Examining Rio's pacification strategy in dialogue with a critically revised securitisation framework: an Immanent Critique

May 2018

UofG: 2283057

Charles Uni: 69363093

Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of MSc International Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies (SECINTEL)

Word Count: 21726

Supervisor UofG: Dr. Mo Hume

Supervisor Charles Uni: Dr. Jan Ludvík
“[T]he business of obscuring language is a mask behind which stands the much bigger business of plunder.”

- Frantz Fanon
Abstract

This dissertation approaches Rio de Janeiro’s public security policy of ‘pacification’ implemented since 2008 from a critical perspective. Widely hailed for being an innovative solution approach to the city’s exorbitant levels of lethal violence and perceived as being conducive to a well-grounded approximation process aimed at unifying the ‘divided city’, it is the purpose of this dissertation to contextualise the public policy with the historical and socio-cultural fundament upon which it is based. The researcher makes use of a critically revised framework of securitisation theory, thus allowing for the examination of the power-knowledge nexus nurturing the securitising discourse. To examine the latter, a wide array of speech act material including official speeches and interviews published on official government websites, Brazilian mainstream media, and video-sharing websites will be analysed. The critical analysis will be placed in dialogue with the socio-cultural context from which it originates by drawing on analytical techniques of critical discourse analysis, connecting the said with the social. For this purpose, the socio-historical process of Brazilian nation-building will be retraced, shedding light onto institutionalised modes of domination that guide state action and its policies.

The analysis reveals how securitising actors engage in discursive techniques of manipulation to draw on and perpetuate a ‘talk of crime’ that is nurtured by categorically excluding parts of the population terming them the nation’s ‘internal enemy’. Based on the discursive propagation of a ‘city at war’, state authorities legitimise the forceful invasion of favelas by tacitly declaring a state of exception in specific criminalised ‘areas of indistinction’. Being congruent with a highly paternalistic and inegalitarian conceptualisation of citizenship which caters for the unequal distribution and application of rights in a democratic context, structural problems are instrumentalised to justify a militarised approach that is fuelled by neoliberal ideology, envisaging market development in the name of economic liberalism. ‘Security’ as enacted in the scope of securitisation is ultimately considered a political technology which places the leeway for action exclusively in the hands of the state, thereby reinforcing existing power configurations while marginalising dissenting voices, allowing for agenda setting and implementation of the powerful elite to the detriment of the lower class. The researcher is enabled to undertake an analytically founded immanent critique of Brazilian political culture typified in Rio’s pacification policy which needs to be considered a seamless continuation of a politics based on the exclusion of those deemed unequal to the benefit of the powerful.
List of figures

**Figure 1**: Securitising discourse and social cognition .........................................................43

**Figure 2**: Map of Rio de Janeiro, its favelas, and the pacification programme .........................67
# Table of contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................. 3

List of figures .......................................................................................................... 4

Table of contents ................................................................................................. 5-6

Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................. 7
  I. Rio de Janeiro, *favelas*, urban violence, and pacification ............................. 7

Chapter Two: Investigative framework ............................................................... 10
  II. Research aim and motivation ....................................................................... 10
  III. Theoretical-methodological approach .......................................................... 13
  IV. Methods of data collection ........................................................................... 16
  V. Delimitations ................................................................................................ 18

Chapter Three: Theory ......................................................................................... 18
  VI. Theoretical/conceptual framework ............................................................... 18
    VI.I. Innovative approach to the concept of ‘security’: Securitisation theory .... 19
    VI.II Securitisation theory: A conceptual-normative critique ......................... 22
    VI.III Conceptual symbiosis: Enabling a critical reflection upon processes of securitisation........................................................................................................ 26

Chapter Four: Case study – Rio’s pacification strategy ....................................... 31
  VII. A critical reflection of the power-knowledge nexus .................................... 31
    VII.I A genealogic account of Brazil’s hereditary elitism and peculiar notion of citizenship ........................................................................................................ 33
      VII.I.I The notion of citizenship ..................................................................... 33
      VII.I.II From colonial rule to independence: Perpetuating elitism ............... 34
      VII.I.III Modernisation and discretionary awarding of social rights ............. 36
      VII.I.IV Military dictatorship and democratisation ....................................... 37
      VII.I.V The *naturalisation* of unequal treatment from an arbitrary state ................................................................................................................. 39
  VIII. Empirical research: How is the militarised occupation of the *favelas* justified discursively? .............................................................................. 42
    VIII.I The ‘city at war’ – Political ‘othering’ and the discursive creation of an internal enemy ................................................................................. 45
VIII. II Humanitarianism as securitisation: Legitimising forceful intervention into
criminalised territorial space .................................................................................................................. 54

IX. Neoliberal ideology and the quest for social control .................................................................... 61

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Outlook ........................................................................................................ 72

X. Securitisation, pacification, and the perpetuation of elitist domination ............................................ 72

Works cited ............................................................................................................................................ 77-85

Archive Declaration ...................................................................................................................................... 86
Chapter One: Introduction

I. Rio de Janeiro, favelas, urban violence, and pacification

Over the course of the last decades, an unprecedented urban population growth has been witnessed owing to an overall, natural increase in population and extensive migration to urban areas.\(^1\) After having reached numerical parity between those dwelling in the world’s cities and inhabitants of rural areas in 2008, current estimations project the global population to be 66 per cent urban by 2050.\(^2\) This forecast bears far-reaching implications on virtually all levels, as this vast increase risks running in disproportion to city administrations’ potential for infrastructural adjustment: Justin McGuirk has pointed out that already today 85% of housing worldwide is built illegally.\(^3\) Hitherto more often ignored or even antagonised rather than properly addressed, attending to this informality appears now more pressing than ever. In fact, some scholars consider informal settlements to provide an invaluable opportunity to compensate for housing shortages and other deficits resulting from the complexities caused by rapidly advancing urbanisation and massive migration, culminating in the ambivalent assertion that the “problem is the solution is the problem.”\(^4\)

Contemporary urban/residential segregation stands emblematic for the profound social and economic disparities so characteristic of highly urbanised Latin America, putting a significant part of the population living in marginalised urban settings at a disadvantage. Brazil is among the most unequal countries in the world, and nowhere is this more palpable than in Rio de Janeiro, the city accommodating close to 25 per cent of its more than six million inhabitants in so-called favelas.\(^5\) Rio’s shantytowns have long existed without benevolent government oversight, let alone formal support, constituting territories of limited statehood instead, also referred to as “sub-state socio-spatial areas within the sovereign jurisdiction of otherwise

---

The target of extensive stigmatisation and demonisation, the favelas have long served as culprit for manifold shortcomings and deficiencies in Brazil’s social, political, and economic domain.

In light of commonly acknowledged multi-causality of violence, it can be asserted that extreme social inequality as encountered in the Americas in general and Brazil in particular, paired with the absence of state support in neglected areas such as the favelas surely pandered the emergence and prevalence of elevated levels of violent crime. Data presented in the *Global Study on Homicide* conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 2013 reveal that more than one third – 36 per cent – of intentional homicides worldwide occurred in the Americas. The historically persistent *perverse* presence of the public authorities in the favelas entailing “mis- and malfeasance of state actors” failed to significantly reduce these numbers. Past governmental approaches directed at curbing violence resorted to military-inspired strategies that were guided by two central, diametrically opposed paradigms. On the one hand, officials have intended to hermetically seal off and isolate certain favelas from the rest of the city in order to impede the sale and distribution of drugs. At best constituting a provisional solution, this *containment*-based approach practically cornered powerful drug gangs (*facções* or *quadirilhas*) into these territories that were left without state supervision, conceding the monopoly of power over territory and residents to criminal groupings. Alternatively, authorities have made excessive use of the state’s executive apparatus by repeatedly *invading* favelas with heavy gunfire, seeking to eliminate the ‘enemy’ and apprehend illegal materials, chiefly drugs and weapons. Governor Marcelo Alencar’s term of office (1995-99) illustrates the latter’s course of action, his policy “creat[ing] incentives for the military police to kill as many drug dealers as possible, linking pay rises and promotion to the number of kills a policeman could prove.”

---

11 Ibid.: p. 365.
Far from surprising, these past approaches have caused more harm than alleviation, culminating in increasing alienation and antipathy between favela residents and state authorities (the police, in particular), and numerous lethal incidents involving civilians and bystanders. It can be asserted that the “traditional state response to crime became part of the problem and contributed to intensifying violence.”

In anticipation of amplified transnational media attention due to it hosting two major international sporting events in recent years, Brazilian state and Rio city administrators have been provided with a renewed impetus for finding a solution to prevailing precarious security conditions. In what appears to constitute a deliberate intention of edging away from previous, repression-based public security paradigms, in 2008, a law enforcement and social services programme known as the ‘Pacifying Police Unit’ (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora - UPP) pioneered in a joint effort headed by State Public Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame, with the backing of Rio Governor Sérgio Cabral. Segmented into distinct phases, the pacification programme provides for, firstly, the retaking of the to-be ‘pacified’ favela with the assistance of the ‘Special Police Operations Battalion’ (Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais – BOPE) and its fleet of highly armoured combat vehicles. Requiring extensive intelligence gathering prior to operational execution, this initial phase is aimed at breaking potential violent resistance encountered in the favela. Once the territory is controlled and foci of resistance eliminated, the BOPE hands over to the UPP, which establishes permanent bases in the favela. A newly formed and specialised force subordinate to a community police command, the UPP officers then become part of the daily community scenario, placing emphasis on crime prevention. Finally, the post-occupational phase consists of continuous monitoring of progress and results.

According to official rhetoric, the pacification intends “(i) to take back state control over communities currently under strong influence of ostensibly armed criminals; (ii) give back to the local population peace and public safety, which are necessary for the integral exercise and development of citizenship; and (iii) contribute to breaking with the logic of ‘war’ that

---

14 Mattar, Flavia; Chequer, Jamile; Dias, Mariana (2010): UPP: tecendo discursos, Reportagem, Democracia Viva Nr. 45, Julho 2010, p. 81.
Currently exists in Rio de Janeiro.” Inspired by previous lessons learned – that the issue surrounding violent crime in and around the favelas cannot be handled by purely resorting to coercion by means of occasional police and military raids – the concept of the UPP envisages interrupting the hitherto recurrent cycle of violence by means of establishing a permanent police presence in the favelas, hence guaranteeing the monopoly on the use of force exclusively to the state. The strategy thus carries a marked spatial component, the programme being designed to deny the favelas as unregulated territories to drug lords.

With this in mind, Rio’s pacification has as its objective to replace the hitherto dominant antagonistic logic with practices of approximation based on community policing. Besides seeking to re-establish a positive and productive relationship between residents and the police force, the pacification programme further seeks to reduce levels of inequality through catering for the provision of basic sanitary facilities and educational services in the scope of its complimentary Rio+Social programme, which “aim[s] to produce quality information about the needs of favelas […], articulating improvements to missing or low quality public services beyond security to reach these areas, including sanitation (sewerage and waste collection), education, health care, and more.” That is, in addition to restoring security, authorities pledge to foster socio-economic development in the favelas. At present, Rio’s pacification programme extends over 264 favelas, which are administered by 38 UPP-units.

Chapter Two: Investigative framework

II. Research aim and motivation

The introduction and establishment of the pacification strategy in Rio de Janeiro has generated a great deal of interest both regionally and globally; it has been recognised as “the most innovative public security policy in the last decade.” Since its first inauguration in late 2008 in the favela of Santa Marta, numerous academic projects have made the UPPs their

---

central research object. A significant amount of these studies is focused on analysing the extent to which the pacification programme has reached its projected goals, that is, assessing target-actual difference. In this context, the research objective constitutes in examining whether the pacification strategy has helped reduce crime and violence in the ‘pacified’ favelas, and/or to what extent residents approve of the permanent presence of police forces, for instance.\(^\text{20}\)

However, mere variance analysis fails to contextualise the programme with the historical and socio-political fundament upon which it is based. This dissertation approaches the policy from a structural, macrosocial perspective. A critical revision of the public policy is trivial due to the fact that “social and economic exclusion, as well as authoritarianism, are still dominant features of most Latin American societies.”\(^\text{21}\) To that extent, this dissertation draws substantially on the tradition of critical thinking, originally attributable most prominently to Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno – all three notable theorists associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, or the Frankfurt School, more colloquially. In principle, critical theory “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about.”\(^\text{22}\) Entailing a pronounced normative orientation, the critical school of thought “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing.”\(^\text{23}\) In stark contrast to the traditional academic paradigm which strives after understanding and explaining society as it is encountered, critical theory – itself originating at a time of mounting political oppression in the 1930s in Nazi Germany – seeks to edge away from precisely that descriptive perspective by adopting a holistic approach, challenging societal arrangements. This is of utmost importance because levels of inequality are among the highest in Brazil, and political efforts at reducing them have lacked conviction repeatedly.


\(^{23}\) Ibid.: p. 129.
Accordingly, it is the overarching aim of this dissertation to examine in detail whether this public security policy constitutes a paradigmatic break from hitherto dominant state authority approaches, or whether it needs to be considered a seamless continuation of an historically persistent practice based on exclusionary action that centres around the notion of subjugating the underprivileged for the benefit of the powerful. In other words, the investigatory aim lies in examining who exactly is at the receiving end of the pacification strategy? Starting from the hypothesis that the pacification process was initiated by political elites who instrumentalised securitisation as a discursive and political strategy to foster elite political and economic interests, this dissertation will examine the following:

1. How is the militarised occupation of the favelas legitimised and justified discursively?
2. How does the pacification strategy relate to historically persistent patterns of subjugation and domination in Brazil?
3. How does it relate to broader political and economic projects and agendas?

The first research question is aimed at revealing how political elites engage in discursive manipulation to frame an issue favourable to them. The second research question seeks to elucidate how the discourse justifying military means relates to Brazil’s socio-political legacy generally, perpetuating domination. Finally, underlying rationalities of the public policy will be considered.

On a general note, political science is concerned with the legitimation of the use of power. Because securitising processes can be considered a constitutive element of the exercise of contemporary political power in both international and domestic contexts (particularly in Latin America), this dissertation expects to make a valuable contribution to foster understanding and highlight the potential of political authorities justifying “the use of militarized policing to enforce social values and norms of powerful elite” in an (implicit) state of exception. The motivation nurturing this dissertation derives from the assertion that “a politics of ‘securitization’ of social issues has become increasingly central to efforts to manage

the contradictions of neoliberal capitalist development.”

This observation is of particular relevance in Latin American contexts generally and Brazil in particular where historically derived and structurally entrenched inequalities pose extraordinary challenges to state authorities in their pursuit of economic liberalisation in a globalised world. Here, Rio’s militarised pacification is interesting in light of the fact that post-dictatorship Brazil firmly committed itself to curtailing the use of its military apparatus in the scope of the democratic transition process of the mid 1980’s. It is against this background that a critical analysis of processes of securitisation – be it in a single case study – fosters understanding of their impact on (and perpetuation of) pervasive inequalities, uncovering “socially degenerative effects on the urban underclass”.

III. Theoretical-methodological approach

The research design outlined here follows deductive reasoning, this dissertation operating with existing (revised) theory and a hypothesis developed thereof which is then tested empirically. By means of addressing set research questions, the researcher seeks to reveal how and why the pacification strategy has come into existence. The use of force within a state’s territory – at least in a formally consolidated democracy such as Brazil – is expected to be preceded by an explanatory statement and transparent line of argumentation. Despite historically consistent articulation of bellicose rhetoric evoking imageries of enmity and warfare, the Brazilian state does not find itself in an officially declared war. Hence, the question arises as to why authorities see the necessity to pacify, that is, to bring peace, if there is no war. Indeed, and as set out above, the city of Rio de Janeiro does face a significant problem of urban violence. However, this on its own does not intrinsically legitimate state authorities to respond in a militarised manner, since – at least in theory – alternative and less radical (law enforcement) measures are available. That said, it is the aim to reveal and examine articulated means of justification and the political process that substantiate the pacification policy.

This invites the researcher to make use of securitisation theory. Securitisation entails a theoretical dimension (holding its own definition of what a question of ‘security’ is) as well as a methodological one, offering the means to identify and analyse processes of ‘security’. By considering Rio’s pacification through the lens of securitisation, the researcher seeks to make a valuable contribution to the literature on and fostering understanding of that concept in the context of the Global South (the concept having been criticised by some scholars for its “Eurocentrism characteristic of the Westphalian straitjacket”\textsuperscript{29}). However, critical scholars have pointed out that the empirical application of securitisation theory entails normative implications in that the mere utterance of ‘security’ and its (textual) reproduction in the academic realm risks entrenching the securitisation of that issue, underscoring the performative role of language.\textsuperscript{30} Murray Edelman notes that “political language [...] has rationalized privileges, disadvantages, aggressions, and violence in the past [and] is likely to continue to do so.”\textsuperscript{31} Adding to this, Jef Huysmans explains “[l]anguage is not just a communicative instrument [...] ; it is a defining force, integrating social relations.”\textsuperscript{32}

Against this background, and fuelled by critical theory, the theoretical/conceptual chapter of this dissertation is dedicated to expounding securitisation’s conceptual framework, paying particular attention to its inherent political and normative orientation. What is more, securitisation is inherently flawed because it merely offers the possibility to explain ‘how’ an issue has been securitised, omitting the more interesting question of ‘why’. Critically revising the theory serves the purpose of allowing for a more evaluative engagement with the concept and empirical analysis of security, allowing for the assessment of consequences of a securitising process based on consequentialist moral theory. The power-know ledge nexus that underlies the securitising process which culminates in the military occupation of favelas will be examined in conformity with a critical reflection of the framework of securitisation theory which is complemented by techniques of critical discourse analysis as proposed by

Norman Fairclough, providing for the incorporation of a structural component, thus allowing for the contextualisation of securitising speech acts within their socio-historical environment.

With this in mind, this dissertation desists from assessing the UPPs merely by juxtaposing them with their proclaimed objectives, going beyond microstructural assessment and undertaking constructive criticism of the strategy itself and in relation to Brazilian political culture more generally by means of engaging in immanent critique. Being considered the core method used by critical scholars who seek “to locate possibilities for progressive change grounded in particular historical, social and political contexts”\textsuperscript{33}, immanent critique can be understood as a “dialectical method of inquiry that engages with the core commitments of particular discourses, ideologies or institutional arrangements on their own terms”\textsuperscript{34}. Titus Stahl defines this as “a form of social critique that evaluates both the empirical behavior constituting social practices and the explicit self-understanding of their members according to standards that are, in some sense, internal to those practices themselves. [...] immanent critique aims at a transformation of such practices that encompasses both actions and self-understandings [sic].”\textsuperscript{35} By avoiding mere moral condemnation on the basis of externally applied and independently justified normative criteria for evaluation (such as ‘justice’, for instance), immanent critique successfully circumvents common criticisms directed at critical approaches – of simply offering a critique and being based upon instinctive moralism\textsuperscript{36} – due to its critical assessment being deducted from and standing in context to socio-historical processes: "all forms of convincing normative critique must draw on unrealized normative potentials that are in some sense to be reconstructed from existing social practices [emphasis added]"\textsuperscript{37}, that is, it “derives the standards it employs from the object criticized [...] the society in question”.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{33} McDonald, Matt (2012): Security, the Environment and Emancipation: Contestations over Environmental Change, Abingdon: Routledge, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.: p. 60.
\textsuperscript{37} Stahl, Titus (2013): p. 3.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.: p. 2.
An empirical application of (critical) securitisation theory requires the identification and analysis of so-called ‘securitising moves’, or what Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde refer to as “securitizing discourse”.\(^{39}\) Ruth Wodak’s holds that “[d]iscourse can [...] be understood as a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic types, that is genres”.\(^{40}\) This indicates that securitisation can be viewed as a particular kind of discourse made up of a multitude of interrelated linguistic acts which, taken together, serve as valid basis for analysis. Wodak amends that “[t]he most salient feature of the definition of a ‘discourse’ is the macro-topic”\(^{41}\) – in the case of this study being ‘public security’.

Requiring qualitative research, the researcher has sought out, categorised, and analysed a wide array of speech act material that has been published by official institutions, including official documents and material produced and published on the UPP official website and governmental agencies.\(^{42}\) Additionally, the researcher has engaged with speech acts and interviews published in Brazilian mainstream media, and those uploaded to video-sharing websites such as youtube. This serves the purpose of revealing how the pacification strategy is being legitimised discursively. In practical terms, securitisation theory holds that the capacity to engage in securitisation of an issue is coupled to positions of authority. Consequently, the researcher has focused on speeches given by Sérgio Cabral, Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro from 2007 until 2014; José Mariano Beltrame, Secretary of Public Security of the State of Rio de Janeiro from 2007 until 2016; Luiz Fernando Pezão, Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro since 2014; Michel Temer, President of Brazil since 2016; and high-ranking police officers of Rio’s Military Police and Pacification Police Units. There are, of course, alternative ‘securitising moves’ that could serve as basis for analysis and that are not depicted in this dissertation. However, their content is virtually congruent with those


\(^{41}\) Ibid.: p. 66.

\(^{42}\) Upon doing research, a fundamental limitation was encountered: the State Government of Rio de Janeiro’s website appears decommissioned; access to official documents was therefore severely hampered.
analysed in this study, making further examples redundant. Backing up the selection of the
speech acts depicted here, examples stem from 2007 to 2018, indicating that the logic behind
the securitising discourse has not altered over time. All excerpts presented here have been
translated and where required transcribed from Portuguese into English by the author of this
dissertation. Where literal translation would have resulted in the loss of coherence, those
modifications deemed adequate have been enacted to the best of the researcher’s ability.

To contextualise the securitising speech acts within their social context, a genealogic account
of the origin of Brazil’s peculiar notion of citizenship will be provided by thoroughly engaging
with (Brazilian) literature. Providing this socio-cultural background is expected to foster
understanding as to how the pacification strategy relates to long-established and enduring
patterns of elitism and domination in Brazil. Since incipient years, Brazilian political leaders
have always seen themselves confronted with the difficult task of building a unified and
coherent nation from a population of manifold divergent social, racial, ethnic, and cultural
backgrounds. Retracing this project of nation-building and disclosing its repercussions with
regard to current modes of how power and societal relations are structured within Brazilian
society is of crucial importance for the contextualisation of Rio’s pacification strategy,
revealing historically consistent patterns of hierarchisation and subjugation which are
perpetuated through securitisation.

Finally, because this dissertation adheres to the hypothesis that securitisation can be abused
in order to foster states’ own political and economic agenda, the implementation of the
securitisation strategy will be related to the general context from which it arose. Based on a
consequentialist evaluation of the securitisation process, for this purpose, existing literature
on the pacification policy as well as official documents related to the mega events – such as
the official candidacy prospect for the 2016 Summer Olympics – have been analysed and
placed in relation to an ‘extended’ securitising discourse which depicts an intimate
connection between the pacification strategy and the hosting of mega events (the 2014 World
Cup and in particular the 2016 Summer Olympics, the World Cup having taken place in all
Brazil, the Olympics exclusively in the city of Rio de Janeiro).

43 von Sinner, Rudolf (2015): Citizenship in the Brazilian Context-Theoretically, practically ad theologically, In:
Missionalia, Vol. 43, No. 3, p. 441.
V. Delimitations

There are, of course, limitations and restrictions to this dissertation. Firstly, the empirical material is limited and selected, making an all-embracing assessment unfeasible. Because speech acts are analysed, it is clear that “competing claims are possible regarding the same discourse”\(^{44}\); this is not endemic to discourse analysis, however, but applies to virtually all social scientific endeavours. Moreover, it should be noted that the results obtained here are not generalisable, but case-specific. Nevertheless, insights offered by means of this present study assist in getting a better grasp at how contemporary security politics operate and may be abused, particularly in those states and regions with an historically derived authoritarian tradition.

Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to raise awareness of how political power can be manipulated to serve the interests of powerful elites to the detriment of the general populace. It therefore has a pronounced normative commitment: “consciousness is the first step towards emancipation.”\(^{45}\) As concerns epistemology, the researcher does not claim to reveal absolute truth; “Critical analysis [merely] seeks to provide a fuller analysis of security practices, and a (realistic) assessment of their dynamics and possible reorientation.”\(^{46}\) As such, the researcher seeks to make explicit that this dissertation envisages to provide an analytically founded alternative perspective on the pacification strategy contrasting those elaborations that hailed its implementation as an unconditional success; it is intended to expound emancipatory potential by revealing underlying rationalities of the securitising discourse.

Chapter Three: Theory

VI. Theoretical/conceptual framework

Securitisation theory constitutes an excellent tool for the analysis of security politics. However, as indicated above, a critical evaluation of the theory is indispensable due to the

\(^{44}\) Powers, Penny (2001): The Methodology of Discourse Analysis, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, p. 64.


the fact that its empirical application bears political and normative implications. Thus, reviewing the concept’s framework serves the purpose of expounding how interests of particular groups and patterns of domination are at risk of being perpetuated by this political mechanism. This task is critical with regard to the overarching aim of this dissertation; it is intended to reveal to what extent a politics of ‘security’ can contribute to the preservation of social inequalities. Hence, it is the aim here to point out how a responsible dealing with that concept can be ensured by attending to its inherent flaws, thus enabling the researcher to engage in a critical reflection upon the securitising process surrounding the pacification programme in subsequent chapters.

VI.I Innovative approach to the concept of ‘security’: Securitisation theory

The unexpectedly peaceful demise of the Cold War and the subsequent departure from a world order arranged around bipolarity induced a profound re-thinking of the concept of security, its conceptualisation and institutionalisation having been fundamentally moulded by this meta-event.\textsuperscript{47} The hitherto dominant and practically unchallenged traditionalist, realist paradigm failed to offer a sound explanation for, let alone prediction of, this unique historical occurrence – how and why the Soviet Union set aside its hegemonic ambitions singlehandedly – having postulated that perpetual political and military rivalry were central features of the anarchic international system. The dissolution and easing of political tensions was paralleled by the conception that previous protagonists of the security discourse which invariably centred around the notion of military clout – arms races, deterrence strategies, nuclear capabilities – were deemed unsatisfactory. In the aftermath of the Cold War the emergence of inter-state conflicts decreased dramatically, and some scholars asserted that potential sources of insecurity were increasingly located outside the domain of the nation state, comprising issues such as environmental pollution, infectious diseases, and economic deprivation, to name but a few. In other words, security is increasingly being perceived as a global phenomenon, standing in correlation with transnational and -cultural contexts.\textsuperscript{48} This disputed debate about the re-orientation and -conceptualisation of International security


studies led to the assertion that security is an “essentially contested concept”\(^{49}\) due to it being “so value-laden that no amount of argument or evidence can ever lead to agreement on a single version as the 'correct or standard use'.”\(^{50}\)

Critical alternatives emerged out of the debate surrounding the necessity of *broadening* the field of security studies, which resonated deeply in the academic realm and resulted in a broadband expansion of the theoretical literature. Securitisation theory as one such alternative is associated with the Copenhagen School of security studies, originally postulated by Ole Wæver and subsequently enriched and further developed by Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde, and has received widespread attention, particularly in Europe. Adopting a constructivist approach, this school of thought places particular emphasis on speech acts. Arguing that security is best studied as a performative utterance, securitisation theory starts from the premise that “security is a modality for dealing with issues and not something ‘out there’”.\(^{51}\) That is, the concept of security bears “a particular discursive and political force […] that does something – securitise – rather than [constituting] an objective […] condition.”\(^{52}\) This stands in stark contrast to the traditionalist perspective which perceives of insecurities as being intrinsic to and an inescapable feature of the international system’s anarchic nature, that is, they are objectively given. By contrast, the Copenhagen School holds “anyone who classifies an issue as a 'security problem' makes a political rather than an analytical decision.”\(^{53}\)

In conformity with its constructivist nature, securitisation theory implies that the production of meaning – and hence any discourse on security – is intersubjectively produced. This means that the securitisation of an issue is “constructed discursively in a socio-political process.”\(^{54}\)

The securitising process comprises a *securitising actor* (who delivers a speech act – a *securitising move* – in which s/he identifies a threat), a *referent object* (constituting the


element endangered by that identified threat), and a target *audience* which decides on whether a securitising move is being accepted or not. Hence, only if a securitising move finds acknowledgment within a target audience becomes an issue successfully securitised. This shields securitisation theory from common criticisms directed at those approaches that seek to incorporate an amplified scope of potential insecurities under the conceptual umbrella of ‘security’ beyond mere military means, most prominently that broadening leaves ‘security’ too wide and ambiguous, the concept therefore losing intellectual validity and coherence. To escape this pitfall and make securitisation more concise, the Copenhagen School introduced the analytical tool of ‘sectors’ which comprise different domains in which the dynamics of ‘security’ are to be expected and analysed. These include the military/state, political, societal, economic, and environmental sector. These sectors constituting “lenses or discourses rather than objectively existing phenomena” 55, securitisation theory remains, in theory, receptive to further inclusion of and expansion to other sectors and referent objects, however. 56

Through labelling a theme as one of ‘security’, the same is “dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority” 57, entailing claims of emergency, and, concurrently, authority, which is (re-)produced if met by positive resonance by the target audience of a securitising discourse. Importantly, an issue does not need to be objectively existentially threatened; ‘security’ is understood as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” 58 for the sake of safeguarding a referent object, in turn providing the securitising “actor [with] a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means” 59, since this extreme version of politicisation indicates a logic of urgency requiring immediate action to avert an identified threat scenario. Put simply, securitisation “is the framing of a political problem in terms of extraordinary measures, survival and urgency”. 60

56 This dissertation picks up on this point at a later point, holding that humanitarianism is yet another sector prone to securitisation.
58 Ibid.: p. 23.
While US-American academics have shown themselves scholastically more attached to Framing theory, their European counterparts are making vast usage of securitisation, which, “as a theoretical undertaking and practical application, should [therefore] not be left unpolticized.”61 For the purpose of this dissertation, in what follows a critical examination of the concept will be undertaken, placing particular emphasis not on operational lacunae but on its inherent political implications and normative orientation. The Copenhagen School being considered a critical alternative to traditional/mainstream security studies, it is the aim of the following section to address its properties and assumptions.

**VI.II Securitisation theory: A conceptual-normative critique** 62

Critical security scholars are committed to challenge, deconstruct, and politicise the prevalent logic of security, holding that “security, as a concept and a political tool, is able to promote subjectivities of fear and it often materializes as the product of oppressive or undemocratic acts as well as processes of social and political exclusion.”63 In this context, conceptualisations of security are seen “not as an objective reality, but as a political construct for which actors can be held accountable.”64 At first glance, this seems to stand in accordance with securitisation theory which, as portrayed above, understands security to be discursively constructed, rather than an objective fact. However, upon examining securitisation theory in light of Robert Cox’ work, irreconcilable discrepancies become apparent. In the early 1980s, Cox classified theories according to the purpose they seek to fulfil. This was based on his often recited “[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose. [...] There is [...] no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space.”65 On the one hand, Cox referred to problem-solving theory as “tak[ing] the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action.”66 The overall aim of this theoretical strand lies in “mak[ing] these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of

---

62 I have developed some of the core statements of this section in other contexts in the scope of a course assignment. I elaborate on them here in a revised, argumentatively enriched, and correspondingly adjusted form, this being a prerequisite for subsequent conceptual improvement proposals and the critical evaluation of Rio’s pacification programme.
66 Ibid.: p. 128.
trouble." By contrast, critical theory “is directed towards an appraisal of the very framework for action [...] which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters.” Envisaging changes in the societal realm, critical scholars understand the prevailing social and power configurations as historically derived and thus recognise potential for change in direction.

Despite its constructivist heritage, however, securitisation theory refuses to offer a critical procedural method to put into question the dominant logic and functionality of security as a political technology, instead operating with a static conceptualisation of the same. That is, the securitisation framework provides for the analysis of the process of security politics, without reflecting on security’s conceptual value – what ‘security’ actually means, and what political implications the securitisation of an issue invokes. Securitisation theory accepts the given socio-political framework as foundation for analysis and operates within inherent power structures without questioning their socio-historical provenance or considering possibilities of change. The Copenhagen School backs up its passive political attitude stating that “even the socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do analysis also on the basis that it continues”.

Being indicative of the fact that securitisation clearly falls within the ambit of problem-solving theory, this is problematic on several levels. It has been pointed out that “speaking and writing about security is never innocent”, implying that without critical reflection “we embed and legitimate the ‘problems’ we set out to study.” Failing to put into question and critically reflect on a ‘problem’s’ origin culminates in the replication of that which already exists, that is, securitisation perpetuates the prevailing status quo, “leaving power ‘where it is’ in security terms.” In accordance with this observation, Ole Wæver states “[b]y definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so”, and further adds “[t]he

---

67 Ibid.: p. 128.
68 Ibid.: p. 129.
70 Buzan, Berry; Wæver, Ole; de Wilde, Jaap (1998): p. 35.
concept of security refers to the state [and] has to be read through the lens of national security”75, upholding the ontological assumption of state centrism so characteristic of the traditionalist paradigm. In other words, securitisation theory “cast[s] the state as the guardian or custodian of values”, asserting that “there can be no security in the absence of authority, the state becomes the primary locus of security [...]", and the security of ‘citizens’ is identified with (and guaranteed by) that of the state.”76 While securitisation contributes to the widening of security studies (taking into account spheres beyond the military one), it fails to advance a deepening of it (enquiring whose security is being threatened other than that of the state). This is worrisome not least because “states can be the biggest threat to the liberty, human rights, and lives of their citizens.”77 This holds true in particular with regard to those countries which have yet to undergo comprehensive processes of democratic consolidation. On a related, gender-sensitive note, Lene Hansen stresses “[t]hose who [...] are constrained in their ability to speak security are therefore prevented from becoming subjects worthy of consideration and protection.”78 Claiming that the Copenhagen School’s approach fails to include a concept of gendered security, the author refers to what she has termed the ‘silent security dilemma’ – a phenomenon which “occurs when insecurity cannot be voiced, when raising something as a security problem is impossible”79 due to lacking (societal) power resources and conditions of oppression and (male) domination. Hence, the weak and disadvantaged – often those in greatest need of ‘security’ – become marginalised and entrenched in their passive position of insecurity.

In line with its unreflective, static comprehension of security, securitisation’s adherence to the traditionalist understanding of security politics as negative, exclusionary, and reactionary (which stems from its incontestable conviction of placing the military sphere at the heart of its conceptualisation of security) is unequivocally linked to it operating within the modus of exceptionality. A speech act turns into a securitising move and becomes “politically efficacious [only] through the authoritative declaration of an ‘existential threat’ to the object

75 Ibid.: p. 49.
79 Ibid.: p. 287.
Exhibiting an intrinsic correlation between security and survival (in fact equating one to the other), security is portrayed as a “failure of ‘normal politics’”\(^{81}\), culminating in a dichotomous conception of (democratic) ‘ politicisation’ as opposed to (undemocratic) securitisation.\(^{82}\) Thus implying that “security acquires content only through representations of danger and threat”\(^{83}\), this assertion bears far-reaching implications in terms of politico-philosophical underpinnings that nurture the Copenhagen School’s framework of securitisation. Revealing elements of fraternisation with Carl Schmitt’s conceptualisation of the political order as marked by enmity and exclusion\(^{84}\), securitisation theory perpetuates a conceptualisation of security that is dualistic in nature, that is, it is constituted in terms of bipolarity. As concerns this study – which takes Brazilian society as its object of investigation – this is noteworthy with respect to societal security constituting one of the five sectors put forth by the Copenhagen School. Wæver states that the societal security sector hinges on identity as its criterion, since a “society that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live as itself.”\(^{85}\) By consequence, it is a society’s identity that can be securitised through a speech act which accordingly embeds the same in a logic of threat-survival. That is to say that an us-them modality is evoked, resulting in a “reified, monolithic form of identity [being] declared”\(^{86}\), generating a politics based on exclusionary practice. Problems arise here because, firstly, this process neglects that societies, far from being inherently homogenous, are constituted by a multiplicity of identities, and secondly, in accordance with above expounded statism, it leaves the ability to suggest who belongs to society and who does not to the state. In short, this divisionary process supports “the determination of friends and enemies beneath Schmitt’s concept of the political, and the acceptance of absolute decision in conditions of emergency.”\(^{87}\)

In sum, securitisation theory constitutes a useful theoretical tool for the analysis of the contemporary modus operandi of security. To the detriment of its application value, however,\(^{80}\)
its “strengths [...] – pure security analysis – are also its limits, because with the securitization approach all that can be performed is security analysis and nothing above and beyond.”

This limitation is of particular relevance in terms of normative utility. Constituting a reiteration of "both dominant voices and traditional security discourses", that is, perpetuating prevailing social and power structures through inherent state centrisn and its unwavering adherence to a traditionalist, fixed conceptualisation of security as exclusionary, its framework is unable to offer any form of reflective engagement with the object analysed, being “politically irresponsible and lacking in any basis from which to critically evaluate claims of threat, enmity, and emergency.”

In practical terms, the Copenhagen School thus fails to make recommendations as to how to improve the lives of the most disadvantaged. The following section is aimed at critically reflecting on the here identified limitations, seeking to concatenate the securitisation framework with the critical school of thought.

VI.III Conceptual symbiosis:

Enabling a critical reflection upon processes of securitisation

In conformity with this critical evaluation, Claudia Aradau correctly recognises that securitisation theory “is oblivious of the fact that our political stance is constitutive of our analysis of the world.”

The Copenhagen School’s framework mirrors and reproduces power relations and elitist discourses without putting into question positions of authority or threat definitions. For critical theorists, conversely, relating questions of theory to praxis is of utmost importance: they are dedicated to “tak[ing] an active part of the production of the social world they observe.”

While it can at times be challenging to maintain a healthy distance between academic analysis and political advocacy, the latter is not inevitably discordant with scientific endeavours. In fact, one should be encouraged to foster the other, that is, academics ought to guide political action. Here, Johan Eriksson proposes a Machiavellian approach which

---

holds that “to fully understand politics, and therefore give proper advice to policy-makers, requires perspective.” It is asserted that “[t]he key to it all is to be aware of the political significance of analysis – the power of words – and try to reveal it. [emphasis the author’s]”

Proceeding on Eriksson’s advisory opinion, Huysmans stresses that “we should move somewhat away from describing shifts in security fields and tackle the question of power or governance more directly.”

The reason rendering a critical analysis indispensable lies in the assertion that securitisation may in fact avail its originator rather than the supposedly threatened referent object, lying is endemic to politics.

Examining the correlation of a securitising speech act with the structural position that the securitising actor occupies is vital because institutionalised power positions grant substantial authority over the production of knowledge that circulates within a society, as well as how it is strategically directed. In a sense, different social groups within a political community find themselves entrenched in a dynamic process in which perpetual competition over the right to claim and frame a social problem according to their exigencies takes place. They do so because each group strives after an allocation of resources favourable to them – "A problem to some is a benefit to others; it augments the latter group's influence." As a logical consequence of this observation, Murray Edelman claims that "social problems are constructions" that can be drafted and adapted to fit a particular agenda. Hence, entrenched positions of authority capacitate actors to speak ‘power to truth’, a process which can take shape and form by means of securitisation. Tracing the transformation of an issue into a problem of security is crucial because the process of securitisation can ultimately be understood “as a specific political strategy." This is congruent with Anthony Burke’s assertion that the very concept of security is to be seen “as an interlocking system of knowledges, representations, practices, and institutional forms that imagine, direct, and act upon bodies, spaces, and flows in certain ways”, that is, coming to understand “security not

as an essential value but as a political technology.”  

Hence, it is the theoretical dismantling of the power-knowledge nexus which underlies a securitisation process that should be given investigative priority. In other words, a penetrative look ought to be taken at who promotes security measures on what issues, and how the latter are presented. It is important here to take into consideration the socio-political environment in which an attempt at securitisation occurs. In this context, drawing on techniques put forth by scholars of critical discourse analysis is beneficial because it enables the researcher to analyse how securitising speeches relate and correspond to the social sphere. In fact, critical discourse analysis is complementary to a critical reflection of processes of securitisation, granting increased robustness to the analysis. Because securitisation theory holds that security is essentially an act of speech and socially constructed, critical discourse analysis constitutes an obvious analytical tool for examining securitising processes.

Accordingly, Holger Stritzel notes that the empirical (and critical) study of processes of securitisation requires “a better and more comprehensive awareness of the existence of a social sphere.” In line with Ronnie D. Lipschutz’ assertion that (perceived) threats are “products of historical structures and processes”, critical discourse analysis builds on this observation by viewing “linguistic practices as embedded in and thus related to but ultimately subordinate to social practices: discursive practices are here specific practices within a broader social realm.” Generally speaking, critical discourse analysis examines the influence and impact of power relations on the content and structure of texts – the securitising discourse. It investigates how power is exercised through linguistic articulation. It enables the researcher to engage in a process of “doing-social-analysis-by-doing-discourse-analysis” through “becom[ing] aware of assumptions that are made in the name of cultural practice or which reflect the ideological basis of the discourse”. Therefore, it is essential to compensate mere analysis of securitising speech acts at word level (that is, examine the

---

linguistic features of a textual production) by relating the same to the norm level – making visible “social values associated with texts and their elements”.\textsuperscript{107} This is ultimately to view language as a tool of power, because “language connects with the social through being the primary domain of ideology”.\textsuperscript{108} This does, incidentally, relate to examining the already mentioned power-knowledge nexus nurturing a critical engagement with processes of securitisation.

Because security is posited as a desirable goal in and of itself, it possesses distinctive mobilisation power entailing a process of a-politicisation of the securitised issue – lifting it beyond the political sphere of debate and into the realm of emergency due to its operating within the modus of exceptionality – thereby shielding it from examination and discussion of ingrained and promoted societal relations.\textsuperscript{109} It is, then, fundamental to enquire how the propagated representation of the social world inherent in processes of securitisation impacts on attributions of identity because “discourses govern social relations.”\textsuperscript{110} In the context of afore-outlined rearticulation of a realist-inspired, conflictual conceptualisation of security intrinsic to the framework of securitisation, it is crucial to reflect on how the contemporary modus operandi of security has contributed to the ordering and (re-)production of subjectivities, and “how these subjectivities continue to regenerate certain emotions or actions such as political ‘othering’ or social exclusion, or how they reinforce particular forms of governing.”\textsuperscript{111} That is, the deconstruction of securitising discourses serves the purpose of disclosing and subsequently critically assessing the mechanisms of subjectivity that become activated through the concept of security; it helps to display “how others or outsiders are not natural enemies but \textit{become} enemies“\textsuperscript{112} due to the manner in which discourses are constructed and sustained.

Generally, (critical) securitisation theory constitutes an optimal tool for analysing processes of security, providing an answer to the question of ‘how’ an issue has been securitised. Crucially, however, it fails to offer explanatory approaches as to ‘why’ securitising actors

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Ibid.} Ibid.: p. 15.
\bibitem{Huysmans} Huysmans, Jef (2002): p. 49.
\bibitem{Charrett} Charrett, Catherine (2009): p. 32.
\bibitem{Huysmans} Huysmans, Jef (2002): p. 50.
\end{thebibliography}
engage in such processes in the first place, that is, it discards an incorporation of underlying rationalities into the analytical process. In an effort to increase securitisation theory’s policy relevance, Rita Floyd has introduced an ethical dimension into the analytical framework which permits the analyst to make an assessment as to “whether a particular securitization is or was morally right/justifiable.”\textsuperscript{113} This revised just securitisation theory is aimed at revealing the coherence of a securitising discourse; induced by consequentialism (which adheres to the notion that the moral rightness/wrongness of an action ultimately depends on the consequences of an action), the guiding question lies in gauging whether a process of securitisation “achieve[s] more, and/or better results than a mere politicisation of the issue would have done”.\textsuperscript{114} The moral rightness hinges on three criteria: 

(1) there must be an objective existential threat, which is to say a threat that endangers the survival of an actor or an order […];

(2) the referent object of security must be morally legitimate, which is the case only when [it] is conducive to human well-being […];

(3) the security response must be appropriate, which is to say that (a) the security response must be measured in accordance with the capabilities of the aggressor and (b) the securitizing actor must be sincere in his or her intentions.”\textsuperscript{115} In that respect, a critically induced securitisation analysis gains from drawing on emancipatory realism (Welsh School) which places the notion of human security at the centre of its argument. Constituting a people-centred approach to security, it promotes an “understanding of security that is focused explicitly on the well-being and welfare of individuals rather than on the protection of states exclusively.”\textsuperscript{116} Ken Booth argues that “[e]mancipation, not power or order, produces true security.”\textsuperscript{117} While heavily (and justifiably) criticised for its analytic immaturity and utopian conception, a critical analysis of security practice can benefit from the idea of ‘security-as-emancipation’ in two ways: Firstly, emancipatory realism does not adhere to a pre-defined and universal understanding of security, but prioritises the perceived insecurities of “real people in real places”.\textsuperscript{118} This is reflected in the fact that it recognises the individual as the “irreducible unit of political life

\textsuperscript{114} Floyd, Rita (2007b): p. 337.
\textsuperscript{116} Vaughan-Williams, Nick; Peoples, Columba (2014): p. 120.
and thus the ultimate referent of security.”\textsuperscript{119} What is more, it perceives of itself as “a form of praxis committed to political change – specifically, the transformation of arrangements that are implicated in the (re-)production of insecurities.”\textsuperscript{120} That is, it pursues a politically motivated reconstructive agenda that engages in immanent critique to criticise underlying power structures. A conceptual symbiosis of both the Copenhagen School and emancipatory realism paves the way for a structured and meticulous analysis of security politics (securitisation theory), while drawing on normative guidance from the Welsh School, thus enabling the critical researcher to be politically motivated and yet prevent inflated political involvement/advocacy. This is trivial because “[e]ffective challenges can only be indirect, by analyzing the conditions \textsuperscript{121} under which a discourse is given, rather than directly arguing for the de-securitisation of an issue/referent object.

While there are further responsibilities of the critical analyst left undiscussed by securitisation theory, including the task of emphasising counter-hegemonic alternatives by seeking out those voices muted by the dominant discourse on security, these will not be touched upon here because it would exceed the scope of this dissertation.

\textbf{Chapter Four: Case study – Rio’s pacification strategy}

\textbf{VII. A critical reflection of the power-knowledge nexus}

The analysis that follows in this section will investigate to what extent the pacification strategy contributes to preserve existing power structures and promote the elites’ interests by revealing and critically examining the institutionalised \textit{power-knowledge} nexus which substantiates the underlying process of securitisation. In that regard, it seeks to make explicit the impact of the underlying historical and socio-political fundament that underscores the pacification programme. The critical researcher’s principal aim enabling an immanent critique is to “develop self-consciousness about the rootedness of discourse in common-sense assumptions”\textsuperscript{122}, tracing the discursively constructed social reality to non-discursive elements. This relates to expounding a discourse’s veiled ideology constituting “an ‘implicit

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.: p. 351.
\end{flushleft}
philosophy’ in the practical activities of social life, backgrounded and taken for granted”.

It is, in a sense, the fundament of a given discursive practice, and substantiates the securitising actors’ power position. Crucially, ideology nurtures and naturalises relations of domination. According to Frank Lovett, domination can be understood as “a condition experienced by persons or groups to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them”. That condition itself is enshrined structurally and/or institutionally; it manifests itself thorough subordination of some by virtue of the practices of others. Domination ultimately constitutes the groundwork for the exercise of hegemony.

As concerns empirical examination, Teun van Dijk notes that “the relation between ideologies and discourse is complex and often quite indirect” because actors may choose to conceal true intentions for strategic reasons; “discourse is not always ideologically transparent, and discourse analysis does not always allow us to infer what people’s ideological beliefs are.”

In fact, “[i]deology is most effective when its workings are least visible” because “[i]f one becomes aware that a particular aspect of common sense is sustaining power inequalities at one’s own expense, it ceases to be common sense, and may cease to have the capacity to sustain power inequalities, i.e. to function ideological.” This is where critical discourse analysis is helpful, providing for the examination of both factors inherent of a text (internal relations) – how the text is constructed – as well as social, structural factors (external relations) which impact on the text’s framing. Broadly drawing on Norman Fairclough’s research framework for critical discourse which extends to “explaining [...] the relationship between interaction and social context”, it is the task of the researcher to make explicit ideological assumptions of the securitising discourse through supplementing text analysis with “sociopolitical and genealogical/historical research” because “[c]ategories of domination [...] are typically grounded [...] on legitimations of history, which accord powers

---

123 Ibid.: p. 84.
to certain strata of a society on the basis of historical precedents”\textsuperscript{131}, that is common-sensical practices “originate in the dominant class” and become “naturalized” \textsuperscript{132} over time. Accordingly, retracing Brazil’s socio-cultural legacy and placing particular emphasis on the origin of its peculiar notion of citizenship is of utmost importance given that “[e]litism is so ingrained in Brazilian politics and ideology that often even classic pluralist mechanisms and processes act to reinforce power monopolies.”\textsuperscript{133} The following socio-historical account is a prerequisite for a sound securitising discourse analysis, ultimately serving the purpose of uncovering the “power behind discourse” asserting that “the whole social order of discourse is put together and held together as a hidden effect of power.”\textsuperscript{134}

\textbf{VII.I A genealogic account of Brazil’s hereditary elitism and peculiar notion of citizenship}

\textbf{VII.I.1 The notion of citizenship}

The notion of citizenship dates back to antiquity; it "has been a key aspect of Western political thinking since the formation of classical Greek political culture."\textsuperscript{135} Its contemporary conceptualisation, however, is related to more recent historical developments – particularly the French Revolution – which brought about the advent of profound social and political upheavals, including secularisation, increasing urbanisation, and the notion of public space.\textsuperscript{136} From the point of view of constitutional law, citizenship bears legal status in that it entitles its holders to rights and duties as members of a political community within a demarcated territory – the nation-state.\textsuperscript{137} Concurrently, it can be seen as a “socio-political identity” in that it entails “civic virtues, an attitude of the citizens towards their status and the relationship to others and to the State implied in it.”\textsuperscript{138} The latter notion indicates that the study of citizenship should not be limited to its purely legalistic conceptualisation, but be related to the dynamic process of nation-building. The main focal point then “is to investigate historically and ethnographically how a citizenship problematizes the equalization and the

\textsuperscript{131} Holston, James (2008): Contesting privilege with right: the transformation of differentiated citizenship in Brazil, In: Citizenship Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, p. 335.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.: pp. vii-viii.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.: p. 440.
compensation of prior differences and deals with the problems of justice and politics that result."139 This is of particular importance because in Brazil the “culture of subordination – especially as it concerns racial, ethnic, and class differentiations — has a deep and significant historical continuity”.140

**VIII.I.11 From colonial rule to independence: Perpetuating elitism**

It is pivotal to trace back the origin of a Brazilian conceptualisation of citizenship to the period that followed the country’s independence it gained in 1822 from its Portuguese colonial rulers, leading to the country’s first Imperial Constitution that was adopted in 1824. Significantly, Brazil’s independence was not the product of widespread popular rejection against the prevailing, socio-economically polarizing colonial system; “popular forces were in any case weak – and divided by class, color, and legal status”.141 It was much rather encouraged and driven by disproportionately few influential plantation owners (fazendeiros), merchants, and bureaucrats who sought to secure their political and economic interests in view of a politically detached, new country by retaining those structures conducive to their socio-economic benefit.142 The project of nation-building was in fact a highly divisive undertaking; white (descendants of) Europeans were considered apt for hard work and thus essential for the future of the nation, while those of African and Indian descendence as well as the poor more generally were excluded due to their “moral and physical inaptness”.143 Known as *crioulos*, the direct descendants of Portuguese colonists who spearheaded the quest for Brazilian independence “received, adapted, and transformed the Enlightenment and revolutionary ideas coming from France and North America, and blended them with the authoritarian, conservative, and Catholic Spanish and Portuguese traditions.”144 That is, they publicly proclaimed to progressive, egalitarian ideals while adhering to long-established, highly aristocratic practices. Bearing profound elitist marks, this was reflected in the political

---

142 Ibid.: pp. 16-17.
structure that succeeded colonial rule: While the majority of their fellow Latin American countries opted for a Republican model of government, Dom Pedro I – son of King João VI of Portugal and immediate successor to the throne – headed the newly installed Empire of Brazil. Failing to implicate a substantial part of the populace, the transition from colonial rule to empire was ultimately marked by socio-political and economic continuity\(^{145}\), preserving a highly hierarchical social order which was built on widespread slavery. In fact, it is estimated that around 30 per cent of the Brazilian population were slaves of African descent. It was not until 1889 that – as the last out of all Latin American countries – Brazil transitioned to a, at least nominally, more democratic political structure which came to be known as the República Velha. A process which was accompanied by the official abolition of slavery in 1888 (again, later than any other country in its vicinity), the first Brazilian Republic did in fact perpetuate the elitist characteristics of the empire, however. Initiated by means of a coup which was headed by Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca and involved army officers and landowners involved in the production and merchandising of coffee, the country was subjugated to the oligarchic rule of a few to the detriment of the large majority.

The elite realised that “[d]iscretionary citizenship afforded […] the opportunity to turn rights that should have been universal into a source of patronage and personalistic political bargains.”\(^{146}\) In the 1850’s, roughly 10 per cent of the then-10 million Brazilians were eligible to vote, this right extending to “men […] who were twenty five years old (twenty-one if married), Catholic, born free, and with a quite low annual income from property, trade, or employment […], including many of quite modest means, those who were illiterate, and even blacks”.\(^{147}\) While this figure representing political participation did indeed surpass that of many European countries at the time, state authorities arranged for the severe curbing of political rights in light of imminent abolition of slavery in the late 1880’s; fearing the loss of influence due to this vast influx of future right holders, the right to vote was extended to include even former slaves, but concurrently coupled to the ability to read and write, thereby effectively precluding more than 80 per cent of the population from the exertion of that right.\(^{148}\) Leaving the elite privileged once again, it is observed that “[l]iberalism may have been

\(^{148}\) Ibid.: p. 6.
the dominant ideology in nineteenth-century Brazil, but [...] it was liberalism of a predominantly and increasingly conservative variety as it was forced to adjust to the realities of an authoritarian political culture, economic underdevelopment, and, most of all, a society deeply stratified (and along racial lines).”

Restricting political citizenship by means of literacy rates and gender while refusing the right to education to overcome codified hurdles and take part in political life equates to an “enactment of proportional inequality,” implicitly justifying the unequal treatment of some while favouring others. Despite progressive expansion of rights to political participation, it was still until 1985 that only those able to read and write were entitled the right to vote and hold elected office.

**VII.I.III Modernisation and discretionary awarding of social rights**

No historical period stands more emblematic for modernisation than the de facto dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas who served as President of Brazil from 1930 until 1945, a period which came to be known as the *Estado Novo* – or New State. Enacting a highly populist style of governance, the Vargas era promoted social rights to an hitherto unknown extent; known as the ‘father of the nation’, it was his proclaimed aim to “incorporate the subaltern classes into a bourgeois order.”

According to his legal foundations, however, “citizenship was not a birthright [...] but a privilege won through narrowly circumscribed forms of labor, morality, and bureaucratic agility.” As such, social rights were deeply intertwined with the urban labour market; only certain types of formal job contracts enabled workers to benefit from the newly installed social benefits, including “[h]ealth assistance, sickness and maternity leaves, pension funds, retirement benefits, and all other existing forms of social protection,” leaving those without access to the formal labour market (which often resided in the countryside and urban peripheries) disadvantaged. That is, those activities “that were not recognized by the law and belonged to the informal sector were practiced by ‘pre-citizens’.”

The state thus implemented a hierarchy of citizenship categories, "consecrat[ing]..."
in practice the inequality of welfare benefits given to occupationally defined, stratified categories of citizens."\textsuperscript{156} Wanderley dos Santos refers here to the notion of “regulated citizenship”, indicating that an individual’s rights hinged upon his/her place in the productive process.\textsuperscript{157} While labour unions emerged as the first autonomous organisations of civil society, they were increasingly knitted into an ever-closer relationship with the state, forcefully forfeiting their intermediary function and adding to the public authorities’ power leverage.\textsuperscript{158} Because political and civic rights were widely suppressed, it is concluded that “social citizenship becomes the fragile daughter of the benevolent authority.”\textsuperscript{159} Based on the ideological triad of nationalism (“[a]ll sectors of society were part and parcel of the national body, regulated and protected by the state”), statism (“the state steers development and is also an economic actor”), and developmentalism (“the belief that planning and adequate political will would assure continuous prosperity”), the Vargas-era paved the way for a paternalistic conceptualisation of state control which charged itself with the modernisation of the country.\textsuperscript{160} The route towards modernisation, then, was installed authoritatively from above; this hegemonic ideology was conceived as imperative for the welfare of the state, implicitly “justifying the high inequality levels that traditionally characterize social distribution in Brazil”\textsuperscript{161}, and that are still palpable today.

\textbf{VII.I.IV Military dictatorship and democratisation}

That broadband advances in matters of citizenship were not achieved under military rule is self-explanatory. With the advent of the military dictatorship that headed the Brazilian state from 1964 until 1985, efforts were once again directed at disseminating and generalising access to social rights to paint the picture of a care-taking state; this was done inter alia by unifying the welfare system and extending it to include workforces in the extensive rural areas

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.: pp. 171-172.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.: p. 190.
of the country.\textsuperscript{162} Perpetuating the hitherto dominant “culture of the gift”\textsuperscript{163}, it appears reasonable to assume that the ruling elite considered this to be an indispensable compensation vis-à-vis the already severely stunted yet further restricted political and civic rights. Not surprisingly, the military regime adhered to the prevailing ideological foundation which was based on nationalism and economic development, intertwining highly authoritarian rule with solidarity to enact what can be called a ruling in the style of state corporatism.\textsuperscript{164} It is also here that the highly militarised nature of Brazil’s approach to public security finds its origin. The notion of ‘national security’ was put at the centre of interest, politicising and bringing to public scrutiny the theme of social control: The newly formulated doctrine of national security implicitly authorised the deployment of militarised action in domestic contexts for safeguarding national security.\textsuperscript{165} This has been a recurring pattern not only in Brazil but the whole of Latin America until the present day – Rio’s pacification programme is no exception here.

In conformity with Brazil’s hitherto expounded political pathway, the incipient democratisation process of the late 1980’s was again initiated and steered from above. And the \textit{Nova República} (New Republic) is, for this very reason, “compromised by its origins”, because it was erected on precisely those authoritarian structures it had set out to replace.\textsuperscript{166} This becomes apparent by contemplating the revised constitution of 1988 which provides for “organic communitarian and liberal-individualistic principles” which are “often at odds with one another”.\textsuperscript{167} While Brazil’s political institutions have determinedly mastered the transition towards the democratic rule of law, “the civil component of citizenship remains seriously impaired as citizens suffer systematic violation of their rights.”\textsuperscript{168} That is, deviances between proclaimed democratic principles and actual enactment of state authority are pervasive.\textsuperscript{169} By referring to differential treatment within the criminal justice system of Brazilian citizens according to their ethnic background, Michael Mitchell and Charles Wood

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{162} Ibid.: p. 177.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Goirand, Camille (2003): p. 229.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Reis, Elisa P. (2000): p. 171.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Bethell, Leslie (2000): pp. 21-22.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Reis, Elisa P. (2000): p. 179.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
have highlighted how social status defines social relations in Brazil rather than membership within a political community, that is citizenship per se.\textsuperscript{170} This has led Roberto da Matta to reinforce the notion of “relational citizenship”, conveying the idea that “the respect for individual privileges heavily depends on the individual's social standing relative to others involved in a particular interaction.”\textsuperscript{171} Full citizenship as understood by Thomas H. Marshall (political, civil, and social rights) is in fact only granted to a small minority of the country, de facto creating a “privileged caste”\textsuperscript{172} – a circumstance which is paralleled by the socio-economic exclusion of most Brazilians.\textsuperscript{173} As has been portrayed, this asymmetric conceptualisation and implementation of Brazilian citizenship is “deeply embedded in a centuries-long tradition that survived the collapse of empire and the construction of modern cities, labor systems, and formally democratic institutions.”\textsuperscript{174} Maria Celia Paoli concludes that “the rule of law’ has already been historically eroded by dictatorships and by the astonishing visibility of the elite’s privileges in manipulating the law, which has frequently produced both situations of impunity and visibly inoperative judicial intervention.”\textsuperscript{175} The myth of racial democracy often reiterated by state authorities is, in fact, just that: a myth.\textsuperscript{176}

\textit{VII.I.V The naturalisation of unequal treatment from an arbitrary state}

Brazil has neither witnessed popular upheavals nor extensive land reforms or any other kind of broadband movement that was aimed at breaking the authoritarian-elitist structures the country has inherited and perpetuated from its colonial past. It has never been grappled by social revolution the likes which were enacted including in quasi next-door countries such as Mexico; in fact, “there has been remarkably little popular mobilization of any kind for political and social change”\textsuperscript{177} throughout its history. In stark contrast to the developmental process of countries such as France where civic, political, and social rights were arduously ‘conquered’ from below, “citizenship in Brazil was [...] not “conquered” from below, but “given” from above”.\textsuperscript{178} Constituting a ‘patronising’ model of citizenship which was arbitrarily bestowed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170} Ibid.: p. 1006.
\item \textsuperscript{171} Ibid.: pp. 1005-1006.
\item \textsuperscript{172} Reis, Elisa P. (2000): p. 179.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Iturrealde, Manuel (2010): p. 332.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Hagopian, Francis (2011): p. 219.
\item \textsuperscript{175} Paoli, Maria Celia (1992): p. 153.
\item \textsuperscript{176} von Sinner, Rudolf (2015): p. 441.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Bethell, Leslie (2000): p. 16.
\item \textsuperscript{178} von Sinner, Rudolf (2015): p. 443.
\end{itemize}
onto the population by an elite which continuously sought to sustain its privileged position vis-à-vis the less privileged ones, it is based on a maxim of justice and equality echoed in Rui Barbosa’s formulation: “‘Justice consists in treating the equal equally and the unequal unequally according to the measure of their inequality.’”\textsuperscript{179} This implies that “a just distribution is generally an unequal one.”\textsuperscript{180} That is, the Brazilian notion of equality is intrinsically linked to proportionality in that “a proportionally equal distribution to people who are unequal [...] would have to be unequal to be fair.”\textsuperscript{181} What is highly worrisome is that this notion of justice as encountered and implemented in historical and contemporary Brazil “not only legalizes new inequality but also reinforces existing social inequalities by rewarding them”\textsuperscript{182} – elite inequality culminates in privilege because upper-class citizens are entitled to priority treatment because of their social status. By the same token, those at the bottom of the hierarchical rights structure experience prejudicial and discriminatory action directed at them. This socio-cultural ‘genetic material’ resonates deeply within the contemporary state, informing virtually all power structures, including the executive, judicial, legislative, and educational dimension of modern-day Brazil. While it can be asserted that the modern Brazilian state does function in a democratic manner as concerns the procedural dimension (holding free elections, for instance), the public sector fails to “protect and promote a broader set of democratic rights of citizens”\textsuperscript{183} however. Almost macabrely, this citizenship model conveys the idea of adhering to universal principles – it applies to all Brazilians irrespective of their colour, race, or religion. It is, therefore, “inclusive in membership”, as James Holston points out, but “massively inegalitarian in the distribution of rights and resources.”\textsuperscript{184} This observation bears explanatory power in that it reveals why Brazilian society is strongly cohesive, why the sense of national solidarity and ‘feeling Brazilian’ is highly prominent, despite the existence of exorbitant socio-economic differences and strained racial relations. Ultimately, scholars interested in Brazilian history have come to the sobering realisation that

\textsuperscript{179} Hagopian, Francis (2011): p. 222.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.: p. 339.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.: p. 339.
"citizenship became a vessel for every imaginable hope, and its lack became the explanation for every ill".\textsuperscript{185}

In an effort to connect Brazil’s socio-cultural legacy with discourse, Fairclough calls attention to the assertion that “if a discourse type so dominates an institution that dominated types are more or less entirely suppressed or contained, then it will cease to be seen as arbitrary (in the sense of being one among several possible ways of ‘seeing’ things) and will come to be seen as natural, and legitimate because it is simply the way of conducting oneself.”\textsuperscript{186} This paves the way for a process of “naturalization of a discourse type”\textsuperscript{187}; it corresponds precisely to the ideological dimension that underlies any discursive practice within Brazil that the researcher has sought to portray. Based on the country’s persistent and unquestioned authoritarian alignment which portrayed the national state as guarantor for welfare and security and thereby granted the elite broadband leeway for action, forgers of this peculiar notion of citizenship have persistently payed lip service to liberal ideals of democratic equality while concurrently enacting practices that were based on perpetuating social inequalities by privileging those already privileged. This became possible because there is an implicit, historically grown and somewhat enforced consensus among Brazilians that (a) unlike in many democratically consolidated states where social contract theory envisages the surrender of some of the citizens’ freedoms in exchange for the guaranteed protection of their rights, in Brazil the state is not intrinsically bound to serve all its citizens equally but allows for the arbitrary distribution and application of rights and privileges (“culture of the gift”), this being based on the premise that (b) inequality legitimises disproportional treatment, i.e. those considered unequal receive unequal treatment, this being considered just and fair. Over the course of its historical development, Brazilian political elites have entrenched a social hierarchy that allows for the marginalisation of particular social groups. This is of relevance with regard to the securitising discourse because it predefines “the means through which political claims are asserted and legitimized.”\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.: p. 91.
VIII. Empirical research: How is the militarised occupation of the favelas justified discursively?

Coming to view ‘security’ as a political technology that stands at risk of being manipulated and abused, the following analysis is aimed at examining how the securitised issue is being framed by the securitising actor(s), the act of framing relating to the particular way of discursively “represent[ing] the entities that populate the (natural and social) world.” In conformity with securitisation’s conceptual framework which adheres to the assumption that elites possess structural advantages over elevating an issue into the realm of security politics and based on above outlined Brazilian political culture, this dissertation is interested in analysing how top-down relations of dominance are mirrored in speech acts. This is of relevance because a defining feature of political discourse consists in its one-dimensionality, involving “hidden relations of power.” More concretely, what the critical researcher seeks to uncover is how elites engage in manipulation constituting “a discursive form of elite power reproduction that is against the best interests of dominated groups and (re)produces social inequality.” This mechanism underpins the discursive conveyance of what Didier Bigo calls “authority of truth”, having as its purpose “the control of the shared social representations of groups of people”.

Because securitisation theory holds that meaning is produced intersubjectively, what is needed to mediate between micro- and macrolevels of society is the incorporation of social cognition into discourse analysis given that it helps to “explain the production as well as the understanding and influence of dominant text and talk”, that is relating text to interaction and social context. Relating to how knowledge is produced and steered, the securitising speeches draw on and concomitantly shape/entrench specific social representations. Social representations are “stable, more permanent, general and socially shared beliefs” upon which securitising actors seek to appeal in their discourse to foster legitimacy because the

190 Ibid.: p. 49.
success of an attempt at securitising an issue relies on the audience’s acceptance (or at least acquiescence). More specifically, the emitter of a speech act seeks to influence the audience’s “formation, activation and uses of mental models in episodic memory”\textsuperscript{196} by “looking for ideational elements within the cultural universe of the target group”.\textsuperscript{197} That is, an issue is framed in a way that easily digestible “interpretative packages”\textsuperscript{198} are delivered to the audience which facilitates their acceptance (or acquiescence) of a securitising move. This is because “[w]hether a condition is a social problem hinges, by definition, on whether a sizeable part of the public accepts it as one.”\textsuperscript{199}

Accordingly, the discursive construction of an existential threat must fulfil certain requirements in order to persuade and convince the audience. The following table provides an overview:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Securitizing Actor → Existential threat → Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dimensions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resonance (felicity conditions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Figure 1}\textsuperscript{200}: Securitising discourse and social cognition.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{196}Ibid.: p. 367.
\item \textsuperscript{197}Carvalho Pinto, Vânia (2014): Exploring the interplay between Framing and Securitization theory: the case of the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain, In: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol. 57, No. 1, p. 165.
\item \textsuperscript{198}Ibid.: p. 165.
\item \textsuperscript{199}Edelman, Murray (1988): p. 32.
\end{itemize}
Resonance of a securitising discourse is achieved through credibility and salience, which in turn hinge upon consistency (whether an argument is coherent), empirical credibility (whether an argument corresponds with the audience’s concerns), the credibility of the articulator(s) (whether the securitising actor possesses required authority and legitimacy), as well as centrality (how pressing the audience considers the problem to be), experiential commensurability (whether it links with the target group’s social representation of the world), and narrative fidelity (whether it connects to the audience’s ideational elements). Some scholars have argued that “the audience is not an analytical concept, but rather a normative concept in analytical disguise, which is to say that it does not stem from actual empirical observation of how politics operates but rather from Ole Wæver’s view of how politics […] should be done.” While this may hold true especially in authoritarian contexts, that is where democratic practices are not profoundly consolidated, it is nevertheless of fundamental importance to connect the securitising speech acts with their social context because a certain degree of resonance is to be achieved by the securitising actor’s speech act for the securitising audience to at least acquiesce to implemented measures.

It appears reasonable to assume that a reiteration of linguistic acts associated with a securitising discourse may be encountered, serving the purpose of fostering and underscoring legitimation for a specific course of action. Such is the case with Rio’s pacification strategy which, since its initial implementation in 2008, continually receives discursively constructed endorsement and legitimacy to this day due to it – as official rhetoric suggests – not being of temporary but permanent nature. The subsequently analysed speech acts are thematically interwoven and can be considered as being constitutive of a common securitising discourse surrounding the implementation of the UPPs. Importantly, given the investigatory aim of this dissertation which places particular emphasis on connecting the said with the social by seeking to reveal instances of domination, and because it would exceed the scope of it, the researcher discards detailed linguistic analysis, prioritising the study of the securitising speech acts’ content instead. The focus lies on the question of how social identities are being assigned by the securitising actors. Here, both discursive representation and identification will be

---


examined: Representation refers to the manner in which certain types of people (or actions, etc.) are portrayed across the text. Identification, in turn, describes an interpersonal dimension – revealing attitudes of the author of a textual production towards elements depicted in his/her elaboration. The discursively conveyed legitimation for the pacification strategy will be placed into context with afore-retraced ideological assumptions.

VIII.1 The ‘city at war’ – Political ‘othering’ and the discursive creation of an internal enemy

Regrettably, violence needs to be considered “a central feature in the evolution of Latin American societies”204, the region having a “legacy of terror, of violence, of fear.”205 It constitutes a key element flowing throughout its history, having accompanied the phases of nation-building, so-called ‘democratic consolidation’, and adjustment to neoliberal market requirements in a globalised context. Because violence is ever-present, politicians often place the fight against crime at the heart of their electoral campaigns. Upon assumption of office in 2007, newly elected State Governor of Rio de Janeiro Sérgio Cabral uttered the following statement in the course of his inaugurational ceremony:

“Our government will win the war against these criminals. We will ensure the safety of our population […]. And our government will not falter.”206

In light of Rio’s crime statistics, this statement appears hardly surprising. Yet, the lexical choice made here is interesting because Brazil is not an officially declared ‘war’ zone. A war requires, by definition, the existence of an opposing enemy; being historically consistent with previous governments who likewise declared an unofficial state of war, Cabral’s announcement bears significant informative value in that it serves the function of assigning blame. Then-Secretary of Public Security of the State of Rio de Janeiro and co-initiator of the UPP programme, José Mariano Beltrame, elaborates on this statement, declaring in an interview that he gave to Brazilian newspaper Extra on 29th of July 2008:

205 Ibid.: p. 2.
“We have here a legion of excluded people who do not know the state. They do not know what the law is. This is a culture that the marginal often carries from the womb of his mother. He lives, he sees armed people on the street, with grenades, with revolvers. [emphasis the author’s]”

Beltrame’s statement carries both ‘representational’ and ‘identificatory’ elements. The Secretary of Public Security portrays ‘the criminal’ as pertaining to a ‘legion’ (martial terminology) that is intrinsically bad, having adopted the culture of violence ‘from the womb of his mother’. His statement insinuates that change in behaviour is precluded due to it being innate and therefore discards any responsibility on the side of the state for the emergence and perseverance of (lethal) violence within the city. This line of argumentation is in fact dominant in Brazilian political discourse and Latin America more broadly. Confirming this, amidst extensive joint police and military operations implemented throughout a group of favelas, Beltrame declared in 2010:

“The Alemão (a complex of favelas situated in Rio’s North Zone, author’s clarification) was the heart of evil. It is an emblematic place for all of Rio de Janeiro where we encountered a conglomeration of marginals who hid there. [emphasis the author’s]”

The hitherto expounded discourse not only assigns blame but praise as well: State action is portrayed as a necessity in the fight against ‘evil’ personified in the form of the ‘marginal’, thus legitimising military action. This line of argumentation is in fact pervasive throughout the years. On 26th of January 2015, that is in full progress of the implementation of the pacification programme, Beltrame reiterated the authorities’ stance in an interview conducted via telephone by GloboNews and published by G1 Globo – a Brazilian news portal maintained by Grupo Globo:

“This is the nature of this very nation of criminals that was created in Rio de Janeiro. I say a nation of criminals because they are people who follow a criminal


ideology, they are people who have an aversion, a total disrespect for human life, and are people who have an idolatry for weapons. And inside their strongholds that are not yet occupied [by the UPPs, author’s deduction] they effectively make use of these weapons as if they were using any other type of object, causing the death of innocent people outside the criminal empire they command.”

In the interview, Beltrame addresses the problem of criminality within the state of Rio de Janeiro; he explicitly designates a culprit for its perseverance by categorising and homogenising people involved in criminal activity calling them a “very nation of criminals”, painting an abstract imagery of a monolithic form of a group of human beings that evokes feelings of strangeness and alienation. The notion of “nation” implying cultural otherness, he buttresses this sensation by evoking a clear-cut us-them dichotomy, and by ascribing degenerative characteristics to the politically “othered”. The speaker applies discursive “techniques for managing fear and the social distribution of ‘bad’” as Bigo notes, in that criminals are linked to the purposeful act of ‘causing death’ of ‘innocent people’. Moreover, in what appears to constitute a process of de-humanisation of the targeted group, the text recalls that criminals “have an aversion, a total disrespect for human life, and are people who have an idolatry for weapons.” In a sense, rhetoric effect trumps logical coherence (implying that human beings have an aversion for human life, for instance). This serves the function of demonising the discursively excluded, rendering them ontologically different from the non-criminal citizen. The lexical choice is of interest here because it reinforces this notion of estrangement: attributing an idiosyncratic ‘ideology’ and ‘idolatry’ to criminals who control their own ‘strongholds’ bears witness of discursively constructed exclusionary practice. In lockstep with the discursive construction of the ‘different criminal’, Beltrame implies that the targeted audience pertains to the same category as the speaker himself: the genuine, honest, honourable, and ‘innocent’ people, who find themselves ‘existentially threatened’.

212 Degenhardt, Teresa (2013): The overlap between war and crime: unpacking Foucault and Agamben’s studies within the context of the war on terror, In: Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 36-38.
A final example will be provided by considering a public speech given by the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Michel Temer, on 16th of February 2018 in which he ordered and justified the federal intervention of the armed forces in the state of Rio de Janeiro. This indicates that the here presented attitude and securitising discourse drawn thereon corresponds not only to the state level but is in fact consistent throughout the federal republic:

“Organised crime almost took over the state of Rio de Janeiro. It is a metastasis that spreads through the country and threatens the tranquillity of our people. [...] We cannot passively accept the death of innocents, and it is intolerable that we are burying families and mothers, workers, police officers, juveniles, and children, and seeing entire neighbourhoods being located under the sight of rifles and avenues transformed into trenches. [...] Our penitentiaries will no longer be business offices for bandits. Nor will our public places continue to be ballrooms for organised crime. [...] Disorder, we all know, is the worst of wars. We have begun a battle in which our only way can be success [...] Therefore, we who have already safeguarded the progress of our country and who have withdrawn, as you all know, the country out of the worst recession of its history, we will now restore order.”

Temer’s speech draws thematically on Beltrame’s verbal articulation, evoking a sensation of national sense of solidarity that is sustained through dramatisation and bellicose rhetoric of almost epic dimension. Stating that “organised crime almost took over the state of Rio de Janeiro” and speaking of “entire neighbourhoods being located under the sight of rifles and avenues transformed into trenches”, Temer engages in a clearly identifiable attempt at securitisation in which he evokes feelings of emergency. By making use of vivid rhetoric that reinforces this notion of urgency – a “metastasis” being a pathogenic agent which ‘spreads’ to the rest of hitherto ‘healthy’ society – the Brazilian President fosters Beltrame’s dualistic conception of Brazilian society, delimitating criminals from “our people”. Concurrently, in what reveals the identificatory dimension of this text, state authorities are displayed as possessing the capacity to avert the identified threat; “we will now restore order” is constructed against an historical precedent which portrays the state as the guarantor for security. “Disorder” is put on a level with “war” and vivid mental pictures reinforcing this

chaotic perception of social reality are drawn by suggesting that public space is/was controlled by “bandits” and put to absurd use (“ballrooms”). By making the claim that a “battle” is rendered necessary in which “success” must be achieved, Temer implies that his government possesses the knowledge necessary to achieve a favourable outcome; it is here that the securitising actor seeks to gain legitimacy for a course of action as proposed by him/her.

The here presented discursive pattern evokes the notion that an imminent threat has been identified, rendering necessary immediate action to avert that danger. These textual passages clearly constitute what has been termed ‘securitising moves’ by ‘securitising actors’, whereby the latter seek to declare an issue as an existential problem. This perception is fostered by portraying a Schmittian-induced conceptualisation of the political order, evoking images of enmity and a friend-foe modality. The texts are indisputably centred around an antagonising logic, driving a seemingly irredeemable wedge between two discursively produced and diametrically opposed types of entities.

The above depicted table illustrates that a set of requirements precede the successful securitisation of an issue. Generally, historical continuity of the discourse underscores its consistency. Because the discourse is uttered throughout all levels of government – from the municipal to state and federal level – the credibility of the articulator(s) is likewise ensured. Their political authority places them as what Bigo terms “security professionals” which reinforces the notion “that security is an ‘explanation’ [...] and not a discourse to be challenged.”

Discursively conveyed generalisation (creating a monolithic group of ‘inherently bad criminals’ who ‘have an aversion for human life’ and ‘spread’ throughout society like a ‘metastasis’) and polarisation (‘bad criminals’ versus ‘innocent people’) can be regarded as techniques that correspond to the securitising actors’ “capacity to create ‘truth’ regarding threats and the ability [to] depict what are deemed the necessary means to manage such threats”. These manipulative techniques serve the function of generating resonance through bridge-building between discursive practice and socially shared meaning.

Rio’s social tissue is characterised by extreme social polarisation which manifests itself most

---

visibly socio-spatially: gated communities and secured shopping malls – “golden prisons” – contrast with metal-plated huts and innumerous informal settlements – the favelas. This socio-spatial arrangement informs much of daily life in the city, fostering estrangement between social classes while upholding the ‘fear of the other’; this applies particularly to upper-class citizens who fear the lower-class for which the favelas stand emblematically. High levels of crime invariably focus collective attention on the routines of daily life, placing particular emphasis on the threat to personal physical integrity.

Induced by historically derived and perpetuated segmentation of the social tissue that results in ubiquitous fear of urban, violent crime, the discursive reinforcement of the notion of a city being at war against an internal enemy conveys a particular reflection of social reality – that does not have to correspond with ‘objective’ reality – and that transforms crime “from [being] an occasional possibility to an institutionalized part of everyday life.” The securitising actors build on and instrumentalise ‘urban violence’ as a social representation which practically and morally orientates the courses of action that residents – as isolated individuals or collectively – deem appropriate and necessary (narrative fidelity). The securitising discourse exploits this fear, serving the purpose of objectifying the abstract, provoking panic among the population. It draws on and propagates what Teresa Caldeira has coined the “talk of crime” which expresses the idea that sheer omnipresent fear of falling victim to ubiquitous urban crime is constantly reiterated throughout society, “mak[ing] fear circulate and proliferate”. The discourse connects to the world view of the target group (experiential commensurability), draws on existing problems as perceived by that group (empirical credibility), and moves it into the populace’s cognitive foreground by discursively reinforcing a “culture of fear” (elevating it to constitute a top priority on the scale of

This propagates a “[s]ocial Darwinistic perspective of individuals”\textsuperscript{223}, consolidating already persistent social fissions in “societies of fear”\textsuperscript{224} with “citizens of fear”.\textsuperscript{225}

In his analysis which is concerned with authoritarian regimes in the South Cone, Lechner uncovers a “paradoxical effect” which can readily be transferred to post-dictatorial Brazil: “a dictatorship increases the demand for security, which then feeds the desire for a \textit{mano dura} (strong hand).”\textsuperscript{226} In line with what the author terms the ‘authoritarian appropriation of fears’, the securitising actors sell the idea that evil (represented by the nations ‘internal enemy’) can only be overcome by military force (constituting the good), thus effectively stifling public debate by a-politicising and \textit{securitising} the issue. The application of force as proposed remedy is made widely acceptable as it reinforces the “popular belief that the defeat of a dangerous enemy [...] will improve the general standard of living”.\textsuperscript{227} The audience is persuaded into supporting the “good causes and leaders and to oppose enemies”, in turn “encourag[ing] acceptance of the stable social structures and [inherent] inequalities”\textsuperscript{228} because legitimacy and authority are granted to the securitising actor – the state – to avert the identified threat. For the sake of ensuring public security and fighting those responsible for its absence, the terrified population accepts drastic remedies and demands punitive action to attend to the imminent danger posed by violent crime. The militarisation of public security management is acquiesced because the securitising discourse resonates deeply with the target audience. In fact, the here implemented discursive strategy is not novel; it has tradition in Latin American contexts where “toughness on crime” serves as electoral promise.\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Punitive populism} – “the idea that public support for more severe criminal justice policies [...] has become a primary driver of policy making”\textsuperscript{230} – draws on the constant rearticulation of a discourse that co-produces and legitimises the implicit proclamation of a quasi-permanent state of emergency. As mentioned, Sérgio Cabral, Rio Governor at the time of the UPPs’

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Meeks, Daryl (2006): p. 35.}
\footnote{Lechner, Norbert (1992): pp. 26-27.}
\footnote{Iturralde, Manuel (2010): p. 323.}
\end{footnotes}
forging, promised to fight crime by military means and secure the city’s favelas in his electoral campaign of 2006, which he won with a stunning 68 per cent.⁵²³

To be clear, it is not the intent of this dissertation to belittle Rio’s precarious public security condition, nor to suggest that the threat potential posed by criminals and drug trafficking agents in particular is entirely unfounded. However, it is the objective here to highlight the institutionalised position of authority that grants the securitising actors broad leeway over the production and steering of knowledge within Brazilian society. To cite Edelman once again: "Problems come into discourse and therefore into existence as reinforcements of ideologies [...]. They signify who are virtuous and useful and who are dangerous or inadequate [...]. They constitute people as subjects".⁵²² Portraying the criminal as ontologically different is historically consistent with political practice in Brazil, this discursive construction of an ‘internal enemy’ legitimising military action by the state. In fact, to the Brazilian populace the discursive creation of an internal enemy does not appear as socially produced, but is much rather common-sensical, having undergone a process of “naturalization of subject positions”.⁵²³ Giorgio Agamben calls attention to the here revealed “structure of the ban in the political relations and public spaces”⁵²⁴ which he holds “constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power.”⁵²⁵ It is congruent with prevalent ideological assumptions that legitimise differential treatment of those considered unequal. Hence, the application of force is perceived as being just and fair, while alternative, social treatment to pervasive problems is discarded from the outset. The work by Alfred L. McAlister, Albert Bantura, and Steven V. Owen on moral disengagement in support of military force is insightful here; a parallel can be drawn between the ‘War on Terror’ and the ‘War on Crime’ in that “national protective countermeasures” against perceived enemies gain political support.⁵²⁶

As Mbembé and Meintjes state, “[t]o exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over

---

⁵²⁵ Ibid.: p. 6.
mortality. […] War, after all, is as much a means of achieving sovereignty as a way of exercising the right to kill.”

By framing Rio’s social problem exclusively as one of crime while simultaneously suppressing all socio-economic and political causes conducive to its emergence, governing elites have reduced “matters of domestic ‘security’ […] to its sole criminal dimension”, in turn effectively diverting attention from enquiry into state mismanagement. This is because “any affirmation of an origin for a problem is also an implicit rejection of alternative origins.”

Public authorities foster “agent provocateur actions” in order to sustain a high threat level and thereby maintain legitimacy for their preferred course of action, propagating faith in the existent order. Yet, besides petty street and organised crime, Brazil generally and Rio de Janeiro in particular exhibit what Johan Galtung has termed “structural violence”, referring to “myriad subtle and not-so-subtle ways in which deeply institutionalized, taken-for-granted practices of domination undermine the life-chances of people by class, race, and gender.”

The public authorities’ approach to violent crime precludes any social treatment of problems, however, entering the logic of ‘urban violence’ instead, rendering necessary the deployment of the state’s armed executive arm. This constitutes a mere continuation of adherence to the ‘doctrine of national security’ that post-dictatorship Brazil has explicitly (rhetorically) sought to edge away from, implicitly “help[ing] deflect attention away from an idea which could lead to power relations being questioned and challenged – that there are social causes, and social remedies, for social problems.”

In recognising a pattern behind this political ‘behaviour’, Jenny Pearce asserts that “[t]he Latin American state increasingly claims its legitimacy not from a monopoly of violence but from its lack of such a monopoly” and adds that “[i]t is this lack which provides the state with the social outcasts and sources of disorder (criminals, drug mafias, youth gangs) which it must respond to with new forms of order,

---

240 Buzan, Barry (2006): Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?, In: International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, p. 1107.
violently imposed, to win its authority.” As a result, (political) “[s]upport for public, equitable, efficient, and non-violent security is lost”. 245

VIII.II Humanitarianism as securitisation: Legitimising forceful intervention into criminalised territorial space

The discursively declared and reinforced state of emergency and the identification of an ‘internal enemy’ merely constituting one side of the securitising discourse, it is the task here to reflect on the implications of this discursive production. The subsequently analysed speech acts stand in reciprocal relation to the ones analysed above, building thematically on the political ‘othering’ of subjectivities.

In what constitutes a recurrent and often resorted to rhetorical technique in political discourse generally, public officials point to previous administrations and their inaptness for counteracting identified grievances:

“Because no one else ever did anything, no other government took the initiative to do what everyone knew needed to be done. There was a lack of political will, either because of a lack of vision, political assistance or corruption. It was almost 40 years without consistent public security policies that allowed for the growth of traffickers and their domination over so many communities.” 246

This serves the function of facilitating the assignment of blame. It does, in turn, provide an ideal basis for legitimising an innovative approach to a perceived problem as sketched out by the securitising actor. Portraying the pacification strategy as ideal remedy for recognised ills, Cabral has stated:

“I believe it is an historic and exciting day for all of Brazil, especially for those who live in Rio de Janeiro. If you add up the city's professionals, state professionals, federal government professionals, more than 3000 people are involved in the

---

The theme of previous abandonment is a persistent one; similarly, securitising actors make explicit the notion of a joint effort at all government levels aimed at ‘rescuing’ forgotten communities. This line of argumentation is reflected in the speech acts of other closely associated securitising actors as well, including Beltrame:

“It [the UPPs, author’s clarification] means a new life for thousands of people who live in a region of Rio that, over the last few years, has been transformed by traffickers into a crime regulatory agency. And opening a window of opportunity for public and private services, allowing the society to fulfil its debt of years of abandonment of those communities, starting to include them again into the city of Rio de Janeiro.”

It is against this background that the pacification programme receives discursively reinforced legitimation: It is portrayed as an act of liberation, bringing rights and freedom to those living in areas long deprived of both. Luiz Fernando Pezão, then-vice-Governor and currently incumbent Governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, reinforced this discursive line of argumentation at the inaugurational ceremony of the UPP in the favelas of Barreira do Vasco e Tuiuti in April 2013:

“These are citizens who are being liberated. Citizens [...] who have seen [...] peace. And we have to be grateful and thank God over and over so that we can bring peace to more territories, to experience and appreciate this joy that you are having here today.”

Relatedly, the pacification strategy has been equated with the very essence of life itself:

---

“The process of pacification represents exactly this: the valorisation of life, the recapture of territory and the freedom for these people in the broadest sense.”

Clearly, the speech acts are part of the broader securitising discourse surrounding the pacification strategy. Constituting ‘securitising moves’, the residents of favelas are identified as the ‘referent object’ that is threatened by criminals operating within the favelas. What is of particular interest here is the observation that the discursively constructed line of argumentation presented by the securitising actor(s) is not limited to ‘safeguarding’ a referent object from an identified threat scenario but extends beyond ‘security’ to include developmental assistance in the scope of the Rio+Social programme. That is, the necessity for humanitarian action is coupled to the notion of ‘liberating’ a demarcated population residing in a specific territory. A text passage published in a booklet accessible on the official UPP website entitled “Livro das UPPs – UPP veio pra ficar” (“Book about the UPPs – UPP came to stay”) reads:

“The UPPs take care of people. The role of the police is to prioritise the preservation of life and freedom. [...] Educational, cultural, and those projects aimed at social and professional development, in addition to others aimed at improving infrastructure, are being carried out in the communities through agreements and partnerships signed between different segments of public power, private enterprise and the third sector.”

Scott Watson undertakes an intriguing attempt at extending the conceptual framework of the Copenhagen School’s notion of securitisation by calling attention to “the power of humanitarianism in legitimizing a wide range of rather extraordinary measures”, stressing that state elites have repeatedly resorted to the ambiguous concept of humanitarianism in order to justify the use of military force in international contexts. By consequence, the author proposes that humanitarianism be understood as a distinct sector of securitisation, as this “contributes to our understanding of humanitarianism as a structured field in which certain

actors hold a privileged position in the enunciation of human insecurity, in which a reified and monolithic form of humanity is declared, and that supports existing international norms pertaining to the provision of security for humans.”

Albeit in a domestic context, the securitisation surrounding the introduction of Rio’s pacification programme clearly builds on the cornerstones outlined here. Despite profound heterogeneity among the different favelas and their residents, the idea of a monolithic form of favela residents is epitomised in an interview with Colonel Frederico Caldas:

“In these areas live people absolutely deprived not only of material goods, but of affection, care, an appreciative look.”

The discursive foundation stone for the implementation of the pacification programme is in fact two-sided. The notion of liberation becomes possible only by connecting the speech acts with the notion of a ‘city at war’, of chaos and havoc. The following excerpt stems from an official statement emitted on 27th of November 2011 by Sérgio Cabral:

“The ongoing operations in Rio de Janeiro, enacted by our police officers, the Federal Police and military personnel, are essential to ensure the free movement of persons. It is a basic right, it is our duty to provide it. [...] We are all united. All with the same purpose: to carry on without any backtracking the quest for the liberation of the people in the communities from the power of criminals. The reference point for people in the communities - and in all of society - must be that of the public authorities, who provide for pacification and social actions. [...] The population wants and will be free, because we will not back down from our security policy. The population is confident. [...] It is my commitment, I reaffirm, to pacify all communities that are under the control of parallel power. [emphasis the author’s]”

What becomes clear upon contemplation of the here expounded speech acts is that the pacification programme can hardly be considered outside the context of a discursively

253 Ibid.: p. 5.
reinforced ‘War on Crime’. Discursively conveyed means of justification are invariably linked to the paradigm that has dominated Rio’s approach to the restoration of public security for decades. The notion of *liberating* the favelas is only lent credence to by means of creating a semantic link between the favelas and crime; the idea that the city of Rio de Janeiro constitutes a downright battlespace between state authorities and a ‘parallel power’ operating in the favelas elucidates why the securitising discourse proposes a *pacifying* process. Securitising actors tacitly declare a *state of exception* in the favelas, thereby establishing “a legal civil war”\(^{256}\) in which the “normative aspect of law can [...] be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that [...] still claims to be applying the law”\(^{257}\), thus paving the way for the application of military force. In fact, “the declaration of the state of exception has gradually been replaced by an unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government”\(^{258}\), epitomised in the political technology of securitisation. Accordingly, the favelas come to be understood as a “zone of indistinction”\(^{259}\) in which its residents correspond to what Agamben has termed *homo sacer*, characterised by “the particular character of the double exclusion into which he is taken and the violence to which he finds himself exposed.” In conformity with Agamben’s assertion that “[t]he original political relation is the ban”, this is in fact congruent with and induced by Brazil’s genealogic trajectory of citizenship-building which indicates that national belonging does not correspond with political belonging\(^{260}\), thus leaving it to the sovereign “who possess the ability to codify values and norms on the basis of social status”.\(^{261}\) The historically legitimised second-class status of the urban poor renders the use of military means in their social environment common-sensical, whereas a similar scenario in Rio’s affluent areas would be entirely unthinkable. The common-sensical, ideological nature of this discourse does explain why resistance at the pacification policy from within the favelas has been rather meek.


\(^{257}\) Ibid.: p. 87.


Contrary to the securitising actors’ suggestion, however, the issue of organised crime is by no means confined to the favelas: Firstly, the command lines of the productive chain lie outside these areas and often outside the national territory; what is more, it is well-known that the point of retail is not restricted to these disadvantaged urban spaces but simply reaches extraordinary levels of visibility here because the coverage of politico-institutional systems that combine social control and protection is much more fragile than in other parts of the city. However, the arbitrary and discursively constructed generalisation by the securitising actors that is produced through a linkage between the marginalised favelas and organised crime creates a “powerful cognitive feedback loop” in that it plays right into the long-established socially shared representation of space of favelas constituting disorderly, unhygienic settlements, linked to physical and moral illnesses, thus resonating deeply with the majority of the population of Rio and decision-making political elites in particular. In other words, the securitising discourse builds on historically derived stigmatisation of a marginal territorial space. Beltrame buttresses this perception upon referring to operational challenges of the pacification strategy:

“It is obvious that the communities are historically troubled places, which have serious problems related to drug trafficking. [...] Rio is not an easy-to-grasp city, we have to make adaptations, since the configuration of the favela is different from the city.”

The discursive construction of marginality is noteworthy because the urban margin has no existence of its own but is always constituted in relation to the "central" authority; it bears witness of power relations given that one institutes the other as "outside". This holds true especially in Latin American contexts where the city “was always a fortress of high culture,

---

the citadel of the elites, and highly homogeneous in class composition”

– contrary to the marginal favela which is degraded from constituting a place to mere space: “‘Places’ are ‘full’ and ‘fixed, stable arenas’ whereas ‘spaces’ are ‘potential voids’, ‘possible threats’, areas that have to be feared, secured or fled.”

Here, Raúl Zibechi remarks that marginal spaces are implicitly perceived as challenges to the social order requiring external intervention to not only foster urban development but also allow for the adoption of disciplinary measures that guarantee the residents’ (particularly those in the wealthier areas surrounded by the favelas) security.

The perceived marginality runs contrary to factual circumstances, however: not only do their social circuits interlock; Milton Santos points out that material links between the formal and informal economies of cities are inevitable, the two sides in fact being invariably integrated.

Janice Perlman refers here to the “myth of marginality”.

The issue of (lacking) ‘public security’ is superimposed with that of the historically grown and perpetuated problem of ‘the favela’ – this being a perpetuation of historically enshrined notions of subjectivity which portrays residents of shantytowns as inferior – thus concentrating the focus of security action on a particular physical space considered perilous.

In her seminal paper, Licia Valladares has retraced the origin of this hegemonic understanding, finding that the social construction of ‘the favela’ is in fact based on a singular informal settlement which served as archetype for the commonly held perception related to this space. Referring to the ‘myth of Canudos’, the author elucidates how oppositional forces to central state authorities settled in a peripherical place surrounding the city of Rio de Janeiro in the early 20th century which was known as the morro da Favella; therefrom, the subsequently spreading informal settlements inherited not only the name but also came to

---

271 Santos, Milton (1979): The shared space: The two circuits of the urban economy in underdeveloped countries, London: Methuen.
272 Perlman, Janice E. (1975).
assume the pejorative, recalcitrant connotation the favelas have maintained to this day. Despite rhetorically reinforced benevolent intentions (public discourse now depicts favela residents as victims rather than accomplices), it is by latently alluding to the historically derived and socially enshrined image of favelas constituting an uncivilised and hazardous space – criminalising territorial space – that is in need of humanitarian assistance, and by enacting a state of exception through the political mechanism of securitisation that forceful intrusion is legitimised discursively to re-establish territorial control and curb the suggested source of violence by military means. The highly coercive component of the pacification strategy is emblematic of the historically persistent relation between the state and the favelas, while concurrently perpetuating the inherited militarised doctrine culminating in the militarisation of the ‘humanitarian/social’.275

What is further noticeable is that the securitising discourse bears witness of the long-established tradition of the “culture of the gift”: Upon being asked in 2013 whether the city of Rio de Janeiro will see the implementation of more UPPs in the years to come, José Mariano Beltrame replied: “Yes. [...] But the exact place will be a surprise. [emphasis the author’s]”276

While at first glance unspectacular, this statement is emblematic for the historically derived and ideologically naturalised arbitrariness retraced above with which state authorities attend to most pressing concerns of those at the bottom of the social hierarchy who are reliant on the benevolence of public authorities. The pacification programme comes to be seen as a ‘donation’ rather than a constitutionally assured right. The territorial focus of the pacification programme puts into question the sincerity of the discursively conveyed commitment, which may not be aimed at bettering the lives of underprivileged favela residents but pursue other objectives entirely.

IX. Neoliberal ideology and the quest for social control

The above outlined analysis revealed how securitising actors cultivate a culture of fear vis-à-vis an internal enemy that is posed as an existential threat, concurrently portraying the favelas

as marginal territories that are subliminally associated with violence and therefore require external intervention for their own benefit. While this observation is informative, it fails to explain the much more interesting question as to why an issue is being securitised. This section is aimed at expounding how the pacification strategy relates to the elite’s political and economic agenda by taking a critical look at the consequences of said securitisation, examining underlying rationalities of enacted ‘securitising action’ that follows from a securitising discourse. By drawing on Floyd’s proposed consequentialist evaluation of ‘security’, the underlying question is “how well any given security policy addresses the insecurity in question.” Floyd’s framework seeks to “hold securitizing actors accountable” for their course of action by assessing the objectivity of a pronounced existential threat, the legitimacy of a declared referent object, and the appropriateness of response. While the first two criteria have been subjected to critical scrutiny in the scope of the above outlined discourse analysis, this section is directed at examining the appropriateness of response. To recall, Floyd holds here that “(a) the security response must be measured in accordance with the capabilities of the aggressor and (b) the securitizing actor must be sincere in his or her intentions.” The empirical examination of both factors bears significant problems: Measuring the capabilities of the aggressor is difficult because contrary to official rhetoric no one singular, homogenous group can be identified as the aggressor. Concurrently, assessing a securitising actor’s sincerity of his/her discursive commitment poses unique measurement problems: “the unavoidable problem about someone’s sincerity is that it is truly unknowable.” In an effort to overcome these challenges, the researcher proposes to relate the securitising discourse to the conduct of the securitising actor, that is assessing implemented measures. It is acknowledged then that the following assessment is of interpretative nature based on factual information. This is nevertheless informative as to why an issue is being securitised and will provide insight into whether the securitising discourse matches practice.

279 Ibid.: pp. 430-432.
It is necessary to contextualise the start of the pacification programme in 2008 with those global events that were set to take place in and around the city of Rio de Janeiro at that particular point in time. On 30 October 2007, the city was selected as host of the 2014 FIFA World Cup; on 2 October 2009 it was announced that the Summer Olympic Games of 2016 were to be held in Rio de Janeiro. Having hosted a wide array of games previously (the 2007 Pan American Games, the 2011 Military Games, the 2010 World Urban Forum, and the 2013 World Youth Day), the staging of these mega events commensurate with the city’s neoliberal strategic orientation it came to adopt in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Corresponding with the general trend that led Latin American countries to implement extensive liberalising reforms in the economic domain, Brazil enacted political and economic transformations that were aimed at enhancing its global economic posture to foster openness to international markets. In this context, investment in mega-events is seen as gainful, since their legacy can provide for economic restructuring, attract (foreign) investment, and promote a positive image of the city which benefits its (economic) development in the long-run.\textsuperscript{282} In particular, city administrations recognise the potential of the “mega-event model of urban development as a core promotional strategy”\textsuperscript{283} and as a “potent vehicle for post-industrial adjustment”\textsuperscript{284}, bearing the opportunity for improved visibility through broadband media attention and marketing initiatives. In fact, Brazil has declared its intention to pursue a “long-term major events strategy which will drive inward investment, tourism and promotion of Brazil to global markets.”\textsuperscript{285}

The fact that the city of Rio de Janeiro was chosen to host two mega events was accompanied by international concern vis-à-vis the Brazilian government’s ability to reduce violence and exercise effective control over the entirety of its national territory.\textsuperscript{286} The events were allocated to the country in conjunction with public officials’ pledge to both the International Federation of Association Football and the International Olympic Committee to undertake

\begin{itemize}
  \item Pinto Costa da Silva, Emília; Rechia, Simone; Pinto Costa da Silva, Priscilla; Stresser de Assis, Talita; Silvestre Monteiro de Freitas, Clara (2015): O Jogo Das Cidades Em Tempos De Megaeventos Esportivos: Algumas Reflexões, In: Movimento, Vol. 21, No. 1, p. 250.
  \item Ibid.: p. 135.
  \item Fleury, Sonia (2012): p. 199.
\end{itemize}
profound security-related improvements; this is reflected in its candidacy announcement for the Olympics, the official brochure reading:

“Rio will look after all its international guests, offering a range of accommodation options as well as safety and security at all times. [...] Security will be comprehensive and unobtrusive. The approach will be fully united, with the three levels of Government working as a single team, and fully integrated with existing significant safety initiatives, including various programmes for security improvement.”

Not surprisingly, the time of implementation of the pacification strategy coincides with the objective to portray Rio as a city that is safe for both visit and investment, conveying a sense of order and control. This correlation and the particular emphasis that is placed on attracting foreign capital is mirrored in a speech given upon a visit of Sérgio Cabral to New York in 2011 in which the former Rio governor implicitly solicited investors to look to his city – “Rio de Janeiro is today the best platform for accessing the Brazilian market” – and accentuated the positive impact of the pacification programme, legitimising the same anew:

“Three weeks ago, we took another step towards the complete pacification of Rio de Janeiro. We recaptured Rocinha (a favela situated in Rio’s South Zone, author’s clarification) for the good people. Without firing a shot, our police reconquered a territory that had been under the control of criminals for decades. Peace is the basis for all other achievements, including for the new moment that Rio lives, attracting billions of dollars in investments in various sectors of the economy. Without peace, none of this would be possible.”

Accordingly, it appears reasonable to assume that the pacification strategy co-exercises a function of producing the sensation of collective security – “strategic city-staging” – that is directed only subordinately at its domestic audience, placing particular emphasis on appealing within the international arena. What is conveyed here is the “myth of the ‘safe city’

– devoid of conflict and contradictions”290, epitomised in the dress of pacification. It hints at a hierarchisation of priorities in which the local population is at best of secondary importance.291 Discursive mentions of underlying mercantile interests the pacification programme seeks to satisfy have been repeatedly uttered in the course of its implementation; Colonel Frederico Caldas, chief of the coordinating body of the UPPs, said in an interview in 2013:

“We are talking about a programme responsible for real estate valuation, for the increase of tourism, for the promotion of commerce [...].”292

Because a common concern uttered by residents of favelas directed at state officials was the fear of mere short-term duration of the pacification programme, discursive insurances were continuously articulated in a domestic context prior to the start of both mega events. Luiz Fernando Pezão, Governor of Rio de Janeiro since April 2014, serves as example, assuring:

“This is a permanent policy. We will not only leave a legacy for the World Cup and the Olympics. Security is our obligation. We will continue to do whatever jobs are needed, ask the Federal Government for help, the Armed Forces. It is not only because of the games that we are doing the UPPs. Until 2020, we will commission further occupations and hire more police officers to bring peace to the whole city.”293

Connecting the pacification programme with the notion of leaving a palpable ‘legacy’ for all citizens, Colonel Alberto Pinheiro Neto of the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro further underscores this promise:

“When we say that we are working to build public safety conditions for a big event, we are saying this: we want a legacy for the people of Rio de Janeiro as a result of what this event will bring, because it is not worth to construct, invest millions of

Reais so that the games can happen at Maracanã Stadium, and then not leave anything that remains as a legacy for our people. What is a legacy to us? There is the material and immaterial legacy. The immaterial is the positive portrayal of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil in the world, the people's desire to get to know the city, and what it generates in the imagination of people from other parts of the world, that is, the country evolves from this. The material legacy concerns all technological and practical innovations that will primarily impact on the police, as well as transportation and health care, and which will then be left to society. The job has to be because of that. It is no use having seasonal security, thousands of soldiers safeguarding a security tunnel, a security channel at the international airport, Copacabana and Maracanã, which lasts 15 days, and then have a civil war afterwards. It would not make sense. What makes sense is the process of pacification, I’m telling you that these communities are returning to live a worthy life.”

However, upon contemplation of those favelas chosen for the public security programme, doubts as to the sincerity of this discourse gain traction. Although figures vary, estimations set the number of favelas within city skirts to be at around 1,000. Only a fraction has been impacted by the programme; this figure highlights how the ones selected relate to planned Olympic sites:

---

In fact, the UPPs were implemented in varying sequences: the initial ‘wave’ was focused on the affluent South Zone of the city, comprising renowned neighbourhoods and tourist hotspots such as Copacabana and Ipanema. In a second phase, favelas along the main routes providing access to those wealthy areas were affected. Thirdly, favelas located around the city’s international Airport Antônio Carlos Jobim received UPP entities. And in a forth sequence, multiple favelas in the city’s less developed North Zone – centred around the Maracanã Stadium – became the focus of the policy’s attention. Underscoring the well-grounded impression that the main focal point lies in containing localised violence around those areas most likely to receive international attention, upon the pacification of the Mangueira-favela situated at a short distance from the Maracanã Stadium State Public Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame concluded that an ‘Olympic security belt’ had been

Figure 2: Map of Rio de Janeiro, its favelas, and the pacification programme.


established, referring to the securitising of sport venues.\textsuperscript{297} Despite Sérgio Cabral’s pledge to pacify all communities, the pacification programme can by no means be considered a city-wide strategy.\textsuperscript{298} Curiously enough, no further favela has been ‘pacified’ since June 2015. Immediately after the Olympics the pacification policy was declared a failure\textsuperscript{299}; in April 2018 it was announced that up to half of the Pacifying Police Units will be withdrawn from ‘pacified’ favelas; the UPP police officers will be subordinate to Military Police battalions of each area and may patrol the communities or the streets, indicating a departure from community policing to previous, more repressive police practices.\textsuperscript{300}

Quite obviously, those favelas affected by the pacification programme are conducive to the "capitalist structuration of the city".\textsuperscript{301} Being located predominantly in the city’s wealthy South Zone, it accounts for merely 7 per cent of Rio’s population, but 50 per cent of formal employment, generating 33 per cent of the city’s Gross Domestic Product.\textsuperscript{302} The public policy can thus be seen a constitutive element pertaining to the legacy of the big games that follows the logic of capitalist accumulation.\textsuperscript{303} This impression is fostered in light of the fact that a substantial amount of the funding for the pacification programme stems from “private investors, including Coca-Cola Corporation, Eike Batista, Brazil’s wealthiest entrepreneur, and a plethora of other oil and energy companies”.\textsuperscript{304} What is more, from the outset funding was set to end in 2016, that is directly after the Olympics.\textsuperscript{305} Acknowledging this, it can be asserted that the policy’s primary objective lies in ensuring the control over strategically relevant territory while the discursively reassured commitment to social development is subordinated.\textsuperscript{306} While initial resonance was overwhelmingly positive due to the fact that


\textsuperscript{305} Ibid.: p. 12.

levels of violence were indeed reduced significantly, minimizing lethal violence merely equates to fighting symptoms of exorbitant levels of social inequality. Researchers found that “no significant policies in healthcare, education or concerning basic needs have followed the implementation of the UPP”\(^{307}\), however. The programme’s social wing – initially \textit{UPP Social}, now \textit{Rio+Social} – entered the favela of Santa Marta, the first ‘pacified’ favela, only three years after its pacification, and remains at best expandable and at worst an adornment embellishing unspoken intentions.\(^{308}\) Reports issued by Amnesty International have expressed similar concerns, finding fault with lacking action in the social domain.\(^{309}\) A study conducted in 2017 revealed that up to 70 per cent of residents in ‘pacified’ favelas asserted no significant changes had taken place post-pacification.\(^{310}\) What is more, the pacification programme has catered for an incipient gentrification process: Because real estate value increased by up to 400 per cent, many favela residents were forced to leave their homes to settle in non-‘pacified’ favelas due to exorbitant rent inflation, the policy being reminiscent of what David Harvey described as ‘accumulation by dispossession’.\(^{311}\) This results in the exacerbation of already severe social inequalities, rather than reducing them, as propagated by the securitising actors of the pacification policy. The ‘social’ is linked discursively to a militarisation process that culminates in a low-intensity war over urban space fought in the name of ‘security’ “in which the state reasserts its being as a state by insisting on itself as the political mechanism for the fabrication of social order”.\(^{312}\)

It is against this backdrop that (critical) scholars have called attention to the pacification programme being reminiscent of a \textit{civilising} mission which is aimed at (re-)establishing (behavioural) control over residents of a specific territorial space.\(^{313}\) Reinforcing this assertion, high-ranking politicians have repeatedly referred to favelas constituting an ‘urban jungle’ in need of ‘anthropological supervision’, the terminology bearing attitudinal

characteristics. Sérgio Besserman, former President of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, said about the pacification strategy that

“the authorities entered some favelas and regained power, the first step in a civilising process that must continue.”

Likewise, Cabral himself has linked the UPP programme with the objective of “raising cleaning standards - cleanliness I think is fundamental in these communities – [and] reeducating the community”. Amidst ongoing police and military operations in Complexo do Alemão, a group of favelas situated in the city’s North Zone, he further added in 2010:

“The moment is ripe for the retaking of territories, for the establishment of order and the democratic rule of law. [emphasis the author’s]”

Mark Neocleous has retraced the historical model of ‘pacification’ stating that it “quickly came to describe the enforcing of a certain kind of peace, order and security”, adding that it constitutes “a political technology for organizing everyday life through the production and re-organization of the ideal citizen-subjects of capitalism.” It entails what Loïc Wacquant refers to as neoliberal penalty that is directed at “curb[ing] and contain[ing] the urban disorders generated in the lower reaches of the social structure” while concurrently bearing productive power in that government agencies seek to discipline behavioural patterns of residents. In ‘pacified’ favelas, events held in public areas require authorisation from officers of the UPP, with those perceived by the police as generators of "turmoil" or disorder being prohibited or curtailed – by means of physical repression if need be. Iconic funk music fests, for instance, are categorically banned due to their close association with

---

banditry, despite constituting a cultural heritage of many favelas. Pacification then is the imposition of an authoritative armed order directed at intimidating any possibility of a return to the previous ‘disorder’, supported by a wide array of what Michel Foucault refers to as ‘disciplinary techniques’ including 24/7 CCTV surveillance.\(^{322}\) The establishment of pacification units takes up on the exercise of excluding alterity in a vertically hierarchised, top-down manner.\(^{323}\) This observation becomes of particular interest in light of Henri Lefebvre’s well-known assertion that “(Social) space is a (social) product.”\(^{324}\) That is, “in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination”\(^{325}\); space is ultimately “defined, characterized and distributed by [...] power.”\(^{326}\) Accordingly, pacification serves the purpose of reinforcing a monolithic and deterministic mode of being that contributes to the quest of consolidating elite hegemony in a neoliberal order.\(^{327}\) In support of this assertion, scholars have noted “uncanny similarities between Rio’s pacification strategy and ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere”\(^{328}\), entailing “a domestic ‘hearts and minds’ campaign.”\(^{329}\) In an interview published on the UPP official website, José Mariano Beltrame alludes to the observation made here:

“These police officers, often without using their weapon, are true transformers of heads, minds and hearts. […] The police officer who graduated today will be tomorrow or the day after placed at a UPP and may already be an agent for transformation. [emphasis the author’s]”\(^{330}\)

\(^{322}\) Ibid.: p. 213.
The “so-called irreconcilable elements” among the targeted population which oppose the hegemonic social order are considered ‘disposable’. The discourse surrounding the implementation of the pacification strategy draws on this notion by clearly delimitating the ‘inherently bad criminal’ from ‘innocent people’, thus offering the favela residents a ‘choice’ as to which social group they seek to belong to. Those opposing the ‘upright citizen’ are considered unequal and therefore justifiably receive unequal treatment.

In sum, it is, of course, difficult to assess securitising actors’ intentions and even more so related sincerity. The here depicted interpretative approach recognises two interrelated efficacies of the pacification strategy: On the one hand, it can be understood as a measure seeking to enact a change in outward appearance, particularly directed at international media attention and complying with security guidelines as dictated by both the FIFA and IOC. Concurrently, it entails an inward dimension aimed at “promoting particular urban development dynamics” while “serving powerful economic interests” in a neoliberal context. In either case, social inequalities, urban poverty, and violence associated therewith are much rather perpetuated than mitigated: in what can be termed a balloon effect, the UPPs merely cater for the translocation of pervasive problems. Adjacent favelas have experienced an increase in crime; besides, those favelas not affected by the UPPs (the vast majority) continue being subject to the traditional, repressive policing paradigm. Following Floyd’s consequentialist evaluative approach to security, it appears more than reasonable to assume that the here analysed securitisation constitutes a negative one in that represents “an intense political solution that benefits the few […] with a too narrow focus to address the underlying problems of the prevailing insecurity.” The exercise of full citizenship and reduction of exorbitant levels of inequality require unstinting politicisation rather than securitisation. Combating social insecurities, i.e. socio-economic inequalities by militarisation of the social domain cannot lead to the desired result.

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Outlook

X. Securitisation, pacification, and the perpetuation of elitist domination

Adopting a critical perspective, this dissertation sought to place the pacification programme within the historical and socio-political context upon which it is based with the purpose of exposing the intended beneficiary of it. Starting from the assertion that “security has no ontological integrity” but constitutes a political technology instead, it was aimed at uncovering how ‘security’ may be subject to abuse by political elites to foster particular politico-economic interests. By making use of a critically revised securitisation framework which caters for the examination of the power-knowledge nexus of a securitisation process and connecting said process with its socio-cultural context by drawing on analytical techniques of critical discourse analysis, the researcher is enabled to undertake an analytically founded immanent critique of Brazilian political culture typified in Rio’s pacification policy.

Promoting normatively induced evaluative research practice, the dissertation revealed fundamental discrepancies between constitutionally and discursively propagated democratic, humanistic ideals on the one hand, and exclusionary and elitist practice on the other. This is because elites are by default tempted to apply securitisation as a political technology to (re-)produce hegemony. In conformity with Bigo’s elaboration, the here analysed securitising actors represent “professionals in the management of unease” by exploiting an historically evolved culture of fear vis-à-vis a discursively declared internal enemy, thus “affirm[ing] their role as providers of protection and security and to mask some of their failures.” Engaging in techniques of “political demonology,” structural problems are instrumentalised serving the purpose of assigning blame to particular social groupings. This categorical exclusion or the “production of bare life” constitutes an historical constant justifying military action, as elucidated by retracing and connecting the securitising discourse with Brazil’s socio-cultural legacy which bears deeply ingrained marks of elitism and caters for detrimental treatment of parts of the population, and leads to the recognition that alternative ways of dealing with the identified problem (i.e. social treatment of poverty) are precluded from the outset: In line

with its ever-prevalent military doctrine the country adopted during military dictatorship, socio-economic root causes are quashed and framed in the language of ‘urban violence’ instead. This dominant approach has become *naturalised*, with “[n]aturalization [being] the most formidable weapon in the armoury of power”.\(^{339}\)

Coming to view humanitarianism as a particular *sector* of securitisation, official rhetoric legitimises forceful intervention into the favelas by emphasising the need for humanitarian assistance in discursively reinforced marginal spaces which – in dialogue with the naturalised ‘War on Crime’ – are declared threatened by a discursively portrayed internal enemy. Entailing a militarisation process of the social realm, the discourse tacitly draws on an historically derived stigmatising process resulting in the implicit criminalisation of peculiar territorial space, establishing a state of exception in the favelas that caters for the deployment of the militarised state executive in ‘areas of indistinction’. The analysis presented here thus elucidated how the political elite engages in manipulation, constituting “one of the discursive social practices of dominant groups geared towards the reproduction of their power.”\(^{340}\)

Fears and social grievances “originating in those shortcomings of polity […] are used, in reverse, in order to legitimate the polity again by naming an adversary, and even an internal enemy”, thus ceding to a “war-based polity” according to which “a form of governmentality based on misgiving and unrest is substituted for a reassuring and protective pastoral power.”\(^{341}\)

Worryingly, “[t]he construction of problems sometimes carries with it a more farreaching perverse effect: it helps perpetuate or intensify the conditions that are defined as the problem”.\(^{342}\) Contrary to the objectives it set out to fulfil, the pacification programme does neither “break with the logic of ‘war’” but very much builds on and perpetuates it, nor does it promote the “integral exercise and development of citizenship”, as it draws on the criminalisation of favelas perceived as marginal space to intervene militarily and secure sporting venues in the context of internationally attended mega events. Rather than constituting a comprehensive strategy committed to tackling exorbitant levels of socio-economic inequality throughout the city, the pacification programme applies to selected and


\(^{341}\) Bigo, Didier (2002): pp. 80-82.

strategically valuable favelas, thus reinforcing the perception that the imposition of a specific kind of order is envisaged that is conducive to neoliberal entrepreneurialism in the scope of Rio’s hosting of two mega events. Ultimately, the militarised approach to social inequality at best perpetuates the level of inequality and at worst exacerbates it.

In conformity with the results obtained in this dissertation, Brazilian inegalitarian citizenship may be regarded “not merely as a dysfunction or a failure of the democratic paradigm, but rather as a political strategy that favors the twin model of free markets and authoritarian states.”343 It legitimises the subjugation of the disadvantaged for the benefit of elitist interests, this having become naturalised. Consequently, a profound re-conceptualisation of its highly paternalistic and hierarchical notion of citizenship and the ever-prevalent militarised paradigm are of utmost importance, un-naturalising unequal treatment and arbitrary application of rights in a democratic context to guarantee that public policies be directed at those hitherto deemed unworthy of consideration. Top-down, militarised approaches as implemented with the pacification strategy merely serve the purpose of (poorly) suppressing symptoms. To borrow from Ken Booth’s words, ‘real action for real people’ is needed.

Between 2000 and 2010, the number of people residing in favelas throughout Brazil rose from 6.5 to 11.4 million, that is by 75 per cent. In the same period, the Brazilian population increased by merely 12.3 per cent; deferring the problem of social inequality is no longer feasible. Properly politicising social inequality would run counter to the historically established paradigm of dealing with said issue in Brazil, however. Edelman asks “Why do some problems become ‘fashionable’ […] while others that are equally or more damaging never do?”, and finds an answer in asserting that “[i]t seems plausible that the difference lies in their implications for whose power is augmented and whose threatened.”345

It was the stated objective of this dissertation to reveal emancipatory potential by expounding the 'power behind the securitising discourse' surrounding the pacification policy. It is now the hope of the researcher to “empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they

encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms.”

Social cohabitation entails taking responsibility for one’s rights; “those who hold power at a particular moment have to constantly reassert their power, and those who do not hold power are always liable to make a bid for power.”

Collective consciousness is the gateway to breaking with domination, holding the state accountable for its actions and demanding equal treatment for all.

Works cited


Buzan, Barry (2006): Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?, In: International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 1101-1118.


Degenhardt, Teresa (2013): The overlap between war and crime: unpacking Foucault and Agamben’s studies within the context of the war on terror, In: Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 30-57.


Huhn, Sebastian (2009): The culture of fear and control in Costa Rica (II): The talk of crime and social changes, GIGA working papers, No. 108.


Mattar, Flavia; Chequer, Jamile; Dias, Mariana (2010): UPP: tecendo discursos, Reportagem, Democracia Viva Nr. 45, Julho 2010.


Santos, Milton (1979): The shared space: The two circuits of the urban economy in underdeveloped countries, London: Methuen.

“Sérgio Cabral - Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs)”, youtube, uploaded by Sergio Cabral Filho on 20.08.2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CI_j7aVhD2I, accessed on 10.05.2018.


MSc International Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies
2016-2018

Dissertation Archive Permission Form

I give the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow permission to archive an e-copy/soft-bound copy of my MSc dissertation in a publicly available folder and to use it for educational purposes in the future.

Student Name (BLOCK LETTERS): ________________________________

Student Number: ____________________________________

Student Signature: ____________________ Date: _____________________

PLEASE INCLUDE A COPY OF THIS FORM WITH THE SUBMITTED SOFT-BOUND COPY OF YOUR DISSERTATION.