Understanding of hybrid warfare in Ukraine: to what extent this understanding is shaped by its internal experience?

Master thesis

Prague 2019
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Academic year: 2018/2019
Abstract

Hybrid warfare has achieved notoriety of being a buzzword attempting to explain the changes in the modern warfare that blur the lines between war and peace, conventional and irregular warfare. Despite its definitional shortcomings, it made its way into the official discourse of the politicians commenting on the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s involvement in it, which did not add clarity. This thesis aims to bring a Ukrainian perspective to the discussion, and it attempts to provide a deep interpretation of sufficiently documented discursive patterns surrounding the actions of Russia in Ukraine since the annexation of Crimea, concentrating on the introduction and the use of the terminology of hybrid warfare in the official security discourse of Ukraine with the external audiences. For the purpose of this analysis I extracted speeches of the Ukrainian officials, with a particular attention attributed to the speeches of Petro Poroshenko, who was the president of Ukraine through the time covered. The methodological framework utilised is poststructuralist discourse analysis.

Keywords

Hybrid warfare in Ukraine, poststructuralist discourse analysis

Range of thesis

50 pages, approximately 106,668 characters (with spaces)
**Declaration of Authorship**

1. I hereby declare that I compiled this thesis independently, using the listed literature and resources only.

2. I hereby declare that all sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. I declare that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague, 31st of July

Tetyana Demyanchuk
I. Topic and Research Goals

The thesis will aim to provide deep interpretation of sufficiently documented discursive patterns surrounding the actions of Russia in Ukraine since the annexation of Crimea, concentrating on the introduction and the use of the terminology of hybrid warfare in the official discourse and wider policy discourse of Ukraine. This work will aim to trace whether the use of the concept of hybrid warfare was introduced into the Ukrainian rhetoric as reactionary to the actions of Russia (annexation of Crimea, and its participation in the conflict in the East of Ukraine) and consequently the use of it is unique to Ukraine, or whether it was adopted from the West and in the manner that is more understandable in the West. Furthermore, the discourse in which contemporary Ukrainian policymakers and media presented the actions within the broader national security discussion and the use of the terminology of hybrid warfare can give insight into official and public perception of Russia as the Other and of the Russian actions. This will help to understand what calling the actions of Russia in Ukraine a hybrid war implies for the understanding of the conflict by the Ukrainian side and for understanding of the foreign policy counter actions. The importance of this work comes from the desire of bringing the Ukrainian perspective to the forefront. The armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine is entering its fifth year, and as of now, there is no certainty of what can bring peace to the conflict torn territories. Understanding the discursive practices that are used by the Ukrainian side, in its appeal both to domestic and international audiences, can shed some light on the current state of affairs.

II. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework I am going to work within is post-structuralism. It adopts both discursive ontology and discursive epistemology (Hansen, 2014, p. 170-171, in Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2014). The discursive ontology holds that language is constitutive of what is brought into being. Language is taken to be not a neutral transmitter, but an active producer and reproducer of meanings. The discursive epistemology is post-positivist and holds that it is
not possible to understand social world through causal ‘cause-effect’ relationships, as the structures are constituted through human action. The link between foreign policy and identity is at the centre of the post-structuralist agenda: foreign policy is based on the identities, but also in the process of the formulation of foreign policy identities are being produced and reproduced through the construction of threats, dangers, and challenges, which means that the relationship between identity and policy is constitutive or performative. Using the David Campbell’s work (1992) on US foreign policy and identity, it is possible to look at how Russia is being constructed as the ‘other’ in shaping Ukraine’s national security identity, particularly how Ukraine presents itself as part of the Western world being at the forefront in the ‘hybrid war’ that Russia waged.

In order to understand to what extent the use of the concept of hybrid warfare by the Ukrainian elites was shaped by the Western definitional perspective on it, the work will also need to deal with the introduction and development of the concept within the Western academic sphere and especially with the recent additions to the debate that concentrate on Russia and hybrid warfare. The term of hybrid warfare was first employed roughly a decade ago by Frank Hoffman in his attempt to address the military conflicts in the post-Cold War environment. He gave form and substance to understanding what hybrid warfare is and presented it to be a converging mode of wars that “blend[s] the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervour of irregular warfare. In such conflicts, future adversaries (states, state-sponsored groups, or self-funded actors) will exploit access to modern military capabilities…as well as promote protracted insurgencies…” (Hoffman, 2009, p. 37). The concept gained in its popularity recently as a tool of describing Russian actions since the annexation of Crimea. The vast new literature on hybrid warfare describes the logic of ‘hybrid warfare’ and explains why former Soviet countries may be vulnerable to ‘hybrid warfare’ measures taken by Russia (Lanoszka, 2016); argues that Russia is waging a world hybrid war against the existing global political system (Horbulin, 2017); looks at how Russia re-invented hybrid warfare and found a ‘new art of war’ that makes up for the drawbacks associated with the conventional capabilities which is of an especial threat to the West (Jones, 2014); concentrates on the way it utilises information warfare is of a particular danger to the Western interests (Thornton, 2015), etc. Analysis of this literature will provide enough material for understanding the Western academic understanding of the topic of Russia and hybrid warfare.
III. Research Questions

As the research design is post-positivist (non-causal) there can be no research hypotheses (i.e. reasoned expected answers to the research questions), which needs to be carefully taken into consideration. The preliminary research questions can be as follows:

- What calling the actions of Russia in Ukraine a ‘hybrid war’ implies for the understanding of the conflict and for understanding of the foreign policy counter actions?
- To what extent the use of the concept of hybrid warfare was introduced into the Ukrainian rhetoric as reactionary to the actions of Russia (annexation of Crimea, and its participation in the conflict in the East of Ukraine) and consequently the use of it is unique to Ukraine, and to what extent it was adopted from the West and in the manner that is more understandable in the West?
- How the discourse and the responses to the actions of Russia (re)shaped and (re)produced each other?
- How is Russia being constructed as the other?

IV. Methodology

In order to effectively detect and investigate the use of the concept of hybrid warfare, I will conduct a discourse analysis using the conceptual framework of interpretation from the work of Lene Hansen (2006) Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. She presents that working on methodology for discourse analysis involves making a number of decisions regarding 1) whether to study foreign policy discourse of one Self or multiple Selves; 2) whether to look at one specific moment or longer historical development; 3) whether to concentrate on a single event or multiplicity of events; 4) which texts should be chosen as foundation and object of analysis, and discourses of which actors should be scrutinised (ibid., p. 65). Making the decisions along these dimensions formulates the basic structure of discourse analytical research design.

For this study, there is a single Self chosen – Ukraine. The study of a single Self involves analyses of the discourses within the Self and looking at how the discourses of this
Self are trying to stabilise the Self’s identity, and how they are being (re)produced by the foreign policy discourse, which will help tracing the transformations and contestations within the Self (ibid.: 69). The choice was dictated by the desire to study the use of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ and how throughout the time the transformation of the conflict had a discursive impact and how then the discursive transformation affected the conflict. The temporal perspective was chosen to be the scrutinisation of foreign policy at a particular historical moment, the timeline of which starts with the annexation of Crimea and continues with the conflict at the East, and will be divided into ‘sub-moments’ or periods. The number of events is chosen to be the Ukrainian debate over the Russian hybrid warfare defined as one event for the purpose of building the research design, even though it will trace the discursive construction of other noticeable events that will be taken to be part of this larger event. Lastly, for this I am going to look at the official discourse of the leaders with official authority to make the policy-making decisions and those who are in the central roles of executing those policies look into the discourse pertaining to a wider foreign policy debate, which involves looking at the political oppositional parties, the media, and corporate institutions (analytical models 1 and 2, Hansen, 2006, p. 53-55).

Therefore, for this research I am going to look into the speeches of the head politicians of Ukraine (for example, President Petro Poroshenko; Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin; Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the International Organizations in Vienna Ihor Prokopchuk), of the parliamentary fractions (by looking at the debates in Verkhovna Rada), of the English writing media outlets (such as Unian. for example) and of other institutions involved in the broader political debate (such as the Ukrainian National Institute for Strategic Studies). There is a language limitation to this research, as I would have to include texts that were originally intended for English speaking public, the materials that have been translated, or the materials significant for translation. In order to trace the greater intertextual links, I will also have to research extensively the rise of the literature on Russia and hybrid warfare. Furthermore, the study will also have to take an account of the background of the development of the events, and include considerations regarding the historical development of the Ukrainian Self in relation to Russia and the West (historical secondary sources including Plokhy, 2015 and Wilson, 2015).
V. Preliminary Thesis Structure

1. Introduction
2. Methodology: Post-structuralist Discourse Analysis
3. Hybrid warfare and Russia
4. Ukrainian Discourse
   4.1. Official government debate
   4.2. A wider foreign policy debate
5. Discussion
   5.1. Discussion and Analysis of Results
   5.2. Limitations
6. Conclusion
7. References/bibliography

VI. Preliminary Bibliography

Materials for theoretical framework and methodology:


Hybrid warfare and Russia:


Materials on identity and history of Ukraine:

Feklyunina, Valentina and White, Stephen (2014) Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: The Other Europes. Palgrave Macmillan.


Other:

UCDP website: http://ucdp.uu.se/

Some potential corpus material:


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Introduction

As the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych gave in to the Russian pressure and backed out of signing EU-Ukraine Association Agreement at the Vilnius summit on the 19th of November 2013, the eyes of the international spectators turned to the popular protest of the pro-European Ukrainians on the Maidan Square in Kyiv. The instability spread to the rest of the country and led to the Yanukovych’s decision to flee the country. The resultant power vacuum was followed by the Russian annexation of Crimea and the unrest in Eastern Ukraine, leading to full-brown hostilities between the pro-Russian separatist forces and Ukrainian army in the regions of Donbas and Luhansk (Donbas). Throughout the five years of the conflict, the interest towards the conflict has been fluctuating, and for a brief time the attention of the international community returned to the conflict with the confrontation in the Azov Sea in November 2018. The aim of this thesis is to provide deep interpretation of sufficiently documented discursive patterns surrounding the actions of Russia in Ukraine since the annexation of Crimea, concentrating on the introduction and the use of the terminology of hybrid warfare in the official security discourse of Ukraine in the communications with the external audiences.

This work traces to what extent the use of the concept of hybrid warfare was introduced into the Ukrainian security discourse as reactionary to the actions of Russia (annexation of Crimea, and the conflict in the East of Ukraine, and other events) and consequently the use of it is unique to Ukraine, and to what extent it was adapted from the West and in the manner that is more understandable in the West. Additionally, the discourse in which contemporary Ukrainian policymakers presented the situation and used of the terminology of hybrid warfare, can give insight into official and public (that was correspondingly shaped by the official) perceptions of Russia and of the West as of the Other(s) important for the construction and production of the identity of Ukraine as of the Self. The importance of this work comes from the desire of bringing the Ukrainian perspective to the forefront.

To study the use of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ and how throughout the time the transformation of the conflict had a discursive impact and how then the discursive transformation affected the conflict, the thesis uses poststructuralist discourse analysis offered by Lene Hansen (2006) in Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. This
means that this thesis is based on the belief that the language that we utilise to talk about the
conflicts is of a crucial importance. As the research design is post-positivist (non-causal) there
can be no research hypotheses (i.e. reasoned expected answers to the research questions), which
needs to be carefully taken into consideration. Hence, the research questions the work aimed
to address were:

• To what extent the use of the concept of hybrid warfare was introduced into the
  Ukrainian security discourse as reactionary to the actions of Russia, consequently
  making the use of it unique to Ukraine, and to what extent it was adopted from the West
  and in the manner that is more understandable to the West?
• What calling the actions of Russia in Ukraine a ‘hybrid war’ implies for the
  understanding of the conflict and for understanding of the resultant policies?
• How does Ukraine construct its Self and its Others?

This Master thesis is structured in the following manner. The first chapter discusses the
theoretical and methodological framework. The thesis utilises poststructuralism, and is based
on the methodological and research design prescriptions offered by Lene Hansen. The second
chapter looks at the evolution of the concept of hybrid warfare to set the scene for the further
work by establishing the academical understanding and the infiltration of it into a broader
official debate. The third chapter proceeds with the empirical part performing the discourse
analysis itself. The last chapter concludes the thesis, addresses the work that was done and
outlines further possible directions for research.
Chapter I: Theoretical and Methodological Framework

The primary task of the first chapter is to introduce the reader to the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this work. The chapter starts with the explanation of what poststructuralism represents in theoretical terms for discourse analysis, by keeping in mind that the information included needs to be instrumental to the further work. To do so, I will look back at the works of the prominent philosophers and scholars, and present their contributions through the prism of the four concepts crucial to understanding of poststructuralism, namely: discourse, genealogy, deconstruction and intertextuality (Hansen, 2014, in Baylis, Owens and Stevens, 2014). After that, Lene Hansen’s methodology of poststructuralist discourse analysis and the research design constructed for this thesis will be presented.

Theory: Poststructuralism for Discourse Analysis

To poststructuralism, language is crucial to understanding of the world around, and it is considered to be social and political. It is social because human beings have to put their thoughts into the language form, in order to make them comprehensible to others, which is achieved through the set of commonly shared codes and conventions pertaining to the certain language. To understand the commonly shared codes and conventions one needs not only to know the language, but also to be socialised into the culture of the locals to understand both verbal and nonverbal language. Furthermore, language is not a simple transmitter of some objective or ‘true meanings’, there is only a linguistic representation that one can refer to (Shapiro, 1981, p. 218), which allows to see politicians, and other powerful players on the international arena, as choosing to use specific language consciously to legitimise their policies to the internal and external audiences. So, language needs to be regarded “as constitutive of political phenomena rather as merely about political phenomena” (Shapiro, 1981, p. 5). Seeing language as political helps to see it as a space of an active production and reproduction of meanings. These qualities of language are captured by Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse that is presented in his works as “ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are […] ways of thinking and producing meaning” (Weedon, 1987, p. 108).
It needs to be noted, however, that this is not to say that events do not happen in the real world, but rather to bring to attention that we attribute meanings to events happening through the discourse. As Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 108) explain it: “An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of "natural phenomena" or "expressions of the wrath of God", depends upon the structuring of a discursive field”. For the analyst this means that discourses are analytical constructions that need to be studied, because once the ‘fact’ or ‘event’ is established as such, and as the one that took place, it then can be mobilised or silenced within a discourse to achieve a certain effect.

Genealogy is another Foucault’s concept featuring prominently within poststructuralism. Foucauldian genealogy investigation is aimed at searching for discontinuities and difference that are silenced through the dominant interpretations of the past, and he has done so on the example of unfolding the Enlightenment idea of a possibility of a unified history from an origin to an end (Calkivik, 2017). Practically, it means that to trace a contemporary concept, one needs to create a comparison with past discourse, and also, to ask which practices formed the present, and which alternative discourses and understandings were marginalised (Foucault, 1984). By looking at the process of how we arrived at the present, it is possible to see the origins, and the alternative ways that could have been adopted, which helps understanding both the discursive and material structures that underpin the present. Within genealogy, Foucault attributed special attention to the conception of power. For him power is productive “in the sense that it does not block, repress, say ‘no’ like the law; it “operates on the field of possibilities”” (Calkivik, 2017; Foucault, 1997, p. 341). In terms of its link to the discourse, the power comes into the picture when one thinks about how discourses constitute particular subject positions as ‘natural’ (Hansen, 2014, p. 173). This goes back to the fact that within this conception, knowledge is an integral element to power, as to speak from a position of expertise is to exercise authority over an issue. Hence, having power and knowledge, allows to create a discourse within which certain things are presented ‘natural’ and unquestioned. For the analysts this means that they need to look for what is constituted as ‘natural’, and question its ‘naturalness’.

Derrida (1970) and his notion of deconstruction furthered the approach with its purpose of understanding the usage of language in the particular instances. Derrida questioned that there can be a universal source of logic and meaning, and aimed at looking at the endless process of
derivation of meaning, which actually represents the major point of distinction between poststructuralists and structuralists. As it was demonstrated above, poststructuralists see the language as ‘a set of codes’ (‘signs’) that enables us to understand the meaning of the words in relation to other words (i.e. what a thing is and what it is not), and this is what structuralists believe in too. However, poststructuralism goes further and sees the codes (‘signs’) as inherently unstable, because they see the connections between the words as never established permanently, and irrespectively of how much discourse strives to fix the meaning of a closed structure “neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 111). For the discourse analysis this means that the analyst should always keep in mind that connotations given to actors’ behaviour, qualities, and events, change within discourse over time, context (and then there can be other variables in play). Further, the Derrida’s deconstruction adds that language is made of dichotomies (e.g., us vs them, civilised vs uncivilised/barbaric, etc.), and these dichotomies are not neutral, as one term is valued above the other. So, deconstruction helps the analysts to problematise the established dichotomies. Overall, deconstruction allows to understand world affairs in an alternative way.

Lastly, the conceptualisation of the texts as being both unique and united is called intertextuality, which is a concept coined by Julia Kristeva (1980). It brings to attention that the texts exist in the intertextual world – the world where all texts are connected to the texts preceding them, and they contribute to the ones succeeding them, and where the meaning of the texts is being continuously renegotiated in this dialogue (Kristeva, 1980, p. 65). She means it in a more intricate and sophisticated way than it appears initially: it is not only that texts reference explicitly (or implicitly) other texts, it allows to see that the texts engage with other texts into debates, and during this process new readings of the existing materials are presented, and when the new meanings are mediated then the texts’ statuses are established. Thus, to understand fully the meaning of any single text, it is needed to grasp how this text is also a product of other readings and interpretations, as the texts exist both within and against other texts. The meaning of the text is never transferred directly to the reader from the text. The effect of intertextuality appears not simply because people do not read the original, but because they read through the discursive constructions put in place, and because of the already existing interpretations of the work in question. This concept is important for poststructuralist discourse analysis, because it points that the political texts need to be analysed within a wider web of materials as they are not entities standing separately from other discourses, it allows to note
what the given text does not mention, either because it is taken for granted or because it is too dangerous to say (Hansen, 2014, p. 175).

To conclude, poststructuralism adopts a critical outlook at the study of the world around - it raises questions about ontology (how do researchers conceptualise what they study) and epistemology (how do researchers know what they know), and it adopts discursive ontology and discursive epistemology (Hansen, 2014, pp. 170-171). The discursive ontology holds that language is constitutive of what is brought into being, and hence language is taken to be not a neutral transmitter, but an active producer and reproducer of meanings. The discursive epistemology is post-positivist and it holds that it is not possible to understand social world through the causal relationships as in the hard sciences, as the structures that are studied are constituted through human action and because of that they cannot be seen as independent variables.

Methodology: Lene Hansen’s Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis

Lene Hansen’s discourse analysis is built on the notions and authors presented above. In the book Security as practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, she aimed to demonstrate that methodology and discourse analysis are compatible by developing a discourse analytical theory of identity and foreign policy, along with a methodology for how to apply it (Hansen, 2006, p. xvi). The conceptualisation of the relationship between identity and foreign policy in this work (and broader within poststructuralism) is the one of the ontological inseparability (constitutive). This means that representations of identity are always employed in the legitimisation of foreign policy, and so foreign policy relies upon the representations of identity, but also in the process of formulation of foreign policy identities are produced and reproduced (Hansen, 2006, p. 3). The poststructuralist understanding of foreign policy as of a discursive practice allows it to argue that foreign policy discourses articulate and intertwine material factors and ideas to the extent that the two cannot be separated from each other.

In this work I am considering the foreign policies that are constructed in terms of security. Following the principles of the poststructuralism that were laid above, there is no extra-discursive realm that is detached from the material realm, so the objective facts assert themselves in the discursive plane, and for the issues to become questions of security, they
need to be successfully constructed within the discursive realm as such. Security is then understood as political discourse. In this way, Hansen (2006, p. 30) explains that underpinning the concept of ‘national security’ is a particular way of identity construction (one which is tied to the sovereign state and articulation of a radical form of identity) (Campbell, 1992). The traditional understanding of security is usually defined in the national terms, because “the meaning of security is tied to historically specific forms of political community”, and this specific community is a sovereign state (Walker, 1990, p. 7). The realist construction of state sovereignty promises that in return for the authority to define security that is taken from the individuals, state promises to ensure ‘state security’ which is the pre-condition of the ‘individual security’ (Campbell, 1992, pp. 63-64).

Sovereignty allows the state to organise authority, space, time, and identity by delineating the domestic realm from the international one, in this way the state promises that on the ‘inside’ of the state, progress, order, democracy, ethics, identity, universal rights prosper, while ‘outside’ anarchy, power, difference, and repetition reign (Hansen, 2006, p. 30). In this way, the national and international become not just two different political realms, but they become constructed as each other’s opposites, as each other’s constitutive Other. This has led to ‘security discourse’ constructing identity in terms of a national ‘Self’ that is protecting itself and resisting to a threatening ‘Other’ (Campbell, 1992). In this view, security becomes an ontological necessity for the state, not because it has to be protected from the external threats, but because its identity depends on the threats and insecurities.

Drawing on the works of David Campbell (1992) and William Connolly (1991), identity is conceptualised by Hansen (2006, pp. 5-6) as discursive, political, relational, and social. Thinking of identity as of discursive and political is to argue that particular representations of identity place foreign policy issues into a particular interpretative optic, for which then an adequate and valid response and a consequential foreign policy can be formulated. To theorise identity as discursive means to think of it as not objectively existing, but depending on the discourses (i.e. to conceptualise it as performative, Butler, 1993), hence the impossibility of thinking of it as of a causal variable. However, identities are only socially real, and to maintain their ‘realness’, they have to be constantly (re)produced, (re)articulated by the discourse and not contested by other discourses (Anderson, 1983). In short, identities are “simultaneously a product of and the justification for foreign policies” (Hansen, 2014, p. 179). The emphasis on the political in this conceptualisation allows to delineate this
understanding of identity from other ones existing, for example, from the one of the anthropological studies, where the conception of identity heavily relies on the cultural context.

Relational conception of identity implies that identity always needs a point of reference to show what it is, and what it is not. There is a constant process of juxtaposition of the qualities, for example, to speak of ‘civilised’ means to constitute someone else as ‘barbaric’, to think of ‘developed’ countries creates a group of ‘underdeveloped’ countries. Poststructuralism’s thinking of identity as social allows to think of it as being established through a set of collectively articulated codes (constituted within and through a collective space), which signifies its intersubjective nature. It is a structure of established meanings and social connections that dictates the appearance of the world.

The presented above conceptualisation of identity as discursive, political, relational, and social, implies that foreign policy always articulates a ‘Self’ and, importantly, a series of ‘Other(s)’. As it was presented above, the ‘Other(s)’ conventionally have been thought of as foreign and negative that are threatening to the cohesion and survival of the national and positive ‘Self’ (Campbell, 1992). Hansen (2006, p. 6) argues that the national ‘Self’ constitutes the ‘Other(s)’ through degrees of difference, ranging from the radically different to the familiar. Therefore, there is a continuum of ‘Otherness’, in which some are constructed to be fundamentally different, while some are constructed as less so.

The Hansen’s analytical perspective on identity brings to the forefront the empirical complexity of identity construction, and specifically allows to analyse both the construction of a national ‘Self’ and a threatening ‘Other’, but also allows for degrees of Otherness. As poststructuralist discourse analysis has a discursive epistemology, the methodology consequently is located on the level of explicit articulation. Hence, the methodology includes considering how identity is constructed through the process of (positive) linking and (negative) differentiating (which refers directly to the ‘Self’ vs the ‘Other(s)’ duality), and then consider its special, temporal, and ethical constructions (which focuses more on the content of identity) (Hansen, 2006, pp. 37-45). Practically, the information below deals with the operationalisation of the concept of discourse.

Methodologically, when thinking of linking and differentiation, the first step is to identify the ‘signs’ (terms) that clearly belong to the ones constructing the “Other(s)” and the
“Self”. Language is a system of various ‘signs’ that acquire their meaning through the process of juxtapositions, where one term is valued compared to its opposite (Derrida, 1978). However, it is insufficient just to find these ‘signs’, it is then important to locate them within a wider system, i.e. to think of the other series of juxtaposed signs. Analytically, therefore, the construction of identity needs to be placed inside a careful investigation of which ‘signs’ are articulated by a particular discourse, and then, of how they are coupled in order to achieve discursive stability and where the instabilities and slips between the constructions occur.

As it was said previously, besides the process of linking and differentiating, Hansen introduced three possible framing types of identity construction, namely spatial, temporal, and ethical, which are methodologically studied by tracing the processes of linking and differentiating. Employing these notions allows to bring out the important political substance of identity construction, which is not explicitly articulated by ‘signs’ and cannot be seen by solely looking at them. The spatial dimension of identity pays attention at the construction of boundaries or delineation of space. The spatial constructions seem to be easily identifiable within the world of nation states (i.e. countries, such as ‘Russia’, ‘Poland’, ‘US’), however, foreign policy discourse employs more complex spatial constructions like regional ones (such as ‘the Balkans’, ‘the West’, ‘Europe’), or even the ones evolving around political subjects (such as ‘civilisation’, ‘the international community’, ‘the people’). Frequently, the identities are constructed as a mixture between the territorially bound and abstract ones.

Then, understanding temporal dimension of identity construction allows to think in terms of time. The temporal themes include the topics of development, transformation, change, repetition. For an analyst it is important to think of whether the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other(s)’ are constituted temporarily at the same point or not, and what is the delineation of the capacity for transformation (for example, if ‘the Balkans’ are ‘barbarian’, it means that temporarily the identity of ‘the Balkans’ is constructed to be at a different point, and that ‘the Balkans’ will be unable to break from the backward identity).

Finally, ethical dimension of identity brings the analyst to thinking about the implicit and explicit constructions of responsibility. In the world politics, it is common to talk about the responsibility of the ‘international community’, but foreign policy articulation also frequently talk about the ‘national interest’ to legitimise the decisions taken, and hence the responsibility towards the national body of politics. So, the discourse analysis needs to be concerned with the
discursive constructions of ethics, morality, and responsibility, then also with the moral force within particular representations, and lastly, with the articulations of (non)responsibility in the ‘Self’ and ‘Other(s)’.

To summarise the methodology laid out above, the analyst is supposed to, first, identify the most frequently articulated signs, then look at the relationship between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other(s)’, account for the articulations of spatial, temporal, and ethical identity to investigate the political substance accompanying them, and then to identify the policy going with these. As policy makers aim at presenting a foreign policy that appears legitimate and enforceable to the relevant audiences, correspondingly, they construct a link between foreign policy and identity that are consistent with each other. So, understanding of identity construction is crucial to understanding of the security discourse that the thesis will be looking at. This thesis is concerned with looking at how Ukraine constructed its identity within the security discourse employing the concept of hybrid warfare in relation to the West and Russia during the ongoing conflict. In here the employment of the hybrid warfare plays its crucial role, and hence the investigation will circle around the discourse in which the actors used hybrid warfare in one way or another.

Research Design

The researches must engage with politically pertinent issues, and a research project has to make a series of choices while working on the research. According to Lene Hansen (2006, pp. 53-55, 67-73), for a sound and a thought through discourse analysis project, the author is supposed to make decisions concerning four fundamental methodological elements, regarding the number of the Selves studied, number of events under scrutiny, temporal perspective and textual models utilised. So, the research design of this thesis is built around the security discourse of Ukraine and in particular employment of the concept of the hybrid warfare. The thesis aims at finding the understanding of why Ukraine employs particular vocabulary at particular point of time and during particular periods of time, and, also, it wishes to add a specific Ukrainian perspective to the debate on hybrid warfare.

Making the hybrid warfare the object of my analysis, I then chose to look at a single Self – Ukraine, as the concentration is on the national context and the security discourse of this country. The ‘event’ chosen is the conflict in Ukraine (starting with the annexation of Crimea,
Russian support of the pro-Russian forces in Crimea and in the East of Ukraine, and Russian military intervention, and taking into account the background of Euromaidan), which is conceptualised as one event for the purpose of building the research design even though it will trace the discursive construction of other noticeable events that will be taken to be part of this larger event. Hence, the temporal perspective selected is years of 2014-2019, which covers the time of the presidential term of Petro Poroshenko (but including the needed information linked to the start of the conflict but before his inauguration in June). So, this thesis is concerned with a study of a particular historical moment, characterised by intense political concern. This moment will be further divided into 2 ‘sub-moments’ that can be called periods, which were characterised by the heightened political, military, diplomatic, and media attention, and had characteristic use of the vocabulary of hybrid warfare. A summary of the research design is given in the form of Figure 1.

To analyse the security discourse of the Ukrainian Self the work uses the textual model which is concerned with the official discourse. This allows to look at the official foreign policy materials that include the discourse of the leaders with official authority to make the policy-making decisions and who are in the central role of executing those policies. For this research the materials that I looked at are united by the use of the concept of hybrid warfare in the communications with the external audiences. I extracted the available complete speeches of the head politicians of Ukraine, with special concentration given to the speeches of Petro
Poroshenko. The reasoning behind this decision is based on the Constitution of Ukraine. Under the Constitution of Ukraine, the president of Ukraine as the Head of State, wide powers in the sphere of the implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine. According to the Article 102 of the Constitution of Ukraine (2019), the status of the president of Ukraine gives grounds to consider him as the embodiment of the state and the state power as a whole, which is determined by the scope of powers and the role and place of the president of Ukraine in the political life of the state. So, as its head, the president of Ukraine is the highest official, and he is empowered to speak on behalf of Ukraine and present it in all matters of international life, which makes his speeches especially important for this thesis.

The corpus is compiled out of the speeches made on the international level (such as addresses to the US Congress, speeches in the UN, Munich Security Forum, and other). The particular attention is given to the international organisations, and to the Western states that constitute those organisations, because Ukraine is seeking to find the recognition of the situation in the way how it sees it at the international level, in order to consolidate support for Ukraine. The power lies with the Western actors, and Ukraine tries to ascertain itself with the West, while the West gives the feedback back, and the process continues in the circular motion. An important notice to make is that when working with the corpus, there is a need to be aware of a certain ambiguity related to the ‘labelling’ as within the discussion the terminology of ‘hybrid war’, ‘hybrid conflicts’, ‘hybrid warfare’, and ‘hybrid threats’, seem to have been components of a common whole and used somewhat interchangeably, which adds an additional layer of complexity to the study and understanding of the subject.

To sum up, this thesis will be based on the analytical framework offered by Lene Hansen. The aim of the research undertaken is to find out why and how throughout the years of the conflict on the territory of Ukraine, the elites discourse employed the concept of hybrid warfare in their communications with the external audiences, and how within those discourses the ‘Self’ was formulated in relation to its ‘Other(s)’ - Russia and the West. This will give a special understanding of why Ukraine employs this particular vocabulary and add a specific Ukrainian perspective to the debate on hybrid warfare.
Chapter II: Evolution of the Concept of Hybrid Warfare

In order to understand to what extent the use of the concept of hybrid warfare was adapted from the West and in the manner that is more understandable to the West, the work needs to deal with the introduction and development of the concept within the Western academic sphere, and then, more importantly, on the way in which the concept entered the Western official political debate in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and events in the East of Ukraine. The question of the Western definitional and adaptational influences, comes from the fact that the concept originates in the Western academic sphere (especially linked to the American military circles), and that its introduction into the debate was coming from the Western scholars, politicians and media. This chapter, firstly, attempts to provide a brief review on the literature that contributed to the conventional definitions of hybrid warfare within the Western military theory, which in no way provides the fullest historical overview but goes through the major milestones in its definitional development. This is important in order to trace the origins of the concept properly. Then, it delves deeper into the infiltration of the concept into the broader usage and into the discourse of the members of the international community (the conflict-relevant Western actors – the EU, NATO and the US) commenting the situation after the start of the Russian operation on the territory of Ukraine. By delving into the academic development of the concept, and then tracing its initial introduction into the common use to the actions of the Russian Federation, this chapter will reflect on the complexity of the evolution of the usage of the concept from the time of the inception of the concept to the days of its common use.

The Emergence and Development of the hybrid warfare concept in the Western Military Theory: From the Earliest Works to the Popularisation by Hoffman

To go back in time, the earliest scholarly works on hybrid warfare are the papers of Robert Walker (1998) and William J. Nemeth (2002). In an unpublished, but widely available, Master thesis, Walker (1998: pp. 4-5) defines hybrid warfare to be the “warfare that lies in the interstices between special and conventional warfare”, and he underlined particularly high degree of flexibility needed to transition operationally and tactically between the special and conventional areas. He used it to describe the Marine expeditionary unit as a ‘hybrid force’ for hybrid wars. William J. Nemeth (2002) in his Master thesis Future War and Chechnya: A Case
for Hybrid Warfare, defines hybrid warfare as “the contemporary form of guerrilla warfare [that is] a continuation of pre-state warfare that has become more effective because it employs both modern technology and modern mobilisation methods” (Nemeth, 2002, p. 29). He devoted the thesis to the emergence of the devolved hybrid societies (based on traditional, pre-state clan and family ties, but accepting some elements of modernity) in Chechnya and their activities. Hence, by referring to hybrid warfare as to guerrilla warfare that is “a continuation of pre-state warfare”, the author hints at the lack of obedience of modern limitations on the warfare (conduct of parties under jus in bello) by the hybrid societies, which brings about, along with other characteristics, a little distinction between combatants and non-combatants (Nemeth, 2002, p. 72).

Nonetheless, it is the Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman who has popularised the term. Hoffman worked on series of articles and books, and his works became the ‘gold standard’ for understanding the concept, they have been a benchmark for others who agreed, disagreed, and attempted to alter or expand the concept in the early stages of its development. In 2005, seeking to predict the future of warfare, James Mattis and Frank Hoffman worked on a development of a concept that was supposed to contrast the popular at that time technology concentrated concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which asked for the defence transformation based purely on technology and it was this technological determinism that they opposed. Mattis and Hoffman emphasised that there is always a need to remember that conflicts involve human beings, and human beings have capacity to think creatively, hence no one should ever undermine the predominance of the human dimension in the conduct of war. They developed their vision of the future of warfare, which they captured with the concept of hybrid warfare, which at that point they presented as an extension of the ‘three block wars’ of Charles Krulak (1999). Krulak meant to capture the developments on the modern battlefield that were to force Marines into conducting full scale military action, peacekeeping operation, and humanitarian aid provision in a span of a few hours within the space of three contiguous city blocks. Mattis and Hoffman (2005) added the fourth block to the conceptualisation – the psychological and information operations that would put the US in the situation of getting involved into the war of ideas present in every single of the aforementioned blocks. So, the conventional superiority of the US forces was to be questioned by an ‘unprecedented synthesis’ of irregular, regular and other capabilities.
In 2007, within the then ongoing ‘Changing Character of Conflict’ research program, Hoffman authored *Conflict in the 21st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars*, in which he presented an examination of a number of selected models and paradigms regarding the future of warfare (‘fourth generation warfare’, ‘compound warfare’, ‘unrestricted warfare’), for the purpose of demonstrating the underlying rationale for developing and refining his new construct. As the result of the work, he came to one of the most commonly referenced definitions of ‘hybrid war’ as of “[t]he blend of the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervour of irregular warfare” (Hoffman, 2007, p. 28). Also, this work gifted the followers and opponents of the concept, with the comprehensive account of what hybrid warfare encompasses (Hoffman, 2007, pp. 7-8), which he in the latter work of 2009 captured by a more succinct definition capturing the major elements, which says that hybrid warfare is a simultaneous and adaptive employment of “a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal activities in the battle space to obtain their political objectives”.

The initial popularity of the term, partially, came from the perceived applicability to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the authors argued that the earlier terms of insurgency and unconventional warfare failed to capture the complexity of the conflicts, and hybrid warfare was doing a better job (Kilcullen, 2009). Then came the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, in which a vastly conventionally superior Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and a weaker Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, in which Hezbollah’s forces achieved remarkable successes using guerrilla tactics, asymmetrical armaments, and a battle for world public opinion (Mecklin, 2017, p. 298). Hoffman himself went as far as to call Hezbollah the prototype of the ‘hybrid challengers’, and argued that the case demonstrates “the ability of non-state actors to study and deconstruct the vulnerabilities of Western style militaries” (Hoffman, 2007, pp. 35-36), and regardless of not achieving a conventional military victory, Hezbollah also became ideologically stronger, and secured its limited goals – frustrated the IDF and survived (Peters, 2006). Hence, it made the proponents of the concept optimistic with regards to the usefulness of the concept and they pushed for its popularisation.

However, there seemed to be lack of a consensual understanding of hybrid warfare both by its proponents and critics within the academic sphere. John McCuen (2008), for example, approached the conceptualisation in a different manner that was characterised by a concentration on the psychological dimension. He defined hybrid war as “a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military
operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously—and more decisively—attempt to achieve control of the combat zone’s indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing them” (McCuen, 2008, p. 108). The last part of that definition played the most important role to him, as “the decisive battles in today’s hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population, and the international community population” (McCuen, 2008, p. 107). In his analysis McCuen concentrated on the conflicts in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Later, in 2012, Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor in their book Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the present looked at the historical occurrences of hybrid warfare. They defined hybrid conflict broadly, as a “conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and nonstate actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose”. So, they concentrated on the combat actions of military and irregular forces, while paying much less attention to the social and informational aspects. Even though in line with Hoffman’s thinking, as this conceptualisation is broader, it does not aim to characterise hybrid warfare by complexity, and hence comes closer to the older conception of asymmetric warfare rather than hybrid warfare (Schroefl and Kaufman, 2014, p. 867). Furthermore, they seem not to differentiate between hybrid warfare and compound warfare, which was brought out by Hoffman in his review to the book, in which he said that: “As there is no universally accepted definition of hybrid threats or warfare, the editors are free to establish their own framework. However, crafting too broad a definition allows everything to be included and diminishes utility of the concept” (Hoffman, 2012). Their work seemed to him to introduce some “terminological clouds of confusion”, however, quite ironically, they never went away as the debate became even more fragmented with the introduction of the case of Russian actions.

Reinvention of Hybrid warfare in the Western Political Debate: Naming the Conflict in Ukraine

Previous discussion was mostly limited to the military specialists from the US, whose works were in a dialogue with one another. As discussion took place in the American military circles, it was naturally concerned with the American agenda, and considerations such as what
are the future threats to the US, where does the future of the warfare lie, what are the lessons that can be learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, and how the US military should be redesigned to be effective in the future. The actions of Russia led to a boom in the number of contributions and the debate has branched out much more than previously. Especially in the beginning, the works increasingly concentrated on trying to put onto paper the actions of Russia, with a much less regard for the previous debate on hybrid warfare presented above, which usually limited itself to the use of one of the Hoffman’s definitions, personal elaborations on understanding of it, and then concentrated on analysing the empirical information (Bahenský, 2016, p. 63). Through the time, the academics also differed on the perspective from which they approached the question, some of the debates included, but were not limited to, looking at when hybrid warfare started and when (or whether) it has finished and transformed into a more traditional warfare (Rácz, 2015), others inquired into the origins of the hybrid warfare launched by Russia and how it can be traced to the Soviet times (Kuzio and D’Anieri, 2018), and others. However, this section moves away from the academic materials and concerns itself with the initial infiltration of the concept into the broader official political usage. The actors selected are the conflict-relevant Western actors – the EU, NATO and the US. So, this section traces the initial discourse reaction surrounding the events, i.e. it is based off the textual body of evidence expressing opinion and commenting on the situation.

For some time after the start of the events, there was an overall confusion regarding to which expressions would capture the best what was happening, and the concept of hybrid warfare was not used immediately after the start of the Russian operation in Crimea. Irrespectively of the fact that military theory contains a few concepts that can be used for elusive and indirect warfare, initially there was a desire of creating a new terminology. As Rácz (2015, p. 40) traced in the comprehensive report on Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist, when Russia started its operation in Crimea in late February 2014, Ripley and Jones (2014), for example, spoke about a ‘novel approach’ to warfare; and then in the same manner in April 2014, Latvian scholar Jānis Bērziņš (2014) claimed that the actions are the real-life example of ‘a new generation of warfare’ coming from the so-called Gerasimov’s doctrine, based on the speech of the Russian Federation’s Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov in 2013, who noted succinctly in it that in the current environment “the very ‘rules of war’ have changed” and there is a blurring between war and peace when describing the lessons that can be learnt from colour revolutions (as they are perceived as the result of the foreign meddling).
According to Rácz (2015, p. 41), the use of the concept of hybrid warfare in this context seemed to have gained actual traction since the summer of 2014. Even though previously it was mentioned by some, such as for example by Dutch General Frank van Kappen in an interview in April 2014 (Kornienko, 2014), the breakthrough in the discourse came when NATO adopted the expression to the situation. For example, former Secretary General Anders F. Rasmussen in a speech at Chatham House in London on the 19 June 2014, while addressing the topic of the Future of NATO in the changing international context (i.e. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the East and states and extreme groups in the South), used the concept of hybrid warfare and defined it as the “combination of covert military operations combined with sophisticated information and disinformation operations”, and on the 3rd of July, NATO posted on its official website a video in which it publicly declares the Russian forces in Ukraine used “rather unorthodox and varied techniques that have been dubbed hybrid warfare” (NATO, 2014a).

More generally, NATO always preferred to talk in terms of hybrid threats rather than hybrid warfare, as it was looking at the threats to the alliance coming from the different flanks. It should be highlighted separately also that the hybrid threats have been discussed in NATO as early as in 2010 in Bi-SC Input for a New Capstone Concept for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats, in which hybrid threats were defined as “those posed by adversaries with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives” (NATO 2010, p. 2), which affected the content of the NATO Strategic Concept in 2010 (even though the term was not explicitly in it). So, NATO is one of the actors that already had the concept at its disposal previously and used it to describe actions of Russia out of the available ones. Currently, on the page addressing the topic of the NATO’s response to hybrid threats, hybrid threats are said to “combine military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces. Hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between war and peace, and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of targets” (NATO, 2018). This demonstrates once again the definitional shift attributed to the new developments, as well as the fact that even organisation such as NATO, which is expected to hold clear definitions, seems to be in the “terminological confusion”.
The media would quote the words of the NATO officials describing what was going on, such as a quotation of Rasmussen in New York Times after his meeting with the President of the US Barack Obama on the 8th of July (2014), in which he warned that Russia was playing a “double game” in Ukraine and waging “what he called “hybrid warfare”” (Lander and Gordon, 2014). However, gradually, media sources started to use it in a more common use way, such as for example, the 27th of August 2014 article in Washington post which still contained a link to the NATO’s website, nonetheless, explained hybrid warfare in relation to the situation itself (Editorial Board of Washington Post, 2014). A comprehensive and well-elaborate use of the term came with the NATO’s Summit held in Wales between 4th and 5th of September 2014. Even though, the declaration following the Summit used all kinds of possible formulations such as “hybrid threats”, “hybrid warfare”, and “hybrid warfare threats”, the vocabulary made its way into the works and minds of the people who were there and beyond. In this document, hybrid warfare threats were described as “a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures […] employed in a highly integrated manner” (NATO, 2014b), which regardless of the vagueness still found its adaptation in the official political document agreed on by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Summit.

An example of how after the Wales Summit organisations adopted the use of the concept to the situation is Resolution 2014/2841 adopted by the European Parliament (2014), on the 18th of September. The resolution concerned the situation in Ukraine and the state of play of EU-Russian relations, and it directly condemned Russia for “waging undeclared ‘hybrid war’ against Ukraine with use of regular Russian forces and supporting illegally armed groups”. In contrast to NATO for the EU it was a new terminology adopted for the situation and directly saying that it has regard for the Wales NATO Summit Declaration. Only in 2016 it published its first Union’s Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats: A European Response, formally acknowledging the existence of hybrid threats to the EU, in which it defined hybrid threats as “the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological) which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare” (European Commission, 2016, p. 2).
To show the definitional development of the concept of hybrid warfare throughout its years in political discourse, this work presents the definition of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (an intergovernmental think tank based in Helsinki) that was opened on the 11\textsuperscript{th} of April 2017 which is the result of the EU and NATO initiative on improving their capabilities to fight hybrid threats. On the official website the Centre (2019) characterises hybrid threat as: (1) coordinated and synchronised actions targeting vulnerabilities of the democratic states and their institutions through a wide range of means; (2) the activities exploit the threshold of detection and attribution (plausible deniability) as well as different interfaces (war/peace, internal/external, local/state, national/international, friend/enemy); (3) the aim is to influence forms of decision making at the local/regional/state/institutional level to favour and/or gain the agent’s strategic goals while undermining and/or hurting the target.

Discussion

Through this chapter, the work attempted to familiarise the reader with the road that ‘hybrid warfare’ undertook, from being a contested concept within the literature of concerning military theory that attempts to capture the developments and complexity of warfare in modern days, to growing into a popularly used term that attempted to put the empirical evidence of the Russian actions into words and give them an all-encompassing label. Along this way, the chapter also demonstrated the definitional and usage inconsistencies linked to the employment of this concept. This is particularly interesting, as it highlights how the destiny of the concept was not pre-determined to become the one that captures the complex developments of the modern warfare the best, but rather has been the best label fitting the purposes of the actors.

The inquiry into the works of the people standing at the inception of the term shows already that the two scholars used the same label to describe two different developments. In the definition of Walker (1998), hybrid warfare possesses elements of both special (practically irregular) and conventional realms, but it presents hybrid warfare, as being at an intersection between the two realms rather than being an unprecedented combination of the two used simultaneously. Nemeth (2002) presented hybrid warfare as a sort of a guerrilla warfare updated to the modern context (in his case use of technology) minus acceptance of international
norms on the conduct of war. For him the name for the warfare he was describing came from the emergence and actions of the hybrid societies that he was investigating.

While there have been earlier works, it was the work and effort of Hoffman that initiated the intellectual debate on contemporary hybrid threats, advocating that hybrid war is the emerging new type of conflict that will be characteristic for the 21st century. Throughout the years of his work he came to the understanding of hybrid warfare which included the critical components of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal actions that are used simultaneously. The spectrum of actors includes the non-state ones, who use both simple and sophisticated technology in innovative ways, while the planning and execution of the operations tend to be decentralised. The most important characteristic to him of hybrid warfare became the way in which forces fuse together, and then how this hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics is employed in the same battlespace. All of these are then used to the achievement of the set political objective.

Irrespective of the initial popularity that grew from the possibility of applying the term to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (along with other ones) and the possibility of deducting the lessons to be learnt from those, already at that level it seemed that there lack of a common ground. McCuen (2008) who used hybrid warfare in his work, as it was noted, in his conceptualisation concentrated most on the psychological dimension and also on the battles of narratives, in which he came closer to the conceptualisation of Nemeth, who also emphasised the crucial role of modern technology and mobilisation methods. His work demonstrated that even on this level of development it can be clearly seen that the theorists meant to capture different developments of warfare, which were going under the same label of ‘hybrid’, as the combination of using different means and forces seemed to go most naturally under this label. And this point was only reiterated by the inclusion of the example of the book of Murray and Mansoor (2012), who even though worked in the same line of thinking as Hoffman, seemed to have made the conceptualisation so broad that it both brought it closer to the concepts existing before, hence defeating the very purpose of having the need for it.

Then moving away from the complexity that was the characteristic of the earlier academic debate and looking at the infiltration of the term into the wider use and the application of it to the diverse set of Russian actions unravelling in front of the startled members of the international community, aimed at tracing how it became introduced and how its meaning...
changed in the process. The term that was previously largely unknown outside of the people working on the military theory unexpectedly made its way onto the pages of media sources, papers of think-tanks, and speeches of the officials. As it was possible to reconstruct, it seems that the popularisation can be attributed to the decision of NATO (on the level of institution and of representatives) to apply it to describe the situation. NATO as a military alliance already knew about the term. After the autumn summit in Wales everyone started using it. Other institutions followed suit, as it was shown by the example of the EU. However, as it was highlighted the definitional understanding of what hybrid warfare meant changed with the actions of Russia, and the usage of it by a wide variety of actors did not lead to more clarity. The definition of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats was presented as the one that encompassed the major elements that are usually present in the Western political discourse’s understanding of hybrid warfare.
Chapter III: Empirical Part

This chapter of the thesis is devoted to the empirical research of the use of the concept of hybrid warfare in the security discourse of Ukraine, in order to trace to what extent the use of the concept was introduced into the Ukrainian discourse as reactionary to the actions of Russia and, consequently, the use of it is unique to Ukraine, and to what extent it was adopted from the West and in the manner that is more understandable in the West. In order to do this, this chapter looks at how hybrid warfare was used in the security discourse, and at how identity was constructed within that discourse. As it was explained in the methodological part, due to the nature of the relationship between policy and identity, a deeper analysis of the identity construction is needed because in order to understand the policy, one needs to look at the identity construction that legitimised and made this policy enforceable to the relevant audiences. In this way, it is not a descriptive investigation of the inclusion of hybrid warfare in the discourse, but an interpretive study allowing to see whether the adaptation was reactionary or imported. This chapter, firstly, addresses the background, timeline, and international response information, giving a clear delineation of the major events. As it was said in the methodological part, foreign policy articulates and intertwines the material factors and ideas to the extent that the two cannot be separated from each other, so that the objective facts assert themselves in the discursive plane, however, for a clearer reading of the findings, I found it useful to supplement the interpretations with the clear presentation of the events unravelling on the ground. Additionally, it allows to see the exact experience of Ukraine the thesis touches upon. Then, it presents the discourse analysis of the materials (which includes the identity construction of Ukraine, and hence the corresponding policy, and explicit examples and developments of the use of hybrid warfare). Even though methodologically there is a division into periods 1 and 2, when presenting the findings there is no concrete delineation of when each period started and when it ended as there are no concrete boundaries between the two. Lastly, this chapter provides the comparison of the two periods to bring out the major discursive developments between the two periods.

Crisis in Ukraine: Background, Timeline, International Responses

The events leading to the annexation of Crimea and conflict in the Donbass started in November 2013, when the president of Ukraine at that time Viktor Yanukovych backed out of
signing the Association Agreement with the EU. These decisions forced hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians (with estimates as high as 200,000) to get out on the streets of Kyiv to protest his abrupt change of heart. The protests started on the 21\textsuperscript{st} of November, and they were held on the ‘Maidan Nezalezhnosti’ square (Independence square). They were widely known as Maidan (after the square) or Euromaidan (highlighting the aspirations of the protesters), and then the name transformed into the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ (signifying the effort and sacrifice of the people standing there). During the course of the protests, there were a number of clashes between protesters and the police. The first turning point was the 30\textsuperscript{th} of November, when the riot police (Berkut), was given the order to dismantle the camp of the protesters, and within the course of that they used disproportionate force. Their actions acted as a major mobilisation incentive, and arguably, this gave the major momentum to the protests. People went out for their aspiration of joining the ‘European family’ where the human rights of people are upheld. The protests were especially supported by the Western and Central regions, and to a considerably lesser degree in the Eastern and Southern regions.

The violence peaked between 18th and 20\textsuperscript{th} of February, resulting in the death of over hundred of people (later called the “Heavenly Hundred”) (Sakwa, 2015, p. 277). The rapidly unfolding instability spread to the rest of the country and led to the Yanukovych’s decision to flee the country on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of February. The resultant power vacuum was followed by the Russian decision to send masked soldiers in unmarked green army uniform (“little green men”) (Wilson, 2014, pp. 110-111). On the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of February 2014, armed men occupied the parliament of Crimea, and held an emergency session to dismantle the government. Then on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of March they held a vote to become a part of Russia, and on the 16\textsuperscript{th} March they held a referendum to get ‘popular’ support for this cause. At this time, Russia used the “little green men” and Crimean-based Russian naval infantry (of the Black-Sea fleet) to surround and eventually take over the Ukrainian military bases and ships in Crimea, and to support the conduct of the aforementioned referendum. The claimed result of the vote is the majority of 96,7% voting in favour of the union with Russia, with an alleged turnout of 83,1% (Wilson, 2014, p. 113). Russia quickly recognised the referendum and hence conducted an open annexation, which procedurally was carried out by Putin signing the treaty on the 18\textsuperscript{th} of March and ratifying it in the upper house of the Russian parliament on the 21\textsuperscript{st} of March.

Further unrest followed in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, and the very same “little green men” were present there too providing their support for the protestors (Wilson, 2014, p.
The protestors against the new interim pro-European government led by Oleksandr Turchynov and Arseniy Yatsenyuk occupied the government buildings in the regional centres of Donetsk, Kharkiv, Lugansk and Odesa. These protestors were pro-Russian, and they called for local referendums happen in a similar style as they were held in Crimea, so that they can declare independence from Ukraine. However, the most success was achieved in Lugansk and Donetsk. As the result of the events in these two regions, on the 15th of April the government in Kyiv started the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation). On the 11th of May, the separatists declared independence from Ukraine after holding internationally unrecognised referendums. They created two separatist entities: the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR).

At the same time, Russia kept on exerting direct pressure on the new government in Kyiv to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow, making it clear that it can “wreck Ukraine as a functioning state before he would allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s doorstep” (Mearsheimer, 2014). Towards that end it supported the destabilisation and separatist aspirations through the available means, such provision of leadership, finance, ammunition, heavy weapons, supplies, and in some cases, regular units of the Russian army to support armed separatism against the government (Velivchenko, 2018, p. 105). Also, it launched a propaganda campaign in Crimea and the East of Ukraine during the initial decisive phase. An example of such, is the way Russia’s media presented Ukraine as the “victim of a fascist coup, taken over by a Western puppet regime” (Strategic Comments, 2014). One of the aims of this campaign was to demonstrate that the people resisting the new government are the locals and they are just supported by the friendly volunteers (‘polite people’) from the outside. Ukraine (and especially Crimea) were pictured as “an integral part of the Russian world” (Strategic Comments, 2014). Given that the protests in Kyiv were met with a lesser support in the East and the South since the beginning, it proved to be a fertile ground for the efforts.

After Petro Poroshenko won the election at the end of May 2014, the military campaign gained traction with the aim of retaking the secessionist Donetsk and Luhansk (Freedman, 2014, p. 15). In the initial stages, the armed forces of the Ukrainian side were in a bad condition because of the years of neglect and underfunding (Katchanovski 2016). It also heavily relied on the conscripts, who lacked experience and morals for the operations. So, out of necessity, the campaign consisted of the regular army units, supplemented by volunteer militia and supported by wealthy benefactors. The volunteer militia proved to be the crucial forces that
helped the Ukrainian army in defending the larger cities of Dnipro and Mariupol in the beginning. Irrespective of the problems with coordinating the campaign consisting of such a variety of actors, the Ukraine’s forces were better organised and in possession of superior firepower in comparison to the pro-Russian (and Russian backed) forces, so by the beginning of July the Ukrainian side managed to retake the majority of the previous gains of the separatists (Freedman, 2014, p. 16). But at this point came another turning point - on the 17th of July the Malaysia Airlines Flight (MH17) was shot over the conflict zone (above Hraboove) with a Russian Buk anti-aircraft missile, killing 298 persons on board. This increased the pressure on the international community to react to the Russian involvement, and led to the stepping up of sanctions by the EU, the US, and NATO.

By the beginning of September, the Ukrainian forces were pushed back by a new offensive, as the weakening forces of separatists were joined by the Russian forces (multiple crossings of the border by the Russian military vehicles, proved by the aerial pictures). The battle for the city of Ilovaisk that lasted from the 6th to the 3rd of September was brutal and was described by one of the surviving soldiers as “a real meat grinder” (Grytsenko, 2014). This painful defeat of Ukrainian forces lead to the peace negotiations and signature on the 5th of September of a peace plan for eastern Ukraine – the Minsk Protocol. Ever since the peace process has been largely done within the framework of Minsk. The ceasefire stipulated by the Protocol was violated a few hours after it was signed, so a follow-up agreement was negotiated and signed on the 19th of September 2014. On the 2nd of November, the territories controlled by the separatists helped election, which were not recognised neither by Ukraine, nor by the West. In response, the EU also put the sanctions on the separatists on the 29th of November (Bentzen, 2016, p. 8).

These elections did not bring any stabilisation, and in January 2015 the rebels with the help of the Russian troops launched offensive. On the 12th of February 2015 leaders from France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia agreed to a new ceasefire, the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the 'Minsk II' agreement), which entered into force on the 15th of February. The observation of the Minsk Agreements, which includes monitoring and verifying the ceasefire, the withdrawals of the heavy weapons, and monitoring the border between Ukraine and Russia, and the withdrawal of the foreign armed formations, militants, mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine, is being conducted by the Special monitoring mission (SMM) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The full bilateral ceasefire was breached almost immediately after Minsk II, as the forces of the pro-Russian rebels celebrated victory of capturing the strategic transport hub of Debaltseve on the 18th of February, following heavy fighting similar to the situation in Ilovaisk.

The worst conflict related losses have taken place in 2014 and 2015, with the UN reporting 9,100 deaths and 20,700 injured by November 2015 (OHCHR, 2015). Now UN talks about estimates of 10,500 being dead and almost 24,000 wounded, with about 30 percent of them being civilians (OHCHR, 2018). This underlines that Minsk II managed to reduce the number of casualties and hotspots, however, there have been recurrent waves of increased violence and its conditions are not being fulfilled. The recurring intensifications call for extensions of ceasefires, and ‘ceasefires within ceasefires’ (Bentzen, 2016).

The Western states kept their involvement into peace negotiations through the Normandy format that arose out of a June 2014 meeting between the heads of state and government of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany that consist of the high level talks (foreign ministers, state secretaries, advisors), and it is the Normandy format that provided political framework for the negotiations in Minsk (Fisher, 2019). After the problems with the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, the Normandy format has been pronounced largely defunct. Other formats included the informal Russian-American track that emerged in May 2015, bringing together US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin (later succeeded by presidential advisor Vladislav Surkov, and the US diplomat Kurt Volker from the Trump administration respectively) (Fischer, 2019).

Slowly the attention of the states turned to the humanitarian situation, and the involvement was mostly through the international and intergovernmental organisations, most notably, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (OSCE is also the one directly involved with the unarmed, civilian mission going under the name of the Special Monitoring Mission since March 2014). On the background, the relations between all of the parties started becoming more complex, as Russia has been accused of launching cyber-attacks against the Western countries, to name a few Estonia, France, Germany, and against Ukraine (such as Not Petya), meddling in the Brexit and the US presidential elections, supporting financially radical left and right wing countries,
and of other actions. Another layer of complexity was brought by the discussions in a number of Western countries to lift the sanctions put to the date, to the concern of Ukraine, and giving other concessions to Russia, such as negotiating to build the Nord Stream 2. At the same time, the situation on along the contact line remained highly volatile, making it impossible to talk about a stable status quo at any point of time (making Ukraine highly vulnerable to any concessions made to Russia), which was demonstrated in 2018 by the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine in the Sea of Azov.

The confrontation in the Sea of Azov was the first open confrontation between Russia and Ukraine since the annexation of Crimea. The tension in the area had been increasing since Russia opened the Crimean Bridge (the Kerch Strait Bridge) in May of 2018. The confrontation began on the 25th of November when the Russian soldiers shot Ukrainian vessels in the Sea of Azov near the Kerch Strait and captured 23 sailors aboard. The justification Russia used was that the Ukrainian vessels have got into its waters, as since the annexation in 2014 it considers the waterways around Crimea its own. Prior to these events, Ukraine crossed the passage similarly, which respects the UN convention on the Law of the Sea that was further reinforced between Russia and Ukraine in 2003 that deemed the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov shared territorial waters, however, since Russia seized peninsula in 2014, there was no demarcation of maritime borders (Bennets, 2018). The NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg characterised the imminent threat of escalation very serious, “because you saw actually that Russia used military force in an open way [...] This is escalating the situation in the region and confirms a pattern of behaviour which we have seen over several years” (Baczynska and de Carbonnel, 2018). Ukraine put its armed forces on full combat alert straight after the incident, and on the 29th of November 2018, Poroshenko requested the imposition of martial law for 30 days. The reconnaissance data suggested that there was a significant build-up of the forces several dozens of kilometres from the border, which signalled to the Ukrainian government the danger of the immediate invasion into Ukraine. The map of Ukraine (Figure 2) is given below to give the spatial and geographical sense to the events.
Discourse Analysis: Period 1

As it was said above, the turning point for the international community to accept the involvement of Russia into the conflict has been the downing of MH17, and this is the starting point for this discourse analysis too, as in relation to this event the first usage of “hybrid war” can be traced. On the 18th of July, the president made a speech to address the tragedy, in which he highlighted that as Russia intervenes in Ukraine more intensively, through a number of means, such as putting the territory under fire from across the border, supplying military personnel and state of the art weapons, and shooting down “our planes”, and no one should stand silently aside. All of these diverse means listed were presented as a part of hybrid war, and this “hybrid war is showing all signs of an external aggression” (President of Ukraine, 2014a). The act of downing the plane in itself was called an act of terrorism, and as an act of terrorism it was underlined that it “is not a local, but a global issue”. There was the first move of showing that Ukraine is facing the same problems as the Western countries, and just like them, it is fighting terrorism. The Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was pronounced to be “a threat to the European and global security”, and hence addressing it asked for “a unified global response” (President of Ukraine, 2014a). A year later, on the anniversary, the president pinpointed that the 17th of July 2014 was the beginning of hybrid war, by saying that “[c]exacty
a year ago a camouflage of the ugly hybrid war launched against Ukraine was taken off” (President of Ukraine, 2015c).

Further step in this analysis, is elaborating on the huge weight attributed to the “common values” and the allegiance to the “Free World”. The core of the existence for Ukraine in this historical period is said to be freedom. This, along with the allegiance to other values, is presented as a conscious decision of the people of Ukraine, who fought for their choice in the “Revolution of Dignity” when protesting against the violation of their “fundamental rights”. With the start of the Russian aggression, the people of Ukraine have continued fighting for the values, so they are said to be the defenders of the freedom who were “willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of a better future” (President of Ukraine, 2014b). In this construction, the people of Ukraine are the heroes who fight for the freedom of Ukraine, but beyond this they are also the “brave men and women who are today on the forefront of the global fight for democracy” (President of Ukraine, 2014b). There is a heavy symbolism attached. They are not only the heroes of the modern Ukrainian history, as the significance of their heroism is presented to go beyond Ukraine, they are the heroes belonging to the “Free World” (the world of the democratic countries where the rule of law and the protection of human rights reign), and they are defending it:

“The war that these young men are fighting today is not only Ukraine’s war. It is Europe’s, and it is America’s war, too. It is a war of the free world – and for a free world! Today, aggression against Ukraine is a threat to global security everywhere. Hybrid proxy wars, terrorism, national radical and extremist movements, the erosion of international agreements, the blurring, and even erasing, of national identities: all of these threats now challenge Europe. If they are not stopped now, they will cross European borders and spread throughout the globe. To prevent this, thousands of Ukrainian soldiers are in the line of fire right now” (President of Ukraine, 2014b).

In the excerpt above, the “hybrid proxy wars” are among the things that are threatening the “Free World”, making the aggression against Ukraine actually “a threat to global security everywhere”, and making it Europe’s and America’s war too. Unless Ukraine fights back effectively, the threats may cross the European borders and spread throughout the globe, so Ukrainians are on the line of fire preventing it now. It is also worth noting that further hybrid
wars were presented as a phenomenon that encompasses a number of other threats/elements, rather than being one of the threats itself, as it was in the excerpt above. A special attention gradually started being attributed to the information and propaganda campaigns that were said to be “a particular destructive form of non-military aggression”, and encompassed “[f]ake news, blatant lies spread to justify aggression, propaganda of intolerance and violence” that aim to “undermine the principles of freedom of expression and poison human souls and minds” (President of Ukraine, 2015d).

Even though the West is one of the Ukraine’s Others, on the spectrum of Otherness it is constructed as an actor very close to Ukraine: both are presented as sharing the same values of the countries belonging to the “Free World”, where the Western states are the natural bearers of those values, while Ukraine decided to adjoin. Hence, in terms of the ‘signs’ attributed in the construction of the Self and the Other, Ukraine positively links to the West. The frequently used common values except for freedom are democracy, rule of law, dignity, life without fear, and other (President of Ukraine 2015a). These values are the ones that Ukraine is fighting for. In this way, the hybrid war in Ukraine was presented since the very beginning as the war of values:

“Ukraine’s war is the only war of the last decade that is purely about values. One nation decided to be free and democratic. Another nation decided to punish her for this. The world simply cannot allow this kind of behaviour! “Values come first” – this is the truth the West would remind Ukraine of over the last years. Now it is Ukraine’s turn to remind the West of this truth! (President of Ukraine, 2014b)”.

This is how then the responsibility was allocated with the West: as we represent the same values, Ukraine is defending them, but it needs help in some areas, be that political support, support for reforms, economic sanctions, urging for comprehensive programmes to address the propaganda and disinformation campaigns, or asking for military equipment (both non-lethal and lethal), and others. Even though Ukraine decided to be part of the same group of the countries belonging to the “Free World”, temporarily it still needs help, as it is on the path to reformation and transformation to be one of the functional democracies.
The excerpt above also points at an important starting point for looking at the construction of the Russian Other, as the relationship is presented as the one where the Self decided upon its allegiance to the “Free World”, but it was punished for that sovereign decision. It is so because Russia is filled “with a desire to return to the imperial times with spheres of influence” (President of Ukraine, 2015d). This desire drives disregard for the norms and laws governing the international security system, and hence the disregard for the rule of law, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states. So, Russia is said to be imperialist and tyrannical, and at this point its nature is juxtaposed against the desire of the Self to be free of its influence and to be democratic. Russia “deliberately created around itself the belt of instability”, which included Nagorny Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and later Crimea and Donbas, and this “belt of instability” had been part of the Russian “hybrid” war for years (President of Ukraine, 2015d). In this vein, the question posed then to the audience, is “what or who is next?”, implying that the expansionist desires do not stop, and can go further. This question is tailored towards the countries that belonged to Soviet Union or Soviet bloc, who in these days are NATO allies. They are said to be especially susceptible to the dangers because of the sizeable Russian ethnic and Russian speaking minorities, and this was the pretence of the intervention in Crimea (President of Ukraine, 2014b).

Discourse Analysis: Period 2

The construction of Ukraine as of a country that is fighting in the common fight for the future of Europe, however transforming from a place on the frontline to being “a key battlefield for the European order and security architecture…. a shield and a sword of Europe” (President of Ukraine, 2018a) persisted over all of the sources inspected pertaining to both of the periods, however, the spread of the hybrid war itself was presented as increasing over the time. It slowly became uncontained by the borders of Ukraine. Now, the object of the hybrid warfare shifted from one sovereign country presenting the “free world”, Ukraine became the country that was “a testing ground for new methods of hybrid warfare”, while by 2016 the warfare was said to have spread to Europe, America and beyond (President of Ukraine, 2016b). The list of actions qualified as the ones being the hybrid warfare expanded beyond the secret subversive and military operations, terrorism, propaganda and information attacks, to political pressure, economic coercion, interference with electoral processes, cyber-attacks, and misuse of diplomatic measures (President of Ukraine, 2016b). Through the years, Russia started being presented as more assertive. Rather than being threatening because of how its ambitions put
the common values under threat, it was presented as the Other promoting alternative agenda and values, practically suggesting a new system. It was doing so because it was rejecting the world order that was built on the values that were foreign to it, and these actions came to be called “hybrid warfare”:

“[I]nstead of tackling the pressing challenges, which erode the Global Order, Russia weaponizes them in its own interests. That is what we call “the hybrid warfare”. It's "hybrid" because it works across the board and has many faces. Misinformation, assaultive propaganda, deliberate hacking and lie - that's only a small part of it. Moscow is not just rejecting the world order. It is trying to build an alternative reality based on alternative values: Tyranny instead of democracy. Intolerance instead of respect. A zero-sum game instead of win-win” (President of Ukraine, 2017).

In line with this argumentation all throughout the time, the construction of the Russian Other included the traditional differentiating moves highlighting that the Other represents a complete opposite that is threatening. The Russian Other was presented as tyrannical, in its values and in its actions, while the Ukrainian Self was presented as the one defending the common values, and the democratic countries by being at the forefront of the hybrid war. The Russian Other is the one who is unprovokingly hostile and aggressive, while the Ukrainian Self is the one that is peaceful, but is put in the position of having to fight for its peace. As Russia started being presented as assertive, the responsibility laid on it also grew:

“It violated the Budapest memorandum…It violated every single piece of our bilateral treaties…It violates its countless promises today – within the Minsk process. NO effective ceasefire. NO release of hostages and illegally detained persons. NO access for international humanitarian organizations. There is no other party to be blamed for it, but Russia. It continues sending troops, heavy weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. It turns Crimea into the world's biggest military base. It stays deaf to demands and arguments for peace. We don't have peace for one reason: Russians are not interested in reaching peace. They are interested in exerting control…No compromises. Just – the rule of force It proves that we have no other way round but to seek peace through strength, not appeasement” (President of Ukraine, 2017).
As it can be seen from the excerpt above, now the Other was not only the instigator, but the single actor accountable for the impossibility of reaching peace and violating the Minsk Agreements, and all because of its putting its ambitions over peace. Furthermore, the excerpt once again underlines, how Ukraine presents itself as peaceful, but forced to fight for peace with strength.

These developments in the discourse culminated in 2018, when it was claimed that “the hybrid war being waged by Russia is gradually turning into a full-fledged World Hybrid War. The developments since 2014 were called the “critical challenges to the international security” that “were around for a long time already and grew in strength and destructive potential”, comparing these developments to the ones leading to the First World War (President of Ukraine, 2018a). This war was said to be waged at different levels, on different battlefields and at different speeds. This war has already recruited many different actors, who might not be even aware of their destructive roles” (President of Ukraine, 2018a). The operation in Ukraine “had been plotted well in advance”, and it involved a number of different actors that were activated when needed (President of Ukraine, 2018a). The analogy drawn says that this was the danger that Europe had to face, implying that the “many agents” had been supported for a long time in Europe and they were now operating in Europe. Those included ultra-right and ultra-left parties, trolls and propagandists, and also cyber-attacks aimed both at election campaigns and critical infrastructure; and all accompanied by massive militarisation of Russia that was showing readiness to use the military tools.

In this way the Western Other was no longer presented as a set homogenous and functioning democratic states, as they were infiltrated with the “many agents” and that were directly threatening the states from the inside. The Other that “resides in Kremlin” was called outright evil, while countering the Russian aggression was then presented as an “existential challenge” to the future of the Western countries: “Will it be a “Russian world of alternative values” or “the Free World of universal values”?”; where the “Russian world” was presented as the one that “turns everything it touched into ruin and decline”(President of Ukraine, 2018a). The goal of the Kremlin’s ambitions was said to avenge “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”, i.e. the collapse of the Soviet Union (President of Ukraine, 2018a). The responsibility laid on the West then was to remember that “[n]either politics, nor business can exist separately from values”, and hence the West was supposed to say no to recognition of the
Russian presidential elections in Crimea and say no to the Nord Stream 2, along with rejecting a number of other concessions, to the extent of not welcoming Russia’s flag anywhere as long as “Russia keeps instigation the World Hybrid War and Russian bullets aim at our symbols”, where “our” pointed at the common values of the Ukrainian Self and the Western Other (President of Ukraine, 2018a). So, Ukraine and the West were supposed unitedly transcend Russia based on their common values.

Later with the intensification of the situation and the first direct standoff between Ukraine and Russia since Crimea in the Sea of Azov near the Kerch Strait, the events in the Sea were called “a new stage of aggression”, which was a part of the “hybrid war” against Ukraine that had been being waged for the last five years (President of Ukraine, 2018b). The nature and manner of the attack was compared to the previous operations, in the way the plausible deniability was abandoned in this instance, as “[n]o one will say now: “They are not there”. No one camouflages into green humanoids or militiamen. This is a bold and frank participation of the regular units of the Russian Federation, their demonstrative attack on the detachment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces” (President of Ukraine, 2018b). Nevertheless, in all of its expressions the discourse oriented on the outside audiences remained the one pertaining to the “World Hybrid War”, even though the phrase itself was not utilised anymore:

“Unfortunately, a number of “hot spots” on the planet is growing. It is not by coincidence that the major part of them is located inside or near Europe. It is hard to miss the looming shadow of the same author of the chain of events, aimed at undermining the unity of the European Union. It is crystal clear that this author is trying to relaunch the well-prepared in advance or to create new conflicts along the whole EU perimeter – starting from Ukraine and Moldova, Southern Caucasus, Western Balkans, Middle East, Africa up to directly some EU member states. And this author is sitting in the Kremlin” (President of Ukraine, 2019a).

As it can be seen from this excerpt, there was a move from presenting the aim of the Russia’s actions as the ones creating a “belt of instability” only around itself and hence endangering only the countries in the vicinity and with the common history, to presenting them as the ones creating “new conflicts along the whole EU perimeter”.
Just as previously the assistance and help provided to Ukraine to build its resilience, was presented as an investment in “your own security, in your own peaceful future”, where “your” is the pronoun addressing the Western Other (President of Ukraine, 2019a). In Ukraine Russia “fine-tunes its new technologies of hybrid war”, meaning that it was only “a matter of time where the Kremlin will use them tomorrow, the very next days” (President of Ukraine, 2019a). Standing by Ukraine was presented as crucial because “[i]f Ukraine falls, it would only incite Russian appetites in other parts of Europe and in other parts of the world” (President of Ukraine, 2019a). In this way the confrontation in Ukraine was said to be the one determining the future of the world order, as Ukraine was “on the cutting edge of clash of civilizations, at the forefront of protecting our common values, the struggle between good and evil”, in which ending “Russian aggression” would lead to saving the world from a Kremlin-grown virus of revanchism and neo-imperialism” (President of Ukraine, 2019a).

Comparison of the Periods

In order to compare the two periods, the findings for each are put in the form of the diagrams and tables for each period separately. Textually, the comparisons between the periods are drawn after the presentations of the figures. In this part of the chapter only the major developments are traced that are related to the shift from the discourse of the hybrid war to the one of the world hybrid war. To do so, first, the identity construction of Ukraine and its Russian Other have been put into diagrammatic form. These figures help to see clearly the processes of linking and differentiating, as both of the processes frame identity and are enacted at the same time. The process of linking is shown with the full lines, and the process of differentiation is shown with the dashed lines (in a way, the solid lines show the signs related to each separate identity, and then the dashed lines place them within a wider system), which demonstrates how the signs communicate. When completing the diagrams, I concentrated on noting and linking the privileged and devalued signs attributed to each actor. So, it can be seen how the positive ‘signs’ in the discourse were attributed to the Ukrainian Self, and the devalued signs were attributed to the Russian Self. As the Western Other is presented as the one possessing the same positive ‘signs’ with the Ukrainian Self (sharing same values with the Self), for this part of the
comparison I did not put the Western Other on the diagrams. The results are presented below with the Figure 3 describing Period 1 and with the Figure 4 describing Period 2.

The diagrams visualise the consistent way in which Ukraine presented itself throughout both of the periods that were investigated, and how it juxtaposed its qualities with the ones of the Russian Other. Except for the presentation of the positive and negative qualities of the Self and the Other correspondingly that are presented, there are also a number of other interesting tendencies to be traced that hint at important contestations. There is a visible contradiction in how the Self presents and perceives itself as peaceful throughout both of the periods as it is noted on the diagrams, but given the hostility and aggression of the Other, the Self has to fight back forcefully as the force is the only possible way to contend the actions of the Other. Another important sign to note, is how the Russian Other from being presented as the one that is barbaric and completely different from the Ukrainian Self and the Western Other (not having
any respect for the values), started being present as the one that is uncivilised in the common
civilizational understanding and hence as the one carrying other values that are parallelly contrary to the commonly held values. Also, through the years Russia was presented as more assertive, and hence the shift from being imperialist and tyrannical, but for the time constraining its activities to the countries of the “near abroad” sharing common history, to being neo-imperialist and revanchist, willing to avenge for the collapse of the Soviet Union and instigating the world hybrid war to change the international system.

Now, in order to delve deeper in the comparison of the periods, after presenting the process of linking and differentiating that will be further discussed below too, I present the three framing types of identity construction in order to bring out the important political substance of the identity construction in the security discourse using hybrid warfare to explain the conflict in Ukraine to the external audiences. In these tables all the three actors are presented – the Ukrainian Self, and both of the Others. I presented the findings in the form of the Figure 5 describing Period 1 and of the Figure 6 describing Period 2, and in the same way as it was done with the diagrams above, draw comparisons textually.

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<th>Spatial</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Ukrainian Self</strong></td>
<td>The people of Ukraine, Ukraine</td>
<td>On the road to deep reforms and profound modernisation, moving towards joining EU and NATO, but needing help</td>
<td>Responsibility for protecting the “free world” – on the line of fire in the hybrid war threatening our values; having to fight back even though peaceful</td>
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<td><strong>The Russian Other</strong></td>
<td>Russia, Moscow, Kremlin</td>
<td>Imperialist, and revisionist</td>
<td>Responsibility for initiating open and unprovoked hostility, responsibility for unleashing an undeclared hybrid warfare</td>
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<td><strong>The Western Other</strong></td>
<td>Europe/EU, America, NATO countries, the collective ‘free world’</td>
<td>Represent working democratic and developed states</td>
<td>Responsibility for solidarity and unity with Ukraine, responsibility for assisting Ukraine (the two are the holders of common values, and Ukraine is at the forefront of protecting those values)</td>
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Figure 5: Spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions in Ukrainian Self vs Russian and Western Others identity construction within the discourse on hybrid warfare in Period 1
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<tr>
<td><strong>The Ukrainian Self</strong></td>
<td>Ukraine, people of</td>
<td>Progressing towards transformations and reforms, still moving</td>
<td>Responsibility for fighting for the “free world” on the key</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>towards joining EU and NATO,</td>
<td>battlefield, uniting the holders of the “common values” in</td>
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<td>order to transcend Russia, having to fight back even though</td>
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<td><strong>The Russian Other</strong></td>
<td>Russia, Moscow,</td>
<td>Neo-imperialist, revanchist</td>
<td>Responsibility for instigating the “world hybrid war” against</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kremlin, Putin</td>
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<td>the “free world”</td>
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<td><strong>The Western Other</strong></td>
<td>Europe/EU, America,</td>
<td>Much more heterogenous and disunited</td>
<td>Responsibility for keeping solidarity and unity with Ukraine,</td>
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<td>NATO countries, the</td>
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<td>and making no concessions or compromises to Russia,</td>
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<td>responsibility for balancing in the decision-making other</td>
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<td>rationales with moral considerations</td>
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Figure 6: Spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions in Ukrainian Self vs Russian and Western Others identity construction within the discourse on hybrid warfare in Period 2

It follows that there is the “free world” of democratic countries and the Self that is defending the values of this “free world”. It is said that both Ukraine and the West belong to this “free world”. As on the spectrum of the Otherness the West is imagined as not that different from Ukraine, they are said to share same respect and commitment for the same set of values (the values on the diagrams that are attributed to the Ukrainian Self). The hybrid warfare since the beginning of the Period 1 was presented as the one that is directed against the common values. This link was built in the way that Ukraine decided to be free and democratic and it is being punished for it, but furthermore, the hostility of the Russian Other is potentially threatening to the Western Other as its hostility was unprovoked and its agenda is imperialist and revisionist (in this context that means that it is expansionist and destructive). This means that beyond the “belt of instability” it created around itself, it can also decide to go further and
wage hybrid warfare against the NATO allies countries (especially the ones with the ethnic Russians and Russian speakers).

Also, since the beginning of the Period 1 there were made moves to present hybrid warfare as the global security threat to all of the countries of the West (America and Europe). Unless Ukraine fights back effectively, with the support of the West’s solidarity (with Ukraine and Ukraine’s cause) and unity (both amongst themselves and with Ukraine), then there is a danger of hybrid warfare crossing Europe’s borders and spreading throughout the globe. This puts a clear responsibility on the West to maintain and commit to the solidarity and unity with Ukraine in different forms pertaining to the particular issues in question (financial, military, diplomatic). Temporally, the Self is presented as the ones still undergoing transformations but being on the right path to become fully the member of the “free world” countries.

Then, in the Period 2 there was a shift in which Ukraine moved from being at the frontline of the hybrid war, to the country that is a key battlefield, as the hybrid warfare is said to have spread and infiltrated other countries, meaning that Ukraine was an important testing ground of the new methods of hybrid warfare that were then used further. The presentation of Russia as of a more assertive actor is coming from the warning that were made in the Period 1 that now seemed to be fulfilled. From aiming at only undermining the common values, it started to be presented as the one trying to instil its own alternative values, practically pushing for a new system. To be able to do so, Russia is said to have instigated world hybrid warfare. Spatially, there started to be a greater emphasis made on the administration of Russia and especially Putin. As the result of the instruments of the world hybrid warfare, the Western countries temporarily are said to be much more heterogenous on the inside and more disunited among themselves, while Ukraine and through time is presented as still progressing but moving in the correct direction, and hence there is said to be even a greater need for overarching solidarity and unity. Making concessions to Russia is presented as being dangerous because it would only help it in its war, so Ukraine and the West should stay together and transcend Russia on the basis of their common values.
Conclusions

The aim of the research undertaken was to find out how and why throughout the years of the conflict on the territory of Ukraine (i.e. to what extent the use of the concept of hybrid warfare was introduced into the Ukrainian security discourse as reactionary to the actions of Russia and to what extent it was adopted from the West), the elites discourse employed the concept of hybrid warfare in their communications with the external audiences, and how within that security discourse the identity (i.e. the Self and the Others) was constructed, accompanied with a deep understanding of the corresponding policy. This allows to gain a special understanding of why Ukraine employs particular vocabulary and adds a specific Ukrainian perspective to the debate on hybrid warfare. In order to do so, this thesis consisted of three chapters that addressed different aspects of the research.

The first chapter introduced the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the work. The work was based on the poststructuralist ideas important for the development of the discourse analysis methodology and performing the discourse analysis itself. To keep the theory instrumental, it was presented through the prism of the four concepts crucial to understanding of poststructuralism, namely: discourse, genealogy, deconstruction and intertextuality. The poststructuralism helps to adopt a critical outlook at the study of the world around, as it raises questions about ontology (how do researchers conceptualise what they study) and epistemology (how do researchers know what they know), and it adopts discursive ontology and discursive epistemology. This lies at the heart of the prescriptions given by Lene Hansen, who developed a discourse analytical theory of identity and foreign policy, along with a methodology for how to apply it. For this thesis, the methodology allowed to look at how Ukraine constructed its identity within the security discourse employing the concept of hybrid warfare in relation to the West and Russia during the ongoing conflict. This was done by identifying the most frequently articulated signs to the Self and the Other, then by looking at the relationship between the two and accounting for the articulations of spatial, temporal, and ethical identity to investigate the political substance accompanying them; and lastly by looking at the policy going with these. The decisions made for this research were succinctly outlined by the Figure 1.
The second chapter traced the complexity of the development of hybrid warfare, in order to understand to what extent the use of the concept of hybrid warfare was adapted from the West and in the manner that is more understandable to the West. It started off with looking at the introduction and development of the concept within the Western academic sphere, and then, more importantly, on the way in which the concept entered the Western official political debate in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and events in the East of Ukraine. Starting with looking first at the academic sphere was decided because the concept originates in the Western academic sphere and its introduction into the debate was coming from the Western scholars, politicians and media. This chapter showed how, subsequently, the use of ‘hybrid warfare’ towards the situation became most commonly used, notwithstanding the fact that, strictly from the military science point of view, hybrid warfare used to have a different, albeit related, meaning, hence also demonstrating the change of the meaning. It also showed that following the reconstructions, it seems that the popularisation of the concept can be attributed to the decision of NATO to apply it to describe the situation.

The third chapter presented the empirical part of the thesis – discourse analysis. In the beginning it gave the information on the background, timeline, and international response information, giving a clear delineation of the major events. This was done for a clearer reading of the findings, as understanding the events on the ground helps to see the objective facts that assert themselves in the security discourse, and furthermore allowed to present the experience of Ukraine that thesis talks about. Then it presented the discourse analysis by looking how hybrid warfare was used in the security discourse, and at how identity was constructed within that discourse and the corresponding policy prescriptions. Due to the nature of the relationship between policy and identity, a deeper analysis of the identity construction was needed because in order to understand the policy, there was a need to look at the identity construction that legitimised and made this policy enforceable to the relevant audiences. In this way, the thesis attempted to conduct not a descriptive investigation of the inclusion of hybrid warfare in the discourse, but an interpretive study allowing to see whether the adaptation was reactionary or imported.

The findings were presented within the third chapter in three parts The first two parts utilised excessively the direct quotations extracted from the corpus to allow the reader to follow how the text was interpreted, and then the last part presented the findings with the help of diagrams and tables for the convenience of seeing how the developments in the security
discourse were traced. The findings within the last chapter address directly how the Self and the Others were presented within the identity construction process as well as the respective policy following, while they also address the extent to which the definitional adaptation of the terminology of hybrid warfare was subject to both the internal events and also of putting the responsibility on the Western Other for solidarity and unity. Even though the terminology was initially used as understood in the West, the slow shift from the rhetoric of hybrid warfare launched against the values of the free world, to the world hybrid warfare launched against the established world order, seem to have been dictated by other considerations shaped by the internal experience.

This project followed the poststructuralist methodology which is subject to interpretation of the researcher, so it is possible for the future researchers to make complimentary readings of the corpus, and possibly subject it to a different set of research questions. There is also a possibility of extending the corpus to trace, for example, the developments in the wider security discourse, or changing the audience to be able to look at the texts intended not only for English speakers. Nonetheless, any future researcher needs to be aware with an additional complexity in the collection of the materials for the corpus, as the change of administration in Ukraine leads to erasure of the previously available materials from the official websites.
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