CHARLES UNIVERSITY

CHARLES UNIVERSITY PRAGUE

Faculty of Social Sciences

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

and

UNIVERSITY OF CONSTANCE

Fachbereich Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft

MASTER THESIS

2019 **Niclas Schlecht**

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Security Studies

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Effects of the Brexit referendum on the Common Security and Defence Policy

Master thesis

Prague 2019

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Academic Year: 2018/2019

Bibliographic note

Schlecht, Niclas. 2019. *Effects of the Brexit referendum on the Common Security and Defence Policy*. Master thesis. Charles University Prague: Fakulty of Social Sciences, Department of Security Studies.

Abstract

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) epitomises the EU's aspirations to be a key actor in global security. With the Brexit the CSDP looses its biggest military power and one of its major payers. This thesis asseses how the EU dealed with the Brexit referendum and how the CSDP developed. It provides evaluation of the CSDP-related policies and asses the degree to which new developments can be traced back to the Brexit referendum and how they are infected by domestic constituencies in the EU Member States. The thesis shows that the exit of the UK gave the CSDP new possibilities to develop, that were not fully used due to domestic constraints of EU Member States.

Abstrakt

Společná bezpečnostní a obranná politika (SBOP) ztělesňuje touhu EU být klíčovým hráčem v globální bezpečnosti. S Brexitem ztrácí SBOP svou největší vojenskou sílu a jednoho z hlavních poplatníků za bezpečnost. Tato práce zkoumá, jakým způsobem se EU zabývala referendem o Brexitu a jak se vyvíjela SBOP. Poskytuje hodnocení o politikách souvisejících se SBOP a posuzuje, do jaké míry lze vysledovat jejich nový vývoj po referendu o Brexitu a jak je ovlivňují domácí voliči členských států EU. Práce ukazuje, že odchod Velké Británie otevřel SBOP nové možnosti rozvoje, které nebyly plně využívány kvůli různým domácím omezením v členských státech EU.

Klíčová slova

Evropská unie; Spojené království; CSDP; Liberalismus; pravidla bezpečnosti; obrana; Brexit

Keywords

European Union; United Kindom; CSDP; liberalism; security policy; defence; Brexit

Range of thesis: [202.658 symbols, 31.881 words, 82 pages]

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 30.12.2018 Niclas Schlecht

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Aliaksei Kazharski and Dr. Sebastian Ziaja for their guidance and advice.

I am grateful to my family, especially my parents and grandparents, who have provided me with unwavering support throughout my whole academic journey. A special thanks to Saadet for her support during the process of writing this thesis.

Institute of Political Studies

Master thesis propsal „Effects of the Brexit referendum on the Common Security and Defence Policy“

Proposal Master thesis “Effects of the Brexit referendum on the Common Security and Defence policy“

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On 23th of June 2016 Great Britain held an historic referendum where the citizens decided with a majority of 51.9 per cent to leave the European Union (EU). After the referendum, there has been widespread speculation in the media and around policy-makers about the implications of the Brexit decision in the area of security and defence. However, there is absence of clear, evidence-based insight into potential policy implications, because much of this commentary has been reactive and political. My thesis aims to help address the deficit of thinking in this area by analyzing the implications the European Union and the United Kingdom (UK) are facing in terms of defence and security after the British withdrawal from the European Union.

Most of the academic and public attention has focused on what might be the future economic relationship model between the UK and the EU and which implications can be drawn from that. None of the academic literature so far, deals with the real implications of the referendum on EU politics. The UK has long been ranked among the world’s most capable and influential nations in the area of defence and security and therefore the referendum should have an implication on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In my thesis I will evaluate the impact of the referendum on the CSDP and how the CSDP developed since the British decision to leave the EU.

Theory and hypothesis

The objective of this chapter is to provide a theory-driven explanation of the CSDP as defined by domestic politics and following a liberal, rationalist approach. What it is usually acknowledged as playing some part in IR and foreign policy-making,

domestic politics is arguably the most important omitted explanation for CSDP (Krotz and Mahler 2011: 571; Moravcsik 1997: 538-541). Nevertheless, Liberalism may be a powerful tool for explaining both the institutional innovations and the dynamics in security and defence cooperation. Liberalism claims that foreign policy is strongly influenced by domestic processes and events, both at the individual and the group level (Moravcsik 2008). This holds for national foreign policies as well as for the CSDP of the EU. The basic argument of liberalism is that the CSDP represents a mixture of partly overlapping and partly diverging national preferences, and that cross-national differences in societal expectations are the primary causes of differences between EU governmental interests. This chapter puts forward a liberal framework for explaining the development of the CSDP. It builds in particular on Andrew Moravcsik's New Liberalism insofar as it focuses on the nexus between governments and the societies they represent (Moravcsik 2008). This chapter asserts that foreign policy is a function of governmental interests. I argue that, in the absence of a direct external threat, these interests are primarily a function of domestic political concerns: governments treat foreign policy as instrumental to their objective of staying in power. Since no direct external threat to European security has emerged since the end of the Cold War, EU governments determine their positioning within the CSDP according to perceived domestic political exigencies and expediencies. Subsequently I argue that in order to understand and explain the CSDP from the perspective of governmental interests, Andrew Moravcsik's new liberalism (2008) is a good starting point.

Hypothesis

The thesis tests two hypotheses designed to help explain the development of the CSDP since the Brexit referendum in June 2016. In particular they explore the relationship between Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the processes through which CSDP is implemented.

H1: The referendum gave the CSDP new power and led to faster development.

The Brexit referendum leads to a considerable momentum in EU security and defence policy. On the one hand because significant changes that have been on the cards for much of the recent decade have been blocked by the UK can now be launched (see Martill and Sus 2018: 11) and on the other hand because the

European public is in favor of the CSDP (see Eurobarometer 2018) and therefore governments will support the development of the CSDP.

H2: The referendum had no positive influence on the CSDP.

The UK is one of only three European Member States that actually spends more than 2% of their GDP for defence. The UK is no longer a great power, but it is a power of great importance to European security and defence. When the UK departs the EU in 2019, the member state with the largest defence budget (at around £35bn, the UK's defence budget is also the second largest in NATO (behind only the US) and fifth largest in the world), one of the two largest defence-investment budgets in the EU, the proven will and ability to deploy armed forces on expeditionary operations around the globe, and an important share of the European defence-industrial base will leave (see Giegerich and Mölling 2018: 4). Also, the UK has the largest defence budget of all the EU Member States and accounts alone for about 25% of defence equipment-procurement spending among them (Giegerich and Mölling 2018: 7-8). This combined with the fact that the UK is the second-biggest economy in the European Union and must pay the proportional share to the CSDP leads to the question if the European Union can compensate this loss and develop a more ambitious CSDP without this money and capabilities. The UK's withdrawal from the EU could also have significant implications for levels of defence spending elsewhere in Europe. Even before the UK referendum, European defence expenditure was a matter of considerable political controversy, as well as a source of tension within the EU and between NATO allies (see Black 2017: 40).

Methodology

I will explore the development of the CSDP after the Brexit referendum with a combination of document analysis and discourse analysis. Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material. Like other analytical methods in qualitative research, document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge (Corbin and Strauss 2008; see also Rapley 2007). As a research method, document analysis is particularly applicable to qualitative case studies—intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, event, organization, or

program (Stake 1995; Yin 1994). Non-technical literature, such as reports and internal correspondence, is a potential source of empirical data for case studies; for example, data on the context within which the participant operates (Mills, Bonner & Francis 2006). Furthermore, as Merriam (1988) pointed out, "documents of all types can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem" (Merriam 1988: 118). Document analysis is an efficient and effective way of gathering data because documents are manageable and practical resources. Documents are commonplace and come in a variety of forms, making documents a very accessible and reliable source of data. Also, documents are stable, "non-reactive" data sources, meaning that they can be read and reviewed multiple times and remain unchanged by the researcher's influence or research process (Bowen 2009: 31).

Discourse analysis must be considered not just as a method, but also as a perspective "on the nature of language and its relationship to the central issues of the social sciences" (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 222). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a powerful tool of scrutiny of other textual and non-textual practices of securitization to uncover unequal relations of power (Hansen et al. 2000). Thus, the thesis borrows from CDA's analytical dimensions, including the study of the characteristics of the texts, the uses of dialogue in texts, and the context (social practice) that is produced in the official language (Fairclough 1992). Thus, a critical discourse analysis allows the researcher to describe, interpret and explain social processes. In light of this, discourse analysis is the appropriate method to examine if the changes in EU foreign policy can be related to the exit of the UK from the EU.

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Contents

List of Abbreviations

CA *Comprehensive Approach*
CCM *Civilian Crisis Management*
CDA *Critical Discourse Analysis*
CFSP *Common Foreign and Security Policy*, *Common Foreign and Security Policy*
CPCC *Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability*
CRRT *Cyber Rapid Response Team*
CSDP *Common Security and Defence Policy*
DPP *Defence Planning Process*
EC *European Community*
ECFR *European Council on Foreign Relations*
ECSC *European Coal and Steel Community*
EDA *European Defence Agency*
EDAP *European Defence Action Plan*
EDC *European Defence Community*
EDF *European Defence Fund*
EDIDP *EU Defence Industrial Development Programme*
EDU *European Defence Union*
EEAS *European External Action Service*
ENISA *EU Agency for Network and Information Security*
EP *European Parliament*
EPC *European Political Cooperation*
EPF *European Peace Facility*
ERRF *European Rapid Reaction Force*
ESDI *European Security and Defence Identity*
ESDP *European Security and Defence Policy*
ESS *European Security Strategy*
EU *European Union*
EUBG *EU Battlegroups*
EUCAP *EU Capacity Building Mission*
EUGS *EU Global Strategy*
EULEX *EU Rule of Law Mission*
EUMC *EU Military Committee*
EUMS *EU Military Staff*
EUPOL *EU Police Mission in Afghanistan*
EUTM *EU Training Mission*
FAC *Foreign Affairs Council*
HQ *Headquarter*
HR/VP *High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission*
IPSD *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*
IR *International Relations*
JSCC *Joint Support Coordination Cell*
MALE *Medium-Altitude Long Endurance Drone*
MEP *Member of European Parliament*
MPCC *Military Planning and Conduct Capability*
NATO *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*
OSCE *Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe*
PESCO *Permanent Strcutured Cooperation*
PSC *Political and Security Committee*
QMV *Qualified Majority Voting*
R&D *Research and Development*
SDIP *Security and Defence Implementation Plan*
SEA *Single European Act*
SEDE *EP Committee for Security and Defence*
SME *Small and medium enterprises*
TEU *Treaty on European Union*
UK *United Kingdom*
UN *United Nations*
WEU *Western European Union*

"Europe will be forged in crisis and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises."
(Jean Monnet, 1976)

I. Introduction

On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) held an historic in-out referendum on its membership of the European Union (EU). On polling day, the results showed 51.9% of those voted were in favor of leaving the EU, while 48.1% were in favor of remain, on the basis of an overall turnout of 72.2% (implying that around 13 million people did not vote) (see BBC 2016). In the aftermath of the referendum, there has been a time of uncertainty how and when the UK will leave the EU. It took almost nine months for the UK government to deliver formal notification of withdrawal from the European Union under Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TEU) (see Duke 2019: 8). This was done on 29 March 2017 in the form of a letter from UK Prime Minister Theresa May to Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council. In this context of uncertainty, there has been widespread speculation in media and policy fora about the implications of this Brexit decision in the field of security and defence (see Besch and Black 2016). However, as Black et al. (2017) describe it, "much of this commentary has been reactive, political or else influenced by the lack of concrete evidence and objective research and analysis about what the UK's decision is likely to mean" (Black et al. 2017: 19). Based on Andrew Moravcsik's Intergovernmental approach this thesis analyzes, with a document as well as a discourse analysis, the progress the EU has reached in its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the shock of the Brexit referendum.

Successive UK governments, including that of Prime Minister David Cameron, have consistently been at the forefront of attempts to ensure that the EU, especially on questions of security and defence, should not be subject to more influence or control by the European Commission or the European Parliament. There were instances where the UK played an obstructive role, such as the blocking of a functional operations headquarters at the EU level or, for seven years, any increase of the European Defence Agency (EDA) budget (see Duke 2019: 1). The UK has remained distrustful of the entire concept of the CSDP, opposed to the coordination of military hardware or personnel, and a slim contributor to CSDP military operations, and

opposed to the CSDP approach of preferring capacity-building projects based on civilian missions (see Hadfield 2018: 179). Instead, Britain prefers a balance of NATO multilateral frameworks and ex-EU bilateral defence relations (e.g. UK and France with their St. Malo declaration). Arguably, the majority of UK security and defence decisions taken in the past decade "have been made with no reference to military roles that might be undertaken by the UK through the EU" (Whitman 2016: 259). Historically, the UK has often been an "awkward partner", to quote the title of a leading book on the UK's role in the EU (George 1997).

The direction and nature of the EU's evolution post-Brexit is of particular interest in the field of security and defence policy. On the one hand for the EU, Brexit comes at a sensitive moment when security and defence are not at the top of the agenda but are central efforts to relaunch wider public enthusiasm for the European project (see Duke 2019: viii). Operating via state-to-state negotiations, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP represent the least integrated areas of policy between the 28 EU Member States. On the other hand, this area is one in which existing structures are more open to alteration and development, in which the capabilities on each side more evenly matched, and in which the stakes are particularly high, given concerns about the credibility of the US commitment to Europe and the less secure international environment. Both sides stand to lose from British withdrawal. Britain is one of only two EU countries that can deploy close to full-spectrum military capabilities, representing one quarter of the Union's total defence capabilities (see Black et al. 2017), and has been the fourth largest contributor to the EU budget (see Herszenhorn and Ariès 2017). The EU also loses one of its two Member States with permanent seats on the UN Security Council (UNSC) (see Dee and Smith 2017: 529–530) as well as the benefits of the UK's considerable diplomatic networks, including the Anglo-American "special relationship" (see Martill and Sus 2018a: 848; Chalmers 2017: 1; Oliver and Williams 2016: 547; Rees 2017: 561).

Writing about the UK's exit from the EU (Brexit) could be assumed to be reckless, especially when the nature of the UK's relationship with the EU are subject to still ongoing negotiation. This thesis does not try and predict what will happen, but it does ask what the Brexit referendum has already changed upon the CSDP. This thesis

therefore contributes to the ongoing debates surrounding Brexit in an informed and analytical manner.

Brexit has renewed scholarly attention and asks new questions to the dynamics of European integration (see Bulmer and Joseph 2016; Hodson and Puetter 2018: 466). First, it has renewed attention to the integrative versus disintegrative dynamics of crises, given the unprecedented challenge to the EU's efficacy and legitimacy arising from the decision (see Chopin and Lequesne 2016: 541; Cini and Verdun 2018; Schimmelfennig 2018). These works have built on earlier theoretical studies examining the integrative (see Börzel 2018: 475; Mény 2014: 1350; Niemann and Ioannou 2015) and disintegrative (see Hooghe and Marks 2009; Jones 2018; Lefkofridi and Schmitter 2015) consequences stemming from the EU's myriad recent crises (see Martill and Sus 2018a: 848-849). Most of the academic and public attention has focused on what might be the future economic relationship model between the UK and the EU and which implications can be drawn from that. None of the academic literature so far, deals with the real implications of the referendum on EU politics. The UK has long been ranked among the world's most capable and influential nations in the area of defence and security and therefore the referendum should have an implication on the CSDP. In my thesis I will evaluate the impact of the referendum on the CSDP and how the CSDP developed since the British decision to leave the EU.

This thesis builds upon Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism approach and provides a theory-driven explanation of the development of the CSDP as defined by domestic politics (see Moravcsik 1991; 1993; 1994; 1995; 1998; 2000; 2008). The author argues that, in the absence of a direct external threat, these national interests are primarily a function of domestic political concerns: governments treat foreign policy as instrumental to their objective of staying in power. Since no direct external threat to European security has emerged since the end of the Cold War, EU governments determine their positioning within the CSDP according to perceived domestic political exigencies and expediencies (see Pohl et al. 2015: 65). Thereby the author makes use of Moravcsik's three-stage framework, where states first define their preferences, then bargain to reach a common agreement and eventually create or reform institutions to secure the negotiation result (see Richter 2015: 52).

The results of this thesis show, that significant changes that have been on the cards for much of the recent decade, and have been blocked by the UK, have now been launched. With the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), the EU Military Headquarters (MPCC) and a European Defence Fund (EDF) the EU instigated for key security and defence initiatives after the Brexit referendum. While the projects are expected to contribute to more interoperable national armed forces in the EU, they do not challenge the fundamental premise of national control over militaries or the intergovernmental nature of CSDP decision-making (see Martill and Sus 2018b: 859). However, important questions remain about the commitment of Member States to the new mechanism—especially those, such as France and Poland, that have either hedged their bets or made their participation conditional (see Billon-Galland and Quencez 2017: 5-6; Martill and Sus 2018a: 859; Fiott et al. 2017: 36-39). The achievements and the progress made in European defence integration after the Brexit referendum remain limited in scope and reach and are surrounded by a discourse of relevance which perhaps overstate the actual outcome of institutional developments (see Svendsen 2018: 2).

The thesis proceeds as follows. The next chapter deals with the historic development of the CSDP and European defence and security integration (chapter 2). This is followed by the theoretical framework and especially Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism approach (chapter 3) and the hypotheses (chapter 4). Chapter 5 deals with the methodological procedure, followed by the analysis (chapter 6). The findings and results (chapter 7) as well as the limitations (chapter 8) of this thesis can be found at the end of this work.

II. Origins and development of the CSDP

How, and why, does a regional economic organization turns itself into an international security actor, willing and able to deploy various types of assistance, including military and police forces, to countries well beyond its geographic core? In order to create a historical background for the thesis, this chapter will be about the steps made in the European security and defence integration in the period after the Second World War. This is of particular importance, because progress and mistakes of the past could give an insight into how and why some decisions are made in the present

and possibly will be in the future. This is the case because defence and security integration is not only a topic of this time but it has also been part in the early years of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (see Talman 2016: 12). Therefore, this section of historic development will be dedicated to the period from the moment the ECSC was created until recent years.

Albeit representing one of the youngest EU policy fields, CSDP's origins date back much further than to its formal incorporation into the CFSP framework in 1999. The first incentives and the theoretic idea of security and defence cooperation beyond the nation state date back to the immediate post-WWII years. In a political environment that was characterized by great efforts and enthusiasm for establishing common inter-state forums to prevent the repeating of the past a variety of institutional settings appeared, each bearing an explicit (NATO, Western European Union (WEU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)) or implicit reference (ECSC, Council of Europe) to security and defence (see Nulle 2014: 32).

Great Britain proposed the creation of the WEU, a version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), only with Western European countries in 1954. The structure of the WEU was not something new because a large portion of the structure was already agreed upon in 1948 in the Brussels treaty between the UK, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Rosenberg 2005: 54). With the signing of the Treaty of Brussels the vision of a mutual European defence system became a formal goal of Western European inter-state cooperation (see Lindstrom 2012: 14; European External Action Service 2014a). It marked the first step towards multilateral European integration on an economic, social, cultural and security level (see Howorth 2012: 5).

In addition to this, instead of creating a supranational army, as proposed by France with the European Defence Community (EDC), the WEU focused on using national armies (Rosenberg 2005: 54; Dinan 2014: 65). This was a solution that was acceptable for all parties in the question of the German re-armament and resulted in the opportunity for Germany to rearm. Thus, the following establishment of the WEU in 1954 marked the first institutional attempt to a common approach on security and defence policy of solely European origins (as opposed to NATO) (see Leuffen et al. 2012).

The bulk of parallel institutional structures in Europe following the Second World War led to a quite long phase of consolidation, during which the different settings balanced their position and stand in the international environment (see Nulle 2014: 33). In the 1970s European Community's (EC) foreign policy cooperation was largely symbolic. The EC became increasingly engaged but the Member States took the lead on key issues, often pursuing different foreign policy objectives. At the Hague Summit of 1969, the foreign ministers of the Community were requested to increase cooperation between the Member States in foreign policy. This led to the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The EPC was based on intergovernmental cooperation and consensus, and its decisions were not binding and excluded from military aspects. Although the EPC came into force in 1970, it was not recognized in the Treaties until the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. But this comparatively weak, informal mechanism certainly did not empower the EC to undertake complex foreign security assistance operations in that time (see Smith 2017: 22). The SEA of 1986 explicitly stated that Member States would formulate and implement a common foreign policy on the basis of intergovernmental co-operation. It also gave a great impetus to European integration by creating a base for advancement in foreign and security policy cooperation, albeit in an intergovernmental nature (see Nugent 2017).

By the mid-1980s, the WEU leadership had two clear principles in mind that would eventually define the future of European defence: first, the broader European construction would "remain incomplete" without its own strategic pillar, which implied both a capability and an identity, and second, it could afford no military adventures of its own, independent of the USA (see Western European Union 1984 and Western European Union 1987). Therefore, parallel to its search for increased self-reliance, the revived WEU sought to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance which remained "the foundation of Western security" (Western European Union 1984). In effect, by developing what would be eventually termed European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), the WEU, generally backed by the US/NATO, sought to "straddle the fence" and satisfy both the Europeanists and Atlanticists simultaneously (see Ivanovski 2016: 47).

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the building and cultivation of ESDI had to be fundamentally adapted as the WEU found itself at the crossroads of three developments: Firstly, the creation of the EU which had to acquire its own defence

component. Secondly, NATO's adaptation to both the post-Cold War world and thirdly a greater European role within the Alliance, and "the growing significance […] of events […] outside Europe" (WEU 1990: 3). The first development was openly endorsed by the WEU Paris Communiqué of December 1990: "the building of Europe […] will have to acquire a defence dimension" (WEU 1990: 3). On the other hand, the emerging crises within and beyond Europe, alongside with the opportunities of the unipolar setting, allowed for the introduction of the concept of crisis management (or the so-called "forward defence") into the western strategic narrative, which eventually overshadowed territorial defence as a traditional and primary function of the state (see Ivanovski 2016: 54).

Consequently, it was not before the late 1990s that a fully consistent link between the EU and security and defence matters was created[1]. In this context, the Balkan wars in the immediate neighborhood of the EU, gained particular importance for explicit considerations and the final outcome of a security and defence arm for the EU.

The EPC was replaced with a far more bureaucratic and legally complex formal EU policy domain in 1993: The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Several scholars have examined the (apparent) sudden emergence of the CSDP in the late 1990s after decades of intensive, yet often fruitless, debates about whether the European integration project should extent its cooperation in the area of security and defence policy (see Smith 2017: 4). Under the 1991 Treaty of Maastricht (Article J.4.2, Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU)), the EU gained the legal authority to draw upon an institutional framework, which is known as the WEU, to facilitate its ambitions as international security actor. With the treaty of Maastricht two "pillars" were added, as a sign that the Member States want to cooperate further in these sectors. For this thesis, the most important pillar is the CFSP. The key elements of the pillar were the general objectives of the CFSP that Member States were expected to achieve: intergovernmental decision-making based on unanimity; the eventual creation of a common defence policy; and the WEU as part of the development of the Union (see Nugent 2017).

Under the EU framework, the CFSP involves a much higher degree of coherence and institutionalization as a formal legal system (see Galloway 1995; Regelsberger 1997; Smith 2004), a major departure from the informality of EPC (see Holland 2016;

[1] Additionally, the entire international security environment entered a period of fundamental change after the end of the Cold War by beginning to disrupt and therefore questioning the, by then established, international security structures (see United Nations 1995).

Regelsberger 1997; Ginsberg 1997). The CFSP was only modestly active in the realm of security, and virtually dormant in the realm of defence, even though the mechanism was explicitly created to help improve the EU's capabilities in these areas. By the start of the reform process that resulted in the Amsterdam Treaty (1996), only a hand-full minor security-related issues had been addressed directly by the CFSP through specific joint actions (see Smith 2017: 24). One, for example, was the CFSP Joint Action on EU participation in the peace plan for Bosnia Herzegovina in 1995.

However, adding the policy areas was one thing, but making it effective and functional is a completely different problem. In the light of the Yugoslavia-conflict it was made clear that the EU was all but ready to act (Dinan 2014: 240-241). Yet it failed to make such use of the WEU throughout the 1990s, despite numerous opportunities, particularly in the Balkans (see Smith 2017: 4).

Albeit the fact that the WEU developed and evolved in parallel to the EU framework the general political foundation it laid, should not be underestimated: While starting out as a security and defence forum it formally acted and even launched common operations in the Balkans throughout the 1990s it was gradually incorporated into the EU legal framework and entirely shut down in 2011 (see European External Action Service 2014b). As Osland (2004) stated: the Balkans region has become the "European security laboratory" for both the CFSP and the CSDP (Osland 2004: 545).

The various steps leading to deeper European integration and thus differentiation of the EU's political system, kept European officials and proponents relatively busy with processes of internal consolidation until the late 1990s. Consequently, from an internal perspective the formal establishment of the CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and later the CSDP, marked the constitution of a new layer of EU integration on the way from a mere economic union to a political one (see German Federal Foreign Office 2018).

WEU ministers had convened in the Petersberg Castle (June 19, 1992) near Bonn, Germany, in an attempt to strengthen the WEU's operational role and its organic ties with both the EU and NATO, as envisaged by the 1991 Maastricht Declaration. The resultant *Petersberg Declaration* urged WEU states, in addition to their overlapping collective defence commitments under both Article V of the Brussels Pact and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, to set up appropriate command and control structures and generate multinational and multi-purpose military units under WEU command in

order to be able to meet the *Petersberg tasks*: humanitarian tasks and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management of combat forces, including peacemaking (see WEU 1992). They were defined as such in 1992 by the WEU and were included in Article 17 of the treaty on the EU (Nice Treaty) on 26 February 2001.

In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam strengthened the Maastricht Treaty in multiple ways because the EU Member States agreed to various reforms. The EU adopted the Petersberg tasks and marked the beginning of more internalized and autonomous policy (see Freire 2008). The EU worked towards a more common position for the Member States by adding the position of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which at the same time is Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) and the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 51). In addition, this gave the EU external policies a face for the outside world and an institutional body to hold regulate meetings and create a common position for the EU. Also, to overcome the inefficient consensus-based decision-making, the Treaty allowed Member States to abstain from a common operation (see Freire 2008: 9-25). This way, other Member States could still engage whilst the joint operation did not get blocked. Additionally, the Treaty included “Common Strategies”, which enabled the EU to set objectives in key domains - such as EU-Russia relations - and design common policies to achieve them (Freire 2008: 11). It renamed the EPC into the CFSP and new policy instruments expanded the Unions foreign policy toolbox. Qualified majority voting (QMV) became a decision-making tool for some policy implementations, although this was not used at that time. It seemed that the willingness for military cooperation among EU Member States restored, but common positions among them about international security were not yet reached.

Regarding changes in responsibilities, the treaty of Amsterdam (Article 11) slightly expanded the definition of fundamental objectives of the CFSP. The Amsterdam Treaty did not increase common spending, it was “an evolutionary rather than revolutionary instrument” (Smith 2017: 26). At that time the CFSP budget was around 40-70 million European currency units each year. This spending, however, still comprised only a tiny fraction (less than one-tenth of 1 per cent) of the entire EC budget. The Amsterdam treaty created a provision of CFSP common strategies (Articles 12-13), in addition to already existing CFSP common positions and joint

actions. However, this policy tool never developed as expected, and was eliminated by the Lisbon Treaty a decade later (see Smith 2017: 26).

At the Saint Malo Summit in December 1998, Britain and France set out the ambition - described by Howorth as a "Rubicon moment" (Howorth 2000: 34) −to build "a (defence) capacity for autonomous action" (Saint Malo Declaration 1998), backed up by credible military forces. They stressed to equip the EU with the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises (see also Tardy 1999; Ulriksen 2004; Freire 2008; Zyla 2011).

> *"The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage [and]...must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises." "[...]the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication […]. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology."*
>
> Saint Malo Joint Declaration on European Defence, Franco-British Summit 1998

This path-breaking agreement, which effectively killed off the ESDI effort within NATO, led quickly to discussions about the creation of a formal ESDP capability at the European Councils in Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999), and Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000). At the Cologne summit in June 1999, the 15 EU Member States officially launched the "common European policy on security and defence". Soon thereafter, it acquired the label the "European Security and Defence Policy" (ESDP) (Bickerton et al. 2011: 3).

Through the quartet of summits in Cologne, Helsinki, Santa Maria da Feira, and Nice, within less than two years (1999-2000), the EU set out its basic ESDP framework, including initial guidelines for permanent cooperation with NATO. At Cologne, EU leaders agreed on ESDP's politico-strategic matrix. This was followed by the outlining of the new policy's military dimension and ambition, the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), in Helsinki which made a commitment to the Headline Goals (see European Council 1999). The subsequent 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal was equally

military-focused when calling on Member States to be able to "deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons)" (Council of the EU 1999). This ambition was supposed to move the EU away from its "civilian" and "normative" power status, with all associated questions about the impact of militarization on the nature of the EU (see Tardy 2018; Télo 2004; Smith 2005; Manners 2006; Smith 2017). These plans provided a major focal point of talks concerning the ESDP during the December 2000 European Council at Nice. By early 2000, the cornerstone ESDP institutions, the Political and Security Committee (PSC/COPS), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), were put into function as interim agencies before being fully institutionalized by the Council's decisions and confirmed by the Treaty of Nice the following year (see Quinlan 2001: 63). This rapid institutional build-up and attainment of operational capabilities was basically enabled by the Union's rich institutional legacy as well as the capability achievements within the WEU (see Howorth 2000: 63-67).

In late 2000 in Nice, the European Council rounded up the fundamentals of a comprehensive ESDP. Specifically, on this occasion the EU leaders adopted the documents detailing the composition, competences, and operation of the *permanent* political and strategic-military structures that were yet-to-be fully formalized (see Ivanovski 2016: 106). Further, they also elaborated the Helsinki Headline Goals with regard to forces, strategic capabilities, and a progress review mechanism, defined the capabilities required for civilian crisis management, laid down the EU's cooperation and consultation arrangements with NATO, non-EU European allies and EU candidates, as well as "other potential partners," and confirmed (the EU Council's "decisions of principle" regarding) the oncoming inclusion into the Union of WEU knowledge/analytical resources and hi-tech capabilities (European Council 2000).

The EUMC composed of the military chiefs of the EU Member States, is the highest military body within the EU. The permanent inclusion of military officials in the EU's institutional structure represented a major breach of a taboo extending back to the failed EDC plans of the 1950s (see Smith 2017: 31). The following year, the Treaty of Nice, along with relevant Council decisions, authoritatively sanctioned the major institutional developments in ESDP since 1999. As a result, the reinvented PSC now featuring a new name and ambassadorial composition, emerged from obscurity to

become a pivotal nexus in the nascent, multilevel CFSP/ESDP mechanism, responsible for, among other things, "political control and strategic direction of EU crisis management operations" (TEU Consolidated Version: Article 25 (7)). Also, the comprehensive ESDP was enabled by the introduction of the long-anticipated flexibility clause (*enhanced cooperation*) (TEU Consolidated Version: Article 27) in the civilian portion of CFSP/ESDP as well as penetration of the QMV rule into pillar two (TEU Consolidated Version: Article 18(5) and 23(2)) (see Ivanovska 2016: 76).

Overall, then, the ESDP was built upon an institutional foundation that had been very well embedded within the EU thanks to three decades of European foreign/security policy cooperation, leading up to the treaty of Nice (in force since February 1st, 2003). One type of cooperation was intergovernmental: the agenda-setting roles of the Council of Foreign Ministers (today's Council of the EU) and the European Council of Heads of State. Another path was supranational: greater involvement by the European Commission, limited input by the European Parliament (EP) and the use of QMV procedures. The third path was transgovernmental (see Smith 2017: 31). By 2003 the new HR/VP for the Union's Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, launched the European Security Strategy (ESS), promising an EU capable of "early, rapid and where necessary robust intervention" (Solana 2003: 11) across the full range of Petersberg Tasks, up to and including peace-making. Even so, post-Saint-Malo European defence autonomy, as embodied by what came to be known as ESDP, could not have been seriously delinked from NATO at this stage. There was little choice in the aftermath of Saint-Malo but to develop a full-fledged EU/ESDP-NATO strategic partnership. On March 17, 2003, Javier Solana and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson concluded a comprehensive framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, which also included Berlin Plus as a set of legally non-binding agreements and protocols providing the EU/ESDP with assured access to NATO resources for military crisis management[2]. In 2004 the Council committed to "civilian goals" consisting of a range of modalities for the setting up and deployment of multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) resources in an integrated format (see Council of the EU 2004). These were the early years of the EU comprehensive approach (CA) that would underpin Union engagement in peacekeeping and CCM

[2] As an adaptation of the WEU-NATO grand bargain, the Berlin Plus package consists of seven components and their secret annexes: an agreement on secure information exchange based on reciprocal security protection rules, assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led military operations, availability of NATO assets and capabilities such as HQ and communication units, strategic transports, and ISTAR (e.g. AWACS, targeting specialists), procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities, terms of reference for the DSACEUR and NATO European command options, arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements, and consultation arrangements in the context of EU-led operations relying on NATO resources (see Ivanovski 2016: 64).

through the ESDP (see Major and Mölling 2013,45−62; Smith 2012; Smith 2013: 25−44). The transition from civilian power to comprehensive power was underway (see Duchêne 1972: 32-47; Sweeney and Winn 2018: 4).

Ever since the ESDP became the core of CFSP under the Treaty of Amsterdam and, thus, of the former second pillar, the EU foreign policy and diplomatic action regarding the political aspects of security, has shared basically the same institutional and decision-making arrangement with the Union's newly established security and defence enterprise (see Ivanovski 2016: 89). In that sense, the largely intergovernmental procedure pertinent to CFSP in general has also been applicable to ESDP. But there is one big difference. Since the old, pre-1999 set of major EU institutions responsible for CFSP could not have entirely covered an emerging strategic enterprise which included two dimensions, civilian and military - it had to be subsequently bolstered by various analytical, defence, civilian and integral crisis management structures. The cumulative result has been a sizable, *multilevel* CFSP/ESDP mechanism (see Smith 2017: 4-5; Ivanovski 2016: 76).

Procedurally, there is also a notable difference between the CSDP and its broader matrix. While, on a formal level, many EU foreign and security policy measures have become subject to QMV as a default option, the Union's "decisions having military and defence implications" (TEU: Article J.4(3); TEU Consolidated Version: Article 31(4)), save as some concerning the CSDP's institutional framework, remain the bastion of consensus, both *de facto* and *de jure* (see Ivanovski 2016: 90). Thus, European security and defence is still an exclusively consensual matter, regulated by legally non-binding acts.

In 2008 a summit was held in Paris, where the then HR/VP of the CFSP Javier Solana, emphasized the need to resolve the capabilities gap and improve civilian and military capacities. This summit also reaffirmed Helsinki's Headline Goal. The Lisbon Treaty signed on 13 December 2007 (came into force in 2009) introduced a mutual defence clause, meaning that if a Member State is attacked on its own territory, other Member States are obliged to provide assistance. The Lisbon Treaty gave security and defence its own section in the TEU and relabeled the ESDP to the CSDP (see Nugent 2017: 382). It created the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the HR/VP, then Catherine Ashton (UK). The new post gave the HR/VP the possibility to assemble all the EU security assets when necessary and to

apply an overall approach in EU crisis management (see European Commission 2015: 2). Smith (2017) describes the development of the EEAS as a more "top down" solution driven by EU Member States and the Commission, rather than a "bottom up" approach based on pragmatic operational experiences (see Smith 2017: 249).
Finally, the Lisbon Treaty expanded the interpretation of the Petersberg Tasks, which now include:

> *"Joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combatting terrorism in their territories."*
>
> TEU, Article 43 (1).

A lot of changes have been made in the European security and defence policy. The treaty of Lisbon already increased the cooperation between authorities of different Member States. The Internal Security Fund has been created to address the targets up to 2020 (key objectives are fight against terrorism, organized crime, and enhancing the capacity of EU Member States in managing security-related risks and crisis (see European Commission 2018a)). Member States coordinate common priorities and actions through the EU Policy Cycle to response efficiently in crisis situations, avoiding an overlap in efforts by the Member States (see European Commission 2015: 5). However, despite the expansion in the CSDP and the increase of the EU as a security actor, the success of the CSDP is limited to the Petersberg Tasks. This means that the "traditional" defence is still left for NATO (or in certain circumstances, to national defence itself) (see Kok 2016: 18). As Smith (2017) states "the initial implementation of the Lisbon Treaty after 2009 seriously disrupted, rather than facilitated or improved, the development of the CSDP" (Smith 2017: 246). One problem is that the Lisbon Treaty failed to streamline foreign policy decision-making to cope with an EU of 27 (later 28) Member States. A second problem is that the Treaty failed to effectively reorganize the EU's larger foreign policy framework in order to make a place for the EEAS, which effectively involved the creation of a "second Commission" for EU foreign and security policy (see Smith 2017: 248).

Since the Lisbon Treaty's coming into force, the rotating, six-month EU Presidencies have remained functional within the Council but have lost much of their importance both as a driving force of the Union in general and as a promoter of CFSP/CSDP in particular (see Hilmann and Hadjisavvas 2012). Meanwhile, the Council itself has seen an increased amount of CSDP-related work, producing *inter alia* consecutive conclusions on civil-military capabilities. It currently deals with security and defence issues through both its formal, foreign ministerial composition called *Foreign Affairs Council* (FAC), which is nonetheless co-attended by national defence ministers twice a year. Major EU institutions like the European Commission, which have thus far played, so to speak, lateral roles in CFSP/CSDP are likely to continue to strengthen their participation in the formulation of EU's security and defence policy. For most of the past two decades the Commission's role has been, as a post-2001 treaty line reads, "fully associated with" the work in this sensitive realm (see Consolidated Version TEU: Article 27), usually, by providing expert feedback upon Council's request. However, having accumulated various technocratic skills over the decades, the Commission has recently become a self-driven, reliable source of expertise regarding the economic, industrial, energy, environmental, or even cyber and outer space aspects of security and defence.

III. Theory

The objective of this chapter is to provide a theory-driven explanation of the CSDP as defined by domestic politics, following a liberal, rationalist approach. What is usually acknowledged as playing some part in IR and foreign policy-making, domestic politics is arguably the most important omitted explanation for CSDP (see Krotz and Mahler 2011: 571; Moravcsik 1997: 538-541). Nevertheless, Liberalism may be a powerful tool for explaining both the institutional innovations and the dynamics in security and defence cooperation (see Richter 2015: 49).

Liberalism claims that foreign policy is strongly influenced by domestic processes and events, both at the individual and the group level (see Moravcsik 2008). This holds for national foreign policies as well as for the CSDP of the EU. The basic argument of liberalism is that the CSDP represents a mixture of partly overlapping and partly diverging national preferences, and that cross-national differences in societal expectations are the primary causes of differences between EU governmental interests (see Pohl et al. 2015: 65).

This chapter puts forward a liberal framework for explaining the development of the CSDP. It builds in particular on Andrew Moravcsik's New Liberalism insofar as it focuses on the nexus between governments and the societies they represent (see Moravcsik 2008). This chapter asserts that foreign policy is a function of governmental interests. I argue that, in the absence of a direct external threat, these interests are primarily a function of domestic political concerns: governments treat foreign policy as instrumental to their objective of staying in power. Since no direct external threat to European security has emerged since the end of the Cold War, EU governments determine their positioning within the CSDP according to perceived domestic political exigencies and expediencies (see Pohl et al. 2015: 65).

The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section deals with the main tenets of liberalism in IR theory and explains why it has strong explanatory power in terms of understanding the development of the CSDP. The core of my argument is that governmental and national interests should be distinguished when trying to understand foreign policy-making in general and the CSDP in particular. Subsequently I argue that in order to understand and explain the CSDP from the perspective of governmental interests, Andrew Moravcsik's new liberalism (2008) is a good starting point.

Generally speaking, Liberalism has a long tradition, dating back inter alia to Immanuel Kant's essay, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795). Initially guided by the work of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill, for instance, Liberalism as an IR theory only emerged in the 1970s, mainly in response to Neorealism with its focus on power and conflict (see Richter 2015: 49). Instead of concentrating on anarchy and state sovereignty, Liberal IR scholars analyzed the growth of transnational processes, the reasons for increased economic interdependence, and, consequently, the incentives for states to cooperate and integrate at the regional level (Kaufman 2013: 53). Since the emergence of Liberalism as an IR theory in the 1970s, there have been many innovations and offshoots of Liberal theory, including, for instance, Interdependence theory, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Liberal Internationalism, Liberal peace theory, Neoliberal Intergovernmentalism, Pluralism, Transnationalism, and World Society approaches more generally (see, for example, the work of Bruce Russett, Robert Putnam, Peter J. Katzenstein and Michael Doyle) (see Richter 2015: 49).

Although there is no canonical definition of Liberalism that captures the particularities of each of the strands of thought, they have certain assumptions and principles in common, and share – at least to a certain extent – a set of economic, philosophical and political ideas. Contrary to the position of Realists who often argue that "states want to maintain their sovereignty" (Mearsheimer 1994: 10), liberal IR scholars generally believe that states may decide to (partly) give up their sovereignty to coordinate their policies at the regional and international level. For Liberals, such a decision is rooted in rationality, i.e. states first calculate the outcome of alternative courses of actions – in this case coordination versus no coordination – and then choose the action that is most likely to maximize the utility for them. Consequently, there is room for choice and progress which, in turn, may lead to collective action, cooperation and, if required, also reform (see Richter 2015: 50). As Kaufman (2013) underlines, "liberal thinking focuses less on power and more on other components of nation-state relationships, including […] the structures that can hold them together" (Kaufmann 2013: 42). Liberalism assumes that actors are motivated by the consequences that their actions are expected to bring about. It is characterized by the notion that all domestic foreign policy actors, whether politicians, bureaucracies or interest groups have particularistic interests (see Schultz 2013: 480). At the same time the liberal family is quite diverse. Some liberals focus on the individual level and for example study political leaders, and others focus on domestic politics in the broadest sense.

In explaining international politics, many IR theorists tended to shy away from crediting the domestic level as more than an intervening variable for a long time (see Walt 1998: 34; Moravcsik 1997, 2000). This is justified insofar as there is little point in asserting that foreign policy behavior can be explained without reference to international crises and the interrelationships between various powers. Yet such crisis, and the variety of responses that they may trigger, are often a function of domestic politics (Moravcsik 2008: 239-240). This has also been true for attempts to explain the CSDP. There are only a few studies (such as Smith 2004; Hoffman 2013; Pohl 2013; Pohl et al. 2015; Richter 2015) that adopt a liberal perspective in the sense of expressly looking at domestic processes (see Krotz and Mahler 2011: 571).

Liberalism in IR theory is of course quite diverse and – depending on one's definition of liberalism - includes rationalist theories about the role of institutions, states, non-state actors, norms and interests on the international and/or the domestic levels (see

Pohl et al. 2015: 67). There is a variety of contributions that adopt an Institutionalist angle. Some studies point to the influence of the EU institutions (both formal and informal) (VanHoonacker and Dijkstra 2010; Menon 2011) and the impact of institutional learning on CSDP (Smith 2012, 2017). Others emphasize the influence of other international institutions, including the UN, NATO and the OSCE, on the development of CSDP (Costa and Jørgensen 2012; Hofmann 2011; Koops 2012 and others). For example, Hofmann (2011) argues that "the European security institutional environment shaped the creation and development of CSDP" (Hofmann 2011: 102).

Liberal theories recognize the explanation of international relations in terms of power and competition of state interests as insufficient. They claim that the goal of state functioning is to aspire for society welfare. Liberals perceive a state as shaped by internal factors, element of social contract and citizens' needs. They notice the role of non-state actors in shaping of security sense. Liberals prefer the view at security from a lower perspective, recognizing the possibility of shaping international relations sphere (see Keohane 1984: 14). In the frame of European studies, the CSDP is explained by intergovernmental liberalism, neo-functionalism, institutionalism and governance approach. Intergovernmental liberalism recognizes the CSDP as a factor of mutual bids between Member States which are decided by internal interest groups. In the neo-functional approach, the CSDP is a result of broadly viewed integration processes (see Mierzejewski 2016: 360). Institutionalists notice the influence of the EU on foreign policy and security between Member States. In opposition to Realists they claim that bigger states (especially France and Great Britain), while creating the CSDP, limited potential profits from power by strengthening of smaller states. Institutionalists indicate at delegating security competencies by states on behalf of union institutions. They believe that institutions moderate the anarchy of the international system, increase states potential, lower action costs, make smaller states more subjective, and give legitimization for international intervention (see Ginsberg and Penksa 2012: 44). Governance approach brings attention to the meaning of ideas, norms and practices in ensuring of European security. The state and society cooperate in security, as well as public and private subjects. Cooperation in the frame of the CSDP was institutionalized at national and international levels. The development of the CSDP is the result of non-military threats and proliferation of non-state actors and arising of new forms of coordination between actors (see

Mierzejewski 2016: 360). The state is not perceived as a unitary actor, but as a structure around which there are other actors functioning and coming into reactions on different levels (union officers, nongovernment organizations) (see Merand et al. 2011: 122). According to liberal theories, security management in the EU is heterarchical, institutionalized and multilevel in various configurations of actors and has a character of functional adaptation of national security policies to new dangers (Webber et al. 2004). Some researchers postulate a social structural approach, recognizing the governance system as a power vector, where some actors dominate over others (see Merand et al. 2011: 122). Liberal researchers in their considerations over European security concentrate on understanding the security idea as a dual concept, concerning both prevention of state, as well as a human security with his freedom from threats, created by political violence. Thus, human security is a socially important concept promoted by Liberals. The liberal concept of security is pro-social, but contemporarily it does not reflect tendencies of political and military stage (see Mierzejewski 2016: 360-361).

I take the New Liberalism approach of Andrew Moravcsik (1993; 1997; 2008), which focuses on the nexus between governments and the societies they represent, as a starting point. In this view, foreign policy is the result of the interaction of a variety of societal actors, including governments, within the context of domestic institutions.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Particular credit for reformulating Liberal International Relations theory in a non-ideological and non-utopian way must be given to Andrew Moravcsik. His framework of international cooperation – laid out in a series of articles during the 1990s (Moravcsik 1991; 1993; 1994; 1995; 1998) – marries Neoliberal Institutionalism and Bargaining theory to provide a more complex account of institutional formation (see Richter 2015: 49). Liberal Intergovernmentalism is “a set of assumptions that permit us to disaggregate a phenomenon we seek to explain – in this case, successive rounds of international negotiations – into elements each of which can be treated separately” (Moravcsik 1998: 19–20). In Moravcsik’s three-stage framework, states first define their preferences, then bargain to reach a common agreement, and eventually create (or reform) institutions to secure the negotiation result. Each of the three stages relies on a more focused theory, “consistent with the assumption of the

overall rationalist framework" (Moravcsik 1998: 19–20). Liberal Intergovernmentalism thus promises to explain why and under which conditions security and defence cooperation was put on the European agenda, and why some EU Member States, like Denmark, decided to opt-out of this integration process.

Stage 1: Liberal theory of national preference formation

During the first stage of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the heads of governments aggregate the societal interests of their constituencies, including interest groups and civil society. Combined with the state's economic, political and institutional setting (see Pollack 2012: 10), governments then translate these societal interests into national preferences towards European integration (see Moravcsik 1997: 518–20; Moravcsik 2008: 237–9). Governments thus have a gate-keeping role. While domestic preferences mostly represent coherent national strategies, they are not fixed (see Moravcsik 2003: 20). On the contrary, preferences may vary across issue and time, in response to exogenous shocks (see Moravcsik 2003: 23). This, in turn, suggests that societal interests and domestic pressures – and, hence, national preferences towards European integration – are closely linked to the EU's economic and political situation (see Richter 2015: 52).

Stage 2: Intergovernmental theory of bargaining

During the second stage the heads of governments bring their state's preferences to the intergovernmental bargaining table. Since the interests of Member States do not completely coincide (as each state has its own economic, political and institutional setting), their domestic preferences are likely to conflict with each other (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 70). Nevertheless, if mutually beneficial cooperation is in sight, bargaining may lead to the convergence of national interests (see Moravcsik 2013: 51). The central negotiations are then conducted by the most powerful Member States so that the final outcome of the bargaining is likely to reflect their relative domestic preferences (see Pollack 2001: 226). During this process, supranational organizations have no (or only little) influence on the outcome.

Stage 3: Theory of institutional choice

Once Member States have reached an agreement on the level and the range of their cooperation, they create or reform already existing institutions as a credible commitment to their negotiation result. The institutional choice either takes the form of pooled sovereignty through QMV or delegated responsibility to a supranational actor. Moravcsik (1998) argues, that the latter is often chosen for policies in which Member States have a high risk of defection from the agreement (see Moravcsik 1998: 9). While states thus restrict their control over certain issue areas, they also guarantee durable and sustained cooperation which, in turn, reduces uncertainty about each other's future preferences and behavior (see Moravcsik 2013: 67).

From a liberal institutionalist perspective, EU integration is mainly the result of a "multi-stage process of constrained social choice" (Moravcsik 2008: 250). Like Neoliberal Intergovernmentalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism assumes that the control over security and defence issues was likely to remain at the national level and hence failed to anticipate the emergence of the CSDP in the 1990s (see Richter 2015: 53; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). Nevertheless, this does not mean that Liberal Intergovernmentalism is inadequate for accounting for the emergence and evolution of security and defence cooperation at the EU level. On the contrary, under Liberal Intergovernmentalism "[…] unforeseen or initially undesired policies may change over time" (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 79), especially if shocks – such as the Brexit referendum – change national preferences in favor of further integration. Thus, with its three-stage framework, Liberal Intergovernmentalism may well account for the various stages in the CSDP (see Richter 2015: 53).

Andrew Moravcsik has consistently argued that the EU is not just a great power, it is a superpower, whose weight on the world stage has been overlooked and underestimated (see Moravcsik 2010). As in many domestic policy approaches, governments are key in new liberalism. They are constrained by societal actors, but also have some degree of autonomy in the sense that they can be distinguished from other domestic actors. In the end, even in strongly consolidated democracies, governments represent "some individuals and groups more fully than others"

(Moravcsik 1997: 518). Moravcsik uses this lens to understand how the EU exercises power internationally, assembling coalitions that act based on intergovernmental bargains (see Moravcsik 2010). For Moravcsik, the EU is powerful because of its immense and multifaceted resources, which Member States in ever changing constellations can deploy depending on the issue at stake (see Moravcsik 2010: 93; Meunier and Vachudova 2018: 2).

Two incentives for governments appear prevalent. Pohl (2013) argues that these domestic identities incite two countervailing pressures in the area of crisis management. On the one hand, governments want to demonstrate "that they are capable of influencing international events in line with domestic values and priorities" (Pohl 2013: 317). On the other hand, they do not want to be accused of "paying too high a price in treasure or causalities for foreign policy projects which turn out ill-conceived" (Pohl 2013: 317). In other words, "governments need to preempt the twin dangers of standing accused of pointless activism and excessive risk-taking or complacency and weakness" (Pohl 2013: 317).

The obvious inference is that governmental interests are not identical to national interests. Nonetheless, Pohl et al. (2015) argue that there is a strong conflation of national interest and governmental interest in much of the academic literature on international politics (see Pohl et al. 2015: 68). This is strange, because, if we assume that governments have an interest in securing the survival and welfare of their states, it would just be logical to assume that they have a similar interest in securing their own survival and welfare, meaning maintaining themselves in office (see for example Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). As Schultz (2013: 480) points out, even some Realists admit that the relative strength of states not only depends on other states in the system, but also on their publics (see also for example Mastanduno et al. 1989; Christensen 1996; Zakaria 1998; Krasner 1978; Evangelista 1997; Pohl et al. 2015).

It seems that the reasoning above might be taken as a re-statement of the idea that national strategic cultures drive CSDP (see Giegerich 2006; Meyer 2005). Yet it differs in two important ways. First, it does not build on the constructivist argument which has governments follow culturally derived national norms according to the "logic of appropriateness" (see March and Olsen 2004; Müller 2004; Weber et al. 2004). Rather, it assumes that governments adapt their behavior according to expected electoral consequences (see for example Stein 1990; Kriesi 2012). The two

will frequently coincide, but there is no reason as to why the relationship between national beliefs, values and foreign policy stances should follow from a logic of appropriateness rather than one of expected consequences (see Pohl 2013: 318). The literature on CSDP and national strategic cultures does not provide strong arguments to this effect. Pohl (2013) argues that "politicians may of course embrace nationally shared ideas because they believe in them […], so excludes the possibility that their stance is of tactical provenience, that they do so because it helps them to survive domestically" (Pohl 2013: 318).

Governmental behavior, I allege, is equally influenced by the need to demonstrate that it is defending the "national interest", meaning in this case that it will not pay a disproportionate price. The omnipresent discussions about burden-sharing are a case in point. Such concerns were evident, for example, in the 2010 Dutch withdrawal from NATO's Afghanistan mission, which was forced on the government with the argument that, compared to other allies, the Netherlands had done more than enough (see NYTimes 2010), or in the recent discussions about the 2% of GDP target in the NATO (see Heath 2018). When it comes to CSDP operations, the importance of this second element is visible in the fact that those Member States that invest political capital by bringing an intervention to the table are expected to deliver the greater part of the necessary capabilities (see Pohl 2013: 319).

So, what are the national preferences that dictate foreign policy? According to Liberal theory, they can derive from both ideational and material interests. On the one hand, Western societies expect that governments seek to shape an international environment that is conducive to the values of domestic order, which means liberal democracy (see Schimmelfennig 2003: 4; Owen 2002: 402). At the EU-level, the civilian power and normative power theorists submit that the EU aims to promote the European liberal order in its external relations (see Duchêne 1972; Manners 2002; Telò 2004).

The 2003 ESS as well as the 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) include ideational and normative elements, including the goal to promote a "stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order" (European Council 2003). On the other hand, according to Pohl et al. (2015), Western societies also expect that their material interests in terms of security and welfare are taken into account, with which they mean, that the

government shows competence in handling potential threats at the smallest possible price in treasure and/or blood (see Pohl et al. 2015: 69).

Critics may argue that contemporary foreign policy in Western countries is more than just a public relations exercise (see Melissen 2005; Ikeda and Tago 2014; Nye 2008). It clearly is, which brings us to the second feature of governmental self-interest. Overt foreign policy populism carries significant risks because government policy is monitored by organized interests and foreign policy elites in domestic societies such as opposition parties, interest groups, bureaucracies, academia and media. They not only influence foreign policy, but they also form an expert community which can be characterized as "organized public opinion" (Everts 1996: 136). This community can be useful (or otherwise) for the government to sell its policy to a larger public. Governments therefore have an incentive to ensure that their foreign policy is judged as competent and legitimate in the eyes of the foreign policy elites (see Pohl et al. 2015: 70). As a representative institution the government constitutes a "transmission belt" which translates the preferences of societal groups into policy (Moravcsik 1997: 518).

The institutionalization of security and defence cooperation has, consequently, not reached the stage where a "set of rules […] prescribe[s] behavioral roles, constrain[s] activity, and shape[s] expectations" (Keohane 1989: 66). On the contrary, the CSDP strongly depends on legitimacy at home, with Member States preserving their armed forces, and military, industrial and technological capabilities. The nature and the pace of EU crisis management – hence, the overall success of the CSDP – is, consequently, highly dependent on Member States' political willingness and financial ability to participate in missions and operations under the EU flag (see Richter 2015: 57). In line with Moravcsik's three-stage framework, further integration (in the form of pooled sovereignty) was quite likely to arise since Member States – being rational actors – aiming for utility maximization. Therefore, they have a strong incentive to relieve their budgets through increased cooperation (stage 1) which, in turn, would have led to a new round of intergovernmental negotiations (stage 2) and eventually brought about QMV for defence matters (stage 3) (see Richter 2015: 58).

New Liberal theorists thus would expect Western governments to anticipate and respond to conflicting societal demands regarding the purpose and acceptable costs of any foreign policy objectives. Pohl et al. (2015) argue that it is in the governments' own interests to be both competent in securing the societies' material interests and

as acting legitimately (see Pohl et al. 2015: 71). There will be events in which these two interests clash. In that case, the expected political consequences of valuating one interest over the other will determine which one prevails, though governments will be likely to try to fudge the trade-off (see Pohl et al. 2015: 71). By contrast, Realist analysis would expect the CSDP to primarily serve the purpose of maximizing Members States' relative power and security, implying that the EU's actions would plausibly serve to increase the relative power of its members (see Rynning 2011; Hyde-Price 2012). Alternatively, Constructivist analysts might expect the CSDP to help implement the international community's normative objectives, for instance the Responsibility to Protect. This explanation would imply that the CSDP credibly and sustainably attempts to implement such duties (see Meyer and Strickmann 2011; Kurowska and Kratochwil 2012). The great advantage of New Liberalism over Realist and Constructivist approaches is that it enables multi-causal explanations (Moravcsik 2008: 235), not only in the sense of allowing for ideational and material explanations of the CSDP, but also in the sense of investigating causal mechanisms at different levels of the policy-making process (see Pohl et al. 2015: 71). By acknowledging that the government is a "transmission belt" through which societal preferences are translated into foreign policy, one is able to show how foreign policy is made through societal preferences and institutions (see Moravcsik 1997: 518). In the view of Pohl et al. (2015), the preferences of societal groups are not simply aggregated through political institutions, but the preferences are also changed and adapted during the process (see Pohl et al 2015: 71). Hence, outcomes in the foreign policy decision-making process are codetermined by domestic institutions and can therefore be expected to differ widely across EU Member States. That is why more attention on the implications of domestic institutions on foreign policy-making is needed.

The foreign and security policy goals, as stated in the TEU, the ESS (2003), EUGS (2016) as well as other key foreign and security policy documents, all emphasize typical liberal values, such as democracy, human rights, international cooperation and international law. In an interesting new wording of the liberal mission statement, the Lisbon Treaty links the foreign and security goals to the EU identity:

> *"The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and*

fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law".

Lisbon Treaty, Article 21 (1).

To sum up, Moravcsik and other liberal works draw attention to the explanatory power of a key argument of liberal theories of international relations: domestic politics matter for international relations. According to liberal theories, governments primarily focus on what their domestic societies want when they formulate foreign policy. I build on the liberal theory as conceived by Andrew Moravcsik. He argues that the theory's central tenet is that the nature of national polities matters for international relations (see Moravcsik 1997: 516-524).

According to this school of thought, "the foreign policy goals of national governments are viewed as varying in response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions" (Moravscsik 1993: 481). Liberalism thus puts governmental interests at the center of foreign policy analysis but understands them as driven less by international than domestic constraints.

IV. Hypothesis

This thesis tests two hypotheses designed to help explain the development of the CSDP since the Brexit referendum in June 2016. In particular they explore the relationship between Liberal Intergovernmentalism and the processes through which CSDP is implemented.

H1: The referendum gives the CSDP new power and leads to faster development.

In the previous chapter I argued that domestic politics matter for international relations. According to Liberal theory, governments primarily focus on what their domestic societies want when they formulate foreign policy. Moravcsik (1993) argues that the "foreign policy goals of national governments are viewed as varying in response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups" (Moravscsik 1993: 481). Once Member States have reached an agreement on the level and the range of their

cooperation, they create or reform already existing institutions as a credible commitment to their negotiation result. The institutional choice either takes the form of pooled sovereignty through QMV or delegated responsibility to a supranational actor (Moravcsik 1998). This argument can be applied on the CSDP. In Chapter II the argument brought up by Richter (2015) was, that the CSDP strongly depends on legitimacy at home, with Member States preserving their armed forces, and military, industrial and technological capabilities. The nature and the pace of EU crisis management –hence, the overall success of the CSDP – is, consequently, highly dependent on Member States' political willingness and financial ability to participate in missions and operations under the EU flag (see Richter 2015: 57). In line with Moravcsik's three-stage framework this leads to further integration since Member States aiming for utility maximization. Therefore, they have a strong incentive to relieve their budgets through increased cooperation (stage 1) which, in turn, would have led to a new round of intergovernmental negotiations (stage 2) and eventually brought about QMV for defence matters (stage 3) (see Richter 2015: 58). Under Liberal Intergovernmentalism "[…] unforeseen or initially undesired policies may change over time" (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 79), especially if shocks – such as the Brexit referendum – change national preferences in favor of further integration. Thus, with its three-stage framework, Liberal Intergovernmentalism may well account for the various stages in the CSDP (see Richter 2016: 53).

If we take a look at the newest Eurobarometer[3] survey conducted by the European Commission (03/2018), regarding the question of a common defence and security policy among the citizens of EU Member States, three-quarters (75%) of the respondents are in favor of this policy (see Figure 1). 18% are opposing the CSDP, whilst 7% say that they do not know (Eurobarometer 2018: 5). In all, still 28-Member States, more than half of the respondents are in favor of a common defence and security policy. As Figure 1 shows, the highest support can be seen in Cyprus (90%), Latvia (87%) and Germany (86%). Even in Denmark, which opted out of the CSDP the approval rate is 68%. By far the lowest approval rate can be seen in Austria (57%) and in Great Britain (63%).

[3] The Eurobarometer survey series is a cross-national longitudinal study, designed to compare and measure trends within Member States of the European Union.

Figure 1



Source: Eurobarometer 03/2018, page 5;
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/83548

If we now take the assumption made above, that the domestic societies are the main drivers of foreign policy for the national governments, we can expect that the national governments of the EU Member States work towards a deeper integration in the field of defence and security.

Another point that could help the development of the CSDP is the fact that Great Britain has always adopted a very cautious attitude regarding European security and defence policy. The UK has been viewed by many as a "brake" on further integration in the fields of foreign, security, and defence policy (Heisbourg 2016: 15-16; Oliver 2017: 526; Rees 2017: 561). They blocked and inhibited many projects in the CSDP frame. As Worré (2013) argues the phase since 1991 was "characterized by either British opposition or reluctant acceptance of […] integration initiatives (Worré 2013: 3). For example, the increase of the budget and the mandate of the EDA was blocked by the British since 2010, and thereby preventing the agency from working on "hard defence" (see Bakker et al. 2016: 8). London has also been notably critical of plans for an EU military headquarter (HQ). Voß and Major (2017) argue that in the last years, the UK did not launch meaningful initiatives, nor did it consider the CSDP as a core channel for its security and defence policy. Although it contributed personnel and equipment (such as the Northwood HQ for the EU Operation Atalanta), these contributions did not reflect its military capabilities (Voß and Major

2017: 2). The UK has “ceased to invest politically or militarily in the CSDP in any substantial manner” (Heisbourg 2016: 13; Kienzle and Hallams 2016: 467). Brexit thus formalizes the reluctance that the UK has had towards the CSDP (see Besch 2018: 4).

The actual record of the UK’s contributions to past and ongoing CSDP missions is somewhat mixed. Of the 35 past or current CSDP missions, the UK has contributed to 25 with an average of 15,72 personnel per mission (see Duke 2019: 14). The principal UK contributions have been to CSDP missions in the Mediterranean (Operation Sophia), the police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), the regional maritime capacity building mission in Somalia (EUCAP), the rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the EU military training mission in Mali (EUTM) (see Duke 2019: 14). In terms of all the missions, the UK’s personnel contributions equal 2.3% of the total contributions by the EU members (or 4.3% of those operations and missions to which it contributed) (calculated by Di Mauro et al. 2017: 97–107). When looking at the period from 2003 to 2015 the UK provided only 110 of 12.140 EU military personnel and 209 out of 4895 civilian personnel (Bakker et al. 2016: 4). Only once, the UK has led in personnel contributions, in the regional maritime capacity building mission to Somalia (EUCAP) involving 19 UK personnel. A House of Lords report notes, that “the UK does not supply personnel to the missions in proportion to its population size in the EU (14.8%)” (House of Lords 2016: 53).

In other respects, the UK has contributed to CSDP via the so-called “Battlegroups” (EUBG) which consists of around 1500 troops, or a battalion, along with the relevant combat support elements. In 2004, the UK, along with France and Germany, proposed the concept to ensure that the EU was in the position to deploy forces rapidly in response to a UN request. The UK was a “Lead Nation” twice, in July-December 2013 and again in July-December 2016 with around 2330 in total involved (see Duke 2019: 15). The UK has not provided any funding specifically for EUBGs since 2010. This means, that the share of UK’s contribution to CSDP missions and Battlegroups is not so high, that the other Member States could not replace them with shared effort.

Taken together these arguments lead to my first hypothesis, that the referendum gave new impetus to the CSDP and thus led to a faster development. The Brexit referendum leads to a considerable momentum in EU security and defence policy. On the one hand because significant changes that have been on the cards for much

of the recent decade have been blocked by the UK can now be launched (see Martill and Sus 2018b: 11) and on the other hand because the European public is in favor of the CSDP and therefore governments will support the development of the CSDP in European decision-making.

H2: The referendum has no positive influence on the CSDP.

From a liberal institutionalist perspective, EU integration is mainly the result of a "multi-stage process of constrained social choice" (Moravcsik 2008: 250). Like Neoliberal Intergovernmentalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism assumed that the control over security and defence issues was likely to remain at the national level and hence failed to anticipate the emergence of the CSDP in the 1990s (see Richter 2016: 53; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). The same logic can be applied to the development of the CSDP after the Brexit referendum.

If we look at the countries with a comparable "low" approval rate of the CSDP in the Eurobarometer survey mentioned above, we can see that 8 countries (including the UK) have an approval rate of under 70%. In France, the major military power in Europe after the exit of the UK, almost 1/5 of the respondents (17%) are against the CSDP, in Sweden (34%) and Austria (37%) more than 1/3 are against a common security and defence policy (see Figure 1). So, I assume that for these countries the CSDP will not be the top priority in their European politics. Regarding the presidency of the Council of the EU we can see that since the Brexit referendum, Malta (01/2017; approval rate CSDP 67%), Bulgaria (01/2018; approval rate 73%) and Austria (02/2018; approval rate 57%) hold the presidency, and therefore they are responsible to set some agendas for European politics. If we take the liberal intergovernmentalist approach, we can expect that national governments focus on what their domestic societies want. In this case we can expect, due to the comparable low approval rate of their citizens towards CSDP, that these countries set their priorities in other topics. Therefore, we can expect no positive development of the CSDP. But since the Lisbon Treaty's coming into force, the rotating, six-month EU Presidencies have remained functional within the Council but have lost much of their importance both as a driving force of the Union in general and as a promoter of CFSP/CSDP in particular (see Hilmann and Hadjisavvas 2012). So, this argument is expected to play a subordinated role.

Another argument that leads to the second hypothesis is that the UK is one of only three European Member States[4] that actually spends more than 2% of its GDP for defence. The UK is no longer a great power, but it is a power of great importance to European security and defence. When the UK leaves the EU in 2019, the Member State with the largest defence budget (at around £35bn, which is also the second largest in NATO (behind only the US) and fifth largest in the world), one of the two largest defence-investment budgets in the EU, the proven will and ability to deploy armed forces on expeditionary operations around the globe, and an important share of the European defence-industrial base will leave (see Giegerich and Mölling 2018: 4). Also, the UK has the largest defence budget of all the EU Member States and accounts alone for about 25% of defence equipment-procurement spending among them (see Giegerich and Mölling 2018: 7-8). To just keep the level of European defence after Brexit the other 27 Member States have to replace the money the UK is paying at the moment. If we look at the discussions around Europe it is not very likely that all Member States will simply pay more without getting into trouble with their own constituencies and citizens (see for example Dijkstra 2016: 371).

From the standpoint of capability, the UK holds a significant capacity that is nominally available to the EU Force Catalogue for the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations, as we can observe from Figure 2. In terms of Research & Development (R&D) and procurement spending, it has been noted that the UK and France are in their own league with regards to EU Member States (see Bakker et al. 2016).

Furthermore, the UK armed forces contribute a number of specialist capacities to the overall portfolio of the EU members' security and defence assets. This includes strategic airlift capacity, long identified as a vital area of concern for CSDP operations (see Biscop and Colemont 2011: 13), where the UK accounts for around 50% of heavy transport aircraft and more than 25% of all heavy transport helicopters among the 28 EU Member States (see Giegerich and Mölling 2018: 7). In addition, as Giegerich and Mölling (2018) identify, the UK has a number of comparative advantages across air, land and sea forces among the EU-28, with the UK and

[4] Greece (2,36%), UK (2.12%) and Estonia (2.98%). Source: NATO.

France being by far the closest Member States to achieving full-spectrum military capability (see Giegerich and Mölling 2018: 7).

This combined with the fact that the UK is the second-biggest economy in the European Union and must pay the proportional share to the CSDP leads to the question if the European Union can compensate this loss and develop a more ambitious CSDP without this money and the capabilities. Furthermore, if we look at Moravcsik's three stage framework, Member States have different interests and national preferences towards European integration (see Moravcsik 1997: 518-520; Moravcsik 2008: 237-239).

Figure 2



Source: EDA (2017), Collective and National Defence Data, Available Online: http://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/eda-national-defence-data-2013-2014-(2015-est)5397973fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f.pdf.

This makes it difficult in intergovernmental bargain situations to find an ambitious compromise, if domestic preferences are in conflict with each other (see Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 70). This leads to the assumption that with still 27 Member States with differing interests and preferences it will be hard to develop ambitious proposals and institutions for European security and defence.
The UK's withdrawal from the EU could also have significant implications for levels of defence spending elsewhere in Europe. Even before the UK referendum, European defence expenditure was a matter of considerable political controversy, as well as a source of tension within the EU and between NATO allies (see Black et al. 2017: 40).

Another point which is playing into the second hypothesis is, that the EU's ability to project power is facing a new challenge from the rise of illiberalism among Member States that could fundamentally alter preferences over both strategies and outcomes of EU power. Most observers and many theories of European integration, including Liberal Intergovernmentalism, have taken ideological convergence around liberal values in the EU for granted. In recent years, however, this convergence has been halted – and, for example in Hungary and Poland, reversed. Competition among parties across Europe is shifting from the economy to identity, and this may reduce the "zone of agreement" among EU governments (see Meunier and Vachudova 2018: 9; Hix 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2018).

V. Methodology

This thesis employs a document analysis alongside with a secondary discourse analysis to investigate the development of the CSDP after the Brexit referendum.
Triangulation is the word used to name the "combination of different methods, study groups, local and temporal settings, and different theoretical perspectives in dealing with phenomenon" (Flick 2008: 389). The purpose of triangulating is to provide a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility (see Bowen 2009). Denzin (2012) distinguishes four different types of triangulation: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological triangulation (see Denzin 2012: 81; Flick 2008: 389-390). In this research, methodological triangulation is used, and two data-gathering methods are employed: document analysis and discourse analysis.

A document analysis of EU decisions, policy statements of Member States, like the German White Book on defence, and secondary academic literature analyzing the CSDP, can, among others, assisted with enough resources answer the question of EU's development in defence integration.

Document analysis

Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents - both printed and electronic material (see Bowen 2009: 27). Like other analytical methods in qualitative research, document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge (see Corbin and Strauss 2008; Rapley 2007). Choosing document analysis as research method can have several attractions: it helps the researcher to reach "inaccessible persons or subjects" (Cohen et al. 2010: 201). Many documents in "public domain" are prepared by professionals and contain very valuable information and insights (Cohen et al. 2010: 201) and documentary sources have the highest level of accessibility (see Denscombe 2014: 230) and are very cost effective (see Denscombe 2014: 244).

The rationale for document analysis lies in its role in methodological and data triangulation, the immense value of documents in case study research, and its usefulness as a stand-alone method for specialized forms of qualitative research. Understandably, documents may be the only necessary data source for studies designed within an interpretive paradigm, as in hermeneutic inquiry; or it may simply be the only viable source, as in historical and cross-cultural research (see Bowen 2009: 29). Documents provide a means of tracking change and development which fits the research interest in this thesis. Where various drafts of a particular document or legislative proposal are accessible, the researcher can compare them to identify the changes. Even subtle changes in a draft can reflect substantive developments in a project, for example (see Yin 1994). The researcher may also examine periodic and final reports (where available) to get a clear picture of how an organization or a program fared over time (see Bowen 2009: 30).

For the process of exploring the "evidence", or the actual content of the documents, O'Leary gives two major techniques for accomplishing this (see O'Leary 2017: 7). One is the interview technique. In this case, the researcher treats the document like a

respondent or informant that provides the researcher with relevant information (see O'Leary 2017: 275). The researcher "asks" questions then highlights the answer within the text. The other technique is noting occurrences, or content analysis, where the researcher quantifies the use of particular words, phrases and concepts (see O'Leary 2017: 171). Essentially, the researcher determines what is being searched for, then organizes the frequency and number of occurrences within the document. The information is then organized into what is "related to central questions of the research" (Bowen 2009: 32). Bowen (2009) notes that some experts object to this kind of analysis, saying that it obscures the interpretive process in the case of interview transcriptions (see Bowen 2009: 32). However, Bowen (2009) reminds us that documents include a wide variety of types, and content analysis can be very useful for painting a broad, overall picture. According to Bowen (2009), content analysis, then, is used as a "first-pass document review" that can provide the researcher a means of identifying meaningful and relevant passages (Bowen 2009: 32).

For this thesis, document analysis was chosen because it gives an opportunity to analyze information gathered by group of professionals, politicians, academics, media, and other people with insights into EU decision-making and the CSDP.
The analytic procedure entails finding, selecting, making sense of, and synthesizing data contained in documents. Document analysis yields data—excerpts, quotations, or entire passages—that are then organized into major themes, categories, and case examples specifically through content analysis (see Labuschagne 2003). Two different sampling methods can be used when choosing documents. One way of selection is to have representative sample of documents of a certain kind and choose randomly from these documents; and the other way is to "purposively select documents to reconstruct a case (Flick 2008: 249). In this study all documents were chosen based on purposive selection. According to Flick (2008), it can be very helpful to choose and compare documents from different contexts (Flick 2008: 250). So, documents of governments, EU officials, media, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks were used. This document analysis is complemented with a discourse analysis of CSDP-related topics since the Brexit referendum.

Procedure document analysis

Firstly, it is important to keep in mind the mechanism of EU decision making procedure. The Council of the European Union, the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament are the main actors. Also, the topics covered by the MEPs as representatives of national electorates may indicate interest to the surveyed field of CSDP but play a minor role.

A researcher can use a huge plethora of texts for research, although by far the most common is likely to be the use of written documents (see O'Leary 2017: 324). There is the question of how many documents the researcher should gather. Bowen suggests that a wide array of documents is better, although the question should be more about quality of the document rather than quantity (see Bowen 2009: 37). The EU has done some efforts in order to make its documentation available for the citizens. For this purpose, internet-based environment EUR Lex was created. It includes documents from EU institutions like the Council of the European Union, the European Council, the European Parliament and its Committees, and the European Commission. Like mentioned above, these institutions are playing a significant role in setting EU goals and development targets and their actions are influencing EU citizens' daily life. From this point of view EUR Lex can be considered as valuable and trustful source of documentation.
EUR Lex search engine provides different options for searches. With the purpose to simplify searching process and to harmonize terminology in all official EU languages EUROVOC terms-vocabulary has been created and linked to the EUR-Lex environment. The author used the option which has grouped official terms to the bigger domains in functioning of the EU. The next step was to select the documents which are characterizing CSDP as Policy. For the time frame since the Brexit referendum 120 documents were found. This figure was not the number of separate original documents. Part of the documents were given repeatedly as a response for different searches. After filtering out the files which responded to different search words/expressions the number went down to 58. These were analyzed in depth. The authors of the documents were: Members of the European Parliament; Council of the European Union; European Council; High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy; European Commission and its Committees; European

Parliaments and its Committees; Court of Justice of the European Union, Court of Auditors of the European Union and EU Member States.

Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis of texts is based on the thought that texts are a common and natural feature of everyday and institutional life and they present a rich source of material for analysis (see Potter 2004: 613). Like document analysis, discourse analysis is appropriate if the researcher is interested in using texts to conduct his work. By doing so, the researcher looks at texts in a particular way to find out how the language that is used to talk about an issue frames the view and understanding we have of it. Michel Foucault (1971; 2005) advanced this view and stated that discourse and especially the language used during discourse are decisive for the way the people involved and affected by it comprehend the issue that is talked about (see Osiander 2013: 40; Bryman and Cramer 2004).

Discourse analysis must be considered not just as a method, but also as a perspective “on the nature of language and its relationship to the central issues of the social sciences” (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 222). By talking, the speaker uses specific words or effects to express his opinion on an issue or topic. Doing so means that he or she creates a view on it that consists of a special concept formed by the linguistic devices he employs. This happens intentionally which means that the speaker pursues a specific purpose with the choice of his language. Examining speeches or texts therefore means to see which intention the speaker had when giving speech. The choice of topics, words, formulations and the frequency of them determine on the one hand his opinion about the issue. It has been emphasized that both in politics and in political science, such discourse is primarily seen as a form of political action, and as pan of the political process (see for example van Dijk 1997). Such a view is perfectly compatible with the dominant paradigm in most social approaches to discourse, that discourse is a form of social action and interaction (see Atkinson and Heritage 1984; Boden and Zimmerman 1991; van Dijk 1985). Although this has especially been shown to hold for spoken interaction or dialogue, it is obvious that also written texts, or rather writing texts, are a form of social and political action (see van Dijk 1997: 20).

The discourse, for example the text or the speech, is in the focus of the analysis, but beyond that, the context of its creation plays a role as well. We can assume that the

context is influential and decisive for the outcome of the discourse (see Widdowson 2008; Gee 2004; Fairclough 2013). Regarding the text, the language that is used reveals a particular world view. Language is therefore constructive and is an active tool which helps the speaker to create an opinion, but also to act in the sense that a well-uttered opinion has the potential to influence its audience and therefore provoke the desired effect (see Osiander 2013: 41).

The Copenhagen School suggests that discourse analysis is an appropriate tool to discover securitizing languages in, for example policy documents, while Paris School demands an additional investigation of policy practices because not all policy proposals come into force (see for example Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan 2008; Foucault 1971; Bourdieu 1984). As a result, the use of discourse analysis conforms to the tradition of critical discourse analysis (CDA) (see Fairclough 1992). CDA focuses on how "discourse actively structures the social space within which actors act through the constitution of concepts, objects and subject positions" (Philips and Hardy 2002: 25).

Political discourse is identified by its actors or authors, in this case politicians. Indeed, the vast bulk of studies of political discourse is about the text and talk of professional politicians or political institutions, such as presidents, prime ministers and other members of government, parliament or political parties, both at the local, national and international levels (see van Dijk 1997: 12-13). Some of the studies of politicians take a discourse analytical approach (Maynard 1994; Holly 2015; Dillon et al. 1990; Seidel 1988).

Discourse analysis has been used for foreign policy analysis before. In the field of European foreign policy, Henrik Larsen has provided a groundbreaking study of French and British foreign policies towards European integration in the 1980s (Larsen 1997). His main hypothesis is that national discursive frameworks can be identified in both countries that operate as systems of meanings (or signification) and frame the alternative tracks their respective governments can choose regarding European integration. He studies how these systems of signification articulate the four concepts of the nation/state, Europe, security and the nature of international relations (see Larsen 1997).

Kettell (2013) analyzed the way British politicians used discourse to justify their strategy concerning the "War on Terror" (Kettell 2013). In a way it is similar to this

thesis, because both times it is assumed that the way the authorized people speak about a topic can explain and justify the change of policies. Defining threats has also been in the focus. Herschinger (2013) looks at the difficulty to define the term "Terrorism" within the UN. This can be seen as a proof that the idea of an issue and the way it is talked about is only successfully distributed, if it is accepted and shared by the audience. Therefore, discourse analysis can be seen as being an acknowledged method to account for the change of policies, especially when it is assumed that this change occurred due to a specific way of talking about issues (see Osiander 2013: 41-42).

Thus, this thesis borrows from CDA's analytical dimensions, including the study of the characteristics of the texts, the uses of dialogue in texts, and the context (social practice) that is produced in the official language (see Fairclough 1992). The official documents will be examined through intertextual chains to map out similar features between EU practices, in particular looking for overarching vocabulary. As mentioned above a critical discourse analysis allows the researcher to describe, interpret and explain social processes. This will offer insights into what security implications the EU prioritizes since the Brexit referendum, and how this is the outcome of discourse. Considering the previous, discourse analysis is the appropriate method to examine if the changes in EU foreign policy can be related to the exit of the UK from the EU.
To sum up, the discourse analysis complements the document analysis in the way that we can analyze the discourse of CSDP-related topics over time. Thus, we can see which and how topics and proposals have changed in this period. Additionally, we can consider policies that were not (yet) implemented and get to the heart of the matter why some policies and proposals may have not been implemented and taken into account or have changed over time.

VI. Analysis

The following chapter proceeds chronological through the various stages of CSDP development in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum.
Keeping in mind the three-stage framework of Moravcsik, firstly states define their preferences (see Moravcsik 1998: 19). The first expression of preferences for future CSDP cooperation of EU Member States took place only four days after the Brexit vote. The French and German Foreign Ministers published a letter in which they

made a strong case for a European Security Union (Ayrault and Steinmeier 2016). French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and German Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke of their "regret" at the outcome of the UK referendum and acknowledged the more general decline in support for the European project (see Duke 2019: 29). But, both stressed that "France and Germany recognize their responsibility to reinforce solidarity and cohesion within the European Union". As part of this Franco-German "recommitment" to "a shared vision of Europe as a security union, based on solidarity and mutual assistance between Member States in support of common security and defence policy", they urged the EU to "step up their defence efforts" with the creation of a European Security Compact (see Ayrault and Steinmeier 2016). The Ayrault-Steinmeier declaration suggested making use—for the first time ever—of the Lisbon Treaty's clause on PESCO (Articles 42(6) and 46 of the TEU) in military matters. It allows for the creation of a subgroup of Member States committing themselves to strict criteria as regards the development of their defence capacities as well as their participation in European equipment programs and multinational forces (see Krotz and Schild 2018: 12). This document confirmed the commitments for tight cooperation on European defence and the two determinative Member States showed that they are ready to lead the defence policy of the European Union. Berlin is keen on partnership with France on the EU's defence and vice versa, but the visions of the two countries are somewhat different. Germany for example wants an inclusive approach to European security, whereas France rather focuses on more ambitious and in return a faster development in European security and defence cooperation of just a few EU Member States (see Csornai 2017: 11). This declaration by members of the government of the two biggest remaining EU Member states form a basis for further discussion inside the whole EU. This is also in line with the expectations in hypothesis 1, that France and Germany, where more than 2/3 of the people are in favor of a common European security and defence policy (see Eurobarometer 2018: 5), setting this topic as one of their top priorities in European policy-making. Furthermore, it shows that the biggest countries in the EU are the main drivers for European security and defence. Pollack (2001) described the centrality of powerful Member States, because they want the final outcome to reflect their relative domestic preferences (see Pollack 2001: 226).

Only one day after this Franco-German letter, the launch of the EUGS took place. Because of this short timeframe after the historic referendum, the EUGS was

scarcely noticed amongst the post-referendum media fuss (see Duke 2019: 29). It calls on Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security. “We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats” (European Union 2016: 19). This is probably the boldest among a number of the strategy’s ambitions. The EUGS details policy proposals and an approach of “principled pragmaticism”, which restated the EU’s commitment to a rule-based international order, based on universal principles and multilateral institutions (see European Union 2016: 8). It calls for implementing the “comprehensive approach” to conflicts and crisis “through a coherent use of all policies at the EU’s disposal” (European Union 2016: 9). Furthermore, it requests the Member States to invest “in all dimensions of foreign policy” (European Union 2016: 10). But still, the EUGS is primarily a symbolic document or as Svendsen (2018) calls it: a “working document” (Svendsen 2018: 2).

After the publication of the EUGS some leading European foreign and security policy pundits have tried to portray the document as a good starting point to make the CFSP more effective (see for example Biscop 2016). Dijkstra (2016) concludes that the EUGS “gets the diagnosis right” and that it proposes “modest and realistic” policy options (Dijkstra 2016: 371). Grevi (2016) argues, that the essence of the 2016 EUGS is about protecting and promoting Europe's interests, and values, in the face of mounting external and internal challenges. While the EUGS is much longer than her predecessor, the ESS (see European Council 2003), it is telling that the word “interests” recurs 36 times in the former (foreword + full text) and only three times in the latter. It is equally revealing of their different focus, and of the lingering concern with growing popular dissatisfaction with the EU, that the EUGS refers 30 times to EU “citizens” (their interests, security and needs), whereas they were mentioned just three times in the ESS (see Grevi 2016: 3).

As Grevi (2016) states, the EUGS does an “overall good job in offering a “reformist” strategic approach to cope with the “revolution” of many of the assumptions that had backed EU foreign policy in the past”, namely that the EU values and its model of integration would be a reference for its neighbors and for international cooperation at large (Grevi 2016: 4). It makes Europe's citizens the central beneficiaries of the EU's external action. Further, Grevi (2016) argues that the new strategy “strives to keep the bar of EU foreign policy steady in the face of much stronger winds, while recognizing that the crew is unhappy (internal political crisis), the hull needs fixing

(institutional system and capabilities) and the aspirational surface of the sails needs reducing or the ship could capsize" (Grevi 2016:4).

But EUGS' weaknesses and its unrealistic call for "strategic autonomy" have also attracted sharp criticism (see Meijer and Wyss 2018: 2; Techau 2016; Mälksoo 2016). Mälksoo (2016) for example, argues that EUGS "displays growing concerns about the Union's ability to fulfil its historical mission to maintain peace and security even in Europe" (Mälksoo 2016: 382). Further she states that this document shows the EU as "increasingly anxious to prove its relevance […] yet notably less confident about the Union's actual convincingness as an ontological security framework" for its Member States (Mälksoo 2016: 382). Also, Dijkstra (2016) questions the willingness of the European citizens to pay for greater EU foreign and security cooperation (see Dijkstra 2016: 371). This argument is in line with the expectation stated in hypothesis 2, that the money the UK is paying for the European security and defence policy cannot be easily replaced by all other Member States. The citizens of the European countries will not be convinced easily about the need to pay more for a European defence policy which is not very ambitious yet.

After the first national preference formation by France and Germany (the Ayrault-Steinmeier letter) the two states brought Italy on board and the push for a "re-launch" of European defence received a further boost at a Franco-German-Italian summit at Ventotene in August 2016 (which was symbolically important due to the 1944 manifesto bearing its name which urged the formation of a federation of European states) hosted by the Italian Prime Minister and the issuance of a joint statement by the three foreign ministers (see Duke 2019: 29). The Italian Foreign Minister, Paolo Gentiloni, called for a "Schengen for Defense" with, at its heart, "a core group of EU countries" who can "accelerate their integration in the area of defense, leaving others the option to join at a later state through an inclusive exercise" (Gentiloni 2016). The respective defence ministers shared the ambition to realize a "union for European defence" but preserved the spirit of the Italian proposal in the sense that not all would be obliged to move at the same speed but those that are like-minded should be able to do so (see Marrone and Camporini 2016).

Government representatives from both France and Germany consider the planned UK exit from the EU as a major opportunity to accelerate the way to a common European security and defense policy (see Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Bundestages 2017: 6). On the 8. September 2016, whilst speaking in Lithuania,

German defence minister Ursula von der Leyen called for a European "defence union" of 1,000 troops to deter Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, intended to "add value" to NATO (Deutsche Welle 2016). Whether she was serious, or seeking to reassure Eastern allies, she dubbed this, referring to Italian foreign minister Gentiloni, a "Schengen of defence". She justifies such an initiative by saying "that is what the Americans expect us to do" (Sytas 2016). Ahead of the defence ministers' meeting in Bratislava on 27 September 2016, the Italian government proposed a "joint permanent European Multinational Force" so that Member States can share forces, command and control, maneuvers and enable capabilities. It also sought a new EU military headquarter (HQ) for the force (see Rettman 2016b). This proposal was made for the only reason that the Brits are no longer able to block such initiatives, as they did in the past (see Chapter "Origins and development of the CSDP"). This supports hypothesis 1 and the argument that the Brexit gives the opportunity for significant changes in the CSDP that the UK has blocked in the recent decade (see Martill and Sus 2018b: 11).

Bearing in mind the first stage of Moravcsik's three-stage framework, the liberal theory of national preference formation, these proposals of the national preferences of France, Germany and Italy ahead of the Council meeting in Bratislava clearly fit into this category.

On 12 September 2016 Germany seemed to pull back from the idea of a European Army as Ursula von der Leyen produced an informal joint report with her French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian (see Rettman 2016a). The proposal sets to serve as a "basis for considering a relaunch of European defence", with the aim to make European defence structures more operational without substituting it for national defence bodies (see Naumescu and Nicolescu 2018: 99). Rather than advocating integrated armed forces, it revisited the idea of an EU military HQ, with its own medical and logistical assets, such as air-lift equipment (see von der Leyen and Le Drian 2016). The aim would be to create a new command center for coordinating medical assistance, a logistics center for sharing "strategic assets" and capacity to share satellite reconnaissance data. The plan also advocated that Battlegroups should be made operationally ready and calls for a single EU budget for military research and joint procurement of assets (see for example Lain and Nouwens 2017: 21; Duke 2019: 29; Csornai 2017: 11). They said that this would start the creation of a "real" common security policy, "an instrument created by the Lisbon Treaty that has

not been used until today" (von der Leyen and Le Drian 2016). The report states that "it is high time to strengthen our solidarity and European capacities in defence, to more effectively protect our borders and EU citizens, and to contribute to peace and stability in our neighborhood" (Barker 2016). It emphasizes the need for the EU's remaining 27 Member States to move towards "a comprehensive, realistic and credible defence in the European Union" (Barker 2016). In terms of content, the proposals of the joint initiative are based on the "White Paper 2016 on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr" published by the Federal Government of Germany on 13 July 2016 (see Bundesregierung 2016) and at the same time, the recommendations are moving along the EUGS (see Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Bundestages 2017: 6). This proposal (like the Ayrault and Steinmeier-paper 2016) supports the first hypothesis only in so far as it calls for a European headquarter that was blocked by the UK over the last years. But the proposal for a HQ for medical and logistical assets is not very ambitious itself. This is due to the fact that a far-reaching HQ would not be supported by countries like Poland which fear the duplication of military structures in NATO and the EU (see Tiroler Tageszeitung 2016). As Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) state in their intergovernmental theory of bargaining, each state has its own setting economically, historically, politically and institutionally. So, the domestic preferences are likely to conflict with each other (see Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 70). This explains the not very ambitious proposal of a HQ just for medical and logistical assets, which supports rather the second hypothesis than the first.

Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, also supported this idea. In his State of the Union address on 14. September 2016 Juncker expressed his support for a single operational HQ and for the EU to establish common military assets, as well as a shared EDF to "turbo boost research and innovation" (see European Commission 2016a). The Franco-German proposal did, however, reiterate that the "political responsibility for defence lies in the first place with Member States" (Rettman and Eriksson 2016).

In September 2016, Commission Vice-President Jyrki Katainen said: "Security has always belonged to Member States and the reality has changed" (Beesley and Barker 2016). The Member States, including France and, to a lesser extent, Germany, are worried that the Commission views the Fund through the prism of the defence industry and market rather than that of strategic security interests (see

Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 14). It is no coincidence that the day the Fund was launched Katainen publicly stressed that “the Member States will remain in the driving seat” concerning the Fund (see European Commission 2017d; Koenig and Walter Franke 2017: 14).

In Moravcsik’s three stage framework, during the second stage (intergovernmental theory of bargain) the heads of governments bring their state’s preferences to the intergovernmental bargaining table (see Richter 2016: 52). On the 16. September 2016 this happened at the European Council meeting in Bratislava, where the Council met without the UK the first time. The Council and the Commission proposed a working program with the “Bratislava roadmap”. In this roadmap the objective to “strengthen EU cooperation on external security and defence” is backed by the concrete measure that the European Council has to decide on a concrete implementation plan on security and defence, especially regarding capabilities and the implementation of the NATO Joint Declaration (European Council 2016a: 5), which was designed to “give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership” (EU and NATO 2016). The roadmap issued a new level of ambition in European security and defence and declared that, “although one country has decided to leave, the EU remains indispensable for the rest of us” (European Council 2016a: 1). The informal meeting marked the “beginning of a process”, complete with an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD) in November 2016 (see Council of the EU 2016a). The new “level of ambition” aimed to “tackle today’s threats and challenges more effectively, with the right capabilities, tools and structures to deliver more security for its citizens” (Council of the EU 2016a: 2). At the beginning of the Bratislava Summit Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, said that she hopes to set a new course for a project battered by Brexit. „We have to show with our actions that we can get better”. The EU must improve “in the domain of security, internal and external security, the fight against terrorism, the cooperation in the field of defence”, as well as defence and jobs, she added (Rankin 2016).

During this second stage of Moravcsiks intergovernmentalism framework the domestic preferences and the interests of Member States do not completely coincide (see Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 70). This can be seen by the Baltic States and the Visegrád Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), which expressed concerns about the plans presented and discussed at the Bratislava Summit. In contrast to the United Kingdom, they are generally in favor of a "common

defense structure" as a precursor to an EU army, but they fear the duplication of military structures in NATO and the EU (see Tiroler Tageszeitung 2016). This can be explained with the domestic preferences and the states' political situation. For the Visegrád states the major security threat, especially since the Ukraine crisis in 2013, is Russia. The answer to that threat is a tight bond with the United States and NATO. Justnya Zajac, professor at the University of Warsaw, points out that "maintaining America's political and military presence in Europe has been imperative from Poland's point of view. In Warsaw, the United States was seen as a security stabilizer and a state whose presence in Europe secured a desirable balance of power" (Blewett-Mundy 2018). If we look at the Eurobarometer survey, not even half of the citizens in the four Visegrád countries have trust in the EU (see Eurobarometer 2018: 7). Therefore, it is not surprising that the governments will be very careful to support new competences in the field of security and defence in the hand of the EU (see Moravcsik 1997: 518-520; Moravcsik 2008: 237-239).

Since the Bratislava summit has not brought ambitious decisions for the EU security and defence policy, Italy, Spain, France and Germany responded to this "headwind" prior to the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels on 14 and 15 November 2016 with a joint letter to all EU Member States. In this letter they tried to make clear, that with the stronger military integration of Europe, no duplication of NATO structures and also no European army was intended, but that, in particular after the outcome of the presidential election in the USA, they were in fact creating a militarily independent and an effective EU that can use its capabilities and structures to help relieve NATO and, at the same time, increase its flexibility (see Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Bundestages 2017: 7). Continuously we are in the second stage of Moravcsik's three stage framework. Again, the biggest and most powerful states come up with a joint position that reflects their relative domestic preferences (see Pollack 2001: 226), which are other to the Baltic and Visegrád states, a far-reaching integration of European security and defence policy.

At the FAC meeting on the 14th of November 2016, the foreign and defense ministers did not specifically address the Franco-German defense initiative, but together adopted, without a British veto, an implementation plan for the EUGS, the so-called "Security and Defence Implementation Plan" (SDIP), which points in the same direction as the Franco-German initiative. This Implementation Plan sets out the way forward for the future security and defense policy of the EU. This can be seen as the

first step towards stage three of the Moravcsik approach. In fact, no new institution was created (see Moravcsik 1998: 9), but the Member States have already agreed to a joint path towards PESCO and further defence integration. That was paved by the powerful Member States like Germany, France and Italy that could convince the Eastern EU Member States that NATO will still be the major defence organization for Europe.

In particular, the following measures of the Implementation Plan (of a total of thirteen) could contribute to greater European integration in the field of security and defense policy:

> *„Action 9: Member States to consider relevant multinational structures or initiatives in the area of security and defence in view of reinforcing cooperation with the EU or deepening existing frameworks of cooperation. In particular, to consider developing a concept to make better use of existing national or multinational deployable headquarters made available to the EU, on a rotational basis, with a focus on training, mentoring and advising* […] (Implementation Plan on Security and Defence: 27).

And:

> *Action 12: Member States to agree to explore the potential of a single and inclusive PESCO (TEU; Article 42) based on the willingness of Member States to strengthen CSDP by undertaking concrete commitments. If so requested, the HR/VP can provide elements and options for reflection"* (Implementation Plan on Security and Defence: 30f.).

The European Parliamentary Research Service states in their briefing to European defence, that the SDIP seeks to mobilize various tools and policies that will allow the EU to respond to external conflicts and crises, build partners' capacities, and protect the European Union, because the plan aims at deepening defence cooperation, moving towards PESCO, enhance the EU's military and civilian response tools, improve the planning and conduct of missions, and enhance CSDP partnerships with third countries (see Lazarou and Barzoukas 2017: 3).

In his conclusions after the meeting, the Council "tasks to review the military requirements stemming from the EUGS and the level of ambition" (Council of the EU 2016b: 8). But while the conclusions do include a section entitled "Level of Ambition", it does no more than illustrate the three tasks set by the EUGS with examples of

operations, without any indication of the number and scale of operations involved. Except to say, as mentioned in the annex, the EU should be capable to do all of this "based on previously agreed goals and commitments" (Council of the EU 2016b: 15), defined in a footnote as: the existing Headline Goal (see Nováky 2018: 100-101). Although the Council did not mention it, a month later, the European Council did restate the EUGS aim for the EU to be able to act autonomously (see European Council 2016b: 3). That means that even within the existing Headline Goal, more strategic enablers will be needed. Nováky (2018) argues, that in reality it also means that the EU has to go beyond the 60.000 troops that are intended, because Europe will have to have its own reserves as well (see Nováky 2018: 101). Moreover, as stated in hypothesis 2, the day Brexit happens, the British contribution, which amounts to a full 20%, will have to be deducted from the EU's Force Catalogue. For the purpose of stepping up the EU effort, it is better to discount them, so that even if the current Headline Goal is maintained, the remaining EU Member States must contribute more in order to fill the gaps left by the UK – and in the end, the overall sum of deployable forces of the EU27 must be bigger than it is today (see Nováky 2018: 101). This supports the second hypothesis, since even the existing Headline Goals are of little relevance today and are too weak to make a great impact for European security (see for example Collins 2016).

The Council agreed to increase the EU's military research budget for the first time since 2010, raising the funding in 2017 by 1.6% and taking the budget to €31 million. As already mentioned, the UK had previously blocked any such increase five years in a row (see Lain and Nouwens 2017: 16). In reality, this keeps the agency's budget at 2016's level in real terms, but Federica Mogherini was optimistic saying "it is still a symbolic increase […] it is a clear demonstration of all EU Member States, including the United Kingdom, to increase the budget of the agency to reflect the work to be done" (Emmott 2016). This is in line with the second hypothesis and the argument that with the UK leaving the EU a major payor will leave and the EU will have a hard time to compensate this loss.

One week after the Council meeting on 22. and 23. November 2016, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) passed two resolutions on the European Defence Union, in which they suggested devoting 2% of GDP to defence, establishing multinational forces and an EU headquarter to plan and command crisis

management operations, in order to be “truly able to defend itself and act autonomously if necessary, taking greater responsibility” in cases where NATO is not willing to take the lead (see Lazarou and Barzoukas 2017: 11-12; Lain and Nouwens 2017: 22). Central to the resolution was the pooling of military resources, whereby the EDA should have a strengthened coordinating role, the EU should establish multinational forces within the PESCO and make them available to the CSDP, and the creation of a separate European Defence Research Programme with an annual budget of €500 million (see European Parliament 2016). In the second resolution the EP just calls for an overhaul of CSDP to allow the EU to act autonomously for collective security and defence. It supports the creation of a permanent headquarter for the EU to command peacekeeping and crisis management operations under the CSDP. This resolution also emphasizes transatlantic cooperation and complementarity with NATO, but notes that the EU should be able, using its own means, to protect EU non-NATO Member States. It also underlines the fact that “NATO is best equipped for deterrence and defence and is ready to implement collective defence (Article 5) in the case of aggression against one of its members, while the CSDP currently focuses on peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security” (Lazarou and Barzoukas 2017: 11-12).

The European Commission also wanted to benefit from the favorable moment to give the CSDP a new momentum at the end of 2016 and adopted the European Defense Action Plan (EDAP) on the 30. November 2016. It is intended to lay the foundations for the future of "achieving as much as possible as efficiently as possible with defense spending" (European Commission 2016b: 5-6). EDAP’s overall goal is to ensure that “the European defence industrial base is able to meet Europe’s current and future security needs and, in that respect, enhances the Union’s strategic autonomy, strengthening its ability to act with partners” (European Commission 2016b: 3). This is to be attained by a combination of investment in new technologies, through joint research and development wherever possible, by buttressing the European defence industrial base, avoiding duplication, as well as by various forms of sharing of platforms and assets at a time of stagnant or negative growth rates in defence expenditure (see Duke 2019: 30). However, EU Member States should continue to be free to choose which technologies and assets to invest in, as well as to retain control over defense capabilities. Under this Action Plan, the Commission proposed the EDF. The EDF consists of a “research window”, to fund collaborative

defence research projects, and a “capability window” to support the joint development of defence capabilities to be finance by the pooling of national contributions and, where possible, supported by the EU budget (European Commission 2016b: 5ff.). The EDF only formally came into existence in June 2017 with a research fund of €90 million allocated for 2017–2020 and €500 million per annum after 2020 and €500 million allocated for 2019–2020 and €1 billion per annum after 2020 for development and acquisition (with a leverage effect from national financing that is expected to increase this to €5 billion per annum after 2020) (see European Commission 2017b). At this time, however, it was far from clear where the budget for EDF (amounting to around 1% of the total EU budget) will come from in the current financial perspective which expires in 2020 (see Duke 2019: 30-31).

The formulation "achieving as much as possible as efficiently as possible with defense spending" (European Commission 2016b: 5-6) alone shows that the EDAP itself is kind of unambitious. It leaves the choice to the EU Member States and the financing of the EDF after 2020 unclear to that time, which supports the second hypothesis.

After the discussions at the Bratislava summit and the ongoing bargaining inside the EU the European Council meeting on the 15th December 2016 moved the proposals to the third stage of Moravcsik’s three-stage framework (theory of institutional choice). The EDAP was endorsed and the Council also discussed a defence package presented by the HR/VP Mogherini (see European Council 2016b), including:

1) specific actions to implement the security and defence component of the global strategy

2) the EDAP (see European Commission 2016b)

3) proposals to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Joint Declaration (see EU and NATO 2016; Lazarou and Barzoukas 2017: 2-3).

At the Summit in Brussels, EU leaders set a timetable for specific actions related to the package, aimed at streamlining the conduct of both civilian and military EU operations, and on further improving the development of civilian capabilities (see Drachenberg and Anghel 2016). This included the launch of a Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), aimed at enhancing defence cooperation among Member States and the establishment of a Military Planning and Conduct Capability

(MPCC) to develop EU crisis management structures, viewed by some analysts to be part of the initial steps towards an integrated EU Military Command (see Turpin 2018: 20; Tardy 2017). Furthermore, this European Council meeting in December 2016 also saw the activation of PESCO, made possible under the Lisbon Treaty but never acted upon, in order to enable willing and able Member States to deepen cooperation on a more limited multilateral basis, specifically in developing capabilities to implement the operational requirements of the CSDP (see European External Action Service 2018a). With the decision to launch CARD and the MPCC new responsibilities in the area of security and defence were delegated to the EU. Richter (2016) describes that in the third stage of Moravcsik's intergovernmental approach "Member States have reached an agreement on the level and the scope of their cooperation" (Richter 2016: 52). Especially CARD reduces the uncertainty of EU members about each other's future preferences and behavior (see Moravcsik 2003: 67). Therefore this supports hypothesis 1.

The Council also invited the Commission to make proposals for the establishment of the EDF, including a window on the joint development of capabilities commonly agreed by the Member States in the first semester of 2017 (see Lazarou and Barzoukas 2017: 2-3). As a result, the conclusions of the December 2016 European Council invited the HR/VP to "present proposals in the coming months" regarding, inter alia, "elements and options for an inclusive Permanent Structured Cooperation based on a modular approach and outlining possible projects" (Fiott et al. 2017: 20-21).

If we have a look at the initial proposals by the defence and foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy and Spain, many of them made it into the three-pronged "winter package" on defence that the EU agreed on in November and December 2016 (see Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 3), which shows that Moravcsik's three stage framework is suitable to explain the development of this "winter package", since the initial national preference formation of France and Germany (stage 1) made it to the second stage, in which all EU Member States negotiated at the Bratislava summit about their national preferences, that at least made it to the supranational stage and were adopted at the EU-level at the Council meeting in December (stage 3).

Not satisfied with the ambition of the agreed proposals in December 2016, Emmanuel Macron, early on his campaign, made a "real" one of his priorities in Berlin

on 10 January 2017: “Europe de la defense”. He said that it was time to overcome old divides: “I want to escape the stereotype of a France in charge of international affairs but stuck in its internal problems, and of a Germany economically powerful but naïve in front of global threats” (Macron 2017a: 6). Germany and France generally agree that flexible integration is necessary if there is no consensus at the remaining 27 Member States. As Macron put it during his speech, “if the ambition of taking action together is not shared in the whole union, we must find ways to move forward faster in a smaller group” (Macron 2017a: 7).

At a meeting in Versailles on 6 March 2017, the German, Spanish, Italian and French heads of states joined the French call for multi-speed Europe and pronounced their support for closer defence cooperation (see de la Baume and Herszenhorn 2017).

Then French President, François Hollande was particularly in favor of the idea of focusing on defence as a means to relaunch the European project (see AFP 2017; Hardy 2017). Macron advocates closer European defence integration compatible with NATO and has pledged to raise French defence spending (see Taylor 2017). At the European Council of June 2017, both the German Chancellor and the French President pushed for progress in EU defence cooperation (see Nielsen 2017). This can be interpreted as going back to the first stage in Moravcsik’s three-stage framework (national preference formation). France and Germany formulate their preference of deeper integration in the CSDP.

Nevertheless, approaches differ, particularly regarding financing. In March 2017, for example, Germany opposed a proposal by France and Italy to use bonds to finance the EDF, saying it would not be a viable way to finance European military projects (see Reuters 2017). Germany also argued that it would be unacceptable to view national contributions to the fund as one-time measures to obtain exemptions from European stability and growth requirements (see Lazarou and Barzoukas 2017: 9). This shows, that the leading EU Member States are indeed united in the idea of progress in EU defence cooperation but have their differences in the way they want to achieve it. Financing is one of the main topics of disagreement, firstly because the British share has to be compensated, and secondly the economic situation and attitudes differ in France and Germany. German constituencies and government parties are strictly against diluting the European economic stability and finance policies and are strictly against the idea of so-called Bonds. France and Italy on the other hand are supportive of bonds. This is in line with Moravcsik’s first stage, where

he describes that Member States translate these societal interests into national preferences towards European integration (Moravcsik 1997: 518-520; Moravcsik 2008: 237-239). This also supports the second hypothesis, that the Brexit does not change the differing positions on key policies of the EU members.

In February 2017, the HR/VP presented the Concept Note “Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations”, which was approved by the Council on 6 March 2017. The Council decided to establish the MPCC, which will serve as a command and control structure for non-executive EU military training missions. The MPCC will work under the political control of the PSC and aims to improve the EU's crisis management structures, as the lack of such a structure undermines its capacity to independently plan and run its own operations. The capability will be established within the existing EU military staff (see Lazarou and Barzoukas 2017: 3). This supports the first hypothesis, because the attempt to establish such an HQ for EU missions was blocked by the UK for several years (see for example Waterfield 2011).

The March Council also applauded the initial work to launch CARD since the current national review mechanisms allow for no overarching or systematic oversight of capabilities, shortfalls and defence spending plans (see Duke 2019: 31). By enabling voluntary transparency at the national level, CARD could in principle strengthen EDAP, with the ambition to establish CARD on a trial basis by the end of 2017 with the aim of full implementation by 2019. But CARD’s voluntary nature and the fact that it will provide an overview that is already available for NATO members, via its defence planning process (DPP), raises questions about the value-added of the initiative (see Duke 2019: 31-32). This may on the one hand support the first hypothesis, because the UK would have blocked such an initiative because of the “doubling” of NATO capabilities, but on the other hand it supports the second hypothesis because of the voluntary nature of the review. Countries like the Visegrad-4 and Austria, who are highly skeptical about giving more power to the EU (especially because of the opinion of their constituencies (see Eurobarometer 2018: 15)), are just on board because of the voluntary nature.

Other voluntary initiatives, such as the four defence benchmarks, run by the EDA since 2007 have seen, at a generous estimate, fulfilment of one of the four collective benchmarks (see Duke 2019: 32; Fiott 2017). CARD will be a Member States-driven tool for deepening cooperation in defence, fostering capability development and

ensuring more optimal use, including coherence, of defence spending plans (see European Parliament 2018a). The Council recalled the need for a timely implementation of the review of the Capability Development Plan by spring 2018. In March 2017, the European Council welcomed the progress achieved, as outlined at the FAC meeting (see European Council 2017a). In May 2017, the Council endorsed the effective establishment of the MPCC within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in Brussels (see Council of the EU 2017c). The MPCC will work in parallel and in a coordinated way with the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The Council welcomed the ongoing work to bring together civilian and military expertise in key mission support areas within a Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC) in Brussels (see Council of the EU 2017c; European Parliament 2018a).

On 16 March 2017, the EP voted on a resolution on the constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: "possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty" (European Parliament 2017), in which it urges the Council to move towards the harmonization and standardization of the European armed forces, to facilitate the cooperation of armed forces personnel under the umbrella of a new European Defence Union (EDU). The Parliament also called on the Council and the HR/VP to elaborate a white book on security and defence and a roadmap with clear phases and a calendar towards the establishment of an EDU and a more effective common defence policy (see Lazarou and Barzoukas 2017: 12).

The decision to create a MPCC within the EU military staff, tasked with the command of non-executive military CSDP missions (Council of the EU 2017bc) and other initiatives, including the EDF within the framework of the EDAP (European Commission 2016b), the strengthening of the PESCO mechanism (Council of the EU 2017c: 5; European External Action Service 2018a; Fiott et al. 2017), as well as the discussions around the resuscitation of the longstanding ambition of creating a common EU army (Juncker in: Reuters 2015), have indeed generated considerable expectations and debate among pundits (see Meijer and Wyss 2018: 5; Kayß 2017; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2017).

Samuel and Foster (2017) mockingly commented that the MPCC was little more than a "call centre". It cited a Whitehall source stating that it was "about as low-ambition as you can get away with" (Samuel and Foster 2017). Indeed, the body fell short of the initial ambition of creating a full-fledged HQ that would provide the CSDP with a

single “telephone number” (see Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 10). With up to 10 core and 20 support staff the body is rather small. In addition, its mandate is limited to the EU’s non-executive (training and capacity building) operations. It thus excludes executive military operations such as Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia or operation EU NAVFOR MED Sophia off the Libyan coast. These limitations are a result of the differing approaches of EU Member States. On the one hand countries like Germany supported a full HQ, but other countries like the Baltic and Visegrád states were afraid of doubling NATO capabilities. This supports hypothesis 2 (see chapter “Hypothesis”).

Despite these limitations, the MPCC has real added-value for the CSDP. Tardy (2017) argues, that it fills a gap in the chain of command for non-executive missions. So far, Mission Commanders assumed all responsibilities in the field and in Brussels. With the MPCC, an additional level of planning and command will prepare and conduct the missions, but also take over the Brussels-based reporting tasks (see Tardy 2017: 4). It could thus increase the speed of deployment and lead to more efficient communication and coordination. Although they only account for one fifth of the military personnel deployed under EU flag, non-executive missions are a central component of the CSDP. They make up half of the EU’s currently six military operations (see Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 10).

French and German officials presented the MPCC as a symbolic and important first step (see for example Zeit Online 2017). Koenig and Walter-Franke (2017) state that the mid-term goal is the transformation of the MPCC into a fully-fledged Operational HQ—an aim that matches the French drive for the EU’s strategic autonomy as well as Germany’s affinity for further institutional deepening (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 10). This supports the first hypothesis because of the constant veto of the UK regarding an operational HQ (see for example Waterfield 2011).

In March 2017, faced with several dilemmas regarding the future of the EU, the European Commission presented a White Paper on the future of Europe (European Commission 2017a). Many were surprised to see defence feature as one of the areas that, under all five scenarios proposed, would not be scaled down by the EU, but instead move forward – under some scenarios – towards a European Defence Union (see Lazarou and Barzoukas 2017: 2). Three distinct proposals were further

developed in the reflection paper on the future of European defence, published by the Commission in June 2017 (European Commission 2017a).

On 25. March 2017 the leaders of 27 Member States, the European Council, the EP and the European Commission met at Rome for the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. In their declaration they pledge to work towards a European Union ready to take more responsibilities and to assist in creating a more competitive and integrated defence industry. The declaration states that the Union is "committed to strengthening its common security and defence in cooperation and complementary to NATO" and takes into account national circumstances and legal commitments (Council of the EU 2017a: 1). Strongly pushed by France and with more German support than ever before, the idea of a sub-group coordination for countries that want to cooperate more, was taken up by the Benelux countries in their common "Vision on the Future of Europe" (Michel 2018) and made its way into the Rome declaration, underlining the intention to "act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary" (Council of the EU 2017a: 1). This perfectly describes the agreement of the Rome declaration as a three-stage process. France, and especially Macron, laid out the national preferences of France, supported by Germany (stage 1). After that the Benelux countries joined in and negotiated a compromise with France, Germany and the other EU Member States (stage 2), which it made into the Rome Declaration (stage 3). This compromise, however, is not a tangible one, regarding that the Rome declaration does not include new rights for the EU, because it is rather a memorandum of understanding and declaration than a treaty. Even the Commission—traditionally hostile to schemes of flexible integration—in its March 2017 White Paper depicted it as one of several imaginable trajectories on the future of Europe (see Krotz and Schild 2018: 1186). This option found support in France, Germany, Spain, and Italy (Chang 2017: 13), which supports the first hypothesis. Germany' and Belgium' citizens are under the top 5 regarding support for CSDP over Europe (see Eurobarometer 2018: 5) and therefore it is no surprise that the governments of these countries pushed for closer cooperation. This is in line with Moravcsik who stated, that "the foreign policy goals of national governments are viewed as varying in response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions" (Moravscsik 1993: 481).

At the end of March 2017, the UK officially triggered Article 50 and submitted officially their exit from the EU.

During their bi-annual meeting, on 18 May 2017, EU defence ministers adopted conclusions on the implementation of the EUGS, with a view to the European Council in June. Discussion focused on the conditions needed to trigger PESCO, as well as the content and the modalities of such cooperation; the terms and conditions for the CARD; and strengthening the instruments for a rapid response to crises, including EU battle groups (European Council 2017b).

In May 2017, the Council endorsed the effective establishment of the MPCC within the EUMS in Brussels after difficult negotiations (see Tardy 2017). The MPCC will work in parallel and in a coordinated way with the CPCC. The "modest" strong MPCC was established on 8 June 2017, but as Duke (2019) stressed it: "this was not the full operational headquarters that had been envisaged over a decade ago by some of the EU's members since, for the time being, it is restricted to "non-executive" missions (i.e. training missions in Somalia, Central Africa and Mali)" (Duke 2019: 32). This is on the one hand in line with the first hypothesis, because a HQ was indeed established after the Brexit referendum, but on the other hand the MPCC is not as strong as desired by some Member States, which stems from the request of some EU members to not duplicate NATO capabilities and the preference of the citizens in many countries (like Austria, Sweden, Romania, Poland etc.) to not give more responsibilities to the EU (see Eurobarometer 2018: 5f.). The three-stage framework of Moravcsik gives insights into the reason, why there is no full operational HQ. Proposed by France and Germany, in line with their national preferences (stage 1), the proposal made it to the intergovernmental bargain stage (stage 2) where countries like Poland, with other national preferences such as no duplication of NATO-capabilities, brought in their interests. As a compromise the bargaining lead to the convergence of the MPCC as a HQ for medical and logistical assets (see Moravcsik 2003: 51). This compromise made it then to stage 3, the implementation on the EU-level at the Council meeting in May 2017.

The Council's main interest is to enhance "the EU's ability to act as a security provider, as well as its global strategic role and its capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible" (Council of the EU 2017b: 2). Furthermore, a political agreement was struck with all Member States,

according to which the ATHENA-mechanism should cover both the deployment and redeployment costs of the EU Battlegroups (Council of the EU 2017b). The aim of ATHENA reform is thus to make the Battlegroups more useable, which in the view of Koenig and Walter-Franke (2017) have become the prime example for the EU's unused instruments (see Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 11).

At the Defence and Security Conference Europe in Prague (9 June 2017), European Commission President Juncker stated that "it is time to go further" (European Commission 2017e). He calls the Member States to cooperate further because "the protection of Europe can no longer be outsourced. Even our biggest military powers […] cannot combat all the challenges and threats alone" (European Commission 2017e). Juncker asks the EU members to "invest more and invest in a more efficient way" and he characterizes the PESCO as "the Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty". (European Commission 2017e). This call from Juncker shows that even one year after the Brexit referendum the remaining EU Member States have not achieved a significant progress in European security and defence policy. On the one hand some countries do not want to undermine NATO (for example Poland) and on the other hand the financing of the CSDP will get harder after the UK as a major payor is gone. Another reason is, that the UK, as a power of great importance to the defence and security in Europe, has the largest defence budget in Europe and therefore has capabilities that cannot be easily replaced by the other Member States without investing significantly more into defence and security (see for example Dijkstra 2016: 371).

Only three days later at the 10th June 2017 von der Leyen, the German minister of Defence stated that "Germany and France want to become the motor of a European defense union and implement the defense fund in a smart way" (Reuters 2017). But when it comes to financing development and procurement positions of the two biggest EU countries still differ (see above). To add incentives, the Commission proposed a "financial toolbox" including project-specific bonds, which would be exempted from the EU's rules on budget deficits (see European Commission 2017b). This is in line with the French and Italian preferences of a Bonds-based finance. On 22 June 2017, the European Council invited the Member States to work on options

for joint procurement “based on sound financing mechanisms” (European Council 2017c). This could be interpreted as leaning more towards the German position.

In its reflection paper on defence of June 2017, the Commission outlined three future scenarios (European Commission 2017c). The first is similar to the status quo; the second is an upgraded version with more cooperation; the third is a step towards an “EU army” with prepositioned forces and fully synchronized national defence planning (European Commission 2017c). While this incremental vision is helpful, the paper remains vague and detached from the more concrete EEAS and Member State proposals (see Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 15).

The Commission officially launched the EDF on 7 June 2017. It aims at enhancing Member State investment and fostering cooperation through three elements:

1. Research: From 2020, the EU will spend €500 million from the EU budget to fully and directly fund collaborative defence research.
2. Development: The Commission will provide €500 million in 2019 and €1 billion from 2020 to co-finance (20%) the development phase of collaborative projects between at least three companies in at least two Member States. The Commission expects this incentive to leverage a total of €5 billion of annual Member State investment.
3. Procurement: A condition for co-financing in the development phase is sufficient Member State commitment to procure the final product in a coordinated manner. For procurement itself, the Commission will act as a “knowledge hub” and provide legal and financial advice (see European Commission 2017d; Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 13-14). From 2020, the Commission is thus planning to provide €1.5 billion annually, equivalent to roughly 1% of the EU budget. The Fund would place the Commission among Europe’s top four investors in defence R&D (see Besch 2017).

This achievement shows that with the EDF the proposals by France and Germany in the first stage, combined with the compromise with Italy, Spain, and the Benelux states made it into the third stage and introduces new power to the EU and the CSDP. This supports the first hypothesis, because it develops a new impetus for the CSDP which is highly supported by a majority of EU citizens, and it takes away the fear of paying more for CSDP after the Brexit in the Member States.

In June 2017, the Council adopted the decision to establish the MPCC within the EUMS. The terms of reference of the EUMS, which is part of the EEAS, have also

been amended and approved. On the same date, the European Tactical Airlift Centre was officially opened further developing capabilities for CSDP (see European Parliament 2018a). Furthermore, the Council agreed on the need to launch an inclusive and PESCO, to strengthen Europe's security and defence to contribute to the fulfilment of the Union level of ambition as derived from the EUGS and as defined in the 14 November 2016 Council conclusions on implementing the EUGS in the area of Security and Defence (see European Council 2017d). Leaders agreed first to define a common list of membership criteria and binding commitments (to be drawn up by Member States within three months), as well as a list of projects to enable interested Member States to quickly notify their intention to participate (see Lazarou and Barzoukas 2017: 4). Here again, a proposal of France and Germany (stage 1) made it into stage 3 after compromising in stage 2 of the Moravcsik framework, especially with the countries which were afraid of doubling NATO capabilities (see above).

The two achievements presented in mid-2017, the MPCC as well as a limited increase of the scope of common funding for military operations under the ATHENA mechanism gained not that much attention as maybe anticipated. Koenig and Walter-Franke (2017) argue that this is due to the fact that "these steps are symbolic, but their effective impact is (still) limited" (see above). This supports the second hypothesis, that with the UK leaving the EU the remaining Member States have difficulties to set up effective and affordable defense and security measurements, despite the major "brake" of CSDP will be gone (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 9).

In July the 19th, perhaps one of the most remarkable Franco-German Ministerial Councils took place in Paris. The two countries announced the launch of a European initiative in favor of PESCO and defined a common approach to the criteria allowing partner countries to participate in it (see Krotz and Schild 2013: Chapter 2; Krotz 2011). During this meeting both governments have defined a list of binding commitments and elements for an inclusive and ambitious Cooperation which includes a timetable and specific evaluation mechanisms. The most important among all were budget commitments by which countries will have to increase their defence budget to reach the target of 2% of GDP (NATO criteria). More important, they have committed to devote 20% of the budget to investment. Furthermore, in the field of armament and procurement, France and Germany envisage the development and

procurement of the next generation's major weapon systems: tanks, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters (see Bundesregierung 2017a; Krotz 2011). France and Germany also announced a range of joint capability projects including:

- A joint fighter jet replacing the current national versions
- A joint fighter tank and artillery system
- A European maritime surveillance system
- A European Medium-Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone (development contract before 2019)
- The next generation of Tiger helicopters (Conseil des Ministres Franco-Allemand 2017: 8-9).

The balance between inclusiveness and ambition has been a bone of contention between Paris and Berlin. Germany views PESCO through the prism of European integration. Though generally open to multiple speeds, it is keen to avoid new dividing lines along the boundaries of a Euro defence core (see Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 12). France instead views PESCO as an instrument for operative efficiency geared towards the EU's strategic autonomy. It would be willing to go ahead with a smaller core group of Member States ready to engage in serious military operations. Overcoming these differences, the Franco-German Ministerial Council was an initial compromise on entry criteria and binding commitments (Conseil des Ministres Franco-Allemand 2017).

After the bilateral narratives, the French and German defence ministers met with their Spanish and Italian counter-parts as well as the HR/VP, Federica Mogherini (see Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 3). On July 21st, 2017, France, Germany, Spain and Italy (supported by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland and the Netherlands) notified to the HR/VP their intention to engage PESCO. Through this letter, all these countries indicated that they had agreed on a proposal for binding commitments which they will put up for discussion in the Council.

In his September 2017 State of the Union address, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, referred to PESCO as a means to achieve a "fully fledged European defence union" by 2025 (European Commission 2017f). "I want our Union to become a stronger global actor. In order to have more weight in the world, we must be able to take foreign policy decisions quicker. This is why I want Member States to look at which foreign policy decisions could be moved from

unanimity to qualified majority voting. The Treaty already provides for this, if all Member States agree to do it" (European Commission 2017f).

On 26 September 2017, in his Sorbonne speech, the French President proposed the establishment of a "common intervention force, a common defence budget and a common doctrine for action" at EU level (Macron 2017b). The president's words fell into line with the country's overall objective to make the CSDP more ambitious and operational. In this respect, Macron's showcase project is the European intervention initiative (EII) (see Major and Mölling 2017). A core group of nation states could advance in building up "operational readiness" on the European continent; this corresponds to Macron's notion of a "multi-speed Europe" (see Maurice 2017). Only approximately one year later, in June 2018, Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany, finally reacted to Macron's Sorbonne speech. In an interview with the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" (FAZ) she stated that she is in favor and positive towards Macron's proposal of an European Intervention Initiative (Gutschker and Lohse 2018). This long time till an answer of Germany shows, that nothing has developed in the meantime and supports the second hypothesis.

The centrality of PESCO to the earlier Franco-German initiatives and the emerging plans to enhance European security and defence still left critical questions open regarding who would bear the brunt for attaining the new level of ambition (see Duke 2019: 32). Twenty-three EU members signed a joint notification addressed to the FAC and to the HR/VP on their intention to participate in PESCO to realize the goal of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions, in the margins of the November 2017 FAC in Brussels. They were soon joined by two more members: Denmark, Ireland, Malta, Portugal and the UK did not initially sign, but Ireland and Portugal joined, after clearing domestic hurdles, soon thereafter. The agreement, which promoted a German-backed "inclusive PESCO", rather than the French preference for a more ambitious version with higher but selective entry criteria, offered a "reliable and binding legal framework within the EU institutional framework", where progress is subject to annual regular assessment by the High Representative (Council of the EU 2017d: 1; see also Billon-Galland and Quencez 2017: 2–3). This means, that the German proposal (stage 1) of an inclusive PESCO

has “won” through the intergovernmental bargaining phase (stage 2) and made it to stage 3, the implementation.

Not all Member States welcomed the establishment of PESCO in the same manner. Poland addressed a letter to the HR/VP where it set out three conditions for its participation:

1) primacy of NATO's defence planning process

2) competitive, innovative and balanced development of the European defence industry in order to suit the needs of all the EU Member States involved

3) a 360-degree approach to security threats with particular attention paid to the “eastern flank” (see Ministry of National Defence Republic of Poland 2017; European Parliament 2018b: 6).

Poland’s position justifies due to the fact that the Polish citizens and the government are strongly committed to NATO and very cautious about further EU integration (see Eurobarometer 2018: 5). This position was brought into the second stage, the intergovernmentalist bargaining stage and was taken into account by the other Member States with the compromise of an “inclusive” PESCO.

On 11 December 2017 the EU established PESCO, a previously unused provision in the TEU. The 25 EU Member States (see above) signed up to a list of “ambitious and more binding common commitments” comparable to PESCO entry criteria (see Council of the EU 2017e). The commitments are instrumental to the development of joint defence projects. All signatories agreed to cooperate more closely in security and defence, increase their defence expenditures gradually, and contribute to at least one PESCO project on capability development (see European Parliament 2018b: 4). The Member States that participate in PESCO also adopted a Declaration expressing their intention to prepare, in different groupings, the first collaborative PESCO projects (initial list of 17 projects) as set out in the Annex to the Declaration (see Council of the EU 2017e: 15ff.). The commitment to PESCO made included “successive medium-term increases in defence investment expenditure to 20% of total defence spending” to increase “the share of expenditure allocated to defence research and technology with a view to nearing the 2% of total defence spending” (Council of the EU 2017e, Annex II: 3). The key word is obviously “nearing” since if applied as a strict condition for PESCO from the outset most, including France and Germany, would not be currently eligible for PESCO (see Duke 2019: 32).

More than 50 PESCO projects were initially proposed by EU Member States. In the end, national defence policy directors and the EDA cut the number down to 17 (Barigazzi 2017). The final list of collaborative PESCO projects includes things such as a European Medical Command, increased cross-border military mobility within Europe, a deployable military disaster-relief package, cyber-defence rapid-response teams and mutual assistance in cybersecurity, a strategic command and control system for EU operations, and a crisis response operation core (see Council of the EU 2017f; Nováky 2018: 100). The initial list of 17 PESCO projects contains four German-led and two French-led projects. Italy is leading four projects, Greece two, and Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Lithuania and Slovakia one project each. In most cases, the PESCO projects chosen by the Member States correspond to national their respective strengths. For instance, Lithuania is leading a PESCO project on cyber rapid response teams (CRRTs) and mutual assistance in cyber technology with a view to making use of its well-developed information technology industry (see European Parliament 2018b: 9). Even if French and German governments were a real impulse for launching PESCO in Europe, Italy is so far the most active member with four leading projects and its participation in almost all remaining ones. On the contrary, France as one of the “funding countries” is not so much present. It leads only two projects and participates in two others. This can be explained by French’s disappointment about the PESCO’s format (more inclusive than France wanted). Moreover, a southern boost of interest should be pointed out through the example of Greece. Indeed, Athens would like to participate in nine projects, especially those specialized in cyber security – which is most likely explained by the existence of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) in Athens. Some countries will use PESCO as an expansion of already existing military cooperation. This involves members like Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, neighboring countries that have joined the same projects (see Council of the EU 2017g).

Three days later, on 14 December 2017, the European Council welcomed the establishment of an ambitious and inclusive PESCO and stressed the importance of quickly implementing the first batch of projects and called on participating Member States to deliver on their national implementation plans (see European Council 2017e).

According to Article 42(6) of the TEU, PESCO is to be established by those EU Member States, "whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria, and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions" and who would cooperate "within the Union framework" (Art. 42.6 TEU). The Protocol on PESCO annexed to the Treaty lists five broad commitments participating Member States have to make:

1. To agree on the level of investment in defence equipment;
2. To "bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible", by harmonizing military needs, pooling, and specialization;
3. To enhance their forces' availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability, notably by setting "common objectives regarding the commitment of forces";
4. To address the commonly identified capability shortfalls, including through multinational approaches;
5. To take part in equipment projects in the context of the EDA.

The Treaty also assigns to the EDA the task of assessing whether these binding commitments are met (see Biscop 2017a: 2). The objectives and commitments of PESCO are laid out in Article 1 of Protocol 10, which states that the participating Member States undertake to (1) develop their defence capacities through the development of their national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programs and in the activity of the EDA; and (2) have the capacity to supply targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group. Some of commitments the EU Member States agreed on are relatively specific, such as making strategically deployable formations available, developing a database on the participating Member States' available and rapidly deployable capabilities, and simplifying and standardizing cross-border military transport in Europe (see Nováky 2018: 100-101). Other commitments, however, are formulated vaguely, using language that leaves significant room for interpretation. The list includes playing a "substantial role" in capability development within the EU, supporting CARD "to the maximum extent possible", "considering" the joint use of existing capabilities, "aiming for" faster political commitment at the national level for EU interventions, "providing substantial support within means and capabilities" to EU operations, and "substantially contributing" to EU Battlegroups (Council of the EU 2017e: 15- 20). Nováky (2018)

argues, that this type of wording is highly subjective (Nováky 2018: 101). The problem with subjective language is that any EU Member State participating in PESCO can argue that it is playing a substantial role in capability development or providing substantial support for EU operations, regardless of what its partners might think. Efforts that might be considered as minor by some might genuinely be seen as substantial by others. Nováky (2018) argues that “this means that the minimum threshold for fulfilling many PESCO commitments will inevitably be low” (Nováky 2018: 101). The problem is, that PESCO has no compliance enforcement mechanism beyond the threat of membership suspension. Article 6(3) of the Council Decision (see Council of the EU 2017e: 11) notes that once a year the Council must review whether the participating Member States are fulfilling their commitments based on the HR/VP’s annual PESCO report (see Council of the EU 2017e: 7). If a Member State systematically fails to meet its commitments, its membership of PESCO should be suspended. According to Article 6(4), a suspension decision will be taken only after the Member State in question “has been given a clearly defined timeframe for individual consultation and reaction measures” (Council of the EU 2017e: 11).

The launch of PESCO has generated a huge amount of public interest and significant fanfare. Federica Mogherini, HR/VP, referred to PESCO’s establishment as “a historic moment in European defence” and that “the possibilities of the PESCO are immense” (European External Action Service 2017a). European Council President Donald Tusk noted that “PESCO is not only good news for us, but it is also good news for our allies” and “bad news for our enemies” (European Council 2017f). Such hype stems from the expectation that PESCO will become a game changer for EU defence cooperation by boosting the Union’s capabilities and helping it to achieve the goal of “strategic autonomy” set by the 2016 EU Global Strategy (European Union 2016: 9). According to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the launch of PESCO is a huge step forward, which "fills a historic gap and shows that we have a real will and ability to defend ourselves” (Bundesregierung 2017b). French President Emmanuel Macron concluded on PESCO that “something which seemed to us impossible only a year ago now becomes a reality” (see Barigazzi 2017). Ursula von der Leyen, German minister of defence, welcomed the PESCO notification as a “great day for Europe” (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2017).

Kochis (2017) argues, that PESCO is not—as some have stated—"a big step toward creating an eventual EU Army" to undermine NATO, or "towards the EU wrestling more control of security matters away from individual Member States" (Kochis 2017). The reasons for this are threefold. First, PESCO is voluntary and does not change existing TEU provisions on security and defence cooperation. Article 42(4), which states that "decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously", remains untouched. Thus, no sovereignty is being wrestled away (see Nováky 2018: 99). Second, decisions within PESCO itself will be taken by unanimity, except for decisions on admitting new members to it or suspending the participation of existing members, which will be taken by a qualified majority. Third, each Member State has only one armed force, which it uses for national, EU, NATO, UN and other purposes. Thus, any capability improvements that PESCO might deliver will also benefit the European pillar within NATO and improve transatlantic burden sharing (see Nováky 2018: 99). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg himself has welcomed PESCO because it should "strengthen European defence which is good for Europe but also good for NATO" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2017).

Duke (2019) argues that Britain's often ambivalent attitude towards EU security and defence has facilitated security and defence development at the EU level which, as the High Representative maintains, "is not a plan anymore, it is not a dream anymore, it is reality coming true" (European External Action Service 2017b; see also Duke 2019: 35). The creation of the MPCC, the possibility of a larger budget for the EDA, the reform of the Athena mechanism (covering some of the common costs of EU operations and missions like headquarters, administration, infrastructure and medical services) and the launch of PESCO would predictably have been resisted and not been approved by the UK, which supports hypothesis 1 (see Fiott et al. 2017: 45–47; Howorth 2017: 5–7).

Views on PESCO, however, vary within the EU and also among the 25 signatories. Alongside contrasting domestic political landscapes and national interests, each Member State follows its own decision-making procedures in security and defence. In this, the role of national parliaments is crucial (see European Parliament 2018b: 4). The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) has identified the

main avenues for EU national parliaments to exert influence on defence policy-making: budgetary powers, right to information, veto powers and the power to determine details of an operation, and procurement process (see Mölling and von Voss 2015). Svendsen (2018) argues that the signing up of 25 states to PESCO indicates, that this as a PESCO that will not make things easier; “it primarily means moving the intrastate battles and discussions on European defence to a new site” (Svendsen 2018: 3). In the long run, it will be interesting to see the actual participation of those countries which are not the most supportive regarding European Defence, such as Poland. Indeed, the country appears to be mostly NATO-oriented and Polish authorities consider PESCO not as a partnership but as a competition for NATO (see above). From this point of view, it is not a surprise that Polish government, with an important military budget, wants to participate only in two projects of which one is a military mobility - an idea initiated by NATO. Thus, Nováky (2018) states “whether PESCO succeeds or fails will depend on the participating Member States’ political will to do more than the minimum required from them to fulfil their commitments” (Nováky 2018: 101). In concrete terms, this will often mean higher defence spending, especially in research and development. Duke (2019) points out that any commitments, however, will be hard to enforce “since the timetable for achieving pledges is unclear”, as is the link to the CARD process which should have been a prerequisite for PESCO, but which is not (Duke 2019: 32-33). European Council on Foreign Relations’ (ECFR) Nick Witney, the first chief executive of the EDA, argues that PESCO has been made far too inclusive (a German demand), including members that only joined to slow it down in the case of Poland. “There is no value-added in any of this”, he concludes; “Big noise on stairs, nobody coming down” (Franke 2017). Franke (2017) argues that PESCO is “a framework, rather than a policy, and we are in the early stages where vague declarations of intent still need to be filled with content”. Sophia Besch from the Center of European Reform notes that “an effective assessment mechanism that holds Member States to account, and ultimately kicks them out of the club if they fail to fulfil the ambitious commitments they have signed up to” would be one way to strengthen the framework (Franke 2017). Rizzo and Germanovich argue that “any sharing, pooling, and common decision-making that did occur under the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) suffered from shrinking defense budgets and only episodic attention on defense” (Rizzo and Germanovich 2018). But the persistence of major

intra-European national divergences in terms of threat perceptions, the imbalances in capabilities, relative gains considerations, and the consequent challenges of defining a shared hierarchization of the main security challenges and military tasks, shed considerable doubt on the prospect of a truly integrated European defence (see Meijer and Wyss 2018: 5; Hyde-Price 2018; Simón 2017a; 2017b). These factors suggest that, all the recent hype surrounding PESCO notwithstanding, a common European defence policy appears to be a distant hope rather than a present reality. These arguments support the second hypothesis and show that without the British contributions monetarily and militarily the EU is not able to immediately step up, close this gap and not at all develop the CSDP further.

On the other hand, compared with previous EU efforts in the defence domain, the alleged added-value of PESCO comes from the combination of the nature of commitments that Member States will make, the accountability that the framework creates for Member States and the permanence of the framework. Furthermore, PESCO brings Member States' defence apparatus into line with each other. Until today they do the opposite: states strictly planning national defence in isolation and without much regard for either the EU or NATO (see Nováky 2018: 103). PESCO can turn this around. Participating Member States should plan together, as if for one force, and then decide which contribution every individual State will make. The aim: to arrive at a single coherent full-spectrum force package (see Nováky 2018: 103). Fiott et al. (2017) argue, that taken together, these elements are "supposed to shape national mindsets and practices, and in the end the form of cooperation, in a way never observed in the past" (Fiott et al. 2017: 8).

Moreover, contrary to when it was first debated, PESCO now also comes with an – ready-made incentive to join: the EDF. Combining the first, fourth and fifth of the criteria in the Treaty (see Council of the EU 2017e: 15-20), which means an agreed level of investment, in projects to address the priority shortfalls, through the EDA, PESCO could be configured to entail an obligation to contribute to the defence fund (see Biscop 2017a: 5). The reward would be that every Euro from the Member States would be matched by a Euro from the Commission, and that the fund would be used for capability projects decided upon through PESCO. The first set of participating States would thus have to assemble "only" €2.5 billion, divided according to GDP.

Through PESCO, the smaller EU Member States will gain relevance. By anchoring their (more or less) entire armed forces in various multinational formations, they will be able to devote a larger share of their defence expenditure to maintaining and deploying their remaining maneuver units and would thus have a greater say in multinational decision-making (see Biscop 2017a: 4). At the same time, PESCO would not mean the end of sovereignty. Because the maneuver units within the multinational formation would remain national, one participant could still flexibly deploy an infantry battalion, for example, without all others having to follow suit, as long as everybody's staff in the support units do their job. In fact, by pooling all too limited national military sovereignty, PESCO would revive sovereignty at a higher level (see Biscop 2017a: 7). However, while PESCO represents an effort to promote greater efficiency within Member State militaries and to enhance their interoperability and does not amount to anything like the idea of an "EU Army" (see Martill and Sus 2018b: 15). While France has approximately 200 000 soldiers at its command (see Ministère des Armées 2017), Estonia's military personnel number only 6 000 in peacetime (see Estonian Defence Forces 2017). Having said this, the Baltic States are leading in information technology, digitization and research on cyber security. PESCO is supposed to make the most of the respective strengths of each participating EU Member State, especially regarding the niche capabilities of smaller Member States (see European Parliament 2018b: 6). This supports the first hypothesis, since with the UK inside the EU decision-making they would have blocked such a cooperation because of their fears of duplicating NATO.

On December 12th, 2017, the Council agreed on the proposed regulation of the European Parliament concerning the establishment of the European Defence Industrial Development Program. According to the Estonian Minister of Defence and President of the Council, Jüri Luik, "the European Defence Industrial Development Program will make our defence industry more competitive and innovative. This is crucial both for the security of our citizens and for the viability of our industry. This plan is completely linked to the EDF, which will have to finance, as explained above, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) of defence, in order to make them become more attractive, competitive and innovative in the global market" (European Council 2017g).

At a high-level event on “Building on vision, forward to action: delivering on EU security and defence” on 13 December 2017 in Brussels, Federica Mogherini laid out six ideas to bring vision and action closer together after having launched new collective tools and facilities in security and defence, recommending action to:

1. make full use of existing EU capacities and instruments, for instance activating the EU battlegroups;
2. ensure that sufficient means and resources are available for common EU action through the European Commission's multiannual framework, e.g. launching a European peace facility to plan and deploy military missions more efficiently;
3. strengthen partnerships with NATO, the UN, the African Union and beyond, for example: creating a mechanism for closer cooperation with non-European countries and international organizations;
4. keep on investing in civilian missions and capabilities;
5. ensure synergy effects and coherence between all EU defence initiatives, for instance setting up a 'defence union task force';
6. work towards a common strategic culture within the EU and boost European military training and education (European External Action Service 2017c).

The aim to get PESCO up and running as soon as possible is evident at EU level. Progress in defence matters also ranks among the top priorities of the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU (January 2018 – June 2018) (see European Parliament 2018b: 10). As for PESCO, Lieutenant-General Atanas Zapryanov, Deputy Defence Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria, stressed in the Committee for Security and Defence (SEDE) in the EP on 24 January 2018 that there is “no room for delay”, and that different defence initiatives will be developed in parallel, i.e. PESCO could be carried out without a properly functioning CARD[5]. This contradicts the expectation stated in hypothesis 2, that countries like Austria and Bulgaria, where European defence is not among the top-priorities of the citizens, will concentrate rather on other European topics than on defence.

The ambitiousness and inclusiveness of the PESCO projects, however, differ; and so do the respective implementation plans. Some PESCO projects are able to build on

[5] See video: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20180124-0900-COMMITTEE-SEDE.

preexisting domain-specific knowledge and achievements at EU or national level, while others require new infrastructure and capacity-building. Moreover, a large number of EU Member States participating in a PESCO project might cause delays in the implementation process owing to the unanimous decision-making procedures at the Foreign Affairs Council in PESCO format (see European Parliament 2018b: 10). General Mikhail Kostarakos, chair of the European Union Military Committee, stated in the SEDE committee on 24 January 2018 that the rapid development of PESCO "is not European Union", which is normally "not doing things within few months"[6].

On 6 March 2018, the Council – meeting for the first time ever in "PESCO" format – formally adopted the list of 17 projects to be developed including a recommendation concerning a roadmap for the implementation of PESCO. On 28 March 2018, the Action Plan on military mobility was presented, which identifies a series of operational measures to tackle different barriers that hamper military mobility (see European Commission 2018b).

On 28 June 2018 at the European leaders' summit, the Council of the EU stressed again that "Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security and underpin its role as a credible and reliable actor and partner in the area of security and defence" (Council of the EU 2018: 4). There is some evidence that this repeated call for greater responsibility for Europe's security means, that despite all the efforts the EU-27 have made, the achievements are not yet to the satisfaction of the Council. In the same direction goes the reaction of the Council to the proposal of the HR/VP for a European Peace Facility (EPF). The Council "takes note of the proposal […] and shares the aim of enhancing the Union's ability to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security" (Council of the EU 2018: 5). "Takes note of" is somewhat the weakest formulation the Council could have adopt. If we look at the other paragraphs that were adopted there were formulations like "calls for" (see Council of the EU 2018: 3), "looks forward to" (see Council of the EU 2018: 3), and "welcomes" (see Council of the EU 2018: 4; 5; 7). All in all, the Council adopted conclusions which "call for" the fulfillment of the PESCO commitments in a consistent manner with the CARD and CDP and mention that a new set of PESCO projects are expected towards the end of the year. Also, the Council "calls for" a second wave of

[6]See video: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20180124-0900-COMMITTEE-SEDE.

PESCO projects and for further ambitious proposals (see Council of the EU 2018: 3). The conclusions also "welcome" the progress on military mobility and stress the need to strengthen cyber capabilities. The Council expects the "military requirements under the EU Action Plan on military mobility now to be finalized and calls on Member States to simplify and standardize relevant rules and procedures by 2024" (Council of the EU 2018: 5). The Foreign Affairs conclusions of 25 June adopted a common set of governance rules for PESCO projects, they welcome the political agreement on the EU Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and reiterate the need to cooperate with NATO, especially in terms of military mobility. During remarks at an EU Informal Defence Ministers meeting in Vienna, the HR/VP stated that more than 30 new PESCO projects are currently being assessed and will be ready for adoption in November (European External Action Service 2018b).

VII. Results

From a liberal institutionalist perspective, EU integration is mainly the result of a "multi-stage process of constrained social choice" (Moravcsik 2008: 250). Liberal Intergovernmentalism assumed that the control over security and defence issues was likely to remain at the national level and hence failed to anticipate the emergence of the CSDP in the 1990s (see Richter 2016: 53; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). Nevertheless, this does not mean that Liberal Intergovernmentalism is inadequate for accounting for the emergence and evolution of security and defence cooperation at the EU level. On the contrary, under Liberal Intergovernmentalism "[…] unforeseen or initially undesired policies may change over time" (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 79), especially if shocks, such as the Brexit referendum, change national preferences in favor of further integration. Thus, with its three-stage framework, Liberal Intergovernmentalism may well account for the various stages in the CSDP (see Richter 2016: 53).

The analysis shows that much has happened in the context of the CSDP since the summer of 2016 and the Brexit referendum. CSDP expert Sven Biscop, director at the Egmont Institute and Professor at Ghent Institute for International Studies, summarized that "everything was happening at once" in European defence (Biscop 2017b: 1). However, the scope of initiatives that we have seen are arguably much more limited in operational terms than what public discourse indicates. A top diplomat in Brussels said it with the following analogy: "what is happening in the CSDP is that

we are laying down a few pieces of a puzzle. If that puzzle ever becomes a whole image is probably many years ahead of us, and it might not even happen. If it does happen, there is also the real danger that it will be left in the drawer" (Svendsen 2018: 1).

But, in line with the first hypothesis, significant changes that have been on the cards for much of the recent decade, and have been blocked by the UK, have now all been launched. As the risk of a UK veto vanished, the EU instigated four key security and defence initiatives. The MPCC was established in summer 2017 and has assumed command of EU non-executive military missions. PESCO – the "Sleeping beauty of the Lisbon Treaty" (European Commission 2017e) – was launched in December 2017 (see Council of the EU 2017e), permitting groups of like-minded and capable Member States to take European defence to the next level and put forward more advanced projects. Next, the EDF was commenced by the European Commission (2017) to allocate money (€600 million yearly until 2020 and €1.5 billion thereafter) for technological innovation and defence research. Finally, CARD was initiated to monitor national defence spending and to identify possibilities for pooling resources and to deliver joint capabilities (see Martill and Sus 2018a: 851-852). These decisions have all made headway each in its own right, following a strictly functional logic driven by shared interests as well as practical needs, and as much by common sense as by common ground, which supports the first hypothesis (see Fiott et al. 2017: 5). This can be explained by the three-stage framework model by Moravcsik. The outcome shows that the EU was able to overcome some old hurdles and agree on concrete deliverables concerning the planning and conduct as well as financing of CSDP operations. However, these developments are not without their limitations, and one must be careful not to ascribe undue expectations to their immediate capabilities. The taken steps were initial and rather cautious (see Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 4). The more ambitious dossiers, implying a degree of variable geometry as well as pooling sovereignty and resources, are still in the pipeline because of the differing national preferences, especially concerning doubling NATO capabilities, which happened especially in stage two of the Moravcsik framework, that led to either unambitious decision or to no compromise at all.

While the projects are expected to contribute to more-interoperable national armed forces in the EU, they do not challenge the fundamental premise of national control

over militaries or the intergovernmental nature of CSDP decision-making (see Martill and Sus 2018b: 12). Nor, for that matter, do they represent a challenge to NATO. Indeed, insofar as for example PESCO and EDF are perceived by the Member States a means to rationalize defence spending and procurement, they may even help more Member States to meet their NATO target of spending 2 percent of GDP on defence. Moreover, these projects are as much a political statement as an institutional development, and their launch in the wake of the Brexit shock is no coincidence, which gives slight support to the first hypothesis. However, important questions remain about the commitment of Member States to the new mechanism—especially those, such as France and Poland, that have either hedged their bets or made their participation conditional (see Billon-Galland and Quencez 2017: 5-6; Martill and Sus 2018b: 12; Fiott et al. 2017: 36-39). There will be limits of the political will towards further defence and security integration. Without the UK, countries such as Austria and Ireland, who are also resistant to full security and defence integration, will lose a champion on the issue. True interoperability will continue to be an issue unless further military integration is accomplished. For example, there are 19 different types of armored infantry fighting vehicles across the EU. The United States in contrary have one (see Lain and Nouwens 2017: 23).

A further challenge lies in the differences between French and German conceptions of the future of EU defence, which came to light as PESCO was negotiated. Germany aimed for an inclusive format for the new project, keen to have as many Member States on board as possible, while France, concerned more with operational effectiveness, pushed for a more exclusive approach (Billon-Galland and Quencez 2017, 2-3). The overall foreign policy approaches also differ. For example, the French defence minister said, that the EU should send military ships to ensure open waterways in the territorially disputed South China Sea (see AFP 2018). France has demonstrated that it is willing to act unilaterally in military affairs, as demonstrated by the interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic in 2013-2014. Such interventionist action is at odds with some states' approach. Germany is certainly becoming more proactive in military and defence affairs. For example, after the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, Germany sent a frigate and reconnaissance aircraft to support the anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq and Syria. However, it is still unlikely to back such adventurist foreign policy (see Lain and Nouwens 2017: 23). This means that limits to the expeditions that the EU can make based on a collective

approach will remain. In the discourse analysis we have seen that the Franco-German bilateralism has a great impact on developments in the CSDP. Shorter-term factors, and longer-term shifts, are likely to further boost the significance and impact of Franco-German bilateralism and EU commitment in the domains of foreign policy, security, and defence. Despite the short-turn turbulences of Britain's "exit", Brexit as just one among other factors and forces is likely to enhance and accentuate these trends. It will thus contribute to boosting not only the role of France and Germany but, ironically and counter-intuitively perhaps, will also significantly strengthen European integration in areas where it traditionally has often proceeded only slowly and with difficulty (see Krotz and Schild 2018: 1184; Krotz and Schild 2013; Chapter 9).

The establishment of PESCO was accompanied by a huge fanfare and public interest. But PESCO's success is not preordained, and the Member States will need to invest significant resources if the mechanism is to live up to the expectations (see Martill and Sus 2018b: 12). Ultimately, the future development of PESCO will depend upon the commitment of the Member States and their willingness to make significant contributions to the project (see Sus 2017).

Fiott et al. (2017) state, in support of the first hypothesis that "measured against the difficulties European security and defence has experienced over the past decade, PESCO also looks – especially to insiders – as a giant leap forward for the EU" (Fiott et al. 2017: 53). For the time being, the speed and determination with which the EU and its Member States have (re)engaged on defence cooperation – well beyond Common Security and Defence Policy proper – prove that Europeans are now becoming well aware of what is at stake in a rapidly mutating security environment (see Fiott et al. 2017: 5). Koenig and Walter-Franke (2017) disagree and state that "France and Germany have taken the lead in terms of shaping European compromises, but too many questions remain open to speak of a real leap towards an ambitious European Security and Defence Union" (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017: 4).

These different opinions alone show the mixed achievements of the CSDP after the Brexit referendum. On the one hand, in line with the first hypothesis, the establishment of PESCO, CARD, the MPCC, and the EDF shows that the EU Member States are willing to move forward in defence and security issues without the "blocking factor" UK. On the other hand, if we look at the many ambitious proposals made in the time after the Brexit referendum, especially by France and Germany, and

then look at what has been achieved, you can clearly say that the implemented new mechanisms need an ambition boost to really bring forward the CSDP in the direction of a really "common" security and defence policy. We can sum up, that there is rather more support for hypothesis 2 in the analysis than for hypothesis 1 and the European defence integration remains limited in its scope and reach. It is surrounded by a discourse of relevance which perhaps overstate the actual outcome of institutional developments over the last 20 years or so (see Svendsen 2018: 2).

VIII. Limitations

According to Moravcsik (1997; 2008), the heads of governments first aggregate societal interests and then translate these interests into national preferences towards European integration. Although Liberal Intergovernmentalism considers that states have different economic, political and institutional settings, it somehow fails to grasp the complexity of the structural environment in which the heads of government take decisions, including the "multiple actors interacting across various domains and levels of social totality" (Hyde-Price 2013: 403). Liberal Intergovernmentalism thus omits, for example, the role of strategic culture and key policy makers in the process of national preference formation. They also fall short of explaining how structural changes affect the domestic level and hence Member States' preferences towards the process of European integration (see Richter 2016: 59). With the "CSDP-centric" perspective in this thesis, I have neglected a systematic comparison of national defence policies and armed forces across Europe. However, national preference formation towards EU integration does not only depend on domestic and international factors. To a certain extent, Member States can be said to have been *path dependent* (see Haugsdal 2005; Duke and Ojanen 2006), an aspect Liberal IR theory neglects by focusing on the different stages in the process of institutionalization. The emergence of the CSDP, however, is at least partly due to the politics carried out by the European Economic Community (EEC), the EC, and the EU (see Koutrakos 2013). Constructivists would thus argue that Member States launched the CSDP inter alia to enlarge the tool box for the EU's external action, thereby facilitating the implementation of the community's normative objectives in crisis management (see Richter 2016: 60). Liberalism fails to capture the complexity of the process which led to closer security and defence cooperation at the EU level. This is mainly due to the fact the Liberal IR theory focusses on one level of analysis only (domestic), thereby

falling short on analysis of the regional and international factors relevant for the development of the CSDP. Such factors are more easily addressed in other theoretical frameworks, including, for example, Structural Realism (see for example Cladi and Locatelli 2016), Neoclassical Realism (see for example Dyson 2016) and Constructivism (see for example Monteleone 2016). Taken together, these approaches promise to give a rather clearer indication of the motives Member States had for embarking on a project of closer cooperation in security and defence matters. Future research in this field must re-emphasize the cross-European comparative study of national defence policies and armed forces (see Meijer-Wyss 2018: 8).
Overall, Liberal IR theory is quite a powerful approach to the institutional innovations and dynamics in European security and defence cooperation, and therefore sheds light on the reasons behind the emergence of the CSDP. Nevertheless, this section has shown that the analysis also exhibits some serious blind-spots: above all, it suffers from some of the longstanding weaknesses of liberal-idealist approaches to international relations, notably a one-dimensional focus on domestic politics (see Hyde-Price 2013: 398).

This thesis is limited in its scope. It is confined to examine the implications of Brexit for defence and security since the referendum. It does not consider directly or in detail the wider diplomatic, economic, political or social ramifications of the UK leaving the EU – all issues which are inevitably interconnected (see Black et al. 2017: 21). This will be the task for academics after the Brexit is finally done.

IX. Conclusion

The historic referendum on the UK leaving the EU in 2016 has been a shock for the EU. The until then opposition and obstructive role of the UK in European security and defence policy has gone with the referendum and gives the EU a chance for further integration in the area of the CSDP. This thesis analyzes the development and discourses in security and defence policy in the EU in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. The expectations by academia, media and experts after the Brexit referendum were divided. Some argued that the British exit gives the EU a chance for more integration and faster development of the CSDP, because the major “brake” of European security and defence policy will leave the EU and can no longer oppose

and veto crucial policies like an EU Military HQ or an increase of the EDA budget (see Svendsen 2018; Martill and Sus 2018b). On the other hand, some argued that the Brexit is a first step to more disintegration in the EU and that the challenges the CSDP and the EU faces, cannot be solved without the second largest economy in the EU and the largest defence budget of the EU. Arguing with Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism approach and its three-stage framework, in which states first define their preferences, then bargain to reach a common agreement and eventually create or reform institutions to secure the negotiation result (see Richter 2015: 52), these predictions were formulated in the two hypothesis this thesis tests. The author argues that, in the absence of a direct external threat, these national interests are primarily a function of domestic political concerns: governments treat foreign policy as instrumental to their objective of staying in power. Since no direct external threat to European security has emerged since the end of the Cold War, EU governments determine their positioning within the CSDP according to perceived domestic political exigencies and expediencies (see Pohl et al. 2015: 65). With a document analysis as well as a discourse analysis of developments in the area of the CSDP the thesis shows, that security and defence came to the fore of the EU's agenda to initially overcome the challenges present in a rapidly changing world and, latterly, to respond to crisis. Security and defence emerged as a rather unlikely candidate to reinvigorate enthusiasm in the European project, but it was one that echoed the insecurities in the EU arising from Russia's military build-up on the EU's eastern borders as well as acts of terrorism in Belgium, France, Germany and elsewhere which added to an atmosphere of threat and insecurity. The Brexit referendum results have added fuel to a pre-existing existential crisis in the EU, but it also opened the political space for progress in policy areas where the UK had often been unenthusiastic or even obstructive (see Duke 2019: 36). For example, the EU established the MPCC, a military HQ, which has long been blocked by the UK. Furthermore, the start of PESCO projects in December 2017 as well as the EDF with a comparatively high budget, have been key security and defence initiatives which show that the EU has been able to overcome old hurdles and is able to agree on concrete measures in terms of the CSDP. However, the projects that were launched do not challenge the fundamental premise of national control over militaries or the intergovernmental nature of CSDP decision-making (see Martill and Sus 2018b: 12), which means that all the discourse about a "European army" (Emmanuel Macron; see Stilwell 2018) or

“army of the European Union” (von der Leyen; see Süddeutsche Zeitung 2018) are not more than nice talking and will not be feasible in the near future. The commitment of many Member States is questionable, especially big countries like France and Poland made their participation in PESCO conditional (see Billon-Galland and Quencez 2017: 5-6; Martill and Sus 2018b: 12; Fiott et al. 2017: 36-39) and there will be limits of political will towards further defence integration. The projects that were agreed on in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum lack ambition, compared to the many proposals that were discussed, especially by France and Germany. Even if the current Headline Goal is maintained, the remaining EU Member States must contribute more in order to fill the gaps left by the UK – and in the end, the overall sum of deployable forces of the EU-27 must be bigger than it is today (see Nováky 2018: 101). Since even the existing Headline Goals are of little relevance today and are too weak to make a great impact for European security, the Brexit aggravates this situation (see for example Collins 2016). This means that all in all the CSDP has developed since the Brexit referendum, but farther lacks in ambition because of the intergovernmental nature of CSDP. Yet, the process of enhancement within the security and defence domain is still in its early stages and the firm Member States’ commitment to the projects mentioned above remains indispensable. The prevailing differences in national strategic cultures, threat perceptions, and views on the role of NATO can easily disrupt this process. Furthermore, the future partnership of the EU and the UK in security and defence related areas is not clear yet. The loss of the capabilities of the UK could hinder a further development of the EU’s defence and security cooperation in the renewed focus on territorial defence that has reinvigorated NATO’s traditional role as the backbone of European defence, but simultaneously laid bare the dramatic shortfalls in the national defence capabilities of major European military powers (see Meijer and Wyss 2018: 9). This was, for instance, vividly illustrated by an official German report in early 2018, according to which less than 50 per cent of the German armed forces’ major weapons systems were ready for training or deployment (Deutsche Welle 2018). As Svendsen (2018) states it: “despite the fact that the EU at 27 will be without a British “brakeman”, several historical and political constellations will remain, providing hinderances to further defence integration in the EU. The EU at 27 will be rid of the UK, but not of its interstate tensions regarding desired scope and substance of defence integration” (Svendsen 2018: 3).

The thesis shows that Brexit has already contributed to a strengthening of ties between the 27 remaining EU Member States as they seek to safeguard the essence of the European construction, including closer cooperation on defence matters (see Martill and Sus 2018b: 13). But even if flagship projects such as PESCO has emerged out of a gradual synchronization of the EU's treaty provisions with the EUGS, it will be interesting to see how PESCO will be used by EU governments to respond to evolving regional and international events in the future. The momentum has been driven by necessity and a deteriorating strategic landscape in and around Europe, but this same landscape is likely to color how far PESCO members adhere to the 20 binding commitments made to one another over the coming years and decades (see Fiott et al. 2017: 52). A European medical command, which Germany always puts forwards as an example of what PESCO can achieve, cannot be the flagship of PESCO, for it would confirm all the prejudices about German and European unwillingness to engage in "serious" military operations (see Nováky 2018: 7-8). Future research in this topic must closely follow the further development in the CSDP after the exit of the UK from the EU is completed.

To sum up, the thesis shows that the CSDP got some new impetus in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, especially by France and Germany, but the concrete decisions lack ambition and the future development is far from clear, regarding the loss of the biggest military and one of the biggest economic power, that must be compensated for.

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