

Abstract

This bachelor thesis focuses on the Bay of Pigs invasion which had been an important part of the U.S.-Cuba relations in the 1960s. The period between the Cuban revolution and the Cuban missile crisis was marked by rapid deterioration of those relations. The thesis is set exactly in this time frame. The invasion was the outcome of the previous deterioration and Castro's victory became the reason for further escalation of the hostilities between the United States and Cuba. This thesis answers the question what decision-making process led to the actual execution of the invasion, what mistakes caused the invasion to fail, who is to blame for this outcome and what consequences did the American failure have on further evolution of the U.S.-Cuba relations. It analyses steps of the planning process and the influence of all the interested parties on this process. It reaches conclusion that the aggressive approach was implemented because of cold war circumstances and the communist threat, the American fear of losing their influence in the western hemisphere and personal ambitions of involved participants. The responsibility for the failure cannot be assigned to just Kennedy's decision making, the CIA's planning or poorly organized Cuban opposition because the fiasco resulted from all these things together. The failure led to further deterioration of the relations which can be defined with continued American attempts to get rid of Castro and his cooperation with the Soviet Union.