

Abstract

This thesis analyses Germany's commitment to multilateral military operations. Following the research question why Germany participates in some multilateral military operations but not in others, Germany's respective decision-making process regarding troop deployment in the DR Congo in 2006 on one hand and military non-engagement in Libya 2011 on the other hand is traced. By contrasting the concept of strategic culture with a purely rational assessment of the factors of alliance politics, risk-analysis and military feasibility of the operations, the decisiveness of taking into account Germany's strategic culture to explain deployment decisions is stressed. Neither is there a lack of external pressure for German military participation in the case of Libya, nor is the military operation in the DR Congo decisively less risky or militarily more feasible. Rather, Germany's multilateral and anti-militaristic strategic cultural strands affect its decision-making. Next to demanding a thorough justification and legitimization of any military engagement, two red lines for military deployment can be identified. First, Germany refuses to act unilaterally and displays a high reluctance towards military engagement outside the multilateral framework of the UN, NATO or EU. Secondly, Germany rejects to engage in active combat, being particularly reluctant towards the aggressive use of military force.