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2019   **Kristína Lehutová**

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Securitization of education in contemporary Europe

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Author: Kristína Lehutová

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Supervisor: PhDr. Ondřej Ditrych, M.Phil., Ph.D.

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Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.

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References

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Abstract

The aim of the thesis is to analyze the current state of policies proposed to address the issue of radicalization in Europe. More specifically, the thesis deals with the topic of the fight against radicalization through education. The paper highlights how security debate in Europe is changing the understanding of educational institutions and their role in anti-radicalization policies. In the past, states in Europe had to deal with various forms of violence caused by either separatist movements or other radical and extremist ideologies. Unfortunately, the problem of the occasional outbreak of violence has not been resolved yet in Europe. In relation to the theme of radicalization, the role of educational institutions is perceived as significant to counter the process. They are considered to be the main institutions able to support the social inclusion and critical thinking of students during the globalization and modernization of Internet technologies. For these reasons, educational institutions should be responsible for protecting European students and pupils and preventing them from being drawn to extremism. This work, however, points out that this understanding is not the only way promoted by governments to tackle radicalization through the sector of education. The role of educational institutions is better described as a mix of policies. On the one hand, this concerns a policy that promotes education for social inclusion, tolerance, democratic principles and open debate. On the other hand, countering radicalization through education often includes methods of surveillance, monitoring, and reporting on the behavior of students and pupils in educational institutions, which can be perceived as a precursor to radicalization. In this regard, we can talk about the significant impact of securitization on policy-making in the education sector, which is aimed at preventing radicalization.

Abstrakt

Cílem práce je analyzovat současný stav navrhovaných politik pro řešení otázky radikalizace v Evropě. Konkrétněji se práce zabývá tématem boje proti radikalizaci prostřednictvím vzdělávání. Práce poukazuje na to, jak bezpečnostní diskuze v Evropě mění chápání vzdělávacích institucí a jejich roli v politikách proti radikalizaci. V minulosti se státy v Evropě musely zabývat různými formami násilí způsobovanými buď separatistickými hnutími nebo jinými radikálními a

extremistickými ideologiemi. Problém občasného výskytu násilí bohužel v Evropě pořád není vyřešen. Ve vztahu k tématu radikalizace je role vzdělávacích institucí vnímána jako významná v boji proti radicalizaci. Jsou považovány za hlavní instituce schopné podporovat sociální inkluzi a kritické myšlení studentů v době globalizace a modernizace internetových technologií. Z těchto důvodů by vzdělávací instituce měli být zodpovědné za ochranu evropských studentů a žáků a jejich prevenci před vlivem extremismu. Tato práce však poukazuje, že toto chápání nepředstavuje jediný způsob vlád, jak čelit radikalizaci s pomocí sektoru vzdělávání. Role vzdělávacích institucí je lépe popsána jako směs více politik. Na jedné straně se to týká politiky,která podporuje vzdělávání k sociálnímu začleňování, toleranci, k zásadám demokracie a otevřené diskuse. Na druhou stranu, boj proti radikalizaci prostřednictvím vzdělávání často zahrnuje metody dohledu, monitorování a hlášení chování studentů a žáků ve vzdělávacích institucích, které může být vnímáno jako předzvěst radikalizace. V tomto ohledu můžeme mluvit o významném vlivu sekuritizace na tvorbu politik ve vzdělávacím sektoru, které míří na prevenci radikalizace.

Keywords

security, education, Europe, securitization, radicalization, extremism, counter-terrorism

Klíčová slova

bezpečnost, vzdělávání, Evropa, sekuritizace, radikalizace, extremizmus, protiteroristická politika

Název práce

Sekuritizace vzdělávání v současné Evropě

Acknowledgement

List of abbreviations

CT	Countering terrorism
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Committee
CVE	Countering violent extremism
EU	European Union
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
NYCPD	New York City Department Police
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PART	The Action Plan to counter radicalization and terrorism
PVE	Preventing violent extremism
RHEBs	Relevant Higher Education Bodies
UK	United Kingdom

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Introduction

"We are united in our determination that our country will not be defeated by such terror but will defeat it and emerge from this horror with our values, our way of life, our tolerance and respect for others, undiminished" (Blair in The Guardian, 2005).

The quote provided above marks a significant moment in the history of the United Kingdom (UK). In his speech, then Prime Minister Tony Blair, addresses events of July 7. These events are usually referred to as the 7/7 bombings that happened in London in 2005. In other words - *"the worst single terrorist atrocity on British soil"* that resulted in the death of 52 people and hundreds of injured (Rodgers, Qurashi, and Connor, 2015). The plot consisted of four attacks with bombs detonated in the London Underground and double-decker buses located in various parts of the UK capital. The 7/7 attacks were perpetrated by four man, mostly second-generation citizens born in Britain with Pakistani background and one first-generation citizen with Jamaican descents. The New York City Police Department (NYCPD) report highlights not only their foreign roots, but also the fact that they were well integrated among the citizens in Britain. On the other hand, as the report states, all of these perpetrators underwent a certain kind of religious seeking in the self-radicalization stage, which preceded the bombings (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). What is more, discovered documents[1] of the terrorist organization al Qaeda revealed the responsibility of the group for the planning of 7/7 attacks, and shows substantive ties between the perpetrators and the terrorist organization (Robertson, Cruickshank and Lister, 2012). Another crucial characteristic of the 7/7 terrorists is their educational level. The already mentioned report of NYCPD profiles the London bombings perpetrators as coming from secular background, none of them receiving religious education in Islamic schools (madrasas) (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). Nevertheless, it was Mohammad Sidique Khan who caught the most of attention from the four men involved in the London bombings. It stems not only from the fact that he was the leader of the group. First of all, he was well educated, attending Leeds Metropolitan University. Secondly, he performed a job as a "learning mentor" at the primary school (BBC, 2011). Khan worked there primarily with children with behavioral

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[1]These documents included notes of Rashid Rauf, who has left Britain in 2002 for Pakistan and joined the al Qaeda organization. These notes provide the evidence that he contacted and recruited two members from the group responsible for the bombings, and he also arranged training in Pakistan for them in 2004 that preceded the attacks (Robertson, Cruickshank and Lister, 2012).

problems and was characterized as highly skilled in gaining trust among the youth (Silber and Bhatt, 2007).

On these accounts, Paul Thomas talks about the emergence of a new approach among policy makers which ties together youth, education and security (2016). It is perceived that youth constitutes a segment of society that is highly vulnerable to Islamist terrorist ideologies (Durodie, 2016; O´Donnell, 2016). That is the reason why the new approach is targeting mostly young people. Moreover, universities and schools are framed as "guardians" of the youth, and at the same time, schooling facilities are also described as "hotbeds of Islamist radicalization" (Glees, 2011). In this way, schools and universities encompass very important role. In more concrete, they should aim to build youth who is resilient against extremist propaganda and radicalization (Thomas, 2016).

In a similar way Lynn Davies discusses the changing role of education in the 21st century. According to him, education should be assigned with "global responsibility" (2000). Taking into account the process of globalization and the development of new technologies, information are spread faster than ever before. Internet and social media platforms like Facebook or Twitter give people the ability to share and transmit information to distant parts of the world. Therefore, it is entirely impossible either for teachers or educational institutions to control what kind of information are accessed by their students. This is the reason why the global role of education should refer to measures nurturing and enhancing critical thinking of the youth. In relation to the youth, it would mean to be able to critically assess the information provided by the media, especially online media, in order to decrease their vulnerability to extremist or radical ideas.

Accordingly, same type of discussions has been present on the level of the European Union (EU). In the aftermath of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015, informal meetings have been held by Educational Ministers in Paris. It resulted in the so called Paris Declaration on promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance and non-discrimination through education. It stresses that the role of education should include more than just developing knowledge and attitudes. In order to safeguard future generations is should encompasses approaches aiming to develop open-minded and responsible youth. In concrete, this would mean teaching students to *distinguish fact from opinion, to recognize propaganda and to resist all*

forms of indoctrination and hate speech" (European Commission, 2015). Furthermore, the main goal stemming from the Declaration is to build inclusive societies. In more detail, this would mean to prevent such phenomena as marginalization and radicalization, and to eradicate all forms of discrimination, intolerance and racism (ibid.).

The paper is going to discuss the relationship between security and youth, particularly in relation to their education. It would primarily target the security discourse in Europe, in concrete, in the UK and France. The aim is to point out what kind of practice is applied when it comes to radicalization. There could be variety of actors emphasized in order to tackle the process. In accordance, the field of education has recently become one of the main areas for de-radicalization and counter radicalization strategies. At the same time, however, it is said to be the subject targeted by a lot of security discourses dealing with radicalization, extremism and terrorism. Unfortunately, this could have a negative effect. If it establishes some discriminative practices, stigmatizing certain groups of society, it could, very possibly, lead to more intolerance and even to violence. That is why the following pages will try to answer the question: *"How does the theory of securitization influence the understanding of educational institutions and their role in countering radicalization?"* First of all, however, the following chapter is going to address some basic concepts and notions in order to provide basic tenets for this paper.

1. Theoretical framework

1.1 Securitization

The theory of securitization falls into the scope of the Copenhagen School, represented by scholars such as Barry Buzan or Ole Wæver and others. Essentially, the Copenhagen school distinguishes three types of issues – non-politicized, politicized and securitized. By putting any particular problem into one of these categories, it reflects the level of concern assigned to the particular issue. In more concrete, the first label assigns the problem with no critical importance. It is then neither a matter of a public debate nor that of a state to act accordingly. Second label implies that certain issue is actually a matter of public debate and a matter of standard political procedures and decision-making. The third label points out to the fact that the issue that is being securitized is no longer in the sphere of normal politics. On the contrary, it enters the politics of emergency (Emmers, 2007). According to Ole Wæver the process of securitization is *"a particular way of handling a particular issue, processing a threat through the security format,"* that is why *"the security quality does not belong to the threat but to its management"* (2011: 472).

First of all, securitization is defined as an act, in concrete as a "speech act" (Williams, 2003; Emmers, 2007; Balzacq, 2010; Wæver, 2011). In this way, the act of securitization is understood as a "productive moment" or as a *"discontinuous reconfiguration of a social state"* (Wæver, 2011: 468). This means that securitization, or in fact the securitizing actor, by choosing certain type of a language, portrays the problem as a security issue that might cause imminent danger. In accordance, the concept of security is regarded as a matter of high subjectivity, depending on shared understanding and thus a "socially constructed concept" (Emmers, 2007: 113). It is defined in both negative and positive terms in order to explain what it actually means to be secure. From one point of view, security implies "freedom from war" (Bellamy in Collins, 2007: 3), or the absence of "threats to acquired values" (Wolfers in Collins, 2007: 3). From another point of view, security may be translated as the *"ability to withstand aggression from abroad"* (Luciani in Collins, 2007: 3). In both ways, the importance is on the language which gives certain meaning to the term.

In particular, security is not treated objectively by the securitization theory. Instead, it is *"the outcome of a specific social process"* (Williams, 2003: 513) which defines what is the threat and to whom or what. However, securitization as a speech act is not determined only by social practices. It is also a process of communicative action which engages arguments, reasoning, evidence presentation and convincing methods to persuade about validity of one's ideas (ibid.). In other words, the act of securitization does not simply report on the state of affairs but actually construct the reality. That is why the concrete language of securitizing actor is perceived to have performative character (Austin in Balzacq, 2010) and to poses transformative capacity (Williams, 2003). On the other hand, language is not the only mean to convey certain way of meaning and understanding of the issue to the audience. Nowadays, visual media might present another challenge to the theory of securitization. In other words, Michael Williams talks about the "power" of televisual images and the fact that modern media presents a core component in relation to security relations (2003). With these regards, the type of medium shapes the impact of securitization act, too.

1.1.1 Component parts of securitization

Ralf Emmers divides the act of securitization into two distinctive stages. During the first stage the particular issues is presented as an existential threat to a referent object. In concrete, the term referent object includes individuals or group of individuals but also any issue area that is perceived to be under the threat. It ranges from military (state or territory integrity) to political (state sovereignty), societal (identity, lifestyle, culture), economic and environmental security problem areas (Williams, 2003; Emmers, 2007). Nevertheless, there are two preconditions to be fulfilled in the first stage of securitization. Notably, the securitizing actor must maintain a privileged position which means to poses the authority to frame any issue a security issue. Furthermore, the subject under the process of securitization must be of a *"sufficient salience as to produce substantial political effects"* (Emmers, 2007: 112). Then it relates to the fact that the security issue has to be acknowledged by the audience. In other words, *''successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech-act. Thus security (as with all politics)*

ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects'' (Buzan in Williams, 2003: 523).

The argument is also supported by Ole Wæver who claims: *"politics is always located in particular human constellations, and that the political impact of a theory is measured there"* (2011: 467). This particular condition relates to the second stage of securitization. In order for the securitization to be successful, the act has to convince the audience (the public or political elites, etc.) about the existentiality of the threat imposed onto the referent object. Furthermore, it has to make the audience to accept extraordinary or emergency measures adopted in relation to the perceived threat (ibid.). Only if the audience is persuaded about the salience of the issue, the securitizing actor is able to apply these extraordinary measures otherwise unacceptable.

However, as pointed out by Emmers, securitizing actor might not aim for emergency action but political support and resources deployment (2007). That is why the process of securitization can become a problem, and as a matter of fact an issue of political abuse. In the following section he argues that: *"With the growing articulation of issues as threats in the post-9/11 context, an act of securitization can lead to the further legitimization of the armed forces in politics as well as to the curbing of civil liberties in the name of security in well-established democratic societies"* (Emmers, 2007: 115). In that matter, desecuritization emerges as an important process to avoid such abuses. It means to reintroduce the securitized issue into the sphere of normal politics. In concrete, this process makes it again a matter of public political discourse and moves it out of the security realm (Williams, 2003).

1.1.2 Education-security narrative

With regards to the topic of education, there is the question of the role it plays when it comes to security. From the one hand, there is the role of a surveillance actor. It is perceived to be more passive, because this implies just monitoring activities which only reflect on potential extremist behavior. Second role is more active and actually includes approaches aiming to change the behavior. Furthermore, the active role assumes also safeguarding initiatives in order to prevent some extremist activities among the communities or nations (Davies, 2016).

The important issue is what type of security the educational development aims to improve. In a more traditional manner, improved education is tied to war and post-war societies or simply to crises. According to Mary Joy Piggozi, during emergencies educational reforms might be pursued more easily than throughout peaceful times. Emergency or crisis situations, such as armed conflicts and natural disasters may introduce an opportunity for change in educational agenda (in Talbot, 2013). Quality education including information on *"survival skills"* like *"landmine awareness, protection from sexual abuse and avoidance of HIV infection"* (Talbot, 2013: 5) is perceived to be life saving in regions marked by crisis or war. In addition, improvements in education or the provision of education as such could also elevate economic or financial security. It mostly relates to creation of job opportunities and improvement of social statuses in the society (Davies, 2016). This is also perceived to decrease the level of violence.

On the other hand, educational reforms may not aim to enhance life saving knowledge. Another type of security, namely the societal security, might maintain similarly important role. Firstly, the relationship between education and societal security would imply improvement in the way society is coping with threats endangering their culture or identity, as examples. It includes the language as well as religious practices and other customs (Wæver et al in Davies, 2016). In concrete, we can look on how the so called migration crisis in Europe is framed through the security discourse as a threat to the identity of European-born citizens. Secondly, quality education in the times of emergency can also help to eradicate causes of violence through educational measures enhancing tolerance, respect for human rights and equality (Talbot, 2013). In this way, educational quality depends, according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on the curricula provided via educational institutions. It is characterized as systematic as well as intended set of skills, attitudes and knowledge that is imposed upon the students. Moreover, curriculum is identified with a significant role of *"forging life-long learning competencies, as well as social attitudes and skills, such as tolerance and respect, constructive management of diversity, peaceful conflict management, promotion and respect of Human Rights, gender equality, justice and inclusiveness"*(UNESCO, 2016). On the top of these, it also serves as a mean to advance aspirations, motivation and self-confidence of learners. As such the

outcomes of curricula are based not only on its content but also on teachers and educational authorities and their skills and strategies to convey the content (ibid.).

The reform of education is thus seen in many cases necessary and inevitable in order to increase security in the particular country or region. However, as argued by Talbot, *"the militarization or securitization of responsibility for education"* in emergency-affected areas could be a state strategy *"to control populations and the transmission of knowledge, ideas and values to children, as part of a wider strategy of seeking political and military dominance"*(Talbot, 2013: 8). These would encompass situations like post-war crisis in the Middle East or Sub-Saharan Africa. On many instances it might be regarded as a substantial part to the strategy of dominance seeking, especially, when it comes to fragile or failed states.

Nevertheless, the argument is that education can enhance security either on the local or global level through its capacity to decrease extremist behavior. This could be explained in various ways. First idea is that education is the opposite of extremism or that lack or no education characterizes extremist behavior. In other words, it means that education has the capacity for "mindset transformation" which implies that it can shape the mind from uneducated/extremist to educated mind. The second one highlights the process of militarization of education which ultimately makes "soldiers" out of students who educated –"weaponized with the knowledge", aim to fight the extremism (Ford, 2017).

In that matter, since it is hard to generalize about the level of education and extremism, UNESCO provides quite better argument on the relationship between education and security. They state that *"the loss of schooling can drive pupils down an alternative path"* (O'Malley, 2010: 98). It means that due to the lost opportunity to attend the school and gain the education, students may become the main targets for illegal practices of recruitment or forced labor. This is especially applicable throughout the conflicts when schools are attacked for the purpose of recruitment or simply to deny students education. With these regard, UNESCO reports plenty of cases like Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Gaza, Democratic Republic of Congo or India (ibid.).

On the other hand, security-education narrative may be present also in developed and democratic states like the US or the UK. The speech at the Labor Party conference delivered by Tony Blair after 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 resembles the educational narrative as provided above. He stated that: *"The child with a good*

education flourishes. The child given a poor education lives with it for the rest of their life. Poor education is a personal tragedy and national scandal" (in The Guardian, 2001). More concretely, he pointed out that education remains the top national priority and he ultimately tied it up with the economic and social freedom that gives every individual the ability to develop themselves. On the contrary, quite an opposite idea has emerged after the 7/7 London attacks just four years later. From that moment educational facilities, particularly universities, have been given special salience – that of potential recruitment places for terrorism.

1.2 Terrorism and its conception

As mentioned by Javier Rupérez, former executive director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, international community has been trying to define the concept of terrorism as early as 1937. Throughout that time, it was the League of Nations that drafted a convention on terrorism. Even though the convention never came into effect, it characterizes the term as: *„All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public"* (Rupérez, n.d.: 14). Moreover, he classified the international effort on defining terrorism with regards to two significant events. The year of 1972[2] marks one of these events when *"the issue of terrorism became the epicenter of attention and contention in the General Assembly"* (ibid.). General Assembly takes into consideration, especially, ideas on how to prevent terrorism and safeguard lives and fundamental freedoms of innocent civilians. The second event relates to the year of 2001 - the year of terror attacks in the US on September 11.

Without any doubt the perception of terrorism has been completely reframed by the events of 9/11. *"In retrospect, the Millennium marked only a moment in time. It was the events of September 11 that marked a turning point in history, where we confront the dangers of the future and assess the choices facing humankind. It was a tragedy. An act of evil."* (Blair in The Guardian, 2001) From that moment terrorism has been regarded as a *"new type of war"* and *"an absolute evil"* which aims at

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[2] The year of 1972 marks the so called „Munich Olympic Massacre". During the 1972 Olympic Games 11 Israeli athletes were taken hostage and killed by Palestinian terrorists affiliated with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Borden, 2015).

values of our civilization[3], namely our *"liberty and freedom"* (CNN, 2001). In the words of George W. Bush: *"On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. ... and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack"* (in the Guardian, 2001). On the other hand, then President of France, Jacques Chirac, was not very convinced to label these terror attacks by the term war (CNN, 2001). The wording can be perceived, indeed, as very convenient if we think about the response that followed after attacks in the US. It relates to the counter-terror approach launched by then President Bush under the title of global war on terror and subsequent war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the attacks in 2001, Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) has also been established by Security Council with the aim to *"help countries strengthen their legal and institutional abilities to fight terrorism"* (UN, 2005).

Despite the fact that terrorism or the fight against terrorism continues to be on the forefront of European and American agenda, there is not a universally agreed definition of the term. Instead, there is a variety of definitions consisting of numerous characteristics that reflect different ideas on what constitutes terrorism. For example, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) considers it to be an act but also a threat of violence. It could be perpetrated individually or collectively as a criminal plan. Targets could be people and individuals as well as national and international facilities and bodies. The intention is to terrorize, threaten, or imperil lives, honor, security or rights and freedoms of people. Also, the OIC includes acts against national resource, threats to state's stability, integrity, political unity and sovereignty, too. With regards to facilities and bodies, an act of terror could be an occupation or seizure causing serious damage (Convention to Combat Terrorism, 1999, Article 1, Paragraph 2). On the other hand, European Union defines terrorism as a *"serious threat to our security, to the values of our democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of our citizens"* (Council of the European Union, 2005: 6). Moreover, the EU provides quite extensive lists of terrorist offences when it comes to combating terrorism. Among others, it includes offences like intimidation of a population, international organization or a government with the aim to made it perform or not to

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[3] The wording - „our civilization", can be understood as the civilization of the Western hemisphere of the world, including North America and Western Europe. On the other hand, it may also encompass nations and societies that adhere to „Western" principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights and fundamental freedoms.

perform certain acts. Causing serious damage, instability or destruction of *"fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization"* constitutes to be an act of terrorism as well (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017).

1.2.1 Terrorism in the "online" century

The changing nature of terrorism should be considered, too. In concrete, the EU Directive on combating terrorism mentions the influence of internet and social media when it comes to terror conduct, including training and recruitment, financing and the online and offline dissemination of terror messages to gain support or intimidate people (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017). As explored by Jason Burke in his article on the changing terrorism, the conduct of terrorist has change greatly since 2001. He points out how the development of media and communication facilities provided an opportunity for international terrorism to evolve. *"New technologies have not only made it possible to produce propaganda with astonishing ease – they have also made it far easier to disseminate these films and images"* (Burke, 2016). New technologies give the terrorist perpetrator enormous opportunity to capture their messages by technologies like go-pro cameras and smart phones and then spread it online almost anywhere via internet. Furthermore high usage of social media such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram works in advantage for the terror groups, too. In many cases it is not perpetrators who spread the message. We can think about attacks in Paris in 2015 or Orlando nightclub shootings in the United States in 2016, when horrible images were presented by the victims themselves. On the one hand, it gives an inspiration for supporters of terrorist groups. On the other hand, it easily spread the threat and fear among various groups of people.

In this way, Burke particularly discusses how today's media provides enormous platform of opportunity for terror propaganda, or what he terms the "oxygen of publicity". Another relevant problem explored by Burke in relation to international terrorism is its organization or the structure. Nowadays, with the evolution of media, it is not organizations but principles that underpin terrorist activity. In environment of high speed internet connectivity and easy accessibility, these principles and guidelines are readily available for anyone in search for that type

of information. This strategy could be defined "leaderless" (Burke, 2016). As developed by the militant strategist Abu Musab al-Suri in the 2000s, it implies that *"extremist activists should be empowered to act as individuals, guided by texts they could find online, without necessarily belonging to any one group"*(ibid.).

1.3 The concept of radicalization

The task of defining radicalization phenomenon is similar to that of terrorism. There is not one single definition but a variety of them, depending on the characteristics depicted by those defining it. Nevertheless, it is agreed that radicalization is not a single event or an act. Instead, it is understood as a process. Asta Maskaliūnaitė defines radicalization by two distinctive phases. According to the author, in the first phase an individual endorses certain belief systems that justify the use of violence. The second phase includes an action upon the adopted beliefs. It is the stage when the individual *"comes to actively support as well as employ violent means for political purposes"* (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015: 14). Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen provides, probably, more precise definition which says it is a *"growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order"* (2010: 798). The author specifies violent radicalization as a development of radical ideas. This development is, however, influenced by individual's willingness to transform radical ideas into violent activity, either by providing a support or by active participation (ibid.). On these accounts, we can distinguish between violent and non-violent form of radicalization. The difference stems from the fact that violent radicalization implies active engagement or support for the use of violence to reach particular aims. At the same time the process might not inevitably lead to the actual use of violence.

On the other hand, definitions of radicalization differ when it comes to the motive, means and purpose of the process. One approach, particularly, emphasizes the relationship between a radical and the process of radicalization. To be more precise, an individual going through the process of radicalization is its main influence when it comes to the final form and the means used – violent or non-violent. As depicted by the above characteristics it is dependent upon radical's endorsed beliefs and ideas, and readiness or willingness to transform them into the use of violence. This approach is represented mostly by the NYCPD model

composed of four stages (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009; Borum 2012). Pre-radicalization is the first stage and encompasses the background and life situation of the individual. Second stage is defined by the model as self-identification stage that begins the process of transformation, driving the individual from old identity. It is affected by internal as well external triggers including economic, social, political or personal. Indoctrination stage is the stage of beliefs intensification when the individual adopts violent ideology and deems the support for an action to be inevitable. The final stage of jihadisation may be a very quick process when the individual accepts the role in jihad and pursue it as a holy warrior (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). This represents just one way how to look on the phenomenon, namely the bottom-up way, when the process is initiated from within radical individuals. Another approach is the top-down when the process of one's radicalization is incited by an external actor – the radicalizer.

1.3.1 Causes of radicalization

There could be variety of "motivations" that incite the process of radicalization. From one point of view, characteristics and tendencies of an individual that precondition the person to become radical or terrorist are emphasized. In concrete, psychological profiling that uses psychoanalysis by Freudian tradition connects violence with past traumas, experiences in the childhood and other "subconscious dynamics" (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015). From another point of view, perceived needs of a person form similarly important basis according to which the behavior of the individual could be determined. The process of radicalization is then understood *"as a result of a search for meaning, stability and respect"* (Slootman and Tillie in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 807). It relates to human motives and social-psychological needs like the need for control and meaning, the need for a membership or the need to belong (Jasko, LaFree and Kruglanski, 2017).

For example, migrant population of second or third generation with Muslim background is deemed to experience identity challenges in today's Europe. In this way, some authors refer to the term called *"a double sense of non-belonging"* (Khosrokhavar; Roy in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 800). It is related to the feeling of exclusion from the community composed of people from countries of their origin. At the same time, the sense of non-belonging is experienced on the account of

marginalization in European societies. In relation to the so called "Muslim radicalization" in Europe, it is also argued that the deprivation of needs or rights and victimization do not necessarily have to be personal. It could be based on a perceived humiliation or suffering of their fellow Muslims in countries like Afghanistan or Palestine that leads them towards radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). What is more, these *"feelings of vulnerability, aggressive anger, frustration, loneliness and isolation from society"* (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017) could be exploited by radicals. In their narratives, they state that Europe is not a welcome place for Muslims. The bases are arguments considering the "War on terror" campaigns and the subsequent rise of Islamophobia, stigmatization and discrimination. Nevertheless, it is important to note at this point that this is just one example. It should not lead us to creation of stereotypes about any religion, particularly Islam, and linking it to violence or terrorism. Radicalization leading to terrorism occurs not only as a religiously motivated process. It could be affiliated with other radical ideologies link to separatism, ethno-nationalism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia or right-wing ideology (Ragazzi, 2017). Moreover, stereotypes about certain religions, nationalities or ethnics could, actually, trigger the process of radicalization because of practices of discrimination, stigmatization and exclusion. On the other hand, hate crimes, xenophobia, and intolerance might escalate the process of radicalization into the actual use of violence.

Secondly, the behavioral approach deems the radical to be a rational decision maker who calculates costs and benefits in order to make decisions. Concerning radicalization leading to the use of violence or terror activity the radical might see the benefits in material gains or in emotional satisfaction like acquiring social prestige and recognition (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015). Borum also mentions the theory on conversion. It relates to processes of personal transformation and involves changes in beliefs and ideologies of the individual. In particular, active conversion characterizes the radical to be active and rational seeker (2012). Contrary, passive conversion defines the process to be influenced mainly by past traumas or psychological needs and thus the radical plays the role of a passive actor (Richardson in Borum, 2012: 23).

1.3.2 Conditions for radicalization

Veldhuis and Staun argue that radicalization defined through psychology or behavior of radical individual is not a sufficient approach. Issues like social environment or ideology should be considered, too. In other words, they deal with conditions initiating radicalization. Furthermore, when and how these incite the process should be addressed as well (2009). Firstly, macro-level factors concern certain preconditions that create climate contributing to development of radical ideologies. Generally, it is determined by international relations and processes such as globalization or modernization or by the level of integration in societies. These factors then influence the role of any individual living in society whose structures are defined by demographics, political rights and economic opportunities and cultural habits. On the other hand, micro-level factors relate to personal and social characteristics. Personal characteristics include the already mentioned beliefs, values, convictions and experiences that make the individual potentially prone to radicalization. The second group considers the relationship between the individual and others –family, friends, members of various groups, etc. The way how these individuals identify within the society reflects how they relate to any particular group within the society (ibid.). Veldhuis and Staun call it a root cause model. In relation to each factor they define a cause and a trigger event that may set up the path for an individual to become a radical. With regards to macro factors, we could list causes like poor integration, poverty, socio or economic issues that could be "triggered" by catalysts like global events or domestic and foreign policies (2009). Nevertheless, Dalgaard-Nielsen links these factors with individual needs. The author explains that globalization but possibly also multiculturalism, incite dissolution of individual identities and traditional communities they lived within (2010). As follows, French sociologists like Kepel, Khosrokhavar and Roy emphasize that *"radicalization is not a reaction to political repression or economic deprivation in any simple sense"*, they claim that the process *"occurs as individuals seek to reconstruct a lost identity in a perceived hostile and confusing world"* (in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 799).

Micro-level factors also relate to processes of social interactions or collective emotions. Randy Borum characterizes it through the discipline called social psychology. It focuses mostly on group behavior and its dynamics. In particular it deals with *"relationships, influences, and transactions among people"* (Borum,

2012: 20). This approach is encompassed by social movement or network theory which deals with group level factors. The most influential forces emphasized by this theory are bonding practices, peer pressure, and indoctrination which aim to change the world-view of an individual with the transmission of radical ideas. It sees radicalization as a social and gradual process which results in changed world-view of the individual. In other words, the term worldview encompasses individual's set of values and beliefs, perceptions and attitudes (ibid.). What is more, the so called framing theory highlights the role of inter-subjective and communicative factors when it comes to in-group radicalization. It means that the way the issue is framed, in other words the world-view, determines the radicalization and not the issue alone (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Structural conditions relating to grievances, feelings of deprivation and injustice and the way how they are framed are very particular examples that could enhance the bonding of members and incite the process of radicalization. It usually results in *"the desire to enact some social change or right some social wrong"* (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015: 19). Membership in a group and ties within it play especially important role as they reinforce the engagement of an individual through the sense of loyalty, personal obligation and responsibility (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Maskaliūnaitė, 2015).

Nevertheless, if an individual becomes a part of a radical group is caused by a random mixture of causes and conditions. It could be sum up by the definition provided in the Prevention of radicalization and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organization. Radicalization of European citizens, is there characterized by the EU, as a complex and dynamic issue stemming from global, political and sociological factors. There is no one profile of a radical but involves *"men, women, and particularly young European citizens of all social origins, who share common trait of feeling at odds with society"* (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017). Furthermore, *"causes of radicalization may equally be socio-economic, ideological, personal or psychological, and, for that reason, it has to be understood in the light of the background of each individual"* (ibid.).

1.3.3 Extremism and radicalization

In relation to the violence/non-violence feature, radicalization is in many cases exchanged for or link to the term extremism. According to the EU,

radicalization is *„a term used to describe the phenomenon of people embracing intolerant opinions, views and ideas which could lead to violent extremism"* (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017). In other words - *"radicalization is the process whereby people turn to extremism"* (Neumann, 2017: 17). It is then understood by Neumann that extremism refers either to extremist ideas or methods, existing in violent and non-violent form. Moreover, Randy Borum talks about radicalization into violent extremism. Specifically, he characterizes extremism by violent ideas that are adopted in the process of radicalization. Otherwise, radicalization, deemed as "action pathways", may lead to the use of violent extremism or terrorism (2012). In accordance, terrorism represents concrete violent strategy or a method. On the other hand, being involved in terrorism relates to non-violent extremism, too. It includes extremist propaganda exploited by radical individuals to create overall conditions favoring terrorism - popularizing terror methods to enhanced recruitment or involvement in actual terror activity and more (Davies, 2016). In a similar manner, non-violent radicalization could be understood by extremist ideas and beliefs promoted online or offline to draw individuals towards the pathway of radicalization. The main problem with the term extremism, however, is the definition of what constitutes to be normal. In other words, what is perceived to be normal by particular societies in order to identify the opposite – the extreme. That is why there exist various notion of extremism, mostly depending on political and cultural norms as well as on contemporary context and historical developments (Neumann, 2017).

1.4 Countering radicalization, extremism and terrorism

When it comes to efforts to counter the process of radicalization it is important to note that the term countering radicalization is usually not used. There is variety of others that refer to these efforts and countering radicalization constitutes to be a part of it. Namely, the terms are "countering violent extremism" (CVE) or "preventing violent extremism" (PVE), "countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism" (VERLT) and also more broadly "countering terrorism" (CT) (Neumann, 2017). This tendency is obvious even from the titles of documents dealing with the process – Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to terrorism (EU, 2005), The Fight Against Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism (Council of Europe, 2015) or Plan of Action to

Prevent Violent Extremism (UN, 2015). The use of these particular terminologies is based on the fact that a lot of definitions of radicalization, actually, link the process with phenomena like extremism and terrorism. As expressed by Peter Neumann, the process of radicalization is often understood as *"what goes on before the bomb goes off"* (in Maskaliūnaitė, 2015: 12).

The question is what kind of measures are incorporated and performed if someone is speaking about CVE/PVE or VERLT and counter terrorism? According to Peter Neumann the counter-terror measures include variety of activities. These would range from suspects arrests to disruption of terror propaganda, recruitment and financing, as well as the protection of civil society and other potential targets. The author states that policies and measures countering terrorism are central to any efforts to counter violent extremism. He argues that countering terror means to protect the society as well as the state's integrity and prevent other individuals and groups from engaging in terror activity. On the other hand, countering terrorism could be a very inefficient strategy if terror threats are persistent and widespread. That is when prevention and countering underlying causes of radicalization are deemed to be more accurate (Neumann, 2017).

Countering violent extremism, in that matter, relates to terrorist threats and at the same time to radicalization. Contrary to counter-terror and its activities, the term CVE referrer to two processes, namely, de-radicalization and prevention. The first term, de-radicalization, is defined as a process aimed at individuals in various stages of radicalization (ibid.). These are the already explained - pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and Jihadisation periods as determined by NYCPD report (in Borum, 2012). In accordance, de-radicalization has various forms regarding the stage of radicalization it aims to target. The goal is to stop the individual from engaging physically in the use of violence or otherwise from engaging mentally in radical ideas and attitudes and their dissemination.

The second strategy of CVE is the prevention. It usually means to transform population into more resilient one. In particular, prevention targets the segment or individuals of any given society characterized as at risk of radicalization or as vulnerable to radical propaganda (Neumann, 2017). It has been already explained that radicalization is influenced by individual causes including personal characteristics and experiences if this to say "radical potential" is to be activated. In

this way various authors talk, particularly, about a special factor – vulnerability. Generally, vulnerability assesses one's proneness to radicalization (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). The act of assessing some individual or a group as vulnerable to radical ideologies could be potentially counter-effective and very controversial. This is true, especially, if it is based on profiles that lead to discrimination of some segments of society. In relation to Europe the profile of vulnerable individuals is often set to characterize young, male, migrant or third country background person who is a Muslim. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Veldhuis and Staun, *"the proportion of young, male, well-educated Muslims in the West who radicalize is simply too small to draw such generalized conclusions"*(2009: 65). Moreover, it is argued that young people are, particularly, very vulnerable group for radical recruitment propaganda. The youth in the formative stage of their life, including the search for identity, may fall for some ideologies represented by radical groups that provide them with feelings of purpose and belonging. Thus the provision of ideology can act as a stabilizer in the identity-search part of youth's life (Dalgaard-Nielsen in Maskaliūnaitė, 2015).

That is why the prevention strategy of CVE is based on awareness programmes and might be specifically directed to tackle the recruitment. In this matter, the process of radicalization could be initiated by self-recruitment or by external actors (Trujillo et al. in Maskaliūnaitė, 2015). Dalgaard-Nielsen uses the label of a "significant other" that could include also influential family members or peers (2010: 808). It could happen online on the internet via social media or other online source materials as well as offline by face to face contact with radicals. The distinction is, as these terms presuppose, that self-recruitment comes from within the individual – it is a self-initiated process. Nevertheless, it could be reinforced by forces like group loyalty or peer pressure.

In accordance, social movement theory puts charismatic leaders in the forefront of the radicalization process. Their success in recruitment of new members stems either from the persuasive techniques, their ability to attract, their pressure tactics or psychological manipulation (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015). Charismatic leaders are said to be older, having better education and knowledge, and being conscious about politics. That is why they determine the direction of the group in matters of politics, ideologies or the use of violence. They are put in contrast to other members of the

group who are not that resourceful or coherent to determine the group and its activities (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). The question is what is causing violent radicalization leading to the use of violence, terrorism included? In other words, why the leader chooses violent illegal means instead of constitutional politics? Reasons may include distrust in legal democratic means, distrust in media and society that is perceived to discriminate them and their fellow members (ibid.).

On the other hand, external factors like charismatic leaders might constitute to be just one factor in the mix of incentives leading the individual to engage in radical activism. Firstly, there is the background, personal experiences with discrimination or inefficient socio-economic and cultural integration as well as personal struggles with identities which may activate the process of self-recruitment into radicalization. The second factor includes triggers in the form of influential events activating the radical activism. Finally, it is the opportunity factors, too, that deals with the possibility that somebody is actually exposed to radical propaganda online or offline (Borum, 2012).

Accordingly, counter measures aimed at radicalization, extremism or terrorism could be directed to any of above listed factors. It could primarily deal with influential leaders, online materials used for propaganda and other incentives in order to stop the recruitment of new members. In concrete, Dalgaard-Nielsen talks about *"disruption by intelligence and law enforcement agencies"* (2010: 808). However, he also notes that such an approach might lack provisions tackling the root causes of the problem. In fact, some counter-terror policies may lead to furthering the process of radicalization if they are based on biased principles and discriminative practices. Another, approach is highlighted by social movement theory. Its integral parts are mobilization, recruitment, motivation and barriers removal. The difference is that it centers on the notion of "mobilization potential". In particular, the theory deals with the issue of development of human resources in a movement. It tries to *"better understand how different people with the same set of beliefs come to assume different roles and take different kinds of actions"* (Borum, 2012: 20). Secondly, it provides the idea of "recruitment net works" and how they are formed and motivated. Thirdly, it focuses on beliefs of movement members as well as on movements overall interests and how these two influence and shape one another. Lastly, regarding the "mobilization potential", movement's removal of barriers to participation is

emphasized when defining radicalization. It is put in contrast when the understanding is based only on incentives or grievances that lead to the process (ibid.).

Contrary, Veldhuis and Staun ask for a different approach. According to their opinion, counter measures should be primarily based on strategies that deal with conditions that lead a group or an individual towards the path of radicalization. In other words, authors emphasize the question of *"how macro-level factors can create general discontent among societal groups"* (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 66). As examples they point out to insufficient integration or to the lack of opportunities to participate in economic and social spheres of the society they are part of. The next step, they argue, is to consider individual conditions, too. These could relate to issues such as identity, peer pressure or manipulation by charismatic leaders (ibid.). In that way, authors perceive the measures dealing with the issue of radicalization to be highly complex, aiming at more factors leading to radicalization.

In order to provide some concrete example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) created a list of basic topics and tenets that could work as a basic guidance for countering radicalization. The OSCE stresses out that the approach should be multi-dimensional. It calls upon a lot of actors to participate together and share practices and experiences in different spheres and levels. Prevention, capacity-building and co-ordination of efforts constitute to be main pillars. When it comes to prevention - intolerance, discrimination, racism, hatred, xenophobic thoughts and the use of violence constitute primary phenomena to be tackled in counter strategies. Prisons constitute one area where the prevention measures apart from reintegration and rehabilitation is very crucial in order to stop the "cycle" of violence and radicalism. Media, including social media and Internet, are another group. It is a platform where radical propaganda and hatred could be spread very easily. On the other hand, media could and should enhanced tolerance and pluralism of ideas that would stop radicalization. Finally, institutions like schools or youth centers are deemed very essential in countering radicalization, too. It is perceived that negative socio-economic aspects of life could be most influential regarding the youth (OSCE, 2015).

1.4.1 Prevention of radicalization – the role of education

In order to counter radicalization or violent extremism and fight against terrorism prevention strategies are highly emphasized. As it is stated in the EU document called Prevention of radicalization and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organizations, more emphasis should be invested "*in preventive rather than reactive measures*" (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017). It is deemed that only prevention can stop individuals from being drawn into this type of activism. Nevertheless, prevention mechanisms and strategies have changed over the past few years. Previously, the fight against radicalization and counter-terrorist strategies belong to competencies of security sector, applying domestic strategies as well as abroad military strategies. Nowadays, many of security competencies are performed by the civil society sector in order to enhanced efforts of traditional sectors. That is why counter-terrorism these days is understood as *"a process through which non-state actors are empowered to take charge of security functions traditionally pertaining to the state, with the objective of preventing future threats linked to terrorism"* (Ragazzi, 2017: 9). However, the same is true for preventive measures, too. They are now initiated or guided by various non-traditional stake holders. To be more concrete, the prevention involves authorities ranging from traditional ones like police and prisons to more non-traditional, including schools, youth centers, civil society, local municipalities or hospitals as emphasized by the Radicalization Awareness Network (European Commission, 2018). The action Plan from the Committee of Ministers – The fight against violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism adds centers of detention, worship places and vulnerable neighborhoods to the list as well (Council of Europe, 2015).

Nevertheless, the EU document on Prevention claims that effective preventive strategy tackling radicalization and terrorism should be link with effective strategy of integration and social inclusion. The aim could be, for example, to prevent European citizens from traveling to conflict zones and thus stop the formation of extreme groups of "foreign fighter" when returning back to Europe (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017). In that matter, schools and teachers are put in the frontline of prevention – teaching democracy and skills in citizenship practice and critical thinking (European Commission, 2018). In particular, teachers and schooling facilities – should provide safe and respectful space where identities

and opinions of young individuals could be developed and where they should be taught democratic, social values and responsible citizenship (Council of Europe, 2015). It mainly serves the role of empowering the youth. According to the guidance made by the OSCE, the youth, especially children, constitute to be the most vulnerable when it comes to radical propaganda (2015). That is why youth empowerment in skill of critical thinking and democracy as well as law abidance is very crucial. Moreover, the prevention should be also based on the provision of opportunities and prospects for the youth to participate in public life and in the job market (OSCE, 2015; Official Journal of the European Union, 2017).

In accordance, educators or teachers face "double confrontation" or they are perceived to serve a "dual mission". From one point of view it is the challenge of identifying radical or extremist meaning in the context of expressions articulated by students. In other words, their duty is to spot radicalization at early stages, for example through behavioral indicators. The EU document on Prevention talks about the strategy of early intervention. In particular, it includes detection of "worrying changes" when it comes to behavior as well as identification of "circles of complicity" when it comes to imitation of radicalization tendencies (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017). Behavioral or "worrying" changes could relate to couple of issues. Radicalization could be thus spotted on the account of advocacy or membership in radical or violent organizations. Particularly in efforts to actively support the causes of these groups in conflict zones. Secondly, breaks with school, family or friends are deemed as other relevant indicators of radicalization. Last but not least, image or habit characteristics or better to say changes could indicate potential radicalization on an individual, too. In may include eating habits, religious practices or clothing preferences (Ragazzi, 2017).

From another point of view, it is the educators´ challenge of how to address these expressions in order to tackle development of potentially radical ideas. The RAN Manifesto for Education – Empowering Educators and Schools provides some helping advices on how to support educators in their duty of radicalization prevention. In concrete, the list includes trainings on how to spot early signs of radicalization as well as on how to deal with them. Practical advices include tips to responses and ways how to initiate conversation on sensitive topics of beliefs for example or the ways how to offer an alternative way of thinking to students with

extreme set of opinions. In that matter online platforms are also important. Teachers should be aware of online activities of their students where extreme content is spread out very easily. That is why students should be taught how to critically asses the content on online platforms. In other words how to differentiate facts from opinions or fake news. Other helping steps is to share these practices among educators or to bring to the classes real life experiences of terrorist victims and former radicals and to facilitated an open dialogue with them. (Radicalization Awareness Network, n.d.)

The "dual mission" of educators or schools is partially tied up to identification of radicalization. The main mission is, however, to enhance tolerance and respect in the first place. Schools should provide social control through the encouragement of social cohesion. The presumption is that the more the society is coherent the more it is resilient to radical and extreme ideologies. The neutralization of narratives is important, too. Schools are places where information flow and where the space for free expression of ideas should be provided. On this account, teachers may not only collect some information for intelligence purposes. They may also provide counter-narratives, or guidance for students with extreme set of opinion that oppose democratic values and human rights and freedoms, expressing intolerance and hatred motivated by religion, race, ethnicity, and the like. It should be strengthen by the promotion of understanding. Teachers should encourage debate on couple of sensitive issues and enhance intercultural dialogue. The strategies to challenge stereotypes, discrimination and racism are also upon the teacher to be initiated in order to build resilient young generation. Nevertheless, there is the precondition of trust if the teacher is to be successful in these "missions" (Ragazzi, 2017). In sum, the role of any teacher is the role of active educator preventing discrimination, racism and *"strengthening social ties, encouraging a sense of belonging, developing knowledge, skills and competencies, critical thinking and media literacy, but also in helping young people – in close cooperation with their parents and families – to become active, responsible and open-minded members of society"* (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017).

2. Methodology

2.1 Education, radicalization and the youth

Issues like violent extremism and radicalism are, unfortunately, not new phenomena on the European continent. They are still present in various forms like extreme separatist ideologies, anti-Muslim/Islamophobic or radical Islamist ideas, to name just few of them. Radical and extremist acts could rest on the actual use of violence, as in the case of terrorist attacks, or it could be demonstrated via the spread of hate speech and propaganda online as well as offline. In accordance, schools and teachers are deemed to play a significant role in order to prevent radical and extremist acts from happening. In fact, they even deemed to hold the responsibility to prevent the youth from acquiring radical ideas in the first place. It is based on the perceived duty of these institutions and authorities to promote values of social inclusion, tolerance and understanding. More broadly, students and the youth should be taught to engage in open discussion and be able to respect ideas of others. They should be capable to distinguish facts from opinion via their critical minds, as well. This is especially important if taking into consideration the "power" of social media and online platforms. Online sphere is where radical propaganda - recruitment initiatives as well as hate speech could spread very easily. Furthermore, it is the sphere where it is impossible to hold a total control or influence by schools and teachers. That is why students should be "weaponized" with certain set of knowledge and skills like tolerance and respect, sense of equality and justice in order to be able to resist any form of hate speech and radical propaganda. It is perceived to be the main idea, these days, how to stop the youth from being draw into extremism and radicalism.

In accordance, the main aim of this thesis is to analyze the relationship between education and security. In concrete, it examines how the role of schools and teachers is determined with regards to strategies countering radicalization. In that way, the concept of radicalization is understood by the paper to be the development or radical ideas. Nevertheless, it does not omit the possibility that the process could lead to the use of violence, terrorism included. Thus the role of schools when countering radicalization is deemed to be two-fold. From one point of view, schools are characterized as "hotbeds" of radical propaganda. From the opposite point of

view, schools are seen as "guardians" of principles of democracy and human rights. In order to find out how initiatives tackling radicalization shape the understanding of education, qualitative frame analysis is applied.

2.2 Qualitative frame analysis

The concept of framing is identified in concrete wording or usage of phrases and metaphors chosen by an actor to ascribe the text with certain meaning. That is why frames could be characterized as "interpretation schemes" (Linström abd Marais, 2012), "organizing ideas" (Kuypers, 2010) or as "socially shared" principles (Matthes, 2011). This means that frames organize social reality. In concrete, the process of framing an issue or an event is conscious or unconscious communication *"to construct a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be viewed in a particular manner, with some facts made more noticeable than others"* (Kuypers, 2010: 300). Moreover, while highlighting some aspects over others, the actor *"defines problems, diagnoses causes, makes moral judgements and suggests remedies"* (Kuypers, 2010: 301).

With regards to the framing process, theme constitutes to be a very important component. It is because the frame is created in relation to the specific theme chosen by the actor. This thesis deals with the theme of countering radicalization through education, and accordingly, it tries to identify specific framing of this particular theme. The thesis question is: *"How does the theory of securitization influence the understanding of educational institutions and their role in countering radicalization?"* It presupposes that the paper examines the framing of the theme through a security format. In other words, it aims to search for basic characteristics of securitization in the process of framing counter-radicalization in education.

2.2.1 The process of framing and securitization

These two processes – securitization and framing already hold some similarities. Securitization defined as a "productive moment" means it constructs and reconstructs the reality of society. Complete securitization act consists of the securitizing actor who defines concrete threat in relation to the referent object and proposes measures to fight the threat. Distinctive type of a language is used for the purpose of making an argument, giving a reason and convincing the audience about

existentiality of the threat. They thus communicate to the audience some preferred meanings that would lead them to willing acceptation of proposed extraordinary measures. That is why the thesis is searching for specific wording like threat and security. To be more specific, it searches for concrete arguments that depict some issue or issues and frame it a threat. In this particular case, the threat would relate to the problem of radicalization.

Following steps of the process of framing include the creation of moral judgments. It is, actually, one of the most important aspects in the theory of securitization, too, because the success of the securitizing actor is measured by the audience. To persuade them about existentiality of the problem means to consider what resonates with the audience the most and what values and norms are already affecting their way of understanding the world around them. The act of securitization might be most powerful when emotional feelings, especially the negative ones like sadness or fear, are triggered. In a similar manner, strength and weakness of frames is measured by the public. It is perceived that strong frames are based on persuasive arguments which evoke "cognitive biases", or otherwise, arguments made by elites that avert losses and "out-group threats" (Arceneaux in Klar, Robison and Druckman, 2012: 20). Moreover, strong frame could be also identified in multiple and frequent arguments or in arguments reused from the past (Klar, Robison and Druckman, 2012). On the contrary, the fact that some concrete term is frequently repeated in specific documents might not be the most determining. The most decisive fact is what terms are used instead of others and how are they used over time (Linström and Marais, 2012).

In accordance, the thesis assumes the application of concepts of violent extremism and terrorism in documents tackling radicalization through education. It is based on the notion that the invocation of violent acts of terrorism and extremism resonate with the public very well. What is more, they may not even be direct victims of these acts or have been ever affected by terrorism and violent extremism to feel strongly against terrorism and extremism. In that way, the goal of terrorism, namely the spread of fear is possibly the main reason how to explain this reality. However, the fear could be strengthened by the media coverage of terrorist attacks and by the spread of "terror" and violent images online. The "hatred" against terrorist and extremist attacks stem also from their immorality of being committed against

innocent and unprepared civilians. That is why the fear, hatred or disgust of terrorism, extremisms and their perpetrators may remain in the public's memory perpetually.

The final stage of securitization aims to identify conditions how to feel secure or better it proposes concrete steps how to achieve and enhance the feeling of security. In general, it could be achieved in two ways – long-term strategies and immediate measures. Long-term strategies are understood as strategies targeting root causes of the problem, in this case radicalism, in order to eliminate their impact and thus prevent the problem from occurring in the future. By the term immediate measures, the paper refers to quick responses to radicalization tendencies in order to avoid some negative consequences like violent extremism or terrorism.

2.2.2 Countering radicalization – the role of external actors

In accordance, the long term strategies could take various forms. On the one hand, it could be defined by micro-level issues or internal causes that lead the individual towards the path of becoming a radical. As the introductory part explains, these would relate to psychological profiles of individuals, individual socio-psychological needs or behavioral characteristics. On the other hand, countering radicalization and extremism might be formed in relation to macro-level conditions. These are determined by socio-economic or cultural aspects as well as by political climate present in the particular society. Macro aspects, together, then influence the structural conditions within which the individual lives. Furthermore, there are also external factors in the form of influential leaders or the overall social environment that encompasses family members and friends. Both of these components could be, potentially, very decisive when it comes to one's behavior and psychology – emotions, perceived needs or attitudes, etc. In this way, schools and teachers should be enlisted among influential external factors, too, especially, in relation to the youth. They provide young generation not only with basic knowledge via school subjects like history, biology and other classes. Besides families, particularly parents, they also shape the identity of young people. In general, it would encompass to development of norms and values characteristic for the concrete society and its historical developments. Educational institutions and authorities should be thus

understood also as "upbringing" actors that shape the identity and mind of young people throughout the schooling period in their lives.

This thesis focuses, particularly, on these external actors – schools or educational institutions and teachers. The goal is to define their role in relation to strategies countering radicalization. In concrete, the issue of youth's education is conceived in this paper as the "upbringing" process – teaching students the values and norms. Both of these actors are equally important. Educational institutions hold the tools - the schooling curricula and teachers decide the method how to convey the content of schooling curricula to students. In relation to the process of "upbringing", educational institutions have the duty to teach students values of democracy and responsible citizenry, values of freedom, non-discrimination and tolerance as determined in the 2015 Paris Declaration. Teachers are then assessed with the duty of choosing the form how to teach students these values. Nevertheless, the strategy of immediate responses could be pursued as well.

2.2.3 Dominant frames in countering radicalization

The thesis searches for one of the following dominant frames. They were pre-determined by schools´ "models" mentioned above – schools as youth "guardians" teaching principles of democracy and values of human rights and schools[4] as "hotbeds" of radicals to spread radical propaganda and extremism. That is why the first frame would emphasize the role of educational institutions as "upbringing" institutions and their duty to teach students respect for human rights, justice and democracy. Furthermore, it is presupposed that the frame would include enhancement of tolerance among students and discouragement of hatred, racism and xenophobia. In this way, it could leave an impact on the micro-causes of individuals that make them vulnerable to radical propaganda, In concrete, it could affect individual's attitudes towards issues like religion or their relations with specific groups in society created on the basis of race, ethnicity or sexual orientation. Educational institutions should encourage multicultural and open dialogue about these issues as well as teach students the differences between facts and opinions, propaganda included, in order to make them more resistant to radical and extremist

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[4] Nevertheless, the thesis would use the term educational institutions from this section onwards because it takes into considerations first and second-level schools as well as colleges and universities.

propaganda. The assumption resulting in this particular approach is that the more societies are inclusive, tolerant, and resistant and open the worse for radical ideologies to flourish. Moreover, the youth is targeted by this approach in order to prevent new generation from acquiring radical ideologies and overall to stop the rise of radicalism in societies.

From the other point of view, the second dominant frame highlights quick measures to stop perceived "radicalized" individuals from pursuing and spreading their radical ideas. According to this approach, schools take the role of "surveillance" institutions applying early warning mechanisms and intelligence gathering methods. These strategies relate to mechanisms set up to "spot" early signs of radicalization. The aim is to avoid negative consequences of radicalization like violent extremism or terrorism. It stems from the notion that it is inevitable to restrict some fundamental freedoms and basic human rights like the freedom of speech or the right to privacy. According to the theory of securitization, these would be called extraordinary measures. They are deemed necessary, especially, in times of emergencies like for example throughout increased frequency of extremist and terrorist attacks. The goal of these measures is to prevent radicals from performing violent acts. The strategy is pursued also in educational institutions because the youth is perceived to be a very risky category within societies. In other words, youth constitutes to be the category deemed very vulnerable to fall for radical propaganda. Based on these arguments, the thesis understands this frame to be decisive when it comes to determining the level of securitization in education. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these two frames might be dominant but they might be pursued simultaneously as two secondary frames, too. That is the reason why the paper also looks on what kinds of measures countering radicalization are described to be the most salient. In other words, if the strategies countering radicalization through education emphasize only one of the two frames or are they both emphasized as equally important. Furthermore, the possibility of other measures occurring in strategies countering radicalization is not omitted.

2.2.4 Countering radicalization – measures of prevention

Strategies countering radicalization could aim to target concrete stages in the process of radicalization. As explained on the example of the NYCPD report,

radicalization process consists of four phases – pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadisation. Counter-radicalization strategies could thus target early stages of radicalization when an individual has not yet acquired radical ideas. It could deal with phases when radicalization has already been "activated" and thus the individual is in the process of identity re-forming and adoption of radical ideas. As follows, it may aim at recognizing radical suspects and their plans to use the violence with the goal of avoiding the radical to actually perpetrate the act. Last but not least, de-radicalization is another form of counter strategy utilized to decomposed one's radical identity. This thesis, however, focuses on strategies of prevention of counter radicalization. The most basic assumption is that educational institutions and authorities are able to enhance security by prevention of radicalism. In accordance with the two roles of educational institutions, the prevention could be also understood in two distinctive ways. Firstly, educational institutions as "guardians" prevent students from being drawn into radicalism by making them more resistant to radical propaganda. This type of prevention is also specific because it provides individuals with alternatives – alternatives to hatred and intolerance. It could be pursued in education on tolerance and respect as well as via freedom of speech in open discussions. Secondly, educational institutions as "surveillance" institutions prevent students from pursuing acts inspired by radical ideologies. It works thought the recognition of signs of someone being radical or radicalized. In general, these signs relate to behavior or internet activism and image, etc. In this case, the word prevention means precluding an individual from objectification of radical ideologies in concrete violent acts.

2.2.5 Defining the sample of the analysis

The sample is identified in governmental documents aimed to prevent radicalization. First of all, this paper targets the period of three years - 2015, 2016 and 2017. Secondly, it deals with two specific cases of France[5] and the UK[6]. The documents for this thesis have been retrieved from websites of governments of both countries. Based on the pre-research of these two websites following bodies haven been selected – Home Office and Ministerial Department for Education, in the case

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[5] https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/news
[6] https://www.gov.uk

of the UK and Ministry of the Interior (Ministère de l´Intérieur), Ministry of National Education and Youth (Ministère de l´Éducation nationale et de la Jeunesse) and Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Innovation (Ministère de l´Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche de l´Innovation). The pre-selection was based on two concrete criteria. Firstly, the paper was looking for strategies established by governments that tackle the phenomenon of radicalization as an internal process occurring within national borders. Secondly, the theme as presented is the prevention of radicalization through education. Although the youth is the most consider segment of society when it comes to preventing radicalization, the analysis is directed towards educational sector. That is why other sectors which may also deal with the issue of youth radicalization are not included. Moreover, the documents for this analysis have been searched on governmental and departmental websites according to couple of key words – radicalism (radicalisme), extremism (extrémisme), terrorism (terrorisme), security (sécurité) – in cases of educational departments and education (éducation) – in cases of interior ministries .

As the theoretical part explains, the problem is also that terrorism, extremism and radicalism are three terms with no commonly agreed definitions on the international scene. Various problems may arise from this fact. These terms may hold very different definitions given by nation states or governments of states. They may also be easily confused or intentionally interchanged if no clear lines are established among them. Moreover, the problem might stem from the fact that these three terms like three "forces" work at once or co-work together. If the radicalization is perceived to be the process or the method and extremism and terrorism are deemed to be the tools, one can not imagine these phenomena apart from each other. On the other hand, radicalization as the adoption of radical ideas at the initial point may not inevitably lead to the final stage of terrorism and violent extremism, in other words, to the use of violence. That is why the thesis focuses primarily on strategies targeting radicalization but these strategies could be, in fact, incorporated in documents with variety of labels – CVE, PVE, VERLT or CT. They thus refer to or operate with all of three terms. Nevertheless, concrete labelling of documents may affect the overall conduct of the strategy and methods proposed to counter radicalization. It relates to the final stage of securitization as well as that of framing - the proposition of extraordinary measures or the suggestion of remedies.

Even though the number of terrorist attacks in the EU is decreasing with the exception of the year of 2017 – 226 in 2014, 193 in 2015, 142 in 2016 and 205 in 2017[7] (EUROPOL, 2018), France and the UK remain to be two countries with the highest number of terrorist attacks[8]. There could be found a variety of reasons why terrorism is affecting mostly these two countries. Firstly, both have a long history of involvement in overseas military operations, in concrete overseas operations countering extremism and terrorism. Both have been engaged in the "war on terror" after 2001 in Afghanistan and since 2014 the UK as well as France has fought Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Middle East. Moreover, these countries stay continually engaged in other campaigns – France in countries like Chad, Central African Republic and Mali or in Lebanon and Iraq; and the UK also in regions of Middle East and Central Asia. Both of the countries were also part of the coalition in the 2011 intervention led by NATO in Libya (Counter Extremism Project, 2018). These facts might represent very particular reasons why these states provide possibly the best ground for extremism and radicalization to flourish. The exploitation of socio-economic grievances by radicals and extremists could enhance this process. The goal could be to recruit or incite to commit terrorist attacks in order to "revenge" particular community (EUROPOL, 2017). The problem of foreign fighters is also emphasized, in other words, the problem of European nationals travelling to conflict zones and then returning to Europe with the aim of committing terrorist attacks (EUROPOL, 2015). As follows, this period represents also the time when Europe had been facing high number of migrants and refugees in what is called the migration crisis. It may have caused the levels of terrorism and extremism to rise in a number of ways. For example, the European Union terrorism situation and trend report states the possibility that irregular migrants entering Europe might be intentionally infiltrated by radicals from terrorist organizations (EUROPOL, 2016). With regards to migration crisis and the negative framing of this phenomenon by the media as well as by some governments, the trend of violence and hatred against these groups continue to rise. In that matter, EUROPOL reports increased violence against

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[7] The statistic comes from yearly documents prepared by Europol agency – European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report and includes terrorist attacks that have failed, have been foiled or have been completed in the particular year.
[8] For the statistics look for TESAT reports of Europol released in years 2014-2018. https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2

certain segments of society like refugees and ethnic minorities. In concrete, it claims that anti-immigration and anti-Islam sentiments continue to inspire right-wing extremism. In fact, 2015 report recorded 9 attacks inspired by this type of extremism in two countries – France and Greece. In comparison, none of these attacks happened in 2014 (EUROPOL, 2016). That is why this paper considers the topic of countering radicalization to be very important, especially, in relation to recent years.

3. Countering radicalization through education in the UK

The following section is analyzing strategies released by the UK Government in the period of three years – 2015, 2016, 2017 with the aim to counter radicalization through education. The goal is to define how the Government of the UK frames the role of educational institutions in counter radicalization strategies. Firstly, the section characterizes basic principles and concepts that form the context of these strategies. It helps to demonstrate which concepts and principles are depicted by the UK Government and how are they framed. Secondly, key frames for educational institutions are identified as well as main threats and measures to counter them. The goal is to determine the level of securitization with regards to counter-radicalization initiatives of the Government of the UK.

3.1 Key strategies tackling radicalization through education (2015-2017)

Key strategies of the UK Government to counter radicalization through the sector of education include: Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Prevent duty 2015, Departmental9 advice for schools and childcare providers, Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015, Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for England and Wales 2015, Prevent Duty Guidance: for higher education institutions in England and Wales 2015, Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for Scotland 2015, Prevent Duty Guidance: for higher education institutions in Scotland 2015 and Channel Duty Guidance 2015.

3.2 Key terms by the Government of the UK

Terrorism is defined by the Terrorism Act 2000. First of all terrorism is interpreted as *"the use or threat designed to influence the government or an international organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public"* (legislation.gov.uk, 2000). Secondly, it is *"the use or threat made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause"* (ibid). It relates to the serious violence perpetrated against a person and endangering other people's lives, serious damage to property, serious healthy or safety risks to the public as well as serious disruptions caused on electronic systems (ibid.).

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[9] Department of Education

According to the Prevent 2015, <u>extremism</u> is a term that encompasses *"vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values"* (HM Government, 2015: 2). It is assumed that extremism means also *"calls for the death of members of our* [British] *armed forces, whether in this country or overseas"* (ibid.). Non-violent extremism then refers to the same definition as the one provided above but it does not encompass violent acts. It is emphasized that: *"tackling extremism is also important because of its link to terrorism"* (Home Office, 2015). However, former Home Secretary specifies this by saying: *"not all extremism leads to violence and not all extremists are violent, but there is without doubt a thread that binds the kind of extremism that promotes hatred and a sense of superiority over others to the actions of those who want to impose their beliefs on us through violence"* (ibid.). The Home Office also points out to one specific form of extremism- Islamist extremism, even thought the Office admits there are other forms of extremism like neo-Nazi for example. The ideology of Islamist extremists is determined by the belief in the clash of civilizations. In more detail, the characteristic understands this ideology to *"promote a fundamental incompatibility between Islamic and Western values, an inevitable divide between ʹthem and usʹ. They demand a caliphate, or a new Islamic state, governed by a harsh interpretation of Shariʹa law. They utterly reject British and Western values"* (ibid.).

<u>Radicalization</u> is understood as *"the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups"* (HM Government, 2015: 21). The revised Prevent duty stresses out the importance of an ideology that drives the radicalization process. In concrete, the Duty defines radicalization as a process driven by *"an ideology that sets Muslims against non-Muslims, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and both obliges and legitimizes violence in its defense"* (HM Government, 2011: 36). On the other hand, Counter-extremism strategy highlights the fact that there is not only one unique model or radicalization but that *„the process is unique for each individual"* (HM Government, 2015: 21). The strategy identifies three basic elements of radicalization -*"a vulnerable person will be introduced to an extremist ideology by a radicalizing influencer (typically an extremist individual) who in the absence of protective factors, such as a supportive network of family and friends, or a fulfilling*

*job, draws the vulnerable individual ever closer to extremism"(*ibid.). In relation to today's online media, counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST identifies the threat of terrorism in the usage of internet for radicalization or recruitment purposes. The section on counter-terrorism and the internet understands radicalization to be:

"*A social process, involving not just virtual space but direct face to face meetings between vulnerable people and propagandists for terror. However, the internet provides a limitless source of material for radicalizes to use once individuals are engaged in this process and creates insular, private communities to share and discuss extremist ideas. It also provides the means for ideologues overseas to reach into the UK, either to preach to groups, or reinforce a commitment to violence"* (HM Government, 2011: 74).

Vulnerability is characterized by the Prevent Duty as "*the condition of being capable of being injured, difficult to defend, open to moral and ideological attack"* and also"*being susceptible to radicalization"* (HM Government, 2015: 21). According to the Channel program specific factors may make a person prone to become vulnerable. These are *"peer pressure, influence from other people or via the internet, bullying, crime against them or their involvement in crime, anti social behavior, family tensions, race/hate crime, lack of self-esteem or identity and personal or political grievances"* (HM Government, 2015: 10).

Fundamental British values encompass "*the rule of law, democracy, individual liberty, and the mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and believes"* (HM Government, 2015). Former UK Prime Minister David Cameron also lists an "inclusive identity" to be a part of distinctively British values (HM Government, 2015). The concept of inclusive identity is based on the notion of unity of British citizens. To be more specific, British citizens are "*bound together by our* [British] *values, a bond that will always prove stronger than any of the false and dangerous narratives dreamt up by our enemies"* (Home Office, 2015). The unity and inclusiveness of the British identity are emphasized because British society is characterized as "*multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious"* (ibid.). It is perceived that only British values make it possible to live in such diverse society united in peace, respect and harmony (ibid.).

Principles of a <u>modern Britain</u> could be found in words of the former Home Secretary Theresa May. She claims that"*it is these values* [British values] *that allow us to enjoy our individual freedoms and to lead varied lives in diverse communities. But they also come with responsibility to respect the rights of others to live as they choose*" (HM Government, 2015: 7). The term thus relate to diverse character of British society when it comes to races, nations or ethnics and religions, etc.

3.3   The role of educational institutions and securitization theory

<u>The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015),</u> in concrete the section 26 sets general duty on specified authorities in relation to risks of an individual or a group of individuals being drawn to terrorism. The first paragraph says: *„a specified authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard[10] to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism"* (legislation.gov.uk, 2015). The Schedule number 6 of the Act defines number of specified authorities - education and child care institutions included[11]. Moreover, it establishes the responsibility of universities in the Section 31 to ensure the freedom of expression, including academic freedom[12] and freedom of speech[13] (ibid.). Higher educational institutions have also the responsibility to *"give to the monitoring authority any information that the monitoring authority may require for the purposes of monitoring that body's performance in discharging the duty imposed by section 26(1)"* (ibid,).

<u>Prevent duty 2015, Departmental advice for schools and childcare providers</u>
The Prevent duty forms an important component of the CONTEST strategy. It was firstly introduced in 2007 and it aims to *"stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism"* (HM Government, 2011: 60). It means to *"address radicalization to all forms of terrorism"* (HM Government, 2011:59). The Duty

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[10] This term refers to the fact that *„authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions"* (HM Government, 2015: 21).
[11] Schedule 6 – specified authorities includes local governments, criminal justice, police, health care, social care and also education and child care (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015).
[12] Education Reform Act 1988 in the Section 202 identifies the duty *„to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions"* (legislation.gov.uk, 1988).
[13] Education Act 1986 specifies that the freedom of speech in universities as well as colleges should be ensured for every individual or body of persons. It is the duty *„ to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the use of any premises of the establishment is not denied to any individual or body of persons on any ground connected with—(a) the beliefs or views of that individual or of any member of that body; or (b)the policy or objectives of that body"* (legislation.gov.uk, 1986).

points out that the threat could be found in violent but also within non-violent organizations that spread extremist ideas from terrorist ideologies. It says that *"preventing radicalization must mean challenging extremist ideas that are conductive to terrorism and also part of a terrorist narrative. Challenge may mean simply ensuring that extremist ideas are subject to open debate"* (ibid.).

The threat is identified in extremist and terrorist ideologies that could cause radicalization of children in schools and specifically the Duty points out to online radicalization. In concrete, it is written there that *"terrorist organizations such as ISIL seek to radicalize young people through the use of social media and the internet"* (Department for Education, 2015: 6). It incorporates five mechanisms to tackle the threat posed on vulnerable children – risk assessment measures, cooperative relations with other institutions and bodies, training of staff in schools, imposition of specific IT policies and building children's resilience mechanisms.

Risk assessment measures refer to the ability of the staff in the school to spot *"changes in children's behavior which could indicate that they may be in need of help or protection. Children at risk of radicalization may display different signs or seek to hide their views"* (ibid.) It is thus their responsibility to be aware of any concerning behavior of students in school. Members of the schooling staff have various options how to provide their help if they find out a student is displaying behavior of concern. Statutory guidance to keep children safe is provided in "Working together to safeguard children" and also "Keeping children safe in education". Another option includes referrals to the Channel[14] program – it is *"a program which focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism"* (ibid.). Working in partnership with other bodies like local authorities and families, particularly parents, is advised to staff in order to be able to spot the signs of radicalization earlier and provide support immediately. Secondly, the awareness training emanates from the Prevent duty. The main goal is to *"equip staff to identify children at risk of being drawn into terrorism and to challenge extremist ideas"* (Department for Education, 2015: 7). Thirdly, schools should impose special filters on online materials perceived to spread extremist or terrorist propaganda. They should also provide pupils with

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[14] Further information about the Channel are provided in separate paragraph below. It also specified there what means the behavior of concern that makes it possible to refer individuals to this Program.

internet safety courses. Building children's resilience and at the same time providing them with safe space where controversial discussion could be made in another important component of schools´ duty towards its pupils (Department for Education, 2015) To be more specific, the Prevent duty 2015 refers to ability of students to *"manage risks, make safer choices and recognize when pressure from others threatens their personal safety and well being"* and to *"encourage pupils to develop positive character traits through PSHE, such as resilience, determination, self-esteem and confidence"*(Department for Education, 2015: 8). Last but not least the education about citizenship is important, too, because it teach them how to critically assess social and political issues, how to weight evidence, how to debate issues and make arguments. It relates to education about diversity in the UK regarding different nations, religions and ethnicities and taught them how to respect and understand people with different identities.

<u>Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015</u>

It is emphasized in the document that schools are obliged under the Prevent Duty to *"promote fundamental British values and safeguard pupils from the risk of extremism"* (HM Government, 2015: 26). On the role of universities and colleges the Strategy claims that these two authorities *„are places where open debate and the exchange of ideas and opinions are essential"* which makes them one of the most *"important arenas for challenging extremist views and ideologies"* (HM Government, 2015: 14). The Prevent duty also *"requires institutions to take action to reduce the risk of radicalization and mitigate fully any risks when deciding whether or not to host a particular speaker, making sure extremist speakers, on or off campus, do not go unchallenged"*(HM Government, 2015: 27).

The Act highlights couple of threats – extremists gaining power at school governing bodies, independent schools failing to promote fundamental British values and the unchallenged presence of extremist speakers in schools and universities. In this way, fundamental British values are considered to be under an attack. Safety and wellbeing of students constitute another area to be protected by schools and higher educational institutions.

Measures to fight threats encompass also the training of teachers to increase their ability to *"identify warning signs of radicalization and to understand the action they then should take"* (HM Government, 2015: 26). Secondly, the regulation on the

appointment of governors has been reformed. The appointment is now made on the basis of skills. Furthermore, *"governing bodies can take action to suspend or potentially remove governors if they are not upholding the ethos of the school, including fundamental British values"* (ibid.). Inspections of schools and independent educational facilities are upheld by the Department of Education in order to monitor the promotion of British values. Last but not leas, "signpost teaching resources" should be provided for young people to help them *"critically assess what they see and hear"* (ibid.)

Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for England and Wales 2015

Providers of an early child care should *"focus on children's personal, social and emotional development"* and ensure *„children learn right from wrong, mix and share with other children and value other's views, know about similarities and differences between themselves and others, and challenge negative attitudes and stereotypes"* in a way that is appropriate to their age (HM Government, 2015: 10). Moreover, publicly funded schools are *"required by law to teach a broad and balanced curriculum which promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils and prepares them for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of life. They must also promote community cohesion"* (ibid.). Independent schools in England and Wales are according to the Independent School Standards obliged to promote among their students fundamental British values as well as *"the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils"* (ibid.). Overall, the Revised Duty claims that *"schools should be safe spaces in which children and young people can understand and discuss sensitive topics, including terrorism and the extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge these ideas"* (HM Government, 2015: 11). Nevertheless, schools should also prevent their pupils from political indoctrination and *"secure a balanced presentation of political issues"* (ibid.).

In this manner, threats are identified in extremist ideas and terrorist ideology in relation to children and young people. Measures to prevent situations when these young people become radicalized include – risk assessments and safeguarding policies set up to identify children that might be at risk. These assessments should also define the level of risk in order to consider what the most appropriate response is. The possibilities for referrals are the already mentioned Channel program or

Children's Social Care and others. Staff should be thus trained to be able to identify pupils that might be at risk of radicalization. Special IT policies should be established to *"ensure children are safe from terrorist and extremist material when accessing the internet in school, including by establishing appropriate levels of filtering"* (HM Government, 2015: 12).

Prevent Duty Guidance: for higher education institutions in England and Wales 2015 and Prevent Duty Guidance: for higher education institutions in Scotland 2015[15]

Higher education institutions are committed *"to freedom of speech and the rationality underpinning the advancement of knowledge means that they represent one of our most important arenas for challenging extremist views and ideologies"* (HM Government, 2015: 3). It is emphasized there in this Duty that high number of young people is being arrested for activities related to terrorism, and also that high number of young people travel to conflict zones like Syria or Iraq to become members of terrorist organizations. Moreover, the Duty guidance for higher education acknowledges that *„some students may arrive at RHEBs* [Relevant Higher Education Bodies] *already committed to terrorism; others may become radicalized whilst attending a RHEB due to activity on campus; others may be radicalized whilst they are at a RHEB but because of activities which mainly take place off campus"* (ibid.).

In relation to the Duty, external speakers and events should be managed with regards to one concrete matter that says: *"Encouragement of terrorism and inviting support for a proscribed terrorist organization are both criminal offences. RHEBs should not provide a platform for these offences to be committed"* (HM Government, 2015: 4). In accordance, established policies should make sure there is a balance – ensuring safe of students and the staff and ensuring freedom of speech as well as academic freedom. Moreover, *"when deciding whether or not to host a particular speaker, RHEBs should consider carefully whether the views being expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute extremist views that risk drawing people into terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups"* (ibid.) In the case it is not possible to avoid these risks throughout the event, it should be cancelled. Otherwise, *"where any event is being allowed to proceed, speakers with extremist views that could draw*

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[15] These two Duties are presented together because they do not show any differences when it comes to determining the issue of radicalization on higher educational institutions and determining the role of these institutions in this process.

people into terrorism are challenged with opposing views as part of that same event, rather than in a separate forum" (ibid.).

That is why risk assessment measures of external speakers and events should be established in order to mitigate potential risks. It should also apply to events that are not organized by the particular RHEBs but it is still associated with the event even when placed outside of the campus. Other measures in the Duty include the already mentioned training plans for the staff, welfare care for students and IT policies to tackle radicalization on and off campuses with regards to students´ personal or online interactions. RHEBs should set up rules and IT policies for the purpose of filtering the usage of internet and *"to enable the university to identify and address issues where online materials are accessed for non-research purposes"(*HM Government, 2015: 6). One additional measure includes welfare and pastoral care. It says that *„sufficient chaplaincy and pastoral support available for all students"(*HM Government, 2015: 5). However, it concerns special rules on how to use prayer rooms or how to deal with potential issues emanating from this usage.

Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: for Scotland 2015

The Guidance stresses the importance of education institutions in Scotland to oblige Prevent duty including proper staff training and IT policies. These are to filter harmful online content and content that might lead a person towards the path of terrorism. It assess that *"risks to young people are often multi-dimensional. Local authorities would be expected to demonstrate an awareness of Prevent in their work"* (HM Government, 2015: 11). To mitigate these risks, it is perceived that education on *"global citizenship and engaging young people in a healthy, democratic society"* is very important (ibid.).

Independent and grant-aided schools in Scotland are obliged to comply with the Prevent duty. It is expected that they *"identify a single point of contact for Prevent, to liaise with Education Scotland and local authority Prevent leads in order to benefit from best practice"*(HM Government, 2015: 13). These institutions are thus also committed to the Prevent duty and its mechanisms.

Channel Duty Guidance 2015

The Guidance has been established by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and it forms an integral part of the Prevent duty. It *"focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being*

*drawn into terrorism"(*HM Government, 2015: 5). The aim is to identify people that might be at risk as well as determining the level and the nature of that risk and provide suitable support. In concrete, the Channel is also "*about ensuring that vulnerable children and adults of any faith, ethnicity or background receive support before their vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would want them to embrace terrorism and before they become involved in criminal terrorist related activity"* (ibid.).

Identification of a risk as well as its nature and level is based on the assessment of individual's vulnerability. It is made by the Channel panel which makes decisions on the vulnerability of any referred person in panel meetings. The Panel is composed of panel members that consist of local authorities and representatives from the police. The police is deemed by the Channel the most suitable authority to deal with potential risks posed by people involved in terrorism. With regards to the referral process and assessment of vulnerability, other partners are invited to assess the risk. Among others it relates to representatives from schools as well higher educational institutions. In concrete, the Channel program makes it a duty for education and child cares to cooperate with local panels (HM Government, 2015). Members and partners are not required to be experts on the radicalization process. However, they should be properly trained to recognize the risks. Their responsibility is to assess the risk of being drawn into terrorism in relation to the concrete person as well as the risk that person might cause to the society when drawn into terrorism. The assessment considers three dimensions - *"engagement with a group, cause or ideology; intent to cause harm and capability to cause harm"* (HM Government, 2015: Annex C). The first one includes an extensive list of "psychological hooks" that together form "the individual pathway into terrorism" (ibid.). These include – *"feelings of grievance and injustice, feeling under threat, need for identity, meaning and belonging, a desire for status, a desire for excitement and adventure, a need to dominate and control others, susceptibility to indoctrination, a desire for political or moral change, opportunistic involvement, family or friends involvement in extremism, being at a transitional time of life, being influenced or controlled by a group and relevant mental health issues"* (ibid.). The second dimension refers to the fact that not all radicalized individuals may also develop intention to cause harm. The readiness to use violence is thus assessed by the

following factors: *"over-identification with a group or ideology, them and Us'
thinking, dehumanization of the enemy, attitudes that justify offending, harmful
means to an end and harmful objectives"* (ibid.). Finally, the capability of someone
to actually cause harm is assessed by: *"individual knowledge, skills and
competencies, access to networks, funding or equipment and by criminal capability"*
(ibid.).

3.4   Qualitative frame analysis

3.4.1 The role of educational institutions

The UK Government's strategies countering radicalization through education
define couple of duties and responsibilities for educational institutions when it comes
to radicalization of young people. In accordance, the duties and responsibilities
provide some characteristics for the frame of educational institutions in the UK.
Firstly, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act from 2015 defines that educational
institutions should prevent people from terrorism including their involvement in
terrorism as well as their support for terrorism. Secondly, Counter-extremist Strategy
2015 sets the obligation for educational institutions to promote fundamental British
values and prevent pupils and students from being drawn to extremism. It relates to
the education about responsible citizenry and thus to the preservation of inclusive
British society. As follows, values of freedom of expression and academic freedom
should be preserved especially with regards to universities and colleges. Early child
care institutions have the duty to enhance development of children personally,
socially, morally and emotionally and to teach them to challenge negative attitudes
and stereotypes and to value opinions of others. Finally, educational institutions are
understood as the actors to challenge extremist ideas of students as well as speakers.
They should provide open space for discussions where extremist ideas are not
silenced but challenged. Therefore, it could be argued that the frame of the UK
Government for educational institutions encompasses mix of characteristics from
both dominant frames. These depict educational institutions and their role in
countering radicalization to be based on surveillance techniques from one point of
view and measures to enhance resistance to extremist propaganda through social
inclusion, promotion of tolerance and democracy from the other point of view.

3.4.2 Threat definition

Throughout the strategies countering radicalization through education, the UK Government identifies certain phenomena as threats to the vulnerable youth. It also relates to the determination of the role of educational institutions because it provides the basis for certain duties and responsibilities to be established instead of others. First of all, it is the process of radicalization itself. The UK Government points out to the threat of online radicalization. In particular, the case of ISIL and their propaganda on the internet, radicalizing young people is provided as the example of today's main threat. In general, radicalization is understood as a process that leads an individual to support ideologies of extremism and terrorism. It is emphasized that radicalization could be driven by the ideology based in the perceived oppression of Muslim community, emphasizing hatred between Muslim and non-Muslim community. Nevertheless, radicalization is characterized as an individual process. The most basic element is the vulnerability of a person that makes him/her open to extremist ideology and propaganda. Various factors may influence this process like perceived grievances, lost identities, lack of self-esteem, involvement in crime or pressure from peers of family members and others. With regards to the radicalization definition, the threat of the vulnerable youth is seen also in terrorism and extremism. Terrorism is understood by the UK Government as the interest to pursue extreme ideologies based in politics, race or religion. The main goal is to intimidate or influence government and the public. The risk of extremism is defined as an opposition to principles and values of Britain. It is understood that links exist between extremism and terrorism, and that extremism manifests itself in hate promotion and imposition of certain beliefs. The Government of the UK depicts Islamist extremism to specify the threat of extremism. This concrete example is characterized by an opposition to Western values and fundamental British values. The extremism could also leave an impact on students and pupils when extremist speakers go unchallenged. Extremism could increase criminality of young people relating to terrorism and what is more to make young people encourage or promote terrorism and traveling to conflict zones.

3.4.3 Measures preventing radicalization

The Government of the UK aims to prevent students and pupils from being draw into extremism or terrorism by the proposal of certain measures. These

measures reflect on the above mentioned threats and it also complete the frame of the UK Government which determines the role of educational institutions in the fight against radicalization. Firstly, it is the imposition of risk assessment measures that would help the staff of educational institutions to spot signs of radicalization. They should be also provided with training materials and courses to teach them to identify students in the risk of radicalization. They are also obliged to make referrals to the Channel program that decides if the person is in the process of radicalization or already radicalized and thus if the person is in the need for a help provided by the Program. As it defines, risk assessment should be made according to three criteria – the actual engagement of the person with extremist or terrorist group, its causes and ideologies, intent and capability to actually harm someone or something. Secondly, it is the imposition of IT policies in order to filter online content encouraging young people to radicalize themselves. Safety courses should be also provided to students to build their resilience mechanisms and help them to develop positive character features - self-esteem and confidence, teach them to be responsible citizens, respecting other nations or cultures and religions. Universities should monitor cases where students access extremist sources online for non-research purposes. Thirdly, the issue of extremist speakers should be tackled by the imposition of control mechanism for speakers and events organized by universities and colleges to challenge potential extremist content. Speakers and events on and off educational institutions should be evaluated according to the risk of radicalization and extremism. Extremist speakers should be challenged by alternative ideas. Finally, the provision of chaplaincy and pastoral support is proposed to help vulnerable youth. This list of measures helps to complete the frame of educational institutions that is promoted by the Government of the UK. It confirms the argument that the role of educational institutions in countering radicalization is determined by the mix of characteristics from both dominant frames defined by this thesis.

3.4.4 The theory of securitization

With regards to characteristics provided above, it could be observed that the role of educational institutions is involving characteristics from the first dominant frame. In particular, educational institutions are portrayed as "guardians" of the youth – providing open space for debates to challenge extremist ideas, education on

democracy, tolerance and respect for others. This role of educational institutions could be mainly observed in their obligation to promote fundamental British values. Furthermore, strategies of the UK Government also refer to the obligation of preserving the freedom of speech as well as the academic freedom. The non-securitized approach could be then identified in couple of measures proposed to prevent the youth from radicalization. Namely, the measure of safety courses for responsible usage of online platforms and information and the measure emphasizing the help from chaplaincy or pastoral support. On the contrary, UK strategies countering radicalization stem from the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act which explain why the term terrorism is articulated very frequently and why it is linked to the process of radicalization. That is the reason why terrorism is defined as the main threat also when considering radicalization in educational institutions. In particular, they are obliged to prevent young people from the process of radicalization that may lead to terrorism. Moreover, measures proposed to prevent students and pupils from being radicalized could be identified with the second dominant frame as well. It is the frame depicting surveillance methods to prevent radicalization in educational institutions. Consequently, the are understood as potential "hotbeds" where terrorist propaganda flourishes very easily among the vulnerable youth. The vulnerability of the youth means their susceptibility to radicalization. That is why measures encompass methods of monitoring and reporting, training of educational staff with the aim to recognize cases when students and pupils display concerning behavior signalizing radicalization. What is more, these measures encompass referrals to Channel program based on the list of characteristics that should alarm responsible authorities, including teachers, about concerning behavior of pupils and students. Securitized approach could be seen in IT policies established to filter and monitor the usage of internet and websites accessed by students and pupils. Secondly, UK Governmental measures do not deal with root causes of radicalization. Strategies established to counter radicalization in educational institutions often identifies radicalization and extremism with Islam and Muslim community when characterizing these terms. In this way, it may contribute to the continuation of radicalization or it could actually trigger the process of radicalization when feelings of grievances, discrimination or alienation are intensified. Finally, these measures could not be or should not be framed as preventive. Although the role of educational

institutions is defined as preventive and their duties and responsibilities are also defined to have preventive affects, proposed measures to counter radicalization do not serve these roles. They are, in fact, imposed to monitor and report on already radicalized individuals or individuals in the process of radicalization. On these accounts, it could be argued that the UK Governmental strategies countering radicalization through education includes characteristics from both of dominant frames. However, based on arguments provided above, the thesis claims that framing via the security format dominates counter radicalization strategies of the UK Government and that the sector of education is a subject of securitization.

4. Countering radicalization through education in France

As follows the thesis analyzes strategies of the Government of France proposed in the period of years – 2015, 2016, 2017. The aim is to characterize the role of educational institutions in relation to the theme of countering radicalization through education. The analysis is based on the identification of the frame created by the French government. Similar to the section dealing the case study of the UK, basic principles and concepts used by the Government of France in strategies aimed to fight radicalization are explained. Moreover, key frames for educational institutions as well as main threats and measures to counter them are defined for the case study of France as well.

4.1 Key strategies tackling radicalization through education (2015-2017)

Key strategies of the Government of France aimed to counter radicalization through the educational sector encompass: Decree number 2015-372 of March 31, 2015 relating to the common base of knowledge, skills and culture, "Stop-Djihadism" campaign, 2015 and Preventing radicalization of the youth, 2015, Action Plan to counter radicalization and terrorism, 2016, Procedures of crisis management and security of educational institutions facing the threat of terrorism, 2017.

4.2 Key terms by the Government of France

According to the Code penal, Article 421-1: *"Constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu'elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l'ordre public par l'intimidation ou la terreur"* [The act of terrorism is connected to intentional act of aggression conducted by an individual or a group for the purpose of seriously disturbing public order by intimidation or terror] (Legifrance.gouv.fr, 2016). It refers to offences like attack on life or integrity of a person, kidnappings, hijackings, computer offenses or damages, destructions, thefts, money laundering and offences relating to explosive and nuclear material and other weapons (ibid.). Furthermore The Action Plan to counter radicalization and terrorism (2016) claims : *"La stratégie des groupes terroristes consiste à vouloir affaiblir les sociétés en exacerbant les*

tensions internes pour y provoquer des fractures sociales, confessionnelles et, dans certains pays, ethniques ou économiques"[The strategy of terrorist groups is to weaken societies by exacerbating internal tensions in order to incite fractures in social, religious and, in some countries, ethnic or economic structures] (government.fr, 2016: 59).

Radicalization is understood by the Government of France through the definition of the sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar – *"Par la radicalization on désigne le processus par lequel un individu ou un groupe adopte une forme violente d'action, directement liée à une idéologie extrémiste à contenu politique, social ou religieux qui conteste l'ordre établi sur le plan politique, social ou culturel"* [The term radicalization designates process by which an individual or a group adopts violent form of action directly related to political, social or religious extremist ideology that challenges the established of political, social or cultural order"] (Le réseau de creation et d´accompagnement pédagogiques, n.d.). Moreover,

"La radicalisation n'est pas exclusive au terrorisme islamiste mais intègre tout type d'idéologie, religieuse ou non, qui conduit l'individu à choisir l'action violente, au nom des croyances auxquelles il adhère sans compromission possible, engagement terroriste contre les autres membres de la société dont il rejette, inconditionnellement, les valeurs et le mode de vie" [Radicalization is not exclusive to Islamist terrorism but relates to all types of religious or non-religious ideologies which lead an individual to choose violent form of action, in the name of the beliefs to which he adheres without the possibility to compromise, and with terrorist commitment directed against other members of society whose values and the way of life he unconditionally rejects] (stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr, n.d.). The Action Plan to counter radicalization and terrorism from 2016 characterizes radicalization –

"La radicalisation exprime la conjugaison de l'adhésion à une idéologie extrême et d'une action violente. Elle relève fréquemment d'un processus de rupture avec l'environnement familial, social ou professionnel. Agir le plus en amont possible est essentiel pour stopper une trajectoire de radicalisation, prévenir tout passage à l'acte violent ou pour tenter de réinsérer socialement une personne radicalisée" [Radicalization relates to combination of adherence to extreme ideology and adherence to violent action. It is frequently a process of breaking with the

family, social or professional environment. Acting as far upstream as possible is essential to stop a trajectory of radicalization, prevent all kinds of transition pathways towards violent acts or attempt to reintegrate a radicalized person socially] (gouvernement.fr, 2016: 37).

Republican values form moral framework of the French Republic that determines the political field and its policies and declarations. It is place on the top of the Constitution to continue the historical reflection and continuation of the republican motto: "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" (Le réseau de creation et d´accompagnement pédagogiques, n.d.). These values include liberty, equality, fraternity, secularism and absence from all forms of discrimination. The value of liberty determines that all human beings are free and equal before the law. However, the freedom means to be able to do anything unless harming others. Every person is also free to express his/her opinion if it does not disturb public order. Equality refers to equal rights and treatment by the law regardless of origin, race, sex or religion. In relation to the youth it prescribes parents duty to provide the child with education and prepare them for the future. The state has the duty to provide children till sixteen years with free and ethical education. Fraternity, besides other aspects, includes the duty of every citizen in France to contribute to cohesion and protection of the nation. It involves also people who have acquired French nationality; however, they might be deprived of that status if engaged in any activity that undermines fundamental interests of France (Ministère de L´intérieur, n.d.).

Secularism is based on separation between religious institutions and public institutions in the state. It ensures believers and non-believers with the same rights – equality before the law, freedom to manifest one's convictions but with the respect for public order. It relates to freedom of as well as from religions which means that *"personne ne peut être contraint au respect de dogmes ou prescriptions religieuses"* [no one can be compelled to any dogmas or religious beliefs] (Gouvernement.fr, n.d.). In accordance, the Department of Education provides the following characteristic: *"La laïcité est un principe de liberté, liberté de croire ou de ne pas croire. Elle est au fondement de notre société et de notre école qui doit préserver les élèves de tout prosélytisme idéologique, économique et religieux"* [Secularism is a

principle of freedom, freedom to believe or not to believe. It is the foundation of our society and our schools which must preserve students from all ideological, economic and religious proselytisms] (Ministère de l´éducation nationale et de la jeunesse, n.d.). The role of educational institutions, teachers in particular, is to support the transmission of secularism and its values throughout the education on civics, or history and literature, and other related courses.

4.3   The role of educational institutions and securitization theory

<u>The Decree relating to the common base of knowledge, skills and culture</u>

It has been established to provide a guide for schools and their role in relation to students. In concrete, the Decree concerns students of elementary schools, public and private secondary schools, grammar schools as well as students educated in families and private education. In includes various dimensions or training area of compulsory education (from 6 to 16 years). For example, teaching on the language to think and communicate and also on media language, teaching how to access information and steps to form students as citizens and others. Education of citizenship refers to education about life in the society and formation of moral standards and civics, taking into account respect for others and for individual responsibilities.

It does not mention the process of radicalization, however, the teaching on media, accessed information and citizenship relates to the topic of radicalization prevention. The Decree defines the duty of schools in relation to student:

”*L'Ecole a une responsabilité particulière dans la formation de l'élève en tant que personne et futur citoyen. Dans une démarche de coéducation, elle ne se substitue pas aux familles, mais elle a pour tâche de transmettre aux jeunes les valeurs fondamentales et les principes inscrits dans la Constitution de notre pays. Elle permet à l'élève d'acquérir la capacité à juger par lui-même, en même temps que le sentiment d'appartenance à la société. Ce faisant, elle permet à l'élève de développer dans les situations concrètes de la vie scolaire son aptitude à vivre de manière autonome, à participer activement à l'amélioration de la vie commune et à préparer son engagement en tant que citoyen*”[Schools have particular responsibility to form the student as a person and a future citizen. With regards to coeducation process, the task is not to substitute for families but to transmit to the youth

fundamental values and principles enshrined in the Constitution of our country. It makes possible for the student to acquire the capacity to make decision for him/her and at the same time to feel the sense of belonging to the society. It allows the student to develop in the concrete period of schooling life the ability to live independently, to participate actively in the improvement of the community life and prepare for the engagement in the role as a citizen] (legifrance.gouv.fr, 2015). Moreover, schools should teach children to think critically and to understand and respect conventions on human rights. They should be taught founding principles and values of the French Republic. Firstly, this duty relates to education about democratic principles. Secondly, it also relates to education on secularism, in other words, on the freedom to choose one's religion or to choose a life without religious belief. Thirdly, it concerns education on the freedom of expression, on mutual tolerance, on equality for all men and women, refusing all forms of discrimination, understanding the rule of law principle in order to live in a tolerant and peaceful society (ibid.).

Finally, the Decree also talks about the education on media, approaches to access and processing of information or on how to conduct a research, especially in relation to the internet. In concrete, schools have the duty to teach their students how to evaluate different sources of information and their content, and then students should be taught how to process information and how to build the knowledge. Last but not least, students should receive the education on the dissemination of information in legal and ethical manner (ibid.).

"Stop-Djihadism" campaign

The campaign has been launched by the French government in 2015. The campaign aims primarily on prevention and fight against terrorism in the French society. It aims to provide information to the general public about the threat of terrorism in France as well as about initiatives that the state adopts to counter this phenomenon. Furthermore, its goal is to explain the role of propaganda and manipulation and how it is applied by terrorist groups. In relation to the process of radicalization, the aim is to help the public to spot signs of radicalization. In accordance, telephone number as well as online form has been established for reports and advices provision.

Main threat is identified in Islamists extremism. In particular,

"Le « djihadisme » est une idéologie extrémiste qui prétend imposer une vision radicale et dévoyée de l'islam – fondée sur le retour de ce qu'il qualifie de « vrai islam » – par la terreur et le combat armé. Les djihadistes justifient le recours à la violence contre tous ceux qui n'adhèrent pas à leur idéologie, qu'ils soient musulmans ou non-musulmans" [Jihadism is an extremist ideology that aims to impose a radical and misguided vision of Islam – based on the idea of a return to what Jihadists call ´true Islam´ through terror and armed struggle. Jihadists justify the use of violence against all people who do not adhere to their ideology, whether Muslims or non-Muslims] (stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr, n.d.).

With regards to educational institutions and youth radicalization, the Ministry of National Education sets up 5 priority actions to tackle the issue of radicalization and terrorism – prevention, tracking and reporting, monitoring the youth in relation to the radicalization in schools, training and research (stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr, n.d.). Firstly, prevention claims that:

"Le rôle de l'école est fondamental dans la construction d'un élève citoyen, apte à appréhender le monde qui l'entoure dans sa diversité et à prendre des décisions qui préservent son bien-être mental et physique, tout en respectant celui des autres pour vivre en société. L'école doit être le garant de l'émancipation du jeune pour qu'il soit en mesure de discerner les dangers, pour lui-même et pour les autres, de discours extrémistes" [The role of the school is fundamental in the formation of a student as a citizen, who is able to apprehend the world around him/her in all its diversity and to make decisions that preserve his/her mental and physical well-being while respecting that of others. The school must be the guarantor of the emancipation of young people to be able to recognize dangers, posed to themselves and others, emanating from the discourse on extremism] (ibid.).

These measures are predominantly based on the primary prevention – the content of courses and educational activities aiming to prevent conditions leading the youth towards the risk of radicalization. It concerns language courses, courses on argumentative skills, development of critical thinking to societal issues, education on the respect of plurality of positions, history and geography courses, education on geopolitical realities as well as education on ethics and civics (ibid.). Secondly, school professionals should engage in tracking and reporting radicalization. *"Leur rôle est de détecter les jeunes en déshérence, en danger et qui éventuellement*

pourraient aussi représenter un danger" [Their role is to detect the youth in danger and who might also represent a danger towards others] (ibid.). List of signs of potential radicalization is provided in the Prevent of the radicalization of the youth, released in February 2015 that would be presented in the next paragraph. Thirdly – secondary prevention – monitoring of the youth. It is based on the internal monitoring within the school – counselor of education, assistant from social service, the nurse, the doctor while supervised by the head teacher of the school. The school also provides support to the family of the concerned individual but it is based on voluntary cooperation of the family and the individual. The aim is to get the person out of the process of radicalization. Finally, it is the training of staff of national education. It includes provision of seminars and courses based on the local needs of a particular area in France (ibid.). The campaign also provides practical tools for teachers like computer graphics, video testimonials and posters to provide a better understanding of the issue.

Preventing radicalization of the youth, 2015

This guidance is providing help to the public, to parents or teachers among others, to be able to identify signs of radicalization. *"La radicalisation relève d'un processus «d'emprise mentale» qui trouve sa source dans l'environnement de l'individu, le plus souvent aujourd'hui par le biais de l'exposition à des contenus extrémistes diffusés sur Internet"* [Radicalization is a process of „mental grip" that finds its sources in the environment of the individual, nowadays it happens often throught the diffusion of extremist content on the internet] (Milistére de l´éducation nationale, de l´enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, 2015: 1). Concerning behavioral signs include: breaks in relationships with friends and the abandonment of afterschool activities, break with the school – multiple absence, contestation of lessons, breaks in relations with family – worsening of the communication, new behavioral habits – in relation to food or clothing, identity changes expressed through vicious or anti-social statements, multiplication of conflicts and tensions with others, rejection and condemnation of Western society and how it is organized – its values, practices (consumerism, immoralism, and other signs), systematic rejection of authorities – parents, teachers, professors, etc., rejection of different forms of life in community, withdrawal and silencing oneself, sudden interest in a type of religion that manifest itself excessively or exclusively, socialization that is reduced to social

networks associated with radical sites, adherence to extremist speeches, ideas on the end of the world and fascination with apocalyptic scenarios (ibid.).

Action Plan to counter radicalization and terrorism, 2016

This Action Plan to counter radicalization and terrorism (PART) aims to set a new phase of the fight against terrorism, encompassing the prevention of the radicalization. The main goal is the preservation of security of French citizens. It claims that:

"Les agents publics, notamment les enseignants, qui sont quotidiennement au contact avec les jeunes constituent des acteurs de premiers niveau essentiels pour détecter des dérives pouvant conduire ŕ la radicalisation et pour entraver l'adhésion aux théories du complot, aux comportements de rupture et aux discours de haine qui favorisent de telles dérives" [Public officials, notably teachers, who are in daily contact with young people constitute to be essential actors of first level to detection drifts that can lead to radicalization and to hinder adherence to theories of conspiracy, disruptive behavior and hate speech that favors these abuses] (gouvernement.fr, 2016: 41).

The threat is identified in the propaganda designed by global terrorist organizations and in violent radical Islamism. In particular-

"Les attentats majeurs survenus en France et en Belgique depuis le début 2015 ont confirmé l'imbrication entre les phénomènes de radicalisation sur le territoire français, l'impact d'une propagande sophistiquée conçue par les organisations du terrorisme mondial, les séjours nombreux sur le théâtre des opérations en Syrie et en Irak, ainsi que la planification depuis ces sanctuaires d'actions violentes d'envergure sur notre territoire, ou contre nos intérêts à l'étranger. La menace liée à l'islamisme radical violent contre notre pays sera durable, comme elle le restera à l'encontre de bien d'autres nations et sociétés, européennes, africaines, proche- et moyen-orientales, caucasiennes, asiatiques. Sa réduction sera probablement l'oeuvre d'une génération, quand bien même Daech perdrait à moyen terme son assise territoriale en Syrie et en Irak" [Major attacks in France and Belgium since the beginning of 2015 confirmed the interlocking between the phenomena of radicalization on the French territory, the impact of sophisticated propaganda designed by global terrorist organizations, many visits in the theatre of operations in Syria and Iraq, as well as planning of violent acts on our territory from

these sanctuaries or against our interests abroad. The threat found in radical and violent Islamism against our country will sustain as it will remain against other nations and societies, European, African Near and Middle Eastern, Caucasian, Asian. Its reduction will probably be the work of a generation, even if Daesh would lose in the medium term its land base in Syria and Iraq] (gouvernement.fr, 2016: 14).

New phase of preventive measures encompass the improvement and update in training courses for the National Education staff, the creation of a national centre of resources for educational authorities, set up mechanisms to prevent risks of conspiracy thinking, violent radicalization, anti-social tendencies, the establishment of the culture of debate and argumentation among students, strengthening of the system aimed to identify and report situations when individuals are displaying concerning behavior (gouvernemnet.fr, 2016).

With regards to the youth, the Plan depicts also the development of critical thinking or the values of sport and culture to be a part of primary prevention of radicalization. It proposes measures for different sectors, educational included, that would prevent radicalization. In accordance, teachers are identified as a first-level group that is able to detect potentially radicalizing behavior. Firstly, the national education system should continue to use prevent and monitor mechanisms. In concrete, the action includes prevention, identification and reporting as well as monitoring and training. Secondly, the monitoring mechanisms also relate to private schools and education provided at home as well. In 2015 it has been made the priority to control non-contract private educational institutions because the trend of home schooling is increasing- it has actually doubled since 2007. That is why control mechanisms should relate to this area of education, too. *"Cette mobilisation particulière permettra de prévenir ou de stopper toute dérive, de garantir le droit des enfants à l'éducation et de vérifier qu'aucun enseignement contraire aux valeurs de la République ne puisse prospérer"* [This particular mobilization will enable to prevent or halt any behavior defections, guarantee the right of children to education and allow for the verification that no education opposing the values of the Republic can prosper] (gouvernement.fr., 2016: 41). Thirdly, *"Mobiliser les volets « citoyenneté » des projets éducatifs de territoire pour développer, en partenariat avec les communes et les associations, une offre d'activité périscolaires dédiée au développement de l'esprit critique, mais aussi de la capacité de jugement vis-à-vis*

des médias et des réseaux sociaux" [Mobilize the ″citizenship″ components of educational projects within the territory to develop, in partnership with municipalities and associations, a range of afterschool activities dedicated to the development of critical thinking, but also of the capability to make judgements about the media and social networks] (gouvernement.fr, 2016: 7). The prevention should thus also regard the education on media and information. Since 2015 the education of young people on media has been assigned as the priority issue by the National Education and the Ministry of Culture. In particular - *"Le jeune public doit en effet être en capacité de comprendre et de s'approprier l'environnement médiatique dans lequel il évolue et développer son esprit critique face à la masse d'information et de contenus auxquels il a accès"* [Young people must be able to understand and adapt themselves to the environment of media and develop their critical thinking accordingly, also with regards to the mass of information and contents which they access] (gouvernement.fr, 2016: 42).

Procedures of crisis management and security of educational institutions facing the threat of terrorism, 2017

This publication discusses the topic of introducing – *"d'une culture de la sécurité et de la sûreté au sein de la communauté éducative"* [culture of safety and security into the field of education] (Ministère de l´intérieur et Ministère de l´éducation nationale, de l´enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, 2017: Synthèse). This „culture" should be based on the following measure – to develop and disseminate guidelines for the partnership between schools and Security forces of the state. It should encompass crisis prevention plans, emergency preparedness measures and crisis management to ensure security and safety in educational institutions.

The main threat is identified in terrorist attacks. The concern about security of educational institutions have been expressed in the letter of 29 September 2016 by when the directors cabinet of the Minister of National Education, Higher Education and Research and Minister of the Interior. It has been articulated in relation to attacks that happened in 2015 on the national territory. The letter included request for inspections of security measures that could possibly indentify additional measures to be established. One of essential steps to increase security of educational institutions in relation to terrorist threat is identified in the following - *"Établir une classification rigoureuse des risques et des menaces et identifier les services et personnes*

spécifiquement désignés, à l'exclusion de tout autre, pour les prendre en charge"
[Establish a rigorous classification of risks and threats and identify services and
specifically designated persons, to the exclusion of all others, to take charge of them]
(ibid.). Furthermore, *"élaborer et diffuser, à l'attention des chefs d'établissement,
des directeurs d'école et des IEN, un tableau résumant les missions et les niveaux
d'action des référents et correspondants au sein des forces de sécurité"*[develop and
disseminate, for school principals, principals and NEIs – National Education
Inspector, a table summarizing the missions and levels of action of the referents and
correspondents within the security forces.] (ibid.). The development of simplified
analysis on the shared security diagnoses should be based on coordinated work of
technical services, national education services, police and gendarmerie services.
Another type of a measure is found in training courses for staff of educational
institutions in relation to the threat of terrorism. Finally, this initiative did not choose
to go into the question of radicalization of students. Nevertheless, radicalization and
terrorism are two phenomena that are not foreign to each other but it is perceived that
adopting measures to prevent the process of radicalization of students would not
affect the implementation of crisis management procedures. In this way the role of
educational institutions is determined by the idea – *"l'idée que l'école est ouverte sur
son environnement mais doit aussi apprendre à se protéger face à un niveau de
menace accru"* [The idea is that schools is open to its environment but must also lean
to protect itself against an increased level of threat] (Ministère de l´intérieur et
Ministère de l´éducation nationale, de l´enseignement supérieur et de la recherche,
2017: 2).

4.4   Qualitative frame analysis

4.4.1 The role of educational institutions

There is a variety of duties and responsibilities ascribed to educational
institution by governmental authorities of the French republic whit the goal of
preventing radicalization. Most importantly, educational institution should educate
on the usage of language, on the access of information, particularly considering
online media as well as on responsible citizenry. In concrete, it is important to teach
students and pupils about ways how to make responsible decisions, how to develop
critical thinking and adhere to fundamental values of the French Republic enshrined

in the Constitution - principles of democracy, secularism, freedoms and mutual tolerance, justice, and the principle of non-discrimination. As follows, the Action Plan to counter radicalization and terrorism from 2016 points out that teachers make the most suitable and primary actors to detect changes in behavior or in attitudes of students and pupils. This role stems from the fact that they are in day to day contact with children in schools. Educational institutions should also established culture of security and safety within them. In other words, their role is to set up measures of protection against threats to its safety and security.

4.4.2 Threat definition

The definition of roles of educational institutions is dependent upon threat identification. Based on campaigns and strategies published by the Government of France the threat is identified in violent radicalization and conspiracy thinking as well as in terrorism. Radicalization means the adoption of an approach that justifies violent acts linked to extremist ideologies which challenge established order. These ideologies could relate to religious ideologies like Islamist terrorism as well as non-religious ideologies. However, the important point is that it is perceived that they can not be compromised, plus they reject values of French society and finally they are committed to terrorism. This means that republican values as the moral framework of France is under the threat as well. With these regards, safeguarding the security of citizens of France constitutes to be the main interest of the French Government. In accordance, the phenomenon of terrorism is characterized by its purpose to cause disturbance to public order via intimidation and terror. Terrorists goal is to cause tensions within the society and fracture it and thus to make the society more weak to its propaganda and manipulation. Concrete case is provided particularly in Islamists extremism based on radical interpretation of Islam justifying the use of violence against those who do not believe in their cause. The Action Plan emphasizes the link between radicalization in France, impact of propaganda, the travels to conflict zones like Syria and Iraq and plans to perpetrate violent attacks.

4.4.3 Measures preventing radicalization

The Government of France proposes various measures in order to prevent radicalization of the youth. They also have the effect of determining the role of

educational institutions in the fight against radicalization because certain characteristics are introduced or strengthen in order to server the goal of prevention. Stop-djihadism campaign proposes 5-point plan that includes measures - prevent, tackle and report, monitor, training and research. Prevention measures should be pursued through educational activities like courses on language, argumentation, critical thinking, respect of plurality of opinions, history and geopolitics to understand complexities of issues and other courses like civics and ethics. However, it also proposes monitoring measures and control of online media and internet platforms as well as measures of detection to spot signs of radicalization. Cooperation with the family is highly suggested in order to spot the signs quicker and be able to provide help immediately. In accordance, related training and courses for the staff of educational institutions should be provided to them to be able to monitor signs of radicalization. Secondly, there is the need to establish and maintain environment within educational institutions that allows open debates, and enhances argumentation. Thirdly, control mechanism on the right of a child to education and monitoring of education in relation to the values of the Republic should be set up, especially, in relation to private education and home-schooling. Fourthly, list of afterschool activities should be elaborated in a way to enhance efforts of education on critical thinking and judgment making, particularly in relation to the media and social networks. Last but not least, partnership with institutions and authorities relating to Security forces of the State should be established. It would then relate to the creation of guidelines on how to keep educational institutions safe from terrorism, including crisis prevention plans, emergency preparedness and crisis management. It would provide classifications of risks and threats – identification of responses and relevant authorities for crisis management.

4.4.4 The theory of securitization

In relation to the measures and definitions provided above it could be observed that the strategy of French government to counter radicalization through education includes a mix of characteristics from both of dominant frames. From one point of view, educational institutions are seen as "guardians" of students and pupils. It means these institutions provide education and enhance republican values of liberty, equality, fraternity and secularism as well as teach the youth to act

responsibly as citizens of France, using their critical minds when accessing online media and other platforms. Measures to prevent radicalization among students and pupils encompass proposals that reflect on this role of educational institutions. To be more precise, it is the emphasis on educational courses and afterschool activities that would strengthen educational institutions´ role as "guardians" of Republican values, helping to build resilience to manipulation and propaganda among young people.

On the other hand, strategies aiming to counter radicalization demonstrate signs of securitization within educational system of France, too. It could be identified in the provision of characteristics that are linked to the second dominant frame which depicts educational institutions as "surveillance" intuitions. In accordance, this approach of the Government of France to countering radicalization through education mirrors the approach of the UK Government exemplified in the Prevent program. First of all, the main threat is identified in terrorism and the process of radicalization is associated with this phenomenon. In fact all three terms – radicalization, extremism and terrorism are interlinked according to the French strategies, although they lack clear definition of extremism. Similar to the case of the UK, the threat of terrorism is associated with Islamic extremism and their propaganda. Secondly, measures of monitoring, control and reports on signs of radicalization among students and pupils make another determinant to claim that second dominant frame is present in French governmental strategies, too. Further points for this argument could be identified in measures proposing training courses for educational staff and the identification of signs of a concerning behavior signalizing the individual might be undergoing radicalization. Finally, security and safety of educational institutions is considered by the Government of France, especially, with regards to terrorist events in 2015. This strategy is different because it does not deal with radicalization among students and pupils. Nevertheless, its aim is to treat the threat of terrorism as is the case of all other strategic documents explained in the thesis. It was presented in order to demonstrate diversity of approaches to counter the threat of terrorism in French educational institutions. What is more, this strategy was also presented to demonstrate diversity of results of the research. In other words, how different could be the results in relation to two depicted case studies – France and the UK, using the same method of selection of strategic documents.

5. Concluding remarks

In general, the cases of the UK and France could be perceived as very similar to each other. Both are and have been involved in overseas military operation, the most recent one being the fight against ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Secondly, the UK and France constitute the most frequently targeted countries by terrorism in comparison to other countries in the EU. Thirdly, the countries are both very multicultural, encompassing many nations, cultures and ethnicities that are matters of a long history of immigration. With regards to the theme of countering radicalization through education, it is possible to identify some similarities as well as differences in the two cases. Both of the Cases could be characterized as a mix of both of dominant frames defined by this thesis – educational institutions as "guardians" and educational institutions as "surveillance" actors within strategies countering radicalization. Even though the comparison was not the goal of the thesis, it could be observed that countering radicalization through education is elaborated more in the case of the UK. It could be observed in the number of publications found on the website of the UK Government, Home Office and the Department of Education. Furthermore, it is manifested in the depth and variety of measures and definitions of the problem of extremism and radicalization in the UK strategies contrary to these provided by the Government of France. The explanation could be found in the Contest strategy developed already in 2003, in particular the Prevent and Channel programs that specifically treats the issue of radicalization in educational institutions. Moreover, 7/7 bombings in 2005 in London and the fact that one of these perpetrators was a leading figure among the youth in the school could have also affected the development of counter radicalization strategies in the UK. The most important point is that educational institutions in the UK are obliged to prevent students and pupils from being drawn to terrorism by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act from 2015.

On the contrary, strategy of French government to counter radicalization through education is not elaborated deeply. It lacks programs like Prevent and Channel that specifically deal with the role of educational institutions in countering radicalization. Nevertheless, The Action Plan from 2016 marked a turning point. As has been presented, French strategies countering radicalization through education are starting to show signs of "Prevent" like methods of monitoring and reporting on

signals of radicalization. These changes could be observed in proposals for training courses for educational staff to be able to recognize signs of radicalization among students and pupils and act accordingly to prevent the youth from radicalization or from being engaged in any form of violence. Furthermore, the proposals for IT policies to filter and monitor the access of online platform by students and pupils support the argument that educational institutions are framed as "surveillance" actors with regards to their role of countering radicalization. These kinds of policies could be identified in the approach of the Government of the UK as well the French government.

On the other hand, both of them emphasize the importance to promote and strengthen the feeling of the youth towards fundamental values that form the basis of these two countries. The goal is to safeguard inclusiveness within the society and teach respect and tolerance for others. At the same time, educational institutions should provide students and pupils the space for open debates. They should teach them how to act responsibly as citizens and how to develop critical thinking in order to enhance their resilience to extremist propaganda. This approach is better observed in parts of strategies countering radicalization that determine the role of educational institutions. However, security format dominates sections defining concrete measures how to counter radicalization. That is why the strategies of the UK Government as well as the Government of France to counter radicalization through education are considered to represent a mix of both of dominant frames defined by the thesis. Nevertheless, the thesis final argument is that the security frame dominates the strategies. The argument is made taking into consideration proposed measures to counter radicalization. Firstly, they represent mainly the second dominant frame and thus promote the understanding of educational institutions as surveillance actors with regards to their role of countering radicalization. What is more, these measures should not be considered preventive because they do not target root causes of radicalization. Secondly, signs of securitization could be identified in the UK and French strategies, too. The most determining is the identification of terrorism as the main threat and the identification of link between radicalization and terrorism.

Summary

In the past, Europe had to deal with variety of extremist ideologies and outbreaks of violence. Today, the issue of extremism and the related process of radicalization are still present within the borders of Europe. What is more, it is understood that radicalization may lead to the use of violence, in particular, to acts of terrorism. In relation to the process of radicalization, various actors constitute to be very influential to prevent the process to occur in the first place. In this way, the role of educational institutions is emphasized by the thesis. The reason is that young people are perceived to be the most vulnerable part of societies, susceptible to violent or extremist propaganda and manipulation. That is why educational institutions should increase the resilience of their students and pupils in order to prevent them from being drawn to radicalization.

In accordance, the thesis aims to characterize the role of educational intuitions in relation to security discourse considering radicalization, extremism and terrorism. In particular, it analyzes governmental strategies established to counter radicalization. Two concrete case studies have been selected for the purpose of the analysis – the UK and France. The goal is to answer the question - *How does the theory of securitization influence the understanding of educational institutions and their role in countering radicalization?"* Qualitative frame analysis has been chosen to analyze the content of strategies of governments and relevant governmental departments in France and the UK. The theme of this thesis is countering radicalization through education.

The analytical section shows that the security discourse influences also the area of education when it comes to countering radicalization. Both of the cases manifest signs of securitization in the sector of education. In concrete, it is observed in the threat identification with terrorism and measures emphasizing surveillance techniques aiming to prevent their students being radicalized and/or become committed to terrorism. However, measures aimed to enhance values of countries like democracy, tolerance and respect are also included in governmental strategies. Although signs of both of frames are present in strategies countering radicalization in the UK and France, the thesis claims dominance of the frame depicting educational institutions as surveillance actors based on the analysis.

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