes (aggregated over past 20 years). Note: years without arms transfers are counted as 0; mean and standard deviation are provided for each arms exporting country. *p < 0.05.

In the last step, hypothesis 2 is tested by investigating whether the degree of dependency between the great power and the potential intervener increases the risk to observe a military intervention in a civil war country. The statistical results in table 4-9 changed compared to the previous analysis. Increased Chinese, French, or British spending has no bearing on a state to become more inclined to intervene in a civil war according to models 11 to 13. In contrast, the United States and Russian spending significantly increase the risk of intervention in model 14 and the United States only in model 15. The difference between both estimations is the inclusion of the foreign direct investment variable, which downsizes the period from 1975-2009 to 2001-2009. It seems that in the latter period, the effect of Russia as major arms supplier vanishes which could be interpreted as a corollary of the end of the Cold War and the unipolar power preponderance of the United States.

Model 16 and 17 allow for simultaneous competing influences through arms trade by all five great powers. The United States and Russia remain significant predictors for an increased risk of military interventions. Counterintuitively, French increased arms exports correspond to lower the risks of the recipient intervention. This is due to the following observation. Nominally, France's biggest arms recipients were the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the German Federal Republic, and Iraq. For the first three countries, the United States transferred arms worth several times more than France,¹⁰⁴ and in the last case, Russia dominated the arms trade with Iraq equally by several magnitudes. Hence, the diverging result to model 5 can be explained by the observation that France sold arms in its highest values to countries that were already purchasing arms from one of the two superpowers to a much

¹⁰⁴ For instance, the cumulative arms trade towards the Federal Republic of Germany amounted to approximately \$4.5 billion in 1978 but was dwarfed by the cumulative US arms trades totaling to approximately \$28.5 billion.

greater extent. To check for the potential effect of the Cold War, a dummy variable was included but without changing the interpretation of the independent variables (see appendix).¹⁰⁵

Dependent Variable Military Interventions							
Independent Variables	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17
Major arms suppliers							
Log(Arms Supply: China)t-1	0.00783					-0.0229	-0.0614
	(0.0297)	0.0272				(0.0308)	(0.0567)
Log(Arms Supply: UK) _{t-1}		0.0273				-0.0220	0.130^{*}
Log(Arms Supply: France)t-1		(0.0275)	0.00284			(0.0359) -0.0787**	(0.0665) -0.179***
Log(Arms Suppry: Trance)t-1			(0.0265)			(0.0347)	(0.0655)
Log(Arms Supply: US)t-1			(0.0203)	0.0724***		0.138***	0.168***
				(0.0231)		(0.0302)	(0.0582)
Log(Arms Supply: Russia)t-1				(0.010-0)	0.0717***	0.103***	0.0540
					(0.0211)	(0.0228)	(0.0392)
Control Variables							
Alliance	-0.0882	-0.0964	-0.0939	-0.106	-0.0604	-0.0554	0.984**
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.235)	(0.233)	(0.235)	(0.384)
Contiguity	2.155***	2.176***	2.156***	2.193***	2.168***	2.161***	1.468***
	(0.361)	(0.364)	(0.363)	(0.370)	(0.358)	(0.363)	(0.491)
Peaceful Relations	-3.929***	-3.915***	-3.923***	-3.895***	-3.965***	-3.920***	-3.936**
	(0.606)	(0.608) 0.815***	(0.607)	(0.612)	(0.605)	(0.609)	(1.575)
Shared Ethnicity	0.802***	0.010	0.808***	0.854***	0.741**	0.805***	0.271
Lag(distance)	(0.303) -1.122***	(0.305) -1.133***	(0.302) -1.125***	(0.310) -1.172***	(0.302) -1.096***	(0.306) -1.144***	(0.405) -0.846***
Log(distance)	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.145)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.192)
Colonial History	2.691***	2.728***	2.687***	2.643***	2.919***	2.710***	2.463***
Colonial History	(0.641)	(0.649)	(0.644)	(0.656)	(0.643)	(0.658)	(0.836)
Corporate and Economic Control	(0.011)	(0.01))	(0.011)	(0.050)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.050)
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}	-0.0226	-0.0224	-0.0224	-0.0243	-0.0226	-0.0278	-0.199***
	(0.0268)	(0.0269)	(0.0268)	(0.0271)	(0.0268)	(0.0269)	(0.0491)
Log(FDI)			. ,				0.182***
							(0.0584)
Log(Oilneed)	0.378***	0.384***	0.379***	0.389***	0.380***	0.381***	0.324***
	(0.0594)	(0.0601)	(0.0598)	(0.0607)	(0.0593)	(0.0603)	(0.0725)
Humanitarian Intervention							
Log(battle deaths)							0.952***
Later and an Enchland							(0.0697)
Intervention Enabler	0.636***	0.626***	0.635***	0.605***	0.613***	0.578***	0.285***
Log(Military Exp.)t-1	$(0.030^{-1.1})$	$(0.020^{-1.1})$	(0.0434)	(0.003^{+++})	(0.013^{+++})	(0.0453)	(0.0797)
Time Dependency	(0.0423)	(0.0440)	(0.0434)	(0.0443)	(0.0429)	(0.0433)	(0.0797)
Last Intervention	-0.159***	-0.158***	-0.159***	-0.157***	-0.158***	-0.158***	-0.149***
Last filter vention	(0.00822)	(0.00822)	(0.00825)	(0.00821)	(0.00822)	(0.00824)	(0.0107)
	(0.00022)	(0.00022)	(0.00020)	(0.00021)	(0.00022)	(0.0002.)	(0.0107)
Constant	-5.839***	-5.776***	-5.829***	-5.541***	-5.876***	-5.454***	-7.170***
	(1.289)	(1.300)	(1.291)	(1.321)	(1.284)	(1.304)	(2.112)
Observations	116,733	116,733	116,733	116,733	116,733	116,733	33,671
Number of iddyad	10,919	10,919	10,919	10,919	10,919	10,919	6,876
rho	0.771	0.775	0.771	0.782	0.768	0.774	0.684
sigma	3.326	3.363	3.331	3.437	3.302	3.361	2.669
BIC					•		
log-likelihood	-3983	-3983	-3983	-3978	-3977	-3966	-1207

Table 4-9: Random-Effect Logit Regression - great power arms supply and military interventions, 2001-2009.Note: standard errors in parentheses for random effect models, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

¹⁰⁵ Further, testing the hypotheses with logistic regressions with and without splines leads to the odd result that military supplies by France and the UK decrease the probability to intervene.

Lastly, figure 4-3 depicts the increase in marginal probabilities for the United States. The base model for the estimation of the predicted probabilities is model 17 as it includes all relevant control variables and corrects the estimators for competing influences by other great powers. The arms supply volume of other great powers kept at zero. The control variables follow the same pattern as in the calculations of the baselines models in table 4-5 and 4-7. The categorial variables are held at the mode value, and continuous variables are held at the median value for nonzero observations. The range of for cumulative arms transfers over 20 years ranges from \$1 million at the 1st percentile to \$33.741 billion at the 100th percentile. When the United States provides at least \$1 million over 20 years to a potential intervener, *ceteris paribus*, then the predicted probability of a military intervention in a civil war amounts to 1.1 percent. Providing the maximum observed value triples the expected probability to 3.4 percent.




Figure 4-3: Calculation of predicted probabilities for US arms trade to potential interveners. Note: Model 17 was used as estimation model.

Moral Hazard and the Sanctioning Mechanism

Lastly, having shown the effect of arms supply on increased risks of interventionism this section illustratively focuses on the use of arms supplies as an instrument to punish deviations in foreign policy congruence. In three exemplary cases, the principal used arms sales in a sanctioning manner after its agent conducted an intervention that has violated the foreign policy principles of its principal. Those were Somalia (1978), Iran (1979) and Iraq (1991). As can be seen in figure 4-5, Somalia received its bulk of military armament from the Soviet Union. However, the attention of the Soviet Union changed to Ethiopia after the revolution by the Derg. It perceived the Derg as a more promising ally. In 1977, Somalia started the Ogaden War over its Somali population. In response, the Soviet Union immediately ceased military arms supply to Somalia and a consequence supported the new Ethiopian regime (Patman 1990). For pragmatic reasons, losing its former Ethiopian ally, the United States began to support Somalia under the Regan administration to maintain some political leverage in the Horn of Africa (Schmidt 2013). Similarly, until 1978, the United States and the United Kingdom were the major arms suppliers to Iran under the Shah (Perkins 1988; Hughes 2015). The Islamic revolution on the 11th February 1979 ousted the allied government, and in combination with the Hostage Crisis at the American embassy, Iran changed its status as an ally to a foe. The arms supplies were immediately ceased in reaction to the unfolding domestic events in Iran and the ensuing Iran-Iraq War (see figure 4-

6).




Figure 4-4: Arms supply to Somalia from 1960 until 1987. Source: SIPRI.

The small rise in 1986 refers to the infamous Iran-Contra Affair in which officials of the Regan administration sold weapons to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 in the hope to use revenues from the arms sales to support the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua to oust the socialist government of the Sandinistas (Marshall et al. 1987). However, since then Iran has never officially received any arms supply by the United States or the United Kingdom. Lastly, the Soviet Union and France constituted the biggest arms supplier to Iraq until 1991 (see figure 4-7). In the same year, Iraq invaded with ground troops Kuwait and annexed its territory. As this was a violation of the norm of non-intervention and territorial integrity as well as not a preferred foreign policy choice by either arms supplier, both ceased any further arms supply and even supported a worldwide arms embargo against Iraq under Saddam Hussein. These three instances illustratively depict how arms supplying states use weapons sales as a form of pressure to ensure compliance with their foreign policy options. When agents deviate from the interests of the principal, then arms supply is used as a sanctioning mechanism as principal-agent theory would predict.




Figure 4-5: Arms Supply to Iran from 1950 until 1998. Source: SIPRI.




Figure 4-6: Arms Supply to Iraq from 1950 to 1996. Source: SIPRI.

Conclusion

This chapter began with the assumption that *direct* dyadic effects between potential interveners and civil war countries are not sufficient to explain the motivation to intervene militarily. It is argued that *indirect* effects transmitted through states outside the dyad influence the propensity of the potential intervener to eventually intervene. Recent research has focused on the concept of coalitional military interventions, but this study goes a step further and contends that great powers harness other states for the purpose of interventions on behalf of the interests of great powers. Early work from Dunér (1981) and Dunér (1987) has touched upon this idea of proxy interventions by states but it has not been conceptually structured and empirically tested outside the case of the Soviet Union and Cuba. This type of intervention differs from coalitional interventions in that it is not a necessary condition that the great power intervenes by itself (but it can as will be elaborated in the following chapter 5).

To identify mechanisms of control and power between great powers and smaller powers, the concept of principal-agent theory was used. It is postulated that the great power constitutes the principal, and the smaller power constitutes the agent. The principal has several mechanisms at his disposal to prevent adverse selection and agency slack. In this study, it was argued that arms trade allows for the identification of the hierarchical power structure between the great power and the agent due to various reasons. First, arms suppliers take great care to screen their recipients before agreeing to sell arms to prevent the provision of weapons to actors that violate foreign policy and security objectives of the arms supplier.

Second, arms supplies can enable the recipient to engage in military interventions in civil wars. Arms supplies raise the power projection capacities of the potential intervener. Third, arms trade creates dependencies between the armed forces of the recipient country and the defense industry of the supplying country. Recipient countries are frequently locked in long-term relationships due to the need for obtaining spare parts and training for the use of the purchased military equipment. Lastly, from the perspective of the principal state, arms trade can be used as a sanctioning mechanism to counter agency slack. When the potential intervener engages in foreign policy activities that contradict the core interests of the supplier, sanctions can be enacted which prevent further sales to the former recipient. Two hypotheses were deduced, which postulated that having a great power as the major arms supplier increases the risk to be used as an intervener in a civil war. This includes the case when the great power remains indifferent to the intervening country and condones his actions without punishing him with arms sanctions. The second hypothesis referred to the degree of dependency and postulated that an increase in arms dependency should also increase the risk of the recipient country to intervene militarily. Descriptive results show that in around two thirds of all interventions recorded in the UCDP External Support Dataset a joint intervention occurred between the potential intervener and the major arms supplier which indicates some form of burden-sharing by coalitional interventions. Of those observations, 46 annual instances record an intervention of a smaller power with combat troops that were supported by the great power with indirect military means like logistics, intelligence of weapons supply. In turn, one-third of all interventions are conducted by smaller powers without any kind of military interference through great powers. Assuming that smaller powers are dependent on their major arms supplier, their involvement must have been at least condoned as otherwise, arms suppliers would use their sanctioning mechanism.

According to the statistical results, hypothesis 1 was partially corroborated. Having China, the United States, and Russia as the major arms supplier increases the risk of the recipient to intervene in a civil war. The results also hold when controlled for military expenditures, which indicates that arms supply not just increases the power projection capabilities of a country but also includes a political component. To control for the potential alternative explanation that the interventions by smaller powers are actually driven by alliance behavior and are a representation of coalitional interventions, an interaction term was included for each great power.

The interaction term discriminated between interventions by smaller powers who were in a joint alliance with the major arms supplier and those smaller power who were in no joint alliance with the major arms supplier. Considering the results, the effect of United States arms supplies works in both directions. It fosters military interventions based on alliance behavior, which is a representation of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, United States arms supply also increases the risk of states to intervene in civil wars that are not part of NATO or another defense pact. In chapter 5, two

such cases are analyzed. In the case of Russia, their arms supply effect only functions outside alliance structures. Overall, controlling for alternative explanations, the results point at an incentivization of potential interveners through channels that are not related to alliance behavior and through channels that are not related to the simple increase in power projection capabilities.

Further results point at corroborative evidence for hypothesis 2. When controlling for the degree of dependence through arms trade, Russia and the United States have a significant positive impact on third-states to intervene in civil wars. The effect for Russia seems only to hold when the entire range of observations is used which pinpoints at its elevated position in international relations during the Cold War. According to the estimation model 17, the predicted probability of a third-state to intervene triples when the range of cumulative military supplies by the United States is assessed from its minimum to its maximum value. Lastly, great powers do not shun to use the sanctioning mechanism when their core security and foreign policy objectives are at stake through an intervention of a recipient. The cases of Iran and Somalia illustrate how regime change led to agency slack and sanctions enacted by the former major arms suppliers. In the case of Iraq, the military intervention in Kuwait became a trigger for arms sanctions against the country.

Concluding, the theoretical deliberations of this chapter point at the use of *indirect* interests in the motivation portfolio of potential intervenes. States which intervene in civil wars do this not only based on interests that they possess vis-à-vis the target but also intervene because they expect benefits (or prevent costs) from their relationship with a great power who constitutes their major arms supplier. However, the statistical and descriptive results can only contribute one perspective on the available data. The question arises whether the postulated hypotheses can be observed in empirical cases (Rogowski 1995: 467). Observing the mechanism of proxy intervention would provide a more coherent picture than the statistical results on their own. Therefore, the following fifth chapter investigates a subset of interventions that can be at face value most clearly identified as a representation for proxy intervention. This approach constitutes a test for the validity of the theory of proxy interventions.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ It should be pointed out that this kind of research is also attempted in the case of coalitional intervention literature. Part of the research by Kreps (2011) and Baltrusaitis (2010) is not just about the logic when great powers resort to multilateral military

Chapter 5 Proxy Interventions: Military burden-sharing in state-tostate interventions

Repeating the theoretical underpinnings of the former chapter, military interventions constitute an important instrument for states to project power in the international system and alter unfolding dynamics in civil wars for the benefits of the intervener. The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 to support a communist leadership (Hilali 2003), whereas the United States militarily supported opposing factions to deny the Soviets a foothold (Hartman 2002). France, the United Kingdom, and the United States intervened in unison in the recent Libyan Civil War in 2011 (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014), and Russia and Iran became active actors in the current civil war in Syria (Wastnidge 2017). The general understanding of these interventions assumes that the intervener has a direct interest in the outcome of the civil war and acts based on its own agency. However, the international system is defined by a web of relationships among different countries. This network can be understood as flat or hierarchical, depending on which theory informs the scholar. Legalists pronounce the equality of states, whereas political science scholars are nuanced about the actual limits of sovereignty (Krasner 1999; Keohane 2005). History illustrates that in several instances a state intervened but was dependent on a great power. Saudi Arabia's and the UAE's participation in the civil war in Yemen was supported with US military supplies. The US, in turn, perceives this intervention as an instrument to push back against Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula.¹⁰⁷

Focusing on the research area of interventions in civil wars, and explicitly on the sub-domain of military interventions, the prior statistical results on proxy interventions in chapter 4 challenge the generally accepted view that states intervene to foster their own interests vis-à-vis the country experiencing civil war. The following case study analysis goes a step further and attempts to address the research question of whether military interventions do occur primarily based on the relationship with a country that does not directly participate in a civil war but has an interest in its outcome. By direct military intervention, I explicitly refer to on-the-ground military combat which jeopardizes the

interventions but also under which conditions smaller states accept being part of a coalition. In the latter case, interests held vis-à-vis the leading state often outweigh interests that are related to the target country.

¹⁰⁷ The American Society of International Law (2019) shows how both the Obama and Trump administrations supported Saudi Arabia with various instruments such as intelligence and refueling of jets, as the Houthi rebels were considered a regional threat. It was Congress which stepped in with a resolution to end military supplies.

lives of soldiers in contrast to just supporting a faction with logistics, arms or intelligence. Is a state willing to bear the costs of a direct military intervention including the risk of casualties chiefly on the relationship it enjoys with another power? If yes, under which conditions can we observe such behavior? While coalitional warfare refers to instances in which the leading power bears the highest burden, e.g., the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Haiti (Kreps 2008) or Australia on the Solomon Islands (Moore 2012), the question in this case would refer to the counterfactual, if states would have intervened had the leading power not provided combat troops.

To answer this question, I focus on a particular subset of interventions, namely such that involve a state intervening with combat troops, but the major beneficiary of the intervention (US or Australia in the aforementioned cases) would only participate indirectly. As explained in more detail in the conceptual section, the condition of indirect intervention indicates interests of the beneficiary in the outcome of the civil war but also indicates that the state is constrained, i.e., not willing enough, to bear the costs of on-the-ground combat. The purpose of this study is to investigate if the assumed phenomenon of proxy interventions by states can be identified as a separate class of interventions which has been overlooked by current scholarship.

To engage with the research question, the following steps have been undertaken. In the subsequent section, the methodological approach is specified and explicated. Subsequently, data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and data on arms trade from SIPRI is used to identify a specific type of interventionism in which the beneficiary engages with military support in a civil war but harnesses another country to implement the intervention with boots on the ground. It follows closely the method section from chapter 4. The following section then engages in two descriptive cases studies to evaluate whether the identified cases meet the expectations of the assumed relationship. The Ugandan intervention in the Central African Republic and the Moroccan intervention in Zaire were chosen for this purpose.

Methodological Framework to analyze Proxy Interventions

To test the principal-agent concept of proxy interventions implemented by states, the process follows two stages. First, I follow the reasoning of Eckstein (1975), who advocates that most-likely samples provide a test of the validity of theoretical propositions. In most-likely samples, the expected causal theory should hold (in contrast to least-likely samples that aim at robustness). In the case of this study, the most-likely sample for testing proxy interventions by states is constituted by the set of cases in which the major arms supplier is only indirectly participating in a civil war, whereas the recipient country uses combat troops on the ground. I believe that according to the aforementioned aspects of unequal interdependency rendered through arms trade, this measurement provides the most-likely sample to observe instances of proxy interventions by states. The separation of military instruments indicates that the great power is inclined to implement military means to achieve a certain outcome in the civil war but not willing enough to commit combat troops. Hence, according to the proxy intervention concept the great power "uses" its relational leverage over the arms recipient to defer the deployment of combat personnel.

In the second step, a thorough analysis of the two cases is conducted to test whether the expectations can be observed or are falsified. George and Bennett (2005) write about the use of case studies as "the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events." While their logic focuses on inductive aspects of theory-building, case studies can from this perspective also be harnessed as "plausibility probes" which are "generally nomothetic in orientation, since the analyst probes the details of a particular case in order to shed light on a broader theoretical argument" Levy (2008: 6). Guiding questions of the following analysis refer to the relationship between the intervening state and the beneficiary. First, does an interest congruence between the intervener and the beneficiary with regards to the outcome in the civil war exist? Second, how does the relationship between the beneficiary and the intervener manifest itself? Third, why does the beneficiary not intervene with troops on the ground?

The first question should answer whether both states had the same interests vis-à-vis the potential civil war outcome. According to the proxy intervention concept, the beneficiary should have

more interest in the outcome than the intervener. The second question probes the interests of the intervener towards the beneficiary. Here, we should expect the driving force of interventionism. The interest itself can be of wide range, as Kreps (2008) identified for the special case of coalitional interventions. Question 3 identifies why the beneficiary did not intervene in the civil war with combat troops. According to the proxy intervention concept, one should observe constraints that only allow for indirect military support.

To avoid selection bias, I identify two such cases for testing the principal-agent concept, which increase their variance regarding the historical conditions within which the cases are embedded (Seawright and Gerring 2008). This approach enables to control for the role of exogenous variables and provides more robustness. One case should be part of the Cold War struggle, and the other should refer to the post-Cold War period. This allows observation of the same phenomenon within international contexts in which different norms regarding military interventionism existed (Finnemore 2003). The overarching norm of non-intervention in domestic affairs was frequently trumped by security interests in the East-West competition. In contrast, the 1990s and 2000s experienced a more pronounced emphasis on human security and the rising norm of "responsibility to protect."

The main goal of this methodological approach is to test the concept against a sample and to uncover whether the expected mechanisms of military proxy interventionism can be observed and hence, whether the concept bears validity with the empirical reality so that proxy interventions by states can be regarded as a distinct class of military interventions in civil wars. The methodology allows investigation of whether the phenomenon as such exists and can be identified. The establishment of genuine cases of proxy interventions by states would corroborate the previous findings of the large-N analysis (Levy 2008).

Identification of Proxy Interventions

To identify all cases which can be classified as proxy interventions (state a intervening with ground troops and state c providing supplies) the UCDP dataset on all recorded instances of civil wars from 1946 until 2017 was harnessed (Pettersson and Eck 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2002). According to their definition, civil wars are instances of violence in which the government of a state is set against a non-state actor who either fights for secessionism or to overthrow the government. To be counted as a civil war, at least 25 battle deaths annually have to be recorded. The civil war dataset is merged with the External Support Data, which is also provided by UCDP (Högbladh et al. 2011). It includes in dyadic format military interventions from 1975 until 2009 and provides details for the exact form of the military intervention. These consist of troop deployment, provision of military intelligence, access to territory, weapons or other types of supply including logistics, training of troops, financial support and other types of relevant supply that do not fit the prior categories. The resulting dataset consists of all pairs of civil war states (state b) with intervening states (state a and state c). The information on the type of military instruments allows the grouping of interventions by troop deployment and those interventions without ground troops.

In the second step, arms trade data from SIPRI is retrieved and used as in chapter 4.¹⁰⁸ Arms trade data on the volume is used to ascertain which state was the major arms supplier of an intervening country. For each state, in a particular year, the cumulative sum of the past 20 years of bilateral arms trade is calculated. For instance, for a country like Indonesia in 1987, cumulative bilateral arms trade volumes from 1968 – 1987 are determined. The country which shows the comparatively highest arms trade volume is regarded as a major arms supplier. Following the conceptual discussion, only great powers are considered. For the definition of a great power, post Second World War data provided by the Correlates of War project is utilized (Correlates of War Project 2017). Japan and (West) Germany are not deemed to be true great powers because both followed policies of non-use of military personnel abroad and both were militarily subordinated in the alliance system of the United States. Japan's constitution has not allowed for military interventions outside its country. Consequently, only five states

¹⁰⁸ See https://sipri.org, retrieved on the 31.07.2019.

are regarded as great powers, namely the United States, the Soviet Union (later Russia), China, the United Kingdom, and France.

The rule to regard the past 20 years of arms supply is grounded on two observations. First, countries rarely have only one state as their major arms supplier but can benefit from different providers. This is especially the case for countries which were supported by a group of Western states, namely France, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Second, some arms sales are crucially important and signify a deeper, long-term relationship between two countries. For instance, the purchase of jets and tanks, as well as other technologically sophisticated armaments, establishes durable relationships due to maintenance, training, and the supply of spare parts. However, such purchases are not frequently conducted due to high related financial costs. Counting only recent supply could mean that a great power which only provides small arms to a recipient country would be counted as the major supplier.

To prevent obscuring long-term and insignificant relationships, 20 years are used to approximate better weighting of influences by the supplying states. Nevertheless, by extending the time to 20 years, the downside is to forgo swift changes in the foreign policy outlook, which typically only occur due to extensive international or domestic changes. Such a historical event is the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the NATO alliance system. Since the Soviet Union was the primary provider to these countries over the course of the 1980s, the change to Western suppliers in the few years at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s could potentially lead to cases in which Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union is counted as the primary supplier of a NATO member. The empirical data will show whether this leads to artifacts.

Merging the data on interventionism in civil wars with the data on arms trade allows for the observation of instances in which both the assumed beneficiary (state c) and the intervening country (state a) were militarily engaged in the same civil war (state b). According to prior deliberations, state a must send ground troops and state c must be militarily involved, in at least one year, without troop commitment. The relationship between state a and c is determined by the volume of arms trade. State c constitutes the major arms supplier for state a. Table 5-1 provides a list of all military interventions which are identified as a specific type of proxy interventions. State b represents the target country in

which the civil war is ongoing. In contrast, state a and state c both intervene in the same year in state b. However, the roles are divided between both actors. Due to the coding rules of civil wars and the calculation of arms trade data, some cases warrant deeper explanation.

Year	Civil War (state b)	Troop provider (state a)	Indirect Intervention (state c)
1984, 1986/87	Chad	France	United States
1977	Zaire	Morocco	United States
1979	Uganda	Libya, Tanzania	Soviet Union
2009	Uganda	Central African Republic	United States
1990	Rwanda	Zaire	France
1977, 1981/83	Ethiopia	Cuba	Soviet Union
1976	Angola	South Africa	France
1975-1991	Angola	Cuba	Soviet Union
1985	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	United Kingdom
1975-1979	Morocco	Mauretania	France
2004	Algeria	Mali, Chad	United States
2009	Algeria	Mali	United States
1982	Israel	Syria	Soviet Union
1979	Yemen	Ethiopia	Soviet Union
1975	Oman	Jordan, UK, Iran	United States
2003	Afghanistan	Poland, Romania	Russia
2001	United States	Poland	Russia

Table 5-1: Proxy Interventions with state a supplying troops and state c providing military support without troop commitment. Note: The period under consideration ranges from 1975 – 2009.

In total, there were fifteen different civil wars which experienced proxy interventions. Of those, nine occurred on African soil, with three happening in the Middle East. Two instances are to some degree artifacts of the coding rules which. It is a subjective assessment based on historical knowledge of the cases and is free to debate. The "civil war' in the United States refers to the 9/11 attacks conducted by Al-Qaeda and is coded as an internationalized civil war in the UCDP dataset. Poland joined the coalition forces to fight against the Taliban, who were providing sanctuary for the Al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan. Russia due to the coding rules is counted as the major arms supplier as NATO membership for Poland was a relatively new condition. The accession was completed in 1999, just two years before the terrorist attacks in the United States. However, Russia initially supported the United States in their fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and therefore although the motivation of Poland to intervene in Afghanistan was primarily motivated by its relationship with the US, it had an interest congruence in this year with Russia. Similarly, as the arms trade volume provided by the US to Poland

and Romania has not yet surpassed by 2003 the previous arms volumes of Russia, the latter is still counted as a major arms supplier. These two cases should be therefore removed from consideration as they do not reflect the relationships that were present when the interventions were conducted and are a consequence of the swiftly changing international configuration in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War.

In the following two sections, the cases of Uganda against the LRA in the Central African Republic and Morocco against the Shaba insurgents in Zaire were chosen. The civil war in Zaire occurred in 1977, hence amid the Cold War. The intervening country was Morocco, a state with a distance of over 5000 kilometers to the battlefields in the interior of Zaire. Its main arms provider was the United States at that time, which also intervened but provided only logistic support and arms supply. Both countries intervened on the side of the government in Zaire. In the second case, the Ugandan intervention in the Central African Republic in the year 2009 is analyzed. In this case, Uganda is not a neighboring country but still deployed combat troops against the Lord Resistance Army (LRA). Uganda was supported by the military of the United States which however did not send its ground forces. To test the validity of the theory of proxy interventions, for each conflict, a short historical introduction is provided, which is then followed by an analysis and evaluation of the three questions.

Case Studies – The United States and Proxy Interventions

Zaire and Shaba

Historically, during the turbulent years of the Congo Crisis following the independence of the Belgian Congo in 1960, the resource-rich region of Katanga attempted to secede from the centralized rule in Kinshasa with the help of Belgian troops. However, by 1963 the first secessionist rebellion was suppressed by the Western and UN-supported government of Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu. Nevertheless, the sentiment for greater autonomy and independence did not fade away and erupted with the arrival of FLNC (Front de libération nationale congolaise) rebels from Angola in 1977 again in large-scale uprisings which are remembered as the Shaba I and Shaba II rebellions (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1979). The rebels were constituted by pro-Tshombe soldiers. Tshombe served as president of the short-lived State of Katanga from 1960 to 1963. They fled from Congo in the second half of the 1960s and regrouped in

Angola. The ensuing First Shaba War drew attention from Western states, in particular, the United States and France. Ultimately, the war was concluded by the deployment of Moroccan troops who were transported by French military aviation (van Reybrouck 2016).¹⁰⁹

Referring to question 1 on the interests of the beneficiary and the intervening country the following can be stated. After the independence of the Belgian Congo, the US had a crucial interest in upholding the territorial integrity of the Congo as well as keeping it firmly within the Western anticommunist camp. The province of Katanga was already a region of interest for the United States during the Second World War, when local uranium deposits became the source for the first nuclear bombs devised in the Manhattan Project (Williams 2016). During the Cold War, Congo became a crucial supplier of cobalt, an element crucial for the production of military armaments. When the First Shaba War began, Mobutu asked Western powers for military support (Schatzberg 1989).

According to Schatzberg (1989), it is difficult to understand clear Moroccan interests in Zaire. One could argue with historical ties to the Congo as Morocco participated in its first UN mission in 1965. However, as he points out, the clearest interpretation is based on the relationship Morocco had with the United States and France. He states that: "Since Zaire had voted against Polisario, Hassan might well have seen this as a chance not only to repay diplomatic debt but also to collect 'chits' from both the French and the Americans which could later be redeemed in forms of aid in the Sahara" (ibid. 332). This indicates that the true motivation behind the provision of ground troops in the conflict was less based on the outcome of the civil war but more by Morocco's relationship with its two largest arms suppliers. The perception that the insurgency in Katanga was guided by communist ideology urged both the United States and Morocco to take action.

Investigating question 2, namely the connection between the intervener and the beneficiary leads to the following conclusion. The relationship between the troop provider Morocco and the beneficiary the United States was in the 1970s determined by the long-standing alliance between Morocco and the United States as well as the US stance towards Moroccan actions taken in Western

¹⁰⁹ The following Second Shaba War similarly ended with a loss for the rebels inflicted by French Foreign Legion soldiers and Belgian paratroopers.

Sahara and Morocco's relationship with France. Morocco under King Hassan II was keen to become the successor administrator of Western Sahara after Spain released its colony, as was evident in the government-organized "Green March" in 1975. According to Mundy (2006), it was in the interest of the US to support Morocco in the Western Saharan Crisis as it proved to be in the past a steadfast ally against Arab nationalism and socialism. Both, France and the US protected Morocco from adverse UN resolutions within the Security Council. Furthermore, the United States engaged in diplomatic talks with Spain with an outcome favoring Morocco in the Western Saharan Crisis. The French were a member of a joint alliance of intelligence services between themselves, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco called the "Safari Club" (Bronson 2008). It was instituted on French initiative and followed US doctrine to contain the spread of socialist governments in Africa at a time when the Carter administration took a more passive stance to US interventionism.

Regarding question 3, the reason why the United States did not intervene militarily, the following aspect played a crucial role. Various US administrations felt constrained to intervene directly with troops in the domestic affairs of newly-independent countries in Sub-Saharan Africa out of fear of being perceived as a neo-colonial, imperialist power and thereby to jeopardize crucial relations with states that had been former colonies and formed a sizable bloc within the United Nations. Therefore, the United States relied on other powers like France and Belgium in the case of the Simba rebellion in 1964 to push back against what was perceived as a communist-inspired uprising (Gleijeses 2010).

Concluding based on the relationship among the United States, Morocco, and Zaire, the intervention in the secessionist conflict of Katanga, can be understood as a genuine state-to-state "proxy intervention." The Moroccan government did not have an intrinsic interest in the civil war in Zaire. Its motivation originated in its relationship with its alliance with its major arms supplier, the United States, and former colonial power, France. Part of the support was constituted by the diplomatic backing of the ambitions of King Hassan II in the Western Saharan Crisis in 1975 and thereafter. In turn, Morocco, who was sharing foreign policy goals with the United States, became part of an intelligence alliance with clear ambitions of containing Soviet encroachment on the African continent. Whereas the United States under the Carter administration was not willing to send military troops to assist Mobutu, it

nonetheless became active in the provision of material and logistics. France airlifted Moroccan soldiers to Zaire, and they proved to be a significant factor in the suppression of the FLNC rebels. This intervention served the interests of the United States by maintaining a territorially stable Zaire and served the interests of the Moroccan government by gaining compensation from the US and French for (future) arms supplies and diplomatic support.

Uganda and the LRA

The origins of the Lord's Resistance Army date back to the civil war in Uganda in the 1980s (Branch et al. 2010). Soldiers from the Acholi were on the losing side when Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) claimed victory and overthrew Tito Okello from the presidency. Following suppressive moves by Museveni's government against tribes in the North of Uganda, his support of the Karamojong, a group hated by the Acholi due to frequent cattle-raids, and a distrust of his motifs by the Acholi created fertile ground for the galvanization of armed resistance groups. Regrouping occurred mainly in Sudan where also members of the wider Acholi people were living. In 1988, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) emerged based on spiritual beliefs anchored in traditional belief and Christianity (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999). Joseph Kony, apparently a cousin of Alice Auma, the leader of the HSM, began his own rebel group in 1987 which he initially called the Holy Spirit Movement II but later changed the name to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Filling his movement with rebels from the defeated Acholi insurgency groups, HSM, and the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), he organized the Lord's Resistance Army around native and Christian beliefs with himself as a prophetic leader.

Losing backing from the Acholi people and increased counter-insurgency by Museveni's government in Kampala at the beginning of the 1990s pushed the LRA to the brink of existence. Peace negotiations between the LRA and representatives of the Ugandan army broke down in 1994 when for unclear reasons Museveni halted the talks and issued an ultimatum of surrender which was refused by the LRA and led to the resumption of the civil war (ibid). Retreating from Uganda, the LRA found sanctuary in Sudan which provided training facilities and supplies. As compensation, Kony turned against the SPLM rebellion. Faced with this new situation, the LRA became exceptionally violent

including against its own Acholi people. With abductions of young men and women and the use of brutal methods against the civilian population, the international community paid closer attention to the conflict to the extent that even the International Criminal Court issued warrants against LRA leaders by 2003 (Branch et al. 2010). From 2008, the region of operation of the LRA stretched from Southern Sudan, the DRC and into the Central African Republic with raids and attacks on villages in all three countries. After the failed Operation Lightning Thunder, Kony fled in February 2009 to the CAR which was embroiled in its own civil war against the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CJPJ) (Oxford Analytica 2010).

Investigating the relationship between the intervener and the beneficiary, the following can be said (Question 2). The operations of the UPDA against the LRA outside Uganda must be considered from the perspective of the relationship between Uganda and its major arms supplier, the United States. For the US, Uganda constituted the hub from which politics in East Africa could be influenced according to its interests (Epstein 2017). Through Uganda, arms supplies from the US reached the SPLA which was fighting the Islamic government in Khartoum. Similarly, Museveni supported Paul Kagame, who received military training in the United States, whereas his Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) received sanctuary in Uganda and military equipment during the civil war in Rwanda in the early 1990s. Equally, after the joint military intervention in Somalia by Ethiopia and the US against the Islamic Court Union (ICU) in Somalia, the United Nations authorized a peacekeeping mission by the African Union in which several thousand US-trained Ugandan soldiers were deployed to support the US-favored Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This was a win-win situation according to which Museveni was able to train his soldiers in combat, deploy them away from Uganda and earn \$20 million annually (ibid. 160). Despite reports of human rights violations within Uganda and allegations of electoral fraud, Uganda remains to-date an important close ally in security matters for the United States and receives military aid (ibid. 179).

Regarding the interests of beneficiary and intervener in the civil war (Question 1), for the United States, the LRA posed an actor that should be targeted based on humanitarian reasons and

security interests. In his letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,¹¹⁰ the LRA was denounced as inflicting violations of human rights through killings, rapes, and abductions. Along these lines, the U.S. President, Barack Obama, also stated that "[...] deploying these U.S. Armed Forces furthers U.S. national security interests and foreign policy [...]". Foremost, the United States was concerned about the instability the LRA could bring to the region. Hence, it became militarily active against the LRA in Central Africa in 2008 and enacted in 2010 the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act which designated Joseph Kony a "global terrorist."¹¹¹ In 2011, the United States sent over 100 military advisors who were to support regional governments and in particular the UDPF in the pursuit of the LRA. Kony was to be apprehended or removed (Arieff et al. 2015).

However, the interest of Uganda in fighting against the LRA in the context of atrocities committed in the Central African Republic (and other countries) was limited. The LRA posed no security threat to Uganda at that time, and Ugandan military personnel were not convinced that it was effectively possible to capture Joseph Kony. An observation raised even by U.S. military personnel: "Although the Ugandan military (Ugandan People's Defense Force or UPDF) is regarded as the most effective of the African forces involved, some observers have questioned its capacity and commitment to complete the mission" (Arieff et al. 2015). An assessment shared by some of the U.S. military advisors engaged in the mission was that searching for Kony was like searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack.¹¹² The joint mission between the US and Uganda ended in 2017 without having captured Joseph Kony but with a significant impact on the capacity of the LRA to conduct future guerilla operations (Cakaj and Titeca 2017).

Summarizing the empirical data, considering the concept of proxy interventions, the following observations can be made. First, both the United States and Uganda had an interest in putting an end to

¹¹⁰https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/14/letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro-tempore, retrieved on the 20.02.2019.

¹¹¹ https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/1067/text/enr, retrieved on the 20.02.2019.

¹¹²https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/inside-green-berets-hunt-warlord-joseph-kony-

n726076?utm_content=bufferbb627&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer, retrieved on the 20.02.2019.

the rebellion by the LRA. For the United States, the LRA constituted a destabilizing actor in a vulnerable environment, especially the Central African Republic. In contrast, the LRA was a rebel group that committed brutal atrocities in Uganda and fought the government since the late 1980s. Second, Uganda and the United States were in a close relationship which mainly manifested itself through the supply of arms. Uganda acted in several cases as a proxy in various settings for the United States even before 2009. Third, the United States, however, perceived the LRA as a threat which local actors had to combat with their own troops. Referring to question 3, the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 explicitly only allowed for "providing political, economic, military, and intelligence support" (Section 3, paragraph 1). Congress explicitly asked for a supporting mission that did not jeopardize the lives of US soldiers. Lastly, it appears that the United States had a higher interest in eliminating the LRA than the Ugandan army did. The UPDF ceased its operations at the same moment the US announced its withdrawal from the mission.

Concluding Remarks on the Case Studies

The case studies began with the assumption that the motivation to engage in military interventions in civil wars cannot be purely understood in terms of the interests the intervener pursues in the civil war. Literature on coalitional military interventions has raised a red flag by analyzing the motivation of great powers to assemble coalitions and the motivation of states to participate eventually (Kreps 2011, 2008; Baltrusaitis 2010; Wolford 2015). Also, studies on "actor-centric" explanations revealed that states intervene in civil wars depending on where their rivals intervene (Findley and Teo 2006). In this analysis, a further step was taken, and it was hypothesized that there exists a subset of military interventions in civil war in which the intervening country intervenes on behalf of another state, typically a great power. To substantiate this claim, I argued that the relationship between two states could be understood from the principal-agent perspective, a concept that was already used for the identification of third state and rebel group relationships (Salehyan 2007; Salehyan et al. 2011). In the case of two sovereign states, the principal, a great power, and the agent can be identified by analyzing defense ties bases on arms trade. Furthermore, arms trade creates unequal interdependencies as the supplier wields diplomatic leverage over the recipient.

In the next step, using arms trade data from SIPRI and information on military interventions in civil wars from the UCDP, all instances were identified in which the agent (recipient of arms supplies) intervened with combat troops on the ground in a civil war and the principal (supplier of arms) only partook with the provision of intelligence, logistics or other indirect forms of intervention. Fifteen cases were identified to exhibit these properties, whereas two cases were disregarded based on a subjective assessment that first to code the War on Terror of the United States and Al Qaeda as a civil war is questionable and second the role of Russia constituting a principal of Romania and Poland at the beginning of the 2000s is a coding artifact caused by the swiftly changing political landscape in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War.

Two cases out of the fifteen identified were analyzed based on three questions in order to test whether the assumptions laid out by using the principal-agent concept reflect the empirical realities. The historical cases of the intervention of Morocco in Zaire during the First Shaba War and the Ugandan intervention to fight the LRA on the soil of the Central African Republic do not falsify the deduced expectations of the principal-agent framework. In each case, the interest of the intervener was less salient towards the outcome of the civil war than the interest of the beneficiary. The beneficiary was however constrained by its choice and avoided participation with combat troops on the ground. Once the beneficiary lost interest in the civil war and withdrew (LRA) or the mission was accomplished (Zaire), then the intervening forces followed suit and were deployed back to their home country without attempting to alter the dynamics of the civil war further. Concluding, the empirical cases illustrate the existence of proxy interventions in accordance with the expectations laid out by the principal-agent framework. This analysis provides a further piece of knowledge to understand proxy interventions by states and complements the results of chapter 4.

Chapter 6 Conclusions and Implications

The dissertation began by laying out the research puzzle which concerned the contradictory results provided by studies investigating various economic factors that could potentially drive the decision to intervene in a civil war. The focus here was in chapter 3 to test a new concept based on the existence of foreign direct investments and followed the dyadic approach of previous studies. Chapter 4 proposed to break out of the narrow conception to solely investigate monadic or dyadic effects in relation to the motivation to intervene in a civil war, but instead introduced the idea to focus on indirect effects in the form of dependence between a smaller power and a great power. Chapter 5 accompanied the statistical results of the previous chapter by testing the theory of proxy interventions in two empirical cases. The results of the dissertation indicate that currently understood motivation portfolio of states should be enlarged. Effects from established concepts like alliances, trade, rivalry, colonial relationship and humanitarian concerns should be accompanied by the inclusion of the *direct* effects concerning existing foreign direct investments (as well as natural resource needs) and *indirect* effects concerning arms trade dependencies between the potential intervener and a great power.

Consequently, the analysis concerning foreign direct investments indicates that prior investments through multinational corporations in host countries significantly increase the probability of intervention. The analysis on arms trade highlights that interventions themselves cannot be strictly understood in a dyadic fashion but require the incorporation of the relationship of the intervening country with existing great powers. Conceptually, the effect is best understood from the principal-agent framework in which great powers constitute the principals, and the intervening states constitute the agents. This relationship can be identified using the logic of arms trade, which functions as a conditioning as well as an enabling factor. Major arms suppliers harness their recipients in intervention. The case studies provided empirical evidence for a specific category of state-to-state interventions based on the principal-agent logic, namely such in which the recipient country provides on-the-ground combat troops, and the major arms supplier supports the intervening country with indirect military means. I will go sequentially through the most relevant results and then formulate theoretical and policy-relevant implications in the subsequent section.

The first study concerned the effect of the presence of foreign direct investments in civil war countries. Theoretically, based on a realist understanding, states are concerned about the contribution their economies provide to their societies and national goals. Since the world is competitive among states, economic gains matter to satisfy the domestic audience and to accrue economic power vis-à-vis other states. Economic power can be translated into political and military power. Within this framework, one major source of wealth in an economically interrelated world are corporations. Historically, many countries regarded corporations created and managed by people of the same nationality as indispensable tools to maintain autonomy over the economy in their own country. Latin American states have for decades followed the policies of Import-Substitution to provide an environment for local industry growth. In current times, China has very restrictive regulations in place to protect its home market and capitalize on foreign companies entering their market. Coupled with an authoritarian system, it coined the term the "Beijing Consensus" in contrast to the free-market, liberal "Washington Consensus."

Prior research indicated that states are similarly invested not just to protect corporations at home but also abroad. History provides observations in which, for instance, the United States went great length to protect assets of American multinational corporations in foreign countries in the case of nationalization. This behavior only receded with the advent of international arbitration courts. Further research emphasizes that foreign direct investments should be understood as a form of power projection. The presence of FDI increases the host country dependence on corporations that are more affiliated with their home country than their targets. Corporations can wield leverage in domestic political decisionmaking and can even coordinate with the bureaucracy in their home country. Many industrialized states like Germany and the United States created institutions which foster foreign investments through loan provisions or insurances. Countries like China employ national banks like the Export-Import Bank of China for this purpose. Its current "Belt and Road" – Initiative is underwritten by projects conducted through private, parastatal or state-owned corporations. Since foreign direct investments are strongly encouraged by developed states and corporations enjoy political protection of their home countries in times of crises, the logical step was to understand the the effect of existing corporate assets in foreign countries on home country governments, when the investments are endangered by the unpredictability of internal political violence. This dissertation assumed that foreign direct investments would exert a similar effect on the political leadership in the home country as they did throughout the centuries when trading companies first gained access to previously unchartered territory in foreign countries and were then defended against local usurpation with military means.

The findings of the dissertation have corroborated some of the expectations and falsified others. The prevalence of US interventions indicates that the international system has been strongly ordered in a unipolar fashion in the 2000s. US interests are manifested globally through unilateral military interventionism. Based on inferential statistics, the following conclusions were drawn. First, foreign direct investments constitute an independent predictor for military interventions in civil wars. The larger the existing investments in the target country, the higher the probability that a state might intervene. In the baseline model, the probability of intervening would almost double when the most frequently observed FDI value was imputed. Future oil satisfaction was equally correlated with highly increased intervention likelihood. Second, the results for the uranium variable are tentative because the variable was completely dominated by the United States as producer. Only the French intervention in Niger in 2007 appears to be a genuine case. Third, there seems to be a strong effect of the potential use of oil reserves in civil war countries when accounted for the circumstances that an oil consuming potential intervener cannot produce enough oil from its own soil. Lastly, the effect of defense industry ties with the civil war country is more uncertain as its effect is strongly dependent on the set of variables used in the econometric models.

The second part of this dissertation concentrated deeper on the variable of arms trade which equally propels states to intervene in civil wars but from a different vantage point. Whereas the first part of the dissertation looked at the direct interests of interveners in civil war countries, the second part emphasized that in several cases the intervention is based on interests that are expressed vis-à-vis a third state. Using the principal-agent framework illuminates the directionality of the causal effect of arms trade. Within the international system, the five major powers (China, United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Russia) constitute a group of countries which have global interests and are at the same time major arms providers. The analysis has shown that holding all control variables constant in the case of China, the United States, and Russia, these states induce states to intervene in civil wars.

Additionally, the dissertation examined the validity of the arms trade claim and analyzed a very specific configuration of proxy interventions to test the expected relationship in two cases. In this configuration, the major arms supplier militarily intervened only with indirect means and delegated the direct intervention with active combat troops on the ground to the arms recipient. Fifteen cases were identified to belong to this type of interventions. The cases on the Moroccan intervention in Zaire in 1977 and the Ugandan endeavor against the LRA on the soil of the Central African Republic in 2009 are telling observations in which the United States' interest was not intense enough to risk causalities but high strong enough to pursue a military policy which would address its interests in the civil war.

Morocco clearly pursued its interests vis-à-vis the United States and France in the First Shaba Revolt. It repaid diplomatic debts for the US condoning the take over of Western Sahara and proved itself to be a staunch ally in the past. In turn, the Ugandan government was less interested in fighting the LRA in the Central African Republic once it was decimated enough not to pose a threat to Uganda anymore. For the United States, however, the LRA posed a regional troublemaker that could prove to be a destabilizing factor in the ongoing civil war in CAR and potentially in other countries of the region. It, therefore, relied on its most important ally in East Africa to combat LRA forces without sending onthe-ground troops to minimize political risk at home in the United States.

Implications for Research on Interventions in Civil Wars

The results of the study on foreign direct investments corroborate one crucial aspect in the current research literature on interventions in civil wars. First, the intervention literature has intensively focused on the characteristics of the intervening country or the target country (Findley and Teo 2006) but seldom included relations between both actors.¹¹³ Frequently, the interests of interveners are exogenously determined by aspects of the target country. For instance, the presence of natural resources or the intensity of human rights abuses is assumed to influence the decision-making calculus of states. However, the benefits of natural resources are not uniformly distributed among each potential intervener. A country not reliant on oil for industrial purposes has little to gain in an intervention into an oil-producing country. Similarly, a country without the need for uranium for energy production will hardly take uranium deposits into account during the decision-making process as in the case of France and Niger. In contrast, states with "skin in the game" are much more likely to consider these factors. The results, for instance, resonate with Bove et al. (2016) findings on oil export/import dependence and oil reserves.

This study has shown that economic relationships are mediated through the presence of corporate actors. National corporations, as well as MNCs as independent actors with intermediary effects on political decision-making are under-researched in the Conflict Studies literature and deserve closer scrutiny. A host of studies with the focus on civil war outbreak, civil war intensity, and civil war interventions has frequently used macro-economic data about resource abundance, resource dependence, and resource deposits. Consequently, however, it is the corporation which is relevant for the production, shipment, and manufacturing of natural resources as well as for cash flows on behalf of participating actors. Without investments of corporations in human capital, production technologies, research, and explorations, non-lootable resources would never surface and affect civil war countries (Klosek 2018). The results of this study show that the economic composition of a state has a significant influence on policymakers in their deliberations for interventions. Such a relationship can be expected

¹¹³ Notable exceptions are studies which have focused on trade patterns, refugee movements and transnational rebel movements.

to influence conflict dynamics. I, therefore, argue that further avenues of research are potentially broad and should encompass the analysis of corporate investment effects on fighting capabilities of conflict actors as well as on effects directed towards the population in conflict-ridden environments and on third states with interests in conflict-ridden countries. Recent initiatives like Business for Peace (B4P) and the setting of the Sustainable Development Goal 16 are aiming to harness corporate actors for good governance developments and should be accompanied by academic research in the field of Conflict Studies.

The inclusion of arms trade as an economic factor revealed the more complex relationship on intervention motivation. Instead of measuring only direct interests of the intervener in the target country, arms trade performs as an instrument to maintain a principal-agent relationship between the arms supplier and the recipient country. There have been numerous historical instances in which states asked other states to militarily intervene in ongoing civil wars on behalf of the interests of the former. Arms sales perform as a useful indicator whether two states pursue the same foreign policy goals in an ongoing civil war. Should these interests diverge, and the agent digresses from the expectations of the principal, then arms sales drop (in severe case even halt) as a sanctioning response by the supplier. The statistical results highlight the importance of great power arms supplies to their agents and the willingness to harness arms recipient countries for interventions if it suits both interests. The results further corroborate the assumption that great powers perform as enablers of interventions on behalf of their interests. Intervening states advance through their interventions the interests of the great powers and in several cases jointly intervene. In the most telling cases, the intervening state carried out the "dirty work" with ground troops, whereas the major arms supplier was involved in the same conflict with weapons supplies, logistics or intelligence.

Further research in this regard is in its infancy since the concept of proxy intervention by the state has not been developed since the works of Dunér in the 1980s. Hence, there is much room to explore the impact of triangular interest relationships as well as potential selection bias in our observations of interventions in civil wars. Since arms suppliers perform as enablers, it can be assumed that the intervening countries select at large such civil wars that comply with the foreign policy interests

of the principal. This has several implications. Great powers with interests in the outcome of a civil war are keener to support interventions by states that further great power interests than those that would produce adverse outcomes. Following the logic of this dissertation, further research should explore whether states anticipate and incorporate reactions of other states in their decision-making process in the case of civil war interventions. Intervention observations will be then tilted towards such that are encouraged or condoned by great powers. Great powers can use a wide range of signals that include official statements, diplomatic information exchange, but also inertia. For instance, Hodzi (2019) describes the passiveness of China within the United Nations in the case of the Libyan intervention in 2011 as a miscalculated act which enabled other states to intervene being legitimized with a UN resolution. This proved to culminate in consequences detrimental to its own interests.

Furthermore, if states anticipate great power reactions, in particular, those of major arms suppliers, then we do not observe cases in which interventions would occur based on the interests of the potential intervener in the civil war country but are practically not implemented due to an anticipated punishment through the arms-supplying great power. Both factors, the supporting and the anticipating effect translate into a universe of observations in which the majority of cases (64%) constitute some form of joint interventions. This non-random sample of interventions might have an impact on estimates like at the aforementioned variable on alliances from the actor-centric perspective (Findley and Teo 2006) since arms supplies are granted mainly to countries that follow similar foreign policy objectives. For instance, US arms supply is to a large degree directed towards members of the NATO alliance. This could bias the alliance variable and overestimates its effect. Therefore, future research should investigate whether the observations of interventions in civil war truly constitute a random sample or are biased towards interventions that are in the interests of great powers and hence affect the effect size or variables that are connected to the relationship between the major arms supplier and the recipient country.

Policy Implications

Following the results of the study on FDI, they provide an accentuated picture of military interventionism and contributes to the current debate in political circles on supporting less developed countries (LDCs) through the encouragement of investment. The current wisdom holds that historically interventions were conducted to secure imports of goods (Fordham 2008: 739). However, this study shows by using data after the Cold War period that investment itself plays a crucial explanatory role. This sheds new light on international initiatives to encourage the involvement of private actors in the economic development of countries like those in Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, the G20 summit in Hamburg in 2017, declared in its final communique to "[...] attract African and international private investors and entrepreneurs" in African countries.¹¹⁴ The G20 Compact with Africa (CWA) initiative was launched including the African Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and G20 members. Within the CWA framework, the major focus lies on the reform of legal systems in African countries to foster private investments as well as on the provision of financial instruments to promote development projects like the improvement of infrastructure with private corporations. By 2019, 12 countries have officially joined the CWA initiative with the effect that foreign direct investment instock in CWA countries, like Togo, Benin or Ethiopia, have risen faster compared to countries that have not participated in the CAW initiative.¹¹⁵ The main beneficiaries became the extractive industries accompanied by investments in real estate, metals, chemicals, and the energy sector. According to CAW estimates, cross-border investments (CBIs) were conducted primarily by Russia, China, and Italy.

Similarly, the EU-Africa Business Forum in Abidjan, 2017, stressed the importance to increase and streamline private corporate investments in Africa to achieve the targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).¹¹⁶ In unison with the CAW initiative, the European Commission launched a program, called the External Investment Plan (EIP), to foster foreign direct investments into

¹¹⁴https://www.g20germany.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7_G20/2017-g20-annex-partnership-africaen blob=publicationFile&v=6.pdf, retrieved on the 23.04.2019.

¹¹⁵https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/dam/Compact%20with%20Africa/reports/monitoring%20report.pdf, retrieved on the 23.04.2019.

¹¹⁶ https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/final_declaration_eabf_en_0.pdf, retrieved on the 23.04.2019.

developing countries.¹¹⁷ According to this program, $\in 1.54$ billion can be provided to guarantee loans of financial institutions to private investors. The aim is to attract risk capital into the least developed and fragile countries and at the same time leverage private corporate investments for developmental projects. An estimated goal is to leverage over $\in 17$ billion in areas like agriculture, city development, and the energy sector. Complementing this picture, in December 2018 the so-called *High-Level Forum Africa Europe* was held in Vienna to stimulate European investments in the digital sector in Africa.

On a bilateral level, the Chinese state is intensively engaged with Outward Foreign Direct Investments (OFDIs) globally. According to Yao et al. (2017), this development began already with the "Open Door" policies in 1978, but only truly became significant with at the end of the 2000s as well as with the announcement of the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) which provided a financial and legal framework for private investors abroad. Chinese foreign direct investments are fundamentally based on equity investments, e.g., the provision of loans to countries like Pakistan or Sri Lanka in sectors like transportation or infrastructure. Target regions for Chinese corporate investments encompass both developed countries as well as less developed countries. For instance, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing, 2018, declared "[...] to create a more enabling environment for attracting investment from Chinese enterprises and for industrial capacity cooperation" and pledged investment initiatives worth \$60 billion over the following 3 years.¹¹⁸ Likewise, Latin America and the Caribbean became a popular destination for Chinese ODFI (Dollar 2017). FDI instock more than doubled in the period from 2010 until 2014 to \$100 billion facilitated by the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank.

All these developments have in common that international corporate actors will be more involved in the economic development of LDCs and aim to lower the importance of Official Development Assistance (ODA). One reasoning behind this change is that more developed states attempt to be less entangled within the internal political dynamics of less developed states through foreign aid as foreign aid has become a questionable ingredient for developmental purposes. Over the

¹¹⁷ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/181213-eip-28-guarantees-brochure-final.pdf, retrieved on the 23.04.2019.

¹¹⁸ https://focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn/eng/hyqk_1/t1594297.htm, retrieved on the 23.04.2019.

past two decades, the academic debate on foreign aid revealed that financial and in-kind contributions seldom entail the expected effect in economic growth and societal development. Burnside and Dollar (2000) find in their extensive empirical study that the provision of foreign aid to countries with weak institutions have a zero positive economic effect, whereas states with strong institutions, which show some growth, are not in need of development aid. Easterly et al. (2004) extend Burnside's and Dollar's study and find that the foreign aid effect vanishes when the dataset is extended by four years from 1970-1993 to 1970-1977 and is corrected for missing data. Djankov et al. (2008) even found a negative impact of foreign aid provisions on democratic institutions in recipient countries. What they dub as the "foreign aid curse" exerts 3 to five times a stronger effect on deteriorating institutions than the effect of the so-called "natural resource curse." Leeson (2009: 44) labels this corrosive effect the "destructive dollar hypothesis."

Countries with weak institutions are therefore not just bad targets for foreign aid but are also in much higher risk of experiencing internal armed conflict. Several studies confirm the "weak state hypothesis" (Humphreys 2005: 512) according to which countries with institutions that are fraught with corruption, rent-seeking behavior, cronyism, and neo-patrimonial structures have a higher likelihood of experiencing internal armed conflict. For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003) found several indications of this mechanism¹¹⁹. Among others, anocracies are most prone to internal armed conflict compared to their democratic or autocratic peers who have more established means of control and legitimacy. Similarly, being a new state, being overly dependent on oil exports or having experienced a major recent regime change according to the Polity IV index increases the odds of civil war. In contrast, Walter (2015) shows that civil war recurrence can be kept in check with the development of strong institutions that allow for public participation, the rule of law and the guarantee of political rights.

¹¹⁹ However, there have been notable challenges to the precise link between civil war onset and weak institutionalism. Neudorfer and Theuerkauf (2014) find that corruption increases the risk of ethnic based internal armed conflict but Fjelde (2009) obtain evidence that corruption can in fact decrease the risk of violence in the case of oil rich countries as it enables leaders to buy off competitors. Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) challenge the view that anocracies are more prone to internal violence and identify several weaknesses of the Polity IV index, one of them being that the measures of institutionalism already factor in looming or existing violence, explicitly in the component measuring political competition.

The stimulation of corporate investments by actors like the EU or China with the goal of creation of jobs and the education of human capital in less developed countries is expected to constitute a cornerstone to attain development goals as corporations can overcome some of the detrimental effect of foreign aid provision by lowering the number of stakeholders involved and produce more efficient solutions to the needs of citizens in poorer countries with less rent-seeking impediments through home and host country governments (Leeson 2009). For instance, corporations were part and parcel in the deliberation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by participating in commissions sponsored by the United Nations like the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda (HLP) (Pingeot 2016). As Pingeot (2016: 192) states: "in addition to engaging in multi-stakeholder arrangements, traditional donors are also increasingly using public resources to leverage private finance as part of their development strategy." Hence, not just home countries of corporations foster foreign direct investment through instruments like the reduction of bureaucratic duties, the creation of trading areas or insurances for risky investments but also less developed recipient countries are encouraged to attract foreign direct investment by using public funding in schemes like public-private-partnerships (PPPs).

As a consequence, foreign corporate investments are likely to increase in future in poor countries and the results of the dissertation point at a further entanglement between home and host countries of foreign direct investments. The deepening ties through FDI in the environment of weakly institutionalized and poor countries can have the effect that home states nevertheless become involved in the domestic political decision-making process of target states, whereas the norms of nonintervention and sovereignty should restrain them. Once investments are present in the host country and they become endangered as a consequence of violent internal armed conflict, states might be more willing to intervene to secure those investments. Hence, the push for more foreign direct investments in weakly institutionalized and poor countries as a supplement or replacement of foreign aid will in fact not ensure less interference in the domestic affairs of poorer host countries by wealthier home countries, but instead provide a further reason to protect the property rights of corporate investors in fragile environments with the use of indirect or direct military instruments. We can already observe how this pull factor affects home countries in their willingness to become involved in foreign internal armed conflicts. One telling story of this development can be observed in the case of China.

Hodzi (2019) provides a compelling account of how China had to reinvent its foreign policy doctrines in the context of internal armed conflicts in Africa where it became a major stakeholder through prior corporate investments. Two of their fundamental foreign policy principles consist of "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity" and "non-interference in each other's internal affairs" (ibid. 54) and both became challenged through the endangerment of the existing investments. Hozdi argues that in the cases of Mali and South Sudan, China used its leverage based on prior investments and export dependency to alter internal conflict dynamics. In Mali, additional to financial lending China was engaged with investments in the agricultural sector as well as with infrastructure projects. China Railway Construction Limited was awarded to rebuild the Bamako-Dhakar railway line worth \$2.7 billion (ibid. 147-148). The historically third successful coup d'état in Mali in 2012 by the Malian army led the Chinese government for the first time to give up the posture of indifference and as it called for the protection of Chinese nationals and investment living in Mali (ibid. 154).

In the case of South Sudan, the relationship between China and the SPLM had a rocky start as China became the major investor in the oil sector in Sudan-proper before 2005 which included oil installations in Southern territories. Bilateral relations warmed after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CAP) in 2005 between Khartoum and the SPLM and China became one of the first countries to recognize South Sudan as an independent state. Being present with investments from the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and Sinopec, the ensuing civil war in 2013 between the SPLM and the SPLM-IO jeopardized and damaged the oil infrastructure as well as endangered investments by construction and telecommunication corporations (ibid. 185). According to Hodzi, in contrast to its non-intervention doctrine, China initiated clandestine meetings with SPLM-IO representatives in Addis Ababa to ensure the security of Chinese oil infrastructure in rebel-held territories (ibid 187–188). It then participated in mediation talks in conjunction with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) between the warring factions and neighboring countries culminating in the IGAD-PLUS framework (ibid. 193). In addition to its diplomatic maneuvering in Mali and South Sudan, in both civil wars China has become part of UN peacekeeping missions and by March 31st, 2019, it contributed over 1000 soldiers to the UNMISS peace operation in the conflict in South Sudan.

The economic rise of China entails economic investments globally and with it a higher propensity of Chinese involvement in the domestic affairs of foreign countries against their own principles of non-interventionism and respect of sovereignty. In unison with European countries, the United States, and other emerging, existing or rising powers like Russia, India or Japan, the trend for more global foreign direct investments is currently unfolding. According to data from the World Bank,¹²⁰ the world experienced from 2010 until 2017 each year over \$1.7 trillion in worldwide foreign direct investments. A substantial fraction consists of genuine investments in the economies of host countries. In the context of this development together with the competition between states vying for market access for their corporations in foreign markets, the rise of interdependence between states will not just consist of trade but also localized investment. Foreign direct investments are one component that defines interstate relationships, and if we take the results of this study seriously, we will observe in future increasing rates of at interferences in domestic politics of host countries with all the potential consequences that interventions can entail.

¹²⁰ https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BM.KLT.DINV.CD.WD, retrieved on the 29.04.2019.

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Appendix

Dependent Variable	Military Interventions							
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	
Corporate Hypotheses								
Log(FDI)	0.186***	0.197***	0.300***	0.223***	0.294***	0.175***	0.187***	
	(0.0302)	(0.0292)	(0.0315)	(0.0375)	(0.0313)	(0.0310)	(0.0349)	
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.412***	0.430***	0.375***	0.316***	0.370***	0.191***	0.197***	
0.1	(0.0649)	(0.0639)	(0.0641)	(0.0652)	(0.0669)	(0.0617)	(0.0636)	
Oilsatisfaction	1.034***							
I (0'1)	(0.261)	0 1 (0 * * *	0.0211	0.005(4	0.0217	0 112**	0 104**	
Log(Oilneed)		0.169***	0.0311 (0.0511)	0.00564 (0.0513)	0.0317 (0.0517)	0.113^{**}	0.124**	
Lucasian	0.519	(0.0557) -0.318	0.148	0.0769	(0.0317) 0.119	(0.0517) 0.230	(0.0519) 0.230	
Uraniumsatisfaction	-0.518	(0.456)			(0.395)	(0.343)		
Control Variables	(0.482)	(0.430)	(0.387)	(0.358)	(0.393)	(0.545)	(0.358)	
Alliance			-0.0844	-0.129	-0.0612	0.231	0.262	
Amanee			(0.277)	(0.269)	(0.280)	(0.231)	(0.287)	
Peaceful Relations			-4.185***	-4.333***	-4.160***	-3.841***	-3.762***	
			(1.224)	(1.329)	(1.216)	(1.375)	(1.378)	
Contiguity			0.638**	0.403	0.603*	0.482	0.542	
contiguity			(0.319)	(0.331)	(0.325)	(0.326)	(0.348)	
Log(distance)			-0.464***	-0.509***	-0.462***	-0.639***	-0.626***	
			(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.137)	
Shared Ethnicity			0.218	0.108	0.243	-0.0985	-0.0711	
, ,			(0.258)	(0.252)	(0.260)	(0.254)	(0.260)	
Temporal Dependency				· /			× /	
Last Intervention			-0.902***	-0.932***	-0.902***	-0.877***	-0.868***	
			(0.0591)	(0.0613)	(0.0594)	(0.0576)	(0.0573)	
Humanitarian Hypothesis								
Log(battle deaths)			0.916***	0.931***	0.916***	0.873***	0.868***	
			(0.0654)	(0.0674)	(0.0652)	(0.0643)	(0.0629)	
Alternative Explanations								
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.124***			-0.0341	
				(0.0338)			(0.0334)	
Colonial History					1.201		0.518	
					(0.780)		(0.660)	
Log(Military Exp.)t-1						0.373***	0.388***	
	1 220444	1.000	0.001**	2 (02*	0.004	(0.0454)	(0.0475)	
Constant	-4.329***	-4.390***	-2.881**	-2.683*	-2.924**	-6.521***	-6.793***	
	(0.0996)	(0.114)	(1.355)	(1.417)	(1.361)	(1.537)	(1.522)	
Observations	40,581	40,581	35,056	35,056	35,056	33,920	33,920	
Pseudo R2	0.0615	0.0584	0.371	0.377	0.373	0.415	0.415	
BIC	6690	6712	4446	4411	4443	4055	4070	
log-likelihood	-3318	-3329	-2160	-2137	-2153	-1960	-1957	

Foreign Direct Investment Model: Logit Regression

Table 0-1: Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars, 2001 - 2009. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

D 1 . 11 11) (¹	. .	•		
Dependent Variable				tary Intervent			
Independent Variables	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
<i>a</i>							
Corporate Hypotheses	0 10 (****	0 107***	0 202***	0.010***	0 207***	0 170***	0 10 (***
Log(FDI)	0.186***	0.197***	0.303***	0.219***	0.297***	0.178***	0.186***
	(0.0302) 0.412***	(0.0292) 0.430***	(0.0309) 0.357***	(0.0371) 0.294***	(0.0308)	(0.0308) 0.179***	(0.0347) 0.182***
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}					0.351***		
Oilsatisfaction	(0.0649) 1.034***	(0.0639)	(0.0623)	(0.0628)	(0.0651)	(0.0600)	(0.0620)
OliSatistaction	(0.261)						
Log(Oilneed)	(0.201)	0.169***	0.0416	0.0151	0.0421	0.120**	0.127**
Log(Officed)		(0.0557)	(0.0506)	(0.0506)	(0.0512)	(0.0510)	(0.0510)
Uraniumsatisfaction	-0.518	-0.318	0.204	0.137	0.182	0.301	0.296
C Touristicition	(0.482)	(0.456)	(0.388)	(0.355)	(0.395)	(0.344)	(0.356)
Control Variables	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
Alliance			-0.0364	-0.0827	-0.0154	0.275	0.297
			(0.275)	(0.267)	(0.278)	(0.287)	(0.285)
Peaceful Relations			-4.213***	-4.362***	-4.180***	-3.860***	-3.795***
			(1.186)	(1.297)	(1.181)	(1.373)	(1.379)
Contiguity			0.652**	0.406	0.619*	0.509	0.547
			(0.321)	(0.333)	(0.326)	(0.324)	(0.345)
Log(distance)			-0.444***	-0.492***	-0.442***	-0.618***	-0.608***
			(0.134)	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.137)
Shared Ethnicity			0.253	0.132	0.278	-0.0622	-0.0382
			(0.260)	(0.253)	(0.261)	(0.254)	(0.258)
Temporal Dependency			0.010***	2 000***	2 000****	1 0 5 4 ***	1 0 2 0 4 4 4
Last Intervention			-2.012***	-2.088***	-2.009***	-1.954***	-1.939***
1' 1			(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.149)	(0.152)	(0.149)
_spline1			-0.458^{***}	-0.472^{***}	-0.457^{***}	-0.454^{***}	-0.451^{***}
_spline2			(0.0757) 0.286***	(0.0746) 0.293***	(0.0761) 0.286***	(0.0766) 0.292***	(0.0765) 0.291***
_spinez			(0.0644)	(0.0640)	(0.0647)	(0.0654)	(0.0655)
_spline3			-0.160***	-0.163***	-0.160***	-0.170***	-0.170***
_spines			(0.0534)	(0.0533)	(0.0535)	(0.0545)	(0.0546)
Humanitarian Hypothesis			(0.0554)	(0.0555)	(0.0555)	(0.05+5)	(0.0340)
Log(battle deaths)			0.911***	0.928***	0.910***	0.871***	0.867***
Log(came deales)			(0.0624)	(0.0642)	(0.0622)	(0.0614)	(0.0602)
Alternative Explanations			(0.002.)	(0.00.12)	(0.0022)	(010011)	(0.0002)
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.135***			-0.0244
				(0.0339)			(0.0336)
Colonial History				. /	1.172		0.495
-					(0.761)		(0.644)
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}						0.371***	0.380***
						(0.0452)	(0.0475)
Constant	-4.329***	-4.390***	-2.850**	-2.652*	-2.894**	-6.485***	-6.677***
	(0.0996)	(0.114)	(1.333)	(1.407)	(1.340)	(1.525)	(1.512)
Observations	40,581	40,581	35,056	35,056	35,056	33,920	33,920
Pseudo R2	0.0615	0.0584	0.382	0.390	0.384	0.425	0.426
BIC	6690	6712	4396	4355	4394	4016	4033
log-likelihood	-3318	-3329	-2120	-2094	-2113	-1925	-1923

Foreign Direct Investment Model: Logit Regression with splines

Table 0-2: Logit Regression with splines – Military interventions in civil wars, 2001 - 2009. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Dependent Variable	Military Interventions							
Independent Variables	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19			
Corporate Hypotheses								
Log(FDI)	0.556***	0.348***	0.537***	0.316***	0.277***			
	(0.0681)	(0.0695)	(0.0678)	(0.0658)	(0.0678)			
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.266**	0.183	0.254**	0.144	0.124			
	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.116)			
Log(Oil _{need})	0.512***	0.410***	0.521***	0.631***	0.591***			
	(0.0860)	(0.0845)	(0.0864)	(0.0921)	(0.0923)			
Uraniumsatisfaction	2.381***	2.033***	2.250***	2.121***	1.982***			
	(0.769)	(0.741)	(0.770)	(0.721)	(0.721)			
Control Variables	× ,	()		· · · ·	· · · ·			
Alliance	0.543	0.333	0.568	1.187***	1.076**			
	(0.460)	(0.440)	(0.461)	(0.459)	(0.458)			
Peaceful Relations	-6.540***	-7.039***	-6.235***	-5.411***	-5.585***			
	(1.924)	(1.831)	(1.919)	(1.845)	(1.838)			
Contiguity	1.554**	0.982*	1.513**	1.483**	1.287**			
contiguity	(0.639)	(0.595)	(0.639)	(0.592)	(0.591)			
Log(distance)	-0.624***	-0.710***	-0.621***	-0.929***	-0.927***			
Log(distance)	(0.233)	(0.229)	(0.234)	(0.248)	(0.245)			
Shared Ethnicity	1.481***	1.006**	1.530***	0.744	0.717			
shared Ethnicity	(0.510)	(0.490)	(0.511)	(0.488)	(0.484)			
Town ougl Don ou dou ou	(0.510)	(0.490)	(0.311)	(0.400)	(0.464)			
<i>Temporal Dependency</i> Last Intervention	-0.402***	-0.451***	-0.399***	-0.417***	-0.426***			
Last Intervention				*****	* • • • = *			
II	(0.0526)	(0.0545)	(0.0528)	(0.0551)	(0.0548)			
Humanitarian Hypothesis	0 (22***	0 711***	0 (25***	0 (0(***	0 (25***			
Log(total refugees)	0.623***	0.711***	0.625***	0.606***	0.635***			
	(0.0632)	(0.0645)	(0.0633)	(0.0621)	(0.0642)			
Alternative Explanations								
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}		0.361***			0.109*			
		(0.0553)			(0.0600)			
Colonial History			3.379***		1.432			
			(1.048)		(0.993)			
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}				0.661***	0.584***			
				(0.0790)	(0.0830)			
Constant	-4.429*	-3.821*	-4.671**	-10.89***	-10.03***			
	(2.282)	(2.218)	(2.293)	(2.440)	(2.448)			
Observations	35,788	35,788	35,788	34,772	34,772			
Number of iddyad	6,631	6,631	6,631	6,576	6,576			
ho	0.825	0.806	0.825	0.804	0.803			
sigma	3.933	3.698	3.934	3.673	3.660			
BIC	2937	2903	2938	2800	2815			
log-likelihood	-1400	-1378	-1396	-1327	-1324			

Foreign Direct Investment Model: Random Effect Regression with refugee as control	

Table 0-3: Random Effect Regression – Military interventions in civil wars with refugees as control, 2001 - 2009. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

el 20 6*** 660) 55 114) 5*** 912) 99** '44) 68* 99** (68) 9** (44) 68* 9** 550) 2*** 2** 288) 11* 14* 14* 14* 14* 14* 14* 14*	Model 21 0.207*** (0.0698) 0.146 (0.114) 0.325*** (0.0924) 1.659** (0.745) 1.111** (0.468) -5.424*** (1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040*** (0.238)	Model 22 0.235*** (0.0660) 0.156 (0.114) 0.343*** (0.0913) 1.708** (0.746) 1.166** (0.468) -5.201*** (1.978) 1.664** (0.651) -1.008***	Model 23 0.131** (0.0635) 0.124 (0.109) 0.421*** (0.0919) 1.615** (0.709) 1.532*** (0.471) -5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631) -1.172***	Model 24 0.172** (0.0680) 0.140 (0.111) 0.464*** (0.0940) 1.714** (0.720) 1.673*** (0.478) -4.712** (1.962) 1.780*** (0.638) -1.121***
660) 55 14) 5*** 912) 99** 744) 68** 688) 99** 75) 59** 550) 2*** 238)	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0698) \\ 0.146 \\ (0.114) \\ 0.325^{***} \\ (0.0924) \\ 1.659^{**} \\ (0.745) \\ \hline 1.111^{**} \\ (0.468) \\ -5.424^{***} \\ (1.965) \\ 1.564^{**} \\ (0.652) \\ -1.040^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0660) \\ 0.156 \\ (0.114) \\ 0.343^{***} \\ (0.0913) \\ 1.708^{**} \\ (0.746) \\ \hline \\ 1.166^{**} \\ (0.468) \\ -5.201^{***} \\ (1.978) \\ 1.664^{**} \\ (0.651) \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0635) \\ 0.124 \\ (0.109) \\ 0.421^{***} \\ (0.0919) \\ 1.615^{**} \\ (0.709) \\ \hline 1.532^{***} \\ (0.471) \\ -5.093^{***} \\ (1.920) \\ 1.548^{**} \\ (0.631) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0680) \\ 0.140 \\ (0.111) \\ 0.464^{***} \\ (0.0940) \\ 1.714^{**} \\ (0.720) \\ 1.673^{***} \\ (0.478) \\ -4.712^{**} \\ (1.962) \\ 1.780^{***} \\ (0.638) \end{array}$
660) 55 14) 5*** 912) 99** 744) 68** 688) 99** 75) 59** 550) 2*** 238)	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0698) \\ 0.146 \\ (0.114) \\ 0.325^{***} \\ (0.0924) \\ 1.659^{**} \\ (0.745) \\ \hline 1.111^{**} \\ (0.468) \\ -5.424^{***} \\ (1.965) \\ 1.564^{**} \\ (0.652) \\ -1.040^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0660) \\ 0.156 \\ (0.114) \\ 0.343^{***} \\ (0.0913) \\ 1.708^{**} \\ (0.746) \\ \hline \\ 1.166^{**} \\ (0.468) \\ -5.201^{***} \\ (1.978) \\ 1.664^{**} \\ (0.651) \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0635) \\ 0.124 \\ (0.109) \\ 0.421^{***} \\ (0.0919) \\ 1.615^{**} \\ (0.709) \\ \hline 1.532^{***} \\ (0.471) \\ -5.093^{***} \\ (1.920) \\ 1.548^{**} \\ (0.631) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0680) \\ 0.140 \\ (0.111) \\ 0.464^{***} \\ (0.0940) \\ 1.714^{**} \\ (0.720) \\ 1.673^{***} \\ (0.478) \\ -4.712^{**} \\ (1.962) \\ 1.780^{***} \\ (0.638) \end{array}$
660) 55 14) 5*** 912) 99** 744) 68** 688) 99** 75) 59** 550) 2*** 238)	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0698) \\ 0.146 \\ (0.114) \\ 0.325^{***} \\ (0.0924) \\ 1.659^{**} \\ (0.745) \\ \hline 1.111^{**} \\ (0.468) \\ -5.424^{***} \\ (1.965) \\ 1.564^{**} \\ (0.652) \\ -1.040^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0660) \\ 0.156 \\ (0.114) \\ 0.343^{***} \\ (0.0913) \\ 1.708^{**} \\ (0.746) \\ \hline \\ 1.166^{**} \\ (0.468) \\ -5.201^{***} \\ (1.978) \\ 1.664^{**} \\ (0.651) \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0635) \\ 0.124 \\ (0.109) \\ 0.421^{***} \\ (0.0919) \\ 1.615^{**} \\ (0.709) \\ \hline 1.532^{***} \\ (0.471) \\ -5.093^{***} \\ (1.920) \\ 1.548^{**} \\ (0.631) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0680) \\ 0.140 \\ (0.111) \\ 0.464^{***} \\ (0.0940) \\ 1.714^{**} \\ (0.720) \\ 1.673^{***} \\ (0.478) \\ -4.712^{**} \\ (1.962) \\ 1.780^{***} \\ (0.638) \end{array}$
55 14) 5*** 912) 99** 744) 68** 688) 99** 688) 99** 509 2*** 238)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.146\\ (0.114)\\ 0.325^{***}\\ (0.0924)\\ 1.659^{**}\\ (0.745)\\ \hline\\ 1.111^{**}\\ (0.468)\\ -5.424^{***}\\ (1.965)\\ 1.564^{**}\\ (0.652)\\ -1.040^{***}\\ \end{array}$	0.156 (0.114) 0.343*** (0.0913) 1.708** (0.746) 1.166** (0.468) -5.201*** (1.978) 1.664** (0.651)	0.124 (0.109) 0.421*** (0.0919) 1.615** (0.709) 1.532*** (0.471) -5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.140\\ (0.111)\\ 0.464^{***}\\ (0.0940)\\ 1.714^{**}\\ (0.720)\\ \hline 1.673^{***}\\ (0.478)\\ -4.712^{**}\\ (1.962)\\ 1.780^{***}\\ (0.638) \end{array}$
114) 5*** 912) 99** 744) 68** 668) 99** 975) 99** 550) 2*** 238)	$\begin{array}{c} (0.114) \\ 0.325^{***} \\ (0.0924) \\ 1.659^{**} \\ (0.745) \\ \hline \\ 1.111^{**} \\ (0.468) \\ -5.424^{***} \\ (1.965) \\ 1.564^{**} \\ (0.652) \\ -1.040^{***} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.114) \\ 0.343^{***} \\ (0.0913) \\ 1.708^{**} \\ (0.746) \\ \hline \\ 1.166^{**} \\ (0.468) \\ -5.201^{***} \\ (1.978) \\ 1.664^{**} \\ (0.651) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.109) \\ 0.421^{***} \\ (0.0919) \\ 1.615^{**} \\ (0.709) \\ \hline 1.532^{***} \\ (0.471) \\ -5.093^{***} \\ (1.920) \\ 1.548^{**} \\ (0.631) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} (0.111)\\ 0.464^{***}\\ (0.0940)\\ 1.714^{**}\\ (0.720)\\ \hline 1.673^{***}\\ (0.478)\\ -4.712^{**}\\ (1.962)\\ 1.780^{***}\\ (0.638) \end{array}$
5*** 912) 99** 744) 58** 468) 99** 509 59** 550) 22** 238)	0.325*** (0.0924) 1.659** (0.745) 1.111** (0.468) -5.424*** (1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	0.343*** (0.0913) 1.708** (0.746) 1.166** (0.468) -5.201*** (1.978) 1.664** (0.651)	0.421*** (0.0919) 1.615** (0.709) 1.532*** (0.471) -5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.464^{***}\\ (0.0940)\\ 1.714^{**}\\ (0.720)\\ \hline 1.673^{***}\\ (0.478)\\ -4.712^{**}\\ (1.962)\\ 1.780^{***}\\ (0.638)\\ \end{array}$
912) 99** 744) 58** 668) 99** 509 59** 550) 22** 238)	(0.0924) 1.659** (0.745) 1.111** (0.468) -5.424*** (1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0913) \\ 1.708^{**} \\ (0.746) \\ \hline \\ 1.166^{**} \\ (0.468) \\ -5.201^{***} \\ (1.978) \\ 1.664^{**} \\ (0.651) \end{array}$	(0.0919) 1.615** (0.709) 1.532*** (0.471) -5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0940) \\ 1.714^{**} \\ (0.720) \\ \hline 1.673^{***} \\ (0.478) \\ -4.712^{**} \\ (1.962) \\ 1.780^{***} \\ (0.638) \end{array}$
39** 744) 58** 168) 99** 775) 59** 550) 22** 238)	1.659** (0.745) 1.111** (0.468) -5.424*** (1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	1.708** (0.746) 1.166** (0.468) -5.201*** (1.978) 1.664** (0.651)	1.615** (0.709) 1.532*** (0.471) -5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	1.714** (0.720) 1.673*** (0.478) -4.712** (1.962) 1.780*** (0.638)
744) 58** 168) 99*** 775) 59** 550) 22** 238)	(0.745) 1.111** (0.468) -5.424*** (1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	(0.746) 1.166^{**} (0.468) -5.201^{***} (1.978) 1.664^{**} (0.651)	(0.709) 1.532*** (0.471) -5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	(0.720) 1.673*** (0.478) -4.712** (1.962) 1.780*** (0.638)
58** 168) 99*** 175) 59** 550) 22** 238)	1.111** (0.468) -5.424*** (1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	1.166** (0.468) -5.201*** (1.978) 1.664** (0.651)	1.532*** (0.471) -5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	1.673*** (0.478) -4.712** (1.962) 1.780*** (0.638)
468) 9*** 975) 9** 550) 2*** 238)	(0.468) -5.424*** (1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	(0.468) -5.201*** (1.978) 1.664** (0.651)	(0.471) -5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	(0.478) -4.712** (1.962) 1.780*** (0.638)
468) 9*** 975) 9** 550) 2*** 238)	(0.468) -5.424*** (1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	(0.468) -5.201*** (1.978) 1.664** (0.651)	(0.471) -5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	(0.478) -4.712** (1.962) 1.780*** (0.638)
9*** 975) 59** 550) 2*** 238)	-5.424*** (1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	-5.201*** (1.978) 1.664** (0.651)	-5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	(0.478) -4.712** (1.962) 1.780*** (0.638)
9*** 975) 59** 550) 2*** 238)	-5.424*** (1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	-5.201*** (1.978) 1.664** (0.651)	-5.093*** (1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	-4.712** (1.962) 1.780*** (0.638)
975) 59** 550) 22*** 238)	(1.965) 1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	(1.978) 1.664** (0.651)	(1.920) 1.548** (0.631)	(1.962) 1.780*** (0.638)
59** 550) 22*** 238)	1.564** (0.652) -1.040***	1.664** (0.651)	1.548** (0.631)	1.780*** (0.638)
550) 2*** 238)	(0.652) -1.040***	(0.651)	(0.631)	(0.638)
2*** 238)	-1.040***			
238)		-1.000		
/		(0.238)	(0.241)	(0.244)
				0.664
				(0.500)
				2.013***
_		= .=		
(47)	(0.303)	(0.377)	(0.057)	(0.633)
`` ***	0.2(1***	0.252***	0.271***	0.255***
				-0.355***
462)	(0.0469)	(0.0462)	(0.0484)	(0.0478)
	0.0608			-0.117**
	(0.0545)	1 450		(0.0589)
				1.395
		(1.121)	0.500+++	(1.085)
				0.588***
1044				(0.0850)
				-12.00***
861)	(2.361)	(2.370)	(2.583)	(2.638)
056	35,056	35,056	33,920	33,920
	,	,	,	6,919
	,	/	,	0.830
				4.002
				2902
				-1362
	1** 09) 2*** 47) 2*** 462) 8**	$ \begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$	$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

Foreign Direct Investment Model:	Random Effect Regression	with major	power status as control
i ofergin Direct investment would	Random Eneet Regression	with major	power status as control

Table 0-4: Random Effect Regression – Military interventions in civil wars with major power status as control, 2001 - 2009. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Dependent Variable			Mil	itary Intervent	tions		
Independent Variables	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29	Model 30	Model 31
1							
Corporate Hypotheses							
Log(FDI)	0.222	0.199	0.448**	0.223	0.186	0.167	0.0152
	(0.214)	(0.221)	(0.198)	(0.215)	(0.217)	(0.213)	(0.236)
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	-0.236	-0.248	-0.243	-0.224	-0.212	-0.280	-0.244
	(0.439)	(0.442)	(0.435)	(0.429)	(0.423)	(0.423)	(0.416)
Oilsatisfaction	-						
Log(Oilneed)		-0.477	-0.776	-0.747	-0.783	-0.519	-0.552
		(0.434)	(0.480)	(0.476)	(0.490)	(0.509)	(0.508)
Uraniumsatisfaction	4.053	4.283	4.583**	4.236*	2.843	3.813*	2.371
	(3.599)	(5.067)	(2.052)	(2.183)	(2.509)	(2.263)	(2.597)
Control Variables							
Alliance			-0.316	-0.576	-0.259	-0.131	-0.0980
			(0.642)	(0.654)	(0.651)	(0.708)	(0.713)
Peaceful Relations			-3.938	-4.807**	-3.985*	-2.858	-2.999
			(2.404)	(2.443)	(2.413)	(2.600)	(2.613)
Contiguity			4.614***	4.352***	4.608***	4.994***	4.919***
			(1.063)	(1.100)	(1.117)	(1.177)	(1.169)
Log(distance)			-0.223	-0.225	-0.164	-0.990*	-0.812
			(0.437)	(0.442)	(0.456)	(0.533)	(0.544)
Shared Ethnicity			2.576***	2.630***	2.952***	2.535***	2.799***
			(0.772)	(0.787)	(0.812)	(0.816)	(0.836)
Temporal Dependency			0.004**	0 074***	0.01(**	0 01 4**	0 20 4**
Last Intervention			-0.224**	-0.274***	-0.216**	-0.214**	-0.204**
TT ·/ · TT /1 ·			(0.0904)	(0.0941)	(0.0914)	(0.0911)	(0.0934)
Humanitarian Hypothesis			0.166	0.162	0.187	0.155	0.174
Log(battle deaths)							
Altornativo Evolanationa			(0.136)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.146)	(0.147)
Alternative Explanations Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.348***			-0.0132
Log(Hade Volume)t-1				(0.129)			(0.154)
Colonial History				(0.127)	6.094***		4.982***
Colonial History					(1.373)		(1.508)
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}					(1.575)	0.600***	0.508***
Log(minung LAP.)-1						(0.154)	(0.165)
Constant	-12.75***	-13.32***	-7.744**	-7.620*	-8.650**	-10.61**	-10.89**
	(0.341)	(0.342)	(3.930)	(3.994)	(4.110)	(4.327)	(4.350)
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(((
Observations	17,685	18,117	14,006	14,006	14,006	13,593	13,593
Number of iddyad	3,268	3,343	3,332	3,332	3,332	3,304	3,304
rho	0.869	0.882	0.762	0.763	0.764	0.779	0.773
sigma	4.671	4.960	3.246	3.255	3.265	3.409	3.346
BIC	826	835	691	694	683	654	663
log-likelihood	-388.4	-387.9	-283.7	-280	-274.7	-260.7	-255.2

Foreign Direct Investment M	odel: Random	Effect Regression	with a sample of Africa
			-

Dependent Variable		Military Interventions						
Independent Variables	Model 32	Model 33	Model 34	Model 35	Model 36	Model 37 [†]	Model 38 [†]	
1								
Corporate Hypotheses								
Log(FDI)	0.236***	0.246***	0.234**	0.197**	0.214**	0.0338	0.161**	
	(0.0854)	(0.0847)	(0.0968)	(0.0999)	(0.0935)	(0.0635)	(0.0699)	
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.417***	0.435***	0.410***	0.397**	0.418***	0.242**	0.365***	
	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.152)	(0.121)	(0.121)	
Oilsatisfaction	2.780***	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,		
	(0.489)							
Log(Oilneed)		0.284***	0.154	0.131	0.154	0.0726	0.170**	
		(0.0932)	(0.109)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.0652)	(0.0728)	
Uraniumsatisfaction	-1.402	-0.923	-0.758	-0.873	-1.390	-1.173	-2.516	
	(1.991)	(2.023)	(1.838)	(1.704)	(1.909)	(1.425)	(3.281)	
Control Variables	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,		
Alliance			0.0293	-0.0228	0.00734	0.842*	0.797*	
			(0.589)	(0.570)	(0.576)	(0.444)	(0.432)	
Peaceful Relations			-5.930**	-6.236***	-5.719**	-5.498***	-2.158**	
			(2.358)	(2.320)	(2.332)	(1.191)	(1.048)	
Contiguity			2.904***	2.338***	2.279***	2.449***	2.749***	
			(0.893)	(0.803)	(0.804)	(0.566)	(0.537)	
Log(distance)			-1.189***	-1.161***	-1.159***	-1.080***	-1.119***	
			(0.276)	(0.262)	(0.264)	(0.249)	(0.208)	
Shared Ethnicity			1.242*	1.076*	1.234**	-0.263	0.339	
-			(0.674)	(0.608)	(0.608)	(0.410)	(0.442)	
Temporal Dependency								
Last Intervention			-0.309***	-0.337***	-0.330***	-0.357***	-0.318***	
			(0.0502)	(0.0504)	(0.0498)	(0.0481)	(0.0494)	
Humanitarian Hypothesis								
Log(battle deaths)			0.915***	0.913***	0.932***	0.888 * * *	0.896***	
			(0.0761)	(0.0751)	(0.0755)	(0.0687)	(0.0697)	
Alternative Explanations								
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.0684			-0.296***	
				(0.0597)			(0.0599)	
Colonial History					5.100***		4.064***	
					(1.272)		(0.794)	
Log(Military Exp.)t-1						0.626***	0.747***	
						(0.0629)	(0.0687)	
Constant	-16.02***	-15.58***	-5.192*	-4.311*	-4.646*	-12.46***	-15.17***	
	(0.194)	(0.205)	(2.723)	(2.599)	(2.616)	(2.162)	(2.023)	
01	20.221	20.221	22 704	22.704	22 700	22 705	22 705	
Observations	39,321	39,321	33,796	33,796	33,796	32,705	32,705	
Number of iddyad	6,837	6,837	6,826	6,826	6,826	6,760	6,760	
rho	0.935	0.930	0.890	0.870	0.868	0.839	0.836	
sigma	6.871	6.633	5.152	4.691	4.657	4.144	4.100	
BIC	2941	2953	2592	2598	2586	2449	2449	
log-likelihood	-1439	-1445	-1228	-1226	-1220	-1152	-1141	

Foreign Direct Investment Model: Random Effect Regression without US War on Terror	

Ing-Intermodul-1439-1443-1228-1220-1220-1120-1132-1141Table 0-6: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars without global US War on Terror, 2001 –
2009.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
†Due to convergence difficulties, the integration method ghermite was used instead of the default myaghermite.

Dependent Variable	Military Interventions							
Independent Variables	Model 39	Model 40	Model 41	Model 42	Model 43			
Compute Hunotheses	0.375***	0.280***	0.353***	0.164**	0.189***			
Corporate Hypotheses								
Log(FDI)	(0.0717)	(0.0728) 0.247**	(0.0701)	(0.0655)	(0.0684)			
	0.276**		0.263**	0.170	0.175			
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	(0.119) 0.279***	(0.118)	(0.117) 0.282^{***}	(0.111) 0.402^{***}	(0.112) 0.442***			
		0.222**						
Log(Oilneed)	(0.0958)	(0.0927)	(0.0947)	(0.0903)	(0.0946)			
	2.287***	2.026**	2.119***	1.785**	1.800**			
Uranium satisfaction	(0.824)	(0.791)	(0.805)	(0.718)	(0.727)			
Control Variables								
Alliance	1.208**	1.063**	1.208**	1.601***	1.686***			
	(0.500)	(0.481)	(0.493)	(0.476)	(0.484)			
Peaceful Relations	-6.033***	-6.380***	-5.708***	-5.360***	-4.928**			
	(2.071)	(1.992)	(2.058)	(1.937)	(1.971)			
Contiguity	2.148***	1.721**	2.004***	1.698***	1.844***			
0,0	(0.763)	(0.714)	(0.739)	(0.627)	(0.649)			
Log(distance)	-0.720***	-0.744***	-0.710***	-1.037***	-1.028***			
8()	(0.254)	(0.245)	(0.251)	(0.247)	(0.250)			
Shared Ethnicity	1.396**	1.118**	1.446**	0.547	0.663			
	(0.577)	(0.544)	(0.562)	(0.495)	(0.505)			
Democratic cw_country	-0.460	-0.809**	-0.445	-0.374	-0.147			
	(0.401)	(0.409)	(0.397)	(0.392)	(0.415)			
Temporal Dependency	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.5577)	(0.5)2)	(0.115)			
Last Intervention	-0.350***	-0.383***	-0.351***	-0.382***	-0.367***			
	(0.0466)	(0.0474)	(0.0465)	(0.0472)	(0.0481)			
Humanitarian Hypothesis	(0.0100)	(0.0171)	(0.0105)	(0.0172)	(0.0101)			
log battle deaths	0.899***	0.881***	0.907***	0.884***	0.897***			
og_battle_deaths	(0.0695)	(0.0692)	(0.0697)	(0.0695)	(0.0699)			
Alternative Explanations	(0.00)	(0.00)2)	(0.0077)	(0.0075)	(0.0077)			
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}		0.185***			-0.101			
Log(Trade v ofume)t-1		(0.0556)			(0.0618)			
Colonial History		(0.0550)	4.431***		2.363**			
			(1.132)		(1.073)			
Log(Militory Even)			(1.152)	0.653***	0.693***			
Log(Military Exp.)t-1								
Comptont	-7.730***	-6.855***	-7.916***	(0.0718) -12.92***	(0.0816) -13.87***			
Constant								
	(2.515)	(2.451)	(2.494)	(2.538)	(2.644)			
Observations	35,056	35,056	35,056	33,920	33,920			
Number of iddyad	6,986	6,986	6,986	6,919	6,919			
rho	0.864	0.850	0.860	0.826	0.828			
sigma	4.576	4.321	4.492	3.946	3.986			
BIC	3040	3037	3037	2897	2911			
log-likelihood	-1447	-1440	-1440	-1370	-1367			

Foreign Direct Investment Model: Random Effect Regression with democratic civil war country <u>control</u>

Tog-inclinedTiffTiffTiffTiffTable 0-7: Random Effect Regression – Military interventions in civil wars with civil war country democracy dummy control
variable, 2001 - 2009.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

Dependent Variable	Military Interventions							
Independent Variables	Model 44	Model 45	Model 46	Model 47	Model 48			
	0.205***	0.250***	0 201***	0 107**	0 170***			
Corporate Hypotheses	0.295***	0.250***	0.281***	0.127**	0.179***			
Log(FDI)	(0.0635)	(0.0687)	(0.0634)	(0.0615)	(0.0662)			
	0.267**	0.248**	0.253**	0.167	0.183*			
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.109)	(0.111)			
	0.225**	0.201**	0.231***	0.344***	0.407***			
Log(Oil _{need})	(0.0878)	(0.0886)	(0.0876)	(0.0925)	(0.0933)			
	1.756**	1.642**	1.656**	1.480**	1.614**			
Uranium _{satisfaction}	(0.730)	(0.727)	(0.732)	(0.680)	(0.698)			
Control Variables								
Alliance	0.982**	0.913**	1.013**	1.419***	1.623***			
	(0.457)	(0.456)	(0.458)	(0.464)	(0.471)			
Peaceful Relations	-6.696***	-6.836***	-6.415***	-5.833***	-5.310***			
	(1.936)	(1.927)	(1.942)	(1.867)	(1.915)			
Contiguity	1.571**	1.439**	1.526**	1.444**	1.730***			
	(0.647)	(0.644)	(0.643)	(0.608)	(0.623)			
Log(distance)	-1.011***	-1.033***	-0.992***	-1.238***	-1.200***			
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.239)	(0.241)			
Shared Ethnicity	1.636***	1.506***	1.686***	0.904*	1.090**			
	2.111***	2.009***	2.046***	1.441***	1.548***			
Democratic Intervener	(0.314)	(0.317)	(0.315)	(0.325)	(0.331)			
	0.0965	0.103	0.117	-0.498	-0.523			
Autocratic Intervener	(0.458)	(0.457)	(0.458)	(0.471)	(0.474)			
Temporal Dependency								
Last Intervention	-0.388***	-0.398***	-0.385***	-0.399***	-0.377***			
	(0.0476)	(0.0478)	(0.0472)	(0.0484)	(0.0479)			
Humanitarian Hypothesis	(0.0470)	(0.0470)	(0.0472)	(0.0404)	(0.0477)			
log battle deaths	0.905***	0.900***	0.912***	0.892***	0.902***			
	(0.0676)	(0.0679)	(0.0680)	(0.0693)	(0.0689)			
Alternative Explanations	(0.0070)	(0.0077)	(0.0000)	(010052)	(0.0005)			
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}		0.0856			-0.159***			
		(0.0527)			(0.0588)			
Colonial History		(*****)	3.353***		1.895*			
			(1.054)		(1.033)			
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}			()	0.587***	0.658***			
5 1 1				(0.0761)	(0.0812)			
Constant	-4.949**	-4.672**	-5.327**	-10.48***	-12.11***			
	(2.337)	(2.325)	(2.334)	(2.502)	(2.576)			
01	25.05(25.05(25.05(22.020	22.020			
Observations	35,056	35,056	35,056	33,920	33,920			
Number of iddyad	6,986	6,986	6,986	6,919	6,919			
rho	0.831	0.830	0.831 4.025	0.811 3.752	0.815			
sigma BIC	4.020 2997	4.002 3004	4.025 2998	3.752 2879	3.809 2890			
			/ 990	/0/9	/ ^ 91			

Foreign Direct Investment Model: Random Effect Regression with democratic or autocratic civil war intervention country control

Table 0-8: Random Effect Regression – Military interventions in civil wars with civil war country democracy dummy control variable, 2001 – 2009.

Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

Dependent Variable			Mil	itary Intervent	ions		
Independent Variables	Model 49	Model 50	Model 51	Model 52	Model 53	Model 54	Model 55
Corporate Hypotheses							
Log(FDI)	0.359***	0.407***	0.408***	0.329***	0.391***	0.227***	0.258***
	(0.0780)	(0.0749)	(0.0653)	(0.0717)	(0.0649)	(0.0656)	(0.0706)
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.176	0.214*	0.276**	0.253**	0.257**	0.178	0.179
	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.118)
Oilsatisfaction	3.259***						
	(0.574)						
Log(Oilneed)		0.591***	0.551***	0.508***	0.559***	0.674***	0.711***
		(0.0916)	(0.0932)	(0.0933)	(0.0936)	(0.0965)	(0.101)
Uraniumsatisfaction	2.747***	2.308***	2.455***	2.263***	2.318***	2.210***	2.233***
	(1.064)	(0.858)	(0.762)	(0.751)	(0.759)	(0.722)	(0.734)
Control Variables							
Alliance			1.536***	1.401***	1.565***	1.998***	2.119***
			(0.468)	(0.463)	(0.468)	(0.488)	(0.501)
Peaceful Relations			-6.294***	-6.535***	-5.987***	-5.755***	-5.343***
			(1.895)	(1.863)	(1.899)	(1.878)	(1.907)
Contiguity			2.482***	2.207***	2.433***	2.383***	2.545***
			(0.661)	(0.652)	(0.659)	(0.636)	(0.662)
Log(distance)			-0.333	-0.415	-0.319	-0.621**	-0.558**
			(0.259)	(0.257)	(0.261)	(0.267)	(0.272)
Shared Ethnicity			1.772***	1.587***	1.849***	1.132**	1.262**
			(0.528)	(0.522)	(0.527)	(0.515)	(0.525)
Temporal Dependency							
Last Intervention			-0.454***	-0.480***	-0.453***	-0.477***	-0.461***
			(0.0619)	(0.0630)	(0.0621)	(0.0627)	(0.0635)
Humanitarian Hypothesis							
Log(battle deaths)			0.720***	0.723***	0.736***	0.705***	0.710***
			(0.0951)	(0.0949)	(0.0957)	(0.0978)	(0.0983)
Alternative Explanations				()	· · · ·	· · · · ·	· · · · ·
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.136**			-0.0915
				(0.0579)			(0.0656)
Colonial History					4.049***		2.570**
,					(1.119)		(1.131)
Log(Military Exp.)t-1						0.564***	0.591***
						(0.0840)	(0.0938)
Constant	-16.45***	-15.13***	-9.813***	-8.998***	-10.26***	-14.88***	-16.04***
	(0.224)	(0.247)	(2.605)	(2.575)	(2.625)	(2.852)	(3.011)
		. ,	. ,		. ,	. ,	
Observations	39,161	39,161	33,636	33,636	33,636	32,544	32,544
Number of iddyad	6,836	6,836	6,825	6,825	6,825	6,759	6,759
rho	0.929	0.910	0.826	0.820	0.826	0.811	0.814
sigma	6.566	5.777	3.951	3.865	3.948	3.758	3.794
BIC	2312	2314	2048	2053	2047	1954	1969
log-likelihood	-1124	-1125	-956.1	-953.4	-950.7	-904.5	-901.2

Foreign Direct Investment Model: Random Effect Regression without civil war in Afghanistan

LoreLoreLoreLoreLoreLoreLoreLore19341969log-likelihood-1124-1125-956.1-953.4-950.7-904.5-901.2Table 0-9: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars without war in Afghanistan, 2001 – 2009.Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

Dependent Variable			Mil	itary Intervent	ions		
Independent Variables	Model 56	Model 57	Model 58	Model 59	Model 60	Model 61	Model 61
Corporate Hypotheses							
Log(FDI) t-1	0.289***	0.311***	0.319***	0.211***	0.302***	0.127*	0.157**
	(0.0754)	(0.0816)	(0.0695)	(0.0752)	(0.0705)	(0.0659)	(0.0701)
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.413***	0.420***	0.438***	0.396***	0.424***	0.285**	0.291**
	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Oilsatisfaction	2.477***	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,
	(0.475)						
Log(Oilneed)		0.237**	0.169*	0.117	0.183*	0.290***	0.326***
		(0.0933)	(0.0925)	(0.0936)	(0.0958)	(0.0920)	(0.0954)
Uraniumsatisfaction	2.569***	2.351***	1.926**	1.684**	1.858**	1.554**	1.590**
	(0.780)	(0.827)	(0.764)	(0.754)	(0.775)	(0.693)	(0.701)
Control Variables							
Alliance			1.253**	1.065**	1.329**	1.540***	1.664***
			(0.503)	(0.503)	(0.520)	(0.496)	(0.504)
Peaceful Relations			-5.417**	-5.739***	-5.111**	-4.851**	-4.483**
			(2.143)	(2.108)	(2.171)	(2.030)	(2.052)
Contiguity			1.500**	1.160*	1.451**	1.213**	1.354**
			(0.676)	(0.678)	(0.698)	(0.604)	(0.618)
Log(distance)			-0.735***	-0.830***	-0.745***	-0.996***	-0.946***
			(0.240)	(0.242)	(0.247)	(0.239)	(0.241)
Shared Ethnicity			0.839	0.613	0.946*	0.236	0.344
			(0.523)	(0.527)	(0.540)	(0.481)	(0.485)
Temporal Dependency							
Last Intervention			-0.622***	-0.632***	-0.617***	-0.637***	-0.632***
			(0.0617)	(0.0618)	(0.0643)	(0.0635)	(0.0635)
Humanitarian Hypothesis			0.050	0.000	0.051444	0.001.4.4.4	
Log(battle deaths)			0.953***	0.939***	0.964***	0.921***	0.930***
			(0.0749)	(0.0754)	(0.0757)	(0.0758)	(0.0759)
Alternative Explanations				0.100****			0.00.10
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.189***			-0.0942
				(0.0577)	2 0 5 7 * * *		(0.0621)
Colonial History					3.957***		2.134**
					(1.167)	0 -00***	(1.076)
Log(Military Exp.)t-1						0.588***	0.622***
Constant	16 16***	-16.64***	-5.994**	5 1 (7**	6 276**	(0.0746)	(0.0830) -12.14***
Constant	-16.16***			-5.167**	-6.376^{**}	-11.15***	
	(0.194)	(0.203)	(2.492)	(2.507)	(2.613)	(2.611)	(2.708)
Observations	34,321	34,321	29,117	29,117	29,117	28,078	28,078
Number of iddyad	6,044	6,044	6,032	6,032	6,032	5,942	5,942
rho	0.938	0.942	0.826	0.824	0.832	0.795	0.794
sigma	7.068	7.336	3.958	3.929	4.033	3.566	3.556
BIC	2929	2940	2526	2525	2528	2411	2425
log-likelihood	-1433	-1439	-1196	-1191	-1192	-1134	-1131

Independentiation-1433-1439-1190-1191-1192-1134-1131Table 0-10: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars with lagged Log(FDI) variable, 2001 –
2009.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.</td>

Den en deut Veniehle			Ma		·		
Dependent Variable	M 11(2	M 11(2		itary Intervent		M 11(7	M 1160
Independent Variables	Model 62	Model 63	Model 64	Model 65	Model 66	Model 67	Model 68
Corporate Hypotheses							
Log(FDI)	0.289***	0.311***	0.253***	0.195***	0.241***	0.125**	0.160***
	(0.0754)	(0.0816)	(0.0513)	(0.0563)	(0.0515)	(0.0513)	(0.0549)
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.413***	0.420***	0.402***	0.374***	0.387***	0.252**	0.257**
	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Oilsatisfaction	2.477***						
	(0.475)						
Log(Oilneed)		0.237**	0.0513	0.0249	0.0555	0.140**	0.178**
		(0.0933)	(0.0662)	(0.0675)	(0.0668)	(0.0699)	(0.0725)
Uraniumsatisfaction	2.569***	2.351***	1.091*	0.988*	1.042*	0.980*	1.035*
	(0.780)	(0.827)	(0.585)	(0.582)	(0.587)	(0.562)	(0.568)
Control Variables							
Alliance			0.576	0.509	0.616*	0.880**	1.000***
			(0.361)	(0.362)	(0.364)	(0.372)	(0.378)
Peaceful Relations			-4.592***	-4.776***	-4.415***	-4.351***	-4.012***
			(1.554)	(1.561)	(1.569)	(1.533)	(1.541)
Contiguity			0.889**	0.723	0.853*	0.787*	0.945**
			(0.448)	(0.452)	(0.451)	(0.439)	(0.452)
Log(distance)			-0.543***	-0.595***	-0.540***	-0.718***	-0.670***
			(0.169)	(0.172)	(0.171)	(0.179)	(0.180)
Shared Ethnicity			0.470	0.364	0.526	0.132	0.228
-			(0.352)	(0.355)	(0.355)	(0.351)	(0.354)
Temporal Dependency			. ,				
Last Intervention			-3.065***	-2.998***	-3.037***	-2.924***	-2.949***
			(0.309)	(0.311)	(0.306)	(0.312)	(0.308)
_spline1			-0.767***	-0.746***	-0.762***	-0.754***	-0.767***
_ 1			(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.110)
_spline2			0.446***	0.436***	0.444***	0.454***	0.461***
			(0.0781)	(0.0782)	(0.0781)	(0.0799)	(0.0799)
_spline3			-0.215***	-0.213***	-0.215***	-0.230***	-0.233***
			(0.0566)	(0.0566)	(0.0567)	(0.0584)	(0.0585)
Humanitarian Hypothesis			(0.0200)	(0.0500)	(0.0507)	(0.0501)	(0.0505)
Log(battle deaths)			0.824***	0.827***	0.834***	0.813***	0.816***
Eog(outrie doutils)			(0.0701)	(0.0704)	(0.0707)	(0.0716)	(0.0717)
Alternative Explanations			(0.0701)	(0.0701)	(0.0707)	(0.0710)	(0.0717)
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.0996**			-0.0978**
				(0.0427)			(0.0470)
Colonial History				(0.0127)	2.480***		1.535*
Coloniar History					(0.806)		(0.783)
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}					(0.000)	0.403***	0.444***
Log(minun y LAP.)[-]						(0.0591)	(0.0654)
Constant	-16.16***	-16.64***	-2.529	-2.249	-2.815	-6.658***	-7.656***
Constant	(0.194)	(0.203)	(1.762)	(1.771)	(1.784)	(1.949)	(2.026)
	(0.1)+)	(0.203)	(1.702)	(1.//1)	(1.70-)	(1.)+))	(2.020)
Observations	34,321	34,321	29,117	29,117	29,117	28,078	28,078
Number of iddyad	6,044	6,044	6,032	6,032	6,032	28,078 5,942	28,078 5,942
rho	0.938	0.942	0.635	0.640	0.640	0.622	0.620
	0.938 7.068	0.942 7.336	2.391	0.640 2.417	2.418	2.328	2.315
sigma BIC	2929	7.336 2940	2.391 2486	2.417	2.418 2487	2.328 2381	2.315
log-likelihood	-1433	-1439	-1161	-1158	-1156	-1104	-1100

Foreign Direct Investment Model: Random Effect Regression with splines

Table 0-11: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars with splines, 2001 - 2009. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Dependent Variable			Mili	tary Intervent	ions		
Independent Variables	Model 69	Model 70	Model 71	Model 72	Model 73	Model 74	Model 75
Corporate Hypotheses							
Log(FDI)	0.191***	0.200***	0.142***	0.103***	0.134***	0.0741**	0.0898**
	(0.0168)	(0.0166)	(0.0338)	(0.0357)	(0.0343)	(0.0336)	(0.0356)
Log(Arms Trade) _{t-1}	0.417***	0.432***	0.256***	0.224***	0.244***	0.138**	0.140**
0.1	(0.0365)	(0.0365)	(0.0722)	(0.0717)	(0.0719)	(0.0688)	(0.0698)
Oilsatisfaction	0.894***						
$\mathbf{L} = \mathbf{C}(\mathbf{C}^{\mathbf{I}})$	(0.135)	0.12(***	0.0057**	0 105***	0.0040**	0.0296	0.00201
Log(Oilneed)		0.126*** (0.0284)	-0.0857** (0.0333)	-0.105*** (0.0332)	-0.0848** (0.0332)	-0.0286 (0.0346)	-0.00891 (0.0345)
Uraniumsatisfaction	-0.441	-0.254	0.313	(0.0332) 0.275	0.319	0.367	0.402
Oramumsatisfaction	(0.307)	(0.303)	(0.488)	(0.463)	(0.482)	(0.443)	(0.455)
Control Variables	(0.507)	(0.505)	(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.175)	(0.155)
Alliance			0.0634	-0.0153	0.0940	0.265	0.354
			(0.240)	(0.237)	(0.238)	(0.227)	(0.230)
Peaceful Relations			-2.459**	-2.497**	-2.416*	-2.504**	-2.411**
			(1.253)	(1.189)	(1.236)	(1.133)	(1.135)
Contiguity			0.495*	0.395	0.485*	0.471*	0.557**
			(0.266)	(0.259)	(0.265)	(0.243)	(0.253)
Log(distance)			-0.216**	-0.266***	-0.207**	-0.335***	-0.300***
			(0.0903)	(0.0865)	(0.0905)	(0.0934)	(0.0932)
Shared Ethnicity			0.192	0.118	0.224	0.0367	0.0826
Town and Don on don on			(0.190)	(0.187)	(0.189)	(0.186)	(0.187)
Temporal Dependency Last Intervention			-5.000***	-4.960***	-4.993***	-4.714***	-4.703***
Last filler vention			(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.181)	(0.181)
_spline1			-1.232***	-1.217***	-1.231***	-1.176***	-1.177***
			(0.0806)	(0.0810)	(0.0807)	(0.0832)	(0.0835)
spline2			0.662***	0.654***	0.661***	0.646***	0.647***
_ 1			(0.0705)	(0.0707)	(0.0705)	(0.0725)	(0.0726)
_spline3			-0.274***	-0.272***	-0.273***	-0.281***	-0.281***
			(0.0590)	(0.0591)	(0.0590)	(0.0607)	(0.0608)
Humanitarian Hypothesis							
Log(battle deaths)			0.666***	0.673***	0.670***	0.662***	0.656***
			(0.0493)	(0.0495)	(0.0493)	(0.0504)	(0.0499)
Alternative Explanations				0 0670***			0.050/*
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}				0.0679***			-0.0506*
Colonial History				(0.0232)	1.084**		(0.0274) 0.659
Coloniai mistory					(0.531)		(0.494)
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}					(0.001)	0.234***	0.259***
						(0.0294)	(0.0341)
Constant	-4.278***	-4.312***	-0.945	-0.667	-1.092	-3.358***	-3.957***
	(0.0466)	(0.0525)	(1.050)	(1.016)	(1.041)	(1.106)	(1.125)
Observations	34,321	34,321	29,117	29,117	29,117	28,078	28,078

Foreign Direct Investment Model:	Rare events	Logistic	Regression	with splines
				-

Table 0-12: Rare events Logistic Regression with splines – Military interventions in civil wars, 2001 - 2009. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Dependent Variable			Mil	itary Intervent	tions		
Independent Variables	Model 76	Model 77	Model 78	Model 79	Model 80	Model 81	Model 82
independent + drideles	Model / o	inouer / /	inouer / o	inoucl /)	inicael oo	iniouel of	110461 02
Major arms suppliers							
Log(Arms Supply: China)t-1	0.0455**					0.0341	-0.0664
Log(rums suppry: china)	(0.0206)					(0.0226)	(0.0524)
Log(Arms Supply: UK)t-1	(0.0200)	-0.0590***				-0.0691**	0.0285
Log(rums supply: on),		(0.0202)				(0.0283)	(0.0442)
Log(Arms Supply: France)t-1		(0.0202)	-0.0610***			-0.0887***	-0.108**
			(0.0203)			(0.0268)	(0.0464)
Log(Arms Supply: US)t-1			(000200)	-0.0229		0.0753***	0.135***
				(0.0169)		(0.0239)	(0.0401)
Log(Arms Supply: Russia)t-1				()	0.0538***	0.0661***	0.0425
					(0.0150)	(0.0183)	(0.0283)
Control Variables						. ,	· · · · ·
Alliance	0.125	0.101	0.138	0.115	0.144	0.182	0.300
	(0.176)	(0.182)	(0.183)	(0.181)	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.309)
Contiguity	1.093***	1.106***	1.115***	1.111***	1.088***	1.056***	0.532
	(0.218)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.213)	(0.205)	(0.380)
Peaceful Relations	-1.664***	-1.731***	-1.628***	-1.711***	-1.730***	-1.624***	-2.260
	(0.451)	(0.439)	(0.441)	(0.446)	(0.470)	(0.458)	(1.379)
Shared Ethnicity	0.1000	0.149	0.173	0.129	0.0761	0.126	0.0348
	(0.185)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.193)	(0.186)	(0.174)	(0.313)
Log(distance)	-0.557***	-0.569***	-0.571***	-0.562***	-0.550***	-0.570***	-0.472***
	(0.0878)	(0.0873)	(0.0880)	(0.0876)	(0.0869)	(0.0869)	(0.136)
Colonial History	1.082***	0.979***	0.952***	1.069***	1.192***	0.963***	0.919*
	(0.361)	(0.374)	(0.364)	(0.368)	(0.367)	(0.362)	(0.547)
Corporate and Economic							
Control							
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}	-0.0734***	-0.0705***	-0.0758***	-0.0732***	-0.0710***	-0.0684***	-0.136***
	(0.0243)	(0.0237)	(0.0239)	(0.0238)	(0.0243)	(0.0243)	(0.0370)
Log(FDI)							0.120***
	0.1.00****	0.1.50***	0.1.50****	0.15(***	0.150444	0 1 4 6 4 4 4	(0.0372)
Log(Oilneed)	0.160***	0.150***	0.152***	0.156***	0.159***	0.146***	0.195***
	(0.0454)	(0.0449)	(0.0446)	(0.0452)	(0.0463)	(0.0458)	(0.0495)
Humanitarian Intervention							0 0 4 0 * * *
Log(battle deaths)							0.848^{***}
Intervention Enabler							(0.0614)
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}	0.423***	0.447***	0.450***	0.437***	0.418***	0.442***	0.229***
Log(Minitary Exp.)t-1	(0.0296)	(0.0289)	(0.0293)	(0.0306)	(0.0317)	(0.0333)	(0.0529)
Time Dependency	(0.0290)	(0.0289)	(0.0293)	(0.0300)	(0.0317)	(0.0333)	(0.0529)
	-0.344***	-0.343***	-0.342***	-0.344***	-0.344***	-0.340***	-0.251***
Last Intervention	(0.0205)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0205)	(0.0200)	(0.0144)
	(0.0203)	(0.0207)	(0.0207)	(0.0207)	(0.0203)	(0.0200)	(0.0177)
Constant	-2.859***	-2.830***	-2.880***	-2.826***	-2.915***	-3.062***	-5.440***
Consum	(0.879)	(0.863)	(0.870)	(0.873)	(0.881)	(0.879)	(1.629)
	(0.07)	(0.000)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.001)	(0.077)	(1.02)
Observations	116,733	116,733	116,733	116,733	116,733	116,733	33,671
Pseudo R2	0.383	0.384	0.384	0.382	0.385	0.391	0.510
BIC	10833	10815	10811	10843	10796	10742	3114
log-likelihood	-5347	-5338	-5335	-5352	-5328	-5278	-1463
Table 0-13: Logit Regression							

Proxy-Intervention Model: Logistic Regression

Table 0-13: Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars, 2001 - 2009. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Demondont Variable			Mil	tom: Intomiont	iona		
Dependent Variable Independent Variables	Model 83	Model 84	Model 85	itary Intervent Model 86	Model 87	Model 88	Model 89
Independent variables	Widdel 85	Widdel 84	Widdel 85	Widdel 80	Widdel 87	Widdel 88	Model 89
Major arms suppliers							
Log(Arms Supply: China)t-1	0.0253					0.0189	-0.0310
Log(rinns Suppry: Cinna), r	(0.0174)					(0.0186)	(0.0436)
Log(Arms Supply: UK)t-1	(0.017.)	-0.0457***				-0.0514**	0.0509
		(0.0163)				(0.0238)	(0.0382)
Log(Arms Supply: France)t-1			-0.0483***			-0.0688***	-0.116***
			(0.0161)			(0.0217)	(0.0410)
Log(Arms Supply: US)t-1				-0.0147		0.0607***	0.101***
				(0.0142)		(0.0198)	(0.0368)
Log(Arms Supply: Russia)t-1					0.0389***	0.0490***	0.0333
					(0.0126)	(0.0144)	(0.0255)
Control Variables							
Alliance	0.116	0.101	0.132	0.109	0.128	0.155	0.381
~	(0.134)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.273)
Contiguity	0.840***	0.821***	0.823***	0.842***	0.841***	0.786***	0.591*
Descentul Deletiere	(0.169)	(0.171) -1.649***	(0.171)	(0.173)	(0.168)	(0.161)	(0.312)
Peaceful Relations	-1.615^{***}		-1.591***	-1.632^{***}	-1.656^{***}	-1.622^{***}	-1.833
Shared Ethnicity	(0.392) -0.0187	(0.398) 0.0293	(0.396) 0.0540	(0.396) 0.00770	(0.401) -0.0362	(0.393) 0.0234	(1.205) 0.122
Shared Ethillerty	(0.135)	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.138)	(0.133)	(0.256)
Log(distance)	-0.461***	-0.474***	-0.474***	-0.465***	-0.453***	-0.474***	-0.357***
Log(distance)	(0.0712)	(0.0705)	(0.0703)	(0.0710)	(0.0704)	(0.0692)	(0.116)
Colonial History	0.718***	0.654**	0.621**	0.711***	0.807***	0.631**	0.981**
	(0.267)	(0.276)	(0.267)	(0.270)	(0.271)	(0.266)	(0.437)
Corporate and Economic	(*==*)	(0.270)	(0.201)	(**= / *)	(**=/-)	(0.200)	((()))
Control							
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}	-0.0619***	-0.0562***	-0.0608***	-0.0604***	-0.0590***	-0.0561***	-0.114***
	(0.0183)	(0.0182)	(0.0182)	(0.0182)	(0.0184)	(0.0185)	(0.0336)
Log(FDI)							0.0890***
							(0.0344)
Log(Oilneed)	0.140***	0.131***	0.132***	0.138***	0.140***	0.127***	0.134***
	(0.0327)	(0.0328)	(0.0325)	(0.0327)	(0.0334)	(0.0334)	(0.0416)
Humanitarian Intervention							0.0 50 to to to
Log(battle deaths)							0.852***
							(0.0530)
Intervention Enabler	0.324***	0.344***	0.346***	0.333***	0.320***	0.337***	0.206***
Log(Military Exp.)t-1	(0.324^{+++}) (0.0227)	(0.0232)	(0.0232)	(0.0237)	(0.0238)	(0.0249)	(0.206^{+++})
Time Dependency	(0.0227)	(0.0232)	(0.0232)	(0.0237)	(0.0238)	(0.0249)	(0.0474)
Last Intervention	-2.618***	-2.613***	-2.613***	-2.620***	-2.600***	-2.574***	-1.618***
Last meet contion	(0.115)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.128)
_spline1	-0.0776***	-0.0774***	-0.0774***	-0.0776***	-0.0769***	-0.0760***	-0.0391***
F	(0.00401)	(0.00395)	(0.00395)	(0.00397)	(0.00392)	(0.00390)	(0.00503)
_spline2	0.0361***	0.0360***	0.0360***	0.0361***	0.0357***	0.0352***	0.0162***
	(0.00204)	(0.00201)	(0.00202)	(0.00202)	(0.00200)	(0.00199)	(0.00277)
_spline3	00622***	00618***	00619***	00622***	00613***	00603***	-0.00180**
	(0.000519)	(0.000513)	(0.000515)	(0.000515)	(0.000513)	(0.000509)	(0.000776)
Constant	-0.107	-0.119	-0.141	-0.108	-0.210	-0.242	-4.890***
	(0.707)	(0.710)	(0.704)	(0.710)	(0.710)	(0.709)	(1.383)
	116 722	11(722	11(722	11(722	11(722	11(722	22 (71
Observations	116,733	116,733	116,733	116,733	116,733	116,733	33,671
Pseudo R2 BIC	0.563 7737	0.564 7727	0.564 7724	0.563 7739	0.564 7722	0.566 7731	0.598 2622
log-likelihood	-3781	-3776	-3775	-3782	-3774	-3755	-1202
Table 0-14 · Logit Regression						-3133	-1202

Proxy-Intervention Model: Logistic Regression with splines

Table 0-14: Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars with splines, 2001 - 2009. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Dependent Variable			Military II	nterventions			
Independent Variables	Model 90	Model 91	Model 92	Model 93	Model 94	Model 95	Model 96
independent variables	Widdel 90	Widdel 71	Widder 72	Widdel 75	Widdel 94	Widdel 95	Widdel 90
Major arms suppliers							
Log(Arms Supply: China) _{t-1}	-0.00107					-0.0350	-0.0614
Log(rinns Suppry: China)(-)	(0.0301)					(0.0313)	(0.0567)
Log(Arms Supply: UK)t-1	(0.0201)	0.0325				-0.0176	0.130*
		(0.0276)				(0.0361)	(0.0665)
Log(Arms Supply: France)t-1		()	0.00771			-0.0746**	-0.179***
			(0.0266)			(0.0349)	(0.0655)
Log(Arms Supply: US)t-1			. ,	0.0744***		0.137***	0.168***
				(0.0231)		(0.0302)	(0.0582)
Log(Arms Supply: Russia) _{t-1}					0.0730***	0.106***	0.0540
					(0.0211)	(0.0228)	(0.0392)
Control Variables						. ,	
Alliance	-0.0919	-0.0955	-0.0945	-0.105	-0.0585	-0.0588	0.984**
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.235)	(0.233)	(0.236)	(0.384)
Contiguity	2.165***	2.192***	2.175***	2.211***	2.185***	2.171***	1.468***
	(0.359)	(0.364)	(0.361)	(0.368)	(0.354)	(0.366)	(0.491)
Peaceful Relations	-3.927***	-3.915***	-3.927***	-3.895***	-3.971***	-3.908***	-3.936**
	(0.605)	(0.606)	(0.605)	(0.610)	(0.603)	(0.607)	(1.575)
Shared Ethnicity	0.815***	0.824***	0.815***	0.863***	0.748**	0.813***	0.271
	(0.302)	(0.304)	(0.302)	(0.309)	(0.300)	(0.308)	(0.405)
Log(distance)	-1.104***	-1.115***	-1.106***	-1.151***	-1.075***	-1.124***	-0.846***
	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.145)	(0.140)	(0.144)	(0.192)
Colonial History	2.666***	2.721***	2.686***	2.632***	2.911***	2.694***	2.463***
	(0.639)	(0.649)	(0.643)	(0.655)	(0.640)	(0.658)	(0.836)
Corporate and Economic Control							
Log(Trade Volume) _{t-1}	-0.0288	-0.0291	-0.0287	-0.0312	-0.0292	-0.0350	-0.199***
	(0.0269)	(0.0270)	(0.0269)	(0.0272)	(0.0268)	(0.0271)	(0.0491)
Log(FDI)							0.182***
							(0.0584)
Log(Oilneed)	0.369***	0.375***	0.370***	0.379***	0.370***	0.371***	0.324***
	(0.0595)	(0.0601)	(0.0598)	(0.0608)	(0.0592)	(0.0606)	(0.0725)
Humanitarian Intervention							0.400
Log(battle deaths)							0.182***
							(0.0584)
Intervention Enabler	0 627***	0 620***	0.629***	0 500***	0 607***	0 571***	0 205***
Log(Military Exp.) _{t-1}	0.632***	0.620***	***=>	0.599***	0.607***	0.571^{***}	0.285***
Time Den en den e	(0.0423)	(0.0439)	(0.0434)	(0.0445)	(0.0427)	(0.0453)	(0.0797)
Time Dependency	-0.160***	-0.160***	-0.160***	-0.159***	-0.160***	-0.159***	-0.149***
Last Intervention							
Cold War	(0.00819) 0.191**	(0.00819) 0.199**	(0.00821) 0.193**	(0.00817) 0.202**	(0.00817) 0.200**	(0.00826) 0.215**	(0.0107)
Cold War	(0.0883)	(0.0879)	(0.0878)	(0.202^{44})			
	(0.0885)	(0.08/9)	(0.0070)	(0.0878)	(0.0876)	(0.0897)	
Constant	-5.984***	-5.922***	-5.984***	-5.696***	-6.050***	-5.591***	-7.170***
Constant	(1.284)	(1.296)			(1.278)	(1.301)	
Observations	116,733	116,733	(1.288) 116,733	(1.316) 116,733	116,733	116,733	(2.112) 33,671
Number of iddyad	10,919	10,919	10,919	10,919	10,919	10,919	6,876
rho	0.768	0.773	0.770	0.780	0.766	0.771	0.684
sigma	3.303	3.344	3.315	3.417	3.281	3.332	2.669
BIC	3.303 8125	5.544 8124	8125	8115	8112	5.552 8136	2.009
log-likelihood	-3981	-3980	-3981	-3976	-3974	-3963	-1207
	-3701	-3900	-3701	-39/0	-37/4	-3903	-1207

Proxy-Intervention Model: Random Effect Regression with Cold War variable

Table 0-15: Random-Effect Logit Regression – Military interventions in civil wars, 1975-2009.