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**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
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**Reassembling Airport Security: An Actor-  
Network Theory Account of Security  
Production**

**Doctoral thesis**

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### Abstrakt

Letištní bezpečnost představuje celosvětově klíčovou část civilní letecké přepravy. Vzhledem k jejímu každodennímu významnému dopadu na miliony pasažérů nevyhnutelně vyvolává otázky jak ohledně dostatečnosti, tak i proporcionality. Práce vychází z Actor-network Theory (ANT) a střednědobého terénního výzkumu na Letišti Václava Havla Praha, který byl složen z kombinace kvalitativně orientovaných metod zahrnujících rozhovory i zúčastněné a nezúčastněné pozorování. Práce se zabývá problematikou povahy a utváření letištní bezpečnosti jako sítě řetězců překladu. Tyto řetězce překládají, přeměňují, skrze vlastní logiku vyhodnocení pravdivosti (logika veridikce), všechny přicházející aktéry, ať již jde o osoby nebo předměty ze stavu, který předpokládá potencialitu hrozby, do stavu, ve kterém je předpokladem bezpečnost. V práci je identifikován komplex pěti logik ustavujících současnou podobu letištní bezpečnosti – logika pohybu, rozdělení, vizualizace, prostoru a identity. Tyto logiky byly identifikovány na základě terénního výzkumu s návazností na předchozí výzkum v oblasti letištní bezpečnosti. Práce rovněž nově zkoumá komponenty těchto řetězců překladu, zejména bezpečnostní technologie a jejich interakci s lidským faktorem a zaměřuje se na případy, kdy se tyto logiky střetávají a tím umožňují rozkrytí své přítomnosti, vnitřní povahy a principů. Práce se dále zaměřuje na komplementární vztah logik prostoru a identity, jejich výlučnost i prolínání. V poslední části práce jsou analyzovány výsledné produkty bezpečnostního řetězce – tedy forma a povaha zajišťované bezpečnosti a podoba hrozby uvažované současným systémem.

Klíčová slova: letiště, bezpečnost, ANT, Letiště Václava Havla Praha, praxe

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### Abstract

Airport security represents a crucial part of civil aviation worldwide. Due to its substantial impact upon millions of passengers daily, it is bound to provoke questions about proportionality and sufficiency. Drawing on the insights from Actor-network Theory (ANT) and a medium-term field research at Václav Havel Airport Prague, which entailed a mix of qualitative-oriented research methods from participant observation to interviews, this thesis examines the nature and production of airport security as a network of chains of translation. These chains turn or translate according to their own logics of veridiction of all incoming actants, both human and non-human, from an insecure status to a secure one. In their translation, they are guided by three respective logics of division, movement and visibility, which have already been identified in previous studies of airport security. Going beyond the existing state of the art, this thesis specifically inquires into the components of chains of translation, particularly the airport security technologies and their interactions with humans, and focuses on instances where either of these logics or the veridiction logics, intersect, thus disclosing their own nature and presence. Furthermore, this thesis identifies spatiality and identity as two complementary actant logics. Their special relationship in the security field is further examined, regarding their complementarity, exclusiveness and merges. Finally, the result of the whole network of translatory chains – the end product of airport security emerges.

Keywords: airport, security, ANT, Václav Havel Airport Prague, practice

Thesis length: 90 799 words

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## List of Abbreviations

|       |   |
|-------|---|
| ANT   | Actor-Network Theory  |
| BEK   | Bezpečnostní kontrola (Security Control)  |
| CAPPS | Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System                                    |
| CITES | Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora |
| CT    | Computer Tomography   |
| CTI   | Complete Threat Image   |
| CU    | Customs Administration  |
| EC    | European Commission   |
| ECAC  | European Civil Aviation Conference  |
| EDS   | Explosive Detection System  |
| ETD   | Explosive Trace Detection   |
| EU    | European Union  |
| FAA   | Federal Aviation Administration   |
| FTI   | Fictional Threat Image  |
| GDS   | Global Distribution Systems   |
| GCHQ  | Government Communications Headquarters  |
| HHMD  | Hand-Held Metal Detection   |
| HR    | Human Resources   |
| IATA  | International Air Transport Association   |
| ICAO  | International Civil Aviation Organization                                       |
| ICTS  | International Consultants on Targeted Security                                  |
| IED   | Improvised Explosive Device   |
| IR    | International Relations   |
| LAG   | Liquids, Aerosols and Gels  |
| LKPR  | ICAO code for Václav Havel Airport Prague                                       |
| NSA   | National Security Agency  |
| ODL   | Oddělení doprovodu letadel (Department of Aircraft Escort)                      |
| OLE   | Ostraha letiště (Airport Guard)   |
| OLK   | Oddělení letištní kontroly (Department of Airport Control)                      |
| OPK   | Odbor pasové kontroly (Department of Passport Control)                          |
| PNR   | Passenger Name Record   |

|      |   |
|------|---|
| SOOL | Sbor ozbrojené ochrany letišť (Airports Armed Protection Corps) |
| SRA  | Security Restricted Area  |
| SS   | Security Studies  |
| STEB | Security Tamper-Evident Bag                                     |
| TIP  | Threat Image Projection   |
| TSA  | Transportation Security Authority                               |
| USA  | United States of America  |
| VAT  | Value-Added Tax   |
| VIP  | Very Important Person   |
| WTMD | Walk-Through Metal Detection                                    |

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## Introduction

Airport security represents a salient and stable part of civil aviation worldwide. It is a relatively young, although firmly rooted domain, which significantly influences the lives of millions of passengers daily. Owing to this, it is bound to provoke contrasting questions about proportionality and sufficiency, where the control stands at both sides as a guarantee of a safe environment and as a threat to it at the same time. This state of affairs bears together wider uncertainties about the role of security and freedom in regard to contemporary governmental practices as well as possible challenges to the ultimate role of state as a monopoly provider of individual and societal security.

Moreover, a growing discrepancy is formed. On one side, increasing aerial mobility manifested by the rising passenger and cargo numbers is turning the aviation into the mundane, and on the other, the growing concerns and escalating perceptions of threats of terrorist attacks, which produce both public and official demands for new exceptional security measures. As such, airport security is a domain where public perceptions importantly interact with the expert knowledge resulting in priorities and spending decisions (Gierlach, Belsher, and Beutler 2010, 1540). Besides the practical managerial hassles this situation opens up questions regarding the role of individual and populational mobility for contemporary societies. Even more notably, it tackles the problematic of a freedom of movement as an inalienable, interrelated, and indivisible human right. Similarly, it opens up a discussion about the role and the existing stance toward risks perception in (post)modern societies. Leading to the fundamental inquiry into the possibility and desirability of a goal of threat-free society promising an individual an absolute protection.

These incommensurabilities render particularly the airport environment and especially its today inherent task of security provision as a distinctive place of modernity labelled as ‘non-place,’ ‘heterotopia,’ ‘banopticon,’ and ‘the bubbles of governance’ (Adey 2004, 1365–67; Feldman 2007, 334; Bigo, n.d., 34; Rigakos and Greener 2000). The airport as such is deemed to be a place of non-social mobility governed by the flux rationale (Adey 2004), a juxtaposition of incompatible spaces into one real place (Feldman 2007, 334), a space of selective exclusion (Bigo, n.d., 34), and a spatial bubble divided among private security forces (Rigakos and Greener 2000).

The airports are also significant spaces of modernity, where human activities are tightly connected with their non-human technological counterparts as was already

mentioned by Michel Serres (Adey 2004, 1367). From this point of view, airports are found to be “prime arenas for critical research into complex assemblages of security production” (Leese 2015, 271). As such, the airport is a place provoking modernist imaginary, whereas airport security is a product of exceptional liminality demanding interest in the practice of everyday provision. The shape of the everyday airport security is, therefore, worth an inquiry in order to understand its production, logic, form and nature as a possible way to approach cornerstone questions of the role of the state in regard to security provision.

In the existing literature focusing on airports, researchers have primarily concentrated on the distinct spatiality of airports, emphasizing both the movement and its connection to security (Adey 2004, 2010, 2006, 2008; Pascoe 2001). Further, while focusing on airport security, particularly the private and public divide and the risk environment resulting from these merges have been inquired by the works of Mark Salter (Salter 2008c, 2013, 2007, 2008e), Lippert and O’Connor (Lippert and O’Connor 2003), Hainmüller and Lemnitzer (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003), and Hoijtink (Hoijtink 2017). Important aspects of the interactions between humans and technologies, or data processing, have been studied by Peer Schouten (Schouten 2014b, 2010), Matthias Leese (Leese 2015, 2014, 2016; Leese and Koenigseder 2015), Govert Valkenburg and Irma van der Ploeg (Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015), Rocco Bellanova and Gloria González Fuster (Bellanova and Fuster 2013), Marijn Hoijtink (Hoijtink 2017) and many others. However, relatively little attention has been paid to “the control of the microscale movements that occur in border zones and airports” (Adey 2004, 1365), and especially they have not been handled as complex processes and systems. Similarly, an important part of airport security provision in regard to particular screening technologies has not been inquired at all, and the theoretical background employed mostly limits research either to problem-solving approach (Cutler and Paddock 2009; Rogers et al. 2016), or to the general inspiration from material turn and the sole embracement of the notion of security assemblage (Salter 2008b). As such Peer Schouten writes: “the study of the production of security should involve investigating the processes through which activities, behaviours and spheres or fields are established as (in)secure (whether or not there is a consensus about the content of such qualifications)” (Schouten 2010, 5). Such an inquiry into the details is, nevertheless, worthy not only in regard to the detail alone, but as well as a subtle way to approach the above-mentioned dilemmas of the role of the state in regard to the provision of security.

This thesis reacts to the proposition of Peer Schouten and inquires into the contemporary daily realities and practice of establishing the entities as secure or insecure. As such, the main goal of the thesis is the exploration of the nature and contemporary practice of airport security, to achieve it, it looks through the lens of Actor-network Theory. The thesis strives to identify the active security logics through inquiry into the security practice. Identifying these logics, the thesis end is to further examine their embodiments into particular procedures and to localise the controversies resulting from these multiple logics clashes, which simultaneously serve as a manner of individual logics delimitation means. The thesis aims to provide an undivided field-based account of airport security regarding the passenger-oriented screening processes. With the goal to analyse the practice of security provision, the thesis also examines the characteristics of the environment in which the security is realised, inquiring on one hand about the background notion of contemporary threat in aviation and on the other, about the end result of security produced in reaction to this notion. In order to achieve this, the thesis further examines the present semblance of risk and probability.

The thesis presents the findings of a field inquiry into airport security at Václav Havel Airport Prague, ICAO airport code LKPR, which is the busiest out of five international airports in the Czech Republic.<sup>1</sup> It is based on the medium-term field research conducted between 8 June and 9 October 2017, which entailed a mix of qualitative-oriented research methods - participant and nonparticipant observations and interviews. The participatory part builds on a brief unique personal experience with security provision. During this phase, I passed the training for the security searchers and continued for the on the job training under supervision. Subsequently, the research continued as an observation, while in the meantime interviews were conducted. The interviews explored the experiences of general airport security screeners, as well as their managers. The body of data was further extended by the interviews with security relevant agents within the airport environment outside of the airport security control. A counterbalance to this view is ensured by the interviews with the passengers regarding their part of the experience at the airport as well as regarding their comparative encounters with airport security screening in other countries. The thesis, therefore, provides a field-based account of the practice of

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<sup>1</sup> In 2018, there are 5 international public airports, ten international non-public airports, and ninety domestic airports in the Czech Republic. Václav Havel Airport Prague dispatched in 2017 more than 15 million travellers, whereas the second busiest airport Brno Tuřany dispatched 417 thousand travellers in 2016 ('Počet odbavených cestujících na Letišti Václava Havla Praha vloni vzrostl o téměř 18 %' n.d.; 'Brno Airport, Brno - Turany International Airport - Brno - Czech Republic' n.d.).



security provision in regard to the regular passengers and the airport established unit of Security Control, which performs the security checks.

This account of airport security practice is mediated by the theoretical grounding of Actor-network Theory (ANT). The choice of the theoretical framework, which is relatively new and, therefore, little applied in the field of International Relations, stems from the unique ability of ANT to approach particular aspects of the research topic, which would not have been so comfortably achievable by traditional IR approaches. For this reason, ANT is still more often used as a source of inspiration by IR, and even more by Security Studies scholars. These authors appreciate particularly ANT practical interest in materiality and the possibility to approach interactions of humans and non-humans (Aradau 2010; Balzacq and Cavelty 2016; Nexon and Pouliot 2013; T. Porter 2013), or its focus on practice (Barry 2013; Balzacq and Cavelty 2016). Closer to the philosophy of science is then appreciated particularly the solution to the unpleasant problems of agent-structure debate (Bueger 2013; T. Porter 2013; Nexon and Pouliot 2013). In many cases, however, the inspiration is only selective and builds particularly on the notion of assemblage, which is not necessarily connected with ANT inspiration (Bleiker 2014; Collier 2014; Sassen 2006; Bousquet 2014). ANT popularity is, however, visible specifically in the domains of research concentrating on border and airport security (Schouten 2014b; Bourne, Johnson, and Lisle 2015; Bellanova and Fuster 2013; Salter 2008b; Jeandesboz 2017). To study this, ANT seems to be particularly fitting.

In case of this thesis, the reasons for the combination of an inquiry into the airport security and ANT are particularly ANT ability to map processes as well as to identify mechanisms of their operation and maintenance. It also expects the tracing of multiple actors. The encompassed dispersion and multiplicity make it suitable for researching an environment of highly standardized procedures, complex processes, and entanglement of private and public groups' interests and interferences. This enables to take into account an interplay of diverging actors ranging from an individual citizen, private company, to states, international institutions as ICAO, and EU and also to backwardly inquiry their influence on the practice. ANT thus enables to introduce airport security as a multifaceted system, where also multiple enacted procedural logics might be identified in relation to their embodiments into the particular procedures.

Moreover, ANT focus on action and the actor's account of action (Latour 2005, 57) proposes a viable solution to an interest in an environment focused on performance and efficiency. ANT also proposes a possibility of reconciling quantitative and qualitative

inquiries, which enables to engage in one, and also to draw on the other. This enables ANT to mobilise broad resources within various streams of academia as well as beyond. Similarly, particularly pertinently to the IR interest of IR, it enables to make a socially relevant inquiry, which is not based on the a priori assumption of deconstructive criticality.

Last but not least, ANT allows to build up an account which is inductive, and deeply rooted within the empirical practice. This, contrary to the objections of some IR authors (Barry 2013; Nexon and Pouliot 2013), enables ANT to extensively travel within the ladder of abstraction and to build an empirically rooted but abstract and also arguably theoretical understanding of the topic. On the other hand, ANT is rather a style of a description than a tool for a technological system analysis. The possibility to achieve abstraction from the study of practice is also, in my opinion, one of the possible greatest ANT contributions to the study of IR together with the proposed relationalist solution to an agent-structure debate. What also comes into play as part of the solution is an ANT's focus on actors' heterogeneity, namely the inclusion of human as well as non-human actants into the analysis. By being a priori agnostic to what elements their entities are made of, ANT also grants materiality and non-discursive elements a more central role in its rendering of reality (Adey and Anderson 2012). This enables ANT to contribute to the "material turn" (Aradau 2010, 493) in remediating the extensive focus on discourse practices proper to the recent years of studies and as such to shape on of the IR big debates.

In regard to this thesis, ANT is adopted as a complex analytical prism explaining the empirical practice of heterogeneous systems performance, rather than as a confined inspiration focusing on one of its abilities. This thesis thus interprets ANT as a complex system of thought, including research design expectations, and as such it illuminates further possibilities for engaging ANT in IR and Security Studies. The thesis comes up with case specific solutions, but does not perform significant adjustments and reconfigurations of the research framework. Doing this, in contrast to the reservation expressed, for example, by Barry (Barry 2013), the thesis contributes to pointing out the practical feasibility of ANT-based research in the area of security.

In regard to the inner conditions of the case studied, ANT provides an account, which not only emphasizes the security provision as an intense collaboration of human and non-human agents but also points out the importance of materialities, especially regarding the establishment of the bond between a threat and the screening method. Employing this notion, ANT allows to understand the whole screening process as a chain of translation turning the incoming actants from the uncertain state of potential threat into the distinct

state of security. These chains are seen as a process translating, according to their own logics of veridiction, all incoming actants, both human and non-human, from an insecure status to a secure one. This process is understood as directed and guided by five logics identified within the thesis, each of which employs a different aspect of materiality; namely the visuality, the division, the movement and further, the logics of spatiality and identity.

These logics have already been identified - to a varying degree and in a partially different context - within the previous research. Going beyond the existing state of the art, this thesis specifically inquires into the components of chains of translation in regard to the first three logics. Particularly the airport security technologies and their interactions with humans are being focused on, as well as instances where either of these logics or the veridiction logics, intersect, thus disclosing their own nature and presence. Furthermore, this thesis identifies spatiality and identity as complementary actant logics, guiding two major security systems. Their special relationship with respect to the practice is further examined, regarding their complementarity, exclusiveness, and merges. In the places where these five logics collide, or produce dense constellations, the thesis also adopts explanative insights driven from beyond ANT. These inputs are, however, not understood as the analytical shortage of ANT explanatory possibilities, but rather as practical shortcuts, which enable to follow the topic and not to take too long detours. Similarly, they present a needed connection toward more theoretically distant research activities. ANT is employed here in accordance with its premises, which fully encourage the enrolment of further, already assembled, networks of thoughts. Finally, ANT enables the inquiry into the distinct notions produced at the opposing end points of the network of the translation, namely the contrast of threat and security, which are examined in relation to the notion of aviation risks presence, understood in material terms. As such, the thesis provides an account of the environment of threat established on one side and to understand the end product of airport security nature on the other.

Lastly, I would like to mention that the text of the thesis is written with an intention to remain as much opened and accessible to the broadest audience as possible, including both ANT and IR scholars. This, however, bears together compromises in nearly all aspects of the work. The theoretical framework is presented in a way which should enable a further reading to those not already familiar with ANT, which in the context of thesis production might be a majority. On the other hand, it might be seen as lengthy and not sufficiently focused to an ANT proficient reader. In regard to the technical detail of a field

practice, the thesis is striving for readability even for those not engaging with the problematic of airport security and as such in some parts, the practitioners might find some details to be too succinct. Even more importantly, the level of the system detail must be in some cases constrained in order to make the thesis accessible to the general public at all. Last but not least, particularly constraining is the choice of language, which limits the access to many practitioners and, unfortunately, also to many of the interviewees, without whom the thesis would not have been possible. This represents for me a particularly problematic point. Similarly, the choice resulted in the sacrifices to the form and literal quality of the text. On the other hand, if the thesis should contribute to the ongoing debate and be accessible at least to those who engage in a similar stream of research, another choice would have been impossible.

### Structure

The thesis proceeds as follows. First of all, ANT is introduced. Its core ideas are explained, as well as its criticism examined. This is followed by the introduction of ANT impact in regard to International Relations and finally the understanding of ANT adopted within this thesis and its practical rendering within the fieldwork. The second chapter introduces airport security in regard to the existing research and further as a general concept, including its history and a brief summary of legislation development followed by the general description of the contemporary airport security system. This section is followed by an account of airport security development relevant to the case studied. As such, the development of airport security and particularly the development of airport security provision at Václav Havel Airport Prague are treated, followed by the description of the contemporary face of the system, especially regarding the tasks division within the present security units. This chapter is concluded by the section recounting the practicalities of the research and data treatment.

The third chapter provides an account of the airport security provision within the field regarding the screening process. The notion of airport security as a network composed of the chains of translation is presented, followed by the introduction of the guiding logics present within this network. The chain of translation of the passenger and luggage is introduced organised along particular screening processes. Firstly, the personal screening chain of translation is treated encompassing Walk-Through Metal Detector, Hand search, Hand-Held Metal Detector, Explosive Threat Detector, and Random sampling. This is followed by the inquiry into the luggage control, treating primarily the key technology of

X-ray, which is followed by the idea of Threat Image Projection, then, leaving the X-ray partially aside, the focus is concentrated on the methods of liquids screening and, finally, the control of the hold luggage within the sorting station is examined.

The final chapter provides an account of the logics of spatiality and identity, which are identified as core ideas within the multiple systems of current airport security provision. Following the introduction of these logics, their performance within the field is examined, starting from the dominant spatial logic, followed by the analysis of identity-based aspects encompassed within this system in the field and concluded by an account of both systems encounters at the airport. The second part of this chapter focuses on the endpoint of the airport chain of translation, where the products of the contemporary system in place are examined. As such, the environment of threat is firstly explored, followed by the examination of characteristics and nature of the security produced, whereas, in the meantime, the interviewing mediation between the threat and the security, namely the risk in aviation, as resulting from the aircraft materiality itself is inquired.

## 1. Actor-Network Theory — the Origins and Main Features

A mixture of the highly theoretical impetuses — particularly the poststructuralist debate and the paradigm perspective proposed by Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 1962) together with the utmost practical encounters within managing systems, which had to reconcile human and technological elements and their interaction, gave birth to the Actor-network Theory in Paris of the late seventies. Its authors, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, who later became the leading figure in ANT propagation and who also further developed it toward the today's form, saw it as an empirical reaction reconciling the poststructuralist currents of the philosophy of science with the practical engineering realities (Law 2007, 3–6).

The term ANT itself has been devised by Michel Callon around 1982 (Law 2007, 3); the wording should allude to the descriptive strategy avoiding “Cartesian divide between matter and spirit” employed by Diderot. Nevertheless, the label showed to be problematic not even due to a problematic translation between the word *réseau* and English variants of web and network, but also due to the inherent impression of the external relation between both parts of the name — actor and network. Precisely a relation that was countered by its authors (Latour 2005, 142; Hodder 2012, 93). Despite that, this label stuck as a hallmark of the approach summing up the relationality proper to ANT.

### 1.1. The Core Concepts – Actants, Mediators, Intermediaries, Action and the Chains of Translation

ANT is a complex theoretical system and as such poses significant challenges to an introduction from external positions. Given the imminent liaison between the concepts of actor and network and their central position within the system, the description will start from the notion of *an actor*, as its delimitation to the network. Derived from Gabriel Tarde's: “To exist is to differ” (Latour and Lépinay, n.d., 35), Latour defines an actor as: “*any thing* that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference” (Latour 2005, 71). It is not necessarily any entity but only an entity that acts (Latour 1999, 120). Followingly, the relative term *actant* is then proposed in order to diminish obscurity resulting from using the term actor or agent for non-living entities and refers to anything that is being represented (Latour 1999, 180, 1987, 84). All the treated entities are then defined in terms of their performance, which only retrospectively assumes a competence (Latour 1987, 89, 2013, 230). As such, the primary feature of an actor in ANT is its *agency*, an ability to

make a difference and transform others and thus as Latour notes, without such an agency there is no agent (Latour 2005, 53).

Nevertheless, the agent itself is not perceived as a source of action or a fixed entity, but more as its modifier, whose own substance is more a flowing composite of other arrays of action (Latour 2005, 46, 216, 1996b, 374). There is no starting entity to build on because all entities including humans are composed of others (Hodder 2012, 90) and: “We are all, as it were, slightly overtaken by events” (Latour 1986a, 48), or: “We are the offsprings of our works.” (Latour 2013, 246). The entity to which a particular action is assigned can then be called a *figuration*, and as humans, we tend to assign actions preferably to human-like figures (Latour 2008, 165).

ANT is interested in following how one actor influences another one. It shows that the connection between two entities is much more indirect than it seems to be in the first view, and the crucial interest of ANT, and substantively also an important part of this thesis, is an interest in tracing the chain of relations that enables one thing to influence or to be transformed into another. Such a chain is then referred to as a *chain of translation*, *chain of reference* or *chain of transformation* (Law 2002, 98; Latour 2013, 78, 1999, 70). Every transformation between two points is then seen as a total rupture from the preceding ontological state, the parts of the chain are then seen as active elements, as the actors themselves (Latour 1999, 60).

The specific perspective taken to describe a particular chain of translation then allows perceiving some actors as mediators. The mediators are those actors that enable contact, transportation and transformation between two neighbouring entities. A mediator: “is an original event and creates what it translates as well as the entities between which it plays the mediating role” (Latour 1993, 78), “Mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry,” and their input is never a reliable predictor of the output (Latour 2005, 39). Latour proposes four types of mediation. First, mediation as a program of action — where the mediator transforms the original direction of action because of its inherent features. Second, the mediation by composition, where multiple mediators are needed by a single agent to achieve its action. Third, the technical mediation which allows the folding of time and space. Fourth, the transition between signs and things, which allows getting from a “material” entity to a sign (Latour 1999, 178–84).

The move between particular places within the chain is then costly, given the work that the mediators have to spend to transform the incoming into the outgoing (Latour

2005, 132). The actor who does not have a substantial role in the particular chain of translation and only passively “transport[s] the meaning or force without transformation” is named for the moment being an intermediary (Latour 2005, 39). In the meantime, the movement between particular places within these chains allows displacing the viewpoint and relating the actors that are physically or otherwise remoted, in other words, it allows travelling within the network of knowledge (Latour 2013, 84). Thus, the chain of translation enables to approach other, qualitatively distant, entities and its analysis may reveal the original actants and their work within.

Thanks to the character of relations between the entities in the form of the chains of translation, the notion of causality is not that of a direct link between a cause and an effect produced, but rather that of a diffused relation. The translation is “a relation that does not transport causality but induces two mediators into coexisting” (Latour 2005, 108) and the agency of one actor is more “an occasion for other things to start acting” (Latour 2005, 60). If the link between cause and effect was explained as a direct interaction of both, the mediator would lose its active role in the process and would be turned into a mere intermediary, meaning an entity which blindly transmits the process (Latour 2005, 106). The active participation of mediators leads to a diffused notion of causality. ANT is especially interested in the process of these chains creation, where new actants are enrolled or enlisted to become a part of the chain (Latour 2005, 65). During this process the context of production is visible, and before the chain is fixedly established, the refused options are still present (Latour 1987, 21–23). This leads to ANT's interest in ongoing controversies and their connections (Latour 2005, 23).

## 1.2. The Features of Networks and Other Network Beasts — Black Boxes, Machines, Olygopticons and Panoramas

The above-mentioned chains of translation are results of an intensive constructive and maintaining activity (Latour 1999, 67). This activity consists of extending the network by a continuous action of: “recruitment, mobilization, enrolment, and translation of many others” in order to maintain the chains in existence (Latour 2005, 218). The result of such a mobilization is: “...the ability to make a configuration of a maximal number of allies act as a single whole in one place” (Latour 1987, 172). The end result of this productive activity is the production of a network.

An ANT network is ultimately characterized particularly by the *flatness of the account*, or otherwise, by the refusal to subsume some actors as a part of some others,



more highly placed. This perspective refuses to consider an actor as being inside another (Latour 2005, 174). Similarly, it refuses a notion of something being outside of a network:

*“Literally there is nothing but networks, there is nothing in between them, or, to use a metaphor from the history of physics, there is no aether in which networks should be immersed. In this sense, ANT is a reductionist and relativist theory, but, ...this is the first necessary step towards an irreductionist and relationist ontology.”* (Latour 1996b, 370)

By this Latour means that absence of an *a priori* building entity, which would set up a particular analytical level, gives ANT the potential of complete ontological inclusion and absolute connectivity. For ANT the main feature of a network is its ability: “to get rid of a third spatial dimension” meaning the notion of a difference between far/close and big/small, asking only whether there exists a connection between two elements (Latour 1996b, 372).

Following the solution proposed in *An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence*, every network is supposed to be composed of two components, one enrolling heterogeneous others in a discontinuous chain and the second, the fluid that circulates within the network in a continuous manner (Latour 2013, 33). Both, the associations creating and extending the network with the actors supplying the energy as well as the circulating fluid and this inner value of a network, can be traced and described (Latour 1996b, 371, 2013, 40). Nevertheless, both components should not be confused because the force responsible for network extension and maintenance is distinct from the circulating aspect (Latour 2013, 32).

In *An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence* Bruno Latour further proposes to distinguish among fifteen modes producing the existence of modern society, one of them being that of a network described above. Each of these is seen as an ontologically distinct way of extension (Latour 2013, 20, 243), with its own correct manner of the extension enactment which is called the process of veridiction (Latour 2013, 53). Based on this division, two types of mistakes can be distinguished, one being the mistake within the mode, meaning the step that is not in accordance with the particular process of veridiction relevant to that mode and the second being the *mistake in choosing the appropriate mode* and considering the procedure within that mode by the veridiction rules relevant for a different mode (Latour 2013, 55).

In his preceding work, Latour further describes some particular processes and formations, similar to the chain of translation, produced during the chaining activity and the following network functioning. Even though these formations profit from their

distinctive constellations within the network, their position is granted by the number of associations with the others and not by their hierarchical superiority.

The most important and most widely employed process is that of a *black boxing*, which is seen as a distinctive type of mediation, where the connections of multiple mediators are so close that we tend to forget that there is a multiplicity of actors within the black box. A closed black box can serve as a muted intermediary until it breaks down and all of its parts become visible again as full mediators (Latour 1999, 183–84, 2013, 214). However, the black box is created not only by the smooth cooperation of multiple actors but also by the credibility of their recruiter, which allows taking the content of the black box for granted (Latour 1986a, 242). Similar to the black box is one of the earliest formations described, and that is *the machine*. The machine is a collective of actors bound together in the manner that: “none can fly apart from the group,” which distinguishes it from the tool on one side and the *automaton*, which adds the inherent control, on the other side (Latour 1987, 129–30). Nevertheless, for the machine, the mutually enacted function is more crucial than for the black box, where the connection of multiple actants into one, or the punctualization is a key aspect (Latour 1999, 184).

Similarly, *a panorama*, for Latour “see[s] everything. But [it] they also see[s] nothing since [it] they simply show[s] an image painted (or projected) on the tiny wall of a room fully closed to the outside” (Latour 2005, 187). As such, panorama proposes an idea of wholeness and centrality and as such enables the public to navigate through the network (Latour 2005, 189). Nevertheless, panoramas are limited in their ability to show the detail by the particular perspective they take. Limited in following the particular flows, they do not make it possible to see everything in order to catch up all parts of the network (Latour 2006, 4).

The contrary of panorama, an *oligopticon* set up as a paraphrase of Bentham’s/Foucault’s panopticon, enables to see some particular well-chosen details of the whole: “Their wisdom is proportional to their deliberate blindness. They gain in coordination capacities only because they agree to lose first water and then most of the information.” (Latour 2006, 28). Oligopticon is, for example, a control panel in a closed room showing the flows of energy, water or the traffic or meteorology (Latour 2006, 32). Latour further describes a special type of oligopticons — the places “where literal and not simply metaphorical calculations are made possible by the mathematical or at least arithmetic format of the documents being brought back and — extremely narrow views of

the (connected) whole are made possible forth,” naming them *centres of calculation* (Latour 2005, 181).

Centres of calculation are interesting particularly by other supplementary means - the inscription devices, which they may employ in order to be in contact with the rest of the network: “*Inscription devices transform pieces of matter into written documents. More exactly, an inscription device is any item of apparatus or particular configuration of such items which can transform a material substance into a figure or diagram which is directly usable by one of the members of the office space.*” (Latour 1986a, 51). Further, inscription device represents an important support of a statement that makes it incontrovertible. It is a type of proof, and notably, it allows connecting multiple networks because particular centres of calculation often use inscription devices developed within different domains (Latour 1986a, 66, 85, 1983, 161). Different types of inscription devices then allow addressing various audiences (Latour 2008, 162).

### 1.3. Things, Technologies and Organizations

Following the flat description, no network is considered bigger than any other. However, it can vary in its density and its length (Latour 1996b, 371). A longer network can be achieved by recruiting non-human actants, which is a specific ability of some more ‘advanced’ collectives in comparison with the ‘primitive’ societies, where mutual relations are not fixed by the presence of non-humans and relations had to be constantly renegotiated (Harman 2015, 19). Inspired by otherwise criticized Durkheim, ANT perceives *the non-human actants as elements stabilizing networks* of humans (Latour 2005, 38; Law 2007, 9). The amount of mobilized non-humans is also seen as an indicator of society sophistication (Strum and Latour 2006, 75). The collective of humans, who label themselves modern, is then distinct by inventing: “longer networks by enlisting a certain type of non-humans” (Latour 1993, 117). The advantages of modernity are summed up as follows: “The moderns’ greatness stems from their proliferation of hybrids, their lengthening of a certain type of network, their acceleration of the production of traces, their multiplication of delegates, their grouping production of relative universals.” (Latour 1993, 132). So, the number of recruited elements and especially the finesse of the interwoven of the social and non-social is a measure of the advancement of the collective of humans and things and the increasing intimacy between humans and non-humans as a sign of modernity (Latour 1999, 195–96).

Technology in this sense is not a type of actor but a kind of translation encompassing heterogeneous actors (Latour 2013, 213, 225). In the meantime, this growing intimacy is a source of the modernity crisis, because the division between facts and ideas is a source of the modernist paradigm (Latour 2013, 9). In this point, Latour is greatly inspired by the work of Donna Haraway, who points out the ability of high-tech culture to challenge traditional western dualisms of public and private or self and the other (Haraway 1991, 313). Similarly, Latour builds on her ideas about technologies as enabling factors for privatization and eradication of public life (Haraway 1991, 306, 308), when he conceptualises his term *plug-ins* as a manner of connecting the local and the global to “individuality, subjectivity, personhood, interiority” (Latour 2005, 207–8).

For ANT, technology is the result of a mutual interaction between human and non-human actors, not a solution to a particular previously identified problem, because the aim arises from the character of technology, and both means and end are created at the same moment (Latour 2013, 219, 220). Technology meanwhile has a particular ability to propose unusual dislocation that allows new ways to approach beings-as-others (Latour 2013, 223, 289, 1983, 163). The smoothness of connections between the human and non-human bestows technology a special feature of being itself invisible while rendering visibility to other objects (Latour 2013, 222, 2005, 207). Latour further states that on the basis of the increasing finesse of connections between heterogeneous actors all collectives can be divided into eleven layers, from the layer of social complexity, where all non-humans are excluded, to the layer of political ecology, where they are encompassed on the level of political rights (Latour 1999, 213).

Importantly, as part of this deepening process, in different phases two particularly important capabilities had to be developed. The management of vast assemblies of non-humans (which, if perceived negatively, is usually labelled alienation) and management of humans, labelled in *Pandora's Hope* as *the Megamachine* but more generally known as *manufacture* (Latour 1999, 202–7). This directly implies the notion of *an organisation*, which Latour labels as a separate mode (Latour 2013, 389). It is a key term for the analysis of a security arrangement. The organisation is seen as a result of the *organising script* (Latour 2013, 391). Scripts are responsible for the non/functioning of organisations and only the faith of actor in the organising script results in the alternation of an outcome (Latour 2013, 394). Actors, whether human or non-human, are not subjugated, nor subjugating the script but mutually transforming each other (Latour 2013, 392). Even though under normal conditions actors can follow the directives of a script, in the case of

crisis, a manual reset is needed and at this moment actors are getting responsible for the script's reshuffling (Latour 2013, 415). From the perspective of security arrangements, it is also very important that although the script is produced as a result of interaction between multiple entities, its application is in all cases following its production (Latour 2013, 418). Meaning that it is an application of the past imagination about the future. This points not only to the retroactive character of security measures but also to an issue of predictions because past decisions change the form of the future system (Hodder 2012, 104). Further, the system may not be changeable in the future, which sets in motion the problem of unintended consequences (Hodder 2012, 105).

The organising script particularly presupposes a program of action that means an intended course of events. This program might be then faced with various antiprograms – processes that are established to counter the proposed program of action (Latour 2008, 152, 168). As Latour and Akrich write in “A convenient vocabulary for the semiotics of human and nonhuman actors,” where this idea emerged for the first time, antiprograms are: “All the programs of actions of actants that are in conflict with the programs chosen as the point of departure of the analysis; what is a program and what is an antiprogram is relative to the chosen observer” (Akrich and Latour 1991, 261). This notion is exploited, as described below, as a leading process in understanding the threat environment and its transformation into the state of security as well as the framework for understanding the diverging activities of employees and passengers. Importantly, the respective choice of a program and its antiprogram depends on the viewer's perspective. In this interpretation the thesis departs particularly from the latter employment of this notion in the article “Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts” (Latour 2008, 152,168), similarly, even though under different labels, these notions are employed in Latour's later work (Latour 2013, 392).

#### 1.4. Power, Politics and Society

The explanatory power of ANT lies in its ability to describe unexpected connections and to see things as composed of other, otherwise unseen, entities. Especially the ‘big’ far-reaching concepts are themselves seen to be in a particular need of explanation. The key concept to be explained is for Latour a society, or more precisely the social: “...the social was to be explained instead of providing the explanation.” (Latour 2005, 108). The false notion of society as a separate entity stands in the centre of Latour's

critique of artificial distinction of nature and society by modernity, popular in times of ANT's origins (Latour 1993, 11).

Similarly, power is “the final result of a process” not a cause (Latour 2005, 64). It is not possible to “have power - in potentia,” or to store it up; power exists only as a result of associations and performance of participating actors (Latour 1986b, 264). Latour writes that: “Power‘ is always the illusion people get when they are obeyed.” (Latour 1986b, 268). Inequalities have to be generated, and power itself is seen as surprisingly fragile, reversible and power relations within society as renegotiable, which are the points hardly commensurable with the stance of politically oriented leftist critical research (Latour 1986b, 264; Harman 2015, 27, 43; Latour 2005, 64).<sup>2</sup>

Latour is very critical of the inquiries where “the political agenda of many social theorists have taken over their *libido sciendi*” (Latour 2005, 49). This is accompanied by a contempt for the deconstructive desire of critical minds (Latour 1999, 268). Such a stance does not mean the apolitical approach to science but a refusal of the politics as the primary cause for inquiry. The solution proposed by Bruno Latour in *An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence* considers politics as a distinct mode of existence with its own proper way of veridiction (Latour 2013, 488), which allows achieving the “science... freed from politics, ... politics freed from science” (Latour 1999, 265). Inspired by pragmatism, politics is seen as being constituted around particular topics: “politics turn around topics that generate a public around them instead of trying to define politics in the absence of any issue.” (Latour 2007, 814). Politics can be produced around the matters of concern, a late Latourian term meaning the matters encompassed within our networks, which as Harman proposes could be maybe better named as the ‘*matters of relations*’ (Harman 2015, 164). Nevertheless, not all such matters are political to the same extent, and Latour is trying to define five stages from just being a member of a human-including network, through being politicised in the strictest sense of the word, to the tacit acceptance of the agreed solution (Latour 2007, 818). Even though Latour respects the possibility of opening up all types of these issues; he sees as the ideal the possibility: “Not having to participate” (Latour 2007, 819).

### 1.5. The Impact of ANT — Critiques, Network Analysis Descendants

The biggest academic fear of Bruno Latour, which he puts forward in *Science in Action*, namely: “There is something still worse, however, than being either criticised or

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<sup>2</sup> This is the argument proposed by Donna Haraway as well (Haraway 1988, 578).

dismantled by careless readers: it is being ignored.” (Latour 1987, 40), certainly did not materialise in his case.

His work, as well as the work of John Law (Law 2002, 2007) and Anne-Marie Mol (Mol 2002), put forward a new idea framework which has been taken up by others. The descendants can be characterised by the shared features as a refusal of atomism as a theory of reality and replacing this notion by the perception of collective character of each actor, giving the voice to all such actors, not preferring any particular scale of analysis and interest in empirics (Lisle 2014, 71; Harman 2014, 119–20). However, not less significantly, ANT also provoked strong critical reactions at its home ground as well as within the field of IR.

#### 1.5.1. Critique

The nature of Latour’s work provoked vivid reactions and criticism, given its problematic classification and the provoking novelty at the time of ANT’s origins. Bart de Jong, citing Huub Dijstelbloem, classifies it into three streams 1) Machiavellian criticism, 2) relativistic criticism, and 3) symmetric criticism (Jong 2012, 95). Even though this classification catches the main points of the critique; the critiques can be hardly divided along these lines given the interwoven nature of these arguments. Furthermore, part of this criticism is primarily motivated by the shared Marxist normative background. So firstly, the more varying criticism concerning the normative questions and reproaches focused on particular concepts is dealt with and secondly, the most important criticism, which targets the question of the relationality of things, is discussed.

##### *1.5.1.1. Normative and Concept Specific Criticism*

This sort of criticism targets mostly Latourian notion of power as “the final result of a process” not a cause (Latour 2005, 64) and his refusal of Truth, or normatively based politics, which has a clear Schmittian undertone (Harman 2015, 113). This understanding contradicts the Marxist-based demand for normativity and especially the demand for power explaining relations. As Benjamin Noys writes: “Plural agency is distributed everywhere, but results in a lack of traction compared to the particular forms of the compact and directed agency required by political intervention.” (Noys n.d., 12). This problem is also mentioned by Brian Gareau, even though he is trying to calm the waters down: “Some adherents of ANT remain close-minded to the conception of a capitalistic socionature with overarching tendential characteristics and thus fail to benefit from the political ecological aspects of emancipation, resource deconstruction, and unequal power distribution found therein.” (Gareau 2005, 1). Particularly painful is also Latour’s opposition to critical

deconstruction (Noys n.d., 7). Harman succinctly sums up the problem: “Here the basic picture of the world is one of a free, transcendent human subject oppressed by the alienating otherness of capital, fetishes, objects, ideology, or society. Given that the whole of Latour’s philosophical advance consists in demolishing any such human/nonhuman dualism at its root, it is little wonder that he is increasingly unpopular on the Left.” (Harman 2015, 111). The division of entities inherent to Marxism is then hardly reconcilable with Latour’s network thinking.

This reservation is also expressed in the criticism of Mark Elam (Elam 1999, 8), who beside a rather obscure allegation that Latour excludes women’s perspective of modernity (Elam 1999, 5)<sup>3</sup>, points to particular weaknesses of Latour’s delimitation of modernity and pre-modernity, as well as to an absencing notion of pre-modernity and asymmetric orientalism (Elam 1999, 15). These reservations, nevertheless, aim concretely at *We have never been modern* (Latour 1993) and do not affect the fundamentals of ANT. Similar is the criticism of Susan Hekman focusing Latour’s reading of “postmodernism as a version of linguistic constructionism” that fails to acknowledge Foucault’s integration of material (Hekman 2009, 435). Even though this argument is very persuasive, it does not erode the solutions proposed by ANT, particularly given the fact that even though undeniably there exist important differences between both, Latour is positive about important aspects of Foucault’s ideas concerning materiality (Harman 2015, 121).

#### 1.5.1.2. *Machines and Other Non-humans*

The most serious criticism of ANT proposed so far is, nevertheless, the point picked up by Donna Haraway and specified by Mark Elam, which is that ANT “largely ignores the interfaces between machines and other non-humans and between humans and non-machine non-humans” (Elam 1999, 5). Given that ANT assumes that there is nothing besides the networks, there is no way how to directly approach anything outside the network already recruited by the human collective. The entanglement with humans, even if not fully acknowledged, is a part of Latour’s solution in order to get rid of the detested Descartes’ dichotomous conception of the world as *res extensa contra res cogitans*<sup>4</sup> (Latour 2013, 110). The second part of this solution is the decomposition of this divide by the chains of translation. The effort to get rid of the mechanistic outside reality is ended by the

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<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, as Law mentions and also other authors have pointed out the style might be “managerialist and even military in character, attending to the powerful, sometimes in functionalist and masculinist mode” (Law 2008, 11).

<sup>4</sup> Possibly translated as “extended thing” (or more freely as corporeal substance) versus mental substance.



proposal presented in *An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence* to perceive the matter as a false connection of two modes, that of reproduction and that of reference (Latour 2013, 200).

The claims that yeast has been designed by Pasteur or that Ramses could not die of tuberculosis prior to its discovery (Harman 2015, 50; Latour 1999, 145) should be understood in light of this argument. This is not, however, a version of relativism: “We do not wish to say that facts do not exist nor that there is no such thing as reality. In this simple sense, our position is not relativist. Our point is that ‘out-there-ness’ is the consequence of scientific work rather than its cause.” (Latour 1986a, 181–82). Latour means by this that through the process of recruitment of new actors these actors are being deeply transformed and designed (Latour 1999, 122). Nevertheless, building on Whitehead, he assumes that entities could have been acting in a different manner even before, existing as ‘propositions’ (Latour 2013, 89, 1999, 141,146).

Latour assumes that: “...the possibility of knowledge that is rectified little by little,” is not prevented (Latour 2013, 50, similarly: 1999, 1). Science slowly gains accuracy and validity through multiple mediations connecting the scientists with the more distant actors, and this mediation simultaneously designs the conditions under which the actors act along the prediction of science (Latour 2009a, 111–12, 1983, 155). In the end, results of science seem to describe “world that came into being without men and without science” (Latour 1996a, 23).

Harman argues that Latour only criticises materialism as itself: “prematurely replaces the matter with a theory of matter,” nevertheless, when Latour to some extent insists that those actors are a little more than: “trials of strength, then he is a realist, since he is tacitly leaving open the question of what lies behind the trials. By disavowing any things-in-themselves beyond the relational networks of actors, Latour undercuts the metaphysical foundations for realism. Yet there remains in his thinking a grain of realism...” (Harman 2015, 37). The ANT response to the above mentioned criticism is thus that the impossibility to leave the perspective of network including humans does not mean that there are no other networks which are not connected to those including humans, because “actants are defined by their relations with other actants, not that they exist only in correlation with a human observer,” (Harman 2015, 100). This perspective thus does not diminish the recruiting capabilities of non-human actors, just makes them very problematic to detect. As Graham Harman correctly notes:

*“One of the basic defects of the Latourian intellectual framework—and one of his surprising inheritances from Kant, who is not one of his heroes—is that it generally remains somewhat difficult to consider object-object relations (such as those between ice caps, algae, rainforests, and permafrost) without also considering the human means by which these entities became accessible. While this follows nicely from Latour’s concept of science as mediation, it does make it rather difficult for him to distinguish the object of knowledge from the means by which it is known.”* (Harman 2015, 142).

Maybe a more conclusive solution to this problem that is worth exploration is the propositions of access to networks composed of non-humans made by Ian Hodder. Rather than the modes crossing described above, his solution is based on the idea of chains of translations. These are disabling the realism’s false distinction between mind and matter. Hodder explains: “This is not a return to materialism because we have seen that things are connected to each other in equip mental totalities, technical systems that only work in relation to some goal” (Hodder 2012, 59). Things are for Hodder keeping their agency, although he - and also John Law - do not hesitate to express their agency as primary, which Latour is reluctant to do, given his views on theory of action (Hodder 2012, 58, 216; Law 2002, 122–23; Latour 1999, 274, 1987, 72).

The primary agency does not imply any intention, “but interactions of their own,” “As they grow, transform or fall apart they have a direct impact on human lives.” (Hodder 2012, 68). Because humans and things differ especially by their various temporalities, human interactions with things usually entrap both in an interdependency, which can be usually overcome only by a further intensification of mutual interactions (Hodder 2012, 201). Humans can be easily drawn into the care of things (Hodder 2012, 68). Ian Hodder importantly argues, in accordance with Bruno Latour and John Law (Law 2007, 9) that: “the source of transformation and constraint in human society is not in the material facts of existence but in the dependencies between humans and things.” (Hodder 2012, 97).

Besides the fact that the whole generations of man can be dependent on one nonhuman, as well as the other way around, the delegation to the things bears other specificities. In his article *Where are the missing masses, sociology of a few mundane artefacts* (Latour 2008, 156), Latour draws the attention particularly to the following points: Whereas the work of a person is usually understood more in terms of a continuous process, the work of a thing is more strictly divided into the phases of production, installation and maintenance. This implies even the linguistic distinction to the work of

humans, which is understood more as a matter of present action and thus tends to the use of present tense, whereas the work of a thing is perceived as automatic, subsequent to installation and thus employs past perfect. Last but not least, the inertia of things gives them a distinctive character which can be advantageous but also can result in the production of inequality (Latour 2008, 158–59; Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015, 327). In this way, the things can serve to influence our activity, our program of action. Significantly for airport security, things can in this way force humans to adjust or alter their behaviour by more direct ways than just oral or textual directives, but this can only influence the human passive or even active resistance, as well as an inability to comply with such adjustments (Latour 2008, 174, 175).

#### 1.5.2. Descendant Connection with Network Analysis

An important offshoot of ANT, represented also by Bruno Latour, followed in later years a later quantitative stream of thoughts, which led ANT into an innovative direction. Even though this development might seem to be distant from the course this thesis follows, I consider it particularly important, given the image of ANT presented in contemporary International Relations (IR). Its presentation serves as an opening to the subsequent discussion of the inspiration driven into IR.

ANT has been playing with the possibility of using more quantitative methods ever since its beginnings. Most obvious are the connections with scientometrics made as early as in the Latour's dissertation thesis, published for the first time in 1979 under the title *Laboratory Life* (Latour 1986a), or in the later *Science in Action* (Latour 1987). In both, the interest in the multiple options of data visualisation is also clearly visible. The remarkable step in the ANT search for the possible empirical embodiment came in 1998 at the conference *Virtual Society?* where the possibility of using digital traces was proposed by Bruno Latour (T. Venturini and Guido 2013). Following this proposition, many methodological innovations came, which led to the opening of the research centre Médialab ('Sciences Po | MedialabSciences Po | Medialab' n.d.), which explores the possibilities of ANT-inspired methodological innovations in 2009. The rationale behind these efforts is the vision that many of the flaws of traditional sociological theories, such as an artificial division between macro and micro level of analysis or rigid theoretical presumptions, have been caused by the scarcity of data. Nowadays with the abundance of digital data, as well as technical capacities, these weaknesses could be at least in some areas overcome (T. Venturini 2012; T. Venturini, Jensen, and Latour 2015, 2).

The ultimate goal is then to explore “the grail of social sciences: the qualitative methods” (T. Venturini and Guido 2013). Such methods should be able to overcome “the blind spot” between qualitative and quantitative methods, they should allow the study of detail and whole in the meantime and should not be restricted to the already stabilized structure and should not be entirely dependent on the participants of an ethnography (T. Venturini, Jensen, and Latour 2015, 1; T. Venturini and Latour 2009; T. Venturini 2012).

One of the promising ways how to, at least partially, achieve such ambitious goals seemed to be to join ANT with the inspirations drawn from network analysis and to realise the promises of “sociology as a science of associations” (T. Venturini 2012). As Venturini explains:

*“As the graphs, the networks have the advantage to focus researcher’s attention on the elementary phenomenon of collective life: the association and disassociation of social actors... Instead of taking the existence of groups, institutions, social structures as granted, the network analysis does not postulate more than the existence of actors (nodes or vertices) and their capacity to connect and disconnect themselves (ties or edges).”* (T. Venturini 2012 [translated by SK]).

This has been an idea expressed by many authors, who have more or less independently recognised the strength and potential of such a combination as evidenced, for example, by the article *Networks in the Social Sciences* (Vicsek, Király, and Kónya 2016), or points made by Roland Bleiker (Bleiker 2014, 76) and Stephen J. Collier (Collier 2014, 38).

This shared intuition is led by the inner affinity of both frameworks. First of all, a network analysis in accordance with ANT does not postulate anything else than the existence of actors — the nodes and their capacity to connect or disconnect themselves to others (T. Venturini 2012). This allows eradicating the a priori categorisation of data as well as the premature explanation based on ad hoc concepts. As has been shown in the article *Hors champs la multipositionnalité par l’analyse des réseaux* (T. Venturini et al. 2015), employing the network analysis, even without both types of such prepositions, the reproduction of results achieved earlier by more traditional approaches is possible,<sup>5</sup> as well as their further advancement.

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<sup>5</sup> Original article by Luc Boltanski published in 1973 used classical variable statistics and the theoretical framework of Bourdieu’s concepts of fields (T. Venturini et al. 2015).

Secondly, the artificial division between micro and macro analysis, which ANT counters by its insistence on flat ontology, can be completely dissolved. There is no more need to choose between a detail and generality as the full detail about many is available (T. Venturini 2012). The network analysis empowered by the latest progress in computation technology allows following “millions of associations while keeping trace of each single data point” (T. Venturini and Guido 2013).

Last but not least, many of the tools proposed by a network analysis allow to avoid (from ANT’s perspective problematic) aggregation of data by simple addition of attributes (T. Venturini and Latour 2009; T. Venturini et al. 2015). The meaning of most of network measures within network analysis is relevant only in relation to the particular arrangement of that network and one change in connections can have a huge influence on the whole structure (T. Venturini 2012).

Even though these first steps made by ANT in the more quantitative directions look promising, there are also multiple problems for its practical use. For this reason, although this thesis could profit from a similar insight, this is actually not the case. First of all, this type of analysis is mostly reserved for the domains of action where sufficient digital traces exist for all the processes in question (T. Venturini and Latour 2009; Tommaso Venturini et al. 2014, 16). Furthermore, the direction of such a kind of analysis is usually significantly directed by the availability of digital traces that can be converted into the data (Tommaso Venturini et al. 2014, 3) rather than by the original scientific interest. Such data can be seen as “the second-hand data” because the researcher has no control over the process of their creation and can only use what has been collected independently of his/her interest (Tommaso Venturini et al. 2014, 4; T. Venturini 2012). Because this thesis research is guided primarily by the interest in the topic, this is exactly the reason which precludes the use of these insights. Sufficient digital traces do not exist for the contemporary security provision, or in the places where they do, their security sensitivity is considered higher than those of traditional ethnography. Similarly, important problems have not been resolved as the problem of transformation of quantitative data, which would spoil the original idea as well as add nothing significantly new (T. Venturini and Guido 2013).<sup>6</sup> This is also exactly the problem this thesis would have to face in case of the more quantitative data-oriented network approach.

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<sup>6</sup> An attempt to find a partial solution to this was a network analysis of qualitative data. This idea has led to the development of the software analytical tool as ANTA (T. Venturini and Guido 2013), which facilitates

## 1.6. International Relation and ANT

In regard to IR, ANT has drawn the attention particularly in connection to the inner impetus of the field as a possible solution to the set of re-emerging questions. Its reception then seems to be mostly consenting with the issues, which it was expected to answer. First of all, ANT seems to provide a sort of response to the debate between the proponents of traditional approaches to the IR studies and those favouring constructivist thinking, or more precisely independent streams of thoughts conceptualised in IR in the same period. Similarly, ANT enables to reconcile some inner disagreements within various constructivist streams particularly responding to the identified limits of Copenhagen school (Balzacq 2009; Buzan – Wæver – Wilde 1998), and other discursive approaches and taking into consideration the Marxist reservations about materiality of IR. ANT also offers insights that resonate with the call for greater attention to material aspects of security and IR in general, as presented for example in the work of Claudia Aradau or Peer Schouten (Aradau 2010; Schouten 2014b). This is also one of its most appreciated features within the IR context as proven by the comments made not only by Aradau, but also Thierry Balzacq, Myrriam Dunn Cavelty, Julien Jeandesboz, Daniel H. Nexon, Vincent Pouliot and Tony Porter (Aradau 2010; Balzacq and Cavelty 2016; Jeandesboz 2017; Nexon and Pouliot 2013; T. Porter 2013). The “return” to materiality is seen by some as a sort of balancing referring to prior materialist streams of thoughts (Aradau 2010, 494). At the same time, however, the means ANT uses in order to achieve this material-idea reconciliation are taken with an utmost caution.

### 1.6.1.1. *Place for Politics and Power*

Beuger and Nexon argue that another major contribution of ANT is the alternative solution to the agent-structure debate, which is very pertinent for IR (Bueger 2013, 338; Nexon and Pouliot 2013, 342). However, although some authors especially appreciate the ability of ANT to work with network constellations not based on geographical correspondence (Balzacq and Cavelty 2016; T. Porter 2013), which is a direct component of this solution, it seems that most of the IR authors share important reservations regarding ANT’s deeper premises.

First of all, ANT’s relationalist perspective might be refused in line with the already treated general critiques as proposing too confined space for reified power relations and

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relational analysis of texts. Nevertheless, it is a question to which extent this remains faithful to ANT's origins.

connected importance of performativity. In this context, for example, Aradau comments, in support of the work of Karen Barad: “the way in which performativity is used within actor-network theory evacuates it of its political history, particularly in relation to the political role that performativity plays in feminist and post-structuralist theories” (Aradau 2010, 496). As a result, and more generally, ANT might be seen as leaving either too little or too much space for politics. For example, Andrew Barry states that: “actor-network theorists were simply content to expand the realm of politics” (Barry 2013, 425).

However, Bruno Latour, has been careful about this pitfall and, as has already been stated, he distinguishes between different degrees of politization and even recognizes politics as a distinct mode (Latour 2007, 818, 2013, 132). The positive possibilities to deal with politics and power have also been argued for by Lisle, Johnson, and Bourne seeing in ANT as a possible way how to understand depoliticization of certain security relevant research tasks (Bourne, Johnson, and Lisle 2015, 312). Similarly, the understanding of “compositional outlook of agency” enables that “security analysis looks not only at the outcome of a specific action but also at the composition of this action” as discussed by Jeandesboz (Jeandesboz 2017, 2,14). This take on agency then definitely opens up the possibilities for understanding a composition of an action as well as the chain of accountability. Last but not least, even though violence might not seem to be prominent in ANT reasoning, as Best and Walter clarify in context of IR, it has been conceptualised at least in two ways as a struggle for enrolment and as a result of practice within networks (Best and Walters 2013, 347).

#### *1.6.1.2. Levels of Analysis - Men, State and War*

ANT in IR context might also be refuted as not proposing possibilities to analyse and to relate oneself to “macro” concepts (T. Porter 2013, 336; Nexon and Pouliot 2013, 344; Barry 2013, 429). This is again seen as particularly problematic in regard to the domain of IR and its interest in such general phenomena as state, war or international relations in themselves. This reservation is even more important given that it is also embraced by general proponents of ANT as above-mentioned Porter, or Nexon and Pouliot. ANT, however enables, at least theoretically, to approach a macro concept quite well. For ANT, as has already been stated above, all possible entities can be taken as the basic actant from which the network will be traced and, similarly, all agents are seen to be a network, which can be further decomposed as multiple actants, as Nexon and Pouliot, by the way correctly states for an individual (Nexon and Pouliot 2013, 343). The whole ANT

objection on a theoretical level is directed toward explaining the chosen actant by the network without a prior consultation of all network components. So, for the more theoretical part, nothing hinders the possibility to explain international relations by the account of individual states interactions. In practice, it is, however, true that using ANT's means and "methodological" guidance it is far easier to follow the human site actors. Exactly to remediate this, ANT broadens its methodological scope, far behind the panoramas and olygopticons in a more quantitative direction, which would have enabled also a practical approach to wider systems.

#### *1.6.1.3. Methodological Reconciliation*

Importantly, ANT does not claim that it should be the only research approach employed, as implied by some authors, for example: "...rather than ANT replacing competing approaches, ANT and these other approaches are better treated as complementary" (T. Porter 2013, 337). ANT only warns against particular malpractices of sciences and points out the consequences of scientific inquiries. In my opinion, it is thus advantageous to distinguish between ANT understood as a research background building on its ontological and epistemological solutions and taking into account the precautions it requires, and a direct use of ANT as a research design. Regarding the case of the research design use, it is then true that the shape of the inquiry must be definitely moulded by the case. However, the insistence on the need to be particularly "adjusted and reconfigured" (Barry 2013, 413) seems to be hiding only the truism that not all research questions might be researched by all methods. In this context it must be again noted that ANT does not refuse other methods and when it analyses the work of the centres of calculations it is not to refuse the results of their work. ANT simply is not anti-science, a stance already refuted in Pandora's hope (Latour 1999).

First of all, ANT has never fully criticised the quantitatively-oriented research. Instead, the biggest point of its critique is the use of 'unknown forces from behind' as a form of explanation, which is directed more against some types of sociological reasoning than against the quantitative inquiry itself (Latour 2005, 244). Similarly, ANT is not based on the denunciation of a particular type of knowledge, but more on equalisations of beliefs of multiple actors. We can see in multiple places how deeply ANT is based on the respect to the institution of science (and especially natural quantitative science) and how much it builds on the solidity of its facts (Latour 2013, 3, 2004, 228). Its abilities to produce a version of Nature are seen as achievements that should be preserved (Latour 1993, 134),



and it just calls for seeing them as relational and not absolute and for returning the consequences of knowledge production into the picture by renewing empiricism (Latour 2004, 231). The only reservations ANT has in this aspect is a premature explaining through a priori data aggregation (T. Venturini et al. 2015; T. Venturini and Guido 2013).

Moreover, ANT perceives the quantitative inquiries as a useful tool not only for oligopticons: “Equations are not only good at increasing the mobility of the capitalised traces, they are also good at enhancing their compatibility, transforming centres into what I will call centres of calculation.” (Latour 1987, 239). It is an option for “displacing the viewpoint” and approaching a particular thing which would be otherwise unattainable through the collected chain of reference (Latour 2013, 84). It could be even argued that the choice of ethnography is not fully commensurable with ANT, given the ethnographic interest in the local and the ANT perspectives of action as overtaken or with a hyperbole ‘other-taken’ (Latour 2005, 45; T. Venturini and Guido 2013). The connection of ANT and ethnography can be then interpreted more like a marriage of convenience with a method capable of dealing with an empirical detail than a fulfilment of the overall ideal. It may be seen as a result of disappointment by the state of quantitative methods employed by the so much criticised sociology of the time.

Lastly, then, an argument has been raised that ANT ethnographical urge is unsuited for IR, given the augmented amount of secrecy encircling politics and particularly state security (Barry 2013). As a response, Best and Waters argue that a researcher can either undertake an investigative inquiry, or more in a vein of ANT, follow the actions of: “Personae such as the investigative journalist and the whistleblower, techniques such as freedom of information requests, or wikileaks now become a part of the network that one studies” (Best and Walters 2013, 346–47).

I would like to add to this point that non-dependent on the approach, probably all research is expected to be based on data. Similarly, Barry’s argument that ANT is not interested enough in history as would be needed for IR, is very problematic given ANT long-term focus on how the existing entities came into being, connected with an inquiry into such topics as a history of vaccination (Latour 1988). In some aspects, particularly the methodological objections raised allude to the argument of “distinctive characteristics of IR,” which seems to emerge in case of any attempts of methodological import.

#### 1.6.1.4. *Assemblages*

In the IR discipline, the inspiration drawn from ANT has been mainly united around the term *assemblage*. The family of these approaches is quite broad and encompasses authors, who employ assemblage mostly as an isolated concept which allows empirical work and liberation from some overloaded theoretical frameworks. This is, for example, the view of Saskia Sassen (Sassen 2006, 5; Sassen and Ong 2014, 18–19). Others engage in the cherry-picking from more approaches (Williams and Abrahamsen 2014; Bueger 2013) and others who attempt to transform the notion of assemblage into a new “big theory” of IR (Corry 2014).

Even though there surely exist some shared perspectives and starting points with ANT, the connections are in many such contributions more distant and problematic than it could appear at the first sight. This illustrates that many choices can be made on the basis of the same premises. First of all, as already mentioned in the section 2.1, some works, as typically those of Saskia Sassen and Aihwa Ong, use only the isolated concept of assemblage as a descriptive term to show that some big concept is composed of more and more heterogeneous parts than expected (Sassen 2006, 5; Sassen and Ong 2014, 18-19,24). No other points from the complex perspective proposed by ANT are employed, whether that would be the relational character of reality, the flatness of description, the explicit work with the agency of non-humans, the notion of translation or the process of black boxing (Latour 2005, 30, 53, 171, 2013, 37, 1999, 184).

Similarly, when theoretical inspiration is included, its sources are often different from ANT. For example, Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams employ the Bourdieu’s field theory (Williams and Abrahamsen 2014, 27) criticized by Latour for search of objectivity without epistemological means to achieve it as well as for the explanation based on the results (i.e. symbolic capital) (Latour 1986a, 205,6, 2005, 139). Christian Bueger combines both approaches (Bueger 2014, 60). Further, as Stephen J. Collier noted: “Some authors here are obviously using assemblage thinking as primarily a deconstructive tool.” (Collier 2014, 34), in this he is probably, as well as Acuto and Curtis (Acuto and Curtis 2014, 10), also alluding to Sassen (Sassen and Ong 2014, 18). The primacy of political interests is also visible in ANT-inspired work by Valkenburg and van der Ploeg (Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015, 328,329). However, as has already been mentioned, these motivations are foreign and to some level contradictory to ANT in the form proposed by Bruno Latour (Latour 2005, 49, 1999, 268).

One of the more important points is also the distinction produced by the framing of the term *assemblage* itself. This concept was proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their book *A Thousand Plateaus* (Bousquet 2014, 94), its English form being more a distant analogy than the translation of the French original term *agencement* (Guillaume 2014, 108). Faithful to this term and its authors, many IR scholars engaging with relational concepts build their work primarily on Deleuze and Guattari and not on Latour. Within the volume *Assemblage Thinking and the International Relations* the Deleuzian inspiration is mentioned by Aihwa Ong and Stephen Collier (Sassen and Ong 2014, 19), Christian Bueger (Bueger 2014, 64), Roland Bleiker (Bleiker 2014, 94), Antoine Bousquet (Bousquet 2014, 94), Xavier Guillaume (Guillaume 2014, 106).

Meanwhile, ANT works with this term only sporadically and for labelling a collective use instead of the notion of actor-network (Latour 2005, 44, 46). This difference is not limited to the rhetorical level but it points to the different origin of each approach. Latour and Deleuze came up with the relational understanding of reality in parallel and more or less separately (Acuto and Curtis 2014, 5). Even though Latour occasionally mentions Deleuze (Latour and Lépinay, n.d., 39; Latour 2011, XI), he feels much more inspired by a process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (Latour 2011, X, XII, 2002, 31, 2013, 59, 2004, 244, 1999, 141) and pragmatists Walter Lippmann and John Dewey (Latour 2005, 162; Harman 2015, 16; Schouten 2014a, 85). Graham Harman further shows the point of incommensurability of both authors, when he claims that Deleuze perceives entities as linear in their existence, while Latour points to the necessity of reproduction of the entities from one moment to the next (Harman 2015, 93, 130, 2014, 124; Schouten 2014a, 85).

Even though it is most probably just a coincidence, the word root “assemble” appears maybe slightly more often as an act of *assembling*. This could be seen as an analogy to the particular attention paid to the process within the context of ANT. In correspondence with this observation, Peer Schouten emphasises the analysis of the process in his ANT-based works about airport security, which have profoundly inspired the thesis (Schouten 2010, 5, 2014b, 26). More specifically, the process of assembling can be seen as a synonym for recruitment and enlisting as described above (Latour 2005, 75, 259). However, the particular activity of *reassembling* is seen as a process of tracing an assemblage, that means the process of scientific inquiry (Latour 2005, 128). In this process-oriented manner, the reassembling activity is also employed here. Further, as described later in this chapter, this thesis goes beyond the adoption of the concept of

assemblage to a fuller endorsement of ANT as a whole set of ideas. This approach corresponds with the scarce instances of ANT-based works focusing on the processes entailed in the form of the chains of translation or interested in the role of mediators in these processes. This is the case of the recently published article by Marieke de Goede (Goede 2018) or an article of Rocco Bellanova and Gloria González Fuster (Bellanova and Fuster 2013).

### 1.7. ANT in this Work

The above-mentioned theoretical impetus had to be embodied in the practical research design, where the choice of ANT itself asked for reflection as well as the implementation of ANT principles. Here three stages were needed. Firstly, the clarification of the extent and the form of ANT insights adopted. Secondly, the practical formulation of the goals regarding the theory. Finally, the enactment of the research framework into the practical fieldwork. The construction of the ethnographic research fieldwork was a particularly demanding given the attempt to follow ANT's assumptions, which do not provide a particularly clear lead.

### 1.8. The Reasons for the Choice of ANT

As mentioned above, ANT got into the focus of Security Studies mostly because of its propositions about non-human actors which have been seen as one of the possible answers to the search for theoretical underpinnings of new inquiries dealing with the materiality of security. Nevertheless, as Claudia Aradau notes, ANT has much more to propose: “because of its distinctive ontology that first pays equal attention to the concept of production and appropriation of maps/meanings/artefacts/security arrangements, and second, incorporates the materials assembled in security arrangements as equally relevant as ‘social’ constructions.” (Aradau et al. 2014, 37). Similarly, the reasons for my choice of this framework have been primarily inspired by the treatment of non-humans, but they have gradually broadened.

First of all, even though ANT is more usually seen as a qualitative inquiry, it proposes solutions that allow embracing multiple methods and significantly combines the qualitative and quantitative ones. By this, I do not mean the pragmatic decision to cherry pick from the results of both and leave their deeper ontological accord open, but a real reconciliation of these perspectives. ANT has been inspired by Gabriel Tarde’s socio-economical views, which pay equal attention to the quantitative and qualitative guiding of research and are only sceptical to some types of generalisation (Latour and Lépinay, n.d.,

12, 19; Latour 2005, 208, 2004, 231). Further, Latour perceives possibilities proposed by digitalisation as an entirely new direction opening way to new types of inquiries based on following the traces of all actors in the virtual environment (Latour 2005, 208; T. Venturini 2012). This brings a potential for methodological creativity, innovations, enhancement as well as the use of methods from related disciplines.

The distinctive view of ANT bridges most of the traditional dichotomies present not only in Security Studies and allows going beyond the traditional debates between agent/structure, natural/social, explication/understanding, objective/subjective and, last but not least, neutral/critical. I perceive as very important that ANT allows making a socially relevant inquiry which is not based on the a priori assumptions of deconstructive criticality (Latour 2004, 239, 2005, 249). Even though the proposed solutions may not be in all cases completely satisfactory, it is definitely an opportunity to move forward from the emptied struggles and to look for new answers. It proposes an opportunity for a direct contact with the studied through experience in the field, an opportunity to get closer to the facts by renewing empiricism (Latour 2004, 231).

Getting into a more technical dimension of the particular topic of airport security, ANT is suitable for mapping particular processes in the airport security environment as well as for the identification of specific mechanisms of their composition and maintenance. The ANT's interest in action and actors' account of action (Latour 2005, 57) proposes a good fit for researching an environment focused on performance and efficiency. It allows approaching the variety of accounts of airport security as action, which I perceive as a central interest of my inquiry. In the same vein, the multiplicity of translations of the concept of security, and subsequent security production enables to follow different actors within the security provision. The diverging features of such understandings can be uniquely rendered by the chosen framework.

Similarly, even though it must be kept in mind that ANT is a type of description, rather than a tool for analysing technological networks (Latour 2005, 142), ANT is based on the assumption of tracing multiple actors and mediators. This embracing of dispersion and multiplicity makes it suitable for researching an environment of highly standardised procedures, complex processes, and entanglement of private and public groups' interests and interferences. Here comes into play the most distinctive feature of ANT - actors' heterogeneity - that should correspond with the focus on materiality and highly technical environment of airport security provision and especially the entanglements of machines and men. The importance of fluidity and the ability to explain through the tracing of a

network could be then an adequate tool for the mapping and reassembling of airport security (Law 2008, 146).

### 1.9. My Understanding of ANT

My understanding of ANT exploits it as a complex and solid system. On the theoretical places, where ANT does not provide answers, my understanding is influenced by the solutions provided in Latour's late oeuvre *An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence* (Latour 2013). In this book, Latour exceeds the borders of ANT and proposes some adjustments and clarifications to his previous work that is made just one of the constitutive parts of his new broader project (Latour 2013, 35, 41). My interpretation draws on these propositions especially in such instances where veridiction modes are discussed (Latour 2013, 55). Nevertheless, not all of them are implemented, given their distinct character in regard to my empirical work as well as some personal reservations.<sup>7</sup> I am following the effort to evaluate connections from the perspective of a studied network. Likewise, the notion of distinctive characteristics of various modes is kept, as well as the notion of the necessity to distinguish between the particular types of veridiction. However, I do not preserve the proposed finite list of modes. Finally, based on Latour's stance expressed in *An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence*, I personally do not consider the broadening of analytical perspective as a breach of the ANT project, but as an adjustment of some prior limitations, which is mutually well compatible with the original perspective (Harman 2015, 81; Latour 2013, 30).

Similarly, given the above-mentioned problematics of the things-to-things relations, in some aspects, I have opted more for the interpretation closer to the non-postpositivist perspective (however, it is problematic to link ANT between such poles). In these places, I draw on the post-ANT perspectives proposed by Ian Hodder, which have been discussed in the preceding segment (Hodder 2012). Nevertheless, I perceive these interpretations just as a variation already possible within ANT. The account is made to tell the stories of the parts and simultaneously propose a picture of the whole. Not only to follow the actors but also to show their complex arrangement and process of its continuous constitution.

In my account of airport security, I have been trying to approach all major participants, whether human or not, as actors and mediators and even though no symmetry

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<sup>7</sup> These reservations are connected mostly to some dividing characteristics of the concepts of the modes as well as the particular articulation of some modes, but given the scope and especially the empirical focus of this work I refrain from treating them here.

in their behaviour has been expected, no a priori division has been made (Latour 2005, 10, 76, 128; Haraway 1988, 592). Based on the Latour's inspiration from Tarde, all actors regardless of whether being a person, group of persons, things or ideas have been expected to have their spokesperson and within the account they will be represented on the basis of the information provided by this representative (Latour and Lépinay, n.d., 83; Latour 1987, 71, 2005, 31). These actors themselves have been, through their spokespersons, invited to define their actorship, delineate borders of their concepts against the others, set up their own frames and their theories (Latour 2005, 31, 147). An attempt has been made in their account to be "allowed to be stronger than that of the analysts" (Latour 2005, 30).

Airport security is understood as a continuously enacted process, which nevertheless evolves in its features in the longer term. The activity is seen as productive, and as such, the account allows the inspection of the origins, transformations and consequences of the airport security in its current European framework. Airport security is perceived as a network of interwoven chains of translation, where the insecure is translated into the secure and where the particular practices of veridiction are in place in order to produce a valid security outcome. The attention has been paid to the particular translations as well as to the values – logics - circulating within the network (Latour 2013, 37). Following these chains of translation, ANT allows me to explore the fine entanglements between humans, ideas and technologies and to show the specificity of a modernist arrangement based on a heterogeneous complexity. The interest in the chains of (security) translation is also shared by the work of Marieke de Goede (Goede 2018). However, she departs mostly solely from the understanding of the chain of translation proposed in Pandora's Hope and focuses on one instance of translation, the main emphasis being put on the production of the information about a threat presence as an analogy to a scientific fact (Latour 1999; Goede 2018, 5). As such, her understanding is closer to the original example of a scientific fact establishment and her main focus is de facto paid to the process of information abstraction, whereas the instances analysed in this work emphasize rather a facet of the ontological transformation of the object translated and target rather the regularity of practice. More generally, this understanding of the specificities of relations between entities endowed with such distinct features as humans and technologies are, offers insights into the logic of functioning of socio-technological systems in security. Especially, it points to the mutual dependencies derived from the exclusive features of all actors. Similarly, the controversies are followed as a mean to unlock the understanding of a particular chain of translation (Latour 2005, 23). Where the controversies do not seem to

be vivid anymore, the delimitations of individual chains are looked for in an effort to reveal them through the inquiry into their borders and their comparisons against their neighbours.

This type of network account enables to describe in detail particular actors engaged in the security provision as well as their connections. Network has been evaluated on the basis of existing connections, their length, and intensity of the interwoven between humans and non-humans — no artificial distinction will be made between micro and macro level (Latour 1983, 143), no a priori assumptions of hierarchy will be applied and similarly no measures of proximity or volume, others than those of connectivity will be presupposed (Latour 1996b, 371). The network has been understood as a “series of associations revealed thanks to a trial — consisting in the ethnographic investigation — that makes it possible to understand through what series of small discontinuities it is appropriate to pass in order to obtain certain continuity of action.” (Latour 2013, 33). That means a type of description (Latour 2005, 129, 1996b, 369). By observing technologies, interviewing airport management, employees and security subcontractors the ideas of security and risk management, as well as the process of security provision, can be understood in its design as well as an informal perception and practice. This allows the comparison of ideas employed during the planning of the system and the informal practice developed within this framework. Particularly, an account of different actors allows to follow the transformations of the concept of airport security and to understand the shared, as well as the diverging, lived rationalities. This proposes unique insights into the complexity of the security provision system. At the level of theoretical reflection, it also proposes some clues for comparison of the two most widely discussed logics — security based on profiling and security as visibility.

The process of tracing has been directed towards assembling the concept of airport security. Other even more extended assemblages of concepts such as power or the social have not been used as explanatory, and the description will follow in the constitutive direction of assembling (Latour 2005, 11, 83). Within the account, the facts have been regarded as matters of concern. That means that they have been presented as a part of the chains of translation, as a process of fabrication, as results of enrolling work of the actors tangibly connected to the network. (Latour 2005, 120, 1986a, 180). The quality of facts has been considered on the basis of the quality of their production and correct application of a particular mode of veridiction. (Latour 2009a, 64, 2013, 55). Within the thesis, the explanation has been attempted by tracing the network and describing particular



connections (Latour 2005, 103). The objectivity of description has been seen as increased through the inclusion of the chain by which it had been produced (Latour 2013, 154). By accepting to be ‘just a story’, a point of view, or a picture it has reduced the uncertainty resulting from the traditional claims for objectivity (Latour 2005, 127) because as decisive is not perceived the transcendence of truth but the possibility of the interpersonal sharing of the perspective (Haraway 1988, 580). As such, the account emphasizes the temporality and place specificity of the airport security depiction, which is seen as a network recording activity (Latour 1996b, 374, 378). Similarly, it is seen by its author as a generative description constituting new webs (Law 2007, 16; Latour 1996b, 374).

#### 1.10. The Practical Doing of ANT— Ethnography and Interviews

One of the ANT's imperatives urges an observer to visit the sites, where the studied concept is being produced and follow its constitution on the spot (Latour 1987, 63). These places are called building sites, construction sites or sites of production (Latour 2005, 88, 91, 193) and Latour supposes that: “...such location ‘in a field’ facilitated the correspondence between a particular group, network, or laboratory and a complex mixture of beliefs, habits, systematised knowledge, exemplary achievements, experimental practices, oral traditions, and craft skills.” (Latour 1986a, 54). They allow to follow the closing up or reopening a controversy, and thus to see things that are hardly achievable otherwise (Latour 1987, 258, 2005, 80). Similarly, they permit to “witness the connections between humans and non-humans.” (Latour 2005, 88).

The methodological goal is then the symmetrical anthropology, which follows the production of facts<sup>8</sup> as a positive process of creation, not as a debunking of the beliefs of others. This should be anthropology that allows spotting the fabrication of reality and the constitution of autonomy of agents (Latour 2009a, 35). It is a non-modern version of inquiry which has not been internalised, or maybe more realistically a version that cures the potential problems of modernist anthropology. The problems that render traditional anthropology asymmetrical are allegedly stemming from ruling the objects of nature out of the study and from limiting the inquiry exclusively to culture, or more precisely the culture of ‘others’ (Latour 1993, 91). The symmetrical anthropology should turn more toward the closer assemblages and treat them better by respecting their own perspectives and not attribute them to our structures (Latour 2009b, VI, 245). Nevertheless, as Latour himself

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<sup>8</sup> More precisely factishes, but for the sake of simplicity, I will leave out this concept from the already very complex web of ANT's terms.

acknowledges in the postscript to the second edition of *Laboratory Life*, this contrast has been made mostly to just a part of the ethnographic to traditional of the '70s, and as such it is more an outdated critic.

Further, as it has already been pointed out by others (T. Venturini and Guido 2013), Latour's definition of the means to these ends is rather vague. To the same extent he discusses the necessity "of bracketing our familiarity with the object of our study" as a precondition to "apprehend as strange those aspects... which are readily taken for granted" (Latour 1986a, 29), or otherwise said: "to remain as dumb as a carp" in order not to distance itself from the language of the group (Latour 2009b, 210). Similarly, the need to balance the proximity to the group, connected with the danger of 'going native,' with the detachment, which disables to relate oneself to the concepts of the groups studied is mentioned (Latour 2009b, 71, 1986a, 38, 44). However, otherwise, he mostly just insists on not leaving the site of production in the search for an explanation (Latour 2005, 167), letting the actors speak and shape the account (Latour 2005, 31, 147) and undertaking the participant observation (Latour 1986a, 28).

The most precise propositions that have been made are to be interested in: a) how causes and effects are attributed b) what points are linked to which other c) what size and strength these links have d) who the most legitimate spokespersons are e) how all these elements are modified during the controversy (Latour 1987, 202). Further, the most distinctive demand of ANT is to pay attention to the things and material associations, because they are the persisting traces of past actions (Latour 1986b, 264). Things and especially technologies are supposed to be hardly traceable when in function (Latour 2013, 217) and their tracing can be made easier by looking *besides* them and thus delimiting their function (Latour 2013, 221) or by "...imagin[ing] what other humans or other nonhumans would have to do where this character is not present." (Latour 2008, 155).

Even though Bruno Latour is concerned with the problem of production of ordered account from observation (Latour 1986a, 35, 43), he does not propose any solution to this problem. Even in the *Reassembling the Social*, which is the closest to 'the guide how to do ANT,' he limits himself to the proposition of using the method of "four notebooks." This traditional ethnographic method is based on leading separate accounts documenting 1) inquiry itself (time span, appointments, contacts) and researcher's immersion in the field 2) data storage and their possible dispatch in multiple distinct rewritable categories 3) field notes and brief ideas and 4) the subsequent feedback, influence of research itself (interview) or whole account on actors (Latour 2005, 133-135).

Such clues are definitively helpful, but for the successful execution of the field research unsatisfactory. For these reasons, I have turned to other methodological sources, which have helped me to overcome the methodological scarcity. First of all, I have employed important parts of the developmental research sequence of participant observation proposed by James P. Spradley in his book *Participant Observation* (Spradley 1980). This sequence enabled me to manage the whole process of field research. Even though I do not apply the whole sequence because my research inquiry is more closed and directed (toward the topic of the security production) than it is usual within the ethnographic tradition, it provides many very useful and practical clues about how to structure field work and especially participant observation. I have profited from the described course of action concerning the presence in the field, particularly in balancing the problematics of accessibility, obtrusiveness and specifics of participation (Spradley 1980, 47–53). Similarly, it has helped me to conduct the observatory activities by deepening my observatory sensitivity through proposing strategies to look for the object of interest, to construct points of interest from the field and to conduct focus observation; the proposed descriptive questions matrix was particularly very handy here (Spradley 1980, 32,40-43,82-83,100). Similarly, I have appreciated the stressed importance of activity repetition (Spradley 1980, 50). For the specific topics concerning the method of the interview, the books *Doing Interview-based Qualitative Research* (Magnusson and Marecek 2015) and *Constructing Questions for Interviews and Questionnaires: Theory and Practice in Social Research* (Foddy 1994) were used.

Maybe even more importantly, Spradley also proposes very good practical instructions about the analysis of field data, which is sometimes seen as a more intuitive activity and especially it even proposes the possibility to analyse particular processes and not only domains of human activities (Spradley 1980, 107). Further advice, in the questions of qualitative coding and field notes and the interviews analysis, has been sought particularly in the classics of the qualitative methodology by David Silverman *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook* (Silverman 2013) and *Interpreting Qualitative Data* (Silverman 2015) and Grounded Theory inspiration (Strauss, Corbin, and Corbin 1998). The data analysis was also enhanced with insights from thematic and cross cases analyses, particularly in regard to the manageability of the data as well as their intelligibility, which was sometimes enabled by data cross-tabulating (Miles et al. 1994; Boyatzis 1998). The data treatment is, nevertheless, described in a bigger detail in the following section.

### 1.11. Field Research and Data Processing

The whole field immersion began in autumn 2015, when, after months spent thinking about how to successfully approach the field, I visited the Safety and Security Conference organised annually by Václav Havel Airport Prague since 2007. After the conference, I contacted a present member of academia from Czech Technical University in Prague, who cooperated with the airport regarding a safety-based research project. Following multiple discussions and clarification this contact enabled my introduction to the airport security responsible representative. This academic contact and credentials together with the opened-minded and generous thinking of the airport security management finally enabled me to conduct an extensive field research, which resulted in this thesis. During the negotiations I strived for the robust design encompassing a method mix with a leading inductive research approach, putting a special emphasis on importance of personal experience in regard to the extensive lay knowledge present in this specialised field. This endeavour finally led to the field research employing a mix of qualitative methods and inductive analytical approach, building the whole account provided on the empirical grounding. The fieldwork consisted of full participant observation, observatory activities and a set of interviews with general airport security control employees, management, travellers and other relevant agents.

The first stage of the research, namely the participant observation took place between 8 June and 6 July 2017. During this time, I passed through the admission procedure, including a formal employment and medical examination. This was followed by the general security training provided to all new employees and further by the specific training of the security screeners. Lastly, I spent a week within the on the job training practice, where I conducted ordinary physical security checks under training supervision. I thus passed the whole training procedure usual for the part-time security searchers, who are contracted as a supplementary force for passengers' screening. This research phase particularly enabled me a nearly ordinary immersion into the working conditions and authentic experience in continuous mastering of the procedures and the within system orientation. This experience proved to be particularly valuable in regard to the later analysis of procedures employed in regard to the comparison of legislative framework, performance training expectation and the field practice. Particularly the astonishing twist and turns hidden within the system could have been revealed from the first-hand authentic experience. Similarly, the direct involvement enabled me to reflect the existing training system and to a limited extent also to go through the instances of the system control and

supervision. In regard to the practical performance the participant observation particularly enabled me to experience the physical demands of the job and especially the practice of passenger-employee encounters. This particularly proved to be very valuable in a balanced reflection of the field situation. Last but not least, the on the job trial also helped me to create a research rapport to the interviewees from the ranks of the employees. As a possible drawback I can see a potential partial loss of the “academia knowledge” authority, connected with mistakes made during a training; however, these were mostly taken positively as a proof of a frank and equal attitude. Simultaneously, occasionally personal skills analogically helped to promote a positive personal presentation promoting further cooperation.<sup>9</sup>

In accordance with the prior agreement with the airport management, my training did not continue after the week of the on the job training to the X-ray training course, which is normally undertaken by the full-time employees. This decision resulted from the balance of costs and effects on both sides. I instead concluded the full participant observation phase and continued as an observer. These observations were conducted from 10 July till 29 September. During this phase, I observed the security provision on most checkpoints operated by the Security Control, thus witnessing a wide range of control situations as well as their diverging courses of action. The observations were organised to witness a maximum variation of the practice as well as to concentrate on liminal parts of the security provision. The list of observations is presented in appendix 1.

Simultaneously, between 10<sup>th</sup> July and 9<sup>th</sup> October, interviews were conducted.

The first part of the interviewing body is composed of the interviews with general employees. These interviews were framed as in-depth, open-ended interviews, where the follow-up questions in the research protocol substantively developed on the basis of the insight provided in the previous interviews. The data dynamics was followed while identifying concepts and searching for their variability or dimensions, in the words of Grounded Theory (Strauss, Corbin, and Corbin 1998, 117). The research protocol is available in appendix 2.

The respondents were addressed while present at particular checkpoints during the night time. Given that shifts and positions rotate along a specific pattern, an approximately

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<sup>9</sup> For example, I struggled with the breast-check methodic, and in one examination I wrote that the United Kingdom is in the Schengen area (I hope my students will never find out). Conversely, particularly language skills enabled me to facilitate some immediate clashes with passengers, and the three-dimensional imagination, even though this could not be compared with the experienced employees, proved me “to have a good X-ray eye” and worth further discussion (particularly in regard to the training unit).

representative sample of employees, slightly favouring the longer-employed ones and men, was addressed. However, given the qualitative nature of the whole inquiry, representativeness is not a cornerstone issue. Overall, 41 interviews were acquired. Out of this, 22 interviews were recorded and 18 written down based on employees' preferences. Out of these 41 interviews, 26 are interviews with a single person, 14 interviews are double interviews, and in one case three people are present. These interviews were conducted during the night shifts. By conducting them at night, I profited from the possibility to interview the employees when on the job, which increased the willingness to participate, as well as the possibility to conduct an interview without any outside disturbances. The double interviews are the result of the guards organisation. All Security Control employees including the crew leads are encompassed within this body. During the daytime, two other interviews with the employees responsible for training were conducted. For the sake of anonymity, these interviews were analysed together with the general employee group. Similarly, ten single interviews, six recorded and four written, were conducted with the airport management, HR unit and administration. Given their content, these interviews were analysed as a second distinct group. Nevertheless, an emphasis was put on the group characteristics, in order to take a different organisational placement of the respondents into account. These interviews usually lasted between 45 minutes and an hour and a half. During the interviews with the employees, a broad range of topics was covered, including the internal workplace conditions. In order to protect the anonymity of the interviewed personnel, when quoting an employee, the concrete date of interview recording was omitted and instead, the interview was numbered in order of appearance in the thesis.

The second part of the interviewing body is composed of the interviews with travellers. These interviews were conducted as semi-structured, the research protocol is available in Appendix 3. The travellers were addressed primarily on the basis of their flight, where an effort was made to interview at least some travellers on each flight type. Further, such flights which proved to be specific during observations and were also perceived as such by the employees, were targeted more intensely, in order to explain their specificity. Within the particular flight or flight type, passengers were addressed also in order to produce the sample which would encompass the maximum variation of instances. This procedure again reflects the above-mentioned approach adopted by Grounded Theory (Strauss, Corbin, and Corbin 1998, 113). Overall, 167 short interviews ranging from 3 to 15 minutes were conducted, out of which six were written. Here again, in 32 cases, two persons, usually couples travelling together, were interviewed at once, and in three cases

three persons were present. A large number of interviews was influenced by the effort to consider the possible national diversity of airport security perception. This need was emphasised by the participant observation, which witnessed significant differences in the passengers' reactions to the control. Secondly, an effort was made to collect quality and rich interviews which will not be negatively influenced by the language barrier. To lower the language barrier, interpreters were used to reach Chinese, Arabic and Russian-speaking travellers. As a supplement to the interviews, twenty-two Korean questionnaires were handed over to Korean speakers and were later translated by an interpreter. These questionnaires were used to differentiate the Asian travellers. The researcher conducted interviews in Czech<sup>10</sup>, English, French and in the cases where a Russian speaker was randomly encountered, in Russian. Similarly, a few Hebrew detours were made in some interviews with the Israelis. These, as well as the Russian interactions, were later checked by a native speaker.

Lastly, five interviews with external airport agents with the relevance to the security were conducted. These interviews included a Foreign Police representative, a Customs Administration of the Czech Republic representative, a leading representative of ICTS Czech Republic and El-Al in the Czech Republic and a supervising employee of one of the two handling enterprises. The list of all interviews is presented in Appendix 4.

The choice of the interview form reflected the time possibilities of the airport environment, where longer and thus less guided interviews were made possible by the airport management and shift schedule, whereas a longer interviewing of passengers, while covering the variability, was not possible due to the screening and departure organisation. Even more important was the rapport between the actor and the topic, whereas for the employees the research question and the whole phenomenon of airport security presented a distinctive part of everyday work and, in many cases, also a key life experience. The interview in these cases thus encompassed broad deep-thought ideas, which enabled to shape the whole inductively-oriented research activity; for the travellers the problematic was not usually an important part of their lives and as such a more closed framing rendered more specific reactions.

In accordance with ethical recommendations, the research was conducted as open, with full awareness of all contracted parties and personnel, and my presence was

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<sup>10</sup> Czech was also used when Slovak travellers were interviewed, given the mutual comprehensibility of both languages.

contractually adjusted on the level of Letiště Praha, a.s.. This approach was chosen in regard to the whole research design, where an exceptional emphasis has to be paid in all phases to the preservation of a balanced view, and particularly also to an externally perceptible aura of a balanced view. The possible pitfalls being perceived as a “spy from the management” on one side, and confused-and-not-well-oriented-in-the-wider-picture on the other side. Under these conditions, for example, an introductory covert phase would have resulted in significant complications in the later interview phase. Similarly, following personal normative persuasion as well as the implications of the chosen theoretical framework, an attempt was made to give an equal voice and possibility to present oneself to all sides. In regard to these presumptions, special attention was paid to the preservation of encompassed security-sensitive information. In some places, therefore, this thesis intentionally avoids the full description of sensitive security details. Similarly, all interviews were preceded by the informed consent of the interviewed person, which clarified the conditions of the interview conduct and recording – particularly regarding the anonymity of the recorded material.

Subsequently, all acquired recordings were transcribed. Transcriptions were made in their original language when comprehensible to the author; otherwise, the already interpreted version was used. The only exceptions to this were the Russian interviews, which were translated before the transcription, given the possible unease caused by transcribing non-Latin alphabet materials on non-matching keyboard. In the list of interviews, the original language is marked by abbreviation.

The transcription was followed by an analysis. All materials were coded in MaxQDA 11 (*MaxQDA* (version 11) 2015) using data-driven inductive codes. The coding scheme was constructed based on the data study before the coding, minor changes were made during the coding and were subsequently recoded. Given the structuring of the thesis as a case study, individual interviews were treated as units of analysis, and an expression of the idea was chosen as a coding unit. Subsequently, an analytical choice was made to encompass a concrete list of codes into the analysis. These codes were chosen in order to provide an account of security provision and its process parts as well as to provide an account of driving concepts of the security provision. The coding list is available in Appendix 5, the codes chosen for analysis are in black, others in grey and italics. The number in brackets states the overall numbers of codes appearance within the whole corpus. Specific important topics were left out of the analysis given its scope and possible focus. Most importantly, the inner dynamics of Security Control functioning and



management have been left out. Similarly, the problematic of cooperation between security control and other units of the airport system and the dynamics of the employee-passenger interaction is not treated. This selection had to be made in order to preserve the analytical focus and scope. However, I am fully aware that important parts of the system logic were left out as a result, particularly in regard to the commercial logic of civil aviation security and subsequently also in regard to the cornerstone and a highly problematic role of the passenger within the system. Nevertheless, this choice was directed by the thesis focus leading rather toward a procedural analysis than toward a broader outside logic of the airport security position in regard to contracting authorities. This later topic has already been treated in a bigger detail by existing literature and its inclusion would have not maximally profited from the access options gained and would have, in my opinion, widen too much the scope of the thesis.

Subsequently, the chosen codes were internally examined following the logic of thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1998), interpreting their inner meaning and variation. When needed, a further sub-coding was enacted in order to deepen the understanding of the codes dimensions. The relationship among the codes was inquired as well as the relations between the codes and cases. Lastly, the co-occurrence between particular sub-codes' emergences and demographically clustered groups of coding units was examined in the meaningful cases. Nevertheless, the cross-tabulation tools were mostly used only as a supplement to the inquiry into the particular codes and their dimensions. The chosen quotations serve only as an illustrative representation of salient results based on broad presence within the data. In all cases, where a unified contrasting view to a chosen quotation or presented point was noted, the fact is mentioned in the text.

## 2. Airport Security and Its Origins

Airport security is a contested notion that undergoes a perpetual development. This thesis' goal is to provide a thick description of its embodiment in the mid-2017 at Václav Havel Airport Prague. As mentioned earlier, this is not a generalizable account, but surely an account that resembles the situation at other, especially European, airports. Even though this thesis focuses on the action that is taken on the spot, the entanglement of this airport and others cannot be denied, and the particular strength of such a connection is a result of shared historical notions, as well as the consequence of a common international and especially European legislative framework. This shared notion can also be employed to come up with a premature definition of airport security, preceding its particular embodiment. Airport security is fluid – following the description proposed by Peer Schouten; it is an essentially contested concept, a controversy that is never settled, where the agreement over the definition of threats means a way to counter them and where the enactment of protection is a result of crossing interests (Schouten 2010, 2). An airport is defined by its major functions in terms offered by Marc Salter as a provider of flight operations, terminal operations, cargo operations, and aviation security (Salter 2008c, 3). Airport security, as a complex notion, is then specific by its strict division of security and safety, where these concepts concord with the concept of danger and risk, “because safety is closely associated with the risk that the company chooses to run while security involves the threat the company is exposed to” (Petersen 2008, 413).<sup>11</sup> The definition of dangers is subsequent to the intrusions, and as such, airport security is a reactive concept (Shim et al. 2013; Salter 2008c, 13). Traditionally being understood in realist terms of critical infrastructure protection (Salter 2008e, 246; Boyle and Speed 2018, 2), it can be defined “in terms of passenger, baggage, and airport employees screening; perimeter and sterile area access; and terminal security” (Salter 2008c, 4). Nevertheless, in regard to Security Studies, particular airport security features have been emphasised within the academic attention paid to them, and cannot be omitted before the field will be approached.

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<sup>11</sup> Czech language has just one word for safety and security, as a result, in exceptional cases, the safety and security professionals might use English words, when willing to point out the difference. However, generally, this notion is distinguished by context, the English-speaking respondents were usually not aware of the difference, as well as one of the explicitly questioned native Englishman (British traveller 1 2017; Italian traveller 6 2017; German traveller 1 2017; BEK M&A&C 1 2017).

## 2.1. Airport Security in Security Studies

Airport security was long overlooked within Security Studies even though it was encompassed to a limited extent within the broader scope of Terrorism Studies. The interest has been slowly rising only as a consequence of private military and security companies research. As a result, the greatest focus within the discipline thus has been definitely paid to the ownership structure of the airport security, which is seen as a case of security outsourcing or hybridisation and mostly is framed, following the discussion proposed in the preceding chapter (1.6.1.4), in terms of security assemblages. The flagrant example of this development is the work of Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, who, being interested in private military and security companies, see them as Bourdieu-framed security assemblages (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007; Williams and Abrahamsen 2014), analyse the airport security constellations as other instances of assemblages presence (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, 2, 2009, 4). The assemblages are used as explanatory substances clarifying the new organising logic that structures the knowledge of the field (Bigo, n.d.) and where: “National governments instigated many of the activities, institutions, and structures now identified with globalization, and they continue to operate through transformed national institutions that enable and facilitate their functioning” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, 172). The preponderance of assemblage understanding as de facto an ownership constellation of airport security is also employed by one of the most productive authors dealing with the airport security topic – Mark Salter, in *Politics at the Airport* (Salter 2008a, XIII), where not only Salter but also other contributors (Klauser, Ruegg, and November 2008) accept this notion. Similarly, it is also emphasised by Peer Schouten in his article *Security as controversy: privatizing security inside global security assemblages* (Schouten 2010) and present in *Security as controversy: Reassembling security at Amsterdam Airport* (Schouten 2014b, 29). These foundations are also shared by Randy Lippert and Daniel O’Connor *Security Assemblages: Airport Security, Flexible Work, and Liberal Governance* (Lippert and O’Connor 2003). The consequences of public-private partnership or the differences resulting from these options in the context of airport security governance are then analysed by Karen Lund Petersen, who points to the intersection of newly formulated needs for horizontal and vertical governance (Petersen 2008, 409). Similarly, Mathias Leese discusses the contested character of airport security as a matter situated between private and public good (Leese 2016). In some cases, the ownership structure is proposed as a possible explanation of the difference in airport security provision (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003). Similar connections are also

proposed between privatisation and more distant safety (de Bruijne, Kuit, and ten Heuvelhof 2006).

When drifting further from the Security Studies' focus toward business administration literature – a series of case studies describing the whole process of airport privatization have been conducted perceiving privatization of security as a tool to improve safety and security in developing countries (Janecke 2010), or discussing the security as a part of competences remaining under the state control after privatisation (Youssef 2013). This kind of studies is usually connected with the management-based literature like the *Journal of Airport Management*. This kind of analyses further includes, for example, *Practice Papers Getting it right first time: Airport privatisation south of the Sahara* (Frankl 2012) or *Brazilian airport privatisation in a booming economy* (Frank and Krpata 2013). Lastly, the airport ownership structure has been discussed in the specific context of the USA and the post-9/11 airport security nationalisation and subsequent sporadic reprivatization. This focus is shared by the articles *Airport Security: How to Avoid the Hassles* (Poole Jr. 2003), *Aviation security: An evaluation of the 'opt-out' option for airport operators* (Sweet et al. 2009) or *Airport privatisation in the USA: Recent legal developments and future outlook* (Reimer 2008). In the following pages, I leave the question of private-public division untouched and also, as described in the previous chapter, I do not employ the sole assemblage concept in this meaning; rather I engage with a limited part of the assembling process.

The focus on public-private interactions is interlinked with the interest in practices of security governance promoted by private actors. These actors are by many authors framed as 'managers of unease' and as Mark Salter writes: "I follow the work of Didier Bigo, Louise Amoore, Marieke de Goede, and Anna Leander, who argue that an important activity of the 'managers of unease' in particular security sectors is the construction of the 'risk' field itself and the concomitant construction of expert knowledge in that field" (Salter 2008e, 243–44). The risk, and particularly the risk assessment, is seen as the end product of the hybrid notion of security and as such, it is subject to intense scrutiny, which is an approach of Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster (Aradau and Van Munster 2007). This focus is also employed by Salter in his above-cited article *Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification, and Aviation Security* (Salter 2008e), as well as in his other publications: *Expertise in the aviation security field* (Salter 2013), *Fear of Flying: The Management of International Aviation Security* (Salter 2007), and *Risk and imagination in the war on terror* (Salter 2008d). The interest in risk assessment within counterterrorism in connection

to public-private merges is, for example, also shared by the already mentioned Karen Lund Petersen in *Risk, responsibility and roles redefined: Is counterterrorism a corporate responsibility?* (Petersen 2008) or Pat O'Malley's *Risks, Ethics, and Airport Security* (O'Malley 2006). Similarly, attention is paid to the manner in which security is rendered as a technological end-product of these practices (Schouten 2010). Schouten treats it here, similarly to the understanding proposed by Govert Valkenburg and Irma van der Ploeg, as a way of translating the abstract concept into a detailed procedure (Schouten 2010; Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015). As another instance of this array of work Bart A. de Jong could be mentioned, who, drawing on ANT, analyses the evolution of noise abatement measures at the Schiphol airport in Amsterdam (Jong 2012).

The interest in risk and risk assessment draws on ideas of general results of calculation in knowledge production (Baele, Balzacq, and Bourbeau 2018), as well as on the problematization of particular calculative approaches and their outcomes (Aradau and Blanke 2018). In the context of airport security, besides the aforementioned outcomes of risk calculations, the discussion has been contextualised sporadically as a component of passengers data processing (Leese 2014). In another context, the data processing is also analysed in regard to the transparency of the system. This topic has been treated by Colin J. Bennet in *What Happens When You Book an Airline Ticket? (Revisited): The Collection and Processing of Passenger Data post 9/11* (Bennett 2013).

However, the interest in airport security has also other inspiratory resources beyond the ownership and calculation. Namely, it is the interest in airports as “‘nonplaces’ in which social relations are based on mobility rather than fixity” (Salter 2008a, IX). This renders an airport as a liminal place of space-bound exceptionality (Feldman 2007), where the movement is securitised and employed for surveillance at once. This topic has been addressed especially by Peter Adey in his works *Aerial Life: Spaces, Mobilities, Affects* (Adey 2010), *Surveillance at the Airport: Surveilling Mobility/Mobilising Surveillance* (Adey 2004), *Mobilities and modulations: The Airport as a Difference Machine* (Adey 2008), *Divided we move: the dromologies of airport security and surveillance* (Adey 2006), or similarly, again in the public-private context, by Gallia Lahav *Mobility and border security: The U.S. Aviation System, the State, and the Rise of Public-Private Partnerships* (Lahav 2008). For Adey as well as for Lahav, the mobility is nevertheless seen only as a distinct characteristic, which is a source of insecurity and which might serve to promote surveillance. The differences in speed are then perceived as an inherent result of passengers' inequalities defined in economic terms (Adey 2006, 196). This

understanding is shared by David Lyon *Filtering flows, friends, and foes* (Lyon 2008). Importantly, in his other works, Lyon connects the idea of the movement with visualisation of personal position as a security precondition (Lyon 2006), similarly to Thomas Martin, who speaks about the prevention as a forgoing visualisation of the potential threat resulting from a person's behaviour (Martin 2018). The direct connection between airport security and visualisation has also been proposed by Rachel Hall, who nevertheless renders visualisation as a cultural insurance of the presence of security (Hall 2007). Importance of visuality has also been proposed by Rocco Bellanova and Gloria Gonzalez Fuster (Bellanova and Fuster 2013). In this regard, this thesis takes a further step by proposing the visualisation as the act of turning or translating an entity into the ontological state of security, as described in chapter three (3.3).

Given the prevalence of technologies in contemporary airport security provision, also this topic has been treated, and the ANT framework, or at least a more general "materiality turn" inspiration, is used relatively often in this perspective, as was already argued in the preceding chapter (1.6). Similarly to this thesis, which focuses on a limited set of human-machine interaction within the passengers' security provision, the interaction of humans and technologies has been analysed by Debbie Lisle and Mike Bourne (Lisle and Bourne 2017). The production of an airport security event and a resulting technological reaction in regard to the liquids has been then dealt by Marijn Hoijsink (Hoijsink 2017). Nevertheless, most of the academic attention within the Security Studies has been paid to just one particular technology – a body scanner. The body scanner, as a security controversy, has been analysed by Peer Schouten, who explains on this example the process through which an entity is established as secure or insecure (Schouten 2014b). Similarly, the organisational background of body scanners installation, as well as the specificities of passenger-employee reactions to this technology, have been analysed by Matthias Leese and Anna Koenigseder (Leese and Koenigseder 2015; Leese 2015). Further, the delimitation of normality regarding disability in a body scanner context has been dealt with by Govert Valkenburg and Irma van der Ploeg (Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015), and in regard to gender by Paisley Currah and Tara Mulqueen (Currah and Mulqueen 2011). In the context of public attitudes, this case has also been analysed by Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, Kate Bowers, and Kevin Chetty and in regard to the controversy settling by Rocco Bellanova and Gloria González Fuster (Mitchener-Nissen, Bowers, and Chetty 2012; Bellanova and Fuster 2013). This thesis, leaving the problematic of the body scanner aside, focuses more broadly on the whole set of screening technologies

as the X-ray, walk-through metal detector, hand-held metal detector, quantum sniffer and liquid detector. Similarly, it deals with screening procedures and technological tools, particularly the hand search, random sampling, and also threat image projection.

On a more applied research level, a broad series of passenger satisfaction analyses have been conducted, evaluating either passengers' satisfaction in regard to security provision (Bezerra and Gomez, n.d.; Sakano, Obeng, and Fuller, n.d.; Gkritza, Niemeier, and Mannering 2006), or inquiring into the definition of passengers' needs (Gupta n.d.). In this regard, this thesis, through explaining passengers' notion of the control and their behaviour rationales, proposes an option to deepen the understanding of passengers' satisfaction. Moreover, in this rather quantitative manner, also many effectiveness-oriented studies have been conducted, concentrating on the system level of security provision; for example, analysing the airport spatial development in regard to security demand (Forsyth 2007), which is mirrored in the thesis interest in spatiality. Particular attention has also been paid to the X-ray technologies and efficiency of baggage screening (Leone and (Rachel) Liu 2005), similarly (Skorupski and Uchroński 2018). Its efficiency has also been evaluated in regard to employees evaluation (Hofer and Schwaninger 2005) and regarding the possibility of employment of new technological solutions based on deep learning (Rogers et al. 2016). Similarly, this thesis explains some aspects of the human-X-ray interaction relevant to the image interpretation, as well as to their mutual dependence in control provision. Also, the problematic of threat image projection and the individual evaluation based on this concept is briefly discussed and analysed.

However, many aspects of the topic still remain omitted within the Security Studies literature, which is not surprising given the topic precipitous development and its extreme youth. Importantly, the quick development realised largely in reaction to the transgressions established the contemporary form of aviation security, which thus must be examined to understand the current form of the system. For these reasons, the aviation security development regarding the unlawful act and the following regulation will be examined in the ensuing lines.

## 2.2. History and Legislation

Following the first known attack perpetrated by eighteen-year-old Clarence René Frechette, who assaulted the pilot with a hammer en route to Pontiac, Michigan on 15 May 1928, only eight air-safety incidents occurred until 1959. These included a hostage situation, where a pilot of Ford Tri-Motor operated by Pan American Grace Airways was

detained for ten days by local revolutionary forces after he had landed at the Arequipa-Rodríguez Ballón Airport in Peru in 1931 ('ASN Aircraft Accident Ford Tri-Motor Registration Unknown' 2018; McCrie and Haas 2018, 150–51). It was only after the beginnings of mass air-transportation in the 1960s, when the civil aircrafts started falling prey to intended man-originating intrusions (Adey 2004, 1368). Since 1961, following the Cuban revolution, the airplane hijacking became a way of emigration and political self-expression on both sides of the Mexican Bay.

Similarly, also the extortion-motivated events as those of D. B. Cooper emerged ('ASN Aircraft Accident Boeing 727-51 N467US' 2018) and with a little delay, the hijackings connected with Palestine Liberation Organization followed. Even though these never reached the popularity of the Cuban route, the numbers spiralled quickly reaching 89 airplane hijackings in 1969 worldwide (McCrie and Haas 2018, 151). These hijackings, although costly and disruptive, usually encompassed and intended to employ only a relatively limited amount of violence – the main goal was publicity, own transportation, and sometimes also the precious spoil – an aircraft (Koverdynský 2014, 12). In these circumstances, pilots were instructed to cooperate to minimise the possible collateral damage (Salter 2008c, 13).

In the Israeli context, the imminent threat was nevertheless higher, given the broader political stakes. Israel was thus the first to react, already following the El Al hijacking on 23 July 1968, establishing the department of aviation security, which came with the idea of terrorist profiling used ever since (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011, 873). Israeli security concept thus emerged separately and remains distinct till nowadays. Two years later, the classical checkpoint, consisting of a walk-through metal detector and newly designed X-ray, was introduced in the US, with the intention to detect guns and knives taken on board (McCrie and Haas 2018, 155). However, the US airlines did not really feel urged to engage in the problem, given the relatively lower stakes on their side, rather non-violent attacks, and governmental interventions. They were also willing to avoid additional costs, and thus pressed for the profiling-based solution, which was temporarily enacted together with the newly established Sky Marshals (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 13). This, however, turned out to be ineffective with the advent of international terrorism, prompting the US Congress to pass the Federal Aviation Security Act in 1972, which stipulated a universal passenger screening from the beginning of 1973 (McCrie and Haas 2018, 155). This emergency legislation was replaced by the Anti-Hijacking Act and the Air Transportation Security Act in 1974, which endowed Federal Aviation Administration



(FAA) with a coordinating role responsible for general guidelines production, as an initiator and sponsor of new technologies development. Whereas the responsibility for airport area was given to the airport and airlines were entrusted with the screening of passengers, luggage and cargo (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 14). The airports worldwide followed, although elsewhere, the security provision remained strictly under the state jurisdiction at least until 1987, when the United Kingdom opted for privatisation (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 9; de Bruijne, Kuit, and ten Heuvelhof 2006, 452).

This development was mirrored in the international relations environment. A series of multilateral treaties focusing on international aviation security and criminal prosecution were concluded, namely in Tokyo 1963, Hague 1970, and Montreal 1971. Finally, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), founded in 1944 as a specialised agency of the United Nations ('About ICAO' n.d.), which was, similarly to FAA, originally tasked with general technical coordination, incorporated the content of these agreements in 1974 by the adoption of Annex 17, which broadened its scope of operation to the area of airport security (ICAO, n.d.). Similarly, other international organisations focusing on civil aviation gradually incorporated the aviation security into their scope of interest. The European Conference on Civil Aviation, founded in 1955, incorporated security in 1985 by the publication of Doc 30, which has two parts - Part I (Facilitation) and II (Security) ('History - Ecac-Ceac.Org' n.d.).

Last but not least, IATA - a non-governmental organisation coordinating activities of airlines, established security as one of its seven working areas and assisted during the preparations of Tokyo, Hague and Montreal treaties ('IATA - History - Growth and Development' n.d.). Importantly, ECAC and IATA maintain since then important votes in security policies formulation with significant influence on ICAO. This is given by the European-based membership of ECAC and the business-based coordination proposed by IATA. For example, the transportation of dangerous goods, being a boundary zone of security and safety, is still generally directed by IATA regulation ('IATA - History - Growth and Development' n.d.; IATA n.d.).

At the beginning of the 1980's, airport security was essentially conceptualised as a protection of passengers on board against the possibility of armed hijacking. Although some precedents, such as Lod Airport massacre of 1972 or Rome and Vienna airports attacks of 1985, did exist, the provision of security corresponded with this notion – the boarding passengers and their hand luggage were screened to discover metal objects right before boarding the plane (Salter 2008c, 13, 2008e, 245). This conceptualisation also led to

the de facto division of airport security as the “on air security” and the “on the ground” perimeter protection. In the US context, this distinction directly resulted from the aforementioned legislation, as pointed out above. Nevertheless, the similar practice also developed in other states, given the special training needed for the on the board checks.

Already in the 1980s’, attempts were made to broaden the scope of security to hold luggage by the use of luggage reconciliation – a technique ensuring that no luggage shall be boarded without a boarding of its owner (‘Baggage Reconciliation’ 2013). In practice, this recommendation was disregarded (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 15). This situation changed slowly, primarily as a reaction to the bombing of the Air India flight 182 from Montreal to Bombay via London on 23 June 1985 leaving 329 casualties, and the bombing of Pan Am flight PA103 from London to New York on 21 December 1988 leaving 259 fatalities, which both employed an explosive device covered in the hold luggage embarked on board without the traveller (‘ASN Aircraft Accident Boeing 747-237B VT-EFO’ 2018; ‘ASN Aircraft Accident Boeing 747-121A N739PA’ 2018). During the investigation, it was revealed that in the case of Pan Am, the baggage reconciliation was not enacted even though it was obligatory at the airport of origin (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 15). Nevertheless, in the US, the positive matching of luggage only started in 1989 for the flights to Europe and the Middle East, and only in 2001 for the domestic ones. Similarly, the screening of hold luggage, which started to be promoted as a component of hold luggage security led in 2001 to the screening of 10 % of hold luggage in the USA and 80% of hold luggage in Europe (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 8). Even though the investigation later pointed to a technical failure, the efforts for reconciliation further intensified after the TWA flight 800 from Athens to New York had exploded over the Long Island on 17 July 1996 (Leone and (Rachel) Liu 2005, 69; ‘ASN Aircraft Accident Boeing 747-131 N93119’ 2018).

The decade of the 1980’s also brought another argument for a general luggage screening. On 17 April 1986, Anne-Marie Murphy, a 32-year-old pregnant Irish woman, attempted to board Boeing 747 flight 016 in its second leg from London to Tel Aviv. El-Al security agents discovered an explosive device in her luggage she was not aware of. The investigation revealed that the device was plotted in by her partner and her child’s father Nizar Hindawi, a Jordanian national, motivated by his ties toward Syrian government (‘Anne-Marie Murphy Case (1986)’ n.d.). A similar mode of operation was also communicated in the so-called “Helsinki warning,” where an anonym in a phone call warned the U.S. embassy eight days before the above-mentioned Pan Am flight PA103 in

Helsinki that an unaware Finnish woman would carry a bomb on the board of Pan Am in the next fortnight. However, finally a different tactics was enacted ('Report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism' 1990). These events singled out the idea of the naïve perpetrator, one of the Israeli terrorist profiles, which has since then served as an argument denouncing the ideas of "risk group" travellers identification and supporting the general equal screening (Committee on Commercial Aviation Security et al. 1996).

However, the encounter of the general and risk-based approaches was not over. In comparison to mostly state-owned security provision in Europe, the focus on general luggage screening and reconciliation was not the only one to come in the US. Given the accountability of airlines for performance and costs for the onboard check, an old idea of a profiling-based solution was resurrected as a temporary measure until the explosive detection technologies would be operable to perform luggage screening. As such, the Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS) was born (Adey 2004, 1372). CAPPS relied on the collection of Passenger Name Records (PNR) and their comparison against the intelligence-based watch lists. Selected bags were then further inspected for explosive presence – as such, for example, nearly a half of 9/11 perpetrators' bags were checked (J. Bennett, n.d., 54).

The attack of September 9, 2001, marked a watershed in airport security. The biggest earthquake came of course in the US, leading to the establishment of Transportation Security Authority (TSA), which was newly charged with the provision of nationalised airport security, including all but five airports (Sweet et al. 2009, 51; Lahav 2008, 92; Salter 2008c, 15). In Germany, in contrast, no major changes in the regime were enacted and only some temporary measures, such as an increased use of sky marshals, were put in place (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 27). However, the following year the EU – with the Regulation N° 2320/2002 – for the first time legislated common standards for aviation security in Europe (European Union 2008). Similarly worldwide, on the basis of Assembly Resolution A33-1, ICAO adopted changes which were incorporated into the seventh edition of Annex 17. These changes temporarily stretched the Annex's applicability to domestic flights, put the basis for cooperation in sharing the threat information, established a national quality control, laid out the preconditions for ICAO security auditing, strengthened the access control and the requirements for screening and encompassed provisions for in-flight security personnel (ICAO, n.d., XI). One of the most significant long-term results adopted worldwide was measures preventing the entry into the

cockpit en route, such as door strengthening and complementary methodics (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 27; ICAO, n.d.; Lyon 2008, 41). Importantly, also the method of 9/11 execution led to the changes of luggage screening focus, which now significantly more concentrates on small objects of everyday use, as for example on the toy guns. This change was also reflected by the above-mentioned Regulation 2320/2002, which for the first time constructed an EU-wide list of items not allowed on board (European Union 2008; ‘European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - Air Security: Commission Draws up EU-Wide List of Prohibited Articles on Passenger Aircraft’ n.d.).

Elsewhere, the attention also concentrated on identity-based measures. As such, ICAO reached an agreement stipulating inclusion of “a digital photo for facial recognition and optional biometrics of fingers and/or eyes to be stored on contactless integrated chips” (Lahav 2008, 89). The identity-based and profiling logic was supported by the mixed result action of International Consultants on Targeted Security (ICTS), which, on the basis of behavioural profiling, detained Richard Reid on 22 December 2001. Allegedly, Reid raised the suspicion by returning to the security check queue (Representative of ICTS Czech 2017). Reid was interrogated for two days but finally allowed boarding, the explosives in his shoes were not revealed, but the later attempt of ignition on the board of American Airlines flight AA63 from Paris to Miami failed and Reid was subdued by passengers (‘ASN Aircraft Accident Boeing 767-323 Registration Unknown’ 2018; Salter 2005). One of the results of the US push for identity-based security was the amended version of Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System II (CAPPS II), which was based on collecting information from the Global Distribution Systems (GDS).

Nevertheless, after fierce privacy rights criticism, the project was abandoned for a similar program Secure Flight, which also relies on comparison of PNR against Terrorist Screening Database maintained by the Terrorist Screening Centre. Nevertheless, in comparison to CAPPS II, it did not include traveller’s behaviour profiling, it was limited to terrorism-related offences and proposed a redress mechanism. These were later merged into TSA PreCheck. In Canada, a similar project called Passenger Protect has been introduced (J. Bennett, n.d., 55). This put the EU operating carriers into a difficult situation, when the PNR hand over was expected by the American side, whereas prohibited by the European Union data protection framework; it forbade data extradition to a third country, which does not ensure an adequate level of data protection (Hailbronner, Papakonstantinou, and Kau 2008, 189). This led to the series of disagreements concerning the possibility of extradition of PNR data collected in the European Union, including the

European Court of Justice litigations lodged by the European Parliament in Relation to Council and Commission decision from 2004 (Hailbronner, Papakonstantinou, and Kau 2008, 190). This was followed by further regulatory attempts in 2006 and 2007 respectively, and further in 2011 and 2012, where the final decision among the EU, the US, but also Canada and Australia was reached (Huijboom and Bodea 2015, 242; De Hert and Papakonstantinou 2010, 369). As a result to this process, European Commission deemed it “necessary to reconsider its global approach to transfers of PNR data to third countries,” and allowed them under data protection promises (European Union n.d.). Subsequently, an obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data upon request was legislated (Česká republika 2004, 82) in Europe, and was also recently followed by the long-pending disputed directive stipulating the mandatory provision of PNR by the carriers (European Union 2016b, 68). This directive stipulates the obligation of a carrier to provide a member state with extra-EU flights PNRs, and a member state might voluntarily in the form of a written notification opt for PNR data also on intra-EU flights. The final form of directive, passed two years ago, also establishes Passenger Information Units which are entrusted with data processing, maintenance and deletion in the set time frameworks (European Union 2016b). Importantly, this directive enables the use of PNR to create new criteria for individual identification of the threat and, as such, proposes a data-driven inductive approach to profiling (Leese 2014, 495).

Nevertheless, in the meantime, airport security has been significantly influenced by the planned bombing attempt discovered in 2006 by the British police, in which ten aircrafts heading for the US should have been bombed by the explosives disguised as liquids (“‘Airlines Terror Plot’ Disrupted’ 2006; Hoijtink 2017). Even though important questions concerning the practical viability and imminence of the threat remains unresolved, this event led worldwide, and importantly also within the EU, to a strict reaction which effectively excluded liquids from onboard transportation (European Commission 2006; Hoijtink 2017, 309). This led to the need for new legislative amendments regulating the transportation of liquids. Similarly, an urge was produced to develop new screening technologies. On the other hand, an effort was also made to disburden the passengers, as well as to the security system from rising screening demands by promoting the idea of a “one-stop security.” These impetuses finally led within the EU to the repeal of the regulation 2320/2002 and its replacement by the regulation 300/2008, which aimed at novelising screening procedures and also systemized existing legislation (European Union 2008, 2008, 200). Similar systematising effort was enacted on the

implementation level, where a whole series of Commission regulations have been repealed and replaced by an embracing regulation 2015/1998 (European Union 2015a). This regulation was later amended especially by the relatively broad regulation 2017/815, which clarified and simplified certain procedures (European Union 2017a, 815).

Further novelisations were also represented by three concise amendments, which broadened the states included in a “one-stop” security 2015/2426 (European Union 2015b), defined the term “commission inspector” 2016/472 (European Union 2016a), and framed regulation 2017/837 which corrected the Swedish and Polish versions of the original regulation 2015/1998 (European Union 2017b). However, despite these amendments, the two documents - the regulation 300/2008 and a commission implementing regulation 2015/1998 create today an axis of the EU airport security legislation. They are completed with Commission Implementing Decision C(2015) 8005/1, which is nevertheless sensitive and its access is thus denied (‘Your Application for Access to Documents - Ref. GestDem N° 2018/3950’, n.d.).

Within the period of this legislation adoption, further three important security incidents happened. Firstly, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab boarded a Detroit-bound flight 253 operated by Northwest Airlines at Amsterdam in 2009 and on the approach tried to mix the explosive powder taped to his leg with a chemical in a syringe. When a small fire erupted it was put out by an extinguisher and the perpetrator subdued by passengers (‘ASN Aircraft Accident Airbus A330-323X N820NW’ 2018). On 24 March 2015 on the Germanwings flight 4U9525 from Barcelona to Düsseldorf the co-pilot decided to strike the ground in a suicidal act, taking with him 149 others (‘ASN Aircraft Accident Airbus A320-211 D-AIPX’ 2018). Finally, on February 2, 2016, a 55-year old passenger, a wheelchair user, was killed during the flight D3159 from Mogadishu to Djibouti probably after an explosion of a notebook he carried (‘ASN Aircraft Accident Airbus A321-111 SX-BHS’ 2018; Freeman 2016).

These incidents changed the notion of airport security even further. All of them either operated with non-metallic threats or were not bound to sophisticated threat items at all, so the metal-searching checkpoints could not lead to their disruption. All of them also used a mode of operation where the perpetrator was on board rendering the reconciliation ineffective. As such these attacks “opened the black box of security” (Schouten 2014b, 35) and led to the inclusion of new objects into the scope of security interest. Importantly, this urge was further strengthened by the fact that when an object was carried on the board, it was in one case carried on the perpetrator’s body. This pointed to the importance of non-

metallic threats inspection for a person. Similarly, the acts as the use of wheelchair and underwear for the item smuggling emphasized the problem of privacy and the clash between the politeness and respect versus security. Likewise, the not yet mentioned attacks on airport grounds themselves – as 23 December 2015 Sabiha Gökçen, 22 March 2016 Brussel airport, 24 January 2017 Domodedovo, 18 March 2017 Paris Orly – illustrated the fluidity of security threats and pointed out the need for broader protection on the ground. Airport security industry evolved as well with the advent of new technologies allowing the detection of explosives and liquids or enabling a full-body scan. Similarly, the checkpoints moved from the gates and centralised (Salter 2008c, 63) and the ownership of airports and their security provision developed in the European context toward the involvement of private components (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 12; de Bruijne, Kuit, and ten Heuvelhof 2006, 452).

Overall, it is possible to argue that airport security progressively evolved towards a complex and organic system, which aims at promoting multilevel security based on mutually contributing and merging components that necessitate even finer cooperation of human and technological actants. Contemporary airport security is, therefore, constituted of the layers of access and perimeter control, checks of persons, belongings and luggage, identity-based security, and/or on the spot behavioural profiling. In all these areas, technology is an important actor, which contributes to rendering airport security as an organic network, where the burden of provision should be managed by the technologies, and simultaneously smooth experience should be proposed to the traveller. Here, the IATA originating idea of Smart Security - a set of recommended practices and technological solutions, as well as the EU idea of coherent and shared screening standards, including a One-stop Security, are only two flagrant instances of the general approach ('IATA - Smart Security' n.d.; European Union 2015a).

### 2.3. A Brief Summary of Current Airport Security System

The above-described events have produced a current complex system which will be briefly described in this sub-chapter in order to delineate the difference between general and case-specific issues. During the important part of this work, the passenger perspective of the system passage will be followed, so this perspective will also be followed now. In the case of individual private travel, the individual encounter with the security system starts with the air ticket purchase. Importantly, a traveller, who acts as a customer ordering a service in regard to the airline, is thus indirectly becoming a client in regard to the airport

authority, which is bound by contract with the airline. However, besides the service purchased, the traveller is also requested to accept the airport security control in a form prescribed by the EU legislation, which, however, might be extended by national legislation. Importantly, an air transport is thus inherently bound to the control, from which not even private flights are exempted (European Union 2008, Article 6, 4.1.1). Practically, however, a traveller is not punished for the rule breach (Salter 2008e, 250) if such is not flagrant and intentional at the same time. Even though the traveller might be in some aspects thus understood as ordering the control, in immediate interaction with the system s/he is rather an objectified passive entity, rather than a responsible actor and citizen. As such s/he enters the system as a possible source of a threat as well as an obligatory object of protection.

Once a passenger requests a ticket purchase via a website,<sup>12</sup> the site contacts one of the global distribution systems, which, in confirmation of the purchase, will record the data entered by the passenger and turn them into the prescribed format of Passenger Name Record (PNR). The flight crossing the EU borders, the airline will be subsequently responsible for “pushing” the PNR data to designated authorities of all the states affected by the possibility of the passenger’s presence. This is supposed to be done 24-48 hours before the flight departure (European Union 2016b, Article 4, Article 8). Similar measures will also be taken in most of other states (Bennett 2013, 115). The passenger may meanwhile pack his/her luggage and head for the airport.

Once arriving at the airport, s/he might be briefly checked at the entrance or even before the arrival and continue to the public hall (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011, 873). Here s/he will be directed with regard to the flow management efficiency to the separate floor for departures (Jong 2012, 50). This space will be decently managed with state or private security guards and overseen by the sets of cameras owned by various parties, from private shops, through airport operator, to police (Klauser, Ruegg, and November 2008, 107). The passenger, in case that s/he has not checked-in online, will proceed to the automatic checking counter and then to the human-staffed counter to put off his or her hold luggage. Here s/he will be asked, in most cases by the handling employee, whether his/her luggage does not contain anything from the list of forbidden items, and in some cases also other

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<sup>12</sup> In case of other types of purchases, the information will be handed in by the purchasing agent, only in cases of charter group flights formally existed a practise of leaving out some parts of the PNR, which is not now possible given the EU regulation of PNR hand over. Similarly, when the billing is done by another agent, the billing information will correspond to his/her entries (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003; European Union 2016b).



security-relevant questions will be posed. In extraordinary cases on particular flights or destinations, at this moment, the luggage might also be X-rayed or opened and inspected on a neighbouring counter by the designed security employee. Further, the hold luggage will be provided with a label, which enables clear assignment of the luggage to a particular flight, destination and traveller. The passenger will then stroll toward the first line of access control. Here, his/her boarding card will be checked either manually or much more probably in an automatic e-gate. In case of an international travel or within EU in case of international travel, where the Schengen border will be crossed, followingly passenger's passport will be checked by a police officer. This check might also be performed by an automatic e-gate administered by a state authority.

In the meantime, the passengers' luggage will be taken to the sorting station, where it will be screened in all cases of international flights (ICAO, n.d.); in case the control has not been already performed in the passenger's presence. This screening might be performed by the police or by responsible private forces as well. In the case of an American airport, the luggage will be examined by CT tomography (Salter 2008e, 258) and within Europe by one of the following methods: (a) a hand search, (b) X-ray equipment, (c) explosive detection systems (EDS) equipment, (d) explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment, or (e) explosive detection dogs (European Union 2015a). Given that hand search of all luggage would be unattainable for reasons of capacity, similar to the search by dogs or ETD, which along the above-quoted regulation requires luggage opening and as such would be primarily used in passenger's presence, the X-ray and EDS will remain the only reasonable options. Following the basic check, a further examination might follow, given that the EU check is based on a multi-levelled inspection system, where the bags found to be anomalous are moved to still tighter inspections "until a final check by CT scanner and personal inspection" is enacted (Salter 2008c, 14, similarly: 2008e, 258). Once passing the check, the luggage will be taken over by the handling and subsequently loaded into the airplane (Gupta n.d., 47).

In the meantime, the passenger arrives at the security check. S/he heads toward a particular security line, like the one in the picture below (Picture 1). One such a line will be most probably staffed with a minimum of four to five employees. For 24 hours it means that 12-15 workers need to be employed for continuous operation (Skorupski and Uchroński 2018, 3) (Skorupski and Uchroński 2018, 3). Here, at the divesting table (C), either with an employee's assistance or without it, the passengers will subdue their belongings and their body to the inspection (ICAO, n.d.). In the European context, the

passenger body might be examined primarily only by the hand search, walk-through metal detection equipment (WTMD) (F), security scanners (K) which do not use ionising radiation, and under special conditions by explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment (N) combined with hand-held metal detection (HHMD) equipment, which are seen as the only possible primary options by current European legislation (European Union 2015a, 4.1.1). The Walk-Through Metal Detector (WTMD) and Body scanners now represent the prevalent options worldwide. WTMD proposes a significantly quicker throughput than the performance of hand searches of all passengers and it is also an inherited and thus a more affordable choice compared to the newer body scanners. Historically, given the prevalence of kidnappings as described earlier, the detection of weapons were seen as the main goal of the control and as such, the first controls were designed to prevent presence of the metallic objects and the WTMD has been its inherent part since the control introduction (McCrie and Haas 2018, 155). Even though valid worldwide, in some countries important exceptions will be made in the case when a passenger is a member of a particular security program, such as the US PreCheck, which allows the member US citizens to keep belts, jackets and shoes on ('TSA Pre✓®' n.d.).




Figure 1: Airport security check layout (Truhlář, n.d.)

In the case of an alarm, the passenger will be further inspected, for example, by a hand search, which might be used as an extension of WTMD and as a primary control method for the passengers with active medical devices or the pregnant ones. Hand search

allows the detection of non-metal (and also non-explosive) hidden objects or the control of passengers, who have on them metallic objects that might not be easily removed. Also, the Hand-Held Metal Detector (HHMD) might be used to find out metal localisation. Together with Explosive Threat Detection, it might also be used “in cases where the screener considers a hand search of a given part of the person to be inefficient and/or undesirable.” (European Union 2015a, 4.1.1.11). This check might be performed publicly, right behind the WTMD, or in privacy (Y). Some airports can employ the body scanners as the alarm resolution technique instead of these techniques. On American airports, before the further screening, a passenger might be temporarily contained in a hold station (‘Security Checkpoint Layout Design: Reconfiguration Guide’ 2006).

During the WTMD screening procedure, some passengers are also randomly selected for further inspection in order to counter non-metallic threats. This selection is enacted by the WTMD which: “also incorporates an advanced Random Alarm function, which enables discreet search of non-alarming passengers.” (‘Metor 300: Walk-Through Metal Detector’, n.d.), or at a different airport by the body scanner. The inclusion of random alarm thus serves as a way of WTMD self-correction of the unsatisfactory detection restricted to the metals.

In the meantime, also the passenger’s belongings and hand luggage will be inspected. Within the EU, the control will be performed primarily by (a) a hand search; (b) X-ray equipment; or (c) explosive detection systems (EDS) equipment (European Union 2015a, 4.1.2.3). Given the similar logic as described above, the X-ray and EDS might be again expected as prevalent choices. Importantly, at the airports that are not equipped with the X-rays enabling the inspection of electronic devices inside the bags, the big electronic devices must be taken out or, in case of omissions, the bags as well as the devices rescreened (European Union 2015a, 4.1.2.8). Similarly, the passenger is expected to remove the liquids, aerosols and gels from their luggage in case that the airport is not equipped with technology that is able to screen multiple closed containers inside the luggage. The liquids in the containers of 100 ml maximum, fitting into one-litre plastic bags, will be exempted from the screening. Further, “*at least*” duty-free products in standardised bags and liquids, aerosols and gels “to be used during the trip for medical purposes or a special dietary requirements, including baby food” will be screened (European Union 2015a, 4.1.2.2.). A similar rule will also be applied in the USA, an originator of this form of limitation, Australia or elsewhere; however, in the Australian case, it might be restricted to the international flights (‘Liquids Rule’ 2014; ‘Travelling

with Powders, Liquids, Aerosols and Gels' n.d.; Hoijtink 2017, 309). Similarly, TSA PreCheck members might not be asked to remove the bags containing liquids ('TSA Pre✓®' n.d.).

In the case of a successful passage, the traveller enters the security-restricted area (SRA) of an airport, which is deemed safe, given the absence of prohibited items. To ensure this, a strict separation is maintained between the secured zone and the public area of the airport. To maintain it, similar requirements for screening are imposed on all the entering persons including personnel as well as all the entering items and the airplanes themselves (European Union 2015a, 1.3;6). Once s/he enters the secure area, the passenger hangs around the retail stores that provide a significant income to most of the airports (Salter 2008c, 7) and finally proceeds to the boarding. Here s/he presents again her/his boarding pass, which is screened by the stewardess, also a passport might be required for check, and then a passenger might proceed on board. This screening serves as a confirmation of boarding, which is used two-folds – as a positive affirmation for baggage matching, enabling to trace that all hold-luggage owners have boarded the plane as well as a basis for possible adjustments to the list of PNRs sent by the airline to the incoming states (European Union 2016b, Article 3). As Bigo notes, these are “the airline companies that, instead of police, are delegated the task of verifying passports” (Bigo, n.d., 16). In case of discord, both processes must be adjusted. Similarly, when the airline transports a person ineligible for the state entrance, it is practically and financially responsible for its return journey (Lahav 2008, 94). Now, once acquainted with the overall context, let us zoom for the case of this thesis interest.

#### 2.4. History of Airport Security in the Czech Context

Even though the Czech system of airport security provision has always conformed to a great extent to the international framework, before the 1989 Velvet Revolution it also entailed several specifics resulting from the nature of the communist regime, which projected in threat delimitation, the structure and motives of the rule-breakers, and in the priorities assigned to the border protection as well. In describing its brief history, I draw in some parts on the book *Letecká Security* (Koverdinský 2014), which describes this topic in detail and provides answers to the parts of the matter (details of the incidents, further information about some aspects of historical organisation and training), which cannot be dealt with here. This book, even though partially popular in its character, relies on archive materials, which would have to be reopened given the hard accessibility of the data.

Importantly, even the fact of events occurring is only clumsily accessible, given the omission in international databases, when mostly only later events of this period are recorded and only in such cases where the state enforcement was successful in thwarting the attempt (Ranter n.d.).

The first perpetrators of the unlawful acts against Czechoslovakian civil aviation were mostly pro-democratic thinking veteran pilots and crew, who had emigrated at the beginning of World War II and joined Western armies and particularly Royal Air Force to fight against Nazi Germany, occupying Czechoslovakia. After their return to the homeland and the change of the regime, they became a thorn in the side of Communist power, which harshly prosecuted them resulting in the death of many. At the same time, shortly after the war, their capacity was needed to provide civil aviation needs. In this situation, at least twelve hijackings with this similar motivation of pilot or crew emigration (and regime revenge) were realised, including three Dakotas being dragged abroad in a single day on 23 March 1950 (Koverdinský 2014, 119). Given that the perpetrators of these acts were largely in control of the airplanes, had a war experience and were mostly democratically oriented, their actions resulted in a high level of success with no violence included. This threat was countered through identity profiling of the time – cadre politics. The unreliable pilots started to be accompanied by reliable overseers and replaced as soon as possible (Koverdinský 2014, 138). Further, in 1956 the new Civil Aviation Act was enacted. This legislation replaced the preceding prewar Act No. 172/1925 Coll. and stipulated the basic idea of airport security as a ban to transport particular objects, and as such, the Ministry of Transportation was endowed, after coordination with the Ministry of Interior, with the enforcement possibility to “stipulate which objects cannot be taken into the civil airplanes” (Česká republika 1956). Similarly, the chief of the civil airplane was endowed with broad enforcement powers against the persons “endangering the safety of the flight,” including not only confinement but also personal inspection and steps necessary for further investigation (Česká republika 1956, par 18).

Nevertheless, the hijackings continued. Now, mostly general public attempting to escape the communist regime used the airplane as a relatively viable option, given that shooting on the illegal border-crossings was regular till the late 1980s’, claiming the lives of at least 282 persons (‘Dokumentace Usmrcených Na Československých Státních Hranicích 1948–1989 - Ústav pro Studium Totalitních Režimů’ n.d.; ‘Oběti Komunistického Režimu - Policie České Republiky’ n.d.). This tendency corresponded with the political development, peaking in the intense normalisation period following the

Prague spring events in 1968. However, given that new hijackers were not airport personnel, their actions lacked the smoothness of the preceding attempts and in some cases, the motives could be mixed, not including only political persecution. Specifically, one co-pilot was seriously wounded and one pilot shot dead during seventeen attempts from 1961 to 1989 (Koverdynský 2014, 119–20). During this period, Czechoslovakia was also touched by the only airplane bombing connected to its history, which occurred on 26 January 1972 in Czechoslovakian airspace on the flight JU367 operated by Jugoslovenski Aerotransport from København to Zagreb, which left 26 dead, with one hostess miraculously surviving a 15,000-foot fall. The Ustashe organisation was probably responsible ('ASN Aircraft Accident McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32 YU-AHT' 2018). However, there are some uncertainties resulting not only from the miraculous survival ('Letadlo, Které Se v 70. Letech Zřítilo u Děčína, Prý Sestřelili Čeští Vojáci' 2009). In any case, the extreme events of 1972 led the same year, at fifteen Czechoslovakian airports, to the establishment of independent specialised police units – the Departments of Airport Control [in Czech: Oddělení letištní kontroly - OLK, translated by SK] – tasked with the passenger hand searches and later also screening with Walk-Through Metal Detectors and Hand-Held Metal Detectors (Koverdynský 2014, 140). OLK was set up as an independent unit, separate from the Department of Passport Control [in Czech: Odbor pasové kontroly, OPK, translated by SK] set up in 1968 and its tasks going beyond the passenger screening also encompassed the armed escort of airplanes. The enactment of airport security controls in the traditional sense thus began in Czechoslovakia the same year as in the United States.

Four years later, the above-mentioned Law about Civil Aviation was novelised with the law 43/1976 (Česká republika 1976). This legislation brought in a new security component – namely the Airports Armed Protection Corps [in Czech: Sbor ozbrojené ochrany letišť - SOOL, translated by SK], which was subordinated to Ministry of Transportation and tasked with “maintenance of order and security in circumference of objects, protected by it” (Česká republika 1976, par 29a (1)). SOOL could control identity documents and require explanation, as well as show the person, seize an item or issue a fine. SOOL was also established as an armed unit, which could use a service weapon not only in case of a self-defence but also for the sake of object protection or to avoid perpetrator escaping (Česká republika 1976, par 29c).

Lastly, OLK was reorganised by the end of the 80s' creating: 1) passengers and checked luggage screening department, which started with selected checked luggage screening on transit after 1975 2) airport protection, for which quick reaction units were

established, and 3) armed airplanes escort; these units were further complemented by snipers and pyrotechnics (Koverdynský 2014, 1962). This division of tasks between SOOL ensuring perimeter protection, OLK screening the passengers and independent OPK police unit controlling visas and passports, which were completed at the end of the 70s' by the Unit of Military Airport Protection [Jednotka vojskové ochrany letiště, translated by SK] protecting airplanes while on apron, remained important for the future and also reflected the common division of airport security enacted elsewhere.

Following the collapse of communist regime, the account of unlawful inferences changed. In October 1991 en route from Bratislava to Prague, Czechoslovakia witnessed another hijack attempt, this time motivated by criminal intentions of a juvenile perpetrator. The plane safely landed in Prague, and after sixteen hours of negotiations, the hijacker surrendered leaving no fatalities behind ('ASN Aircraft Accident Tupolev 134 Registration Unknown' 2018). Four years later, a shooting occurred at the airport, when a passenger got into a conflict with a policeman performing security screening. The passenger overpowered the policeman and, gaining his service gun, caused a serious injury to another passport control police member who was pursuing him (Koverdynský 2014, 135). Lastly, Prague airport accepted at least two diverted planes one in 2006, second in 2016, where the alleged, later refuted, bomb threat emerged ('ASN Aircraft Accident Airbus A321-211 VP-BQS' 2018; 'Bombou Vyhrožoval Klidně, Popsali Poláka z Letadla. Čeká Na Psychiatra' 2016).

However, not only did the threats change, but the whole system was restructured. In 1993, the SOOL was abolished and its tasks were divided between the Police of the Czech Republic and Airport Guard [Ostraha letiště, OLE, translated by SK], a unit established by the airport operator – which was a state enterprise Správa Letiště Praha, s.p., where some additional duties were transferred from the police to OLE in 1996 (Koverdynský 2014, 164). Similarly to the situation, when the airport operator was entrusted with the OLK duties in regard to passenger screening, the police gradually handed the passenger screening over to the newly established Security Control [in Czech: Bezpečnostní kontrola, BEK, translated by SK]. Security control was also established under the jurisdiction of the airport operator and the transition realised from November 1996 to 30 November 1997 (Koverdynský 2014, 164–65). The OLK tasks directed by the police regarding airplane escort were disbanded in 2001 but reinvigorated in 2004 in reaction to TSA requirements on armed guards on the flights (Koverdynský 2014, 168–69). The second specialised police unit – Department of Mobile Intervention/Response [Oddělení mobilního zásahu,

translated by SKJ] was established the same year as a specialised unit of the Inspectorate of Czech Foreign Police. This unit specializes in the on the ground situations including important person's arrival, or sniper assistance (Koverdinský 2014, 169).

Also, the legislative framework changed with the adoption of a new Law about Civil Aviation in 1997, which replaced the legal regulation from 1956 and later became a cornerstone for harmonisation of the Czech legislative framework with the EU requirements (Česká republika 1956, 1997). In 2008, the airport itself also changed its legal status from the state enterprise Správa Letiště Praha, s.p. to a newly established joint-stock company Letiště Praha, and three years later it became a subsidiary company of the Český Aeroholding a.s., whose sole shareholder is the state, represented by the Ministry of Finance ('Údaje o společnosti' n.d.). Lastly, the airport was renamed in 2012 after the first president of Czechoslovakia after 1989 – Václav Havel. Václav Havel Airport Prague is today a quickly expanding airport. In 2017 it was passed by more than 15 million travellers, which represents a 17.9% rise in comparison with the previous year ('Počet odbavených cestujících na Letišti Václava Havla Praha vloni vzrostl o téměř 18 %' n.d.). This successful growth emphasises the need for the airport's spatial as well as personal development.

## 2.5. Václav Havel Airport Prague and Its Current Security System

The contemporary provision of airport security at Václav Havel Airport Prague is based on the system's origins described above. The core and non-outsourcable tasks, such as a passport or visa control, are currently performed by the Police of the Czech Republic. Its organisational part, Foreign Police, is responsible for the protection of Schengen border crossing and as such, it performs the controls of travel documents.<sup>13</sup> In this task, it is currently assisted by a set of e-gates using biometric validation, which enables the automatic control of travel documents of adult citizens of the EU, European Economic Area and Switzerland ('Ruzyňské Letiště Má První E - Gate - Policie České Republiky'

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<sup>13</sup> Police of the Czech Republic is organised in fourteen regional headquarters with regional jurisdiction, and two organisation branches with national jurisdiction. The first is directed by the First Deputy Police President and includes, besides others, Protection Service, President of the Czech Republic Protection Unit, Explosive Ordinance Disposal Service, and also Directorate of Alien Police Service (which is the headquarter of Foreign Police, but Police seemingly did not decide about the official unit translation yet). The second branch is then subordinated to the Deputy Police President for Criminal Police and Investigation Service and consists of the units active in investigation and intelligence gathering as National Headquarters Against Organised Crime, Intelligence Gathering Unit or Rapid Response Unit. The simplified chart of Police of the Czech Republic organisation is available at: <http://www.policie.cz/clanek/organizacni-struktura-policie-cr.aspx> ('Organizační Struktura Policie ČR - Policie České Republiky' n.d.; *Police České Republiky* 2017)



n.d.). The border control also encompasses activities aimed at identification of the fugitives and wanted persons, suppression of international crime, human, goods and drugs trafficking and connected counterfeiting activities (*Policie České Republiky* 2017, 66). Regarding this activity, the police also assists in providing temporary protection to asylum seekers in the refugee facility managed by the Ministry of the Interior in the separated transit area of the airport ('PřS Ruzyně | suz.cz' n.d.; Representative of the Foreign Police 2017). The Foreign Police is also tasked with the screening and processing of PNRs provided by the airlines via the OBZOR system ('Fond pro Vnější Hranice: Roční Program 2013' 2013, 7). Subsequently, it also sanctions the airlines for PNR transport rules breaking. Police also performs patrols within the airport area, inspections of abandoned and unaccompanied luggage and it is responsible for the control of transported guns as well (*Policie České Republiky* 2017, 66). Police also provides an assistance to the security screening in case of conflict or theoretically non-resolved alarms (Representative of the Foreign Police 2017). The above-mentioned specialised unit also provides a resource for the management of the on the ground situations (Koverdinský 2014, 169). Police are assisted in these tasks by the pyrotechnic and police dog teams. The distinct organisational unit of Foreign Police – Department of Aircraft Escort [in Czech: Oddělení doprovodu letadel, translated by SK] then provides the undercover in-flight assistance as well as deportees escort (*Policie České Republiky* 2017, 66; Koverdinský 2014, 168–69). Now, the third Foreign Police Unit should be established and tasked with newly incorporated face-recognition systems (Representative of the Foreign Police 2017).

Another state actor within the system is the Customs Administration. At Václav Havel Airport a designated Customs Administration Department is placed. This department is a unique addition to the region-based Customs Administration system ('Organizační Struktura Celní Správy České Republiky', n.d.); as such, it is also specific by the territorially discontinuous customs area which covers the clearance connected spaces, which might be territorially distinct from the airport (Representative of Customs Administration 2017). Customs Administration is primarily responsible for customs proceedings regarding external Schengen border – customs collection on arrivals and VAT refunds on departures. It also performs control activities in regard to the export and import of all types of goods. In this, besides screening technologies, also the Customs Administration is assisted by the police dog unit. In cases of transgressions and in cooperation with the police, it also investigates customs and taxes misdemeanours as well as drug trafficking ('Boj Proti Porušování Celních Předpisů | Celní Správa ČR' n.d.).

Similarly, it counters illicit weapons or dual-use technologies trafficking, the breaches against the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and is tasked with radiological protection ('Ochrana Společnosti a Životního Prostředí | Celní Správa ČR' n.d.).

The last publicly-managed security entity at the airport is the detached county office of the municipal police, which is responsible for maintenance of order in public areas of the airport. As such, it focuses on traffic offences on public communications and controls of taxi drivers. Within the public airport hall it also casts out/banishes the homeless people (Gabriel n.d., n.d.).

The two biggest bodies active in the airport security are established directly by the airport operator Letiště Praha. Given the above-described ownership structure, these bodies are de facto remotely-controlled by the sole shareholder of Český Aeroholding, which is the Ministry of Finance. This, to some extent, influences not only the economic management of the airport as a whole but also the financing of security (Sůra 2018; BEK M&A&C 1 2017). On the other hand, both bodies are de iure private and their employees work under normal working contracts and are not ranked among the state employees. Nevertheless, in contrast to private security workers in other domains, their enforcement powers are partially extended by the above-mentioned Act 49/1997 Coll. par 85c, which entitles them to issue an order directed at the provision of compliance with the Act 49/1997 Coll. itself or with the EU legislative framework, to ensure the restraint of the activity breaching this provision and also to cast out a person from the area restricted for the protection of civil aviation. The physical persons targeted by the order are then obliged to abide by such an order (Česká republika 1997).

The first one of these bodies is the already mentioned Airport Guard [Ostraha letiště, OLE, translated by SK]. The airport guard is further divided into a guarding unit, which works unarmed and the armed patrol unit. OLE provides security in the airside area external to the terminal. It is tasked with patrolling, access control at most of the non-public entries, including the inspections of people other than passengers, their luggage and particularly the incoming vehicles. OLE also inspects the abidance to the traffic regulation at the airside ('Ostraha letiště - vhodné pro ženy i muže - Letiště Praha, a.s.' n.d.).

The second of these bodies is the Security Control [in Czech: Bezpečnostní kontrola, BEK, translated by SK]. BEK is basically responsible for the passenger and luggage screening and for the screening of persons passing through these checkpoints, like the aircraft crews. It also ensures inspections at some of the service entries within the

terminal (the remaining part being provided by OLE), and as such, it is responsible for a part of the employees screening. Further, BEK performs limited area inspections and guarding activities in the area of the gates as well as the screening of incoming duty-free goods, cargo screening and screening services for regulated agents. Internally, BEK employees are divided into two main sections, the full-time employees, providing all the activities, out of whom recruited are also further specialists assigned and trained for particular tasks such as explosives detection, or a special position within a hold luggage screening. The second group are the security searchers, who are part-time job students, who have passed a shortened version of training and as such are not licensed to perform X-ray screening and connected activities. Security searchers thus in practice predominantly perform a passenger control. There also exists a supplementary position of security assistants, who are outsourced from the human resources enterprise. These are usually younger students on a temporary job, providing only informative assistance, having no valid licensing for any type of control performance. The whole thesis focuses predominantly on the perspective of airport security provided by BEK employees, and especially on BEK experience based on work performance in regard to a passenger screening. This framing results from the focus of the thesis concerned with employee-passenger interaction. As such, BEK is the unit which is crucially responsible for the framing of the public image of the airport security.

Lastly, since the mid-2017, the airport operator also established a behavioural profiling unit, which enacts surveillance in the terminal and focuses on behavioural detection (Ljubymenko 2018). Supplementary checks of the selected individuals, probably particularly in the gate areas might then be performed by the unit members.

Besides these bodies, two more fully private security agencies are present at the airport – El-Al and ICTS (International Consultants on Targeted Security). El-Al is providing services for its own airline flights, and ICTS is subcontracted by Delta airlines for their US-bound flights. In regard to the legislation in place, both agencies provide profiling-based checks that are conceptualised as additional to the BEK controls. Lastly, also the above-mentioned obligatory security tasks such as the PNR transfer or reconciliation are performed by the airlines.

The inherent part of the airport security are, however, also the travellers, who are at least its partial *raison d'être*. Even though exhaustive passenger statistics for LKPR is not, up to my knowledge, available, the structure of travellers might be partially derived from the operated destinations and their popularity. Most travellers head in order of popularity

for Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Russia, France (each over a million travellers annually). The composition of the most popular destinations by cities is: London, Paris, Moscow, Amsterdam and Frankfurt ('Počet odbavených cestujících na Letišti Václava Havla Praha vloni vzrostl o téměř 18 %' n.d.). This combination seems to point out providing important within the EU connections, particularly in regard to Western Europe. Czech Republic and more specifically Prague, is also a popular destination of foreign tourism. Similarly, however, the composition of particular destinations, including the biggest European airports, points to being rather the spoke, in regard to the spoke-and-hub aviation system (Salter 2008c, 11). However, Václav Havel Airport Prague is also pushing for a further development of originating long-haul lines (now 13 lines in the summer schedule) to the USA, Canada, China and Middle East. The flight mix is also completed by seasonal holidays lines particularly to North Africa (Hurghada, Marsa Alam) ('Nový letní letový řád přinese 6 nových destinací a přímé spojení do 157 míst po celém světě' n.d.; 'Počet odbavených cestujících na Letišti Václava Havla Praha vloni vzrostl o téměř 18 %' n.d.). This results in a situation where the airport has to handle a diverse mix of needs from those of regular business and frequent flyers, long-haul journeys, to the amalgam of domestic and foreign tourists, all with very diverging needs, wishes, and knowledge about airport security.

The frequent flyers express, sometimes very profound, knowledge of the airport security system, understands the technological abilities and thus are characterised by high compliance to usual demands. On the other hand, their knowledge makes them also more assertive and demanding in their expectations of the system and also often focused on the problematic of norm coherence (Observation 27. 26 September 2017; Observation 16. 9 August 2017). On the other hand, many particularly sea holidays tourists have only a very vague idea about the system and its abilities, and thus are very often not able to follow the system expectations. When faced with a problem, emotive arguments and protests against the whole system functioning, particularly in regard to liquids, might burst out. However, lacking knowledge and taking air travel as a unique experience, they might be in certain respects much more prone to obey, or to voluntarily enact even very limiting requests (Observation 26. 22 September 2017; Observation 3. 11 July 2017; Czech traveller 20 2017).

A similar divergence emerges between the luggage of these groups; whereas frequent flyers heading away for shorter periods and narrower travel purpose have smaller, even though more often onboard suitcases, encompassing only limited set off items easily

manageable, with existing rules and technologies (Observation 16. 9 August 2017). To achieve this, or to maintain a desired level of privacy, however, some of these travellers might be intentionally excluding some items from transportation, or intentionally checking in such luggage, which given the frequent flying might be simultaneously perceived as limiting (Czech traveller 32 2017). Less frequent travellers might, on the other hand, need to transport many, hardly manageable items; however, given the flying scarcity, similar limitations are not felt as personally constraining (Czech traveller 26 2017; Observation 26. 22 September 2017; Observation 3. 11 July 2017). This type of behaviour has been recently confirmed, for example, by a diploma thesis research performed at LKPR interested in a quantitative research of secondary luggage inspection (Nikitin 2017).

### 3. The Chain of Security Production

This chapter analyses the process of passenger and luggage screening which is seen, following the ANT logic, as a set of the chains of translation (Law 2002, 98; Latour 2013, 78, 1999, 70). The activity of travellers and their belongings' passage through the airport security system at Václav Havel Airport Prague is dealt with, explaining the process resulting in the production of a set of inspected, secured actants. I argue that within this process, the pivotal translation between insecure/secure is done and thus the end result of security is being produced - all incoming actants eligible for translation being translated from insecure into secure. This productive change is understood "as total rupture from the preceding state" (Latour 1999, 60) or put differently as "ontological shifts" in actant's characteristics (Schouten 2014b, 28). The actants composing the security check line – such as the X-rays, the Explosive Threat Detection (ETD) machines, liquid detectors, Walk-Through Metal Detectors (WTMD) and not lastly the employees, are all perceived as active elements of the process which performs the costly work in order to enable the movement toward the output of the translation. (Latour 2005, 132, 1999, 60).

Their particular activities of mediation can be then seen in the light of the mediatory types described in the theoretical chapter (1.1) – a mediation as a program of action embodied by the line and procedural organisation, mediation by a composition putting temporarily together incoming actants and the screening technologies, technical mediation represented by the focus technological abilities of the detection technologies or transition between the signs and things expressed by the outputs of these technologies as well as (Latour 1999, 178–84). Their heterogeneous compositions, such as the cooperation between the employee and the X-ray, then create the Latourian machines (Latour 1987, 129–30). These compositions are then an object of a diverse amount of black-boxing, depending on the view of a relevant actant (Latour 1986a, 242).

This understanding, describing the enactment of security procedures with the ultimate goal of security production, is proposed as a complementary jig-saw to the previously studied airport chains of translation. These studies concentrated mostly on the non-causal and arbitrary processes of translating the idea of security into the practical set of check procedures in the area of protecting against the unknown, where the consensual scientific knowledge is missing (Schouten 2014b, 24, 2010, 2; Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015, 327; Hegemann and Kahl 2018, 559), not as instances of the actual security performance. Nevertheless, sometimes the travel in both directions of the chain of

translation is needed to capture the chain's logic, given that the enactment of a security procedure, or in Latourian terms the manufacture (Latour 1999, 202–7), requires organisation guided by a very strict organising script that results in both-way – security idea and procedure – transformative actions (Latour 2013, 389–92).

The enactment of security through the chains of translation points to particular aspects of security provision. ANT allows here to delimitate unique instances observed at the studied airport, where multiple chains and their distinct modes of veridiction cross, producing either a controversy or especially dense encounter of diverse, not only security, logics. These instances are presented and further analysed using explanations drawing on and beyond ANT. This, nevertheless, does not mean that fully ANT-rooted explanations would not be possible, but only that this insight is used as an analytical shortcut, enabling mobilization of further resources in a manner compatible with ANT, as has been previously argued (1.6.1.2). Moreover, the understanding of security provision as a network of chains of translation enables deriving *three guiding logics - division, movement, and visibility*, which this chapter follows, and illustrates their enactment on the above-mentioned instance. These logics, together with those complementary ones mentioned in the following chapter (4), are understood as distinct, in a sense that each is contributing to the form of contemporary airport security with an irreplaceable aspect. In the meantime their interference, which only produces airport security in the form described, makes them interdependent, because the security is established as a result of their indivisible interplay.

Specifically, I argue that security production can be seen as a *divisive network* where security is provided by following individual divided chains of translation, or similarly 'threat vectors,' of luggage or person screening, as proposed by Adey. (Adey 2004, 1365). The validity of translation within these chains is then evaluated by the faithfulness of following particular organising scripts, which are understood as a distinct process of veridiction (Latour 2013, 53). This means that translation of a particular item or person from the ordinary into 'secure' is valid only if the procedural set-up has been followed in detail. This renders security as a directly measurable entity, where personal accountability can be traced (Skorupski and Uchroński 2018, 1). The translatory activities lean on a rule-based premise of "uniform practices in which every case is accorded to the same degree of scrutiny" (O'Malley 2006, 414). In the current field practice, however, even though no a priori threat evaluation is made, rather the same degree of resulting inspection is a goal, the procedure importantly varying in intensity.

The enacting of the particular chains of translation then requires the streaming of the incoming flow of actants, their ongoing division, inspection and connecting. This activity is based on mastering the flows and synchronising their speeds. The security in practice can be then performed only while the actants' *movement* is achieved. The movement is thus an inherent part of security provision, without which not only the passage, but the technical interplay with the technology and thus security itself could not be enacted.

The ultimate characteristic of a veridiction mode is then *the visualisation* of the threat (Martin 2018, 4; Hall 2007). The rendering visible is based on the idea of comparing visualised items with a pre-given set of threat characteristics. For example, discovering a knife in the luggage by X-ray means the following. To compare the X-ray waves intercepted on the receptive desk of an X-ray machine (in a form displayed by the machine) in regard to their shape and colour, reflecting a proton number, to the mental image of a knife present in the screeners mind. Followingly, to compare the result to the procedural script, which clearly defines the criteria of acceptability of potential threat items. In this case the shape and material are found decisive for threat identification. Followingly, these three distinct logics of the airport security are described as a precondition for a successful handling of the system and for illustrating their operation on individual instances.

### 3.1. Division – Classification for the Correct Process of Veridiction

The ultimate characteristic of airport security is the need for the division of entities into the proper chains of translation, where a correct *process of veridiction* (Latour 2013, 53) can be applied. Particularly over-sized luggage, check-in luggage, cabin luggage, luggage with a special status, personal belongings and persons, as well as cargo, mail and retail goods, must be sorted as a consequence of capabilities of individual technologies. Each entity has a proper classification or modality as proposed by Adey in the passengers-only context (Adey 2008, 146), which must be followed. Improper division renders the whole translation, anyhow correct, fraudulent and the security result compromised, as different rules apply to each group. Even though the need to classify all objects leads to classification inclusiveness and leniency, in the end this situation still recalls very much the prototypical classification scholar discussion, where the ontological status of the entity must be decided to achieve the possibility of treatment of the entity. Judith Romney Wegner (Wegner, n.d., 7), for example, nicely describes the rabbinic polemic about the



need to sacrifice (or not) a *koy*. *Koy* being a mystical offspring of a goat and a gazelle, thus sharing the qualities of a domestic animal – leading to the need for sacrifice, as well as those of a wild beast – implying the prohibition. Very similarly in the context of an airport handling and security, there is no need to look for mystical creatures, as an ordinary dog also provides a case of a troubled classification.

To follow this illustrative case, the dog is one of the few animals eligible for a relatively easy legal transport, which needs to be classified at the European Airports either as a person or as luggage, though (European Union 2015a, 4.1.1.6). The practice within the studied airport then copies the following procedure. A dog might be turned into the “normal luggage;” as such, dogs classify themselves on the same basis as normal luggage, by the logic of weight and size. Those above eight kilograms (some differences exist among airlines) are then turned to the checked-in luggage (‘Travelling with Animals | Czech Airlines’ n.d.; ‘Transporting Animals by Plane: Travel with Your Pet in the Cabin or the Hold - Air France’ n.d.). Nevertheless, their shape, activity and living character renders them unfitting for the normal treatment “as luggage,” so they have to be confined to the transportation box, which results in erasing the hindrances arising from their activity and shape and, oppositely, gives them the quality proper to the normal luggage, such as easy handling, transportation and storage.<sup>14</sup> Further, similarly to their little colleagues, this is not a sufficient solution to the classification problem, as they still pose the key quality, which cannot be easily managed, while preserving their inherent features – namely being alive. This renders their “processing” as normal luggage uneasy because the standard procedure for inspection of “normal” luggage is an X-ray, which is not found acceptable for processing living things (Participant observation 2. 15 June 2017). This turns them to an anomaly, which must be extensively dealt with, and which results in a variety of solutions specific to the prior classification. One of the employees described the situation as follows:

*“Some small dogs, their masters pass [the metal detector] with them in their arms, and it is without a problem, and then you also have dogs, which are so nice that they pass alone ...and then it is probably not a problem. In some cases, they [the masters] just put the animals inside the X-ray, and they do not mind, or they say that the animal is so stressed that they even cannot take it out [from the box]. Correctly, the animals are not*

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<sup>14</sup> This transformation itself can be seen as problematic, at least from the perspective of some animal-sensitive employees (BEK Employee 2 2017).

*allowed into the X-ray, which is a paradox, because when sent via cargo, nearly all may go through the X-ray and no one asks them.*"<sup>15</sup> (BEK Employee 1 2017)

Because of a classificatory problem, the dogs can end up as nearly the only thing entering the airplane that is inspected only visually (Observation 22. 13 September 2018), or they can be inspected in a human-like manner (this solution still demands new adjustments and exceptions), or are simply treated as normal luggage. Such classifications, once made, are in the overwhelming majority uncontested. Nevertheless, in some cases the classifications forced upon the actants may cause a resentful reaction among passengers, for example, when an airline decides due to the full booking and resulting spatial reasons that luggage intended by the travellers as a cabin should be checked-in. In other cases, they can be a welcomed solution to the problematic translation in that particular mode of veridiction.

### 3.2. Movement - Streaming the Flow

Once the agents have been separated, their unobstructed flow upon their proper trajectories must be ensured. The flow is the cornerstone for ensuring airport function. The contrast between "circulation" and "containment," proposed by David Pascoe (Adey 2008, 148) enables the continual distinction between entities that are non-problematically heading toward their translation as "secure" and those diverted as anomalous and, as such, as an agent in need of further deeper inspection. In this conceptualisation, Pascoe reflects the Foucauldian notion of security based on a division between "good" and "bad" circulation (M. Foucault 2007, 34).<sup>16</sup> The anomalous status, as proposed by Claudia Aradau and Tobias Blanke, requires a further scrutiny, which either classifies the anomaly as a possible deviation from normality or renders it as an abnormal threat (Aradau and Blanke 2018, 11). The security check itself is a remarkable slowdown and the bottleneck

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<sup>15</sup> On departures, even the "checked-in dogs," are not officially and regularly screened and instead their visual inspection is advised, if possible.

<sup>16</sup> In contrast to Foucault, in this thesis circulation and division are treated as two distinct logics out of the five uncovered. This division results from an analytical perspective, which concludes that each of these logics brings in a new aspect necessary for a contemporary form of security provision. These logics are, however, as a result seen as interdependent, because the security is established as a result of their indivisible interplay. This perspective is not excluding the solution proposed by Foucault; rather, it is a different (methodological) approach to tackling the security phenomenon. Foucault in his works often clearly opts for zooming in on one particular organising phenomenon, which establishes his "inertial frame of reference," to which he relates the rest of analysis. However, this is not to invalidate the remaining relevant phenomena (this relation is, for example, visible in regard to his analysis of discipline and biopolitics) (M. Foucault 2007; Michel Foucault 2010). This approach is also at root of his work criticism by Aradau and Blanke (Aradau and Blanke 2010).

for the system (Leese, 2013). Notably, the maximal, although divided, movement is preserved in the meantime as the program of action, the containment, slowdown and halting are the adverse limit options. The flow must be maintained to avoid the overall collapse of the system or its dysfunctions. Such adverse effects may embody themselves as costly planes' delays, or the lost luggage, which has not been loaded in time, the queues and decrease in passenger satisfaction.

The practical embodiment of this logic within the studied terrain is described by one manager, who noted that: "Security control is not merely about security provision but about security provision in a particular time" (BEK M&A&C 2 2017). This task complexifies as the overall managerial awareness of the adverse effects of the push for quick performance on individual employees transfers the mobility question to the system level. The "ideal" of the flux is strived for at this airport. To achieve it, recently the innovations have been introduced at the level of queue management where new possibilities of calculation enabled the computer-assisted planning that facilitated a forecast of the queuing development during the day on the basis of prior records (BEK M&A&C 3 2017), thus enabling a more efficient crowd streaming (Adey 2008, 150) and maintaining more ideal throughput times. The speed is a background value for the airport security striving to maximise the passenger throughput with the consequences for the whole industry.

Similarly, the organising logic clearly states that a screening technology, once purchased, should work at the maximum capacity to promote a maximum payback (Salter 2008c, 8). Within the field, in case of the on-board check, the X-ray of cabin luggage and personal belongings inspection is a known impediment to a physical screening of persons – the X-ray being a translative activity, which has to be waited for, because of the complexity of passenger-employee interaction (Vokáč 2015; BEK M&A&C 3 2017). In practical terms, the task is thus not to achieve a maximum speed but rather to reconcile the individual speeds enacted within each of the translating chains. This is also valid within the bigger picture of the security processing of the whole crowd boarding an airplane. As one of the responsible persons noted: "If they are finished earlier [with the check of the whole crowd], no additional profit is gained, it is only more expensive, important is the maintenance of the standard" (BEK M&A&C 3 2017).

Even more precisely, the logic of the split movements' reconciliation can be spotted in the baggage sorting station. This is a place where the luggage put off at the check-in goes to be passed through the security check and to be sorted into the airplanes.

Essentially, here the decision about accepting the luggage or moving it for further inspection at the upper level is taken by the screener, while the luggage is temporarily diverted to another route. The decision must be taken before the luggage reaches the following junction, which, in case of absencing choice will move the luggage to the upper level. Thus, a decision is taken while the luggage is in the movement. The costly halting is performed only at the top level of control (BEK Employee 3 2017).

### 3.3. Visualisation of Threats

The production of security also means promoting visualisation of threats. As such, incoming entities must be inspected and rendered visible. The process of visualisation itself means the security provision, because visibility, as Thomas Martin writes is: “the processes of *making visible* the traces the future leaves in the present” [italics original] in regard to the possible danger, these uncertainties are then turned into “visibly perceptible objects” (Martin 2018, 4–6). Similarly, Nishiyama notes in the context of pre-emption that “uncertainty in the future constitutes a threat in the present before it is materialized” (Nishiyama 2018, 7). As such, the items which are rendered in terms of “*dispositif* of security,” meaning something that “might be governed in the name of security” (Salter 2008e, 249) and which are found having a threat potential, must be visualised. Still, the visualisation does not imply full transparency, as one senior government security policymaker interviewed by Peer Schouten describes: “... to send people through gates naked, and scan them internally with Röntgen scanners.” (Schouten 2010, 9).<sup>17</sup> Transparency is an abstract unachievable ideal, described by Rachel Hall as the idea to:

*“...turn the world (the body) inside-out such that there would no longer be any secrets or interiors, human or geographical, in which our enemies (or the enemy within) might find refuge. This objection to interiority is both physical and psychological, referring as much to the desire to rid the warring world of pockets, caves, spider holes, and veils as it is concerned to ferret out all secrets and stop at nothing in its effort to produce actionable intelligence from detainees.” (Hall 2007, 321)*

This idea promises absolute security, and further, as proposed by Fuller, predictability (Fuller 2008, 169), fairness and equality (Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015, 327). The visualisation, in contrast to it, is subsumed to the ideal of transparency and does not necessarily imply the whole and complex disclosure toward every possible type of

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<sup>17</sup> Even here the transparency would not be complete.

vision, which is practically unreachable. Rather, it is an application of some of the restricted modes of visibility that indicates and provides information about concrete types of actants based on their shared material nature. The material nature chosen for visualisation is then derived from the material characteristics of particular threat actants. The sets of these actants are then based on historical experience and induction. As such the metals are visualised using an electromagnetic field to provide information about guns and knives, the proton number is used to provide information also about explosives, and ion velocities are measured to inform about the presence of drugs and explosives respectively. These all are visualising procedures. The security provision is then enacted only through visualisation, where the threat is either found to be present and thus visible or not visible, thus absent, and as such, the actant is seen as clear and more importantly as secure. Clearly, the choice of visualising modes depends on the threats searched for and as such, the security, defined as an absence of the dangerous, is threat-dependent.<sup>18</sup>

In practical terms, even though the visualisation of threats is endorsed as a way to produce security, the enacted mode of visibility and its sensitivity is not comprehensible to the passengers disregarding the procedure and technology. All modes of veridiction encompass uncertainties. This uncertainty is partially intentionally maintained as it can potentially simplify a discovery of such amateurish smuggling attempts like packing forbidden (or thought to be forbidden) objects in the aluminium foil or placing them in metallic shoe tips (Participant observation 5. 21 June 2017; Observation 28. 27 September 2017). This uncertainty, nevertheless, includes some trade-offs as unaware passengers tend to believe that many objects – it does not matter whether it is a one litre bottle of Becherovka<sup>19</sup> or the suspenders, might be somehow “passed through” unnoticed, not being properly visualised (Observation 8. 19 July 2017; Observation 26. 22 September 2017; BEK Employee 4 2017), which of course leads to discovery and lengthy corrections. Similarly, they might reversibly overestimate the visualisation sensitivity opted for and believe that some tiny objects like gentle jewellery chains may cause the alarm, which leads to their unnecessary disposal, questions and the resulting slowdown in a better case, their loss in the X-ray box in the worse one (Observation 16. 9 August 2017; Observation

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<sup>18</sup> The notion of visibility is also dealt with by Bellanova and Fuster; however, given their focus on body scanner, their conceptualization of visibility is restricted to visibility in regard to enabling eyes’ abilities. Further they also treat the problematic of intentional restriction of the vision, which will be also dealt with in here (Bellanova and Fuster 2013).

<sup>19</sup> Becherovka is a Czech traditional liquor (38% ABV).

7. 18 July 2017). Even more importantly, this seems to diminish the overall trust in the control efficiency as one passenger explained: “It is hard to guess what they even can see in the X-ray, I do not have any experience with it. I am carrying a binocular now, and that could have been something dangerous.” (Czech traveller 28 2017). So, because passengers may expect scrutiny when transporting some, in their view, problematic objects, even though these might be quite easily analysed, the absence of further inspections questions in their view the visibility achieved or the skill of the control.

### 3.4. The Control of Passengers and Their Belongings at LKPR

Following the above-mentioned logics, passengers enter the system which observes the principals of a more and more sophisticated division in a context of constant movement, which renders a particular sort of entities, deemed suspect, as visible. Keeping these principles in operation allows the rest of chapter to follow the passage through the usual security check, taking some possible control detours. This means to follow a few chains of translation and their mutual junctions, which, however divisive, aim at translating toward a unitary concept of airport security.

#### 3.4.1. The Assistance in Dividing Persons and Things

Disposed of hold luggage and being streamed through the control checkpoint, the passengers and their luggage must undergo another division. This time not only cabin luggage but also personal belongings considered oversized for the check of a person must be divided, and further general “things” must be separated from larger electronics and liquids. The need for division is resulting from the mutual obtrusiveness of the multiple items visualisation in regard to the technological capabilities. This division can be seen as an expected and intended *program of action*, following the divisive logic, designed by the airport managers, which is clearly opposed to the *antiprogram* of the “normal” passengers’ behaviour – namely leaving everything in its original state (Latour 2008, 152, 168). Given the ongoing problematics of this task and present failures, passengers are usually largely assisted by *non-human non-figurative signs* (Latour 2008, 165) that depict in detail what must be taken off, what should be pulled out and how all this should be placed in or outside the boxes.

Within the study field, until relatively recently, the non-human assistance was deemed satisfactory and the performance of separation was left on the responsibility of the individual passenger. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned push for a smooth flux rendered the achieved levels of separation as insufficient. In order to suppress the common

enactment of the antiprogram of letting notebooks and bottles in and the hats on, the position of an outsourced security assistant promoting and controlling the quality of the separation was introduced. The strength of the program of action and its provision by this doubled assistance is further stressed by assuming the responsibility for its successful performance by the system, as one of the managers noted: "...if the passenger has on him something after this procedure, then it is really our mistake, [mistake] of the whole system, simply, at this moment we have done something incorrectly, or we did it in a way that was unsatisfactory..." (BEK M&A&C 2 2017). Thus, the design of a new function not only served as a way of suppressing antiprogram but also as a further way of agency takeover, where the traveller is on one hand nominally responsible, but on the other has no true agential capacities. This system thus might be similar to the responsibility transfer between airport security system and individual employees described by Leese, although here the passengers are made a part of the process (Leese 2016, 159).

Once enacted, the function was found crucial by the employees, so now they tend to take this position even when the assistant is not available and even with priority over the position of secondary X-ray assistance or the crew leader supervision (Observation 9. 24 July 2017). The position's successful performance should lead to the removal of flow haltings and returns, as well as to augmenting the quality of the X-ray pictures, meaning increasing the visibility. This is achieved by the content control (no notebooks or liquids inside), as well as by providing good positioning regarding X-ray screening axis, enabling subsequent *technical mediation* (Latour 1999, 178–84). A similar activity is expected towards the personal preparation of passengers but concluding from the interviews its result is not seen as so successful and conclusive and rather general crowd management outcomes are expected here. Given the relative simplicity and preliminary character resulting from the exemption from licensing and resulting limited enforcement options as well as the expectations connected to the position's task, this function is seen only as informative and thus entailing low responsibility by many employees. It is usually described as assistance, the information providing or helping (BEK Employee 4 2017; BEK Employee 5 2017; BEK Employee 6 2017). This framing of the division enactment in comparison with the above-mentioned statement of agency takeover, might then lead to the divergence in the perception of the responsibility within the Security Control structure.

To successfully promote a designed plan of action and to preserve a maximum flux and thus promote *the streaming logic*, various approaches are followed. Firstly, the trick based on enlisting other entities or capabilities is used. To promote responsiveness, it is

seen as ideal to address each passenger individually, as the human-provided assistance has, in comparison to the non-human one, a very limited temporality but a higher persuasive power. Similarly, a need for good language skills and appropriate fit with the passenger's nationality is emphasized, as well as the utility of mentioning a wide variety of objects which demand the separate treatment (the observations confirm this notion); in the case of liquids, naming perfumes and the toothpaste as separate entities is mentioned as a key (BEK Employee 6 2017; BEK Employee 5 2017). Interestingly, other non-humans have been creatively enlisted by the employees in order to promote intended plan of action – exemplary model plastic bags including various cosmetics have been created and are used to point out what should be sorted separately (Observation 7. 18 July 2017). These bags not only serve as examples but also enable employees to cross the possible language gap between them and passengers (although, in some cases, passengers tend to mention that these cosmetics are not theirs). Even though other enlisting attempts have been made, such as placing the trash box with a bottle at the beginning of the line, those have been allegedly stopped by management due to the adverse aesthetics and spatial impacts (BEK Employee 7 2017). It is important that these attempts propose a whole program of action meaning – what should be put away and where. It is not a simple depiction of an object but a complex proposal of a process. Otherwise, the communication of action on the verbal level, in comparison to the communication consisting of identifying objects, seems to be a complicated part of the process. Passengers, for example, tend to show their belt buckles but do not understand the communicated intent of taking them off (Observation 7. 18 July 2017).

The second sort of the tricks is based on procedural adjustments, which directly reflect the need for a flow. The management and the training unit here push especially for standing close to the X-ray machine, in order to enable the preparation of multiple passengers at a time. Similarly, the need for not piling up bottles is usually mentioned (Participant observation 3. 16 June 2017). Based on the observations, preparation of luggage before the preparation of a person seems similarly advantageous. Similarly, sending firstly passenger's belongings to the X-ray and passengers themselves as second to a physical check is seen as advantageous because of a less costly return in case of a mistake. This is especially highlighted if a passenger expresses some signs of uncertainty (Observation 9. 24 July 2017).

Nevertheless, even if all possible entities are recruited to help to promote the program of action, the anti-program performance on the passengers' side remains high.



Passengers' behaviour, originating in any of the reasons such as forgetfulness, recklessness, defiance, felt privacy discomfort, fear of the possible damage or loss of one's property or the explicit misunderstanding of the security control logic, usually results in the performative characteristic of avoiding an activity (Korean traveller 13 2017; Russian traveller 4 2017; Observation 26. 22 September 2017; Observation 8. 19 July 2017). As one employee puts it: "...you can ask them as many times as you want, there might be the best one of us, but simply – no. There are people who simply won't pull it out, and then it must be traced by the X-ray worker" (BEK Employee 8 2017). The employees usually ascribe these frustrating outcomes to the passenger's information gap caused by a language barrier and to their general ignorance toward airport security (BEK Employee 5 2017). The framing of ignorance contributes to feelings of frustration, whereas the failures discovered are perceived as failures of the passengers' trust in the control (BEK Employee 9 2017; BEK Employee 10 2017).

The notion of an "act of truth" steps to the forefront here (Salter 2005), where not only obedience but also passenger's honesty and trust in dividing the belongings is expected.

However, in this case, this notion is flawed, as on the one hand the responsibility for correct enactment of the task is entrusted to the passenger, but on the other hand, its incorrectness is revealed later by the veridiction enacted in assistance with the employee. This contrast between the expectation of trust and its later verification and discovering of failure might then contribute to the divergence of passengers' and employees' notions of the accountability and the overall acceptance of the control, which then might be interpreted as a personal failure. As one employee recounts, "Rarely, the level of success [in the separation] is such that one would have been satisfied with himself, it is even worse for some destinations, where they do not understand even native speakers, who were born in those countries, but they do not want to understand, they do not cooperate" (BEK Employee 11 2017).<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, in all these cases, the enacted behaviour originates in their specific understanding of the logic of security check on the passengers' side. Firstly, passengers are not aware of the particular modes of veridiction or their exact borders and thus simply consider the passing through a chain of translation as satisfactory, even when the match between the type of object and the correct process is not achieved; therefore, sending a

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<sup>20</sup> The expected meaning is that they are not willing to understand.

computer inside a bag or passing through the metal detector with a hat on does not mean a breach of the correct performance in their view. This behaviour is particularly noticeable when compared to the behaviour of ordinary airport employees who are not engaged in security provision. These persons are well aware of the divisive logic and as such, they work on simplifying the passage. One of such particular workarounds is an effort to trigger the smallest possible number of the translatory chains – for example, avoiding the X-ray by leaving personal belongings and metallic objects in the security-cleared area before temporarily leaving. Alternatively, when something needs to be handed into the security-restricted area, passing only an object through the X-ray and avoiding the passage of a person (Observation 7. 18 July 2017; Observation 19. 18 August 2017; Observation 29. 28 September 2017). Similarly important might be the incomprehensibility of the enacted mode of visibility, which might lead to the feeling of the passenger that a particular object “could pass somehow” without being detected, or to the overall miss with the security logic enacted within the European Union. Both perceptions lead to revealing of a failure. These cases are discussed later in the respective sections of an identity-based security system (4) and an X-ray (3.4.3.1) in detail. Nevertheless, it is precisely this combination of motives, which leads to the perceived failure of the act of truth (Salter 2005) experienced by employees, because where passengers lean to the expectation of performing a trust operation (Czech traveller 1 2017), the employees resort to verification, which then gives them a frustrating proof of the insufficient honesty in regard to the system.

#### 3.4.2. Screening of Passengers

Once divided from cabin luggage and belongings, the passengers proceed to the screening. Currently, hand search, walk-through metal detector (WTMD), security scanner and explosive threat detection (ETD) combined with hand-held metal detector (HHMD) present the only legal possibilities within the EU, as has already been mentioned in the preceding chapter (2.3) (European Union 2015a, 4.1.1). At this point, it must be stressed that the rules and the fact of the division itself are a result of the material demands of the particular screening technologies employed. The *agency* of the screening technology has then the ability to make a difference and to transform others through the way of technical mediation (Latour 2005, 53, 1999, 178–84) and as such, it produces the particular chains of translation and delimits their borders. Nearly the whole *division logic* of airport security then can be seen as a result of the material abilities of particular screening technological solutions, or of such abilities of their predecessors. These performative skills, as analysed

below, produce the notion of threats, and oppositely, the threats produce the need for the new technological abilities. Similarly, the *visibility logic* implies the pre-emptive component, where the presence of an object itself is interpreted as an imminent threat, “uncertainty in the future constitutes a threat in the present before it is materialized” (Nishiyama 2018, 7) meaning not the future materialization of an object, but its potential for future employment as a threat. Further, the system is produced by the past events, firstly in respect to the threats previously detected, but also in regard to the technological solutions recruited for their countering. These correspond with the state of engineering available at the time concurrent to the threat emergence. In regard to this, the options available within the legislative framework reflect this technological heritage.

#### 3.4.2.1. Walk-Through Metal Detector

The stream of passengers is managed and they are directly guided toward WTMD, which is the prevalent control option. As proposed in the previous chapter (2.3), WTMD is an inherited technological solution, aimed particularly against kidnaping attempts with a gun on board, prevalent at the time of the control introduction; as such, it represents one of the primary technological solutions inherent to the control since its beginnings. It is a solution proposed by FAA, and first tested in 1969 in relations to the Cuba hijackings and employed generally in the USA in 1972 (Haas 2010, 470–74). The concurrent employment of this solution worldwide points not only to direct inspiration by the US case but also to the prevalence of a specific threat perspective and availability of peculiar technological possibilities. Particularly, the Prague airport seems to be an important case of this control logic diffusion, given the fact that a distinct local logic has been at play and still this type of solution was employed here the same year as in the United States, as explained in chapter two (2.4).

The system functionality is focusing on *visualisation* of metallic objects present on the passenger’s body, which is announced by the sound and visual alarm. The alarm further indicates the zones of the passenger’s body, where the breach of metal limit has been detected (‘Metor 300: Walk-Through Metal Detector’, n.d.). The indication is based on an interference of the metal object with the induced electromagnetic field, where required sensitivity is set up as a proportion to the minimum weight of a manganese brass (Skorupski and Uchroński 2018, 22). This technological solution produces the above-mentioned need of metallic objects disposal, and as such, it renders all metals present as a possible threat, which should be signalled by an alarm. All metals are thus found eligible for disclosure and thus visualised in the meaning described by Hall (Hall 2007, 320–21). In

contrast to the deviation from bodily normality searched for by a body scanner (Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015, 328), here it could be noted that the correspondence with a threat is looked for, anyhow the practical consequences might be similar.

Within the field, as an unintended consequence, the low specificity of threats detection, based just on the very broad material accordance, leads to the need for extensive exclusions from this translatory chain that can be sometimes only problematically enacted. As a result, a high level of alarms, which requires further scrutiny from the side of the employees, is present. Despite a very high number of these unjustified alarms, WTMD is viewed by the employees as a reliable technology that should be trusted as its discriminatory capability is a clear-cut technological solution, where the search for metal objects carried by persons is perceived as the main goal (BEK Employee 10 2017). Thanks to this framing, only objects not carried on the passenger's body are seen as a hindrance to its proper function (tray carriages, electric grid) (BEK Employee 12 2017). More importantly, once the alarm rings, an employee can, in the overwhelming majority of cases, reveal the source of the alarm and localise the metal object without serious problems using subsequent control mechanisms. This renders WTMD a reliable technology.

If the passengers' omissions resulting from forgetfulness are left aside, in some cases, the division is simply impossible or at least the damage caused by such a separation is deemed inadequate. These instances clearly counter the will of the divisive logic and include the cases of artificial joints, nonremovable casts fortified with metallic components, or bra wires thus directly leading to a further scrutiny being paid to a particular type of travellers. Interestingly, when compared to the already-mentioned analysis of body scanners, the groups of travellers further scrutinized are framed differently. Scanners are discussed as imposing a heavier burden on passengers with disabilities (Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015, 328), also diminish the hindrances for others in regard to WTMD. Given the visualising technology of body scanners that deals only with the body surface, the control by body scanner is preferred by some passengers with artificial joints, who expect not to raise the alarm in body scanners and as such to be evaluated as "normal" (American traveller 4 2017). In other cases, the WTMD logic of inseparability combined with the screening logic that is based on the magnetic field interference then renders some entities not only uncontrollable but potentially damageable by the act of the control itself. This is most strikingly the case of active medical devices as the implantable cardiac pacemakers and neurostimulators, which were proved to be influenceable by WTMD and HHMD (Guag, Addissie, and Witters 2017, 2). Similarly, an

exception is made when demanded by a pregnant passenger (Participant observation 3. 16 June 2017). The particular choice of personal screening technology thus leads to the differences in regard to the scope of potential threat materialities identified, as well as their placement on the surface or within the bodies checked, beyond the simple notion of a broader scope of capabilities of a more “modern” security scanner. Pointed out are the differences in the treatment of a respective group of travellers in regard to the altered materialities of their bodies.

However, beyond this, in regard to WTMD, the opinion on what is deemed separable for the needs of WTMD check and what should be accepted as a proportional discomfort may significantly diverge among travellers, employees and management. The reasons for this divergence reside within the visibility conceptualisation of the threat, where, as mentioned above, the presence itself without the intent is considered threatening. During this research a new controversy of this kind was provoked, when penetration security tests found out that under special circumstances a metallic object could be smuggled under an orthosis and, as a result, these were reclassified from the inseparable items to the separable ones. This provoked a discussion about the “objective status of the orthosis separability” where on one side the passengers pointed to the possible adverse health effect, it does not matter whether real or perceived, that on their side proved the inseparability. As one traveller, who in his words, suffered the tibia fracture, said: “And they told me to take of this [pointing to the whole leg-long orthosis] and they broke my leg, this is shit! The doctor said not to take it off, don’t take this off.” (Israeli traveller 8 2017). On the employees’ side, similar contrast arguments for the separability were presented: “...we have a given procedure, and we have to follow it, it is worse for the people who refuse to take it off, but on the other hand, the majority, in case that it is an orthosis, it is named orthosis, it is an orthosis, I think that 99% of orthoses are removable. The person cannot have it permanently. How would he bath, how would he sleep in it, it is not even possible” (BEK Employee 1 2017).

Analogical is the long-time ongoing debate about the removability of shoes which the metallic reinforcements of which might sometimes cause alarm. Here, the stance of the management is the opposite and deems shoes as inseparable from a regular passage through a WTMD, unless voluntarily removed by the passenger without a prior warning. In case of alarm, deeper scrutiny is demanded (BEK Employee 13 2017). Employees then, for the work-saving reasons as well as on the basis of a prior interaction with passengers, render shoes as fully separable and, given the ban to require taking them off, produce a

wide number of tricks that should promote shoes take off without explicit order (BEK Employee 13 2017). Similarly, the travellers, who are generally reluctant to take the shoes off (Chinese traveller 1 2017), seem to favour shoes disposal, when compared to the more complex subsequent procedure (Czech traveller 18 2017).

Nevertheless, the low detection specificity is only one of the problems, the one which is usually not even mentioned by the management and which is perceived as already mentioned as natural by the employees. More important is the limitation of detection to the metallic objects. Following the bombing attempts of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, London Bombing attempt and 9/11 described in the second chapter (2.2), the notion of a threat has shifted. The black box of airport security as Peer Schouten writes (Schouten 2014b, 33), has been questioned (or rather a particular chain of translation), and a significant amendment was demanded. Peer Schouten described this amendment mostly in terms of liquids detection and particularly the detection of liquids carried on persons to whom a body scanner was proposed as a solution (Schouten 2014b, 35). Nevertheless, the controversy reflected within the airport seemed much broader, and in the context of passenger screening, it included the control system as a whole, or at least the problematics of the detection of explosives generally, as well as the detection of non-explosive non-metallic weapons such as ceramic knives (BEK M&A&C 2 2017).

This shift in threat perception, strengthened by the increasing global mobility, has also led to the change of the WTMD checks perception at the airport studied. Where the simple absence of alarm was a sufficient condition for successful veridiction, new conditions have risen. Particularly, the visibility mode broadened from visualisation of metallic objects by WTMD to the parallel eye control of the passenger's body. To perform such a check a newly established rule expects that the employee's view should not be obstructed by hindering coverings of the body and these must be taken off and submitted to the belongings control procedure (BEK M&A&C 4 2017; Observation 8. 19 July 2017). Similarly to the metallic objects, where separation is reasonably impossible as in the case of gypsum casts, subsequent control mechanisms are also obligatory in this case. The identical problem of the "reasonable separability" has obviously also arisen in here. Nevertheless, here with even more pervasive consequences as one of the managers describes:

*"We started to elaborate this topic last year with the beginning of these lines to Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Muslims equipped with the religious coverings, whole body*

*coverings, or also just scarves and head coverings have appeared in higher numbers... so we say if the person wishes for a religious reason, or also for a medical reason... because of some treatment of cancer issues or tumour treatment, we can encounter a situation where the person expresses the will not to take off the clothing. So, we just must work with these cases, ...so we say, perform hand search, preceded by the question, whether the person wishes a separate control in the cabin or not.” (BEK M&A&C 4 2017)*

As mentioned in the same interview, the coverings requesting further inspection are defined as head coverings because, allegedly, the urge was felt to clearly define what is an unusual covering requesting the special procedure. So, following the guiding logic of mandatory visibility and an effort for cultural respect, the management produced a situation where all the persons reluctant to take off the things off their heads are set for further inspection, no matter what the rest of their attire looks like. The head coverings are thus defined as the decisive actants determining the significant deviation from the norm of clothing. The norm is defined on the basis of a culturally rooted sample, where the significant deviation is seen as anomalous and thus worthy of intensified scrutiny (Aradau and Blanke 2018, 9).

Nevertheless, given the usual work-saving reasons, a strong tendency to the divisibility logic is enacted by the employees. Thus, a variety of approaches, besides the ones expected by the internal rules, is enacted as a reaction to this situation in practice. Firstly, a discussion can be held about what the head covering is and whether a wig represents such a type of a separable covering (BEK Employee 6 2017). Similarly, the division itself might be considered a priority and a sufficient solution even in such instances when the expected time sequence is not kept. As such, even though not allowed, a head covering removal, usually when the rest of the attire is Western, is considered by some employees as a formal fulfilment of the condition even though performed only after the passage through WTMD. This removal can be either public, as is usually the case of *kipas*, or restricted to privacy of the cabin, where subsequently no proof of the procedure omission exists (BEK Employee 4 2017; BEK Employee 6 2017; BEK Employee 14 2017; BEK Employee 1 2017; Observation 21. 5 September 2017). Once the separation is achieved, the revalidation of the false passage is gained. The definition of undue covering in combination with this practice, which inevitably leads especially to the inspection of the head, once the inspected person is in the cabin and is asked to remove the hat, turns the head covering into the significant potential source of the threat. As one of the interviewed

employees noted in these cases “especially the area of the head” is inspected (BEK Employee 15 2017). The reproduction of a covered head area as exceptional and potentially representing the weakness of the system is probably a shared notion within the airport industry as one manager noted:

*“It is based on experience from other airports concerning head coverings, either scarf or a cap, it is a head covering, a place that enables smuggling, although now I agree with you a bit that we want from the person who did not trigger alarm, to take his cap off, so we could similarly want from someone who did not trigger alarm to show us his pockets or to take off his shoes, which are the places where something can be hidden as well.”* (BEK M&A&C 1 2017)

Besides the exceptionality of a head covering, the culturally-rooted standard of normality, in fact, leads to an intensified inspection of certain groups of travellers. This renders “the covered” groups as significantly distant from other travellers in the eyes of employees and, subsequently, the usual time-saving logics might lead employees to call for “normalization” of these travellers by the obligatory covering removal: “If it was up to me, I would forbid the covering at the airport, to make it a non-religious zone. The security should be superior to this.” (BEK Employee 16 2017). Nevertheless, similarly often, also the criticism of the rule emerges, which describes it as unjustified and unfair compared to other passing attires and importantly also looking as “a discrimination” (BEK Employee 1 2017) or “racist” (BEK Employee 14 2017). Thus, the enrolment of a head covering as a distinguishing actant for employing a particular veridictory action leads to important consequences for the security production in regard to particular individuals and groups. Even though this practice cannot be labelled as a racial profiling, the employees perceived the discriminatory appearance itself as problematic (BEK Employee 1 2017; BEK Employee 14 2017). Their notion is in accordance with the research of Hasisi and Weisburd at Ben Gurion airport. According to them, the “passengers who believed that the security checks were fair and unbiased, and agreed that improved passenger safety justified increased inconvenience and reported that they had been treated respectfully and professionally by the security personnel, tended to rate the security checks highly and expressed high levels of satisfaction with the security process” (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011, 869). More importantly, they also noted that the real difference of approach is not decisive – decisive is the perception of difference (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011, 871, 888; similarly: Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015, 327).



Within the field practice WTMD remains a cornerstone technology, which, however, provokes particularly the controversies resulting from its low specificity of threat detection – the mode of visualisation employed, as well as the discussion about actants divisibility. Further, the broadening of the threat perception resulting in these controversies rendered WTMD maybe reliable but highly insufficient and imperfect in the eyes of management (BEK M&A&C 5 2017; BEK M&A&C 4 2017; BEK M&A&C 2 2017). This change of perception led to the salient embranchment of the network of translatory chains as well as to important consequences for the employees. The complex solution and its particular components proposed as the resolution of these problems, as well as normal alarms, are dealt with further.

#### *3.4.2.2. Hand Search*

The hand search represents a possible part or obligatory detour within the particular chain of translation, permitting the detection of non-metal (and also non-explosive) hidden objects or the control of passengers, where the WTMD passage is found out to be invalid, or impossible for other reasons. Hand search thus emerged as a substituent for WTMD for travellers with electronic medical implants, or being pregnant. Concurrently, it represents a reaction to the above-mentioned opening of the security black box and the inclusion of non-metallic threats. The possibility of hand search was introduced in the terrain into the system in phases. Firstly, a hand touch complemented the prior method of alarm resolution with a sole use of Hand-Held Metal Detector (HHMD) (BEK Employee 12 2017). Subsequently, it developed into an independent procedure, which firstly extended and then partially replaced the use of HHMD, serving as a non-technological solution to the new scope of threats (as a parallel to a security scanner). Hand search thus represents a relatively recent and important extension of security control competencies in regard to a traveller.

Hand search itself or in combination with HHMD might serve as an alarm-resolution technique. When used this way, the fact that the metal objects whose presence is certain are searched for greatly contributes to the mutual reaffirmation of both veridictory technologies reliability. This makes hand search a very appreciated tool. Particularly, the methodic developed by the studied airport on its own based on foreign inspiration is seen as very thorough and sophisticated. Importantly, the notion of quality and rigour is shared not only by the airport side but is also confirmed by the travellers (BEK M&A&C 4 2017; Chinese traveller 15 2017). Nevertheless, subsequently its use is also very costly as it is, from the management's point of view, time-consuming (BEK M&A&C 2 2017), very

exhaustive from the employees' point of view (BEK Employee 5 2017), and also quite unpopular among some, especially Asian travellers, who find it to be too intimate (Korean traveller 1 2017; Korean traveller 4 2017).

The central point of hand search is *a tactile visualisation of the body surface* and as such, the body is inevitably a centrepiece of interest. So, as noted by Leese and Koenigseder in the context of body scanners, here the “zooming in on the body” is inevitable: “In the crossing of the checkpoint, the body itself clearly remains the centre of the screening operation, being a key element of authorization for proceeding to the next stage of air travel by revealing its harmlessness” (Leese and Koenigseder 2015, 47). This rendering of the check is very precise because, even though during the check any anomaly is searched for, as noted by Currah and Mulqueen or Valkenburg and van der Ploeg (Currah and Mulqueen 2011, 562; Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015), rather as Leese and Koenigseder put it: “...all the deviance their own body would reveal from whatever ideal of beauty...” (Leese and Koenigseder 2015, 44).

This feeling can be clearly traced in the field, where most of the passengers minding the check do not fear the discovery of the bodily anomaly, as the anomaly is from its definition a scarce good, but they rather fear the revelation of non-flattering averageness and imperfection, which will be revealed to the controller, and in the worse case, even to other travellers (American traveller 8 2017). The codification of procedure expecting standard clothing may also render particular moves more intimate than intended in cases, where, for example, the standard waistline is not kept. Similarly, the cultural and religious context, which renders some body parts as private, enters the picture (Israeli traveller 3 2017).

As a result, a private or public context of enacting this visualisation might be seen as crucial for the travellers, where the privacy of the check cabin enables for some crucial ensuring of gender segregation as well as the possibility of exclusion of the maximum people possible. On the other hand, it also excludes the possibility of an interference by others and as such, it may provoke fears of incorrect treatment, as one American traveller recalls her experience from a check in the United States:

*“I find very offensive that they made me lift my blouse, that they put their hands in my pants, they touch me, and they are rude about that. In the US I had to do it in front of people. That’s far from me. Horrible. She was a mean woman... then they say, ‘Would you prefer we did this privately?’ And I am going noooooooo I don’t think so. This is ok. It was awful.”* (American traveller 8 2017)

More importantly, the spatial exclusion provided by the cabin seems to be even more threatening to the controllers than to the controlled. This aspect is probably a result of the present risk perception, which is dealt with in the fifth chapter of this thesis (5.2). For now, let us compare previous memory with the controller's experience:

*"...once I had a woman in a burka, and she had a Velcro-fastened belt that people wear, she didn't want to take it off, saying that she has a hernia or something like that. So, we went into the cabin, and there I started to be anxious as she took off the burka, and under it, she had a wonderful floral dress, but in her waist, beneath the belt, she had some squeezed rolls. At the moment I felt totally dizzy, I already imagined dynamite or that kind. Some classical explosive, one already has the fantasy from all those movies, but fortunately, it was money. She had the money hidden there. But it was so very uncomfortable, and it was just simply her and me in the cabin."* (BEK Employee 9 2017)

This quotation explains in a nice detail the often-felt anxiety described by the controllers. When compared, the passenger's experience is clearly connected with privacy issue whereas the employee's one frames the worry as a security issue. Whereas the security risks are seen as inherent to the security control and as such are managed as the ordinary part of the processes (even though this one has not been tackled yet up to the author's knowledge), the privacy issues represent a distinct part understood as somehow contradictory to the security logic. This framing is relatively well visible in the existence of the special paragraph 85(d) within the Czech civil aviation law that simply stipulates that the check must be performed "in a manner and by means that follow the goal of the control solely and save the dignity of every human, subdued to the control. To ensure this goal the hand search of persons is performed by the person of the same sex." (Česká republika, n.d. [translated by SK]). This paragraph is solely distinct from the rest of the body of the law which deals with rather technical matters and procedures stipulation.

More importantly, also this paragraph renders security provision as gendered, which has important consequences not only for a security provision, as I showed in the fourth chapter (4.4), but also provides a divergence from the line provided by the European Union. The Commission Implementing Regulation does not include any dignity clause, but stipulates in the context of the body scanners output evaluation that: "a passenger may request that the image of his/her body is analysed by a human reviewer of the gender of his/her choice" (European Union 2015a, 4.1.1.10 (e)). Leaving aside the possible juridical consequences, gender is framed as a fixed characteristic by the Czech side, which in some

cases might contribute to obscuring the non-binary travellers, who are focused by employees' attempts to verify their gender before the check starts (Participant observation 9. 27 June 2017), and subsequently thus unnecessarily rendered as anomalous (Currah and Mulqueen 2011, 562–70). However, significantly more often the obscure “baby debate” takes place where their genders need to be found out in order to provide a correct worker to perform this control. Nevertheless, some crew leads engage here in a more lenient supervision than others, and sometimes employees searching mothers just ask for their permission and also perform the child check (BEK Employee 14 2017).

The legislative framework thus leads to a strict reification of gender, which might produce hindrances for the flow, but more importantly also contributes to obscurity in regard to the interaction with passengers. In certain instances, the primarily passenger-oriented legislative effort for the “saving of dignity” thus leads to the opposite results. Concurrently, no tangible results are produced in regard to security, given that in comparison with the situation in the United States (Currah and Mulqueen 2011, 562–70), local security control does not process identity at all and, as such, no added value of biometric gender verification is provided. Even more importantly, the fact of not-processing identity could serve as a tool promoting honesty and openness during the check if the check mechanism had been explicitly rendered as performatively and positively anonymous and not only as private. Such positive potential outcomes of anonymity, when compared to the privacy, have been recently described by Asenbaum (Asenbaum 2018, 10). Currently, the anonymity is not promoted as beneficiary for a passenger.

#### *3.4.2.3. Hand-Held Metal Detector*

Soon after the beginning of the security checks, hand-held metal detector became a standard device employed to resolve WTMD alarms. In the Czech context the Hand-Held Metal Detector probably even preceded the advent of WTMD (Koverdinský 2014, 158); still, the enacted logic remains the same. HHMD was thus firstly the only control option and subsequently the only possible extension of the chain of translation, when the passage through WTMD proposed an invalid result (BEK M&A&C 4 2017). Today, its function has changed and, with the reframing of the threats, a more limited position has been assigned to it, in many cases only supplementary to a hand search that proposes a broader visualisation option going beyond the metal detection. As such it is partially a surviving system evolution relict, which is in particular cases used as a supplement to a hand search thanks to its highly-focused recognition abilities. This non-replaceable ability, nevertheless, gives it a unique position, which has led to its conservation after a period of

non-use and disbanded the discussion about its possible dismissal (BEK M&A&C 4 2017). Localising the exact place of metal presence, it followingly enlists an employee who performs the subsequent part of translation by distinguishing between objects found dangerous and obstructive. So, mostly the presence of “inseparable metals” like artificial joints and bra underwires is confirmed in this way or, similarly, it serves as a backup equipment when the physical check fails. This renders it an obligatory part of the translation when turning a gypsum cast into a secured item.

Importantly, HHMD is also used as a tool that enables the inspection of intimate body parts, besides the possibility of a dressed bra inspection. These parts, although for a long-time presenting a regular area of control for the Customs Administration (Representative of Customs Administration 2017) and although already partially covered by the WTMD checks and hand search methodic, got into a special focus after the first installations of body scanners (Currah and Mulqueen 2011) and the already mentioned bombing attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, popularly called an “Underwear bomber” (*Reuters* 2007; CNN n.d.).<sup>21</sup> These events, quoting Peer Schouten, meant not only “the ‘ontological shift,’ that mundane objects undergo in airport security governance” but also showed that: “when it is in the making, security itself is ontologically unstable” (Schouten 2014b, 24). Here, these parts clearly became a part of “*dispositif* of security,” meaning something that “might be governed in the name of security” (Salter 2008e, 249). Something that was not a direct part of security translation suddenly became so and, even more importantly, the way of translating it demanded not only an inclusion of a technological solution such as body scanner, but also the enrolment of the public acceptance.

The resulting solution is based on the inclusion of private parts into Salter’s “*dispositif* of security,” (Salter 2008e, 249) and their delimitation on the one hand, but also on including restricted regimes of visualisations on the other. This was in that time proposed either by a body scanner, as dealt with by Bellanova and Fuster (Bellanova and Fuster 2013), or for the metal threats by HHMD. Here, the restricted visualization that provides information only about the presence and placement of metal objects is exploited as an advantage. The restriction of information is seen as a positive and sensitive solution

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<sup>21</sup> Peer Schouten in his article Security as controversy: Reassembling security at Amsterdam Airport presents the deployment of body scanners in causal link with this bombing attempt (Schouten 2014b, 32). Nevertheless, on the basis of news sources it is very probable that the scanners have been deployed two years earlier in the half of May 2007 (*Reuters* 2007; ‘Body Scanners Replace Manual Grope at Schiphol - FlyerTalk Forums’ n.d.)

that on the one hand enables the inspection (translation) and veridiction even in case of alarm, and, on the other hand, avoids the full “tactile visualisation.” The bra wire can be thus clearly localized without touching the passenger or the need of a further clothing removal. More importantly then, the chosen visualization method was not the only one discussed: “...it was discussed whether on all body parts the finger pads and palms should be put on the passenger, simply the hand on the clothed body, or whether I should permit somewhere the little finger and the palm edge, whether it will not be perceived better by the controlled person, if I suddenly turn the hands palms up...” (BEK M&A&C 4 2017). So, even within the scope of a tactile control option, the varying pervasiveness was perceived as a result of the “quality” of contact. Similarly, the intimate parts became the only places where the inspection by HHMD is still deemed valid. On the explanatory level, this decision is backed by the narrative of proportionality based on the regulation wording: “to *reasonably* ensure that the person is not carrying prohibited articles.” [Italics added] (European Union 2015a, 4.1.1.3). This “reasonability” was then stressed in the interviews with management (BEK M&A&C 1 2017). The narrative of reasonability here importantly enters the account in relation to a passenger’s comfort but even more saliently serves as a check of employee’s responsibility. The employee is not found accountable for letting the threat through, in case that s/he has applied the *reasonable* amount of control measures, resulting in *reasonable* certainty. This enables to limit the scope of otherwise non-limited responsibility for the threat passage.

#### 3.4.2.4. Explosive Threat Detector

Explosive Threat Detector (ETD) is the last contributing technological actant which, together with WTMD, HHMD and hand search, proposes a loose manufacture providing person translation into the secure state. ETD was an important part of the solution proposed for the shift of threat perception and the resulting inclusion of non-metallic explosive entities. Even though these particular bombing attempts discussed in the sections above (3.4.2.1, 3.4.2.2) surely contributed to their inclusion into the threat list, the logic of their inclusion is more deeply rooted and in the events prior to these. At this place, allow me a longer quotation originating from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which clarifies this logic:

*“Explosive device technology improvements have increased airliner vulnerability to bombings. Today, IEDs are less likely to be prefabricated. They can be assembled from a variety of materials and made to resemble innocent objects. Semtex and C-4, for example, can be moulded into sheets and made to resemble books or radios. Terrorists*

*have also learned to embed IEDs in electronic devices to make detection even more difficult. Timing devices have been miniaturized and digitized, compounding the difficulties of detection with conventional X-ray equipment. For these reasons, the potential for complete aircraft destruction, with great loss of life and disruption of the NAS, has grown.”(Cormier and Fobes 1996, 2–3)*

This quotation shows that it was not the bombing attempts made that led FAA to the inclusion of explosive devices as a possible threat, but it was the mere existence of these entities. In the words of ANT, the enlisting of these complex agents into the networks including humans clearly produces also a possible connection, a possible chain of translation of these entities into a threat to civil aviation. So, as Latour might have written, quoting his favourite cases, once the yeasts are discovered by Pasteur, they must be managed, and once the Tuberculosis is described, Ramses should start to be afraid, and the cure should be looked for (Harman 2015, 50; Latour 1999, 145). This reality was also reflected by the “paradigm of risk,” described by Mark Salter, where “one does not *start from* a conflictual situation observable in experience, rather one *deduces* it from a general definition of dangers one wishes to prevent.” [italics original] (Salter 2008e, 255). Problematically, Salter’s perception of a risk as paradigmatic and in regard to airport security as very temporal seems to propose a relatively achievable change. Nevertheless, the question is whether the once made enlistment of these entities and the already existing connections can be undone so easily.

In any case, to counter this threat the still new entities had to be recruited and a quantum sniffer became an important one of them. At LKPR, the sniffers in the contemporary appearance and mode of employment emerged in September 2015, in reaction to the requirements resulting from the legislative changes (‘Pražské Letiště Má 30 Nových Detektorů, Výbušninu Odhalí Za Pár Sekund’ n.d.; ‘Během Několika Sekund Odhalí Výbušninu. Detektory Urychlují Kontroly Na Pražském Letišti - Metro.Cz’ 2015). They were, however, promoted as highly advantageous for the airport security operation. In regard to travellers they were presented, as the news mentioned-above show, in terms of comfort as augmenting the speed of security dispatching (thus relating to the logic of movement). Moreover, as a substitute for unpopular hand searches, meaning in terms of analysis a change in the mode of visualisation employed from tactile to chemical, which is promoted as significantly more restricted and thus less intrusive in regard to the passenger. Internally, the sniffers enabled the fulfilment of legislative demands as well as a promise to

increase the line throughput, being quicker than the hand searches (BEK M&A&C 1 2017). As such they were also favoured by the employees as important work-saving devices (BEK Employee 14 2017).

The last generation quantum sniffers became relatively recently tightly incorporated into the transitory chains of airport security, with a firmly assigned place in two distinctive procedures; one is treated here, the other one described in the following section. ETD thus became a component to HHMD used for checks of entities rendered as problematic by the security perception. Here, ETD is especially important in such instances where HHMD itself is inefficient or undesirable, as described above (European Union 2015a, 4.1.1.11). As such, it contributes to the inspection of persons, where HHMD might not be safely used as those with active electronic implants or where HHMD is ineffective, because of “inseparable metals.” The control mechanism based on a different visibility logic than visualizing all metals enables weakening of the requirements for entities separation.

Within the field, this makes them an important tool for the inspection of wheelchairs and their users as well as for the control of prostheses. The advantages of the prosthesis control were summed up by one employee:

*“When there were no machines for sniffing, it had to be controlled really tightly, everything removed, put in the X-ray and the passenger had to be taken into the separate room. This won’t be a problem, but what was the problem was that they often have a hard time to take it off, and then they don’t have their time to put it on again, and then bruises might emerge, that was a problem, it was really inconvenient.”* (BEK Employee 4 2017)

The persons using metal medical devices thus became partially normalized in regard to ETD, whose visualization does not render them as different from “average” people. Nevertheless, the original logic of the check, which incorporates the idea that a “normal” person has no inseparable metal component, is still present and renders those who have it as an outlier that should be dealt with in order to produce a clear picture of the situation. The expectation of normality and the resulting creation of a standard that is supposed to produce the coherence over space and time then produces obstacles cast upon those deviating from the norm (Currah and Mulqueen 2011, 562; Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015; Baele, Balzacq, and Bourbeau 2018, 37). Nevertheless, the problematics of outliers seems to work both directions because the intended abnormality might be employed as a mean for not being measured by standard means and instead to be dismissed as an outlier. This traditional treatment of outliers was described by Aradau and Blanke



(Aradau and Blanke 2018, 8). This possibility has also been described by some of the managers:

*“...people are trying to misuse this on the basis that in other countries the explosive devices were found, it was in Asian countries, the boy with a disability had it in the wheelchair, the emotions are played on, ...here the security view and the human view might clash, and I understand that to a dispassionate traveller it might look like bullying: ‘he is on the wheelchair, and he is so much controlled.’ Not for us, it is a traveller as any other, yes, we reflect the different cultural, religious, or health disposition, but security-wise we look at that person identically, may be in regard to this, we look at him even a bit more suspiciously.” (BEK M&A&C 1 2017)*

The outliers thus do not seem to be dismissed, but rather endowed with their agency, which is being mediated by the particular medical device. Crucially, the concept of equality is thus enacted as the equality in the degree of scrutiny achieved, rather than the equality in attitude.

Importantly also, in difference from the technologies which were in operation till the advent of ETD, explosive threat detection proposed a more complex visualization. Namely, whereas WTMD and also X-ray simply used a special type of vision to reveal particular types of objects and in case of WTMD also dismissed findings below a setup threshold, this new technology also proposes the sort of evaluation of the findings resulting in a simple yes or no (with a brief comment) outcome. This means a very important difference from a traditional Latourian machine as the X-ray is, which needs a well-trained interpreter with years of practice who analyses the machine results and speaks for it (Latour 1987, 70–71). As Peer Schouten writes with reference to Latour: “Nor are security technologies such as screening machines and security guards straightforward security solutions: actor-network theory follows *spokespersons* that present us with how we should interpret these ‘things’ as actants rendering reality secure.” (Schouten 2014b, 28). But the presence of these spokespersons is costly and further complicates the security production – if the further licensing, let us say similar to that on X-rays, should be performed, the organizing as well as financial costs would be high. Therefore, an important push for a technology with no need for interpretation is present. This is nearly what the currently used version of a quantum sniffer in this field proposes. The simple “yes” outcome means an automatic “go” decision; the “alarm” means – call a specialist. This specialist is a colleague with relatively limited additional expertise, which is based rather on the

knowledge of further checking procedure. One of the former specialists, who was used to working with the previous generation of explosive detection sniffers, noted: “I used to have the detector [specialization], but as the machines changed, the detectorist is just a man who reads the output paper. Anybody can do this, so I gave this position up, as only one specialisation was allowed at that moment” (BEK Employee 2 2017).

The specialist is also presented with only this relatively limited additional information concerning the alarm reasons. Given the amount of training, this information practically never leads to the discovery of the alarm cause as confirmed not only by observation but also by one of the specialists (BEK Employee 12 2017). Even though the “go” decision is later given, the cause of the alarm remains in its roots de facto unresolved. As the unresolved remains unresolved, no credit is given to the machine for the right identification of a situation. Furthermore, as noted in the introduction, the low tolerance for a mistake present within the airport security industry produces a high number of false positives (O’Malley 2006, 417). As Mathias Leese with reference to Cavusoglu and co-authors writes, the airport security checks are from their design prone to this effect:

*“Specifically, in aviation, screening policies necessarily must aim at minimizing Type II errors (false negatives), as an individual that was incorrectly assessed as harmless while being a potential offender poses the worst-case scenario and could cause devastating harm. Thus, risk assessment at the airport must be very rigid and is consequently prone to producing exceptionally high numbers of Type I errors (false positives). This phenomenon is also referred to as the base-rate fallacy problem of security measures that have to deal with an overwhelming majority of ‘normal’ cases and therefore are not resource-effective” (Leese 2014, 496).*

Similarly to liquid detectors, the last generation quantum sniffers discussed here thus produces a high number of false positives.<sup>22</sup> To get an idea, there are a few dozens of specialists assigned to alarm resolution within the whole Security Control and no real explosives have been most probably ever detected during a real security operation at this airport or at least not during the last 20 years (even though in the units of cases, the traces of explosives might have been discovered at persons working in the field of industrial explosives) (BEK M&A&C 2 2017; BEK M&A&C 3 2017; Participant observation 7. 23 June 2017). Even though some solutions are known and some are traditionally believed by

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<sup>22</sup> The false positive problematics in regard to the liquid detection has been also addressed by Hoijtink (Hoijtink 2017, 310).

the employees to cause these alarms, the alarms remain largely unresolved. This might lead to actual distrust of the technology, a stance which was expressed openly by six of the twenty interviewed employees, who commented on the question (BEK Employee 10 2017; BEK Employee 17 2017; BEK Employee 18 2017; BEK Employee 19 2017; BEK Employee 20 2017; BEK Employee 21 2017).

#### *3.4.2.5. The Random Sampling*

There is still one method, even though not a new technology, which has been introduced among other methods and technologies to counter the “new” non-metallic threats, which has not been mentioned so far, namely the random sampling. Random sampling is a technologically based random selection of a given percentage of travellers for further inspection, which is performed by WTMD (‘Metor 300: Walk-Through Metal Detector’, n.d.).

Within the case studied, the performance of choice by the technological device is seen as helping the employee in the task performance, as there is no need to do the selection personally and, importantly, it is also a way to ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment (BEK M&A&C 6 2017; BEK M&A&C 1 2017). In regard to travellers, nevertheless, the random check might be a source of numerous misunderstandings, as travellers are largely unaware of this possibility and, as such, they might be surprised or even anxious about being chosen “without a cause.” Especially the travellers, who feel uncomfortable with the check and particularly the hand search, might tend to prepare consciously for the WTMD passage and subsequently may describe the feelings of perceived injustice, when in their view all conditions for a clear passage had been fulfilled and the check was still performed regardless of their effort (Chinese traveller 2 2017; Israeli traveller 3 2017). Nevertheless, the enactment of a random check became a fixed part of the translatory chain as a probabilistic veridictory procedure, which must be present to preserve correct veridiction as a whole, even though its performance is only applied to some randomly selected entities.

Given that, the principle of this procedure is based on the risk-assessment logic. This logic entails the following points. Firstly, a connection through the possible chain of translation is established between an incoming actant and the possibility of representing a threat to civil aviation. Followingly, the strength of this connection is evaluated. As Mark Salter inspired by Michel Foucault writes, such entities or events “are inserted in a calculation of cost”; and, finally, ‘instead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and on

the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded” (Salter 2008e, 249). As a result, the appearance of objective knowledge of a particular risk is produced and even quantitatively evaluated, and this “probabilistic uncertainty comes to be understood as a governmental resource that can be deployed to create, obscure, or manage certain issues, institutions, or behaviours.” (Salter 2008e, 248). The quantitative nature of risk analysis works not only as a managerial resource but also the numbers produced are “signifiers that powerfully alter other actors’ ways of thinking and behaviours” that “contribute to the fabrication of agents’ subjectivities; and ...produce or enable distinctively new behaviours and practices” (Baele, Balzacq, and Bourbeau 2018, 27).<sup>23</sup>

As such, this particular veridictory procedure is established as a valid part of the check, even though, as Mark Salter objected,: “there is good evidence from various quarters that because both the probability and impact of security breaches (and to a lesser extent accidents) are largely *incalculable*, the risk management approach is *inappropriate*.”<sup>24</sup> (Salter 2008c, 21) However, given that the random check is a result of this reasoning, to explore its practice the return to the field is needed.

Till recently, as has already been discussed in the previous section (3.4.2.4), all these supplementary checks were performed as hand searches, which meant a great physical load for the employees. The change was enabled by the broad deployment of quantum sniffers. Subsequently, following a brief development, these supplementary checks are mostly performed by the sniffers, and only a proportion of persons is further chosen for a hand search (Participant observation 5. 21 June 2017). A relatively similar procedure is then used also for hand luggage. This solution is generally welcomed in the field as a healthy compromise, even though the employees consider the percentage of supplementary checks too high and are worried about the possibility of random alarm masking the real threat indication (five employees). They usually endorse the random sampling logic (BEK Employee 17 2017) even though the compromise character of this solution is mentioned in the top parts of organising management (BEK M&A&C 2 2017). Generally, this solution is seen as proposing a great degree of certainty of the absence of threat items. Moreover, this is valid for the management as well:

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<sup>23</sup> The move toward risk calculation and a subsequent sampling is followed not only in Europe or Canada, but also in the USA. For comparison see (Leone and (Rachel) Liu 2005, 71).

<sup>24</sup> Salter distinguishes risk-based approach to safety, where he finds the probabilities to be adequately evaluated based on evidence about material deterioration and maintenance evidences or external objective factors; in comparison, a similar quantification is according to him impossible in case of security, where the occurrence does not seem so predictable (Salter 2008a, 21).

*“It is needed to have a control when we are also examining the people who do not have a metal object on them, but they have some dangerous object which is not metallic, so here definitely the random check is very important because to rely simply on human factor is not simply possible, so the technology makes it easier for us this way... I think that this is totally amazing... [details of the check] ... so, I think it is really good now because before, in case you had a dangerous object and it was not metal, you did not have to find it out. Now, this option also exists, it might happen that he will not be chosen, but still that person might not know it...” (BEK M&A&C 6 2017)*

as for the ordinary employees:

*Interviewer: “Concerning the random check, if he is not chosen, he can carry on him some non-metal dangerous object...”*

*Employee: “I am trying not to think about this because otherwise I would have to go really crazy.”*

*Interviewer: “Why do you think so?”*

*Employee: “Because when I imagine this – everybody who passes and is clear could have something on him! Oh! There is hopefully no such possibility. One must not admit this!” (BEK Employee 22 2017)*

A random check thus seems to provide a great amount of certainty among the personnel, which might be interesting, when compared to the view of statistics. Even though it is not possible to state the percentage of chosen passengers in the field under the study, for an approximate estimation in Katowice in 2014 13% of passengers were assigned to the supplementary check by sniffers giving a possibility to uncover an explosive threat (Skorupski and Uchroński 2018, 13). Out of these passengers, every Xth<sup>25</sup> passenger was also hand searched. So, clearly, the percentage of passengers examined against the presence of non-metal non-explosives threats falls into the range of low units of percent. Even though also other security measures, primarily in the area of intelligence as well as on the board protection measures, have been put in place after 9/11 (Koverdynský 2014, 110), the possibility of discovering a similar attacker with a ceramic or plastic knife during a security check seems quite limited in this light.

To explain why this solution is found so efficient, the concept of risk assessment must be left aside, and random control should be understood in terms of risk perception.

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<sup>25</sup> The particular number cannot be revealed due to security sensitivity.

This is also exactly what the interviewed manager quoted above notices. Following Gierlach, Belsher, and Beutler, risk assessment is an objective notion based on evidence about the past occurrences, whereas risk perception is a subjective notion of the felt likelihood of event occurrence (Gierlach, Belsher, and Beutler 2010, 1539). In the area of risk perception, significant distortions of probabilities perception have been revealed pointing particularly to “overvaluation of low probabilities and undervaluation of high probabilities” (Gayer 2010, 2). This effect corresponds with the actually felt certainty. The wide gap between the expected and perceived probability seems to be a result of this effect multiplication, where the employees on one hand clearly overvalue the possibility of choice of a prospective criminal for a check, and additionally also expect similar a rule-breaker’s overvaluation of the possibility of revealing. As such, the effect of skewed probability perception is a component of the functional system design.

This rendering of control has important implications toward the whole control practice, where the perception of probability significantly influences the perceived reliability of the whole system not only in regard to public, possible intruders but also internally. To produce the perception of the system impenetrability a significant amount of procedural activities is needed and relatively high requirements are demanded from passengers. From the perspective of a risk assessment logic might be argued that the level of certainty in regard to the non-explosive and non-metal threat does not need to be absolute given the threats importance as well as the large availability of potentially dangerous items within the security restricted area behind the control. Despite that and peculiarly in regard to the explosives detection, a specific characteristic of the system rests in a production of a perceptive outcome.

Furthermore, even though random sampling is designed as a cornerstone element ensuring equality in regard to the interaction with the system, the limited public knowledge of the principle being in place de facto disables its benefits. Passengers are not aware of being selected randomly by a “fair” technological means and as such the desired outcome of felt equality might not be produced. Even though the presence of this mechanism is internally ensuring that EU legislation promotes equality, externally, the important aspect of procedural justice (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011) is not produced.

#### 3.4.3. X-Ray and Other Means of Luggage Control

Leaving the area of person screening, in regard to luggage and accessories, the X-ray is an almost universal mean for translating non-human agents from their insecure state

into the secured one besides the problematic of living creatures described in section 3.1, and the exception concerning the screening of liquids, which will be treated below. The X-ray and WTMD represented the original dual solution to the inspection of human and luggage control and as such also the X-ray remains an axial technology of airport security provision. Currently, further hand searches might be found to be needed to resolve potential issues detected by screeners, and in case of hand luggage, also the system of random ETD checks is applied. Nevertheless, the chain of translation for non-humans is simpler than the complementary one for human actants. This is enabled probably by the X-ray characteristic as the most complex system of vision enacted in the context of airport security.

#### *3.4.3.1. X-ray*

The X-ray serves as a general counterpart to WTMD inspection of persons and represents an original component of the airport security control in its American form focusing on the eradication of dangerous items presence on board. It is a solution developed on its own incentive by a private enterprise Philips Government Systems residing in the United States, which was followingly proposed to various American airlines (McCrie and Haas 2018b, 155). An X-ray is a classical Latourian machine, requiring a well-trained spokesperson interpreting the machine activity (Latour 1987, 70–71). Such a training requires not only courses, but three to six years of practice and thousands of bags reviewed, to achieve one's best (BEK Employee 13 2017). The requirements of the X-ray, particularly regarding the complexity of its vision, turn the ability to be a reliable spokesperson at the top of the paramount of Security Controller's skills. The ability to interpret an X-ray is highly evaluated by the colleagues and strictly required by the control system (European Union 2015a, 11.3 and 11.4; BEK Employee 8 2017). Importantly, it is also seen as a distinctive feature of the whole Security Control unit as evaluated by others (Representative of Customs Administration 2017). The complexity of vision results from the visualisation of the whole sets of examined actants even though the detail diverges in relation to the threat specificities. The visualisation of threats is concentrated along the idea of identification of particular "threat objects" excluded from transportation. This iterated list-based ban entails eminent interest in mundane things (Lyon 2008, 43; Schouten 2014b, 24) and crucially presupposes the absence of these items as the guarantee of security. According to Mark Salter, this exclusion is framed as "the inconveniences of travel and not the increased securitization of everyday life" (Salter 2008e, 244). Nevertheless, the security dispositif is not solely centrifugal – requiring the integration of still newly

appearing actants in regard to the travellers' rights (Salter 2008e, 250), rather it is slowly transferring the bans for passengers into the inner managerial problem of the airport security system.

To reveal such threat items, the shapes and materials, identified broadly on the basis of proton number, are made visible. The reveal of "threat items" is based exactly on the vision difference from the possibilities available to humans. The mistakes in interpretation result from the same logic. As Hofer and Schwaninger describe: "some threat objects look very different in an x-ray image than in reality. Other prohibited items are difficult to identify in an x-ray image because they look similar to harmless objects. ...When prohibited items are rotated they can become more difficult to recognize" (Hofer and Schwaninger 2005, 418). To successfully interpret the images and thus to perform the function of Latourian machine, the screeners need to subsequently acquire a range of capabilities – familiarizing themselves with the basic principles and main types of dangerous objects, broadening the gallery of mind maps by checking luggage, developing mechanisms on how to identify an unknown object and learning the patterns of "dangerousness" (particular combination of materials, uncommon features and object type). To achieve this, the identification of all the items in the luggage is required in training, even though practically the experienced employees concentrate only on the above-mentioned patterns of "dangerousness" (Participant observation 8. 26 June 2017; BEK Employee 2 2017).

General experience with the visualisation type and ideally experience with the object visualisation in X-ray, which can be provided mostly only through at least one instance of pairing the optical vision of an actant with its X-ray image, is usually used. If this is not available, further deductive analogies are employed – symmetry, context, identity or difference, where more same type objects are present, the differences between the rest and the inappropriate context are searched for (BEK Employee 23 2017; BEK Employee 24 2017; Observation 3. 11 July 2017; Observation 17. 10 August 2017). Similarly, the vision difference produces something that could be called an "evil twin" effect, namely the object couples, which look for a screener very similar in the X-ray even though one is mundane and "harmless," whereas the other one is considered a threat – some of the most known are electric toothbrushes and electronic cigarettes, scented sticks and sparkle sticks, electric shavers and paralyzers or more obscurely power ball and offensive grenade. The tricks for recognising them are covered by training and then learned through practice (Observation 3. 11 July 2017; Participant observation 8. 26 June 2017;



BEK Employee 25 2017). The difference in visual modality nevertheless means not only an expansion of possibilities – as definitely is the ability to distinguish materials and penetrate objects, but also distinct limitations derived from these – as such, only objects of limited complexity and density can be reasonably inspected with X-ray, others demand a hand search (Hofer and Schwaninger 2005, 418; BEK Employee 25 2017; BEK Employee 2 2017). Till recently also the angle was a limitation, while this problem diminished with the introduction of a dual-view technology producing two simultaneous images (BEK M&A&C 6 2017).

The vision difference, its diverging range, material penetration and capturing of actants material, has important consequences. For example, the diplomatic bag exempted from the inspection by Vienna convention, stating that it “shall not be opened or detained” (*Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* 1961, Article 27 (3)), can be inspected by the X-ray (Participant observation 8. 26 June 2017; Observation 8. 19 July 2017) as it is expected that the vision provided by X-ray is not breaching the confidentiality of its content, which is supposed to contain: “only diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use.” (*Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* 1961, Article 27(4)). The type of vision provided thus differs in its employment not only in contrast to the skills of a man but also in the contrast to the legislative interpretation relating towards a man-abilities-equipped actant.

The difference between the material capabilities of an X-ray and the legislative expectations can, nevertheless, be twofold. In some cases, on the contrary, the legislation expects the detail of performance from an X-ray with Explosives Detection System<sup>26</sup> (or similarly from liquid analysers, dealt with below), which is beyond the ability of the machine, such as the identification of some flammable solutions, repellent sprays, or particular concentration of alcohol or peroxides might be (IATA n.d.; ‘European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - Air Security: Commission Draws up EU-Wide List of Prohibited Articles on Passenger Aircraft’ n.d.). This problem can be in some cases solved by a proper function of Latourian machine – namely by the intervention of the screener’s knowledge and its inference with the threat materiality – which, for example, enables distinguishing of the problematic flammable materials as the paintings in sprays and the regular toiletries, thanks to the presence or respective absence of a mixing ball in a spray container (BEK Employee 25 2017). This produces a lay knowledge,

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<sup>26</sup> EDS is a built-in X-ray function enabling the screening for explosives.

supporting exceptionality and providing an exemption from the general law as noted by O'Malley (O'Malley 2006, 419). Nevertheless, in some cases, these conflicts remain unresolved.

An X-ray employment thus represents a particularly prominent Latourian machine binding together the skills of a technology and a highly trained employee, where mutual abilities complementarity is needed in order to guarantee the proper translation of an incoming agent. For the employees this bound importantly structures inside relations and peer-evaluation. More generally, the mode of X-ray employment represents another instance, where a restricted vision is seen as beneficiary in regard to the passenger or contracting authority requirements for privacy embodied in limited visualisation. Lastly, the limits of a Latourian machine are shown, where even the maximal mutual interplay of man knowledge, skill and creativity, with machine abilities and precision cannot exceed the material limits resulting from a potential threat's low specificity in regard to the vision employed. Here clearly the legislative and followingly procedural expectations resulting from threat imaginaries do not follow the available capabilities producing either omissions or significant hassles. The low threat specificity, however, seems to coincide with the threat severity, for example in regard to regular insect repellents, and the divergencies resulting from the legislative demand result rather from an inevitable verbatim rigorous interpretation, rather than from a mismatch on the level of the technological capabilities.<sup>27</sup>

#### 3.4.3.2. Threat Image Projection

Security provision is considered to be of an utmost importance but, concurrently, the certainty of its provision can be reliably measured only against catastrophic failures. This state of affairs resulting in low acceptance of error, as well as the scarcity of incident occurrence, creates an extreme push for quality control regarding the individual employee performance, as well as the overall system setting. The problematic of measuring the efficiency of the checks has been raised by several authors, mostly concluding that:

*“The only objective measurement method is to analyse the number of unlawful acts on board of aircraft using objects undetected by the security screening. Basing on such data is far from enough since it is obvious that the number of such incidents is only a small*

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<sup>27</sup> Even though a wasp spray in combination with a machete has been used during an attack on airport security in New Orleans, it seems quite probable that regular repellents and particularly those placed in hold luggage do not represent a substantial danger. Similarly, along available resources in the above-mentioned attack, the machete, rather than the spray, seemed to be accountable for the wounds (‘New Orleans Airport Machete Suspect Is Dead’ n.d.)

*percentage of that of prohibited items which could get on the board.*” (Skorupski and Uchroński 2018, 6; similarly: Salter 2008e, 257).

Similarly, Shim and collective note in the context of employee training that: “knowledge and skills for security may not be fully developed by workplace practice alone since security-related incidents rarely occur” and that “the gap between the declaratively-acquired knowledge and the procedural knowledge, represents a big concern for them in making a training program effective” (Shim et al. 2013).

To resolve this problem, the idea of Threat Image Projection was introduced. Threat Image Projection is a software component encompassed within the X-ray interface, which, at the set ratio, inserts an image of a threat item into the picture presented to the screener. In case of cabin luggage, given the visual contact of the screener with the luggage, the threat item is superimposed over the real bag image via a procedure called Fictional Threat Image (FTI). In hold baggage screening Complete Threat Image (CTI) is employed, presenting the screener with the whole fictional picture, meaning the fictional baggage with a threat. A predefined time is given to the screener to identify a threat, and their hits, misses and non-TIP alarms are counted and used for an individual evaluation (Cutler and Paddock 2009, 49; Hofer and Schwaninger 2005, 418). When designed, the system was intended to increase screeners’ attention and vigilance, as well as to improve screeners’ skills through making them more familiar with the threat items screens (Cutler and Paddock 2009, 46), also as a possibility to measure the overall effectiveness in particular threats detection (BEK M&A&C 4 2017) and as a measure to counter the screeners avoidance of tagging and searching the suspected items, given the low probability of a threat presence (Cormier and Fobes 1996, 4).<sup>28</sup>

The idea of individual screener’s assessment and control was thus to some extent inherently present in TIP logic from its birth. Nevertheless, also due to the former technological possibilities, it remained mostly tacit and TIP was presented as an educative and counter-stereotype component. This has very much changed ever since. The push for the zero risk described by Aradau and Van Munster and Marijn Hoijtink (Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 103; Hoijtink 2017) resulted in a call for greater reliability of the Latourian X-ray screening machine. Because the strength of a system is judged by its weakest component and the X-rays are not only certified, but also tested on a regular basis in their

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<sup>28</sup> Importantly, this problem has not been successfully solved by the advent of TIP, just removed one step further toward indicating the threat in the X-ray and not performing the subsequent check, as such it remains a tangible issue till now (BEK M&A&C 1 2017).

on the job performance – by screening a special testing suitcase containing the samples of distinctive types of solutions (Observation 19. 18 August 2017), clearly the human component of the machine had to be tested accordingly. So, the simple test restricted certification became insufficient and on the job training, or more precisely testing, conditioning the individual licensing had to be enacted. As such, today the strictly defined TIP projection became a legislated obligatory part of the security provision (European Union 2015a, 11.4). If the reliability is not monitored, the translation from insecure to secure becomes flawed.

Similarly, development unfolded also at LKPR, where firstly TIP was used as a counterstereotype tool, employed firstly on a limited set of X-ray machines, where only the data for the whole unit were processed. Followingly, airport management developed by its own incentive the system to achieve individual evaluation. As such this took place at Václav Havel Airport Prague even prior to the European legislative requirement and the system was lately only adjusted in order to achieve commensurability (BEK M&A&C 4 2017; BEK M&A&C 4 2017).

Following the perspective proposed by Peer Schouten, here the technology is becoming a disciplining factor ensuring the employee's performance and fulfilment of the quality requirements (Schouten 2010, 15). As Schouten writes:

*“It is through technology that it becomes possible to disaggregate regulations and the vague concept of security into small measurable and controllable processes carried out by different employees assigned to such simple tasks, that in turn feedback and are constantly compared to and rationalized in relation to key performance indicators representing clients' demands and regulations”* (Schouten 2010, 16).

As such TIP serves as tool for attributing responsibility for mistakes and enables to trace the accountability to an individual. Given the high esteem attributed to an X-ray performance, as well as the awareness of the great stakes involved, not only the licensing but also the long-term on the job assessment resulting from a legislative framework is generally accepted by the employees. Nevertheless, the airport also applies a supplementary competitive assessment program evaluated on a monthly basis, which includes bonuses and maluses (BEK M&A&C 4 2017) and this is taken by the employees as a thorn in their side (BEK Employee 26 2017; BEK Employee 12 2017).

The negative perception of a control mechanism – in contrast to the positive reaffirming acceptance – which is described by Verbarg and collective, came and the

control, or rather the assessment, is seen to be a result of the external push and a substitute for trust (Verburg et al. 2018, 180–81). As TIP is framed de facto as the reliability measure, the important stream of criticism is targeted exactly against its own reliability – pointing to the fact that some threat projections might be placed in an unrealistic angle towards the original luggage, or presenting the images of objects that are after the legislative changes already allowed – as, for example, toy gun models, which cannot be confused with a real weapon, or that some projected objects might be otherwise normally accepted for transport – as, for example, the locally famous cheese scraper (BEK Employee 21 2017; BEK Employee 27 2017; BEK Employee 28 2017). Similarly, the fact that at checkpoints opened for passengers’ passage some objects, allowed for the staff, might be projected into the employees or crew luggage is also criticised (Observation 29. 28 September 2017).

Here the conflict resulting from the practical infeasibility of the divisive logic – which expects a clear separation of entities through the whole chain of translation, can be clearly spotted. These criticisms are then usually accompanied by the narrative that the use of TIP for individual assessment is de facto an abuse of its original purpose, which was an educative and vigilance measure (BEK Employee 22 2017). Importantly, none of these comments say that TIP is a bad idea, but only that it is not reliable enough to measure the employees’ reliability on a monthly basis. Here, of course, the question remains to which extent the measurement is really influenced by the instances criticised or whether it is another instance of a probability *perception*, leading to an “overvaluation of low probabilities and undervaluation of high probabilities” (Gayer 2010, 2), as described above. Even though Hofer and Schwaninger came in their research dealing with the problematic of the use of TIP for individual assessment with the conclusions rather confirming the possible weaknesses of this approach (Hofer and Schwaninger 2005, 420), the situation in the field could not be evaluated in this regard.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Hofer and Schwaninger show that in case of cabin luggage screening, with the use of gallery, which is relatively “simple” for the screeners, and I would add in the environment, where significant intrusions into the work wash away personal differences in performance, the resulting standard deviation of individual performances is slight. This leads to a low correlation coefficient between personal odd and even day performances. The mean even-odd day correlation for one month was  $r = .19$ , improved over seven months to  $r = .33$  (Hofer and Schwaninger 2005, 420). This does not seem to be a reasonable basis for benefits or reductions from wages. Nevertheless, the situation in the field could not be evaluated in the similar way, as these data were not available to the author and along available information these data have not even been evaluated in this vain by the management (BEK M&A&C 4 2017).

For this thesis, more interestingly, following Schouten, the approach adopted by the employees can be seen as the reframing of the issue in the vein of a human factor security conceptualisation in contrast to the disciplining intent (Schouten 2010, 15). As such, the higher reliability of the searches compared to the TIP software was emphasized as well as the human agency primacy over the machines. Similarly, the situation stresses out the very different levels of endorsement and acceptance of the multiple control matrices, resulting from relatively minor differences in the control matrix formulation, thus contributing to understanding the control mechanism acceptance in regard to the preceding work by Verbung and collective (Verburg et al. 2018).

#### 3.4.3.3. Liquids, Aerosols and Gels Detection

Together with other non-metallic actants already treated in the preceding sections, it was particularly the liquids that entered the set of potential threats, as Schouten writes:

*“the previously clean area after the security checks now became potentially dirty with prohibited liquids and gels, the taken-for-granted process in which security personnel worked with technology was problematized and picked apart by media, politics and airport management alike. The black box of associations that previously made up airport security was opened, and now became a Pandora's box of infinite elements”* (Schouten 2010, 1, similarly: 2014b, 35).

These new actants hold a prominent place given the number of resources needed to govern them and cast them out of the security restricted area. Salter explains their inclusion into the usual framework of security dispositif:

*“The banning of liquids/gels – or, more precisely, the strict limiting of liquids/gels – is another example of the security dispositif. The international norm of 100ml of liquids/gels is based on an assumed failure of screening – 100ml of explosives would likely not cause a catastrophic crash. This limit emerged from within the Israeli aviation security community and has been adopted around the globe”* (Salter 2008e, 259).

However, this inclusion brought together not only a significant discomfort for travellers but a whole range of issues. Primarily, this group of actants proved to be very heterogeneous and avoiding a clear delimitation, as already the label “liquids, aerosols and gels” (LAG) implies. The first years of the liquids regulation enforcement thus saw numerous controversies also at LKPR – about the inclusion of various pasts, about cakes with whipped cream fillings, or about the pickle’s liquid (BEK M&A&C 4 2017; BEK Employee 29 2017), whose solution only slowly settled the line for LAG inclusion.

Nevertheless, this line remains more than complex and unclear for many travellers, even in such a case when one is generally acquitted with the European security framework. For example, a Swiss couple whose jam was just not permitted on board explains: “Above all, we have not thought this, we have just bought a bit of jam, and we really did not realise, that it is also in this” (Swiss traveller 1 2017).

Contemporarily, the shared liquid actants’ characteristic is seen as the viscosity “causing leakage when turned upside down,” or “not keeping once squeezed in fingerprint” (BEK Employee 26 2017; BEK Employee 30 2017), or more precisely as proposed by the training, gel is “a solid matter of jelly characteristics, which after squeezing by hand might be returned to its original shape, without the change of its structure” (Participant observation 6. 22 June 2017). Also, the content of the liquid component below 100 ml, following the line of the EU regulation is considered acceptable (European Union 2015a, 4.1.2.2 (a)). Nevertheless, even under this definition, significant variance remains causing quarrels among the employees based on their approach to the reasonability of this rule - the hardliners following the strict enforcement on one side (BEK Employee 31 2017), the critics more a lenient approach on the other (BEK Employee 32 2017). This results in a state of affairs, where not rarely the LAGs control might undermine the meaningfulness of checks in employee’s eyes: “The things, like that the cake is OK, but when it has a fruit filling then not... at that moment, one feels like a total... I have no polite word for that - when one must solve whether the cake has a fruit filling or not. Don’t be angry with me; this has absolutely nothing to do with security” (BEK Employee 29 2017). The inclusion into a proposed security dispositif thus seems complicated in this case.

The ANT explanation is proposed on the level of materiality of these actants. In comparison with the above-mentioned actants as plastic explosives, or even knives and scissors, where their materiality itself proposes the option of harm, the LAGs materiality does not propose this option, and these material characteristics have even never (at least in all publicly-known cases and in its strict sense of an explosive) been detected at this particular airport (BEK M&A&C 2 2017). The threat is thus one step removed toward the problem of threat specificity and a problematic solution identification. Moreover, the especially strong controversy is concentrated around food products (when compared with toiletries), where their materiality implies the imminent value for a human agent, which might be further strengthened by the felt added value of the agent as a result of human work. For example: “I, yet, won’t throw passengers’ pickles into the garbage, in case he carries *the homemade*, I can *see inside* it, and I know that it is squeezed so a drop of

vinegar... I won't throw this out" (BEK Employee 32 2017; similarly: BEK Employee 22 2017; BEK M&A&C 5 2017). Some employees even openly claim that when food is in question, they never throw it away and always opt for a further control (BEK Employee 5 2017). The hardships with the liquids limitation enforcement thus result from their heterogeneous materialities and from heterogeneous and complex nature of the actants that encompass them. Returning once again to the work of Claudia Aradau and Van Munster, the expectation of the zero risk leads to the shifting of the burden of proof (Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 106) – not only the materialities encompassing the agency of potential harm are excluded, but also the materialities, among whom such materiality might be hidden. These are rendered a priori suspicious, and their beingness, not their threat potential must be proved.

This system originated in the state of emergency subsequent to the terrorist attempt, where in the words of Didier Bigo, the suspension of old categories became possible leading to the infusion of the new ones (Bigo, n.d., 38) and as such the exceptional enabled only by special circumstances became the rule (Lyon 2008, 43). More interestingly, the normalisation of this exceptionality, together with the advent of liquid detectors, enabled a further exception, this time normalising the situation toward the previous state, namely to screen some liquids and allow them on board. To be precise, now all checkpoints are equipped with a liquid analyser, and other liquids-analysing technologies are readily available, enabling the analysis of all solutions brought by the travellers (BEK M&A&C 4 2017). This widened the possibility of admitting particular solutions for transportation even beyond the medical purposes and a special dietary requirement including baby food, which had been exempted from the limitation already from the beginning (European Union 2015a, 4.1.2.2).

Nevertheless, even though overall screening is seen as a future ideal, the status of exception of this approach is maintained for fear of a slippery slope and resulting capacity problems (BEK M&A&C 4 2017; BEK M&A&C 2 2017). This argumentation seems to concur with the airport owners' position identified by Hoijtink (Hoijtink 2017, 310). This led to the incorporation of this exception into the internal rules, stating that a particular liquid might be checked and admitted for transportation in the cases of "special consideration" (BEK M&A&C 4 2017). The troublesome problematic of exception codification has been summed up by Feldman, who points out that on one hand bringing the exception within the law is seen by some authors as legally ensuring its marginality, on the other hand it is understood by others as "the surest route to a transformed normalcy and



a permanent state of exception” (Feldman 2007, 334). In practice, this raises the question of who is eligible for exception and for what reasons and how the codification influences the exception of employment. Importantly, even though the exceptions have been codified, and in case of the true “special consideration” exception some concrete reasons have been proposed, their definition is rather free.

Similarly, the definition of baby food, the expected amount to be used during the trip, the baby age limit or the definition of acceptable medical reasons are not proposed in the internal rules (BEK M&A&C 2 2017; Observation 8. 19 July 2017; Observation 10. 25 July 2017). The management frames this approach as entrusting the agency to the employees and their security awareness-based consideration. Nevertheless, it could be argued that this interpretation is left opened exactly with an idea of the exception inclusiveness: “We have set it internally that it is up to the decision of each security controller, whether a child is under a year, two, or three, here it is a bit free, with the overlap to the security awareness. We do not have a fixed limit; it is rather about one’s perception at the checkpoint. Nevertheless, it is this domain of children where the legislation says that it allows liquids... for the trip duration” (BEK M&A&C 2 2017). The practical inclusiveness employed by employees then varies significantly defining the upper limit in one case “two to three years” (BEK Employee 22 2017), a broader consensus being reached between six and eight (BEK Employee 19 2017; BEK Employee 11 2017; BEK Employee 26 2017; BEK Employee 17 2017), and further at ten years (BEK Employee 33 2017; BEK Employee 16 2017; BEK Employee 29 2017; BEK Employee 10 2017), and one stating even twelve years as an age limit (BEK Employee 23 2017). Similarly, the approach to the type of the beverage transported varies, from refusing only the transportation of liquors to questioning even sugar-rich lemonades (BEK Employee 7 2017).

Nevertheless, it seems that the normalisation and inclusive approach toward the exception is in place when the accepted age limits are compared to the usual meaning of the word “baby” stated in European legislation (European Union 2015a, 4.1.2.2). The situation concerning the medical solutions seems to be relatively similar. In case of the exceptions based on “special consideration,” the willingness for the exception acceptance seems to be much lower for a group of employees. In many cases even the reasons explicitly mentioned as being worthy of this attention in the guidelines, as especially valuable items (BEK M&A&C 2 2017) are disregarded and, even though sometimes the solution is achieved, for example, by checking-in the item, a much more lengthy and costly

solution is employed, rather than the simple detection in a liquid detector (Observation 2. 10 July 2017). In addition to the above-stated worries about the slippery slope, the general employees also perceive as decisive factors for opting for this type of exception the acceptance of rule-breaking and control authority, time-saving reasons and in some cases the urge for fairness and procedural justice (Observation 27. 26 September 2017). For example, the passengers' misunderstanding of the security-restricted area of the airport might be seen as a viable rationale (BEK Employee 34 2017; BEK Employee 16 2017).

The lower willingness for exception might be, besides the psychological reasons described above, explained by the "truly exceptional" character of this situation. The baby food and the medical reasons have been de facto a part of the special branch of the liquid chain of translation since the beginning of liquid restriction, even though now their testing has been exchanged for the detection (BEK Employee 29 2017). As such, they have been in nature de facto always allowed for transportation. In contrast, "special consideration," represents a new detour in the translatory chain, which is voluntary and has no exactly delimited group of instances, and which allows something that was once forbidden, as one manager notes:

*"Even though we do not advertise it publicly, we are trying to make the employees use the options given by legislation, which does not list liquids among forbidden items any more, but requires their control. Recruiting the employees for this approach took some effort because suddenly there was a new threat and the employees were forced by the legislation, by the airport to approach it as a threat... They were used to it, and now, with the technological development and the partial legislative relaxation, it is still approached as a threat, but we are trying to reshape it to the model, where, yes, be aware that it is a threat, but control it and if you are sure, or you make yourself sure by the control that it is not a threat, then provide a client with the maximum possible service you have."* (BEK M&A&C 4 2017).

The detection with the liquid analyser is not understood as a valid detour for a proper translation of the liquids into secure items. This notion results not only from the novelty of this option, but also from the liquid analyser characteristics, which is sharing with ETD the wish for no need for interpretation and presents, as a result, the simple OK, invalid check, or "Alarm, check the content." Moreover, the liquid analyser might require from the employee answers to a set of questions before the detection is performed. The content of these questions, given the vision differences between an employee and the

machine, might provoke further suspicion about machines' performative abilities given their trivial character for a human actant (BEK Employee 9 2017). The lack of the understanding and resulting distrust in the machine's performance may, together with the opportunity proposed by the questioning, produce an urge to outsmart and cheat the technology as the employee perceives himself/herself wiser than the machine (BEK Employee 6 2017; Observation 5. 13 July 2017).

On the other hand, the lack of translatory options produces in the long-term an important number of conflicts with passengers (Czech traveller 7 2017; BEK Employee 1 2017) and contributes to the poor public image of airport security as a whole (Czech traveller 13 2017; Israeli traveller 13 2017; Israeli traveller 16 2017; Korean traveller 20 2017), either as a source of the concept misunderstanding (Russian traveller 11 2017), or simply as a result of deprivation of free access to something that is perceived as a basic need (Chinese traveller 9 2017; Chinese traveller 10 2017; Chinese traveller 13 2017); importantly, even business-class travellers, for whom the goods purchase is probably not problematic, might share this notion (American traveller 7 2017). Along Rajivs Gupta's research, the access to free water is evaluated as the thirteenth out of sixty-five most important needs required by the passenger, outranking even "friendly customs," "seating," "parking," or "escalators" (Gupta n.d., 55). Last but not least, the problematic accessibility of water connected with the concept of duty-free stores, which produce an important part of the airport income, as Schouten describes this situation "the content of security merges with the context" (Schouten 2010, 6) further corrupts the image of airport security as a commercial affair. Importantly, this perception is not reserved for travellers (Czech traveller 17 2017; Slovakian traveller 2 2017) but also is felt by employees (BEK Employee 12 2017).

The inclusion of LAGs among a possible scope of threats thus has important repercussions. LAGs are a precedent of threat framing not on the basis of its actual material presence, but on the idea of impossibility to positively confirm its absence. The shifting of the burden of proof thus develops preceding impetus of the kind present in the European legislation (European Union 2015a, 6.2.1.2). The problematics of this shift together with its impenetrability from a passenger's perspective results in hassles and, importantly, compromises the airport security performance, which might be particularly sensitive, when the financial reasons are perceived to be at play.

#### 3.4.3.4. *The Sorting Station*

Employing the *divisive logic*, the hold luggage undergoes the strictest and longest separation. Historically, this separation used to be seen as a sufficient barrier against considering the hold luggage a threat and as such the hold luggage was disregarded by the security for a long time (Leone and (Rachel) Liu 2005, 69). Following the Air India and Pan Am bombings ('ASN Aircraft Accident Boeing 747-237B VT-EFO' 2018; 'ASN Aircraft Accident Boeing 747-121A N739PA' 2018), discussed in detail in the second chapter (2.2), the idea of providing this connection through reconciliation, in order to guarantee the simultaneous boarding of luggage and passenger, was born. Followingly in Europe, also the regular screening of hold luggage was enacted (Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 6). Currently, once separated, the hold luggage in the European system and thus also at LKPR undergoes a base screening, which is subsequently intensified in case of any suspicion. In case that even subsequent X-ray checks cannot evaluate the nature of the threat, the luggage is carted at the gate, where it is opened and checked in the passenger's presence. Since May 2017, in such cases where the suspicion that the luggage might contain an explosive device exists, it might be opened as well by the specialised employees in the area of sorting plant without the passenger's presence ('Na Letišti v Ruzyni Vám Budou Moci Kufr Otevřít i Násilím. Kvůli Výbušninám' 2017).

Leaving the passengers' reaction aside for now, the multilevel screening system based on enacting hierarchical decisions under the conditions of a constant movement might produce a specific type of uncertainty at the top of the controlling pyramid alluded to at the beginning of this chapter (3.2). When the screener's capacity at the lower level is not reached, the lacking slots for X-ray screens evaluation may exceptionally lead to the absenting decisions. These automatically result in accumulation of more ordinary luggage at the top control stage. Even though this is not common and the incoming bags may be easily handled by the staff at this point, more interestingly it provokes the feeling of uncertainty about one's colleagues' skills. This represents a type of mediation by composition (Latour 1999, 178–84), where the upper floors of the decision-making system are presented with the mix of luggage unaccepted at lower levels as well as those not examined at all. Skilled staff at this position are not aware whether this decision is a result of the automatic system outcome or whether it is a result of the manmade decision at the lower level, as one employee noted: "When it is very easy, I think who could have sent this up, such a person has nothing to do in here, so then I just hope that it was a system" (BEK Employee 3 2017).

The *logic of division* between multiple chains of translation and the following employment of correct veridictory procedure is thus especially valid for the hold luggage. Interestingly in some cases, only the reclassification of an object and its transportation into a distinct chain of translation, where different veridiction procedure applies, may serve as a solution to a problem resulting from breaching the rules by the passenger. In these instances, for example, hold luggage including the items not allowed in this veridictory mode – such as a lithium battery or a lighter may be carted at the gate and in the presence of passenger pulled out of the checked-in luggage, where its presence was inadmissible and placed to the cabin luggage or the passenger’s pocket – thus solving the problem by changing its status. This logic applies in both directions, as an expensive liquor, pocket knife or scissors, inadmissible in cabin luggage may be in the security checkpoint checked-in and saved, as its presence in the checked-in luggage is then deemed fully admissible. Nevertheless, the object must classify itself as a “passing” entity within the new chain of translation. Such a classification is, for example, conditioned by “not being a plastic bag,” which is not deemed possible hold luggage (Handling Employee 2017).

Such shifts are nonetheless rendered as exceptions, because the system of airport security is constructed as divisive and the encounter of entities and their reclassification once assigned to a particular chain of translation is not expected, as one employee put it: “...this is solved only exceptionally, when it is something really expensive, or when you see that it is somehow precious” (BEK Employee 4 2017). Such a deviation erodes the particular mediatory program of action (Latour 1999, 178–84) and thus burdens the system. The general rule thus proclaims that once separated entities should not meet either until secured or in case of hold luggage until the journey ended. In the places, where such a division blurs, either due to a separate treatment or due to the very nature of the handled items, the production of security seems to be endangered. One such case was a VIP lounge, where screened hold luggage was temporarily stored under employee’s supervision till given over to a further processing; in this case, an external audit stated that the enacted division was not sufficient (Observation. Date omitted July 2017). Similarly, on Terminal 3 where operation of private flights is ensured, this division is enacted in order to fulfil the legislation but given the internal organization of the aircraft space on such private flights this division is rather symbolic, resulting together with the characteristic of those flights in the shared feeling of “alleviated” security measures (BEK Employee 21 2017).

Even though this type of solution might look like a miracle of a kind, in some cases it does not provide a fully ideal solution and represents only a fix to a situation, where too

many veridiction mode crossings produced disarray. The complexity of situation might be described by the following example. An Asian couple packed 29 pieces of 150 ml toiletries sprays into one of their checked-in suitcases; these were uncovered and carted out of the sorting station, and in their presence, 16 of them were not allowed on board (Observation 7. 18 July 2017). The explanation of this action cannot be found at the airport security information webpage ('Předměty, jejichž přeprava je nejčastěji dotazována' n.d.), nor even in any public part of European legislation (European Union 2008, 2015a). Only IATA dangerous goods guide provides a partial answer to this, when stating that only 2 litres of toiletry aerosols are allowed (IATA n.d.). But still, the couple was travelling together on the Emirates line to Dubai, and along the Emirates page at this line the luggage is handled on the basis of a weight concept, which enables to combine group baggage allowances ('What Is the Weight and Piece Concept? | Baggage and Lost Property | FAQ Details' n.d.). Therefore, when travelling in pair, up to 4 litres, or 26 sprays could be theoretically allowed, but only in case that security wouldn't have been operating in all instances on the basis of a piece concept (Observation 7. 18 July 2017). This is, however, information that I was not able to recover from any publicly-available sources. Further, in case that also their second luggage would have been taken out of the sorting plant, which is not a possible practice, 13 more sprays could have been simply repacked to the second suitcase and allowed, following the above-described logic. Similarly, if this information was available before, the couple could have packed these sprays separately in two suitcases at the beginning.

Given that in some cases the veridictory modes encompass complex rules, where multiple airport rationalities clash, the results cannot be foreseen by an average traveller. Consequently, the entanglements among the individual chains of translation then might simply produce a non-ideal outcome against which no appeal exists and which puts a traveller into the unfavourable situation, which only can be accepted. The complexity and non-transparent nature of the network of the chains of translation, which might be intentional in concrete segments but mostly results from the network development, then leads to particularly tangible outcomes for the travellers. The strict rules of the veridiction logic in individual chains of translation then might be partially remediated by the change of the mode; however, this option represents a scarce exception, which is also limitedly comprehensible to travellers.

Leaving the sorting station, set for the hold luggage inspection, this chapter concludes having introduced all major components of the control relevant to the individual

traveller. Showing the control's possible course, this chapter has pointed out the practical instances from which the guiding logics in operation within the field have been identified. Providing an account based on these principles, the chapter has also introduced and explained the origins of dilemmas present in the practice of security provision, their inner rationalities, and the unfolding solutions adopted.

## 4. Identity and Spatiality

In the preceding chapter the guiding logics of visibility, division and flow were presented as the underlying entities guiding the security performance at the checkpoint. In this chapter, the logics of identity and spatiality are introduced. These two logics are part of the chains of security translation and as such produce an interdependent security system with those logics shown in the previous chapter; nevertheless, given their special mutual relation, they are dealt with separately. Their connection sets them more remote and seemingly also maybe more widely rooted actants within the security logic. Moreover, the manner of their contemporary employment also makes them the defining rationalities of the two prevalent airport security systems, where the manner of their endorsement sets these two systems apart. The first one, predominantly described in the public part of the European airport security legislation and mostly treated within the preceding chapter, even though broader, is based on equality in the degree of visual scrutiny achieved. The second one, based on equality in the degree of identity-based risk verification, has its origins in Israel and the US but recently has been gaining popularity worldwide. However, both of them, as has been discussed in the second chapter (2.2), represent a fixed part of the airport security landscape since the passenger check introduction. Even though they were set up rather independently, as rather distinct and geographically distant, they both share important similarities. The embracement of spatially based logic in the USA as well as its spread worldwide then seem as a result of a long-term wondering and trials of both. Resulting differences then might be understood rather as a result of different emphases than a product of incommensurability. These logics, even though opposing in some cases, are thus not described as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary systems, emphasising different aspects of the spatiality and identity actorship. In these roles they are treated as complementary to the activities of the logics introduced in the preceding chapter.

### 4.1. Identity Logic

The identity-based security logics crucially rely on the idea of intent and the possibility of its identification. The identity is then deemed as a measure allowing identification of intent. The intent, or maybe more precisely the threat, is then seen as identifiable within the framework combining information and its absence. To operate with the notion of identity-based threat in the field practice, I develop the previous work of Claudia Aradau and Tobias Blanke, who already pointed out in the context of anomalies' detection that the threat is deemed to be identifiable within the Donald Rumsfeld's matrix



of known knowns, unknown knowns, and unknown unknowns. This matrix has been developed in the data-processing context by National Security Agency and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) as a matrix including the following: known target-known query (target discovery), known target-unknown query (target tracking), unknown target-known query (behaviour-based discovery), and unknown target-unknown query (anomaly detection) (Aradau and Blanke 2018, 7). The actorship of identity in regard to a threat can be mapped onto this concept. The identity acts here on two levels, firstly as a formal identity, meaning passenger's name and other biographical information, and secondly – identity as an ontological status – meaning a threat identity of a perpetrator or the innocent identity of a regular passenger. Following Aradau and Blanke, on one side there stands the identity based on “biometric data anchored in the human body, apparently fixing and securing identity” and on the other the idea that “activity becomes alternative identity” (Aradau and Blanke 2018, 6–7), even though in an understanding proposed here the activity is just a marker of the “true” ontological status of identity.

In the first two cases of known knowns and known unknowns, the formal identity is used as a verification, which enables translating an actant from the state of insecurity to the secure one, as described in the preceding chapter. This verification firstly includes the exclusion of a passenger as a known known, meaning excluding the option of a direct encounter with a wanted person. This approach means, for example, a comparison of passengers' identities against an intelligence-based no-flight list, but as will be shown in a following section (4.5), it might also work as a positive confirmation of formal identity with a known informal non-threat status.

The second case then includes the examination of a particular identity against the set of identity-based “risk factors.” This is the shadow zone of traditional profiling, where statistical and other inferences are made on one case from the “group characteristic.” In the third case, the translation into the secure state is based either on the idea that “a threat identity” bears common distinguishable performed characteristics, which can be searched for to recognise whether the particular formal identity has this ontological status. This approach is enacted as behavioural profiling. It is exactly this idea expressed in the materials authored by a Czech ICTS (International Consultants on Targeted Security) representative active in the field, when he describes the possibilities to discover lone wolves on the basis of behavioural profiling as “showing negative indications” and “behaviour contradict[ing] to the habits of other persons staying at the airport” (Just 2005, 7–8; translated by SK). However, behavioural profiling under this definition, even though

usually not labelled as such, also includes broader transportation behaviour markers as air ticket purchasing behaviour. Nevertheless, these might also be included under the second type given the connection to formal identity. In the last case of unknown unknowns, the presumption about particular behavioural features implying the threat is removed, and simply the anomaly is searched for. This is also entailed within the airport environment and quoting the same source as such can be labelled the presence of “atypical individuum” (Just 2005, 4).

Crucially, besides the first case, when a traveller is a known perpetrator traveling under his/her name or known alias this system is based on: “The underlying assumption here is that a passenger who embodies certain characteristics could turn out to become a threat, even if there is no objectified statement about the nature or likelihood of that threat” (Leese 2014, 498). This is exactly the idea again expressed in the materials authored by the Czech ICTS representative:

*“Because sometimes the suspicion and categorisation of an individual is more important than a proof. An X-ray, though, has not shown any threat, but what if the concerned person broke a bottle and attacked passengers or crew on board? Or if he took a mobile phone and said that a bomb had been placed in the airplane hold and he would activate it through the mobile phone...”* (Just 2005, 9).

As has already been noted in the previous chapter, Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster pointed out that this understanding of threat as a precautionary risk shifts the burden of proof and leaves the only limited possibility of refutation (Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 103). Similarly, as O’Malley mentions, the intense scrutiny target in a particular direction does not lead to the discoveries outside this group and as such might produce self-strengthening outcomes (O’Malley 2006, 415).

The veridiction mode based on the ideal of a known formal identity and a known threat status renders security as identity-bound and also allows for a relatively extended temporality. Once it is known that a person, whose identity is confirmed, does not represent a threat, the person might be considered secure, in case that the status does not change, which is supposed to be a rather long-term process. The long-term nature of the secure status of a person then requires the affirmative identity proof, which will permit to avoid the need for future veridiction. To provide the long-term character of the proof as well as the indivisibility, which would have compromised the precondition of a confirmed identity – biometric data might be used. As such, not only that “the body is becoming the

stable token of identity” (Adey 2004, 1369; similarly: Currah and Mulqueen 2011, 568), but also a token of security.

However, in the second pair of cases when the formal identity is not confirmed in this way, the “threat status” of the person is searched for. Even though some of its “negative indications” could be measured by technological means, the role of technologies is made limited given the unclear expression of this status toward the external world. This renders the human providers of security as superior to the technologies, which are turned into simple tools, as only humans are deemed to be able to recognise this ontological status. This is pointed out by Peer Schouten, in his discussion about a security awareness concept (Schouten 2010, 17). Similarly, given that no clear indicators are searched for, this type of identity examination seems to promise the unique possibility of proactivity within airport security (Bigo, n.d., 40).

#### 4.2. Spatiality Logic

It was probably the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and border that rendered the provision of security as spatially bound. Even though it might be argued that the privatisation of security erodes this traditional notion, the only thing which might be disrupted is the bond between state and border security. According to George S. Rigakos and David R. Greener, contemporary airport security might be understood in terms of “bubbles of governance” (Rigakos and Greener 2000). This effect of space-limited security provision has also been labelled “spatialization”: “Spatial practices constitute the contested territories (properties, borders, and the spaces of flow of people and goods) where security is deployed. As a form of spatialization, the rise of mass private properties constituted a shift in security with the formation of an elaborate archipelago populated by private ‘bubbles of governance’” (Lippert and O’Connor 2003, 337). As C. Feldman notes, more important than the form of ownership is the fact that: “In general the heterotopic site is not freely accessible like a public place. Either the entry is compulsory, as in the case of entering the barracks or a prison, or else the individual has to submit to rites and purifications. (Though obvious, it is perhaps worth mentioning that security screening has taken on the trappings of a purification ritual.)” (Feldman 2007, 334).

This is exactly the logic currently governing the “European model,” which is rooted in the idea of Security restricted area (SRA) specified as: “‘security restricted area’ means that area of airside where, in addition to access being restricted, other aviation security standards are applied” (European Union 2008, 11.). This, clearly separates SRA from other

public, or non-public accessible areas, by the special status, which is enforced through the performance of checks, translating incoming entities into the secure one, on its borders, as has been described in the previous chapter. In practice, the application of aviation security standards means that particular actants, who are rendered as a threat, are de facto excluded from the presence within SRA. As such, SRA could be labelled as a banopticon, which Bigo defines as an entity selectively applying its rule of entry denial against the unwelcomed (Bigo, n.d., 34–35). Although Bigo applies this concept in relation to human agents only; Salter already pointed out that the banopticon operation in the airport security context includes the exclusion of prohibited items as well (Salter 2008e, 256). However, ANT provides a further critical insight here – the SRA banopticon is not directed primarily against the presence of human actants at all. Humans might not be allowed as a result of their status of the not-being a passenger, but for their nature only non-human actants are banned. As such the spatial logics entrusts a significant agency to non-humans, whose sole agency is deemed as threatening and as such their presence must be excluded. The exclusion performed on non-human only is then seen as a guarantee of a fair treatment of human agents. Banning the non-humans on the basis of their agency allows leaving the human agency aside. Salter mentions the fact of leaving out passengers’ screening “for behaviour or intent” (Salter 2008e, 255). The absence of these actants is then deemed sufficient for achieving security within the spatial security logic. As such the security is detached from human identity, and the temporality is extended in regard to place, but shortened in regard to a person’s stay behind the control. As has already been pointed out, the spatiality and identity logics are nevertheless not exclusive, and as such now their practical relations will be introduced.

### 4.3. Spatiality at LKPR

The airport security in the terrain studied is organised along a strong spatialised logic expected in the European framework. In the centre of this spatialized organisation lies SRA accessible for all<sup>30</sup> only after the performance of a check described in the previous chapter. The situation in place is depicted in the image below. SRA might border either with a publicly accessible area or a non-public area, accessible only to the employees, which provides a variety of possible crossings.

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<sup>30</sup> Almost, as will be pointed out below.



Figure 2: Airport access layout ground floor ('11. Režim pohybu na Letišti Václava Havla Praha' n.d.)<sup>31</sup>

Importantly, following the divisive logic, these crossings are usually divided between those intended for passengers and those for employees. The strength of spatiality logic might be illustrated on the notion of airport security provided by at least five employees, who defined airport security in terms of interdiction of forbidden items carried into SRA (BEK Employee 11 2017; BEK Employee 22 2017; BEK Employee 10 2017; BEK Employee 34 2017; BEK Employee 33 2017). This notion is accompanied by a strict delimitation by the border, which renders the secure actants as divided from the ordinary and potentially the dangerous one. However, this border is not only divisive but also streaming the crowd following the logic of movement. On terminal 2 of Václav Havel Airport Prague, the border of SRA is marked by a thick white line painted on the floor.

<sup>31</sup> This image was chosen thanks to its public availability and further adjusted by the author in regard to image layout and language.

Even though, when problems during a control as described in the previous chapter (3) emerge and the passenger might be sent back to either check-in the problematic item, or hand it over, beyond this line no return is possible through the check-point, but only through the arrival corridor. As such, the passage is one-way, following the logic of movement, resulting in streaming the crowd. This is exactly what might pose a challenge to non-European travellers who demand a VAT refund on Customs Administration and then mistakenly proceed beyond the check with the expectation that the refunding agency is placed in SRA. Once beyond the check, they are not able to navigate back via arrivals, which requires substantive local spatial and procedural knowledge (Observation 14. 2 August 2017). Similarly, the passengers are streamed by the one-way filters while leaving SRA.

The SRA borders must be strict, given the fact that its characteristic as “free” from threats, which is sometimes even in academia labelled as “sterile” (Salter 2008e, 255; Currah and Mulqueen 2011), make it thus susceptible to contamination. Such a contamination might be understood in terms averse to the notion of transparent security described by Hall (Hall 2007, 332). Even a relatively slight contamination might result in the need to depopulate the whole, or at least an important part of the area, and resterilise it by the inspection of the space as well as the new screening of all present actants causing hours of costly delays within the whole terminal. This is one of the last components of airport security chains of translation, which has not been mentioned so far, namely that the spatiality logic leads to the translation of an actant being invalidated by any contact with a non-secure actant of any kind, including space.

Such a contamination might result exactly from the spatial organisation of the airport in combination with an aviation practice. For example, the non-EU originating flights might be directed toward the Terminal 2, which is all encompassed within SRA and used for one-stop security bound flights, in case that the plane will be later inspected and used for the flight to the Schengen area. The incoming passengers, nevertheless, are not allowed to enter the terminal, given their non-secured status and must be guided to the bus. A human mistake, though, might let them in (2009; Participant observation 5. 21 June 2017).<sup>32</sup> This leads to the area being contaminated, and the urge to screen all present actants again. A similar problem might emerge when a passenger or even a pilot forgets an

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<sup>32</sup> The airport studied is not the only one with similar experience (Gkritza, Niemeier, and Mannering 2006, 213).

item in the aircraft, or SRA and would like to return for it from the non-SRA area (BEK Employee 14 2017; BEK Employee 11 2017).

The language of sterility and contamination, as well as defining the contamination in terms of physical contact, results in rendering the insecure status in terms of a disease. For example, on similar occasions, as described above, the changing aircraft crews might meet together but are not allowed to shake hands. Here the situation might be described by the actors in terms of possible “infection” from the unchecked crew (Participant observation 11. 29 June 2017). This terminology is also encompassed within the notion of the above-mentioned one-way “filters” directing the flow. The high stakes included then result in strong reactions when a possible contamination is in place – a child who is unwilling to subdue to the control and escapes to SRA is pursued and physically overpowered not to pollute the area (Participant observation 12. 30 June 2017).

The positioning of the SRA border is also important, which derives from the organisation of the terminal and especially from the organisation of the control. As discussed in chapter two (2.2), historically the controls were placed directly at the gates in a decentralised manner, as the protection was bound to the flight. This is the situation visible in the picture in Terminal 1. Later, the controls were moved forward and centralised as is the case of Terminal 2. As Salter writes: “This allows airport officials to concentrate expensive, large, labour-intensive technology in one site and maximizes the amount of sterile space for retail outlets of passengers who have time to shop” (Salter 2008c, 13). In a recent diploma thesis focusing on queue management and check-in efficiency, which is based on research and operational experience at Václav Havel Airport Prague, the reasons beyond the historical ones, and the possible use for one-stop security are summed up as follows:

*“Decentralised concept is used, in cases where it is convenient to separate the controls of passengers for individual flights. ... The advantage of the centralised system is the savings in the area of human resources and simpler organisation of operation in one centralised site. The well organised centralised system allows a great amount of flexibility and the maintenance of the same level of quality provided during daytime intensities changes in checked passengers within peaks and out of them, with the emphasis put on the effective use of the workplace and expenditures saving. In case that the retail stores are placed in front of the security control the problematic of the need of screening of the purchased goods arises.”* (Vokáč 2015, 18–19)

From the perspective of ordinary employees at Václav Havel Airport, human resources savings are also a factor (BEK Employee 31 2017; (Observation 29. 28 September 2017). However, the centralised control is not a favourite concept – thirteen interviewed employees perceived it as a mass-production, a never-ending flow, which proposes no opportunity for a break, and where any connection to the particular flight is missing (BEK Employee 9 2017; BEK Employee 12 2017; BEK Employee 33 2017; BEK Employee 26 2017; BEK Employee 10 2017; BEK Employees 15 2017; BEK Employee 6 2017; BEK Employee 31 2017; BEK Employee 4 2017; BEK Employee 5 2017; BEK Employee 18 2017; BEK Employee 35 2017). It is exactly the resources-saving spatiality, which enables greater efficiency and as such increases the work performance demands. This is further combined with the lack of task-completion feeling, as well as with the disappearance of the differences resulting from dispatching a flight bound to a particular destination.

In contrast, Terminal 1 at Václav Havel Airport seems to offer all that the employees miss elsewhere. However, it is much trickier from the passengers' side. Given the position of security checkpoints at the gates, Terminal 1 encompasses a huge area, which is accessible only to the travellers after the passport control, but which is outside SRA. Many passengers do not notice that passing through the passport control is not actually the same as to enter SRA, given that they thought to be translated into the secure status by the identity control, as shown below. These passengers do not realise that the retail stores in this area are actually not in SRA, even though they propose the goods which are screened in accordance with the airport supplies screening intended for SRA, which might be later taken on board (European Union 2015a, 9.3.3, 4.1.3). These passengers thus do not require the packaging of their purchased beverages into security tamper-evident bag (STEB), which could be accepted on board by the control, and instead leave with unpacked bottles, which are usually later not permitted on board. A couple of passengers explain the situation: “We went recently on holidays with kids, and we bought there, in that zone some drinks, and right when we proceeded here, it was taken from us, so we bought it here again. So, the rules are not clear, where yes and where no.” (Czech traveller 32 2017; similarly: Russian traveller 11 2017; Israeli traveller 8 2017). Nevertheless, some employees acknowledge the possible misunderstanding and consider the purchase in this zone as a reasonable reason for the exception in the terms described in the previous chapter (3.4.3.3) (BEK Employee 34 2017; BEK Employee 16 2017).



Similarly, this placement of the control results in a significant limitation of passenger movement on particular types of transfer flights (Chinese traveller 1 2017), as well as a further load for the security check. Some travellers postpone their check till the very last moment because they want to shorten up the time without beverages or might fear that in the tiny space assigned to the particular gate, no water or toilet is available. In some cases, this is true, or water is presented as non-drinkable, which causes not only further dissatisfaction (Chinese traveller 13 2017; Czech traveller 18 2017) but also a passenger returns to the transit area followingly requiring new checks (Observation 19. 18 August 2017; Observation 21. 5 September 2017). The dissatisfaction seems to correspond with the already presented importance assigned to the availability of free drinking water (Gupta n.d., 55). The dissatisfaction with the unavailability of free drinking water seems to be particularly prevalent among Chinese travellers, among which seven out of twenty interviewed explicitly complained (Chinese traveller 2 2017; Chinese traveller 8 2017; Chinese traveller 9 2017; Chinese traveller 10 2017; Chinese traveller 13 2017; Chinese traveller 15 2017; Chinese traveller 19 2017). This does not mean, though that a decentralised control is overall unpopular among travellers, some might rate it positively, exactly thanks to the longer accessibility of beverages, and especially shorter, time-saving queues (Korean traveller 7 2017; British traveller 3 2017; Indian traveller 2 2017; American traveller 5 2017).

The most significant in regard to the security focus is, nonetheless, the imagination of the Terminal 1 transit area as a threat, following the trend of airport terminal attacks (Salter 2008c, 4). Some of the passengers, compared to the employees, who do not mention the topic at all, already consider the absence of security screening at the airport hall entrance as a weakness (Syrian traveller 1 2017). However, a different type of unease is expressed about the fact that the Terminal 1 transit area is accessible without any security control. This unease is less common, but when present, it is stronger. It emerges not only among a limited number of travellers (Israeli travellers 13 2017; Israeli traveller 5 2017; American traveller 5 2017; Czech traveller 29 2017) but importantly, it was also expressed by four airport employees (BEK Employee 31 2017; BEK Employee 6 2017; (BEK Employee 36 2017; Observation 3. 11 July 2017):

*“He can just step out of the queue and say: ‘May I pass? Hold on,’ the queue will be behind him, and the crash is done, all of these glasses will be smashed, they all will be down, the whole row, and it will unfold, the immense damage. Only in the terminal, if he*

*blew up the shock wave would shatter the whole glass, damage the airplanes, and the airplane has enough if it collides with a tiny bird, or something, let alone the shards. So, all of this is wrong how it is done in here, it is dangerous in this.” (BEK Employee 31 2017)*

These concerns among employees are surprising, given that an attack in any public hall would probably end up with similar results in regard to human life losses. The airport spatiality provides a possible explanation because the transit area might be seen as an insecure wedge driven among the secure landscape of the airside. As such the transit area is delimited against the secure surroundings and rendered as a threat, although technically the level of security provided there is higher than that in most public halls, given the identity control at the transit area entrance. Interestingly, also the imagination of smashed glass is reoccurring (Israeli traveller 13 2017) and as such seems to produce a counterweight to the visibility logic. The shards being understood as an opposite to the traditional notion of this material in aviation industry: “Glass appears to be the perfect match for a cultural fiction that associates commercial international aviation with lightness and airiness, rather than pollution and war” (Fuller 2008, 162; similarly: Adey 2008, 151).

The spatiality thus significantly frames the idea of security producing itself safe places but also areas of a potential threat. The delimitation and spatiality of SRA then produces and alters passengers’ circulation, not only regulating but also producing totally novel flows. The spatially based system also results in a strict rendering of borders, which might be hardly comprehensible for the outsiders, who on the one side perceive the border importance, but might misunderstand its correct placement or might be stricken by its severity or the direction of the flow.

#### 4.4. Identity Elements Rooted Within the Spatial System at LKPR

The contemporary security system, in the terrain studied, as well as generally, encompasses many identity-based components. First of all, Civil Aviation Authority of the Czech Republic stipulated an exemption from the control for the list of defined political function representatives, departing after an official visit based upon the invitation from the Czech side (‘11. Režim pohybu na Letišti Václava Havla Praha’ n.d.). The identity acts here as a “non-threat” status veridiction in the meaning of known known and known unknown – verifying the true identity of a person and expecting that this identity is itself a guarantee of the non-threat status. The special status of a certain group of foreign representatives is thus emphasised, but also the act of an invitation related to the state

interest, which together are found sufficiently compelling to supersede the traditional control logic. This exemption also applies only to the person's screening, not to his/her luggage.

A similar, but much broader exemption is directly rooted in the EU legislation. This exception is more limited but includes a much broader scope of persons – namely the employees. Here the exemption does not cover the body check but in comparison with passengers alleviates the rules regarding the items allowed, permitting the liquids, the workmen's tools and most of the objects with a sharp point or sharp edge (European Union 2015a, ATTACHMENT 1-A). Also, the exception is based here on the idea of a trade-off between spatial and identity logic. The alleviation is conditioned by the employee status, which requires a background check, corresponding with the preceding criteria of formal identity establishment and the guarantee of a non-threat status, based on actual confirmation of the person's working or studying activities and a criminal record in the past (European Union 2015a, 11.1.3).

In a formally not fully acknowledged practice, these exceptions are amended by the spatial expectation of threat's presence in such places where the identity information about the passing actants is not available. In the places where only identity-checked persons, meaning employees, emerge, the SRA border might be a bit more relaxed. For example, it might be represented by the hangar entrance. A similar divide also separates airport canteen service counter, where the places for guests are separated by a glass wall, whereas one unseparated kitchen accessible only to the employees distributes food for both sides, no exact border being settled. This arrangement permits to provide accessibility of one service for the non-public and the public hall at the same time (Observation 1. 5 July 2017). However, in this case, the bigger ease might be partially explained by the fact that only public and non-public areas are separated.<sup>33</sup> These are exactly the points which are criticized by some practitioners, who see in this disruption of the spatial logic – which is, nevertheless, replaced by the identity logic – the disruption of the system as a whole. As one security employee noted: “There anybody [employees] hangs out as he wishes, they pull the whole unchecked helicopter from the non-public [area], and they won't let you inside it” (BEK Employee 13 2017). For comparison, this perception has also been shared by one of the passengers, who turned out to be an American airport employee: “They guess the loophole for airport security is not here, it's out there it's on the ramp. I know, twenty

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<sup>33</sup> However, at other places of such a separation, the identity card is needed.

years in this business and I worked in passenger service on the ramp, so the access on the airside, it needs to be as tight as it is on the passenger's side” (American traveller 7 2017). Nonetheless, this logic is also latently present with the EU legislation, which, for example, prescribes lower screening standards for Walk-Through Metal Detector placed at checkpoints available only to the employees (European Union 2015a, 12.1.2), or which stipulates the possibility of a visual check for some types of airport and in-flight supplies, similarly to cargo and mail based exactly on the idea of lowered risks thanks to the provenience (European Union 2015a, 8.1.2.3,9.1.2.3,6.2.1.5).<sup>34</sup> Here, the spatiality and identity meet together presenting a higher barrier to the smuggling of forbidden items.

Yet, to use the identity to trade off the spatiality logic, the chain of translation, translating a person to the secure ontological status (in normal words a background check), must be somehow fixed and anchored to avoid the need for its constant repetition. To this end serves the identity card issued to every employee. This card is de facto a shortcut encompassing the whole translation and fixing it in time – in Latourian words; it is a black box of identity veridiction. This chain of translation is then deemed more reliable than the limited chain caught in the boarding cards available to passengers. Given that both chains must be checked before the entrance to SRA is accessed, and both are entrapped in the items using a different type of machine readability, the flow of passengers and employees must be strictly divided. So again, as noted in the previous chapter (3.1), the divisive logic comes into play, and its rules and the fact of the division itself is a result of the material demands of the particular screening technologies employed. It is the *agency* of the employees’ cards and boarding cards’ reading technology that has the ability to perform the technical mediation (Latour 2005, 53, 1999, 178–84).

The identity also steps into the access system conceptualised as a two-factor authentication, encompassing not only a token – card but also a password. Within this system the connection between the card and the identity of its current holder is not so firmly established and could be strengthened by biometric information, which would connect the user with a formal identity expectation anchored in the card as such, as mentioned “the body becoming the stable token of identity” (Adey 2004, 1369; similarly: Currah and Mulqueen 2011, 568). In this situation, the management being aware of this problem requires the employees to perform a sort of “biometric” control by checking the

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<sup>34</sup> Another aspect of the control alleviation is based on the barrier produced by time and difficult backward identification of the threat placed among such items.

ID photos against the real appearance of the passing persons (BEK M&A&C 1 2017); in other words, to connect two parts of the chain of translation, which are deemed to be too loosely connected. By the employees, this is accepted in the places where the machine-based access control is not performed or where this control is spatially distant. Nevertheless, this strategy is not very popular among some employees in such places where the two-factor authentication is performed by the technological mean in a direct proximity, which is perceived as sufficient (BEK Employee 5 2017). This position results from the extensive agency assigned to the cards by employees, where a human control seems not to be needed any more.

This trust in the cards derives from their broad abilities. The card performance is not limited to the simple letting an employee into SRA. The access rights are much more finely defined, also granting access to non-public areas, administrative areas, dividing SRA into more spatial complexes and encompassing a few special islets singled out from this general system. Employees' access rights are identified by the card, and as such, it is the card's setting which directs the spatial movement of an employee within the airport. The card permits or denies entry to a particular door. The card is found to be better oriented in the complex entry system than the newbie employees, fairly outsmarting them in the ability to define where the access is allowed and where not. These are thus directly instructed to allow navigation by the card, as was noted in training: "The card knows it, it will keep an eye on it" (Participant observation 2. 15 June 2017).

The card type distribution is based on the working position and might be further influenced by the individual employees' working needs. The card is issued by the airport to the employees either against the proof of passing the introductory security training and the extract from the criminal record, for the cards not allowed into SRA or the proof of passing the introductory security training and the background check for the cards allowed into SRA. The background check is performed by the Civil Aviation Authority on the request of the employee candidate, and beyond the general biographic information requires detail information about the candidates' activities over the past five years in regard to the preceding employment, study, and long-term stays abroad ('Background Check Application Form, Úřad pro Civilní Letectví' n.d.)

Moreover, even within the card system itself, again the spatiality logic with the identity logic meets. On one hand stands the idea of a spatially-guided access to the area, endorsing simplicity and possibility of control, where the controlling employee must be able to mentally cover the whole system and decide whether the card is authorized to enter

through the particular checkpoint. This is further stressed by the security awareness concept, which is turned into the expectation that not only the security employees but all employees in general should watch the cards and should be able to decide whether the card is authorized for the particular place (Schouten 2010, 14; Participant observation 2. 15 June 2017).

On the other hand, stands the idea of card configuration based on minimal individual needs of access. The identity logic is further emphasized by the inclusion of card types, permitting the passage with weapons. Here, the right is directly bound to a person's identity, not to the spatial system. Less importantly, the card is also a representation of the employee's general identity toward the airport, recording working hours or lunch payments (Participant observation 2. 15 June 2017). The mechanisms prescribed by European legislation also work on distantly similar bases, to enable non-travelling, non-employee's presence in SRA on the idea of escorted access, where the escort is provided by an employee, which is in combination with the presentation of the escorted person's personal data considered to bring in sufficient proof enabling the access (European Union 2015a, 1.2.7). This procedure is employed for individual entries, as a paid service of assistance for the welcoming of foreign diplomatic missions, under slightly different conditions also for accompanying the wheelchair users by a policeman, in such cases when other passengers are using stairs, and it was also applied in case of interpreters for this field research ('11. Režim pohybu na Letišti Václava Havla Praha' n.d.; Participant observation 11. 29 June 2017).

The identity also enters the spatial logic in the manner similar to the situation described by Currah and Mulqueen (Currah and Mulqueen 2011), namely it renders the movement around the airport as gendered, and its gendered character then reversely produces airport security working positions as the gendered ones. As was already mentioned in the preceding chapter, Czech legislation insists on the performance of the hand search by the person of the same sex (Česká republika, n.d.). This provision is also applied in regard to the randomized ETD screening and hand searches. Given that some positions within the aviation industry, especially in regard to the freight manipulation, are predominantly occupied by men, the airport security checkpoint in non-public places might also be staffed by a man-employee only, by the operators, in order to save human resources. This turns the system in some places unpredictably impassable for a woman, in dependence whether she will be chosen for the random check or not.

For example, during my presence, a gender-mixed couple of duty-free stores' employees attempted to cross such a checkpoint staffed by a man-employee only. The woman provided an escort access to the man employee, who was carrying the store supplies, given that his ID expired and the woman shop assistant was not found physically capable of carrying the supplies. When crossing the checkpoint back to SRA, the woman employee was chosen for the random check, which already happened for the second time during the supplies' uploading. The man security employee said that he could not perform the check and would have to call for a woman staff. The shop assistant repeatedly proposed that instead of waiting she would prefer to be checked by the present man employee. The security employee called for the woman staff, who arrived after a significant waiting time in a very bad mood complaining that the female shop assistant was using the checkpoint as a service entry. Even after explanation that the checkpoint was not used as an entry but as a part of de facto job performance, the female employee insisted that the shop assistant should have taken an alternative route, which would have taken approximately fifteen minutes, to arrive at the other side of this checkpoint, where her man colleague should have waited in the meantime. This led to a very exceptional situation, given the significant push for consensus within the unit, where the man employee took the side of the shop assistant against his colleague and proposed the shop assistant to complain, claiming that if members of his unit were put in the similar situation they would be as well complaining, expressing the belief that the shop assistant had the right to pass as the others and should not be limited in it by the airport staffing policies (Observation. September 2017; the date is omitted).

In these instances, as we have seen, the woman controller is called in from the closest woman-staffed check-point, though this might be very lengthy and cause a significant discord with the crew leads at the neighbouring points. Further, the staffing of men employees at these particular points, which are less exposed than the Terminal 2 central checkpoint, might lead to inequality toward women employees, who might be placed at exposed Terminal 2 positions. Similarly, in regard to this expectation, women might be less-likely chosen for particular specialisations, in case that their presence is not directly excluded by the internal rules, and the changes of shifts are enabled only among employees of the same gender (BEK M&A&C 7 2017; BEK M&A&C 6 2017; BEK M&A&C 7 2017; BEK M&A&C 3 2017; BEK Employee 25 2017). This situation leads to the occasional questioning of the need to keep the gender parity particularly for ETD check

performance, especially in regard to employees (BEK Employee 14 2017; BEK Employee 28 2017).

The identity-based elements are thus inherent to the system conceived as primarily spatial. As was pointed out, the identity logic is in certain aspects importantly superseding the elementary system spatiality. Their encounter then results in system complexity. The analysis also pointed out the interaction between humans and technology in fixing the identity as a proof of a secure status and explicated the perceived emergence of security weaknesses. The special position of identity cards and their agency takeover in regard to the system was explicated by their importance for the system as temporary fixed proofs of identity veridiction and as agents enabling the acceptance of complexity. The exceptions were pointed out as resulting either from an exceptional identity or from the advantages resulting from the possibility to stretch the time span of the secure status; in relation to this, they were shown to be also possibly space-bound. It is exactly this characteristic of identity logic, which serves to promote its contemporary popularity with important political implications. The instances analysed above, however, show that this approach is not new and in a certain form has been present within the European logic since its beginnings.

#### 4.5. European Framework Encounter with Identity-Based System at LKPR

The control based directly on the identity-connected factors is also part of the security system performance in the studied case as a possible additional measure. In these cases, additional checks might be performed even when not required by the technological measures or procedure, or similarly, some objects might or might not be allowed on board based on employee's security evaluation. The employees are instructed to scrutinize nervous or untraditional behaviour or unfitting appearance, or object-owner combinations (Participant observation 6. 22 June 2017), the identity component thus being based on the search for a "threat status," meaning the second pair of instances described at the beginning of this chapter (4.1). The formal identity is not considered by Bezpečnostní Kontrola (BEK) and is not even available to the controllers at the checkpoints. In regard to the system as described earlier, it might be understood as a possible extension of the chain of translation where the state of security is somehow postponed till the subsequent procedure has been performed.

This approach might be seen as a relatively recent and rising trend, which is an outcome of close cooperation with ICTS, and to some extent EI-AI resulting in rising popularity of profiling, which is embodied not only within this procedure, but also was



clearly expressed, for example, by the presence of Ben-Gurion International Airport Security Division Director on Safety conference on 23 November 2017 ('Safety Konference 2017' 2017). The most important moves in this direction, however, have been taken outside of BEK and entail fundamentally the foundation behavioural profiling unit. Even within BEK, this stance is, however, gaining on. For example, one member of management explained: "Personally, I think that generally assessment of passengers along a risk is a way forward, definitely. However, it is an issue of future, because there of course also the registration of some databases, some input data and the related processes must be considered, but I definitely think that for sure the approach based on risk assessment is a way which is logical" (BEK M&A&C 2 2017). The quotation implies that not only behavioural but also formal identity measures are considered as a way forward.

Nevertheless, the contemporary practice is much more limited. In regard to the items allowed on board or not, the security evaluation contradicts the system's consistency and predictability, which is also considered as one of the goals to strive for (BEK M&A&C 2 2017). As such this whole idea is also openly opposed by some employees, who besides this add that the outcomes in these cases are then mostly dependant on the screener's mood (BEK Employee 17 2017; BEK Employee 29 2017). The performance of additional checks, even though acknowledged, also raises some uncertainties, especially in regard to the need to distinguish between the formal identity-based check, in the meaning of racial profiling, and the behavioural profiling. As one of the employees needed to explain, when asked about the factors which he deemed suspicious:

*"Usually, it is a weird behaviour. I won't lie to you, I do not choose them whether they are white or black, or yep, some ethnic membership, religious, or not. And I pay great attention not to take this into account. The person might be Arab or Indian, for example, we have all kinds of maharajahs, it might be such a type of person, and he is ok. He behaves politely, you can see that all his luggage passed at the first trial with flying colours, so you won't waste your time with such a person. Instead, you deal with the persons who you find irregular."* (BEK Employee 26 2017)

Nevertheless, this quotation reveals not only uncertainty and an attempt to maintain the equal approach, but also a problematic understanding of the behavioural logic, where the status of the non-problematic passenger is unified with the notion of the non-threat passenger. This position toward a threat evaluation will be discussed in the last part of this chapter (4.6). Similarly, it must be mentioned that not all employees are proponents of

equal approach toward passengers and some identity-based aspects logic being further stressed might lead to the misguided results (Participant observation 13. 6 July 2017). So far, crucially, such additional measures have been performed scarcely. One employee is noting that he does not recall such a situation during the last year (BEK Employee 29 2017). Even though others were not so concrete, it is reasonable to expect a similar frequency on the basis of other answers (BEK Employee 35 2017; BEK Employee 36 2017). This, though, does not contradict the validity of identity-based logics and does not even question the contemporary practice. Given that the occurrence of unlawful acts within the civil aviation is not high, it might be well possible that scarce decisions for additional inspection are rather a result of mature risk assessment based on deep lay knowledge.

The current state of affairs shows that the airport security environment, at least in the case studied, is importantly developing toward a greater inclusion of identity logic, whereas the existing European legislative framework has not reflected these changes so far and has limited itself to a formal support of risk assessment and refusal of discriminatory approaches; neither of these is, however, further specified on the level of implementation (European Union 2008, Article 6,1., 2015a). This legislative underpinning does not provide a clear guidance to the whole plethora of identity-based approaches, which might be missing, and externally accessible clear mode of employment and delimitation.

#### 4.6. Identity-Based Systems Encounter with the European Framework at LKPR

The most significant representation of identity logics is, nevertheless, the direct presence of ICTS and El-AI at the airport, who are representatives of more identity-oriented models. Their presence itself is a direct result of dispatching lines of American and Israeli airliners. My possibility to directly interact with these systems was limited to the interviews and the interaction with the passengers screened by these actants. I further rely on these data, including the representatives' comments on the topics whenever available. Their activities toward the airport security system are framed by their interviewed representatives identically as a "complementary" element, a potential additional layer to the security provided by the airport proper (Representative of ICTS Czech 2017; Employee of the El-AI Czech Republic 2017). Both representatives present the mode of their enterprises operation as encompassing the profiling component. In regard to inner variation, the behavioural side, which could be summed up as a "threat" status identification was more emphasized by ICTS representative (Representative of ICTS Czech 2017). This is also visible in the ICTS relevant quotations mentioned above (4.1). In

comparison, in case of El-Al, the activity was characterised rather by an identity interest described in relation to the passenger as “understanding a full picture of him and the trip;” further, the possibilities provided by quantum sniffers screen were emphasized (Employee of the El-Al Czech Republic 2017).

Peter Adey speaks in this context about automated profiling system based on thicker information set than PNR, which leads to the tagging and increased inspection of the selectees, who might be intensively surveilled through the duration of the whole journey (Adey 2004, 1372–73). This information is further broadened by the questioning – the passenger interrogation technique (Committee on Commercial Aviation Security et al. 1996, 13). Both these components thus seem to encompass “formal” as well as “threat status” identity components. In both companies, providing only limited information about the procedure and its basis was seen as crucial, even though the ICTS representative shared the above-mentioned materials, which were more open toward the basics of the method than the personal interview (Just 2005). One general exception existed to this rule, meaning the affirmation of both actants that the procedure in place is not discriminatory (Representative of ICTS Czech 2017; Employee of the El-Al Czech Republic 2017).

To focus on the interplay with the general BEK employees and their perception of these systems, the positive general persuasion about the system sophistication and superiority is shared by some BEK employees (Observation 9. 24 July 2017). However, also the myths appear, such as that all El-Al security providers are all Mossad members or similar produced as a result of this secrecy – especially around El-Al (Observation 4. 12 July 2017; BEK Employee 30 2017). While these are left aside, the positive evaluation stems from seeing profiling as a remedy to the shortages of the spatial-based system. Most importantly, the possibility to alleviate the liquids control was seen as a bonus, given its already mentioned problematic position within the security control landscape. This alleviation was seen as an opportunity to focus on important aspects of security instead of “shower gels” (BEK Employee 30 2017; similarly: BEK Employee 17 2017), as well as an option to behave more leniently toward some age groups in regard to the liquids, the elderly persons and children mentioned explicitly (BEK Employee 24 2017). Similarly, given the problematic acceptance of random selection, the profiling-based selection was proposed as a possible improvement of the system (BEK Employee 17 2017). This is in accordance to the description presented by Peer Schouten, where the desire of identity-based logic is seen as enabling the targeted “counterinsurgency” in contrast to contemporary “all-front war” (Schouten 2010, 19). These propositions, however, internally

contradict with one of the important arguments about the need for general screening, namely the notion of naïve perpetrators, who might be carrying a threat unknowingly (BEK M&A&C 2 2017). The identity-based system thus looked in the eyes of employees as a possible manner to eradicate the biggest perceived weaknesses of the system in regard to the travellers' experience.

Nevertheless, the opinions about identity-based elements were very often mixed, and individual employees usually provided positive as well as negative arguments. Some employees expressed scepticism about the possibility to identify the threat on the basis of passenger behaviour (BEK Employee 16 2017; BEK Employee 23 2017), or pointed to the fact that they have never encountered behaviour, which would have, even when subdued to a special inspection, led to a revelation of any kind, beside the security inspectors. This was compared to a contemporary model which sometimes yields results in smugglers revealing (BEK Employee 35 2017). It has also been noted that both systems derive from a different security situation and experience, and as such aim at providing a different type of service (BEK Employee 30 2017). Similarly, the local system was found simpler, even though maybe less effective, fairer and less intrusive (BEK Employee 15 2017; BEK Employee 17 2017; BEK Employee 26 2017). One of the employees explained:

*“Because here we are in the Schengen area. You have a right of free movement here, so the people must fulfil certain criteria, but then you definitely mustn't restrain them in that movement, this is not possible. And if someone is not guilty, he is innocent. You can hardly approach this differently, it is not possible. You might find that person irregular, but he fulfilled the rules – I had personally checked Mr [name of a Czech entrepreneur left out] the day before the police came for him. And does it mean anything? He fulfilled the rules, so for me, he is allowed to fly. And if he could not – for this there is police and customs administration.” (BEK Employee 26 2017)*

The equality of rules is, however, not emphasized only given the employees' personal normative beliefs and expectations about the rule of law and the role of state in enforcing security, but also due to the outcomes resulting from the need to process passengers used to the identity-based model through the local spatial-based chain of security translation. These publics might not be prepared to pass on this type of chain and thus resist these efforts. Under these circumstances the employees might share the stance that especially profiling based on the ownership of Israeli passport means de facto exemption from the control, as a blank cheque of formal identity confirming a non-threat

status, which results in severe problems, when another security system is encountered (Observation 10. 25 July 2017; BEK Employee 32 2017). The interviewed representative of El-Al explains the perceived smooth passage of the control by Israeli citizens reversely, by the unawareness of non-Israelis of the identity-based chain of translation in place, in comparison to the Israelis, who are used to the particular framework, evaluating “the difference only because of the awareness” (Employee of El-Al Czech Republic 2017).

The problems related to the endorsement of the chain of translation based on a different security logic are shared by all travellers. Those used to the identity-based shortening of the chain of translation might regret that this translation is not valid beyond the borders of their system. For example, the interviewed US travellers expressed disappointment that the alleviations resulting from the identity guarantee entailed within the TSA PreCheck (‘TSA Pre✓®’ n.d.) (American traveller 2 2017; American traveller 7 2017; American traveller 9 2017; American traveller 10 2017) are not applied at the Václav Havel airport. However, the situation on Israel-bound flights was even more serious, probably given the mixed nature of the US system, which also employs the spatial logic to the extent that the EU enables the US check as a possible entering point to the system of one-stop security since December 2015 (European Union 2015b). Here of course also the language barrier stepped into the play, worsening in the case, where the flights were not operated by El-Al, which is the relatively high-end airline and is prepared to provide language assistance to the airport employees in urgent cases (Observation 7. 18 July 2017). The passengers on the El-Al not-operated flights, for example, when asked to take out their computers, understanding only the last word, started to provide the Czech employees with the information expected within the identity-based system, such as the brand of the device and its origin (Observation 8. 19 July 2017). More importantly, these passengers might be surprised or even displeased by the fact of public performance of physical checks or ETD checks, which they seemed not to experience in Israel (Israeli traveller 20 2017; Israeli traveller 3 2017), or similarly by the limitation on transportation of liquids (Israeli traveller 6 2017; Israeli traveller 8 2017; Israeli traveller 13 2017; Israeli traveller 15 2017; Israeli traveller 17 2017).

The notion of identity-based system endorsed by these passengers seemed to fall under the category of identity-based formal identity risk factors, probably similar to the profiling logic described by Hasisi and Weisburd (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011, 873). The relation of their notion to the factual logic in place is, however, not clear, given the lacking official information. For example, one passenger explained: “In Israel it is different, if you

are Israeli, you can take the water with you, we do not make any problem with this, but when you return it is more severe” (Israeli traveller 13 2017; similarly: Israeli traveller 3 2017; Israeli traveller 12 2017). This perception of identity-based security logic as primarily a possibility to alleviate one’s security check is nonetheless shared beyond the group of passengers with the direct experience of this type of security provision (Czech traveller 32 2017; Czech traveller 28 2017).

When the general passenger’s perspective is examined, the passengers who have encountered the system for the first time, express above all the astonishment (Slovakian traveller 3 2017; Belarusian traveller 1 2017). Overall, the trends seem to reproduce those of Czech employees. In some cases, the model is seen as sophisticated and proactive in contrast to the “obsolete” European model (Czech traveller 28 2017; Israeli traveller 19 2017). Other passengers mention above all the concerns of not being able to react due to the language barrier, but also because of the lack of knowledge about the answers demanded during the questioning part (Czech traveller 6 2017; Slovakian traveller 3 2017; Belarusian traveller 1 2017). Very often doubts are also mentioned about the efficiency of the system. These travellers usually understand the check as a combination of formal identity inquiry with the underlying effort to uncover “threat identity” through its behavioural expression; nonetheless, the real possibility to uncover the threat identity behaviourally is questioned or doubted (Swedish traveller 2 2017; Israeli traveller 7 2017; Israeli traveller 3 2017; Czech traveller 9 2017). The formal identity-based component is then deemed shallowish, as one passenger with a security background job explains:

*“The person’s identity cannot be checked in 5 minutes, it is not possible, and even the units – as we discussed Israel or the USA – that are more focusing on this, equally a person’s identity cannot be uncovered by a regular employee here. Whenever you uncover identity it lasts a few months, a few months of surveillance and a few months of wiretapping and a few months of whatever, so I think that identity simply cannot be checked here.”* (Czech traveller 9 2017)

From the passengers’ experience, the questioning and personal identity proofs are also usually seen as more intrusive in comparison to the rather spatially-based procedure. In this context, out of those passengers who claimed to have experience with both systems, four found the questions less intrusive, importantly practically all of them were from identity-based system partitioning states (American traveller 9 2017; Israeli traveller 19

2017; Czech traveller 3 2017; Israeli traveller 3 2017),<sup>35</sup> two originating within the same states found the intrusiveness comparable (Israeli traveller 5 2017; Israeli traveller 20 2017), and eight higher (German traveller 1 2017; Czech traveller 9 2017; Ukrainian traveller 2 2017; Belarusian traveller 1 2017; Italian traveller 2 2017; Italian traveller 4 2017; Swiss traveller 1 2017; French traveller 2 2017).

The notion of the higher sensitivity of the questions has also been confirmed by the representatives of ICTS and El-Al interviewed (Employee of El-Al Czech Republic 2017; Representative of ICTS Czech 2017). Similarly, higher sensitiveness has also been identified by Schouten (Schouten 2014b, 35). This is a result of the questioning methods, which might be, especially in case of cross-examination, uncomfortable themselves (Czech traveller 9 2017; Ukrainian traveller 2 2017) and further tend to provoke among passengers the feeling of being falsely accused (Italian traveller 4 2017; Australian traveller 1 2017)). The risk-assessment-based interrogation also provokes the feeling of racial profiling among some travellers, which corrupts their trust in the system (Ukrainian traveller 2 2017; French traveller 2 2017). This is in accordance with the finding of Hasisi and Weisburd, who pointed out that:

*“passengers who believed that the security checks were fair and unbiased, and agreed that improved passenger safety justified increased inconvenience and reported that they had been treated respectfully and professionally by the security personnel, tended to rate the security checks highly and expressed high levels of satisfaction with the security process”* (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011, 869).

The same authors also present quantitative findings, which seem to support the notion that if not the input conditions then, at least, the outcomes might result in a racialized focus (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011, 880).

The encounter with the systems placing a greater emphasis on the identity elements inherently brings back in the already discussed act of truth (Salter 2005). Here one's persuasion of one's own innocence is seen as a possible guarantee of an easier passage, or an easier passage enabled by a trade between one's biographical and behavioural information sharing. In practice this persuasion is, however, faced with the perceived greater intrusiveness of such an exchange, particularly for a non-habituated travellers. On the level of employees, this proof of innocence might be found either on the basis of

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<sup>35</sup> The Czech respondent had very unpleasant experience from the physical personal check performed on borders prior to the Velvet revolution, and the intrusiveness of spatial-based regime was considered in this light.

demographic features or as a manner enabling to circumvent the controversial parts of originating system, with both of these notions de facto undermining the system logic. Similarly, for the Czech employees and many travellers, the system's actual capacity is not seen as persuasive and instead provokes the questions connected to coherence, transparency and normativity.

Concluding with these, the chapter has examined and contrasted two broad approaches present within the practice of security provision and has explored particularly their intense merges and encounters. Especially, the chapter pointed out inevitability of the systems' communication and interactions within contemporary practice.



## 5. Threat and Security

Even though other aspects might have been chosen and emphasized, the core of the airport security network of translation in regard to passengers has been passed through now. In this chapter, the attention shifts to the beginning and the end of these chains of translation – the insecure environment encompassing possible threats and the end product of security, without which the translation could not exist at all. Even though both notions are heterogeneous, they are also mutually dependent, as one can be delimited only in relation, provided by the translation, to the other. Thus, in order to present the panoramas of these two notions, their mutual relation in the form of the inquiry into the risk in aviation needs to be introduced. The contemporary shape of airport security, as well as the particular form, in which the threat is pronounced, are presented here as a result of the chain of translation, which is in place at the airport studied. As such they are both seen rather as consequences and not preconditions to the chain of translation. This understanding is particularly tangible, for example, in regard to the framing of liquids as a threat, where this framing saliently corresponds with the productive shape of the contemporary airport security system rather than with a pre-given background notion. This understanding of liquids produced as a possible threat notion is also employed by Hoijtink (Hoijtink 2017). The most important, as not only Hoijtink notes, is, however, an observation that the notion of risk itself and particularly the risk assessment is itself a product of the security production. The notion of risk and its evaluation then subsequently becomes an object of security concerns and produces new proofs and areas of security governance (Aradau and Van Munster 2007; Aradau and Blanke 2010; Baele, Balzacq, and Bourbeau 2018).

### 5.1. The Aviation Risks

The risk to a passenger's life in aviation is negligible and further decreases. According to U. S. Safety Council, the likelihood of the death is 180 times lower for a per passenger unit flown compared to the unit driven by car (McCrie and Haas 2018, 149; similarly although not numeric: Hainmüller and Lemnitzer 2003, 19–20). However, contemporary civil aviation probably encompasses certain features, which render it as a source of uncertainties for its users. These factors have more sources, many being derived from the materiality of its focal actant – the aircraft itself. Some of these characteristics have already been identified by McCrie and Haas in context of the discussion of aircraft as a target selection, namely aircraft as a valuable target, representing a valuable asset,

accessible to public, encompassing isolated space with a focused control enabling the threat multiplication, where the situation must be solved in regard to the limited event time and the possibility of an asset's total destruction with an international effect (McCrie and Haas 2018, 54–55). Similarly, Salter pointed out that: “Within this realist perspective, airplanes and airports are perceived as being highly symbolic targets that are particularly vulnerable physically” (Salter 2008e, 245).

These defining features then interact with an important characteristic of human agents, known as optimism bias. An optimism bias is an observed psychological effect, causing that humans tend to rate the general risks against their life as lower than the same risks against the lives of the others (Lin Wu and Jing Lin 2017, 1865; Gierlach, Belsher, and Beutler 2010, 1541). The strength of this effect seems to be dependent on a dread risk, meaning the seriousness of consequences, and on an unknown risk, meaning the sense of uncertainty connected with the risk, particularly its controllability and predictability. The risks scoring high in both are then deemed to be especially concerning (Gierlach, Belsher, and Beutler 2010, 1540; Lee, Lemyre, and Krewski 2010, 242).

Given the above-mentioned certainty of death and the zero-controllability and predictability of the event of an aircraft, aircraft accidents are scoring high in both categories. The civil aviation is even mentioned as a probable case of overestimated concerns by Gierlach, Belsher, and Beutler (Gierlach, Belsher, and Beutler 2010, 1541). The optimism bias has three possible explanations: 1) defensive denial, which is based on probability skewing from oneself to the rest of the group; 2) downward comparison, which is based on evaluating one's probability of event likelihood on falsely comparing oneself, not against a general public, but against a specific group with above the average exposure toward the risk; and 3) egocentrism, where personal characteristics protecting oneself against the risk are taken into account while omitting that others also have them (Caponecchia 2012, 1525). The characteristic of the optimism bias also seems to be based on an actual overestimation of the risks for others, rather than diminishing the one for oneself (Gierlach, Belsher, and Beutler 2010, 1541). The magnitude of the bias is influenced by the proximity toward the relative others and cultural factors, resulting in differences across socioeconomic status, gender, and ethnicity, the most prevalent being for white men, especially in comparison to Asians (Gierlach, Belsher, and Beutler 2010, 1539–41; Lin Wu and Jing Lin 2017, 1872).

The bias seems to be more significant for abstract, sensational, eventful threats rendered as a natural, in comparison to more frequent affairs, such as civilisation diseases

(Lin Wu and Jing Lin 2017, 1870; Gierlach, Belsher, and Beutler 2010, 1539; Petersen 2008, 414). The classification of risks as “natural” and “unnatural” and framing the second one in terms of security, as Petersen writes, leads toward the need for the maximum accountability and control of the unnatural (Petersen 2008, 414). This resulted in the conceptualisation of events of the type of airport intrusion in terms of precautionary risk, which must be handled via the already mentioned rationalities framed by Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster as: “zero risk, worst case scenario, shifting the burden of proof and serious and irreversible damage” resulting in drastic prevention (Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 103). Concurrently, over the last years the whole understanding of acceptable risks has developed and as Marijn Hoijtink quotes one of her interviewees: “So the appetite for risk has completely changed“ (Hoijtink 2017, 314). This leads to a further widening of airport security framework, a large set of actants which have been included into the dispositive of security as described by Mark Salter, and which given the length and density of its network then further inclines to stretch and enrol further elements within the “spiral of risk” as coined by O’Malley (O’Malley 2006, 418). Under these conditions the minuscule risk posed to human life by air travel seems to be maintainable only in case, as McCrie and Haas write, that: “The philosophical principle is that risks are reduced by controls” (McCrie and Haas 2018, 157). As a result, in one research, for example, 72% of respondents said that air travel is “more stressful than a visit to the dentist” and more than a half that it is “more stressful than doing one’s taxes” (Leone and (Rachel) Liu 2005, Liu).

## 5.2. The Aviation Risks at LKPR

The general aviation risks expressed within the studied terrain are concentrated around the central aircraft actant, which represents the utmost focus of protection. This protection is needed given the aircraft materiality, whose seeming vulnerability requires protection and which also renders it as an advantageous target, and as such it further augments this need. The aircraft is seen by the employees as well as by the passengers as fragile, given its construction, which enables it to fly. As even Pascoe noted, a flight is for humans considered unnatural, bound to the special device of an aircraft (Pascoe 2003, 7). As such the constructed alliance of a man and technology, a Latourian machine is regarded as especially delicate and temporal. Thus, only a minor misfortune or damage may significantly endanger it (BEK Employee 31 2017; BEK Employee 26 2017). This fragile object is further placed in a significant height, which might be itself a cause of unease (Czech traveller 19 2017; Saudi traveller 7 2017). This notion might be further combined

with the awareness that in comparison to other means of transportation, the mere cease of operation - not necessarily an accident - leads to a granted death (Emirati traveller 5 2017; Israeli traveller 2 2017; BEK Employee 17 2017; BEK Employee 12 2017; BEK Employee 29 2017). This concerns might be understood in terms of a high dread factor. Simply, the falling aircraft seems to inevitably fall all the way to the ground. Furthermore, in accordance with the optimistic bias expectation, the source of the threat is the fact of uncontrollability, where no meaningful reaction to any kind of trouble is possible (Czech traveller 11 2017; Saudi travellers 5 2017; Czech traveller 14 2017), given that the aircraft has just one pilot, who is not a passenger, and, in difference to the terminal cannot be abandoned.

The aircraft as a closed unit clearly bounds together the lives of everybody on board apparently sentences them to a shared destiny (BEK Employee 14 2017; BEK Employee 26 2017; Israeli traveller 5 2017; Czech traveller 27 2017). The shared destiny notion then leads to the concerns produced by the disabling evasive mechanisms of the optimism bias, which are based on the contrast of oneself toward the others (Caponecchia 2012, 1525). As one employee explains: “All these lives being squeezed in that airplane” (BEK Employee 14 2017). The aircraft materiality thus results in a situation of almost a perfect agency takeover in regard to one’s life preservation on the flight. Even though it might be successfully argued that being smashed by a gone-wild truck leaves pretty much the same space for reaction, in case of the airplane not even an illusion of reasonable action or a possible survival can be maintained.

Moreover, this bound destiny has important consequences also for the security provision, saliently influencing the screeners. As one of the employees noted: “Frankly, you have no real authority, but you look at it that way that you have a billion aircraft there and one hundred ninety people sitting in. So, the one hundred ninety-first will either comply or simply won’t fly, because he represents a security risk at that moment” (BEK Employee 26 2017). The bound destiny produced by the aircraft thus materially results in a firm approach toward the non-compliance, given the immensely augmented leverage perceived. The perception of threat is further multiplied by the already described issue of a probability perception problem, here in regard to overvaluation of low probabilities, resulting in experiencing stress on the job performance (Gayer 2010, 2). For screeners as well as for the management, this effect is combined with the need to engage with the notion of risk continuously, while actively searching for its potential presence. The managers, who are situated into the control role entailing a broad accountability, then

subsequently tend to frame the work performance in regard to this perceived leverage to promote on the job security procedures compliance (BEK M&A&C 6 2017; BEK M&A&C 4 2017; BEK M&A&C 1 2017). From the employees' side, the probability is then significantly skewed. For example, two employees summed up during the interview the idea shared in the similar words also by others (BEK Employee 6 2017; BEK Employee 29 2017):

1: *"We are watching the news, whether something has not happened somewhere in the airplanes."*

2: *"Me as well, many times, I tell myself 'Oh, Jesus!' and then I look and think, whether these planes are already there, and are good..."*

1: *"Many times, I am also thinking back, whether I did the control correctly, whether I really checked everything properly, whether I did not forget something."* (BEK Employee 31 2017)

The behaviour and concerns described here clearly contradict the current accident rate of 0,000242 % for scheduled commercial departures in 2017, where only less than one quarter of them resulted in fatalities and none were caused by a security issue ('ASN Infographic' 2017; 'Accident Statistics' n.d.).<sup>36</sup> It can be argued that this is exactly the credit of airport security worldwide; nonetheless, the system being in place, the concerns do not correspond with the risks. As one passenger described:

*"I mean you cannot exclude any risk from life anyway, so flying probably is the safest transportation method, so I do not know. And we worry a lot about terrorism these days. Too dangerous for your life still is traffic, even sicknesses, diseases, so I do not know, it is maybe the wrong focus I think."* (German traveller 3 2017)

However, these answers proved to be extremely rare, and the concerns of the possible security breaches, or generally accidents have been omnipresent. The airport security under these conditions may propose tangible outcomes to the travellers. Even though the security is prescribed by state, in the end its providers are at least partially dependent on the passenger's satisfaction as well as the felt need to require such a prescription from the state as citizens. What is thus the felt threat and a response provided?

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<sup>36</sup> In 2017, the accident rate was 2.42 per million scheduled commercial departures making it extremely safe; however, within the last five years the highest rate was 3.03, resulting from all, not only security causes, similarly, even if counting the deadliest year from the last decade – 2014, only 911 people died worldwide.

### 5.3. Threat

The threat is an actant that might emerge within the context of the airport with a Latourian *program of action* aimed at causing harm to other actants and their regular actions, and this program of action is countered by the *antiprogram* of airport security, which intends to preclude its performance (Latour 2008, 152, 168). The antiprogram is based mostly on sorting the actants on the basis of their material characteristics, translating those who do not share the qualities of a threat into the secure entities assigned to the secure space established on the basis of the same characteristics and excluding those, who do share these characteristics from the realm of the secure. This process is based, as already described in chapter three (3), on the expectation of the threat material expression. This expectation is then based on the previous experience of threat form, which enabled the enrolment of (technological) actants capable of distinguishing particular, ideally – defining and unique – characteristics of the threat. In regard to this notion the threat emerges in multiple contexts – as a system failure defined either as a failure in performance of a particular chain of translation or as a system failure in regard to the ability to detect a particular material characteristic, or to counter an unexpected program of action, and last but not least as the sole presence of a program of action aimed at causing damage to a particular actant within the aviation and airport network.

#### 5.3.1. The Endangered Actants and the Program of Action at LKPR

The particular action of the system disruption in situ is now mostly concentrated on the idea of the explosion. This seems to be particularly threatening given the limited options of an antiprogram, which as has been shown (chapter 3), cannot be compared to the certainty provided by WTMD in regard to the possible bringing in of metallic actants. The materiality of explosives, nonetheless, remains a difficult threat to counter (Cormier and Fobes 1996, 2–3). The innovations within the chain of security translation being ETD, liquid threats detectors, or random sampling, are all directed against this threat, as such this threat is also reflected particularly among the employees as visible from the crosstabulation in Appendix 6. The explosion is seen as an ultimate threat particularly in regard to the inflight employment, where again the airport materiality enables the total target destruction, making the aircraft particularly vulnerable toward explosions (McCrie and Haas 2018, 55). Under these circumstances, a destructive effect of an explosion might go beyond its regular scope inflicting more casualties, not dependent on whether the suicide tactics have been employed or not (Nilsson 2018, 10).

In contradiction to this stands the idea of an explosion in the public hall, where the multiplier effect enabled by the aircraft might not be expected, yet the program of action seems not to face any substantial security antiprogram. The traditional understandings of airport security as an in-flight protection, slightly predominant among the employees, also given their specialized task within the airport security protection (BEK Employee 6 2017; BEK Employee 19 2017; BEK Employee 32 2017), collide here with the more recent understanding of passengers, who also feel most endangered on flight, but are also generally more prioritizing the terminal security given their greater focus on individual personal security (Czech traveller 8 2017; Chinese traveller 18 2017; Israeli traveller 7 2017). This difference seems to reflect the broader security shift toward soft targets protection comprising control delocalisation and space and crowd surveillance as a reaction to non-hardened targets attacks (Nishiyama 2018, 2; Ahmed 2018, 380; Bigo, n.d., 17; Klauser, Ruegg, and November 2008).

The possibility of realisation of the harmful program of action without any designed weapon using, for example, only blackmailing strategies, bare hands, and the items of everyday use or adjusted items purchased in duty-free is sometimes also discussed by the employees (BEK Employee 10 2017; BEK Employee 16 2017; BEK Employee 12 2017). However, this program of action is mainly formulated as a possible contrast to the spatial logic of the contemporary system. Different ideas about the possible program of action, such as hijacking, stabbing, and panic in the aircraft are discussed only rarely, as visible from the crosstabulation in Appendix 6. This framing of threat does not mean that other options are not considered by the airport security network, but rather that the enacted antiprogram is either considered very efficient, as is, for example, the case of screening of metals (BEK Employee 4 2017), or that it is enforced by a different part of the system and as such is not seen as pivotal by the BEK employees. The very similar composition of the possible means also on the passengers' side, on the other hand, stipulates the explosion as a central threat to contemporary (airport) security. This corresponds with the terrorist tactic analyses of Marco Nilsson, who points out that even though a sequential gun attack might be generally used to increase the death toll, in case of protected targets the suicidal tactic might be not only a necessity but also a relative tactical advantage: "...the inability of a suicide bomber to perform multiple sequential attacks is not a relative tactical handicap against hard targets, as conventional terrorists that use firearms often need a greater window of opportunity for killing than is available when attacking well-protected targets" (Nilsson 2018, 6).

Lastly, passengers diverge from the employees in an impression that goods and especially drugs trafficking is a part of BEK interest in countering the threats (see Appendix 6). Given the general screening performed, BEK sometimes discovers drugs, endangered species or money trafficking, and in these cases gives over the information and further cooperates with Customs Administration (Representative of Customs Administration 2017). However, such findings are rather collateral hits allowed by the materialities of trafficked actants. In contrast, several interviewed passengers believed that the ETD test actually primarily targets a drug screening (Slovakian traveller 3 2017; Czech travellers 6 2017; Israeli traveller 4 2017, Observation 12. 28 July 2017). Given the blurred information strategy, the employees usually do not reverse such persuasions and instead use it for a light passengers' mockery. For example, when a family with a teenage son was leaving for holidays and the son was randomly sampled for ETD, he was standardly informed that he would be checked for presence of "dangerous substances." Further conversation unfolded:

*Teen's mother: "Oh, narcotics!"*

*[Employee remains silent not refuting the information.]*

*Teen's mother: "Jesus, Mary and Joseph! Now I will find it out."*

*Employee [serious face]: "This is very often, normal today."*

*[ETD gives no alarm]*

*Teen's mother: "It is ok, so you fly with us." (Observation 11. 26 July 2017)*

The inclusion of trafficking into the scope of threats by the passengers is very interesting regarding the question of which actants are set to be protected by the whole airport security network. The inclusion of trafficking by the passengers to some extent moves the idea of security provision toward the notion of state interest and the protection of the state itself, in contrast to the protection of an individual traveller. This trend is also marginally present within other dimensions of threat mentioned nearly exclusively by the passengers, such as, for example, the danger of the presence of a specific person within the state territory. Even though, as already mentioned, the difference in the scope of threats is partially determined by the specificity of the BEK task, the passengers incline more toward perceiving airport security as a matter and interest of the state (Russian traveller 15 2017; Chinese traveller 18 2017; Czech traveller 32 2017). Interestingly, given the El-AI position as of flag carrier, this notion was also clearly shared by the El-AI security representative,



who stated that aircraft intrusion represents: “a severe security issue, casus belli, similarly to the assassination attempt on Yitzhak Rabin” (Employee of the El-Al Czech Republic 2017). Nonetheless, besides these, the state has been mostly left out as the possible actant in danger.

Many interviewed passengers perceived themselves as the main actants to protect, as visible from the crosstabulation in Appendix 7. In their view, the overall goal of airport security is expressed in terms similar to these: “Make all passengers safe and feel safe, you yourself feel more safe when you see this kind of policies.” (Emirati traveller 2 2017). This type of answers puts to the forefront the passengers of the particular flight with the important inclusion of the passenger himself. These answers also highlight that passengers should be protected in their vital interest of physical survival. This is in contrast with the perspective of employees, who tend to define their goals with the context to the aircraft or the flight: “This is the protection of the flight” (BEK Employee 20 2017). This framing particularly emphasises the need for ensuring the suitable conditions where the process of transportation will be enabled. The main actant to be protected here is rather an aircraft or the system of civil aviation. When these differences should be explained, at one point stands the call for the protection of the public, which materializes as a personal demand for feeling safe, which should be satisfied by the control (Sakano, Obeng, and Fuller, n.d.). The opposite perspective reflects the professional view which perceives the multiplicity of stakes within the framework, as well as the legal ground, for example, the Annex 17 of Chicago convention, which defines security as: “Safeguarding civil aviation against act of unlawful interference.” (ICAO, n.d.), which only in the following section further specifies what this term should encompass.

The second part of the explanation might be the result of a practice of interaction, where the poor compliance of travellers may contribute to the conceptualization even more distanced from the individual passengers. This differentiating is shown in the following quotation, where an employee explains, why she is interested more in the protection of the flight:

*“Maybe, it is due to the approach of the passengers, because, many times they have written everywhere, what they can have and what they cannot. Whenever you want to take it from them, you are the worst. They start to swear at you, and ‘why we cannot have it’ and you are thinking why you should care. You, me, we won’t be in that plane, if something happens. I do care about them to be transported safely, and they have a problem with it*

*and boycott it a lot, so I do care more about the plane than the travellers.” (BEK Employee 6 2017)*

This logic seems to significantly participate in reframing the picture, where the individuals are on one side still one group of the actants to be protected, but on the other side, they are not accepted as distinctive individual targets, but more as passive components of the whole. The practice thus further problematizes the problematic of a contracting authority and “customer” in regard to the airport security network. Even though passengers might be still considered the end customers, they are not expected to be the fully active part of the process. The state, or the individual being the end point in the process of provision individual agency is supposed to be overtaken by the security controllers. It should be noted here that not all employees follow this logic and some find the way to combine the task, usually through the use of the client or guide logic. This logic is on the one hand more individualistic in its approach to the traveller, but on the other hand, it successfully avoids the problem of legal rules that must be enforced, which is the thing that seems to contradict the logic of a customer and service. For example, as one employee noted: “Customer should be sold to, you want to make money on him. But the client is someone for whom I am here, I want nothing from him, and I have to care about him” (BEK Employee 35 2017). This logic makes it possible to circumvent the pure service relation, which would take the passenger for the contracting authority, or the securitizing actor.

### 5.3.2. The Threat of System Failure at LKPR

The failure of the system is a leading source of threat presence for employees as well as for management at the airport studied, being the second one for passengers only after the notion of terrorism, as visible from the crosstabulation in Appendix 6, which will be dealt with in a while. The system failure is overwhelmingly rendered as a possibility that a forbidden item might be brought into SRA. This fact itself is presented as a source of the threat. Importantly, the failure is not framed as a general mistake but as a result of a perpetrator’s activity, which enables to encompass the evil intent, which is needed to frame the situation as a security matter. Whereas for the passengers this act is most often connected with smuggling in a gun, for employees the main source of the threat is represented by an explosive device. This difference is probably a result of the broader imagination of the attack by both groups, but particularly also a consequence of the knowledge of the chain of security translation and the problematic of non-metal items

detection described. Yet, in the majority of cases, the nature of this item is not expressed, and the threat is related to the general notion of breaching SRA. Similarly, the idea is also included within the considerably less popular notion of unauthorized person's penetration into SRA.

Not only the unlawful breach of SRA but also the mere presence and legal entry of a suspicious person might be an important source of a threat, de facto also being caused by the system failure. The two most important sources of direct danger thus seem to be in consonance with the dominant logics of spatiality and identity. However, the precise nature of the suspiciousness, or the expression of a threat status seems to be very unclear. Besides the formal category of "potentially disruptive passengers" defined as "a passenger who is either a deportee, a person deemed to be inadmissible for immigration reasons or a person in lawful custody," this notion actually encompasses a continuum of persons (European Union 2008, 18). Covering, following David Lyon, the "vagabond" a person not representing an existential threat but rather an unwanted hindrance for the system, a person undesirable for the air travel or for its mere presence within the airport (Lyon 2008, 31; similarly: Klauser, Ruegg, and November 2008, 117). These persons have been marginally mentioned as a possible threat (BEK Employee 17 2017; BEK Employee 31 2017), particularly in regard to the incident, when a homeless woman stabbed a municipal policeman on the airport ground ('Bezdomovkyně Pobodala Pražského Strážníka, Chtěl Ji Vykázat z Letiště' 2012). Followingly, suspicious persons might be encountered in difference to the previous type as passengers, characterised by non-compliance with the security measures and aggressivity, sometimes connected with alcohol consumption. As an employee explains:

*I: "that person, I do not say that he is vulgar, but he behaves simply, not unacceptably, but just from how he behaves, we have the BEK instinct that simply, the nose, that we might control that person and we will control him. For example, at the order of the checkpoint leader."*

*T: "So, in case that a person arrives, who looks aggressively, the leader recommends you..."*

*I: "So, we could add to that. Make him even more furious by the control, but if he does not obey, does this, so then by adding the control we verify that the person really does not have anything on him. Specifically, not anything that was not revealed by the metal detector, not randomly, not anyhow... So, when he then reacts that he will do it even more,*

*so we can only confirm by that that he is refusing to comply with these controls and we can solve it either with the airline, or directly with the police.”* (BEK Employee 23 2017)

This exhibit points out that such a person is considered a threat. The non-compliance then goes beyond the disruption of flight based on inappropriate behaviour toward a “threat status” of the passenger himself. Such a person is seen as more likely to smuggle a forbidden item, which is not something anticipated in case of simple arrogance of the intoxicated passenger. The continuum then ends with the notion of a suspicious person, where the suspiciousness is simply behavioural or another expression of the person’s threat status. Importantly, such a suspicious person is usually considered identifiable by the system, because it is a bearer of the identity threat status, and consequently, the non-recognition might be understood as a system failure (BEK Employee 9 2017; BEK Employee 29 2017; German traveller 4 2017; German traveller 3 2017). This understanding of “suspiciousness,” which was in this thesis entailed by the notion of threat status then leads to essentialist threat expectations whose consequences will be addressed in the following section.

However, besides the essentialist suspicious person, there are further human actants, who occupy an important position on the threat list. Peculiar is the professional, who is rendered as a person equipped with the superior knowledge, means and motivation (BEK Employee 26 2017). Particularly the knowledge enables him to be a threat which might not be averted (BEK Employee 7 2017; BEK Employee 32 2017; Russian traveller 18 2017). The professional employs a system failure in regard to the ability to detect a particular material characteristic, or to counter an unexpected program of action and as such might employ a program of action, which deterministically will not be countered by an airport security anti-program. Similar to him a threat might be represented by an employee whose position is much more marginal, though. An employee represents an inner threat which is based on the combination of limited knowledge and particularly the access, which is deemed to enable to circumvent some parts of the security procedure (BEK Employee 28 2017; BEK Employee 33 2017; Observation 3. 11 July 2017).

Very similar is also the threat encompassed within a naïve perpetrator, who on the one hand theoretically might be detected by the spatial system function but completely disables the identity-based logic, because s/he does not have the formal threat identity and not even the “threat status” which would be behaviourally or otherwise detectable. The naïve perpetrator thus employs the system failure in regard to the ability to detects a

particular characteristic in regard to identity, and not spatial logic. The naïve perpetrator is considered a possible threat, but crucially s/he is also the main component of the argumentation against sole employment of identity logic and one of the main arguments for equal approach toward all passengers (BEK Employee 9 2017; BEK Employee 29 2017; BEK Employee 26 2017; BEK M&A&C 2 2017). The advantage of naïve perpetrator augments also relies on its relatively non-conflictual nature toward the passenger, as such it is also mentioned by the management (BEK M&A&C 2 2017; BEK M&A&C 6 2017). The last person, who is saliently present within the threat map, is a lunatic. A lunatic is similarly to the naïve perpetrator, rather harder to reveal, and particularly unpredictable given his/her “lunatic” irrational nature; on the other hand s/he is defined primarily by its determination, which allows him/her to penetrate the system, mostly not on the basis of invisibility, but rather given the disregard for the consequences (BEK Employee 10 2017; BEK Employee 9 2017). The lunatic as a term has, on the other hand, a significant agency toward the notion which will be dealt with in a short while – the terrorism.

### 5.3.3. Terrorism at LKPR

All the notion described above somehow mixed in the views of the interviewees at Václav Havel Airport with the general notion of terrorism. Terrorism was often mentioned, as visible from the crosstabulation in the Appendix 5, and was obviously present within the network of airport security as an ultimate threat combining all the discussed aspects of optimistic bias and aviation with further uncontrollability and emotional dread proper to the terrorism itself (Lee, Lemyre, and Krewski 2010, 263; Avdan and Webb 2018, 2). In the meantime, terrorism seemed not to endorse any particular form or characteristic, and inquiries about its nature were understood as an obvious question, which was, nonetheless, only very rarely met with a comprehensive answer. Often also only a mention about terrorism tended to provoke emotional reactions, where concerns were occasionally expressed by some passengers, who seemingly intentionally avoided to mention a particular type of danger (Russian traveller 9 2017; Chinese traveller 18 2017), or called upon transcendental beliefs in destiny, predestination, and God for protection against threat (Israeli traveller 15 2017; Russian traveller 17 2017; Saudi traveller 6 2017).

When comprehensive answers were obtained, either a particular attack was mentioned, usually 9/11 by the passengers or Richard Reid by the employees (American traveller 7 2017; Israeli traveller 20 2017; Participant observation 7. 23 June 2017;

Participant observation 2. 15 June 2017), or a particular tactic – namely bombing (Czech traveller 2 2017; Czech traveller 34 2017). Broader ideas about its nature were rarely discussed. My observations seem to be in consonance at least in the first two points with a research about terrorist threat perception realised by Lee, Lemyre, and Krewski, who pointed out that the interviewed persons mostly: “mentioned a specific attack or referred to an attack in general terms (25.2%). Others thought about different types of terrorism or weapons that might be used in an attack (19.5%). However, a distinguishing feature of these word associations was the prominence of themes reflecting socio-political factors” (Lee, Lemyre, and Krewski 2010, 251). Finally, if the terrorism has any nature within the field, it is probably Islamic (BEK Employee 6 2017; German traveller 3 2017; Czech traveller 8 2017). This is in consonance with the findings quoted by Avdan and Webb, who point out that also within the North American public the violent acts perpetrated by Muslims tend to be more often classified as terrorist (Avdan and Webb 2018, 3). Nevertheless, this notion was at the same time contested with efforts to avoid cultural preconceptions (BEK Employee 36 2017), a trap in which some employees were stuck.<sup>37</sup> When passing the participant observation part of my research, I, for example, took part in this conversation, after a Sikh passenger was separately inspected due to head cover presence. The trainee performing this inspection returned and positively nodded on passenger’s politeness and compliance adding:

*Trainee: “He told me that 95% of people with this turban are not terrorists.”*

*Instructor: “That is true, Sikhs usually are not terrorists.”*

*Me: “Isn’t it maybe that 95% of people are not terrorists generally?”* (Participant observation 13. 6 July 2017)

Here clearly can be seen that an effort for cultural understanding is made with an intention to multicultural acceptance, which at the same time meets with the already explained probability misconception and an underlying preconception that terrorism is somehow culturally rooted. Importantly, this framing is not present only on the side of the employee, but on the passenger’s side as well.

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<sup>37</sup> In some individual cases, employees shared openly anti-Islamic ideas, for example, in regard to the violent nature of the religion, or a general refusal to accept a different way of life (Participant observation 7. 23 June 2017; Observation 16. 9 August 2017). However, even though these ideas definitely influence the situation within the field, the general mood corresponds rather with the excerpt above.

The second feature of terrorism is its unnatural nature (Saudi traveller 6 2017). This characteristic of deviance points out the real partisanship of the bizarre lunatic character described above. The lunatic is, in fact, the terrorist. He performs terrorist activities, but he is just not labelled so (BEK Employee 29 2017; BEK Employee 6 2017; (BEK Employee 17 2017). As one passenger, for example, explained: “one crazy person is running around with the knife, then it is in the news in particular when he says something about Allah” (German traveller 3 2017). The emerging connection between terrorism and psychological condition has already been broadly researched, where on the one hand exists some weak evidence that terrorist acts perpetrators might, for example, express “lack of empathy” (Argomaniz and Lynch 2018, 8), but on the other hand: “the idea that terrorists, in general, must be sociopaths or psychopaths has little empirical support” (Nilsson 2018, 2). The use of this label, in fact, enables to explain, why the terrorist attempt is so hardly avertable because the irrational nature renders the attack unpredictable (BEK Employee 10 2017; BEK Employee 9 2017). The notion of this type of threat is strengthened by the characteristic of a lunatic perpetrator, which bears within the allusion to a lone wolf attack unpredictable by the intelligence (Barnea 2018, 219). Similarly, the lunatic label, as has already been noted, on the one hand, enables to depoliticize and delegitimize the act (Salter 2008e, 245; Larsen 2018, 3). Conversely, however, labelling the terrorist a lunatic, bears together the notion of exceptionality and abnormality, which is by some employees used as a way to deal with the problematic of cultural prejudice because rendering the perpetrator as an exception from his kind enables to avoid the sweeping judgement (BEK Employee 29 2017 BEK Employee 28 2017; Czech traveller 14 2017; German traveller 3 2017).

On the other hand, the abnormality entailed in the notion of insanity further supports the above-mentioned essentialism present within the understanding of terrorism. As Aradau and Blanke write: “‘How do I find a cell of terrorists that has no connection to known strong selectors?’ is answered by ‘Look for anomalous events’” (Aradau and Blanke 2018, 8). Within the context of the field, this essentialism expects that the terrorist is identifiable during the control on the basis of identity logic. The essentialist threat status of a person is something that is expected to manifest itself or at least something that is clearly detectable as an inherent feature of an individual, if one is performing his/her screener’s duties properly. One employee, for example, explained that at the times where many physical checks were mandatory, she felt so overwhelmed by their performance that she would not have recognised even Bin Laden personally (BEK Employee 14 2017).

Similarly, one passenger pointed out that the main goal of the control is to make “to be known, who is who” (Ukrainian traveller 1 2017).

Both statements actually do not expect the recognition of the person’s formal identity, which BEK does not work with (and Bin Laden was also already dead at the time), but point out the expectation of revealing the hidden threat status of the passengers, which will be behaviourally or otherwise recognisable. This notion is shared by passengers as well as employees (BEK Employee 31 2017; Czech traveller 9 2017; Czech traveller 28 2017; Chinese traveller 8 2017; Indian traveller 2 2017). This identification could be united with the notion of danger as described by Tomas Martin in the context of radicalisation: “Dangers, in this reading, represent an immediacy and localizability of harm. The harm exists in the future, but there is a linear and observable line between the present and the future harm” (Martin 2018, 4). However, within this process of recognition, radicalisation occupies a very limited space as the persons either are or are not bearers of a threat.

Approaching the threat in civil aviation, its content and form, enables to uncover what is in focus of contemporary security thinking of professionals as well as of the ordinary citizens, who produce the principal demand for security provision. The imagination of threat also brings to light the problematics of a contracting authority and an end client of the whole security system, pointing to the state inclusion accompanied by the individual demand, which is, however, realised through a temporal agency takeover. Importantly, an agency take over is also in some respect realised by the employees untrusting the responsibility to the system design. The nature of civil aviation itself as well as particular available technological solutions produce particular niches for threat materialities and threat employment. The acknowledgment of necessarily a limited scope of an airport security network then gives rise to imaginaries of particular attackers employing the weak points and borders of the system. Similarly, the idea of the system functioning in regard to a possible identification of perpetrators on the basis of a threat status puts forward the problematic of an essentialist understanding of terrorism. This perspective also opens the discussion of the terrorism conceptualisation, particularly in regard to its political and cultural nature.

#### 5.4. Security

Once the threat has been inquired the final step remains, namely to focus on the end product of the airport security translation – the security itself. As has been noted at the beginning, airport security is fluid, and it is an essentially contested concept, a controversy



that is never settled (Schouten 2010, 2). The security is produced as reactive to the framing of still new threats. The chains of security translation are then established to counter the particular threat materialities and to produce spaces and actants deemed free of these. This allows understanding the security in negative terms as the absence of particular actants and programs of action, as it has been examined right now as the absence of threats. The translatory procedures, nevertheless, produce a security black box, which goes beyond this notion. This black box is created not only by the smooth cooperation of multiple actors but also by the credibility of their recruiter, which allows taking the content of the black box for granted (Latour 1986a, 242). As such, airport security is produced not only as a negative notion but also as a positive end product, even if sometimes significant criticism might be present. It was found in an Israeli research that the “majority of 83% of the passengers felt that the security check contributed to their sense of safety during flight” (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011, 879). The situation at the airport inquired also witnessed a high level of the feeling of added value promoted by the security system. In this regard following the previous pattern of threat analysis, the positive notion of security is provided in regard to the actants protected, the means ensuring this positive notion and finally the nature of security itself.

#### 5.4.1. Security Antiprograms at LKPR

The main security antiprogram enacted within the context of airport security is the production of Security Restricted Area and its enforcement against all agents framed as threats. This idea further encompasses the identity-based components, which consider personal identities in regard to the strength of SRA protection against their presence. The SRA idea is also reflected as a cornerstone of airport security by all groups of human actants, as is visible from the crosstabulation in Appendix 8. Importantly, the security is provided by the fact of control performance itself, which, serving as a black box, promotes the certainty of security presence to the passengers. The most common expression of the security being provided for the passengers within the field was: “We feel safe, they have checked everything.” (Israeli traveller 12 2017; similarly: Israeli traveller 13 2017; Turkish/Cyprus traveller 1 2017; Emirati travellers 4 2017; German traveller 2 2017). Very important within this idea is the notion that everything was controlled, meaning that none of the items entails a threat. Here a similar conception as the threat status of persons is coming into play for non-human actants. The fact that the non-human actants were

somehow controlled means that they could not represent a threat because otherwise they would have been identified.

The feeling of good security performance is strengthening when some of the passenger's item has been further scrutinized because this process emphasises the possibility of threat identification (French traveller 1 2017) – an opposite example being mentioned in the previous chapter. This is also stressed by the management, which is aware that passing some bordering item might result in a worsened passenger's perception of the control performance (BEK M&A&C 1 2017). Ideally, though, after scrutiny, this object should be allowed because the passenger is “sure” about its non-threat status and the opposite evaluation proves a “mistake” of the control (French traveller 1 2017).

Similarly, some passengers also tend to imagine that there is more control in place than there is in reality, which might be a source of uncomfortable feelings for some but a reaffirming certainty for others (Czech traveller 27 2017; Belarusian traveller 1 2017). As one passenger explains: “Here were controls, which I am even not aware of, maybe, yes, there are cameras, maybe I have passed through some detector, I have not noticed, maybe, I hope, that yes, I want to feel secure” (Czech traveller 3 2017). A similar argument also emerges among the employees, though here it is usually entailed in the idea of following the rules. Following the rules is seen there as promoting a certainty of security. As has been pointed out, this notion might contrast with the system settings based on probability expectation. Nevertheless, for the same employees following the rules means a straightforward way to security provision given the belief that the system could not have been designed with imperfections (BEK Employee 4 2017; BEK Employee 22 2017; BEK Employee 12 2017). This notion is usually connected with the idea of zero risk, where the possibility to accept a low-risk probability is perceived by the employee as unthinkable. Here returns the precautionary notion of zero risk criticised by Aradau and Van Munster (Aradau and Van Munster 2007, 103). This stance might also lead to the inner misunderstanding, where these employees might insist on detailed rules fulfilment even in cases where this approach is not perceived as advisable, namely in regard to a disability to recognise what is substantial for the particular chain of translation and what is not (BEK M&A&C 2 2017). In this form, the security performance might become commodified, not in regard to the relationship between a contracting authority and client but in regard to the security performance framed as the procedure performance, formalised as a technique (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, 5).

However, in other cases, the control is openly acknowledged by both passengers and employees as a risk-diminishing activity based on risk knowledge and evaluation (BEK Employee 36 2017; BEK Employee 12 2017; BEK Employee 17 2017; American traveller 5 2017; Czech traveller 29 2017; Swiss traveller 1 2017). In these cases, the risk then entails the form described by Abrahamsen and Williams: “it is a particular way of thinking about and responding to potential dangers. It is preventative, not restorative. Primarily actuarial and calculative, it works by designing and controlling spaces, through the collection of statistics and the production of categories of danger, and by surveillance” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, 5). The notion of risk perception is also encompassed within the security deterrence antiprogram.

The fact that the control is present is producing a deterring effect and thus the introduction of the control itself importantly raises the threshold for damaging a program of action. This is enabled particularly by the limited understanding of the security translation in place by the general public, as proven, for example, by the imagination of further controls (Czech traveller 3 2017), or the feeling of control strengthening by the performance of control itself (BEK M&A&C 1 2017; French traveller 1 2017). Nevertheless, the deterrence logic is mentioned only marginally, not so surprisingly, by the passengers, but more interestingly also by the employees (see crosstabulation in Appendix 8). This antiprogram could have been understood as the rationale of the random sampling described in the previous chapter. Even though this rationale might not be fully refuted, the scarcity and the framing of the deterrence within the field seems to point to the prevalence of adoption of the risk perception bias by all groups of actants in contrast to deterrence.

#### 5.4.2. The Protected Actants at LKPR

The actants protected by the control, in reaction to the positively framed inquiry, reasonably mirror those that are put in danger by threats emphasizing the human actants on the side of passengers and the technological and systems actants on the side of employees. However, two new entities seem to enter the picture. Whereas the threat’s program of action endangers the passengers, persons, or (hu)mans, the security is provided in contrast in a salient number of cases, to “us” or to “me” (crosstabulation in Appendix 8). The translation into the secure state is provided by translating the actant in person, as well as by translating all actants on the flight, leading to the personalisation of the security provided. This, though, does not erode the negative notion of security translation, where the translation of oneself is just a result of the failure of the act of truth (Salter 2005), whereas

the translation of others is the factual performance of real security (BEK Employee 26 2017; Czech traveller 3 2017; Korean traveller 12 2017; Bulgarian traveller 1 2017). The security is provided for a traveller as a trade-off, where the unnecessary check of oneself is performed just to ensure the same level control of others (American traveller 5 2017). The uncertainty about behaviours of others and persuasion of one's flawlessness then stands in the centre of the argument – "I have nothing to hide" (Russian traveller 10 2017). Within the context of airport security, this might be extended not only to the real transportation of threats but to all problems (even though not caused by passengers) generally, which seem to indicate overall non-compliance with security measures. As one of the passengers answered the question, whether she had ever experienced any type of problem during the control: "No, if one does not carry on anything of that kind, how one can have problems?" (Russian traveller 21 2017). The demand for privacy preservation might be even fully discarded by fellow co-travellers by implying that such a demand includes a necessity to hide: "I do not care [opening the suitcase], I do not have any weird hobbies, pervert ones, I am just a regular citizen, so a shirt, socks and notebook." (Czech traveller 27 2017). This, even though not necessarily connected to security, implies a deviance as honesty is only equivalent to transparency.

In regard to threat, the security seems to be stretching in two directions, not only toward the inclusion of oneself but also, in the other way, toward the very broad networks of actants known as state and society. Mark Salter described this situation as a case, where: "(inter)national mobility is first problematized and then managed" (Salter 2008a, 12). This extension is not mostly made on the side of employees, for whom the security remains mostly flight-bound, but on the side of passengers. For passengers, the control entails the border protection, which on one hand is directly bound to the control of the movement of human and non-human actants, on the other hand, it has the broader task of protecting the state within the international environment (Slovakian traveller 2 2017; Israeli traveller 9 2017). This stretches the notion of airport security even more broadly toward: "enforce the laws of that country you're in" (British traveller 1 2017). Airport security is as such turned into an actant contributing to state sovereignty. For other passengers, this type of stretch might follow another direction encompassing broad community, as a part of the mankind (Chinese traveller 15 2017; Pakistani traveller 1 2017). Nonetheless, such an inclusion rather points to the general idea of the nature of security.

#### 5.4.3. The Nature of Security Produced at LKPR

The security achieved after the control in the field studied in first-order depends on the level of security perceived before, because when the threats are not present, all actants being secure within the general environment, there is no translation needed. According to Global Terrorism Database, which contains data from 1970, 33 persons died due to terrorism-related causes in Czechoslovakia and in the Czech Republic. This includes the 26 passengers of flight JU367 (see chapter two 2.4), who have no direct relation to Czechoslovakia ('ASN Aircraft Accident McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32 YU-AHT' 2018; 'Incident Summary for GTDID: 197201260002' n.d.). Out of the seven remaining persons, one is a suicidal death leaving no other injuries, and another is a letter bomb explosion in the pool-producing facility, where the terrorism label could have been successfully questioned ('Incident Summary for GTDID: 201301190012' n.d.; 'Incident Summary for GTDID: 201401150065' n.d.).

Even though the criticism of the too extensive security focus on airport security is to some extent present also among foreign passengers (German traveller 3 2017; Russian traveller 5 2017), or at least a perception of the bad focus (Pakistani traveller 1 2017), the country's security profile influences the perception of the need for security among Czech nationals. The controls in place are relatively often seen as more than satisfactory, and in some cases, the focus on security is criticized as an empty bubble (BEK Employee 36 2017; BEK Employee 10 2017; Czech traveller 34 2017; Czech traveller 6 2017). Still, this notion is also reflected abroad, where some passengers mention the situation in the country as one of the important aspects of the country's visit experience (Bulgarian traveller 1 2017; Italian traveller 6 2017; Swedish traveller 2 2017; Greek traveller 1 2017; Lebanese traveller 1 2017; Italian traveller 3 2017). As such the airport security might be seen as dependant on the inputs to the chains of translation.

The outcoming product of the chains of security translation is then usually rendered as "psychological." This notion is understood rather negatively by the employees as something that is not real, that is just a perception, a trick on the viewer. Here the ontological translation of the actants into the secure state is actually not performed; it is not a "total rupture from the preceding state" (Latour 1999, 60), or "ontological shifts" (Schouten 2014b, 28). It is just an illusion of these (BEK Employee 31 2017; BEK Employee 9 2017; BEK Employee 35 2017). Even when the translation is not performed, the rules must be followed, because otherwise, the illusion ceases to have an effect. As one employee answered the question about what is security: "This is such a concept. People

have the feeling that we have thrown away their water, that we have checked them. Those people who fly thirty times a month, they do not care, they do not engage much with it” (BEK Employee 20 2017). This also renders security as a service to the psychological needs of the crowd.

The passengers are mostly willingly accepting the service being promoted, even though they also reflect it in psychological terms. Nevertheless, for passengers, the psychological dimension of security means a positive, reassuring feeling that the responsibility, their security agency, has been taken over by a different actant. The security is thus then mainly a possibility not to pay any attention to the security, not to see it and not to care (Czech traveller 8 2017; Italian traveller 6 2017; Czech traveller 5 2017). This moves the security again into the service being provided as it is also framed, for example, by Gkritza, Neimeier, and Mannering (Gkritza, Niemeier, and Mannering 2006, 219). As such the security then might be evaluated in terms of passenger’s “comfort” (American traveller 1 2017; Belarusian traveller 1 2017; Korean traveller 10 2017). The ideal security is thus an ‘other-taken’ process (Latour 2005, 45; T. Venturini and Guido 2013). It is clearly present but invisible in the meantime: “Security means that you do not notice it. That is security” (Russian traveller 18 2017).

Security thus operates with significant agency entrusted to it by the travellers, who are willing to take part in an other-taken process and thus subsequently acknowledge the agency removal from their side and submission to the agency of security (Chinese traveller 17 2017; Israeli traveller 15 2017; Israeli traveller 1 2017). Relatively similarly to the process described by O’Malley, the security agency is then imposed on the population “in their own interest” and importantly accepted by the other side (O’Malley 2006, 419). The agency of security might then be used to control and enforce the security translation. The employees might use the agency of security to enforce a particular behaviour or prohibition (BEK Employee 4 2017; BEK Employee 31 2017; BEK Employee 22 2017; BEK Employee 16 2017). The agency takeover then significantly limits the knowledge of travellers about the process and practically disables the agency retrieval in case of conflict. This process is in part endorsed spontaneously by the employees, who themselves become the enlisted actants of airport security agency:

*I: “...I have the feeling that somehow they are not willing at all to cooperate with us, but it is actually their security in question, so they should realise why we are here...”*

2: *“This, I think so, it is about the intelligence level of the person! Since a person on some intelligence level understands and won’t discuss it at all.” (BEK Employee 22 2017)*

On the other hand, it is also a knowingly applied approach, which points out the impossibility to reverse the decision, particularly enrolling the European legislative framework (BEK Employee 15 2017; BEK Employee 27 2017; BEK Employee 8 2017; BEK Employee 10 2017; BEK M&A&C 5 2017). Similarly, the security agency might be enlisted even in relations between employees and management, where the security might oblige either easing of working tasks or the compliance with rules (BEK M&A&C 4 2017; BEK M&A&C 2 2017; BEK Employee 13 2017; BEK Employee 14 2017; BEK Employee 17 2017).

Security agency strength is of course enabled by the general security relationship toward all kinds of actants, not depending on whether human or not. Security is understood as the certainty of non-interference with the actant agency and thus as the insurance of actant’s own preservation, alluding to the notion of biopolitics, though positively formulated (Nishiyama 2018, 3). This crude but frank phrasing has been clearly formulated particularly by Asian travellers (including Russia) but seems to be latently more broadly shared (Chinese traveller 1 2017; Chinese traveller 3 2017; Chinese traveller 5 2017; Chinese traveller 16 2017; Russian traveller 17 2017; Russian traveller 20 2017; Pakistani traveller 1 2017). As such, security is an essential need of an actant, in human context understood as the preservation of life (Chinese traveller 5 2017; Chinese traveller 11 2017; Chinese traveller 16 2017; Russian traveller 17 2017), and an ultimate condition of flourishing (Uruguayan traveller 1 2017; Chinese traveller 3 2017). These ideas might be in airport security context entailed in the notion of homecoming, where home is an ultimate shelter free of even the potential of threat (Czech traveller 13 2017; Lebanese traveller 3 2017; American traveller 8 2017). Leaving the individualist cultures of Europe and North America, security might be positively seen as an extrapolation of its psychological dimension, as a general environment, which Latouriantly encompasses not only humans but also actants, where no latent danger is present. A state of tranquillity, happiness and peace of all existence (Chinese traveller 20 2017; Indian traveller 2 2017; Chinese traveller 18 2017; Chinese traveller 19 2017).

The form of an end product of airport security is mostly shaped by the production of the security agency. This production is enabled by the entrusting of one’s own security

agency into the hands of a security control provider. The traveller thus resigns on his agency in the relevant aspects and in exchange thus might be provided with a commodified service of a security provision, where the exact content of the provided service needs not to be firmly delimited. The agency overtaking and acceptance of a service is then expressed by the felt ease, where one does not have to care about one's own security, whereas his personal preservation as an actor is provided. In a broader sense these needs are fulfilled in regard to a more complex network of humans and non-humans. The giving-up of one's agency is, however, traded off for a limited option of appeal and redress. Agency take-over is, however, not limited to travellers but is also endorsed by the employees, in an idea of rule fulfilment as a necessary but sufficient condition leading toward a guarantee of security. The performance of the system within its design then gains the individualised agency, which might be reversely employed on its productive network ensuring its own preservation.

This chapter has explored the material logics of aviation risk perception and has analysed the nature of threat, as well as the positive form of the security delimitation, as the two end points of the security translation. It has pointed to the essentialist understanding of terrorism endorsed in terrain, as well as to the security agency overtaking proposed to the contemporary traveller. The inquiry into threat environment and the end product thus concludes this account of the contemporary practice of airport security provision. Being concentrated on Václav Havel International Airport Prague, this thesis has provided an exploration of one case, where the sharp focus has enabled an interest into the lived-through experience and its find detail, as well as proposed a comparative background for further research of airport security.



## Conclusions

This thesis has examined the existing practice of airport security in the particular site of production at Václav Havel Airport Prague. In contrast to the existing research, it has mostly focused on the manifestation of the already established practice. The adoption of Actor-network Theory has enabled a particular understanding of airport security as a network composed of the chains of translation employing distinct veridictory procedures, where on one side stands the general environment with the potential presence of threats and the secure environment composed of the translated “secure” actants is produced at the output.

The thesis is going beyond the state of the art by promoting a complex inspiration driven from ANT than might be the rather common but only loosely related assemblage impetus dominantly present in IR. By emphasising the principle of a chain of translation, the thesis follows the lead proposed by the work of Marieke de Goede (Goede 2018). Marieke de Goede, building specially on the ideas proposed by Bruno Latour in Pandora’s Hope, focuses on one instance of translation, highlights the process of information abstraction and the production of a threat presence as an analogy to an establishment of a scientific fact. In difference to her conception of a chain of translation, which is in some aspects more faithful to the original form, this thesis puts forward a conception which focuses on the stabilised practice and which stresses the act of ontological transformation of the object translated.

Rendering airport security as a network composed of chains of translation leads to the possibility of relating and considering the interactions within and among the chains. This grounding has enabled to identify and also explain the instances, where the veridiction logics, proper to individual chains of translation, are mutually crossing or producing the dense encounter of diverse actors. Following the empirical practice has thus enabled to identify five guiding logics, which were followingly traced back to their previous academic elaboration. Their understanding through the notion of the chains of translation refusing the “salto mortale toward the invisible rear-world of the social context” (Latour 2005, 191) has enabled to admit their full agency in security production, which turns them from the necessary preconditions or components to active security producers. The thesis’ empirical interest in the intra-institutional practice thus points out the possibility of agency attribution within a complex system, relating itself toward the problematic of agency in regard to agent-structure relationship. The thesis thus capitalizes the observations about

these ANT premises relevant for IR made by Bueger, Porter, and Nexon and Pouliot (Bueger 2013; T. Porter 2013; Nexon and Pouliot 2013).

Followingly, the identification of the guiding logics, on the bases of a field research inquiring a practical detail, thus points out the possibility to reach abstraction with this methodological grounding. Doing this, the thesis shows a viability of theoretical conclusions based on ANT-conceptualised field research, and thus answers the concerns or limitations regarding this ability of ANT, expressed by some authors in regard to a possible employment of ANT in IR (Barry 2013; Nexon and Pouliot 2013).

The identified logics are then seen as the guiding principles of contemporary airport security, which are forming and reshaping the existing chains of translation and as such serve as circulating entities entrenched within the whole network of airport security; following Latour, they represent network fluids (Latour 2013, 33). These logics are understood as distinct in a sense that each is contributing to the form of contemporary airport security with an irreplaceable aspect. Only their interference then might produce airport security in the form described, which is making them interdependent, because the security is established as a result of their indivisible interplay. Identifying these logics and particularly bringing them together and call the attention to their interplay thus contributes to the understanding of a contemporary shape of, not only, airport security, thus adding to the existing research of security studies. These logics are: movement, division, visibility, spatiality and identity.

Particularly, in this thesis, movement (circulation) and division are treated as two distinct logics. This perspective is not excluding the solution proposed by Foucault, rather it is a different (methodological) approach to tackling the security phenomenon (M. Foucault 2007; Michel Foucault 2010). Foucault in his works often clearly opts for zooming in on one particular organising phenomenon, which establishes his “inertial frame of reference,” to which he relates the rest of analysis. As such, the approach proposed within this work does not exclude the Foucauldian perspective. The treatment of mobility and division (3.1 and 3.2), however, contrasts with certain streams of preceding literature, where mobility is mostly characterised as a notion, with a potential to be turned into the source of insecurity. As such, it followingly might serve to promote surveillance, where the divisibility and the resulting differences in speed are perceived as an inherent result of passengers’ inequalities defined in economic terms (Adey 2006, 196; similarly: Lahav 2008; Lyon 2008). Nonetheless, in this thesis, these logics have been traced as distinct and

most importantly as necessary parts not only of the security system but also of the process of security production.

This thesis found the divisibility logic to be forced upon the actants by the screening technologic capabilities and threat materialities, which must be enacted to perform a valid security translation. The agency of the screening technologies is thus requiring an existing layout of the security check as well as a particular form of division. Simultaneously, the past of the system based on threat imaginaries in the times of the system's origins, together with the technological solutions available in the concurrent time period, result in framing the contemporary threat especially in regard to organic materials and, particularly, explosives. The explanative saliency of the divisibility is then documentable in the instances identified on the ground and described in section 3.4.3.4. Here a change of the division performed – the movement from one chain of veridiction procedure to another – is shown to be a satisfying act leading to the legitimization of the allocation of the secure status to an entity.

The importance of division logic is further witnessed in the section 3.4.2.1. Here the possibility of the division is identified as an internal expectation demanded by the agency of technologies employed within the particular modes. The expectation from a traveller to perform such a division, which is, however, later verified, then produces a parallel to an act of truth described by Salter (Salter 2005). Given the later veridiction, this act is in its essence only staged; however, it reveals individual commitment to the system and indirectly one's decision to answer to the demand for security enforcement realised by state.

When this expectation is not valid, and for example, a human and a metal item cannot be separated, an alternative veridiction has to be employed, otherwise the security cannot be performed. Similarly, it is shown that different technologies of personal screening acceptable within the European legislative framework require different types of division and as such produce diverging concepts of normality in regard to passengers' bodies. The technological demands for the separation of metals also raise important controversies concerning the possible and socially desirable division of humans and metal as well as other objects. Here the need to employ longer chains of translations produces in the field dilemmas of actants' divisibility. The desirability of division produces a push for its achievement, and as such the technological agency importantly frames the passage of the security checkpoint. The thesis then documents temporal changes and controversies resulting from the shifts in evaluation of a desirable separability of humans and things. It is

an agency of technology that produces an image of disability and the need for travellers with a disability to conform; interplay of social and technological means then producing similar outcomes for the religious travellers. The catches produced by this logic thus entail important implications not only for travellers with disability or religious coverings, but point to larger social and political implications.

Similarly, the mobility was reframed in regard to its distinct nature, and developed beyond the notion that speed and movement are a result of security system distribution of humans, which was its existing framing within security studies proposed by Peter Adey (Adey 2008, 148, 2006, 207). Mobility is identified in the thesis as an inevitable technological mean of security production at Václav Havel Airport Prague. Speed is identified as a background value, where slowdown or halting are adverse options, income maximalisation. Only the reconciliation of speeds can promise the ideal of flux, which leads to its prioritisation over the speed itself. The sections 3.2 and 3.4.3.4 found the security control as designed for performance only under the condition of movement. The thesis explores security in the field as being possibly performed in regard to the check layout only through movement and passage, requiring management and crowd control in regard to the queues as well as spatial organisation, which will reduce the queues and effectively allocate human resources.

Central to the thesis, is then the logic of visibility, dealt with in the section 3.3. Security is provided as a visualisation of the possible markers of the threat and refutation of their presence.

Visibility is identified as an activity of acquiring limited knowledge about the set of pre-given characteristics of an entity; these are constituted on the basis of the preceding historical experience of the threat's material performance and the visualising technology material capabilities. This enables, on the basis of the characteristics of presence or absence, the respective identification of the threat, rendering, as a result, the actant either as secure, or non-secure. The thesis thus proposes, on the basis of the field work, an understanding which goes beyond the one pointed out by Rachel Hall, who understands visibility rather as a cultural notion connected to security than as the security production itself (Hall 2007). Similarly, it goes beyond the visibility notion discussed by David Lyon, who conceptualises the visibility in the context of mobile phones and GPS position as the security guarantee or danger identification (Lyon 2006), or the conceptualisation by Bellanova and Fuster, who, given their focus, limit visibility to the visual output perceptible by human eye (Bellanova and Fuster 2013).

The visibility is identified in the thesis as a principle deeply rooted in the studied airport security system. Within the context of the field work at Václav Havel Airport Prague, particular modes of visibility entailing different sets of characteristics were analysed and discussed, being based either on a single visibility mode — X-ray screening in section 3.4.3.1, electromagnetic field in sections 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.3, tactile visualisation in section 3.4.2.2, ion quantum spectrometry in the section 3.4.2.4, or a combined mode of liquid threat visualisation dealt with in the section 3.4.3.3. Importantly, visibility is in all cases characterised by the thesis as being limited to the particular aspect of actants materialities and as such is put in contrast to the idea of absolute transparency proposed by Hall (Hall 2007). An account of mutual historical development of the visibility mode in regard to a threat-expected materiality and the technological solution produced in response. As such, the visibility mode is varying in type demanding different modes of division and leading to the different type of revelations. The thesis further identifies in the field work the instances where logics beyond the security rationale are consulted to examine, whether such visualisations are admissible or intruding either the privacy, or possibly the diplomatic mail confidentiality in sections 3.4.3.1 and 3.4.2.2. The thesis thus points out that not under all circumstances the transparency is strived for, but rather that based on connections with faraway actors, the vision might be intentionally limited.

The thesis further identifies, in accordance with the preceding research on false positives (O'Malley 2006, 417), specific instances of the effect occurrence at Václav Havel Airport Prague, where the visibility's specific setup aimed at including all possible threats of the kind, tends to include supplementary non-threat items. The thesis not only identifies these instances but further analyses a different interpretation of false alarm occurrence – as a mistake on the side of the passenger, a natural event, as a false alarm or the sign of the technology malperformance and non-reliability. These differences in interpretation are explained by the intensity of the human-machine interactions within the system, meaning a total black box on one side and a Latourian machine, where the employee is an indivisible part of the interpretation on the other (see sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3). Also, the inquiry into a probability perception significantly contributes to the discussion of security production in regard to its 'objective' and perceived nature. Analogously, it contributes to the understanding of risk perception, which is a topic recently opened in security studies (Aradau and Van Munster 2007). In this context, the thesis provides explanation in regard to the system design, as well as in regard to the service provided to the citizens, explaining on one hand the perceived high efficiency of the system on the side of security consumers,

and on the other hand pointing out the reasons for similarly high remaining security concerns.

Moreover, the process of false alarms and anomalies' normalisation is described as diverging in relation to the combination of the technology visualisation type and the anomaly produced, leading to the normalisation of a particular type of travellers in the types of screening and revealing them as anomalous in others. Doing this, the thesis adds to the discussion of a body scanner anomaly production proposed by Schouten, Valkenburg, van der Ploeg, and Currah and Mulqueen (Schouten 2014b; Valkenburg and van der Ploeg 2015; Currah and Mulqueen 2011). In regard to the anomalies, the thesis identifies the notion of equality enacted as the equality in the degree of scrutiny achieved rather than the equality in a procedure performed. This on one hand puts particular travellers in the extended focus of the control, on the other hand, it might be understood as the full agency acknowledgement. Furthermore, on the case of random sampling the thesis analyses the instances of skewed probability perception and points out that the expectation of this effect is a functional premise of the system design. This functionality is in the same time problematised by the necessity of making the principle of random sampling public, which on one hand diminishes the level of uncertainty about whole system design, but on the other hand, is needed to produce the effect. Moreover, random sampling being designed as a cornerstone element ensuring equality is functional only when being understood by the general public. This situation contradicts the limited public knowledge identified among travellers. This situation disables many of its benefits. Even though, the factual equality is de facto promoted, the positive effects in regard to production of perceived procedural justice (Hasisi and Weisburd 2011) and public approval of the system are not exploited.

Similarly, the thesis discusses the problematics of exceptionality, finding out the difference between exceptions embedded in the system design and "true" exceptions, where the perceived non-reliability of technology and chain of translation exception are found to be intervening factors influencing the exception's endorsement. This discussion, together with the above-mentioned problematic of separability, importantly relates to the questions concerning the proportionality and sufficiency of the control.

The thesis proceeds identifying on the basis of the field study and European legislative framework inspection the logics of spatiality and identity. The identity logic is traced in the terrain as the idea of the exclusion of threats from a bordered area, where controls are performed. The threat within this logic is found to be produced due to the sole

presence of an actant sharing the material qualities of a “dangerous” item within its borders. The thesis recognises the agency of non-human items within the logic to be so strong that their exclusion is sufficient to promote security, allowing the equality toward the humans by the practical permission of their non-exclusive presence. As such, the notion of airport security as a Banopticon, employed by Mark Salter (Salter 2008e, 256), is reframed as de facto the Banopticon of things. The Banopticon of things is identified by the thesis with a practice employed in the European legislative framework and within the field.

The thesis also tackles the practical embodiment of this logic materialized in the general concept of Security Restricted Area. The narratives connected with the SRA maintenance in the terrain are explored in section 4.3. The thesis points out that a strict notion of spatial separation produces the secure area notion in terms of medical sterility, which is thus prone to contamination. Similarly, the thesis points out that the particular spatial delimitation of the area present at Václav Havel Airport Prague, where the SRA border is not concise, may then itself establish the areas deemed dangerous. In regard to spatiality, the thesis further reveals the logic applied in the outstanding case of liquids, where this principle is extended to include not only the materialities sharing the agency of potential harm, but also the materialities among whom such a materiality might be hidden. As such, the thesis has found liquids being rendered as a priori suspicious, with the burden of proof switched from identifying the threat potential to proving their innocence in the section 3.4.3.3.

In contrast with the spatiality logic, the thesis explores the identity logic, where the chain of translation toward the secure is based on translating one’s formal and non-formal identity. Here the thesis adopts an established framework of threat classification (Aradau and Blanke 2018, 7), but newly applies it to the profiling logic. This enables to build upon the interview data a finer conceptualisation and a subsequent understanding of the procedures discussed. The idea of ontologically rooted “threat status” presented within the thesis modifies the argument proposed by Aradau and Blanke on the basis of the preceding work of Grégoire Chamayou’s, whereas ‘activity becomes an alternative to identity’ (Aradau and Blanke 2018, 6). The argument presented in the thesis renders the activity just as another manifestation of identity similar to the formal one, where the goal of the security is the revelation of the ontological dimension. This subsequently explains the essentialist understanding of terrorism found in the interview data. Analogically, a clue is

proposed for further research on the seeming failure of human rights and connected freedom of movement arguments, when facing the security matters.

The thesis also points out the instances of identity and spatiality logics' interaction in sections 4.4-4.6. Identified identity-based components are found to be inherently present within the current rather spatial system at the airport. They are embodied especially in the identity card, the authentication procedure, and the gendered character of security provision. Moreover, the thesis examines the encounters with external more identity-oriented systems present at Václav Havel Airport Prague. Contrasting these systems, addressed in the sections 4.5 and 4.6, brings in the reflection of the weaknesses of both, lying in the indiscrimination as well as in the threat of the opposite. Similarly, the clashes produced as a result of the distinct experience of travellers used on the opposing systems are explained through these logics analysis. Here on one hand stands the travellers' expectation or disappointment from the impossibility to enjoy the benefits resulting from a granted secure identity and the deepened feelings of physical intrusiveness from the control in place, whereas on the other hand stands the intrusiveness experienced as a result of the extended identity check and the expectation of a possible control alleviation in case of its local introduction. Similarly, the thesis identifies the argument of the move from spatial-based reactive security toward the identity-based proactivity.

Followingly, the thesis analyses the notion of threat and risk in regard to the aircraft and threat materialities, discussing the problematic of risk overvaluation on the basis of interview data, as being derived particularly from the airplane physical features disabling the operation of optimism bias due to the agency takeover, a bound destiny of those on board, and a high dread factor. The threat emergence is understood as the characteristic of the general environment, from which the actants coming into the system must be translated by the chain of translation into the secure state, where the background shape of threat as well as the resulting form of security is importantly framed by the system in place. The nature of civil aviation itself as well as particular available technological solutions produce particular niches for threat materialities and threat employment.

The acknowledgment of a necessarily limited scope of an airport security network then gives rise to imaginaries of particular attackers employing the weak points and borders of the system. Given that a threat is found out to be able to operate either due to the system failure – a poor performance of a particular chain of translation, the non-ability to detect particular material characteristics, non-ability to counter an unexpected program of action, and as the consequence of mere presence of a program of action aimed at causing



damage. The threat is further delimited in regard to endangered actants. Here the thesis identifies the divergence of the perception of the threat and protection scope, where the technical means are identified as a prime object of protection by the employees, whereas the passengers understand themselves as the object of protection and target of danger, and similarly assign a bigger role to the state as a protected and endangered actant. Imaginations of threat also influence the relation of security in regard to the contracting authority and an end client of the whole security system. Here, the state expressed demand for security is accompanied by a demand of an individuum, which is, however, realised through a temporal agency takeover. Importantly, an agency takeover is also in some respect realised by the employees untrusting the responsibility to the system design.

Within the mapping of threat, the perception of terrorism present at Václav Havel Airport Prague is also examined, revealing particularly an essentialist understanding of terrorism. This idea is then found to be further entailed in an expectation of the system functioning, where the essentialist threat status of a perpetrator's identity is expected to play an active role in the possible identification of its bearer. Further, the thesis identifies in the field particularly terrorism characteristics of uncertainty and unnaturalness. The idea of unnaturalness, which is traced toward the notion of insanity is then interpreted in a new context, not only as a depoliticizing move, but also as a possible option to avoid the notion of sweeping racial judgement. This, however, further supports the idea of essentialism, which is found to be important for the security practice. The thesis thus opens a new aspect of terrorism conceptualisation, particularly in regard to its political and cultural nature.

Finally, in section 5.4, the security is analysed as the endpoint of the chain of translation. The thesis identifies security as a form of antiprogram to the threat deployment, where the preservation of SRA is seen as the cornerstone. Security is understood as a negative notion of security translation, where the translation of oneself is just a result of failed trust, whereas the control of others is the factual performance of the real security. At this point, the thesis also points out the relatively low importance attributed to the deterrence as the functioning mechanism at the airport studied, and oppositely the high level of certainty provided by the sole control performance disregarding its particular content. Thus, in positive terms, the form of a security end product is mostly shaped by the production of the security agency. The passengers' idea of security being framed as security, which is present but which does not have to be thought about and as such the agency of security is moved from passengers to the providers, and the sole presence of control is deemed satisfactory by the passengers. The psychological

dimension of the security connected with the agency takeover leads to the positive notion for passengers, whereas the feeling of security failure for the employees. Traveller's agency resignation resulting in felt ease, where personal preservation as an actor is understood as being guaranteed, is exchanged for a possibility to be provided with a commodified service of a security provision, where the exact content of the provided service needs not to be firmly delimited and might encompass a trade-off in the form of a limited option of appeal and redress. This type of takeover is, however, not limited to travellers but is also endorsed by the employees, in an idea of rule fulfilment as a necessary but sufficient condition leading toward a guarantee of security. The performance of the system within its design, endowed with a strong entrusted power, then gains the individualised agency, which might be reversely employed on its productive network ensuring its own preservation.

Focusing on the detail interactions within the security network thus allows to witness the depoliticized nature of its performance as "a technique of governing that takes issues out of the political sphere of public contestation and contingent decision making and transfers them to the non-political sphere of simple necessity" (Hegemann and Kahl 2018, 557; similarly: Lisle and Bourne 2017; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, 174). As such, the turn of security in commodity is observed, where: "Once a right of citizenship or public good, physical security is said to be becoming more and more a commodity bought and sold in the marketplace; that is, increasingly consumed, rather than exercised as a right" (Lippert and O'Connor 2003, 335).

Coming to the end, I would like to comment on the existing research limitations as well as my perspective of the topic. First of all, I see as general shortcoming the thesis' focus on one security unit and only on the part of its activities, which narrows the map of security produced. Even under these circumstances I believe that the thesis has brought up interesting insights into the practice of security production, which have important societal repercussions. Similarly, I hope that the theoretical results entailed in the identified logics provide a complex perspective contributing to the debate about the nature of contemporary security.

Returning toward the limitations, the thesis would have definitely profited from a longer and less intensive approach to the field, as well as from technological, financial resources, or teamwork, which would have enabled a more effective allocation of the time. This would have been crucial given the unique non-repetitive opportunity of the fieldwork within the security sensitive environment. Moreover, the advantages of ANT employment

are also countered by the cons. Primarily, I see ANT as rather harder to digest, and as such its adoption alienates the thesis from the field and its representatives, and significantly diminishes the possible thesis' impact in regard to the applied research, which is not primarily caused by its content, but by its form. In the similar vein, the qualitative nature of the work diminishes the perceived strength of its outcomes. Last but not least, the mapping approach tends to create the fine web account of reality, which does not allow the production of a single big conclusion around one particular issue. As such, the thesis does not propose a tight central conclusion, which would have provided it with a persuasive strength and leading argument, even though the whole network of security provision in regard to passengers is examined.

These shortcomings might be also tangible in regard to the reflection of the work by the management in the field. On the other hand, other outcomes of my research effort have been implemented since, within the environment of an airport studied. Even though their adoption was not directly connected to my work, the enactment of the steps in the similar areas and directions with those proposed in my inquiry at least point out that the perspective of my inquiry might be also shared by practitioners.

Further, the shortcomings resulting from the thesis' scope limitation, however, might be remediated by future research, which could also entail a distinct quantitative component, and in some aspects just by the continuation of the analytical work. In regard to the already collected data, which, however, have not been treated within this thesis, further research can be developed toward the exploration of security in regard to the contrasting notions of service and state interest, which would contribute to the debate focusing on the problematic of ownership. This could be also developed toward the still remaining work on the conceptualisation of passenger's position and particularly toward the analysis of interactions between employees and travellers. Similarly, the inner organisation of BEK seems to be a promising topic, especially in regard to the unit functioning, internal management, motivation and evaluative mechanisms. Particularly interesting then seems to be the topic of information passage within BEK and the processing of information within BEK, as well as toward the environment in regard to the public and sensitive divide of the information character.

At the airport studied, a further data collection would have enabled to examine in a similar vein other security actants within the field and to map their contribution toward security provision and analyse their inner working logics. This would have enabled an interesting comparison of their understating of security. For example, the notion of SRA on

arrivals is probably perceived as rather a reverse area with the threat presence, which must be eliminated against spreading outside by the Customs Administration (Representative of Customs Administration 2017), or the focus on persons and goods divided among Police and Customs Administration seems to be a very interesting point, too. Similarly, their organising and working logic would be a particularly interesting topic as well as the inquiry into their mutual relations, which would enable to reconstruct the whole system of airport security.

In a more general direction, the thesis stresses out the importance of the human-machine interactions for security studies and more generally IR, where especially the user interface seems to be an interesting topic for future inquiry, treated within the framework of ANT or not. In the same vein, the acceptance of false positives seems to produce a research option, either within the context of security or generally. As such, also the problematics of risk perception in a particular regard toward security seems to propose similar opportunities. Last but not least, the problematics of motivation within security forces opens new perspectives toward the questions of the role of state and private security within contemporary society.

In general terms, pointing to the interactions within the security network, this thesis tries to contribute to the debate about the nature of contemporary (airport) security, as well as to the debate encircling the interaction of humans, technologies and materiality generally present within contemporary IR. The thesis points out the further possibilities proposed by ANT in regard to the security practice analysis, particularly beyond the notion of assemblage. It also represents another case proving the viability of empirical field research in an area of security, which is another concern raised in respect to ANT (Barry 2013). Doing this the thesis also points out the meaningfulness of ANT's inspiration for IR, which further does not require substantial reconfiguration and reshuffling. In the same vein, it shows the possibility of combining ANT with enrolment of insights from the broader research domains. The thesis also broadens the possibilities of profiling theoretical grounding, points out the consequences of an essentialist framing of threat and inquires a positive understanding of security.

Finally, ANT does not provide a guidance to normative criticism, but its strongest force is, in my view, in representing system realities not as fixed and given, but in a parallel of a sort to Ernest Renan's daily referendum (Renan 1882). The shape of airport security we encounter in democratic societies is then a result of our daily votes, which are

influenced by the actants we enrol for consultation. As citizens we should be thus careful and well aware about the enrolments and votes we make.

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Emirati traveller 2. 14 August 2017. Interview by author. Praha.  
Emirati traveller 4. 14 August 2017. Interview by author. Praha.  
Emirati traveller 5. 14 August 2017. Interview by author. Praha.  
British traveller 1. 25 September 2017. Interview by author. Praha.  
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American traveller 1. 2 August 2017. Interview by author. Praha.  
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American traveller 4. 25 September 2017. Interview by author. Praha.  
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## Appendixes

### Appendix 1: List of observations

| <b>Observation</b> | <b>Participant<br/>Observation</b> |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| 5 July 2017        | 8 June 2017                        |
| 10 July 2017       | 15 June 2017                       |
| 11 July 2017       | 16 June 2017                       |
| 12 July 2017       | 20 June 2017                       |
| 13 July 2017       | 21 June 2017                       |
| 15 July 2017       | 22 June 2017                       |
| 18 July 2017       | 23 June 2017                       |
| 19 July 2017       | 26 June 2017                       |
| 24 July 2017       | 27 June 2017                       |
| 25 July 2017       | 28 June 2017                       |
| 26 July 2017       | 29 June 2017                       |
| 28 July 2017       | 30 June 2017                       |
| 1 August 2017      | 6 July 2017                        |
| 2 August 2017      |                                    |
| 8 August 2017      |                                    |
| 9 August 2017      |                                    |
| 10 August 2017     |                                    |
| 14 August 2017     |                                    |
| 18 August 2017     |                                    |
| 4 September 2017   |                                    |
| 5 September 2017   |                                    |
| 13 September 2018  |                                    |
| 14 September 2017  |                                    |
| 18 September 2017  |                                    |
| 20 September 2017  |                                    |
| 22 September 2017  |                                    |
| 26 September 2017  |                                    |
| 27 September 2017  |                                    |
| 28 September 2017  |                                    |
| 29 September 2017  |                                    |

## Appendix 2: Research Protocol – Employees

Good evening,

My name is Sarah Komarová, I am from the faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, where I am writing my dissertation thesis now. In my thesis, I am making an inquiry how the employees and the travellers perceive the process of airport security provision. I am interested in the perception of airport security as a whole, and also in the perception of individual procedures. I also inquire whether there exist some particular areas, where the problems emerge, and whether there would be a possibility to improve the solutions of these situations. For this reason, I am interested in the working experience of individual employees, and for this reason I would like to ask you whether you would be willing to help me. The assistance would consist of recorded interview taking about an hour, which we could have conduct here, during your night shift. The recording will be anonymized and used for the research analysis. The recording will never be made public as a whole, and will not be made accessible to your colleagues or superiors. However, a shorter quotation, which will fulfil the anonymity principles might be selected and published. This means that it will not be identifiable with your person. This will be ensured firstly by removal of all biographic information potentially mentioned in the quotation as name, date of birth, or other personal information, secondly by removal of the information of the context clues, which could potentially identify you, for example on the basis of your unique working position, or your unique working experience. Would you agree to take part in the research under these conditions?

(In case that the recording was seen as a primary hindrance, the written form of interview was proposed.)

(With the managers, administration and control, further the limitations in regard to anonymity, resulting from the limited set of persons in decision-making positions have been discussed.)

How long have you been working at the airport?

What was important for you during the choice of the job?

How have you found out about the job?

Topics:

Main working activities

*(types, detailed descriptions) – later omitted*

The most common non-standard situations, you encounter during work

*(Detail description, causes, course, possible approaches to tackling, solutions, what is helping to solve it, personal tips and tricks, personal stance toward these situations)*

Later specifically probed if not already mentioned:

Management of the WTMD passage

Cooperation on the line

Problems in persons inspection

*(privacy)*

Declaration of items

Liquids

*(exceptions, kids age, difference between medicine and cosmetics)*

X-ray screening difficulties

Interactions with technologies

Interaction with travellers

*(is security more a service or a state interest)*

Overall working conditions in regard to work organisation, equipment and collective.

*(work in night, shifts rotation, assignment to the positions, environment of the airport)*

Security

*(nature, how is it provided, what is protected, threats)*

Main job advantages

*(comparison with other working experiences, what could be done to make you more satisfied)*

Is there something else, you would like to mention, regarding any topic we have discussed, or any other question, which you would like to ask?

I would like to thank you for your time and willingness to take part in the research. If you would have any other points you would like to share with me, or if you would have found out that you do not want some part of the interview to be used, do not hesitate to contact me either directly, here at the airport, or to e-mail me, or call me. Also, I will appreciate any tips for further research interest.



### Appendix 3: Research Protocol – Travellers

Good day,

I am Sarah Komarová, from the faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. As a part of my dissertation thesis I inquire the perception of airports security control. Would you be agreeable to answer me a few questions concerning your experience with the security control here at the airport, and your experience and opinions about airport security controls generally?

The interview will be anonymous, nevertheless if you do not mind I would like to record it for analytical purposes. If the recording is, however, problematic for you for any reason I may instead use written notes.

Which country are you from?

How often do you fly?

Rather for working purposes or for holidays?

How was your today security control?

- In case of “OK” or “good,” what does it mean?

How the security control should look like for you to be satisfied?

Could you describe which security measures have you noticed here at the airports?

What parts did the control consist of?

Have you ever experienced any hindrance during the control?

If not mentioned:

Does the regulation of the transportation of liquids affect you somehow?

*(How do you solve it; do you have some tricks)*

*(In case that something has been thought away and not explained: Was it your first flight to the EU? Did you know about the limitation? Who should have informed you?)*

Does the control somehow affect your privacy?

*(If yes: how?)*

*(Do you know that along the new legislation your suitcase might be opened without your presence in case of suspicious object detection?)*

Do you perceive the security control more as a service to client or as a state interest?

Do you find the level of the control as appropriate to the risk?

*(Do you find the level of risk in aviation as higher than in other means of transportation?)*

What is the overall goal of the control?

*(What does the control protect?)*

What does security mean?

Do you have some other ideas concerning airport security, which we have not mentioned so far, which you would like to add or clarify?

Thank you very much for your time and I wish you a pleasant flight.

Appendix 4: List of interviews

| Date   | Recording code | Position                                 | No. of persons | Gender |
|--|----------------|--|----------------|--------|
| <b>External Actors (5)</b>                             |                |  |                |        |
| 27.VII   | written 2      | Employee of EI-AI Czech Republic         | 1              | -      |
| 04.IX  | written 1      | Handling Employee                        | 1              | -      |
| 06.IX  | written 3      | Representative of ICTS Czech             | 1              | -      |
| 12.IX  | 170912_001     | Representative of the Foreign Police     | 1              | -      |
| 12.IX  | 170912_002     | Representative of Customs Administration | 1              | -      |
| <b>BEK Management, Administration and Control (10)</b> |                |  |                |        |
| 28.VII   | written 1      |  | 1              | -      |
| 21.VIII  | written 2      |  | 1              | -      |
| 06.IX  | 170906_002/3   |  | 1              | -      |
| 06.IX  | 170906_001     |  | 1              | -      |
| 07.IX  | 170907_001     |  | 1              | -      |
| 07.IX  | 170907_002     |  | 1              | -      |
| 13.IX  | 170913_001     |  | 1              | -      |
| 27.IX  | 170927_001     |  | 1              | -      |
| 27.IX  | written 1      |  | 1              | -      |
| 09.X   | 171009_001     |  | 1              | -      |
| <b>BEK employees (42)</b>                              |                |  |                |        |
| 10.VII   | 170710_005     | BEK employee                             | 1              | F      |
| 11.VII   | 170711_002     | BEK employee                             | 1              | M      |
| 11.VII   | 170711_003     | BEK employee                             | 2              | F F    |
| 11.VII   | 170711_004     | BEK employee                             | 1              | F      |
| 11.VII   | 170711_005     | BEK employee                             | 2              | M F    |
| 12.VII   | 170712_001     | BEK employee                             | 2              | F M    |
| 12.VII   | 170712_002     | BEK employee                             | 1              | F      |
| 13.VII   | 170713_001     | BEK employee                             | 2              | F M    |
| 14.VII   | written 1      | BEK employee                             | 1              | M      |
| 15.VII   | 170715_001     | BEK employee                             | 1              | M      |
| 15.VII   | 170715_002     | BEK employee                             | 2              | M F    |
| 16.VII   | written 2      | BEK employee                             | 2              | M F    |
| 17.VII   | 170717_001     | BEK employee                             | 1              | M      |
| 17.VII   | 170717_002     | BEK employee                             | 1              | M      |
| 17.VII   | 170717_003     | BEK employee                             | 1              | M      |
| 18.VII   | 170718_001/2   | BEK employee                             | 2              | F M    |
| 18.VII   | 170718_003     | BEK employee                             | 1              | M      |
| 25.VII   | written 3      | BEK employee                             | 2              | F M    |
| 26.VII   | 170726_001     | BEK employee                             | 1              | M      |
| 26.VII   | written 4      | BEK employee                             | 2              | F F    |

|         |               |                                   |   |   |   |   |
|---------|---------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| 27.VII  | written 5     | BEK training responsible employee | 1 | M |   |   |
| 27.VII  | written 6     | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 28.VII  | written 7     | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 28.VII  | written 8     | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 28.VII  | written 9     | BEK employee                      | 1 | F |   |   |
| 30.VII  | 170730_001    | BEK employee                      | 1 | F |   |   |
| 31.VII  | 170731_001    | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 07.VIII | written 10    | BEK employee                      | 1 | F |   |   |
| 08.VIII | 170808_001    | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 11.VIII | written 11    | BEK employee                      | 3 | F | F | M |
| 11.VIII | written 11    | BEK employee                      | 2 | F | M |   |
| 08.IX   | written 12    | BEK employee                      | 2 | F | M |   |
| 13.IX   | written 13    | BEK employee                      | 2 | F | M |   |
| 14.IX   | written 14    | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 15.IX   | written 15    | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 19.IX   | 170918_001A/B | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 19.IX   | 170918_003    | BEK employee                      | 2 | F | M |   |
| 19.IX   | 170918_004    | BEK employee                      | 2 | F | M |   |
| 23.IX   | written 16    | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 23.IX   | written 17    | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 23.IX   | written 18    | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |
| 28.IX   | written 19    | BEK training responsible employee | 1 | M |   |   |
| 30.IX   | written 20    | BEK employee                      | 1 | M |   |   |

**Passengers (167+20 questionnaires)**

| Date                       | Recording code | Interview language | No. of persons | Gender | ID |
|----------------------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|--------|----|
| <b>Australia (1)</b>       |                |                    |                |        |    |
| 31.VII                     | 170731_014     | EN                 | 1              | F      | 1  |
| <b>Belarus (1)</b>         |                |                    |                |        |    |
| 7.IX                       | 170907_006     | EN                 | 1              | M      | 1  |
| <b>Bulgaria (2)</b>        |                |                    |                |        |    |
| 26.IX                      | 170926_004     | EN                 | 1              | M      | 1  |
| 28.IX                      | 170928_007     | RU                 | 1              | M      | 2  |
| <b>Canada (2)</b>          |                |                    |                |        |    |
| 2.VIII                     | 170802_009     | EN                 | 1              | M      | 1  |
| 9.VIII                     | 170809_001     | EN                 | 1              | M      | 2  |
| <b>Czech Republic (34)</b> |                |                    |                |        |    |
| 31.VII                     | 170731_002     | CZ                 | 1              | M      | 1  |
| 31.VII                     | 170731_003     | CZ                 | 1              | F      | 2  |
| 31.VII                     | 170731_004     | CZ                 | 1              | M      | 3  |
| 31.VII                     | 170731_005     | CZ                 | 1              | M      | 4  |
| 31.VII                     | 170731_018     | CZ                 | 2              | M M    | 5  |
| 1.VIII                     | 170801_001     | CZ                 | 2              | F F    | 6  |
| 1.VIII                     | 170801_003     | CZ                 | 1              | M      | 7  |

|         |            |    |   |       |    |
|---------|------------|----|---|-------|----|
| 2.VIII  | 170802_004 | CZ | 1 | M     | 8  |
| 2.VIII  | 170802_005 | CZ | 1 | F     | 9  |
| 2.VIII  | 170802_011 | CZ | 1 | F     | 10 |
| 2.VIII  | 170802_016 | CZ | 1 | M     | 11 |
| 8.VIII  | 170808_002 | CZ | 1 | M     | 12 |
| 8.VIII  | 170808_003 | CZ | 1 | F     | 13 |
| 8.VIII  | 170808_004 | CZ | 1 | M     | 14 |
| 9.VIII  | 170809_002 | CZ | 2 | F M   | 15 |
| 18.VIII | 170818_003 | CZ | 1 | F     | 16 |
| 21.VIII | 170821_006 | CZ | 1 | M     | 17 |
| 21.VIII | 170821_007 | CZ | 1 | M     | 18 |
| 5.IX    | 170905_001 | CZ | 1 | F     | 19 |
| 22.IX   | 090116_003 | CZ | 2 | F M   | 20 |
| 22.IX   | 170922_005 | CZ | 2 | F M   | 21 |
| 22.IX   | 170922_006 | CZ | 1 | M     | 22 |
| 22.IX   | 170922_007 | CZ | 2 | F M   | 23 |
| 22.IX   | 170922_008 | CZ | 1 | F     | 24 |
| 22.IX   | 170922_009 | CZ | 1 | M     | 25 |
| 22.IX   | 170922_004 | CZ | 2 | M F   | 26 |
| 25.IX   | 170925_001 | CZ | 2 | M     | 27 |
| 25.IX   | 170925_002 | CZ | 3 | M M M | 28 |
| 25.IX   | 170925_007 | CZ | 1 | M     | 29 |
| 26.IX   | 170926_001 | CZ | 1 | M     | 30 |
| 26.IX   | 170926_002 | EN | 2 | F M   | 31 |
| 28.IX   | 170928_005 | CZ | 2 | F M   | 32 |
| 28.IX   | 170928_006 | CZ | 2 | M     | 33 |
| 29.IX   | 170929_006 | CZ | 2 | M M   | 34 |

**China (20)**

|       |            |    |   |     |    |
|-------|------------|----|---|-----|----|
| 18.IX | 170918_001 | CH | 2 | M F | 1  |
| 18.IX | 170918_002 | EN | 1 | F   | 2  |
| 18.IX | 170918_003 | CH | 1 | M   | 3  |
| 18.IX | 170918_004 | CH | 2 | F F | 4  |
| 18.IX | 170918_005 | CH | 1 | F   | 5  |
| 18.IX | 170918_006 | CH | 1 | M   | 6  |
| 18.IX | 170918_007 | CH | 1 | M   | 7  |
| 25.IX | 170925_006 | EN | 1 | M   | 8  |
| 25.IX | 170925_011 | CH | 2 | F M | 9  |
| 25.IX | 170925_012 | CH | 1 | F   | 10 |
| 25.IX | 170925_013 | CH | 1 | M   | 11 |
| 25.IX | 170925_014 | CH | 1 | F   | 12 |
| 25.IX | 170925_015 | CH | 1 | M   | 13 |
| 25.IX | 170925_017 | CH | 1 | F   | 14 |
| 25.IX | 170925_018 | CH | 1 | F   | 15 |
| 25.IX | 170925_019 | CH | 1 | F   | 16 |
| 4.X   | 171004_001 | CH | 1 | F   | 17 |
| 4.X   | 171004_002 | CH | 1 | M   | 18 |

|                    |                |       |   |   |     |    |
|--------------------|----------------|-------|---|---|-----|----|
| 4.X                | 171004_003     | CH    | 1 | F |     | 19 |
| 4.X                | 171004_004     | CH    | 1 | F |     | 20 |
| <b>France (3)</b>  |                |       |   |   |     |    |
| 31.VII             | 170731_012     | FR    | 1 | M |     | 1  |
| 31.VII             | 170731_015     | FR    | 1 | F |     | 2  |
| 2.VIII             | 170802_003     | FR    | 1 | M |     | 3  |
| <b>Germany (5)</b> |                |       |   |   |     |    |
| 1.VIII             | 170801_007     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 1  |
| 2.VIII             | 170802_001     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 2  |
| 2.VIII             | 170802_002     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 3  |
| 2.VIII             | 170802_010     | EN    | 1 | F |     | 4  |
| 14.VIII            | 170814_014     | AR    | 2 | M | F   | 5  |
| <b>Greece (1)</b>  |                |       |   |   |     |    |
| 2.VIII             | 170802_012     | EN    | 1 | F |     | 1  |
| <b>Italy (8)</b>   |                |       |   |   |     |    |
| 31.VII             | 170731_017     | EN    | 1 | F |     | 1  |
| 31.VII             | 170731_008     | EN    | 2 | F | F   | 2  |
| 31.VII             | 170731_009     | EN    | 2 | F | M   | 3  |
| 31.VII             | 170731_010     | EN    | 2 | F | F   | 4  |
| 31.VII             | 170731_016     | EN    | 1 | F |     | 5  |
| 1.VIII             | 170801_002     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 6  |
| 2.VIII             | 170802_006     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 7  |
| 26.IX              | 170926_003     | FR    | 1 | M |     | 8  |
| <b>India (2)</b>   |                |       |   |   |     |    |
| 14.VIII            | 170814_006     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 1  |
| 29.IX              | 170929_005     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 2  |
| <b>Iraq (1)</b>    |                |       |   |   |     |    |
| 29.IX              | 170929_004     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 1  |
| <b>Israel (20)</b> |                |       |   |   |     |    |
| 14.VIII            | 170814_015     | RU    | 2 | F | M   | 1  |
| 14.VIII            | 170814_016     | RU    | 2 | F | M   | 2  |
| 14.VIII            | 170814_017     | EN    | 2 | F | M   | 3  |
| 14.VIII            | 170814_018     | EN    | 1 | F |     | 4  |
| 14.VIII            | 170814_019     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 5  |
| 14.VIII            | 170814_020     | EN    | 1 | F |     | 6  |
| 14.VIII            | 170814_021     | EN    | 2 | F | F   | 7  |
| 18.VIII            | 170818_002     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 8  |
| 18.VIII            | 170818_004     | EN    | 1 | F |     | 9  |
| 18.VIII            | 170818_005     | EN    | 1 | F |     | 10 |
| 5.IX               | 170905_002     | EN    | 2 | M | M   | 11 |
| 7.IX               | 170907_002     | EN    | 1 | M |     | 12 |
| 7.IX               | 170907_003     | EN/HB | 3 | F | F M | 13 |
| 7.IX               | 170907_004     | RU/HB | 2 | M | F   | 14 |
| 7.IX               | 170907_005 (2) | RU    | 1 | F |     | 15 |
| 7.IX               | 170907_005 (1) | EN    | 1 | M |     | 16 |
| 7.IX               | 170907_007     | RU    | 1 | M |     | 17 |

|                     |                  |       |   |     |    |
|---------------------|------------------|-------|---|-----|----|
| 7.IX                | 170907_008       | FR    | 1 | F   | 18 |
| 22.IX               | 170922_001       | RU    | 1 | F   | 19 |
| 22.IX               | 170922_002       | EN/HB | 1 | M   | 20 |
| <b>Korea (22)</b>   |                  |       |   |     |    |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 1  | KO    |   |     | 1  |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 2  | KO    |   |     | 2  |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 3  | KO    |   |     | 3  |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 4  | KO    |   |     | 4  |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 6  | KO    |   |     | 5  |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 7  | KO    |   |     | 6  |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 8  | KO    |   |     | 7  |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 9  | KO    |   |     | 8  |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 10 | KO    |   |     | 9  |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 11 | KO    |   |     | 10 |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 12 | KO    |   |     | 11 |
| 26.IX               | questionnaire 13 | KO    |   |     | 12 |
| 29.IX               | questionnaire 11 | KO    |   |     | 13 |
| 29.IX               | questionnaire 12 | KO    |   |     | 14 |
| 29.IX               | questionnaire 13 | KO    |   |     | 15 |
| 29.IX               | questionnaire 14 | KO    |   |     | 16 |
| 29.IX               | questionnaire 15 | KO    |   |     | 17 |
| 29.IX               | questionnaire 17 | KO    |   |     | 18 |
| 29.IX               | questionnaire 18 | KO    |   |     | 19 |
| 29.IX               | questionnaire 19 | KO    |   |     | 20 |
| 29.IX               | questionnaire 20 | KO    |   |     | 21 |
| 29.IX               | questionnaire 21 | KO    |   |     | 22 |
| <b>Lebanon (4)</b>  |                  |       |   |     |    |
| 14.VIII             | 170814_010       | EN    | 1 | F   | 1  |
| 14.VIII             | 170814_011       | AR    | 2 | F M | 2  |
| 14.VIII             | 170814_012       | EN    | 1 | M   | 3  |
| 14.VIII             | 170814_013       | EN    | 2 | F M | 4  |
| <b>Oman (1)</b>     |                  |       |   |     |    |
| 14.VIII             | written 8        | EN    | 1 | M   | 1  |
| <b>Pakistan (1)</b> |                  |       |   |     |    |
| 14.VIII             | 170814_001       | EN    | 1 | M   | 1  |
| <b>Russia (22)</b>  |                  |       |   |     |    |
| 1.VIII              | 170801_008       | CZ    | 2 | F M | 1  |
| 8.VIII              | 170808_005       | RU    | 1 | F   | 2  |
| 8.VIII              | 170808_006       | RU    | 1 | F   | 3  |
| 8.VIII              | 170808_007       | RU    | 1 | F   | 4  |
| 8.VIII              | 170808_008       | EN    | 1 | M   | 5  |
| 8.VIII              | 170808_009       | EN    | 1 | F   | 6  |
| 18.VIII             | 170818_001       | CZ    | 1 | F   | 7  |
| 21.VIII             | written 3        | RU    | 1 | F   | 8  |
| 21.VIII             | 170821_001       | RU    | 2 | F M | 9  |
| 21.VIII             | 170821_002       | RU    | 1 | M   | 10 |

|  |            |    |   |   |   |    |
|--|------------|----|---|---|---|----|
| 21.VIII  | 170821_003 | RU | 1 | F |   | 11 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_004 | RU | 2 | F | M | 12 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_005 | CZ | 2 | F | M | 13 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_008 | RU | 1 | M |   | 14 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_009 | RU | 1 | F |   | 15 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_011 | RU | 2 | F | M | 16 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_012 | RU | 1 | F |   | 17 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_013 | RU | 1 | M |   | 18 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_014 | RU | 1 | F |   | 19 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_015 | RU | 2 | F | M | 20 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_016 | RU | 1 | M |   | 21 |
| 21.VIII  | 170821_017 | RU | 1 | F |   | 22 |
| <b>Saudi Arabia (7)</b>                        |            |    |   |   |   |    |
| 8.VIII   | written 4  | EN | 1 | M |   | 1  |
| 8.VIII   | written 5  | EN | 1 | M |   | 2  |
| 8.VIII   | 170808_010 | EN | 1 | M |   | 3  |
| 8.VIII   | 170808_011 | EN | 1 | M |   | 4  |
| 14.VIII  | written 6  | AR | 2 | F | F | 5  |
| 14.VIII  | written 7  | AR | 1 | M |   | 6  |
| 14.VIII  | 170814_002 | AR | 1 | M |   | 7  |
| <b>Slovakia (3)</b>                            |            |    |   |   |   |    |
| 31.VII   | 170731_006 | CZ | 1 | M |   | 1  |
| 1.VIII   | 170801_004 | CZ | 1 | F |   | 2  |
| 7.IX   | 170907_001 | CZ | 1 | F |   | 3  |
| <b>Syria (1)</b>                               |            |    |   |   |   |    |
| 29.IX  | 170929_002 | EN | 1 | M |   | 1  |
| <b>Spain (1)</b>                               |            |    |   |   |   |    |
| 31.VII   | 170731_19  | EN | 1 | F |   | 1  |
| <b>Sweden (2)</b>                              |            |    |   |   |   |    |
| 1.VIII   | 170801_005 | EN | 1 | M |   | 1  |
| 1.VIII   | 170801_006 | EN | 1 | M |   | 2  |
| <b>Switzerland (1)</b>                         |            |    |   |   |   |    |
| 31.VII   | 170731_011 | FR | 2 | M | F | 1  |
| <b>Turkey (1)</b>                              |            |    |   |   |   |    |
| 29.IX  | 170929_001 | EN | 1 | M |   | 1  |
| <b>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1)</b> |            |    |   |   |   |    |
| 29.IX  | 170929_003 | EN | 1 | F |   | 1  |
| <b>Ukraine (2)</b>                             |            |    |   |   |   |    |
| 2.VIII   | 170802_007 | RU | 1 | M |   | 1  |
| 2.VIII   | 170802_014 | RU | 1 | F |   | 2  |
| <b>United Arab Emirates (6)</b>                |            |    |   |   |   |    |
| 14.VIII  | written 1  | AR | 2 | M | F | 1  |
| 14.VIII  | written 2  | EN | 1 | F |   | 2  |
| 14.VIII  | 170814_004 | AR | 1 | M |   | 3  |
| 14.VIII  | 170814_005 | EN | 2 | M | F | 4  |
| 14.VIII  | 170814_007 | EN | 1 | M |   | 5  |



|                           |            |    |   |   |     |    |
|---------------------------|------------|----|---|---|-----|----|
| 14.VIII                   | 170814_009 | EN | 1 | M |     | 6  |
| <b>United Kingdom (3)</b> |            |    |   |   |     |    |
| 25.IX                     | 170925_005 | EN | 1 | M |     | 1  |
| 25.IX                     | 170925_010 | EN | 1 | F |     | 2  |
| 28.IX                     | 170928_003 | EN | 1 | M |     | 3  |
| <b>United States (10)</b> |            |    |   |   |     |    |
| 2.VIII                    | 170802_008 | EN | 2 | F | M   | 1  |
| 2.VIII                    | 170802_013 | EN | 1 | F |     | 2  |
| 2.VIII                    | 170802_015 | EN | 1 | F |     | 3  |
| 25.IX                     | 170925_003 | EN | 1 | F |     | 4  |
| 25.IX                     | 170925_004 | EN | 1 | M |     | 5  |
| 25.IX                     | 170925_008 | EN | 1 | F |     | 6  |
| 25.IX                     | 170925_009 | EN | 2 | M | F   | 7  |
| 28.IX                     | 170928_001 | EN | 3 | F | F F | 8  |
| 28.IX                     | 170928_002 | EN | 2 | M | F   | 9  |
| 28.IX                     | 170928_004 | EN | 2 | M | F   | 10 |
| <b>Uruguay (1)</b>        |            |    |   |   |     |    |
| 31.VII                    | 170731_13  | FR | 1 | F |     | 1  |
| <b>Unknown (1)</b>        |            |    |   |   |     |    |
| 31.VII                    | 170731_007 | EN | 1 | M |     | 1  |

## Appendix 5: Coding scheme

### Code System [22806]

#### security [716]

- % decrease of risk [24]
- argument for prohibition/order [52]
- raison d etre/goal [32]
- elimination of danger/process disruption [81]
- procedures observance [21]
- deterrence [9]
- psychological/feeling [67]
- disable the entrance of dangerous person [44]
- SRA sterility [124]
- illusion/false focus [57]
- presence of security forces [26]
- knowledge of threats [6]
- control [44]
- necessary evil [17]
- harmony/peace [13]
- essential need/life preservation [27]
- homecoming [13]
- passengers compliance [8]
- compromise [6]
- other [23]
- local [19]
- quality [12]
- weak spot [25]
- we are not safe [21]
- we are safe/threat is elsewhere [71]
- fulfils the goal [22]
- take it seriously/with respect [13]

#### risk in aviation [84]

- same [18]
- higher [24]
- lower [43]

#### security of what [29]

- aircraft [61]
- community [12]
- airline [9]
- state [34]
- airport [19]
- aircraft [23]
- people [132]
- me/us [54]

#### *control appropriateness [189]*

#### *said dully [8]*

#### legislation [355]

- other [14]
- formal fulfilment of obligation [73]
- our duty [63]
- of employees activity [68]
- firm borders/ clear definition/absence [57]
- unbreachable [13]
- noncompliance [40]

should know them/transparency [41]  
limits our activity [57]  
implementation problems/ inconsistencies with EU [76]  
obligation of passengers/tool to enforce control [35]

*conflict [67]*

*police x service [250]*

*pro-client [49]*

*service to passenger [9]*

*relationship between passenger and employee [9]*

*another demand of the management - effectivity [14]*

*pro-client x security x authority [9]*

*reason for accepting liquid – looking for justice [11]*

threat [568]

other [15]

situation in the world [35]

decisive is situation in the world [24]

state interest [8]

controls elsewhere [3]

no threat [49]

other [15]

projectile [1]

security test [2]

liquids [16]

general [18]

person sneaking in [19]

abandoned luggage [12]

aircraft weaponization [4]

trafficking [46]

lasers and drones [3]

presence of dangerous person on state territory [17]

reveal of system function [2]

naïve perpetrator [7]

employee [10]

reactivity [8]

professional [22]

traveller [17]

suspect person [44]

disruptive person [10]

lunatic [23]

anonym [2]

accident [6]

something unexpected [25]

terrorism [119]

attentat [2]

unlawful act [9]

hijacking [12]

stabbing [8]

use of fire weapon [5]

attack [8]

action without weapon [11]

jokes [4]

panic on board [6]

explosion [57]

disruption from threat identification [8]

carrying in a threat item [106]

- decomposed [3]
- liquids [6]
- projectile [4]
- weapon [32]
- IED [43]
- knife [19]
- threat to flight [24]
- threat to aircraft [75]
- threat to the airport [15]
  - T1 [12]
  - hall [30]
  - outside the hall [3]
- threat to travellers [64]
- threat to employee [18]
- profiling [107]
  - identification on assistance [12]
  - taking person into account while allowing item [15]
  - we x el-al x ICTS [20]
  - principles of profiling [49]
    - cons [22]
    - pros [31]
  - profiling factors [24]
    - technological/AI [4]
    - transportation history [3]
    - nationality/ethnicity [6]
    - is not discriminatory [3]
    - family [1]
    - child [3]
    - retired [5]
    - disability [2]
    - individual picture [2]
    - check-in info 1]
    - weird clothing [1]
    - undefined weirdness [8]
    - contrasting look/untraditional clothing combination [6]
    - scarcely dressed [2]
    - repulsing look [1]
    - behavioural [6]
    - unaccommodating [9]
    - polite/mild [2]
    - nervous [11]
- meaning [434]*
- aircraft [165]**
- mistake [32]*
- cargo [35]*
- arrivals [10]*
- opinion [28]*
- colleagues [329]*
- travellers behaviour [475]*
- we x travellers [375]*
- employees feelings [158]*
- employees activity [119]*
  - tricks [23]*
  - arguments toward traveller [99]*
- gender [150]**

*not our problem [6]*  
*elsewhere in the world [325]*  
*other units [584]*  
    *military [14]*  
    *maintenance [13]*  
    *information red T-Shirts [9]*  
    *auditors and figurants [2]*  
    *el-al [33]*  
    *TNT FedEx and others [15]*  
    *duty-free [9]*  
    *luggage [4]*  
    *hall assistants [11]*  
    *ICTS [35]*  
    *ODL [5]*  
    *technicians [9]*  
    *municipal police [5]*  
    *crew [40]*  
    *handling/check-in [58]*  
    *OLE [45]*  
    *firemen [7]*  
    *pyro [19]*  
    *medics [8]*  
    *other airport employees [56]*  
    *customs [55]*  
    *police [170]*  
    *airline [64]*  
    *police dogs [14]*  
    *historical development [176]*  
*enforcement powers [63]*  
*subdue [28]*  
*authority and respect [111]*  
*duty [19]*  
*justice and truth [39]*  
*dullness [10]*  
*experience [8]*  
*fatigue [61]*  
*humanly (individually, common sense) [44]*  
*decision [109]*  
*stress [59]*  
*stereotype [6]*  
*responsibility [51]*  
*concentration [27]*  
*need to think [1]*  
*uniform [68]*  
*privacy [335]*  
*transparency [4]*  
*uncertainty/ lack of information [56]*  
*fan of aviation [12]*  
*information [182]*  
*sensitive information [41]*  
*language [98]*  
*operation [139]*  
*nature of the job [64]*  
*characteristics of the job [15]*  
*working environment [87]*

*security test* [89]  
*complain* [35]  
*incident* [71]  
*food* [33]  
*smoking* [8]  
*health issues and disability* [179]  
*item give away* [27]  
*alcohol* [23]  
*night* [38]  
*inner BEK* [0]  
    *assistant* [46]  
    *searcher* [40]  
    *training* [178]  
    *specialisation* [86]  
    *management* [384]  
    *management do not stand behind us* [13]  
    *shift lead* [55]  
    *crew lead* [183]  
    *control room* [45]  
    *wage* [201]  
    *shifts* [181]  
    *odd x even* [22]  
*BEK* [60]  
*Public presentation of airport* [51]  
**methodic** [219]  
    questioning [51]  
        same [2]  
        less intrusive [4]  
        more intrusive [11]  
    scanner [23]  
    HHMD [34]  
    assistance on declaration [108]  
    follow up x-ray inspection [16]  
**technology** [87]  
**database** [9]  
**cameras** [69]  
    person localization [2]  
    enables TIP control [2]  
    diminishes possibility of transgression [1]  
    normal [2]  
    quality control [4]  
    privacy intrusion [5]  
    how to use the picture of reality from camera [4]  
    provides insufficient picture of reality [4]  
    misuse [2]  
    reveals the state of affairs [11]  
    picture of the whole [15]  
**items** [0]  
    items function [16]  
        liquidation [2]  
        fun [1]  
        threat [13]  
        priority [13]  
        transportation rules [53]  
        check-in a solution [13]

sorted out [13]  
astonishment [15]  
beeps [15]  
causes Hand Search [6]  
must be disposed [27]  
traveller must return [10]  
passenger thinks they will beep [3]  
must be taken out [11]  
found/detected [39]  
do not complicate X-ray screening [2]  
nondetectable/hardly detectable [17]  
complicates sniffing [5]  
complicates Hand Search [12]  
complicates x-ray [70]  
allowed for transportation [63]  
not allowed for transportation [130]  
sucked in x-ray [10]  
requires special treatment [22]  
problematic manipulation [17]  
are forgotten [28]  
problem items [269]  
others [74]  
pressure vessel [17]  
projectile [3]  
knife [53]  
shoes [4]  
coins [1]  
dense food [8]  
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paperweight [4]  
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    - inconsistency [20]
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## Appendix 6: Crosstabulation – Threat

### Threat program of action

#### Travellers

Terrorism (58)  
 Carrying in Dangerous Item (48)  
 Something Unexpected (22)  
 Suspect Person (22)  
 Explosion (16)  
 Smuggling (16)  
 Professional (12)  
 Lunatic (12)  
 Another Traveller (8)  
 Dangerous person on Territory (8)  
 Attack (7)  
 Accident (6)  
 Security is State Interest (6)  
 Hijacking (4)  
 Person Sneaking in (3)  
 Weaponization of the Aircraft (3)  
 Naïve Perpetrator (2)  
 Abandoned Suitcase (2)  
 Stabbing (2)  
 Use of Fire Weapon (2)  
 System Reactivity (2)  
 Anonym Phone Call (1)  
 Action without Weapon (1)  
 Lasers and Drones (1)  
 Disruptive Passenger (1)  
 Panic on Board (1)

#### BEK employees

Carrying in Dangerous Item (25)  
 Terrorism (15)  
 Explosion (12)  
 Suspect Person (8)  
 Action without Weapon (7)  
 Lunatic (6)  
 Professional (6)  
 Another Traveller (4)  
 Derangement from Threat (4)  
 Travellers jokes (4)  
 System reactivity (4)  
 Another employee (4)  
 Naïve perpetrator (3)  
 Panic on Board (3)  
 Stabbing (3)  
 Person Sneaking in (3)  
 Hijacking (3)  
 Disruptive Passenger (2)  
 Abandoned Suitcase (2)  
 Smuggling (1)  
 Attentat (1)  
 Reveal of System Function (1)  
 Dangerous person on Territory (1)  
 Weaponization of the Aircraft (1)  
 Use of Fire Weapon (1)

#### BEK M&A&C

Carrying in Dangerous Item (6)  
 Explosion (3)  
 Naïve Perpetrator (2)  
 Stabbing (2)  
 Suspect Person (2)  
 Terrorism (2)  
 Action without Weapon (1)  
 Lunatic (1)  
 Derangement from Threat (1)  
 Abandoned Suitcase (1)  
 Smuggling (1)  
 Professional (1)  
 Person Sneaking in (1)  
 Use of Fire Weapon (1)  
 Another Employee (1)

## Appendix 7: Crosstabulation – Actors Endangered

### Actors Endangered

#### Travellers

Travellers (39)

Aircraft (36)

Airport (27)

No Threat Present (21)

Flight (14)

#### BEK employees

No Threat Present (13)

Aircraft (12)

Airport (9)

Travellers (9)

Employee (7)

Flight (4)

#### BEK M&A&C

No Threat Present (3)

Travellers (3)

Aircraft (2)

Flight (2)

Employee (1)

## Appendix 8: Crosstabulation – Security

### Security

#### Travellers

SRA Sterility (57)  
Elimination of Disruption (48)  
Psychological/Feeling (45)  
Control (33)  
Essential Need/Life Preservation (26)  
Argument for Prohibition/Order (22)  
Disable Entrance of Dangerous Person (20)  
Illusion/False Focus (19)  
Security Forces Presence (19)  
Necessary Evil (16)  
Peace/Harmony (13)  
Homecoming (13)  
Decrease of Risk (9)  
Procedures Observance (6)  
knowledge of Threats (4)  
Compromise (2)  
Deterrence (2)

#### BEK employees

SRA Sterility (20)  
Argument for Prohibition/Order (16)  
Elimination of Disruption (12)  
Procedures Observance (9)  
Psychological/Feeling (8)  
Decrease of Risk (5)  
Deterrence (5)  
Disable Entrance of Dangerous Person (5)  
Control (3)  
Compromise (1)  
Knowledge of Threats (1)

#### BEK M&A&C

SRA Sterility (4)  
Argument for Prohibition/Order (4)  
Decrease of Risk (2)  
Procedures Observance (2)  
Control (2)  
Disable Entrance of Dangerous Person (2)  
Elimination of Disruption (1)  
Illusion/False Focus (1)  
Psychological/Feeling (1)  
Security Forces Presence (1)

## Appendix 9: Crosstabulation – Actors Protected

### Actors Protected

#### Travellers

People (84)

Us/Me (48)

Flight and Aircraft  
(32)

State (21)

Airport (11)

Community (11)

Airline (8)

#### BEK Employees

People (16)

Flight and Aircraft (16)

Airport (4)

State (2)

Community (1)