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Germany's Commitment to Multilateral Military Operations: Comparing the Cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Libya

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Abstract

This thesis analyses Germany's commitment to multilateral military operations. Following the research question why Germany participates in some multilateral military operations but not in others, Germany's respective decision-making process regarding troop deployment in the DR Congo in 2006 on one hand and military non-engagement in Libya 2011 on the other hand is traced. By contrasting the concept of strategic culture with a purely rational assessment of the factors of alliance politics, risk-analysis and military feasibility of the operations, the decisiveness of taking into account Germany's strategic culture to explain deployment decisions is stressed. Neither is there a lack of external pressure for German military participation in the case of Libya, nor is the military operation in the DR Congo decisively less risky or militarily more feasible. Rather, Germany's multilateral and anti-militaristic strategic cultural strands affect its decision-making. Next to demanding a thorough justification and legitimization of any military engagement, two red lines for military deployment can be identified. First, Germany refuses to act unilaterally and displays a high reluctance towards military engagement outside the multilateral framework of the UN, NATO or EU. Secondly, Germany rejects to engage in active combat, being particularly reluctant towards the aggressive use of military force.

Keywords

Germany, strategic culture, EUFOR RD Congo, Libya, military deployment abroad, political decision-making, process tracing, foreign and security policy

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Prague, May 10th, 2019 Westenberger, Kay 

Institute of Political Studies
Master thesis proposal

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Diploma thesis proposal

Germany`s commitment to CSDP Operations: Comparing the cases of Congo and Libya

Author: Kay Westenberger

Supervisor: Dr. Tomáš Karásek

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Introduction

The security environment for the European Union is changing, strengthening the importance of EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The thesis focuses on a major member of the EU, Germany, and analyses Germany's (changing) role and engagement in international conflicts and multilateral military operations in specific. Not least due to Germany's unique history, the state has a particular strategic culture, affecting Germany's foreign policy and form of engagement in multilateral military operations. The thesis aims at identifying and assessing the key influential factors on Germany's foreign policy behaviour in the context of Germany's strategic culture. Regarding the CSDP operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2006 for example, Germany took on a leading position. In the case of Libya in 2011, however, it refused any military engagement. The thesis will trace the political decision process regarding both cases and analyse the public and political debate accordingly with the goal to gain a deeper understanding of Germany's (potential) limitations regarding its commitment to international military operations.

Research target, research question

The research target of the thesis is to gain a deeper understanding of Germany's international military engagement, following the research question: If and to what degree does Germany's strategic culture limit Germany's engagement in multilateral military operations? The research target combines the question of a) Why does Germany participate in some multilateral military operations but not in others? as well as b) How does Germany participate in multilateral military operations and are there certain limitations identifiable?

Literature review

John Glenn's "Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?" and Alastair Iain Johnston's paper "Thinking about Strategic Culture" will serve as the basis to define and discuss the concept of strategic culture.

Regarding Germany's strategic culture in particular, the paper "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan" from Thomas U. Berger analyses Germany's and Japan's new political-military culture after the Second World War and its evolution over time. The thesis will address the new security environment for Europe and Germany and assess a potential change in Germany's strategic culture. For analytical purposes, the thesis will follow a similar approach as Berger does who is focusing on three main influencing aspects of Germany's security policies, namely alliance politics, force structure and mission, and civil-military relations.

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen identifies two main schools of thoughts in the German strategic culture, namely 'never again alone' and 'never again war', in her paper "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes". The author uses the two competing strands to explain Germany's reluctance to follow the US into Iraq in 2003, outlining certain conditions necessary for Germany to engage in war, given its strategic culture. The objective of the thesis is to understand the effect of the competing strands within the German strategic culture further. Therefore, different influence factors on Germany's foreign affairs behaviour, namely debates within the German population as well as pressure from its allies and own national interests, are assessed.

Several papers and reports address the topic of EUFOR RD Congo, such as the French Centre of Strategic Analyses in their report "EU support to the Democratic Republic of Congo" focusing on the European Union as actor, or the occasional paper of the Institute for Security Studies "EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006" including the role of Germany in the EU mission. Others even set focus on Germany's military engagement specifically in context of the German Strategic Culture such as Oliver Schmitt in "Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action". This also applies to literature regarding military engagement in Libya in 2011 and Germany's non-action. In "The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?", Nicole Koenig outlines the Libyan crisis and the EU response accordingly, highlighting the issue of a lack of internal coherence and addressing Germany's non-involvement. Alister Miskommon focuses on

Germany's foreign policy behaviour regarding Libya in particular, addressing the contrasting influential factors of international influence and alliance politics on one hand and Germany's national interest based on domestic and economic concerns on the other.

Whereas existing literature assesses why Germany behaved the way it did in the specific cases, the two cases and especially Germany's respective decision processes were not yet put in direct comparison. Identifying similarities and differences of the two cases might, however, offer to shed more light on Germany's foreign policy behaviour and explain when Germany is willing to take on a leading role and when it refuses any form of participation in multilateral operations. The thesis not only compares the different situations and contexts in 2006 and 2011, but more importantly traces the distinct decision processes in Germany, using primary sources of official state documents and media coverage. Thereby the main influential factors on German foreign policy behaviour are identified and analysed in order to gain a deeper understanding of when Germany engages in multilateral operations and when not.

Theoretical/conceptual framework

The thesis will be based on the theoretic framework of strategic culture, focusing on Germany's strategic culture in particular. The concept of strategic culture and its limitations will be defined and discussed. The paper will follow John Glenn's broader definition of strategic culture as "a set of shared beliefs, and assumptions derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which influence the appropriate ends and means chosen for achieving security objectives."

The thesis is based on the assumption, that Germany has a specific strategic culture. Secondly, three core factors are identified which affect Germany's foreign policy behaviour, namely national interests, alliance politics and public opinion. For the factor of national interests regarding military missions abroad, the thesis will focus on the questions of national security concerns, military feasibility and economics. The field of alliance politics will assess the importance of multilateralism to Germany as well as

the existence of a legal basis for a military mission based on a UN mandate, other states (allies) involvement and pressure stemming from international demand for a German participation in a mission. Public opinion incorporates the assessment of the traditional German sentiment of anti-militarism after World War II and its development within the society as a whole as well as the different party and societal groups' opinions and their effect on the government decision-making, including the effect of upcoming elections.

It seems that at times the international demand for German participation and taking on responsibility clashes with the German population's pacifistic sentiment. The thesis follows the hypothesis that Germany nowadays uses its strategic culture to "hide" behind and avoid active combat engagement in international military operations but rather focuses on training and stabilization operations. The thesis will assess if the traditional German anti-militarism changed into general risk-averseness over time.

Methodology and data

The main part of the thesis is a case study research. Two cases are chosen to trace, analyse and compare the decision processes in Germany for (non-)engagement in multilateral military operations. The case of the EU operation in DRC Congo 2006 serves as an example for German military engagement, where Germany took on a leading position. In contrast, the second case is about the debate about a potential involvement in Libya 2011 and Germany's refusal regarding any engagement in Libya. The cases will be analysed regarding the decision process in Germany, especially looking at the effects of the three factors of national interest, alliance politics and public opinion as defined above.

The key sources for the analytical part of the thesis will be primary data from a) political debates, specifically public documents from the German parliament and government outlining the political discourse regarding Germany's engagement in DRC in 2006 and the debate about a potential engagement in Libya 2011. Bundestag documents include for example brief enquiries from parties concerning the matter of military engagement to the executive and respective answers as well as information on the mandating-process of the operation. b) Media coverage, especially Newspaper

articles from the respective time periods of 2006 and 2011 will serve as key sources to analyse the public debate and also international discourse concerning the cases of DRC and Libya in respect to Germany's (non-)involvement. To trace the German public debate, a variety of newspaper outlets will be incorporated from left-wing to conservative to allow a comprehensive approach, encompassing the German society as a whole. The objective is to assess the general sentiment and potential pressure on German decision-makers within Germany as well as from German allies. Therefore rather than picking a few selected speeches, a broad pick of various sources is used.

Expert analysis and scientific papers regarding strategic culture and Germany's strategic culture in particular as well as the two cases will be the third field of sources primarily for outlining the theoretic framework and giving important background knowledge.

Planned thesis outline

1. **Introduction**

   In the introduction, the current security environment for the European Union will be described. In this context, Germany's (changing) role in international conflicts will be outlined and the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy shortly introduced. The introduction further includes an overview of the following chapters of the thesis as well as a review of the relevant literature.

2. **Germany's strategic culture**

   a. *Strategic culture general*

      This part will explain the theory of "strategic culture", serving as the thesis's theoretic framework. How can strategic culture be defined, how can it help understand a country's behaviour and what are its limitations?

   b. *Germany's strategic culture*

      In this part, the theoretic framework of strategic culture will be used to analyse Germany's strategic culture and its strategic preferences in particular, starting after the Second World War and touching on major

military events such as Germany's participation at the NATO mission in Kosovo in 1999, its engagement in Afghanistan since 2001 and Germany's unwillingness to join the coalition of the willing in Iraq 2003. Thereby I will identify factors which decisively affect Germany's behaviour in international politics. Three factors are assumed to mainly form Germany's strategic behaviour. These factors are 1.National interests, 2.Alliance politics and 3.Public opinion and the sentiment of anti-militarism.

3. Methodology

The analysis is based on a comparative case study. It will be outlined why the two cases of the DRC 2006 and Libya 2011 were chosen. Furthermore, the method of process-tracing for generating the required data for the analysis will be introduced.

4. General decision process for military operations in Germany

For a better understanding, the empirical-analytical section will first outline the general decision process in Germany, explaining the various steps which need to be followed for the German government to be able to send out military troops. Germany for example has a "parliamentary army" which requires mandates from the parliament allowing military operations abroad.

5. Case DR Congo

a. *Introduction to conflict*

   Background information will be given to what the conflict is about, what actors are engaged and more precise information on the CSDP operation and its goals.

b. *Tracing decision process in Germany regarding "EUFOR RD Congo"*

   The decision process in Germany which led to German leadership in the EUFOR RD Congo operation will be traced.

c. *Analysing the decision process based on the factors*

   i. National interests
   ii. Alliance politics
   iii. Public opinion

Given that those factors were identified as major influencers regarding Germany's international behaviour, it will be analysed how they affected the decision process in engaging in DRC in particular.

6. Case Libya

a. *Introduction to conflict*

Background information will be given to what the conflict is about, what actors are engaged and more precise information about the potential CSDP operation in Libya.

b. *Tracing decision process in Germany regarding Libya*

The decision process in Germany will be traced which led to Germany dismissing any engagement in Libya in 2011.

c. *Analysing the decision process based on the factors*

   i. National interests
   ii. Alliance politics
   iii. Public opinion

Given that those factors were identified as major influencers regarding Germany's international behaviour, it will be analysed how they affected the decision process leading to denying any engagement in Libya in 2011.

7. Analysing findings

a. *Compare Cases*

In the first step of the analysis, both cases will be compared to point out important similarities and differences between case situations and Germany's reaction accordingly.

b. *Generalize findings*

In the second step, it will be checked if the cases confirm the context of the German strategic culture. The overall findings will be generalized in order to identify (potential) limitations to Germany's commitment to international (more precisely CSDP) operations in general.

8. Conclusions

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THOMAS U. BERGER. Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan. In: *The Culture of National Security, Peter J. Katzenstein,* Article 9.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union (Christ Democratic Union)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUHR	European Union High Representative
RD Congo	République démocratique du Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo)
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
ISAF	International Assistance Force mission
ISR	intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
MLC	Mouvement de Libération du Congo (Congo Liberation Movement)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy)
SPD	Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschland (Social Democratic Party Germany)
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs)
UN	United Nations

List of Appendices

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has changed. International organizations such as the UN, NATO and EU find themselves confronted with new security threats stemming from failing or failed states, civil wars and humanitarian conflicts. As a result, pressure on Germany as the largest EU nation and an economic powerhouse has grown to take on more international responsibility and engage in multilateral military operations. Nevertheless, rather than taking on institutional duties without hesitation, Germany's foreign- and security policy typically occurs on the basis of lengthy domestic debates, especially when it comes to the question of whether or not to deploy military force.[1] The thesis assesses Germany's commitment to multilateral military operations. To understand Germany's decision-making concerning troop deployments, two cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) and Libya are analysed. Whereas Germany took on a leading role within the operation EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, the government refused any military engagement concerning a multilaterally discussed no-fly zone during the crisis in Libya 2011.

Following the research question "Why does Germany participate in some multilateral military operations but not in others?", two red-lines are identified regarding Germany's deployment commitment. First, Germany refuses to act unilaterally and is highly reluctant to engage within any military operation outside the multilateral frame of the UN, NATO or EU. Secondly, Germany rejects to engage in active combat operations. Being sceptical against the deployment of military force in general, the country shows a particularly high reluctance towards aggressive military force. Thus, whereas Germany continues to display restraints in the deployment of force, a commitment to multilateral operations is far more likely if the operation is embedded within one of the multilateral organizations and follows a defensive, protective or deterrence posture. These deployment restrictions can thereby be traced back to Germany's strategic culture. It is hence argued, that Germany's strategic culture must be taken into account to understand Germany's decision-making processes.

[1] Franz-Josef Meiers, "Made in Berlin". Wohin steuert die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?," *Zeitschrift für Außen und Sicherheitspolitik (ZFAS)*, no. 4 (2011): 684-685.

In the first chapter of the thesis, the promises and limitations of the concept of strategic culture are outlined. After elaborating on the various debates within the body of literature, a two-step approach for the feasible deployment of the concept is introduced. Secondly, Germany's strategic culture of the early 2000s is thoroughly analysed. Thereby the two cultural strands of multilateralism and anti-militarism are identified as the core of Germany's strategic culture. The second half of the thesis compares Germany's decision-making processes regarding the two cases of the DR Congo and Libya. Applying the method of process tracing, Germany's respective deployment decision is analysed in detail according to the three factors of alliance politics, risk-analysis and military feasibility. Thereby the concept of strategic culture is contrasted with a purely rational assessment of Germany's decision-making. The analysis reveals that a purely rational approach cannot explain Germany's decision-making. Neither is there a lack of international pressure in the case of Libya, nor is the operation in the DR Congo decisively less risky or more feasible, which could have explained Germany's engagement in the DR Congo but non-engagement in Libya. The distinct deployment decisions can on the other hand be feasibly explained by taking into account Germany's strategic cultural strands of multilateralism and anti-militarism. The thesis findings thus stress the decisiveness of Germany's strategic culture in the country's deployment decisions.

1. Promises and Challenges of Strategic Culture

From realists to constructivists, explaining and possibly predicting strategic and foreign policy behaviour of states has always been a major concern for scholars in the field of international relations and security studies. Strategic culture thereby is a popular but widely contested concept among scholars with multiple interpretations. As Ian Johnston, one of the leading scholars in the field, puts it: "There is, in short, a great deal of confusion over what it is that strategic culture is supposed to explain, how it is supposed to explain it, and how much it does explain."[2] Before assessing the different interpretations of strategic culture however, it is important to understand and identify core principles of the concept which apply to the various strategic culture approaches.

[2] Alastair I. Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 63.

As the term implies, strategic culture looks at the relationship between a state's culture and its strategic behaviour.[3] John Glenn offers a broad definition which fits various conceptual interpretations, viewing strategic culture as "a set of shared beliefs, and assumptions derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which influence the appropriate ends and means chosen for achieving security objectives."[4] The term first appeared as an attempt to assess the different strategic "styles" of the US and Soviet Union in the Cold War, predominantly in the 1980s. The concept originated in Jack Snyder's take on Soviet nuclear strategy in 1977, noting that Soviet leaders other than just being generic strategists were socialized in a unique strategic culture.[5] Strategic culture is based on the assumption that distinct cultural influences shape behaviour, beliefs and ideas which in the end influence actors and actions in world politics. The basic idea is that decision-makers "in different strategic cultures will make different choices when placed in similar situations."[6]

This way, strategic culture distances itself from classical realist approaches which primarily focus on the material environment to explain foreign policy behaviour. Johnston argues that it is strategic culture what gives meaning to ahistorical or "objective" variables like military capabilities or technology, thereby side-lining factors decisive for foreign policy analysis form a realist perspective. According to Johnston, variables such as geography, capability or threat will be interpreted differently depending on the different strategic cultures.[7] Following this logic, strategic culturalists assume that each state has a strategic culture and each culture is more or less unique. This way strategic culture should be understood as a concept offering findings to a particular state respectively, rather than generating universally valid outcomes.[8]

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[3] Ibid, 35.
[4] John Glenn, "Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?," *International Studies Review* 11, no. 3 (2009): 530.
[5] Edward Lock, "Refining strategic culture: return of the second generation," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 03 (2010): 5.
[6] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", 32.
[7] Ibid, 34-35.
[8] Alan Bloomfield, "Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 3 (2012):438.

Two core arguments can be identified throughout the body of literature. First, scholars agree on the basic idea that cultural differences will lead to different strategic choices of the respective communities, when acting in a similar strategic environment. Secondly, there is a mutual understanding that culture can change, but typically changes slowly. This way, strategic preferences of a given community are likely to be consistent and persistent.[9] Despite these basic shared assumptions of strategic culture however, the concept is widely debated. This lack of a clear conceptualization renders "strategic culture a difficult concept to deploy".[10] To avoid this trap, the main aspects of debate will first be outlined. It will then be defined how the concept of strategic culture is deployed in the following analysis.

1.1. Strategic culture as a highly contested concept

Despite shared core understandings of strategic culture, scholars do not agree on basic interpretations of the concept. Debates circle around questions as fundamental as what strategic culture incorporates, what it can and cannot explain and how it does so. While focusing on research about the relationship between culture and strategic behaviour of a country, scholars disagree on the explanatory power of strategic culture, if it is an explanatory variable causing strategic behaviour, an intervening variable conditioning behaviour or a constituent of behaviour. The various differences regarding the concept of strategic culture are most visible in the popular debate about the concept's nature and analysis between Iain Johnston and Colin Gray. The debate is also known as the debate between the first and the third generation, based on Johnston's elaboration of three generations of strategic culture, placing Colin Gray in the first and himself in the third generation. At the core of the debate is "the question of whether or not strategic culture should be conceptually distinguished from strategic behaviour."[11]

Johnston's conceptualisation is based on the attempt to measure the causal effect of strategic culture on state behaviour. His main criticism of the first generation of the early 1980s is their understanding of strategic culture as "the product of nearly all

[9] Lock, "Refining strategic culture", 6.; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", 48.
[10] Bloomfield, "Time to Move On", 438.
[11] Lock, "Refining strategic culture", 6 and 9.

relevant explanatory variables" and its "all-encompassing nature".[12] The sheer amount of variables constituting strategic culture can be seen as a core problem of the first generation. In that view, a concept incorporating "all things strategic", including a variety of ideational and material factors ranging from geography, to history to technology and political culture lacks explanatory power.[13] Johnston titles the first generation the generation of over-determined and under-determined explanations, stressing their difficulty of distinguishing strategic cultural explanations from non-cultural explanations of strategic choice. According to Johnston, the first generation lacks the ability to spot what aspects of strategic behaviour are affected by strategic culture and to what degree, as well as to take into account a potential instrumentality of the concept.[14] In order to rectify the identified problematics, Johnston follows a positivist conceptualisation of strategic culture. He therefore treats strategic culture as an independent explanatory variable among other non-cultural ones and particular decisions as dependent variables. Behaviour is thereby explicitly excluded from the definition of culture.[15]

This is where Colin Gray and other scholars such as Forrest E. Morgan, Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka disagree. Multiple scholars not only of the first generation deny the possibility to distinguish behaviour from culture and to treat strategic culture as an independent variable.[16] "Such an approach is flawed because culture does not act independently. (…) Therefore, while it is standard practice in scientific inquiry to study a given phenomenon as an independent variable, doing so cannot yield reliable results in a study of culture's effects on behaviour."[17]

According to Gray, "strategic culture should be approached both as a shaping context for behaviour and itself as a constituent of that behaviour." His notion that strategic culture exists as "'strategic attitudes' in the heads of policy-makers"[18] and this

[12] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", 37-38.
[13] Bloomfield, "Time to Move On", 438-439.
[14] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", 36-39.
[15] Bloomfield, "Time to Move On", 443; Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", 41.
[16] Bloomfield, "Time to Move On", 448.
[17] Forrest E. Morgan, *Compellence and the strategic culture of imperial Japan: implications for coercive diplomacy in the twenty-first century* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003): 8.
[18] Colin S. Grey, "Strategic Culture as Context: the First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 56.

way constitutes behaviour goes in line with Johnston's position that strategic culture leads to strategic preferences of decision-makers. The crux, however, lies in the first part of Gray's definition, describing strategic culture moreover as context and "something out there".[19] While Gray agrees that there is "more to (…) strategic behaviour than culture alone", he stresses the fact that behaviour is always carried out by people and institutions that are on one hand encultured and on the other form the culture at the same time. Denying the interdependence between culture and behaviour for the sake of measurement and definitional clarity is thus perceived as a "clear error".[20] Crucial to Gray's conceptualization of strategic culture is his proclaimed consequence for rejecting culture as an independent variable. According to Gray, the unity of cultural influence and behaviour denies a cause-and-effect analysis. "If there is cause in the effect how can cause be assessed for its effect?"[21] This, however, limits the utility of the concept when trying to assess the relationship between culture and behaviour.

1.2. A solution to the problem?

Given the nature of culture, Gray is generally correct in rejecting the possibility to treat culture as being distinct from behaviour. It is an inherent trait of culture and hence of strategic culture to influence as well as being influenced by actors and action. From this view, strategic culture is seen as a complex set of various, mutually influenced and country-specific factors, taking into account the state's past behaviour and developments. Denying strategic culture its complexity for the sake of a clearer analysis ignores the reality and nature of culture. In contrast to Johnston's claim, it is argued that the variety of ideational and material factors constituting a strategic culture does thereby not lack explanatory power.

By looking at past behaviour and attitudes of (state) actors in various contexts as well as the current situation of a country, it is possible to analyse and identify a country-specific strategic culture including behaviour tendencies. According to Thomas U. Berger, "for analytical purposes it is [further] possible to disaggregate policy behavior

[19] Bloomfield, "Time to Move On", 446.
[20] Grey, "Strategic Culture as Context: the First Generation of Theory Strikes Back", 50-52.
[21] Ibid, 56.

and the meanings that political actors and the general public attach to those policies, as reflected in public opinion polls, parliamentary debates, books and articles written by opinion leaders, newspaper editorials, and so forth".[22] The multiple factors together make up for a country's strategic culture and form a unique set of decisive strategic preferences and attitudes, which can be identified and singled out. These cultural strands and preferences influence the specific strategic decision-making process in a given country. Following this line of thought, strategic culture is displayed in certain ideas and preferences which exist prior to and affect the entire rational process.[23] This logic in turn offers a timely distinction between strategic culture and actors' decision-making in a given moment of analysis, and hence allows treating strategic culture as "a causal factor in its own right".[24]

In other words, in order to properly deploy the concept of strategic culture, one should follow a two-step approach. The first step is a thorough analysis of the strategic culture of the country or community on hand at the time of interest. The second step involves the analysis of how the identified strategic culture affects the decision-making process of the case to be analysed.

1.2.1. The two-step approach

Regarding the first step, elaborating a specific strategic culture involves the identification of main attitudes and strategic preferences as well as the identification of main factors and functions influencing the decision-making process of a country on hand. A state's behaviour clearly is not a direct mirror of culturally shared believes. Rather, such believes and attitudes are translated into policies through various channels and multiple actors. Policy-making procedures thereby vary from country to country. The same is true for the amount of influence of elites vis-a-vis the general public, among others. A thorough analysis and identification of a strategic culture hence includes the identification of underlying influential believes and attitudes regarding strategic considerations as well as defining elements of a country's typical decision-making processes, including major actors and influential procedures. Berger follows a

[22] Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan," in *The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein*, 7.
[23] Bloomfield, "Time to Move On", 445.
[24] Glenn, "Realism versus Strategic Culture", 544.

similar approach to study a country's political-military culture. His multi-layered research strategy envisions to first "investigate the original set of historical experiences that define how a given society views the military, national security, and the use of force" and secondly assess "the political process through which actual security policy was made and how particular decisions were subsequently legitimated (…) at a *particular point in time*". He thirdly points out the "necessity to examine the evolution of both the political-military culture and defence policies over time, monitoring how they evolved in response to historical events."[25]

As mentioned above, strategic culture is broadly understood as being subject to change. Early scholars of strategic culture, however, stressed the slow pace of change, which renders strategic culture a rather sticky concept, viewing the change itself as being of secondary importance. When focusing on change, it was treated as an exceptional event caused by external shocks disrupting the slow change process.[26] Berger for example claimed that drastic change in strategic culture was possible, but "only if they are challenged by a major external shock"[27], such as a military attack, a revolution or other major crises. In his view, a change in strategic culture equals the rejection of core historic narratives and past believes, which would require their thorough discrediting and a society being "under great strain".[28] More recently, however, an increasing body of literature appeared concentrating on the question how and when culture changes despite exceptional interferences.[29] The focus is thereby on a more dynamic understanding of strategic culture. Firstly, strategic culture is viewed as a complex entity composed of multiple influential factors, actors and beliefs, which interact with each other and show different levels of resistance to change. Hence, various factors reaching from structural changes to individual actors have the potential to influence strategic culture and lead to change.[30] Secondly, it is argued, that strategic culture should not be understood as a coherent entity. Alan Bloomfield correctly points

[25] Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan", 267.
[26] Pietro Pirani, "Elites in Action: Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture," *Political Studies Review* 14, no. 4 (2016), doi:10.1111/1478-9302.12058: 512-513.
[27] Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan", 2.
[28] Ibid, 6.
[29] For a detailed analysis on literature regarding startegic culture and change see Pirani, Pietro, "Elites in Action: Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture", *Political Studies Review* 14, no. 4 (2016): 512-520.
[30] Pirani, "Elites in Action", 513.

out that a feasible model "requires conceptualizing a state's strategic culture as a singular entity which contains 'contradictory elements' [and] various 'strains'", which he refers to as "competing subcultures".[31] At times these various strategic cultural strands are contending for dominance and influence in strategic decision-making.[32]. These potential clashes are thereby a vehicle for change. In consequence, given the changing nature of strategic culture, it is important to identify a country's strategic culture at the respective time of the case to be analysed.

Once strategic cultural strands and main elements of strategic decision-making are detected, it can be analysed how they influence the decision-making process of the chosen case. It is important to realise that the effect of strategic culture on a given decision-making process is highly context specific, depending on the surrounding environment as well as actors involved. John S. Duffield elaborated a framework of analysis for a state's policy behaviour incorporating both domestic political settings and attitudes as well as a country's external environment and institutional setting at the given time.[33] Whereas the concept of strategic culture is often limited to the structural perspective[34], this approach points to the necessity to incorporate aspects of rational decision-making and the actual actors involved in the process. Thereby a more rational-technical analysis can be applied.[35] Strategic culture in fact does by no means reject the realist principle of rationality in decision-making. According to Johnston, "rather than rejecting rationality per se as a factor in strategic choice, the strategic culture approach challenges the ahistorical, non-cultural neorealist framework for analyzing strategic choices." Also, Janice Bially Mattern stresses core realist principles within the strategic culture approach. According to the author, even when focusing on the discursive power, strategic culture does not dismiss the relevancy of power politics.[36]

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[31] Bloomfield, "Time to Move On", 451.
[32] Ibid, 452.
[33] John S. Duffield, *World power forsaken: political culture, international institutions, and German security policy after unification* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998): 13 and 16-24.
[34] Klaus Brummer, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 9, no. 1 (2013): 3.
[35] Ibid, 451.
[36] Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering international politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force* (New York: Routledge, 2005): 22.

While applying the two step approach, the thesis follows a conventional constructivist conception of strategic culture as defined by John Glenn. In this conception, culture is understood as affecting the identity of a state and state interests are seen as being dependent on the domestic cultural context. Most importantly for the thesis on hand, the conventional constructivist's conception of strategic culture "seeks to explore causal explanations for regular patterns of state behavior and to generate contingent generalizations from their work", this way being able "to establish comparative explanatory models either across cases or across time".[37] Such a comparison can be seen as an optional third step. Engaging in process tracing and comparing cases which occur within the same time period and are thus subject to the same strategic culture thereby allows scholars to draw generalisations from their findings to identify behavioural tendencies of a state and this way predict future foreign policy behaviour.

1.3. Limitations and Requirements

Deploying the concept of strategic culture comes with certain limitations and requirements. As outlined above, key controversies surround the relationship between strategic culture and policy behaviour, the question of change in a strategic culture and how to best deploy the concept. A main reason for this inconsistency in the body of literature is the nature of culture itself. Given its complexity and dynamic, one can argue that culture can never be fully comprehended. Various conceptions of culture in turn lead to distinct understandings of cultural dynamics in the literature.[38]

In that regard, John Glenn developed four conceptions of strategic culture, namely the epiphenomenal, the conventional constructivist, the post-structuralist and the interpretivist conception of strategic culture. The first two conceptions identify intervening or causal variables and follow a generalization approach to explain identifiable behavioural patterns. The latter two conceptions, on the other hand, deal with strategic culture on a case-by-case basis, following a hermeneutic or interpretive methodology.[39] Glenn's reason behind the conceptual division is "to highlight the

[37] Glenn, "Realism versus Strategic Culture", 533 and 544.
[38] Pirani, "Elites in Action", 512.
[39] Glenn, "Realism versus Strategic Culture", 531-539.

ramifications for those seeking to pursue a strategic culture research program."[40] Deploying one conception is hence not better than applying another. Glenn's approach rather stresses the importance of being aware that distinct conceptions of strategic culture lead to different angles of analysis, research objectives and methodology.

In consequence, two considerations are required when deploying the concept of strategic culture. First, the lack of a clear conceptualization within the body of literature demands clear definitions of how the concept of strategic culture is deployed in the work on hand. By defining what conception of strategic culture is used, what it is set out to explain and how to explain it, the analysis allows for transparency and traceability. Being subject to change and formed by historic experience further raises the set of problems identified by Johnston as "the process of deriving an observable strategic culture."[41] What time period is represented in the culture on hand? What sources should be used to analyse the current strategic culture? Do we take into account the last 10, 50 or 100 years? And staying with Johnston, "How is strategic culture transmitted through time?"[42] The answers to these questions vary from country to country and can differ among the scholars dealing with strategic culture. Hence, each country-specific analysis further requires a clear identification of what time period will be regarded as influential for a given strategic culture and what years will be concentrated on in analysing the strategic culture of the country on hand.

Second, given the nature of strategic culture, one should not have the aspiration to develop mathematical-like cause-and-effect relations between strategic culture and foreign-policy behaviour, but understand the dynamic character of strategic culture. In contrast to most attempts of explaining and predicting state behaviour, the concept recognises the importance of culture to understand strategic issues and serves as a valuable tool to explain and analyse foreign policy behaviour.[43] Nevertheless, given the complexity of strategic culture and that it can be subject to change, predictions on a state's behaviour cannot be made with 100 percent accuracy but do present *a well-*

[40] Ibid, 530.
[41] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", 39.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Rashed Uz Zaman, "Strategic Culture: A "Cultural" Understanding of War," *Comparative Strategy* 28, no. 1 (2009): 68.

educated guess based on the identified general tendencies for strategic decision-making of the country on hand.

In order to assess the influence of strategic culture on Germany's deployment decision-making in the two cases of the DR Congo in 2006 and Libya 2011, the thesis will thus first identify Germany's strategic culture in the early 2000s. Thereby the origin and further developments of Germany's strategic culture will be accounted for. In the second step, the effect of the strategic culture on Germany's rational decision-making will be analysed. Thereby the thesis follows a conventional constructivist conception of strategic culture. Given the decisiveness of Germany's strategic culture in understanding both Germany's engagement in the DR Congo and non-engagement in Libya, generalizations will then be drawn from the two cases to answer the question why Germany engages in some multilateral military operations but not in others.

2. Germany's strategic culture

For deploying the concept of strategic culture, Germany serves as a particularly interesting case. Most importantly, Germany's unconditional capitulation at the end of the Second World War led it to a construction of a completely new strategic culture. The time of Germany's capitulation is commonly referred to as "zero hour". On one hand, the term refers to the physical as well as moral and psychological devastation in Germany at the end of the war. On the other hand, "zero hour" is widely understood as Germany's "fresh start". Whereas the term is contested, it does express the drastic break with the past and the beginning of a new chapter for Germany.[44] This major "external shock" allows pinpointing the time of formative origin of Germany's current strategic culture to the time period post 1945. Following Berger's conditions for the possibility of drastic change of a state's strategic culture, Germany's society was "under great strain" and former hold values and beliefs were "thoroughly discredited" by the denazification of Germany under allied occupation.[45] Therefore "[the] formative period in the

[44] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 26.
[45] Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan", 6.

emergence of the Federal Republic's strategic culture is arguably far easier to locate than that of other cases."[46]

Secondly, the continuity of Germany's restricted foreign policy aspirations after the war despite various changes in the external environment renders Germany a show-case model for the relevancy of strategic culture to explain strategic behaviour. What made the German case particularly intriguing for scholars of strategic culture is the lack of Germany's reorientation of its security policy after the Cold War despite the major change in geopolitical circumstances, thereby confiding neorealist expectations. Instead of seeking to regain the status of a traditional great power and pressing for the removal of foreign troops on its territory, developing significant conventional capabilities or engaging unilaterally in regional conflicts, Germany continued its moderate and internationally integrated foreign policy approach.[47] According to Berger, the fact that Germany did not break from its restrained security policies confirms the existence and effect of an underlying culture of antimilitarism.[48] Strategic culture, it is argued, can hence serve as an alternative and arguably more authentic form of explanation than traditional realist ones.[49]

Following the two-step approach for deploying the concept of strategic culture, one first has to analyse and identify Germany's strategic culture, its various strands and behavioural tendencies at the time of the case studies. Berger's multi-layered research strategy as outlined above is therefore seen as most adequate. The thesis will focus on the first years after Germany's capitulation as "the formative period" and origin of the "foundational elements" of Germany's strategic culture.[50] Nevertheless, Germany underwent major changes in the following years moving from a state of occupation, to careful rearmament in West Germany, to becoming a united, sovereign state in 1990, and continuous foreign policy developments thereafter. To analyse Germany's strategic culture of the early 21st century, developments since 1945 will be taken into account. By

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[46] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 25.
[47] John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism" (1999). *Political Science Faculty Publications* 42, (1999): 9.
[48] Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan", 1-2.
[49] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 11-12.
[50] The notions of "formative period" and "foundational elements" are taken from Kelly Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force.*

concentrating on major foreign policy events such as Germany's unification and the end of the Cold War, the country's participation in the Kosovo-war 1999, its involvement in Afghanistan 2001 and non-participation in Iraq 2003, the potential evolution of Germany's strategic culture up until the early 2000s will be assessed.

2.1. The Origins of Germany's Strategic Culture

The devastating consequences of the Second World War led to a new strategic culture in West Germany, which drastically differed from historical believes. Before the war, Germany could be described as highly militaristic with the military enjoying social prestige and notable political influence. As Berger points out, "[Germany's] status as great military power(…) was central to [its] national self-understanding(…)".[51] In light of the disastrous Second World War and Germany's defeat, the mood and perception of the German society shifted tremendously. The horrors and consequences of the Nazi dictatorship discredited main elements of formerly hold believes.[52] The change was fostered by the Western Allies' denazification program of West Germany, including the high-profile Nurnberg trials for war crimes of political and military leaders, adaptions of the school curriculum and anti-military and anti-Nazi propaganda expressing Germany's militarily as well as "moral defeat".[53] As a consequence, core concepts of identity, nationhood and power underwent revision.[54] In a quest to determine what had went wrong, nationalism, excessive militarism and Prussian authoritarianism were thought responsible for the two world wars.[55] Being traumatised and disillusioned with nationalist ambitions and the power of force, Germany's militaristic past was rejected creating a strong sense of antimilitarism and the feeling of "Never again".[56] As a consequence, West Germans followed the stance that the military was to never again play a central role within Germany and generally rejected the use of force in

[51] Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan", 8.
[52] John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *Political Science Faculty Publications* 42 (1999): 31.
[53] Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan", 9.
[54] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 26.
[55] Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 3 (2005): 344.
[56] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 28.

international affairs. Instead, given its recent history, West Germany's special responsibility to engage in conflict resolution and advocate for peace was stressed.[57]

The strong antimilitary posture contrasted with the emerging Cold War and the threat of communism. The Western powers and their expectations from and demands on West Germany in light of the Cold War influenced the emerging German strategic culture.[58] According to the US and UK, a contribution and hence a rearmament of West Germany displayed an essential aspect for the West's security by precluding ideas of Germany as a neutral zone in the middle of Europe and securing West Germany as a partner instead. Rearmament was broadly seen as inevitable. Hence a focus was set to ensure "West Germany was on the 'right side'".[59] Domestically, the question of rearmament was highly debated. The left-wing opposition rejected the idea straight away, fearing it would interfere with the rout to national unity. The centre-right government under Konrad Adenauer on the other hand understood its perks. Under Adenauer, West Germany strove to regain its status as a sovereign state, acquire international rehabilitation and being seen as an equal partner. The chancellor thereby accepted that armed forces were a necessary requirement for sovereignty, granting meaning and political influence to West Germany.[60] At the same time, it was essential to reassure the Western allies, opposing forces as well as the own public that rearmament and increased sovereignty did not mean a return to former notions of militarism and unilateral force.[61] Given Germany's history, any new source of mistrust was to be avoided. The solution lied in replacing former nationalism with a strategic, political and moral integration within the West. A main precept for the process of German rearmament, rehabilitation and reconstruction hence became the mantra of "Never again alone".[62]

The precept found its expression in Germany's profound commitment to multilateralism and deep integration in Western Institutions. Throughout their ranks, German political leaders rejected the notion of unilateralism. It was believed that acting

[57] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes", 344.
[58] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 2.
[59] Ibid, 29.
[60] Ibid, 30-34.
[61] Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan", 10.
[62] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture", 344.

alone would necessarily lead to diplomatic isolation, insecurity and conflict.[63] The Euro-Atlantic framework was seen "as the only context in which security for the Federal Republic could be attained as well as that within which any West German defence contribution should thus be realised."[64] West Germany's rearmament and the founding of the German army finally occurred against the backdrop of its membership in the Western European Union in 1954 and NATO 1955.[65] This way, Germany engaged in a conscious and strict dependence on allied command structures.[66]

The new German army was further limited to various other restrictions. Both Left and Right parties were determined not to allow the military a similar political role as of before 1945.[67] The deeply felt mistrust and unease against the military led to a system of civilian control, which is still valid today. For one, the civilian minister of defence (and in time of crisis the chancellor) assumes the supreme command. At the same time, the Inspector General holding the highest military position acts only as a military advisor to the civilian superiors. Furthermore, defence matters are under scrutiny of the German Parliament.[68] A second dimension of restrictions can be seen in the limits on when and how to apply force, stressing the army's purely defensive nature. Article 87a of Germany's Basic Law denies Germany from engaging in offensive warfare: "The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence", with the remark that "Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law."[69] The role of the newly established German army was seen as restricted to territorial defence of the nation and its NATO allies or strictly humanitarian issues. Generally, West Germany expressed a strong preference for economic, political and diplomatic instruments in its foreign policy.[70] In context of the

[63] Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism", 35.
[64] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 35.
[65] Ibid., 37.
[66] Martin Zapfe, "Strategic Culture Shaping Allied Integration: The Bundeswehr and Joint Operational Doctrine," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 2 (2016): 249.
[67] Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan", 9.
[68] Zapfe, "Strategic Culture Shaping Allied Integration", 251.
[69] Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 87a.
[70] Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior", 33-34.

strategic culture, it is worth noting that these partially institutionalised restrictions were pushed forward entirely by West Germany and the German army themselves.[71]

The foundational elements of the German strategic culture must be seen as a product of both historic experiences and Cold War realities.[72] Germany's recent history as the "domain of shame and guilt" led to the rejection of statism, nationalism and unilateralism as well as the dismissal of former hold identity traits and values projected to militarism and the use of force. At the same time, the urge for close cooperation and multilateralism to secure Western as well as domestic security objectives were manifested in light of the Cold War.[73] Together, the two strands of *antimilitarism* on one hand and *multilateralism* on the other formed a German "culture of reticence".[74] Sets of assumptions and policies emerged "that honoured both precepts" of the West German strategic culture. For one thing, West Germany set a focus on cooperation and building trust with its partners. The country committed to pursue a responsible and accountable security policy based on compromise and consensus building domestically and with its international partners. For another, antimilitarist sentiments led to the demilitarization of international affairs, a defensive military posture and the integration of the armed forces within society and civilian politics as well as with NATO command structures.[75]

The origin of Germany's strategic culture can hence be pinpointed to the first years after the Second World War and the influence of the traumatic historic experience together with the emerging Cold War. The foundational elements of West Germany's strategic culture thereby circle around the two cultural strands of antimilitarism and multilateralism. In the second step, the potential evolution of the German strategic culture will be assessed by analysing main foreign policy events up until the early 2000s, namely the effects of Germany's reunification and the end of the Cold War, Germany's military participation in Kosovo 1999 and Afghanistan 2001 as well as its refusal to engage in the Iraq war in 2003.

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[71] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 36.
[72] Jeffrey Lantis, "The Moral Imperative of Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in Kosovo," *Comparative Strategy* 21, no. 1 (2002): 22.
[73] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 46.
[74] Lantis, "The Moral Imperative of Force", 22.
[75] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture", 344; Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 47.

2.2. Germany's Reunification and the End of the Cold War

The persistence of Germany's strategic culture throughout the first decades could be explained by the Cold War acting "as a cocoon", restricting attitudes and policy behaviour. Germany's strategic culture and security policies originated, manifested and were legitimised entirely in the context of the Cold War. Regarding the use of force, the one purpose of Germany's military was to deter and defend against the Soviet threat. "Virtually no thought was given to using the Bundeswehr outside of the NATO area".[76] The End of the Cold War and Germany's reunification, however, broke that cocoon. Suddenly Germany found itself in a new security environment with internal and external pressure to respond to the new security challenges.[77] Germany's reunification had in fact little impact on its strategic culture and external state behaviour, despite East and West Germany's vastly differing experiences and developments throughout their 45 years of division. East Germans only made up for 20 percent of the overall German population and being preoccupied with own "everyday issues" they showed little interest in Germany's foreign and security policy.[78] The drastic change in geopolitics on the other hand posed a challenge to Germany's post-war security policies and the careful balancing of its strategic cultural strands.

New forms of conflict such as the Gulf War in the early 1990s displayed an emerging discord between expectations of Germany's allies for an increased security role of Germany and its internal fears and reluctance of military engagement, especially regarding out-of-area missions.[79] The German left-wing in particular pointed to the legal restrictions of Article 87a, limiting military missions to the defence within NATO territory, and underlined Germany's historical responsibility to restrain from the use of military force.[80] Conservatives on the other hand stressed the importance of alliance solidarity. It was argued that in light of the changing security environment, Germany had the "moral and political debt" regarding its allies to take on more responsibility in accordance with the county's economic strength. Not joining its partners would damage

[76] Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior", 44.
[77] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 50 and 54.
[78] Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior", 31-32.
[79] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 58.
[80] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture", 346-347.

Germany's international reputation and risk its isolation.[81] In short, the new context led to a clash between Germany's antimilitaristic stance and reluctance towards participating in international military missions and its commitment to multilateralism and acting as a reliable partner.[82]

Nevertheless, increased international pressure served as a powerful tool within the domestic debate, triggering Germans' urge to act as a good ally. As a result, the German government engaged in a strategy of constantly stretching the boundaries of military force deployment. Whereas German soldiers did not participate in the 1991 Gulf War, Germany helped monitor a sea embargo in 1992 against Serbia-Montenegro, supported a no fly-zone in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, and even provided logistical and medical support to the UN mission in Somalia 1993. Cloaking this peace-enforcing operation as purely humanitarian, the Somalia-mission became Germany's first out-of-area military deployment since the Second World War.[83] The legal debate regarding out-of-area missions was finally solved by a ruling of the Constitutional Court in 1994, rendering out-of-area missions as constitutional, under the precondition of parliamentary approval.[84] Without doubt, Germany's security policies underwent changes in the 1990s which involved the breach of formerly hold taboos and a less controversial stance on military force as a security policy tool.[85]

While adapting to the new security environment however, Germany's foreign policy behaviour remained in line with the precepts of multilateralism and military restraint in contrast to many (neorealist) expectations. It is important to note that Germany's increased international military role came with substantial restrictions. Given Germany's antimilitaristic strand, participation typically occurred on a small scale, required a clear humanitarian objective and was limited to roles which would exclude any risk of actual combat.[86] The changes which occurred in Germany's foreign and security policies throughout the 1990s can hence be explained by Germany finding a new balance between the two cultural strands of multiculturalism and antimilitarism in

[81] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 57; Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior", 47.
[82] Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior", 47.
[83] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture", 346.
[84] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 64.
[85] Ibid, 56.
[86] Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior", 10 and 45.

order to adapt to the new context. It is important to understand the two precepts as "the product of differences of emphasis rather than of irreconcilable positions".[87] The clear restrictions on force despite a changing security environment and international pressure thereby point to a continuous predominance of the stance on antimilitarism.[88]

2.3. The Kosovo War

The War in Kosovo represents an important landmark in the development of Germany's foreign policy behaviour. First of all, Kosovo was the first offensive military combat mission of the German army. Secondly, the military engagement received broad support by the German Parliament and was sanctioned by a newly elected Social Democrat-Green government, a coalition of centre-left parties which formerly emphasised the antimilitarist strand of Germany's strategic culture. Thirdly, the operation was conducted without a clear UN mandate.[89] In light of the developments, one could assume a "normalization" of Germany's foreign and security policy, moving away from the restrictions enforced on Germany's policy behaviour by its (former) strategic culture. A deeper analysis of the case, however, reveals the specific context of the military deployment in Kosovo and suggests that rather than turning away from its strategic culture entirely, Germany engaged in a reinterpretation of the antimilitarist strand and the notion of "Never again".

One reason for an adapted policy stand of Germany's centre-left wing can be seen in political-tactical reasons. Being in power, the vocal pacifists of the former opposition felt the need to present themselves as reliable partners within the Western institutions.[90] As mentioned before, Germany's strategic cultural strands of antimilitarism and multilateralism do not cancel each other out but condition each other. More decisive, however, was the parties' adaption of cultural believes. It was the systematic mass murder of Bosnian Muslims by Serb security forces in the UN 'Safe Area' in Srebrenica in 1995 which led to a rethinking of core believes of many pacifists.[91] Following Berger's notion on cultural change, the mass killing can be understood as an "external

[87] Ibid, 49.
[88] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 49.
[89] Ibid, 69-70.
[90] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture", 348.
[91] Ibid 347-348.

shock" challenging existing believes and triggering policy options which would not have been considered earlier on.[92] Political and diplomatic efforts of NATO and Germany in particular neither stopped the humanitarian catastrophe 1995 nor resolved the crisis thereafter. Massacres and humanitarian tragedies in the Balkans in the 1990s hence revealed the moral dilemma of strict pacifism.

The purely antimilitaristic strand was taken on by using the morality argument of pacifists themselves. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder for example legitimised the military deployment in Kosovo by stressing Germany's "moral obligation" with "no other option open but to end the murdering in Kosovo".[93] The notion of "Germany's historic responsibility to oppose war" as a corner stone of especially the left-wing's take on Germany's antimilitarism shifted towards the common understanding of Germany's historic responsibility to combat human rights abuse and aggressions against civilians.[94] This shift of thinking could also be observed within the general public. A public survey conducted in early 1999 revealed that 61% of Germans supported the NATO airstrikes.[95] The new perspective on military force did not, however, eradicate Germany's cultural strand of antimilitarism. Rather, the preconception was adapted to allow for a legitimate use of force under distinct conditions. The war in Kosovo revealed a new balance between the strands of multilateralism and antimilitarism, leading to a foreign policy which would allow the use of force if being deployed within a multilateral framework, as last resort and in order to combat large-scale human suffering.[96]

Looking at Germany's role in Kosovo in more detail, one can further identify Germany's ongoing "culture of reticence" when it comes to the use of force. In its more than 500 air force missions, Germany solely concentrated on striking radar sites and engaging in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) sorties. German forces thereby were not equipped with any precision guided missiles. Their contribution did, nevertheless, support the allies' strike aircrafts and was appreciated by the NATO

[92] Lantis, "The Moral Imperative of Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in Kosovo", 38.
[93] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 71-72; Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture", 347.
[94] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture", 347-349.
[95] Lantis, "The Moral Imperative of Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in Kosovo", 29.
[96] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture", 350.

partners.[97] At the same time, Germany's strong preference of diplomacy prevailed. Germany's Kosovo policy was characterised by a 'dual-track' approach. On one hand, Germany actively engaged in NATO's bombing campaign. On the other, the German government kept pushing for a diplomatic solution trying to avert the use of force.[98] These developments outline the continuous German wariness regarding the use of force, despite its first offensive military mission.

2.4. The War in Afghanistan

Germany's decision process to participate in the war in Afghanistan displays the fragility of the newly found balance between Germany's urge to be a reliable partner and its continuous wariness towards the use of military force. According to Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Afghanistan approached the limit of what the German working consensus could sustain".[99] As an immediate response to the events of 9/11, Chancellor Schröder pledged "unconditional solidarity" with the US. Being driven by its traditional preference for multilateralism, Germany thereby actively pushed for a consolidation of an international alliance against terrorism, using political as well as military means. With the objective to avoid a US unilateral response which might escalate the conflict in the Middle East, Germany worked towards a joint EU diplomatic response and strengthening the UN-engagement with a focus on post-war reconstruction.[100]

A formal US request for military contribution compelled the German government however, to make true on the pledge of unconditional support including military engagement. Nevertheless, the decision to send troops to the US-led anti-terrorist Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was domestically highly debated. Especially members of Schröder's own governing coalition pointed to the potential suffering of the Afghan population in case of war and demanded to include political and social measures as a vital part of the operation.[101] The debate led to a vote of confidence on Chancellor Schröder to force support for the mission. Schröder thereby justified his decision for a German military contribution by stressing the importance of being seen as a reliable

[97] Douglas Peifer, "Why Germany Won't Be Dropping Bombs on Syria, Iraq or Mali," *Orbis* 60, no. 2 (2016): 274.
[98] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 72.
[99] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes", 350.
[100] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 82-83.
[101] Ibid, 84.

partner willing to support its allies in matters of international security. In the end, Schröder won the vote and troop deployment passed the parliament by only a little.[102]

America's call for action and the invocation of the mutual defence clause of NATO in 2001 put great pressure on the German government to push for military engagement. Besides participating in the US-led anti-terror operation, Germany became a major contributor for the NATO-led International Assistance Force mission (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Since 2002 one could thereby note a constant shift of German forces away from the anti-terrorist operation and towards a continuous expansion of the ISAF stabilisation mission in Afghanistan.[103] Even though OEF and ISAF presented the first combat experience of Germany's ground forces,[104] the government portrayed the Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan as a humanitarian and stability operation to the public, concentrating on elements such as building schools. The ongoing sensitivity of the topic of force deployment was further displayed in Germany's rejection to send combat aircraft and attack helicopters for ground-troop support.[105] Overall, the complex debate about Germany's participation in the Afghan War reaffirmed ongoing wariness and constrains concerning Germany's military engagement in international conflicts.

2.5. The non-engagement in Iraq

Whereas Germany's traditional loyalty to its partners compelled the country to follow the US call for military contribution in Afghanistan despite concerns, a participation in Iraq was a step too far. In 2003, Germany denied military support to the US anti-terror operation in Iraq. The case thus serves as a vivid example portraying the limits of Germany's military engagement.

As outlined above, Germany's unique strategic culture conditioned the use of force based on three main principles, namely the need to act within a multilateral framework, being a last resort and combating humanitarian suffering. Apart from that, Germany followed a strict preference of political and economic tools in its foreign policy. The US policy towards Iraq starkly contrasted with Germany's strategic culture

[102] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture",350; Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force*, 85.
[103] Meiers, "Made in Berlin". Wohin steuert die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?", 681.
[104] Zapfe, "Strategic Culture Shaping Allied Integration", 252.
[105] Peifer, "Why Germany Won't Be Dropping Bombs on Syria, Iraq or Mali", 274.

and its understanding of legitimate foreign policy behaviour. As opposed to Germany, the US foreign policy under George W. Bush placed its military force at its core. The USA secondly followed a unilateral stance ignoring consultative and multilateral platforms and thirdly neglected any post-conflict strategy. Fourthly, America's war on terror became grounded in the notion of pre-emptive strikes against various sovereign states identified as "the axis of evil", including Iran and North Korea next to Iraq.[106] Strikes against potential future threats carried out by a coalition of the willing would not only deny the use of multilateral fora but also contradict the notion of force as a last resort. The war was further feared to risk escalation with mass casualties. As a result, despite the US being a long-time ally, the centre-left government under Schröder issued an unconditional 'no' to a German military contribution in Iraq. Rather than confrontation, Germany argued for containment.[107]

Given traditional anti-war sentiments, the decision earned massive support of the German public. Internationally, however, Germany's harsh no caused a rupture in the US-German relationship and left Berlin isolated.[108] The domestic opposition rallied against the chancellor's move, accusing him to have sacrificed Germany's international standing for the sake of a second term in office. Germany's deeply hold aversion towards unilateralism and fear of isolation consequently triggered two main responses to reduce the damage. On one hand, Germany engaged in active "counter-balancing" against the US, bringing other European states behind its position and improving relationships with France and Russia. The government kept emphasising "how Germany did not stand alone". On the other hand, Germany engaged in soothing the conflict with the US. Against domestic protests, Germany granted the US unrestricted use of its bases in Germany for the time of the war and engaged in non-military reconstruction activities in Iraq, striving to build a democratic-Iraqi state.[109]

Even though Germany denied military support to a long-term ally, both antimilitarist and multilateral considerations defined Germany's foreign policy in 2003. Germany's non-engagement can in fact be understood as a manifestation of the deeply

[106] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force,* 89 and 150-151.
[107] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture", 350-351.
[108] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force,* 90.
[109] Dalgaard-Nielsen, "The Test of Strategic Culture", 352-353.

felt belief in multilateralism and a restricted use of force.[110] This way, the case of Iraq expresses clear limits on Germany's commitment to international military operations.

2.6. Conclusion: Germany's Strategic Culture in the early 2000s

Germany's horrific experiences under the Nazi-regime together with its unconditional capitulation and the emergence of the Cold War ingrained a strong aversion of statism, nationalism and unilateralism as well as anti-war and pacifist sentiments in Germany's collective memory together with the urge to act as a reliable partner and engage in international cooperation. These attitudes and deeply hold believes can be summed up into the two strands of multilateralism and antimilitarism. Together, they form the backbone of Germany's new strategic culture, restraining Germany's foreign policy behaviour. Changes in the international environment nevertheless triggered adaptions in Germany's security policies. The new security context after the Cold War led to an expansion of the role of the German army with increased international military involvement. Afghanistan and Iraq on the other hand demonstrated the limits of the trend and the ongoing relevance of the two precepts of multilateralism and antimilitarism in Germany's foreign policy. Various scholars agree on the persistence of the key strands of Germany's strategic culture.[111]

The identified changes in Germany's behaviour did thus not represent a reversal of its strategic culture, but are expressions of an evolution on the interpretations of the two main cultural strands. Regarding Germany's strategic culture of the early 21st

[110] Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force,* 151.

[111] See for example Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force,* 147: "German strategic culture was not changed by the ending of the Cold War; rather, it successfully adapted during the 1990s to its new circumstances."; further, Schmitt "side(s) with Longhurst, Giegerich and Mirow to argue that elements of the German culture of restraint still have an influence." (Olivier Schmitt, "Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 1 (2012)); Also Duffield ascribes to Germany's "ongoing cooperative approach to security" and "[emphasis on] the use of non-military means wherever possible", resembling foreign policy criteria "unusual for a country of Germany's size and overall importance in world affairs." (p.10 and 46.); According to Berger, shifts in Germany's national security display adjustments to changes in the international system rather than a shift from the core principles of Germany's strategic culture, hence "despite profound changes in their external security environments, German (…) policy makers have acted in a manner consistent with the core principles of the political-military cultures established by their nations in the 1950s and 1960s." (p.23); Dalgaard-Nilsen agrees that the Germany rejecting the participation in Iraq 2003 differed from the Germany abstaining in 1991 Gulf War. Importantly, she explains the change by the "geostrategic context of the 1990s and the nature of the crises of the era (which) permitted competing schools of thought within Germany's strategic culture to converge on a new working consensus", thereby stressing the continuing effect of Germany's strategic cultural strands of multilateralism and antimilitarism (p.356).

century, multilateralism incorporates the importance Germany has attached to international cooperation. The country firmly believes in the need to work through structures of international institutions and abide by their rules.[112] This is especially true for the deployment of military force. Whereas it is important to Germany to proof its willingness and ability to come to its allies' support, coalitions of the willing outside NATO, UN or EU military missions are seen with unease. Nevertheless, one could argue that due to its multilateral stance, international pressure for military engagement and taking on more responsibility does serve as an important trigger for action. Germany's antimilitarist sentiment thereby conditions the military use of force. In doing so, it does not equate to strict pacifism but generally accepts military deployment as a foreign policy tool. This shift of thinking displays an important adaption of Germany's antimilitarist strand. Nevertheless, it demands certain restrictions when it comes to *if* and *how* to apply force.

In order to be seen as legitimate, the use of military force must be acknowledged as decisive. Typically public approval rises when a military operation is perceived as the last resort, with diplomatic instruments having failed in prior endeavours. Nevertheless, troop deployment does not have to be the last means in terms of time, but can be accepted if there is no better measure to fulfil the task.[113] If military engagement does, however, not present the "last or best resort", Germany continues to display a strong preference for political and economic tools in its foreign policy. Secondly, military deployment should be based on humanitarian objectives, combating human rights violations and the harming of civilians. This precondition denies Germany the use of force as means to achieve own national interests.[114] The third precondition requires a multilateral framework for any military deployment. Next to these conditions whether or not to apply force, Germany's antimilitarist cultural strand restricts *how* force is deployed.[115] Wherever possible, Germany refrains from engaging in active combat, with stability measures and post-war reconstructions being main fields of action. German

[112] Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior", 36.
[113] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Federal Minister of Defence Dr. Thomas De Maizière, Plenarprotokoll 17/112, May 27, 2011.
[114] Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer, "All the way? The evolution of German military power," *International Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2008): 219.
[115] Zapfe, "Strategic Culture Shaping Allied Integration: The Bundeswehr and Joint Operational Doctrine", 252.

military contributions typically involve training and advisory tasks, ISR or fuelling and logistic support operations.[116] Whereas Germany is willing to show solidarity and commitment by participating in international missions and risking the lives of own soldiers, the country shies away from the direct use of force and any military activity which could risk civilian casualties.[117] This way, "Bundeswehr operations remain limited to defensive or supportive roles within the context of multinational military operations"[118] and Germany "continues to draw a red line in terms of coercive airpower and direct combat operations."[119]

To conclude, throughout the last decades, Germany experienced clear changes in its policy behaviour towards expanded military engagement with out-of-area operations becoming an established aspect of Germany's foreign policy.[120] Nevertheless, Germany's unique strategic culture continues to restrain its military contributions. Germany's foreign policy behaviour can be seen as a product of finding a functional working balance between the two strands of antimilitarism and multilateralism when responding to pressures of Germany's external environment and domestic debates. Hence, in order to understand Germany's foreign policy behaviour in light of its strategic culture, Germany's political elite, its international allies and the German public all need to be taken into account as relevant actors in the decision-making process. Thereby Germany's strategic culture can as well be *instrumentalised,* most importantly by Germany's elite. Given the right framing, Germany's strategic culture can to a certain degree be used to on one hand justify Germany's restraint behaviour to its international allies, on the other to legitimize troop deployment to the domestic audience. In any case, Germany's strategic culture, based on its antimilitaristic and multilateral strand, is essential to understand whether or not Germany participates in international military operations.

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[116] Bundeswehr, "Abgeschlossene Einsätze der Bundeswehr", https://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/start/abgeschlossene_einsaetze.
[117] Peifer, "Why Germany Won't Be Dropping Bombs on Syria, Iraq or Mali", 276.
[118] Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer, "All the way? The evolution of German military power", 219.
[119] Peifer, "Why Germany Won't Be Dropping Bombs on Syria, Iraq or Mali", 266.
[120] Ibid, 270.

3. Methodology

The overarching research objective of this thesis is to assess Germany's commitment to multilateral military operations. Therefore the two cases of the EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2006 (EUFOR RD Congo) and Germany's non-engagement regarding the conflict escalation in Libya 2011 will serve as the base for a comparative case study. This two-cases-research design allows for a focused comparison of Germany's decision-making. The two cases are chosen for being similar in their set-up, however having led to different results regarding Germany's decision-making process whether or not to engage in the respective conflict. Both cases present military out-of-area engagements which were multilaterally discussed and supported by the UN. Thereby Germany did not have special interests in the DR Congo or in Libya. Furthermore, the cases occurred within five years and thus allow for a comparison within roughly the same time period. Nevertheless, whereas Germany assumed command in the DR Congo and together with France acted as main troop supplier, the country rejected its participation in a planned no-fly zone in Libya. The two cases therefor nicely confirm to the research question why Germany participates in some multilateral military operations but not in others.

It is argued that all states pursue national interests and thereby generally follow a rational decision-making process. Thereby the ultimate decision-makers assess the internal and external environment on the basis of available information, define the situation at hand and based on cost-benefit considerations examine alternate courses of action. The actor strives for a maximisation of utility and selects the action alternative most suitable to satisfy national interests.[121] As mentioned in the theory part of this thesis, the concept of strategic culture is in no means incompatible with rational decision-making. It is on the contrary important to take into account how "rationality" of an actor is effected by given conditions and human psychology. Even neoclassical realists already acknowledged the influence on limited information and perception (see

[121] Laura Neack, *Studying foreign policy comparatively: Cases and analysis*, Fourth Edition, New Millennium Books in International Studies (Lanham Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019): 19-20.

for example security dilemma)[122] as well as psychological phenomena such as actors focusing more on losses than on comparable gains or overweighing certain outcomes in comparison to probable ones (see prospect theory).[123] Following this line of thought, it is not far-fetched to claim a country's strategic culture to influence the rational decision-making as well. While a state assesses the various alternatives based on a cost-benefit analysis, strategic culture affects the scope of the various options considered, the actors perception of issues and the weight assigned to each perceived cost and benefit according to national preferences. It is argued that pure rational thinking alone cannot account for Germany's deployment decisions.

For the analysis of Germany's foreign policy decision-making, three factors are identified as central regarding troop deployments. Those are alliance politics, the level of risk and military feasibility. The factor of alliance politics accounts for Germany's integration in multilateral security alliances. First of all, the incentives of the international community to call for action and the international pressure on Germany to commit to the multilateral operation will be analysed. Secondly, Germany's own multilateral interests will be assessed. Thereby the degree of importance of a German participation, inter-alliance bargaining and Germany's perceived international responsibility and "duty" to act as a member will be taken into account.

To analyse the risk factor of the operation, a focus is set on assessing the dangers for soldiers deployed. This primarily includes the risk of being harmed within combat situations, considering the strength of the enemy as well as the operation tasks ranging from logistical support to direct offences against hostile forces. The assessment goes in hand with the question whether ground forces, the air force or the marine was deployed. The risk-analysis further incorporates potential threats stemming from the surrounding conditions within a given operation, such as the weather, health risks and psychological pressure.

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[122] See among others Booth, Ken, and Nicholas Wheeler. *The security dilemma: Fear, cooperation, and trust in world politics*. Springer Nature, 2007; John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (1950).
[123] Glenn, "Realism versus Strategic Culture", 529.

Last but not least, the assessment of military feasibility deals with the question what military actions are possible to carry out regarding the circumstances on hand and availability of resources. Thereby the objectives of an operation and whether or not they are achievable are discussed. The analysis further takes into account the proportionality of measures and costs of the operation to reach the identified goals. This includes the assessment of necessity as well as legitimacy of the military engagement.

Both the cases of (non-)engagement in the DR Congo and Libya will be analysed according to these factors. It is thereby argued that if Germany's strategic culture is not taken into account, the rational decision to engage in the DR Congo but not in Libya should mean at least a set of the following:

1. military engagement in the DR Congo was subject to higher international pressure than in the case of Libya

2. military engagement in the DR Congo was perceived as less risky than an engagement in Libya

3. military engagement in the DR Congo was perceived as militarily more feasible than in Libya

If these assumptions are proved wrong *and* Germany's rational decision-making can in a second step be consistently explained by taking into account Germany's strategic culture ("smoking gun", evidence that is very unlikely or hard to explain from an alternative perspective[124]), it is argued that the decisiveness of Germany's strategic culture in explaining Germany's security and foreign policies is validated.

Besides the overall analytical structure of the thesis, it is important to identify a proper method for generating thorough data for the analysis. Typically, the concept of rational decision-making is applied from a realist perspective which renders the state as main foreign-policy actor a "black box". Nevertheless, the importance of internal processes in affecting a state's decision-making is widely acknowledged today. Relevant factors include the type of political system and regime, bureaucratic

[124] Nina Tannenwald, "Process Tracing and Security Studies," *Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015): 226.

procedures and power divisions as well as societal factors such as activities of political parties or interest groups, media agenda setting and national culture and identity. Furthermore state-society relations including upcoming elections, interest group lobbying, securitization of issues and mobilization of citizens by political or civil society actors might affect dynamics and decision-making processes.[125] Therefore a state should not be understood as an individual, but a complex apparatus taking into account "group rationality". According to Maoz, "Group decision making is taken to be rational to the extent that members develop multiple definitions of the situation, explore multiple alternatives in a parallel manner, engage in an open process of argumentation and exchange of information, evaluate the various policy options in terms of the value tradeoffs they entail, and choose the option that reflects a weighted aggregate of individual preferences."[126] Of course one has to take into account a certain hierarchy of decision-making power within a state system, which rarely gives the same weight to each individual preference. Nevertheless, especially within a democracy, the concept of "group rationality" highlights the importance of debate and compromise between the preferences of the various actors involved for the government's rational decision-making process.

To properly account for this complex set of internal and external, measurable and non-measurable factors and interrelations in Germany's foreign policy decision-making, the methodology of process tracing will be applied. On the very basic level process-tracing assesses how and especially why things evolve the way they did by examining "what happened and who did what when".[127] Process tracing is at times considered incompatible with rational-choice theories. Other scholars, however, point to the importance of taking into account the actual processes through which rational decisions are made.[128] Ignoring the complexity of decision-making for the sake of a straight forward analysis does not lead to relevant insights. Therefor in this thesis, the narrative strategy of process tracing will be applied. The main benefit of the narrative story

[125] Neack, *Studying foreign policy comparatively,* 79.
[126] Zeev Moaz, "Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings," *World Politics* 43, no. 1 (1990): 82.
[127] Ann Langley, "Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data," *The Academy of Management Review* 24, no. 4 (1999): 692.
[128] Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds., *Process Tracing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 6.

telling is its comprehensive approach considering the multi-causality of decision-making.[129] The decision-making process whether or not to deploy armed forces abroad is not simply a product of events merely following each other. Rather events are connected to one another. Narrative strategy allows taking into account the generative nature of events and actions and provides contextual details in its full richness and complexity.[130]

Thereby process-tracing typically follows a simple chronological approach to show the inter-related nature of events and how they unfold over time. Nevertheless, cases do not need to be presented in the exact temporal order as long as the temporality of arguments is taken into account.[131] In order to assess Germany's decision-making regarding the deployment of armed forces, each factor of alliance politics, risk analysis and military feasibility is analysed individually by tracing the corresponding debates and how they evolved. The various respective arguments and positions of the involved actors and their effect on the decision-making process will be analysed. Thereby three main groups of actors are identified as relevant actors: First, international actors including the various multilateral organisations such as the UN, EU or NATO, as well as single countries involved; Secondly, German political actors, being comprised of the government, political parties and individual members of parliament; and third the domestic public, involving experts from research institutes or civil society organisations, journalists, businesses and the broad public opinion.

Process-tracing thereby includes the judgement "of when 'absence of evidence' constitutes 'evidence of absence'", as outlined by Bennet and Checkel.[132] On one hand, one should be aware of certain information limitations. Due to the security nature of the research question on hand, part of relevant information is classified and hence not accessible. Furthermore one must consider potential tactical biases with actors keeping processes to themselves or framing arguments in a certain way to distract from their real

[129] Tannenwald, "Process Tracing and Security Studies", 220.
[130] Sharon Crasnow, "Process tracing in political science: What's the story?," *Studies in history and philosophy of science* 62 (2017): 10; Langley, "Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data", 695.
[131] Crasnow, "Process tracing in political science: What's the story?", 10.
[132] Bennett and Checkel, *Process Tracing,* 19.

motives.[133] Nevertheless, if a whole theme or group of stakeholders will not appear within the thorough case research based on a variety of primary and secondary sources, including parliamentary and state documents, media coverage and academic literature, it is possible to assume their negligible role in the decision-making process.

The model presented here strives to combine the benefits of both the comparative case study based on rational decision-making and the method of process tracing. Like no other method, process tracing allows for a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the debates and positions of the various actors involved, taking into account their interconnection and outlining the actual process of Germany's decision-making. On the other hand, the comparative case study with a focus on rational decision-making allows testing the salience of strategic culture and its decisiveness in explaining Germany's foreign and security behaviour. Having identified Germany's strategic culture through data-driven generalisation and successfully tested it based on the two case studies will then serve as grounds for elaborating general criteria conditioning and (potentially) limiting Germany's commitment to multilateral military operations.

4. Mandating process in Germany: sending troops abroad

Before assessing the decision-making process for the cases of the DR Congo and Libya in specific, it is worth taking a look at Germany's unique decision-making procedure regarding troop deployment in general. Some scholars argue it to present an institutionalisation of deeply hold values and beliefs of Germany's strategic culture of restraint.[134] Germany's political structure regarding its security and defence policy is indeed characterised by a complex web of checks and balances, incorporating the executive, legislative and judiciary. In order to deploy armed forces outside the NATO territory, a complex procedure of mandating the mission is required. Thereby the domestic decision-making process is multilaterally incorporated in the international system and the role of the military within the decision-making procedures is limited.[135]

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[133] Alan M. Jacobs, "Process tracing the effects of ideas," in *Process Tracing*, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 42.
[134] Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan", 9.
[135] Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas, *Strategic Cultures in Europe* (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2013): 142-144; Markus Kaim, "Die Mandatierung von

The current procedure to deploy military troops abroad originates from two prominent rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court. In 1994, the court set the foundation for the legal deployment of troops in out-of-area missions. It thereby conditioned the missions' constitutionality by three criteria: the existence of a mandate by the collective security system, the deployment within a multilateral operational framework and the approval of the German Parliament. Since 2005 further details of the parliamentary mandating process for the deployment of German armed forces abroad are regulated by the Parliamentary Participation Act.[136] Together, the criteria led to a complex system for the legal deployment of German armed forces abroad. The graphic "Bundeswehr missions abroad" gives an overview of the various actors and multiple processes involved.

Graphic

Bundeswehr missions abroad

Mandating actors and processes[1], according to rulings by the Federal Constitutional Court



Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr: Themengrafik zu den Akteuren der Verteidigungspolitik," Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, bpb (Federal Agency for Civic Education), http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/deutsche-verteidigungspolitik/204755/themengrafik-auslandseinsaetze.

[136] Parlamentary Participation Act (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz ParlBG), §1 (2); Kaim, "Die Mandatierung von Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr"; Schmitt, "Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action", 64.

The decision-making procedure regarding military missions abroad displays the complex interaction of domestic and international political actors. Given the requirement of acting within a multilateral framework, considerations of a German military mission abroad are typically initiated by a call for action by the UN, NATO or EU and their assessment of a given conflict as threatening international peace. An important precondition for action is the authorisation of the military operation by the UN Security Council. Until today, the German military participation in the Kosovo-war without a UN mandate was a unique exception.[137]

Domestically, the government holds the power of initiative to formulate a mandate regarding the objective, scope and costs of the German military contribution. The Chancellor, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) are main actors in the formulation of security and foreign policies. Since the MoD serves as head of the army in peace times and is responsible for military policy, it takes charge of drafting the mandate.[138] Importantly, the three actors serve as independent entities. The chancellor cannot dictate the work of the ministries. The coalition nature of the German government therefore requires consensus-building between the actors and parties in power.[139] At the time of both case studies, the centre-right Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) was in charge of the chancellery as well as the MoD. The MFA was first held by the centre-left Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD) in 2006 and in 2011 by the new coalition partner the liberal Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP).

After the mandate proposal passes the cabinet, the military deployment must be approved by the parliament. Compared to other EU nations, in Germany there is particularly high parliamentary participation in deployment decisions.[140] Most importantly, the German parliament has the right to reject or approve German military participation. Parliamentary approval is thereby required *before* troop deployment. In

[137] Kaim, "Die Mandatierung von Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr".
[138] Ibid.
[139] Schmitt, "Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action", 64.
[140] Nicolai von Ondarza, "EU Military Deployment - An Executive Prerogative? Decision-making and parliamentary control on the use of force by the EU" (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) - German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany, 2008): 14, https://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_IX_2_vonOndarza.pdf.

case of urgency, the government can deploy forces without prior approval, however must obtain it as soon as possible. The parliament is then allowed to demand a troop withdrawal. Approval is further needed in case of an extension or change of the mandate.[141] Due to the parliament's last say, the German military is often referred to as a "parliamentary army".[142] It is furthermore important to note that the parliament's opinion does not only come into play when deciding on the mandate. Because of the Bundestag's needed approval, the government already consults main parliamentary groups and tests the mood within the parliament for various policy options during the decision-making process. The defence committee and the committee for foreign affairs thereby serve as a platform for a more detailed exchange between the executive and legislative.[143]

The mandating procedure neatly demonstrates the complexity regarding Germany's decision-making process when it comes to whether or not to participate in international military missions. The German government as main decision-maker finds itself under pressure from various sides. Own national interests must be assessed within the tensions between the international call for action on one hand and potential domestic resistance on the other. The domestic debate comprises discussions within the German parliament and the various parties as well as the public's sentiments. In conclusion, the international community, Germany's executive, legislative and its general public all must be taken into account when tracing the country's decision-making process whether or not to participate in international military operations.

5. Germany's decision to engage in EUFOR RD Congo

In the case of the DR Congo in 2006, Germany did not only participate in the Common Security and Defence (CSDP) operation, but took on a leading position. To understand why Germany accepted its military leadership role, Germany's decision-making process regarding the case is traced. Therefore the first half of 2006 is taken into

[141] "Kurzinformation: Parlamentsbeteiligung in den Mitgliedstaaten der EU bei bewaffneten Auslandseinsätzen"; Kaim, "Die Mandatierung von Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr".
[142] Biehl, Giegerich and Jonas, *Strategic Cultures in Europe,* 142-143.
[143] Ondarza, "EU Military Deployment - An Executive Prerogative?", 15; Al Rifai, Idriss and Joanna Scott, "The EUFOR DR Congo operation–initial conclusions," *Défense nationale et sécurité collective (online)* 36, no. 1 (2007): 50.

account, starting with the UN call for action to the EU on December 27th, 2005 and ending first of June with the German parliament approving the mandate.[144]

5.1. Conflict context

The parliamentary and presidential elections in the DR Congo 2006 were the result of a difficult transition process after years of violent conflict. In 1997 the Mobutu-regime was ousted with the help of the neighbouring states Rwanda and Uganda. Laurent-Désiré Kabila took office and renamed the state the Democratic Republic of the Congo. After Kabila prompted Rwanda and Uganda to leave the country in 1998, the two states strove to secure their economic interests in the DR Congo by sending regular troops to occupying resource-rich territories and supporting new rebel movements against Kabila. As a result, the DR Congo was divided into three parts: the West governed by Kabila with support of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, the North-East under control of the new rebel organisation Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) and the rest of the East divided under occupation by the two splinter groups of the rebel group Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD).[145] Between 1998 and 2002 the DR Congo experienced two devastating civil wars, claiming millions of victims.[146]

The country's transition process was started when Joseph Kabila assumed power in 2001 after the murder of his father. Joseph Kabila initiated an inter-Congolese dialogue including representatives of the rebel movements, political parties and the civil society. In 2002 the Pretoria Peace Accord was signed. The parties agreed on a power-sharing interim government, the withdrawal of all foreign troops involved and elections for 2005. Nevertheless, the fear of a loss of power by some actors and ongoing conflicts over resources remained as major obstacles. A new constitution in 2005 finally paved the way for an electoral law in March 2006 and an election date for the 30th of July the same year.[147] The elections were internationally seen as "historical" and a critical step

[144] Ondarza, "EU Military Deployment - An Executive Prerogative?", 19.
[145] Blaese, Jan-David. *Friedenssicherung im Kongo: EUFOR RD Congo und die Präsidentschaftswahlen 2006 in der DR Kongo*. (Hamburg: disserta Verlag, 2012): 13-14.
[146] Magnus Pahl, "Die Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an EUFOR RD Congo," in *Bernhard Chiari, Magnus Pahl (editor): Wegweiser zur Geschichte Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr*, http://mgfa.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/auslandseinsaetzederbundeswehr/aktuelles.
[147] Mary Martin, "Human Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The European Union as a Force for Good?" (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2008), https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/ipg-2008-

for establishing lasting peace.[148] Nevertheless, the interim government struggled with a lack of power. Moreover, the presidential candidates came from former warring groups and kept ties to their armed forces. In case of unwelcomed outcomes, there was an imminent risk of the losers to contest their defeat with violence. Without a military contribution, the DR Congo was perceived as being at risk to fall back into yet another civil war, destabilising the region and threatening international peace.[149]

5.2. Sequencing of the decision-making process

EUFOR RD Congo[150] was initiated by a call for support by the UN Security Council in December 2005. Regarding the decisiveness of the elections as well as the risks associated with it, the UN mission MONUC which supported the DR Congo's peace process since 1999 found its capacities to be overstretched and hence requested temporarily support from the European Union.[151] Therefore the Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno asked the European Union to "consider the possibility of making available a deterrent force" to "enhance the quick reaction capabilities of MONUC during or immediately after the electoral process."[152] As a response, the EU deployed a fact-finding mission to the DR Congo in January 2006 to assess a potential military commitment and engaged in a lengthy decision-finding process.[153]

Domestically, the German Ministry of Defence publicly confirmed the UN-request for military support on January 16th. The initial response throughout Germany

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1/07_a_martin.pdf, 91; Jan-David Blaese, *Friedenssicherung im Kongo: EUFOR RD Congo und die Präsidentschaftswahlen 2006 in der DR Kongo.* (Hamburg: disserta Verlag, 2012): 14-16.

[148] European External Action Service, "Fact-Sheet EUFOR RD CONGO: THE MISSION," http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rd-congo/.

[149] Denis M. Tull, "EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, But Not a Model,", in *The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations* (SWP Research Paper 2009/RP 14, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) - German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany, 2009): 47.

[150] For an overview of the main events in the decision-making process see Appendix 1: "Overview of Main Events regarding the Case of DR Congo".

[151] United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 12 April 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, April 12, 2006.

[152] United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 27 December 2005 from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, December 27, 2005.

[153] Viereck, Karlheinz, lieutenant general, "RD Congo: Europe can do it," *Truppendienst*, no. 3 (2007): 253-254.

was one of general scepticism.[154] Nevertheless, four policy choices for a German commitment to an EU military mission in the DR Congo were under main consideration. The first option restricted Germany's commitment to political support, the second considered military support in the form of logistics and transport but denied the deployment of combat troops, the third option was to engage in a co-leadership of the mission with France and the fourth option entailed the deployment of the EU German-Franco Battlegroup[155].[156] The government's decision for a co-leadership was made early on. At a German-Franco summit on January 23rd, the German chancellor Angela Merkel and France's president Jacques Chirac reached a preliminary agreement in favour of a military engagement in the DR Congo based on joint leadership.[157]

Due to domestic concerns, the government further adopted four additional conditions for the German military commitment in the DR Congo, next to the normal necessities of a UN-mandate and parliamentary approval. At a meeting of the EU-defence ministers on March 6th, the German Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Jung, demanded the consent of the Congolese Government, a broad European participation, a territorial restriction of Germany's troop deployment to the capital Kinshasa and a temporary restriction of the mission to four months.[158] After the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (EUHR) Javier Solana travelled to the DR Congo on March 19th and secured official approval of the Congolese Government for an EU operation, the EU member states met for an informal coordination meeting in Berlin. On March 23rd, the EU announced its decision in favour of a military support operation and informed the UN five days later. By April 27th, General Lieutenant Karl Heinz Viereck was declared operation commander and Germany took on its strategic leadership role. At this point the German Government

[154] Stefan Jungbauer, *Parlamentarisierung der deutschen Sicherheits-und Verteidigungspolitik? die Rolle des Bundestags bei Auslandseinsätzen deutscher Streitkräfte* (Münster: LIT-Verlag, 2012).
[155] In the early 2000s the EU established EU Battlegroups as part of its CSDP. Each group consists of 1,500 troops, typically provided by a coalition of member states. EU Battlegroups are based on a rotational basis so that always two groups are ready for deployment.
[156] Brummer, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo", 9.
[157] Denis M. Tull, "Die Führung und Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an EUFOR RD Congo," in *SWP-Studie: Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr,* 68-69.
[158] *Stern, "*Bedingungen für Einsatz im Kongo," March 7, 2006, https://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/bundeswehr-bedingungen-fuer-einsatz-im-kongo-3504896.html; Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of the Federal Minister of Defence Dr. Franz Josef Jung, Plenarprotokoll 16/36, May 19, 2006.

was officially committed. Only a veto from the parliament could have stopped a troop deployment. After the UN Security Council issued resolution 1671 mandating the CSDP operation, the council of the EU adopted a joint action for deploying EUFOR RD Congo on April 27th.[159]

On May 17th, the government requested parliamentary approval to participate in EUFOR RD Congo.[160] The Bundestag approved the timely and territorially restricted troop deployment on June 1st with 440 votes from the CDU/CSU, SPD and the Green party for the mandate, 135 votes of the FDP and The Left against it and six abstaining.[161] On June 12th the EU Council announced the decision to launch EUFOR RD Congo.[162] In order to understand how Germany went from initial reluctance to the final mandate approval, it is worth taking a more detailed look at Germany's decision-making process. Thereby core factors considered in military deployment decisions are taken into account, namely Germany's alliance politics, the operation's incorporated risks and its military feasibility.

5.3. Alliance politics

Germany's participation in the DR Congo was pushed for by its allies. Both the UN and the EU had major incentives for their call for action. After yearlong engagement to support the DR Congo's transition process by the UN, successful elections were perceived as a critical step.[163] For the EU, the operation was an important opportunity to demonstrate own intervention capabilities and strengthen its common security and defence policy.[164] The positive response of the EU to the UN request was

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[159] Klaus Brummer, *Die Innenpolitik der Außenpolitik: Die Große Koalition, „Governmental Politics" und Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr* (Springer-Verlag, 2013); Council of the European Union, COUNCIL DECISION 2006/412/CFSP on the launching of the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process, June 12, 2006; Ondarza, "EU Military Deployment - An Executive Prerogative?", 14; Peter Schmidt, "Nationale Entscheidungsspielräume in der Europäischen Union und den Vereinten Nationen," in *SWP-Studie: Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr*, 55.
[160] Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 16/1507, May 17, 2006.
[161] *Süddeutsche Zeitung, "*Bundestag stimmt Kongo-Einsatz zu," May 17th, 2010, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundeswehr-einsatz-bundestag-stimmt-kongo-einsatz-zu-1.800725.
[162] Council of the European Union, COUNCIL DECISION 2006/412/CFSP on the launching of the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process.
[163] Tull, "EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, But Not a Model", 46.
[164] Al Rifai, Idriss and Joanna Scott, "The EUFOR DR Congo operation–initial conclusions," *Défense nationale et sécurité collective (online)* 36, no. 1 (2007), 49.

further fostered by the EU's security policy framework. First, the EU had already demonstrated its support of the democratic transition process in the DR Congo, through prior civil as well as military measures.[165] Furthermore, the EU had officially acknowledged the decisive role of the UN for international security and pledged its support in 2003. The next year, the two organizations established approaches for cooperation with a special focus on EU military support operations to the UN. Also the EU's recent generating of quick reaction battlegroups on a rotational basis increased action expectations. Last but not least the EU adopted its Africa strategy which envisaged civil and military engagement to stabilise and secure Sub-Saharan Africa in December 2005, the same month of the UN's request.[166] Despite these joint "conceptual pre-decisions"[167] by the EU-member states however, any engagement still hinges on the individual domestic decision-making processes.[168]

Germany has served as a leading advocate for the development of a common foreign and security policy of the EU for many years and has striven to establish the organization as a core player of international governance.[169] A failure of the European Union to agree on a military support mission would have sent a catastrophic political signal, undermining past developments and the organization's effectiveness as a security actor.[170] From the governmental view, a German military non-engagement would have not only imperilled its own position within Europe but put Germany's credibility regarding its foreign policy into question. Neither the chancellery under Angela Merkel (CDU), nor the Foreign Ministry under Frank Walter Steinmeier (SPD)

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[165] This includes an extensive election aid program, the military support operation ARTEMIS, the police training via EUPOL and an advisory mission under EUSEC DR Congo; see Council of the Eurpoean Union, Council of the European Union, "EU military operation in support of the MONUC during the election process in DR Congo: Council adopts Joint Action, appoints Operation and Force Commanders," news release, April 27, 2006; Rohde, "Wahlen in der DR Kongo 2006", 115-116.

[166] Peter Schmidt, "The EU's Military Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Security Culture, Interests and Games," *Contemporary Security Policy* 32, no. 3 (2011): 573.

[167] In case of sources that are not in English, direct quotes of the original source are translated into English by the author of this thesis.

[168] Schmidt, "Nationale Entscheidungsspielräume in der Europäischen Union und den Vereinten Nationen", 52.

[169] Tull, "Die Führung und Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an EUFOR RD Congo", 69.

[170] Nicole Alecu de Flers, Laura Chappell, and Patrick Müller, "The EU's Foreign and Security Policy: Incremental Upgrading of Common Interests and the Effects of Institutionalised Cooperation: Comparing policies," in *Gerda Falkner, The EU's Decision Traps: Comparing Policies. OUP Oxford, 2011: 169*, http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.001.0001/acprof-9780199596225.

or the Ministry of Defence under Jung (CDU) categorically ruled out a participation of German armed forces.[171] Given these fundamental considerations, the question for the German government was not one of military engagement or nor, but on how to engage. This general decision was made early on and set the ground for further debate.

It is assumed that Merkel and the French president Jacques Chirac already reached a preliminary decision during a bilateral meeting on January 23rd for a joint engagement with both countries committing to a sizable personnel contribution.[172] Originally, being backed by Solana, France pushed for the deployment of the German-Franco EU Battlegroup since both countries contributed to it in 2006. Thereby Germany had 1,500 soldiers ready to act, whereas the French contribution was limited to four soldiers at the time. Given the overwhelming majority of German troops, the government feared that any problem or failure of the mission would have reflected back directly on the country. Not only would an almost exclusively German mission have led to severe domestic repercussions, a failure would have also endangered Germany's international standing and future engagement in international military missions.[173] The government's position against the deployment was backed by a refusal of German members of parliament. When the government officially informed the Defence and Foreign Committees of the Bundestag about the UN request on January 18th, the option to send the EU battlegroup was utterly dismissed.[174] At the German-Franco meeting in January, Merkel hence rejected the deployment of the battlegroup or any sole leadership role of Germany in an EU mission but offered a co-leadership in return. This compromise allowed averting the use of the battlegroup without affronting Germany's close ally.[175] With this oral

[171] Brummer, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo", 10-13; Tull, "EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, But Not a Model", 47.
[172] Tull, "Die Führung und Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an EUFOR RD Congo", 68-69.
[173] Brummer, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo", 10-11; Schmitt, "Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action", 67.
[174] Jan Ryjáček, "Losing the Power of Parliament? Participation of the Bundestag in the Decision-Making Process Concerning Out-of-Area Military Operations," *German Politics* 18, no. 4 (2009): 494.
[175] Brummer, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo", 12.

commitment to the French president, it can be argued that Germany could "no longer turn back" from a decisive military participation.[176]

Domestically, however, Germany's commitment in the DR Congo was widely debated. It was questioned if being an alliance member demands or even justifies a German engagement in Africa. Even members of the coalition government claimed the question of Germany's own interests in the DR Congo "to be completely open".[177] This fostered doubts regarding the appropriateness of Germany's military participation in Africa. A "nightmare scenario" was drawn of white soldiers opening fire on African civilians.[178] Given these concerns, the consent of the Congolese government became a main condition for a German military participation in the EU operation. On March 17th, Merkel again stressed this precondition publically. Two days later EUHR Solana met with president Kabila, securing the explicit consent for an EU-mission of the president, vice-president and other involved organisations in the DR Congo.[179] By end of March a change of mood could be noted within the Bundestag, with CDU/CSU, SPD and the Green Party getting on board.[180] The consent of the Congolese government and African Union served as a main source of legitimation for military engagement.[181] The Green party further pointed to the duty for military commitment: "Now the United Nations and the Congolese have asked us, the Europeans, to support them (...). If we were to say no to this commitment, we would not only bitterly disappoint the Congolese. Above all, a no to this mission would be a slap in the face of the United Nations."[182]

Within the domestic debate it was further pointed to Germany's previously articulated commitment to Africa and multilateral institutions. Various newspaper

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[176] *Spiegel, "*Allergrößte Zweifel," March 20, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46332247.html.
[177] *RP Online, "*Einsatz der Bundeswehr im Kongo umstritten," March 19, 2006, https://rp-online.de/politik/deutschland/einsatz-der-bundeswehr-im-kongo-umstritten_aid-17459957.
[178] Martin, "Human Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo", 92.
[179] Brummer, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo", 8 and 14.
[180] *Welt, "*Kongo-Einsatz der Bundeswehr rückt näher," March 18, 2006, https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article204815/Kongo-Einsatz-der-Bundeswehr-rueckt-naeher.html.
[181] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of the Federal Minister of Defence Dr. Franz Josef Jung, Plenarprotokoll 16/36; Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Plenarprotokoll 16/36, May 19, 2006.
[182] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Kerstin Müller (Green Party), Plenarprotokoll 16/36, May 19, 2006.

commentaries referred to Germany's proclaimed international responsibilities. It was argued that Germany cannot talk about the decisiveness of the UN in international politics and its own international responsibility and then back off any commitment in Africa.[183] Steinmeier supported this argument. Addressing "those who in recent years [inside and outside the parliament] have asked what Germany actually wants in Africa", he stressed that "the old order in which each region had its own backyard (…) no longer exists". As a member of the UN and carrying international responsibility, Germany "could no longer [categorically] claim it had no business in Africa".[184]

5.4. Risk analysis

One of the main concerns for whether or not to deploy armed forces is the risk an operation entails. Regarding EUFOR RD Congo, the EU committed "to support MONUC to stabilise a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties (…), to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence (…), to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel (…) [and] (…) to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger."[185] Thereby an important aspect of the deployment was its deterrence of potential aggressors. The EU-troops would be visible on the streets and in the air.[186] Within the operation, however, it was upon France to support MONUC and patrol the streets. German engagement was limited to the protection of international election observers and evacuations in the area of Kinshasa. France further agreed to engage in evacuation tasks outside the area of German troop

[183] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*Im Zweifel dafür," June 1, 2006, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/eu-einsatz-in-kongo-im-zweifel-dafuer-1333586.html; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*Kongo: commentary," February 10, 2006, Glosse Politik, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/glosse-politik-kongo-1301391.html; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*Kongo: commentary," February 27, 2006, Glosse Politik, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/glosse-politik-kongo-1301245.html.

[184] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Plenarprotokoll 16/36.

[185] Council of the Eurpoean Union, "EU military operation in support of the MONUC during the election process in DR Congo: Council adopts Joint Action, appoints Operation and Force Commanders," news release, April 27, 2006.

[186] *Die Deutsche Welle (DW), "*Kongo-Kommandeur Viereck zeigt sich gelassen," June 13, 2006, https://www.dw.com/de/kongo-kommandeur-viereck-zeigt-sich-gelassen/a-2054617.

deployment. The airport protection was taken care of by the remaining European nations.[187] Thus, the outlined tasks for the Bundeswehr did not involve active combat.[188]

On the other hand, the mission would, nonetheless, involve combat troops in form of paratroopers and ground forces.[189] The government's general yes to a military engagement in the DR Congo conflicted with domestic fears of putting German soldiers at incalculable risk. In large parts of the DR Congo the situation was described as obscure and unpredictable.[190] Various marauding militias were still active. Especially the East of the DR Congo was continuously subject to rebel factions destabilizing the region.[191] The military commissioner to the parliament as well as the Bundeswehr alliance referred to 14 armed militias which presented "a serious threat".[192] Whereas General Lieutenant Viereck assessed the situation as relatively calm in June[193], there was an increased risk of conflict before, during and immediately after the elections.[194] In case of eruption of violence, German ground forces could have been easily engaged in direct confrontations. An additional factor which made German politicians and the public uneasy was the high number of child soldiers active in the DR Congo. Whereas members of the Bundeswehr referred to the importance of the soldiers' readiness to defend against child soldiers if need be[195], the public was highly reluctant of the idea.[196]

Next to possible risks during combat, concerns were raised regarding the general conditions in the DR Congo including language barriers, unusual climate and new

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[187] *Die Deutsche Welle (DW), "*Kongo-Einsatz: Von Chancen und Risiken," May 18, 2006, https://www.dw.com/de/kongo-einsatz-von-chancen-und-risiken/a-2024961; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*UN genehmigt Kongo-Einsatz der EU," April 26, 2006, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/vereinte-nationen/bundeswehr-im-ausland-un-genehmigt-kongo-einsatz-der-eu-1304784.html.

[188] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*UN genehmigt Kongo-Einsatz der EU" Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 16/1507.

[189] *Welt, "*Kongo-Einsatz der Bundeswehr rückt näher".

[190] *Spiegel, "*Bundeswehr im Herz der Finsternis," March 10, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/kongo-bundeswehr-im-herz-der-finsternis-a-405174.html.

[191] *The Guardian, "*The roots of war in eastern Congo," May 16, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/16/congo.

[192] *Die Deutsche Welle (DW), "*Kongo-Kommandeur Viereck zeigt sich gelassen".

[193] Ibid.

[194] Tull, "EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, But Not a Model", 46.

[195] *Spiegel, "*Bundeswehr im Herz der Finsternis" *t-online, "*In "Duell-Situationen" sind auch Kinder Kriegsgegner," June 15, 2006, https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/id_14290892/kongo-mission-bundeswehr-notfalls-auch-gegen-kindersoldaten.html.

[196] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*Nicht in Kongo," January 30, 2006, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/glosse-politik-nicht-in-kongo-1301121.html.

health risks such as Malaria, other infections and a high AIDS-rate.[197] Given the domestic concerns and Germany's general risk aversion, Merkel, Steinmeier and Jung agreed on conditions to reduce the risks. Almost two thirds of the EU troops deployed were to be stationed outside the DR Congo, in its neighbouring country Gabon. Furthermore, the mission was to be restricted in time and territory.[198] Mid-March Merkel officially stated Germany would only participate in an EU-mission if the mission was restricted to the area of the DR Congo's capital Kinshasa and limited to four months.[199]Last but not least, to account for the more difficult environment, the ministry of defence decided on 280 support forces for medical and logistic support for the previously considered 500 soldiers to be deployed. Jung stressed the importance of such support forces to ensure the safety of Germany's soldiers.[200]

These conditions soothed various critics. Whereas members of the parliament including the coalition parties had harboured major doubts towards a German troop deployment in the DR Congo and initially had been warning of "such an adventure",[201] by May the government parties proclaimed their support in light of the restricted Bundeswehr mandate. The territorial limitation did not only underline the deterrence factor of the operation in the capital, but also rendered a potential confrontation with child soldiers "highly unlikely".[202]The German UN-director of the Congo mission Albrecht Conce noted that "there were no child soldiers in all of Kinshasa".[203] Moreover, General Lieutenant Viereck referred to the reduced risk of the operation due to its restriction to four months and generally considered the operation as less risky than others.[204]

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[197] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*Im Zweifel dafür"; *Bild, "*Aids-Angst bei der Bundeswehr," May 21, 2006, https://www.bild.de/news/2006/kongo-aids-angst-bundeswehr-436854.bild.html.
[198] Brummer, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo", 9.
[199] Ibid., 10-11. *Frankfurter Rundschau, "*Kongo-Mission entzweit Bundestag," March 15, 2006, https://www.genios.de/dosearch?isBackToSearch=true&offset=0#content
[200] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of the Federal Minister of Defence Dr. Franz Josef Jung, Plenarprotokoll 16/36.
[201] *Spiegel, "*Allergrößte Zweifel", March 20, 2006; *Spiegel, "*Die Kongo-Falle," March 27, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46421510.html.
[202] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU), Plenarprotokoll 16/36, May 19, 2006.
[203] *Spiegel, "*Bundeswehr im Herz der Finsternis".
[204] *t-online, "*In "Duell-Situationen" sind auch Kinder Kriegsgegner"; *Die Deutsche Welle (DW), "*Kongo-Kommandeur Viereck zeigt sich gelassen".

5.5. Military feasibility

Another key factor to consider regarding the potential deployment of armed forces is the question of military feasibility. Up until March, Defence Minister Jung argued against a significant German military contribution in the DR Congo. At the beginning of the debate Jung declared that Germany would neither send combat troops nor take on a leadership role.[205] The German army still found itself within the transition from the Cold War posture to an intervention army. With 6,000 soldiers already deployed on multilateral missions, the limit of deployable forces was reached. An additional mission in Congo would present a strain on the financial and human resources of the ministry and army.[206] Jung further feared that Germany was not ready to take on a leadership role in the DR Congo given its lack of experience in Africa.[207] Nevertheless, both his positions were overruled.

Merkel's commitment to France from January put the chancellor's reputation on the spot and pressured the government into action.[208] More importantly, a German leadership role seemed unavoidable for the feasibility of the EU operation. In 2006, the EU did not yet have an independent operation centre and depended on the availability of a national strategic operational headquarter. At the time, only four EU nations had such headquarters. While Great Britain and Italy referred to their deep involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, France already had been in charge of the prior EU-mission Artemis in the DR Congo.[209] A repeated French leadership would have fostered the view of "a French operation in European Union disguise".[210] This only left Germany's operation centre in Potsdam. In light of these considerations, a German leadership role became seen as a necessary requirement if Germany wanted the EU to positively respond to the UN request.

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[205] *Spiegel, "*Die Kongo-Falle".
[206] Brummer, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo", 10.
[207] Schmitt, "Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action", 67.
[208] *Spiegel, "*Die Kongo-Falle".
[209] Al Rifai, Idriss and Joanna Scott, "The EUFOR DR Congo operation–initial conclusions" 50.
[210] Schmidt, "The EU's Military Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Security Culture, Interests and Games", 569.

At a meeting of the EU defence ministers on March 6th, Jung made clear that Germany would not evade its responsibility. Nevertheless, striving to keep the German scope of the mission abroad as small as possible, the minister named conditions for such a commitment, including a fair burden-sharing among EU members as well as a temporal restriction of the mission to four months.[211] On March 14th, at another German-Franco meeting, an informal agreement was reached.[212] In the end, the compromise entailed that Germany assumed leadership at the strategic level and agreed to provide the Operation Headquarters in Potsdam and a third of the troops, with France taking over the tactical leadership in the DR Congo and sending another third of the troops. The last third was to be provided by a coalition of 19 other EU member states and Turkey.[213] By end of March, Minister Jung affirmed the decision of the government for a German-Franco co-leadership in the DR Congo.[214]

When the set-up of the operation became clearer, the domestic debate circled around the proportionality of measures and objectives of the mission. Overall, the support of the UN and the decisiveness of a stable DR Congo as the final goal were broadly agreed upon. Especially its stabilizing effect on the whole region was stressed.[215] Some parties further portrayed the DR Congo as a country rich of "strategic resources which are important for Europe".[216] A third argument was brought forward by the Green Party, comparing the conflict potential in the DR Congo to the human catastrophe in Rwanda and calling on Germany's moral duty to act in order to prevent more suffering.[217] Steinmeier brought the main arguments of the government to the

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[211] Brummer, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo", 13-14; *Stern, "*Bedingungen für Einsatz im Kongo".
[212] Schmidt, "Nationale Entscheidungsspielräume in der Europäischen Union und den Vereinten Nationen", 55.
[213] Alecu de Flers, Chappell, and Müller, "The EU's Foreign and Security Policy: Incremental Upgrading of Common Interests and the Effects of Institutionalised Cooperation", 173; Brummer, "The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany's Participation in EUFOR RD Congo", 9.
[214] *der Tagesspiegel, "*Deutsch-Französische Führung ausgemacht," March 20, 2006, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/eu-einsatz-im-kongo-deutsch-franzoesische-fuehrung-ausgemacht/694942.html.
[215] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Plenarprotokoll 16/36; Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU), Plenarprotokoll 16/36.
[216] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU), Plenarprotokoll 16/36.
[217] *Die Deutsche Welle (DW), "*Bundeswehr-Einsatz im Kongo als Signal für Afrika," June 1, 2006, https://www.dw.com/de/bundeswehr-einsatz-im-kongo-als-signal-f%C3%BCr-afrika/a-2040203.

point by declaring that "only a stable Congo can prevent that there will be renewed destruction and war throughout Central Africa. Only a stable Congo can prevent another outbreak of humanitarian disasters. Only a stable Congo can prevent people from deciding to set off and seek their salvation as refugees and migrants."[218]

Debate, however, evolved around the means how to best support the DR Congo. The costs for the military mission amounted to 56 million Euros. Critics called the number "immense". Others argued that the international community had already spent around 500 million Euros on the peace process.[219] In that regard, the operation was seen as an additional contribution to stabilising the DR Congo, which was not considered cheap, but a failure as all the more expensive.[220] The FDP and The Left Party on the other hand accused the military mission of being "anything but absolutely necessary".[221] The Left Party further portrayed the operation as merely being a symbolic power demonstration of the EU and pointed to the public reluctance towards the military aspect. Both parties called for a civil EU support mission instead.[222] The SPD countered by referring to Germany's learning process throughout the last years and its new foreign and security policy which accepts the "necessity of military support to be able to spent money otherwise". The public reluctance was thereby linked to a lack of political communication in conveying the new German understanding of military engagement as one small, but important part of a comprehensive concept.[223]

Another main argument criticised the size of the EU-mission. Given that the DR Congo was a huge, chaotic and dangerous country, it was argued that a small operation such as EUFOR RD Congo with less than 2000 soldiers was not able to stabilize the nation. Various experts and politicians, however, pointed to the wrong premises applied in the opposition's concerns. The Green party accused the FDP of cheap propaganda for spreading the false rumour that the 1,500 EU-soldiers were supposed to stabilize the

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[218] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Plenarprotokoll 16/36.
[219] *Die Deutsche Welle (DW), "*Pro und Kontra Kongo-Mission," July 10, 2006, https://www.dw.com/de/pro-und-kontra-kongo-mission/a-2084962.
[220] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*Im Zweifel dafür".
[221] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Paul Schäfer (Left Party), Plenarprotokoll 16/36, May 19, 2006.
[222] Ibid; Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Birgit Homburger (FDP), Plenarprotokoll 16/36, May 19, 2006.
[223] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Ursula Mogg (SPD), Drucksache 16/36, May 19, 2006.

whole country.[224] Thereby, the clearly defined and limited scope of the operation to support MONUC was stressed. EUFOR RD Congo was about a joint EU-operation to support MONUC for four months in a critical phase in order to secure the electoral process. Rather than acting alone, the EU-operation would act alongside the 17,000 blue-helmets, local police and military forces.[225] "For anything else, the Bundeswehr had neither the mandate nor the means."[226]

Whereas some experts stressed the importance of the restricted mandate for military feasibility given the scarcity of resources, others viewed exactly those conditions as a weak point.[227] Congo-expert Denis Tull from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) outlined how the end of the operation mandate in November occurred only shortly after the official announcement of the second election round for the presidential run-off. Tull drew a worse-case scenario with EU-soldiers leaving the DR Congo exactly in the moment when violence was erupting and their military presence would have been needed to fulfil the operation's objective. Rumours of a potential prolonging of the mandate were, nonetheless, dismissed by the government to avoid another outbreak of domestic debate.[228]

In any case, it can be argued that an operation with a more extensive scope would have faced even more political resistance. Also the question of national interests and international responsibility would have been a different one in light of the feasibility and increased risks of a larger operation. Regarding EUFOR RD Congo in its restricted mandate, however, the costs of intervention were seen as less than the costs of non-intervention.[229]

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[224] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Kerstin Müller (Green Party), Plenarprotokoll 16/36.
[225] *Zeit Online, "*Sollen deutsche Soldaten in den Kongo?," March 30, 2006, https://www.zeit.de/2006/14/Sollen_deutsche_Soldaten_in_den_Kongo_/komplettansicht; *t-online, "*170 Soldaten fliegen in den Kongo," July 16, 2006, https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/deutschland/id_14290936/bundeswehr-einsatz-170-soldaten-fliegen-in-den-kongo.html.
[226] Ibid.
[227] *Die Deutsche Welle (DW), "*Pro und Kontra Kongo-Mission".
[228] Tull, "Die Führung und Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an EUFOR RD Congo", 74-75.
[229] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*Begrenzte Mission," June 1, 2006, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/glosse-politik-begrenzte-mission-1326939.html; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*Im Zweifel dafür".

6. Germany's non-engagement in Libya

Regarding the evolving crisis in Libya 2011, the international community debated a military intervention. Whereas France and Great Britain pushed for the establishment of a no-fly zone, other EU member states including Germany expressed scepticism towards any military engagement. Even after a UN resolution authorized "all means necessary" to stop the Libyan regime's violence against civilians, debates among the EU member states only allowed for the planning of a limited CSDP humanitarian mission, which never was deployed in the end.[230] In the following, Germany's decision-making in particular is traced. Since Germany held a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council at the time, its position on military engagement in Libya must be seen in context of the general debate about a Western no-fly zone in Libya and the UN Security Council vote on resolution 1973 legitimizing such intervention.

6.1. Conflict context

The conflict in Libya erupted within the wider movement of the Arab Spring. Since December 2010 mass demonstrations and civil uprisings emerged, protesting against autocratic rulers in the region. In early 2011, the leaders of Tunisia and Egypt were ousted. By February 15th, the movement reached Libya.[231] Libya's ruler Muammar Gadhafi resorted, however, to much harsher tactics to stop the demonstrations, unleashing a bloody crackdown against the protesters with over 200 civilians killed in the first five days of the demonstrations.[232] The EU declared to be "extremely concerned by the events unfolding in Libya".[233] While Germany argued for demanding Gadhafi to stop violence against the protesters, France initially called for an EU stabilising role in favour of Gadhafi given the country's prior relationships to the regime.[234]

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[230] Nicole Koenig, "The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?," *The International Spectator* 46, no. 4 (2011): 22.
[231] Nicole Koenig, "Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis," *European Security* 23, no. 3 (2014): 257.
[232] *Al Jazeera, "*Gaddafi hits with deadly force," February 21, 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/02/201122113343795447 7.html.
[233] European Commission, "Declaration by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on behalf of the European Union on events in Libya," news release, February 20, 2011.
[234] Andreas Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht? Warum sich die Bundesregierung in der Libyen-Frage enthielt," *Internationale Politik*, no. 4 (2011): 45, https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/archiv/jahrgang-2011/juli-august/eingreifen-oder-nicht.

On February 22nd, the dynamic of the conflict and consequently France's position changed. While the Gadhafi regime announced to purge Libya "house by house" from the demonstrating "rats" and "cockroaches", the Arab League proclaimed their support for the rebels.[235] At the same day, the UN Security Council "called for an immediate end to the violence and for steps to address the legitimate demands of the population".[236] On February 26th, the council passed resolution 1970 condemning the use of lethal force against civilians and imposing sanctions on Libya. At this point, military engagement was not yet debated at the council and Germany showed great support for the resolution. The UN authorized sanctions were applied two days later by the EU. As the situation on the ground continued to worsen, debates about further international engagement emerged shortly after the first resolution was passed. Leading politicians from France and the UK started to publically discuss a military no-fly zone as a next step. The debate about a military involvement became serious with the Arab League announcing support for a Western-led no-fly zone on March 2nd. [237]

6.2. Sequencing of the decision-making process

Regarding the question of how to engage in Libya[238], the option of a military no-fly zone was debated early on. Not only did EU-member states such as France and the UK already advocated for it end of February, also the Arab League announced their support for a western military engagement in the air. A no-fly zone was further urged for by two representatives of the newly established National Transitional Council (NTC) for Libya during a visit at the EU parliament on March 8th. While German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Minister of Defence Thomas de Maizière and Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle were concerned regarding the situation in Libya and pushed for more sanctions, they shared deep scepticism towards any military engagement.[239]

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[235] *ABC, "*Raging Gaddafi orders forces to 'capture the rats'," February 22, 2011, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-02-23/raging-gaddafi-orders-forces-to-capture-the-rats/1953788.
[236] United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Press Statement on Libya," news release, February 22, 2011, https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10180.doc.htm.
[237] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 45-46. Sarah Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya," *Survival* 55, no. 6 (2013): 66-67.
[238] For an overview of the main events in the decision-making process see Appendix 2: "Overview of Main Events regarding the Case of Libya".
[239] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 46.

As violence in Libya continued, EU member states met at an extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels on March 11th. At the meeting as well as at an EU Foreign Minister summit in Budapest the same day, Germany together with several central and east European countries publicly spoke out against a no-fly zone or any military activity.[240] In the end, the EU called on Gadhafi to "relinquish power immediately" claiming "his regime has lost all legitimacy" and recognised the NTC as "a political interlocutor". The council moreover announced to "stand ready to adopt further sanctions". The final declaration did not, however, mention a no-fly zone.[241] The debate became intensified with an official request for a no-fly zone by the Arab League to the UN the next day. The following G8 meeting of the Foreign Ministers on May 14th and 15th revealed a dissent especially between France and Germany. At this point, the US shared Germany's reluctance against a military engagement and a UN resolution seemed unlikely.[242]

An important turning point was President Obama's change of position on March 15th. At a visit to the Gulf area, Foreign Minister Clinton secured the general commitment of various Arab states for a military engagement in Libya. In light of these news and increasing threats to civilians, Obama not only agreed to a no-fly zone but pushed for a quick UN resolution authorizing further measures including targeted airstrikes. Germany only got notified about the developments in the early afternoon on March 16th local time, leaving the government with a 34-hour period to decide on how to vote at the Security Council. Earlier that day, Westerwelle had already vocally argued against any military engagement during a parliamentary debate. Thereby the members of parliament predominantly shared the government's scepticism towards a no-fly zone.[243] During an interview in the evening of March 16th after being aware of the changed US position, Merkel again rejected German military involvement in Libya which can be seen as a pre-decision of the government. After two discussion rounds at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the afternoon of March 17th and a consultation between Merkel, Westerwelle and de Maizière, the German government jointly decided

[240] Ibid.
[241] Secretary General, "European Council Declaration," news release, March 11, 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-11-2_en.htm.
[242] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 48.
[243] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 70-73.

to abstain at the UN council's vote on resolution 1973 that evening.[244] As suspected by the German government, the resolution was nonetheless passed. The next day, a coalition of the willing without Germany began air campaigns and attacks in Libya to establish the no-fly zone.[245]

On March 31st, NATO took over command, initiating Operation Unified Protector.[246] Germany still refused to participate in the operation. On March 21st however, the country had announced its support for an EU CSDP humanitarian operation. By April 1st, the EU decided on EUFOR Libya in case EU military support would be requested by the UN. Despite further EU meetings to plan and prepare a potential operation, the UN expressed concerns for a military humanitarian intervention so that EUFOR Libya was never deployed.[247] To understand why Germany decided to abstain from the Security Council vote but expressed support for a later CSDP operation, the government's decision-making process is traced according to the three factors of alliance politics, risk analysis and military feasibility.

6.3. Alliance politics

In case of the Libyan conflict, there was no direct call for military support of the EU. Rather, a potential no-fly zone was debated at the UN Security Council, the NATO and the EU.[248] The UN resolution 1973 in the end did not refer to a specific international organization but broadly authorized all member states to act "nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements".[249] The debate within the EU about military engagement in Libya was hence closely tied to Germany's general reluctance towards a no-fly zone. With its abstention at the UN Security Council, Germany aligned

[244] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?",51-52, Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 77-78.
[245] *BBC, "*Libya: Aims unclear as military campaign starts," March 20, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12799620.
[246] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR: Final Mission Stats, November 2, 2011.
[247] Meiers, "Made in Berlin". Wohin steuert die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?": 679.
[248] Bundesregierung, "Regierungspressekonferenz vom 9. März (Government Press Conference)," news release, March 9, 2011, https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/dokumente/regierungspressekonferenz-vom-9-maerz-846934.
[249] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), S/RES/1973, March 17, 2011.

itself with China, Russia, Brazil and India and for the first time acted in contrast to all its NATO and EU allies.[250]

France and the UK had discussed military engagement in form of a no-fly zone in Libya already end of February and initiated military planning early on. Potential alternatives included to take action without a UN mandate if need be.[251] By March 10th the two countries publicly demanded the establishment of a no-fly zone. Germany, on the other hand, felt excluded from the Franco-British diplomacy[252] and criticised especially France's unilateral actions. Despite its former affiliation with Gadhafi, France had become the first country to recognize the NTC's leadership in Benghazi and strongly pushed for military action, both without coordination or communication with the German government.[253] The former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank Walter Steinmeier blamed France for the split among the EU: "Throughout my political career, I have never seen a decision about a military intervention by the international community that was so motivated and driven by the national motives of one state."[254] At an informal meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers on March 11th the German position was backed by several East and South European member states. The states were shocked by the force with which the UK and France pushed to enforce their policy. The result was a split in the European Union into pro- and counter-interventionist camps which in consequence side-lined the EU as a security actor. Whereas the EU decided on further sanctions, a mentioning of a no-fly zone was hindered.[255]

Germany had especially pointed to the requirement of a UN mandate and the approval of Arab states for any military involvement.[256] When on March 12th the Gulf cooperation council, the organization of the Islamic Conference and the Arab League expressed their wish for a Western-led no-fly zone, Westerwelle demanded active

[250] Koenig, "The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?", 22.
[251] *Evening Standard, "*Libya no-fly bid 'legal without UN'," March 1, 2011, https://www.standard.co.uk/newsheadlines/libya-no-fly-bid-legal-without-un-6572201.html; Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 67.
[252] Alister Miskimmon, "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis," *German Politics* 21, no. 4 (2012).
[253] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 47; Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 67.
[254] Edmund Ratka, "Germany and the Arab Spring: Foreign Policy between New Activism and Old Habits," *German Politics and Society* 30, no. 2 (2012): 63.
[255] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 48; Jessica Bucher et al., "Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya," *European Security* 22, no. 4 (2013): 524.
[256] Miskimmon, "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis", 396.

participation of Arab states.[257] This was domestically supported by the political parties. The CDU pointed to the decisiveness of Arab responsibility for the protection of Libyan civilians. If this was solely expected from NATO and EU, Germany should not participate in such a "division of work".[258] Anyhow, both a UN mandate and Arab participation seemed unlikely at the time. Germany felt assured in its position by America's proclaimed scepticism against a no-fly zone which rendered the passing of a UN resolution improbable.[259]

The announcement of military support by Arab states and America's change of heart on March 15th must therefore be considered a game changer.[260] Since Germany was, however, not notified until late afternoon on March 16th, Westerwelle had already forcefully argued against a no-fly zone in front of the parliament. Despite new international pressure to act, one might argue there was only little room left to change the government's position after the speech. The Bundestag debate was furthermore followed by a two-hour expert discussion regarding military engagement in Libya all in light of the wrong assumptions of a US refusal and unlikelihood of a UN-resolution. This way, the chance to properly assess Germany's international responsibilities and potential support of the new US policy was missed. Whereas it is not possible to say whether an earlier notification would have led to a different decision outcome given that Germany continued to harbour doubts, the US change in position clearly altered Germany's situation.[261]

In any case, the long and forcefully proclaimed rejection of a military engagement by the German government was by March 16th accepted as a given. At the day of the resolution, the government's discussions merely circled around the question how to vote in the Security Council. On one hand, diplomats warned against an international isolation of Germany if it abstained and argued it was possible to vote in favour of the resolution while not consequently engaging in the approved military actions. On the other hand, a rejection of military support despite a 'yes' in the council was seen as

[257] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 67.
[258] Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/98, Stenografischer Bericht, 98. Sitzung, March 23, 2011.
[259] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 48.
[260] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 65.
[261] Ibid., 72-73.

even worse than an abstention.[262] The latter position prevailed. An important decision facilitator was the information during the day that the resolution would pass the council in the evening with or without Germany's approval. It was assumed that an abstention would only seriously harm Germany's standing among its Western partners if the vote would bring the whole resolution down. In a call to the British Premiere minister Cameron, Merkel assured that if it would come to that unlikely point, Germany would vote together with its allies.[263] The German government furthermore stressed from the beginning that an abstention did not mean that Germany acted neutral in the Libyan conflict.[264] In a call with NATO General Secretary Rasmussen shortly before the vote, Minister de Maizière already offered increased support for the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (Awacs) operation in Afghanistan to free NATO capacities for Libya.[265] At a Libya Summit in Paris on March 19th Merkel officially announced to support the Libya operation "by taking on additional responsibility in Afghanistan".[266]

Notwithstanding Germany's quest to demonstrate its alliance loyalty, its abstention at the Security Council received major criticism internationally as well as domestically. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung called Germany's abstention "a diplomatic damage of the highest magnitude".[267] According to a narrative analysis of German media reporting on its abstention, Germany was most commonly characterized as an unreliable alliance partner. Its "refusal of alliance solidarity" was claimed to create a "loss of trust" with Germany failing "to live up to its 'responsibility'".[268] Also the opposition and various experts severely criticized Germany's vote for causing its

[262] Ibid.
[263] Mischa Hansel and Kai Oppermann, "Counterfactual Reasoning in Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of German Nonparticipation in the Libya Intervention of 2011," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10, no. 24 (2014), doi:10.1111/fpa.12054; Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 52.
[264] Bundesregierung, "Merkel: UN-Enthaltung zu Libyen keine Neutralität," news release, March 23, 2011, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/merkel-un-enthaltung-zu-libyen-keine-neutralitaet-467740.
[265] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 52.
[266] Meiers, "Made in Berlin". Wohin steuert die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?", 677-678;
[267] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*Die Isolierung des Systems Westerwelle," March 19, 2011, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/naher-osten/un-resolution-zu-libyen-die-isolierung-des-systems-westerwelle-1606261.html.
[268] Kai Oppermann and Alexander Spencer, "Telling stories of failure: narrative constructions of foreign policy fiascos," *Journal of European Public Policy* 23, no. 5 (2016): 695-696.

"isolation".[269] According to Joschka Fischer, former Foreign Minister, Germany had lost its "credibility in the United Nations and in the Middle East".[270]

Germany's participation in establishing a robust EU humanitarian mission after the Security Council vote thus should be understood in light of the severe international and domestic criticism over its abstention as well as the urge to moderate the perception of its diplomatic isolation.[271] When the EU decided on a potential humanitarian support mission on March 21st, Westerwelle stressed that Germany would "of course not evade its responsibility".[272] Furthermore the operation was driven by the desire to demonstrate the EU's military planning capacity distinct from NATO.[273] From a more critical view however, a European diplomat noted that the prior reluctance of Germany and other EU member states regarding military engagement meant that "the only possible result was a minimum role of the EU. This was EUFOR Libya."[274]

6.4. Risk analysis

Considering the risks of a military engagement, a no-fly zone can be considered a "preferred strategy, as it holds little risk for casualties".[275] Rather than sending own ground forces, the West decided to use its superiority in air force and support local troops on the ground via counselling and weapon supply.[276] On the other hand, the risk of a protracted civil war instead of a quick ousting Gadhafi's became clear early on. End of February the regime in Libya demonstrated resistance and announced the willingness to "fight until the last man, the last woman, the last bullet'."[277] Despite regional support

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[269] *Welt, "*Heftige Kritik an Deutschlands Libyen-Haltung," March 19, 2011, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article12884683/Heftige-Kritik-an-Deutschlands-Libyen-Haltung.html.
[270] *Spiegel, "*Fischer Joins Criticism of German Security Council Abstention," March 22, 2011, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/shame-for-the-failure-of-our-government-fischer-joins-criticism-of-german-security-council-abstention-a-752542.html.
[271] Ratka, "Germany and the Arab Spring: Foreign Policy between New Activism and Old Habits", 68.
[272] Meiers, "Made in Berlin". Wohin steuert die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?", 679.
[273] Ludovica Marchi Balossi-Restelli, "The Common Security and Defence Policy in a State of Flux? The Case of Libya in 2011," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 15, no. 1 (2014): 94.
[274] Koenig, "The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?", 22.
[275] Bucher et al., "Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya", 534.
[276] Thomas Speckmann, "Die Libyen-Doktrin," *Die Politische Meinung*, nr. 498 (2011): 53.
[277] *The Guardian, "*Libya on brink as protests hit Tripoli," February 21, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/20/libya-defiant-protesters-feared-dead.

for the opposition and an advance of the rebel forces, Gadhafi's troops initiated an offensive and were able to reconquer various cities on March 13th.[278]

Keeping German soldiers out of an armed conflict became the main argument for the pro-abstention camp.[279] "From the beginning, we stated that we do not want to be dragged into a gradual escalation regarding a permanent engagement in a war in Libya."[280] There was the general fear among German officials that if the military measures of a no-fly zone were not sufficient, a deployment of ground forces would be the next step.[281] As the CDU put it, it was important to understand that a no-fly zone alone would not stop the killing done by the regime. "Who stops the tanks, the artilleries, the well-trained mercenaries of Gadhafi?"[282] These concerns were shared by various experts[283] and the public. According to a poll from March 16th, 88% of Germans were against the deployment of German armed forces in Libya.[284] Upcoming elections served as another incentive for the government to continue voicing scepticism regarding any military engagement in Libya.[285] At an interview in the afternoon of March 16th after the government's decision finding, Merkel claimed she could not lead Germany into a military mission "with a highly uncertain ending".[286]

It is important to note that despite a change in settings by March 15th with Arab states assuring their military support and the US getting on board for a no-fly zone, the government's concerns regarding any German military engagement persisted. Under US pressure, the UN resolution which was set out to authorise a no-fly zone in Libya was adapted to also include targeted air bombings and possibly allow for ground troops as

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[278] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 46.
[279] Ratka, "Germany and the Arab Spring: Foreign Policy between New Activism and Old Habits", 62.
[280] Bundesregierung, Regierungspressekonferenz vom 18. März, March 18, 2011.
[281] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 68.
[282] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Dr. Andreas Schockenhoff (CDU), Plenarprotokoll 17/95, March 16, 2011.
[283] See for example *Focus, "*Ex-Nato-General warnt vor Militäreinsatz in Libyen," March 12, 2011, https://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/focus-interview-ex-nato-general-warnt-vor-militaereinsatz-in-libyen_aid_607806.html.
[284] *Stern, "*Deutsche wollen sich nicht einmischen," March 16, 2011, https://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/umfrage-zu-unruhen-in-libyen-deutsche-wollen-sich-nicht-einmischen-3863588.html.
[285] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 73.
[286] *Saarbrücker Zeitung, "*Kanzlerin Angela Merkel kündigt Überprüfung aller Atomkraftwerke an," March 17, 2011, https://www.saarbruecker-zeitung.de/nachrichten/politik/inland/kanzlerin-angela-merkel-kuendigt-ueberpruefung-aller-atomkraftwerke-an_aid-838566.

long as they were not an occupation force.[287] From the German perspective, the changes presented exactly those measures which Germany feared a "simple" no-fly zone could lead to, therefore increasing the risks associated with the operation even more.[288] Germany's final decision to abstain was driven by the perception that potential risks of such military engagement would exceed the benefits.[289] At the Security Council vote, the German ambassador Peter Wittig explained Germany's abstention by referring to "great risks" including the "likelihood of large-scale loss of life" with regard to the resolution on hand.[290]

Concerning the risk factors, the government's decision against a German military involvement was generally accepted in the domestic debate. The discussion rather circled around the question if a "yes" to the resolution would have inevitably led to a military involvement or not. Various members of the parliament and experts in the field argued Germany could have made clear that it generally approved the resolution, however, would not participate with own military means. The government on the other hand followed the narrative that military involvement would have been unavoidable after approving the UN resolution.[291] "If we had agreed, Germany as the largest European NATO country would have come under even greater pressure to participate militarily. We would no longer debate whether or not we should deploy soldiers in Libya, but simply be faced with the question of how many we should send."[292] According to Westerwelle, the important message of the abstention was that Germany "would not send German soldiers to a combat mission in Libya."[293]

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[287] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 49.
[288] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 75.
[289] Koenig, "Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis", 263; Guido Westerwelle, "Regierungserklärung durch Bundesminister Westerwelle vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zur aktuellen Entwicklung in Libyen (UN-Resolution)," news release, March 18, 2011, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/110318-bm-regierungserklaerung-libyen/242740.
[290] United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions," news release, March 17, 2011, https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.
[291] Oppermann and Spencer, "Telling stories of failure: narrative constructions of foreign policy fiascos", 694; *Welt, "*Heftige Kritik an Deutschlands Libyen-Haltung"; Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 82.
[292] Bundesregierung, Westerwelle: "Einen deutschen Sonderweg gibt es nicht", April 14, 2011.
[293] *MiGAZIN, "*Wende in Libyen-Politik," April 11, 2011, http://www.migazin.de/amp/2011/04/11/wende-in-libyen-politik/.

Germany's commitment to a CSDP operation on March 21st can thus be seen as an important turn of events. Despite having stressed that "Germany will not participate in military measures" the day after the Security Council resolution,[294] Chancellor Merkel offered to take on a leading role regarding the EU CSDP operation in support of UN endeavours.[295] In case of a UN request, EUFOR LIBYA would have included the securing of medical care and protection of refugee transports. Therefore an EU Battlegroup would have most likely been sent. At the time being, Germany contributed 990 soldiers to the battlegroup including paramedics, military police and command support.[296] The operation would have hence meant that Germany would not only engage militarily in Libya, but would further send ground troops.[297] At the same time, the situation in Libya worsened. Already one week after the international coalition started their military manoeuvres, the alliance talked about an upcoming "war of attrition" rather than hoping for a quick military win.[298]

Media and opposition criticized the German government's decision in favour of an EU operation as a "turnaround", "backward roll", "zigzag course" and "confusion".[299] The government, on the other hand, used various occasions to outline the difference between a combat mission and a humanitarian intervention. While Westerwelle admitted that a humanitarian mission would "operationally entail major risks",[300] he stressed that a military hedging of humanitarian aid transports was "something completely different" than engaging in a war operation.[301] It was argued

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[294] Bundesregierung, "Pressestatement von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel zur aktuellen Entwicklung in Libyen," news release, March 18, 2011, https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/dokumente/pressestatement-von-bundeskanzlerin-angela-merkel-zur-aktuellen-entwicklung-in-libyen-842900.

[295] Chris Marsden, "Europäische Union bereitet Bodentruppen für Libyen vor" (World Socialist Web Site, 2011), https://www.wsws.org/de/articles/2011/04/liby-a12.html.

[296] *Stern, "*Im Zickzackkurs aufs Schlachtfeld," April 8, 2011, https://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/humanitaerer-libyen-einsatz-der-bundeswehr-im-zickzackkurs-aufs-schlachtfeld-3198176.html.

[297] Bundesregierung, "Regierungspressekonferenz vom 8. April," news release, April 8, 2011, https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/dokumente/regierungspressekonferenz-vom-8-april-843144.

[298] *Süddeutsche Zeitung, "*Angst vor dem Zermürbungskrieg," April 8, 2011, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/nato-einsatz-in-libyen-angst-vor-dem-zermuerbungskrieg-1.1083197.

[299] *MiGAZIN, "*Wende in Libyen-Politik"; *Stern, "*Im Zickzackkurs aufs Schlachtfeld" *t-online, "*Regierung: Libyen-Mission noch nicht entschieden," April 11, 2011, https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/specials/id_45602932/regierung-libyen-mission-noch-nicht-entschieden.html.

[300] Meiers, "Made in Berlin". Wohin steuert die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?", 679.

[301] Bundesregierung, Westerwelle: "Einen deutschen Sonderweg gibt es nicht".

that rather than being a turnaround, the government had always followed the position that Germany would not engage in a military *combat* mission in Libya, which still was the case.[302] Furthermore, the danger of being dragged into a lengthy civil war was prevented by an early decision by the EU to limit the potential CSDP operation to 4 months.[303] Despite the opposition's criticism of the perceived back and forth, a broad approval within the Bundestag for a potential EU support operation in Libya became apparent.[304]

6.5. Military feasibility

When looking at the objective of the no-fly zone, the need to help the Libyan people and stop Gadhafi was broadly agreed upon. A main argument which arose in the public debate was that the Europeans cannot stand and watch while Gadhafi massacres protesters.[305] The general decision that Gadhafi had to be ousted was already made within Germany as well as the EU in the beginning of March.[306] The means on how to pressure Gadhafi into stepping down were nevertheless widely debated. According to an analysis of German newspapers, pro- and contra-intervention arguments were rather balanced. Thereby core arguments for a military intervention were the support of the rebels, Germany's responsibility to protect, human rights, economic reasons like oil and the prevention of terrorism. The media analysis further identified five main arguments against an intervention. As already outlined above, one was afraid of a long-term military commitment (which would further put a strain to military personnel)[307] and the need for a regional solution was stressed. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the rebels was doubted, the sovereignty of Libya pointed out and the feasibility of other means highlighted.[308]

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[302] Bundesregierung, "Regierungspressekonferenz vom 8. April".
[303] Marsden, "Europäische Union bereitet Bodentruppen für Libyen vor", *World Socialist Web Site*.
[304] *Abendzeitung, "*Breite Bundestagsmehrheit wahrscheinlich," April 8, 2011, https://www.abendzeitung-muenchen.de/inhalt.libyen-einsatz-breite-bundestagsmehrheit-wahrscheinlich.b852c8e3-add9-4900-91b1-fc5e7cf55b11.html.
[305] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 45-46.
[306] Secretary General, "European Council Declaration".
[307] Major, Claudia and Christian Mölling, "Nur ja kein Militäreinsatz in Libyen," *Financial Times Deutschland*, February 28, 2011, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/nur-ja-kein-militaereinsatz-in-libyen/.
[308] Bucher et al., "Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya", 532-533.

Both Germany and the US doubted the effectiveness of a no-fly zone to push back Gadhafi's troops or protect civilians.[309] While it would be rather easy to deploy, its effect seemed limited. Since Gadhafi did not have a credible air force, the civil war in Libya was much more an obscure urban warfare, man against man and district against district.[310] Moreover there was a lack of reliable information.[311] Not only the German but also the French and the British ambassadors in Libya positioned themselves against a military intervention and warned against the tribal structures and general complexities of the Libyan society. Not even the German intelligent service could provide thorough information on the rebel force, their structure and aims. A no-fly zone would consequently mean "acting as the air force of a rebel movement that no one knew much about."[312] According to FDP Minister of Development Dirk Niebel, despite general agreement that the "dictator had to leave", it was not clear "if Gadhafi's local enemies would support the freedom movement or whether it was just about traditional tribal fights."[313]

Furthermore, the US and Germany both stressed that the establishment of a no-fly zone would first require attacks on Libyan air defences. What was portrayed as a simple no-fly zone was warned to actually be "a big operation in a big country".[314] NATO would have to establish a no fly zone approximately three times as large as the zone the US and UK tried to keep clear for 12 years in Iraq.[315] When arguing against the no-fly zone in front of the parliament in the morning of March 16th, Westerwelle stated that "the seemingly easy solution of a no-fly zone creates more questions and problems than it promises to solve". He argued that the no-fly zone must be understood as a military intervention while not even knowing if it was effective for a big country such as

[309] Bundesregierung, Regierungspressekonferenz vom 18. März.
[310] Major, Claudia and Christian Mölling, "Nur ja kein Militäreinsatz in Libyen", *Financial Times Germany*.
[311] Ibid.
[312] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 68-69.
[313] *der Tagesspiegel, "*"Man sollte wissen, wie man Einsätze beendet"," March 23, 2011, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/libyen-konflikt-man-sollte-wissen-wie-man-einsaetze-beendet/3982626.html.
[314] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 69.
[315] Henning Riecke, "Zähne zeigen und verhandeln in Libyen", German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 2011: 2.

Libya.[316] Former experiences in Afghanistan already revealed that military engagement does not always reach the set objectives but can cause intervening forces to be more and more dragged into the conflict.[317]

Despite prior concerns, the US changed its position in favour of military engagement. Given expert assessments that "a no-fly zone alone would not be sufficient to protect Benghazi civilians from a massacre", however, Obama called for further military options.[318] In the end the UN resolution was adapted to authorise "all necessary measures (…) to protect civilians", including targeted airstrikes.[319] From the US point of view, the adaptions facilitated the achievement of the operation's objectives. According to German experts on the other hand, additional targeted air strikes would further risk the lives of citizens given the difficult distinction between fighters and civilians.[320] Moreover, before the sudden change of Obama's position, Germany did not expect an actual UN resolution to come to pass which would be needed for German military action in the first place.[321] Therefore, while other countries assessed various military options in early March, Germany did not.[322] The short notice of America's new policy hence pressured Germany into a quick decision-making process while facing a lack of planning. Germany furthermore criticized the resolution to be poorly prepared.[323] Whereas the protection of the Libyan civilians was seen as decisive, it was warned against blind activism.[324]

On top of the above mentioned, the legitimacy of a military intervention was much more debated in Germany than in other Western countries.[325] According to De Mazière "the responsibility to protect a country's civilian population if its government violates human rights is firmly anchored in international law. But does that mean we are

[316] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle, Plenarprotokoll 17/95, March 16, 2011.
[317] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 45.
[318] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 70.
[319] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), S/RES/1973.
[320] Major, Claudia and Christian Mölling, "Nur ja kein Militäreinsatz in Libyen", *Financial Times Germany*.
[321] Ibid.
[322] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 70.
[323] Miskimmon, "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis", 397.
[324] Major, Claudia and Christian Mölling, "Nur ja kein Militäreinsatz in Libyen", *Financial Times*.
[325] Bucher et al., "Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya", 525.

allowed to intervene? Or does that mean we're actually required to? I believe that each military operation must be analysed to determine whether its goals can be achieved with appropriate means and within an appropriate time frame as well as how one gets out at the end."[326] Regarding those considerations, the German government as well as the public expressed strong preference for economic and diplomatic sanctions.[327] A survey revealed that 70% of the public advocated for a trade embargo against Libya whereas a German military involvement was broadly rejected.[328] From the beginning, the government promoted harsh sanctions and claimed the crisis could be resolved through economic and political tools.[329] Germany acted as a key driver for gradually strengthening European sanctions and gave full support to the UN's and EU's diplomatic and humanitarian activities.[330]

Regarding potential military means on the other hand, doubts concerning the military feasibility of a no-fly zone were brought forward to explain the government's rejection and its subsequent abstention at the UN council vote. After the resolution, however, some voices including from the CDU coalition party criticized "an operational gap" between Germany's position and the goal to oust Gadhafi.[331] Throughout the party ranks, no-one called for full military participation. Some members of parliament implied, nonetheless, that they might have supported a limited involvement.[332] It can be argued that EUFOR Libya would have presented such a limited operation. The decision to engage in a potential CSDP support operation was backed by feasibility considerations. It was argued that rather than decisively intervening militarily, the operation was set out to enable humanitarian organizations to do their work. Thereby humanitarian actions traditionally follow the principle of neutrality so that all conflict parties would accept the help. Such a support from NATO forces which at the same

[326] Miskimmon, "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis", 397-398.
[327] Maximilian Overbeck, "European debates during the Libya crisis of 2011: shared identity, divergent action," *European Security* 23, no. 4 (2014)., 589.
[328] *Stern,* "Deutsche wollen sich nicht einmischen".
[329] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 50; Miskimmon, "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis", 396.
[330] Koenig, "Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis", 258 and 263.
[331] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ),* "Die Isolierung des Systems Westerwelle", *FAZ.*
[332] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 82.

time bombed Gadhafi's troops would thus not be deployable for the humanitarian operation.[333]

Nevertheless, the neutrality of EU troops was not convincing either. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) expressed concern to blur the lines between humanitarian and military action by a CSDP operation. Indeed, Gadhafi threatened to respond to such a humanitarian action with "armed resistance".[334] Furthermore, a mission would have required European troops on the ground which was strictly opposed by the Arab League and the Libyan rebel council.[335] Last but not least, its necessity was questioned. Up until that point, all humanitarian aid transports were feasible without the need of military support.[336] Experts thus claim EUFOR Libya to have been "a symbolic gesture more than a real response to UN needs."[337] In light of these concerns, UN humanitarian chief Valerie Amos stated EUFOR Libya was considered as a measure of last resort.[338] Despite the EU's announcement on April 7th that EUFOR Libya was ready to be deployed to encourage the UN to request support, the call for action never came.[339]

7. Case comparison: establishing the limitations of purely rational explanations of the deployment decisions

As outlined above, main factors influencing deployment decisions are alliance politics, the risks incorporated in the operation and its military feasibility. Given that Germany participated in EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 in a leading position but rejected military engagement regarding a no-fly zone in Libya 2011, a decision-making purely based on rational considerations should reveal clear differences of the factors in the two cases. Sending troops to the DR Congo but not to Libya should hence mean that there was either more international pressure to act in the case of the DR Congo, the operation

[333] Claudia Major, "EUFOR Libya als bedeutsamer Testfall für die GSVP?" (German Institute for International and Security Affaits (SWP), https://www.swp-berlin.org/kurz-gesagt/eufor-libya-als-bedeutsamer-testfall-fuer-die-gsvp/, 2011).
[334] Koenig, "The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?", 22-23.
[335] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 46 and 48.
[336] Meiers, "Made in Berlin". Wohin steuert die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?", 679.
[337] Koenig, "The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?", 22.
[338] Ibid., 23.
[339] Marsden, "Europäische Union bereitet Bodentruppen für Libyen vor", *World Socialist Web Site*.

in Libya was considered more risky and/or EUFOR RD Congo was militarily more feasible than taking military action in Libya. In the following part it will be outlined how neither of the factors alone can account for Germany's deployment decisions.

7.1. Alliance politics

When looking at alliance politics, both military operations occurred on demand of the United Nations and with the support of local forces. While the call for military action was rather general in 2011, the UN directly addressed the EU when requesting military support in 2006. One can thus argue that the EU faced a higher pressure to act in the case of the DR Congo. This does not mean however, that Libya was lacking in international pressure. Throughout the debate about a no-fly zone, EU forces were still incorporated in action discussions. Furthermore, the Libyan NTC approached the EU in specific for the establishment of a no-fly zone. It should hence be noted, that whereas the CSDP mission in the DR Congo was seen as decisive to proof the EU's capabilities as a security actor, a strong EU stand for military engagement in Libya would have as well fostered the organizations position in the world. In fact, in light of EU's non-action in 2011 media reports portrayed the organization as "slow, divided and incoherent (…) standing on the sidelines while the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) did the job."[340] Germany nonetheless only pushed for broad member-state participation in the case of the DR Congo and thereby served as a main enabler of the EU operation. Concerning the conflict in Libya on the other hand, the country joined the non-intervention camp within the EU when debating a potential no-fly zone.

Both times, Germany (as a leading EU-member state) faced additional international pressure to act from individual ally states. Especially France acted as a main driver for military action in both cases. Whereas Merkel tried to accommodate its close ally by offering co-leadership in 2006, Germany engaged in open dissent with France regarding the conflict in Libya. The main difference in 2011 was that the German government was initially backed by the USA in its reluctance towards military engagement in Libya. Nevertheless, when President Obama changed his position, the situation altered drastically. By holding a non-permanent seat in the UN Security

[340] Koenig, "Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis", 250-251.

Council, Germany's strong stance against military action meant in consequence its abstention at the Security Council vote and thereby acting in contrast to all other Western allies. Despite this severe international pressure and various calls from the UK and the US shortly before the vote, Germany did not change its position to abstain.[341] The issue and gravity of the government's decision in light of alliance politics can be seen in the harsh international as well as domestic criticism after Germany's abstention. Even when blaming Germany's decision to abstain to a miscalculation of international repercussions, it does not change the fact that Germany consciously decided to act against the position of its allies despite severe international pressure.

Whereas Germany's urge to proof its alliance loyalty and to reverse the perception of international isolation after the UN security council vote can explain the government's sudden support for the military operation EUFOR Libya, alliance politics alone make it difficult to understand why Germany took on a leading role in the DR Congo but refused to engage in the multilateral combat mission in Libya.

7.2. Risk analysis

Taking into account the risk factor of the two operations on hand, one can argue the overall situation in Libya to have been more risky than in the DR Congo. Whereas Libya found itself in the midst of a civil war with armed rebel forces going against an established state force including trained mercenaries and tanks, the DR Congo was on the path of a rather peaceful transition process. While there was the potential for escalation before, during and shortly after the elections especially regarding the existence of various armed militias, conflict was not as certain in the DR Congo as it was in Libya. Moreover, the deployment conditions of a territorially and timely restricted mission in the DR Congo reduced surrounding risk factors even further. It is, however, important to also take into account the operation itself. Regarding Libya, military engagement was planned in form of a no-fly zone with additional targeted air strikes. Given the Western strong superiority of its air force, Gadhafi's limited air force capabilities and the Western soldiers' distance to the threats on the ground, the actual combat risk for the deployed forces was limited. In contrast, EUFOR RD Congo

[341] Rinke, "Eingreifen oder nicht?", 52.

incorporated troops on the ground being at risk to get involved in direct combat in case of conflict escalation.

Germany's awareness of the risks for ground forces can be seen in the government's fear that a no-fly zone in Libya would eventually require boots on the ground. Even though NATO, Libya's NTC and the Arab League rejected the idea of deploying Western foot soldiers, the remaining possibility of an increased military involvement in Libya alone was seen as too risky from Germany's point of view. The announced support for a humanitarian CSDP operation in Libya by the German government as well as the parliament later on is thus striking regarding the risk-analysis. It was clear to all parties involved that a German participation in EUFOR Libya would mean "to set foot on Libyan ground".[342] Whereas the operation was set out to act "neutrally", Gadhafi had already announced armed resistance against such a humanitarian mission. Despite the "humanitarian" objective, German soldiers involved would have therefore been at severe risk of engaging in active combat on the ground and facing an immediate threat to their lives. The planned restriction of the operation to four months would not have limited that risk for the time of deployment.

As mentioned above, from the perspective of risk analysis, participating in a no-fly zone must be considered a "preferred strategy [to boots on the grounds] as it holds little risk for casualties".[343] Germany's military engagement in the DR Congo and its support for EUFOR Libya while rejecting to participate in the establishment of a no-fly zone can hence not be explained by a purely rational risk-assessment.

7.3. Military feasibility

A third important factor to take into account when deciding on troop deployment is the military feasibility and possibility to reach the operation's objectives. In both cases there was consent about general Western support. In the DR Congo the objective of the military operation to allow for feasible elections was seen as decisive for a stable Congo. Regarding the crisis in Libya, there was a general agreement that Gadhafi had to be ousted. A Western engagement was further justified domestically by stressing

[342] Bundesregierung, "Regierungspressekonferenz vom 8. April".
[343] Bucher et al., "Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya", 534.

Germany's international humanitarian responsibility. Both times the massacre in Rwanda was put forward as a negative example for a lack of international support.[344]

Rather than criticizing the objectives, the debates circled around the question of means. Concerns regarding the actual feasibility of the military engagement were raised in the case of the DR Congo as well as Libya. In 2006, however, concerns about limited resources and engagement efficiency were moderated by a territorial and temporary restriction of the deployment of German armed forces. Regarding the crisis in Libya on the other hand, fears of the mission's failure and a protracted war prevailed. Instead of considering a restricted military engagement, the government denounced any military support for the no-fly zone. In retrospect, the planned military operation was, nonetheless, generally feasible. The alliance forces managed to establish the no-fly zone and to fly targeted air strikes. By mid-April they had already destroyed one third of Gadhafi's military machinery.[345] Furthermore, when Germany offered to send more soldiers for the AWACS operation in Afghanistan to free NATO airborne assets for Libya, the government revealed the general availability of German troops. Later, Germany moreover agreed on the deployment of the EU Battlegroup for a potential CSDP operation in Libya, which as well incorporated roughly 1000 German soldiers.

Given their general feasibility, the question remains if the military operations presented the best option to reach the Western goals. In both cases, voices emerged calling for civil action instead. Whereas in 2006, the two opposition parties FDP and The Left countered the government's commitment to military action, in 2011 it was the German executive itself claiming political and economic means to be the better solution to oust Gadhafi. This preference of civil means over military action was both times supported by the general public. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the military presence in the DR Congo 2006 had an important deterrent effect. Allowing for a secure environment for the civilians to vote as well as for the electoral workers would not have been possible through civil measures. The military engagement in Libya, however, did

[344] *Welt, "*Heftige Kritik an Deutschlands Libyen-Haltung"; *Die Deutsche Welle (DW), "*Bundeswehr-Einsatz im Kongo als Signal für Afrika".
[345] *Spiegel, "*"There Is No Military Solution to the Libya Conflict': SPIEGEL Interview with NATO Head Rasmussen," April 13, 2011, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-nato-head-rasmussen-there-is-no-military-solution-to-the-libya-conflict-a-756575.html.

face various obstacles. In order to avoid further air strikes, the regime changed its tactics by hiding its tanks and using civilians as human shields. This proofed Germany right in its fear of a high risk of civilian casualties regarding the combat operation. On the other hand, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen pointed out that by hiding the tanks they were less easily used against the civilians. Furthermore, Gadhafi's tactics just underlined his brutality and the need to stop his regime. Even though it was broadly agreed upon that the Libyan crisis was in need of a political solution, the air strikes were important to weaken Gadhafi's troops and thus rendered a political solution much more likely.[346] One should further note that without the military engagement of Germany's NATO partners, Germany would most likely not have been able to implement various diplomatic measures such as opening a new liaison office in Bengasi in June 2011.[347]

While the direct effect of the military engagement and its feasibility was arguable more visible in the DR Congo, both operations were generally deployable and important to enable further civil support. Concerns regarding military feasibility alone can hence not explain why Germany engaged in the DR Congo but rejected a no-fly zone in Libya.

8. Evaluating Germany's decision-making on troop deployment in light of its strategic culture

As shown in the previous chapter, pure rational thinking cannot account for Germany's foreign policy decision-making regarding the deployment of armed forces. In both cases, Germany experienced severe international pressure to act. Furthermore, the operation in the DR Congo was neither less risky nor decisively more feasible. Nevertheless, the notion of the state as a rational actor should not be dismissed. National interests clearly play a core role in each country's decision-making with alliance politics, risk-analysis and military feasibility affecting the deployment decisions. Rather, rational decision-making should be seen in light of a country's strategic culture. Instead of being a black box, the decision-making of a state occurs on the domestic level in a complex and intertwined manner with various actors involved. Actors are thereby human beings and hence subject to perception, availability of information and inherent

[346] Ibid.
[347] Meiers, "Made in Berlin". Wohin steuert die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?", 682.

norms and values. Growing up in a distinct environment, a country's strategic culture affects how individuals view situations and deal with potential action alternatives. Costs and benefits are thereby assessed vis-à-vis underlying values and preferences.

The German strategic culture in particular is based on the two cultural strands of multilateralism and anti-militarism. Germany's national interests and option evaluations must hence be seen in light of these two precepts. Looking at Germany's decision to engage in the DR Congo, deny a military participation in the no-fly zone in Libya but approve to send troops as part of EUFOR Libya reveals the explanatory potential of taking into account Germany's multilateral and anti-militarist strategic cultural strands.

8.1. The influence of multilateralism on Germany's deployment decisions

In course of the last decades, Germany developed into a global economic power and a respected international actor. Its recognition in the world thereby came with a growing self-confidence. In consequence, the effect of alliance pressure on Germany's foreign and security policy is reduced. Rather, Germany assesses a multilateral military participation in light of own considerations and interests.[348] With regard to Germany's strong multilateral strand, however, multilateralism itself must be understood as a German national interest, with a strong imprint in the layer of strategic culture. When presenting the reorientation of the Bundeswehr to the parliament in May 2011, de Maizière claimed that for each deployment decision, Germany's direct and indirect interests are taken into account. The minister thereby stressed that Germany would not always have a direct interest but also must consider its international responsibility as well as the assessment of potential consequences of a non-engagement.[349]

Regarding the two cases of the DR Congo and Libya in light of direct national interests, Germany's relation to both states was rather limited and mostly economic.[350] Generally speaking, a mission in Libya would have been more easily justifiable than in

[348] Miskimmon, "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis", 393.
[349] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Federal Minister of Defence Dr. Thomas De Maizière, Plenarprotokoll 17/112; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*„Töten und Sterben gehören dazu"", May 27, 2011, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/de-maiziere-im-f-a-z-gespraech-toeten-und-sterben-gehoeren-dazu-17203.html.
[350] Bucher et al., "Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya", 528.

the DR Congo given Libya's proximity to Europe. Libya nonetheless was not perceived as a direct threat to Germany's national interests[351] while the DR Congo arguably was. As outlined above, the German foreign and security policy is grounded in multilateral action within international institutions such as the UN, NATO and the EU. Germany is highly reluctant towards engaging outside such multilateral frames, let alone acting unilaterally. In consequence, a lot of effort is put into strengthening the organizations. According to de Maizière "alliance interests are most of the time as well our national security interests".[352] The "Weißbuch 2006" outlined Germany's security policy for the next 10 years. Thereby the importance the country placed on multilateralism and well as a "networked security approach" was highlighted. It was argued that security could neither be provided by unilateral action nor by purely military engagement. The EU in particular was pointed out as a major civil-military actor and hence being of great value to Germany.[353] Looking at the two cases of the DR Congo and Libya from this perspective reveals a higher incentive to act in the DR Congo.

Whereas a clear stand and military action would have supported the image of the EU as an independent and relevant security actor in the international field in both cases, an important difference must be seen in the UN's direct request for military support of the EU in 2006. This call for action occurred furthermore against the backdrop of recent strategic cooperation between the two organizations fostering exactly this kind of military CSDP support missions to the UN. A non-engagement of the EU would thus have resembled a severe backlash in EU's recent developments and foreign policy credibility. Germany understood the grave risk of non-action. Given its own national interest in a strong EU CSDP, the government was willing to push for a positive response to the UN request. Germany's urge for multilateralism thus served as a major incentive to take on the costs of an engagement. In the case of Libya, however, no concrete demand to the EU was put forward. Rather, Western military engagement was broadly debated in the various multilateral frameworks and bilaterally among individual countries. The backlash of an EU non-engagement was hence comparatively smaller.

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[351] Miskimmon, "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis", 402.
[352] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Federal Minister of Defence Dr. Thomas De Maizière, Plenarprotokoll 17/112.
[353] "Weißbuch 2006: zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr" (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006).

Another important aspect regarding Germany's precept of multilateralism is the different multilateral set-up of the military operations in 2006 and 2011. Whereas EUFOR RD Congo was discussed, planned and implemented within the EU, the debated no-fly zone in Libya was under no clear command of one of the international organizations. The UK and France even considered military engagement without a UN mandate. If Germany would have advocated for military engagement, it would have risked to be drawn into a Western intervention outside a multilateral organization. In fact, when the resolution was passed, military action was initially implemented by a coalition of the willing instead. Yet, looking at Germany's strategic culture, the country is highly reluctant towards such set-ups and displays a strong preference for military action within the UN, NATO or EU. Regarding the plan of EUFOR Libya which was again clearly placed within the European frame for example, Germany's reluctance for military engagement in Libya diminished.

One can argue that in Germany's cost-benefit analysis regarding troop deployment, its inherent multilateralism increased the perception of the costs of non-action in the case of the DR Congo. With the EU's reputation and its future international engagement capacity at risk, the costs of non-engagement were thus seen as higher than the costs of action. The set-up surrounding the debate about the no-fly zone in Libya neglecting multilateral frames, on the other hand, increased the potential costs of action from a German point of view. Thus Germany's deployment decisions regarding the two cases of the DR Congo and Libya can be explained by taking into account Germany's multilateral strand of its strategic culture.

8.2. The influence of antimilitarism on Germany's deployment decisions

Whereas the cultural strand of multilateralism can serve as a main trigger to act, Germany's inherent anti-militarism defines how to engage and sets certain action limitations. The public in general but also large parts of the political elite continue to demonstrate a structural risk-averseness and view their country primarily as a civilian power. Whereas civil means are hence uncontroversial, Germany's foreign and security

policy reveals a consistent ambivalence towards the use of military force.[354] Particularly problematic is thereby the use of *aggressive* force. Analysing Germany's strategic culture, one can identify a "red line in terms of coercive airpower and direct combat operations".[355] Looking at past missions, Germany mostly contributed to training and advisory tasks, ISR or fuelling and logistic support operations.[356]

This strong reluctance against combat operations can serve as a valid explanation why Germany would participate in the CSDP operations EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Libya, but reject any military engagement regarding the no-fly zone and targeted air-strikes, even when it was under NATO command. Neither EUFOR Libya nor EUFOR RD Congo was arguably less risky or militarily more feasible. Regarding the conditions on the ground, if deployed, EUFOR Libya would have indeed been subject to high risks and questionable feasibility. What rendered the two EU operations different, however, is that they did not involve offensive tactics. Other than the no-fly zone, both CSDP operations were set out to support a "neutral" UN-mission. Thereby the general posture was one of deterrence, defence and protection rather than aggression. Participating in the combat mission in Libya on the other hand would have meant to become a warring party of a war and engage in active bombings.

Apart from a strong rejection of the use of *aggressive* military force, Germany's anti-militarism further requires a thorough legitimization and justification of the deployment of military force in general. In both cases of the DR Congo and Libya, the operations' necessity, incorporated risk and military feasibility were questioned and had to withstand domestic criticism. In the case of Libya, Germany's political leadership itself voiced major concerns towards the establishment of a no-fly zone. In the case of the DR Congo, on the other hand, the government was willing to take on a leading role regarding its multilateral interest. Germany's general scepticism towards the use of force required however a lengthy domestic debate, which went on for several months before reaching a feasible compromise. In order to accommodate domestic concerns,

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[354] Junk, Julian and Christopher Daase, "Germany," in *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Germany*, ed. H. Biehl et al. (eds.) (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2013); Miskimmon, "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis", 393.
[355] Peifer, "Why Germany Won't Be Dropping Bombs on Syria, Iraq or Mali", 266.
[356] Bundeswehr, "Abgeschlossene Einsätze der Bundeswehr".

Germany's military engagement in the DR Congo was in the end limited in time and territory. The short decision period in the case of Libya before the Security Council vote on the other hand, presented great difficulties for Germany. The lack of room for debate and compromise in 2011 arguably furthered the government's decision to abstain.[357]

It is thereby important to understand, that the government is not only subject to strategic cultural restraints but also uses selected concerns and considerations to justify its deployment decision. In 2006, for example, it was pointed to Germany's international responsibility and alliance duty, the importance of supporting the election process in the DR Congo to help the Congolese people and to prevent future humanitarian suffering.[358] In Libya, however, Germany rejected to participate in the no-fly zone despite international pressure and visible human suffering during the crisis. According to NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, "a massacre threatened to unfold in Libya".[359] Thus the German government could have stressed its international responsibility and the humanitarian aspect of a military engagement in Libya much more. Instead, the political leadership decided to frame the mission as too risky and pointed to issues of military feasibility, arguments which were neglected when later advocating for the potential CSDP mission in Libya.

To conclude, due to Germany's inherent anti-militarism, military use of force is generally seen with scepticism. Looking at Germany's cost-benefit calculations of military engagement, the government must engage in a process of restricting and/or justifying the costs of engagement in order to allow for troop deployment. Germany's commitment to the CSDP operation in the DR Congo can thus be understood as the product of a compromise. By restricting the deployment mandate, the costs of engagement were reduced enough to allow for the benefits of enabling EUFOR RD Congo. In the case of Libya and the question of participating in the no-fly zone, however, the German government did not even try to find a compromise. It seems as

[357] Brockmeier, "Germany and the Intervention in Libya", 64.
[358] Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Plenarprotokoll 16/36; Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Kerstin Müller (Green Party), Plenarprotokoll 16/36; Deutscher Bundestag, Parliamentary Speech of Ursula Mogg (SPD), Drucksache 16/36.
[359] *Spiegel, "*"There Is No Military Solution to the Libya Conflict"".

that its anti-militarist strand and strong reluctance regarding aggressive use of force rendered the perceived costs of engagement as too high to be moderated.

9. Germany's commitment to multilateral military operations: conditions and limitations

Analysing Germany's decision-making concerning the two distinct cases of the DR Congo and Libya has proven the decisiveness of taking into account Germany's strategic culture to explain its deployment decisions. Therefore careful generalizations regarding Germany's commitment to multilateral military operations can be drawn. Thereby it is important to note that the respective decision-making processes in light of rational calculations, debates, negotiations and potential compromises must always be accounted for. Such dynamic processes cannot be fully predicted. The generalizations rather refer to "ground rules", setting the stage for the various debates and rational thought-processes. In that sense it is argued that some conditions render a German commitment to multilateral operations more likely than others. First of all and most decisively, one can identify two red lines stemming from Germany's strategic culture when it comes to German deployment decisions:

- Military engagement outside international organizations: Germany refuses to act unilaterally and shows a high reluctance to deploy forces outside the multilateral frame of the UN, NATO or EU.

- Offensive posture: The country rejects to engage in active combat, displaying particularly high concerns regarding the use of *aggressive* military force.

These red lines present major concerns and thus high costs for engagement from a German point of view. Whereas even higher costs of non-action such as severe external pressure or decisive humanitarian despair might still lead to a German military commitment, the likelihood decreases drastically in light of these red lines. Germany's allies should thus pay attention to request German military support within a clear set-up of one of the international organizations, whereas a call for action among a simple coalition of the willing should be avoided. Furthermore, Germany's military

commitment to multilateral operations strongly hinges on the *kind* of operation. The commitment to various humanitarian, stabilization and training missions around the world has demonstrated Germany's willingness to come to its allies' support and put its soldiers at risk. The international community should, however, not expect to see a participation of German troops in offensive operations including active combat and targeted air strikes anytime soon without severe domestic debate and restraint.[360] In short, a German commitment to multilateral military operations is much more likely when the operation is set under command of the UN, NATO or EU and follows a defensive, deterrent or protective posture.

These requirements set the boundaries for any deployment decision. Operations adhering to the two conditions are likely to be debated, including deployment details and constraints. Thereby Germany's anti-militarism and the political system demand a thorough legitimization and justification of deployment decisions. In 2011, only 14% of the German population supported military interventions as a legitimate foreign policy tool.[361] This general reluctance towards military use of force requires to moderate domestic concerns. This leads to three main aspects to additionally take into account:

- Regarding any deployment decision in Germany, a process of convincing and moderation is required. Offering Germany enough time for debate can thus increase the likelihood of a positive response.

- Concerns can be soothed by restricting the deployment of force and thus limiting perceived risks and feasibility concerns. Germany's commitment to a multilateral operation is hence more likely when there is the opportunity to constrain the use of force by temporary or territorial deployment limitations.

- Concerns can further be moderated by boosting the operation's legitimacy by stressing humanitarian reasons to act, the existence of a multilateral frame and presenting the use of military force as a last or best resort. The existence of such preconditions hence fosters a positive deployment decision.

[360] Peifer, "Why Germany Won't Be Dropping Bombs on Syria, Iraq or Mali", 276.
[361] Junk, Julian and Christopher Daase, "Germany", 147.

Last but not least, it is important to note that decisions to commit to a multilateral operation are typically justified top-down from the government to the parliament and public. Actors are hence not only subject to and constrained by the own strategic culture but also use it in their favour.[362] Thereby "the framing of a military intervention plays a decisive role in shaping public opinion towards acceptance or rejection."[363] This does not mean that conditions such as the necessity, risk and feasibility of military engagement as well as its justification are unimportant in Germany's deployment decision-making. Effects are clearly outlined above. Nonetheless, it is argued that the core considerations regarding the red-lines of deployment seem to be most decisive and once the government has made a decision, other factors are picked and instrumentalized pertaining to the government's needs. Indeed, the German public opinion regularly criticises decisions made by the government. Also the parliament as a rule voices concerns regarding military deployment and demands a feasible justification. Yet, if the decisions do not cross a clear line, parliamentary approval is likely due to the coalition system and also the public opinion typically "rallies around the flag".[364] In that regard, "public opinion is best understood as defining the outer limits of acceptability with regard to breaks from traditional strategic cultural principles."[365] Thus the German government must be seen as the most important actor in Germany's deployment decisions with the two red-lines presenting the core restrictions to Germany's commitment in multilateral operations.

Conclusion

This thesis assesses Germany's commitment to multilateral military operations and aims at answering the question why Germany participates in some multilateral operations but not in others. Therefore the two cases of Germany's military engagement in the DR Congo in 2006 and the country's reluctance to participate in the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya 2011 were analysed. Looking at the two cases from a purely rational perspective regarding the factors of alliance politics, risk-analysis and military

[362] Schmitt, "Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action", 76-77.
[363] Junk, Julian and Christopher Daase, "Germany", 147.
[364] Bucher et al., "Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya", 529.
[365] Lantis, "The Moral Imperative of Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in Kosovo", 38.

feasibility thereby exposed inconsistencies. Neither did German military participation in Libya lack external pressure, nor was the operation in the DR Congo less risky or decisively militarily more feasible, which could have explained why Germany engaged in the DR Congo but not in Libya. A thorough tracing of Germany's respective decision-making thus revealed the necessity of taking into account Germany's unique strategic culture in order to understand Germany's deployment decisions. The country's strategic culture is thereby based on the two cultural strands of multilateralism and anti-militarism. Generally, Germany's foreign and security behaviour can be "characterized by reluctance towards the use of military force and a preference for the benefits of multilateral cooperation (including the European Union, NATO or the UN)."[366]

Assessing Germany's commitment to multilateral military operations in light of its strategic culture, two red lines can be identified. Firstly, Germany refuses to act unilaterally and is highly reluctant to deploy forces outside the multilateral frame of the UN, NATO or EU. Secondly, the country rejects to engage in active combat missions, displaying a particularly high reluctance towards the use of *aggressive* military force. Therefore despite international pressure and a strong humanitarian rational, Germany refused to engage in the combat mission in Libya 2011. In case of operations which meet the conditions of a multilateral frame and defensive posture on the other hand, the country typically engages in a lengthy domestic debate and tends to restrict its force deployment. In both cases of EUFOR RD Congo and the planned CSDP operation EUFOR Libya, conditions for German troop deployments were negotiated to moderate domestic concerns. The deployment decisions can be seen as a compromise between the urge to act due to Germany's multilateral interests and the inherent concerns regarding the deployment of military force in general. Typically, the German government is thereby not only subject to restraints, but can make use of strategic cultural considerations to justify the respective deployment decisions and generate support.

Nevertheless, international as well as domestic criticism increases regarding this "balancing" act of Germany's interests. It is pointed to an "operative gap" between the voiced support for its allies and the operations' objectives on one hand and the

[366] Schmitt, "Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action", 66.

government's unwillingness to provide the necessary means on the other.[367] This contradiction in Germany's foreign policy was both visible in the troop deployment in the DR Congo, where the restricted mandate could have risked the operation's success, as well as in Libya, where the government backed the international goal to oust Gadhafi but refused own military participation and abstained at the vote for the resolution 1973 which authorized the necessary sanctions. Germany's restrained behaviour thereby stems from its strategic culture which originated in light of the horrors of the Second World War. Nevertheless, not despite of but because of Germany's history, the country has an international responsibility for peace and stability in the world which other states already assume since World War II. It is time that Germany takes on its responsibility in international crisis and conflict management in accordance with its available resources and power position in the EU.[368] Careful considerations regarding a mission's necessity, feasibility, risk and legitimacy are clearly important and to be preferred over blind activism. Nonetheless, international criticism of Germany "free riding" on the allies' engagement[369] and "hiding behind its strategic culture"[370] should be taken serious.

It is thereby important to note that notwithstanding the persistent nature of strategic culture, it is subject to change. In fact, over the past few years a development towards a higher acceptance of deploying military force can be noted. At the Munich Security Conference in 2014 for example, former German President Joachim Gauck criticised politicians for using "Germany's guilt for its past as a shield for laziness or a desire to disengage from the world" and called for a new approach. His endeavours were backed by both the current Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen (CDU) and Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Frank Walter Steinmeier (SPD), advocating for a more active foreign policy.[371] More recent debates about NATO defence spending and a potential reintroduction of compulsory military service in Germany in addition hint at

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[367] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), "*Die Isolierung des Systems Westerwelle".
[368] Meiers, "Made in Berlin". Wohin steuert die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?", 683.
[369] See among others *Handelsblatt, "*Germany's great European defense heist," May 17, 2018, https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/opinion/free-rider-germanys-great-european-defense-heist/23582166.html?ticket=ST-3688324-EqoIQfEBTeYPMK3NrYqc-ap4.
[370] *Süddeutsche Zeitung, "*"Ein schwaches Deutschland schwächt auch die Allianz"," May 18, 2012, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/us-kritik-an-berlin-vor-dem-nato-gipfel-ein-schwaches-deutschland-schwaecht-auch-die-allianz-1.1360020.
[371] Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price, "The "sleep-walking giant" awakes: resetting German foreign and security policy," *European Security* 24, no. 4 (2015): 603-604.

a slow development towards Germany taking on increasing military responsibility in the world. At the same time, however, the identified red-lines still seem to hold true. In 2018, the German government again denied any military assistance to a US-led air-strike operation, which was based on a coalition of the willing including Great Britain and France and acted in response to a chemical outrage by the Syrian regime.[372] A focus for further research should hence be set on the potential change of Germany's strategic culture and its interplay with existing external and internal pressure on Germany's foreign and security policy.

The thesis' findings can thereby serve as a starting point for assessing the possibility and degree of change in Germany's foreign policy behaviour and future commitment to multilateral military operations. Given the decisiveness of the German executive in deployment decisions, the power and influence of the government as an advocate of change should be assessed. Thereby, the identified red-lines and considerations for Germany's deployment decisions should be tested according to their likelihood of persistence. It is further argued that the German government has an interest in fostering the change process. By taking on a more decisive role in international conflict and crisis management, Germany cannot only increase its influence regarding post-conflict developments but foster its standing in the international organizations in general. Especially given Germany's reluctance of unilateral international action, a strong say in the various multilateral settings is decisive to enforce its own interests. Given the country's inherent multilateralism and anti-militarism, however, such a policy change would face strong domestic repercussions and would require determined and persistent advocacy by the government. Thus it seems safe to assume that Germany will not commit to a military operation outside known multilateral frameworks or engage in active combat any time soon.

[372] *Die Deutsche Welle (DW), "*The German stance on Syria: Ready to help, but not militarily," April 12, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/the-german-stance-on-syria-ready-to-help-but-not-militarily/a-43356242.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Overview of Main Events regarding the Decision-Making Process in the Case of DR Congo

International Community		Germany	
Dec. 27th	UN request for EU support		
Mid.January	EU Fact-Finding Mission to DR Congo	Jan. 16th	MoD affirms UN call for action
		Jan. 18th	Defence- and Foreign Affairs Committee discuss issue for the first time
		Jan. 23rd	**GE-FR summit with preliminary decision for co-leadership**
		March 6th	Meeting of EU defence ministers – announcement of German conditions
		March 14th	GE-FR informal agreement on force composition
March 19th	Approval of Congolese Government		
		March 20th	Informal coordination meeting of EU member states in Berlin
March 23rd	**EU decides on military support**		
March 28th	EU officially informs the UN		
April 25th	UN resolution 1671		
April 27th	Adoption of the EU Joint-Action		
		May 17th	Governmental request for parliament approval
		May 19th	Parliamentary debate
		June 1st	**Parliament mandate approval**
June 12th	EU Decision to launch EUFOR DR Congo		
Nov. 30th	End of CSDP operation		

Appendix 2: Overview of Main Events regarding the Decision-Making Process in the Case of Libya

International Community		Germany	
End of February	France and the UK consider the establishment of a no-fly zone		
March 8th	Visit of the Representatives of the new Libyan National Transitional Council to the EU Parliament		
March 11th	- EU Council Meeting on Libya - EU-Foreign Minister meeting in Hungary; member states are divided over military action	March 11th	Germany advocates against military engagement at the EU meetings
March 12th	Arab League officially requests a no-fly zone by the UN		
March 15th	**US change of mind for a military engagement in Libya**		
March 16th	Official consultations at the UN Security Council on the draft resolution 1973 for authorizing "all means necessary" in Libya	March 16th Morning Early Afternoon	- Sceptical Bundestag debate on a no-fly zone - Berlin learns about US change of mind
March 17th	**UN passes resolution 1973, Germany abstains**	March 17th	Discussion meetings at the MoF and final Government decision for abstaining
March 19th	- International Libya Summit to prepare military action; - beginning of international air campaigns without Germany	March 19th	Germany announces an increase in AWACS forces in Afghanistan to disburden NATO forces in Libya
March 21st	European Council meeting on possible action in Libya	March 21st	Germany announces support for a CSDP humanitarian operation
April 1st	**EU decision for EUFOR Libya**		
April 12th	EU foreign ministers' meeting to discuss operation details		
April 20th	UN expresses concerns regarding the potential operation EUFOR Libya; **it never is requested**		

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