FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Charles University

INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Homegrown Terrorism in the European Union: Political Discourses of France, the United Kingdom and Slovakia

Master's thesis

Author: Bc. Anna Hruboňová

Study Programme: Mezinárodní vztahy/International Relations

Supervisor: PhDr. Ondřej Ditrych, MPhil. Ph.D.

Year of the defence: 2019

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.

2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.

3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on May 10th, 2019   Anna Hruboňová

References

HRUBOŇOVÁ, Anna. *Homegrown Terrorism in the European Union: Political Discourses of France, the United Kingdom and Slovakia.* Prague, 2019. 70 pages. Master's thesis (Mgr.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Department of International Relations. Supervisor PhDr. Ondřej Ditrych, MPhil. Ph.D.

Length of the thesis: 111 840 characters

Abstract

This thesis deals with the topic of homegrown Islamist terrorism in the European Union. The target of this research is to provide an interpretation of the homegrown terrorism in the political discourse of the EU as an entity and selected member states – France, the United Kingdom and Slovakia. Building on assumptions of social constructivism and securitisation theory, the thesis explores the patterns in the discourses during the years 2015 - 2018 and seeks to identify potential similarities and differences in the political discourses of respective countries. While studying the changes in the discourse, the thesis analyses how the issue of homegrown terrorism has been securitised, thus how the narratives of political authorities shape perception of the homegrown terrorism as a major threat for Europe. In order to organise the arguments in a more objective manner, the research uses a qualitative method of thematic analysis. Our findings suggest that themes which are of general concern in all the discourses are, among others, prevention of terrorism and radicalisation, the significant role of the internet in spreading Islamist propaganda and the problem of returning foreign fighters However, some themes were identified as state-specific, such as highlighting the homegrown nature of current terrorism in France, engaging wider public in the UK or relying on international commitments in Slovakia.

Abstrakt

Tato práce se zabývá tématem domácího islamistického terorismu v Evropské unii. Cílem tohoto výzkumu je poskytnout výklad domácího terorismu v politickém diskurzu EU jako subjektu a vybraných členských států - Francie, Velké Británie a Slovenska. Práce vychází z předpokladů teorie sociálního konstruktivismu a sekuritizace a zkoumá vzorce diskurzů v letech 2015 - 2018 a snaží se identifikovat možné podobnosti a rozdíly v politických diskurzech jednotlivých zemí. Při zkoumání změn v diskurzu práce analyzuje, jak byla problematika domácího terorismu sekuritizována a jak politické autority formují vnímání domácího terorismu jako hlavní hrozby pro Evropu. Za účelem objektivnější argumentace využívá výzkum kvalitativní metodu tematické analýzy. Naše zjištění naznačují, že témata, která jsou ve všech diskurzech obecně přítomna, jsou mimo jiné prevence terorismu a radikalizace, významná role internetu při šíření islamistické propagandy a problém navrácení

zahraničních bojovníků. Některá témata jsou však speciciká pro konkrétní stát, jako je zvýraznění domácího charakteru současného terorismu ve Francii, zapojení širší veřejnosti ve Spojeném království nebo spoléhání se na mezinárodní závazky na Slovensku.

Keywords

Homegrown Terrorism, Political Discourse, Securitization, European Union, United Kingdom, France, Slovakia

Klíčová slova

Domácí terorismus, politický diskurz, sekuritizace, Evropská unie, Spojené království, Francie, Slovensko

Název práce

Domácí terorismus v Evropské unii: Politický diskurz ve Francii, Spojeném království a na Slovensku

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INTRODUCTION

After a decade of being relatively overlooked, the topic of terrorism has recently flooded European media and has become a priority for policy-makers and security experts all around the European Union (EU), this time transformed into a new wave of terrorism, driven by different kind of motivation.[1] While the major European terrorist attacks from the previous century were rather considered local issues caused by violent separatist groups, the currently prevailing Islamist terrorism based on the hatred towards the whole "Western" civilization poses a threat on a much larger scale, affecting all European countries, whether directly or indirectly. Another disturbing factor is the rise of the so-called "homegrown" terrorism – involvement of European citizens who were born, raised and educated in the countries against which they later committed a terrorist attack.[2] The spread of this phenomenon implies that one of the most significant European security threats nowadays comes from within the European borders rather than from the external areas. Having become a sensitive matter of discussions among non-expert population, terrorism has consequently gained more attention in high politics, including populist and extreme right parties, and turned into a highly securitised issue, thus changing the overall political discourse.

With the evolution of modern technology and emergence of global jihadi movement, terrorism is no longer an internal issue, but a matter of international affairs, especially in the Schengen area of the EU where physical barriers for movement of potential terrorists are rather lacking. Being a topical issue, homegrown terrorism needs to be studied from diverse perspectives, whether it comes to its causes and potential prevention strategies or its consequences and new trends in political and public discourse. Exploring the political discourse we might interpret the impact terrorist acts have on rhetoric of policy-makers and on general political atmosphere in the EU countries.

While there is sufficient academic coverage of the homegrown terrorism, including its discursive analyses, most of the research focuses on the period preceding the current wave

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[1] RASLER, Karen and William R. THOMPSON. Looking for Waves of Terrorism 1. *Terrorism and Political Violence* [online]. 2009, **21**(1), 28-41 [accessed 2018-11-07]. DOI: 10.1080/09546550802544425. ISSN 0954-6553. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546550802544425

[2] CRONE, Manni and Martin HARROW. Homegrown Terrorism in the West. *Terrorism and Political Violence* [online]. 2011, **23**(4), 521-536 [accessed 2018-11-07]. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.571556. ISSN 0954-6553. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2011.571556

of terror in Europe. Even though the US scholars enhanced extensive research after the 9/11 attacks, the European academics and researchers were not preoccupied with the issue until 2015 when France was hit by a major Islamist terrorist attack for the first time. Therefore, this thesis aims to contribute to the scholarly research by targeting the current discourse in Europe, taking into account geographical, political and historical specifics of the respective region. Moreover, it brings a comparison of discourses in several EU countries, including internationally not well-known discourse in Slovakia.

The target of this research is to provide an interpretation of the homegrown terrorism in the political discourse of the EU as an entity and selected member states. The thesis explores the patterns in the discourses during the past four years and seeks to identify potential similarities and differences in the political discourses of respective countries. While studying the changes in the discourse, the thesis analyses how the issue of homegrown terrorism has been securitised, thus how the narratives of political authorities shape perception of the homegrown terrorism as a major threat for Europe. Analysing the securitisation of the topic, the author aims to engage in a political discourse discussion and reflect on possible ideological effects caused by the discourse. Considering the interpretive character of our target, the following research questions attempt to capture the circumstances of the emergence of the current discourse and understand the effects it may have on political practices and social norms. The author operates with two main research questions, supported by several sub-questions which are expected to help fulfil the research target in a more structured way and in sufficient depth.

- How do political actors in the EU and selected member states interpret the homegrown terrorism?
  - ➢ What are the main discursive foundations and core narratives?
  - ➢ How has the homegrown terrorism been securitised?
  - ➢ How can a constructivist theory be applied to the findings?
- What similarities and differences can be found in political discourses of these countries?
  - ➢ How can these be explained?

The thesis is built on two main, inter-related concepts. Firstly, it deals with the notion of homegrown terrorism, a term often not directly used by relevant policy actors but hidden

under most of the references to terrorism in Europe in the examined period, considering that the major terrorist attacks were committed by the EU nationals. Therefore, even though unknown to the public in general, the concept of homegrown terrorism is a relevant one in the field of terrorism studies as its practices and tactics are supposedly different from terrorism perpetrated by foreign nationals,[3] e.g. the case of the 9/11 attack in the United States. Secondly, the research works with the concept of securitisation – intersubjective construction of a security threat,[4] namely the threat of homegrown terrorism in the EU. As the thesis aims at answering the given RQs by the methods of discourse analysis, we consider security threats being constructed through discourse, as understood by the Copenhagen School.[5] Therefore, securitisation is approached as an instrument of elevating the theme of terrorism above the level of everyday political issues, thus making the topic both politicised and securitised. In our model relevant policy-makers as securitising actors define homegrown terrorism as an existential threat for the wider EU population, doing so through speech acts.[6]

Even though the thesis does not intend to directly apply any major theory of international relations discipline, it is necessary to mention that the concepts and methods used initially evolved from the background of social constructivism. This theory assumes that the reality is socially constructed, building on the A. Wendt's article *Anarchy Is What States Make of It* which suggests that effects of anarchy are outcomes of a certain intersubjective understanding by actors with specific identities and interests that may undergo changes.[7] Similarly, the author of the thesis works with the presumption that "homegrown terrorism is

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[3] CRONE, Manni and Martin HARROW. Homegrown Terrorism in the West. *Terrorism and Political Violence* [online]. 2011, **23**(4), 522-524 [accessed 2018-11-07]. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.571556. ISSN 0954-6553. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2011.571556

[4] BUZAN, Barry, Ole WAEVER and Jaap de WILDE. *Bezpečnost: nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005. Současná teorie mezinárodních vztahů, p.41-43. ISBN 80-903333-6-2.

[5] STRITZEL, Holger. Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School. STRITZEL, Holger. *Security in Translation* [online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014, 2014, s. 11-37 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1057/9781137307576 2. ISBN 978-1-349-45558-4. Available from: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/9781137307576_2

[6] BUZAN, Barry, Ole WAEVER and Jaap de WILDE. *Bezpečnost: nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005. Současná teorie mezinárodních vztahů, p.35-36. ISBN 80-903333-6-2.

[7] WENDT, Alexander. Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization. 1992, 46(2), 391-425 [accessed 2018-11-08]. Available from www.jstor.org/stable/2706858

what states/ relevant actors make of it" and thus examines partial ideas of social constructivism and the concept of securitisation on the case of terrorism in the EU. Despite the fact that the kind of research outlined in this thesis does not necessarily require formulation of a hypothesis, we may outline basic expectations about our conclusions. Taking into account the theoretical framework used, findings of various discourse analyses presented in the Literature review and observations of the author, it is presupposed that homegrown terrorism is being securitised by relevant political actors in the EU who thus form the perception of this threat by the public. Furthermore, it may be expected that rhetoric used differs in specific states due to the different political/ social circumstances, interests and identities in respective countries.

Apart from the theoretical and scholarly literature, the empirical-analytical part of the thesis operates predominantly with primary data. In an interpretive analysis of discourse the amount of sources which should ideally be taken into account is usually overwhelming. While it is humanly impossible to study everything what constructs the discourse, we will attempt to delimit the source material in such a manner that none of the major documents is omitted. As the aim of the thesis is to analyse political discourse, the attention will be paid especially to relevant political actors, even though the political discourse cannot be fully detached from other discourses, such as public or media discourse. If we want to operationalise the concept of homegrown terrorism from the discursive perspective, we need to consider which actors have the authority to deal with this topic, which may slightly differ in each of the selected states as well as the EU. Generally, we will analyse sources of political character (e.g. security strategies, speeches) issued by authoritative political actors (e.g. governments, prime ministers, presidents, parliamentary parties, counter-terrorism coordinators), which will be precisely defined and reasoned later in the chapter dealing with data and methodology of our research. We are looking for mentions of "terrorism in Europe" in general rather than "homegrown terrorism" as this term is rarely used in political rhetoric. The documents will be collected from official websites of the actors, thus they are all publicly accessible data. The time period of our focus starts in January 2015, with the Charlie Hebdo attack as the first major terrorist incident in Europe after 10 years, and ends in December 2018, when the data collection for the purpose of this research was finalised.

As the target of the thesis is to conduct a deep interpretation of discursive patterns based on the language of political statements, the method chosen to fulfil this aim is a discourse analysis. It is expected that the rhetoric examined is often used to influence the audience through deliberate securitisation of the topic and thus forms the general socio-political context. The thesis will attempt to apply the approach of a grounded theory, therefore instead of fixating on a specific model of categorisation of the data we are rather going to formulate our own discursive categories through empirical study and abstraction, as suggested by Glaser and Strauss.[8] In order to answer the RQs in a more objective manner, the research uses a qualitative method of thematic analysis which is further explained in the methodological part of the thesis.

The primary purpose of this Introduction was to present the topic of the thesis, explain its political and academic relevance, state the target of the conducted research and formulate precise research questions guiding the author in fulfilling the aim. Secondly, all the major conceptual, theoretical and methodological considerations of the thesis were briefly outlined in order to give a reader an idea about the character and the general framework of the research. What follows after the introductory part is the Literature review containing an overview of the most relevant academic publications related to terrorism discourse in Europe which inspired the author to dig deeper in this topic.

After highlighting important insights from existing literature and identifying a gap the thesis aims to fill in, the third chapter describes the conceptual and theoretical framework of the research in more depth. The first part of the chapter shortly presents several ideas of social constructivism which will lead us in our theoretical exploration of the topic. Secondly, the concept of securitisation according to the Copenhagen School will be introduced, including how exactly the thesis defines securitisation, its main aims, actors and audience with references to work of concrete scholars. In the third section of this chapter the term "homegrown terrorism" in Europe is conceptualised as such, explaining its meaning and scope in order to correctly label specific attacks as homegrown (or not) later in the data collection and analysis. Last but not least, the chapter defines the "political discourse" to enable us to differentiate it from other discourses which are not the main focus of the

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[8] GLASER, Barney G. and Anselm L. STRAUSS. The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Strategies for Qualitative Research. New Brunswick: AldineTransaction, 1999. ISBN: 0-202-30260-1.

research. The fourth chapter first deals in details with the data used, operationalises the concepts for selected countries and specifies where the data was collected. Subsequently, the method of a discourse analysis will be introduced as understood by the author and researching techniques and paradigms will be explained.

The fifth chapter is the core part of the thesis, conducting the actual empirical analysis of the data. Sections of the chapter are divided along the line of the states selected, starting with the EU as a specific and the most complex actor. The second part focuses on the political discourse of France which was hit by the new wave of terror as the first EU country. The third part continues with the analysis of the British discourse and the chapter is closed by exploration of securitisation of terrorism in Slovak political discourse. The Conclusion once again summarises the main argument and findings of the author, formulates answers for the RQs based on the analytical part and assesses fulfilment of the research target.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

Formulation of the above presented research questions was inspired by studying related academic literature and consequent curiosity of the author to explore some aspects of the European terrorism discourse in more depth or from a different perspective. One of the most relevant insights which this thesis draws upon was provided by C. Baker-Beall's article on the EU's "fight against terrorism" discourse. Baker-Beall identifies three major strands of the discourse: terrorism as crime and as emotive act of violence; terrorism as an act perpetrated by non-state actors; terrorism as a new and evolving threat.[9] However, this article operates with sources from 2001 to 2012, years preceding our focus, and it may be interesting to explore whether these strands can still be applied to the current EU discourse, challenged by the latest development of the Islamist terrorism in Europe.

When it comes to the discourse constructed in specific states, an interesting article was written by C. Health-Kelly who deals with the radicalisation discourse under the PREVENT

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[9] BAKER-BEALL, Christopher. The evolution of the European Union's 'fight against terrorism' discourse: Constructing the terrorist 'other'. *Cooperation and Conflict* [online]. 2013, 49(2), p. 220-226 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1177/0010836713483411. ISSN 0010-8367. Available from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010836713483411

strategy of the United Kingdom (UK), pinpointing the controversy of constructing the picture of British Muslims being both "at risk" and "risky" at the same time, making the strategy unstable.[10] Once again, this research was completed in 2012 and a change in discourse may be expected in the light of recent terrorist attacks perpetrated on the British soil.

Last but not least, an inspiration for part of this thesis may be found in a newer K. Rekawek's article on counterterrorism in the Central-Eastern Europe. Even though this piece of work does not represent an analysis of discourse in its nature, it brings useful empirical basis on the topic of counterterrorism in the post-communist Europe and suggests that the respective countries mostly "copy" strategies from the more experienced Western countries,[11] which will be relevant for comparison of the analysed discourses.

Understandably, the spectrum of research taken into account when designing this thesis is larger. While the articles mentioned above present the main sources which have shaped the empirical-analytical approach of the thesis, the following academic work will partially guide us in the search for the answers for given RQs, whether it comes to the structure, theorisation or a specific idea withdrawn from the authors' conclusions. These articles do not match the topic and the methodology of the thesis perfectly but they have broadened the author's horizons in various perspectives on the issue of constructing terrorism and were indisputably relevant in the initial research, therefore they should be shortly introduced here. R.Jackson's *Constructing Enemies: "Islamic Terrorism" in Political and Academic Discourse*, even though following a different research target, presents an inspiring guidance in approaching the topic within a discourse analysis, including critical reflections. The author pays attention to the politicised character of the dominant narratives which construct the

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[10] HEATH-KELLY, Charlotte. Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the 'Radicalisation' Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* [online]. 2012, 15(3), 397-411 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00489.x. ISSN 1369-1481. Available from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00489.x

[11] REKAWER, Kacper. Referenced but Not Linear? Counterterrorism in Central-Eastern Europe in Theory and in Practice. East European Politics and Societies and Cultures. 2017, 31(1), 187-194 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1177/0888325416678657. Available from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0888325416678657

perception of Islamic terrorism as an existential threat and shows how this discourse encourages a specific political and social order.[12]

L. Malkki and T. Sinkkonen analyse political "resilience", a word often used by European political leaders in relation to terrorist attacks, both as a discourse and as a scientific concept, outlining possible methods of researching this phenomenon.[13] J.P.Walsh examines moral panic framework on the example of terrorism, explaining how exaggerating threats and creating fear is misused for political purposes.[14] L.Powell criticises the discourse of the UK's Prevent strategy as being dysfunctional, counter-productive and lacking the understanding of the role of cultural-linguistic epistemologies in extremism.[15] V. Coppock and M. McGovern also deconstruct the British counter-terrorism discourse by challenging the controversial "psychological vulnerability" to radicalisation in relation towards children.[16]

S. Kettell analyses the position of the anti-secular discourse in the British politics. Even though the article does not deal with terrorism, it brings an insightful analysis of construction of the political discourse in the UK, mentioning both domestic and transnational factors and interests of opposing actors who were using identity politics to achieve their aims.[17] An unusual contribution is brought in an article written by L. Jarvis and

[12] JACKSON, Richard. Constructing Enemies: „Islamic Terrorism" in Political and Academic Discourse. *Government and Opposition*[online]. 2007, **42**(3), 394-426 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x. ISSN 0017-257X. Available from: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x

[13] MALKKI, Leena and Teemu SINKKONEN. Political Resilience to Terrorism in Europe: Introduction to the Special Issue. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* [online]. 2016, **39**(4), 281-291 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1117325. ISSN 1057-610X. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1117325

[14] WALSH, James P. Moral panics by design: The case of terrorism. *Current Sociology* [online]. 2016, **65**(5), 643-662 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1177/0011392116633257. ISSN 0011-3921. Available from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0011392116633257

[15] POWELL, Lauren. Counter-Productive Counter-Terrorism. How is the dysfunctional discourse of Prevent failing to restrain radicalisation? Journal for Deradicalization. 2016 (8), 46-99 [accessed 2018-11-08]. ISSN: 2363-9849. Available from: http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/66/0

[16] COPPOCK, Vicki and Mark MCGOVERN. Dangerous Minds? Deconstructing Counter-Terrorism Discourse, Radicalisation and the 'Psychological Vulnerability' of Muslim Children and Young People in Britain. *Children & Society* [online]. 2014, **28**(3), 242-256 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1111/chso.12060. ISSN 09510605. Available from: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/chso.12060

[17] KETTELL, Steven. The Militant Strain: An Analysis of Anti-Secular Discourse in Britain. *Political Studies* [online]. 2015, **63**(3), 512-528 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.12119. ISSN 0032-3217. Available from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9248.12119

M. Lister, presenting findings from a research in the UK where publics were asked about solutions for the terrorism issue. The authors present diverse opinions and suggestions from the UK public discourse,[18] which is partially a result of political rhetoric and thus provides us with useful data.   L. Howie conducts a research about discourse from a rather different perspective, focusing on a role of witnessing terrorist acts in producing discourse.[19] Y. Eski, using an example of port security officers, argues that even though never really confronted with the terrorism, they have constructed their occupational identity through the "terrorist other".[20] On the example of the port security the article shows how terrorism can shape our identity without ever having to directly face a terrorist threat.

The review of the existing literature on the topic confirms our expectations about highly constructivist nature of the terrorism discourse, at least in the case of the EU and the UK. The rhetoric used in official documents of governments and other political actors shape the way of perceiving terrorism, but also Muslim population by wider public. Exaggeration of the threat, encouraging panic and using identity politics are tools often being used for the political purposes, while this practice is rather counter-productive in the actual fight against terrorism. The scholars above argue that even though most of us have never been directly under this threat, our identities are influenced by the terrorism discourse, through which we have all become "threatened", speaking from the constructivist perspective.

These articles played an important role during the author's initial exploration of the terrorism from discursive perspective and construed her broader background in the existing research on the topic, although not all of the above mentioned articles will be referred to later in the text due to their different geographical or disciplinary focus. This thesis will build on the knowledge acquired from the existing research and attempt to contribute to the understanding of political discourse on terrorism by providing a thematic analysis of the

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[18] JARVIS, Lee and Michael LISTER. What would you do? Everyday conceptions and constructions of counter-terrorism. *Politics* [online]. 2016, **36**(3), 277-291 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1177/0263395715613644. ISSN 0263-3957. Available from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263395715613644

[19] HOWIE, Luke. Witnessing terrorism. *Journal of Sociology* [online]. 2013, **51**(3), 507-521 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1177/1440783313500760. ISSN 1440-7833. Available from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1440783313500760

[20] ESKI, Yarin. The war on meaninglessness: A counter-terrorist self through an absent terrorist other. *Ethnography* [online]. 2016, **17**(4), 460-479 [accessed 2018-11-08]. DOI: 10.1177/1466138116639984. ISSN 1466-1381. Available from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1466138116639984

discourse produced by relevant political actors in selected states. Apart from using this not such a usual method within terrorism studies, its contribution also lies in the focus on recent development of discourse and thus current consequences for European society.

2. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. TERRORISM AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

As the Islamist terrorism is quite a new threat from the historical perspective, we might as well use more recent theoretical approaches to grasp the issue. This thesis does not intend to apply any traditional theory of the discipline of International Relations on an examined problem, however, the basics of the chosen methods and the author's understanding of the world can be traced back to social constructivism, as we are not necessarily looking for patterns in politics. Two main concepts can be identified in the Wendt's work, idealism and holism. Material reality does not objectively exist, it rather stands on the interpretation of ideas, such as knowledge, language and norms, which are shaped collectively, not individually. Therefore, our world is social and the interactions of specific actors contribute to constructing and transforming the politics.[21]

Building on Wendt's thoughts, other constructivist scholars similarly suggest that reality is socially constructed. Actors are produced by their social environment which points to the relevance of identity, shaping interests of actors.[22] This idea is indisputably relatable to our research of democratic states where wide population chooses relevant political actors by elections, forcing them to consider the social identity when identifying their interests. Secondly, reality cannot be interpreted objectively as it is constructed using our knowledge,

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[21] WENDT, Alexander. Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization. 1992, 46(2), 395-422 [accessed 2018-11-08]. Available from www.jstor.org/stable/2706858

[22] WELDES, JUTTA. Constructing National Interests. *European Journal of International Relations* [online]. 2016, **2**(3), 279-288 [accessed 2018-11-09]. DOI: 10.1177/1354066196002003001. ISSN 1354-0661. Available from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066196002003001

concepts and categories which are not objectively existent but culturally created.[23] Drawing upon this assumption, terrorism, the issue of our concern, is a social fact dependent on human agreement which shapes our actions and categorisation of the world. Additionally, norms and rules also play an important role in the social construction of reality.[24]

Actors are not only socially constructed but they can help constitute identities and interests by changing norms and rules through reflection and arguments. Finnemore and Sikkink describe this change by developing a concept of the life cycle of norms[25] which can be related to our case of norms being institutionalised in one state/ body (the EU), even though initially formulated for the international arena. The first stage of the cycle is identified as norm emergence, within which norm entrepreneurs interpret, potentially even exaggerate an issue by using appropriate language in order to achieve acceptance of a new norm by a critical mass. The second stage involves norm "cascading" through the remaining population, strengthened by pressure for conformity and legitimation, which can be compared to "peer pressure". The life cycle is finalised by internalisation of the norm when norms are generally accepted and are not a matter of discussions anymore.[26] This concept is expected to be identified in our discourse analysis as well when exploring how certain rhetoric about homegrown terrorism emerges, spreads and potentially becomes internalised.

When it comes to research in social sciences, constructivists argue that the methodology used must be able to capture how actors interpret their actions. Humans are capable of assessing their previous experiences and re-thinking their future behaviour, therefore in order to provide any kind of explanation in social science it is necessary to understand how

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[23] BAYLIS, John, Steve SMITH and Patricia OWENS. *The globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations*. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, c2011, pp.161-162.. ISBN 978-0-19-956909-0.

[24] Ibid, pp.158-159.

[25] FINNEMORE, Martha and Kathryn SIKKINK. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization. 1998, 52(4).International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, pp. 887-917 [accessed 2018-11-09]. Available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2601361.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5492ce73de3d8facb579a284dcd446cf

[26] FINNEMORE, Martha and Kathryn SIKKINK. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization. 1998, 52(4).International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, pp. 894-905 [accessed 2018-11-09]. Available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2601361.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5492ce73de3d8facb579a284dcd446cf

we give meaning and relevance to our actions. This possibility of reflecting on one's actions and gaining new knowledge enables change of one's practices and thus excludes formulation of timeless laws and patterns in social sciences.[27] These general constructivist assumptions about science will lead us in our analysis dealing with the interpretation of an issue (homegrown terrorism) by relevant actors (EU/ national policy-makers), set in a specific social context.

2.2. TERRORISM AND SECURITISATION THEORY

When conducting a discursive research about a security topic, it is often useful to dive into the theoretical construction of threats in order to understand how the phenomenon became a threat in the first place. As our research is set in the constructivist background, the thesis presupposes that rather than being objective as presented in realist and liberal perspectives, security is in fact an intersubjective construction. Therefore, security threats are not produced by the nature of the system or actors but instead security is constructed either through discourse or political-bureaucratic practice. As the aim of this thesis is to explore political discourse, the conceptual part of the research will rely mainly on the authors of the Copenhagen School and their discursive understanding of constructing threats.

The Copenhagen School approaches security as an intersubjective construct stemming from discursive acts which have a constitutive nature.[28] Securitisation is then conceptualised as an instrument of elevating an issue above the level of "everyday politics". When an issue (e.g. homegrown terrorism) falls within this special or exceptional regime in politics, the topic is considered securitised, differentiating it from themes which are being only politicised (a part of general public policy) or even non-politicised (not being dealt with by political actors).[29]

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[27] WENDT, Alexander. Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization. 1992, 46(2), 419-421 [accessed 2018-11-08]. Available from www.jstor.org/stable/2706858

[28] BUZAN, Barry, Ole WAEVER and Jaap de WILDE. *Bezpečnost: nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005. Současná teorie mezinárodních vztahů, pp. 43-45. ISBN 80-903333-6-2.

[29] Ibid, pp. 35-36.

Bearing in mind that within the Copenhagen School securitisation is perceived as a discourse, we can define it as a speech act performed by a securitising actor which presents an issue as an existential threat for a specific reference object. In practice this means that an influential actor (policy-maker) attempts to depict a topic (terrorism) as an existential threat for an actor or a value (European citizens/ liberal democracy etc.), separating it from non-security issues. The impact of the actor's speech act depends on its internal constitution as well as external context. In addition to securitising actors, functional actors (e.g. security experts) can enter the process and influence securitisation of the issue. The goal of securitisation is to ensure that relevant public accepts establishing extraordinary measures in order to prevent unrepairable damage.[30] The relevant public may vary depending on different circumstances, for the purpose of our thesis set in European democratic societies it is represented by voters or citizens in general.

Authors of the Copenhagen School divide security in various sectors, such as military, environmental, economic, societal and political. This is done for analytical purposes as the approach reduces the number of variables and thus makes the research feasible, however, an analysis of relations between the sectors is necessary when attempting comprehensive understanding of security.[31] Within the sectoral analytical framework outlined by B. Buzan, O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, the societal and political sectors, which are closely inter-related, are the most relevant ones for our research. Borders of a state and of a society are rarely identical, therefore in the analysis of security we need to consider ideas and habits which shape self-perception of individuals and their integration in different social groups. The core concept in the societal sector is the notion of "identity", hence the understanding of the societal security as "identity security". The societal insecurity emerges when some situation is perceived as an existential threat for a society, which may be approached as a nation as well as a religious or ethnic group.[32] This might prove to be crucial in our discourse analysis

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[30] Ibid, pp. 48-49.

[31] BUZAN, Barry. *People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. 2nd ed. Harlow: Longman, c1991, pp. 19-20. ISBN 0-7450-0720-1.

[32] BUZAN, Barry, Ole WAEVER and Jaap de WILDE. *Bezpečnost: nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005. Současná teorie mezinárodních vztahů, pp. 139-140. ISBN 80-903333-6-2.

when examining how actors construct terrorism as a threat to the European/ national identity.

B. Anderson argues that due to the considerable number of individuals comprised within a nation, the national community must be imagined, at least to some extent. Even though his book *Imagined Communities* mostly deals with the topic of nationalism, this idea can also be applied to our research. The European/ national identity may be based on objective factors (e.g. geographical area), however, one's self-identification is always an individual choice and thus national identity is "imagined".[33] The formation of societal insecurity then depends on the identity which gains superiority and an identity threat is constructed within the societal insecurity. While the discussions about threats to societal security differ significantly across regions, the theme of this thesis may be incorporated in the concept of the horizontal competition as extremist religious groups inhabiting the same area attempt to influence the lifestyle of the remaining population,[34] which can even be presented as Huntington's clash of civilisations. When analysing regional dynamics related to societal security in Europe, the Copenhagen School scholars also mention the historically motivated religious distrust between "Europeans" and "immigrants" from the Middle East.[35] Even though the perpetrators of the homegrown terrorism grew up in Europe, they usually come from the second or the third immigrant generation.

Turning to the political sector, political security stands on the stability of the existing social order based on states' sovereignty. As it is sometimes problematic to distinguish political sector from other sectors, especially the societal one, in general we may say that political threats are the ones that endanger legitimacy or recognition of political units or relations between them.[36] From this perspective, rather than aiming at external legitimacy, terrorism threatens internal legitimacy[37] of a state/ unit by attacking political ideologies and

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[33] ANDERSON, Benedict R. O'G. *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Rev. and extended ed. London: Verso, 1991, pp.1-7. ISBN 0-86091-546-8.

[34] BUZAN, Barry, Ole WAEVER and Jaap de WILDE. *Bezpečnost: nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005. Současná teorie mezinárodních vztahů, p. 141. ISBN 80-903333-6-2.

[35] Ibid, pp. 154-155

[36] BUZAN, Barry, Ole WAEVER and Jaap de WILDE. *Bezpečnost: nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005. Současná teorie mezinárodních vztahů, pp. 166-167. ISBN 80-903333-6-2.

[37] Ibid, p. 169.

other state-defining topics, in our case freedom, secularism, liberalism etc. The strength of analysing the political sector lies in the precise delineation of the securitising actor – political representation at the state level, the EU institutions at the European level. In liberal democracies, security is constructed not only from a perception of external threats but also as the internal security encompassing protection from intra-state activities which endanger the state's population, e.g. terrorism.[38]

While the sectors presented above are accepted by most scholars within the Copenhagen School, some authors have widened this categorisation. P. Hough distinguishes between military threats caused by states and those which come from non-state actors, referring particularly to several types of non-state military groups. According to the author, the Islamist terrorism is considered to be threatening the Western world more than other forms of non-state violence due to its transnationality and challenge for secularity.[39] Similarly, P. Hough analyses the societal security in the context of existential threats for individuals rather than for societies.[40] Various forms of possible violent discrimination are presented, including national identity and religion. The author argues that the nations never really replaced religions as a social identity and conflicts of faith still persist in the age of secularism. Many European states keep on referring to our Christian tradition and the presence of other religions may be constructed as a threat to the nation, which could lead to societal repression of individuals with "foreign" faith. More importantly, the current trend of radicalisation and religious fundamentalism triggers societal insecurity based on real existential threats, it is not constructed solely around the label of difference.[41]

Although the latter developed Paris School promotes the idea that security threats are constructed through political-bureaucratic practice rather than discourse, this stream of thinkers also has some implications for our research, especially in the work of T. Balzacq. For the purpose of our analysis, the main contribution of T. Balzacq's theorisation is his criticism

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[38] Ibid, pp. 170-171.

[39] HOUGH, Peter. *Understanding global security*. New York: Routledge, 2004, pp. 65-66. ISBN 0-415-29666-8.

[40] Ibid, pp. 106-107.

[41] HOUGH, Peter. *Understanding global security*. New York: Routledge, 2004, pp. 107-111. ISBN 0-415-29666-8.

of discourse analysis as understood by the Copenhagen School. He argues that CS scholars restrict the examined data to written utterances which is, according to Balzacq, insufficient if we want to capture the meaning of texts in broader social context and thus suggests enlarging our data gathering to non-textual activities of securitisation. Secondly, the Balzacq's concept of intertextuality will be important especially for the last, comparison in our analysis. T. Balzacq emphasises the relationships among various texts which enable us to capture the patterns of representations, emanating from these interrelations. Discourse is always connected to past discourses or to discourses prevalent in other social contexts. Therefore, in order to reflect on the breadth and depth of securitisation, we must explore the intertextuality in our data.[42]

To summarise, even though authors of the securitisation theory may differ at some points, their approach is in general radically constructivist. Topics turn into security topics following the act of securitisation conducted by securitising actors who present these themes as existential threats in order to convince the relevant public.[43] The thesis builds upon these theoretical and conceptual considerations when analysing the homegrown terrorism discourse in the EU and investigates how the threat is constructed by speech acts of securitising actors.

2.3. HOMEGROWN TERRORISM IN EUROPE

After explaining the main theories which the thesis draws on, we need to define the very notion of the homegrown terrorism as the core subject of our research. First of all, despite the fact that there is a wide academic discussion on the definition of "terrorism" as such, the author does not intend to engage in this debate as in the current European geographical area there are no significant controversies surrounding this term. Therefore, we will work with the most frequently accepted understanding of terrorism as an intentional indiscriminate violent act perpetrated by a non-state entity which is politically, eventually religiously or ideologically motivated and aims to create fear.[44]

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[42] BALZACQ, Thierry. *Securitization theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve*. New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 39-43, ISBN 0203868501.

[43] BUZAN, Barry, Ole WAEVER and Jaap de WILDE. *Bezpečnost: nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005. Současná teorie mezinárodních vztahů, p. 234. ISBN 80-903333-6-2.

[44] WEINBERG, LEONARD, AMI PEDAHZUR and SIVAN HIRSCH-HOEFLER. The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* [online]. 2004, **16**(4), pp.780-785 [accessed 2018-

It also needs to be specified that we are focusing solely on the Islamist terrorism, omitting possible extreme right-wing, left-wing or separatist terrorist attacks. Having said this, we should pay closer attention to the concept of the "homegrown" terrorism. Before the London bombings in 2005 the terrorist threat towards the West was perceived as coming from a foreign entity. The attack in London did not follow this pattern, though, as it initially seemed that it was planned and perpetrated by radicals born and raised in Britain, without any foreign support. In order to enable an analysis of the European Islamist terrorism at a domestic level and to develop efficient counterstrategies it was necessary to grasp this phenomenon within a new concept, hence the homegrown terrorism.[45]

M. Crone and M. Harrow provide interesting suggestions on how to academically approach this issue by outlining two analytical dimensions – belonging and autonomy. Belonging captures one's attachment to the West, such as one's citizenship and the number of years lived in the Western countries. Autonomy then represents the extent of the independence from foreign jihadists, operationalised as the ability of a terrorist group to form and gain resources without the assistance of groups from outside the West.[46]

While their analysis seems like a successful attempt to clarify the ambiguity of the term "homegrown", it was developed in the period preceding the focus of this thesis when the homegrown terrorism in Europe was less frequent and thus less discussed in the public discourse. Moreover, the recent years have brought significant rise in the use of online sources and social media in the spread of radical ideology and due to the accessibility of these means and transnational character of terrorist networks we can hardly claim that any terrorist attack is an act of self-radicalisation. Similarly, considering the core ideas of social constructivism and the role of identity, having been born and raised in Europe does not automatically mean the feeling of "belonging".

11-12]. DOI: 10.1080/095465590899768. ISSN 0954-6553. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/095465590899768

[45] CRONE, Manni and Martin HARROW. Homegrown Terrorism in the West. *Terrorism and Political Violence* [online]. 2011, **23**(4), 521-524 [accessed 2018-11-11]. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.571556. ISSN 0954-6553. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2011.571556

[46] Ibid, pp. 524-525.

However, considering the nature of our research, this chapter should be approached purely as basic introduction of the term "homegrown terrorism" and its roots. Our aim is not to engage in the academic discussion on definitions or typologies of this issue. On the contrary, the research examines how political actors define and construct this threat, thus excluding related academic debate from our focus. Moreover, looking at the attacks perpetrated in Europe since 2015, some links to the foreign influence are always traceable, at least through online resources. Therefore, this thesis considers the homegrown terrorism as attacks committed on the European soil by individuals or groups who have spent their formative years in Europe, regardless of their place of birth, citizenship or attachments to foreign militants.

2.4.   ANALYSING POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Last but not least, if we want to conduct a political discourse analysis, a definition of the political discourse as such must not be omitted. The obvious and simple one would argue that the political discourse is defined by politicians who are the main actors or authors of political discursive acts, such as talks and texts. Depending on the needs of a concrete research, these actors might include presidents, chancellors, ministers, members of parliamentary political parties and other actors, at different analytical levels – international, national and local. In our democratic world we can define politicians as people who were elected or appointed and are paid for their political activities.[47]

Having labelled politicians as the crucial actors, it is necessary to add that they are not the only participants in the political field. Considering the interactional character of a discourse, apart from the authors of the discourse it is also needed to analyse recipients, mainly citizens or the public in general, even if they are involved passively rather than actively. Secondly, the delineation of the term politics (and consequently "political") is also a matter of academic discussion. The professional politicians and citizens/ voters are not the only participants of the political process as these may include lobbying groups, demonstrators

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[47] FETZER, Anita. The multilayered and multifaceted nature of political discourse. FETZER, Anita, ed. *The Pragmatics of Political Discourse* [online]. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013, 2013, s. 1-18 [accessed 2018-11-12]. Pragmatics & Beyond New Series. DOI: 10.1075/pbns.228.01fet. ISBN 9789027256331. Available from: https://benjamins.com/catalog/pbns.228.01fet

and various non-state organisations whose activities are shaping the political discourse.[48] This definition seemingly broadens our scope to unbearable extent, however, politicians, citizens and all other actors are not necessarily involved in the political discourse. On the contrary, they are a part of the discourse solely under the circumstances when they are acting as political actors, e.g. legislating, voting or protesting. Therefore, the nature of the activities is comparably important as the nature of the participants. An analysis of a political discourse works with the talks and texts which have some political implications, meaning that the examined practices are both political and discursive at the same time.[49]

T. A. van Dijk suggests that eventually what decides whether a discourse is political or not is the overall context with participants and activities being the core while political events and encounters may complete the analysed context, depending on their settings, functions and intentions. Therefore, participants are considered to be talking politically when set in political communicative events, e.g. election campaigns, parliamentary and cabinet meetings, media interviews or political protests.[50] Another disputable situation occurs when political actors speak in the political context but the talk/ text is produced off the record. This kind of a political discourse cannot be considered public as the political act is not recorded and thus the actor is not politically accountable. However, even the off the record talk can be published through media but without attribution to concrete politicians. This discourse is then still of a political nature but is rather considered media discourse, even though in fact it was produced by political actors.[51] That proves our previous assuming that the political discourse can never be entirely detached from other discourses and must be analysed in the broader discursive background.

[48] What is Political Discourse Analysis?. *Belgian Journal of Linguistics*[online]. 1998, **11**, pp. 13-15 [accessed 2018-11-12]. DOI: 10.1075/bjl.11.03dij. ISSN 0774-5141. Available from: http://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/bjl.11.03dij

[49] Ibid, pp. 20-23.

[50] What is Political Discourse Analysis?. *Belgian Journal of Linguistics*[online]. 1998, **11**, p. 14 [accessed 2018-11-12]. DOI: 10.1075/bjl.11.03dij. ISSN 0774-5141. Available from: http://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/bjl.11.03dij

[51] What is Political Discourse Analysis?. *Belgian Journal of Linguistics*[online]. 1998, **11**, pp. 22-23 [accessed 2018-11-12]. DOI: 10.1075/bjl.11.03dij. ISSN 0774-5141. Available from: http://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/bjl.11.03dij

To summarise, identifying texts as constitutive for the political discourse will not always be straightforward. It is always necessary to consider various criteria, such as a speaker's position and aim, special circumstances and functionality. Generally speaking, a discourse will be approached as political when it directly functions as a political action within a political process.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. DATA

Whenever attempting to conduct a discourse analysis, gathering data is one of the most challenging tasks for a researcher due to a highly complex structure of any discourse. As the discourse is constructed by actors, firstly it is necessary to choose which actors are competent as well as authoritative in producing the examined discourse, while the (ir)relevance of specific actors might often be debatable. Secondly, it is impossible to collect all the data which could be potentially forming the discourse as in reality one can never be sure about having discovered all the significant speech acts related to the researched topic.[52] Despite these obstacles the thesis will attempt to consider a sufficient number of sources in order to provide a convincing analysis of the discourse. Considering that discourse as such is a broad concept containing innumerable amount of data needed for its analysis, our research will focus solely on the official governmental political discourse, even though in practice we cannot fully separate it from public or media discourses which are mutually inter-related.

Within a political discourse analysis the most relevant actors who produce the discourse are politicians/ policy-makers. Taking into account the national and the EU analytical level of this research, it needs to be stated that these actors will differ in each of the analysed cases due to the different political systems and organisational structures in concrete states and the EU respectively. Therefore, we first need to clarify which actors have the authority to comment on the homegrown terrorism in each of the countries.

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[52] NEUMANN, Iver B. in KLOTZ, Audie and Deepa PRAKASH, ed. *Qualitative Methods in International Relations* [online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008, p. 66 [accessed 2018-11-12]. ISBN 978-0-230-24175-6.

The EU is indisputably a special case as it is a community of states and thus presents a body even more complex. As explained further below in the Methods section, the research will start with the analysis of constitutive texts issued by the EU which might lead us to other relevant sources through references. Considering the topicality of the terrorism, it is being dealt with in all the EU institutions, either directly or indirectly. Our focus will be on the institutions and individuals who have the greatest authority to have an impact on the terrorism discourse, starting with the European Council and the Council of the EU.[53] As terrorism is still mainly the domain of home affairs and domestic counter-terrorism strategies, the Councils as representatives of national interests in the EU will be relevant for us. Moreover, the post of the official EU counter-terrorism coordinator, since 2007 held by G. de Kerchove, serves as a coordinator of the EU counter-terrorism efforts.[54] Secondly, the narrative of the European Commission will be examined as it reflects the discourse of the EU as a unified body. Last but not least, the Europol is approached as a relevant actor due to its role of the first-line investigative support[55] which often influences the narratives of other institutions.

In the chapter dealing with the French discourse the rhetoric of the French government will be explored, particularly of the Ministry of the Interior which is informed directly by the French intelligence services.[56] Considering the French semi-presidential political system, the discourse formulated by the respective French presidents, F. Holland and E. Macron, cannot be omitted. Additionally, we will explore the narrative of policy-makers from all the major political parties in order to find out to what extent it differs from the official governmental rhetoric.

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[53] EU fight against terrorism. European Union. 2017, [accessed 2018-11-13]. Available from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/

[54] Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. European Union. 2017, [accessed 2018-11-13]. Available from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/counter-terrorism-coordinator/

[55] TESAT – European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. *European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation* [online]. 2018, p. 14 [accessed 2018-11-12]. DOI: 10.2813/00041. ISBN 978-92-95200-91-3. Available from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018

[56] Le lutte contre le terrorisme et les extrémisms violents. Ministère de l'Intérieur. 2018, [accessed 2018-11-13]. Available from: https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Le-ministere/DGSI/La-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-et-les-extremismes-violents

Similarly, the exploration of the British discourse will be based on the analysis of the documents issued by the British government, especially the narrative of prime ministers as well as the Home Office and its relevant policy-makers, such as the Home Secretary, the Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism and other officials from the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism.[57] A discourse constructed by the UK's counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST and the accompanying debate on its controversies will also be taken into account within the analysis.

Slovakia will be a special case in our analysis because it does not have a tradition in counter-terrorism offices and coordinators as the cases above due to its lacking direct experience with terrorism. However, considering its membership in the EU and the Schengen zone, the issue has been securitised by various political representatives. The focus will be devoted to the claims of the government, particularly of the prime ministers and officials from the Ministry of the Interior.

3.2.   METHODS
3.2.1. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

After having clarified the sources of data used for our research, it is needed to explain how this data will be analysed in order to fulfil the given research target. The RQs which were posed in the introductory chapter of the thesis clearly attempt to answer the questions of "how" rather than "why", making the character of the research interpretive and not necessarily explanatory. In order to analyse the way in which our topic is being interpreted by policy-makers, it is best to use the method of a discourse analysis. As we are exploring discourses of multiple states, the thesis narrows down the object of the research to the political discourse analysis (PDA) with the aim to provide an analysis of a sufficient depth.

Despite being an interpretive method in the first place, discourse analysis may uncover explanatory patterns in politics, e.g. by examining how politicians construct the understanding of the terrorism we contribute to explaining why the terrorism is considered

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[57] The National Counter-Terrorism Security Office. About us. The UK Government. 2018, [accessed 2018-11-13]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-counter-terrorism-security-office/about

to be an existential threat and why citizens tend to vote for populist and extremist representatives. As I. B. Neumann argues, in social relations a discourse has some regularity, frames how people think about a topic and categorise it and thus conditions future action. To discover these socio-political patterns the discourse analysis explores utterances, such as texts or other means of expression set in concrete context. Due to the necessity of contextual thinking, an inevitable prerequisite for conducting a discourse analysis is cultural competence of a researcher who should have a command of related political knowledge and language skills.[58]

When planning a methodological framework, first we need to delimit the examined discourse to an extent that is realisable but still relevant. In practice this usually means deciding on some specific timeframe and on the kind of sources which will be examined.[59] Our empirical analysis will be based exclusively on primary sources of data, considering that secondary sources are mostly produced by academics or media which are not the main focus of this thesis. I.B. Neumann suggests building a research around canonical texts, e.g. white papers, which can be perceived as anchor points referring to other relevant texts, consequently creating a net of core texts that a researcher should study to gain a representative overview of discursive positions.[60] Therefore, our research will start with reading these canonical texts issued by governments, ministries, parliaments etc., paying attention to other sources which may be referred to in the texts. The examined timeframe is clearly defined by the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack perpetrated in January 2015 as an obvious cut-off point in the recent development of the European Islamist terrorism. The period of our focus ends with December 2018 when the data collection was completed, however, the evolution of this discourse will definitely be worth following in the future as well.

Secondly, based on studying the texts, different representations of the discourse will be identified. If any asymmetries are present in these representations, they will be compared

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[58] NEUMANN, Iver B. in KLOTZ, Audie and Deepa PRAKASH, ed. *Qualitative Methods in International Relations* [online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008, pp. 62-63 [cit. 2018-11-12]. ISBN 978-0-230-24175-6.

[59] NEUMANN, Iver B. in KLOTZ, Audie and Deepa PRAKASH, ed. *Qualitative Methods in International Relations* [online]. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008, p. 63 [cit. 2018-11-12]. ISBN 978-0-230-24175-6.

[60] Ibid, p. 67.

and challenged in the analytical part. Typically, one of the representations is dominant and the others are questioning some specific points of its position.[61]

Despite being often criticised as not scientific enough, discourse analysis is based on theoretical commitments which set acceptable contexts of justification. Firstly, discourse is approached as a system of signification constructing social reality, drawing on constructivist understanding of the world. Discourse analysts then focus on relationships by which objects in a sign system are distinguished from one another and thus construct the meaning of things. Additionally, discourse is often built on binary oppositions which privilege one element over the other, forming a relation of power.[62] In our research we will explore these relations as well as binary oppositions, such as the narrative of "us vs them", "Western identity vs non-Western identity" etc.

There is no overlapping method of analysing language practices and relational distinctions which could interpret a system of signification. However, the so called grounded theory encompasses the idea that a researcher does not select data according to set theoretical categories but rather a theory is formulated by empirical study of the data and its abstraction. These empirical findings are then used to create provisional categories and potentially reformulate them if newly discovered data do not fit the already developed categories.[63] Grounded theorisation is useful in guiding a researcher in when to stop the data collection. The discourse analysis will be considered validated when analysing and comparing new texts does not produce any new categories as the ones already generated may be applied.[64]

Secondly, studying discourse also shows how discourse itself produces the world by constituting narrative authorities, justifying certain policies and eventually changing living

conditions in society. This discursive productivity contributes to understanding the production of common sense and policy practices. By constructing a common sense of societies the discourse legitimises concrete actors and their actions in the eyes of the public and thus forms relations of dominance. Moreover, discursive analysis may also uncover how policy practices are produced and even implemented.[65] The research on implementation of counter-terrorism narratives is definitely a relevant question, however, due to the limited space in this thesis it will be omitted. If we consider the papers presented in the Literature review, it is obvious that there are numerous scholars dealing with the issue of policy practices related to the homegrown terrorism, while the analysis of constructing a common sense is rather marginalised in most of these works. Therefore, from this point of view, the author of the thesis will focus on grasping the production of the common sense in the European societies.

In order to fulfil the aim and purpose of a discourse analysis, scholars use several different methods, frequently combining them within a research. This thesis will primarily apply a method of thematic analysis to paint a complex picture of thematic focus in the current terrorism discourse.

3.2.2. THEMATIC ANALYSIS

As we do not intend to engage with any particular theory, an appropriate method for our analysis will be a thematic analysis (TA) which can be applied to a research problem set in any theoretical background. Even though this methodology was initially developed for the purpose of psychological research of interviews, political speech acts often aim to create certain psychological or social effects and therefore applying a thematic analysis can help us analyse how the threat of terrorism is constructed by the thematic focus of securitising actors.

TA is an appropriate methodology for an interpretative research as it attempts to identify both implicit and explicit ideas hidden in a set of data. In order to achieve this, a researcher generates codes which are supposed to capture potential recurring patterns in the data. As G. Guest, K.M. MacQueen and E.E. Namey argue in their *Applied Thematic Analysis*

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[65] MILLIKEN, JENNIFER. The Study of Discourse in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations* [online]. 2016, **5**(2), pp. 236-242. [accessed 2018-11-12]. DOI: 10.1177/1354066199005002003. ISSN 1354-0661. Available from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066199005002003

handbook, TA is the most suitable method when trying to analyse the complexities of meaning within textual data. It draws on mixed assumptions of a grounded theory and phenomenology, yet creating its own features allowing an analysis of larger data sets.[66] The authors present a detailed outline of conducting a transparent and efficient TA which will be our general guideline in seeking answers for the RQs related to the analysis of specific states as well as the final comparative part of the thesis. During the whole research we are also keeping in mind conclusions of V. Braun and V. Clarke about semantic and latent level of themes. In order to provide an actual interpretation rather than a pure description, it is necessary to look beyond what was explicitly said and search for underlying, implicit ideas and assumptions in the data.[67] This approach is expected to prove to be relevant when examining political discourse as some ideas might be "coded" in language due to political correctness or targeting only specific groups of recipients of the message.

V. Braun and V. Clarke also suggest six-phase methodological framework which is usually followed in thematic analyses and will be used as a step-by-step manual for the purpose of this thesis too. The Phase 1 of our analysis can be labelled as familiarisation with the data. Collected data will be read and re-read in order to become well aware of its content and start spotting potential codes for later phases of research. Data related to our RQs will be marked, leading us to identify the most obvious patterns and thus enhance the coding process. If we are dealing with non-written sources, such as speeches or discussions, it is important to pay attention to non-verbal utterances of the speaker and transcribe them into our notes.[68]

After thorough reading of the data, we are ready to proceed to the Phase 2 - generating initial codes. This coding process is a systematic method of organising data and pinpointing information that is relevant for our research. Even though thematic analysis is rather inductive, we do have specific RQs formulated in advance and therefore we do not need to code every line of the text. Instead, we will code parts of the data which potentially carry a piece of information related to our RQs. The analysis will use the so called open coding,

[66] GUEST, Greg, Kathleen M. MACQUEEN and Emily E. NAMEY. *Applied thematic analysis*. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, c2012, pp.10-18. ISBN 978-1-4129-7167-6.
[67] BRAUN, Virginia and Victoria CLARKE. Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology* [online]. 2006, **3**(2), pp. 77-101 [accessed 2019-03-06]. DOI: 10.1191/1478088706qp063oa. ISSN 1478-0887. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa
[68] Ibid, pp. 77-101.

meaning that the codes are not pre-defined but will be developed, added, combined etc. as the analysis progresses. This phase will be a useful tool for data reduction as by focusing on given RQs we will manage to create categories and organise our ideas better.[69]

Developing a codebook will be the most critical part of our TA. The codebook provides space to systematically sort texts into categories, types and relationships with necessary modifications as the research uncovers new insights. A definition of each code needs to encompass not only a specific code label but also clear boundaries of when to apply this code and when not in order to avoid ambiguity of our coding.[70]

The Phase 3, searching for themes, will begin an actual analysis of the developed codes. While it is sometimes problematic to distinguish between "codes" and "themes", we might say that a theme captures something significant about our RQs, provides explanatory ideas and identifies what the data means. Therefore, a theme is a result of analytical reflection of the codes which have been developed.[71] To find themes in our TA, we have to refresh our understanding of the research aim as this will always frame our views eventually determine which themes are worth coding.[72] The aim of the Phase 3 is to discover combinations of codes which form over-reaching themes or sub-themes in our data. In order to achieve this, we will gather the codes which have similar meaning or close relationship and label them under one category, thus finding an initial theme. Special attention should be paid to recurring ideas, frequency of occurrence, topics and vocabulary patterns. This process will be repeated until no more "codes clustering" is possible. While we will attempt to categorise all codes within some specific theme, it is possible that we will need a category labelled "miscellaneous" in case we are unable to fit some codes into any theme. Similarly, some codes may be gathered under several different themes.[73] Last but not least, bearing in mind

our previous assumption about implicit meaning of speech acts, it is necessary to consider not only what is present in the data but also what is missing. This may be interesting to follow especially when comparing discourses in different countries.

In the Phase 4, reviewing themes, we are going to confront the preliminary themes from Phase 3 with our dataset in order to make sure that the themes actually reflect what the data say and answer our RQs. It may be expected that in this phase the proposed themes will be slightly modified. We will consider whether the themes are in fact supported by the data and whether they fit in the broader context of the analysis. Secondly, it is needed to examine whether it would be appropriate to split a theme into subthemes or whether some themes should be emerged if they are overlap too much.[74]

The Phase 5, defining and naming themes, will be the last refinement of the themes within our analysis. This phase aims to identify the essence of the themes,[75] how they fit in a broader picture, why they are interesting and how they interact with each other. Additionally, each theme will get a comprehensive name reflecting its meaning and we will be able to describe these themes and explain their significance.[76] After this final revision and naming the themes, we will proceed to the last Phase 6, writing the final report[77] which will be the main, analytical part of this thesis. The analysis will attempt to concisely present our findings, explain the themes discovered and relationships between them and, most importantly, to relate the conducted TA to the RQs posed in the introductory part of the thesis.

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[74] MAGUIRE, Moira and Brid DELAHAUNT. Doing a thematic analysis: A practical, step-by-step guide for learning and teaching scholars. AISHE-J: The All Ireland Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education [online]. 2017, **9**(3), p. 3358, [accessed 2019-03-06]. ISSN 2009-3160. Available from http://ojs.aishe.org/index.php/aishe-j/article/viewFile/335/553

[75] BRAUN, Virginia and Victoria CLARKE. Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology* [online]. 2006, **3**(2), p. 92 [accessed 2019-03-06]. DOI: 10.1191/1478088706qp063oa. ISSN 1478-0887. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa

[76] MAGUIRE, Moira and Brid DELAHAUNT. Doing a thematic analysis: A practical, step-by-step guide for learning and teaching scholars. AISHE-J: The All Ireland Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education [online]. 2017, **9**(3), p. 33511 [accessed 2019-03-06]. ISSN 2009-3160. Available from http://ojs.aishe.org/index.php/aishe-j/article/viewFile/335/553

[77] BRAUN, Virginia and Victoria CLARKE. Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology* [online]. 2006, **3**(2), pp. 77-101 [accessed 2019-03-06]. DOI: 10.1191/1478088706qp063oa. ISSN 1478-0887. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa

Due to the general framework of our research, we might mention an additional phase of our TA – qualitative comparison of the findings from specific states. This comparison is purely interpretivist, therefore it will be based on two overarching questions: 1) Are some themes relevant in political discourse of one state but not another? 2) If a theme is present in discourses of all states, is it expressed differently?[78]

4. ANALYTICAL PART
4.1. THE EUROPEAN UNION

After analysing gathered data on the political discourse within the EU as described in the *Data* section of the thesis, ten main themes were discovered in rhetoric of institutions/ policy-makers and outlined in the table below:

THEME: **Threats posed by terrorism (securitisation)** **CODES:** Threat to security Threat to democracy Threat to rights and freedoms of Europeans Need to safeguard European values Fighting terrorism = making Europe safer Fighting terrorism = top priority Threat increasing Threat emanating from inside of Europe Jihadist terrorism the most lethal and impactful Attacks on Western lifestyle Attacks on authority Threat still on despite degradation of IS Active interest in CBRN weaponry Regulating the use of PNR Possibility of Daesh 2.0 in Europe	**THEME:** **Effectivity of the EU policies (what EU does well; highlighting active role)** **CODES:** Prevent – Protect – Pursue – Respond Prevention of new forms Criminalisation of terrorist offences Fight against online propaganda Fight against money laundering Reinforcement of external border Enhanced firearms controls Institutions – CT coordinator; commissioner for Security Union; counter-terrorism centre Improved information exchange Pinpointing active role in global fight Highlighting success in arrests Cooperation with international partners
THEME: **Possibilities for improvements in EU policies (what EU could do better)** **CODES:** Information exchange among MS should improve	**THEME:** **Accusation of Europe (what EU does not do well; role of Europe in radicalisation)** **CODES:** Threat emanating from inside of Europe Highlighting the "homegrown" nature of attacks

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[78] GUEST, Greg, Kathleen M. MACQUEEN and Emily E. NAMEY. *Applied thematic analysis*. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, c2012, pp.162-163. ISBN 978-1-4129-7167-6.

THEME: **„Victimisation" of terrorists** **CODES:** Individuals vulnerable to manipulation	THEME: **Future prognosis** **CODES:** High probability of new attacks Low number of returnees Degradation of IS reduces attractiveness Threat from AQ Possibility of Daesh 2.0 in Europe Threat increasing; threat still on despite degradation of IS
THEME: **Foreign fighters** **CODES:** Travel for terrorist purposes Travel of women and children Returnees and their activities in Europe Success rate in arresting	THEME: **Role of internet** **CODES:** Fight against online propaganda Social media – propaganda and networking Incitement of lone actor attacks
THEME: **Societal and individual impact** **CODES:** Human suffering Innocent victims of indiscriminate violence Jihadist terrorism the most lethal and impactful Attacks on Western lifestyle Emotional response	THEME: **Nexus terrorism – migration** **CODES:** Terrorists using irregular migrant flow to reach Europe Unlikeliness of terrorists among asylum seekers Need to stop using rhetoric "refugees = terrorists"

Table 1: Thematic analysis of terrorism discourse in the EU. Themes and codes

Confirming our initial expectations, one of the most common topics is presenting terrorism as a threat to different aspects of our lives. Terrorism is not only being depicted as a threat to European security but also as a threat to features of European democracy, such as rights and freedoms of our citizens and the need to protect our values is often highlighted. Understanding these as the core of the European society, we might say that terrorism is constructed as creating societal insecurity, thus being an existential threat to European identity. Apart from the threatening European lifestyle and being a menace to the societal sector, terrorism in Europe is also construed as a threat to political sector by the notions of attacks on European authorities, undermining our institutions and the rule of law. While the official EU rhetoric clarifies that terrorism can take many different forms, it does contribute to perceiving jihadist attacks as the currently greatest threat by language using expressions as "the most lethal" or "the most impactful". Additionally, jihadist terrorism

takes considerably more space in different speech acts and Europol reports compared to other types of terrorism. The EU narratives also attempt to emphasise the continuity of the terrorist threat despite ongoing degradation of the IS and acknowledge the increasing tendency of the threat due to expected returning of European foreign fighters (FF). An indisputable example of securitising homegrown terrorism are warning about terrorists taking interest in CBRN weaponry or a possibility of creating "Daesh 2.0" in Europe, as these proclamations could even lead to mass panic due to their seriousness and sensitivity. According to the Copenhagen School, an issue is being securitised in order to gain public acceptance of extraordinary measures. We can trace this aim behind the EU reasoning of regulating the use of PNR and frequent reminders that the terrorist threat emanates from within Europe and thus combating it may require some special precautions. Last but not least, fighting terrorism is being presented as a top priority of the EU as it makes Europe safe.[79] All these "codes" discovered in the gathered data have one thing in common – they aim to depict homegrown terrorism as a threat to European citizens, which led to labelling them under the securitisation theme in our analysis. "Terrorism as a threat" is one of two mainstream themes identified in the narrative of the EU authorities.

The second one was Effectivity of the EU policies as apart from securitising the terrorist issue, our data frequently shows signs of highlighting an active role of the EU institutions in the fight against terrorism and praising the success which the EU has achieved in the field so far. This theme encompasses all the codes which were identified with relation to the EU strategy Prevent – Protect – Pursue – Respond. A substantial part of this theme evolves around modern innovations in terrorism and how the EU is handling them, e.g. its efforts in fight against online propaganda, money laundering and preventing emergence of new forms of terrorism in Europe. Presenting restrictive measures like enhancing firearms controls[80] and reinforcing EU external borders[81] were also categorised under the theme of EU effectivity as in speech acts they are usually used as supportive evidence of active approach

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[79] European Council. Council of the European Union, „EU fight against terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/.

[80] European Council. Council of the European Union, „EU strengthens control of the acquisition and possesion of fireamrs," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/25/control-acquisition-possession-weapons/.

[81] European Council. Council of the European Union, „Schengen borders code: Council adopts regulation to reinforce checks at external borders," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/07/regulation-reinforce-checks-external-borders/.

of the EU, however, they also imply some relation to previous, securitising theme. Other codes understood as EU effectivity were notions of criminalisation of terrorist offences and success rate achieved in arrests of Islamist radicals. Ensuring of the public about active role of the EU is further supported by its international aspects, namely improved information exchange among the EU member states, cooperation with third countries and involvement of the EU in global fight against jihadism. Similarly, the official EU rhetoric also pinpoints institutionalisation of the EU fight against terrorism in the form of establishing EU counter-terrorism coordinator, a commissioner for Security Union and counter-terrorism centre.[82] This "list" of EU activities covers a considerable space in relevant speech acts, thus making the active role of the EU one of the main features of terrorism discourse.

While in our data focus is definitely put on the successful part of the active fight against terrorism in the EU, we may also find hints about possible improvements of the EU policies towards homegrown terrorism, even though they are rather rare and minor. Interestingly, the main gap in EU policies, which was spotted in several speech acts, is insufficient information exchange between member states, which was at the same time coded under the previous theme, pinpointing successful measures of the EU, as other speech acts present the information exchange as gradually improving rather than lacking. G. de Kerchove, the EU anti-terrorism coordinator, sends the message towards policy-makers, experts as well as wider public that it is wrong to expect from the EU or its member states to prevent all attacks as this is unrealistic. However, at various occasions he suggests possible improvements of EU policies, such as more open information exchange among MS or investing in educating European imams about peaceful Islamism.[83] Indisputably, the EU rhetoric focuses more on what the EU is doing right rather than what it should do better, although this is understandable as in communication towards citizens the EU attempts to confirm its qualification while the criticism of ineffective policies is held behind door or high-level negotiations.

Apart from the effectivity and possible improvements in the EU policies, one other theme related to the EU role was identified in the EU discourse– fault of Europe in the rising trend

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[82] European Council. Council of the European Union, „EU fight against terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/.

[83] Euractiv, „Terrorists can´t access weapons, EU anti-terrorist coordinator says after Spain attacks," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/terrorists-cant-access-weapons-eu-anti-terrorist-coordinator-says-after-spain-attacks/.

of Islamist radicalisation. Even though this theme is far less common than highlighting successful measures, references to failure of the European society may be found in two main aspects. Firstly, terrorism is often construed as the most challenging threat to European security nowadays. Despite the fact that most of the terrorists responsible for the attacks from the followed period pledged allegiance to ISIS (Al-Qaeda respectively in the case of Charlie Hebdo attack), the threat is generally understood as coming from within Europe rather than from outside, thus implying that the EU member states have gaps in their prevention policies or wider security area. Secondly, the official EU rhetoric occasionally uses the academic term "homegrown terrorism", especially when trying to underscore the fact that these attacks are committed by the EU nationals who went through European schooling system and spent their formative years exposed to European values, which makes them products of European society and policies.[84] Spotting the codes of homegrown nature of terrorism and framing terrorism as internal threat leads us to identifying the theme of accusation of Europe and its role in Islamist radicalisation.

Building on this, an interesting aspect of discourse is hidden in presenting terrorists and radicals as a vulnerable group of population with inclination to being manipulated by a violent group or ideology. Signs of this rhetoric can be traced to Europol reports which subsequently have impact on speech acts of other EU institutions and authorities. For example, TESAT 20018 pinpoints that according to their experience, vulnerable individuals often have only rudimentary and fragmented knowledge of Islam which makes them susceptible to manipulation. Notions of selective usage of religious texts by jihadi groups or leaders for the purpose of justifying extremism and violence contribute to constructing perpetrators of terrorist attacks as individuals prone to becoming victims of radicalisation.[85] Any hints of constructing homegrown terrorists as vulnerable targets for jihadi recruiters were coded under theme "victimisation" of terrorists. Even though this theme is not mainstream in the EU speech acts, its presence proves the attempt of experts to provide a different perspective to policy-makers and wider public on the issue of homegrown

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[84] Euractiv, „EU anti-terror tzar: The threat is coming from inside Europe," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/freedom-of-thought/interview/eu-anti-terror-czar-the-threat-is-coming-from-inside-europe/.

[85] Europol, „EU TESAT Report 2018," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.30-33, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018.

terrorism. It encourages a debate about the role of ideology behind jihadi attacks and swifts focus of the EU on the importance of preventive measures, protection of vulnerable groups and counter-narrative in contrast to spreading jihadi messages.

Especially with the progressing retreat of the IS, the EU policy-makers have been trying to outline possible scenarios of development in the Levant region and its impact on terrorism in Europe. We may say that in the EU there is general agreement about ongoing threat, high probability of new terrorist attacks in Europe and the need not to encourage the illusion that the end of caliphate means end of terror. On the contrary, in the recent months, when the defeat of the IS seemed inevitable, the discussion in Europe has been focused mostly on the problem of returning European fighters as the number of returnees has been low so far and thus their home-coming may be expected in the next months or years, strengthening the threat again. However, some speech acts believe in a more positive result of the IS defeat – degradation of the IS authority could reduce attractiveness of the ideology of violent jihad and consequently lead to a lower number of Islamist extremists in the EU. Having said this, Europol reminds that the IS has been the most active jihadi group in the past years but it does not represent the only terrorist group out there – after the decline of the IS, the Al-Qaeda or other terrorist entities may become empowered.[86] Additionally, G. de Kerchove argues that unless major economic changes happen in the Levant region, we cannot rule out the possibility of "Daesh 2.0",[87] which would inevitably have impact on terrorism in the EU. All these possible outlines of upcoming development of homegrown terrorism, frequent particularly in data from recent months, were coded under the theme future prognosis.

Apart from being coded within the future development, foreign fighters (FF) can be identified as a separate theme, especially in the most recent speech acts following gradual loss of ISIS' territory. In the early years of the caliphate the attention of the EU officials was paid mostly to a spreading phenomenon of EU citizens travelling to Syria and Iraq for terrorist purposes. Focus of the EU rhetoric is not only on jihadi men leaving to join the fight in the ISIS but also on women and children accompanying FF or leaving for a purpose of

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[86] Europol, „EU TESAT Report 2018," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.21-30, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018.
[87] Euractiv, „EU counter-terrorism chief: Europe may see something like Daesh 2.0," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/interview/eu-counter-terrorism-chief-%D0%95urope-may-see-something-like-daesh-2-0/.

marriage with a FF. However, in the later period the discussion about foreign fighters deals mostly with the so called returnees, former fighters attempting to return back to Europe. Similarly as with radicalisation, the EU rhetoric highlights successful arrests of returnees[88] and thus its competency in the field.

Indisputably, when analysing current terrorism discourse, role of the internet cannot be omitted. References to the power of online media can be found within various of the above mentions themes, whether within active steps of the EU in the fight against terrorism, recruitment of foreign fighters or victimisation of terrorism perpetrators. However, the role of internet in general may be identified as a self-contained theme within the EU discourse. Social media are presented as a means of Islamist networking and recruitment, thus increasing awareness of experts as well as wider public about the need for fight against the online propaganda. The role of the internet is especially highlighted in relation with incitement of the so-called "lone wolfs" who have seemingly no direct contact with any organised terrorist group but got in touch with radical online content which inspired them to commit a lone actor attack.[89] This focus on online methods of recruitment in recent political discourse is interesting especially in comparison with recommendations of terrorism experts who often argue that social media are just one of the many methods and most of the radicalisation happens while socialising in family, friends and religious circles.

Last relevant theme found in the EU discourse towards homegrown terrorism was named as societal and individual impact, embracing all speech acts related to human suffering and emotional responses related to terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks are presented as targeting Western lifestyle, thus having wide societal consequences. When analysing different kinds of terrorism in Europe, even Europol presents the jihadist terrorism as the most lethal and impactful one.[90] This kind of rhetoric is usually prevalent in speeches and social media posts which are aimed at wider public space, while official political documents are rather focused on more constructive themes, such as implementation of policies.

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[88] Europol, „EU TESAT Report 2018," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.6-28, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018.
[89] Europol, „EU TESAT Report 2018," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.29-33, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018.
[90] Europol, „EU TESAT Report 2018," accessed May 10, 2019, p.4, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018.

The very last theme which was identified in the EU discourse, nexus between terrorism and migration, does not entirely fit in our research design as the notion of "migrants-terrorists" does not fall under the definition of homegrown terrorism. However, this nexus was in the centre of attention of European policy-makers especially during the peak of the mass migration in 2015 and 2016, used as argument against accepting migrants and thus creates an inseparable part of European terrorism discourse in general. Interestingly, at the EU level we have mostly discovered ideas opposing the idea of terrorists using irregular migration flows, arguing that terrorist networks have sympathisers among European citizens and do not need to use complicated routes of migrants. G. de Kerchove emphasises that presence of terrorists among asylum seekers is unlikely and encourages European political leaders to stop using rhetoric which constructs nexus between refugees and terrorism.[91]

As examining the EU terrorism discourse is a complex and elaborate task, by focusing on different aspects we could discover different discursive patterns. Applying the thematic analysis leads us to several conclusions. Homegrown terrorism is presented to public as one of the major current threats to European security having strong impact on the European society. However, the EU rhetoric attempts to rather soothe the citizens and prevent panic by constantly emphasising efforts and success of the EU anti-terrorism policies. While the image of terrorists becoming victims of radical ideology and the potential societal/political failures of the EU to protect individuals vulnerable to radicalisation are present in the official speech acts, they do not represent mainstream discourse. An important role within the radicalisation process is being assigned to online content and social media. With the decline of the ISIS the focus has shifted towards the question of the future of terrorism in general and the return of foreign fighters back to European countries. Unlike in national political scenes, the EU discourse does not pinpoint the nexus between terrorism and irregular migration, thus constructing terrorism as mostly homegrown and internal issue. Bearing this in mind, we may notice that the role of religion or ideology in the process of radicalisation are rather lacking in the discourse which might not be the case in national discourses which follow after this chapter.

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[91] Euractiv, „EU counter-terrorism czar: Terrorists among asylum seekers? Unlikely," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/interview/eu-counter-terrorism-czar-terrorists-among-asylum-seekers-unlikely/.

4.2. FRANCE

After the initial analysis of the general thematic discourse in the EU institutions, we are moving to analyses of national discourses, starting with France as a member state which has suffered the most significant terrorist attacks of the current Islamist wave and has rich experience with counter-terrorism and fight against radicalisation. These themes were identified as the most relevant ones in our data:

THEME: **Threats posed by terrorism (securitisation)** **CODES:** High terrorism risk Evolving and long-term threat Dynamic threat Need to tackle terrorism together Key issue in national security War on terrorism	**THEME:** **Successful French policies** **CODES:** Success of intelligence services Upgrading governmental counter-terrorism plans Implementation of PNR
THEME: **Homegrown nature of terrorism** **CODES:** Predominantly endogenous threat Key issue in internal security	**THEME:** **Understanding terrorism** **CODES:** Insufficient knowledge of radicalisation process Need for better understanding of the threat Need for better identification of the threat Need for constant updating of the strategy
THEME: **Preventing terrorism** **CODES:** Protection of vulnerable individuals Combating financing terrorism Supporting peace in conflict regions Improving technological capabilities	**THEME:** **Funding terrorism** **CODES:** One of the major factors in successful attacks Better international cooperation in tracing individuals supporting terrorism
THEME: **Radicalisation online** **CODES:** Technology raising the threat Dissemination of propaganda on the Internet Fight against using Internet for terrorism purposes Need to remove online content supporting terrorism	**THEME:** **Radicalisation in prisons** **CODES:** Need to monitor individuals radicalised in prisons Integrating prison intelligence into national intelligence Isolating radicals

THEME: **French involvement in conflicts abroad** CODES: Diplomatic help to settle conflicts Relation European terrorism – Levant region	THEME: **United EU** CODES: Strengthening relations between EU MS Leading role of France in the EU
THEME: **Jihad vs Islam** CODES: War against jihad and not religion	

Table 2: Thematic analysis of terrorism discourse in France. Themes and codes

It is not surprising that also in national discourses homegrown terrorism is first and foremost constructed as a threat, including the French official discourse. The first sign of securitising terrorism can be identified in labelling the risk of a terrorist attack in France as high. The official French security strategy constructs homegrown terrorism as a key problem in its national security, while highlighting the need to tackle this issue together, whether it comes to the activating citizens or wider international community. Furthermore, the French political discourse puts emphasis on the dynamic character of current homegrown terrorism, emphasising that the dealing with this evolving threat also requires constantly evolving counter-terrorism policies. Last but not least, using the narrative of being "in war" against terrorism, jihadism and Islamist radicalism constructs understanding homegrown terrorism as a national security issue deserving special attention of the public. However, it is made explicit that this "war" is not aimed against religion of Islam,[92] which carries a strong discursive message to French citizens about the assumed role which Islam plays in the terrorist acts perpetrated in France.

The analysis of the EU rhetoric uncovered pinpointing success of existing policies as one of the most dominant themes. This theme can indisputably be found in official French narrative too, however, it seems to be rather minor and each newly released counter-terrorism strategy pays more attention to the analysis of what should be improved in French policies based on previous experience with terrorism. For example the latest action plan published in July 2018 appreciates success of French intelligence services, implementation of

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[92] Sécrétariat Général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, „Plan d´action contre le terrorisme," accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/uploads/2018/07/plan-d-action-contre-le-terrorisme-v8.pdf.

PNR and other movement control mechanisms, while emphasising the need to keep on improving French counter-terrorism plans due to its dynamic development.[93]

Interestingly, even though we did find several references to the homegrown nature of terrorism in the EU discourse, the French narrative is more explicit about this issue and the problem of the perpetrators being born and raised in France/ Europe can be identified as a particular theme within the political discourse in France. The national strategy purposely describes Islamist terrorism as predominantly endogenous threat, thus highlighting the significant role of jihadi propaganda spread among French Muslims. The homegrown background of the current terrorist problem is also emphasised by constructing terrorism as a key issue of internal, not external security of France and the EU.[94]

A French-specific theme which we identified in the discourse is focus on better understanding of radicalisation issue by political authorities, experts and public. One of the codes included under this theme, need for updating the counter-terrorism strategy, has already been described above. Apart from this, our knowledge of the process of Islamist radicalisation is construed as insufficient in terms of thorough understanding of the threat it poses for French or European security and society in general. In order to combat homegrown terrorism, we need to better identify where the threat is coming from and how it is evolving.[95] This rhetoric implies that French political authorities admit the unsatisfactory level of know-how in European counter-radicalisation policies due to unawareness of underlying inclination of vulnerable individuals towards radicalism.

The need for strengthened protection of these vulnerable citizens was coded under the theme of preventing terrorism. This theme is mirrored in various other speech acts, especially those referring to the need for improving French technological capacities with relation to spread of online propaganda, intensification of combating financing terrorism from abroad or supporting peace efforts in conflict areas, in the followed period particularly in the Levant region.[96]

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[93] „Plan d´action contre le terrorisme."
[94] „Plan d´action contre le terrorisme."
[95] En Marche!, „Discours de la politique de lutte contre le terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, https://en-marche.fr/articles/discours/meeting-macron-politique-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme.
[96] Sécrétariat Général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, „Plan d´action contre le terrorisme," accessed May 10, 2019, http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/uploads/2018/07/plan-d-action-contre-le-terrorisme-v8.pdf.

However, all these codes under the theme of prevention can also be identified as independent themes within French political discourse. Funding of terrorism from abroad is one of the dominant topics in the current narrative and it is constructed as a major factor contributing to success of terrorists in Europe. In order to combat this, French narrative calls for deeper international cooperation in tracing individuals who are financially supporting terrorist activities and spreading extremist propaganda.[97] Building on this, online radicalisation is probably a theme currently present in the discourses across all EU member states. Specifically in the French political speech acts, technology is presented as a factor raising the terrorism threat due to accessible and affordable dissemination of Islamist violent propaganda on the Internet. Consequently, the French counter-terrorism strategy emphasises the necessity to remove online content supporting terrorism and combat this issue even if this interferes with freedom of expression.[98] Compared to the EU narrative, France is more focused on the relation of the French/ European homegrown terrorism with terrorist cells operating in the Levant or other war zones, construing the inevitable involvement of France in these conflicts, at least in form of diplomatic support.[99] Additionally, French official stance also implies that France should have a leading role in combating terrorism within the EU and coordinate closer cooperation of member states in combating the threat of terrorism. [100]

Another theme which seems to be outstanding in the French discourse is radicalisation in French prisons. While in general European discourse there are differing opinions on imprisonment of Islamist radicals together with non-radicals, the French narrative and practices are leaning towards isolating radicals in order to prevent further radicalisation of other inmates. The French counter-terrorism strategy also suggests accepting prison

[97] Gouvernement, „Lutter contre le financement du terrorisme," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/5954-lutter-contre-le-financement-du-terrorisme.
[98] Elysée, „Discours du Président de la Republique – Mission permanente de la France – ONU – Le terrorisme internet," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/21/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-mission-permanente-de-la-france-onu-le-terrorisme-internet.
[99] France Diplomatie, „Terrorism: l´action internationale de la France," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/defense-et-securite/terrorisme-l-action-internationale-de-la-france/.
[100] En Marche!, „Discours de la politique de lutte contre le terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, https://en-marche.fr/articles/discours/meeting-macron-politique-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme.

intelligence as an integral part of national intelligence which would enable more efficient monitoring of individuals who were radicalised in prison.[101]

4.3. THE UNITED KINGDOM

After analysing data related to the UK political discourse on homegrown terrorism, following codes and themes were identified:

THEME: **Threats posed by terrorism (securitisation)** **CODES:** International terrorism as a severe threat to the UK Significant threat Substantial/Severe/Critical threat level Restrictions on freedom of expression Longer prison terms for terrorist offences Cause of harm and fear Undermining European society Need for countering emerging threats Threat from ideology Islamist terrorism most significant	**THEME:** **Functioning UK policies** **CODES:** Prevent – Pursue – Protect – Prepare Countering extremism
THEME: **Needed improvements for UK policies** **CODES:** Linking intelligence agencies, local authorities Countering extremism Integrating communities	**THEME:** **International nature of terrorism** **CODES:** International vs Domestic terrorism UK counter-terrorism overseas ISIS/AQ terrorism Foreign fighters Financing
THEME: **Victims of terrorism** **CODES:** Victims Survivor networks Vulnerable individuals	**THEME:** **Role of public** **CODES:** Calls for solidarity and togetherness Reporting suspected terrorism Reporting extremist online content Public awareness

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[101] Gouvernement, „Lutte contre la radicalisation en prison," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/3128-lutte-contre-la-radicalisation-en-prison.

THEME: **Role of institutions** **CODES:** Counter-terrorism offices	**THEME:** **Prevention methods** **CODES:** Tackling causes of radicalisation Countering ideology Safeguarding individuals vulnerable to radicalisation Early intervention Disengagement and rehabilitation of terrorists
THEME: **Radicalisation factors** **CODES:** Extremism, ideology Conflict and instability Developments in technology	**THEME:** **Indoctrination** **CODES:** Extremism Role of ideology Radicalisation online
THEME: **Role of internet** **CODES:** Reporting extremist online content Restrictions on freedom of expression Technology increasing radicalisation Training and indoctrination	**THEME:** **Future prognosis** **CODES:** The threat expected to last Fight against terrorism after Brexit

Table 3: Thematic analysis of terrorism discourse in the UK. Themes and codes

Similarly as at the EU level, one of the most dominant themes is constructing terrorism as a threat from various perspectives. With the decreased number of IRA activities, the Islamist terrorism is considered to be the most significant threat also in the UK in our examined period. The UK government labels jihadi terrorism as a severe threat, especially due to its international character, spreading fear and undermining the European society. In comparison with the EU thematic discourse, the UK speech acts focus more the need to counter emerging threats, such as spread of violent ideology through online means. In general, highlighting the ideological threat is present in the discourse to such an extent that it was identified as a particular theme and will be further discussed. Other signs of securitisation may be found in rhetoric encouraging restrictions on freedom of expression, particularly in the form of access to private online conversations of suspected individuals and networks for security services, or legitimising longer prison terms for terrorism-related offences in the UK. Last but not least, the theme of terrorism as a threat is present in the UK

discourse whenever talking about the official current level of threat which has always been construed as substantial, severe or even critical within our timeframe.[102]

Even though emphasising successful anti-terrorism policies does not seem to cover as much space in the UK discourse as it does in the EU speech acts, it can be indisputably identified under the codes Prevent - Pursue – Protect - Prepare which characterise British official strategy in the fight against terrorism. However, after analysing the CONTEST 3.0 document, it can be argued that the section dealing with the UK response to terrorism is written from a perspective of lessons learned during the previous years of the UK fight against terrorism rather than as a statement of achievement of the British policies. Therefore, the UK official rhetoric highlights the learning curve in the anti-terrorism policies and thus once again constructs terrorism as an evolving threat which needs tighter international cooperation. More attention is also paid to British policies in countering non-violent forms of extremism as it may become a breeding ground for violent and terrorist activities.[103] In the EU terrorism discourse this connection between violent and non-violent extremism was less explicit.

Countering extremism was also coded under the theme of needed improvements in the UK policies. This topic covers a substantial part of the CONTEST strategy and other political speech acts, as opposed to our findings in the EU discourse which imply focus on the success of existing policies rather than their failures. The theme of improvements in the UK discourse was also identified in frequently occurring notions of need for tighter cooperation between intelligence agencies, local authorities ant other field-related experts in order to fight against homegrown terrorism in the UK and in the EU as a whole.[104] Additionally, a considerable part of this theme is devoted to policies of integrating Muslim and immigrant

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[102] Secretary of State for the Home Department, „CONTEST. The United Kingdom´s Strategy for Countering Terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.19-20, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf.

[103] Secretary of State for the Home Department, „CONTEST. The United Kingdom´s Strategy for Countering Terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.25-34. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf.

[104] Secretary of State for the Home Department, „CONTEST. The United Kingdom´s Strategy for Countering Terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, p.3, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf.

communities into the majority society which are considered insufficient or failing.[105] This kind of rhetoric indicates that the UK officials work with the "homegrown background" of jihadi terrorists and search for their radicalisation motives in dysfunctionalities of the British society, particularly in the field of actively integrating vulnerable communities into civic society.

A notable feature of the UK discourse may be found in highlighting the international character of the current terrorism threat. When speaking about jihadi terrorism, it is usually accompanied by the word "international", even when referring to homegrown terrorists, while the word "domestic" terrorism is assigned to attacks related to the Northern Ireland conflict. Building on this understanding of international connections of jihadi terrorism the UK emphasises the necessity of British counter-terrorism operations overseas as an integral part of their fight against homegrown terrorism. ISIS (in the official British strategy called Daesh) is constructed as the major terrorist threat both in the UK and globally, while the strategy also warns not to forget about a potential long-term threat coming from Al-Qaeda. The focus on international nature of jihadi terrorism was also identified in highlighting the importance of prosecuting home-coming foreign terrorists and mentioning financing of terrorism and spreading Islamist extremist ideology from abroad. The rhetoric of emphasising the highly international character of terrorist threat creates the linkage between security threats at home and global fight against terrorism, thus reasoning for the British anti-terrorist involvement abroad.[106]

A considerate part of the UK speech acts concerning terrorism is devoted to the victims of attacks. Providing assistance to the victims not only shows willingness of the government to actively support the response and recovery phase in emergencies but it is also believed that survivor networks play an important role within British counter-terrorism efforts as sharing their experience publicly may help in combating the extremist ideology. The Cabinet Office even publicised an official guidance for identifying vulnerable individuals in order to develop effective action plans for emergencies at local level. A wide range of institutions and

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[105] Secretary of State for the Home Department, „CONTEST. The United Kingdom´s Strategy for Countering Terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, pp. 33-34, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf.
[106] Security Service MI5, „International Terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/international-terrorism.

platforms has been made available to victims, thus constructing the support for victims of terrorist attacks as one of the priorities for the British government when dealing with recovery from terrorism. A related theme which we identified in the UK discourse was named role of the public, embracing all speech acts referring to the question how wider public can be helpful in the fight against terrorism. First of all, this involves calls for solidarity and "togetherness" which are a central part of virtually all speeches addressed to the public by authorities. Secondly, the British government is raising public awareness about the terrorist threat and inducing citizens to be attentive to warning signs of radicalism in their surroundings. The wider public is encouraged to actively engage in the fight against terrorist threat by reporting any suspected terrorism as well as online extremist content to authorities.[107] This strategy of raising general public awareness constructs the fight against homegrown terrorism as a shared responsibility of all British citizens and incorporates the threat into everyday lives.

An interesting aspect of the British discourse is its focus on the role of institutions in the fight against terrorism and establishing several counter-terrorism offices, thus giving the issue of terrorism notable importance. Even if we are searching for information related to British counter-terrorism policies at the official websites of the UK government, we may notice that we are instantly referred to the websites of specialised offices and agencies, depending on our concrete needs – whether we are interested in prevention of terrorism, response of the government in case of an attack or where victims of terrorism should reach for help both in the UK and abroad.[108] Similarly, references to various counter-terrorism institutions can as well be found in the CONTEST document. The institutions are mentioned in all parts of the strategy (Prevent – Pursue – Protect – Prepare) but are especially relevant in the part dealing with implementation of the strategy, thus presenting these institutions to the public as the cornerstone of the UK safety and fight against homegrown and foreign terrorism.[109]

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[107] UK government, „Terrorism and National Emergencies," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.gov.uk/terrorism-national-emergency.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Secretary of State for the Home Department, „CONTEST. The United Kingdom´s Strategy for Countering Terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.83-89, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf.

When analysing CONTEST and related documents, we may discover obvious discursive focus on prevention strategies. Apart from the above discussed engagement of the public in reporting suspicious activities, British speech acts highlight the importance of preventive measures from other perspectives too. Tackling the causes of radicalisation is presented as one of the main objectives of the UK counter-terrorism strategy, while there is a strong emphasis on searching for the roots of extremism both online and offline in vulnerable communities. Monitoring these means is expected to enable early intervention in case of identification individuals at risk.[110] Additionally, the strategy introduces disengagement programs for those individuals who have already been radicalised but have not perpetrated terrorist attacks.[111] References to these preventive steps create a substantial part of the official British strategy and thus signify the high importance of the prevention theme in the UK discourse.

Together with prevention methods we may identify several inter-related themes in the UK discourse, such as analysing factors of radicalisation, indoctrination process and a special role played by the internet and online media. When it comes to the radicalisation factors, the UK official speech acts indicate three most important elements in radicalisation of British Muslims, which were coded as extremist ideology, instability and technological progress. The CONTEST strategy emphasises the impact of radical Islamist narratives, pointing out the thin line between an extremist ideology and a terrorist ideology. The instability factor is not directly related to the homegrown terrorism as it rather refers to the conflicts of the Levant region, however, the factor of technological developments creates connection between environment of fragile states and spreading radical propaganda from these areas to Europe and particularly the UK, thus becoming a factor of homegrown radicalisation.[112] Compared to the EU discourse, the British narratives seem to be more open and explicit about the role of ideology and interconnectedness between non-violent extremism and terrorism. Therefore, these codes were grouped within a particular theme of indoctrination. While

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[110] Secretary of State for the Home Department, „CONTEST. The United Kingdom´s Strategy for Countering Terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, p.31-42,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Secretary of State for the Home Department, „CONTEST. The United Kingdom´s Strategy for Countering Terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.15-16,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf.

online radicalisation can be coded within broader indoctrination topic, general role of the internet may be identified as an independent theme due to its complexness embracing not only the indoctrination and radicalisation aspect but also the above discussed online means of fighting terrorism, such as reporting extremist content to authorities or restrictions on freedom of expression related to securitisation of terrorism.[113]

Last but not least, the theme of future prognosis can be identified in the UK discourse, which is constructed similarly as in the EU speech acts – despite the territorial loss of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, terrorist threat in the UK and Europe in general is expected to last.[114] A UK-specific question within this theme is how the British counter-terrorism will look like after Brexit, however, this topic is rather minor in the mainstream terrorism discourse and inconclusive on whether Brexit will strengthen, weaken or have no impact on the UK security related to homegrown terrorism.

Our thematic analysis of the UK terrorism discourse has shown some similar tendencies as the EU discourse, especially in the prevalent securitisation rhetoric constructing homegrown terrorism as a threat undermining European society, highlighting the active role and success of the UK authorities in the fight against terrorism and focus on the role of the internet in radicalisation. Considering the fact that the UK government actually has executive power over its counter-terrorism policies, it can be observed that the official discourse is constructed in a highly practical manner, raising public awareness about the process of Islamist radicalisation and engaging the public in active approach towards potential signs of terrorist activities. Substantial attention is devoted to international connections of homegrown terrorists and the process of indoctrination, openly presenting the Islamist ideology as a major factor in radicalisation of British Muslims. The British official counter-terrorism strategy also explicitly emphasises the close relation between terrorism and extremist Islamist narratives, thus constructing non-violent radical ideology as a threat as well.

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[113] Secretary of State for the Home Department, „CONTEST. The United Kingdom´s Strategy for Countering Terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, p.8, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf.
[114] Secretary of State for the Home Department, „CONTEST. The United Kingdom´s Strategy for Countering Terrorism," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.22, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf.

4.4. SLOVAKIA

The last case of our discourse analysis is Slovakia as an example of an EU member state which has not been directly affected by the homegrown terrorism, the probability of an attack remains low and yet it has become a matter of general concern and public discussion, especially at time of the parliamentary elections. The following table summarises results of our thematic analysis of the Slovak discourse:

THEME: **Terrorism as a threat** **CODES:** Threat to democracy Threat to human rights Threat to economic development Threat from returnees Threat from the internet and lone wolves Threat from foreign imams Terrorism as one of the greatest threats Raising the level of threat Fight against terrorism as priority	**THEME:** **International commitments** **CODES:** Fight against terrorism within the EU Fight against terrorism at global level Returnees as the greatest challenge for Europe Vulnerability of Schengen
THEME: **Returnees** **CODES:** Returnees as the greatest challenge for EU Skills attained at training camps abroad Accessible travel through Schengen Women and sexual jihad	**THEME:** **Lone wolves** **CODES:** The greatest threat Online propaganda and self-radicalisation
THEME: **Social networks** **CODES:** Self-radicalisation Need for better online prevention Online propaganda	**THEME:** **Muslim community** **CODES:** Seemingly peaceful and non-problematic "Monitoring" of all Muslims Threat from foreign radical imams
THEME: **Migration and Schengen** **CODES:** Possibility of terrorists using migration routes to Europe Schengen raising the threat	**THEME:** **Extremism strategy** **CODES:** Solely right-wing extremism

Table 4: Thematic analysis of terrorism discourse in Slovakia. Themes and codes

For the purpose of transparent comparison with discourse in other states, we start with presenting terrorism as a threat, which is predominant narrative across the EU in general. Slovakia makes no exception as terrorism is constructed as a threat for Europe in the first place, but for Slovakia itself too. According to the official speech acts, terrorism is threatening democracy, human rights and even economic prosperity of Europe.[115] The level of terrorism threat has been repeatedly raised in Slovakia during our followed period, despite claiming that there has never been a direct suspicion of a possible terrorist attack in the country.[116] However, terrorism is not only presented as one of the major threats in Europe but it was also set as the first priority by a new president of the Slovak police M. Lučanský when taking the position in June 2018,[117] which became a matter of controversy as it was understood as populist rhetoric by the opposition parties, considering that in Slovakia other issues should be prioritised by the police. In the crucial anti-terrorism strategy, two main terrorism threats are highlighted – returnees, thus European citizens previously involved in jihad abroad coming back to Europe, and the threat posed by the internet propaganda and possibility of self-radicalised lone wolves who are constructed as a possible issue in Slovakia too. The official strategy also mentions foreign imams spreading radical thoughts among Slovak Muslims,[118] which is a sign of the understanding of interconnected radical Islamist networks in Europe.

Compared to other countries in our analysis, Slovakia puts more emphasis on international commitments related to the fight against terrorism. This could support Rekawek's argument presented in the Literature Review that the V4 countries do not really have their own anti-terrorism strategies and rather copy tactics from the Western states. When analysing the official anti-terrorism concept of Slovakia and informative websites of ministries, a substantial part of the rhetoric focuses on references to documents and strategies released either by the EU, the UN or other international organisations and platforms. This highlighting of the international aspect of the current terrorism threat can be

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[115] Ministerstvo vnútra SR, „Terorizmus," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.minv.sk/?terorizmus-1.
[116] Aktuality.sk, „Na Slovensku platí druhý stupeň teroristického ohrozenia," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/515447/na-slovensku-plati-druhy-stupen-teroristickeho-ohrozenia/.
[117] Teraz.sk, „Nový šéf BIS považuje za prioritu boj proti terorizmu," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www2.teraz.sk/zahranicie/novy-sef-bis-povazuje-za-prioritu-bo/213193-clanok.html.
[118] Ministerstvo vnútra SR, „Národný akčný plán boja proti terorizmu na roky 2015 – 2018," accessed May 10, 2019, p.8, https://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/naka_opr/nptj/NAP%20terorizmus%202015-2018.pdf.

also detected in constructing returnees from war zones as the greatest challenge for Europe, pinpointing their unproblematic movement between the EU countries due to the Schengen zone, which is increasing vulnerability of the country towards the terrorist threat.[119]

Returning foreign fighters were at the same time identified as an independent theme in the Slovak political discourse, presented as the major threat for Europe related to the homegrown terrorism and one of the main current challenges in general. More specifically, the national plan highlights the need to create a mechanism for disabling radicalised European citizens to leave for war zones as well as return from them back to Europe. Returnees are being securitised by expressing possibility of using their newly-gained skills and experience from the war of ISIS in terrorist attacks perpetrated in Europe. Additionally to the returning foreign fighters, European women who have travelled abroad for the purpose of the so called sexual jihad are also constructed as a security risk.[120]

Interestingly, while in other chosen countries we identified ideological indoctrination as a particular theme in the discourse, it is only marginally present in Slovak official speech acts. Instead, the rhetoric is focused on related issues of "lone wolves" and the role of social networks in homegrown terrorism. Therefore, rather than securitising violent ideology, radicalised individuals are construed as the greatest threat in Europe, thus highlighting the issue of self-radicalisation through online propaganda without raising public awareness about the ideological factor behind it. Furthermore, social networks were also identified within the thematic analysis, concretely as the most important means of spreading Islamist propaganda online and leading to self-radicalisation of vulnerable individuals. The official anti-terrorism concept also calls for improving online prevention in the EU, however, it does not provide any country-specific suggestions.[121]

Even though the Muslim community in Slovakia is minor and differently composed when compared to the ones in France, the UK or the EU in general, its relation to the homegrown terrorism can be identified in the official political discourse. The official governmental anti-

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[119] Ministerstvo vnútra SR, „Národný akčný plán boja proti terorizmu na roky 2015 – 2018," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.6-7, https://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/naka_opr/nptj/NAP%20terorizmus%202015-2018.pdf.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ministerstvo vnútra SR, „Národný akčný plán boja proti terorizmu na roky 2015 – 2018," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.6-10, https://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/naka_opr/nptj/NAP%20terorizmus%202015-2018.pdf.

terrorism strategy describes the local community as seemingly peaceful and so far non-problematic, while encouraging constant cautiousness, especially about the influence of foreign, potentially radical imams coming to Slovakia.[122] While in the other analysed political discourses we may find politically incorrect utterances regarding connections between Muslim religion and Islamist terrorism, these are usually present in speech acts of far right-wing representatives, not in the official governmental discourse. However, a strong discursive act was made by R. Fico, the Slovak prime minister at the time, when after the Paris attacks of November 2015 he proclaimed that Slovak intelligence services are monitoring all Muslims in the country.[123] By using the affiliation to the religion of Islam, rather than belonging to a terrorist group or allegiance to an extremist ideology, as an underlying reason to monitor activities of the whole religious group, this narrative publicly securitises all Muslims based solely on their religion.

Having said this, two other points need to be mentioned in relation to Slovak political discourse on terrorism, even though they are not directly related to its homegrown nature. Firstly, terrorism rhetoric in Slovakia is mostly produced as concern about lacking barriers for international movement of terrorists, whether it comes to European homegrown terrorists and returning foreign fighters who have unrestrained freedom of movement within Schengen or non-European Islamist radicals who might potentially get to the European soil using irregular migration routes due to the failing protection of the external borders of Schengen area.[124] These narratives imply that the current state of Schengen enables spread of terrorism in the EU. Secondly, it is noteworthy that while general anti-extremism strategies in France, the UK and the EU are mostly focused on fight against Islamist extremism, Slovak anti-extremism strategy is conceptualised in more general terms and target far right and far left extremism exclusively.[125] This suggests that religious Islamist

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[122] Ministerstvo vnútra SR, „Národný akčný plán boja proti terorizmu na roky 2015 – 2018," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.7-8, https://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/naka_opr/nptj/NAP%20terorizmus%202015-2018.pdf.

[123] Denník N, „Francúzi reagujú na Fica: Ani Le Pen by nepovedal to, čo on.," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MxA6r0RJ9Z8.

[124] Ministerstvo vnútra SR, „Národný akčný plán boja proti terorizmu na roky 2015 – 2018," accessed May 10, 2019, pp.6-10, https://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/naka_opr/nptj/NAP%20terorizmus%202015-2018.pdf.

[125] Ministerstvo vnútra SR, „Koncepcia boja proti extrémizmu na roky 2015 – 2019," accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/naka_opr/nptj/koncepcia%20extremizmus%202015-2019.pdf.

extremism is only a minor issue in Slovak political practice, despite populist voices of political representatives claiming Islamist terrorism as a top priority for the Slovak government.

Summarising our main argument about Slovak political discourse, terrorism is indisputably constructed as a major current threat for Europe, but also for Slovakia in spite of the fact that the actual probability of a terrorist activity in the country is rather low. Slovakia builds its own strategy and rhetoric in reference to commitments stemming from the EU and international agreements, highlighting particularly the threat posed by individuals self-radicalised through online platforms, returning foreign fighters and the vulnerability of the Schengen area. Signs of securitising local Muslim community may be identified in the narratives of high political representatives, despite the peaceful image of Slovak Muslims presented by the official governmental counter-terrorism strategy.

CONCLUSION

Homegrown terrorism in Europe is currently a topic being widely discussed at expert forums, political meetings as well as in wider public sector. Consequences of a potential terrorist attack on the European soil are so far-reaching that this issue has become possibly the most pressing security problem we are facing nowadays.

This thesis was dealing with the concept of the homegrown terrorism in Europe from discursive perspective. Building on assumptions of social constructivism and securitisation theory, we analysed the political discourse on terrorism in the European Union within the past four years, focusing on the narratives of the EU institutions and subsequently the rhetoric of policy-makers in three member states – France, the United Kingdom and Slovakia. As discourse analysis as such is a considerably complex methodological tool, we decided to apply particularly thematic analysis in order to find out what themes are constructed as predominant in the official political discourse in chosen countries.

To shortly summarise our findings, some similar discursive patterns can be discovered in all analysed cases. First and foremost, in all the states homegrown terrorism is being securitised and presented as one of the major current threats for European society. The achievements of the counter-terrorism practices are often emphasised in order to confirm the capabilities of political authorities to tackle this issue. Themes which are of general

concern in all the discourses are, among others, prevention of terrorism and radicalisation, the significant role of the internet in spreading Islamist propaganda and the problem of returning foreign fighters, raising questions about the future perspective of jihadi terrorism in Europe.

However, we have seen that each of the countries has some specific thematic focus and narratives. France has the tendency to highlight the homegrown nature of the current terrorism wave, while taking into account its connections to terrorist groups in the Levant region and the need for diplomatic involvement of France in conflict areas. Due to a considerable Muslim percentage in French population, the rhetoric also puts emphasis on the fact that France is in war with jihadists, not Muslims. The United Kingdom is more focused on actively engaging wider public in spotting signs of Islamist extremism in their surroundings and on the process of indoctrination of vulnerable individuals in the British society. Slovakia is mostly relying its official strategy on international partners, however, its rhetoric related to terrorism is occasionally populistic, considering that the actual threat of a terrorist attack in Slovakia is rather low.

The primary target of this thesis was providing an interpretation of homegrown terrorism discourse in the EU and selected member states, focusing on analysing predominant themes and thus understand how the picture of homegrown terrorism is being constructed by the political authorities. However, the topicality and seriousness of this issue deserves continuing attention of academia, whether from the perspective of discourse, case studies or quantitative research to ensure complex analysis and provide inspiration and know-how for policy-makers when deciding on further counter-terrorism actions and strategies.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AQ – Al-Qaeda

CBRN – Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

CS – Copenhagen School

CT – Counter-terrorism

EU – European Union

FF – Foreign fighters (of the Islamic State)

IRA – The Irish Republican Army

IS – Islamic State

MS – Member state (of the European Union)

PDA – Political discourse analysis

PNR – Passenger name record

RQ – Research question

TA – Thematic analysis

UK - The United Kingdom

UN- The United Nations

US - The Unites States

V4 – Visegrád Group

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FACULTY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Charles University

INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

PROJECT OF MASTER´S THESIS

Author: Anna Hruboňová

Study Programme: Mezinárodní vztahy

Supervisor: PhDr. Ondřej Ditrych, MPhil. Ph.D.

Prague, September 2017

Topic

Homegrown Terrorism in the European Union: Political Discourses of France, the United Kingdom and Slovakia

Even though Europe has a long-lasting experience with terrorism, the last wave of terror[126] perpetrated by Islamist radicals has led to intensification of debate about this phenomenon not only in academic sphere but society in general. Perception of the "Western world" as enemy in addition to modern technology of the 21st century enabled the current terrorism to become an issue for the whole Europe. The so-called homegrown terrorism - attacks performed by terrorists born and raised in the attacked country - makes the topic even more interesting and debatable, considering the fact that one of the major security threats to Europe nowadays stems from within, not outside its borders.

As homegrown terrorism is a considerably complex issue and might be researched from various perspectives, this thesis narrows down the broad topic to exploring political discourses in the European Union and later specifically in three of the member countries. This analysis aims at contributing to the debate about the effects which recent terrorist attacks have had on rhetoric and actions of political representatives. While there is sufficient amount of academic literature on the discourse of the EU/ member states from the period before 2015, due to the quite recent increase of terrorist attacks in Europe there is a lack of research dealing with the question of how these attacks influence current political discourse. C. Baker-Beall identifies three strands of terrorism discourse within the EU – terrorism as emotive act of violence, act committed exclusively by non-state actors and evolving threat.[127] However, taking into account the so-called Islamic State, its connections to European Islamist radicals and the extent of damage which these groups and individuals have lately caused in Europe, it is necessary to reconsider Baker-Beall´s conclusions in the light of the recent development. Similarly, C. Health-Kelly argues in her earlier article that the UK´s PREVENT strategy makes terrorism knowable and governable[128], contradictory to the terrorist attacks in the UK which we witnessed in 2017. Therefore, the change in the British discourse after these events

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might be expected. Additionally, this thesis explores how the homegrown terrorism has been securitised in the political discourses of selected European countries.

Research questions

- How do political actors in the EU and selected countries interpret homegrown terrorism?
- How do these political discourses evolve since 2015?
- What similarities and differences can be found in political discourses of these countries?

Methodology

The diploma thesis uses qualitative researching methods, mainly discourse analysis. Consequently, the research is of rather interpretative than causal nature[129], built from constructivist and post-structuralist theoretical background. Bearing in mind the main assumption of constructivism that social reality is created by social interactions and communication[130], the thesis attempts to understand how rhetoric of political representatives shapes perception of homegrown terrorism as a threat.

Exploring the ongoing securitisation[131] of homegrown terrorism in Europe the analysis focuses on change of political discourse. Terrorist attacks committed in France in 2015 are considered to be a milestone in the current terrorist wave. Therefore, discourses before and after 2015 will be compared. The thesis first analyses the discourse of the EU as a unit and later proceeds to analysis of three selected cases – France and the United Kingdom as examples of countries with considerable Muslim population and a direct terrorist threat; Slovakia as one of the central European countries where the threat is minor but highly

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politicised. The expected outcome of the research is comparison of political discourses of the EU and selected countries as well as comparison of the discourses in period before and after 2015. The main source of data are official documents and statements of the EU, governments and relevant political parties.

The theoretical/ methodological part of the thesis deals with the notions of *securitisation*, *political discourse* and puts the research into constructivist background. The second part first introduces the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism in Europe and later provides discourse analysis of selected cases. Last part is devoted to a concluding comparison of discourses.

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LIST OF APPENDICES

Table 1: Thematic analysis of terrorism discourse in the EU. Themes and codes

Table 2: Thematic analysis of terrorism discourse in France. Themes and codes

Table 3: Thematic analysis of terrorism discourse in the UK. Themes and codes

Table 4: Thematic analysis of terrorism discourse in Slovakia. Themes and codes