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**Kemalist Eurasianism: A Third Way for
Contemporary Turkey in-between the West and East**

Master's thesis

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Year of the defence: 2019

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on 9 May 2019

Emre Can Yılmaz

References

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Abstract

After seven months of diplomatic crisis following the shooting down of Russian fighter jet by the Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish-Russian relations entered into the process of reconciliation in June 2016. Few weeks later, Turkey faced with a coup attempt (July 15, 2016) which was a crucial turning point in Turkey's repositioning itself in the international politics. Deteriorating relations with the West and rapprochement with Russia have brought along debates with regards to Eurasianism as an alternative foreign policy orientation. In this regard, this thesis is dealing with the Patriotic Party's proposed Eurasianist idea, Kemalist Eurasianism, to put forth the idea's conceptual and contextual map by analysing and interpreting the works of Doğu Perinçek, chairman of the Patriotic Party, and the party's monthly journal, *Teori*, within the framework of conceptual history approach. In doing so, the thesis confronts the misconception of Kemalist Eurasianism as a derivation of Russian neo-Eurasianism and argues that the idea is originated from the Kemalist revolution and left-nationalist currents of thought historically. Thus, the thesis reveals that Kemalist Eurasianism primarily is a national agenda based on Kemalist principles of nationalism, *etatism* and populism, and is the international extension of the Turkish national revolution.

Abstrakt

V červnu 2016, po sedmi měsících diplomatické krize v důsledku sestřelení ruského stíhacího bombardéru tureckými ozbrojenými silami, vstoupily turecko-ruské vztahy do procesu smíření. O několik týdnů později zažilo Turecko pokus o převrat (15. července 2016), což se stalo zlomovým okamžikem ve změně postavení Turecka v mezinárodní politice. Zhoršení vztahů se Západem a sblížení s Ruskem přinesly debaty o eurasianismu jako alternativní orientace zahraniční politiky. V této souvislosti se práce zabývá

kemalistickým eurasianismem, tedy ideou navrženou Vlasteneckou stranou eurasianistickou. Práce předkládá konceptuální a kontextovou mapu této idey pomocí analýzy a interpretace díla předsedy Vlastenecké strany Dogu Perinceka a stranického časopisu Teori v rámci přístupu konceptuální historie. Přitom zpochybňuje mylnou představu o tom, že kemalistický eurasianismus pochází z ruského neoeurasianismus a naopak odvozuje historický původ této idey od kemalistické revoluce a levicových nacionalistických myšlenkových proudů. Práce tudíž ukazuje, že je kemalistický eurasianismus především národním programem, založeným na kemalistických zásadách nacionalismu, etatismu a populismu, a také mezinárodním rozšířením turecké národní revoluce.

Keywords

Kemalism, Eurasianism, left-nationalism, conceptual history, anti-globalism, anti-imperialism, Turkish revolution

Klíčová slova

Kemalismus, eurasianismus, levicový nacionalismus, konceptuální historie, antiglobalizace, antiimperialismus, turecká revoluce

Název práce

Kemalistický eurasianismus: třetí cesta pro současné Turecko mezi Západem a Východem

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Short Description of the Topic:	The thesis is about the Patriotic Party's proposed Eurasianist idea of Kemalist Eurasianism based on the interpretation of the writings of the Patriotic Party circles and the party's monthly journal, Teori, within the framework of conceptual history approach. The thesis puts forth the conceptual and contextual map of Kemalist Eurasianism by scrutinising the historical articulation and transformation of the concepts and ideas with regards to the Turkish national revolution, Kemalism and left-nationalism in Turkey. In doing so, the thesis aims to provide a conceptual and theoretical insight on the topic, which has been overlooked in the Turkish academia since it is being equated with Russian neo-Eurasianism, and to demonstrate that the idea is particular to Turkey and distinguished from Russian neo-Eurasianism in terms of historical development and ideological background.
Proposed Structure:	-Introduction -Chapter 1: Approaches To Kemalism And Early Eurasianist Implications -Chapter 2: Left-Nationalist Interpretation Of The Kemalist Revolution -Chapter 3: Conceptualisation Of Kemalist Eurasianism And The Patriotic Party -Chapter 4: Kemalist Eurasianism And Russian Neo-Eurasianism -Conclusion
Sources (basic selection):	Emel Akçalı & Mehmet Perinçek, "Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey," <i>Geopolitics</i> 14 (2009); Mustafa Türkeş, <i>Kadro Hareketi: Ulusçu Sol Bir Akım</i> (Ankara: Imge Yayınevi 1999); Feroz Ahmad, <i>The Making of Modern Turkey</i> (London: Routledge 1993); Mehmet Perinçek, <i>Avrasyacılık: Türkiye'deki Teori ve Pratiği</i> (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2006); Doğu Perinçek, <i>Kemalist Devrim-5: Kemalizmin Felsefesi ve Kaynakları</i> (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları 2014); Doğu Perinçek, <i>Lenin Stalin Mao'nun Türkiye Yazıları</i> , (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları: 1992); Doğu Perinçek, <i>Kemalist Devrim-3: Altı Ok</i> , (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999); Doğu Perinçek, <i>Avrasya Seçeneği</i> (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları 1996); Michael Freeden, "Ideologies and conceptual history," <i>Journal of Political Ideologies</i> 2:1 (1997); Reinhart Koselleck, "Begriffsgeschichte and social history," <i>Economy and Society</i> 11:4 (1982)

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INTRODUCTION

After seven months of diplomatic crisis following the shooting down of Russian fighter jet by the Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish-Russian relations entered into the process of reconciliation in June 2016. Few weeks later, Turkey faced with a coup attempt (July 15, 2016) which was a crucial turning point in Turkey's repositioning itself in the international politics. The coup attempt was operated by the pro-Atlantic Gülenist military members who were to be liquidated by the Supreme Military Council meeting on 1 August 2016.¹ Following the coup attempt, Turkey's focus has shifted from the Atlantic camp towards Eurasia through the process of developing multilateral relations with Russia and Iran. The shift is because of the fact that Turkey was not given support by her Western allies in the post-coup period, the U.S. criticised the arrest of the coup plotters, and John Kerry brought Turkey's NATO membership into question.² At the same time, Turkey adopted a new foreign policy on Syria in co-ordination with Russia and joined the Astana Process alongside with Iran which was a radical alteration in Turkish foreign policy considering the history of the inter-relations of these two countries.

The Turkish Armed Forces have also been subjected to changes since the Supreme Court of Appeals quashed the convictions in Sledgehammer³ (2015) and *Ergenekon*⁴ (2016) trials and acquitted the detained politicians, intellectuals, generals, military commanders and colonels who are akin to Kemalist ideas of anti-imperialism, nationalism, laicism, *etatism*, non-alignment and sovereignty. After the attempted coup, acquitted military officers and colonels

¹ "Supreme Military Council meeting draws near; details revealed," *Daily Sabah* online, last modified July 12, 2016, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/07/13/supreme-military-council-meeting-draws-near-details-revealed>.

² John Hudson, "Kerry Warns Turkey That Actions Could Have NATO Consequences," *Foreign Policy*, last modified July 18, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/18/kerry-warns-turkey-it-could-lose-nato-membership-if-purges-continue/>.

³ For a detailed information on the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer plots, see Dani Rodrik, "The Plot Against the Generals," last modified June, 2014, <http://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/plot-against-the-generals.pdf>.

⁴ For a detailed information on Ergenekon plot, see Gareth H. Jenkins, "Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation," *Silk Road Papers*, 2009, http://isdpeu/content/uploads/publications/2009_jenkins_between-fact-and-fantasy.pdf.

were appointed in place of the coup plotters and the others who had already returned before the coup got promoted to higher ranks following the approval of the Supreme Military Council's Decisions by President Erdoğan in August 2017.⁵ Aforementioned consequential developments in the Turkish politics have brought about debates recently with regards to a Eurasianist takeover of Turkish politics and its foreign policy.⁶

The main reason behind the debates on Eurasianist takeover was the rapprochement with Russia that was actually initiated before the coup attempt with the initiative of the Patriotic Party (former Workers' Party)⁷ through proactive dialogue with unofficial visits to Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) and Alexander Dugin, "the leader of the International Eurasian Movement and a member of the Advisory Board at the Russian State Duma"⁸. Members of the Patriotic Party paid visits to Russia during the time of political crises after shooting down of the Russian jet, pre- and post-coup-attempt period and after the assassination of Andrey Karlov, Russian Ambassador to Turkey, in December 2016, in Ankara. The Patriotic Party and its members, particularly the party leader Doğu Perinçek, İsmail Hakkı Pekin, the Former Head of the Intelligence of the General Staff, and retired admiral Soner Polat, have played a mediating role in the time of crises, thanks to their established connections with the officials of the Russian Federation on behalf of the Turkish government. These efforts for and benefits of the dialogue were mentioned on *Katehon*, Russian think-tank and media outlet, by Alexander Dugin and Konstantin Malofeev.⁹

⁵ "President Erdogan Approves Supreme Military Council's Decisions," Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/80082/president-erdogan-approves-supreme-military-councils-decisions>

⁶ Paolo Magri, "Introduction," in *Turkey: Towards a Eurasian Shift?*, ed. Valeria Talbot (Milano: Ledizioni 2018), 7-11.

⁷ The Workers' Party changed its name to the Patriotic Party in 2015. For a brief history of the party, see "Brief History of the Patriotic Party," *Vatan Partisi*, <http://vatanpartisi.org.tr/english/haberler/brief-history-of-the-patriotic-party-turkey-10962>

⁸ "Alexander Dugin," *Geopolitica*. <https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/person/alexander-dugin>.

⁹ Video by the official channel of the Patriotic Party on the role of the Patriotic Party in Turkish-Russian rapprochement: statements of Konstantin Malofeev and Alexander Dugin "Türk-Rus İlişkilerinin Düzelmesinde Vatan Partisi'nin Rolü." YouTube video, 02:55, posted by "Vatan Partisi," August 11, 2016. Accessed Feb 20, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IWkHihbiYDw>.

The Patriotic Party also played a constructive role during the Turkey's strategic shift in Syria through their visits to the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Those visits were very well received when all the communication channels were closed at the bureaucratic level between Turkey and Syria and paved the way for the relatively moderate bi-lateral relations between Turkey and Syria.¹⁰ Also, reciprocal visits took place with Iranian bureaucrats during the same period where both parts exchanged their ideas on Turkey-Iran relations regarding the strategies in the Middle East and Syria.¹¹ The impact of those proactive and constructive efforts became visible in Syria peace talks in Astana¹², since January 2017, when Turkey became a party in the process together with Iran and Russia. Also, this reconciliation and co-operation process brought along trilateral trade agreements among the trio based on using local currency in petroleum, gas, fundamental goods and banking.¹³

The reconciliation process with Russia, foreign policy and strategy shift in the region, change in Syrian policy and decisive strategy on border security regarding the northern part of Syria together with Turkey's becoming a part of Astana trio sparked off a reaction in the West.¹⁴ During the post-coup period, Doğu Perinçek and Eurasianists were mentioned in the Western media and social media in a very negative manner and blamed for driving Turkey towards the East. Especially following the coup attempt, Michael Rubin and Henri J. Barkey insistently implied that Turkey is being ruled by Doğu Perinçek, and Eurasianists would attempt to topple

¹⁰ "Patriotic Party Chairman Perinçek met Syrian President Bashar al-Assad," *Vatan Partisi*, last modified March 3, 2015, <http://vatanpartisi.org.tr/english/news/patriotic-party-chairman-Perinçek-met-syrian-president-bashar-al-assad-12989>.

¹¹ "Diplomatic visit of the Patriotic Party to Iran," *Vatan Partisi*, last modified July 2017, <http://vatanpartisi.org.tr/english/news/diplomatic-visit-of-the-patriotic-party-to-iran-13986>; "Russian and Iranian delegations visit Patriotic Party" *Ulusal*, last modified Nov 9, 2016, <https://www.ulusal.com.tr/gundem/rusya-ve-iran-heyetlerinden-vatan-partisi-ne-ziyaret-h127748.html>.

¹² Patrick Wintour, "Russia in power-broking role as Syria peace talks begin in Astana," *The Guardian*, last modified January 23, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/22/russia-syria-talks-astana-kazakhstan->.

¹³ "Turkey, Russia, Iran to use local currencies for trade," *Hurriyet Daily News*, last modified September 9, 2018, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-russia-iran-to-use-local-currencies-for-trade-136631>.

¹⁴ Ceren Kenar, "Turkey's 'Deep State' Has a Secret Back Channel to Assad," *Foreign Policy*, last modified July 12, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/12/turkeys-deep-state-has-a-secret-backchannel-to-assad/>.

down the President Erdogan.¹⁵ Moreover, online media outlets like Al-Monitor and think-tanks also gave way to, so to say, ‘liberal’ authors after the coup who also implicated the role of Doğu Perinçek¹⁶ and Eurasianists in the post-coup Turkey by referring to Eurasianists as “Russian lobby” and claiming that “a group of so-called Eurasianists are again whispering to Ankara that Turkey’s future lies with Russia and China and have outlined a plan of severing ties with Europe”.¹⁷

During the post-coup period, there have been many op-eds written and published in mainstream Western media and Turkish ‘liberal’ media outlets¹⁸ in the same fashion. However, how come such a marginal Eurasianist political party (Patriotic Party) and its leader whose voting rate has been around 0.2% draws such attention and has been claimed as the shadow ruler of Turkey, directing Turkey away from her Atlantic Alliance towards Eurasian orientation? It suggests a very interesting case of how have the people, who were in prison until a few years ago under the pretext of *Ergenekon* and Sledgehammer plots, which will be mentioned below, become influential in shaping Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy without compromising the principles of Kemalism, secularism, anti-imperialism and anti-Atlanticism? As remains to be shown that a third way for Turkey is possible between the obsolescent relations with the West and the refrained East. In this regard, the ideology of the Patriotic Party and their proposed international strategy, Kemalist Eurasianism, which brought concrete results

¹⁵ Michael Rubin, “Turkey Is Headed for a Bloodbath,” *Newsweek*, last modified November 3, 2016, <https://www.newsweek.com/michael-rubin-turkey-headed-bloodbath-515787>; Leela Jacinto, “Turkey’s Post-Coup Purge and Erdogan’s Private Army,” *Foreign Policy*, last modified July 13, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/13/turkeys-post-coup-purge-and-erdogans-private-army-sadat-Perinçek-gulen/>; Michael Rubin, “Will Erdogan survive his struggle with Turkey’s military?,” *Medium*, last modified Dec 17, 2016, <https://medium.com/@turkeyobserved/will-erdogan-survive-his-struggle-with-turkeys-military-1d0db603c243>.

¹⁶ Leonardo Veneziani, “If Erdogan Has a Boss, It Must Be Doğu Perinçek,” *Vocal Europe*, last modified Feb 11, 2018, <https://www.vocaleurope.eu/if-erdogan-has-a-boss-it-must-be-Doğu-Perinçek/>.

¹⁷ Mustafa Akyol, “What the ‘Russian lobby’ in Ankara wants,” *Al-Monitor* (December 15, 2016) <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/contents/articles/originals/2016/12/turkey-russia-what-russian-lobby-wants.html>

¹⁸ Oya Baydar, “Amerika gitsin Rusya mı gelsin, Allahsız Gomonistler!,” *T24*, last modified Nov 15, 2017, <https://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/oya-baydar/amerika-gitsin-rusya-mi-gelsin-allahsiz-gomonistler,18515>; Erol Aral, “ABD emperyalizmine karşı neofaşist Avrasya dolması,” *Evrensel*, last modified Dec 20, 2017, <https://www.evrensel.net/yazi/80510/abd-emperyalizmine-karsi-neofasist-avrasya-dolmasi>.

in the region, need to be paid attention to as a subject of study as it has left its mark on the Turkish foreign policy praxis over the past few years. Especially as the unipolar U.S. hegemony in the world politics has been challenged by China and Russia together with economic giant but political dwarf, the EU, a country like Turkey, which is in-between the West and East in every sense, is to seek a new strategy in the region. Herein, the Patriotic Party suggests a third way, which stems from internal dynamics and unique revolutionary experience of Turkey, through which Turkey will materialise the unfinished national democratic revolution initiated by Atatürk and become a sovereign power in the region. Hence, this thesis evolves around two main questions: what are the roots of Kemalist Eurasianism and how does the Patriotic Party conceptualise this idea of Eurasianism? The main argument of the thesis is that Kemalist Eurasianism is a two-layered concept: 1) it is a national agenda for Turkey grounded on Kemalist nationalism, socialism, and *etatism* which has a historical context; and 2) it is an international agenda, in accordance with the former, prioritising the regional cooperation and Turkey's national interests based on anti-globalism and the sovereignty of the nation states. In addition, Kemalist Eurasianism is distinguished from Russian neo-Eurasianism not only since the idea is particular to Turkey and to the unique revolutionary experience but also Turkey has its own practical and intellectual accumulation historically so that it is capable to produce the idea particularly.

The Statement of the Problem and the Research Question

Eurasianism in Turkey, as a field of study, has gained popularity in the Turkish academia in the beginning of the 2000s. The debates on Eurasianism in Turkey have been shaped within the framework of international relations and geopolitics. Turkey's foreign policy agenda on the Central Asia and Caucasus in the 1990s and Davutoğlu's "strategic depth" doctrine have been reckoned as nationalist and Islamist variations of Eurasianism respectively. Nevertheless,

practitioners of the Turkish foreign policy did not assert any Eurasianist claim nor did they mention Eurasianism in their party programs or political agendas during this period. In parallel with this, the studies focus on geopolitical theories and their implementation on the Turkish foreign policy praxis in explaining the phenomenon within the framework of Eurasianism.

Kemalist Eurasianism has also been approached in the same manner despite the fact that it has yet been implemented in practical terms. The scholars such as Erşen, Bilgin and Eren-Webb, predominantly apply critical geopolitics¹⁹ in deconstructing Kemalist Eurasianism as a radical geopolitical discourse which “allows nationalists and the military to preserve status-quo inside and call for radical foreign policy projects outside”, such as Turkey’s shifting from the West and turning towards Eurasia.²⁰ As a second approach, Aktürk argues that ‘Turkish Eurasianism’ projects an alternative globalisation and a “counter-hegemonic vision” against the current political, economic and cultural globalisation.²¹ The third approach tries to connect and explain Turkish Eurasianism within the scope of Russian neo-Eurasianism, and compare both in terms of compatibility and viability in the case of a potential alliance.²²

However, critical geopolitical approach does not touch upon the conceptual features of Kemalist Eurasianism; rather, focuses on the analysis of discourses and interprets those discourses without expounding the historical uses and transformation of the terms. Moreover, scholars studying Eurasianism tend to explain or interpret ideas within the context of

¹⁹ Ebru Eren-Webb, “To Which Eurasia Does Turkey Belong? A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Eurasianist Geopolitical Discourses,” *Bogazici Journal* 25, no. 2 (2011); Emre Erşen, “Geopolitical Traditions in Turkey: Turkish Eurasianism,” in *The Politics of Eurasianism: Identity, Popular Culture and Russia’s Foreign Policy* ed. Mark Bassin and Gonzalo Pozo (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 263-281; Pınar Bilgin, “Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey’s Geography: The uses of ‘geopolitical truths’ in Turkey,” *Political Geography* 26, no. 7 (2007): 740-756; Lerna Yanık, “Constructing Turkish ‘exceptionalism’: Discourses of liminality and hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy,” *Political Geography* 30, no. 2 (2011): 80-89.

²⁰ Bilgin, 753.

²¹ Sener Aktürk, “Counter-Hegemonic Visions and Reconciliation through the Past: The Case of Turkish Eurasianism,” *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2004): 237.

²² Marlene Laruelle, “Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the idea of Eurasia-Alexander Dugin’s Networks in Turkey,” *The Jamestown Foundation*, last modified in 2008, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/Jamestown-LaruelleRussoTurkish_01.pdf?x74728; Igor Torbakov, “Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations,” *The Jamestown Foundation*, last modified in October 2007, <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/Torbakov-OP.pdf?x87069>.

democratisation and Europeanisation that also cause a gridlock for the discussions on original theories for the development of Turkey. Another problem stems from the approach which assumes Kemalist Eurasianism is a derivation of Russian neo-Eurasianism. Due to the same reason, Kemalist Eurasianism has been reckoned merely as a pro-Russian idea, and proponents of it have been argued as old-fashioned ultra-nationalists who are inclined to undemocratic militaristic rule. At this point it is essential to mention that the first Eurasian Conference held by the Patriotic Party was before Dugin's manifestation of the Foundations of Geopolitics²³ (1997), in which Dugin put forward an Eurasianist geopolitical path for Russia by challenging the U.S.-hegemonic unipolar world order. Kemalist Eurasianism's comprehension of Eurasianism loosely coincides with Dugin's conceptualisation, philosophy and strategic projection. In fact, as this thesis argues, Kemalist Eurasianism's ideational aspects trace back to the Kemalist revolution, its theory and praxis, and the left-nationalist currents of thought of the 1930s and 1960s. Furthermore, Kemalist Eurasianism cannot solely be considered as a foreign policy agenda; instead, it is, first and foremost, an agenda for the Turkish nation-state and national identity; one as such when conceived as in-between the West and the East.

Trying to explain Kemalist Eurasianism solely on the basis of foreign policy strategy or geopolitical discourse overlooks the very essence of the idea. Also, association of the Eurasianism in Turkey with Russian Neo-Eurasianism, despite the fact that Turkey has her own historical and revolutionary legacy, demonstrates the need of a historical and theoretical study on Kemalist Eurasianism. For this reason, this thesis seeks answers to the following questions in order to constitute a conceptual framework: What are the roots of Kemalist Eurasianism? How does the Patriotic Party, which has it as one of its defining political concept and discourse, conceptualise Kemalist Eurasianism domestically and internationally? To which symbolic geography does Turkey belong? How does Kemalist Eurasianism define the Turkish national

²³ Alexander Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları 2015).

interest? How can Turkey realise its sovereignty in the political and economic realm? What does lie behind its anti-Western stance? What are the Kemalist Eurasianist premises on the basis of the Turkish foreign policy? Thus, this thesis aims to put forth Kemalist Eurasianism's conceptual and contextual 'map' by finding answers to aforementioned questions within the framework of Kemalist Eurasianism's understanding of the nation state and apprehension of the Turkey's identity vis-à-vis the Turkish foreign policy based on the fact that, from a historical perspective, the Turkish foreign policy has been "inextricably intertwined with the national identity of Turkey"²⁴. Thus, based on that proposition, the thesis argues that the concept of Kemalist Eurasianism is not merely a foreign policy strategy but a national ideology for contemporary Turkey conceptualising Kemalism by left-nationalism which traces back to the 1930s and 1960s' left-nationalist currents. Hence, it is outrightly related to the approach towards the Turkish nation-state and the Turkish national identity which have been constructed within the context of political, economic and cultural history in the past years going back to the late Ottoman period. During those times, various ideas were proposed by the young civil-military intellectuals for the Ottoman state to regain its former power and to restore its authority over its territory. Similarly, in the time of crises, political elite and the intellectuals sought way-outs by challenging the existing structure as in the 1930s and 1960s when the left-nationalist intellectuals tried to idealise the Turkish revolution as a unique revolutionary praxis which could be the only way to gain political and economic independence. The Patriotic Party, as the continuum of this left-nationalist tradition, also became prominent in the time of aforementioned crises and suggested an intrinsic ideology as an alternative way for Turkey. In this regard, the subject deserves a comprehensive theoretical and historical approach.

²⁴ Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

Research Method

The perception of concepts and ideologies differs from nation to nation by the historical continuum; and the perception and meaning of political concepts are formed through the historical experience and stages of political and economic development of that specific nation and geography. In this regard, Freedon's remarks are notable:

“Political concepts acquire meaning not only through historically transferred traditions of discourse, and not only through the pluralist disparities of culture, but also through their particular location within a constellation of other political concepts.”²⁵

Accordingly, if the meaning of political concepts are fluid and they are the configuration of historical, cultural and spatial articulations, then the analysis of political concepts and perception of ideologies necessitate a distinctive approach out of the scope of established formations.²⁶ In other words, unique historical experiences should be taken into consideration substantially not to overlook the essence of the idea as there is no objective criteria for the meanings and perceptions of political concepts and ideologies. In connection with this, rather than seeking an answer for if an ideology is good or bad, or true or false, the aim should be to reveal, for example, why and how such an ideology appeared, what the circumstances were, what propositions the ideology suggests. As mentioned before, since ideologies incite people to action and confront the *status quo*, it is necessary to determine the prevalent political and economic conjuncture of the time to comprehend the emergence or re-emergence of an ideology in the analysis and interpretation of the subject.

Thus, these debates on the temporality and spatiality of the meaning of the concept and ideology lead us to conceptual history approach as the method to be applied in analysing the Kemalist revolutionary principles and the Patriotic Party's and Doğu Perinçek's proposed idea

²⁵ Michael Freedon, *Ideologies and Political Theories: A Conceptual Approach*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 54.

²⁶ Toni Alaranta, *Contemporary Kemalism: From Universal Secular-Humanism to Extreme Turkish Nationalism*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 3.

of Kemalist Eurasianism. Conceptual history, *Begriffsgeschichte*, is an interdisciplinary methodological approach theorised by Reinhart Koselleck in the post-War Germany dealing with the historical semantics of the concepts. It is “a method aimed at examining the history of fundamental political concepts ... within a broad social and cultural context”.²⁷ According to Koselleck, “historical clarification of past conceptual usage must refer itself not only to the history of language but also to social-historical data, for every semantic has as such an involvement with non-linguistics content”.²⁸

It is due to the fact that the concepts have been used during a certain specific time in certain specific social historical circumstances in explaining or challenging the existing conditions which have been and are open to change as the social-historical and -political transformation is inevitable. Thus, the use of concept or the meaning of an ideology is open to alteration semantically. Such alterations also differ not only temporally but also spatially. Koselleck exemplifies it as following:

“One needs only to think of the shifts in meaning and function of the concept “revolution,” a concept which at first offered a model formula for the probable recurrence of events; was then reminted as a concept of historicophilosophical objective and political action; and is for us today an indicator of structural change. Here, *Begriffsgeschichte* becomes an integral part of social history.”²⁹

In this regard, the focus should not merely be the linguistics; instead, social historical context must be the core as a signifier in the analysis. For this reason, as a method, texts will be read and interpreted, instead of using texts as in structural analysis which is applied as “instrumental activity for purposes other than understanding text”³⁰, to establish a connection with the meaning of the text. Here, our method converges with Gadamer’s hermeneutics according to

²⁷ Michael Freeden, “Ideologies and conceptual history,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 2, no. 1 (1997): 3-4.

²⁸ Reinhart Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte and social history,” *Economy and Society* 11, no. 4 (1982): 414.

²⁹ Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 80.

³⁰ Martin W. Bauer, Aude Biquelet, Ahmet K. Suerdem, “Text Analysis: an introductory manifesto,” in *Textual Analysis*, eds. Martin W. Bauer, Aude Biquelet and Ahmet K. Suerdem (London: Sage, 2014), 28.

whom “interpretation is not free from historically effected consciousness” so that “hermeneutic process must take preconceptions as a starting point”.³¹ Accordingly, Koselleck argues that during the process of textual exegesis use of socio-political concepts and their meaning assume a sociohistorical status where “the moments of duration, change, and futurity contained in a concrete political situation are registered through their linguistic traces”; therefore, “social conditions and their transformation become in this fashion the objects of analysis”.³² In this way, the conceptual approach transcribes and clarifies the texts written in the past and “bring more clear viewpoint into contemporary intentional circumstance or relation in their linguistic make-up”.³³

Hence, in the thesis, Kemalist Eurasianism, which is advocated and pioneered by the Patriotic Party and its leader Doğu Perinçek, will be scrutinised and analysed as an ideology within the framework of conceptual history. As primary sources, Doğu Perinçek’s works and the monthly journal of the Patriotic Party’s, *Teori* which has been published since 1990, will be utilised selectively by subjects of politics, economy and history. Additionally, the works and writings of scholars, intellectuals and retired military generals published in *Teori* journal will be used in analysis as primary sources addressing specific issues on the sphere of economy, history and geopolitics respectively. The texts will be read, analysed and interpreted within the framework of abovementioned conceptual history method which will differentiate this work from the previous ones in the sense that the majority of the previous works on the field of subject adopted post-modernist or geopolitical approaches by overlooking or bypassing the substantiality of the ideology without theorising it historically.

Above-named people and *Teori* journal are chosen as the unit of analysis purposefully for specific reasons. First and foremost, the reason for applying to the works of above-named

³¹ Bauer et al, 28.

³² Koselleck, *Futures Past*, 79.

³³ *Ibid*, 81.

people is that they are specialists in their field and on the respective subjects and have been very productive in the topic of Eurasianism in Turkey. They differ from the ones who proposed ideas on Eurasianism by overtly qualifying themselves as Eurasianists which is observable both in their works and practices. The second reason is about *Teori* journal, the monthly journal of the Patriotic Party which has been issued since 1990 comprising about 80 pages in each issue, that the journal is quite useful as a source because notable events and issues of certain specific periods are compiled and addressed monthly, which helps to trace and find important historical events of the time; and various authors and scholars either from close circle of the Patriotic Party or different groups, has contributed by their ideas to the journal that provide wider perspective in interpreting those events. The topics cover the areas of politics, economy and history such as political thought, specific historical events, or commentary on particular political or economic issue which is remarkable in the month when the journal was issued. But more importantly, the journal is very useful as it provides a panoramic view towards the significant events which took place in Turkey's agenda and facilitates the tracking of recent history as a whole retrospectively which is very important in the sense of establishing an analytical connection and causality among the ideology, discourse and status quo of the time.

As mentioned above, Kemalist Eurasianism is the continuum of the left-nationalist currents of 1930s and 1960s, Cadre Movement and *YÖN* Movement respectively. Thus, these movements frame the concepts which will be used in explaining Kemalist Eurasianism. Therefore, Kemalism, left-nationalism, *etatism*, and anti-imperialism will be the core concepts in analysing and interpreting Kemalist Eurasianism by referring to the historical circumstances and conjuncture.

In this regard, the thesis is divided in four chapters. The first chapter will be dedicated to historical and theoretical framework which will be set through Kemalism by referring to the early republican era in order to present the approaches towards the Turkish nation-building

process and national identity. The interpretation of Kemalism as ‘westernisation’ will be challenged and the particular aspects of the Kemalist revolution will be demonstrated.

In the second chapter, the consolidation period will be mentioned in order to demonstrate the convergence of socialism and nation-state nationalism in the 1930s under the Cadre Movement which will be acknowledged as one of the ideological pillars of Kemalist Eurasianism. Following that, the impact of *YÖN* Movement, vanguard left-nationalist movement in the 1960s which defended the idea of National Democratic Revolution, will be referred to construct the theory of the thesis since the movement is the outlet of Kemalist Eurasianist current of thought and the idea of the National Democratic Revolution is still taken as pre-condition for the realisation of the Turkish Revolution pioneered by Atatürk.

After forming the theoretical and ideological frame historiographically, in the third chapter, Kemalist Eurasianist interpretation and adoption of Kemalism and Kemalist revolutions will be analysed historically within the context of wider framework of revolutions and practical analogies by which Kemalist Eurasianist worldview will be constituted. Following the formation of Kemalist Eurasianist worldview in the political and economic sphere, the chapter will be dedicated to the core of the thesis, the historiographic analysis of the political and economic specifics of Kemalist Eurasianism. In parallel with this, their position towards the EU, NATO and the US will be scrutinised applying historical and conceptual references through which the contradiction between the Atlantic camp and Eurasian camp will be better analysed in response to superficially established approaches towards Eurasianism mentioned in the Introduction chapter.

In the fourth chapter, Kemalist Eurasianism and the Russian neo-Eurasianism will be compared since Kemalist Eurasianism is perceived as a variation or imitation of Russian neo-Eurasianism based on Dugin’s projection. Convergences and divergences between the two

Eurasianisms will be demonstrated and Kemalist Eurasianism will be distinguished from Russian neo-Eurasianism.

In the conclusion part, a holistic approach, concerning the position of Turkey in the world politics including the Turkish national identity and geopolitical musts, will be postulated in regard to Kemalist Eurasianist idea through induction method by composing the theory, historical evolution of the problems and transition processes in the world politics by referring to specific historic events which influenced Turkish political and economic sphere. In this way, a broader and original perspective will be provided to the position of Turkey which has been caught between the West and the East for years in terms of the national identity, economy and foreign policy.

CHAPTER 1: APPROACHES TO KEMALISM AND EARLY EURASIANIST IMPLICATIONS

With the globalisation and the collapse of the socialist and communist systems in the Eastern Bloc, it was believed that the post-Cold War era will be shaped by the western liberal democratic system and its open market economy. In this new international order, it was assumed that nation-states and their nationalisms would enter into the process of decay. Nevertheless, those assumptions were proven wrong later on due to the consequences of series of specific historical events such as the War in Yugoslavia, September 11 attacks in the United States (U.S.), the wars in the Middle East, global economic crisis, ‘Arab Springs and recently the Syrian War, immigration flows and rising rightist movements all over the world. All those events together with some concomitant factors, such as rising populist nationalisms and border security concerns have played a certain role in nation-states’ coming into prominence even within the supra-national organisations. Especially the ‘global terrorism’ and recent immigration flows have pushed nation-states to take some serious measures against the outside threats. One can suggest that the national law of the nation-states and their practices have prevailed over the norms of international human rights and European Human Rights Convention due to the security concerns and interests of the nation-states. As Keyman suggests:

“...rather than suffering a demise, today nationalism and nationalist sentiments are becoming more and more unleashed... and it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that nationalism will retain its dominant place in politics in the foreseeable future of national and global affairs.”³⁴

The end of the Cold War not only influenced the European sphere of politics but also affected Turkey in terms of re-positioning itself in the new international order. Once, as a buffer against the Soviet Union and the spread of communism, articulated to the West as a NATO

³⁴ E. Fuat Keyman, “Nationalism in Turkey: State, Modernity and Identity,” in *Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey*, ed. Ayse Kadioğlu and E. Fuat Keyman (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press 2011), 11.

member through the instrumentality of its geographical location, in the post-Cold War era, Turkey has embarked on a quest of political identity. Already engaged with and dependent on the West in terms of military, as a NATO member, and economy, due to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and prescriptions and neo-liberal policies since the late 1980s, respectively, Turkey also faced with internal problems such as increased PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) terrorist attacks, the rise of Islamist fundamentalism in political and societal level and mafia-state relations during the chaotic environment of the 1990s.³⁵ Kemalist Eurasianist ideology emerged in that particular political and economic atmosphere among the “Kemalist, Social Democratic and a segment of Socialist intellectual and political actors, such as the supporters of the Republican People's Party (RPP), Democratic Leftist Party (DLP) and the Workers' Party (IP)” who claimed that the pro-Western and pro-US policies were the main factors in the decay of Kemalism and deterioration of the “secular and social Turkish nation-state”.³⁶ With regard to that argument, it can be suggested that the characteristics and ideology of Kemalist Eurasianism stem from the constituent elements of the modern republic and the Turkish nation-state.

When we look at the ideas operating within the framework of the construction of the Turkish nation-state since the modernisation efforts in the Ottoman Empire and during the Republican era, those ideas and debates have been shaped within the context of ‘Westernism’ (*baticılık*), Turkism and Islamism. Correspondingly, proponents of each current have tried to attribute some degree of authenticity and exceptionalism to their apprehension of the Turkish national identity. Hence, for Eurasianism debates in Turkey, except Westernism, Turkism and Islamism have been referred as Eurasianist variations. Nevertheless, those ideas were already

³⁵ For a detailed information on Turkey in 1990s see Michael M. Gunter, “Susurluk: The connection between Turkey's intelligence community and organized crime,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 11, no. 2 (1998): 119-141.

³⁶ Emel Akçalı and Mehmet Perinçek, “Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey,” *Geopolitics* 14, no. 3 (2009): 551.

apparent in the form of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in earlier periods before the proclamation of the republic. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish Kemalist Eurasianism from those “Eurasianisms” due to its novelty because of the fact that it proposes a new direction after failed attempts of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. Aktürk defines Eurasianism as the fourth pole of intellectual landscape by referring to three intellectual trends of Westernism, Turkism and Islamism and to Huntington’s use of these conceptualisations:

“*Having rejected Mecca [Islamism] and then being rejected by Brussels [Westernism], where does Turkey look? Tashkent [Turkism] may be the answer.*’ What Huntington or anyone else could not have imagined at the time was that, in fact, some intellectuals – the so-called Eurasianists – have suggested ‘Moscow’.”³⁷

As mentioned before, Kemalist Eurasianism has been rooted in two cores: Kemalism and the Turkish nation-state. Therefore, to be able to comprehend the understanding of the Kemalist Eurasianist idea, it is necessary to scrutinise the early republican modernisation, Kemalist revolution and its principles, the role of the Turkish nation-state and nationalism in implementing and consolidating the revolutions, and accordingly the projected Turkish national identity under the state-led nationalism.

Kemalist Nationalism

The studies on Kemalism and the making of modern Turkey constitute the variety of approaches in accordance with the ideological standpoint of the scholars. Those debates were shaped around the ideas based on Westernism and nationalism particular to Turkey’s anti-imperialist struggle of the National War of Liberation against the Western imperialism. With regards to these, proponents of the former tend to characterise Kemalist revolution as Westernisation whereas the latter put emphasis on particularism of the Turkish nationalism articulated through anti-imperialism and Asiatic notions of *etatism* and populism interrelatedly with the Soviet

³⁷ Sener Aktürk, “Counter-Hegemonic Visions,” 209-211.

revolution. As to the nation-building process following the national liberation war, Kemalist revolutions are approached in line with these two different ideas regarding Turkey's position within the East-West or Europe-Asia dichotomy.

According to Brubaker, "nationhood is not an ethno-demographic or ethno-cultural fact; it is a political claim. It is a claim on people's loyalty, on their attention, on their solidarity"³⁸:

"...claims to nationhood are addressed first of all to putative members of the nation. They seek to change the way people understand and identify themselves. This may involve getting people who previously understood themselves in non-national terms—in religious terms, for example, or in local terms, or as subjects of an emperor—to redefine themselves as members of a nation. Or it may involve getting people to think of themselves as members of a different nation—to persuade people they are not Spanish but Basque or Catalan, for example; not Turkish but Kurdish"³⁹

Brubaker argues further that the nation is used in the process of nation-building to keep the political status quo and territorial integrity by creating the sentiment of national unity:

"It is this sort of work that was (and still is) undertaken... by leaders of post-colonial states, who had won independence, but whose populations were and remain deeply divided along regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines."⁴⁰

Explaining nation and nationhood, Brubaker defends the position of nation-states and argues that nationalism or patriotism can be the driving force for civic engagement by creating the sense of solidarity and mutual responsibility among different groups living within the same boundaries.⁴¹ Hence, nationalism, or patriotism, can be used as the means of nation-states to create an organic society through the sense of collective belonging to the set of values imposed by nation-states.

³⁸ Rogers Brubaker, "In the name of the nation: reflections on nationalism and patriotism," *Citizenship Studies* 8, no. 2 (2004): 116.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 117.

⁴¹ Ibid, 121.

According to Kadioğlu⁴², one of the main features of nationalisms is showing the “flirtatious” character with different ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism and Marxism, throughout the history. Secondly, Kadioğlu asserts that nationalisms are constructions manufactured by national intelligentsia. Differed from French nationalism and Lenin’s distinction between the nationalisms of the oppressor and the oppressed, both reflect the idea of transfer of power to the people, nationalism was introduced to the Ottoman political sphere by the intellectuals such as *Namık Kemal*, *Yusuf Akçura* and *Ziya Gökalp* during the late Ottoman period in order to preserve the existing state rather than transforming state-society relations.⁴³ Indeed, during the late Ottoman period, intellectuals framed nationalism as a modernist idea to keep the Ottoman state alive; and later on, during the early republican era, the same state-centric understanding was in effect in the form of nationalism again.

According to Keyman, nationalism was the main ideology in the process of Turkish modernisation.⁴⁴ He argues that “the modern state-building process and the state-centric mode of modernization in Turkey have constituted the very foundation on which nationalism has acquired its dominant ideological status and its transformative power.”⁴⁵ Accordingly it can be proposed that the Turkish nation-state under the administration of the military elite was the pioneer of Turkish modernisation and nation-building process by implementing nationalist discourse. To establish a modern nation-state, it was necessary to abandon the Ottoman past and its feudal legacy in terms of structures, institutions, politics, economy, culture and so on. Hence, during the early years of the newly proclaimed republic, the aim of the Kemalist elite was to “reach the contemporary level of civilization by establishing its political, economic, and

⁴² Ayse Kadioglu and E. Fuat Keyman, *Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2011), xiv.

⁴³ Kadioglu, xiv.

⁴⁴ Keyman, 12.

⁴⁵ Keyman, 12.

ideological prerequisites, such as the creation of an independent nation-state, the fostering of industrialization, and the construction of a secular and modern national identity.”⁴⁶

Kemalist approach towards the nationalism stems from the territory which was already defined under the National Pact before the war of liberation. As Ahmad argues “the Ottoman or Kemalist notion of citizenship had never been ethnic... ..Turkish citizenship depended on residence (not birth) within the borders of the emerging state defined by the National Pact”.⁴⁷ Additionally, in the context of identity, some scholars have tendency to explain the Kurdish rebellions, like the Sheikh Said Rebellion, in the early republican era as a sort of nationalist movements against the republic; nevertheless, one cannot claim the existence of national consciousness in that period not only in the eastern part of but in the whole of Turkey. Akşin argues that the Sheikh Said Rebellion emerged as a religious counter-revolutionary riot in the name of restoring caliphate and Sharia, and in such a feudal society, which has been ruled by the tribal landowners, development of nationalist movements was not possible at that time.⁴⁸ With regard to aforementioned approaches, the Turkish nation-state “...was derived from a reaction to two fundamental problems which were the key to the decline of the Ottoman empire: the personal rule of the sultan and the Islamic basis of the Ottoman state.”⁴⁹ In doing so, Kemalism conceptualises the republic “as a nation-state in its fullest form” that was projected as the leading force to transform society in order to reach to the modernity and the universal level of civilisation through the rational thinking and rational morality.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Keyman, 13.

⁴⁷ Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 80.

⁴⁸ Sina Akşin, *Ana Çizgileriyle Türkiye'nin Yakın Tarihi-2* (İstanbul: Yeni Gün Haber Ajansı, 1997), 61-62.

⁴⁹ Fuat Keyman, “On the Relation between Global Modernity and Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 13, (1995): 103.

⁵⁰Keyman, “Nationalism in Turkey”, 17.

Kemalism: 'Unnamed Eurasianism'

Mardin argues that approaching Kemalism merely as the will to Westernisation provides only one part of the ideology; therefore, it is necessary to explain Kemalism by looking through the replacement of the Ottoman system by imposing the opposite model: 1) annihilation of the monarchy and installation a regime defined by the civil law; 2) construction of a “Turkish” republic and national consciousness deriving from the Fatherland (*vatan*); 3) abolition of the role of the *Ulema* by imposing the positive science to pioneer to the nation; 4) idealisation of the republic regardless of class discrimination such as *münevver* (intellectual elite) and *avam* (ordinary people); 5) creation of resources by the for the economic development i.e. *etatism* and creation of national bourgeoisie; 6) foundation of a social order which revolutionises the structure of the Ottoman Empire and continuation of the revolution.⁵¹

Until his death, Atatürk managed to achieve some of those ideals: ‘after the war of liberation sultanate and caliphate was separated and the former was abolished; the new regime was defined as a republic and the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed; Caliphate and its institutions were annihilated; Turkish Civil Code was adopted; the phrase of state religion of Islam was annulled; Arabic and Farsi were removed from the Ministry of National Education curriculum; Turkish Historical Society and Turkish Linguistics Society were founded; *etatism* was included in the RPP’s party programme; the first five-year development plan was launched.’⁵²

All these aforementioned revolutions and developments indicate the spheres which were vital for and had strategic importance in the materialisation of the modern Turkish republic and transformation of the society. Nevertheless, those efforts were challenged and interrupted time to time either by the members of the parliament or rebellious Kurdish and local Islamist groups. It was obvious that consolidation of the revolutions and transformation of the society

⁵¹ Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990), 156-159.

⁵² *Ibid*, 159-160.

necessitated further measures in order to prevent any opposition during, one can say, the consolidation period. The state ideology was systemised as Kemalism and incorporated to the RPP to be imposed under the banner of six arrows representing the Kemalist principles: “republicanism, secularism, revolutionism, nationalism, *etatism* and populism.”⁵³ Furthermore, amalgamation of the state and the party provided more authoritarian and state-centred rule facilitating the realisation of the revolution and construction of the Turkish national identity after 1931.

Etatism gained prominence after the state-party amalgamation especially in the sphere of economy during the 1930s. According to Akçalı and Perinçek, “statism (promoting a state led mixed-economy model) and populism (opposition towards class privileges and class distinctions) were influenced by Soviet Bolshevism”.⁵⁴ This is mainly derived from the interpretation of the war of liberation as an anti-imperialist war waged against the Western powers whose ultimate goal was to divide and share the country in accordance with their imperialist interests in the Middle East. The late-1920s and 1930s witnessed Turkish-Soviet rapprochement politically, economically and culturally in terms of foreign policy, planned economy and stance towards the West.⁵⁵ In the same vein, Aktürk, referring to Attila İlhan, Turkish intellectual and poet, states that:

“...The distinctive feature and core of Atatürk’s foreign policy consisted of a strong alliance with the Soviet Union bolstered by a web of regional security networks in the Balkans and the Middle East. The ‘golden age of Kemalism’ is inextricably linked to cooperation with the Soviet Union, not only in foreign policy, but also in domestic affairs. Most importantly, the planned economy and rapid industrialization, a remarkable achievement of Kemalism in the 1930s, is attributed to the recommendations of Soviet planners...”⁵⁶

⁵³ Aysel Kadioglu, “Paradox of Turkish nationalism and the construction of official identity,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no.2 (1996): 187.

⁵⁴ Akçalı and Perinçek, 553.

⁵⁵ Samuel J. Hirst, “Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet-Turkish Convergence in the 1930s,” *Slavic Review* 72, no. 1 (2013): 39-40.

⁵⁶ Aktürk, 228.

In the same period, Asiatic notions were brought to the forefront and, regarding the ancient land of Turks, Anatolia was presented as the Turkish motherland since the antiquity, while Central Asia was considered as fatherland.⁵⁷ During the same period, the emphasis on ‘Turkishness’ increased also in the speeches of Atatürk. For example, the nationalist/patriotic discourse is apparent in the aphorism of “*Ne mutlu Türk’üm diyene!*” (Happy is he who call himself a Turk) by referring to all the constituent people living on the fatherland (*vatan*) regardless of ethnic-religious identities. As Uzer quotes from Oran:

“...all citizens living in Turkey who spoke Turkish and accepted Turkish culture and ideals, no matter which religion or sect they belonged to, were considered Turks. So, he [Oran] argued that territorial and subjective qualifications prevailed over objective criteria such as ethnicity or religion, making Kemalist nationalism similar to French-type nationalism.”⁵⁸

Similarly, Ahmad asserts that Kemalist nationalism is inclusive and territorial rather than exclusive and ethnic. He argues that Kemalist nationalism is distinguished from the ethnic, racial and irredentist pan-Turkist nationalism by referring the aphorism of “*Ne mutlu Türk’üm diyene!*” and suggesting that:

“Kemal’s aphorism opposed the idea of birth, blood, or ethnicity, an idea that was popular among the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. Anyone who lived within the borders of the new Turkey could call himself a ‘Turk’. That is how patriots interpreted *milliyetçilik* (nationalism). The pan-Turkists on the other hand, possibly influenced by the fascist regimes in Europe, tended to adopt the dogmatic, ethnic, and linguistic interpretation of nationalism.”⁵⁹

Ahmad labels Atatürk as a patriot and refrains from categorising Kemalism as nationalism; instead he refers Kemalism as patriotism which is in fact more compatible with the word’s meaning in Turkish language.

⁵⁷ Umut Uzer, “The Genealogy of Turkish Nationalism: From Civic and Ethnic to Conservative Nationalism in Turkey,” in *Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey*, eds. Ayse Kadioglu and E. Fuat Keyman (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2011), 118.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 119.

⁵⁹ Ahmad, 89.

Nevertheless, the scholarly works on the Kemalist revolution and the formation of the Turkish national identity is apt to ignore Atatürk's ideas during the national struggle of liberation; therefore, his views regarding the East-West dichotomy, the geography and the roots of his principles are not analysed under the light of his socialist and 'Easternist' worldview. His ideational standpoint and praxis constitute today's Eurasianism. Especially his writings in the official newspaper of the Grand National Assembly of the Ankara government, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (National Sovereignty – 1920-1934) demonstrate his leaning towards Asia. Atatürk's determining the Turkey's position among the oppressed nations of Asia⁶⁰ indicate the character of the Kemalist revolution. The principle of populism is also the reflection of the characteristics of the Eastern revolutions which will be shown in the third chapter. Furthermore, on 5 March 1922, Atatürk, in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, wrote as "we, the Turkish, are an Asiatic nation and Asiatic state".⁶¹ It is the expression of the political position and ideological stance rather than the geography considering the time of war. Furthermore, Atatürk used the East-West dichotomy in his writings and stated that "the East realised the own 'self' and the humanity, gaining independence through revolutions and has been united by this consciousness against the self-interested and oppressing West which stands against the common good of mankind".⁶² Atatürk questioned the compromise with the West and urged to follow the Eastern path and supported the co-operation of the Eastern nations against the West in his address to the GNA:

"Some of us might think that the Eastern nations are not ready yet for an alliance. However, the incidents befalling to the underdeveloped nations of the East in the recent years have provided them a century old experience."⁶³

⁶⁰ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri-9* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015), 177, quoted in Doğu Perinçek, *Asya Çağının Öncüleri: 21. Yüzyılda Lenin Atatürk ve Mao* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2015), 89.

⁶¹ Ibid, 297, quoted in Doğu Perinçek, *Asya Çağının Öncüleri*, 91.

⁶² Ibid, 299, quoted in Doğu Perinçek, *Asya Çağının Öncüleri*, 96.

⁶³ Perinçek, *Asya Çağının Öncüleri*, 97, referring to *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları-1* [Turkish Grand National Assembly Closed Session Proceedings] (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi 1980), 332.

Atatürk also distinguished the revolutionary West from the imperialist West by comparing the France of the French Revolution, which influenced Atatürk and the revolutionary cadre, and the imperialist France as an intruder, and foresaw the rise of revolutionary Asia against the imperialist West in a united front of the revolutions.

According to what has been mentioned so far, the state and civil-military elite were the main practitioners of the revolutions and ideology from above due to the absence of the social (civil society) and political forces (opposition and bourgeoisie). State bureaucracy was consisting of the military elite cadre who proclaimed the republic after a defensive war of liberation waged against the Western powers. The two features of the war of liberation, defending the fatherland and anti-imperialist stance, underlie the Turkish patriotism in terms of international relations and foreign policy in the early republican years. National sovereignty and indivisibility of the territory have become the core elements incorporated into the essence of the Turkish nation and the nation-state. Nevertheless, anti-Westernism did not bear any ideological premise rather it was pragmatic as a natural consequence of the anti-imperialist war waged against the West. With regards to the needs and circumstances of the time and changes and developments in the international politics, Atatürk adopted realist and pragmatic strategies on the basis of regional alliances which serve the national interests of the republic.⁶⁴ During the 1930s, relations with the Soviet Union and the West were shaped according to rational calculations, hereby it allowed Turkey to form new alliances to keep stability. It also provided room for manoeuvre in international relations in terms of protecting the national interests and sovereignty by not being under the influence of any international power. The security of the country, protection and indivisibility of the territory, and peace at home and abroad were Atatürk's main concerns together with implementing revolutions to form a self-sufficient state in the late 1920s until his death. In short, as Akçalı and Perinçek asserts:

⁶⁴ Clemence Hoffman and Cem Cemgil, "The (un)making of the Pax-Turca in the Middle East: understanding the social-historical roots of foreign policy," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2016): 1285.

“On the seventh anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk remarked to an American journalist: ‘Turkey is not a monkey and is not aping any nation. It will neither Americanize nor Westernize. It will only become pure’”⁶⁵

In terms of international relations, Kemalist ideology and Kemalist nationalism were freed from pan-Turkism and irredentism. It was defensive and peaceful in nature with regards to the foreign policy approach. Additionally, independent from any ideological blindness, it defended the sovereignty of all nations and nation-states unconditionally against the imperialism and any form of exploitation. Hence, rationalism and realism were taken as core principles in the sphere of the foreign policy making and international relations. In parallel with these, Turkey signed the Balkan Entente with Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia in 1934 and the Saadabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in 1937 in order to preserve the current international status quo and the sovereignty and demarcated borders of the newly emerged nation-states after the first World War.

Especially the British plans over the region, with regards to leaving Mosul to the British mandate Iraq instead of Turkey and using the Kurdish religious rebels against the Kemalist government were major concerns for the early republic. Following the League of Nations’ rule against Turkey with regards to the Mosul issue, Atatürk knew that co-operation with the Soviet Union, as in the beginning of the national liberation war, was necessary against the threats rooted from the British side and in favour of both countries who were against the Western imperialism.⁶⁶ As the pioneers of the revolutions in the East, Turkey and the Soviet Union signed the series of bilateral pacts of non-aggression: Treaty of Moscow between Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1925; Soviet-Afghan treaty and Turkey-Iran treaty in 1926, in 1927 and then in 1932 Soviet-Iran treaty, in 1928 Turkey-Afghanistan treaty.⁶⁷ These treaties were based on non-alignment principle and opposed to the Western imperialism targeting the region. The

⁶⁵ Akçalı & Perinçek, 553-554.

⁶⁶ Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi-4* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1986), 1429-1430.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 1432.

friendship and co-operation starting with the mutual interest in the Caucasus front during the National War of Liberation and its aftermath demonstrated that Turkey and Russia had to get along with each other. By this means, the Republic had been proclaimed, and through the treaties national security issues were resolved. Amicable relations with the Soviet Union and the Middle Eastern countries, which can be articulated as Eurasia, provided Turkey with leverage against the West, balanced relations on the equal basis, realisation of its sovereignty via the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and acquisitions via Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits in 1936 which gave the full control and regulation of the Straits with regards to transit of naval warships to Turkey.⁶⁸

During the 1930s, Turkey did not take part in any camps; rather, played a proactive role in the region via non-aligned position and focused on an intrinsic state-led social, educational and economic development. As a result, without any effort to be a taking part in Europe or the West, a unique breakthrough was carried out by the state in the 1930s during the aftermath of the 1929 crisis; and Turkey stood on her own feet by means of her own resources through the centrally planned state economy and state-owned enterprises both of which were materialised thanks to co-operation with the Soviet Union. In this regard, the 1930s were the period the practice of state-led nationalism in mobilising the nation and *etatism* were the main locomotives of the revolution. In parallel with this, Kemalist state endeavoured to form an ideological base to reinforce the development policies. Hence, between the years of 1932-34, *Kadro Hareketi*, literally Cadre Movement, became prominent concordantly and contributed to form an ideological ground for the Kemalist revolution and proposed *etatist* development strategies within the framework of left-nationalist ideology.

⁶⁸ Ali Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler ve Uygulamalar* (İstanbul: ALFA, 2017), 60-61.

CHAPTER 2: LEFT-NATIONALIST INTERPRETATION OF THE KEMALIST REVOLUTION

Cadre Movement (1932-1934)

Cadre Movement emerged as a quest for a development strategy for Turkey during the transition and reconstruction period between the two world wars.⁶⁹ The cadre was organised around the Cadre Magazine (1932-34) by a group of Turkish intellectuals: *Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge* and *Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu*. Aydemir had adopted Turanist ideology during the first World War; however, after being appointed as a teacher to Azerbaijan, following Bolshevik Revolution, his ideology shaped around the revolution. He studied economics at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KTUV), then, following his return to Turkey, joined the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) and wrote his ideas in the party's journal, *Aydınlık*. However, due to his opposition to *Komintern*, he dissented from the party. Tökin studied high school at St. Georgs-Kolleg in İstanbul and then went to KTUV to study economics as Aydemir. Tör was introduced to Marxism while he was a student in Germany; and after his return he joined the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party (TPWSP) which gave support to Atatürk during the national liberation war. Belge was also similar to these intellectuals ideologically. Only Karaosmanoğlu did not have similar background; he was in the close circle of Atatürk and İsmet İnönü thanks to which the Cadre Movement was put into practice by their permission.

This group of intellectuals set forth ideas on development strategies for Turkey and interpreted the Turkish revolution aiming to formulate an ideology for the revolution within a theoretical framework.⁷⁰ The Cadre appeared as an intellectual and ideological movement, “took upon itself the role of a theoretician or ideologue of the Turkish revolution, and “envisioned a unity of ideology and revolution”.⁷¹ Although Kemalist republic was discussed

⁶⁹ Mustafa Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi: Ulusçu Sol Bir Akım* (Ankara: Imge Yayınevi, 1999), 214.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 9.

⁷¹ Mohammad Sadiq, “The *Kadro* Movement in Turkey,” *International Studies* 23, no. 4 (1986): 321.

above as freed from any ideological submissions, Kemalist revolutions' being unsuccessful to substantiate themselves within the liberal in-party opposition and in the rural Anatolia and transition to *etatist* economic policies following the 1929 crisis necessitated the search of an ideology in order to consolidate the revolutions within the socio-historical and -political perspective and to balance a possible reaction from the liberal opposition. The group tried to impose radical implementation of *etatism* and transform the role of the state in economy policies vis-à-vis the private sector. The Cadre Movement believed and aimed that their left-nationalist ideology and development strategy could be reconciled with Kemalism and the suggested development programme could be implemented by the assent of the executive “*cadre*”.

It is also necessary to mention that, the Cadre Movement was given liberty to produce development strategies and ideology for Kemalist government during the time of political prohibitions and restrictions; therefore, the group avoid direct criticism towards the party and the state policies, or they abstained from characterising the present state, but asserted what is ought to be so that they expressed their criticism latently. However, as the supporter of radical *etatism*, anti-imperialism and nationalism, the Cadre Movement was attacked by liberal and “Germanophile” groups in the RPP as being communists; and communists denounced the group for being social fascists. Cadre Magazine was ceased in 1934 following the established economic relations between the state and the private sector.

Though the group's practical impact was not profound, their ideational contributions and assessments on domestic and international economic situation were notable. Cadre Movement will be reviewed in this section in two parts: their ideology and the proposed development strategies. Since they are considered as the early ideologues of left-nationalism or patriotic left, as Türkeş terms, the movement requires specific attention for the thesis in order to build a theoretical framework for the ideology of the Kemalist Eurasianism retrospectively.

The Cadreists intended to idealise the Kemalist revolution within the scope of anti-imperialism and radical *etatism* for the development. It can be suggested that they were influenced by nationalism of the Unionist era, the critique of Ziya Gökalp, Leninism, Galievism, Soviet experience of New Economy Policy, and the critique of Marxism, fascism and capitalism. According to Türkeş, the Cadreist shares similar reasoning with Yusuf Akçura, the nationalist intellectual of the Unionist era, though almost never mentioned his name in the magazine, in interpreting the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as “the negative effects of the industrial revolution on Ottoman artisan production, influence of the French Revolution in the Balkans, and the military and economic ascendancy of the Western powers”.⁷² On the other hand, the Cadreists differed themselves expressly from Gökalp since he envisioned the national unity as “racial, ethnic, geographical, religious, voluntary and cultural unity”.⁷³ According to Aydemir, in the modern time, the notion of the national unity depends on the “technique” and production which joints and confronts the peasants, workers and businessmen with each other; therefore, the national unity depends on the participation in the economic production and co-operation.⁷⁴ Unlike the Unionist nationalist intellectuals’ emphasis on history, culture and ethnicity of the Turks, the Cadreists “regarded the economic element as the pivot of the Turkish national awakening and its ideological substance”.⁷⁵ What is meant by “technique” is the lack of industrialisation which was considered as one of the main cause of the collapse of the Ottoman state since the production was depended on “*zati iktisat*” (“home production-consumption economy”).⁷⁶ Hence, the Cadreist perceived the basis of the national identity in the industrialisation which would lead up private capital accumulation by which people would

⁷² Mustafa Türkeş, “The Ideology of the Kadro [cadre] Movement: a patriotic leftist movement in Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 4 (1998): 93.

⁷³ Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi*, 102.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 102.

⁷⁵ Sadiq, 330.

⁷⁶ Mustafa Türkeş, “A Patriotic Leftist Development Strategy Proposal in Turkey in the 1930s: The Case of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement,” *International Journal of the Middle East Studies* 33, (2001): 97.

participate in economic life, surplus value would be created, and a national market would emerge. By the emergence of a strong national market, the Republic would be independent economically after the acquired political independence following the National War of Liberation. Hence, the Cadreists' criticism towards Gökalp's idealism and their approach towards the national issues show that they adopt historical materialism.

There is no doubt that they were inspired by Leninism. As aforementioned, Aydemir and Tökin got familiar with Lenin's thoughts when they were in Moscow in the early 1920s and influenced by the anti-imperialist discourses of that time.⁷⁷ Lenin had predicted that all the exploited nations would gain national independence and after that imperialism would come to an end where the socialism in the world would prevail. Although the Cadreists take this idea as the primary source of their analysis, they do not foresee socialism for Turkey; rather, they asserted that the national economic independence must be pursued following the collapse of the imperialist system.⁷⁸ In this regard, the Cadreists conceptualised the Turkish revolution as the revolution (the National War of Liberation) in the first phase and the reforms (national economic independence) as the second phase to bring the national revolution to its ultimate goal.

Türkeş regards the New Economic Policy (NEP) as another factor which also had impact on the Cadreists' thought and puts emphasis on the NEP's internal policy dimension. By the NEP, the Soviet Russia softened the restrictions on the confiscated lands during the civil war, allowed the peasants to use the state-owned land by agricultural holding, and encouraged the production of the small-scale enterprises in order to ease the negative stance of the peasants against the state.⁷⁹ Similarly, the Cadreists suggested large scale land reform to regulate property relations between the feudal landowners and the peasants in the rural through which

⁷⁷ Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi*, 105.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 105-106.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 113-114.

they assumed that the land reform would change the decayed method of production, create surplus value, liquidate feudal structure, emancipate the peasants from the yoke of landowners, and thus the state would receive the support of the peasantry. Hence, unlike the NEP, they asserted that the peasantry should have the private ownership of the land, but the scale of private property must be limited by the state.⁸⁰

The Cadreists also took part in preparing the five-year development plan in Turkey, which was initiated in 1931, following the five-year development plan of the Soviet Union. Since they knew the language, the Cadreists appeared as the specialist “cadre” in analysing and translating the Soviet experience, encouraged the Kemalist government to prepare a large scale development plan, and put emphasis on heavy industry and electrification whereas the government did not include these in the first five-year economic plan and gave important roles to private sectors.⁸¹ The Cadreists advocated that the industrialisation in every sense must be undertaken by the state and strategically less important areas can be left to the private sector in order to keep the private capital out of the decision-making mechanism.⁸² Thus, the private capital is considered as a self-interested group which must be excluded from decision making processes, which is linked to the economic potential, since they would not regard the national and public interest. Also, according to them, the peasantry and agricultural production technology lagged behind due to the liberal policies in favour of the private capital which was privileged by the end of 1920s; therefore, the state takeover is vital for economic and political development as they are interrelated as aforementioned.

The Cadreists idealises classless and non-privileged society. Hence, they take a clear stance against capitalism as they consider capitalism as the main source of inequity. According to Cadreists, capitalism emerged in Europe with the exploration of America where the

⁸⁰ Ibid, 114.

⁸¹ Ibid, 116.

⁸² Ibid, 116.

Europeans killed the Indians and transferred the raw materials together with the slaves from Asia and Africa to Europe and through which they actualised the early accumulation of capital from the 15th century.⁸³ In this regard, they have a critical approach towards Marx as he attributes the process of the accumulation of capital to the exploitation of the European working class whereas he overlooks the acquired surplus from the colonies which constitute the periphery. Especially with the Industrial Revolution, the European countries, which had already actualised the early accumulation of the capital, started to export their goods and products to the colonial and semi-colonial countries that resulted in the deterioration of the local artisanship in those countries and fastened the process of the accumulation of the capital in Europe. According to the Cadreists, the development of capitalism in Europe occurred at the expense of the periphery's lagging behind.⁸⁴ Capitalism brought along two problems: the first was the conflict between the working class and bourgeoisie, which was the problem of Europe at that time since there was no such structure in Asia, and the second was the emergence of the industrial metropolises and non-industrial colonies and semi-colonial countries.

According to the Cadreists, the Marxist approach falls short in explaining the conflicts in Asiatic semi-colonial states and Turkey because Turkey did not gain surplus acquired through the colonial system since it did not have such experience historically, and class conflict was unique to Europe and did not exist in Turkey due to the lack of industrialisation. Hence, they distinguished the European worker, or the workers of the industrial countries, from the workers of the non-industrial countries qualitatively since the surplus acquired through the exploitation of the working class of the non-industrial Asia would create inequity between the European and Asian working class.⁸⁵ In parallel with this, the Cadreists defined the main conflict in the 20th century as the conflict between the industrialised and non-industrialised

⁸³ Ibid, 122.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 124.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 126.

states instead of class conflicts so that they did not foresee, or prioritise, socialism in Turkey; rather, put emphasis on national liberation. Therefore, they rejected the class-based society or any privileged group within the society for the development where the state, which should be ruled by a small “cadre”, was featured as a supra-class entity whose priority is not to reconcile the existing classes but to abolish the differences. The Cadreists also opposed and addressed fascism as a notion of a semi-capitalist system which protect the interest of the industrial bourgeoisie at the expense of the interest of the working class by suppressing and reconciling the class conflicts.⁸⁶ Also, they called for a resistance against fascism due to the imperialist and colonial intentions and the racism in the examples of Italy and Germany.

In this regard, they suggested that both socialism and fascism are notions belonging to Europe which emerged through industrialisation and ensued class conflicts. While socialism fails to address the problems of the non-industrial states and its working class, fascism cooperates with the industrial bourgeoisie against the working class. Hence, neither of these can set a model for Turkey and non-industrial Asia. Also, imperialism, with the industrialisation, created a conflict in the world between the metropole and non-industrial states; and targeted the latter. The “industrial civilisation”, constituted by the few such as Great Britain, France, Belgium and Germany later, dominated the others; and capitalism, following the industrialisation, together with the liberal democracy and liberal economy which are the necessary political and economic orders for the capitalist mechanism, became the new imperialist form of domination over the colonies and semi-colonies and their national markets. Therefore, this capitalist-imperialist international order can only be changed through national liberation movements, by which colonies and semi-colonies would be freed from exploitation and imperialists would be deprived of the raw-materials and markets, and successive national economic independence.⁸⁷ Furthermore, in their analyses, the Cadreists also put emphasis on

⁸⁶ Ibid, 127.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 135-136.

the conflict and competition among the industrialised nations which would cause another war, as after the first World War imperialist nations were in crisis, and that crisis over the colonies and semi-colonies would create opportunity for revolutionary national liberation movements in those countries.⁸⁸ In this regard, they considered Asia as the geography of national revolutions.

The Cadreists regarded the Turkish National War of Liberation as an ant-imperialist struggle and as a pioneer revolutionary movement for the colonies and semi-colonies in Asia. In accordance with their analyses of the international political and economic order, together with the political and economic structure in non-industrial countries, they suggested the national liberation ideology for the political and economic independence. As the national economic independence is a requisite for the political independence, they proposed economic development strategies compatible with the political and economic structure in Turkey. They stressed the importance of the state-led industrialisation to establish a self-sufficient economic structure so that they suggested a strong centralized *etatism* in regulating the political and economic relations. As Turkey did not have a strong bourgeoisie and the accumulation of capital, state was given a vanguard role for the industrial and agricultural breakthrough. For that, a large-scale land reform was suggested to transform the feudal relations between the landowner and the peasant, lessen the political and economic dominance of the landowner in the local, increase the agricultural production and create surplus for investments. Secondly, planned economy was suggested in line with the Soviet experience following the 1929 crisis. They predicted that, after the 1929 crisis, the production of the industrial commodities would not be under the Western monopoly; new financial centres would emerge; the European states would lose their colonies and their hegemonic power would diminish; three type of states would emerge as capitalist-imperialist, socialist, and the countries which are in struggle of national liberation; the European states would have to sell the means of production and the non-

⁸⁸ Ibid, 140.

industrial countries would enter in the process of industrialisation; the 1929 crisis would continue so that the government should prepare a long-term economic plans and establish the heavy industry.⁸⁹ For the economic and industrial breakthrough, Turkey should implement planned and protectionist foreign trade policy, increase the national production, state-led and state-planned industrialisation and land reform.⁹⁰

The Cadreists tried to harmonise socialist and nationalist ideologies to direct the Kemalist government to the *etatist* and populist policies in order to consolidate the revolutionary praxis socio-politically and socio-economically. They determined the problems of that time and acted as an ideologue for the Kemalist government and the state against the feudal socio-political and -economic structure and liberal opposition waxing around the Business Bank group. They prioritised the gaining national economic independence as the requisite for the Kemalist revolution to be fulfilled and proposed non-capitalist development policies accordingly. These policies were state-led industrialisation and comprehensive land reform domestically, and protectionist foreign trade policies based on their analyses of capitalism and post-1929 crisis. They were opposed to the private sector and the foreign capital ideologically as the both are self-seeking.⁹¹ Also, they argued that the private sector, beyond its weakness, strengthens the rooted feudal structure and creates social injustice. In this regard, national development and the national unity could be achieved only through the state-led planned economy and the elimination of the feudal structure through a populist land reform after which the peasantry has their own land and participates the national production. They distinguished the European and the Soviet model of planned-economy: while “state planning in Europe sought solutions to the problem of overproduction, the Soviet state planning sought to envisage socially defined needs”.⁹² They considered that the Soviet model fit to the

⁸⁹ Ibid, 176-177.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 177.

⁹¹ Türkeş, A Patriotic Leftist Development Strategy, 102-103.

⁹² Ibid, 103.

circumstances in Turkey. The Cadreists urged a strong centralised state for national economic development by incorporating political and economic power. The state “must be entitled to regulate resource allocation and decide income distribution, as well as to prevent the private sector from gaining an influential position in decision-making”.⁹³ However, the liberal opposition and the Business Bank group, which was influential in decision-making, outweighed and forced the cease of publications of the journal in 1934.

All in all, the Cadreists “were convinced that Turkey could not follow the path that European countries had been traveling” and suggested a different path by attempting to propose a unique ideology and development strategy for Turkey within the framework of socialism and nationalism assuming the uniqueness of the Turkish revolution. In this regard, they urged a left-nationalist development strategy and ideology for Turkey, which proposed a co-operation and association with the non-industrial Asian countries rather than the capitalist West, to form the national unity and materialise the national revolution. They conceptualised the main conflict in the world between the industrial and non-industrial countries within the scope of capitalism. Moreover, they stressed the historical, spatial and temporal circumstances of Turkey assessing a uniqueness to the revolutionary praxis and develop a non-capitalist development strategy and an eclectic ideology for Turkey. They ascertained Turkey’s place on the side of non-industrial countries; wherefore, put emphasis on national economic independence and the role of the state as the only possible entity to achieve the development and national unity before the capitalist order politically (liberal democracy) and economically (liberal economy). In this regard, they equated nationalism with national economic development through establishing national market and with economic contribution of the people for the common national interest. They were opposed to capitalism and fascism, together with Nazism, as they were regarded as the derivations of the capitalism serving the interest of the bourgeoisie. Hence, their nationalism is

⁹³ Ibid, 106.

rational and far away from irredentism and racism. They favoured the national liberation movements in Asia and Africa against any type of exploitation of the capitalist West in accordance with their analyses of the capital accumulation of Europe referring to Europe's colonial past and transformation of colonialism, following the Industrial Revolution, as they labelled, to imperialism. The Cadreists' analyses and remarks on the existing socio-political and -economic structures, national economy, foreign trade policies and the international order can be qualified as beyond its time. Their non-capitalist development strategy and proposed left-nationalist ideology laid the foundations of the National Democratic Revolution thesis of the 1960s' *YÖN* Movement which is influential on the thoughts of Doğu Perinçek and the emergence of the ideological background of Kemalist Eurasianism.

YÖN Movement and the National Democratic Revolution

The Cadre Magazine was ceased in 1934 since their proposed strategies and efforts to influence the Kemalist government, or a small "cadre" in the government, triggered reactions from the right-wing and liberal circles who had a strong position in the politics and economy. Turkey realised the planned economic breakthrough during the 1930s; however, the Cadreists' strategies were considered as too radical considering the different interest groups within the party, and Kemalist government tried to balance the *etatism* and private sector relations. During the 1930s the private sector and the state-led economy developed side-by-side; however, the private sector developed faster during the Second World War, and such development brought along self-confidence to the private sector which did not want to tolerate the state interference anymore.⁹⁴ The conflict among the interest groups became more evident after the Second World War. Although Turkey did not take part in the war actively, the government's precautions taken during the war and authoritarian statist tendencies had created discontent in the public and

⁹⁴ Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2016), 125-126.

within the party. According to Ahmad, the hardliners wanted to break the political power of the landlords and war profiteers by transforming the economic relations between the landlords and peasants through a large-scale land reform.⁹⁵ The post-War period witnessed the conflict between the radical statist and the liberals following the Land Reform Bill introduced in 1945. The dissidents of the centralised party policies resigned from the RPP and established the Democratic Party (DP). Two names are important as they would leave their marks to the Turkish politics until the 1960 Revolution: then-president Celal Bayar, businessman and banker, and then-Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, landowner and cotton producer.

The post-War period caused domestic and foreign policy changes. During the war, the Turkish government betrayed Atatürk's will, could not stay neutral, and were manipulated by the British diplomacy to take a side during and after the war at the expense of established relations with the Soviet Union.⁹⁶ After the war, relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union deteriorated due to Turkey's shifting foreign policy orientation and Stalin's demands regarding the post-War order, particularly on the Turkish Straits. The U.S. and the Great Britain started to be considered as "saviour" during and in the aftermath of the War through which Turkey joined the United Nations in 1945. Together with the Marshall Plan, the U.S. aids in military and economy would become the initial events in Turkey's aligning itself with and dependency on the Western camp politically, economically and militarily.

In accordance with these changes, the Turkish politics also entered into the political liberalisation process, and, in 1950, the DP won the first multi-party elections which was marked as the transition period to liberalisation and democratisation. The dissidents of the early republican military-bureaucratic elite rule, composed of heterogeneous interest groups, introduced private-sector-dominant liberal economy policies and civil-bureaucratic politics. The goal was set as making Turkey a "little America (the U.S.)" by the president Celal Bayar.

⁹⁵ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), 103.

⁹⁶ Avcioğlu, 1542-1590.

In parallel with this, privatisations and liberal economic policies were implemented, mechanisation in agriculture was increased through imports from the U.S, roads were built, and the conditions of the peasantry were improved temporarily thanks to the foreign aid. Their popularity increased among the peasants and in the rural since the public was suffocated due to the austerity policies and taxes imposed by the RPP during the years of the war. Thereafter they consolidated their political power in the elections of 1954, the DP followed populist discourses and brought Islam back to the politics before the Kemalist revolutions. The economy depending on the foreign aid proved that the liberal economic policies created a new bourgeoisie from the rural, composed of landlords and local gentry; however, on the other hand, these policies did not change the socio-economic conditions of the peasantry and worsened the economic conditions of the middle class and the military officers in the face of increasing cost of living and poverty.⁹⁷ The rule of the DP favoured the newly emerged rich against the traditional industrial bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the oppressive policies against the opposition party, universities and media, together with the economic decay, increased discontent among the middle- and lower-middle class, intellectuals, military officers and the traditional bourgeoisie.

Turkey had joined to NATO, in 1952, in exchange for sending troops to the Korean War. As a NATO member, the military officers had a chance to visit different countries and discuss with the officers from different NATO member countries that broadened their horizons regarding their worldview towards the international matters and helped them to understand the backwardness of their country, internal politics and the upper-rank generals.⁹⁸ Along with the aforementioned reasons, the military officers felt bitterness regarding the conditions in their country compared to other countries and in the upper ranks staffed by Menderes who “permitted

⁹⁷ Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 141-143.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 151.

the status and prestige of the military profession to sink lower than it had at any time since the founding of the republic”.⁹⁹

The discontent among the middle rank military officers, who considered themselves as the guardians of the Kemalist revolutions, ended up with the 1960 revolution that the young middle ranked officers, who were socio-economically belonging to the middle class, seized the control of the government on the basis of aforementioned reasons. The 1960 revolution is important in the sense that, the revolution put into the practice against the newly emerged bourgeoisie with the political support of liberal-conservative pro-American Menderes government and the upper rank generals who were in the close circle of the DP. Moreover, these young officers observed the economic situation, acted on behalf of the impoverished and got support of the public. As Harris states:

“Not only had the military aspect of their plans been worked out with great care, but popular response was favourable. Thanks to the deeply ingrained respect for the army prevalent among civilians, there was no significant resistance. Most people saw the military takeover as offering welcome relief from the oppressive political tension.”¹⁰⁰

Although the revolutionary cadre, namely the National Unity Committee, consisted of anti-American and socialist officers, as well as ultra-nationalists like Alparslan Türkeş, who would become the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP), the Committee declared commitment to the existing alliances in the NATO and CENTO. The division within the Committee was methodological rather than ideological. While the radicals were for the rule of the Committee, the moderates were urging the establishment of parliamentary system; and that division ended up with the purge of the radicals like Türkeş whereas the officers who had anti-American, socialist and even *Baathists* leanings remained in the committee and participated in

⁹⁹ George S. Harris, “The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey,” *The Middle East Journal* 24, no. 4 (1970): 441.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 454.

the making of the 1961 Constitution.¹⁰¹ The 1961 Constitution is still been considered as the most democratic constitution by the leftists as it paved the way for socialist political parties and entities together with improvements in the social and individual rights, but specifically the workers' rights. Tachau and Heper state that:

“The 1961 constitution also gave voice to aspirations for social justice and civil and social rights. The period after the adoption of this constitution saw a flowering of political ideas, particularly on the left. For the first time under the republic, an avowedly socialist party, the Turkish Labor Party (TLP), was organized. Organized labor made significant gains among industrial workers, partly as the result of a new law authorizing the right to strike (1963). University students became politically active...”¹⁰²

During the 1960s, the left found a space to flourish, for the first time a socialist party, Workers' Party of Turkey¹⁰³ (WPT), entered into the parliament, and revolutionary ideas and *etatist* development strategies for Turkey began to be discussed. However, the left could not form a united front and split in two divisions on the character of the envisioned revolution as that one group in WPT defended socialist revolution and the other advocated the National Democratic Revolution. As the latter was asserted by the *YÖN* movement and the opinion leader, Dogan Avcioğlu, the ideological differences between these two groups will not be discussed; rather, the *YÖN* movement's conceptualisation of the National Democratic Revolution will be emphasised due to the relevancy to our topic. The idea of the National Democratic Revolution bears importance since Doğu Perinçek, during his years at the university, was influenced by the idea which forms an ideological and conceptual ground for the Kemalist Eurasianism.

The socialist *YÖN* Movement emerged during this era around the weekly *YÖN* Newspaper (1961-1967), which was established by the opponents of the DP to spread socialist

¹⁰¹ Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, “The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey,” *Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of New York* 16, no. 1 (1983), 21-22.

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 23.

¹⁰³ John C. Dewdney and Malcolm Edward Yapp, "Turkey," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, last modified March 3, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Turkey/The-military-coup-of-1960#ref482352>.

ideology and *etatist* development policies with the aim of fulfilling the Kemalist revolution to shape Turkey's future. Dogan Avcıoğlu and other intellectuals developed ideas within the framework of socialism and nationalism and advocated a socialism particular to Turkey. In this section of the thesis, *YÖN*'s and Avcıoğlu's approaches towards the ideologies, their conceptualisations and worldview will be scrutinised within the framework of domestic and international conjuncture of the 1960s.

YÖN's slogan, "Socialists carry the flag of nationalism", demonstrates its ideological position. Similar to the Cadreists, *YÖN* tried to form a basis for a socialism particular to Turkey by associating socialism with nationalism. By nationalism, the National Liberation War and the struggle against the imperialist powers are meant; and the development of nationalism in the East and the West are distinguished in the analyses of the *YÖN* writers. İlhan Selçuk, Turkish intellectual and former editor in-chief of *Cumhuriyet* newspaper (2001-2010) demonstrates as that:

"the Western capitalist bourgeoisie has already established its national industry so that they can distribute the surplus and profit, realised through the exploitation of the underdeveloped nations, to its own working class and bring prosperity by which the conditions for a national democracy can be provided... However, in the underdeveloped countries, neither developed a national bourgeoisie as in the West nor was sought a way for establishing industrial enterprises. Progressive nationalism could not develop; rather, feudal notion of *ummah* prevailed over the nation... In this regard, in the underdeveloped nations, the nationalism begins with the awakening of the progressive forces in the society and develops through taking the foreign capital and its collaborators under control as Atatürk did by nationalising foreign enterprises."¹⁰⁴

YÖN writers melted nationalism and socialism in the same pot by referring to Kemalist nationalism and its consolidation through Kemalist revolutions. According to them, nationalism is to defend unconditional independence of Turkey within the framework of anti-imperialism as the Western capitalism has been exploiting the rich sources of Turkey, aspiring the natural

¹⁰⁴ Atıl Cem Çiçek, *Milliyetçilik Bayrağını Sosyalistler Taşır: Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Yön Dergisi (1961-1967)* (İstanbul: Tezkire Yayıncılık 2016), 99-100.

resources in Turkey, hindering the capital accumulation through profit transfer, and imposing the capitalist way which led Turkey to bankruptcy during the Menderes government.¹⁰⁵

As to socialism, the same division regarding the development of socialism in the East and West put forth by the Cadreists is evident in *YÖN* writers' approach. Avcıoğlu categorised implementations of socialism as Eastern socialism, Western socialism and the socialism in underdeveloped countries. In Eastern socialism, underdeveloped nations realised a rapid development as in the example of the Soviet experience; in Western socialism, socialism can be realised moderately in the Western countries as they have conscious and organised working classes and advanced economies, and the feudal remnants of the medieval order was already liquidated; and in the underdeveloped countries' socialism, socialism is to abolish the feudal structures, to create a new society and to realise rapid economic development through a radical revolution.¹⁰⁶ Turkey falls into the third category, and socialism in Turkey is considered as the continuum and fulfilment of the unfinished Kemalist revolutions. Turkish socialism is conceptualised by *YÖN* writer Aydemir, who was also one of the Cadreists, as: anti-imperialism equals to unconditional independence/sovereignty, anti-capitalism equals to national and populist economy, *etatism* which does not reject mixed economy, populism equals to social justice, anti-irredentism and anti-expansionism, scientific and rational nationalism equals to Kemalist nationalism, planning in every branch of life, strong and independent unionism, laicism.¹⁰⁷ According to their approach, Turkey has not finished the consolidation of Kemalist revolutions and needs a national democratic revolution by referring to the consequences of the economic and political developments during the rule of the Menderes government.

They asserted that the U.S-originated capitalism could not and cannot bring any solution to Turkey's problems related to feudal structure; rather, such a system made Turkey dependent

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 102.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 114-115.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 115-116.

to the U.S. economically and politically through the aids and comprador bourgeoisie so that the U.S. capitalism and its collaborators severed the ties between the revolutionary cadre and public. The U.S. is considered as the biggest and ultimate imperialist power by *YÖN* writers, and they argued that Turkey's siding with the U.S. as a developing country is to side against itself which is self-destructive.¹⁰⁸ They distinguished the U.S. imperialism from European colonialism as that the U.S. attracted supporters in underdeveloped and developing countries through granting aids by which it creates the privileged few who work for the account of the U.S. policies in the country.¹⁰⁹ This method of aids, funds and discourse of democracy replaced military invasion or occupation methods, and the *YÖN* writers addressed the U.S.' understanding of "peace" as taking a firm grip over such countries and preserving the capitalist world order. Turkey, according to *YÖN* writers, became a satellite country under the Menderes government and its successor Justice Party, led by then-President Süleyman Demirel, in the 1960s. They were opposed to the U.S. aids and its military bases in Turkey and advocated that to re-gain political and economic independence Turkey must stop giving concessions to the U.S. The *YÖN* writers were responsive to the U.S. policies in the world and they slammed the U.S. policies especially regarding the missile crisis with Cuba and the Vietnam War. Moreover, the Johnson Letter¹¹⁰, which was sent as an ultimatum to the President of the time İsmet İnönü to prevent Turkey from intervening with Cyprus in 1964, sparked off a reaction against İnönü and the U.S, and "most Turks considered it a solemn indication that the US controlled everything in Turkey and that it even directed Turkish foreign policy".¹¹¹ These events created anti-US reactions among the young generation of 1960s who protested the presence of the American Sixth Fleet in Bosphorus. In 1969, left-wing students gathered to protest the 6th Fleet;

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 215.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 216.

¹¹⁰ "Johnson Warns Inonu on Cyprus; Invites Him to U.S. for Talks – Turkey Said to Give Up Plan for a Landing," *New York Times*, last modified June 6, 1964, <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/06/archives/johnson-warns-inonu-on-cyprus-invites-him-to-us-for-talksturkey.html>.

¹¹¹ Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Johnson Letter Revisited," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no.3 (1993): 505.

however, anti-communist pro-American religious groups, namely the Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey, one of the founders of which was Fethullah Gülen, and the National Turkish Student Union, attacked the left-wing student groups after praying towards the 6th fleet by knives and that incident referred to as Bloody Sunday in Turkish history.¹¹² This event was only one of the many organised attacks on the progressive forces of Turkey and is important to demonstrate the co-operation of reactionary forces with the U.S. imperialism as it is previously mentioned in the beginning of this section.

The Cyprus crisis also brought along questioning of Turkey's membership to NATO. *YÖN* writers advocated that the NATO was obsolescent as the Soviet Union adopted a realist and reconciliatory foreign policy after Stalin, and NATO membership did not bring any benefit to Turkey in terms of her national interests. In contrast, NATO membership endangers Turkey's relationship with her neighbours and the countries in the region as Turkey has the U.S. military bases and missiles which caused tension between Turkey and Russia during the Cuba missile crisis.¹¹³ *YÖN* writers also criticised the dependency to the foreign aids in exchange of patrolling against the Soviet Union as a NATO member and urged a referendum to leave NATO since NATO membership not only affect Turkish foreign policy but also hinder to develop an independent domestic policy.¹¹⁴

As an alternative, *YÖN* writers suggested to develop balanced relations with the Soviet Union as a leverage by distancing Turkey from the U.S. Turkey had aligned itself with the Western camp following the Second World due to uncompromising attitude and requisitions of the Soviet Union; however, according to *YÖN* writers, circumstances of the 1960s was not urging Turkey to follow the same path especially considering that Turkey had no benefit from the existing alliance in that time. By that time, Turkey had already become the backyard of the

¹¹² Nur Bilge Criss, "A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case," *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (2002): 479-480.

¹¹³ Avcioğlu, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi-4*, 1632-1636

¹¹⁴ Çiçek, 221.

U.S. through the aids, funds and NATO alliance. As *YÖN* writers argue that such economic and military aids made Turkey dependent on and compliant to demands of the capitalist countries, specifically to the U.S., in order to re-gain political and economic independence the rapprochement with the Soviet Union is a must. This is because they argued that the capitalist countries hinder the industrial development in the third-world countries and exploit their markets and raw materials, and the emancipation of the Third-World can be achieved through a regional alliance against the imperialist powers. Thus, Turkey's interest is in the East, or in the Third-World, rather than the West since Turkey and the Third-World were hindered by the Western imperialism. According to Avcıoğlu, "a Third-World had emerged against the imperialism and as a pioneer country once which fought against imperialism under the leadership of Atatürk, Turkey must side with the Third-World".¹¹⁵ In this regard, the revolutions in the Middle East, *Baathism* -socialist and secular Arab nationalism- and the Chinese revolution are affirmed and suggested for Turkey as a model alternative to the Western alliances. Thus, *YÖN*'s 'Easternism' against Westernism can be articulated as an immature Eurasianism by referring to their positive stance towards the revolutions in Egypt, China and Syria and the non-capitalist development strategies. The left-nationalist circles' anti-imperialism and 'Easternism' are the antecedents of Kemalist Eurasianism and have been inherited by the Kemalist Eurasianist intellectuals.

YÖN writers prioritised the struggle against imperialism over the class struggle. According to their view, the main conflict was between the imperialist countries and the Third-World whose economic development was hindered by the former. Regarding the political and economic independence of Turkey, the conflict between the national forces and the imperialist forces and their collaborators must be eliminated primarily, and this can be achieved through national democratic revolution rather than socialist revolution. *YÖN* circle and the supporters

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 226.

of the national democratic revolution distinguished themselves from the classical socialist group of the WTP and had become more akin to Mao's "Theory of Three Worlds" especially after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia which had caused a fraction in the party as the *YÖN* circle criticised the Soviet invasion and denounced it as "social imperialism". In order to achieve the national democratic revolution, according to them, dynamic forces, comprising of civil-military intellectuals, civil servants, professors, teachers, engineers, and so on, must lead to the revolution rather than the class leadership. Class leadership and socialist revolution were considered as the later phase of the national democratic revolution after which the national industrial breakthrough was foreseen, economic and political independence was achieved, and the class consciousness would emerge. By this phase, internal capitalism was tolerated but anti-imperialism was prioritised to struggle with. Also, they determined that Turkey historically is an Eastern country, and due to the aforementioned economic analyses falls into the Third-World sharing the common fate with the underdeveloped or developing countries which were hindered by the imperialist forces. Hence, considering the stages of capitalist development vis-à-vis nationalism in the West, in such a group of countries, the nationalist forces are progressive forces since the imperialist forces have collaborators among the feudal landowners and comprador rural bourgeoisie. Therefore, nationalism remains at the centre in the socialism of the underdeveloped and developing countries. In this regard, *YÖN* circle relied primarily on the military to lead the national democratic revolution since the Turkish army was considered as the army of the people also referring to the socio-economic aspect of the Turkish soldiers and officers; however, another group in the army seized control, and Turkey was faced with the two military coups in 1971 and 1980 both of which targeted the leftist current of thoughts and, especially 1980 coup, paved the way for political Islam and neo-liberal economic policies.

1980 pro-American Coup was one of the most influential events in the history of Turkey since it paved the way for the rise of political Islam full-blown neo-liberalism in Turkey.

Following the coup, the *junta* banned almost all the major political parties to participate in elections and gave authority to pro-American neo-liberal Turgut Özal, who was a member of *Naqshbandi tariqa*, to form the government in 1983. Özal left his mark in the Turkish politics as the vigorous advocate of privatisations and private enterprises at the expense of the common good and public interest¹¹⁶. Under the Özal government, national market was opened to the West by lifting all the barriers with regards to customs, foreign exchange and finance in line with the principles of perfect free market; full integration with the West by regulating the Turkish political, economic and administrative structure in line with the West and globalism; opening the national market to the Western monopolies and foreign currencies unconditionally; minimising the state by privatising the State Economic Enterprises and the public service institutions for the sake of comprador bourgeoisie; getting loan, instead of taxation, from the big capital owners.¹¹⁷ These policies resulted in the takeover of the U.S. dollar in the national market, control of the national market by the Western finance monopolies, loss in the value of the Turkish *Lira*, boom in imports and drastic fall in exports, increase in external debts, and the collapse of national agriculture, industry and trade together with the deterioration in the conditions of the peasants, workers and artisans.¹¹⁸ In economy, Özal paved the way for the rule of the foreign capital in Turkey, foreign loans in line with the IMF policies and advices, and these brought along the emergence of usury, illicit bankers and mafia since the production decayed and the role and control of the state was minimalised in the economy.

Likewise the neo-liberal economic policies, the Turkish foreign policy went in parallel with the inherited neo-liberalism of the 1980s, and especially following the collapse of the

¹¹⁶ Turgut Özal's economic policies dictated by the U.S. and the IMF were appreciated in the U.S. during that time: Marvine Howe, "Turkey's Economic Miracle," *The New York Times*, last modified September 12, 1981, <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/09/12/business/turkey-s-economic-miracle.html>; Marvine Howe, "Man in the News: Turgut Ozal; Turkish Ally of Capitalism," *The New York Times*, last modified November 9, 1983, <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/09/world/man-in-the-news-turgut-ozal-turkish-ally-of-capitalism.html>

¹¹⁷ Arslan Başer Kafaoğlu, "Turgut Özal'ın özel sektör yıkıcılığı," *Teori* 142 (2001): 2-3.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, 3.

Soviet Union, neo-Ottoman ideas came to the forefront with revisionism based on Islamism and irredentism unlike Kemalist foreign policy regarding the nation-state ideology.¹¹⁹ The conflicts in Yugoslavia and the newly emerged nation-states in Central Asia were approached by opportunism and the ethnic and religious elements became dominant with the goal of making Turkey as the big brother of the Islamic and Turkic world. Kemalist foreign policy were challenged by introducing identity politics into the foreign policy; however, the Westernism was not abandoned, in contrast, the West, especially the European Community (EC), was instrumentalised in reconstructing domestic power relations to overcome the hegemony and the opposition of the Kemalist elite.¹²⁰

In this regard, Turkey applied for the full-membership to the EC, knowing that was practically impossible, in order to be fully articulated to the Western economic system; however, it also exposed Turkey to the external political influence with regards to the Armenian and Kurdish issues. The relations with the EC resulted in the establishment of the free trade area between the EU and Turkey under the Customs Union Agreement in 1996 after the Özal era. As to the opportunism, Özal abandoned the Kemalist principles in foreign policy with regards to the neighbour nation-states and complied with the U.S. policies during the Gulf War. The embargo imposed on Iraq caused \$100 billion loss in the Turkish economy during the 1990s and influenced the 2001 Crisis indirectly; decreased power of Iraq caused a power vacuum which paved the way for the PKK; it created insecurity in the southern borders of Turkey and affected the trade in the region which brought along unemployment and increased impact of the PKK in the local.¹²¹

Following the break-up of the socialist bloc after 1990, bi-polar world order replaced by the unipolar order under neo-liberal capitalist system led by the U.S. hegemony. The end of

¹¹⁹ Balci, 209.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 211; Yanık, 87.

¹²¹ Ibid, 223-224.

the Cold War brought along concerns in Turkey regarding its position in the new international order after acting as a buffer against the Soviet Union during the Cold War for her Western allies. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the victory of the liberal-democratic and capitalist system and the emergence of new nation states in the Eastern bloc and Central Asia were the precursor of new dynamics in the international politics.

The destructive policies of the U.S. towards the East have affected all the newly emerged nation-states, the Middle East and Turkey as well. Following the years of a static position, the emerging new order necessitated Turkey to develop new foreign policy strategies in a dynamic political environment towards the newly emerged countries in the region, more specifically the Central Asia and the Balkans. For the pro-American Turkish governments, the change implied repositioning itself in terms of the relations with the EU and the U.S. which were also decisive in the role that Turkey would undertake in the Central Asia and the Middle East. In this regard, with the push of the U.S., Turkey turned towards Eurasia because, on the one hand, she could develop political, economic and cultural relations with the Turkic states and set an example for them as a model country; on the other hand, Turkey could act as a bridge connecting the West to the resource-rich region and paving the way for global integration of those countries.¹²²

During the post-Cold War era Turkey sought to grow into a regional power. Both of the presidents, Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel, who were pro-US liberal-conservative politicians, had been raising the discourse of “from the Great Wall of China to the Adriatic” by declaring that the 21st century will be the Turkish era and that Turkey should be at the helm of “a Turkic-speaking world”.¹²³ Eurasia, by the 1990s, has not been a popular term in Turkey aside from few exceptions such as “Intercontinental İstanbul Eurasia Marathon, which was at

¹²² Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), 194-224.

¹²³ “Süleyman Demirel, top Turk,” *The Economist*, last modified Jul 22, 1999, <https://www.economist.com/node/225596>.

first organised in 1979 (in 2013 the event re-named as İstanbul Marathon) with the initiative of some German tourists”¹²⁴.¹²⁵ Since the 1990s, the term, Eurasia, has gained popularity in Turkey and been frequently used in the names of companies, TV channels, institutions, associations, organisations so on and so forth. The proliferation of the word, Eurasia, was a result of growing political and academic interest towards the notion at that time when the political parties initiated developing strategies and approaches towards the countries and the region which they perceive as Eurasia.¹²⁶ Since then, Eurasia, as either a geographic or a political term, has been increasingly used by nationalist, conservative and socialist intellectuals ambiguously. The ambiguity mainly arose from different geographical, historical and ideological comprehensions of Eurasia. Each group has shaped its own understanding regarding Eurasia, proposed foreign policy strategies towards the region, and published their views in periodicals.

Although the Patriotic Party’s Eurasianism is similar to the socialists’ comprehension of Eurasianism, there are certain divergences; and considering the fact that while none of the groups defined themselves as Eurasianist, the Patriotic Party overtly characterised itself as a Eurasianist party and took concrete steps as a pioneer to internationalise the Eurasianist movement in addition to the theoretical contributions to the Eurasianist idea. Hence, their approach towards Eurasianism, which will be termed as Kemalist Eurasianism, is the continuum and adoption of the left-nationalist ideology under the umbrella of Kemalism in accordance with the changing world order; i.e. globalism.

¹²⁴ "İstanbul Marathon: History," *İstanbul Maratonu*, last modified April 25, 2019, <https://www.maraton.istanbul/history>.

¹²⁵ Demirhan Fahri Erdem, *Dünyada ve Türkiye’de Avrasya ve Avrasyacılık: Algılamalar, Yaklaşımlar ve Stratejiler* (Ankara: Barış Kitap 2016), 191.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* 191-192.

CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUALISATION OF KEMALIST EURASIANISM AND THE PATRIOTIC PARTY

Kemalist Eurasianism emerged in the second half of the 1990s as a reaction and an alternative to pro-Atlantic orientation by opposing the political, economic and social conjuncture of that time. Mass privatisations and pro-U.S. policies of liberal-conservative Turgut Özal from the mid-1980s to 1993, right-wing coalitions era and their mafia-state relations, rising fundamental Islamism in social and political spheres, escalated terrorist attacks of PKK, asymmetrical relations with the EU under the Customs Union Agreement, IMF prescriptions during the 2001 crisis, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the region, and Cyprus issue were some of the important events in Kemalist Eurasianism's came into being. These events also influenced the stance of the political parties, and an alliance emerged in the early 2000s among the socialists, social democrats and nationalists which led to the Republic Protests as mentioned before. The Patriotic Party also adopted an agenda bringing nationalism to the fore over socialism in accordance with the changing world order and emerging conflict in the world between the globalism and nationalism. Eurasianism became their foreign policy idea which originated from socialism and nationalism. Hence, in this chapter, the Patriotic Party's conceptualisation of Eurasianism, Kemalist Eurasianism, is scrutinised within the theoretical framework drawn in the previous chapter by referring to the chairman of the party Doğu Perinçek and the party's monthly journal, *Teori*.

The Patriotic Party, which defined itself as a Eurasianist party, on 19-20 November 1996 and in April 2000, held the first and second Eurasia Conference in İstanbul with the participation of the socialist and communist party representatives from Russia, China, Japan, India, Iraq, Syria, Spain, Italy, Portugal, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Africa aiming to establish a common position of defence among the Eurasian nation-states against 'the attacks

of the global imperialism'.¹²⁷ Early 2000s witnessed series of reciprocal visits between the Russian and Turkish Eurasianists. On 20 November 2003, in Moscow, the International Eurasian Congress was held; and the International Eurasian Movement was established after the congress in which the Workers' Party was also represented.¹²⁸

The idea of an Eurasianist association attracted the socialist and Kemalist intellectuals, academicians, retired military members, and social democrat parties such as the RPP and DLP¹²⁹, due to the hawkish U.S. policies in the Middle East, IMF prescriptions, the Customs Union Agreement, and newly established liberal-conservative Justice and Development Party's (JDP) rising power in the early 2000s. Dugin's words in the International Eurasian Congress explains why Eurasianism found a ground among the socialist and Kemalist groups in Turkey:

"The modernists who have not fallen on the postmodernist side have similar concerns. That's why today the socialists and nationalists can find themselves on the same front. However, Eurasian patriotism does not mean chauvinism and micro-nationalism. We oppose these two. Post-modernism in return opposes socialism, the real industry, and the nation-state."¹³⁰

In 2002, Tuncer Kılınç, the Secretary General of the National Security Council, expressed his discontent about the EU-Turkey relations by stating that "the EU acts in an unfavourable manner towards Turkey's concerns; therefore, Turkey must form new alliances including Russia and Iran".¹³¹ In 2003 and 2004, several symposiums were organised in Turkey with the participation of representatives from Russia, Iran, China, India, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.¹³² Akçalı and Perinçek report that "Kemalist Eurasianists articulated their opposition to the decentralised government and

¹²⁷ Kerem Yıldırım, "Türkiye'de Avrasyacılığın Kökenleri," *Aydınlık*, last modified Dec 1, 2016, <https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/kose-yazilari/kerem-yildirim/2016-aralik/turkiye-de-avrasyaciligin-kokenleri>; Akçalı and Perinçek, "Kemalist Eurasianism", 561.

¹²⁸ Mehmet Perinçek, *Avrasyacılık: Türkiye'deki Teori ve Pratiği* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2006), 81.

¹²⁹ Akçalı and Perinçek, 551.

¹³⁰ Mehmet Perinçek, 83.

¹³¹ Christina Lin, "A New Eurasian Embrace: Turkey Pivots East While China Marches West," in *Toward Well-Oiled Relations?*, ed. Horesh N. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 30-47.

¹³² Akçalı and Perinçek, 562.

neoliberalism in political economy since they deem these policies as postmodern globalist strategies promoted by the West with the aim of disintegrating, weakening and even eliminating nation-states like Turkey”¹³³. Furthermore, Kemalist Eurasianists appreciated Russian, Chinese and Indian resistance against the Western hegemony and emphasised the similarities among Russian, Chinese, Indian and Turkish historical revolutionary praxis and the experiences of anti-imperialist struggle which constitute the strategic core of Eurasian alliance.¹³⁴

After a series of reciprocal visits via congresses and symposiums, aforementioned groups and parties organised “the Republic Protests”¹³⁵ in Turkey, few months before the presidential elections of 2007, in support of the Kemalist Republic and its principles, particularly laicism, against the Islamisation of the modern republic under the JDP rule. Later on, Kemalist Eurasianists were linked to a coup attempt plan by the Ergenekon (2007) and Sledgehammer (2010) plots; and the members of the movement including active and retired military officials, intellectuals, journalists, politicians were imprisoned through accusations based on fabricated documents.¹³⁶ Thus, thereafter, Kemalist Eurasianists have been imputed by liberal and conservative groups as ultra-nationalist pro-Russian radicals who were aiming to topple down JDP government through a military coup; and Kemalist Eurasianism have been imagined as a movement which “serves the interests of the nationalist milieu in Turkey or to act as a fifth-column on behalf of Russia”¹³⁷ by the liberals and conservatives.¹³⁸

As already mentioned before, domestic and foreign policies are inter-related and cannot be independent from each other, and the history has significant impact in adoption of ideologies

¹³³ Ibid, 562.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 563.

¹³⁵ “Secular rally targets Turkish PM,” *BBC*, last modified April 14, 2017, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6554851.stm>.

¹³⁶ See Dani Rodrik, “Ergenekon and Sledgehammer: Building or Undermining the Rule of Law,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 10, no: 1 (2011); Pınar Doğan and Dani Rodrik, *Balyoz: Bir Darbe Kurgusunun Belgeleri ve Gerçekler*, (İstanbul: Destek Yayınevi, 2010).

¹³⁷ Akçalı and Perinçek, 552.

¹³⁸ Cengiz Çandar, “Avrasyacılık, Ulusalçılık ve Ergenekon’a Dair,” *Radikal*, last modified September 14, 2008, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/cengiz-candar/avrasyacilik-ulusalcilik-ve-ergenekona-dair-898573/>.

and their interpretations. In all ideological currents in Turkey, the history and Atatürk have been used as the elements of justification or a ground for support. This led different ideological groups to interpret the ideas and practice of Atatürk, or Kemalism, in distinctive ways in accordance with their ideological or political position. The same applies to Doğu Perinçek's ideas where there is an effort to harmonise, or even justify, socialism in Turkey with Kemalism by referring to the revolutionary practices took place in Asia during and after the First World War. The parallelism among the revolutionary practices in Asia, including the causes and circumstances, forms the main pillar of the Kemalist Eurasianist idea in terms of domestic and foreign policy. In this regard, an effort to prioritise the influence of the Bolshevism in Kemalist revolution and ode to Soviet-Turkish co-operation in defeating the imperialist powers in the national liberation struggle and the *etatism* of the 1930s are evident in Perinçek's writings. Since the left-nationalist theoretical framework has been mentioned, this chapter will be dedicated to the conceptualisation of the Turkish revolution in Perinçek's writings interrelatedly to the history of the foreign relations.

According to Perinçek, the international roots of the Turkish revolution derive from democratic revolutions following the French Revolution of 1789, *Narodnism* which occurred as populism in Turkey, and the Soviet revolution.¹³⁹ Since the influence of the Enlightenment and the ideas of the French Revolution on Kemalism and its civic nationalism mentioned in the Introduction part, this chapter focalises on Turkish-Russian interaction. According to Perinçek, there has been interaction between the Russian and Turkish revolutionary movements chronologically. Following the 1905 Russian Revolution, the Young Turk Revolution against the reactionary and oppressive Sultan Abdulhamid II took place in 1908. During the First World War, in 1915-1916, the Turkish Army led by Atatürk defeated the intruders in Gallipoli which had dramatic impacts on the direction of the war; and in 1917 the Bolshevik Revolution changed

¹³⁹ Doğu Perinçek, *Kemalist Devrim-5: Kemalizmin Felsefesi ve Kaynakları* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları 2014), 44.

the balances in the war and had a crucial impact on the Turkish revolution which was initiated in 1920. In 1921, the Soviet Union proposed the NEP and in 1923, just after the foundation of the Republic, Turkey held Izmir Economic Congress where the economic development plans were discussed, and mixed economy was opted. In 1929, the Soviet Union started collectivisation, and Turkey adopted centralised state planned economy in 1930 influenced by the Soviet plans. Following the Second World War, Turkey faced with a “counter-revolution” under the Menderes government which was named as “Little America process” and has been transformed through the counter-revolution at the expense of Kemalist revolution, and in the Soviet Union, “counter-revolutionary process” began with return to capitalism following the death of Stalin until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hence, that chronology indicates that the progressive and regressive processes both in Turkey and Russia has gone hand to hand.

According to Perinçek, the 1917 Revolution and the Turkish Revolution initiated a new revolutionary era in Asia, and both revolutions were complementary since the Bolsheviks supported the Turkish revolution ideologically, financially and militarily, and the emergence of the Turkish nation-state after an anti-imperialist war secured the Soviet Union reciprocally. This friendship was materialised, in 1928, in the Republic Monument in *Taksim* Square by placing the statue of Semyon Aralov, Soviet Ambassador in Ankara during the national liberation war, together with Atatürk and İnönü.¹⁴⁰ Although scholars have consensus on that Atatürk was not akin to any ideology as discussed in the first chapter, Perinçek’s approach is rather different as he argues that the Soviet revolution influenced the revolutionary cadre ideologically based on Atatürk’s speeches, writings and letters. Atatürk, in 1904, wrote his notebook “must first be socialist and understand the matter”¹⁴¹ and just before initiating the national liberation war he met with Soviet officials during his rallies. Mehmet Perinçek cites Yerasimos and argues that during Atatürk’s rallies, governors loyal to the İstanbul government

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 78.

¹⁴¹ Doğu Perinçek, *Asya Çağının Öncüleri*, 121-122.

published notices against the leaders of the national struggle by claiming that they were Bolsheviks and called the public to fight against those *Moskofs*; and likewise, Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha, who collaborated with the Allied occupation forces and advocated the British mandate for the Ottoman state, sneaked to the British Admiral Roberck that Atatürk desired to bring Bolshevism.¹⁴² Nevertheless, these do not imply that Atatürk was a socialist, and he clearly stated that he and the military cadre did not think about fighting against imperialism and capitalism initially but they were aware of the threatening forces.¹⁴³

The post-War Treaty of Sevres (August 1920), which was signed by the İstanbul government paving the way for division of the Anatolia among the imperialist forces as mandates and emergence of Kurdish and Armenian states, indeed was posing a common threat to Turkey and Russia since Turkey was to be divided and mandated, and the Allies would pose a threat to the Bolshevik government from the Caucasus. When the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara founded in April 1920, the Ankara government increased the dialogue with the Soviet Russia through the members of the Communist Party of Turkey. Atatürk also sent letters to Lenin with regards to co-operation against the imperial plans over the Caucasus, Armenians and the Baku oil and the character of the Turkish national struggle which was affirmed and supported by Lenin and Stalin in their letters.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, the official newspaper of the GNA, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (National Sovereignty – 1920-1934), overtly advocated communism and socialism as following where the influence of the Soviet revolution is apparent in the characteristics of the Turkish revolution: “the ultimate enemy is capitalism”, “the communism is the only way for independence”, “Anatolia is uniting for communist struggle”, “Turkish communism is different than Russian Bolshevism”, “ the Turkish and

¹⁴² Stefanos Yerasimos, *Ekim Devrimi'nden "Milli Mücadele'ye Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1979), 137, quoted in Mehmet Perinçek, *Atatürk'ün Sovyetlerle Görüşmeleri* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları 2011), 42.

¹⁴³ Perinçek, *Kemalist Devrim-5*, 82.

¹⁴⁴ Doğu Perinçek, *Lenin Stalin Mao'nun Türkiye Yazıları* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1992).

Russian revolutions are in the same front and pioneering to emancipation of mankind”, “the world is divided between the capitalist and the oppressed”, “in Asia the matter is nationhood and sovereignty”, “the centres of the Eastern Revolution are Moscow and Ankara” and so on.¹⁴⁵

According to the Patriotic Party circles, another aspect of the influence of the Soviet revolution in the Turkish revolution is that the *etatism* and populism which also distinguish the Turkish revolution from the bourgeois revolutions took place in the West. The Turkish revolution took place in the geography of the oppressed and was opposed to the individualism of the Western capitalist system of liberalism; therefore, the revolution was cultivated from the populist aspect of the Soviet revolution and built upon populist-*etatist* ground pioneering to the underdeveloped countries of Asia as a model.¹⁴⁶ Populism, as mentioned by the Cadre Movement, refers to elimination of the privileges among the social classes based on equality and co-operation. Atatürk in his writings used populism as synonym to democracy.¹⁴⁷ Populism was embodied in the GNA in 1920, empowering the people or national sovereignty against the Ottoman Sultan and the caliphate, building the nation under the name “Turk” which had a derogatory meaning for the ordinary people of Anatolia in the Ottoman era, prioritising the social needs and common good instead of self-seeking individualism.

Hobsbawm characterises the Russian *Narodnism* as “the most interesting revolutionary movement of the era which is different than others” and argues that “it is the ancestor both of an important family of movements in the backward countries of the twentieth century and of Russian bolshevism”.¹⁴⁸ According to Hobsbawm “failure of the reforms and emancipation of the serfs in 1861 created conditions for the revolutionary peasantry”; and the lack of bourgeoisie due to belated deconstruction of the pre-capitalist structures compared to Western Europe caused the Russian intelligentsia to take responsibility as an “educated coherence force” to

¹⁴⁵ Perinçek, *Kemalist Devrim-5*, 84-85.

¹⁴⁶ Doğu Perinçek, “Kemalist Devrim’in milletlerarası düşünsel kaynakları,” *Teori* 197, (2006): 9.

¹⁴⁷ Doğu Perinçek, *Kemalist Devrim-3: Altı Ok* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999), 40.

¹⁴⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital 1948-1875* (London: Orion Books, 2010), 328.

pioneer.¹⁴⁹ The Russian intelligentsia were distinguished from the western counterparts: 1) they were not absorbed into the prevailing middle classes and into liberal ideology, and 2) they could not follow the path of nationalism to establish a liberal bourgeois society due to aforementioned reasons.¹⁵⁰ As Hobsbawm further asserts, the political and economic circumstances together with the failed reforms, and the lack of bourgeois class determined the character of the revolution in Russia and other Third World countries, as well as Turkey:

“They were – as natives of what was par excellence the backward country of Europe they had to be – modernizers, i.e. ‘westernizers’. Yet they could not be only ‘westernizers’, because western liberalism and capitalism at the time provided no viable model for Russia to follow, and because the only potentially revolutionary mass force in Russia was the peasantry. The result was ‘populism’, which briefly held this contradiction in a tense balance. In doing so ‘populism’ illuminates much about the revolutionary movements of the Third World in the mid-twentieth century.”¹⁵¹

A similar association between the characteristics of the early revolutionary movements in the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire as the predecessor of the Russian and Turkish revolutions is established in *Teori* journal, the political and economic circumstances are pointed out, and both populisms are distinguished from the Western revolutionary movements.¹⁵² The September (2005) issue of the journal is dedicated to Russian and Turkish populism, their history, similarities and differences. According to Odabaşı, Turkish populism was influenced through four channels: 1) Turkist intellectuals of the Ottoman era who were born in or came from Russia and were introduced to *Narodnik*, pan-slavist, nationalist and socialist ideas during their time in Russia, such as *Yusuf Akçura* and *Ahmet Ağaoğlu*, 2) the Turkish military officers who fought against the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation whose struggle influenced the young officers who would become the Unionists (CUP); and the struggle of the

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 331.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 332.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 333.

¹⁵² Arda Odabaşı, “II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi, Türk Halkçılığı ve Halka Doğru Dergisi,” *Teori* 188, (September 2005): 10-11.

Serbs and Bulgarians, 3) the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party formed by Armenian intellectuals among whom *Narodnik* ideas were influential; nevertheless, the most influential channel was the immigrants from Russia.¹⁵³

The populism constitutes the backbone of the national war of liberation and the Turkish republic. The populism was later consolidated with *etatism* after the proclamation of the Republic. As aforementioned, the philosophy of the *etatism* in Turkey differed from the Soviet practice that it was more populist which stemmed from the difference between the Russian and Turkish populism. In the writings of Doğu Perinçek and in *Teori* journal, the Kemalist principles are taken as a whole and complementary to each other but topics on populism and *etatism* take place more frequently and are given more importance as the two most important and indivisible features constituting the national unity. In the September 2006 issue of *Teori*, nation building process is attributed to suppression of ethnic and religious rebellions, crushing the economic power of the opponents of the Republic and revolutions, establishing economic infrastructure, integration of the national market through telecommunication and transportation, and development of public services which consolidate national identity and consciousness.¹⁵⁴ *Etatism* is considered as the method to overcome the conflicts and differences based on ethnic and religious identities through nationalisation and increasing economic power of the people.

Thanks to *etatism* and expropriation in the early Republican era state took control of the foundations and *waqfs* which were, and still are, the major source of economic power of the religious communities (*jamaah*) and religious sects (*tariqa*), to prevent difficulties caused by religious communities and sects before the nation building. Similarly, Doğu Perinçek argues that Atatürk was opposed to the feudal ownership of the property, and his government

¹⁵³ Ibid, 12-13; Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002), 391-392; Francois Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), 109.

¹⁵⁴ Yıldırım Koç, "Atatürk döneminde Türk ulusunun oluşturulması açısından devletçilik," *Teori* 196, (2006): 46.

nationalised all the property of the Ottoman dynasty, religious community buildings were transformed into public schools, the feudal titles causing social division in the society such as *ağa, hoca, molla, efendi, bey, paşa*, were removed and equality before law was provided regardless of the social status, all the real property belonged to tribal leaders, *ağas*, and sheikhs were expropriated, railways were nationalised and expropriated, and laws were drafted for distribution of the tribal leaders' lands to the farmers to emancipate the peasantry from the yoke of feudal forces.¹⁵⁵ These efforts and implementations are mentioned comparatively to the ideational sources of the Kemalism and exemplified by historical references to, such as, Reformation in England where the property of the monasteries were seized which was supported by the bourgeoisie and the parliament, 1640 Revolution in England where the English feudalism was ended, the French Revolution of 1789.¹⁵⁶ Perinçek also puts emphasis on the division between the abolishment of feudal property and the collective property; while the former is the result of democratic bourgeois revolution as in the example of the 1789 Revolution, the latter is associated with socialist revolution as in the examples of the 1917 Revolution (*kolkhoz*) and Chinese Revolution of 1953 (the people's commune).¹⁵⁷ Perinçek, likewise the Cadreists and *YÖN*, associates the Turkish revolution with the former due to social structure of Turkey. Perinçek and *Teori* writers prioritise the French Revolution with regards to the Kemalist revolution over the socialist revolutions; however, in the writings related to political and economic situation in 1990s and 2000s Turkey, China is mentioned more frequently as a success story of the *etatist* development model.

Perinçek and *Teori* writers do not distinguish populism and *etatism* from the nationalism as they are all taken as a whole and complementary with regards to the nation-building and state-society relations. Kemalist nationalism is considered as a revolutionary nationalism which

¹⁵⁵ Doğu Perinçek, "Cumhuriyet Devrimi'nde kamulaştırma," *Teori* 134, (2001): 27-34.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 17-18; Christopher Hill, *1640 İngiliz Devrimi* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983), 26.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 18.

is progressive and particular to Turkey as it is the particular adoption of the aforementioned national bourgeois revolutions and socialist revolutions in accordance with the needs and circumstances of Turkey. The emphasis is put on the geography, people, and the revolution.¹⁵⁸ Nationalism is taken as the characteristic of the Kemalist revolution and as a whole together with the six principles of Kemalism. This revolutionary nationalism is labelled as progressive nationalism and categorically distinguished from ethnic and racial nationalism. In this regard, pan-Turkist or Turanist ideas are rejected; however, Turkey and the Turkish nation are regarded as Asian or Asiatic irrespective to ethnic or racial roots.¹⁵⁹ Ethnic and racial nationalism together with religious sectarianism are categorised as reactionary nationalism and play factious role in Turkey and also in the region throughout the history. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the comprador classes and the economic and political agenda they follow vis-à-vis the capitalist/imperialist countries all fall into the same group with such type of nationalists as the reactionary forces since both impede Turkey's political, economic and social development by hindering the establishment of balanced relations with the neighbouring countries and regional alliances. In *Teori* journal the topics of populism, *etatism* and nationalism are frequently covered interrelatedly, together with foreign policy and geopolitical strategy. Eurasianism is also taken in the same fashion related to what has been mentioned so far and emerged under the guidance of history, as a result of the political, economic and geopolitical developments which took place in Turkey and in the region.

Kemalist Eurasianist Approach and the Eurasianist Choice

A comprehensive theoretical approach towards Eurasianism has been developed by the Patriotic Party circles since the second half of the 1990s. In order to analyse their approach, it

¹⁵⁸ Doğu Perinçek, "Devrimci Milliyetçilik ve Irkçı Milliyetçilik," *Teori* 95 (December 1997), 15-16.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 17. "Atatürk in his speeches also stated this as: 'we are an Asiatic nation and Asiatic state'".

was necessary to scrutinise their interpretation of the Kemalist revolution, its inter-relation with the Soviet Revolution and Chinese Revolution within the framework of left-nationalist anti-imperialist ideology. Thus, in the previous chapters, the Kemalist revolution has been mentioned by referring various approaches towards it; and left-nationalist interpretation has been addressed in order to demonstrate the inter-relation with the Soviet revolution and Asiatic notions on which the main pillars of the Kemalist revolution, the Republic and the national-identity were constructed. According to them, Turkey has been in the process of a counter-revolution since the Second World War; however, with the end of the Cold-War, Asia, as well as Turkey, has become a geography of revolutions again with the emergence of the nation-states and new international order, especially considering the rise of China. This was a contestation against Zbigniew Brzezinski's characterisation of Eurasia as a geography of chaos because wherever and whenever the system is in crisis the revolution has been a solution brought by the labourer and the people in this geography.

Perinçek identified six conflicts in the world: 1) the conflict between the oppressor and the oppressed countries; 2) the conflict among the imperialist countries; 3) the conflict between the mafia capitalism and the all mankind; 4) the conflict between the U.S. imperialism and the all other nations in the world; 5) the conflict between the dominant class and the working class in the countries; and 6) the conflict between capitalism and socialism.¹⁶⁰ The main conflict among these is the conflict between the oppressed and the oppressor; however, the major conflict which determine and would resolve the main conflict is the conflict between the U.S. imperialism and all mankind.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the EU had space to expand their influence over the territories over which Russia had hegemony. When we look at the integration and division, the newly emerged states in the Eastern Europe were integrated as

¹⁶⁰ Mehmet Perinçek, *Avrasyacılık*, 30.

they complied with the neo-liberal system whereas the resistant countries were disintegrated as in the case of Yugoslavia. Not only Eastern Europe, but also Central Asia and the Middle East became the centre of interest for the U.S. where Turkey was considered as a reliable ally as an outpost with regards to its geopolitical position considering the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Middle East, connection with the Turkic nations and Caucasus, capabilities vis-à-vis the implementation of the U.S. policies in Iraq.¹⁶¹ The expansionist and interventionist policies brought along transformation in the idea of the oppressors and the oppressed as the countries who divide and the ones who are divided or will be divided. In this regard, the world is divided into two camps: the dividing countries are the U.S. and the U.K, together with Israel, and the divided and will-be-divided ones are Iraq, Yugoslavia, Central Asian and Caucasian countries together with Turkey, Russia, Iran, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and China.¹⁶² Europe stands in-between the Atlantic and Asian fronts where Germany might evoke anti-US dynamics. Hence, Eurasia is not taken as a clearly defined geography as in the geopolitical approaches; rather, it is envisioned as a political concept or as a camp formed against the Atlantic camp whose program and strategy are neo-liberalism and globalism respectively.

According to retired Admiral Soner Polat, vice-chairman of the Patriotic Party, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has no interest in the Atlantic camp; in contrast, the emerged conditions have created a dynamic environment for Turkey to re-form her alliances on the regional basis with the countries which Turkey could not develop good relations with due to the alignment with the Atlantic camp since the 1950s.¹⁶³ Doğu Perinçek and the Patriotic Party circles foresaw the U.S. interest in the Middle East, specifically Iraq, and were opposed

¹⁶¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books 1997), 77; Brent Scowcroft and George Bush, *A World Transformed* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 760, 773-774.

¹⁶² Doğu Perinçek, *Avrasya Seçeneği* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1996), 7-10.

¹⁶³ Soner Polat, *Türkiye İçin Jeopolitik Rota*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2017).

to participate in the U.S' wars in the region like a U.S. 'gendarmierie'. According to them, Turkey should not follow the interests of alliances such as NATO; rather, needs to pursue her national interests vis-à-vis the neighbour countries which was the bequest of Atatürk. Atatürk, before his death, bequeathed that the basis of the Turkish foreign policy was the friendship with the Soviet Union; thus, Turkey shall not betray this friendship and sign any treaty jeopardising it since that friendship is a part of the National Pact.¹⁶⁴ The reason is that Atatürk foresaw the Second World War, realised the progressive revolutionary dynamics of Asia, and refers to the Turkish revolution as the Great Eastern Revolution which connected the oppressed nations of the East.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, Turkey, after the Second World War, turned her back to the Kemalist principles through alignment with the U.S. and undermined the relations with her neighbours for the sake of the interest of the U.S. in line with its globalist program.

The application for the EU membership and the Customs Union Agreement are also approached in the same manner. When Turkey applied for membership to the EU, the move sparked off reactions in Europe too. According to Helmut Schmidt, Turkey is the Trojan horse of the U.S. not only in Asia but also in Europe and Turkey obtained candidate status since the EU was constrained by the U.S. for its strategic interests and hegemony over the diluted EU.¹⁶⁶ In this regard, Turkey will not be allowed to become a member in the EU but would only participate in the U.S.-envisioned free trade area without having the right to participate in decision-making process.¹⁶⁷ By this way, Turkey was tied to the EU door meaning that she neither can enter through the door nor can move away from it. Moreover, under the agreement, Turkey has become responsible to the EU with regards to the trade agreements with the third

¹⁶⁴I. Andronov, "Soratniki Atatürka," *Novoe Vremya*, September 15, 1967, quoted in Mehmet Perinçek, *Atatürk'ün Sovyetlerle Görüşmeleri* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2011), 235, 237.

¹⁶⁵ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri-12* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2003), 213, quoted in Mehmet Perinçek, *Atatürk'ün Sovyetlerle Görüşmeleri*, 239.

¹⁶⁶ Helmut Schmidt, *Die Mächte der Zukunft: Gewinner und Verlierer in der Welt von morgen* (Hamburg: Siedler Verlag, 2004), 110, 211, quoted in Mehmet Perinçek, *Avrasyacılık*, 33.

¹⁶⁷ Erol Manisalı, *Türkiye Avrupa İlişkilerinde "Sessiz Darbe"* (İstanbul: Derin Yayınları, 2007).

parties and the EU's interest has become more prior to the Turkish national economic interests.¹⁶⁸ These conditions are considered by the Patriotic Party, socialist and nationalist circles as contradictory to the national sovereignty.

Especially in the issues of *Teori* journal, between the years of 2001-2004, the relations with the EU are covered based on the Turkish national sovereignty. Following the 2001 financial crisis, Kemal Derviş, who “is vice president and director of Global Economy and Development, formerly head of the United Nations Development Programme and Minister of Economic Affairs of Turkey”¹⁶⁹, was invited to Turkey to take the responsibility in the Turkish economy under the Ecevit government. Derviş had come up with a prescriptive agenda based on IMF and World Bank directives and stipulated conditions for economic reforms which were against the national interests of Turkey. Turkey had economic crises before but had overcome these crises by the state-led national economic policies in the 1930s and 1960s; however, this time Turkey unconditionally capitulated to the IMF and World Bank (WB) via Derviş's economic program, which was sustained by the first Erdogan government, and the public sector and the state enterprises, which had strategic importance such as *Türk Telekom* (Turkish Telecommunications), were privatised adversely. These reforms, in line with the IMF and WB, were also imposed by the EU for membership conditions under the pretext of adjustment which would be named as “15 günde 15 yasa (15 laws in 15 days)”. These were welcomed and advertised by the U.S. and the EU in those days.¹⁷⁰ Some of these reforms and prescriptions were that: *Türk Telekom* was privatised and the foreign capital possessed the 55% of it; sugar beet factories were privatised, the minimum price were determined by the factories instead of the state, farmers were imposed quota for beet production, and the sugar industry was opened

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 107-109.

¹⁶⁹ “Kemal Derviş,” *World Bank*, <https://live.worldbank.org/experts/kemal-dervis>.

¹⁷⁰ “The Man Turks Trust: Kemal Dervis,” *The Economist*, last modified August 15, 2002, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2002/08/15/the-man-turks-trust-kemal-dervis>; “Dervis warning over Turkey reforms,” *CNN*, last modified May 15, 2001. <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/05/15/turkey.loans/index.html>.

to Cargill company; reforms imposed quota on tobacco production, all the national tobacco factories were sold and 95% of the tobacco industry passed to foreign companies; state monopoly was liquidated in natural gas industry, and natural gas and electricity industries were opened to the foreign capital, and most of them were privatised and sold to the foreigners; duties and authorities of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey were restricted; state was disposed of the banking sector and 60% of the banking sector was possessed by foreigners; public procurement law was amended and the restrictions towards foreigners were lifted; and the labour unions were strictly controlled and restricted.¹⁷¹

In line with these integration policies, political demands were enforced in exchange with economic aids during the early 2000s. Erdogan got support from the EU and the U.S. by promising to implement all these economic reforms and the political demands. It was the first time in the history of Turkish politics that a government inherited and implemented the economic policies and reforms of the previous one. Erdogan was determined to meet the political demands of the EU on the areas such as “the role of the military in politics through the judiciary; the State Security Courts; and through the National Security Council, the Turkish Penal Code and its articles on freedom of expression and association”¹⁷² Additionally, Erdogan had promised to pass the resolution for military action to invade Iraq in line with the U.S. demands, to which the parliament opposed, and the resolution was not passed.¹⁷³ Erdogan also tried to implement moderate policies with regards to the Cyprus issue in accordance with the EU; whereas the opposition and the military circles opposed the withdrawal of the Turkish armed forces from the island.

¹⁷¹ Mehmet Akkaya, “Kemal Derviş’in 15 kanunu neydi?”, *Aydınlık*, last modified July 23, 2015, <http://www.aydinlikgazete.com/kemal-dervisin-15-kanunu-neydi-makale,60882.html>; Dilek Uğuz Ertuğrul, “15 günde 15 yasa’nın getirdikleri,” *Teori* 138, (2001).

¹⁷² Meltem Müftüler Baç, “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union,” *South European Society and Politics* 10:1 (2009), 22.

¹⁷³ Rob Watson, “Bush backs Turkey’s EU efforts,” *BBC News*, last modified December 11, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2564339.stm>.

Under these circumstances the Patriotic Party and the Kemalist military and civil groups had the anti-U.S. and anti-EU stance due to the agenda of globalism which manifested itself as neo-liberal economic policies, IMF prescriptions and EU reforms targeting the role of the constituent institutions of the Republic of Turkey and the envisioned role for Turkey as an outpost with regards to the U.S. policies in transforming the Middle East. These reforms and the whole agenda were considered as an attack to the values of the Kemalist revolution and Turkey's national sovereignty by the socialist and nationalist groups. Eurasianism has become the patriotic agenda against the globalism. During the early 2000s Eurasianist strategies for Turkey were suggested by the Patriotic Party circles with regards to economic and foreign policies on the basis of anti-globalism and anti-imperialism. Kemalist Eurasianism is the continuum of the Kemalist revolution and the aim of achieving it. In this regard, it is the sum of the strategies and alliances against the forces targeting the Turkish nation-state.¹⁷⁴

According to the Patriotic Party circles, Kemalist Eurasianist strategy begins with unifying the home front against the imperialism and comprador classes in the country. Second, on the regional basis, the strategy is to unify the regional countries to stand against the interventions and to co-operate with them for development. Turkey suffered from the pro-US foreign policies towards its neighbours which caused alienation and isolation of Turkey. Although stood against the invasion of Iraq, Turkey could not or did not show the same stance towards Iran and Syria. Also, in the 1990s, Chechen mujahedeen were supported against Russia through military aids and harbouring which caused Russia's retaliation by supporting the PKK. Additionally, Turkey's ethnic nationalist policies towards the Central Asian countries and planning and supporting of 1995 Azerbaijani coup attempt created crises with those countries and ended up with Turkey's exclusion from and Russia's assuming influence over the region. Moreover, Turkey also periled her relations with China by supporting the separatists in

¹⁷⁴ Mehmet Perinçek, *Avrasyacılık*, 63.

Xinjiang-Uygur region. In this regard, Turkey should immediately return to the Kemalist principle of “peace at home, peace in the world” since the errant foreign policies backfired and created more domestic problems regarding the religious and ethnic fault lines of Turkey. Hence, Turkey should respect the national sovereignty of other nation-states and should not involve in provocative actions based on ethnic and religious matters. The third strategy is to unite with the nations of the Eurasia who are under the attack of neo-liberalism and the U.S. imperialism. In this regard, the regional co-operations and organisation are supported and especially the importance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is emphasised.

According to *Teori* writers and the Patriotic Party circles, Eurasia has become a geography of revolutions against the U.S. hegemony and the unipolar world order. Russia has adopted an Eurasianist stance and found her natural position after the turbulent period of the 1990s. China has been rising as an economic and military power and pivoted to the West which is to change the balance of power in the world and pioneer to the multipolar world order by challenging the U.S. In this regard, Turkey should analyse the changing order and take its position in the Eurasian camp because the policies in line with the U.S. and the EU, together with the NATO, has bankrupted for Turkey. Turkey has been facing with a danger of losing her nation-state by the invasion of the foreign capital, decay of economy, and betrayal to the Kemalist values under the political Islam. Thus, Turkey needs to re-consider the obsolescent alliances which has undermined the national interests of the Turkish state and turn her face to the rising Asia. In this regard, the Chinese economic model is frequently referred to together with Mao’s “Theory of Three Worlds” by establishing connections with Kemalist revolution and its *etatist* policies. According to *Teori* writers, Turkey is on the edge of another struggle for liberation as she has been turned into a semi-colonised state through the Customs Union, the EU adjustment laws, foreign capital invasion of the national market hindering production; therefore, to be able to overcome these issues Turkey needs to bring back Kemalist policies and

must have a position in the geography where she belongs. In other words, new international conjuncture has created a manoeuvring space for Turkey to achieve and complete the national democratic revolution in Eurasia by developing relations with the aforementioned countries on the basis of the alliance of the nation-states with which more balanced and dynamic relations could be developed militarily, economically and culturally proven by historical experiences.

For the Patriotic Party circles, Eurasianist alliance is not envisioned as a union or Eurasianism is not approached as a counter-globalisation as in the case of Russian neo-Eurasianism. It is rather projected as an informal alliance or cooperation among the nation-states, who are resisting the U.S. imposed economic and political globalisation process, on the basis of shared common fate. Therefore, the Patriotic Party circles and Doğu Perinçek do not mention of common Eurasian ideology or identity in emergence of such alliance. Although there are similarities between Kemalist Eurasianism and Russian neo-Eurasianism such as the polarisation between Atlanticism and Eurasianism, anti-Atlanticism based on collectivist features like populism/public interest, common good which are particular to Eurasia;¹⁷⁵ there are essential differences between Kemalist Eurasianism and Russian neo-Eurasianism.

¹⁷⁵ Mesdi Ismayilov, *Avrasyacılık: Mukayeseli Bir Okuma – Türkiye ve Rusya Örneği* (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2011), 353.

CHAPTER 4: KEMALIST EURASIANISM AND RUSSIAN NEO-EURASIANISM

As aforementioned, Doğu Perinçek and the Patriotic Party circles have been charged of being ultra-nationalists who want to bring the military tutelage back in line with pro-Russian policies by the liberal and conservative groups in Turkey and were imprisoned for being members of the alleged ‘*Ergenekon* Terror Organisation’. As the anti-Americanism of the imprisoned group was mentioned, the ties between the Patriotic Party and Dugin were brought to the forefront by the Turkish media by labelling the anti-American generals, intellectuals and the Patriotic Party as ultra-nationalist pro-Russian group associated with Dugin, thus Kemalist Eurasianism was associated with Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism accordingly. Nevertheless, although the Patriotic Party joined to the International Eurasian Movement, established in Moscow in 2003, Kemalist Eurasianist idea and Russian neo-Eurasianism are essentially different concepts.

It can be suggested that Russian neo-Eurasianism is an improvised version of Russian classical Eurasianism. Russian classical Eurasianism emerged in Europe among the Russian *émigré* after the Bolshevik revolution as an ideological, political and social movement. It is based on the idea that the Russian culture is not European, rather it is the unique composition of the Eastern and Western cultures; therefore, while belonging to both East and West, it is neither Eastern nor Western culture.¹⁷⁶ Within this context, the European culture, which was equated to Romano-Germanic culture in Trubetzkoy’s *Europe and Mankind*¹⁷⁷, is rejected and criticised since it has established a post-Christian system, as the result of the laicisation of the Western Christianity, where the individualism, self-interest, competition, materialism, technical development and consumption is sacralised by which the weak is exploited.¹⁷⁸ Europeanisation is also approached in the same manner with regards to the reforms of the Peter the Great by ignoring the technical developments. According to Trubetzkoy, the reforms paved

¹⁷⁶ Alexander Dugin, *Moskova-Ankara Eksenini: Avrasya Hareketinin Temel Gorusleri* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007), 15.

¹⁷⁷ Nikolai S. Trubetzkoy, *Avrupa ve Beşeriyet* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları 2012).

¹⁷⁸ Dugin, *Moskova-Ankara Eksenini*, 18.

the way for “cultural and spiritual enslavement of Russia” and caused social fragmentation due to the social dimension of the reforms including the “destruction of the patriarchate which was so important to the ideological and political system” as well as to the society.¹⁷⁹ Hence, the Russian culture was exposed to Romano-Germanic culture’s exploitation, which led to an “Antinational Monarch”, “disintegrated national personality” and “forgetting the historical essence of Russia”.¹⁸⁰ In this regard, the nature of the exploitation is social and cultural in Trubetzkoy’s views while the advanced technique and economy are the tool for the exploitation, not the characteristic.

Classical Eurasianism rejects the superiority of the advanced technique and economy, through which the Romano-Germanic culture is imposed, over the spiritual and traditional values of the nations. According to this view, each nation has its own particular way to develop a culture, tradition, values, model of government determined by the geography. In regard to geographical determinism, Trubetzkoy defines Eurasia as a geographical system of the steppes, mountains intercepted by the meridional system of rivers which has distinct climate as landlocked geography between Europe and Asia.¹⁸¹ According to Trubetzkoy, “Eurasia represents an integral whole, both geographically and anthropologically”, and “historically destined to comprise a single state entity by its nature”.¹⁸² “Genghis Khan achieved the historical task set by the nature of Eurasia, the task of unifying this entire area into a single state, by unifying the entire steppe under his power”.¹⁸³ Thus, while conciliating the Russian history with the Mongol yoke, Trubetzkoy defines the Russian state with respect to the Genghis Khan’s Eurasian empire and urges Russian state to re-incorporate these areas and “recreate the broken unity as the “descendant of Genghis Khan, the heir and the successor to his historical

¹⁷⁹ Nikolai S. Trubetzkoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991), 199.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid: 204.

¹⁸¹ Ibid: 164.

¹⁸² Ibid: 165.

¹⁸³ Ibid: 166

endeavours”.¹⁸⁴ To achieve this ‘divine’ mission, the state, society and people should serve to a superior moral purpose; therefore, strong economy, strong army and advanced industry are considered as means to reach to the higher *idea* but what gives meaning to the states and the nations is the dominant ideology.¹⁸⁵ Hence, the dominant ideology for Russia, considering the attributed historical mission, proposed by the classical Eurasianists, is Eurasianism.

Neo-Eurasianism is the revitalisation of the principles of the classical Eurasianist theory and transforming those into ideological and political programme by improvising the classical ideas according to the contemporary conjuncture and including the geopolitics. In neo-Eurasianism Trubetzkoy’s critique of Romano-Germanic civilisation was replaced by critique of the Anglo-Saxon world and the U.S, and the continental Europe has been distinguished from the Anglo-Saxon world and the U.S. by stressing an internal division in the West referring to the rise of European right movements which can be cooperated with. Hence, the concepts of Atlanticism, Anglo-Saxon world, globalism, new world order, and universal liberalism replaces the notions of the classical Eurasianism. On the other hand, mystic, spiritual, metaphysical and traditionalist features of classical Eurasianism have been kept or improvised by “articulating those to the geopolitical approach, and the imperial legacy is stressed in connection with the Russian culture”.¹⁸⁶ In addition, neo-Eurasianism refers Huntington’s clash of civilisations notion and Eurasianism is taken as an ideology and identity by geographical determinism primarily. In this regard, the ethnic nationalisms are considered as the roots of separatism in and disintegration of the empires and as the features of the modern nation-states; therefore, such nationalisms tried to be overcome through Eurasianist culture, or nation, bounded by geography and history.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Ibid: 167.

¹⁸⁵ Dugin (2007): 22.

¹⁸⁶ Dugin (2015): 32-35.

¹⁸⁷ Ismayilov, 362.

While Russian neo-Eurasianism represents the imperial legacy of Russia and proposes a Eurasian civilisation against the Atlanticism and its “objective” globalism, Kemalist Eurasianism puts the nation-states in the centre in its approach and urges co-operation or alliance among the nation-states targeted by globalism. Although the both agree on anti-Atlanticism and globalism, the roots of resistance are substantially different. While Kemalist Eurasianism refers to negative economic and political effects of the globalism and neo-liberalism regarding the Turkish nation-state vis-à-vis the relations with the U.S., Russian neo-Eurasianism prioritises the cultural and civilizational features and proposes an alternative globalisation against the current globalisation.

Russian neo-Eurasianism takes geopolitics as a worldview and sees the conflict between the land and sea, in accordance with its geographical determinism, which has led to the emergence of different development models, traditions, values in civilisations. On the other hand, in Kemalist Eurasianist idea, the main conflict is between the oppressed and the oppressor based on historical materialist approach. While in Dugin’s views has mystical and metaphysical elements, Doğu Perinçek and the Patriotic Party analyse the conflict by economic determinism. Moreover, Eurasia is not defined geographically in Kemalist Eurasianism; rather, it is defined as a political and strategic position of nation-states against the Atlanticism and its program of neo-liberalism. Thus, geographical factor is considered mainly in military and national security issues strategically. Additionally, the teleological notions attributed to Russia such as “sacred mission”, “messianic nation” contradict with Kemalist Eurasianist idea as they opposed the mystical, religious or metaphysical approaches. The disapproval of such approaches is evident in the Patriotic Party’s rejection of Turanist and pan-Turkist ideas and movements regarding the Central Asia.

Another important divergence between two Eurasianisms is the approach towards the religion. While in Russian neo-Eurasianism religion is an important constituent of its

worldview and Russian identity, together with traditionalism, Kemalist Eurasianism approaches national identity in line with modernist understanding of nationalism. Considering the politicisation of the religion in Turkey since the proclamation of the republic, the Patriotic Party has a radical secularist stance against the threat of political Islam and religious feudal structures. On the other hand, Dugin brings religion to his Eurasianist geopolitical approach and tries to find commonalities between the Orthodox and Islam, especially in his discussions with Sheik Imran Hosein.

Another difference manifests itself in their 'anti-Westernism'. In Russian classical and neo-Eurasianism the West is approached through a civilizational approach within the framework of moralism and spiritualism and associated with egoism, individualism and superiority of technique over moral values¹⁸⁸ whereas Kemalist Eurasianism adopts historical materialism and does not completely reject historical articulations of Europe in terms of philosophical and political thought and the revolutions. Additionally, the attributed features to the West are approached within the framework of capitalism and neo-liberalism rather than abstract notions. Furthermore, Dugin affirms Huntington's clash of civilizations idea regarding transition from nation-state to civilisation¹⁸⁹ whereas Perinçek and the Patriotic Party circles reject the civilizational approach and criticise Huntington's thesis as it is considered in line with the globalism's agenda of identity politics inciting ethnic and religious separatism against the nation-state's unity.¹⁹⁰ Considering that the nation-state is the touchstone of the Kemalist Eurasianists, these different approaches set major divergence between these two Eurasianisms.

Therefore, Kemalist Eurasianism and Russian neo-Eurasianism share common ground in their anti-Atlanticism and anti-globalism in terms of politics, economy and military; however, it is necessary to take both ideas separately according to the conditions of the

¹⁸⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, (Arktos 2014), 36,37.

¹⁸⁹ Alexander Dugin, *İnsanlığın Ön Cephesi Avrasya*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları 2017), 64-65.

¹⁹⁰ Doğu Perinçek, "Devrim Coğrafyası: Avrasya," *Teori* 123, (2000): 9; Mehmet Perinçek, *Avrasyacılık*, 161.

emergence of these ideas connected to the historical, political and economic developments and experiences vis-à-vis the Atlantic camp rather than endeavouring to present the former as an imitation or adoption of the latter. It is evident that Russian neo-Eurasianism constitutes a more comprehensive idea historically, intellectually, philosophically and scientifically. Russian neo-Eurasianism revokes the Russian imperial legacy through a Eurasian integration in the continental Europe and Asia by centralising the Russia's imperial land in its historicity and tries to reconstruct unique Russian identity as a Eurasian identity. On the other hand, Kemalist Eurasianism approaches Eurasia on the basis of strategic cooperation of the nation-states against the common enemy which targets the nation-states by neo-liberalism and globalism. Though Kemalist Eurasianism and Russian neo-Eurasianism consider the Atlantic camp and its globalisation agenda as a common threat and urge strategic cooperation, historical background, conditions and reasons for the emergence of the ideas, their projections, goal settings, economic, cultural and political approaches demonstrate essential differences.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the Patriotic Party's idea of Kemalist Eurasianism was analysed within the framework of conceptual history approach in order to provide a historical and conceptual insight on the subject. The thesis centralised two main problems regarding Kemalist Eurasianism and the proponents of the idea. The first one was that Eurasianism in Turkey has been studied merely as a topic of international relations and geopolitics without establishing historical connections with the terms which have been used. In the case of Kemalist Eurasianism, same problem was observed in the literature as the idea is characterised with ultra-nationalism, militarism and pro-Russian thinking. The second problem, related to the previous one, was that Kemalist Eurasianism has been considered as an imitation of Dugin's neo-Eurasianism and analysed within the scope of Russian neo-Eurasianism. For this purpose, the roots of the concept of Kemalist Eurasianism was scrutinised to frame the conceptual and contextual 'map' of the idea by interpreting the works of Doğu Perinçek, chairman of the Patriotic Party, and the party's monthly journal, *Teori*.

In this regard, one of the arguments of the thesis was that Kemalist Eurasianism is not only a geopolitical strategy, but also a national agenda articulated through the Kemalist revolution and the left-nationalist currents of 1930s and 1960s. Hence, the Patriotic Party's worldview with respect to their negative stance towards the U.S. and the EU was established vis-à-vis the legacy of Kemalist revolution and left-nationalism. Hence, in the first chapter, Kemalism was introduced as the constituent program and ideology of the Turkish revolution within the framework of anti-imperialism. Although the Kemalist revolution aims to reach to the level of contemporary civilization through modernisation, in the studies Westernisation is used as a synonym to modernisation. However, in the first chapter, it has been revealed that Kemalist revolution is not Westernisation. Revolutionary principles of *etatism* and populism, together with the socialist thought and the relations with the Soviet Union, influenced the

direction of the revolution and its aftermath. The non-aligned position through the pacts and treaties with the neighbouring countries and good relations with the Soviet Union in addition to the pioneer role attributed to the Soviet and Turkish revolutions for the independence of the Middle East and Asia imply 'Easternism' of Kemalism.

In the second chapter, left-nationalist interpretation of Kemalism was based on a theoretical ground and conceptualised by referring to the ideas of the Cadre Movement of 1930s and *YÖN* Movement of 1960s. By this way an analogy has been established between the Soviet-influenced *etatist* anti-capitalism of the 1930s and the anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism of the 1960s which emerged as a reaction against the pro-US policies of the then-Turkish government. The alignment with the West and the U.S., imposed economic model and NATO membership hindered the Turkey's particular way of development and limited Turkey's national sovereignty with respect to regional policies and relations. *YÖN* writers urged Turkey to leave NATO and develop relations with the Middle Eastern nations and China. Their views are influenced by Mao's "Theory of Three Worlds" which is apparent in their 'Third-Worldism'. However, their approach is not a geopolitical one; rather, stems from the economic and political circumstances affecting the Turkish nation-state. Thus, their orientation towards the East, or 'Easternism', is considered as a necessity for Turkey to achieve its incomplete national democratic revolution originated from the Kemalist revolution.

The Patriotic Party, bearer of the legacy of the *YÖN* Movement and idea of the national democratic revolution, proposed the concept of Kemalist Eurasianism as a national and international strategy for Turkey against the U.S. imperialism after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. In Kemalist Eurasianism, the concepts of the early republican era, national revolution and national sovereignty, and socialist concepts of the oppressor and the oppressed are inherited; however, adopted to the contemporary conjuncture as anti-imperialism and anti-globalism. After the end of bi-polar world order, the U.S. led globalisation accelerated and initiated

integration process for the nation-states under the 'laws' of neo-liberalism. As the globalisation replaced the imperialism, the division between the oppressors and the oppressed are replaced by globalism and nationalism. In this regard, a resisting front of the nation-states against globalisation has emerged in Eurasia opposing to the Atlantic camp. Hence, the Patriotic Party defined the Eurasia as a political geography resisting against the globalisation and neo-liberalism directed from the U.S. Eurasia is perceived as a symbolic geography where the U.S. imperialism has gravitated to. In this regard, Eurasia is conceptualised as the counter-pole in the form of cooperation of the nation-states resisting against the globalism. On the other hand, Kemalist Eurasianism is distinguished from the Russian neo-Eurasianism, which is projected as an imperial project and identity for Russia through a civilizational approach, since Kemalist Eurasianism does not attribute a supranational feature to Eurasia as a counter-globalisation; rather centralises the informal alliance and cooperation of the nation-states by advocating the national sovereignty of each individual nation-state in the region.

This thesis can be concluded that, since the Second World War, Turkey has been an ally to the Western camp regarding; however, the U.S. influence, the EU's political demands and the Customs Union, and neo-liberal economic policies demonstrated that Turkey has diverged from the principles of the Kemalist revolution and has been losing its national sovereignty. In order to bring the Kemalist nation-state back and regain economic and political independence, Eurasia, or the Eurasian cooperation, is proposed. Hence, Kemalist Eurasianism means completion of the Kemalist revolution prioritising the *etatism* and populism domestically, and Eurasia is the geography of this revolution. In this regard, Kemalist Eurasianism is the international extension of the Turkish national revolution and Kemalist nationalism.

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