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**The Challenges and Prospects of
Democratization in The Muslim World:
The Case of Pakistan**

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Abstract

Debate on the compatibility of Islam with democracy has gained momentum between academic circles in the recent years often in the context of a “clash” between Western and Islamic civilization. The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to this debate by trying to identify main challenges and prospects of democratization in the Muslim world. The theoretical framework of this thesis will be based on modernist and reformist theories of Islamic political thought. The concepts of *Ijtihad* (independent reasoning) and *Ijma* (consensus or agreement) will be applied in order to answer key questions research “*Are the key principles of Islam compatible with core values of democracy?*” or “*Is Islam inherently authoritarian?*”. The theoretical outcomes will be applied on the case study of Pakistan, country that has just achieved another significant democratic transition of power through general elections.

Keywords

Islam, Democracy, Modernism

Range of thesis: 103,414 characters, 77 pages

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague, 4/1/2019

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Characteristics:

During the first two decades of 21st century the Muslim world has witnessed a rise of authoritative regimes on one hand and a strive for democracy on the other by ousting despotic leaders. Debate on the compatibility of Islam with democracy has gained momentum between academic circles in the recent years often in the context of a “clash” between Western and Islamic civilization. The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to this debate by trying to identify main challenges and prospects of democratization in the Muslim world and answering the primary research questions of this thesis: “Are the key principles of Islam compatible with core values of democracy?” or “Is Islam inherently authoritarian?”.

For this purpose, I will explore various theories such as modernism and reformism, their main arguments and key concepts such as *Ijtihad* (Independent interpretation), *Ijma* (Consensus) over *Taqleed* (Blind following). In this paper, I will look at the i). historical challenges from the *Caliphate* to current crisis such as ISIS, ii). the challenges rooted in doctrine and ideological political thought, prospects found in doctrine and ideological political thought and the promises of current democratic tendencies in the Muslim world a case study of Pakistan.

Working hypotheses:

1. Islam and Democracy share many fundamental principles and values, thus making them inherently compatible.
2. Globally majority of Muslims desire democratic system of government.

Methodology:

My study will focus on current debates on Islam and democracy alongside with the earlier research published by great modernist and reformist authors. I will apply these theories on case study of Pakistan by conducting qualitative analysis of the political and institutional system of the country.

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1. INTRODUCTION

During the first two decades of 21st century the Muslim world has witnessed a rise of authoritative regimes on one hand and strive for democracy on the other by ousting despotic leaders. According to the recent report published by Pew research centre, most Muslims strive for Democracy, Islam and personal freedom. The report noted that they “embrace specific features of a democratic system, such as competitive elections and free speech” (Pew Research Center, 2012). Tunisia ranked “Free” by Freedom house is a beacon of hope and source of inspiration for many Muslim societies globally (Freedom House, 2018). In his book “Democratic Transition in the Muslim World: A Global Perspective” Stephan praises Tunisia’s effort of democratization and applauds Ghannouchi and Ennahda coalition which developed a “democratically friendly Islamic political theology” (Stephan, 2018, p. 4).

Despite the struggle of Muslim world for democracy, most Muslim societies are authoritarian (Kadivar, 2017). As noted by Otterman, “repression by monarchies and military governments; the lack of independent secular political parties; traditional mind-set that consider Western-style democracy a foreign, non-Islamic invention; an ideological obsession with unity; and a long-standing policy of U.S. and Western support for many autocrats in the Arab world” (Otterman, 2005).

Debate on the compatibility of Islam with democracy has gained momentum between academic circles in the recent years often in the context of a “clash” between Western and Islamic civilization. The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to this debate by trying to identify main challenges and prospects of democratization in the Muslim

world. For this purpose, I will analyse development of the Muslim world from both historical and ideological perspective that will help to answer key research questions of this thesis: “*Are the key principles of Islam compatible with core values of democracy?*” or “*Is Islam inherently authoritarian?*” I will apply these theoretical outcomes on the case of Pakistan as a historical example that democratic political system can be combined with religious teachings. Pakistan has just completed another democratic transition of power through general elections. Despite the extensive military rule since its formation, the transition of power is a success for democracy in a country of over 200 million inhabitants.

The theoretical framework of this thesis will be based on modernist and reformist theories of Islamic political thought. Fuller notes “Islamic modernism lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from fundamentalism in terms of its willingness to maximize interpretation to derive new understandings of Islamic texts” (Fuller, 2003, p. 54). He explains that “modernist and pluralist Islamist approach accepts the near-universal values of democracy, human rights, pluralism, and vibrant civil society as fully compatible with Islam and inherent in Islam’s own original multiculturalism” (2003, p. 54). Modernists argue that the concept of *Ijtihad* (independent reasoning) and *Ijma* (consensus or agreement) are key instruments for understanding Islam in modern contemporary Muslim societies.

In order to employ the theoretical underpinnings in practice I chose a case study analysis as a methodology of this paper. I will conduct a qualitative analysis in the case of Pakistan and examine its political system and democratization process over time.

This thesis comprises of seven chapters including introduction; literature review; two chapters covering the challenges rooted in historical and political ideological thought of Islam; one devoted to prospects found in doctrine and political ideological thought of Islam; and one chapter dedicated to case study analysis of Pakistan; the last chapter for conclusion.

2. Literature review

Samuel P. Huntington theorized the famous “Clash of Civilizations” theory in an essay published in 1993 in journal *Foreign Affairs*. He wrote “The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another” (Huntington, 1993). It attracted a lot of attention and reaction as it was interpreted as a “new phase” in world politics after the end of Cold war. He called “Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations” (1993, p. 25). The conflict between West and Islam gets the most amount of attention. Said wrote, in an article response to Huntington’s essay that “the personification of enormous entities called “the West” and “Islam” is recklessly affirmed, as if hugely complicated matters like identity and culture existed in a cartoonlike world where Popeye and Bluto bash each other mercilessly, with one always more virtuous pugilist getting the upper hand over his adversary” (Said, 2001).

Huntington gives importance to Christianity as a significant positive stimulus in the building of Western civilization: “Western Christianity, first Catholicism and then Catholicism and Protestantism, is historically the single most important characteristic of

Western civilization” (Huntington, 1996, p. 70). He writes that the single most important outcome of Western civilization is the separation of church and state. He goes on saying that out of all the non-Western civilizations the Islamic civilization is the most dangerous. The author overemphasizes the cultural influences and omits politics out when describing the association between the United States and Islamic Radicals. This is over simplification and not an outcome of clash of civilizations, but the consequence of extremist Muslim groups (Bottici & Challand, 2006).

The emergence of Modernism in Islamic thought was due to 19th century European colonialism in the Muslim world. As Parray notes that modernists “did not simply wish to restore the beliefs and practices of the past; rather they asserted the need to ‘reinterpret and reapply’ the principles and ideals of Islam to formulate new responses to the political, scientific and cultural challenges of the West and of modern life” (Parray, 2011, pp. 79-80).

Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) among other modernist scholars questioned: “How can Muslims be true to the enduring values of their own past while living in the modern world? Embracing the ideas of *islah* (reform), *tajdid* (renewal), and *Ijtihad* (independent legal reasoning), the modernists promoted Muslim unity and resistance to Western cultural hegemony by adopting the fruits of science and technology while overhauling Muslim educational, legal, and political institutions” (Rozehnal, 2004).

As Black notes, “Al-Maududi was the first Islamic thinker to reject explicitly and wholeheartedly the ‘modernist’ programme of adapting the Shari’a to the modern world through a renewal of *Ijtihad*. He returned to a literalist view of revelation: the Shari’a is

unchangeable” (Black, 2011, p. 308). He writes that Al-Maududi was the “founder of fundamentalism” (2011, p. 308)

The primary objective of this thesis is to contribute to this debate by trying to identify main challenges and prospects of democratization in the Muslim world through the lens of Modernism of Islamic political thought.

3. Challenges rooted in the History: The early Political system of Muslim world

In this chapter, I will try to identify the challenges rooted in early political system of Muslim world. For this purpose, I will analyse early Islamic tradition, its political system and some core values.

During the last 14 centuries, Islamic political thought tracks differing position throughout its political expansion (Bowering, 2015, p. 4). Islamic history preserved its both tradition and reformed its internal culture consistently over the period of growth and Islamic political thought preserved the core foundations whilst experiencing continuous stages of evolution (2015, p. 4). Bowering notes that “The foundations of Islam neither allow for distinctions between spiritual and temporal, ecclesiastical and civil, or religious and secular categories, nor envisage the same duality of authority accepted in Western political thought as standard, such as God and Caesar, church and state, and clergy and laity” (2015, p. 4). He explains that “over the centuries, Islamic forms of state and government, power and authority, and rule and loyalty have exhibited great diversity” (2015, p. 4) The realms of religion and state are closely linked and subject to a process of fluid negotiation i.e. the notions of duty and authority

dominates those of freedom and the rights of the individual. Islamic political thought deals with matters of politics, government, and the state and it also addresses questions of acceptable behaviour and ethics of both the ruler and the ruled before God (2015, p. 4). Islamic political thought must be understood within its own tradition, characterized by a vibrant integration of the secular and sacred in obedience to God and His Prophet. Islam is dynamic in its nature not static both as a way of monotheistic worship and way of life (2015, p. 4).

The main Islamic political thought was during the time of Prophet Muhammad in Medina and it enforced the essential principle of obedience to God and His Prophet. That principle articulated in the centre of its creed, the *shahada*¹, and inferred in oral tradition by the early practise of the community, modelled after the Prophet known as the Sunnah (2015, p. 4). Muslim political thought has always looped around the three pillars of law (Shar'ia), Leadership and the community of believers.

Crone explains "Islamic political thought is based on the assumption that humans are fundamentally antisocial animals constrained by their own needs to live in societies" (Crone, 2015, p. 238). In nature, human beings are in pursuit of their own interests at the cost of everyone else, without government the weak would be consumed by stronger and for reproduction and coexistence social bonds are required (2015, p. 238). In Western traditions, this view can be seen in Thomas Hobbes writing that in the state of nature life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Hobbes, 1968). Al-Farabi cited Aristotle in his book "Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle" that "It is innate

¹ Shahada – "The first pillar of Islam is to openly proclaim and bear witness that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah" (Cornell, 1999, p. 77).

nature of this animal to seek shelter and to dwell in the neighbourhood of those who belong to the same species, which is why he called the social and political animal” (Al-Farabi's, 1962). Muslims share the same view as of Thomas Hobbes that the formation of political society required an agreement whereby people submitted their sovereignty to a single individual the king (2015, p. 239). Hobbes envisaged people signing their freedom to a human king (Hobbes, 1968). Muslims sign it to God creator or king of the universe. God revealed his commandments to mankind by means of prophets such as Adam the first man and Prophet Muhammad his last messenger bearing a divine law (Crone, 2015, p. 239).

3.1 The State of Medina

In his article Khel described that “After the advent of Islam at Mecca, Muhammad (pbuh) dedicated himself to the integration of this newly established *ummah* in its different aspects in the light of the message of Islam” (Khel, 1982, p. 61). He quotes modern western political philosophers “John Locke, Thomas Hobbs and J.J. Rousseau held the belief that civil society sprang from a state of things which was not civil” (1982, p. 61).

He noticed that Arabs had deep-rooted traditions and customs having the authorisation of law. He argues that their social communication was based “in principle of right and equity and from Islam’s point of view the life they leading was not moral” (1982, p. 62). He explains that “A good state is the one whose citizens are good...In every system, it is important to examine man’s place in society and state’s relationship or commitments to the higher values of life and concept of the Divine being in the social order” (1982, p. 62).

He describes that “The Muslim *Ummah* had come into being soon after the emergence of Islam at Mecca but its members were not allowed by the pagans and vested interests to lead a peaceful and honourable life at Mecca and elsewhere” (1982, p. 64). Esposito explains that “Much of Muhammad's prophetic career, from the time he began publicly preaching in about 613 until his death in 632, was consumed with warding off and eventually overcoming the opposition of his own tribe, the Quraysh” (Esposito, 1999, p. 8). He describes as the following of Prophet Muhammad grew “the opposition and abuse by the remaining Quraysh hardened; conditions became so bad for some that Muhammad arranged for a number of them to take refuge with the ruler of Axum in perhaps about 615” (1999, p. 8).

Muhammad started to search for new places in western Arabia for supporters and around 620 he earned following from residents of Yathrib “an oasis town about 250 miles (400 km) north of Mecca. For some years the population of Yathrib, which included two predominantly pagan tribes and a number of Jewish tribes, had been riven by intractable internal strife” (1999, p. 8). Esposito describes that “People of Yathrib agreed to observe the Prophet's message, until finally a large delegation of people from Yathrib agreed to follow his teachings and invited him to come to Yathrib as arbiter of their disputes and de facto ruler of the town” (1999, pp. 8-9). He explains that “The Prophet's move (the hijra, emigration) to Medina marked the beginning of a new chapter in his life and that of his followers. They were no longer a small, oppressed religious group in Mecca; they were now an autonomous religio-political community of Believers that dominated the oasis of Medina” (1999, p. 9).

Ibn-Khaldun has written in “Muqaddimah” – That it is necessary for human to have social organisation and stresses the importance of authority (Ibn-Khaldun & Rosenthal, 1967). This was the place where Prophet Muhammad could live peacefully and find ways to spread Islam.

Khel writes that “The charter of Medina (Mithaq al-Medina) issued fourteen hundred years was not only of great importance then but has also become a weighty and significant document in the recent decades” (Khel, 1982, p. 75). He describes that “The grant of civil liberties in this charter in a land still ruled by tribal aristocrats was of far more political significance and should serve as a pointer to the modern civilized world because its application to the conditions and changed circumstances which its author had in mind, the Charter of Medina has become the most important single document in the development of constitutional and legal freedom in the contemporary Muslim world” (1982, p. 75).

By careful inspection he explains “The Various articles of the constitution of the city-state of Medina would reveal that it was not merely a treaty of alliance but a written constitution laying down the foundation of the Islamic state at Medina and regulating the relationship between Muhajirin² and the Ansar³ (1982, p. 81).

Khel describes that “The *Ummah* established first at Mecca and now stipulated in the constitution as the first blow to tribalism and the introduction of a new system or a new

² Muhajirin – ““Emigrants,” the Believers who had emigrated to Medina from Mecca or elsewhere” (Esposito, 1999, p. 9)

³ Ansar – ““Helpers,” Muhammad's first followers in Medina, who had invited him and his Meccan followers to find refuge with them); and between some of Medina's Jews and the new Believers” (1999, p. 9)

way of life where nationality was based neither on common race or language nor on a common fatherland but on a common ideology” (Khel, 1982, pp. 81-82). Bowering explains that the constitution of Medina “offered a model of applied political thought and a glimpse into the Prophet’s pragmatic approach toward the creation of a new polity” (Bowering, 2015). Black illuminates that “It is clear from the Constitution of Medina and the earliest phase of Muhammad’s teaching there, that his purpose was to construct out of tribal confederacies a new people driven by his own sense of moral mission” (Black, 2011, p. 10).

3.2. Caliphate

Donner writes, “It was widely accepted in the early community of Believers that Muhammad could have no successor in his role as Prophet” (Donner, 1999, p. 14). He explains that The early supporters decided that “someone should succeed Muhammad as temporal head of the community and the first documentary references call the leader of the community of Believers not caliph but amir al-mu minin (“commander of the Believers”), and this may be the original term for the heads of the community, replaced only some time later by the term caliph, which was seen as synonymous but had the advantage of being found in the Quran” (1999, pp. 14-15). He states that “whatever it was called, community leadership was at first informal and personal, much like tribal leadership” (1999, p. 15). It was gradually that the “caliphate acquire greater prestige and formality, as the original Islamic state grew into a far-flung empire during the early conquest era” (1999, p. 15).

Kadi and Shahin defines that “The caliphate (al-khilāfa) is the term denoting the form of government that came into existence in Islamic lands after the death of the Prophet

Muhammad and is considered to have survived until the first decades of the 20th century” (Kadi & Shahin, 2015, p. 47). They explain that “It derives from the title caliph (khalīfa, pl. khulafā’ or khalā’if), referring to Muslim sovereigns who claimed authority over all Muslims (2015, p. 47). They clarify that “The caliphate refers not only to the office of the caliph but also to the period of his reign and to his dominion—in other words, the territory and peoples over which he ruled” (2015, p. 47).

They state that “The term “caliphate” is most commonly restricted to five periods or dynasties: the Rightly Guided Caliphate (632–61), the Umayyad caliphate (661–750), the Abbasid caliphate (750–1258 and 1261–1517), the Fatimid caliphate (909 1171), and the Umayyad caliphate of Córdoba (928–1031) (2015, p. 47).

The first 4 successors of Prophet Muhammad are called Rightly guided caliphs and they were Abu Baker (632-634 CE), Umar ibn Al-Khattab (634-644 CE), Uthman ibn Affan (644-656 CE) and Ali ibn Abi Talib (656-661 CE).

They described that “The institution of the caliphate developed gradually with time and crystallized only at the beginning of the Abbasid period in the second half of the eighth century. Also, despite their claims to universal rule over all Muslims, few Muslim sovereigns actually did so; many provinces and regions controlled by Muslims did not acknowledge the suzerainty of any caliph. Furthermore, they added that “the caliphs possessed actual power for a relatively short period, as they became mostly puppets in the hands of military commanders and high-ranking officials” (2015, p. 48). They clarify that “For centuries prior to the rise of Islam, sovereigns in the Arabian Peninsula adopted

a titlature based in the title *m.l.l* (king, monarch) and the title was also employed by Arabian dynasties like of Nabataeans and Palmyrenes (2015, p. 49).

As Kadi and Shahin notes in their book that - The title of malik given to the highest political office and is further verified in Quran, *malik* appears 13 times in the singular twice in the plural (*muluk*) to signify a sovereign with 5 of the total 13 occurrences in the singular referring to God who is the possessor of all sovereignty (2015, p. 49). The title of *malik* in Arabia peninsula came to dissolution when Muslims didn't not follow the titlature based on it and reason for that was God is sovereign.

After the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE leading Muslims from Medina gathered and discussed the future leadership of the community and Abu Baker was given a pledge of allegiance (*baya'a*) as the leader of Muslim community (2015, p. 54). They explain, "his elections was formalized at the mosque of Medina, where he received the general allegiance of all present Muslims" (2015, p. 54). Abu Baker selected Umar b. al-Khattab as his successor and the community in this case did not select the successor but only the recognised choice of Abu Baker by formulating a pledge of allegiance to Umar (2015, p. 54).

They show that "Umar appointed a consultative council (*shūrā*) of six members that was to select one of its own as his successor, they chose 'Uthman b. 'Affan...After 12 years of rule, 'Uthman was killed in 656 by a group of Muslims after he refused their demands to abdicate or to accept deposition" (2015, p. 54).

They explain that in essence, there were two methods of succession in the caliphates: by election or by designation which was the most used method. "Designation was

normally done by a testament ('ahd), when the heir apparent, normally of the age of majority, was called walī al-'ahd ("one in charge of safeguarding the testament," equivalent to crown prince); his appointment was binding on him and on the community and could not, in principle, be repealed" (2015, p. 54).

3.3. Demise of Caliphate

In this chapter I will describe the fall of caliphate. There were 2 main exogenous and some endogenous factors which were attributed towards the demise of caliphate over the span of its existence. The first was the Mongol invasion of Middle East in 13th century and second the imperial and colonial empires which made most of Muslim countries its subjects. Ottoman Empire was the last Caliphate, which collapsed in early 20th century. The internal factors such cultural and political regionalism resulted in different variants.

Donner writes that "Muhammad's community in Medina had been at once a small religious community and an embryonic state or political community" (Donner, 1999, p. 60). He states that "The political entity, under caliphal leadership, grew into a vast empire with explosive speed, but the religious community grew much more slowly" (1999, p. 60). He explains that "The early Believers were at first a small minority in the empire they ruled, but they were politically dominant...The caliphate thus provided the sheltering aegis and a political identity that enabled the small Islamic religious community to survive, along with the political and social conditions within the empire that attracted new converts to the faith" (1999, p. 60). He explains that "When the caliphs lost real power in the tenth century, moreover, the autonomous or independent states that sprang up in their former territories, from Spain to India, were also self-

consciously Muslim regimes. Under these Muslim successor states, Islam continued to put down deep roots throughout the Near East and North Africa “ (1999, p. 60).

He describes that “The rise of Islamic culture was even more important than political and social factors in drawing new people to the Islamic community, which now began to spread beyond the confines of the caliphal empire” (1999, p. 60).

He explains “With the political regionalism of the tenth and following centuries came cultural regionalism. Spain, North Africa, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, Iran, Anatolia, Yemen, and other regions developed distinctive variants of a recognizably common Islamic culture, focused particularly in the main cities: Córdoba, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Isfahan, Samarqand, Konya, and others” (1999, p. 60). He shows that “Changes in demographic patterns and linguistic usage contributed to this cultural regionalism” (1999, p. 60). He describes, “This process of cultural evolution and diversification continued in the later Islamic centuries, as Islam spread to many new areas and as new cultural developments took place in the Islamic heartlands.” (1999, p. 60).

He further shows that “In the early thirteenth century, the Mongol leader Genghis Khan embarked on his career of world conquest, which would eventually bring inner Asia, China, Russia, Iran, Anatolia, and Iraq under his family's domination” (1999, p. 58). He explains that “The Mongols tolerated no opposition and were careful to destroy any centres of political power independent of their own” (1999, p. 58). Donner states that “for some time they clung to the pastoral traditions of the steppe and had little interest in, and no sympathy for, cities or agricultural areas, except as revenue sources” (1999, p. 58). He shows that “These factors, coupled with their perhaps intentional use of terror

as a means of social control, may explain the destructiveness of the Mongol invasions, which saw the obliteration of many cities and their inhabitants and the destruction or neglect of many irrigation works on which the agrarian prosperity of the countryside depended” (1999, p. 58).

He continues by showing that from 1258 onwards “when the Mongols executed the last Abbasid caliph, the caliphate had effectively spent itself as a physical symbol of Islam's unity and identity” (1999, p. 59). He explains that “Several other rulers—including the Fatimids, the Umayyads of Spain, one of the Almohads, and even the Hafsid governor of Ifriqiya—had taken for themselves the once coveted titles of amir al-mu'minin or caliph, and the Shiite development of the rival concept of imam (head of the Islamic community) had also called the caliphate's meaning into question” (1999, p. 60). He describes that by this time “the Islamic community was no longer defined merely by political boundaries and hegemony” (1999, p. 60). He explains that more important now were “a common set of religious beliefs, an elaborate system of religious law and practice, and other elements of Islamic culture, and this identity was firmly enough established to survive even rule by non-Muslims such as the Mongols” (1999, p. 61).

Since the early 19th century, the dissolution of Ottoman Empire saw the region split into many parts. Ottoman Empire was the last of the Caliphate, which started with the Umayyad's the first great dynasty to rule the empire of caliphate in 7th century. The change from co-opted and religiously inspired rulers to ending of Caliphate into present Middle east, the new republic of Turkey and elsewhere to former imperial provinces which were taken over by the war's victors and by the new League of Nations and ruled under factions of conditional sovereignty that they called mandates (Rogan, 2016).

3.4. Colonial Era

In his book “Colonization: A Global History” Ferro describes “Colonization is associated with the occupation of a foreign land, with its being brought under cultivation, with the settlement of colonists” (Ferro, 1997).

Janin describes “Islamic power began to ebb, however after the first major Ottoman reversal – the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699), which ceded Ottoman Hungary to Austria. This was the peace signed by a defeated Ottoman Empire with the Christian West. As such, it can be considered a milestone in the military, economic and political decline of the Islamic world from its former glories” (Janin, 2005, pp. 111-113).

Bowering gives an account “During the 19th century, half of the Islamic world passed under the formal colonial rule of European states—geographically tiny but militarily and economically mighty countries in comparison to the vast Muslim territories they ruled and controlled” (Bowering, 2015, p. 15). As Dona J. Stewart notes that European colonial rule entered in the Middle East when the Ottoman Empire and its rule was declining (Stewart, 2009).

Tan writes “Whether in India (under the British), Indonesia and in the Malaysian archipelago (under the Dutch), the Caucasus and Turkestan (under the Russians), or the Maghreb (France), most Muslim countries came under direct or indirect colonial rule” (Tan, 2017).

Panjwani describes, “The colonial encounter in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, brought a revolutionary shift...Unlike the subjugation by the Mongols in the

thirteenth century, which was essentially military in character, colonialism brought a total eclipse of Muslim military, political and intellectual life” (Panjwani, 2004).

Bowering writes that “The European exploration of the East and the growing ability to exploit an existing vast trade network, together with the inadvertent but eventually lucrative “discovery” of the New World, were to result in Europe’s economic and political hegemony over the Islamic world, with which it had rubbed military and mercantile shoulders since the early Muslim conquests” (Bowering, 2015, p. 3). He describes that “The early modern Islamic world (and much of the rest of the world) fell definitively behind the West economically and politically with the advent of the Enlightenment in the 18th century and the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century” (2015, p. 3).

He states that “By about 1800, small European nations (e.g., England, France, and Holland) had established rule over large regions of the Islamic world...Their trading companies and imperial outposts in distant Muslim lands were transformed into colonies of European supremacy that were eager to benefit from Western industrialization” (2015, p. 3). He writes that “It took until the end of World War II for the global geopolitical map to become reorganized into an array of discrete nation-states on the European model” (2015, p. 3).

As Nasr describes “The colonial era ended after World War II, when Britain and then France withdrew from the majority of their colonial territories (Nasr, 1999, p. 552). He writes that “By the mid-1970s most Muslim territories, from Sub-Saharan Africa to

Southeast Asia, had gained independence from colonialism and constituted either independent Muslim states or parts of independent non-Muslim states” (1999, p. 552).

He explains that “The idea of a Muslim territorial state, much like the idea of nationalism, is thus an import from the West...The inclusion of the concept of the territorial state into Muslim politics and the actual boundaries of Muslim states are both products of colonialism” (1999, p. 553). He describes “Ethnic nationalism and its association with a nation-state, however, is new to the Muslim world and has its origins in the colonial era” (1999, p. 554). He states “It was then that nationalism as a primary form of political identity—one that is not subservient to Islamic identity but supersedes it absolutely and is associated with a territorial state modelled after those in the West—grew roots and became a part of Muslim political consciousness” (1999, p. 554).

Nasr writes that “How colonialism actually worked and what its imprints were have shaped Muslims' perception of their identities and politics and separated the path that various Muslim states have taken since independence” (1999, p. 557) He continues by saying that “Early on, through the aspiring new elite that the colonial rulers trained in European languages and ways to create a machinery of government, the division of Muslim territories took shape” (1999, p. 557).

He describes “Over time, ethnic and territorial definitions became the boundaries for national identity formations; they grew roots and developed as a secular and dominant form of political identity in lieu of memories of a united Islamic world in history” (1999, p. 558).

The colonial rule lasted almost a century but it completely changed all aspects of politics, social relations, economy and geography. It shaped Muslims perceptions of their identities and politics and separated the path many Muslim states have taken since independence.

3.4. Rise of Authoritative regimes

Bowering writes “In the 20th century, Europe lost its global leadership during the period of the two world wars, when it experienced the eclipse of fascist nationalism, the downfall of colonial imperialism, and the emergence of the Soviet Union and the United States as the primary shapers of the world order” (Bowering, 2015, p. 20). He explains that “For Islam, the 20th century began with forceful secularist movements and ended with a rising tide of fundamentalist movements seeking to expunge the Western presence from Muslim lands” (2015, p. 20).

On one hand it was Ataturk (1881 – 1938) who abolished sharia courts, polygamy and Quran schools, empowered women to vote and obtain divorce and equality in education and employment. He was secularizing one of the strongest Muslim empire on the globe and Turkey became main case of a political and cultural revolution imposed from top by authoritarian regime resulting the country being split into urban elites who accepted secularization and rural masses who rejected it (2015, p. 20).

He describes that “On the other side of the spectrum, in the late 20th century the Islamic world became dominated by fundamentalist movements: the Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906–49) in Egypt and spearheaded by Sayyid Qutb (1906–66); the Islamic Group, established by Mawlana Mawdudi (1903–79) in India and

Pakistan; and the movement of clerics and mujahidin led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1903–89) that culminated in the Iranian Revolution in 1979. These three movements transformed Islam into a political ideology and were not hesitant to use force to secure their political objectives” (2015, pp. 20-21).

Nasr explains that “Unresolved tensions between peoples and regions that were included within the same state, but never consolidated into one nation have resulted in challenges to state boundaries” (Nasr, 1999, p. 559). And he describes that “Muslim states gained independence in territories that were delineated by the colonial powers. They largely accepted the shapes in which they were born as well as the fact that states would be bound by international borders into distinct sovereign entities” (1999, p. 555).

He states, “Muslim states have not sought to reconstruct the *ummah* but only to expand the boundaries of nation-states” (1999, p. 555).

He writes that “The only exceptions to this general rule have been the ideologies of Arab nationalism and Islamism...Arab nationalism, which was a widely popular political ideal in the 1960s and has been a general political and cultural thrust since then, has in principle questioned the division of the Arab world into twenty-two states” (1999, p. 555).

He describes that “Arab nationalism was not an Islamic ideology, and in that sense it did not seek to reverse the division of Muslim lands so much as it did the division of Arab ones” (1999, p. 556). He states that “Islamist movements too have argued for the unity of all Muslims above and beyond their national identities and to accept the reality of the *ummah* in lieu of nation-states” (1999, p. 556).

3.5. Current Crisis

Muslim societies are currently facing numerous challenges. It swings between the glory of its beautiful past and misery and apathy of present (Kalin, 2015). Many Muslim countries suffer from political crisis, economic and technological backwardness, poor infrastructure and lag in research of science and technology. Salam writes that “There is no question, but today, of all civilizations on this planet, science is weakest in the lands of Islam. The dangers of this weakness cannot be over-emphasized since honourable survival of a society depends directly on its strength in science and technology in the condition of the present age” (Salam, 1991).

Kalin explains Muslim societies “are paralyzed by social inequality, injustice toward women, sectarian conflict, extremism, poverty, violence and terrorism”(Kalin, 2015). When we look around the globe, we see many Muslim countries embroiled in different crisis. Pakistan has been marred by terrorism for the last couple of decades and its due to numerous reasons such as; decaying law and order situation in Pakistan including war against terrorism in Afghanistan, internal issues and international meddling, all these issues have played a negative role (NACTA, 2016).

In an article Abdul-Hamid writes that “The issue of compatibility of Islam and modern liberal democratic values keeps on creeping into the public debate following each terrorist attack and each tragic development in the Middle East, and there have been plenty of them over the last few years to ensure that the debate never falls off radar” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016). He describes that “Since the breakout of what has popularly been named the Arab Spring and the assortment of dramatic developments affiliated with it—the implosion of Syria, Iraq and Yemen, the rise of ISIS as a global terrorist threat, and

the emergence of the global refugee crisis—popular media, think tanks and an ever growing circuit, if not circus, of pundits and experts have kept the debate going, often at the expense of its quality” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016).

With all this going, the question still remains the same; is Islam compatible with democracy or modernity? Modern democratic values arose slowly within the context of internal multi-layered developments specific to western powers over period of past few centuries. He states that “What helped facilitate this development as well was the fact that the processes of modernism in the West were driven purely by internal dynamics, which expressed themselves through familiar languages and institutions” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016).

He describes that “Still, Muslim-majority societies and countries have been dealing with the challenges posed by modern values for more than a century now, and the increased levels of violence at this stage indicate how threatened adherents of fundamentalism and traditionalism feel, and how deep have been the inroads made by Muslims who have adopted the modernization agenda” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016). He continues explaining that “this progress has been achieved despite tremendous setbacks, including the failure of liberalism and nationalism in the design of key states, and the rise of mafia-like regimes which, despite speaking the language of modernization at times, are more interested in transforming their countries into private fiefdoms than in real modernization or secularization as such” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016).

He highlights “Another complicating factor results from the intimate connection between modern values and Western culture...Indeed, considering the geographic and

cultural realities surrounding the birth of modernity and liberalism, the process of modernization calls by its nature for a great degree of Westernization as well—a fact that unsurprisingly fosters certain feelings of resentment and inferiority among many Muslims, irrespective of their educational backgrounds” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016). He shows that “Politically, this situation has contributed to the unceremonious defeat of liberal forces at the hand of leftist and Islamist counterparts, both of which reject in their different ways modern liberal values” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016).

He states that “by embracing anti-Western ideologies—despite the fact that this step itself is inspired by the writings of Western authors—the Muslim Left, its secular trappings notwithstanding, repudiated a core commitment to democracy and supported the establishment of various autocratic regimes” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016). He argues that “These regimes were supposed to bring a measure of social justice, but they broke the society instead, and they thus facilitated the rise of Islamist movements in reaction” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016). He mentions the Muslim Left “ended up rediscovering the importance of democracy, it did so without appreciating the necessity and usefulness of political engagement with Western governments; it’s still a profoundly anti-Western movement” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016). As a result, he sums that “the Muslim Left remains incapable of reaching compromises and working arrangements with Western governments, and this weakens its position as an alternative both to existing autocratic regimes and to Islamist movements alike” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016).

4. Challenges rooted in doctrine & ideological political thought

In this chapter, I will try to analyse the challenges rooted in doctrine and Ideological political thought by dissecting what is written by scholars in Muslim and the Western World.

As Gerhard Bowering write in his book: “Islamic Political Thought: In Introduction” that Muslim nations perceived Islam not only as the way of life led by the majority of the population but also as the source of normative principles for social order (Bowering, 2015, p. 3).

Iqbal writes that “[Islam] demands loyalty to God, not to thrones... The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change” (Iqbal, 1934, p. 140).

To understand the core principles, we must try to recognise what are the core issues at hand. As Muslims believe Islam is not only confined to religion but it is also a way of life. Islam helps cater for all the fields of human existence from social to political. Rosenthal describes “Islam is a religious way of life which contains diverse elements all bound together in a certain unity of outlook by the common belief in God and his prophet who had received a revelation—the final revelation—in the form of the Qur'an, "the precious Book" (Rosenthal, 1962, p. 2).

Islamic law stems from two main sources: the Qur'an and Sunna. The Qur'an is based on divine revelation of God's word, made by the Angel Gabriel to Muhammad between the years 610 and 632. The Qur'an however does not contain many statements that

constitute rules of law capable of direct application. Out of the Qur'an's 6 236 verses, which are split in 114 chapters in 30 main parts, only about three percent are dealing with questions that from our Western point of view are of legal nature.

As Rosenthal notes in her book: "Political Thought in Medieval Islam – "...Society must be based not only on particular laws (that is, on laws laid down by human authority to secure material well-being), but on a comprehensive, general law which takes account of man's spirituality. Such a law is the divine law (Shari'a), which is the revelation of God through his messenger, the prophetic lawgiver" (1962, p. 145). He states, "Shari'a is composed of exemplary life of Prophet Muhammad, Quran, Sunnah and Hadith. The Shari'a is the supreme authority, the exclusive and complete guide of the *ummah* of Islam" (1962, p. 52).

In her book "When Islam and Democracy meets" Cesari explains that "There is no nation within the Muslim world that does not claim Islam as a foundational element of national unity" (Cesari, 2004, p. 44). She describes "In every country of the Muslim world, Islam is either a State religion or under State control, even in ostensibly secular nations such as Turkey and Iraq under the former administration of Saddam Hussain" (2004, p. 44).

Shari'a development continues to the present day as scholars incorporate the demands of the new circumstances and conditions of the twenty-first century into the Shari'a. It is also important to note the considerable diversity of approaches and interpretations within Islamic law, illustrated in a variety of schools of thought (each with several divergent currents and discursive styles within them), all of which are considered equally

valid and orthodox. Quran and Sunnah doesn't offer a system of legal provisions but supply only material from which a system could be constructed (Ruthven, 2000).

One of the main challenges faced by Muslim societies is Rise of Islamism. This emerges in the form of Fundamentalism. They are not traditionalist who represent a force of preservation and conservation and they also adapt to new circumstances when it is necessary to keep Islam alive (Voll, 1994, pp. 21-23). In his book "The Future of Political Islam" Fuller described fundamentalists as those who "oppose the status quo, and represent the most conservative element among Islamists" (Fuller, 2003, p. 48). He highlights that they "seek to correct contemporary (mis)understandings of Islam, and to return to basic texts (Qur'an and Hadith) to understand the faith as literally written for all time" (2003, p. 48). As Voll notes that Fundamentalists "insists upon a rigorous adherence to the specific and general rules of the faith and presents a critique of existing conditions by calling for a return to the fundamentals of faith" (Voll, 1994, p. 22). Fundamentalists strive for a purity in the practise of Islam and seek to establish an Islamic estate. The essential component of Islam for them is law with overwhelming stress on jurisprudence. As Fuller notes "They are closely associated with fundamentalism's strictest form, *Wahhabism*, sometimes also referred to as *Salafiyya* (the faith of the founding fathers of the Islamic community) (Fuller, 2003, p. 48).

The fundamentalists or Islamist radicals accept narrow, intolerant and literal interpretations of Islam. "The rationale and ideological foundation of radicalism is usually traced to the twentieth-century Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb, whose views have been of profound importance in establishing the modern radical vision of Islam" (2003, p. 52). As Fuller describes "Qutb, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood when it was still

a radical and violent movement under the conditions of Egypt from the 1940s to the 1960s, borrowed a concept from the medieval Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya to categorize Muslim society as living in jahiliyya or “a state of ignorance” that is, bereft of true Islam” (2003, p. 52).

Fuller states that for radicals the crucial ideological principle is of “jihad as a “sixth pillar” of Islam, made popular in the 1950s by ‘Abd-al-Salam Muhammad al-Faraj in his manuscript *Jihad: the Forgotten Obligation*” (2003, p. 52). In his thesis Al-Faraj urged “Muslims to undertake direct jihad (struggle, violent or non-violent) against its enemies in order to strive for creation of a unified umma. Those who reject Islamic law for Western law are apostates and enemies” (2003, p. 52).

As Fakhry writes in “The Oxford History of Islam” that Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-79) in Pakistan “have tended to target Christianity and the West as the causes of the decadence of the Muslim people on the one hand and the spread of secularism and irreligion on the other” (Fakhry, 1999, p. 299). He explained that this is because “of its exclusive spiritual character, they have argued, Christianity has abandoned humankind to its egotistic and materialistic resources and has violated the supreme principle of divine unity (tawhid), which stipulates that God's sovereignty and lordship is not confined to the spiritual aspects of human life; rather, it dominates and regulates every aspect of that life” (1999, p. 299). He states that “In his critique of Western civilization, Abul Ala Mawdudi inveighed against Western nationalism, democracy, and secularism...According to Abul Ala Mawdudi, nationalism culminates ultimately in the cult of the nation, democracy in the tyranny of the majority, and secularism in the

repudiation of God's universal lordship and ultimately in irreligion or atheism" (1999, pp. 299-300)

The other factor to be considered is the influence exerted on Islam by the secular character of Liberal democracy from Western world. Cesari writes that "In many respects, Islam is considered to be the diametrical opposite of the principle of secularism, viewed as an inherent attribute of the Western world" (Cesari, 2004, p. 43). The principle of religious freedom in Europe was developed through struggle of many years from 16th Century onwards and this led to separation of state and religion which is now essential aspect of democracy. This process of Church and State separation is called secularization which is based on philosophical principles of tolerance and respect for religious beliefs.

Another aspect to this debate highlighted by her "is the prevailing view of international relations, which depicts Islam and the West as opposing forces, creating a "siege mentality" among Muslims and turning Islam into a tool of political resistance" (2004, p. 44).

In her book "Future of Islam and the West : Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?" she describes "The ideologization of international politics and the paradigmatic methodology of studying it bear most responsibility for advancing two paradigmatic theories—the end of history and the clash of civilizations— to replace the East-West conflict as the principal determinant of the character of international relations in the post-Soviet era" (Hunter, 1998, p. 4).

Fukuyama in his famous book "The End of History and the Last Man" notes that "It is true that Islam constitutes a systematic and coherent ideology, just like liberalism and communism, with its own code of morality and doctrine of political and social justice" (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 45). He describes "Islam has indeed defeated liberal democracy in many parts of the Islamic world, posing a grave threat to liberal practices even in countries where it has not achieved political power directly" (1992, p. 45).

He states that "Indeed, the Islamic world would seem more vulnerable to liberal ideas in the long run than the reverse, since such liberalism has attracted numerous and powerful Muslim adherents over the past century and a half. Part of the reason for the current, fundamentalist revival is the strength of the perceived threat from liberal, Western values to traditional Islamic societies" (1992, p. 46).

He explains that "Orthodox Judaism and fundamentalist Islam, by contrast, are totalistic religions which seek to regulate every aspect of human life, both public and private, including the realm of politics...These religions may be compatible with democracy-Islam, in particular, establishes no less than Christianity the principle of universal human equality-but they are very hard to reconcile with liberalism and the recognition of universal rights, particularly freedom of conscience or religion" (1992, p. 217).

In his article "The West Has Won" he writes that "Islam, by contrast, is the only cultural system that seems regularly to produce people like Osama bin Laden or the Taliban who reject modernity lock, stock and barrel" (Fukuyama, 2001). He raises the question of "how representative such people are of the larger Muslim community, and whether this rejection is somehow inherent in Islam" (Fukuyama, 2001).

He notes that “For if the rejectionists are more than a lunatic fringe, then Huntington is right that we are in for a protracted conflict made dangerous by virtue of their technological empowerment” (Fukuyama, 2001).

Samuel Huntington popularised the concept of clash of civilizations in his famous essay which appeared in 1993 issue of Foreign affairs. The concept was originally introduced by Bernard Lewis in The Atlantic “The Roots of Muslim Rage” in which he wrote “Islam was never prepared, either in theory or in practice, to accord full equality to those who held other beliefs and practiced other forms of worship” (Lewis, 1990). Bernard Lewis goes on by writing that “This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both” (Lewis, 1990).

Samuel Huntington put forward a hypothesis concerning the nature of global politics in the post-Cold-War era. He stated that wars in 21st century will not be fought between Ideologies and countries but rather between civilizations. He argues that after the cold war the battles will be between Western civilization and the Islamic world (Huntington, 1996).

He explains that “Conflict was, on the one hand, a product of difference, particularly the Muslim concept of Islam as a way of life transcending and uniting religion and politics versus the Western Christian concept of the separate realms of God and Caesar” (Huntington, 1996).

He notes that “A comparable mix of factors has increased the conflict between Islam and the West in the late twentieth century. First, Muslim population growth has

generated large numbers of unemployed and disaffected young people who become recruits to Islamist causes, exert pressure on neighbouring societies, and migrate to the West. Second, the Islamic resurgence has given Muslims renewed confidence in the distinctive character and worth of their civilization and values compared to those of the West. Third, the West's simultaneous efforts to universalize its values and institutions, to maintain its military and economic superiority, and to intervene in conflicts in the Muslim world generate intense resentment among Muslims. Fourth, the collapse of communism removed a common enemy of the West and Islam and left each the perceived major threat to the other. Fifth, the increasing contact between and intermingling of Muslims and Westerners stimulate in each a new sense of their own identity and how it differs from that of the other. Interaction and intermingling also exacerbate differences over the rights of the members of one civilization in a country dominated by members of the other civilization" (Huntington, 1996).

5. Prospects found in Doctrine & Ideological political thought

In this chapter I will analyse the theories of democracy and try to describe the Islamic version of democracy that is accepted in some parts of the Muslim societies. I will also describe the Modernist and Reformist views in political thought and their contribution to the modern contemporary Muslim societies. This chapter is dedicated to study the current political views held by Modernists and Reformists scholars and their contributions to current debates about democracy and its acceptance.

As Abdul-Hamid writes "The question of compatibility of Islam and modern liberal democratic values keeps on creeping into the public debate following each terrorist

attack and each tragic development in the Middle East, and there have been plenty of them over the last few years to ensure that the debate never falls off radar” (Abdul-Hamid, 2016).

Parray writes in “Islamic Modernist and Reformist Thought: A Study of the Contribution of Sir Sayyid and Muhammad Iqbal”- From the 16th till 20th century Muslim societies all over the world have experienced European colonialism to nationalism, from fragments of medieval empires to modern nation-states, from transnational to fixed community “to a global community not only of Muslim majority communities in Africa, the Middle East and Asia but also of significant Muslim-minority communities in Europe and United States” (Parray, 2011, p. 79).

Resistance and activism to European imperialism resulted in the birth of modernist thought through the teachings of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897). “Al-Afghani asserted that Muslims had to take charge of their own welfare rather than passively accepting foreign domination” (Esposito, 2003).

As Kurzman describes in his book “Modernist Islam” that movement pursued to “reconcile Islamic faith and modern values such as constitutionalism, as well as cultural revival, nationalism freedom of religious interpretations, scientific investigation, modern style education, women rights...” (Kurzman, 2002, p. 4). Scholars and activists engaged in the debates and saw the tensions between the modern values and Islamic faith as an accident not an integral feature of Islam. Kurzman describes “The modernist Islamic movement pioneered the formation or reformation of educational institutions; agitation for political liberalization or decolonization; and the establishment of a

periodical press throughout the Islamic world” (2002, p. 4). One of the major features of this movement described by Kruzman was “the self-conscious adoption of “modern” values— that is, values that authors explicitly associated with the modern world, especially rationality, science, constitutionalism, and certain forms of human equality” (2002, p. 4).

Kurzman proposed that freedom of speech “was the central intellectual issue of the movement: the right to say novel things in an Islamic discourse and in order to defend modern values, modernists had to defend the right to defend modern values” (2002, p. 5).

5.1. Democracy

In order to understand Islamic democracy, which is followed by some of the democratic Muslim societies, it is important to understand the core tenets of democracy. In this sub chapter I will explain the main aspects of democracy and how it varies within Western context as there is no blanket approach to defining and measuring democracy.

Sorsen describes democracy in his book “Democracy and Democratization” as “Democracy is a form of government in which the people rule” (Sorensen, 2008, p. 3). Democracy comes from 2 Greek words: *demos* and *kratos*. *Demos* meaning people and *Kratos* meaning rule therefore “rule by the people”.

Held in his book “Models of Democracy” describes the origin of democracy “In the fifth century BCE, Athens emerged as the most innovative and sophisticated ‘city-state’ or polis among many rival Greek communities. The reason for its development and for the establishment of its extraordinary ‘democratic’ way of life...” (Held, 2006, p. 11).

The development of democracy in Athens inspired modern political thought. Held describes the political ideals such as “equality among citizens, liberty, respect for the law and justice - have influenced political thinking in the West...” (2006, p. 13).

In his book “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” Schumpeter define democracy as “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1976, p. 260).

The notion of democracy formulated by Schumpeter was a narrow concept and for him it is simply an apparatus for choosing political leadership (Sorensen, 2008, p. 10). The other end of this spectrum is the concept of comprehensive democracy suggested by David Held (2008, p. 11).

In his book “Polyarchy; participation and opposition” Dahl noted that a key characteristic of a democracy “is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals” (Dahl, 1971, p. 1).

Dahl described eight requirements for a democracy among a large number of people: “(1) Freedom to form and join organisations, (2) Freedom of expression, (3) Right to vote, (4) Right of political leaders to compete for support, (5) Alternative sources of information, (6) Eligibility for public office, (7) Free and fair elections and (8) Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference” (1971, pp. 2-3). Lijphart writes in his book “Patterns of democracy” that these requirements “are already implied by Lincoln’s simple definition of democracy as government by the people (or by representatives of the people) and for the people”

(Lijphart, 2012, p. 47). He further explains “For instance, “by the people” implies universal suffrage, eligibility for public office, and free and fair elections; and elections cannot be free and fair unless there is freedom of expression and association both before and between elections” (2012, p. 47).

The simple definition of democracy is rule by the people. But as Sorensen explains “A more precise definition is difficult to formulate because democracy is a dynamic entity that has acquired different meanings over the course of time” (Sorensen, 2008, pp. 28-27). He further explains that the dynamism comes from changes within the societies and “from the different interpretations by analysts of the consequences of these changes for democracy” (2008, p. 27). As the world develop in different ways today it is not surprising that the meaning of democracy is a subject of debate. The core pillars of democracy are competition, participation, and civil and political liberties.

5.2. Theories of Democracy

In this chapter, I will describe 2 main theories of democracy. Such as Direct democracy, and representative democracy.

5.2.1 Direct Democracy

Direct democracy is also known as pure democracy. It “forms of direct participation of citizens in democratic decision making, in contrast to indirect or representative democracy, based on the sovereignty of the people” (Schiller, 2017).

Schiller explains that “Direct democracy may be understood as a full-scale system of political institutions, but in modern times, it means most often specific decision-making

institutions in the broader system environment of representative democracy” (Schiller, 2017).

As Dahl compares John Locke with Jean-Jacques Rousseau and noted that Rousseau “sometimes seems the more radical democrat, though a close reading of his work shows that, in important respects, Rousseau’s conception of democracy is narrower than Locke’s” (Dahl, 2018). Dahl notes in Rousseau’s most influential work of “political philosophy, *The Social Contract* (1762), Rousseau asserts that democracy is incompatible with representative institutions, a position that renders it all but irrelevant to nation-states” (Dahl, 2018).

As Dahl explains Rousseau’s argument about sovereignty of the people, can be neither alienated nor represented (Dahl, 2018).

As Dahl express what Rousseau wrote about the idea of representatives is modern and “In the ancient republics...the people never had representatives....[T]he moment a people allow itself to be represented, it is no longer free: it no longer exists” (Dahl, 2018)

Dahl further more explains Rousseau that “if a political association that is small enough to practice direct democracy, such as a city-state, were to come into existence, it would inevitably be subjugated by larger nation-states and thereby cease to be democratic” (Dahl, 2018).

Schiller explains that with “this background of historical and theoretical restrictions, the normative theory of direct democracy cannot exclusively rest on popular sovereignty, which is also claimed by representative democracy” (Schiller, 2017).

Schiller notes the “two sets of democratic institutions are distinguished by basic features of direct participation: (1) direct democracy focuses on specific issues, in contrast to voting on candidates and general programs for long terms of office, and (2) citizens themselves act as decision makers rather than delegating these powers” (Schiller, 2017).

As Schiller explains that “Direct democracy comes in a variety of institutional forms, with the common feature of procedures focusing on popular votes on political issues”. The institutions such as: referendum, initiatives, worker boards, town meetings, panning consultation and local participation.

The main characteristics of direct democracy are: active engagement by all citizens, citizenship rights and duties and majority rule and not minority right.

5.2.2 Representative democracy

Representative democracy is also known as liberal democracy. It is a liberal political ideology and form of government where representative democracy functions.

The characteristics of liberal democracy are: elections between multiple political parties, the rule of law, separation of powers into different branches of government, a market economy with private property, equal protection of human rights, civil liberties, civil rights, and political freedoms for all people.

John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government provides clear defence of individual moral rights, individual liberty and right to private property.

Macpherson notes “natural right of unlimited private property, with which society and government are not entitled to interfere: no-one, before or since, has come near his skill

in moving from a limited and equal to an unlimited and unequal property right by invoking rationality and consent" (Macpherson, 1980).

Habermas distinguishes liberal model by noting that "the democratic process accomplishes the task of programming the government in the interest of society, where the government is represented as an apparatus of public administration, and society as a market-structured network of interactions among private persons" (Habermas, 1994, p. 1).

He further explains that the architectonic of liberal "government and society undergoes an important change: in addition to the hierarchical regulations of the state and the decentralized regulations of the market, that is, besides administrative power and individual personal interests, solidarity and the orientation to the common good appear as a third source of social integration" (1994, p. 1).

He notes that the "citizen's status is primarily determined according to negative rights they have vis-a-vis the state and other citizens" (1994, p. 2). He explains that citizens can enjoy the protection of government "as long as they pursue their private interests within the boundaries drawn by legal statutes - and this includes protection against government interventions" (1994, p. 2).

He clarifies that the political rights such as free speech and able to vote "have the same structure but also a similar meaning as civil rights that provide a space within which legal subjects are released from external compulsion" (1994, p. 2).

He describes the liberal view "the point of a legal order is to make it possible to determine in each case which individuals are entitled to which rights" (1994, p. 3).

According to liberal view noted by Habermas that “the political process of opinion- and will-formation in the public sphere and in parliament is determined by the competition of strategically acting collectivities trying to maintain or acquire positions of power” (1994, p. 3).

He explains that “a contest for power, if represented according to the liberal model of market competition, is determined by the rational choice of optimal strategies” (1994, p. 3).

The liberal view described by him is that “the democratic process takes place exclusively in the form of compromises between competing interest” (1994, p. 6).

He reports that “The liberal model hinges, not on the democratic self-determination of deliberating citizens, but on the legal institutionalization of an economic society that is supposed to guarantee an essentially nonpolitical common good by the satisfaction of private preferences” (1994, p. 7). He continues by saying that in the liberal model “the boundaries between “state” and “society” are respected; but in this case, civil society provides the social basis of autonomous public spheres that remain as distinct from the economic system as from the administration” (1994, p. 8).

5.3. Islamic or Spiritual Democracy

In this chapter, I will try to describe democratic system that some Muslim countries have tried to implement. In some cases, it is defined as Islamic democracy or Muslim democracy. Islamic democracy is a political ideology which pursues to apply Islamic principles for policy choices within democratic structure.

In an article published by Khan he explained the 3 key features found in Islamic sourced for Islamic governance – Quran, Sunnah and Muslim discussion on Islamic state (Khan, 2015). He summarises these 3 features as three C's of Islamic democracy – Constitution, Consent and Consultation (Khan, 2015). He explains “Muslims who seek to implement the Shariah are obliged to emulate the Prophet's precedence and, given the rather narrow definitions of Shariah and Sunnah that most Islamist operate with, there is no escape for them from the three key principles identified here” (Khan, 2015).

Muhammad Iqbal was a great Islamic philosopher, poet and politician who pioneered the modernist agendas and visions during the 19th and 20th century. As noted by Parray that for Iqbal Islam was a dynamic religion and he described “his vision for Islamic history as dynamic, creative and adaptive tradition – and it was Islam's dynamism that had made it a potent force” (Parray, 2011, p. 81). Iqbal proposed the idea of “spiritual democracy” in his book “The Reconstruction of religious Thought in Islam that “Let the Muslims of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principles, and evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed purpose of Islam, that “spiritual democracy” which is the ultimate aim of Islam” (Iqbal, 1934, p. 170). Javid Iqbal his grandson clarified the idea of spiritual democracy that “the first dimension of “freedom” which the spirit of Islamic culture provides is the establishment of “people's democracy”, i.e. Muslims accept the responsibility of running a democratic state” (Iqbal, 2015). He further explains that democracy “according to Iqbal, is neither a “theocratic” state nor a “secular” state and he calls the third alternative, a “spiritual” democracy, which means a democratic state in which all religions are respected and protected” (Iqbal, 2015).

Iqbal's work particularly focused on spirituality and he emphasised on spiritual and political awakening of Islam and Muslim for socio-political freedom.

Iqbal notes that "The ultimate spiritual basis of life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change...A society based on such a conception of reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change" (Iqbal, 1934, p. 140).

5.4. Theory of Modernism

In this chapter I will try to define the theories Modernism in Islamic political thought. Parray explains modernism as a movement to "reconcile Islamic faith with modern values such as democracy, rights, nationalism, rationality, science, equality and progress" (Parray, 2011, p. 79).

He noted that "Islamic modernism began as a response of Muslim intellectuals to European modernity, who argued that Islam, science and progress, revelation and reason, were indeed compatible" (2011, p. 79). He stated that "they did not simply wish to restore the beliefs and practices of the past; rather expansion they asserted the need to 'reinterpret and reapply' the principles and ideals of Islam to formulate new responses to the political, scientific and cultural challenges of the west and of modern life" (2011, pp. 79-80).

In his book "Modernist Islam" Kurzman distinguished "the modernist Islamic movement from previous Islamic reform movements, which did not identify their values as modern, and

from contemporaneous competitors such as traditionalists who rejected modern values" (Kurzman, 2002, p. 4). He further clarifies that "it distinguished the movement

from two of its successors, which supplanted modernist Islam in the middle of the twentieth century: on one hand secularists who downplayed the importance of Islam in the modern world, privileging nationalism, socialism, or other ideologies; on the other hand religious revivalists who espoused modern values (such as social equality, codified law, and mass education) but downplayed their modernity, privileging authenticity and divine mandates” (2002, p. 4). Parray notices the three most prominent scholars and intellectuals who pioneered the visions and agenda of modernism were “Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) in the Middle East and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817- 1898) and Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) in South Asia” (Parray, 2011, p. 80).

He quotes Mir Zohair Husain by describing modernists are modern knowledgeable Muslims whose job is “(a) to define Islam by bringing out the fundamentals in a rational and liberal manner; (b) to emphasize, among others, the basic ideals of Islamic brotherhood, tolerance and social justice; and (c) to interpret the teachings of Islam in such a way as to bring out its dynamic character in the context of the intellectual and scientific progress of the modern world” (2011, p. 80).

Modernists are supporters of *Ijtihad* and oppose taqlid, they oppose traditionalists who believe in the doctrine of taqlid. They believe that Islam is dynamic, progressive and rational religion in which taqlid has no place. As Parray notes that for modernists “Islamic law must be carefully revised in order to be flexible and adaptable enough to incorporate modern political, economic, social, cultural and legal conditions” (2011, p. 81). They argue that Islam must be open, energetic and vibrant, supporting that principle by

quoting from Quran (Chapter 13: Verse 11). “God does not change men’s condition unless they change their inner selves” (Quran 13:11).

Parray explains that Islamic modernism is often presented as “a response to the challenge of West, in fact its roots are both Islamic (its revivalist tradition) and Western (a response to European colonialism)” (Parray, 2011, p. 82).

Jamal al-Din al- Afghani highlighted the concerns and programs of Islamic modernism by arguing that reason and philosophy is not new to Islam and were not products of West, in fact Islam is in harmony with principles discovered by scientific reason. Parray notes that Afghani “advocated for an Islamic renaissance, which would unite the Muslim world while simultaneously confronting the cultural threat posed by adaptation of Western Ideals” (2011, p. 83).

Ibn Taimiyya (1263-1328) and in his wake some Ulama, including the founders of pre-modern religious reform movements, Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1793), Shah Wali Allah (1703-1762) and others protested against this theological dogma and reasserted the right of *Ijtihad*” (2011, p. 89).

Iqbal among many other forward-thinking scholars opted for an open and modern approach. Iqbal accepted *Ijma* (consensus) as the most vital legal concept in Islam. Parray explained the view of Iqbal on *Ijma* “that the right to interpret Islam for the community be transferred from *Ulama* to national assembly or legislature” (2011, p. 89). Iqbal writes, “The transfer of the power of *Ijtihad* from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form *Ijma* can take in modern times, will secure contributions to legal

discussion from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs” (Iqbal, 1934, p. 165).

Parray records that it is clear that “the development of Muslim legal thought was the establishment of *Ijtihad* as the principle of movement of and legal advance in Islam as well as the re-establishment of the principle of *Ijma* with its enlargement of the scope and authority” (Parray, 2011, p. 89).

Another principle used by some countries in the search of moderation is *wasatiyyah*⁴. Kamali defines it as “principle of moderation and balance” (Kamali, 2008, p. 7). He explains that it is an important but abandoned aspect of Islamic teachings (2008, p. 7).

He describes that “The opposite of *wasatiyyah* is *taṭarruf*, which denotes ‘inclination toward the peripheries’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalism’ and ‘excess’” (2008, p. 9). He states the point of view of Al-Alusi who authored *Tafsīr al-ma’ānī* that “a commitment to *wasatiyyah* is essentially a commitment to justice” (2008, p. 10). Al-Alusi describes “superiority for this *ummah* over other nations who were recipients of divine guidance and prophets that delivered God’s messages to them and advised them” (Al-Alusi, 1970).

Kamali quotes a contemporary observer who wrote “that *wasatiyyah* manifests the manner in which an Islamic civilisation should relate to other world civilisations” (Kamali, 2008, p. 11). In the article published by Kamali, he shows with numerous examples from different religious and contemporary scholars that the principle of *wasatiyyah* is

⁴ *Wasatiyyah* – “Moderation, or *wasatiyyah* (Arabic synonyms: *tawassuṭ*, *i’tidāl*, *tawāzun*, *iqtisād*) is closely aligned with justice, and means opting for a middle position between two extremes, often used interchangeably with ‘average’, ‘core’, ‘standard’, ‘heart’ and ‘non-aligned’” (Kamali, 2008).

supported by Quran (Kamali, 2008). He highlights that “The Prophet himself has been addressed in the Qur’ān in the following way: “And become moderate in thy pace (waqsid fi mashyika), and lower thy voice...” (31:19)” (2008, p. 12). He goes on by explaining that “Whether one reads this verse literally or metaphorically (but preferably the latter), it can sustain both meanings: to moderate one’s “pace” and one’s “voice” signifies a cultural refinement and courtesy in one’s encounter with others; it also implies moderation and balance in the context of contacts with other communities and civilisations” (2008, p. 12).

In an article “Spreading In an “Moderate Islam”? Morocco’s New African Religious Diplomacy” published by Baylocq & Hlaoua that some countries “are looking for a moderate religious framework for their populations; that of a ‘middle path’ to Islam (al wasatiyya), which Morocco wish to present as its guiding principle, particularly since the attacks that hit Casablanca in May 2003” (Baylocq & Hlaoua, 2016).

In the book “The Politics of Islamism: Diverging Visions and Trajectories” published by J.L. Esposito et al. that “wasatiyyah theological articulations offer considerable socio-political potential, particularly when progressive Islamic clerics and scholars interact closely with participatory Islamists, secular democrats and other pro-democracy actors at the national and international levels” (Esposito, et al., 2017, p. 12). The mention that “Tunisia stands as the rare wasatiyyah lighthouse in the Muslim world – stirring other Islamist parties and movements and Muslim regimes that have suffered from acute or incremental political backsliding, towards the evolving wasatiyyah path of Muslim democracy” (Esposito, et al., 2017, p. 15).

Qaradawi states that wasatiyyah believes that government obtain its authority and legitimacy from people just like democracy (Al-Qaradawi, 2004, pp. 78-80).

He states that people around the world desire for democracy and “many among the Islamists see in democracy the preferred means for restraining the sort of individualism, arbitrary rule and political despotism that afflict our Arab and Muslim peoples” (Al-Qaradawi, 2009, p. 231).

5.5 *The Principle of Ijtihad*

Islamic modernism comes in various forms. As Fuller notes that “A key early school of Islamic philosophical thought long ago abandoned is the *Mu'tazilite* rationalists” (Fuller, 2003). The rationalists seek to restore intellect and rationality to the core of Islamic understanding. Fuller further states that “They are making a comeback, reopening the basic *Mu'-tazilite* belief that God granted mankind reason and expects him to use it in understanding the message of Islam...The rationalists are willing to introduce a considerable degree of *Ijtihad* (interpretation) into the contemporary understanding of Islam” (Fuller, 2003).

Hallaq explains *Ijtihad* in an article “Was the Gate of *Ijtihad* Closed?” as “conceived by classical Muslim jurists, *Ijtihad* is the exertion of mental energy in the search for a legal opinion to the extent that the faculties of the jurist become incapable of further efforts” (Hallaq, 1984, p. 3). He states that “activity of *Ijtihad* is assumed by many a modern scholar to have ceased about the end of ninth century, with the consent of Muslim jurists themselves” (1984, p. 3).

In his recent article "*Ijtihad*" Emon describes that "Throughout the twentieth century and more feverishly in the twenty-first century, many have called for the gates (or alternatively the doors) of *Ijtihad* to be reopened, on the assumption that the gates have been closed and that *taqlid* has reigned supreme with rigid inflexibility" (Emon, 2018, p. 181).

Hoodbhoy states, "The subsequent slide towards stultifying rigidity and reactionary dogmatism is ascribed to the triumph of *taqlid* (tradition) over *Ijtihad* (innovation)" (Hoodbhoy, 1991).

Parray explained Iqbal's point that "one of the major reasons for the decline of Muslims in the past centuries was their inability or unwillingness to subject the legal system of intellectual scrutiny, particularly with reference to *Ijtihad*, which is one of the acknowledged sources of Islamic law" (Parray, 2011, p. 88). He highlights "seeking the re-evaluation and re-codification of Islamic *fiqh*, Iqbal stressed the critical need for *Ijtihad* by contemporary Muslims" (2011, p. 88).

Hallaq describes *fiqh* - "In Islamic legal theory, discovering the law of God was of crucial significance, for it was the law that informed man of the conduct acceptable to Allah... It is exactly for the purpose of finding the rulings decreed by God that the methodology of *usul al-fiqh* was established" (Hallaq, 1984, p. 4). He clarifies that the Quran and Sunnah does not specify the law but "only contain some rulings (*ahkim*; pl. of *hukm*) and indications (*dalalat* or *amiart*) that lead to the causes (*'ilal*; pl. of *cilla*) of these rulings... On the basis of these indications and causes the *mujtahid* may attempt, by employing the procedure of *qiyas* (analogy) to discover the judgement (*hukm*) of an unprecedented case (*far'*; pl. of *furu*) (1984, p. 4).

5.6. *The Principle of Ijma*

El-Fadl states that's many moderate Muslims "also rely on the concept of consensus ('*Ijma'*), or the general agreement of a group of people that a particular issue is wrong or right" (El-Fadel, 2005, p. 192). He explains that the "classical scholars utilized consensus in the jurisprudential context, and they often disagreed about the requisites and conditions for a valid consensus" (2005, p. 192).

He states that "Moderate Muslims have tried to reinterpret the concept of consensus to support the idea of democracy that is governed by the will of the majority" (2005, p. 193). He further explains that modernists contends "for the purposes of governing a country, the will of the people represents the will of the political sovereign, and this will is binding and obligatory" (2005, p. 193).

In her book "Medieval Islamic Political Thought" Crone notes "*Ijma* is classically described as the third source of law, but it was only a source in the sense that it put doctrinal constructions to the test, eliminating some, endorsing others and thereby adding a new layer of accepted views, on which the next generations could build" (Crone, 2005, p. 140).

Razek states in his book "Islam and the foundations of Political Power" that "It is the path outlined in the Book of God, the traditions of His Prophet and the consensus [*ijmā*] of Muslims" (Razek, 2013, p. 29).

In his book "Islam and Secular State" An-Naim states that "The foundational and continuing role of consensus among generations of Muslims is important not only for historical interpretation of Sharia but for its constant reform and evolution over time"

(An-Na`im, 2008, p. 12). He explains that the critical role of “of consensus is clear from the fact that it is the basis of the acceptance of the text of the Quran (al-Mushaf) and records of Sunnah as authentic content of the fundamental sources of Islam and Sharia among countless generations of Muslims” (2008, p. 12).

He describes, “consensus is the basis of the authority and continuity of *usul al-fiqh* and all of its principles and techniques, because this interpretative structure is always dependent on its acceptance as such among the generality of Muslims from one generation to the next” (2008, p. 12) He explains, “In this sense, consensus is the basis of the acceptance of the Quran and Sunnah themselves, as well as of the totality and the details of the methodology and content of their interpretation” (2008, p. 12).

He draws a contrast that “there is nothing to prevent the formation of a fresh consensus around new interpretative techniques or innovative interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah, which would become a part of Sharia, just as the existing methodologies and interpretations came to be a part of it in the first place” (2008, p. 13).

5.7. The Principle of Wasatiyyah

Wasatiyyah derives from the root Wasat, the centre or middle ground in Arabic. It inspires Muslims to strive to use reason with in the Islamic rules. It is a modern movement within Islam, which advocates centrist and moderate approach towards political, cultural and religious issues (Polka, 2003, p. 40).

Sadiki writes in article “Tunisia: 'Ghannouchi for president'?” that “Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi of Tunisia stands out as a leading voice of reason in his bid to acculturate Muslims in Tunisia, primarily, into the art of making possible a paradigm of "wasatiyyah"

(moderation) in matters concerning the shared space between religion and politics” (Sadiki, 2012). One of the main movements that espoused wasatiyyah is of Tunisia, which was led by Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi of Ennahda party.

Polka notes that “Vivid distinction between Divine ordinance and Muslim legislation: Allah’s heavenly commandments are inscribed in the text of the Koran and in the hadith of the prophet, as opposed to their earthly application, which is in the hands of Muslim lawmakers and which grants considerable leeway for opinion and speculation” (Polka, 2003, p. 43).

As stated by Polka that moderate Muslims explains that “by no means do they speak in the name of Islam, nor do they see themselves as empowered representatives of the Muslims in the name of religion...On the contrary, they believe that their purpose is to propagate their ideas by means of constant dialogue with representatives of other ideological schools and socio-political fronts in a gentle manner” (2003, p. 43).

Another main principle of wasatiyyah explained by Polka is to find balance between “the fixed tenets of religion, *thawabit*, and its modifiable rules of conduct, *mutaghayyirat*” (2003, p. 42). He further states that “These fixed tenets are, in fact, the essential articles of the faith, its age-old rituals, its supreme moral code and such peremptory statutes as are elucidated in the canonical literature, albeit the majority of the principles of the Shari’a are subject to *Ijtihad*, and allow differences of opinion” (2003, p. 42).

In Quran (Chapter 49: Verse 13), Humanity is created into nations and tribes, so they may get to know each other through their differences. El-Fadel writes that “Moderates argue that at the same time that humans ought to cooperate in the pursuit of goodness

the Qur'an clearly embraces the idea of multiplicity and pluralism of laws" (El-Fadel, 2005, p. 211).

Wasatiyyah is breaking ground in identifying and recognizing people's needs so they can better understand themselves and foster cooperation and prosperity among nations.

6. Promises of the Current Democratic Tendencies in the Muslim world: *The Case of Pakistan*

In this chapter I will look at the case of Pakistan and try to see if democracy and modernity is compatible with Islam. Pakistan is an interesting case as it has experienced democratization, marshal law, coup d'états, extreme religious fundamentalism, war against terrorism in country and on its borders. Since its birth in 1947, first time in Pakistan's history that a second consecutive democratic government has completed its five-year tenure.

6.1. Democratization in Pakistan

Pakistan has been struggling to maintain the democratic set up in the country as much as peace and stability particularly following the September 11 attacks. It was on March 17th 2013 that a democratically elected parliament in Pakistan completed its term for the first time since the country came into being. At the time of writing this paper the third democratically elected government is in tenure after the second parliament completed its full term and it is believed that democratization in the country will continue. This could help the country deal with its economic, social, and security issues. However, the history of democratization in Pakistan is bumpy.

6.1.1. The History of Democratization in Pakistan

Soon after independence, the democratic set up in the country started to fail as there was only one party at the time and there were internal political conflicts within the party. The issues on key governing matters were paramount within early governments (Tudor, 2013). By 1958 i.e. within ten years of coming into being of Pakistan, there were seven prime ministers who had entered and exit the office. The governing power was then assumed by military in 1958. The democratic system started fluctuating since then. The political instability affected the democratic set up of the country in its early years which paved way for the military to assume the governing role. Over the years three martial laws have been enforced in the country: first in 1958, second in 1977, and third in 1999 led by General Ayub Khan, General Zia-ul-Haq, and General Pervez Musharraf respectively (Afzal, 2018).

It was not until 2013 that a democratically elected parliament handed over power to another democratically elected parliament. All previous parliaments were either dissolved by the Presidents or aborted by military coup in the country (Shah, 2014).

It is also important to note the constitutional history of the country which has been as bumpy as the political set up in the country. Even though the country came into being as a result of constitutional process whereby the United Kingdom devolved independence to Pakistan and India as two separate and independent dominions under Indian Independence Act 1947, the country faced constitutional crisis soon after. The country adopted Government of India Act 1935 to enable the federation to work and frame a constitution. However, it was not until 1956 that Pakistan framed a constitution of its own. This constitution was abrogated as a result of military coup in 1958.

Subsequently the military ruler, General Ayub Khan, framed a constitution of 1962 which was presidential in nature. The present constitution of the country is the one which was passed by the legislative assembly of 1973. This constitution is regarded as resilient as it survived two military rules, that of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977 to 1988) and that of General Musharraf (1999 to 2008). It is also important to note that for the first time in political history of Pakistan the two major parties: Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group) did not collaborate with military establishment for destabilizing each other's government in a period between 2008 and 2018. This led to completion of two successive complete terms of the democratically elected parliament in the country for the first time in its political history.

6.1.2. Military and Politics

The ability of the military in the country to disrupt the civilian government has reduced over time particularly due to the manner whereby General Musharraf ran the country. Ironically it was under the rule of a military ruler that Pakistani society witnessed an exponential growth in civil society, and the freedom of press and media. However, the independence of judiciary had to be asserted following the tussle of power between the executive and judiciary due to differences between General Musharraf and the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary (Zaidi, 2011).

In the first quarter of 2007, things were in control of General Musharraf led military regime. Although terrorist attacks were taking place in the country, they were mainly targeting foreigners and minority segments of the society and not the state. Two events gave a major setback to Musharraf's regime, military operation against terrorist hiding in Red Mosque, and the sacking of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary. This led

to the rise of pro-democracy movement or the lawyers' movement in the country on one side and increase in anti-state activities on the other side. Both of which jolted the foundations of military rule in the country. The military backed government could not maintain political power in the country due to rise of lawyers' movement which were attracting masses. Ultimately, Musharraf was forced to resign six months after Pakistan People's Party formed government in the centre in 2008. This provided foundation for the establishment of civil rule in Pakistan (Shah, 2014).

Although currently military may not be in a position to disrupt the democratically elected set up of the country, but it is argued that it still maintains a significant influence in different areas of policy making such as national security matters and foreign policy. Now that the democratic set up has been going on in the country successfully for over a decade, it is believed that the reason behind this is military and civilian governments being on same page on prominent issues in the country.

6.2. Reasons for struggling democracy other than military's displeasure

6.2.1. General Unawareness about democratization

Democracy in Pakistan has been struggling also because of the unawareness among people about the true essence of democracy. Democracy in Pakistan has had been approached from Islamization as well as Secularism aspect. In Pakistan people belong to two main streams of ideologies. First stream regards that democratic set up should be secular, whereas other stream regards that it should be Islamic in nature. Democracy in Pakistan has seen the rise of both Islamic parties and secular parties. However, it is interesting to note that none of the political parties which are formed on the basis of bringing Islamization in the country ever secured majority of the seats in the country to

constitute government. The parties focused on social and economic uplift of the country have formed governments in the country. Nevertheless, the constitution of the country names it as Islamic Republic and no law in the country which is repugnant to Quran and Sunnah can be passed in the country (Dhaliwal, 2012).

6.2.2. Confusion about Islam vs Democracy

Majority of the people in Pakistan are Muslims. There is a general sentiment that the country should be govern under Islamic principles. This notion was exploited by extremist organizations which tried to take over the public sentiment that the governments are running on secular system and that Islamic principles are not governing the society. This also eroded any attempts for democratic set up in tribal areas of the country as people believed that democracy meant anti-Islamic set up not knowing that the country was already Islamic Republic and that various Islamic injunctions were already in place in the criminal law, inheritance law, and family law (Dhaliwal, 2012).

Feener writes that Pakistan “gained support by appealing to sentiments stirred by modern Muslim writers of the subcontinent, both poet/philosophers like Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and Islamist ideologues like Mawlana Mawdudi (1903–1979)...Mawdudi held an activist vision of Islam that demanded the formal implementation of the shari’a in order to be truly fulfilled” (Feener, 2004, pp. 30-31). Followers of Iqbal argues that “The liberals, who have ostensibly embraced a different approach, compel the conservatives (clergy) to bring forth changes in the teaching of Islam through *Ijtihad*, which has been proposed by the Islamic teachings” (Khan, 2016).

6.2.3. Caste system barring meritocracy in politics

The social structure in the society is also preventing the democracy to seep in at the grass root level. The back bone in any democratic set up is the consensual political culture. Political culture represents the attitudes of people with respect to political system and its different parts (Almond & Verba, 1963). The political culture in Pakistan is influenced by caste system. People in a caste-oriented society are divided into communities of social hierarchy. There is a place of each community in the hierarchy which remains the same generation by generation (Waqas & Khattak, 2017). Although there is generally a decline in the caste system but it still influences the political set up of the country (Holtzman, 2005). Barbara Crossette, a New York Times Reporter, said about Pakistan that even the choice of candidates in a political party is dependent upon the caste system (Crossette, 1990). A 2008 survey in the country showed that 37% of voters from rural areas and 27% of voters from urban areas affirmed that they participate in their respective caste meeting to decide which candidate to vote for (Waqas & Khattak, 2017). In an article "Elections and parochialism" written by Bari that "Political society in Pakistan, in spite of its stated programmes/manifestos, in fact promotes parochialism during election time (Bari, 2013). He states that "our society is predominantly parochial, as our actions tend to be influenced by our tribe, caste, sect, religion and ethnicity (Bari, 2013).

Individual opinion is suffocated in caste system as people follow the caste decision blindly. This has led to the introduction of layer within a layer in a society where democracy has not had any grip at grass root level. This only creates a challenging aspect for democracy.

6.2.4. Feudalism in Rural Areas

The rural areas of Pakistan still have remnants of feudal system. The landlords with huge land parcels in their name exploit the decision of the poor farmers about voting. The leading political parties also try to harness the support of such feudal lords or landlords to secure funding for the parties and ultimately to achieve victory in the constituency. This has led to the exploitation of poor farmers. This has only aggravated situation for poor people in rural areas who despite having the feeling that they are participating in a democratic set up due to right to vote are still unable to reap the benefits of democracy. They are unable to make an informed choice. Vote in such an instance is only reduced to element (Jaffrelot, 2016).

6.2.5. Cultural and colonial influence

Another challenge facing the democracy is the legal pluralism in the country. Legal pluralism represents the existence of more than a single legal system. Although the country has one constitution and laws are framed under it. But in essence there are customary laws in the country. People tend to follow their customs with religious binding even when it comes in conflict with the laws of the country. In a democratic state there should not be any legal pluralism. The challenge of legal pluralism also arises due to cultural pluralism. Although developed countries are also legally and culturally plural but the law of the state is regarded as supreme law and any conflict between custom and law is decided in favour of law of the state (Moore, 2001). However, in Pakistan the democratic set up is weak due to legal pluralism. For example, in tribal areas women were generally discouraged to exercise their right to vote. This became evident when in PK-23 constituency there was record of less votes being polled by women.

Subsequently, Election Commission of Pakistan declared the results null and void and ordered the re-election in the constituency (Chaudhry, 2018).

Petersen argued that the main reason developing countries struggle with democratization is because they shape their laws under the influence from developed countries and in a bid they fail to bring their laws and customs in line with each other (Petersen, 1997). This gives rise to legal pluralism in developing countries which affects the democratic set up. Pakistan had a colonial history. After independence the country had to rely on a colonial piece of legislation (Government of India Act 1935) for constitutional running of the country. The Civil Procedure Code, and the Criminal Procedure Code of the country is still the amended version of the one introduced in colonial era. The governments in Pakistan have not been able to reduce the legal pluralism in the country. In tribal areas people still tend to settle disputes as per traditions which are often in conflict with the laws of the state e.g. child bride phenomena. Due to this reason the law enforcement in the country remained weak previously and resultantly rule of law which is a cornerstone of democracy could not be ensured.

6.2.6. Weak civilian establishment

The tussle for power between military and civil administration started in the very early days of Pakistan. However, due to existential threats from India, Pakistan had to invest in its military to keep its borders safe from any external aggression. This led to considerable amount of investment being made in military expenditure as compared to education and other sectors of socio-economic importance. Due to Indian threat, Pakistan also joined military alliances at international level to seek military aid such as

CEATO and SENTO. Pakistan also aligned itself on US side in cold war thinking that it would lead to protection from India. This led to US aid being driven towards military more than towards education sector. Resultantly, the military instead of civilian administration grew strong over the years. The civil administration had fewer resources to work on the democratization of the country (Waqas & Khattak, 2017).

7. Conclusion

The democratization in Pakistan has had several challenges since the inception of the country. If the military regimes affected the democratic set up, the foreign military aid only weakened the civil administration in the country. The lack of resources for education sector created a general awareness gap in the country, which only affected the democratization in the country. The general presumption due to lack of awareness that democracy is at odds with Islamic set up also made it hard for the concept of democracy to gain grip in the minds of the people. The situation was further complicated by legal pluralism as people tended to follow their customs with religious force than the laws of the state. Therefore, there are different challenges facing democratization in Pakistan. It is imperative that different synchronized approaches are simultaneously run in the country to ensure democratization. Past decade has had a promising effect due to two successive democratically elected parliaments completing their term. As written by Lipset, "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset, 1959).

The process of Democracy is time-consuming; it requires institution building; education and active participation. Owen describes, "There was a time when many in the West

also believed strongly that liberal democracy (the marriage of individual freedom and democracy) was an oxymoron” (Owen, 2015).

Overall, the theory “Clash of Civilizations” by Huntington is a simplistic view on world politics and it divides the world into 2 groups. Muslim countries such as Tunisia, Malaysia and Pakistan have rejected the argument presented by Huntington. In fact, these countries alongside other have shown that Quran and Sunnah does not limits the societies to use principles such as *Ijtihad*, *Ijma* and *Wasatiyyah* to form democratic environment. Rosenthal writes, “Machiavelli is at one with him in stressing that the fear of God which religion inspires in man makes him obedient to orders and laws, reliable in keeping an oath or a promise, and easy to rule” (Rosenthal, 1962).

As shown in this research, Muslim societies are continuously facing exogenous and endogenous factors that shape its political thought. The colonialism resulted in the fragmentation of Muslim societies and birth of Muslim nation states based on religion, culture and nationalism. The events of 9/11 have dramatically altered the political atmosphere of Muslim world. Muslim societies are under scrutiny for the rise of terrorism, birth of ISIS and rise of authoritarian regimes. The support of authoritarian regimes by Western world have made the process of democracy slow and in some cases almost obsolete.

Despite all above factors mentioned in this paper, as research shows, Muslims desire democracy and they believe they can enjoy religious freedom more under democracy in comparison to authoritarian or fundamentalist government.

The key questions posed at the beginning of this research were: “Are the key principles of Islam compatible with core values of democracy?” or “Is Islam inherently authoritarian?” As proven in this paper, the principles of *Ijtihad*, *Ijma* or *wasatiyyah* are present in Quran and Sunnah and proves that Islam and democracy is possible if the societies reach consensus with independent reasoning.

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