

## **Abstract**

The bachelor thesis deals with the comparison of preparedness and the ability of NATO and EU organizations to decide whether to participate in the intervention on the example of the crisis in Libya. The aim is to investigate why the EU has failed to develop a joint plan for intervention in Libya, and what on the other hand has made NATO differently in order to take over the intervention later. Within these two organizations, the work focuses on their member states and how they have influenced the decision-making process. In the EU, I focused on France, Great Britain, and Germany. The first two countries are being explored as actors promoting intervention and I am focusing on their joint cooperation and different attitudes to NATO-led work. While UK officials welcomed the unification of the operation under the command of the Alliance, representatives of France were reluctant to do so. Germany is examined in the work as an actor with a different outcome of the decision-making process that led to the rejection and criticism of intervention. The German refusal is described as one of the factors why the EU did not participate and did not lead the intervention. Within NATO, I focus on the United States, their decision-making process and their influence on the takeover of alliance intervention. I analyze how the United States has decided to take a secondary role in the Libyan crisis and give leadership to European countries. The comparison is made on the basis of selected concepts which are dealing with the decision-making process of intervention. The work is based on a number of sources – mostly on sources from the NATO, EU, UN and other databases. Furthermore, it is based on the press websites and many other publications.