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Intercultural Dialogues and the Creativity of Knowledge: A Study on Daya Krishna

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Declaration

Hereby I declare that I have written this doctoral thesis by myself, using solely the references and data cited and presented in this thesis. I declare that I have not been awarded other degree or diploma for thesis or its substantial part. I give approval to make this thesis accessible by Charles University libraries and the electronic Thesis Repository of Charles University, to be utilized for study purposes in accordance with the copyrights.

Vienna, 18 January 2019

Elise Coquereau-Saouma
Abstract

This work discusses the contribution of the philosopher Daya Krishna (1924-2007) to the realm of intercultural dialogues. A leading figure of academic Indian philosophy, Daya Krishna left an immense and eclectic, yet mainly unexplored, corpus. Firstly, I offer one approach to his diverse philosophy by focusing on his philosophical project as a whole. His project attempts to unveil the presuppositions of thinking, which can only be effectuated in dialoguing across philosophical traditions founded on different presuppositions.

Applying his project to the realm of intercultural dialogues, I begin by questioning the limits encountered by recent intercultural theories aiming at deconstructing Eurocentrism and establishing a global philosophical dialogue while responding to their postmodern European heritages. As a counterpoint, I introduce the challenges of Anglophone Indian philosophers in India, facing an uprooting from their own traditions. They feel this uprooting as cultural subjection, deprived of their own philosophical past.

Within this context, Daya Krishna connected isolated communities of thinkers by organizing multilingual dialogues (called ‘saṃvāda’) between traditional paṇḍits, ulama and Anglophone philosophers. I reconstruct some of these experiments, thereby emphasizing methodological insights gained from this dialogical practice and the process of their organization. However, this intensive dialogical practice contrasts with the lack of a theory of dialogue in Daya Krishna’s philosophy. Therefore, I analyze what unveiling presuppositions means, and how it can contribute to the question of philosophical creativity in intercultural dialogues. I locate the source of this creativity in the challenge of accepting epistemological uncertainty in the latter. This uncertainty is further explored in the dissatisfaction felt in the gap between the ideality of philosophical apprehension and its realization, as well as in the illusion of I-centricity. These, however, are not obstacles for intercultural dialogues. They rather constitute the human predicament through which the specific creativity of intercultural dialogues originates – in the fragility of differences being explored conjointly.
Zusammenfassung


Acknowledgments

In honor of my grandfathers, Chekri Haïd Saouma and Bernard Coquereau

This work is not only about intercultural dialogues, of course. It is constituted, in so many ways, by chai-conversations, academic conferences and talks in-between lectures, questions and answers by mail exchanges, sharp debates, strong counter-positions, and long open-ended dialogues with so many partners throughout the world - professors, colleagues and friends. The list grew during the years in the discoveries and encounters of each journey and visit. And so did the acknowledgements.

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“The tension and the conflict between a human civilization transcending all civilizations and existing civilizations is, however, not exactly as new as may appear at first sight, especially in the contemporary context. All civilizations in the past have not only extended their frontiers but have also come into active contact and interaction with other civilizations not only through war, trade, and conquest, but also through what may be called, a genuine desire to understand and assimilate the other’s project, vision, and values. This aspect of the interaction between civilizations has generally been underplayed because of the habitual historians’ understandable fascination with the formation and dissolution of centres of political power and, more recently, those of wealth and riches which, in classical Indian thought on the subject, were clubbed together under a single puruṣārtha entitled artha. But, however underplayed by historians, there has been a fascination with the ‘other’ not only for its strange and exotic character which lies at the root of most recent anthropological studies, but also because the ‘other’ represents another possibility, another puruṣārtha of an individual’s own being which has not been explored or developed in his own civilization. The story of Chinese travelers in search of Buddhism epitomized so graphically in the life of Huien Tsang cannot, for example, be understood in any other way. However, the story of persons travelling in search of knowledge is as old as of those who have ventured out in quest of profit and plunder. If we remember the difficulties in travelling at that time and those involved in learning a foreign language and mastering it to such a degree as to be able to translate it into their own language, it is possible to begin to appreciate the impulse in at least some members of a civilization to understand the puruṣārtha of another and make them available to his own people. If it is further remembered that it was through the activities of these persons that such a large mass of literature was not only transported over thousands of miles but also preserved, translated, and received in course of time by millions of people of other civilizations who gradually tried to relate the projects and insights of their own civilization to them, it is possible to begin to realize that the dialogue between civilizations and the attempt of people belonging to one to transcend their own ‘parochiality’ has also been a perennial feature in the past of all civilizations.”

Preface

Daya Krishna was born in Meerut (near Delhi) in 1924 and graduated from the University of Delhi with a PhD thesis written under the supervision of N. V. Banerjee, examined by G. Ryle (Oxford University), H. H. Price (Oxford University) and S. K. Maitra (University of Calcutta), published with minor changes in 1955 as *The Nature of Philosophy*. This early work already contains a programmatic agenda for Daya Krishna’s further philosophical developments. It originates from the awareness that, although philosophy is claimed to be the organon for Knowledge based on Reason (rather than opinions) and leading to Truth, one only finds disagreements among philosophical theories, and philosophers furthermore do not seem to be able to ‘rationally’ convince each other in arguing against each other. To avoid plain indifference or unintelligibility, Daya Krishna ventures into exposing the unquestioned presuppositions of philosophy from which the ‘illusions’ of finality, unity and absoluteness of Truth, Reason, Knowledge, Freedom, Reality and Value originate. In my reading, it is this approach of ‘unveiling’ the presuppositions of thinking in general and of philosophy in particular that orientates his writings from this beginning until his posthumous work *Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions* (2012). The task is multifarious with numerous implications in the different realms of thinking, and in consequence, Daya Krishna’s publications are thematically eclectic. He considered the transcendental presuppositions of consciousness, their perceptual and biological structures, their cultural, political, sociological and economical organizations in terms of central-peripheral powers, their logical expressions and the epistemological consequences of subjectivity for knowledge, as well as the ‘myths’ of Indian philosophy in view of their historical presuppositions. For that purpose, Daya Krishna delved into various traditions of Buddhist and Brahmanical classical Indian philosophies as well as the analytical and continental traditions of the so-called Western philosophies. He travelled freely and widely between traditions, texts and disciplines, with the persisting idea of exposing the unasked and the givenness of any way of ordering, structuring and thinking philosophical problems.

Such a project cannot be realized alone, for one’s own presuppositions are far too deeply rooted to be overcome. Daya Krishna was not only aware of this limitation, but furthermore convinced that it could be a beneficial potentiality to enter in dialogue with participants sharing different sets of presuppositions. He thus continuously organized and participated in dialogical experiments, in particular during his career as a professor at the University of Rajasthan (Jaipur), with traditional *pandits* (later also with Muslim *Ulama*) in bilingual or trilingual dialogues (which he referred to as *saṃvāda*) for reinterpreting and thinking together philosophy creatively. He furthermore was for two decades the editor of the *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, the form of which he also modified to allow more questions, answers and discussions. Finally, he wrote and edited more than 20 books and 200 articles: among these, a large part was dialogically conceived as responses to his interlocutors, another part was edited to promote receptions of neglected Indian philosophers and foster cross-cultural discussions, and yet another part was also consciously written in Hindi as a battle against the hegemony of English. In view of his impressive contributions and of his commitment to public ‘academic’
(broadly understood) dialogues, Daya Krishna appears today as a leading figure and one of the most creative writers of Indian academic philosophy of the 20th century.

The first reason for a study on Daya Krishna’s philosophy is obvious: a decade after his death, with an incredible amount of work left behind him on an amazing range of topics, the philosophy of Daya Krishna should become available to philosophers. This denomination includes scholars of Indian philosophy/ies but also scholars who do not associate with the cultural and geographical adjective ‘India’, outside the field of South Asian Studies (and its relatives, such as Indology, Religious Studies, etc.), inside and outside India. To this last world in particular, Daya Krishna is still unknown, and this work first hopes to introduce his dialogical philosophy. In so doing, the questions pursued here, although emerging from India and committed to the specificities of the context in which they arouse, are not limited to a historical perspective of a ‘regional’ philosophy. I want to question intercultural dialogues as such, starting with his dialogical experiments and philosophy.

Devoting an intercultural analysis to Daya Krishna’s work is not insignificant. It grounds the enquiry in contemporary Indian philosophy with the challenges and difficulties that its context brings: the intermingling and division between classical and contemporary philosophies in India, the postcolonial stakes organizing this division, and the global context impacting its development. Such an enquiry thus implies to look simultaneously and reciprocally in two directions. On the one hand, it requires considering what an analysis which originates in philosophies from Indian academics could bring to intercultural theories elaborated in Europe or America. This further leads to question how the specificities of the postcolonial Indian academics meet or differ from ‘world philosophies’ elaborated in the ‘West’, i.e. to recognize specific developments among the world philosophies themselves. On the other hand, it also requires considering the influence of the ‘Western’ (including the reductions in the use and understanding of this term) reception of the contemporary philosophical developments of Anglophone Indian academics.

Taken together, the difficulties of these relations illustrate how the Western/Indian debate is relevant today only when it is understood as a binary entity. The meaning of both the ‘West’ and ‘India’ can be only grasped in the mutual but unequal relation of the two terms. This inequality, however, renders the relation as necessary as it is reductive and unbalanced: for the Western influence is unavoidable, while it seems that even highly sophisticated world philosophies, cross-cultural or intercultural theories can be developed without involving their Anglophone Indian counterparts. Consequently, this work tackles on political questions relevant to the postcolonial structures Daya Krishna’s project was shaped in, in Indian academia and in connection with different movements fostering similar objectives - however, in very different ways. The contributions of Indian academia that originated following the colonial encounter and the transformations of Indian academics should not be underestimated, for they offer tremendous resources of postcolonial reflection on the terms on which intercultural dialogues, understanding, encounters and cross-cultural analyses can foster philosophical creativity today. Inspired by the specificities of the colonial Indian context, but also by the influences of their philosophical heritages and continuities for interrogating contemporary situations, Indian academia and contemporary philosophies offer highly relevant questions and
answers to the fields of ‘intercultural philosophy’ seen in a ‘global perspective’. Thus, Daya Krishna’s philosophy and his dialogical experiments firstly help us questioning, from another perspective and traditions, what intercultural dialogues could bring to intercultural theories, and in particular, how do intercultural dialogues foster creativity and novelty in philosophy.

Furthermore, to specifically analyze the intercultural creativity involved in Daya Krishna’s experiments and philosophy among contemporary intercultural theories, implies not only to consider the Anglophone Indian academic context and its difficult relation to the Western counterpart that it addresses, but also the originality of Daya Krishna himself. What is Daya Krishna’s contribution among his peers, and what is the singularity of his position? Daya Krishna is a man of this between ‘classical’ and ‘contemporary’, ‘Indian’ and ‘Western’. He has been accused of being an outsider of the field of classical Indian philosophy/ies, because his interest in Indian philosophy/ies would have supposedly come late. Some scholars therefore suggested to divide his work into a first, middle and late phase. There are indeed differences in the style of writings as well as in the influences on his work, which should be a hopeful insight for any philosopher, namely the possibility of developing her/his thought further. But Daya Krishna is also a philosopher who, trained in Western Anglophone philosophy in India, and also in Sanskrit, interested in learning, listening and bringing visibility to the diversity of Indian philosophies, tried to bring different (rather isolated) communities of philosophies together. He could bring them together while fostering contemporary thinking with these traditions at the University of Rajasthan in Jaipur. His philosophy therefore reflects the ‘living’, ‘classical’ Sanskrit community, includes Hindi speakers and, to a lesser extent, Urdu speakers. It also reflects the living English-speaking contemporary community, itself divided between ‘Western’ sources and contemporary Indian philosophy inherited from a postcolonial fusion between indigenous traditions and external receptions, with the impossible clear-cut of these antagonistic heritages.

In this sense, Daya Krishna is both an insider and an outsider. Living and teaching in Indian academia, born as a Hindu, he does belong to Anglophone postcolonial academia and to the Hindi sphere of philosophy. But he is equally an outsider of the same Hindu philosophical world, of which he refused much orthodoxies, of the Islamic philosophical world, of the Buddhist philosophical world, and also, in his own way, of the English-world, of which he refused the hegemony. Of course, he is related to these traditions in different ways and degrees, being more closely associated to some than others. Like many instances of today’s world, whether it is due to colonization in or of one’s country or migrations to another, Daya Krishna is a mediator and an in-between figure. He is committed to the traditions of Sanskrit philosophies to which he feels no personal allegiance but a responsibility to reattribute to them a scholarly place of debate of which they have been deprived, however implying a critical view of their heritage. He is equally committed to the plurality and complexity of India’s intellectual traditions. He is finally, also trained and inclined to the ‘Western’, primary analytical, methods, sources and traditions, of which the Indian intellectuals also have a legitimate claim and heritage. Thus, he is a traveling mediator of different worlds.

In so doing, Daya Krishna is both an illustration of his time, of the problems and concepts of his own contemporary Indian philosophical context, and an innovative thinker. Unlike others,
however, he was mostly committed to two things: first, to actually engage with scholars who were for their part, grounded in a single training and heritage. Secondly, to dissociate these traditions from blind loyalty to any heritage, and to consider them instead as creative sources for today’s thinking.

_Samvādas_, as he referred to, were the philosophical and open dialogues organized across traditions and disciplines. Beyond the experiments that were carried under this name, I argue in the present work that _samvāda_ underlies Daya Krishna’s philosophical life, his philosophical collective projects, and grounds most of his work. It is in the reconstruction of implicit or explicit dialogues with his colleagues that one grasps the origins and developments of his critical appreciation of Indian philosophy/ies, and the basic assumptions and intuitions of his own work. However, he did not write any monograph on the problem of dialogue or _samvāda_, and very little of his philosophical work is explicitly, systematically and theoretically reflecting on dialogue itself. The topic is therefore somehow always there, underlying, as the origin, the cause, the motivation of his whole work, without being there, as a topic reflected upon. In the diversity of his writings and the forms the experiments took, how to proceed to define and qualify what _samvāda_ exactly means? And what exactly is dialoguing for someone who wrote so little explicitly on the topic? Can we, without losing the diversity of his insights, provide a meaningful continuity in Daya Krishna’s thinking if we articulate it around this concept? In Daya Krishna’s reception, _samvāda_ takes more and more importance, but it is still true that there is no monograph reconstructing Daya Krishna’s philosophy of dialogue. This thesis is simply an endeavor to fill this lack.

This work thus does not respond to a specific claim made by Daya Krishna on dialogue or interculturality. The objective rather lies in answering these questions by unveiling what I see as the persistent attempt in his multifarious writings, which I hypothesize to be a commitment to _samvāda_ even when it is not named or theorized upon. I aim at elucidating what _samvāda_, in the diversity of its experiments and the absence of theoretical elaboration, could mean. I therefore engage less in the analysis of a particular school (Indian or Western), a position or the historical reconstruction of a classical concept, which could (also) be found in Daya Krishna’s writings, than with what I see as Daya Krishna’s philosophical project. While it could seem in consequence that there is no ‘Daya Krishnian concept’, or domain of expertise, this work argues that it is the method, or the path chosen by Daya Krishna that makes his contribution to the topic of intercultural dialogues original. I will show how this way is a practice of _samvāda_ by combining theoretical research to unveil presuppositions that result in intercultural dialogues if used creatively, whereas presuppositions impede any dialogue when they remain unquestioned and become dogmatic assertions.

Thus, the present work follows two objectives: firstly, the one of highlighting what I see as one consistent project in spite of, or better, thanks to, Daya Krishna’s various philosophical directions and engagements. Secondly, I will highlight what this project could bring those of us who argue for intercultural, cross-cultural, comparative projects, in particular for the role of dialogues therein. I begin with an analysis of forms of communication located first of all in Franco-German thought (chapter 1), before turning to some critiques based on intercultural and cross-cultural projects established on the heritage of these European positions (chapter 0). As
an answer to these critiques, I first reconstruct Daya Krishna’s *saṃvāda* experiments (chapters 2 and 3), and then ground these experiments in the larger framework of his philosophical writings (chapters 4 to 7). I focus in particular on presuppositions (5), dissatisfactions (6) and illusions (7), which, I argue, enable to articulate a plurality that is confronted in dialogues and thereby constitute the points of tension from where intercultural creativity arises. This last theoretical part includes some of Daya Krishna’s interlocutors and Indian philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century (and most of the time, them only).

There is no need to hide the fact that the organization and development analyzed in the following pages is highly personal. The resources of intercultural philosophy and cross-cultural philosophies from the Western hemisphere are used before all as a conceptual framework and counter-point to engage and frame the debate with contemporary Indian philosophy, and even more, to see how the distinct answers from the latter can help us delineate some limits of already established theories. The history of ideas on the postcolonial Indian academia that is provided in section 2.2.1 aims to elucidate Daya Krishna’s context of *saṃvāda*. Thus, neither the introductions nor the intellectual descriptions surrounding the dialogical experiments are exhaustive (which would in itself be an independent work, or even several). They present instead an intelligible context and a set of questions to address Daya Krishna’s dialogical practice and theory.

Regarding the chapter 3 in which I describe the *saṃvāda* experiments, the problems are however quite different. They do not originate from the vastness of the sources among which one must choose in order to intelligibly articulate an idea, but rather from the lack of availability of the resources. Much of the material on which the reconstruction of the *saṃvāda* experiments is based has been assembled during research stays in India to create a usable corpus of data beyond the two published experiments. It includes unpublished letters provided by the Daya Krishna Archive (Jaipur/Tel-Aviv) and a series of interviews and meetings with participants of these seminars and dialogues, along with out of print essays and documents. But even collecting and processing these resources implies having to ‘make one’s way’ in a field that is as little researched and accessible as contemporary Anglophone Indian philosophy (whether this is first of all a defined ‘field’ itself is an open question). In this sense, the following work delineates a possible path in need of further developments and the *saṃvāda* experiments are described here as a possible way to engage further in intercultural dialogues.

The last theoretical part faces both problems, namely the difficulties of accessibility of contemporary Indian philosophies and the vastness of possible interlocutors with whom Daya Krishna engaged in his philosophical writings. The integration of interlocutors and the construction of a line of thinking in his philosophy among the tremendous amount of material that he explicitly or implicitly used is my own bricolage. It required a selection of topics and authors depending on my own abilities (to collect, process and frame materials that for the most part are difficult to access) and judgment (to integrate what seemed relevant to establish a philosophical background for dialogue in Daya Krishna’s philosophy). There is no doubt that many other paths and interlocutors are possible. This also forms the raison d’être of each philosophical dialogue, which I define later in this work as unique and infinite in abstracto, but de facto limited to its participants.
Thus, rather than exhaustivity, one of the objectives I had set for myself was to suggest one comprehensive way to approach such a diverse literature, the one of Daya Krishna in particular, in dialogue with contemporaries from the Indian academia of the second half of the twentieth century. That this field is in need of comprehensive recollection, reconstruction and visibility, is evident to anyone who has tried to come to grip with this literature, in particular outside India. The choice to favor contemporary Indian interlocutors in the third part of this thesis has been grounded first in view of trying to at least partially reconstruct an immediate ‘circle’ in which Daya Krishna’s philosophy matured. Secondly, it illustrates certain common concerns and interests to a postcolonial generation of Indian academia. Thirdly, because neither the particular authors nor the more general concerns have been until now been much analyzed or made available (to the Western reader in particular, but also to a large extent to Indian readers), it is also motivated by a concern of providing reception to texts and ideas of some participants of a cosmopolitan and philosophically rich generation of Indian philosophy/ies. Their thoughts are not limited to the time and contexts that enabled their emergence and formulations, but still constitute a resource for creative thinking to engage with.
1. Introductions:

“‘Dialogue’ is more problematic. (…) There is no alternative to speaking and listening to one another, but we must not be naive about it. What is the language in which Indians today speak about themselves and their tradition? Do they still speak for the tradition? How does this tradition itself speak to me? What is my ability to listen? How can I understand the tradition on the one hand, and the broken identity of its modern representatives on the other? Do I understand myself in the process? Could it be that understanding itself is not just a European, but a Eurocentric notion? With all these questions in mind, I still have to listen and to speak to the other. Whatever the problems with ‘dialogue’ and ‘understanding’ may be - these are channels that have to be kept open.”

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1.1. Thematic Introduction: Forms of communication

‘Dialogue between cultures and/or civilizations’, ‘dialogue with oneself’, ‘dialogue as mediation between I and You’, ‘interreligious dialogue’, ‘dialogism’, logic of dialogue: the use of the term ‘dialogue’ is now widely implanted across disciplines and practices. Scattered in many domains, from technical studies of communication to ethics, in the areas of politics and diplomacy, in sociology, linguistics, cultural studies and anthropology up to philosophical conferences, the topic seems to reach saturation point. Especially as it often takes for granted an alleged common idea of a dialogue, which presupposes that from politicians to participants of interreligious dialogue, everyone would share the same ‘intuitive’ representation, and maybe the same praxis of ‘dialoguing’. Even more confusing, the concept of dialogue seems more and more to acquire a moral pressure: ‘the necessity of dialoguing’, the ‘urgency of a dialogue’. Dialoguing turns out to be an imperative of our century, which contributes to make ‘dialogue’ a suspicious concept, which would be used for ideological purposes. This suspicion, which arises from the feeling of an insistent moral obligation to a vaguely defined concept (which could thereby include different and opposed ideas) is furthermore strengthened by the gap between the saturation of the uses of the term dialogue and the lack of argumentation and philosophical research on the concept itself. In other words: everyone hears about the necessity of dialogue, however very few attempt to theorize, define and determine modalities as well as conditions for establishing and thinking different forms of dialogue. What is exactly this dialogue that we urgently need? Or rather: what exactly do we need to set off dialoguing? There is therefore a gap between a feeling of saturation of the use of the term – which makes the idea hackneyed – and a lack of examination of what it actually means in different contexts – which makes its theorization and the philosophy of dialogue neglected.

Another gap, as relevant today as the wide spreading vs. deeper examination of the concept, concerns the difference between a theoretical necessity and a lack of practice. While the ‘necessity of dialoguing’ is generally accepted as an idea, the praxis, i.e. dialoguing itself, is rather seldom. Speaking about how urgently we need to establish intercultural dialogues is not in itself dialoguing, only harping on about dialogue. More exactly: while the ideal of a global dialogue is almost universally (supposedly) aimed at, its praxis is severely contrasted and marked by several failures: failures at a political level between different nations, failures at negotiations for peace and independence, failures between different layers and communities of a society, between different domains of research, and within philosophy, even sometimes between scholars of a same field in a common conference. Does this imply that dialogue is not a viable model of communication? Does it point at constitutive defects of ‘dialogue’ itself and concludes to an ‘impossibility of dialoguing’? Is ‘dialogue’ at the end only an ‘empty’ label to be used by those who want to add some ethical shape to their ideas – and should we therefore jettison the concept in philosophy? Besides, at a philosophical level of thinking, B. Waldenfels notices that,

“When I philosophically engage myself in my fellow human beings, I think of them and I speak with them only in passing, but I reflect primarily on them and I speak about them. However, it
Waldenfels acknowledges that such a procedure of abstraction inherently belongs to the very nature of the philosophical exercise so that dialogue on the one hand and reflection on dialogue on the other hand as a concept and phenomenon, must be clearly distinguished. This act of distinction in the abstraction is a condition to remain philosophical. However, it is necessary to philosophize in such a way that we bring the undefined experiences into a language that gives them meanings. This means to make sense with these experiences, rather than project a meaning detached of all experiences. I would add here that dialogue, since it is intersubjectively dependent, belongs to a kind of experience in which thinking about (something) and with (someone) cannot be distinguished in the process, which makes the praxis of dialogue so necessary to the conception of dialogue – since the praxis corrects, modifies and transforms what we thought dialogue was, could reach and develop. This makes the failures of dialogue even more uncomfortable. Does that mean that the theory is also distorted?

On the contrary, this very mistrust and suspicion are reason to analyze these gaps and their grounds. They first emerge on the subsumption of distinct forms of communication under a common denomination. Is it always the case that when two persons or a group of persons are speaking with each other, they are dialoguing? Of course not. Are all political, diplomatic, academic meetings dialogues? Definitely not. So what can we call a dialogue, and how to delimit it? Under the label ‘dialogue’ are often entailed or used indifferently the following forms of communication: discourse, debate, conversation, and even perhaps the idea of a conference and unilateral speech. The following paragraphs suggest primary distinctions and exemplified differences between these communicative models, which suggest a preliminary frame for this investigation concerned with philosophical dialogues between intellectual traditions.

1.1.1. Lectures, Conferences, Interviews: Unilateral Communicative Forms

That a ‘real dialogue’ cannot be confused with a session of question and answer after a lecture appears evident. It is so, firstly because the speaking time is unequally distributed between a single speaker and her/his audience and this repartition is prefixed according to established conventions. It is so, secondly and mostly, because the format of questions and answers is organized around the idea that the speaker ‘has’ the answer: she or he is supposed to deliver a certain amount of (pre-acquired) informative knowledge, which remains unquestioned, already established, articulated and fixed. This informative knowledge is systematically self-organized

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as theses, the hermeneutic context of which, relying on a certain position and methodological formation, remains presupposed and unquestioned. This communicative structure also implies a definite hierarchy and the authority of the invited speaker. It can be understood as the ‘classroom model’ of communication, such as the one operating between a teacher and her/his students, where the knowledge-asymmetry is presumed. Furthermore, this basic unequal situation is exacerbated by an immutable academic structure, such that it looks like a “ritual” where roles are distributed according to one’s rank within the whole of the academics – something criticized for example by Daniel Hornuff in an article of the German Newspaper Die Zeit:

“On this background, it becomes evident that the classical structure of a conference is based on this correlation between knowledge and power. The knowledge of those who are well-established, successful and highly decorated appears like the intellectual vanishing point: best known are the conferences, in which the participants develop the grotesque ambition to quote the keynote-speaker in a more extravagant and penetrating manner than all others. These meetings degenerate into pseudo religious rituals, during which more will be blindly repeated than freely thought, and during which in particular young academics learn to have to grasp the gesture of obeisance. That is how the power of knowledge starts to become a pattern. (…) Such a format of conference inhumes critique, because the structural conditions to practice it are missing.”

While such a structure is in itself dubious, what is even more questionable than its mere possibility is its invariable frequency and the inviolability of its format: conferences almost automatically adopt this ‘classroom model’, even among pairs, even if they share the same area of competence, with the same ‘experience’ or academic qualification. This type of communication precisely avoids any type of dialogical confrontation and collective thinking. It keeps reproducing patterns, hierarchies and ranks, power distributions, already established theses, etc. In short, despite the acclaimed ‘necessity of dialoguing’, academics seem to be fundamentally structured on an anti-dialogical communication model.

A sub-group for this communicative form could include the ‘interview’: both types share the same asymmetry in assigning speaking-time and supposed knowledge. Indeed, the

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4 This knowledge-asymmetry problem is not only delimited to lectures and conferences, although this format is structurally configured according to this asymmetry. This syndrome is however also a basic problem for dialoguing, as criticized by Daya Krishna as the “guru-śiṣya paramparā”, the “master-disciple syndrome”, which prevents creativity out of fearful respect for the authority Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 28. The concrete difficulty that this conception brings about for Daya Krishna’s dialogical experiments are presented in 2.2.2. The theoretical problems concerning the hindrance of dialoguing due to the unquestioned authority of a tradition passed on to disciples are analyzed in 6.2.

interviewer’s interventions simply aim at inciting the interviewee’s speech, dividing the roles of the participants – either questioner, or answerer. However, in this asymmetrical pattern, a certain one-sided or mono-intentional dialogical exploration can take place, because, unlike in the case of the lecture, the knowledge of the interviewee is not ‘ready-made’, ready to be delivered. The interview consists in exploring one perspective by the play of questioning the interviewee. While the communication is constructed such as to favor one (the interviewee) perspective, a common exploration of this perspective is configured.

The interview aims ‘only’ at an introspective understanding of the interviewees, but from a common exploration of one perspective. A certain ‘self-explanation’ originates from the external perspective of the interviewer projected on the interviewee. This forces oneself to think anew and to present differently one’s own theories and discourse. In other words: within the restrictive format of a unilateral exploration, a self-explanatory process of introspection through the other takes places. An excellent example of this phenomenon can be found in the published interview of the French philosopher and Member of the French Academy, Michel Serres, conducted by Bruno Latour (Serres, 1992). The original title expresses at its best this procedure: Éclaircissements, i.e. ‘clarifications’, the process of illuminating, or literally render something clear. The self-clarification is provoked by the reflection of the other’s understanding on oneself, which brings oneself, in the process of self-explanation and answering, to think oneself or one’s philosophy anew in order to present it differently to the other. ‘Reflect’ in this sense covers its two meanings: the self-activity of thinking carefully (to reflect on something), and the reflection sent back to oneself, something being emitted and directed back to oneself by something external (the light being reflected by a mirror, for example, or in this case, one’s own theories being reflected by the other). The reflection operates so to say by the mirror of otherness, what is triggered by the act of being interviewed, which means in Serres’ case encountering the other’s perspective and understanding of oneself, which brings a new self-understanding and, thereby, some “éclaircissements”, clarifications. This phenomenon of clarification will characterize the concept of dialogue too, with the difference that the self-clarification in the latter concerns different participants and should therefore be a reciprocal enterprise.

What one notices throughout Latour’s long interviews is Serres’ initial resistance towards all forms of academic debates and discussions. He recognizes himself to be solitary and isolated throughout his career, deeply marked by the violent context of the twentieth century, including

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6 The translation of this book does not convey this meaning. In English, see Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time (University of Michigan Press, 1995). Although the objective is stated by Bruno Latour at the very beginning: “Bruno Latour: There is a Michel Serres mystery. You are very well known and yet very unknown. Your fellow philosophers scarcely read you. Michel Serres: Do you think so? BL: Even though your books are technically on philosophy. MS: I hope so. BL: This is where I’d like some clarifications (éclaircissements, in French). Your books aren’t obscure, but the way to approach them is hidden.” Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Éclaircissement: Cinq Entretiens Avec Bruno Latour (Bourin, 1992), 9. Serres and Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 1.
the world of academics, and scared by the oppressing stature of influent intellectuals, such as Jean-Paul Sartre’s.\textsuperscript{7}

“Don’t you think you’re wasting your time when you engage in such a polemic? Since war is the most common thing in the world, it causes the indefinite repetition of the same gestures and the same ideas. Neither debate nor criticism makes any advances, except of the social chessboard and in the conquest of power. By what strange aberration where they believed to be fruitful, since they kill? What makes for advancement in philosophy, and also in science, is inventing concepts, and this invention always takes place in solitude, independence and freedom – indeed, in silence. We have a surfeit of colloquia these days; what comes out of them? Collective repetitions. On the other hand, we are cruelly deprived of convents and quiet cells and the taciturn rules of the cenobites and anchorites. Debates bring pressure to bear, which always tends to confirm accepted ideas. It exacerbates them, vitrifies them, constructs and closes off lobbying groups. At the very most it sometimes chisels out clarifications, but it never makes discoveries. But unless philosophy is devoted to commentary, it ridicules retracing existing concepts. Discussions conserves; invention requires rapid intuition and being as light as weightlessness.” \textsuperscript{8}

Debate defined as sterile, reproduction of violence and imbalance of power that prevents original thinking: Serres’ statement is indeed irrevocable. \textsuperscript{9} However, throughout the interview\textsuperscript{10}, his appreciation of this act of clarification above mentioned changes, nonetheless with little esteem, in particular regarding his feelings towards discourses and debates. The clarification (or the repetition at its worst) of the dialogue is not simply opposed to discovery (according to Serres) of the solitary work, but a creative ‘illuminating’ dimension can emerge from the clarification process, and thereby enables self-discoveries. Thus, Serres’ view slowly changes in this direction after several long interviews. Coming back on his initial statements and his own ‘journey’ in philosophy, he states later on:

“Basically, when you have no available model, when you’re wandering in the desert, you don’t always see things clearly. The constant presence of a scientific community, of ongoing debate, peer pressure – things we talked about earlier, so lacking for me – all these contribute powerfully to clarifying what you say. Solitude often accompanies difficulty, explains it. When


\textsuperscript{9} “BL: This negative experience of discussions, do you hold to it? MS: Why get into discussions of determinism and chaos, when the same things have been said, by the same factions, in nearly every generation? No, debate is not productive. (…) Polemic never invents anything, because nothing is older, anthropologically, than war. The opposite notion has become conventional wisdom in the Anglo-Saxon world, which today holds sway. It is because it holds sway that this method is propagated. That’s always the strategy of victors. Reread Plato: Socrates always imposes the methodology by which he always wins. Dialectics is the logic of the masters. It’s necessary first of all to impose, in a manner defying discussions the methodology for discussion.” \textit{Ibid.}, p.38 (English); pp.60-61 (French)

\textsuperscript{10} Although the term ‘interview’ in English normally implies a professional context (examination of a candidate), I prefer the term to ‘conversation’ (used in the translation) or ‘discussion’, which in the present work specify other pluridirectional forms of communication. In the original text, ‘entretien’ rather means interview, even if it refers here to scholarly meetings among peers.
two people are together, as we are today, debate already begins to clarify things. So, you see, I’m beginning to evolve, on the question of discussion.”

Finally at the end of five long interviews, he even finds a kind of cure in the communicative process that took place between him and Latour, correcting his earlier impressions:

“Let me say again that you have convinced me, in part, on the question of debate. The entire question of evil is to a certain extent projected into it. So, then, what is the enemy? Often a collection of partners that I have myself produced and with whom I am conditionally and continually obliged to contract. The kind of debate that you are right in praising allows for a series of local contracts, represented here by segments of questions and answers. Whereas the kind of debate that frightens me produces a war that continually flares up more and more violently, going from local skirmishes to moral advance-guard and resguard battles. Thanks for curing me of my formidable naïveté.”

In so doing, Serres ‘discovers’ in the practice that there are different types communication, which create different experiences, dialogical and anti-dialogical. Does this however mean – following Serres’ last comment - that dialogue is an irenic model? This idea will be dismissed in the practice conducted by Daya Krishna (2.1.1), if the dispute is rationally oriented towards the object of thinking and detached from the speaker, namely if the polemic engages the content rather than the person (see 5.2 and 5.3). However, although interviews are limited by a one-sided perspective, the transformative dialogical experience is here already described.

1.1.2. Debates

A ‘debate’ introduces two or more participants, who unlike in an interview, multilaterally enter in communication on a subject matter. The arguments and theses of the speaker meet different arguments by another speaker. While the teacher/student, master/disciple, interviewer/interviewee distinction vanishes, what persists are the pre-established ‘positions’ and ‘theses’ of the participants. A debate therefore resembles the successive presentation and confrontation of ‘theses’ defining various ‘positions’. ‘Thesis’ in this context means an assertion composed by a ‘rational’ sequence of arguments that converge to establish a position, which excludes on explainable grounds other incompatible theses and arguments, and is defended against other established theses. The ensemble of theses defines one’s position on a particular subject. It summarizes, designates, maintains, holds and roots the theses so that it becomes possible to map different theses on a common ground. Within the intellectual space, it draws positions on theoretical maps to orientate oneself and the different participants. In so doing, positions settle the debate in a certain reproduction and continuity of the theses: even contradictory positions from the opponent are located on the same map. Hostile or friendly neighbors, they are both integrated in the same space with different internal locations – and the

11 Ibid., pp. 75-76 (English); p.114 (French)
12 See also, ibid., p.164 (English); p.237 (French)
hostile neighbors presuppose the same framework of understanding to challenge one with counter-arguments. A ‘counter'-argument is established ‘against’ something, which presupposes the understanding and the knowledge of the initial ‘argument’. Both parts are necessarily connected, even if their relation implies an opposition. Belonging to the same map formed by a common rational framework has the following consequences, described by Georg Stenger:

“For a common ground of understanding and thinking, it could be postulated that in order to be composed in an entelechal or heuristic manner, or as a regulative idea, ‘theses’ are important, insofar as they fulfill the conditions that are associated with the dispute of the discussion. This means that theses do not argue about the ground but on the ground. The argumentation consists in the fact that one competitively argues with and against the other. Discussions are competitive argumentation, and its winner is the one who can be designated as the one who has the best arguments. The one who has the best arguments is the one who comes the closest to the ground on which the battle occurred. But who decides that? This can be of course decided only by the ground itself, which however does not appear and is therefore quasi replaced by the arguments.”

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15 Stenger introduces a classification that distinguishes between discussion (Diskussion), dialogue (Dialog) and conversation (Gespräch). Although I use here some of the distinctive elements and characteristics as described by Stenger, I do not follow his classification, for the following reasons: the first is terminological. The usual English translations of these terms have different connotations, and using the corresponding terms could thereby lead to confusion. The characteristics of Diskussion (discussion) resemble rather the (English) ‘debate’, and ‘conversation’ in English is generally understood as ‘Unterhaltung’, as any kind of talk and exchange between different persons. I thus prefer keeping the concept of dialogue to describe the ‘highest’ form of communication that Stenger names Gespräch (conversation). Secondly, the motivations of my classification have a different background. Stenger’s introduction of the concept Gespräch denounces the ‘limits of hermeneutics’ (i.e. the limits of the question of understanding itself) in distinction with dialogue (Dialog) retrieved from the hermeneutic tradition. Stenger suggests instead a ‘deeper’ ‘hermetics’ that constitutes the background of his concept of Gespräch – which Stenger, inspired by Heinrich Rombach, defends against hermeneutics. Gespräch is not fundamentally understood in difference to Dialog (whereas Dialog and Diskussion are categorically opposed) but rather as a further realization of Dialog. Or, in his words, Dialog understood as a “intended conversation” (“intendierte Gespräche”). In the present work, I rather turn to Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda, a conception which I believe, does not correspond exactly neither to hermeneutics nor to hermatics, or at least is constituted by a different conceptual background, for which this classification cannot be strictly applied. Georg Stenger, “Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Diskussion–Dialog–Gespräch,” in Philosophie Aus Interkultureller Sicht / Philosophy from an Intercultural Perspective, ed. Notker Schneider et al. (Amsterdam / Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997), 300. See also the related chapter (2.1.3 ‘Diskussion – Dialog – Gespräch’) of his book, Georg Stenger, Philosophie Der Interkulturalität: Erfahrung Und Welten; Eine Phänomenologische Studie, Originalausg (Freiburg: Alber, 2006), 927–46. See also Heinrich Rombach, Drachenkampf. Der Philosophische Hintergrund Der Blutigen Bürgerkriege Und Die Brennenden Zeitfragen. (Freiburg: Rombach, 1996), 117–49.

This entails some consequences. While engaged in a debate, it is impossible to question the structure of the debate itself, as it presupposes the same framework of understanding, the same understanding of reason, the same procedure of presenting arguments, the same dialectic tradition, etc. It shapes a common frame within which internal differences can be scrutinized. On the contrary, meta-reflection on the ways to think, formulate and answer these questions, and self-critical analyzes of the structure itself are not rendered possible by the model. It can therefore not analyze its limits, nor some problems that haven’t been thought because of some unreflected presuppositions. As a model, it is reproducing a certain way of communicating in which different questions can be similarly treated. These characteristics describe a certain closure inherent to the position one holds – one can certainly change his or her ‘position’, but having a position implies having chosen and decided between alternatives, it is itself a closing attitude. This defines the difficulties of a ‘debate’ for Daya Krishna:

“The frustration with interminable discussion that leads nowhere and results only in a perpetual reiteration of ‘known’ alternatives, arises generally when the participants instead of ‘trying’ to think, begin propounding what they believe, in invoking the ‘authorities’ of the past or even the present, thus changing the ‘discussion’ into a ‘debate’ between those who have settled ‘positions’ of their own which they are not prepared to ‘think’ about any further. They have reached the end of their journey, journey in the realm of thought, and they have no ‘use’ for ‘thinking’ any further.”

A famous example of the debate-configuration could be the Paris encounter of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s with Jacques Derrida, which was organized and perceived as one between ‘hermeneutic’ and ‘poststructuralism’. This debate, which to a large extent was regarded as having ‘failed’, as a “non-event” in Derrida’s words, was however proven quite fertile in an indirect way. The missed- Encounter between Derrida and Gadamer might have had however dialogical consequences, either deferred and posthumous, or relocated, i.e. for the reception
and followers, students and colleagues of the philosophers, especially English-speaking.

Although the details and the grounds of this debate do not concern us right now, some elements are worth noticing for a theory of philosophical communication. The encounter presupposed the meeting of two determined ‘positions’ having common references (Heidegger, Nietzsche) and foundational questions (understanding, dialogue, language), being familiar with each other’s work (Gadamer articulated what he supposed would distinguish his position from Derrida’s), from which however different interpretations of the same concepts opposed them, one embedding the ‘hermeneutic’ answer, the other the ‘deconstruction’. What was attempted in the debate was thus never to ‘modify’ or ‘transform’ their different ‘positions’, but (at least for Gadamer) to explore the internal differences of their interpretations of common presupposed grounds and common presupposed references. Such an analysis would have characterized the encounter as a ‘successful’ debate. However, that did not happen, and degenerated in a parallel presentation of positions and thesis without real confrontation. The elliptic questions did not touch upon the main concern but on marginal problems, they were formulated in an alienating way for Gadamer. Derrida’s questions were not really directed to the other, but rather to himself, and he rather considered his own answers as ‘eligible’ and accepted answers. And so the communication was summarized from both sides as follows:

for him, just like, in his view, all instances of speech (parole) and of writing: they are a legacy that survives their author and that the friend should then carry in him.” My translation. Original text: “Pour Derrida, l’interruption du dialogue vivant avec Gadamer permettrait au réel dialogue de commencer. Derrida écrit quelque part que c’est lorsque la conversation s’arrête que le dialogue commence. À cet égard, on peut se souvenir des réserves que Derrida marquait, dans la deuxième question qu’il adressait à Gadamer en 1981, au sujet de l’idée d’un dialogue « vivant ». Cette idée lui paraissait « des plus problématiques », au grand désarroi de Gadamer. Tout se passe comme si le dialogue avait pour lui quelque chose de testamentaire, comme l’est à ses yeux toute parole et toute écriture : elle est un legs qui survit à son auteur et que l’ami doit alors porter en lui.” Jean Grondin, “Le dialogue toujours différencé de Derrida et Gadamer,” Les Temps Modernes, no. 669–670 (2012): 357–75. (P.14-15)

22 Grondin partially bases his analysis on the particularly eulogistic posthumous writing by Derrida for Gadamer, which shows the differed and relocated ‘uninterrupted’ dialogue between Derrida and Gadamer, according to the former: “I was convinced that someone like Gadamer deserved never to die, because we needed such an absolute witness, who actively or as observer participated into all philosophical debates of the century. I admit something else, which may seem to be an alibi: I thought that his immortality could allow us to postpone, almost indefinitely, the moment of a real “confrontation” (Auseinandersetzung), as we did for so long. This discussion to which common friends in the United States and in Europe would always prompt us. Some complained about it; some reproached me never to have entered this open dialogue that Gadamer had inaugurated in April 1981 at the Goethe Institute in Paris, to which I seemed to evade. I am inclined to believe that they were not wrong.” My translation. Original text: “J’étais convaincu que quelqu’un comme Gadamer méritait de ne jamais mourir, parce que nous avions besoin d’un tel témoin absolu, qui a participé activement ou comme observateur à tous les débats philosophiques du siècle. J’avoue aussi autre chose, qui pourra apparaître comme un alibi : je pensais que son immortalité nous permettrait de reporter presque indéfiniment le moment d’une réelle « confrontation », comme nous l’avons fait si longtemps. Cette discussion à laquelle des amis communs aux États-Unis et en Europe nous incitaient toujours. Certains s’en plaignaient ; certains me reprochaient de ne jamais être vraiment entré dans ce dialogue ouvert que Gadamer avait inauguré en avril 1981 à l’Institut Goethe de Paris et auquel j’ai semblé me soustraire. Je suis disposé à croire qu’ils n’avaient pas tort.” Jacques Derrida, “Comme il avait raison!,” Contre-jour : Cahiers littéraires, no. 9 (2006): 88. In German, Jacques Derrida, “Wie Recht Er Hatte! Mein Cicereone Hans-Georg Gadamer,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 23, 2002.

23 The translations of all the texts of the encounter, along with their philosophical commentaries, interpretations and treatment into English contributed substantially to the reception of this missed-encounter in Anglophone literature. See Michelfelder and Palmer, Dialogue and Deconstruction.
“Derrida: During the lecture and ensuing discussion yesterday evening, I began to ask myself if anything was taking place here other than improbable debates, counter-questioning, and inquiries into unfindable objects of thought—to recall some of the formulations we heard. I am still asking myself this question.

(…) Gadamer: Mr. Derrida's questions prove irrefutably that my remarks on text and interpretation, to the extent they had Derrida's well-known position in mind, did not accomplish their objective. I am finding it difficult to understand these questions that have been addressed to me. But I will make an effort, as anyone would do who wants to understand another person or be understood by the other.”

Gadamer and Derrida’s encounter illustrates a third alternative to Serres’ distinction in debates: neither “local contracts” formed by questions and answers, nor a destructive “war”, it rather constitutes a “conversation that never happened”, a sequence of “settled positions” of a thinking journey, in Daya Krishna’s words, which do not meet but are parallelly presented. It shows the difficulties of articulating creative “counter-positions” engaging into the other argumentation, and the difficulty of modifying one’s own position, which forms the core of Daya Krishna’s entreprise (5.1). It also raises the problem of debating and communicating on the same base, or located on the same intellectual maps, along with the correlated issue: what happens when we want to transcend this map? Even more urgently: what happens in the case of philosophical dialogues across traditions when there is no common map available? This hints to dialogue, which in our analysis breaks the common referential and conceptual context. But before this definition is introduced, another communicative alternative must be distinguished: discourse and discussion.

1.1.3. Discourse – Discussion

The term ‘discussion’ is more equivocal than the former ‘debate’, because it indicates another dimension to the communicative components. While in a ‘debate’, we focus on the internal argumentative composition (position, counter-position), an external element is taken in consideration in discussion and discourse, namely the society in which the discourse occurs. Society appears as an agent having an effect on the discourse and the discussion. Two authors can be seen as complementary for analyzing the different effects of society and the public dimension on discourse: Habermas and Foucault, to which I will limit myself here to introduce the distinction of discourse to other forms of communication.

Habermas and Foucault already quite differ in the meanings and connotations attributed to the term ‘discourse’. This polysemy originates first from the linguistic differences: ‘discours’ (Fr.) covers first the German ‘Rede’, i.e. the idea of an organized speech, that stands closely associated with the art of rhetoric, i.e. what can be said and how it can be said in public. Only secondarily can it be associated with discussion, in which different art and forms of discours

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24 Michelfelder and Palmer, 52–53.
are organized with each other in the society. This explains Michel Foucault’s26 insistence on the conditions of emergence of a speech rather than on the emergence of a common rationality from speeches, which is Habermas’ argumentation.27 The ‘common’ for Foucault would rather refer to the processes in which a society unconsciously forms the discourse we can hold in public, what we can say and how we can say it. Foucault insists on the social embodiment of speakers in a surrounding community, within which implicit “rules of exclusion” operate. Quite differently, in German, ‘Diskurs’ implies a high level of formalization of communication with different participants examining a definite topic in the public sphere. This connotation incites Jürgen Habermas29 to delimit the formal possibilities and conditions of communication for it to occur and to be ethically developed in the public sphere. The mutual history of reception of theories on discourse being furthermore quite complex, since the authors appear often ‘known’ on the other side of the Rhine without really satisfying the expectation of the other audience,30 it explains why theories on discourse and discussion usually follow one of these alternatives.31

Leaving apart the historical study of these relationships, what could we draw from their philosophies to define the idea of a discourse and discussion? If we do not renounce to think the idea of discourse in spite of these differences, we can interpret Foucault and Habermas as highlighting two sides of the intrusion of the public into the discussion: Habermas provides us with a formal approach underlining the possible conditions for an ethical discussion, to which Foucault would answer with a ‘critical’ approach, pointing at the obstacles and the difficulties of the public into the discussion, what the ideal discourse would implicitly bring about as soon as it is incarnated in a certain society. This critical side probably explains that postcolonial authors such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who try to throw light on the condition of access to discourse by subalterns and minorities, and the controlled and limited production of discourse by a dominant elitist part of society, rather based their theories on Foucault. In the philosophical dialogues between different scholastic traditions that we are concerned about, this aspect is metaphilosophically relevant in a postcolonial perspective. It implies that the integration of

26 Michel Foucault, L’ordre Du Discours (Paris, Gallimard, 1971); Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses: une archéologie des sciences humaines, Collection Tel 166 (Paris: Gallimard, 2010).
27 “I am supposing that in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality.” Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1982), 216; Foucault, L’ordre Du Discours, 10–11.
28 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language, 216.
29 Jürgen Habermas, Moralbewußtsein Und Kommunikatives Handeln, vol. 422 (Suhrkamp Frankfurt am Main, 1983); Jürgen Habermas, Erläuterungen Zur Diskurstheik, vol. 975 (Suhrkamp Frankfurt, 1991).
30 Deleuze’s comments on the inutility of discussion illustrates the French disagreement to Habermas: “Nor does philosophy find any final refuge in communication, which only works under the sway of opinions in order to create “consensus” and not concepts. The idea of a Western democratic conversation between friends has never produced a single concept. The idea comes, perhaps, from the Greeks, but they distrusted it so much, and subjected it to such harsh treatment, that the concept was more like the ironical soliloquy bird that surveyed [survolait] the battlefield of destroyed rival opinions (the drunken guests at the banquet).” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, European Perspectives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 6. In original: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Qu’est-Ce Que La Philosophie? (Minuit, 2013), 12.
31 Probably the semantic differences left unclear to the readers how Foucault and Habermas could use the same terms, while their meanings and connotations in the original language differ, which explains why the commentators usually chose one author to define discourse and discussion. That is also one argument for Stenger to dismiss Foucault in his analysis (based on a German understanding of these terms). Stenger, “Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Diskussion–Dialog–Gespräch,” 309–10.
speakers is delimited by external factors. It also determines how the speakers address each other: the monopoly of a specific language in a discourse, the monopoly of a certain scholastic vocabulary and argumentative methods, the validation or refusal of certain tropes and logics, etc. The acute problem of the monopoly of the ‘West’ in postcolonial Indian philosophy, which influenced Daya Krishna’s project, is related to these delimitations of the discourse (see 2.2.1), and the argument for including a plurality of standpoints in dialogue is also a reaction to this monopoly (see 5.2.2). So described, discourse seems to be contaminated by an externality, either by the society that constructs its limits or by the community of speakers looking for agreement and validity of the theses in the discourse. Discussion is thus either directed to an exteriority in the sense of what it produces on the public (an influence, ideally ethical, on the community), or conditioned by an exteriority, i.e. how the community proceeds to the discussion. This characteristic emphasizes a distinction from debate qualified as the exchange of arguments between a number of positions for a study of internal differences. Discussions bring about the question of the public influence and determination of communication, which distinguish them from dialogue that opens communication to another dimension of the intimate, i.e. to the interiority of the person.

This exteriority of discussion seems to induce a ‘cumulative’ communicative model: participants are several individuals with their own arguments and propositions who aim, via mutual evaluation, to reach a common point (agreement, understanding, definitions). In other words, discussion is the sum of different structured speeches who, in their connection, correction, evaluation, aim at a consensus. In Habermas’ words:

“I call interactions communicative when the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims.”

A sum of different coordinated participations, even if they can reach norms and agreement, is not a dialogue, since it does not engage one fully but rather one’s public opinion with others on a chosen topic. In Francis Jacques’ words, “a conception of discourse remains non dialogical as long as sentences are held to be results of the symbolic activity of a separate speaker.”

Characterized by the division between public and private spheres, discussion can only be composed by my public intention, the part of my being that is oriented to the public, and distinguished from others. My assertions are the products of my expressive capacity in encountering others, i.e. a way to regulate intersubjective relations in a particular society (from which follow the ethical implications). Of course, the questions regarding which kind of societies (and the consequences of their plurality for the expressions and apparitions in the public) and which kind of rationalities are left open, subsumed by Habermas under ideal conditions that presumably would be valid everywhere, and even mostly untouched by Foucault’s sociological critiques.

This implication to the public, in difference with the personal implication of a dialogue, explains probably why Daya Krishna distinguishes discussion and dialogue on the basis of the number of participants, as a practical implication of this conceptual distinction:

“If only two persons are involved and they ‘share’ a long part with ‘knowledge’ of the field they are covering about, it may turn into a ‘dialogue’ which generally is supposed to be only between two persons. But if there are more than two, though not too many, it has to take the form of a ‘discussion’, where different minds make new points suggesting different possibilities and carrying the discussion in different direction.”

The number of participants make for Daya Krishna an important difference, and he relates ‘dialogue’ (possibility also on the ground of a wrong etymological conception, opposing monologue and dialogue, and dialogue and ‘multilogue’) to a ‘dual’ form, in particular ‘I’ and ‘Thou’, while discussion is declined in plural. A numeral difference does not seem enough to me to ground the conceptual distinction between the two concepts (see also 5.2), but it does point at an important element that I would rather correlate to the distinction between public and private, or more exactly, between subjects and persons. Indeed, I consider that dialogue and discussion can both happen with two participants and with more, but, while discussion is composed by the addition of (separate) subjects, dialogue engages first persons in relation, an indivisible ‘we’. But is ‘we’ not the addition of several ‘I’? From the perspective of communication, ‘we’ cannot be reduced to a grammatical plural of ‘I’, it points at a different function and relation between the ‘I’. N. V. Banerjee defines ‘we’ as follows:

“But what is this ‘we’? It is not only not ‘I’ nor ‘others’ nor even ‘I and other’, but cannot also be a person or persons. Yet, if it is not anything concrete, it is an ultimate datum and as such, is not, like the pure ‘I’ or the mere ‘others’, an abstraction either. It must have a definite

35 It seems that Francis Jacques would have agreed with Daya Krishna: “Dialegesthai originally means to converse. However, even if the prefix dia does not signify “two”, when the number of speakers exceeds two, it is most of the time better to speak of conversation rather than dialogue. It is a communication with several voices, which designates another mode, besides not less significant, of Being together”. My translation. However, where both would disagree is the fact that Daya Krishna considers precisely this Being together, and in fact Thinking together, as the highest mode of philosophizing, whereas Francis Jacques, maybe more traditionally, limits himself with the relation of two persons only, in which case he can send back the conversation to compose another category – left apart. Original text: “Dialegesthai, c'est primitivement converser. Pourtant, même si le préfixe dia ne signifie pas “deux”, quand le nombre des interlocuteurs dépasse deux, mieux vaut la plupart du temps parler de conversation que de dialogue. C'est une communication à plusieurs voix, qui désigne un autre mode, d'ailleurs non moins significatif, de l'être ensemble.” Jacques, L’espace Logique de l’interlocution, 117.
36 In January 1992, while Maurice Friedman was invited in the Indira Gandhi National Centre for Arts (New Delhi) to deliver lectures on Martin Buber, a dialogue on ‘dialogue’ was successively organized between him and the participants and audience of his lectures. During this dialogue, Daya Krishna seems to come back and analyze his own long-lived dialogical practice. He then raised again the difference between a dialogue between only two participants, in particular in buberian context, and a dialogue between more participants (multilogue), also he there did not distinguish it from discussion: “Is a dialogue possible in a very large group? Is the limitation of the group’s membership a necessary condition for a fruitful dialogue? What is the distinction between the dialogue between the so-called I and Thou, that is between two persons, and a multilogue where the conversation or whatever takes place is between not-too-large a group but not confine merely to two persons?” Daya Krishna, in Maurice S. Friedman, S. C. Malik, and Pat Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image (New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for Arts : D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd, 1995), 181.
'We’ as ‘I with others’ implies the realm of the personal, which for N. V. Banerjee is correlated to ‘meaning’, which is different from epistemic knowledge and from the aggregate ‘I and others’. His conception of the realm of the personal, and in particular the role of dialogue to realize how others are constitutive of the ‘I’, constitutes the topic of the last chapter in relation with Daya Krishna’s philosophy (7.3). Limiting aside the former epistemological aspect for now, N. V. Banerjee’s distinction can be here useful to delimit the spheres of discussion and dialogue as follows. Discussions are configurations of ‘I and others’ who externally agree on the norms and positions upon which the discussion takes place. The arguments might differ and the positions might oppose the participants, but the meaning entailed in their arguments is independently formed by each participant. The discussions thus assume, for the purpose of communication, a certain consensus on the framework and understanding of the concepts that are discussed. Dialogue, on the contrary, proceeds in ‘I with others’, i.e. in the common creation of meaning in the realm of the personal. It is in the dialogue itself that the framework and the understanding necessary for the concepts to be intelligible and meaningful are questioned, and ‘dialogued’ upon. In so doing, both forms can be used in plural but one correlates ‘I and others’ in a society where norms for discussion are already established (as subjects) while the other joins ‘I with others’ in the realm of the personal.

1.1.4. Dialogue

Before examining dialogues in Daya Krishna’s experiments and philosophy, I want to suggest a first preliminary and general approach based on the commonalities of some literature from the French, German and English speaking academic spheres. I want to underline some shared basic features in philosophical description of the phenomenon of dialogue, in distinction from the above communicative forms.

a) First, dialogue – in contrary to other communicative forms – emphases reciprocity. What does reciprocity mean? It characterizes the interpersonal relation that takes place between you, me and the other participants. Interpersonal, as the relation engages us all as persons (in distinction to discussion); reciprocal in the sense that it requires a non-hierarchical (in distinction to the classroom model) relation that leaves room to bilateral communication (in distinction to interviews, lectures, etc.). Every participant can participate on the same

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37 N. V. Banerjee was Daya Krishna’s professor and supervisor at Delhi University. Daya Krishna refers to him eulogistically in Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy: A New Approach, 1st ed, Studies in Indian Tradition Series, no. 7 (Delhi, India: Sri Satguru Publications, 1997), 211–13; Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western (New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations; Motilal Banarsidass, 2001), 302–5. He also published an extended review of Banerjee’s book Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy in Margaret Chatterjee, The Philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 1990), 190–211. It is thereby clear that he was familiar with his philosophy, which influences his own thought on the non-egoistic construction of knowledge, his criticism of solipsism and his argument for the necessity of conceiving knowledge as intersubjectively constructed. Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons (Birkenhead: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), 29.
conditions, no matter their academic positions or what is evaluated as their possible knowledge. This interpersonal reciprocal relation in dialogue is best described by Martin Buber, in the description of the shift from the I-It relation to the I-Thou, where the subject/object dichotomy vanishes to grasp the relation beyond this binary rupture. In describing a tree for example, I can very well consider the tree as an object with qualities, as a picture in terms of its colors, as movement in terms of the way the air makes it move, or how it slowly grows, as a species in terms of scientific classification, I can abstract from its existence laws and numbers, but,

“It can, however, also come about, if I have both will and grace, that in considering the tree I become bound up in relation to it. The tree is now no longer It. I have been seized by the power of exclusiveness. (...) To effect this it is not necessary for me to give up any of the ways in which I consider the tree. There is nothing from which I would have to turn my eyes away in order to see, and no knowledge that I would have to forget. Rather is everything, picture and movement, species and type, law and number, indivisibly united in this event. (...) Let no attempt be made to sap the strength from the meaning of the relation: relation is mutual [Gegenseitigkeit]. (...) I encounter no soul or dryad of the tree, but the tree itself.”

Buber’s I-Thou relation describes a mode of apprehension beyond the subject-object duality in which the Thou is perceived as an indivisible whole in relation to me, designating my existence as being possible strictly with other persons and elements. As well formulated by Francis Jacques, “the person needs to be in a relation with the other (you and her/him) to become herself or himself.” It does not mean that I cannot be at all without the reciprocal relation, or that I cannot be alone for a moment, but in this case I would come back to an I-It perception. In the time in which I am in a dialogical relation, I depend on the mutuality of this relation with the others. In the context of dialogues, it points at the importance of the other for the constitution of my own self, not as differentiation from others (I being a not-others, others being not-I) or as a limitation to otherness (the others being the limit of myself but as relation (I being ‘I-with-others’, others being also ‘I-with-others’) whose ontological consequences will be developed in chapter 7 in Daya Krishna and N. V. Banerjee’s account. This implies a strong thesis, namely that a reciprocal relation cannot function on the basis of the distinction between the self and the Other, the same and the other, the alter and the idem, the I and non-I and all similar kinds of distinction (which are exclusion of the other in the non-I sphere). And that would be true even in the mode of recognition of the Other, even with the intention of reaching to him, in addressing him from my (distinguished) own to his (outside) self. In Francis Jacques’ words again:


40 I use limit (Grenze) and limitation here in their distinction to border, following Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber’s definition: “A border, literally, is a line, often conventional seldom natural, that separates two regions of space. Borders connect what is separated and separate what is connected. In principle, borders can be crossed. (...) Were there borders that we could not cross at all, they had to be of a sort that does not connect what is separated; they had to be limits. With limits, unable to get a hold of the other side, we are left with nothing much to separate from and connect to.” Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber, eds., Comparative Philosophy without Borders (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 1.
It is assumed that dialogism is characterized by putting forward the double recognition of the other in me and of me in the other. The intention is laudable. But this alterity in chiasmus, in spite of its appearance as an existentialist paradox, is way too weak to serve as the interlocutive relation that it besides presupposes. It introduces at the most an alteration and something like a hypothesis of the Self by the Other where the subject accepts to expose herself even if she gets changed in her very existence. According to the poet Hugo von Hofmannstahl: “Each encounter dislocates and recomposes us.” In truth, we do not speak alone, not even to someone, but with him. If we look for the foundation of a human relation in a permanent determination of the self by the other, synchronic and miraculously unified in a reciprocal relation, we do not only pursue the implausible, we reverse the natural order of concepts.”

A double recognition of oneself in the other and the other in oneself, or a simple recognition of the other (as different from me) is insufficient to define a dialogue. We do not speak as a singular constituted entity to someone but with him (participating in my constitution and thereby in my thoughts, speech or parole, etc.). This encounter happens prior to the recognition, so that the modification operates before I can attribute his own space to the other and before I myself formulate my ‘own’ argument or thesis, detached of any traces of the other. Indeed, the same argument will be presented differently in front of different listeners: I do not explain Heidegger in the same way to Heidegger’s experts (reading the original texts in German and familiar with Western and German philosophy) as to pandits, master in Nyāya logic, speaking Sanskrit and used to a different set of concepts and references. And I do not think in the same way in front of them. I do not interact in the same way, I do not address myself in the same way, and probably my arguments, my language, my attitude, and at the end myself, will differ accordingly. A dialogue already implies an encounter with the whole of the person and an engagement from whole to whole rather than a divisive contribution in some particular linguistic proposition (see 4.1 and 7), some theses and arguments that would be transferrable from one audience to the other. This aspect is crucial for intercultural dialogues and underlines Daya Krishna’s Saṁvāda project presented in chapter 2.

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42 A definition of pandit in the Indian academic context by M. P. Rege: “When one talks about Indian philosophers one has in mind western-trained Indian philosophers. But there has been in India a countrywide community of philosophers, who worked within the Indian tradition and were engaged in formulating, criticizing and reformulating philosophical theories through the medium of Sanskrit. This is the community of pandits or śāstris. But they were never counted as philosophers. The role which western-trained Indian philosophers in their scheme of things had assigned to them was that of repositories of the knowledge of traditional thought. That is to say they were regarded as scholars and not as philosophers.” Daya Krishna et al., eds., Saṁvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions (Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1991), xxi. In the different quotes that will be used in this work, pandit is also written as pandit or pundit according to the transliteration style.
b) Reciprocity implies also the idea of a continuous movement between me and you(s). What is this continuous movement constituted of, how does it work, what does it bring? These questions are essential to dialogues and will lead the second part of this work (II.) focusing on ‘creativity’, as the dynamic creative movement of dialogue (Chapter 4 to 7). But as a work hypothesis, I would like to highlight here already that reciprocity, understood as a continuous movement between participants inherent to dialoguing itself, enables another constant feature of dialogue in the literature: the idea of the ‘togetherness of a between’, of an interrelation between participants that implies them both, of an activity created together: a “thinking togetherness” for Daya Krishna, a Zwischen, Ko-aktivität (co-activity), ‘Kon’-kreativität (con-creativity) for intercultural phenomenologists such as Waldenfels, Stenger and Weidtmann⁴³, or in general a codimensionality contained in the dialogical (implied in the sam- of samvāda, 2.1)

“This between is to be understood in its greatest importance. Although we tend to understand communication as “bringing together messages between human beings”,⁴⁵ the “between” seems

⁴³ Weidtmann grounds “interculturality” in the “between” itself (Zwischen) and defines followingly cultures according to their mutual movements and transformations in-between: “The concept of interculturality refers to that ‘between’ of cultures, which appears in the encounter and in the exchange of cultures. Cultures are understood as intercultural fundamentally from this between, which lies beyond the cultures and therefore orientates them beyond themselves. The between, which separates cultures, is itself nothing different than relating to (Bezogensein) each other. In so doing, the between indicates that cultures are separated through nothing. They are the same, namely the respective other culture, but each in their own way.” My translation. Original text: “Der Begriff der Interkulturalität bezieht sich auf jenes ‘Zwischen’ von Kulturen, das in der Begegnung und im Austausch der Kulturen sichtbar wird. Interkulturell werden die Kulturen grundsätzlich von diesem Zwischen her verstanden, das jenseits der Kulturen liegt und diese deshalb zu einer Orientierung über ihr Eigenes hinaus bewegt. (…) Das Zwischen, das die Kulturen trennt, ist selbst nichts anderes als ihr Bezogensein aufeinander. Damit macht gerade das Zwischen darauf aufmerksam, dass die Kulturen durch nichts getrennt sind. Sie sind dasselbe, nämlich die jeweils andere Kultur, dies aber auf ihre je eigene Weise.” Niels Weidtmann, Interkulturelle Philosophie: Aufgaben - Dimensionen - Wege, UTB Philosophie 3666 (Tübingen: A. Francke Verlag, 2016), 39–42.


⁴⁵ “We call communication in general any process of bringing together messages between human beings, whatever the degree of uniformity of the code that is used, which applies to words and discourses in interlocutive contexts, to the type of situation and the number of participants. The term communicability designates then a condition of possibility for the interaction and the understanding of meaning.” My translation. Original text: “On appellera communication en général tout processus de mise en commun des messages entre êtres humains, quels que soient
to be here considered simply as a repartition of the intended meaning, intended messages from the speaker to the listener. ‘Between’ points at a plurality of interlocutors from and towards which messages are communicated, transmitted, and divided. It seems to indicate an exchange of messages from A ‘to’ B, and when A ‘and’ B are ‘together’, i.e., located in the same space and conversing with one another. Now in dialogue, ‘to’ and ‘and’ becomes the interrelation of between: the intention of the exchange remains, but one realizes that it is not about repartition of pre-ordered and pre-intended meaning exchanging piece of knowledge. Meanings and knowledge rather emerge from the place of between itself. The communication creates a place for meaning to emerge between participants, who, unlike in discussion and debates, are not individually contributing by critically analyzing their own positions or by adding to the sum of pre-existing knowledge, but who ‘together’ create positions, knowledge and meanings between themselves. In Francis Jacques’ words:

“It is plainly impossible to join two soliloquies in a dialogue, like two mingled threads, or conversely, to fracture a speech [parole] duly exchanged as two halves of the meaning. Before I started to hear the other, I have sent him messages. Better, I have met him, i.e. I have entered in a relation with him, creating conditions of transcontextuality. There is no way to distinguish what comes from the one and what comes from the other. There is only one solution: to take them both at a time. This is the principle of non-separability of linguistic actions. Non-autonomy of discourses seems to be a condition of dialogue.”

This implies that the dichotomies between speaker and listener, or position and counter-position cannot be maintained, as it was the case for a lecture, a debate and a discussion. It also means that we take some distance to the idea of the other thought from myself, thought as the limits of myself, as the non-I. This in-between as the proper location of dialogue has a great relevance for interculturality, since it constitutes both its greatest challenge, i.e. permitting a relation that opens a ‘between’ in the encounter, the necessity of overcoming the dichotomy of difference/unity, and the idea of an unreachable direct access to the other, to the limits of my understanding alone.

c) Thirdly, a dialogue also implies a detached intellect (niśsāṅga buddhi) which creates a togetherness of thinking:

“(…) they want to engage in what we would call the activity of a thinking togetherness. What does this togetherness mean? (…) What is needed is a new concept; that is a dialogue presupposes I am detached from what I am saying. That it is not I and Thou – both I and Thou should vanish to some extent. I must have a detached intellect – the concept of a detached intellect. That is an intellect that functions freely without committing itself necessarily to what

46 My translation. Original text: “Il est manifestement impossible de joindre deux soliloques en un dialogue comme deux fils qu'on mêle ou, à l'inverse, de fracturer une parole dûment échangée en deux moitiés de sens. Avant que je n'aie commencé à entendre l'autre, je lui ai envoyé des messages. Mieux, je l'ai rencontré, i.e. je suis entré en relation avec lui, créant des conditions de transcontextualité. Pas moyen de dissocier ce qui vient de l'un et ce qui vient de l'autre. Une seule solution : les prendre tous les deux à la fois. C'est le principe de non-séparabilité des actions linguistiques. La non-autonomie des discours semble bien être une condition du dialogue.” Jacques, 78–79.
it is saying. It is not because I am saying it, and therefore I have to hold it. It is a sort of postulational activity that is, for the moment, what I think to be meaningful and true. And that you also are a detached intellectual function and also you see a potentiality and a possibility./*47

What he notices is that even once we break with the dichotomy I-It on the subject/object mode and even in the exclusiveness of the encounter, ‘I and Thou’ remain separated by the relational activity – what Ramchandra Gandhi criticizes in Martin Buber while publishing his Advaitic answer, I am Thou.48 While leaving the ontological debate aside on what can compose the relation, Daya Krishna points at a togetherness, which could be understood as a togetherness of the dialogue itself, of what is said in the dialogue. This, I believe, is neither a coming back to a distinction subject/object, nor an objectivistic account going back to a thinking as a thing detached from us, nor the disappearance of the person as such: I am the one thinking, I am the one speaking while being convinced that what I think is meaningful, and I do so as being wholly engaged as a person in the dialogue. But in so doing, I am not allowing my person to be attached to what I think is meaningful, but, in a kind of dispossession of my thoughts as being mine, I engage them in the dialogue, as if they would belong to the dialogue itself. Resuming the impressions of her academic meetings with Daya Krishna, Bettina Bäumer recalls this intellectual detachment49 and its relevance in dialogue:

“He [Daya Krishna] was aware that dialogue is not a facile undertaking, because each side is so much identified with their own ideas and positions. Therefore he repeatedly said: ‘but we should try.’ Dialogue is only possible if we try to ‘become the other, to be the other, to think from the viewpoint of the other, to identify with the other. Is it possible?’ he asked. ‘Let us try’, was his challenge. He also gave a key, ‘The heart of the Indian civilization is the search for de-identification – de-identification with the body, with the mind, with the intellect, with thought… and the challenge of all civilizations is to de-identify with the past, with their concepts…’ This was a clear reference to the basic ideal of all Indian spiritual-philosophical systems of arriving at a state of thought-free awareness, of nirvikalpa, where alone reality is perceived in its own light. What he hinted at was a state of inner freedom.”50

Daya Krishna sees this intellectual detachment as a way to engage in worldly dialogues with others, from which his inner freedom originates. It designates also a capacity to let myself follow the course of the dialogue, free of belonging to any given tradition and being able to

47 Daya Krishna, in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 181.
49 She gives elsewhere further details on her account of de-identification: “One of the greatest obstacles in creating a true understanding and harmony with other traditions is the sense of ‘identity’ - not the innermost spiritual identity to which we all aspire - our divine nature, our Buddha-nature, or whatever we may call it -, but an identity consisting of labels, walls, concepts, social identification with a group, a caste, a community, a region, a language, a religion. If the aim of religion is to liberate its followers; this liberation has to go along with a de-identification, breaking down of walls and limitations, based not on Divine revelation or enlightenment, but on narrow ego centred human identifications. De-identification does not mean loss of connection with a tradition, but, as in the title of our meeting, an opening of our windows and our hearts, which makes us capable of, not only meeting the others, but accepting other ways, other revelations, other experiences, which will ultimately enrich our own.” Bettina Bäumer, “Interreligious Dialogue,” in Windows on Dialogue, ed. A. Bongiovanni et al. (Delhi: Indian Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2012), 65.
argue beyond my position (see the epistemological relevance of this idea in 5, its relevance for freedom from any tradition in 6.2.3 and for engaging with others in 7).

Does this dispossession imply that my words are not bound by anything, and that all speech is allowed, included for example injurious and aggressive speech? If there is no immediate ethics preventing any content (and for Daya Krishna, dialogues can emerge only without prevention of any thought), the detachment from the person reduces considerably the possibility of such speech, since such speech reach at the person rather than the topics or the philosophical ideas that is being discussed. In so doing, one could imagine a dialogue in which one could defend a thesis that is motivated by racist prejudices or theses (and engage in a dialogue with participants that have different opinions) but one could not attack the persons in the dialogue related to their cultural origins, nor held personally injurious behaviors or comments. One can easily see the difficulty of conceiving such an idea once it is embedded in the practice: the borderline between attacking the person or his or her ideas vanishes more often than not, even among scholars. The borders are, although theoretically very clear and understandable, rather blurred in practice and seem to quickly explode in the emotional impulse that one can with difficulty repress in the given situation. The same is the case for the ‘togetherness’ and ‘thinking together’ emerging from the dialogue itself (the co-dimensionality). Theoretically described, it is the dialogue as such that leads its participants rather than individual contributions which give us a sum of separate information. In practice, it is more difficult to observe, and impossible to ‘guarantee’.

I do not imply that it can never arise, that nobody can witness such experiences or that we do not have any account of such. Indeed, Daya Krishna provides us with concrete dialogical experiments and material of concrete dialogues (chapter 3), and also for this reason, his engagement with dialogical experiments in his life greatly contributes to show his relevance in theories of dialogue. But beyond this exception, it sounds as if it is difficult to believe that these ‘high standards’ and ‘perfect’ realization can be reached. And, except of Daya Krishna, examples of successful dialogical experiments following the principles defended by these authors, are relatively rare to be found in the context of philosophical dialogues between traditions in academia.

Rather than denying the ideal dimension contained in dialogues (and the problems regarding their realization), or rather than ‘lowering’ our expectations of the dialogical, let us presuppose a perfectibility in dialogues, i.e. a potentiality for self-improvement. In this sense, the ideality contained in dialogue functions as a model for actual dialogues, providing them with an ideal framework that can be used as a self-critical tool (and vice versa). If actual dialogues are necessary witnesses and corrections of the theoretical foundation, the ideality contained in the theory can act as an orientating paradigm to practice, correct and reflect on the actual dialogue – something that I claim, grounded Daya Krishna’s dialogical experiments. The consequences that can be drawn from such a dynamic will be developed in chapter 6 and the concrete ways in which Daya Krishna grounded this relation are described in chapter 2. Thus, although Daya Krishna refused projecting a normative dimension to dialogue, which restricts its scope (and

further raises the problem of ‘who’ produces the norms), dialogue is connected to the question of values conceived in relation to pūrvapakṣa. Values are in this sense not what frames a dialogue in terms of rules of conduct, but they are conceived as orientation of the dialogue, i.e. that towards which we seek together, this ideality that ‘ought to be’: this constitutes the topic of chapter 6.

d) The following characteristics are all derived from this condition of reciprocity. The next one regards one dialogical form in which reciprocity is concretized: the confrontation in dialogue. Confrontations are necessary parts of dialogue, for the obvious reason that in a complete agreement between all participants, no dialogue (no debate and no discussion either) could take place, because speech would be superfluous - everything would be understood in the same way, would share the same intuitions and would be expressed in synonyms. Consensus is neither the aim nor the result nor any ultimate state of dialogue. Now, whether a full agreement between human beings could happen is already in itself questionable, so we most probably always contemplate either partial, strong or even radical disagreements on a question, on a topic, and/or on a method. However, confrontation seems prima facie quite anti-dialogical, mostly due to image like Serres’ above, pictures of ‘wars’ like debates, destructive and unproductive fights where the aim is just about demolishing the other’s argument (if not the other itself). Or in a milder picture, confrontation seems to be more depending on rhetorics and persuasion to win the other than ‘truth-related’ in the classical models of sophistry in the Greeks and vitaṇḍā (eristic wrangle)53 in the Nyāya framework.

So, how can we admit confrontation as a necessary dialogical method or tool? The difference between the fallacious or destructive type (destructive both in the sense that it is an attack to the person, and a rhetoric that blocks and destroys the communication itself) and what I want to underline here comes back to the description of reciprocity, and emphasizes again 1) the importance of the detached intellect and 2) the dispossession of the position. In dialogues confrontation is without use of force and under the acceptance of the other who contributes to the confrontation, which makes dialogue non-irenic but also non-destructive. In so doing, the questions are raised on the arguments and not on the person and for the sake of the dialogue

52 In distinction to forms such as negotiation (in business, diplomacy and politics, etc.), where the negotiators are expected to reach a consensus, a ‘deal’, an agreement, etc. See Jacques, L’espace Logique de l’interlocution, 125.; in distinction also to Habermas’ discussion in the public sphere, in which the consensus validates the participation of all in the rational process of discussion.

itself rather than for any victory. This has more the character of a “play”\textsuperscript{54} between different positions held and defended but detached from my person and subject to modification.\textsuperscript{55}

e) One last common aspect of dialogue, which rather implicitly underlies the earlier characteristics of a dialogue and its conceptions by the aforementioned authors, could be thus critically formulated by my reader: is not such a dialogue something completely ideal and can we even pretend to actualize or practice dialogues so understood? Indeed, a kind of virtuous ideal seems to arise at different places. First, a kind of hierarchy seems to be admitted among the forms of communication, which puts dialogue at the summit regarding its ethical and valutational realization. Only some kinds of virtuous communication are recognized as dialogical, those which do not use force nor pressure (such as blackmailing, threats, etc.), which do not aim at protecting the interests or the domination of one group (whether economical, diplomatic, etc.), which do not have to reach a consensus or any pre-established utility (such as an agreement, a deal, etc.): in summary, as Francis Jacques writes, “the interlocutive space of dialogue aims at evading the field of forces. Rather than a public or social space, it is a logico-pragmatic space. That is why its relation to force is completely different. The man of dialogue is more mindful of confrontation than of conflict. If he claims a thesis through and through, it is always under the accepted control of, and even solicited by the other.”\textsuperscript{56} Devoid of personal or social interest and of any utility pressure, dialogue is delimited in the social sphere. The space of its occurrence is thereby restricted, which justifies Daya Krishna’s experiment to the specific case of philosophical dialogues between intellectual traditions. Dialogues are within the scholastic and academic framework not devoid of politico-socio problems and questions. The challenge they present for the contemporary intercultural debate is highlighted in (1.2.1) and the specific postcolonial challenges they raise is analyzed in (2.2.1). As a response to these specific difficulties and to address a limited scope of issues, Daya Krishna isolated the dialogical process to the academic context. He developed a logico-intellectual sphere of reasoning preventing in the dialogue animosity and disputes between religious, social and cultural communities. In that sense, although Daya Krishna’s dialogues between philosophical traditions engage with different religious communities, they do it from a scholastic or academic perspective rather than from a religious one. This entails a strong limit: participants dialogue on religious traditions but without religious feelings. Bettina Bäumer\textsuperscript{57} contemplates the limits of intellectual and logical approaches to other spheres of consciousness, or rather the limits that

\textsuperscript{54} See Daya Krishna’s comment during the Bhakti dialogue (see also 5.2.1 where this quote is further explained): “I shed my ego to the extent I participate in this universal reason in the game of knowledge. In the game of knowledge when we enter into a dialogue, I do not remain Daya Krishna, you are not just Kriplani and he is not just this particular, specific human individual. But we get out of our individual prejudices, biases and try to reach an objective universality, which can be mutually corrected and jointly explored.” Daya Krishna, Mukund Lath, and Francine E. Krishna, eds., Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion: Philosophical Explorations in the Indian Bhakti Tradition (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 2000), 64–65.

\textsuperscript{55} See Daya Krishna’s approach, defending vitandā rather than vāda committed to a pre-identified idea of truth in 2.1.1 and Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 175–76.


\textsuperscript{57} Personnal communication with Bettina Bäumer, Abhinavagupta Research Library, Varanasi (23/01/2017).
it implies in terms of participation (see the analysis of the dialogue referred to here regarding the different seekings pursued by different participants in 6.3). While some dialogues engaged with participants following different religious practices, devotion or ‘religious’ attachment (such as the bhakti dialogue with Shrivatsa Goswami) could succeed in exploring the intellectual dimensions of these traditions when the participants could accord the intellectual with the spiritual (see 3.3.2), other dialogues encountered difficulties due to the limitations of the perspective in which the dialogue was conceived. In Srinagar (Kashmir), Daya Krishna’s approach was insufficient to grasp the complexity of the multi-layered dimensions of the spiritual approach of pandit Lakshman Joo, which signals the problems of intrareligious dialogues with ‘believers’. Thus, as described by Bäumer,

“the seminar was an exploration of Kashmir Śaivism, a relatively new discovery for Indian philosophers. Dayaji discovered it for himself, and was also viewing it critically. It was more the fact of meeting and discussing the issues involved, than a real contribution to the research on Kashmir Śaivism. In a sense historic, the meeting with the last and powerful representative of the living tradition, Swami Lakshman Joo, at the Guptaaganga Hall in Ishbar, near his Ishvar Ashram, did not result in a satisfying dialogue, because the levels were too different: the merely intellectual approach of the scholars and the lived experience of the master.” 58

In particular, following Panikkar’s 59 distinction between the inter- and the intra- religious, Daya Krishna’s dialogues are “dialectical dialogues”, dialogues that meet on the ‘arena of doctrines and opinions’. In this sense, his entreprise of gathering “experts or representatives of different belief-systems or artistic sensitivities” remain at the interreligious level in view of exclusion of the religious dimension of man in the process. For Panikkar, the intrareligious dialogue (that he practices and demands, as well as Bäumer) is a “religious act” that includes the whole religious personality of its participants. And thus, the insufficiency of the inclusion is felt for some participants, as soon as ‘believing’ becomes a necessity for understanding, as Shail Mayaram also remembers:

58 Bettina Bäumer, ““Falling in Love with a Civilization”: A Tribute to Daya Krishna, the Thinker,” in Philosophy as Samvāda and Svarāj: Dialogical Meditations on Daya Krishna and Ramchandra Gandhi, ed. Shail Mayaram (New Delhi: SAGE, 2014), 35.

59 The distinction between inter- and intra-religious dialogues, and a broad introduction into Panikkar’s conception of dialogue can be summarized as follows: “When we limit our field to human relationships, we see that the other is not just a producer of ideas with which we agree more or less, or just a bearer of affinities that make possible a number of transactions; it is neither a mere (other) subject nor a mere (other) object. It is a person who is not my ego, and yet it belongs to my Self. This is what makes communication and communion possible. This awareness is the dawn of the ‘dialogical dialogue’. The thou emerges as different from the non-I. When this encounter touches the depths of our intimate beliefs, when it reaches the ultimate questions of the meaning of life, in whatever sense, we have the ‘religious dialogical dialogue’. Oftentimes this dialogue does not go beyond doctrinal levels or emotional projections. This is the ‘interreligious dialogue’, which is generally carried on by experts or representatives of different belief-systems or artistic sensitivities. When the dialogue catches hold of our entire person and removes our many masks, because something stirs within us, we begin the ‘intrareligious dialogue’. This is the internal dialogue triggered by the thou who is not in-different to the I. (…) In brief, the intrareligious dialogue is itself a religious act-an act that neither unifies nor stifles but re-links us (in all directions). It takes place in the core of our being in our quest for salvific truth-in whatever sense we may understand these too-loaded words. (…) The search becomes an authentic prayer, a prayer open in all directions.” Raimon Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue, Rev. ed (New York, N.Y: Paulist Press, 1999), xvi–xvii.
“I remember the meeting of the scholar’s group including Daya Krishna, Ram Chandra Dwivedi, Arindam Chakrabarti and Mukund Lath with Laxman Joo, then celebrated as one of the greatest living exponents of the school of philosophy that is popularly known as Kashmir Śaivism. Laxman Joo responded to their questions with complete silence; his emphasis on the sadhana pakṣa of that school disappointed the scholars. After their departure, he asked Bettina Bäumer, ‘Yeh nāstik kaun tāhe?’. (personal communication, 14 January 2010).

It is thus not the case that spirituality or belief were excluded from the realm of dialogue. Rather, it is as a sceptic of any (spiritual or not) tradition that Daya Krishna participated in these dialogues. I believe that difference of perspective of Daya Krishna’s experiments to the interreligious dialogue is necessary, since it defines his dialogues as “dialogues between philosophical traditions” (including traditions of religious origins), or intellectual dialogues between representatives of different (religious) traditions (see the Bhakti dialogue in 3.3.2). These dialogues, although protesting against the exclusion of (religious) traditions in the academic spheres (see 2.2.1), did not aim at bringing a religious practice or communication between different faiths.  

1.1.5. Definitions versus Dynamics

To summarize the characteristics of each form of communication, I distinguish lectures, conferences, interviews, debate, discussion and dialogue in terms of the function the subjects hold in each of them. In the first three forms, lecturer and public or interviewer/interviewee are clearly opposed vis-à-vis knowledge and authority. The subject is perceived as the one who knows and brings his knowledge to the public, who at the most can raise a question in return. The inequality in expertise, time allotted to speak and authority is accepted. However, even if limited, the question can ask for clarification and provoke an ‘éclaircissement’, a self-illumination, in Serres’ sense. It is mostly against such forms, which presuppose an expert facing listeners that Daya Krishna conceived his samvāda project, whereas he implied clarification as a function operating in dialogue. In the debate, the subject and the listener become participants arguing on a given topic. The emphasis on the topic debated tends to presuppose a certain homogenous background on which one stands to present thesis and antithesis. This homogeneity renders the model difficulty usable in intercultural context. This limitation is not formulated directly by Daya Krishna vis-à-vis debate, but his samvāda project between different philosophical traditions addresses this difficulty. What remains from this model for him is the importance of the categories of position and counter-positions (pūrvapakṣa) (see 5.2), however closer to the Sanskrit model of dialectics introduced in (2.1.1). With the idea of discourse, the exteriority implied in the idea of public or the audience is taken into consideration, which is of great relevance in postcolonial Anglophone Indian academics (see 2.2.1). While debate implied an emphasis on the topic and an agonistic constellation as ‘participant 1 versus participant 2 on the topic X’, discourse is more of a summative model. In

60 Mayaram translates: ‘Who were these non-believers?’. ‘Na-āstik’ literally means ‘non-believers’, which as Daniel Raveh remarked to me, should be rather translated as ‘sceptics’. While the first can be indeed interpreted as a criticism, the second is read as a compliment to philosophers, in particular by Daya Krishna.

61 Mayaram, Philosophy as Samvāda and Svarāj, xxiii.
a summative model, it is rather the participation of 1 and 2 together that contributes to the *sum* of knowledge on a topic in a certain public context. Concerning dialogue, the characteristics that are emphasized for Daya Krishna’s project are the detached intellect and the confrontation, derived from the emphasis on the topic rather than the person, and on the creative outcome of the dialogue rather than on the addition of theses; the reciprocity and essentiality between persons (see 7.3), unlike in the three first forms; the idea of a ‘between’ inserted between participants as a locus for creativity, which shifts the perspective from a cumulative to a holistic model.

In such a description of the forms of communication, what already appears are the following: first, my work is restricted to a delimited type of communication, namely philosophical dialogues between traditions. The consequences and difficulties of dialogue to be applied to intercultural context can already be perceived: the plurality of – not only different positions or different philosophical doctrines – but of different ways of philosophizing, different forms of rationality, and with it, of understanding in such context, of being able to communicate, in particular of questioning, of being able to think together beyond definite positions.

Furthermore, one caution should be formulated. It seems easy to delimit these categories in a formal manner and to attribute them perfectly distinguished characteristics. It is also possible to classify and order them, to show the increasing problems of debate and discussion for intercultural applications, the gradual insertion of the importance of the other in these models and the space left for meeting the other in these different communicational paradigms. These characteristics and distinctions, however, only serve an explanatory purpose. In contrasting these models, I wanted to highlight different dimensions implied in communicative forms: the distribution of knowledge and inclusion of an authority (in lectures and interviews), the insertion of the public in discourse in difference to the emphasis on the intimacy of a ‘between’ persons in dialogue, the confrontation and formation of positions on the same conceptual map in debate. By a formal introduction into different forms of communication it is possible to start unveiling the multi-layered problems that they imply, notably by emphasizing their differences. However, the borders between these different forms are in practice not possible to trace. In the facts and in the practice, what the examples tried to show, it is difficult to sharply decide between one or the other category, in the case of an encounter: a debate can turn into a dialogue, a discussion into a debate, an interview into a dialogue, etc. It is not possible to decipher beforehand whether a question and answer session will be dialogical, or whether a disagreement in a debate will enable questioning the ‘conceptual map’ in which it was taking place. T

“But if a discussion can degenerate into a debate, a ‘debate’ can result in the resuscitation of discussion once more. The challenge to one’s firmly-held belief by consent and compelling counter arguments and counter-evidence compels once to ‘think’ afresh and find ‘new’ arguments or evidence, or to expose the weakness in the other’s arguments or the evidence, or give an alternative interpretation of the latter to show that it is more in consonance with one’s own position.”

The happening of a dialogue can also turn into a posteriori exegetic commentary that removes the ‘dialogical’ character of the event in the process of explanation, with Stenger’s example:

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“Notwithstanding, this ‘Socratic dialogue’ became a ‘Platonic dialogue’, which was followed by further ‘discussion’ and ‘discourse’. This means also that the unique experience of thinking quasi subsides and henceforth serves as sediment and presuppositions of thinking.”63 And vice versa, as the exegetic tradition of a text can create dialogues in exchanging questions and thoughts on different interpretations and the meaning of texts, what constitutes the aim of Daya Krishna’s collective investigation in *India’s Intellectual Traditions: Attempts at Conceptual Reconstructions*64, where participants questioned together the texts. The distinctions operated are not to be taken as literal borders between forms of a communication where one form exactly qualifies one encounter, but unveils characteristics essential to dialogue by contrast to other forms of communication. These characteristics are explored by Daya Krishna in his dialogical experiments. The experiments and Daya Krishna’s philosophy demonstrate in particular the entanglement of all these dimensions, for which reason I define ‘dialogue as multifaceted whole’ in chapter 4.1. In chapters 4 to 7 I argue furthermore that it is from the dynamics of this entanglement that the dialogical creativity originates.


1.2. Genealogical Introduction: Intercultural Dialogue – Emergence and Difficulties of the Field(S)

1.2.1. The Illusions of a “Global Dialogue”: Intercultural Studies, their Audiences and their Limits.

After a thematic specification and after having characterized ‘dialogue’ among different forms of communication, I want to determine what the ‘intercultural’ of ‘intercultural dialogue’ implies. This encompasses clarifying the stands of the contemporary philosophical research related to interculturality to justify my choice of thinking intercultural dialogues with the philosophy of Daya Krishna among the intercultural field, where he is not usually received. This intercultural field being itself composed of different cross-cultural approaches and researches, I define and delimit first some approaches that have already been established. In articulating these different approaches, I then attempt in this introduction to locate restrictions of different established cross-cultural movements and show the absences left on the margins on these research, absences which I try to remedy with a contribution from the side of contemporary Indian philosophy.

To analyze the interculturality in the different philosophical fields, I believe that one requires less a thematic approach – to define interculturality as such – than a genealogical one in a Foucauldian sense, i.e. to inquire on the factors that enacted cross-cultural studies and to delimit the forms and contexts in which they take place. Cross-cultural studies in philosophy, in spite of the manifoldness of their apparitions in different parts of the worlds, all responded to the Euro-American centrism of philosophy and to the postcolonial affection of philosophies. In that sense, cross-cultural studies are positioned as critical responses with demands and claims enacting the construction of theories. This responsive position qualifying cross-cultural studies entails however an unresolved problem, the consequences of which are highlighted in

65 I distinguish in this section between Intercultural Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy and Postcolonial Theories (which are defined below). I use the term ‘cross-cultural studies’ to designate these three approaches together when I integrate them in the same field, considering the fact that in spite of their differences, these approaches all focus on crossing different philosophical traditions and are by definition concerned with this problem (to which they answer differently).


67 For example in intercultural philosophy: “Questions of philosophy - questions concerning the fundamental structures of reality, the knowledgability, the validity of norms - have to be discussed in such a way that a solution is not propagated unless a polylogue between as many traditions as possible has taken place. This presupposes the relativity of concepts and methods, and it implies a non-centristic view to the history of human thinking. At the very beginning there can be formulated a negative rule: never accept a philosophical thesis from authors of a single cultural tradition to be well founded.” Franz Martin Wimmer, “Is Intercultural Philosophy a New Branch or a New Orientation in Philosophy?” (1996), 15, http://homepage.univie.ac.at/franz.martin.wimmer/intpheng95.pdf. See also Hamid Reza Yousefi and Ram Adhar Mall, Grundpositionen der interkulturellen Philosophie, Interkulturelle Bibliothek 1 (Nordhausen, Thür: Bautz, 2005), 126–29; Ram Adhar Mall, Intercultural Philosophy, Philosophy and the Global Context (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 19–32.126-129; 19-32; in postcolonial Indian philosophy, the same problem concerns the negative definition of svarî which is taking more and more importance in postcolonial Indian political philosophy. See R. Prasad remarks on K. C. Bhattacharyya’s use of the term in Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, “Svaraj in Ideas,” Indian Philosophical Quarterly. Special Number. Svaraj in Ideas XI, No. 4 (December 1984): 486. See also below 2.2.1.
the next two sections: a negative self-understanding. By a negative self-understanding, I mean a negative definition of one’s grounds and principles characterized by what they are not, what they fight against, what they criticize, what should be attained, rather than what one is. If standing against someone constitutes an efficient starting point for new claims and recognition, the insufficiency of a ‘positive’ formulation of the foundation of a concept can be a crucial defect. The problem is that any fight needs not only an opponent to defeat, but also, and for so doing, a ground on which to stand, so as to avoid the foundation to collapse in the fight itself. The relevance of cross-cultural studies consists in their ability to ground the critical response in a positive definition. The terms of these definitions remain problematic, on the one hand concerning the audience they implicitly address, and thereby the unspecificity of the ‘global dialogue’ they institute, and on the other hand concerning their remaining European foundations in mostly French and German philosophies (1.2.2).

Historically, ‘cross-culturality’, ‘interculturality’ and related concepts such as “world philosophy” or “transculturality”68 are systematically investigated in academics circa from the 1980’s on69, with the basic idea of providing access and reception to non-Western literatures, connecting and thereby ordering concepts and philosophies originating from different traditions. ‘Non-Western’ designates in this context philosophies that do not belong to the mainstream corpus that has been canonized in Western Europe, in North America and further applied in former European colonies. Such a necessity of diversity of sources and cosmopolitan authors in academics respond to the current globalized world. The globalization and the proximity enabled by the new configuration of space and by technology increased the exchanges between scholars in the world. Demands were formulated for integrating a diversity of participants as well as the texts that formed their conceptual background into what is believed to be a global dialogue70, the possibility of engaging with philosophers from all around the world. While ‘globalization’ became a central concept in academics, this belief into a ‘global dialogue’ has

68 See on “Transkulturaltität” and “multiculturalism”, the definitions of Wolfgang Welsch and Rajeev Bhargava respectively in Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, Gita Dharampal, and Minou Bernadette Friele, eds., Die Interkulturalitätsdebatte: Leit- und Streitbegriffe - Intercultural discourse: key and contested concepts, (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2012), 146–64. See one interpretation (in favor of the term ‘intercultural’ philosophy) of the distinction between transculturality, interculturality and multiculturality by Weidtmann in Weidtmann, Interkulturelle Philosophie, 23–49. Also in favor of interculturality, see Mall, Intercultural Philosophy, 36. Since these distinctions are made by authors sharing the same conceptual framework, namely German intercultural philosophy, responding to each other, I do not find it relevant for the present explanation that rather operates between the different fields of ‘cultural’ philosophies.

69 German publications flourished from 1980 on, such as Mall’s, Kimmerle’s and Wimmer’s work; in English, Mehta’s India and the West is also published in 1985, such as the beginnings of postcolonial publications by Edward Said (1978 for Orientalism) and Spivak and Homi Bhabha at the beginning of the 90ties (except for forerunners such as Franz Fanon in French literature, as early as 1952).

70 J. L. Mehta warns us of the dangers of a world civilization and the necessity of instituting a dialogue between civilizations today where each independent seems to be in a crisis, related to the others in the idea of a ‘planetary culture’ which seems to conduct all individual civilizations to their loss; the threatening of the global or planetary to the dialogue is the illusion of a homogeneous (Western prevalent) culture: “The one peril threatening man today comes neither from the plurality of cultures nor from the diversity of religious traditions but from what, following Heidegger, has been called world-civilization above, the destiny of homelessness in which men all over the world are caught today. (…) A new way of thinking, meditative, recollective, originate, can have a glimpse into these dark depths and it alone can do so, once it abandons the naivety of the rationalistic faith in a ‘cunning of reason’ operating behind the outward history of man and governing it” Jarava Lal Mehta, Philosophy and Religion: Essays in Interpretation (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2004), 45.
not been much investigated. Or rather, the ‘illusion’ (to speak in Daya Krishna’s term, see 7) and the problems connected to this belief have not been much exposed.

The idea of a global dialogue rests on the awareness of a plurality of philosophies rooted in different traditions. The problems of their commensurability, of the possibility of hermeneutic exegesis of foreign traditions, of radical or gradual differences between them, the possibility of reaching a common understanding to bridge them, and the creativity and newness of the interspace constitute core questions relating the various cross-cultural studies. In a nutshell, the question of how to relate philosophies between traditions frames the background on which different approaches of cross-cultural studies meet, as well as one of the first impetus for their establishment. However, if an awareness of a need for ‘global dialogue’ has emerged, the heterogeneity of its methodologies, the borders that it erects, and the relative incomplete realization of global dialogues in practice, has not been much considered. In other words: while scholars agree that research ought to be global and interconnected, interculturality remains absorbed in a singular academics (usually Western prevalent). I want to illustrate this point with the example of the integration of Anglophone Indian academic philosophy. Indeed, both postcolonial theories applied to the Indian situation, as well as comparative philosophies between classical Indian philosophies and Western philosophies are by now rather acknowledged in the so-called ‘global academic discourse’, even if the proportion between Western and Indian philosophies remains highly imbalanced in the syllabi, teachings and research. All cross-cultural theories agree and stand for integrating Indian philosophies in the philosophical curriculum and enact comparative approach with Indian traditions in philosophies. The relevance of Indian philosophies (as philosophy ‘proper’) is slowly acknowledged, even if the modes of reception remain incomplete and perfectible, and Indian studies are ‘on the way’ to be better integrated to philosophy. However, it is quite striking that despite such an “intercultural turn” 72, philosophy produced in India in the twentieth century remains largely unknown, even in the case of Anglophone Indian philosophy, whose exclusion cannot rest on the unavailability or inaccuracy of translations. Postcolonial philosophers outside India even chose for a large part to base their research on contemporary sociological or anthropological data in India rather than on contemporary Indian philosophies. They combine these sociological or anthropological analyzes with philosophical principles and methods that are often inspired by Derridian or Foucauldian concepts. This creates a fusion in which Anglophone Indian philosophies are for the most part not included. 73 Why is it the case that despite of cross-cultural


72 Stenger, Philosophie Der Interkulturalität, 45.

73 This gap between an active development of contemporary sociological and anthropological research in India compared to what is felt as a difficulty for Indian philosophies to be creative and contemporary was one of the motivations for the Jaipur experiments conducted by Daya Krishna: “Veena Das in the Introduction to her well-known work entitled Structure and Cognition has argued for the articulation of both the manifest and the implicit conceptual structures embedded in the texts and the use of them for the understanding of Indian social reality. But as her interest was limited, she confined herself to two texts only, and even within them only to those concepts which seemed to serve her limited purpose. Brahmanhood, householdship, kingship and asceticism are not usually the type of concepts which a cognitive enterprise deals with. And in case it does accept them for conceptual
movements and even within cross-cultural theories such a fragmented reception and a compartmented participation is still operating, and why is it the case that such exclusions remain unnoticed? Which kind of illusions does the idea of a global dialogue generate, which makes us believe in the possibility of a global participation while disregarding these absents? Why is it so that the participation into the global dialogue is not global but locally distributed?

My work contributes to fill this lacuna, and suggests an analysis of the situation of the contemporary philosopher Daya Krishna located in the composite contemporary Indian academic world and his response to the problems of intercultural dialogues. To investigate the difficulties of the ‘intercultural dialogues’ today, which are not limited to a conceptual definition of ‘intercultural’ and ‘dialogue’ themselves but also by the questions of its access, repartition and composition, and to justify the necessity of taking seriously unreceived fields of philosophy such as the contemporary Anglophone Indian academic production, I contemplate suggesting some conditions and limits of the global discourse in cross-cultural studies. I hypothesize that cross-cultural research’s scopes also exercise a selection in the reception of philosophers and text, despite claiming creating a global and diverse dialogue, and that a reflective awareness of the margins of this field is necessary for an inclusive development, not only in the theoretical conceptions, but also in terms of resources and literature. In the next pages, I therefore distinguish between three fields that analyze different aspects of the phenomenon of interculturality to show where they operate, which kind of literature they consider and which methodologies they use, in order to ascertain their centers and peripheries.

I define in general ‘cross-cultural studies’ as research on the specific questions generated by the emergence of cultural otherness in a globalized world and conceptual reflections on forms of cultural relations, along with critical analyses of any form of ethnocentrism. This minimal definition is explored in (at least) three different ways by what is called ‘intercultural philosophy’, ‘comparative philosophy’ and ‘postcolonial studies’. ‘Intercultural philosophy’ is understood as a set of theories and models for thinking the encounter of cultures and questions related to cultural Otherness in a globalized world. It has been established from 1980 on in the German-speaking world as an internal philosophical development with the central idea of

purposes, it would perhaps have to understand them at a more abstract level in functional terms. Yet, whatever may be one’s dissatisfaction with the particular concepts chosen for articulation and the interrelationships worked within them, there can be little doubt that the move is in the right direction. (...) These are not the only works [J. P. S. Uberoi, Veena Das, Sudhir Kakar] which give evidence of a search analogous to ours. The search ‘for a sociology of India’ and the debate around it is well known. The latest, perhaps, in the article by T. N. Madan in the book Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer (...). The work of Ashish Nandy, Claude Alvarez and Dharm Pal tries to do the same thing, though in a different direction. (...) But the attempt that we are trying to make and which is only faintly reflected in this work is in many ways significantly different from all these in that it seeks a conceptual articulation of the intellectual tradition in different fields of knowledge in order to use it creatively for extending, deepening and enhancing knowledge in these domains.” (emphasis added) Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions, xi–xiii.

74 This question comes close to Raghu Ramachandran’s investigation on the “classical presences that are absent in the modern times”. However, I deviate the debate from the Indian academic milieu to the contemporary philosophical movements developing intercultural or comparative philosophies, which paradoxically still, while standing for the “classical” presences, leave modern participants absents. A. Raghu Ramachandran, Enduring Colonialism: Classical Presences and Modern Absences in Indian Philosophy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1.

75 See for example the by now classical texts by Heinz Kimmel, Interkulturelle Philosophie zur Einführung, Zur Einführung 266 (Hamburg: Junius, 2002); Ram Adhar Mall, Philosophie Im Vergleich Der Kulturen:
‘interculturalizing’ philosophy itself, rather than appending a subdiscipline to it. Covering quite a wide range of topics, the focus in intercultural philosophy concerns the internal modifications brought by the plurality and hybridity of cultures to philosophy itself, and the question of the contacts themselves instead of the separate investigations of different traditions. In so doing, the research consists into reinvestigating, revising and correcting the mono-European narrative of philosophy. Authors for example re-explore the European traditions from an ‘intercultural perspective’, i.e. an intercultural reading of European authors to denounce their limits and see how one could develop their conceptual tools to make them conceptually contribute to thinking the encounter of cultures. For example, studies on Gadamer on the one hand criticize the problematic represented by the encirclement within one’s own horizon and the closure of one’s tradition, and on the other hand rework concepts such as ‘fusion of horizons’ (Horizontverschmelzung) to think intercultural understanding. The objective is to enlarge and widen the horizons and perspectives of philosophy and to reflect on the new contemporary phenomena occurring, such as cultural otherness, globalization, international human rights, or even methodologically trans-, inter- and multiculturality in the legacy of the philosophical discourse. As a textual approach based on philosophical traditions and heritages, intercultural philosophy aims at developing a conceptual apparatus to think cultural otherness and interculturality.

Running parallelly and originating earlier, ‘comparative philosophy’ offers a close but distinct perspective on the subject matter. First, there is a tendency to consider comparative philosophy, by now rather Anglophone, as a ‘global philosophy’, to be developed and established homogenously in academics in the world, which would however lead to multiple and sometimes contradictory definitions and methodologies used in different times and places. For example,
Paul Masson-Oursel, who is believed to have been the earliest to explicitly use the term “comparative philosophy” in the West, considered it as a condition to reach positivism, as a follower of Auguste Comte. He elaborated the concept of analogue cultural “proportions”. This means for example that the relation between Socrates and Greek philosophy is analogically comparable to the relation between Confucius and Chinese philosophy. This positivist study is quite different from the recent one asserted by Chakrabarti and Weber:

“The imperative is to re-interpret Indian, Chinese, or Japanese philosophy in terms of (oppositionally or positively) Western philosophical ideas as much as contributing back into English-language philosophy by bringing in elements of Asian or African or Hawaiian philosophy.”

Initially comparing was tantamount to objectively highlighting the differences and resemblances between two fixed entities retrieved from their different traditions, possibly in order to show the equality of both or the missing parts of one. This idea is slowly fading for a dynamic approach where all traditions equally contribute to philosophical thinking itself, which constitute also Daya Krishna’s approach. In responding Ben-Ami Scharfstein’s Introduction in progress of his work entitled A Comparative History of World Philosophy. From the Upanishads to Kant, Halbfass suggests even a ‘dialogic comparative’ model that could be pursued (I have no indication affirming that he lastly would have written one of this type), which he describes as follows:

“If I were to write a similar work of ‘dialogic comparison’, it would perhaps include some imaginary dialogues between representatives of the three traditions, for instance, between Śāṅkara and Descartes on the foundations of knowledge (i.e., the Veda and the Cogito), Aristotle and Nāgārjuna on arguments, debate, and the ‘two truths’, or even such modern figures as the Neo-Vedantin Vivekananda and the Indologist Paul Hacker on the role of the person in ethics and the possibility of ‘Practical Vedānta’. I might also try to correlate some of the guiding patterns and underlying premises of Indian philosophy and culture, such as the

79 It is interesting to make a small detour here to P. Masson-Oursel who was the first to explicitly use the term “comparative philosophy” in 1923. Wilhelm Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding (Albany: SUNY, 1988), 420.  
As a follower of A. Comte, he believed that the main condition to reach this state of positivism was to be obtained through comparison. He chose the analogy as a main method to practice it. For Masson-Oursel, the comparison cannot operate directly between two authors or systems since of course, as they are culturally different, their context, history and content have to be distinguished and cannot be immediately brought together. One needs a comparative tool to conduct a parallel between cultures. More precisely, a parallel cannot be drawn directly between cultures, one has rather to grasp the proportion in each cultural system. Only the proportion can be compared interculturally. To say it differently: analogy is defined as a mathematical proportion that enables the comparison, as the equality of two relations, and Masson-Oursel writes to illustrate: “A is to B as Y is to Z”. Between A and Y, or between B and Z can be as many and as broad differences as one can see, since what we compare is only the relation between A and B and between Y and Z, which has to be comparable. In this way, we do not come up against the problem of the encounter, or the reduction to the same, or the inadequacy, the gap between cultures. Each culture keeps its own intelligibility in its singular structure, which distinguishes it from the Other (on the side of difference). However, the analogy (the similarity of the respective internal relations) enables to relate the different particular structures (on the side of identity).
80 Halbfass, 420. Halbfass attributes the introduction of the term to Indian authors, in particular to the Bengali B. N. Seal in 1899. Halbfass, 422. Needless to say, the reception of the term in the West, including by Indologists, is probably more the result of the use of the term by Masson-Oursel.
82 See the historical account of Halbfass, Halbfass, India and Europe, 419–33.
Such approaches testify of the evolution of the discipline. It is now about elaborating a cross-cultural philosophical questioning or “fusion philosophy” 84, which also shows that it progressively comes closer to ‘Intercultural Philosophy’, even if the latter contains metaphilosophical and methodological perspectives that might vary. These gradual transformations in comparative philosophy, which proceeds from the struggles for the acknowledgment of non-Western traditions in Western academics, from the postcolonial investigations in the newly independent states and the critical analyzes of Western traditions by non-Western nations, are explained by certain ‘phases’ or ‘stage’ 85 in its development. “Roughly summarized, Chakrabarti and Weber outline these phases as follows: the first stage consists in finding equivalents in non-Western philosophies that would anticipate Western philosophies; the second stage attempts to contrast these philosophies; the third stage aims at reinterpreting Western philosophies by using contribution of non-Western theories (and vice versa)"86. These originally pedagogical, and sometimes nationalistic approaches for the recognition of all

84 Chakrabarti and Weber, Comparative Philosophy without Borders.
85 In order to distinguish different layers in comparative philosophy, M. Kirloskar-Steinbach, Geeta Ramana and J. Maffie differentiate between three stages in their thematic introduction to their journal Confluence, which are close from Chakrabarti and Weber. The first one reveals “sincere attempts were made to make the “East” understandable to the “West””, such as B. K. Matilal’s work on introducing Nyāya philosophy into analytical philosophy. Their pedagogical and exegetical individual efforts into creating a space for non-Western philosophy into the Western framework aimed in a second phase at a certain systematization of comparative philosophy, “where one strives to work out a common space for comparisons. The bounds of this space are clearly framed by moral commitments which underline the equal positionality of the participants involved; in some contexts a heightened hermeneutical awareness leads thinkers to mark out an area in which cross-cultural philosophizing can meaningfully take place.” Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ramana, and Maffie, “Confluence,” 9–10. This could include intercultural philosophy as defined above in the approach it aims to take. However, except of the systematic enlargement that would distinguish it from the first phase, I believe that the individual philosophers in the first stage also aimed at an equality of the participants and imagined a meaningful way of comparing, if not supported by their institution or affiliation. Finally, the authors considered a third stage where the philosophers "work out the socio-political ramifications of the insights developed in the preceding stages”. Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ramana, and Maffie, 10. This would be rendered possible by a further step of internalization of the awareness of equality presupposed for any comparative philosophy. One major problem in this view remains that it highly presupposes to be the evolution of comparative philosophy in Western institutions, with the struggles for including non-Western philosophies in syllabi and the establishment of the postcolonial studies. I suspect that it does not consider other attitudes, such as the nationalist ethos described above by Bhagat Omam in their scheme, nor the internal relation between Sanskrit and English teaching described in Sharad Deshpande, ed., Philosophy in Colonial India (New York, NY: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015), 1–20. It seems therefore that different comparative philosophies exist, notably those developed in American and English institutions by, in the present case, Indian scholars, and those described by Deshpande of Indian scholars who remained in Indian institutions. Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ramana, and Maffie, “Confluence.”
philosophies ‘as’ philosophy, slowly took into consideration and affirmed the context-dependency of philosophies to explore the differences between philosophical systems.

Despite various stages in the development of comparative philosophy, and the span in the meanings attributed to the concept in different occurrences, the general idea that justifies their common use remains to establish a pluricultural philosophy, but in a different way than Intercultural Philosophy. While the latter rather takes as a subject the very phenomenon of interculturality (question of cultural otherness, understanding of the other, elaboration of a dialogue), comparative philosophy retains the classical philosophical subjects while modifying the approach. The fields of logic and philosophy of mind have been notably widely investigated by comparative philosophy considering for instance the concept of perception between Indian Nyāya tradition and analytical tradition such as Frege and Wittgenstein. The idea is not to study what happens in the encounter between different traditions and cultures, which kind of experience it creates, nor how it modifies the presupposition of one’s understanding, but rather to benefit from more information and concepts to creatively investigate a specific topic. Weidtmann notices in this regard that rather than the investigation on the conditions to create a common space for dialogue, comparative philosophy considers in priority the “extension of our knowledge”, our own and the other’s knowledge. This academic interest must lead us to “extract” ourselves as much as possible from our own traditions and to constitute an objective methodology which forms the preconditions for comparing two objects. The criticism and the

87 Halbfass qualifies this first period as follows: “Comparative philosophy,” if it is possible at all, is still in a nascent stage, and it requires much critical reflection and hermeneutic awareness. Western partners in the comparative enterprise and the East-West “dialogue” have to be aware of their historical background and of some long-standing biases in the European approach to non-European traditions - as well as of an inherent bias and one-sidedness in the “comparative” approach as such: They have to recognize that their allegedly neutral, purely theoretical and cultural developments, and that the very openness of comparative, cross-cultural “research” is conditioned by an implicit European parochialism, by one peculiar, almost idiosyncratic manner of understanding reality. On the other hand, Indians in many cases still have to find the necessary freedom for a kind of comparison which is not primarily apologetics and cultural self-defense against the Western challenge, which does not amount to hastily reinterpretting or readjusting their own traditional concepts and ways of thinking, and which at the same time does not simply extrapolate and perpetuate the traditional schemes of inclusivism by subordinating all other world views to Advaita Vedānta.” Halbfass, India and Europe, 433.


90 "Der komparativen Philosophie geht es anders als etwa dem dialogischen Ansatz nicht primär um Verständigung, anders als dem Polylog nicht darum, Stimmen anderer Kulturen zu Wort kommen zu lassen, und anders als den universalistischen Ansätzen nicht um die Verteidigung einer einheitlichen Grundlage aller Kulturen. Es geht ihr schlicht um die Vergrößerung unseres Wissens sowohl von der eigenen wie von anderen philosophischen Traditionen. Und das nicht zu dem Zweck, den eigenen, zu einem guten Teil durch die eigene
discussions within comparative philosophy concerns therefore rather the objectivity and the scientificity of its conditions: the question of a tertium comparationis\textsuperscript{91}, of the very possibility of cultural neutrality\textsuperscript{92} in comparing. To some extent, the distinction between comparative and intercultural theories echoes the distinction between analytical and continental philosophies respectively, which quite interestingly shows how these “cross-cultural philosophies” runs on from specific (Western) traditions.

Quite differently, postcolonial theories,\textsuperscript{93} mostly strongly pluridisciplinary and political in character, are grounded on the one hand on the analysis of the influences and legacy of the different forms of colonization on their subjects, as well as on social analysis of the environment of the latter’s and the inequalities produced by the colonial residues. Rather than the philosophy itself, it considers the politics underlying the production and repartition of philosophy, and knowledge in general. Influenced by methods such as Foucauldian genealogy and Derridian postmodernist deconstruction between power and knowledge (the problem of their foundations is analyzed in the next section), postcolonial theories extended such analysis to the colonial phenomenon. Their investigations include questions regarding unequal access to the discourse, politics of translation, the constitution of one’s own identity in a postcolonial world, the criticism of the Western social idea of modernity, etc. Although recent French philosophy largely set up their reflection, it is less an internal philosophical approach working within and for the philosophical legacy and corpus, than the elaboration of socio-political analyzes highlighting (hidden) dominating forces that exercises their power on the production of any theory and philosophy that is at stake. Philosophy constitutes a tool and an instrument rather than a locus or an end. In that sense and for philosophers, postcolonial theories constitute a metatheory useful to bring awareness to the conditions of philosophizing and the political elaboration of theories, which can be associated with the former two approaches as cross-cultural developments of philosophical theories. In her famous text “Can the Subaltern Speak?”,

\textsuperscript{91} Chakrabarti and Weber, Comparative Philosophy without Borders, 6.

\textsuperscript{92} See the postcolonial reading of comparative philosophy by Rada Ivekovic, “Now, the problems which are already more than evident reveal how difficult it is to juxtapose, let alone compare, two worlds and two traditions. The very act of comparison is not a neutral operation. Neutral comparison does not exist. It is forced to draw on a terminology and an intellectual context. In the case we are considering, these are occidental. And they make capital, to use a Derridean term (see Derrida 1992), for occidental thought. Theoretically, the terminology and intellectual context would, for an oriental subject, be oriental. But we can say nothing about this. We lack any means of verifying the relationship of the other to the other. Comparison also opens the question of temporality and the consecutive: is the comparison occurring in one and the same time? In consecutive times?” Rada Ivekovic, “Coincidences of Comparison,” trans. Penelope Deutscher, Hypatia 15, no. 4 (2000): 227–28, https://doi.org/10.1353/hyp.2000.0060; Rada Ivekovic, Orients, Critique de La Raison Postmoderne: Essais, Le Diwan Occidental/Oriental (Paris: N. Blandin, 1992), 28.

\textsuperscript{93} Considered as the forerunners, Aimé Césaire in his “Discours sur le colonialisme”, https://archive.org/details/DiscoursSurLeColonialisme, Franz Fanon and Edward Said distilled at different places of the world the first concepts and structural criticisms on colonialism. Regarding postcolonial philosophy in relation with Indian colonization, the works of Gayatri Spivak, Dispesh Chakrabarti, Homi K. Bhabha, Ashish Nand, Sudhir Kakar and P. Chatterjee are by now considered classical.
Spivak, continuing Said’s critique, denounces the (in)ability for French intellectuals to uproot themselves from their tradition: a tradition of white colonizer and exploiter, which, even when fighting, determines their thinking in the intellectual environment in which they take their inspirations and references, but also to the world to which they have been exposed:

“Edward W. Said’s critique of power in Foucault as a captivating and mystifying category that allows him ‘to obliterate the role of classes, the role of economics, the role of insurgency and rebellion’, is most pertinent here. I add to Said’s analysis the notion of the surreptitious subject of power and desire marked by the transparency of the intellectual. Curiously enough, Paul Bove faults Said for emphasizing the importance of the intellectual, whereas ‘Foucault’s project essentially is a challenge to the leading role of both hegemonic and oppositional intellectuals’. I have suggested that this ‘challenge’ is deceptive precisely because it ignores what Said emphasizes - the critic’s institutional responsibility. This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathex, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary - not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law.”

In so doing, postcolonial studies have further denounced the Eurocentric level, not only constituting of the texts themselves, which earlier were either ignorant, indifferent or clearly exclusive, such as Heidegger’s or Husserl’s famous remarks on the Europeanization of the earth and the European philosophy as only possible philosophy. These studies showed that not only the textual traditions but also the subjects themselves in their colonial constitution and in the hidden political forces and powers influencing their works and grounding their intuitions, constitute Eurocentric barriers, not only on historiographical terms but also in terms of our identities. However, although postcolonial studies influenced contemporary Indian philosophy, and brought awareness for comparative and intercultural studies on the conditions of writings and composing philosophy, it specifically did not answer the problems of connecting classical Indian philosophies with Western philosophies, nor the conditions for creating philosophical dialogues between these traditions, and thereby could not provide the space for receiving Anglophone Indian academic philosophy. This case raises furthermore the problem of integration of philosophies which are not specifically political, but nevertheless affected by the political consequences of colonization, into the fields of postcolonial studies. Since the topics of Anglophone Indian philosophies are not necessarily political, and furthermore written in English, it becomes complex to integrate them into an anti-hegemonic discourse. The postcolonial demands in this case relate to the equal right to engage in philosophical discourse, for instance on epistemological topics, from different traditions and standpoints. This means that the postcolonial reflections constitute the frame in which one philosophizes rather than a philosophical topic itself.

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For these reasons, while postcolonial studies have immensely contributed to cross-cultural analyzes of international power structures and of conceptualization of the colonial predicament per se, the lack of integration of specificity of local traditions and local movements in the globalization of philosophy itself remains a problem. How to keep the specificities of localities while aiming at an international scope? How to integrate the locality of non-Western movements and academics while denouncing the globality of colonialism? I agree with Yoav Di-Capua’s statement (in an article entitled “Arab Existentialism: An Invisible Chapter in the Intellectual History of Decolonization”, pointing at the same kind of exclusion I am outlining in the Indian context) in his evaluation of postcolonial studies on that matter:

“Indeed, even postcolonial studies, a field that has made a point of studying the ‘decolonization of the mind,’ has done little to rehabilitate local thought and its global context. While it offers an important corrective to Eurocentric scholarship on empire as well as a critique of the practices of the nation-state, the realities of colonized peoples are almost always projected against the essentialized epistemology of colonial Europe, with the ultimate goal of investigating the persistence of “colonial discourse.” (…) While postcolonial studies provide us with invaluable insights and a critical emancipation of marginal historical subjects, it has done little to date by way of presenting a systematic and comprehensive account of how people put their thoughts together.”

What do these distinctions between Intercultural, Comparative and Postcolonial methodologies imply for thinking intercultural dialogues? There are two levels in my analysis for thinking dialogues that I will combine with a study on Daya Krishna. The first concerns what cross-cultural studies advocate, i.e. a dialogical praxis engaging participants from different intellectual traditions, aiming at reaching global dialogue. Whether these participants are considered from their postcolonial political implications, their contribution to a cross-cultural knowledge (from a comparative perspective) or in the constitution of dialogue itself, the integration of different traditions at a global scale is claimed by these different movements. However, the locality of the movements they stand for is not represented enough. This global dialogue is in its composition already restricted by the limits of these three approaches, which can only accommodate ‘global’ participants when they fit into these limited frameworks. These three fields of cross-cultural studies are by now widely received and grounded and seem to answer to the challenge of ‘world philosophy’ and of a global discourse. However, in reaching this global reception, they rather integrated the participants and the different philosophical traditions under the rules of writing of Western academics. They did not much influence the very standards of academic thinking and writing. In that sense, they rather contribute to the already established syllabi in appending to already existing categories a global dimension, for instance in completing a ‘Logic’ course by an Indian perspective, without questioning the very categorization at play in distinguishing a Logic course from a Metaphysics course. The compartmentalization did not undergo further modifications, and furthermore, non-Western traditions did not contribute rethinking the compartments: Sanskrit compartments have, for example, never influenced English philosophical divisions. M. P. Rege, in the introduction of

the first published dialogue organized with Daya Krishna, writes, as an incentive for saṃvāda between philosophical traditions, that:

“The Indian doctrine is significant to the extent that it raised or touched upon or foreshadowed conceptual issues with which the ongoing philosophical debates in the West is concerned, and in tackling them deployed modes of arguments which were similar to those used by western thinkers, leading to parallel epistemological or ontological conclusions. It is the western philosophical tradition which yields the yardstick by which to measure the relevance or importance of Indian thought. The cognitive and practical concerns of western philosophy are taken as central or natural and Indian thought has to prove its worth by establishing that somehow its speculations and conclusions had a direct or at least indirect bearing on them.”

Comparative philosophy according to him did not contribute in breaking this modus operandi, nor in overcoming the opposition East/West to which the saṃvāda experiments also respond, by exploring internal differences and relations in Indian philosophies. On the contrary, comparative philosophy in most of its practice for Rege adapted to this yardstick and contributed to give similarity and soft differences to enrich the Western framework in answering the philosophical trends of the West: “Nyāya and realism, Mimamsa and hermeneutics and so forth”, Advaita responding to Absolute Idealism and later on Nyāya responding to the anglo-analytical logic. In so doing, some great absents have been left at the margins of cross-cultural studies. Indian authors who are not part of Western institutions, who do not share their intellectual references nor the same topics, who write in vernacular languages or who write in English outside these established movements, are excluded from the ‘world’ reception and the ‘global dialogue’, such as a vast part of contemporary Indian philosophy. The works of Daya Krishna, Ramchandra Gandhi, Rajendra Prasad, K. Bagchi, D. P. Chattopadhyaya, R. Balasubramanian, R. Sundara Rajan, N. V. Banerjee, and many others, are completely unknown outside India (and probably partially also in India), although they were all also trained in Western philosophy, often engaging further with classical Indian philosophies in different languages, or conceptualizing further the relation between contemporary Indian philosophers and Western philosophies. Thus, in different words and applying this idea to another side of Indian philosophies, Coseru describes how cross-cultural philosophies are merged within the ‘global’ philosophical scene as follows:

“A sort of open-ended and non-committal thinking across traditions has taken root among practitioners of what some now call ‘fusion philosophy’, others ‘cross-cultural philosophy’, but what might be best described as ‘cosmopolitan philosophy’. This idea is neither new nor particularly revolutionary. When Dignāga (c. fifth to sixth century) embarks on his synthesis of the prevalent epistemological, grammatical, and psychological theories of his day and Vācaspati Miśra (tenth century) authors his empathetic and influential commentaries on Advaita Vedānta, Nyāya, and Saṃkhya-Yoga texts, they do so as members of a Sanskrit cosmopolis. That cosmopolis endures today among traditionally trained scholars in India and the Indian diaspora. But it functions within, and relative to, an all-encompassing and universalizing cosmopolis that we now call the global West. Doing Indian philosophy today

97 Daya Krishna et al., Samvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xviii.
98 Daya Krishna et al., xix.
means operating within a larger horizon whose cardinal points of reference are no longer geographical but for the most part conceptual and institutional.”

This situation shows the importance of a correlated basic fact that has not been highlighted enough in this context: the importance of the audience one is addressing to. We always write for someone and we always speak to someone. There is an audience aimed at, even if it is a virtual or invisible one, with a set of common presupposed references, a certain style and rhetorical codes, some a priori common understanding, a shared horizon, namely an enunciative context determining where we speak from (our context) and to whom we speak (addressee), which in return determines how we speak to the one we address (rhetorics). The belief in the possibility of a globalized audience is caused by internet and the wide-spread usage of English, common means of communication and a common linguistic tool, both enabling the global participation. However, the reader remains fractioned into different schools, academic research groups and models of learning, which partially determine the sources we use, the texts we read, the appreciation and the use we make of these texts, as well as our own reception, may it be by opponents, colleagues or students. Furthermore, the reception of academic writing is also culturally and socially determined, which partially explains the difference in reception originating from India and Europe or America, or more nuanced the difference in reception of well-known Universities and smaller ones, even within the same country. To believe in a globalized audience entails therefore the risk of a) remaining in one’s own academic and cultural world while believing to address one’s writing to the global world; b) to presuppose that academic participation, reception and distribution is global, or in other words, that all scholars can freely communicate with all scholars; c) not to realize that these limits create the illusion of believing in an equality and sometimes even in a homogeneity of readers. In so doing, a reflection on the audience of cross-cultural studies should not be underestimated: who are we speaking to in intercultural, comparative and postcolonial studies?

A large majority of authors in cross-cultural studies address in priority a Western audience looking for reinterpretation of its own traditions or for enlarging the tank of resources and materials of Western research. Bhagat Oinam comments on this persisting framework of Western reference:

“At times, Indian contemporary philosophers raise questions within and about philosophy in a Western context, and, to an implied reader who is also Western. It may also happen that the same question is raised and addressed to the native scholars. When Sri Aurobindo wrote The Foundations of Indian Culture (1997/1998), his first audience were the native populations. It

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100 The following paragraphs develop the relevance of the audience and the address in setting a platform for global dialogues. I developed in another article the relevance and the problems of the audience and the address in the Anglophone Indian academic scene in questioning the difficulty of the reception of this field and hypothesizing that it might come from weakness in conceiving the audience and the address. These two aspects are complementary.

101 Eric Schwitzgebel estimates that only 3% of articles published in the most prestigious English-language philosophy journals refer to works that are not originally written in English today. The only other source languages that he found are ancient Greek, Latin, German, French and Italian. See https://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2016/09/how-often-do-mainstream-anglophone.html (visited on 16. 01. 2019). I thank Elisa Freschi for making me aware of this article.
was with a view to generate nationalist feeling that such a text was written. When Raghuramaraju writes on classical Indian philosophy or contemporary Indian philosophy, his audience, too, is primarily Indian. But the two are not the same, as the latter under no circumstances is faced with the challenge to generate the feeling of nationalism. On the other hand, the writings of B. K. Matilal or Ganeri (2001) show that their audience is the West. They locate themselves within the philosophical framework of Western philosophy, within which Indian philosophical narratives are brought in as an exception! This is quite obviously clear when Ganeri in his book *Identity as Reasoned Choice* (2012) brings Indian theories in the larger framework of democratic discourses in the West. Though both the trends use Western philosophy as a yardstick, in the former it is the use of Western philosophical methodology that serves as the tool for conceptual articulation, whereas in the latter it is the use of Western philosophical framework as the larger discourse, wherein Indian narrative serves as the content. Indian philosophy seems to get a secondary place in both. This is the plight of the post-colonial intellectual enquiry where colonial rule continues to covertly haunt through collective memory. The West continues to remain the point of reference even for engaging in Indian philosophy!102

The critical point that I want to raise here does not concern the variety itself of audiences, nor even the prevalence of the Western audience (which is criticized by Oinam), but what one could, using Daya Krishna’s terminology, call an ‘illusion’ (see 7) of the audience when we believe addressing a global audience (writing in English on an open-access platform on non-Western philosophies). Authors addressing a Western audience, either hermeneutically in teaching Indian philosophy in America or politically in bringing awareness to a global world in Europe, are certainly in their rights, and their work are important contributions that began changing the academic scenes. A certain ‘illusion’ however occurs if these authors would believe that they initiate a global dialogue when they engage with non-Western philosophies in the West, or if their audience would believe in cross-cultural approaches when exclusively reading what is only addressed to them. For instance, while Spivak challenges a Western audience in deconstructing postcolonial power-relations, and incite her audience to rethink itself as intellectuals today, it would be overhasty to conclude that she represents the ‘Indian’ voice and that a global dialogue is reached in her writings (which in the case of the quote given above, rest on a critical reading of Foucault and Derrida). The larger paradox of this framework is the fact that as soon as the subaltern reaches a voice, she is not representing the subaltern: thus, the access of a part of the minority to the global academic does not erase the problems of other minorities that continue to exist parallelly. The provocation and demands for recognition in front of a Western audience does not immediately imply an engagement with non-Western (in this case Indian) philosophies. Such differences in the addressed audience explain the gap between postcolonial studies abroad and contemporary philosophy in India. Such scholars abroad answered Euro-American prejudices against Indian philosophy or Indian identities in being located in a determined enunciative context from where they could address a Western audience, in defining themselves abroad. Their creative debates certainly enhanced great debates and new philosophical categories, but it did not lead to a global dialogue.

This situation justifies why I confront an approach based on another context, working with the difficulties of the Indian academic environment. Engaging the situation of cross-cultural studies

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102 Bhagat Oinam, “‘Philosophy in India’ or ‘Indian Philosophy’: Some Post-Colonial Questions,” *Sophia* 57, no. 3 (September 2018): 463, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0679-0.
justifies my choice for introducing another context into it, and working with Daya Krishna’s objectives, conceptual background and philosophy, although he remained distanced to comparative philosophy and postcolonial studies. Articulating the limits of the models already established in cross-cultural studies to relate to the contemporary Indian context (with its own difficulties and stakes) enable a different perspective on dialogue to emerge. It is consequently not about favoring the contemporary Indian situation, which also copes with difficult issues that will be at stake in the next chapters (2.1.2 and 2.2) nor to present the Indian academics or classical Indian philosophies as a more favorable terrain for dialogues. This is what Amartya Sen for example attempts to do in elaborating the figure of a ‘native’ “argumentative Indian” by selecting positive interreligious or intercultural figures throughout Indian history. What I rather aim at is to point at the differences of contexts and the differences of the difficulties that enacted intercultural dialogues, which highlights differences in the conceptions of intercultural dialogues themselves. After the limits of the horizon of the global dialogue in cross-cultural studies, i.e. the interplay between the different cross-cultural studies and their constitutions of peripheries, I want to analyze some ‘vertical’ limits in the constitution of cross-cultural studies, namely how they relate to their historical foundations, which are of European nature.

1.2.2. Paradox of Cross-cultural Studies: is Anti-Eurocentrism a ‘Self-critical’ Eurocentrism?

As a second correlated problem, I now turn more specifically to the foundations of cross-cultural analysis described above, which are grounded in the criticism of Eurocentrism. Postcolonial and subaltern studies such as the ones of Gayatri Spivak, have been strongly influenced by studies of political organization and power distribution in the discourse from Foucault as well as the ‘dominating’ positions of Deleuze and Derrida. The postcolonial move originates from the insufficiency of these French theorists to pluralize their philosophies, to go beyond their own location (historical and cultural) when considering the play of power and politics in the access to speech, and finally, their impossibility to contemplate an Other that would be other than the “other of Europe”, i.e. an Other that would escape the binary logic of the idem/alter to reach an otherness that cannot be taken back to the same.

Derrida’s case is symptomatic and relevant, since he is a figure and a reference for a large part of postcolonial and intercultural philosophy working with the concept of “différance”. L’Autre Cap (the Other Heading), for instance, pleads for a strong defense of hospitality, a defense of Europe and of a ‘beyond’ Europe, an openness of the borders. However, this manifesto for ‘Others’ is grounded in itself, i.e. does not imply any other philosophy nor culture, is not


105 Foucault, L’ordre du Discours.
addressed to them, and does not consider any non-Western references. This becomes problematic in his dialogue with Mustapha Chérif, where both speakers emphasized sharing an Algerian connivance. In Derrida’s colonial context of his childhood, this is tantamount to going back to an ‘elsewhere’ that he cannot access. Rather than Algeria itself or the presence of another culture, Algeria means the unreachable, whose access is forbidden by colonialism – and consequently in Derrida’s speech, the criticism of brutality of colonization.

“The cultural heritage I received from Algeria is something that probably inspired my philosophical work (...). Everything that has interested me for a long time, regarding writing, the trace, the deconstruction of Western metaphysics—which, despite what has been said, I have never identified as something homogeneous or defined in the singular (I have so often explicitly said the contrary)—all of that had to have come out of a reference to an elsewhere whose place and language were unknown or forbidden to me.”

An “elsewhere whose place and language were unknown or forbidden to me” defines the conception of alienness which emerges in such literature. Derrida’s philosophy and his answers in the dialogue show rather the radical ruptures imposed by colonization: the access to the Other was impossible, and only a posteriori criticism of oneself seems to be possible to bridge between the one and the Other. Derrida seems to be symptomatic in recognizing the presence of Others that make him analyze the limits of oneself without being able to reach these. But is a criticism of oneself sufficient to integrate Others and configure intercultural dialogues?

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106 Halbfass, much earlier than me, denounced the same in Said’s writings, which is not surprising regarding the influence of Derrida on Said himself. It nevertheless shows the continuity of the problem, from postmodernism to postcolonialism: “Of course, the critique of ideologies tends to be ideological itself and may turn out to be more so than its targets. Indeed, the highly ideological nature of Said’s critique of Orientalism can hardly be overlooked. Which are the group interests and perspectives represented by this critique? Is it immediately evident that neither his Orientalism nor any of his other publications can be regarded as an assertion or self-assertion of traditional Islam against its modern Western representations and interpretations. The religious and traditionalistic dimension is completely absent. No reference is made to traditional Muslim sources; apart from Anouar Abdel-Malek, even modern Arab, Muslim or other non-Western writers play no role whatsoever in Orientalism. Said never proposes any non-Western alternatives to the Western Orientalist ways of dealing with "self and "other," "Orient" and "Occident". Said speaks within the Western world, as a Palestinian Arab (not a Muslim) living in the West and with a thoroughly Western education. He thinks, writes, and teaches in a Western medium; his audience is primarily Western. His critical impulses and directions are inspired and guided by Western patterns of critique and self-critique. His critique and its object are branches of the same tree. He is very much included in pie processes and procedures which he denounces.” Wilhelm Halbfass, “Research and Reflection: Responses to My Respondents. 1. Beyond Orientalism? Reflections on a Current Theme,” in Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, ed. Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, 1st Indian ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), 7.


108 In a different context, namely the one of scholars studying another culture than their own, choosing to have access to materials from another culture, or for Derrida being deprived of having access to it, is quite different from the one of living with a culture imposed at a certain place by colonial forces (through the categories of which one has to think): “As European leisurely enjoyed the bounty of a cross-cultural encounter the material reality of which unfolded thousands of miles away, the conditions for the Indian reception of things European were quite different. India was host to a colonial presence. Offsetting the luxury with which Europeans could occasionally appropriate Indian materials, Indians suffered the company of an ineradicable other. As one party enjoyed the privilege of suspending the engagement at will, the other party saw its agency slowly ebb as a foreign presence became politically and materially entrenched.” Thomas B. Ellis, “India and European Philosophy,” in History of Indian Philosophy, ed. Purusottama Bilimoria and Amy Rayner (New York: Routledge, 2018), 516.
Which kind of place does that leave to Others to configure a dialogical model or to answer to the still delimited self?

In Derrida’s text, it seems that the Other is used to confirm one’s own thesis or to insinuate himself as example to reinforce one’s thesis. The Other seems to prove that Derrida’s self-criticism is true. Does this not constitute a vicious circle, of looking for Others while remaining self-critical? And thus, Ivekovic comments:

> “Here is the whole problem. This intuition or oriental inspiration puts the Orient back to its traditional place for us, while seeming to rehabilitate it. The unsaid Orient to which we give shape. As if Western philosophy could suck by magic the strength of the foreign referents that it assimilates in making codes out of them. We feed ourselves of this other thought without giving back its due, apart from the name we adopted. This is the very gesture of a monologue.”¹⁰⁹

This undertaking of a ‘self-critical eurocentrism’ still forces the Others to address their concepts, philosophies and formulate their traditions to the West. But, if the beginnings and the foundation of cross-cultural studies ‘had to’ start from calling into question the Western monopoly from the inside, and if this gesture of self-criticism was necessary in the first place to render the encounter necessary with the Other, can it remain sufficient to define ‘interculturality’ today? Can self-critical Eurocentrism help overcome Eurocentrism? Rada Ivekovic presents to my view the most eloquent criticism on the persistence of Western models in thinking Otherness and the application of Western methodologies:

> “That is the movement of all philosophers of difference and/or postmodern: the different [the Other], the oriental, are ‘rehabilitated’ but keep their traditional pictures. This is what I question, because I still see in it the figure of the philosopher, of the dominating reason, of the western subject who (dis)poses the values, who configures a world around himself. The ‘rehabilitation’ is then mostly utilitarian. Indeed, the oriental (or feminine) model taken up for the interests of western philosophy does not change the relations of power. (…) The answer of Derrida, as well as of Sloterdijk, of Lyotard, etc., and to a lesser extent, of Serres, leave beyond the horizon of the difference-problem the question about how the Other (the Orient) would answer to it, and in particular about what he would have to say (about/from) himself.”¹¹⁰

Ivekovic’s critique is addressed to French philosophers, postmodern thinkers and thinker of the difference (Lyotard, Serres, Derrida), who have questioned the Eurocentrism and are precursors

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¹¹⁰ My translation. Original text: “C’est là le geste de tous les philosophes de la différence et/ou postmodernes : le différent, l’oriental, sont “réhabilités” mais gardent leur imagier traditionnelle. C’est ce que je questionne, car j’y vois encore la figure du philosophe, de la raison dominante, du sujet occidental qui (dis)pose les valeurs, qui configure un monde autour de soi. La “réhabilitation” est alors surtout utilitaire. Car le modèle oriental (ou féminin) repris au compte de la philosophie occidentale n’y change pas les rapports de force.” (…) La réponse de Derrida, comme celles de Sloterdijk, de Lyotard, etc. et, dans une moindre mesure, celle de Serres, laissent en dehors de l’horizon du problème de la différence la question de savoir comment l’autre (l’Orient) y répondra, et surtout de savoir ce qu’il aurait à dire (de) lui-même.” Ivekovic, Orients, Critique de La Raison Postmoderne, 47–48.
and influence of many cross-cultural philosophers. Extending slightly her critique to the field of cross-cultural studies, is the self-humility sufficient to establish a dialogue when the methodology itself is left untouched and when we reproduce the asymmetrical conditions of dialogue, even if we are now aware of our own limitations?

My description certainly does not do justice to the scope of the available literature on the topic. It nevertheless attempts to sketch one pertaining problem these authors are dealing with, namely the legacy of German and French philosophies, which conditioned the development of these fields. These cross-cultural studies were enforced by the necessity of countering the limits of their predecessors, either denouncing Eurocentric assumptions or the lack of consideration of the cultural specificities in their philosophies of dialogues. It was consequently necessary to derive ‘other’ concepts of the Other in intercultural applications from these classical philosophies. This also applies to intercultural studies, which had to face the problem of redefining the position of the Other as a critique of the non-specificity of Otherness in 20th century European philosophy. However, the specification that responded to this insufficiency also remains itself based on the correction and revision of 20th century European philosophy, which retains the monopoly of the conceptual background and reference. I call this gesture a ‘self-critical Eurocentrism’, which retains the mono-culturality and the centrality of the self-effectuated critique, as described by Ivekovic. This question, I think, although more acute in postcolonial studies, should be faced by all cross-cultural studies. Not only the question of the Otherness in its Otherness, but also to interrogate how we conceive this question. Studies on Intersubjectivity for example first from Husserl\textsuperscript{111} and then from Merleau-Ponty\textsuperscript{112} do not directly include intercultural situations but can be applied to intercultural dialogues in further developments of the concept, such as analyzed by Waldenfels.\textsuperscript{113} The problem of the non-specificity of the Other in 20th century German and French philosophies enacted intercultural theories to investigate the variations of the concept of Otherness if considered from cultural perspectives.\textsuperscript{114} The Other was in 20th century philosophies grounded as an abstract entity, as


\textsuperscript{112} See in particular the chapters “Autrui et le monde humain” and “La liberté” in \textit{La phénoménologie de la perception}. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phénoménologie de la perception}, Tel 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 2009), 398-422;496-520.

\textsuperscript{113} Waldenfels, \textit{Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs}.

\textsuperscript{114} See again Ivekovic’s critical contrast: “The ‘theoretical West’ envisages such a possibility [to acknowledge the cultural dissymmetry or arbitrariness of its universalistic claim] only when compared to the Other. But the concept of the Other, indispensable in this process, is itself a Western construct and obsession. It is not that the Indians do not have the expression or the concept of the Other. They do, and it is \textit{anya}, and also \textit{dvaita}. However, in the European tradition the concept of the Other is linked to the metaphysics of the subject, or agent, which is clearly not an Indian preoccupation in philosophy. The idea of the Other is heavily exploited in different wakes of philosophy in the West, as the flip-side of the subject, and especially so in the various post-modern and the like ‘philosophies of the difference.’ The Other understood in this sense would rather be something to be overcome in the main currents of the Indian orthodox tradition or of Buddhism, since it would be considered a possible source, or result, of illusion or of apparent multiplicity. But this is certainly not a concept of the Other that could contribute, as in the European version, to the globalization of one dominant point of view. On the contrary, one has the feeling
non-I or as a universal Other: the idea of an independent Other outside myself and different from my own limits has become necessary. It also took seriously the problem of commensurability and relation in intercultural contexts.

In particular, one of the major contributions of intercultural phenomenology, has been to distinguish between two types of otherness. More exactly, it gave full significance to this distinction in intercultural contexts. Authors such as B. Waldenfels and G. Stenger thus distinguish between der Andere (other) and der Fremde (alien).¹¹⁵ One of the main difference between the two concerns their relation to the I. Indeed, der Andere, the other, is understood in relation to me, the Other as we find it in 20th century European phenomenology, the Other such as Lévinas’ or Buber’s, i.e. the Thou in distinction to the I. He/she is the ‘other’ face of myself, what I am not, what I do not understand, what I cannot reach. Beyond the personal level, the ‘other’ operates also between cultures such as in the dichotomies ‘East and West’, ‘Europe and the Orient’. The Orient is nothing else than the ‘other of Europe’, i.e. limited to what Europe is not. The other, being an ‘alter’ (etymologically, the other of two), enables only a binary relation: the one and the other. We think that there is a difference only by contrast to ourselves, by delimitation. The alien, for Waldenfels, is understood in the sense of inclusion and exclusion: “what is alien does not simply appear different, rather it arises from elsewhere. The sphere of alienness is separated from my sphere of ownness by a threshold.”¹¹⁶ While the sphere of otherness is a relative sphere to me, the sphere of alienness is a sphere originating elsewhere. The other can be understood only in reference to me and my horizon, although he runs the risk of disappearing in my understanding, since he then becomes integrated to the own once understood. Nevertheless, a transformation of myself is implied by the other. This transformation of myself and this transformation of my understanding and my ways of understanding, in the binary context of the Other (the other in reference to the own), can be seen as a first preliminary step towards the Other: enlarging my horizon, opening and

that avoiding it, avoiding or overcoming the split subject/object in the Brahmancial tradition or pursuing the advaya in Buddhism, is a willing effort to prevent any such globalization. This is an example of what I called a ‘choice of civilization.’ Furthermore, the subject and its Other bear testimony to the Western ontological concern, weak if not absent in the case of India.” Rada Ivekovic, “The Politics of Comparative Philosophy,” in Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, ed. Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, 1st Indian ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), 223–24.

¹¹⁵ Waldenfels’ distinction is present throughout his work. For the present paper and for an English definition, we can use the following one today: “And this brings us to the second great division, namely, between one’s own and the other’s. More precisely, we must distinguish one’s own (Eigenes) from the familiar (Eigenartiges) and the other (Fremdes) from the alien or heterogeneous (Fremdartiges). The other would include unknown and unavailable contents of experience and spheres of experience, so to speak uncharted spots within one’s own world, indeterminacies for which determining rules exist, and empty places that can be filled by a suitable continuation of experience. The heterogeneous, on the contrary, would be something that shatters the existing structures of experience and orders of experience, that is, something unknown in a heightened sense and for which our ordering grids are inadequate. An example of the other would be lack of knowledge within our own language; an example of the alien or heterogeneous would be an unknown foreign language. The heterogeneous can occur in various forms: at the same stage, in the guise of forms of life, cultures, and languages of similar development; at an earlier stage, such as one’s own childhood and, collectively, in so-called primitive forms of life, all the way to animal prior forms; or finally, as a deviancy, as in the case of anomalies and diseases.” Bernhard Waldenfels, Order in the Twilight, Series in Continental Thought 24 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996), 76.

relativizing my position, trying to understand the other behind me and bringing him in my understanding.

On the contrary and to escape the problems of this binarity, the alien (der Fremde) provokes us beyond the limits of understanding, where our rational framework is not sufficient to find an agreement within the same horizon, the same borders. It calls for an encounter and an experience, which finds its incarnation in a dialogue (Gespräch) in its authentic and demanding form.

“It seems that the alien thing resp. the alien person can neither be simply received nor understood. They seem to fundamentally elude every access, which does not have to immediately be an appropriation. A preliminary attempt to answer would maybe consist in (…) entering in a dialogical configuration and in the event of a discussion, wherein a coming closer does not exclude the alien, but lets the infinite detraction of the alien “be”, and actually estimates it.”

It is therefore in the dialogue that one can find access to the alienness, but an access that is not directly directed from me to him. The alienness appears in the dialogue, not in order to be domesticated, nor to be brought into a common frame, but to bring forth an encounter, a confrontation, a surplus that could not arise otherwise.

But more important for the moment, and rather meta-philosophically, the alien (der Fremde) which should englobe intercultural experiences and allow an intercultural (universal?) experience, is, from the genealogy of its conception, grounded in the limits of the classical concept of Otherness. Stenger partially acknowledges this point, without admitting its European foundation – or at least the possibility of its non-universal ground: “With the experience of the Other in his otherness comes a first irritation in the centuries-old traditions of thinking, whereby all otherness is just the Other of Oneself, analogous to the fundamental relation in which all diversity is and has to be reduced to unity.”

Intercultural philosophy answered to this problem by reinvestigating specific manifestations of otherness in intercultural contexts and the phenomenon of cultural otherness in general. The methodological problem however, although apparently present for example within hermeneutic intercultural research, has not led to a calling into question of classical methodology. It rather called for enlarging the classical foundation to further applications and illustrations. But is it sufficient, on the one hand to escape Eurocentrism and on the other hand to engage in a dialogue with the Other?

Furthermore, in refusing the mode of ‘alterity’ that presupposes the binary reciprocal definition of the I and its alter (ego), the definition attempts to escape defining the Other by the I in


considering her/him as an ‘alien’ (in Waldenfels’ definition above described). He/she is not anymore understood as ‘non-I’ in the duality of the I and Thou, but as ‘beyond the I’, as what I cannot grasp. However, in doing so, he/she is left untouched as the ultimate excluding category, as ‘exo-topos’ and remains a formal unspecified category. This also leads to a certain homogeneity presupposed in such concepts of alienness. The alien is an ‘extra-ordinary’ phenomenon, beyond any categorical order and ‘hermetic’, beyond any understanding. A problem however follows, namely to consider alienness itself to be one unified concept. It is a ‘beyond’, the ungraspable category. Within this ‘beyond’, one can distinguish a plurality of cultures, but they will all be characterized by what is ungraspable for the Other. To say it differently: regardless of the origin of the alien, his or her characteristic as an alien is to be ‘beyond’ the own, defined by this difference or this gap between the own and the alien. In remaining Other and yet powerful colonizer instituting a hierarchy, European philosophies have set the configuration of thinking and dialoguing in their own scheme. Even when willing to engage, are we able to do it without reducing the other to our own representation?

Is it however not naïve from my part to believe that we could simply ‘leave’ Eurocentrism and accede another point of view than ourselves, grounded in European thoughts and context? Are we maybe not condemned to move circularly in qualifying different phases of (persisting) Eurocentrism? Halbfass and Ivekovic present clearly distinguished alternatives on the topic. For Halbfass, Eurocentrism, including what I call ‘self-critical’ Eurocentrism, is an unescapable fact, as much as the Europeanization of the Earth, the denial of which constitutes a self-illusion:

"""Is it really possible to move briskly from Eurocentrism to anti-Eurocentrism (and from logos to anti-logos?)" [ibid., p.50 question raised by Fred Dallmayr]. Our answer to this question has to be clear and simple: No. The various recent forms of ‘anti-Eurocentrism’ cannot lead us beyond the Eurocentric constellation of our modern world. Instead, they may prevent us from facing the problem, or perhaps even reinforce it. We cannot simply replace ‘Eurocentrism’ (or ‘logocentrism’) with its opposite. There is no room for such ‘opposites.’ Any discourse of rejection is inevitably futile as long as it is unable to face the extent to which it is permeated by what it rejects. Modern ‘Eurocentrism’ which coincides with the ‘Europeanization of the earth,’ is, of course, no longer a particular kind of ethnocentrism, which would coexist with or might be replaced by other ‘centrism’ or culturally and geographically bound views of the world. In the universality of its cognitive claims, it suppresses and anticipates its own rejections and opposites. For the time being, we have no choice but to accept the historical predicament of Europeanization, and to try to understand it from within, patiently, ready to ask questions

without expecting immediate answers. Trying to discard or replace it would be an act of self-deception.”

When Halbfass mentions the futility of the rejection, insofar as it is already conditioned by its own rejection, he means, I believe, what I outlined with the idea of Eurocentrism turning into a self-critical Eurocentrism. Simple critiques and negations certainly cannot erase Eurocentrism in the deeper layers of its conditioning our thoughts. Does it mean however that we are left speechless, having no right to speak, or in Halbfass’ alternative, left to “accept the historical predicament of Europeanization, and to try to understand it from within?”

On this point, I believe that Ivekovic’s ‘answer’ to Halbfass internal acceptance of Eurocentrism - Ivekovic first wrote her essay on Halbfass to which the latter answers, her explanation does not constitute a direct answer - raises relevant questions. In so doing, she also interrogates the very ability of dialoguing between these traditions if the prism of Eurocentrism is maintained in spite of our efforts:

“India, the Orient, is the Other we have given ourselves, as Halbfass puts it. By which words should one call this Other to a dialogue, a dialogue that has no status in its tradition? And why should one do it? Isn't dialogue also a Western setting? How is it possible not to pressure the Other with violence while proposing the dialogue? This is a problem of the politics of discourse. The problem of reception of which one clue resides at the side of the Other is invisible and unsolvable from 'this side.' We would have to de-center ourselves. Identity is caught up in a paradox. It is the impossible position between ‘I’ or ‘we’ and the ‘Other,’ never accountable. How could one break with the arrogance of one's own cultural identity without necessarily renouncing it - when this arrogance seems to be constitutive of it? Jacques Derrida would confirm the paradox here: we must be true within treason itself (Derrida 1991). But is it sufficient to take note of the de facto asymmetry in order to be exonerated? Instead of giving some space for the Other to speak, space that will remain empty, shouldn't we try to go one step further and listen to the Other, to that other language, and try to understand it? That would produce a world of multiple co-subjects. However, it would be uncontrollable. Why should Europe, the West, always be that inexhaustible source of universality? How could one insure collaboration between multiple subjects? In order to come to this sort of advaita from the Western position we certainly have to start by doing what Wilhelm Halbfass does when he lets the Other speak. The most radical moves in these matters seem to be the moderate ones.”

Breaking with the arrogance of one’s identity corresponds to breaking with Eurocentrism, the impossibility of which seems to lie in the constitutive relation to one’s own identity. However, does it excuse Halbfass’ resigned comment on remaining internally aware of Eurocentrism? “Is it sufficient to take note of the de facto asymmetry in order to be exonerated”? I understand this relevant critique in concrete intercultural applications: Is it justified to systematically ground intercultural philosophy on philosophical methodologies that have no reference outside European contexts? Can we simply integrate the Other in such a context, and does he/she not become rather intercultural illustration than actors?

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1.2.3. Contemporary Indian philosophy Interculturally Defined: Outline of the Content.

To analyze intercultural dialogues, I believe that using examples from non-Western literature is not sufficient, but that the theories themselves should originate from different sources, in my case, an Indian philosopher trained in Western philosophy (and initiated to Sanskrit) who himself engaged with different traditions of Indian philosophies. Before turning to a detailed description of these dialogical experiments, I wish to elucidate the somewhat unusual background of the following chapters. Chapter 2 reconstitutes the context of the dialogical experiments and answers to the questions “What does saṃvāda mean, how did the saṃvāda project come to existence and why was it conceived?” The next chapter 3 describes the forms of the dialogical in the different experiments organized and the methodology that underlies them, and responds to the “how”, namely “how did they happen and what are the dialogues themselves?”.

These two chapters, which both consider the concrete proceeding of the dialogues, demand a longer comment, on the one hand to measure the specificity of the context they describe, and on the other hand to notify the reader of the personal reconstruction that I effectuate. Indeed, the following description has been reassembled from diverse sources, partially published, partially unpublished and/or informal interviews, which I have conducted during my research. This concerns first the information about the dialogical experiments themselves, which have not all been published, and the material around their organization or their assessment, but to a certain extent also the conceptual narrative of the colonial time. Indeed, only one encompassing history of colonial Indian philosophy has been until now written, by Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield, which concerns the generation preceeding Daya Krishna’s and thereby does not include the intellectual history of these dialogical experiments. This means that, in the field of colonial and post-colonial Indian philosophy, in English-speaking academia in India and in other Hindu and Muslim education systems, there are no “ready-made” resources, neither regarding the collection of data nor their evaluation and interpretation, and not even a contextual historical narrative surrounding them. This simple fact has important consequences: these concepts and authors are not part of our familiar conceptual environment and cannot be immediately used in an argumentation. As Raghuramaraju comments, the resources have first to be recollected and identified, analyzed and connected to their peers, namely the discourse in which they occurred must be reconstructed. This process provides the text with an

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127 “There is a variance, an unevenness, between these two [Euro-American philosophy and Indian writers]. I am sensitive to this and wish to tread carefully so as not to accentuate the difference or unevenness. Unlike in the Euro-American world, in India, academic resources are not available readymade, one has to get them ready for use. This is a long procedure, and it requires different levels, stages, and methods of preparation. Firstly, the resources have to be identified and their descriptions have to be drawn up. One, then, needs to find out if there are existing interpretations available on them, and write about these realities, practices, or ideas in a new idiom. Only then, these can be used in academic discussions.” Raghuramaraju, 476.
intellectual context, so as to create a discourse where the concepts can be meaningful and used appropriately. It is worthwhile to notice that this procedure of recollecting, identifying and analyzing the resources, which is invisible once the text is written and not recognized in the philosophical field, partially explains the lack of research on these fields, and in general in non-Western resources. The imbalance between the ‘ready-made’ handbooks and easily available resources on Western philosophy and their absence concerning non-Western, in my case here, post-colonial Indian philosophy, makes the development of the latter from scratch strenuous.

These chapters try in consequence to create a coherent image of *samvāda* in its own context, in order to make the concept “usable”. Raghuramaraju explains the risk in overstepping these steps when he writes about the danger of comparing “uneven” authors, when there is a “disproportion in the availability of the scholarship on these thinkers”\(^\text{128}\). He writes that “directly using the resources from India can expose these scholars from India to vulnerabilities and render them less enduring - to be considered esoteric at most, attracting more of curiosity than academic credibility, despite themes and ideas from India gaining visibility at the global level.”\(^\text{129}\) I want to draw attention to this precaution, which I find methodologically significative in a study in intercultural philosophy, and which justifies my detailed exploration “around” the idea of *samvāda*. With Raghuramaraju, I have to warn against the danger of uprooting authors to a global context, which also implies, for unfamiliar readers, using these authors without introducing the discourse in which they occurred. It is indeed easy to dismiss a theory when our philosophical approach is monocultural, or in more moderate cases, too inclined to analogical thinking, akin the ‘*like*-argumentation claim, i.e. ‘the non-Western concept X actually resembles the Western concept I know Y, ergo there is nothing new about it, and I do not need any non-Western philosophy’. Without elucidating the singularity of a context from which a new concept emerges, one risks missing the creativity of non-Western philosophers (even if chronologically, it also often happens that the non-Western philosopher suggested the ‘similar’ concept prior to the Western one). Conceptual analogy, if sometimes a useful pedagogical device, can easily erase the originality and the specificity of non-Western philosophers who find themselves, from the simple unevenness of the corpus, immediately in a situation of conceptual inequality: in front of the masses of documentation on European author X, a single text of a non-Western text preserved in the library (without any external references, intellectual context or other texts available), naturally seems less elaborated, precise, or complex. In other words and to illustrate my point: in order not to understand Daya Krishna’s *samvāda* as a mere late (intercultural) copy or variation of Plato’s dialogue, or to avoid simply ‘picking’ the concept ‘*samvāda*’ and add it as an ‘*exotic example*’ to a Western theory of dialogues, or *pūrvapakṣa* as an *equivalent* to counter-position, their specific narrative must be reconstructed ‘from scratch’, from a very reconstruction of sources to the specificities of the intellectual context in which he was rooted.

In this regard, the next chapter reconstructs the project that led to the dialogues: first, in recollecting and gathering Daya Krishna’s comments at different places, unpublished thoughts on dialogue and in his comments in the introductions to different *samvādas*, from which I draw

\(^{128}\) Raghuramaraju, 476.
\(^{129}\) Raghuramaraju, 476.
a first definition of the concept as used by him and its different implications (2.1). Then, I investigate the etymological meaning of samvāda and the use in the classical scholastic Sanskrit traditions (2.1.1): I thereby connect it with the classical dialogical traditions to underline the originality of Daya Krishna’s reinterpration, who implied pāṇḍīts, as those who directly inherit the classical traditions, but only in order to be contemporary actors of the philosophical traditions (2.1.2). The divide between the idée reçue of pāṇḍīts as those who preserve the texts and Daya Krishna’s implication of them as thinkers questions the perception of the philosophical ‘tradition’ in India. This antinomy between historical and philosophical approach brought an intellectual divide in the different philosophical communities in India. It is from this perspective that samvāda becomes not only a philological, historical and hermeneutic device of importance, but also a postcolonial project (2.2.1). This motivation for reacting to a more inclusive philosophy has also a more personal aspect of engagement, in particular from his experience as a professor and the friendship involved in the experiments, which leads me to suggest some predecessors who have inspired and contributed to the creation of the experiments (2.2.2) and (2.2.3)

The following chapter articulates the different forms, which I consider by extension to be part of the samvāda project (since the name was only given to the multilingual dialogues organized between different philosophical communities), including the weekly seminars of Jaipur (3.1), the editing work of the Journal of Indian Council for Philosophical Research (3.2), the saṃvāda experiments themselves (3.3), and the dialogues organized between contemporary Anglophone philosophers (3.4). Besides the historical motivation of reconstructing a corpus with the material I could recollect, but also of making available excerpts from unpublished letters and documents used for the preparation of the experiments, and the experience of participants, I pursue also another objective in this chapter 3. I investigate the cross-cultural attempts and the methodology developed in the practice of the different dialogues, that gradually integrated different philosophical traditions in the Anglophone academics, and also the preparation and thoughts on how to make academics in India more diverse, and followingly, more creative and relevant today. These methodological analyses from the practice form the ground on which I then turn to theorize the concept of samvāda itself.

In the second part of this work entitled ‘Saṃvāda in Theory’, I investigate Daya Krishna’s wide-ranging philosophy in order to think ‘dialogue’ in connection with the practical experiments that he conducted. Dialogues can be seen from two angles in Daya Krishna’s philosophy: as a topic and as a method. As a topic, it implies thinking what dialogues across philosophical traditions could mean with his philosophy. As mentioned in the Preface, and further investigated in 3.5, there is no monograph and only few articles dealing explicitly with the subject of dialogue in his immense corpus. Therefore, we need to articulate different core concepts in his philosophy and investigate in which sense they can contribute to the topic. As a method, however, Daya Krishna’s own writings are often dialogical in the sense that they imply interlocutors, and often also his listeners, as part of a philosophical dialogue in his texts. For this reason, the next part includes some interlocutors, mostly his immediate predecessors and contemporaries with whom he also engaged in real life, or those who influenced him greatly. In the different chapters, I relate his thoughts to those of Krishachandra and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, J. N. Chubb, Margaret Chatterjee, G. C. Pande, S. S. Barlingay and N. V.
Banerjee, who I believe, are helpful to integrate Daya Krishna’s ‘counter-positions’ into a larger philosophical framework to which he is responding.

In chapter 4, I emphasize on thinking dialogue as a ‘multifaceted whole’ by outlining the different inseparable dimensions that are implied in it. Thus, refusing to limit the analysis of dialogues across traditions to the question of translations between languages or conceptual frameworks, I focus here on all the philosophical interlocking that it raises. *Samvāda* indeed necessarily implies rhetoric and, in a larger perspective, epistemology. The questions of what is fallacious or not, what can be said or not, how it can be presented, as well as the question of the kind of truth that we want to reach in a dialogue, belong to a certain extent to these realms.

However, in Daya Krishna’s perspective, these questions imply to think anew what we think is true and false, which kind of authority is exercised and what is its legitimacy, which kind of persons are there and how they see themselves in relation to others, how knowledge is inextricable from its intersubjective constitution, and how we are ‘moving’ towards a certain idea of truth, i.e. what is this force pushing us together towards something which we seek. Knowledges take here a plural and wider sense: they are defined as constituted on the one hand by elaborated resources from various traditions (in the sense of śāstric knowledge, bodies of fixed treatises), put in tension with knowledge-as-seeking (as *purusārthas*), this movement towards what we want to know, or what ought to be realized. Within these two poles, I first suggest to see dialogue as a tool (*śilpa*) that activates this tension between the different resources and the seeking for ‘more’. In this sense, dialogue is a tool for what Daya Krishna calls ‘the art of the conceptual’ as what can liberate critical and creative thinking in distinction to the fixed ‘thoughts’ of the acquired resources from all traditions.

The next chapters further develop the different dimensions implied in chapter 4. Chapter 5 investigates epistemological presuppositions by focusing on a device to which Daya Krishna gives great relevance in his philosophy: *pūrvapakṣa* or counter-position. I first contemplate the advantage of counter-positions to unveil presuppositions of thinking, since counter-positions in this sense (ideally) require taking into consideration the other’s position to the best of one’s capacity before presenting alternatives. It thus enables a certain detachment from one’s position and a sense of plurality of different standpoints (5.2). Continuing with J. N. Chubb’s and Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s respective concepts of epistemological introspection, which the former conceives of as witnessing the origins of thought, and the super-philosophic attitude of contemplating a plurality of contradictory and absolute philosophies, I interpret with Daya Krishna their insights as an epistemology of dialogue (5.3). Such an account requires a thinking of knowledges in the plural, alternating and aware of their own presuppositions, which is revealed by counter-positions in dialogue. To explain that knowledges can be seen in the plural implies to consider that theories, although different and even contradictory with each other, can be seen as equally valid from a super-philosophic point of view. This signifies to regard them as an alternation or exploration of different standpoints. That these standpoints exist in the first place, and that they lead to contradictory unfolding requires to take into consideration concepts such as significance and meaning. This means that knowledge is not only the result of premises, but that these premises are developed according to some criteria leading the knowledge toward a certain direction. These criteria and directions fall outside of the epistemological realm.
I investigated these directions and criteria from the perspective of values in chapter 6, retrieved in particular from the structure of puruṣārthas. First I analyzed the difficulties that taking in consideration values for dialogue entail, in particular the difficulty of critically discussing values and the hierarchy of particular value-contents between traditions (6.1). In that sense, values are presented as a content of the dialogue. I then further considered how values influence dialogue itself, namely as what defines attitudes in the dialogue (6.2). With Daya Krishna, I regard participants of dialogues as ‘seekers of knowledge’ (jijñāsu), thereby introducing a valuational modality to the concept of dialogue. This leads me in particular to consider the role of ignorance and the tension between ‘not knowing yet’ and ‘yet wanting to know’. This tension between what ‘ought to be’ and what ‘is’, or more exactly what ‘is not yet’ is correlative to Daya Krishna’s interpretation of puruṣārthas and values. After investigating the influence of values on participants, I finally articulate values from the perspective of dialogue itself, namely as the tension between the conceptual apprehension of the idea(l) of dialogue and concrete realizations of dialogical experiments (6.3). The gap between the two appears from the dissatisfactions that reality brings about with regard to our ideal apprehensions. Rather than concluding with a radical distinction between theory and practice, I contemplated the advantage, with Daya Krishna, to locate the dynamic of dialogues in this tension, as the freedom to continue, which ‘moves’ the dialogue forward.

While dissatisfactions can be felt, and thus revisions can be implemented for the next dialogue, and while epistemological presuppositions can be unveiled from another standpoint, chapter 7 analyzes difficulties - regarded as further creative tensions - which cannot be detected from an external point of view. These concern illusions of consciousness, distinguished by Daya Krishna into two categories, structural and transcendental. Structural illusions in particular reveal the difficulty of unveiling the givenness of what appears similarly to all who share the same structure (biological, conceptual, historico-cultural). This points at the limits of our human condition itself (7.1). I focus on one limit in particular, which is of crucial relevance for dialogue: ‘I-centricity’. This points at the impossibility of conceiving the other as I-consciousness, having the same sense of absoluteness as our ‘I’ has for us (7.3). Limiting the other to an ‘object of my consciousness’, namely as a position or an argument, raises the problem of our ontological relation to others in dialogue. This relation is further complicated by the fact that seeing others as ‘objects’ of my consciousness is also configurated by politico-cultural forces. Since I associate my ‘I’ with certain identities (being ‘Indian’ for instance), the identity of my ‘I’ is also related to other structures. While I feel my ‘I’ as an absolute centre for me around which ‘others’ gravitate, the cultural centres and peripheries might entail different constitutions. This raises further the problem of ‘others’ as ‘objects’ to be studied from my own centre. In postcolonial Indian philosophies and for intercultural discourses in general, the intermingling of these identities in the I and others, but even more my understanding of ‘others’ as ‘objects’ about which I think (and not with whom) raises central difficulties for dialoguing. With N. V. Banerjee in particular, I investigated the foundation of an ‘I with others = We’. This, I believe, is crucial to avoid a conception of dialogue as a sum of separated contributions (‘I and others’) instead of a constitutive relation from where (from the ‘we’) creativity arises. I hypothesized with Daya Krishna - and his contemporaries - that to become aware of this essentiality to others is a demand originating from within consciousness (7.2). With Daya
Krishna, however, resisting any a priori constitution, this demand is to be realized in mutual actions with others, namely in dialogues. In the movement of withdrawing within my ‘I’ and engaging ‘out’ with others lies my realization of being with others. For Daya Krishna, this dynamic is furthermore an expression of my freedom, a freedom which is neither (only) impeded by others, because of which my absoluteness is limited, nor absolutely detached from the world, as a transcendental escape. It is precisely a freedom to enter in dialogue with others, which my consciousness demands from within, but which meets with the concrete limitations of my intersubjective possibilities.
Part I: Saṃvāda in practice

2. Saṃvāda Project: Definition and Genesis of Daya Krishna’s Dialogical Experiments.

“There still remain a very large number of questions that demand answers. (...) It is hoped that others will take up the endeavor from where we have left it. We wish them luck and hope that they will have learnt something from the achievements and deficiencies of this volume, which attempted the writing of a new type of history. How professional historians will respond to this effort is difficult to say. But new departures are generally not welcome and intellectuals, as a class, happen to be ‘conservative’ as anyone else. Perhaps I was ‘saved’ from the usual traditions of history writing as I was never trained as a historian and, even in the field of philosophy, I have been an ‘outsider’ as I have not belonged to any ‘school’, whether modern or traditional. I have been, if anything, a ‘thinker’ at large for whom the activity of ‘thinking’ has always been more important than the products of that activity and hence, have always questioned the obvious, so easily accepted by most.”

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130 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 15–16.
2.1. What is Śamvāda?

2.1.1. Sam-vāda, “Collective Discussion”: from the Nyāya-sūtra to Daya Krishna

The term samvāda in the present context refers to the scholastic dialectic traditions of Sanskrit literature, and to the dialogical form of philosophizing in classical India. The term, usually translated as dialogue, or more precisely ‘collective discussion’ is composed of sam- (‘with’, comparable to the Latin prefix cum in con-versation) and vāda, ‘discussion’, ‘debate’. However, (sam)vāda does not refer to any kind of debate or discussion, but to discussion among pairs in the Nyāya-sūtra, which corresponds to Caraka’s non-agonal form of scholastic debate. In this literature, distinctions are made between three types of verbal confrontations: vāda, jalpa and vitanḍā. Vāda aims at establishing the truth, and requires in the Nyāya-sūtra (I.2.1) the exposition of positions and counter-positions, refutes contradictions, and “consists in the establishment of their respective thesis and the refutation of the counter-thesis based upon the means of knowledge and reasoning (pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambha)”138. Jalpa (NS.

131 It could be useful to explore here the differences with European classical scholasticism, in particular to notice how modern European philosophers reacted to their tradition in difference to their Indian counterparts. From a historical study one could locate the roots of different practices and emphases by confronting both classical traditions. I chose here to limit myself to a general introduction of the classical Indian rhetoric from the more specific point of view of Daya Krishna’s reinterpretation.


134, “Gemeinschaftliche Unterredung”. In den Nyāyasūtren bezeichnet der Terminus die Unterredung unter Gleichgesinnten und entspricht somit dem bei Caraka gelehrtten Begriff der nicht-agonalen Form der wissenschaftlichen Debatte.” Oberhammer, Prets, and Prandstetter, Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien, 203–4. My translation: “‘Common Interlocution’. In the Nyāyasūtras, this term signifies the interlocution among like-minded persons. It thus corresponds to the concept of the non-agonal form of scientific debate as taught in the Caraka.”

135 The difference between these two references is summarized here: “Both manuals [Caraka-saṃhitā and Nyāya-sūtra] discuss the question of debate in general (vāda, jalpa, vitanḍā) with the difference that vāda in the Nyāyasūtras is understood as the friendly form of debate, and disputation (jalpa) and eristic wrangle (vitanḍā) are the hostile forms, whereas in the Caraka-saṃhitā disputation and eristic wrangle are subdivisions of vāda (…). This means that in the Caraka-saṃhitā, vāda is only the hostile variety of debate.” Prets, “Theories of Debate, Proof and Counter-Proof in the Early Indian Dialectical Tradition,” 440–41.


137 Gautama and Pakṣilavāmin, Le Nyāya-Sūtra de Gautama Aksapāda, le Nyāya-Bhāṣya d’Aksapāda Pakṣilasv āmin, 341–43.

I.2.2\textsuperscript{139} occurs between rival parties who aim at winning the debate. While the development of the dispute (jalpa) resembles the dialogue (vāda), the means are different: tricks and sophistical strategies\textsuperscript{140} are as much part of the game as the rational content of the argumentation. Finally, vitanḍā (NS. I.2.3\textsuperscript{141}) also implies the idea of victory, this time however for the sake of it, without establishing any position of its own, nor aiming at establishing the truth. As Elisa Freschi notices, Daya Krishna’s choice of using the term samvāda “clearly points at his positioning himself within those who search for truth and not for a victory in debate”\textsuperscript{142}, and I would add, also clearly locates the project as a contemporary reinterpretation of the Sanskrit dialectic tradition. She continues in highlighting the relevance of the addition of the prefix ‘sam-’, which, although it has precedents and evokes the rhetoric tradition, is not usually found in combination with vāda: this addition clearly emphasizes the mutuality in Daya Krishna’s use of the term. She adds:

“Although vāda is in Nyāya truth-oriented, it also retains a competitive aspect. Daya Krishna removed this in favour of an open-ended and non-competitive discussion. This removal does not amount to an irenic ideal, since the critical engagement with other ideas makes Daya Krishna often ready to dismiss what he deems to be prejudices or closedness in other authors. (…) Moreover, Daya Krishna even displays a preference for the hostile confrontation modelled after the vitanḍā when he writes:

“It should be noted that jalpa is defined in terms of chala [‘fraud’, EF] and jāti [‘futile rejoinder’, EF] and hence consists of them (see sūtra 1.2.2). Thus, really speaking, there are only vāda, jalpa and vitanḍā as jalpa consists of chala and jāti. This reveals that ultimately the act of reasoning in its psychological aspect consists only of honesty and dishonesty in reasoning. Both vāda and vitanḍā are honest, even though the latter is not generally considered as such. But, the person who engages in vitanḍā is perhaps even more honest than the one who engages in vāda, because he openly declares that he has not yet found the truth or does not have any settled siddhānta [‘conclusive opinion’, EF] of his own, but that he sees the defects in what someone else is claiming to be truth or proclaiming as a siddhānta. However, in this sense of vitanḍā one who argues that reasoning can not establish any siddhānta at all or, in other words, can not find the truth or is a completee skeptic can not be considered a vitanḍic.”\textsuperscript{143}

This implies that Daya Krishna is well aware of the fact that vāda entails an a priori assumption – which he calls “final and ultimate absoluteness of the knowledge” – namely, that of the possibility of establishing a definite truth. In this sense, vitanḍā implies more openness.”\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{139} Gautama and Pakṣilavāmin, Le Nyāya-Sūtra de Gautama Akṣapāda, le Nyāya-Bhāṣya d’Aksapāda Pakṣilavāmin, 343; Matilal, “Debate and Dialectic in Ancient India,” 57–58.

\textsuperscript{140} See the elaborated study on these device by Prets, who also prevent us from the ‘negative’ understanding in the translation as quibble, tricks and sophisms, since these device are in the NS valid means of refutation. Prets, “Futile and False Rejoinders, Sophistical Arguments and Early Indian Logic.”

\textsuperscript{141} Gautama and Pakṣilavāmin, Le Nyāya-Sūtra de Gautama Akṣapāda, le Nyāya-Bhāṣya d’Aksapāda Pakṣilavāmin, 345–46; Matilal, “Debate and Dialectic in Ancient India,” 58–64.

\textsuperscript{142} Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 175.


\textsuperscript{144} Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 175–76.
Freschi argues that Daya Krishna chose the term *vitaṇḍā* over *vāda* for not risking a skeptical (and maybe relativistic) account and for not encouraging an “easy rhetorical victory”. Daya Krishna could not concede the honest argumentation for the sake of the rhetorics, although he could also not accept an irenic model. J. L. Mehta, who himself has been engaged in phenomenological and hermeneutic analyzes of Indian philosophy and confronted to the dialogical problem in his career abroad, comments on his own experience. He underlines the necessity of a certain confrontational attitude in dialoguing for not risking mutual congratulating or politeness.

> “Whether one takes it in the ancient Greek spirit of *agon* and *eristikos* or in the Indian sense of *shastrartha*, there is an element of mutual grappling and fight in such dialogues, without which they easily turn into a mere exchange of courtesies. In order to be fruitful the dialogue must be conceived also as a mutual challenging, a calling out to the other to come out into the open, and it needs being conducted as a ‘liebende Kampf’, to use Karl Jaspers striking phrase.”

I believe that Daya Krishna would subscribe to this idea of a ‘loving fight’ to avoid superficiality of courtesies. Nevertheless, in spite of his inclination to a confrontational model, it is most probable that he could not consider it a viable model due to the rhetorical aspect and that he also could not favor a dialogical model that did not consider seriously counter-positions in its procedure.

Daya Krishna remained consciously closer to *vāda*, although in a *vitaṇḍic* move of not self-proclaiming a given truth. This commitment to *vāda*, its implication of the objective and scholastic truth as well as the importance of the dialectic in classical Indian traditions *per se*, can partially explain why Daya Krishna relied on dialogue as a logical instrument apt to philosophize. Indeed, in the European traditions, dialogues as proper philosophy reached its apogee with Socrates and Plato, and although the advent of Modernity still provides some examples (with Descartes or Hume) or even if we find contemporary sporadic examples, it remained a genre at the margins, which has difficulties to be integrated to the ‘proper’ scientific expectations of modern philosophy. Treatises largely replace and expulse philosophical dialogues, which are not felt as enough reliable or systematic. *Samvāda*, on the other hand, is not felt in opposition to, but as a component of *śāstras* (treatises) as a logical method of tending towards truth since the classical developments of Indian philosophies. It is in rational debates with counter-positions that the arguments are sharpened. While rhetoric is seen as suspicious in modern European philosophy, in particular as the instrument of sophistry, the elaboration of complex rhetorical rules in India circumvents this difficulty without jettisoning the necessity of confrontation for logical argumentations. Thus, *samvāda* does not carry the skeptic connotation vis à vis scientific and philosophical standards of knowledge implied by modern European philosophy. On the contrary, it contributes to knowledge through a precise and systematic collaborative investigation to erase mistakes, obscurities and approximations. The logical

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146 A contemporary expression of skepticism towards the possibility of dialoguing in philosophy is illustrated by Slavoj Žižek in his “Philosophy is not a dialogue” Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, and Peter Engelmann, *Philosophy in the Present*, English ed (Cambridge ; Malden, Mass: Polity, 2009), 49–72.
connotation implied in the term may also justify Daya Krishna’s preference over the English equivalent, bearing of a more literary and disregarded philosophical importance.

The technical Sanskrit term *samvāda* clearly and self-consciously articulates the project undertaken by Daya Krishna, both in its relation to the tradition, and in the etymological composition. With his projects however, the term takes a new signification. In Daya Krishna’s dialogical project, *samvāda* was first the name attributed to M. P. Rege’s and his first institutionalized and published multilingual dialogue, a philosophical encounter between Nyāyāyikas, trained in Sanskrit Indian philosophy, and English-speaking philosophers trained in Indian academics. The dialogue (see 3.3) created a philosophical platform to collectively engage different intellectual traditions on a common topic, in this case Russell and the concept of proposition, which could benefit from both expertise and perspectives.

Beyond this explicit denomination as *samvāda* and the *samvāda* project, there are only a few occurrences, either to ‘dialogue’ or to ‘*samvāda*’ in Daya Krishna’s work. However, there are as few occurrences as there is an absolute consensus from participants of any of the dialogical experiments, from his colleagues, students and friends on the fact that he has been entirely concerned, throughout his life, with dialoguing with as many thinkers as he could. Daya Krishna’s epistolary legacy, his classes and seminars, but also his home opened in the afternoon to all seeking dialogues, as well as his dialogical way of editing the *Journal of Indian Council for Philosophical Research* are clear evidences of a constant, open and long-lasting enthusiasm for dialogues between philosophical traditions. One way to resolve this apparent paradox is simply to consider that his constant engagement either did not allow him (enough time) to come back to conceptually elaborate on a practice he was conducting daily (see 3.5). Another, maybe more plausible explanation given Daya Krishna’s capacity to write extensively, is to consider that he saw dialogues to consist of a practice constantly evolving according to the opportunities and encounters, questions and demands of the dialogues themselves, rather than a theory, which runs the risk of becoming systematic, automatic and presupposed. Thus, dialogue is a way to act-ualize philosophical theories rather than a philosophical pre-written and fixed ‘instruction book’. Dialogues, if conceived as a method, are meant to be used. So conceived, no theoretical methodology, even if independently tailored for each dialogue, can *a priori* guarantee success to the dialogue\(^\text{147}\) or uncritical endorsement.\(^\text{148}\) Critiques are on the contrary necessary to renew the dialogical attempts. Regardless of the reasons for the lack of conceptual analysis, Daya Krishna’s work leaves us with the legacy of an immense praxis – partly transcribed and published - contrasted with few clear and direct analyses of the topic. This span between a constant and lively engagement with dialogues and the paucity of an analysis of the phenomenon itself, is worth being explored as a possibility of thinking anew with his legacy the question of dialogues between different philosophical traditions.

\(^{147}\) See for example Bettina Bäumer’s experience, Bäumer, “‘Falling in Love with a Civilization’: A Tribute to Daya Krishna, the Thinker,” 34–40.

\(^{148}\) See for example Shail Mayaram’s testimony in her fictive dialogue, Mayaram, *Philosophy as Samvāda and Svarāj*, 278–91.
Nevertheless, I could locate a philosophical analysis of *samvāda* project, which, coincidentally, is retrieved from a dialogue, the topic of which was itself ‘dialogue’. It shows how Daya Krishna took seriously the praxis of dialogue, not only illustrating his theory by artificial dialogues or simple examples, but theorizing dialogues in the dialogues themselves. Organized by Kapila Vatsyayan, an important scholar of Indian classical arts, on 15th-16th January 1992 at the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts in New Delhi, the dialogue took place after a series of lecture delivered by Maurice and Aleene Friedman on topics related to dialogue and Martin Buber. The dialogue started as a discussion on Maurice Friedman’s lecture on “Dialogue and the Human Image”. In 1992, Daya Krishna looks back at the assessments and the future of his undertaking. As a rather rare case of straightforward definition and analysis of his own project, I find it useful and worth to reproduce the full utterance pronounced during this dialogue, as it shows not only what *samvāda* means in Daya Krishna’s experiments, but also how he conceived it as a life project. This is how he introduced himself and his philosophical interests to the audience at the very beginning of the dialogue:

“I’m a philosopher, and I’ve been interested for some time past in what you would call the activity of philosophizing, enlarging it to what we would call the activity of thinking, particularly as it happens in small groups. What exactly emerges out of what we could call the collectivity of interactive thinking. After that I have recently been experimenting on what we would call establishing dialogues – the living careers of traditional knowledge in different fields, both in the Sanskritic and Islamic traditions in this country. Now here the experiment has been in diverse forms, but one major experiment that has been attempted is how persons with the reservoir of traditional knowledge respond to contemporary intellectual issues about which they are not aware in the Western tradition and the Western languages. The other is to establish an interaction between themselves with respect to new questions which we formulate with respect to their own traditions, that is, traditions of knowledge as they are developed and the classical perspectives. The other aspect is how these interact, for example the classical Arabic tradition as it is represented in India, and the classical Sanskritic tradition with respect to a particular field of knowledge. Because they belong to two different traditions that are both classical, but they have not interacted among themselves. So we try to make them interact with each of them. One carries the experiment a little further in what we would call extending not merely in the fields of knowledge but what we would call a skill, like, for example, bringing traditional persons who deal with architecture both theoretically and practically and modern architecture. One also extends the experiment to what one may call a discussion on the tradition of commentaries because most of the classical traditions of knowledge have been presented in the form of commentaries on basic texts and commentaries on commentaries further, giving rise to a feeling that nothing new is being said. So we try to bring people from what you would call the tradition of commentaries in the Sanskrit tradition and the Arabic tradition and the Christian tradition and the Greek traditions together into a dialogue to reflect on that. That is how, through the form of commentaries, new things have been said. So we ask the scholar’s concern to tell us to take specific examples where they could find that, through a new commentary, something new is being said, though the form is the commentarial form, just the

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149 This dialogue is not part of Daya Krishna’s *samvādas*, in the sense that it was not organized by him but he was invited to participate. According to the foreword and preface, the seminars, including the dialogue, were organized for the venue of Maurice and Aleene Friedman by Kapila Vatsyayan, with the help B. N. Saraswati and the retranscription edited by Pat Boni and S. C. Malik.
style of writing, intellectual thinking and tradition. We have been carrying on different kinds of experiments, and it will be interesting to see what sort of dialogue takes place.”  

The attention to the diverse directions undertaken and to the creativity that grounds this diversity stands out in Daya Krishna’s description. Saṃvāda, as he specifies, primarily means the “collectivity of interactive thinking”. It implies a process of ‘thinking’ that engages a ‘collectivity’ in an ‘inter-relation’, i.e. multiple participants together, in a common effort of reflection on a topic, where ‘together’ includes all willing-participants (not necessarily in terms of a large number, but in terms of a diversity of intellectual traditions, whether cultural or scholarly in terms of a domain of expertise). This togetherness refers to the earlier definition of dialogue in its con-creative aspect (see 1.1.4), with the difference that it does not seem to be conceivable outside the dialogues themselves for Daya Krishna, unlike the phenomenological theories used in the definition of dialogue above (1.1.4). Daya Krishna emphasized on the liveliness of dialogues, as a hermeneutic attitude for reading and questioning texts, but even more, whenever possible, as a ‘real encounter’ with the thinkers themselves, which provokes a ‘shock’ of an actual meeting the Other (see also 7): the embodiment of a complex of ideas, conceptual structures, feelings, personality and expression which, met in its otherness in the encounter rather than in one’s own interpretation in reading, breaks out our own projection on the idea itself:

“This shock of a real encounter with the original is well known, but what is not so well known is the still greater shock that one feels when one meets the thinker himself. There is, on the one hand, the encounter with the person, which, in a sense, puts all that he had said or written far behind and seems somehow strangely irrelevant to the situation.”

This belief, which does not on the other hand presuppose any insufficiency of the texts but emphasizes on the creative act of reading, interpreting and discussing them together, grounds Daya Krishna’s interest for ‘real’, ‘embodied’ encounters and dialogues. Interestingly, Gadamer also evoked the “shock” (Anstoß) although he does it within his hermeneutic research, in his account of question as generated by the experiences “when we are shocked by

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150 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 164–65.
151 Daniel Raveh explored with Daya Krishna’s philosophy what a ‘text as a process’ means, in particular the dialogical reading of a text as an active engagement with the text. Even in his monographs, Daya Krishna indeed does not ‘write alone’ but rather speaks to the texts that he is concerned with. In addition to this, I believe that his dialogues with a text were conducted along with real encounters with others, which were influencing the texts he was writing and the type of questions he was raising. Thus, one does not exclude the other, quite the contrary, which is why I include the encounter with others as a necessary inspiration and source of creation for further engaging in texts. See Daniel Raveh, “Text as a Process: Thinking with Daya Krishna,” Sandhān VII, no. 2 (December 2007): 191–205.
things that do not accord with our expectations”. For Lorenzo Bonoli, who reinterpreted this mention of Anstoß in the anthropological context, the shock becomes the moment of the manifestation of cultural otherness, the apparition of the cultural difference:

“It however appears obvious that this work of linguistic elaboration [to give an anthropological account of the shock] is not an epistemological neutral gesture: it implies a transformation, a construction of the lived experience according to lexical and conceptual tools that our linguistic system provides us with. It is precisely in this work of elaboration that the conditioning linked to our cultural belonging takes place, and that otherness is transformed, from “something that produces a shock” towards something that we can say and understand, and therefore towards something that can be integrated in our symbolic system. It follows that an otherness expressed in our language is already not a ‘true’ otherness anymore, insofar as it is already mediated and belongs straightaway to our conceptual horizon.”

I do not believe that the shock is limited to the cultural aspect of otherness, but it breaks out the common and un-reflected continuous movement of the exchange and lets appear a fissure to reexamine what was presupposed and accepted. The awareness and the burst of consciousness that emerge from this plain encounter with otherness challenge our presupposition and prejudices and allow a ‘fresh start’ on the same idea.

From the development of the shock to the inter-actions characterizing dialogues, a collective ‘thinking’ emerges, expressed and integrated by the participants with their different conceptual backgrounds who meet in a dialogue. The shock is fainting in the mutuality of thinking, so that one of Daya Krishna’s way to retain the ‘freshness’ is to consider thinking as an activity and a process: it cannot be achieved nor definite – it is “subject to revision and counter-revision”, which is how samvāda progresses. In this sense, it has to be distinguished from ‘thought’ as “a product of the activity of thinking”: a thought is an achieved and particular product or result of thinking, which can be exposed in argumentation, systematized in philosophical works, which usually grounds one’s position in a dialogue. Thoughts can be exposed and explained in a structured framework, and publicly presented. In this sense, thoughts compose lectures and conferences and are exposed in debates. However, precisely where conferences and debates are limited to the expositions and the descriptions of these thoughts, dialogues consist in the activity

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157 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 28.
of their inter-active constitution. On the relation between thinking and dialogue, Daya Krishna writes in a letter to Sharad Deshpande:

“‘Thinking’ is not easy, but one can ‘start’ thinking, and if one does, the momentum builds ‘itself’ and then one wonders how one could have lived without getting ‘fresh’ new ideas all the time.

You are thinking. Keep it up, and write as it helps one to think. Also, discuss with friends, colleagues and even students as that too brings new ideas to one’s mind and ‘objections’ one had not thought before.”

‘An explorative activity ‘between’ the participants interested in the togetherness of thinking’, is consequently how I would define the practice of saṃvāda for Daya Krishna.

2.1.2. Saṃvāda as a Manifesto for Creative Indian Philosophies

Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda project constitutes chiefly a response to the needs of Indian philosophy today in India, vis-à-vis Euro-American philosophies and vis-à-vis classical Indian philosophies, in a postcolonial context. The difficulty of defining ‘Indian’ philosophy today - is it the following of classical Indian philosophy, in which case can it be only an exegetical, historical or repetition of earlier doctrines, or is it something else, in English, in Euro-American philosophical categories - in which case, is it still ‘Indian’? These bundles of postcolonial problems in positioning Indian philosophy today are for Daya Krishna summarized in one major challenge for contemporary Indian philosophies: to renew with creativity. This means avoiding on the one hand the historical repetition of the classical, on the other hand the imitation of the ‘Western’, whether the categorical forms inherited from the British colonial time or the sources and methodologies further applied in India, mostly inspired by Anglophone academia. With the following intentions, Daya Krishna developed saṃvāda as a manifesto for contemporary Indian philosophy:

1) He first urges to reanimate ‘Indian philosophies’ in their plurality and interconnection. This implies a strong and perseverant critique of the denomination “classical Indian philosophies” strictly meant as historical presentations, understood as philological objects studied for the sake of unveiling a conceptual brilliant past. His views concur on this point with Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s, one of the most respected and acknowledged Indian philosopher of the colonial period, in the denunciation of a historicizing of Indian philosophies to a certain inanimate classicism:

“The historian here cannot begin his work at all unless he can live in sympathy into the details of an apparently outworn creed and recognise the truth in the first imperfect adumbrations of

159 Daya Krishna, Letter to Sharad Deshpande, 11. 05. 2014. I am thankful to Sharad Deshpande for his authorization to quote this extract.
Daya Krishna left a treasure of letters, which have been by miraculously preserved and scanned by Daniel Raveh and Dor Miller at the Tel Aviv University. I am very much indebted them for sharing these supplementary readings and resources. The dating used is the one given in the manuscripts. Any obvious and unambiguous typing mistake is directly corrected; any equivocal typing mistake is left untouched or with further explanation.
it. The attitude of the mere narrator has, in the case of the historian of philosophy, to be exchanged as far as possible, for that of the sympathetic interpreter. There is the danger, no doubt, of too easily reading one’s philosophic creed into the history, but the opposite danger is more serious still. It is the danger of taking the philosophic type studied as a historic curiosity rather than a recipe for the human soul, and of seeking to explain the curiosity by natural causes instead of seriously examining its merits as philosophy. This unfortunately is sometimes the defect of Western expositions of Eastern philosophy and religion.”

In Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s context, this criticism is directly addressed to colonial Indology, associated to George Thibaut in this Studies in Vedāntism in their scientific application of classification and linguistic operations developed in philology, an approach devoted to ‘past’ cultures. The symmetry brought the same consequences to classical Indian philosophies, including the assumption of them being fixed in a distant past. For sure, the saṃvāda challenges such an approach when arguments from classical Indian philosophies answer modern questions. Daya Krishna’s objective certainly differ from Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, since he does not aim at recognizing the ‘truth’ of Advaita Vedānta, implied in the above quote, but rather contributes in questioning this truth (see the critique addressed by Daya Krishna to K. C. Bhattacharyya in 5 and 7.2). However, like K. C. Bhattacharyya, Daya Krishna argues with the idea of approaching Indian philosophies as “living-fabrics” from the point of view of a “sympathetic interpreter”. Sympathetic interpreter does not contradict philosophical critique in Daya Krishna’s view. He rather encourages vivid critiques in the philosophical responses and comments, however after having read other philosophies as a sympathetic interpreter, granting them the right to be philosophical and the ability to contribute to philosophical knowledge and rational discussions. While concluding his Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards, Daya Krishna comes back to the problem of historiography, and explicitly describes his ‘principles of interpretation’ in close affinity with K. C. Bhattacharyya’s:

“As for the principles of interpretations we have not adopted any ‘new’ ones except that we have been ‘open’ to any and every sign which even faintly suggested that something new and significant was being said by the thinker concerned, or that the extant text contained in it the possibility of a new direction of thought which was only half-explicit in it. This, of course, meant that we not only kept our own intellectual preferences aside but ‘suspended’ even our own considered judgements regarding what was right or wrong in the matter and let the ‘text’ take hold of us as if we ourselves were ‘recreating’ it from within or being led by it in directions which we had not thought of before.

A ‘real’ encounter with texts, is thus, not just a reconstruction of past thought but rather stepping into a living stream where the though currents of the past, both visible and invisible,
carry one into the future as they gently ‘force’ one to move in directions one had not dreamt of before. The encounter with ‘history’ is, thus, not a movement into the past as has generally been thought but rather a movement into the future because one has stepped into the living currents that flow from the past and have sufficient vitality and force in the present to carry one onwards into the future. At least, this is what we have ‘experienced’ and the sensitive reader will find on every page the marks of this living encounter leaving an exciting challenge to carry on the dimly-seen possibility and develop it into directions which are only faintly indicated there.”

The first paragraph further explicates his notion of ‘detached intellect’ (mentioned in 1.1.4) and the second paragraph illustrates the objective of samvāda, i.e. how stepping in traditions which we see as living can propel us into the future, into directions which we could not have else imagined. Samvāda is therefore understood against the historicizing practice of Bhattacharyya’s generation of Indologists, which left traces on the whole study of Sanskrit, not only in Europe where the philological parallel to Greek and Latin remained, but also in India:

“The psyche of even the traditional scholar was transformed and he saw his task as somehow consisting mainly of editing and publishing classical Sanskrit texts by collating different manuscripts and producing standard editions in consonance with the standards set by the West and/or in translating these texts and making them available to the Western-trained intellectual who did not have sufficient command of Sanskrit or hardly knew it all.”

This change of attitude in seeing Sanskrit philosophies as historical objects that had to be preserved in being edited and translated created the idea that it had been lost or forgotten and successively rediscovered, both by foreign Indology scholars and modern Indian scholars writing in English. If Sanskrit philosophies were ‘re-discovered’, it implied a historical rupture, a certain ‘death’, becoming ‘classical’ language and knowledge, “where it [classical knowledge] has become primarily an ‘object’ of understanding and scholarship, having little to do with the active life of the intellect as it is lived and pursued in modern times.”

A last visible difference between K. C. Bhattacharyya’s and Daya Krishna’s views implies a reciprocity duty: in Daya Krishna’s postcolonial time, the critique of inanimate historization is still addressed to Indian studies developed in Western institutions, and in general to the blind parallelism of historiographies of India and Western cultures (and the evaluation of the former by the latter). Moreover, it also addresses pandits themselves when they refuse to engage

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163 Daya Krishna, *Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western*, 343.
165 Daya Krishna, 193.
166 “The interests of western Indological studies combined with the search for a spiritual self-identity in the face of overwhelming western superiority in all fields of knowledge seems to have led to the creation of a certain picture of India’s philosophical past, which has become fixed in the minds of successive generations both in India and abroad, through innumerable text books which render it almost impossible to question the picture or to build another one.” Daya Krishna, *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, no. 310 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006), vii.
167 “Some of these difficulties [to delineate the Indian philosophical entreprise over more than two and a half millennia of its recorded history] arise from the fact that the very entreprise of writing the story of Indian philosophy has been undertaken under the inspiration of the way the histories of Western philosophy have been written and
with academic scholars, lacking interests to be themselves “sympathetic interpreters” of other philosophies, and all subsequent form of “blind”\textsuperscript{168} orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{169} Lamenting the lack of response to his writings, Daya Krishna witnesses the difficulty in making people think anew:

“Yet, what is perhaps still more amazing is the fact that the evidence amassed in these articles has failed to make the slightest dent in the assertions of those who have had the occasion to know a little closely of their contents. (…) Occasionally, there have been some responses, even attempts at rebuttal, but generally of the most perfunctory kind. In a recent seminar devoted to a discussion of my thought, five papers were presented on what I have written on Indian philosophy. But, except for the paper by Prof. J. N. Mohanty, no one even tried to come to grips with the central conclusions of my papers or the arguments and the evidence presented therein. Karl H. Potter is the only exception, but his response to my detailed critique of the reply he made earlier is so tangential that one begins to wonder if any serious discussion can be held about issues in Indian philosophy with scholars in the field. The response of traditional pandits has been no different, though as many of them do not know English, they can hardly be blamed for not doing so. But even when a shorter version of the article entitled ‘The Vedic Corpus: Some Questions’ was presented in Sanskrit to a gathering of the most outstanding Mimāṃsā scholars at Tirupati, not a single person said anything. Some of the most eminent Nyāya pandits failed to see any problems posed by the text of the Nyāyasūtroddhāra or by the fact that some of the sutras have not only variant readings, but contradictory ones in different versions of the text as given by different authorities.”\textsuperscript{170}

If the idea defended here by Daya Krishna and Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya seems self-evident, the fact is that ninety years after the former’s introduction to \textit{Studies in Vedāntism}, the methodology used to approach classical Indian philosophies remains largely untouched, the prejudices of its belonging to the past are still holding, and the contact between these different spheres remains scarce. This shows the necessity to formulate the issues clearly and develop alternative dialogical frameworks.

The question is therefore how to contemporize the conception of classical Indian philosophies, and how to renew our philosophical approaches towards them. This frames the \textit{samvāda} project, or in Daya Krishna’s preface to the first published \textit{samvāda} (Rege experiment), “to think of ways and means of revitalizeing the Indian philosophical tradition”.\textsuperscript{171} This interrogation encompasses different implications. Concretely, it entails including and putting back the learned and ‘traditional’ scholars (\textit{paṇḍīts}, \textit{ulama}, etc.) at the centre of the dialogues to question and discuss contemporary issues.\textsuperscript{172} For Daya Krishna and M. P. Rege, this is necessary for the

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\item Daya Krishna, \textit{New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy} (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2001), 4.
\item Daya Krishna, \textit{Indian Philosophy}, 1997, 104.
\item Daya Krishna, \textit{Indian Philosophy}, 2006, p.viii-ix.
\item Daya Krishna et al., \textit{Samvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions}, xii.
\item “Also, if classical Indian philosophical thought was really vibrant and alive at one time and had the strength in it, even in contemporary times, to respond critically and creatively to philosophical issues in contemporary philosophy then why should it not be capable of independent growth and development on its own, even in modern times? Anything that is alive must be capable of modification, growth and development along new lines - a
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future of Indian philosophy for the following reasons: regarded by Western-trained scholars, pāṇḍīts are seen simply as those who conserve and preserve the Sanskrit cultural patrimony. This includes an implicit exclusion from the philosophical discourse, since it means that Sanskrit philosophy is ‘dead’ in the same sense as Latin and Greek philosophies, namely further explained but not lively developed by philosophers belonging to these traditions. It becomes a source of historical interest. This perspective projected by those who already stepped outside the Sanskrit traditions is for Daya Krishna and M. P. Rege wrong and must be addressed. Secondly, the shift of medium in doing Indian philosophy from Sanskrit to English “affects the message”:

“The basic terms in which he [a western-trained scholar] articulates his understanding of Indian doctrines inevitably remain western, terms which have originated and crystallized in the course of the development of the western philosophical tradition and the broader cognitive tradition, in the debates and controversies, discoveries and criticism which propelled it. (…) The act of transfer carries with an implicit criterion of evaluation.”

This postcolonial affection of philosophy, the incapacity of relating to traditions in the languages and cultural forms in which they were prior to colonization, cannot be denied in India. However, for Daya Krishna pāṇḍīts play a determining role for the future of philosophy since they were less affected or differently influenced by these new media and instructions. Thus, even if the forms and contents of their philosophizing has changed, these changes happened often parallely to the ones of English-speaking academia of which they remained (willingly or not) outsiders. Rather than excluding them to the pre-modern sphere, the inner hybrid creativity of postcolonial India originates from a dialogue with them. Finally, their methods of doing philosophy is for Daya Krishna of particular interest, namely the samvāda itself, the rhetorical tradition into which they are trained. Pāṇḍīts therefore possess for Daya Krishna the ability to be thinkers and philosophers today (neglected as such), the resources to be creative, able to rearticulate counterpositions of postcolonial India from the traditions, and master another method for philosophizing: samvāda. It is in those qualities that Daya Krishna tried to involve them in a dialogue with Western-trained Indian philosophers. This, however, faces different obstacles, both to locate pāṇḍīts who are not part of the academic system, in breaking prejudices and indifference from both sides, in rendering dialogues at least bilingual and in formulating questions and hypotheses in languages that are understandable to both sides. The art of samvāda consists in bringing enough closeness for communication in these two separated world.

It first implies a recognition from the side of Indian academics from where these scholars have been excluded, or from where they chose to withdraw, and to “take them seriously”. What does
that mean precisely? To credit them with the certainty that they are able to answer, as representative of their traditions, contemporary and cross-cultural philosophical questions (rather than exegetically or historically repeating their positions) in the language they choose to express themselves. Even more: that they are able to answer more creatively in entering in dialogue with their western-trained counterparts than the latter alone, using a different set of apparatus to the already available analyses responding to modernity. In Garfield’s words, “taking seriously the standpoint and hermeneutic method of one’s interlocutor as well as his/her ideas themselves, and taking seriously one’s own tradition not as a lens through which to view another’s, but also as specimen under one’s colleague’s lens at particular moments in the dialectic”\(^{175}\), is the condition of “possibility of conversation”. As such, it grounds the possibility for enlarging the “scholarly community”, he reports, as well as the “range of texts and resources on which it can draw”, which again is a condition for “a greater philosophical depth and rate of progress”. In other terms, it determines the future possibility of fusion of horizons for Garfield.

Contemporizing Indian philosophies signifies for Daya Krishna challenging received “pictures” for alternative “narratives”\(^{176}\); while a “picture once built is difficult to dismantle”\(^{177}\), in other words, static and strongly printed in our conceptions, “alternative narratives” have the potential to present more complex, variegated and interrelational developments of concepts.\(^{178}\) One of


\(^{176}\) In general concerning the consequences of created ‘pictures’ in history, see Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations; Daya Krishna, Civilizations: Nostalgia and Utopia (Shimla : Los Angeles: Indian Institute of Advanced Study; SAGE, 2012); Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western. (in particular the conclusion of the latter). Daya Krishna investigates before all the consequences of unconsciously constructing a certain picture of a period, which, although based on evidences, does not question the principles of interpretation and selection on which the picture is created. This leads, within philosophy, to simplification and fixation of some received ideas, which are denounced by Daya Krishna as ‘myth’. See Daya Krishna, “Three Myths about Indian Philosophy,” in Indian Philosophy. A Counter Perspective, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, no. 310 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006), 18–37; Daya Krishna, “Three Conceptions of Indian Philosophy,” in Indian Philosophy. A Counter Perspective, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, no. 310 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006), 38–65; Daya Krishna, “Indian Philosophy and Moksha: Revisiting an Old Controversy,” in Indian Philosophy. A Counter Perspective, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, no. 310 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006), 66–102. (see 6.1 for the same issue regarding puruṣārtha, the hierarchy of which raises problems concerning the fixity of such pictures).

\(^{177}\) Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy, 5.

\(^{178}\) Federico Squarcini further comments on the relation between the staticity of the narrative and the isolation of the tradition as follows: “The South Asian intellectual panorama has been portrayed for centuries as a consistent and impervious monolith, easily framed – according to this received opinion – by a few epitomizing effigies, such as the so-called Indian mysticism (twin of the ‘Asian irrationalism’) , the static tradition of India and its perennial philosophy (which nicely matches its ‘soteriological wisdom’), all invariably understood as universally fitting notions. This common view gained significant ground after the beginning of the eighteenth century, although some of its roots can be traced back to the endeavour of leading figures in South Asian thought, even prior to colonization, to establish a unified ‘cultural’ canon. Having proved itself to be an effective apologetic and propagandistic tool, it has continued its career until today in the context of the activism of representatives of so-called Neo-Hinduism. It found fertile ground because it has been reinforced by some classical models of approach to South Asian thought which have been classified by Amartya Sen into “magisterial, exoticist [and] curatorial”. (…) No matter how we may perceive it, there is no doubt that this static representation of the intellectual world of South Asia is to be held responsible for the growing isolation of the different philosophical traditions and the fracture in their dialogue, as well as for the increasing refusal on the part of philosophers to build an environment of shared beliefs and to welcome the variegated realities of world-wide philosophical practice.” Federico
the relevant challenges for *saṃvāda* concerns the picture of Indian philosophy as consisting of isolated and stagnating Indian schools. This preconceived idea predominating the understanding of classical Indian philosophies delimits classical Indian philosophies into orthodox and heterodox schools, which seem to be systematized in separated units, presenting substantialized philosophies. This reading of ‘Indian philosophy’ reduced the subject matter to a somewhat simplistic view, categorizing classical Indian philosophy in a systematic manner between orthodox and heterodox schools, divided into six orthodox schools and a few heterodox such as Jain, Buddhist, Cārvāka. The frozenness of such classification, and in general the denunciation of received ideas of (Indian) philosophies have constituted the central target of Daya Krishna’s philosophy. In a famous article entitled ‘Three Myths About Indian Philosophy’, he tackles the misconceptions (that he calls ‘myth’) of Indian philosophy being ‘spiritual’, the authority of the Vedas (and the following division between ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ schools with regard to the acceptance or rejection of the former), and the fixed division into ‘schools’. About the latter, he states that

“There is no such thing as final, frozen positions which the term ‘school’, in the context of Indian philosophy, usually connotes. If ‘schools’ change, develop, differentiate and divide, then they are never closed, finished or final with respect to what they are trying to say. There could, then, be no fixed, body of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Saṅkhya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Buddhist, Jain or Cārvāka positions except in a minimal sense. These would, on the other hand, rather be styles of thought which are developed by successive thinkers, and not fully exemplified by any.”

Thus, he laments the fact that “however, the traditional presentation of the schools of Indian philosophy is hardly ever along these lines. They are treated as something finished and final”. The solution lies for him in denouncing these myths in order to allow for a “new or fresh look” at Indian philosophy. The realization of this fresh look takes shape in the dialogical project that Daya Krishna undertook with traditional Indian philosophers, when the “dead, mummified picture of Indian philosophy (…) [comes] alive only when it is seen to be a living stream of thinkers who have grappled with difficult problems that are, philosophically, as alive today as they were in the ancient past”, which constitutes his conclusive remarks on the topic, as well as the leitmotif motivating his dialogical project. This classification that Daya Krishna criticizes excludes any consideration regarding the development of these schools on a long-time period, the individual contribution made by remarkable philosophers deviating from the tradition, or defining newly the tradition, as well as the interconnection between them all in


179 Daya Krishna, *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*, 5–6.
182 Daya Krishna, 33.
183 Daya Krishna, 34.
184 Daya Krishna, 36.
185 Daya Krishna, 36.
the form of debates. This form of philosophizing, namely of constituting philosophical traditions in debates, defining evolutions and positions, captures the attention of Daya Krishna. It does so for its lively conceptual form but also for the sophisticated rationality and rhetoric devices developed in such debates, against the religious prejudices applied to Indian philosophies. As he summarized the refinement of philosophical debates:

“The great debate between the Buddhists and the Nayāyikas, starting from Dignāga in the fifth century C.E. and ending sometime around eleventh century C.E. is evidence of this [sophisticated debates]. (...) After the disappearance of the Buddhists from the Indian scene, there was the great debate between the Advaitin and the non-Advaitin whose last great representatives were Vyasatirtha on the side of the latter and Madhusudan Saraswati, on the side of the former. Along with this were the radical and revolutionary developments in Nyāya after Gangeśa from the twelfth century which lasted until the seventeenth century, a period of almost 500 years in which there were at least thirty-six thinkers whose names are known and who, by their works, contributed to the development and refinement of logical thought in Indian development that set new norms for intellectual precision such that no study remained unaffected by it.”

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The renewal of Daya Krishna is also a coming back to the form of classical debates into the contemporary set, and the expression *samvāda* in his project should be understood as an attempt to explore the forgotten creativity and dynamism of Indian philosophies to be engaged again today. For this creativity and dynamism to arise again, rather than focusing on belonging to a certain school and asserting the position of a given school against another, *samvāda* appears as a powerful instrument. In this sense, it means a dialogue between philosophers, influenced by certain traditions but nevertheless able to generate individual insights and to detach themselves from a sense of belonging to their particular tradition. This is one concrete sense for understanding the creativity and dynamism of knowledge that is philosophically investigated in chapters 4 to 7 as the outcome of dialogues.

2) This renewal therefore signifies to connect different traditions *with each other*. On the other hand, it does not suggest excluding any foreign philosophy. American philosophers participated closely in the dialogues, and a majority of Indian philosophers in Indian academics are *de facto* steeped in American and European philosophies, from the very beginning of their education (including Daya Krishna). Conceived as a reaction against their monopoly, the *samvāda* project calls for reviving the plurality of philosophies in India from different cultural, religious and historical origins. *Samvāda* consist therefore in connecting traditions and exploring concepts and topics from different perspectives, which excludes a philosophical practice in different languages (Daya Krishna was also a frequent Hindi writing philosopher). From a ‘pluri-traditional’ approach, one also “moves a little bit further” to a pluri-disciplinary one: Daya Krishna also tried to articulate traditional theoretical knowledge, such as architecture as he mentions above, with contemporary practical form, i.e. not only scholars in aesthetics, but also professionals in these fields (architects). These attempts, however variegated they could be, pursue the same objective of diversification of the exploration:

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“But, normally within a cognitive culture even different disciplines share a certain way at looking at things or certain ways of asking questions or seeing something as problematic. It is, therefore, only when one undertakes a conceptual journey to another cognitive culture that one really encounters a different world – a world which, because of its different conceptual framework, appears to be no cognitive world at all. It can only be seen as something bizarre, something superstitious, something that one need not waste one’s time upon. In the arts, one has already learned or is slowly learning the perverse parochiality of such an attitude. In religion, one is growing towards an awareness where one may accept, even provisionally, the meaningfulness of other religions, at least for them if not for oneself. But as far as cognitive entreprise is concerned, the very idea that there may be different cognitive traditions seems perverse to most of its practitioners today. And this, in spite of current fashions in model-building on the one hand and what goes under the name of sociology of knowledge, on the other.”

Daya Krishna conceived *samvāda* as conceptual journeys that could be accomplished only with travel companions from different ‘countries’ and it is under the metaphor of traveling that one can grasp the nature of the project: tentative, explorative and questioning. Like in travel literature, one can observe a transformation from perceiving the other from one’s perspective to slowly and gradually entering into the Other’s world and fuse with him. The tension between the differences seen from one’s own perspectives - which allows for questioning the difference between what is known and what appears as new and different - and the transformation of one’s own in the encounter is perceivable in Daya Krishna’s own journey through the dialogues.

Surely, Daya Krishna is not the only one to argue for the relevance of Indian philosophies (classical, modern and contemporary) in philosophy in general as resources able to contribute to thinking by bringing distinct perspectives that enrich the global conversation. B. K. Matilal’s, pioneer of comparative philosophy between Indian and Western (before all Nyāya and analytical philosophy), argued earlier for the creativity of cross-cultural philosophy, as Mohanty reminds us of:

“Matilal would insist that in spite of the similarities he was so good at bringing out, Indian philosophers did not ask many of the questions which Western philosophers asked, and vice versa. If we keep all such possibilities of questioning in mind, then “the study of Indian philosophy is not simply necessary from a cross-cultural point of view, or from the viewpoint of understanding the ‘Indian Mind’ (if there is such a thing), but that it is most urgently needed for increasing creativity and comprehensiveness in the philosophic endeavours of modern professional philosophers.” In other words, Indian philosophy could contribute to the formation of a global philosophy, not in the sense of a philosophical theory acceptable to all (for that would not be philosophical), not in the sense of a common project to which all different traditions can contribute, but as a common discourse in which they can participate - in other words, a conversation of [hu]mankind (not a conversation of the West or the East by itself).”


Such a definition of a conversation contributing to clarifying philosophical issues in a creative way and raising new questions that are made possible by the cross-cultural analyses themselves, beyond the Eastern-Western dichotomy, would qualify the ideal of Daya Krishna’s project. In general, what connects these different “experiments” is the interconnection between apparently universal questions and variegated cultural perspectives and answers, and the assumption that only their collective contributions can create novelty in philosophy. In a way, Lévinas’ analysis on Buber also epitomizes Daya Krishna’s enterprise applied to a different culture – substitute Buber for Daya Krishna, Judaism/Jewish for Indian, and maybe the Council Fathers for Euro-American philosophers and philosophers in India trained solely in these Western traditions:

“Buber approached post-Christian Judaism as a lively civilization of an admirable maturity, and he established it as a fully-fledged partner to the symposium of the Occident. Because through the Jewish civilization, he was speaking only about universal questions. (…) And that is no doubt the indelible mark left by Buber’s passage, who reminded the Council Fathers (…), that this antique wisdom learned the modern languages and is ready, if one is willing to, for dialogue.”

Whether Daya Krishna would agree on the “antiquity” of the wisdom is unsure, or maybe at the condition that the modern languages also get translated into the antique categories, for a mutual exploration and enlightenment-clarification (éclaircissements in Serres’ words) of different traditions. One thing however distinguishes both ‘dialogists’: Daya Krishna, having engaged with philosophies who have a certain spiritual, if not religious origin, remained a strong secular philosopher, which motivates also his project. He chose to communicate with any representative of any spiritual movement and to philosophically explore their traditions without their faith, thereby without asking them to withdraw from it, but as a questioner.

Convinced of the potential creativity of the togetherness in thinking and of the potential creativity of traditional philosophers in answering contemporary questions, Daya Krishna’s samvāda project is in its outline grounded in a critique of historicizing Indian philosophies (thereby rendering them unactual) and the classification into separated and fixed schools. In emphasizing the interrelation and contemporariness via a classical dialectical tool of debates, samvāda responds to the difficulties of Indian philosophies in academia during his time, in particular to the separation between different philosophical traditions and their lack of communication.

190 My translation. Original text: “Buber aborda le Judaïsme post-chrétien comme civilisation vivante d’une maturité admirable et l’installa comme partenaire à part entière au symposium de l’Occident. Car à travers la civilisation juive, il ne parlait que de questions universelles. (…) Et c’est sans doute la marque indélébile laissée par le passage de Buber qui rappela aux pères conciliaires (…) que cette antique sagesse a appris les langues modernes et est prête, si on le veut, au dialogue.” Emmanuel Lévinas, Hors sujet (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1997), 17.
2.2. Origins and Motivations of the Saṃvāda Project

After a first conceptual outline of what saṃvāda means for Daya Krishna and what the saṃvāda experiments were challenging, I now turn to a contextual exploration of this project. While the idea retains the initial spirit of debates in Sanskrit traditions, its practice answers contemporary postcolonial stakes and the needs of Indian academics today. What does this concretely entail, how is this “contemporariness” manifested in the experiments? I will examine three levels: the intellectual environment that prompted the organization of dialogues, the lived-relation between Daya Krishna and the saṃvāda, and his inspirations by immediate precursors.

2.2.1. Saṃvāda as a Reaction. Being Located in an Intellectual Context. Between Over-Presence’ (of the West) and Absence (of India)

2.2.1.1. The Cosmopolitan “Renaissance” and the Anguish of its Experience

Daya Krishna was aware of the context of writing – political\textsuperscript{191}, sociological\textsuperscript{192} and historical\textsuperscript{193} – and, while tending to explore transcontextual concepts and universal questions, he located creativity in the variation of interpretations, answers and ways of questioning in different traditions. This is what he saw as novelty - not \textit{ex nihilo} but as a conscious investigation of philosophical alternatives and creative questions emerging from such a confrontation. In so doing, he was not only influenced and reacting to a certain situation, but very consciously exploring its possibilities and questioning its limits. Among what shapes the impetus for saṃvāda are the vivid difficulties of contextualizing Indian ‘philosophies’ at a postcolonial time, and the wide disagreement of conceptual contents presupposed under this denomination. The problem can be summarized in the distressing and recurring questions raised by the philosophers of these times: \textit{what is ‘Indian’ philosophy and who is an ‘Indian’ philosopher?} This debate focused first on the definition of Indian philosophy (vis-à-vis the West), and secondly (vis-à-vis India) on the authenticity of Indian philosophy, namely ‘what is ‘Indian’ in

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{191} Although Daya Krishna has been throughout his life interested into political aspects of philosophy, political writings are mostly part of his earlier writings. Daya Krishna, \textit{Planning, Power and Welfare} (New Delhi: The Office for Asian Affairs, Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1959); Daya Krishna, “Political Thought in the US,” \textit{Quest} 78 (October 1972): 35-40.; Daya Krishna, \textit{Political Development: A Critical Perspective}. (Bombay - Calcutta - Madras: Oxford University Press, 1979).
  \item\textsuperscript{193} On the contrary, although history is related to society and politics and present in his early works, it is rather in the later period, under the forms of historiography, critique of antiquarian historicism and studies in the histories of Indian philosophy, that Daya Krishna contributes the most to history, as philosophy of history and history of philosophy. Daya Krishna, \textit{Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations}; Daya Krishna, \textit{Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, History of Science, Philosophy, and Culture in Indian Civilization}, pt. 1 (New Delhi: Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy, and Culture : Centre for Studies in Civilizations : Distributed by Motilal Banarsidass, 2002).
\end{itemize}
(contemporary) Indian philosophy and in philosophy made in India. Furthermore, this debate appears to me as the counter-part of the debate on Otherness and Eurocentrism raised in the earlier section, namely counter-perspective from the colonized perspective, responding to ‘Otherness’ by ‘Alienation’ and Eurocentrism by the monopoly of Western Indian academics. It is thus rhetorically fair to address critique of this context in response to the critiques elaborated above.

These two questions regarding the identity of Indian philosophy and the Indianness of Indian philosophers are insolvable and yet sustained interrogations. They cover a further web of subsequent questions: how to articulate the pluralities of Indian philosophies in the Western classifications, how to compare and contrast Indian philosophies with Western philosophies (while retaining the internal diversities of both)? Is there something fundamentally ‘Indian’ in Indian philosophies? In a postcolonial world, who is still an ‘Indian philosopher’, and what can that even mean in such a context? On the other hand, could all philosophers in Indian academics not be ‘Indian’? What does it actually presuppose to be an ‘Indian philosopher’? Which identity concept is included in this attribute? And if J. N. Mohanty is right when he states that

“One who is asking “What is Indian philosophy? What is ‘Indian’ about it?” has already situated himself outside of that tradition which we call ‘Indian’. None of the philosopher who shaped that tradition, and with those writings we are acquainted, ever asked such a question. They lived and thought within that tradition, which today we are, by the very questions we are asking, thematizing. In that very act of thematizing, a rupture has taken place.”

then which kind of rupture has taken place, and which consequences did it bring for philosophical thinking in India? If we concede that when asking ‘what is Indian philosophy?’, we are already located outside this tradition, then how to define this ‘tradition’ of asking ‘what

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194 At a general level, these concerns are not limited to India but constitute what connect postcolonial studies (conceived broadly). In an introduction written for the UNESCO on ‘Teaching and research in philosophy: Asia and the Pacific’, Daya Krishna relates the different country reports (including Australia, Bangladesh, China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, the USSR Central Asia and Viet Nam) from the perspective of these persisting questions. He writes: “The diversity of groupings on the basis of these different criteria underlines the difficulties that are bound to be encountered in any serious consideration of the situation of philosophy in these countries and suggests the need for sensitivity to the different identities of the countries from which these reports have been received. It should be noted, however, that the differences relate mostly to the past of these countries. As far as the present is concerned, they share a common situation that derives from the world situation in which each of them exists at the present time. All of these countries face, in a sense, the same dilemma: what to do with their past which makes them what they are and gives them a distinctive identity of their own and yet with which they cannot remain satisfied for the simple reason that if they have to live in the modern world, they have to come to terms with contemporary standards, determined primarily by what goes on in Europe or the United States in these domains.” Daya Krishna, “Overview of Country Reports,” in Teaching and Research in Philosophy: Asia and the Pacific (Paris: UNESCO, 1986), 3–4.


is Indian philosophy’ in India (since this question characterizes a large part of post-independence philosophy in India)? If it does not belong to the Indian tradition anymore, then where does it belong to? Considering the fact that ‘India’ as a concept (including its geographical borders but also its idea as cultural identity) arises with its independence, the idea of Indian philosophies can only come along with paradoxes. On the one hand, its definition seems to constitute an inescapable postcolonial necessity, i.e. to give an essence to such a sudden identity. On the other hand, it follows out of this conceptual rupture that as postcolonial identities, the idea of Indian philosophies is not fit to integrate the representations of ‘classical’ Indian philosophies which fall out of such representations. Consequently, how would this ‘new’ tradition relate to ‘The’ Indian tradition? What is first of all ‘that tradition which we call ‘Indian’’? And lastly, are not these questions turning into an infinite regress, and if they are, then how to overcome it?

I believe that Daya Krishna suggests tentative responses to these questions in taking in consideration the three following aspects, which form the ground of the samvāda project: a) the monopoly of the ‘West’ of Indian academics, as described above, manifested in the Indian scholars’ “blindness” for the philosophical production and recognition in the West (usually limited to its Anglophone parts); b) parallelly, an exclusion of traditional scholars (non-Anglophone) from Indian academics, leading to a gap between them and the first group, trained in Western philosophy in English. It is to be noted that this exclusion can be voluntary, originating from these scholars themselves. c) the question of identity of contemporary Indian philosophy, along with the search for a ‘contemporary’ Indian philosophy with the ‘classical’ heritage, which is the formal formulation of a lack of connection between a) and b), the modern English-speaking and the traditional Sanskrit-speaking scholars.

What this set of questions expresses for an Indian intellectual is the oppressing attraction of a somewhat undefined ‘West’ constructed as a center and reference around which he has to locate himself (as a periphery). The hierarchical gravitational structure is emphasized in philosophy. As highlighted by Daya Krishna in the same article, the case is quite different for the Arts and religion, where the recognition of plural cultural traditions is less a problem, or in general in domains that do not approach the “rationality” and “scientific” paradigm, this one being predominantly Eurocentric. It is thus not the case that cosmolopolitanism and hybridity are not valued at all, or that cross-culturalty is never seen as creative. However, in the fields in which the criteria of evaluation are accepted to be those of the ‘West’, such as philosophy, the integration of other criteria raises much more difficulties. On the other hand, as Daya Krishna suggests, in other fields where Indians consider themselves to be the ‘center’ (due to the “frozen pictures” above mentioned in 2.1.2) such as spirituality, the same hierarchy operates in

197 “Only in the cognitive domain can a strict claim be made for objectivity and universality. In the field of arts and spirituality, diversity is the heart of the matter. Plurality is not merely encouraged but valued. A person who repeats what the master did is no artist at all. And even in the realm of philosophy if one only repeats what the masters did or the great thinkers said, one is no philosopher. (…) Now, if we see the cognitive enterprises in this way, there can be no such things as fixed centres for all times.” Daya Krishna, “Encounters between Civilizations: The Question of the Centre and the Periphery,” *Quest*, no. 125 (1997): 268.
reverse. This hierarchy creates an evaluative structure where references are universally classified, so that

“no western intellectual ever feels ‘embarrassed’ about not ‘knowing’ about any thinker, any intellectual of the non-western world, however great he may be [like K. C. Bhattacharya]; while on the other hand, people in the non-western world are always ‘embarrassed’ if someone points out their ignorance of a second-rate thinker of the western world. This is because we have accepted the notion of a centre and the periphery in our souls, in our minds.”

Philosophy in India was during the colonial period intensively exposed to an international dimension, and thus the problem cannot be how to proceed interculturally or transculturally, how to develop hybridity nor how to reach cultural otherness, which are the predominating concerns in intercultural European philosophy (see 0). In this perspective, Indian philosophies seem already equipped, and yet, Indian philosophers became even more anxious about this interculturality than their European counterparts. This anxiety persists until today and is commonly symptomatized in the English-medium monopoly, which became the epitome of the alien interpenetration of indigenous thinking. This alien absorption in the own, or rather the feeling of a loss of the own, or an ignorance of what the ‘own’ should even consist in, is famously described in the ‘colonial subjection’ witnessed by K. C. Bhattacharyya in his speech (1929), which I believe, constitutes a turn in the history of Anglophone academic Indian philosophy, regarding its reception and its impact. The colonial subjection exposed there is defined as the inner alienation of the one who feels forced to conceptualize and think only in a foreign language. He further declares:

“Our education has not so far helped us to understand ourselves, to understand the significance of our past, the realities of our present and our mission of the future. It has tended to drive our real mind into the unconscious and to replace it by a shadow mind that has no roots in our past and in our real present. (…) The result is that there is a confusion between the two minds and

198 “Supposing I ask each one of you what great, spiritual personality has been produced in West in the last four hundred years? Can you give me a name? You are not embarrassed about not knowing it, because you are quite confident that the norms and the standards for judging what a spiritual personality consists in are located in our own tradition. (…) Is it not amazing that India has creativity in certain fields where it does not look outside for recognition? Take music, for example. This is the city where Amir Khan, a great vocalist, an innovator, and a master died in an accident. Did we ever go to the West to discover whether Amir Khan was a great singer or not? Does anybody go and ask for the western recognition of Kelucharan Mahapatra, the great dancer?” Daya Krishna, 267.

199 Daya Krishna, 265.

200 Following the argumentation of Bhushan and Garfield, themselves relying on Ganeri, Shulman, Alam and Subrahmanymam and Kinra: “In pre-British India there was no sense that Indian philosophy was ‘pure’ of foreign influences. The dichotomy of deśi/vidéśi did not structure Indian thought about philosophy in the pre-British period, and the predicaments that so vexed colonial Indian philosophers could hence not be framed. These predicaments, however, (…) erupt with considerable force in the colonial period. Why? We propose that this is not because of a radical first-order discontinuity between the precolonial and colonial intellectual worlds, but rather because of the establishment of a specific metanarrative of Indian intellectual history, one grounded in a fantasy of purity and authenticity co-constituted by European orientalists and Indian nationalists, each for their own reasons.” Bhushan and Garfield, Minds without Fear, 37.

201 “There is cultural subjection only when one’s traditional cast of ideas and sentiments is superseded without comparison or competition by a new cast representing an alien culture which possesses one like a ghost. This subjection is slavery of the spirit.” Bhattacharyya, “Svaraj in Ideas,” 383.
a hopeless Babel in the world of ideas. Our thought is hybrid through and through and inevitably sterile. Slavery has entered into our very soul.”

The domination of teaching of Western philosophy in Indian Universities and the (almost) exclusive use of English as an academic language have been the focus of the colonial denunciation in academics. It constitutes a complex focus, however, because in this symptom are assembled different causes of the problem. First, the monopoly of English exemplifies the social hierarchy at stake in the academic structure in terms of normative centre-periphery relations that it creates. In so doing, its monopoly discriminates non-English speaking scholars. Daya Krishna exposes the very concrete consequences of the colonial hierarchy operated in Universities:

“Thus, three different streams of education existed in the British period from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The first, and most visible consisted of those who were the direct products of the British system of education in the country. The second, consisted of those who were the products of the new institutions of traditional learning created by the British to maintain and foster traditional forms of learning and Sanskritic studies on the one hand and Arabic-Persian on the other. The third, consisted of those who were the products of traditional institutions which survived the British institutional innovations and were primarily maintained and fostered by non-governmental patronage in British India and by a princely patronage in princely India. There was a certain overlap between the last two as they taught the same kind of texts and courses, though there was a distinct difference in the method of teaching and the way in which examinations were conducted. There was also, a difference in the status of the persons belonging to these two streams, at least in British India, as those working in the British-sponsored institutions had better financial support than the ones patronized by non-governmental agencies. In fact, there was great discrimination in even the salary scales between the institutions of traditional learning fostered by the British and those which gave a western type of education in the newly-created seats of learning. This deliberate policy of segregation and financial discrimination in the salaries given to the teachers belonging to these two different types of institutions had a deep and lasting influence on the intellectual scene in India during the one and a half century of British influence in the field of education. The whole world of classical knowledge and those who pursued and practiced it became gradually invisible to those who came out of the new institutions modelled on the British pattern and thus produced an intellectual environment which was only aware of the western traditions in knowledge as its reference point and treated India’s traditional intellectual enterprises either as having had no value at all or as having been completely superseded by the developments of knowledge that had taken place in the West and were, therefore, completely irrelevant to the contemporary quest for knowledge.”

The postcolonial implications of Daya Krishna’s saṃvāda project become self-evident as a reaction to the context so described, as a rehabilitation and reintegration of the pāṇḍītas as reliable and creative sources of Sanskrit-speaking knowledge in the research and teaching environment; and thus, the saṃvādas “had to be bilingual”. It is furthermore directed against the presumed ‘single centre’ of knowledge in the picture inherited from the colonization and integrated by these institutions: there are different centres and peripheries, as well as different

202 Bhattacharyya, 387.
203 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 309–10.
204 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xxvii.
others and ways to relate to them. Thus, while the most visible thinkers produced by the British system of education adopted the Western standards as their centre, the sanvāda project was an opportunity to realize that other institutions had their own standards. It reveals that Westernized philosophers are as much an other to Sanskrit philosophers as they are to philosophers abroad, and that philosophers abroad are also an other to Sanskrit philosophers. While the dialogue with Europe had been existing since several centuries, introducing together different interlocutors within India allowed to change the perspective, and consequently to relativize the idea of a unique centre in philosophy.

Why, however, does this earlier social discrimination still pervade Indian academics today? The hierarchy remained not only as a social establishment, but in terms of cultural subjection in the common evaluation of English over Sanskrit or English over Hindi, and the idea of superiority instigated in the independent minds of Indian academia. The situation of the vernaculars might even be more preoccupying in the philosophical scene, and Daya Krishna himself did not seem to be able to remedy the lack of attention brought to it.205 In spite of his encouragements and (isolated) initiatives, Sheldon Pollock’s urgent warning remains true and also applies to Daya Krishna’s experiments:

“At the time of Independence, and for some two millennia before that, India was graced by the presence of scholars whose historical and philological expertise made them the peer of any in the world. They produced editions and literary and historical studies of texts in Kannada, Malayalam, Tamil, and Telugu — and in Apabhramsha, Assamese, Bangla, Brajghasha, Gujarati, Marathi, Oriya, Persian, Prakrit, Sanskrit, Urdu — that we still use today. In fact, in many cases their works have not been replaced. This is not because they are irreplaceable — it is in the nature of scholarship that later knowledge should supersede earlier. They have not been replaced because there is no one to replace them. Two generations of Indian students have been lost to the study of classical Indian languages and literatures, in part due to powerful economic forces no doubt, but in part due to sheer neglect. The situation is dire.”

The asymmetry between Sanskrit and vernaculars - or maybe the hegemony - in the reception of South Asian Studies is clear. The monopoly of English over all these languages is flagrant.

English was both propagated as a superior language and as radically different: using it necessarily implied excluding oneself from one’s vernacular tradition, which could only bring successively contempt for those who did not join the superior modern paradigm contained in English. At the same time, the identity problem was also bound to arise, for English-speaking Indians, if radically different, were still not British, and yet remained undefined. This vague indeterminateness was then specified as a felt ‘inauthenticity’, namely a lack of traceable origins, an uncomfortable ‘in-betweenness’. Thus, the monopoly and instilled idea of superiority of English does not suppress all other languages, it only classifies them

205 Daya Krishna was committed to teaching in Hindi, as will be explained below, and did publish in this language. The Bhakti dialogue in its published version also contains only Hindi and English (Sanskrit portions have been excluded from the proceedings). There are also reports of dialogues using Urdu, an invitation letter published by Khawaja testifies of it Mayaram, Philosophy as Samvāda and Svarāj, 114–15.

hierarchically. Intellectuals did not simply erase their vernacular, but felt Janus-faced, divided between multilingual every-day life and English intellectual life, which according to G. C. Pande, “tends stifle originality by interposing a psychological barrier between the language of learning and the language of every-day life.” Beyond the psychological ambivalence and alienation of evolving in two radically distinguished worlds, it also damages the creative potentiality of thinking, disconnecting the intellectual from a reservoir of images and concepts. G. C. Pande adds: “Concepts and images are like magical sluices through which the material of practical experience passes into thought and attains a new birth into an almost autonomous-looking world.”

This divide in the adequate linguistic spheres of life of these thinkers had another problematic effect: it parallelly divided Indian philosophy and Western philosophy on the same bases of “relevance”, “modernity”, “scientificity”, etc. Language and philosophy concorded, which brought another set of anxiety, following Macaulay’s Minute, found in an intellectual such as S. S. Barlingay:

“In 1835, Lord Macaulay introduced a new education policy in India [the English medium] (...) This was the beginning of colonization (...) But it separated us (Indians) from our umbilical cord, from our moorings. It alienated the educated from the Indian culture. Those who learnt English were isolated from their past history, from their attainments. The philosophy of Indian origin naturally had a setback. Those who opted for English education could not study Indian philosophy at all.”


This disconnection originates furthermore in academia (of Indian and postcolonial societies in general) from the contrast made between ‘philosophy’ in the wider sense, closer to traditional forms, and philosophy in the narrower sense elaborated in the analytical standards of Western academia. This is another relevant conclusion drew by Daya Krishna in the above-mentioned UNESCO report that combines different local studies: “Another problem most of these countries face relates to the distinction between philosophy in the wider sense of the term and philosophy in the narrower sense. The distinction is made in almost every report and ambivalently oscillates between the two. On the one hand, one can hardly regard anything as philosophy unless it is philosophy in the hard-core, narrow sense of the word. On the other hand, unless it has a living relationship with what may be called philosophy in the common and larger sense of the word it cannot be regarded as relevant to human concerns in contemporary times. Philosophy in the narrow sense is primarily analytical in nature and is concerned with conceptual and methodological problems as well as the relationship between the argument and what it establishes. In the wider sense, philosophy is concerned with any general view regarding man, society and nature and their relationship to the whole which is vaguely discerned by man and articulated in imaginative and mythical forms. In this sense, it is closely related to religion on the one hand and to culture on the other. Much of the traditional philosophy in many of these countries is of the latter variety though in many the distinction between philosophy and religion was made very early in their history, particularly between philosophy in the form of theology, i.e. the rational substantiation and vindication of truths propounded by religion, and religion itself. (...) In fact, philosophy in the narrow sense presents three problems: (a) its relationship to the folk or popular culture of a country; (b) its relationship to religion, both in the past and the present, particularly in those countries where religion is still a living force—as it is in many of the countries of Asia today; and (c) its relationship to what may be called the contemporary problems of social transformation and change, which constitute the common historical situation of most of the Third World countries at the present time.” Daya Krishna, “Overview of Country Reports,” 9–10.


Something paradoxical (or at least it seems) emerges from the inheritors of Macaulay’s-led education: although the shift to the English paradigm allowed a certain creativity and the formation of a certain hybridity, today praised by scholars looking for ‘world-philosophy’ or intercultural philosophy (and so much looked for in European intercultural research), Indian authors provide long descriptions of the impossibility in nature for Indian philosophies to be creative today, due to this feeling of colonial alienation. The ‘between’ looked for by Europeans is felt as shallowness when one is dispossessed from one’s tradition, and the ‘radical otherness’ aimed at to respect the integrity of the Other (in contrary to the felt violent ‘assimilation’) prevents the integration and the natural modification of one’s own in the encounter with the Other. What we are facing in the mirroring of these cross-cultural traditions is the clash of two ideologies: the one who has been accused of centrism looking for reaching otherness, and the one who has seen himself as peripheral and felt being alienated, looking for reconnecting with the own. This difference creates an important shift of perspective in the respective literatures on intercultural dialogues, the consequences of which have however not been further elucidated.

For Daya Krishna, inheritor of the latter’s paradigm, one objective consists therefore in ‘repairing’ the asymmetrical relation between English and Sanskrit. He firmly believes in the abilities of Sanskrit to be able to formulate alternative - thereby, more ‘authentic’ - conceptual frameworks that allow for analyzing philosophy in India. Although English is, de facto, the *lingua franca* of India, even (more) in the domain of intellectual discourse, Daya Krishna prefers to exclaim that “Sanskrit was, and still is, a living all-Indian language of classical and intellectual discourse. (...) From north and south, from east to west, people can get together anywhere and talk in Sanskrit.” This stance remains an enthusiastic hope that the project cannot (alone) prove, since it did not cover such an extent of the Indian philosophical scene. However, in spite of a certain exaggeration, what I find interesting - and symptomatic - of this generation of Indian thinkers is the enthusiasm itself that originates from the feeling of discovery. The discovery lies in the ‘something’ able to counterbalance the domination of the English language, although the idea of English to be counterbalanced by Indian traditions itself emerges in English. Interestingly, this paradox remains unsolved both in the Western academics, as denounced by Ivekovic earlier, as well as in the ‘Western Indian’ academics, namely Indian universities functioning in this language. What connects these two rhetorics seem to be the realization of this paradox that they however cannot solve.

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211 Bhushan and Garfield, *Minds without Fear*, 143.
212 Daya Krishna, *Civilizations*, 76. This statement naturally leads to the *saṃvāda* project, and the institution of bilingual dialogues, as stated in the preface of the Pune experiment: “Few people know, in India or elsewhere, that Sanskrit is still the living lingua franca of traditional scholarship in India, which may be as distant from each other as Kashmir and Kerala or Manipur and Gujarat, is Sanskrit and Sanskrit alone.” Daya Krishna et al., *Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions*, xii.

213 This applies to Daya Krishna himself in this lecture, but before him and acknowledged by him, of much larger movements known as ‘Neo-Vedānta’ (and in Bengali literature at large), which illustrates this need: “It [the English language] was also primarily seen as providing access to a particular kind of knowledge and a system of values which gave a radically different foundation to both society and polity to the country. Bengal became the centre of this new enthusiasm as also the attempt to find some sort of a new creative civilizational response to this western impact so that its own civilizational and cultural identity was not completely lost. The movement of neo-Vedāntism has to be seen in this light and the writings from Ram Mohan Roy onwards, who was proficient both in Sanskrit and Persian, should be seen as an attempt to come to terms with this fascination with the West which
The circularity of this argumentation (counterbalancing English in English, and in so doing contributing to English literature) provokes a feeling of desperation, since it frames the critique in a certain foreign framework in trying to challenge this framework, which is not felt as very hopeful by the writers, here Kalidas Bhattacharyya:

“In a way, thus, Indian philosophy was revived for those Indians who had been trained in Western learning. This revival has passed under the name of (Indian) Renaissance, though few have noticed this – with the meaning of the word ‘renaissance’ turned upside down. What happens in genuine renaissance is that under the impact of some powerful new ideas people with a living tradition adjust those ideas to that tradition: normally long forgotten classical ideas come to be absorbed in the then current tradition. What happened, however, in India in those days was quite different. Forgotten by the English-educated Indians and only half-forgotten (because only half noticed) by the vast mass of traditional Indians (who had till then no English education), the so-called ‘newly found’ Indian ideas could not possibly be freshly incorporated in an existing living tradition; for, even as unnoticed, they still informed the bulk of the day-to-day life of even the English-educated Indians, let alone the vast mass who had not that education till then. So if there was any question of adjustment, for the English-educated Indians, it was that of the traditionally Indian (though half forgotten) ideas with the English (in effect, Western) ideas that were newly acquired. Naturally, what these English-educated Indians did was to understand and interpret the traditional Indian ideas – Indian philosophy, for that – in terms of ideas that were Western. This is no renaissance. If there could be any such really in those days, it would have rather interpreted the Western ideas in terms of ideas that had been traditionally Indian.”

Thus, within this new ‘hermeneutic circle’, a paradoxical difference emerges between the feeling of alienation of these authors and our a posteriori perception as world-philosophers, cosmopolitan, hybrid, intercultural, etc.; between the feeling of a substantial lack of creativity and our perception of a Renaissance; and therefore, between the experience as philosopher and the narrative of a ‘philosophical movement’ born from this (anguished) experience.

Let us come back to this linguistic dilemma in the Indian context. Another dissatisfaction (remaining unresolved) emerges: the gap between the felt efforts to address a world-wide simultaneously aroused ambivalent feelings amongst those who came in deep contact with it.” Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 291.

214 Or R. Satchidananda Murty: “There can be no one ‘modern and Indian philosophy’, nor can any single philosophy with an ‘independent Indian identity’ emerge. As in the past, there are now and there will be in future many philosophies in India. Some of them will be ‘original’, ‘independent’ or ‘creative’, others dependent on or derivative from classical or modern Indian or non-Indian philosophies, and yet others influenced by some or all of these. They may have, of course, something ‘Indian’ about them, as the ātmavāda of Vedānta, the nairātmyavāda of Mādhyaamika and the tattvopaplava of Jayarāśi had; and, as in the past, at different times one or some of them may be more dominant and widespread than others.” K. Satchidananda Murty, Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching, and Research (Delhi: New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass ; Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1985), 173.

215 Rama Rao Pappu and Puligandla, Indian Philosophy, 172–73.


217 Bhushan and Garfield, Minds without Fear, 10.
modern audience (à la Macaulay), and the silence resorting from it. Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield comment on a remark Daya Krishna would have made in an interview with them:

“Daya Krishna may indeed have been wrong about the state of philosophy under the Raj, but he gets something deeply right. He correctly characterizes the experience of Anglophone Indian intellectuals under colonial rule when he says in the same interview:

... The deepest anguish of the Indian intellectual is that he is unrecognized in the West as an equal, or as an intellectual at all. Ibid.

This failure of recognition is tragic. These philosophers wrote in a context of cultural fusion generated by the British colonial rule of India. They were self-consciously writing both as Indian intellectuals for an Indian audience and as participants in a developing global community constructed in part by the British Empire. They pursued Indian philosophy in a language and format that could render it both accessible and acceptable to the Anglophone world abroad. In their attempt to write and to think for both audiences they were taken seriously by neither.”

After the feeling of alienation succeeded the correlated question of integration of ‘Indian philosophy’ to (European-conceived) ‘philosophy’, which was foremost addressed by Indian philosophers working outside India, and in general formulated vis-à-vis the non-India. On the other hand, for those who stayed, the problem was raised in terms of the ‘Indianness and the problem of remaining authentic while being hybrid. As an inheritor of the colonial, how to define oneself vis-à-vis India and the Indian traditions? In both cases, while these philosophers remained partially unknown in the West (Indian academic Anglophone philosophers being the

218 The use of the conditional in this sentence points at a certain reserve from my side regarding the context of the interview, in which Daya Krishna would have said that “anybody who is writing in English is not an Indian philosopher ... What the British produced was a strange species – a stranger in his own country. The Indian mind and sensibility and thinking [during the colonial period] was shaped by an alien civilization.” The critique of this statement led Nalini Bhushan and Jay Garfield to publish their collection of texts of Indian philosophers in English from the 20th century, arguing that “the intellectual agency and creativity in the domain of Indian philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries belongs to Indian thinkers; they sustained the Indian philosophical tradition and were the creators of its modern avatar.” It remains dubious why Daya Krishna, himself an Indian philosopher writing in English, and defending the creativity of Indian philosophers writing in English during the colonial and postcolonial times (such as K. C. and K. Bhattacharyya, R. Prasad; T. V. R Murty, about whom he also writes), would have contradicted his own work in such a flagrant manner. The context of this statement, which has not been reproduced, may explain this remark, or the text that has been cut. Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield, eds., Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), xiii–xiv.

219 J. N. Mohanty’s remarks on the difference between the ‘continental’ and ‘analytical’ (in this case as heritage of respectively European and American traditions) recognition of Indian philosophy as philosophy is here relevant, since for once it specifically distinguishes between the common ‘Western’ and the ‘specific’ European: “It is remarkable that the analytical philosophers - who are not contaminated by Hegelian historicism or Heidegger's Seins Geschichte - have no problem in ascribing 'philosophy' to the Indian tradition. It is the 'continental' philosophers who find here something which goes against their deeply held prejudices. Quine, Strawson and Dumett - to name three distinguished analytical philosophers - not only have no a priori doubt (how could there be philosophy outside of the Western tradition?) on this matter, but have admitted (to this author) that they were convinced that good (and bad) philosophy knew no geographical limits. Historicism may have, in many ways, a liberating influence, but unless carefully thought through it may provide a subtle way of justifying one's deeply held prejudices.” J. N. Mohanty, “Between Indology and Indian Philosophy,” in Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, ed. Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, 1st Indian ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), 167.
most concerned by this unacknowledgement), a certain appropriation of the Western categories for thinking Indian philosophies however operated ‘in spite of themselves’. This appropriation consisted in a vague acceptance of Indian philosophy as philosophy in selecting concepts, topics and schools appropriated to the Western idea of rationality, as well as contributing to it (like Buddhist logic or Nyāya’s adaptation to philosophy of mind). M. P. Rege describes in his very lucid and precise manner this scenario in the introduction of the first published saṃvāda:

“It in the prevailing circumstances western-trained Indian students of Indian philosophy quite naturally adopted this point of view of looking at Indian philosophy and one of the most thriving areas of philosophical studies in India has been that of ‘comparative philosophy’ which is devoted to exploring similarities between western and Indian doctrines such as Nyāya and realism, Mīmāṁsā and hermeneutics and so forth, and even between the views propounded by major western philosophers and classical Indian philosophers such as Kant and Śāmkara, or Whithead and Vācaspati Miśra. In the early decades of the century when Absolute Idealism was the reigning philosophy in Britain and to a lesser extent in America, it was to the idealistic Advaita and other varieties of Vedānta that Indian commentators pointed to representative Indian doctrines. Later when the tide of realism and analysis swept the Anglo-Saxon philosophical scene, the emphasis shifted to Nyāya. Still later, when Anglo-Saxon philosophy came to adopt a highly sophisticated and technical idiom as a proper and necessary medium of philosophical discussion, it was to the sophisticated technicalities of Navya-Nyāya that Indian commentators turned for something to match with it.”

It created a new lineage in Indian philosophy, one however that had no direct contact to the Sanskrit medium nor to the ‘traditional’ Indian philosophers of India. Furthermore, this evaluation of Indian philosophy is also fostered by a certain persisting exoticism from the West, pressuring Indian scholars to nevertheless commit to an Indian heritage they however cannot master, which constitute the consequence of “Western yardstick” described by M. P. Rege. This yardstick implies a definition of Indian philosophy as per Western criteria that however requires Indian scholars to themselves validate this yardstick as the ‘authentic’ philosophers.

In so doing, the topic of their research classified them in ‘Indian’ philosophy while the medium and the tradition to which they related were not directly connected to Indian traditions - they were also not directly connected to Western traditions. The following effect was such that while having failed to be noticed in the West (notably due to the West’s own discriminations and exclusions), the contemporary Indian philosophers failed to be considered as ‘Indian’ in their own academia, since they did not seem to continue the philosophical traditions as they were now known and acknowledged. This is what Deshpande describes as the “dual estrangement” of this Indian philosophy, which instead of connecting these traditions in a reciprocal critical dialogue on one’s tradition, isolated them from one another further:

“The tradition either purely Indian or Western that they could claim as theirs was in fact not theirs. Being philosophers in the colonial era, they were exposed to the major Western philosophers belonging to the Greek and the European traditions and as professionals they were connected in some way or the other to modern educational Institutions such as universities and colleges. And being Indians, these philosophers were also expected to be acquainted with the traditional systems of classical Indian philosophy. However, what was thus expected could not become a defining attribute, i.e. acquaintance with classical Indian philosophy was not a

221 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xix.
Indian philosophers are bound to oscillate between intellectual implications of the Western definition of Indian philosophy, in which they have been trained, and the necessity to define themselves as distinctively ‘Indian’, because of which they have to reject their Western-training. In practice, it is epitomized by the monopoly use of English, the language they master, and a commitment (or the negation of it, a reject) to Sanskrit sources. Such a postcolonial allegiance to the classical (or the received idea of the ‘classical’ dimension entailed in Sanskrit) as a reaction to what is felt as an exclusion from the West can turn into a self-defense of the idea of ‘India’, with the dangerous consequence of polarizing the substantialized entities ‘Indian’ versus ‘Western’. This in turn foments some nationalistic ideologies, which responds to the idea of colonial superiority imposed on them with some kind of ‘Indian’ superiority. Contemporary Indian philosophy has inherited these dilemmas and challenges when it comes to positioning itself in the world philosophical picture, between decolonizing attempts and identitarian quest (and sometimes even nationalist drifts), often navigating between the former two, like in the case of S. Radhakrishnan and K. C. Bhattacharyya. Bhagat Oinam comments that the “emergence of nationalist ethos cannot be understood in isolation, but in context, as an offshoot of colonial rule,” pointing at the fragile border and restricted choices of post-colonial Indian philosophers. The other side of the same coin consists in rejecting Indian philosophy on the ground that it only includes classical-Sanskritist-Brahmanical elitist positions against which the English-speaking modernity can prevail, a position which is also not without its own shortcomings.

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223 J. N. Mohanty testifies of this postcolonial confrontative reaction: “Indian philosophers educated in Western thought developed a myopic vision of Indian thought. They characterized it in such global terms as ‘spiritual’ and ‘transcendent’. Our professors in Calcutta - with perhaps the exception of Rash Vihary Das and Kalidas Bhattacharyya - talked about Indian philosophy in edifying language. Not that they did not know the text. They wanted to instil in us the perception that Indian philosophy was superior to Western. One respect in which this superiority was explicated was by claiming that Indian philosophy was practical (i.e. aiming at the removal of pain and suffering, leading eventually to mokṣa) and spiritual (in a rather undefined sense of the term, and we all felt we knew what it was about), culminating in a mystic union with the truth. All this was contrasted with the alleged theoretical, intellectual, and scientific nature of Western thought. It struck me much later as strange that Husserl, in his Vienna lecture, drew a similar contrast, but used the alleged theoretical character of Western philosophy to show its superiority over the practically oriented Eastern thought. This only confirmed my suspicion that such contrasts must be spurious.” Mohanty and Bilimoria, *Relativism, Suffering, and Beyond*, 5.

224 Oinam, “’Philosophy in India’ or ‘Indian Philosophy,’” 461.

225 Ananda Vajpeyi writes for instance: “But by the end of the 20th century, secular and left-wing scholars began to criticize the elitism—indeed the outright social inequality—associated with Sanskrit learning. Undeniably oppressive for some communities within India, especially non-Brahmin castes and women, but arguably
Daya Krishna directly inherited these internal contradictions, which are leitmotiv of his entire work. I see the incentive of the *samvāda* project in its particular attention to multilingual setting and revalorization of Indian traditions as *contemporary* as a clear manifestation of the dilemmas above explain. The Janus-faced consequence of these dilemmas may explain the apparently flagrant self-contradiction that Daya Krishna would be guilty of when he would have told Bhushan and Garfield that “anybody who is writing in English is not an Indian philosopher … What the British produced was a strange species – a stranger in his own country. The Indian mind and sensibility and thinking [during the colonial period] was shaped by an alien civilization.” I expressed my reserve above on the fact that Daya Krishna, Indian philosopher (mostly) writing in English, would deny ‘Indianness’ to Indian philosophers writing in English in view of his own position and his engagement with fellow Anglophone philosophers (3.4) and the difficulty to decipher on such a claim without context. However, if we acknowledge this paradox, it would exemplify the radical extent of the dilemmas faced by Anglophone Indian philosophers who go so far as to deny themselves ‘Indianness’ on the ground of the estrangement they have been facing. In this perspective, would *samvāda* represent a seeking of some Indianness in Indian philosophy today to re-establish an ‘authentic’ (not-alienated) creativity? If viewed in such a manner, does *samvāda* also not fall into the dangerous nativist dream of finding an ‘original’ form of philosophizing? Moreover, how would this nativism avoid the persisting “Western yardstick” above described, even when seeking authenticity?

### 2.2.1.2. The Political in Dialogues and *Saṃvāda* as Postcolonial Response

The emergence of these questions expresses the complexity of postcolonial political structures (and are, in this sense, not unrelated to other postcolonial societies) caught up between the two poles of alienation and authenticity which orientate the responses that are produced. More importantly even, these postcolonial political structures influence the dialogical domain, which justifies their relevance in my analysis. With whom to engage, who to include in the dialogue, who is willing to participate, which rhetorical devices are allowed and which of them have a better effect, which arguments are accepted, and under which criteria? The answers to this second set of questions largely depends on the answer given to the first set above, in particular regarding the integration of participants related to a certain idea of Indianness and the segregation based on a certain concept of philosophy.

Vajpeyi’s article, in its excesses and restrictions, delineates a growing debate inside academia in India today.
To start with, one should keep in mind Arindam Chakrabarti’s and Ralph Weber’s general warning on the relation between dialogue and politics, which legitimize the inclusion of politics in an analysis of dialogue:

“Every dialogue, collaborative work in hybrid styles of philosophy has had and will have an economics and politics. Future theoretical philosophy will theorize reflectively about that economics and politics also. It is said that some time back in undatable antiquity a debating assembly of scholars was arranged by King Janaka of Videha (modern Bihar, India). A thousand cows with horns wrapped in gold were to be given as a reward to the wisest of all. Savants and wranglers from all over the country had gathered to take part in this Philosophical Olympics. Before the dialogue had even started, the young arrogant Yājñyavalkya got up and told his two helpers, “Please take these cows to my home.” When the other brahmins raised a hue and cry at this outrageous appropriation, Yājñyavalka explained, tongue in cheek, of course, “We salute the wisest knower of Brahman, we just crave those cows.” After this ironic remark, for more than thirty sections of Bṛhadāranyaka Upanisad, we get a deep metaphysical and phenomenological analysis of consciousness, desire and the Self, which broke the path of nearly all future metaphysics in India, led by this same ironic philosopher (and whose pre-Socratic irony was no Greek influence). Every dialogue also has a politics, a negotiation and competition for power, at least for persuasive rhetorical impact. And in every age, every science and every academic discipline, specialists working within well-defined and established borders do have a margin of power over the open-minded, self-doubting, eclectic, many-minded styles of thinking.”

Daya Krishna’s samvādas seem also to be motivated by a political strategy in the sense described here, in terms of rhetorical impact. This seems evident due to the public dimension that he chose to confer them in institutionalizing them via the Indian Council for Philosophical Research (financial and academic support), in publishing some of them and in promoting the outcomes in his letters in order to bring attention to these experiments. He could indeed have conducted the samvādas privately as his predecessors did (see 2.2.3). Opening, publishing, publicizing them had such a persuasive dimension, one of those however of the ‘open-minded’ and ‘eclectic’ kind described by Chakrabarti and Weber. This kind meant first to deviate from the usual conference model of assembling experts working in the same (narrow) field, a priori agreeing on the outlines, debating internal arguments and details upon a common framework, reading aloud their papers, following the critique made by Hornuff above in the unilateral ‘conference’ type of communication, but also the internal limitations of the debate (see 1.1.2).

Daya Krishna’s denunciation of the “effective apartheid between traditional and modern learning” and the “consequence of the apartheid on the psyche of the Indian intellectual today” is, however, not the first attempt of this kind in the history of Anglophone colonial

226 Chakrabarti and Weber, Comparative Philosophy without Borders, 229.
227 Although published, the effort made by Daya Krishna to promote new works, to connect scholars and their works, to integrate Sanskrit scholars to the mainstream English-written philosophy, is visible in a number of letters. This attests Daya Krishna’s philosophical interest, but also of a certain engagement in enlarging the academic sphere of philosophizing in India to more scholars working outside Indian Universities.
228 “It [the Indian Council of Philosophical Research] has also agreed to undertake the publication so that the intellectual rasa of the discussion may be tasted by a wider audience. Let the consciousness of Bhakti discover the intellectual element in it and enjoy the specific flavour it has.” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, v.
229 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 191.
and post-colonial Indian philosophies. It even almost seems that Anglophone Indian philosophies originate from this endeavor. Is there a difference between Daya Krishna’s approach and the venture of his predecessors? A main distinction concerns the method of answering the Western influence that persists in the postcolonial consequences of Indian academia, and the way to address the Western audience. While the first generation was rather confrontative in its approach of the Indian-Western comparison, trying to counterargue the colonial diminishing of the value of Indian philosophy by demonstrating the ‘greatness’ (i.e. the superiority) of Indian spirituality, their answer was thereby limited by the Western prejudices. Like the other side of the same coin, their responses had to symmetrically answer, which implied to remain within the persisting colonial logic by creating a mirroring picture of Western and Indian values, like Radhakrishnan. This kind of argumentation is analyzed by A. P. Rao cited in Ganeri’s analysis as a “new antinomy of reason” as follows:

“There is no specific name for this type of argument in the extant logical literature. Nonetheless it is a fallacy, and is typical of colonial intellectuals (…) To capture the formal structure of that argument relativising it to the present context, I may venture to state that it reads like: if foreign Plato could do it, then desī [indigenous] Śaṃkara must have done it. Plato did it, so Śaṃkara did it.”

In so doing, the debate was already predetermined by the need to ‘answer’ a certain idea of Indian philosophies that was propagated in the colonial time. It could only configure predetermined position of a restricted debate. Concretely expressed: to the refusal propounded by Western academics to recognize Indian literature as ‘modern’ and ‘philosophical’ under the criteria that the presentation, format and concepts of the texts were not exactly equivalent to Western termini, modern Indian philosophers found themselves in an offensive restricted position, having themselves to distort their own heritage. They had to force the historical development, form and content of their texts into the Western framework, arguing thereby for the ‘equality’ or even the ‘superiority’ of their own traditions. The debate was necessarily biased due to this political imbalance and a rhetoric that was bound to fail, the one of recognition

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230 I follow here Pawel Odynice’s use and definition of this term in analysis of K. C. Bhattacharyya’s ‘confrontative’ philosophy: “Thus, concerned as Bhattacharyya was with defining and highlighting those outlooks that he identified as ‘distinctively Indian’ and wishing to make an ‘Indian contribution in a distinctive Indian style to the culture and thought of the modern world’ (SI. 4), K. C. Bhattacharyya’s philosophy was ‘confrontative’ in that (a) it aimed to face Western and Indian philosophy with each other, (b) to clarify their fundamental notions, and then only (c) to give an assessment of Western stands from the standpoint of classical Indian philosophy (SI.9). The ‘confrontative’ feature of his comparativism lies, then, in the undeniable fact that he took sides with classical Indian philosophy, took it as his own culture—while he alienated modern Western philosophy, and then prioritized only one of the theoretically sketched outcomes that their comparison might have entailed. This is well illustrated in the fact that though there are plenty of philosophically interesting insights in Krishnachandra’s discussions concerning how certain philosophic problems were shaped and discussed in Western philosophy and concerning how they may be either resolved or entirely dismissed from the standpoint of classical Indian philosophy, to my knowledge there is no explicit exploration in the other direction.” Pawel Odynice, “Rethinking Advaita Within the Colonial Predicament: The ‘Confrontative’ Philosophy of K. C. Bhattacharyya (1875–1949),” Sophia 57, no. 3 (September 2018): 413, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0678-1.

231 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, East And West In Religion (London: George Allen And Unwin Ltd., 1933).

under the condition of an equivalence. Thus, this led Daya Krishna to dismiss ‘comparative studies’ in his evaluation of the discipline biased by this responsive need:

“‘Comparative studies,’” thus, meant in effect, the comparison of all other societies and cultures in terms of the standards provided by the Western societies and cultures, both in cognitive and noncognitive domains. The scholars belonging to these other societies and cultures, instead of looking at Western society and culture from their own perspectives, accepted the norms provided by Western scholars and tried to show that the achievements in various fields within their cultures paralleled those in the West and thus, they could not be regarded as inferior in any way to those that were found there. This hindered the emergence of what may be called ‘comparative ‘comparative studies’, which might have led to a more balanced perspective in these fields. Further, the so-called comparative studies were primarily a search for facts or a reporting of data in terms of a conceptual structure already formulated in the West. The questions to which answers were being sought were already predetermined in the light of the relationship that were regarded as significant or the theories that were to be tested.”

The fact that European missionaries and the first indologists had their own stakes and their own ignorance in a field that was still unknown and only partially available to them, is a historical fact that could be acknowledged and criticized as the ‘first mistakes’ or ‘beginner’s mistakes’, what probably necessarily ground the establishment of a new field. But the persisting “blindness” of (Indian) scholars in unquestioningly accepting the prejudices established by others, either glorifying them in return and considering their simplifications as the mark of their own resources and the essence of their identity, or simply nourishing these interpretations themselves234 – even after the West has accepted a long work of critical investigation on the foundation of its hermeneutics – provoked Daya Krishna’s fury235, such as the related necessity of awaiting Western recognition as a ‘blessing’ of one’s truth, or as approving one’s act of dialoguing.236

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234 Daya Krishna is eloquently provoking his audience in Shimla on the ‘fear’ of critically creating today in India: “Take Śāṅkara for example. He had disciples like Padmapāda, Suresvara, Maṇḍana Miśra and others. They write about their teacher’s teaching, and they are not afraid—like everyone today is—to differ, to criticize and to suggest that the master was perhaps not quite correct in certain cases. But nowadays, people have turned strange: there is no utopia before us, only nostalgia. For us, the golden age is over. It is in the past. For some people it is in the time of the Vedas; for some people, the Upaniṣads (…). We look backwards. We want to hold on to something. We are afraid. We cannot see. We prefer to be blind. (…) What has happened to all these wise people around me, who talk about the Vedas and write about them? The Vedas are full of people we call rṣis, who were not afraid. It is we who are afraid. The Vedic canon did not close. It continued to be composed. Mantras were composed all the time. (…) People could write on anything. Nowadays, no one dares. While one may talk of the chandas, work on the alankāra, why is it that one cannot compose a mantra in a chanda and author a new sūkta? One does not even think of it or thinks that only the rṣis could do it. But why have the rṣis ceased? Has god forsaken everyone? Are we not intelligent enough? Or are we not sensitive enough?” Daya Krishna, Civilizations, 109.
235 “Yet, whatever the justifications for this attitude [of an antiquarian spirit when looking at Indian traditions] on the part of Western scholars, there could be none for the non-Western ones. However, surprisingly enough, most scholars belonging to cultures other than the western one accepted this as the natural state of affairs and considered their own rich intellectual heritages as completely irrelevant to their cognitive enterprise, excepting, of course, the Greek Masters whom the western scholarship has already accepted.” Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 71.
236 A task for the future [to integrate Indian sources in languages other than Sanskrit], this can only be undertaken if the presupposition that all non-western modes of knowledge have been superseded by the current western thought in these fields is abandoned. This, however, can only happen when the social, political and historical roots
On the contrary, Daya Krishna did not bother to counterargue the old denomination of a Western rationality by opposing the superiority of Indian spirituality\textsuperscript{237}: this bare opposition had proven its incapacity to dispense any vitality to Indian philosophies, and it even damaged the internal differences of these philosophies to correspond to these fixed ‘pictures’. This attitude also brought a certain tendency, for those who did not recognize themselves in the depiction of this ‘Indian spirituality’ that was supposed to define Indian philosophies, of leaving this field for Western philosophies who were for them more fit to engage in a contemporary world. The ‘Indian spirituality’ has been slowly left for ideological uses and simplifications of a nationalist type. Daya Krishna’s attempt is not new to the postcolonial ‘defense’ mechanism of Indian philosophies, and does not form an exception to the attitude of ‘answering’ to some Western prejudices.

There is however also a certain tendency in his strategy to simply reverse this earlier emphasis on spirituality for its opposite, namely ‘Indian rationality’, which is best pointed out by the mirroring of the approach presented by German philosopher Rudolf Brandner:

“I think that any intercultural approach to philosophy will depend on our capacity to originally reappropriate the own tradition; and there are quite a lot of typical modern prejudices we will have to cancel in order to get there. Our concerns in this direction might be quite similar and it might be even a common project we are working on from very different angles; it seems to me quite funny - in a very significant way - that while you are trying to show that Indian philosophy is not mokṣa-centred: and that thereby it has to be considered as ‘philosophy proper’ just as western philosophy, I am trying to show - by passing through Indian Philosophy - that Occidental Philosophy is basically mokṣa-centred and that this is exactly its constitution as ‘philosophy proper’.”\textsuperscript{238}

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\textsuperscript{237} “Often the tendency is to show the superiority of Indian thought and culture. This is done through a two-layered projection. One, that India, too, has (had) what the West has (had); and two, that India had it much earlier or much richer than what the West has (had). Take for instance, Sri Aurobindo’s Aspects of Indian Culture, where he shows that Indian culture and its philosophical worldviews are not only rich but also much older (and richer) than those of the West. That is how Radhakrishnan and many of his contemporaries discovered Adi Sankara as counter point to Bradley - much older in civilisational location in time, and much richer in philosophical rigour. Unlike Bradley, who was supposed to be a disguised imitator of German idealism, Sankara was shown as epitome of logical rigour and creative metaphysics. The idea of an unqualified monism that encompasses within its fold all multiplicity of human experiences, and existence of the world, is highlighted by the Indian philosopher. Adi Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta is shown to rescue the Indian culture and tradition from the garb of a receiving community. The projection is of centuries-old philosophical tradition that shows its richness when modern Europe was yet to be culturally and politically conceived.” Bhagat Oinam, “Philosophy in India: An Agenda for an Alternative Mode of Philosophising.” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XXVIII, no. 2 (2011): 78.
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\textsuperscript{238} The quote is retrieved from the section ‘Discussion and Comments’ of the JICPR with the following introductory note: “We are giving below a long comment from Prof. Rudolf Brandner, which he had written in a personal letter after reading the book entitled Indian Philosophy - A Counterperspective. We are publishing his comments, as his observations might be of wider interests to all those who are interested in ‘understanding’ the philosophical enterprises as enshrined in the two traditions of philosophizing which have come to be known by the names ‘Indian’ and ‘Western’. Rudolf Brandner, “Should One Try to Understand Indian Philosophy on the
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The mirroring effect of Western philosophers looking for mokṣa for Western traditions (inspired by Indian traditions), while Indian philosophers inquire on non-mokṣa-centered traditions in Indian philosophy (to respond to the claim of Western rationality) illustrates the kind of reversion that is taking place. In that sense, Daya Krishna belongs to the postcolonial generations coping with colonial Western prejudices without being able to overcome the response in the terms defined by the same Western prejudices.

I would nevertheless claim that this reversion goes further than an equivalence of the type ‘Indian philosophies are as rational as Western philosophies’. Daya Krishna rather aims to alleviate the problem of a certain Western obsession observed in Indian academics, and looks for genuine resources in Indian traditions that could offer a novel perspective. This search for genuine and authentic resources remains doubtful, which might explain why participants of a seminar on Indian Intellectual Traditions could have been disturbed and excessively accused the attempt of looking for ‘specific Indian intellectual structures’ of being nationalist and even “racist”. Daya Krishna indeed pertains a certain dichotomy between India and the West, rather between Western-constructed Indian philosophies of Indian academics and the (blinding) perception of the West in the same Indian academics. In other words, he opposes the perception and the evaluation of Western and Indian philosophies by Indian academics, rather than per se. He appeals to revive the creativity of Indian academics by freeing them from the subject of a dreamed idea of Western academics and a stereotyped knowledge of Indian traditions. It is in this sense that Daya Krishna argued to look at India itself and to neglect the ‘West’ in its Indian academic perception, i.e. an obsessive and superior fantasized entity. This neglect was, however, not exclusivist, in the sense that it did not exclude integrating scholars outside of the traditions in question, neither to the saṃvādas, nor in his correspondence or teaching.

Therefore, in view of this attitude, Ganeri classifies Daya Krishna, as a post-independence philosopher “pushing away tradition, resisting the return to one’s own tradition as a counter-weight to colonial domination in favor of an entitlement to criticize inherited tradition and foreign tradition alike according to one’s own judgment”. He further states that

“Daya Krishna summarizes the new mentality when he says that “svarāj in ideas can only be achieved by a radical alteration in our attitude to both the traditions—the Indian and the Western. We have to de-identify with both and treat them only as take-off points for our own thinking, which should be concerned with what we consider important.” We see here key themes in the new mentality: the rejection of Bhattacharyya’s notion of reverence in favor of de-identification; the idea that the philosopher’s own sense of what is of importance is the fundamental norm against which to appraise cultural tradition. The post-colonial Indian philosopher has similarly lost any anxiety about the use of English as a language of communication and is not worried that its use is another modality of foreign domination; for English has become just a machine of communication and not a site of subjectivity.”

Western Model? Fundamental Defect in Daya Krishna’s Approach to the ‘understanding’ of the Indian Philosophy,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XVI, no. 2 (April 1999): 141.

239 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions.
240 Daya Krishna, ix.
242 Ganeri, 5.
In Daya Krishna’s case, I disagree with the loss of the anxiety caused by the use of English, the monopoly of which is denounced by Daya Krishna. He wrote for this reason several monographs and articles in Hindi (2.2.2). Furthermore, although Daya Krishna saw the resources of (his and others) cultural traditions critically, the samvāda project also constitutes an endeavor into diversifying the ‘philosopher’s own sense of what is of importance’ by bringing different cultural traditions together to evaluate these resources. ‘The philosopher’s own sense’ is also constituted out of humility of one’s own limit and extension to different philosophical communities.

Therefore, in introducing the “Who’s who of teachers and scholars in philosophy in India”, a thematic and nominal yearbook listing Indian philosophers, Daya Krishna explains the underlying motive of the yearbook as follows:

“The philosophical community in India has not yet become a ‘community’ in any significant sense of the term. (...) But whatever the causes, there can be little doubt that those who are aware of the lack cannot but attempt to build one. And, what better beginning can be made in this direction than to have a ‘Who’s Who’ of information about who is doing what and where? The Indian philosophical community, in fact, is divided into at least three major constellations and/or groups. [into English-speaking scholars, Sanskrit pandits and Islamic scholars, to which are added those working in vernaculars, and those working in Christian theology] Each of these is a world unto itself and is almost ‘worlds apart’ from others, with hardly any knowledge of, or interaction with, the others. Even within their own ‘world’, there is hardly any all-India awareness. There is also, what may be called ‘differentiated growth’ or ‘islands of growth’ in certain centres, regions and institutions. They tend to look inward, and their attempt to establish some interaction with the outside academic community in their own subject is generally with centres or institutions abroad. Their own country is just a hinterland for them, a scheduled-caste land of underdeveloped academia from whom they would like to escape as much, and as soon, as they can.”

Roughly formulated, for Daya Krishna, samvāda means to take up the challenge of this creative dialogue that did not happen between ‘Indian philosophies’ – those made in Sanskrit and born from the classical traditions, the legacy of these first English-writing generations, and further traditions, forgotten in most of the literature (including the above ones on colonial India), who still operate in India, from Islamic, Buddhist, Jain traditions. Looking at a hybridity and a cosmopolitanism which had all the reasons to succeed at the time of this colonial encounter (and in some cases, such as the Bhattacharyas’, did happen), Daya Krishna’s postcolonial response consists in restituting a dialogue between those who did not meet.

The enunciative rupture between English and vernaculars/Sanskrit and the fracturation in micro-philosophical groups is at the origin of the parting above described, between the experience of anguish of Indian scholars and our interpretation of them as hybrid cosmopolitan actors. Daya Krishna attempted to create a community with which to engage, and with which to speak. The scope of such a community remained strongly limited: it would be exaggerated to consider that Daya Krishna did break the disinterest of the Sanskrit-speaking community or brought

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deep modifications to their protective structures or educational system. He himself admits in a dialogue he organized in 1983:

“In regard to the question of having a dialogue with the traditionalists we, in the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, have had several experiments of this kind. Firstly, in the Department we have had an exchange of teachers between our Department and the Sanskrit College in Jaipur City. One of their traditional pundits has come to the Department and has held a long series of seminars with our colleagues and we have studied some texts with him. On the other hand, some of our teachers have offered to go to the Sanskrit College in the town to do courses in western philosophy with their students. However, that part of the exchange has not been so successful as they do not seem to be interested in what we have to offer.”

If Daya Krishna succeeded in creating a small community ready to open up for dialogues, it cannot be generalized to the Sanskrit philosophical world and remained an undertaking in a circle of acquaintances.

This points at internal difficulties of another kind beyond the damages caused by the colonization. Rekindling the internal philosophical diversity of India highlights also problems independent of the monopoly of English and the Western influence on Indian philosophy:

a) not-belonging to the monopolistic English-speaking philosophy does not necessarily imply other interactions between the different groups. Daya Krishna mentions in the dialogue on dialogue referred to above that even what are called ‘classical traditions’ just do not interact, and that each remains in its own world. Samvāda is therefore not only a ‘postcolonial’ attempt, but an intra/intercultural one for creating relations between different philosophical communities and remedying to the lack of internal contacts between philosophical worlds, the only condition for achieving creativity to him.

b) beyond the colonizer/colonized dichotomy appear many distinguished subgroups ordered also by power relations and hierarchy. The Brahmanical elite has been leading the perception and reception of ‘Indian philosophies’ for millennia. At different places, Daya Krishna denounces the oblivion of the role of Buddhism in Indian philosophies, and the biases in considering Indian philosophies in the prevalence of Advaita Vedānta as an elitist Brahmanical reconstruction. With the samvāda project, Daya Krishna therefore argues against the forced absence of any tradition as well as for reconnecting these different traditions between them.

This becomes political again in the case of Islamic scholars, which are today neglected in Indian academia. Rajni Bakshi, a student of Daya Krishna, mentioned to me the emotion of Islamic scholars who had the feeling to be invisible, during a Workshop in 1987 in Jaipur on the “art of the

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244 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions, xxiii.

245 “If we take all these facts together, a clear picture emerges which questions at its foundations the total picture that has been built of India’s philosophical tradition in the first millennium AD, stretching back to the period from the appearance of the Buddha. This whole period of a millennium-and-a-half is dominated by the intellectual and spiritual presence of Buddhism which has either been ignored or presented as a minor motif in the usual pictures that have been painted until now. The story has to be changed and drawn in the light of inconvertible factual evidence. (…) The history and philosophy of India from 500 BC to 1 000 AD has to be totally rewritten placing Buddhism in the centre and treating it as a chief protagonist as it not only outnumbered all other schools of philosophy both in quantity and quality but set the agenda to them.” Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy, 21.
commentary” (to which Daya Krishna refers to above in the dialogue on dialogue) where Daya Krishna invited Islamic scholars, Nyāya pāṇḍits, Samkhya pāṇḍits, Western scholars, etc. This feeling is due to the absence of visibility of their traditions, the inexistence and public ignorance of their tradition. In another communication to Shail Mayaram, she declared:

“It was through such meetings that students like me got a glimpse of the fact that there is an elaborate and indigenous tradition of Islamic theology and how painfully neglected it is by the modern universities. I have vivid memories of an aging maulvi-saheb, almost in tears, saying: ‘Dayājī ne hamaīṃ bulāyā, hamārī bāt sunī, varnā to hamaīṃ zindā kaun samajhtā hai [Dayaji called us, heard us, otherwise we are not even regarded as being alive]’ (personal communication, 10 April 2008).”

She added to me that this was the time where she herself realized the plurality of Indian traditions, their wide scopes and differences: when philosophy becomes philosophies.

c) consequently, absences are not only exclusion but sometimes voluntarily withdrawing, what maybe is the most difficult challenge for dialogue itself. Integrating the pāṇḍits self-willingly to the saṃvāda, arousing interests to them for non-Sanskristist texts and questions that are external to their usual perspectives on commenting their canons, bringing them at the centre of an intercultural dialogue and asking them to contribute to the outward Sanskrit-speaking philosophical world constitute a partially unresolved problem. M. P. Rege admits a certain closure emerging from the side of pāṇḍits, in the form of the lack of interest for engaging, but also a lack of self-critique when viewing their philosophies:

“If this [to conceive Indian philosophies as history of philosophy] is an unfortunate situation, it must be said in fairness that pandits share the responsibility for it with western-trained philosophers. It was understandable that till the ‘age of discovery’, the Indian philosophical tradition should have developed in isolation without being influenced by and without responding to currents of thought elsewhere because of the fact of geographical isolation. Even so, one must recognize that this geographical isolation was itself partly the result of the mental isolation into which the Brahmins had retreated owing to pride based on ignorance. They, perhaps, took unduly seriously the boast of the Mahābhārata that in matters of dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa what is not here is not to be found elsewhere. Western philosophy of modern times in its creative role, fashioned new ideals of knowledge (…). By comparison, Indian philosophy gives the impression of moving in a closed circle. The discussions, no doubt, were free, but all the pūrva-pakṣas [counterposition] are given. (…) The new argument is much likely to be a variation of an old argument.”

Such remarks on a certain stagnation of the tradition and a mere repetition of already established thesis by pāṇḍits constituted a motivation for the project, which aimed at rekindling Indian philosophies. The critiques were thus addressed to Anglophone philosophers vis à vis their understanding of the tradition (in translations) and vis à vis pāṇḍits’ continuation of the tradition (in originals). The first were risking alienation in the change of medium and the second mere repetition in the isolation they voluntarily or not were facing. J. N. Mohanty comments on the latter’s loss of

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246 Personal communication with Rajni Bakshi, Mumbai, on 18th February 2016.
247 Mayaram, Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj, xxiii.
248 Ibid.
249 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xxiii.
creativity: “A certain way of reading, perhaps separately characterizing each lineage (as in the case of distinct gharāṅās of Indian music), was being preserved and transmitted, and in each case, a certain rhetoric was being preserved and used. By our\textsuperscript{250} times, creativity had come to an end, again with some rare exceptions.”\textsuperscript{251}

In consequence, Daya Krishna was on the one hand actively and cordially supported by some, such as Badrinath Shukla\textsuperscript{252}, who were at the core of the engagement, as well as criticized and ignored by many others. The difficulties are many and variegated in their nature and influence on the state of philosophy of India, although they are related and reflect the state of postcolonial philosophy. The samvāda project can nevertheless not be understood independently of it but as an internal reaction to a global situation, whether seen as cosmopolitan resources or as alienation of one’s own heritage.

2.2.2. \textit{Samvāda} as a Way of Living: Personal Engagement and Attitude

Daya Krishna is portrayed as ‘dispassionated’ when facing counterpositions, of a man of reason when ‘dissecting’ arguments, of the “detached intellect” in dialogue (see 1.1.4 and 5.2.1), calmly but steadily “thinking through”\textsuperscript{253} any reasoning, as much as ‘passionate’ for the act of thinking itself, loving the friendliness of the debate, valuing the opponent as a person, and constantly enthusiastic for philosophical dialogues. Rajni Bakshi describes him as the combination of these two aspects: a ‘passionate’ man for thinking with a necessary ‘detachment’ required to take a position, and modify it and accept adversity in thinking. Passionate (as a person willing to engage in dialogue) and distanced (in the intellectual analysis) are no antonyms, quite on the contrary: the detached intellect enables a connection between the attitude that leads to the practice and the intellectual analysis that unfolds the theoretical arguments. Being personally engaged to promote this detached intellect without being self-attached to the thing that is defended determines the way samvāda has been practiced by Daya Krishna.

Due to the few mentions of samvāda in Daya Krishna’s writings and the large number of unpublished material, I went to question some participants, colleagues and students of Daya Krishna in order to recollect a larger picture of samvāda than the one available in the publications, as well as a personal picture of the man behind it. Less than the chronological expected dimension, what emerged the most clearly in these talks is the following: the portrayal of a man and the love felt for him, as much as his love for philosophical dialogues that he at the

\textsuperscript{250} Mohanty means here B. K. Matilal’s and his time, about whom he is writing the introduction of this \textit{Festschrift}.

\textsuperscript{251} “Introduction”, Mohanty and Bilimoria, Relativism, Suffering, and Beyond, 4.

\textsuperscript{252} See the dedication of the transcript of the Pune experiment to him: “to the late Pt. Badarinath Shukla, the towering pandit of the older generation, this volume is dedicated. Without his inspiration, enthusiasm, affection and guidance little would have been achieved as he was the bridge between the old and the new, the traditional and the modern. He was, so to say, the modern amongst the traditional, and the traditional amongst the moderns – and hence the bridge-builder \textit{par excellence} revered by everybody, acceptable to everybody.” Daya Krishna et al., Samvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xvi.

\textsuperscript{253} An expression used by Rajni Bakshi during our meeting, 18.02.2016, Mumbai.
und embodiend. The affection for the person and the friendliness of the dialogues should not be philosophically underestimated, for it is part of dialectic categories and a necessary ground to pursue collectively the ‘truth’, or, if such a term cannot be hold in our philosophical worldview today, an honest rational investigation of a problem. Following the definition of sanmvāda in classical Indian philosophy (Nyāya-sūtra and Caraka, see 2.1.1), B. K. Matilal traces the relevance of friendship in philosophical debates to Socrates and correlates it to Caraka in classical Indian dialectics:

“[Socrates] mentions to Meno (Meno 75 c-d): “… if my questioner were one of the clever, disputatious, and quarrelsome kind, I should say to him ‘You have heard my answer. If it is wrong, it is for you to take up the argument and refute it.’ However, when friendly people, like you and me, want to converse with each other, one’s reply must be idler and more conducive to discussion. By that I mean that it must not only be true, but must employ terms with which the questioner admits he is familiar.” The debate between ‘friendly people’ as Socrates calls it does not seem very different from the kind of debate which Caraka described as sandhāya sambhāṣa ‘debate among fellow scholars who are friends.’ And this is to be contrasted with what Socrates described as a debate with a disputatious person. In Caraka’s terminology, this is the other kind of debate which is actually a verbal fight (vīgrhya). Caraka broadly divides debates into two types. The first is held with a fellow-scholar and in a spirit of co-operation (sandhāya sambhāṣa), but the second in a spirit of opposition and hostility (vīgrhya).

The distinction from the hostile type of dialogue where the objective is to destroy the other (what occasionally happens in debate) and the counterarguments that are given in such type of dialogue are of a different rhetorical nature than the devices used for the second kind. This implies that friendliness is not a formal convention of politeness, but changes the nature and the constitution of the debate itself, and cannot be philosophically neglected for this reason. As stated in the Caraka-Samhitā:

“One should have friendly discussions with persons of learning possessed of scientific knowledge, power of argument and counter-argument, who do not get irritated, who are endowed with correct knowledge, who are not jealous, who can be made to understand, who are competent in convincing others, who are capable of facing difficult situations and who can


\[255\] On sandhāyasambhāṣa: “Unterredung”, “Nicht-agonale Diskussion’ Der Termus ist eine sprachliche Variante des bei Caraka belegten Terminus anulomasambhāṣa und bezeichnet die nicht-agonale Form der ‘Wissenschaftlichen Unterredung’ (tadvidyāsambhāṣā, vgl. auch s.v. samvādā). Von diesen [beiden Arten der wissenschaftlichen Unterredung] wird die sandhāyasambhāṣā jemandem empfohlen, der Wissen, Erkennen, die Fähigkeit der Rede und Gegenrede vollkommen besitzt, den man nicht zu besänftigen braucht und der mit den Regeln respektvollen Anstandes vertraut ist, der Fehler ertragen kann und freundlich konversiert.” CarS [vim 8,17] 264b, 22-32). My translation: “On sandhāyasambhāṣā: ‘Interlocution', 'non-agonal discussion'. This term is a linguistic variation of the term anulomasambhāṣā documented in Caraka and it refers to the non-agonal way of ‘scientific interlocution' (tadvidyāsambhāṣā, cf. also s.v. samvādā). Of these [two kinds of scientific interlocution] the sandhāyasambhāṣā is recommended with a person who completely possesses knowledge, intuition, the ability to hold a speech and to object, a person one does not need to calm down and who is familiar with the rules of respectful decency, who can endure mistakes and converses friendly.” Oberhammer, Prets, and Prandstetter, Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien, 224–25; Agnivesa and Caraka, Traité fondamental de la médecine ayurvédique = Caraka Samhitā, trans. Jean Papin (Paris: Ed. Almora, 2006), 346.

\[256\] Matilal, “Debate and Dialectic in Ancient India.”
address in a sweet tone. One should confidently discuss with such persons and put questions to them. When he asks anything, it should be elaborately described with confidence. One should not get worried under the apprehension of getting defeated. One should not rejoice by defeating his opponents. One should not boast of having defeated such opponents. One should not hold extreme views under delusion. One should not try to describe a thing which the other party does not know. One should try to bring round the other party with politeness and not by deception. One should be very careful to behave politely with his opponents.”

Coming back to a practical level, the friendliness should also not be underestimated concerning the intercultural context of such dialogues. Indeed, to initiate samvāda connecting different traditions, in a postcolonial context that made participants sensitive to the feelings of exclusion and alienation, requires people to trust you. Trusting you in this context refers to vāda as the quality enabling an honest type of dialogue seeking ‘truth’, or what one honestly hold to be true and demonstrates at the best of one’s rational capabilities. It therefore implies “taking each participant seriously” in Daya Krishna’s motto, which means listening, trying to understand and exposing one’s argument and counter-arguments as rationally and clearly as possible. The friendliness of vāda as practiced by Daya Krishna allowed him to be able to “bring people together”258, arising interests in different groups and communities, and persuading them to join the dialogue. ‘Invitations’ are not only accepted on the ground of the philosophical paper that will be given, but in regard to the conditions in which people will be received, including a friendly welcome - the assurance of a satisfiable context for communication. This attitude of Daya Krishna, the one of a friendly dialogue and deep friendships doubled by sincere expectation of the intellectual engagement from others and a strong exigence for philosophical reasonings (on the background of a strong belief that all scholars, independent of his tradition, can ‘reason’ as sharply even if with different tools or in different ways) are also the explanation of the success of samvāda in Daya Krishna’s lifetime, and his intimate connection to it. As Yashdev Shalya, friend and dialogical partner writes:

“Daya Krishna occupies a space of unique distinction even amongst the very few front-rank thinkers in contemporary Indian philosophy. This uniqueness is defined by two qualities possessed by him. First, his wholly untraditional, creative approach and his natural tendency to probe into roots. It is because of this innate bent that Daya Krishna is able to raise ever-fresh and fundamental questions. Simplicity, openness and a complete freedom from arrogance are, in fact, ingrained in his personality itself, and are not merely functions of his philosophical thinking. The second characteristic is his wide-ranging vision and capacity to understand and think about problems related to various other disciplines.”259

In this aspect, and although the dialogues were publicly announced and everyone welcome, they were mostly composed of learned scholars and friends, who came from various traditions


and who often disagreed with each other. Although the scope was varied, it did not reach out the ‘many’. If the influence of the dialogues on these friends and scholars are deeply felt, the wideness of this influence should also not be overestimated.

Samvāda in the form of a dialogical experiment between different philosophical traditions, in the name that was given to the transcription bearing this title, has grown from the teaching practice and the difficulties encountered while teaching by Daya Krishna. He is known to have kept his home door open for all seeking philosophical discussions in the afternoons. Neelima Vashishtha recalls how Daya Krishna was both difficult and demanding with his students, and at the same time always concerned and affectionate. The love to his students was going together with the will for developing their critical spirits and their ability to ask questions, their inquisitiveness, as she further mentioned. One could be tempted to either relate Daya Krishna to the guru-śisya tradition, where education is not an external contractual relation through the established institution delivering diplomas, but an informal relation engaging one’s person into one’s teaching: being in informal dialogues as an intellectual, as described by Sharad Deshpande:

““What was happening as a matter of fact was a replacement of the traditional system of education by a new one in which the traditional guru-śisya paramparā (teacher-disciple lineage) was completely altered. In this alteration, the roles and relationship between the guru and śisya were completely changed. Teachers began to receive their monthly salaries by virtue of which they became professionals. Pupils began getting scholarships and stipends for their performance at regularly conducted examinations. The relationship between the guru and the śisya became incidental to the system of annual examinations. With these alterations, the basic structure of the traditional system which was based on the inseparable relation between the form and content of knowledge acquisition was mutilated.”

A relation engaging thinkers constitutes the ideal of education developed by Daya Krishna. Indeed, he is also known to disagree with the guru-śisya concept insofar as it leads to a ‘blind’ relation where the students (out of loyalty and respect) are bound to the position of their teacher. This creates a repetitive model, something also criticized in contemporary terms by K. Satchidananda Murty:

“Moreover, due to the unfortunate traits of the guru-shisya tradition and the structure of our caste-class hierarchical society, students expect to be taught, to be ‘given’ knowledge or truth, and not to learn on their own and make an independent intellectual effort to acquire knowledge or arrive at truth; while most teachers due to these reasons do not consider students as co-partners in the education process and do not encourage them to raise questions, entertain doubts and exercise their critical faculties. So, without a change in these attitudes,
tutorials/seminars/discussions may not be very fruitful, though for training in philosophizing they are the best methods.”

In this context of commitments to a personal philosophical relation to his students, grounded in dialogues, and challenging questions in the academic description of Murty that one can appreciate Daya Krishna’s teachings, which appear, by contrast, of a radical different nature, described by Mustafa Khawaja:

“His class was never a one-way traffic of words. It was a real ṣaṃvāda (dialogue) in which all the students and scholars took an active part. Doing a class with Dayaji was like drawing a picture, under the watchful eye of a master artist. Unless and until one has not touched the canvas, or has not made any statement one is absolutely free to try his/her hand on drawing any pictures of his/her choice. The moment one draws a line or make a statement the logical implications of the act result in some sort of determination. But this determination is subject to one’s creativity and resourcefulness. When the implications of one’s act are pointed out, one may realize one’s stupidity in making the statement or drawing the line, but then it may be erased or modified under the guidance of the master. However the dialogue between the disciple and the master shall have to continue so that the contours of the picture may emerge.”

Furthermore, his attention to the linguistic muddle in contemporary Indian philosophy were amplified during his teaching at the Rajasthan University. As in most Indian universities, the legacy of the English-speaking institution does not imply an equal or universal command of the language in practice: the division within students, regarding their schooling (English, Hindi or another regional language) and background is such that not all of them can at the beginning of their studies articulate philosophical argumentation in English. On the other hand, some professors (or students), having internalized a long training in English, may not be able to express themselves in regional languages or lack the faculty to translate Western philosophical

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264 Murty notes however counter-examples found in the tradition, from where Daya Krishna takes his inspiration: The methods mentioned above had their counterparts in India. Upadeśa (personal teaching) and pravacana (lecture), encouraging questioning (paripraśna) and insisting on reflection on what is heard (manana, nididhyāśana), correspond to the lecture method. Dialogues such as those of Yaajñavalkya-Maitreyī and Uddālaka-Śvetaketu and of the Buddha with others correspond to the tutorial. The different aahnikas in philosophical works are summaries of daily lessons. Śāstrātha carcā (discussion of the meaning of texts) and Vāda (debate through presentation of a position and a counterposition on an issue), conducted in a gathering of scholars (goṣṭi, pariṣad), correspond to the seminar. The vigour of philosophical activity in ancient and medieval India was due to the simultaneous adoption of all these methods.” Murty, Philosophy in India, 186–87.


266 Daya Krishna comments on the division between students as per their linguistic medium: “Higher Education in India means primarily college and university education for boys and girls after passing out of High or Higher Secondary schools with a minimum number of marks which entitles them to seek admission to these institutions. These schools are of varying standards all over the country. But the most radical and important distinction between them is that they can be divided into two broad classes which almost completely exclude each other. The distinction is based on the language used as the medium for instruction in these schools. There are some that exclusively use English as their medium for instruction. Others, and they form the majority, use the regional language for this purpose. This results in a clear division between the students who come to the colleges and the universities. They form almost two different castes, the one lower and the one higher, with overt and covert forms of feeling and behavior corresponding to their status in the inner world of the college and that of society outside.” Daya Krishna, John, and Sundaram, Indian Education Today: Prospects & Perspectives: Essays, in Honour of Mohan Sinha Mehta, 9.
concepts into Hindi. As for the speakers who are not native from Hindi speaking areas, they simply may have command of other vernacular languages or prefer to use English. The problems that it creates concern the philosophical communication, but also the access to academic resources, which are limited in vernaculars. This situation is also regretted by an evaluation of philosophy in Indian Universities led the University Grants Commission Review Committee (published in two reports in 1966 and 1968), in which it is mentioned:

“One increasingly big problem, though, is the pressure exerted on colleges to introduce instruction in Hindi or the regional languages, a problem, because of the general absence of books of a sufficiently high standard or in some cases absence of any books at all written on philosophy in these languages. Pass course teaching in philosophy suffers much on account of the poor linguistic equipment of the students. Dictation and memorization of notes seems to be the prevailing method at the moment. (...) There is a great need, therefore, for more books, better syllabi and better linguistically equipped students if pass course teaching is to be improved.”

It is to be noted that the situation still prevails today. The same report also mentions the “need for the translation of essential texts so that students do not depend on second-hands accounts”, along with introducing “some outstanding pundits” in the departments of philosophy and translation of philosophers of regional languages into English. Interestingly in another contribution on the topic of education, Daya Krishna mentions active solutions to tackle the problem of translation, such as making it the responsibility of each department to prepare its own reading material, in suggesting translation of an article as compulsory assignment for Master or PhD Students, in actively publishing autonomous vernacular materials, etc. He then notes that preparing reading-material in regional languages constitutes a “concomitant prerequisite of any real change in the system of higher education of India”. This, he felt, could not be found in metropolitan Universities or Institutes, which are too deeply grounded in English language, not ready to question this situation. He further writes:

“No university is worth its name and mission, which fails creativity to solve this fundamental problem of higher education in India. The metropolitan universities are, however, cushioned against the realization of the absolute necessity of what is required, as their students are largely drawn from families and schools where English is taught and learnt in a regular manner. (...) They [these students] only help to sustain the illusion of these universities that they can make significant contributions to the problem of higher education in India.”

Reversing the usual educational hierarchy into an asset for smaller or more isolated colleges, Daya Krishna did not limit himself to advocating ideals to be followed: himself being part of a non-metropolitan university of Rajasthan, the linguistic needs he had to face – like any other professor – probably initiated the writing of his publications in Hindi. The first one Gyāna

267 Also in Daya Krishna, John, and Sundaram, 18–20.
271 Daya Krishna, John, and Sundaram, 19.
Mīmāṃsā, written in 1980 on epistemology, was thought in particular for his students as a high-quality book for teaching – the lack of textbooks and teaching materials of quality in Hindi being deplored. The second one Bhārtīya Darśana: Eka Nayī Drṣṭī, (in Hindi) (Indian Philosophy: a New Approach) published much later in 2000 is still addressed to students, but also to scholars to continue the dialogic engagement and provoke interests to those who might not read English (it is close to the book with the same English title published by Daya Krishna). Furthermore, Daya Krishna regularly contributed to Unmilan, a journal of philosophy in Hindi, to provide philosophical research in vernacular. Asha Mukherjee mentions the importance of translation in Daya Krishna’s class, between Hindi and English, when Daya Krishna discovers the difficulty of communicating between an English-speaking professor for logic and his Hindi-speaking students. As philosophizing should be addressed to all, and allowed to all regardless of their languages, Daya Krishna became sensitive to the linguistic question, initially already as a teacher. This question came to the core of the entreprise while acknowledging the importance of Sanskrit-speaking (and sometimes Hindi-speaking) pāṇḍits.

However, strongly against the imposed hierarchy of a guru-śiṣya or any teacher-student relationship, samvāda cannot be only a ‘teaching tool’ for philosophical communication nor to replace the Western monopoly by the Sanskritist one. In conducting samvāda, it so happened that Daya Krishna was himself as much a student as a teacher – and maybe a little bit more of the first, and that while originally trained in Western philosophy, he became a strong interrogater of Sanskrit ones. In this sense, his interest in samvāda was strengthened by his own learning. While discovering Sanskrit and its contemporary liveliness, still operating in India, as possible national language in a country where the communication between states and communities can be rendered impossible, he himself wanted to learn more, and learn in his own way. Immediatedly taught by the living masters of these philosophies, for whom these traditions were alive and creative, in their own languages. Bettina Báumer notices the growing openness of Daya Krishna, for whom his philosophy, completely occidental (even if due to his origins a part of traditions remains), grows little by little, and for which samvādas are done and organized “for himself” to learn Indian traditions: Daya Krishna learns from samvādas. The model, as mentioned by T. N. Madan, is the one of a conversation between two friends, extended to a dialogue between different groups of people.

273 Mentioned by Daniel Raveh in his Encyclopedia Entry of Daya Krishna (forthcoming)
274 Personal communication, Santiniketan, 24.01.2016.
275 “Even Europeans, who are proud of their languages, have begun to translate their works into English. A work in German or French, just like a work in Italian, has no international audience unless it is translated into English. This is a fact, just as earlier when Sanskrit was the pan-Indian language. Imagine! Even the Buddhists and the Jainas had to write in Sanskrit in order not merely to be considered knowledgeable, but to pave their way to the central arena of discussion in the country. When did the Buddhists start writing in Sanskrit? When did the Jainas do so? The transition from Pali and what we call Prakrit into Sanskrit is an interesting story. Sanskrit was, and still is, a living all-Indian language of classical and intellectual discourse. We are not aware of it. I discovered it, and I try to tell my friends, ‘Look! English is one of the all-Indian languages of intellectual discourse; Sanskrit is the other.’ From north and south, from east to west, people can get together anywhere and talk in Sanskrit.” Daya Krishna, Civilizations, 75–76.
276 Personal communication, 23.01.2017, Abhinavagupta Research Library, Varanasi.
277 Personal communication, 15.02.2017, New Delhi.
While dialogue has been a philosophical form of thinking as well in Ancient Greece as in Ancient India, and while the idea of dialogue leading to truth has been underlying this conception, dialogue also strongly depends on the persons involved in it, as a lively and evolving activity of thinking. The rupture after his death, or the weakening of the project (we note the existence of dialogues of the same kind on numbers in Delhi led by Arindam Chakrabarti, in Delhi again between Chinese and Indian philosophers led by Bhuvan Chandel, etc.), but also the importance of his person in their conception (for the preparation of questions, for the contacts and the response to his invitations, for his relative importance in the happening of the dialogues themselves) imply a personal talent to bring people together. Although samvāda as a theoretical concept, and as an operating methodology cannot be restricted to Daya Krishna himself and deserves independent investigation, it would also be naïve to dissociate the person from the project, and not to consider that the samvāda project undertaken by someone else may have a quite different form than the one I am describing in this work. The importance of his own experience, of the biographical, must be outlined in the process. Unlike how it might appear, namely as a reason to dismiss the whole project due to its ‘subjective’ nature (depending on Daya Krishna’s personality), I see it as the manifestation of the neglected inherent nature of philosophy lying in subjective intuition (the presuppositions of which are studied in 5); secondly, I see it as the valuation of the person in philosophy, something akin to N. V. Banerjee’s emphasis on the “realm of the personal”, the interperonal consequences of which are explained in 7.3.

2.2.3. Samvāda as Continuity of Novelty. Inspirations and Precedents

Daya Krishna did not believe in novelty ex nihilo, but in reinterpretation, rearrangement of the concepts in contemporary contexts and connecting concepts from different traditions to re-problematize them. With Chhakrabarti’s words (describing Daya Krishna): “the real novelty of philosophical thinking lies in seeing new – in the epistemic sense of hitherto unperceived – connections between apparently unconnected conceptual questions or muddles, rather than in creating new concepts.”

It is therefore not surprising that samvāda itself, conceived as a platform for thinking anew philosophical problems, has been developed in agreement with such an idea of a ‘continuation with new eyes’, inspired by preceding experiments, together with these predecessors. S. S. Barlingay had already tried to tackle the problems of contemporary Indian philosophy above mentioned (postcolonial change, ‘stagnation’ and stereotypes in perceiving Indian philosophy) at the Indian Council for Philosophical Research, from which Daya Krishna received his financial and academic support for the organization of samvāda. In a mail dated 08.07.2017, Sharad Deshpande mentioned that Barlingay had organized in 1971-1972 “a novel seminar called ‘Sequence Seminar’. The idea was to focus on some seminal concepts from systems of Indian Philosophy and discuss them as deeply as possible. The first seminar was devoted to Samkhya notions of Puruṣa and Prakriti. (...) This experiment continued three times in consecutive years”. He notes that the philosophers K. J. Shah, K. T. Pandurangi, E. R. Sreekrishna Sharma and others had attended, and that, although some notes

were taken in order to prepare the reports, it seems difficult to locate these notes today, if they still exist. S. S. Barlingay himself comments on the “sequence seminars”279, his description of which resembles the *samvāda* experiments:

“I look at this problem [stagnation, stereotypes and traditionalism in Indian philosophy] from two points of view – organizational and theoretical. In order to tackle the organizational side, I started for example, three philosophical journals, in English, Hindi and Marathi for creating a forum for those who wanted to study and write. I think this should be done all over India. But the main problem is rather theoretical, I thought and do think that Indian philosophy is just philosophy. There is nothing special about it; and so we should enter into a dialogue between Indian philosophers and the philosophers of the Western mode and a synthesis should be arrived at. This could be done at two levels. First, by arranging a dialogue between the pāṇḍits and the Western scholars. What is living in Indian philosophy should be accepted and what is dead should be given up. But while doing this, we must also examine the interpretations given by commentators; and as far as possible we should understand the original text directly rather than depend on the commentaries. With this end in view, I arranged some seminars with the title “sequence seminars”. I am happy that ICPR is carrying on the work now under the leadership of Daya Krishna.”280

What Barlingay aimed at is “philosophy, and philosophy alone”281 where the “confluence” in respective languages of all philosophies would be integrated to modern thought in the exercise of thinking: and the product of this thinking, in different languages, in different traditions and in their encounters, would not need to be regionalized nor to bear any particular label, but would define philosophy as intrinsically plural. This rejection of regionalization of philosophy, which has been emphasized in comparative models that highlight a concept in different regional traditions (India/Europe), has been recently also defended by Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber with the idea of a “comparative philosophy without border”282. Here, the categorization into regional philosophies is avoided to counter the correlated exclusion or hierarchy that implicitly plays a role in this division, since the reference remains the Western conception of a concept X, to which another perspective is added – but formulated in Western context, the concept of “ethics” for example, even if highlighted by a Chinese perspective, remains bounded by a departure point understood as Western ‘ethics’. Barlingay, followed by Daya Krishna, was earlier already trying to balance such an asymmetry described above:

“While discussing with Prof. Gilbert Ryle at Oxford University, the contribution of modern analytical philosophy, it came to my mind that long ago the grammarians of India, Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas have discussed the problems of language and have propounded their theories of language. (…) A bridge is being built now over the modern philosophical structures and the ancient Indian structures. But the distance still remains. Macaulay’s reforms brought about something which Indians had perhaps never thought of. The growth of Indian thought is stunted. It is still not a living discipline. The result is that everything ends in false and incorrect historicising. I also feel that many a time while interpreting the concepts the orientalists did

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279 Also mentioned in Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 201.
281 Barlingay, 75.
282 Chakrabarti and Weber, *Comparative Philosophy without Borders.*
not take the cultural context into account and did not bring in the old Indian and the new thought under one canopy. This was also the case with Paṇḍīts. I thought there should be a dialogue between the Paṇḍīts and the modern philosophers. I, therefore, held a few seminars and arranged for some dialogues under the title ‘Sequence Seminars’ in the University of Pune. This was later followed by ICPR under the scheme ‘Saṃvāda’. But what is necessary is a renaissance in the domain of philosophy of Indian origin.”

Furthermore, in his introduction to the first saṃvāda experiment, Daya Krishna mentions the work of K. Satchidananda Murty who has held a “meeting” in Tirupati and suggested to open the experiments to the non-Sanskritist world, in particular to scholars from the Arabic tradition. These experiments are reported by Ashok Vohra to have happened in the 70ties. In any case, both philosophers were in close contacts pursuing the same objectives, attested by K. Satchidananda Murty’s work, in particular in his reflection about the state of Indian philosophy (which Daya Krishna commented before its publication) in Philosophy in India, Traditions, Teaching, and Research.

A major earlier dialogical experiment, in which Daya Krishna also took part, has been conducted by Prabodh Parikh, Michael McGhee, M. P. Rege, Ramchandra Gandhi and others. Entitled ‘Convivium’, it consisted in informal philosophical discussions and meeting for thinking. Michael McGhee recalls it as follows:

“But chiefly [the dissatisfaction with the state of philosophy], and in summary, it was a lack of connection with life — and that connection was palpable in the case of Dayaji, Ramubhai, and Rege. I wanted to insist that there was nothing monolithic about this ‘Westernization,’ but rather that there were countercurrents in the West that mirrored Indian philosophical resources that could be mobilized for resistance, that one had to distinguish between the (super)imposition of a foreign culture and the specific content of what was aggressively dominant in that culture, and that there was plenty of room for dialogue and a meeting of minds — if the right conditions could be found. This was really the founding principle of our Convivium series: that a small group of philosophers living together for a short ‘retreat’ and under the same roof would sufficiently thaw out so that they could actually talk to each other.

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283 Barlingay, Reunderstanding Indian Philosophy, 8.
284 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xii.
285 Daya Krishna et al., xiv.
286 “[As a result of the lack of reaction of the Western scholars, some Indian philosophers started to think that they would be recognised only if they work in Indian philosophy; they also realised that the problems of Western philosophy are rooted in their own environment and detached from the Indian situation. They therefore turned back to Indian philosophy]. As a result of this change of attitude, they who understood only English and a modern Indian language and wrote only in English, had to pay heed to scholars trained in the traditional way, who were writing mostly in Sanskrit or occasionally in Indian languages and were not part of the university system. So, a need was felt for an interaction between scholars belonging to the two streams which had hitherto been running parallel to each other. The two types of scholars were first brought together in the 1970s by K. Satchidananda Murty who organised two seminars for this purpose at Tirupati when he was the Vice-Chancellor of S. V. University. The first seminar was a conclave of Pandits with traditional learning and mainly Hindu philosophers of the modern type, and the second that of Ulemas and mainly Muslim philosophers of the modern type.” Ashok Vohra, “Relevant and/or Rigorous Thinking: Contemporary Indian Philosophical Situation,” in The Divine Peacock: Understanding Contemporary India, ed. K. Satchidananda Murty and Amit Dasgupta (New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations ; New Age International (P) Limited Publishers, 1994), 16.
287 Murty, Philosophy in India, X.
and find common ground. Large-scale conferences with banks of sessions had their place, we thought, but conversation did not flourish in such environments.”  

Unlike Daya Krishna’s samvādas, it was organized independently and self-financed, without academic support: the latter will be developed at a larger scale and institutionalized by M. P. Rege and Daya Krishna in the samvāda experiment (see 3.3.1). The former was organized in India and in U.K. during five days, once every two years in an average. In a letter, Prabodh Parikh sent the preparative issues for the next convivium to Daya Krishna for his philosophical reactions. The way the exchange takes place tells us a lot about how the convivium proceeded. Daya Krishna answered him as follows:

“Nice to learn from your letter that the Convivium is still alive and that its sixth session is going to be held in some Buddhist Monastery in H. P. [Himachal Pradesh].

The problem you have chosen is interesting, but perhaps one should try to understand this urge for getting out of subjectivity rooted in a culture and shaped by it and, at another level, formed by intellectual traditions to which one belongs and which is available to one in one’s language.

I think the Convivium should start with a ‘confession’ of the difficulty one is encountering presently and share one’s own attempt to get out of the constraints and limitations unconsciously created by the culture and in intellectual tradition one is born into. But then, would the awareness of one’s culture and its presupposition really ‘free’ one, and even if it does, what shall this ‘freedom’ mean as, ultimately, freedom is what one does with it.”

Reflecting on our embodiment in our own culture, Daya Krishna mentions the form of confession, a way to personally introspect within ourselves our attachment to our own culture. This ‘engagement’ in the reflection is different from a debate or lecture, something on which McGhee comes back in his own answer to Daya Krishna’s reaction to Prabodh Parikh:

“I think these remarks of Daya Krishna go straight to the heart of the issues that should be confronting us in the Convivium. I take very much to heart the things said in the second paragraph. As many of you already know there has always been some unease/tension about what the nature of our presentations should be. I have always favoured plenary sessions introduced by a twenty minute talk about things currently on one’s mind, but some people have felt more secure with a written paper and the result has sometimes been a full programme of talks with relatively little room for the discussion and conversation that is supposedly to be at the heart of our project as convivists, which is to bring what has been always too snatched and peripheral to the centre. The idea of a ‘confession’ in the wider sense of a personal account of one’s approach to and agenda in philosophy, delivered in the first person (as done so admirably last time by Syed) appeals to me greatly, and in fact would make a good collection of essays.”

This idea of a confession in the sense of a ‘personal account of one’s approach’, namely of one’s way to philosophize, reveals a will to unveil one’s presuppositions which emerge out of one’s (cultural) position. In other terms, the presuppositions of one’s thinking are embedded into a larger valuational context through which we think, which is unveiled by engaging in

289 McGhee, 535.
dialogue. The constitution of epistemological positions out of valuational orientations revealed by engaging into collective thinking constitutes the topics of the theoretical part of this work (chapters 4 to 7). What these remarks tell us is how this reflection is grounded in a larger experimental framework of dialogues conducted by Daya Krishna and his colleagues. This in return implies that the philosophy analyzed in this second part originates and is intrinsically related to a ‘living together’ which describes dialogues more adequately than a ‘talking together’. McGhee writes elsewhere, while commenting again on the convivium:

“What we wanted to achieve was not just a ‘talking together’ but a ‘living together’, a milieu in which we could share ideas and experience at leisure, in which we would not simply settle down uncomfortably to listen to a series of long papers crowded into an arduous and cerebral dat, but in which conversation would arise naturally because we were a gathering of thinkers curious about each others ideas, would arise over breakfast or dinner, or on long walks along country paths, or, best of all perhaps, in the midst of washing up in the kitchen after supper.”

During our meeting, Prabodh Parikh also mentioned the friendship that unites Daya Krishna and M. P. Rege in this venture, philosophically very close in their ideas and engaged in the idea of ‘thinking’ and ‘philosophizing’ rather than ‘doing philosophy’ (in the sense of history or a commentary as an acquired substance), but different in their style: Rege was a man of prose, systematic in his thoughts, especially in Indian philosophy, while Daya Krishna was ‘playful’ in his thinking, composed but poetic. The association of their differences and their agreements on the lacks of philosophy today motivated them probably to continue the experiments in the forms of a dialogue between Indian traditions at a larger scale to bring awareness to the scholars philosophizing in India today. M. P. Rege organized with Daya Krishna the first published experiment entitled *samvāḍa*, also named the Rege experiment. While I will come back on the experiment itself in the section below (3.3), I will just mention here the initial motivation for such an organization in Daya Krishna’s words in the preface, who explains why this experiment really started the *samvāḍa* process:

“Few people know, in India or elsewhere, that Sanskrit is still the living lingua franca or traditional scholarship in India, that the only language in which intellectual dialogue can be carried on between these persons from different parts of India, which may be as distant from each oher as Kashmir and Kerala or Manipur and Gujarat, is Sanskrit and Sanskrit alone, as the only other language they know is their regional language which are as diverse as the regions they belong so. Unlike Latin, therefore, Sanskrit is the living language of traditional scholarship in contemporary India, and if one wants to enter into a dialogue with this tradition, one will have to do so in Sanskrit or have facilities for bilingual translation from Sanskrit into English and vice versa. This, though so obvious when stated, seems to have escaped the notice of everybody till Prof. Rege realized it and took active steps to realize the preconditions or any successful dialogue between the two intellectual traditions which are not only culturally and civilizationally far apart, but also do not share a common language through which the conceptual distances could be bridged.

The Rege experiment, of which this [publication] is a record, was unique in another respect also. One could perhaps find its halting precursors (...). Yet, none of them had really clicked.

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They were good while they lasted. But they did not generate that feeling of discovery, enthusiasm and success which the Rege seminar did in Poona. They were, so to say, abortive beginnings which did not leave any successful fruition. The Rege experiment, on the other hand, led to a series of successive activities each giving rise to another as is the way of all creative activity. In fact, nothing was pre-thought or pre-planned. Rather, each step showed the way for the next – and the next, for the next next.”

‘It clicked’: an expression characterizing the inseparable whole of the experience (see 4.1 on dialogue as a multifaceted whole) that happens in the encounter. Inseparable in the sense that it describes the experience itself, composed of the different participants, their individual relations, the conceptual topics and the reaction of the group, i.e. the individual elements of the encounter. However, it refers to something superseding the individuality of all these elements, expressed in this expression ‘it clicks’. A venture into the different individual elements can give us leads on the reasons why it ‘clicked’ and maybe inspirations for other similar dialogues, but it cannot recreate the atmosphere, the experience and the encounters of the ‘clicking’ moment. These, however, decide of the success of the dialogue. And yet, in the successive attempts at dialoguing by predecessors and contemporaries, Daya Krishna succeeded in developing a dialogical form that filled a lack felt by the participants of relations between different philosophical communities and a philosophical methodology to think creatively about philosophical problems.

The saṃvāda project does not constitute an exception nor an unprecedented innovation, rather the continuous expression of a long tradition - what Daya Krishna emphasized in referring to the experiments with the term saṃvāda itself. He was himself neither the first nor the only one to have instituted successful dialogues between traditions, between languages, and between philosophical communities, neither the last one. The felt division between the traditional philosophical communities, between those who believe in the necessity of communicating with the ‘mainstream’ philosophers and the Western audience, and those who recluse themselves did not disappear. The project remained also limited in its organizations and audience. However, something distinctive in Daya Krishna’s approach is the visibility that he created. Unlike his predecessors (but also his followers, since I cannot find a movement of that public importance after him), he succeeded, via a sustained effort in publishing the dialogues, in promoting new publications in regional languages and Sanskrit in the journal he edited, in many letters to students, friends, colleagues, and pandits, to bring a public visibility to the saṃvāda project, which he hoped would become a movement. Thus, Daya Krishna tried to institutionalize regular direct contacts in the academic world between different philosophical traditions engaging together on contemporary matters. The project did not avoid the shortcomings and defects of its time in the postcolonial presuppositions that motivated it in terms of Indianness and identity. Nevertheless, in spite of the concrete limits which every practical experiment has to face (see 6.3 on the philosophical dynamic of apprehension facing the limits of realization), the visibility that Daya Krishna succeeded to foster made the project wider. It contributed to transform the prejudices and presuppositions on classical Indian philosophy and to the ‘death’ of Indian philosophy tout court. It created a sense of, if not united community, at least of some scholars of different communities able to dialogue with each other. The variety of forms related to

293 Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xi–xii.
Samvāda and of the dialogical forms that I consider to be a part of the samvāda project, is a key to this success. It is now time to turn to these concrete experiments.
3. Forms of samvādas: Description and Inductive Methodology of Dialogues

“Thus, the spirit of Pune took another turn and the experiment that Rege had launched there, another direction. Issues were framed and sent to possible participants. The stage was set, and we met for a full three days to explore the philosophical dimensions of the Bhakti tradition in India in the heartland of bhakti itself. At times, it almost seemed blasphemous to say the things we said when the eternal flute of the Divine itself called to us every moment to give up the vain, empty, dry world of the intellect and the greeting of the ‘Rādhe Rādhe’ which reminded us of the ecstasy of divine love. But amidst these enticements and allurements what sustained us was the unbelievably long, hard-core tradition of the ever-seeking, ever-doubting sāttvika quest for the ultimate Truth by the buddhi in the Indian tradition, which has never been afraid of raising the most formidable pūrvapakṣas against one’s own position and attempting to answer them.”

294 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, iii.
The description of the different forms of *saṃvādas* that follows does not delimit the definition of the idea of dialogue or even of the *saṃvāda* project to the forms described. This would imply that I consider *saṃvāda* to consist strictly of the experiments that were published or communicated and to define it historically as the sum of the experiments that happened from the early 80ties until 2007. However, as a potential methodology and a philosophical concept, the description of the experiments does not delimit the possibilities for dialoguing between philosophical traditions in general on the account of those that did happen, nor normatively classify them in terms of success and limitations. The following description proceeds from the examples of the experiments as a starting point for inductively abstracting a possible methodology that is grounded on actual scenarios. I analyze the initial intuitions at the origins of the project, but also the conceptual developments from the practice and their relevance to promote visibility to different philosophical communities in the Indian academic world. The description encompasses the intellectual context, incentives and reconstructions, and the philosophical presuppositions upon which the idea of *saṃvāda* has taken form. I also try to give a coherent picture and narration of the experiments that have been organized, less in chronological terms than in reconstructing the conceptual venture that implicitly motivated their undertaking. This part consists therefore less in a historical report than in the presentation of different forms of dialogues and their developments. In recollecting the multiple references, notes, mentions, and anecdotes, I also try to offer a taste of the mass of unrecorded and unpublished dialogues that happened, the spirit in which they were thought and conducted, and a tone of Daya Krishna’s way of philosophizing. Most of these experiments were successively created from the previous ones, as the following of new ideas showing the paths for further steps and creating new dialogues, which were preceding unplanned. The following attempts to give an idea of this process. As guiding-line, Daya Krishna’s ‘Plea for a New History of Philosophy in India’ can be used to illustrate how he conceives research to proceed: although published in a volume of his own article, he emphasizes there the need for collective research and “successive seminars” required to proceed into one’s own research. Let us also note in particular in the following quote his mentioning of “adopting the viewpoint or perspective of someone else”, what one faces in dialogue and relating to the relevance of counter-position (or *pūrvapakṣa*, further analyzed in 5):

“The need for a new history of philosophy in India, thus, can hardly be denied. But even if the plea is accepted, how shall one go about implementing it? The usual method, is for some institution to approach an outstanding scholar to undertake the work who, in turn would ask other scholars to write for the volume. But as they are generally well-known specialists in the field, when they are invited to write upon the subject, they only summarize, repeating what they have already said on the subject. Few scholars are prepared to do any new research to write for a volume edited by someone else and hardly anyone can adopt the viewpoint or perspective of someone else to do the task he/she is asked to do. (…) What, then, is to be done to avoid such a situation? Perhaps, only a long-term plan consisting of diverse strategies at various levels would yield the desired result. One could start with a stock-taking of what has been done, spell out what needs to be done and then locate persons at various levels who could be involved in the thinking and execution of the project. A detailed spelling-out of interrelated research could be given to see that research work is done in those domains. Similarly, successive seminars could be planned in such a way as to explore questions that need and
answer on problems that need to be resolved. The idea of a long term collaborative, cumulative research has not happened in the Humanities though it is now a commonplace in the natural sciences even though it is true that disciplines in the Humanities need this particularly in the contexts of projects such as this. What one needs is imagination, will and commitment to undertake these enterprises. 295

From my meetings with some participants, two attributes defining the samvāda are consensually evoked: the creativity emerging from the dialogical, and the capacity of these to bring people together. In this chapter, I also trace these characteristics from the dialogues themselves, i.e. from the dialogical method practiced. The definition of samvāda indicated previously (2.1), in terms of a multilingual, open and equal (by which I mean against a guru-śisya parampara system) philosophical dialogue between living representatives of the traditions is embodied in the experiments. Daya Krishna’s conception of the idea of samvāda unequivocally coincides with its realization, so that this section parallelly illustrates, explains and completes the definition given previously. Read in the context of postcolonial Indian philosophies elicited before (2.2.1), the context and the inputs that incited the dialogues become clearer in analyzing the platform to integrate different Indian traditions. This chapter therefore surveys how the context preceding enunciated takes form in the samvāda, and what the strategies for putting these principles into action consist in: the creativity expressed by the participants is the creativity felt in exploring a new method of reading and doing (Indian) philosophy.

3.1. Jaipur Experiments

The initial series that I include in the samvāda project are composed of seminars and workshop, whereby they are distinguished from the usual academic seminars in their conception and realization. They were conducted in Daya Krishna’s University of Rajasthan in Jaipur, and named retrospectively the ‘Jaipur experiments’. Diverse in their forms, topics, objectives and success, they constitute a ‘laboratory of dialogical experiments’, which, in the forms of ‘weekly or Wednesday seminars’, evidenced the intellectual vitality of the University of Rajasthan 296. Remembered vividly by all, these seminars seem to have ceased after Daya Krishna 297. But

296 M. R. Ventakesh mentions notably: “It was such small steps that triggered an exciting experiment, a new East-West Encounter in Jaipur. And several of the top Philosophers-intellectuals of the day, from the great Prof. Ramchandra Gandhi, Dr. Rajendra Prasad from IIT-Kanpur, Dr. S. S. Barlingay from University of Pune, Ms. Roop Rekha Verma, Prof. K. J. Shah, a student of Wittgenstein and then teaching at Karnataka University, Dharwar, Dr. S. Sunderarajan from the University of Pune, Ms. Bhuvan Chandel, to the brilliant young star and Tendulkar of the Indian Philosophical scene then, Prof. Arindam Chakrabarti, were all invited for one seminar or the other.” M. R. Ventakesh, A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly: In Memory of Two Indian Philosophers (Chennai: Prism Art Press, 2008), 31.
297 He himselfs comments rather preoccupied when he refers to these Wednesday Seminars: “In fact, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, had witnessed, for years, what I used to call ‘a daily miracle’, at which I myself never ceased to be surprised. Almost every day, we had a seminar at a fixed time on some philosophical topic and invariably fresh perceptions and new points emerged during the course of this
rather than consecutive lectures by renowned philosophers, what demarcates them was an emphasis on dialoguing open to the present audience, conceived as active participants. The participants recall the intense liveliness and demanding philosophical thinking at these occasions. Shail Mayaram writes that

“Philosophy in Jaipur became a public activity - ‘‘Wednesdays with Daya’’— where groups of teachers, researchers, activists, journalists, and others came together for an afternoon of open-ended discussion. Someone would pose a problem, and soon an intense collective exercise in philosophizing would follow. He had a capacity to reframe a question or concern and to show the possibilities that lay buried in a formulation. There were countless occasions when I took my own work/problem to him for discussion. I always came away enriched.”

Rajni Bakshi\textsuperscript{299} evokes the seminars that were organized every week on different themes to which all (undergraduate and postgraduate students, faculty members, etc.) were invited to take part while being considered with the same seriousness and treatments in return in the discussion. She adds that Daya Krishna himself was a “participant like the others, neither omnipresent nor leader, but also not invisible”. These undertakings frame the first regular preliminary form of the \textit{samvāda} project (and relates it to its teachings at the University, see 2.2.2). M. R. Ventakesh narrates that

“Daya Krishna considerably changed student’s perception of a noble subject and his classes or seminars were never for a moment dull. An entire afternoon every week, Dayaji had earmarked for ‘Creative Philosophizing’, when anyone could raise any issue, or present any paper which he thought was of philosophical interest. And then over plates of Jaipuri ‘Kachori’ [North Indian snacks] and steaming hot cups of Rajasthani tea, an animated discussion would follow.”

What should be noticed in this dialogical experimental laboratory is the informal spontaneity of the enterprise, where nothing was either recorded nor planned but organized pursuant to the discussions that aroused. The topics for the next dialogues, the required modifications or the extension of the problems to new concepts were emerging from the dialogue itself, from the epistolary correspondence that followed, and the dialogues also developed due to the coincidences and self-reflexivity of the shared moments. The dialogical experimentation operates when some place is left for the ‘spontaneous’ and ‘unexpected’, maximizing the ‘krishnian-gadamerian’ shock of the encounter above described (2.1). The ‘weekly’ or ‘Wednesday seminars’ with his students and guests – and others, since all were invited - were known to touch all possible topics (from Greek philosophy to Indian, continental philosophy,

\textsuperscript{299} Personal communication with Rajni Bakshi (Mumbai, 18\textsuperscript{th} February 2016).
\textsuperscript{300} Ventakesh, \textit{A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly: In Memory of Two Indian Philosophers}, 30.
ethics, etc.), where each class was “fresh” and “creative”, according to Khawaja\textsuperscript{301}. He accordingly comments on the spontaneous, unprepared and open, yet rigorous exploration of concepts:

“His [Dayaji’s] class was never a one-way traffic of words. It was a real \textit{samvāda} (dialogue) in which all the students and scholars took an active part. Doing a class with Dayaji was like drawing a picture, under the watchful eye of a master artist. Unless and until one has not touched the canvas, or has not made any statement one is absolutely free to try his/her hand on drawing any pictures of his/her choice. The moment one draws a line or makes a statement the logical implications of the act result in some sort of determination. But this determination is subject to one’s creativity and resourcefulness. When the implications of one’s act are pointed out, one may realize one’s stupidity in making the statement or drawing the line, but then it may be erased or modified under the guidance of the master. However the dialogue between the disciple and the master shall have to continue so that the contours of the picture may emerge.”\textsuperscript{302}

The metaphor shows that freshness and creativity do not exclude, but rather require a rigorous logic consisting in defining one’s argument, defending it against counter-arguments exposed by other participants, oneself considering possible counter-arguments, and continuing the argumentation up to one’s abilities. Khawaja specifies that the logical flow characterized the class, and interconnected them, the concept that emerged being explored in the next class. He however notes that besides the rigorous argumentation itself, the weekly seminars, unlike the ‘\textit{samvāda} experiments’ (3.3) and other workshops, were not planified. On the contrary, a precise preparation was necessary for elaborating the questions of the \textit{samvāda}, selecting participants, gaining contacts and organizing larger seminars.

Thus, \textit{samvāda} experiments are paradoxically grounded on a careful planning that allows the spontaneous dialogue, namely an intended framework upon which unintended meetings can take dialogical shape. In other words, a conscious work in the preparation, organization and realization of the setting is required. Evidences of a rigorous report stating of the different stages of the organization of a workshop on ‘Texts and their Interpretations’\textsuperscript{303} (Jaipur, 28\textsuperscript{th} to 31\textsuperscript{th} March 1992) was sent to the Indian Council for Philosophical Research, reproduced in full length for the present work in the Appendix 1\textsuperscript{304}. In summary, the following steps are described:

a) invitations for the workshops explaining the topics, sent to multiple and diverse institutions, encouraging thereby contacts between them.

b) organization of a prior meeting with the participants to explain the purpose and the methodology of the workshop, where suggestions were taken in return to the organization committee.

\textsuperscript{301} Personal communication with Mustafa Khawaja (Delhi, 14\textsuperscript{th} August 2017).
\textsuperscript{302} Mustafa Khawaja, in Mayaram, \textit{Philosophy as Samvāda and Svarāj}, 109.
\textsuperscript{303} Report unpublished and undated (hypothetically from the same year as the workshop, 1992). For all the letters as well as for this report, I owe my gratitude again to Daniel Raveh and Dor Miller, who provided me with all the unpublished documents they could preserve and scan numerically.
\textsuperscript{304} Rajni Bakshi also mentioned another workshop on “The art of commentary” to which I referred earlier, gathering Ulema, Nyāya paṇḍits, Western scholars, etc., which took place in 1987 in Jaipur.
c) a prior experience to practice the methodology presented was organized, where participants were asked to send their answers to the following questions based on some of Plato’s texts:

1. What were the questions or problems to which they (the texts) would be the possible answers or solutions?
2. What are the questions that you can possibly raise with respect to the passages given to you?
3. What are the deficiencies that you find in the contentions made in the paragraphs given to you?
4. In what directions could you possibly develop the thought given in the passages?
5. How would you answer the question or solve the problem independently of the way it has been attempted or answered in the text given to you?”

d) Daya Krishna received the answers with some queries asking for clarifications on the workshop, which led him to publish a “brief statement stating the nature of the experiment”

e) the organization committee was requested to prepare the materials to be used as ‘texts’; they were provided to the participants when they reached the place “with the instruction that they should go through and do the exercise before the actual sessions started.”

These are all preliminary steps to the workshop itself, which shows how the spontaneity of the encounter and the contents explored in the dialogues as well as the opportunities for its further development were enacted, not as formal restriction of the contents and format of a paper, but as a methodological stage. A dialogical setting was carefully organized so as to allow a dialogue to occur. This means concretely a certain consensus, visible in the preliminary steps on the methodology, objectives and framework of the dialogue – even when dialogues aim at connecting different rationality and ways of thinking. Concretely in the case of this workshop, it required before all a certain understanding and agreement on the “approach” of the experiments, in terms of methodology and the purpose of the investigation. I could not locate the annexures mentioned with the details provided, sent as notes and explanation, but it is justified to assume in Daya Krishna’s dialogical context that these aimed at preventing 1) a bare historical presentation of some texts, 2) a repetition of literature theories (or other theories) on what is a text, 3) an exegesis of an authoritative text. The approach rather fosters a critical questioning on the role of texts in different fields. The methodology is also implied in the questions above, which clearly point at a progressive independence from the text to the thinking subject – from the commentary of the texts themselves to a singular answer to the questions themselves, and from an exegetical perspective to a critical questioning of the problems or concepts.

The workshop itself was divided into a “general introduction to the new approach to the texts which was to be experimentally demonstrated at the workshop” and “information regarding the diversity of the notion of the “texts” an “interpretation”, which has emerged in recent time, particularly in the field of Literature, Law, Medicine and History.” This is also perceptible in the advice addressed for further realization, which encourages the ideal preparation of the participants:

“In case such workshops are to be held in future, the preparations should be done well in advance so that the “texts” are sent to the participants beforehand and they be asked to work
The setting of the dialogue also implied an intense individual preparation of the materials, which are collectively shared and together thought about in a *samvāda*. The spontaneity is the result of a specific setting within which participants agreed on the kind of thinking required and on the approach or methodology. This does not mean that only one rationality or kind of thinking can be accepted, but it requires a reflection beforehand on the kinds of argumentation that will contribute to the dialogue. The diversity of topics and resources are even more visible in the Appendix 2 - Discussion on the ‘Gauhati Meeting’ in a letter addressed to Shri Kireet Joshi, Chairman in February 2005 of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research. In this letter, while discussing the possibility of organizing a Gauhati meeting which seems to be rather organized for students, Daya Krishna gives a wide range of possible topics: classical and contemporary, based on original Sanskrit sources and contemporary English discussion in India on Kant, analytical and continental topics, etc. The questions that are suggested to be raised to the students are methodologically quite close to the ones of the seminar and show the same progression from an understanding of the philosophical problem to an independent critical assessment and further exploration of the problem. The last question further encourages to argue with, i.e. to engage with the author, by directly assessing one’s argument vis à vis the initial position.

“(a) What is the question or the problem which the author is trying to answer or solve here?
(b) Do you consider the answer or the solution satisfactory? If not, why not?
(c) How would you extend the thought expressed in these pages/paragraphs further?
(d) What would be your own answer to the question or solution of the problem concerned?
(e) What are your grounds for thinking your solution is more satisfactory than that of the author?”

305 For instance:
“(a) *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 2. 4. 8. and the discussion on it in Śābara-bhāṣya (Gaṅgānāth Jhā’s translation).
(b) The discussion in Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on the Brahma Sūtra 1. 3. 34 to 38 and its comparison with the discussion on the same issue on the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 6. 1. 4. onwards in Śābara-bhāṣya (op. cit.).
(c) The whole of the discussion on Brahma Sūtra 3. 4. 1. in Śaṅkara Bhāṣya is to be analysed and commented upon.(…)

Western Philosophy
(b) Kant’s arguments in the Transcendental Analytic in his Table of Judgement and the Categories of Understanding.
(c) “Kant’s Doctrine of the Categories, Some Questions and problems” Daya Krishna, JICPR. Vol. XVIII No. 4. P. 1-11.
(e) “Binod Kumar Agarwala’s Response to Daya Krishna’s Essay on Kant’s Categories, R. S. Bhatnagar. JICPR Vol. XIX No.4 P/137-147.
(i) The analysis of the statement “X is Good” by Moore and Stevenson.” See the Appendix 2.
This pedagogical and methodological approach also means that people who participated agreed with the broad lines of his ‘dialoguing with a text’. The setting was discussed beforehand and could naturally be questioned. However, at the time of the encounter, an overall agreement had been made on the objectives and approaches, which seems to be the necessary condition for dialogue. These conditions are for me understood in terms of the specific ‘seekings for knowledge’ that define the broad orientation of a particular dialogue. These concrete orientations here described thus form the practical counterpart to the values (puruṣārtha) as desires to know that are philosophically investigated in chapter 6.

The Jaipur experiments also set up an academic engagement with paṇḍīts who came to teach in the philosophy Department, fostering their visibility into the Western-mode of philosophical training. Daya Krishna reports:

“We, in the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, have had several experiments of this kind. Firstly, in the Department we have had an exchange of teachers between our Department and the Sanskrit College in Jaipur City. One of their traditional pundits has come to the Department and has held a long series of seminars with our colleagues and we have studied some texts with him. On the other hand, some of our teachers have offered to go to the Sanskrit College in the town to do courses in western philosophy with their students. However, that part of the exchange has not been so successful as they do not seem to be interested in what we have to offer.”

Raghuramaraju uses these reservations expressed on the success of the project to denounce the initiative itself (see 3.4). To me these are rather indications of actual difficulties to engage between philosophical traditions. Indeed, there are real obstacles in entering the Sanskrit philosophical communities: locating and accessing members of a community outside the mainstream, and even more establishing a trust and raising interest to different contents and methods than the ones already mastered. This constituted a much greater challenge, which deserves a few comments. It is difficult to exactly record the proportion of refusal from paṇḍīts to enter in dialogue, logically because it is difficult to record silence (in terms of those who did not answer), even if some comments of the type quoted above attest of a gradual, relative or partial success of saṃvāda in terms of penetrating Sanskrit philosophical communities. Conversely, these difficulties justify Daya Krishna’s insistence for an “open” dialogue and give us a glimpse at the efforts made to reach out paṇḍīts for building the saṃvāda project.

Besides the direct intra-cultural dialogues, and the seminars preparing them, another kind of dialogue happened in Jaipur (thereby often included in the Jaipur experiment’s series) in the early eighties. It was referred to as the ‘Interdisciplinary group’, an outcome of which has been

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306 Daya Krishna also mentions the organisation of Summer and Winter schools in Modern Logic and Navyā-Nyāya for traditional and modern scholars together and seminars on comparative logic following the Pune experiment. Daya Krishna et al., Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xiv. In a letter sent to Sharad Deshpande, M. P. Rege invited him to join the “Summer School for Pandits in Western Logic”, from May 25th to June 6th 1987 in Wai (Maharashtra), where the Sanskrit scholars Dr. Pralhadachar and S. R. Bhat introduced sections on inference to western-trained philosophers. These schools seem to have met interest and success, but the other way was more difficult to institute. Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 311.

307 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions, xxxiii–xxiv.
published in the book *India’s Intellectual Traditions* \(^{308}\) in 1987. It involved Anglophone Indian academics trained in different disciplines such as sociology, philosophy and arts, discussing the classical texts of the Indian traditions, in particular of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. The difference between this project and the *saṃvāda* with *pandīts* is stated during the preliminary meeting organized to this dialogue, defining the objectives, methodology and goals. Daya Krishna explained that these meetings are intended to create a shift in perspective: “We are not trying to understand the classical tradition as the pundits apprehend it. We are trying to see if there is an implicit conceptual structure in the Indian tradition which can be brought to the surface and stated in modern terms.” \(^{309}\) This endeavor can be regarded as a reflection on how to elaborate methodologies for social sciences proper to articulate Indian traditions and in interdisciplinary contemporary readings of classical texts, such as the *Manusmṛti* (in which case a relevant question is “what is living and what is dead in *Manu*” \(^{310}\)) or the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

“It [this work] seeks a conceptual articulation of the intellectual tradition in different fields of knowledge in order to use it creatively for extending, deepening and enhancing knowledge in these domains. Thus, its primary purpose is not to *understand* the texts in which these conceptual structures are embedded, but rather to free these structures from their moorings so that they may become *available* for diverse cognitive purposes. It is true that concepts find their meaning in interrelationship with other concepts and in the context of their applicability to the fields they refer to. But both the applicability and the interrelationships go on changing over time in response to the cognitive needs of the thinkers and the times. (...) It [the task] is to discover the intellectual idiom of the past, or to vary the metaphor, to take possession of the intellectual patrimony which is ours by right and use it to advance the cognitive enterprise of mankind today.” \(^{311}\)

However, in the published edition, the dialogical dimension is difficult to grasp, since, although the group developed reflection on the approach, methodology, aims and content (recalled by the introduction) in meetings, the publication did not keep the dialogical form, except for the summary of the discussions of the preliminary meeting. The reader has to rely on the report of the introduction to imagine the dialogues, and otherwise use the individual contributions. This project also has met with some difficulties in a long run, showing a gradual disengagement from the participants \(^{312}\).

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\(^{308}\) Daya Krishna, *India’s Intellectual Traditions*.

\(^{309}\) Daya Krishna, xxiii–xxiv.

\(^{310}\) Daya Krishna, 57.

\(^{311}\) Daya Krishna, xiii–xiv.

\(^{312}\) In an indirect way, these difficulties were productive as an incentive for Daya Krishna to continue his research: “However, the ‘Jaipur Experiment’, as Daya Krishna recalled later, aimed at critically rearticulating India’s Intellectual traditions, began “losing momentum sometime after 1985”, following the ‘untimely death’ of Prof. A. M. Ghosh, a close associate of Dayaji in his department. (...) Stating that the idea of the ‘Jaipur Experiment’ emerged from a lecture by Prof. S. C. Dube, sometime in 1983, Daya Krishna writing about it once said, “the collective thinking on the subject by the interdisciplinary group at Jaipur as well as other convergent ‘experiments’ initiated by Prof. M. P. Rege, resulted in the publication of ‘Saṃvada’. Yet, it began to lose steam after some years as Dayaji acknowledged. “Though occasional meetings of the group continued, we gradually began to realize that we could not proceed significantly beyond what had been achieved so far. I realized then that, ultimately, one ‘individual’ effort would enable us to take any further steps towards the goal that we had set ourselves”, reflected Dayaji on the turn the ‘Jaipur Experiment’ had taken.” Ventakesh, *A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly: In Memory of Two Indian Philosophers*, 31–32.
“There has been so much talk of ‘indigenization’, and so little real attempt at doing it, that one wonders if those who talk are really serious about it. It reminds one very much of those who talk and write incessantly about ‘revolution’ and ‘praxis’ without engaging in any action to change things where they happen to be located. Yet, reflecting the next day on what I had said, I felt why should we not start the game ourselves. And so, what may be called ‘The Jaipur Experiment’ was born. Sometimes in early eighties, a meeting of persons from various disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities was called and, initially, the group met every week to keep the flame alive and the enthusiasm going. The group called itself ‘The Interdisciplinary Group’ and later met at more infrequent intervals, fortnightly or monthly. Since my retirement from the University, the meetings have become even more infrequent, though these are still held to remind ourselves of the promises that we had made and the task we had undertaken. Many of the early members of the group have lost interest; some even turned ‘hostile’ to the very spirit of the enterprise. One such person recently remarked to me that it was a ‘racist enterprise’. But a ‘hard core’ remains and, hopefully, might attract new enthusiasts in the future. In fact, it was to attract such new enthusiasts that we persuaded the Indian Council of Philosophical Research to fund a seminar on the subject. The idea that there is a hard-core intellectual tradition in India, and that it is differentiated according to different fields of knowledge is so alien to the prevailing intellectual ethos of the country, that we did not even know who amongst the scholars in the social sciences and the humanities would be interested in the enterprise.” 313

The project can be suspiciously scrutinized indeed considering the emphasis on a specific Indian intellectual tradition, what Daya Krishna calls “hard-core intellectual tradition in India”. It could imply a nativist or nationalist motivation of the type developed by the earlier generation of Indian philosophers during the colonization, who were looking for specific ‘Indian’ characteristics (see the problems of these conceptions in (2.2.1). If the formulation of this presentation remains dubious, the project put into the perspective of Daya Krishna’s work, who was himself dedicated to deconstruct such monolithic categorizations of philosophies, can be understood as a counter-perspective to the monopoly of the Western methodologies in social sciences. While the content of social sciences varies and includes different geographical zones and cultures, Daya Krishna reacted against the lack of alternative methodology to analyze the different cultural data, and in particular against the lack of an Indian methodology to apply to Indian data. Relating his approach to the work of Veena Das and Sudhir Kakar for their sensitivity to the implicit and the ambivalences in shifting conceptual structures when analyzing one’s own tradition (see 1.2.1), he emphasizes the need to conduct further research in these directions in different fields, in particular to analyze conceptual categories and methodologies. It is, I believe, in this sense that the Interdisciplinary Group was formed. In spite of the criticism, Daya Krishna did consider this publication as a success for his approach, as reported below.

“The only substantive result, besides the new and radical formulation of the Nyāya position with regard to Atman in Pandit Badrinath Shukla’s lecture, and the publication of India’s Intellectual Traditions, giving a tentative preliminary account of the attempt at conceptual reconstructions in the field of sociology, political science, aesthetics, and law, has been the change of awareness and atmosphere with regard to the urgency of establishing critical and creative linkages with the cognitive traditions of India.” 314

313 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions, ix.
The ‘Jaipur Experiments’ had no definite form, and mitigated successful results, which is easily understandable if one considers it as a ‘raw laboratory for thinking’. Jaipur was home to the first ideas and experimentations in Daya Krishna’s own university. It is mostly the place where the topics and methodologies were tested and renewed continuously. While some methodologies made their proof, in particular the pedagogical methodology of critically revealing one’s presuppositions and elaborating creative counter-positions (see 5), others did not lead to a larger audience, or met with critiques, as above mentioned (see 6.3 for thinking these as part of a dynamic developed in the gap between ideality and reality of ideas). The idea was more ‘attempting’ and renewing both the methodology of looking at concepts, the audience and the behavior of participating, and creating a common brainstorming, a resource for situating and exploring new problems. Discovering connections between concepts and confronting one’s intuition and logic was the aim and result of the project, i.e. in other words, exploring the potential creativity.

3.2. Editing the Journal of Indian Council for Philosophical Research

The dialogical attempt of the editorship of the Journal of Indian Council for Philosophical Research (henceforth JICPR), which Daya Krishna edited from 1990 (Vol. VII (1)) until 2007, is to be found at two significant places. It is firstly visible in the setting, in the modifications of the structure itself of the Journal, making gradually more space to collective new columns such as “Notes and Queries”315 and “Discussion and Comments (1992 onwards)316, and later “Focus” and Agenda for Research” (1997 onwards 317), where short notes of a philosopher were discussed upon through several issues by others, as an uninterrupted dialogue.

Secondly, although unpublished, attempts at dialogical outcome can be found in the background of the editing process. In the epistolary exchanges for the account of the JICPR, Daya Krishna reveals an intense philosophical engagement in his lengthy answers to each submission for articles. He vividly encourages new philosophical initiatives, sends equally sharp critiques on the articles received, trying to provoke incentives and dialogues. He also discusses how to include more intra- and inter-cultural traditions and multilingual contributions in the journal and how to break with the mono-Western/Indian comparative framework.318 Each submission

315 In the publication of the collection of these columns by R. S. Bhatnagar, the introduction written by Yogesh Gupta dates the apparition of Notes and Queries from Vol X. (1), in Sept-Dec. 1992, with the following introduction by Daya Krishna: “With this issue, we are starting a new section entitled Notes and Queries in the JICPR. Most students of the subject have always some problems with what they read, or will like something to be clarified about which they are in doubt as to whether what they understand is correct or not. The section will provide a forum for all such queries and it is hoped that eminent scholars of the subject will help in elucidating and clarifying the issues so raised. Readers are invited to take advantage of this new forum in the JICPR.”

316 Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, Agenda for Research in Indian and Western Philosophy, First edition (Jaipur: UGC, ASIHSs Programme, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan and Literary Circle, 2013), iii.

317 Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, v–vi.

318 In an unpublished letter to a colleague announcing him the launching of a new Journal, dated 20.07.2007, Daya Krishna answers with his best wishes to the editor, mentioning also the awaiting challenges of such a task: “There is also the problem that most of our good people are stuck, and perhaps rightly so, with Western thought and are
was returned with a detailed comment on the conceptual implication of the article, its contemporary relevance and possible utilizations for further explorations of the concepts. He addressed potential critiques on the approach taken, and refused any purely historical exposition or repetition of an argument already established elsewhere, asked for more clarity, not hesitating to suggest counterpositions or alternatives. However, admittedly, it is probable that in most of the cases the communication must have been abruptly, since in such a configuration of reviewer, what Daya Krishna must have received back is at its best a revision of the articles he returned. Indeed, being the editor, i.e. in this case the authority accepting or declining the submissions for publications, a certain asymmetry, as mentioned in the introduction in cases of lectures, must have been felt. In any case, only little answers to the reviews are to be found in the remaining piles of letters, either because they have remained with the addresser or because of a lack of answer.

Coming back to the configuration of the Journal, Jay Garfield and Arindam Chakrabarty draw an interesting comparison in their memorial tribute to Daya Krishna, when they mention that “he also contributed to it in a constant flurry of short notes and questions for discussion. These were the philosophical precursors of today’s blogs, and inspired a great deal of philosophical work.”

The image of philosophical blog illustrates both the form and the function of these columns: brief notes that raise attention on new or unnoticed publications, on a problem or a question one had currently in mind, roughly thought, like the preliminary notes one makes before composing it through in a book or an article. Similarly, these columns were conceived as a collective platform for research, first to bring one’s own research into the light, and moreover to collaborate on open questions or exchange on each other current research. Daya Krishna himself was in the front line a ‘user’ and contributor of this ‘blog’, regularly looking for help on his own issues (the dates of publications of his questions fit his forthcoming publications) and equally responding to others. In this type of correspondence, but also in all the other forms of the dialogical experiments, Daya Krishna himself learns, in particular in his study on the Indian traditions, which he entirely conceived as a collaborative enterprise - learning from experts and questioning what he learned.

At this ‘unfinished’ state and therefore ‘open form’, these notes could however arouse more diverse reactions: not (yet) definite in a systematic argumentation and rhetoric ornament,

safeguarded by a whole of authoritative references that would prevent any intrusion, the ‘naked’ thought can still benefit from inputs in various directions and be connected in different networks of concepts and different traditions of thinking. Plus, the final writing eliminates options and hypotheses that were inadequate or wrong, something that remains in the stage of the blog, and can be a springboard for discussing alternatives, counterpositions, modifications, and suggest other alternatives, if discussed collectively. In this regard Khawaja reflected with me on the oral dimension of dialogues in contrast to writings that we continuously re-work and improve. He specified that in dialogues, unlike in writings, once something is said, it cannot be erased, even if it is a mistake: it has to be worked upon in the dialogue where all statements count, so that counterpositions and better counterarguments have to be established to draw the logical argumentation from the initial hypothesis. Similarly, in the blog, a wider spectrum of positions and counterpositions can be carved out from the collaborative research at the very level of hypotheses, prior to the completion or the reviews written on a finished product. This corresponds in a sense to the ‘advantage of being ignorant’ discussed in 6.2.1 and concretely explicates Daya Krishna’s emphasis on ‘thinking’ rather than definitive ‘thought’, i.e. considering the potentiality of of still open-ended propositions.

The content was consequently varied according to the authors’ interests and current works: some focuses and attention brought to unnoticed publications, agendas suggesting further possible research worth to be undertaken, short notes on new publications, less as a review than a personal assessment of their contributions with regard to one’s interests, informal notes

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320 Personal communication with Mustafa Khawaja (Delhi, 14.08.2017)

321 For example, a call for further work by Daya Krishna: “Philosophical writing in India is generally assumed as being confined to either the English or the Sanskrit language. Normally, no one expects any significant philosophical activity to occur in any of the other Indian languages. However, a book published some 20 years ago draws the reader’s attention to the existence of philosophical writing in Indian languages. Edited by Professor V. M. Bedekar, the book *Philosophical Writings in Fifteen Modern Indian Languages* is published by Continental Prakashan, Vijaynagar, Pune, 1979 (p.342, Rs. 45). The information provided in this book covers the period up to 1975 only. The contents need to be up-dated so that information regarding any work that has been done later in these languages is also available.”\footnote{Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, *Agenda for Research in Indian and Western Philosophy*, 393–94 Vol. 2.}

322 Example at a general conceptual level (agendas are also suggested in cases of a single author): “Questions of morality are generally discussed in respect of actions of an individual, and not of groups or institutions or political entities such as nation-states. There is, of course, some sort of a value judgement on the actions of groups and institutions and an attempt to regulate their behavior as they function within the jurisdiction of a polity which has control over them. The relation between politics, however, is not usually governed in such a way as they are supposed to be sovereign in character. The problem of moral values and norms that should govern this relationship between a plurality of equally sovereign and independent states deserves exploration, particularly in the light of the global situation emerging today.” Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, 31.

323 For example: “The awareness that there are diverse philosophical traditions, particularly the Western, the Indian and the Chinese has been haunting the philosophical consciousness for quite some time. But ‘Comparative Philosophy’ as it has been called, has not yet come into its own as the three great traditions in philosophy have generally failed to be seen in a unified perspective. The difficulty is perhaps irresolvable as each has a unique singularity of its own. A significant and fruitful attempt in this direction has recently been made by Professor Ben-Ami Scharfstein in his *A Comparative History of World Philosophy from the Upanishads to Kant*, State University of New York, 1998, pp. 683. A cursory look at the title and contents of the chapters will reveal both the scope and the exercise that author has tried to achieve in this work.”\footnote{Table of content follows}. Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, 417–18.
and thoughts about a concept or a problem, etc – from Kant\textsuperscript{324} to vernacular Indian philosophy via Arabic and Jewish philosophy\textsuperscript{325}. Daya Krishna assesses the potential of their creativity as follows:

“These queries evoked a number of responses from various persons and provided some clarification regarding the issues that were raised. However, they themselves brought to light not only deep differences in the understanding of what was sought to be clarified, but also raised new issues which have not yet been highlighted or become the focus of further discussion” \textsuperscript{326}

This ‘naked’ form of thoughts formed a tank for issues and topics, which could be further explored in the dialogical experiments, questions redirected to the audience who had the expertise to discuss them, and connecting scholars among and outside of academia who reacted differently on these notes. The JICPR was so to say a pre-test in its form and its process: it constituted a preliminary test for evaluating the potentiality of a topic or a set of questions to enhance a dialogue, to be responded to, prompt to incite reactions from different thinkers or different philosophical traditions. Posthumously, R. S. Bhatnagar proceeded into publishing these queries and notes, otherwise spread out through decades of the Journal, into two volumes, leaving the questions raised as material for further research and dialogues.\textsuperscript{327}

As expected, and as in the case of blogs, responses differed: not all issues arouse interest and/or answers, some others moved into long discussions with unexpected perspectives opening through several issues of the JICPR, which led some of them to be afterwards republished together in a volume entitled Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy.\textsuperscript{328} In the preface of this publication, Daya Krishna connects the ‘blog-type’ exchanges of these columns to the \textit{saṃvāda} experiments:

“The story started, as it always does, by a ‘chance’ encounter with a ‘stray’ quotation from Staal by Wendy O’Flaherty in her Introduction to the Volume on Karma edited by her. The quotation seemed to present, at least prima facie, a view of oblation in the Vedic sacrifice, or \textit{dravya-tyāga}, which was mistaken. The obvious solution was to find from reputed Mīmāṃśā scholars the ‘authoritative’ view on the subject and in case it conflicted with Staal’s interpretation, send the same to him so that he could defend his own interpretation against theirs. Accordingly, Staal’s view was translated into Sanskrit, sent to Pt Pattabhiram Sastri, Remella Suryaprakasa Sastri, Ramanuja Tatakarya and Professor K. T. Pandurangi. They all cooperated in the experiment and their comments along with Professor Staal’s reply were published in different issues of the JICPR and are reprinted in this collection for the reader’s benefit. (…) \textit{Saṃvāda} was the first experiment of this type, planned and executed by Professor M. P. Rege, who is now no more. (…) The Rege experiment which occurred at Poona had had slow, but lasting, effect on the ‘understanding’ of Indian philosophy in this country. The

\textsuperscript{324} The discussion on Kant was quite fertile and extended throughout the issues. For an example on a brief “work note”: “What is the relations between theoretical and practical reason in Kant? What is the difference in Practical Reason as evidenced in the prudential action on the one hand and the one displayed in Moral action?” A longer reply was attempted by R. K. Gupta, Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, 324–26.
\textsuperscript{325} Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, 396–98.
\textsuperscript{326} Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, iii–iv.
\textsuperscript{327} Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, \textit{Agenda for Research in Indian and Western Philosophy.}
\textsuperscript{328} Daya Krishna, ed., \textit{Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy: Issues in Vedaṇṭa, Mīmāṃśā, and Nyāya} (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2004). Not all issues raised in the JICPR were published in this volume.
discussions and debate collected in this volume are a continuation of that ‘experiment’ and an
evidence of its influence over the intervening years. An ‘invisible’ change has, however,
ocurred during this period as the focus of attention has shifted from the ‘external’ ‘reference
point’ of Western philosophy to something that was ‘internal’ and immanent to the tradition of
Indian philosophizing itself. The debate with the exponents of Indian philosophy in the West
is still marginally here, but gradually the students and practitioners of Indian philosophy in
India are discussing and rediscovering a rich field of diversity, conflict and ambiguity in the
tradition that challenges debate, discussion and exploration resulting in a ‘new’ partnership
between traditionally trained Pandits and modern University-trained philosophy persons in the
country. This has already resulted in incalculable benefit to both the parties concerned, as
Indian philosophy becomes once again, a matter of ‘living concern’ to the practicing
‘philosophers’ in the country.”

In so doing, the JICPR constituted the platform of discussion which slowly and partially
succeeded to integrate different traditions of philosophizing in India and abroad. Daya Krishna
collaborated with the journals in regional languages, himself publishing in Hindi and trying to
get translations of some Hindi articles, and wished to introduce a column in Sanskrit, something
that was left unachieved until now. Extending the visibility of the diversity of philosophizing
in India has been an overarching objective, something that was also reflected in the edition of
the Who’s Who, hoping for creating one philosophical community in India, while however
preserving the heterogeneity of its different traditions in a dialogical engagement.

“One of Daya Krishna’s outstanding contributions has been his long Editorship of the Journal
of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (JICPR). And in that job, he never lost sight
of the need for documenting the basic approach of great Indian thinkers of his time, even if
they were not exactly his contemporaries.

A classic case in point is the story of the late Prof. C. T. K. Chari, an outstanding and original
thinker and an unparalleled teacher of Philosophy for nearly four decades at the Madras
Christian College in Tambaram near Chennai. Dr. Chari, at his suburban home that he
symbolically called ‘The Cloister’, died virtually unknown and unsung on January 4, 1993 at
the age of 83. Even the local newspapers did not report his death then.

But the moment Prof. Daya Krishna came to know about Dr. Chari’s death in Chennai, he
immediately wrote a letter to me as a former student, asking whether someone could write an
obituary piece on the legendary Dr. Chari for publication in the JICPR. Such was Dayaji’s
concern for chronicling the lives of great Indian thinkers for posterity’s benefit.”

Due to its regular publication and the continuity of the work, Daya Krishna used this platform
to answer some problems of division of philosophical communities exposed in (2.2.1) and to
inter-connect the different micro-groups of the philosophical worlds.

To summarize, the Jaipur experiments and the edition of the JICPR were the platforms for long-
term ‘testing’ and developing the saṃvādas. They constituted preliminary stages of the more
formal saṃvādas. I mean formal in terms of academic support, which required a more exact
preparation and organization. The Jaipur experiments and the JICPR offered a constant space

329 Daya Krishna, xiii.
330 Mentioned by Daniel Raveh in his introduction to Daya Krishna, Civilizations, xxi.
331 Daya Krishna, Who’s Who of Teachers and Scholars in Philosophy in India.
332 Ventakesh, A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly: In Memory of Two Indian Philosophers, 34.
for short-term ventures in their most heteroclite forms: they engaged with interdisciplinaryity, interculturality, tried to restructure the ‘lecture’ form of academia, and used the opportunity of a journal to institute dialogue in writings. Naturally, some of these forms did not hold and topics were left apart. Critiques were raised against some attempts such as the interdisciplinary groups, the letters might have often not found responses in the cases of harsh critiques emitted by Daya Krishna as the editor, many notes and topics suggested in the JICPR have not been taken up for further consideration, and probably some topics were considered irrelevant. In spite of Daya Krishna’s commitment to including vernaculars and Sanskrit, the JICPR remained an English-speaking platform. However, these steps and these preliminary stages were crucial to Daya Krishna experiments: they were first platforms of possible encounters without further commitment required, in particular in the JICPR where no long-term implication nor traveling was necessary to participate. They created contacts and generated conceptual resources to be further used in personal research or collective dialogues, to which I now turn.

3.3. Saṃvāda Experiments

One step leading to another, the organization of the saṃvāda experiments took place, with the twofold objectives of connecting and dialoguing between philosophical traditions, and doing it so in a contemporary way. This constitutes the epitome of the challenge described above, of interconnecting different isolated philosophical communities in multilingual platforms allowing for thinking originating from different conceptual structures. It differs from the other dialogical forms here inasmuch as it directly integrated paṇḍits or ulema at the core of the entreprise, forming a direct dialogue between philosophical traditions on contemporary issues. Shail Mayaram describes them thus:

“A series of dialogues were organized with traditional Indian scholars, the paṇḍits. Seminars would always be held with plenty of breaks to let ideas seep in, and they always needed good food, particularly sweets, and sometimes novel venues. (…) The pattern was similar: The purpose was to confront traditional Indian scholars with a set of new questions, to de-fossilize traditional Indian Philosophy, as it were, in order to spur a new impetus to thought.” 333

‘Confronting’ implies articulating questions from a Western perspective to be investigated by the classical ones, after having them translated in the relevant language. It was confrontative in the sense that it fostered debates, which demanded unusual questions from the perspective of the respondent, and necessitated thinking new argumentations in displacing one’s usual set of analysis. For such ‘confrontations’ to actually arise (and not to disperse into uncomfortable silent and diverting answers) necessitates a precise organization and pre-conditions: the first is to render feasible the encounter itself, materially and mentally in acknowledging the very possibility of contemporary Indian philosophy to exist in Sanskrit and English simultaneously, by paṇḍits and academic philosophers together. Before I describe the experiments individually, let us look at the general project that was aimed under the umbrella of the ‘saṃvāda experiment’.

333 Mayaram, “Daya Krishna,” 442.
The first aim of any dialogical experiment referred to as *saṃvāda* was to immediately confront philosophical traditions today. Daya Krishna mentions mutual recognition of two ‘contemporary’ traditions by the first ‘*saṃvāda*’ or Pune experiment, provoking the excitement of such an encounter:

“Samvāda was the first experiment of this type, planned and executed by Professor M. P. Rege, who is now no more. His death on the 28th of December, 2000 has deprived the philosophical world of one of the most ‘imaginative’ experimenters who brought the active practitioners of the two philosophical traditions, the Indian and the Western, in a dialogical situation where each was ‘forced’ to ‘existentially’ face the ‘living’ tradition of a different way of philosophizing. The Rege experiment which occurred at Poona has had slow, but lasting, effect on the ‘understanding’ of Indian philosophy in this country.”

To begin with, the encounter “broke the ice” between communities, beyond the frozen pictures and prejudices of each other, to create an embodied presence that concretizes the diversity of philosophizing. In directly engaging with the traditions from the perspective of those for whom it is alive, it also incarnated the contemporization of classical Indian philosophy described in the definition of *saṃvāda* above (2.1). In a letter to a *paṇḍit* dated from the 12. 05. 2006, Daya Krishna writes, while working in the background on the organization: “what we really want to know is how a person primarily trained in Sanskrit feels about the book and whether he/she thinks that he/she get some idea of what another philosophical tradition has thought about the problem he is familiar with.” The liveliness, however, is not to be understood in the sense of describing, in an anthropological study, indigenous philosophical communities today preserved from the mainstream Indian academics, but in including them as contemporary actors of philosophy and dialoguing together for the purpose of creative inter-thinking. The liveliness therefore leads to creativity, a relation that Daya Krishna conceptualizes in the presentation of the objectives of the second published *saṃvāda* on Bhakti:

“If knowledge claims universality, then, in each field there are contemporary issues engaging the best minds of the world today; so, if the tradition has real vitality, if the carriers of traditional knowledge have real knowledge, then they must be able to tackle contemporary intellectual issues in the perspective of their own traditions of knowledge. Therefore, we formulate contemporary intellectual issues in Sanskrit or in Arabic, place them before classical scholars and ask them to respond to them. In turn, we critically respond to their responses, and so the dialogue goes on. We have done this until now in the field of contemporary philosophical problems, and current issues in linguistics.”

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334 Daya Krishna, *Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy*, xiii.
335 “The meetings and the dialogues gradually broke the ice between the representatives of the two philosophical traditions in India and established a rapport between the two groups, resulting not only in a profound intellectual respect for each other, but also in the exhilarating discovery of philosophically exciting differences in the way problems were perceived, questions posed, answers attempted and solutions sought. A contrasting analysis which leads in a different direction and gradually builds an imposing structure of philosophical construction over millennia is something whose possibility one can not even conceive of if one is confined to one philosophical tradition alone, which one inevitably treats as the only possible tradition and hence as universally paradigmatic in character.” Daya Krishna et al., *Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions*, 75.
Methodologically, it circumvents the biases implied in the status, authority and legitimacy of the * tertium comparationis* in comparison. Since the comparer approaches the * comparanda* in a defined aspect from his/her own limited perspective, the imbalance denounced by the implicit favoring (in terms of knowledge abilities if not of preference, usually Western) is here avoided. Secondly, *samvāda* is valuable for the space it leaves to the traditions (usually located at the margins) to structure their discourse as they conceive it, rather than in the terms elaborated for them by Anglophone philosophers trained in second-hand sources or Indologists trained in a foreign conceptual structure. In so doing, it also circumvents the postcolonial dilemma of having to answer a foreign conceptualization and/or compartmentalization, and having to structure one’s categories according to the expectations of the more powerful other, which is faced by Anglophone Indian philosophers (see 1.2.2 and 2.2.1). One critique that one could already anticipate in Daya Krishna’s above formulation concerns the methodology, when he mentions that “we formulate contemporary intellectual issues in Sanskrit or in Arabic, place them before classical scholars and ask them to respond to them”338. This still implies that Anglophone Indian philosophers position themselves as the questioners to whom *pandits must* answer, even if they can reformulate the issues and/or counter-question the assumptions presupposed by the questions. This critique, inherent to the conception of *samvāda*, is addressed (with Raghuramaraju’s) in the section 3.4.

Nevertheless, in responding to contemporary question, they are in the position of themselves articulating their traditions vis-à-vis these questions, which means that the contemporization is not imposed. This is what Daya Krishna conceives when he speaks of ‘living’ traditions. Methodologically, this finally circumvents the inherent risk entailed in comparative philosophy of substantializing philosophies. When comparative philosophy relates concepts seen from a historical perspective, it implies a fixity and a closure in the concepts frozen by the textual exegesis. It becomes therefore difficult to instigate further modifications and to dynamically connect these entities seen from such a perspective, which creates difficulties for cross-cultural dialogues. On the contrary, a living tradition means that modifications and transformations *within* the tradition still occur through multiple comparing subjects. This strategy is also suggested by J. L. Mehta as a necessary, although softly, ‘modernizing’ of philosophy:

> “Modernizing what goes on in any department of the arts faculty, Sanskrit, Arabic or Philosophy, is to take these subjects out of their confinement within ancient scholarship and to

337 “A specialist of contemporary ethics might be comparing early Chinese and Greek ethics while being unfamiliar with both and claiming a roughly equal interest in their respective ethics and their notion of honor. But, of course, the comparer in this case is a specialist of contemporary (let us admit with self-critical candor, Western) ethics, or, if no specialist, is at least familiar with ethics to some degree. From this point of view, it might be fair to say that each comparer sets out to compare from the standpoint of a certain “cultural tradition”. This can be phrased more hermeneutically or it can be fashioned as an implicit comparison so that our example would feature three rather than two * comparanda* at work (contemporary ethics, Chinese ethics, and Greek ethics), with the comparer being more familiar with one * comparandum* (contemporary ethics) than with the other other * comparanda* (Chinese ethics and Greek ethics). In each way, the comparer emerges as a further variable to content with.” Chakrabarti and Weber, *Comparative Philosophy without Borders*, 7.

make them contemporary in their relevance, appropriable in the present, literally translating their meaningfulness from the past into the present.”

However, typically for Mehta, this modernization implies to go through a Western reinterpretation of classical Indian philosophies, namely to filter the subjects through Western categories of analysis:

“A scholar of Tulasi Das, for example, may wake up to a new approach to his past, and to what it means to be a poet, and suddenly see that Tulasi is indeed modern and speaks to us with a living voice. He is more likely to succeed in this if he is not only steeped in his own literary and religious tradition but also has an alert eye on what is being done by literary critics and theorists in Western countries.”

This resembles and yet differs from Daya Krishna: the basic logic of enriching via knowing from more traditions than one’s own is nothing foreign to Daya Krishna and belongs to the process by which the \textit{samvādas} are conducted. Indeed, questions from, for example, Western logic are posed to \textit{pandits}. However, Daya Krishna perceived this process in a bidirectional procedure: he himself profited and enjoyed the reverse process, namely to learn from the Sanskrit categories thinking Western problems. This reciprocity is not implied in Mehta’s statement, who conceived the Westernization as a necessity.

\subsection{Pune Experiment.}

The first dialogue explicitly presented as \textit{samvāda}, was held in Pune from July 11\textsuperscript{th} to the 16\textsuperscript{th} 1983, organized by M. P. Rege (Professor, University of Pune) with close assistance by Francine and Daya Krishna, and published bilingually in a Sanskrit-English edition by Mukund Lath and Francine Krishna in 1991. It consisted in reinterpreting the concept of proposition from Russell, in Sanskrit and English simultaneously. For a dialogue to happen between these two worlds, however, the text, the questions had to be carefully selected and formulated. M. P. Rege justifies his choice in his introduction:

“I selected Russell’s theory of the nature of proposition as presented in his \textit{Principles of Mathematics} as the subject of the dialogue because it represents something like an attempt to make a new beginning in philosophical analysis by turning one’s back on what has gone on before. I thought that it would therefore be comparatively easier to put the theory across to \textit{pandits} as its exposition would not demand many references to the tenets and arguments of earlier schools and thinkers, and the points of agreement and disagreement between them. Also Russell’s realistic and analytical approach has an obvious affinity with that of Nyāya and

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339 Mehta, \textit{Philosophy and Religion}, 232. \\
340 Mehta, 232. \\
341 The following comment of Mehta is a reaction to the Heideggerian ‘Europeanization of the Earth’: “There is no other way open, to us in the East, but to go along with this Europeanization and to go through it. Only through this voyage into the foreign and the strange can we win back our own self-hood; here as elsewhere, the way to do what is closest to us is the longest way back.” Quoted in Halbfass, \textit{India and Europe}, 442. \\
342 Daya Krishna et al., \textit{Samvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions}, xviii.
\end{flushright}
Mimāṃsā. The next step was to secure the collaboration of Prof. E. R. Swaminathan, a sound and versatile scholar of the darśanās who was then on the faculty of Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapitha at Tirupati. But for his unstinted co-operation the dialogue could not have taken place. We agreed that the best course for us to take would be for me to prepare a statement in English summarizing the main points made by Russell and formulating the philosophical problems raised by them. He would then translate the statement into Sanskrit for the benefit of those pandits who were unfamiliar with English. (…) I may remark that this probably was the first time when a western philosophical doctrine was presented through the medium of Sanskrit to an audience of pandits.”

For an audience external to one’s tradition, the relative historically independent position of Russell and a certain common interest for logical questions were strategically considered a possible bridge between pandits and analytical philosophers. This alludes to a first question for cross-cultural projects, namely whether it is possible to dialogue on all philosophical topics between traditions, and how to delimit what can be fructuous and what cannot. Indeed, what M. P. Rege and Daya Krishna describe in the introduction and preface (which narrate the background) are carefully established conditions for the setting of the dialogue, which mostly depended on particular reactions to the text by philosophers interested in the process.

They also comment on the organization of the bilingual facilities, complemented by the account given by Daya Krishna in a subsequent article, on creating a favorable setting for the dialogue. Of particular importance is the above stated precise choice and clear formulation of a topic and the effort to translate a philosophical world into a different conceptual frame. Secondly, Daya Krishna explains the material difficulty in locating pandits, to reach out to them, invite and persuade them of the necessity of the dialogue. He further emphasizes on how

343 Daya Krishna et al., xxv.
344 “I had several discussions with Shri Shrinivas Shastry during which I tried to explain to him Russell’s theory of the nature of proposition, its philosophical context and implications, with Dr. Jha functioning both as an interpreter and participant. It was an extremely encouraging experience, I discovered. I must confess to my surprise, that the two pandits could, without much difficulty, acquire an accurate understanding of Russell’s theory and appreciate its philosophical signification. But pandits are professionally trained to tentatively entertain philosophical theories on their own terms for the purpose of working out their philosophical presuppositions and implications. (…) I could now make so bold as to visit personally Shri Badarinarath Shastri Shukla, the doyen of Naiyāyikas, at Varanasi. When I explained him the idea of the dialogue I was trying to hold he entered into its spirit with great enthusiasm, went over the Sanskrit statement with me line by line and at the end promised his total co-operation in this venture. (…) Another eminent scholar-philosopher who generously put his services at my disposal in organizing the event was Prof. K. T. Pandurangi. He introduced me and the idea of the dialogue to many pandits who in addition to being masters of traditional doctrines could enter with zest into philosophical discussion. Prof. K. T. Pandurangi combines the advantage of having studied for many years, the darśanās in a pāṭhaśālā in the traditional way, as well as having a facility in English which enables him to expound lucidly and accurately the more subtle points in Indian doctrines.” Daya Krishna et al., xxvi–xxvii.
345 “The dialogue had to be bilingual. This meant that scholars who could translate from Sanskrit to English and vice versa had an essential role to play in making it possible. As would be evident, the translations they were required to provide extempore were not merely translations from one language into another but also from one conceptual framework into another.” Daya Krishna et al., xxvii.
346 “The traditional scholars are not only scattered far and wide in different parts of the country, sometimes even in remote areas not usually associated with the presence of any man learning here, but they have generally little occasion to meet each other in intellectual interchange. Many of them are old and retired and settled in their ancestral villages or in Mathās belonging to their own Sampradāya. To find their whereabouts and find funds for inviting them all to one place from all the four corners of India was a difficult and challenging enterprise indeed.” Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 74.
selecting the participants was relevant, both for the discussion itself and to create a trustful atmosphere:

“He [M. P. Rege] was also careful in choosing the scholars from both sides for the dialogue. The traditional Pandits invited for the dialogue were drawn not only from various disciplines, such as logic, grammar, linguistics, hermeneutics (Mīmāṃsā), which would be relevant to the subject under discussion, but also were of such outstanding authority in their respective fields that the very fact that they had consented to take part in such a dialogue made the experiment seem worthwhile to other Pandits. Prof. Rege also met many of them personally and explained to them the purpose of the dialogue so that they had some idea of what was intended to be achieved through the dialogue and were favourably inclined towards it. Besides this, he took care to choose those amongst traditional scholars who had a relatively open mind about philosophical issues and were prepared to modify their positions in the light of counter-arguments or offer new arguments for holding to the old positions. These qualities were preeminently embodied in such outstanding representatives of traditional scholarship as Pandit Badrinath Shukla, Pandit Srinivas Shastri and Pandit Laxman Shastri Joshi who throughout guided the discussion for one full week during which time the dialogue was held.”

The western-trained scholars were also carefully invited as participants who had “a fair knowledge of Sanskrit”, “knew Indian philosophy” and “had a firm foundation in Western philosophy”. The dialogue was rather a meeting between Anglophone scholars trained in Indian academics in Indian philosophy, able to use Sanskrit for using original sources and reinterpreted into English, and Sanskrit scholars. As Mukund Lath recalled in our meeting, the English-speaking audience could often understand Sanskrit and the scholars usually knew each other, even if they could disagree with each other’s position or work differently, in terms of method, sources and training. Thus, it is the combination of these different linguistic and hermeneutic facilities, philosophical affinity and mutual interests and respect that allowed the success of this first endeavor of this kind, as Daya Krishna elsewhere comments:

“The innovation of Professor Rege lay in that he not only provided the facility of a bilingual dialogue between traditional and modern scholars concerned and explaining to them the purpose of the dialogue. Also, he chose a subject which lay on the borderlands of contemporary and traditional philosophy and formulated the issues which were to be discussed in the dialogue in as precise a manner as possible and in a language which was well-known to traditional paṇḍīts, that is, Sanskrit. He thus created an atmosphere where traditional scholars could feel free to express their ideas in their own language on issues of relevant contemporary philosophical concerns which engaged the minds of those who were trained in that subject in institutions modelled on the western pattern in India. (…) The work has been hailed as “the First Exercise in doing comparative philosophy, rather than in ‘talking’ about it.”

This teaches us that a certain familiarity between participants is necessary for dialoguing, which at a first glance seems to contradict the nature of my previous definition of ‘intercultural dialogues’ (1.1.4). Unlike debate, which imply a common framework in which arguments and theses are scrutinized and evaluated, I hypothesized that intercultural dialogues unsettle this

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347 Daya Krishna, 72.
348 Personnal communication, Jaipur (on 06.05.2016).
349 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 311.
common framework. In this disruption of the framework emerges novelty in ideas. Is familiarity therefore an obstacle to this disruption?

If familiarity is a counter-argument to an intercultural theory based on ‘radical otherness’ or difference, it can be a resource for intercultural methods which are grounded on theories of overlaps, similarity or resemblances. Using familiarity as a tool for intercultural dialogues does not mean to overemphasize similarities or look for identity, parallels and analogy. On the contrary, familiarity itself can be displaced in order to allow intercultural communication, and yet differences in the understanding, interpretation, formulation, and lastly, new thinking. By displacing familiarity, I mean shifting the familiarity that arises on the basis of a certain training and affiliation to a thematic familiarity, however interdisciplinary or interculturally conceived. In this case it means shifting from the context-related familiarity of analytic philosophers with the same background, to the thematic familiarity of logic-trained scholars where the Russellian theory of proposition is formulated in Sanskrit in a way in which it is understandable to Sanskrit-speaking logicians. In a way, this familiarity is positioned between the hermeneutics of resemblance and difference in the intercultural debate: a ground of familiarity is created between philosophical communities (who do not otherwise communicate) to allow differences. This thematic familiarity is today revendicated in the academic world at different levels, notably in the case of revising the usual regional separations of manuals into European philosophy / Indian philosophy / Chinese philosophy into reorganizing theories according to their thematic familiarities such as “logic” in which both Analytic and Sanskrit Nyāya sources are exposed together, for example. However, the inclusion of contemporary reinterpretation of these traditions in a direct encounter enables an experiential dimension from which arouses the initial enthusiasm of the samvāda.

The enthusiasm or the feeling of philosophical discovery originated from the above mentioned feeling of “doing comparative philosophy rather than talking about it”. This does not however mean that the ‘talking about it’ was absent, since the introduction and conclusion of the samvāda, but also the epistolary exchanges regarding the organization of samvādas, and other writings of Daya Krishna continuously reflect on methodological problems in doing comparative philosophy. Nevertheless, as encouraged by the critiques, it is a unique instance of philosophical communities engaging in philosophical dialogues being recorded:

“What we have here is an example of comparative philosophy being done, an instance of a practice often talked about but rarely undertaken. The participants in this seminar did not discuss whether it is possible for a Sanskritic Natyāyika to have philosophically useful conversations with an anglophone Russellian; they simply went ahead and had the

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350 Mall, *Intercultural Philosophy*; Mall, *Philosophie Im Vergleich Der Kulturen*; Yousefi and Mall, *Grundpositionen der interkulturellen Philosophie*.
351 The pioneering work of B. K. Matilal can be considered emblematic of such attempt.
352 Daya Krishna, *Contrary Thinking*, 8, 27.
conversations. And so here, for the first time, to my knowledge, we have a record of actual philosophical engagement between philosophers from these very different backgrounds” 354

This ‘doing’ surpassed the methodological descriptions, it unveiled possibilities which had only been abstract (‘talked about’) and which were incorporated by the participants. This arouse for Daya Krishna the discovery of an alive community having philosophical stances and reasoning that deserved to be integrated to the philosophical debates.

“The fact that there were scores of living representatives steeped in the traditional ways of philosophising with whom it was almost a way of living itself came as a surprise to everyone who had thought that the classical traditions of Indian philosophy were dead and gone and hence a subject of only historical and antiquarian interest to be satisfied by rummaging among the dusty shelves filled with ancient texts, difficult to interpret and understand.” 355

This illustrates again and justifies the importance of the encounter in the samvāda project propounded by Daya Krishna 356 (see 2.1).

For these reasons, this samvāda was a successful initiator of the subsequent series. The enthusiasm it arose stimulated the conception and institution of samvāda as defined above. Subsequently, he claimed that “philosophical activity, at least in India, is to be a joint activity undertaken through some sort of a cooperative, though dialectical, interaction between the two traditions where each questions the other and, by questioning, forces the thought to take new directions.” 357 This samvāda then permitted the organization of further dialogues and encounters between these worlds, in the forms of summer schools, integration of pañdits in the University of Pune and University of Rajasthan as well as classes taught in Sanskrit.

Four years later for example, M. P. Rege organized a “Summer School for Pandits in Western Logic” in Wai (Maharashtra), between May 25th and June 6th, 1987. In the official invitation sent to Sharad Deshpande, he describes the Summer School as follows:

“One of the programmes the School will conduct is that in which a Senior Pandit will read a classical Nyaya text with western-trained philosophers who may not have much knowledge of Sanskrit. The text will be expounded in the traditional manner, in which will [be] provide[d] full exegesis of philosophical and textual points. Dr. D. Prahladachar has kindly agreed to read ‘Bhasha-Pariccheda’ – the sections on Inference and Shabda-bodha and Prof. S. R. Bhat ‘Vyapti-Pancheka’ with Mathuranath’s commentary in this programme. We will try to arrange the time-table in such a way that one can attend both the classes if one wants to. A seminar on the philosophy of logic with special reference to inference will be held on the last four days of the school which will be open to all scholars participating in the school.” 358

355 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 73.
356 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 8,27.
357 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 76.
358 Invitation by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, signed by M. P. Rege and sent to Sharad Deshpande, dated 19. 4. 1987. I am indebted to Sharad Deshpande to share with me this historical document.
The preface to *saṃvāda* mentions other Summer and Winter schools and further dialogues, which derived from the enthusiasm and discovery felt in Pune.

The dialogues created possibilities of collaborations that answer the challenges analyzed earlier (2.2.1). This recognition constitutes for Daya Krishna a “substantive result” that materializes in a “change of awareness and atmosphere with regard to the urgency of establishing critical and creative linkages with the cognitive traditions of India.” Beyond the politics, this recognition is urgent from a historico-philosophical point of view given the hermeneutic situation. Since the reading of classical Indian texts is mediated by Western concepts in Indian and Western academics, *paṇḍits* who master the original texts (the language but also the complex contexts and references) can create novel works relying on the traditions that are in an “unbroken continuity.” Without their collaboration, “important texts would become unintelligible to modern students of the subject”, as Daya Krishna continues. This does not limit their role to solely consist of preserving the texts, but of reinterpreting them today in novel ways.

It is beyond my expertise and the scope of this work to detail the complex logical reasonings effectuated in Sanskrit and in English that took place during this dialogue. However, I provide here a few methodological remarks on how the communication seemed to proceed, and some assumptions on how it may have contributed to Daya Krishna’s philosophy. Responding to the questions that were circulated beforehand, the dialogue proceeded to a large extent in establishing parallels between the Russellian terms and implications and (mostly) Nyāya counterparts. These parallels begin by observing in which conceptual terms the Russellian proposition could be ‘translated’ into Sanskrit categories. The philosophical problems originating from it open the way for internal discussion within Sanskrit philosophies as well as outlining difficulties in Russell. This process operated mainly by contradictions and further questions for clarifications. One example of it is given by Daya Krishna, himself translating Prof. Pahi’s statement:

“The second point made by Dr. Pahi was that in Russell’s earlier position there is a distinction between the notion of ‘existence’ and the notion of ‘being’. While the notion of ‘existence’ can be relevantly rendered by the Sanskrit word ‘padārtha’ in the Naiyāyika framework, there is no corresponding word in Sanskrit, this was a most important point he made, there is no corresponding concept to that of ‘being’ which we find in early Russell. Hence if Russell’s thought is to be translated into the traditional Indian framework, we will have to find a corresponding term for the notion of ‘being’.

Pahi: I also suggested a way. Within the Sāmkhya-Yoga ontology there is the notion of *saviṣayakavrtrytī*.”

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360 Daya Krishna, 77.
361 Daya Krishna et al., *Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions*, 30.
This in return questioned the choice of choosing the concept of proposition of the early Russell and the ambivalence within his early and later philosophies\textsuperscript{362}.

For example, the debate on what ‘entity’ means in Russell is paralleled with the distinction between ‘mental’ (\textit{bauddha}) and ‘external’ (\textit{bāhya}) categories, and proceeded into the problems that applying these categories would result in Russell’s understanding of entities, as in Pandurangi’s definition:

> “What has really to be examined is that if we think of two types of entities, bauddha and the real, when a word denotes a bauddha entity; but the question is: whether the intervention of a bauddha entity in between to convey a real entity is thought to be necessary for Russell. This is a point which westerners have to clarify. If all that Russell wants to say is that whatever the ontological status of an entity, an entity which is conveyed by a word; then that is understandable and it is so without prejudice to the ontological status of the entity. But it would seem that he wants to say that whenever a word conveys an entity which has existence in space and time, there is also a bauddha entity functioning as a medium, and in the case of words which do not stand for a real entity there is only a bauddha entity. This, however, would create difficulty.”\textsuperscript{363}

The developments of the Sanskrit implications of the categories applied to Russell forced both the Sanskrit \textit{paṇḍits} to rearticulate their definitions and logical argumentation to the Russellian context, and the ‘Western’-trained philosophers to re-articulate Russell’s philosophy in the light of such answers. The origin of the creativity felt by Daya Krishna arises from exchanges of this type that modifies the usual ways of articulating and thinking a problem and a concept (here: ‘entity’). There are many more examples of this kind, which altogether result in the response written after the \textit{saṃvāda} by Badrinath Shukla, entitled in the volume in the appendix “On Propositions: A Naiyāyika Response to a Russellian Theory”\textsuperscript{364}, translated by Arindam Chakrabarti. This response was republished in a collective work edited by Chakrabarti. The latter indirectly answers the opening comments by M. P. Rege in the introduction of the \textit{saṃvāda}, who suggested to continue the collective exploration with the concept \textit{śābdabodha}\textsuperscript{365}.

\textsuperscript{362} By Arindam Chakrabarti: “I think it is rather unfortunate that we have chosen Russell as the representative defender of the concept of proposition. For one thing, this is one of the points on which Russell is found to be vacillating. Even in the principles where he comes closest to holding strongly the concept of proposition he uses language as if he sometimes means by proposition a sentence and sometimes a state of affairs. And it is not quite clear what he means by it. (…) But unfortunately the mature Russell does not believe in propositions. So if we want to discuss Russell in the context of propositions at all, i.e., Russell as a defender of propositions, then we will have to discuss the Russell of the Principles. And that is the Russell who makes the distinction between being and existence. And if we talk of the Russell who drops the distinction between being and existence, than it will be difficult to see, and that would make it more interesting, how in spite of dropping this distinction, in spite of being of the opinion that only things that exist, be they mental or physical, are independently meant by words (…), he can defend the notion of proposition.” Daya Krishna et al., 31–32.

\textsuperscript{363} Daya Krishna et al., 18.

\textsuperscript{364} Daya Krishna et al., 191–213.

\textsuperscript{365} Thus, M. P. Rege concludes the introduction to the written \textit{saṃvāda}, coming back on the entreprise as follows: “It appears to me, therefore that it is in the direction of śābdabodha (knowledge gained by understanding sentences) that the dialogue should continue. This is an area which overlaps epistemology and ontology, as well as formal logic with its formalized syntax and semantics. It is thus central to philosophical inquiry and has been minutely explored by classical Indian thinkers. The recent movements of analytical philosophy and hermeneutics have also progressed in this direction. It is, perhaps, in this area that a dialogue of this kind will be most fruitful and rewarding” Daya Krishna et al., xxviii.
(knowledge gained by understanding sentences), a concept that was discussed several times in the dialogue. Chakrabarti expanded the project as follows: he started by questioning the epistemic weakness of Western philosophy that considers knowledge of words but very less, if ever, the knowledge from words, namely the knowledge earned by testimony. He thus describes the situation as follows:

“In pooh-poohing testimony as something we cannot help depending upon because of our gullibility on the one hand and our epistemic laziness on the other, in ignoring the role of accumulated (and more or less unquestioned) tradition in the progress of scientific knowledge, in being reluctant to grant that when deference to the authority of the expert is in order it is irrational to try to observe and reason for oneself – mainstream Western epistemology has been arrogantly revisionary. Given such cultivated irreverence toward one’s own cultural patrimony of knowledge, it is not surprising that this “individualistic tradition” (an oxymoron?) should be unwilling to learn from an alien (=non-Western) tradition, especially when that tradition is by definition un-modern!”

Not hesitating to unveil the myth of intellectual autonomy (see also 3.5), he also counter-balanced the “perils of trust” and the problems of interpretation of the concept śabdabodha. Chakrabarti uses the resources from each tradition to counter-balance the lacunae of each. He circumscribed them by mutual analysis and presentation of the issues from different perspectives. In so doing, he acknowledged this entreprise of the samvāda experiment, when he finally states:

“when the traditional Sanskrit-speaking scholars (who still carry on, in India, the indigenous lineage of philosophy of language and knowledge) were for the first time exposed to themes like Russell’s theory of propositions or Frege’s sense/reference distinction or the problem of proper-names – their creative response took the Western-style ‘philosophers’ of India by surprise. In this book we try to give a flavor of such responses through the papers by Shukla (translated from Sanskrit) and V. Bhattacharya (translated from Bengali). Thus, the second gap that this volume tries to bridge is between contemporary Western and classical Indian traditions – because luckily we can still make the latter speak to live issues through these ‘pandits’ who teach and write in a method untouched by any Western influence.”

He thus opened the debate to philosophers of language such as P. F. Strawson, John McDowell, Michael Dummett, who contributed next to the above mentioned classical pandits and Indian philosophers familiar with the two areas such as B. K. Matilal and J. N. Mohanty. On the other hand, Chakrabarti also persevered in the Sanskrit philosophical communities, being an active translator and introducer of Western analytical philosophy in Sanskrit. He thereby also contributed to considering Sanskrit epistemology (particularly Nyāya) as an active purvāpakṣa of other logical traditions, able to unveil the neglected presuppositions of other traditions and to reformulate them.

367 Matilal and Chakrabarti, 8–9.
368 Matilal and Chakrabarti, 15–16.
Finally, for Daya Krishna, this dialogue was an immersion into the Indian dialectical tradition, namely an occasion to practice *sam-vāda* as defined by the tradition. A way to describe the dialectical proceedings is formulated in the opening of the dialogue by Śrīnivāsa Sāstrī:

“Russell has argued that words refer to entities that have an external existence. But our understanding of the matter is different. We believe that words such as ghaṭa refer to an entity qualified by the universal ghaṭa-hood. In other words; the word ghaṭa means something that exists in a form of its own (svārūpasat). Let me confess, however, that I am not sure what Russell means by ‘external existence’: can it really be equated with the notion of bāhyārtha that we have? (…) We would like to know from you, sirs [Western-trained philosophers], whether a word according to Russell denotes something that has an external existence, or does it refer to an entity existing in its own form, qualified by a universal. We have in our midst many eastern *panḍits*. They too will present their views. We shall then have to face the task of deciding what is right and what is not. We have gathered here to engage in an encounter of ideas. Ours will be a discussion between those who are seeking the truth. We are not aiming at more sophistry or winning an argument. Sītā, when she wanted to teach something to Rāma, never said ‘I want to teach you.’ She said ‘I want to remind you of something you know.’ I too would like to remind you of something you know. In expressing your views, do not try to impose it on others. Do not hold on to your views dogmatically; yet do not give them up if they can withstand the force of all the counter-arguments aimed at them. You are free to express any view that you think fit. But whether the view be that of a great ācārya or a renowned sage, you must be prepared to support it with sound arguments; since what we propose to hold here is an exchange of ideas, wherein views will be put to the test of reasoning.”

What is enunciated as the rules of the *samvāda* here, precisely embodies the definition of *vāda* given earlier from the *Nyāya-sūtras* and by Caraka, namely a collective (*sam-*) seeking of the truth together in analyzing the rightness and wrongness of the arguments propounded, in honestly and soundly defending positions and counter-positions. Śrīnivāsa Sāstrī supplements to the traditional rules a careful warning against dogmatism, may it originate out of allegiance to a tradition that one feels endangered by the question (see 6.1 on the authority of a tradition), or out of academic dogma (possibly also out of laziness). This usual and classical way of conceiving *samvāda* is carried out throughout the dialogue, even until Shukla’s answer, which is a successive presentation of positions and counter-positions, either from the tradition or by Russell. It is my hypothesis that Daya Krishna found this dialectic successful and exciting and got convinced of its potentiality for developing *samvāda*. He himself developed a unique approach (very clearly visible in his books on Indian philosophy): a fervent counter-position of classical philosophies via sustained argumentations. This distinguishes Daya Krishna’s approach from the typical carefulness of Western-trained philosophers studying classical Indian philosophies who have too much reverence towards it or feel bound to defend it in front of Western philosophies (in a position of power). His critical engagement corresponds here in practice to what he reinterpreted from the concept *purvāpakṣa*, counter-position (see chapter 5 for the details of his reinterpretation): listening to the other’s arguments, understanding and learning from it respectfully while being ready to find counter-positions and alternatives if the arguments are to be found unconvincing.

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369 Daya Krishna et al., *Samvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions*, 2–3.
3.3.2. Bhakti Experiment

The second published samvāda took place from 13th to 16th Oct. 1988 at the Sri Caitanya Prema Samsthanā (a centre for Vaishnava studies) in the holy city of Vrindavan. Presented as a seminar on “the Intellectual Dimensions of Bhakti Tradition in India”, this dialogue was motivated by the comment of Shrivatsa Goswāmī, of a historical attempt to “recast all knowledge” in the perspective of bhakti (devotion, attachment, feeling), to which Daya Krishna answered by wondering “whether there was really an intellectual dimension of the Bhakti tradition in India which had not been paid any attention to until now.” Starting from the idea of re-exploring the bhakti tradition, the large range of issues discussed included questions related to the ontological status of devotion/feeling (bhakti), the problematic relation between feeling and knowledge for philosophy, and, consequently, “the place of philosophical argument” in a feeling-centred bhakti as well as how any “socio-cultural determined pattern of feeling” may influence bhakti. The question of the inclusion of bhakti, which can be interpreted as the absolute in the realm of feeling, in contemporary societies, was also raised: “How is the notion of impersonal obligation to institutions, ideals, norms and values

370 For more resources on the specificity of the bhakti tradition of Vrindavan upon which the dialogue reflects, and on the Shri Caitanya Prema Samsthanā where the dialogue took place, see the following resources, published in association with Shrivatsa Goswami. A detailed description and study of the Caitanya Prema Samsthanā (Jaisingh Ghera), (namely a study into the bhakti world of this samvāda) can be found in Margaret H. Case, Seeing Krishna: The Religious World of a Brahman Family in Vrindaban (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). A collective exploration on Govindadeva, the temple visit described in the Session VI of the Bhakti dialogue, is published as Margaret H. Case, ed., Govindadeva: A Dialogue in Stone, Vraja Nāthadvārā Prakalpa, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for Arts, 1996).

Due to the usual problems of transcription, one finds numerous variations of the scripts for ‘Vrindavan’ (Brindaban, etc.) and other Sanskrit names and terms used in this section. Instead of consistency (impossible due to the different sources I use), I chose to respect the transcriptions indicated by the authors or editors of the works I quote, and for myself to use the most common use in English.

371 On the honorific title ‘Goswami’, Shri Shrivatsa humbly comments in the dialogue: “In the Vedic perspective, the word ‘gosvāmī’ will definitely mean something very different but which, in the spiritual dimension was not only eulogized but got respectability to such an extent that even the Bhaṭṭas or the Dīves thought it great to have the appendage ‘Gosvāmī’ to their names. The word means, one who can control the senses. But I have no pretention of giving myself the connotation of that respectable dimension of the meaning of ‘Gosvāmī’. Rather I will take it more in the other sense of ‘Gosvāmī’, the Lord of the cows, the bull who is destined to carry the burden of the tradition.” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 208–9.

I am deeply thankful to Shrivatsa Goswami’s hospitality in Vrindavan, for sharing his precious time, memories, experiences and insights with me, and letting me stay in his ashram. (18th-19th August 2017, Sri Caitanya Prema Samsthanā, Vrindavan)

372 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, i.

373 Bhakti (devotion, attachment, fondness) is first a fundamental generic category that signifies a complete devotion from the devotee (bhaktā) to the divinity founded on a personal relationship through devotional practice; as a concept, it applies to Hinduism in general. A long bhakti tradition however, composed of different religious movements, encompasses this basic idea of bhakti characterized in various forms. Flourishing in South India between the 6th and 9th century and developing in North India, flourishing in Vrindavan in the 15th and 16th century, developed by acāryas (scholars) and saints, the long-lasting and spread tradition renders the details on the means and practices of the devotion, the referring texts and debates on the nature of the divinity complex (impersonal or personal God); it is to be noted that the bhakti Kabir, of Muslim origin, and the Guru Nānak, founder of the Sikh religion, are among the most famous bhakti saints. W. J. Johnson, A Dictionary of Hinduism, 1st ed (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

374 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, ii.

accommodated in Bhakti thought? How does Bhakti relate to the realization of other ideals—personal or social such as justice, freedom and equality?” The investigation explored alternative ways of gaining knowledge and the possibility to reflect on religious devotion. What is the space left for knowledge in the conception of absolute love and how can it be compatible with contemporary societies? J. L. Mehta can help us re-contextualizing the tension between feeling or devotion (bhakti) and knowledge when he discloses bhakti as follows:

“whatever is communicable from one to another, like a message, or teachable, like a theory or doctrine, is within the grasp of the intellect and its way of relating man to the ultimate, through understanding and insight. This we see here shattering to bits when confronted with the actuality of the gopis’ at onement with Krishna in love, in separation even more fully so than when he was in their midst as a physical presence. What we also see here is that such a vision of the Lord as beloved is mediated by prior thought and knowledge, as a necessity imposed upon us as ordinary inquiring and seeking mortals, not to speak of learned participants in a seminar, which can aspire at the most to be a dance of thoughts and views and information exchanged. The dialectical movement between thinking, a finite man’s attempt to touch the Absolute, and the ecstasy of love for the supreme as Person continuously goes on and one must find ever new ways of putting this in words.”

There, due to the nature of the matter and the approach from which it was organized, it bears a different motivation than the first published samvāda. It specifically questioned in the dialogue the very possibility of dialoguing on bhakti. More exactly, it asked how to understand the intellectual mediation of the absolute bhakti while discussing it, how to articulate the intellectual expression of the experience of a pure feeling.

The participants were Sanskrit scholars, among whom some were actively belonging to this tradition, Indian scholars in philosophy (mostly Western philosophy, with exceptions), two American scholars of religious studies and two Indian scholars in the fields of art or history. It is worthwhile to remember that the published version of the samvāda is on the one hand an incomplete reproduction of the dialogue and on the other hand reflects only partially the lively

376 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 255.
377 Mehta, Philosophy and Religion, 205–6.
378 Daya Krishna, at the beginning of the first Session (as published), addresses this problem as follows: “I am suggesting that one of the foundational issues with respect to bhakti or thinking about bhakti is that bhakti is feeling-centered, emotion-oriented. It treats feelings and emotions as the basic instrument or means of grasping ultimate reality. If this is so, then what is the place of reason in it? Reason and an argument are the heart of philosophy, and this is so not just in the western tradition, but even in our own tradition, right from its very beginning. As far as bhakti is concerned, it is supposed to be just the opposite. Bhakti is a cultivation of the emotional life of man in relation to transcendent; it is also the underplaying of doubt, samśaya. As they say, ‘samśayātma [samśaya-dāman, the essence of doubt, EF] vinaśyati [vanishes, EF].’ But in darśana [philosophy] samśayātmā does not vinaśyati. Without samśaya or doubt one cannot make a movement in thought. First there is doubt; then the doubt is tentatively settled by an argument. And this goes on; doubt is the eternal motive behind the movement of thought. If there is darśana in bhakti then we have two questions before us. One is: what is the textual evidence of this philosophical tradition and what are the arguments, and what is or could be the pratipakṣa [counter-position, EF] of bhakti? This is the first issue. There is also a factual aspect to it. The other is that even supposing there is no literal evidence about the philosophical aspect of bhakti, can we not start a philosophical tradition of thinking now?” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 10–11. I am grateful to Elisa Freschi (‘EF’) for her translations or corrections. The translations that are not specified with an acronym are mine; mistakes remain also mine.
379 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion.
experience and the programs that were organized. For an instance of the incompleteness, the opening address by Shrivatsa Goswami (of about 45 min explaining the reasons for the dialogue) could not be reproduced due to the alteration of the recordings. Concerning the second, the samvāda proposed a complete experience of bhakti that included the visit of temples (one partial recording of a visit to the Govindadeva temple is published as Session VI380), rāsalīlās381 performances in the evening, etc. The experiential dimension of engaging with bhakti went much beyond the intellectual expression contained in the published book. It is in view of this second dimension that I develop the connection to the Govindadeva temple in this section, explaining the relation of the content of the dialogue with its place. This expresses the manifoldness of the idea of dialogue (see chapter 4) as an encounter with living persons, traditions and places. It also helps us understanding from the dialogical practice why Daya Krishna does not reduce in his philosophy knowledge and dialogue to the linguistic analytical philosophical domains, but includes these concepts into the larger framework of values. In particular the idea of ‘seeking knowledge’ in dialogue, and of participants as seekers (jījñāsu) developed in 6.2 could be related with such a practice. Furthermore, Shrivatsa Goswami added during our meeting that beyond the book, the encounter constituted a complete shared experience since all were staying in his ashram, sleeping, eating, enjoying the music and the rāsalīlās together, and it is this togetherness which created an experience much beyond the limited recordings available. This prompts me to outline a limitation of the textual in general for analyzing dialogues, since the oral and the experiential characters cannot be rendered justice in a written reproduction. This limitation applies to the present analysis of dialogue as well, for which reason I draw on Shrivatsa Goswami’s account, commenting and narrating the Bhakti dialogue during our meeting in Vrindavan (18th-19th August 2017) as organizer and participant. In contrast to the previous one, which focused rather on the organization of the dialogue and the methodological insights derived from it, this section considers the interlocking of reflecting and experiencing in dialogue by connecting the topics discussed and the forms in which they were expressed. When approaching the “liveliness” of samvāda, this dimension, which is lost in the experience for those who did not participate, must not be forgotten in order to imagine the nature of the dialogue.

My approach is here again not to explore all the concepts and argumentation contained in the dialogue, but rather the dialogical dimension itself. In this regard, I start by distinguishing between the Pune and the Bhakti samvādas. In Pune, the dialogical relation consisted in sharing common interests, which resulted in the discussion of how creative it can be to develop a question through another philosophical tradition, and how to respond anew in such a situation. In Vrindavan, since the question itself had a performativity implied in it (where the interrogation “can we express the absolute experience of devotional feeling” served both as

381 “rās(a) līlā (‘dance pastime’): Narrowly, Kṛṣṇa’s dance (rāsa) with the gopīs, described in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (10.33). The women dance in a circle; Kṛṣṇa inserts himself between each pair, so that each individual supposes that he is attending to her alone. For many Vaiṣṇava bhakti traditions, this typifies the individual’s relationship to God, an experience intensified through various meditation and visualization practices focused on the rāśa līlā. More widely, the term rāsa līlā refers to the full extent of Kṛṣṇa’s divine play (līlā) with the gopīs—their love, union, incomprehensible separation, and reunion—described in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (10.29–33).” Johnson, A Dictionary of Hinduism.
intellectual self-reflective topic as well as an exercise implied in the dialogue), the matter constituted a challenge to ‘philosophy’ itself, as conceived by Western-trained philosophers, and integrated a spiritual dimension which was intellectually apprehended.\footnote{382}

For Shrivatsa Goswami\footnote{383}, the dialogical is inherent to bhakti: bhakti requires a bhakta (devotee) and Bhagāvan (the supreme deity). The former incarnates the humanity, the latter the divinity, and bhakti is the way of celebrating togetherness in a reciprocal way. These two dimensions require communication, and this must occur for humans in a dialogical process. Since our human condition limits us to the understanding of the human sphere (we cannot reach a supra human understanding), we need to humanize the divine, which is what Krishna stands for, as a human god. The necessity felt to communicate the sense of bhakti is discussed several times in the dialogue, in terms of relation (what is the relation between the feeling of the experience and the communication of this feeling in the writings), of impetus (why did the bhaktas feel the need of writing about bhakti?) and transcendental levels (what is the relation between the divinity and the self who expresses it?). Thus, dialoguing seems to be an impossible and yet, unescapable issue related to bhakti, and Shrivatsa Goswami comments in the Bhakti dialogue\footnote{384} as follows:

> “Why then do we communicate if it is unthinkable? As I have already said, the śāstras [systems of knowledge, EF] are mundane affairs. But why is there this communication? One answer I can suggest is that at least there is the continuity of the self. The self that enjoys that bhāva\footnote{385} at the transcendental level, does not always stay there. It comes down, so to say. And so, we can say, it is because of this continuity of the same self at the two levels, that there is prapatti [self-surrender (of one’s soul to God), EF]. What is higher than prapatti? It is said, this self continues, and that is why when it comes down there is an urge to communicate with others what one has realized in the higher state. But, unfortunately, one fails, and therein lies the tragedy. We try, we attempt to describe it. We can’t really define. Logic and all such things are inapplicable in the realm of the acintya [inconceivable\footnote{386}]. But when one returns to the everyday level one again becomes bound by this logic and everything else. So, we create a śāstra. We try to make some approach to communicate with others.”\footnote{387}

\footnote{The following remark by Prof. Pande in the dialogue helps clarifying the relation of bhakti vis à vis religion: “Now I would like to argue regarding the question whether bhakti is possible without a personal god or not; Religion is possible without belief in a personal god. There may be a religion without belief in a personal god, but it cannot be called atheism. It is also theism; it is religion. But bhakti without faith, without belief in a personal god is not possible. Bhakti is something too intimate, too personal. A saint can be and in fact is a bhakta, but he is not called upon to give a rational explanation, of the object of his devotion. What, then, is bhakti? Two things are required. Firstly, a belief in a personal god, and secondly, a belief that god has something to do very intimately, with oneself in particular. It is not universal, it is not social. It is a personal, intimate something. If one believes in a transcendental love, who is sarvajña [omniscient], sarvaśaktimāna [omnipotent], kṛpānidhāna [graceful, omnibenevolent], karmanidhāna [receptacle of all ritual acts; omni-active], then alone one is entitled to be called a bhakta. It is not, thus, the duty of one who is devoted to such a god, to argue out, to work out what that god is, or what is its nature; that is the duty of the ācārya, the commentator or the philosopher.” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 46.}

\footnote{The comments without quotation marks are all made by Shrivatsa Goswami during our meeting in Vrindavan, 18th-19th August 2017. I adapt here and reformulate excerpts from our interview.}

\footnote{In order to distinguish between the philosophical concept ‘bhakti’ and the ‘Bhakti dialogue’ organized, I capitalize the latter as a proper noun.}

\footnote{bhāva means ‘emotion’ or ‘passion’ in the classical Indian aesthetic theories which are developed and expressed in relation to theatrical performances (the answer relates to a discussion on Aesthetics).}

\footnote{In a literal sense: a-cintya, what cannot be grasped, conceived by the intellect.}

\footnote{Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 165–66.}
This conception extends to the very definition of *saṃvāda*: in crossing traditions and in demanding translations (of concepts and modes of thinking), *saṃvāda* remains unsatisfactory and uncomplete, yet necessary. This definition provides for Daya Krishna’s the productive force of dialoguing: it makes *saṃvāda* a regulative idea, which means something perfectible to be attained, *ad infinitum* pursued (as necessary) yet never ending (since it is impossible). This perfectibility *ad infinitum* is a fundamental characteristic of the idea of *saṃvāda* in Daya Krishna’s analysis of the puruṣārtha (a point developed in 4 and 6) from which the creativity of dialogue originates. The Bhakti dialogue is an experience of this dialogical tension.

In our meeting, Shrivatsa Goswami commented on this aspect in disclosing the intrinsic relation between experience and expression, due to which this tension occurs. Experience and expression are necessarily implied as soon as we mention or are located in the human or in the mundane world, even in liminal forms of consciousness such as sleep or even *samādhi* (profound meditation, intense contemplation), beyond any division of awareness. Even the *Yoga-Sūtra* designates as “*saṃādhi experience*” the highest form of contemplation, which shows that even experience remains at that level. This experience has no value if we cannot communicate it. For him, this originates from the necessity for the unbound (divinity) to meet the bounded (humanity): incarnations, avatars and prophets who come as expressions of the absolute to manifest the experience of the unbounded divine are illustrations of this communication and relation. They are the necessary mediation between the two spheres that allow communication, which makes them necessary (and transient in comparison to the divine itself): ‘the incarnations are limitations of the unlimited out of freedom’, he adds, and thus they act in a way like teachers guiding human via expression on the way to the experience.

They allow the dialogue without which the experience could not be communicated, and thereby would not exist.

However, in *bhakti* the communication is not limited to the relation with the divine, but also emphasized in the community of *bhaktas*, as Daya Krishna remarks with interest in the Bhakti dialogue:

“We were just talking about the problems of communication even in spiritual life. But in bhakti there is a collective community of bhaktas. Bhakti is not an isolated individual thing.”

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388 Shrivatsa Goswami comments in the dialogue: “Let us take our clue from Vaiṣṇava and bhakti history, whether Basava or Caitanya and the Gsovāmīs: feeling is the core. But the articulation and the intellectual exercise is a must as it holds everything together. (…) What has happened at this moment in our history is that we have intellectually mortgaged ourselves to the west. We have accepted that ideas should come to us from a high seat of learning in the west (…). But, what did the Gsovāmīs do? They experienced. (…) But they did not stop there. If you see their life work, they were the most articulate jhānis and philosophers and scholars. (…) Imagine Gopāla Bhaṭṭa’s plight. He was collecting this Śmṛti, trying to give a complete system or life style. (…) He wrote a book, which is in 600 pages, where he quotes from almost 300 (…) texts. No library was there at the end of the 15th century in Vrindavana where one could get the Śmṛtis he quotes from. Where to get even the hand-made paper and ink in Vrindavana where nobody was living? (…) At the same time, they had understanding and sensibility, for after writing these six volumes on bhakti-rasa (…), Jivā Gsovāmi writes these last words (…): I might have diluted it, the rasa, in this jhāna and the jhāna-process. But nonetheless, what was done was important. When he is writing this, he mentions Rādhā. He says, without the dhārā [stream, uninterrupted flow] of Rādhā your saṅga-ṛanga [the colour of your attachment, EF] would not have been available to anyone, and without the dhārā you would have been unknown and meaningless and useless for us. So the whole process of manana and jhāna is important.” Dhārā and Rā-dhā Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 233–35.
Particularly in the Caitanya sampradāya it is not an isolated seeking of the self in relation to the divine alone. Even Kṛṣṇa had to be surrounded by gopīs in the plural. I have called our seminars ‘baudhīka sankīrtana’ [collective intellectual devotional singings/mental celebration of God’s name]. I have not propounded the idea yet, but the idea is to see life itself as a baudhīka sankīrtana. Sankīrtana is where there is a community of bhaktas; the feeling relationship of to the Lord [Kṛṣṇa] is its essential part. This notion of a collectivity, which inter-communicates feelings amongst its members, and by doing so intensifies the feelings of each in relation to the divine principle or order, is what is to be emphasized. What I meant to say was that this community aspect, this collectivity in bhakti is to be emphasized.\footnote{389}

The question of the relation is not only transcendental, or rather, in Shrivatsa Goswami’s terms in the Bhakti dialogue, “it is not an exclusive transcendence but an inclusive transcendence in the socio-political realm as well”\footnote{390}; the relation, and with it the communication also comprises the community of bhaktas, and furthermore, the society in general. Daya Krishna’s naming of this samvāda as “baudhīka sankīrtana” shows his typical ‘playing’ with insights from different realms to think. Baudhīka means noetic or intellectual, namely what concerns buddhi (whose function is resembled by the Greek nous), the intellect as faculty to order and grasp concepts. Apparently oxymoric in this association, kīrtana designates devotional songs or litanies, a popular form of celebration in the bhakti culture. The prefix sam- (like in sam-vāda) emphasizes the collectivity of the community of bhaktas singing together. This devotional model was introduced by Caitanya and consisted in devotional songs about Kṛṣṇa and the gopī’s relation in Vrindavan.\footnote{391} The relation between baudhīka to kīrtana is obviously not an orthodox interpretation. It illustrates Daya Krishna’s creativity, and a possible provocation of both the buddhi-relying community of academic philosophy and the kīrtana-relying community of bhaktas. If interpreted a bit further, it could suggest the requirement of both buddhi and kīrtana together (sam-) for (sam)vāda to occur in this intersection of realms and displacement of thinking.

The emphasis on the community (and the reiteration of sam-) implies that otherness is not excluded from my personal relation to the divine and the untranslatable singularity of my experience, but constitutes a necessary component of the devotion. In the Bhakti dialogue, Prof. Dwivedi suggests an original reinterpretation of the Bhakti-sūtra, which includes otherness in the definition of bhakti as a condition for the dialogue:

“Bhakti is defined in the Śaṅdilya Bhakti-sūtra as: sā parānuraktiṁ Īśvara me premāṁ bhakti hai. Two meanings of the sūtra are accepted. One is: a great anurakti in God is bhakti. In the other meaning, 'parama' is taken with Īśvara. So, the second meaning is love towards that which is the highest, which is Īśvara. The two meanings together are: great love or softly love for God who is the loftiest. But a third meaning is possible. ‘Parānurakti’ can also mean, love for the para, the other. Thus we have, ‘bhakti is anurakti, love, for the other in the presence of God.’”\footnote{392}

Grammaticaly, ‘sā’ refers to bhakti; para [highest, other]-anurakti [affection, love, devotion] is a compound, which can be understood in different ways according to Sanskrit grammati...
rules. Īśvara means Lord (the divine). The usual translation is given in Hindi (Īśvara me parama prema bhakti hai), which means ‘the absolute attachment in Īśvara (the Supreme Lord) is bhakti.’ This corresponds to the first meaning Dwivedi elucidates. In the third meaning, his novel reinterpretation, he suggests another interpretation of the relation between the terms para and anurakti playing both on the grammatical relation and the different meanings of para: he analyzes it as “love for the other”, grounding otherness at the core of the concept of bhakti.

What this reinterpretation of the bhakti definition attests, is that a personal relation to the divine does not imply exclusivity. Such an aspect is enacted both in the celebration of bhakti, for instance in the sanākīrtana, where the community participate together in singing and recitation, and in so doing, constitutes an integrated part of it. But beyond participation, or collective experience, there is a further relation implied: the idea of service. Dwivedi explains:

“The real problem in all these discourses is whether bhakti is more important or Bhagavāna or the bhaktas are more important. In the final analysis, what is important is the bhakta.” 393 If the qualifications and the qualities of a bhakta are important, then, there is no need for any further discussion. If Bhagavāna is important, as philosophers thought, then intellectual awareness of Bhagavāna is sufficient. In that case, we can do away with the bhaktas because the intellectuals will take over the issue. So, it is in this context that we may say that it is neither Bhagavāna nor bhakta, but the bridge which connects the two, that is bhakti, which is important. And bhakti has two well-known forms (...) But in both of them intellectual awareness or action-oriented awareness is not important. It is service, which is important in the ultimate analysis.” 394

Shrivatsa Goswami supplemented this idea in our meeting when he added that the essential nature of a devotee is to be the eternal servant of bhakti. However, the awareness of this “serving” occurs in the other who has experienced the same and communicates his relationship with the devotee. “It clicks”, he says, which means that it deciphers the moment of self-revelation, unravels the awareness of being a devotee, which leads to the transformation as a devotee. This idea of becoming aware through the other in dialogue, in particular in realizing our essential bound with each other, is further explored with Daya Krishna’s philosophy in chapter 7, even if it does not bear a direct relation with bhakti. The idea of philosophical dialogues as a service to philosophy would need further investigation.

The idea of expression in the community implies a relation between selves who share the same idea in constant dialogue, and the samvāda with the divine is a continuous celebration and revelation. However, Shrivatsa Goswami goes even further in the exploration of dialogue, with two further implications. First, the “inclusive transcendence in the socio-political realm” above mentioned indicates not only a ‘community’ but also a relation with the society, namely external communication with members of different communities. The session X transcribes discussions concerning the actuality of the ideals propounded by bhakti (notably in terms of equality and abolition of caste that characterize the bhakti movement), and the difference between principles of bhakti and the limits encountered in reality. It also questions the capacity for a feeling-centered community to connect with external communities and guarantee a social order. The

393 Given the following of the quote, I believe what was said here is “bhakti” and not “bhakta”.
394 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 226.
question implies a historical dimension concerning the integration at the time of emergence and propagation of bhakti and its relations to other communities, and the answer refers to the historical development and the foundation of Vrindavan. Shrivatsa Goswami interprets further the idea of samvāda at two different levels in connecting place and politics to elaborate the idea of “a dialogue in stone”. It is this idea that I want to elucidate now for its political but also for the literal anchoring of the dialogue in stone – and consider the relevance of the place to samvāda, not only as ‘embodiment’ but even as ‘engravement’.

The epitome of the dialogue in stone is for Shrivatsa Goswami located in the Govindadeva temple in Vrindavan, whose visit constitutes the Session VI of the samvāda, and a specificity of the experiential dimension of dialogues on this occasion. The idea of a dialogue in stone was also expounded earlier in a paper by Shrivatsa Goswami entitled ‘Govinda darśana: lotus in stone”, where he develops the meaning of the temple from the metaphor of the lotus, carved at the main entrance of the temple. “The central part is a six-petaled form, which expands into the ever-increasing circles of the nine waves of the lotus. It is the key, or the mantra, for understanding the fabric and meaning of this structure in stone called Govindadeva.” The petals are history, power and politics, ritual, architecture, arts and the most important, samvāda (this discussion is developed in the Bhakti dialogue as “one, dialogue in stone, two, history in stone, three, ritual in stone, and four, power politics in stone”). Shrivatsa Goswami evokes the subtle political game of the creation of Govindadeva, a dialogue between enemies and allies, Muslims and Hindus, North and South India:

“This temple was a creation out of a political and power game design. And who was the plotter? It seems to me that it was Śri Caitanya. When the creation was beginning, he was living in Baṅgāla, and his movement was being persecuted. When his people went into the street and chanted the holy name, they were attacked, their drums were broken, they were beaten to death and thrown into the river Gaṅgā. (…) But when it came to the creation of Vṛndāvana, he chose a site at the eye of the storm, on the marching route of the invaders’ armies – whether of the Lodīs or the Mughal. Śri Caitanya knew that when political power is not at the core of any cultural or artistic or sublime creativity, the whole thing will collapse.”

At a time of Muslim domination of the territory, Śri Caitanya selected very carefully his “project managers”, influential ministers having connections with Muslims rulers, as well as powerful people from South India, and convinced them via numerous visits. Shrivatsa Goswami speaks of bhakti as the “resurrection of the Hindu psyche” in a time of political Muslim domination.

395 Case, Govindadeva, 269.
396 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 129.
397 Afghan dynasty (Muslim rulers) governing Delhi and founder of Agra at that time.
398 Case, Govindadeva, 270–71.
399 Case, 271.
400 “Śri Caitanya very carefully designed the way he would carry out his purpose. He selected his project managers very carefully. The core of his management team came from a ruling family that had to flee Karṇāṭaka; in the second generation, the children had become the finance minister and prime minister of Husain Shāh, one of the more powerful rulers of Baṅgāla at that time. Through correspondence, Śri Caitanya first establishes rapport with them, then he visits them and meets with them clandestinely at the village of Rāmakeli. He returns and continues to plan. Again he visits them and again goes back to Uḍīs. On his third visit, he tells them that now the time has come to quit. Husain Shāh arrests his ministers and puts them in jail, but they escape. Śri Caitanya meets them at Kāśi and Prayāga, carefully briefs them and sends them to Vṛndāvana. Earlier, he travels south and picks up one of the most powerful people in all of South India.” Case, 271.
While *bhakti*, representing a religious minority, could have been seen as a threat to the power (arrested and condemned), it would not have achieved its state peacefully without an art of dialogue. Furthermore, and more extraordinarily, Shrivatsa Goswami adds that Vrindavan came as a gift from the Mughal to the Goswami. He added in our discussion that there is no other parallel in the world history of the holiest of the holiest of places for one religion to be a gift by another religion. In return of this Muslim gift administered by the legendary Mughal emperor Akbar (offering the township but also financing the temple construction), Caitanya ‘answers’ in the architecture of the temple:

“Govindadeva can be seen as an expression of what might be called the Indian style of politics, the politics of embrace. The exterior of the temple expresses a reserved and carefully modulated interweavings of Hindu and Muslim architectural styles (...) One might say that when a Hindu temple, decorated with Buddhist features, danced in love with an Islamic monument, Govindadeva was born. The politics of embrace culminates in the transformation of the other as part of your own body.”

The temple presents a combination of genres and aesthetics, which pays attention to the fact “that the sensitivity of the benefactor, that is, Akbar, may not be hurt, the Gosvāmis deliberately chose not to have a single picture or sculpture outside.” The architectural foundation, through engaging in politics, constitutes an inter-religious dialogue, which justifies for Shrivatsa Goswami the last petal, the most important of all, namely *saṃvāda*.

“There are two kinds of dialogue that are manifest in the building of Govindadeva: the inter-religious and the intra-religious. (...) A dialogue with the other is relatively simple; one confronts well-defined characteristics, and there is not much danger of losing one’s own identity. But still dialogue in these conditions becomes meaningful only when both sides are willing to give up something. In the case of the creation of Govindadeva, both Akbar and the Gosvāmīs gave up something. Akbar, who firmly disbelieved the worship of images, gave land to Govindadeva – not to the priests, not to an establishment, but to Govinda Rāya himself! And the Gosvāmīs gave up some important traditions in the buildings of temples; their move was daring, challenging, adventurous. In the end, both parties were enriched.”

Shrivatsa Goswami further develops the example of a British during colonization, who spent his resources in restoring and writing about Mathura’s architecture, opposing the colonial power that tried (and lastly succeeded) in dismantling his work. For him, this dialogue in stone, which was initiated by the strategies of the early construction, was then illustrated by the respectful and unique diversity of genres, continued in the ritual celebrations. It moreover

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401 Case, 274.
405 If politics may be said to be an effort to create in this world the realm of the perfect, then we have to look into the vision and needs of the people involved in this game. The main players here are Śrī Caitanya and the company of his disciples, whose ultimate desire is to be in a loving relationship with Kṛṣṇa. Their devotional life style, their spiritual discipline, centers around full-time devotional service, which leads them into an eternal loving relationship with the divine. The grammar and discipline of bhakti are mostly injunctional and are practiced through a set of rituals. In the standard ninefold bhakti discipline, ritualistic workship of Kṛṣṇa is the major demand on the seeker.” Case, *Govindadeva*, 272.
formed the actual background for inviting the participants in Vrindavan, to express and experience in “stone”, namely in direct experience with the temple that ‘incarnates’ (‘engraves’) all these principles at many levels and in all its layers. Could this temple and its visit represent a concrete example of what Daya Krishna calls ‘the art of the conceptual’? Despite the lack of explicit connection in his philosophy, I suggest that it be understood as such and related in particular to conceiving dialogical knowledge as ‘multifaceted’, which I analyze in chapter 4.

He further specifies the intra-religious dimension in the temple with examples in the architectural foundations of the temple:

“Intra-religious dialogue is of different nature. In such dialogue, very subtle nuances are in play, and the processes are often automatic and unconscious. But in this case the Gosvāmī’s dialogue was very conscious, because they were designers, and not only of temples in stone, but also of history, theology and ritual. (…) The other side chapel enshrines a devī never heard of before. (…) Vṛndā Devī is on a high pedestal, the realm of manifest nature. Where does this devī come from? It is the Gosvāmīs’ environmental awareness through the experience and enjoyment of Kṛṣṇa’s Illā in the pastoral landscape of Vraja that makes the basil shrub the presiding deity. The powerless is made the most powerful through an ecological process of aesthetic theology, ritual and arts, from the pastimes of Kṛṣṇa to the enactment in rāsallīlā and pilgrimages in the forests. The forests, the bower, has now been made into a house; the trees have been translated into stone. (…) The potential for dialogue to violate what has been established is a very interesting process. What happens here in this temple is a conscious violation of śāstra, so that a new śāstra can be created, and it reminds us of the dialectical nature of the creation of śāstra. There must be some material, some phenomenon, available to start with. From this can emerge categories and analysis that are systematized as śāstra. This in turn becomes part of the material available for further creation. This temple grew out of śāstra, but was developed in a dialogical creativity.”

‘The creativity of the violation of what was established previously’, here applied to the intra-religious, can be extended to a further definition of the dialogical process aimed by Daya Krishna. The novelty of the critique of one’s philosophical tradition by transcending it, is however effectuated in Daya Krishna’s project via the externality of another conceptual paradigm, rather than in an internal exploration. The dialectical move of knowledge conceived in Daya Krishna’s terms in the opposition between ‘thought’ (as śastric knowledge, a fixed body of established theories) and ‘thinking’ (as process and action working on the ‘thought’),

406 This expression refers to the title of a compilation of his articles, Daya Krishna, The Art of the Conceptual. The individual articles republished here however are not connected to Bhakti or dialogue.

407 “For example, one such design was the Ujjvalanilaṇa of Rūpa Gosvāmī, the definitive work analyzing, incorporating and transcending the Indian tradition of aesthetics and poetics. In his chapter on Rādhā, Rūpa Gosvāmī made the bold statement that the śakti of the tantric tradition is Rādhā herself. This statement became formalized in this temple when the image of Rāsaraseśvarī Rādhā came to be installed beside Govinda. (…) Rādhā first took concrete form in the image established in Govindadeva temple in the sixteenth century. It was an event of dialogical evolution. Absorbing the śakti tradition, the aṣṭadurgās and aṣṭaṣakhi, it was a very definite creation to make Śrī Govindadeva powerful (śaktimān).” Case, Govindadeva, 275–76.

408 Another example: “The doorways of Govindadeva temple are decorated with the birds of the forest, not with other animals; and among the birds, the overwhelming presence is of peacocks, the emblem of the nikuñja. The brackets, overhead, which elsewhere are shaped like elephants and boars, here have been systematically changed by the Gosvāmīs into peacocks.” Ibid.

409 Case, Govindadeva, 276.
or the opposition between śāstra and puruṣārtha (as seeking of knowledge)\textsuperscript{410}, two poles in dialectic tension from which creative thinking can emerge, can be here anticipated in Shrivatsa Goswami’s words (see 4).

Finally, the dialogue in stone that is expressed in the temple contributes to my exploration with a definition of saṃvāda: a performative dialogue built in the expression of a temple, upon which one reflects on dialogue itself. Following the logic of expression/experience above described, a last thing is missing with Govindadeva, namely the experience of the temple in the bhakti dialogue led by Daya Krishna. Did the experience enable something in the bhakti saṃvāda? And what does the introducing remark of Daya Krishna mean, when he specifies that “rather than meet in Delhi or Jaipur or Bombay or Calcutta, it is preferable to get together in a traditional place and to share the style of living, the ethos and to have a living contact with those who keep the tradition alive”\textsuperscript{411}? It is naturally difficult to comment without extrapolating on the experience of the participants, but I can only suggest the influence of the holy place of Vrindavan, whether in the ashram of Jaisingh Ghera or in the Govindadeva temple visit, the relevance of the place for dialoguing itself. A concluding remark by Dwivedi can hint at the embodiment of dialogue (or even the “enstonement”, engravenment of dialogue) and what Vrindavan meant for the dialogue itself (in Hindi):

“I experience a strange mega-aphorism whenever I get invited for a contemplative session in a place like Vrindavan. It is an entirely different experience. Any dialogue happening in any city affects by way of the things learnt, but what affects the most is the significance of the location. Why is it so that Dayaji realized only on coming to Vrindavan that bondage and liberation, enjoyment and salvation are linked together? That there is no contradiction. Until now we have been habitual of thinking under the effect of the compartmentalized philosophizing of Greek thought, as Srivatsaji pointed out in the beginning. This is foreign manure. (...) When worship assumes the form of knowledge, a vision which is called akhaṇḍa [undivided/undifferentiated] assumes visual form by itself; differentiated vision ends and undifferentiated vision appears. As Dayaji said, “from reason into the realm of feeling and from feeling into action.” All three have been referred to in Gita by the term Yoga. It refers to karmayoga, jñanayoga, bhaktiyoga [path of action, path of knowledge, path of feeling]; what was implied was that the awakening of one after the other is necessary. There is a massive independence in the Indian tradition; you have to attend the company of sages to experience this freedom. We seem to have a vision bound to the outside. In their presence, it seems as if the democracy of freedom of thought has been established. This is the biggest particularity of Indian thought tradition. Everyone has a receptive vision, and a reconciliatory viewpoint as per his own era and his own age. This sense of freedom we realized in Vrindavan and if we can see this sense transform into mahābhāva [the absolute emotion] in front of Bankebihariji [Krishna temple in Vrindavan], then nothing like it!\textsuperscript{412}

Daya Krishna continues in this sense, and in the variation of his naming the bhakti dialogue:

“I have named it as an intellectual saṅkīrtana. Such a conversation can also be called an intellectual yajña [ritual]. Mukund has called it ‘satra’ [‘session’, also a great Vedic sacrifice], where everyone is a ‘yājak’ [one who performs yajña], as well as a ‘yajamana’ [one for whose

\textsuperscript{410} Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 20–26.

\textsuperscript{411} Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 8.

Daya Krishna reiterates here the basic principle of *saṃvāda*, the transformation (and violation) implied by the dialogue in practice, for which he integrates the experience of collectivity and the particularity of the holy place. The integration of a ritualistic lexical in the denomination of *saṃvāda* shows the way the dialogue proceeded, beginning with a skeptical question mark “is there an intellectual dimension to the bhakti tradition?”, which was meant as the initial philosophical doubt towards the religious bhakti, to naming the very dialogue as *saṅkīrtana* and intellectual *yajña*. Shrivatsa Goswami was amused by the “conversion” that occurred to these philosophers who came as opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*) of the spiritual and got transformed in the dialogue. The transformative dimension of the *pūrvapakṣa* that arouse here and in general, that was at play in the *bhakti* dialogue, is a significant part of Daya Krishna’s theorization of *saṃvāda* and will be developed in the next section 5.

Finally, I would like to point out the influence of the practical *saṃvāda* in Daya Krishna’s philosophy has many aspects: one direct consequence of the *bhakti* dialogue is the writing and publication on *bhakti* with the provocative title “Did the Gopīs Really Love Kṛṣṇa?*: Some Reflections on Bhakti as a Puruṣārtha in the Indian Tradition” and further “Bhakti, the New Puruṣārtha: The Tidal Wave from the South”. My belief is that it opened a new way for him to understand the meaning of a dialogue and entering into the world of others, thus while keeping a critical voice. Instead of dismissing the religious, he came to investigate it critically, but however respectfully and playfully:

“At times it almost seemed blasphemous to say the things we said when the eternal flute of the Divine itself called to us every moment to give up the vain, empty, dry worlds of the intellect and the greeting of the “Rādhē Rādhē” which reminded us of the ecstasy of divine love. But amidst these enticements and allurements what sustained us was the unbelievably long, hard-core tradition of the ever-seeking, ever-doubting sāttvika [genuine, true] quest for the ultimate Truth by the buddhi in the Indian tradition, which has never been afraid of raising the most formidable *pūrvapakṣa* against one’s own position and attempting to answer them.”

Thus, it further persuaded Daya Krishna of the necessity of *saṃvāda* and possibly developed new insights for conceptualizing *saṃvāda*, which means that I believe the points elucidated above in the concept of *bhakti* also contributed to rooting his theory.

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413 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 250.
3.3.3. Unpublished Saṃvādas

Further references\(^{417}\) can be found to different unpublished experiments, which illustrate the scope of a ‘saṃvāda’ movement\(^{418}\), under Daya Krishna’s organization. The “Sarnath Experiment” (Varanasi) pursued the discoveries of the Pune experiment and the possibilities of connecting Nyāya with Western logic, “where, for the first time, more than a hundred Naiyāyikas from all over India met under the leadership of the late Pandit Badrinath Shukla to discuss some modern issues in respect of Nyāya.”\(^{419}\) From Nyāya, a move to explore Mīmāṃsā was made in Tirupati, while another tried to explore Kashmir Saivism in Srinagar.\(^{420}\)

“The first meeting of such a kind, i.e. of Nyāya pandits from all over India, was held in Benaras, the home of Sanskrit learning in India for millennia. The meeting, held for a full five days was such a resounding success and aroused so much enthusiasm that it was felt by everybody involved in its organization that such a meeting must also be repeated with traditional scholars specializing in other schools of Indian philosophy. Steps were therefore taken later to organize a meeting of Mīmāṃsā scholars at Tirupati in Andhra Pradesh, and of scholars in Kashmir Shaivism at Srinagar in Kashmir. One of the constant features of these meetings was the challenging question posed before the scholars of these traditions as to how they would further develop the thinking in these schools in modern times. Also, what was the doctrine or the position which the adherents of those schools could not give up without giving up their identity as belonging to a recognizable school, distinctly different from others. The more sensitive question, perhaps, concerned their own dissatisfaction with the traditional formulations – with

\(^{417}\) Due to their similar objectives and patterns, they can easily be brought under the same name of a continuous attempt. Comment by Shail Mayaram: “A series of dialogues were organized with traditional Indian scholars, the pandits. Seminars would always be held with plenty of breaks to let ideas seep in, and they always needed good food, particularly sweets, and sometimes novel venues. One session, on Vastusāstra, was held at Amber Fort; another on Kashmir Saivism was held at Srinagar in one of the mountain valleys of Gulmarg; and on another occasion scholars of Arabic and Persian came together with scholars of Sanskrit. Francine worked with Mukund Lath on a book, titled Bhakti, that was the product of a dialogue at Vrindavan hosted by Srivatsa Goswami. The pattern was similar: The purpose was to confront traditional Indian scholars with a set of new questions, to defossilize traditional Indian Philosophy, as it were, in order to spur a new impetus to thought.” Mayaram, “Daya Krishna,” 442.

\(^{418}\) Mentioned by Mukund Lath, reported by Shail Mayaram in her Foreword to Daya Krishna, *Civilizations*, xii.


\(^{420}\) In a letter on 10. 02. 2006, Daya Krishna writes: “It would be ‘something’ if the exercise is continued and the presentation of Western thought in different fields of knowledge in Sanskrit for the information of Sanskrit knowing pandits in this country is done as it might provide a challenge to our traditional thought to ‘think’ in a new way as when two different intellectual traditions meet, something like the Sangam in Prayagraj might happen.” As Daniel Raveh pointed to me, this comparison beautifully expresses the idea of the saṃvāda project: in Prayagraj is the confluence of the rivers Ganga and Yamuna, the respective colour of each remaining distinguishably identifiable. In this confluence emerges also the (mythical) river Saraswati, who is a personification of the goddess of wisdom.

“Later we had held meetings of Sanskrit pandits in the fields of Nyaya, Mimamsa and Kashmir Saivism at Varanasi, Tirupati and Srinagar respectively. Mimamsa meeting at Tirupati was held under the auspices of Kendriya Vidyapeeth itself. The idea was to bring all outstanding scholars together at one place to think and reflect how ‘Navya’ or ‘new’ thinking could be done in the contemporary context of knowledge in this country and abroad.” See also Mayaram, “Daya Krishna,” 442; Ventakesh, *A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly: In Memory of Two Indian Philosophers*, 35.
their defects, incompletenesses, weaknesses – as without these there can be no such thing as the living growth of a system.”

“Prof. G. C. Pande, Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya and Prof. N. S, Dravid held a series of sessions with the pundits of Varanasi. Then in Calcutta, Prof. Bhattacharyya, Prof. Dravid and myself met the Bengali pundits. There we had a very lively meeting and the pundits responded creatively to what we were trying to do; in fact they reversed the process and asked us to try to deal with traditional problems in the light of modern philosophy. One began to have a sense that the tradition was active and alive and one also became aware of the immense complexity of the different schools, a sense that the usual textbooks on the different systems of Indian philosophy just do not reveal.”

Dialogues also engaged with Islamic philosophy, as was mentioned earlier, with Ulema in Hyderabad and Lucknow (27-29 October 1987), to which Mustafa Khawaja refers to and provides us with the questions circulated in Urdu and English at that time in his article, and Daya Krishna mentions an attempt by Jamal Khawaja at Aligarh Muslim University with the support of the Indian Council for Philosophical Research. Although it ensued the experiments with Sanskritists, its general relevance to contemporary India is not underestimated by Daya Krishna:

“The existence of Arabic philosophy is fairly well known though it is usually treated either as an appendage to Greek philosophy or as a transmitting channel through which Greek philosophy was introduced to Western Europe. Its existence in its own right has seldom been recognized, nor its own independent contribution to philosophical thought carefully assessed. (...) The story of its transplantation into India and its independent treatment there is, however, hardly known to anybody. To have become aware of it, is itself an immense gain whose philosophical fruits can only be known in the future. But (...) it imposes on the philosophical intelligentsia of contemporary India the same tasks and duties with respect to it. And this is to become aware of it and to establish a living dialogue with it, so that it may transform both itself and us in the process.”

Furthermore, Mukund Lath also mentions *samvādas* that happened on Mīmāṃsā in Chennai and on Nyāya in Delhi. The need to connect traditions but also fields of research, which expresses a need to draw anew the borders erected between scientific domains, was also felt

421 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 74. Further mention: “We have also tried to bring scholars in one area together, as, for example, in the field of Nyāya, where a hundred people from all over India gathered together at Sarnath, Varanasi for five days and discussed some new issues which had been formulated with respect to Nyāya. This has also been attempted with respect to Mīmāṃsā and Kashmir śaivism. We have held meetings at traditional places like Wai at the Prajñā Pāṭhāśālā of Pt. Laxman Shastri Joshi, one of the greatest scholars this country has produced, and the editor of Dharmakośa, twenty one volumes of which have already been published.” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, *Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion*, 8.

422 Daya Krishna, *India’s Intellectual Traditions*, xxiii.


425 Daya Krishna, 80.

426 Personal communication with Mukund Lath, which took place in Jaipur, on 06th May 2016.

427 “However, the discovery of a living, alternative philosophical tradition cannot long remain confined to the field of philosophy alone. It inevitably raises the issue of alternative cognitive traditions in other fields of knowledge, too. As philosophy itself is not an isolated cognitive activity, it is intimately related to all other fields of knowledge and is both affected by them and affects them in a substantive manner over a period of time. But in case this is
and led to the organization of interdisciplinary *samvādas*. In Bhubaneshwar and in Orissa, dialogues in the field of linguistics in cooperation with the Central Institute of Indian languages of Mysore and the Central Institute of English and Foreign languages in Hyderabad were organized.428 “Current issues in linguistics were framed for discussion by these two institutions jointly and then translated into Sanskrit and circulated to traditional scholars beforehand.”429 One step further in transcending fields limits was taken in a dialogue in Amber about Vastu śastra, described by Ventakesh as

> “an offbeat case is when he got together a group of traditional Indian ‘Sthapathis’ rooted in ‘Vaastu Shastra’, including Shri Ganapathy Sthapathy from Chennai to directly interact with modern Indian architects, at a seminar in Jaipur, to help uncover conceptual issues and structural divergences.”430

However, the apparent loss of the reports concerning their organization makes it difficult to analyze how they could have contributed either to their philosophical field or to a methodology of dialogue. The contents have also not been published and I could neither locate recordings nor any substantial details, neither administrative nor philosophical. The different mentions to various *samvādas* testify of a certain sustainability of the project under the guidance of Daya Krishna. They also outline the wide range of topics touched upon and the participation, the interdisciplinary and intercultural commitment of the project. However, since no further publication and transcription have been made, research on these unpublished *samvādas* is necessarily limited. Indeed, the important number of dialogues that have not been transcribed, the lack of systematic reports analyzing the results and the future of the project and the absence of theoretical methodology of *samvādas* makes it vulnerable to oblivion and unusable by further researchers. In that sense, it indicates a lacuna by the organizers and participants (or if results have been lost, by successors) concerning the reports and the analysis of outcome. If the participants individually benefited from the *samvādas*, the lack of systematic publication seriously undermines the future use of the project.

3.4. Dialoguing Between Contemporaries: Challenging the ‘Temporal Imbalance’ and the ‘Assymetry’ of Classical Indian/Contemporary Western Philosophical Encounters

*Samvāda* emerged from the will to acknowledge the diversity of philosophizing in India, linguistically and conceptually, rooted in multiple traditions. It certainly drives its relevance and its scope from the interaction with *pandits* in Sanskrit. This commitment to Sanskrit over Arabic or other languages, correlates to Daya Krishna’s discovery that Sanskrit could be the national language of philosophizing in India, possibly completing, if not replacing, the place of English, the use of which is commonly justified as a link between different linguistic communities in India. However, while the idea of *samvāda* is born from this postcolonial

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428 Daya Krishna, 76.
429 Daya Krishna, 76.
430 Ventakesh, *A Gandhi and a Socratic Gadfly: In Memory of Two Indian Philosophers*, 35.
awareness and its milestones belong to the area of Sanskrit-English communication, it would be unfair to limit saṃvāda to this scope. I mentioned several occasions of inclusions of Ulema. The reports include Buddhists, and also numerous interactions with non-Indian philosophers. It is however true that the lack of publication of these dialogues makes it difficult to evaluate the results.

However, there is one more category which has been underestimated in Daya Krishna’s enterprise, and even severely condemned for its lack by A. Raghuramaraju: the relevance of contemporary Indian philosophers writing in English in the project, not as participants questioning panḍits, but as topics of investigation. Raghuramaraju indeed mentions in his publications the “temporal imbalance” of the saṃvāda project, answering ‘classical’ Indian philosophy with ‘contemporary Western philosophy’. This conception is already, I believe, a certain misunderstanding, since Daya Krishna did not conceive of the panḍits as classical, but precisely as contemporary, answering now and here contemporary questions in Sanskrit from the traditions. Daya Krishna even responded to this question of “temporal imbalance”, even if he analyzed it in a slightly different way. He addressed the “asymmetry” that one could object to the project due to the one-directional preparation of saṃvāda, which prepared ‘contemporary’ questions to ask to ‘traditional philosophers’. He thus answers:

“Though it was inevitable that in the initial stages problems had to be taken from the contemporary western context, the situation need not remain asymmetrical for long and the pandits trained in the classical philosophical traditions of India may raise counter-questions of their own with respect to the western formulations. In fact, such questions become inevitable in the course of the dialogue as the intelligibility of the problems posed itself depends on assumptions which, though widely accepted within the western tradition, are hardly accepted within the Indian one. And, once the hidden assumptions are brought into the open they themselves become the subject of discussion. Further, as the traditional Pandits become aware of the western philosophical tradition, they are bound to raise questions regarding it and, to some extent, they have already started doing so. In one of the summer/winter schools in modern logic for traditional Nyāya Pandits, held on their own request to acquaint them with modern logic, this has occurred to some extent.”

Raghuramaraju expends however his argument in his book *Philosophy and India*, suggesting that Daya Krishna completely missed the ‘modern philosophers’ of India, such as Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo and Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, who were the ones able to bridge the classical and the modern in their own writings, in particular in the case of Advaita Vedānta. He further considers that rather than pointing at the absence of the classical in the modern as Daya Krishna and the participants did, one should focus on pointing at the wrongness of the “antagonism” between classical and modern inherited from the Western structures (acknowledging thereby the political matrix in which these modern philosophers were embedded, unlike the panḍits). He writes accordingly:

433 Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 78.
“This proposal of the modern contemporary Indian philosophers for a synthesis between classical Indian philosophy – in this case Vedānta – and modern science, rather than the rejection of the classical instituted by modern Western philosophers, provides a good foundation for facilitating the recognition of pandits as philosophers. However, the opportunity that these modern Indian philosophers, such as Vivekananda, provide, and their immense contribution have escaped the attention of the authors of the Saṃvāda project. There is no reference in the project of modern Indian philosophers. One might say that what pandits are to modern Western philosophers, contemporary Indian philosophers are to the philosophers of the Saṃvāda project. This project, in its enthusiasm for their ancestors, neglected their predecessors, an omission which costs them dearly. The neglect is particularly ironic, considering that the project is authored by those very philosophers who are making out a case for the victims of exclusion.”

Two further counterarguments answer Raghuramaraju’s claim: firstly, Daya Krishna, student of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, himself son of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, remains throughout his work deeply influenced by the Bhattacharyyas’ philosophies (Krishna Chandra’s theory of feeling is at length discussed in the Bhakti dialogue itself). Daya Krishna’s philosophical work is marked by the English academic scene in India with which he was constantly engaged. Furthermore, beyond the influence exerted by the Bhattacharyyas, a clear endeavor to bring acknowledgment to them, in a way close to the one he claimed for the pandits, can be read in the publication of his work Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, developed in several steps until becoming part of the voluminous collection “History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization” edited by D. P. Chattopadhyaya. Another, although smaller, analysis can be found in the chapter “Developments in Classical Indian Philosophy after British Intrusion and the Creation of the Apartheid in the Intellectual World of Modern India.” These works constitute an elaborated overview of the Anglophone post-colonial Indian philosophers to disseminate their work and relate to their thoughts.

But since Raghuramaraju specified that his critique concerned the saṃvāda project, let us consider the integration of contemporary philosophers within this scope. Even there, the stance is univocal, for example when Daya Krishna claims during the saṃvāda on Bhakti:

434 Raghuramaraju, Philosophy and India, 62.
437 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards.
438 Requested by D. P. Chattopadhyaya, a first chapter of the future Prolegomena has been for example published in another volume of the same project: Daya Krishna, in D. P. Chattopadhyaya and Ravinder Kumar, eds., Science, Philosophy, and Culture: Multi-Disciplinary Explorations (New Delhi: Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy, and Culture in association with Indian Council of Philosophical Research : Distributed by Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1996), 480–504.
“I started this seminar on the first day by saying that we have to develop a living relationship with the past tradition of this country, and I have tried to articulate what a living relationship means. But I must further add that we have to make a living relationship with the contemporary present or the recent past also. If we do not pay attention to our thinkers, if we do not take seriously what they say, if we do not develop it further, if we do not criticize it or modify it, how can we build any tradition? The utter neglect in this country of not only our traditional thinkers but of our recent thinkers is appalling. I cannot really find a word to express my indignation, anger and surprise at the fact that even the works that have been done in India since the 19th century onwards have not been paid attention to by subsequent thinkers. Everyone seems to be writing in *vacuum*.”

Even when the dialogue addressed the *bhakti* traditions, the objective was to include the traditions as living, including the contemporary works on the traditions and the differences and plurality of traditions by recent thinkers, also those from the post-colonial Anglophone world.

I finally agree with Raghuramaraju’s argument concerning the specific lack of discussion on Gandhi and Vivekananda. However, I do not find the argument particularly relevant for the general dialogical project, which was in particular concerned with bringing visibility to unknown and/or discriminated philosophers and traditions. Gandhi’s and Vivekananda’s works are extensively researched and mentioned in any textbook and philosophical corpus on modern Indian philosophies. Thus, they are also among the rare Indian philosophers to be internationally known. As Shail Mayaram also mentions in the words she attributes to Daya Krishna in her fictive dialogue, it was probably not felt as a lacuna nor as a lack of dialogue but as the crystallization of what ‘Indian’ philosophy seems to represent in the reception it encountered. However, I sympathize with Raghuramaraju’s basic argument on the imbalance with regard to Anglophone Indian philosophy if it is extended to *academic* Anglophone Indian philosophy: the works of M. P. Rege, S. S. Barlingay, Sundara Rajan, Srinivasa Rao, K. J. Shah, to name just a few, would have deserved independent *saṃvādas*. It would nevertheless be unfair to Daya Krishna to conclude that he did not *at all* consider his peers in the *saṃvāda* project. If I concede the qualification ‘imbalance’, it does not however mean absence. Daya Krishna did bring attention to Anglophone academic philosophy, notably in organizing with his colleague K. L. Sharma discussions and publications of articles which were published under his name on J. N. Mohanty and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, followed in the same series by an edition of N. V. Banerjee edited by Margaret Chatterjee, which included answers by the concerned philosophers. A note in the same volume mentions that “the papers written by Professor A.G. Javadekar, Professor N.S. Dravid and Professor Hiranmoy Banerjee were originally presented at a seminar on the philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee held in April, 1982 under the auspices of the Department of Philosophy in the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, and organized by Professor Daya Krishna”, which points at further possible engagements on contemporary

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441 Mayaram, *Philosophy as Samvāda and Svarāj*, 283–84.
443 Chatterjee, *The Philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee*.
444 ‘Editor’s Preface’, xxiii.
Indian philosophies that could have happened at the University of Rajasthan, of which traces are not available. In the introduction to the edited book on Kalidas Bhattacharyya follows an anticipated answer to Raghuramaraju’s critique 445:

“We are happy to release our ninth publication, 'The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya' edited by Professor Daya Krishna with the assistance of Prof. A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastava. The papers included in this volume were presented at a seminar on the philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, planned and organized during January 1981, by the Department of Philosophy, Rajasthan University, Jaipur.” 446

“There can be little doubt that hardly any attention has been paid to philosophical thinkers of India's recent past. Somehow the attention has either been focused on contemporary philosophers in the West or on those Indian thinkers who have played a significant role in the religious or political life of this country. While Vivekananda, Tagore, Aurobindo and Gandhi have been discussed a great deal, the same cannot be said of such professional philosophers as K. C. Bhattacharyya, G. R. Malkani, S. Radhakrishnan, K. D. Bhattacharyya, V. N. Banerjee and others. The alleged spirituality of Indian philosophy and its relation to mokṣa seem to have continued to haunt contemporary Indian philosophers also. That perhaps may be one reason why hard-core philosophers have not attracted the attention even of those who have considered themselves philosophers in the current Western sense of the term. There can be little doubt that after K. C. Bhattacharyya, Kalidas Bhattacharyya was one of the most original thinkers amongst the professional philosophers in the country in this century. It has been our desire for long to organize seminars about the work of living philosophers of this country so that they may respond to a critical appraisal of their work by their colleagues in the country.” 447

Lastly, another critique on the crucial idea of ‘asymmetry’ in the encounter between these philosophical traditions must be addressed, which calls into question the whole samvāda project. Written almost en passant in his weighted manner, Wilhelm Halbfass was actually answering Rada Ivekovic on the politics of comparison in the volume dedicated to his research and edited by Franco and Preisendanz when he formulates this sharp critique. He uses Daya Krishna as a

445 In the publication of the volume on J. N. Mohanty, another argument can be found: “The volume on the philosophy of Professor J. N. Mohanty was conceived as a part of the exercise to awaken interest in the work of contemporary Indian thinkers in the field of philosophy, to subject their work to a critical scrutiny and to persuade the thinker to creatively respond to his criticism. The enterprise itself was part of a wider concern that for certain reasons, both the past and the present traditions of philosophizing in India had ceased to be matters of living interest to the philosophical community in the country. In fact, there was no philosophical community; there were only individual who took interest in philosophy, or sometimes philosophized on their own. And, though there were a few outstanding intellectuals, there was no live give-and-take, no feeling of growth, no sense of critical indebtedness to the achievements of the past masters, or of intellectual accountability to future generations of philosophers in India. It was these feelings that made the Department of Philosophy at Jaipur in the University of Rajasthan undertake a series of activities such as the preparation fo Subject and Author indexes to about twelve important philosophical periodicals published in English in India, the holding of a series of seminars in which contemporary philosophical issues were to be examined in the light of classical Indian philosophy, the establishment of a live dialogue with traditional pandits in the field of philosophy, the attempt at a differentiated conceptual mapping of the hard core intellectual terrain in different fields of knowledge in the Indian tradition, and a critical examination of the philosophical writings of some of the important living thinkers in contemporary India.” K. L. Sharma and Daya Krishna, eds., The Philosophy of J. N. Mohanty, 1991 edition (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 1991), vii.


(rather failed) example of contemporary approach trying to re-balance the encounter between ‘India and Europe’, the topic of which concerned his own endeavor:

“Recent efforts to explore the actual feasibility of balancing the situation of the encounter and perhaps reversing the asymmetry of the dialogue deserve our attention. But are they really more than isolated curiosities? In a series of conferences initiated by Daya Krishna on behalf of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, attempts have been made to test whether (and, if possible, to demonstrate that) traditional Sanskrit pandits can deal, in Sanskrit, not only with their own tradition, but also with problems of Western philosophy and science in a manner which would not be fundamentally different from the way modern Western terms and concepts are used to deal not only with the Western, but also the Indian tradition. (...) Can such efforts produce convincing answers to questions such as the following ones, which I raised in India and Europe with regard to the inherited hermeneutic resources of traditional or traditionalistic Sanskrit pandits:

“Do they possess traditional means of understanding which are sufficient to respond to and interpret the modern world? Does the tradition itself provide such a framework of understanding? (IE, p. 261).”

The setup of Daya Krishna’s meetings is, of course, somewhat artificial and remains embedded in a thoroughly Western or Westernized context. Such experiments ought to be encouraged, but we can hardly expect any significant hermeneutic reversal from them. In general, there seems to be little we can do, in terms of organized, methodic procedures, to bring about a fundamental change. The urge to act, to organize, to initiate change may, in fact be counterproductive. For the time being, there seems to be little choice but to continue the (admittedly asymmetrical) dialogue, the careful reading and listening, the patient work of understanding the other, but also understanding our own conditions and limits. We have to be ready for a certain amount of ‘Gelassenheit.’

The critique is penetrating, and to a certain extent justified. Let us first clarify the context from which Halbfass speaks. Halbfass naturally is not located on the same side as Daya Krishna. Daya Krishna may primarily have been trained in a Western-fashioned philosophy and in a ‘Westernized context’, his location in India nevertheless strongly distinguishes his hermeneutic situation from Halbfass’. Admittedly, ‘we’ who are working outside of India and/or with Western colleagues and who have to present our theses and arguments to this audience, “have to be ready for a certain amount of ‘Gelassenheit’”, for the simple reason that we do not have the material or ‘fundamental’ resources to create dialogues akin to the samvāda experiments. By fundamental I mean a ‘familiar’ hermeneutic ground (a mixture of friendship and trust required to honestly engage in vāda, the relevance of which has been clarified in 2.2.2). Are we however followingly allowed to conclude that what we cannot do ourselves cannot bring “any significant hermeneutic reversal”, which is implicitly what seems to constitute Halbfass’ argument? If there is little ‘we’ can do in terms of organization, can we not participate in the dialogue when invited and use further our colleagues’ resources? Are we also those who decide what should be encouraged without however believing into the relevance of what we cannot ‘do’ ourselves? This passage is quite problematic for what could be seen as some disregard from Western Indologists towards their non-Western counterparts, positioning themselves as

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autonomous epistemic agents, and rejecting collaborating forms they cannot control. Nevertheless, although this normative judgment cannot be held, and although the samvāda project cannot be dismissed due to the lack of self-reliance or trust by others, some limits of the results of the samvāda project are precisely outlined by Halbfass.

The question “but are they really more than isolated curiosities?” refers to the limits of the audience I already mentioned above, and can also be affirmatively stated again: the experiments included a limited number of paṇḍits and cannot be - as of today - said to have reached unanimity (nor majority) in the world of Sanskrit philosophies in India. Following the answer to the questions “Do they possess traditional means of understanding which are sufficient to respond to and interpret the modern world? Does the tradition itself provide such a framework of understanding?” will vary: responses produced by Badrinath Shukla in the samvāda for instance, testifies of a “yes”; but can it be expended to all and become a systematic answer? Probably not. However, I have highlighted the difficulties in locating and finding paṇḍits who are (sometimes remotely) away from the academic system: wouldn’t it be more prudent, and maybe humbler, to provisionally doubt whether they at first have been given a chance to participate in such a dialogue before definitively judging of their ability to answer?449

Finally, to concede the end of the argument to Halbfass, it is highly improbable that paṇḍits would provoke this chance themselves, considering the certain closure of the traditions exposed above (itself a topic of Halbfass’ India and Europe450) but also, and more importantly here, the fact that the embodiment “in a thoroughly Western or Westernized context” is a condition for the elaboration of such dialogue. Indeed, as Mohanty also noticed,451 the emergence of these contexts in India is the consequence of a hybrid, cosmopolitan and postcolonial world that brought attention to the persisting asymmetry and ways to correct it. This justified in this work introducing the larger context in which the dialogues took place (2.1.2 and 2.2). The exposition

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449 One could redirect Daya Krishna’s following critique to Halbfass (Daya Krishna does not mention any explicit name here nor indication on the Indologists he addresses): “There is so little knowledge about traditional scholars and their work that hardly anything can be said with confidence about it. However, the more we have come to know about them and their works during the last few years, the more suspicious we have become about the stereotypes built up over the past century-and-a-half under the leadership of western Indologists.” Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,” 79.

450 See for example Halbfass’ famous stance: “Traditional Hinduism has not reached out for the West. It has not been driven by the zeal of proselytization and discovery, and by the urge to understand and master foreign cultures. It has neither recognized the foreign, the other as a possible alternative, nor as a potential source of its own identity. “It has at no time defined itself in relation to the other, nor acknowledged the other in its unassimilable otherness.” [Mehta, India and the West, 117] India has discovered the West and begun to respond to it in being sought out, explored, overrun and objectified by it. Its initial position in the encounter was that of a target of European interests and expectations. It was not the course of Indian history, nor the inner dynamism of the Hindu tradition, that led to the encounter. Europeans took the initiative. They went to India. This is a simple and familiar fact. Yet its fundamental significance for the hermeneutics of the encounter between India and the West is often forgotten.” Halbfass, India and Europe, 172.

451 I mentioned this quote in the clarification of the Indian philosophical context in Samvāda as a Reaction. Being Located in an Intellectual Context. Between Over-Presence’ (of the West) and Absence (of India): “One who is asking “What is Indian philosophy? What is ‘Indian’ about it?” has already situated himself outside of that tradition which we call ‘Indian’. None of the philosopher who shaped that tradition, and with those writings we are acquainted, ever asked such a question. They lived and thought within that tradition, which today we are, by the very questions we are asking, thematizing. In that very act of thematizing, a rupture has taken place.” Mohanty, “Indian Philosophy between Tradition and Modernity,” 233.
to the Westernized world is the condition for this awareness to arouse provoked by the colonial encounter. How paradoxical would it be to expect *pandits* to provoke these dialogues occurring from a postcolonial perspective when we expect them to participate at the same time in these dialogues as the holders of an untouched tradition? In that sense, it is therefore true that the initiation and motivation of the *saṃvāda* is *de facto* embedded into Westernized and postcolonial contexts, since the debate simply does not exist without this awareness - this is also what justifies my appellation of the *saṃvāda* project as a postcolonial response in (2.2.1.1). It is also true that the dialogue entails an asymmetric dimension, in terms of efforts and initiatives. However, renouncing to the dialogue due to this asymmetry does not remove the asymmetry either, it just leads to accepting to its political consequences in terms of exclusion of traditional modes of philosophizing. Denying this asymmetry is probably also not desirable, since it simply creates another illusion. Halbfass himself was very much aware of this hermeneutic situation that constitutes the concern of *India and Europe*, and it is slightly odd to read him escaping - in my understanding - the Halbfassian method itself452.

3.5. Conclusive Remarks: A Philosophy of *Saṃvāda*?

To conclude, this chapter developed the idea of *saṃvāda* on the account of the experiences of the dialogues organized under this name. I attempted to extract from the experiments described a certain methodology and practice of dialogue, hinting at possible procedures, requirements and definitions for thinking *saṃvāda*. The procedures are two-folded: the seminars (Jaipur experiments) and the JICPR proposed two regular and spontaneous dialogical laboratories. Weekly organized or scheduled for ongoing issues, they maintained and extended networks and resources in order to try different formats and to refine methodologies. These attempts could be in terms of interculturality, interdisciplinary, or modifying the rules of a seminar or a journal. Exploration of interculturality includes the discussion on the validity of looking for ‘Indian’

452 Franco addresses the question “To what extent was Halbfass himself a Halbfassian while assessing the reception of Halbfass’ method and inheritance in the Forword in the volume edited by Preisendanz in commemoration of Halbfass (in Karin Preisendanz, ed., *Expanding and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Denkschriften / Österreichische Akademie Der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-Historische Klasse ; Beiträge Zur Kultur- Und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, 351. Bd. Nr. 53 (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2007), xi). The two authors also discuss more extensively what could constitute a “Halbfassian method” in their Introduction and Editorial Essay on Wilhelm Halbfass in their earlier publication, *Beyond Orientalism* in particular its hermeneutic development both vis-à-vis Gadamer and Neo-Hinduism : “Is there a distinctive name to this Halbfassian "method"? Halbfass himself has not termed his "method," but two reemerging words, *Gespräch/"dialogue" and Verständnis/"understanding," could capture what he has in mind. It is quite clear that the usual everyday meanings of these words do not always correspond to the Halbfassian usage; this is indicated already by the fact that "dialogue" appears in inverted commas in the Epilogue (chapter 20) of *India and Europe*. For instance, Halbfass seems to speak of a "dialogue" or "dialogic situation" even when one party is not addressing the other party, but is rather turning to itself in responsive reflection: even when someone like Hacker writes for a European audience, Halbfass considers what he says as part of the ongoing "dialogue" between India and Europe. Also, contrary to what is sometimes presupposed, this "dialogue" is not necessarily a balanced communication between two parties; Halbfass is of course clearly aware of the fact that the "dialogue" has been dominated by Europe so far.” Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, “Introduction and Editorial Essay,” in *Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies*, 1st Indian ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), XI.
methodologies in social sciences by Anglophone Indian scholars versus including pañđits as the ‘authentic’ Indian philosophers - and what the Indian of Indian philosophies could accomodate or not. The interdisciplinary aspect was for example explored in questioning a “text” and “commentary” in different fields (see Appendix 1). The dialogical exploration of the JICPR integrated the different additions of columns and categories presented above. In all these cases, the use of an established platform enabled the changes in the structure itself, without need for pre-organization.

On the other hand, the occasional samvāda experiments required a different organization. Although the idea of each samvāda occurred in ‘spontaneous occasions’ (philosophical questions that emerged in personal meetings), it was occasional in its frequency and larger in scale. It therefore required a rigorous material and philosophical organization, notably to formulate bilingual questions and invitations. This, which I described as a careful setting, reveals how rigorously planned the experiments were. The procedures are therefore divided between a regular, yet spontaneous organization supported by established structures on the one hand, and a spontaneous dialogical execution of a carefully staged organization on the other hand. The difference between oral and written accounts also makes a difference in these different experiments, notably in terms of the spontaneity: the orality and the direct confrontation with others in the different dialogues contributes to creative thinking in the form of ‘naked’ thinking described above. Although the arguments might not always be proved exact or accurate when spontaneously formulated, they illustrate Daya Krishna’s ‘thinking’ as a process in opposition to the fixed thoughts that constitute the resources from which one can think (see 2.1).

More important than the opposition between thinking and thought is their necessary relation. The dialectic implied between the two motivates the samvāda project, criticizing the usual academic model that values thoughts over thinking. In the common vision of academics where knowledge is to be acquired by accumulation, thinking is believed to constitute of the addition of resources on known topics that do not necessarily question the perspectives from which and the grounds on which these resources are organized and thought. However - at least this is the regulative idea underlying the samvāda project - facing the visage (face) of the Other in a dialogue, in a Lévinassian sense, asks not only for an answer to one’s thoughts with one’s ‘contribution’ on the same topic. It also asks for an answer of one’s ‘thinking in process’ hic et nunc, the orality of which is relevant for the spontaneity and directedness. The treatment of the JICPR as a blog reproduces this orality at a written level. While the context and the objectives of these two thinkers differ, the encounter in dialogue with the other has something in common: the insufficiency of the Other-as-object, either as character (persona) or as ‘thoughts’ and the overcoming of this objectivity in the direct relation.

453 Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions.
454 “Le visage est signification, et signification sans contexte. Je veux dire qu’autrui, dans la rectitude de son visage, n’est pas un personnage dans un contexte. D’ordinaire, on est un ‘personnage’ : on est professeur à la Sorbonne, vice-président du Conseil d’Etat, fils d’Un tel, tout ce qui est dans le passeport, la manière de se vêtir, de se présenter. Et toute signification, au sens habituel du terme, est relative à un tel contexte : le sens de quelque chose tient dans sa relation à autre chose. Ici, au contraire, le visage est sens à lui seul. Toi, c’est toi.” Emmanuel Lévinas,
These characteristics bear an influence on the definition of dialogue: it places the others at the centre of the definition, however as the other-in-thinking. In the first definition of dialogue (1.1.4), I emphasize on the difference with debate where arguments are posed on the same ground, which enable to agree on one common criteria to validate them. On the other hand, I suggested that dialogue was taking into account the notion of encounter in a continuous movement between the participants in the confrontation of whom the arguments were emerging. I think that the samvādas points at this oscillation between participants as persons ‘en chair’ in the direct encounter where the rules for debating can be questioned and the presuppositions implied in one’s conceptual framework can be unveiled. However, the persons appear as ‘thinking persons’, in that they are not the object discussed and they are required to develop what Daya Krishna called a ‘detached intellect’, which is the thought being reflected upon. In ‘thinking’ therefore, in Daya Krishna’s distinction, appears the flow of thoughts of one person. A samvāda is a platform for different thinkings in process to meet.

There are, however, at least two serious limits to consider: this going-back-and-forth implied in collective thinking cannot seem to sustain alone. It should be regarded as a melting pot of thinking, a laboratory for novelty in thinking, and for the benefit of its experimental, thought-provoking character. However, it cannot replace the labor of individual research. It generates impulses for new researches and it inspires the emergence of new ideas, but it cannot permit the elaboration of these ideas alone. Daya Krishna himself testifies on this point when he considers the slow fainting of the Jaipur experiments: “We gradually began to realize that we could not proceed significantly beyond what had been achieved so far. I realized then that, ultimately, only ‘individual’ effort would enable us to take any further steps towards the goal that we had set ourselves.”

These lines, written in the preface of his monograph *The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought*, attests of the insufficiency of dialogues *alone*. However, in spite of critiques on the “peril of autonomy” for knowledge and the “utopian character” of the “self-reliant epistemic agent”, such a conception of the

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456 This is also attested by Bäumer’s account when she states that “the seminar was an exploration of Kashmir Śaivism, a relatively new discovery for Indian philosophers. Dayaji discovered it for himself, and was also viewing it critically. It was more the fact of meeting and discussing the issues involved, than a real contribution to the research on Kashmir Śaivism.” Bäumer, “‘Falling in Love with a Civilization’: A Tribute to Daya Krishna, the Thinker,” 35. (emphasis are mine)

457 Chakrabarti’s analysis strictly investigates ‘knowledge from words’ in this paper and not the simultaneity of collective thinking. Nevertheless, his starting point serves my purpose: “The ideal seeker of knowledge in Western philosophy, at least since Locke, is a lonely figure. He does his job single-handed, finding out facts about his environment by direct observation, deducting, generalizing, and explaining on the basis of principles of inference which he has himself enunciated using his own ‘natural lights’. However handy and plausible a bit of personally unchecked information might be, he would never take anyone else's word for it. Language does contribute to his knowledge-gathering enterprise, but only by facilitating the filing system, as a medium of preserving and
role of researchers and intellectuals remain the norm, relying on one’s own tower of doctrines. And however insufficient dialogues are alone for the foundation of knowledge, what Daya Krishna proves with the saṃvāda project is the other side of the same coin (of knowledge): the necessity of collectivity for thinking tout court. If dialoguing alone entails the risk of superficiality, as witnessed by Daya Krishna above, researching alone entails the risk of (besides arrogance and self-limitation) reproduction of knowledge under the appearance of continuity, where footnotes completes a thesis already pre-established. This account is based on a summative conception (I actually cannot know alone everything) but also on interaction, namely what the others do to my doxa in the dialoguing process, when what I hold to be true is proved wrong, when what I could not imagine is told in front of me. Insofar, it is the reciprocated dynamic of dialoguing, for the reflexive judgment on one’s knowledge and the impetus for opening new ones, that constitute knowledge after systematizing these inputs and questions into doctrines. Therefore, Daya Krishna continues in the same preface:

“There is another obstacle preventing these traditions from becoming an active presence in the intellectual consciousness of the present. This is the attitude common to most traditional scholars who feel that all the thinking on these subjects has already been done and that nothing more is required except to ‘understand’ it as fully as possible. Their only dispute, therefore, is with regard to the ‘correct’ understanding of what the texts say in these matters. The question is not whether the understanding of a concept or of a set of concepts is ‘correct’ in the light of what has been said in a particular text or a series of texts on the subject, but whether one is creatively using and developing it to understand one’s own experience as did so many of the great thinkers in the past.” 458

However, Daya Krishna himself pursued his individual effort half way only: while this effort led him to deepen topics on Indian philosophies explored during the saṃvādas (such as the above-mentioned book, but also the papers on bhakti, etc.), it did not prompt him to formulate a theory of saṃvāda. There is no explicit monograph on Daya Krishna on dialogue nor any systematic organization and reflection on the saṃvādas. There are no explicit leads for a theory of dialogue, neither of Western conception nor grounded on Sanskrit sources, but only a few mentions, in particular in the introduction and prefaces of the published saṃvādas processing, rather than procuring, data. Of course, none of us who learnt our first (and second and third...) languages by trusting our natural or appointed tutors and know most of our Science, History, and Geography from books, actually resemble this strictly self-reliant epistemic agent. But then, as an heir to Sextus Empiricus, much of modern epistemology wears its utopian character on its sleeve. One interpretation of the Socratic disavowal of knowledge could be that when he applied the strict criterion of knowledgehood to his own cognitive repertoire he found that nothing came up to those standards. Neither among the specialized scientists of our times who work in teams and depend more and more heavily on previously gathered results nor among educated common folk do we actually find such obstinate refusal to share epistemic responsibility with fellow-cognizers.” Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” in Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, Synthese Library 230 (Dordrecht: Springer, 1994), 1–2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2.


459 The most explicit full paper on dialogue is unpublished: Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge.”

460 The most explicit full paper devoted to the saṃvādas is entitled: Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy.”
explaining the project, in unpublished letters, in Daya Krishna’s statements in the dialogue on dialogue with Maurice Friedman - namely, an erratic conceptual journey.

In our meeting, T. N. Madan conceded regretting the lack of a concluding theoretical approach that remains unachieved by Daya Krishna. Madan presents a worthwhile critique: he began from the fact that Daya Krishna was first of all trained in Western philosophies, where he started to bring his own contributions and from where he thinks. In reaction to the monopoly of Western philosophies and with a growing consideration for the discriminated philosophical traditions of India, Daya Krishna developed an urge to include the latter into the philosophical dialogue. In so doing, he chose to turn his back on Western philosophies. Madan therefore compared him to Louis Dumont and his relation to anthropology, stating the need to know the Other in order to know oneself. This anthropological prospect is wholeheartedly pursued by Daya Krishna in the *samvāda* project when he puts together different traditions in a question/answer setting. However, for Madan the problem remains the following: “Did he turn completely back?” For him, Daya Krishna gave up his strength for some “gold holders”, i.e. he jettisoned his strength and knowledge for some (exceptions) that do not leave space for others. I described earlier some limitations in the audience in terms of a certain familiarity: it included those scholars who were sympathetic to the project, but it certainly did not connect the whole communities of Indian traditions. The participation was gradual and Daya Krishna made effortless gestures to encourage the diversity of the participation and to extend invitations to different philosophical traditions and scholars. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the circle remained limited and only a few resurgences were effectuated after his death. Thus, for Madan it constitutes a certain sacrifice from Daya Krishna’s side. He did not have the same level of knowledge in Western and Indian philosophy, which leads Madan to estimate his project as “unfinished”. The latter considers the advantages of the project and the implication of numerous persons in the dialogues. However, as he notices, Daya Krishna “didn’t come to an end of his own”. He lacks a theoretical work in the way Dumont did: similarly, Dumont started working on Europe in the same way Daya Krishna started on Western philosophy, and then came to India like Daya Krishna came to Indian philosophy. Nonetheless, Dumont came back to Europe to draw his own conclusion (on the ground of his Indian analyzes), a last move that Daya Krishna did not effectuate. For Madan, this last synthesis is missing. While in Dumont, two texts are superposed, a theoretical and an ethnographic description (Madan specifies that Dumont disagrees with his interpretation), he sees a lack of the former dimension in Daya Krishna’s work. This is a serious critique with which I agree, and which justifies my work as a theoretical outline of the dialogical with Daya Krishna, inductively based on his *samvāda* experiments (the numerous dialogues in *praxis*) and connected to his theoretical philosophy (lacking a philosophy of dialogue). This chapter therefore consisted in an organization and description of the experiments upon which I outlined the above described characteristics. The next part connects these practical characteristics to Daya Krishna’s philosophy, yet not on dialogue. As much as the description of the experiments is based on personal reconstruction grounded on the material available to me, the following part is a personal reconstruction of the

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461 Personal communication, 15.02.2017, New Delhi.

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relation between dialogue in praxis and the dialogical in theory: it does not focus on the whole of Daya Krishna’s philosophy but freely selects concepts (according to their general importance in Daya Krishna’s work and their specific relevance for the dialogical) to be related to the *samvāda* project, suggesting one interpretation of the multifaceted dialogical in Daya Krishna’s philosophy.

If there is no theory of *samvāda*, is it legitimate to postulate one in Daya Krishna’s philosophy? Does it mean that *samvāda cannot* be theorized in his work? Does it mean that it should not be theorized at all? (1) Indeed, some could fear a “fixity” implied in the theorization, which would confine *samvāda* in a definite system, against which Daya Krishna himself would stand. (2) Some could fear that trying to reconstruct the concept in Daya Krishna’s theoretical works would prevent the development of a practice of *samvāda*, that the theory would occult the *praxis*. (3) Some could even deny Daya Krishna the ability of reflecting on what could have been only a random experimental practice that could not be rooted in philosophical concepts – Daya Krishna’s *samvāda* would be an accidental and non-reflected practice detached from any methodological conception.

(1) To the first criticism, one could answer that, although any theory is limited in the form of a finite paper, thesis or book, nothing prevents it from describing, analyzing, and defending creativity or dynamism, what Daya Krishna himself did throughout his work. His distinction between ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ can be helpful. If any theory on Daya Krishna will be to some extent a thought, i.e. something delimited by a particular author in a particular paper, nothing prevents this author, may it be Daya Krishna, to express the dynamicity of thinking. This dynamic can be found as an engagement with an idea, with a concept that can be further developed into other ‘thoughts’, delimited books for example, or into new dialogues. (2) Secondly, theory and practice are not excluding each other, and one could obviously develop a theory of dialogue while organizing dialogues at the same time, or engaging the same theory in dialogues. (3) The next chapters precisely constitute an attempt to answer to the last objection, namely the fact that Daya Krishna’s experiments are not grounded in his philosophy, or the fact that *samvāda* was exclusively a practice without methodological philosophical foundation. In spite of the lack of explicit theory, I believe it is justified to postulate a theory of dialogue in Daya Krishna’s philosophy, considering the relevance of his *samvāda* project for him as I tried to outline in chapter 2 and in general the relevance of dialoguing for Daya Krishna. First of all, it would be suspicious to imagine a hiatus between Daya Krishna’s practical engagement in dialogues and his philosophy, that is, in spite of a lack of explicit theory, to conclude simply of an absence of thinking dialogues. In a review article dedicated to the memory of S. N. Ganguly and edited by S. P. Banerjee and Shafali Moitra, Daya Krishna harshly reproaches the authors and editors to have not reflected in the edited volume on the practice of the concepts they use in their title, namely communication, identity and self-expression. For him, the identity of the contributors is very much restricted to Bengal, the communication is limited to the English-sphere and the high cost of the volume restricts its availability. He further comments on the nature of the critiques he makes:

“If these remarks [the above mentioned critical points] seem both flippant and irrelevant, that would only mean that we accept the deep dichotomy between what is said and what is lived or
even what the act of saying itself implies, to which most intellectuals wittingly or unwittingly
seem to subscribe. Perhaps the dilemma faced by all writers who are concerned closely with
matters pertaining the the fact of living itself is avoided through recourse to the notion of
engaging in a second-level activity, which all philosophy is supposed to be.\textsuperscript{463}

The dichotomy that Daya Krishna condemned would apply to him if his dialogical practice
would not have any colouring of his theory, if his dialogue would not be reflected in his
discourse, or would contradict it. Would it be possible to bracket the experiments to the point
of not thinking dialogues with Daya Krishna’s philosophy? While it is impossible to directly
formulate a theory of dialogue, I hypothesized until now that one could reconstruct one from
the intentions, the practices and the concepts of the experiments. While it does not constitute a
central concept in his theories, the idea of a relation with others is more and more present and
relevant in the \textit{samvādas} from the 1980ties on, and it will constitute my following task than to
show how this relation can be seen as dialogical. Moreover, Daya Krishna’s writings on
knowledge, precisely ‘human’ knowledge, imply both others as constituent of the process, as
well as correlated dimension of values in which knowledge is formed. This conception
integrates the human seekings toward knowledge as a part of the process. Thus, intersubjectivity,
including the intercultural variations as source of creativity, are very much part of his
philosophy, to which I will turn now. Finally, the dialogical remained a method of
philosophizing in Daya Krishna’s philosophy, something Raveh qualified as dialogue-as-
\textit{pramāṇa}\textsuperscript{464}, due to the method of approaching texts, in dialoguing rather than commenting
in particular in his works after 2000. I believe that this last series of articles and texts can be seen
as Madan’s expected ‘attempted conclusion’ and I wish to use it for suggesting a ‘prolegomena’
for thinking a philosophy of \textit{samvāda}.

\textsuperscript{463} Daya Krishna, “Book Review: Communication, Identity and Self-Expression: Essays in Memory of S.N.
Ganguly by S. P. Banerjee and Shefali Moitra,” \textit{Philosophy East and West} 38, no. 4 (1988): 431,

\textsuperscript{464} Daniel Raveh, “Philosophical Miscellanea: Excerpts from an Ongoing Dialogue with Daya Krishna,”
Part II: Saṃvāda in Theory

4. Dimensions of Dialogues and their Entanglements

“Daya Krishna ended his youthful enquiry into the nature of philosophy with the “contrary” reflection that philosophy is cognitive activity par excellence, which itself consists in getting into unsuspected conceptual muddles and aims at clarifying them, that philosophy lives in the clarification of its own confusions, “a clarification that is its own death.” So should we look forward to solutions of philosophical problems or shrink away from any solution for fear of the death of the thinking enterprise?

Till the end, when he wrote the strategies for creativity in thinking, he never resolved the emotional tension, the love-hate of the subject that we see in the concluding chapter of his first book. He loved conceptual analysis, the ideal method of clarifying confusions, which, as we noted at the start, he called “the art of the conceptual.” But at the same time, he was open about the informational sterility of conceptual analysis. Not only did he mock all pretensions of philosophers’ special knowledge of ultimate reality as the confusion-mongering conceptual analyst wearing “the false plumes of the shaman, the priest, or the prophet”, he also threw up his hands at the conceptual disputations among philosophers about reality of time, permanent objective physical objects vis-à-vis subjective awareness of them by remarking: “What a mess!” There is always a tension which keeps him going at these issues. He enjoys the tension thoroughly and has no desire to ease it out.

By the time he came to his last optimistic writings on the future of creative, cooperative, “cognitive journeys”, he seemed to have become iconoclastic about his own variety of iconoclasm also.

An individual thinker cannot alone have this sort of idol-breaking desire. New insights take birth only when intellectual rebels get into a dialogue with the traditionalists, different incommensurable critiques of the old ideas start talking to each other even about the impossibility of talking to each other. It is then that what Daya Krishna called “the realm of between” emerges. Genuinely new cognitive desires come to be in that realm.” 465

4.1. Dialogue as a Multifaceted Whole

Admittedly, Daya Krishna was more engaged in actual dialogues than in methodologically constructing them, more preoccupied with philosophically responding conceptual questions raised by scholars in the world and from different traditions than theorizing how intercultural responses could at first emerge. The published samvādas, but also his numerous publications on Indian philosophies⁴⁶⁶, testify of this conceptual journey among traditions without needing supplementary methodological explanations regarding their elaboration in the context described in the preceding chapters. Nevertheless, it is possible to take note of the significance of intercultural dialogue if one reinterprets his later publications and connects his theoretical works on the relations between and signification of knowledge(s)⁴⁶⁷, truth(s)⁴⁶⁸ and freedom(s)⁴⁶⁹, the tension between values (puruṣārthas) and doctrines (sāstra)⁴⁷⁰ for creative thinking⁴⁷¹. These definitions and relations include descriptions of the obstacles for thinking creatively and the ‘thinking tools’ to be used (e.g. counter-position and questioning). Since Daya Krishna was intensely participating into dialogues among philosophical traditions before and during the period he developed these notions, it would be difficult to assume that these sides of his philosophizing had nothing to do with each other (which is also witnessed by Arindam Chakrabarti in the opening quote above). Could we, therefore, not assume that creative thinking was realized by his dialogical practice? Can we intrinsically relate philosophizing and dialogue, in the sense that philosophizing (in opposition to the exegetic and historical presentation and repetition of an earlier text) was necessarily taking place in the form of dialogues, intercultural, interdisciplinary or intertextual, and that in consequence, although not always explicitly, these later texts could provide us an entrée into a philosophy of dialogue, or in his terms, a prolegomena to dialoguing? How to think intercultural dialogues with Daya Krishna, in a theoretical way that nevertheless reflects the practice he was engaged with, and what does ‘creative thinking’ mean for philosophizing in dialogues? Does the latter necessarily guarantee

⁴⁶⁶ Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997; Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy; Daya Krishna, The Nīyāya Sūtras; Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006; Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking.


⁴⁷⁰ Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 20–25.

the former, do dialogues form and actualize creative thinking? Does creative thinking in this way encompass dialogues, does it exceed it? In this sense, would creative thinking be the goal ‘seeked’ at when dialoguing, a criterion to evaluate the ‘success’ of a dialogue? And what could bring the ‘intercultural’ dimension, or the thinking between philosophical traditions, to creativity? Does it necessarily expand the possibilities to be creative, or does it impede the communication? Does it constitutively change creative thinking, or does it simply ‘taint’ it with different types of illustrations and communication practices? These questions raise different dimensions of the problems that are progressively developed in this theoretical part, and the difficulty with Daya Krishna is to retain the relations between these dimensions while clarifying the problems, which is however the core of the issue, and, in my sense, his most relevant contribution to the topic. For these reasons, the present chapter (4) attempts at highlighting the connections between the key concepts of Daya Krishna’s philosophy that I relate to his idea of dialogue, which I successively distinguish to delve in the next chapters (5 to 7). While it is for me a hermeneutic necessity to separately articulate the different dimensions that I consider fundamental for thinking dialogue with Daya Krishna, I am nevertheless firmly convinced that it is their entanglement that forms the dynamicity of intercultural dialogues. Hence, I first introduce the relations before exposing the complexity of each concept. I start from the dialectic tool Daya Krishna argues for to emphasize how these dimensions should be seen in interconnection and the central theme that I want to follow.

The dialectic tool Daya Krishna often uses and refers to is retained from the Sanskrit concept of pūrvapakṣa (see 5.1), or counter-position: pūrvapakṣa in this sense is not simply a ‘counter-’, i.e. an anti-thesis (pratipakṣa472). It rather implies to defend the other position to the best of one’s ability, i.e. to be (in) the other’s position for a moment, to integrate it to one’s exposition and ideally, to let one’s argumentation be transformed by the act of being in the other’s position. This refers to the task of intellectually detaching oneself from one’s position while engaging in dialogue with the other (see 1.1.4 and 5.2.1). But how to do so, what enables this movement of engagement via detachment? Engaging in dialogue while seeking non-attachment (niḥsaṅga buddhi473) as an ideal for participants implies, on the one hand, a detachment from a position, a mode of reasoning, a philosophical doctrine and a philosophical tradition. But if one acknowledges that philosophical positions, doctrines and traditions are situated at “the intersection of the past and the future as well as that of the here and the beyond”,474 i.e. at the crossroads of historical heritages, present interpretations and future applications, then it follows that this intersection “provides thus a matrix within which the history of any civilization or culture may be apprehended.”475 The challenge of the search for niḥsaṅga buddhi in dialogue thus implies revealing and unveiling this matrix, in the multiplication of the expressions of

472 On the analysis of pratipakṣa, see in particular Prets, “Theories of Debate, Proof and Counter-Proof in the Early Indian Dialectical Tradition.”
474 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 15.
475 Daya Krishna, 15.
different positions, modes of reasonings, doctrines and traditions - and in their intersections. Detachment is a way of letting differences appear in the game of dialoguing (see 5.3).

Is that even possible? How can dialogue allow the detachment of its participants towards an intersection of positions, which would have no location of its own? And how can we argue and dialogue if there is no position, no location? Does that point at a dialogue in vacuo? There seems to be a middle point between a-position and a position, which is self-reflection via the intersubjective engagement, of analyzing from the perspective of the other’s position - and to change it accordingly, or to discover new questions in the enterprise. For self-reflection is grounded in what Daya Krishna sees as the fundamental capacity of consciousness “to move out of itself and to move back to itself” that “self-consciousness encounters when it reflects on itself”, or “the capacity for attending and withdrawing that is the foundation for all the consciousness does in its attempts to change itself from one state to another” 476 (see 6.2.3 and 7.3). This capacity is located in our very possibility to consciously be an active part of the world in which we are located, and while being fully involved in it, to be able to withdraw from it, 477 either by a critical ability to reflect on what we are engaged, or at a more spiritual level of detachment from the reality surrounding us. The force of such a motion is further elicited by Daya Krishna as constituting freedom (see 6.2.3):

“Yet, that which is felt to be ‘unreal’ can become ‘real’ in an instant, the moment one wants or desires something, and feels simultaneously its ‘present absence’ and future ‘presence’, if only one were to do something to bring it about through action based on some knowledge relevant to it, and also pertaining to the same. The Indians call this pravṛtti, the generalized name for the ‘out-going’ movement of consciousness, determined by desire, and memory, and

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476 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 2.
477 Relating this metaphysical stake to saṃvāda, Daniel Raveh previously emphasized the importance of the ‘back and forth’ of the movement of engagement and disengagement: “Taking issue with traditional positions of disengagement-as-freedom, such as Patañjali’s stance in the Yogasūtra, Daya Krishna suggests that freedom cannot be achieved through disengagement alone. Instead, he offers his own prescription of freedom in the form of the capacity to disengaged but also to ‘return’ and to re-engage at will. For him, the two movements, ‘withdrawal’ and ‘return’ are complementary, and freedom consists of both. Daya Krishna further suggests that if one accepts the possibility of ‘withdrawal’ and also of the ‘return’ from it, one has (…) to ask how the attainment of the former affects the latter. One’s phenomenal existence, he argues, cannot remain unaffected by one’s metaphysical journeys. Hence he pleads for what can be referred to as abstract-concrete mediation, or more precisely, for an ‘enlightened action’ in the world.” Daniel Raveh, “On Philosophy as Saṃvāda: Thinking with Daya Krishna,” in Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Śvarāj: Dialogical Meditations on Daya Krishna and Ramchandra Gandhi, ed. Shail Mayaram (New Delhi: SAGE, 2014), 106. See also Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 68–70.
478 In S. S. Barlingay’s words, which can be applied to what Daya Krishna expresses here: “Man’s role as a knower and doer or creator requires that he is not just a passive observer outside the process of creation but that he is a part of the creative process itself. His uniqueness is that he can patiently observe the process and be a critic of it although he is a part of the process. He is a part of the process because he is a product of the process, because he is governed by the cosmic laws. He can be a detached observer because of the awareness that arises in the process itself. It is this awareness which makes him a universe by himself, capable of looking upon the rest of the universe to which he actually belongs, as different from himself. The formation of his self-identity and alienation (or the otherwise) from the rest of the universe take place simultaneously like the two ends of the sea-saw, one going up and one going down.” Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, “Experience and Reflection,” in Problems of Indian Philosophy, ed. S. P. Dubey, Facets of Recent Indian Philosophy, v. 3 (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research : Distributed by Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1996), 200–201.
imagination, and resulting in that perpetual ‘seeking’, or ‘thirst’ for what-is-not, which the Buddha called tṛṣṇā, and which lies at the root of samsāra, or the human world as we know it.

But if there is pravṛttī, there is also nivṛttī, the counter-movement of consciousness, the 'withdrawal' from it all, and 'returning' to oneself to find once again what one had lost to the ‘world of objectivity’, the samsāra with its myriad charms and unending frustrations, ever-changing, never remaining the same or being ‘still’ even for a moment, as ‘time’ is the essence of it.

Freedom, thus, lies in this double capacity of consciousness at the human level to move outward or return inward as it pleases, bound neither by the one or the other, and hence at another level, feeling itself ‘free’ from both. Neither of these can define it exclusively, or exhaust its reality as it ‘appears’ to itself as transcending both, no matter if this is ‘judged’ to be illusory by the consciousness itself when it ‘sees’ the situation ‘objectively’ and tries to understand it. Both the ‘outward’ and the ‘inward’ movement seem to have in-built limitations not exactly known to man, and perhaps, ‘unknowable’ in principle, as the former encounters the ‘givenness’ of the body and the physical world on the one hand and the socio-cultural and politico-economic ‘worlds’ on the other; while the latter seem to result from the very nature of consciousness and self-consciousness, and the interactive inter-relationship between them.479

The freedom to oscillate originates from the ‘possibility’ of imagining further and of seeking further, thus of contemplating what is not (6.2.3). It is thus a freedom expressed negatively in the experience of the limits of the given, either of the natural condition of man or of the social conditions of one’s ‘world’. This external movement outward is furthermore constantly hindered by the centricity arising in consciousness: the ‘I-centricity’ 480, namely the fact that I cannot not escape from of the ‘self-ness’ of self-consciousness, further influenced by cultural centricity (along with the power-relations at stakes), tradition-centricity, doxa and school centricities - different battles engaged by Daya Krishna481 (see 7.3). In that sense, the capacity to move out and back, to withdraw and return, is not devoid of limitations, and the quest for detachment does not seek absolute liberation. Nevertheless, the awareness of these limits also unveils the potentialities of overcoming them in the movement of realization back and forth (7.2).

It also points at the “feeling of constraint or determination by something outside itself, particularly when it finds that this dual movement is not a free act of itself, but is determined or influenced by factors in the external and inner worlds over which it has little control.” 482 Daya Krishna, rather than trying to erase any identification to reach a transcendental liberation

480 “The “identification” with one of these aspects [knowing, feeling, willing] and its relative predominance perhaps defines one’s personality and the self-consciousness in respect of them generates what may be called the ‘structural illusions’ which are primarily rooted in the fact that one is generally able to effectuate or bring into being some state of affairs through the act of attending and intending alone. This generates the feeling that one can achieve whatever one wants through the mere act of willing or, as we have called it, attending and intending it. This illusion of almost omnipotent power centred in one’s consciousness is tempered by the fact that at the human level one needs the material reality of the body to bring into being what one intends and that one can be and many a time is opposed by other centres where the “I-consciousness” dwells as much as it does in one’s own case.” Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 151.
481 Raveh, “Knowledge as a Way of Living,” 431.
482 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 3.
(7), suggests for example to turn to alternative views, namely to oscillate further between oneself and others (see 5.2.2). Concretely for instance:

“Amongst the many possible ways of overcoming the limitations imposed by those natural identifications which are an inevitable concomitant of having been born and grown up in a particular region, language, religion and culture, perhaps the most important is the attempt at an imaginative identification with the other and trying to see things and situations from his or her point of view. (…). In a cognitive enterprise such as history for example, one may imaginatively try to write different histories from multiple points of view. No one of course has yet attempted it, but it would be an interesting exercise for any one historian to undertake and attempt to write different historical accounts of the same event or sets of events by imaginatively identifying oneself with diverse groups and persons involved in the historical event.”

The objective is therefore to find strategies to “free philosophy from the prison house of I-centricity” (7.3). To be able to reach a counter-position requires space and time in thinking - to locate one’s position and to be aware of the resources (in terms of śāstric knowledge) and presuppositions of a particular place and time, but also to have the imagination to “move out” of it - to contemplate alternatives, to create other stories. The position and the seeking for an ideal of a-position, or freedom from one’s positioning, requires a faculty of imagination that is enabled with the experience of dissatisfaction of the reality (see 6.1). This dissatisfaction, in the forms of critiques, insufficiencies, lacks and inadequacies, makes us aware of our own conceptual presuppositions and limits: a capacity to picture the unboundedness of knowledge, and the desire and seeking to reach elsewhere.

“Imagination, normally, is supposed to be the preserve of the arts. But the capacity to go beyond what is given lies at the root of all innovation and creativity. ‘What is not’ is, therefore, more important than ‘what is’ or ‘has been.’ (…) But, in the context of concepts, limitations arise from the settled habits of the past, which constrain thinking to move in certain grooves only. To break the habit one has to make a conscious effort to think against the grain, and one may develop as many strategies to achieve this as one can think of. The central point in all strategies, however, is a subdued, skeptical attitude toward the sufficiency of what is given and an openness to everything that suggests the possibility of the development of a new conceptual alternative or even of a new way of looking at old concepts that have ceased to excite curiosity or wonder or even interest by long familiarity and mechanical use. One of the simplest

483 Daya Krishna, 89–90.
485 Already in 1989, when the volume “The Art of the Conceptual. Explorations in a Conceptual Maze Over Three Decades” was published, in which Daya Krishna selected and edited articles he had written ‘over three decades’, he describes in his Preface the connections he sees between these (quite variegated in fields and topics) articles in the following terms: “Looking back, it seems that there is a perennial concern with certain central philosophical issues in these articles - the relation of logic to reality and its relevance to philosophy or philosophizing, the multifariousness of values and their essential conflict with one another, the essential irreducibility of diverse realms and the concepts and categories through which we demarcate them, the centrality of consciousness and the strange fact that beliefs tend to bring corresponding realities into being through the actions they influence, the strange and paradoxical nature of social reality as the continuing creation of a plurality of free beings, each simultaneously a subject and an object, an agent and a recipient, all rolled into one.” Daya Krishna, The Art of the Conceptual, xi. Most of the dimensions above described correspond to these topics “rolled into one”, although I do locate dialogue and counter-position as the mean that enables the connections of all these dimensions in intersubjective worlds.
strategies, perhaps, is to realize that, though one is aware of concepts in certain contexts alone, there are other contexts and settings in which they may also occur.” 486

Daya Krishna continues on the benefit of curiosity and unfamiliarity brought by the challenge of interdisciplinarity that develops our “comparative judgment about the way the knowledge-enterprise is conceptually structured in the two different disciplines”. 487 Whenever this is possible, “there is every possibility of returning with a new feel and fresh look regarding the concepts one is habitually used to.” 488 Returning to one’s field, to oneself and one’s own conceptual structure after a detour into an imaginative journey to other domains gives us a clue of the creativity of such an imagination, as well as a concrete illustration of a moving back of one’s consciousness that consequently influences oneself as well as the other. Further, the most radical move to the other seems to be the intercultural move, “for normally within a cognitive culture even different disciplines share a certain way of looking at things or certain ways of asking questions or seeing certain issues as problematic. It is, therefore, only when one undertakes a conceptual journey to another cognitive culture that one really encounters a different world.” 489 This stake sounds indeed like the philosophical manifesto underlying the samvāda project.

Dialogue is integrated in these creative strategies as the incarnation and articulation of unresolved tensions between different dimensions of human reasoning, less in view of solving them by homogeneous methods and uniform conclusions than in exposing their complexities. In so doing, dialogue is nothing but the space that can allow these meetings, a carefully organized space for thinking to occur. But how to think this space if it is supposed to be only what let thinking emerge, i.e. if it is conceived as a ‘recipient’ or an ‘in-between’ without its own definite entity, malleable tool to be rearranged and redisposed at each occasion? If it has no fixed substance of its own but only an ongoing practice, can it be theorized upon? Would that already contribute to fixing it into a model that its very nature seems to contradict? We saw however, in the description of the experiments, that flexibility and openness did not occur from chaos, but that it followed a conscious organization. Can we think a careful organization that would avoid becoming a fixed model?

4.2. Śilpa, Śāstra, Puruṣārthas and the Art of the Conceptual.

To articulate further these dimensions, I retrieve from Daya Krishna’s analysis on historiography in Prolegomena To Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations 490 - that is, I reinterpret the connections he makes between the concepts of śilpa [technology, skill],

486 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 34.
487 Daya Krishna, 34.
488 Daya Krishna, 34.
489 See also 2.1.2 where the full citation is provided explaining the relevance of conceptual journeys for the empirical dialogues organized by Daya Krishna in the context of postcolonial Indian academics. Daya Krishna, 35.
490 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations.
śāstra [knowledge system] and puruṣārthas\textsuperscript{491} [values, seeking]. For thinking history of cultures,\textsuperscript{492} Daya Krishna argues, one cannot confine oneself to give a “snapshot picture of a culture”\textsuperscript{493} (see also 2.1.2), i.e. a to describe a “culture primarily in static terms”\textsuperscript{494}. On the contrary, he brings attention to the tension between a value apprehension and a value realization (6.1) that renders the complexity of cultures. This tension unveils an essential difference between conceiving values and the way these values are de facto realized. The first attempt, of conceptual nature, tries to grasp and qualify the values of a society and culture at a particular time, while the second consists in ‘living’ the present values in the given society and culture. But the difference does not only lie between the intellectual and the experiential levels: what is more relevant even is the fact that realizing values itself modifies the gap between the idea one had of them and the way they have been realized. This gap is felt in terms of dissatisfaction, implying the sense of limits of an idea when coming to grasp with reality. Thus, the tension is not only something \textit{a posteriori} reflected upon, it itself affects the realization. In return, it also bears an affect on the apprehension itself, since the realization generates new concepts out of critiques and evaluations of the forms the ideas took shape in. In that sense, history or anthropology would rather be constituted of “the delineation of successive modifications in the value apprehension in the light of the negativities revealed in the course of its actualization and implementation.”\textsuperscript{495} “This is for Daya Krishna the story of puruṣārthas”, defined as values and valuational seekings (see 6.1), in the complexity of their intellectual modifications and the multifoldness of their realizations that is at the core of cultures. The value apprehension relies on śāstric knowledge, in the sense of systematized bodies of knowledge inherited from the traditions, on which the corrections and reflections provoke the formation of new values.

However, for the actualization and implementation to occur, one needs something else, called skill or technology, a term Daya Krishna reinterprets from the Sanskrit śilpa. I prefer to

\textsuperscript{491} Concerning Daya Krishna’s interpretation of the ‘classical’ puruṣārthas (artha, kāma, dharma and mokṣa), see 6.1 and Elise Coquereau, “Seeking Values in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy,” in Kontexte Des Leiblichen, Contexts of Corporality, ed. Cathrin Nielsen, Karel Novotny, and Tom Nenon (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz Verlag, 2016), 125–49. I restrict here the concept of puruṣārtha to its interconnection with śāstra and śilpa, referring mostly to Daya Krishna’s use in Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations. Daya Krishna distinguishes sharply between civilization and cultures, however his use of these terms demonstrates the intrinsic continuity and interdependence of them. Shail Mayaram comments thus on the difference between civilization and culture: “Daya Krishna’s lectures on civilization need to be read against the backdrop of his earlier effort to use Indian categories to theorize cultures and civilizations [referring here to Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations]. ‘At the heart of any civilization’, he asserts, ‘lies the drama between consciousness and self-consciousness that assumes multifarious forms, the most subtle of which stems from reason itself’. The dialectics of faith and doubt is fundamentally the dialectic between consciousness and self-consciousness...’ Human beings, like animals, live largely at the conscious level and have only rare moments of self-consciousness. Cultures are characterized, he argues, by śilpa or a repertoire of skills and smṛti or memory. Cultures become civilizations as self-consciousness predominates over consciousness along with systematization and as ‘reflection takes precedence over experience’, resulting in śāstra formation and distinctions such as the desi and the mārgī or the provincial and the universal. This is done by elite groups in a civilization ‘who lay down norms in the various fields of human endeavour’. The puruṣārthas of a culture now undergo transformation, becoming ‘objects of self-conscious reflection and critical evaluation along with a newly emerging problem of hierarchy and inter-relationships’.” “Foreword” by Mayaram, in Daya Krishna, Civilizations, IX–X.

\textsuperscript{492} Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 19.

\textsuperscript{493} Daya Krishna, 19.

\textsuperscript{494} Daya Krishna, 21.
understand it here in the sense of skill or tool for art and craft in a reinterpretation of Daya Krishna’s title of his collection of articles “the art of the conceptual”. In this sense, I suggest seeing dialogical tools such as pūrvaṇa and samvāda as providing a skill for the art of the conceptual. What does Daya Krishna mean with the ‘art of the conceptual’ in this context? In a later lecture delivered at Punjab University, he defines it as follows:

“In my view, thinkers are conceptual artists. They deal with concepts, and create new worlds of concepts by giving prominence to one concept rather than another. They bring concepts into being, or change old concepts by bringing them into relationship with other concepts in the context of which they had never occurred before.”

Now, how do these thinkers create new worlds of concepts, how do they attribute significance, what are the laws arbitrating the relationships between concepts, and the laws to break in order to be able to bring these concepts in new contexts? In other terms, what are the causes for the conceptual art? For him, causality, in particular in the realm of imagination and creation, cannot be limited to a logical unfoldment from a single cause to an effect by an individual who would organize his concepts in his own categories, no matter the complexity of the unfolding itself (a critique addressed in particular to Kant). It must reflect on the one hand the “cooperative, complementarity of diverse actors with different skills and abilities” from which it would in consequence follow that “the effect, it should be remembered, cannot be decomposed into separate, individual effects ascribable to each separate individual cause in the complex unity created by the complementary and cooperative character of the causes concerned.” This does not mean that nothing can be causally created by a single agent, nor that an effect necessarily has different causes. But it points at some ‘things’ - dialogue belonging, I believe, to this category - that cannot be reduced to a single causality, cause-effect relation, or causal agent and which furthermore, cannot be separated from this very multiplicity. They constitute inseparable ‘wholes’. Thus, the picture of cultures abovementioned consists of the unfolding and

497 “The distinction between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’, like the distinction between the ‘true’ and the ‘false’ or between the ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’, or between ‘intelligible’ and ‘unintelligible’ is as much a ‘given’ to human consciousness as any other. The ‘given’, therefore, is not of just one sort, or of one type, and not only this, it may even ‘change’ as one’s experience changes. Causality is no exception to this, and the ‘demand’ for intelligibility in ‘causal terms’ is only a ‘demand’ like other demands, which may either be fulfilled or not. The attempt to save it at all costs by treating it as an a priori constituent condition of ‘understandability’ as in Kant, or as a necessary methodological precondition of engaging in any cognitive inquiry or research would mean giving up the empirical-experiential foundation of the aim of knowledge to be ‘scientific’ in the most radical sense of the term. This is not a return to Humean skepticism, either overt or disguised, as it does not deny the possibility of finding an actual relation between a certain class of events which may be ‘causal’ in nature. It only says that it is not necessary that such a relation be always found, or that it is a necessary condition for the ‘understandability’ or ‘intelligibility’ of the event or events concerned. ‘Causal relation’, in other words, is as contingent as any other empirical relation, and thus may factually obtain or not as the case may be.” Daya Krishna, “Thinking with Causality about ‘Causality’: Reflections on a ‘Concept’ Determining All Thought about Action and Knowledge”, 124. On the specific use of the term ‘demand’, see 7.2.
499 Daya Krishna, 53.
entanglement of these dimensions of inseparable wholes\textsuperscript{500}. Not only in the plurality of values and knowledges that are generated in different cultures, but also in the sense of the plurality of those who are embedded into this nexus, who need to communicate in the plurality of values and knowledges, with it and about it. This view denounces the fact that only one type of epistemological causality has been taken into consideration. It claims to admit ‘creativity’ and its ‘creations’ as specific kinds of activities or ‘things’ that cannot correspond to this understanding of causality\textsuperscript{501}:

“The same is the case with the ‘causality’ of a plurality of beings in interactive interaction between themselves, resulting in the production of something which none of them could have brought about on their own. The usual thought in this regard has taked of ‘plurality of causes’ and ‘inter-mixture of effects’, but it has always been thought to be the result of a lack of sufficient analysis (…). The idea of a ‘one-one’ correlation between ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ has plagued thought since its beginning, without anyone ever having asked what was meant by ‘one’, and how did this ‘one’ come into being, or how if it was ‘one’, it did become ‘many’?"\textsuperscript{502}

In other words, the singular and individual contributions cannot form by simple cumulation the ‘whole’: one can understand this in the perspective of concreativity that was explained in (1.1.4). What interests Daya Krishna in this relation between the one and the many is the fact that “the parts contribute not only towards the maintenance of the ‘whole’, but also to its effective functioning as a ‘unitary entity’ in relation to other ‘wholes’ which are in such an inter-relationship that they all mutually influence one another.”\textsuperscript{503} So it is not about dissecting the complexity of a whole into a combination of several independent causes and effects, and into a combination of independent positions to understand the dialogue. On the contrary, what should be underlined are rather the effects brought by the plurality of parts and plurality of participants into the whole itself (considered as philosophical traditions, cultures, persons from the point of view of the whole unity).

\textsuperscript{500} “The difference between diverse civilizations may be viewed in terms of diversities in the dominant purusārthas which they pursued over a long period of time and which they explored in depth and articulated and embodied in the products they left behind. (…) Yet, as one’s own language seems to be the most natural for a human being born in the group in which it is naturally spoken, so also do the purusārthas as articulated in one’s culture. It is only when one encounters a different formulation that one begins to apprehend the contingency and the parochiality of what one had unconsciously accepted as the only possible formulation of the ends worth pursuing and the means for their pursuit.” Daya Krishna, \textit{Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations}, 25.

\textsuperscript{501} This conception of the necessary cooperation and complementarity is in the present context presented from the ontological part/whole perspective, as well as from its application to multiplicity in dialogue. One can also notice, however, that it bears political consequences, which, although not directly relevant for the present purposes, can not be separated for Daya Krishna due to his ‘wholistic’ conception of philosophy: “The theoretic knowledge about the causal relationships is continuously changing and, thus, challenging us to a reorientation of our instrumental action. The causal chains get more and more complicated and the realization of ends comes to depend more on other persons and groups and nations than on one’s own effort and endeavour. The necessity of collective cooperation even for the achievement of individual ends in a mass society of present dimensions raises problems of individual dependence deriving from the inevitable hierarchical organization of interlocking role-specialisations requiring integrating functions within some institutional set-up or other.” Daya Krishna, “Action and Contemplation,” \textit{Visva-Bharati Quarterly} 24 (59 1958): 3.


\textsuperscript{503} Daya Krishna, 170.
These unexpected effects are, on the other hand, also subject to the same dissatisfaction as the one above mentioned, namely the fact that once actualized, the effects do not exactly correspond to the expectations and the objectives that were set. If one conceives dialogue in such a way, this dissatisfaction accounts for the open-endedness of dialogue (both in the sense of incompleteness and critical self-reflection in the post-analysis that opens for new directions for dialoguing). Thus, a dialogue can be also characterized as a ‘seeking’, a value to be attained (6), which accounts for the ‘idealist’ connotation of dialogue. This, as we have seen in the last section (4.1) does not mean that it cannot be realized at all, quite the contrary. But it points at the necessary gap between particular realizations and ‘seeked’ apprehension as a puruṣārtha:

“What appears as an indubitable fact of experience is that the effects man wants to achieve are of such a strange kind that they are not only unrealizable by any identifiable individual unit of causality, but that the effect even when seemingly achieved, does not seem to be what one really wanted to achieve, for what one wanted to achieve was the realization of a value that alone seems to give meaning to human life. Values are what one wants to achieve, and yet they are hardly the sort of things that can be specified as effects achievable through causes that one can effectuate individually or collectively.”

Thus, the cooperative complementarity of actors with different skills bring about a complexity into the causal picture, rendered multi-layered and multi-directional. The effects that are sought depend on this plurality and escape a unicausal realization, due to the ideality that they entail, namely the difference between their apprehension and realization.

But what is the epistemological difference of dialogue that grounds the impossibility of a single cause-effect relation? What accounts for the specificity of this type of causality? This continuous modification is further clarified by his colleague S. S. Barlingay (University of Pune) in view of man’s condition as a knower505 (or seeker for knowledge, see 6.2). Hence, a knower is “not just a knower, (...) [but also] an enjour, modifier, constructor, builder, critic and appreciator of the total situation simultaneously.”506 While, he says, it is possible to distinguish these different roles, they cannot be separated. They can be understood in different ways and point at different functions, but they cannot operate singularly: they depend on the whole that is man.507 Consequently, man, besides being an epistemological agent, and simultaneously to this role, “is a gestalt or a unified temporal whole of action.”508 This implies that s/he is not only an outsider detached from the laws ordering the cosmos, since s/he is an active part of any process s/he is observing. S/he is however able to be a “detached observer

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504 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 53.
505 S. S. Barlingay further explicits this idea: “I think it is to the credit of Gaudapāda that he pointed out that instead of using the model of the knower and the known we should use the model of bhoktā and bhojya. But usually the activity element in our life is ignored with the result that the problems we pose are only about the possibility of knowledge, and not about the total experience. It is forgotten that the theory of knowledge is only an element in the total experience-situation. From this point of view the Vaiśeṣikas were on the correct track. For, their scheme of padārthas or categories was an analysis of experience and was not merely concerned with knowing as in the case of Locke or even Descartes.” Barlingay, “Experience and Reflection,” 199.
506 Barlingay, 199.
507 Here and elsewhere, ‘man’ is not understood in terms of gender.
because of the awareness that arises in the process itself.”\textsuperscript{509} In that sense, being a knower also implies “continuously modifying that which is given.”\textsuperscript{510} But here also, the fact that these different dimensions or roles operate simultaneously within the same person renders the cooperation and the communication necessary:

“He [the scientist] takes this two-track world as a one-track-objective world and discovers the laws of this world. These laws, in a sense, are objective but the frame in which laws are expressed, codified, is not necessarily objective. The framework of these laws, since they involve concepts, categories and the relationships between them, is a man-made fabric. It is not a personal subjective frame, it is an impersonal intersubjective one. (…) Again, all the laws of the scientist are not necessarily objective. They are, to a great extent, the laws of his experience also. However, what is important is that when a man discovers these laws he does not simply discover them and stop at that. He also expresses them, codifies them, creates a machinery for communicating them. He does this by the process of abstraction, by thinking away (removing) space and time out of experience.”\textsuperscript{511}

There are here two different consequences underlined from the conception of man as a “knower” who is not only a knower, but a “critic and appreciator”;\textsuperscript{512} These complete, in my view, Daya Krishna’s explanation. The first goes along with the plurality mentioned by Daya Krishna, in terms of the intersubjective constitution of knowledge, the “frames” and ways knowledge is conceived, expressed and communicated through experience (see 5.3). Secondly, the formative elaboration of knowledge (here expressed by the active “he does this”) connects knowledge and action, the fixity of the former and the motion of the latter. For Barlingay, this is due to two factors: “1) selectivity and 2) shortening of duration”\textsuperscript{513} (both in terms of memory and condensation of the experience into a narrative), due to which knowledge is made.

To go back to Daya Krishna, it is due to selectivity and shortening of duration that knowledge takes a static appearance. He thus differentiates knowledge from skill based on this apparent fixity:

“The formation of a śāstra out of preceding skills in certain areas results in both an advantage and disadvantage. The advantage obviously is that the knowledge is organized, codified and assumes a self-conscious form which is primarily intellectual in character and conceptual in nature. It also treats the so-called skill in terms of ‘knowing’ rather than ‘doing’. It is thus the cognitive aspect that comes to be emphasized rather than the performative aspect in which the skill was solely embodied earlier. This, however, gives it a fixity of a very different kind from the one that was there at the level of the skill which was continuously modified not only in the process of transmission and training but also because of the challenges which the changing situation exercised or imposed on it.”\textsuperscript{514}

Thus, between the tension of thinking and thought, between the process implied by the value-realization and the fixity of the corpus, the fundamental ground upon which one might act (which in turn, influences the knowledge already established by calling it into question), one

\textsuperscript{509} Barlingay, 200.
\textsuperscript{510} Barlingay, 200.
\textsuperscript{511} Barlingay, 200.
\textsuperscript{512} Barlingay, 200.
\textsuperscript{513} Barlingay, 197.
\textsuperscript{514} Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 22–23.
needs conceptual tools. To take in consideration the whole interaction between these dimensions constitutes, I believe, Daya Krishna’s objective, and the articulation of these dimensions forms the stake of dialogue which confronts the reality of conceptual problems.

“The relation between śīlpa and śāstra, on the one hand, and of both of these to the puruṣārthas, on the other, should be a matter of investigation. It is equally necessary that one does not see it as a one-way movement where the puruṣārthas determine the śīlpa and the śīlpa gives rise śāstras, as the śāstras may themselves give rise to new puruṣārthas, or at least bring a radical transformation in our understanding of the puruṣārthas by making that possible whose very possibility could not have been conceived of before for the lack of adequate conceptualization or technology to achieve it. Similarly, śāstric formulations not only bring the whole differentiated world of intellect and reason into existence but also provide a new puruṣārthas of intellectual or rational knowledge for man which is absent if they are not developed or only marginally developed in a culture.”

It is for this reason essential to keep in mind the intrinsic correlation of these dimensions, which are expressed, articulated and reformed in the engagement with others in dialogue. It is, indeed, surprising that dialogue is not thematised in such a philosophical development. It is mentioned at some occasions in Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations and Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, mostly in connection, on the one hand, to language and communication, and on the other hand, to Otherness and intersubjective composition of the world. (see 7.3). Dialogue conceived from the perspective of rhetoric rules and compositions of (saṃ)vēda (as presented in 2.1.1) belong to śāstric knowledge in the processus of abstraction that defines it. Differently, dialogues realized as in the saṃvēda experiments (3) are grounded in the confrontation of śāstric knowledges in contemporary intercultural discussion that were realized. In that sense, the apprehension-realization tension above explained also applies to dialogues, and the dynamism that resorts from it, thus to a puruṣārtha. This will be further investigated in chapter 6.

What is exactly the place of dialogue in such an account of knowledges, values and skills that are related by the dissatisfaction of the apprehension vis-à-vis actualization? How does the function of dissatisfaction apply in dialogue and with dialogue vis-à-vis śāstric knowledge and puruṣārthas? If we grant at the present the possibility for dialogue to be the locus where these dimensions and their entanglements are revealed by the meeting and engaging with others, then how to articulate these dimensions to the concept of dialogue, if dialogue is only a method?

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515 Daya Krishna, 25.
516 See notably Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 91.
517 See notably Daya Krishna, 79; Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 78,202.
5. (Presup)positions: Unveiling Together the Unquestioned of My Beliefs

“A proper understanding of the nature of philosophical disagreement and dialogue will, I believe, change the whole complexion and purpose of philosophical discussions. For over two thousand years philosophical controversy has been dogmatic and polemical. Philosophy has been the arena of battles, skirmishes and tug-of-wars. And this has appeared to philosophers to be the unfortunate, but unavoidable, outcome of their occupation. Much of discussion in philosophy has been futile giving opportunity not for the pursuit of truth and the clarification of ideas, but for the exercise of ingenuity and the exhibition of dialectic skills. As Śāṅkara pointed out - though he drew a totally erroneous conclusion from the fact - the crown in a philosophical controversy goes to the disputant who shows subtler ingenuity and superior dialectical skill. Satyameva Jayate [Truth Alone Triumphs] is unfortunately not true where philosophical wrangling is in question.

The maxim, ‘Know thyself’, is applicable as much to Philosophy as to the philosopher and the seeker of salvation. There have been sporadic and partial attempt at self-knowledge made by the so-called reformers of philosophy, but all of these have failed because they have tried to build on the foundations of a deep-rooted dogmatism which is fatal to critical inquiry. This dogmatism which prevents thought from attaining freedom through self-awareness is what may be called the rationalist fallacy which pervades the whole of philosophy and influences the thought of the empiricists as much as that of the rationalists. (…)

The deep-rooted and all-pervasive fallacy consists in the assumption, never examined, but simply taken for granted, that all assertions in philosophy should be so well-grounded as to be indisputable. Hence disputes necessarily multiply, for each of the alternative and mutually incompatible systems claims to rest on indisputable grounds. (…) But what if this universal and firmly-rooted assumption concerning the role of reason in philosophy has no better foundation than sheer thoughtlessness and error?

A detached contemplation of the entire panorama of philosophy with the rise and fall and perpetual clash of innumerable systems has led me to the belief that though philosophy was born more than two millennia ago the consummation of philosophy in the direction of the growth of self-consciousness has yet to be achieved. Philosophy claims to give knowledge of many things and illumine many aspects of life and existence, but it has yet to come to know and illumine itself. When this happens there will take place, for the first time, a true revolution in philosophy as it will mean the freedom of thought from dogmatism, partisanship and unconscious assumptions, leading to a wide tolerance and a new comprehension of all points of view. Differences of opinion may and, perhaps, will persist, but discussions will cease to be polemical and disputatious, dealing dialectic death-blows to rival theories and, instead, have for their purpose the exploration and probing of each other’s points of view to discover their alogical bases and the nerve or pattern of their dialectic.”


The relation between śāstra, śilpa and puruṣārtha is thus characterized in terms of dissatisfaction between the ideality and the reality, between the apprehension and the realization (see 6). This dissatisfaction originates from the structural and transcendental illusions of consciousness (7). These illusions give rise to different presuppositions that condition thinking in the cultural, historical and ontological limitations of its conceptions (5.2). However, it also conditions the possibility for thinking. At the same time as it attaches us to certain traditions and categories, it provides the capacity to ‘move out’ of them when becoming aware of their limits: this capacity is the one given by imagination and is called ‘creative thinking’. The dialogical encounter with the other who reflects the parochiality and limits of my position enables the awareness of the limitation and the arising of creative thinking (7.3).

This description of creative thinking - and the contribution that interculturality could bring forth in terms of plurality of inputs and solving the “limited parochialism”519 - although it seems intelligibly plausible, appears until now likewise highly speculative and intuitive. However, the development of the philosophical process and reasoning that underlies such a journey is rigourously complex in Daya Krishna’s philosophy, notably because of the multifolded entanglement that I highlighted above. Furthermore, I conceive this process as reflecting the dialogical practice described in the earlier chapters 2 and 3. I limit myself in the following part (4 to 7) to the theories and implications that are relevant to include and analyze dialogue in this framework. First of all, let me clarify the relation between three concepts that are closely associated to describe the relational processus between śāstra, puruṣārtha and śilpa: presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions. I will then proceed into developing each in relation to dialogue in the next sections.

While Daya Krishna himself closely and apparently loosely uses these three concepts,520 I want to emphasize internal differences in their connotations and functions that are nevertheless

519 Daya Krishna, Contry Thinking, 35.
520 Different reasons can explain the variations, one of which being simply the timespan between the first attempt to explain the ‘presuppositions of philosophical thinking’ in Daya Krishna’s PhD Thesis, published as The Nature of Philosophy (1955), to its posthumous book on Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions (2012) (where the Kantian influence is more evident in the choice of his vocabulary). In so doing, my separation might not always be correct in the terms used by Daya Krishna, but I maintain that it expresses different dimensions of the same domain of the unreflected and commonly assumed that shape our thoughts. In the earlier monograph, Daya Krishna defines as presuppositions 1) “the belief that the nature of ultimate Reality is such that it can be discovered by pure thought alone”; 2) “both the object and the organon of knowledge are finished, unchangeable and final”; 3) “the identity of the rational and the valuational” and 4) “the final and ultimate absoluteness of the knowledge with which Philosophy is concerned.” Qualifying these four presuppositions, he explains: “By calling them ‘presuppositions’ we neither wish to imply that philosophers have always been unaware of them nor that they have never thought they had sufficient grounds for believing in them. Nor do we wish to imply, in the strict logical sense of the term, that they are mutually independent and jointly sufficient for the building up of philosophical activity. (...) That we have called them ‘presuppositions’ is because they are of such a final and ultimate character that to give them up would mean to give up Philosophy completely in the traditional sense of the term.” Daya Krishna, Nature of Philosophy., 29. In his latest text, illusions are thus defined as follows: “The criterion of a transcendental illusion would, then, be that it arises from the fact that something which is
discernible in their adoption. Surely, they are all employed to enhance ‘unveiling’ philosophy from its confusions and from the sense of finality and givenness that philosophical theories produce. The specific differences of the concepts highlight different kinds of obstacles. Daya Krishna does not pursue the naive dream to simply free philosophy from its puzzles and riddles. On the contrary, he rather seeks an awareness of the overshadowed complexity. The role of question/answers in dialogue corresponds to the clarification that Daya Krishna defends, which does not erase presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions per se but reveal them as potentialities for new discoveries - or clarified issues generating other questions. Thus, these concepts are closely related in terms of objectives and purposes.

However, and interestingly, as objectives and purposes, they are rather negatively expressed. Since the highest goal seems prima facie to remove them to clarify an issue, this precisely implies becoming aware of a kind of inherent defect of the human condition. In so doing, freedom and liberation from this state of ignorance and insatisfaction, a rather prominent topic for Daya Krishna (see 6.2.3 and 7.3), precisely does not mean self-liberation as an autonomous act, but an engagement with others with whom these presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions can be unveiled. The basic intuition underlying this tension is not uncommon to various traditions of classical Indian philosophies (as the relevance of the concept transcedentally presupposed is treated as phenomenally given, and that this gives rise to insoluble antinomies for thought which get dissolved or resolved when the mistake is realized. A ‘structural illusion’, on the other hand, arises when the structure of the cognizing mechanism itself creates the illusion whose ‘illusoriness’ is realized because of the incoherence which such an apprehension produces in respect of the object which appears to be different under other conditions.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 15. This latter definition is explained in 7.1.


522 See Freschi’s comment on Daya Krishna’s definition of philosophy in dialogue: “Since his PhD thesis, which was subsequently published as Nature of Philosophy, Daya Krishna conceived philosophy as an exercise in the decontamination and refinement of thought. A philosopher is primarily someone who brings clarity without unneeded complications, and it is the very task of dialogue and collective dialogical thinking to practice refinement and clarification of thought by continuously questioning unclear issues and responding to them.” Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 183. See also Daya Krishna, Nature of Philosophy.

523 “The idea that ‘freedom’ involves within it the ideal of kaivalya [perfect isolation, detachment] is as mistaken as the idea of siddhis [completion, fulfillment] also adumbrated in the Yogasūtra. The Sāmkhya has a notion of plurality to puruṣas, or a plurality of the kevalin, without asking the question: ‘What is the relation between them?’ Nor does Pātañjala-yoga seem to be aware of the problem created by the postulation of the siddhis, promised by it to all on the road to samādhi, through the practice prescribed in its third chapter, known to all who have even a nodding acquaintance with this fundamental text on Yoga in the tradition of spiritual seeking, that is not confined now to India alone but has spread all over the world and become global in character. Freedom, then, has to be conceived in a different way if it has to become the possession, not just of one, solitary, isolated individual but of others as well. A plurality of ‘centers of freedom’ in inter-communication, in interactive relationship, has to be conceived if one is to resist the temptation of a ‘false’ monistic singularity of the idea of a ‘God’ who cannot bear to have any others besides Himself and, thus has to be both omniscient and omnipotent without ever being ‘known’ or influenced by anyone else. Freedom, thus, is limited by the freedom of others, many others, just as it limits their freedom in return. The relation between ‘freedoms’, however, need not be of just ‘limitation’ in the negative sense; it can also be positive in the sense that each person's freedom may enhance the ‘freedom’ of others and, in many cases, it actually does so.” Daya Krishna, “The Cosmic, Biological, the Cultural Conditionings and the Seeking of Freedom,” 136.
of māyā indicates in Daya Krishna’s writings⁵²⁴). However, its expression, and in particular the refusal of a transcendental unity, and its embodiment in socio-cultural pluralities go much further than a simple application of the terms and traditions to modern times:

“Freedom, thus, is not what the existentialists or post-modernists, or even the mokṣa-seekers have thought it to be. It is embedded in a plurality of ‘interactive beings’, ‘living’ and ‘human’, where there is no such thing as freedom, given once and for all time, but something that is continuously ‘lost’ and ‘gained’ by the dynamic interplay of the interacting constituents of the dynamics.”⁵²⁵

These concepts therefore point, as ‘illusion’ in particular indicates, towards a certain seeking of freedom from the given, commonly accepted and unquestioned ‘knowledge’. This in return requires the actions and values that are correlated to the knowledge that we have, as the relations between śāstra, puruṣārtha and śilpa indicates. Finally, they designate a ‘path’, i.e. a dynamic movement onwards, from the state of ignorance, error, insatisfaction, insufficiency, to something that is corrected and improved. However, unlike mokṣa-seeking philosophers,⁵²⁶ for Daya Krishna there is no transcendental liberation per se: the path is unending and consists rather in a wordly movement, back and forth, between the realization of presuppositions that generates new insatisfactions, which themselves turn to be illusory, raising new questions in the difference between the apprehension of presuppositions. Both creativity and illusions arise in intersubjective relations, in dialogue with others: this signals the open-ended character of dialogues.⁵²⁷

However, presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions apply to three distinct domains of reflection: presuppositions are epistemological assumptions of (philosophical) theories, and thereby signal the limits of one’s śāstric knowledge (5). Dissatisfactions originate from the

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⁵²⁶ The terms (mukti, mokṣa), the nature, paths of liberation and the objects from which one should free oneself certainly differ from philosophy to the other, and from one commentary to the other, but even the radical rejection of these terms consists in an internal negation of them, not an external alternative from the conceptions they entail. For Daya Krishna’s critique of mokṣa, see in particular Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006, 3–59. See also K. H. Potter’s critique of Daya Krishna’s rejection in Potter, “Are All Indian Philosophers Indian Philosophers?” and the more recent critical appreciation of Daya Krishna’s stake by Matthew Kapstein, “Interpreting Indian Philosophy: Three Parables,” in The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy, by Jonardon Ganeri (Oxford University Press, 2015), 1–19.

⁵²⁷ See Raveh, “Philosophical Miscellanea,” 497–99. Raveh elsewhere extends the intersubjective dialogue to dialogue between an author and a reader through texts characterized by the same ‘open-endedness’: “For DK [Daya Krishna], the process of thinking is never-ending; its ‘products’ in the form of articles, books, works of art etc., are merely stops along the journey, intended to collect questions and queries, feedback and counterperspectives, based on which one’s thinking develops in new directions. Therefore DK’s suggestion is to cut through the ‘finality cover’ of a text, any text, and see it as a process. Text as a process means not merely that the writer’s thinking process is reflected in the text, but also that the text is where the author and the reader meet, that the reader is as integral a contributor to the text as the author. If one’s sees a text as a process, then the balance between authorship and readership is changed. The reader becomes not less active in the process than the author. The text no longer ‘belongs’ merely to the latter, but in fact turns into samvāda.” Raveh, “Text as a Process: Thinking with Daya Krishna,” 196–97.
difference between reality and ideality in the attempt to describe or realize something (what is and what ought to be, what is and is thought to be, what is and what is imagined to be), and point at the limits of our condition vis-à-vis our seeking to be something else (6). Illusions point at the limits of consciousness: they encompass, so to say, internal presuppositions of philosophy, and touch to our human condition and the very way our apprehensions are shaped (7).

But let me now define them one by one more precisely. What does presupposition mean, and how does it apply? Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Daya Krishna’s teacher and influential inspiration, begins his essay ‘Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy’ as follows: “Whatever points, principles, topics or propositions are used in a study but not themselves studied there, though they are, or may be, studied elsewhere, are called presuppositions of that study.” In other terms: all what is, voluntarily or not, presumed in a study, in order to enable elaborating the theory is a presupposition. They can be formed for example on the basis of intuition motivating the study, or resources that are unquestionably accepted, or on the very specific logic and methods used. He further distinguishes between different types of presuppositions, of which axioms and postulates are of greater relevance in the present context. The difference between the two corresponds in my interpretation to Daya Krishna’s dialogical project. Kalidas Bhattacharyya continues his reflection on presuppositions as follows:

“Though both axioms and postulates are unquestionable by the X that presupposes them, axioms differ from postulates in that while the latter can yet be questioned by something other than X no axiom can ever be questioned that way even from outside X. As long as one is pursuing X one is not indeed very much conscious of its axioms and postulates and has, so far, no occasion to ask any question about them. But he may have occasion to doubt or question the entire system X from a standpoint outside the system. This generally happens when some crucial case, which is a challenging fact, refuses to fit in any manner with that system, so that unable to deny its facthood, one is compelled to question the very foundation of the system. Or sometimes, out of simple theoretical curiosity, one may sportively question a total given system and suggest its replacement by another, generally a wider one comprehending it. (…) Axioms are unchallengeable because, by definition, they are self-evident. (…) Axioms are unconditional principles that have application as much in the system in question as in other

528 See Daya Krishna’s acknowledgment of Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s philosophical contributions in Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 203–6; Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards, 299–302; Daya Krishna, Ghose, and Srivastava, The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya. More specifically on the later book conceived as dialogue, see 3.4.

529 Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy & Other Essays (Santiniketan: Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy Visva-Bharati, 1974), 1. I am grateful to Asha Mukherjee for generously gifting me this book from her own library. See also of K. Bhattacharyya, “Metaphysics - A Genuine Cognitive Pursuit”, in Devaraja, Indian Philosophy Today, 19–53.

530 Kalidas Bhattacharyya summarizes them thus as follows: “(i) A presupposition of a study X, which cannot be questioned either from inside or outside it is an axiom. (ii) A presupposition which cannot be questioned from inside X but can well be questioned from outside it is a postulate. (iii) A presupposition which can be questioned both from inside and outside X is just an empirical factual presupposition. (iv) When, however, a presupposition, already accepted, is theoretically questionable at least from outside X, but when at the same time there is no possibility even of theoretical verifiability, because it is a presupposition regarding the world as a whole which can never be presented to observation, it is a heuristic principle.” Bhattacharyya, Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy & Other Essays, 10.
systems, and this is at all possible only because, whether one likes it or not, one has to admit that they have some sort of Platonic status.”

It is to be noted that Kalidas Bhattacharyya is only concerned here with the presuppositions of sciences and consequently defines the role of philosophy as epistemology constituting the meta-level of investigation of science. He is, in this respect, not taking in consideration other dimensions or kinds of presuppositions, may they be historico-sociological à la Foucault, or rather cultural in my interpretation of Daya Krishna. But he does inform us on the constitutions of presuppositions of any philosophical reasoning, and on the necessity of ‘moving out’, to speak in Daya Krishna’s terms, from one’s system to unveil its postulates - as well as the very limits of this move, the axioms that apply to different systems. Kalidas Bhattacharyya does not investigate much further on axioms, which seem to me to rather signal the structural and transcendental limits that Daya Krishna understands as illusions (see 7.1). It is perhaps useful to remind the reader here of Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s parallel with illusion, warning us that the “study of illusion is not itself an illusion; it is rather formulable as a proposition about the actual phenomenon of error.”

In the same manner, the study of presuppositions is not devoid of its own particular presuppositions, i.e. is not equal to ‘presupposition-ness’ either. In that sense, a meta-study on the presupposition of a certain study, notably by its confrontation with external theories (from other disciplines, cultures or systems) is eventually bringing forth other sets of presuppositions. But although it seems that presuppositions remain inherent to any study, the specific presuppositions of a study can be unveiled by reorienting the study from a different standpoint. There is, in so doing, no vicious circle inherent to presuppositions, but external viewpoints are required to disclose the given presuppositions. In other words that are relevant to dialogue: different positions are necessary to unveil presuppositions (5.2.2).

How does this externality operate in the study of presuppositions? Let me relate the latter with Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s description of a meta-study of a second-order in the same chapter. “Meta-X, corresponding to a factual study X, enumerates and analyses the postulates of X and studies how these were used in X, and studies them also in their interrelations.” Further,

531 Bhattacharyya, 8.
532 On the presuppositions of sciences, Foucault rather insists on the “onerous and complex conditions” that allow a certain discourse to come to existence. In other terms, sciences have to ‘fit’ certain implicit presuppositions, which are rather socio-historically constituted. For example, in the scientific fields of botanic and biology: “People have often wondered how on earth nineteenth-century botanists and biologists managed not to see the truth of Mendel’s statements. But it was precisely because Mendel spoke of objects, employed methods and placed himself within a theoretical perspective totally alien to the biology of his time. (…) Mendel, on the other hand, announced that hereditary traits constituted an absolutely new biological object, thanks to a hitherto untried system of filtrage (…) Here was a new object, calling for new conceptual tools, and for fresh theoretical foundations. Mendel spoke the truth, but he was not dans le vrai (within the true) of contemporary biological discourse: it simply was not along such lines that objects and biological concepts were formed.” Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language, 224. As I will show later in this section, such a view is also in line with Daya Krishna’s conception of presuppositions, including the ‘human’ and subjective dimension in forming knowledge and truth-conceptions. However, Foucault never extended further his historical investigation to the (inter)cultural level or to the study of cultural presuppositions, what Daya Krishna was more inclined to do.
533 Bhattacharyya, Presuppositions of Science and Philosophy & Other Essays, 25.
534 Bhattacharyya, 29.
“Meta-X that studies the postulates of X is only the study of the movements of thought by thought itself, without those movements being ever objects to the studying thought or, what is the same thing, without this latter being the subject for them. The thought in question here is a type of self-revealing consciousness and the study in question nothing but that thought showing itself in self-conscious movement. To be more precise, it is the statement of how it shows itself as so moving.” 535

He underlines thus the “dynamic process”536 by emphasizing the movements537 of thinking while thinking something - the ‘something’ becoming a thought, in Daya Krishna’s term, in the sense that its form (illusorily) appears fixed and definite. A meta-study is by distinction the ‘flow’ of consciousness that creates the thought without itself being revealed in it, a condition for its possibility and at the same time the cause of its limitations. Self-revealing consciousness as a movement does not constitute a detachment from the object of study, it rather designates the activity that cannot be separated from it.538 If the postulates require an external viewpoint to be revealed, and if a meta-study of postulates is a conscious study of the movement of the thought at play in the study, could not dialogue be a meta-tool for revealing the presuppositions of thinking?

5.2. Pūrvapakṣa: Defending Your Position in mine, Transcending Ours

Regarding their application to dialogue, pre-sup-positions refer to the unreflected implications and assumptions of a certain position within a debate, from which the consequence of the argumentation is derived. The development from presuppositions to a position implies a logical unfolding of an argumentation. However, the logical unfolding accounts for earlier steps, which themselves are not included in the logical unfolding, but determines it a priori. Thus, the ‘pre’ signals ‘pre’-intellectual intuitions that motivate one’s argumentation, and one’s position

535 Bhattacharyya, 31.
536 Bhattacharyya, 32.
537 Although he himself does not seem to be satisfied by this word, he justifies his choice by the emphasis on dynamicity: “And, what is recorded in the study are, we have seen, neither particular movements as events in time nor their empirical generalizations, nor even a priori facts - not this third alternative because these movements are the presuppositions of metaphysics which studies a priori facts. It is better not to call them even ‘movements’. ‘Modes’ is a better term, provided it is used with a dynamic bias. Or, perhaps, the dynamic term ‘movement’ or ‘act’ or ‘function’ is used just for the purpose of distinguishing this de-ontological thought from whatever thought is only an empirical event.” Bhattacharyya, 32.
538 Kalidas Bhattacharyya disagrees here with both theories classified as realist and idealist of classical Indian philosophy: “By far the most of the traditional Indian philosophers hold that they are not so assured and are unwilling, therefore, to regard any kind of cognition, be it thought or imagination or sense-perception - even non-cognitive mental affairs like will - as dynamic. It is just in contrast to such cognitions as are empirical events that the self-revealing thought is called act, function, referring, etc., though it may be noted that those traditional Indian philosophers who have admitted such non-empirical thought have proposed to call it just consciousness without bringing in any dynamic import. For these Indian philosophers, consciousness as subjectivity proper does not refer to anything: it only reveals things, and even there the revealing is no act or function of consciousness; rather consciousness constitutes revelation. A to be revealed just means that it gets somehow related to consciousness, not the reverse: consciousness does not get related to it; so that, from the point of view of consciousness, the portion of A (including A) of the situation ‘revelation of A’ falls entirely outside consciousness and does not in any way affect; whereas, in contrast, if we look at the situation from the point of view of A, its revealedness, i.e., its relation to consciousness, is, in various ways, of enormous importance to it, though, of course, it could well remain (unheeded) without that relation.” Bhattacharyya, 33.
(analogical to the *Vor-urteil* for judgment). They derive from a certain choice that one makes, consciously or not, when elaborating an argument: either by affiliating oneself to a certain tradition, school, method or scholarship, or in being embedded in a certain nexus of concepts and possibilities of thinking - which entails, as a necessary consequence, other choices left out. This operation refers to the selectivity mentioned by S. S. Barlingay above. While the choice can be conscious, the vastness of the unseen possibilities that are left out are, by definition, not conceivable (and refers to structural illusions, see 7.1). In that sense, presuppositions define the limits of one’s position. ‘Limits’ comprises here the two implications of the definition: enclosure (what is included up to its limits) and restriction (what is left outside the limits). In Gadamerian terms, a position is inscribed within a horizon, which is pre-ontologically limited (notably by prejudices entailed in beliefs and assumptions). On the contrary, suppositions differ from presuppositions in the sense that they constitute the objective logical consequences of presuppositions that are required for the argumentation of a position. In Barlingay’s words:

“Thus, if in my investigation, I am analyzing my experience, I must confess that I am already believing in, assuming, a particular kind of picture of Reality. This is a common sense, pluralistic picture. In a way, I am only rationalizing my beliefs. I am technically committing the fallacy of petition principle; for I am only explicating what I have already assumed. My only explication for this is that it is inevitable, for no investigation can start without some such assumptions. Do we give the name presuppositions to such inevitable beliefs? I think we should make a distinction between initial beliefs and presuppositions. For example, that there is a multiplicity in the universe should not be regarded as a presupposition. It is my belief only. But if such a belief logically requires Space and Time, these should be regarded as presuppositions. My beliefs and what I assume are subjective, they are concerned with me primarily, presuppositions take us to the sphere of objective pre-conditions.”

To connect Barlingay and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, I suggest understanding ‘presuppositions’ in K. Bhattacharyya’s sense as entailing both the initial beliefs and suppositions that Barlingay calls presuppositions, i.e. the objective logical conditions that unfold my beliefs. The ‘pre’- of presuppositions implies beliefs, and the ‘sup’- (sub-) of suppositions the objective pre-conditions that are necessary to build my argumentation. This is nothing new to philosophy, since the diversity of irreconcilable methods and systems originate from the ‘inevitable’ contradictory beliefs that are then systematically and logically articulated. However, the dialectical approach that I want to develop now concludes differently on the status of this inevitable *doxa*. Indeed, what provokes dialogue is not the attempt to minimize or remove presuppositions, but the need to communicate within and between these different presuppositions. In that sense, the aim of dialogue cannot be to bracket the different beliefs, but rather to explore the potentialities of different sets of presuppositions in argumentative encounters.

This is relevant in the case of cross-cultural dialogues and in intercultural discourses. Political analyzes, in particular postcolonial studies, have shown the impossibility of negating the presuppositions involved in any standpoints. They outlined the power at stake in philosophy and dialogues, demonstrating that any attempt at removing presuppositions implicitly rather

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tends to conform philosophy to the presuppositions of the most ‘powerful’ proponent. In other words: denying presuppositions, or trying to eradicate presuppositions to make philosophy more ‘scientific’ does not lead to an absence of belief, but rather to uniforming them according to a distribution of (rhetoric) power. It is therefore urgent to consider other ways to acknowledge this ‘inevitable’ state and take advantage of primary and unconscious presuppositions without reducing philosophy to a fight of beliefs.

One answer could be found in a device for unveiling the presuppositions of each position, which neither amounts to obliterate them nor to assert their legitimacy. I have already introduced in section 4.1 such a device, which I now want to relate more closely to the challenge of intercultural dialogues or dialogues between philosophical traditions. The term pūrvapakṣa, or in its English use, counter-positions, has been widely used by Daya Krishna, thereby associating himself with this method. In his own writings, it can be seen in his recurrent (and somewhat unconventional) use of the locution “but then”, an example of which can be seen here:

“Take the notion of duḥkha or ‘suffering’. What exactly is the notion and why is there such a persistent and prevalent concern with atyanta duḥkhaniyān, or the complete cessation of the very possibility of all sufferings for all times? This will involve a discussion of possibility and what it means. One solution is the state of the soul where it loses the very possibility of being conscious. But then what is the difference between such a soul and an inanimate object except that it is still characterized by having had such a consciousness in the past which the inanimate object can never be said to have had. Also, the difference of such a position with that of the Cārvāka would only be something like postulating a soul to survive after the destruction of the body. But, then, even for the grossest materialist something survives and it is generally called ‘matter’. The only difference between this matter and the soul would be that the latter is still supposed to have a uniqueness of its own which the surviving matter lacks. But then what could this uniqueness consist of except with reference to the past which is no more? This is something similar to what Strawson has discussed in his book entitled Individuals. But then (...)”

540 According to the definition of the Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien, pūrvapakṣa is translated as ‘[Gegnerische] Stellungnahme.’ Der Terminus (...) bezeichnet in der wissenschaftlichen Darstellung das Darlegen einer vom Autor selbst nicht vertretenen Lehrmeinung, die in der ‚Antwortenden Stellungnahme‘ (uttarapakṣa) oder der ‚Erwiderung‘ (nirnaya) zurückgewiesen wird. Gemeinsam mit seinen Gegenbegriffen (uttarapakṣa bzw. nirnaya) bestimmt er damit wesentlich den dialektischen Charakter indischer wissenschaftlicher und philosophischer Darstellung, die die eigene Lehre zumeist im Gegenüber zu gegnerischen Lehren entfaltet oder durch die Widerlegung gegnerischer Thesen und Ansichten die eigene Lehre zu festigen sucht. ‘The definition insists on the continuity of the meaning throughout the tradition, with emphasis on different aspects of it: on the confutative (Kautṣiyā) and refutational, or the interrogative (Suśruta). Oberhammer, Prets, and Prandstetter, Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien, 167. My translation: pūrvapakṣa is translated as ‘[Opposing] statement’. On the scientific account, this term [...] signifies the demonstration of a doctrine not given by the author himself and which is rejected in the ‘answering statement’ (uttarapakṣa) or in the ‘rejoinder’ (nirnaya). Together with its antonyms (uttarapakṣa and nirnaya), it thus essentially determines the dialectical character of Indian scientific and philosophical presentation, which mostly unfolds the own teaching as against opposing teachings or attempts to strengthen the own teaching via the refutation of opposing theses and opinions.

541 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006; Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking; Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy; Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997; Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras.

542 Emphasis added. Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy, 17–18.
Insignificant in appearance, the mentions of this repetitive “but then” often signal more than a mere contradiction, complexity or ambiguity. It implies in the flow of his writing the serious consideration of possible counter-positions that one could address. Logically, it signals a “if X, then Y” where, while defending X, one has to take in utmost consideration Y, which can lead to X² (variation of the initial position) or even Z, i.e. opening of a new position. More exactly with Daya Krishna, it points to a “if X, then the problem follows that”, i.e. not simply a logical causal consequence of X, but the perspective of further problems and questions originating from the initial thesis. It also reflects different ‘voices’ from imagined opponents, or rather from ‘real’ opponents retrieved from debates between different schools and authors of classical Indian philosophies (here Buddhist and Cārvāka), in connection with positions retrieved from Western philosophy (here Strawson).

The creativity of the counter-position lies in interconnecting positions that have been separately exposed, without yielding to a parallel ‘comparative’ juxtaposition. The interconnection is established in view of the questions and answers to a philosophical problem rather than an evaluation or contrasting comparison between two schools, authors or systems: this constitutes the fundamental critique made to comparative philosophy, which in its earlier phases (see 1.2.1) had been rather ‘school’- and ‘parallel-presentation’-oriented, namely contrasting schools or thinkers rather than questioning a concept in the counter-perspective of different traditions. The development and conclusion thus originate from a critical evaluation of the relevance of the arguments provided from positions and counter-positions to analyze the problem. Beyond his own incorporation of the idea to his philosophical texts, Daya Krishna shows a reflective awareness of the resources that this device entails:

“...In any work of Indian philosophy, pūrvapakṣa (the opponent’s position) has necessarily to be presented and refuted before one can establish one’s own position. The counter-position, it would be remembered, is not merely stated but rather presented with all the arguments that have not only been already given in its favor, but also those which one can imagine to support it in any way whatsoever. If one simply asserted something and could not provide any reason or hetu for it, one opted out of the philosophical arena and ceased to be counted therein (...)

Then, all reasons are not regarded as equally valid; a great deal of thought went into determining what was valid reasoning and how to distinguish it from that which was fallacious. Not only this, the history of the debate on any philosophical issue documents, thinker by thinker, the development of the argument and the flaws pointed out by each in the position of the others. There was, however, in this process, no static repetition of positions but a modification of one’s position in light of the trenchant criticism of the opponents or even a more sophisticated reformulation of one’s position in light of those criticisms.”

543 See the practical consequences of this idea described above in 2.2.3, as well as the already referred to explanation by Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” 5.

544 This approach forms the most contemporary development in the fields of cross-cultural, comparative, intercultural or world philosophies. See for example the idea of ‘fusion’ philosophy developed by Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber along with its practice by the contributors of Chakrabarti and Weber, Comparative Philosophy Without Borders., and my discussion of its advantages and limits in Coquereau, “From Comparative Philosophy to Fusion Philosophy”, Ed. Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber, Comparative Philosophy Without Borders, London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 2016, 246 Pp.”

As it has been noticed by scholars of Indian literature and philosophies, this optimistic scenario is not exempt from the dissatisfaction above noted between model and applications: it historically de facto often happened that the counter-positions were already known and fictitious, thus not requiring any modification or any sophistication of one’s own position. It is not free from the same risk that applies to any abstract model or device, namely to be formally applied without in practice emulating any of the initial principles for which the model ‘ought’ to be used. The degradation of the raison d’être into a mere format symptomatizes the dissatisfaction at stake in any relation theory and practice (see 6.3). Nevertheless, overall and in spite of its concrete limits, it remained conceptually a scholastic model widely used in śāstric knowledge.547

By a game of reflection of one’s limits in confrontation with another’s position, the multiplication of dialogical partners consequently entails wider chances to point out the presuppositions of one’s tradition. Thus, since widening the limits of one’s position constitutes a criterion for creative thinking according to Daya Krishna, dialoguing with multiple partners offers itself as an efficient device:

“The atmosphere necessary for creative thinking to emerge is (...) a half-serious, half-playful attempt to explore collectively the various possibilities that spontaneously arise when people gather together to think about something that appears problematic to anyone belonging to that group at that moment. The attempt is to welcome each idea that spontaneously suggests itself to anyone present, and to see in it the possible opportunity for a new direction of thought. (...) The purpose, ultimately, is not so much to find a definitive answer or solution to the question raised or the problem posed, but rather to see how many directions thinking can take when confronted with a question or a problem.”548

But does a collectivity of participants directly implicate a multiplicity of directions in thinking? Numerically multiplying partners does not guarantee multiplicity of directions: first, evidently because homogeneity can also be found in a large number of people sharing the same ‘approach’ (methodologically or doctrinally) to a given problem. But more importantly, even heterogenous groups of thinkers might not open new directions for thinking - and most often, do not. They

546 “Ideas are, accordingly, not just enunciated but rather emerge from a discussion. This does not always and automatically guarantee a pluralistic discussion since some of the pūrvapakṣins “upholders of the prima facie view” and even more of the uttarapakṣins “upholders of the antithesis to the prima facie view” can be just fictitious opponents, emerging out of the author’s desire to reach a given conclusion. It is, some of the opponents’ view may have been chosen or adapted in order to make them appear less appealing to the audience, and some uttarapakṣins may have been fictively created in order to voice speculative positions that had never been actually upheld by real thinkers.” Freschi, in Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 178.

547 “A thorough understanding of the pūrva-pakṣa (the prima facie view) is required to start a vāda. There are philosophers who could present the opponent’s view with such exact comprehension that we can restore some of the lost philosophical systems only through the debate that was carried on in their refutation. For a real vāda, the argument should be meaningful. It is true that there were debates in which facts were distorted, reasoning were mutilated, and arguments were not properly utilized. Kālidāsa had perhaps witnessed debates with meaningless arguments. Duṣyanta in Abhijñānaśākuntala says: kim vṛttā tarkena anvisyate (what is to be sought by futile arguments?). Dharmakirti, a renowned Buddhist philosopher has given an account of futile debates. (...) But for more than two millenia, Indian culture has thrived because of real good debates.” Radhavallabh Tripathi, Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues, and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study and DK Printworld, New Delhi, 2016), 13.

can simply remain proponents of their own view, disregarding other positions as opponents to be defeated, or integrate external elements (arguments or examples) into their own argumentations without questioning the presuppositions of their positions, or even plainly withdraw from the discussion. Thus, there is no certainty in plurality to guarantee the ‘atmosphere’ above described. This atmosphere depends on a collective seeking (puruṣārtha, see 6) and of concrete conditions established to favor the possibilities of a dialogue: the developments of these practical conditions were explained in 3 and constitute the endeavor of Daya Krishna in the creation of the samvāda experiments. They also remind us of the necessity of considering conjointly theory and practice for thinking dialogues.

Beyond the practical limits of its realizations, the conceptual device offers two relevant functions for dialoguing: it is first an exercise in intellectual detachment (from one’s position), and consequently, a tool to articulate different standpoints across philosophical traditions, which avoids both relativism and absolutism.

5.2.1. An Exercise in Intellectual Detachment

To seek dialogue implies a desire to reach an ideal (of) dialogue constituted by non-position: as a regulative idea, non-position can either be interpreted as complete detachment from all positions (non-position), or as the ideal of vāda (see 2.1.1), reaching the true, perfect position (position of none, position of all). It depends on whether we conceive position as a positive (unity of the whole of all) or negative (devoid of) entity. The difference between non-position as detachment from all positions (absence of position?) or non-position as the negation of one’s position in order to reach a position constituted by imply two implications of the concept. In Daya Krishna’s postmodern awareness549 both interpretations resist the temptation of believing in ‘the’ Truth, the latter alternative could only implicate an intersubjective objective truth composed by the whole participants of the dialogue as a consequence of honest discussions from diverse standpoints. The epistemological consequences of pūrvapakṣa for dialogues are developed in the next section 5.3.

Thus, if it is conceptually possible to imagine such an ideal of samvāda as non-position, it would in its realization a) never reach a complete truth (which is the negation of the dynamic of dialoguing itself) and b) risk absolutizing any part out of powerful rhetoric. While Daya Krishna saw in the ‘postmodern tendency’ an excess in jettisoning the concept of truth, to which he remained committed (albeit in a non-absolutive way), the relevance of the practical consequences of dialogue implies a two-steps articulation equally significant: first, to practice a detachment for oneself, to then engage ‘honestly’ (in the sense implied by classical rhetorics described in 2.2.2) with others to reach an intersubjective objectivity of truth(s).

Concretely, Daya Krishna argues for pūrvapakṣa as a device for seeking detachment of one’s own position and ‘freedom’ from one’s tradition. The concept of intellectual detachment,

introduced as a characteristic of dialogue in 1.1.4 and further in chapter 4 as part of the movement inward and outward one’s position, has a far-reaching meaning in Daya Krishna’s philosophy. It is constitutive of freedom to withdraw and engage (see 6.2.3), part of consciousness’ move in and out of itself, i.e. in relation with others (see chapter 7). As an expression of the dialogical movement, it will be further used with other (valuational and ontological) implications in the subsequent chapters. I now restrict the idea of intellectual detachment as the ability to detach oneself from one’s philosophical position and one’s tradition in a dialogue, to the process towards listening and understanding other’s position. In so doing, intellectual detachment cannot be separated from engagement: read in the lines of what Daya Krishna interprets from pūrvapakṣa, an intellectual detachment is a way to dialogically engage with others by considering alternative arguments. It is a critical and creative ability to envision other’s positions and even be a part of other worldviews. Daya Krishna conceives pūrvapakṣa in this regard:

“Ultimately, it is arguments given for a certain position that are of interest to a philosophical mind and in this respect, the Indian philosophical tradition is especially rich as its very format of presentation consists of giving the arguments of the opponent first and then the establishment of one’s position by their rebuttal. To search for distinctive philosophical problem, or for distinctiveness in the solutions offered to familiar problems, is not only to see the alien tradition in a new way but to enrich oneself with the awareness of an alternative possibility of thought, a possibility that has already been actualized. The awareness of this alternative, actualized possibility may, hopefully, free one’s own conceptual imagination from the unconscious constraints of one’s own conceptual tradition.”

In being forced to think through the other’s position to the best of one’s ability requires to reflect and justify one’s presuppositions, or to realize that one’s thesis, which might have been obvious from its standpoint, needs further explanations. What Daya Krishna emphasizes in this process of de-identification is more specifically the de-identification of a thinker from a specific tradition, school, system or another thinker to whom/which he relates. His criticisms insist more on the ‘Indian’ self-association and genealogy of one’s thinking to a school (one ‘seeing’ himself as a Naiyāyika, Vedāntika, etc.), which he thought was epitomizing the difficulties of contemporary Indian philosophy (see 2.1.2). Nevertheless, the criticism is not devoid of application to its ‘Western’ counterpart (as a ‘phenomenologist’, Neo-Kantian, etc.). Thus, de-identification is first a call to overcome one’s loyalty to another thinker for a rather conceptual evaluation of one’s philosophical problem. In this sense, Daya Krishna’s pūrvapakṣa does not only take into consideration adversity, but also alterity (the alter of my position, the ‘counter’-position) and otherness (positions which are beyond a contradiction of my own position, which entail other conceptual structures).

551 More extensive developments of this idea, in particular on the differences that this conception entails vis-à-vis the Gadamerian conception of understanding and the role of question for his dialogical hermeneutics, has been examined here: Coquereau, “Peut-on Dialoguer Avec Un Texte? Interculturalisation de l’herméneutique, de Gadamer à Daya Krishna.”
This, in turn, allows crossing boundaries, since, while schools and thinkers are related to a tradition, problems - although illuminated by different perspectives - are not bound to any tradition.

“There is, in fact, no problem the discussion of which does not end across the boundaries of a traditionally demarcated system. (...) It is not the problems and the issues that are seen as central and the siddhantas of the so-called schools as peripheral, but instead the latter are viewed as central and the forms as peripheral. This is because the self-identification of the thinker is treated as more important than the problem he is concerned with. But, philosophically viewed, it is the latter that is important and not the former. The question, for example, of what is meant by ‘śruti’ and what is regarded as such is more important than the specific answer that a Mīmāṃsakā or a Vedāntīka or a Naiyāyīka or even a Buddhist or a Jain thinker gives to it.”

But isn’t the śruti a tradition-specific question, just like mokṣa or duḥkha? Questions can be of specific relevance in a particular tradition. Thus, these concepts have taken a singular importance in some scholastic debates (but not in all), which explains their meanings, the connotations that they imply and the (assumed) worldviews (ontological, epistemological, etc.) that sustain their existence. Thereby, the concepts themselves remain untranslated, since no single equivalent can render the complexity of the nexus of meanings they entail. Can they thus be ‘uprooted’ to be discussed in extended contexts even if other participants have no knowledge of their particularities? Is the usual careful hermeneutics or the historical interpretation to be erased in dialogue? If they are, isn’t dialogue more inclined to the comparative ‘mistakes’ than a careful exegesis, and is this approach not prejudicial in trying to project one’s own belief into another? This is a crux of the matter: what to choose? On the one hand, the carefulness of the historical exegesis and the awareness of prejudices and beliefs in any cross-cultural hermeneutics tend to repetition, imitation and lack of creativity, as denounced by Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya notably.

552 Daya Krishna, “Towards a Field Theory of Indian Philosophy: Suggestions for a New Way of Looking at Indian Philosophy,” in New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2001), 20.
553 G.C. Pande, Daya Krishna’s long-time friend and colleague in Jaipur, explains more systematically the cultural dependency of concepts as follows: “There are words describing perceptual or logical objects in a practical or cognitive situation, or words expressing the self-exploration of the intersubjective consciousness of a society. We have thus a class of meanings which could be called inter-cultural constants. These are meanings given to consciousness objectively. Words signifying them in different languages and cultures are, in principle, more or less exactly translatable in specific practical or scientific contexts. On the other hand, there are meanings which are clearly accessible only in social self-consciousness. The corresponding words differ in different cultures and their meanings too are nebulous and variable. No strict parallels or equivalents for these can be found. ‘Culture’ itself is one such word. All cultures have their own reflective notions about what they are or ought to be, i.e. they have their own notion of ‘culture’ which comprises a general view of the nature, condition, ideals and means of human life, the proper way of being human.” G. C. Pande, “Culture and Cultures,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XI, no. 3 (1994): 43–44. On G. C. Pande and Daya Krishna, see Garfield and Chakrabarti, “Remembering Daya Krishna and G. C. Pande.”
554 See 2.1.2 where I exposed Daya Krishna’s criticism of historicism when this implies to reduce classical Indian philosophies to a past and fixed philologico-historical object of studies that cannot be contemporarily further developed, in accordance with K. C. Bhattacharyya’s plea for ‘sympathetic interpretation’. For the latter, the danger of “too easily reading one’s philosophic creed into the history” does not justify the historical attitude, for its danger is “more serious”, it is the “danger of taking the philosophic type studied as a historic curiosity rather than a recipe for the human soul”. The defense of the contemporary creativity of Indian philosophies and the freedom to reinterpret them, including in heterodox ways, constituted a main incent for the samvāda project that is now elaborated more theoretically. On the other hand, the ‘feeling in a living continuity’ with a tradition, what
materials from another culture easily run into the risk of plain misunderstandings, cultural reductions and distortions. Can we get out of this epistemological dilemma? Or does this dilemma at the end amount to a valuational choice between exactitude and creativity, thus between the ideal of truth and the ideal of freedom (or free thinking)? I believe we can draw on pūrvapakṣa and dialogue to address a few points related to this matter.

First, I believe that this problem precisely outlines a constitutive deficiency of ‘dialogues with oneself’ vis-à-vis dialogues with others: using counter-position does imply to take in consideration the other position as oneself, and thus, ideally (and in Daya Krishna’s sense), pūrvapakṣa allows the Otherness in oneself, and the dialogue with oneself to be ‘truly’ other. But in cases of dialogues between philosophical traditions, can pūrvapakṣa guarantee to reach an Otherness not only constituted of another position within the same conceptual structures, but also between different structures? Let us consider the phenomenological thesis of an intercultural philosopher such as Waldenfels, that the Other (Fremde) is precisely what escapes the own (in difference to the alter) thus what is beyond any understanding and horizon. In consequence, one must question whether dialogue with oneself - even in the exercise of pūrvapakṣa - contains enough ‘otherness’ in itself. The ‘shock’ (Gadamerian Anstoß, the hermeneutic reaction when facing unexpected things, see 2.1), the ‘surprise’ and the questions arising when reading different works can certainly provide pūrvapakṣa within one’s writing and readings, thus impulsion to other arguments. But they will eventually be integrated within one set of presuppositions and prejudices, or in Gadamerian terms, within one hermeneutic horizon: even if they can enlarge it to a certain extent, they remain committed to one rationality and the infinite possibilities remain entailed within one unity conceptually organizing and constituting a theory. Daya Krishna does not consider the problem from this pluricultural perspective, but since consciousness has an irremediable tendency to ‘I-centricity’ (see 7.3 for an analysis of this illusion), namely to revolve around itself and making others as objects of one’s own, dialogue with oneself seems only temporarily possible:

I discuss in the next pages, easily explain the reluctance of ‘Western exposants’ of Eastern relations (in K. C. Bhattacharyya’s terms) to allow themselves this freedom of interpretation, for it risks plain reductions and misunderstandings if one’s presuppositions are radically different from those entailed in the tradition one studies. While this dilemma cannot be solved, it itself justifies the need of dialoguing between internal traditions of reading the same philosophical texts from different perspectives. This, in turn, argues against Halbfass’ critique of Daya Krishna’s samvāda exposed in 3.4, who reproached it an artificial and ‘Western’ setup leading in consequence to no hermeneutic reversal. For it seems to me again that different reading methods operate no differently than different traditions having different presuppositions, and thus can be used in the same way for fostering dialoguing. In other words, is there only one proper way of hermeneutic reversal und who can define it?

555 See 1.1.2 and 1.1.4: I distinguished debates and dialogues on this ground to outline the conceptual difference entailed at this point. I defined there debates as a form of communication in which a common ground of argumentation is already assumed, within which different positions are discussed. On the contrary in dialogues, this ground is not assumed but emerge in the encounter of the participants. The conceptual structures can be questioned, and the framework shaped by different rhetorics. Theoretically, it constitutes an important difference for outlining the constitution of the rational basis in which we communicate. In practice, the distinction is rarely clear between these two forms and the communication usually oscillates between both forms, notably in case of misunderstandings when one has to clarify the ground on which he argues, as also already mentioned in 1.1.5.

556 Sundar Sarukkai in his article ‘On Quiet Conversation: Ethics and the Art of Self-Conversation’ seems prima facia to disagree with such an idea when he writes that “the basic difference [between conversation and self-conversation] is that the other with whom the conversation is being conducted is ‘outside’ the self. One way in which this outside is represented is through the medium that separates the self from the other - a physical space
“One may at times be said to ‘converse’ or ‘discuss’ with oneself, but, then, one not only treats oneself as the ‘other’ but soon finds the limitations of this and seeks the ‘real’ other, the other than oneself who may look at whom one ‘thinks’ more objectively, critically without lies, or prejudice, or ‘self-love’ that the inevitable ‘I-Centricity’ in ‘thinking’ always involves.”

I believe for both the reasons of an ‘intercultural gap’ (differences to others) and the tendency of making the other one’s own, this is where dialogue with oneself becomes possibly insufficient alone.

Thus, in its contemporary reinterpretation, pūrvapakṣa is not limited to the inclusion of different positions on the same map of conceptual nexus, what I used to characterize debates (1.1.2). It becomes a device for integrating a plurality of modes of reasoning, by a widening of the concept of otherness. In so doing however, an engagement with actual dialogues prevents the emptiness of otherness that I criticized in 1.2.2 with Rada Ivecovic, and the lack of determination of an other whose main qualification is to be ‘other’ or ‘beyond’. To avoid the problems inherent to the literature on the institution of an other that is the other of myself in the logic of alterity, or an other who, being ‘beyond’, nevertheless is characterized by ‘me’ only, the presence of actual others from different traditions enables participants to reinterpret their own positions in the light of different (definite and characterized) standpoints. The other is not simply somewhere to reach or to come back to, s/he is a definite standpoint participating in the collective ‘universality of knowledge’ with an acceptance of the śāstric tradition from which her/his concept occurs. This multiplicity of standpoints does not go without disadvantage either, which I discuss in the next pages, but it answers the insufficient practical applications of this account. During the Bhakti dialogue, Daya Krishna introduced this otherness, in view of detachment, as follows:

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557 Grammatical typing mistakes of this unpublished manuscript have been corrected. Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 8.

558 See the discussion, following Daya Krishna’s intervention, on Buber’s emphasis on dialogue that is restricted to dialogue with ‘real otherness’ in contrast to dialogue with oneself. Daya Krishna, Maurice Friedman, Bijoy Boruah, Gautam Biswas, Jaideep Singh and S. A. Sayeed (in order of speech), in “Dialogue”, Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 180–88.
“Today what we are to discuss should open new avenues for thinking, not merely for us but for others, other cultures and civilizations which have as much right to our cultural heritage as ourselves. We talk of ego. But what is ego in the Indian tradition? Is it not ego when I identify myself only as an Indian? The shedding of ego is not easy. One will engage a rational pursuit ones [sic.] when one has identified one say [oneself, sic.] with universality. In other words, I am a rational animal only to the extent I become universal. I shed my ego to the extent I participate in this universal reason in the game of knowledge. In the game of knowledge when we enter into a dialogue, I do not remain Daya Krishna, you are not just Kriplani and he is not just this particular, specific human individual. But we get out of our individual prejudices, biases and try to reach an objective universality, which can be mutually corrected and jointly explored. It is continuous with the whole of humanity, past and present, which man has built over time.”

An identification with universality does not mean that specific concepts from different traditions cannot be answered or counter-argued from another angle or that we should restrict dialogues to the topics or questions that ‘seem’ universal enough to be applied everywhere or being responded to by anyone. The locality of concepts retrieved from traditions embedded in a cultural nexus versus the universality of ideas that can be meaningfully questioned by all traditions (albeit bearing different connotations and implications) remains a paradox. In operating precisely between these two extents, dialogue offers itself as a way to confront an actual plurality of thinkers from their own (cultural) standpoint. At the same time, it allows transcending their standpoint in the idea of a universality of ideas. This universality, if not reached and corrected by the different views offered in the dialogue, remains a necessary ideal for communication. In the same way, if one does not ‘become’ the opponent in presenting his pūrvapakṣa, the bracketing of one’s position to imagine being the other for a moment has the merit of pointing out the limits of a position and to incite the imagination of others. Thus, ideally a position is something I hold without it to be me, and a counter-position is something you hold that I have to defend as if it were mine. In this mirror, the presuppositions of each of us are elucidated by the change of standpoints.

Further, since (in Daya Krishna’s terms) the “capacity to resonate and feel a living continuity is the heart of understanding of at least some aspects of a civilization with which one feels identified and in harmony” 560, a real plurality of traditions is preferable to avoid misunderstandings. However, avoiding misunderstanding does not guarantee ‘understanding’ either. It is a well-known fact that identity can be constructed by distorting historical events and ideological uses of concepts, as well as it is known that one can be identified with a culture without feeling in harmony with it, and even ‘resonate’ more with another culture than the one s/he is in living continuity with. The danger of such a sense of belonging is particularly relevant in cross-cultural dialogues, since it can lead to excessive associations and exclusions, where one feels intrinsically bound to what he/she considers as its own cultural heritage to be defended against the opponent, what appears in the ‘ego’ question raised by Daya Krishna above. In postcolonial contexts, the resentment and the de facto inequality against which postcolonial thinkers have to struggle often lead to confusion in the allegiance they feel committed to in particular in their defense of the superiority of Indian philosophy to Western philosophy (See

559 Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 64–65.
560 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 95.
2.2.1.1). Dissociating the conceptual critique made to an argument from the fact that this argument might have originated in a tradition, the reception of which might remain problematic, is a way to liberate it from its political unevenness. However, it goes without saying that this can function only if participants also detach themselves from the privileges of their living association with traditions whose legacy have been imposing the standards and modes of reasoning on others. The second part of this equation remains the most problematic, for they are often not felt as problematic - and fall themselves under the category of unreflected ‘belief’. The actual presence of others, who have a right to point these beliefs out is again a necessity for cross-cultural dialogue, and this de facto asymmetry justifies the need of going one step forward out of our privileges, i.e. of deconstructing these standards to include other modes of philosophizing remaining at the margins. Thus, the detachment from one’s living continuity with a civilization remains more complex than the more obvious attachment to one author or school (even if the attachment to an author or school often implies a deeper attachment to a civilization). In such a complexity, intercultural dialoguing between different living continuities and discontinuities requires the challenge of accepting misunderstandings, and even more: of using misunderstanding as potential creativity.

Accepting the ‘risk’ of misunderstanding as a necessity for unveiling new possibilities does not mean falling into relativism: not all theses will be accepted, and not all misunderstandings can establish new directions of thinking. The engagement in dialogues is precisely a process to clarify what is potentially creative and what can potentially lead to new interconnections in the actual confrontation with others embedded in these traditions. Nevertheless, misunderstanding must be included in the necessary fallibility that creates the dynamic of dialogue. In that sense, rather than considering dialogue as a hermeneutic tool in which exegesis enables understanding, I contemplate the hermeneutic dimension of dialogue by focusing on listening.561 Listening, a

561 Although beyond the scope of this present work, it could be interesting to investigate how classical approaches on listening could be creatively reinterpreted into a contemporary ethic of dialogue or a dialogical attitude. This, with Daya Krishna, would imply a move of critically investigating the resources of the concept śabda-pramāṇa (devoid of the social exclusion and the authority that it implies, see 6.2.2) to decipher the relevance of listening for knowledge in general, and listening to the other-as-seeker-for-knowledge (6.2) in particular. As a very broad opening into such a question, I quote here Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s emphasis on listening in classical traditions as a philosophical method (which could be further investigated as used by his father’s philosophy, Krishchandra):

“When we consider transcenental philosophy, however, we find a basic difference in approach. The transcendental philosophers of the West were all seer-speakers. They, in whatever manner, first discovered apriorities and then expressed them, systematically or unsystematically. In India, on the other hand, the dominant attitude was that of a hearer, a learner, intent on discovering apriorities, but not having yet discovered them or discovered them fully. This is why they relied so much on scriptures. Even to acquire a right to listen to scriptures they had first to undergo a training such that the truths to be discovered would not be distorted, and, also, that one might not submit blindly or be hypnotized. This listening, technically called śravana, was understood as already constituting transcenental intuition, though in the making. But even this was not considered enough. The hearer was required to go on continuously substantiating the truths, half realized, by means of arguments pro and con. (This second process was called manana.) But this was again to be followed up by a third process, viz., that of deep concentration, called nidhidhyāṣāna, which was to serve a double purpose. It was to dissipate the philosopher-hearer’s subconscious doubts, if any were still left, and, second, a sustained deepening of concentration was considered capable of disclosing deeper implications and ultimately the whole system of relevant apriorities. This last process, known as jñāna-sādhana, was a process which Plato hinted at and Kant developed to a degree and which is in modern times treated in all seriousness by phenomenologists, and vicariously by many existentialists.” Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “Classical Philosophies of India and the West,” Philosophy East and West 8, no. 1/2 (April 1958): 35, https://doi.org/10.2307/1397419. See also Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “Traditional Indian Philosophy as a Modern
pre-condition for understanding, leaves space for the otherness of the other’s position, even when understanding the Other as Other would remain inaccessible. In its close relation to ‘understanding’, listening is at the crossroad between epistemology and ethics, insofar as it the act of listening determines the reasoning and the logic that will unfold, but, embedded in human behavior, it implies first an acknowledgment of the Other and a readiness to comply with his difference. It presupposes to accept that I might not understand the Other’s intention and meaning, but that I am ready to admit the limits of my condition, and to acknowledge her/his position within my own horizon. The difference between the two pushes the dialogue forward, between ‘silence and conversation’:

“Supposing I’m prepared when I listen, what do I do? I don’t really comprehend what the other person is saying, though that is the minimum condition of listening, but also I am prepared to accept it not really as it is but seeing it as potentiality in a significant manner. Now what is the difference between conversation and dialogue? (…) A dialogue is after all a communicative act. But silence can also be communicative, particularly in the spiritual traditions, about which Prof. Malik and some others have been talking. But if we take the distinction, a dialogue is somewhere between a communication through silence and conversation. It involves an act of listening which is also a kind of silence.”

In that sense, dialogue is not a hermeneutic enterprise if hermeneutic is understood as a quest for understanding and consensual clarification. It is rather conceived as an event that allows to transcend the limits of each presupposition and position from the difficulties of understanding and the disagreement occurring in the confrontation. An understanding is a necessary step and requirement of pūrvapakṣa, which implies to defend the other’s position to the best of one’s abilities, namely of one’s understanding of the other’s position. However, since it cannot merely constitute a repetition, it requires the ability to listen, feel and explore the other’s realm as one’s own. This does not mean an appropriation into one’s own framework, but a trying to reach out of one’s own limits into another alternative thinking. In this sense, it indicates a seeking towards the universality of thinking, beyond the distinction of one or another position. This creates a position where there is no distinction between my position and the other’s position, i.e. where the mutual contribution turns into a creation that belongs neither to the one nor the other. This

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562 “There is something special in an ethical relation and that is already captured in the art of conversation. To converse with another is to acknowledge the other - this is primarily an ethical act and not an epistemological one. To converse is to listen, not only to what is said but also to what is not said - this is an ethical move and not a pragmatic one such as one for more efficient communication and so on. To converse is to engage with the silence between utterances - the fact that there is no need to do so implies that this is not a part of communication but an impulse that is ethical in character. To converse is to anticipate - as described earlier, this idea of anticipation, also related to that of waiting, is again an ethical character and not a behavioural one. To converse is to anticipate - as described earlier, this idea of anticipation, also related to that of waiting, is again an ethical character and not a behavioural one. To converse is to understand language as something more than its representations in the spoken and written mode - and this awareness about language is again not knowledge about language but an orientation towards language, an orientation that can be characterized as ethical.” Sarukkai, “On Quiet Conversation: Ethics and the Art of Self-Conversation,” 140.

563 Daya Krishna, in the dialogue in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 193.

564 A more precise outline of the difference of this understanding and the role of dialogue vis-à-vis understanding in Gadamer and Daya Krishna is given in Coquerseau, “Peut-on Dialoguer Avec Un Texte ? Interculturalisation de l’herméneutique, de Gadamer à Daya Krishna.”

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engagement into the universality of knowledge is a participation in the common ‘seeking for knowledge’ that will be explained in 6.2.2, where I show in particular the valuational nature of this ‘desire’ for knowledge. This tension constitutes a condition for dialogue: it signals the tension between reasoning from particular standpoints and the feeling of a universality that is not limited to the rational realm nor to the addition of the standpoints, which however must also be communicated and debatable. In this communication, agreements and disagreements occur, which point at differences and pluralities (see 7.2), although we seek an ideal which unites us together in this search.

5.2.2. An Articulation of Different Standpoints

Furthermore, pūrvapakṣa is mainly a tool to articulate different standpoints across philosophical traditions. The dismantlement or decomposition of presuppositions operates due to the pūrvapakṣa tool (śilpa) that distinguishes between the universality of knowledge and the particularity of the standpoints. It is useful here to remind us of the difference between distinction and separation according to S. S. Barlingay: “When things are not only distinguished as different but can also be separated or divided, I call them separables. When they are purely distinguished but cannot be divided or separated, I call them distinguishables.” Barlingay insists on this fundamental difference between separables (like the branch of a tree which can be divided into two), which determine the actual plurality of objects, and distinguishables, which signal a possibility of envisioning differences. The differentiation between the two becomes clear and necessary when applied to cases “where there is definite distinctness but it is not possible to separate one distinct from another distinct.” Barlingay insists on this fundamental difference between separables (like the branch of a tree which can be divided into two), which determine the actual plurality of objects, and distinguishables, which signal a possibility of envisioning differences. The differentiation between the two becomes clear and necessary when applied to cases “where there is definite distinctness but it is not possible to separate one distinct from another distinct.” Such as the color or the extension of something. Thus, distinctions are made necessary for the purpose of communication and conceptualization: “when we explain, we re-arrange our experience in a linguistic form so that it may become meaningful or communicable,” which however, is not tantamount to an actual separation of things. To apply it to the realm of communication, I would apply this differentiation to the forms of communication exposed in 1.1. While I distinguished between lectures, debates, discourse-discussion and dialogue, I added that these forms cannot be separated, first because the communication evolves and makes consequently the separation in practice impossible: a question to a lecture can give rise to a dialogue and a discourse can become a debate. Furthermore, the characteristics of each form that I distinguished for the sake of conceptual clarification are not strictly delimited to one form, i.e. they cannot be separated from others. For the sake of conceptual clarification, such classifications are helpful to start investigating the complexity of a concept and its interrelations. They point at emphases, connotations and conceptual problems which can be distinguished from the concept as well as from other forms, but they cannot be separated from them.

Having clarified this difference, we can admit pūrvapakṣa as a distinguishing tool between positions that as a whole, render the ideal of universality of knowledge from a panel of possible

566 Barlingay, 3.
567 Barlingay, 4.
standpoints. In a dialogue, standpoints are distinguishable parts of knowledge, which is conceived as a whole implicating all standpoints in interactions seeking this universality. It could be possible to consider a standpoint separately, in a monograph where one would develop ‘one’s own thesis’, although I doubt this thesis would anyway be possibly developed in total independence from other references and influences, even if they are criticized and destroyed in the argumentation. In a dialogue however, standpoints are only distinguished insofar as the communication makes their relation necessary: one indeed needs different points for a relation between them to exist, which is why an ideal total consensus does not enable communication. Furthermore, knowledge is here conceived as a whole created not only by the sum of the standpoints but by their interrelations in counter-positions, i.e. by the transformations of the standpoints. Thus, it is this “distinguishability-qua-distinguishability”\textsuperscript{568} (namely, the fact that the two entities are not separated) that allows the creative tension in dialogue between particular viewpoints of the standpoints and the universality of the concepts.

This emphasis on the difference between separation and distinction also pursues an objective that I consider salient in postcolonial Indian Anglophone philosophy: seeking reconciliation of different systems, worldviews and viewpoints that appear irreconcilable. Referring to the Naiyāyika K. K. Banerjee who comments on the acceptability of a system depending not on logic but on the individual and society of the individual, Margaret Chatterjee, close friend and classmate of Daya Krishna, elaborates on the plurality of realism that modern Indian metaphysicians try to articulate:

“Several modern Indian metaphysical thinkers find entry to a metabasis eis allo genos within stances of reflection. Such reflective shifts seem to me to take the place of the classical distinction between the paramārthika [highest, supreme realm] and the vyavahārika [worldly, daily, practical realm]. To the phenomenologically inclined they take the place of the turn from the naturalistic standpoint to the post-epoché stance of ratio intuitive. However, it is usually maintained that a purged mode of reflection, that is, one which has left behind the unreflective, can provide insight into the nature of what is. But since these insights are so various, philosophers like K. K. Banerjee and Kalidas Bhattacharyya concede how diverse our standpoints can be. Herein lies both their modesty and, I would say, their realism.”\textsuperscript{569}

Chatterjee comments further that K. K. Banerjee’s statement shows “how standpoints come into existence thanks to a multiplicity of factors”\textsuperscript{570} Thus, without jettisoning the possibility of gaining insights into the nature of what ‘really’ is, it is acknowledged that these insights might be plural, even if they are immediate. Furthermore, it is also recognized that different modes to gain insight can be accepted, including those retrieved from the phenomenal or worldly existence, which might be in contradiction with unreflective insights. At both levels, plurality exists, as well as between these levels - a connection which must also be articulated without excluding one for the other. For these Indian metaphysicians, such an insight into the diversity of our standpoints challenged them to develop ways of integrating radical internal differences of philosophy. This applies to J. N. Chubb, to K. C. Bhattacharyya, and even more to his son

\textsuperscript{568} Barlingay, 5.
\textsuperscript{570} Chatterjee, 85.
Kalidas Bhattacharyya with the concept of alternation, on which I will come back in the next chapter 5.3. For Daya Krishna, who refuses both relativism and jettisoning reason or truth themselves, it is a challenge for diversity in dialogue and creative thinking.

To illustrate how pūrvapakṣa can unveil the particular presuppositions involved in an argumentation, let us come back to the Bhakti dialogue (see 3.3.2)\textsuperscript{571}. In a session examining the problems of applying the rational term pūrvapakṣa itself to bhakti, realm of feeling par excellence, Kedar Nath Misra (Banaras Hindu University), a participant questioned the assembly’s presuppositions on bhakti itself. More precisely, he underlined the “presupposition about the unchanging character of the tradition”, that he interpreted as possible misinterpretation of previous positions. He adds:

“The concept of bhakti that we are discussing, I presume, follows the way, which thinks that there was no bhakti in India and it is with Rāmānuja that it began and so on. But that is not the case. There is a pūrvapakṣa to bhakti; but within bhakti there are many pūrvapakṣas also.”\textsuperscript{572}

As obvious as this statement could sound to a reader outside this debate, this awareness during the dialogue is the reflection of the collective undertaking of analyzing bhakti from different perspectives, or more exactly, to notice the insufficiencies of each perspective. The debate therefore followed the possible break between Vedic traditions (the relation of which suggested by Kedar Nath Misra being counter-argued) and later stages, on the divergences of meanings in the traditions of ācāryas (the scholarly tradition) and the saints, more importantly on the roots of the contemporary idea of bhakti being rather located in the latter tradition, and on the possibility to relate a ‘core’ idea of bhakti to all traditions, or rather to one conceptually more influential on today’s idea.\textsuperscript{573} If it is conceptually self-evident, the reasoning of individual thinkers when writing their own papers tends to take for granted that their assumptions and presuppositions are the only possibility, which becomes self-evidently contradicted in a collective endeavor.

There are however, three limits to be considered: the first is inherent to the definition of dialogue as “open-ended”. Considering pūrvapakṣa as a device in Daya Krishna’s interpretation implies never to be able to reach a finite conclusion. The tension between model and standpoints and between locality and universality can per definition, not be resolved since it constitutes the fundamental dynamic of dialogue. There is thus no certainty and no conclusion to be reached. Dialogue remains fallible, open for counter-positions, which lies at the core of the matter.

One could however easily object that each dialogue ‘ends’. Whether it is due to time-restriction or a consensual silence that leads to concluding the session, the outcome remains that each transcription of the samvāda experiments is contained in a book, and that each dialogue, debate and discussions come to an end. But are all endings the end? Daya Krishna observes:

\textsuperscript{571} This analysis of pūrvapakṣa with the bhakti dialogue is a revision of a version originally published as Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 191–200. The section that is being reworked here is the author’s sole work.

\textsuperscript{572} Kedar Nath Misra, in Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion, 35. His complete explanation is found in ibid., p.33-43.

\textsuperscript{573} In the transcription, Shiv Kumar Sastry responded in English and Hindi, followed by G. C. Pande and Kedar Nath Misra responding again. Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, 43–49.
“Whether it is a dialogue between two persons or more than two persons, there is a start and there is an end. The end is not really an end but something occurs, and we have to think about what happened. It is very difficult to really understand what happens, but at some point, after an hour or two hours, everybody feels that now, nothing more can be said on the issue. It is a very strange thing because the something that happened exhausted the possibility of creativity. It does not mean that we can come back to it tomorrow or the day after and the thing will not flow again. Something new will happen. What will happen we will not know. But the point is that there is a sort of temporal span of creative thinking, and that something happens, but it is a rest. It should not be seen as a closure. And if we do not see it as a closure then this is an infinite activity - an activity that can be carried on till eternity and dying.\textsuperscript{574}

This is thus the difference between the end and a rest - a pause of creativity, and a rest of the dialogue. There is no closure nor any definitive conclusion, but a possible momentary stop of the process, which allows both to reflect on what has been reached and in which directions to proceed further (the analysis of which are usually done in the introduction and conclusion of dialogue, see part 3). In that sense, it is a necessary introspective part of dialoguing. Dialogues are not only constituted of the collective thinking on the given topic, but also of the reflective awareness on its contents and methods (which affect in return the topics) and of the silences that occur between the creative duration. Thus, the ideal of perfection or the refinement of one truth, although remaining operative as a regulative idea, cannot be the actual objective of a dialogue. This intrinsic defect signals also the creative dynamic of dialogue.

2) The second defect is more difficult to dismiss: it concerns the limits of the particular entailed in a standpoint. Although pūrvapakṣa as a device can generate boundless dialogues, the starting-point however is by definition, strongly limited to the standpoints of individual participants. In other words: while dialogue can a priori cross any disciplinary or cultural boundaries, in practice each participant is limited, which allows delimit the broadness of concrete dialogues. I underlined the fact that it is this individuality that avoids the emptiness of an a-cultural Other characterized in opposition or ‘beyond’ me. Nevertheless, the opposite is not devoid of its own difficulties, namely: are all standpoints relevant? How to ensure possible communication among an infinite field of possibilities? How to allow enough unity in diversity to be able to exchange? Where is the limit between heterogeneity that would impede communication and a diversity that would enrich it?\textsuperscript{575} It would be naive to believe that a maximum heterogeneity can be plainly absorbed into a collective and creative dialogue. Some stances, behaviors, ways of reasoning and arguments often obstruct the discussion more than they contribute to it, and the rigorous procedure to prepare the diverse samvāda testifies of such an awareness. Scholars were certainly diverse in terms of the philosophical traditions they belonged to, or in interdisciplinary fields, but they did share a scholarship on the given topic, even if from various aspects; they were trained in diverse learning institutions and models, but they were, indeed, trained; thus, most of the time, they knew each other or part of the assembly. Thus, having a position takes a set of beliefs and presuppositions for granted, consciously or not. But does counter-position help us out of this muddle? Is not counter-position also restricted

\textsuperscript{574} Daya Krishna in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, \textit{Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image}, 183.

\textsuperscript{575} I addressed some of these questions in reviewing Ralph Weber and Arindam Chakrabarti’s project of ‘fusion philosophy’ in their edited volume \textit{Comparative Philosophy Without Borders}. Coquereau, “‘From Comparative Philosophy to Fusion Philosophy’, Ed. Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber, Comparative Philosophy Without Borders, London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 2016, 246 Pp.”
to standpoints, even if these standpoints are different than mine? Does pūrvapakṣa ‘free’ my argumentation from presuppositions and beliefs if other positions also assume another set of presuppositions? To say the least, it depends on the pūrvapakṣa that I am facing. Although Jay Garfield does not conceptualize this problem, he raises it very efficiently in responding to Daya Krishna’s article ‘Eros, Nomos, Logos’, in his speech delivered at the Daya Krishna Annual Lecture 2018 in Jaipur. He maintained there that the paradoxes arising from our human condition itself, in particular the problem of I-centricity, or the impossible way out solipsism, require another perspective than Daya Krishna’s, in the sense that they occur as insoluble because of the standpoints he chose. According to Garfield, Daya Krishna criticizes Kant’s and Hegel’s positions because of his insatisfaction of their legal conception of society. Daya Krishna thus introduces as a counter-position the concept of Eros, reinterpreted from Śaṅkara and Aurobindo, “to draw our attention to the possibility of the re-enchantment of the commonplace and to the easy availability of a transcendental sensibility”.

Garfield concludes on Daya Krishna’s interpretation:

“So, this is the final point. So long as we remain trapped in the immanent, egocentricity is hard to avoid. This is simply because, on Daya’s view, the world as it is merely empirically is bereft of value: value enables and requires connection to the transcendent. And without value, desire is all that can drive us. When Eros is understood as mere individual desire, it serves Nomos in its causal sense. But when Eros is taken as care for others, it serves Logos, and motivates a life of gratitude and beneficence. I have to regard this approach to those goals as a noble failure. And I think that the failure was built in from the start, that is, from the use of resources drawn from Kant and Hegel in Europe, and from Śaṅkara and Aurobindo in India; that is, from sources that begin analytically with the individual subject and then try to work out from there. My own suspicion is that Daya’s prison-house of I-centricity is in fact inescapable. The only way not to become imprisoned therein is never to enter in the first place. I would therefore like to help Daya to work his way towards these same goals by starting elsewhere, in the matrix of interdependence and collective life, drawing inspiration from Hume in the West and from Buddhists such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva in India. The relation between Eros, Nomos, and Logos may look different from there.”

Garfield continues his development, but I would like to interrogate the nature of the dialogical move he undertakes. What Garfield implicitly underlines (or what I interpret in his suggestion to displace the counter-positions) is the following: in view of the fact that Daya Krishna chose Kant, Hegel, Śaṅkara and Aurobindo here as counter-positions to answer to, he remains thereby strongly influenced and limited by them. Even as counter-position, they determine his answer in a certain direction. This implies a certain location within a particular conceptual framework and thereby, within a certain “prison-house” (of transcendence). So, if counter-positions determine the answers according to their own presuppositions in exactly the same way as positions determine one’s answer, are counter-positions a solution to unveil presuppositions or simply the variation of one set for another? In other words: are they fundamentally a creative tool to escape the prison-house of presuppositions, or simply a slightly more diverse and heterogenous contribution to a position confined in presuppositions? Is Daya Krishna’s use of

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577 Garfield, 10–11.
pūrvapakṣa free of conditioning? Or doesn't he assume the presuppositions of those he disagrees with and thereby reproduces the illusions he is denouncing?

Pūrvapakṣa does not erase limits. It does not allow a ‘dialogue without borders’ in itself. However, what it opens is the (in abstracto) infinite possibility of counter-positions from a boundless spectrum of presuppositions and positions. De facto, it entails the inclusion of several counter-positions limited to the actual participants taking part in the dialogue. Thus, the same topic on dialogue can be engaged on infinitely by different participants, and the results will be unique (but not infinite). The difference between the results and conceptions obtained in the abstract ideal of dialogue and the limits of any particular realization of it constitutes the dissatisfaction (see 6) of any empirical realization. On the one hand, the creativity that arises from pūrvapakṣa is the one of the plurality itself, and the one originating from the tension between the particularity of the plural standpoints and the ideal of universality engaged by all. The creativity arising from dissatisfaction, on the other hand, arises from the tension between conceptual imagination and empirical realization. It signals the gap between the ideal of dialogue in its apprehension and the limits of its realization. The dissatisfaction, which is the awareness of the limits of any particular realization with regard to the idea one had imagined, enables however to re-think and correct both the model and its realization. This, in turn, leads to new dialogues. This creative tension is exposed in 6.

3) The last one is one with serious epistemological and ontological consequences, and the one studied by Daya Krishna himself (and taken up by Garfield above): the problem of ‘I-centricity’. Given its relevance for dialogue and otherness, it constitutes the topic of 7.3. In short, counter-positions are not rhetorical devices detached from the person. Although a person is not bound by her/his position on a topic, a position is enabled by a thinking person, which explains that her/his presuppositions as ‘intuitions’ and ‘beliefs’ relate to larger worldviews and values than the bare unfolding of its logical premisses. It is as a person that I can formulate a position, expressed as ‘I think that’ or a counter-position, ‘I disagree with’ (and their variations). This ‘I’ expresses my consciousness, thinking and disagreeing with my (intellectual) actions, and ‘that’ or ‘with’, the objects of my consciousness. The basic problem that occurs is how to overcome the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’, i.e. the absolute sense of subjectivity entailed in my consciousness. While I can conceive myself as an object of consciousness and reflect on myself as self-consciousness, it does not seem possible to conceive of others as subjects of my consciousness (as other-consciousnesses). At least, it does not seem possible for me to have access to their ‘I’ in any way other than in making them objects of my consciousness. This, in view of my explanation of pūrvapakṣa, raises serious difficulties: how to defend the other’s position as if it were mine if ‘I’ cannot be the ‘other’, i.e. if the other’s position is bound to remain an object of my consciousness? Can I ‘be’ the other?

5.3. Witnessing Epistemic Plurality in Dialogues

Let us now turn to the epistemological background for the use of pūrvapakṣa as an intercultural tool for dialogues. This implies to include pūrvapakṣa within the larger epistemological context
of Truth in avoiding the extremes of dogmatic absolutism and relativism. I also want to investigate the epistemological foundations that can justify how the device operates. Connecting epistemology (as the science of knowledge having been foremost developed by logic) and rhetorics (as the science of correct reasoning and rules of debate) is nothing new to Indian philosophies: the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, from which the concept of (sam)vāda was retrieved, and the commentarial tradition that followed, precisely refined this connection between valid arguments and correct means of knowledge. At this point however, it is to be expected that Daya Krishna remained unsatisfied (albeit influenced) by its presentation:

“Vāda, Jalpa [disputation] and Vītaṇḍa [eristic wrangle] are forms of argumentation and they have nothing to do with the strict pramāṇa-vyāpāra [activity of knowledge] as they have nothing to do with the argument. (…) As for chala [fraud], jāti [futile rejoinder] and nigraha-sthāna [point of defeat], these are terms that have nothing to do with the theory of pramāṇa [means of knowledge], as they refer to debate or strategies employed by disputants to win an argument, the last specifically referring to winning or losing which can hardly be considered to be the prayojana [ultimate goal] of engaging in the pramāṇa-vyāpāra to attain certitude or knowledge.

The ‘extensional’ enumeration of the subject-matter of the Nyāya-sūtras, thus, is an amalgamation of two different discourses, the one relating to the forms of argumentation between different persons debating a point and winning or losing in the argument, and the other relating to the theory of proof or justification.”

The confusion of the equivalence between the ‘victory’ of an argument when the terms of this victory are discussed from a rhetorical point of view, and the ‘victory’ understood as epistemological validity of the truth of the argument is called into question. In other terms, Daya Krishna criticizes how the acknowledgment of rhetorical skills can lead to establishing the epistemological validity of an argument. Such a conception of epistemological validity bereaves the speaker of her/his subjectivity in the constitution of knowledge that is elaborated in a debate because it confers an objective validity to a particular truth-statement. Rhetoric provides universal rules that determine the validity of a statement in any situation, which corresponds to the epistemological validity of the argument. In equating both, the speaker is considered as an ‘epistemological subject’ in opposition to a ‘person’, which raises difficulty, notably in view of the I-centricity above mentioned.

Moreover, the outcome of a debate in terms of victory and defeat of an argument according to a set of predetermined rules, indicates further problems for considering epistemology as the outcome of rhetoric. Although vāda aims at truth rather than at victory, the overall conception of debates remains determined by this focus, for truth equates victory of the debate. Secondly, the enterprise of the Nyāyasūtra is committed to a metaphysical seeking for mokṣa or liberation being achieved by knowledge of an argument. This further questions the logical relation

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between a valid argument and a state of consciousness, or how rhetoric can influence a metaphysical quest.

Thus, while Daya Krishna (and his contemporaries) can connect epistemology to rhetoric on how truth is elaborated in debates, his perspective differs in a contemporary context. He rather questions how to determine ‘valid arguments’ in the context and the plurality of subjects if the validity is not consensually determinable anymore. While classically, the debate was rather questioning how to erase errors and illusions in order to reach truth and liberation, it is rather the discordance of opinions and the possibility to reach different truths that interest a contemporary philosopher like Daya Krishna. This discordance is not conceived as the ignorance of subjects to be overcome to reach a higher state of knowledge, but as what constitutes forms of knowledge out of the very differences of subjectivities. Thus, he is rather interested in the contradictory manifestations of truths and the disagreements in dialogue than in any overarching consensus. In his words:

“The inalienable and irreducible subjectivity of the other is, however, encountered in a more intractable manner by its nonacceptance or opposition or rejection of what one communicates even after the other has understood it. Many a times one deludes oneself into thinking that if the other had really understood what one is saying, one could not but have agreed to it. But this is to forget that one has oneself disagreed or rejected someone else’s contention after having claimed to understand it as otherwise one would not, or could not, have done so. The continuous and continuing refutation of views and counterviews thus proclaims aloud the plurality of subjectivities in inter-subjective interaction, as nothing else could.”

Counter-positions and disagreements reveal the intersubjective nature of knowledge, understood as knowledge of the other. It is only when we start to consider knowledge not only in terms of contents, i.e. of objects of knowledge, but when we introduce modality and contextuality, i.e. the way knowledge is subjectively constituted, that we perceive the relevance of persons in the construction and activity of consciousness. The subjectivity of another consciousness is necessary for interacting, validating, contradicting, and resisting in the process of creating knowledge. One knows for oneself and thinks for oneself, but one knows because of an alterity.

This, in return, questions the presupposed unity of truth if we accept a plurality of valid arguments. Rather than jettisoning the concept of truth altogether or proposing a strong relativism, contemporary Indian metaphysicians share a certain commonality in a project of ‘accommodation’ and ‘integration’ of plural viewpoints as evoked by Margaret Chatterjee above (in 5.2.2). They not only react to the argumentative perspective of the Nyāya tradition,

579 “The claim that a correct knowledge of all the elements mentioned in the sūtra will lead to tattva-jñāna is preposterous as, firstly, to win a debate certainly cannot be a sign of having knowledge of that which is ultimately real, assuming that the term tattva in the sutra refers to that which is ultimately real, as it would only prove that one is more skillful in debate or argumentation than the other with whom one is debating. moreover, the idea that from this one would Nilśreyas, that is, liberation or Mokṣa, is highly debatable, for it is difficult to see how a knowledge of valid argument can ever give rise to a state of being or consciousness, which is free from any kind of determination or bondage.” Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras, 48–49.

580 Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 297.
but also against the scientific and positivist equivalence between knowledge and truth\textsuperscript{581} (in the singular), and the distinction between natural and social sciences/humanities.\textsuperscript{582} The more contemporary developments of conceiving knowledge in economical neoliberal terms, on the other hand, are captured by Daya Krishna as a collaborative process involving a plurality. This plurality, however, only operates at an instrumental level for producing technological means in view of knowledge devoid of values. The plurality involved there is limited to the instrumental effort, not to the ‘seeking’ of man (\textit{puruṣārtha}) without developing the conception of truth or knowledge.\textsuperscript{583}

The difficulties to account for multiple and intersubjective truths which lie at the core of dialogue explain the necessity to establish other epistemological conceptions that more adequately correspond with the subjectivities at stake. However, objectivity remains a necessary parameter, because a pure relativism cannot enable dialogue if it consists in presenting parallel truths that cannot be discussed:

\textsuperscript{581} “The dispute about knowledge in the social sciences or the humanities is well known, as also the question whether knowledge in these fields is strictly to be accorded the status of knowledge as the process of establishing a knowledge claim is generally not clear, or even agreed upon. There are, as everybody knows, schools (sampradāyas), each with its own orthodoxy and methodology, self-enclosed in its own certitude, oblivious of the criticisms offered by others. (…) Some may cite the so-called “schism in Physics” and the Intuitionist revolt in Mathematics as evidence that even these hard-core knowledge-fields are not immune from the problem. But if this is accepted then the problem will be seen to lie deeper still, and not just be confined to certain kinds of knowledge only. The problem relates to the notion of knowledge itself. Does it form a unified whole covering everything that is known, or does it consist of disparate atomic sentences each mirroring a fact or displaying or showing it? There can be in-between positions, loosely organized unities relating to certain fields only, along with the hope that some day it will all be tied so neatly as not to be disturbed ever again. But this will be a utopian absurdity as it can only be achieved by a suicide of the knowledge-entreprise itself even while humanity is living and has not become extinct.” Daya Krishna, 142–43.

\textsuperscript{582} In an early paper prepared for a UNESCO survey on the problems of social sciences and humanities, Daya Krishna already noticed that “the social sciences and the humanities, however, suffer from a situation which, at least, does not seem to be prevalent to the same extent in the natural sciences. The diversity of trends seems not only much greater and more complex than the one found in the natural sciences but also, which is perhaps unique, opposite and even contradictory in character. The very fact that ideological disputes find themselves more at home in the social sciences and the humanities than in the natural sciences is, by itself, almost convincing evidence of this. If we further take into account the fact that there seems to be far more of a national tradition in the former studies than in the latter, the evidence is further strengthened. It is not as if the different areas of a study were differentially emphasized and pursued in different countries but that the same area is differently and even contradictorily pursued in different countries.” Daya Krishna, “On the Distinctions Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences and the Humanities,” \textit{International Social Science Journal (UNESCO)} XVI, no. 4 (1964): 514.

\textsuperscript{583} “At the centre of it [the problem of freedom in the contemporary context of globalization] lie the radical change in the conception of knowledge, which now is seen not only in purely instrumental terms, but also as something that can be self-consciously ‘created’ by the collective effort of man, through planning and management and investment of huge resources, mobilized for the purpose by the state or the political centre, that sees itself now in terms of the ‘future’ and not as the ‘preserver’ of all that was achieved in the past. It is not the \textit{dharma}, or the \textit{status quo}, or the socio-cultural realities that give meaning and identity to a people. It is rather ‘development’ in all fields and all directions that is seen as its ‘defining’ function, leading to perpetual instability whose quality and intensity is increasing at such a rate, that not only all social relations, including the one between the generations, are being disrupted, but also the conceptual structures that man had evolved to ‘understand’ human reality and the values it was supposed to enshrine and pursue to make it ‘human’ and give it meaningfulness.” Daya Krishna, “The Cosmic, Biological, the Cultural Conditionings and the Seeking of Freedom,” 142. See also Daya Krishna, \textit{Civilizations}, 83–86. See also Daya Krishna, \textit{Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations}, 279–82.
“Without the notion of objectivity, human seeking will not make much sense in any realm whatsoever. If every perception is veridical, every thought true, every feeling adequate, every action right then there is just no question of seeking anything, for everything is realised all the time. The possibility of the illusory, the false, the inadequate, the wrong gives meaning to human seeking but these terms themselves have meaning only if there is some objectivity with which they can possibly be confronted and judged in its light.”

Objectivity\(^{585}\) is here conceived as “‘the knowledge of object’ [which] should be the same as the object itself”. \(^{586}\) In concordance with the view that presuppositions, fallibility and misunderstandings are creative potentialities for dialogue, objectivity can be considered as a necessary parameter to enable dialogues. However, such a conception of objectivity cannot be detached of space and time, nor be of universal applicability. It is also subject to change and modification when objective facts are themselves proven wrong. It is, thus, grounded in an experience. This explains that subjectivity and objectivity cannot function independently: even if they stand in radical opposition, both poles are required to give each member its intelligibility. In such a perspective, the admitted relativism could not mean the absence of objectivity. On the other hand, such a concept of objectivity implies admitting a possible plurality of truths that would emerge from conflicting accounts, and the possibility that something held to be true can be demonstrated false \textit{without} it to be necessary an error, but simply based on a different objective presupposition. But how to account for different objectivities that are still distinguished (and not separated) from subjectivities?

This has two implications: it refers first back to the beliefs and presuppositions above mentioned in 5.1, and secondly, qualifies philosophy itself as inherent conflicts and paradoxes that must be elucidated vis-à-vis the systems that produce them, rather than an accumulative quest for truth that would be jointly and harmoniously constituted. The attempt at philosophical dialoguing seems to depend on an articulation of contradictions apparently inherent to the nature of philosophy, rather than a correction of earlier mistakes to reach a collective Truth. These implications go hand in hand and the connection is made by the philosopher Jehangir N. Chubb in distinction to scientific epistemology:

> “Philosophical thinking reaches no new conclusions for it is at its origin committed to a point of view and ‘evidence’ in its case simply means the presenting of considerations which tend to show the reasonableness and the logical coherence of the ‘conclusion’ already presupposed in


\(^{585}\) See Kalidas Bhattacharya: “If in place of the simple word ‘object’ we here use a more complex expression ‘the thing which stands to subjectivity as its object’, this is because we here mean alternation between such thing (standing over there in nature and on its own right, as the realists understand it) and subjectivity (that refers to it): we do not mean any alternation between subjectivity (in Husserl’s language, ego = noesis) and content (in Husserl’s language, object = noema).” Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “My Reaction,” in \textit{The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya}, ed. Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose, and P. K. Srivastava, 9 (Pune: Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications, 1985), 190.

The problem that arises is many-sided. It points at the constitutive but neglected differences between sciences and philosophy regarding the role of belief: neglected in the sense of the lack of methodological consequences drawn from this difference, in particular if philosophy ‘seeks’ to become ‘scientific’.\(^\text{588}\) It also outlines some grounds of failure of philosophical dialogues. In remaining a truth versus false conception of philosophical systems, it leads to a closure of philosophical discussion, for each interlocutor will simply argue against the other. In conceiving philosophy’s process of verification in correspondence with the scientific one, however without having any empirical proof nor external logical justification at one’s disposal, philosophical debates are bound to remain endless ‘wranglings’. ‘Wrangling in philosophy can never come to an end, since each of the disputants claims that her/his ultimate grounds alone are self-evident or indubitable.’\(^\text{589}\) What needs to be considered, however, is that ‘her’ or ‘his’ grounds are intrinsic to ‘her’ or ‘his’ system, and thus cannot be verified outside of internally logical systems, nor independently of one’s presupposition.

J. N. Chubb elaborates further, albeit bearing different consequences, on presuppositions that account for conflicts (in distinction to dialogue) in philosophy:

> “On being included in a metaphysical system, and not before, the scientific presuppositions are turned into propositions and assigned a relative truth or a lesser degree of truth than the propositions which form the body of the metaphysical system. The notion of truth itself is organic to the system and inseparable from it. The mistake of the metaphysicians is to assume that the presuppositions of science are in themselves propositions, that they are unconscious metaphysical commitments about the Universe or the ultimate nature of things.”\(^\text{590}\)

The problematic assertion of truth within a philosophical system (depending on certain presuppositions) is responsible for the incompatibility between different philosophical systems.

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\(^{588}\) “In the beginning Philosophy was regarded as co-extensive with the whole of knowledge. It was the mother of all sciences. Gradually the special sciences broke away from the tutelage of Philosophy and established themselves as separate disciplines with their own characteristic methods. This was all to the good. But though science has liberated itself from philosophy it has not occurred to philosophers to see whether there is any need for liberating philosophy from science. As at one time they formed a single body of knowledge it is natural that they shared many presuppositions. One of these is that science and philosophy are both forms of knowledge in the same sense, both sciences in the wider sense of the term, and with the separation of the special sciences from philosophy it was naturally assumed that the difference between the two lay primarily in their subject matter. (…) Now it seems to me that there is a need to question the assumption that philosophy is a science in the wider sense of the term, only with a different subject matter and perhaps a different method. If this assumption is not questioned then the mind naturally falls a prey to the fallacy of rationalism. The empirical and the mathematical sciences each have their own way of supporting the truth of their assertions. What then is more natural but to assume that philosophy must do likewise and produce logical grounds to support its theories. Rationality, it is assumed, consists in not making any statements which are not supported by reasons. And the supporting reasons must themselves not be open to question. Philosophy does not rest on any other science for providing a justification of its grounds. Hence it is assumed that the ultimate grounds of all philosophical statements must necessarily be either self-evident or indubitable in the sense that if you doubt them your doubt destroys itself.” ‘Philosophical Arguments and Disagreement’, Chubb, *Philosophical Papers of Professor J.N. Chubb*, 290–91.

\(^{589}\) Chubb, 291.

\(^{590}\) Chubb, “Critical Philosophy,” 108.
Chubb takes the example of a positivist who would suppose that speaking about reality as something that transcends the senses is a meaningless proposition. However, denying metaphysical propositions on the ground that the positivist denies transcendence is not founded on a logical analysis. This is eventually a choice based on a set of presuppositions that leads the positivist to hold such a view. In that sense, the positivist theory is just ‘one’ attempt at translating her/his experience into a theory, i.e. a particular communication of a general experience. Chubb concludes from this unsatisfying state of affair that philosophy in consequence makes no “ordered progress” and cannot hold any “universal statement”, unlike science. What the early Daya Krishna could add to this is the relevance of ‘significance’ to highlight the differences between systems, which determines the choice of the criterion.

591 “The positivist, for example, would neither assert nor deny that there is a Reality which transcends the senses. He would say that talk about such Reality is meaningless. But this attempt to deny truth-value to metaphysical propositions rests on an ontological commitment. The metaphysical point of view is not logically self-contradictory. The rejection of the positivist’s theory of meaning violates no law of thought. The positivist cannot show and perhaps does not claim to show that his Verification Principle is an analytic proposition such that its denial is self-contradictory. Hence the positivist in rejecting metaphysics is not rejecting a flagrant self-contradiction, but what is logically considered, a possible point of view. (…) Nevertheless, he rejects the truth of one statement which, without being a part of any metaphysical system, is necessarily presupposed by every metaphysical system, the statement, namely, that the Verification Principle has only a limited application and is not true of all significant utterances that claim to give information about the nature of things. The statement is not self-contradictory and to reject it as meaningless because it does not satisfy the verificationist’s criterion of meaning is obviously to beg the question. At the level of presuppositions, therefore, the positivist cannot simply ignore the metaphysician, but must join issue with him and hence positivism cannot completely free itself of all ontological commitments. In this rather indirect way the positivist cannot help being a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of his own.” Chubb, 109.

592 These terms represent M. Chatterjee’s formulation of the same idea: “A metaphysical theory does not describe anything but it expresses an attempt to put into words a vision of things which the philosopher himself has experienced. It is an essay in communication, a communication of something which is itself progressively articulated through the verbal expressions used, be these arguments, examples, imagery or all three. (…) Just as a translator often has to incorporate the ‘untranslatable’ (the proper name, the idiom, the word which is highly culture-determined), a metaphysician may find himself having to accommodate the “undigested” elements. (…) Furthermore, just as there are alternative translations, so there are alternative metaphysical theories. The touchstone in the one case is the ‘original’ and in the other experience. Now, our experience does have a common structure to be sure. But differences of temperament go a long way in conditioning our reactions to this common structure. It has often been pointed out that the difference between the idealist and the realist, the monist and the pluralist, has much to do with differences in overall orientation to life. If in the physical world the possibilities are so vast as often to make predication and control hazardous, the possibilities in the case of man (whose endowment includes and goes beyond the physical) are infinitely more. To read conflicting metaphysical statements is to read diverse records of human experience.” Margaret Chatterjee, “Towards an Anthropological View of Philosophy”, in Devaraja, Indian Philosophy Today, 119.


594 Chubb. 109.

595 “(…) Radically different and even contradictory answers are asserted as true by eminent thinkers; If this term ‘real’ is to be distinguished from the term ‘unreal’, we would have to take some selective criterion, the presence or absence of which would make “reality or unreality”, as the case may be. But at the point of choosing of the criterion, an arbitrariness enters which would inevitably result in different philosophers choosing different criteria. any attempt to determine the choice of the criterion is bound to fail for, unless one chooses to accept, one cannot be forced to do so. (…) Time and again we have come across the singular fact that philosophers, while aware of each other’s arguments, fail to be convinced by them. It is not the argument that is disputed, but its significance. Of course, there are times when the arguments themselves are disputed, but the deeper difference always relates to the significance of certain facts or certain arguments. Descartes’ ‘Cogito, ergo sum’, Berkeley’s ‘Esse est percipi’, Husserl’s ‘Phenomenological reduction’, Alexander’s ‘Democracy of mind among the objects of the world’ are all obvious truisms which may be accepted, but the significance that they have tried to attach to them
that will eventually lead to a theory. While the arguments can be internally disputed between philosophers, the primary choice lies rather in the “significance that they have tried to attach to them and the superstructures they have sought to build on the fact of this significance.” For him, this can also be interrogated, however it “is a thing of which one cannot be convinced and, therefore, the failure of philosophers to convince each other is not surprising.” Thus, while arguments within a system can be disputed and their validity asserted, the structures and the systems that entail their logical and rational unfolding is not a matter of argumentation. It belongs to the freedom of self-consciousness to choose between structures and systems, a choice that is itself not logical, but the fact of ‘significance’ related to other spheres of self-consciousness, such as values (developed in chapter 6).

Continuing with Chubb’s account, this choice does not simply result in a logical unfolding of a premise, the conclusions of which allow us to question the premise after the deduction has been effectuated. Rather, it is a criterion, i.e. “it is in the light of the underlying point of view that our thinking takes shape”. There is therefore no deductive verifiability that can operate backwards to the premise since the criterion determines the whole direction and shape of the system entirely permeated by it. In my interpretation, the criterion gives the significance to the system, and belongs to the valuational aspect of philosophizing in Daya Krishna’s terms. For dialogue and rhetoric, this means that in spite of the ‘rationality’ entailed in philosophical dialogues, and in spite of the ‘objectivity’ of rhetoric as analyzed by the Nyāya, an argumentation is bound to a logical unfolding of a valuational choice that provides the overall significance of one’s position (see 6.1).

Moreover, Chubb does not argue for erasing this arbitrary choice on the ground of a correspondence of philosophical methods with scientific ones. He rather shows the inadequacy of what is actually already contained in a primary ‘belief’, the scientific paradigm of philosophy itself being a presupposition in the sense above described. It is rather the prevalence in accepting this scientific paradigm as the norm for philosophy that leads to the ‘impossibility of dialogue’ in philosophy. While this could be ‘one’ structure to be put into dialogue, it cannot constitute the overarching framework stipulating truth to all structures. This impossibility lies in the arbitrariness of truth implied in the presuppositions internal to philosophical developments. In

and the superstructures they have sought to build on the fact of this significance may be, and, in fact, have been disputed.” Daya Krishna, *Nature of Philosophy*, 294.

596 Daya Krishna, 294.
597 Daya Krishna, 295.
598 “The rationality of a philosophical system is something that exhibits itself within the system. It is interior to it and does not serve as its foundation. Though its sole activity is to mature a point of view which is alogical, the process of maturation is shot through and through with logic. Thought must accept the criterion of coherence. Its rationality is shown in its purpose, which is to construct a coherent, closely-knit system of ideas in which the elements are connected together by purely logical links. The laws of thought and the rules of inference preside over the whole process and permit no deviation from their exacting standards. Though the system as a whole is not deductive in the sense that, like mathematics, it merely draws out the implications of axiom-systems or premises which are taken for granted or which are acknowledged as self-evident truths, within the system itself there are stretches of deductive reasoning, chains of arguments, which move from premise to conclusion with the same inevitability which we find in mathematical reasoning.” Chubb, *Philosophical Papers of Professor J.N. Chubb*, 292–93.
599 Chubb, 294.
consequence, he notices, “philosophical polemic takes the form of rejecting what one’s opponent says as false, and in recent times of charging him with talking nonsense. Victory in philosophical disputes depends, as Śankara points out, on superior dialectic skill and not on the persuasive force of Truth.”

Chubb, however, does not rashly conclude that “philosophy is not a dialogue” or can in essentia not be so. He reconsiders the impossibility of dialogue as a sign for the needs of establishing a philosophical method that would be adequate to philosophical truths:

“They have sought to make philosophy an objective science by attempting to get rid of deep-seated dissensions instead of rising to a point of view from which all these dissensions are seen to fall into place without feeling the need or even admitting the possibility of bringing them to an end by a dialectical process. (…) What we should do instead is to look steadily at philosophy and philosophical reasoning and try to become aware of what it is that we all philosophers do when we set out to philosophise. This implies cultivating at the level of philosophical thinking what in the spiritual discipline of the Samkhya and the Vedanta is called the Sāksin or the Witness attitude. It implies a capacity to stand back from the turmoil of polemical thought in a poise of detached contemplation and to become conscious of our thought wholly at its very root. This is the secret of critical philosophy because it results in philosophy becoming conscious of itself.”

There are two intertwined ideas to elucidate here: the witness or sāksin attitude, reinterpreted from Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, is here defined as a ‘detached contemplation’ providing awareness of thoughts ‘at their very roots’. Thus, in Chubb’s account, the witness attitude is a detachment from one’s position grounded on the epistemological consideration of one’s presupposition, i.e. the awareness of the origin of one’s thought. It is an attempt at reaching a higher level of contemplation transcending the particular philosophical systems. However, this transcendence does not aim at a universal unity, but reaffirms an anthropological foundation, for the roots of the systems are grounded on subjective attitudes. It thus prescribes a method to consider philosophy to be the activity of re-discovering one’s thought, which is, however, itself not detached from the world, but embedded in the human condition. He correlates the human foundation and the need of detaching oneself (from one’s assurance of the scientific objectivity of one’s thought) with the idea that the activity of philosophy lies in witnessing this origin:

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601 Žižek, “Philosophy is not a dialogue”, in Badiou, Žižek, and Engelmann, Philosophy in the Present, 49–72.
602 In another article, Chubb expands on sāksin as a critique of the Mādhyamika dialectic: “The distinction which I have made between the two levels of thought, the level of constructive thinking which rests on and develops an alogical criterion-concept and the higher level of detached contemplation, corresponds to a certain extent to the distinction made by the Mādhyamika between drṣṭi (point of view) and prajñā (wisdom). The Mādhyamika philosophers were the first in the history of philosophy to make a sustained attempt to free thought of all dogmatism and raise it to the level of self-conscious freedom. From their point of view freedom of thought is achieved by freeing the mind from all views (drṣṭi). Wisdom (prajñā) is the perception that all drṣṭi are false. The Mādhyamika system, however, fails to achieve its goal of liberated thought since it sets about it in the wrong way. Its thesis is that, while holding no position of its own, it can successfully refute all philosophical positions. (…) I believe the Mādhyamika dialectic fails of its purpose, which is to liberate thought from dogmatism, precisely because its approach is dialectical. The mind cannot reach the stage of detached contemplation by committing what amounts to intellectual mayhem on all philosophical theories. It is like trying to cast out Satan by Satan.” Chubb, Philosophical Papers of Professor J.N. Chubb, 295–96.
Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. This is true not of the whole of philosophy but of critical philosophy, and the activity is not that of clarifying linguistic puzzles and muddles, for this itself presupposes a notion of clarity and intelligibility which would not be acceptable to all, and so would rest on a theory; it is the activity of contemplating or witnessing thought. Critical philosophy is not primarily a theory but a form of what I have called epistemological introspection, to distinguish it from psychological introspection. It is a clear awareness of what we are doing when we philosophise and of the origin of our thought, i.e. the points of orientation and on what they rest, whatever the particular structure or system into which our thinking results.\footnote{Chubb, “Critical Philosophy,” 115.}

Margaret Chatterjee, in her comment on Chubb’s metaphysics, interprets this introspection as intellectual biography, which, at first glance, does not seem to equate contemplation or witnessing thought. However, I believe that this witnessing the origin of one’s thought, which could be an interpretation of Daya Krishna’s withdrawal of consciousness (see 6.2.3 and 7), implicates as a ‘return’ to dialogue, the detached awareness that allows for criticism. Chatterjee also considers that it is this awareness that allows criticism, in particular “self-criticism, something that there is evidence of when a philosopher adopts a radical change of standpoint.”\footnote{“Critical philosophy practiced in this way is elsewhere described by him [by Chubb] as a form of ‘epistemological introspection’. It is reckoned to result in a clear awareness of “the origin of our thought, i.e. the points of orientation and on what they rest”. It seems to me that, in so far as the activity advocated involves something very much like intellectual biography, the ‘findings’; in the nature of things, must necessarily be different. However, Chubb says they are not exempt from criticism. This criticism, I would suggest, might very well be self-criticism, something that there is evidence of when a philosopher adopts a radical change of standpoint.” Chatterjee, “Indian Metaphysics,” 86.}

Chubb’s witnessing remains, thus, anthropological in character, and the epistemological introspection - in my interpretation - an intellectual detachment of the kind Daya Krishna suggests,\footnote{Daya Krishna, ‘Dialogue’, in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 181–82. See also 1.1.4.} which does not lead to a transcendental abstraction or to the elaboration of a supra-standpoint encompassing all others.

The anthropological dimension of philosophy and philosophical knowledge is, I believe, what Daya Krishna calls ‘human knowledge’\footnote{See in particular Daya Krishna, “Illusion, Hallucination and the Problem of Truth.”: “The realization that there is no such thing as knowledge but only knowledges and that what is thought of as knowledge or described as such in any domain is only a short-hand term describing the tentative results of a collective seeking on the part of a large number of individuals that is continuously being challenged, questioned and modified in the light of the inadequacies and imperfections that people see will change the situation in a fundamental way. It will thus see human knowledge as subject to all the weaknesses and strengths that define the human situation in its basic structural aspect.” Daya Krishna, 140–41. On collective seeking, see 6 and on the relation of these knowledges and seekings to the human situation, see 7.}, whereby it does not imply that there would be non-human knowledge, but rather that knowledge cannot be detached from the human condition in which it is embedded. While this seems quite evident, the consequences of this statement remain relevant for considering knowledge (as fallible, in process and finite) and more importantly, the constitutive role of dialogue for creating knowledge. D. P. Chattophadyaya, another prominent
philosopher and close interlocutor of Daya Krishna, can be mentioned here to clarify the anthropological roots in such an epistemological perspective:

“Some philosophers have been overimpressed by the model of physical science, its precision and testability, and some others by the analogy of God, his comprehensiveness and power. Underlying all philosophical positions there is a more or less inarticulate anthropological presupposition. Philosophy being essentially a reflective enquiry, every philosopher in the course of rounding up his position consciously or otherwise touches upon its anthropological root or principle of unity. Man is obliged to be present in all his thought and action, and this obligation is existential. The more he deepens and willfully explores the consciousness of this obligation the more he realizes the human foundation or pre-reflective presence and function of his being in all his works, theoretical and practical. In philosophical reflection we get what we have already got in a pre-reflective form. It is a sort of getting the got, prāptasya prāpti.”

The qualification of knowledge as ‘human’ or anthropological, reveals the presuppositions of the different subjects elaborating on knowledge-systems, but also the dissatisfaction in the sense of the remaining gap between the development and construction of philosophy as an activity (realization) and its apprehension (see chapter 6). It also points at the structural illusions rooted at the core of self-consciousness that conditions it (chapter 7). It thus permeates the different dimensions of human fallibility that are exposed in this chapter. Underlining the correlation of these dimensions shows the advantage of thinking dialogue in relation with knowledge. Dialogue as a confrontation of different standpoints between persons enables to highlight this intermingling that constitutes knowledge. It also renders explicit why such ‘human knowledge’ is fallible and open-ended, which is however not seen as an epistemological defect but as a necessary correlative to its constitution. Finally, it includes what Chubb calls ‘critical philosophy’, as the activity of epistemological introspection via contemplation and witnessing of thoughts. In unveiling the presuppositions of one’s theory, this activity also avoids that dialectic becomes sophistry. Different standpoints across philosophical traditions are coming together in a dialogue and the counter-positions of these standpoints are enabled by witnessing their different origins and beliefs.

5.3.1. Negation and Dialectic

The realization of the ‘human’ of knowledge appears first negatively, in the epistemological limits and finitude of ‘humans’, in the awareness of the infinite that one seeks for or can imagine. These dimensions have epistemological, axiological and ontological consequences, which are respectively the delineation I drew under the names presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions. In such a broad and fundamental perspective, the ‘negativity’ involved also bears different aspects, but it always indicates a relation of opposition, that is, that which cannot be separated but rejects the other term of the correlation. It is in this broad sense of negativity that the tension operates. In an article elaborated on the different emphases given by different civilizations either to grammar, logic or mathematics to articulate knowledge, Daya Krishna expresses the force of this negativity. The self-reflection on language, becoming an object of

knowledge, can be articulated in terms of highly-sophisticated rules of grammar (with the example of Pāṇini), in rules of logic\textsuperscript{608} or even in mathematical terms in self-conscious articulation of truth-statements and expressions of a specific world\textsuperscript{609}. They are manifested in different ways and results. Nevertheless,

“All civilizations discovered the puzzling, paradoxical mysteries of language, thought, counting and measuring but they were not equally struck by them. (…) Civilizations, then, may be distinguished by the fact whether grammar, logic or mathematics first achieved the Śāstric form or that which is nowadays called ‘science’ (…) The notion of ‘infinite’ involved in it [is] different from the one that is encountered when one is struck by the phenomenon of self-consciousness in man. The last, however, is a negation of all the three we have mentioned, and as the latter constitute what we have called ‘civilization’ as it is a result of the way man sees himself ‘objectively’ in terms of the one or the other, the ‘history’ of any civilization may be seen as the result of a tension or conflict between that which negates and that which is negated and the way it is negated. The other side of the story is the influence of that which is negated on that which negates it. In other words, how objectification of consciousness in the field of grammar, or logic or mathematics changes the consciousness when it reflects on itself, after the objectification.”\textsuperscript{610}

The objectification is the negation of the universality pretended or ‘seeked’ at in the rules elaborated, for the enunciation of their universality contradicts the limited developments of their forms in different epistemological realms. The infinity of self-consciousness in terms of open-ended possibilities of creating anew contradicts the specific infinite of the rules. In other words, the finality of their expressions and the objectivation at stake in the knowledge-enterprise denies its own root and development in the very process of universally codifying the elaborated rules. The tension of the perpetual negation between self-consciousness and its objects in self-reflection forms the dynamic of knowledge.

Without elaborating now on the axiological and the ontological consequences of such a conception, let us focus on the epistemological role of negation in such a perspective. It can, I believe, articulate further an epistemological understanding of the role of counter-positions in

\textsuperscript{608} “But grammar is not the only thing which the self-consciousness of a civilization may take shape and, in turn, shape the ‘personality’ of that civilization. Thought which articulates and embodies itself in language may itself become an ‘object’ of reflection and one may ask the question what makes one spontaneously say, or judge, that what the ‘other’ has said is ‘wrong’, or what the other is saying does not ‘follow’ from the grounds he is giving for it. Logic is the usual name given for this though, perhaps, the term ‘Pramāṇa Śāstra’ or ‘Pramāṇa Vidyā’ as given in the Indian tradition expresses the idea better.” Daya Krishna, “Grammar, Logic and Mathematics: Foundations of the Civilizations Man Has Built,” *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* 19, no. 3 (September 2002): 68.

\textsuperscript{609} “Unlike grammar or logic it [mathematics] is not generally considered to be the result of a self-reflection on the part of a more or less pre-existent activity of his such as that of ‘speaking’ or ‘thinking’. But mathematics is also the result of a self-reflexon, though it is not generally seen as such because we do not have two distinct names for the activity that is ‘reflected’ upon and that which results as a consequence of the activity of reflection. ‘Counting’ is the activity that is reflected upon and which, as everybody knows, gives rise to that which is known as arithmetic. (…) What one discovers to ones amazement and surprise through a reflection on ‘counting’ is the realm of the ‘infinite’ and the ‘truth’ about it. What can be counted are things, not numbers, which always extend beyond those one has counted and one need not, and usually ones does not, pay attention to this. But the mathematician does, and it is he who, like the grammarian or the logician, makes the ‘ordinary’ human being aware of the ‘mystery’ that lies all around him and in which he is immersed each time he speaks or thinks and argues or counts.” Daya Krishna, 70–71.

\textsuperscript{610} Daya Krishna, 74.
dialogue. Negation, shortly introduced in 5.2.1 as non-position, could be interpreted as absence of position (non-position as detachment) or the negation of one’s own position to reach a position constituted by all the positions of the participants in a dialogue. The ability to negate in linguistic propositions, but by extension also to negate an argument, seems to imply first the recognition of the existence of the argument itself, for every negation must go along the a priori recognition of the positive entity. Furthermore, negation implies doubt and opens the possibility to, by extension, see how different the argument could be, or not be. This ability to negate opens a sense of ‘freedom’ entailed in the act of negation that Daya Krishna describes:

“The facts of feeling, consciousness, and language at the human level need no proof even if, for methodological reasons, some may deny the one or the other or even all of them. But the denial, even if it be only for methodological purposes, reveals a new dimension of consciousness which is not found at any non-human level (…). This is the ability to deny, to negate, to doubt everything, including itself. In language, this is symbolized by the sign of negation without which no language can function as ‘language’ at the human level. (…) Negation, however, is only one aspect of language that has been noticed. The other, and perhaps the more important aspect, is the ‘freedom’ that it confers on consciousness because of the unending possibility of linguistic combinations that it offers which bring into being new ‘worlds’ for the apprehension of the listener and, eventually, to that of the speaker also.”

The freedom of creating new ‘worlds’ will be further analyzed in 6.2.3 and 7. Negation thus appears to be not only a linguistic device, but also to entail a possibility to imagine further the existence of what is negated and the alternatives of this negation. This works closely to pūrvapakṣa, as the argument that must be refuted, however only after its defense is made - a defense, which ideally, should go further its initial presentation, namely envision new possibilities. In that sense, the negation operates first as the negation of one’s own position. And if one has to reflect on the negations entailed in one’s position, then one has to pause on this possibility. This rest that self-negation implies in the dialogue allows for detachment and witnessing of one’s thought. Daya Krishna critically observes the insufficiency of the debate of negation located at a perceptual level in Nyāya and Buddhist theories, and immediately expanded it to values in the sense of what ought to be but is not, which I characterized as dissatisfaction, a term used by Daya Krishna in the next page:

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612 “The exclusive concentration of the discussion on abhāva at the perceptual level seems to have deprived the Indian thinking on the subject from paying attention to the active element involved in it and treat it only as something passively received, which is generally the way in which perception has been treated almost in all philosophical thought. A shift to the consideration of the active element might have resulted in seeing abhāva as negation which has been extensively discussed in the western tradition. Even the attempt of Dharmakirti to see abhāva in terms of an inference whose ground or hetu was supposed to be anupalabdhi did not change the situation as it did not see the active element in negation which characterizes self-consciousness at all levels, and more particularly in the activity called thinking. The Buddhists tried to come to terms with this in their doctrine of apoha but either they did not see it as an essential element of self-consciousness or thought or vikalpa as they called it, or they could not grasp the dynamic creative element which negation. brings into being through an awareness of the demand generated by what is negated. This is the well-known realm of values which is disclosed by self-consciousness when it sees the object not as what it is but as what it is not and what it could be, or should be, or even ought to be. What is perhaps even stranger is that this did not take place, in spite of the centrality of the pūrvapakṣa in India’s philosophical thinking. (…) A rethinking on the notion of abhāva, in the Nyāya and the

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“Negation is of various kinds and can take multifarious shapes which logic has not yet taken note of. One of the most important of these is the one that lies at the root of moral, aesthetic, and spiritual consciousness which, though radically different in the directions of their development, share a common origin which lies in the dissatisfaction with what ‘is’ and the feeling that something is lacking which would be there if one makes the effort required to bring it into being. Indian thinkers have thought of this in positive terms and called it ‘abhāva’ and treated it as an ontological correlate of that which functions as ‘negation’ in language. (…) The effect that such a postulation could have and perhaps did have, to some extent, on the nature of self’s reflection on itself or of self-awareness, is still a matter of historical investigation.”

In such a conception, negation can be interpreted as an epistemological and linguistic device having ontological consequences for the understanding of presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions. The faculty of negating can instantiate the gap between reality and seeking, and a detachment between one’s argument and the possibility to negate its truth-value.

Daya Krishna did not investigate the role of negation connected with this possibility of epistemic imagination, nor the epistemic consequences for counter-position and dialogue. However, in his explanation of further developments of the Nyāya dialectic, B. K. Matilal extended his reflection to the realm of logic and dialectic. As an expert on Nyāya engaged in a widening of philological materials to philosophize as such, he questions the problem of skepticism that could arise from the infinite negation of all positions which would not result in establishing any position. “Can there be a debater without any positions?” he asks. Indeed, what would a debate be constituted of if there were no position at all but only successive refutations? Is negation not the end of dialogue if it functions ad infinitum? This grounds criticisms elaborated on debate understood as vitanḍā if the debater does not have any position of his own to defend, but only present to destroy others positions to win the debate. However, as Matilal remarks, “it is not necessary that a debater in the third type of debate [vitanḍā] is always looking for victory as the goal and using tricky devices. It is conceivable that his business is also to find out or seek after truth.” But can one seek after truth without establishing any assertion or (positive) position? Can anything be elaborated by negations only? And if the negation is simply not-A, how can it lead to the freedom above described by Daya Krishna for conceptual imagination, if it is restricted by the same ‘A’ (the criticism elaborated on pūrvapakṣa as the simple ‘counter’-position)?

Matilal thus continues in this direction:

Buddhist traditions may help us to bring that dynamic rethinking into the Indian tradition, which is the preeminent abhāva—which has been present in Indian thought since it started its journey two and a half millennia ago.”


615 Matilal grounds this position on Udayana’s comment, Nyāyadarśana: “Some Gauda Naiyāyikas, such as Sāññatī, talk about a fold-fold classification of debate, a) vāda, b) vāda-vitanḍā, c) jālpa and d) jālpa-vitanḍā, the first two being for the honest seekers after truth, and the last two for the proud people who intend to defeat others.” Matilal, 16–17.
“Is not the negation of a position another position? If the proposition \( p \) is refuted, does it not amount to the defense of not-\( p \)? This was actually the import made of \( \textit{vitaṇḍa} \) by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. But the sceptic-debater after refuting \( p \) will only proceed, under the circumstances (i.e., being faced with such a question), to refute not-\( p \). This will probably imply that \( p \) and not-\( p \) do not exhaust the possibilities, and that might mean in turn that the law of excluded middle does not apply here. (…) For it is possible for \( p \) and not-\( p \) to be both false. (…) Alternatively, we may hold that the refutation of a position need not amount to commitment to the ‘negation’ of the proposition involved.”

By definition, the negation of a position does not (directly) lead to affirming any theory or position, although it can lead to establishing a third position. In itself, it can be insufficient in view of its impossibility to state anything. Nevertheless, it is linguistically and logically the first sign for doubting one’s own truth-statement contained in one’s position. The reluctance to accept negation as a valid device for dialogue originates on the one hand from the difficulty to assert truth to a negative statement,\(^{617}\) and on the other hand from the issue of contradiction, if two contradictory statements are accepted as being true. However, in the case of \( \textit{pūrvapakṣa} \) and of dialogue in general, contradiction is also seen as an opportunity to articulate different positions which might be true from different perspectives or alternatively. In that sense, negation is ‘temporarily’ necessary as negation of one’s own and the other’s position and as a logical ability to foster interrogations:

“Knowledge, thus, is a succession of interconnected assertions perpetually expanding and perennially changing as a result of doubt and questioning, in which negation plays only a subsidiary role that is purely temporary in character. This, however, is not to see it as a logician does, not even of the type that sees logic as dialectics, for neither doubt nor questioning are negation and, in any case, they are not predetermined either as to their content or even form, as negation has to be.”\(^{618}\)

I interpret ‘temporary’ here in reaction to the lack of position of a \( \textit{vitaṇḍic} \) debate: negation cannot constitute the core of a debate, for it lacks position \textit{tout court}. The intellectual detachment in the sense of negation or absence is not simply the inexistence of position per se. It is either the act of temporarily negating the truth-claim contained in one’s position, or the ‘rest’ of one’s position in contemplating alternative and negative positions. In that sense, negation allows a temporary distance to the arguments that enables the ‘change of knowledge’ mentioned by Daya Krishna in its relation to doubt and questioning. In consequence, it does not constitute a (negative) dialectics for the negation does not condition knowledge, but it only impels the dynamic dimension of its constitution.

“Strangely, neither Hegel, nor Marx seem to have understood the nature of true dialectics as they superimposed on what was a free activity of reason the notion of necessity taken from traditional logic where the movement of reason was bound by necessities that no seeker of

\(^{616}\) Matilal, \textit{Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis.}, 17.

\(^{617}\) “The ambiguous role of negation in language, thought and experience has created problems and paradoxes for philosophy. (…) Negation is usually a sign of something being untrue. But a negative statement may be true, and in case it is true, its truth should be of the same order or type as that of a positive or affirmative statement. On the other hand, if it is supposed to be different, the truth itself will be given apart and become a divided house, leading to consequences that might be difficult to live with.” Daya Krishna, \textit{Contrary Thinking}, 115.

\(^{618}\) ‘Negation: Can Philosophy Ever Recover From It?’, in Daya Krishna, 119.
knowledge could ever be free from as they were the very conditions of knowledge that was not only defined but constituted by them.”

Dialectic is seen as another systematic way to constrain knowledge by sublation (Aufhebung) of the positive and the negative. What Daya Krishna hints at is rather the possibility offered, once negative counter-positions are made, to arise our awareness of the contradictory nature of these.

“The more fundamental problem relates to the question regarding the meaning of ‘self-contradiction’ itself and the question of whether what is regarded as self-contradictory obtains only in the verbal or linguistic formulation that is being treated as self-contradictory. At a deeper level still, the problem relates to the ontological status of language itself, for, if it were regarded as having any ontological reality of its own, then the so-called ‘self-contradiction’ would have to be granted some sort of ontological status therein. (…) One may find it [the reality of self-contradiction] in philosophy itself, for it would be difficult to believe what philosophy would be if there were no self-contradiction in thought. One has only to remind oneself of the role that ‘dialectic’ has played in the formation and development of philosophical thought since at least Plato onwards and its acknowledgment in thinkers such as Hegel, Fichte, and others. In fact, the movement or motion in philosophical thought occurs primarily because of self-generation of opposition that each formulation of thought entails, resulting in an unending movement that continuously propels thought further and further from the point where it started. The problem then is how to conceive of this negative movement in thought and what reality to assign to it.”

If linguistic negation has ontological consequences on presuming the existence of the entity that it negates (as in the case of Nyāya on which Daya Krishna draws his reflection), it then raises the question of the law of contradiction further. This means that self-contradiction is not only a linguistic problem but induces the possibility of contradictory realities. How to account for contradiction in this perspective? How can contradictory statements be simultaneously real and/or true? For dialogue, this raises the question of how to accommodate different systems and positions that entail different truth-claims without one necessarily being false. For Daya Krishna, this possibility grounds the ‘motion’ via the generation of oppositions that form the development of philosophical thought, a ‘motion’ that is reflected in dialectics, however without sublation, but as an open-ended process that reflects the character of dialogues.

5.3.2. Disjunctive Unity and Alternation

Let us come back to the previous example of an objectivist theory and a subjectivist theory appearing contradictory because of the beliefs grounding their views (5.3). In such a case, negation would seem to be insufficient if it would be the sole conclusion to resolve the issue, since we have seen that negation can only be temporary. The positivist or the realist can suspend her/his judgement, temporarily negate her/his position defend the truth-claim of the Other, thereby negating the truth-claim of his own, but a simple negation of one for the other could

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619 Daya Krishna, 119.
not enhance the dialogue between the two. In dialectic terms, a conclusion would arise by sublating both positions into a synthetic one. However, the point of dialogue (for Daya Krishna’s conception) is not to look for a conclusion, even of the synthetic type, but to take the contradiction as an opportunity for questioning the presuppositions of the positions, and proceed with further problems. So, rather than asserting the truth of one and refuting the other, or sublating the two, let us raise the question: in view of the conflicting theories that are irremediably contradictory such as subjectivist and objectivist theories of knowledge, how to understand the contradictory nature of philosophical arguments in a dialogue? Is there another means to account for differences of viewpoints without resorting to errors? This means, on the other hand, not to deny the existence of mistakes or errors within a theory or a philosophical argumentation. However, in the case of subjectivist versus objectivist theories, i.e. idealism versus realism, the problem does not lie within a certain system but in the confrontation of different systems. Mistakes and errors are integrated within a certain framework that predicates the conditions of truth and falsity. However, as seen above with Kalidas Bhattacharyya, what now needs to be taken into consideration is the meta-articulation of different frameworks external to truth and falsity. I do not want to justify the logical or argumentative mistakes within one of them but on the contrary, to account for the pluralities of systems, the confrontation of which seems endless. In Daya Krishna’s terms:

“The “Knowledge-situation”, thus, presents a problem, for it reveals a close unity of two terms which, however, seem also opposed to each other [subject / object]. The usual solutions of this problem have taken either the form of asserting the primacy or even the absolute reality of the Subject or the Object or the denial that there is any opposition between them. (…) The movement from epistemological objectivity to metaphysical objectivity is the central problem in almost all the great thinkers from Descartes to Kant and though they all find alternative routes to their solutions (or do not find a route at all) they are convinced that the immediate awareness of consciousness is indubitable in a sense in which the consciousness of the object is not.

On the other hand, the whole movement of modern realism is based on the immediately felt independence of the object from the fact of its being known. The object is, thus, revealed to be independent in its very being, the situation of being known being essentially accidental to its very nature. (…) The opposition between the two terms in the ‘knowledge-situation’ is, thus, the reason for the divergent movements in philosophy. But the very fact of the ‘knowledge-situation’ reveals that there is also a close unity between them. The question, then, arises: “can we intelligibly conceive of a unity of elements which are in mutual opposition to each other?”

The clue lies in the mentions of ‘they are convinced’ and ‘immediately felt’. In other terms, object and subject stand in a relation that affects both parts. They indicate that, regardless of the complexity and truth implied in both answers to the opposition of subject and object, it is the belief of the ‘immediate awareness of the subject’ ‘or’ the one of the ‘independence of the object’ that grounds apparently contradicting solutions. This, in logical terms, favors a conception of inclusive disjunction, or in Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s terminology, a ‘disjunctive unity’, i.e. a unity of the form ‘either A or B’. In rhetorical terms, it argues for considering

disjunctions as possibilities rather than as logical incompatibilities. The connection that is pointed out here is the one from doubt, which arises when incompatible predicates are attributed to one predicant, and freedom, when the incompatibility is seen from the self-reflective consciousness having the freedom to consider it from different angles. Following Chakrabarti’s discussion of ‘or’, “the swing of disjunction is always a cognitive attitudinal indefinite. The so-called weakness of uncertainty lies at the heart of the power of free choice. If free-choice makes us more powerful than choiceless agents, then uncertainty must be empowering. Epistemic hesitation may be the source of freedom and hence a strength rather than weakness.” Disjunctions create a multitude of possibilities if one accepts the uncertainty contained in the notion of choice and the possibility of alternative conceptions that cannot be dismissed as simple errors. In dis-junction signaling un-certainty, it is the ‘force’ of ignorance for dialogue that is revealed (see also 6.2.1). This ignorance is to be distinguished from the internal ignorance leading to errors, as the ignorance within a philosophical theory or argument that insufficiently proves one’s point and is thus counter-argued and invalidated. The dialogical ignorance that underlies epistemic hesitation and uncertainty is meta-epistemological, because it denies a sense of overarching truth which necessitates to accept alternative conceptions as possibly true, or alternatively real. It is thus the uncertainty and ignorance that is existentially related to the limits of one’s condition, transcendental to human’s knowledge. To follow Kalidas Bhattacharyya, this ignorance is related to the alternative philosophical condition and is thus irremediable:

622 Kalidas Bhattacharyya formulates the necessity of disjunctive unities as follows: “It is ordinarily believed that every unity is of A and B or of A and B and C etc. Several items are there, and they conjunctively form a unity - this is our general attitude to unities. A unity is a whole, and a whole is at least an aggregate; and an aggregate means several things together, i.e., joined by ‘and’. With this notion of unity we are sure to stumble at the phenomenon ‘knowledge of object’ [where knowledge is defined as the subjective feeling of the object that rejects the object]. The items united here are antagonistic; at least one of them, viz. subjective knowledge unqualifiedly contradicts the other. How in the face of this contradiction can the two be taken together un unity? (…) Those who believe in conjunctive unity here have not admitted the contradiction, and those who admit the contradiction have not spoken of conjunctive unity. (…) This does not mean the denial of all unity. It is not true that a unity is either conjunctive or nothing at all. (…) This other form of unity is the unity of alternatives, a unity which, as opposed to the conjunctive type, may be called disjunctive and is expressed in the form Either A or B.” Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Philosophy) (Calcutta: Das Gupta & Co, 1953), 135–36.

623 I reduce here A. Chakrabarti’s detailed exposition on the relation between doubt and freedom in the logical analysis of ‘Or’ in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Kashmir Śaivism, Kant, Russell and Strawson. The further comment draws on his conclusion in particular on the concept of vimārsa between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Kashmir Śaivism: “The sub-commentary Uddyota here raises the subtle question of different kinds of alternativity. There is a distinction between vikalpa and vimārsa. In case of the latter, the options exclude each other, they are incompatible. (…) In case of the former (vikalpa), when clear options are given, the limits of choice are set most determinately: “Either do this or that, and there is no third option. This is to be distinguished from doubt.” I just want to record one very important linguistic fact here. The word “vimārsa” is used in Nyāya-Sūtra and other places simply to mean “doubt” (vimārṣasāmsayaḥ). Yet, in Kashmir Śaivism, this very word is used to mean “freedom of choice” (vimārṣaḥ svātantraṃ). Consciousness has the unique feature of being playfully self-ruled (sva-tantra) and hence exercising the powers of knowing, distinguishing, remembering, willing, and acting; and these powers are contained in its reflexive self-consciousness which is called “freedom to mirror itself in whichever way it chooses to” or vimārsa. This extension of meaning from doubt to freedom is not accidental.” Arindam Chakraborty, “Or,” in Studies in Logic: A Dialogue between the East and the West: Homage to Bimal Krishna Matilal, ed. Madhabendranath Mitra, Mihir Kumar Chakraborty, and Sundar Sarukkai (New Delhi: Sanctum Books, 2012), 41.

624 Chakraborty, 49–50.
“The disjunction between knowledge and object is precisely such a case. It may involve ignorance, most probably it does. But there is no possibility of transcending this ignorance. There is no conceivable standpoint from which one specifically of these subjectivity and object will appear as the final definite reality. What we have learnt so far belies such possibility. Subjectivity or object - this is the final disjunctive structure of reality. If this is incompleteness or indeterminacy, it has to be submitted to, as there is no way out. This notion of reality as indeterminate involves a large amount of ignorance. But it is a form of ignorance which cannot be removed.”

A disjunctive unity indissolubly and negatively relates disjunctive predicates such as knowledge/object (the subjective and objective attitude) which are distinguished and even opposed, but cannot be separated, for one seems to (negatively) involve the other. Disjunctive unities for Bhattacharyya are thus a logical way to articulate the contradictory reality of philosophical alternatives which ultimately lies in one’s belief and commitment and are related to each other via the negation of the other’s position. Daya Krishna’s answer to the question of intelligibly conceiving a unity of elements that are contradictory to each other, in his explanation of Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s logic of alternation, is elaborated in two steps: first, the unity of alternatives operates in disjunctive judgements:

“The disjunctive judgement, being a judgement, unites in itself elements which are in opposition to each other. The judgement, however, does not assert either the one or the other or both together but only the excluding relation between them which is of such a nature that if one is true, the other is false and vice-versa. The difficulty, in fact, has been felt because - so Bhattacharyya contends - almost all thinkers have presupposed that unities can only be of the conjunctive type. If the unities were only of the conjunctive type then, obviously, there could be no unities, i.e., conjunctions of incompatible elements. But if the unities can be of types other than the conjunctive then there is, at least, a possibility that even incompatible elements can form a unity.”

The ‘judgement’ indicates (as Kalidas himself explains627) that there is a distinction between the verbal enunciation and the ontological status: the disjunctive unity is a verbal attempt at

625 “This entails consequences in conceiving reality that go much further any mystic or divine approach of the ‘unknowability’ on the one hand, and the unknowable metaphysical thing-in-itself on the other hand: “This would be a form of avidyā [ignorance] deeper than any offered by a philosopher. it is an avidyā which persists even in the highest knowledge. A position like this goes beyond even the most far-reaching Mysticism. For while to Mysticism Reality is after all contacted, though in a super-ordinary attitude, the present position denies even that. To it Reality is absolutely unattainable. The mystic after all prescribes some way of approaching Reality, but here there is no possibility of even that, as the removal of this infra-primal ignorance is unconceivable. So it has to be admitted that if there is at all a Reality beyond the disjunctive indeterminacy of subjectivity and object, it is inscrutable. One may, if one likes, go further. One may hold that perhaps there is no such transcendent Reality, perhaps Reality itself is disjunctively indeterminate.” Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Philosophy), 162.


627 “In the disjunctive judgement there is a disjunctive unity of alternatives. So here also knowledge and object, or the subjective and the objective attitudes, have to be taken as alternatives forming a disjunctive unity. Each attitude is valid, but alternatively. (…) The subjective and objective philosophies are each self-complete and totally in disregard of the other. Each alternative fulfils itself in a system, and the two different systems so developing stand in such a way that from the point of view of each the other is as good as nothing. Idealism and objectivism are such alternative systems, each absolutely valid on its own ideology. There is no question of treating both as true, except verbally. (…) This view may be called ‘Alternative Absolutism’ - each is absolute but alternatively.” Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Philosophy), 153.
articulating the contradictory nature of reality that is intelligibly impossible to grasp in the experience of one subject, and to embody in one philosophical attitude. Conjunctive unities (of the type ‘A and B’) are insufficient for providing an account of the contradictory nature of reality which however is revealed in the existence of conflicting philosophical systems (expressed as ‘either A or B’). The existence of conflicting philosophical systems shows that reality does not function as conjunctive aggregate into a harmonious whole, but rather integrates contradictory elements that cannot be articulated together without one rejecting or negating the other. Disjunctive unities are by extension thus a way to articulate the different positions that are embodied by different speakers attached to one view of reality, seemingly contradictory to each other. But how does this unity operate between these systems?

“The unity of elements in a disjunctive judgement, thus, is an extremely close unity of alternatives which either actively reject each other or are, at least, completely indifferent to each other. In the wider sense of negation, they negate each other and yet form a close unity, for each is related to the negative of the other. The question, therefore, whether we can intelligibly conceive of a unity of elements which are in mutual opposition to each other, gets its answer in the affirmative. The unity, in such a case, must be conceived of as a disjunctive unity- and, at least, the disjunctive judgement is no mysterious or unintelligible affair.”

A unity of mutual opposition asserts alternatively one or the other position while the negated position remains intrinsically related by this very act of negation. It is again to be emphasized that this alternation operates at a meta-philosophical level, or in Kalidas terms, a ‘super’-philosophic level: a system cannot alternate within itself, the alternation cannot present ‘parts’ of one attitude or the other, nor combine them within the philosophical theory, according to Kalidas Bhattacharyya. In that sense, the alternation does not provide a philosophical system per se but only a logical framework for including contradictory philosophical systems. In other words, it is a method for philosophizing, philosophy itself being seen as an evolving activity of alternation. From a rhetorical perspective, this implies that we have no choice but to stand within a philosophical position while cultivating at the same time an awareness of its alternation at a super-philosophical level:

“In the disjunctive judgment there is a disjunctive unity of alternatives. So here also knowledge and object, or the subjective and the objective attitudes, have to be taken as alternatives forming a disjunctive unity. Each attitude is valid, but alternatively. So we cannot have both knowledge and object at the same time, unless of course, we utter the verbal trite that there are these two

629 See also: “Kalidas Bhattacharyya did not remain satisfied with grounding the whole philosophical enterprise of man in the search for the three absolutes which K.C. Bhattacharyya had apprehended and which, according to him, could only be seen as alternatives without the possibility of any synthesis between them. He tried to provide a logical grounding for this synthesis in the unity of disjunctive judgment which, according to him, was as fundamental as the unity in a conjunctive judgment. For him a genuine disjunctive judgment asserts a unity between alternatives which are related in such a way that in case one is asserted or actualized, the other is either positively negated and denied, or nothing is said about it, that is, whether it is real or not. The disjunctive judgment for him, then, includes both the exclusive and the non-exclusive uses of ‘or’ in the usual judgments. He has also argued for its being more fundamental than the conjunctive judgment, as, in the ultimate analysis, alternatives can only be asserted ‘alternatively’ as it would be an act of arbitrary dogmatism to assert only the one and not the other.” Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 205–6.
630 Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Philosophy), 155.
alternatives. Actual philosophy which is more than this trite is either from the subjective or from the objective point of view, not from both. The subjective and the objective philosophies are each self-complete and totally in disregard of the other. Each alternative fulfills itself in a system, and the two different systems so developing stand in such a way that from the point of view of each the other is as good as nothing. Idealism and Objectivism are such alternative systems, each absolutely valid on its own ideology. There is no question of treating both as true, except verbally. As in philosophy, we must be either Idealists or Objectivists. From each to both there is no passage in Philosophy the ultimate logic of which is alternation. This view may be called Alternative Absolutism - each is absolute, but alternatively.  

This seems to be in line with Chubb’s ‘critical philosophy’ when he argues for a meta-philosophical tool that could articulate different viewpoints and positions. This investigation of meta- or super-levels could be also another reason for an absence of philosophy ‘of’ dialogue in Daya Krishna’s philosophical writings, if we consider, like Chubb and Bhattacharyya, that dialogue as a tool is also located at a meta or super-philosophic level. I thus conceive dialogue as a platform to enable disjunctive unities with regard to truth, and alternative standpoints that enable a common articulation of contradictory views on reality. In entailing the idea of different ‘standpoints’ and a reality that can be felt as contradictory, it also leaves space for expressing and witnessing different conceptual frameworks and larger worldviews from which these standpoints originate, namely for philosophies across traditions. In such a sense, this ‘critical philosophy’, ‘super supra philosophy’ concretely applied into dialogues, is not intrinsic to any philosophical theory or system, but rather a dynamic tool and an activity for articulating theories and positions. While Chubb and Kalidas Bhattacharyya expanded on the very logic, reasoning and necessity for elaborating such a tool for the practice of philosophizing, which I use to ground a theory for Daya Krishna’s dialogical experiments, it is rather directly in the practice that Daya Krishna developed it.

631 Bhattacharyya, 153.
632 Chubb does not refer to Kalidas Bhattacharyya in his paper. Nevertheless, their account is largely in agreement, regarding the relativity of truth-statement to their philosophical systems and the need to develop an attitude to contemplate a meta-level of alternation. The strongest difference I would see lies in the fact that Kalidas Bhattacharyya, although concerned about logically grounding the metaphysical account of alternative absolutes of his father, remained embedded in a metaphysical investigation, whereas Chubb was motivated by a criticism of a the latter. The terms of the alternation, however, remain close: “In philosophical controversies the disputants use words like ‘right’, ‘correct’, ‘satisfactory’, ‘true’, without realizing that there are criterion words and so do not have uniform meaning. Thus when A says that his theory is right he really means, though he may not be aware of it, that his theory is right, when properly understood and made explicit, would similarly amount to the claim that he has worked out a point of view which is in conformity with the criterion implicit in it. But as the two criteria are different the two statements only apparently clash. In reality they merely afford evidence of the fact that the same problem can be viewed in two different ways, provided we approach it with different sets of criteria and presuppositions. The two viewpoints do not contradict each other. Each is simply an alternative to the other.” Jehangir N. Chubb, “Philosophical Arguments and Disagreement,” in Philosophical Papers of Professor J.N. Chubb, ed. H. M. Joshi (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2006), 303.
633 According to J. N. Mohanty’s observation, however, it was also practiced by Kalidas Bhattacharyya in his lectures, although not in a plural dialogical way involving participants, but as an alternation of philosophical views he would defend: “In Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s lectures during the forties and also in the two major publications of these years, there was one central thesis which he sought to amplify, illustrate and defend by showing the application in various domains and to various philosophical issues. This is the thesis that in philosophy there are, in the long run, theoretically undecidable alternatives. Between realism and idealism (…) no final decision can be made, no decisive refutation of any is possible. There are, at the end, based on commitments which are theoretically neither defensible nor refutable. As a consequence of this elaborately worked out position, Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s
Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s theory is more ambitious and far-reaching than the use I want to make of it now in a dialogical context, for it articulates the contradictory nature of reality rather than its expressions by different participants. He develops the logical alternation of knowledge and object without an explicit embodied person. He conceives philosophy itself as an alternation between object and subject in deviation to his father’s account of the alternative absolutes. For K. C. Bhattacharyya, the alternative absolutes emanate from self-consciousness itself and the problem of its reflection raised to philosophy: the relation between consciousness and object being itself problematic, the alternative absolute is thus necessary to express the different possible approaches to the absolute for self-consciousness.634 For his son, this became the alternation of philosophy and philosophical systems themselves:

“He [Kalidas] tried to provide a logical underpinning to K. C. Bhattacharya’s thought and not only developed it in a new direction but also tried to see the whole history of western philosophy from its perspective. Kalidasa Bhattacharya sees the whole history of western philosophy as built around the three alternative absolutes of K. C. Bhattacharya moving in three different directions which he called “philosophy of the object, philosophy of the subject and philosophy of the absolute”.”635

I consider here that such an alternation (in Kalidas’ sense rather than Krishna Chandra’s636) can also be an epistemological tool for dialogue in the sense of an alternation of truth-statements between different pakṣas and pūrvapakṣas among philosophical traditions. Indeed, the alternation between systems themselves is here extended to an alternation between the persons defending a system, i.e. between different philosophical positions hold in a dialogue. These positions, crossing philosophical traditions and disciplines, might be in contradiction with each other, for they express incompatible views or they do not even share a possible area of agreement. I thus limit myself in the present context to drawing consequences of this account

634 See Daya Krishna’s comment: “K. C. Bhattacharya introduced the notion of “alternative absolutes” which is almost a contradiction in terms. For, if something is absolute then, by definition, it cannot have alternatives to itself. The term ‘absolute’ was introduced in the western philosophical tradition by Hegel and since then it has generally been used in the sense in which he used it. Yet, K. C. Bhattacharya introduced this notion self-consciously to show that the postulation of an absolute was a necessity of thought to resolve a fundamental problematic question or paradox which was found in self-consciousness itself. It was the self-conscious reflection on “self-consciousness” which gave rise to philosophy and the philosophical enterprise consisted first in becoming aware of the paradox involved in self-consciousness and then, secondly, in the attempt to resolve it. As this resolution, according to him, could be attempted in different ways, the idea of an alternative absolutes was entailed by the possibility of alternative ways of resolving the problematic question posed by self-consciousness to the philosophical reflection on it.” Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 295.

635 Daya Krishna, 299.

636 For another development of the alternative absolutes of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya with Daya Krishna’s philosophy (knowledge, will, feeling, or jñāna, karma, bhakti) see Elise Coquereau, “Relational Consciousness: Subjectivity and Otherness in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy,” in Unzugänglichkeit Des Selbst. Philosophische Perspektiven Auf Die Subjektivität, ed. Filip Gurjanov (Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz, 2016), 299–325. I develop there the metaphysical account of self-consciousness’ relation to object with Daya Krishna’s philosophy in reaction and distinction to Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya.
of disjunction and alternation to articulate positions presenting different alternative theories, facing others whose positions are seemingly irreconcilable in dialogue. I therefore do not integrate here the purely logical alternation and its logical possibility but the possibility of seeing contradictions in dialogue as a potential alternation for thinking and the contribution that such an articulation could bring. I believe however that such a restricted use of Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s theory is, although insufficient for rendering a full account of his complex view, not incompatible with his own thinking. He himself refers to rhetoric in his own account, which seems to indicate that this concern was also his own, although he proceeded further into a logical direction of alternation:

“How is it possible for me to refrain from attacking others when the philosophies they offer are opposed to mine? If their ideologies contradict mine I am bound to reject them unless I am a nincompoop. (…) The best form of reconciliation is our Alternative Absolutism. Let everyone develop his doctrine from his basepoint, let him attack and reject the views of others as he must, but let him realise that the standpoints of others are also alternatively correct, that while he is understanding the world in one language there are equally other alternative languages, and that each such languages is alternatively final.

In Philosophy (which is the essence of life) thus one has to identify himself with one or other of the different alternative ideologies - for all of them cannot be accepted. Yet at the same time there must be an eye to a super-philosophic standpoint from which the different ideologies and their developments into systems of philosophy will appear in their true colour as alternatively absolute. But this super-philosophic standpoint, it should be remembered, can offer no solid content. The conjunctive attitude that comprehends several alternatives together is only verbal and as such knows nothing more than the trite that there are so many alternatives. So is the super-philosophic attitude of indifference. By itself it cannot construct a philosophy, as it has nothing to start with, no incipient idea that can develop into a system. Only after the different systems have developed from alternative standpoints can it pronounce a conjunctive judgment on them. Only then can it declare ‘There are so many alternative philosophies, each absolute in its turn, so no one has a right to condemn others as absolutely wrong, though in his own philosophic life he will have to stick to only one of these.’”

From a perspective of cross-cultural philosophies, I do not think that such an articulation recedes into the problems of a tertium comparationis (see 1.2.1), for it precisely suggests a different level of interpretation. While in comparative philosophy the problem is that in articulating two (culturally distinctive) alternatives, we pretend to extract ourselves from our own - which denies our own presuppositions - to reach a tertium or neutral point of view, Kalidas precisely argues for the impossibility of doing so. However, this impossibility does not mean the end of dialogue, but calls for cultivating another level external to the philosophies from where these alternatives can be organized as per their own truth-statements: in other terms, to accept other positions as absolute and alternatively valid. Practically for dialogue, this attitude entails the humility of accepting that, as absolute as one position can be felt, there are contradictory absolutes that are equally valid. This commitment, needless to say, itself implies the ‘presupposition’ of plurality that led him to develop such a device. It has been however

clarified in the proceeding section (5.2) that presuppositions are necessary postulates to hold a position and to articulate any view in a dialogue. They become prejudicial only when they are used to dogmatically refuse taking in consideration the other’s position. In that sense, Kalidas’ own presupposition is a self-conscious exploration of the very prejudices entailed in one’s position if we refuse to alternate with other positions.

This logical development of alternating of philosophical systems is Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s earliest contribution. It is quite interesting to notice that, towards the end of his career, he rearticulated his earlier theory in a very similar way as the detachment described by Chubb above. In the publication that I analyzed in an earlier chapter as ‘dialogue between contemporaries’ (see 3.4), i.e. a further application of samvāda in the form of papers engaging contemporary philosophers who in turn responded to the papers, Kalidas thus proceeds to answer the different papers by first reformulating his earlier theory of alternation in the light of his further developments. Four decades later639, Kalidas Bhattacharyya thus writes:

“At the far end of my philosophical career, I feel increasingly inclined to believe (…) that the alternation of ‘itself’, ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, etc. is as much a full sympathetic understanding of the positive possibility of each of these philosophies through cultivating, as far as possible, an authentic catholic attitude to each possibility as not also to not committing oneself permanently to any one of them, and thus maintaining a scrupulously neutral attitude between them. It is a sort of authentic spiritual neutrality - a sort of genuine averaging - steering a safe middle course by not committing to any of these thoughts permitting, at the same time, the possibility of every one of these - a sort of full exclusion and full inclusion in and the same attitude. This last attitude is precisely the awareness that these philosophies are only alternative philosophies, each equally acceptable and yet each to be kept at an equal distance. In short, it is to have no special philosophy of one’s own but to maintain a sort of free sympathetic aloofness from all philosophies of the absolute developed, or to be developed, anywhere in the world at any time. And this itself is no philosophy. If one likes, one may call it super-philosophy - a strict attitude of neutrality, a transcendence equidistant from every one of these.”640

This reformulation of ‘super-philosophy’ indicates a certain development tending towards a complete detachment in terms of ‘spiritual neutrality’. Kalidas initially argued for a necessary commitment within philosophy to a single absolute and a single alternative, together with the cultivation of an awareness of their alternation at a super-philosophic level. The present articulation remains quite in line with this. However, the focus shifted: the recognition of alternatives was a non-dogmatic acknowledgment of possible truths and realities required (in

639 Kalidas Bhattacharyya states that his philosophical career began around 1938 and the manuscript of Alternative Standpoint in Philosophy was ready in 1942 even if it was published in 1953. The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya in which he answered criticisms, questions and papers was published in 1985. See there the details of his philosophical journey, Bhattacharyya, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy (An Enquiry into the Fundamentals of Philosophy), 149.

640 Kalidas grounds and distinguishes at the same time such a super-philosophic attitude to Mādhyamika Buddhism, also closely related here to Chubb: “(…) the super-philosophy that I am driving at is in an important respect very much like that of the Mādhyamika Buddhists. They prescribe that we should transcend all philosophies (dṛṣṭis) and that yet this transcendence of theirs is not another philosophy co-ordinate with others. But though agreeing with them so far, we, however, differ in another important respect from them. (…) While for them all existing philosophies, including the resilient ones, are erroneous, we are rather inclined to hold that all these are correct though, certainly, we have to transcend all of them in order that we may view each in its full possibility from a super-philosophic distance. It is only then, i.e., when we view them from the super-philosophic standpoint, that we feel we must not commit ourselves to any of them.” Bhattacharyya, “My Reaction,” 152–53.
my interpretation) to engage in a dialogue with others holding incompatible positions. It differs from a detachment of all positions that are seen in alternations, holding each view temporarily. While he still maintains that there is a need to have ‘a special’ philosophy, i.e. a position - necessary to ground a philosophy -, it goes with a stronger personal commitment (sympathy) towards others, i.e. a need to articulate and defend ‘other’ or counter-positions. The equal distance between positions is expressed as a personal attitude of ‘free sympathetic aloofness’. Margaret Chatterjee comments this interpretation by distinguishing the epistemological detachment of Kalidas Bhattacharyya (as of Chubb and Daya Krishna) from a metaphysical detachment leading to liberation from the world:

“If the freedom of man shows itself par excellence in the attitude of detachment from objects (including under this rubric al possible types of accusatives) the culminating point will be a state where consciousness is turned in on itself. However Kalidas’s own stress on alternation keeps him from any dogmatic pronouncement regarding the end term of the metaphysical quest. In fact he ventures an innovative use of the līla (sportive play) idea traditionally applied to the absolute, saying that it is the philosopher who almost in a playful way approaches the absolute through various alternative paths. This image which he left with us in his latter dates (when arguments often ended in laughter on his part) is as different from that of the detached observer as it is from the stance of those who claim to have ‘realized’ Himalayan heights. Along each path, and at every rung on the scale of ascent, that is to say in multiform ways, Bhattacharyya finds evidence of what he calls the ‘spiritual’. He was never attracted by a synthetic attitude that combined disparate approaches. He was, moreover, sufficiently interested in the relations that selves bear to each other to write critically about the concept of mukti (liberation).”

The detachment via alternation cannot be a singular procedure towards liberation, which would obviously recede into an absolute or dogmatic conception. It rather corresponds to an epistemological exploration of alternatives, which, on the one hand, leaves the field of metaphysical consequences and ethical behaviors open-ended. On the other hand, it places the other at the center of the exploration rather than as a bondage to be overcome. The valuational dimension that underlies this conception is developed in the next section 6 and the ontological consequences for thinking others is 7.

Nevertheless, if alternation and such a playful detachment constitute an epistemological frame for thinking dialogue, the former remains limited to a certain extent. Although alternations enable articulating different absolutes in their very contradictions, they imply a definite and final scope, an ‘either-or’, which delimits the range of positions that can be established. Admittedly, it is necessary for philosophies to be developed by positions, as the grounds on which they stand. Similarly, a range of positions is equally required to enable any choice to be made between them. However, what Kalidas Bhattacharyya does not tell us, is how to modify and renew the range of positions, or the scope of alternations according to different cultural and historical contexts and different consciousnesses. What if the absolutes of Object, Subject and Dialectic have no equivalent elsewhere? What if they are no absolute at all in other traditions? And if they are not, does that make the alternation unnecessary or inapplicable? What if these paradigms evolve in a way that renders the alternation obsolete? Would that be impossible for

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Kalidas Bhattacharyya? I must concede that he himself also developed the alternation between different absolutes beyond object/subject/dialectic, which I have not exposed here. He came back to his father’s division of knowledge, will and feeling, for instance. Nevertheless, he does not question the development of the logic of alternation itself in these further considerations, but rather extends it to different spheres of consciousness. In that sense, he does not tell us how to create alternations, how to renew the very idea of alternation, but applies it as a model or structure.

For Daya Krishna’s dialogical perspective, however, this remains insufficiently ‘open-ended’, for as we will see in the next chapter (6.3), according to the tension between apprehension and realization, a model is itself influenced by its applications. Alternation as a logic thus cannot remain untouched by the realization of alternations in philosophies. In other words: the realization of a process has reciprocal consequences, affecting the alternations as well as the logic of alternation that underlies their articulation. The logic of alternation must itself alternate or be modified in different ways by its alternations: would that be possible? It is possible that the main contention between Daya Krishna and Kalidas Bhattacharyya lies in Kalidas’ commitment to his father’s remaining Advaitin approach committed to an idealism whose transcendentalism means an investigation of the unity of the Absolute. Plurality is for the later a verbal necessity for expressing an Absolute in each sphere of human consciousness (knowledge, will, feeling). The Absolute is thus distinct but unique. Although Kalidas is himself less committed to such a view, the influence of his father’s philosophy might have been too strong to avoid it. For Kalidas, alternatives are also the verbal necessity of a reality that remains, however, transcendentally inaccessible.

Daya Krishna thus comments:

“His [Kalidas’] last and final alternation is related to the question whether the alternative formulations that we are forced to make are merely due to the limitations not only of our intellect but also on account of our way of experiencing the world along with the manner in which we are constituted or whether it is an intrinsic and inalienable nature of reality itself. As this is an unanswerable question, we are, according to him, ultimately left with an alternation where we might choose any of the alternatives but where we can never assert on any substantive ground that any one of them alone is true.”

The indeterminateness of reality leaves further room for possible alternations and variations than in his father’s philosophy, but Kalidas nevertheless does not seem to question how his

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643 This entails consequences in conceiving reality that go much further any mystic or divine approach of the ‘unknowability’ on the one hand, and the unknowable metaphysical thing-in-itself on the other hand: “This would be a form of avidyā [ignorance] deeper than any offered by a philosopher. it is an avidyā which persists even in the highest knowledge. A position like this goes beyond even the most far-reaching Mysticism. For while to Mysticism Reality is after all contacted, though in a super-ordinary attitude, the present position denies even that. To it Reality is absolutely unattainable. The mystic after all prescribes some way of approaching Reality, but here there is no possibility of even that, as the removal of this infra-primal ignorance is unconceivable. So it has to be admitted that if there is at all a Reality beyond the disjunctive indeterminacy of subjectivity and object, it is inscrutable. One may, if one likes, go further. One may hold that perhaps there is no such transcendent Reality, perhaps Reality itself is disjunctively indeterminate.” Bhattacharyya, 162.

644 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 301.
super-philosophic structure could itself be questioned. One could object that such an attempt would proceed into an infinite regress, for it would involve a super-super philosophy that would itself requires a super-super-super philosophy, etc. However, I believe that we can, with Daya Krishna, rather understand it in terms of reciprocal consequences of the alternation. It thus does not suggest the endless elaboration of ‘super’ transcendental levels, but the ‘comeback’ in terms of reciprocal effects of the practice itself into the model.

This refusal of a transcendental unification shows that for Daya Krishna, reality is itself plural, which includes the appearing incompatibilities entailed in plurality. There is a shift from plurality in formulation (cognitive and verbal apprehension) to the realization of the contradictions that constitute self-consciousness, which has no transcendental resolution, neither in a transcendental unity nor in an indefinite reality. Thus, dialogue is not meant to solve the contradictions, but to clarify the roots of the appearing contradictions into conjointly exploring their consequences and the problems that they raise. Rather than ordering the plurality into definite alternatives, the alternatives constitute starting-points for questioning the contradictions of plurality itself. Thus, Daya Krishna comments:

“The necessity of resolution, however, is felt only because it is assumed that a pair of contradicories cannot characterize a real situation. The notions of ‘appearance’, ‘maya’, ‘phenomena’, ‘unreal’ derive all their strength from this basic assumption. The history of philosophy may be understood as a continuous struggle between those who are bent on showing contradictions in different areas of experience and those who are trying to show the inadequate nature of the analysis that leads to such a conclusion. Dialectical philosophers are no exceptions; they seek resolution of the contradiction as assiduously as those they content against. The Absolute is needed just for this reason; otherwise one would not think of it at all. Even the religious philosophers who usually tend to articulate their insights in the simultaneous assertion of pairs of contradictory propositions seek their ultimate resolution in God who is supposed to be completely real and completely ecstatic just because it has no blemish of the shadow of the opposite in itself. The concept of Alternative Absolutes elaborated in the writings of the two most original thinkers of contemporary India, K. C. Bhattacharyya and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, does not escape, in my opinion, the charge of having made this assumption. The only possible reason why the alternative absolutes cannot be asserted simultaneously is because it would involve the affirmation of a contradiction, a thought too radical even for the radical Bhattacharyyas.”

Dialogues constitute the challenge of simultaneous contradictions, for solving it would simply end the dialogue. In that sense, the contradictions enable dialogues. Positions (with their respective presuppositions) remain necessary, and their alternation in terms of detachment and witnessing the origins of thoughts is required for ‘entering’ into a dialogue with others. Without positions, no ground for argumentation is possible, and without their alternation, dogmatism and absolutism of a single truth can impede any dialogue. However, the process of dialogue overcomes alternations and positions at the same time, since not only individual positions are set in alternations, but the logic of alternations is itself called into question by the enworlded intersubjectivity of the dialogue. It is the conjunction of participants being both epistemological subjects (in Kalidas’ and Mohanty’s sense of subjectivity of the universality of consciousness)

and persons (in Mohanty’s sense, as a “concrete, corporeal entity” who is “in the world, and with others”\textsuperscript{646}, which Kalidas does not consider) which enables the very logic to be modified. Since subjectivity (as consciousness) is not only what reveals the object to itself, but also an enworlded person in interactions with Others who affect her/his way of revealing the object, the process of dialogue can provoke new ways of conceiving the object-subject relation.

This implies that not only the philosophical contents, or positions are alternating, but also the orientations, criterion (in Chubb’s definition) and the values that were in the first place determining the particular presuppositions of their philosophical positions. While the alternation is a logical device that enables the articulation of different positions, dialoguing between subjects modifies the terms of the alternation itself. Thus, in my interpretation, the logic of alternation is not entirely logical and universal, since it is also constituted by the different subjectivities in dialogue. It belongs to the ‘human knowledge’ and is in consequence characterized by the same tension as the one of the alternations. In another article, Daya Krishna writes (however without referring to the Bhattacharyyas):

“The existence of other subjects presents problems of a metaphysical kind also. (…) The dilemma is significant in the sense that every seeking of man involves in some sense an intrinsic reference to other subjects. (…) The dilemma is mirrored in the every day situation where each holds his vision to be true and yet continuously appeals to others for confirmation in argument and discussion. The intrinsic necessity for others in every seeking of man coupled with the continuous demand for essential independence from them epitomizes this situation very well.”

The others are not limited to the different alternative philosophical theories or arguments, but they also participate in the very logic of alternation, which becomes then as subjective and alternative as the positions and arguments. In this sense, ‘knowledge’ is not made of one’s consciousness and does not belong to anybody, which constitutes another firm claim of Daya Krishna when he considers knowledge formed by dialogue in his unpublished paper:

“A ‘knowledge-claim’ entertained on whatever grounds has to be submitted before others and ‘accepted’ by them before it is accepted as ‘knowledge’ even by oneself as in case others question the claim that it is knowledge, one begins to doubt oneself if it were really so. The submission before other, the ‘competent’ others, for their judgement and their ‘acceptance’ of it as ‘knowledge’ however tentative such as acceptance might be, makes knowledge lose its private character and make it a public possession in the most radical sense of the term.”\textsuperscript{647}

Participation not only implies that the theory has to be simply put into a practice, but that this very practice brings other dimensions to be included in the theory. In other terms: the confirmation and refutation is not a logical alternation of theories but also a relation to others.

\textsuperscript{646} “The person, on the other hand, is a concrete, corporeal entity who calls himself „I”, a bodily-psychic unity that is appropriated into the structure of a unitary self-consciousness. It is in the world, and with others. Its mode of being in the world is not an epistemological subject’s having a world stand over against it, but a concerned, caring, willing and acting temporally structured by systems of recalling, anticipating, and fulfilment-frustration. In the language of the Indian philosophers, the person is characterized by \textit{kārtṛtvā} and \textit{bhokṛtvā}; he is an agent and an enjoyer; his being an enjoyer and being an agent together form one total structure of mundaneity. For the person, objects (\textit{artha}) are primarily not objects (\textit{viṣaya}) of knowledge, but objects of affective-volitional concern (\textit{arthyaṭe anena}).” Mohanty, \textit{Essays on Indian Philosophy Traditional and Modern}, 75.

\textsuperscript{647} Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 1.
Thus, the freedom involved is not only the freedom to choose between alternatives, and to choose to detach oneself from one absolute, but also the contradictory relation of freedoms to others. This tension is manifested in seeking independence from others to elaborate a position of one’s own, or to seek to overcome the otherness in a transcendental resolution of liberation, while however requiring their confirmation and their refutation for grounding the very theory that allows independence from them. The contradictions are therefore not limited to the epistemological level of philosophical theories, but also imply the way these presuppositions are generated. This ‘generation’ of presuppositions occur from values that are experienced in dialogue rather than consciously apprehended. This implies further conflicts to be elucidated in the realm of dialogue, which I have classified under the name given by Daya Krishna, ‘dissatisfactions’. The unfolding of all these dimensions at once summarizes what Daya Krishna calls ‘the story of civilizations’:

“The story of civilizations is the story of this interplay between the delusion and deception superimposed by the successive definitions of reality at all levels, both of objectivity and subjectivity, and the attempts to get out of them only to get caught in some new snare or conceptual net created by the cognitive enterprise of man. (...) Each of these [entreprises, which can be cognitive, but also spiritual, aesthetic, economical, political], paradoxically, however gives rise, because of the reflexive self-conscious nature of man, to a view of self and reality which are not only at loggerheads with one another, but results in the creation of that human world which has necessarily to be self-contradictory because of this very fact. Man has to see himself in terms of all of these, including all that he knows about them even if it results in contradictions which he finds difficult to live with. The contradictions arising from the conflicting definitions which continue to persist even after one is supposed to have superceded the other provides a clue not only to the dynamics of the human situation in all its dimensions, but also to the unbelievable tragedy which permeates every aspect of it since its very inception. (...) Definitions constitute knowledge and knowledge determines the way ‘reality’ is seen, and the way reality is seen determines the way men feel and behave and act on its basis. Once, one loosens the bonds between these, one would also ‘free’ oneself from the compulsions which the uncritical acceptance of reason and the belief or ‘faith’ in the knowledge that is its result, result in.”648

6. Dissatisfactions: The Creative Deception of Reality vis-à-vis Ideality

“The realization that there is no such thing as knowledge but only knowledges and that what is thought of as knowledge or described as such in any domain is only a short-hand term describing the tentative results of a collective seeking on the part of a large number of individuals that is continuously being challenged, questioned and modified in the light of the inadequacies and imperfections that people see will change the situation in a fundamental way. It will thus see human knowledge as subject to all the weaknesses and strengths that define the human situation in its basic structural aspect.

The seeking for knowledge, however, is quite different as it makes everything, including all other seekings, its subject and hence has a supervening character unlike any other seeking of man. That is one reason why truth seems to have such a supreme value that when that is questioned, no one knows what to do in the face of that questioning. The raising of the question about the truth of anything, it should be remembered, is not a question of verisimilitude or even of veridicality but of something else that is perhaps more adequately conveyed by that which relates to the seeking itself and as the seeking cannot be separated or divorced from the one who seeks, ultimately therefore it is the seeker who becomes the central concern of all those who want seriously to think about either knowledge or truth.

To talk of the seeker is to talk of a being who is self-conscious and conscious of his inadequacy and imperfections, as that is why he seeks or wants to know and through that knowledge become something that he is not.”

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For philosophical dialogues, ‘knowledge’ is multiple. It is constituted first by each argumentation propounded by the participants, inspired by their own ‘knowledge theories’. These knowledge theories, broadly defined as śāstras, are bodies of knowledges and resources on which one draws her/his personal argumentation. These theories originate within particular cultural and historical horizons which are influencing the elaborated doctrines. These śāstric knowledges are inherited by the participants who followingly construct their individual argumentations through certain languages, conceptual structures and references. The transition from śāstric knowledge to particular positions connects the historical heritage to the present possibility of revising and questioning these resources. For instance, while a contemporary Advaitin is likely to endorse a position that articulates an argument in accordance or in refutation with classical positions found in the texts, or methods of arguing inherited from them, the possibility to ‘free himself’ (an expression regularly occurring in Daya Krishna’s texts, pointing at the activity and the process of freedom, see 6.2 and 7.3) remains to find new counter-positions. While these positions are resources for thinking, it is only the ‘act-ivation’ or the ‘realization’ of knowledge into particular arguments that avoids the closure of the tradition leading to the feeling of its authority with regard to which personal interpretations ought to be ‘true’ or not. Such an activation breaks on the one hand with the idea of philosophy to be composed by fixed and definite ‘thoughts’ (as opposed to ‘thinking’, see 2.1.1 and 3.5) and with the idea, for Sanskrit philosophy in particular, of ‘classical’ Indian philosophy about which only exegesis of the past is adequate (see 2.1.2). The past heritage is thus ‘set up on motion’ into the present, i.e. dynamically formulated and reflected upon by each participant in her/his argumentation.

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650 This section draws on an already published article of which portions are reproduced here: Coquereau, “Seeking Values in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy.”

651 See in particular the Preface by Shail Mayaram: “Daya Krishna is committed to a philosophy of freedom. Freedom is multiply constituted in his writing. It manifests as the work of consciousness emancipating itself from the world of necessity and causality and in the capacity for reflective self-consciousness. Thinking itself is an act of freedom, as the conceptual imagination seeks to distance itself from one’s inherited conceptual tradition. Freedom is also evinced in the experience of art, each form of which constitutes its own distinctive kind of freedom. In his letters, Daya Krishna refers to death as freedom. The poet, Gagan Gill, told me that she had once asked him, ‘Dayaji, don’t you want to take another birth-[since] you have known real love?’ His reply was, pyār bhī bāndhā hai (love also binds)! His ultimate quest was for complete freedom.” Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, ix.

652 I have analyzed different dimensions of counter-positions with regard to the distinction between historical and contemporary pūrva-pakṣas by retrieving examples from the Bhakti dialogue in ‘Unveiling the Historicity of Concepts: Dimensions of Pūrva-pakṣa’. I am in the present section more concerned about the implications of these distinctions for thinking the concept dialogue in relation with values than with concrete applications, which can be found in the aforementioned article, Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 194–200.

653 Of particular relevance for this section, the work of Rajendra Prasad on values and in particular his critical interpretation of puruṣārtha based on the Sanskrit texts is an example of such activation and realization. While rooting his analysis in the presentation of the classical theory of puruṣārthas, he offers critical insights for demonstrating the historical background for organizing such a structure which needs to be socially, politically and philosophically reinterpreted in today’s context. See in particular the chapter ‘Classical Indian Theory of Human Value: Some Structural Features’, Rajendra Prasad, A Conceptual-Analytic Study of Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals, History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization Levels of Reality (CONSSAVY),
This can arise in an individually conducted analysis (and Daya Krishna often refers to Pandit Badrinath Shukla, a Nyāyāyika, for his capacity of doing so, see 3.3.1). However, beyond one’s own capacities, in particular of crossing one’s philosophical horizon, such an activation rather operates in dialogues across traditions. The presuppositions entailed in each position influenced by the śāstric knowledge are then called into question by the counter-positions one has to answer to. This (ideally) results in the generation of new knowledge. Such a ‘motion’ is enabled by the individuality of each thinker, but moreover, by the intersubjectivity of the dialogue itself that exceeds the individual positions. Daya Krishna reminds us of this continuous operation that is invisibly happening in all discussions, which is felt in the most dissatisfying way in the disagreement of the other participants and in our felt frustration in view of his/her counter-positions. As mentioned in the preceeding chapter (5.3), while we are intuitively driven into thinking that the disagreement is limited to the communicational level (“s/he did not understand my point”), we refuse to admit that we have ourselves operated in terms of agreement/disagreement with another position in order to be able to communicate our position. In other words: in order to articulate a position, we have been beforehand in direct or indirect (via the reading of other texts) communication with others, with whom we agreed or disagreed. This beginningless view of dialogue thus refutes the contention of invidual and...


654 Besides numerous mentions in his letters, references to the creativity of Pandit Badrinath Shukla can be found in Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 151–55; “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy”; Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 1997, 4. See notably: “Both the Śatślokī and lecture on dehātmavāda show a great original mind steeped in the philosophical traditions of India yet, struggling to get out of the settled modes of classical Indian thought. But, it is equally clear that he is not able to throw out the metaphysical baggage which every traditional Indian thinker carries with him so as to address himself to the pure philosophical problem that he is dealing with. The creative possibilities that lie within the domains of the classical tradition of Indian philosophical thought are exhibited here as also how if those who are steeped in that tradition when challenged to think anew can do so. It may be remembered in this context that Pandit Badrinath Shukla had not only participated in the Rege experiment which has been documented and published as Samavāya, but was also the guiding spirit therein. He also had provided the leadership in the convening of the conference on Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Kashmir Śaivism in which an attempt was made to give a new direction to traditional thought in these systems. It is difficult to say how this continuous interaction with persons steeped in the western philosophical tradition contributed to the innovative experiments he made in the Śatślokī and the dehātmavāda lecture but there can be little doubt that the philosophical atmosphere he breathed in must have had something to do with it.” Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 155. Moreover, besides Daya Krishna’s appreciation, see Badrinath Shukla’s paper as well as Srinivasa Rao’s response to it, Badrinath Shukla, “Dehātmavāda or the Body as Soul: Exploration of a Possibility within Nyāya Thought,” trans. Mukund Lath, Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 5, no. 3 (1988): 1–17; Srinivasa Rao, “The Possibility of Dehātmavāda: A Critique of Pandit Badrinath Shukla,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 25, no. 1 (2008): 129–40., as well as his contribution written as a reaction to the Pune experiment, published in the same volume Daya Krishna et al., Samavāya, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, 191–213. Reproduced with further developments in Matilal and Chakrabarti, Knowing from Words. 655 This intersubjectivity touches on all the realms of consciousness for Daya Krishna: “Man “thinks” as if “knowledge” and “action” were not essentially dependent on others who are as much “subjects” and self-conscious selves as oneself. Knowledge and actions are both inter-subjective, collective enterprises, but the philosophical reflection on them systematically ignores this aspect, for if it were to do so, it would encounter a foundational “insufficiency” in the self which it is not prepared to entertain as its own self-consciousness denies it.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 139.
radical (atomistic\textsuperscript{656}) novelty of ideas, since any new insight is the outcome of a refutation or modification of a previous position, i.e. an intersubjective realization.

Now, this constitution of knowledge is ‘human’\textsuperscript{657} in the sense exposed above, since, although objective, it is emerging from the intersubjectivity. This intersubjectivity is itself the result of epistemological subjects who are also persons, i.e. ‘seekers’ of truth, knowledge and reason (see 6.2). They are however embodied and finite in a world composed of others, in which the meaning of knowledge, truth and reason and the significance that is conferred to them, is also structured by values. Values presuppose the \textit{sāstric} knowledge (as the knowledge of value-theories, whether these theories are retrieved from the Indian, Western or any other tradition), the reasoning of the values’ proponents or opponents, as well as the knower who is seeking to know them. Thus, dialogues are made of ‘seekers’ for truth(s), which includes another dimension than the epistemological one analyzed above (5): the axiological or ‘valuational’ dimension that irredeemably characterizes knowledge (of particular relevance for knowledge in dialogue). Indeed, for Daya Krishna it is the “character of ‘seeking’ that characterizes the consciousness that apprehends a value”.\textsuperscript{658} This entails another variable: not only the systematic knowledge understood as \textit{sāstra}, but the larger cultural \textit{Weltanschauung} in which it is embedded play a role in the constitution of our knowledge, which happen furthermore in the activity of the seeker for knowledge.\textsuperscript{659} G. C. Pande, a long-time friend and colleague of Daya Krishna in Jaipur, defines \textit{Weltanschauung} in relation to values as follows:

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656 See Arindam Chakrabarti’s on novelty in philosophy, commenting on Daya Krishna’s approach: “In philosophy, as Peter Strawson said, if there are no new truths to be discovered, there are the old truths to be rediscovered. Strawson’s favorite E. M. Forster quote was “Only connect!”’. Coming to recognize the perennial in the new is the best creativity that meta-conceptual thinking is capable of. Suggesting new mappings of one set of problems onto another, illuminating connections never perceived before are the creative heights that our best original thinkers can reach, effortlessly, somewhat rarely, and often surprisingly to themselves. Unexpected connections and rediscoveries of the same old issues in a different garb and context are the new stuff which philosophical creativity is made of. “There is always more pleasure to be gained from combinations than from simplicity,” says Thomas Aquinas, in his Commentary on \textit{De Anima}. Recombinations of old concepts so that one can unravel one tangle in order to discover yet another one (this-tangled-string-with-an-unfindable-end metaphor is taken by Daya Krishna from Mirza Ghalib, his favorite Urdu poet), is the essence of philosophical creativity.” Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” 22.

657 The anthropocentric character of knowledge, already analyzed in the last chapter, is furthermore commented on by S. S. Barlingay in his article ‘Value, Values and Value Systems’: “What I am interested in pointing out is that in the ‘value-object’ complex, this valuational element, which makes the object valuable or values is itself anthropocentric in character, that the anthropocentric objects themselves are further subjected to valuation, which, in its turn, is anthropocentric, that the anthropocentricity itself operates at different levels and the ‘objects’ are peculiarly modified, more than once, by the phenomenon of anthropocentricity.” Surendra Sheodas Barlingay, “Value, Values and Value Systems,” in Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, 6 (Pune: Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications, 1983), 173–74.

658 Daya Krishna, \textit{Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations}, 262.

659 G. C. Pande is perhaps, among Daya Krishna’s peers, the one who emphasizes the most the interrelation between cultures and values: “Values are immediate objects of self-conscious individual experience. The means to such experience and their knowledge as also reflections over the process may also be called values in a secondary sense. The knowledge and experience of the individual enter social communication and tradition in the form of symbols. In this sense the world of culture is a world of symbols expressive of knowledge and experience evolved in the process of value-seeking. Culture emerges as a revelation in the individual psyche and enters social tradition creatively as a symbol. The determinants of culture thus lie not only in the diverse ‘vehicles’ in terms of which consciousness attains self-consciousness, but in the dialectical interplay of seeking, experiencing, reflection, symbolizing and communication. The understanding of culture involves understanding the working of ideal
“As an operative idea of life as a whole it [Weltanschauung] enters into the making and working of institutions. As faith it guides the individual person’s quest for what is right and authentic, what constitutes excellence and the ultimate good. As a fragmentary glimpse of cosmology and anthropology, a metaphysic, essential but without formal definitions and system, it functions as the matrix of fundamental suppositions for the thinkers of the age. This basic faith or Weltanschauung itself springs from an intuitive vision or revelation of an essentially spiritual character which is inseparable from praxis and being expressed symbolically enters into the social tradition. Vision (vidyā), praxis (sādhanā), tradition (āgama), structure of norms and principles of practice (dharma and nīti) constitute the underlying basis of a culture or a distinctive macro-society.”

Weltanschauung thus defined emphasizes the relation between knowledge of values, values and their context. This relation is not conceived in terms of causality nor historical relevance between śāstra and puruṣārtha, but as an interrelation in which one cannot be separated from the other. This implies recognizing the “ever making himself” dimension of man, i.e. the lack of finality of his consciousness and what this consciousness apprehends, as well as the nexus of values constituting the direction and orientation (or in Chubb’s terms, the criterion) through which s/he is ‘becoming’ and ‘knowing’ further:

“Man is, perhaps like everything else, in the process of ‘becoming’, but this ‘becoming’ is unique as it is determined not so much by conditioning and causal factors around him, but by the way and the direction he wants them to ‘become’ and ‘change into’.”

So conceived, ‘seeking’ knowledge is both a necessary feature for dialogue (understood as motivation to ‘enter’ in dialogue for its participants) and a reason for its unendingness (positively formulated as the open-ended character of dialogues, since ‘seeking’ disaffirms ‘reaching’; negatively formulated as the reason for fallibility and revision, since ‘seeking’ introduces something that is not actualized and can thus not be said to be ‘true’). In Sanskrit terms, it translates what Daya Krishna interprets of the concept puruṣārtha, introduced in 4.2 as a pole in tension with śāstras. While śāstras are characterized as ‘thought’, i.e. definite body of systematized knowledge, puruṣārtha as goal of life and value, indicates the ‘seeking’ towards something beyond, something that ‘ought to be’ and is, however, not. It is not ‘yet’, but this moreover implies that even when it is realized, it will not become what it was thought to be, since ‘seeking’ precisely indicates something unfulfilled. Thus, what ‘ought to be’ does not reach conformity with what ‘what is’. This tension pushes the dialogue forward as a quest for truth and collective knowledge-enterprise, generated by the fact that what is around us in reality


660 Pande, “Culture and Cultures,” 42.
661 “To understand a causal sequence, you always have to move backwards. Some thing which comes after is explained fully by some thing which preceded. The alternative to causation is chance. In nature we have chance or cause. On the other hand, living experience calls for an end, for destiny. The spiritual activity, the activity of the mind, is intent on the realization of some ideals which is not actual at all. Here the apprehension of actualities is sought to be brought into some relationship with what is non-actual, ideal. For the human psyche the ideal is the proper clue to the real, far more than the actual. If the actual falls short of the ideal, that is not a defect of the ideal, but of the actual. In seeking the real, man seeks the ideal, seeks to somehow bring it into the world of actuality, to understand the actual in terms of the ideal. This means that the life of the spirit constitutes an evolving process, which has an orientation.” Pande, Consciousness, Value, Culture, 25.
662 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 263.
663 Daya Krishna, 251.
is not (at least not completely) what it ought to be, and/or what we apprehended it to be. This gap between reality and value and between intellectual apprehension and empirical realization is what I called dissatisfaction and expresses the potential dynamic of dialogue at study in this chapter. The dissatisfactions arising from this gap further indicate the inner relation between the axiological and the epistemological levels. To take in consideration knowledge as the result of these interactions between śāstras and puruṣārtha is necessary for Daya Krishna on the one hand to underline the dynamic of knowledge, which renders knowledge inconclusive, and on the other hand to signify the plurality of contexts in which knowledge is created, which can enable simultaneous contradictory and yet ‘equally valid’ knowledge theories. Both these aspects, namely the lack of finality and the multiple truth-statements, are crucial to think knowledge elaborated in dialogues across philosophical traditions.

Such a conception has implications for conceiving participants of a dialogue as ‘seeker of knowledge’ rather than ‘beholders’ of it with the potential creativity that it opens to explore further questions (6.2). Indeed, values are relevant insofar as they ‘orientate’ the participants towards the significance to which their argumentations are bound, as well as towards the definition of the criteria, dimension and horizon in which the ideas and argumentations arise. Furthermore, values also impact the participants’ dialogical engagement in providing motivations for participating, and also in influencing the way they ‘seek’ for knowledge. Broadly conceived, values define the modality and attitude of the participants with which the arguments are made. Moreover, values also imply that we can conceive of dialogue itself as a tension between apprehension and realization. Indeed, the theory entailed in the apprehension and the practice implied in the realization reciprocally create the dynamics of its open-endedness (6.3). Such a tension explains a certain ‘ideality’ latent in each theory of dialogue in contradistinction to the limits, and sometimes the failures encountered in the case of concretely organized ‘dialogues’, which, although carefully planned, can leave the feeling of a missed encounter, a non-dialogue that reached nowhere (see the example Derrida and Gadamer’s encounters in 1.1.2, which although probably planned as ‘dialogue’, turned out not to be one). These different aspects, i.e. first the valuational conception of participants of a dialogue as seekers of knowledge and the implication of such a conception to understand knowledge, and second the intermingling of theory and practice understood as the confrontation of the valuational dimension of the ‘ought to’ with regard to the concrete ‘is’ with regard to dialogue, will be studied in the following two sections. But this tension between apprehension and realization has first an effect for conceiving ‘values’ (as puruṣārtha) themselves. Values can be also the object of reflection of dialogue, in which case the participants as ‘seekers’ in the dialogue (defined as valuational enterprise) reflect on what values mean. At all these levels, the same ‘dissatisfying’ tension applies between apprehension and realization, although with different (interconnected) implications.

To define values first, let us start by considering values as objects of knowledge and how far engaging in dialogues is possible and needed to think values. The gap between apprehension
and realizations originates from the paradoxical dissociation between values and realities, which are intrinsically related:

“The term ‘real’ arises only because we find ourselves in situations where we find that things are not as we had taken them to be and that this discrepancy matters to us in some way or other. It is then that the distinction between the real and the unreal arises and we tend to feel that we should get away from that which is unreal and seek or find the real alone.”

The problem can be analyzed with the assimilation of their antonyms, namely ‘unreal’ and ‘unvaluational’, i.e. what is not real has no value. In consequence, the ‘highest’ reality corresponds to the ‘highest’ value, for which one ‘ought’ to free herself/himself from māyā and illusion. In Daya Krishna’s words:

“The distinction between real and unreal, drawn in whatever terms, usually involves the imperative that one ought to seek the one and avoid the other. The linkage with value at this point seems obvious. The unreal, however, is not just non-existent and thus has to be ascribed some sort of reality. This, in various ways, is the central headache of all metaphysics, and its intellectual insolubility is designated by the term māyā in Indian thought. However, whatever may be the being of the unreal, or whatever the ontological status we ascribe to it, it is usually considered as less valuational or even positively disvaluational in comparison with that which is regarded as real. The ideas of value and reality are thus closely associated.”

In classical Indian terms, this implies that puruṣārtha understood as ‘goal of life’, or “what is desired by man” are universal and can be found in any societies. Following Hiriyanna, they are defined as higher values for a self-reflecting subject. They are what allows us to distinguish both the self-perfection of man as opposed to other creatures and at the same time man’s sense of ‘ought’ as opposed to what he ‘is’. However, for Daya Krishna, the contents of

664 See the chapter ‘Reality and Value’ (1952) and the article ‘Value and Reality’ (1965) respectively in Daya Krishna, Nature of Philosophy, 109–50; Daya Krishna, The Art of the Conceptual, 179–86.


666 N. V. Banerjee (Daya Krishna’s supervisor) also conceives our way to approach duty and obligation (the axiological domain) in negative terms, which he retrieves from the Indian classical traditions and summarizes as follows: “The problem as stated above indicates that the highest aim of man’s empirical life is the undoing of thing, viz., the effect of Ignorance rather than the doing of anything. In other words, it is negative rather than positive.” Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, Concerning Human Understanding, Essays on the Common-Sense Background of Philosophy (London: George Allen And Unwin Ltd., 1958), 261–62.


669 See also Rajendra Prasad: “The Sanskrit word for an object of a human being’s desire is puruṣārtha. In fact, puruṣārtha, as Dhamottara analyses it in his Nyāyabinduṭṭhā, means puruṣasya arthah, artha of a human being. Artha from the root arth means in it an object of arthān. Arthānā means a desire, wish, intention, etc. Thus puruṣārtha literally or etymologically, means an object of a desire, an objective, a goal, i.e. that which a human being aims at, wants or desires to have, a purpose he wants to fulfill, etc. In its linguistic meaning, therefore, there is no restriction on the concept of an object, or on that of a desire, or on that of a person or human being an object of whose desire it is. Obviously, then, puruṣārtha means any object of any desire of any human being.” Rajendra Prasad develops then further to the semantical signification into the historical subtle developments of the idea; nevertheless, it is helpful to begin with the general definition and overarching structure to understand Daya Krishna - and Rajendra Prasad himself - argumentation for an open-texture of the different puruṣārthas included in the theory. Prasad, A Conceptual-Analytic Study of Classical Indian Philosophy of Morals, 206.

670 Hiriyanna, Indian Conception of Values, 6–8.
what one sees as ‘value’ (purusārtha\textsuperscript{671}), and in particular the hierarchies and orders between different contents, are specific and subject to changes.\textsuperscript{672} This sense of hierarchy is typically

\textsuperscript{671} Daya Krishna provocatively entitled his main contribution to the classical Indian theory of purusārtha ‘The Myth of the Purusārtha’ in continuation of his exposition of the presuppositions contained in the interpretations of classical Indian philosophies (‘Three Myths about Indian Philosophy’; ‘The Myth of the Prasthāna Traya’). He aimed to bring attention to the fixation of the tradition that led to ‘blindly’ accept presuppositions as immutable axioms. Rajendra Prasad, who agrees on the general undertaking of this project and on the necessity to creatively critique the traditions, nevertheless suggests not to misunderstand Daya Krishna’s title ‘Myth of the Purusārtha’: “‘Purusārtha’ being a word of ordinary language and therefore a word in current usage, meaning in virtue of its sheer grammar an object of desire, the concept of a purusārtha cannot be a myth. It cannot be, because the concept of an object of desire, which it means, is not a myth. It is not, because there are, in fact, a large number of things which are objects of human desires. DK entitles his essay in the book ‘The Myth of Purusārtha’ which implies that for him purusārtha-s, objects of desire, are mythical. But this is palpably false. To attribute to a philosopher of his calibre this kind of error may appear unfair. Therefore, I have suggested that he intends to call the theory of purusārtha-s, and not the concept of a purusārtha, a myth.” Rajendra Prasad, “Daya Krishna’s Therapy for Myths of Indian Philosophy,” \textit{Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research} 32, no. 3 (December 2015): 368, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-015-0018-6.

\textsuperscript{672} The contestation of the commonly seen hierarchy between the different contents of the purusārthas as well as their modifications according to the contexts is a crucial critique of the contemporary reinterpretations, in which Indian philosophers manifest the relevance of the theory for thinking values today, if and only if the theory can be adapted to these different contexts. Philosophers and colleagues of Daya Krishna such as K. J. Shah and R. Sundara Rajan thus consider the necessary interrelations of the four purusārthas for constituting human life, and Sundara Rajan emphasizes a conception of purusārtha as a transcendental a priori framework within which the contents must be subject to changes. See K. J. Shah on the hierarchy: “Our discussion of the sciences has taken their goals to be interactional, not hierarchical. Is there a mistake here, or does the hierarchy of the traditional four goals need to be understood differently from what is usual? I think that the latter is the case. We must realise that artha will not be a purusārtha unless it is in accord with kāma, dharma and mokṣa; kāma in turn will not be kāma unless it is in accord with dharma and mokṣa. Equally mokṣa will not be mokṣa without the content of dharma; dharma will not be dharma without the content of kāma and artha. The four goals, therefore, constitute one single goal, though in the lives of individuals the elements may get varying emphasis for various reasons.” K. J. Shah, “Of Artha and the Arthaśāstra,” in \textit{Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer ; Essays in Honour of Louis Dumont}, ed. Triloki N. Madan, New ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988), 59. See also Sundara Rajan, who prefers articulating the hierarchy and variability through a Kantian systematic expression: “What they [the purusārthas] define is the transcendental a priori framework of human life and to this extent, considered purely in their purely a priori or ‘formal’ aspect, they have a universality and necessity about them. (…) But this does not mean that the particular content or significance which goes into them the specific ‘material’ interpretation of this framework also must be necessary and invariant. Indeed, the content is variable and relative contingent upon a host of other historically determined factors, social, cultural and temperamental.” R. Sundara Rajan, “The Purusharthas in the Light of Critical Theory,” \textit{Indian Philosophical Quarterly} 7, no. 3 (1979): 342–43. Mention of the appreciation of their interpretations by Daya Krishna can be found in Daya Krishna, \textit{Indian Philosophy}, 1997, 4–5. Furthermore, it seems to be a possible point of concordance between contemporary Indian philosophers and Western Indologists (South Asian Studies), at least if we consider W. Halbfass as epitomizing this tendency is his appreciation of Daya Krishna’s critique, which concludes his analysis on ‘Being Human and Goals of Life’ (‘Menschsein und Lebensziele’). “Daya Krishna hat den ‘Mythos der purusārthas’ kritisiert und bemängelt, daß die traditionellen Listen des \textit{trivarga} und des \textit{caturvarga} unvollständig seien und namentlich ‘den eigenständigen Leben der Vernunft’ (‘the independent life of reason’) nicht den gebührenden Platz und Wert einräumen. Dies mag in der Tat der Fall sein. Andere Einteilungen, andere Wertsetzungen sind nicht nur möglich, sondern auch, außerhalb der indischen Tradition, historisch belegt. (…) So viel jedenfalls ist klar, daß die indische Lehre von den Lebenszielen bzw. den Entwurfshorizonten der menschlichen Existenz nicht nur ein Phänomen von erheblichen kultur- und geistesgeschichtlichen Rang ist, sondern uns zugleich auch auf grundsätzliche menschliche Existenzmöglichkeiten hinweist und nach wie vor zum philosophischen Nachdenken und Weiterdenken einlädt.” Original Text. My translation: „Daya Krishna assailed the ‘myth of the purusārthas’ and criticized that the traditional lists of the \textit{trivarga} and the \textit{caturvarga} would be incomplete and not acknowledge the place and the value of the independent life of reason. This might indeed be the case. Other classifications, other sets of values are not only possible, but also, beyond the Indian tradition, historically indicated. (…) In any case, it is evident that the Indian doctrine of the aims in life and accordingly of the projecting horizons [Entwurfshorizonte] of the human existence is not only a phenomenon of considerable value for cultural and intellectual history. At the same
manifested in terms of ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ values, which is exemplified in the classical Indian context by the significance of mokṣa (self-perfection) with regard to the three other values, namely artha (wealth), kāma (erotic desire, by extension desire in general), and dharma (virtue). The hierarchy indicates also conflicting conceptual relations between the different contents since they display different ‘dimensions’ of human life. Of particular relevance in this context is the combination between the ‘highest’ consideration of mokṣa and the denial of the implications that it implies for the other values. Indeed, in Daya Krishna’s interpretation, “the addition of mokṣa as the fourth and final end of human seeking and striving was not a fulfilment of the original three, but ultimately their denial or negation”. This is easily understandable since mokṣa is defined as the ultimate reality and the liberation from illusion (that is, from the worldly reality, or vyavahāra in Daya Krishna’s use). From this follows that mokṣa is precisely the absolute union between reality and ideality. However, rather than negation or completion (in a unity), Daya Krishna emphasizes the reciprocity of this ideality time, it also makes us aware of fundamental human possibilities of existence and still invites us to philosophical reflection.” Wilhelm Halbfass, “Menschen und Lebensziele. Beobachtungen Zu Den Puruṣārthas,” in Hermeneutics of Encounter: Essays in Honour of Gerhard Oberhammer on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, ed. Francis X. D’Sa and Mesquita Roque, Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 20 (Vienna: Gerold & Co - Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 134–35.

673 This does not deny any modification throughout the history of Indian philosophy, to which also Daya Krishna refers Daya Krishna, “The Myth of the Puruṣārthas,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1986). It rather underlines the wide acceptance and relevance that they occasioned. It therefore questions “whether, if the Indian tradition is to be believed, they comprehend meaningfully all the goals that men pursue or ought to pursue in their lives.” Daya Krishna, 1.


675 Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006, 7.

676 See Daya Krishna’s invitation to actively engage in ‘today’s world’; “To end, I think that as a civilization, we are suffering from nostalgia. We are thinking of the past, of the Golden Age of India, when the ātsis walked around and meditated, when the ātman was sought and the ātman-Brahman identity was taught, when the bhaktis were singing their songs and engaged in kirtan, when people were talking of sāmarasya between Śiva and Sakti. We live in a private world; we live in a nostalgic world. We live in a world that is very strange. When I talk to people, they seem to be unaware of what is going on. They know something of what economics is doing, they know something of what politics is doing, but they do not believe in the reality of politics and economics. For them, these realms are unreal or belong merely to the vyavahārīc realm. Imagine! With this one word, vyavahāra, one may reject everything. But after all, the vyavahāra matters!” Daya Krishna, Civilizations, 114–15. See also Daniel Raveh’s section “Twisted and perverted to suit narrow sectarian caste-interests of a society” in Daniel Raveh, “Daya Krishna on Social Philosophy [Forthcoming],” in Social Theorizing in Contemporary India: Critique, Creativity and Transformations (New York: Springer, 2019).
with the common reality: reality is not simply opposed to ideality, and facts and actions opposed to values, but what we consider as values is affected by this tension, as well as what we realize. In that sense, values are real and unreal, for once they become real, they stop being values and become ‘acts’ that never correspond to the expectations that were set in their ideal conception:

“The postulation of the reality of values arises from the enterprise of human action, which seeks at a self-conscious reflective level ideals which perpetually question that which is present. The dilemma which the postulation faces is the simultaneous ascription of reality and unreality to the value which exercises such a continuing formative influence on action and yet exercises this just because it is not actual. The question whether a value when actualized is actual is equally difficult to answer either way. In an obvious sense, if it is really actualized, it should be called ‘actual’ - for, what else could the term ‘actualization’ mean? Still, it is equally clear that what actually exists is the things or the events or the states of affairs and not the value in any residual sense of the term. Also, nothing seems to be added to the valueness of the value by the fact that it exists also - whatever may be meant by the term ‘exists’ when applied to value.”

Rather than postulating a dichotomy between values and reality, one should conceive values as a bridge between what is and what ought to be, since they are the direction and orientation between reality and ideality. In Sanskrit terms, it could be related to the difference between siddha (what is already there – something already accomplished) and sadhya (what has to be realized – something to be caused in the future). Thus, while moksha seems to ‘resolve’ the problem in uniting reality and ideality, Daya Krishna is, once again, not ready to ‘solve’ the issue, but rather to question the presupposition that this ‘solution’ entails, and in particular, to explore this tension as an opportunity for engaging again in the debates offered by the traditions and further in the political consequences that remain unquestioned by the positions within this debate.

While moksha could be ‘one’ possible value, the sense of absoluteness in the prevalence given to liberation remains highly problematic insofar as it denies the worldly dimension of human’s life. Thus, Daya Krishna criticizes the hidden consequences of such a solution, in particular the above quoted denial of the worldly others in this ‘ideal reality’. In the division between artha, kāma, dharma and moksha, the first two are embedded into a social context. In Daya Krishna’s definition,

“desire or kāma may thus be taken as the generalized term for all that man may aim for, except the desire to get rid of all desires, or rather, of the act of desiring itself. But artha, then, may be thought of as all that which in a generalized way is the means of satisfying kāma, that is, whatever man may desire.”

The other pair, namely dharma (virtue) and moksha (self-perfection) were extensively commented on and analyzed throughout Indian philosophy. In general, the former literally

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678 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 254–55.
679 Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and Polity, 55. See also Rajendra Prasad’s criticism of Daya Krishna specific interpretation of artha and kāma in Prasad, “Daya Krishna’s Therapy for Myths of Indian Philosophy,” 367.
means “what holds together” and composes the basis of the social and moral order, while the latter is, as already seen, rather preoccupied with self-realization and self-perfection. While the interpretation of how the other is exactly integrated into the dharmic order remains open for discussion, the presence of the other within dharma is not discussed: “Dharma, even in the most minimal sense, involves some awareness of the ‘other’ and his or her claims on oneself. This invariably not only takes one away from oneself, but also disturbs the equanimity and equipoise of one’s being, even to the little extent that one may have it.” Thus, the prevalence of mokṣa over the three further values lessens in particular the significance of others, notably duties towards others entailed in dharma. Notwithstanding the complex and variegated internal developments of these concepts, they overall delineate a classification of particular contents elevated into a commonly accepted general division of values. Thus, what he denounces is not the selection of these particular values as ‘values’, that is, what they singularly mean, nor even the delimitation entailed in the division, but the prevalence and the hierarchy of such an organization of value-contents. In other words, he sees a confusion between value-structure and value-contents, i.e. to consider first puruṣārtha to be composed of the exclusive addition of artha, kāma, dharma and mokṣa, and secondly within this combination, to commonly restrict mokṣa as the ‘highest’ of all. This exhorts Daya Krishna to carefully examine the hierarchy (and the powers) at stake in the organization of values provided in the classical systems of Indian philosophies in the consequence that they imply for thinking the social reality today - that is, how relevant they can still be.

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681 Although dharma (virtue, duty) is supposed to imply the moral perspective and with it, the normative aspect of conducting action towards others, Daya Krishna offers however a critical insight regarding its conception. He points at the paradoxical self-construction underlying the assumed other-directed normativity. Dharma means in his interpretation less an other-centric concept than a conscious-ness-centric concept focusing on the effects of one’s actions, rather than on the actions of the other, or on the way of acting towards the other. “Thus, instead of being concerned with the ‘consciousness’ and ‘self-consciousness’ of others and how one’s actions affect them, one begins to be concerned with the effects that actions have on one’s own consciousness.” Daya Krishna, *The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and Polity*, 27–28.

Daya Krishna grounds his argument on the Gītā in this text following the above quote (op. cit., p.28): “The Gītā is the classic example of this. The discussion of action contained in the Gītā seems to suggest that the consequences of one’s actions on others are irrelevant if they do not adversely affect one’s own state of consciousness. And, if per chance one has achieved a state of consciousness either through God’s grace or personal sādhanā or past karmas or all of these together, it does not matter what one does or how it affects others. See also on this topic Daya Krishna, “The Myth of the Puruṣārthas,” 7–8; Daya Krishna, *The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and Polity*, 58–61.
683 I have analyzed this idea more precisely in Coquereau, “Seeking Values in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy.”
684 Daya Krishna’s ‘Shimla lectures’ are the most eloquent for formulating this concern: “Let me conclude with the following observation: we think that the so-called sakṣhatkara or anubhava, or the realization of the saints, the self-realized souls, is the ultimate thing about consciousness. I would like to suggest that this is a result of our conditioning. We were born in this civilization, so this is our belief. However, it is not true! The self-realizations of the past, in different civilizations - after all, mysticism is not confined to India alone - are not completely irrelevant, but they've totally lost their monopoly. The past should not hold one. One should learn from the past, get inspiration from the past; the past should be used, valued and respected, not rejected like in the West [a theme developed in the next chapter], but let one not be identified with the past. Let one not say that everything that has to be achieved in the field of consciousness has already been achieved. The future is open!” Daya Krishna, *Civilizations*, 88–89.
The fixity of these value-contents elevated as universal and timeless values raises two interconnected problems of relevance for dialogue, which I want to elucidate now. The first consists in the immutable ‘authority’ of their establishment that hinders the possibility of critical discussions. The second concerns the political organization that results from the authority of a single value-structure. In view of my previous discussion on the foundation of positions, a dialogue is defined as an investigation into the unquestioned presuppositions of knowledge with the task of witnessing their origins and exposing alternatives. In this context, while ‘tradition’ is seen as a resource and the ‘traditional’ concepts and viewpoints considered as necessary and actively being part of the dialogue, they cannot do so ‘authoritatively’, in which case no discussion would even be possible. It then becomes a simple transmission (which does not mean that transmission has no part in dialogue, but in Daya Krishna’s view, it operates via a critical engagement). For values, this difference is of greater importance, because the closeness of tradition raises the problem of the adequacy of values that are inherited from a particular tradition and further applied to different contexts in different times. This asynchronous state between historical conception and actual realization of values results in the problem of how to ground values on historically fixed theories, in particular if theories and practices are reciprocally influencing each other.

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685 Daya Krishna sees the combination of both these problems in the mokṣa-debate, if mokṣa is essentially related to the definition of ‘Indian philosophy’ (in general) since posing such a relation a priori impedes any debate on whether mokṣa can be equated with the goal of Indian philosophy in general or not. This, a posteriori, is a reason of exclusion of Indian philosophy outside India where philosophy is defined differently, in particular without such a goal: “The first and foremost question that has engaged all those who have been seriously concerned with the so-called ‘philosophical’ tradition in India relates to the issue as to how it can be regarded as ‘philosophy’ proper when it is supposed to be primarily concerned with mokṣa, i.e., liberation from the very possibility of suffering, which is a practical end par excellence and has hardly anything theoretical about it. To this is added the consideration as to how any cognitive tradition can be regarded as genuinely philosophical that accepts the authority of revelation or of some super human authority that is supposed to have an over-riding authority over both reason and experience. In fact, the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies officially underwrites the necessary relationship of Indian philosophy with mokṣa, and maintains that the former cannot be understood without the latter. It is then no wonder that Indian philosophy is not taught in the departments of philosophy of most Western universities, for neither the students nor the teachers in these departments are presumably seeking mokṣa. The relegation of Indian philosophy to departments of Indology and its effective segregation from all active philosophical concerns of the day speaks for itself. The other side of the same coin is attested to by the so-called revival of interest in Indian philosophy on Western campuses in the wake of interest in such subjects as Transcendental Meditation, Yoga, etc.” Daya Krishna, “Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be,” 2011, 61.

686 G. C. Pande considers that the “basic determinants of identity have to be sought in their systems of values and symbols”, which include religion and social ethics (primary value) and language, ritual and art as their symbolic systems. Interestingly, communication plays the major role in distinguishing and relating cultures thus defined, and he immediately continues arguing in favor of “creative continuation” of the tradition: “Cultural identity in this sense tends to be circumscribed by the barriers of communication. The Arabs, for example, had no difficulty in learning science from the Greeks and Hindus, but there was an obvious barrier as far as communication in the sphere of religion was concerned. It is easy to multiply such examples. The contact of India with the West since the nineteenth century is itself illustrative of the difference in communication between different levels of culture. In fact, the awareness of Indian culture in the modern sense arose from the encounter. Different approaches to the discovery and exposition of Indian culture arose naturally and the present crisis of cultural identity in India may itself be traced to the continued effort to distinguish the essential from the inessential in the cultural tradition so that it may be understood as a creative continuation with contemporary relevance rather than as a dead burden on its way to the scrap heap of time.” Pande, “Culture and Cultures,” 58.
For Daya Krishna, it is the challenging task of critical dialogue to ‘map’687 the values that are present at a particular time in a particular civilization and to expose their unquestioned ‘legitimacy’ and ‘sovereignty’ which are, in fact grounded in ‘beliefs’ and presuppositions. This task of critical engagement is not restrictive to classical Indian systems, although Daya Krishna considers their authorless, beginningless revelatory character as an obstacle for dialogue. In the next section (6.2), the ‘attitude’ that one adopts when regarding texts of a certain traditions as perfect and final is discussed in contradistinction to the attitude of ‘seeking’ knowledge from the point of view of individual participants in dialogue. From a structural perspective of values, critical discussions have a crucial role to actualize the classical texts into contemporary resources, which can be further used for grounding certain values into political institutions.

Thus, critical discussions on values can be useful for political sciences and philosophy in general if we take as a starting point the dissatisfaction felt between the political realizations and the intellectual apprehensions which orientate the former. Questioning the discrepancy between concrete institutions and theories can lead to a critical investigation of the values themselves which direct the theories. As Daya Krishna notices, the political sciences and philosophy have rather been preoccupied with analyzing the foundations of sovereignty and the legitimacy of the law, rather than unveiling the immanent values to cultures. These values, however, actually ground the orientation for establishing particular forms of political regimes and are expressed in singular laws. Thus, political sciences have been rather concerned with legitimizing already existing institutions relying on a set of ‘given’ values rather than questioning how they at first emerged according to these immanent values, confirming them rather than questioning them. In doing so, however, we are exposed to defend ‘our’ values against others (of a different time or a different culture) rather than communicate the structural nexus that enables them at the first place. He thus writes on political analysis:

“Political science was first preoccupied with the theoretical analysis of the concept of sovereignty, it was first devoted to describing the different forms through which intermediate this sovereignty can be or has been exercised. Since Aristotle, thinkers did not stop wondering about the foundation of the sovereignty and the law - if there are some - of the transition from one political form to another. But if the problem of power takes precedence over political thought, the one of the legitimate ratification of the exercise of this power was never far away. Whether this legitimate ratification was founded in a ‘divine right’, a ‘general will’ or a ‘social contract’, the question was always the one of the axiological foundation, of the justification of the plain fact of a coercive power. (…) However, the nature of values in politics has been so rarely specified that the comparison between different regimes, as well as the one between the different forms taken by a same regime at different times, has been hindered by the absence of a clear notion of the variables at stake, variables which would enable to express these variations. Of course, we can ask ourselves, if, from a practical point of view, this is really necessary: but it would be asking the question wrongly. Indeed, the question is not to arbitrarily pose some ‘set’ of values and to judge all societies according to them, but to draw the values

687 This expression refers to Daya Krishna’s second chapter, ‘Mapping the Field: Illusions, Temptations and Possibilities in the Enterprise of Understanding Civilizations’, of Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 87–158.
that are already effectually present, immanent to the domain of political thought, of which it is important that researchers become aware.”

In this sense, the traditions present a resourceful ‘starting point’ to start ‘mapping’ the different values, but they cannot draw the legitimacy of the political instances in which they were located nor the authority that these political instances or the social forms that lived in these instances granted them from the values they propound. Rather, the idea of these values must be investigated to explain the existence of these political instances and their social forms. To avoid absolutizing any given legitimacy and authority, analogously as to avoid absolutizing one form of knowledge by those who have more power in the epistemological realm, a critical discussion must here also involve alternative viewpoints who do not belong to the legitimated and authoritative tradition.

Thus, the necessity of critical discussions more generally matters in Daya Krishna’s context where the ideas of subjectation and alienation to other imposed values operates to such an extent that the very idea of a traditional reception is disrupted. Which values and which hierarchy of values are legitimate, and which set of values generated in such postcolonial societies? The desi ones only? But what do they even signify in postcolonial societies? The political strategy hiding between such delimitation and legitimacy-claims shows how such questions can easily degenerate into ‘using’ one’s Weltanschauung in order to legitimize one’s personal views by turning them into ‘value-contents’, contradicting the very meaning of values while giving them the appearances of the name. Given the far-reaching consequences of such strategies, it is nevertheless necessary to mention deviated uses of the idea of ‘values’. Roughly formulated, the tension is epistemologically the same in the case of values and of presuppositions (see chapter 5). Our apprehensions are determined by beliefs that we however involuntarily consider as certain and absolutely determined. In Daya Krishna’s words:

“Social reality is the sort of reality where ‘beliefs’ in varying degrees are an integral part of the reality itself. They may constitute it wholly or partially, but there can hardly be any social reality in the making of which beliefs do not play any role at all. (…) Socio-cultural reality is

My translation. The text is issued from a French translation of Daya Krishna’s paper, the original version of which could not be located. French version: “La science politique s’est préoccupée au premier chef de l’analyse théorique du concept de souveraineté, elle s’est attachée à décrire les différentes formes par l’intermédiaire desquelles cette souveraineté peut être ou a été exercée. Depuis Aristote, les penseurs n’ont cessé de s’interroger sur le fondement de la souveraineté et sur la loi - s’il en existe - du passage d’une forme politique à une autre. Mais si le problème du pouvoir a tenu la première place dans la pensée politique, celui de la sanction légitime de l’exercice de ce pouvoir n’était jamais bien loin. Que celle-ci se fonde sur un « droit divin », une « volonté générale » ou un « contrat social », la question posée était toujours celle du fondement axiologique, de la justification du fait brut d’un pouvoir coercitif. (…) Toutefois, la nature des valeurs en politique a rarement été précisée, si bien que la comparaison entre les différents régimes, de même que celle entre les différentes formes prises par un même régime à différentes époques, ont toujours été entravées par l’absence d’une notion claire des variables en jeu, variables qui permettraient d’exprimer ces variations. Certes, on peut se demander si, du point de vue pratique, cela est bien nécessaire ; mais ce serait mal poser la question. En effet, il ne s’agit pas de poser arbitrairement quelque ensemble de valeurs et de juger toutes les sociétés en fonction de celui-ci, mais de dégager les valeurs déjà effectivement présentes, immanentes au domaine de la pensée politique, et dont il importe que des chercheurs prennent conscience.” Daya Krishna, “Des Coefficients Politiques,” Contract Social 2, no. 5 (September 1958): 299.

See 2.2.1.1 on the emergence of the idea of specific Indian values as a postcolonial reaction, and the already quoted interpretation of it by Bhushan and Garfield, Minds without Fear, 37.
equally the result of what men believed and the action they undertook consequent upon those beliefs. […] The radical difference between truth and falsehood is replaced [at the social domain] by the dynamic difference between what is believed to be true and what is not so believed.”

In so doing, our beliefs constitute the ground for our ways of evaluating other assumptions according to which the latter can be seen as ‘true’ or ‘wrong’, or ‘higher’ or ‘lower’, i.e. ‘ought to be pursued’ or not. However, the close connection of values with reality makes the passage from the former to the latter possibly affected by political ideological manipulations. In other words, our apprehensions, when they are turned into actuality, tend to also concretize our particular beliefs into normative rules which are supposed to be ‘valid for all’. Thus, neglecting the epistemological presuppositions of values entails much empirical consequences, which can have a substantial effect in the political realm or in the realm of discourse. This explains Daya Krishna’s plea against the fixity of the four puruṣārthas. The acceptance and hierarchy of the values under this name do not historically simply testify of an axiological philosophico-religious debate but are also motivated by political issues, in particular regarding the exclusion of those who neither ‘belong’ to the realm of spiritual liberation nor to the one of the dharmic and social order, for instance the śūdra (so-called lower caste) or women. At a different level, this problem also explains why Daya Krishna insisted on including the diversity of participants above described, trained in different education systems, so as to prevent the normative rules of discourse to remain prevalently those of western-trained Indian scholars who have the monopoly of the Indian academia today, as described in 2.1.2, 2.2 and 3. Both levels do not

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691 Daya Krishna notices the interweaving of the different puruṣārthas with socio-political realms, in particular regarding the conflict between dharma and mokṣa. He sees the conflict between values as representing a socio-political conflict, the consequences of which however still in return characterize the concept of values. In the wrong assimilation of the two, he notes the exclusion of labour (śūdra): “The conflicting relations between knowledge, power and wealth have not been explored in their psychological, social, political and institutional aspects to the extent needed. Still, it is strange that the sheer dependence on the labour of a vast number of others has never evoked the ambivalence or the type of feelings that the relation-ship amongst those who wield power or possess knowledge or wealth usually evokes. The śūdra has been out of the picture, even though on him or rather his function everyone depends more basically. This absence of the feeling of dependence in a situation where dependence is so obviously pre-sent may perhaps be attributed to the fact that one takes it for granted as a part of life. It is analogous to one’s dependence on the body on which one becomes aware during sickness, and that too only for a short while till one gets accustomed to the constraints and limitations imposed by the illness. The body is itself seen as a bondage in the context of certain perspectives of ‘freedom’ which are well known in the Indian tradition, and one who seeks freedom does try to minimize the needs of the body which make him de-pendent on others. The valuational hierarchy of those times has come down to us and all attempt by thinkers, reformers and revolutionaries to put labour at the centre of things or even bring it on par with other values in socio-etyl have not been successful.” Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and Polity, 68–69. See further details in Coquereau, “Seeking Values in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy,” 132–34.

692 “This is the community of pandits or Śāstris. But they were never counted as philosophers. The role which western-trained Indian philosophers in their scheme of things had assigned to them was that of repositories of the knowledge of traditional thought.” Daya Krishna et al., Saṁvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xx–xxi. Rege, in the Preface of the Pune experiment, presents the point of view of the pandits, namely their exclusion from the realm of philosophy. Beginning the first session of the Bhakti dialogue, Daya Krishna presents the other side of the same exclusion, namely the alienation felt by the western-trained philosophers: “The
exclude each other, although their combination adds further problems, which Daya Krishna did not seem to be able to resolve in practice. Indeed, the 

*pandīts* included in the dialogues constitute the minority excluded from the larger postcolonial academic discourse, but they also form the intellectual majority of the Brahmanical tradition of which the *śūdra* is the minority. Nevertheless, Daya Krishna was not unaware of this problem, due to which he also emphasized the necessity to re-read the texts from the Brahmanical traditions critically, and publicly denounced the exclusions operated within.

‘Ideology’ is the political expression of a confusion between value-apprehension and value-realization, as the projected political ideal whose reality becomes dubious once ‘en-acted’ in

first thing I would like to talk about is the background of this dialogue. This is a dialogue between the traditions of India and our modern intellectual life. We have to understand this difference because unless we understand it, we will not be able to see the contemporary situation as it now prevails in this country. All of us who have been trained and educated in institutions of formal learning in this country have developed a whole western-centered way of looking at the world. (…) To realize that this has been deeply implanted in us through a foreign system of education imposed in this country for historical reasons, is to become aware that what we take for granted can be questioned. Similarly, to realize that India has a rich traditions of knowledge in various fields, rich intellectual traditions, traditions rooted in evidence and argument and reasoning, and traditions differentiated with respect to different fields of knowledge, and that these traditions have had at least more than two millenia of historical continuity and development, is to become aware that somehow we have ourselves been cut off from our own intellectual past. How this has happened is a matter of history. But how to overcome it after one has become aware of it is the challenge before all of us.” Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna,  

*Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion*, 1–2. This challenge grounds the initiative of the Bhakti experiment and the larger framework of the *samvāda*, pleading for the need of integrating different worldviews to realize what we intellectually take for granted. Finally, in another dialogue, Daya Krishna begins on the gap between the number of talks on ‘indigenization’ or for that matter on decolonization and the much lesser number of actual practices of it. This denunciation justifies again the *samvāda* experiment, as an attempt at ‘doing’ contemporary, postcolonial and cross-cultural philosophy rather than lamenting the historical facts that led to such an intellectual situation. See the details on the Jaipur experiments in 3.1, and Daya Krishna, *India’s Intellectual Traditions*, ix.

693 Daya Krishna vividly expressed his incomprehension of the exclusion of women and *śūdra* from the Vedic sacrifice during his Shimla lecture. He acutely does not formulate it as the expression of his political views, but rather questions the consistency of the idea in order to criticize its political realizations: “The common regard regarding the Vedic tradition is that its central concern is located in the *yajña*, the Vedic sacrifice. Let me state here that I do not agree with it, but well, it is the common consent. If the Vedic tradition is indeed centred in the *yajña*, how can we claim to uphold universal values? And we do claim to universality; without it, we cannot be a civilization. And this civilization raises the following question: are the *śūdra* and women entitled to *yajña* or not? What a question! Anybody who can even raise such a question has ceased to be a human being. I am more than serious. If one excludes women, one has excluded half of humanity. Then how is it possible to speak of universality? And if a large class - and the *śūdra* form the largest class in the society - is excluded, one has excluded the majority. If this is the case, let me ask here: where is the so-called Vedic consciousness? Why do we suppress this from our minds? We have to reflect on it. If this is not the original sin, it is the original guilt of Hinduism or the Indian civilization.” Daya Krishna, *Civilizations*, 98.

694 Daniel Raveh reminds us of one of Daya Krishna’s ‘awakening provocations’, conceived as an invitation for critically investigating the values endorsed by one’s traditions: “In a Q&A session following one of DK’s lectures in Shimla, which focused as the whole series did on a ‘new philosophy’ for a ‘new world’, one of the listeners, a ‘classical pandit’, was trying to protect the familiar and the known, quoting at length from the *Mahābhārata* and drawing extensively on Bhīṣma. ‘Why don’t we forget about Mr Bhīṣma,’ DK told him, ‘and concentrate on contemporary physics, technology, cloning, internet etc.’ His response and especially the phrase ‘Mr Bhīṣma’ shocked quite a few listeners. DK (…) was not ‘anti-traditional’ as some of his listeners might have thought. Instead, he wanted to awaken his listeners and readers, in Shimla and elsewhere, from their ‘dogmatic slumber’ and make them think anew. ‘Mr Bhīṣma’ was a speech act intended to free his listeners from the bonds of the past.” Daniel Raveh, “Introduction,” in *Civilizations: Nostalgia and Utopia*, by Daya Krishna (Shimla : Los Angeles: Indian Institute of Advanced Study; SAGE, 2012), xviii–xix.

695 Alienation could be located on the other end of the same scale as indicating the forced assimilations to values which are not felt to be one’s own. Quite differently from Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya and philosophers from
the world. An ideology is discovered to be ideological once it is actualized in a particular political context. Then it finds its limitation, its inadequacy, or even its contradiction with the contemplated ideal. This difficulty is described as the “dialectical relationship between a value apprehension and a value realization.” The very nature of value-realization seems to lie in the dissatisfaction that we feel once we actualize values. In Daya Krishna’s words:

“The dissatisfaction with any actualized value does not usually emanate from the fact that we have encountered or apprehended a value which we regard or consider as more truly or really a value than the one we actualized, more or less successfully, earlier. Rather, it is the felt dissatisfaction that makes us doubt the reality of the value we had actualized and, however much of a fact it may be, we wish to get rid of it, the sooner the better. In a sense, the falsity or inadequacy of a value is revealed or apprehended only when it begins to be actualized. That is one reason why so many of the ideals of man which seem so alluringly attractive when abstractly conceived turn into nightmares or, in other cases, just boring actualities when concretely realized. The concept of real value or of a value that is really such is, thus, not the result of a direct apprehension, but merely the shadowy counterpart of the real dissatisfaction which we have with values as they are actualized. It is the dissatisfaction which makes us aware that the value which we had thought to be real and genuine is not really so. The criterion of the reality of a value, thus, is not its conformity with some real values in an ideal sphere or even its coherence with other values in any meaningful valuational sense of the term, but rather the deep, inner fulfilment which its realization gives to the actual living human person.”

Ideologies express the ‘reality’ of values in the sense that they have been realized. However, in their realization arises their discordance with the ideality that we apprehended before. In contrast, the criterion for the reality of a value in its ideal apprehension is not its capacity to be realized but the deep fulfillment that it provides in the actual life. This means, in other words, how meaningful values became or remained once they were actualized, or on the contrary, how deceptive they turned out to be. Seen in the light of the political implications explained above, such a conception of the reality of values implies that the institutions and norms cannot be justified by their efficiency (how easily or how powerfully realized they are), but rather by how meaningfully they are experienced. This entails that the inner fulfillment is not reserved to a majority that the institutions and norms validate, but that the realizations of values that legitimate their position can be questioned by those who feel them to be dissatisfying.

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696 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 19.
697 Daya Krishna, “Value and Reality,” 182.
discussion thus enables to challenge the deceptive realizations of values and the privileges of the majority that is in a position to realize them.

Bringing awareness to the privileges and to one being privileged to acknowledge and take the ‘risk’ of engaging in dialogue, revising her/his position, exploring her/his presuppositions, and possibly, recognizing their privileges, is no easy task. It is up to the participants to take upon themselves the duty of de-identification and detachment, of listening and accepting alternatives: thus, the epistemological dimension studied in the previous chapter is motivated by a valuational attitude to dialoguing. Since we have seen that the valuational is fused with ideality, this program admittedly entails an ‘ideal’ view. However, since the ideal is also a vector that pushes forward the imperfect realization, a commitment to the ideal is a requirement for the actual life.

Daya Krishna expresses the difficulty of bringing participants into a dialogue if these participants are favored by a context that provides them with a legitimacy and an authority which are not questioned. In his critique of authority, he gives the example of what the qualifies as the postmodern attitude of “destroying everything” which acts against philosophy itself. This constitutes furthermore the gesture of privileged philosophers who, in a way, seem to be able to ‘afford’ such a destruction.

“Richard Rorty is one of the most gentle, urbane, ironic, and complacent examples of such an attitude [of "taking a holiday from rationality itself"], not even seeking to engage in any real dispute, for to do so would be to accept the conditions of a rational debate and discussion which to him seem unacceptable in principle. He prefers to engage in 'conversation', mostly with himself, for 'to converse' with 'others' would be to 'listen' to them and be prepared to change his personal opinion, not because of the rhetorical power of the other, but because of the counter-argument made or the counter-evidence provided. He therefore bids good-bye to philosophy and opts for literature, and that too in its ironic mode. Rorty thinks that this is the best of all possible worlds, and it is easy for him to subscribe to this belief as he happens to be an American philosopher. He is thus able to see the world from the vantage point of the global dominance that such a position confers not only in terms of power and wealth, but also in those of knowledge and culture, which lend an aura of self-evident unquestionableness to such a view of looking at things.”

The problem is endemic beyond this singular example and could be extended to different social classes of the same society or different cultures in the power-relation between them. What could anyone’s motivation be to enter in a dialogue, if s/he is resting on her/his privileged position in her/his society or the world, to engage on critical discussions on the ‘values’ that reflect or legitimate the very society which grants her/him/ her/his privileges? One answer would be the awareness itself that s/he is privileged, combined with a sense of rightness to admit that his/her

698 “Postmodernism has destroyed everything. These people have destroyed everything. They have destroyed their own house, their own foundations; now they are looking around, complaining at the debris that surrounds them. It is the strangest situation, where man has self-consciously and gradually committed suicide, and then he asks, ‘What is happening to me?’” Daya Krishna, *Civilizations*, 80. On Daya Krishna’s “postmodern philosophical battle”, see Miller, “Reading Derrida with Daya Krishna: Postmodern Trends in Contemporary Indian Philosophy”; Raveh, “Knowledge as a Way of Living,” 432., and the preface by Raveh of Daya Krishna, *Civilizations*.

position hinders other potential participants of the same society to the right to speak. Daya Krishna asserts this duty to the intellectual who

“are supposed to be the conscience keepers of the world and vigilant critics of those who are in power. (...) The ‘brahmanical’ function of the intellectual class vis-à-vis those who exercise the ruling function in any society or polity is one of the crucial factors in restraining those who rule from departing too much from the path of ‘dharma’ or righteousness. To be an intellectual means just this: that one is not completely governed by considerations of wealth and power, hence not afraid of displeasing those who may withhold patronage because of their overwhelming power. (...) If freedom has any intellectual content, then the acts of the mighty and the powerful have to be scrutinized on the bar of rightness which itself, of course, is not easy to determine.”

Regardless of the difficulty and resistance of the realizations, the a priori conceptual requirement remains to maintain the possibility of change: of change of the values’ contents, order and structure, and to contemplate the gap between realization and apprehension. Daya Krishna did not consider Max Scheler’s *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*701. Scheler, however, shares with him a critique of the formalism of values contained in the Kantian imperative and in general, in the abstractness of the ‘ought’. As a reaction, like Daya Krishna, Scheler also lays importance to considering values in the differences of social, cultural and historical contexts, taking in consideration on the other hand the risk of a total relativism that would remove any meaning from values. While both are careful as to avoid the binary division between universalism/relativism - which is a necessary condition for dialoguing on values, for there can be no discussion if values are entirely dependent on each speaker’s definition, as well as if the speakers consider their own values indisputably valid for all -, their account nevertheless differs enough to raise further problems for dialoguing on values.

An important distinction between the two raises limits of the reflectivity entailed in dialoguing based on argumentations and counter-argumentations. For Scheler, although values are structurally organized around a personal experience relative to communities, cultures and

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700 Quoted in Daniel Raveh’s ‘Daya Krishna and Social Philosophy’ (section ‘The Conscience Keepers and Other-centricity’) with his further comment: “DK used to write regularly not just hardcore philosophical papers for hardcore philosophical journals, but also articles for venues that appeal to a broader readership, such as *Quest* (we have seen above) and the *Economic and Political Weekly* (EPW). The activist in him refused to be confined to the academic Ivory Tower.” Raveh, “Daya Krishna on Social Philosophy [Forthcoming].”

701 He does mention Scheler’s *Nature of Sympathy*, without however developing further in ‘Substance’ Daya Krishna, *Contrary Thinking*, 105.
histories (which he names ‘ethos’702), the order703 of these values lies in their essence, not in their conception by a seeker. In that sense, the hierarchy of these values is invariable704 and independent of any preference.705 In so doing, he implies that we feel values as higher or lower706 intuitively, i.e. without cognitive mediation, outside any reflective judgment or deliberation.

Taking the words relative and absolute in this sense [i.e. values are relative to the types and functions that belongs to the experience of these values, so that the value of the agreeable does not exist for non-sensitive being; on the contrary, absolute values are those that exist in ‘pure’ feeling, independently of the nature of sensibility, such as moral values], I assert it to be an essential interconnection that values given in immediate intuition ‘as higher’ are values that are given as nearer to absolute values in feeling and preferring (and not by way of deliberation). Entirely outside the sphere of ‘judgment’ or ‘deliberation’ there is an immediate feeling of the ‘relativity’ of a value. And for this feeling the variability of a relative value in comparison with the concomitant constancy of a less ‘relative’ value […] is a confirmation, but not a proof. (…) Such a value is also quite independent of an estimative deliberation about the permanence of such beauty or truth with regard to the ‘experiences of life,’ which tend more to detract us from true absolute values than to bring us nearer to them. (…) Implicit in the very kind of the given value experience there is a guarantee (and not a conclusion)707 that there is here an absolute value. This evidence of an absolute value stems neither from an estimative deliberation about the permanence it may have in practical life nor from the universality of a judgment which holds that ‘this value is absolute in all moments of our lives’."707

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702 Defined as “the experiential structure of values and their immanent rules of preferring, which lie behind both the morality and the ethics of a people (primarily those of larger racial groups)”. Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, 5th rev. ed., Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 302. “The ethos lives in the structure of this historical life-reality itself and is therefore not an adaptation to this reality. It serves as the basis of this reality and has also guided the construction of the non-arbitrary form of its structure. (…) Nevertheless, this most radical relativity of moral values-estimations gives us no reason to assume a relativism of moral values themselves and their order of ranks. One can only say that a complete and adequate experience of the cosmos of values and its order of ranks, and, with this, the representation of the moral sense of the world, is essentially connected with the co-operation of the different forms of ethos which unfold historically according to its laws. It is precisely a correctly understood absolute ethics that strictly requires these differences - this value-perspectivism of values among peoples and their times and this openness in the formative stages of the ethos.” Scheler, 303–4.

703 Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, 86.

704 While the values are in essentia invariable, Scheler acknowledges different sorts of variations: “variations in feeling (i.e., "cognizing") the values and the structure of preferring values (ethos); the judgment in assessing values and their ranks in actions (ethics); the types of unity of institutions, i.e. in Daya Krishna’s terms, the realization of values in a given society according to the normative interpretation of values by specific institutions; practical morality, i.e. the realization of values by comportment of particular individualities; mores and customs, i.e. cultural variations in the realization of values. Scheler, 299–300.

705 Scheler, 87.

706 Scheler, 90. Concretely, this implies an order from the lowest ‘agreeable’ to the ‘vital’ to the ‘spiritual’ to the highest ‘holy’. “As we have stated, these modalities have their own a priori order of ranks that precedes their series of qualities. This order of value-ranks is valid for the goods of correlative values because it is valid for the values of goods. The order is this: the modality of vital values is higher than that of the agreeable and the disagreeable; the modality of spiritual values is higher than that of vital values; the modality of the holy is higher than that of spiritual values.” Scheler, 110.

707 Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, 98–99.
Scheler’s insistence on the immediacy of feeling value independently of our second-order judgment, deliberation or conclusion from an argumentation, brings a valuable restriction of dialogue to the realm of values. We can indeed discuss ‘values’ as objects of reflection, but which consequences do these discussions have for values which are characterized by an immediacy and a feeling outside the realm of ‘logos’? Thus, what is the use of dialogue for feeling values, or even more for transforming them creatively, which is the purpose of Daya Krishna’s critique of the Indian classification? Can we be ‘convinced’ or even ‘persuaded’ of the ‘value’ of other values? What is the function of the mediation of language and communication for the immediate feeling of values? This is not totally distinct from our discussion of presupposition (see 5), insofar as, as we saw, the ‘beliefs’ contained in presuppositions also escape the epistemological outlook of the rational argumentations that contain them: because of this, dialogue is a tool to unveil them.

Daya Krishna’s investigation of the traditional puruṣārthas operates in the same way, since what he aims to do is to unveil the political, sociological and philosophical presuppositions that underlie values appearing as ‘given’ and ‘invariable’. But can this have an effect on the way these values are felt by persons who would relate to such a classification? There is no guarantee of the effect of dialogues on participants, neither in the epistemological realm, nor in the valutational which is depending on the person and individual will. Nevertheless, the lack of guarantee, or in other terms, the fallibility of the process points also at the possibility of changes and transformations which lies in the very feeling of dissatisfaction at the core of our felt experience of values. While dissatisfaction remains for Scheler a negative term connected to feeling such as resentments, for Daya Krishna it is precisely in these feelings that the potential creativity of consciousness for values is expressed:

“The transformation of the given, or even its denial, seems to be the essence of consciousness, and as consciousness itself is ‘given’ to self-consciousness, its transformation or even denial seems to be the task set by self-consciousness to itself. (…) Consciousness is not a passive, reflexive, mirroring activity whose task is to know, but rather, something which apprehends something which is aesthetically or morally in need of improvement. The same obtains when consciousness itself becomes an ‘object’ to self-consciousness. Consciousness is found to be that which it should not be, or even ‘ought’ not to be, and hence the dissatisfaction it feels is

708 “But apart from the above kind of variation in the growth of the ethos, i.e., the variation in which a disclosure of the realm of objective values and their order occurs, there are also in history all those forms of value-deceptions and deceptions in preferring, as well as falsifications and overthrows which are founded on such deceptions and which pertain to earlier forms of ethical assessment and standards that had conformed to the objective ranks of values. I discovered one such deception in my study of resentment. Only a systematic study of these kinds of emotional deceptions will teach us to observe also those which lie in the history of the ethos and to distinguish falsifications of values from mere false ideas about their bearers, as well as from practical immorality. Principles of value-judgment in an age, in the sense of a dominant or acknowledged ‘ethics’ can rest on such deceptions; and they can be overtaken and judged accordingly by those whose ethos did not fall victim to such deceptions. It is important, therefore, to investigate not only the genealogy of deceptions but also the forms of their dispersion. Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between attitudes toward values themselves and attitudes toward the contemporary historical reality, i.e., between attitudes toward the factual bearer of values and attitudes toward the world of goods. Let us consider the example of the relations between vital values and values of utility. Norms that come from vital values alone undoubtedly require in principle an aristocratic structure of society, i.e., a structure in which noble blood and character-values of heredity belonging to such noble blood possess political prerogatives.” Scheler, 306.
not in respect of objects that consciousness apprehends, or even in respect of the relationship between them, but with regard to consciousness itself and the way it reacts to the world it apprehends. (…)

Values, norms and ideals implicit in the dissatisfactions that consciousness feels in respect of the world of objects themselves become objects of questioning when consciousness becomes an ‘object’ to self-consciousness. And, once values, norms and ideals get questioned, one does not know where the questioning will end. This provides a new dynamism to the story of man’s diverse enterprises as it is unending in principle.  

Dissatisfaction is not ‘simply’ a negative feeling belonging to the realm of values, which would be negatively related to ‘satisfaction’, itself probably included among ‘kāma’ as a desire. For Daya Krishna, it is rather constitutive for our relation to the world, as a creative possibility that pushes us forward, between realization and apprehension: a feeling of incompletion of the former and the ideality of the latter that is not resolved in a transcendent unity of reality and ideality, but in dialoguing on the potentialities of the latter vis-à-vis the actualizations of the former. In this va et vient between action (will), apprehension (knowledge) and the way we experience them lies the chance of engaging in dialogue to explore the gaps and unquestioned assumptions of these realms and their interrelations.

“The realm of values is disclosed to man by a perpetual dissatisfaction with things as they are, accompanied by the feeling that they can and ought to be different. These ‘things’ with respect to which continuous dissatisfaction is felt include one’s own self, other persons, and both natural and social states of affairs. The dissatisfaction provides the dynamics for change, exploration and experimentation.”

To me it seems that this deceptive dimension of values constitutes the core of Daya Krishna’s critical reinterpretation of the classical Sanskrit concept of puruṣārtha, and a critique of the lack of productive uses of the idea in Western theories (in particular Hartmann and Moore). Furthermore, I consider dissatisfaction to be a potential central concept for analyzing the particularity of the ‘ideality’ entailed in dialogue. Indeed, philosophies of dialogue - at least it is my contention - often provide us with theories the application of which is hard to grasp. The exigent models they offer seem to contradict the realization they imply. The reason, I believe, lies in the ideality contained in the predicament they proffer, i.e. one hardly sees how it could be applicable in the world we live in, which is more often than not characterized by disagreements or even strong conflicts than harmonious relations. In contrary, I contemplate the advantage of Daya Krishna’s understanding of puruṣārtha as the ‘highest goal’ one seeks, which can be interpreted as the ideality necessary for orienting dialogue, however experienced in its deceptive dimension. Furthermore, it is precisely this deceptive dimension that enables the dynamism of dialogue, for dialogue then becomes a seeking the highest, the dissatisfaction

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711 Daya Krishna’s acknowledged forerunner in this attempt at considering values within plurality of realms are N. Hartmann and Moore. However, the perspective of the philosophers seems to differ in the use of this “map of the realm of values” as Daya Krishna does not seek any ordering of these realms into first or second order values. See Daya Krishna, *Nature of Philosophy*, 124–27; Daya Krishna, *Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions*, 50; Daya Krishna, *Contrary Thinking*, 105.
of which in the reality of a ‘it is not yet realized’ provides the ‘push’ to look further and try differently.

The seeking that characterizes values is what ‘evaporates’ when we actually try to bring them to concretion. It operates in a sense like a mirage, as something that deceptively turns out to be different in reality than what it intellectually seemed to be. In a similar way as the disjunction and the negation in the realm of knowledge incite a minimal doubt that prevents the absoluteness of one’s position in favor of a pluralistic epistemology, the dissatisfaction negates the completeness of reality. In the realm of action and feeling it reveals the incompleteness of our actions with regards to our apprehension, and the mutual influences of the one on the other: the “valuational indeterminacy” is what “provides the dynamics for change, exploration and experimentation” (op. cit.) in defining an orientation for ‘seeking’ which is not existing and yet already in process as a further potentiality to be realized (however remaining unfulfilled).

“The basic point is that the cycles of cultural creativity in a civilization are embedded in the biological cycle of generations. This, however, is only one dimension of the problem. The other relates to the fact that the concept, the image, or the value which demands to be explored is full of such unknown implications and possibilities that it may take even generations or millennia to exhaust what is contained in them. The innovation and creativity may thus consist in the exploration of the possibilities that have not yet been seen or apprehended in them. It may also consist in the creation of a new concept or image or value which then may interact with the old or even start a new cycle of its own in term of the unfolding of the possibilities inherent in them. Furthermore, as we usually do not have just a single concept or image or value, but rather a cluster of them, it is the interactional possibilities between them that may be explored by successive generations in a culture or civilization. Even here, the innovation may lie in what concept or image or value is treated as dominant or central in the cluster, and what are regarded as subsidiary or peripheral in nature.”

Daya Krishna attributes great significance to terms that are perceived as negative, such as presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions (as well as alienation). He does acknowledge the consequences of these terms (unquestioned, unrealized, deceptive, uncertain, fallible) but in so doing, he refused to limit them to their ‘negative’ attributes. Or in other words, he refuses to see their negativity as an impediment, but rather as a creative possibility. He thus rather enjoys thinking the uncertainty entailed in these concepts viewed as ‘chances’ and ‘potentialities’. He was not aiming at an ideal, formal and systematic theory of dialogue and of philosophy in general (see also 7.3). He rather saw more opportunities in the imaginative force to think further, to turn the felt dissatisfactions into an occasion of critical analysising the origins of these dissatisfactions, and to engage in difficult and dissatisfying dialogues with very different traditions, than in the comfortable self-made tower of one’s own systematic thinking. While this does not lessen the political and historical problems above described concerning the realization of ethical norms, it also prevents the closure of the discussion. However, the discussion does not simply rely on a description of value-contents and value-structures such as the one I have drawn here. It requires that participants are ready to deceptively feel the inconsistencies of their particular value-apprehensions and their realizations, and to question

712 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 143.
them. In other words, it implies to participate not only for discussing values, but to recognize that we are also as participants engaged in value-structures, i.e. ‘seekers’.

6.2. Participants as *Jijñāsu*: On Seeking to Know in Dialogue

6.2.1. On the Advantage of Being Ignorant

Dissatisfaction appears first as what relates values and reality in the negative experience of their being felt: between value-apprehension and value-realization lies a gap expressed in the form ‘what ought to be and is not’. The actualization of values does not solve this inherent gap, since values, once realized, turn out to be finite actions that have no measure to our initial apprehension. In other terms: the ‘ought’ is never caught up by the ‘is now’. The gap is also a creative dynamic, since we seek the ‘ought’, for which imagination is required, as well as the critical assessment of the apprehension imagined which transforms the ideas into judgments to be discussed. In the previous section, I have articulated this dissatisfaction in structural terms, as the dynamic of creation and evaluation of certain sets of values with regard to their generation and actualization, in particular in (but not limited to) the classical theory of the *puruṣārthas*. However, underlining this structural tension is not in itself sufficient: this already appeared in the political consequences of value-realizations which demand to be critically discussed. Indeed, dialogues originate from persons who not only reflect on values but are engaged in a valuational seeking. Consequently, the structure of values, although integrated to their *Weltanschauung*, is further in tension with their ‘human’ attitudes in dialogues. This connects the anthropological dimension of the epistemological presuppositions with the valuational dimension of knowledge.

In the previous section, I mentioned the difficulty of critically discussing this value-structure by those who would belong to societies or part of societies which legitimate their privileged access to a discourse.

The implications of persons in dialogues point at another valuational dimension, i.e. the particular lived apprehension of this value-structure by ‘seeker for knowledge’, the translation used by Daya Krishna of the desiderative form *jijñāsu*. By ‘seeker’, he means someone who is living in such an internalized and experienced value-structure, who orientate her/his actions and knowledge (both seen in interactions) towards such a perspective. Hence, it is as a seeker for knowledge that one enters in dialogue, which brings further two important points. First, how do these attitudes reveal an interpretation of the texts? More specifically, how do the *śruti*, the authority of texts in view of their revelatory character (intrinsic to the traditions) is manifested as an attitude and what are the consequences for dialoguing? Second, this implies to also embody the dissatisfaction presented above as being part of one’s consciousness, which shape our very apprehension of knowledge (6.2.2). This, in turn, helps us to understand, in the last section of this chapter (6.2.3), freedom in communicational contexts, that is the freedom to participate and withdraw from dialogue without being forced, but by being *invited* to engage into the dialogue by seeking knowledge.

To see ‘knowers’ as ‘seekers’ means to consider the realm of knowledge itself to be composed by values and oriented by *puruṣārtha*. The consequences of such a shift can appear to be trivial,
since it simply begins with the consideration that ‘knowers’ do not know everything, and that the humility to accept the possibility of not knowing something is in itself a sufficient condition to be ready to listen to others and participate in a dialogue. This apparently simple statement, if not understood as an ethical formal prescription\(^7\), entails a complex set of questions: where does this ‘humility’ originate from and what would be the causal relation between not-knowing-something and ‘be-ready-to-listen’? Many a times, we encounter in dialogue participants who - from our perspective - do not ‘know’ (something) either by omission, errors or because they do not see the connection with another problem. In spite of our best will to communicate to them our ‘dissatisfactions’, these participants continue repeating their statements in different words, and ‘reply’ (rather than answer) from the knowledge they have already established without taking in consideration counter-positions and alternatives. This does not arise from a lack of ‘knowledge’ available (in terms of theories and organized śāstric knowledge), but - if it is granted that their goal is not simple sophistry or ārtic destruction of the other - from a valuational dimension of knowledge and I argue, from the insufficient consideration of puruṣārtha as knowledge. This can explain the importance Daya Krishna attributes to those who do not know in dialogue when he reacted during the dialogue organized at the venue of Maurice Friedman:

“There is a third element in a dialogue which in my experience often shows that the more information and knowledge one has, the more one is in a disadvantaged position to say something really significant and new as opposed to a person with less information and less knowledge who is fresh, so to say, not a clean slate but who has an open mind though he doesn’t know much about the subject. He can always come up with something startlingly new. But it’s only with seeing in this sense by a person who has less information that something new emerges, which often he himself may not quite see. But all this cannot be grasped by a person who already has that knowledge, so there is this comparative advantage and disadvantage of the person who knows a lot. Because his mind works on established questions, he takes the terms as stated in the usual manner of the person whose knowledge comes out

\(^7\) Across Daya Krishna’s contemporaries, a critique of the formality of the Kantian imperative in the moral realm seems to pervade. Their approaches are to be distinguished from comments or interpretations on Kant (which can also be found during the times of encounter as a ‘Western’ dialogical partner to the idealist philosophies of classical Indian traditions): in ethics/moral philosophy, the Kantian formalism constitutes rather a starting-point and a pūrvapakṣa that gives rise to a creative re-thinking of values and the moral ought. Delving into the details of these relations would be the purpose of another study, for their responses are variegated. However, specifically for thinking the ‘ought’ and its relation to morality, we can consider N. V. Banerjee’s description of the general problem for thinking the Kantian imperative in a contemporary Indian philosophical context: “The fundamental difficulty of Kant’s doctrine of the categorical imperative lies in his ascription to the moral ought (that is, moral obligation or moral responsibility) the characteristic of unconditionality as opposed to conditionality. And, as we shall immediately see, it is especially brought out through his interpretation of the supposed unconditionality of the moral ought as signifying human freedom.” Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Reconstruction., Somaiya Publications (Mumbai, 1985), 98. Daya Krishna’s ‘ought’ indeed articulates the possibility of thinking the unconditionality of values (as value-structures) in relation with its conditionality (as value-contents) further complicated by the integration of values as seeking ‘here and now’ embodied by seekers already engaged in a value-structure characterized by particular value-contents. This entails a specific and creative redefinition of freedom, which I explore later in this section in the context of dialogue, quite opposed to the Kantian one. Further to Daya Krishna, this Kantian starting point of the moral critique is also an influence on the moral philosophy of (between others) Sundara Rajan, N. K. Devaraja, G. C. Pande, S. S. Barlingay and D. P. Chattopadhyaya, who I have used in this work as interlocutors.
Daya Krishna does not advocate ignorance in general here. What he points out is the advantage of participants genuinely seeking knowledge for engaging with specialists on a given topic, who, despite of having at their disposal a tremendous amount of ‘knowledge’, may not have the ability to ‘seek’ novelty in their knowledge. Or in other words: their knowledge, when too much rooted in the comfortable habit of a certain established way of thinking, might not generate novelty, since they lack the disturbing ‘shock’ and the sense of dissatisfaction with their own way of seeing. In this sense, the collaboration of not-knowing-seekers with knowledgeable seekers, might prove fertile for creative thinking. Moreover, it is here the collaboration that enables novel creation, since the ‘fresh’ non-knowing-seekers are per definitionem not able to recognize alone and elaborate on the ‘freshness’ of their questions, and the knowledgeable seekers are not (anymore) able to generate ‘fresh’ insights on their own long-acquired knowledge. The creativity originates from the combination of ‘not-(yet)-knowing’ with ‘not-(yet)-thinking-anew’ which together can turn into the initial ‘wonder’ that has shaped philosophy from the negation of given knowledge by taking a startling new look at it. This need not to be a Cartesian tabula rasa, it can also emerge from a contemplative detachment from the givenness, from the hybridity of crossing traditions, or simply from the emulation of a particular encounter. While the ways can be diverse, I believe that for Daya Krishna, creativity in knowledge is fundamentally connected to the tension between not-knowing and yet-wanting-to-know - and that this reciprocal movement back and forth is the one operating in dialogue. However, the tension cannot operate unidirectionally, since the one who does not know and the one who knows vary and the question of ‘how’, ‘in which may’, ‘through which conceptual structures do we know’ depends on cultures and contexts. Thus, the dialogue cannot follow the form of delivering a lecture and being questioned by ‘less-knowledgeable-students’ (i.e. people considered to be lower in the hierarchy of having-knowledge), or guru-śisya-paramparā in the Indian context, which amounts to a redistribution of a specific knowledge. It is rather in an oscillation between persons who are both ignorant and seeking to know, in different realms of knowledges, conceptual frameworks and variations of expressions. This corresponds to what Daya Krishna defines as ‘comparative philosophy’:

“Conceptual structures may be seen as tools for the organization of experience and for giving it meaning and significance. Each available conceptual structure thus shows the limitations of

715 See Arindam Chakrabarti’s comment: “Although he did a lot to revive the Navya Nyāya and other scholastic traditions of debate and dialectic in Sanskrit, Daya Krishna had a rather fraught relationship with the Guru-śiṣya-paramparā or didactic-lineage system - what he called “master-disciple syndrome” which is prevalent in the Indian intellectual culture for millennia. He thought of it as a theological hang-over of the age of dogmatic-élites where any kind of heterodoxy would be not just discouraged, but punished. Such a stronghold of textual traditional-groupism stymies all creativity according to him, Yet, he saw more originality of thinking within the so-called Sanskrit-speaking, text-gloss-writing, traditional, un-Westernized, lineage-bound scholars whom he came to know in the last quarter of his life rather intimately, than among the individualistic academic Westernized professors who swear by their individual originality.” Chakrabarti, “Introduction,” 9. While Daya Krishna could never accept the ‘blind’ acceptance to the guru which renders a dialogue impossible, the ‘individualism’ creates the problem of the ‘monopoly’ of truth and knowledge by oneself, which also transforms a dialogue into a monologue.
the others and suggests an alternative possibility unexplored by them. Also, they may be seen as drawing our attention to those facts of our experience, which have been neglected in other perspectives, and to ways of organizing and patterning experiences that were not seen by them. (…) Concepts can never be simply images or symbols and are hardly ever a matter of just feelings and emotions. The questions of truth and falsity can never be allowed to remain absent for long, even though they may be intractable in nature. Yet, what we should remember is that the cognitive enterprise is as unending as any other enterprise, and that though the truth-claim has inevitably to be made, it is equally certain that it shall remain unfulfilled. The future shall always be there to show us not only the limitations of our knowledge and the falsity of our claims, but also to bring to our notice a new horizon, undreamt of before.”

The dissatisfaction is a key concept of cross-cultural, inter/transcultural or comparative philosophies originating from a sense of one’s ‘limitations’, what ‘has been neglected’, and what ‘was not seen’. These limitations point out the specificity of each argumentation and positions, which, in being specific, are limited. The ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’, the ‘conceptual structure’, ‘organization of experience’, ‘meaning and significance’, the ‘alternative possibility unexplored’ form in relation with each other the ‘seeking’ in which participants are distinctively but collectively engaged. The result is, in Daya Krishna terms, quite nuanced. On the one hand, he sees the positive encounter as a ‘bringing to our notice a new horizon, undreamt of before’. On the other hand, the horizon again points at a direction expressed in the seeking, something that itself is subject to further ‘unfulfillment’ and ‘falsity’ to be revealed in the future, once this horizon is concretely realized into new propositions which will be themselves limited. Rather than the promises of an utopian, ‘startling new’, revelation of a new ‘truth’, he sees comparative, inter/tran/cross-cultural philosophizing as an imperfect exploration which can orientate the participants to the unforeseen in the direction of an ‘ought’ subject to the ever-continuing dissatisfaction of the ‘is’. In the context of intercultural philosophy (broadly conceived), in view of the dilemma between careful exegesis and free creative use (see 5.2.1), i.e. between the risk of sterile repetitions and reductive distortions, I find such a conception relevant. It avoids absolutizing an idea of truth (which configurates the dilemma between exactitude and novelty). Thus, it envisions alternatives as potential discoveries, while at the same time remains aware of the provisional and tentative way towards these discoveries. The carefulness is displaced from the object of study (the exegetic material) to the creativity itself (contemplating it as a limited attempt). Furthermore, it is the tension between the limits of a ‘not-knowing’ and the seeking for knowing, as a subject to dissatisfactions, which allows these discoveries, which means that it is a part of the ‘knowledge-enterprise’.

In the same dialogue with Maurice Friedman, Daya Krishna thus continues and goes so far as to determine the success of dialogue as depending on this tension, i.e. including ignorance as a condition, combined with a seeking that can enhance new knowledges.

“I think we can call anything a dialogue we choose to. But how does it illumine or help us? After all, a term can be extended widely or narrowed according to one’s own convenience and cognitive purpose. I suggest that any significant encounter is not necessarily a dialogue. One can call it so if one so likes. To my mind it is perhaps the more useful if we confine the term initially to an interaction between persons who are finite and ignorant. They may have different levels of knowledge or information or understanding, but each of them, when they enter into a

dialogue assume, at least provisionally, that they do not know. That whatever each one knows, or thinks one knows, may possibly be wrong – that one is prepared to learn from the others who are participating in the dialogue. The initial proposition is certainly jigyasa, curiosity of knowledge. But all of us are curious, isn’t it? One of the tests of a successful dialogue, recognition, is when each person feels something new has occurred which one did not know before. That is, something new has occurred, and each person after the dialogue feels enriched primarily in the realm of recognition and understanding, and of course related to feeling which is to that something significant has occurred.

Therefore, I suggest, that the ideal of a dialogue between omniscient beings or between one omniscient being and a non-omniscient being – or, for example, between me and nature, between me and art is encountering. But I can show why it is that when there is a dialogue with the text that it is an entirely different kind of thing. A dialogue between, let me call finite, ignorant, desirous of knowing, human beings, who get together with the presupposition that they know, but do they really know? Their knowledge is incomplete, partial. Each one contributes to it. This is the whole thing. So many good points have been made around the table, but they have not been taken up. They have not been developed. Their significance has not been seen as complimentary to each other, leading to a deeper depth of understanding the issue.

I further suggest, that though it is true, we can always widen it or narrow it down, but for the present context, it would be more useful if we accept that a dialogue is between finite ignorant beings desirous of knowing, desirous of learning, sharing a common experience, an endeavor and seeking, where each contributes and each learns from the other.717

Disagreeing with the intrinsic relation of dialogue with knowledge presented here, Maurice Friedman responded to Daya Krishna by designating this definition in Buberian terms as “technical dialogue” (thus, qualifying dialogue in such a view as purely informative and lacking the sense of ‘between’ of the I and Thou). He interpreted it as a limitation of dialogue per se to the realm of knowledge. It is interesting to note here that Friedman’s rather critical and (as felt by the other participants) abrupt answer (see 6.3 for a longer analysis) to Daya Krishna’s stance seems to have hindered the dialogue in which Daya Krishna was explicating the ‘success’ of dialogue, to the extent that Friedman in a postscript, characterizes the dialogue as “as much of a mismeeting as a meeting”.718 This constitutes in my view an example of the dissatisfaction between apprehension and realization of dialogues themselves, the more concrete occurrences of which will be studied in the next section (6.3). Values are structurally deceptive, the tension between persons as seekers faces dissatisfactions of her/his knowledge, and dialogues themselves as a mode of encounter are subject to the same dissatisfying tension. Focusing at the moment on what Daya Krishna actually attempted to delineate in the above quote, I want to question the rather contra-intuitive idea that ignorance of the participants can be part of characterizing dialogue as ‘successful’. Participants for a dialogue are above defined as “finite ignorant beings desirous of knowing, desirous of learning, sharing a common experience, an endeavor and seeking”: the tension between the ideality of reaching a completeness is immediately and intrinsically connected to the reality of our finitude, from where the dissatisfaction as mainspring for engaging in dialogue operates.

718 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 284.
Furthermore, Friedman, probably unaware of Daya Krishna’s wide and unconventional use of ‘knowledge’, misunderstood the broader sense implied here due to which he designated the definition as ‘technical dialogue’ operating as a cognitive exchange of information. In Daya Krishna’s terms, ‘desirous of knowing’ entails ‘desire’ and an ‘endeavor’ which respectively imply feeling (which is also the “feeling which is to that something significant has occurred” for characterizing its success) and action. This term encompasses the actions of engaging, communicating, debating, discussing, dialoguing made conjointly by all participants. The result of this subtle operation unveils (this time, formulated in positive terms) the ‘success’ of a dialogue, when something new emerges. It is easy to see that ‘success’ does not stand far away from ‘dissatisfaction’, since the participants, even together, will not reach this ‘complete’ knowledge towards which they strive and are thus bound to be dissatisfied with their findings and feel the urge to question them again. Thus, even a successful dialogue remains limited by the ideal dimension of ‘ought to’ in comparison to what it is. But the success, as momentary as it ought to be, caught up by the puruṣārtha of knowledge, is qualified exclusively in terms of novelty. Of course, the first question to arise is how to determine novelty and success, in particular in Daya Krishna’s context of dialogues between traditions and disciplines. In such a context, novelty and success cannot be defined quantitatively, i.e. they cannot be measured, and they cannot be logically deduced from the setting of the dialogue, i.e. they are not predictable. On the contrary, they both are ‘felt’ and belong to the same valutational desire. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine externally of the success and novelty of a certain dialogue, except in the sense of what it brings about for the participants and the further readers of their transcriptions. But similarly, it relativizes criticisms such as Halbfass (see 3.4) claiming that no significative change can (ever? in all cases?) be brought by the setting of the samvāda experiments. The notion of ‘success’ will rather depend on the answer each participant would make to the questions: ‘Did I learn anything? Did I make a meaningful encounter? Do I think anything differently?’

There seems to be no definite evaluation possible of the regulative idea entailed in puruṣārtha and no ‘objective’ criteria to assert the results. The only possible criteria that I can imagine would be to see whether the dialogue reflects the intentions and seekings that initiated it at the first place. Again, the answer might vary according to different participants, but in practice, this could thwart the ‘lectures’ that are given under the name of dialogue when the participants rather transmit their knowledge than question it with the other participants. In that sense, the preparations and post-reflections are necessary for the dialogue itself, as a kind of possible intersubjective evaluation on the gains and the gap between apprehension-realization (and further apprehensions). I will come back on these phases on dialogue in 6.3. What such a view in general outlines is the necessity of relating dialogue-theory to a praxis in emphasizing the subjective feeling of its seekers (de facto, it also happens that some participants will be ‘satisfied’ while others will not). Thus, I could agree with the view that Daya Krishna’s definition of knowledge is purely cognitive (with the limits that it implies) if and only if ‘cognitive’ is itself understood in an encompassing way including knowledge as a puruṣārtha and composed by questions rather than śāstric knowledge.
6.2.2. Seeking Knowledge: Personal Attitudes and Transcendental Orientation

The ‘ignorance’ or more broadly formulated, the incompleteness of knowledge has another advantage which is crucial for dialoguing and of high relevance for Daya Krishna: the possibility to ‘question’. A genuine question - one that is neither raised to expose one’s own research or vastness of knowledge, nor to diminish the other’s position - expresses both the limits of one’s knowledge (I ask for further clarifications) and my seeking for knowledge (I am genuinely interested in thinking further such a problem). It locates my ignorance as well as ideally results in a possible realm for exploring what I don’t know yet. Thus, the epistemological limits open a desire and a will. In Daya Krishna’s texts, we always meet these dimensions together. Unlike most academic philosophers, Daya Krishna’s writings rarely appear as a ‘complete’ work. We do not encounter a definite and achieved ‘research program’, a list of classifications and definitions which would categorize the realm studied, a systematic approach encompassing all resources on a topic, a language that would be so carefully composed or poetic enough to be self-relying, or a ‘conclusion’ which would summarize and close the investigation. On the contrary, each work could be ‘criticized’ for its incompleteness, further references could be added, the language could also sometimes be sharpened, the topic ‘rounded’ and systematized, and the question ‘answered’.

But that, precisely, would hinder the dialogue with Daya Krishna’s text. This is not an excuse to try to legitimate an ‘insufficient’ work. But saying that Daya Krishna’s work is not ‘complete’ or even not ‘perfect’ highlights the necessity to question why we expect a work to be ‘perfect’ by appearing ‘complete’ in the sense above described. Is a ‘perfect’ work not imperfect in a dialogical perspective, since in the painstaking entreprise to look perfect, it would simply try to hide the momentary stage of the knowledge it contains and prevent further questions? Is the outlook of perfectness not an indirect way to avoid exposing one’s presuppositions? Daya Krishna’s texts are ‘achieved’ in that they have reached a certain state of completion, which aims at satisfying enough research

719 Daya Krishna continuously ‘asks’ questions to which he either tries to provide an attempted answer, or that he underlines ‘for further research’ and ‘for further dialogical partners’. The formulations are diverse, such as ‘nobody has seen’, ‘it should be asked’, ‘what if’, ‘the question should be raised’, etc. It is impossible here to list all the variations and references, but I want to give an example that fits the discussion on values (emphasis is mine): “That knowledge, whatever be its source or nature, provides a basis for living and should have raised the question of the relation between sense-organs (jnānendriyas) and motor-organs (karmendriyas). But epistemological reflection on the problem of knowledge has, for some reason, failed to come to grips with the problem in spite of the fact that pravṛtti-sāmartya (the capacity of knowledge to lead to successful action) and the relation of knowledge (jnāna) to liberation (mokṣa) have played a significant role in Indian thinking on the subject just as the centrality of “cash-value” of ideas on the operational theory of meaning has done in the western tradition. But whether it be pravṛtti-sāmartya, “cash value of ideas”, or the operational theory of meaning, they all (…) surreptitiously give a direction to the enterprise of knowledge which it would not have had otherwise. Besides this, it also thrives on the unasked question as to how such a formulation would avoid the fallacy of “affirming the consequent”, even if one accepts that the notion of success can be defined in such a way as to suggest that the knowledge on which it was based was true. Perhaps, the insight involved in these formulations has to be disengaged from the notions of success or cash value, and seen in a different way. The crucial question perhaps is whether the idea of knowledge can even be thought of without involving some sort of activity intrinsic to it and varies with the type of knowledge that it is.” Daya Krishna, “Definition, Deception and the Enterprise of Knowledge,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 146.
to have thought a certain topic anew and have outlined the ‘further research to be done’. The distinction might be difficult to trace sharply. But I find it significant to underline the horizontal values of a work in terms of its ‘wideness’, i.e. the openness that “comprise agenda for further research” as Daya Krishna formulates it. This means understanding a work as a (serious) occasion to engage with a certain discourse without closing it at the same time.

Thus, besides Daya Krishna’s own way of writing/thinking, the capacity to ‘question’ originates from a sense of wonder and doubts and must necessarily go beyond the given systematic knowledge to be able to interrogate its premises, its beliefs and its postulates, which is precisely easier when one faces an external perspective in dialogue. But besides the epistemological externality, this capacity also originates from a genuine ‘desire’ for knowledge, i.e. from a valutional seeking, expressed above by Daya Krishna in terms of ‘open minds’ and ‘other-consciousness’. This implies a basic awareness of the other as a potential knower, as an ‘opportunity’ for thinking further which belong to the neglected but deciding ‘surroundings’ and ethos of dialogue. In other words: although the context and conditions for dialoguing are usually seen as philosophically irrelevant, the attitude of a seeker constitutes the conditions of possibility for new questions to occur (as analyzed in the concrete cases of the samvāda experiments in 2.2.2). More explicitly in Daya Krishna’s own terms:

“The roots of creativity in all fields, including that of thinking, are unknown and perhaps unknowable in principle, at least in the usual sense in which ‘knowing’ is generally used. Yet, one of the preconditions for creativity to manifest itself is the giving up of the mistaken belief that it is confined only to certain persons, or periods, or countries, or civilizations, and that the rest are only doomed to repeat or approximate what they have achieved. The belief that every human being is capable of entertaining a new thought, of asking a new question, of seeking a new problem is almost an a priori condition for fostering creativity and letting it emerge in the life of the mind. This means that people have to be encouraged to ask questions, to see problems and to attempt solutions, and that what they attempt in this regard it treated with genuine respect.

Many a time, the person who asks the questions, sees the problem and attempts a solution does not know the significance of what he has asked or seen or attempted. It is, or should be, the function of those who can see a little farther ahead, to see the potential directions for thought that are implicit in them. But such a situation can only emerge when the people who pose questions, formulate problems, and attempt solutions are not afraid of making themselves appear foolish or ridiculous or ignorant. This, however, depends on an atmosphere that is just

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720 Several of Daya Krishna’s monographs end with such a proposition, such as ‘Problems and Issues still remaining to be explored in Intellectual History from Eighteenth Century upto the Present Time,’ in Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western.; ‘The Possible Extension of the Methodology for the Understanding of Other Texts in the Indian Tradition’, followed by ‘Conclusion’ and ‘The Text of the Nyāya Sūtras: Some Problems’, in Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras.

721 I refer here to a posthumous publication edited by R. S. Bhatnagar, which collected the questions, agenda for research and topics evoked in the Journal of Indian Philosophical Research when Daya Krishna edited it. These agendas are not part of his own monographs but show the extent of Daya Krishna’s commitment for provoking further research rather than relying on (his) already-accomplished works. Daya Krishna and Bhatnagar, Agenda for Research in Indian and Western Philosophy.

the opposite of what normally obtains in most institutions devoted to the fostering and
development of intellectual life today.”

It is interesting to notice that “the roots of creativity of thinking are unknowable” and at the
same time, that an a priori condition for it lies in a ‘belief’ in the capability of creativity. Is this
belief a presupposition or an evaluation? I think it should be postulated as an epistemological
presupposition to engage in dialogue, but the act of postulating a human capability to generate
new questions is in itself related to the intrinsic ideal tension of the ‘ought’ and the desire to
seek knowledge. But what do we ‘ought’ to know, and what is the ‘ought’ of knowledge? The
impossibility for Daya Krishna to accept a fixed classification of ‘ought’ is significant here,
since closing the discussion on what we ‘ought’ to know is also closing the dialogue. The first
section (6.1) showed how the ‘ought’ itself ‘ought’ to be discussed not to become dogmatic.
Does that mean that there are no criteria for determining who to engage with, on which topic
and in which way? Not all suggestions, orientations and argumentations will be fruitful in
dialogue, for the criteria lie in the ability to ‘respond’ that is given to it. ‘Desiring’, ‘seeking’ to
know and seeing knowledge as value does not mean to jettison intransigence or intellectual
rigor, as it might appear first for those who associate knowledge with a quest for absolute
objectivity: dialoguing does not mean compromising with knowledge, but conceiving
knowledge as a collective creation:

“If we accept the notions of action and thinking, we’re also going to accept notions of what we
call relevant delimitation of the field. If I’m acting in a particular domain, then certain things
are relevant and certain things are irrelevant. Similarly in the realm of thought – certain
questions simply don’t make sense. What I’m suggesting is that this notion of the delimitation
or segregation of relevant and irrelevant which belongs both to the realms of action and
thought, has to be distinguished from the concept of wholeness or the partialness of the self
from which it flows. This capacity which we choose to delimit or segregate is the heart of the
matter with which we are concerned. If we take this into account, then when do we describe
the action as moral? The world of action is where the world consciousness is other-
centered, and the other happens to be a living being whatever one believes.”

I understand ‘relevant’ here in the sense of being able to create responses and reactions rather
than in terms of truth or validity, i.e. rather in terms of collective implications than in objective
qualifications. Thus, rather than an a priori norm or a universally applicable validity of the
arguments, the criteria are seen in terms of ‘effectivity’ and ‘creativity’ which both refer to the
realm of action and realization above presented. Daya Krishna therefore shifts the constitution

723 Daya Krishna, 32.
724 I would like to add a linguistic remark here: in English, French and German, a ‘compromise’ (un compromis,
ein Kompromiss) indicates a rather positively connoted term of coming to an agreement after a dispute with
conflicting opinions by mutual concessions. One ‘reaches’ a ‘compromise’ in the intellectual engagement with
others (which is, however, not Daya Krishna’s objective since it concludes the dialogue). However, the same
substantive acquires a rather pejorative connotation as a verb ‘to compromise’ (compromettre, kompromittieren)
where the meaning of reaching a compromise is doubled by the nuance of lowering one’s expectation in order to
settle down an issue (or refusing to lower them), and even by possible meaning of bringing someone into danger.
In Hindi, samjhaata (compromise) can have the same connotations. This, as a linguistic example, shows the
difficulty of seeing the act of engaging into a dispute, discussion or dialogue as an epistemological gain and as a
‘positive’ model for constituting knowledge. It also outlines how counter-intuitive it is to consider the benefit of
others for thinking in dialogue and for accepting the idea of ‘intersubjective knowledge’.
of knowledge from an extrinsic and objective approach to an intrinsic approach, insisting on the subjects and persons constituting knowledge. In including a seeking of knowledge, he underlines the agents creating knowledge. He therefore includes action in the constitution of knowledge. These actions are not pure acts, they are also influenced by feelings (desires) which ground their motives. Seeking for knowledge involves therefore these three dimensions of consciousness: the subject acting towards knowledge and the feeling originating the desire for knowledge.

“The crucial question perhaps is whether the idea of ‘knowledge’ can even be thought of without involving some sort of ‘activity’ which is intrinsic to it and varies with the type of knowledge that it is. ‘Knowledge’ surely is not of one type, and the difference in this must affect not only the way it is acquired or comes into being, but also that which it inevitably must give rise to, as ‘effectivity’ of some sort is generally supposed to be one of the characteristic of reality, besides others. Knowledge always requires some sort of ‘activity’, even if it be only of ‘attending’ which is minimally required in any ‘knowing’ or ‘learning’ process, as it itself is a part of the process, a resultant of some previous activity of knowing and giving rise, in its own turn, to further knowing and thus engendering a chain which may be broken at any moment, but which is unending in principle. And, strangely, even ‘knowledge’ has to be known, understood, interpreted, disputed, debated and discussed, not only by others but even by oneself as the entreprise of knowledge is as unending as all other enterprises, both for oneself and everybody else.”726

Daya Krishna’s insistence on seeking knowledge as something unfulfilled is obvious throughout his work. Fallibility, unpredictability, dissatisfaction, indeterminacy, uncertainty are concepts grounding his approach. It also at the same time deprives anybody the privilege of knowledge, also tackling in so doing the traditional exclusion of ‘Indian philosophy’ from the rational ‘philosophy’ (originating in the Western hemisphere) and the exclusion of any caste or gender from the knowledge-entreprise:

“Knowledge does not belong to anybody, even though one says, ‘I know’ and philosophers make a distinction between ‘knower’, ‘known’ and ‘knowledge’ or, as they say in Sanskrit jñātā, jñeya and jñāna. Those who made the distinction forgot that knowledge was a collective, cumulative affair of humankind, and if it had to be regarded as ‘belonging’ to anybody, it would be to the humankind as such, and not to this or that ‘I’. But humankind includes not only those who lived in the past, but those who will live in the future also. (...) Knowledge is an ongoing human enterprise, a collective puruṣārtha of humankind. But if it is so, it throws a light on the other puruṣārthas, the number of which is indefinitely large and not just four as enumerated in the Indian tradition, for if it were so ‘knowledge’ could not be a puruṣārtha as it has not been mentioned amongst them. A puruṣārtha is a matter of seeking, perennial seeking, as perennial as time itself, and hence not something that can be possessed, or meant to be possessed. But man does not seek just one thing; nor does he know what he seeks. Had he known this, he would not have been almost always dissatisfied, or even disappointed with the success that his ‘seeking’ temporarily results in.”727

Daya Krishna points here at the complex intermingling of time and space for knowledge and the tensions resulting from it: (śāstric) knowledge originates from a particular nexus that allows different conceptual structures and arguments, but it cannot be restricted to the context that enables its creation. Moreover, it is to be used and discussed by different historical and cultural generations of scholars, in which sense it cannot be owned by a single one. For this reason, considering the context in its different possibilities and variations, offers itself as a necessary resource (to avoid misunderstandings on the one hand, but even more to make the ideas in different contexts ‘usable’ for thinking further) but not as an invariable ‘truth’ that depends only on its context. Knowledge is thus transcendent and immanent at the same time. It originates from an individuality that characterizes it, which we can transcend (for example by writing in another language or on another culture, or by moving elsewhere to get influenced by another context). This does not mean that in doing so we abolish all limits, but these limits can be shifted: one experiences it for instance in writing in a foreign language, where we carry our own idioms and yet discover also other possibilities to express ourselves. Similarly, writing on other cultures does not erase our own cultural traces, but it enables us to question our own conceptual framework as well as the one we study. It is the intermingling of these two dimensions that prevents ownership. The independence/dependence of a concept to its conceptual nexus also explains the necessary intersubjectivity for Daya Krishna, which does not mean a rational agreement by all on a concept, but further effectuations or uses of the concepts. This questions what one ‘does’ with an idea, in particular as a reinterpretation into one’s own realm of ideas, which can question the initial realm and ‘ought’ to be further questioned by others in return.

It is now easy to understand how incompatible such an account of knowledge is with the concept of śruti or the revelatory authority from the foundational texts of a tradition. Exposing times and again the danger of authority for creative thinking - authority producing an exegetic limitation of interpretation, which can become dogmatic at times -, Daya Krishna extends the concept of śruti to all traditions. He analyzes how inconsistent the consequences of such an attitude are in his article ‘Is the Doctrine of Arthavāda Compatible with the Idea of Śruti? The Basic Dilemma for the Revelatory Texts of Any Tradition’ (emphasis is mine). What is relevant here for the present context are the implications that the concept entails for dialogue, since all philosophical traditions relate to foundational texts on which participants of dialogue draw their own argumentation. Thus, the authority of these texts constitutes a concrete hindrance to

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Raveh on his account of knowledge-without-certainty, I prefer here to relate knowledge with the dynamic of the dissatisfaction that connects it to the realm of value (as puruṣārtha), thus knowledge without certainty the creativity of which originates from the valuational dissatisfaction we encounter in reality when we actualize knowledge.

728 “There is, in fact, no problem the discussion of which does not end across the boundaries of a traditionally demarcated system. Yet, even though the fact is well known, its radical implications for the understanding, comprehension and presentation of philosophical thinking in India has not been seen. It is not the problems and the issues that are seen as central and the siddhantas of the so-called schools as peripheral, but instead the latter are viewed as central and the forms as peripheral. This is because the self-identification of the thinker is treated as more important than the problem he is concerned with. But, philosophically viewed, it is the latter that is important and not the former. The question, for example, of what is meant by ‘śruti’ and what is regarded as such is more important than the specific answer that a Mīmāṃsaka or a Vedāntika or a Naiyāyika or even a Buddhist or a Jain thinker gives to it. Once the situation is seen in this way, the distinction between the so-called ‘agāma’ and the ‘śruti’ will be seen as relating to the specificities of what is to be regarded as the foundational, authoritative text for a tradition.” Daya Krishna, “Towards a Field Theory of Indian Philosophy: Suggestions for a New Way of Looking at Indian Philosophy,” 20. See also 5.2.1.
philosophical dialogues since it prevents further ‘uses’ and delimits the meaning to the realm in which it occurs (for which then the question of truth is rather a question of correspondence to the text and the original context).

In that sense, it is first crucial to notice the importance of the “any tradition”. While the concept śruti has its own commentatorial tradition,729 it is first noticeable that in Daya Krishna’s extension of the concept, such a reverential attitude is not ‘religious’ in character: ‘religious’ in this sense would mean accepting the authority of a text, may it be via an oral revelatory tradition or a transmitted canon in view of one’s own belief into or of one’s belonging to the tradition in which it is proclaimed as authority.730 Thus in such a view, for example, a Heideggerian, a Kantian or even a ‘Daya Krishanian’ can share the same attitude towards their referential texts as a devout Christian to the Bible. Furthermore, and most importantly, this extension points at the relevance of the ‘attitude’ to the śruti. In other words, the problem does not lie in the revelatory character, in the orality or writtenness of the transmission, nor even in the historical context of the foundational text, or in the sacredness of the object itself, but in the way the exegetic attitude regards these texts and how their attitude influences their interpretation. The problem thus lies in the person, and more precisely, on the valuational determinacy that is enforced on the texts:

“It is thus the attitude that creates the śruti; once the attitude changes and the so-called śruti is regarded as human creation, it no longer carries an aura of infallibility about it. It is seen for what it is, something full of inconsistencies, incoherences, contradictions, vain claims to truth that can easily been controverted by reference to counterevidence and fallacies inherent in the arguments given in support of it. It is not that one does not see the positive achievements and admire the insights or wonder at the skill displayed in the construction of the ‘Houses of Reason’ that the master built.

729 Notably discussed by Daya Krishna in the following article of the same collection with reference to the Mīmāṁsā tradition, “The Mīmāṁsāka versus the Yājñikā: Some Further Problems in the Interpretation of Śruti” Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 228–44, also published together with further articles on the topic ‘Mīmāṁsā before Jaimini: Some Problems in the Interpretation of Rule in the Indian Tradition’ and Śyena yāga: The Achilles Heel of Śruti in the Indian Tradition, in Daya Krishna, New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy, 69–126.

730 “The notion of a ‘secular śruti’ may appear to be a contradiction-in-terms. After all, it is only in the context of some infallible authority, whether divine or superhuman or even human beings who had attained perfection such as the Mahāvīra and the Buddha that we normally speak of śruti. Ultimately, it is the attitude of the believers that determines what is to be regarded as śruti, and not the source from which it is supposed to emerge. After all, even the authority of God has not been able to convince the believers in the rival traditions of revelations as the Jewish, Christian, Islamic worlds, or those that have occurred in the Indian tradition. There is, thus, no basic difference between the nonsecular śrutis and the secular śrutis except perhaps in the fact that the latter have generally not had the comprehensiveness and the coercion of the former, at least till recent times. (...) Marx, however, stands only midway between the two extreme poles of śruti, which may be called the ‘sacred’ and the ‘secular’, as he is too closely associated with the coercive power of the state and the prophetic mode of thinking, which is so common with those streams of the śruti that derive from the Hebrew tradition. The secular version becomes more apparent in the attitude displayed by those who call themselves Wittgensteinians, Kantians, Hegelians, or the many other varieties of them, as there is no question here either of using of coercive power of the state to persecute or convert those who do not agree with the way one understand the ‘master’.” Daya Krishna, “Is the Doctrine of Arthavāda Compatible with the Idea of Śruti? The Basic Dilemma for the Revelatory Texts of Any Tradition,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 220.
One cannot read a Plato or Kant or any other great thinker without these feelings at every step, but once one sees all texts as human creations the attitude remains the same, appreciative and critical at the same time. One is prepared to learn and learns all the time. But one is also dissatisfied at every page and turn of the argument. One sees through the little tricks that the master has played and, though one excuses them, one is not taken in by them.

The same thing happens to the Vedas, Upanisads, the Gītā or the Qur’ān, the Bible, the Torah or any of the other innumerable texts reversed as revelation by the devotees or the disciples who can not bear to treat or think them otherwise. It is true that the attitude to these is built-in almost from the moment of one’s birth, as one is always born into a family and a community that treats them as such and thus, one can hardly even think of treating them otherwise. (…) But most members of such communities are aware, however dimly, that there are persons belonging to other communities who do not regard those sacred texts in the same way. And they obviously do not see these sacred texts of other communities in the same manner as the members of that community do. Paradoxically each sees the holes in the other’s claim but somehow fails to see them in one’s own.”

This ‘attitude’ is of utmost importance in a dialogue, for it is here that the epistemological consideration of presuppositions and knowledge remains insufficient if understood as the sole component of a dialogue - that is, if we restrict dialogue to the level of argumentation. Knowledge and its presuppositions are communicated via a certain attitude from which possibilities and hindrances arise. A reverential attitude to a given tradition is certainly the most difficult obstacle, for it cannot be changed externally by way of argumentations. It is only concerned with an embodied internal self-consciousness which acts according to certain values. On the other hand, the ‘reverential’ attitude hides another mechanism of evaluation commonly understood as ‘epistemic authority’: in the reverence to the foundational text, one actually bows to the authority carried by the ‘author’ or the authorless revelation which is either granted absolute truth, or at least of a higher reliability and higher truth. By referring to and holding to such an authority, one aims to associate her/his own statements with the general and encompassing truth-claim of the reference. This, naturally, impedes the dialogue, since it all happens as if the statement of the speaker cannot be questioned due to the epistemic authority contained in the reference (which the speaker might well interpret in her/his own way for the sake of the argument).

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731 Daya Krishna, 219.
732 See the example given by Ralph Weber, who considers the variations of authority granted to the statement “Swiss chocolate is no longer produced in Switzerland”, claimed either 1) by “someone”, by 2) “many”, by 3) “Ralph” or 4) by “the press officer of Chocosuisse, the Association of Swiss Chocolate Manufacturers”. Besides the difference granted according to ‘quantity’ between 1 and 2, he notes regarding 3 that “if, however, the New York café goer utters the third statement (…), you perhaps would be inclined to believe this person if you knew that I was from Switzerland and was generally considered to be a very trustworthy epistemic authority regarding Switzerland. If you did not know Ralph, the person could as well have said that “someone” has said that… But if you did know him, I hope that the epistemic authority of that speaker would be increased qualitatively, as if many more people were saying what she is saying. If you think my authority in this domain to be at best questionable, then think of how many in philosophy cringe at somebody replying: “but Confucius himself said that” or “Immanuel Kant has said that”: is that not as if a thousand people standing on the speaker’s shoulders were shouting at you? (…) It is not a higher number that caries (mistakenly or not) authority, but that one and same number might be invested with different levels of authority.” Ralph Weber, “Authority: Of German Rhinos and Chinese Tigers,” in Comparative Philosophy without Borders, ed. Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber (London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 163–64.
However, ‘epistemic’ authority can be a misleading expression. ‘Epistemic’ refers here to the external reference in the realm of knowledge to which we grant authority. The operation through which this authority is generated is, however, valuational in character and precisely outlines how the generation of epistemic knowledge is intermingled with a valuational judgment. The other side of the same coin outlines the prejudices related to someone’s academic ‘rank’ (i.e. the authority associated to a certain social hierarchy), cultural or social origins, or gender. The reverential attitude is thus not limited to textual acknowledged resources but stratifies the academic environment in the sense of subtle and yet prevalent authority-claims, granted differently to the participants. While the authority can qualitatively increase according to one’s reference, it can also immediately (i.e. non-reflectively based on socially ‘given’ assumptions) decrease on the basis of the ‘persons’ in dialogue. Here the ‘epistemic’ authority includes the institutional dimension of values as discussed above, i.e. the apparition of deceptive social realities having their roots in the given values of a society. For dialogue and debates, the ‘name’ (including her/his ‘fame’) can influence the motivation to participate in the first place, as does the engagement in terms of the sincerity and honesty of the responses in ‘taking seriously’ the other. It can also lead again to a bare closure of the discussion refusing to engage with X or Y. The difficulty referred to by M. P. Rege to convince some pandits to participate in a dialogue with philosophers trained in the Western traditions reminds us of the very concrete consequences of such a sense of epistemic authority, as does the more widely acknowledged difficulty to include traditional Indian philosophers in Western institutions. The valuational assumptions lying at the core of epistemic authority justifies speaking instead of “epistemic injustice”. In an article on this topic, Ralph Weber uses the example of the encounter between Wittgenstein and Russell while the latter was already an acknowledged professor and the former, an “unknown German (…), speaking very little English (…) [who] turned out to be a man who had learned engineering at Charlottenburg.” (Russell’s own description). This was enough reason to refuse to take Wittgenstein’s philosophical position seriously. It is unfortunately obvious enough to extend the example to various prejudicial cases, but it is even more interesting to consider that this example can retrospectively easily denounce Russell’s attitude, because Wittgenstein has now himself acquired a status of ‘epistemic authority’ so that ‘Wittgenstein said that’ is an authoritative-claim equating to thousand people shouting at you (as described in the proceeding footnote). This make the case easy to decipher, the prejudice easy to locate, and Russell’s reticence easily dismissable (later by himself too). But what about the countless others who have been and will be refused authority or access to dialogue because of a lack of a posteriori granted recognition? How to account for their authority hic et nunc? Weber engages in an ethics of dialogue, which I believe was not Daya Krishna’s theoretical concern. He indeed was voluntarily trying to integrate different

733 In introducing the samväda experiment of Pune, M. P. Rege gives an overview of the philosophical situation of India, focusing in particular on the exclusion of pandits from the Indian academia and the lack of discussion between isolated philosophical communities. He also notes the responsibility incumbing to pandits in this process, leading to a partial self-exclusion from the realm of discourse: “One must recognize that this geographical isolation was itself partly the result of the mental isolation into which the Brahmins had retreated owing to pride based on ignorance. They, perhaps, took unduly seriously the boast of the Mahābhārata that in matters of dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa what is not here is not to be found elsewhere.” Daya Krishna et al., Samväda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xxiii.


735 Weber, 155.
philosophical communities to the practical experiments that he conducted. However, he refused to offer an a priori normative framework which would be subject to the same dissatisfaction once it is fixed into a set of rules to automatically apply in all contexts. Daya Krishna rather emphasizes the ‘encounter’ or the meeting of the person than a proper ethic, for the living person can relativize the authority of the texts:

“The presence of the person, in a sense, transcends all that he has written and, to a certain extent, even negates it. But that is not what we are interested in here. Rather, it is the person actually thinking before us, and the relation of this to his finished thought that we read earlier in his writings, that I am interested in for the present. And the contrast here is almost as great as between the person and the thought that he thinks or the action that he does. Seeing the thought arising, so to say, before our very eyes is to see it in a different way than when one finds it finished, frozen, congealed between the covers of a book. The latter appearance is deceptive, but its deceptiveness is grasped more easily if one has the thinker thinking before oneself, even if it be only for a little while. After one has experienced it, everything becomes fluid once again – tentative, hesitant, provisional – subject to revision and counter-revision."

This of course cannot answer the problem of the prejudices that would prevent these persons to have at first a right to speak, or to come to speak. It only considers how the presence relativizes the authority once s/he is already ‘speaking’. Other strategies have to be developed to tackle this problem, which I believe was his practical concern in the samvāda experiments, and for which I do not find an explicit theoretical answer in his writings. On the other hand, it also shows the limits of any systematic theory of dialogue or ethics of dialogue which would aim at providing a normative framework for all dialogues. This uncertainty and the dissatisfaction that is bound to occur are an intrinsic part of any dialogue. It is for this reason that I consider it to be crucial to consider theories of dialogue concurrently with practical dialogical forms, and in particular to conceive of every settings and framework ‘step by step’ and experience by experience, since they need to be re-thought after their being experience. This ‘unready-made’ aspect of dialogue is another locus for its creative potential, for it can be re-imagined at every instance, and will turn out to be differently (even if always deceptively). It also shows how values differ in a dialogical context: neither as a priori set-up values (the most extreme form of which would be the Platonic ideas), nor as a formal systematic theory, not even in terms of virtues or normativity (à la Habermas). Rather, Daya Krishna accentuates the movements and valuational processes. He proceeds by describing the dynamic underlying the coming into existence of such prejudices while tackling them practically by organizing further dialogues, truthful to the dynamic itself between apprehension and realization.

This can explain, I think, the difference of the relevance of authority for dialogue that Weber specifies when he analyzes that “the issue, however, runs deeper.” He continues:

“On the one hand, epistemic authority as conscious and voluntary renunciation of any and all opposition seems to preclude any dialogue, and certainly any debate. Dialogue and debate are all about reacting. On the other hand, epistemic authority as that which should be granted to

any interlocutor understood in his or her capacity as a potential knower, seems to be a condition of any dialogue and debate.”

Interpreting Daya Krishna freely, I would hypothesize that he would rather refute the second term, or maybe modify it into ‘epistemic trust’. Authority immediately brings about an unequal condition while ‘trusting’ that someone can know, can think, can ask a question (even if s/he does not know) might create some new insights and open new directions toward which the dialogue can lead. Thus, for Daya Krishna, ‘bracketing’ the authority or rejecting one’s own and other’s authorities for taking the risk of trusting the other’s ability to reflect, seems more adequate to his ‘human’ epistemic account. Attitudes also shape dialogues. because of this, the external normative influence to be exercised on attitudes to internally transform them is very limited. The normativity is rather imposed on the participants in a certain setting. Such a normativity cannot be detached from the particular setting in which it is established, nor universally settled. It is subject to the same dissatisfaction and uncertainty.

This uncertainty characterizes the dialogue, according to which a meeting can become fruitful (everybody can remember ‘meeting’ someone in a dialogue whose open-mindedness was pleasantly fertile for thinking a problem anew), and of course, can turn into dogmatic repetition of a certain orthodoxy impeding any dialogue. Between these two poles lie most of the concrete dialogues in which an implicit agreement is established to ‘tolerate’ certain attitudes. Beyond the obvious (like violence and personal offenses), who and what determines what can be ‘tolerated’ or not in a dialogue, how to address someone or not, what can be said and what cannot? Answering this would imply a common understanding upon which to agree. How to create an ‘understanding’ between attitudes which precisely fall out of the cognitive hermeneutics, i.e. a non-verbal and non-cognitive understanding of the attitudes and of their interactions? Can there be a hermeneutics in the realm of actions and values? Daya Krishna raises further problems in this regard:

“Comprehension, however, presupposes that there is something preexistent which is to be understood or comprehended. It, thus, commits oneself to a metaphysics or ontology which gives primacy to the idea of Being. On the other hand, the idea of possible effectuation through a conceptualisation which is both creative and critical at the same time brings not ‘Being’ but that which ‘ought-to-be’ into the centre of thought. It, thus commits one to a thinking which gives primacy to the idea of value or the good which, in this context, mean the same thing.”

Comprehension and understanding thus presuppose a common rational normative framework preexisting for all participants. It presupposes to share the same conceptual structure rooted in similar philosophical traditions, or to sufficiently master the intellectual pre-requirements of a tradition to understand the coming-into-being of a certain way of thinking. For instance, to understand a philosophical conference on Heidegger’s philosophy requires some philosophical knowledge on Heidegger, but even more importantly the broader context of his philosophy, implying Greek philosophy. The implicit amount of pre-required knowledge (which is also

unequal, since as Daya Krishna elsewhere notices, nobody is “embarrassed”\textsuperscript{739} of not knowing K. C. Bhattacharyya, while knowledge of Heidegger and his context belongs to the presupposed ‘philosophical’ culture) concretely explains M. P. Rege’s comment when introducing the Pune experiment (already quoted in 3.3.1). There he justifies the choice of Russell as a starting point:

“I selected Russell’s theory of the nature of proposition as presented in his \textit{Principles of Mathematics} as the subject of the dialogue because it represents something like an attempt to make a new beginning in philosophical analysis by turning one’s back on what has gone on before. I thought that it would therefore be comparatively easier to put the theory across to pandits as its exposition would not demand many references to the tenets and arguments of earlier schools and thinkers, and the points of agreement and disagreement between them. Also Russell’s realistic and analytical approach has an obvious affinity with that of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā.”\textsuperscript{740}

Furthermore, the prerequisites of knowledge in such an academic context also include the general rules of conducting a lecture in the context in which the lecture is delivered. This includes formal aspects such as the logical progression and the structure of the presentation. It thus rests on preexisting knowledge in the broad sense, which differs across philosophical traditions. I highlighted for instance the dialectic implied in the idea of counter-position (\textit{pūrvapakṣa}) (in 2.1.1 and 5.2), which can remind us of the Greek dialectic. However, this differs from the dogma of innovation of our contemporary academia, where the singularity of the idea is emphasized. To avoid remaining implicitly committed to the standards through which we have been trained, Daya Krishna shifts the relevance of understanding to the one of effectuating. This shift emphasizes less the (lone) mastering of what the understanding presupposes, than the possibility of intersubjectively achieving something different on the basis of various understandings. This possibility refers again to an ideality to be actualized. He does not mention dialogue at this place, but the practical relevance of philosophers in general. However, I believe this shift is also crucial for dialogue. Considering thinking and knowledge as a \textit{purusārtha} thus has the advantage of shifting our attention from preexisting categories of thinking and normative models to the uncertainty and the possibility of the ‘ought-to-be’. Within this idea of possible effectuation, comprehension plays a role without exclusively determining dialogue at the same time.

Thus, conceiving dialogue as a nexus of values, feelings and knowledge enables us to observe the constitution of knowledge itself as a result of its contextuality\textsuperscript{741} that implies the intersubjectivity forming it. For Daya Krishna, this is again not simply a question of personal taste or an empty label to define those who seek knowledge. The attitude of a seeker is also

\textsuperscript{739} Daya Krishna, “Encounters between Civilizations: The Question of the Centre and the Periphery.”

\textsuperscript{740} Daya Krishna et al., \textit{Saṃvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions}, xxv.

\textsuperscript{741} See Prasenjit Biswas’ comment: “More than establishing a first-order relationship between action and its immediate context, Daya Krishna examines the contextuality of such an act by positing how feeling, judging, telling, responding and such other acts take a ‘self-referential’ turn. Contextuality of an act lies in showing how the very act is a necessary part of the ‘context’. This, Daya Krishna poses contra-Kant, against the indispensability of a priori forms of intuition that transcend all the contexts of activity that spring from it.” Prasenjit Biswas, “Daya Krishna’s ‘Presuppositionless Philosophy’: Sublimity as the Source of Value and Knowledge,” in \textit{Philosophy as Saṃvāda and Svarāj: Dialogical Meditations on Daya Krishna and Ramchandra Gandhi}, ed. Shail Mayaram (New Delhi: SAGE, 2014), 140.
what determines knowledge, like the way philosophers think and use the texts determines knowledge and bears a mark on the particular culture in which such knowledge is produced. In the valutational conception of knowledge and in the correlation between apprehension and realization, knowledge is itself composed by the facts, actions and participants of knowledge, in which sense the attitude is an integral part of knowledge itself.

“What exactly is the role played by the ‘inner sense’ [in the Kantian sense] in relation to the seeking of knowledge, is the question that does not seem to have been raised in epistemological literature, which has dealt with the problem of knowledge. (…) These [the contents of the inner sense742], strangely, are not supposed to be of any relevance or significance to what is called ‘knowledge’ at the human level and its claim to be ‘true’. Yet sincerity, honesty, and objectivity are accepted by everybody to be the necessary prerequisites for any one engaging in the ‘knowledge entreprise’ or staking the claim that what he ‘claims’ to know is ‘true’. (…) Knowledge, thus, is essentially a ‘human’ achievement and depends, in a strange sense, on a ‘belief’ in the veracity and the trustworthiness of those who claim to know. Such a belief is a necessary prerequisite for knowledge and unless we try to understand what this belief is and what it presupposes or implies, we cannot understand what knowledge consists of. In other words, unless we understand what is meant to be ‘sincere’, ‘objective’, ‘truthful’ and ‘trustworthy’ we cannot understand what it means to know at the human level. Besides these, there has to be assumed a desire to impart the knowledge that one has, not to be secretive, to help others through knowledge for the good of mankind.”743

First, let me note here that a ‘belief in the veracity and trustworthiness of those who claim to know’ is not formulated in terms of ‘authority’, even if it bears the implications outlined by Ralph Weber above, i.e. the basic recognition that a seeker has something to say which is potentially true and an opportunity to think further. It is devoid of authority in the sense of being forced to accept the other’s thesis, but rather thought in terms of ‘trusting’ that there is something ‘valuable’ worthy of understanding, reacting upon and thinking ‘with’. While it might appear to be a simple variation of expression, it should not be so: Daya Krishna explicitly relates (in an omitted passage within this quote) to Śabda744 Pramāṇa745 in the context of the Nyāya Sūtra. While thinking what being a seeker means from (and beyond) this tradition, Daya Krishna vehemently refuses at the same time the ‘authority’ that is prescribed to the text.746 He

742 They “comprise such items as desires, feelings, emotions, imaginings, hopes, fears and all the other paraphernalia which constitute the human situations.” Op. Cit.
744 The problem concerning the definition of śabda is introduced elsewhere in the following terms: “Śabda as a pramāṇa is defined as the upādeśa of an āpta-puruṣa, but much of the discussion in the text does not seem to have any connection with this definition. The problem of eternity or non-eternity of śabda, for example, seems completely irrelevant to the definition offered by Gautama in the text. Thus, one has to find whether the term śabda means sound in general or word as spoken, or as the advice of a trustworthy person (āpta) for the well-being of the person concerned.” Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras, 18.
745 “Yet sincerity, honesty, and objectivity are accepted by everybody to be the necessary prerequisites for any one engaging in the ‘knowledge entreprise’ or staking the claim that what he ‘claims’ to know is ‘true’. The Indians called this Śabda Pramāṇa which has generally been dismissed by all ‘serious’ philosophers as being totally unphilosophical in nature. Yet all knowledge at the human level has to be necessary ‘human’ by definition and this involves someone’s claim that he knows about ‘something’. And such a claim is accepted if one has no reason to disbelieve or doubt what is said.” Op. Cit.
746 In his study The Nyāya Sūtras: A New Commentary on an Old Text, Daya Krishna attempts to show the contradictions that the commentatorial tradition brought in the text by restricting knowledge in view of certain authoritative prescriptions or addresses, subsequently relating āpta-puruṣa to the Vedas, to the Ayurveda and to
rejects the Vedic authority to which the text refers while at the same time exploring further how the idea of śabda could contribute to the discussion. He sees in particular an important insight in this concept in the notion of reliability of the source of the word that it brings, i.e. as trustfulness or trustworthiness.\(^{747}\) He thus continues as follows:

“But what does it mean to be Jijñāsu or seeker of knowledge or truth? The tradition has interestingly brought in the notion of adhikāra [competence, right to knowledge]\(^{748}\) in this connection. The term is so ambiguous and varied that it is not easy to pinpoint its exact meaning. There are examples of those who have interpreted it in the context of the Śruti in the Indian tradition and viewed the ‘right’ for the pursuit of ‘knowledge’ contained in it, that is of the Vedas in particular and the Vedic Corpus in general. The women and the sūdras were explicitly excluded from the right to pursue this knowledge. (...) In fact, the idea of adhikāra-bheda [the barrier between the privileged (those who have the right to know) and the subaltern (who are doomed not to be taught)] has been carried to extremes and whenever one does not wish to impart one’s knowledge to someone, one can always legitimize it by bringing in this notion into the picture, forgetting that ultimately it is the desire to know and learn which is the only thing one can demand of one who has come to learn from someone.”\(^{749}\)

Thus, for Daya Krishna, trustfulness belongs to knowledge, in particular in (spoken) dialogical knowledge, irrespective of one’s community. Secondly, the whole valuational dimension of attitudes seem to converge in both the responsibility for the realization of knowledge and in the creativity for generating knowledge itself, understood as the dynamic and anthropological constitution of knowledge. After this careful critique, Daya Krishna elaborates on the relevance of thinking jijñāsu (seeker of knowledge) for a ‘valuational epistemology’:

“The definitions given in the Nyāya Sūtra point out explicitly to a dimension of knowledge and truth which has not been noticed and paid attention to even by Indian commentators on the text. The term upadeśa [helpful advice] points to someone else, someone other than the person who knows and has been designated as āpta because of the fact that he knows. The ‘other’ in the definition is one who is desirous of knowing, one who wants to know or rather one who is a seeker of knowledge and truth. This is usually conveyed in the Indian texts by the terms Jijñāsā and Jijñāsu (...). But, there is a dimension of the term ‘seeker’ of knowledge and truth which has not been understood, for if it had been understood, the concept of āptapurusa [a trustworthy person]\(^{750}\) would not have been understood the way it has been in the tradition.”\(^{751}\)

\(^{747}\) See Daya Krishna, 27.

\(^{748}\) The Sanskrit translations of the quotes from this article are those provided by the editors in the reedition of this article in Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 165–77.


\(^{750}\) The editors add “in the context of the article, someone who knows that only through sharing knowledge is knowledge possible”. Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 177.

\(^{751}\) This relates to the critique evoked above. The problem is further expanded in his commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra: “However, one of the basic problem with respect to both upamāna and śabda does not seem to have been noticed and it is that the notions of ‘similarity’ and ‘reliability’ or ‘trustworthiness’ are fundamental to all knowledge as it is inconceivable without them. (...) As for śabda, one has to accept reliability and trustworthiness of even one’s own memory, let alone of that which is said by someone else. Knowledge is a collective entreprise and, in case it is so, śabda pramāna will have to be regarded as the most foundational in its acquisition. (…) Vācaspati Miśra introduces the notion of Īśvara in the context of śabda pramāna and in doing so destroys the notion of the “āpta puruṣa” in terms of which the śabda pramāna was defined by the author of the N.S. If Īśvara alone can be an āpta puruṣa then obviously there can be no other person or persons who can be given that
To put the point in another way, one may ask the question ‘Is one who “knows” not desirous of knowledge and truth?’ In other words, is the āptapurūsa not a Jījñāsu and if he is not, how can he be an āptapurūsa at all. The distinction between one who knows or claims to know and one who is desirous to know is after all a relative one. One who has ceased or stopped seeking truth or knowledge has already given up the puruṣārtha in which he was engaged as a human being, which, in a sense, defined him at least in respect of this dimension. The seeking for truth and knowledge is one of the puruṣārthas or ends of human life which defines what being human means, and if one has ceased to pursue this end, then, to that extent, one has ceased to be human.”

The distinction pointed out by Daya Krishna’s reading of the Nyāya Sūtra appears to me an (underestimated) crux of the matter: can ‘knowing’ be ‘achieved’ without ‘desiring to know’? What would even be the ‘achievement’ of knowledge, if not a transitory self-reflective organized conception of knowledge ready to be further completed and questioned? Can an expert, i.e. a knower of a field, in a ‘state’ of knowledge be without seeking this knowledge at the first place? And furthermore, can one be a knower, i.e. have achieved a ‘state’ of knowledge? What is even a ‘state’ of knowledge but the self-reflective analysis of what one has retrosively learned and thought until now, necessarily unfulfilled in regard of future findings? In which case, does the word ‘expert’ even make a sense, and are our conceptions of expertise in today’s academic context adequate to consider the knowledge-entreprise? If Daya Krishna’s conception is accepted (which might not be the case since it would question our entire conception of productive/rentable academic knowledge), is an expert not an ignorant seeking to know, desirous to question? Such an attitude could be coined as ‘epistemological humility’ which would convey an entry of the valutational realm into the epistemological.

I believe that Daya Krishna’s conception would encompass and admit the necessity of such a quality among what makes one āpta, but I think it bears further implications. Such an epistemological humility would be restricted to an ethical view of knowledge in which the virtue of dialogue relies on each participant. The ethical would be conditioned by the epistemological: one would need to act ethically with humility in order for knowledge to be open-minded and equal. However, in Daya Krishna’s reading of the Nyāya Sūtra, the epistemological depends on the valutational and vice versa. Knowledge is firstly produced because one is desirous to know, and this desire proves to be unfulfilled in reality which produces in return more seeking, which enhances more knowledge, etc. Secondly, ‘seeking’ is not restricted to one personal attitude but is part of the human consciousness. As Daya Krishna states, “if one has ceased to pursue this end, one has ceased to be human.” (op. cit.). By connecting knowledge itself to the vital force of human, i.e. to the very dynamic of fulfillment/unfulfillment of life, Daya Krishna makes of knowledge as a puruṣārtha a universal quest (with infinite forms) which grows from the particular limits of each individual engaged

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appellation. (...) The sutra 2.1.68 explicitly refers to Ayurveda as example to support the contention that there is such a thing as śabda pramāṇa but then Ayurveda will have to be regarded as the word of Īśwara and hence final in respect to what it deals with. This obviously will be difficult to maintain in face of the fact that the texts known as Ayurveda show unmistakable signs of additions and alterations even at the time when Vācaspati and Udayana were writing their commentaries.” Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras, 196.

in the collectivity of the universal desire. Desire is again here regulative. It does not exclude that some will refuse to listen or reject other’s positions. It is nevertheless grounded in the reflective nature of ‘humans’ and in their intersubjective process, as also analyzed by Prasenjit Biswas commenting on Daya Krishna:

“Value is created in terms of the Puruṣārthas without ascribing them to persons but to reflexive nature of being of humans that ‘mediates’ between oneself and another. Values are not subjective, they are a part of the ongoing process of subject’s domain of relationality and in this sense they are ‘objectifiable’ in the possibilities of relationship with the other. Daya Krishna explores this pregnant domain of values not in the sense of where ‘I’ resides, but in the sense of extending the capacities of the subject that gives it ‘freedom’ to ‘will’ and ‘imagine’ that can ‘re-live the fact [that] the other is also the center of his world’.”

I think that it is not possible to understand this ‘ongoing process’ without positing a regulative ideal of knowledge and truth, which is how I would understand ‘vāda’ in Daya Krishna’s dialogical perspective. The motivation to engage in dialogue originates at first from a belief that a ‘higher’ truth or knowledge or reality could be reached. However, this sense of truth entailed in vāda remains regulative, in the sense that it is the puruṣārtha dimension of knowledge that is emphasized. Secondly, there is no ‘liberation’ or ‘enlightenment’ to attain, except as a regulative ‘improvement’ understood as efficiency and creativity in generating new findings. Knowledge consists in succession of clarifications being questioned and clarified again. What is important here is rather the description of a certain path for knowledge and of knowledge, a desire which is universally conceivable and existentially realizable by each seeker. It goes much further than any ethical or moral depiction:

“But the realm of values is not exhausted by the moral or the ethical distinction alone; it pursues one relentlessly, questioning and asking if what is, is as it should be, for if it could be otherwise, it might not only be different but also more satisfying to oneself and others in more ways than one. Dr Mukund Lath has called this aucitya-bodha, meaning thereby that the inalienable and intrinsic property of self-consciousness which sees all that it is aware of in terms of what it is not, detached from the pleasantness or unpleasantness or even the neutral feeling that all consciousness-qua-consciousness usually has towards it. The term aucitya does not convey the negative centrality of this aspect of self-consciousness which finds itself perpetually dissatisfied with whatever is even if what is has been brought into being by its own activity.

753 I articulated elsewhere this productive tension between universal/local in the epistemology of counter-positions: “In this sense, the method of pūrvapakṣa rests on the tension between the concept itself and its incarnation, and between a will of conceptual universalisation implied in methodological counterpositions and the consciousness of its limitation implied by the other three dimensions. Without will of conceptual universalisation, counterpositions constitute unrelated philosophical alternative modes of thinking: alternatives to different philosophies, different philosophical traditions, or different philosophers/ opponents. These do not have to be correlated to assert some truth-values. Without existential limitation and empirical practice, there is a risk of reducing every philosophy, tradition, or concept to a universally and eternally applicable “essence”, a risk that Daya Krishna’s samvāda averts. The method of pūrvapakṣa enables therefore to think the relation between, on the one hand, conceptual universalisation and, on the other hand, its constant experience of its limits, inadequacy, or dissatisfaction, begetting thus the need to conceptualise anew through reciprocal reflection and modification. This tension constitutes the condition for alternative, critical, and creative pūrvapakṣas, which, being renewable in concrete dialogues, engage thereby further the significance and concept of samvāda itself.” Freschi, Coquereau, and Ali, “Rethinking Classical Dialectical Traditions. Daya Krishna on Counterposition and Dialogue,” 199.

This is what gives rise to that Angst or alienation or Entfremdung or being banished from the Garden of Eden, about which existentialists and some other modern thinkers have spoken. But though there has been much talk about it, it has not been adequately appreciated that intrinsic negation involved in self-consciousness not only gives rise to that dialectic, about which Hegel and Marx spoke in recent times, but also to this nagging, perpetual doubt about one’s own authenticity, honesty, and sincerity in talking about it all. One is never even sure whether one has done all that one could to meet the challenge posed by this awareness that something should be or ought to be and the obligations that it imposes on oneself to realize it or bring it into being.”

This sense of obligation is an existential one, one that we face in our own realization of incompleteness. It is related to all consciousness in the tension between being and becoming. Authenticity, honesty and sincerity are in this view not defined by an a priori rational and ethical framework imposed on a society or culture but belong to the consciousness’ sense of ‘ought’. Dialogues are an expression of this seeking for knowledge and the readiness to engage with others that results from this sense of ‘ought’.

6.2.3. The Freedom to Engage, the Freedom to Withdraw

The sense of obligation and the regulative ideal originating from the ‘ought’ of values are related to the concrete dissatisfactions of the experience from where the above described Entfremdung, Angst and alienation arise. Thus, the tension between the reality as it ought to be and the reality as it is creates two contradictory reactions. It gives rise simultaneously to a seeking liberation from the negativity of dissatisfaction by reaching a transcendental state that would equate the regulative ideal posited, and to the worldly feelings of Angst and alienation that originate from the confrontation of the dissatisfactions with the empirical world. This creates two directions, one ‘away’ from the contradictions of the world into a transcendental reunion of all broken identities and one ‘back’ to the world through the dissatisfactions of reality vis-à-vis the ideal. These two movements imply a different conception of time which is derived from a sense of ‘values’. The detachment from the worldly is an abstraction away from the distinctions or sequences of time, while the engagement in the world alternate between past,

756 See Daya Krishna’s definition of alienation: “What constitutes the ‘other’ is primarily the realm of persons with whom one comes in direct contact of some sort or other and who help, obstruct, fulfill or frustrate one, in the realm of feelings or of action or both, and who are thus objects of concern on the part of most persons most of the time. The realm of the Personal, then, to use a phrase of N. V. Banerjee, constitutes par excellence the realm of the ‘other’. This is the realm where one finds one’s heaven or hell, where one feels at home or alienated. The ‘other’, however, is not a bare ‘other’, but is socially structured at least in the first instance. One is born not merely into the world but into a world that is always socially structured and, to a large extent, socially interpreted. Yet, whatever structuring and interpretation there may already be, one has to restructure and interpret it once again in one’s own individual way. One is born, or as the existentialists say, thrown into the world, not just as a person but with a particular body, into a particular family, in a specific culture at a unique period of its historical development, and in a society which already has a fairly determinate system of role-expectations with a coordinate system of rewards and punishments. Each individual encounter these and has to come to terms with them and transcend them in his own way. The coming to terms never ceases nor, for that matter, does the need for transcendence. Between the alienation and the over-coming of alienation lies the eternal dialectic of man, at all levels and in all dimensions.” Daya Krishna, “Alienation, Positive and Negative,” 40–41.
present and future. Dissatisfactions are also the realization of the insufficiencies of the present and the unfulfillment of the past with regard to the infinite possibilities of the future. The ‘significance’ and the ‘meaning’ in particular associated with values as puruṣārthas are derived both from a retrospective understanding of the past’s transmitted knowledge and its present reinterpretation with regard to the errors and lacks to be revised and the enhancement of future knowledge. For Daya Krishna, these characteristics are also those of freedom:

“But, then, this prior question will have to be asked as to what is this ‘freedom’, or ‘liberation’, about which we are thinking in the human context, and whether it is so central as we tend to assume, or is just one value among others with which it has to be reconciled, as without that it itself may become meaningless, or stale and futile.

Perhaps the answer lies not in denying the practical or applied aspect of every ideal value that man pursues, but in ‘seeing’ that this aspect neither exhausts nor is essential to that which makes human life meaningful in itself in the context of temporality, which whatever one may say, is ‘felt’ by one as extending indefinitely into the future. Human life may only be given significance and meaning through the pursuit of something that is not only intrinsically unrealizable in time, but which is capable of being perceived as developing both quantitatively and qualitatively when seen retrospectively from the constantly moving vantage point of the present. The moment of retrospection appears far off from the ‘ideal’ as it ever was, and is ‘felt’ to be so.

Freedom shares both these characteristics, as it seems to be an ‘ideal’ value to be realized through action both at the individual and the collective level. However, it is also presupposed by any and every pursuit that man engages in, challenging us to ‘think’ about something that, though already achieved, is yet still to be achieved, and in that sense is never achieved, or can even possibly be achieved.

Out of socio-political reasons, out of revolt against the prevalent ‘mokṣa-centricity’ of Indian philosophy (which he sees as an escape from the worldly), but also out of philosophical belief

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757 "Time is not now a form of inner sensibility as Kant said, but a form of human action where the ‘future’ forms an immanent ingredient of the ‘present’ shaping it in the direction of that which is ‘desired’ and hence is regarded as ‘desirable’. The fallacy involved is necessary, as without this illusion action at the human level just can not be. (...) Time is now that in which purposes can be realized and ‘freedom’ shows its power to bend causality to achieve its ends which would have been dismissed as unreal by a consciousness that was confined to the immediacy of the present, and to that only." Daya Krishna, “Possible Worlds,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research XVIII, no. 2 (June 2001): 186.

758 The published version of the article says ‘steele’ instead of ‘stale’ (which I assume is a mistake of the edition). I follow the original unpublished manuscript, available at https://www.dayakrishna.org/c (p.22 of the unpublished document).

759 Similarly, the published version omits ‘human life’ and relates the end of the sentence to the previous one. I here also follow the original manuscript.

760 The published version varies: “though capable of being seen as developing, both quantitatively and qualitatively when seen retrospectively from the constantly moving vantage point of the present, yet appears as far off from the ‘ideal’ as it ever was, and is ‘felt’ to be so”. Daya Krishna, “The Cosmic, Biological, the Cultural Conditionings and the Seeking of Freedom,” 144–45. There are further minor grammatical variations in the quote, which however do not modify the meaning.

761 Daya Krishna, 144–45. (for the published version); p.22-23 for the online unpublished version.

762 This refers to the caste and gender exclusion that operated in-reserving ascetism (conceived as withdrawal from the world) as mentioned in relation to mokṣa in the Brahmanical tradition in 6.1. See: “There is, in fact, another dimension to this problem of asceticism and its relation to freedom. Asceticism, at least historically, has been primarily a ‘male’ phenomenon. Women, by and large, have been ignored as the possible ‘subjects’ to pursue the
into the activity of consciousness and its relation to other-consciousnesses (explained in more details in chapter 7), and the openness of the future, Daya Krishna is a strong defender of the movement ‘back’ to the world through dissatisfactions rather than away from them. This does not deny the withdrawal from the world, away and into oneself either: as a movement, the direction ‘back’ or into the world is an oscillation that implies its other pole. Epistemologically seen, the intellectual detachment above analyzed (in 5.2.1) necessitates first a position to be able to move away from it through the counter-position or the other’s position for modifying one’s position accordingly. But the intellectual detachment is not an absolute detachment from the world or a quest for transcendental unity, it rather implies engagement, a movement back and forth. Here as in the case of the analysis of mokṣa, Daya Krishna’s critique is not directed at the ‘withdrawal’ or ‘liberation’ conceived in these terms per se, but at its prevalence or hierarchy vis-à-vis other forms of freedoms. Applying the dynamic to his own philosophy, it is thanks to such ‘liberation as withdrawal’ that Daya Krishna can posit a ‘liberation as engagement’ as counter-position at the first place, which means that without the former idea, his own articulation would also be impossible. Such differentiations are not only necessary within his philosophy, they constitute for him the foundation of freedom in the plurality of perspectives that it opens and the dynamic in the deceptive realizations that it enables. Thus, freedom as the choice between alternatives, as the open-ended realizations and the expression of differences ground the intellectual pluralism and the dynamic tension between past and future. On the contrary for Daya Krishna, conceiving freedom solely as transcendental unity denies such a freedom and the potential deceptive realization within the world:

ascetic ideal. (…) But, if it is so, then asceticism or renunciation cannot be the ‘truth’ of human beings, or the ideal, as it, almost deliberately, excludes half of humanity. (…) It is surprising that neither the Advaitin nor the Sankhyan has seen this elementary problem which contradicts its own basic metaphysical insights.” Daya Krishna, *Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions*, 152–53.

763 See Daya Krishna’s strong critique of the idea of freedom involved in renunciation (the critique of the exclusion of women follows this quote): “The freedom is both evidenced and realized in the act of withdrawal of attention. This activity of consciousness which stops the flow of the activity of desiring is the foundation of what is generally known as ‘asceticism’ in different religions and civilizations. But those who have emphasized this have forgotten that in its capacity to withdraw from what it attends, the ascetic, in fact, is not a free person at all, for he is ‘bound’ to the fact of ‘withdrawal’ to which he is obsessively committed and from which he cannot withdraw as he thinks that therein alone lies his alleged freedom.” Daya Krishna, 152.

764 This again, is not only a theoretical principle for Daya Krishna but bears concrete implications. See his letter, dated 29.08.04, (unpublished, p.31): “‘Sannyasa’ [ascetic renunciation of the world] is not good for anybody least of all for an intellectual like you. I am glad that you have returned back to the ‘world’ which needs us more as those who have a little detachment will alone have that other centered consciousness which not only is a prime condition for engaging in the knowledge-enterprise, but also for making the world a little better to live in both for oneself and others.”

765 Showing again how Daya Krishna ‘embodies’ his own philosophical principles, Bhuvan Chandel and K. L. Sharma point out that Daya Krishna’s commitment to pluralism is thus related to the relevance he ascribes to such a sense of freedom: “His [Daya Krishna’s] interest lies elsewhere; to find out why a thinker expresses himself/herself in one particular way rather than another. He situates a thinker in his cultural background and then tries to understand and interpret him. The western culture and thinkers draw his pointed attention. This approach has a positive outcome. It leads to a type of cultural and intellectual pluralism. It is no surprise that Daya Krishna is a consistent and vigorous pluralist. His method of critical dialogue is not intended to demolish or even distort other’s point of view. In this conceptual articulation one is pleased to find that self and others are engaged in a continuous dialogue providing best possible freedom to both. This form of philosophizing is born of Daya’s deep commitment to freedom as value.” ‘Preface’, in Chandel and Sharma, *The Philosophy of Daya Krishna*, viii.
“Those who have asserted the reality of identity or its superiority to difference have done so only at the cost of denying all reality and value to the world we live in and the diverse experiences that we go through in it. The Advaita Vedantins are the best known protagonists of this denial of the reality of all difference and they have treated the whole world as māyā. The cost is too great and, in any case, unacceptable to anyone who cherishes or values the immense diversity at every level of being which is found in the world. Not only this, it denies also the very notion of ‘possibility’ which opens horizons for man’s effort at attaining what is not yet achieved and thus what is ‘different’ from it. The notion of an ‘ideal’ itself involves a difference from actuality, and without ideals, life is not worth living. Thus the reality of difference is that which makes one move and without acknowledging its reality one would be dead.”

Daya Krishna’s conception is indeed directed against mokṣa-centered philosophical systems or any kind of renunciation or asceticism that overemphasizes withdrawal as the ‘highest’ freedom, which incites him to argue for a freedom that remains conditioned by one’s embodied limitations (corporal, socio-cultural, historical, etc.) and by others, thanks to whom it originates in the first place. ‘Conditioning’ freedom as ‘freedom’, i.e. as the freedom to evolve further, is thus Daya Krishna’s first necessity when inquiring on freedom, which avoids at the same time the ‘temptation’ to ‘free’ oneself from freedom itself, or to be attached to the illusions of I-centricity freedom (the topic of which constitutes the next chapter, 7).

“It is true that conditions within which freedom is exercised condition its exercise, but the direction that this exercise takes and the way it is exercised create those very conditions that retard or enhance it in an essential way. The facilitating or obstructing situations are at least partly created by oneself and, at another level, by the fact whether the exercise of freedom by oneself has enhanced the freedom of others, or at least not affected it adversely. Freedom, thus, is not what the existentialists, postmodernists, or even the mokṣa-seekers have thought it to be. It is embedded in a plurality of interactive beings, living and human, where there is no such thing as freedom given for once and for all time, but something that is continuously lost and gained by the dynamic interplay of the interacting constituents of the dynamics.”

While I develop the consequences of the others for thinking freedom in terms of relationality at the level of consciousness itself (7.3), I want to outline here the relevance of such a worldly account of freedom for thinking the dynamic of values which, in Daya Krishna’s account, depend on it. This implies to consider freedom as subjected to conditions and dissatisfactions. For Daya Krishna, freedom is for embodied agents, which means that it is delimited by the actions of others and by one’s own limits. More specifically, it is by reinterpreting the freedom to withdraw and to engage with others in the context of dialogue, which Daya Krishna thought of as an opposition between a social existential account of freedom and an ascetic or contemplative one, that I want to suggest some further views for justifying the lack of normative ethical prescriptions by Daya Krishna studied above. I am trying to outline a way to understand the motivations to engage in dialogue in relation to the freedom to engage and to withdraw. The freedom to engage and withdraw implies first an awareness of its fragility which is correlated to dissatisfactions in the limitations of its exercise:

“The freedom to withdraw, as we said earlier, is always there, but only temporarily so, as one has to return, unless one chooses to exercise the freedom, in order to destroy the very center of freedom at the human level itself. To talk of freedom in the context of death seems meaningless, just as one does not know where would freedom be if one were not born as a human being. Within these two opposed but interrelated limits, freedom at the human level has its being, and only by its human exercise can a realm of freedom be built by individual and collective effort of each in the consciousness that itself is freedom centered and knows that its freedom is fragile and dependent not only on others, but on the universe itself, or that which constitutes its being a reality.”

This fragility is itself correlated to its intersubjective origin, which implies a dependency on others upon which, precisely, one has no control over their ‘engagement’ and ‘withdrawal’. Interestingly for thinking dialogue, the otherness of these others is not abstract, since the engagement of the other is visible in the common dialogue in which all consciousnesses are engaged. This avoids aggregating the others in one general category, which otherwise can lead to binary conception such as Indian/Western, and instead rather focuses on the outcome of concrete participations.

“…It is the other ‘selves’ or consciousnesses which play an essential role in creating those standards of validation which, however tentative in character, determine the standards of quality and validity of what one experiences oneself. One’s experience is neither isolated nor confined to oneself alone as the usual analysis suggests. The ‘other’, in fact, in its indefinite multiplicity, is an essential constituent of the consciousness itself. (…) This, of course, only provides the metaphysical foundation for one’s freedom and not the achievement of it in actuality.”

Although the others can be indefinitely multiple, it is in the collectivity of the engagement in dialogue that s/he is experienced, not as subjectivity over which I have no control, but as subjectivity related to me. This operation has reciprocal influences and transforms both consciousnesses. The engagement and withdrawal, seen from this intersubjective perspective, also influences knowledge as an open-ended entreprise by seekers of knowledge in dialogue. They thus determine the criteria of validation and the settings for dialoguing which are affected by the same fragility and bondages vis-à-vis others. At the level of consciousness, this engagement and withdrawal also define the orientation of ‘seekers’ who, unlike for instance Advaitin conceptions as criticized above by Daya Krishna, are not detached from reality but bound by their action of ‘seeking’ knowledge:

“‘Human freedom’ is limited, fundamentally as also radically, by the ‘freedom’ of other beings, without which it would neither be conceivable, nor have any meaning. The requirement of ‘inter-subjective understanding’ of the notion of freedom at least at one level which, if not the most fundamental, is at least one of those that has to be regarded as fundamental.

For some strange reason, however, this ‘freedom to build or not to build’, ‘to create or not to create’, ‘to want or not to want’ has not only been seen as the very definition of ‘freedom’, but also identified with only one of its fundamental ‘choices’, i.e., the choice of ‘not wanting anything at all’ as that alone can be the state of freedom, the other, or, rather, ‘others’, seen

768 Daya Krishna, 11.
only as ‘bondage’ or ‘bondages’ of different kinds. This is the classical position of Indian thinking on the subject where nivṛtti [movement of the introversion of consciousness within itself] alone is seen as ‘freedom’, ‘real freedom’ and, by this simple twist, all enterprises of man in the field of knowledge or art or morals or the realization of other values are seen as signs of bondage, rooted in some fundamental mistake or error called avidyā or mithyājñāna [erroneous (or mundane, worldly) knowledge], as the Nyāya Sūtra calls it (…).

But the distinction between mithyājñāna and jijñāsā is presupposed, just as that between vidyā and avidyā [knowledge and ignorance], and the jijñāsā to ‘know’ the one and pursue the puruṣārthā needed to ‘realise’ it. But ‘knowledge’ is a strange thing and if some ‘action’ is needed to ‘realise’ something or bring it into being, then it cannot already be there and, what is worse, shall, when realised or actualized, be a correlate of, or relative to, the ‘type’ of action undertaken to achieve it.”

Thus, if knowledge is made of actions conducted in the intersubjective valuation and common creation, it is related to this freedom ‘to create or not to create’, ‘to engage or to withdraw’. This freedom is a freedom of choice, to act or not, to think or not, to participate or not in the dialogue, to listen or not, etc. The choice between alternations is related to individual freedom, but this freedom is already engaged with other self-consciousnesses in the world, which enhances and hinders one’s individual freedom at the same time. Although participation and engagement in the world can thus not be forced, the awareness of freedom as relational indicates that freedom is already constituted by our de facto presence in the world. For Daya Krishna, we can withdraw only momentarily if we wish to remain free in the sense of being able to choose to attend or withdraw. In other words: freedom consists of the oscillation between engaging and withdrawing. We are free not to participate in a particular dialogue or to withdraw from the worldly for a time. However, a total disengagement from the world is a denial of one’s own freedom, since it takes away our very possibility to choose.

“Freedom, therefore, does not lie in the acceptance or rejection of this or that, but in the very fact of self-conscious choice of either. However, as the self-conscious choice is always made within a perspective and as the perspective forming the framework is generally accepted, all persons feel free most of the time. But, as we said earlier, the strange possibility of questioning, not this or that perspective, but the whole notion of perspective as such, is open to man. What one chooses in the face of this ultimate possibility, is not our concern. (…) Yet, even at this point, the ‘Either, or’ of Man is not taken from him and he stands before his ultimate Freedom-to Be or not to Be.”

6.3. Samvāda Apprehended, Samvāda Realized and the Gap in Between

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770 The Sanskrit translations of the quotes from this article are those provided by the editors in the reedition of this article, in Daya Krishna, Contrary Thinking, 306. The editors add for nivṛtti: Ingoing, reversal movement of consciousness, away from objects, from the world; a movement of introversion of consciousness within itself.

771 Knowledge and ignorance, or ‘science and nescience’ in the antagonistic relation: in this context Daya Krishna insists on the negative prefix ‘a’ that intrinsically relates knowledge and ignorance with each other.


Before proceeding further to defining the intersubjective relationality, I want to connect the apprehension-realization dimension of values with the samvāda experiments themselves. In particular, given the relevance of action for creating knowledge and the mutual influence of theory and practice in dialogical contexts, I want to suggest an analysis of some difficulties encountered in the experiments with regard to values as elicited in the previous sections. More precisely, I am interested in the appearing ‘failures’ and critiques of the samvādas or related experiments. I now want to confront why, in view of the regulative ideal of values above described, the practice seems to have been subjected to dissatisfactions, and how to interpret them in concrete contexts. With dissatisfactions, we touch on the empirical realization of dialogue, however seen from a theoretical point of view. This precisely outlines the connection between the theoretical apprehension and the practical realization.

Theoretically, the first difficulty which I believe has been insufficiently taken in consideration by Daya Krishna is the following question: how to merge different values and desires? Daya Krishna insists indeed on their ‘objectivity’ that would arise from the intersubjectivity itself, but he does not explain the process of such an intersubjective objectivity. There is in Daya Krishna’s account no objectivity which can be a priori imposed, but there is also no pure subjectivity, for a self-consciousness tends to ‘objectify’ everything in the act of reflectivity. This objectivity is not final, but continuously formed in intersubjective processes. It applies to the outcome of the reflexivity of self-consciousness. When we self-consciously reflect on a concept, we make it independent of our own consciousness and communicable to others, for whom the concept is not felt as a part of my consciousness, but as a common object of reflection. It is on this basis that we can begin a philosophical dialogue. The same could be exemplified with a painting, which is not only the artist’s expression, but an object that overcomes the subjectivity of its author to ‘speak to all.’ It is furthermore the other’s appreciations and comments that gives this concept or painting its meaning and that, in a sense, confers its existence to this object via reactions and discussions. In this regard, the concept or painting is not subjective, but it is objectified in the intersubjective processes of reception and communication. This implies the transformations that the other’s interpretations bring about to the initial concept or the understanding of the painting. Daya Krishna extends this idea to all the ‘worlds’ that we create together:

“Whatever be the structure of consciousness, it gets modified in a way that is difficult to specify, when it is accompanied by, or becomes, an ‘object’ of self-consciousness. There is some sort of flexibility introduced in its structure, a plasticity that allows ‘freedom’ to emerge in a way that was not earlier available when consciousness alone happened to function. (…) This awareness or rather revelation of the hidden power of consciousness has a ‘creative’ aspect in it in the sense that it can bring into being ‘worlds’ whose reality consists in the fact

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774 “The point is that self-consciousness, because of its very constitution, cannot be ‘subjective’ in character. It has to try to be objective as ‘to be objective’ is merely another name for being self-conscious. Objectivity is not something given once and for all, but has to be achieved anew, continually depending not only on the nature of the object concerned or the activity one wants to pursue, but also on the sort of person one wants to become as the personality that tries to seek objectivity is itself changing over time due to many factors which include among them the desire to be as objective as possible.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 129–30.
that they can become objects not only to the consciousness which has created them but also to others for whom they are as ‘objective’ as to the consciousness that has created them.”

Daya Krishna continues describing this creative power of imagination of consciousness as what “forms and transforms that spoken world into something ‘inter-subjective’ capable of creating a world of meanings, which, in turn, modifies and shapes both the consciousness that has created it and the consciousness which encounters it.” I agree with thinking consciousness as active in its reciprocal dimension (with others, with the world, etc.) of influencing and being influenced at the same time. However, this still does not answer the question of how to accommodate for contradictory values and feelings which are not only in dissatisfying tension but which are in conflict, because of which precisely the ‘creation of a common world’ is so difficult. How to account for the times when a dialogue is interrupted because the participants cannot respond to the concepts presented by others, i.e. when the concepts cannot be objectified by them? Or how to account for the mismeetings when participants seem to speak about different things because they mean with the same word two totally different ideas?

In my present analysis, I understand objectivity as the common base upon which the arguments can be discussed. It is understood that this common base and the arguments produced are not strictly cognitive, but also contain the feelings and values of the participants, which constitute their presuppositions. Feelings and values are part of this intersubjective process, but as we have seen, values also entail a regulative ideal subjected to dissatisfactions. What happens then if the desires do not concur, if the ideal values seem to be contradictory or insatisfying in the realizations of a dialogue? If we consider participants of dialogues as seekers of knowledge, the desire for knowledge lies at the core of the dialogical constitutions. But in Daya Krishna’s perspective, this cannot remain a singular desire. Like for values, the contents of these desires differ. While desires can be in harmony, or grow and decrease together, it also simply happens that they do not. Let us illustrate this point with academic examples: One person might seek philosophical knowledge of aesthetics (what does beauty mean?), another the techniques of architecture (how to build a mausoleum?), a third the historical knowledge of the same mausoleum (how is the Mughal conception of beauty represented in the Taj Mahal?). One might

776 Daya Krishna, 169.
777 Daya Krishna is not unaware of the difficulty that such question entails, and defends a pluralistic idea of ‘objectivity’ itself that could accommodate different objectivities according to the different fields, but he nevertheless does not seem to consider the consequences of intersubjectively not reaching a common objectivity: “The impulse to objectivity and the desire for it is an integral part of the activity of self-consciousness itself and is generally denoted by such terms as ‘integrity’ and ‘honesty’. What else can these terms mean except that one tries one’s best to be as ‘true’ to that which one is trying to achieve in the realm of either knowledge, feeling or action? It has been a mistake to understand the term ‘objectivity’ in the context of knowledge alone and think that no realms which are constituted primarily by feelings or emotions on the one hand, and action on the other, need them for an adequate description of the reality concerned and constituted by them. In the realm of action the seeking for ‘objectivity’ is usually designated by the term morality, on the one hand, and efficiency on the other. (…) The search for ‘objectivity’ in the realm of feelings is something that may appear prima facie to be a contradiction in terms, as it is the one realm which is supposed to be ‘subjective’ almost by definition. How can one be objective about something so subjective as feelings and emotions, and yet the same self-consciousness which seeks objectivity in the realm of knowledge and actions, also ‘demands’ that one ‘seek’ objectivity in this realm as well?” Daya Krishna, 128–29.
only refer to philological studies of manuscripts of a certain period, another to contemporary sociological analyzes, and so on. One might also consider that his or her duty as a scholar is to accurately transmit the knowledge he or she has inherited, while another might want to break out completely with the traditions. It is assumed that all these scholars ‘seek’ to know, for which reason they want to dialogue with other scholars, as it happened for instance in an unrecorded dialogue on architecture “bringing traditional persons who deal with architecture both theoretically and practically and modern architecture”. Nevertheless, the tools that they develop and furthermore the directions that their studies take vary and might even be opposed in forms or results. This concretely leads to much academic quarrels between conflicting methods reflecting the different seekings that motivate how inquiries are pursued. Although Daya Krishna seems to take for granted the objective intersubjective process leading to the creation of common worlds, or at least although he does not theoretically comment on the difficulties of this process, he does indicate some issues that he encountered when this intersubjective process involved scholars of different trainings. In his study on the development of Indian philosophies since the eighteenth century onwards, he took help of scholars working in different media and kinds of institutions, including panyaits, and admits in the introduction of his work the difficulty of proceeding as such:

“Our initial survey of developments in various fields of knowledge before the eighteenth century had revealed that their centre was around key controversies which had occurred earlier and were carried into the period that we were concerned with. The whole material thus had to be seen from the perspective of these debates and discussions. Unless there was a clear awareness of the stage that the controversy had reached before the dawn of the eighteenth century, subsequent developments in the debate could not be properly understood or assessed. This, however, was not the perspective from which the scholars viewed their own disciplines. Thus the questions that we asked appeared both new and inconvenient, as they had to reorganize their whole knowledge in the context of the way in which we were trying to look at material which was familiar to them but which they had not seen from this perspective. Scholars are generally as conservative in their intellectual habits and ways of looking at things as are most of us, and thus it was not easy to find persons who had both the ability and the willingness to look at familiar texts in a new way.”

The possibility that these collaborations can be innovative and open new ways of thinking history and philosophy is surely what motivated his endeavor. But they are admittedly difficult to create, not only because of the ‘ability’ that he mentions, but also because of the

778 Daya Krishna mentions this dialogue while presenting his larger samvāda project in Friedman, Malik, and Boni, Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image, 164–65. I quoted his presentation at length while introducing the samvāda experiments in 2.1.

779 Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, 8.

780 Although indirectly, it is possible that the problem lies also here in divergent ‘desires’: “His [Daya Krishna’s] early work Planning, Power and Welfare (1959) consists of a dialogue between DK, then at the department of philosophy, Sagar University, and economists Vu Quoc Thuc of the University of Saigon and Nurul Islam of the University of Dhaka. This is an intra-Asian dialogue between three scholars from the non-West, attempting to decolonize (the phrase is mine) the concept of welfare. DK’s later motto, “when people gather together, something new emerges” (1988, 54), captures the incentive behind this dialogue. But a dialogue, or samvāda, is no easy “business”, especially when the participants belong not just to different countries and cultures, but even disciplines.
‘willingness’ of scholars. The willingness, in my interpretation, does not simply refer to whether they agree or not to contribute. It accounts for accepting to merge one’s desire to know with the other’s desire, i.e. to look in the same direction, even from different standpoints.

Academic divergences are a rather common object of interdisciplinary and intercultural misunderstandings, quarrels or simply of mutual avoidances which turn into a mutual exclusion. However, what is significant here is less how recurrent and well-spread these quarrels are, but rather the reasons of their occurrences. These quarrels are less due to divergences in the scientific approaches themselves (e.g. philology versus philosophy) or the tools used for analyzing (e.g. empirical versus theoretical studies), i.e. any epistemological differences. The reasons lie in the differences of ethoses and desires. Interestingly enough, this dimension is rarely admitted in academic discussions. The valutional differences can be ‘hidden’ in methodological and objective terms (for example in dismissing another scholar’s approach or training). However, at the core of one’s objectives lies one’s specific desire to know, i.e. a certain orientation towards a particular kind of knowledge (which also explains that these quarrels cannot be solved by epistemological arguments). It is also to be noted that these desires and values are influenced by cultural, social and historical contexts, which influence one’s desire to know and play a role in determining which approach to adopt (i.e. which one is considered ‘the best’ by one’s scholarly community). This dimension of desires and values lies at the core of knowledge-acquisition. Although it is absent from the explicit academic discourse, it seems to be the cause of much indifference (interdisciplinary and intercultural) as well as academic failures in dialoguing.

Furthermore, this aspect is difficult to realize from within a dialogue. Once we are engaged in a dialogue, we seem to be more concerned about the argumentation itself, which however depends on the initial desires, a dimension we neglect while discussing the arguments. Thus, many a times, the feeling of dissatisfaction of a dialogue originates from the divergences of ethoses and the disrupted desires. At the epistemological level, however, it is difficult to influence this feeling from within by responding to an argument. Only a retrospective look, or closer to Daya Krishna’s philosophical terms, the ‘withdrawal’ of consciousness back to itself, seems to enable such an awareness. This explains why it is so difficult to re-orientate or to efficiently blend conflicting desires within the dialogue. Thus, the dissatisfactions are also the causes of defects in the realization of a dialogue. While theories of dialogue such as the ones discussed here can suggest ideal and regulative dialogical models encompassing all actualizations, the moment one turns to dialogues such as the samvāda experiments, some unforeseen difficulties, impossibilities, limits or simply modifications of the principles will be encountered. This explains the criticism of the samvāda experiments by several proponents, who generally underline the insufficiency of inclusion of a specific types of philosophies and scholars, for example, contemporary Indian philosophy as propounded by Raghuramaraju (3.4).

It could also invoke particular arguments that were not properly understood or reacted upon. The singularity, the spontaneity of the orality and the dependency to the persons participating

DK, the publisher notes, “is not a professional economist (that may perhaps be the reason why he is able to approach the subject from a fresh angle)” (1959, 4). But what appeals to the publisher as “fresh” is not necessarily perceived as such by the economists.” Raveh, “Daya Krishna on Social Philosophy [Forthcoming].”
are factors of the unpredictability that already renders the systematization of the theory obsolete: correspondingly, they also generate the unforeseen.

In this context, I want to come back to two problems experienced by Daya Krishna in dialogues, the origin of which seems to me to lie in these conflicting seekings to know. The first one has been already mentioned in the unpublished samvāda experiments (3.3.3), felt in the Kashmiri dialogue including Pandit Laxman Joo (1.1.4) and narrated in particular by Bettina Bäumer. This does not mean that she was the only participant to have felt this dialogue ‘unsuccessful’ or that other experiments did not provoke the same dissatisfaction. Quite the contrary, I can only suspect that other experiments which were mentioned in the pages of this work (in particular the unpublished experiments, 3.3.3), suffer from the same limits. I also want to come back on the problems above mentioned of the dialogue with Maurice Friedman, in which Daya Krishna participated.

I had mentioned at the beginning of this work the regret that Bettina Bäumer formulated after having participated to the samvāda with Pandit Laxman Joo about which she expresses reservation 781 (1.1.4). The purely rational approach of scholars such as Daya Krishna to question the tradition of Kashmiri Saivism was felt inadequate to reach its spiritual core, from which only it could be ‘understood’, which in this context rather means experienced and felt for these two participants.782 Since Daya Krishna’s endeavor has been much explicated in this work, let us turn in contradistinction to Bäumer’s own idea of an interreligious dialogue (independently of the Kashmiri dialogue) in her own words:

“Let me mention the areas and levels in which dialogue happens and is meaningful, and how they are related and interconnected. There is always a twofold movement: from the inner to the outer, and from the outer to the inner. The innermost level of any interreligious dialogue is certainly a spiritual one. I immediately confess that this is where I am most at home. Let me therefore elaborate a bit what we mean by a spiritual dialogue. Spirituality - more specifically may be even mysticism - is at the core of any religion. It is not only when we have experienced that core in our own religion that we can be open to other traditions and spiritualities. (…) To give only two examples of the medieval saints in India, we can take Saint Kabir of Banaras

781 The critique and context have been presented in 1.1.4. Bäumer writes: “The seminar was an exploration of Kashmir Śaivism, a relatively new discovery for Indian philosophers. Dayaji discovered it for himself, and was also viewing it critically. It was more the fact of meeting and discussing the issues involved, than a real contribution to the research on Kashmir Śaivism. In a sense historic, the meeting with the last and powerful representative of the living tradition, Swami Lakshman Joo, at the Guptaganga Hall in Ishbar, near his Ishvar Ashram, did not result in a satisfying dialogue, because the levels were too different: the merely intellectual approach of the scholars and the lived experience of the master.” Bäumer, “‘Falling in Love with a Civilization’: A Tribute to Daya Krishna, the Thinker,” 35.

782 The metaphysical position may be summarized in the following way: “The Word at its highest level and pure Consciousness are not different. Differentiation in both, Word and Consciousness, amounts to a descent, a gradual manifestation which is, however, never cut off from its original source. Communication at any level requires differentiation into speaker, spoken to, word and meaning. Only an ideal pair of speaker and listener can be instruments of revelation, where the question, coming from a slightly lower level than the answer, is a part of the total manifestation of the Word, and the answer, coming from the respectively higher level, assumes the question in itself. It is the fact of the unity of Word and Consciousness which makes that, in the words of Abhinavagupta, ‘there is no speech which does not reach the heart directly.’”, Bettina Bäumer, “Vāc as Samvāda,” in Hermeneutics of Encounter: Essays in Honour of Gerhard Oberhammer on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, ed. Francis X. D’Sa and Mesquita Roque, Publications of the De Nobili Research Library 20 (Vienna: Gerold & Co - Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 18.
and Lal Ded (Lalla) of Kashmir. Both were mystics, both became bridgers, by heir own deep experience, between Hinduism and Islam, to put it in very general terms.  

The spiritual dimension is indeed absent from the _saṃvāda_ experiments in the sense described by Bettina Bäumer, i.e. as providing a platform or a framework for an encounter between different levels of consciousness. For instance, the spiritual dimension of the _bhakti_ dialogue is an object to be reflected upon rather than a way of practicing or motivating the dialogue itself. As she mentioned to me concerning the dialogue in Kashmir, the ‘levels’ were too different to be fruitful, in the sense that the conceptual-critical approach (of Daya Krishna in particular) could not grasp the specificities of or the differences with a more spiritual or religious level of experiencing. For her, this level was not apt to convey the ‘essence’ of Kashmir Saivism, an interesting term that also connotes the valuational dimension of a philosophy. In that sense, the dialogue did not lead to an intersubjective creation of a common meaningful world, because the expectations projected into the dialogues did not match in practice. In other words, the orientation of the seekings for knowledge were too diverging, since seeking for knowledge did not mean a critical and conceptual inquiry for her, but an immersion into the philosophy itself by spiritual experience.

As mentioned in the previous section (6.2.2), another ‘misunderstanding’ and a divergence occurred among the participants of the dialogue at the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts. This concerned the reflection on dialogue concerning finite, ignorant and yet desirous to know participants by Daya Krishna in the dialogue with Maurice Friedman. The problem cannot be here strictly defined as a problem of interreligious communication, since it is not as a spiritual seeker, as a believer or as a religious man that Friedman reacted (although he is influenced by Jewish thought). It is, nevertheless, a difficulty of ‘levels’ grounded in a certain spiritual interpretation of Buber’s dialogical conception of ‘I and Thou’, in particular of the realm of the between. According to Friedman, this realm was not included in Daya Krishna’s account of dialogue in his use of the terms knowledge and ‘seeking of knowledge’. Besides what I believe was a misunderstanding of what Daya Krishna meant with ‘knowledge’ (i.e. its reduction to an epistemological conception), the participants of the dialogue interestingly do not seem to have been able to ‘clear’ this misunderstanding. Even more interestingly, ‘dialogue’ was here not only the form but also the content, so that it is on the object of dialogue that the participants - as subjects - felt the dissatisfying tension between their ‘idea’ of dialogue and how the dialogue itself drifted in a ‘non-dialogical’ way.

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784 Personal communication, Abhinavagupta Research Library, Varanasi (23. 01. 2017)
785 For the reader’s convenience, I quote here again a smaller portion of his statement quoted in 6.2.2, which I think, describes the basis of the divergence: “They [the participants] may have different levels of knowledge or information or understanding, but each of them, when they enter into a dialogue assume, at least provisionally, that they do not know. That whatever each one knows, or thinks one knows, may possibly be wrong – that one is prepared to learn from the others who are participating in the dialogue.” Friedman, Malik, and Boni, _Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image_, 240.
From the readings of the transcription of the dialogue, different hints can be suggested to outline the problems. Some are of practical nature, such as the fact that, as usual in academic contexts, the communication was ‘managed’ through the invited speaker via an act of moderation, which might have been felt as impeding spontaneous communication and equal distribution of speech. Being not only a mediator, Friedman appears to be (maybe in spite of his own will) the main speaker and authority of the dialogue. Furthermore, Friedman’s response was felt to have been “rather unkindly” and he later on concedes that “I get the impression that many of you are disturbed because I spoke directly to the Professor.” It is of course, impossible to reconstruct and determine how much of the communication problems are related to the feeling of offense (whether by Daya Krishna himself or by the other participants), how much of it could have been a sensitive overreaction, and how much resulted in a misunderstanding of the intention of what Daya Krishna or Friedman tried to express. There also could have been a philosophical disagreement on what dialogue means. This highlights the impossible separation of the different dimensions operating in dialogue, which in this case leads to dissatisfaction. Conceptually however, the disagreement occurs in the response given by Friedman to Daya Krishna’s conception of dialogue as an engagement of seeker for knowledge:

“What Prof. Daya Krishna has described was by and large what Martin Buber has called ‘technical dialogue’. Basically what we have here is an exchange between someone who wants to know and someone who has information to impart, but that is still, by and large, technical dialogue. Within it, of course, something else may happen. (…) It is only dialogue in Buber’s and in my sense of the term when it goes beyond the exchange of information to some sort of actual meeting of person and person - the between.”

In the context of this work, it would be easy to a posteriori reflectively counter-argue with Daya Krishna’s philosophy on the reasons why ‘seeking knowledge’ is not limited to the cognitive, what I emphasized in the preceding section. It is, on the other hand, more complex to understand why, although argumentatively it clarifies the respective positions, such an exchange disrupted

786 Having neither access to the recordings nor to the history of the transcription, I cannot affirm whether the transcription is a complete and exact retranscription of the whole recording or not. My analysis is thus solely based on the published text.
787 Stated by Rekha Jhanji: “Starting from the point that you made that dialogue happens. It’s grace, as you say. I agree, we can’t contrive anything. But there are certain things we can, at least, try to create so that there may be a possibility of a dialogue. I feel that the way we are sitting and the way we are interacting, we are at least not totally frozen. I haven’t really come out of myself at all in this situation (the ongoing seminar or dialogue) and I think this must be happening to many others. The reason for me, we have no way of interacting with one another - but the only way we interact is through you. And I think this is a very artificial way. It really is not conductive to the possibility of dialogue.” Friedman, Malik, and Boni, *Intercultural Dialogue and the Human Image*, 236.
788 Mrinal Miri: “I just wanted to say a word in defense of Prof. Daya Krishna because I think he’s been misunderstood and rather unkindly. Maurice Friedman: I didn’t mean to be unkind. Mrinal Miri: Well, it sounded unkind. I don’t think he was talking about exchange of information at all. I think he was trying, you must correct me if I’m wrong, to suggest that there are many varieties that have come out in the discussion, that there may be varieties of dialogue in that sense, and a flash of understanding may be a dialogue. A moment of recognition is a dialogue, a meeting of minds may be a dialogue. And the real giving of a cup of tea and real accepting of a cup of tea may be a dialogue. I thought he was talking about a variety of dialogue, which is very important and in which we are hoping to be involved, and that I would characterize as a cognitive dialogue. As a result of which, you see there is a progressive unfolding of a problem and a progressive insight into things. The real giving and accepting of a cup of tea I don’t think leads to progressive unfolding of problem.” Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 247–48.
789 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 248.
790 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 241.
the dialogue. As for the Kashmiri dialogue above mentioned, both examples seem to point at
the same basic problem: a misunderstanding, the origin of which is not located in the intellectual
dimension of ‘understanding’, but in a difference of approach to a concept. In other words, this
misunderstanding does not occur at the linguistic or argumentative level, but as the difficulty
to communicate at the same level. The first Kashmiri dialogue mainly entailed the difference
between inter-traditional philosophical and interreligious dialogues, while the dialogue with
Friedman concerned the limits of the intellectual versus the spiritual (Friedman arguing from a
Buberian perspective). In both cases, the problem seems to outline the limitations of the
‘intellectual’ dimension of the dialogues, which was felt not to be encompassing enough to
accommodate other (more spiritual) dimensions of the studied traditions. This difference shows
that the feeling of ‘failure’ does not result from the lack of knowledge or the impossibility to
express or defend one’s position, not even to articulate counter-positions. It rather results from
the dissatisfaction of the apprehended expectations which were felt as not corresponding with
the realizations because of an impossible communication or understanding of non-intellectual
feelings, seekings and attitudes. This aspect does not seem to have been solved in either case,
and I could not find a reflection on the divergence of desires and expectations when dialoguing.
Friedman concludes his postface by coming back on this dissatisfaction, which led him to
qualify the dialogue as a whole as not a ‘genuine dialogue’:

“There was often mismeeting and meeting - enough so that half way through I declared that
the seminar was not what I would call a genuine dialogue. Rereading the discussion centering
around this point in the transcripts was painful to me. Many of the participants seemed to be
offended by my calling one participants’ attempt to limit dialogue to the cognitive “technical
dialogue”. This is an issue which never seemed to get properly resolved in the course of the
seminar. To that extent I would judge it to be as much of a mismeeting as a meeting. Yet when
I think of all the richness of thought and experience that did enter into these days I cannot
maintain this judgment. Even our disagreement about what we meant by dialogue was itself a
meaningful part of our dialogue, coming as we did from many intellectual fields and
geographical and cultural backgrounds, including very different understandings of what is
optimal philosophical discussion, these in turn probably influenced by the tension between
East and West. Aside from the fact that a group of people from different backgrounds, many
of whom have just met for the first time, cannot simply will to have ‘genuine dialogue’ in the
full meaning of that term, our conflict was also an integral part of that tension between
understanding and misunderstanding, agreement and disagreement which, as Buber points out,
belongs to even the finest manifestations of ‘the word that is spoken’.”

It is tempting to classify the lines of this postface as a diplomatic conclusion rather than a sincere
evaluation of the ‘mismeeting’. It is possible that Friedman could not express any
disappointment freely at such a place. It is also likely that he could not explain in detail that he
had further concerns concerning this miscommunication, or that he was plainly disappointed.
The fact that he concludes the whole book by referring to this ‘miscommunication’ already
indicates his unease with how the dialogue proceeded at such a point and how unresolved it
remained. Nevertheless, if we accept to take his words seriously, they also indicate the creative
dynamics originating from the dissatisfaction itself, and the intermingling between theory and
practice, when he writes that for instance that “‘our conflict was also an integral part of that

791 Friedman, Malik, and Boni, 284.
tension between understanding and misunderstanding, agreement and disagreement which, as Buber points out, belongs to even the finest manifestations of ‘the word that is spoken.’”

Indeed, the conclusion of a particular instance of dialoguing does not mean the end of dialogue. Mismetings, dissatisfactions, miscommunications and misunderstandings are in the practice, often concretely impeding a dialogue. Far from always generating creative insights (unlike Daya Krishna’s own emphasis on this aspect), they also sometimes cannot be resolved in the course of a dialogue. This is a dimension which I believe is important to accept in order to avoid understanding dialogue as an ideal form which can absorb all differences. It is however through these dissatisfactions, or in Friedman’s words, “even our disagreement (…) was itself a meaningful part of our dialogue” that the dialogue evolves, both in theory and for the forthcoming practices. This explains the nature of the prefaces to the published experiments that analyze what happened, how far the dialogue could go, and what remains to be done, improved or thought of.

While the transcribed dialogues are philosophically instructive and testify of a dialogical practice, it is mainly in the memories of the participants that they had a lasting impact. As Daya Krishna writes in a letter to Arindam Chakrabarti, one of the main parner of the samvādas, referring the dialogues that occurred in these respective places, “the past recollection still linger. Kashmir, or Benaras or Tirupati, or Pune or Delhi or Bangalore; they all are with us.” For the readers afterwards, I find the post-reflective traces around the dialogues even more relevant (these having been used as material and developed in chapter 3), since they indicate further concrete possibilities to be realized, prospective attitudes reflecting on what has been achieved and what should come, and an important relating of theory and practice. To me it seems that this ‘unfulfilledness’, i.e. what Daya Krishna refers to elsewhere as ‘agenda for further research’ is the most promising for the reader.

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792 For the Pune experiment: “In all these meetings, discussion was organized around issues previously formulated and circulated in Sanskrit to the potential participants, the last session always devoted to the question as to what are the deficiencies in the system as handed down to us and how should we try to develop it further. (…) These have not been the only spin-offs of the Poona seminar. There have been others, and they are worth mentioning also. One has been the extension of the dialogue to areas other than the strictly philosophical and to traditions other than the Sanskritic. The first was done in the field of linguistics where a dialogue between traditional pandits and modern linguists was held on ‘Current Issues in Linguistics.’ (…) As for the movement outside the Sanskritic tradition, it was triggered off by a chance remark of Prof. K. Satchidananda Murty as to why the dialogue with the tradition be confined to Sanskrit pandits alone. This led to another path-breaking initiative (…) and resulted in the organization of a dialogue on philosophical problems with the Ulema, the Arabic Scholars representing the West Asian philosophical tradition in India.” Daya Krishna et al., Samvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, XIII–XIV.

793 Letter from Daya Krishna to Arindam Chakrabarti, 10th April 2005. I thank Arindam Chakrabarti and Daniel Raveh for providing me the letter.

794 See the Introduction and Preface of Daya Krishna et al., Samvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions; Daya Krishna, Lath, and Krishna, Bhakti, a Contemporary Discussion; Daya Krishna, India’s Intellectual Traditions; Daya Krishna, “Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy.”

795 This refers to the already mentioned Daya Krishna, Agenda for Research in Indian and Western Philosophy, ed. R. S. Bhatnagar, First edition (Jaipur: UGC, ASIHSS Programme, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan and Literary Circle, 2013). In the previous 6.2.2, I mentioned Daya Krishna’s usual way of concluding by opening the discussion to further problems to be explored, as for instance: ‘Problems and Issues still remaining to be explored in Intellectual History from Eighteenth Century upto the Present Time,’ in Daya Krishna, Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western, ; ‘The Possible Extension of the Methodology for the Understanding of Other Texts in the Indian Tradition’, followed by ‘Conclusion’ and ‘The Text of the Nyāya Sūtras: Some Problems’, in Daya Krishna, The Nyāya Sūtras.
The tension between the two dimensions - felt as dissatisfaction in the insufficiency of one particular realization - can lead to the incentive to organize further dialogue. Thus, for example, he begins the preface of the second edition of *India’s Intellectual Traditions: Attempts at Conceptual Reconstructions*, by painfully looking back at the ‘loss’ of the Jaipur experiments and with a critical consideration of the entreprise fifteen years later:

“To read about the ‘Jaipur experiment’ and the interdisciplinary group which started meeting sometime in the early eighties seems to ‘enter’ some prehistoric past whose ‘reality’ is difficult to retrieve. (…) Where have all the friends ‘gone’, and why was the ‘enthusiasm’ evaporated? Have the ‘sceptics’ been proved right? Was the ‘entreprise’ unmeaningful, even impassible, just a waste of time as some had warned.”

Yet, after some pages analyzing the different ‘enterprises’ that occurred after the beginning of the Jaipur experiments, notably the different *samvādas*, Daya Krishna continues:

“The Jaipur experiment (…) has, thus, not been entirely fruitless. Some of the persons associated with it are now no more. Their absence is a loss, both personal and otherwise, though it is difficult to say whether they fully shared the belief in the feasibility or desirability, or even in the worthwhileness of the of the project. The ‘understanding’ and articulation of the conceptual structure of India’s intellectual enterprises in different fields of knowledge is one thing; their internalization and utilization for understanding of the same phenomena in modern times, another. Without the latter, the former is meaningless.”

Daya Krishna’s view is not idealistic but very aware of the difficult task and the challenging limitations of his endeavor and of the larger context in which it was pursued. He is aware that actions, wills and feelings are painstakingly entailed in the *purusārtha* of knowledge and in spite of the regulative ideal in which they are embodied, of their difficult realizations. This also explains why he does not strive for a ‘perfect’ achieved work, which would contradict the reality of the experiments in which he was at the same time engaged in, and terminate the project itself. His philosophy also reflects the practice, which explains why he sees more potentiality in future realizations or in terms such as ‘dissatisfaction’ and ‘illusion’. These leave room for improvement and change, and reciprocally necessitate to consider the imperfectness and incompleteness of the practice itself. This way of doing ‘human’ philosophy is concretely the only possible way for someone actually engaged in dialoguing rather than systematically theorize the ideality of dialogue. The former opens up other conceptual possibilities to think dialogue in the first place. Formulated in more theoretical terms, Daya Krishna explicates the relation between theories and practices of philosophizing as the oscillation between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’:

“Philosophical practice is what philosophical theory tries to articulate, though through this articulation it begins to influence philosophical practice itself. Thus, philosophy as practiced does not remain unaffected by what philosophy is conceived to be even though, in the first instance, the conception itself is supposed to be the result of a reflection upon the way philosophy is actually practiced and an articulation thereof. The ‘is’ of philosophical practice

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796 Daya Krishna, *India’s Intellectual Traditions*, IX.
797 Daya Krishna, XIII.
turns into an ‘ought’ for future philosophizing when mediated by a reflective articulation concerning the practice itself.”

More concretely for dialogue, I think this reciprocity implies that we recognize the significance of the place (I insisted on the location in Vrindavan and the significance of the Govindadeva temple for the *Bhakti* dialogue in 3.3.2) and of the participants as individuals. I also believe that this is what singularizes and enables intercultural plurality. It explains why the delimitations discussed in the introduction (1.1) between the different forms of communication are insufficient if taken alone. Although I consider them necessary to begin clarifying what dialogue means by contradistinctions with each other, the practice (as also already mentioned in the same introduction, 1.1.5) necessarily shows the impossibility of separating each of these forms. Furthermore, these forms of communication themselves evolve in the practice, so that each definition will be challenged in a certain dialogue, blurring its limits and some of its characteristics. While I can understand the temptation to jettison the practice to reach a more formal definition encompassing all actualities, I argue here with Daya Krishna that this would also suppress the creative dynamic at stake in the reciprocal influence between theory and practice. Furthermore, in doing so, I think there is a risk of assimilating the ideality entailed in the theory to the definition itself, i.e. to consider that the dialogue is limited to the regulative ideal of the theory - which I believe is insufficient to define dialogue itself. Finally, although the practice might seem less ‘reliable’ due to the importance of uncertainty and unpredictability, considering this dimension also avoids the risk of thinking an ‘other’ understood in a binary exclusion or distinction (either as the alter or as the ‘beyond’ myself) to myself. In the end, this ‘empties’ the other of any other characteristics than being the Other of myself (see my critique in 1.2.2).

In that sense, dissatisfactions indicate the processual character, ongoing and endless venture of dialogues. Felt negatively as disappointment of the actual impossibility of realizing the idea(l), they nevertheless constitute a necessary experience. This tension can clarify a certain tendency in writings on dialogue trying to convey the impossibility-yet-necessity of dialoguing. We already found such a tendency for instance in the first statement of Wilhelm Halbfass with which I opened this work: “With all these questions in mind, I still have to listen and to speak to the other. Whatever the problems with ‘dialogue and understanding’ may be - these are channels that have to be kept open.” And more specifically related to Daya Krishna, by Daniel Raveh:

“It is not the metaphysical experience which occupies him, but the possibility of a dialogue, a *saṃvāda*, between ‘worldly’ thinking human beings. If Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak agrees with Derrida that “in every possible way translation is impossible but necessary,” then for DK it is *saṃvāda* that in every possible way is impossible but necessary. Every *saṃvāda*, in fact, involves an act of translation, not necessarily between languages but rather between mindsets and across inner worlds.”

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800 Raveh, “Philosophical Miscellanea,” 493.
Thus, dialoguing is, in my interpretation of Daya Krishna both as a ‘writing philosopher’ and as a ‘practicing philosopher’, the interface of these two dimensions, which can be qualified as ‘experimentations and explorations’ as follows:

“Dharma or Nomos depends entirely on man, while the latter, i.e. Logos, is supposed to be independent of him, and totally unaffected by what man does or does not do. (…) Logos and Nomos are, thus, at odds with each other, and man is a victim of the conflict between the two, neither of which he can give up as one is required for ‘knowledge’ and the other for ‘action’. The primacy given to the one or the other determines the direction which the attempts at a solution take place within a culture or even in an individual who is self-reflective and becomes aware of the problem. The conflict is between the ‘True’ and the ‘Good’, and as both are values, which is treated as primary and whoch as secondary, or which as subservient and instrumental to the other, becomes the central question both for individuals and cultures alike.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that both arise within a human context and because of the fact that one has become self-conscious for some reason and thus is aware of these opposite values which, though ‘given’ in a certain sense, have to be ‘sought’ and realized within the human situation as ‘lived’ by one and ‘known’ or ‘discovered’ through this seeking. There is no such thing as the Truth or the Good, given and found for once and all and, what is perhaps even worse is that even among the ‘known’ or the ‘discovered’ at any time or place, there always are many ‘truths’ and many ‘goods’ pertaining to diverse fields, and that there is a conflict of opinion about them or difference about the importance or the primacy one should accord them. This, though disheartening to those who want certainty and finality of ‘faith’ in these realms is, however, the basis of that continuous exploration and experimentation that lies at the heart of human enterprise, both in the field of knowledge and action. Exploration and experimentation, however, require some ‘base’ to start from which itself has to be incomplete and inadequate to permit, or even require, an ‘open-ended’ challenge for its further construction, correction, emendation, addition along with the enthusiasm, the energy, the elan and the thirst for novelty that creates the dissatisfaction with what is there or has been achieved and the ‘impulse’ that urges man to seek something else, whatever it be.”

7. Illusions: Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Other-Consciousnesses in Dialogue

“The real creative power of consciousness in the process of imagining is revealed when it forms and transforms that spoken word into something ‘inter-subjective’ capable of creating a world of meanings which, in turn, modifies and shapes both the consciousness that has created it and the consciousness which encounters it.”

7.1. From Presuppositions and Dissatisfactions to the Illusions of their Distinction

Although presuppositions and dissatisfactions are not defined as opposites in Daya Krishna’s writing, I interpreted his use of these terms as applying to different, and yet interconnected realms of consciousness. With ‘presuppositions’, I explored the beliefs, postulates, prejudices and criteria that initiate and ground our ‘knowledges’. With ‘dissatisfactions’, I showed how the constitution of these knowledges are directed by valuational seekings. There are immanent to human life and transcend the realizations that result from our knowledges towards something ‘beyond’ which drives our collective efforts. The ‘beyond’ needs not to point at a beyond the world (as in liberation from the world) but implies a ‘beyond the reality as it is given to us’ which indicates an ideality and a potentiality to imagine how the world ‘ought to be’. It calls for further transformations and realizations which are themselves affected by cultural, social, political and historical conceptions of the world. Presuppositions are thus embedded into epistemological intuitions, and dissatisfactions into values that are experienced in the deceptive actualizations of our knowledges. I hypothesized that one way to unveil presuppositions and to ‘realize’ the nature of our dissatisfactions is dialoguing with others, who by their differences (of conceptual structures, influenced by cultural and socio-political factors) can reflect our own presuppositions and dissatisfactions. Reciprocally, the practice of dialoguing is influenced by these presuppositions and dissatisfactions, and in general by the collective others participating, so that the movement between realizing our presuppositions and dissatisfactions is itself modifying them as well as the dialogue itself. There is therefore no static conception of what forms our positions in dialogue, but a movement back and forth between theory and practice, my position and the other’s position, and so on.

In Daya Krishna’s writings, another concept is often used in correlations with presuppositions or dissatisfactions: ‘illusions’. In general, it is more difficult to determine a specific realm to which it applies in distinction to the formers. Furthermore, like for the term ‘seeking’, the conception of which is strongly influenced by his understanding of puruṣārtha, however reinterpreted in a broader contemporary philosophical context, ‘illusions’ refer in particular to
the Sanskrit term ‘māyā’\textsuperscript{803} and the Kantian use of illusion.\textsuperscript{804} Knowing how constitutive the tripartite conception of consciousness is for Daya Krishna, who often refers to ‘knowledge, will and feeling’ (influenced by the Kantian distinction of his three \textit{Critiques}) or in its Sanskrit counterpart, to \textit{jñāna, karma and bhakti} \textsuperscript{805} (in reference to the traditions but also to contemporary developments, in particular those of K. C. Bhattacharyya \textsuperscript{806}), it would be expected that ‘illusions’ apply to the realm of feelings. Indeed, since ‘presuppositions’ are the ‘illusions’ of knowledge and ‘dissatisfactions’ the ‘illusions’ provoked by the ‘act’-ualizations of knowledge (with regard to our concepts), should not the ‘illusions’ of feeling be the ‘illusions’ themselves? Although feelings play an important role here, in particular when the sense of ‘illusoriness’ of the illusions is felt, I believe however that illusions overcome this division. They are located prior to any distinction and they thus encompass both the epistemological and valuational dimensions. They are, so to say, the ‘illusions’ generated by the very tripartite separation of consciousness and thus apply at a more fundamental ‘metaphysical’ or ‘ontological’ level.

I will investigate in this chapter how these illusions of consciousness further complicate the understanding of the human condition. In particular, I want to concentrate on the difficulties that these illusions bring for conceiving a dialogue with others whose consciousnesses are also subjected to illusions. Indeed, the beliefs of knowledge are grounded into values, which are unquestionable from within a knowledge-system. The presuppositions can be unveiled in the activity of debating and dialoguing when the limits become visible, i.e. when knowledge is

\textsuperscript{803} “Reason or Logos, thus, has brought us to an absurdity which is refuted every time anyone acts, whether he is a genius or not. Man is the living refutation and the constant questioner of that which the Logos proclaims as ‘Truth’, truth with a capital ‘T’, as people are fond of saying. The truth of Logos is overcome or transcended or negated by the truth of freedom self-consciously felt and experienced by every human being when he intends and wills and makes the physical and mental effort to act and, if this be an illusion as Logos insists, then we can only say that it is an effective illusion, an effectiveness that is a sign of something being real and not a Nothing, or absolute non-Being which the Logos itself thinks of and characterizes as such. Traditional thought in India saw the dilemma and formulated the concept of \textit{sadasadvilaksana} and called it \textit{māyā}, that is, something which could neither be characterized as being or nonbeing, as it was unreal to thought, but still causally effective, and through that efficaciousness creating a world which was the source of joy and sorrow and thus leading one to ever renewed action to get more of the one and less of the other, if one could not get rid of it altogether. But if this is the way one looks at things, then one will have two opposed and conflicting ideals or \textit{purusārthas} to realize, the one immanent in the notion of reason or Logos or knowledge, and the other immanent in will or action. The former will see the latter as based on a foundational illusion or ignorance or \textit{avidyā} that believes or thinks that the Real can never be other than what it is and has always been, something timeless and eternal and unchanging.” Daya Krishna, “Eros, Nomos, Logos,” in \textit{Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna}, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 313.


\textsuperscript{805} In another paper, I relate the illusion of I-centricity to the prevalence of the mode of consciousness of knowledge, where the epistemological subject is distinguished from the agent and the feeling person. Such a conception of knowledge results in the impossibility of reaching the others as subjects, since they are objects of my knowledge. In conceiving these three modes of consciousness in interrelation, however, it becomes possible to integrate others to the process of constituting knowledge, as agents in the activity of knowledge and as feeling person whose feelings relate us in the intimacy of our subjectivities. Although working closely with this idea, I proceed here differently in order to investigate the relational role of dialogue in overcoming metaphysical I-centricity. Coquereau, “Relational Consciousness: Subjectivity and Otherness in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy,” 310–22.

actualized and perceived as inadequate (false, incomplete, etc.). The human constitution of knowledge is unveiled in the dissatisfactions that it generates and in the differences that are encountered with confronting different knowledge-theories. These dissatisfactions point at the cultural, social and historical boundaries of these knowledge-theories that are elaborated within specific contexts. Illusions, however, operate prior to this realization: they constitute the unquestionability of beliefs. This in return, denotes the human condition since all humans are subjected to illusions and are as such limited. The illusions operate differently in the three realms of consciousness (knowledge, will and feeling). It is however in the intermingling of these realms and in the interrelationships of the different illusions that they generate that Daya Krishna defines the human condition:

“Consciousness thus has almost opposed dimensions, the presuppositions of which are diametrically different from one another. The knowing consciousness cannot but treat the object as ‘given’, while consciousness as involved in action can only see it as something to be changed or transformed in the direction of what it considers to be ‘better’. At the level of feeling it is neither concerned with knowing the object as it is or in changing it in any specific way except when it sees it as producing a state of feeling which one considers to be unwelcome. The object is seen here purely instrumentally; what matters is the state of feeling itself. However, this instrumentality of the object in the context of feeling transforms human action and gives a radically different direction to action from the one it takes when it seeks a value which essentially involves the other. The diverse relationships with the object that consciousness has in its modalities of what are usually called ‘knowing’, ‘feeling’, and ‘willing’, and the transcendental presuppositions and structures that are involved in these different relationships along with the interrelationships between them, defines the human condition in both its transcendent and immanent aspects. The complexity that this introduces into the human situation is literally unimaginable.”

In my interpretation of this citation, the ‘transcendental presuppositions and structures’ signify illusions. These are firstly involved in the different relationships with these three realms of consciousness, secondly in their ‘interrelationships’, and thirdly in relation with the other’s consciousness similarly constituted. Illusions are manifold, but Daya Krishna distinguishes between two general kinds, the ‘structural’ and the ‘transcendental’ ones. The transcendental illusions are understood in the Kantian sense, namely “something that is transcendentally presupposed is treated as phenomenally given”. However, in Daya Krishna’s reinterpretation, the transcendental illusions can be extended, including to reason itself. Thus, he adds that “the transcendental illusion, then, would be the result of a projection of not only the generalized category of causality to each of the products of the activity, but also of the specific category which differentiates the modality of the activity from all other exercises of itself.” Drawing on the Kantian arising of antinomies that occur when space and time are seen as given rather than transcendently constituted, Daya Krishna introduces from a classical example of a stick bent under water the perceptual illusions that are generated by the very structure of our cognition.

807 Daya Krishna, 97.
808 Daya Krishna, 15.
809 Daya Krishna, 22.
The concepts of ‘transcendental’ and ‘structural’ illusions hint at the different directions in which an illusion is constituted. For Daya Krishna, the problem does not only concern the relation between mundane and transcendental realms, i.e. between the given that we experience in the world and the transcendental a priori, a realm to which we have no access. Illusions operate also in the mundane world. Even what is transcendentally presupposed is subjected to the illusions of our own structure for conceiving it. These structures are biological, cultural, social, historical, etc. They are not specific to reason only, but also shows that reason functions within certain embodied contexts and groups. Furthermore, conceiving transcendental presuppositions influences our experience of the given and the structural illusions that we perceive. In this sense, as Daya Krishna suggests, it is impossible to bracket the structure through which we experience and conceive the world since there is no faculty escaping this existential structure of human beings:

“The deeper problem, however, is how one can ever know that what is transcendentally presupposed is not ‘really’ given for in case it is transcendentally presupposed, it shall always appear as given. There can simply be no way of becoming aware of the illusoriness of the given unless one has some faculty other than the one the structure of which is involved in the experience concerned. The point is that experience will always appear as ‘structured’ and one can never, in principle, come to ‘know’ that the structure does not belong to the experience but is the very precondition of its appearing as such.”

The structural illusions, however, are not necessarily limited to our perception of the world as in the case of the stick bent in water. They originate from the commonality of the human structure of consciousness, which renders the illusions intersubjectively objective since we cannot detect their illusoriness. Their objectivity is determined by the intersubjective community sharing the same structure, which makes a content appear as object of an all-consciousness in such a (determined) way. Thus, a stick appears bent in water to everybody sharing the same perceptual cognitive structure. We can theoretically ‘correct’ this illusion by ‘knowing’ that the stick is straight, although our perception of it will remain ‘bent’. Furthermore, as Daya Krishna adds: “if, for some reason, we lived in a world where we were dealing with sticks under water most of the time, it is extremely probable that we would have opted for the view that sticks are really bent and that their appearance as being straight outside water was illusory.” Thus, structural illusions are not perceptual deficiencies per se or optical illusions. Rather, they refer to an objective, in the sense of intersubjectively shared and thus not

810 Daya Krishna, 15.
811 Daya Krishna, 43–44.
812 Daya Krishna, 16.
depending on our individuality, ‘way of seeing’ the world in a certain manner that we cannot question, since we cannot perceive it differently. In the absence of a ‘higher’ faculty that could unveil the illusions, we are doomed to experience the illusion, in spite of all our faculties, being also structurally defined. I thus interpret the given example of a stick in a metaphorical way with further consequences than proper perceptual applications, qualifying the structural illusions as a shared ‘certain way of seeing’ the world. While analyzing history and historiography, Daya Krishna refers back to this concept of structural illusions, where he applies it to ‘historical knowledge’ showing how far structural illusions operate and how multifold consequences they can have:

“The transcendental conditions of historical knowledge, therefore, would result in the historical illusion or illusions, or rather in structural illusions belonging to the domain of historical knowledge only when they are seen not as being its transcendental conditions, but as being the object or objects discovered by the historical consciousness or provided to it. Perhaps, the structural illusion in the case of history arises from the fact that the historian inevitably projects his own cultural mentality into that which he is trying to study and finds it objectively displayed therein by the evidence that he chooses to marshal in its support.”

The illusions of different realms of knowledge are thus generated when we treat as object something that is a transcendental precondition. They occur when we treat axioms and postulates that are inherent conditions of our knowledge as the objects of this knowledge, holding these axioms, postulates and beliefs to be ‘true’ (although the ‘truth’ is simply a consequence of our conditions).

The example that Daya Krishna chooses is especially relevant for inter- or cross-cultural studies and can be easily extended to philosophy in the way we select, interpret and relate concepts between traditions. The very way we form ‘comparisons’, the way we evaluate what is ‘proper’ (philosophy, or proper method such as philological analysis versus philosophical expansion), what we integrate and what we omit in an analysis, the texts and concepts that we receive and those which fall into oblivion, depend on our structural situation (historical, cultural, social, etc.). This situation produces structural illusions when we refuse to see that the situation, structurally ordered, creates transcendental conditions for the production of our philosophical knowledge. Although these conditions are shared by all those who are located in the same situation and share the same structure, they are not universal. However, they are also necessary to create a particular discourse, which at the same time indicates the possibility of other alternative discourses. These discourses have their own structures within which ‘truth’ can be evaluated and might be contradictory to the truths elaborated in another discourse. This

813 Daya Krishna justifies the impossibility for reason to ‘correct’ its own illusions as follows: “Normally it is ‘reason’ that is supposed to expose the illusoriness of such an appearance even when it is shared by everybody and continues to appear in the same way after reason has pronounced it to be illusory. The correction, therefore, is only a theoretical correction and does not affect the perceptual experience in any substantial way. But if perception can have structural illusions whose illusory character cannot be realized at the level of perception, can ‘reason’ not have such structural illusions of its own? Kant tried to suggest that it has and used a transcendental critique to expose the illusory nature of those seemingly objective realities brought into being by reason itself. Kant however did not discuss as to how reason could possibly expose its own illusions even by a transcendental critique, if they were the result of the very structure of reason itself.”Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 117.

814 Daya Krishna, 118.
possibility can be creatively used in dialogue to realize the specificity of our conditions for producing knowledge and exploring other’s knowledge, which is basically Daya Krishna’s plea. However, if the illusoriness is not realized, i.e. if we consider these conditions as objective productions of knowledge having a claiming universal validity, the illusions become an impediment to creative knowledge and dialogue. In other words: the illusions, when realized as such, can motivate a dialogue, while when they are not recognized, they create obstacle for dialoguing. The proofs that we have produced on the basis of this knowledge might be verifiable, but the structural framework from which they were produced (which thus condition them) is not. Thus, our epistemological assertions are ‘presuppositions’ which themselves originate from structural and transcendental illusion. The illusions of ‘truth’, ‘finality’, ‘authority’, ‘beginning and end’ (of a text, of thinking, of knowledge) which we have earlier mentioned are instantiations of these structural illusions. In Foucauldian terms, structural illusions are what make something appear to be ‘true’ although it is only situated ‘within the truth’, i.e. within a contingent and limited (historically, socially, culturally) structural nexus from which truth and false can be attributed.

Dissatisfactions originate when we encounter the limits of this ‘within’ the truth, i.e. when the practical experience is insufficient with regard to what our consciousness had apprehended. While the illusions of knowledge occur from the denial of the specificity of our structures, the illusions of values arise from the denial of the limited reality of our ideals. For consciousness, reality is conceived of as encompassing all the existing possibilities. In the experience of the incompleteness of reality in our actions, however, the illusion is being revealed and points at

815 “The terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ will then be seen to be systematically misleading as they generate the illusion that there is or can be such a thing as knowledge that unifies all knowledges within itself and thus is that which alone may be regarded as preeminently true.” Daya Krishna, “Illusion, Hallucination, and the Problem of Truth,” 173.
816 “The illusion that this unendingness is ‘illusory’ is generated by that view of consciousness which sees it as cognitive in character, whose sole function consists in knowing ‘what is real’ and whose sole function consists in knowing ‘what is real’ and whose sole value consists in its being ‘true’ to the nature of that which is real. There is no reality; if consciousness is real and if self-consciousness is real, then also there can be no such thing as ‘truth’ or finality not only in the realm of knowledge, but in all other realms also.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 145.
817 “Knowledge, it should be remembered, is usually knowledge of what someone else has said or a repetition of what is habitually accepted as true by practitioners in a certain domain. The first is just information that may be useful in certain contexts. As for the second, a closer look at the field will always reveal dissidents who are anathema to the establishment. Thus, the distinction between those who know and those who do not is not only relative but also misleading if it is construed as a relationship of authority in which the latters have necessarily to accept what the formers say, as they are a disadvantaged group in the situation. This illusion of authority is generated by the child’s relation of multifarious dependence on adults, and is later strengthened by the schooling system where the teacher is supposed to know and the student to learn.” Daya Krishna, “Thinking versus Thought: Strategies for Conceptual Creativity,” 29.
818 “The text, in other words, is to be seen as the thought product of someone’s thinking and thus having all those characteristics that any product of one’s own thinking usually has: tentativeness, incompleteness, provisionality, lack of finality, etc. But this would destroy the illusion created by the appearance of the beginning and the end within a finite number of pages securely bound within the confines of a book. (…) But, once the illusion of the beginning and the end are realized, the revelatory attitude to texts will cease also. One can easily see the absurdity of this attitude in the context of the so-called revealed texts of other religions but seldom in that of one’s own. And those who have seen through the revelatory pretensions of religions are seldom able to see through their almost universal prevalence in secular contexts also. The tribes of Marxians, Freudians, Fregeans, Wittgensteinians, Husserlians, Chomskians are legion (…). The disciples proudly proclaim the final findings of the master, little realizing that each of them has been rejected as untenable by followers of the other group.” Daya Krishna, 31–32.
819 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language, 224. See also 5.1.
the discrepancy between reality and ideality. This is again correlated with the finality of truth which appears concomitant to objective ‘reality’. But in fact it is contradicted by the fragmentary, imperfect and dubitable existence of this reality in our actions, which renders the finality of truth suspiciously illusory. In Daya Krishna’s words:

“There is a generally unquestioned acceptance of the view that what is real must be so. It is assumed that this is the case because it must be of such a nature that there is not even the possibility of anything being added to it. That is, it cannot, in itself, stand in a necessary relationship to anything else, including human consciousness. This view derives, not from anything in the concept of reality itself, but instead from the structure of human consciousness.

Kant tried to uncover and articulate this structural presupposition of the act of knowing but he did not see that knowing was only one of the modulations of consciousness even in the context we call ‘cognitive’, and that for any real understanding of the human situation, man finds himself in trying to understand the structure of consciousness and self-consciousness involved in it. Consciousness, it should be remembered, cannot differentiate between the real and the imaginary, as both appear equally as appearances to it. As for self-consciousness, which is everywhere at the human level, everything that appears is equally dubitable and necessarily so.

But by a strange twist, philosophical thinking, which occurs at the level of self-consciousness, sees the self or the sense of the I alone as indubitable and treats all the rest, including itself, as objectivity given and hence essentially dubitable, and that too in the sense that it is contingent in principle. It demands and requires that whatever appears as object, including itself, can only be regarded as real if and only if it has the same indubitability as self-consciousness or the I consciousness.

But this is to suffer from an illusion generated by the fact of self-consciousness itself. Once the source of this illusion is realized, the dubitable character of all that is object and the indubitability of the self, that is, the subject, will disappear and philosophical thinking be freed from the delusion that has characterized it since its beginning, as it is the reflexive activity of self-consciousness in its purest from that we know at the human level.”

It is important to notice that for Daya Krishna, first, ‘realizing’ the illusoriness of the illusion is different than ‘correcting’ or ‘annihilating’ the illusions, which, belonging to the structure of consciousness itself, is almost impossible. It is also artificial, in the sense of a ‘theoretical correction’ that does not modify our experience of it. The ‘feeling’ of illusoriness thus does not disappear, but is only a posteriori theoretically realized. This leaves the question of the illusions of feeling open, which I think Daya Krishna himself did not respond to. Although he

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821 “The relations between beings who are ‘self-conscious’ are, thus, structurally determined by the fact that each of them happens to be simultaneously a ‘subject’ and an ‘object’ to the other. This relationship, however, is itself differentiated radically in the dimensions of knowing, feeling and action, which seem so incommensurate that it is difficult to see how they can be reconciled in a unitary relationship which is demanded by the existential structure of the human reality itself. (…) The situation in the realm of feeling is far more complex and hence has hardly been paid any attention by thinkers as even those who have tried to think about this dimension of human reality have seen it primarily in terms of ‘understanding’, a task which is undertaken in the same way as one ‘understands’ other objects in the context of the enterprise of knowledge. But ‘feelings’ are not to be understood, at least in the same sense of ‘understanding’, as one does when the term is applied to inanimate matter, or a living being or even a cultural object which is a human creation. Feelings are ‘lived’ through, ‘felt’ and existentially experienced in a way that nothing else is.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 108–9.
articulates the illusions of knowledge and action, and the presuppositions and dissatisfactions, his account on feeling in general (not only confined to aesthetic feelings which he however usually epitomizes as feeling\textsuperscript{822}) raises further questions.

Some of these questions have been asked by Arindam Chakrabarti on his essay in honor of Daya Krishna, wondering whether he really ‘misses’ Dayaji after his decease, or ‘seems’ to miss it, i.e. whether feelings are subject to fallibility or whether, because we feel in a certain way, we cannot contradict how we feel.\textsuperscript{823} The possibility of deceiving myself in my feelings (as in blaming others for my feelings of being annoyed because they come late, while I am either actually annoyed at myself, or annoyed because I actually wished they had not come at all\textsuperscript{824}) shows that feelings, in spite of the immediacy which seems to prevent any objective distance to assert truth or falsity, can also be subject to illusions. But are these illusions structural illusions? If we understand Daya Krishna’s definition in the intersubjective sense that structural illusions arise due to our common perceptual and cognitive limits, because of which the illusions are indecipherable, the problem is even more complex. On the one hand, the inner state of feelings is precisely what is ‘mine’ and not shared by others in its immediacy: I can express and communicate it, but nobody can have a direct access to my inner feelings. On the other hand, in spite of the diversity of feelings and the complexity of psychological structures, we all share ‘feelings’, i.e. we all feel some things, notwithstanding the indefinite variations in their nature and expressions. This means that if we consider the feeling structure in itself, the way we deceive ourselves with our feelings can be related to dissatisfactions. The content of feelings can vary, so as for values, but we all have a valuational structure - characterized as seeking - and feelings. One difference however is to be noted: dissatisfactions imply a contact with an external reality, an actualization of our ideal apprehensions. Feelings on the contrary need not to be confronted with an external reality and can originate from within ourselves (such as spiritual or religious feelings). If we consider that feelings are precisely this intimacy that escapes the structural sharedness - such that, paradoxically, our self-illusion can be detected by others using their own faculty to notice our hypocrisy - then the question of the structure of feelings is unresolved. But can we even speak of ‘structure’ in the case of feelings, which seem to contradict any idea of organized coherence? Or can we, again, conceive of ‘feeling’ at a level where the diversity and incoherencies are encompassed under a commonality of all humans ‘feeling’ sadness and beauty and joy, even when the context of their arising might totally differ?

\textsuperscript{822} Daya Krishna, 87.


\textsuperscript{824} “Yet we do, undeniably, make mistakes of different sorts in assessing our current mental, hedonic, somatic and proprioceptive states. When we are feeling lazy while trying to lift up a chair, we believe that a certain chair feels too heavy for us to lift when it really does not. We think - tell ourselves - that we are not annoyed when we are. We think that we are annoyed because some friend has arrived too late, whereas the fact-hard-to-acknowledge-is that we are annoyed because he showed up at all! (…) Thus, many different kinds of mistakes fall under the general category of ‘Errors about one’s current mental state’. Some inward or higher-order self-ascription of cognitive states ‘inherit’ the error of the outward judgement that it reflectively registers. While having the rope/snake illusion, as yet undetected, one could introspect: ‘I am seeing a snake now.’ The error of the outward judgement: ‘That is a snake, over there’ contaminates the introspective awareness ‘I am seeing a snake now’, rendering it erroneous in so far as the claim is taken as existentially qualified: ‘There is a snake which I am now seeing.’” Chakrabarti, 181.
Daya Krishna seems to favor the first alternative, which still does not solve the issue whether structural illusions occur in the case of feelings, or whether feelings generate other kinds of illusions. Consequently, I would even ask whether feelings could constitute the forms of illusions (i.e. how we experience them), rather than their content (such as the illusions of knowledge). In the first alternative, ‘illusoriness’ designates the feeling due to which we become aware of the illusion, for example ‘being annoyed’ as the feeling that forces me to realize that I actually do not want to meet my friend. In the second alternative, illusoriness can be considered as the actual content of my feeling of being annoyed when my presumed friends come too late, if I deceive myself according to Chakrabarti. The unreliability of my own feeling gives rise to the illusion of my feeling which is felt as illusoriness when I realize that I was mistaking myself. It thus seems to me to alternate between the illusion of feeling (as content) and the feeling of the illusoriness of the feeling, once we realized - or have been made to realize - that we were mistaken. I hypothesize that both are related to each other, so that the feeling of illusoriness affects the feeling of being annoyed, and this feeling is also affected by its illusion.

More importantly, ‘illusion’, like presupposition and dissatisfaction, is not simply a negative term ‘from’ which we should free ourselves. Freeing oneself from an illusion does not equate freedom from all illusions. Like with dissatisfactions, illusions might be experienced as deceptive. But it is precisely in the undecidedness of dissatisfactions and illusions, i.e. in their incompleteness, tentativeness and fallibility, that the potentiality for creation lies. Thus, the negativity is a condition for creative possibilities, however not in a dialectic way but in the reciprocity of an ever-going dynamic at all levels of consciousness and self-consciousness, as well as between consciousnesses. It is in this spirit that Daya Krishna concludes his posthumously published work *Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions*:

“‘The structural and transcendental illusions that are thus revealed to be characteristic of human consciousness have, it should be remembered, both a positive and a negative aspect. In their positive forms they refer to that creativity that lies at the root of the world and which becomes manifest at a human level in all the myriad forms that surround him all around and have accompanied him in his historical journey through the ages. The negative aspect is revealed when he forgets the fact that this all is, to a large extent, his own creation, and when he falls in love with it, or is obsessed by it, or feels bound to it in such a way that he feels that he can never be freed from it. At a deeper level, the bondage may emanate from the fact that he takes for granted the ‘given-ness’ of the forms that this power of ‘creative illumining’ has taken in the past. ‘To be free’ from the forms that freedom has taken in the past is the real freedom which man forgets all the time. One can recover this freedom only by becoming aware of the roots from which these forms emanate and the source of this discovery perhaps lies in becoming aware of the illusions that are generated by the structure and transcendental character of consciousness at the human level.’”

825 The realm of feelings, however, never attains and cannot, in fact, ever attain in principle the ‘definiteness’ and ‘coherence’ which all knowledge attempts to attain and which action also tries to achieve, even if it never attains it completely. The inchoateness and indefiniteness which infects the world of feelings makes it thus impervious to both knowledge and action which continually try to affect and modify them in the light of what they consider as the ‘ideal norm’ of what they ‘should’, or even ‘ought’ to be.” Daya Krishna, *Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions*, 109.

826 Daya Krishna, 170.
These concluding lines constitute for me ‘guiding lines’ of Daya Krishna’s philosophical project which connect his otherwise multifold writings. They relate the positive aspect of illusions if used as a creative source for engaging further in discussions, if conceived as indefinite and containing possibilities for thinking and creating. The same dimension of illusions can also be seen negatively if the feeling of their illusoriness is lost, which also leads to a loss of the feeling of ‘wonder’ so crucial for philosophical thinking. It can also be seen negatively if the feelings of givenness that these illusions create corresponds for us with what reality is, in the singular, complete and absolute. Furthermore, if the ‘given-ness’ is ‘taken for granted’, the very questioning that is also at the core of the philosophical entreprise is negated and thus every dialogue is closed. Finally, these lines accentuate Daya Krishna’s pregnant view on freedom, a freedom that is not the liberation from māyā, but passes through illusions as a process of clarification and ‘illumination’ towards further illusions.

Although Daya Krishna’s account of illusion is complex, it is rewarding to ‘illuminate’ the creative potentiality of dialogue. On the one hand, he emphasizes the mutuality and reciprocity of all dimensions of consciousness: of consciousness and self-consciousness, of I-consciousness and other-consciousness, of these consciousnesses with their bodies, with nature and the world. He also insists on the difficulty that these relationships, all interconnected, create - which he defines as ‘the roots of creativity’. On the other hand, these mutual and reciprocal interrelationships at all levels do not merge into a complete unity, which would precisely negate the potentiality of creativity in such a diversity (this explains his critique against the Advaitin developed in 6.2.2).

Daya Krishna is thus a philosopher of differences, more precisely of ‘identity-in-differences’, which can be defined as the ‘move’ from withdrawing into the unity and returning to the worldly differences. This move is what connects my consciousness, which tends to unify the diverse experiences into a single understanding or which seeks a transcendental unity, with others who embody the diversity of the world we share. In that sense this move is what enables a relation with other-consciousnesses. This question of the move that occurred in the relation between identity and difference is relevant at different levels. First it is relevant for Daya Krishna’s philosophy, since I believe it is the dynamic between identity and difference which describes at best his objective to unveil the presuppositions of philosophy. I think that he does so mostly by locating the impasse of philosophical thinking when it ‘stopped’ the ‘move’ as described above. It is in this sense not the presence of conflicting theories that creates a deadlock, but the lack of further perspectives from which these differences can be further discussed. This arises when one ‘falls in love’ with his theory or position, as Daya Krishna formulates it when he explains the negative aspects of illusions. In other terms, the impasse of differences arises when the different theories are considered as final and one refuses to reflect further on these differences.

Secondly, the notion of move is important for dialogue and creativity in dialogue, which originate in such an ongoing multi-directional process between different dimensions of consciousness, self and others, etc. Thus, isolating one dimension of dialogue for a theory of dialogue (such as language, performative communication, or a normative ethics of communication) remains for me, interpreting Daya Krishna’s practice and theory, insufficient to explain the specificity of the dialogical creativity. This creativity is located in the ‘cracks of
certitude” that differences enable, however together with identities which are equally needed to make dialogue possible. In his only unpublished article explicitly and entirely dedicated to the problem of dialogue, debate, discussion and conversation, Daya Krishna emphasizes the ‘indeterminacy’ generating novel horizons, questions and problems by the presence and participation of the other, an other whose differences (of position, perspective, philosophical traditions) increases the potential creativity. Interestingly, the doubts that arise from this indeterminacy are provoking both identity and differences among the different positions hold in dialogue:

“The whatever the strategy adopted, the seeds of ‘doubt’ and suspicion in respect of one’s position have been same in one’s mind and one ‘knows’ that one has to come to terms with it. Strangely and paradoxically the same thing happens to the other party also, specifically if one’s arguments had any strength and the evidence any validity. The respective positions thus get modified and subtly changed so the debate after lasting for centuries, or even millennia, seems to converge towards formations which though still different in appearance mainly due to difference in terminology, reveals an ‘underlying identity’ even though one continues to be wedded to the differences as it is supposed to give one the ‘identity’ which differentiates one from the other.”

The differences account for the change and modification of a position and are thus creating the movement of thinking in a dialogue. At the same time, they converge in a kind of *ipse* identity, if we reinterpret Ricoeur’s concept to philosophical debates for which the same philosophical concept or question can be interpreted and transformed in many ways - an identity through differences. Identities within dialogues tend to jeopardize the continuous movement of the dialogue. However, at another level of abstraction, they delineate ‘tendencies’, cross-points, similarities and overlaps. Although they form the battlefield of specialists arguing for the specificities of their own research, and although they can be used to reduce the other’s position to oneself, they enable the formation of a ground on which debate, discussion and dialogue (1.1) can take place. Thus, Daya Krishna’s battle is not exactly the one arguing against cultural reductions. There are bound to appear in any study looking for convergences of civilizations at a general level, such as the reduction of the idea of ‘India’ with regard to ‘Western’ philosophies or the reduction of the idea of the ‘West’ to India. What he rather criticizes is that such reductions are not able to foster new questions. In other words, his criticism focuses on the

827 T: they
828 T: sub
829 Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 7. The quote from this article is based on the unpublished transcript (T) typed by D. D. Mathur, which however has been corrected with the help of the original manuscript. The emendations are indicated above.
fact that identities get fixed into epithets such as ‘India is spiritual’, ‘the West is rational’, which reduces the debate itself to already-known alternatives. In order to tackle such a problem, the ‘underlying identity’ above mentioned that delineates civilizations should form a ground to investigate and to be confronted with alternative identities, different models or methodologies and various traditions. Thirdly, the question of the relation between identity and difference underlines the intercultural dimension of dialogue. This is not only because Daya Krishna’s insights originate from a criticism of the Kantian and Advaitin idealisms at the same time. It is also because such a conception of relational ‘identity in differences and differences in identity’\(^{831}\) has the advantage to take us away from the binarity of ‘identity versus differences’ in intercultural discourses.\(^{832}\) It furthermore does not justify the ‘reciprocity’ or ‘mutuality’ in formal ethical and normative terms, but articulates them at a more fundamental level, i.e. at the core of consciousness itself, which is effectuated by the ‘awareness’ of it and of its limitations rather than by an external pre-established framework.

Thus, identity alone runs the risk of becoming ‘obcessive’\(^{833}\), while differences create the illusions of independent and separated positions which give us the impression of finality and


\(^{832}\) In intercultural philosophy, the issue of developing an intercultural method (by drawing on German phenomenology and hermeneutical discourses) which would resist reducing the Other to the same in my ‘understanding’ of him enabled a discussion of models of ‘identity’ versus ‘difference’. In this context (and unlike the Advaitin inspiration of postcolonial Indian models), the ‘difference’ models were often preferred, usually either navigating between identity and difference to avoid the extremes of both, or suggesting hermeneutic or phenomenological differential accounts that can be adapted to intercultural contexts. See Weidtmann, *Interkulturelle Philosophie*, 76–98; Georg Stenger, “Differenz: Unterscheidungen, Differenzierungen, Dimensionen,” in *Die Interkulturalitätsdebatte - Leit- Und Streitbegriffe. Intercultural Discourse - Key and Contested Concepts* (Freiburg - München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2012), 45–55.

\(^{833}\) “Any identification with a group thus tends to jeopardize the realization of value at the deepest level just as one’s own identification with one’s empirical self tends to do when it is conceived in such a way as to exclude others. This may occur even at the transcendental level where one aspires to de-identify oneself with all that is given to consciousness as the ‘other’. The only way out of the dilemma, at least at the theoretical level is to conceive of oneself, at every level of its identification as subserving the interests and values of the ‘other’ or, at least as not
indubitability. While we cannot escape the movement towards identification (with our bodies, our cultures, our academic field and so on), the isolation of differentiated positions can create the impression that these are too far away to be related. Thus, it is only in the relation of identity and difference, in the movement of identifying what is which implies what is not, that we can remain aware of the illusions above-mentioned:

“Whatever a man may be, he has a body, and he is conscious and he is also conscious of the fact that he is conscious. Not only this, he also inevitably draws the distinction between truth and falsity, good and bad, right or wrong, and what appears to him as pleasant and unpleasant, or beautiful and ugly. (...) The distinctions are embedded in consciousness and when one becomes aware of them, one feels the obligation and the challenge to remove them through one’s own effort, which has been called puruṣārtha in the Indian tradition. But if man is to be defined or understood in terms of what we call the human effort to realize something that is not there including what is truth, then he himself will have to be seen in a different way and the question asked, ‘where does falsity exist?’ The only answer that can be given to this question is that it is in the very being of consciousness that makes the distinction. To be conscious is to bring into being something that is ontologically impossible, for it simultaneously has the character of being both ‘is’ and ‘is not.’ If it were just not there, one could not be even aware of it and if it were there then the question of bringing about any change would not arise. But to be conscious at the human level is to be just this and the history of man cannot be understood without this radical transformation of the notions of reality and truth, which are closely related to each other.”

Thus, definitions imply distinctions which necessarily relate to their opposite. This is easy to understand in the example of ‘India’ and the ‘West’, which are negatively defined by what they are not, rather than by any substantial content of what they are. The problem occurs when we lose sight of the relations implied and begin to attribute to one of these poles a higher value such as ‘good’ or ‘superior’ or ‘true/truer’. The illusions thus operate to give us the ‘feeling’ of an objective validity without making us see that the arguments for this truth lie in particular structural conditions. Positively seen, this awareness enables the opportunity to question the truth of these oppositions, how well-founded their definitions are, how the questions can be asked differently, from which other perspective they could be explored, etc. Thus, identity and difference remain intrinsically connected, and it is their relation that forms the core of the creative dynamic:

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834 “Distinguishing, discriminating, and evaluating awareness is present and active at all these levels, and yet is not treated as knowledge, even though it also changes and grows and stagnates and perhaps has a history of its own just as knowledge is supposed to have. The latter, however, seems to have a cumulative character which the former lacks. In most cases, the latter is better or more reliable than that which has been superseded by it. This results in that ambivalent relationship which makes all that is not accepted and certified as true by the reason-centered enterprise of knowledge as superstitious belief or faith, which only the ignorant and the irrational can cherish or live.” Daya Krishna, “Definition, Deception and the Enterprise of Knowledge,” 2011, 151.

“The debate between those who have opted for identity alone as real and the ones who asserted the reality of difference is unmeaning, for one has to accept the reality of both as without such an acceptance, one cannot either meaningfully speak of, or make sense of, one’s experience. The assertion of difference does not deny the possibility of relation or even of similarity between those that are different. Thus, similarity, relatedness and difference are three aspects of one and the same phenomenon, the other name of which is self-consciousness. Similarity assumes both identity and difference, and relatedness is the overcoming of the illusoriness of the absoluteness of difference, while still preserving its reality itself. It is ‘relatedness’, therefore, that is at the heart of the matter and the exploration of the diverse forms that it takes or may take, in its pursuits, has to be seen, so that one may understand human life as it finds itself in this world.”

The intellectual detachment that was discussed in 5.2.1, as well as the process of identification with and deidentification from a culture, a history, a position, appear to be crucial for constituting knowledge in dialogue. Furthermore, the ability to relate to others is a condition for any moral order, and the seeking of knowledge and truth is embedded into this matrix of identification and deidentification, for it challenges what ‘is’ in terms of what ‘ought’. The plurality that the differences let emerge is also a condition for dialogues in general, and of intercultural dialogues in particular. Relationality, which is at the core of the awareness of the illusoriness of the illusions (i.e. their theoretical corrections) enables the dynamic between the different spheres of (self-)consciousness.

7.2. The Demand of Consciousness for Dialogue

In an unpublished article with the intriguing title ‘‘Thinking’ without ‘Things’: without Identity, without Non-contradiction, and yet ‘Thinking’ still’837, Daya Krishna asks whether a ‘problem’ is a ‘thing’ and if it is not, what are philosophers thinking about when they think about ‘thinking’. In other words, he discusses the relation between ‘thinking’ and ‘problems’ to the objects of self-consciousness. The most interesting case for him appears when the ‘things’ are incompatible with each other, since it creates the ‘problem’ of their simultaneous contradictory ‘reality’. Thus, in my reflective self-consciousness, if thinking is an object of my inquiry and if that implies contradictions and paradoxes - which we know are the foundation of any philosophical problem upon which philosophy is developed -, can thinking and the different objects of my thinking be simultaneously real? He suggests that defining a thing requires the simultaneous negation of what the thing is not: to be defined, the thing is at the same time something and not its contradiction. The conclusion of his argumentation is very useful at this point, since he connects this logical question of the ‘law’ of contradiction to the ‘law’ of ethical

837 This unpublished article is available at [https://www.dayakrishna.org](https://www.dayakrishna.org) in its original handwriting version and a transcription typed by D. D. Mathur, Daya Krishna’s personal assistant and scribe of many of his later writings. The quote from this article is based on the transcript (T), which however has been corrected with the help of the original manuscript (M). The emendations are indicated below.
injunction. In so doing, he shows the similarity of the question of objectivation of ‘things’ to create identities upon which only we can reflect with the one of ethical norms that objectify values. He furthermore points at the problem of their simultaneous contradictory reality in both cases. Thus, while the logical ‘alternatives’ of Kalidas Bhattacharyya (5.3.2) could appear to be enough of a solution to solve the problem of simultaneous logical contradictory appearances, from the perspective of ethical norms it remains insufficient. Indeed, simultaneously applying ethical norms and rules that are contradictory would appear as ‘self-defeating’, or in other words, contraproductive. Even more interestingly, Daya Krishna points here at the efficiency of intersubjective discussion and living together for unveiling the illusoriness of the structural illusions of such ‘laws’ that are generated from the appearing stability of the identities of the contradictory things. Thus, it appears as if these contradictions must be solved in order for the identities to be simultaneously safeguarded, productive and valid. However, it is actually in the dynamic modifications taking place in discussions and living together that we can see the illusoriness of these stable identities and realize that their dynamics is their identity through contradictions. In Daya Krishna’s words:

“The purely abstract notion of ‘identity’ as symbolized by Aristotle is, thus, not only empty but meaningless (…). The current reformulation of the law on which the notion of a ‘thing’ rests does not fare any better. It shifts the problem from the ‘referent’ of a word to its ‘meaning’, and sees meaning in terms of the ‘use’ of the word, and understands the law as a stipulative imperative to keep ‘use’ of the ‘word’ or the ‘term’ unchanged in a particular cognitive discourse as the discussion about what is claimed as ‘knowledge’ would become ‘self-defeating’ if the normative injunction were not observed.

The reformation shifts the problem to the identity of ‘discourse’ or ‘context’ and makes the law ‘normative’ in a way whose far-reaching implications have not been seen. Logic becomes something like ‘ethics’, an a priori conditional pre-requisite of the possibility of inter-subjective discussion and argumentation amongst human beings, just as the latter may be understood as an a priori conditional prerequisite for ‘living together’ as ‘human beings’ amongst human beings.

But what is overlooked by those who argue like this is that whether it be ‘discussion and argumentation’ or ‘living together’ each, in its own way, not only involves but demands a continuous re-shifting modification and change in the ‘illusory identity’ of each and all of the linguistic and behavioural signs or signals that are transmitted, reflected back in converse transmission amongst participants who are continuously in motion intellectually and emotionally.”

838 T: this
839 T: low
840 T: world
841 T: discomic
842 T: discomic
843 T: par-reaching
844 T: signed
The parallel between the identity of a thing and the normative injunction that is derived from this stable identity is interesting for understanding why Daya Krishna refused to engage in a normative and prescriptive ethical theory of discourse or dialogue, and why he rather referred to the universality of ‘seeking’ as an existential orientation for human beings, insisting however on the infinite plurality of seekings. The logical and normative ‘laws’ express the identities that are supposed to (illusorily) be recognized by all, unifying our conceptual frameworks based on the consensus of these meanings and uses, upon which we can debate and discuss the ‘thing’. But precisely, what if these laws were illusory because the identities on which they rest are not fixed and harmoniously determined by simple exclusion and negation of others, but related by their contradictions which form their existence? What if these laws are the structural illusions of all who are located in the same discourse, within the same ‘truth’? How to unveil these illusions, or at least reveal their illusoriness? Furthermore, Daya Krishna adds a level of complexity in relating these logical laws of identity to the ethical normativity responsible not only for the formal identities but also for the behaviours and utterances of those who discuss on the basis of these identities. Ethics as an a priori pre-requisite for participating in a discussion remains illusory given the same impossibility to extricate ourselves out of the specific discourse in which we are located, which however, dictates what we can say and how we can say it. The solution out of the realm of these illusions cannot be to ‘replace’ one truth by another, one discourse by another, or one ethical model by another: it must articulate a different way of ‘seeing’ the problem. This, however, is the core of structural illusions when we all share a way of ‘seeing’ the problem. This view enforces Daya Krishna’s belief that dialogues across philosophical traditions are necessary for breaking out of these illusions.

Proceeding from his account to an intercultural theory, intercultural dialogues are not simply ‘good’ or ‘valuable’ because it is ethically more just to include diverse participants according to the current normative necessities of our societies. They are not only epistemologically contributing to maximizing knowledge by adding different philosophical theories, or even by crossing them for novel insights by mutual introspection. They are, so to say, a metaphysical reaction to the illusions of consciousness, or at least a way to realize their illusoriness. If we consider, following Daya Krishna, that “discussion and argumentation or living together not only involves but demands a continuous re-shifting modification and change in the illusory identity”, then it follows that the dynamic of identities-in-transformative-differences are revealed to consciousnesses in dialogue. In other words: our self-consciousness creates ‘things’ by reflecting, which need to be thought by contradistinction and negation of what they are not in order to reach a stable identity. This stability is itself necessary to be ‘thought about’, i.e. reflected upon in terms of definitions, classifications, systematizations, etc. However, the process of reflection creates the stability, which implies that it is never acquired and given, but in ever-changing qualifications, definitions, exclusions by differentiation. Thus, in order to be able not to perceive this identity as finite, Daya Krishna points at the ‘demands’ originating from discussion, argumentation and living together. But what exactly does ‘demand’ mean, and
how can intersubjective discussion, argumentation and living together ‘demand’ the continuous differences operating within identities?

‘Demand’ is another recurrent term in Daya Krishna’s writings,\textsuperscript{846} in particular in relation with illusions, creating a tension akin to dissatisfaction. It designates the conflict between a reality that ‘is’ but which ‘ought’ to be different or which ‘is’ not really, or not yet, etc. Often in relation with consciousness or self-consciousness, a ‘demand’ expresses the feeling produced by the given experience of reality in contradiction with reality itself, either as transcendental reality, or at least as the reality we believe ‘ought to be’. However, while dissatisfaction designates the external contradiction of our actions with regard to our apprehensions or planning, the ‘demand’ expresses a metaphysical reaction within consciousness.\textsuperscript{847} The contradiction here is the one of our inner experience with our apprehension of reality, or between our subjective and objective attitudes within consciousness. Thus, while in the case of dissatisfaction, a possible momentary resolution consists in ‘changing’ or adapting our actions - i.e. for example, to reorganize the setting of the next dialogue in view of the difficulties experienced in the previous one -, the transformation ‘demanded’ by consciousness implies to modify my way of experiencing itself

\textsuperscript{846} I consider the following quote as paradigmatic of his use of the term, articulating the ‘demand’ from a subject to know an object, i.e. the separation that is effectuated in the act of knowledge - a separation which creates illusions. The formulation of the problem of defining objects as a subject, which means as an object for self-consciousness, reflects Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s influence on Daya Krishna: “The problem [of the idea of ‘definition’], however, is a deeper one and infects classical, modern and post-modern thinkers alike on the subject concerned. It assumes not only the notion of an object, but that all objects are of one kind as, whatever be the differences between them, there are objects of knowledge both in the epistemological and the ontic sense of the term. In the former sense, they are all objects of consciousness, provided one accepts that there is such, whereas in the case of the latter they enjoy an independent reality of their own, and it is because of this that they become the objects of knowledge. The glaring contradiction between the two senses has either not been seen or has just been glossed over. In the former sense, all that is there is already there, there is nothing to be known as the presentation exhausts what there is without any residuum whatsoever. In the latter case, the object is never exhausted by any of its appearances and thus demands to be known, a demand that is insatiably inexhaustible and which thus set the enterprise of knowledge on its unending course whose possible finality is nurtured only by the illusion that the so-called presentation has no ontic reality of its own, independent of the facticity of its being known. The illusion, as should be obvious from the history of the knowledge-enterprise of man, creates the delusion that the object is not only constituted by the acts of the knowing consciousness, as in Husserl, but also that ultimately it is as definitional in nature as in mathematics.” Daya Krishna, “Definition, Deception and the Enterprise of Knowledge,” 2011, 145.

\textsuperscript{847} The distinction between these two levels is clearly effectuated by Kalidas Bhattacharyya, who is not only Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s son, but also an illuminating reader of his father’s philosophy: “Pure consciousness is thus intrinsically real, although as pure it is above empirical reals. (…) Above the level of objective idealities, then, there is pure subjectivity which is intrinsically real, and the reality that is demanded by objective idealities is in the end the intrinsic reality of subjectivity. (…) Idealities necessarily demand reality, and it is this very demand that constitutes their ideality. From this point of view any ideality is a value, an ought-to-be. It is not yet is, it only demands to be. It is unnecessary, therefore, to distinguish between ideality and value. Ought-to-be is not necessarily in the context of doing, what is in that context is ought-to-do which is not subsumed under ought-to-be. While the reality that is claimed in ought-to-do is that of empiricals, the moral value being realised in the world of empiricals, the claimed reality in ought-to-be is above the empirical level. The second reality is ultimately that of pure subjectivity.” Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “The Business of Philosophy,” in Philosophy, Logic and Language (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd, 1965), 32–33.
and my way of expressing and reordering reality.\textsuperscript{548} In Daya Krishna, the demand calls in particular for removing the illusoriness of the illusion by seeing the inherent dynamics operating in consciousness, the deceptive operation of which is summarized as follows:

“The transformation of the given, or even its denial, seems to be the essence of consciousness, and as consciousness itself is ‘given’ to self-consciousness, its transformation or even denial seems to be the task set by self-consciousness to itself. Strangely this has not been seen or realized by those who have talked either of consciousness or of self-consciousness. Consciousness is not a passive, reflexive, mirroring activity whose task is to know, but rather, something which apprehends something which is aesthetically or morally in need of improvement. The same obtains when consciousness itself becomes an ‘object’ to self-consciousness. Consciousness is found to be that which it should not be; or even ‘ought’ not to be, and hence the dissatisfaction it feels is not in respect of objects that consciousness apprehends, or even in respect of the relationships between them, but with regard to consciousness itself and the way it reacts to the world that it apprehends.”\textsuperscript{549}

In this case there is an activity, which is however not oriented outwards, and thus the dissatisfaction operates with respect to itself and to the relation that consciousness develops with the world. In my reading, the transformation of itself and its object in the apprehension of something which ‘ought to be’ expresses the impulse of the ‘demand’ originating in the deceptive activity of own apprehension. The denial of the given consists in ‘imagining’ other possibilities, from which creativity originates - not only in the critical apprehension of what is already realized, but also in denying any given of reality for unveiling alternative ‘worlds’.

The concept of ‘demand’ remains, however, mostly unspecified in Daya Krishna’s works. It belongs to a certain common vocabulary of postcolonial Indian philosophers in India, the similarity and differences of its meanings having not yet been much explored. I will make use

\textsuperscript{548} Kalyan Kumar Bagchi explains Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s meaning of ‘demand’ accordingly: “In metaphysics, ‘problems’ are viewed in a peculiar sort of way: they are viewed as, what may be called, ‘demands’. Metaphysics arises out of a kind of demand that the metaphysician has to ... "Has to what?" - it may be asked. (…) The revolutionary, again, demands some practical solution to the ills of society. Now, the metaphysician differs both from the intellectualist or theoretician and the man in search of some practical solution. For him, to find a 'solution' is compelling from the very sort of the way he views experience. His demand is existential in the sense that he cannot rest content without settling account with what he genuinely finds. It is not the same with the intellectualist or the practical revolutionary. For an intellectualist is interested in conceptual clarity, ordering, re-arrangement, revision, enlargement etc. etc., and the practical revolutionary feels a compelling urge to remedy the situation he finds himself and his fellow-beings in. In the case of neither, however, is experience disturbed. This, however, is so in the case of the metaphysician. Something appears to him and he feels a demand that it must be realised: what such realisation involves is a re-ordering of ordinary experience, a recasting of the ordinary modes of thought which inhibit the grasp of what appears to the metaphysician. His demand, then, is to settle accounts with existing modes of thinking so that (i) what appears to him is not inhibited any longer and (ii) what inhibits (or inhibited) that appearance does not appear any longer. When, therefore, the demand is fulfilled consequent on the existing modes of thought being found to be inadequate to what appears to the metaphysician, or, what comes to the same thing, consequent on what appears as bringing about a re Vision or an abandonment of the existing modes of thought, his problem no longer appears. It would be more appropriate to say that the problem is resolved than it would be to say that it is solved.” K. Bagchi, “Towards a Metaphysic of Self: Perspectives on Professor Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya’s Unpublished Essay on ‘Mind and Matter,’” \textit{Journal of Indian Philosophy} 9, no. 1 (1981): 22–23.

\textsuperscript{549} Daya Krishna, \textit{Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions}, 144.
of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s conception\textsuperscript{850}, as well as of N. V. Banerjee’s, whose influences on Daya Krishna’s philosophy have been already mentioned, and who are, for the remaining pages, our main interlocutors. The connection between the latter two is suggested by Margaret Chatterjee who also elucidates their uses of the term:

“K. C. Bhattacharyya had spoken of the ‘demands of experience’ and Kalidas too finds possibilities rather than ‘stoppers’ in experience. We shall come across the word ‘demand’ again in N. V. Banerjee’s thinking, although in a different sense. What is behind the various meanings of ‘demand’ presented by these thinkers is a challenging consideration, namely whether the main spur or leverage of metaphysics is the desire to know or the desire to be, ‘desire’ of course being here used in the sense of metaphysical impulse (cf. Kant’s ‘disposition’).”\textsuperscript{851}

In my analysis, the ‘desire to know’ (\textit{jijñāsā}) or to be is another translation of Daya Krishna’s ‘seeking for knowledge’, conceiving knowledge in motion by a valutational impulse as defined in the preceding chapter (6.2). This metaphysical seeking implies that we are what we know, or that knowledge is a realization of what we fundamentally are. But what are we that we know, or do we know who we are? Seeking to know implies thus also an implicit presupposition that the knowledge ‘ought’ to be in accordance with the reality, and that our self-knowledge ought to be the bridge between the two.

The complexity originates in the ‘ought to’ (implying seeking/desire) which never corresponds to the ‘is’ - thus, the demand is never extinguished. This explains why for Daya Krishna, consciousness cannot be a ‘passive’ or ‘mirroring’ activity that simply absorbs or integrates external knowledge within itself, but a multidirectional and reflective force. The reflection does not mean in this case a mirror of the outside, but something that both modifies itself and the object reflected, as well as the relation between the two, and further the relation to the world in which it is located. On the other hand, for Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, the ‘ought’ of the demand points at an injunction,\textsuperscript{852} by which not only the tension between present reality and

\textsuperscript{850} Closely related, Bina Gupta comments: “The concept of ‘demand’ frequently appears in Bhattacharyya’s writings. He informs his readers that philosophy begins in reflective consciousness in which there exists a distinction between content and consciousness and a ‘demand’ for ‘supra-reflective consciousness’, i.e. a consciousness in which the distinction between content and consciousness is clearly visible. One wonders what is this demand? What kind of a consciousness is it? Is this consciousness not conscious of either a known or a willed or a felt content?” Bina Gupta, \textit{An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Perspectives on Reality, Knowledge, and Freedom} (New York, NY and London: Routledge, 2012), 302.

\textsuperscript{851} Chatterjee, “Indian Metaphysics,” 90.

\textsuperscript{852} I am indebted to Pawel Odyniec for bringing to my attention a convincing Sanskrit subtext to Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s concept of demand here, concerning the injunction contained in his use of the concept. For Odyniec, Bhattacharyya is here decontextualizing the religious context of a Vedāntic injunction to reinterpret it in a philosophical (non-religious) context. Attempting to abstract the Advaítin idea from its religious textual references, Bhattacharyya seems to reinterpret the gerundives (future participles of necessity) used in Vedāntic religious prescriptions, which express what ought to be done (ritual injunctions) into a philosophical demand. This demand retains the character of an injunction, however of a philosophical injunction originating within ourselves. In view of the inwardization, Odyniec relates the demand notably to the upanishadic injunction “\textit{ātmā vā are draṣṭavyah śrotavyo mantavyo nididdhvīṣītavyo maitreyi / ātmano va are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānena idam sarvam viditam}” (“You see, Maitreyi, one should see and hear, think and meditate on the Self; for by seeing
future possibility is highlighted, but also the idea of a commitment or obligation. In Daya Krishna the commitment occurs in the tension itself, and such a commitment is emptied from prescriptive obligation.

In distinction to the dissatisfactions of external actions, this tension furthermore signals the discrepancy between the object that ‘is’ for my self-consciousness, and ‘I’ as subject who ‘is’ a condition for the object to be (perceived, realized, experienced) and thus whose state of being cannot itself be externally confirmed nor objectively actualized. Chatterjee continues to define Banerjee’s sense of demand as follows:

“Philosophizing is not a linguistic exercise. It involves a grappling with the human predicament and an attempt to find a way out of the situation of bondage. All this is tied up with in-depth awareness of who and what we are and a reaching out which to some might seem speculative, but which Banerjee used to refer to through words like demand/vista/destiny. He was sufficiently appreciative of the ancient Indian insight that we cannot become other than what we are to see the central ‘adventure’ in the discovery of a realm from which, through our own ignorance, we have been in a state of exile. This is the “realm of persons.””

The refusal to limit the ‘demand’ to a linguistic or behavioral utterance, and in general to limit the realm of communication, of my being with others as well as the meaning of the very pronoun ‘I’ to analytical linguistic, performative and pragmatic or cognitive functions, is common to the three authors. More importantly, it is crucial to elaborate on ‘dialogue’, which in no case can

and hearing, thinking and meditating on the Self this entire [world] is known’) (BrhUp.2.4.5), which is a religious prescription for self-knowledge. Thus, the religious prescription becomes a philosophical demand for inwardizing self-knowledge: “Theoretic consciousness is embodied in science and philosophy. Science alone speaks in genuine judgments, the content of which is fact intelligible without reference to speaking and is alone actually known and literally thought. Philosophy deals with contents that are not literally thinkable and are not actually known, but are believed as demanding to be known without being thought. Such contents are understood as self-subsistent object, real subject and transcendental truth. We have accordingly three grades of philosophy which may be roughly called philosophy of the object, philosophy of the subject and philosophy of truth.” Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, “The Concept of Philosophy,” in Studies in Philosophy, ed. Gopinath Bhattacharyya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 169.


854 For Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, this constitutes a departure out of the Kantian influence to a more Advaitin stance; for N. V. Banerjee, a journey of elucidation and contradistinction to Descartes, Kant, Hume, Berkeley and later on Wittgenstein, on which he grounds by counter-position his concept of ‘I with Others=We’ and the realm of persons, which I will discuss; for Daya Krishna, also a Kantian reaction, which goes however for him together with rejecting the consequences of the Advaiting insights that Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya concludes with (similarly, but differently, for N. V. Banerjee). See Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 15–26. Commenting on Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya’s ‘move’, Burch writes: “The second pillar of the first-phase philosophy of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya is the assertion of faith, not faith in revealed scripture but faith in the fulfillment of the demands presented by experience. It is by faith that we go beyond Kant to Vedanta. According to Kant the self is not real, though it demands to be real, since this demand is impotent. But Bhattacharya maintains that there is no evidence that this demand will not be actualized, and we have faith that it will be, not merely as an ideal of pure reason or postulate of practical reason but as known. To know the phenomenon is neither to know the reality nor to not know it; but to know it as unknown and demanding to be known. The absolute, although unknown, is believed not to be unknowable but as demanding to be known. The Vedanta doctrine of Brahman and illusion is the conceptual formulation of this demand, which is based on our feeling of the vanity of life and consequent unreality of the world. Unreality has meaning only in contrast with reality. The illusory object demands the real subject. The superstructure erected on these pillars is the dialectical system which Bhattacharya called
be limited to a linguistic analysis of the spoken content, even (less) in the case of plurilingual intercultural dialogues. The plurality and diversity of dialogues and cultural backgrounds that also shape our behaviors are indeed included in the way we express and conduct ourselves within dialogues, but cannot be isolated to constitute the ‘whole’ of it. In Banerjee’s term, the ‘whole’ lies in realizing the ‘realm of persons’ essentially relating us, which is liberation, rather than in a following of normative injunctions, rhetoric rules and arguments. For Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya, the ‘whole’ lies in spiritual freedom which is liberation from dissociation. Daya Krishna is closer to Banerjee, as for him dialogue, I believe, is freedom through bondage, unveiling the illusions created by our limits (to ourselves and to others) through which only and mutually with others we can realize a (limited and wordly) freedom. Thus, freedom lies rather in realizing our bondage and identification with the world, and with such a realization, we ‘move’ forward to the next level of identification and bondage, never stopping the ‘move’ itself, the creative force of which means a limited freedom.855 In this stance he disagrees with K. C. Bhattacharyya’s Advaitin-inspired method.856

“K. C. Bhattacharyya has drawn attention to this fact [identification with the body] in his remarkable work entitled Subject as Freedom wherein he had built his whole philosophical edifice upon the notions of identification and deidentification and suggested that when one has identified one realizes that the prior identification must have been voluntarily in the sense that it need not have been there as there was no necessity about it. But he has not seen that the deidentification does not set one free as one relapses into the identification once more. The freedom was only momentary and even illusory as one does not become free of the transcendent psychology” and summarized in The Subject as Freedom as a sequence of grades of subjectivity.” (my emphasis) George Burch, “Contemporary Vedanta Philosophy, I,” Review of Metaphysics 9, no. 3 (1956): 489, https://doi.org/10.2307/20123522. More generally, Daya Krishna notices regarding K. C. Bhattacharyya (concerning only the first volume of his Studies on Indian philosophies): “It may be interesting to note that the thinking of traditional Indian philosophy took its rise from an epistemological reflection on such phenomena as dream, sleep, illusion, repentance and pain while the current philosophical thinking in the West arises primarily from an epistemological reflection on science which is treated as the example par excellence of knowledge that we know of. A confrontation of the two reflections may possibly be helpful to the modern thinker, but I suspect that Bhattacharyya’s work would arouse more interest in the phenomenological existential circles than in the analytical-positivist ones.” Daya Krishna, “K. C. Bhattacharya on Indian Philosophy,” The Visva-Bharati Quarterly 26, no. 2 (1960): 7–8. More specifically and further on linguistic analysis, see Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “Is Philosophy Linguistic Analysis,” in Philosophy, Logic and Language (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd, 1965), 1–18.

855 “The illusions about the perfectibility or transformation of consciousness are as much illusory as those about the perfectibility or transformation of that which is the ‘object’ of consciousness, that is, the ‘world’ [in my interpretation, the latter are dissatisfactions]. It is not that change, even basic changes do not, or cannot, take place. (…) Beatitude, or the state of perpetual Bliss or Ananda, or anything else which goes by similar names. Each step creates new problems which, then, have to be addressed and tackled anew. And, strangely, not only ‘problems’ that have been ‘solved’ cease to matter, but also that which has been achieved as it too ceases to matter just because it is there and has been achieved. It is that which is not, which alone matters, as it is not only indeterminate but something has to be done to bring it about, and it is this ‘doing’, this challenge that makes one ‘move’ and feel that one is ‘living’ and ‘alive’.” Daya Krishna, “Consciousness, Materiality and Spirituality: Issues, Dilemmas and the Future of Mankind,” in Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective, 1st ed, Sri Garib Das Oriental Series, no. 310 (New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006), 499.

identification and relapses into it again and again. In fact, it is an identification one cannot do without as it is the very condition of one’s being alive and living in the world.”

There is thus no ‘absolute freedom’ for Daya Krishna, and certainly no freedom that is ‘de-individualised’ and ‘free from distinctness’; i.e. freedom for Daya Krishna is not to be ‘free of everything’ but to realize the illusoriness that gives us the feeling of being bound or of being free.

A demand is thus also a desire (never to be fulfilled in Daya Krishna’s account) for reconciliation: of the consciousness with self-consciousness, of consciousness with the world, and of selves with others. It is furthermore in that sense that the demand cannot consist of a simple ‘linguistic exercise’, either of poetic description or of analytical analysis of communication in logical terms. It articulates the existential seeking for a metaphysical situation, which in a self-awareness reconciles myself with the world. In that sense, the ‘demand’ of dialogue implies a readiness to change within oneself in collaboration with others at the most fundamental level, rather than an external agreement on the thing discussed. It signals an impulse for a transcendental unity of consciousness, which however, for Daya Krishna operates as a regulative ideal through plurality, and for N. V. Banerjee, is to be realized but also in a plurality, a ‘We’. For K. C. and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, the plurality is a spoken manifestation of a reality that is unitary but that we have to see as consisting of alternatives.

Thus, I would say that for N. V. Banerjee and Daya Krishna the (ideal) unity is found in plurality, while for K. C. and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, the plurality is found in unity.

Finally, the ‘demand’, according to Padmaja Sen (who is analyzing K. C. Bhattacharyya’s meaning of the term), “appears to be an inner force which continuously drives the subject towards the realization of its (absolute) freedom. It is the pre-condition of the self-realizing

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858 The Subject as Freedom ends as follows: “I am never positively conscious of my present individuality, being conscious of it only as what is or can be outgrown, only as I feel freeing myself from it and am free to the extent implied by such feeling. I do not know myself as free but I conceive that I can be free successively as body from the perceived object, as presentation from the body, as feeling from presentation and as introspective individuality but I am aware in my introspection into feeling that the self from which the feeling is distinguished may not actually introspect and may not even possibly introspect, that individual as it is as introspecting- individual or distinct freedom without being, it may be free even from this distinctness, may be freedom itself that is de-individualised but not therefore indefinite - absolute freedom that is to be evident.” Bhattacharyya, “The Subject as Freedom,” 454.

859 Chatterjee comments further on the critique by Banerjee to K. C. Bhattacharyya: “It is in this lecture [K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Lectures on The Concept of Philosophy delivered in the University of Calcutta in 1964] that Banerjee, to all intents and purposes, signals his agreement with K. C. Bhattacharyya’s tenets (1) I am unaccountably embodied (2) I am in personal relationship to other selves. But he dissociates himself from the further step taken by Bhattacharyya, namely, ‘I am in communion, or in the relation of identity-in-difference with the over-personal self.’ Banerjee’s whole critique of Advaita Vedānta is contained in the line ‘what I am insisting on is simply that philosophy has no means of building a road from the assertion ‘I am’ to the assertion ‘I am in communion with the over-personal self’.” Margaret Chatterjee, “Intersubjectivity and Essentiality,” in The Philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, ed. Margaret Chatterjee (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Munshiram Manoharlal, 1990), 95.
activity of the subject”860 (brackets added). In other words, a ‘demand’, like a seeking, creates the motion861, which for Daya Krishna operates both inwards on my own subjectivity, as well as outwards on the other conjointly engaging with me. Or with Banerjee: it creates an inward motion to realize that I am already and essentially, ‘with others’, in order to detach myself from the biological illusion of my separation from others as an individual (body).

“So existentialism’s preoccupation with the problem of the relation of the individual to what are others to him, as well as absolutism’s reduction of human existence to utter insignificance are but ways of escape from the actual human situation. Man is not a mere individual suffering insufficiency or deprivation which is incompatible with existence, but, as we have argued earlier, is a person held in the relation of essentiality to his fellows. And this points to the nature of human existence. To exist, strictly speaking, is to be sufficient, and to be sufficient is to be essential to one another as is signified by the concept of the person. Human existence thus understood is, however, another name for human liberation, for what else can our liberation mean except our essentiality to our fellows expressed in our love of others and our joy of living? But then, it is hard for man to remain what he really is and to live a liberated life. This is due to the fact that, on account of the inexplicable anomaly of his nature consequent upon his unavoidable biological birth, man is prone to be a victim of the illusory idea of himself as a mere individual and to suffer self-alienation. Hence there arises a problem, not the absurd problem of his becoming anything which he is not, but that of his return to himself as a participant in the universal plan for action, the resolution of his self-alienation, the undoing of what we have called the universal predicament of mankind.”862

The problems to access and fulfill this demand are complex and varied, and I will come back in more details on the implications of the relation of essentiality for liberated existence (7.3), which means a realization of the realm of persons. The concepts that are used here anticipate Banerjee’s philosophical developments to reach his conclusion. But beginning with the conclusion shows that the demand cannot be resolved, but rather drives the subject towards the realm of the personal throughout the way. This way goes inwards in order to reach the other for Banerjee, or more exactly: in order to realize that the other was always there, and that I have

861 As a ‘motion’, it is thus oriented towards the ‘future’. Daya Krishna interestingly concludes his study into the conceptual structures of Indian classical thought first by opening the perspective to comparative approaches, before finishing by insisting on the ‘demand’ to develop these structures further: “As I have repeatedly insisted, the cognitive enterprises of the Indian civilization are not closed and their traditional formulation need not become an intellectual prison-house for us. We can use the insights gained in a creative way to meet the challenges of our own times, just as thinkers in past decades also did. One must distinguish between the use of a concept and talk about it. The latter has been the job of those who, to use a currently fashionable phrase from Foucault, do the archaeology of knowledge. Such theorists comprise all those for whom other civilizations except the modern western one are dead and hence only a subject matter of historical study. But for those who treat these civilizations as still alive, their intellectual self-formulations are not just objects of study but theoretical and experiential insights which demand to be developed further. It is in this use of past conceptual structures that their living future lies.” Daya Krishna, The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought about Man, Society, and Polity, 192. This connects the ‘demand’ to Daya Krishna’s manifesto for classical Indian philosophies seen creatively and contemporarily as described in 2.1.2.
862 Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 171.
been nothing but ‘with others’. For Daya Krishna, more radically critical of the Vedantic detachment of the worldly, the process is bidirectional. The freedom to engage is as much a freedom as the freedom to withdraw (see 6.2.3), and the inward and outward movement that they provoke are themselves allowing the dynamic process of change of modification:

“The consciousness as it moves outward thus encounters and experiences more and more of difference and enjoys it while as it ‘withdraws’ into itself, experiences an identity that is different at different stages of the ‘return journey’. But as the ‘return’ and the ‘withdrawal’ are only temporary, the ‘inward’ and the ‘outward’ journey alternates and while the self is constituted by both, it is only the philosopher who is taken in by it and argues for the one or the other, as is evidenced by the long debate between the advaitins and the non-advaitic Vedāntins on the one hand and the advaitins and the naiyāyikas, on the other.”

Dialoguing corresponds, I think, to the multidirectionality of the ‘demand’. Dialoguing is about defining one’s position, one’s knowledge and realizing (or witnessing, to use Chubb’s concept) the way this knowledge is constituted with others. Very concretely, I relate this ‘changing oneself’ in dialogue to Bettina Bäumer’s mention to me that Daya Krishna also organized the samvāda experiments for himself, for himself to learn from Indian traditions through dialoguing with pandits, with a growing openness and interest towards these traditions, the impact of which can be easily seen on his philosophical production, publishing more and more on Indian philosophies as the experiments were organized. Thus, the demand operates in an alternation of detachment and engagement, withdrawing in myself and engaging with others, and letting the others and myself modify my thinking. These, in turn, are not only epistemological, behavioral or linguistic modification, but touch upon the ‘human predicament’, i.e. thinking in the broader context of puruṣārtha. In that sense, the invitation to engage is also an invitation to recognize the essentiality of the others for my thinking.

However, this realization that is demanded is itself impeded by different obstacles, which explains the difficulties of dialoguing much beyond the simple plurality of languages and diversity of attitudes in dialogue. Trying to keep the mutual relations of these problems and illusions, I want to formulate them as follows: the problems impeding freedom appear to be the external constraints by others, which is however revealed as the illusion of existentialism. The second correlated problem is the one of myself being a constraint to my own freedom, which Daya Krishna calls ‘I-centricity’, i.e. the impossibility to detach myself from my consciousness. In other words, this means the problem of not being able to reach other I-consciousnesses than

863 The connection between the inner and the outer world is interestingly connected to the fact that the world is an intersubjective creation for Daya Krishna: “But if the ‘human world’ is the creation of the ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘she’ and ‘it’ in their innumerable variety and diversity, then the question has to be faced squarely as the ‘defect’ in the ‘outer’ must reflect, at least to some extent, the ‘fault’ or ‘defect’ in the ‘inner’.” Daya Krishna, “Consciousness, Materiality and Spirituality: Issues, Dilemmas and the Future of Mankind,” 472.

864 Given the mentioning of ‘alternates’ and the critique of Vedāntins, this also suggests a criticisms of the alternation propounded by K. C. Bluttacharyya, which is however an alternation oriented to my inward consciousness. Daya Krishna, “Identity, Difference and the Problem of Reflexivity and Explanation,” Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19, no. 1 (March 2002): 18.
my I-consciousness. This originates from a further and fundamental problem of consciousness which cannot but objectify all that is not itself, i.e. see the other as an object of my knowledge, emotion of action. Finally, this problem originates also if the attempted solution to escape the bondage of others on me consists in a dissolution of myself into an absolute, overarching God or an absolute unity of my consciousness\(^{865}\).

While the modern Advaitin answer of Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya lies in dissociation and detachment, for Daya Krishna, the ‘unrelatedness’ cannot be enough of a solution, for even if it allows one to reach a certain freedom (unbounded by others and the worldly state of affairs), such a freedom, emptied of all force and motion, becomes itself a bondage:

“But as the feeling of ‘unrelatedness’ is founded on the illusion created by the fact of withdrawal, which if reflected upon sufficiently, itself would show its illusoriness. ‘Withdrawal’, obviously, is a withdrawal from ‘something’, and makes sense only in relation to it. (...) The problem of jīvanmukti, or ‘being completely liberated’ while one is ‘biologically alive’, tries to come to terms with this in the Indian tradition. But though one does achieve or realize some sort of freedom - freedom from all objectivity - one does not get the power to effectuate or transform, as there is nothing left to change or transform, and in any case, one does not want anything, as one is supposed to have given up ‘wanting’, having seen through the illusion of the bondage that it creates. Freedom without power, however, seems so empty thing, and one does not know what to do with it. (...)”

Freedom, thus, has an ‘in-built’ illusion not only of omnipotence, but of the denial of even the possibility of there being any constraint or restriction on it, whether of reason, or morality, or law, or taste. In short, it wants to deny the very possibility of the ‘other’, any other, and yet it needs it all the time as without it, it finds no meaning either in the field of action, or knowing, or feeling the ‘worlds’ it wants to create and ‘live’ in.”\(^{866}\)

Thus, for Daya Krishna, ‘unrelatedness’ or ‘freedom from all objects’ does not make sense (except maybe as death), because it loses all efficiency.\(^{867}\) No matter how dissatisfying every

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\(^{865}\) In Banerjee’s terms: “On the one hand, while absolutism surrenders the individual by conceiving him to be a part of, or else making him completely disappear in the Absolute, existentialism tends to make the individual himself absolute so as to reduce him to solitariness and insularity. On the other hand, existentialism, curiously enough, is characterized by the tendency to insist on the idea of human existence as contingent, the idea from which, among other things, absolutism derives its main thesis. The former tendency leads existentialism to affirm the freedom and responsibility of man. But the latter compels it to set limits to and even nullify the importance of man’s freedom and responsibility.” Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 170.


\(^{867}\) Daya Krishna emphasizes in several places the importance of actions (in the forms of willing, desiring, seeking, attending) for consciousness, which cannot survive in withdrawing from all (the world, feelings, the body, etc). This is foremost a critique of all mokṣa-inspired traditions, but furthermore, in general, of the ones who attempt to detach themselves from the worldly state of affairs, among which some philosophers can be included: “The consciousness that results in ‘cultural creations’ and their ‘felt apprehension’ is close to the ‘lived’ life of man than the one embodied in theoretical knowledge and which always has an ‘abstraction’ about it that seems ‘lifeless’ to ordinary consciousness. This, though so obviously true, ignores the fact that the real feel of ‘reality’ at the human level occurs not in consciousness, as is generally thought, but in its power to make things happen through what is generally called ‘willing’ or ‘intending’ or ‘desiring’ to bring something about. Without this, consciousness is practically ‘nothing’, a helpless spectator of whatever happens, something that is found as common occurrence in
concrete dialogue is, for instance, the solution cannot be found in accepting that dialogue is an instrumental way to discover the inner freedom and truth, which leads us to negate the others at the end, thanks to whom we reached this discovery. Daya Krishna illustrates the contradiction of this negation with the example of mystic masters who deny the reality of the others through whom they have been trained in the discipline that led them to deny them. No matter how ‘bounded’ I am in dialogue by certain social conventions, by language, by the freedom of others to participate and argue against my position, reaching out a supreme transcendental level of unity where they are excluded is a bare contradiction of the process itself. Thus, there cannot be an end to dialogues, but there is also no escape from its ambiguities, contradictions and limits. In other words: dialogues are not a way to reach a supra-level of knowledge or liberation, in which communication would not be necessary anymore. Dialogues do not lead to any revelation that make them obsolete, there is no transcending objective - but for Daya Krishna, there is also no other way without their imperfectness. On the other hand, a certain idea of ‘freedom’, ‘truth’ and ‘reason’ is necessary as a regulative ideal which can lead the dialogue to connect this infinite plurality of others. For, without a common ground first, but also without a certain seeking that motivates us to enter a dialogue in the first place, one risks also a disaggregation into unconnected differences. At the level of dialogue, this explains Daya Krishna’s suspicion against those who jettison reason altogether, even if he recognizes the fallibility and internal differences of reason(s):

“The debate on this [skepticism on reason] has been long in the Indian tradition, but the dialectical denial of reason has generally been in the service of some higher seeking of man which was supposed to be supra-rational. The Advaitins and the Śunyaṇavādin Buddhists had been the chief protagonists of this view, but there were others also. However, the main philosophical stream never accepted this suicidal tendency [referring here to Derrida and Rorty] on the part of reason to abdicate its total responsibility as is involved in a withdrawal from any serious attempt to communicate with others on a basis which was grounded in some sort of universality the acknowledgement of which compelled one to refuse one’s opinion or contention if it was shown that one was wrong. Such an acknowledgement is a precondition not only for all cognitive pursuits and any fruitful discussion and debate about them, but also for meaningful human living if conflicts are to be resolved by argument and not by force. The presupposition does not mean that any ready-made solutions are available either in the field of reason or of what is good or right, but it is seen as an immanent ideal involved in the activity itself which one tries to articulate to the best possible extent. Even if one agrees to disagree, the ‘agreement’ is based on the acceptance of the possible plurality of viewpoints or visions regarding the issue in question, and the hope that perhaps one would later come back to the exploration through mutual discussion and find a new alternative which was not apprehended conditions that are known as ‘paralytic’.” Daya Krishna, “Consciousness, Materiality and Spirituality: Issues, Dilemmas and the Future of Mankind,” 461.

868 “Yet, the fact is that the ‘mystic’ is not an isolated, self-enclosed monadic person but exists in a community of people, who are generally known as his disciples. The mystic master is himself based in tradition where he learned at the feet of another master from whom he is supposed to have received the discipline and the training which has led him to the experience which, paradoxically, denies ‘reality’. The denial of the ‘other’, both in terms of reality and value which lie at the heart of the ‘self-centric’ experience of the ‘I’, is an existential contradiction which the actual life of the so-called masters denies and contradicts at every step.” Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 118.
by both the parties who had to close the discussion by ‘agreeing to disagree’. Reason itself is embedded in a larger human enterprise which is basically a pursuit of diverse ideals vaguely apprehended and which conjointly seek a meaningful human living together which has elements of joy and beauty, even though they have seldom been seen in such a way. The human world, of course, is a ‘creation’ based on ‘given’ materials the limits and possibilities of which are never clearly known.”

Thus, Daya Krishna’s relatedness has a pragmatic function for connecting us in dialogue, doubled by a metaphysical foundation, close to Banerjee’s. Similarly, the universality of ‘seeking’ and the unity have a pragmatic role for realizing this relation, and the differences and singularity an existential acceptance of our human condition, as illusory as it is. To navigate between these two poles, at the worldly level, I believe, is made possible in dialogue. This apparently simple term of ‘demand’ entails deep metaphysical insights on identity and difference, self-consciousness and otherness, and subjective and objective attitudes to knowledge - and more importantly, on the relationality of all - which constitutes the endeavor of the following section. Nevertheless, the possibility to establish any relation depends on our ability to overcome the illusion of I-centricity, i.e. to be able to realize the other as another subject, with whom I can dialogue ‘on’ different objects of thinking. This implies on the one hand a de-centralization of myself as the absolute and unique ‘I’, and on the other hand, the possibility to shift out of the subject/object constellation that originates in I-consciousness. Realizing this illusion initiates the demand for resolving the metaphysical distinction between my I and ‘you’ (accusative) or for an immediate relation between I and You. The question of ‘how’ to first realize the illusion and then to answer to this demand is raised as well as the question: are these relations between ‘I and you’ enough for dialogues?

7.3. Relationality of Consciousnesses in Dialogue, I Dialoguing with Others = We

To understand Daya Krishna’s context, or rather to think dialogue within his philosophy, Banerjee can be helpful. His sense of relation implied in freedom lies in a realization of the realm of the personal where I am located with others, which Daya Krishna himself acknowledges as a turning point of post-colonial Indian philosophy:

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869 This is part of a longer argumentation from Daya Krishna denunciating the overemphasis on logo-centrism of Derrida, while for the former the problem rather consists in ‘any’ centrism through which we have to think. He consequently sees this overemphasis as jettisoning reason itself, which is not possible “if one makes a cognitive claim and wants others to accept what one says, not on the basis of the fact that one says it, but on some other grounds which are justifiable in some sense or other.” This applies to Derrida and Rorty. On the other hand, he also considers Nagarjuna and ‘the Upanisadic seers’ as opponents of reason in stating that “ultimate truth could not be comprehended by reason.” Consequently, the above quote refers to Advaitins and Śunyavādin Buddhists for whom “the dialectical denial of reason has generally been in the service of some higher seeking of man which was supposed to be supra-rational.” Daya Krishna, 59–60.
“The return to the temporal, historical, living world of the embodied being who is a member of society and polity and actively participates in the building up of a common inter-subjective world in cooperation with other human beings seems to be a common concern of most Indian philosophers who have written in the English language after their contact with the western world. But yet, while the emphasis in K. C. Bhattacharya’s thought was primarily on a return from the identifications of the self with each succeeding level of objectivity, seeing thereby the essential freedom of man as consisting in this de-identification, it is only in later thinkers starting from N. V. Banerjee that the isolated, de-identified self is understood not in terms of ‘freedom’ but as deprived and cut off from its relationship with the ‘others’ which constitute, according to him, the essential reality for the self, and in the fulfillment of this relational obligation lies its real freedom.”

Freely interpreting Daya Krishna’s philosophy, I hypothesize that this relational obligation lies more precisely in engaging and dialoguing with others, a relation which oscillates between essential connection and de-identification: in the ‘between’ lies the metaphysical ‘force’ of dialogue. Metaphilosophically, I think that the difference of direction is important to realize. For many European intercultural theories that have been evoked in this text, the relation between me and the Other is the one of outwardization. In other words, the project to relate requires reaching out to the Other, either to understand her/him or dialogue with her/him or simply to recognize his/her radical Otherness. For Banerjee, Daya Krishna and the Bhattacharyyas, the journey is rather inward. It fluctuates for Daya Krishna between realizing within ourselves the essentiality of the other beyond the illusory objectivation originating in self-consciousness, which separates ‘I’ as subject from the ‘we’ as objects, and engaging with them in the world in dialogue or other joint actions. The answers of these authors are not homogeneous and can range from realizing the unity of the I with the other (in the famous Advaitin reinterpretation of Ramchandra Gandhi, ‘I am Thou’\(^\text{871}\)) to emphasize the difference yet relatedness with the other by Daya Krishna. This also means, in consequence, that for K. C. Bhattacharyya and N. V. Banerjee in particular, the ‘between’ is itself different, since it is not located outside you and I but within my consciousness in the movement between reaching out and coming back. Between you and I lies nothing but my own illusion of separatedness that originates from the objectivation of the other-consciousness. In so doing, ‘you’ are not located outside of any understanding or grasping, but in my own illusory and fragmentary understanding which must be overcome by the realization of the illusion. The attempts of the former to resolve it are multiple, either by realizing that I am thou, or with you: this realization is not the fact of an objective understanding of the other, but an inner awareness of the relation between the I and the other. I believe that Daya Krishna is also influenced by K. C. Bhattacharyya’s and N. V. Banerjee’s account, notably by the ‘illusion’ and ‘realization’ of the illusion, in spite of his more persisting emphasis on the joint empirical world in which we realize this illusion together. This focus provides a more concrete perspective on the withdrawal and

\(^{870}\) Daya Krishna, *Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western*, 317.

\(^{871}\) Gandhi, *I Am Thou: Meditation on the Truth of India*. 

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engagement with others, due to which my lone realization of the relation is not enough to enable the concrete relation with others. Thus, I believe that dialogue entails for him the alternation of consciousness within me and my position, and towards your understanding, through which we realize that any position and thinking is actually the result of our interconnection. To justify this interpretation constitutes the purpose of this section.

Before continuing this demonstration, I want to highlight the political connotations of this shift of orientation between the inside and the outside for thinking the relation with others. Indeed, while the postcolonial European project rather argues for an openness in order to de-centralize its own self by reaching out to the other (see 1.2.2 and 1.2.1), the postcolonial project of these Indian philosophers in India is best coined by K. C. Bhattacharyya’s svarāj (self-rule, autonomy) in ideas (1929) (see also 2.1.2). Svarāj is indeed first a colonial resistance and expresses a wish for independence from the “slavery of the spirit” and cultural colonization. In so doing, it expresses furthermore a return to oneself to realize the presence of the other and the I in myself, the identity of which and the distinction in particular between the two being somewhat blurred by the postcolonial consequences of education, conceptual categories and their linguistic expressions. Interestingly, K. C. Bhattacharyya uses the same concept of ‘demand’ elucidated above with political implications in a way that seems quite anti-dialogical and ‘anti-intercultural’ if not seen from its historical context, when he writes: “We speak also a little too readily of the demand for a synthesis of the ideals of the East and the West. (…) The ideals of a community spring from its past history and from the soil: they have not necessarily a universal application, and they are not always self-luminous to other communities.” (emphasis added)

The content might be surprising to be used on elaborating on intercultural dialogues, but it indicates a less heard necessity than the plea for hybridity and cultural synthesis via intercultural or interreligious dialogue. Such a demand insists on the unusual ‘right to withdraw’ which I believe however necessarily implies by opposition the right to engage. Furthermore, in K. C. Bhattacharyya’s historical but moreover, philosophical context, this maybe today somewhat polemical view has its own reasons. If we relate this more political speech of him to his other philosophical texts, it tells us that the ‘demand’ for cultural synthesis cannot be imposed by external faculties or forces. The ‘demand’ - if we extend it to the demand for dialogues - is not a negotiation with external forces, nor even the need to reach a consensus on a setting that would enable a more inclusive global communication. In order to be dialogical, roughly formulated, the synthesis and the dialogue across traditions need ‘to make sense’ from within, to be ‘self-luminous’. This sense includes Daya Krishna’s significance and meaning contained in puruṣārtha (see 5.3 and 6), and the correlated knowledge which is a mixture of śāstric resources and creative thinking. In other words, it needs to reach a ‘self-luminous’ state for

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873 Bhattacharyya, 389.
874 In this politico-cultural sense, see ‘Encounters between Civilizations: The Question of the Centre and the Periphery’, where Daya Krishna argues for substituting thinking in terms of center/periphery to the idea of dynamic centers in different fields: “The whole panorama begins to take a new shape and a new meaning in one’s
the consciousness that apprehends the ideals of another cultural communities. For this matter, the relation cannot be limited to ‘reaching out’ to the Other, but also requires to ‘reach within’ in an interrelational process in Daya Krishna’s context. Thus, it is through the critical reinterpretation from within of knowledge and purusārthas originating from any culture, and their connections with other conceptual frameworks that cultural subjection can be turned into intercultural creativity. However, for Daya Krishna, this process of critical assimilation and creative exploration is made possible in directly engaging with these cultural others, which allows us to reformulate our own positions (rooted in one or several, but limited traditions) and get inspired by others.

The latter’s reaction to such a concept of ‘svarāj in ideas’ is nevertheless mitigated, since for him, the problem rather lies in the question “how to foster that assimilation and creativity about which he [K. C. Bhattacharyya] has written in the article”. The Bhattacharyya from the 20ties is fearful and defensive, which is, under the British rule, admittedly necessary but insufficient in Daya Krishna’s later context. The latter thus plainly comments that “if each culture tries to preserve its own identity and accepts only that from other cultures which it can assimilate on its own terms, the situation will be desperate indeed.” It is now easier to understand the implications of his conclusion, evoked in 2.1.2, that “svarāj in ideas can only be achieved by a radical alteration in our attitude to both the traditions - the Indian and the Western. We have to de-identify with both and treat them only as take-off points for our own thinking which should be concerned with what we consider important.”

The formulation seems almost trivial, but I understand it as the engagement and withdrawal of
consciousness in de-identification, which, while using knowledge as śāstric resources to start thinking with, requires critical and imaginative creativity. This thinking is the activity of consciousness which is composed by knowledge and seekings, the valuation of which is expressed in the apparently insignificant expression of ‘what we consider important’. To go even a little bit further, I believe that to unveil the structural illusions of ‘what we consider important’ (constituted by certain values), we precisely need this de-identified engagement with others in dialogue, in this case in particular the others of different cultures.

The political consequences of this demand further imply to question the unevenness of the ‘between’ seen in cultural terms. Given the fact that the cultural synthesis has been imposed on certain cultures, the ‘between’ India and the West is not a neutral place (the consequences of which for the elaboration of comparative or cross-cultural studies have been analyzed in 1.2.1 and 1.2.2). From this it follows that the absoluteness felt in the subjective ‘I’ does not operate only at the level of individuals, but immediately as individuals being already located within a culture. The hierarchy of which is what attributes different senses of the ‘importance’ and ‘finality’ of this I. In other terms, the globalization has also as an effect that it configures one ‘centre’ (the ‘West’, as insufficiently undefined as it can be) as the absolute ‘I’ around which ‘peripheries’ gravitate as object of the I-consciousness, namely objects of study. It is also in these terms that Daya Krishna articulate his criticism of comparative philosophy when it ignores the a priori unevenness that is deep rooted in the consciousness of those who practice it:

"To adopt a well-known phrase from Sartre, all nonwestern cultures have been reduced to the status of ‘objects’ by being looked upon, that is, observed and studied by Western scholars in terms of Western concepts and categories that are treated not as culture-bound but universal in character. In a deep and radical sense, therefore, it is only the West that has subtly arrogated to itself the status of subject-hood in the cognitive enterprise and reduced all others to the status of objects." 880

The politico-cultural ‘I/Youness’ or ‘subject/object attitude’ which has its correlate at the metaphysical level of consciousness, has however different effects in the political realm and in the metaphysical one. For the former is usually not limited to knowledge, in spite of K. C. Bhattacharyya’s emphasis on the ‘slavery of the spirit’ when he wanted to also highlight the invisible consequences of colonization due to the British presence on the Indian soil. It is combined with concrete political presence and actions, from where self-centricity brings about other consequences:

“The ‘self-centricity’ which occurs in self-consciousness in the context of knowledge now gets transferred to one in the context of power. If the former gives rise to the feeling that

879 This quote follows the reedited version of the article as referred to below. In the original publication ‘nonwestern cultures’ is indicated, while in the reedited version, the editors wrote ‘Western’ cultures. In the context of the quote, I chose to follow the initial text at this place. Daya Krishna, “Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be,” 1989, 77.
everything is an ‘object’ to one and that one is the only unique ‘subject’ in the world, the second gives rise to the feeling that one is the centre of power that can effectuate anything in the world. Both are self-centric and give rise inevitably to ‘ego-centricity’ at the human level as whatever be the metaphysical or ontological reality of the self, at the empirical level it always occurs as the ego and is felt as such.”

Consequently, Daya Krishna notices that the movement of these self-centricities is itself contradictory, since the illusion of being the unique subject in the world leads to denying the reality of other I-consciousnesses when we believe that we can ‘free’ ourselves from them and the mundane world. On the other hand, the illusion of being the ‘centre’ of power creates the illusion of omnipotence, which makes our consciousness believes that it can “bring into being what it desires to be there.” Thus, it fluctuates between the illusion of lone freedom from others and absolute power on the others, or their domination. What is however common to both these illusions is the annihilation of the idea of the other-consciousnesses, which is consequently seen either as an object of my knowledge or a remote periphery that I can control, or at least which has no influence over my subjectivity. Thus, it does not deny the possibility of a ‘between’ as such, but gives the illusion that this between is my sole initiative, if I reach out to the other as object in order to understand her/him or to include her/him in a conversation that I lead in the first case. In the latter scenario, I see the other as a periphery, which can be, if I want to, integrated on the margins of my consciousness, exotically recognized as different (from me), which I can use if ‘I feel like it’. Thus, for example at an intellectual level, I can use and integrate some resources of her/his traditions that I integrate to my development as examples or concepts fitting my argumentation, leaving her/his resources unchanged (thus, not contributing to them) and my own position also unmodified. I simply use ‘her/him’ as philosophical object to make ‘my’ case stronger. In both cases, the other does not appear to be necessary for my I-consciousness but can be invited into my world to participate in a discussion under my own rules. Needless to say, this is the larger scenario within which academic ‘Western philosophy’ has ‘invited’ Indian philosophies to take part in a ‘global’ dialogue, as described earlier (1.2.2). As I concluded earlier also with Rada Ivekovic (1.2.2), this, however, looks more like a monologue than a dialogue.

Thus, importantly enough, Daya Krishna does not remain ‘between’ the I and the Thou. Dialogue can be addressing You either in the Buberian or Ramchandra Gandhian way, but goes further a binary relation or identity. Daya Krishna’s ‘between’ implies a plurality which contributes to the creativity of dialogue in drawing a ‘world’ between us, rather than establishing a twofold relation, which in the scenario just described, necessarily brings unresolved question such as the tertium comparationis. Seeing the dialogue not in binary terms of the two poles that must be related, for example - as participants or as abstract ‘India’ and

882 Daya Krishna, 138.
883 See Daniel Raveh’s contribution on the philosophical relations between Martin Buber, Ramchandra Gandhi and Daya Krishna’s way of dialoguing: Raveh, “Thinking Dialogically about Dialogue with Martin Buber and Daya Krishna.”
‘Europe’ - but as a collective creation of a world of philosophy emerging from us all, enables, I think, avoiding the fallacies of comparative philosophies (described in 1.2.1).

It remains however difficult to decipher what exactly Daya Krishna means with ‘world’, which he uses in expressions such as ‘the world of art’, ‘of philosophy’, loka, the Leibnitzian world, etc. It might be the case that he loses a definite meaning in the undecipherable character of his wide use of the term. But precisely what attracts Daya Krishna to this concept is the infinite possibility of joint creations and re-creations of diverse worlds within the common cosmos. He thus begins his article ‘Possible Worlds’ with this idea: “A world, as Leibnitz pointed out long ago, involves the notion of ‘compossibility’ or, in other words, the possibility of different possibilities being ‘possible’ together.”

Defining ‘what’ the world means would probably be counterproductive since it would finalize these possibilities into an actuality. In the indecisive use of ‘worlds’ hides thus the open form of all the contents that we can produce together, which potentially has no boundary nor definition, since it can be (and ‘ought to be’) modified in each encounter and dialogue. More specifically on the world of philosophy, which is the one that philosophical dialogues across traditions create, he thus comments elsewhere:

“The world which philosophy creates is not only built on the basis of the questioning activity of consciousness and the doubts that it involves, but is itself constituted by the dynamic unfoldment of concepts in their inter-relationships where each step in the construction not only reveals the inadequacy and inner consistency of what has been conceptually realized, thus challenging to a further exploration which might overcome the inadequacies and the inconsistencies so revealed.”

If understood in the context of dialogues across traditions, such an account implies that the inter-relationships are foremost seen on the basis of the common activity of dialoguing that it creates. Here it is less the question of the I and the You that is focused on, but the dynamic unfolding of what originates from all the ‘I(s)’ and ‘you(s)’ who we can integrate in a dialogue. The relationship enables such a dynamic unfolding which happens on the ground of our being with each other and communicating with each other, seen however from the perspective of what it produces, i.e. the questioning, the doubts, the inadequacy and inner consistency and the further exploration. Thus, addressing each other or speaking to each other is only the necessary beginning of what the dialogue creates and the world of philosophy that it allows, which is the product of our intercommunication.

It is perhaps for this reason, i.e. because of conceiving the relationship in terms of the creative effects that the dialogue enables, that Daya Krishna does not limit the ‘between’ you and me.

884 Daya Krishna, “Possible Worlds,” 181.
885 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 88.
886 See Daniel Raveh’s comment, referring to Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 5. (Daya Krishna’s text is indicated in italics): “‘Much has been said’”, he [Daya Krishna] writes, “about the dialogical interchange between the ‘I’ and the ‘You’, or the ‘Thou’, or the other potential ‘I’, to whom one is a ‘You’ or ‘Thou’; but little, very little, about what the ‘he’ or the ‘she’ does to a ‘conversation’ or ‘discussion’ that occurs all the time. The interaction and the interplay become more complex. [ … ] The problem
but enlarges it to whoever we integrate in our ‘world’, whoever wants to participate in its creation. The relationality that he implies is not the one of me reaching your I-ness and you my I-ness, but consists in essentially realizing that our freedoms and creations originate from the space between yous and Is. This is what he reproaches to Murty’s account of the ‘realm of between’ in particular, and to Indian conceptions of conceiving transcendental relation in two-way relationships only:

“The important thing, to my mind, is that the relationship of ‘between’ need not obtain only between three entities but that it may occur between a large number of entities and thus bring into being a far more complex and multiple world than the relationship would give rise to if conceived in a minimal manner only. A society or a community can only be conceived as the creative result of a plurality of ‘betweens’ and the conflict and the tensions within it will be because of the conflicting nature of these relationships between its different constituent units. The trouble with the model of the ‘between relation’, as usually formulated in the spiritual literature of the world, including India, seems to be that it conceives of the relation only between man and God rather than between God and an indefinite plurality of men and women or between all human beings or even the whole world of living beings which constitutes the Realm in which the relationship of ‘between’ may arise.”

Thus, for Daya Krishna, the ‘realm of between’ is the creation of an intersubjective world (and in his practice, a world across traditions and disciplines), the result of an inter-communication which depends on our will and desire to include many and diverse participants. In so doing, the question of the ‘between’ is relevant only if it does not focus on the identities that are connected, but on the complexity of the processes that take place simultaneously at different levels. Dialogue is for that matter a good illustration, since it does not focus on the individual participants but on the content that emerges from this between. These worlds are thus fundamentally human, in the limits that they create as well as in the potentiality that they allow. Thus, commenting on N. V. Banerjee’s conception of ‘I with Others’ = ‘We’, Daya Krishna qualifies his professor’s philosophy as “anthropocentric in the best sense of the term”.

Indeed, Banerjee clearly distinguishes between modes of relation to nature and the animal world and those with humans in view of the specific inter-communication that the latter allows. This

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possibility to dialogue grounds a radical difference in terms of relation to the other humans, which Daya Krishna qualifies as follows:

“The very starting point of Banerjee’s philosophical reflection is, thus, not the isolated Cartesian ‘cogito’, or the Husserlian ‘transcendental ego’ which has ‘bracketed’ the world, or the pure purusa of Samkhya who is the eternal subject which can never be an object to itself or know that there are other purusas in the world besides itself, or the Advaitic ātmān which has no other or the non-Advaitic ātmāns which have an essential relationship only with the Lord and which either have no knowledge of other selves or know them only as fellow-devotees who are totally immersed in some form or other of the bhakti of the divine. Rather, it is man in the plural - man not as ‘I’, but as ‘we’, the ‘we’s’ who alone may communicate and have a dialogue or rather a multi-logue between themselves.”

The humanness is thus grounded in our dialogical necessity. However, neither Banerjee nor Daya Krishna actually develop a theory of dialogue, neither from a linguistic perspective nor in examining how the communication between subjects or between myself and the others operate. This is remarkable for Daya Krishna in view of his practice of dialogue, and for Banerjee in view of his epistemological analysis, in particular in his work *Language, Meaning, Persons* in which the reader would expect such a theory. While it could be concluded that there is no theory of dialogue, I think that we can conceive dialogue as the realization of the inter-relationality that they offer, and I thus would conceive with them dialogue differently, in terms of this essential inter-relation. In that sense, the spoken content of communication is only the linguistic external manifestation of the process that operates at a deeper level of each consciousness engaged. This process transforms both what is spoken of and our conceptual relations and behaviors. What does not appear is more encompassing than its linguistic expression, which is however needed as the connection between the participants. But how to qualify this encompassing relation if it goes beyond the spoken words in dialogue?

I think that the relation can be understood via the problems that it raises, namely the appearance of the aforementioned I-centricity. Indeed, for Daya Krishna and for N. V. Banerjee, the relation is always-existing. We can withdraw from it and return to ourselves, but this happens on the background of a world that is already with others: it is, thus a denial of the relation, which does not erase its existence. The problem is consequently the awareness of this relation, i.e. how to realize that we are with others even when we are not actively engaged with them (when we are alone) or if we refuse to engage (when we consider others as impediment). The illusion of I-centricity is located in this forgetfulness of our state of being with others which occurs from the difficulty of grasping the state of constant change that they bring about:

889 Daya Krishna, 191.
890 I have analyzed the problem of I-centricity in Daya Krishna with a different emphasis, in particular in view of the articulation of the different realms of consciousness (knowledge, will, action) and absolutes with K. C. Bhattacharyya in the following article: Coquereau, “Relational Consciousness: Subjectivity and Otherness in Daya Krishna’s Philosophy.” While the views of these two investigations concord, I rather focus here on the consequences of I-centricity for dialogue and on the I-centricity vis-à-vis the constitution of a ‘We’.
“We are at the ‘mercy’ of others, just as they are on mine, and it is this fact of dynamic, ever-changing interdependence that structures the human situation, even though in each individual self-consciousness it is mirrored in just the opposite way. For the individual self-consciousness that articulates itself as ‘I am’, the whole world, including its relationship to it, is contingent and hence unnecessary to the self-certiﬁying certitude of its own being which alone is the witness to its absolute existential necessity that self-consciousness testiﬁes and certiﬁes at the same time.”

The illusion of I-centricity concentrates other illusions the were mentioned above (7.1): the impossibility to doubt the I results in indubitability and the illusions of beginninglessness and endlessness, since we cannot extract ourselves from our own existence. It also confers a ﬁnality to ourselves, which can only be questioned when consciousness reﬂects on itself, when the self becomes an object of consciousness in self-consciousness. From the objectiﬁcation of ourselves occurs the possibility to improve, change and modify ourselves but also our relations with others. It is here that Daya Krishna locates our seeking towards what ought to be, from the dilemma of the relation between the indubitable subjective I-consciousness and the dubitable objective self-consciousness. For dialogues, this could explain the difﬁculty to doubt ‘ourselves’ while we can on the other hand admit that ‘our arguments’ can be inconsistent or inadequate. We can recognize that our argument is defeated, but with much more difﬁculty that ‘we are’ wrong or that ‘our’ belief upon which our position is grounded, with which we intimately identify is wrong. This explains Daya Krishna’s emphasis on intellectual detachment, so as to distinguish between the subjective indubitable I speaking in a debate from the reﬂected argumentation that we propound, which can be found inadequate. The difﬁculty to ‘realize’ this difference between the ‘I’ thinking and the ‘thought’ while debating grounds the complaints of


892 If we interpret the following quote by Daya Krishna in a dialogical context, where assertion and judgement are included as part of the argumentation of each participant, the following quote illustrates the relation of dubitability of the arguments (including the ‘self’ when it becomes an object of the argument) and indubitability of the consciousness holding these arguments: “Self-consciousness, however is necessarily judgmental at the ordinary human level and in a judgement the categories are not only related to one another and brought into a ‘unity’, but there is also an element of ‘assertion’ which accompanies the act of judging and which Kant indicated by the phrase ‘I think’ or ‘I judge’ (Ich denke). This ‘act’ of ‘assertion’ is a psychic act involving the ‘owing’ of ‘responsibility’ which implies that one is prepared to give grounds for one’s judgement and justify it on those grounds. To question the grounds is to question the judgement and it is this aspect of judgemental cognition which gives rise to man’s enterprise of rationality which consists in providing ‘reasons’ for what one says. But the ‘reasons’ can always be found to be inadequate or shown to be inconsistent with what one holds on other grounds. There is, thus, an inherent ‘dubitability’ in the enterprise of rationality which ‘self-consciousness’ has inevitably to engage in just because it is self-consciousness. (…) It has seldom been seen that the elements of ‘reﬂexivity’ and ‘negativity’ arise in a pre-reﬂective consciousness that is neither reﬂexive nor negative in the sense in which ‘self-consciousness’ appears in man. The ‘negativity’ is surrounded by a vast certitude which belongs to consciousness itself. And, reﬂexivity at this level is the self-certiﬁcate of consciousness as reﬂected in the indubitable self-certiﬁcate of the ‘I’ at the level of self-consciousness. The indubitability of ‘I’ and the dubitability of everything else thus provides the matrix of the drama of self-consciousness which man essentially is. (…) Consciousness, thus, is indubitable, even though at the level of self-consciousness it becomes dubitable as it too becomes an ‘object’ to itself, like all other objects. It is this ‘dubitability’ however which gives rise to that eternal seeking in respect of both the self and the world which ﬁnds them not as they could be and hence tries to make them ‘better’. The unending dynamism that this engenders deﬁnes the human situation.” Daya Krishna, “Possible Worlds” 188.
Daya Krishna and J. N. Chubb against philosophical debates which turn into ‘wrangling’ when both are confused, which compelled me to develop with them the notions of ‘alternative’ and ‘detachment’ (see chapter 5). The difficulty is thus not simply to accept a plurality of rational truth-statements, but also to recognize this difference between the subjective I-consciousness and the self-reflected consciousness when debating. Precisely this difference cannot be rationally proven but has to be experienced from within via a practice of detachment which allows to feel the split between my ontological consciousness and its activity of knowledge as consciousness. It is now clear that this is not simply an intellectual, or rational and cognitive exercise, but also implies a metaphysical consideration on the constitution of consciousness.

Within the rational framework of argumentation, a first step consists in recognizing that the many others participate in my thought. This implies to realize that the activity of knowledge is a joint activity with others without which my thoughts could not exist. This interrelatedness is located at the level of self-consciousness in the sense that the reflection on myself is permitted via the mediation of others without which this act could not be and could not make sense (see also 5.2.1 where I limited the quote to the intellectual dimension):

“The relation of conversation, Dialogue, Discussion and Debate to ‘thinking’ is so intimate, intertwined and complex that it is difficult, if not impossible, to unravel the contribution that each makes to the activity we call ‘thinking’ (…). But whatever the complexity, one thing is clear. The ‘other’, whether it be one or more than one, is necessarily involved at every level. One may at times be said to ‘converse’ or ‘discuss’ with oneself but, then one, not only treats oneself as the ‘other’ but soon finds the limitations of this and seeks the ‘real’ other, the other than oneself who may look at what one ‘thinks’ more objectively, critically without that lies, or prejudice, or ‘self-love’ that the inevitable ‘I-Centricity’ in ‘thinking’ always involves. The ‘I’ in ‘I think’ is more important than ‘think’ or ‘thinking’ as the well-known examples of Śaṅkara, Descartes and Fichte, among many other, attest. For the ‘other’ on the other hand, it is the ‘thinking’ or rather ‘thought’ which is its result, even if it be only contingently related to it, that is the heart of the matter. (…) This (dialogue including continuous questions and thoughts), most people forget, is the life of the Intellect or Reason in which knowledge, ‘human knowledge’, lives, takes shape, is formed and grows over spaces and times no one knows. (…) And, what is almost never understood or realized, is that its center is not the individual, however important he or she may seem, but the ‘interrelated’ and ‘interacting’ community, both visible and invisible, extending from the present into the indefinitely receding horizons of the past whose members ‘feel’ the ‘presence’, the persistent presence, of the other, the innumerable ‘other’ is the very ‘act’ of one’s thinking.”

The problem originates however in succeeding to connect these two poles by realizing that the others themselves are both ‘I’ and ‘thought’ and furthermore, that my I, their I and our thoughts are also interrelated. This means that although conceiving a split between ‘I’ and ‘thought’ or I-consciousness and self/other-consciousness can enable accepting criticism and detachment in
dialogue, their separation is itself an illusion. For dialogue, the illusion of this separation points at a dilemma. On the one hand, it is necessary to distinguish me from my thoughts and even more you from your thoughts, so as to reach an apparently ‘objective’ ground where our thoughts can be debated, questioned and criticized. On the other hand, it is in reaction to your thoughts that mine can be elaborated, with ‘you’ that ‘I’ think, in our common language that we can communicate through the different intellectual backgrounds and conceptual frameworks that our creativity arises. It might be useful to remind the reader here that this communication is itself part of the creation of self-consciousnesses, thus subject to misunderstandings and ambiguities the uncertainty of which opens new potentialities for thinking together (as seen in 5.1). Thus, the common elaboration does not merge into certainty but in the discoveries enabled by the common explorations of doubt and questions. Furthermore, ‘we’ in dialogue are not only our words, thoughts or self-consciousnesses but also ‘ourselves’ as different ‘Is’, which designates much more than the simple location or container of our thoughts. How to think a relatedness between us that also allows a distinction?

It is difficult to answer this question with Daya Krishna, who on the one hand emphasizes the necessary critical distance and intellectual detachment to oneself and one’s tradition, which also implies the right to navigate between different traditions as one’s own. On the other hand, he also insists on our being with others, which creates this common intersubjective world in which we all live and think. Since this world is also created by our collective actions, the only possibility I could think of with Daya Krishna is to consider our collective actions of creation to arise from our engagement with others, i.e. out of our consciousness, while the critical faculty implied in the activity of knowledge contains an ‘inwardization’ to allow the intellectual detachment. In other words: creation occurs when we direct our consciousness outside to a world of togetherness, while criticisms are possible when we come back within our selves as self-consciousness and distinguish between subjective and objective activities. Can we split further to be I-consciousness and self-consciousness on the outside and I-consciousness and self-consciousness on the inside? Within ourselves, the distinction appears solely as self-consciousness in distancing ourselves from our thought. Outside of ourselves, the distinction appears first in the created joint actions or explorations of which the I is the impulse without which our thoughts or actions would not be embodied. This articulation, however, does not solve the I-centricity of I-consciousness itself. It only shifts it further by observing the commonness of what emerges from it. In any case, Daya Krishna seems to distinguish between the cognitive independence and the existential relatedness - although he would probably agree

897 “Self-consciousness brings something into being as it questions everything including knowledge and action and communication. The question of truth and falsity, of right and wrong, of significance and insignificance, of meaningfulness and meaninglessness arise which had not risen before. (...) The Garden of Eden was there and it was self-consciousness that destroyed it for ever. But the fact that is has infected and vitiates communication itself and made it essentially ambiguous has not been seen even by those who have talked about the essential indeterminacy of the meaning and the text.” Daya Krishna, *Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions*, 141.
that our cognitive independence happens within our existential relatedness in the world here and now. Thus, for the realm of thinking, he writes:

“Philosophical enterprise is ‘cognitive’ in the sense that it is neither a matter of ‘feeling’ nor of ‘action’, but always involves argument and counter-argument concerning questions and problems that are primarily theoretical and arise mostly from what I have characterized as the ‘conceptuality’ of the concepts. As for ‘independence’, these ‘questions’ and ‘problems’ are independent in the sense that once they have arisen, they become as ‘objective’ as anything else, not only to the mind that has encountered them, but to every other mind that can be interested in them. It should be remembered in this connection that even what is ‘constituted’ by belief gets independent of it after it has been constituted. This is the basic māyā of all human reality.”

Thus, in order to allow thinking an independence of the thoughts however in essential relation with my I-consciousness and the other-consciousnesses, I think we have to effectuate two further steps: while engaging and withdrawing are two directions that are possible for my I-consciousness to connect with the world, I believe we have to consider that these actions happen on the background of an essential relatedness with each others, best expressed with N. V. Banerjee’s expression “realm of the personal” (in opposition to the individual subject implying the split with object). If we consider I-centricity in the sense of an impossibility of reaching other-consciousnesses as I-consciousness, there is a possibility to realize that we are nevertheless as I-consciousness essentially with Others. Indeed, it is not as consciousness in treating the other consciousnesses as object of my consciousness (i.e. as other-self-consciousnesses) that we can ‘understand’ or ‘know’ that we are with them in the world. This knowledge ‘of’ the others, i.e. the others as objects, defines “basic otherness” in Banerjee’s terms. Knowledge is conceived “from outside” as externalization of my relation with others on the mode of my knowledge of nature.

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900 “Let us now try to ascertain the exact nature of the relation between the subject and the object, it being granted that the object is characterized by basic otherness. (…) One may admit the direct and immediate relationship between the subject and the object and yet may, under the influence of philosophical sophistication from which laymen are fortunately free, come to misunderstand the meaning of the word ‘object’. Such misunderstanding is prominently illustrated in the admission of the distinction between the object in itself and the object as known and the acceptance of the view that, whereas the latter is obviously held in a direct and immediate relation to the subject, the former, as held by the representationists in general headed by Descartes in modern times, is knowable indirectly and mediatly by means of inference or else, as held by Kant, is absolutely unknown and unknowable. But both these views amount to understanding knowledge from outside and not, as should be appropriate, from within itself. And this goes to show that they are but attempts to substitute theories for a fact - the fact of knowledge. In particular, they are vitiates by the arbitrary and unwarrantable employment of the concept of causality in the understanding of the nature of knowledge.” Banerjee, 15–16. Daya Krishna also criticized the application of naturalistic causality to describe our relations with others. Interestingly, he uses the concept of ‘essentiality’ at this occasion, showing a possible influence of the term as used by Banerjee: “The relation with the other cannot be causal in the usual sense of the term, as it is not only mediated by norms but also leaves an essential, irreducible margin of indeterminacy both because of the other’s freedom and the intrinsic unpredictability of the response made by them.” (emphasis added). Daya Krishna, “Thinking with Causality about ‘Causality:’ Reflections on a ‘Concept’ Determining All Thought about Action and Knowledge,” 55. However, Daya Krishna’s insistence on
in isolation from other realms, if I consider that I can know ‘your philosophical position’ by understanding the different points made in your argumentation. Debating on our differences, I can offer a counter-argument to your assertion. However, this (defined as the rational debate) remains an external knowledge of arguments that emanate from ‘you’ without this ‘you’ to be in essential relation to me. On the contrary, in the realm of the personal, the challenge is to realize that your position, as different from mine as it can be, is yet essentially related to you and me, since it is enabled by our inter-communication. It is ‘in reaction’ to me that you offer an argument, which is grounded on the one hand on the possibilities that are left open by my questions and those of your answer, and on the other hand on our belonging to one ‘world’ composed by valutational seekings or desires. The interrelation of these realms is what defines us as ‘human’, i.e. less our ability to conceive of ‘epistemology’ or ‘values’ than the fact that we are already located together in relation in a world composed of the intermingling of all these dimensions. However, due to our rational ability to distinguish and analyze, it seems to us that these realms are separated and that we are ourselves separated. As illusorous as these separations could be, they form our human condition and have thus a certain reality grounded in the biological fact of the separation of our bodies for Banerjee. He summarizes this dilemma as follows:

“In the understanding of this relation the distance between one man and another as signified by the word ‘other’ or even by the words ‘each other’ should then be somehow or other overcome. And the only way in which this may be done seems to consist in conceiving man’s relation to his fellows to be that of his essentiality to them, expressible in the formula ‘I with others = we’. Here the use of the word ‘with’ before the word ‘others’, it is worthwhile to note, serves to indicate the undoing of the adverse effect that the word ‘other’ is apt to produce by itself alone or even with the word ‘each’ added to its prefix.

Nevertheless, man’s relation to his fellows originally falls below the strict human level or, in other words, is not characterizable as essentially to one another. This is due to an original and inexplicable anomaly of human nature, which refers to man’s unavoidable biological birth. Viewed in the purely biological perspective, man is constituted by certain vital drives and as such is ordinarily a mere individual or an ego. And that being so, his relation to his fellows, equally biologically born, is analogous to his relation to nature, being that of others to him. But then, man’s relation to his fellows cannot be what we have called basic otherness. This is obviously due to the possibility of inter-communication between one man and another. It is precisely for this reason that the otherness in the case of the relation between man and man is really each-otherness which is another name for mutuality.”

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the indeterminacy brought by our essentiality with others is his own, which for dialogue is necessary. Indeed, although we are already with others, this state should also not be understood as a renunciation of communication because we would already have access to the otherness of the others. It is on the basis of this essentiality that we can communicate but the communication itself escapes any norm and remains indeterminate, i.e. possibly creative for Daya Krishna.

901 This is what Friedman understood as ‘technical dialogue’ according to Buber’s philosophy when he responded to Daya Krishna in the dialogue about which I commented in 6.3.

Banerjee grounds the difference between basic otherness and essential each-otherness is the ‘possibility of inter-communication’. It is indeed at this point very surprising to notice that he does not develop in consequence a concept of dialogue or a mode of communication corresponding to this essential relation with each other. I can only hypothesize that his reservation against linguistic analysis made him suspicious of such a concept, which could have been interpreted at a pure linguistic level of communication. Conversely, we could think dialogue as this essential inter-communication with each-other beyond linguistic analysis in applying his insight further. In so doing, dialogue can be understood as the ‘undoing’ of this original distance visible in our biological birth as described by Banerjee. Furthermore, dialogue would then be the mode of relating ‘with’ others as the realization of our essentiality to each other, which most obviously applies through language, but also in thinking (following Daya Krishna’s idea that our thinking is enabled by its acceptance and revision in front of others) and creating (a common world of desires, seeking and values).

This being-with might not be continuously perceivable as a state of being where we are always situated and from which we cannot extract ourselves, thus having no possibility to reflect on it as self-consciousness. It should rather be explored as realization and awareness from within. It might also not give us access to the I-consciousness of the others, but it can constitute enough of a belief to engage in dialogue with others. It can make us confident that we all are I-consciousnesses whose communication can be however only effectuated through the objectivity and distance of self-consciousnesses. In so doing, I think that we would avoid on the one hand the Advaitin unity, which for Daya Krishna runs the risk of nullifying the power of differences. On the other hand, we would keep the sense of inner-awareness of our essentiality to others against the illusion of omnipotence. Thus, this would mean that we are essentially related from within and different and distinct enough to enter in dialogue. But how are we ‘essentially’ related from within and what does that mean?

903 “Despite the fact that it is man’s own creation and is the most effective means of the expression of his thoughts, feelings, desires, hopes and fears as well as the medium of his communication with his fellows, language is, after all, a tool for him to use and as such is in a sense an ‘other’ to him. Thus language is of a dual nature, and this perhaps indicates that the importance of linguistic analysis in philosophical investigations is subject to a limitation. Its importance lies not only in bringing the problem of meaning to the forefront of philosophic thought but in insisting that meaning as such cannot be committed to the care of the verification principle - the principle which is of exclusive use in deciding between truth and falsity and the recognition of the all-importance of which in the field of philosophy is a way of liquidating philosophy or else leaving it in a state of slavery to science. (…) Philosophy, although in the fitness of things it embraces linguistic analysis, must go beyond, and in any case is not identifiable with, the latter. And, further, the bewitchment of our intelligence is due to a cause which lies deeper and is more comprehensive than the mere abuse of language as the protagonists of linguistic analysis may conceive it to be. Judged in this light, linguistic analysis, while providing for the awareness, of course vague and inadequate, of the proper business of philosophy, misses the chance of developing into philosophy; so that, if it must be associated with the name of philosophy, it may well be designated as still-born philosophy. And this is due to the failure on its part to comprehend the truth that the bewitchment of our intelligence is ultimately the effect of the illusory idea of ourselves as mere individuals.” Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 167–68.
In his earlier presentation of the same problem of essentiality, in *Language, Meaning, Persons* (1963), Banerjee had formulated the issue in a more condensed way, notably in terms of ‘demand’:

“Essentially related to the point made above is the curious and yet the most fundamental fact about human existence, namely, that man, by birth, is of an anomalous nature, being both an individual and a person, and that, due to the peculiarity of his birth as a human being, this original anomaly of his nature is imbued with the demand for its own resolution.”

Thus, the dilemma demands to be solved according to the explication in the earlier section of the term of ‘demand’. Undoing the original distance is a human seeking (in Daya Krishna’s term) to feel again our essentiality with each other as persons, i.e. an inner struggle calling for mutuality. In his review of Banerjee’s later book (*Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy*, 1985), Daya Krishna, in spite of his highly appreciation of Banerjee pleading for his readers to be “convinced that there is a thinker whose thought deserves to be paid serious critical attention by those who are genuinely interested in his creative philosophical thinking done recently in this country” (note the mentioning of ‘critical’ and ‘creative’ in Daya Krishna’s incentive to encourage further discussions on Banerjee’s philosophy), has a serious critique to make. His critique is to be taken seriously first because it raises a problem on the concept of essentiality, and second because, in my interpretation, the problem that he raises could bring dialogue at the core of the discussion. Daya Krishna writes:

“The first reserve expressed is indeed answered by Daya Krishna himself, namely that our biological condition can be seen to constitute our nature, but not our humanness. This does not
mean that we can overcome our nature. We remain embodied, but our bodily behavior is also insufficient to define how we ought to act or be. However, the second question is more interesting and brings attention to Banerjee’s formal constitution of essentiality. For Daya Krishna, whose vocabulary and views are more down to earth or more exactly, down in the world, such a general metaphysical idea of essentiality turns out to be suspicious. It requires to presuppose some kind of speculative view which also runs the risk of becoming absolute. In assuming that (all) human beings are essential to one another, he seems to fall in what Daya Krishna points out as a transcendental illusion, namely the fact that Banerjee sees our essentiality to each other as phenomenally given although it is transcendental. In other words, Banerjee replaces the transcendental ‘I’ by a kind of transcendentally influenced conception of a We. But what can justify presupposing as a fact that all human beings are essential to each other? What can explain in the worldly state of affairs an essentiality with each other that would necessarily and already signify our human condition? Can there be an a priori essentiality to each other which is grounded in our necessity to realize it rather than to actualize it? In other words, is Banerjee not replacing a kind of transcendental liberation by another kind, even if he implies an empirical liberation in this life?908

This issue is further investigated by Daya Krishna’s second critique, which continues as follows:

“And, what about ego-centricity? Is one human being different from another human being, or not? Banerjee eschews transcendent metaphysics, and, in fact, is totally against it. Being out-and-out anthropocentrically-minded he cannot take recourse to some transcendent, non-empirical, non-vyāvāhāric identity as many Advaitins do. But at the empirical, vyāvāhāric level, differences are what provide individuation and thus provide that richness and variety which is the spice of life. Not only this, at the empirical level we are not just human beings but belong to a particular sex, caste, race, religion, nation, language group, civilization, etc. All these define and restrict the field of those with whom I can meaningfully communicate. It is strange that while Banerjee has said so many interesting things about language and communication, he has not talked about the empirical fact of there being a plurality of languages along with the fact that most human beings are born into a particular community which restricts their communication-field primarily to those who can speak their language.”909

I agree with Daya Krishna that there is a certain attraction for a transcendental orientation within the world in Banerjee’s account, which arises from his critique of the pāramārthika level in

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908 Concluding on the necessity to enact humanizing principles of conduct as a spiritual activity and humanist education which should combine theory and practice to lead us to the realization of our essentiality with each other, Banerjee concludes his book The Future of Religion as follows: “If and when this happens, their original alienation from themselves and from their fellows is more likely than not to be eliminated and, consequently, they may be initiated into a new way of perfectly integrated life well marked by the prevalence of the joy of living (ānanda). Hence is indicated the Way—perhaps, the only Way, that would lead to the fulfilment of the destiny of man, consisting in his realization of liberation in this life (jīvan-mukti).” Nikunja Vihari Banerjee, The Future of Religion (New Delhi: Munishiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1981), 119.

909 Daya Krishna, “Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy..” 209.
general, and the Advaita Vedāntin doctrine of ātman in particular. Attempting to oppose them a plurality of others at the empirical level, his counter-position does not escape the whole framework in which it is grounded. It rather seems to pose the ‘I with others’ contra the absolute I-subjectivity, and the empirical contra the transcendental. In doing so, his metaphysics remains deeply influenced by a transcendent perspective. What if, however, we consider the essentiality to each other not as a state of being (or a becoming what we are), but as something that requires a realization from within and a construction with others? In other words, this means to realize from within the possibility of being essentially with each other (however, not always, not with everybody, not a priori), which would motivate us to participate actively to an essential relation out in the world? Such a conception would implicate my desire and seeking originating from my inner consciousness, knowledge and will, which could concretize the relation.

This brings me back to conceptualize dialogue as a way to realize the essentiality to each other. However, such a conception does not presuppose that we are already and necessarily with all others, but with ‘some’ colleagues, friends, scholars and thinkers who came to participate in a dialogue. The task or the demand for essentiality would then take a second, more concrete meaning: in view of the impossibility to realize a priori our essentiality with ‘all’ others, the task would rather consist in attempting to enlarge the dialogue with as many and diverse others as possible, through the plurality of languages, nations, civilizations, castes, genders, etc. Above (5.2) I had described that dialogue is theoretically possible with indefinite participants, while it is concretely limited to the actual others participating: this renders the essentiality with them concrete in the ‘here and now’. In so doing, we can integrate the second criticism of Daya Krishna, namely the one concerning the restrictions and individuations of the participants who provide the richness of plurality, whereas they generate at the same time the risk of an impossibility of dialoguing due to these differences. In particular the plurality of languages mentioned by Daya Krishna proves to be a very practical impediment to dialoguing, although the belonging to different groups might be a deeper and more complicated obstacle to tackle. This further points out Daya Krishna’s more general view, which I apply to dialogue, namely

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910 See the following remarks of Chatterjee, for whom however the intermingling of the transcendent in the empirical does not seem to constitute a contradiction: “The state of illusion, it is important to note, is, for Banerjee not a cognitive deprivation. Rather it concerns the gulf between knowledge and performance which pertains to our ordinary actions the vyavāhārika level - except that I suspect that for Banerjee there is no meaning in speaking of a pāramārthika level. What is needed is to transcend both egoity and mere collectivity (I and others). (...) Banerjee now introduces his own view of liberation from bondage. It involves ‘expansion’, ‘entrance into the lives of others’, ‘love of himself in and through his love of others’ (p.153). This is what blessedness (ākanda) is. One must note the link between this and Banerjee’s main grouse against Advaita Vedānta (that it involves an unwarranted inflation of selfhood). Expansion suggests a welcoming of plurality, and all this without falling into any kind of ātman doctrine.” Chatterjee, “Intersubjectivity and Essentiality,” 92. She later also explains the background of Banerjee’s “K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Lecture” by detecting the transcendental influences (via opposition) of his view: “Banerjee is concerned at the conclusion of his lectures both to criticize any kind of leap from ‘I am nothing’ to some form of absolutism, and to criticize on the other hand any sort of theory which stresses the insular subject, a tendency he detects in western philosophy from the time of Descartes onwards. Both absolutism and insular subjectivity are regarded by him as ‘a travesty of the human situation’. The ‘I with others’ which is his positive alternative suggestion is, however, ‘not the content of any mode of our consciousness’. Banerjee refers to it as transcendental (p.82) and maintains that there obtains a demand for its actualization. This is clearly a shift from a Kantian view of the transcendental as presupposition to something which is set as a task.” Chatterjee, 96.
that there is no final resolution of the illusion. It seems to be proven insofar as Banerjee, attempting to erase the illusion of ego-centricity, seems to fall in the transcendental illusion of the constitution of the We. Thus, unlike others, Daya Krishna does not see the solution in solving the problem of the illusions but in realizing them or using them as resources for further discussions (as investigated at a metaphysical level in 7.1, now used as practical resources for topics orienting dialogues).

Thus, for Daya Krishna the plurality contained in the idea of ‘individuals’ is not to be erased, which would again tend towards a unity, even if at the empirical level this time. He rather contemplates the advantage to make use of the plurality in a common and joint enterprise led by ‘We’ essentially related to each other in the common enterprise itself. The We thus needs to be re-actualized, it can be transformed and modified throughout dialogues and silences, so that the force of differences also operate within me. For, if I am already with others, can others change me? How to explicate the changes of ideas, positions, discoveries, wonders but also doubts, errors, revisions and corrections otherwise? These movements are ‘essential’ to the flow of dialogue for Daya Krishna, they cannot be annihilated by any unity with others. The relation that is created is an essential bond with each other, but it requires a constant engagement. It runs the risk of disappearing or failing at each moment, and it can also integrate moments of withdrawal. It is the full scopes of these possibilities and fragilities that configure the dynamic of dialogue, the instability of which also highlights its potentialities. In Daya Krishna’s words, the dynamic is the one relating different consciousnesses as follows:

“Consciousness has the threefold aspect with feeling as its core and awareness as its centre, the one looking inward or being inward, the other looking outward and becoming all that it is aware of in a sense which is difficult to specify but not difficult to understand. As for the third aspect, it is silent but ever-present, a possibility that can always turn into an actuality by a movement which no one understands. Awareness and feeling are always there but that which ‘hides’, and by hiding or even desiring or attending or shifting the focus of attention brings about a change, no one understands. Yet, it is as palpably there as awareness and feeling are, and the moment it becomes active, it assumes a centrality in that it affects the other two radically. (...) The roots of identity and difference thus lie within these aspects of consciousness and their interrelationships along with the changes that self-consciousness introduces in them with the coming into being of what we have called the ‘I-consciousness’, ‘the consciousness of the I’ and the interactive interrelationship between them. The identity and the difference that originate from these and percolate down to all the other levels and get differentiated and diversified in this process are radically affected by the almost a priori modalities which consciousness has in dimension of knowing, feeling and desiring or wanting or willing. Each of these has elements of the other but, inspite of this, seeks a purity and puruṣārtha of its own, unmixed or even uncontaminated by that which is immanently involved in the other.”911

For realizing our essentiality with each other in Daya Krishna, I hypothesize that we need both the inward feeling of the others’ presence and the awareness for becoming what the feeling

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brings about. In other words, ‘realizing’ has both meaning of becoming internally aware and bringing something into actualization. The third aspect is not named, and I believe that in the context of dialogue, it can be understood as the element of uncertainty beyond the control or will of the participants which gives rise to the indescribable ‘click’ that opens up dialogue. This expression was used by Srivatsa Goswami in our meeting to describe the Bhakti dialogue (see 3.3.2) and is used in the preface of the Pune experiment to describe its dialogical success, as already quoted in 2.2.3. Daya Krishna compliments there on the efforts of K. Satchidananda Murty’s earlier experiments, who influenced him (among others) to organize the samvāda, but remarks also that “yet, none of them had really clicked. They were good while they lasted. But they did not generate that feeling of discovery, enthusiasm and success which the Rege seminar did in Poona.”912 For indeed, there seems to be no immediate reason that would differentiate the earlier attempts and the enthusiasm generated by the Pune experiment, and conversely, nothing can guarantee afterwards that the next dialogue will generate the same enthusiasm. This constitutes the element of uncertainty, which for Daya Krishna is a condition of creativity, as the uncontrollable shock, surprise or wonder inherent to philosophizing, which may or may not be realized. Unlike feeling and awareness which are ‘always there’ but fluctuate in their realization and thus depend on our activation and reception, this silent possibility, although ‘ever present’, cannot be self-activated and rather depends on the context (see for instance the relevance of the location in Vrindavan for the Bhakti dialogue in 3.3.2), including coincidences emerging from the context. The dynamic creating dialogue originates from the intermingling of these dimensions within and outside my I-consciousness and essentially with others, however from the dilemmas of its contradictory movements, struggling to be detached from others.

But how do these contradictory movements originate? If the essentiality with each other is part of our awareness and feeling, why does Daya Krishna describe a struggle away from the others towards “a purity and puruṣārtha of its own, unmixed or even uncontaminated by that which is immanently involved in the other”? For Banerjee, this is precisely the result of the illusion of I-centricity. N. V. Banerjee developed his conception over several works and applied it to different realms of consciousness, with consequences that go much further than my present investigation. I rather select here from his philosophy what I believe can be relevant to emphasize the ‘human’ (what Daya Krishna qualifies as ‘anthropocentric’), ‘essential’ dialogue with Daya Krishna’s philosophy, the metaphysical background of which remains - in my reading - implicit. In the former’s account, this I-centricity originates from our conception of ourselves as ‘individuals’ who require an external relation, for example ‘language’ in order to connect the I and the You or others. Indeed, even at a very ordinary level, solipsism and isolation are not always possible so that we need a common language in order to communicate ‘to’ each other. In that sense also, my knowledge ‘of’ you as objectified is an external knowledge of what I perceive or even accept to share with you in the public realm. This even applies to ‘understanding’, which for Banerjee is indeed not egoistic and allows for mutual

912 Daya Krishna et al., Samvāda, a Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions, xi–xii.
cooperation for example in technology or science. Our collective efforts can produce new tools in these realms. But understanding remains of a social order of human beings on the model ‘I and Others’ in the externality of our engagement in order to create something which can be useful to both sides.\textsuperscript{913}

It is interesting that N. V. Banerjee overcomes this level towards the realm of the personal (in opposition to individuals) and I with others (in opposition to I and others) in the last chapter of \textit{Language, Meaning and Persons} which is entitled ‘Of Human Liberation’, akin to Daya Krishna’s strong belief of freedom which cannot be achieved without others. They do not mention dialogue, neither as a way to reach this freedom, nor ‘as’ freedom. In particular, I understand ‘dialogue’ as a way to respond to N. V. Banerjee’s question (which I believe is shared by Daya Krishna):

“For what else can human bondage be but another name for man’s inviduality, his egocentricity, his circumscriptions within the small world dominated by the interplay of his passions? And considering this, one obviously cannot come to conceive liberation except in terms of the conquest of individuality.”\textsuperscript{914}

The conquest of individuality is best epitomized in the engagement in dialogues with others, which, following the above limitation of understanding, is not understood as a social act in a public discourse (as in the sense of Habermas). Rather, I understand it as the realization that our knowledge, values, positions and beliefs are made with others on the ground of this essential dialogue, the task of which is to make us realize our own human constitution. In that sense, dialogue is not (only) where we meet and agree or disagree on arguments that we have prepared beforehand. Instead, it is where we realize that what we fundamentally are is the result of our ‘being with others’, which we can realize in communication. This communication is just the external tool for expressing the transformations of our identities in the activity of dialogue, which is modifying our positions - themselves elaborated on the ground of a shared knowledge - and directed to values. In view of the transformative process operating at all levels (at least in Daya Krishna’s account), liberation is the ever-going realization of our humanness rather than an escape from it,\textsuperscript{915} which Banerjee also conceives as such when he continues:

\textsuperscript{913} Banerjee, \textit{Language, Meaning and Persons}, 148.
\textsuperscript{914} Banerjee, 153.
\textsuperscript{915} See Shail Mayaram’s interpretation on Daya Krishna’s view of freedom: “In a letter to Bettina Bäumer, Daya Krishna wrote, ‘The realm of the spirit seeks ‘freedom’ from (…) any ‘externality’ to which it is essentially bound as it is what it [is] and] wants to know in order to be ‘freed’ from it.” For Daya Krishna, freedom also had to be woven into the everyday. In conversations I had with him, he frequently emphasized the importance of distancing oneself from the lived world, from what one had read, from sensual experience. (...) It was that which put us in touch with the power of our own self-consciousness. Freedom for Daya Krishna, however, is not an I-centric consciousness focused on its own self-aggrandizement or possessive individualism. In ‘Eros, Nomos, Logos’, he writes both of Kant’s famous essay ‘Perpetual peace’ and the \textit{Gītā}, articulating a vision of freedom involving responsibility, repeated effort, and the cultivation of an other-centric consciousness. It is only through nomos or dharma, he argues, that an ‘I can become truly human. The ‘structure of self-consciousness must involve an awareness of the ‘other,’ of multiple others, and an obligation towards them not to hurt or harm or injure [them] in any way whatsoever, if not help them to the extent one can, in becoming ‘freer,’ better, more ‘other-centered’
“But then, one should not be so over-zealous as to construe liberation as contradictory to individuality, because individuality cannot be contradicted except by its own annihilation, which is absoluteness of a kind or else vacuity śūnya916, in either case conspicuous for its non-human character, and because liberation is not worth the name unless it is not only not non-human, but, on the contrary, is human, and human in the strictest sense.”917

Thus, “liberation consists in the individual’s discovery of himself as a person”918. This discovery is further “solely and exclusively dependent upon the termination of an illusion, the illusory idea of oneself as a mere individual”919, which makes this discovery “unique” for Banerjee. In other words and closer to Daya Krishna: realizing the illusoriness of the illusion of I-centricity is a way towards liberation, which as we saw, unlike for Banerjee, is itself not realized but creates an interactive way between persons and individuals, I with others. Since we are “essentially persons” we cannot “become” persons920, which for Banerjee renders education negative since it simply un-does our original bondage rather than brings us to our original freedom. In contrast, he argues for a “re-education” “with a view to regeneration”921, i.e. a re- and ‘helpful’ in the best way one can.” This, he argues, is implied by the Gītā’s ideas of parasparam and śreyas, the former implying mutuality and a relation of perfect equality between self and other, whereas the latter bears connotations of universality and intersubjectivity.” Daya Krishna and Shail Mayaram, “Preface,” in Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna, ed. Nalini Bhushan, Jay L. Garfield, and Daniel Raveh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), ix.

916 vacuity, absolute non-existence: Banerjee’s condemnation is irrevocable and explicated in a footnote: “This refers to the boldest and yet the most absurd metaphysical speculation of the Mādhyamika Buddhists, which found in the concept of śūnya the key to the understanding of the universe comprising the material world as well as human beings.” Ibid. For once, Daya Krishna has a more moderate interpretation of this vacuity, being part of the process, which becomes problematic only if one gets ‘stuck’ in it: “The two [identification and deidentification] are supposed to be diametrically opposed to each other, but a little reflection would show that each not only presupposes and involves the other, but that the so-called movement of ‘withdrawal’ or ‘turning away’ is there even in the awareness of the distinction between ‘this’ and ‘that’, or ‘I’ and ‘you’, or even ‘I’ and ‘me’. The capacity to ‘attend’ and to shift attention from one ‘object’ to another involves the deeper capacity of ‘withdrawal’ of attention, and is founded and rooted on it. On the other hand, the indefinite extensibility of distinction and differentiation creating the world of plurality is made possible only because there is what is formless and contentless, neither this nor that, the ultimate non-being, or śānya or a-bhāva, which is encountered outside as ‘emptiness’ that makes both plurality and motion possible, and within as ‘consciousness’ and ‘self-consciousness’ that make both ‘knowledge’ and ‘action’ possible at the human level. Freedom itself is only another name for this capacity, from ‘this’ to ‘that’, or from all that is ‘object’ and one’s relation to it, if one wishes to do so.” Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 238–39.

918 Banerjee, 153–54.
919 Banerjee, 154.
920 Banerjee, 155.
921 Banerjee, 162.
orientation of man on himself (in Banerjee’s words “on life and human affairs”). However, I find Banerjee’s answers at this point unconvincing regarding the challenge that he addresses, his answer being formulated in terms of “principles of conduct” which are rather analyzed in his other word Knowledge, Reason and Autonomy. Like Daya Krishna, he refuses to propound universal ethical norms which would contradict the different applications in various contexts, and rather conceives them as heuristic formulations, regulative for all human persons. This, in a way, is akin to values functioning as regulative ideals applicable to all but variable in contexts. Nevertheless, although we could dialogue about or within the regulative principles of conducts, they seem to contain a formal fixity which would be counterproductive for dialogues as elaborated here. I believe consequently that it is rather in the communication itself with others that Daya Krishna sees freedom instead of in any formal principle:

“Yet, in spite of all these, consciousness proclaims its independence and freedom from them [bondages of all sorts created by the body and the mind] and an essential ‘joyfulness’, which nothing can suppress as unless it were there, there will be neither freedom nor joy in the world. The realizations that it is so, in spite of all the appearances to the contrary, is both a challenge and an opportunity to see that the world which is constituted by ‘consciousness-in-inter-relationship’ should also be a world where freedom and joy should be realized to the maximum extent possible.

The difficulties and the impediments in this realization emanate from two factors: one, that it is not sufficiently realized that what is involved in the acceptance of the reality of independent multiple centres of consciousness which are all, at the metaphysical level, equally ‘free’ and capable of peace, happiness and joy in both ‘aloneness’ and ‘relationship’. The second obstacle that stands in the way of the creation of such a world is the lack of realization, or even and [sic.] active denial, of the fact that both joy and freedom are dependent on and conditioned by the freedom and joy of the other. Consciousness, it should be remembered, are both interdependent and in essential communication with one another so that the condition of one affects to some extent at least, the condition of the others.”

However, Daya Krishna’s analysis suffers with regard to Banerjee’s of the opposite defect. Indeed, although Banerjee refuses to systematize rules of conducts or ethical norms providing

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922 Chatterjee interprets this concept of regeneration in Banerjee from the point of view of another work, which also justifies his principles of conduct: “Here and there in his writings there is a suggestion that meditation on the principles of conduct might serve to humanize man. At the same time Banerjee’s humanistic metaphysic clearly concerns man as an agent, for to bring about a new world is precisely what he conceives the task facing man to be. By the time we reach his book The Future of Religion (1981) it seems that the whole theme of the essentiality of man to his fellows is the theme of religion conceived in a humanist way, or alternatively expressed, it is the theme of liberation. Man bears the promise of being regenerated in this life. The exposition of the concept of essentiality in fact gives us a twentieth century version of the life of the jīvanmukta but though through in inter-personal terms and with a ground theme of love which perhaps emerges as the key to or basis for the three humanizing principles mention of which recurs throughout his writings. As such it provides a valuable and distinctively Indian style of humanism which, for a change, does not lean on the usual historic pillars of rationality, science or individualism.” Chatterjee, “Intersubjectivity and Essentiality,” 98.

923 Banerjee, Language, Meaning and Persons, 162.


925 Daya Krishna, Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions, 161.
guiding rules for essentially realizing our bound with each other, his regulative principles nevertheless provide a general framework within which rules of conduct can be empirically developed. On the contrary, Daya Krishna, by emphasizing on the potentiality of the complex dynamics and the possible elaboration of different worlds, and by leaving all possibilities open, also refuses to answer in a way. There is thus theoretically not only no way to ‘force’ the essential realization to each other, since this would contradict the meaning of the inward realization. Also, there is nothing to externally motivate our willingness to engage with others, or integrate a diversity of others. His practice, on the other hand, has concrete limits but offers a way which can be further applied, which justifies my choice to integrate both sides in my analysis.

It is in view of this correlation between theory and practice that I want to add a last element in the encounter between Daya Krishna and Banerjee. In spite of the final difference between the principles of conduct and Daya Krishna’s ‘open-end’, one element still connects both philosophers. This element relates to the re-education which implies regeneration for Banerjee:

“The undoing of the predicament regarded as the goal of education can have nothing else primarily to depend upon except the inner development of human nature in the manner of the conquest of man’s inveterate self-alienation by his self-integration. Such a development, it is needless to point out, may be brought about only by an activity of the human mind, indeed the highest and the most perfect of its kind, which is competent to synthesize the authority of the realm of the personal as borne by Imagination with the power of Understanding and, through the good offices of Understanding, with the power of the passions. (…) The synthetic activity of the human mind, the possibility of which is envisaged here, is then the dynamism of the whole being of man, as distinguished from his usual state of self-alienation.”

Banerjee describes the synthetic activity between understanding and imagination, or in Daya Krishna’s words, ‘critical and creative faculties’, in terms of ‘the dynamism of the whole being of man.’ This synthesis demands an inner development to bring us to realize the essentiality to

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926 It could be fruitful to combine here Daya Krishna and N. V. Banerjee’s plurality in the foundation of an empirical We with the Advaitin-inspired and also rather wordly oriented approaches on the ‘address’ to the other developed by Ramchandra Gandhi, also touched upon by Kalidas Bhattacharyya and inspiring later philosophers such as Arindam Chakrabarti. Their approach (allowing myself to combine different insights) focuses on the non-coercive freedom of addressing the you, which might further enforce the invitation to a dialogue. I choose to focus here on the collective creation of worlds rather than on the ‘I’ versus ‘You’ pole of communication, i.e. on what emerges from the dialogue rather than on the gesture of inviting or entering You in the same dialogue. Further studies could show whether it is possible to relate the two, in particular in view of the reluctance expressed by Daya Krishna and N. V. Banerjee alike of the Advaitin insights. However, in their contemporary reinterpretation, acquaintances or combination of the two could explore a way to relate the differences of the former with the unity that addresses create between us to make ‘us’ no other than what I and you are together. Gandhi, I Am Thou: Meditation on the Truth of India; Ramchandra Gandhi, Presuppositions of Human Communication (Bombay - Calcutta - Madras: Oxford University Press, 1974); Kalidas Bhattacharyya, “Self and Others,” in Philosophy, Logic and Language (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd, 1965), 130–42; Arindam Chakrabarti, “Troubles with a Second Self: The Problem of Other Minds in 11th Century Indian and 20th Century Western Philosophy,” Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1, no. 1 (2011): 23–36; Arindam Chakrabarti, “Now, Kali! I Shall Eat You Up’: On the Logic of the Vocative,” in Ramchandra Gandhi. The Man and His Philosophy, ed. A Raghuramaraju (London ; New Delhi: Routledge, 2013), 194–208.

each other which is for Banerjee an inter-communication. I find that this inner development responds to Daya Krishna’s emphasis on lifelong learning (and we know with Bettina Bäumer that Daya Krishna was himself a continuous learner, see 2.2.2), the desiderative form of which is found in the description of jijñāsu given in the precedent chapter (6.2). It is thus not surprising to find the same terms of ‘critical’ and ‘creative’ defining what learning means in Daya Krishna’s philosophy:

“Man, thus, is the creature who has to ‘learn’ to be himself and this process of ‘learning’ is, as everybody knows, unending. It continues from generation to generation, and each generation has to pass what it has ‘learnt’ to those who have just entered the process of learning. Learning, however, is not what most people seem to think. It is not a dull, monotonous, unending repetition of what someone else has said, or done, but a creative adaptation of it in the light of the critical consciousness that is simultaneously aware of the changed circumstances in which what one learns has to be applied, and the inner inadequacies and inconsistencies within that which one has learnt.”

Thus, for Daya Krishna, the demand of humanness or of our imperfect and fallible human condition seeking to be what we are not, is best expressed as a demand for learning, which is everything but a school examination. This learning, for Daya Krishna, cannot be effectuated alone: we might read texts alone, but these texts have been passed through generations and cultures of different writers. In our critical and creative reading, we dialogue with them, asking them questions, trying to find preliminary answers to be further challenged. This learning is also present in Daya Krishna’s philosophical life: as explained in 2.1.2 and 2.2.2, the first and foremost motivation for the samvāda experiment was to ‘learn’ directly and without mediation from those who were trained in different traditions and had thus, different insights, methods, questions and answers to offer and to respond to. This learning is not necessarily textual for Daya Krishna who used to recite his texts and enter in philosophic conversation with everybody. It has thus the dynamic of the oral dialogue, the spontaneity of thinking in movement, which was studied with the dialogical experiments described in 3.2 and 3.5. Such a learning also answers to K. C. Bhattacharyya’s svarāj in ideas in the ‘synthetic activity’ (to refer back to Banerjee’s term) which is a creative adaptation in the light of critical consciousness. The synthesis can operate between any tradition and time, but it requires indeed the engagement of both critical and creative faculties. Finally and most importantly, this

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928 Daya Krishna, Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures and Civilizations, 236.
929 See also Mehta’s interpretation of K. C. Bhattacharyya’s project, who does not comment on the specific reserve expressed in Svarāj in Ideas but rather on Bhattacharyya’s own hermeneutic method: “In a modern thinker like Bhattacharyya, open to the highest reaches of the Western philosophical tradition, the demand springs from the awareness that ancient texts communicate truth to us only insofar as we are able to translate them and re-think what they say in the language and idiom of the present, that a truth, to be eternal, must be ceaselessly reinterpreted and reformulated and thus made to withstand the exigency of time. It springs, above all, from the need for a creative response to the encounter of two traditions, each speaking a different language, each constituting a world-horizon in its own right, and of which a certain degree of fusion can be brought about only by the faith that the utterance of one's own tradition can sustain itself and even find a more satisfying articulation in an alien medium, in an alienated age.” J. L. Mehta, “The Problem of Philosophical Reconception in the Thought of K. C. Bhattacharyya,” Philosophy East and West 24, no. 1 (1974): 68–69, https://doi.org/10.2307/1397603.
learning is open-ended and endless. It is literally a life’s project and the *puṇḍṛśārtha* of cultures through generations, thanks to which *śāstric* knowledge is produced, and thanks to the critical and creative interpretation of which the *śāstric* knowledge does not lose its dynamic for the illusion of a finality. These different aspects have been explored in the second part (II) of the present work’s investigation of a possible dialogical method developed out of the concrete practice of *sāṃvāda*.

This proposition demonstrates Daya Krishna’s originality: his metaphysical insights in the dynamic of consciousness (I consciousness, consciousness of the I, self-consciousness) in inter-relation with other-consciousness, with different realms of consciousness, and with the world around is extremely complex. However, at the end of such a journey through illusions, there is neither the attraction for a transcendental realization nor a translation into ethical norms nor into any other formal and systematic theory. ‘Learning’ as a process for unveiling the human predicament might sound trivial and almost ‘unphilosophical’ for academic philosophy. And yet, after meandering through the complexity of the dimensions of consciousness, it is the path that Daya Krishna suggests. He did not seek to reach an impressive systematic order nor to promise any liberation in this or another world. He was rather interested in the appearing most simple ‘things’ like thinking, learning and dialoguing. No matter how trivial they sound, they remain the most difficult to realize from within the fullness of our consciousness and in essentiality with others, whoever they might be, whatever they know and howsoever they can express it. Daya Krishna was an idealist in the faith he had in philosophically dialoguing and thinking, but he was not elitist, and preferred to offer the most simple terms we have at our disposal to lead us towards the most challenging path (which professional academic philosophers sometimes forget).

Daya Krishna ends his review of N. V. Banerjee’s *Knowledge, Reason and Autonomy* as follows:

> “Had these issues been raised during the lifetime of Professor Banerjee, he might have replied to them or reformulated his position in their light. Unfortunately, this is a posthumous work, published after his death. But he wrote many other work prior to this in which some of the key ideas developed in this book were sketched and which were published during his lifetime. However, the tradition of taking our thinkers seriously has hardly flourished in contemporary India. Let us hope that the philosophical community of this country can revive the past tradition of *pākṣa* and *pratipākṣa*, argument and counter-argument, in an on-going debate which sometimes lasted many centuries, if not millennia.”

This conclusion by Daya Krishna is typical for his way of precisely *not*-concluding but opening the end of a text for further investigations and in particular, calling for further dialogues. He does so by manifesting his hope for future debates across generations and philosophical traditions, his plea for contemporary discussions, notably on those thinkers whose texts have not achieved the critical reception and visibility that they deserve in the past, and his belief in

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the creative philosophical force of *saṃvāda*. The two first qualifications characterize *saṃvāda* as a critical and creative contemporary dialogue for the future of philosophy across traditions, with as many and as diverse participants as one can possibly reach. This forms the ideal defining ‘open dialogue’ as *saṃvāda*, both in terms of participation, content and form, and ongoing process. At the very end of my own exploration, I can only make his plea my own and apply it back to Daya Krishna’s philosophy. This means, like him, not focusing on the regret that he himself is no more to respond to this work, but rather with the hope that further philosophers of any traditions and cultures will undertake the task of responding to and questioning, not necessarily this work, but Daya Krishna’s philosophical project defined as an ‘art of the conceptual’. This also means hoping that his way of living *saṃvāda* can inspire others for creatively thinking further today in dialogue with him, with his contemporary interlocutors in India, and with others to come. Maybe here lies his conception of ‘I with others = We’, less in a speculative condition of human beings, but rather as a potential constitution of a community of thinkers, ready to engage with each other in all rational seriousness but also in the human essentiality that connects whoever is willing to enter in dialogue.
“But whatever be the disputes and differences, one thing is certain and that is that intersubjective communication is the heart of ‘human reality’ and that knowledge, like everything else, has to accommodate itself to ‘this’ ‘necessity’ which paradoxically makes ‘freedom’ not only ‘visible’ and ‘alive’ but also be felt and seen as lying at the foundation of all the other enterprises of man, including those that are designated by such terms as ‘spirituality’ and ‘religion’.

Conversation, dialogue, debate and discussion are thus everywhere, not just in knowledge, but in all that man does or seeks, as in these man finds and feels and discovers what ‘being human’ is.”

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932 T: to
933 T: fast
934 T: of
935 T: the
936 Daya Krishna, “Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge,” 34. The quote from this article is based on the unpublished transcript (T) typed by D. D. Mathur, which however has been corrected with the help of the original manuscript. The emendations are indicated above.
This work pursued objectives of different natures. At a metaphilosophical level in today’s academical world, it was motivated by the will to introduce the understudied philosophy of Daya Krishna into the more acknowledged realm(s) of intercultural, transcultural, crosscultural cultural and postcolonial philosophies. This means firstly to make his corpus readable to readers unfamiliar with his philosophical and academical context by confronting the differences of the postcolonial problems of Anglophone Indian academia with intercultural research originating from Europe. It furthermore implies to connect his philosophical motivations with the contemporary concerns of his generation. Secondly, attempting at the same time to highlight Daya Krishna’s singularity and creative contributions to these fields, I also wanted to pave a way into his own project and wide-ranging analyses, even (more) when they appear to be iconoclastic or when they cannot be said to be representative of his larger Indian academic context. His philosophy could seem miscellaneous at first glance, for which reason I chose to relate different topics of his studies by organizing them around the question of dialoguing across philosophical traditions. This enabled me first to introduce another important part of his philosophical life, namely the organization of dialogical experiments between different and rather isolated philosophical communities within India, interrogating the resources from these traditions in a contemporary way. I chose to connect these experiments with a question which I think permeates the whole of his philosophy in spite of the diversity of the topics. The guiding line of his immense corpus seems to me to consist in the persisting project of unveiling the presuppositions of thinking. How best to unveil one’s own presuppositions of thinking if not by dialoguing with other philosophers, trained by different methods, and thinking from resources retrieved from different traditions?

I chose to begin with the first objective, i.e. to introduce his philosophical context to a wider audience in order to clarify some specificities of postcolonial Anglophone Indian philosophies (chapters 1 and 2) that explain Daya Krishna’s motivations to organize dialogical experiments (referred to as samvādas). Assembling the material to which I could have access, I described the preparation, settings and some intentions of these multifold samvādas in order to gain some insights for thinking intercultural dialogues from their practice (chapter 3). This practice was further developed by Daya Krishna’s philosophy, which however does not explicitly address at length the topic of dialogue and even less of intercultural dialogues. In inquiring into the different forms of presuppositions and their constitutions, I derived further concepts concerning the dialogical constitutions of knowledge and creativity. In connection with his dialogues, these concepts raise questions for thinking intercultural dialogues, and more specifically, what intercultural dialogues ought to reach, namely the creativity of intercultural knowledge (chapters 4 to 7).

While these lines roughly describe the logical progression of this work, I now want to proceed in reverse to conclude it. The larger concern of intercultural studies has framed my approach of Daya Krishna’s philosophy, and the dialogical experiments have contextualized how I developed my analysis of his philosophy. Beginning by the end, I now want to start by connecting his theoretical inputs to his practical dialogues in the larger fields of cross-cultural studies.
Another question that made the transition between the practical experiments and the philosophy of Daya Krishna was raised in section 3.5, namely: is there a theory of dialogue, or a philosophy of intercultural dialogue in Daya Krishna? And how can we interpret the gap between such an intensive dialogical practice in which he was engaged throughout his life, and such comparatively less explicit writings on ‘dialogue’ itself? I suggested a first hypothesis by interpreting the experiments themselves, suggesting in particular that, being constantly engaged in concrete dialogues and often writing as if conversing with philosophers, he might not have felt the need to theorize ‘dialogue’ as such: he rather lived in dialogues. Let me now come back to this point from the perspective of his philosophy.

There is little explicit and systematic theory of dialogue in Daya Krishna’s philosophy. However, much of his philosophy expresses what dialoguing across philosophical traditions means when connected to the practice he was developing. This connection is found in concrete experiments with others and in his own writings. As it has been earlier noticed by his friends and further described here, Daya Krishna writes as a pūrvapakṣin, as the one raising counter-positions. Not hesitating to denounce any presupposition, in the sense of beliefs, postulates and axioms necessarily entailed in a study, a field of research or an intellectual tradition (see chapter 5), he is very often in a position of questioning and counter-arguing. He is in so doing exposing the implicit ‘givenness’ of what is actually self-constructed, the commonness of received ideas that have been accepted as ‘true’ by those who are located within the same (conceptual) structure (see section 7.1). Not unaware that he himself must presuppose some concepts and ideas, he is also always fostering questions and hoping for counter-positions to his own counter-positions, for the ‘dialogue to go on’. In this sense, as he often repeats, he did not consider his own answers to be final or himself to be the holder of absolute truth-claims. His argumentation does not belong to him, as he says of knowledge in general. Each of his monographs, articles and dialogical experiments takes its signification from the reading of others, i.e. the questions that can be raised from it, or the further applications that could be derived from it. In that sense, his writings and his experiments are depending on how others engage with and contribute to them, i.e. on their dialogical potentialities.

This gesture of counter-position, as a contemporary reinterpretation of the resourcefulness of the classical Indian dialectic traditions to think today (see 2.1), presents several advantages. Firstly, it enables to question the very foundation of any given system, thereby challenging the sense of certainty and fixity of any frozen pictures (see 2.1.2 and 6.2). Secondly, it refreshes philosophical curiosity, reinforces critical imagination and a creative, sympathetic usage of concepts without jettisoning traditions, resources from the past and their rigorous studies. It thus enables to shift the methodological debate on ‘exegetic carefulness’ versus ‘creative (mis)understanding’ into careful exploration and mutual clarification (see 4.1 and 6.2). It thirdly emphasizes less-heard aspects of the dialogical realm: the relevance of listening (see 5.2.1 and 3.3.1), of witnessing the origin of one’s thought (see 5.3), the self-luminous awareness of the other’s position from within oneself (see chapter 7), and a detachment-via-engagement in philosophical dialogues. In other words, it describes how to let alternative positions emerge from the dialogue and overcome these alternatives into a mutual transformation (see 5.3). This constitutes the epistemological endeavor of chapter 5, although already there it was made clear that such a conception requires concepts such as ‘significance’ and ‘meaning’, which
necessarily imply a valuational dimension (chapter 6). It also implies an ontological reflection on the activity of consciousness, which ‘demands’ from within an intersubjective essentiality with some others who participate in a meaningful dialogue to create ‘philosophical worlds’ (chapter 7). This way of doing philosophy has far-reaching implications that open up new dimensions of what dialogue means, besides the linguistic account of translations. However, it does not go without some difficulties. Most importantly, Daya Krishna tends to expose other philosophies without building a systematic overview of his own and without reconstructing the full historical context of what he is discussing (see 3.5). This has often prompted specialists (most of the time historians or philologists) to reproach him inaccurate or incomplete details of his studies.938

To add an exegetic ‘footnote’ on classical texts was never his objective. Although he carefully analyzed any topic he was writing about, I do agree that his studies are often ‘incomplete’. In my reading, however, they are like that because they are conceived as conscious responses to others, i.e. they presuppose dialogical partners to whom Daya Krishna is responding. Thus, they take their incentive in discussions and dialogues, which Daya Krishna continues even in monographs. This can explain why I also chose to connect these last chapters to other philosophers, in particular to K. C. and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, as well as N. V. Banerjee, whom I find helpful to reconstruct a ground on which counter-positions can be raised. It also justifies why I announced in the preface that there could be many other interlocutors, and thus, many other ways of reading Daya Krishna. The range of his dialogical partners is too wide to be encompassed in a single work. In any case, I do not think that it is possible to read Daya Krishna ‘alone’ for he constantly invites his readers to look elsewhere and he himself writes with others in mind. In other words, he is constantly dialoguing while writing. Thus, for his reader, a more encompassing framework would be needed to understand or imagine positions he is counter-arguing against. It also enables to ground his counter-positions, namely to understand more fully ‘what’ he is reacting against. In other words, I find it useful to draw a ‘position’ from his ‘counter-attitude’ or contrary thinking, in need of a positively ground to engage ‘against.’ (see 5.3.1 on negation in dialogue), even if these positions are to be momentary and questioned again. In addition, as also frequently mentioned, Daya Krishna never aimed at a conclusion. Being a specialist of open-ended writings that conclude in exploring further research, this incompleteness is a way to keep the dialogue going and an invitation to think further. His incompleteness thus reflects how he conceives of dialogue (see the openness in the different dialogical experiments in 3 and in connection to presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions from chapter 4 to 7).

For the charge of ‘inaccuracy’ above mentioned, which I believe can be made, I think however that Daya Krishna was exploring another sense of accuracy, which should be seen in an interdisciplinary and intercultural perspective. For Daya Krishna, who viewed himself as a philosopher, the task was to show the ‘inaccuracy’ of some presuppositions of thinking, rather than the inaccuracy of the particular details within an already defined field of study. This is in

938 For instance with Karl Potter and Rajendra Prasad respectively on moksā and puruṣārtha. For Potter, see Potter, “Indian Philosophy’s Alleged Religious Orientation”; Potter, “Are All Indian Philosophers Indian Philosophers?” and Daya Krishna in Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy, 2006, 57. For Prasad, see 6.1 and Prasad, “Daya Krishna’s Therapy for Myths of Indian Philosophy.”
particular indicated by his description of the ‘myth’ of Indian philosophies. In general, his virulent critique of any fixed thought (see chapter 2 and 5) shows how he conceives of ‘inaccuracy’. For him, accuracy is not limited to applying a sense of validity conceived from within a system, a discipline or a tradition. Thus, it cannot deductively follow the premises of a study, for a study is relying on its own presuppositions, which are left untouched by the validity that operates from within. In that sense, Daya Krishna was more concerned about questioning the field (including the context from which the field is constituted, namely its tradition, implying socio-political-cultural-historical aspects of it) in which one is located. This extends to the method that one uses, the perspectives that it brings, and the presuppositions and illusions of one’s thinking. If the conclusions that he reaches are sometimes too fast and provoking, they rather aim at producing this ‘shock’ of the confrontation with others (fields, scholars, concepts) and the wonder so crucial for philosophical thinking. While using him within a micro-study to contribute to one’s already-oriented knowledge might be insufficient, this insufficiency originates from the fact that he precisely questioned this very way of proceeding - thus, he might not be easily adaptable to such footnotes. It is therefore, in his own words, “as an outsider” (see the introducing quote of chapter 2) that he chose to approach a problem. In other words, he provokes us to question this sense of accuracy that we tend to consider as given from within our tradition, academic background, cultural identity and history, etc. It is in such a perspective that I made his philosophy a resource for intercultural theories, for it contributes to the difficulties that intercultural dialogues unveil, namely the lack of ‘one’ criterion upon which to evaluate other theories which are located ‘outside’ one’s philosophical tradition. This, in practice, constitutes one of the incentives for the samvāda experiments between disciplines and philosophical traditions. The cross-cultural approach practiced is not the one of comparatively juxtaposing parallel presentations, or a collection of different articles from various traditions on a common topic. It is conceived in terms of conceptually broad questions and specific answers, positions and counter-positions from different standpoints related by what he calls the ‘universality of knowledge’ (see 5.2.1). This universality implies the common seeking for knowledge of participants who engage together and mutually into an explorative thinking. Such a practice avoids again the problem of ‘understanding’ (see in particular chapter 7) the other as other, or how to understand the resources from within the tradition when we do not belong to this tradition. It rather contributes to a productive effectivity of what originates from ‘each-other’, i.e. from a ‘we’, which can highlight unforeseen questions and problems.

Another apparent difficulty of his approach as a pūrvapakṣin is that Daya Krishna remains conditioned by the positions against which he is arguing, namely by seeing through the other. As I mentioned in section 5.2.2, by critically questioning Kant and the Advaitin inspiration of philosophers such as K. C. Bhattacharyya for instance, he unveils some presuppositions entailed in their philosophies, notably a critique of the transcendental unity and other forms of illusions contained in the transcendental conception. This occurs due to a certain shift of perspective. However, by refusing to construct any synthesis out of his counter-position, he does not leave behind the structure as such. Unveiling the presuppositions of a position does not necessarily enable us to traverse the framework through which the other was thinking, since this first requires to genuinely understand and defend his/her position to the best of one’s ability.
(according to Daya Krishna’s interpretation of pūrvapakṣa). In so doing, outlining the others’ limits does not necessarily reach a third perspective or an alternative system. It is most likely that Daya Krishna was aware of this limitation, which would explain at a practical level why he constantly enlarged the dialogue with many different partners, curious to explore further standpoints (see chapter 3). It also, I think, led him to encourage other narratives (see 2.2.2, 3.1, 6.2.2) and alternatives, and even more, to carefully suggest the limits of alternatives which are made of ‘A or B’ (as a critique of the Bhattacharyyas, see 5.3.2). Refusing the choice entailed in the ‘or’ while being at the same time aware that A and B are needed conceptual resources to think further, he proceeded in extending to C, D, etc. Finally, although by definition a counter-position is not able to provide a synthesis or a conclusion, Daya Krishna’s device and practice of pūrvapakṣa makes it possible to leave room for underestimated aspects of creative knowledge in dialogue. Rather than focusing on the sublation (Aufhebung) to be reached, he outlines the movement from A to B (and so on), which brings attention for instance to the relevance of ignorance as a condition to seek to know (jijñāsa) (6.3). This implies that knowledge is not constituted by established positions, but by a tension between resources and the dissatisfying awareness that something more or different ought to be reached, i.e. a desire which implies the realization of ignorance as what moves us - and the dialogue - further.

This already shows how such a simple ‘device’ of counter-position can unfold further dimensions of the dialogical, and how counter-position is not simply a rhetorical tool to win an argument, but an engagement with others for creative knowledge. One can also see that in Daya Krishna, practice and theory stand together, because his conception of counter-position corresponds to his own writings, and furthermore, to the organization of many saṃvādas. He concretely prepared series of questions ready to tackle the ‘givenness’ of certain concepts and positions, e.g. to consider the intellectual dimension of Bhakti, which apparently would deny it, and there, to stand ‘against’ any tradition, while at the same time, getting influenced by it (when speaking of bauddhika saṅkīrtana, for instance, see 3.3.2) Such an account of ‘creative knowledge’ in dialogue, described as a ‘positive’ ideal, seems to include what we usually consider as impediments, such as ignorance, inaccuracy or incompleteness.

I further articulated the second part around three concepts: presuppositions (5), dissatisfactions (6) and illusions (7). Presuppositions can bring about prejudices, dissatisfactions rather connote a negative unfulfillment, and illusions can be associated with errors. Can they really be used as a foundation for thinking dialogues? Are these rather negatively connoted concepts really a theoretical ground that we can relate to Daya Krishna’s dialogical practise, the one that arouse enthusiasm among its participants for the sense of discoveries that it enabled (see 3)?

I demonstrated in chapters 4 to 7 how each of these concepts, apparently being the cause of epistemological difficulties, could indeed be interpreted as the source of creativity of knowledge constituted in dialogue. If we accept dialogue across traditions to be a form of investigation on our own illusions, since they can unveil what is taken for granted in our approach to a philosophical problem, then the awareness of our own presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions constitutes a first step of the dialogical engagement. If we further grant others the capacity of questioning our presuppositions and illusions, and of making us feel the dissatisfaction of our apprehensions with regard to what we achieve or what remains to be
achieved together, we begin to see the unfolding of what dialogue means for Daya Krishna: an arduous path through my and others’ presuppositions and illusions, engaged together as seekers of knowledge. This orientation towards knowledge is itself to be corrected through the dissatisfactions between the theories conceived and their imperfect realizations (chapter 6). The knowledge that it strives for is also subjected to continuous revisions in a critical and creative intersubjective process from seekers grounded in different traditions. Accepting such a definition does not seem to be very ‘fulfilling’ in the first place, since it mostly exposes a number of obstacles. I used to describe dialogue in these lines the terms ‘arduous, presuppositions, illusions, corrected, dissatisfactions, imperfect, revisions’. Can such a list really account for the promise of a ‘critical and creative intersubjective process from seekers grounded in different traditions’? Does that mean that we reach such knowledge only when we overcome all these obstacles, and in particular when presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions are solved?

Dialogues across traditions are not only a method to make us realize our parochiality, biases and prejudicial errors, even if they also enable this important perspective. They enable it furthermore by exploring what these prejudices entail rather than by simply erasing them in view of reaching a more inclusive sense of truth upon which all could agree. In this sense, the overarching objective is not to solve the problems related to these concepts, but to transform them into investigations that can lead to new formulations, insights and methodological revisions. Thus the source of this creativity of knowledge that is constituted in dialogues does not lie in the cumulation of different perspectives exposed parallelly to present the multifold dimension of a concept, but in the confrontation of different knowledges. In so doing, the creativity is not constituted by an addition of standpoints from different traditions which can mirror our own lacunae, but by the tension that originates by navigating through presuppositions, dissatisfactions and illusions.

A few remarks can explain this point. The basic idea underlying this assumption is that the uncertainty that is implied in these three concepts creates the dynamic of knowledge, a dynamic which describes how dialogue proceeds. Presuppositions can cause fallacies and illusions blindness when they are not investigated. They can also generate new questions and perspectives when they are carefully unveiled by a confrontation from different standpoints. This process does not erase the possibility that new presuppositions and illusions originate, which can then again be questioned. This gives rise to the feeling of dissatisfaction. This feeling, combined with an inquiry into the generated presuppositions and illusions, describes how dialogue proceeds. For this to happen, however, I emphasized one illusion in particular, which seems to me to be the condition for the dialogical process to be unfolded: the illusion of I-centricity, which is the illusion of seeing myself as an absolute subject around which others gravitate as objects (of my knowledge) (see 7.3). To this illusion corresponds also the tendency to consider that what I belong to is the center around which others gravitate in my periphery. The difference between the two is that the latter is influenced by political, social, historical and cultural forces, so that it is rather my identification to a larger world which is configured. For example, if I identify my ‘I’ as belonging to the cultural world ‘India’, I might not conceive of my ‘I’ as a centre in the philosophical realm (due to the persisting Eurocentrism examined at length in chapter 2). I might however associate my ‘I’ with a centre in the art. Thus, others will
be seen as objects of my consciousness gravitating around me, which I tend to further organize in different hierarchical peripheries. This creates a sense of absoluteness in the I further complexified in the different cultural realms with which I identify myself - the complexity of which, in a postcolonial world, creates such feelings as ‘cultural alienation’, ‘estrangement’, etc. as described by Indian philosophers in chapter 2.

Overcoming this illusion demands an ontological analysis of the structure of consciousness which was done in chapter 7 in order to reveal the constitution of a ‘We’ through which the dialogue is possible. This constitution is the one of subjectivities based on the interactivity of which knowledge originates at first, in listening, correcting, counter-questioning. In other words, the creativity that is sought cannot originate from an artificial setting, the ethical framework of the discussion being enforced upon its participants. It also cannot lie in a purely linguistic account, a word-game or technical translation to render the same. It cannot rely on a consensual understanding that presupposes pre-determined rules within which validity cannot be deducted. On the contrary, it is connected to a form of life, which consists in an intersubjective world. In this sense, creativity originates within consciousness, ‘self-luminous’ in K. C. Bhattacharyya’s term, a consciousness which is however in interaction with others. In other words: creativity originates from the tension between their plurality and the unity of my consciousness, but also between my engagement in the world and my (momentary) withdrawal to witness the origin of my and other’s thoughts within me. This tension operates further between the ideal apprehension of something and the dissatisfaction of its concrete realizations, that the dialogue moves on (see chapters 6 and 7). There is thus no reconciliation possible as well as no sublation (Aufhebung), for clearing up this tension would bring the dialogue to an end. In that sense, the contradictory positions, seekings and valuational directions as well as the contradictions originating from the sense of absoluteness of my subjectivity in contrast with the other’s sense of absoluteness, are necessary. These, in return, imply to jettison any unitary concept of truth, finality and solution, for they cannot be articulated in such a contradictory plurality. In practice, it also implies to accept ‘failures’, i.e. dissatisfactions.

Articulating dialogue around three rather negatively connoted concepts highlights the ‘risk’ of the knowledge that originates in this encounter: such a knowledge is perfectible, incomplete, uncertain, fallible. Considering this risk as a challenge however avoids idealizing dialogue. For Daya Krishna, dialogue does not occur out of grace and does not designate an ideal form of communication, something that was first hinted at by the apparent hierarchical form of the introductory presentation of the forms of communication (1.1). This hierarchy implicitly operating in discourses on philosophy of dialogue (see the ‘mismeeting’ with Friedman on this point in 6.2 and 6.3), as well as the idea of a harmony in intercultural dialogue, is not what Daya Krishna suggests. There is a regulative idea in the direction suggested by vāda even if the truth aimed at cannot be singular for Daya Krishna. This ideal remains present in the idea of dissatisfaction as the seeking that motivates us to enter in a dialogue. But the dialogues themselves are happening through experiments which entail silence, miscommunication and misunderstanding. This does not mean that dialogues have no limit otherwise. As Daya Krishna said and as it was demonstrated in the concrete limits of the experiments (3 and 6.3), there are periods of rest where a session stops. Similarly during a dialogue, not everything finds an answer, not every proposition is responded to, and not everything is creative. It is however in
the practice - tentative and imperfect - that one can evaluate its limits. It is furthermore from the apprehension of these limits afterwards, from new ideas for improvement, or other directions that the dialogues continue. These limits rather show the arduous task of dialogues between traditions, navigating between conceptual structures that are difficult to translate and to render usable in different contexts, between the different persons and the personal efforts to be made to create a welcome atmosphere, between the prejudices, the standards and norms that one must deconstruct to create alternatives. Conversely, a theory of dialogue cannot be detached from this process of correction, since the idea of dialogue is itself affected by the praxis. In Daya Krishna’s sense, dialogues can be only a path. The destination can be conceived ideally as a regulative direction, but precisely the arrival signifies the end of dialogue and, for Daya Krishna, the end of philosophy. This is in particular reflected in the manifoldness of the dialogical experiments, both in the ‘laboratory’ of ideas of the regular Jaipur experiments and the ‘blog’-type questions of the JICPR (chapter 3), as well as in the continuous self-reflection that prepares and further develop the samvāda experiments, and in the exposition of their conditions and contexts in chapter 2.

Finally, a word should be added on what I chose not to do, and what could remain to be explored, or in Daya Krishna’s sense, an ‘agenda for further research’. First, it should be clearly stated that I used and described the samvāda experiments as a source of inputs for thinking dialogue rather than by focusing on their individual topics. Thus, I used their contents, in particular concerning the Bhakti dialogue, only to the extent that it was helpful to delineate components of what constitutes dialogue. In this case, I discussed the relevance of the location and the performative idea of investigating intellectually the non-intellectual dimension of Bhakti. I thus strongly limited the given philosophical contents to their more encompassing, and maybe more formal, contribution as dialogues across traditions. It would have been possible to explore the dialogical dimension via an intensive study of one philosophical theory in a dialogue, namely from the point of view of their content. This could be further explored, for instance in analyzing how the bilingual discussion of Russellian propositions influenced both Naiyāyikas and analytical philosophers. This definitely remains to be done in order to locate the precise enthusiasm and feeling of discovery that originated from it. However, such an account would have rendered an overview impossible, since it would have already constituted an independent study. I was rather concerned with unfolding the correlated dimension of the ‘dialogical movement’: its development, preparation, organization, context and further applications, in order to illustrate the dynamic of dialogue in practice. It is for me this dynamic, from one experiment to the next, from one dialogical setting to the introduction of another column in the JICPR, which constitutes an impulse for Daya Krishna’s philosophy. I also do not imply that these were the only ones, and I tried to give an idea of their wide range by mentioning unpublished dialogues, and diverse forms, as far as I could have access to further materials. My aim was here thus not to fix them into historical examples, as an endeavor by now completed, which to any reader would appear contra-productive to Daya Krishna’s idea of dialogue. I rather wanted to introduce the reader to their diversity - of topics, participants, dialogical forms, locations and contexts. This was motivated first for reconstituting parts of a memory that might with the years slowly fade away, and even more to convey a sense of what the dialogues consisted of to non-participants. With regard to the larger academic context, I
wanted to insist on the necessity of connecting dialogical theory and practice with the intercultural context, which I regard as a current lacuna in the philosophical academic world. The latter seems globally more concerned with producing systematic theories rather than experimenting different intercultural dialogues, necessarily laborious and subjects to dissatisfaction. In return, with Daya Krishna’s philosophy, I argued that these experiments also influence the development of his concept of dialogue, which I emphasized above with the necessity of including the challenge of presupposition, illusion and dissatisfaction into a philosophy of dialogue.

Secondly, the reader might wonder how it is possible, for an analysis on dialogue across traditions, to elaborate so little on linguistics and translations. In particular after emphasizing the feeling of subjection originating from the hegemony of the English language in the Indian academia, this question should be addressed (2.2.1). On the one hand, the postcolonial linguistic alienation strongly motivated the whole endeavor, the necessity of bilingual or trilingual communication, as well as further publishing in Hindi or Sanskrit. On the other hand, in spite of the occasional description in the *samvādas* of a situation where there was a linguistic miscommunication, there are very few traces of the specific difficulties that multilingual encounters could have arisen. It enabled more inclusion, diversity of participants, as well as in general to bring attention to the richness of Sanskrit philosophies. Thus, the difficulties concern rather the setting-up, in terms of invitation and location of different communities, than the actual philosophical encounter, where the communication does not seem to have been felt as a source of impediment. As I also discussed with participants, the specificities of languages matter in concrete conceptual cases (see 3.3.1) for applying a Sanskrit category to an English one, but it was successfully spoken by different participants not to be felt as an obstacle. Probably due to this, although Daya Krishna wrote on grammar and language, this aspect did not seem to me to highlight his more crucial contribution to think dialogue. I thus more strongly focused on the latter with an analysis of presuppositions of ‘thinking’. It is rather the problems of ‘truth-claim’, the authority of ‘values’, the ‘fixity’ of an idea or the sense of absoluteness of the ‘I’ that create challenges for dialogues. Further, in line with other philosophers of his time, like N. V. Banerjee, I on the contrary felt a certain reluctance to reduce philosophy, knowledge and dialogue to their linguistic aspects. I interpret this as a counter-position to the strong Anglophone analytical philosophy received in India, and possibly also to the analytical Indian philosophies done in England or America (following B. K. Matilal). K. C. and Kalidas Bhattacharyya insist on the necessity of plural expressions, however rather correlated to a certain idea of transcendental unity; Chubb, Barlingay, Pande, Banerjee, all rather insist on an ‘anthropocentric’ view of knowledge including values in certain societies and cultures, combined with different ideas of freedom and constitution of the human condition. Thus, I refrained from restricting dialogue to the question of translation or bilingual expressions, and rather reflected on the ‘human’ idea of creative knowledge. Although in practice, such a knowledge is expressed in different conceptual structures in different languages, which is a source of creativity, it is not in the technical translation that it is are expressed, but rather in the wider worldviews that it entails. In so doing, knowledge is ‘moving’ through a plurality of languages that express different positions, merged in an intersubjective seeking. It is this ‘move’
that I tried to articulate. Whether the ‘move’ itself is different if we consider solely Daya Krishna’s writings in Hindi in conversation with Hindi interlocutors, remains to be explored.

Similarly, I made use of Daya Krishna’s reinterpretation of Sanskrit terms such as pūrvapakṣa and puruṣārtha as conceptual forms that enable the inclusion of other dialogical dimensions. The former has been described above, namely the epistemological implications of conceiving philosophy as counter-position, while the latter was used in particular to highlight the ideality of apprehending something to be realized (the significance of the ‘ought’) with regard to the deceptive realization of the ‘is’. Similarly, samvāda was related to the classical rhetoric, as an inspiration that however does not reduce any experiment to the classical format of rhetoric (2.1.1). I wanted to highlight the contemporariness of Daya Krishna’s thoughts and his ability to make use of resources in a creative way. This indeed is the core of the present work. There is, on the other hand, much more to be done: not only could one make philological uses of his research on classical Indian philosophies, but also locate the points of intermingling which give rise to creativity. This work argued in this sense, however from another direction. Instead of tracing back Daya Krishna’s reinterpretation to Sanskrit sources, I tried to think ‘dialogues across traditions’ from the contemporary reinterpretation of these concepts. I did not try in particular to historically trace the roots and the historical steps of these reinterpretations, but focused on what they can philosophically offer us today to think and practice dialogue.

This has consequences for considering the ‘Indianness’ of this study. I do not consider Daya Krishna’s philosophy as uprooted from its philosophical context, neither do I see him as an authentic preserver of a particular tradition. There is something ‘Indian’ in the emphasis on the ‘way’ towards ‘knowledge’, in the productive ‘negativity’ of dissatisfactions and ‘illusions’, in the ‘intellectual detachment’ and in the insistence on the ‘human’ conception of knowledge implying values and ontology. But stating this is as true as it is reductive and vague. For this reason, it is to no avail to classify his philosophy under a certain label, may it be Indian or Western, and to presuppose a radical postcolonial epistemological rupture from different classical traditions. Maybe it is precisely this what makes cosmopolitan or ‘hybrid’ philosophies so difficult to be globally received, for they escape the categorization that we tend to forcefully apply. They present a distinctiveness that is perceptible, but they are already dislocated enough so that characterizing them from the point of view of the classical traditions from which they are partially issued amounts to reducing these traditions. And yet, it is from this indecisiveness and, in a way, this freedom to navigate between traditions, that they offer creative insights made of different inspirations and flexible frameworks which can do justice to none of the traditions from where their inspiration originates if they are taken in isolation. It is the combination of different networks of concepts that provides their originality and creativity. In such a perspective, Daya Krishna is neither an Indian Philosopher who is not an Indian philosopher (to paraphrase Karl Potter’s designation939), nor a Western philosopher who is not a Western philosopher. He precisely belongs to those who, as uncomfortable as it can be for philosophers wishing to categorize everything, are located in-between traditions, able to counter-question several of them.

939 Potter, “Are All Indian Philosophers Indian Philosophers?”
Finally, among these cosmopolitan philosophers and free thinkers beyond a single tradition, there would be much more to be explored between Daya Krishna’s dialogical approach and his own counter-positions, in particular the Advaitin oriented approach of K.C. and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Ramchandra Gandhi and their followers. I located N. V. Banerjee in between, critical like Daya Krishna of a transcendental attraction of unity. He however himself poses the worldly ‘we’ as a metaphysical foundation of the human condition that does not escape all sides of such an attraction, in particular a sense of absoluteness. In so doing, I chose to relate Daya Krishna’s intersubjectivity to this ‘we’ and focused on the possibility of creativity to emerge from this ‘I with others’. I suggested in 7.3 further connections, in particular to the concept of ‘addressing’ of Ramchandra Gandhi, which could be seen as an invitation to take part to this realm of the personal. I also connected in particular Kalidas Bhattacharyya’s concept of alternation to Daya Krishna’s plurality of standpoints along with the critiques addressed by the latter to the finality of a choice, which also implies a certain sense of absoluteness. The concepts of ‘address’, of ‘listening’, of ‘demand’ of consciousness as well as the self-luminous witnessing of the other’s thought, the awareness within me of the other, are resources that deserve further attention. They indicate alternative ways of relating to the other from within dialogue, and of inviting the other within me - however without negating the differences of these others ‘within’ me. They enable further possibilities for articulating differences and identities of others and myself, in relation with each other. While Daya Krishna is more confrontative in thinking a ‘counter’-position, I argued that the relatedness that emerges from the ‘counter’ is also a way to welcome other positions in a dialogue. This, however, operates in the mutual creation of a dialogue, i.e. from the point of view of its effectuation. Engaging further into a mutual dialogical transformation would require investigating a step forward into the ‘within’, i.e. in the other within me rather than ‘I with others’. Finding a way to effectuate such a move without falling into a metaphysical, transcendental account denying differences (in Daya Krishna’s sense), and without loosing the dynamic of differences seeking together the universality of a knowledge which remains plural, remains a further investigation. In any case, such a dialogue between Daya Krishna and his peers would contribute to constructing identity in difference and differences in identity in dialogue, a crucial question for intercultural discourses.

At a meta-philosophical level, the further directions to be explored point at the diversity and relevance of contemporary philosophers who refuse to have the last word on any philosophical or cultural subject matter. The advantage of Daya Krishna lies precisely in the possibility to confront his counter-positions with himself and with other interlocutors. This ensures that the dialogue can continue, and it shows how rich its forms can be. It moreover tells us how much resources can be used from those who are able to navigate between traditions. Immersed in different worlds, their philosophical contributions for intercultural discourses are truly invaluable. They never imply to ignore or radically break out of one or several traditions and their classical canons. Instead, these thinkers’ ingenuity and sensibility to reflect within and at the same time across different traditions, without an ‘allegiance’ to preserve any of them as they are historically conceived, is the source of much philosophical creativity and continuity. I hope that the emergence of different fields of inter-cultural and cross-cultural studies will not remain limited to the introduction and comparison of the immense classical traditions from which they
got inspired. I hope that these fields will also acknowledge the intellectual and creative richness of these free travelers in between cultures. Their original positions, methodological tools, counter-perspectives and alternative ways of thinking can provide the global community of philosophers with fresh insights. These insights, however, are only receivable in the ongoing activity of open dialoguing.
Appendix 1 – Report on the Workshop on “Texts and Their Interpretations” Held at Jaipur from 26th to 31th March, 1992 (unpublished)*

* My acknowledgement to Daniel Raveh and Dor Miller who shared these documents in Daya Krishna’s correspondence with me.

“The Workshop on “Texts and their Interpretations was held at Jaipur from 25th to 31st March, 1992, both days inclusive.

SUBJECTS:
The subjects chosen for the workshop were the following:

1. Philosophy.
2. Sociology.
3. History.
4. Sanskrit.
5. English.

INSTITUTIONS:
The letters of invitations informing about the workshop were sent to the Head of the Departments of the above subjects of the following Universities: (copy of the Invitation Letters enclosed as Annexure ‘A’):

1. Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.
2. Andhra University, Waltair.
4. University of Delhi, Delhi.
5. Gujarat University, Ahmedabad.
6. University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad.
7. Jadavpur University, Calcutta.
8. Karnatak University, Dharwad.
9. Lucknow University, Lucknow.
10. University of Madras, Madras.
11. University of Mysore, Mysore.
12. Osmania University, Hyderabad.
13. Panjab University, Chandigarh.
15. Rajasthan University, Jaipur.
16. Utkal University, Bhubaneswar.
17. Visvabharati, Santiniketan.
20. J. N. Vyas University, Jodhpur.

Replies were received from the following Departments:

1. Philosophy:
   a) Utkal University, Bhubaneswar.
   b) University of Madras, Madras.
   c) University of Poona, Pune.
   d) University of Mysore, Mysore.
   e) I. I. T., Kanpur.
   f) University of Panjab, Chandigarh.
   g) University of Bombay, Bombay.
   h) University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad.
   i) Andhra University, Waltair.
   j) J. N. Vyas University, Jodhpur.
   k) Visvabharati, Santiniketan.

2. English:
   a) University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad.
   b) University of Delhi, Delhi.
   c) Visvabharati, Santiniketan.

3. Sociology:
   a) Osmania University, Hyderabad.
   b) Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur.

4. History:
   a) Gujarat University, Ahmedabad.
   b) Visvabharati, Santiniketan.
   c) Panjab University, Chandigarh.

5. Sanskrit:
   a) Panjab University, Chandigarh.
   b) Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.
   c) University of Delhi, Delhi.
   d) Jadavpur University, Calcutta.
   e) Osmania University, Hyderabad.
   f) University of Mysore, Mysore.
   g) Gujarat University, Ahmedabad.
   h) Utkal University, Bhubaneswar.
i) University of Poona, Pune.
j) University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad.
k) M. L. Sukhadia University, Udaipur.

PARTICIPANTS:

Thirty-five persons were selected (as per list enclosed – Annexure ‘B’) from the applications received. Out of these twenty-four candidates actually participated. The names of those who could not participate have been crossed out in the enclosed list.

PURPOSE OF THE WORKSHOP:

The main purpose in this workshop was to acquaint the participants with regard to the notion of a text and the problems of its interpretation.

METHODOLOGY:

As the workshop was an innovative experiment in changing the attitudes of the participants towards all that they read, it was tentative and experimental in character. A meeting of possible Resource persons was, therefore, held prior to the workshop to acquaint them with the purpose of the workshop and the possible methodologies that could be adopted keeping in mind the radical differences in the disciplines from which the participants were expected to come for the workshop. This preliminary meeting was useful in more ways than one, as it not only acquainted the possible Resource persons with the experiment we were proposing to conduct, but also resulted in various concrete suggestions regarding the ways in which the workshop could be organized. Some of these suggestions were tried during the workshop.

As a result of this preliminary meeting it was felt that the possible participants could be informed beforehand not just [about] the purpose of the workshop, but also asked to engage in a prior exercise of this kind even before coming to the Workshop so that they may become acquainted with the new approach, at least to some extent before they arrive for the workshop. In pursuance of these objectives, the passages from Plato were selected and sent to the participants along with a letter asking them to perform the following exercise in respect of the texts which were sent to them:

1) What were the questions or problems to which they (the texts) would be the possible answers or solutions?
2) What are the questions that you can possibly raise with respect to the passages given to you?
3) What are the deficiencies that you find in the contentions made in the paragraphs given to you?
4) In what directions could you possibly develop the thought given in the passages?
5) How would you answer the question or solve the problem independently of the way it has been attempted or answered in the text given to you.

They were also asked to send the results directly to us even before coming to the Workshop (Annexure ‘C’). Responses were received from many of the participants before the start of the workshop and it helped them to some extent in understanding the purpose of the workshop. However, as many of the participants wrote to us seeking further clarification regarding the nature of the workshop, a brief statement was prepared stating the nature of the experiment in which they were supposed to be involved and in which they were to actively participate during the workshop (‘Annexure ‘d’).

The Resource persons were requested to prepare the materials to be used as ‘texts’ for entire experimentation during the workshop. They were photocopied and given to the participants as soon as they arrived along with the instruction that they should go through the material and do the exercise before the actual sessions devoted to those subjects started in the workshop. A list of material prepared and given to the participants on the various subjects is enclosed herewith as Annexure ‘E’.

The planning of the workshop was divided into two major parts one, the presentation of general introduction to the new approach to the texts which was to be experimentally demonstrated at the workshop and information regarding the diversity of the notion of the ‘texts’ and ‘interpretation’ which has emerged in recent times, particularly in the field of Literature, Law, Medicine and History. Attempt was also made to divide the texts on which the participants were supposed to work in the sessions into two groups. The first type of ‘texts’ consisted of material which all the participants could reasonably be expected to understand and respond to. The other type of ‘texts’ were more specialized and only those who belonged to the subject concerned were expected to work upon them.

We also tried to divide the groups according to subjects on the first day and found that it would be better if all the participants were present in each of the sessions rather than be segregated into different groups.

The workshop benefitted immensely from the presence of Prof. T. N. Madan, a well-known Sociologist from the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi and Prof. Satish Chandra, the well-known Historian of Medieval India from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The other outstanding personality who addressed the participants was Dr. P.K. Sethi, the internationally known Orthopedic Surgeon from Jaipur who gave the participants as well as others present, a new insight into the idea of treating the patient as a “text” whose symptoms were to be “interpreted” involving all the usual problem along with some specific ones belonging to the situation. Similarly we had a very interesting lecture from Prof. T. Bhattacharya, Professor of Law, at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, on the judicial interpretation of legal and non-legal texts in cases that come before the Court for decision.

There was an interesting presentation from Dr. (Mrs.) Sharada Jain, Professor at the Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur regarding the problem of interpretation of social reality in the context of social action, particularly when it is concerned with its transformation.
They were a number of problems arising from the fact that the participants belonged to different disciplines and also because the problem of interpretation differed from subject to subject. But as is evident from many of the letters received from the participants, it seems that the interdisciplinary nature of the workshop added a dimension to it which, otherwise, it would have lacked. It enlarged the awareness of the participants in a way which a workshop devoted to one or two subjects alone would not have done.

In case such workshops are to be held in future, the preparations should be done well in advance so that the “texts” are sent to the participants beforehand and they be asked to work on them before coming to the workshop. At the workshop the discussion could then be concentrated on the results of their different responses arising from the texts in the context of the new approach suggested to them. Also, the workshop should last perhaps for a week rather than just four days, as it was felt that the time was too short for real active work to be done during the time we had at our disposal. The material prepared for this workshop could be utilized with additions and alterations, where necessary.

Daya Krishna
Appendix 2 - Discussion on the ‘Gauhati Meeting’
(Addressed to Shri Kireet Joshi, Chairman, Indian Council of Phil. Research, New Delhi)

14th February, 05

Dear Shri Kireet Joshi,

It was nice meeting you and Prof. Vyas and discussing the possibility of organizing the Gauhati meeting in a way that would be different from the usual one which is adopted, as a matter of routine, by almost every institution that organizes such things.

We may try some ‘new’ experiments, a few of which are mentioned below:

We may divide the ‘experiment’ in two major divisions:

1. Indian Philosophy and (2) Western Philosophy.

In Indian Philosophy we may write to selected candidates in advance and ask them to write independently on the subjects assigned to them which they should bring when they come to the meetings:

(a) Mīmāṁsā Śūtra 2. 4. 8. and the discussion on it in Śābara-bhāṣya (Gaṅgānāth Jhā’s translation).

(b) The discussion in Śaṅkara Bhāṣya on the Brahma Śūtra 1. 3. 34 to 38 and its comparison with the discussion on the same issue on the Mīmāṁsā Śūtra 6. 1. 4. onwards in Śābara-bhāṣya (op. cit.).

(c) The whole of the discussion on Brahma Śūtra 3. 4. 1. in Śaṅkara Bhāṣya is to be analysed and commented upon.

(d) The discussion in Brhadāraṇyaka Upānīṣad between Yājñavalkya and Janaka. In the fourth adhyāya in the first chapter and the discussion between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyi in Vth Brahmana of the IVth Adhyāya.

(e) The following section from Chāndogya Upānīṣad: Fourth section of fourth chapters: the story of Saṭyakama Jabala and the story of Swetketu in the third part of the fifth chapter.

(f) Taṇṭiriya Upānīṣad, Siksawalli, Brahmawalli and Bhrghuwalli.

Western Philosophy

(a) Hegel’s refutation in his Science of Logic, Chapter 2 Section (C), para (b), Remark 2 of Kant’s arguments given in his Antinomy of Reason in the Critique of Pure Reason.

(b) Kant’s arguments in the Transcendental Analytic in his Table of Judgement and the Categories of Understanding.

(c) “Kant’s Doctrine of the Categories, Some Questions and problems’ Daya Krishna, JICPR. Vol. XVIII No. 4. P. 1-11.

(e) “Binod Kumar Agarwala’s Response to Daya Krishna’s Essay on Kant’s Categories, R. S. Bhatnagar. JICPR Vol. XIX No.4 P/137-147.


(g) Reaction to Comments made by Binod Kumar Agarwla on my Essay (JICPR, Vol. XIX NO. 4) on his Response to Daya Krishna’s Article on Kant’s Categories (JICPR XIX No. 3). R. S. Bhatnagar. JICPR Vol XX No. 4. P/176-179.

(h) Aristotle’s Distinction between kinds of necessity.

(i) The analysis of the statement “X is Good” by Moore and Stevenson.

(j) Wittgenstein’s arguments against the Self-evidence of ostensive definitions.

Photocopies of these have to be sent in advance to the person selected for commenting on them. Groups of five to ten may be choosen to comment on the basis of one or two of them.

The list is only illustrative and the Council may choose others for this or other seminars and workshops that it may hold.

As for the other idea that we discussed and which was earlier experimented upon at Jaipur we may do the following:

The students may be divided in groups of five or more and given one or two pages or even a few paragraphs from original texts of outstanding philosophers and asked to answer the following:

(a) What is the question or the problem which the author is trying to answer or solve here?

(b) Do you consider the answer or the solution satisfactory? If not, why not?

(c) How would you extend the thought expressed in these pages/paragraphs further?

(d) What would be your own answer to the question or solution of the problem concerned?

(e) What are your grounds for thinking your solution is more satisfactory than that of the author?

In case you have any difficulty in getting photocopies of the material mentioned above, I can send them to you.

With regards,
Yours sincerely,
Daya Krishna
Appendix 3 - Daya Krishna’s Bibliography

Daya Krishna authored and/or edited more than 20 books, and published about 200 articles. Prolific and heteroclite writer, he touched upon any philosophical topic, but also wrote on literature, sociology and economics. At a time where online resources and open access were limited, many articles are not available online, and very rarely in libraries, in particular outside India. To tally this difficulty, some monographs have tried to compile some of Daya Krishna’s important contributions, including posthumously by his colleagues and students (articles republished in monographs are indicated with ‘*’; articles republished in monographs that could not be located in their original publications are not indicated independently).

This bibliographical list has been conceived on the basis on my own research and thanks to the ‘Bio-Data’ document initially prepared by D. D. Mathur and provided by Asha Mukherjee. I thank here Shaked Eshach and Daniel Raveh for their corrections. This bibliography has been published on the Daya Krishna Online Library: https://www.dayakrishna.org/bibliography

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22. Agenda for Research in Indian & Western Philosophy, (Vol 1 & 2), edited by R.S. Bhatnagar and Yogesh Gupta, Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan and Literary Circle, Jaipur, 2013.

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27. ‘Some suggestions towards the formation of Political Index Numbers’, *Le Contrat Social*, Paris (September 1958).
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IV. Unpublished

1. ‘Anumāṇa’ (2007)
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3. ‘Conversation, Dialogue, Discussion, Debate and the Problem of Knowledge’ (2007)

374
5. ‘Knowledge, Predictability and Truth’ (2007)
6. ‘Narrative, Meta-Narrative and No Narrative’ (2007)
8. ‘The Formative Period of Indian Civilization: The Vedic, the Śramaṇa, the Āgamic Traditions; the Interactions between them and the reflexive Reflections on them’ (2007)
9. ‘The Sources, the Texts, the Subsidiaries, the Supportive, the Exegetical Literature: The Puzzle and the Problem of the Veda in the Indian Tradition’ (2007)

V. Review Articles

4. ‘Sources of Indian Tradition, compiled by by Wm. Theodore de Bary, Stephen Hay, Royal Weiler, and Andrew Yarrow’, Philosophy East and West, 13 (2) (July. 1963), pp. 159-165.
Appendix 4 - Literature on Daya Krishna

There is no resource available on the literature published on Daya Krishna. This bibliography comprises all the entries I could locate. However, at this point of research, exhaustivity cannot be claimed. This bibliography has been published online at https://www.dayakrishna.org/on-daya-krishna

I. Volumes


II. Articles and Comments

*The articles published in the above-mentioned edited volumes are not reproduced separately in this section.*

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