

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
Institute of Political Studies

**Master thesis**

**2019**

**Gabriel van Oppen Ardanaz**

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**  
**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
Institute of Political Studies

**Gabriel van Oppen Ardanaz**

**Going green:**  
**MINUSMA and the United Nation's turn to**  
**Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency**  
*Master thesis*

Prague 2018

**Author:** Gabriel van Oppen Ardanaz

**Supervisor:** Prof. Mgr. Oldřich Bureš, M.A., Ph.D.

**Academic Year:** 2018/2019

### **Bibliographic note**

Van Oppen Ardanaz, Gabriel. *Going green: MINUSMA and the United Nation's turn to counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency*. 97 p. Mater thesis. Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science, Supervisor prof. Mgr. Oldřich Bureš, M.A., Ph.D.

## **Abstract**

This Master's thesis will focus on the newest trends in the field of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations that are moving the organization to unknown territory by deploying in theatres where missions are faced with asymmetric threats. In this regard, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), constituted as a groundbreaking and innovative peacekeeping operation, is spearheading a realignment in peacekeeping that can potentially shape future operations to come, as mandates increasingly reflect roles in areas such as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. The core objective of this study will be to analyze why MINUSMA is being forced to *go green* while studying how it is doing so, reflecting on past experiences from other operations such as the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I), that have guided changes in MINUSMA's doctrines and capabilities.

## **Abstrakt**

Tato diplomová práce se zaměří na nejnovější trendy v oblasti mírových operací Organizace spojených národů (OSN), které přesouvají organizaci do neznámého území nasazením v místech, kde jsou mise vystaveny asymetrickým hrozbám. V tomto ohledu vede vícerozměrná integrovaná stabilizační mise Organizace spojených národů v Mali (MINUSMA), považovaná za průlomovou a inovativní mírovou operaci, ke změnám v mírových operacích, které mohou potenciálně ovlivnit operace budoucí, neboť hrozby terorismu a povstání se stávají čím dál častějšími. Hlavním cílem této práce bude vysledovat tyto inovace, co se doktrín a schopností týče, v rámci dřívějších kampaní, jako jsou ty, které se uskutečnily v Afghánistánu, prostřednictvím Mezinárodních sil pro stabilizační pomoc (ISAF) a Iráku, a to prostřednictvím mnohonárodních sil (MNF-I).

## **Keywords**

United Nations – Peacekeeping – Traditional Peacekeeping - Counterterrorism – Intelligence  
Counterinsurgency – Asymmetric Warfare – Stabilization – Robust Peacekeeping

**Range of thesis:** 85 pages, 164.046 characters

## **Declaration of Authorship**

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Brussels, Gabriel van Oppen Ardanaz



## **Acknowledgments**

In a year of many changes, I beyond happy to submit this thesis and move on to the next phase in life. I would like to dedicate this section to my thesis supervisor, Mgr. Oldřich Bureš, who has aided and guided me throughout the process. I would also like to take the chance to thank my family, with a special mention to my mother and father for all the help provided throughout the years, as well as all the people that have been with me through thick and thin. This section might not be long enough to thank everyone as much as they deserve but, to everyone who was there for me over the last years of my life, thank you very much.

Lastly, I would like to dedicate this section, as well, to the United Nations and its personnel. Having had the luck to work in the UN while writing this thesis, I have had the chance to see for myself the incredible people that are behind the machine and the often overlooked vital role the organization plays in the functioning of the global order. In a period of uncertainty and rise of extreme ideas, the UN must be protected and cherished as an organization that, regardless of its flaws, still stands for the improvement and enlightenment of humanity.

**Contents**

- 1. INTRODUCTION..... 11**
  - 1.1. Literature review..... 14
  - 1.2. Approaches and methods..... 15
- 2. EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS..... 17**
- 3. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND..... 26**
  - 3.1. Robust Peacekeeping ..... 26
  - 3.2. Stabilization Operations ..... 29
  - 3.3. Asymmetric Warfare ..... 32
    - 3.3.1. Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency ..... 33
- 4. A CONFLICT IN PERSPECTIVE ..... 38**
  - 4.1. The Malian conflict ..... 41
  - 4.2. Importance of the conflict in the international scene ..... 43
- 5. ENTER MINUSMA ..... 45**
  - 5.1. Mandate ..... 46
  - 5.2. MINUSMA's capabilities ..... 49
  - 5.3. Deployment and challenges..... 51
- 6. LEARNING FROM THE PAST ..... 53**
  - 6.1. Doctrinal lessons learned..... 54
  - 6.2. Adapting capabilities ..... 64
  - 6.3. Outcomes..... 69
- 7. CONCLUSION..... 70**
- 8. APPENDIX ..... 73**
  - 8.1. Appendix 1: Map of Mali ..... 73
  - 8.2. Appendix 2: Ethnic map of Mali ..... 74
  - 8.3. Appendix 3: Troop contributing countries (MINUSMA – ISAF – MNF-I) ..... 75
- 9. BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... 77**

**Tables:**

Table 1: Expansion of peacekeeping operations: Cold War and Post-Cold War operations from 1989 to 1993 ..... 19

Table 2: Post-Cold-War peacekeeping under Chapter VII authorization.....21

Table 3: Main differences between traditional peacekeeping and stabilization operations..... 30

Table 4: Insurgency and terrorism as models of warfare ..... 34

Table 5: Models of Counter-terrorism..... 36

Table 6: Security Council Resolution 2100 Mandate ..... 46

Table 7: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2423 mandate extension ..... 48

Table 8: MINUSMA fatalities (2013-2018)..... 52

Table 9: MINUSMA capabilities ..... 65

**Figures:**

Figure 1: Counterterrorism Targeting Cycle ..... 58

Figure 2: The OSINT Operations Cycle ..... 60

Figure 3: Stabilization Objectives ..... 62

## Abbreviations

\* **Note:** Several acronyms do not match the French names they are officially given. Furthermore, only those abbreviations that appear more than twice or more during the thesis will be noted in this section.

<b>AFISMA</b>	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>COIN</b>	Counter-insurgency
<b>CONOPS</b>	Concept of Operations
<b>CT</b>	Counter-terrorism
<b>DPO</b>	Department of Peace Operations
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>F3EAD</b>	Find, finish, fix, exploit, analyze and disseminate
<b>G5S</b>	Group 5 Sahel
<b>GWOT</b>	Global War on Terror
<b>HIPPO</b>	High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
<b>HUMINT</b>	Human Intelligence
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Device
<b>ISAF</b>	International Stabilization Assistance Force
<b>ISR</b>	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
<b>MDSF</b>	Malian Defense and Security Forces

<b>MINUSCA</b>	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
<b>MINUSMA</b>	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
<b>MINUSTAH</b>	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
<b>MNF-I</b>	Multi-National Force – Iraq
<b>MNLA</b>	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
<b>MONUSCO</b>	United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>PCC</b>	Police Contributing Country
<b>ROE</b>	Rules of engagement
<b>TCC</b>	Troop Contributing Country
<b>UAV</b>	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNGA</b>	United Nations General Assembly
<b>UNMIK</b>	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council

## 1. Introduction

Ever since its creation, in 1945, the United Nations (UN) has strived to achieve its existential goal of saving *succeeding generations from the scourge of war*.<sup>1</sup> From this moment, and especially the deployment in 1948 of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which was to be the first UN peacekeeping operation ever deployed, the UN has been praised or criticized by its capacity to live up to that ambitious goal. Over its many decades of life, the UN and its peacekeeping operations have had to face different threats to peace, with different actors involved, in different regions, with different contexts, etc. The complex environments in which UN peacekeeping operations were deployed, added to the lack of experience, clear guidelines and financial and material support have often made the UN act as a mere bystander to the worsening situations on the ground which resulted in humanitarian catastrophes for which the concept of peacekeeping was to be stained. For all its silent successes, the failures were for what the UN was to be infamously known.

Over time, external factors, such as the bipolar struggle during the Cold War and its end with the disintegration of the USSR, added to the failures and successes of the UN when tackling crisis all around the globe have made the UN and its peacekeeping operations exist as a reactive organization, always adapting and playing catch-up with the trends and circumstances it was living. Peacekeeping has seen periods of expansion of operations and periods of retraction; periods of optimism and periods of disillusion; and finally, periods of business as usual as well as periods of evolution and rewriting of what UN peacekeeping operations mean. This thesis will deal with the latter, arguing that current events all across the globe (i.e. Syria, Yemen, Libya or Mali, to name some) are moving the UN to reframe its operations to better adapt for what is likely to become the new normal in the years to come.

The idea, therefore, that peacekeeping is not a monolithic and never-changing endeavor is extremely important to account for the history of an organization that has adapted to every context it has lived in. Events like the aforementioned end of the Cold War, the traumatic disasters of the UN during the 90's in countries such as Rwanda, Bosnia or Somalia, or the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the following campaigns launched in name of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) had a profound impact on the UN and its peacekeeping operations. As a reactive organization, historical events such as these have resulted in periods of adaptation and soul search, which would be pinpointed in reports and resolutions such as

---

<sup>1</sup> United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice". *San Francisco*, 1946, 54.

the *Brahimi Report* of 2000, the General-Assembly *Resolution 1373* of 2001, *The Global Counter-terrorism Strategy* of 2006, *the United Nations Principles and Guidelines* (also known as *Capstone Doctrine*) of 2008, *the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations report (HIPPO report)* of 2015, and the more recent *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers* (also commonly known as the *dos Santos report*) of 2017, amongst many other resolutions that have given shape to the UN peace and security pillars as we know them today.

With this thesis, I intend to demonstrate we are currently in the midst of new changes that are vital to understand what peacekeeping stands for nowadays and what it is likely to stand for in the future. The Global War on Terror initiated in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000's, and the expanding instability that reigns many countries since then, has evidenced that the UN is less likely to respond to a Westphalian situation of conventional warfare between two states, but rather more to a post-Westphalian situation of civil war in which terrorist and insurgent spoilers contest the authority of failed (or fragile) states, making for more complex, fragmented and intractable conflicts for the UN to solve. The expansion of terrorist organizations and the power vacuums left behind after the collapse of Governments in the Middle East and northern and central Africa during the last years has led the UN to a turning point realization; either the UN adapts to the circumstances or it risks being unprepared and irrelevant when facing the new threats to international stability that are already coming from the collapse of fragile states and the appearance of sub-national spoilers that may not only pose a threat to a particular nation, but also pose a regional or even global threat.

With my study, I would like to add to the literature that suggests that UN peacekeeping is *going green* (view note 1<sup>2</sup>), growing more military or kinetic oriented, or to be more specific, more counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorist (CT) oriented. Although in the latest years there have been some examples of this adaptation to a more muscular COIN approach of peacekeeping capable of combating asymmetric threats, such as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) or the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central

---

<sup>2</sup> Note 1: The concept of *going green* has often been used in peacekeeping literature to signal a turn to more military-oriented operations. In this case, *going green* makes reference to situations, as is currently happening with MINUSMA, in which traditionally white-painted UN assets and equipment is being painted in camouflage green to adapt to the environment. These decisions, far from being meaningless, signal the position the UN takes *vis-à-vis* third parties, as it shows a lack of confidence in the neutrality the UN is generally granted. The use of this concept in this study should not be confused with the use of *going green* given to UN peacekeeping operations in the latest years, where missions have been attempting to reduce their ecological impact by implementing eco-friendly measures.

African Republic (MINUSCA), the clearest example of the new shift of peacekeeping operations is best exemplified by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (view appendix 1), better known as MINUSMA.

MINUSMA is to be considered by experts as an outlier of UN peacekeeping operations, having been described as *the laboratory of peacekeeping facing the new threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century*<sup>3</sup> by the ex-Under Secretary General of UN peacekeeping operations. What we see in MINUSMA is the first attempt ever by the UN of setting up a multidimensional robust peacekeeping stabilization operation capable of running in an unstable environment where it is being targeted by a myriad of terrorist and insurgent spoilers. This adaptation process which started with MINUSMA's deployment in 2013, however, has been far from easy. The first years of the operation evidenced a profound lack of knowledge and know-how on how to operate under a new series of threats the UN had never faced. Up to date, despite its short existence, MINUSMA is already the deadliest and most dangerous ongoing peacekeeping operation.

With my master's thesis, I don't intend only to confirm the existence of a new trend or wave of peacekeeping operations. This thesis will aim beyond that scope and focus specifically on MINUSMA, attempting to answer two research questions; 1). Why has MINUSMA been forced to *go green*, and; 2). How it is doing so. Responding to this research question will require; 1). An in-depth analysis of the Malian context and what makes it unique for a deployed peacekeeping operation; 2). Understanding how MINUSMA has attempted to adapt to the security environment by mirroring best-practices from other operations, which in this specific case will require a thorough analysis of the major influence of operations such as the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I), and; 3). What these learning processes have actually meant in terms of doctrines and capabilities present in MINUSMA. This thesis, therefore, will use ISAF and MNF-I as role models with which to explain how MINUSMA has come to be nowadays and why this departs from other ongoing peacekeeping operations deployed at the time of writing.

As mentioned previously, MINUSMA could be understood as a laboratory to test and anticipate what is to come in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The UN is eager to learn its lessons early in Mali to be ready for the next crisis, because whether the UN is prepared or not, the threats to

---

<sup>3</sup>. Le Secrétaire général adjoint aux opérations de maintien de la paix Monsieur Hervé Ladsous rencontre la presse. *MINUSMA* [online]. 19 March 2017. [Accessed 7 October 2018]. Available from: <https://minusma.unmissions.org/le-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-adjoint-aux-op%C3%A9rations-de-maintien-de-la-paix-monsieur-herv%C3%A9-ladsous-rencontre>

international stability that will be coming from spoilers in war torn regions where fragile governments fall are expected to be high. MINUSMA is the UN's bid to be ready and get ahead of the wave that is likely to come. As stated by a Dutch Commander of the UN Intelligence Unit in Mali:

*We are trying to learn these lessons here, rather than in Iraq, Libya or Syria. This is not the end of this type of mission. It's the beginning.*<sup>4</sup>

The structure of this thesis will continue as follows; 1). Outlining of existing literature on the matter and explanation of how this study pretends to contribute to it, specifying as well what methods and approaches will be used; 2). Presentation of the UN and its historical evolution until nowadays; 3). Theoretical outline with exposition of the most relevant concepts for my thesis; 4). Outdrawing of the evolution of the Malian conflict, focusing as well on the importance of the conflict in the international context; 5). An analysis of the early phases of MINUSMA's deployment, highlighting its mandate and early struggles; 6). Highlighting of MINUSMA's learning process through the analysis of the doctrinal and capabilities lessons learned and, finally; 8). A conclusion with which I will intend to highlight the main crucial points of my study.

### **1.1. Literature review**

The innovative and groundbreaking character given to MINUSMA, as a peacekeeping operation that faces asymmetric threats and is adapting by acquiring CT and COIN doctrines and capabilities, is not new. There is already some literature on the subject as MINUSMA has attracted attention from academics and experts from the field. Perhaps the expert that has best captured the new trend in peacekeeping and its origins has been John Karlsrud, who is an expert in UN peacekeeping operations and senior researcher at the *research Group on Peace, Conflict and Development*. In articles such as *Europe's return to peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali*<sup>5</sup> (co-written with Adam C. Smith), *toward UN counter-terrorism*

---

<sup>4</sup> The world's deadliest U.N. mission. Washington Post [online]. [Accessed 28 April 2019]. Available from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-mission/The-al-Qaeda-threat-in-Mali-presents-a-new-challenge-to-peacekeepers>.

<sup>5</sup> Karlsrud, John, and Adam C Smith. "Europe's Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali." *International Peace Institute*, Providing for peacekeeping n° 11, 2015, 28.

*Operations*<sup>6</sup> or *are UN peacekeeping Operations moving towards “chapter seven and a half” operations*<sup>7</sup> John Karlsrud pictures MINUSMA as a departure from traditional peacekeeping as we know it viewing the mission and its collaboration with other regional and static actors as having a drastic effect on peacekeeping principles and capabilities which are certain to bring the organization to unexplored territory.

Other articles and authors of importance to my thesis would be *the use of force in UN peacekeeping operations*<sup>8</sup> written by Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko or *Peacekeeping operations in a changing world*<sup>9</sup> written by a variety of experts of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Furthermore, UN specific documents such as the before mentioned *Brahimi report, the HIPPO report, or the dos Santos report* (etc.) will be extensively used to understand and follow the evolution of the UN throughout the last years and clarify how MINUSMA has come to be. Understanding the need and importance of analyzing ISAF and MNF-I as role-models for MINUSMA’s evolution, relevant reports (from NATO, US or other member states) will be studied, in order to pick up the stick and add a contribution to the field with a deeper and larger study of the new turn in peacekeeping operations. My objective is, thus, to shed light on the learning process the UN has undergone to adapt to the situation in Mali and detail what these changes have meant for the doctrines and capabilities the UN is used to using.

## 1.2. Approaches and methods

With this thesis the objective will be to conduct an exercise of *process-tracing*, which is a research method often used in Social Sciences and other disciplines to *enable generalizations of findings from single case studies to other causally similar cases*.<sup>10</sup> However, due to the particularities of my investigation, I won’t be using neither of the two macro-theories commonly associated with the use of process tracing in International Relations

---

<sup>6</sup> Karlsrud, John. “Towards UN Counter-Terrorism operations?” *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 6 (June 3, 2017): 1215–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1268907>.

<sup>7</sup> Karlsrud, John. “Are UN Peacekeeping Missions Moving Toward ‘Chapter Seven and a Half’ operations?” *IPI Global Observatory*. Accessed October 4, 2018. <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/02/peacekeeping-chapter-seven-half/>.

<sup>8</sup> Berdal, Mats, and David H Ucko. “The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping operations: Problems and Prospects.” *The RUSI Journal* 160, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 6–12. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1016718>.

<sup>9</sup> Netherlands Institute for International Relations. “Peacekeeping operation in a changing world.” Clingendael Strategic Mirror Project (January, 2015). <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Peacekeeping%20operations%20in%20a%20changing%20world.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> Beach, Derek. *Process-Tracing Methods in Social Science*. Oxford University Press, (January, 2017). <http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e 176>.

academia. Therefore, throughout this thesis neither *theory-building* nor *theory-testing* will be used as they don't appear to be useful for the type of investigation my study requires. Instead, my focus will be on tracing possible linkages that can explain why and how MINUSMA has adapted to the Malian security context. This study will demonstrate that said process is intimately linked with a UN learning process that mirrored best-practices from the GWOT campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Due to the assumption that all three conflicts have similar backgrounds, understood as being the target of asymmetric warfare tactics, and the respective third-party interventions also shared a number of features, this thesis will extensively touch upon ISAF and MNF-I as vital operations to understand MINUSMA today. In other words, answering the research question of how MINUSMA has adapted its doctrines and capabilities to *go green* would be practically impossible without drawing the connections with these two campaigns.

The fact that MINUSMA has adapted in the same ways to asymmetric threats is not a coincidence and is mainly due to three factors: 1.) The withdrawal of NATO (as well as non-NATO) member states' forces from Afghanistan and Iraq and their inclusion in MINUSMA (view appendix 3); 2.) the unprecedented Western participation in MINUSMA (view appendix 3), shaping the mission on their long experience in CT and COIN from participating in NATO campaigns and securing their own national territories; and finally, 3.) the fact that the UN was present in Afghanistan through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) which already provided organizational learning on how to operate in a volatile environment where there is a presence of asymmetric threats.

Nevertheless, the assumption that the same doctrines and capabilities appear in all three theatres doesn't prove by itself without a shred of doubt that the outcomes of MINUSMA reflect the lessons learnt from the GWOT campaigns. Evidence of the linkage between Afghanistan and Iraq and MINUSMA will be demonstrated by four means: 1.) proof of a UN learning process identified in relevant documents; 2.) evidence retrieved from academic literature on MINUSMA and; 3.) Interviews or comments of key-figures related to the GWOT campaigns or MINUSMA. To answer both research questions, the main sources of information for this thesis will come from academic literature, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and pioneering and ground-breaking documents that over the years have moved the UN to more robust military oriented operations such as *Resolution 1373*, *the Global Counter-terrorism Strategy*, *the Capstone Doctrine*, *the HIPPO report*, or *the dos Santos report*.

## 2. Evolution of United Nations peacekeeping operations

Already in 1954, in the early years of the UN and in the midst of the Cold-War, who best captured the spirit and ambitions of the organization was the then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who pinpointed that the UN *was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell.*<sup>11</sup> This limited idealism and pragmatism seemed necessary at the time, given the context in which the UN was born. After a first half of a century which had seen two World Wars, the persecution and holocaust of minorities, the use of the first ever nuclear weapons and the beginning of the Cold-War between two superpowers capable of *Mutual Assured Destruction* (MAD), any caution and pragmatic approach to the role the UN could play as a guarantor of peace and security in the international scene was well advised.

The early years of peacekeeping operations, which as a concept was never mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations and only appeared throughout the 1950's, evidenced the limitations of the moment where the UN, under Security Council authorization, would only intervene in those Westphalian state-to-state conflicts the permanent five (P5) members deemed unimportant for their own strategic interests.<sup>12</sup> The predominant idea of the moment held that civil wars weren't the business of the UN, as any act of interference in a countries' domestic issues would constitute a flagrant and illegal violation of the principle of state sovereignty by which a state has the uncontested control of all people and resources under its territory. The UN was, thus, given tasks which involved the brokering of cease-fires between states and the deployment of missions to observe its fulfilment mostly positioning itself between the hostile parties, always playing a role during the peace-making and peace-keeping phases in the conflict continuum. These missions were to be small in number, lightly armed and always dependent on the three basic principles of *impartiality*, *consent* and *minimal use of force* that constituted the *holy trinity* of peacekeeping. Such operations, thus, were reliant on an extremely limited *rule of engagement* (ROE) on the use of force, which was only to be used in self-defense. Therefore, acting under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations on *peaceful settlement of disputes* the charter called upon peacekeeping operations to *seek a*

---

<sup>11</sup> Kolb, Andreas S. "The Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect in the Age of New Wars." In *The UN Security Council Members' Responsibility to Protect*, by Andreas S. Kolb, 1–47. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2018. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55644-3\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55644-3_1).

<sup>12</sup> Bellamy, Alex J. and Williams, Paul D. "*Understanding peacekeeping*". Cambridge: Polity Press. Second edition. 2010

*solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.*<sup>13</sup>

During the Cold-War the principle of military minimal use of force was only broken in one instance, this being the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), from 1960-1964,<sup>14</sup> which was to be the first authorized intervention to use force, or what was most commonly named *all measures necessary*, to halt aggressions and fulfil the mission's mandate. This operation was pioneering in relying on the chapter VII of the UN charter on *actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression* which allowed UN authorized military components to take any actions *it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.*<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, despite some specific and situational adjustments regarding the use of force during the Cold-War, peacekeeping was to remain largely limited and unidimensional.

This would all change with the arrival of a new era with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fall of the Soviet Union, and its disintegration through the secession and independence of its former republics, shifted the world power politics from a bidimensional balance of power to a new period of US unipolar hegemony. This event was to be a defining moment for the UN and its peacekeeping operations as it marked the beginning of an extraordinary period of optimism. The triumph of the liberal order over communism added to the unprecedented cooperation of both the US and the still Soviet Union in the early response of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait during the Gulf War (1990-1991) seemed to mark the beginning of an era of understanding and prosperity.<sup>16</sup> The author that best captured this period of optimism was Francis Fukuyama who in a book of 1992, entitled *the end of history and the last man*,<sup>17</sup> envisioned a world no further divided by ideology where the victory of the US and Western liberal democracy had marked the final form of human progress.

The new found potential for change and action was evident in the UN, where in the following years there would be a vast expansion of the number of peacekeeping operations, with a far larger participation of Western States, and even of Security Council members,

---

<sup>13</sup> United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice". *San Francisco*, 1946, 54.

<sup>14</sup> Klinger, Janeen. "Stabilization Operations and Nation-Building - Lessons from United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo (1960-1964)." *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 29:2 (2005): 83–101.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice". *San Francisco*, 1946, 54.

<sup>16</sup> Fuller, Graham E. "Moscow and the Gulf War." *Foreign Affairs*, June 1, 1991. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/1991-06-01/moscow-and-gulf-war>.

<sup>17</sup> Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York : Toronto : New York: Free Press ; Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992.

which now saw the possibility of liberating military capacity from the obligation of national security, in the absence of a threat, to set them under a UN banner to carry out peacekeeping operations. During the early years of the end of the Cold War, particularly since 1989 to 1993, 18 new missions were deployed all around the world,<sup>18</sup> compared to the 14 that had been launched during the Cold-War years of 1945 to 1989 (view table 1). This new expansion in peacekeeping operations, signaling a new era for the organization, demanded a new conceptualization of peacekeeping which would come in 1992 by the hand of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his *Agenda for Peace*. In this document, the Secretary-General gave an optimistic view of the role peacekeeping operations could play going into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, giving advice on communication, prevention and diplomacy, troop training, readiness, use of force and expansion of peacekeeper’s functions coining the concept of peace-building. However, the Secretary-General also made a warning that was to prove premonitory for the disasters to come reminding the members of the UN that if mandates of peacekeeping operations were to grow ever more ambitious, the logistic and financial support to accomplish them should grow too as to not create a gap between goals and means.<sup>19</sup>

**Table 1: Expansion of peacekeeping operations: Cold War and Post-Cold War operations from 1989 to 1993<sup>20</sup>**

Cold-War peacekeeping operations (1945 – 1989)		Post-Cold-War peacekeeping operations (1989 – 1993)	
<b>UNTSO</b>	1948 – ongoing	<b>UNAVEM I</b>	1989 – 1991
<b>UNMOGIP</b>	1949 – ongoing	<b>UNTAG</b>	1989 – 1990
<b>UNEF I</b>	1956 – 1967	<b>ONUCA</b>	1989 – 1992
<b>UNOGIL</b>	1958 – 1958	<b>UNIKOM</b>	1991 – 2003
<b>ONUC</b>	1960 – 1964	<b>MINURSO</b>	1991 – ongoing
<b>UNSF</b>	1962 – 1963	<b>UNAVEM II</b>	1991 – 1995
<b>UNYOM</b>	1963 – 1964	<b>ONUSAL</b>	1991 – 1995
<b>UNFICYP</b>	1964 – ongoing	<b>UNAMIC</b>	1991 – 1992
<b>DOMREP</b>	1965 – 1966	<b>UNPROFOR</b>	1992 – 1995
<b>UNEF II</b>	1973 – 1979	<b>UNTAC</b>	1992 – 1995
<b>UNDOF</b>	1974 – ongoing	<b>UNOSOM I</b>	1992 – 1993
<b>UNIFIL</b>	1978 – ongoing	<b>ONUMOZ</b>	1992 – 1994
<b>UNGOMAP</b>	1988 – 1990	<b>UNOSOM II</b>	1993 – 1995
<b>UNIIMOG</b>	1988 – 1991	<b>UNOMUR</b>	1993 – 1994
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>UNOMIG</b>	1993 – 2009

<sup>18</sup> Bellamy, Alex J. and Williams, Paul D. *“Understanding peacekeeping”*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Second edition. 2010

<sup>19</sup> Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. “An Agenda for Peace.” United Nations, 1992.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations. “List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948 - 2017,” 2017. [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/unpeacekeeping-operationlist\\_1.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/unpeacekeeping-operationlist_1.pdf).

	<b>UNOMIL</b>	1993 – 1997
	<b>UNMIH</b>	1993 – 1996
	<b>UNAMIR</b>	1993 – 1996
	<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>

Most of these missions were to respond to non-Westphalian crisis which departed from the traditional state-to-state conflicts peacekeeping had dealt with in the past. The late 1980's and early 1990's saw an expansion of civil wars that originated from the withdrawal of support of the US and the USSR to their former client states in the absence of the Cold-War struggle.<sup>21</sup> The withdrawal of military and financial aid evidenced the lack of support and control some regimes had *vis-à-vis* their own populations, proving incapable of coping with the revival of identity conflicts - mostly ethnic and nationalistic - which had remained under check during the Cold-War.

The outburst of civil wars added to what was to be called the *CNN effect*, by which audiences at home were confronted in real time and non-stop with the suffering of civilians half way around the globe, made UN inaction untenable.<sup>22</sup> For the first time, principles of non-intervention were dismissed with the appearance of a global demand to carry out humanitarian missions in locations where civilians were carrying the burden of conflict. Consequently, the UN would adapt to the new demands growing ever more multi-dimensional carrying out assignments such as key infrastructure reconstruction, delivery of humanitarian aid or de-mining activities, to name some new tasks.<sup>23</sup> However, humanitarian interventions of the 1990's reflected a deeper re-evaluation of what UN peacekeeping could achieve with the inclusion of growing ambitious mandates which tasked the missions with responsibilities such as institution building, economic assistance to establish a market economy or democratic election monitoring. These new tasks manifested the dominant theory of *liberal peace* in the post-Cold War era and the new inclusion of *peace-building* in the lexicon of peacekeeping operations by which it was believed that stability and conflict resolution wasn't only a question of lack of conflict, but also a matter of democratic values, market economies and human rights respect.<sup>24</sup> Thus, throughout the 1990's, peacekeeping wasn't only to be evaluated on its capacity to provide for conflict resolution, but also for its capacity to fulfill its

---

<sup>21</sup> Bellamy, Alex J. and Williams, Paul D. *“Understanding peacekeeping”*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Second edition. 2010

<sup>22</sup> Robinson, Piers. “The CNN Effect Revisited.” *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 22, no. 4 (October 2005): 344–49. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07393180500288519>.

<sup>23</sup> Kaldor, Mary. “A Decade of Humanitarian Intervention: The Role of Civil Society,” 2001, 35.

<sup>24</sup> Chinkin, Christine, and Mary Kaldor. “The Liberal Peace: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding.” *International Law and New Wars*, April 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316759868.010>.

humanitarian obligations and leave a stable system upon departure in line with Western standards of statehood.

Though the vast majority of operations deployed in the late 1980's and early 1990's still reflected traditional mandates with chapters in line with what peacekeeping had been accustomed to, worsening situations in Bosnia and Somalia fostered new interpretations of the role peacekeeping operations could or should play in the midst of conflict. Gradually, during the 1990's the expansion of peacekeeping operations was also met a unprecedented authorization of peace-enforcement mandates (see table 2) falling under chapter VII, whether it was directly enforced by the peacekeeping operations or in collaboration with an *ad-hoc* intervention from a third party multinational coalition. While those peace-enforcement tasks carried out by third parties often proved successful and sufficient, in the case of Bosnia and Somalia they proved largely ineffective in restoring order as the mandates they were tasked with weren't paired with the means necessary to achieve them. Thus, these missions would remain in an uncomfortable *chapter six and a half* scenario between voluntarism and enforcement,<sup>25</sup> where peaceful resolution was proving unsuccessful in halting violence and peace-enforcement wasn't feasible due to inherent lack of military strength *vis-à-vis* other actors and the fear of becoming part of the conflict.

**Table 2: Post-Cold-War peacekeeping under Chapter VII authorization (Yes/No or ad-hoc)<sup>26</sup>**

Peacekeeping operations (1989-1999)					
<b>UNAVEM I</b>	1989	No	<b>UNMOT</b>	1994	No
<b>UNTAG</b>	1989	No	<b>UNAVEM III</b>	1995	No
<b>ONUCA</b>	1989	No	<b>UNCRO</b>	1995	No
<b>UNIKOM</b>	1991	No	<b>UNPREDEP</b>	1995	No
<b>MINURSO</b>	1991	No	<b>UNMIBH</b>	1995	No
<b>UNAVEM II</b>	1991	No	<b>UNTAES</b>	1996	Ad-hoc
<b>ONUSAL</b>	1991	No	<b>UNMOP</b>	1996	No
<b>UNAMIC</b>	1991	No	<b>UNSMIH</b>	1996	No
<b>UNPROFOR</b>	1992	Yes	<b>MINUGUA</b>	1997	No
<b>UNTAC</b>	1992	No	<b>MONUA</b>	1997	No
<b>UNOSOM I</b>	1992	Ad-hoc	<b>UNTMIH</b>	1997	No
<b>ONUMOZ</b>	1992	No	<b>MIPONUH</b>	1997	No
<b>UNOSOM II</b>	1993	Yes	<b>UNCPSG</b>	1998	No
<b>UNOMUR</b>	1993	No	<b>MINURCA</b>	1998	No
<b>UNOMIG</b>	1993	No	<b>UNOMSIL</b>	1998	No
<b>UNOMIL</b>	1993	Ad-hoc	<b>UNMIK</b>	1999	Ad-hoc

<sup>25</sup> Findlay, Trevor. *"The use of force in UN peace operations"*. Solna, Sweden : Oxford ; New York : SIPRI ; Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0-19-829282-1. JZ6374 .F56 2002

<sup>26</sup> Durall, Júlia G. "Operations under Chapter VII: Exception or Widespread Practice ?" 2013, 26.

<b>UNMIH</b>	1993	No	<b>UNAMSIL</b>	1999	Yes
<b>UNAMIR</b>	1993	Ad-hoc	<b>UNTAET</b>	1999	Ad-hoc
<b>UNASOG</b>	1994	No	<b>MONUC</b>	1999	Ad-hoc

The over-stretching of UN resources paired with the enlargement of several missions had catastrophic effects. With the worsening of conflicts in countries such as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda or Angola, the UN proved incapable of putting a halt to the atrocities either requiring an outside intervention or withdrawing altogether.<sup>27</sup> These would come to be known as the worst years of the UN and were to stain the name of peacekeeping for the years to come. Locations such as Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Mogadishu or Rwanda were to be infamously recognized as the most traumatic events of the organization's history.

Though these failures had a devastating effect on the reputation, support and number of operations launched in the immediate years that followed these infamous disasters, before long new ambitious peacekeeping operations were being deployed to tackle conflicts in countries such as Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The missions of the late 1990's were once again put to the test and were pushed to near collapse, needing *ad-hoc* interventions to avoid more catastrophic consequences (see table 2). The latest setbacks were once again a wakeup call for the UN, who's Secretary-General ordered the creation of an independent panel to evaluate the shortcomings of UN peace operations and formulate guidelines for improvement. The report would be presented in 2000 and would be commonly known as *the Brahimi Report* in honor of the chairman and former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi. The report constituted a realistic and comprehensive guideline for peacekeeping operations improvement, arguing that amongst other things: 1). Impartiality may mean complicity and the UN should do better in differentiating victims from aggressors; 2). Mandates must be realistic and achievable, pairing ambitions with means; 3). When needed, operations should be robust enough to deter threats through force; 4). Recommendation of a new venue for peacekeeping information gathering and analysis; 5). Enhanced readiness to deploy a mission in a period of 30-90 days after authorization of the mission and, finally; 6). Calling for an adaptation of UN peacekeeping operations to the new technologies and the arrival of the age of information.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Jacobson, Thomas W. "UN Peacekeeping: Few successes, many failures, inherent flaws". 2012. International Policy and Public Policy Center.

<sup>28</sup> United Nations. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects. *International Peacekeeping*. September 1996. Vol. 3, no. 3, p. 119–136. DOI [10.1080/13533319608413629](https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319608413629).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on US landmarks and their response in the form of the UN authorized invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the UN un-authorized invasion of Iraq in 2003, which kick started the GWOT campaigns, signaled the entrance into a new era in which transnational terrorism appeared to be the main threat to international peace and stability. The UN reacted immediately to the new context through resolution 1373, which granted a chapter VII authorization for states to *work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism.*<sup>29</sup> In 2006, the UN's approach to terrorism would be widened and specified through the *Global Counter Terrorism Strategy* which would try to harmonize the state-to-state policy towards terrorism in a global manner strengthening cooperation, prevention and response to terrorism.<sup>30</sup> This resolution, passed in the General Assembly and subject to periodic review every two years, was the first ambitious attempt of the UN to give a global response to a threat that until then had been treated nationally. By way of structuring the response to countering terrorist threats through a IV pillar approach, the UN pledged to get involved in combating terrorism by supporting member states through capacity-building initiatives which still didn't identify a UN military-specific approach to countering terrorism and insurgency.

This, however, was to change in 2013 with the authorization and deployment of MINUSMA. The newly established peacekeeping operation, which followed a swift and efficient French-led campaign against spoilers threatening the stability and integrity of Mali, didn't take long to realize it was to be targeted by the remnants of these forces, being drawn into an asymmetrical warfare it wasn't prepared to wage. Evident capability and doctrinal shortcomings of MINUSMA during the initial period of deployment made clear the UN couldn't affront the particularities of the conflict and its threat environment with the same tool box it had traditionally used in other war-torn regions. Up to then, the UN had refrained from developing its own COIN and CT capabilities, fearing it would signal a major departure from traditional procedures which could bring its peacekeeping operations away from its customary neutrality to be considered a potential lawful target by the rest of actors. Thus, through the deployment of MINUSMA, and to a lesser extent also MONUSCO and MINUSCA, in the

---

<sup>29</sup> United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1373 (2001). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001. *The International Journal of Human Rights*. September 2000. Vol. 4, no. 3–4, p. 345–348. DOI [10.1080/13642980008406913](https://doi.org/10.1080/13642980008406913).

<sup>30</sup> The United Nations global counter-terrorism strategy. [online]. 20 November 2008. [Accessed 12 October 2018]. DOI [10.18356/10302c2a-en](https://doi.org/10.18356/10302c2a-en). Available from: [https://www.un-ilibrary.org/peacekeeping-and-security/international-instruments-related-to-the-prevention-and-suppression-of-international-terrorism\\_10302c2a-en](https://www.un-ilibrary.org/peacekeeping-and-security/international-instruments-related-to-the-prevention-and-suppression-of-international-terrorism_10302c2a-en)

latest years the UN has been undergoing a learning process to adapt to the new threats it is facing nowadays. This, however, hasn't been a linear or unanimously supported process, as several UN member states have criticized the overreaching functions and ambitions of peacekeeping operations, drawing conclusions on what effects they might have on the future of the organization's missions. This fear was famously highlighted by the 2015 panel HIPPO report that emphasized that the UN troops *should not undertake military Counter-terrorism Operations*,<sup>31</sup> understanding the Organization can't, and generally should not, be the key actor in carrying out such type of operations either if it acts in the frontline of such activities or as a mere enabler in aiding a third party.

Despite warnings of caution and the impact of the HIPPO report, the tide was moving towards one inexorable reality: ready or not, peacekeeping operations were already co-existing with asymmetrical threats in countries where there was no peace to keep. The HIPPO report, which vehemently opposed the trespassing of peacekeeping operations in CT and COIN activities, nevertheless recognized the inevitability of preparing for it and thus also recommended that if peacekeeping operations are to be deployed in these types of theatres, the UN should better prepare for the challenges faced by; 1). Establishing clearer mandates in line with the reality of what can be truly achieved improving a triangular cooperation between the UN Security Council, the Secretariat and those troop and police contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs); 2). Provide sufficient resources to fill the gap between expectations and means to achieve them; 3). Improve force generation with which to enhance readiness and adaptability to increasingly complex high-risk environments, and, lastly; 4). Undertake a systematic capacity-building programme amongst peacekeeping operations currently deployed in locations where there is a threat of asymmetric threats to better the safety of mission personnel by developing its preparedness and means to counter hostile spoilers.<sup>32</sup>

In spite of the HIPPO report recommendations, the UN entered yet another crisis as it entered the deadliest quinquennial period (2013-2017) of the organization with casualties rising due to hostile acts in missions such as the United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA. Throughout this period, the evident lack of

---

<sup>31</sup> United Nations. *Uniting our strengths for Peace Politics, Partnership and People / Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* [online]. 16 June 2015. [Accessed 25 February 2019]. Available from: [https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO\\_Report\\_1\\_June\\_2015.pdf](https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf)

<sup>32</sup> Lijn, Jaïr van der, Rob de Rave, Timo Smit, and Rianne Siebenga. "Progress on UN Peacekeeping Reform - Hippo and Beyond." Clingendael Institute, October 2017.

experience on how to adapt to asymmetric threats meant UN personnel fatalities nearly doubled each year due to malicious acts since 2013, which coincidentally happened to be the year MINUSMA was deployed.<sup>33</sup> Facing this dramatic trend, the Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres called for the formation of a special panel aimed at identifying policy-related solutions to reduce peacekeeping fatalities that resulted from hostile acts of violence, in what was to be known as the *dos Santos report*. The report identified present peacekeeping operations as being unprepared for the scenarios in which they are being deployed, suffering from a *chapter VI syndrome* that affects the Organization's capacity to act proactively towards threats and results in a permanent reactive defensive posture which more often-than-not grants first-strike initiative to hostile spoilers. In what has been come to be known as one of the most critic, realistic and policy-driven UN documents to date, the *dos Santos report* offered a newer view on how business as usual is, and will not, be sufficient for what the reality on the ground demands from peacekeeping operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Focusing almost exclusively on a militaristic approach towards enhancing robustness in peacekeeping operations, the report highlights the need to adapt to asymmetric threats on issues such as: 1). Improving intelligence systems with a clear will to act proactively on the gathered information; 2). Bettering structural defenses of UN compounds as to reduce vulnerability and avoid *bunkerization*; 3). Extending operation activities to night time as to better use the technologic advantages *vis-à-vis* spoiler groups and restrict their freedom of movement; 4). Acquiring more advanced equipment such as UAV's, snipers, special ammunitions, laser aim, (etc.) or; 5). Improving troop training and preparedness to better react to situations of ambushes, IED's, terrorist attacks, etc.<sup>34</sup>

The history of the UN, so far, has been one of evolution, setbacks, re-evaluation, and finally, re-adaptation. Newest challenges in matters of asymmetric threats are calling for yet another learning process that, in hindsight, might mark the end of traditional peacekeeping operations as we knew them to a more multi-dimensional robust concept of peacekeeping. Whether this trend will persist or be a temporary diversion from standard peacekeeping remains to be seen, but what seems clear is that peacekeeping is currently in the midst of major changes that undeniably are and will continue to change doctrines and capabilities of these type of operations in the following years.

---

<sup>33</sup> Henke, Marina E. Has UN Peacekeeping Become More Deadly? Analyzing Trends in UN Fatalities. *Providing for Peacekeeping*. December 2016. Vol. 14, p. 24.

<sup>34</sup> dos Santos Cruz, Carlos Alberto, R. Phillips, William and Cusimano, Salvator. *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: we need to change the way we are doing business*. December 2017.

### **3. Conceptual background**

The vocabulary lexicon and doctrines proper to peacekeeping operations have advanced much since its origins in the late 50's. The contexts and challenges the UN is facing nowadays make it obligatory to understand the new terms that are increasingly being used in the field. To this purpose, the following section will try to explain the meaning behind late added concepts in the domain of peacekeeping such as robust peacekeeping and stabilization operations. Furthermore, this section will also analyze the meaning of what constitutes counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, to better understand the doctrines and capabilities acquired by MINUSMA to counter the asymmetric threats present in the Malian territory.

#### **3.1. Robust peacekeeping**

UN peacekeeping operations have, throughout history, always had a complicated task in defining what situations require a legitimate use of force. No period in the Organization's history did more to highlight this fact than the 90's failures in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, when peacekeeping operations were caught in conflicts where neutrality and lack of will when differentiating victims from aggressors was progressively being framed as compliance with aggression. Lack of decision, experience and capabilities when facing these emergencies submerged peacekeeping operations in a deep crisis from which its framework regarding the use of force was to be changed. The 2000 Brahimi Report reflected upon the turbulent decade the UN had just experienced and laid the path for a realistic and ambitious future in which for peacekeeping to stay relevant, it had to understand neutrality should never mean inaction. Said report recognized the world was expecting more from peacekeeping operations than acting as mere observers of cease-fires and peace processes. The Security Council had been adapting to these expectations by mandating operations with an increasing number of tasks, creating so-called Christmas tree mandate operations, for which these missions were in no capacity capable of delivering upon. The report addressed *the need for robust doctrine and realistic mandates* asking to fill the material capability gaps between mandates and realities emphasizing also the need for a clearer ROE more in line with a worst-case scenario planning. The Brahimi Report was the precursor of robust peacekeeping operations in its call to prepare operations to defend themselves, other mission components and their mandates, making the defense of civilians a key axe for the future of peacekeeping by ordaining peacekeeping personnel, whether troops or police, to act within their means and possibilities to halt all acts

of violence committed in their presence.<sup>35</sup> Post-Brahimi newly established multidimensional operations, such as the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) started to reflect a wider definition of peacekeeping in which these missions were allowed to be robust in their mandate of defending civilians. Since then, rather than becoming the exception in peacekeeping operations, it has become more and more the norm by which the Security Council aimed at demonstrating resolve towards third-party spoilers

Seeing how the trend towards more assertive peacekeeping operations continued into the 21<sup>st</sup> century and acting upon the skepticism and criticism this new stance was met with, the UN deemed necessary to conceptualize the notion of robustness through the 2008 *Capstone Doctrine*. This document offered the first conceptual attempt to defining robust peacekeeping up to date, in a bid to clarify what it implies and how it differentiates from traditional peace-enforcement operations. The *Capstone doctrine* drew the differences by claiming that:

*Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter. Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict. By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.*<sup>36</sup>

By introducing the concept of robust peacekeeping, the UN attempted to navigate the thin line between acting as a mere passive bystander to violations of human rights and getting too involved as to become part of the conflict in a full-fledged peace-enforcement operation. By emphasizing the tactical and temporary use of force with the consent of the host nation, the UN strived to keep intact two of its basic foundations of minimum use of force and impartiality while still complying with basic standards of International Human Rights Law

---

<sup>35</sup> United Nations General Assembly. *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects* [online]. 2000. United Nations. [Accessed 10 March 2019]. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533319608413629>

<sup>36</sup> UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* [online]. 2008. Available from: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/484559592.html>

and International Humanitarian Law fundamental to the UN normative framework that have traditionally guided its peacekeeping operations. This conceptual innovation, thus, was aimed at signaling resolve to all rogue parties in conflict, implying the UN was ready and willing to use whatever level of force necessary to defend its mandate against spoilers violating civilian's human rights and jeopardizing any peace process.<sup>37</sup> 21<sup>st</sup> century operations such as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which actively engaged in the use of force to *threaten, coerce, remove, suppress and destroy sources of instability*<sup>38</sup> during their hostilities with the gangs of Port-au-Prince or, more recently, the defeat of Congolese rebel group M23 by hands of the newly established Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) linked to MONUSCO has highlighted the potential of robust peacekeeping in taking an offensive stance towards spoilers in order to create stability.<sup>39</sup> These experiences, considered by many as having been positive, evidenced the potential utility of peacekeeping offensive operations in high-risk areas and were to be taken into account when deploying current ongoing missions such as UNAMID, UNMISS, MINUSMA or MINUSCA, which constitute the newest, and most challenged, generation of robust peacekeeping operations.<sup>40</sup>

To date, many UN member states and experts have made vocal their stance on the negative effects robust peacekeeping may have for the future of the organization. Amongst the most common points of criticism are: 1). The impact these types of operations might have on traditional peacekeeping principles such as those of minimal use of force and impartiality; 2). Its strategic ambiguity and its lack of study on the impact it might have on the mission's concept of operations (CONOPS); 3). The credibility gap it might create, hampering the UN's options and efforts when pursuing a politically negotiated solution; 4). The negative impact it might have on TCCs and PCCs which might prove more reluctant when pledging troops to such type of operations and, lastly; 5). The consequences such operations might have on the UN's image of neutrality, which could potentially backfire on attacks on non-military UN personnel or third-party collaborators.<sup>41</sup> Addressing the gaps and challenges that resulted from the inclusion of robust peacekeeping in contemporary peacekeeping, the UN has of late

---

<sup>37</sup> idem

<sup>38</sup> James, Cockayne. The Futility of Force? Strategic Lessons for Dealing with Unconventional Armed Groups from the UN's War on Haiti's Gangs. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 2014. Vol. 37, no. 5, p. 736–769.

<sup>39</sup> Berdal, Mats and Ucko, David H. The United Nations and the Use of Force: Between Promise and Peril. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 29 July 2014. Vol. 37, no. 5, p. 665–673. DOI [10.1080/01402390.2014.937803](https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.937803).

<sup>40</sup> Richard, Gowan. The end of a peacekeeping era. *Global Peace Operations Review* [online]. 4 April 2018. [Accessed 11 March 2019]. Available from: <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/the-end-of-a-peacekeeping-era/>

<sup>41</sup> Tardy, Thierry. A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations. *International Peacekeeping*. 1 April 2011. Vol. 18, no. 2, p. 152–167. DOI [10.1080/13533312.2011.546089](https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.546089).

attempted to define in a clearer manner the guidelines necessary to carrying out such operations in the 2017 document named *Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*<sup>42</sup> which provided a more detailed definition of what these type of operations actually entail for the ROE and CONOPS to which TCCs and PCCs are to be subject to. These potential consequences of robust peacekeeping mandates, together with others that might become evident gradually as these operations face new challenges, might have unforeseen consequences for the business of UN peacekeeping.

### **3.2. Stabilization Operations**

In recent years, stabilization mandates have become widespread as peacekeeping operations have been deployed in unstable environments where there were identifiable hostile spoilers to be contained. This approach, which is intrinsically linked with the surge of robust peacekeeping operations, is still a rather new and undefined type of operation that, nevertheless, has common particularities which can be seen in all such operations, these being; 1). Stabilization operations are traditionally deployed with an on-going conflict in process; 2). Their mandates task the operations with sustaining a government and protecting its population through the restoration or maintenance of order *vis-à-vis* any hostile spoilers; 3). There is a lack of impartiality, as these operations are tasked with supporting authorities in whichever way possible and, lastly; 4). They are authorized to undertake their mission in a robust manner, having a more flexible ROE.<sup>43</sup> Stabilization operations have their origin in the GWOT campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq and have, since then, been adopted by other regional actors such as the African Union (AU), The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU) and the UN itself showcasing a growing interest in conflict management and State building narratives.

For the UN, the post-Cold War era kick started a surge of post-Westphalian conflicts where more than ever failed or fragile governments were being challenged by sub-static spoilers such as transnational terrorist organizations or organized insurgencies. These new types of wars, which the UN was being called to act upon, brought the organization to adopt stabilization operations as a better mean to tackling the new array of conflicts for which

---

<sup>42</sup> Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. *Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. [online]. 2017. [Accessed 3 March 2019]. Available from: <https://info.publicintelligence.net/UN-PeacekeepingForces-2017.pdf>

<sup>43</sup> Coning, Cedric de. What does 'stabilization' mean in a UN Peacekeeping context? *Complexity 4 Peace Operations* [online]. 19 January 2015. [Accessed 17 March 2019]. Available from: <https://cedricdeconing.net/2015/01/19/what-does-stabilisation-mean-in-a-un-peacekeeping-context/>

traditional peacekeeping operations didn't seem to be well suited for. The inclusion of these types of operations in the UN toolbox meant a major departure from traditional peacekeeping (as viewed in table 3)<sup>44</sup> which continues to develop nowadays. This shift also meant a doctrinal shift from a liberal peace-building discourses to stabilization and counterterrorism discourses which have been guiding latest peacekeeping operations.<sup>45</sup>

**Table 3: main differences between traditional peacekeeping and stabilization operations**

	<b>Traditional peacekeeping</b>	<b>Stabilization operations</b>
<b>Objectives</b>	Conflict Resolution (Monitor ceasefire /implement Peace agreement)	Conflict Management/Containment (Restore or maintain order)
<b>Impartiality</b>	Yes	No
<b>Consent</b>	Yes	No
<b>Minimal use of Force</b>	Yes	No
<b>Protection of civilians (POC) mandate</b>	Possible	Yes

The first appearance of stabilization in a United Nations Security Council resolution appeared shortly after the traumatic decade of the 90's when the United Nations was once again confronted with threat environments in which traditional peacekeeping wasn't believed to be suitable. Missions such as UNMIK<sup>46</sup> in 1999 and the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)<sup>47</sup> in 2006 were the first early precursors to include some mention of stabilization through a Security Council authorized mandate. The full inclusion of stabilization operations, nevertheless, came into effect in 2004 with the authorization to deploy MINUSTAH in Haiti. This mission, which was the first to include the concept stabilization in its name, was followed by MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2010, MINUSMA in Mali in 2013 and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2014. An analysis of what this term meant for these stabilization operations highlights the focus on certain common aspects, such as: 1). The aid and support in restoring

<sup>44</sup> Coning, Cedric de. What does 'stabilization' mean in a UN Peacekeeping context? *Complexity 4 Peace Operations* [online]. 19 January 2015. [Accessed 18 March 2019]. Available from: <https://cedricdeconing.net/2015/01/19/what-does-stabilisation-mean-in-a-un-peacekeeping-context/>

<sup>45</sup> Karlsrud, John. From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism. *International Peacekeeping*. January 2019. Vol. 26, no. 1, p. 1–21. DOI [10.1080/13533312.2018.1502040](https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2018.1502040).

<sup>46</sup> Resolution 1244 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999. *The International Journal of Human Rights*. September 2000. Vol. 4, no. 3–4, p. 369–375. DOI [10.1080/13642980008406917](https://doi.org/10.1080/13642980008406917).

<sup>47</sup> Security Council resolution 1704 (2006) [on establishment of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)]. *Refworld* [online]. 25 August 2006. [Accessed 18 March 2019]. Available from: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/453786b50.html>

and extending the State authority wherever it may be challenged; 2). Undertaking capacity-building measures with which to enhance the State's authority in sectors such as security or justice and, finally; 3). Provide for protection of civilians.<sup>48</sup>

The inclusion of Stabilization is linked to the push by three of the Security Council permanent members, these being the United States, France and the United Kingdom, which have historically acted as the main penholders in the drafting and shaping of UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, the way the UN faces its stabilization operations nowadays is a reflection of how these three permanent members have understood stabilization in their particular domestic doctrines, evolving from their joint participation in the NATO-led campaign in Bosnia, to the GWOT campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. An analysis of their definition of stabilization allows for some points of agreement which could be summarized as: 1). Stabilization operations are those external interventions aimed at managing or containing a particular intrastate conflict; 2). The ultimate goal is always to achieve a desired political outcome, and; 3). Stabilization operations encapsulate both military and civilian measures with which to respond to varying types of challenges.<sup>49</sup>

This basic conceptualization hasn't proven enough to offer clear guidelines to existing missions and placate criticism from numerous sectors that criticize the current path UN peacekeeping operations are set upon. Echoing these doubts, the 2015 Hippo Report warned that:

*in the past decade, the Security Council and the Secretariat have used the term 'stabilization' for a number of missions that support the extension or restoration of state authority and, in at least one case, during ongoing armed conflict. The term stabilization has a wide range of interpretations, and the Panel believes the usage of this term by the United Nations requires clarification.*<sup>50</sup>

Nevertheless, lack of clarification has proven to be only one of the many criticisms the development of stabilization has brought in the UN, as many member states have highlighted the vital challenges it brings in terms of; 1). Departing from the holy trinity of peacekeeping, as defined in the *capstone doctrine*; 2). Increasing tensions amongst TCCs and

---

<sup>48</sup> Gorur, Aditi. Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions. *Stimson Center*. December 2016. P. 32.

<sup>49</sup> Idem

<sup>50</sup> United Nations. *Uniting our strengths for Peace Politics, Partnership and People | Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* [online]. 16 June 2015. [Accessed 25 February 2019]. Available from: [https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO\\_Report\\_1\\_June\\_2015.pdf](https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf)

PCCs who have an aversion to participating in such type of operations due to its lack of clarity and the higher chances of personnel fatalities and, ultimately; 3). Problems arising from approaches which shade doubt on the effectiveness of such type of operations in building a durable and sustainable peace.<sup>51</sup>

### 3.3. Asymmetric Warfare

The new push to include stabilization mandates in current robust UN peacekeeping operations with a more flexible approach to the ROE of specific operations ultimately reflects the reality that latest peacekeeping operations are being deployed in territories with little to no peace to keep, where missions coexist on the ground with sub-static spoilers that no longer view a blue helmet and the United Nations flag as a neutral symbol in conflict, but as a legit enemy that can be targeted through asymmetric means.<sup>52</sup> This strategy, first coined in the 1999 US Joint Strategy Review understands asymmetric warfare as *something done to military forces to undermine their conventional military strength*.<sup>53</sup> This minimal definition has been extended throughout the years to portray asymmetric warfare as the strategic choice, short of conventional warfare, used by the weaker part to undermine and destabilize the stronger part into submission, either through the degradation of the enemy's conventional military forces or through the instilment of fear with which to coerce the enemy's decision-making process.

Currently, it is estimated at least seven missions, considering UN Special Political missions (SPM) and peacekeeping operations, coexist with some sort of asymmetric threat from terrorist and insurgent groups such as al-Qaeda and its several regional off-shoots, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and groups of the like. 21<sup>st</sup> century peacekeeping operations, deployed in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya or Mali,<sup>54</sup> and the unusual high UN personnel fatality rate catalogued as due to *malicious acts* by the UN peacekeeping operations,<sup>55</sup> stand witness to the difficulties and shortcomings of UN missions when encountering and adapting to asymmetric

---

<sup>51</sup> Gorur, Aditi. Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions. *Stimson Center*. December 2016. P. 32.

<sup>52</sup> dos Santos Cruz, Carlos Alberto, R. Phillips, William and Cusimano, Salvator. *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: we need to change the way we are doing business*. December 2017.

<sup>53</sup> Sudhir, M R. *Asymmetric War: A Conceptual Understanding*. . 2008. P. 9.

<sup>54</sup> International Peace Institute (IPI). *UN Peace Operations in Violent and Asymmetric threat environments*. March 2016.

<sup>55</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping and Crisis Center. Stats by Mission and Incident type. [Online]. 7 January 2019. [Accessed 29 January 2019]. Available from: [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/statsbymissionincidenttype\\_4\\_20.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/statsbymissionincidenttype_4_20.pdf)

threats. The dilemma for the UN in the latest years, thus, has changed from knowing when to effectively put end to an operation and disengage from a country to how best to stay while assuring UN personnel security and achieving tasked mandates.

### **3.3.1. Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency**

More often than not, terrorism and insurgency are confused or blurred as being one and the same. However, despite the fact that both types of warfare can be described as being asymmetric, and often cases do employ similar tactics to close the capability gap with stronger opposing forces, the similarities end there. Insurgency is to be understood as an organized movement aimed at subverting or toppling a government or political system through means of degradation and weakening of opposing conventional forces to alter the balance of power between both parties. Traditional insurgent campaigns regularly fall within the frame of independence, self-determination or secession movements, which aim to align their goals with those of the broader population to gain legitimacy and public support to bridge the capabilities, resources and manpower gap existing with the enemy forces.<sup>56</sup> Even though insurgent campaigns can, and often times do, resort to acts which could be considered to be terrorist in nature, insurgent actors consider these acts to be acceptable only as an ultimate and temporary means to an end, not supposing thus a strategic long-term approach towards defeating a stronger enemy.

Terrorism, despite its similarities as a strategy of asymmetric warfare aimed against a stronger opponent, relies on different motivations, structures, tactics and objectives to achieve its goals. Terrorist motivations differ from insurgent motivations in that they often are more varied and complex, falling regularly under the umbrella of political, ideological or religious principles.<sup>57</sup> Continuing with its structures, terrorist organizations tend to act at the fringe of society due to a belief or ideology that is not widely supported by the broader population. This estrangement from local populations tends to affect the capacity of terrorist organizations to recruit and rely on public support, consequently requiring a different type of structural organization from insurgent groups based on cell structured groups which follow a hierarchical or network model depending on the security risks that could appear if faced with an infiltration, an overreaching crackdown campaign or a successful leadership beheading

---

<sup>56</sup> Johnston, Nicholas. Defining Terrorism and Insurgency: Beyond Morality. *Small Wars Journal* [online]. [Accessed 31 January 2019]. Available from: <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/defining-terrorism-and-insurgency-beyond-morality>

<sup>57</sup> idem

operation. Differing from insurgent groups, which’s traditional broader popular and resilience allows for the formation of a military-like structure with which to oppose the enemy, the disaffection *vis-à-vis* the local population and the security threats faced calls for a different structural approach with which to wage asymmetric war.<sup>58</sup>

An analysis of the tactics also highlights evident differences between both forms of warfare. While insurgent campaigns aim at degrading the opponent to a point in which victory is possible through conventional warfare, terrorism seeks to fulfill its goals creating a state of fear and anxiety by targeting both hard targets, such as governmental or military forces personnel and infrastructures, and soft targets, civilian and unprotected population, alike. The difference resides, therefore, in the status given to civilians as legitimate targets with which to advance their goals and achieve their objectives, which could be understood as the coercion of a stronger opponent into caving into the terrorist organization’s demands, in opposition to a conventional victory over a state-like apparatus and its military forces. A larger and more visual scheme of the differences between insurgency and terrorism as models of warfare can be found in the following table 5.

**Table 4: Insurgency and Terrorism as models of warfare**

	Insurgency	Terrorism
<b>Unit Size</b>	Medium: platoons, companies, battalions, etc.	Small: <10 people
<b>Weapons</b>	Mostly infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery pieces as well	Hand guns, hand grenades, assault rifles and specialized weapons: car bombs, remote-control bombs, barometric pressure bombs
<b>Tactics</b>	Commando-type tactics	Specialized tactics: kidnapping, assassinations, car bombing, hijacking, etc.
<b>Targets</b>	Mostly military, police and administration staff, as well as political opponents	State symbols, political opponents and civilians
<b>Intended impact</b>	Physical attrition of the enemy	Psychological coercion
<b>Control of territory</b>	Yes	No

<sup>58</sup> A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure AU - Kilberg, Joshua. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. 1 November 2012. Vol. 35, no. 11, p. 810–830. DOI [10.1080/1057610X.2012.720240](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.720240).

<b>Recognized war zones</b>	War limited to a certain geographical area	No recognized war zones. Operations can have a global national, regional or global reach.
<b>International Legality</b>	Yes, if conducted following the rules	No
<b>Domestic</b>	No	No

Source: Merari, Ariel. Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. December 1993. Vol. 5, no. 4, p. 213–251. DOI 10.1080/09546559308427227.

Western approaches to countering terrorist and insurgent threats have often led to treating both types of asymmetric threats as being similar models of warfare that, thus, could be fought with the same toolbox. The evidence, nevertheless, suggests both types of warfare call for different types of responses as there is no one-fit-all solution to both threats. In the case of counter-insurgency, doctrines and strategies have developed closely in line with challenges faced with Western countries in well-known counter-insurgency struggles led by the British in Malaya or the US in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Experts generally agree that each insurgency is different, and thus, requires a different type of approach. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish common characteristics specific to most modern counter-insurgency campaigns which follow the famed principle of *winning hearts and minds*.<sup>59</sup> This principle, brought to specific policies, could be defined in three pillars that can be enumerated as: 1.) Comprehensive and limited use of force only targeted against hostile forces and avoiding collateral civilian casualties, which could fuel disaffection for the counter-insurgent party and enhance the appeal of the insurgent option; 2.) Strengthening the reach of the State apparatus expanding the distribution of public goods and services to local populations living in insurgent affected areas, increasing the legitimacy of the counter-insurgent party while also decreasing motivations to adhere to insurgent options and, lastly; 3.) Offering a path towards dialogue and negotiated settlements, with which to provoke schisms in the insurgent’s unity and offer a way out to more moderate sectors willing to reach a compromise.<sup>60</sup> Current approaches, thus, attempt to accommodate two different approaches viewed as military-centric and population-centric, believing in degrading insurgent forces while taking away the

<sup>59</sup> Miller, D. Gregory. On Winning Hearts and Minds: Key Conditions for Population-Centric COIN. *Small Wars Journal* [online]. 2016. [Accessed 3 February 2019]. Available from: <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/on-winning-hearts-and-minds-key-conditions-for-population-centric-coin>

<sup>60</sup> WATTS, Stephen, CAMPBELL, Jason H., JOHNSTON, Patrick B., LALWANI, Sameer and BANA, Sarah H. *countering others’ Insurgencies*. Rand Corporation, 2014.

oxygen that fuel them by tackling causes of insecurity and disenfranchisement amongst affected populations.

Thought on Countering terrorism has undergone vast reconceptualization primarily due to Western uncertainty following the September 2001 attacks, the beginning of the Global War on Terror with the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns and the increase in both international and homegrown terrorist attacks in many regions of the world. The fact that the struggle against transnational terrorism was framed as a war, was in itself a declaration of intent with which to justify the taking of extreme measures and the adoption of a particular type of counter-terrorist model (as viewed in table 5) which departed from other Western approaches such as those of European NATO members.

**Table 5: Models of Counter-terrorism**

	Defensive	Reconciliatory	Criminal-Justice	War
<b>General Features</b>	Terrorism is a physical and psychological threat	Terrorism is a political problem	Terrorism is a crime	Terrorism is an act of war
<b>Goals and Methods of the State</b>	Protecting potential targets and victims	Addressing the root causes of Terrorism	Arrest and punish terrorists according to the rule of law	Eliminate terrorism through military force
<b>Legal Aspects</b>	Corresponds in most cases to the elements of Liberal Democracy, with exceptions when practices undermine civil liberties	Corresponds with the law	Corresponds with the law and is subject to constant judicial oversight	Corresponds to laws of war, or may ignore law entirely
<b>Agents</b>	Police, private security companies, firefighters and paramedics, other state and municipal agencies	Politicians, policymakers, brokers, diplomats	Police and the criminal justice system	Intelligence and military units

Source: Pedahzur, Ami. *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism* [online]. Columbia University Press, 2009. ISBN null. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/peda14042>

Before long, nevertheless, other actors started to reflect a wider understanding of counter-terrorism developing a broader strategy in line with a two-method approach towards balancing kinetic and non-kinetic activities. In conjunction to the war model of counter-Terrorist activities, different countries started pushing for a more reconciliatory approach which focused both on maintaining the pressure on terrorist organizations through military means while also leaving space for political measures to improve the root causes that lead to terrorism. This approach recognized that terrorism is not something to be defeated, but rather to be mitigated through the building of static and societal resilience against a threat that potentially cannot be fully eliminated. Though nowadays there are several different approaches to both understanding and countering terrorism, a Western holistic policy has grown in importance and could be viewed as the clearest most comprehensive strategic plan of course to date.

As evidenced by the OSCE's 2014 report on *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism*, current CT efforts focus on building a multistep response that addresses the different phases in terrorist activities as follows; 1). Countering terrorist narrative and preventing individuals from joining terrorist organizations; 2). Providing a path out and incentives for current members to disengage from a terrorist organization; 3). Denying terrorist organizations from the material, financial and territorial means necessary to plan or carry out attacks; 4). Improving security of both hard and soft targets; 5). Enhancing all means necessary to pursue terrorists and bring them to justice and, finally; 6). Building resilience to assist and react to terrorist attacks, improving also a proportionate first-response to such threats.<sup>61</sup> This step-by-step approach towards Countering terrorism has been synthesized in a broader fashion in the 2006 United Nations *Global Counter Terrorism Strategy* as meaning; 1). Taking measures to address particular conditions – such as promoting a culture of peace, improving justice and human development, assuring respect for human rights, tolerance towards ethnic, religious and political differences, etc. – to tackle grievances that lead to the spread of terrorism; 2). Taking measures towards preventing attacks and combating terrorism and, ultimately; 3). Taking measures which lead

---

<sup>61</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. *Preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: a community policing approach*. Vienna: OSCE, 2014. ISBN 978-92-9235-023-9.

to an enhanced static resilience and capacity with which prevent and combat terrorism there where it represents a threat.<sup>62</sup>

#### 4. A conflict in perspective

To understand the current conflict in Mali as it is today, one must be aware of the countries past, which is intrinsically linked with the rise and fall of kingdoms, the expansion and retreat of religions, the co-existence and war between different ethnic groups, and ultimately, the colonization and de-colonization which have given shape to one of the vastest and less densely populated countries of the African continent. Despite possessing a rich and ancient history that encompasses long-lost empires such as the Ghana, the Malinké or the Songhai,<sup>63</sup> current events are better understood through the prism of more recent events, of which French colonization is at the forefront.

At the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the territory currently known as Mali was occupied - though unequally, with a more fragile control of the most northern territories of the country - and brought under colonial rule being added to the federations of the French West Africa under the name of French Sudan. The lack of political and economic value of French Sudan meant it was accorded a secondary position of importance behind other more profitable regions such as Ivory Coast or Senegal which were subject to tighter control from colonial administration. Throughout the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, French Sudan would remain under colonial rule participating in both World Wars on the side of the French forces without, by consequence, receiving any special recognition in the form of aid towards development or autonomy policies. This would come to change in 1959, when the territories of Senegal and French Sudan gained sufficient political clout to form the Federation of Mali, which despite its collapse nearly one year later in 1960, made way to the independence of the Republic of Mali with its known borders of nowadays.<sup>64</sup>

The creation of a new independent Republic of Mali and the arrival of a Marxist president to power translated into profound political swifts that would lead Mali to a process

---

<sup>62</sup> The United Nations global counter-terrorism strategy. [Online]. 20 November 2008. [Accessed 11 February 2019]. DOI [10.18356/10302c2a-en](https://doi.org/10.18356/10302c2a-en). Available from: [https://www.un-ilibrary.org/peacekeeping-and-security/international-instruments-related-to-the-prevention-and-suppression-of-international-terrorism\\_10302c2a-en](https://www.un-ilibrary.org/peacekeeping-and-security/international-instruments-related-to-the-prevention-and-suppression-of-international-terrorism_10302c2a-en)

<sup>63</sup> US Department of State. Overview of Mali History and Independence. *ThoughtCo* [online]. [Accessed 15 February 2019]. Available from: <https://www.thoughtco.com/brief-history-of-mali-44272>

<sup>64</sup> Idem

of nation-building with the intent of unifying a heterogeneous population under a sole Malian authority. This new policy explained through specific measures meant: 1). Taking distance with the former colonial authority of France, expelling and substituting French administration employees for local Malian workforce, while conducting a political and economic rapprochement to the communist sphere; 2). Establishing a military control over the territory which extended a client or patronage system with which to assure regime stability and dissent repression and, ultimately; 3). The favoring of a hierarchical system through a campaign of *divide and rule* that privileged economic and political importance of the south over a subordinated north which,<sup>65</sup> from this period onwards, was to be marginalized and underdeveloped with a clear intention of keeping any northern group from gaining sufficient power to threaten the wealthier south.

The first challenge to the newly formed State came as early as 1962 in what is commonly known as the first Tuareg rebellion. This population, of Muslim religion and pastoral nomadic culture, had historically inhabited the territories of northern Mali claiming for auto-determination with the formation of an independent Tuareg State named Azawad. Seeing an opportunity in the arrival of a new government at the head of a new born State, Tuareg insurgent groups started carrying out hit-and-run attacks against governmental forces which soon grew in proportion to constitute a full-fledged rebellion against Malian southern authority. The rebellion lacked a clear structural command and sufficient support amongst Tuareg population and was ultimately defeated by a use of overwhelming and indiscriminate use of force from the government.<sup>66</sup> Despite crushing the rebellion, whose members either suffered governmental reprisal or had to flee into exile to neighboring countries, the heavy hand and lack of restraint showed, added to the lack of aids offered throughout a period of intense droughts, was the seed for an increasing disaffection of the Tuareg population towards the southern governmental authorities that would evolve into future rebellions.

In the wake of a democratization process that would end with Mali adopting a democratic system in 1992, repression and exclusion of the northern territories still persisted. The ongoing marginalization of Tuareg communities, added to long-lasting droughts and the return of trained and radicalized Tuareg exiles that had combatted amongst the ranks of the Libyan Regime of Muammar al Gaddafi ignited what was to become known as the second

---

<sup>65</sup> Chauzal, Grégory and van Damme, Thibault. The roots of Mali's conflict: moving beyond the 2012 crisis. *Cingendael*. March 2015.

<sup>66</sup> The Crisis in Mali: A Historical Perspective on the Tuareg People. *Global Research* [online]. 1 February 2013. [Accessed 30 March 2019]. Available from: <https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-crisis-in-mali-a-historical-perspective-on-the-tuareg-people/5321407>

Tuareg Rebellion. In the wake of major changes in the Malian political system, the conflict was rapidly framed as an ethnic conflict (view note 2<sup>67</sup> and Appendix 2) to rally support amongst local populations dividing between authentic Malians against foreign nomadic invaders, which sparked nationalist and ethnic feuds which worsened the severity of the conflict. Only one year later, conflict fatigue seemed to open the way for a peace negotiation, which was successful with the signing of the *Tamanrasset National Pact* between Malian governmental authorities and several Tuareg rebel groups.<sup>68</sup> In said accord, a permanent cease-fire was linked with the granting of *special social economic and administrative status for the north; Tax exemptions for the inhabitants of the North for the duration of ten years; The creation of structures to secure the gradual return of refugees after the end of the conflict; Integration of former rebels in the Malian Armed Forces and administration.*<sup>69</sup>

The lack of adherence of all Tuareg rebel groups to the peace accord and the lack of commitment of the Malian authorities to actively and efficiently follow through with the accord agreements in time fuelled, once again, hostilities and disenchantment amongst the Tuareg population whom in 2006 reignited hostilities attacking Malian military outposts and bases. This violent outbreak, nevertheless, lacked the intensity and clout of previous rebellions and was to be considered a small-scale uprising that already mostly de-escalated that same year after the mediation of Algeria in what was to become known as the *Algiers Accords*. The accord tied the end of hostilities to promises of further autonomy and the provision of development programs for the northern regions which,<sup>70</sup> despite allowing to solidify a cease-fire and achieve some sort of negative peace, wasn't enough to solve the structural problems that would lead to the third Tuareg rebellion.

---

<sup>67</sup> \* Note 2: Ethnic tensions in Mali have been historically important in explaining the north/south divide and the herders/farmers tensions which are as much at the root of the problem as religious or independence narratives in Mali. For the sake of brevity and complexity, this thesis will not go into detail in the particularities of the many ethnic tensions present in Mali, instead preferring to make clear that they exist and play a fundamental role in the developing of the conflict and the difficulties to arrive to any peace agreement.

<sup>68</sup> Ba, Oumar. *Tuareg Nationalism and Cyclical Paterns of Rebellions: How the past and present explain each other* [online]. March 2014. Sahel Research Group University of Florida. [Accessed 30 March 2019]. Available from: [https://sites.clas.ufl.edu/sahelresearch/files/Ba\\_Tuareg-Nationalism\\_final.pdf](https://sites.clas.ufl.edu/sahelresearch/files/Ba_Tuareg-Nationalism_final.pdf)

<sup>69</sup> *National Pact concluded between the Government of Mali and the unified movements and fronts of Azawad giving expression to the special status of Northern Mali* [online]. 11 April 1992. The Government of the Republic of Mali and the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad. [Accessed 30 March 2019]. Available from: [https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Mali\\_Peace\\_Accord-proof.pdf](https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Mali_Peace_Accord-proof.pdf)

<sup>70</sup> Boutellis, Arthur and Zahar, Marie-Joëlle. A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement. *International Peace Institute*. 2017. P. 52.

#### 4.1. The Malian conflict

The third and latest Tuareg rebellion was initiated in 2012, when Tuareg forces belonging to the newly formed MNLA took, without serious governmental opposition, large swaths of territory in northern Mali. The rebellion had its roots in long-lasting Tuareg ambitions of an independent state and a historic animosity towards the governing southern elites, however, other reasons were also important in explaining the revival of conflict in northern Mali, such as; 1). The return to northern Mali of combat hardened, well-equipped, Tuareg forces after the death and fall of the regime of Muammar al Gaddafi in Libya; 2). Disaffection with the lack of security offered by the Malian government against a rising al-Qaeda terrorist threat; 3). The deteriorating economic situation as tourism collapsed and international NGOs departed following the worsening security environment and, lastly; 4) The dire humanitarian situation in the region following a period of intense drought, which brought famine to northern Mali (exacerbated by the departure of international NGOs) and ignited a feeling of abandonment amongst the Tuareg population.<sup>71</sup>

In the early wake of the Tuareg rebellion, and pushed by the astonishing lack of strength of the Malian National army in controlling its northern most territories, the Security Council reacted swiftly passing an unanimous decision on resolution 2085<sup>72</sup> calling for the creation and deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), composed by personnel belonging from ECOWAS, which due to the gravity of the challenge was granted a chapter VII mandate.<sup>73</sup> Almost in parallel to the Tuareg rebellion, a jihadist movement led by Islamic groups such as Ansar-Dine, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), Al Mourabitoune and Al-Qaeda also made advanced in the northern Malian territories. Despite co-existing in the same territory, early stages of the rebellion saw the Tuareg and Islamist fighting side-by-side a common Malian State, regardless of divergences in their causes, which were; the search of an independent and secular Tuareg State named Azawad for the former and an Islamist Sharia-law governed territory for the latter. With the rebellion being initiated in January 2012, by March, the Malian army was in no position to hold on to its northern territories and was finally pushed out. The rapid defeat

---

<sup>71</sup> Lecocq, Baz and Belalimat, Nadia. The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought - Baz Lecocq and Nadia Belalimat. *African Arguments* [online]. 2012. [Accessed 4 April 2019]. Available from: <https://africanarguments.org/2012/02/28/the-tuareg-between-armed-uprising-and-drought-baz-lecocq-and-nadia-belalimat/>

<sup>72</sup> Security Council Resolution 2085 - UNSCR. [online]. [Accessed 6 April 2019]. Available from: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2085>

<sup>73</sup> Heisbourg, François. A Surprising Little War: First Lessons of Mali. *Survival*. May 2013. Vol. 55, no. 2, p. 7–18. DOI [10.1080/00396338.2013.784458](https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.784458).

and the lack of means and leadership provided to face enemy forces prompted a *coup d'état* in Bamako by officers that resulted in the ousting of President Amadou Toumani Touré. The new Junta, under the lead of the Malian army officer Amadou Sanogo and his newly founded National Committee for the for the Restoration of Democracy of State (CNRDR), was swiftly condemned and sanctioned by the international community and neighboring countries, being forced to enter negotiations with ECOWAS's negotiators which resulted in the stepping down of the coup plotters and the formation of an interim civilian-led government under new President Dioncounda Traoré.<sup>74</sup> In the meantime, and benefiting from the chaos the coup instilled on the Malian army, the MNLA declared the independence of Azawad, fulfilling a long lasting Tuareg aspiration and effectively dividing the Malian territory in two separate states.

In parallel to the rifts opening in the Malian government, however, splits were also taking place within Tuareg and Islamist groups, who in control of a same territory and with no enemy left to fight turned on each other. The battle between both factions resulted in the defeat of the MNLA to the Islamist groups, who were pushed out of all towns in the north and were forced to regroup in smaller towns along the borders with Algeria, Niger and Mauritania. With almost complete control of the north in Mali and an opposing army in disarray, Islamist forces started to advance southwards taking vast swaths of territory nearly unopposed. Recognizing the dire situation, in January 2013, the Malian government requested an international intervention. With two columns of Jihadist convoys advancing southwards at only 160km from Bamako, France decided to launch Operation Serval and Operation Sabre, invoking chapter 51 of the UN charter, mobilizing its air forces, Special Forces and light armored vehicles from bases located in Burkina Faso, Chad and Ivory Coast. France's unexpectedly sudden and robust intervention, together with the deployment of ECOWAS' AFISMA peacekeeping mission, drove jihadist forces northwards.<sup>75</sup> Within the next three and a half months, Malian, French and AFISMA sustained military operations managed to liberate all major towns in northern Mali obliging jihadist spoilers to flee to remote areas within Mali, retreat to Niger or Libya, or dissolve into the local population.<sup>76</sup> The defeat and expulsion of

---

<sup>74</sup> Bergamaschi, Isaline. French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Consensual yet Insufficient. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*. 12 June 2013. Vol. 2, no. 2, p. Art. 20. DOI [10.5334/sta.bb](https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bb).

<sup>75</sup> Heisbourg, François. A Surprising Little War: First Lessons of Mali. *Survival*. May 2013. Vol. 55, no. 2, p. 7–18. DOI [10.1080/00396338.2013.784458](https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.784458)

<sup>76</sup> Boeke, Sergei and Schuurman, Bart. Operation 'Serval': A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 19 September 2015. Vol. 38, no. 6, p. 801–825. DOI [10.1080/01402390.2015.1045494](https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1045494).

both Tuareg rebel factions and jihadist groups from all major cities in northern Mali would open a new phase of the Malian conflict which would be characterized by the surge of asymmetric warfare.

#### **4.2. Importance of the conflict in the International scene**

Since the beginning of the hostilities in 2012, the Malian conflict has drawn multiple actors to intervene throughout Mali's national borders, showcasing the potential destabilizing effects the conflict might have for neighboring countries and the broader region. There are several factors that have drawn international actors such as countries (France, Mauritania, Chad, etc.), regional organizations (ECOWAS, EU, Group 5 Sahel or G5S) or global organizations (United Nations) to consider Mali a conflict of strategic importance to guarantee regional peace and stability, which could be explained as; 1). Fears of a spillover effect of the Tuareg independence claims amongst other neighboring nations which also hold a Tuareg minority population; 2). Possibility of terrorist organizations filling the power vacuum in northern Mali to establish a safe haven from which to destabilize the region; 3). The geographical importance of Mali as one of the main illicit drug routes of the region; 4) Mali's historical importance as a human trafficking route and, lastly; 5). Its potential for worsening the refugee influx into neighboring countries and Europe.

The Tuareg are a population often considered to be the *Kurds of the Sahel*, due to their similar status as a large ethnic minority, with a distinctive regional language and culture, which nevertheless, despite ancestral aspirations, have never possessed an independent state and are scattered throughout many different countries. Counting an estimated population ranging from 1.2 to 3 million, nowadays, the Tuareg are located in Mali and Niger, which hold the largest percentage of Tuareg population, as well as Burkina Faso, Algeria and Libya.<sup>77</sup> The formation of the MNLA and the proclamation of the independent state of Azawad in 2012, was received with regional fear and anxiety by neighboring countries fearing an influx of fighters into Mali or the possibility of similar conflicts erupting within their own national borders. Despite evidence showing there is no clearly defined pan-Tuareg movement, due to underestimated ethnic and cultural differences amongst the Tuareg population, the conflict in Mali has been considered a potential source of instability from neighboring countries, whom have attempted to isolate and stabilize the conflict through the

---

<sup>77</sup> Asfura-Heim, Patricio. The Tuareg: A Nation Without Borders? A CNA Strategic Studies Conference Report: [online]. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, 2013. [Accessed 7 April 2019]. Available from: <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA587213>

improvement of border security or the participation in offensive operations under the umbrella of regional organizations such as ECOWAS or G5S.

Added to the fear of a Tuareg rebellion, which could spill-over to other neighboring territories, fears of the establishment of a terrorist safe-haven, from which to destabilize Western-Africa and potentially reach Europe, have also fueled concerns and drawn the attention of international decision-makers on the Malian conflict. Such fears are far from new, and have their clearest example in the GWOT campaign in Afghanistan, which also had its effects in neighboring Pakistan, when a large part of the international community deemed those states as either compliant, unwilling or incapable of denying terrorist organizations, which had a transnational ambitions and reach, from acquiring territory from which to finance, govern, plan and execute terrorist attacks. In Mali, longstanding grievances from the population, added to the general lack of resources and employment,<sup>78</sup> makes for the region a potential recruiting hub for terrorist organizations to enlarge their ranks. The threat an uncontrolled northern Mali could pose to Western African stability and European homeland, has been a major motivator for foreign intervention and investment.

The Tuareg rebellion, the establishment of terrorist organizations and the infighting between similar ideological factions amongst each other in northern Mali is a consequence of one often overlooked, yet critical, factor of strategic importance; Mali is a key focal point of vital importance in the illicit drug routes. With origins in South America and entry point into Africa from the Gulf of Guinea, Mali constitutes the logical route for drug smuggling (mostly Hashish, cannabis and Cocaine, as well as other products such as cigarettes, petrol, arms, etc.) into the Sahel, North African territories and southern Europe.<sup>79</sup> The control of these routes, which in some cases constitute the main sources of revenues for spoilers established in northern Mali, has been a fundamental source of instability in a generally ungoverned, porous and impoverished northern region, and has added another layer of complexity towards settling disputes or initiating negotiations with these groups. The Malian conflict, thus, reflects as much an ethnic and ideological conflict, as it reflects, as well, purely rational and strategic calculations over control of drug money to finance operations and weaken adversaries.<sup>80</sup> The

---

<sup>78</sup> Santo, Elena Dal. Mali: Is It All About Terrorism? [online]. 17 April 2018. [Accessed 13 April 2019]. Available from: <https://icct.nl/publication/mali-is-it-all-about-terrorism/>

<sup>79</sup> Marticorena, Bricana, Mccurdy, Daphne, Mcdougall, Owen, Pham, Minh-Thu and Kuhn, Patrick. Adapting and Evolving: The Implications of Transnational Terrorism for UN Field Missions. Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs. P. 58.

<sup>80</sup> Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali. Crisis Group [online]. 13 December 2018. [Accessed 13 April 2019]. Available from: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/267-narcotrafic-violence-et-politique-au-nord-du-mali>

potential destabilizing role illicit drug financing can play in strengthening a spoiler's capabilities and means, as well as the negative effects the distribution of drugs can play in itself, has often been recalled as one of the main sources of preoccupation for the international community. Furthermore, however, Mali is also known as main route for human trafficking acting as an origin, transit and destination country for individuals in the Western African region. Much like the traffic of illicit drugs, human trafficking also constitutes a major source of revenue for terrorists, as well as a grand problem for men, women and children of the region which are exploited into forced labor, in sectors such as Agriculture or industry, as well as service sectors such as prostitution or domestic work.<sup>81</sup>

As usual, the burden of conflict has been harsh on local populations which have been encountered with social, political and economic instability, which has forced civilians to find refuge in neighboring countries or attempt the goal of reaching Europe. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR), until 2018, it is estimated an approximate 220.000 Malians have been displaced mostly in between Mali (84.285) as internal displaced persons (IDP), Mauritania (56.591), Niger (55.496) or Burkina Faso (24.666).<sup>82</sup> Many displaced, nevertheless, also attempt to traverse the porous northern borders to attempt to reach Europe through the Mediterranean, which in 2018, received or intercepted at sea an estimated 11.200 Malian refugees which, to put in perspective, reflects a higher number of refugees than those coming from traditionally more mediatized countries such as Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq.<sup>83</sup> In the midst of a refugee crisis that exploded after the upheavals of the Arab Spring and the worsening of the conflicts in time, the Malian conflict has also been framed as a source of instability due to its potential for forced displacements and the strain they can have on neighboring, as well as European, countries' stability.

## **5. Enter MINUSMA**

In the aftermath of the French and AFISMA intervention to halt the jihadist advance on Bamako and later oust them from their strongholds in northern Mali, the Security Council unanimously adopted, on the 25<sup>th</sup> April 2013, the deployment of MINUSMA, which was to

---

<sup>81</sup> Sarrica, Fabrizio, Anja Korenblik, and Suzanne Kunnen. "Global Report on Trafficking in Persons." Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), 2009.

<sup>82</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). "Mali Situation." Operational portal Refugee Situations. Accessed April 13, 2019. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/malisituation>.

<sup>83</sup> "Refugees and Migrants Arrivals to Europe in 2018 (Mediterranean)." United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2018. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68529>.

substitute ECOWAS' AFISMA mission and integrate the already established United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM). Demanding for a period of deployment of approximately 60 days from the passing of the resolution, the Security Council opened the door for this date to be pushed forward if potential security threats against civilians and MINUSMA personnel continued to be present within the area of responsibility of MINUSMA,<sup>84</sup> which clearly showcased the fears of deploying a mission in an area where spoiler groups continued to constitute a hazard that could push MINUSMA to be a party to conflict. Nevertheless, within the two-month calendar set by Resolution 2100, the situation was deemed sufficiently under control for MINUSMA to fully deploy on the 1<sup>st</sup> July 2013.

**5.1. Mandate**

Observing Security Council Resolution 2100 (view table 6) which brought about the creation and deployment of MINUSMA, authorized under chapter VII to *take all necessary means* to carry out its mandate within its capabilities and areas of responsibility, its tasks, which evolved and grew throughout the years, encompassed the following assignments;

**Table 6: Security Council Resolution 2100 Mandate**

<b>A) Stabilization of key population centers and support for the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country</b>	(i) In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize the key population centers, especially in the north of Mali and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas;
	(ii) To support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country;
	(iii) To support national and international efforts towards rebuilding the Malian security sector, especially the police and gendarmerie through technical assistance, capacity-building, co-location and mentoring programs, as well as the rule of law and justice sectors, within its capacities and in close coordination with other bilateral partners, donors and international organizations engaged in these fields, including the EU;
	(iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, through training and other support, in mine action and weapons and ammunition management;

---

<sup>84</sup> UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) [on establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)], 25 April 2013, S/RES/2100 (2013), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/519dffbe4.html> [accessed 19 April 2019]

	<p>(v) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in developing and implementing programs for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the dismantling of militias and self-defense groups, consistent with the objectives of reconciliation and taking into account the specific needs of demobilized children;</p>
<p><b>B) Support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process</b></p>	<p>(i) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali to implement swiftly the transitional road map towards the full restoration of constitutional order, democratic governance and national unity in Mali;</p> <p>(ii) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, including through local partners as appropriate, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict;</p> <p>(iii) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali and communities in the north of Mali to facilitate progress towards an inclusive national dialogue and reconciliation process, notably the negotiation process referred to in paragraph 4 above, including by enhancing negotiation capacity and promoting the participation of civil society, including women’s organizations;</p> <p>(iv) To support the organization and conduct of inclusive, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections, including through the S/RES/2100 (2013) 8 13-31417 provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective security arrangements;</p>
<p><b>C) Protection of civilians and United Nations personnel</b></p>	<p>(i) To protect, without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional authorities of Mali, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capacities and areas of deployment;</p> <p>(ii) To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;</p> <p>(iii) To protect the United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;</p>
<p><b>D) Promotion and protection of human rights</b></p>	<p>(i) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Mali and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;</p> <p>(ii) To support, in particular, the full deployment of MINUSMA human rights observers throughout the country;</p> <p>(iii) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;</p>

	(iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in their efforts to promote and protect human rights;
<b>E) Support for humanitarian assistance</b>	In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance to humanitarian principles, and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors;
<b>F) Support for cultural preservation</b>	To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, as necessary and feasible, in protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration with UNESCO;
<b>G) Support for national and international justice</b>	To support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the transitional authorities of Mali, without prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali, taking into account the referral by the transitional authorities of Mali of the situation in their country since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court;

The latest yearly extension of MINUSMA, unanimously approved through UNSC Resolution 2423 (view table 7), on 28 June 2018,<sup>85</sup> identifies an expansive list of mandates (even including a first ever mention to climate security related factors in a UNSC mandate)<sup>86</sup> which are worth mentioning;

**Table 7: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2423 mandate extension**

<b>A) Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali</b>	(i) To support the implementation of the political and institutional reforms provided by the Agreement, especially in its Part II, notably to support the Government's efforts for the effective restoration and extension of State authority and rule of law throughout the territory, including through supporting the effective functioning of interim administrations in the North of Mali under the conditions set out in the Agreement;
	(ii) To support the implementation of the defense and security measures of the Agreement;

<sup>85</sup> UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2423 [Adopted by the Security Council at its 8298th meeting, on 28 June 2018]. 28 June 2018.

<sup>86</sup> UNSC extends MINUSMA Mandate to include climate security aspects for the first time. Planetary Security Initiative [online]. [Accessed 21 April 2019]. Available from: <https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/news/unsc-extends-minusma-mandate-include-climate-security-aspects-first-time>

	<p>(iii) To support the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures of the Agreement, especially in its Part V, by continuing its current activities, including with respect to the support of the operations of the International Commission of Inquiry, in consultation with the parties, support to the work of S/RES/2423 (2018) 18-10687 11/18 the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, support to the effectiveness of justice and corrections officials in the North and Centre of the country and to associated interim authorities, and technical support to Malian judicial institutions regarding the detention, investigation and prosecution of individuals suspected of, and sentencing of those found responsible for, terrorism-related crimes, mass atrocities and transnational organized crime activities (including trafficking in persons, arms, drugs and natural resources, and the smuggling of migrants), which risk destabilizing the peace process;</p>	
	<p>(iv) To support, within its resources and areas of deployment, the conduct of inclusive, free, fair, transparent, and credible elections, conducted in a peaceful environment, as well as the holding of a constitutional referendum, including through the provision of appropriate technical assistance and security arrangements, consistent with the provisions of the Agreement;</p>	
<p><b>B) Support to the restoration of State authority in the Centre</b></p>	<p>To support the redeployment of the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) in the Centre of Mali, including through continued operational, logistical and transportation support during coordinated operations and joint operations, mentoring, planning, strengthened information sharing and medical evacuation, within existing resources, without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping;</p>	
<p><b>C) Protection of civilians and stabilization, including against asymmetric threats</b></p>	<p>(ii) In support of the Malian authorities, to stabilize the key population centers and other areas where civilians are at risk, notably in the Centre and North of Mali, and, in this regard:</p>	<p>to enhance early warning and documentation of the impact of conflict and violence on civilians,</p> <p>to anticipate, deter and counter threats, including asymmetric threats,</p> <p>to strengthen community engagement and protection mechanisms, including through reconciliation, mediation and support to the resolution of local conflicts,</p> <p>to take robust and active steps to protect civilians, including through active and effective patrolling in areas where civilians are at risk, mitigating the risk to civilians before, during and after any military operation</p> <p>to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas, engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threats;</p>

## 5.2. MINUSMA'S capabilities

Under Resolution 2100, MINUSMA was to succeed AFISMA with a total force strength of 11.200 military personnel, which would comprise reserve rapid deployment

battalions dispersed throughout the country, as well as 1.440 United Nations police personnel (UNPOL) tasked with training Malian authorities and sustaining the rule of law throughout the area of responsibility of MINUSMA. Aware of the potential difficulties MINUSMA could be facing when deploying in vaguely governed territories where spoiler groups had a grip and, in many cases, the sympathy and support of local populations due to the provision of basic services of governance, resolution 2100 called for close collaboration and contributions, understood as: 1) The provision of member states of qualified and well-equipped troops and police personnel, in line with a security environment and challenge that requires experience and capabilities well beyond normal circumstances; 2). Demands of logistical and capability coordination between MINUSMA and other neighboring peace operations such as the United Nations operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), aiming at strengthening force capacity through the sharing of troops and assets, without hindering individual operational capacities with respect to their mandates; 3). The welcoming of any mission contributions or ad-hoc responses from regional organizations such as the EU, the AU or ECOWAS; 4) The acceptance of French forces to remain in Mali, undertaking all necessary measures within their area of responsibility to stabilize Mali, in close collaboration with MINUSMA and, lastly; 5) The reminding of Malian authorities that any solution to the conflict has to be nationally owned and cannot be imposed or met solely through external interventions, something that reflected a change in paradigm that would become in norm in UN peacekeeping in 2016 following the twin *sustaining peace* resolutions.

MINUSMA overtook AFISMA's role in Mali as the sole international actor that, in theory, had the international legitimacy, experience, sustained funding, operational cooperativity to partner with other actors and resource capabilities necessary to carry out a multidimensional mandate in a volatile context such as the Malian. From its onset, MINUSMA was primarily sustained by TCCs and PCCs coming from Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Chad, Togo, Niger, Guinea and Senegal,<sup>87</sup> which reflected the key interest neighboring countries had in not allowing Mali to fall to terrorist organizations which could threaten their own territories. Furthermore, however, MINUSMA's founding Resolution 2100

---

<sup>87</sup> Cohen, Matt. UN Peacekeeping with no Peace: Disorientation, Demoralization and Scarcity in Mali. Centre for Security Governance [online]. [Accessed 22 April 2019]. Available from: <https://secgovcentre.org/2017/09/un-peacekeeping-with-no-peace-disorientation-demoralization-and-scarcity-in-mali/>

call for member states to provide for *adequate capabilities and equipment*<sup>88</sup> was understood as a general call for Western member states to fill in the logistical gaps, pledging the human experience and necessary means, to face Mali's threat environment in what has been often denominated the European return to peacekeeping. Despite a traditionally close engagement of European countries with peacekeeping operations, the tragic 90's and, especially, UNPROFOR's traumatic experience in Srebrenica, saw European TCCs fall back on their commitment to UN-led operations to focus on participating in NATO ventures such as ISAF in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the dying down of NATO commitment in Afghanistan and other locations, added to the increasing muscular approach the UN has adopted post-Hippo report through the inclusion of stabilization and robust peacekeeping mandates, the increase in capabilities acquired through European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions since the 2000's and the high stakes of the Malian conflict for European interests has seen a significant return of EU member states to UN peacekeeping.

This return should not be understood as a return of pre-Cold War troop contributions, but rather as a capability enabling return with the provision of mission critical niche capabilities (i.e. Helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs, transport aviation support, intelligence gathering sources, etc.) with which to enhance UN force generation.<sup>89</sup> This return, far from being anecdotic, constitutes a fundamental reason to understanding the uniqueness of MINUSMA and its evolution throughout the years. Echoing Ambassador Samantha Power's words, the complex threat environment MINUSMA coexists with has highlighted the reality that MINUSMA *is not your mother's, or your grandmother's peacekeeping*.<sup>90</sup>

### **5.3. Deployment and challenges**

The official deployment of MINUSMA, the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 2013, supported by the Malian army and French forces from *Operation Serval*, was intended to coincide with the ousting and retreat of Islamist forces from MINUSMA's areas of deployment. Nevertheless, the mission was subject to asymmetric warfare for which it proved unready, despite the inclusion of European TCCs that offered recent CT and COIN experience from Afghanistan and Iraq.

---

<sup>88</sup> UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) [on establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)], 25 April 2013, S/RES/2100 (2013), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/519dffbe4.html> [accessed 19 April 2019]

<sup>89</sup> Koops, Joachim A. and Tercovich, Giulia. A European return to United Nations peacekeeping? Opportunities, challenges and ways ahead. *International Peacekeeping*. 19 October 2016. Vol. 23, no. 5, p. 597–609. DOI 10.1080/13533312.2016.1236430.

<sup>90</sup> Power, Samantha. On Peacekeeping. *HuffPost* [online]. 42:42 500. [Accessed 22 April 2019]. Available from: [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/samantha-power/on-peacekeeping\\_b\\_6124822.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/samantha-power/on-peacekeeping_b_6124822.html)

Through a mix of means stemming from ambushes, mortar attacks, suicide attacks to mines, since its deployment, MINUSMA has become the most dangerous peacekeeping theater the UN is engaged in up to date. As demonstrated by table 8, which illustrates MINUSMA’s fatality rates since its deployment in the period 2013-2018,<sup>91</sup> the mission has often-times, and several times by large, topped the list as the deadliest mission for UN personnel;

**Table 8: MINUSMA fatalities (2013-2018)**

Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Fatalities	6	39	29	39	42	22

In 2014, French-led Operation Serval evolved into Operation Barkhane, which was constituted to perform as a 3.000 soldier strong counter-terrorist operation tasked with carrying out actions against terrorist spoilers present throughout the Sahel region acting in Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and, especially, Mali. This operation was intended to act as the muscle behind MINUSMA’s peacekeeping activities, aimed at offering a form of regional arrangement, legitimated under Chapter VIII of the UN charter, by which the UN mission could avoid becoming a party to conflict. Since then, the Malian army, MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane coexisted with other actors such as the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and the G5S, which have been deployed to reinforce existing capabilities or fill in the gaps of Mali’s security environment. EUTM was deployed in 2013, within the framework of European CSDP as a response to UNSC resolution 2100 and has grown to constitute a 600 strong force, coming from 25 European countries, tasked with carrying out training and advisory functions to support the MDSF’s and G5S efforts in providing security throughout the Malian territory and regaining State authority there where it has been lost.<sup>92</sup> The G5S mission, on the other hand, constitutes an intergovernmental regional effort by Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina-Faso and Chad to act upon common security threats present in the region. Constituted in 2014, it is formed by 5.000 soldiers stationed in 3 different sectors throughout the Sahel region to carry out operations aimed at countering terrorist threats, combatting cross-border organized crime and tackling human

---

<sup>91</sup> Fatalities. United Nations Peacekeeping [online]. 31 March 2019. [Accessed 27 April 2019]. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities>

<sup>92</sup> European Union Training Mission in Mali. EUTM Mali [online]. 2019. [Accessed 27 April 2019]. Available from: <http://eutmmali.eu/en/>

trafficking.<sup>93</sup> The G5S military operations, have been included within the 2017 Sahel alliance, formed by the before-mentioned countries with the support of the EU, the African Development Bank, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank (WB) and several independent countries, to provide for services in Mali to act upon education, employment, food security, climate, governance and service delivery challenges present in Mali.<sup>94</sup>

MINUSMA and other actors present in Mali have achieved numerous successes during the last years, first of which is the fact that the country hasn't fallen to terrorist organizations nor become a safe haven for terrorist activities. With the support of the UN and MINUSMA the country has been successful in holding two elections in 2013 and 2018, that were largely praised as exemplary and corruption-free, as well as signing the 2015 *Accord pour la paix et la reconciliation au Mali*<sup>95</sup> (also referred to as the Algiers accords) which managed to secure a peace deal between the Malian Government and opposing war faring factions, such as the MNLA and the Platform of armed groups (commonly known as the platform), in exchange of peace consolidation in northern Mali and increasing autonomy through the support for local elections and improved self-governance.<sup>96</sup> The general sense that Mali was rescued from total collapse, largely due to foreign interventions since the 2012-2013 shocks, is nearly undeniable. Nevertheless, latest trends and developments show that the situation is far from stable and MINUSMA and other actors seem to have been dragged into a worsening asymmetric warfare in which there is no clear end in sight.

## 6. Learning from the past

The title of this section might seem misleading as both GWOT campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are either ongoing in the case of the former or recent in case of the latter. Either through the intervention of a UNSC approved intervention in Afghanistan with the NATO-led ISAF or the coalition of the willing that intervened in Iraq, and later evolved

---

<sup>93</sup> G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance. France Diplomatie : Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs [online]. [Accessed 27 April 2019]. Available from: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/>

<sup>94</sup> Alliance Sahel [online]. 2019. [Accessed 29 April 2019]. Available from: <https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/>

<sup>95</sup> Back from the brink. how the UN is stabilizing, securing, and strengthening Mali. 2018. United Nations Foundation.

<sup>96</sup> Nyirabikali, Gaudence. Mali Peace Accord: Actors, issues and their representation. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [online]. 27 August 2015. [Accessed 29 April 2019]. Available from: <https://www.sipri.org/node/385>

into MNF-I, both Afghanistan and Iraq have served as the two main theatres to gain insight in how to conduct COIN and CT operations in a world of increasing armed rebellions and surge of transnational terrorist organizations. For the United States, which was at the forefront of both interventions, the Iraqi and Afghan quagmire seemed to have brought back memories of past wars such as the war in Vietnam, where it gained experience in counter-insurgency strategies while being bogged in a war that seemed out of reach for conventional victory, yet too complex to offer for a simple withdrawal. In the same way Vietnam offered for an experience-gaining theatre for the US in spearheading both invading coalitions, the UN is using Afghanistan and Iraq as its own experience-gaining theatres for which to adapt to Mali.

In 2014, shortly after the deployment of MINUSMA and in the aftermath of several terrorist attacks which had raised the mission's casualties rate to unprecedented levels in such a short span of time, the then Force Commander of the operation noted that *MINUSMA is in a terrorism fighting situation without an anti-terrorist mandate without adequate training, equipment, logistic or intelligence to deal with such a situation.*<sup>97</sup> The following sections will try to highlight how the UN has tried to correct its operational weakness in adapting to an asymmetric threat environment for which it wasn't ready. In order to do so, current doctrinal and capability innovations present in MINUSMA, and almost exclusively in MINUSMA, will be traced back to lessons learned or knowledge transferred from Afghanistan and Iraq. To understand the following section correctly, one must first understand the role of MINUSMA in the Malian conflict is one in a broader picture, in which the mission acts intraoperatively with other actors, such as the French operation Barkhane and GFS, which constitute the coercive and military-centered component, and EUTM which undertakes complimentary roles in advising and training Malian MDSF.

### **6.1. Doctrinal lessons learned**

This section of the thesis deals with those doctrinal innovations that are undeniably new to the United Nations and which nowadays find their highest expression with MINUSMA. A military doctrine, as understood by RAND Corporation, is a *fundamental set of principles that guides military forces as they pursue security objectives*. According to the American think tank, these set of principles *can range from the policies and procedures put in*

---

<sup>97</sup> Boutellis, Arthur. Can the UN Stabilize Mali? Towards a UN Stabilization Doctrine? *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* [online]. 25 June 2015. Vol. 4, no. 1. [Accessed 12 May 2019]. DOI [10.5334/sta.fz](https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.fz). Available from: <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.fz/>

place by a particular military branch to the tactics and techniques taught to new members during training.<sup>98</sup> Despite often being confused with military strategy, which relates more to the way or manner those particular principles are put into practice through specific actions, military doctrine offers a continuous and sustained principle or belief on how to wage war whether in a specific or a generic fashion, depending on the nature of the threat, offering guidelines for force building, training and equipping with which to achieve military ends.<sup>99</sup>

### **The need for Intelligence**

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, which constituted the worst attack on American soil since the Second World War, the US rewrote its National Security Strategy to adapt from the 20<sup>th</sup> century superpower dynamic into the new 21<sup>st</sup> century age of sub-State transnational terrorism threats, claiming that *Intelligence—and how we use it—is our first line of defense against terrorists and the threat posed by hostile states*.<sup>100</sup> Echoing the American pivot towards countering asymmetric threats, soon other countries and international organizations (primarily NATO and the UN) would come to similar conclusions, signalling the beginning of a new era in which intelligence grew in importance and prestige while acquiring a predominant role both in mandates and in budget enlargements. The importance acquired by the intelligence community during the GWOT campaigns would be so vast, that they would commonly be come to be known as the *intelligence wars*.<sup>101</sup>

One of the first realizations following the formation of coalitions to undertake the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, thus, was that in order to carry out such endeavors, military action would have to be sufficiently supplied by timely and credible intelligence, based on a decentralized command structure which allowed for rapid response to terrorist and insurgent activities through the empowerment and flexibility provided to lower ranking authorities and the local level.<sup>102</sup> Aware of the possibilities of suffering asymmetric warfare following an initial invasion, and in part also owing to the success experience of the Gulf War campaign, which mixed overwhelming power with latest state of the art technological and intelligence

---

<sup>98</sup> Military Doctrine. RAND Corporation [online]. [Accessed 14 May 2019]. Available from: <https://www.rand.org/topics/military-doctrine.html>

<sup>99</sup> idem

<sup>100</sup> National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (2002). Washington, DC: The White House.

<sup>101</sup> Dahl, Erik J. and Viola, David. Intelligence and Terrorism. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies [online]. 1 March 2010. [Accessed 18 May 2019]. DOI 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.91. Available from: <https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-91>

<sup>102</sup> Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations [online]. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), 2015. [Accessed 26 May 2019]. Available from: <https://info.publicintelligence.net/JCOA-Decade-of-War.pdf>

gathering innovations to achieve great effectiveness with extremely low casualty results, both campaigns were heavily influenced by the development of a vast intelligence apparatus with which to guide war efforts.

The first similarity, regarding the use of intelligence, between the GWOT campaigns and the way MINUSMA is countering asymmetric threats, in collaboration with other actors, is the model used, commonly known as being a model of *Network-Centric Warfare* (NCW) which links modern warfare with latest technological developments of the current information age. This model has been defined in the 2005 United States Department of Defense report as a term that describes *the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even a partially networked force can employ to create a decisive warfighting advantage.*<sup>103</sup> Making use of a vastly superior military capacity in all sectors, both in the initial invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the coalition forces led by the US managed to locate and identify enemy forces with relative ease, thus reducing the delay time for decision-makers to act upon it from hours to minutes through an efficient use of four types of information gathering techniques; geospatial or imagery intelligence (GEOINT), Sensors intelligence (SIGINT), Intelligence, Surveillance and reconnaissance systems (ISR) and the human intelligence (HUMINT) necessary to exploit it and lead it to action.<sup>104</sup>

In terms of intelligence learning for the UN and MINUSMA, Afghanistan has proven to be particularly important as nearly 40 Nations, many of which are currently deployed in Mali, participated in NATO-led ISAF operation (view appendix 3).<sup>105</sup> Nowadays, MINUSMA's CT and COIN activities are based on a network-centric model, heavily influenced and pushed by NATO countries participating in MINUSMA such as Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark,<sup>106</sup> which has been adapted to the US CT military doctrine guideline commonly known as *find, finish, fix, exploit, analyze and disseminate* (F3EAD).<sup>107</sup> This intelligence cycle is commonly associated with Western military intelligence in contexts of asymmetric warfare, where regularly, as in Mali through operation Barkhane and G5S operations, the mission is mandated to *kill or capture* through whatever means available. The

---

<sup>103</sup> Office of Force Transformation. "The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare." United States of America Department of Defense, January 5, 2005. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a446831.pdf>.

<sup>104</sup> Harris, Barry. "Stabilizing Iraq." The Washington Institute. Accessed May 16, 2019. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/stabilizing-iraq-intelligence-lessons-for-afghanistan>.

<sup>105</sup> Idem

<sup>106</sup> Cherisay, Erwan de. "Desert Watchers: MINUSMA's Intelligence Capabilities." IHS Markit, 2017. [https://www.janes.com/images/assets/319/71319/Desert\\_watchers\\_MINUSMA\\_s\\_intelligence\\_capabilities.pdf](https://www.janes.com/images/assets/319/71319/Desert_watchers_MINUSMA_s_intelligence_capabilities.pdf).

<sup>107</sup> "US Counter Terrorism Doctrine." US Joint Chief of Staff, October 24, 2014.

F3EAD intelligence cycle, used through a population-centric (or ethnographic or cultural) lens during the campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq,<sup>108</sup> and nowadays in MINUSMA, would obey the following guidelines:<sup>109 110</sup>

1. The initial phase involves identifying the *who, what, when, where and why* of a plausible target (*find*) through ISR means, proceeding in a second phase to gather evidence (*fix*) with which to assure the initial raw intelligence and lower the risk of operational error.
2. Based in the previous evidence, the decision-makers act upon the intelligence either eliminating, capturing or rendering the target ineffective (*finish*).
3. Gathering all information available from the result of the operation (*exploit*) either through the questioning of any detainees or the analysis of any relevant documents recuperated from the site.
4. Set the obtained raw intelligence into a broader picture to establish any further link or conclusion (*analyze*) and draft and distribute said findings for collection or further use (*disseminate*).

Put visually, the F3EAD intelligence process would look as follows (View figure 1):


---

<sup>108</sup> Rietjens, Sebastiaan and Dorn, A. Walter. The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence: The UN's Laboratory in Mali. In : Baudet, Floribert, Braat, Eleni, VAN WOENSEL, Jeffrey and WEVER, Aad (eds.), Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali [online]. The Hague : T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017. p. 197–219. [Accessed 20 May 2019]. ISBN 978-94-6265-182-1. Available from: [http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8\\_9](http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8_9)

<sup>109</sup> “F3EAD: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate.” Digital Shadows, February 8, 2017. <https://www.digitalsadows.com/blog-and-research/f3ead-find-fix-finish-exploit-analyze-and-disseminate-the-alternative-intelligence-cycle/>.

<sup>110</sup> Karlsrud, John. “Towards UN Counter-Terrorism Operations?” Third World Quarterly 38, no. 6 (June 3, 2017): 1215–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1268907>.

**Figure 1: Counterterrorism Targeting Cycle – Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD)**



**Source 1:** Adapted from “US Counter Terrorism Doctrine.” US Joint Chief of Staff, October 24, 2014.

Another intelligence-related development present in MINUSMA, which can be traced back to the Afghanistan and Iraq military campaigns,<sup>111</sup> despite not being entirely new, is the inclusion and rising importance of Open source intelligence (OSINT). In November 2001, in the aftermath of the attacks on the United States, NATO released its first ever *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*, understanding the crucial importance mass intelligence gathering techniques of unclassified and open information could have in the age of internet and global communications.


This technique, which has grown in importance following the unexpectedness of events such as the Arab Spring and the Islamic State, uses public and unclassified information to gather information with which to influence decision-making processes (view figure 2). Amongst the sources analyzed, they can be categorized as follows: 1). Internet (Facebook, YouTube, blogs, etc.) Anything that can be found online; 2). Mass media, such as Television, radio, books, magazines (etc.); 3). Academic papers, specialized journals, company reports (etc.); 4). Photos and videos, and; 5). Geospatial sources.<sup>112</sup> The mass gathering techniques captured by OSINT rely heavily on the correct management and analysis of what otherwise could be considered massive raw information without context by HUMINT means, which are still considered essential to make the most out of OSINT.

---

<sup>111</sup> Military Intelligence Lessons Learned. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, September 2009. Vol. 35, no. 3, p. 60.

<sup>112</sup> An Introduction to Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Gathering. Secjuice Infosec [online]. 12 August 2018. [Accessed 19 May 2019]. Available from: <https://www.secjuice.com/introduction-to-open-source-intelligence-osint/>

**Figure 2: The OSINT Operations Cycle**



**Source 2:** Adapted from “NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2001.”

Drawn on NATO’s use of OSINT in Afghanistan through ISAF’s Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell (SOFFC), MINUSMA has incorporated a similar OSINT intelligence tool called the All-Sources Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU),<sup>113</sup> which has captured experts and practitioner’s attention as the first ever OSINT gathering tool ever deployed with a peacekeeping operation.

<sup>113</sup> Karlsrud, John. “Towards UN Counter-Terrorism operations?” *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 6 (June 3, 2017): 1215–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1268907>.

### Stabilization doctrine

Stabilization operations are described in the 2005 *Department of Defense Directive* as being *Military and Civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions.*<sup>114</sup> In other words, stabilization operations undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq followed a *carrot and stick* model where; 1). The potential for military force was planned to undertake operations on the high spectrum of violence, and; 2). There is also room for typical civilian operations aimed at reconstruction and aid projects. Therefore, *while these efforts have a military dimension, they also possess political, economic, legal and civil aspects.*<sup>115</sup>

Peacekeeping operations such as MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, MINUSCA, and especially MINUSMA, have been deployed with stabilization mandates that widely resemble the mandates of ISAF and MNF-I in Afghanistan and Iraq, where military and civilian activities intertwined, but where, nevertheless, the former was considered only to be a tactic or a means to an end, while the latter is the strategy.<sup>116</sup> From the onset, stabilization has been an elusive and poorly-defined concept for NATO, the United States (acting as hegemon and leading member of the NATO partnership) and the United Nations. Despite conducting such operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, stabilization doctrinal guidelines were only drafted, by some member states, post-invasion and in the case of the UN continue to be undrafted (despite vague references in the 2008 *Capstone Doctrine* and the *New Partnership Agenda: drafting a new horizon for UN peacekeeping*)<sup>117</sup> until the date. However, an analysis of the 2009 released US *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*<sup>118</sup> provides for *post-facto* clarification of the doctrine that guided military and civilian operations in the GWOT campaigns. This document divides Stabilization efforts in five different fields (as viewed in figure 3) which focus on action in:

- 1). *providing for a safe and secure environment*: Ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence.

---

<sup>114</sup> "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations." Directive. Department of Defense, November 28, 2005. [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5623~v~Military\\_Support\\_for\\_Stability.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5623~v~Military_Support_for_Stability.pdf).

<sup>115</sup> Lahneman, William J. as found in "Meer, Sico van der. Factors for the Success or Failure of Stabilisation Operations. Clingendael Security Paper 11. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael, 2009.

<sup>116</sup> Idem

<sup>117</sup> Muggah, Robert. The United Nations Turns to Stabilization. IPI Global Observatory [online]. 5 December 2014. [Accessed 25 May 2019]. Available from: <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/12/united-nations-peacekeeping-peacebuilding-stabilization/>

<sup>118</sup> United States Institute of Peace, ed. *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: United States Inst. of Peace Press, 2009.


2). *providing for a sustainable economy*: Ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law.

3). *providing for stable governance*: Ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state

4). *providing for social-wellbeing*: Ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement.

5). *providing for the implantation of the rule of law*: Ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights and ensures their safety and security.

**Figure 3: Stabilization objectives**



**Source 3:** Adapted from “United States Institute of Peace, ed. Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United States Inst. of Peace Press, 2009.”

Much as in Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of the invasions, MINUSMA deployed in Mali in an environment where: 1). The State apparatus was either non-existent or weak depending on the location; 2). Battle lines weren't clearly defined, not specifically having a war front or regions completely safe from attacks, and; 3). The sheer dimensions of the country posed difficulties in itself (i.e. Mali is roughly twice the size of France). This fact, led MINUSMA, together with other actors present in Mali, to conduct strategies known as *clear, hold and build* which similarly to NATO coalition's doctrine of State building in Afghanistan and Iraq<sup>119</sup> calls for:

*Installing state representatives and institutions in the regions, including defense and security forces, justice officials, and providers of other services to the populations which are key to addressing the populations social and economic grievances, ensuring security and law and order.*<sup>120</sup>

Within the broader framework of MINUSMA's groundbreaking stabilization mandate, MINUSMA has been tasked with conducting both military stabilization tasks as well as capacity-building or State-building tasks. In these regards, MINUSMA has mirrored NATO initiatives such as the formation of Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams<sup>121</sup> (OMLS) which were tasked with bringing state capabilities to operational effectiveness through training and mentoring programs, while at the same time providing for a liaison point between the local armed forces and the third-party intervening actors to ensure cooperation of actions. Building on these experiences and acting upon its mandate, MINUSMA has also established training and liaison forces with which to aid in aspects such as training, mentoring, demobilization of former combatants, respect of human rights and the rule of law, etc.<sup>122</sup>

In observing the UNSC resolutions that gave birth to MINUSMA and established its mandate such as resolution 2100 (view table 6), from the first, to its successive extensions through Resolutions 2164 (2014), 2227 (2015), 2295 (2016), 2364 (2017) and its latest 2423

---

<sup>119</sup> Cordesman, Anthony H. Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build. [online]. 23 September 2009. [Accessed 20 May 2019]. Available from: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/shape-clear-hold-and-build>

<sup>120</sup> Razza, Namie Di. Protecting Civilians in the Context of Violent Extremism: The Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Mali. International Peace Institute (IPI). October 2018. P. 52.

<sup>121</sup> Organisation du Traité de L'Atlantique Nord. NATO handbook. Brussels : NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2006. ISBN 978-92-845-0178-6.

<sup>122</sup> Karlsrud, John. "Towards UN Counter-Terrorism operations?" Third World Quarterly 38, no. 6 (June 3, 2017): 1215–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1268907>.

(2018) (view table 7), it seems clear MINUSMA has adapted to the Malian context in ways that resemble how the GWOT campaigns have adapted to Afghanistan and Iraq.

**6.2. Adapting capabilities**

The following section will draw conclusions on the similarities of ISAF, MNF-I and MINUSMA from the point of view of its capabilities. Mostly due to the similar threat environments faced, the drawdown of both missions from Afghanistan and Iraq, the increased participation of Western NATO countries in MINUSMA and self-interest in using equipment in UN peacekeeping missions to receive reimbursements for equipment, instead of leaving it unused and costing money through regular maintenance,<sup>123</sup> MINUSMA can be considered a groundbreaking operation from the point of view of its equipment, here understood as capabilities. The following section, thus, will deconstruct those assets unique to MINUSMA (with some occasional exceptions in other peacekeeping operations) which in many cases can be demonstrated to have been present in ISAF and MNF-I.

To draw these links, a table will be made in which the division of capabilities will be made across the following lines: 1). Robust all-terrain vehicles; 2). Aviation Support; 3). Specialized Military Units and, lastly; 4). Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Assets. To evidence similarities in assets used in MINUSMA with those used in the GWOT campaigns of Afghanistan (ISAF) and Iraq (MNF-I), the following structure will be followed;

-  Green: used for those cases where a particular asset has been used in Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali
-  Yellow: used for those cases where a particular asset has been used in either Afghanistan or Iraq, together with Mali
-  Red: used for those cases where a particular asset has only been used in Mali, thus not proving a link between MINUSMA in Mali and the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

Furthermore, to show the exceptionality of MINUSMA with regards to current United Nations peacekeeping operations, another cell will be added to analyze whether these assets are or have been deployed in current or past peacekeeping operations. Finally, another section for comments will be added to provide additional information with which to contextualize the findings.

---

<sup>123</sup> Karlsrud, John, and Adam C Smith. “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali.” International Peace Institute, Providing for peacekeeping no 11, 2015, 28.

The following information to support this section has been obtained from several different sources, to gather the closest picture of the capabilities of MINUSMA since its deployment in 2013 until today. Amongst the most relevant sources used, the following are to be considered the most important;

- Boutellis, Arthur, and Naureen Chowdhury Fink. “Waging Peace: UN Peace Operations Confronting Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” n.d., 44.
- Cherisay, Erwan de. “Desert Watchers: MINUSMA’s Intelligence Capabilities.” IHS Markit, 2017.
- Johnson, Loch K., A. Walter Dorn, Stewart Webb, Sarah Kreps, Wolfgang Krieger, Elke Schwarz, Shlomo Shpiro, Patrick F. Walsh, and James J. Wirtz. *Intelligence and National Security* 32, no. 4 (June 7, 2017): 411–40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1303127>.
- Karlsrud, John, and Adam C Smith. “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali.” International Peace Institute, *Providing for peacekeeping* no 11, 2015, 28.
- Karlsrud, John. “Towards UN Counter-Terrorism operations?” *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 6 (June 3, 2017): 1215–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1268907>.
- Karlsrud, John. “UN Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism: Uncomfortable Bedfellows?” *Vereinte Nationen* 65 (n.d.): 7.

**Table 9: MINUSMA capabilities**

ROBUST ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES					
	MINUSMA	ISAF	MNF-I	Other peacekeeping operations	Comments
<b>Thales Bushmaster</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (UNDOF)	These vehicles are Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and can also be placed within the ISR section as providers of intelligence through their sensor equipment.
<b>KMW Fennek</b>	Yes	Yes	No	No	
<b>Denel RG-32</b>	Yes	Yes	No	Yes (ONUB and UNOMIG)	
<b>RMMV Fuchs</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
<b>Casspir NG2000</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (MONUSCO)	

AVIATION ASSETS					
	MINUSMA	ISAF	MNF-I	Other peacekeeping operations	Comments
Apache helicopter	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	The Chinook, apache and MD500E helicopters could also be listed under ISR assets, however, due to their functions as offensive and CASEVAC /MEDEVAC assets, have been decided to be kept as aviation support. Regarding CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, building on NATO lessons learned throughout the Afghanistan campaign, medical evacuation in MINUSMA has moved to provide for night evacuation and NATO's standard 10-1-2 principal, where; enhanced aid must be provided in the first 10 minutes; Damage control resuscitation must be provided within the following hour, and; damage control surgery must be provided within no longer than 2 hours.
Euro copter Tiger Attack helicopter	Yes	Yes	No	No	
MD500E Attack Helicopter	Yes	No	No	No	
Chinook helicopter	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
C130 Hercules transport aircraft	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (MONUSCO)	
C160 Hercules transport aircraft	Yes	Yes	No	Yes (UNMISS)	

SPECIALISED MILITARY UNITS					
	MINUSMA	ISAF	MNF-I	Other peacekeeping operations	Comments
Special forces	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (MONUC, MONUSCO, UNMISS and MINUSCA)	MINUSMA's special forces capabilities were provided by the Dutch <i>Special Operations Land Task Group</i> (SOLTG) which were replaced in 2015 by the <i>Maritime Special Operations Forces</i> (MARSOF). MINUSMA, nevertheless, counts on special forces which realise offensive operations through their cooperation with French-led operations Barkhane and Sabre and G5S, which act upon MINUSMA's need and intelligence as the

<b>Demining units (landmines, Explosive Remnants of war and Improvised Explosive Devices)</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (MINUSCA, UNFICYP, MONUSCO, UNIFIL, UNSMIL, UNSOS, UNSOM, UNISFA, UNAMID, UNMISS and MINURSO)	<p>special operations branch of the mission.</p> <p>With regards to the specialised demining activities carried out by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), evidence shows their inclusion in peacekeeping operations has not been limited to MINUSMA. However, the activities undertaken in training and providing for improvised explosive devices removal is unique to MINUSMA, as no other peacekeeping mission faces the same type of asymmetric attacks.</p>

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS					
	MINUSMA	ISAF	MNF-I	Other peacekeeping operations	Comments
<b>All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU)</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	<p>The case of ASIFU, which constituted the UN's first ever intelligence cell, is a particularly interesting development that MINUSMA pioneered. Based upon NATO's <i>Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell (SOFFC)</i>, ASIFU aims at gathering information from various sources (or "sensors, as used by NATO member states) such as surveillance and reconnaissance assets, television, radio, social media (etc.) with which to provide information on issues regularly named by NATO as X-PEMESII, which is that interconnected information (X) information that comes from Political (P), Economic (E), Military (M), Social (S), Infrastructure (I) and</p>
<b>Close range UAVs (&lt;50km)</b>					
<b>AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
<b>AeroVironment Puma AE</b>	Yes	No	No	No	
<b>AeroVironment Wasp III</b>	Yes	No	No	No	

<b>AAI RQ-7 Shadow</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	<p>Information (I).</p> <p>With regards to UAVs, the trend of their use is rather new and unique to two specific missions, these being MONUSCO, which was the first ever peacekeeping operation to make use of them, and MINUSMA. MONUSCO constituted the first time a UAV was put under UN peacekeeping command (despite not being the same model as those on this table), instead of acting as a third-party asset under the command of another actor present in the territory. Since then, MINUSMA has taken the lead as the UN peacekeeping operation operating with the greatest number of UAVs.</p> <p>Nevertheless, a distinction should be made as to the use of these UAVs. Attempting to not be stained by the negative image associated with armed UAVs in Afghanistan and Iraq, the UN has so far vowed to maintain their UAVs (or Unarmed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UUAVs, as they prefer to call it) purely designated to surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities on issues such as provision of humanitarian aid, stabilization and recovery efforts and conflict dialogue facilitation, thus, not realizing any targeting strikes. However, the fact that these assets, and therefore MINUSMA, does share this information and the construction of targeting packs with CT operations such as operation Barkhane and G5S, sheds doubt on the inoffensiveness of these Assets.</p>
<b>EMT Aladdin</b>	Yes	Yes	No	No	
<b>Air Robot AR-100B Mikado</b>	Yes	Yes	No	No	
<b>Short range UAVs (&lt;150km)</b>					
<b>Boeing ScanEagle</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
<b>EMT Luna</b>	Yes	Yes	No	No	
<b>Medium range UAVs (&lt;650 km)</b>					
<b>Hermes 900</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
<b>Endurance UAVs (&lt;350km - 36h)</b>					
<b>Heron 1</b>	Yes	Yes	No	No	

### 6.3. Outcomes

Table 9, together with the previous section on doctrinal lessons learned, confirms the similarities, already established by several authors and UN-related documents, that puts MINUSMA at the center of an increasing interest from the organization to adapt and counter (or prevent, as preferred in UN parlance) asymmetric threats whether they come in the form of insurgency or terrorist tactics. Through the section dedicated to doctrinal lessons learned, the nexus between ISAF, MNF-I and MINUSMA has been established when highlighting two fundamental aspects, such as the use of intelligence to conduct operations and the stabilization mandates mixing military and civilian-led activities that, until the date, are almost exclusive to MINUSMA throughout all 15 peacekeeping operations under the guide of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) deployed all around the world.

With regards to table 9, the analysis of specific equipment and capabilities, which is mostly exclusive to MINUSMA and no other UN operation yet, illustrates the importance the drawdown of NATO operations and the withdrawal of its personnel and equipment is having on the UN and, more specifically, MINUSMA. This table shows the interest of Western countries, that possess a long experience in countering asymmetric threats and a keen interest in keeping them at bay there where they originate, in participating in MINUSMA by providing niche capabilities with which to enhance the mission operational effectiveness while confronting a threat it is not used to. The table illustrates how many assets are common to ISAF, MNF-I and MINUSMA, while also highlighting an interesting element; ISAF, due to the fact that it encompassed a broader coalition of the willing acting under NATO's banner and a UN Security Council authorization, shows a higher influence on MINUSMA both in terms of doctrinal lessons learned and assets transferred. An explanation of this fact might rely on the broader basis of countries that participated in ISAF and nowadays in MINUSMA (view appendix 3), if opposed to MNF-I, as well as the situation regarding the four main niche capability contributors (Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Netherlands) whom either didn't participate in MNF-I altogether (Germany and Sweden) or did but played a more limited non-military oriented role (Denmark and Netherlands).

## 7. Conclusion

When initiating this master's thesis, I aimed at demonstrating, and move beyond, the idea that the UN is currently in the midst of adaptations and changes that are likely to set a new trend for peacekeeping operations. This work focused specifically on MINUSMA, as the role model for these new types of operations, trying to answer two main research questions: 1). Why has MINUSMA been forced to *go green*, and; 2). How it is doing so. Furthermore, it was noted that responding to these research questions would require: 1). an in-depth analysis of the Malian context and what makes it unique for a deployed peacekeeping operation; 2). understanding how MINUSMA has attempted to adapt to the security environment by mirroring best-practices from other operations, which in this specific case required a thorough analysis of the critical influence of operations such as ISAF in Afghanistan and MNF-I in Iraq, and; 3). What these learning processes have actually meant in terms of doctrines and capabilities present in MINUSMA.

Regarding this research, the following results can be identified. In first place, regarding the assumption that UN peacekeeping is undergoing a fundamental period of changes seems undeniable. As highlighted throughout this study, the latest years have seen the development of new kinds of operations that could be defined as *robust stabilization peacekeeping operations*. Missions such as MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, MINUSMA or MINUSCA, are difficultly explainable from the lens of traditional peacekeeping. The new push towards addressing world conflicts as a matter of stabilization is largely incompatible with upholding the *holy trinity* of principles that has guided peacekeeping operations for decades. Operations such as MINUSMA transgress on the principle of:

1. *Consent*, when operations deploy in a conflict-affected territory without the tacit permission or agreement of all parties to conflict, regardless of if they are potentially traditional legitimate actors, such as the MNLA , or terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda;
2. *Impartiality*, when peacekeeping operations deploy with a mandate to *extend state authority*, thus renouncing from the onset to any impartial role in the conflict and consequentially entering in direct opposition to any contender or spoiler that threatens the national state's sovereignty, and;

3. *Minimal use of Force*, when peacekeeping operations are tasked with mandates that authorize the mission to *threaten, coerce, remove, suppress and destroy sources of instability* and possess sufficient capabilities to carry them out.

This study isn't suggesting the UN has completely renounced to its core principles, especially when referring to the principle of *minimal use of force*. Current peacekeeping operations still attempt to remain neutral and as distanced from conflict as possible. However, the before-mentioned peacekeeping operations have shown an identifiable and remarkable trend that evidences they are increasingly capable of carrying out actions on the higher spectrum of violence. In the specific case of MINUSMA, for example, violence has been used sporadically and in situations of dire need to avoid civilian or personnel casualties, which in itself shouldn't signal any major departure from past operations, as those that drew intense public attention in the 90's. However, MINUSMA's departure from traditional peacekeeping's use of force comes through its cooperation and interdependence with other actors present throughout the Malian territory in a phenomenon that John Kalsrud has adequately coined as *chapter VII and a half* situations. In this new paradigm, MINUSMA tries to signal neutrality and lack of intention in undertaking kinetic military action by ceding this role to other actors such as the MDSF, French-led Operations Barkhane and Sabre and G5S. On the paper, this approach to the conflict could show MINUSMA is not undertaking COIN and CT operations as such and, thus, not violating its principle of *minimal use of force*, which, in theory, is true. Nevertheless, despite not undertaking itself the COIN and CT offensive activities, can it be said that MINUSMA is not a party to conflict that still abides by the principle of *minimal use of force*? This study suggests not. Though the delegation of offensive activities to third parties through chapter VIII arrangements seems to assure MINUSMA's respect to the principle of *minimal use of force*, the fact that it provides them with assistance and intelligence (i.e. *targeting packs* for CT and COIN activities) strains its principles. Either through its direct capabilities in conducting activities to carry out its mandate through force or its capacity to enable other actors to conduct them in its place, MINUSMA is the spearhead of a new trend that is setting peacekeeping operations on the path towards more military-oriented roles in conflict-affected regions across the world.

This thesis has attempted to explain not only why MINUSMA has needed to adapt to the Malian context in the way it has, but also how it did so by analyzing its innovative doctrines and capabilities. Answering this second question seemed difficult to achieve without analyzing the vital role ISAF and MNF-I have had on MINUSMA. In this regard, the research conducted seems to confirm such links exist, as doctrinal adaptations have moved MINUSMA to implement similar operational arrangements with regards to its stabilization methods and intelligence-gathering focus. For the former, the learning process has been demonstrated through the similar approach towards extending State authority, through a mix of both military and civilian actions, while for the latter, the similarities have been demonstrated through the fundamental role given to intelligence when conducting COIN and CT activities, while mirroring GWOT best practices in focusing on open-source intelligence gathering methods and the Counterterrorism targeting analysis cycle (F3EAD) used by ISAF and MNF-I. On the hand of the capabilities acquired by MINUSMA, this work establishes a picture of assets which are if not entirely, almost exclusively present within MINUSMA amongst all 14 peacekeeping operations currently deployed by the DPO. The use of these assets in Mali draws a clear line between MINUSMA and ISAF and MNF-I, which this study suggests comes from the drawdown of the GWOT campaigns and the re-positioning of these, mostly Western assets, in UN peacekeeping operations, of which MINUSMA is the biggest beneficiary to date.

To conclude, what does MINUSMA and the latest trends in peacekeeping operations point at? What is the future of UN peacekeeping operations? It is difficult to say, but it seems almost undeniable that MINUSMA won't be the last of its kind, but rather a pioneering operation that is going to influence future operations to come, as the UN moves to engage in theatres it would have traditionally considered too dangerous, volatile or out of scope. The suddenness and gravity of the latest conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen or Mali, to name some, has highlighted that traditional peacekeeping won't suffice to address the current instability and turmoil in today's world order. Echoing what has been stated at the introductory chapter of this study, the UN seems to have understood that, seeing the latest developments, either the UN adapts to the new international security context as it is, or it risks being irrelevant and unprepared for the upcoming threats to international stability that are likely to come in the near future.


## 8. Appendix

### 8.1. Appendix 1: Map of Mali



Source 4: as found in "Sidibe, Sahla. Mali: broedplaats voor extremisme, terrorisme en criminaliteit? Militaire Spectator. 2014. Vol. 183, no. 3, p. 14."

## 8.2. Appendix 2: Ethnic map of Mali



### 8.3. Appendix 3: Troop contributing countries (MINUSMA – ISAF – MNF-I)

TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS			
	MINUSMA (Mali)	ISAF (Afghanistan)	MNF-I (Iraq)
ARMENIA			
AUSTRIA			
BANGLADESH			
BELGIUM *			
BENIN			
BHUTAN			
BOSNIA(BiH)			
BURKINA FASO			
BURUNDI			
CAMBODIA			
CAMEROON			
CHAD			
CHINA			
CZECH REPUBLIC *			
DENMARK *			
EGYPT			
ESTONIA *			
ETHIOPIA			
FINLAND			
FRANCE *			
GAMBIA			
GERMANY *			
GHANA			
GUATEMALA			
GUINEA			
INDONESIA			
ITALY *			
IVORY COAST			
JORDAN			
KENYA			
LATVIA *			
LIBERIA			
LITUANIA *			
MAURITANIA			
MEXICO			
NEPAL			
NETHERLANDS *			
NEW-ZEALAND			
NIGER			
NIGERIA			

NORWAY *			
PAKISTAN			
PORTUGAL *			
ROMANIA *			
SALVADOR			
SENEGAL			
SIERRA LEONE			
SPAIN *			
SRI LANKA			
SWEDEN			
SWITZERLAND			
TOGO			
TUNISIA			
UKRAINE			
UNITED KINGDOM *			
USA *			
NATO member States *			

## 9. Bibliography

- A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure AU - Kilberg, Joshua. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. 1 November 2012. Vol. 35, no. 11, p. 810–830. DOI 10.1080/1057610X.2012.720240.
- Alliance Sahel [online]. 2019. [Accessed 29 April 2019]. Available from: <https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/>
- An Introduction to Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Gathering. Secjuice Infosec [online]. 12 August 2018. [Accessed 19 May 2019]. Available from: <https://www.secjuice.com/introduction-to-open-source-intelligence-osint/>
- Asfura-Heim, Patricio. The Tuareg: A Nation Without Borders? A CNA Strategic Studies Conference Report: [online]. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, 2013. [Accessed 7 April 2019]. Available from: <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA587213>
- Ba, Oumar. Tuareg Nationalism and Cyclical Paterns of Rebellions: How the past and present explain each other [online]. March 2014. Sahel Research Group University of Florida. [Accessed 30 March 2019]. Available from: [https://sites.clas.ufl.edu/sahelresearch/files/Ba\\_Tuareg-Nationalism\\_final.pdf](https://sites.clas.ufl.edu/sahelresearch/files/Ba_Tuareg-Nationalism_final.pdf)
- Back from the brink. how the UN is stabilizing, securing, and strengthening Mali. 2018. United Nations Foundation.
- Beach, Derek. *Process-Tracing Methods in Social Science*. Oxford University Press, (January 2017).
- Bellamy, Alex J. and Williams, Paul D. “Understanding peacekeeping”. Cambridge: Polity Press. Second edition. 2010
- Berdal, Mats and Ucko, David H. The United Nations and the Use of Force: Between Promise and Peril. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 29 July 2014. Vol. 37, no. 5, p. 665–673. DOI 10.1080/01402390.2014.937803.
- Bergamaschi, Isaline. French Military Intervention in Mali: Inevitable, Consensual yet Insufficient. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*. 12 June 2013. Vol. 2, no. 2, p. Art. 20. DOI 10.5334/sta.bb.
- Boeke, Sergei and Schuurman, Bart. Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 19 September 2015. Vol. 38, no. 6, p. 801–825. DOI 10.1080/01402390.2015.1045494.
- Boutellis, Arthur and Zahar, Marie-Joëlle. A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement. International Peace Institute. 2017. P. 52.
- Boutellis, Arthur, and Naureen Chowdhury Fink. “Waging Peace: UN Peace Operations Confronting Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” n.d., 44.

- Boutellis, Arthur. Can the UN Stabilize Mali? Towards a UN Stabilization Doctrine? *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* [online]. 25 June 2015. Vol. 4, no. 1. [Accessed 12 May 2019]. DOI 10.5334/sta.fz. Available from: <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.fz/>
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "An Agenda for Peace." United Nations, 1992.
- Chauzal, Grégory and van Damme, Thibault. The roots of Mali's conflict: moving beyond the 2012 crisis. *Cingendael*. March 2015.
- Cherisay, Erwan de. "Desert Watchers: MINUSMA's Intelligence Capabilities." IHS Markit, 2017. [https://www.janes.com/images/assets/319/71319/Desert\\_watchers\\_MINUSMA\\_s\\_intelligence\\_capabilities.pdf](https://www.janes.com/images/assets/319/71319/Desert_watchers_MINUSMA_s_intelligence_capabilities.pdf).
- Cherisay, Erwan de. "Desert Watchers: MINUSMA's Intelligence Capabilities." IHS Markit, 2017.
- Chinkin, Christine, and Mary Kaldor. "The Liberal Peace: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding." *International Law and New Wars*, April 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316759868.010>.
- Cohen, Matt. UN Peacekeeping with no Peace: Disorientation, Demoralization and Scarcity in Mali. Centre for Security Governance [online]. [Accessed 22 April 2019]. Available from: <https://secgovcentre.org/2017/09/un-peacekeeping-with-no-peace-disorientation-demoralization-and-scarcity-in-mali/>
- Coning, Cedric de. What does 'stabilization' mean in a UN Peacekeeping context? *Complexity 4 Peace Operations* [online]. 19 January 2015. [Accessed 17 March 2019]. Available from: <https://cedricdeconing.net/2015/01/19/what-does-stabilisation-mean-in-a-un-peacekeeping-context/>
- Cordesman, Anthony H. Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build. [online]. 23 September 2009. [Accessed 20 May 2019]. Available from: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/shape-clear-hold-and-build>
- Dahl, Erik J. and Viola, David. Intelligence and Terrorism. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies* [online]. 1 March 2010. [Accessed 18 May 2019]. DOI 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.91. Available from: <https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-91>
- Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations [online]. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), 2015. [Accessed 26 May 2019]. Available from: <https://info.publicintelligence.net/JCOA-Decade-of-War.pdf>
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. [online]. 2017. [Accessed 3

March 2019]. Available from: <https://info.publicintelligence.net/UN-PeacekeepingForces-2017.pdf>

- dos Santos Cruz, Carlos Alberto, R. Phillips, William and Cusimano, Salvator. Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: we need to change the way we are doing business. December 2017.
- Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali. Crisis Group [online]. 13 December 2018. [Accessed 13 April 2019]. Available from: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/267-narcotraffic-violence-et-politique-au-nord-du-mali>
- Durall, Júlia G. “Operations under Chapter VII: Exception or Widespread Practice ?,” 2013, 26.
- European Union Training Mission in Mali. EUTM Mali [online]. 2019. [Accessed 27 April 2019]. Available from: <http://eutmmali.eu/en/>
- F3EAD: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate. Digital Shadows, February 8, 2017. <https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/f3ead-find-fix-finish-exploit-analyze-and-disseminate-the-alternative-intelligence-cycle/>.
- Fatalities. United Nations Peacekeeping [online]. 31 March 2019. [Accessed 27 April 2019]. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities>
- Findlay, Trevor. “The use of force in UN peace operations”. Solna, Sweden : Oxford ; New York : SIPRI ; Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0-19-829282-1. JZ6374 .F56 2002
- Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York : Toronto : New York: Free Press ; Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992.
- Fuller, Graham E. “Moscow and the Gulf War.” Foreign Affairs, June 1, 1991. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/1991-06-01/moscow-and-gulf-war>.
- G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance. France Diplomatie: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs [online]. [Accessed 27 April 2019]. Available from: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/>
- Gorur, Aditi. Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions. Stimson Center. December 2016. P. 32.
- Harris, Barry. “Stabilizing Iraq:” The Washington Institute. Accessed May 16, 2019. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/stabilizing-iraq-intelligence-lessons-for-afghanistan>.
- Heisbourg, François. A Surprising Little War: First Lessons of Mali. Survival. May 2013. Vol. 55, no. 2, p. 7–18. DOI 10.1080/00396338.2013.784458

- Henke, Marina E. Has UN Peacekeeping Become Deadlier? Analyzing Trends in UN Fatalities. *Providing for Peacekeeping*. December 2016. Vol. 14, p. 24.
- <http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e 176>.
- International Peace Institute (IPI). *UN Peace Operations in Violent and Asymmetric threat environments*. March 2016.
- Jacobson, Thomas W. "U.N Peacekeeping: Few successes, many failures, inherent flaws". 2012. International Policy and Public Policy Center.
- James, Cockayne. The Futility of Force? Strategic Lessons for Dealing with Unconventional Armed Groups from the UN's War on Haiti's Gangs. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 2014. Vol. 37, no. 5, p. 736–769.
- Johnson, Loch K., A. Walter Dorn, Stewart Webb, Sarah Kreps, Wolfgang Krieger, Elke Schwarz, Shlomo Shpiro, Patrick F. Walsh, and James J. Wirtz. *Intelligence and National Security* 32, no. 4 (June 7, 2017): 411–40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1303127>.
- Johnston, Nicholas. *Defining Terrorism and Insurgency: Beyond Morality*. *Small Wars Journal* [online]. [Accessed 31 January 2019]. Available from: <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/defining-terrorism-and-insurgency-beyond-morality>
- Kaldor, Mary. "A Decade of Humanitarian Intervention: The Role of Civil Society," 2001, 35.
- Karlsrud, John, and Adam C Smith. "Europe's Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali." *International Peace Institute, Providing for peacekeeping* no 11, 2015, 28.
- Karlsrud, John. "Are UN Peacekeeping Missions Moving Toward 'Chapter Seven and a Half' operations?" IPI Global Observatory. Accessed October 4, 2018. <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/02/peacekeeping-chapter-seven-half/>.
- Karlsrud, John. "Towards UN Counter-Terrorism operations?" *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 6 (June 3, 2017): 1215–31. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1268907>.
- Karlsrud, John. *From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism*. *International Peacekeeping*, January 2019. Vol. 26, no. 1, p. 1–21. DOI 10.1080/13533312.2018.1502040.
- Klinger, Janeen. "Stabilization Operations and Nation-Building - Lessons from United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo (1960-1964)." *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 29:2 (2005): 83–101.
- Kolb, Andreas S. "The Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect in the Age of New Wars." In *the UN Security Council Members' Responsibility to Protect*, by Andreas S. Kolb, 1–47. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2018. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55644-3\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55644-3_1).

- Koops, Joachim A. and Tercovich, Giulia. A European return to United Nations peacekeeping? Opportunities, challenges and ways ahead. *International Peacekeeping*. 19 October 2016. Vol. 23, no. 5, p. 597–609. DOI 10.1080/13533312.2016.1236430.
- Lahneman, William J. as found in “Meer, Sico van der. Factors for the Success or Failure of Stabilization Operations. *Clingendael Security Paper 11*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael, 2009.
- Le Secrétaire général adjoint aux opérations de maintien de la paix Monsieur Hervé Ladsous rencontre la presse. MINUSMA [online]. 19 March 2017. [Accessed 7 October 2018]. Available from: <https://minusma.unmissions.org/le-secr%C3%A9taire-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-adjoint-aux-op%C3%A9rations-de-maintien-de-la-paix-monsieur-herv%C3%A9-ladsous-rencontre>
- Lecocq, Baz and Belalimat, Nadia. The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought - Baz Lecocq and Nadia Belalimat. *African Arguments* [online]. 2012. [Accessed 4 April 2019]. Available from: <https://africanarguments.org/2012/02/28/the-tuareg-between-armed-uprising-and-drought-baz-lecocq-and-nadia-belalimat/>
- Lijn, Jaïr van der, Rob de Rave, Timo Smit, and Rianne Siebenga. “Progress on UN Peacekeeping Reform - Hippo and Beyond.” *Clingendael Institute*, October 2017.
- Marticorena, Briana, Mccurdy, Daphne, Mcdougall, Owen, Pham, Minh-Thu and Kuhn, Patrick. *Adapting and Evolving: The Implications of Transnational Terrorism for UN Field Missions*. Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs. P. 58.
- Merari, Ariel. Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. December 1993. Vol. 5, no. 4, p. 213–251. DOI 10.1080/09546559308427227.
- Military Doctrine. *RAND CORPORATION* [online]. [Accessed 14 May 2019]. Available from: <https://www.rand.org/topics/military-doctrine.html>
- Military Intelligence Lessons Learned. *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, September 2009. Vol. 35, no. 3, p. 60.
- Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. Directive. Department of Defense, November 28, 2005. [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5623~v~Military\\_Support\\_for\\_Stability.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5623~v~Military_Support_for_Stability.pdf).
- Miller, D. Gregory. On Winning Hearts and Minds: Key Conditions for Population-Centric COIN. *Small Wars Journal* [online]. 2016. [Accessed 3 February 2019]. Available from: <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/on-winning-hearts-and-minds-key-conditions-for-population-centric-coin>
- Muggah, Robert. The United Nations Turns to Stabilization. *IPI Global Observatory* [online]. 5 December 2014. [Accessed 25 May 2019]. Available from:

<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/12/united-nations-peacekeeping-peacebuilding-stabilization/>

- National Pact concluded between the Government of Mali and the unified movements and fronts of Azawad giving expression to the special status of Northern Mali [online]. 11 April 1992. The Government of the Republic of Mali and the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad. [Accessed 30 March 2019]. Available from: [https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Mali\\_Peace\\_Accord-proof.pdf](https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/Mali_Peace_Accord-proof.pdf)
- National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (2002). Washington, DC: The White House.
- NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2001.
- Netherlands Institute for International Relations. “Peacekeeping operation in a changing world.” Clingendael Strategic Mirror Project (January 2015). <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Peacekeeping%20operations%20in%20a%20changing%20world.pdf>
- Nyirabikali, Gaudence. Mali Peace Accord: Actors, issues and their representation. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [online]. 27 August 2015. [Accessed 29 April 2019]. Available from: <https://www.sipri.org/node/385>
- Office of Force Transformation. “The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare.” United States of America Department of Defense, January 5, 2005. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a446831.pdf>.
- Organisation du Traité de L’Atlantique Nord. NATO handbook. Brussels: NATO Public Diplomats Division, 2006. ISBN 978-92-845-0178-6.
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: a community policing approach. Vienna: OSCE, 2014. ISBN 978-92-9235-023-9.
- Pedahzur, Ami. The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism [online]. Columbia University Press, 2009. ISBN null. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/peda14042>
- Power, Samantha. On Peacekeeping. HuffPost [online]. 42:42 500. [Accessed 22 April 2019]. Available from: [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/samantha-power/on-peacekeeping\\_b\\_6124822.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/samantha-power/on-peacekeeping_b_6124822.html)
- Razza, Namie Di. Protecting Civilians in the Context of Violent Extremism: The Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Mali. International Peace Institute (IPI). October 2018. P. 52.
- Refugees and Migrants Arrivals to Europe in 2018 (Mediterranean). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2018. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/68529>.

- Resolution 1244 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999. *The International Journal of Human Rights*. September 2000. Vol. 4, no. 3–4, p. 369–375. DOI 10.1080/13642980008406917.
- Richard, Gowan. The end of a peacekeeping era. *Global Peace Operations Review* [online]. 4 April 2018. [Accessed 11 March 2019]. Available from: <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/the-end-of-a-peacekeeping-era/>
- Rietjens, Sebastiaan and Dorn, A. Walter. The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence: The UN's Laboratory in Mali. In: Baudet, Floribert, Braat, Eleni, Van Woensel, Jeoffrey and WEVER, Aad (eds.), *Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali* [online]. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017. p. 197–219. [Accessed 20 May 2019]. ISBN 978-94-6265-182-1. Available from: [http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8\\_9](http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-6265-183-8_9)
- Robinson, Piers. “The CNN Effect Revisited.” *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 22, no. 4 (October 2005): 344–49. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07393180500288519>.
- Santo, Elena Dal. Mali: Is It All About Terrorism? [online]. 17 April 2018. [Accessed 13 April 2019]. Available from: <https://icct.nl/publication/mali-is-it-all-about-terrorism/>
- Sarrica, Fabrizio, Anja Korenblik, and Suzanne Kunnen. “Global Report on Trafficking in Persons.” *Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking*. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), 2009.
- Security Council resolution 1704 (2006) [on establishment of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)]. *Refworld* [online]. 25 August 2006. [Accessed 18 March 2019]. Available from: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/453786b50.html>
- Security Council Resolution 2085 - UNSCR. [online]. [Accessed 6 April 2019]. Available from: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2085>
- Sidibé, Sahla. Mali : broedplaats voor extremisme, terrorisme en criminaliteit? *Militaire Spectator*. 2014. Vol. 183, no. 3, p. 14.
- Sudhir, M R. *Asymmetric War: A Conceptual Understanding*. 2008. P. 9.
- Tardy, Thierry. A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Peace Operations. *International Peacekeeping*. 1 April 2011. Vol. 18, no. 2, p. 152–167. DOI 10.1080/13533312.2011.546089.
- The Crisis in Mali: A Historical Perspective on the Tuareg People. *Global Research* [online]. 1 February 2013. [Accessed 30 March 2019]. Available from: <https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-crisis-in-mali-a-historical-perspective-on-the-tuareg-people/5321407>
- The United Nations global counter-terrorism strategy. [online]. 20 November 2008. [Accessed 12 October 2018]. DOI 10.18356/10302c2a-en. Available from: <https://www.un->

ilibrary.org/peacekeeping-and-security/international-instruments-related-to-the-prevention-and-suppression-of-international-terrorism\_10302c2a-en

- The world's deadliest U.N. mission. Washington Post [online]. [Accessed 28 April 2019]. Available from: [http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-mission/The al-Qaeda threat in Mali presents a new challenge to peacekeepers](http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-mission/The-al-Qaeda-threat-in-Mali-presents-a-new-challenge-to-peacekeepers).
- UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines [online]. 2008. Available from: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/484559592.html>
- UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) [on establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)], 25 April 2013, S/RES/2100 (2013), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/519dffbe4.html> [accessed 19 April 2019]
- UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2423 [Adopted by the Security Council at its 8298th meeting, on 28 June 2018]. 28 June 2018.
- United Nations General Assembly. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects [online]. 2000. United Nations. [Accessed 10 March 2019]. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533319608413629>
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). "Mali Situation." Operational portal Refugee Situations. Accessed April 13, 2019. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/malisituation>.
- United Nations Peacekeeping and Crisis Center. Stats by Mission and Incident type. [Online]. 7 January 2019. [Accessed 29 January 2019]. Available from: [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/statsbymissionincidenttype\\_4\\_20.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/statsbymissionincidenttype_4_20.pdf)
- United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1373 (2001). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001. The International Journal of Human Rights. September 2000. Vol. 4, no. 3–4, p. 345–348. DOI 10.1080/13642980008406913.
- United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice". San Francisco, 1946, 54.
- United Nations. "List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948 - 2017," 2017. [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/unpeacekeeping-operationlist\\_1.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/unpeacekeeping-operationlist_1.pdf).
- United Nations. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects. International Peacekeeping. September 1996. Vol. 3, no. 3, p. 119–136. DOI 10.1080/13533319608413629.

- United Nations. Uniting our strengths for Peace Politics, Partnership and People | Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [online]. 16 June 2015. [Accessed 25 February 2019]. Available from: [https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO\\_Report\\_1\\_June\\_2015.pdf](https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf)
- United States Institute of Peace, ed. Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: United States Inst. of Peace Press, 2009.
- UNSC extends MINUSMA Mandate to include climate security aspects for the first time. Planetary Security Initiative [online]. [Accessed 21 April 2019]. Available from: <https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/news/unsc-extends-minusma-mandate-include-climate-security-aspects-first-time>
- US Counter Terrorism Doctrine. US Joint Chief of Staff, October 24, 2014.
- US Department of State. Overview of Mali History and Independence. ThoughtCo [online]. [Accessed 15 February 2019]. Available from: <https://www.thoughtco.com/brief-history-of-mali-44272>
- Watts, Stephen, Campbell, Jason H., Johnston, Patrick B., Lalwani, Sameer and Bana, Sarah H. countering others' Insurgencies. Rand Corporation, 2014.