

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Institute of Security Studies

Master's Thesis

2019

Alice Gallard

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Security Studies

Alice Gallard

**France's Mal-Être: Exploring the Root Causes
and Other Explanatory Factors Behind the Rise
of Radicalisation in France**

Master's Thesis

Prague, 2019

Author: Alice Gallard

Supervisor: Doc. Emil Aslan Souleimanov

Academic Year: 2018/2019

Bibliographic note

Gallard, Alice. *France's Mal-Être: Exploring the Root Causes and Other Explanatory Factors Behind the Rise of Radicalisation in France*. 90 p. Master thesis. Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Security Studies. Supervisor Doc. Emil Aslan Souleimanov

Abstract

All in all, this thesis sheds light on a few factors that were not accounted for in the general literature on radicalisation but that are of high importance for understanding the reasons behind the radicalisation processes of individuals in France. Hence, the overall conclusion of this thesis seeks to explain that there are a few issues within the French society that are acting as push factors for individuals to radicalize. A young age, unstable environments, humiliation, social networks such as the carceral environment, a feeling of injustice, hatred towards the French foreign policy and military interventions, a search for an ideal, Salafi-jihadism ideology, a clash with the French secularism and assimilationist model and petty crimes are understood as explaining the risk factors and root causes of radicalisation in France. Overall, this research restates that radicalisation should be seen as a gradual process with different intertwined factors. Said statement leaves hope for counter-terrorism policies: As it is a gradual process, radicalisation can be more or less easily identifiable and stopped at an early stage.

Keywords

Radicalisation, root causes, jihadism, terrorism, Islamism, risk factors, jihad, French terrorism, French radicalisation, French radicals.

Range of thesis: 90 pages, 26 098 words, 190 636 symbols.

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Paris, May 9th 2019

Alice Gallard

Acknowledgements

I dedicate this Master's thesis to the French Ministry of Defence: May it be an open door to finally joining your ranks and fulfilling a life-long goal of mine.

To all the people who helped, in one way or another, in the drafting and writing process of this thesis: Thank you.

To that very special person: You know who you are and I am eternally grateful to have you in my life. May we always think fondly of each other.

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT

LIST OF USED ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION **1**

METHODOLOGY AND DATA **3**

- i. METHODOLOGY'S JUSTIFICATION 3
- ii. THEORITICAL/CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 3
- iii. TYPE OF SOURCES 4
- iv. LIMITATIONS 5
- v. RESEARCH TARGET AND HYPOTHESES 6
- vi. RESEARCH GAP 6

CHAPTER 1: DEFINITIONS OF RADICALISATION **8**

- i. RADICALISATION: A GENERAL DEFINITION 9
- ii. ISLAMIC RADICALISATION: A DEFINITION 12
- iii. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RADICALISATION AND TERRORISM 14

CHAPTER 2: THEORIES AND MODELS OF RADICALISATION **15**

- i. THEORIES OF RADICALISATION 15
- ii. MODELS OF RADICALISATION 16
 - a. WIKTOROWICZ'S MODEL 16
 - b. PET MODEL 17
 - c. NYPD MODEL 18
 - d. MOGHADDAM'S STAIRCASE TO TERRORISM 18
 - e. THOMAS PRECHT'S PROCESS OF RADICALISATION 19
 - f. A GENERAL EXPLANATION THROUGH THE PUSH AND PULL FACTORS' MODEL 21

CHAPTER 3: GENERAL ROOT CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO RADICALISATION **23**

- i. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS 23
- ii. POLITICAL FACTORS 26
- iii. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 28
- iv. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 30
- v. IDEOLOGY 32
- vi. GRIEVANCES 34

CHAPTER 4: ROOT CAUSES OF RADICALISATION IN FRANCE **37**

- i. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS 38
 - a. POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT 38
 - b. AGE: AN IMPORTANT RISK FACTOR? 41
 - c. SOCIAL NETWORKS: ROOT CAUSE OR RISK FACTOR? 43
 - d. EDUCATION 46

ii. POLITICAL FACTORS	48
iii. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS	51
a. MENTAL ILLNESSES	51
b. HUMILIATION	52
c. A SEARCH FOR AN IDEAL	53
d. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION	55
iv. RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY	55
v. CLASH WITH FRENCH SECULARISM/ASSIMILATION PROBLEMS	56
vi. PETTY CRIMES	59
vii. PRISONS AND RADICALISATION: A PROVEN CORRELATION?	61
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION	65
BIBLIOGRAPHY	69
i. ACADEMIC ARTICLES	69
ii. BOOKS	72
iii. BOOK REVIEWS	72
iv. ISSUE BRIEF	72
v. ONLINE NEWSPAPERS	73
vi. REPORTS	74
vii. WEBSITES	76
APPENDIX	78

Abstract

This thesis will provide readers with an in-depth understanding of the root causes and risks factors of Islamic radicalisation in France. It argues that Islamic radicalisation in France cannot solely be explained through one factor. This research argues that mental illnesses, deception, trauma and relative deprivation do not give a solid impetus for individuals to radicalize. Rather, radicalisation in France should be understood as an association of socio-economic, psychological, and political factors. Given the misuse of the term, the first chapter has been dedicated to its definition and to the differences between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation. Such differentiation is necessary for a thorough understanding of the topic. The second chapter gives a clear and concise overview of the different models and theories of radicalisation, contributing to a quick introduction to the different root causes and risk factors of radicalisation. The third chapter consists of a review and analysis of the available literature on the risk factors of radicalisation while the fourth and final chapter consists of an analysis of said factors in light of the French case, ultimately aiming to understand which root causes and risk factors are of high relevance in the case of France.

All in all, this thesis sheds light on a few factors that were not accounted for in the general literature on radicalisation but that are of high importance for understanding the reasons behind the radicalisation processes of individuals in France. Hence, the overall conclusion of this thesis seeks to explain that there are a few issues within the French society that are acting as push factors for individuals to radicalize. A young age, unstable environments, a feeling of humiliation, social networks such as the carceral environment, a feeling of injustice, hatred towards the French foreign policy and military interventions, a search for an ideal, Salafi-jihadism ideology, a clash with the French secularism and assimilationist model and petty crimes are understood as risk factors and root causes of radicalisation in France. Overall, this research restates that radicalisation should be seen as a gradual process explained by various intertwined factors. Said statement leaves hope for counter-terrorism policies: As it is a gradual process, radicalisation can be more or less easily identifiable and stopped at an early stage.

List of Used Abbreviations

AQ: Al-Qaeda.

AQUIM: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

CREST: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats.

DGSE: Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure or General Directorate for External Security (**DGES**) in English.

DGSI: Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure or General Directorate for Internal Security (**DGIS**) in English.

EU: European Union.

GIA: Groupe Islamique Armé in French or Armed Islamic Group (**AIG**) in English.

GSPC: Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat or Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (**SGPC**) in English.

ICCT: International Centre for Counter Terrorism.

ICSR: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.

IFRI: Institut Français des Relations Internationales or French Institute of International Relations (**FIIR**) in English.

IRIS: Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques or Institute of International and Strategic Relations (**IISR**) in English.

IS: Islamic State, also referred to as Islam State of Iraq and Syria (**ISIS**).

MENA: Middle East and North African.

NYPD: New York Police Department.

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

PET: Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (Danish Police Intelligence Service, equivalent of the DGSI).

RAN: Radicalisation Awareness Network.

RCOR: Root Causes of Radicalisation.

SMT: Social Movement Theory.

UNDP: United Nations Development Program.

US: United States of America.

Introduction

Since 2006, 77% of the academic articles and research papers published in the “Terrorism and Political Violence” and “Conflict Studies and Terrorism” journals focus on radicalisation.¹ Between 1980 and 1999, academic articles focusing on the above-mentioned term only represented 3% of the published work.² So why is there such an increasing focus on radicalisation?

The answer is simple: The 9/11 attacks, as well as the terrorist attack in London in 2005 and the ones of 2015 and 2016 in France, have fuelled the interest of scholars on the topic. Radicalisation became the new trending topic. The Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper Cacher’s terrorist attacks called for the French government to take actions in order to fight terrorism. Since these attacks, French public authorities put the fight against radicalisation on their agenda and turned it into their number-one priority by deploying significant legal, institutional and financial resources. Yet, it seems like French governmental institutions focus more on trying to counter the occurrence of terrorist attacks rather than on understanding the reasons as to why individuals radicalized in the first place. This thesis seeks to explain how we can understand the reasons as to why individuals in France radicalize through the following research question:

What are the root causes and risk factors of radicalisation in France?

This thesis has a particular political, social as well as scholarly relevance seeing as the topics touching upon radicalisation are still of actuality nowadays. The reorganisation of the French intelligence and security institutions as well as the rising recurrence of security within political debates shows the political relevance of this topic. Moreover, according to a recent poll made in February 2018, more than 60% of the French population believes that the “threat of terrorism is by far the main source of security concerns,”³ positioning itself in front of the fear of burglaries (37%), vandalism (35%), and thefts (25%).⁴ Furthermore, when delving into the political and societal debates around terrorism, it appears that French citizens are becoming

¹ Bart Schuurman, "Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and Authorship," *Terrorism and Political Violence*: 1-3, March 1, 2018, doi:10.1080/09546553.2018.1439023.

² Ibid.

³ Erwan Lestrohan, "Les Français Et La Sécurité," BVA Group, February 16, 2018, <https://www.bva-group.com/sondages/les-francais-et-la-securite/>.

⁴ Ibid.


increasingly concerned with and interested in the issue of radicalisation. Said fear and interest arose after the two infamous terrorist attacks of 2015 at the head-quarters of Charlie Hebdo's redaction and at the Hyper Cacher supermarket. Once the French government, along with French newspapers, released the news that Amedy Coulibaly, the author of the Hyper Cacher's attack, had been mentored by Djamel Beghal, an Al-Qaeda camp veteran and highly radicalized individual, and that the latter was responsible of the radicalisation of the former, both entities started acknowledging that prisons seem to play a fundamental role in the radicalisation process of individuals. Most importantly, the French population realized that radicalisation is an inherent threat to society as it seems rather complicated to infer when a radicalized individual is planning on conducting a terrorist attack.

Hence radicalisation and terrorism are two trending topics that are both relevant on political, social and scholarly levels, and that are in line with the current political, societal, academic and intelligence debates occurring nowadays. Although there is an extended amount of literature available on radicalisation, it appears that there are barely any publicly available French governmental papers focusing on the root causes of radicalisation in France. The few academic papers focusing on French radicalisation mostly concern the role of prison in the radicalisation processes of individuals. Additionally, the few available academic papers and governmental reports on the matter state that deception, vulnerability and relative deprivation account for the main root causes of radicalisation. Hence, while building on the existing literature on radicalisation and its root causes, this thesis seeks to explore French-related risk factors and root causes of radicalisation which have not yet been looked into or have been overlooked by scholars and governmental reports. The peculiarity of this thesis lies in the fact that it will use general academic literature on the topic of radicalisation, along with governmental and think tanks reports and see whether or not the mentioned root causes apply to the French case study. Ultimately, we seek to understand why some general risk factors and root causes of radicalisation are not applicable to France while delving into typical French factors of radicalisation such as assimilation problems with the French society and the reject of the concept of secularism.

Methodology and Data

i. Methodology's justification

The methodology used for this thesis is based on qualitative papers while being indirectly quantitative, hence resulting in a mixed method of research. More specifically, the method used consists of an explanatory sequential design. This entails that the sources used contain a collection and an analysis of quantitative data, followed by a collection and analysis of qualitative data, with a final interpretation of both data. Simply put, the sources used for understanding the root causes of radicalisation pursue the following methodology:



5

ii. Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

The theoretical framework we will deal with for this dissertation lies in theories and models of radicalisation. The uncertainty reduction theory, as well as the moral disengagement theory, will account for the two main theories of radicalisation. Wiktorowicz's model, along with the PET, NYPD, Moghaddam's and Precht's models will account for the 4 main models of radicalisation looked at for this dissertation. Said models have been chosen as they all explain radicalisation through a different core factor. The overall theoretical framework of this thesis "makes it possible to make comparisons of contributions from a variety of different areas thus reflecting on the interdisciplinary nature of the study of terrorism in general and radicalisation as a part of it."⁶

⁵ Cenk Akay, "Turkish High School Students' English Demotivation and Their Seeking for Remotivation: A Mixed Method Research," *Canadian Center of Science and Education* 10, no. 8 (July 13, 2017): 111, doi:10.5539/elt.v10n8p107.

⁶ Asta Maskaliūnaitė, "Exploring the Theories of Radicalisation," *International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal* 17, no. 1 (2015): 9, doi:10.1515/ ipcj-2015-0002.

iii. Type of sources

The data and literature used for the following chapters are drawn from various sources. As for the first chapter focusing on the definition of radicalisation, the sources used were drawn from research articles and official governmental reports or briefs. These reports were found on governmental websites. The same type of sources has been used for laying out the theories and models of radicalisation in Chapter 2 and for describing the general root causes of radicalisation in Chapter 3, with the additional use of think tanks articles and academic papers or researches. The reports and briefs drawn from think tanks and databases come from the following sources: Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), the Radicalisation Research database, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), among others. Additionally, a few psychology-orientated articles and reports have been used, for adding a socio-psychological perspective to the thesis, in order to englobe all factors -political, economic, sociological and psychological-leading to radicalisation. Lastly, the sources used are both of macro-level (ie: looking at general trends among radicalized individuals in general) and of micro-level (ie: looking at the root causes leading to radicalisation in France).

Based on the research question and topic of this thesis, the following terms have been extracted: “root causes”, “radicalisation”, “jihadism”, “terrorism”, “ISIS”, “jihad”, “cognitive radicalisation”, “behavioural radicalisation”, “counter-terrorism”, “Islamism”, and “Islamic”. It is important to note that all the above-mentioned terms and key words have also been used in French for finding French literature on the matter. The term “radicalisation” has been looked up both in British English (“radicalisation”) and in American English (“radicalisation”).

For the sake of this thesis’ clarity, a time frame had to be set. The time frame chosen has been set from 2000 onwards for the general information we will use for this thesis. Reports and academic articles written before 2000 will be too outdated for the purpose of this research, except if they are solely used for giving a thorough definition of what radicalisation is, as well as a for a thorough understanding of what the global root causes of radicalisation are.

iv. Limitations

First and foremost, it is important to note that all the academic papers dealt with for the purpose of this research have been written by Western or Western-influenced scholars. This might lead to a bias in the literature used for said research. Although there might be a literature bias, it is important to point out that the reports used for this thesis have been issued by governments which have done a thorough research on the root causes of radicalisation. Hence, they should have studied a broad array of radicalisation factors and should have used a broad number of sources, which should make their results unbiased and wide enough for not discriminating any ethnicities in particular.

Secondly, it is possible that by the time this research gets presented in front of a jury, other research papers delving into the root causes and risk factors of radicalisation in France might have been written, thus countering the hypotheses and conclusions presented in this dissertation. Unfortunately, this limitation cannot be countered.

Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the French secrets services' reports and governmental reports are not all publicly released yet. This means that the hypotheses and conclusion of this dissertation might not be in total accord with what the secret services really believe are root causes of radicalisation. Moreover, this means that some hypotheses might not have been directly confirmed or countered by the French government.

Lastly, some debates have purposely been overlooked. As such, debates ranging from the trial of jihadists and/or radicalized individuals who have perpetrated terrorist attacks in France to recommendations given out in order to tackle radicalisation's root causes will not be delved into in this dissertation. While one could argue that said debates could have been presented in this thesis' conclusion, it has been deemed unnecessary and unfitting in light of this dissertation's research question. Moreover, this thesis does not make a difference between the radicalisation of women and men, nor seeks to explain if there is such a difference. This is why the term "radicalized individuals" has been preferred, instead of "radicalized men" or "radicalized women".

v. Research target and hypotheses

This thesis seeks to answer the following research question:

What are the root causes and risk factors of radicalisation in France?

The research target is France and radicalisation. Radicalisation entails but is not restricted to: “individual socio-psychological factors, social factors, political factors, ideological and religious dimensions, the role of culture and identity issues, and trauma.”⁷ Hence, the following root causes and risk factors of radicalisation among the French society are deemed to be the following:

- The (in)capacity of the French educational and social system to include some individuals,
- A resentment from said individuals towards the French society for said failure,
- A resentment against the French government’s foreign policy, notably its intervention in the Middle East, alongside other Western powers,
- Cultural clashes -such as the concept of laicity- between the French culture and its third generation of immigrants,
- The role of prison in the radicalisation process of France’s new terrorists,
- A low educational background,
- Poor economic background,
- Petty crimes,
- Islamic ideology,
- A young age.

vi. Research gap

Overall, there is a research gap in the radicalisation literature that is used in order to understand the root causes and risk factors of radicalisation in France. This thesis seeks to address said gap, by stating that we should look at the role prisons play in the radicalisation processes, as well as looking at typical French political, socio-economic and psychological factors. While the general

⁷ Magnus Ranstorp, The Root Causes of Violent Extremism, issue brief, *Radicalisation Awareness Network*, January 04, 2016, 3, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_root-causes_jan2016_en.pdf.

literature on the root causes of radicalisation is pretty dense and seems to be covering the research question of this thesis, it appears that it is not the case, and that previous scholars and academics have “forcefully” applied said factors to the case of France, even though some of them might be irrelevant and unfitting to the case study presented in said thesis.

Chapter 1: Definitions of Radicalisation

“Radicalisation became the new buzz word.”⁸ Saying it in an open space will trigger reactions, if not discomfort. But rather than focusing on the effect the word produces among individuals, we will focus on what it entails. Firstly, it is important to note that there is no consensus among scholars, researchers and governmental institutions on the definition of radicalisation, nor is there a consensus on what terrorism entails and how it should be defined. Dr. Asta Maskaliūnaite, an expert in the field of terrorism, rightfully put it: “most researchers and policy makers agree that radicalisation is a problem, yet, there is less agreement as to what exactly the word entails.”⁹ While the title of this chapter can be quite intriguing, there is a rationale behind using “definition” in its plural form. Indeed, as we will see it, there are different types of radicalisation. The following chapter is of high importance for this thesis. Undoubtedly, the root causes and risk factors of radicalisation are directly related to radicalisation itself. Hence, it is necessary to define what the main word of the expression coins. Moreover, knowing what radicalisation entails is important for understanding the following chapters. It would be impossible to answer the research question if a definition of radicalisation is not given.

The subsequent definitions aim to give a general idea of what the term entails, while showing where the definitions diverge. Some definitions consider violence as an intrinsic part of radicalisation, others leave it out, stating that it is only present in a specific type of radicalisation. Interestingly, almost all general definitions of radicalisation leave out connotations with Islam, preferring to include it -and rightfully so- under the term “Islamic radicalisation”, “Islamic terrorism” or “Islamic extremism”. Said terms will be defined in the second subsection of this chapter. Lastly, as stated in a report from the Centre for the Study of Democracy, it is important that radicalisation is differentiated from terrorism, seeing as both terms are often misused and taken to fall under the same definition.¹⁰ Hence, for the sake of this thesis’ clarity, the third and last subsection of this chapter will briefly delve into the differences between radicalisation and terrorism.

⁸ Maskaliūnaite, *Exploring the Theories of Radicalisation*, 9.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁰ Rositsa Dzhékova et al., *Understanding Radicalisation. Review of Literature*, report, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016, 7, https://csd.bg/fileadmin/user_upload/publications_library/files/22778.pdf.

i. Radicalisation: A general definition

Peter Neumann broadly defines radicalisation as “what goes on before the bomb goes off,”¹¹ while Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalkenko describe the term as a “development of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in a conflict.”¹²

Interestingly, the Canadian Intelligence Services define radicalisation “as the process by which individuals -usually young people- are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views.”¹³ It is one of the very few definitions -if not the only one- that makes a direct link between radicalisation and an age group.

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen defines it as a “growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order.”¹⁴ She emphasizes the different subsets of radicalisation, and defines “violent radicalisation” as “a process in which radical ideas are accompanied by the development of a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts.”¹⁵ This definition mirrors Peter Neumann’s typology of radicalisation, described as “the (gradual) process whereby people become extremists.”¹⁶ Doosje et al propose a rather similar definition of radicalisation. Indeed, they define it as “a process through which people become increasingly motivated to use violent means against members of an out-group or symbolic targets to achieve behavioural change and political goals”.¹⁷ Hence, it appears that radicalisation is often coined with an individual’s desire to change the existing order of the society in which he or she either lives in, or evolves in, and that sometimes this involves the use of violence.

¹¹ Peter Neumann et al., *Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence*, report, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, January 2008, 4, <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource/perspectives-on-radicalisation-and-political-violence/>.

¹² Sophia Moskalkenko and Clark McCauley, "Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 2 (March 30, 2009): 4, doi:10.1080/09546550902765508.

¹³ *Radicalisation: A Guide for the Perplexed*, report, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, June 2009, 1, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/grc-rcmp/PS64-102-2009-eng.pdf.

¹⁴ Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Violent Radicalisation in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 9 (August 16, 2010): 798, doi:10.1080/1057610x.2010.501423.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Peter Neumann, "The Trouble with Radicalisation," *International Affairs* 89, no.4 (July 2013): 874, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12049.

¹⁷ Bertjan Doosje et al., "Terrorism, Radicalisation and De-radicalisation," *Current Opinion in Psychology* 11 (October 2016): 79, doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.06.008.

Emil Souleimanov follows the path of Dalgaard-Nielsen by defining radicalisation through two different subcategories: cognitive and violent or behavioural radicalisation. The author defines cognitive radicalisation as “a shift in the value system without necessarily committing physical steps to advance them,”¹⁸ while violent or behavioural radicalisation entails radicalized individuals who “come to use violence, that is, to commit violent action.”¹⁹ Violent or behavioural radicalisation “is said to be the ultimate end-point of radicalisation.”²⁰ It is important to note that these two subcategories of radicalisation “may be intertwined, with the former preceding the latter,”²¹ the former being cognitive radicalisation and the latter being violent or behavioural radicalisation.

Finally, the OSCE states that “radicalisation in itself is not necessarily a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred.”²² This exemplifies Emil Souleimanov’s and Dalgaard-Nielsen’s point, namely that there are two “branches” of radicalisation: cognitive and behavioural radicalisation, and that it is important to dissociate the two terms as radicalisation does not necessarily entails the commitment of violent acts. Ultimately, the OSCE argues that “radicalisation becomes a threat to society if an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action.”²³ Violent radicalisation “may eventually, but not necessarily, lead this person to advocate, act in support of, or engage in terrorism.”²⁴

The main commonality between scholars’ definitions of radicalisation and governments’ definitions lies in the idea that radicalisation is a process. Indeed, the European Commission and the United States (US) Department of Homeland Security respectfully define it as “socialization to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism”²⁵ and as “the process whereby an individual or group adopts extremist beliefs and behaviours.”²⁶ Other governments, such as

¹⁸ Emil Aslan Souleimanov, "Civil War and Religion: Salafi-Jihadist Groups," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics: 3, doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.653.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² *Radicalisation and Violent Extremism*, report, European Parliament, December 2017, 12, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596838/IPOL_STU\(2017\)596838_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596838/IPOL_STU(2017)596838_EN.pdf)

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ *Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism*, report, May 15, 2008, 7, <https://rikcoolsaet.be/files/2008/12/expert-group-report-violent-radicalisation-final.pdf>.

²⁶ *Radicalisation: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature*, report, Homeland Security Institute, December 15, 2006, 1, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a497263.pdf>.

the United-Kingdom, directly define it “as a pathway to terrorism”²⁷ where “a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.”²⁸ Although all the above-mentioned governmental definitions agree on the fact that radicalisation is a process and should be seen as such, they fail to agree on exactly where said process begins.²⁹

The clearest and most Islamically-connotated definition of radicalisation is put forward by Farhad Khosrokhavar who defines radicalisation as a “process by which an individual or group adopts a violent form of action directly related to an extremist ideology of political, social or religious content that challenges the established political, social or cultural order.”³⁰ While the above-mentioned scholars and researchers attempted to define radicalisation without the extremism connotation, this definition directly links it to ideological extremism.

As a conclusion, radicalisation is not necessarily a threat in itself. After having reviewed its scholarly and governmental definitions, it appears that radicalisation becomes problematic when individuals -or a group- resort to violence in order to uphold their ideas and beliefs. Differently put, this means that radicalisation becomes problematic when the individual shifts from *cognitive radicalisation to behavioural radicalisation*. Surely, radicalisation is often tied with political violence, but after having analysed its different definitions, it appears that the term could be generally defined as the following: *a gradual process or escalation dynamics in the potential formation of violent and often clandestine groups, advocating for a change within society, resulting in a shift from cognitive radicalisation to behavioural radicalisation,*^{31 32} *with the final aim of changing the existing order of a society, through the use -in some cases- of violence.*

²⁷ Maskaliūnaitė, *Exploring the Theories of Radicalisation*, 12.

²⁸ *Roots of Violent Radicalisation*, report no. 19, House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, January 31, 2012, 4, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf>.

²⁹ Maskaliūnaitė, *Exploring the Theories of Radicalisation*, 12.

³⁰ Nicolas Campelo et al., "Who Are the European Youths Willing to Engage in Radicalisation? A Multidisciplinary Review of Their Psychological and Social Profiles," *European Psychiatry* 52 (March 7, 2018):1, doi:10.1016/j.eurpsy.2018.03.001.

³¹ Dzhokova et al., *Understanding Radicalisation*, 8.

³² Souleimanov, *Civil Wars and Religion*, 3.

ii. Islamic radicalisation: A definition

In our contemporary setting, radicalisation is often “discussed or linked with reference to young Muslims who are influenced, to one degree or another, by Islamic thoughts.”³³ Yet, as we saw it with the first subsection of this chapter, radicalisation does not automatically entail an Islamic ideology. When talking about Islamic ideology and radicalisation, the term “Islamic radicalisation” should be used, in order to avoid all confusion. A project called “Radicalisation, Recruitment and the European Union (EU) Counter-Radicalisation Strategy” explains that “radicalisation among European Muslims has been the subject of study since the 1990s, and that attention to this particular phenomenon has increased dramatically after the attacks of the United-States on September 11, 2001.”³⁴ Given the increased concern and research on the topic, it is important to define what the term really means.

Firstly, Islamic radicalisation should not be mistaken with Islamic fundamentalism or even with Islamism. The United Kingdom’s Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) defines Islamic fundamentalism as “forms of Islamic belief and practice that fall outside the norms of mainstream Islamic practice, usually of an overtly political or behaviourally conservative nature.”³⁵ While Islamic fundamentalism is vaguely associated with a form of Islamic belief, Mehdi Mozaffari directly links Islamism with a religious ideology and defines it as follows: “a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means.”³⁶

Dounia Bouzar defines Islamic radicalisation as “the result of a psychic process that transforms the cognitive framework of the individual (such as his/her way of seeing the world, of thinking, of acting etc) by shifting him/her from a personal quest to an ideological one related to a Muslim collective identity and a totalitarian political project that he/she wants to control by using violence.”³⁷

³³ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Radicalisation*, 2.

³⁴ *Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-Radicalisation Strategy*, report, Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, November 17, 2008, 8, <http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/doc2-WP4-Del-7.pdf>.

³⁵ "Glossary: Islamic Extremist Material," Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, March 30, 2017, 3, <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/glossary-islamic-extremist-material/>.

³⁶ Mehdi Mozaffari, "What Is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 1 (March 2007): 21, doi:10.1080/14690760601121622.

³⁷ Dounia Bouzar and Marie Martin, "Pour Quels Motifs Les Jeunes S’engagent-ils Dans Le Djihad ?" *Neuropsychiatrie De L’Enfance Et De L’Adolescence* 64, no. 6 (October 2016): 355, doi:10.1016/j.neurenf.2016.08.002.

Concerning the French definition of the term “Islamic radicalisation”, it appears that a majority of French scholars, whether specialized in political sciences or in sociology, prefer substituting it for the term “jihadist radicalisation.”³⁸ Indeed, two eminent French political scientists both specialized in Islam -although intrinsically opposed on their political views and geopolitical ideas-, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy, prefer talking of “jihadist radicalisation” for the former, and “Islamisation of radicalisation” or “radicalisation of Islam” for the latter.³⁹ This variation is also present in the official definitions given by the French government. Indeed, the French governmental website against jihadism defines jihadist radicalisation as “not only challenging or rejecting the established order, but as a choice driven by the desire to replace democracy with a theocracy based on Islamic law through the use of violence and weapons.”⁴⁰ This definition comes closest to a “proper” definition of jihadist radicalisation or Islamic radicalisation.

Yet, it remains that there is a lack of consensus among the French government on what “radicalisation” and “Islamic radicalisation” mean and what both terms really entail. Although few parliamentary reports directly dealt with both terms, they failed to clearly define them. Interestingly, the French government seems to prefer the term “jihadist radicalisation” as it clearly deals with Islamism and has a strong correlation with the use of violence in order to advocate one’s Islamic ideals and beliefs. Although the French government’s definitions of radicalisation and Islamic radicalisation are quite vague, they give out a definition of Islamism which is a bit clearer and is defined as follows: an individual’s desire to change the course of political and social actions through the implementation of Islamic law.⁴¹ Hence, the French definition of Islamic radicalisation can be interpreted as an individual’s radicalisation process fuelled by Islamic ideology.

³⁸ "Prévention Et Signalement Des Cas De Radicalisation Djihadiste," Gouvernement Français, 2017, <https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/risques/pdf/fiche-prevention-et-signalement-des-cas-de-radicalisation-djihadiste.pdf>.

³⁹ Jean-Paul Richier, "Que Désigne Le Terme « Radicalisation » ?" Mediapart, December 19, 2018, <https://blogs.mediapart.fr/jean-paul-richier/blog/181218/que-designe-le-terme-radicalisation>.

⁴⁰ "La Radicalisation Djihadiste, Qu'est-ce Que C'est ?" Stop Djihadisme, October 03, 2017, <http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/radicalisation/explication-du-phenomene/radicalisation-djihadiste-quest-ce-que-cest>.

iii. Difference between radicalisation and terrorism

Terrorism is often used in the definition of radicalisation, even though these two terms are quite different once one looks into their proper definitions. While there is no general consensus on the definition of terrorism, the following term is defined by the Council of the European Union's as "intentional acts that were committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation."^{42 43}

Riyad Hosain Rahimullah, Stephen Larmar and Mohamad Abdalla differentiate radicalisation and terrorism the following way: "Radicalism however does not equate to terrorism. While radicalism typically precedes terrorism, a radicalized individual may not necessarily intend to commit terrorism. However, some individuals who commit terrorism may circumvent the process of radicalisation which warrants attention in current research."⁴⁴

While radicalisation does not necessarily entail terrorism, it appears to be clear that the actual use of violence and the desire to change society's established order are present among most radicalized individuals. Forenamed use of violence characterizes what is called "behavioural radicalisation", namely the "point of no return" of radicalisation, as it results in the commitment of terrorist attacks. Again, it is important to reiterate the fact that it is necessary to be cautious when using the term "radicalisation", as it coins different meanings depending on the presence and the use, or lack thereof, of violence. Overall, the above-given definitions of radicalisation, Islamic radicalisation, jihadism radicalisation and Islamism will be of relevance for the following chapters as said definitions will be delved into when looking at the causal factors and root causes behind individuals' radicalisation processes. Lastly, it should be noted that radicalisation is not a threat in itself but becomes one when individuals shift from cognitive to behavioural radicalisation.

⁴² Riyad Hosain Rahimullah, Stephen Larmar, and Mohamad Abdalla, "Understanding Violent Radicalisation amongst Muslims: A Review of the Literature," *Journal of Psychology and Behavioral Science* 1, no. 1 (December 2013): 20, December 2013, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/143865434.pdf>.

⁴³ "Acts of Terrorism," European Commission, March 04, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/acts-terrorism_en.

⁴⁴ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 20.

Chapter 2: Theories and Models of Radicalisation

Theories and models of radicalisation seek to explain the reasons as to why individuals radicalize. These theories and models are important to delve into seeing as they provide a preliminary approach of root causes and risk factors of radicalisation. As Keiran Hardy stated it, understanding theories and models of radicalisation is of high importance as it “offers a framework for understanding radicalisation’s various complex causes (...) while exhibiting significant variation in how the phenomenon can be explained.”⁴⁵ Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to lay out the different models and theories of radicalisation as it will provide a first basis and understanding of what some root causes and risk factors of radicalisation can be.

i. Theories of radicalisation

Riyad Hossain Rahimullah, Stephen Larmar, and Mohamad Abdalla identify two main relevant theories for explaining radicalisation: moral disengagement and the uncertainty reduction theory.

The moral disengagement theory, put forward by Albert Bandura and analysed by the above-mentioned authors, relates to “the process of radicalisation, in which individuals’ sense of morality becomes reversed, making committing terrorism a moral obligation instead of a forbidden crime.”⁴⁶ Adding onto Albert Bandura’s theory, the authors believe that Ehud Sprinzak’s “sequential cognitive stages of radicalisation” is also relevant. Said model present the radicalisation process of an individual through 3 different stages. The first stage consists of “a crisis of confidence, where individuals hold less confidence in their governments and where disagreement arises with certain policies or rulers.”⁴⁷ “Conflict of legitimacy, where individuals begin to challenge the legitimacy of the government, and where more extreme forms of protest emerge”⁴⁸ constitute the second stage. The third and last stage results in a “crisis of legitimacy where everyone associated with the government is delegitimized, depersonalized and

⁴⁵ Keiran Hardy, "Comparing Theories of Radicalisation with Countering Violent Extremism Policy," *Journal for Deradicalisation*, no. 15 (June 29, 2018): 76, <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/150/119>.

⁴⁶ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 28.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

dehumanized.”⁴⁹ The ultimate end point of this process results in the cognitive radicalisation of the individual.

The uncertainty reduction theory emphasizes that “in situations of uncertainty, individuals are more likely to categorize themselves with a group that reduces their uncertainty.”⁵⁰ The authors point out that “Savage and Liht argue that Muslims in the West are facing situations of uncertainty like the conflict between Muslim and Western values occurring in the minds of Muslims in the West, and that such uncertainty is reduced when adopting the arguments of a group, as this is less vulnerable to critique than ordinary individual opinions.”⁵¹ Overall, Savage and Liht explain radicalisation as a reaction to uncertainty, if not as a result to a threat of the individuals’ survival.⁵²

Hence, these different theories explain radicalisation through different factors. They explain this phenomenon through the desire to belong to a group in order to reduce individuals’ personal uncertainty, while explaining the impetus behind committing terrorist attacks as a result of a switch in individuals’ morality, fuelled by socio-political factors. They list interesting factors explaining radicalisation, namely the first two important categories of root causes of radicalisation being socio-economic and political factors, which will later be delved into in the following chapters.

ii. Models of radicalisation

a. *Wiktorowicz’s model*

After having studied a Muslim activist group and the way it functions, Quintan Wiktorowicz came up with a four-stage model of radicalisation, using the Social Movement Theory (SMT), which used “congeries of ideas that have been found useful in understanding movements”⁵³ and draws attention to “mobilizing structures, political opportunities, framing and repertoires of contentious action.”⁵⁴ At stage 1, the individual goes through a cognitive opening: the “individual becomes receptive to the possibility of new ideas and worldviews.”⁵⁵ At stage 2, the individual engages in religious seeking. Stage 3 is illustrated through what the author calls

⁴⁹ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 28.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Understanding Political Radicalisation: The Two-Pyramids Model," *American Psychological Association* 72, no. 3, 206, doi:10.1037/amp0000062.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 30.

“frame alignment” where the “public representation offered by the radical group makes sense to the seeker and attracts him or her initial interest.”⁵⁶ Finally, stage 4 lies in socialization, where “the individual experiences religious lessons and activities that facilitate indoctrination, identity-construction, and value changes”⁵⁷, leading to full radicalisation. Out of the following models of radicalisation, it appears that Quintan Wiktorowicz’s is the most ideologically-oriented explanation of radicalisation.

b. PET model

The Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET) model, developed by the Danish Intelligence Services, “observes radicalisation as a top-down process in which an external radicaliser plays an important role in influencing the individual through a process of change that involves changed behaviour, a narrowing of his or her social life and a moral hardening.”⁵⁸ The interest of this model lies in the fact that it directly starts off with the influence of another radicalized individual, and not the “indirect” influence of radicalized beliefs. This top-down model explains the radicalisation process in a 4 stages mode, quite similar to Wiktorowicz’s, which functions as follows: Phase 1 starts with a “contact between a radicalisator and a person open to radical ideas,”⁵⁹ then followed by phase 2 where one can see “a gradual change of behaviour”⁶⁰ with the soon-to-be radicalised individual, while phase 3 consists of a “narrowing of social life, aiming to include only like-minded individuals, resulting in social bonds with family and former friends to be cut off or restricted.”⁶¹ Lastly, the fourth and final phase consists of a “process of moral hardening of the new radicalized individual, by watching very violent videos and combat scenes.”⁶² Thus, said model emphasizes radicalisation through a connection with an individual who is already radicalized. This is rather interesting as no other models look at radicalisation in light of an individual’s relationships. While relations (whether friendly, familial or romantic)

⁵⁶ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 30.

⁵⁷ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 30.

⁵⁸ Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun, *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model*, report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, October 2009, 2, https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/islamist_radicalisation.veldhuis_and_staun.pdf.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

with radicalized individuals have been shown to be an important radicalisation factor, no other models used it as a main explanatory factor for radicalisation.

c. NYPD model

Another renowned radicalisation model is the New York Police Department (NYPD) one. This model is called a “bottom-up model, which focuses on radicalisation as a bottom-up process.”⁶³ The NYPD approach is quite similar to Wiktorowicz’s and the PET model, as it has a 4 phases level approach. The first phase consists of pre-radicalisation, which “describes an individual’s world -his or her pedigree, lifestyle, religion, social status, neighbourhood and education- just prior to the start of their journey down the path of radicalisation.”⁶⁴ The second phase consists of self-identification, where “the individual begins to explore Salafi Islam, while slowly migrating away from their former identity.”⁶⁵ The third stage consists of indoctrination, where the individual “progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that action is required to support and further the Salafist cause.”⁶⁶ Lastly, the fourth stage is the finality of the radicalisation process and results in jihadization, meaning that the individuals “accept their duties to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen.”⁶⁷ Said theory of radicalisation could be seen as a complete one as it takes social, ideological and psychological factors/root causes of radicalisation into account. Yet, although it globally explains radicalisation as a mix of different factors, it appears that the NYPD model does not believe political factors to be thorough explanatory factors of radicalisation.

d. Moghaddam’s “Staircase to Terrorism”

Moghaddam’s model “describes six steps, beginning on the “ground floor” with psychological interpretation of injustice, then ascending through greater moral engagement and categorical thinking towards an ultimate violent act: a terrorist attack.”⁶⁸ Said model emphasizes the role of the perception of injustice and the feeling of frustration based on political decisions taken by

⁶³ Veldhuis and Staun, *Islamist Radicalisation*, 15.

⁶⁴ *Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, report, New York Police Department, 2007, 22, https://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_Report-Radicalisation_in_the_West.pdf.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁶⁸ Hardy, *Comparing Theories of Radicalisation*, 81.

the government of the country in which the future radicalized individuals lives in.⁶⁹ Based on the above-mentioned grievances, individuals will “try different doors in search of solutions to what they perceive to be an unjust treatment.”⁷⁰ Secondly, individuals are triggered by “anger at the perceived perpetrators of injustice.”⁷¹ This means that individuals “develop a readiness to physically displace aggression”⁷² without necessarily committing violent actions directly. The individuals develop a moral engagement that “justifies the struggle to achieve the ideal society by any means possible.”⁷³ The fourth floor consists of the individual becoming part of a terrorist organization. Finally, the radicalized individuals “dehumanize enemy civilians to make them legitimate targets of violence.”⁷⁴ Throughout this stage, the individuals “become psychologically prepared and motivated to commit acts of terrorism.”⁷⁵ Hence, grievances, perception of injustice, a sense of relative deprivation, and anger are seen by Moghaddam as being a general model of radicalisation, explaining individuals’ shift from cognitive radicalisation to behavioural radicalisation. This model is quite similar to the NYPD model to the extent that it does not incorporate political factors as explanatory factors of radicalisation. Surely, anger stems from a feeling of injustice where said feeling is a response to the perpetrator’s actions, but nowhere does it specify that the radicalized individual firstly radicalized due to a desire to change the political discourse or political agenda of the country in which he lives in. This brings us to the last model and theory of radicalisation.

e. Thomas Precht’s process of radicalisation

In a research report issued by the Danish Ministry of Justice, Thomas Precht came up with a theory of process of radicalisation. Said theory lies out some root causes of radicalisation and details the different stages of radicalisation. Said stages are the following:

- **Pre-radicalisation:** This stage groups a “number of different background factors which can lead an individual to radicalize”⁷⁶ among which “experiences of discrimination,

⁶⁹ Fathali Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration," *American Psychologist*, 60, no. 2 (2005): 162, doi:10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 163.

⁷¹ McCauley & Moskaleiko, *Understanding Political Radicalisation*, 205.

⁷² Moghaddam, *Staircase to Terrorism*, 164.

⁷³ Moghaddam, *Staircase to Terrorism*, 164.

⁷⁴ McCauley & Moskaleiko, *Understanding Political Radicalisation*, 206.

⁷⁵ Moghaddam, *Staircase to Terrorism*, 166.

⁷⁶ Irène Gilperez-Lopez, Mahmoud Barhamgi, and David Camacho, *An Initial Study on Radicalisation Risk Factors: Towards an Assessment Software Tool*, report, International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications, August 2017, 12, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320089317_An_Initial_Study_on_Radicalisation_Risk_Factors_Towards_an_Assessment_Software_Tool.

societal or social alienation, perceived injustices, personal traumas, and living conditions”⁷⁷ can be found.

- **Conversion and identification:** In this stage, individuals are believed to “change their attitudes towards religion, politics and to resort to the use of violence to achieve political means.”⁷⁸ This includes “a stricter following of Islam, increased feeling of membership to a group and a change in narrative about the West.”⁷⁹
- **Conviction and indoctrination:** In this phase, the individuals “will firmly believe that violent action is necessary to defend Islam.”⁸⁰
- **The last and final stage of this theory of radicalisation is action:** This phase “represents the end of the process of radicalisation. If individuals reach this point they will be completely radicalized.”⁸¹ Put differently, the pre-final stage (resort to violence) leads to the final stage (action) which means that by now, the individuals should be fully “behaviourally radicalized.”⁸²

Precht’s model is quite interesting as it directly links radicalisation to be associated with the desire to change the political agenda of a country, or at least to be directly linked with political factors. Radicalisation can thus be interpreted as a politically driven process. Yet, as it will be proven throughout this thesis, some individuals do not mainly radicalize due to political factors. They might simply try to use their radicalized ideas and beliefs to advocate -or forcefully- change the way society functions or even use them for gaining social importance. Said political connotation is interesting as Precht’s model is the only model out of the 4 mentioned in this chapter that directly understands political factors as core reasons driving individuals’ radicalisation processes.

What is interesting with the above presented theories and models of radicalisation is that we can see how “scholars are moving away from a linear approach of radicalisation towards behavioural, relation and multi-causal models of radicalisation.”⁸³ Although said models differ in the way they present the different radicalisation processes individuals might choose to undergo, they show some common ground. Indeed, “each model describes a person who

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Gilperez-Lopez et al, *An Initial Study on Radicalisation*, 12.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Keiran Hardy, *Comparing Theories of Radicalisation*, 81.

internalises and strengthens their association with an extremist ideology. This internal process is influenced heavily by external connections to terrorist groups and networks. Although this is not necessarily a linear process, these “graduated” and “non-linear” models help us understand an individual’s progression towards violence and as this process culminates, said process might result in the individual committing a violent act.”⁸⁴ As Keiran Hardy explained it, it is important to keep in mind that these models describe and explain the “how of radicalisation but not the why.”⁸⁵ The different theories and models presented in this second chapter are necessary to grasp a broad idea of the different stages radicalized individuals go through before switching to behavioural radicalisation. Although this chapter has initially been thought for laying out the general theories available on the reasons as to why individuals radicalize, it does not go into details into the different reasons or risks factors of radicalisation. Thus, the following chapter will delve deeper into the various reasons behind cognitive and behavioural radicalisation.

f. A general explanation through the push and pull factors model

A Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Issue Paper from 2016 states that “the radicalisation mechanisms are a product of interplay between push and pull-factors within individual.”⁸⁶ While this statement is not ground-breaking in itself as we already knew that radicalisation is better explaining through a mix of different factors, Magnus Ranstorp, the author of said report, sheds light on a push and pull model of radicalisation that is interesting to delve in. Ranstorp argues that the push factors are the following: social, political and economic grievances, a sense of injustice and discrimination, personal crisis and tragedies, frustration, alienation, fascination with violence, searching for answers to the meaning of life, identity crisis, social exclusion, marginalization, disappointment with democratic processes, and polarization. Factors such as a personal quest, a sense of belonging to a cause, ideology or social network, power and control, a sense of loyalty and commitment, a sense of excitement and adventure, a romanticized view of ideology and cause, the possibility of heroism and personal redemption are considered as being pull-factors of radicalisation.

Said approach points out at some precise factors, which are mostly absent in other institutions or scholars’ reports on the matter. While other reports point out social-economic deprivation

⁸⁴ Hardy, *Comparing Theories of Radicalisation*, 81-82.

⁸⁵ Hardy, *Comparing Theories of Radicalisation*, 82.

⁸⁶ Ranstorp, *The Root Causes of Violent Extremism*, 4.

and poverty as being the main factors of radicalisation, the RAN's approach counters said approach.⁸⁷ Moreover, this report is thought provoking as it argues that individuals might encounter a certain form of resistance throughout their radicalisation process, resistance illustrated through the pull factors, retaining them from shifting from cognitive radicalisation to behavioural radicalisation. This approach has never been adopted before, and although it does not entirely explain the reasons as to why individuals radicalize, it is interesting to see that radicalisation is more the process of a tension between different factors and of a cost-effectiveness analysis than something totally smooth sailing. Moreover, by comparing the push and pull factors, this report once again sheds light on the fact that radicalisation is a complicated process to understand. One individual's push factor might be another individual's pull factor and vice versa. Hence, this joins Asta Masakaliūnaitė argument that "engaging in terrorist activities as a result of radicalisation is more a process based on rational choice than an outcome of processes beyond individual's control."⁸⁸ Thus, this once again proves that radicalisation fluctuates from individuals to individuals and that countering radicalisation will prove to be difficult as the risk factors of radicalisation are extremely volatile.

⁸⁷ Ranstorp, *The Root Causes of Violent Extremism*, 1.

⁸⁸ Maskaliūnaitė, *Exploring the Theories of Radicalisation*, 23.

Chapter 3: General Root Causes Contributing to Radicalisation

All scholars, researchers and governmental institutions agree on the fact that there are no single factors leading to radicalisation. Yet, as the OSCE stated it, “while there is no single driver of radicalisation -and therefore no single profile of a terrorist – experts have identified a number of recurring factors and dynamics.”⁸⁹ Before delving into the different categories of factors influencing radicalisation, it is necessary to define said term. Root causes of radicalisation or “radicalisation factors” can be defined as “something that increases the likelihood that someone will radicalize to violent extremism.”⁹⁰ It is put in opposition to a “protective factor”, as exemplified in Appendix A, which is defined as “something that decreases the likelihood that someone will radicalize to violent extremism.”⁹¹ Root causes of radicalisation can be categorized in three different subsections: socio-economic factors, political factors, and psychological factors. After having delved into the literature available on that matter, relative deprivation was found to be portrayed as an important factor of radicalisation. However, this factor is often criticized. Hence, instead of framing it under the psychological root causes of radicalisation, it has been deemed necessary to give it a subsection of its own, in order to talk about the discussion going on with said factor.

i. Socio-economic factors

Syed Mansoob Murshed and Sara Pavan identify a few socio-economic factors as “producing systematic disadvantage.”⁹² The authors believe that inequality of opportunity on account of people’s identity can be a push factor toward radicalisation.⁹³ They also claim that unemployment or even living in poorer areas of a city may be a fuelling factor for individuals -and more specifically for Muslims in light of this research- to radicalize.⁹⁴ Overall, this first socio-economic risk factor for radicalisation aims to explain that Muslims in Western Europe may be subject to an inequality of opportunity on account of their identity, which is producing systematic disadvantage. This means that the ongoing discrimination faced by Muslims based

⁸⁹ Peter Neumann, *Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation That Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region*, report, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, September 28, 2017, 17, <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/346841?download=true>.

⁹⁰ *Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned From Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.*, report, National Institute of Justice, U.S Department of Justice, July 28, 2015, 8, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249947.pdf>.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Syed Mansoob Murshed and Sara Pavan, "Identity and Islamic Radicalisation in Western Europe," *Civil Wars* 13, no. 3 (October 04, 2011): 261, doi:10.1080/13698249.2011.600000.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 24.

on their socio-religious identity is producing systemic disadvantage, a disadvantage that forbids them from having access to certain assets or wealth that are granted to all citizens of a country, regardless of their social identities.

Furthering this argument, Emil Souleimanov exposes the striking conclusion of a study conducted by Piazza: it seems to appear that “there is a correlation between economic discrimination experienced by minority groups and support for terrorism.”⁹⁵ What is interesting with said statement is that one should read it carefully. While the aforementioned factor shows a support for terrorism, it remains that there is a difference between a factor providing *support* for something and a factor *directly causing or leading to something*. If economic deprivation would inherently lead to radicalisation, then most -if not all- individuals experiencing economic deprivation would carry terrorist attack. Yet, as this statistically is not the case -it suffices to look at how many individuals are or have been experiencing economic deprivation and compare said number with the number of terrorist attacks that occurred since 9/11 for example-, it is not hard to see that this argument does not stand any statistical evidences nor logic in all ways. Finally, although said argument might be easy to use in understanding why individuals radicalize, it simply does not explain it soundly and should thus be discarded when one uses it as the main justification for understanding the rationale and root causes of radicalisation.

The US Department of Justice identifies additional key social factors that explain the root causes of radicalisation. Said factors are the following: “experiencing an identity conflict, feeling there is a lack of meaning in one’s life, wanting to achieve a certain status or wanting to move up the social ladder, wanting to belong to a group, desiring action or adventure, having engaged in criminal activities in the past, being exposed to violent extremist groups or individuals, being exposed to violent extremist belief systems or narratives, and having family members or others acquaintances in violent extremist networks.”⁹⁶ These factors are interesting to look at as they delve into the reasons as to why individuals might radicalize, while succinctly pointing at what are driving factors instead of simply enumerating them like it is the case with part of the literature that has been delved in for this chapter. Moreover, the addition of factors such as “wanting to achieve a certain status” or “having engaged in criminal activities in the past” is interesting, as said factors have been left out, if not purposely overlooked by other

⁹⁵ Souleimanov, *Civil Wars and Religion*, 5-6.

⁹⁶ U.S Department of Justice, *Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned From Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.*, v.

scholars who have conducted research on this specific topic. The reason behind this overlook has not been found out, yet, it is interesting to see that the United States Department of Justice makes a direct link between having engaged in previous criminal activities and radicalizing. This underlines the idea that for the American government, radicalisation is inherently assimilated to a criminal activity, regardless of whether or not the individuals are cognitively or behaviourally radicalized.

On top of the above-mentioned risk factors, the OSCE identifies five additional factors : *grievances, needs, ideas, people and violence*.⁹⁷ The first factor relates to “(...) societal tensions, conflicts, and fault lines, which may cause thwarted expectations, conflicts of identity, feelings of injustice, marginalization and exclusion.”⁹⁸ *Needs* refer to “emotional needs, such as the desire for belonging, community, adventure, power, significance or glory.”⁹⁹ *Ideas* relate to “all the ideas that make sense of the grievance, such as identifying the scapegoat and offering solutions to said grievances.”¹⁰⁰ The fourth factor, *people*, identifies some key people taking part in the radicalisation process of the individual, such as “authority figures, charismatic leaders or tightly knit peer groups that are key to generating trust, commitment, loyalty and peer pressure.”¹⁰¹ Overall, this means that *being in contact with authority figures* upholding extremism ideas and beliefs can be a radicalisation factor. Lastly, the fifth radicalisation factor lies in violence, where individuals are fuelled by revenge.¹⁰² The OSCE also claims that a feeling of injustice and/or a feeling of an unjust treatment is also considered as a factor of radicalisation. Indeed, some trigger events such as the torturing happening in Guantanamo Bay, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the Danish cartoon affair fuelled a feeling of hatred and injustice among some individuals, who decided to avenge themselves or the oppressed population in question.

Last but not least, economic disparity and socio-economic disadvantage “can play a causal role in radicalisation by aggravating perceptions of injustice.”¹⁰³ Although said factors are relevant in understanding the reasons as to why individuals radicalize, it is important to restate that “many recent terrorist attacks have been committed by well-educated, middle class

⁹⁷ Neumann, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 17.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Hardy, *Comparing Theories of Radicalisation*, 87.

offenders”¹⁰⁴ and that “there is therefore no necessary connection between low socio-economic status and risk of terrorism.”¹⁰⁵ This argument has been further emphasized and proven through various empirical studies that “have also rejected the suggestion that countries which experience higher levels of poverty also experience higher levels of terrorism.”¹⁰⁶ Therefore, it is argued that socio-economic disadvantage, paired with personal experience of discrimination, can play a causal role in radicalisation by aggravating perceptions of injustice which often leads to a feeling of relative deprivation.”¹⁰⁷ Said concept will be touched upon in a following chapter’s subsection.

ii. Political factors

Although political factors are “insufficient to explain why some people join extremist groups and not others, their importance should not be understated.”¹⁰⁸ According to Marc Sageman, the answer explaining why “ordinary people turn into fanatics who use violence for political ends”¹⁰⁹ lies not in “how they think, but rather how they feel.”¹¹⁰ But what do they feel?

Moral outrage and resentment, if not a desire for revenge. Said desires are thought to be fuelled by “the killings of Muslims in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Palestinian intifada beginning in 2000, and the infamous Iraq War in 2003.”¹¹¹ These events “became the focal point of global moral outrage for Muslims all over the world, along with the humiliations of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.”¹¹² Yet, this moral outrage does not necessarily translate into extremism and behavioural radicalisation. Marc Sageman argues that “in order for this moral outrage to turn into extremism, the frustrations must be interpreted in a particular way: said violations are deemed part of a unified Western strategy, namely a war against Islam.”¹¹³ The war on Islam fuels cognitively radicalized individuals to behavioural radicalisation. Indeed, the argument that they radicalized in order to avenge their fellow Muslim brothers and sisters is quite recurrent in various studies focusing on radicalized individuals. Said war against Islam and fellow Muslims creates a feeling of resentment against Western countries who, in one way or another, have

¹⁰⁴ Hardy, *Comparing Theories of Radicalisation*, 87.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 86.

¹⁰⁹ Marc Sageman, "The Next Generation of Terror," *Foreign Policy*, October 8, 2009, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/08/the-next-generation-of-terror/>.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Sageman, *The Next Generation of Terror*.

decided to fight political Islam. Moreover, it appears that Western countries who are military present in Middle Eastern countries are highly fuelling said resentment.

Indeed, Riyad Hosain Rahimullah, Stephen Larma and Mohamad Abdalla argue that a few radicalized individuals were motivated by a desire of “retaliation against the presence of foreign armies in the Middle East”¹¹⁴. The authors see such motivation as a direct consequence of the political agendas of Western countries. A second political argument explaining the radicalisation of individuals lies in the desire to fight against the West’s involvement in the wars with Muslims countries.¹¹⁵ Indeed, after having conducted interviews with radicalized individuals, the authors found out that a majority of said individuals were driven by a desire to “punish some specific Western countries for being involved in killing Muslims in Iraq.”¹¹⁶

Adding on to the above-mentioned point, Marc Sageman believes that witnessing political events driven by states’ foreign policy -such as the War on Terror- can be considered as an explanatory element behind the radicalisation processes of individuals. The author believes that governmental policies, whether domestic or international, fuels a feeling of discrimination, resentment and moral outrage among individuals, hence causing some of them to radicalize in order to counter said feelings.

What is interesting with the political factors explaining radicalisation is that they explain how the actions of one individual’s country can directly have an impact on individuals. This consequence of the macro-level (ie: a state’s political agenda and foreign political actions) onto the micro-level (ie: their citizens) is striking as it is not necessarily obvious at first. It is indeed more common for socio-economic factors to be put forward when trying to understand the rationale behind terrorist attacks. To prove that, one could simply delve into a discursive analysis of speakers or guests invited on national television or authors writing articles and columns in newspapers a few days after a terrorist attack has occurred. The majority of them point out at the fact that the radicalized individual was unstable, relatively deprived, was experiencing mental illnesses, faced traumatism at some point of his life, has witnessed the loss of loved ones, was an immigrant and much more. Political factors are not always put forward nor added to the frame of the different causes leading to the perpetuation of a terrorist attack.

¹¹⁴ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 21.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

This can be explained through the fact that many academics do not wish to mention or delve into the political root causes of radicalisation as they think they would be at risk of giving the impression of making a sociological reading of violence which may be interpreted as being compassionate with the terrorists and as justifying their resort to violence for advancing an ideological cause of theirs.¹¹⁷

Other scholars, professionals or politicians might simply overlook said factors as they do not wish to delve into a political debate, which would ultimately result in a judgement of Western countries' political agendas and foreign interventions, hence diverging the focus from the actual debate being about radicalisation and why individuals resorted to violent radicalisation. Moreover, this would mean that if said debate was to be sustained, Western countries would have no other choice than considering that their undertaken actions for fighting terrorism by conducting interventions on foreign grounds might be counterproductive, as by resorting to foreign interventions in order to tackle terrorism in foreign regions might fuel individuals' propensity to radicalize, hence increasing the threat of terrorism even more. Yet, it remains that political factors such as the ones mentioned above are interesting and are important explanatory factors as to why individuals radicalize, or at least, as to how political discourses and political interventions can impact and fuel someone's behavioural radicalisation.

iii. Relative deprivation

Relative deprivation as well as trauma have often, if not always, been put forward in the attempt of understanding what the root causes of radicalisation are. Yet, these two factors do not explain everything. Seeing their extensive uses in the academic and governmental literature, it has been deemed important to dedicate them a subsection. Firstly, there is a need to define what relative deprivation means. Secondly, there is a need to identify what the concept really entails, and thirdly, as this factor has been criticized by many scholars and institutions, it is important to incorporate said debates within this subsequent subsection.

Relative deprivation can be defined as “a tension that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is” which disposes men to violence.”¹¹⁸ Fathali Moghaddam, a professor of

¹¹⁷ Xavier Crettiez, "Penser La Radicalisation: Une Sociologie Processuelle Des Variables De L'engagement Violent," *Presses De Sciences Po* 5, no. 66 (2016): 710-711, doi:10.3917/rfsp.665.0709.

¹¹⁸ Caleb Odorfer, *Root Causes of Radicalisation in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, report, United Nations Development Program, United Nations, July 13, 2015, 4,

psychology at Georgetown University, believes that relative deprivation is an important radicalisation factor and that more attention should be paid to it, yet, it should not be used as an overarching radicalisation factor and should not be considered as the sole explanatory factor as to why individuals radicalize. Indeed, the author believes that a “sense of (relative) deprivation”¹¹⁹ should be incorporated as an explanatory factor in individuals’ radicalisation but should not be used by itself when explaining why individuals radicalize. Moghaddam is not the first scholar to put forward said factor as an explanatory dynamic behind the radicalisation processes of individuals.

Indeed, he is joined by Ömer Taspınar who fights the justification of radicalisation through the explanation of relative deprivation by stating that “breeding grounds for radicalism and terrorist recruitment emerge not necessarily under conditions of abject poverty and deprivation, but rather when negative social, economic, and political trends converge.”¹²⁰ Rather than using the expression as a *catchall*, the author argues that relative deprivation, especially in the Arab world, should be defined as “the absence of opportunities relative to expectations.”¹²¹ This redefinition is interesting, especially in light of the globalized world in which we live. Indeed, the author argues that “globalization created an accurate awareness about opportunities available elsewhere. This leads to frustration, victimization, and humiliation among growing cohorts of urbanized, undereducated, and unemployed Muslim youth who are able to make comparisons across countries.”¹²² Hence, this sheds light on another radicalisation factor that was remotely absent within the different models and theories of radicalisation, namely, globalization. Another author, Olivier Roy, also believes that globalization can be one of the factors explaining the radicalisation of Muslims individuals. Olivier Roy explains that globalization and modernization are perceived by Muslims as a “Western culture and values that are imposed on their own culture.”¹²³ Hence, “this sparks outrage amongst some Muslims, where some of them can respond by moving in the direction of radical Islam in order to avoid modernized Islam as much as possible”¹²⁴, as it goes against the traditional Muslim values they

<https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/conflict-prevention/discussion-paper---root-causes-of-radicalism.html>.

¹¹⁹ McCauley and Moskalenko, *Understanding Political Radicalisation*, 215.

¹²⁰ Ömer Taspınar, "Fighting Radicalism, Not 'Terrorism': Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined," *SAIS Review* 19, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 77, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/summer_fall_radicalism_taspinar.pdf.

¹²¹ Taspınar, *Fighting Radicalism*, 78.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 24.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

have known throughout their lives. Lastly, Ömer Taspınar puts forward a final argument to putting an end to the use of relative deprivation as a core explanatory factor of radicalisation. As such, the author believes that, as “most terrorists are neither poor nor uneducated and are coming from the middle class and ordinary backgrounds”¹²⁵, relative deprivation should not be considered like a main factor or root cause of terrorism.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) sides with Ömer Taspınar on this point. Indeed, in a 2015 report focusing on the root causes of radicalisation in Europe, they stated that “the most commonly viewed attributing factor that creates an enabling environment arises from feelings of relative deprivation,”¹²⁶ yet, this does not fully explain the reason as to why individuals radicalize. Another reason that has been put forward in order to scrape out relative deprivation as the main reason behind individuals’ radicalisation lies in the fact that if it really were to be true, then “those who are in absolute poverty would all have resorted to radicalisation”¹²⁷. Hence, this means that even though relative deprivation plays a role in individuals’ radicalisation processes, it should not be looked at as the main factor. Rather, we should look at one’s radicalisation process as being fuelled by different and various factors.

iv. Psychological factors

As Rahimullah, Larmer and Abdalla stated it, “there are a number of psychological factors that may also place an individual at risk of radicalizing.”¹²⁸ Firstly, a few scholars such as Stern, Juergensmeyer, Richardson and Khosrokhavar have respectively mentioned feelings of *humiliation* to be a leading risk for radicalisation.¹²⁹ Khosrokhavar even argues that “humiliation by proxy, which refers to when terrorists feel humiliated that their fellow Muslims are being oppressed, leads to retaliation (and resort to committing an act of terrorism) as a form of objection.”¹³⁰ Humiliation can also be a risk factor of radicalisation when the individual tries to make up a new identity through radicalisation as a refuge and sees said radicalisation as a solution to counter his feeling of humiliation.¹³¹ In order to assert his personality and fight against the feeling of humiliation, one could argue that the individual will more have a tendency

¹²⁵ Taspınar, *Fighting Radicalism*, 75.

¹²⁶ Odorfer, *Root Causes of Radicalisation*, 4.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 5.

¹²⁸ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 26.

¹²⁹ Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 25-26.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ La Radicalisation Djihadiste, Qu'est-ce Que C'est ?" Stop Djihadisme, October 03, 2017, <http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/radicalisation/explication-du-phenomene/radicalisation-djihadiste-quest-ce-que-cest>.

to resort to violent radicalisation, namely behavioural radicalisation, than cognitive radicalisation. As the individual desires to prove that he has a strong personality, his willingness to resort to radicalisation will more tend towards a behavioural radicalisation seeing as said process can be easily quantified through the number of victims he or she is planning on killing. One could argue that resorting to violent radicalisation is an indirect way of proving one's motivation to achieve a goal.

Another psychological risk factor for radicalisation lies in frustration. Dollard at al put a theory forward in 1939, named the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Said theory entails that “when an individual's ideal is incongruent with their actual achievements, they become frustrated and resort to violence”¹³² which can result in violent radicalisation and thus can lead to the commitment of terrorist attacks. According to Rahimullah, Larmar and Abdalla, said frustration stems from relative deprivation, which they illustrated through the example of the frustration that “Muslims experience contemporarily, where their ideal is incongruent with their actual treatment.”¹³³ A third psychological factor lies in the competition for status or glory, as put forward by Sageman.¹³⁴ The author explains that one of the psychological root causes behind the radicalisation of individuals lies in poor self-esteem, while pointing at “anger and humiliation in reaction to perceived Western injustice to Muslims”¹³⁵ as driving factors behind the radicalisation processes.

Dounia Bouzar and Marie Martin built onto the above mentioned factors and found seven more reasons for radical engagement among which we find “a search for an ideal (ie: ideal world, ideal community), a desire to find something better elsewhere, a quest for redemption due to “unlawful” acts the individuals may have done throughout their lives, a desire to recover the Muslims” lost honour, and a desire to belong to something.”¹³⁶ This desire to belong to a certain place and to feel loved and/or useful are seen by the authors as main psychological root causes of radicalisation. Adding on to this factor, it is also believed that *idealistic and humanitarian reasons* are also risk factors. Indeed, some radicalized individuals were fuelled by the desire - and felt a necessity- to save the lives of the Syrians targeted by Bashar Al-Assad's regime. Moreover, some individuals radicalized for *romantic reasons*, such as following a loved one

¹³² Rahimullah, *Understanding Violent Radicalisation*, 27-28.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ McCauley and Moskalenko, *Understanding Political Radicalisation*, 208.

¹³⁵ McCauley and Moskalenko, *Understanding Political Radicalisation*, 208.

¹³⁶ Bouzar and Martin, *Pour Quels Motifs Les Jeunes S'engagent-ils dans le Jihad*, 4.

into their radicalisation process, or even re asserting themselves through radicalisation, as they believed this would give a strong image of themselves to their entourage.¹³⁷

This feeling of disenchantment and this desire to remedy to it mirrors John Horgan's idea that "a sense of dissatisfaction or disillusionment with the individual's current personal or activity"¹³⁸ is an important component of radicalisation. Lastly, said dissatisfaction can stem from the "loss of loved ones, work, home, and way of life."¹³⁹

Although the above-mentioned factors pointed specific psychological risk factors/predispositions to radicalisation, it is nonetheless important to specify that "psychotic disorders are among radicalized individuals and that individuals with psychiatric condition represent a minority of the individuals involved in terrorist activities."¹⁴⁰ Hence, psychological disorders and illnesses cannot solely be accounted for leading to radicalisation. This is an interesting point, as it is quite recurrent that some debates revolving around radicalized individuals try to "excuse" or "justify" their actions by pointing out that said individuals were mentally unstable. Yet, as it has been mentioned above, mental illnesses account for a very slight part of the reasons as to why individuals radicalized in the first place. Being mentally unstable surely does give a broader leeway for an individual to radicalize as their sense of right or wrong might be altered by the illness, yet, solely justifying behavioural radicalisation does not cut it nor thoroughly explain the reasons as to why individuals radicalized. Hence, said root factor of radicalisation should not be put forward as the main explanation behind an individual's terrorist actions. Again, this shows how the root causes of radicalisation are intertwined and how there are no single causes leading to violent radicalisation.

v. Ideology

If there is a recurrent assumption about RCOR, it is that ideology paves the way for radicalisation.¹⁴¹ Indeed, "ideology often layers up on a later stage as aggrieved individuals seek for new meanings and life avenues, or engage with radical persons or individuals in a

¹³⁷ "Why Do People Become Violent Extremists?" Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 23, 2015, <https://www.fbi.gov/cve508/teen-website/why-do-people-become-violent-extremists>.

¹³⁸ McCauley and Moskalenko, *Understanding Political Radicalisation*, 206

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Campelo et al., "Who Are the European Youths Willing to Engage in Radicalisation?," 3.

¹⁴¹ Souleimanov, *Civil Wars and Religion*, 7.

process of slippery slope.”¹⁴² Whether or not “religion is instrumentalized to legitimize jihad”¹⁴³ is not the debate here. However, it is important to point at what Sageman wrote in 2004: namely, that “religion in itself does not provide an impetus for jihad.”¹⁴⁴

While the sample size can be criticized and can be up to scrutiny, it nonetheless appears that “there is evidence that a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalisation.”¹⁴⁵ The reason behind this finding lies in the fact that an individual with a strong religious identity knows -or at least is supposed to- know what his or her religion, in this case Islam, preaches and forbids. Indeed, “drug-taking, drinking alcohols and visiting prostitutes”¹⁴⁶, which were some activities undergone by terrorists or radicalized (both cognitively and behaviourally) individuals, are “unthinkable under the strict Salafi doctrine.”¹⁴⁷ Moreover, it appears that most of the individuals’ sample taken for this study converted to Islam and were not “practising their faith regularly,”¹⁴⁸ were “regarded as lacking religious literacy and could actually be regarded as religious novices”¹⁴⁹ while “very few of the studied sample have been brought up in strongly religious households.”¹⁵⁰ Moreover, killings of innocents is not a tenant of Islam, nor does the Quran give any impetus for conducting terrorist attacks. Lastly, it appeared that “religious radicals also felt genuine affection for Western values of tolerance and pluralism, system of government and culture while terrorists, on the other hand, were unique in their loathing of Western society and culture.”¹⁵¹

Hence, this means that religious ideology should not be interpreted as a core root cause of radicalisation, nor as a strong springboard leading to cognitive or behavioural radicalisation. Rather, this means the aforementioned factor, while mixed with other factors (whereas social, political or psychological) *can* be seen as a risk factor. Again, any mix of factors can explain cognitive or behavioural radicalisation. The importance given to religious ideology should be

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 8.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Alan Travis, "MI5 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain," *The Guardian*, August 20, 2008, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1>.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, *The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism*, report, DEMOS, 2010, 10, https://www.demos.co.uk/files/Edge_of_Violence_-_web.pdf.

toned down as it has been proved that said factor alone does not account nor provide a strong impetus for an individual to radicalize.

vi. Grievances


Grievances have been mentioned and referred to in the previous chapters as one of the many root causes of radicalisation. According to Emil Souleimanov, based on previous works written by Coolsaet and Ranstorp, “grievances, perceived individually or collectively, politically or apolitically, usually serve as a precondition of subsequent radicalisation providing for a cognitive opening toward subsequent radicalisation.”¹⁵² While there are a lot of different types of grievances, factors such as “cultural alienation, sense of victimization, disagreement over foreign policies, and economic marginalization”¹⁵³ are presented as the main factors “falling into this umbrella category.”¹⁵⁴ As we can see it, a lot of different factors fall under the “grievances” factor. This once again restates that radicalisation is a complicated concept to grasp and that a lot of factors are intertwined, then leading to radicalisation, whether cognitive or behavioural.

As we saw it, the root causes and risk factors of radicalisation are much broader than what one could think. In light of all the above-mentioned risk factors of radicalisation, it would be interesting to incorporate all of them in a specific graph or table, such as the ones present below, taken from Campelo et al’s report and a French Senatorial Report of 2018:

¹⁵² Souleimanov, *Civil Wars and Religion*, 5.


¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Souleimanov, *Civil Wars and Religion*, 5.



155

and:



156

Although this three-level model is quite complete, it would be necessary to integrate more factors in all levels. Indeed, in light of this chapter's results, one could argue that the "individual

¹⁵⁵ Campelo et al., "Who Are the European Youths Willing to Engage in Radicalisation?," 11.

¹⁵⁶ Rapport Fait Au Nom De La Commission D'Enquête Sur L'Organisation Et Les Moyens Des Services De L'Etat Pour Faire Face à L'Evolution De La Menace Terroriste Après La Chute De L'Etat Islamique, report no. 639, Sénat, July 4, 2018, 60, <https://www.senat.fr/rap/r17-639/r17-6391.pdf>.

factors” level could integrate factors such as relative deprivation, humiliation, frustration, Dollard et al’s frustration-aggression hypothesis, and a search for an ideal.

Some additional factors could be added to the “micro-environmental factors” level. Indeed, factors such as social exclusion, an assimilation problem with societal norms of a country, a desire to belong to a certain social status, a disappointment with democratic processes, a competition for social status, a desire to belong to a certain social class as well as a problem of social integration and marginalization should be added to the this level.

Lastly, the factors included in the “macro-environmental” level should also include unemployment, inequality of opportunity offered by the state, systemic disadvantage and a desire to fight against a state’s military actions.

Chapter 4: Root Causes of Radicalisation in France

In 2006 and 2008, the French Ministry of Defence's strategical and defence reports, the "White Papers", had "minimal mentions and references to radicalisation."¹⁵⁷ Said papers lay out the defence strategy of the French government. The French interest, both governmental and societal, in radicalisation and its prevention arose "after the shootings committed by Mohammed Merah in 2012, the attack in the Jewish museum in Brussels (2014) and by the departure of youngsters to Syria and Iraq."¹⁵⁸ This marked the entrance of radicalisation in mainstream media and in societal debates. The political guests who took part in such debates "interpreted the killings as an assault on freedom of expression and core French values of liberty, equality and laïcité (secularism)."¹⁵⁹ After analysing these debates, it appeared that anger and resentment were pointed out as main root causes of these individuals' radicalisation. However, the French literature focusing on radicalisation and terrorism presents other relevant risk factors and root causes.

This chapter aims to answer this thesis' research question. Firstly, we will take into account the above-mentioned RCOR of Chapter 3 and see whether they are fit -or unfit- in explaining the reasons as to why French individuals radicalized. We will then delve into other explanatory factors that were not present in the general literature on radicalisation, but that are nonetheless relevant for our case study. Lastly, we will look into the relevance of past criminal activities in the radicalisation processes of individuals as well the role prisons play in creating or furthering radicalisation. Essentially, this chapter aims to see which general risk factors and root causes of radicalisation mentioned in the general literature apply to the French case.

¹⁵⁷ Stef Wittendorp et al., *Dealing with Jihadism: A Policy Comparison between the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK and the US (2010 to 2017)*, report, Leiden University, December 2017, 44, https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/governance-and-global-affairs/isga/report-1_2017_dealing-with-jihadism.pdf.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Matthew Moran, "Terrorism and the Banlieues: The Charlie Hebdo Attacks in Context," *Modern & Contemporary France* 25, no. 3 (May 18, 2017): 2, doi:10.1080/09639489.2017.1323199.

i. Socio-economic factors

a. *Poverty and unemployment*

Poverty and unemployment are often taken as being a root cause of radicalisation in France. These factors are often mentioned in political and societal debates and are the very first factors put forward by reporters when trying to understand what is the personality of an individual that committed terrorist attacks.

However, according to a study of 78 individual cases of French radicalized individuals conducted by Globsec and published by the Institution des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), it appears that the studied French terrorists “are settled in peri-urban areas and small rural villages and although these areas are usually poorer and less educated than larger cities -with economic deprivation and low human capital both enabling conditions of radicalisation –few examined individuals from these areas actually come from significantly poor families and environments.”¹⁶⁰ As such, this study seems to counter the recurrent assumption that poverty is a risk factor for radicalisation.

Moreover, as it appears that some French radicals did not grow up in a poor and deprived environment, this study research invalidates the recurrent claim that all economically deprived individuals are more likely to radicalize and commit terrorist attacks. Although *a few* of them were coming from such backgrounds, it remains that the majority of the study sample appeared to have been brought up in middle class families, or in families that were wealthy enough for not being considered as being part of the lowest social class.

It is simplistic to justify radicalisation in France through poverty and unemployment. Although statistical evidences show that a *slight* fraction of radicalized individuals came from relatively deprived economically backgrounds, it remains that more than half of them were not belonging to said social class.¹⁶¹ This shows the importance of properly analyzing and using statistical data. It seems fairly easy to make numbers say whatever one wants, but radicalisation is to be taken seriously and any analytical shortcuts will have an important impact on the way we understand and analyse said process.

¹⁶⁰ Pierre Colomina, Olivier De France, and Damien Saverot, *From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Quarterly Report: France*, report, Defence & Security Programme, IRIS-GLOBSEC, January 07, 2019, 4, <http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/From-Criminals-To-Terrorists-And-Back-Quarterly-Report-France-Vol-2.pdf>.

¹⁶¹ Colomina, de France, Saverot, *From Criminals to Terrorists*, 4.

While economic deprivation does not provide a strong enough impetus for radicalisation, it may be interesting to look at the bigger picture: If there is a high percentage of a country's population living under the poverty threshold, or living in poor economic conditions, it might be interesting to look at what those governments are doing, or lack thereof, to tackle these issues. If governments are seen as being inactive and unmotivated to improve their citizens' standards of living, then society as a whole -along with governments- can be interpreted as providing a strong impetus for individuals to radicalize.

In any case, pointing to poverty as the main driving factor behind radicalisation in France does not merely explain the reasons as to why individuals radicalized in the first place. As the UNDP report stated it,¹⁶² using these two arguments as core RCOR would entail a strong statistical correlation between individuals coming from relatively poor or economically-deprived backgrounds and the commitment of terrorist attacks.¹⁶³ However, although there were 8.8 millions of French individuals (out of a total population of roughly 67 millions) who were considered to be living under the poverty threshold in 2018,¹⁶⁴ there has not been 8.8 million terrorist attacks in France. The occurrence of terrorist attacks in France remaining low compared to the number of citizens living under the poverty threshold shows that the two above mentioned factors have been overstated and may not be as strong in pushing to radicalisation as initially thought.

The excuse of unemployment does not solely explain behavioural radicalisation either. Although 56% of the interviewees in the aforementioned survey were "unemployed at the time of the arrest,"¹⁶⁵ the same argument countering the idea that behavioural radicalisation is linked with poor economic background applies here. Hence, the data gathered and analysed tends to show that behavioural radicalisation in France is better explained through a mix and combination of different risk factors -which might be a blend of socio-economic, political, psychological and unclassified elements- rather than through one core socio-economic facet. At best, poverty and unemployment can account for *slight* risk factors of radicalisation in France, but not as strong root causes of radicalisation.

¹⁶² Odorfer, *Root Causes of Radicalisation*, 5.

¹⁶³ Odorfer, *Root Causes of Radicalisation*, 13.

¹⁶⁴ Maxime Tellier, "Être Pauvre En France En 2018 : De Qui Et De Quoi Parle-t-on ?" France Culture, September 13, 2018, <https://www.franceculture.fr/societe/etre-pauvre-en-france-en-2018-de-quoi-parle-t>.

¹⁶⁵ Colomina, de France and Saverot, *From Criminals to Terrorists*, 6.

The following subparts will respectively deal with political, psychological and other non-classified determinants of radicalisation.

b. *Age: An important risk factor?*

After having reviewed the extensive literature available on the topic of radicalisation and terrorism, a statement can be made: “almost all of the terrorists with few exceptions – were men and in the majority, young men.”¹⁶⁶ However, it appears that this fact is “rather mentioned “en passant”, without focusing on it and without using it as a promising starting point for further investigations.”¹⁶⁷ This is less striking in the case of France: most of the reports read in light of this thesis mentioned that a young age seemed to be a recurrent component among French radicals.

Indeed, when it comes to the French case study, it does appear that radicalized individuals studied by researchers and the French government are between 21 and 28 years old.¹⁶⁸ Depending on the study, the average age varies between 22 and 26.¹⁶⁹ Does this necessarily entail that age is a relevant risk factor? It appears so.

In a research and study conducted by Laurent Bonelli and Fabien Carrié, it appeared that a young age was indeed a risk factor as teenagers usually are in search of an ideal or are seeking to regain self-esteem.¹⁷⁰ As the two authors stated it, “Islamist radicalisation is grafted on a relatively classic adolescent conflictual and offers the means to increase one’s self-esteem.”¹⁷¹ These minors “who (through their young age) resonate with a strong and deep anger against authority figures”¹⁷², often radicalized through being ‘integrated into small groups’¹⁷³ where some radicalized individuals could be found.¹⁷⁴ This refers to the theory of social networks, which will be delved into in the following subpart.

¹⁶⁶ Elisabeth Rohr, "Terror, Fundamentalism, and Male Adolescence," *Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy* 31, no. 4 (July 05, 2017): 1, doi:10.1080/02668734.2017.1345001.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Laurence Bindner, *Jihadists' Grievance Narratives against France*, issue brief, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, February 2018, 10, <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Bindner-Jihadists-Grievance-Narratives-Against-France-February2018.pdf>.

¹⁶⁹ Colomina, de France, Saverot, *From Criminals to Terrorists*, 6

¹⁷⁰ Laurent Bonelli and Fabien Carrié, *La Fabrique De La Radicalité. Une Sociologie Des Jeunes Djihadistes Français* (Paris: Seuil).

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

Lastly, it is important to note that France counts around 2 000 radicalized minors.¹⁷⁵ These underaged individuals who have been flagged for glorification of terrorism and cognitive radicalisation are said to be “looking for strict rules”¹⁷⁶ as their familial background did not provide them with a solid structure in which they could evolve in. Part of these underaged radicals resorted to radicalisation as a desire to fight against familial environments that they considered as having exerted an important control on them.¹⁷⁷ According to the French Ministry of Justice, it is in this category that we see most religiously radicalized individuals.¹⁷⁸ Lastly, a chunk of these minors radicalized as a way of showing that they were against the system and that they desired to see it change, while being driven by the desire to challenge the different authority figures they encountered in their lives, such as their parents or the government itself.¹⁷⁹

What these different governmental reports and researches show is that the younger one is, the more prone one will be to challenge the authority figures in his or her life. It appears that most -if not all-of the French radicals (whether underaged or not) have radicalized as a desire to fight authority figures or as a desire to make up for the lack of structure in their lives. Moreover, these reports show that the younger one is, the more vulnerable he or she is. Hence, it appears that young individuals going through their teenage crisis and who are lacking authority figures are resorting to radicalisation as it presents itself with strong ideas and authority figures. Essentially, it appears that these individuals are looking for people who guarantee them a bit of order in this complicated world in which they do not know how to navigate in. As such, and driven by such anxiety, these young individuals are looking for an environment constituted of individuals on which they can rely and that will make them feel safe. As the authors stated it, “in search of an ideal and in response to the symbolic emptiness of life and lack of authority, they seek a form of transcendence.”¹⁸⁰ As these young individuals “failed to be accompanied by their familial authority figures, they are navigating life by themselves and with no authority references on which to rely and are thus more easily attracted or drawn to fundamentalist

¹⁷⁵ Christophe Cornevin, "Près De 2000 Mineurs Radicalisés En France," *Le Figaro*, September 22, 2016, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/09/22/01016-20160922ARTFIG00327-pres-de-2000-mineurs-radicalises-en-france.php>.

¹⁷⁶ *Note Relative à La Prise En Charge éducative Des Mineurs Radicalisés Ou En Danger De Radicalisation Violente*, report, Protection Judiciaire De La Jeunesse, Ministère De La Justice, 3.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ Jennifer Vasile and Amira Karray, "Filiation En Détresse Et Crise De L'autorité Chez L'adolescent Concerné Par Le Phénomène De Radicalisation," *Dialogue*, 222nd ser., 4:117, January 14, 2019, doi:10.3917/dia.222.0107.

systems upholding radicalized beliefs.”¹⁸¹ Although the infamous French radicals and terrorists have committed terrorist attacks in their early 20s or mid-20s, it still appears that they have radicalized at a young age. As a final conclusion, it does indeed appear that a young age, which brings about vulnerability and instability, is an important risk factor of radicalisation in France.

c. Social networks: Root causes or risk factors?

Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins define networks as “pre-existing kinship and friendship ties between ordinary individuals and radicals that lead to the diffusion of extreme beliefs.”¹⁸² The authors define enabling environments and support structures as both “physical and virtual settings such as the Internet, social media, prisons, or foreign terrorist training camps that provide ideological and material aid for radicalizing individuals as we deepen their commitment to radical milieus.”¹⁸³ When analysing the backgrounds of infamous French terrorists such as the Kouachi brothers -the perpetrators of the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015- and Mohammed Merah -the perpetrator of the Toulouse and Montauban’s shootings in 2012- and those of young French radicals, it appears that social networks are indeed a risk factor for both cognitive and behavioural radicalisation.

Prisons fit within social networks. Talking of which, the Kouachi brothers radicalized in a French Parisian mosque, where they got indoctrinated little by little and met Farid Benyettou who had a thorough knowledge of Islam and was an important radicalized figure known by the French Secret Services.¹⁸⁴ Farid Benyettou was the leader of the jihadist spinneret of the Buttes Chaumont and taught its “students” how to use weapons, among other things.¹⁸⁵ This group which was “described as staggeringly amateurish was deemed by Le Monde to be the first jihad school in France.”¹⁸⁶ A proof of the impact of social networks as a springboard for furthering radicalisation is shown in the fact that “after a quick demonstration of to hold a Kalashnikov, a

¹⁸¹ Vasile and Karray, *Filiation et Détresse*, 117.

¹⁸² Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, "The Radicalisation Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 11 (April 1, 2015): 961, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ "Ce Que L'on Sait Sur La Radicalisation Des Frères Kouachi," *Le Monde*, January 9, 2015, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/09/ce-que-l-on-sait-sur-la-radicalisation-des-freres-kouachi_4552422_3224.html.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Angélique Chrisafis, "Charlie Hebdo Attackers: Born, Raised and Radicalised in Paris," *The Guardian*, January 12, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/-sp-charlie-hebdo-attackers-kids-france-radicalised-paris>.

handful of the Buttes-Chaumont's members had left at various points to fight in Iraq."¹⁸⁷ Chérif Kouachi can be found among the number of individuals who left to go fight with ISIS, and whose decision was enabled by the social networks in which he was evolving in and surrounded with. In 2015, he even got arrested by the French police while he was on his way to Syria.¹⁸⁸ As a result, he got sent to prison, where he furthered his radicalisation processes with the help of his newly found mentor, Djamel Beghal, who uses the surname of Abou Hamza.¹⁸⁹

Similarly, Mohammed Merah radicalized in the carceral environment and continued to further his ideological radicalisation once his prison sentence came to an end.¹⁹⁰ The question is not whether or not these individuals were radicalized before joining said networks. The take-home observation from such case studies shows that social networks are a risk factor of radicalisation, without necessarily having provided the impetus for radicalisation at first. It appears clear that they have furthered the radicalisation processes of individuals by putting them in relation with similarly radicalized individuals. As the "group effect" fuels a call to action, it is clear that social networks enhanced the radicalisation processes of a few French individuals and helped them in setting up and coordinating terrorist attacks.

Moreover, networks such as friend and family environments are also considered by the French government to be a risk factor for radicalisation. Indeed, a study of the radicalisation processes of infamous French terrorists shows that all of them were coming from unstable familial backgrounds. These unstable familial networks are said to have fuelled the radicalisation processes of these individuals.¹⁹¹ In order to understand how the familial environment, which is considered as a social network, can provide an impetus for radicalisation, we will have to talk of Pierre Bourdieu and his socialisation theory.

Pierre Bourdieu, a renowned French sociologist, stated that the familial circle consists of the main cultural capital. It creates and fuels the primary socialisation of the individual.¹⁹² Through

¹⁸⁷ Chrisafis, *Charlie Hebdo Attackers*.

¹⁸⁸ Le Monde, *Ce Que L'On Sait Sur La Radicalisation*.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ "Merah Aux Policiers: "Je Me Sentais De Mieux En Mieux" à Chaque Tuerie," *La Dépêche*, July 17, 2012, <https://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2012/07/17/1401768-merah-aux-policiers-je-me-sentais-de-mieux-en-mieux-a-chaque-tuerie.html>.

¹⁹¹ Emmanuel Jovelin, "De La Délinquance à La Radicalisation," *Hommes & Migrations*, no. 1315 (March 2016): <https://www.cairn.info/revue-hommes-et-migrations-2016-3-page-59.htm>.

¹⁹² Anne Jourdain and Sidonie Naulin, "Héritage Et Transmission Dans La Sociologie De Pierre Bourdieu," *Idées Economiques Et Sociales* 4, no. 166 (2014): 6, doi:10.3917/idee.166.0006.

the familial circle, the individual will learn the basic tenants of societal norms, along with social codes. Hence, while one could argue that the familial circle moulds the individual as for him to fit within society, it can also be argued that if an individual finds himself to be evolving in an unstable familial environment, he could be more prone to uphold radical ideas. Indeed, the instability present within the familial environment could push the individual to find stability through a different environment, stability which can superficially be found through radicalized cells. This seems to have been the case with the sample of French radicals studied by the Mission de Recherche Droit et Justice (or the Law and Justice's Research Mission) and with the sample studied by the French government in light of its Senatorial report on radicalisation. These reports show that more than half of the study samples evolved in unstable familial backgrounds and that individuals radicalized at home via Internet or through radicalized cells, to which they have been introduced by friends or family. In a few cases, individuals joined these cells by themselves, while being motivated to find a stable environment, without being introduced to them by the aforementioned entities.¹⁹³ This shows that on top of joining social networks such as various social organizations, an unstable familial environment provides an indirect springboard for radicalisation.

As the studies conducted by the French government and various think tanks have showed it, social networks are legitimately considered to be enabling factors of radicalisation in France. Although the aforementioned elements have been proven to be risk factors of radicalisation, Globsec and the French government restate the fact that “radicalisation is not a linear and vertical process but rather a dynamic horizontal puzzle in which personal events, interpersonal ties and encounters, and more diffuse social and spatial dynamics, either hostile or supporting (ie: school, family, prison) intersect.”¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Farhad Khosrokhavar, "Les Radicalisés En Prison," in *Prisons De France* (Paris: Robert Lafont, 2016), 270-276.

¹⁹⁴ Colomina, de France, Saverot, *From Criminals to Terrorists*, 4.

d. Education

Although Gilles Kepel countered the recurrent idea that the lowest the education background, the highest the chances for behavioural radicalisation, it appears that a striking sample of French radicals were not holding more than a high school degree.¹⁹⁵ This correlation could be simplified and could be understood as pointing to the fact that a low educational level is strongly correlated with higher chances of radicalizing. While the general literature states that “fundamentalist followers are by no means only the destitute, the poor and the illiterate,”¹⁹⁶ but that “many of them have a college education and belong to the technical elite of their respective countries”¹⁹⁷ this fact does not seem to apply to our case study.

Indeed, according to the previously mentioned IRIS report, “63% of French individuals who got arrested for glorification of terrorism and for presenting signs of radicalisation had high school as the highest level of education.”¹⁹⁸ It could be argued that individuals with a low educational background might be lacking a thorough understanding of the way society functions while not having the necessary keys for tackling their problems. Hence, one could believe that resorting to radicalisation could be an answer to one’s problems.

However, French political scientists and sociologists argued, just like the UNDP, that a low educational level does not alone consist of a radicalisation factor.¹⁹⁹ Indeed, they believe that “all levels of a society are potentially vulnerable to radicalisation” which is believed to show that “it is the societal environment, and not just education level or employment status, that created the vulnerability for radicalisation.”²⁰⁰ Yet, there is no actual consensus from the French government on whether or not this factor is relevant in the case of France. While delving into the very little amount of French governmental literature on the matter, it appeared that there had been more debates concerning the relevance of a low educational level in the radicalisation processes of individuals than on the actual accuracy of said factor. Hence, knowing whether or

¹⁹⁵ Colomina, de France, Saverot, *From Criminals to Terrorists*, 4.

¹⁹⁶ Rohr, *Terrorism*, 5.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Marc Hecker and Elie Tenenbaum, *France vs Jihadism: The Republic in a New Age of Terror*, report, Notes De L’IFRI, IFRI, January 2017, 4, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/hecker_tenenbaum_france_vs_jihadism_2017.pdf.

¹⁹⁹ Xavier Crettiez and Sèze Romain, *Saisir Les Mécanismes De La Radicalisation Violente : Pour Une Analyse Processuelle Et Biographique Des Engagements Violents Rapport De Recherche Pour La Mission De Recherche Droit Et Justice*, report, *Mission De Recherche Droit Et Justice*, 2017, 78-82 <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01592825/document>.

²⁰⁰ Odorfer, *Root Causes of Radicalisation*, 13.

not a high educational background prevented French individuals from radicalizing, or if a low educational background enabled radicalisation, is quite hard to state as literature is lacking on the matter.

The fact that the study samples used in the available French literature on the matter are rather small and cannot be generalized to the whole population of French radicals could show that the correlation “low educational background” and “radicalisation” does not stand. Unfortunately, there will not be a clear answer concerning whether or not a low education level is a strong risk factor of radicalisation in France. The French government never confirmed nor refuted this correlation, and the very few reports in which educational level was mentioned were more descriptive than analytical. Hence, it is impossible to draw a conclusion from these reports, and the relevance of educational level in light of radicalisation will remain unclear.

ii. Political factors

According to a report issued by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), various political scientists and international relations experts believe that “there are several reasons why France has become a prime target for Jihadi groups. In the past, groups such as the Algerian-based Islamic Armed Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) all blamed France for its colonial history and its ties with Algiers’ perceived infidel government. Moreover, they also criticized the French for being impious and perverted.”²⁰¹ Said experts believe that “today, ISIS specifically targets France for three reasons: First, Jihadis condemn France for its anti-Muslim policies at home. ISIS has repeatedly used the 2004 law prohibiting religious signs in schools and the 2010 law banning face covering in public spaces -based on the French principle of *laïcité*- to underline how Muslims are consistently humiliated in France.”²⁰² Additionally, it is believed that “Jihadis fault France for militarily intervening in the Muslim world -or Muslim populated areas. France’s operations in Mali, Iraq and Syria have predominantly been pointed out, assumptions that prompt ISIS to claim that France is waging a war against Islam.”²⁰³ Indeed, according to a report from the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, “jihadists’ legitimization of recent attacks against France include the immediate reprisal narrative, namely that the attacks committed on French national ground avenge France’s military involvement in the coalition.”²⁰⁴

Therefore, the French government, its defence institutions, French political scientists, sociologists and political figures are more inclined to “interpret terrorist attacks conducted on French soil as a reprisal”²⁰⁵ and retaliation of some Islamically-ideologically driven individuals against French political decisions and foreign military interventions. Additionally, it is thought by said actors that “jihadis target the French population -of which Muslims represent approximately 8%- because they view French society as weak and extremely divided. Jihadis hope to create chaos, enabling them to extend their influence and eventually carry out their order.”²⁰⁶

²⁰¹ Hecker, Tenenbaum, *France vs Jihadism*, 4.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 4-5

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ Bindner, *Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives*, 3.

²⁰⁵ Hecker, Tenenbaum, *France vs Jihadism*, 5.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

Lastly, it appears that some of the French individuals studied by the ICCT were driven by a desire to make France pay for its hostile domestic policy towards Islam. This brings up the ongoing debate about the 2010 law banning face coverings in public spaces, which argued that “face recognition was necessary for security as reasons” and that hence, face coverings were a threat to safety.²⁰⁷ However, some individuals felt targeted by this new legislation and interpreted it as a discriminating measure toward the Muslim community present in France and most specially towards Muslim women wearing hijabs or burkas. This new law fuelled individuals’ resentment towards the French state and furthered their ideas that France “harboured tremendous revulsion for Islam itself”²⁰⁸ and that it was seeking to wipe-out said community from its national ground and its society.

Thus, according to a report from the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), French radicalized individuals are fuelled by the following political reasons:

- A desire to fight against France’s colonialism who they believe “led to an imposition of French education, culture and political institutions”²⁰⁹ which is thought to erase the Muslim identity,
- A desire to avenge the injustices caused by the French colonial empire, such as the redrawing of borders in the Levant through the Sykes-Picot accord,²¹⁰
- A desire to avenge the injustices causes by the French government in general,
- A desire to fight against France’s involvement in the international coalition fighting against ISIS,²¹¹
- A desire to avenge their fellow Muslim brothers and sisters,²¹²
- A desire to fight against the French political and military decisions and interventions,²¹³
- A desire to make France pay for its “decades-long support for “apostate” regimes and for the country’s actions against Islamist or jihadist groups.”²¹⁴

²⁰⁷ Bindner, *Jihadists’ Grievance*, 5-6.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Clément Beaudouin, "Causes Profondes, Cause Toujours.," *Mediapart*, July 27, 2016, <https://blogs.mediapart.fr/clement-beaudouin/blog/270716/causes-profondes-cause-toujours>.

²¹⁴ Bindner, *Jihadists’ Grievance*, 5-6.

While the above-mentioned political factors do not solely account for radicalisation in France, they have been interpreted as the French government, after having conducted various studies and interviews with French radicalized individuals, as core root causes of radicalisation. As we can see, these political factors are highly linked with an idea that the French nation is a threat to Islam and to Muslim citizens. As such, these political factors are highly intertwined with ideological beliefs. This does not only show that the above-mentioned political factors are important root causes of radicalisation, it also shows that these reasons are highly linked to ideology, and most specifically to the Salafi-jihadism ideology.

iii. Psychological factors

a. *Mental illnesses*

In August 2018, Gérard Collomb, the French Minister of Interior at the time, stated that a third of the French individuals flagged as radicalized presented symptoms of mental illnesses.²¹⁵ However, many psychologists and doctors countered that idea by stating that mental illnesses do not account for radicalisation, nor do they provide a strong impetus to commit terrorist attacks.²¹⁶ While we could find everything and its contrary on the accuracy of said factor, it seems to appear that most psychologists and sociologists agreed on discarding this argument for justifying or understanding radicalisation in France. Indeed, they argued that mental illnesses and psychological instability are two factors that are too broad and that are used for justifying everything and its contrary.²¹⁷ Overall, researchers and psychologists argue that these components alone do not give a strong springboard for committing terrorist attacks, but that a mix of various factors, paired with mental instability, can provide such springboard.

Moreover, it appears that French psychologists and sociologists do not have access to the filing systems of radicalized individuals and terrorists that the French government created. Hence, the justification of radicalisation as being triggered by mental illnesses provided by the French government is quite biased and cannot be confirmed by the medical body. How the French government and its secret services analyse radicalized individuals' psychological stability is rather unclear. The few available reports, along with the various public statements made by French political figures, do not mention whether psychologists and psychoanalysts had confirmed mental illnesses as a key risk factor or/and root causes of radicalisation among the individuals flagged as radicalized. According to French psychologists who debated on the matter, if mentally ill individuals resort to radicalisation, it has more to do with vulnerability than with their actual mental illnesses.²¹⁸

Moreover, after having been in contact with more than 80 radicalized youths, Serge Hafez, a French psychiatrist at the hospital of Pitié-Salpêtrière, argues that “the common thread among

²¹⁵ Stéphane Trouillard, "Radicalisation: "Les Terroristes Ne Sont Pas Des Malades Mentaux", " *France 24*, August 23, 2017, <https://www.france24.com/fr/20170823-france-radicalisation-terrorisme-psychiatrie-gerard-collomb-hopitaux-passage-acte>.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Béatrice Collin, "Djihadistes: «La Grosse Erreur Est De Dire Que L'on a Affaire à Des Malades Mentaux», " *20 Minutes*, October 03, 2017, <https://www.20minutes.fr/toulouse/2143751-20171003-djihadistes-grosse-erreur-dire-affaire-malades-mentaux>.

²¹⁸ Trouillard, *Radicalisation*.

those who become radicalised seem to be a number of failures during adolescence and radicalisation is an attempt to exit this existential angst they find themselves in.”²¹⁹ Overall, psychological factors seem to be too vague for explaining radicalisation. All individuals have experienced psychological traumas, whether in their early childhood or throughout their adult lives. Yet, humanity is not inherently radicalized. Hence, we should rather look at specific factors such as childhood trauma, family problems (ie: being put in a placement homes), unstable familial environments and unhealthy living environment rather than using mental illnesses as an explanation for radicalisation. The latter factor does not explain radicalisation in the case of France. In the case of the Kouachi brothers and Mohammed Merah, mental illnesses were not seen as a root causes of their radicalisation. Moreover, even if French governmental reports touched upon mental illnesses as being a potential risk factor for radicalisation, they have been rather cautious in using this component for justifying radicalisation, which shows that this factor is too broad to be taken as a root cause of radicalisation in France.

b. *Humiliation*

Humiliation has often been pointed out as being a root cause of radicalisation. Using said factor as an explanation of an individual’s desire to resort to radicalisation brings about the idea that an individual whom experienced humiliation seeks to increase his or her self-confidence through radicalisation.

A report commissioned by the Mission de Recherche Droit et Justice (or the Law and Justice’s Research Mission), showed that individuals who “have a low socio-economic status, few if not no prestige and a relatively low possibility of action”²²⁰ within the French society are said to “experience an utter sense of helplessness and humiliation.”²²¹ After having cross-analysed the various parliamentary reports published by the French Senate and National Assembly, it appears that the French government believes humiliation, paired with injustice, to be a driving risk factor and root cause of radicalisation.²²² Indeed, in a Senatorial report from August 2018,

²¹⁹ Louise Nordstrom, "How France Was Forced to Reassess Its Ideas about Radicalised Youth," *France 24*, November 12, 2018, <https://www.france24.com/en/20181111-france-psychology-radicalised-youth-counter-terrorism-stereotype-theories-minds>.

²²⁰ Xavier Crettiez and Sèze Romain, *Saisir Les Mécanismes De La Radicalisation Violente : Pour Une Analyse Processuelle Et Biographique Des Engagements Violents Rapport De Recherche Pour La Mission De Recherche Droit Et Justice*, report, *Mission De Recherche Droit Et Justice*, 2017, 76, <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01592825/document>.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² Crettiez and Romain, *Saisir Les Mécanismes de la Radicalisation Violente*, 74-82.

the Senatorial Investigative Committee stated that “many French jihadists are inhabited by a feeling of injustice and of humiliation, which gradually turned into a resentment against the colonial West and Western countries, and bred the desire and felt necessity to fight against what is perceived as a form of oppression and humiliation.”²²³ Hence, humiliation is understood by the French government as being a root cause and risk factor of radicalisation.

c. A search for an ideal

After having conducted a study on 809 French individuals (both men and women) following a deradicalisation program in France, Dounia Bouzar shed light on 3 different types of psychological motivations for radicalisation, which can be interpreted as both risk factors and root causes of radicalisation: The Saviour’s myth, Lancelot’s myth and Zeus’ myth. The first myth characterizes a quest for redemption.²²⁴ The two others are understood as being ultimately fuelled by a search for an ideal.

According to this study, the individuals falling under the Saviour’s myth seem to be so terrified of the potential punishments they could undergo due to their impious way of life that they seek to counter these sanctions by fighting for what they believe is a just cause. By joining ISIS and its fight against Western powers, they believe that they will secure themselves a spot in heaven and find themselves to be purified of all their sins.²²⁵

Lancelot’s myth has more to do with chivalry than with a fear of godly punishment. French men who radicalized motivated by the former element were apparently in a quest to save the oppressed and make up for the oppression of Muslim individuals killed by foreign Western forces.²²⁶ According to the author, “this ideal of justice goes hand in hand with a certain attraction for armed combat and with a search of adrenaline and adventure.”²²⁷ Moreover, it appeared that “those who enlisted under Lancelot’s myth have, for many of them, been turned down from entering French army forces or French judiciary services.”²²⁸ Hence, for said individuals, radicalizing and joining ISIS’ ranks provided them with the necessary battlefield

²²³ Sénat, *Rapport de la Commission d’enquête*, 63.

²²⁴ Bouzar and Martin, *Pour Quels Motifs Les Jeunes S’engagent-ils dans le Djihad*, 355.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 356.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

they needed for implementing and furthering what they thought was the ideal type of justice. Moreover, said motivation was providing young men with “an ideal of virile identity.”²²⁹

Zeus’ myth explains French individuals’ decision to radicalize as being motivated by political factors. Indeed, these radicals were mainly driven -among other things- by a desire to implement Sharia law throughout the world.²³⁰ These psychologically and politically driven factors of radicalisation highlight the idea that these individuals also wish to be part of something meaningful. Through their desire of implementing Sharia law, these individuals seek to apply a specific ideology throughout the world while retaliating against a way of life they see as being impious.

This report, along with other governmental reports, also shows that a very slight percentage of French radicals resorted to radicalisation as a way of making their deaths worthwhile. Indeed, it appeared that very few individuals who had mental illnesses or contemplated committing suicide decided to radicalize as a way for their deaths to be meaningful. In the seven myths presented in the CPDSI’s report, although three myths directly implied the acceptance of a future death when the individuals will be sent along ISIS combatants on the battlefield, only the Saviour’s myth entailed death as a final result of radicalisation.²³¹

The above-mentioned root causes of radicalisation presented a search for an ideal as one main factor of the aforementioned phenomena. This factor has also been mentioned in diverse French governmental reports, once again proving that a search for an ideal is considered by the French government as being an important root cause of radicalisation.²³²

²²⁹ Bouzar and Martin, *Pour Quels Motifs Les Jeunes S’engagent-ils dans le Djihad*, 356.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid., 358.

²³² Sénat, *Menace Terroriste*..

d. Relative deprivation

The relative deprivation part will be rather short, as nor the French government nor French scholars believe it has an importance in fuelling radicalisation.²³³ Rather, as we have stated it until now, both entities explain radicalisation through various factors, whether socio-economic, political or psychological.

iv. Religious ideology

Ideology seems to be an important driving factor of radicalisation in France. Gérard Godard, a consultant for the French Ministry of Interior, estimates that around 4 000 individuals convert to Islam every year in France.²³⁴ In total, the French Ministry of Interior believes that France counts between 12 000 and 15 000 radical Muslims who abide to Salafism, and that among these numbers around 2 000 individuals are directly involved in jihadists groups.²³⁵ It is important to note the relativity of said number: Indeed, the aforementioned number of Muslims who abide by the Salafi-jihadism ideology is relatively low: they represent around 0,075% of the total number of Muslims in France.²³⁶ Yet, in a Senatorial report issued in July 2018, the French government sought to implement a specific plan aiming to tackle the problem of Salafism, whose discourse is perceived as a threat to France's security.²³⁷ The belief that Salafism is an inherent threat to the French Republic as it fuels radicalisation was even restated in a list of proposals aiming to tackle the terrorist threat which proposed to register Salafism on the list of sectarian excesses of the Interdepartmental Mission for Vigilance and Fight Against Sectarian Excesses.²³⁸ This once again restates the fact that the French government believes ideology to be an important fuelling risk factor, if not root cause, of radicalisation.

However, it is important to keep in mind that converting to Islam does not give an impetus for radicalisation, nor does ideology in itself as Marc Sageman stated it.²³⁹ Nonetheless, it remains that ideology has various important functions in the radicalisation processes of individuals.

²³³ Sénat, *Menace Terroriste*.

²³⁴ Alexandre Pouchard and Samuel Laurent, "Quel Est Le Poids De L'islam En France ?" *Le Monde*, July 6, 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/01/21/que-pese-l-islam-en-france_4559859_4355770.html.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Sénat, *Rapport de la Commission d'Enquête*, 6.

²³⁸ Simon Barbarit, "Le Sénat Veut Inscrire Le Salafisme Sur La Liste Des Dérives Sectaires," Public Senat, July 13, 2018, <https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/parlementaire/terrorisme-le-senat-veut-inscrire-le-salafisme-sur-la-liste-des-derives>.

²³⁹ Karen Peterson, "Book Review: Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*," review of Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*., *University of Pennsylvania Press*: 507.

Indeed, as Hafez and Mullins stated it, “ideology can help forge a new rebellious identity by appealing to symbols, narratives, mythologies and rituals that give meanings to acts of personal risk and sacrifice.”²⁴⁰ Moreover, ideology can also be used for “demonizing or dehumanizing enemies and enabling moral beings to engage in immoral violence.”²⁴¹ Again, when looking at the discourses upheld by French radicalized individuals, this point proves itself to be true. Indeed, a quick look into the infamous French radicalized individuals shows that ideology is both a known risk factor and a root cause of their radicalisation.

v. Clash with French secularism/Assimilation problems

Michael Neiberg, an American political scientist, stated that “some optimistic French observers drew faith from the presumed superiority of the “French method of laic assimilation over the multicultural model of the Anglo-Saxon world.”²⁴² The French concept of laïcité, or *secularism* in English, “projects the idea that France forms one solitary unit that does not recognize religious differences for social or political purposes.”²⁴³ Said concept “symbolizes France’s supposed ability to bring in people from around the world, educate them in the ways of French society and produce people who think of themselves as French first, whatever their (or their parents’) country of origin are.”²⁴⁴ Yet, secularism does not seem to create a perfect society in which all individuals are assimilated to one single overarching culture. After the riots in the Parisian suburbs in 2005 and the terrorist attacks of 2015, the French understood that they might have been “too overconfident in their assimilationist model.”²⁴⁵

French political sociologists and experts, such as Gilles Kepel, believe that the failure of secularism as a uniting model can be explained through what he calls “a “clash” between the third generation of Muslims who reached maturity”²⁴⁶ and the “French secularist and assimilationist model.”²⁴⁷

²⁴⁰ Hafez and Mullins, *The Radicalisation Puzzle*, 967.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Michael Neiberg, ““No More Elsewhere”: France Faces the New Wave of Terrorism,” *The Washington Quarterly* 40 (April 2017): 21, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302736.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 22.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

Michael Neiberg explains said clash as a result of “changes in the complex and multiparty French political landscape which had isolated many Muslim voters from the political process, especially the young and unemployed, thus undermining the idea of France as a single unit.”²⁴⁸ The author believes that “Muslim voters became disenchanted with the French Socialist Party both for its failure to improve the unemployment problem in suburban areas and in opposition to the party’s support of a gay marriage law.”²⁴⁹ The author goes even further and interprets the riots in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois in 2005 as being “the spontaneous acts of young French Muslims responding to mostly local issues of alienation, underrepresentation and persistent unemployment.”²⁵⁰ Because the reasons for which young Muslims were fighting for seemed to have been totally overlooked by the French government as they did not intend to fix the problems the youths had, said population started trusting the French assimilationist system less and less, if not anymore. When Nicolas Sarkozy, the Republican candidate running for the French presidential elections in 2007 who “co-opted the anti-immigrant sentiment of the far right”²⁵¹ in his speeches, became elected into office, “young French Muslims believed that the political process no longer represented them or offered them an opportunity to participate in any meaningful way”²⁵² which marked and showcased the limits of the French assimilationist model.

Because of a model that proved itself to be inclusive of *some people* but not *all of them*, the “third generation of French Muslims that began to reach maturity in the early 2000s started seeing the idea of assimilation more negatively than had previous generations.”²⁵³ Although said generation “was predominantly educated in France and spoke French as a native language unlike their parents, they started seeing their Muslim identity as incompatible with their French one.”²⁵⁴ Moreover, after the 2005 suburban riots, these youths appeared to be far less likely than their parents or grandparents to “have faith in the promise of eventual assimilation into the wider French society.”²⁵⁵ The anger and resentment, paired with a rejection of French culture and values, that this third generation felt “revealed the flaws in the deeply-held French belief that generations of immigrants would become more French as they themselves grew up in

²⁴⁸ Neiberg, *No More Elsewhere*, 22.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

France.”²⁵⁶ Lastly, this disenchantment with the French society and its failed presumably “inclusive” secularist model led “large numbers of unemployed and embittered youths to turn to Islam as an alternative source of identity to an assimilationist French identity they neither felt nor desired.”²⁵⁷ The author rightfully argues that “this self-separation as in turn fuelled the National Front’s rhetoric that Muslims are not capable of assimilating into French society as previous waves of immigrants had,”²⁵⁸ which led this self-separation model to feed upon itself, hence producing a dangerous level of anger on political, economic, social and cultural levels.”²⁵⁹

Michael Neiberg is not the only scholar who believes that the French assimilationist and secularism models have been inefficient in including young Muslims’ culture and identity, and that the failure of said model provided a springboard for radicalisation. Gilles Kepel also believes so. Kepel argues that most, if not all, radicalized movements “resist the spirit of modernity and secularism,”²⁶⁰ and “these movements are reflections of widespread and profound discontent with modern ways of life and modern society.”²⁶¹

Hence, this subsection proves two points: The first being that the French society, and most specifically the inaction of the French government in regard to the problems felt by part of its population, has been proven to be a problematic factor fuelling radicalisation. The second point that this subsection points at lies in the fact that the resentment said population felt against the French government’s inaction has been used by some individuals as a springboard and as a leitmotiv to radicalize. This point is exemplified through the French terrorists who committed the 2015 terrorist attacks and who had grown up in an atmosphere of unfitness in light of the French assimilationist model. They felt let down by the French government for not having provided them with solutions.²⁶² Again, although this element can be considered as a fuelling factor for radicalisation -whether cognitive or behavioural-, it is important to restate that this component alone does not feed radicalisation but that it is rather a blend of different factors that

²⁵⁶ Neiberg, *No More Elsewhere*, 23.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 24.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 23.

²⁶⁰ Rohr, *Terrorism*, 2.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Milton Viorst, "The Muslims of France," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996): 80, doi:10.2307/20047745.

do so. Nonetheless, it remains this component can be understood as a risk factor and a root cause of radicalisation.

vi. Petty crimes

A report published by the French Senate highlighted the fact that “the individuals who committed terrorist attacks on French grounds are traditionally known by the French judiciary authorities for small and medium delinquency including acts of fraud or armed robbery. The French intelligence services point out in the same direction and explain that there is a certain “porosity” between the commitment of petty crimes, terrorism and radicalisation, and that the overrepresentation of petty criminals among radicalized individuals and terrorists is a known and identified phenomena since 1990.”²⁶³ Oliver Roy furthers this correlation by stating that most French radicalized individuals were known for having dealt drugs or other illicit substances and for having a past of petty delinquency.²⁶⁴ Similarly, H el ene Bazex and Michel B en ezech conducted a study on 112 individuals who have been placed in open and secure custody in French prison, and came to the realization that there is a “high rate of common crime in 75% of the subjects”²⁶⁵ who present mild or high radicalisation. Laurent Bonelli also highlighted the role played by past delinquency in the commitment of terrorist attacks. The author argues that “the mode of operation of terrorist attacks (ie: those of Charlie Hebdo or the Hyper Cacher which both took place in 2015) is part of the continuity of previous forms of delinquency in which some radicalized individuals engaged in in the past.”²⁶⁶ Stealing cars, obtaining weapons and knowing how to use them was transposed and used for carrying out the infamous terrorist attacks of 2015. Amedy Coulibaly, one of the perpetrators of the January 2015’s attacks, was a well-known multi-criminal offender who had cold-bloodedly planned the forenamed attacks. According to French judicial authorities, his experience with petty crimes was deemed as having been important in planning and carrying out these attacks.²⁶⁷

These researches show the recurrent appearances of petty crimes in the background of French radicals’ individuals. While this recurrence does not entail that all individuals with petty crimes

²⁶³ Menace Terroriste : Pour Une R epublique Juste Mais plus Ferme, report, S enat, May 7, 2019, <https://www.senat.fr/rap/r17-639/r17-6393.html>.

²⁶⁴ Ranstorp, *The Root Causes of Violent Extremism*, 4.

²⁶⁵ H el ene Bazex, Michel B en ezech, and Jean-Yves Mensat, "Le Miroir De La Haine: La Prise En Charge P enitentiaire De La Radicalisation : Analyse Clinique Et Criminologique De 112 Personnes Plac ees Sous Main De Justice," *Annales M edico-psychologiques Revue Psychiatrique* 175, no. 3, doi:10.1016/j.amp.2017.01.009.

²⁶⁶ Bonelli and Carri e, *La Fabrique De La Radicalit e. Une Sociologie Des Jeunes Djihadistes Fran ais*.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

history are radicals, it nonetheless proves that the “know-how” gotten through petty crimes, such as knowing how to use a weapon, how to orchestrate a crime and more, can serve in the commitment of terrorist attacks. Hence, it is arguable that experience with petty crimes can be understood as a risk factor of radicalisation in France.

vii. Prisons and radicalisation: A proven correlation?

The French government and French political scientists strongly believe -and have proved- that the carceral milieu can be both a risk factor and a root cause of radicalisation.

As we have seen it in the previous subsections, radicalisation is fuelled by different factors. This statement is shown in the way the French government thinks of carceral radicalisation. As such, it appears that Emmanuel Macron's government believes that a stay in prison itself does not provide any springboard for radicalisation, but that a young age and an unstable background, paired with carceral sentences and carceral social networks, do provide a key step in the strengthening of one's radicalisation process. The reason behind that is believed to be that "carceral time allows young people, who are still novices of radicalisation, to reinforce their activist capital in both its cultural dimension (through reading and intellectualisation of radicalised individuals' experiences) and through its social dimension (through the constitution or joining of a radicalized network present within the prison)."²⁶⁸ This statement brings about the idea that the prison environment can be a catalyst of radicalisation, but according to Farhad Khosrokhavar's research, it is more than that.

After having conducted a research based on long series of interviews with various carceral actors such as inmates, supervisors, doctors, and directors, Farhad Khosrokhavar believes the prison environment to be both a risk factor and a root cause of radicalisation. Apart from stating that social networks, such as being in direct contact with radicalized individuals, are proven to provide a strong springboard for radicalisation, he also proved that there are three typical profiles that can be found among the individuals who radicalized within the carceral environment.²⁶⁹

According to the author, we can distinguish three different profiles of individuals who radicalized in prisons:

- Those who have a solid terrorist background and have been condemned for glorification of terrorism or for belonging to a criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking,²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ Sénat, *Rapport de la Commission d'enquête*, 65.

²⁶⁹ Farhad Khosrokhavar, "Les Radicalisés En Prison," in *Prisons De France* (Paris: Robert Lafont, 2016), 274.

²⁷⁰ Khosrokhavar, *Les Radicalisés en Prison*, 275.

- Those who were not radicalized before and did not show a direct desire to do so until they had to look for the protection of a leader (who happens to be radicalized) in order to escape the various pressures exerted by other detainees on themselves,²⁷¹
- Those who intend to “monetize” their belonging to the Islamist-jihadism movement in order to increase their glory, as for them achieve a higher status within the carceral milieu.²⁷²

As such, the first category of individuals shows that prisons can be seen as a risk factor of radicalisation: it simply furthers their radicalisation processes by allowing them to spread their beliefs and to gain new followers, who will be indoctrinated and will later be able to carry terrorist attacks once their prison sentences will come to an end. As these individuals were radicalized prior to their prison sentence, this is why the carceral milieu can be interpreted as a risk factor rather than a root cause. For the second and third category, the prison environment is understood as a root cause of radicalisation. Indeed, as they were not radicalized before but did so in order to seek the protection of a leader, the prison environment is clearly seen as a root cause of radicalisation as this is where individuals radicalized in the first place. The same logic can be applied to the third category.

Not only does this show the importance of social networks in the radicalisation process of individuals, it also shows that individuals who resort to radicalisation are also fuelled by a desire of personal glorification, as well as being driven by a desire to increase their social status. Lastly, this study once again shows that the carceral milieu in itself does not provide any impetus for radicalisation, but that individuals who radicalized did so as they had predisposing factors leading them to resort to such process.

The idea that prisons and social networks are both a risk factor and a root cause of radicalisation is shown in the French government’s decision to separate “regular” detainees from radicalized individuals. Indeed, following the 2015 terrorist attacks, the French government has decided to create new “entities” in few of its prisons, specifically made for containing inmates who are

²⁷¹ This category can also be described as what Khosrokhavar named « Instrumental radicalisation », where the individuals do not show a desire to radicalize and do not abide by the jihadist ideology, but nonetheless radicalized as a way to escape the various pressures they are facing within the carceral milieu.

²⁷² Khosrokhavar, *Les Radicalisés en Prison*, 275.

facing a prison sentence for glorification of terrorism or for having tried to reach Syria and its surroundings with the aim of fighting for ISIS.²⁷³

While France already counts 3 “radicalisation-proof wards,” two more are aiming to be constructed, hence restating the French government’s idea that the carceral milieu is an important springboard for radicalisation, as well as root cause, as it has been proven by Farhad Khosrokhavar’s research.²⁷⁴ Said wards do not only seek to isolate radicalized detainees in order to avoid a spill-over effect of radicalisation onto other detainees, they also aim to help in deradicalizing these individuals. Indeed, psychologists, religious referents, and rehabilitation counsellors are mobilized in order to help these individuals, but also in order to understand how and why they radicalized while giving them the opportunity of repenting and going back to a normal life.²⁷⁵ Seeing all the measures put in action by the French government, it is clear that the carceral milieu where detainees who have committed common crimes are in contact with radicalized individuals is taken to be a risk factor and a root cause of radicalisation.

What this chapter aimed to prove was that the general risk factors and root causes of radicalisation encountered in the general literature on the topic do not necessarily apply nor explain the radicalisation processes of individuals in France. While a low education level was thought to be a main explanatory factor of radicalisation, it appears that the French government does not take it into account. Moreover, some root causes of radicalisation presented in Chapter 3 are deemed to be risk factors of radicalisation by the French government. This is the case with economic deprivation. The French government does not see unemployment as a root cause of radicalisation. At best, it can be understood as a slight risk factor of radicalisation, but not as a root cause of said phenomenon.

²⁷³ "Plan De Lutte Contre La Radicalisation : La Course D'un Poulet Sans Tête," Observatoire International Des Prisons, accessed May 07, 2019, <https://oip.org/analyse/plan-de-lutte-contre-la-radicalisation-la-course-dun-poulet-sans-tete/>.

²⁷⁴ "Prison/Alençon: Ouverture D'un Quartier Pour Radicalisés," Le Figaro, September 20, 2018, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2018/09/20/97001-20180920FILWWW00328-prisonalencon-ouverture-d-un-quartier-pour-radicalises.php>.

²⁷⁵ "Le Plan Du Gouvernement Pour Isoler Les Détenus Radicalisés," L'Express, February 23, 2018, https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/le-plan-du-gouvernement-pour-isoler-les-detenus-radicalises_1987577.html.

A young age is believed to be a root cause of radicalisation by the French government. The French government does not believe that age alone provides an impetus for radicalisation, but rather that instability and vulnerability can lead an individual to radicalize as he or she is in quest of an ideal, ideal that can be provided by radicalisation through different ways, as it has been explained in this chapter. Moreover, France seems to agree with the general literature on radicalisation concerning the role social networks and political factors play in the radicalisation processes of individuals. Indeed, the government believes that said networks, along with the political factors mentioned in this chapter, are both risk factors and root causes of radicalisation.

Lastly, France joins radicalisation specialists in the idea that religion in itself does not provide any impetus for radicalisation. However, they believe that a very specific branch of religion, namely Salafi-jihadism, represents a root cause of radicalisation. Lastly, a clash between third generation immigrants and the French secularist and assimilationist model are thought to be other root causes of radicalisation, along with the carceral milieu.

It can be argued that the risk factors and root causes presented in this chapter have already been studied in the general literature presented in Chapter 3. Undeniably, it is the case, as this chapter seeks to draw from the factors presented in Chapter 3. However, this chapter seeks to understand and analyse which of these factors apply to the case of France, and which ones have been deemed irrelevant by the French government or French scholars. As each section specifies whether or not general radicalisation factors have been confirmed to be important risk factors or root causes of radicalisation by the French government, the aim of this chapter has been fulfilled. An extended conclusion of this chapter can be found in the following conclusive chapter.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

“To better understand the reasons of radicalisation, we must reconstruct the radicalized individuals’ biographies.”²⁷⁶ – Laurent Mucchielli

After having analysed the general root causes of radicalisation and the recurrent root causes and risk factors of radicalisation in France, the following hypotheses have been validated and can be understood as a general conclusion to what the root causes and risk factors of radicalisation in France are:

- a. Material conditions such as poverty and unemployment do not play a significant role in our case study. This component cannot be seen or interpreted as a significant root cause of radicalisation. If it were the case, as Moghaddam argued, “acts of terrorism would be committed more by the poorest individuals living in the poorest regions, yet this is not the case.”²⁷⁷ In our case study, poverty and unemployment are understood as being *slight* risk factors of radicalisation.
- b. Along with a teenage crisis, a search for a stable structure, and a desire to be surrounded by strong authority figures providing a safe space that the familial milieu failed to provide, a young age does seem to be a risk factor of radicalisation in France. However, age alone does not provide any impetus for radicalizing. Moreover, it appears that young individuals are more prone to challenge the system in which they evolve in. Hence, in some cases, resorting to radicalisation can be used as a way to counter said system and to voice one’s dissatisfaction with the society in which he or she lives in. Thus, a young age can be interpreted as a risk factor of radicalisation.
- c. Social networks can be understood both as a risk factor and as a root cause of radicalisation in France. As we have seen it, spending time with radicalized individuals does create or further an individual’s radicalisation.
- d. The relevance of education as a risk factor and/or root cause of radicalisation has not yet been confirmed by the French government. As this factor created more debates than

²⁷⁶ Laurent Mucchielli in Jovelin, *De La Délinquance à La Radicalisation*, 58.

²⁷⁷ Moghaddam, *Staircase to Terrorism*, 163.

actual researches on its accuracy, it is impossible to draw a final conclusion concerning this component.

- e. A desire to fight against France's military interventions, a desire to make the French nation pay for its foreign military interventions as well as for its support to the international coalition fighting ISIS, paired with a desire to make France pay for its hostile domestic policy towards Islam are proven root causes of radicalisation. It is important to note that these claims are highly linked with Salafi-jihadism ideology.
- f. While religion in itself does not provide any impetus for radicalisation, it is clear that Salafism-jihadism is considered by the French government as being a root cause of radicalisation.
- g. Mental illnesses are not considered by the French government as being root causes or risk factors of radicalisation.
- h. Humiliation is taken by the French government as being a root cause of radicalisation.
- i. The French government believes that a search for an ideal is both a risk factor and a root cause of radicalisation.
- j. Past criminal activities are believed to be a risk factor of radicalisation by the French government, as it provides individuals with the knowledge on how to lead attacks (ie: using weapons, how to establish a criminal plan etc). However, the relevance of past criminal activities can be seen as a shortcut made by the French government. Indeed, they based their claims on the fact that most flagged as radicalized have a history of petty crimes. Whether or not it is inherent to the process of radicalisation is unclear, yet the French government flagged said activity as a risk factor of radicalisation.
- k. It is important to note that factors such as trauma and deception do not always result in the radicalisation of individuals. If it were the case, every deceived and traumatized individual would radicalize. Yet, as the numbers showed it, radicalisation is still a marginalized phenomenon. Hence, this means that this process is intertwined with other factors.

- l. Resentment towards the French nation due to its foreign policy (ie: Intervention in the MENA region, bombings or attacks conducted towards Muslim communities with the aim of targeting ISIS) and a feeling of Western-colonization in the Middle East region for the sake of “international security” are key factors fuelling individuals to resort and/or further their radicalisation processes.
- m. There seems to be an intrinsic problem of integration for Muslim individuals, as well as a peculiar clash of values and beliefs with the French society, especially with its secular system. These clashes lead to grievances which can thus be interpreted as risk factors and root causes of radicalisation.
- n. Prisons, along with other networks and enabling environments, play a non-questionable role in the radicalisation process of individuals in France.
- o. Religion itself alone does not provide an impetus for jihadism/radicalisation.

As we have seen it, the root causes of radicalisation in France are numerous and complex. As shown in Chapter 4 political factors such as resentment towards the French foreign military interventions, socio-economic factors such as a feeling of humiliation, unstable environments, a problem of assimilation within the French society, experiencing racism or xenophobia, psychological factors such as Lancelot’s myth and factors such as Salafi-jihadism ideology and a clash with secularism and the French assimilationist model are risk factors and root causes of radicalisation. Yet, although radicalisation is a hard and complex process to foresee, the French Security and Intelligence services such as the DGSE or DGSI are doing their best. The fact that they have thwarted 66 terrorist projects since 2014,²⁷⁸ seized 625 firearms among which 78 were considered as weapons of war such as Kalashnikovs, assault rifles and rocket launchers,²⁷⁹ led 4457 administrative searches in homes of individuals suspected of having close links with the jihadist movement or were suspected of being radicalized and the fact that more than 750

²⁷⁸ Sénat, *Menace Terroriste*.

²⁷⁹ Alicia Paulet, "32 Attentats Déjoués, 4457 Perquisitions, 625 Armes Saisies : Le Bilan De L'état D'urgence," *Le Figaro*, October 31, 2017, <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2017/10/31/01016-20171031ARTFIG00125-32-attentats-dejoues-4457-perquisitions-625-armes-saisies-le-bilan-de-l-etat-d-urgence.php>.

dangerous individuals have been placed under to house arrests²⁸⁰ shows the reinforced efforts put in action by the aforementioned intelligence services.

It is evident that the study of radicalisation is complex as not all risk factors apply to individuals' radicalisation processes, thus making them harder to spot. But security and intelligence services are allying forces and furthering their efforts in the quest of understanding this process. Proof is, Emmanuel Macron's government announced in April 25th 2019 that "in a few weeks, handpicked researchers will be able to peel the 11 000 of so called "active profiles" of the Terrorism Prevention and Terrorism Reporting File System (FSPRT), commonly referred to as the "Fichier S"."²⁸¹ While the accuracy of this filing system has been subject to various criticisms, what is interesting is the rationale behind opening up said files to individuals others than security and intelligence personnel. The rationale behind the French government's decision to open said terrorist and radicalized individuals' system lies in the hope that with the help of various actors (ie: experts, psychologists, penitentiary personnel, and analysts), security and intelligence services will better identify cognitive radicalisation and will be more efficient in countering the potential occurrence of terrorist attacks. This inherently shows the increased attention drawn to the study of radicalisation and gives hope for the next future, as behaviourally radicalized individuals will be easier to spot, and terrorist attacks will be countered faster.

Hence, radicalisation is not marking the end of peaceful times in France. As Laurent Bonelli stated it in his *Le Monde's* tribune in February 2015, "the situation, as tragic as it is, is not a war, nor an end of French's societal peace. Judicial authorities, police and secret services have it under control. The perpetrators have been neutralized or quickly stopped, and one can legitimately think that the same scenario will happen if other terrorist attacks were to happen."²⁸² French citizens can rest on their two ears: the French government, along with different scientists and radicalisation experts, are combatting this phenomenon as well as they can.

²⁸⁰ Paulet, *Attentats Déjoués*.

²⁸¹ *Rapport D'Information Fait Au Nom De La Commission Des Lois Constitutionnelles, De Législation, Du Suffrage Universel, Du Règlement Et D'administration Générale Par Le Groupe De Travail Sur L'amélioration De L'efficacité Des Fiches S*, report, Sénat, December 19, 2018, <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r18-219/r18-2191.pdf>.

²⁸² Laurent Bonelli, "Les Chemins De La Radicalisation," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 2015, https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/02/BONELLI/52619?erreur_connexion=noid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

i. Academic articles:

Akay, Cenk. "Turkish High School Students' English Demotivation and Their Seeking for Remotivation: A Mixed Method Research." *English Language Teaching* 10, no. 8 (2017): 107-122.

Bazex, H el ene, Michel B en ezech, and Jean-Yves Mensat. "Le Miroir De La Haine: La Prise En Charge P enitentiaire De La Radicalisation : Analyse Clinique Et Criminologique De 112 Personnes Plac ees Sous Main De Justice." *Annales M edico-psychologiques Revue Psychiatrique* 175, no. 3. doi:10.1016/j.amp.2017.01.009.

Bouzar, Dounia, and Marie Martin. "Pour Quels Motifs Les Jeunes S'engagent-ils Dans Le Djihad ?" *Neuropsychiatrie De L'Enfance Et De L'Adolescence* 64, no. 6 (October 2016): 353-359. doi:10.1016/j.neurenf.2016.08.002.

Campelo, Nicolas, Alice Oppetit, Fran oise Neau, David Cohen, and Guillaume Bronsard. "Who Are the European Youths Willing to Engage in Radicalisation? A Multidisciplinary Review of Their Psychological and Social Profiles." *European Psychiatry* 52 (March 7, 2018): 1-14. doi:10.1016/j.eurpsy.2018.03.001.

Carli, Pierre, Caroline Telion, and David Baker. "Terrorism in France." *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18, no. 2 (2003): 92-99.

Crettiez, Xavier. "Penser La Radicalisation: Une Sociologie Processuelle Des Variables De L'engagement Violent." *Presses De Sciences Po* 5, no. 66 (2016): 709-27. doi:10.3917/rfsp.665.0709.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. "Violent Radicalisation in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 9 (August 16, 2010): 797-814. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2010.501423.

Dechepy-Tellier, Johan. "La Pr evension De La Radicalisation En France Et Ailleurs En Europe." *Le Journal Des Psychologues* 362, no. 10 (2018): 40-44.

Doosje, Bertjan, Fathali Moghaddam, Arie Kruglanski, Arjan De Wolf, Liesbeth Mann, and Allard Feddes. "Terrorism, Radicalisation and De-radicalisation." *Current Opinion in Psychology* 11 (October 2016): 79-84. doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.06.008.

Hafez, Mohammed, and Creighton Mullins. "The Radicalisation Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 11 (April 1, 2015): 958-75. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2015.1051375.

Hardy, Keiran. "Comparing Theories of Radicalisation with Countering Violent Extremism Policy." *Journal for Deradicalisation*, no. 15 (June 29, 2018): 76-110. <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/150/119>.

Jourdain, Anne, and Sidonie Naulin. "Héritage Et Transmission Dans La Sociologie De Pierre Bourdieu." *Idées Economiques Et Sociales*4, no. 166 (2014): 6-14. doi:10.3917/idee.166.0006.

Jovelin, Emmanuel. "De La Délinquance à La Radicalisation." *Hommes & Migrations*, no. 1315 (March 2016): 59-68. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-hommes-et-migrations-2016-3-page-59.htm>.

L'Heuillet, Helene. "Radicalisation and Terrorism." *Cités* 66 (2016): 123-36.

Ludot, Radjack, and Moro. "« Radicalisation Djihadiste » Et Psychiatrie De L'adolescent." *Neuropsychiatrie De L'enfance Et De L'adolescence* 64, no. 8 (2016): 522-28.

Maskaliūnaitė, Asta. "Exploring the theories of radicalisation." *International Studies. Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal* 17, no. 1 (2015): 9-26.

McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalkenko. "Understanding Political Radicalisation: The Two-Pyramids Model." *American Psychological Association*72, no. 3, 206-16. doi:10.1037/amp0000062.

Moghaddam, Fathali. "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration." *American Psychological*60, no. 2 (2005): 161-69. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161.

Moran, Matthew. "Terrorism and the Banlieues: The Charlie Hebdo Attacks in Context." *Modern & Contemporary France*25, no. 3 (May 18, 2017): 315-32. doi:10.1080/09639489.2017.1323199.

Moro, Marie-Rose. "3.4 VIOLENT ISLAMIC RADICALISATION AND SUPPORT FOR IT AMONG THE YOUNG TODAY: A TRANSCULTURAL QUALITATIVE STUDY IN FRANCE." *Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry* 55, no. 10 (2016): S5-S6.

Moskalkenko, Sophia, and Clark Mccauley. "Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism." *Terrorism and Political Violence*21, no. 2 (March 30, 2009): 239-60. doi:10.1080/09546550902765508.

Mozaffari, Mehdi. "What Is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*8, no. 1 (March 2007): 17-33. doi:10.1080/14690760601121622.

Murshed, Syed Mansoob, and Sara Pavan. "Identity and Islamic Radicalisation in Western Europe." *Civil Wars*13, no. 3 (October 04, 2011): 259-79. doi:10.1080/13698249.2011.600000.

Neiberg, Michael. "'No More Elsewhere': France Faces the New Wave of Terrorism." *The Washington Quarterly* 40 (April 2017): 21-38. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302736.

Neumann, Peter R. "The Trouble with Radicalisation." *International Affairs* 89, no. 4 (2013): 873-93.

Połośńska-Kimunguyi, Eva, and Marie Gillespie. "Terrorism Discourse on French International Broadcasting: France 24 and the Case of Charlie Hebdo Attacks in Paris." *European Journal of Communication* 31, no. 5 (2016): 568-83.

"Radicalisation." *Le Monde Diplomatique* N 699, no. 6 (2012): 3

Rahimullah, Riyad Hosain, Stephen Larmar, and Mohamad Abdalla. "Understanding Violent Radicalisation amongst Muslims: A Review of the Literature." *Journal of Psychology and Behavioral Science* 1, no. 1 (December 2013): 19-35. December 2013. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/143865434.pdf>.

Rohr, Elisabeth. "Terror, Fundamentalism, and Male Adolescence." *Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy* 31, no. 4 (July 05, 2017): 343-54. doi:10.1080/02668734.2017.1345001.

Schuurman, Bart. "Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and Authorship." *Terrorism and Political Violence*: 1-16. March 1, 2018. doi:10.1080/09546553.2018.1439023.

Souleimanov, Emil Aslan. "Civil War and Religion: Salafi-Jihadist Groups." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*: 1-30. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.653.

Taspınar, Ömer. "Fighting Radicalism, Not 'Terrorism': Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined." *SAIS Review* 19, no. 2 (Summer 2009). https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/summer_fall_radicalism_taspinar.pdf.

Vasile, Jennifer, and Amira Karray. "Filiation En Détresse Et Crise De L'autorité Chez L'adolescent Concerné Par Le Phénomène De Radicalisation." *Dialogue*, 222nd ser., 4:107-20. January 14, 2019. doi:10.3917/dia.222.0107.

Viorst, Milton. "The Muslims of France." *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996): 78-96. doi:10.2307/20047745.

ii. Books

Bonelli, Laurent, and Fabien Carrié. *La Fabrique De La Radicalité. Une Sociologie Des Jeunes Djihadistes Français*. Paris: Seuil. Online summary of the book's main findings done by Eric Keslassy.

Chowanietz, Christophe. *Bombs, Bullets, and Politicians : France's Response to Terrorism*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2016.

Khosrokhavar, Farhad. "Les Radicalisés En Prison." In *Prisons De France*, 274-369. Paris: Robert Lafont, 2016.

Khosrokhavar, Farhad. *Prisons de France. Violence, radicalisation, déshumanisation: surveillants et détenus parlent*. Paris: Robert Lafont, 2016. Online summary of the book's main findings done by Théo Blanc. <https://journals.openedition.org/lectures/22243>

Makarychev, A. S., Robert W. Orttung, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and NATO Advanced Research Workshop on National Counter-Terrorism Strategies: Legal, Institutional Public Policy Dimensions in the US, UK, France, Turkey Russia. *National Counter-terrorism Strategies Legal, Institutional, and Public Policy Dimensions in the US, UK, France, Turkey and Russia*. NATO Security through Science Series. E, Human and Societal Dynamics ; v. 14. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006.

iii. Book reviews

Peterson, Karen. "Book Review: Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks." Review of *Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks*. *University of Pennsylvania Press*.

iv. Issue Brief

Bindner, Laurence. *Jihadists' Grievance Narratives against France*. Issue brief. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. February 2018. <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Bindner-Jihadists-Grievance-Narratives-Against-France-February2018.pdf>.

v. Online Newspapers

"Ce Que L'on Sait Sur La Radicalisation Des Frères Kouachi." *Le Monde*, January 9, 2015. https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/09/ce-que-l-on-sait-sur-la-radicalisation-des-freres-kouachi_4552422_3224.html.

"Le Plan Du Gouvernement Pour Isoler Les Détenus Radicalisés." *L'Express*, February 23, 2018. https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/le-plan-du-gouvernement-pour-isoler-les-detenus-radicalises_1987577.html.

"Merah Aux Policiers : "Je Me Sentais De Mieux En Mieux" à Chaque Tuerie." *La Dépêche*, July 17, 2012. <https://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2012/07/17/1401768-merah-aux-policiers-je-me-sentais-de-mieux-en-mieux-a-chaque-tuerie.html>.

"Prison/Alençon: Ouverture D'un Quartier Pour Radicalisés." *Le Figaro*, September 20, 2018. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2018/09/20/97001-20180920FILWWW00328-prisonalencon-ouverture-d-un-quartier-pour-radicalises.php>.

Beaudouin, Clément. "Causes Profondes, Cause Toujours." *Mediapart*, July 27, 2016. <https://blogs.mediapart.fr/clement-beaudouin/blog/270716/causes-profondes-cause-toujours>.
Bonelli, Laurent. "Les Chemins De La Radicalisation." *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 2015. https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/02/BONELLI/52619?erreur_connexion=noid.

Chrisafis, Angélique. "Charlie Hebdo Attackers: Born, Raised and Radicalised in Paris." *The Guardian*, January 12, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/-sp-charlie-hebdo-attackers-kids-france-radicalised-paris>.

Collin, Béatrice. "Djihadistes: «La Grosse Erreur Est De Dire Que L'on a Affaire à Des Malades Mentaux»." *20 Minutes*, October 03, 2017. <https://www.20minutes.fr/toulouse/2143751-20171003-djihadistes-grosse-erreur-dire-affaire-malades-mentaux>.

Cornevin, Christophe. "Près De 2000 Mineurs Radicalisés En France." *Le Figaro*, September 22, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/09/22/01016-20160922ARTFIG00327-pres-de-2000-mineurs-radicalises-en-france.php>.

Nordstrom, Louise. "How France Was Forced to Reassess Its Ideas about Radicalised Youth." *France 24*, November 12, 2018. <https://www.france24.com/en/20181111-france-psychology-radicalised-youth-counter-terrorism-stereotype-theories-minds>.

Paulet, Alicia. "32 Attentats Déjoués, 4457 Perquisitions, 625 Armes Saisies : Le Bilan De L'état D'urgence." *Le Figaro*, October 31, 2017. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2017/10/31/01016-20171031ARTFIG00125-32-attentats-dejoues-4457-perquisitions-625-armes-saisies-le-bilan-de-l-etat-d-urgence.php>.

Pouchard, Alexandre, and Samuel Laurent. "Quel Est Le Poids De L'islam En France ?" *Le Monde*, July 6, 2016. https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/01/21/que-pese-l-islam-en-france_4559859_4355770.html.

Sageman, Marc. "The Next Generation of Terror." *Foreign Policy*, October 8, 2009. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/08/the-next-generation-of-terror/>.

Tellier, Maxime. "Être Pauvre En France En 2018 : De Qui Et De Quoi Parle-t-on ?" *France Culture*. September 13, 2018. <https://www.franceculture.fr/societe/etre-pauvre-en-france-en-2018-de-quoi-parle-t>.

Travis, Alan. "MI5 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain." *The Guardian*, August 20, 2008. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1>.

Trouillard, Stéphane. "Radicalisation: "Les Terroristes Ne Sont Pas Des Malades Mentaux"." *France 24*, August 23, 2017. <https://www.france24.com/fr/20170823-france-radicalisation-terrorisme-psychiatrie-gerard-collomb-hopitaux-passage-acte>.

vi. Reports

Bartlett, Jamie, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King. *The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism*. Report. DEMOS. 2010. https://www.demos.co.uk/files/Edge_of_Violence_-_web.pdf.

Colomina, Pierre, Olivier De France, and Damien Saverot. *From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Quarterly Report: France*. Report. Defence & Security Programme, IRIS-GLOBSEC. January 07, 2019. <http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/From-Criminals-To-Terrorists-And-Back-Quarterly-Report-France-Vol-2.pdf>.

Crettiez, Xavier, and Sèze Romain. *Saisir Les Mécanismes De La Radicalisation Violente : Pour Une Analyse Processuelle Et Biographique Des Engagements Violents Rapport De Recherche Pour La Mission De Recherche Droit Et Justice*. Report. Mission De Recherche Droit Et Justice. 2017. <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01592825/document>.

Dzhekova Rositsa, Nadya Stoyanova, Anton Kojouharov, Mila Mancheva, Dia Anagnostou,, and Emil Tsenkov. *Understanding Radicalisation. Review of Literature*. Report. Center for the Study of Democracy. 2016. https://csd.bg/fileadmin/user_upload/publications_library/files/22778.pdf.

Gilperez-Lopez, Irène, Mahmoud Barhamgi, and David Camacho. *An Initial Study on Radicalisation Risk Factors: Towards an Assessment Software Tool*. Report. International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications. August 2017. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320089317_An_Initial_Study_on_Radicalisation_Risk_Factors_Towards_an_Assessment_Software_Tool.

Hecker, Marc, and Elie Tenenbaum. *France vs Jihadism: The Republic in a New Age of Terror*. Report. Notes De L'IFRI, IFRI. January 2017. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/hecker_tenenbaum_france_vs_jihadism_2017.pdf.

Menace Terroriste : Pour Une République Juste Mais plus Ferme. Report. Sénat. May 7, 2019. <https://www.senat.fr/rap/r17-639/r17-6393.html>.

Neumann, Peter, Olivier Roy, Nick Fielding, Anatol Lieven, Mustafa Ceric, Jack DuVall, Yezid Sayigh, and Daniel Benjamin. *Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence*. Report. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. January 2008.

<https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource/perspectives-on-radicalisation-and-political-violence/>.

Neumann, Peter. *Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation That Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region*. Report. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. September 28, 2017. <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/346841?download=true>.

Note Relative à La Prise En Charge éducationnelle Des Mineurs Radicalisés Ou En Danger De Radicalisation Violente. Report. Protection Judiciaire De La Jeunesse, Ministère De La Justice.

Odorfer, Caleb. *Root Causes of Radicalisation in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States*. Report. United Nations Development Program, United Nations. July 13, 2015. <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/conflict-prevention/discussion-paper---root-causes-of-radicalism.html>.

Projet De Loi Relatif à La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme Et Portant Dispositions Diverses Relatives à La Sécurité Et Aux Contrôles Frontaliers. Report. Sénat. 2017. <https://www.senat.fr/rap/105-117/105-11719.html>

Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. Report. European Parliament. December 2017. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596838/IPOL_STU\(2017\)59683_8_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596838/IPOL_STU(2017)59683_8_EN.pdf).

Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism. Report. European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation. May 15, 2008. <https://rikcoolsaet.be/files/2008/12/expert-group-report-violent-radicalisation-final.pdf>.

Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-Radicalisation Strategy. Report. Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law. November 17, 2008. <http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/doc2-WP4-Del-7.pdf>.

Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned From Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. Report. National Institute of Justice, U.S Department of Justice. July 28, 2015. <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249947.pdf>.

Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat. Report. New York Police Department. 2007. https://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_Report-Radicalisation_in_the_West.pdf.

Radicalisation: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature. Report. Homeland Security Institute. December 15, 2006. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a497263.pdf>.

Ranstorp, Magnus. *The Root Causes of Violent Extremism*. Issue brief. Radicalisation Awareness Network. January 04, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_root-causes_jan2016_en.pdf.

*Rapport D'Information Fait Au Nom De La Commission Des Lois Constitutionnelles, De Législation, Du Suffrage Universel, Du Règlement Et D'administration Générale Par Le Groupe De Travail Sur L'amélioration De L'efficacité Des Fiches S.*Report. Sénat. December 19, 2018. <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r18-219/r18-2191.pdf>.

*Rapport Fait Au Nom De La Commission D'Enquête Sur L'Organisation Et Les Moyens Des Services De L'Etat Pour Faire Face à L'Evolution De La Menace Terroriste Après La Chute De L'Etat Islamique.*Report no. 639. Sénat. July 4, 2018. <https://www.senat.fr/rap/r17-639/r17-6391.pdf>.

*Roots of Violent Radicalisation.*Report no. 19. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee. January 31, 2012. <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf>.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police. *Radicalisation: A Guide for the Perplexed.*Report. Canadian Government. June 2009. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/grc-rcmp/PS64-102-2009-eng.pdf.

Veldhuis, Tinka, and Jørgen Staun. *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model.*Report. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. October 2009. https://www.diiis.dk/files/media/publications/import/islamist_radicalisation.veldhuis_and_stau_n.pdf.

Wittendorp, Stef, Roel De Bont, Jeanine De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, and Edwin Bakker. *Dealing with Jihadism: A Policy Comparison between the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK and the US (2010 to 2017).*Report. Leiden University. December 2017. https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/governance-and-global-affairs/isga/report-1_2017_dealing-with-jihadism.pdf.

vii. Websites

"Acts of Terrorism." European Commission. March 04, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/acts-terrorism_en.

"Glossary: Islamic Extremist Material." Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats. March 30, 2017. <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/glossary-islamic-extremist-material/>.

"La Radicalisation Djihadiste, Qu'est-ce Que C'est ?" Stop Djihadisme. October 03, 2017. <http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/radicalisation/explication-du-phenomene/radicalisation-djihadiste-quest-ce-que-cest>.

"La Sociologie De La Radicalisation : Entretien Avec Farhad Khosrokhavar." SES ENS. <http://ses.ens-lyon.fr/articles/la-sociologie-de-la-radicalisation-entretien-avec-farhad-khosrokhavar-291659>.

"Plan De Lutte Contre La Radicalisation : La Course D'un Poulet Sans Tête." Observatoire International Des Prisons. Accessed May 07, 2019. <https://oip.org/analyse/plan-de-lutte-contre-la-radicalisation-la-course-dun-poulet-sans-tete/>.

"Prévention Et Signalement Des Cas De Radicalisation Djihadiste." Gouvernement Français. 2017. <https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/risques/pdf/fiche-prevention-et-signalement-des-cas-de-radicalisation-djihadiste.pdf>.

"Why Do People Become Violent Extremists?" Federal Bureau of Investigation. October 23, 2015. <https://www.fbi.gov/cve508/teen-website/why-do-people-become-violent-extremists>.

Barbarit, Simon. "Le Sénat Veut Inscire Le Salafisme Sur La Liste Des Dérives Sectaires." Public Senat. July 13, 2018. <https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/parlementaire/terrorisme-le-senat-veut-inscire-le-salafisme-sur-la-liste-des-derives>.

Jenkins, Brian Michael. "Generations of Terrorism." RAND Corporation. December 12, 2012. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2012/12/generations-of-terrorism.html>

Lestrohan, Erwan. "Les Français Et La Sécurité." BVA Group. February 16, 2018. <https://www.bva-group.com/sondages/les-francais-et-la-securite/>.

Richier, Jean-Paul. "Que Désigne Le Terme « Radicalisation » ?" *Mediapart*, December 19, 2018. <https://blogs.mediapart.fr/jean-paul-richier/blog/181218/que-designe-le-terme-radicalisation>.

Appendix

Protective Factors

National Institute of Justice | NIJ.gov

Table 4. Potential Protective Factors Against Individuals Radicalizing to Violent Extremism

	Protective Factor	May Result in an Individual
Individual Factors	Having self-esteem	Being confident in one's own views and less likely to be easily influenced by others.
	Having strong ties in the community*	Feeling one is a member of a community and has someplace to turn when facing difficulties.
	Having a nuanced understanding of religion and ideology	Being less accepting of religious or ideological interpretations that are simplistic or dogmatic.
Contextual Factors	Parental involvement in an individual's life	Feeling one's family is present, cares and is ready to help in times of difficulty.
	Exposure to nonviolent belief systems and narratives	Being able to identify a range of alternatives to violent belief systems and narratives.
	A diversity of nonviolent outlets for addressing grievances	Feeling one's grievances are acknowledged and respected as well as believing in the possibility of their being resolved in a lawful manner.
	Societal inclusion and integration	Feeling one's group is a valued member of society and is treated fairly.
	Resources to address trauma and mental health issues	Feeling that help is available when facing cognitive and emotional difficulties.

*Protective factor was identified by comparing individuals who did and did not endorse extremist violence.

283

²⁸³ U.S Department of Justice, *Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned From Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.*, 10.