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Diplomová práce
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES V. COUNTERTERRORISM:
WHICH FACTORS ARE THE MOST INFLUENTIAL?

MASTERS THESIS

PRAGUE, 2018
Zpravodajské komunity vs. protiteroristické operace: hledání klíčových faktorů

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RNDr. Jan Kofroň, Ph.D.

September 2018
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

1. I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this Masters Thesis.
2. I authorize the Charles University to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research.

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V Praze dne 29.07.2018

Claire Bouchard
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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on whether we can create a categorizational model for foreign intelligence communities and if we can identify factors that will help us predict those foreign intelligence communities’ effectiveness in counterterrorism. In order to determine this, the author based one of her main factors on the 1995 Sederberg article that separates counterterrorism models into three main categories: (1) War Model, (2) Criminal Model, and (3) Disease Model. She also relates these models to three of the main geopolitical schools of thought as follows: (1) War Model - Realism, (2) Criminal Model - Liberalism, and (3) Disease Model - Constructivism.

The second main factor analyzed here is the centralization of the intelligence community. This clearly affects the consistency of the counterterrorism message being encouraged by the state, as well as the speed with which the Intelligence Community can respond to an emergency situation.

The key contributions of this thesis lie in creation of the comparison model and the subsequent analysis of the six case studies. This model combines and acknowledges theories of counterterrorism effectiveness that have not been previously studied together and is also a useful comparison tool for foreign intelligence agencies without running into many of the same issues\(^1\) that usually hinders intelligence studies.

The thesis concluded that while centralization might play some role in a state’s counterterrorism efficiency, the key variable is the specific macro model utilized by the counterterrorism effort as a whole. In a very quick snapshot, the War Model has the strongest short-term results but most harmful long-term results, the Criminal Model also has strong short-term results, but worrisome mid- and long-term results, and the Disease Model has weak short-term results but shows the strongest long-term results.

The thesis also suggests that the strongest model for counterterrorism would actually be a centralized hybrid model that mixes the Criminal and Disease Models. The author suggests that further research be concluded on this possibility.

\(^1\) The most common issue within this type of study is the difficulty in gathering information based on the covert nature of intelligence work.
KEYWORDS

Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Intelligence, Intelligence Community, Disease Model, War Model, Criminal Model, Centralization, Efficiency
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of many. While any
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INTRODUCTION

The world seems to be entering a new era of violence. The standard country-versus-country wars of the past no longer hold the same level of visible threat, whereas non-state actors and their associated networks are wreaking havoc on a global scale (primarily through the threat of terrorism). One of the main weapons in our arsenal against this new threat\(^2\) is the intelligence we can gather on these organizations. And yet, while there are a few outlying examples, very little is known about how global Intelligence Communities operate; even though their actions are becoming increasingly relevant for government policies and counterterrorism preparation. In particular, the actions and assessments of Intelligence Communities are driving the implementation of national security strategies. This thesis will take a focused look at the various types of counterterrorism measures and policies that can be implemented by an Intelligence Community. Seeing as the various Intelligence Communities do not all function under the same working philosophy, their rules of operation are based on a variety of factors, and thus there is not an overall consensus on how an Intelligence Community should either be structured or function. Because of the different bureaucratic structures, intended purposes, degrees of oversight, power in policy decision-making, and many other influences, the various Intelligence Communities, while operating in the same field, act incredibly differently.

This thesis acknowledges these differences in the many intelligence organizations and aims to identify the determinative qualities that can organize Intelligence Communities by their counterterrorism efforts. Being able to create this categorization model can help us understand how more private/covert Intelligence Communities are likely to act based on their comparison with more publicly documented Intelligence Communities\(^3\). Further, as terrorism is becoming an increasingly pressing global issue and the model purports to focus on the counterterrorism results of these intelligence communities, the ability to predict how a state may act in the face of a terrorist threat is a an important aspect for analyses of the modern geopolitical environment.

Which leads us to our research questions: (1) Can we create a categorical model for the world’s various Intelligence Communities that would be able to predict an

\(^2\) Note that the author recognizes that terrorism, in and of itself, is not a new threat, but rather that the way it is currently being exhibited is often argued as a new wave or strain of such (Crenshaw, The Debate over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism 2007).

\(^3\) The author acknowledges that this is assuming that each category in this organizational system would have a base set of more well known or easily accessible Intelligence Communities to use as a foundation for comparison.
Intelligence Community’s effectiveness in conducting Counterterrorism? (2) How do the various combinations of the Counterterrorism macro model and centralization of terrorism intelligence within an IC affect a state’s effectiveness in their counterterrorism efforts?

In order to both encompass the analysis-driven goal of identifying key categories of Intelligence Communities, as well as to address the difficulty of finding enough information about all of the Intelligence Communities in each category, the model will be a Prototype Graph. The prototype graph for the model is strategically chosen in an effort to respond to the criticism that it is incredibly difficult to research all Intelligence Communities. It is evidently true that due to the nature of their work, Intelligence Communities hold their tradecraft very close. However, some of the world’s most public Intelligence Communities (i.e. The United States) have been forced to make many of their actions more transparent, thereby enacting a higher level of accountability for their more destructive actions. Utilizing a prototypic model allows for the assumption that if an intelligence community shares enough determinative characteristics they may share some more similar characteristics in regards to their actions.

Further, this thesis does not focus on specific intelligence tradecraft or covert affairs, but rather on the counterterrorism effectiveness resulting from their organizational structure of the Intelligence Community. The chosen prototypes will also serve as case studies for this thesis, allowing for a more in depth analysis of each possible combination of the axes.

The Intelligence Communities’ organizations (and any analysis thereof) are fairly complicated. Therefore, in order to keep this analysis as accessible as possible, while also not over-simplifying the question at hand, the prototypic graph should serve well. The crux of this thesis lies in selecting the key variables affecting the counterterrorism effectiveness of the International Community. This selection will be guided by literature and theories that shall be further expounded upon in the methodological section of this thesis; but the variables chosen will be (1) An Intelligence Community’s Counterterrorism Macro Model (i.e. War, Criminal or Disease) and (2) The

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4 Defined later in the thesis
5 This will be further explained in the theory and methodology chapters to follow.
6 Intelligence Community
7 The definition of how a counterterrorism model is deemed effective will be further discussed in the theory and methodology sections of this thesis.
8 As first denoted by Sederberg (Sederberg 1995) and often used throughout the CT academic community (Bjorgo 2015) (Stares and Yacoubian 2007).
Centralization of the Intelligence Communities Counterterrorism Capabilities and Operations.

In order to address these questions the thesis will proceed as follows: first the author will define her terms in more detail. Next, the author will build the basis for the intended graph through the methodology section of the thesis. Following, the author will work through what she expects the graph to reveal in her theory section of the thesis. And finally, the author will move into examining her case studies that will each fit into their respective sections of the model, before finally drawing her conclusions.

Also to consider for this study, there are other factors that must be held constant, so as not to affect the outcome. The first of these factors is the state’s terrorism threat level. If the states had widely different threat levels it could account for a range of response severity/urgency, as well as gauging how “successful” a state’s counterterrorism effort has been. For the purposes of this thesis, the terrorist threat level will be based off of the Index created by the Institute for Economics and Peace⁹, and the degree of the threat will be held within a constant span for the case studies chosen. The author will only look at states that have a threat level between 4.5 - 6 out of 10 on the aforementioned Index¹⁰; which classifies states within this range as being at an “orange” or “moderate” threat level.

Secondly, also to be held as constant as possible is the general level of human rights infringements perpetrated by the governments. While this is a particularly limiting statistic, the author will use the number and severity of complaints and concerns logged within the Universal Human Rights Index from the United Nations¹¹. The author recognizes that in order to broaden the types of governments that can be included within this analysis, there will need to be a bit of flexibility on this variable, but it will be limited as much as possible.

Ultimately, this thesis aims to show that the analyzed combination of various counterterrorism macro models coupled with the centralization of the terrorism units within Intelligence Communities does affect a state’s counterterrorism ability. With the aforementioned graph, and a detailed analysis of the resulting case studies, the author will walk the reader through exactly how these factors affect states’ counterterrorism effectiveness via the chosen case studies.

1.0 METHODOLOGY

A pivotal feature of this thesis will be the legitimacy and stability of the resulting graph that this chapter will build a strong base for. By explaining how the graph was created and building the graph with the reader, the author hopes to increase the understanding of how the graph operates.

Firstly, the graph will aim to create categories in which an Intelligence Community can fall into (as opposed to a value driven plot graph). As a majority of the qualities being analyzed are qualitative and not quantitative, the category system is the best suited to provide a visual context of how the various case studies compare. If the author can also succeed in making these qualities easily identifiable from public facts about the Intelligence Communities, this would allow for a more comprehensive spectrum that the model can apply to.

One of the main difficulties with the categorization goal of this model lies in choosing the two determinant axes. As mentioned above, the crux of the model lies in creating the categories most suited to its goal, which is done through the selection of the axes.

The ideology behind the task of choosing these axes will largely be based off of the model used in determining political ideologies proposed by Hans J Eysenck12. The difficulty is choosing exactly which two identifiers are the most salient to the model’s goal: analyzing the Intelligence Communities effectiveness in counterterrorism. The author Eysenck addresses this dilemma by saying: “The physicist and the lady of leisure are not forced to use the same concepts, but are quite at liberty to choose those which are most relevant to their particular purposes”13. Further, in defending his model’s choice of axes, Eysenck states: “There is no reason why we should not discuss stockings14 in terms of sheerness rather than in terms of dernier and gauge. There are alternative ways of description which may be useful for different purposes”15.

The author’s specific purpose is to evaluate an Intelligence Communities counterterrorism capabilities efficiency, meaning that our axes should not only reflect this goal, but be exclusively chosen to determine it. Keeping the above caveats in mind the axes chosen will be (1) An Intelligence Community’s Counterterrorism Macro Model (i.e. War, Criminal or Disease) and (2) The Centralization of the Intelligence Community’s Counterterrorism Capabilities and Operations. Our x-axis choice is based

14 The specific case study graph being discussed was based on a comparison of types of Stockings
largely off of Sederbergs\textsuperscript{16} 1995 article where he attempted to categorize nationwide counterterrorism efforts. The author chose this particular categorization attempt as it is often cited in counterterrorism analysis, and therefore has proven its resiliency to time and saliency to the subject matter. However, the author also finds that while Sederberg has done a thorough job of categorizing the entire nation-state’s counterterrorism system, he overlooks the specifics and importance of the Intelligence Community within this structure. Instead, he focuses on the military, judiciary and diplomatic structures that a state can use. The y-axis choice of this model is inspired largely by much of the debate within the American sphere of counterterrorism (particularly following 9/11) regarding intelligence bureaus communication and organizational structure. The new American system, which was copied almost universally after the “War on Terror” began, blamed the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attack in 2001 largely on the Intelligence Community’s organization not being centralized enough to handle the threat\textsuperscript{17}. This theory was echoed not only in the American restructuring of their Intelligence Community\textsuperscript{18}, but also by many of the reforms of other countries following the American example\textsuperscript{19}. To note, neither axis is dependent on the other (i.e. They are both independent), as is typical of prototypic models: “[…] dimensions are preferably independent of each other, and which can be measured”\textsuperscript{20}, their designation as either the x-axis or the y-axis is purely coincidental.

1.1 X-AXIS

The x-axis will be measured based on a preliminary categorization of how the counterterrorism complex is framed within each country. Overall, these counterterrorism models can fit into three types of macro trends\textsuperscript{21}: (1) The War Model (as commonly seen in the United States post 9/11 counterterrorism response); (2) The Criminal Model (as is commonly exhibited by most countries within the EU); and (3) The Disease Model (as is most prominent in Southeast Asia)\textsuperscript{22}. The author finds this differentiation critical. These macro models delineate the ideology that drives much of how the counterterrorism effort is conducted within a country and is highly indicative of how terrorism is perceived by the state in question.


\textsuperscript{18} As will be explained in Section 2: United States of America chapter of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{19} As will be explained in the Case Studies analyzed below.


\textsuperscript{21} As based on the theory proposed by Sederberg in his 1995 article

1.2 Y-Axis

The y-axis will be a bit more difficult to measure, as it tends to be more multi-disciplinary. Rather than exploring the intricacies of any particular tradecraft or counterterrorism techniques, the model purports to focus on the departmental and bureaucratic structure of the counterterrorism efforts, reducing the complexities of this axis. This also implies that this axis does not address how an Intelligence Community interacts with policy decision makers but instead how the various counterterrorism focused subunits interact with the rest of the Intelligence Community. For example, while the US Intelligence Community ultimately responds to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and has a highly centralized structure overall, America’s counterterrorism efforts are split between a variety of departments (i.e. FBI, CIA, DOJ, Homeland Security) and do not all have to communicate with the DNI (or each other for that matter), therefore rating on the lower side (i.e. more decentralized) on this axis. On the other hand the British Intelligence Community, who does not have a single person to whom it is ultimately responding, has highly independent sub units, including that of the counterterrorism department, therefore rating higher on this scale (i.e. more centralized). This factor also has a large amount of literature, however, much of the research regarding the benefits of centralization comes from the business world\textsuperscript{23,24}. In regards to gauging how centralized an Intelligence Community is, the author will walk through the counterterrorism complex of each case study and follow the average flow of intelligence within this facet of the community.

Once the case studies have been analyzed, creating a prototype model that would pull from these well-documented (or at least more completely documented) cases allows for a “stereotype” to represent each category. This should help rectify the common problem of most academic endeavors when analyzing an Intelligence Community: not having access to enough information. “Finally, the prototype could instead be an “ideal” exemplar or caricature that indicates not only the content of the items in the category but also emphasizes those features that distinguish the category from others”\textsuperscript{25}. This will allow for a differentiation in the types of Intelligence Communities without having to analyze the covert tradecraft that is often kept secret in the name of national security. Helping justify the prototype characteristic of this thesis’ model, there is “no requirement that a property

or set of properties be shared by all members”26 within the prototype category. This implies that it will be acceptable to employ a system of “best fit” when choosing the prototypic case studies for the model if attempting to extrapolate from the case studies analyzed to other foreign Intelligence Communities.

In regards to the possible issue of how to place a given Intelligence Community within the created model, the author acknowledges the need for a “biting the bullet” technique. Instead of a counterterrorism model being allowed to straddle the various model types, it will be typecast into one of the three options (i.e. War, Criminal or Disease). While this is not an elegant solution, it will have to suffice for the purposes of this thesis. The same technique will be utilized in regards to the centralization or decentralization of the intelligence community in question.

As mentioned briefly in the introduction, in order to effectively analyze the effects of the IC centralization against the different macro model types, many other factors must also be addressed. In order to account for the prominence that the counterterrorism effort receives in national security strategy, the author will choose case studies that all have relatively similar levels of terrorism threat (i.e. between 4.4-6.4 on a 10.0 scale). This will be assessed via an authoritative global index27.

The author will then act under the rational choice assumption, and assume that each state is a rational actor. This means that if the states all have relatively similar levels of terrorism threat, then they will all give similar amounts of importance to their counterterrorism efforts within their respective National Security Strategies. Therefore there should not be a significant amount of variation between how important the counterterrorism efforts are perceived by the selected governments, and the same amount of resources should be allocated to them.

Rational Choice Theory states, “that all action is fundamentally ‘rational’ in character and that people are likely to calculate the costs and benefits of any action before deciding what to do”28. The author is therefore comfortable undertaking the assumption that the leader of a state should be acting under the constraint of choosing actions that are in the best interest of the state’s survival, regardless of the type of government that reigns in the state itself. As the dilemma of terrorism threatens the existence of the state itself, one can reasonably presume that state leaders who are facing similar threat levels of

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terrorism will raise the concern to the same levels of importance within their national security strategies.\(^{29}\)

In order to track how effective a state is within the counterterrorism complex the author has created, and will utilize, the following model:

**Figure 1: Model Example**

*Source: Author*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Centralized</th>
<th>Decentralized</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Model</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Model</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease Model</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the case studies will fit into one of these six categories. They will then be judged by three separate statistics. The first is by the number of terrorist incidents over time. Due to the sensitive nature of intelligence and national security, it is very difficult to gauge the amount of viable threats made against a country. Therefore, in order to see if there is any sort of effect on counterterrorism effectiveness from the chosen axes, the author will instead compare the number of completed terrorist attacks on each state over the chosen ten (10) year period in an effort to establish a trend regarding the number of attacks. Theoretically, this will show both the short term and long term possible successes via a decrease in the number of attacks.

The second evaluating statistic will be gauging the general public’s opinion of terrorism. As part of our terrorist definition involves creating an atmosphere of fear, a proper counterterrorism plan should also create an atmosphere of security. If the public

\(^{29}\) The author does acknowledge that democratic states may be limited in their counterterrorism responses by public opinion. But, as one of the evaluative statistics is the public’s opinion of the terrorist threat and faith in the government's national security, this should not be effected by a successful counterterrorism effort.
either views the terrorist discourse favorably or exhibits a large irrational fear of danger from terrorists, then the counterterrorism efforts of the state are not terribly effective. However, if the public displays a sense of confidence in the state’s national security and government structures, then it may indicate that the terrorist narrative is weaker than that pushed by the state.

The third evaluating statistic will be the number of terrorists placed within the state’s penitentiary system. This statistic helps to gauge how effective the state’s police and intelligence communities are while using a number that is not as difficult to find as that of credible terrorist threats. It will also serve to help adequately gauge how successful the Criminal Models are over a longer period of time.

1.3 CONCLUSION

The model, as described above, should serve to clearly demonstrate six case studies that will serve to answer our research questions: (1) Can we create a categorical model for the world’s various Intelligence Communities that would be able to predict an Intelligence Community’s effectiveness in conducting Counterterrorism? (2) How do the combinations of the Counterterrorism macro model and centralization of terrorism intelligence within an IC affect a state’s counterterrorism effectiveness? The prototypic quality of the graph circumnavigates the issue of access to information for most intelligence communities while allowing for a more in-depth qualitative analysis; and the axes chosen serve to pinpoint the focus of the study onto counterterrorism effectiveness. Further, the three chosen points of evaluation should serve to circumnavigate the issues associated with analyzing a highly sensitive topic while still providing a clear insight into the state’s counterterrorism effectiveness.

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30 Defined later in the thesis
31 This will be further explained in the theory and methodology chapters to follow.
32 Intelligence Community
33 The definition of how a counterterrorism model is deemed effective will be further discussed in the theory and methodology sections of this thesis.
2.0 THEORY

There are many definitions of intelligence. Some are focused on the process of creation, while others are focused on the final product. For example, *Webster’s Dictionary* defines intelligence as “The obtaining or dispensing of information, particularly secret information; also, the persons engaged in obtaining information; secret service”\(^{34}\) whereas the *Directory of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage* defines intelligence as “the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operation and which is immediately or potentially significant to planning”\(^{35}\). The first definition clearly is more focused on the process, whereas the latter is focused on the final product. However, both definitions neglect to acknowledge counter-intelligence and have vastly different scopes of what they encompass. It is for this very reason that the term must be defined in a more limited fashion before being used in any analytical work.

A more refined definition, that serves the purpose of this thesis, would need to acknowledge all forms of intelligence (i.e. including counterintelligence), as well as differentiate between information and intelligence. While this may seem initially counter-intuitive, it is absolutely possible. Bimfort offers his own interpretation of intelligence after analyzing this existing dichotomy: “Intelligence is the collecting and processing of that information about foreign countries and their agents which is needed by a government for its foreign policy and for national security, the conduct of non-attributable activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy, and the protection of both process and product, as well as persons and organizations concerned with these, against unauthorized disclosure”\(^{36}\). This definition is particularly helpful due to the fact that it specifies the area of interest for intelligence (i.e. “information about foreign countries and their agents […] needed by a government for its foreign policy and for national security”\(^{37}\)) while not necessarily focusing on the manner or form that this

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intelligence may take. Otherwise said, intelligence is much more than the typically conceived covert aspects that tend to infatuate the common public. Also of importance to note in this definition is the end goal that this specific type of information has (i.e. foreign policy and national security). This end goal allows the definition to also encompass counter intelligence and other types of intelligence operations. Further, due to the high focus on counterterrorism within the entire national security framework and the strong effects that this has on a state’s foreign policy, this is the definition that this thesis will operate off of.

But an understanding of intelligence is only half of the battle for this thesis. Understanding the concept of terrorism is another highly contested term that is necessary to clarify for this study.

This is one of the most difficult terms to define in this thesis. The term “terrorism” is highly controversial between international organizations/institutions, as well as within states themselves. “The definition of terrorism in the political discourse is greatly influenced by the interests of the state”\(^\text{38}\), therefore each state is personally motivated to craft a definition that specifically serves its needs.

The author will attempt to avoid falling into the trap of defining such a term\(^\text{39}\): "Indeed, it has become commonplace to start scientific treatises on terrorism with a lament that the object is notoriously difficult to define, not least because of its politically contested nature. This, however, has arguably been something of a ritual having no practical consequences for the subsequent inquiry"\(^\text{40}\). In order to avoid this, the author shall attempt to specify her definition so that all readers are aware of exactly what is being referred to in this document when the term “terrorism” is used.

When looking at a survey of various definitions of terrorism Maskaliunaite points out that “51% of the definitions emphasize the creation of an atmosphere of fear as an important element of terrorism”. Similarly, “Schmid argues: ‘There is [...] a solid conceptual core of terrorism, differentiating it from ordinary violence. It consists in the calculated production of a state of extreme fear of injury and death, secondarily, the exploitation of the emotional reaction to manipulate behavior’\(^\text{41}\).


\(^{39}\) This trap is most aptly described by Professor Ditrych


According to Maskaliunaite’s research, the seven main elements used in a sampling of definitions of terrorism are as follows:

**Figure 2: Maskaliunaite’s Definition of Terrorism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element included in definition:</th>
<th>Frequency of appearance:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Violence / Force</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Politically based</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Fear (i.e. terror emphasized)</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Threat</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Psychological effects and anticipated reactions</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Victim – Target differentiation</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Planned / Systematic / Organized Action</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This thesis’ author agrees with the first five elements listed, but will not be including the sixth element in her definition for the thesis and remains indifferent to the seventh element.

While the sixth element listed, “victim-target differentiation”, is often emphasized in texts analyzing terrorism trends regarding the perceived movement from hard targets to soft targets, there is no actual empirical evidence supporting this claim. Further, it must also be understood that the designation of a target as a civilian or soft target is largely subjective. For example, in the United States Department of State definition, “noncombatant” targets refers not only to civilians and typical soft targets, but also to off duty military personnel, thereby allowing for a higher number of violent incidents to classify as terrorism within American statistics. Whereas from the perspective of many terrorist organizations, primarily those stemming from religious extremism, civilians in democratic countries would classify as legitimate targets for their attacks (and therefore not soft targets), as they are the population directly responsible for electing and giving power to their governments, who are military involved in Middle Eastern affairs.

Regarding the seventh listed element, the author agrees with it in so far as a systemized and organized series of actions helps establish the ever-present atmosphere of fear, as well as adding credibility to any threats from terrorist organizations. But the author also cautions away from waiting to classify an action as terrorism until a pattern is established.

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“It becomes clear that a definition of terrorism should include at least four elements: violence, political motivation, an attempt to create an atmosphere of fear, and a systematic, organized character of actions.”44 The author agrees with this assessment and defines terrorism as: politically motivated violence, or the credible threat of violence, perpetrated by non-state actors aimed at creating an atmosphere of fear in order to coerce or manipulate the target political unit.45

There is very little research done in the academic world regarding the direct correlation between the organization of an intelligence community and their efficiency in counterterrorism activities. We can, however, find literature on the various techniques that governments use in order to direct their counterterrorism complexes. The main source of this comes from Sederberg 199546 who first breaks down the state’s macro levels into three categories: (1) The War Model, (2) The Criminal Model, and (3) The Disease Model.

A state that uses the War Model views terrorism as a single entity that can be destroyed via military force. This will lead to a state having a liberal use of military intervention and a higher degree of general force used in intelligence missions that concern terrorism. A state who uses this type of model also tends to be of a particular geopolitical type, i.e. often considered a great power within the world and with a strong and internationally involved military.

Most akin to this ideology is the logic used throughout much of the classical and neo-realist philosophies. “Contemporary realists consider military capability and alliances the very foundation of security.”47 Which means that if a state is feeling threatened; they are likely to respond by military means in the attempt to annihilate the perceived threat. Kenneth Waltz echoes this belief by stating that “the political clout of nations correlates closely with their economic power and their military might.”48 The primary goal of a state is based largely off of self-interest rather than moral or justice considerations; which means that if a state perceives their military status to be put into

45 Again, the author acknowledges that this definition accepts the socialized assumption of the legitimacy of state held monopoly of violence. However, this is done largely to increase the number of states available to use as it is commonly assumed in research.
question by another’s actions, they are very likely to respond with an overzealous military show in order to reestablish their dominance.

Realists have often been challenged on their ability to adapt to new types of security threats. With the revolution of globalization and the accompanying discourse regarding identity and culture, modernization has changed what it means for a state to be secure. But what does hold true is that “Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid”\(^{49}\). Regardless of time and place, the primary interest remains the same and operates under zero-sum game rules. This relates particularly to terrorism as a terrorist threat calls into question a state’s military might and ability to provide security to its general population. A realist state would likely respond to this type of emerging national security issue with a show of military force, attempting to destroy whatever entity had caused the threat in the first place.

A state that uses the Criminal Model for counterterrorism views terrorism as a crime that needs to be punished through the proper channels of the state’s judicial system. The crime of terrorism does not differ in nature from other crimes that the state may prosecute; it seems to simply be perceived as a more intense crime. Each instance of terrorism is an individualized circumstance that has its own facts and conditions, thereby also emphasizing a culture of evidence collection and due process rights. This differs from the above War Model, as it does not view terrorism as an entity that must be destroyed, but rather an illegal action that is conducted by individuals and must be condemned.

In order to make this distinction, we see a liberalist perspective emerge. With a strong emphasis on institutions and their power to create order within societies, the judicial institutions take the lead on the fight against terrorism. In order to do so, the institutions rely heavily on rationalism: “rationalism is based on methodological individualism according to which the actor is prior to and can be studied independently of social structures”\(^{50}\). This means that it is not the terrorist entity that is conducting a cost analysis of an attack’s pay off, but rather an individual who is making that decision. This has led the government to organize “along the lines of specific ends and needs, and according to the conditions of their time and place”\(^{51}\). As a result the government has utilized this ideology to entrust quite a bit of power to the state institutions and defers to

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their power to control the issue of terrorism. With the states of the European Union acting as our main example of this particular counterterrorism model, the power of institutions on an international level becomes even more apparent as it is the institution of the European Union that unites the multiple EU member states in their counterterrorism efforts. “Our aim must be to call forth to the highest possible degree the active forces and opportunities for co-operation, while touching as little as possible the latent or active points of difference and opposition.”

This Disease counterterrorism Model chooses to engage with the radicalization process more than reacting to the individual terrorist attacks. Instead of employing military or police measures, this model focuses on a theological and philosophical approach, attempting to re-educate the general population on Islamic fundamental values and by encouraging intellectual conversation between the various understandings of Islam. This is most commonly seen through the Southeast Asia geographical area.

The model utilizes a constructivist perception of the world. “Social constructivism, by contrast, is based on the ontological assumption that inter-subjective meaning is constitutive for intentional action.” It is only through communicative action that people’s understanding of reality and perceptions of the world can change. This is what is targeted by the theological and ontological conversations employed by the Disease Model.

Bjorgo 2015, who focuses on the Criminal Model, and Stares 2007 who focuses on the Disease Model further expounded upon these models.

We also again see a very large amount of literature focusing on the definition of terrorism within this academic endeavor. As shown in the definition above from Smith 2008, Crenshaw 2007, and Ditrych 2014, the definitions of terrorism are contested within the academic environment. This is a debate that is not likely to be settled soon, as

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52 The exact intricacies of how the regional EU institutions contribute to the member states counterterrorism efforts will be further elaborated during the case studies of this thesis.
54 To note: this particular thesis references Islam as it is the primary ideology found within this current wave of terrorism, however, this theory is not particular to Islam, and can fit whichever opinion is the driving force of the current terrorist wave.
the topic is one of great international interest in both academia and politics. Therefore the literature here is exhaustive and will simply be alluded to in order to establish a base definition for the thesis.

And finally, the literature regarding centralization of the intelligence communities seems to be missing. The author was unable to find any literature discussing the effects of centralization within an intelligence community, let alone how that would affect a country’s counterterrorism abilities (other than the specific reports following the 9/11 terrorist attacks within the United States of America, referenced with the second case study). Instead, the author will draw from the literature on centralization regarding businesses, and authors such as Campbell 2011 and Pai n.d. But ultimately, the theory about centralization affecting the efficiency of businesses should hold true for the efficiency of any organization, even that of the intelligence community.

2.1 EXPECTED RESULTS

There have been many attempts to calculate the efficiency of counterterrorism efforts in order to either (a) justify a country’s counterterrorism investments and actions or (b) to determine which counterterrorism model is the most effective. Throughout a vast majority of the Western literature, the most commonly analyzed factors attributed to the success of intelligence organizations have been (1) the centralization of their efforts (this is primarily resulting from the intelligence failure leading to 9/11 within the United States, and focuses almost exclusively on the communication avenues, or lack thereof, between the American Intelligence Departments); (2) intelligence sharing between foreign intelligence communities; and (3) the prominence that their efforts receive in national security strategy. The general and most commonly accepted idea is that the


54 And therefore also of counterterrorism intelligence efforts

55 This factor also encompasses the sharing of intelligence within a single national counterterrorism effort for any particular country.

56 This is largely linked to the amount of funding that the counterterrorism effort can receive as well as the amount of power that can be given to the military and intelligence community involved in the national counterterrorism effort.
higher the degree of all three attributes, the more efficient any intelligence effort, and therefore also a counterterrorism effort, will be\textsuperscript{66}. For example, a state with a centralized Intelligence Community, that shares intelligence effectively, and is perceived by its state as being a priority in national security will be more effective than a state who is lacking in any individual or combination of these attributes. However, when looking specifically at the counterterrorism sections of intelligence, it is only within a small part of the counterterrorism community (based in academia and not policy) that there can be found any analysis on the effects of the different macro model options on counterterrorism efforts. This blind spot in the literature seems problematic to the author and is also largely why it was chosen as one of the two main axes for analysis.

2.2 CONCLUSION

Within the three acknowledged and widely studied aforementioned factors, many place a large emphasis on the lack of centralization within an intelligence community as a factor that will decrease the success of an intelligence operation, and therefore also of the counterterrorism efficiency. The author disagrees with this assumption and purports to show that the first factor listed (the centralization of the counterterrorism effort) is not necessarily relevant to the efficiency of a counterterrorism effort; but, rather, that there needs to exist a strong communication structure between the various components of a counterterrorism effort. This will mean that the author does not anticipate seeing a large difference, if any, between the efficiency of two case studies who exhibit the same macro model but different centralization levels of their Intelligence Community. However, the author expects to see a huge emphasis regarding the state’s Macro Models and their effect on the state’s counterterrorism efficiency. Proving it to be the more influential factor.

This means that the author expects categories (1 and 2), (3 and 4), and (5 and 6) to act similarly.

The author also expects to see a difference in short and long-term results. As part of the chosen terrorism definition involves creating fear, part of the counterterrorism success should involve the general public’s opinion on the viability of the terrorist threat. This is a factor that is easily affected by time. For example, the author expects that both Case Study 1 and Case Study 2 of the War Model section will show strong counterterrorism successes in the short-term, but will actually increase the terrorist threat viability in the long-term. As the War Model responds with a strong show of military force, the author expects that this would annihilate all immediate threats, but build resentment among the surrounding communities causing long-term issues.

The author has a tougher time predicting how a Criminal Model will unfold. While addressing the terrorism threat via the state’s judicial system would surely take longer than the War Model, it will also be less likely to cause resentment from the surrounding communities, as the idea of due process is often already in place. This system’s effectiveness will also likely depend on the capacity and affectivity of the state’s penitentiary system. If the system adequately discourages the incarcerated terrorists from returning to the terrorism lifestyle, this could turn into a successful long-term model. However, if there are any weaknesses here, they will likely be exacerbated by the influx of prisoners, causing a possible breeding ground for radicalization.

And finally, the author predicts that we will see the most long lasting results from the Disease Model case studies: Case Study 5 and Case Study 6. A pure version of this

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Centralized</th>
<th>Decentralized</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>War Model</strong></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Criminal Model</strong></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disease Model</strong></td>
<td>V</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
model, however, will not produce many (if any at all) short-term results, as it is ignoring the terrorist attacks and instead diving into a deeper and more complex debate on the value of the extremist ideology. But, if successful, this method would essentially discredit the base philosophy of a terrorist organization, removing its recruitment strength and future ability to provide a threat.

The following case studies will elucidate whether or not the author’s predictions are sound and will gauge the effectiveness of each case study’s Intelligence Community counterterrorism capabilities via the markers delineated in the Methodology Section of this thesis.
This section of our proposed model represents a country that has a centralized terrorism section of the intelligence community and has adopted a War Model for its macro model of the counterterrorism complex.

Having a centralized intelligence community essentially means that all leadership and major decisions are hierarchical, eventually all responding to a single person or entity. As will be shown below, in the case of Russia, this all comes back to the President: Vladimir Putin. President Putin has done a thorough job of consolidating all power under the executive branch whose direction is ultimately at his discretion. Especially when looking at matters that are designated as national security issues, President Putin is the clear and definitive leader and driver of all strategy and action.

Categorizing Russia, as a War Model of counterterrorism was actually a bit more difficult than qualifying the intelligence community as centralized. As will be explored in further detail below, the primary Russian counterterrorism technique actually seems to be that of forced expulsion. Russia is also notorious for manipulating the narrative concerning terrorism in order to best fit her national goals. For example, any secessionist groups (i.e. Chechnya, Ukraine, etc.) are deemed as terrorist organizations, which is then
a discourse used in order to justify any military or intelligence action utilized by the state against the aforementioned region. However, the author will still classify this state’s counterterrorism macro model as falling into the War Model category as Russia seems to be addressing terrorism with the same strategies and tools as it did during all of it’s war or conflict scenarios in the past. The most active forces involved in Russian counterterrorism are the military and intelligence services, not the judicial, police or diplomatic services. In fact, even the Russian technique of expulsion is executed by the military. Therefore, Russia will be our first case study for this thesis.

Regarding the preliminary requirements that would qualify a country as an eligible case study, Russia passes all of them. As of 2016, Russia is ranked number 30 on the Global Terrorism Index\(^67\) with a score of 5.43/10 in threat level. This falls into the same category of threat as all of our other case studies within this thesis holding a moderate terrorism threat level. Russia is, however, a borderline case regarding human rights. While the United Nations Universal Human Rights Index\(^68\) does not show an exorbitant amount of human rights violations, this may be largely due to Russia’s famously oppressive political system. However, as the Human Rights Index is also showing that the amount of possible human rights violations are decreasing, and that Russia is not showing many more violations than our other case studies, the author will allow it to remain as an eligible case study.

3.1 STRUCTURE OF THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN REGARDS TO COUNTERTERRORISM

As can be seen in many facets of Russian bureaucracy, the structural organization of her Intelligence Community is highly centralized. “Since returning to the presidency in 2012, Russian President Putin has worked to consolidate power”\(^69\). In fact, Russia has kept and “restructured its internal security forces to ensure a more loyal and responsive apparatus. Russia maintains security forces that are not subordinate to the military to conduct a range of internal security and policing functions”\(^70\). To exemplify this, below is

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As we can see from this figure, the entire organizational structure is incredibly linear and has very little (if any) lateral communication between the departments. This lack of horizontal communication serves to ensure the vertical line of command within the intelligence community.

This linear pattern holds true within much of the Russian bureaucratic structure, including, but not limited to, the FSB, MVD and most military units. All of these "power
ministries - the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Border Service - were used in counterterrorism and "mop-up" operations in Chechnya as part of the Combined Group of Forces."72 In order to assist these power ministries and military battalions in their counterterrorism tasks, "the FSB, the Interior Ministry, and the Main Intelligence Service of Russia created special task teams for the liquidation of terrorists and militants without trial"73. In the particular instance of Chechnya, this created a culture of impunity within the operations, which ultimately degenerated "into the indiscriminate use of overwhelming military force, characterized by deplorable pattern of brutalizing the local population". This abuse of force has not only led to the ultimate radicalization of the local population, only further exacerbating the problem74, but has also solidified Russia’s placement as a War based Macro Model.

One of the most active services within the Russian intelligence community is the infamous Federal Security Service, or the FSB. "The FSB has three primary missions: countering foreign intelligence services, combatting organized crime, and ensuring economic and financial security. It is also the Russian lead counterterrorism organization"75. Upon returning to the presidency in 2012, President Vladimir Putin began a major reorganization of the FSB, with the ultimate result being the organization now placed directly under the President’s control. With it placed at his fingertips, President Putin has worked to also expand the FSB, essentially having it swallow the Border Guard Service of Russia and the Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI)76. This makes the FSB one of Russia’s primary counterterrorism tools.

The exact objectives of the FSB, as listed by the Russian government website, are listed in the below footnote77. To note Objectives 1-6 deal specifically with the concentration of power that the FSB provides for President Putin, showing a truly

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77 The fundamental objectives of the Russian FSB will be the following:
   ○ 1) the command and control of the subsidiary agencies and troops, as well as the organization of their activities;
   ○ 2) the notification of the President of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the Russian Federation Government, and, acting on their instructions, federal government agencies and the government agencies of components of the Russian Federation, of threats to the security of the Russian Federation;
centralized intelligence structure. This is further solidified when looking at the delineated organization of the Russian FSB shown in the below footnote\textsuperscript{78}. All of the listed organizational bullets point to a linear structure that places all of the power into the President's hands.

Objective 7, however, jumps into the counterterrorism arena: "support for the struggle against terrorist and subversive activity"\textsuperscript{79}. Intriguingly, Russia seems to operate off of the understanding that terrorism is synonymous with any activity that can be considered subversive to the Russian government. When jumping forward to number 37

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\textsuperscript{78} IV. Organization of Russian FSB Activity

- 10. The Russian FSB will be headed by the director of the Russian FSB, appointed to this office and removed from it by the President of the Russian Federation.
- 12. The Russian FSB will have a collegium made up of the director of the Russian FSB (the collegium chairman), the deputy directors ex officio, and administrative personnel of the subsidiary agencies and troops.
- 13. The number of members and the composition of the Russian FSB collegium, with the exception of the ex officio members, will be approved by the President of the Russian Federation.
- The Russian FSB collegium will discuss the most important aspects of the activities of subsidiary agencies and troops at its meetings and make decisions on them.
- Decisions of the Russian FSB collegium must be approved by a majority of its members and recorded in orders of the Russian FSB.

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of the FSB's defined functions, their role in controlling the counterterrorism activities is expanded upon:

“37) participate in disseminating the experience in the application of federal laws to safeguard the security of the Russian Federation, to combat terrorist and subversive activity and crime, to defend and protect the state border, internal waterways, the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation and their natural resources, and exercise state oversight of the conservation of biological maritime resources; submit recommendations for its improvement according to the established procedure;”

The further objectives listed as numbers 8-15 solidify the FSB's right to interfere and control the action of any other body of intelligence or national security, at their discretion, serving to solidify the FSB’s control.

Another intelligence agency that holds a large amount of power within Russia’s intelligence community is the SVR, the Foreign Intelligence Service. This is "Russia's main external intelligence agency" that "focuses on civilian affairs." While not directly involved in any of the counterterrorism missions (based off of it's mission statements) they are involved in protecting Russia’s national security and have the ability to be involved with military and other intelligence operations when the President deems fit.

The two charts below summarize the responsibilities of the other intelligence organizations within Russia's intelligence community and denote the defense and intelligence capacities of various political ministries.
Figure 6: Responsibilities of Russian Security Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry / Agency:</th>
<th>Mission:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>Regime and internal security, federal law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)</td>
<td>Civil policing and local law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Security Services (FSB) Border Troops</td>
<td>Border Security: ground and maritime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice (UIN)</td>
<td>Civil judicial system, prison guarding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM)</td>
<td>Civil defense, disaster response, humanitarian relief, firefighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Protection Service (FSO)</td>
<td>Presidential, VIP, and regime protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X = Main Role
Y = Subsidiary Role

In general, there is clearly a high level of importance placed on Russia’s political and national security. This is also reflected by the government’s spending on national defense, that has grown over the last decade and has "reached a post-soviet record" in
2016.\textsuperscript{82} The reason behind this increase is two fold, it is both in response to the increasing Russian GDP, but also the “political decision to increase the defense burden”\textsuperscript{83}

In conclusion, it is clear that the entire Russian political and intelligence system is a highly centralized apparatus that falls under the strict control and guidance of President Vladimir Putin. It is also clear that the term “counterterrorism” is one that comes up in the mission of many of the intelligence apparatus, political departments and ministries while often indicating that it is either a top priority or that it is a useful buzzword Putin has adopted in order to justify many of his military actions.

3.2 RUSSIA COUNTERTERRORISM MACRO MODEL

Russian has a rather long history with terrorism. “Since the first terrorist campaign set up by the Russian revolutionaries in the late 19th century, terrorism in Russia has been regarded as an assault against the state personified by the Tsar, the communist party, or the central government and leadership of the modern state, respectively”\textsuperscript{84}. Within the context of the Russian revolutionaries, terrorism was coupled with the movement against absolutism. During the beginning of the Bolshevik era, it was essentially akin to anti-communist counter-revolutionary ideas and actions. Within a short twenty-year span, the tone of terrorism changed from counter-revolutionary to the “subversive activities of foreign intelligence services, or acts of resistance to the Soviet government orchestrated by secret services from Western states”.\textsuperscript{85} This widely changing Russian understanding of terrorism betrays the fact that Russia has not clearly defined terrorism, nor has it distinguished it from any other sort of violent or political crimes. “The vague definitions created uncertainty in the application of the law, which allowed for politically motivated enforcement of the criminal legislative provisions”.\textsuperscript{86} The author believes that this is a very intentional tactic.

When analyzing the modern Russian counterterrorism apparatus from a historical perspective, direct correlation can be drawn to the Tsarist era “security departments” or “okhrannye otdeleniya” that were responsible for much of the counter-revolutionary (and


therefore the counterterrorism) functions. This was again mirrored in the Soviet Era secret police, resulting in powerful and politically motivated organizations such as “The "All-Russian Emergency Commission" ("Vserossiiskaya Chrezvychainaya Komissiya"), or VChK, which became the main tool of the Bolshevik terror and a precursor of the Committee of State Security (KGB) created in 1954”87.

In the current modern Russian era, these historical structures shine through. For example “the FSB’s anti-terrorism office was a direct successor of the KGB’s department for the fight against terrorism”88. Not only do the actual physical apparatus hold strong, but also the attitudes of the officers within these organizations retain much of the same attitude as their predecessors. For example, many of the officers in power tend to believe in the Soviet Era work method of “short-term reactive and coercive responses”,89 rather than exploring the more globally accepted method of “long-term measures for preventing the threat of terrorism”90.

Therefore, with an emphasis on short-term and reactive responses, it should not be terribly shocking that the overall macro model of Russia is that of a War Model. As terrorism is generally perceived as an attack on the state, the state’s interest and even more importantly for Russia, the state’s territories, counterterrorism measures are seen as a very personal protection of the state rather than a political move, which justifies the use of authoritarian measures. These particular measures also tend to result in the use of suppression to handle any challenge to the Kremlin power.

Within the more modern era, Putin has taken “an aggressive, hardline stance on terrorism”91. With the global rise of ISIS, he has also taken full advantage of the American rhetoric regarding the “war on terror” in order to justify his increasingly “preventative measures that most would consider violations of basic human rights”92. These techniques range from collecting DNA, using racial categories for high-risk police

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registries, surveilling mosques, and conducting raids. With these strategies the FSB has released claims that in 2015 alone they had prevented thirty crimes and detained 770 criminals. However, being that the measures taken are preventative without any third party verification, they are incredibly difficult to confirm.

The Russian tendency to use terrorism in order to justify their authoritarian actions transcends the police, intelligence and political world into the legal world. For example, in 2016 Putin and the Russian government passed the “Yarovaya Law” which includes increased FSB data surveillance, criminal liability for failure to report the planning of a crime, and prison sentences for those as young as 14 for extremism, terrorism, and participation in mass riots.

One of the primary reasons for Russia’s modern emphasis on harsh preventative measures stems not only from it’s cultural history of the Tsarist and Soviet regimes, but also from the more recent color revolutions starting in 2004. “The Russian leadership concluded that forceful and preferably preventive suppression of opposition movements was imperative, since the key precondition for revolutionary victories was the self-defeating indecisiveness of the ‘soft’ regimes of Shevardnadze and Akaev.”

These soft regimes were replaced by bold unicentric structures that served solely to solidify and emphasize the Moscow oriented power, while also severing any outside (or non-Moscow based) links between the Central Asian states.

A prime example of Russia’s usage of a War on Terror rhetoric in order to justify suppression-esque actions is the Russo-Chechen conflict. This was arguably “the bloodiest confrontation in Europe since World War II” which attracted much of the Western media’s attention. While Putin’s hardline response to the Chechens was popular among the ethnic Russian electorate, the Western world strongly disapproved on the principle of ethics and the brutality of the Russian campaign. However, following 9/11, Russia has presented this conflict as “almost exclusively it’s frontline in the international war on terror”; making it difficult for the West to publicly denounce the Russian actions.

95 Baev, Pavel K. *Turning Counterterrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages*. Charles University, European Security, 2006.
96 Baev, Pavel K. *Turning Counterterrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages*. Charles University, European Security, 2006.
97 Baev, Pavel K. *Turning Counterterrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages*. Charles University, European Security, 2006.
Coupled with the rising perception from Moscow of the “danger posed by Islamic militants and terrorists [...] the Kremlin is particularly sensitive to the growth and spread of these ideologies and their potential to further radicalize Russian Muslims in the turbulent North Caucuses and other Muslim areas of Central Russia”\(^98\). This is a large part of the Russian justification for their military involvement and actions in Syria. The operation is branded as an attempt to eliminate jihadist elements operating within the territory of the former Soviet Union. This exact same principle holds true for the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, where Russia is particularly anxious about extremists spilling over into their satellite Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union.

Another technique that Russia has been seen using in order to handle their radical Muslim population is called the “green-corridor deals”. Largely encouraged by the FSB, this technique serves to both “push radicals out of Russia’ and to “gain informants on the ground”\(^99\). Those who left Russia would be declared as deceased in official records and “were promised lighter sentences when they returned to the country through a legal loophole”\(^100\). In essence, Russia is exporting Jihad as part of a “long term operation to sabotage U.S.-led coalition efforts”\(^101\).

For example, this Green Corridor Deal is used often in Chechnya, which as discussed above, is considered a top national security risk. Many have raised “allegations that Russia is covertly “exporting jihad” from Chechnya to Turkey” throwing “Russian intentions into suspicion”\(^102\). This is creating a “negative spillover-effect” as Russia is solely focusing on the short-term appearance of an effectively functioning government, while only delaying a much larger problem down the line.

This was seen partially from Spring 2004 – Spring 2005, resulting in the infamous Orange Revolution and the brutal response to the uprising in Andijan Uzbekistan during May 2005. In response to these uprisings, Russia enforced it’s design of providing


“extensive support to the regimes that were ready to defend themselves with forceful means” in order to suppress any sort of politically motivated (or any other motivation for that matter) uprisings\textsuperscript{103}.

President Putin has also cleverly intertwined his counterterrorism policy with his energy policy in Central Asia. This “initially was aimed at exploiting the threat of the Taliban in order to cajole the post-Soviet regimes into closer cooperation with Moscow”\textsuperscript{104}. This was done through the rather creative combination of three key factors. (1) “The politics of energy or, more specifically, the export of hydro-carbons”\textsuperscript{105}: directly tied to the seemingly ever-increasing global price of oil that helped the Soviet economy and has boosted President’s Putin’s goal of Russia being the world leader in energy. (2) Counterterrorism: used by Putin very early on in his Presidency to imply “a policy focused on countering the challenge of terrorist spill-over from a localized conflict, but in fact covers the use of forceful instruments for far wider political purposes”\textsuperscript{106}. And finally (3) in response to Russia’s failure to defeat the Orange revolution in Ukraine during 2004 and the overthrow of the Shevardnadze regime in Georgia during 2003, Putin exhibited a renewed sense of importance and urgency in preserving authoritarian regimes throughout the post-Soviet states. While Putin often describes this goal as counter-revolutionary, in actuality, it has proven to be fairly oppressive and aggressive\textsuperscript{107}. Through the manipulation of these three factors, Putin was able to consolidate power within Moscow as the worried and affected states turn to the Kremlin for support.

However, while this strategy has been effective for enforcing Putin’s power within the old Soviet arena, it has also brought him into direct confrontation with the United States and the European Union. Both of these entities “had been directly involved in preparing the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine and expressed support for democratic forces in other post-Soviet states, starting with Belarus”\textsuperscript{108}. This is also in large part what has motivated Putin to paint his actions in the colors of energy defense and counterterrorism. By doing so, he avoids a much larger conflict with the US and EU by

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{103} Baev, Pavel K. \textit{Turning Counterterrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages} . Charles University, European Security, 2006.
  \item \textsuperscript{104} Baev, Pavel K. \textit{Turning Counterterrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages} . Charles University, European Security, 2006.
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Baev, Pavel K. \textit{Turning Counterterrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages} . Charles University, European Security, 2006.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Baev, Pavel K. \textit{Turning Counterterrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages} . Charles University, European Security, 2006.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Baev, Pavel K. \textit{Turning Counterterrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages} . Charles University, European Security, 2006.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Baev, Pavel K. \textit{Turning Counterterrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages} . Charles University, European Security, 2006.
\end{itemize}
being able to control the narrative and presenting his actions as a counter-revolutionary strategy that was “even partly merge[d] with the policy of counterterrorism, so that the forces seeking to overthrow the ruling regimes were presented as extremists and terrorists”\textsuperscript{109}.

In conclusion, The Russian counterterrorism model clearly falls under the category of the War Macro Model. President Putin has not only highly centralized his power, in all domains, but is actively and aggressively pursuing military tactics in order to address any and all threats to his reign, including that of terrorism.

3.3 RUSSIAN COUNTERTERRORISM EFFICIENCY

As stated within the Methodology chapter of this thesis, a state’s counterterrorism efficiency will be measured through three main indicators: (1) The number of executed terrorist attacks over the chosen ten year time period; (2) the public opinion towards terrorism and faith in the state’s national security; and (3) the number of imprisoned terrorists\textsuperscript{110}. All three of these factors will be measured, to the best of the author’s ability, over the span of 10 years (from 2006-2016)\textsuperscript{111}.

3.3A NUMBER OF TERRORIST ATTACKS

Using the database from the University of Maryland\textsuperscript{112} we are given the number of terrorist incidents by year within Russia. The following Figure shows us a summary of this data from 2006 – 2016.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure8.png}
\caption{Summary of Incidents Over Time}
\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{Source:} University of Maryland. \textit{Global Terrorism Database: Russia.} June 2017.  
\end{flushleft}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{109} Baev, Pavel K. \textit{Turning Counterterrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages}. Charles University, European Security, 2006.

\textsuperscript{110} This will be even further divided within the thesis between terrorists imprisoned after they have committed a terrorist crime and before they were able to commit them.

\textsuperscript{111} The author will also extend her trend research into 2017 where the data permits.

\textsuperscript{112} University of Maryland. \textit{Global Terrorism Database: United States of America}. June 2017.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data shows us a spike in terrorist activities during the mid years of 2008 – 2013. However, with the beginning of the green – corridor policy, it is not surprising that the number of terrorist attacks showed a quick decrease in 2014. The exportation of radicals would naturally lead to a decrease of immediate terrorist attacks within official Russian borders. However, following this particular technique, we are seeing an initial spike back up of terrorist acitivies in 2016. It still remains to be seen whether President Putin’s counterterrorism techniques will work in the long-term, but the data suggests that the terrorist attacks will continue to rise.

Another interesting statistic to note regarding the Russian counterterrorism technique is the number of fatalities due to terror attacks within Russian borders over that same time period. The following Figure shows this in graph form:

**Figure 9: Fatalities Over Time**
We can see here a direct correlation between the number of deaths and the number of terrorist attacks occurring. This indicates that while the current Russian counterterrorism technique may be able to decrease the absolute amount of terrorist attacks happening on Russian soil, they are not affecting the impact that the individual attacks are having. Meaning that the attacks occurring are still just as lethal as the attacks prior to the implementation of this technique.

3.3B PUBLIC OPINION OF TERRORIST THREAT

There is an interesting generational divide in the public opinion on the threat of terrorism. Many older Russians “identify many issues as [...] serious problems”, including terrorism within this list. For example, “those 55 years or older are more likely than young people (those between 18 and 34 years of age) to say the gap between the rich and poor (76 percent vs. 54 percent), terrorism (61 percent vs. 49 percent), access to medical care (73 percent vs. 64 percent), organized crime (64 percent vs. 56 percent), and corruption (81 percent vs. 74 percent) are serious problems”\(^\text{113}\). On the other hand, many younger Russians (i.e. 18-34 year olds) are more likely to define issues such as access to education as a top concern (54 percent) than those 55 and older (46 percent)\(^\text{114}\). However, “across the board, fewer Russians report several key issues as being serious problems now than two years ago”; i.e., crime, access to education, organize crime and unemployment\(^\text{115}\). The Figure below further enforces this concept of Russians being consistently less worried about many issues than in the past. This indicates that the

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Russian population is responding positively to President Putin’s hardlined counterterrorism (and general foreign policy) approach, exhibiting more trust in his abilities to protect the nation from external threats.

**Figure 10: Russia’s Public Opinion On Economic and Domestic Issues**

**Percent of Russians who rate each issue as an extremely or very serious problem in 2012 and 2014**

Coupled with a decrease in worry about threats to the nation is an increase in confidence towards the state’s institutions. More “than four-fifths of Russians (82%) feel certain that the government can protect the population from potential terrorist attacks, a poll conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center showed”[^116]. In fact, the public’s confidence in the Presidency, military, federal assembly, police and judiciary system have all risen between 2012 and 2014.

**Figure 11: Russia’s Public Opinion on Institutional Roles**

However, as is often seen with the trend of terrorism, much of the affected general population’s fear is often irrational. And so, while the population is not worried about their own level of exposure to terrorism, “two-thirds of those polled (66%) expressed fears to a greater or lesser degree that they or their loved ones could become victims of a terrorist attack, while every fourth respondent considered the Islamic State (IS, terror group, outlawed in Russia) the chief source of that potential threat”\textsuperscript{117}.

Overall, however, the current regime’s counterterrorism technique seems to be lowering the public’s perception of a terrorist threat in the short-term.

3.3C IMPRISONED TERRORISTS

Not surprisingly, Putin’s hard lined stance on terrorism has also spilled over into the policing sector. The rise of the extremist threat, primarily from ISIS, has “conveniently justified increased preventative measures that most would consider violations of basic human rights”\textsuperscript{118}. These techniques include “collecting DNA, using racial categories for high-risk police registries, surveilling mosques and conducting


raids”. According to the FSB, in using these new techniques they have prevented 30 crimes and detained 770 criminals in 2015 alone. However, this technique does not exclusively focus on the world of terrorism, and instead looks at all imprisonment. The following chart shows a summary of these statistics from 2006 – 2016.

Figure 12: Russian Prison Population Trend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prison Population Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>823,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>883,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>864,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>755,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>677,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>646,085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, it appears as if the number of prisoners in the Russian penitentiary system has fallen. This directly contradicts Russia’s earlier statement of increasing their counterterrorism policing. Through expelling terrorists from their territory, Russia would also be removing possible criminals that would have been imprisoned.

3.4 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the War Macro Model with a centralized terrorism unit of the Intelligence Community shows a very strong short-term response, but remains to prove it’s long-term efficiency. When looking at the initial data, however, we can expect to see some repercussions from an international and diplomatic standpoint. The strong military response exhibited here shows efficiency in quelling uprising within the Russian territory, but the Kremlin’s involvement in the surrounding old Soviet satellite states have seen significantly more push back from the international community. The primary technique of expulsion is also likely to cause international upset and diplomatic issues.

However, Putin’s highly centralized structure does emphasize a very strong ability to act quickly and efficiently. By centralizing all of the power in Moscow, the decisions made there are very quickly implemented and do not seem to ever be questioned. Therefore, this model seems to quell terrorist threat on the short term, but bodes problematic for future diplomatic repercussions and further international radicalization.


This section of our proposed model represents a country that has a decentralized terrorism section of the Intelligence Community and has adopted a War Model for its counterterrorism complex. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, a decentralized Intelligence Community does not forbid the separate sub-departments, bureaus or agencies from communicating and cooperating, but rather they ultimately do not all depend on a singular source to act or take any decisions. This does not include the relation between the Intelligence Community and political or general policy world. The author has chosen to not include the policy world as the Intelligence Communities tend to work independently from their policy counterparts, only liaising with them once a final intelligence product (i.e. generally a report) has been produced.

The War Model aspect of this model is directly related to the general technique and theme adopted by the counterterrorism complex of the country in question. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, this model views terrorism as a singular entity that can be militarily destroyed. This encourages the use of violent force from a country’s military against suspected terrorist threats and groups. There is little, if any, focus on de-radicalization or of pursuing the individuals suspected to be involved in terrorist
activities. The only caveat to this is when the individual is seen as a leader within the terrorist organization, in which case the war-based models will target certain individuals in an effort to remove the “general” of the operation. But this pinpoint focus is not generally to apprehend the individual but to eliminate them. This concept is largely justified by stating that these countries tend to view the organization of the terrorist groups as haphazard and centered around the motivational force and direction of the leading individual (i.e. Saddam Hussein in Al Qaeda).

For this particular case study the author has chosen the United States of America. Regarding the preliminary requirements to be shared by all case studies, the United States rates as number 32 from the Global Terrorism Index\textsuperscript{121} with a score of 5.492/10 in threat level. This falls into the same category of threat as all of our other case studies. America also does not have many instances of human rights violations recorded within the United Nation’s Universal Human Rights Index\textsuperscript{122}, meaning that the techniques being used within the country are not going to be seen as highly repressive. The United States also has a relatively high amount of transparency surrounding the structural organization of it’s Intelligence Community\textsuperscript{123}, thereby facilitating the analysis of the IC’s centralization.

Given the level of observance that the academic world can have upon the American Intelligence Community, we see that there are multiple levels of centralization within the IC. At first glance, the IC appears to be a highly centralized structure that all falls under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

There are “17 separate organizations” that are all considered members of the Intelligence Community and that can be separated into three subgroups: (1) Program Managers: “those who advise the ODNI in identifying requirements, developing budgets, managing finances and evaluating the IC’s performance”; (2) Departmentals: “IC components within government departments outside of the DoD that focus on serving their parent departments intelligence needs”; and (3) Services: “this encompasses intelligence personnel in the armed forces, that primarily support their own branch’s needs”\textsuperscript{124}.


\textsuperscript{123} To note, this does not apply to the operations conducted by the various agencies and companies of the Intelligence Community, but rather the overall skeletal organization of the entire complex.

While the first two subgroups ultimately respond to the ODNI and the DNI, there is a clear difference with the third subgroup: the Services. This subgroup seems to act independently from the other two subgroups and does not seem to look for any single source of direction for permission to act. Due to this separation and independence in action, the author purports that the American Intelligence Community is, in fact, decentralized\textsuperscript{125}, with instead a central DNI that is meant to facilitate communication\textsuperscript{126}. Further, as will be shown below, it is the services subgroup that truly runs the intelligence portion of the American counterterrorism complex.

4.1 Structure of the American Intelligence Community in regards to Counterterrorism

The connection between intelligence and security enterprises are at the nexus of a successful counterterrorism system. But how exactly does Intelligence operate within the counterterrorism complex? Once a piece of intelligence is discovered who is able to get access to it? It would appear that in the current literature and within the publically accessible information these answers are not available. Through the use of organizational charts the author hopes to convey to the reader truly how chaotic the American system is. While there are some organizational charts for the individual organizations involved in the counterterrorism complex, there does not seem to be any focused primarily on intelligence or the collective counterterrorism system. In order to create these graphs, information had to be pulled from government websites, agency reviews, executive orders, laws and other academic analyses\textsuperscript{127}. These resources allowed for the elucidation of a few key principles. Firstly, the notion of controlling organizations that serve as the primary drivers of operations emerged. These will be referred to as “macro nodes.” Secondly, it became clear that the system is filled with redundancy. It is difficult to point to the reason for this redundancy, but a lack of trust can be assumed based on the nature of the national security enterprise and its components interactions. Lastly, the flow of intelligence is not unidirectional. The following charts hope to clarify these principles.

\textsuperscript{125} The author recognizes that this is not a commonly accepted view and will further defend it when elaborating on the actual structure of the American Intelligence Community.

\textsuperscript{126} As opposed to singular direction and focus.

\textsuperscript{127} (Bellavita 2009) [ CITATION Gen18 \l 1033 ][ CITATION Nat14 \l 1033 ][ CITATION Dep171 \l 1033 ][ CITATION Dep163 \l 1033 ][ CITATION Dep164 \l 1033 ][ CITATION Fed172 \l 1033 ][ CITATION Nat175 \l 1033 ][ CITATION Dep05 \l 1033 ][ CITATION Dep18 \l 1033 ]
## Legend:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol:</th>
<th>Meaning:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Text" /></td>
<td>This refers to a particular position, department, directorate or bureau. It is a nodal point through which the intelligence will flow at some point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Arrow" /></td>
<td>This type of arrow shows the order of hierarchy between two nodes. The node which is at the arrow head is subordinate to the node at the beginning of the line segment; meaning that intelligence flows counter to the direction of the arrow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Text" /></td>
<td>This refers to a particular position, department, directorate or bureau that is subordinate to more than one blue node.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Arrow" /></td>
<td>This type of arrow denotes that intelligence flows both ways between two nodal points.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Arrow" /></td>
<td>This type of arrow indicates that information is flowing from a particular node to macro node that it is not directly subordinate to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Text" /></td>
<td>This node refers to a macro node: meaning that it is one of the major organizations involved in the American counter terrorism complex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Text" /></td>
<td>This node refers to a particular position, department, directorate or bureau that has the capacity to collect actual intelligence specifically for counter terrorism purposes (Aka: the base node)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 14: Macro Organizational Structure
Figure 15: Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
Figure 16: National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
Figure 17: Department of Justice (DOJ)
Figure 18: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Figure 19: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Figure 20: Department of State (DOS)
It is clear that the bulk of the counterterrorism responsibility lies within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). This would also indicate that the United States is primarily concerned with terrorism on its own soil, rather than the issue as a whole on a global level. We also notice that while many different “base nodes” gather intelligence, it is shared between many of the macro-nodes on multiple occasions. This non-centralized system may be used in order to avoid missing information between organizations (as was exhibited before September 11th, 2001, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI did not share information that could have led to the prevention of an attack on American soil).

It can also be observed that many of the “base nodes” actively engaged in the reconnaissance of intelligence have redundant roles. Many are repeated within multiple macro-nodes (aka: macro-organizations). This could possibly be showing distrust within the system between the macro-nodes regarding the standard of quality and the lack of shared intelligence between the main organizations.

Somewhat surprisingly, while the CIA is actively involved in many intelligence reconnaissance missions for national security, the author could not find much information regarding their specific work in counterterrorism. There was available a mission statement and general guidance, but no specifics. Thereby causing this particular organizational chart to be rather small.

Also a surprise, while the author expected the Department of Justice (DOJ) to be involved in the oversight of the American counterterrorism efforts, she did not expect actual intelligence to be flowing as directly as it appears to through this organization. Further it was not expected to find nodes that pertained to the DOJ jurisdiction to be actively involved in intelligence reconnaissance.

Ultimately, it is clear that the flow of intelligence through the American counterterrorism complex is not a clear line. In fact, it is incredibly difficult to try and discover who gathers what piece of intelligence and to whom they pass it on to. Organizations on the same team are actively chasing the same intelligence and constantly reshaping the direction of operations within their counterterrorism efforts.

However, one thing that is clear, is that while the Intelligence Community ultimately reports to the Director of National Intelligence, this does not seem to be the case when looking at the intelligence specifically for counterterrorism. This line and focus of intelligence seems to spread across many departments and facets of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, the author
will be classifying the intelligence component of America’s counterterrorism efforts as decentralized.

4.2 US COUNTERTERRORISM MACRO MODEL

“Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government’s emergency response plans. Our military is powerful and it’s prepared”\textsuperscript{128}.

This statement immediately followed the nation’s most prominent terrorist attack in the modern age. Nineteen Al-Qaeda agents’ boarded American bound flights with the intention of showing the world that even the globe’s leading super power was not immune to their threat. In the process of these attacks, one of the planes crashed into the South Tower of the Twin Towers in New York City, causing a scene of panic, chaos and death; but the resounding American reaction was clear and straightforward: they were at war. “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war”\textsuperscript{129}.

However, this war-like attitude towards terrorism has not always been the American status quo. “The evolution of American perceptions has gradually emerged from traditional views that terrorism constitutes a “crime” to the view the terrorism is a new unprecedented form of warfare”\textsuperscript{130}. America has therefore shifted from the Criminal Model to the War Model as their homeland has become in increasing amounts of danger. The attacks of 9/11 can be considered the catalyst to this realization and subsequent shift, as it brought the fight against terrorism home to US soil.

This strong American response to terrorism was not simply one of show immediately following the major attacks. This ideology of the “War on Terror” continues well into the current day and drives the entirety of the American counterterrorism efforts. Looking at the time period in question for this thesis, the counterterrorism strategy released by the Pentagon in February of 2006 through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) creates the environment from which the American strategy works. “The US is readiness for what it calls a “long war”, perhaps a generational struggle akin to the Cold War”\textsuperscript{131}, hinting that our military responses are not going to be pushed aside any time soon.

While there is little question that the United States operates off of a War Model template, there is a bit more ambiguity regarding exactly how the American counterterrorism complex works. Especially since, after 9/11, the counterterrorism complex saw a major overhaul in its structure.

As can be seen by the earlier mapping of how counterterrorism intelligence moves within the American Intelligence Community, the primary location of counterterrorism efforts can be found within the NCTC and the FBI. “By law, NCTC serves as the ‘primary organization in the United States Government’ for analyzing and integrating information pertaining to international terrorism”\(^\text{132}\). The NCTC has defined the current main terrorist threat as coming from “violent extremists inspired by the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) and Al Qaida”\(^\text{133}\).

However, as is also shown by the above charts, the flow of intelligence and/or information is not uni-directional, and many nodes often report to multiple larger organizations. (i.e. The counterterrorism section of the Department of Justice under the attorney general who reports to the DOJ (Department of Justice), DOS (Department of State), DHS (Department of Homeland Security) and the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation)).

Therefore it appears that the American counterterrorism complex is largely driven from a split approach, where the intelligence, research and information exchange is housed within the FBI and NCTC, but the military branch runs the actual counterterrorism actions and missions.

4.3 American Counterterrorism Efficiency

As stated within the Methodology chapter of this thesis, a state’s counterterrorism efficiency will be measured through three main indicators: (1) The number of executed terrorist attacks over the chosen ten year time period; (2) the public opinion towards terrorism and faith in the state’s national security; and (3) the number of imprisoned terrorists. All three of these factors will be measured, to the best of the author’s ability, over the span of 10 years (from 2006-2016).


4.3A Number of Terrorist Attacks

Using the database from the University of Maryland\textsuperscript{134} we are given the number of terrorist incidents by year. The following Figure shows us a summary of this data from 2006 – 2016.

**Figure 21: Summary of University of Maryland Statistics**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This Figure shows a relatively low number of terrorist attacks on American domestic soil (except for 2012, where we see a spike of domestic terrorist attacks from many anti-police and anti-government forces).

An interesting statistic to note for the United States is the trend regarding the number of deaths from American military soldiers while on active duty. In a study by DeBruyne\textsuperscript{135}, we see a steady decrease in deaths from 1991 (during the Gulf War) until 2002 (the beginning of the war on terror). During this time we can also observe a fairly constant number of soldiers on Active Duty, meaning that this decline in numbers is not due to a decline in the number of soldiers at risk. However, beginning in 2002, we see a very steady increase in total deaths until approximately 2010 (when the data for this graph stops)\textsuperscript{136}. Therefore, it would appear that while the number of terrorist attacks on American soil has remained low, the threat level retains its elevated position partially due to the amount of overseas involvement and threat to the US military; ultimately meaning that the terrorism threat to America is much more credible overseas than it is domestically.


4.3B PUBLIC OPINION OF TERRORIST THREAT

As can be expected from the irrational fear that plagues the minds of most civilians in regards to terrorism, the American perception of the terrorist threat to their individual daily lives tends to be inflated. As we saw from the previous statistic, the number of actual terrorist attacks on American soil is relatively low, and yet an approximate consistent 50% of the American population is “very/somewhat worried” 137 about being a victim of terrorism.

Somewhat paradoxically, when asked the following question – “Next, we’d like to know how you feel about the state of the nation in each of the following areas: the nation’s security from terrorism?” 138, we see a majority vote of confidence in America’s perceived national security abilities.

Figure 22: American Opinion on State of the Nation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat Satisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Very Dissatisfied</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While we see an increasing perception of threat from terrorism from 2006 – 2016, we also see confidence from the American public in the American government and national security enterprise to protect them from the threat of terrorism. This discrepancy between the two above figures only serves to further enforce how terrorism creates such a strong atmosphere of irrational fear.

4.3C IMPRISONED TERRORISTS

The number of convicted and imprisoned terrorists seems to have stayed relatively consistent within the United States. As shown by Figure 23, this is not the case for the entire international community. Instead, the global total numbers of convicted terrorist prisoners are steadily increasing.

“American prisons currently hold 443 convicted terrorists” and hold another 89 convicted felons in Cuba at Guantanamo Bay. The majority of these prisoners are being held in a select few prisons throughout the US, primarily in Illinois, Colorado, and Virginia. The steadiness of the American imprisonment numbers shows us two main findings: firstly, that the current American system has not been terribly efficient at putting terrorists behind bars. This first point can be due to many factors. In large part, as mentioned above, the American terrorist threat is over seas. This makes the question of legal jurisdiction over the prosecuted terrorists difficult to ascertain.

However, the second fact that these numbers point to is that the American counterterrorism goal does not necessarily aim to increase these numbers. As can be anticipated with a War Macro Model, these numbers are not moving as much as the amount of terrorist related military activity, which has seen a steady increase via the War on Terror. The amount of incarcerated terrorists would be expected to move much more within a Criminal Macro Model.
4.4 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the War Macro Model with a decentralized terrorism unit of the Intelligence Community shows a limited number of successes. Its strongest point of success is seen by the American perception of confidence in their country’s national security. The War Model does a wonderful job of giving a very public display of counterterrorism action that can produce some violent and tangible results. That being said, these results are not just visible to the United States, but to the entire world, which may partially explain why the American terrorist threat is now largely overseas. The decentralized terrorism portion of the Intelligence Community also allows for a stronger military presence and direction in the counterterrorism macro model. Therefore, this model seems to diffuse the terrorist threat from the homeland to overseas.
This section of our proposed model represents a country that has a centralized terrorism section of the Intelligence Community and has adopted a Criminal Model for its counterterrorism complex.

The French Intelligence Community is very familiar with counterterrorism. Having a long history with terrorism and political strife, France’s intelligence system has centralized itself in order to consolidate power under the nation’s president. “The French would argue that counterterrorism and intelligence agencies in the country benefit from a higher level of secrecy and centralization”\textsuperscript{140}. While not a requirement for centralization under the definition of this thesis, the French intelligence system is actually centralized under the French political system, ensuring a more seamless communication between information and policy.

This is also our first case study that falls under the macro Criminal Model counter. This means that within the French context, terrorism is viewed as a crime and is not differentiated

from other crimes under the legal system. This not only creates a more robust judicial system around terrorism, but also focuses on the individuals involved in terrorist activities, rather than the network as a whole (as opposed to the War and even Disease macro models). This type of model should result in a larger prison population of incarcerated terrorists, and a larger literature on the exact judicial nature of the crime of terrorism.

France also fits wonderfully within the requirement restrictions for a case study delineated for this thesis. It ranks as number 29 on the Global Terrorism Index\textsuperscript{141} with a rating of 5.603/10, qualifying as a moderate threat level within the study (along with the rest of our chosen case studies).

France is also an interesting case regarding the United Nations Universal Human Rights Index\textsuperscript{142}. While there are not many French human rights violations, staying true to the country’s reputation as a champion of democracy, there have been an increasing amount of complaints pertaining to the French prison system (which is actually in large part due to their ability and technique when handling terrorists). This will be further explored later in this chapter. However, the French state as a whole does not have any grievous human rights violations and therefore will be considered as a viable case study for this thesis.

5.1 Structure of the French Intelligence Community in regards to Counterterrorism

France has developed into a highly centralized Intelligence Community. While it’s organization may appear similar to that of the decentralized United States of America intelligence community, there are a few key factors that differentiate them.

To begin, the French intelligence agencies have developed from a long history. Beginning with espionage agents in the Middle Ages and emerging as a “modern intelligence community” in the nineteenth century, France truly pushed to “expand it’s boundaries during the Napoleonic era and Age of Empire”\textsuperscript{143}. Specializing in military intelligence, espionage was crucial to the French success on the battlefield and it’s further security of territorial government outposts. This strong military presence within the Intelligence Community is also largely emphasized in today’s model. In modern day France, the “Intelligence Community is divided


between military and civilian agencies, all of which report to the executive branch.”\textsuperscript{144} The below figures show the English translation\textsuperscript{145} of this divide below\textsuperscript{146}.

**Figure 25: French Intelligence Agency Structure 1**

English Translation: Laurence Bouchard

![Diagram of French Intelligence Agency Structure 1](https://gosint.wordpress.com/2017/02/23/an-introduction-to-french-intelligence-agencies/)

**Figure 26: French Intelligence Agency Structure 2**

English Translation: Laurence Bouchard

![Diagram of French Intelligence Agency Structure 2](https://gosint.wordpress.com/2017/02/23/an-introduction-to-french-intelligence-agencies/)


\textsuperscript{145} Translation by Laurence Bouchard

\textsuperscript{146}
Figure 27: French Intelligence Agency Structure 3
English Translation: Laurence Bouchard
Along with a military focus, the French Intelligence community “emphasizes counter-intelligence and domestic security”\(^{147}\). This requires the cooperation of local law enforcement and security agencies in the domestic domain, further centralizing any and all intelligence operations on French soil. On the other hand, almost all external or foreign intelligence is

handled by the French military. “This separation of powers gives military and civilian intelligence organizations their own *de facto* jurisdictions in the intelligence community”\(^\text{148}\).

Acting as an umbrella for the six main French Intelligence Agencies is the National Defense General Secretariat (SDGN). The SDGN “coordinates intelligence and security operations within the various intelligence community agencies”\(^\text{149}\).

Under this are the main two military intelligence agencies: (1) Directorate for the Defense Protection Security (DPSD) and (2) the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Brigade (BRGE). “The DPSD is the primary military counterintelligence agency, planning and coordinating most military security operations. The agency also conducts political surveillance of the armed forces and national military police, the Gendarmerie”\(^\text{150}\), as well as being responsible for the security of information, personnel, material and facilities of the armed forces and the defense industry\(^\text{151}\). Working closely with the DPSD, the BRGE monitors classified and sensitive communications and works to secure the military’s computer information systems.

The civilian intelligence agencies fall under the directorship of the Ministry of Interior. The primary domestic civilian agency is the Direction Generale de la Securite Interieure (DGSI). This was formed in 2008 through the merger of the General Information Service (RG) and the Direction Surveillance du Territoire (DST). Prior to this “the director of the RG […] brief[ed] the president on domestic national security issues. Charged with the protection of internal security and domestic counterintelligence, the RG work[ed] in close conjunction with provincial governments and prefectures of the national police to protect national interests within France”\(^\text{152}\). The DST essentially performed the same tasks as the RG, simply in French territories and not within the mainland. However, due to the international focus, the DST would also work more closely with the French military in order to secure French political, scientific and economic interests abroad.

Possibly the most important agency to note for this thesis is the Direction General de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE). This agency reports to the Minister of Defense (i.e. falls under the

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military and foreign sectors of the French Intelligence Community) and “is responsible for collecting foreign intelligence on civilian issues and also performs paramilitary and counterintelligence operations abroad. DGSE is responsible for both HUMINT and SIGINT”\textsuperscript{153}. Similar to the American model, this agency utilizes both analysts as well as field operatives (as opposed to the other military intelligence agencies listed above who do not have field operatives in active duty) in order to be the primary foreign intelligence agency.

Recently, the DSGE has been granted an increase in both manpower and other resources. Since the June 27, 2008 decree that merged the RG and DST, as mentioned above, we are seeing a general trend of added resources towards French National Defense. In that same decree we see the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCLAT – \textit{Unité de coordination de la lutte anti-terroriste}) being created in order to “coordinate the police and the national gendarmerie, which has its own anti-terrorist brigade (BLAT- \textit{brigade de lutte anti-terroriste})”; and we see the “National Intelligence Council (CNR – \textit{Conseil national du renseignement}) being created, including the appointment of a coordinator answerable to the President of the Republic”, who partially works on recognizing the value of a terrorist threat\textsuperscript{154}.

Also adjusted in recent reorganization (and will be expanded upon within the counterterrorism model evaluation portion of this thesis) is what the government considers as an individual’s involvement in terrorism. France charges conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence as a full crime and, as such, has developed prevention agencies such as “the DCRI is both an intelligence agency and a unit of the criminal police” and has given “criminal judges an effective judicial instrument which enables them to dismantle networks before an attack takes place”\textsuperscript{155}.

But returning to the centralization of the French Intelligence Community, there has also been legislation further enforcing the linear structure of command. In particular, “the French laws, such as \textit{Loi n° 2015-912} and \textit{Loi n° 2015-1556}, from July and November 2015 respectively, grant the Prime Minister full authority to order and approve intelligence activities both domestic and foreign. Each collection request is sent by the intelligence service director to its parent ministry and to the Prime Minister, who gives final approval”\textsuperscript{156}.

This linear structure of command is not left unchecked however, the French government has also created an advisory committee known as the CNCTR (Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Techniques de Renseignement, or National Commission for the Control of Intelligence Techniques) who is to be “kept informed of all requests for oversight purposes”\textsuperscript{157}.

Even more recently, immediately after “the November 2015 attacks in Paris, President Hollande addressed a Joint Session of Parliament, proposing a three-month extension of the state of emergency, changes to the constitution to allow the government to revoke French citizenship of convicted terrorists with dual citizenship, increased monitoring of foreigners and dual nationals, 10,000 additional security jobs, 2,500 judiciary and prison system jobs, and 1,000 more jobs for border patrol”\textsuperscript{158}. This placed an even larger emphasis on the Intelligence Community’s information collecting capabilities over the previously championed French ideals of civilian privacy.

The French have always had a very active Intelligence Community. It is in large part what had allowed them to grow so strongly and quickly in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. It has “built resiliency mechanisms over a long history of counterterrorism, allowing for an extension into police and judiciary powers”\textsuperscript{159}, which has strongly affected it’s counterterrorism techniques and macro model. And throughout the entire process, one thing that has remained consistent is the centralization of the Intelligence Community within the French state.

5.2 FRENCH COUNTERTERRORISM MACRO MODEL

France has a rather long and tenuous history with external terrorist threats to the homeland, which has resulted in the aforementioned increase in police and surveillance powers above.

France’s main clash with terrorism began in the 1950’s and 1960’s during the war in Algeria. This bloody and messy affair included “multiple bombings and police killings, which led to increased counterterrorism efforts up to and including torture and killing”\textsuperscript{160}. The backlash from this was so intense that the terrorist attacks continued into the 1980’s and 1990’s. In large


part, the attacks were a direct result of France’s “Sanctuary doctrine”: “During this time, France was considered a sanctuary for international terrorists, allowing foreign terrorists to stay in the country as long as they operated outside French borders and there were no attacks on France or its interests”\textsuperscript{161}.

This may remind the reader of Russia’s current technique of exporting terrorists through the Green Corridor Deal. Both doctrines (Russia’s current doctrine and France’s doctrine through the late 1900’s) allowed their respective governments to claim a neutral stance regarding international independence disputes (primarily those of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Israel and the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque territory of Spain). However, this technique did not last long and there was soon a new wave of terrorist attacks within the French borders, resulting in the termination of the sanctuary doctrine and an overhaul of the structure for the entire Intelligence Community.

A key component of the new intelligence technique for the French Intelligence Community is the emphasis on conducting "counterterrorism investigations—whether domestic or foreign—[...]/ in the same manner as a criminal investigation”\textsuperscript{162}. By refusing to place terrorists into a separate crime classification or handling their cases with more urgency and importance, the French judicial system aims to delegitimize their cause. “From the French viewpoint, the special jurisdiction for enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay is counterproductive because it elevates terrorists to a higher level of importance, bolstering their narrative”\textsuperscript{163}; and as the main goal of terrorism is to control the narrative in order to effect their desired political change, the French authorities have removed this tool from their arsenal. Further, the French government views “the threat of terrorism differently from the United States. Although France considers Islamist terrorism a major threat, it does not view terrorist actions as an “act of war” against France or against the West as a whole. France defines terrorism as the violent expression of extremism, which is sometimes motivated by religion and other times motivated by different factors”\textsuperscript{164}. This again serves to delegitimize the terrorist’s importance and reduce the impact of their story and narrative.

This also serves as a wonderful example of exactly how a Criminal Macro Model for counterterrorism operates. The main emphasis is placed on the judicial system and the


individuals conducting the terrorist actions, not on the terrorist organization as a whole or it’s narrative.

The French Criminal Model also takes on a preemptive tone by adding to their already broad definition of terrorism with “criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking (association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste)”\textsuperscript{165} and the possibility of accusing an individual of “association with wrong-doers involved in a terrorist enterprise”\textsuperscript{166}.

Due to the emphasis on the judicial process, the Criminal Model exhibited in France, unsurprisingly, has some very specific legislation.

\begin{quote}
“Under Article 421-1 of the French Penal Code, all acts of terrorism are now autonomous offences liable to increased penalties. Terrorist activity is generally taken to consist in the perpetration of one of a limitative list of criminal offences \textless in connection with an individual or collective undertaking, the purpose of which is seriously to disturb public order through intimidation or terror\textgreater. Some offences, however, such as environmental terrorism, conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence and the financing of terrorism are now specific offences”\textsuperscript{167}.
\end{quote}

Once identified as a terrorist, the criminals are then subject to very specific procedural rules. This includes the “centralization of investigation, prosecution and trial within a single jurisdiction made up of specialist members of the judiciary with competence for the whole of France”\textsuperscript{168}.

In addition to prosecution in the judicial field, France, along with the rest of the European Union (EU), has also targeted the financial capabilities of the terrorist organizations. The 2006 \textit{Anti-Terrorism} act passed by the EU and the United Nations (UN) allows for “persons or entities that commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts \textit{[to]} have their assets frozen by order of the Minister of the Economy and Finance”\textsuperscript{169}. Not only does this measure follow the UN and EU protocols, but it is also the common criminal proceeding for any other sort of organized crime.

Another modification made to France’s legal and counterterrorism system is the consideration of modern technology (i.e. the internet).

\textsuperscript{166} Novitsky, Olga. \textit{Why Intelligence Overhaul Is Not the Answer for France}. February 25, 2016.
“On 21 December 2012, Parliament adopted Act 2012-1432 on security and action against terrorism. The Act steps up sanctions against persons who are “guilty of justification of or incitement to terrorism on the internet”. It provides for the prosecution in French courts of terrorist acts committed in other countries by French nationals or persons simply habitually residing in France. The act allows for the prosecution of persons who attend terrorist training camps outside France (even though no misdeed has been committed on French territory), and for the extension of asset-freezing to persons who incite to terrorism.”

However, a new development within the French counterterrorism system is a re-found focus on radicalization.

“Jusqu’en 2013-2014, la France refusait de considérer la « radicalisation » comme un problème en soi. Sous le titre « lutte contre la radicalisation », on pouvait lire, sur le site internet du ministère des Affaires étrangères, « la pratique française en matière de lutte contre la radicalisation se fonde essentiellement sur une approche de respect de la légalité. Elle ne vise pas à contrer un discours idéologique qui certes, dans certains cas, peut contribuer au passage à l’acte violent, mais ne conduit pas de façon automatique à l’usage de la violence. La pratique française vise des infractions à la loi (incitation à la violence, à la haine raciale etc.) mais non l’adhésion à un discours, ce qui contreviendrait à la conception française de la liberté de conscience et d’expression ».

And yet, even with this new turned attention and acknowledgement of radicalization, the French approach is based solely on compliance with the law and does not aim to directly influence the discourse or engage in an ideological stance, for fear of infringing upon the civilization’s freedom of expression.

Instead, the only de-radicalization programs in place are those that resemble rehabilitation programs within prisons. The extremists and those dispersing the radical discourse, once found guilty under French law and placed within the penitentiary system, are periodically

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171 “Until 2013-2014, France refused to consider “radicalization” as a problem in and of itself. Under the title “the fight against radicalization”, we could read, on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the French actions in the fight against radicalizations are fundamentally based on the respect for the law. These actions do not aim to counter the ideological discourse that, in certain cases, can contribute to violent action, but does not automatically result in such violent action. The French actions looks to infractions of the law (inciting of violence, racism, etc) but not at the discourse itself, which would infringe upon the French concept of freedom of expression” (Translation completed by author).

separated from the general prison population and “receive visits from imams, teachers, sociologists and psychologists”\(^{173}\).

The French government consistently responds to terrorist attacks in the exact same manner: “L’évolution historique des dispositifs antiterroriste en France montre qu’à chaque fois que l’État a été confronté à une nouvelle vague de violences radicales - pendant la Guerre d’Algérie, ou les attentats terroristes des années 1980/1990 - il a multiplié les mesures répressives d’exceptions, puis les a transposées dans le droit commun sous prétexte que le dispositif antérieur était insuffisant. Résultat : plus de 20 législations antiterroristes en 30 ans\(^{174}\)\(^{175}\). For example, after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the government announced a huge increase in finance for counterterrorism measures and a law was soon passed allowing various intelligence agencies to monitor and record phone and email conversations without permission from a judge. Following the November attacks, President Hollande declared a state of emergency and the police and intelligence agencies immediately began profiling “Muslims across the country, [who] have complained to human rights organizations that they are being systematically profiled”\(^{176}\).

This increased pressure in counterterrorism within French borders continues today. “President Emmanuel Macron’s first major piece of security legislation, would allow the government to lift the state of emergency imposed nearly two years ago while still being able to reassure the public that the state will exert, if anything, even greater vigilance”\(^{177}\). Intriguingly, the French general public tends to support the state of emergency as “many French have not suffered ill consequences from it, and they fear any retreat from the emergency measures will leave them more vulnerable”\(^{178}\). Unsurprisingly, President Macron’s move to take many of the characteristics from the state of emergency and to solidify them into the new status quo has been fairly well received by his populace.


\(^{174}\) “The historical evolution of counterterrorism methods within France shows that each time the state was confronted with a new wave of radical violence – during the Algerian War or the terrorist attacks in 1980-1990 – it has multiplied it repressive exception measures, then it has transposed this into the common law under the pretext that the previous methods were not sufficient. Result: over 20 pieces of counterterrorism legislation in 30 years” (Translation by author)


Another major factor within the French counterterrorism model is its large involvement in international cooperation. As this does not directly affect the French counterterrorism macro model, the author will not go into too much detail on this subject, but will instead list some of the main centers/organizations with their primary tasks below:

**Figure 29: List of International Cooperation in France for Counterterrorism**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTCEN (Intelligence Analysis Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Justice and Home Affairs pillar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurojust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Action Task Force (FATF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Euro-Mediterranean partnership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Task:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provides input to the High Representative of the European External Action Service, EU security, foreign policy, defense and counterterrorism agencies and Member States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deals with issues relating to terrorism outside the EU, especially by conducting bilateral dialogues with our main partners, and to technical assistance to third countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deals with specific issues relating to internal security within the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and judicial cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set up an anti-terrorist unit in 2003. Since 9/11, a consensus has emerged that the forum should be used for political initiatives, in particular to encourage its members to ratify UN conventions or to step up technical assistance on the subject to member countries. In December 2012, the OSCE adopted a specific decision which describes the efforts made by the organization since 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set up by the OECD countries to combat money laundering. Its brief was extended to combating the financing of terrorism after 9/11 and it has adopted nine special recommendations on the subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adopted an anti-terrorist code of conduct in November 2005.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ultimately, the French population places a lot of trust in these international institutions and actually wants the EU to intervene more in the state’s individual fights against terrorism.

### 5.3 French Counterterrorism Efficiency

As stated within the Methodology chapter of this thesis, a state’s counterterrorism efficiency will be measured through three main indicators: (1) The number of executed terrorist attacks over the chosen ten year time period; (2) the public opinion towards terrorism and faith in the state’s national security; and (3) the number of imprisoned terrorists. All three of these factors will be measured, to the best of the author’s ability, over the span of 10 years (from 2006-2016).
5.3A Number of Terrorist Attacks

Using the database from the University of Maryland\textsuperscript{179} we are given the number of terrorist incidents by year within France. The following Figure shows us a summary of this data from 2006 – 2016.

**Figure 30: Summary of Incidents Over Time**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data shows us a small spike in terrorist activity during 2012, but otherwise displays a relatively steady and consistent number of attacks. However, as the threat of terrorism has increased for France during this time, their steady numbers may actually indicate an increase in efficiency for the state’s counterterrorism techniques.

Also important to note, while France has stable statistics over time, it is the only Western European state listed by a Statista study\textsuperscript{180}, which denotes the total number of non-militant fatalities at the hand of a terrorist during the year 2015, where France falls as number 22 out of 26\textsuperscript{181}. This may indicate that while the French counterterrorism technique is relatively competent at limiting the absolute number of terrorist attacks on its soil, the attacks that are occurring may be more fatal than in the past.


5.3B Public Opinion of Terrorist Threat

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the public opinion of the state of emergency is a surprisingly positive one. As a majority of the French citizens’ individual civil rights and lives have not been directly affected, they are not opposed to the harsh measures being imposed by the government. This desire to keep an elevated level of emergency may also indicate that the French population perceives a very high threat from terrorism on their homeland. “Selon une étude Ifop, 92% des Français considèrent la menace terroriste élevée” (And yet, while many supported the movement of certain aspects of the state of emergency into national law, “depuis la levée de l'état d'urgence, 21% des Français se sentent moins en sécurité”. The following Figure demonstrates how the French population has responded via their perceived threat level of terrorism based on the attacks that occurred.

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182 According to a study conducted by IFOP, 92% of French people consider the terrorist threat as high” (translation completed by author).


184 “Since the lifting of the state of emergency, 21% of French people feel less secure” (translation completed by author).

Figure 31: Evaluation of Threat in France
Source: Europe 1.

Terrorisme : pour 92% des Français, la menace est élevée.
November 12, 2017.

L’évaluation de la menace terroriste en France

- Evolution depuis octobre 2001 -

Ifop pour Le Journal du Dimanche
Le regard des Français sur la menace terroriste ▶ Novembre 2017
As we can see, the French public has maintained a very high perception of the threat of terrorism that stays consistent regardless of state action or terrorist attack.

5.3c Imprisoned Terrorists

This is probably the most interesting statistic for evaluating the French counterterrorism model’s efficiency for it is the most controversial. Over time, as shown in Figure 32, the amount of incarcerated criminals have increased for the country.

**Figure 32: French Prison Population Trend**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prison Population Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>55,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>59,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>62,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>72,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>71,190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, “prisons reflect the societies they inhabit, says Magnum photographer Paolo Pellegrin. France's over-stuffed penitentiary, in which over half the population is estimated to be Muslim, offers a rather unsettling mirror for an electorate soon to decide on the future of their country”186. In fact, it is estimated that between 40-60% of French inmates are Muslim, intriguingly making it a “population highly susceptible to messages that promise them an alternative sense of solidarity”187.

As a result, “over the past few years it has become a common belief that prison radicalisation is the most dramatic manifestation of a wider problem: the vehement rejection by many young French Muslims of what they see as a xenophobic and impious French republic. As France’s media and politicians do not tire of pointing out, some of the worst recent atrocities on French soil have been committed by men who were “radicalized” behind bars”188. Beginning to truly pick up in the mid-2000’s, French prisons began receiving many Muslim inmates who were educated by the French education system and were therefore well aware of their rights as prisoners. They therefore began to demand the state to facilitate religious expression and were able to cultivate a breeding ground for spreading their particular ideology. This over crowding coupled with police and legal targeting, created the perfect atmosphere for a supportive network found behind bars to easily make an impact. It has, in fact, proven to contribute strongly to the radicalization of susceptible innocent people who found themselves behind bars.


5.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the Criminal Macro Model with a centralized terrorism unit of the Intelligence Community shows some conflicting results. While the general population approves of the government’s strong and centralized response to security, they do so primarily because they do not perceive the terrorist threat as diminishing. While the prisons are showing an increased population of possible terrorists, they are also serving as a breeding ground to radicalize others, and finally, while the number of terrorist attacks has stayed relatively consistent, the fatalities due to terrorism seem to have increased. “Excesses in the name of preventing terrorism, even if the overall strategy is based on use of the criminal justice system, are likely to be counterproductive insofar as they alienate entire communities. Injustice feeds resentment and erodes public trust in law enforcement and security forces among the very communities whose cooperation is critical in the fight against terrorism. Over the long term, these abuses may actually feed into the grievances exploited by extremists”\textsuperscript{189}.

Ultimately, while this combination of intelligence and Criminal Macro Model may serve to look efficient in initial statistics, it does not seem to prove effective in the long-term and in actuality.

This section of our proposed model represents a country that has a decentralized terrorism section of the Intelligence Community and has adopted a Criminal Model for its counterterrorism complex.

Indonesia finds itself in a particularly interesting position as it is in one of the most heavily Muslim populated areas of the world: South East Asia.

This was earlier identified as an area that specializes in the Disease Macro counterterrorism Model; however, Indonesia has placed a stronger emphasis on their legal and policing apparatus than on their cultural ones, landing them a place in the Criminal Model classification. As will be shown within this case study, Indonesia focuses on their judicial structure and has passed a number of legislative bills in order to strengthen this aspect.

Indonesia qualifies through the delineated thesis parameters as well. The country ranks as number 38 on the Global Terrorism Index\textsuperscript{190} with a rating of 4.429/10, qualifying as a moderate threat level within the study (along with the rest of our chosen case studies).

Indonesia is also an interesting case regarding the United Nation’s Universal Human Rights Index\textsuperscript{191}. While it shows no serious human rights violations during the studied time period, the country has been attempting to pass a new counterterrorism legal measure that has some human rights analysts worried about it’s repercussions. This will also be further discussed in the analysis of the Macro counterterrorism Model later in this chapter of the thesis. However, for the chosen time period of this thesis study, Indonesia qualifies as a case study.

6.1 STRUCTURE OF THE INDONESIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN REGARDS TO COUNTERTERRORISM

Indonesia’s struggle with terrorism began, as soon as it gained its independence from the Netherlands in 1949. The new country fell almost immediately under a military-backed authoritarian ruler for forty years, and was unable to escape his hold until approximately 1985. The country was then able to transition towards a demilitarized popular government structure. Even as this transition was underway, Indonesia continued to be plagued with “persistent problems such as growing poverty, tribal and ethnic tensions, territorial disputes, government corruption, and political turmoil”\textsuperscript{192}. Yet, Indonesia has continued to strive for reform and to stabilize the nation’s intelligence and security communities.

As a result, Indonesia has developed “several small civilian intelligence agencies responsible for specific security functions, such as counterintelligence, antiterrorism efforts, government protective services, and media relations”\textsuperscript{193}. These various agencies operate “largely autonomously” and have very limited “direction and coordination of the largest civilian agency, the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN)”\textsuperscript{194}. BAKIN focuses largely on domestic security and intelligence, leaving much of the counterterrorism and foreign intelligence to other departments.

The Coordinating Agency for National Stability (BAKORSTANAS) is largely associated with counterterrorism. The BAKORSTANAS created a discourse between the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, focusing primarily on “ferreting out anti-government organizations in Indonesia”\textsuperscript{195}. Due to the perceived high threat of anti-government movements, the Indonesian


government has decided not to give to much oversight to this agency, resulting in very few limitations on operations. Naturally, this caused the agency to fall “under suspicion of human rights violations from several international humanitarian organizations”\textsuperscript{196}. However, in order to address the humanitarian concerns, the Indonesian government was forced into some reforms for the BAKORSTANAS and “limited its powers to control action forces without government consent”\textsuperscript{197}.

Another important intelligence factor for Indonesia is found within the military branch. Indonesia’s military consists of three branches: the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Each of these branches has their own “strategic intelligence forces within its operations units”\textsuperscript{198}, but the primary military intelligence agency is that of BAIS. BAIS serves to coordinate the military’s intelligence forces overseas. “Indonesian military intelligence focuses on foreign intelligence information, especially that garnered from communications surveillance. In recent years, the Indonesian government has made the actions of military intelligence agencies more directly responsible to the DPKN in order to gauge political sentiment within the military and prevent the rise of insurgent groups”\textsuperscript{199}. This speaks to Indonesia’s focus on controlling any threat to their current administration. Further, the use of communications intelligence speaks to a Criminal Model’s emphasis on evidence collection.

But the most important Indonesian Intelligence Agency (as far as this thesis is concerned), is Indonesia's National Intelligence Agency, known by its acronym BIN. BIN has seen a steady increase in power and resources with the current wave of terrorist attacks and therefore is often “arguing that it is better equipped to handle the challenges than the police or the military”\textsuperscript{200}.

As a result of its central role in the counterterrorism field, BIN has gone through some pretty intense structural and procedural reforms. To begin, it has grown from its original five departments into seven and has delineated its intelligence strategies reorganization goals as follows: “(1) streamlining to enhance the organization’s effectivity and efficacy, (2) reorganizing


to be a responsive institution, and (3) redefining its function and responsibility”\textsuperscript{201}. A prime example of this reorganization is seen when “the Deputy 5 on covert action and propaganda was dissolved and replaced by Deputy 3 on counter-intelligence”\textsuperscript{202}.

Another major BIN change has been the push “to recruit more operatives to face challenges from the global, regional, and national level”\textsuperscript{203}. This has been met with an increase in manpower, but some question whether it has been coupled with an increase in skill and training. One of BIN’s primary recruitment strategies is to utilize Indonesia’s Intelligence College (STIN) “as a recruiting pool, allowing for the best people in the country to become intelligence officers”\textsuperscript{204}, helping to ensure a high quality recruit. However, it does not seem to have focused on its in-house training for recruits who do not hold the same STIN background.

Presidential Decree No. 34 Year 2010 recently updated BIN’s organization structure. In this update to BIN’s structure, the head of BIN is called the chief, and also serves as the Police General. The main task of the BIN chief is to “lead in performing the duties and functions of the NIA. The BIN chief is given the right financial, administrative and other facilities on par with the Minister”. Next in the hierarchical line is the Deputy Chief. This person’s task is to help the intelligence chief in whatever manner necessary. Another key role is that of the Main Secretariat who “has the task of coordinating the implementation of the tasks, coaching and providing administrative support to all organizational units within the NIA”\textsuperscript{205}. This coordination is done largely between the various Deputies. They have been listed with their titles and a description of their primary duties in the Figure below.

Figure 34: Description of Indonesian State Intelligence Agencies
https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFJnKLY72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uc0/wiki/Indonesian_State_Intelligence_Agency.html (accessed May 3, 2018).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description of Duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Deputy Foreign Affairs (Deputy I) has the tasks of policy formulation and implementation of activities and/or operations of foreign intelligence field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Home Affairs</td>
<td>Deputy Home Affairs (Deputy II) has the tasks of policy formulation and implementation of activities and/or operations in the field of domestic intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy of Counter Intelligence</td>
<td>Deputy of Counter Intelligence (Deputy III) has the tasks of policy formulation and implementation of activities and/or counterintelligence operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Economy</td>
<td>Deputy Economy (Deputy IV) has the tasks of policy formulation and implementation of activities and/or intelligence operations in economics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy for Technology</td>
<td>Deputy for Technology (Deputy V) has the tasks of policy formulation and implementation of activities and/or intelligence operations technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Communications and Information</td>
<td>Deputy Communication and Information (Deputy VI) has the tasks of policy formulation and implementation of activities and/or intelligence operations in Communication and Information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Processing and Production Intelligence</td>
<td>Deputy Analysis and Production Intelligence (Deputy VII) has the tasks of policy formulation and implementation field of processing and the production of intelligence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And finally, all of the internal oversight within this Intelligence Agency is conducted by the Main Inspectorate. Each of these individual deputies operate in a mostly autonomous fashion, following the general trend of the Indonesian intelligence community.

Over all, the primary counterterrorism areas of the Indonesian intelligence community seem to be split between the BIN and the BAIS. It seems as if both of these operate in an autonomous fashion and have very little incentive or desire to coordinate with each other or any centralized government oversight. Therefore, Indonesia easily qualifies as a decentralized Intelligence Community both in general, and in regards to their counterterrorism intelligence mission.

6.2 INDONESIA COUNTERTERRORISM MACRO MODEL

As stated in the introduction of this case study, Indonesia holds one of the largest Muslim populations in the world and has struggled with terrorist activities since it’s freedom from the Netherlands in 1949. Following its colonial independence, Indonesia fell into the clutches of an authoritarian dictator parading as President: Suharto. Under his thirty-two year-long rule, President Suharto was able to suppress “extremist movements such as Darul Islam, a precursor to the Islamist terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)”, who is responsible for a majority of the terrorist
acts carried out in Indonesia today. However, with Suharto’s fall in 1998, the “Indonesian Muslims who had traveled to join the fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s returned to Indonesia and formed various militant groups”.

These extremist militant groups have gone on to execute multiple terrorist attacks throughout the country. The primary jihadist group, JI, is “led by its co-founder Abu Bakar Bashir, who pledged allegiance to ISIS in July 2014.” With this pledge of support, ISIS and other extremist groups have capitalized on the already existing Islamist and Muslim networks within Indonesia’s borders to supplement much of its own recruitment and execution efforts. The Figure below lists the primary extremist groups operating in Indonesia, their areas of operations, and their goals/general aims.

Figure 35: Principle Extremist Groups Operating in Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Name</th>
<th>Area of Operation</th>
<th>General Aims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISIS-associated Daulah (JAD)</td>
<td>Jemaah Ansorut an ISIS-aligned coalition of cells located throughout the country</td>
<td>establish an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>overthrow the Indonesian Government and, ultimately, establish a pan-Islamic state across Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) network in Indonesia</td>
<td>maintains a covert operational presence</td>
<td>replace the Indonesian Government with an Islamic state and implement ISIS’s strict interpretation of Sharia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A particular strategy to note for extremist recruitment in Indonesia has been that of the local ISIS network. Using online propaganda, “in a video published in July 2014, titled “Join the Ranks,” a man identified as Abu Muhammad al-Indonesi spoke in Indonesian and called on Indonesian Muslim men to put <all your effort into using your physical and financial strength to migrate to the Islamic State>.” Also “following the June 2016 Orlando attack, during which Omar Mateen killed 49 people, ISIS released a video entitled “You Are Not Held Responsible Except for Yourself.” The video featured Abu Nusseyba al-Indunisy, who praised Mateen and called for more lone-wolf attacks against “crusaders” and America. According to security expert Professor Greg Barton of Australia’s Monash University, ISIS views Indonesia as fertile ground for recruitment because of the large number of Indonesian Muslims who have

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already gone to Syria and the potential to recruit more”210. The wave of online recruitment has proven as a powerful and effective tool in Indonesia, as there are so many young and disenfranchised Muslim men who are susceptible to the extremist message.

Another popular recruitment and radicalization area has been the “Pesantren, or Islamic schools. […] According to Sydney Jones of the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, an estimated 40 pesantren have terrorist connections”211. Less prominent, but still worthy of note, “USAID found that a small number of mosques have also become sites of radicalization, and are particularly pro-ISIS”212.

The primary manner in which “Indonesia addresses the threats of terrorism is through the lens of law enforcement”213. In order to do so, the government “has passed a series of domestic counterterrorism laws and established regional alliances to address extremism”214. The main focus of these pieces of legislation has been to increase law enforcement capabilities with the end goal of dismantling the major extremist networks operating within the country.

As can be expected from a Criminal Macro Counterterrorism Model, “the Indonesian government seeks to try terrorist suspects according to the existing laws while modestly using coercive measures against violent terror attacks”215. This indicates a strong emphasis on the individual perpetrating the terrorist attack, treating the terrorist organizations in the exact same manner as any other organized crime unit, rather than giving their cause any more importance or significance in the public’s eye.

Particular to Indonesia, the country has a very specific aversion to military employment, keeping the country at a safe distance from the War Macro Model for counterterrorism. Therefore, as seen above in the description of the Indonesian Intelligence Community, the military has been much more involved in the intelligence gathering portion of counterterrorism than any active physical engagement with the extremist groups. “The Indonesian government carefully engages the TNI in the counterterrorism campaign. To date, the military has played a

crucial role in intelligence gathering.” General Moeldoko, the TNI chief, has recently released a new report regarding the military’s counterterrorism strategy, which includes the creation of a new counterterror task force: “The new unit will be assembled from troops with relevant skills for special operations on ground, sea and air, and each respective division of the armed services will retain command of these soldiers during peacetime.”

However, as the threat of terrorism grows on a global scale, the Indonesian government continues to evolve its own counterterrorism strategy. It has slowly begun to adopt some more soft power approaches to radicalization such as “prison reform, rehabilitation programs and counter-propaganda,” and while the government has slowly allowed for the increasing involvement of the TNI within counterterrorism operations, they “remain under the Indonesian police, particularly the unit Detachment-88.”

This two pronged military and law enforcement approach to counterterrorism that came about in 2015 has been given the name of “Operation Tinombala.” This Joint Special Operations Command has combined the top counterterrorism leaders from both arenas in an attempt to terminate the terrorist threat within Indonesian borders.

This approach also signals an evolution in the terrorist threat itself. As law enforcement became the main roadblock for the terrorist operations within Indonesia, “the police have become the main target of terrorist plots and attacks. In December 2012, for instance, a police patrol was ambushed by gunmen in Tambarana, Poso, causing the deaths of four officers.” Further, “despite their ideological distinctions, relationships between jihadist fighters and religious vigilante groups have emerged,” increasing the viability of the terrorist threat.

Due to this development, Indonesia has begun to bring new institutions into their fight against terrorism:

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“the communication and information ministry, religious affairs ministry, justice and human rights ministry, manpower ministry, social affairs ministry, education and culture ministry, home affairs ministry, youth and sports ministry, the Indonesian Defense Forces, the National Police, and the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center, among others.”

These new recruits to the counterterrorism fight built up Indonesia’s soft approach (versus the hard approach exhibited by the law enforcement and military agencies up until this point). Two prime examples include “the communication ministry, who is involved to shut down websites that promote radicalization content in Indonesia as well as cyber terrorism and recruitment; and the religious affairs ministry who is tasked to spread tolerance, the education ministry must look to prevent radicalization in universities, while the youth and sports ministry must have programs for the youth to deter them from radicalization.”

Two of the main catalysts for this legislative improvement were the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005. Prior to this point, Indonesia had not adopted an official counterterrorism strategy into its national defense strategy. This had allowed extremist groups to “exploit perceived injustices against the Muslim community in Indonesia and abroad, the Internet, and weaknesses in Indonesia’s overcrowded prisoner system to influence and recruit new members, according to the U.S. Department of State.”

This has caused Indonesia not just to strengthen and update its national legislation but to also implement “programs to address radicalization at the community level. Since 2010, the BNPT has tested various deradicalization programs with varying degrees of success. The agency reportedly found that its most effective program has been supporting jihadist families and equipping inmates with business training.”

Playing a key role in this developing Indonesian counterterrorism strategy is NU, the largest Muslim organization in the world. “NU aims to establish an international network that promotes Indonesian Islam as having a nonviolent, pluralistic tradition.”


However, ultimately, while there are some de-radicalization models being developed by Indonesia, their primary response to the terrorist threat remains one that is driven by law enforcement and that focuses on legislative repercussions. This places Indonesia, both historically and currently, firmly within the Criminal Counterterrorism Macro Model.

6.3 **Indonesian Counterterrorism Efficiency**

As stated within the Methodology chapter of this thesis, a state’s counterterrorism efficiency will be measured through three main indicators: (1) The number of executed terrorist attacks over the chosen ten year time period; (2) the public opinion towards terrorism and faith in the state’s national security; and (3) the number of imprisoned terrorists. All three of these factors will be measured, to the best of the author’s ability, over the span of 10 years (from 2006-2016).

6.3a **Number of Terrorist Attacks**

Using the database from the University of Maryland\textsuperscript{228} we are given the number of terrorist incidents by year within Indonesia. The following Figure shows us a summary of this data from 2006 – 2016.

**Figure 36: Terrorist Incidents Over Time**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Figure shows us a relatively steady number of attacks throughout the decade in question, possibly suggesting a stabilization of terrorist activity in recent years. While we do see a decrease in attacks during 2010 and a spike in attacks in 2012, overall, the statistics prove rather consistent. This potentially indicates that Indonesia has found a counterterrorism strategy within the last decade that has proved more effective than in the past. To note, if looking at data

from a few years earlier than the decade choice for this case study, we see a strong decrease in the number of incidents occurring in Indonesia.

6.3b Public Opinion of Terrorist Threat

While we are seeing a steadiness of terrorist attacks in Indonesia following a strong decrease, we are still seeing the terrorist narrative of irrational fear at work. “According to a July 2015 poll by the Pew Research Center, 20 percent of Indonesians say they are “very worried” about the threat of “Islamic extremism in our country”229. By the year of 2017, that number “has increased to nearly 93%”230 even though this worry has not been accompanied with any increase in actual attacks. In the 2015 Pew Research Center Polls, “approximately 65 percent of Indonesians view ISIS as the primary threat to global security”231, outweighing the local population’s concerns in “global climate change (42 percent), global economic instability (41 percent), Iran’s nuclear program (29 percent), cyber attacks (22 percent), tensions with Russia (15 percent), and territorial disputes with China (11 percent)”232.

However, speaking to the effectiveness of Indonesia in controlling the recruitment and radicalization narrative, “a November 2015 Pew poll found that 79 percent of Indonesians disapprove of ISIS”233. The 2011 suicide bombings within the Indonesian borders also revealed that a majority of Indonesians felt that these bombings were “unjustified”234. In fact, “according to a 2012 Lowy Institute poll, 88 percent of Indonesians said such bombings are never justified”235.

When analyzing a poll from a non-Western based source, the information seems to hold consistent. A poll released on June 4th, 2017 from a Jakarta-based pollster Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting, stated that “92.9 percent of survey respondents said ISIS sympathizers should not be allowed to live in Indonesia, up from 79 percent who disapproved of ISIS in November 2015”236.

Overall, while the perceived threat of terrorism has seemed to inexplicably increase in recent years, the dis-approvalment of ISIS and extremist actions has also increased. This indicates that Indonesia’s new de-radicalization programs seem to be objectively succeeding in the short-term, but that the Criminal Model does not seem to lower the perceived terrorist threat.

6.3c Imprisoned Terrorists

Similarly as seen with our other Criminal Macro Model of France, “Indonesia also suffers from radicalization problems within its prisons”\textsuperscript{237}. A study conducted by the Brookings Institute “found that prison dynamics allowed for the spread of extremism, with guards failing to closely monitor terrorists in jail”\textsuperscript{238}. With a prison staff that was and is not properly trained to deal with the influx of extremist inmates, the inmates are able to “answer to no one except themselves, deciding on their own routines and complying with prison regulations and participating in so-called de-radicalization workshops only when it suits them”\textsuperscript{239}. This creates a power dynamic that that has the terrorist convicts appear above the law; which can prove incredibly problematic as of early December 2016, 241 terrorists were imprisoned in Indonesia and another 150 terrorist suspects were being held in pre-trial detention facilities, according to the U.S. Department of State\textsuperscript{240}. Proving the prison system to serve as a huge potential recruitment zone for extremist groups.

Speaking to this inability to rehabilitate terrorist convicts, “the country has reported cases in which prisoners, believed to harbor jihadist sentiments, returned to terrorist activities after their release”\textsuperscript{241}. This has been estimated to be the case with at least 15\% of the population in question according to the Brookings Institute\textsuperscript{242}.

However, speaking to the law enforcement’s ability to incarcerate suspected terrorists, “Indonesia prosecuted more than 700 suspected terrorists between 2002 and 2015, with a nearly 100 percent conviction rate”\textsuperscript{243}. Following this trend, as shown in the below figure, the amount of incarcerated criminals have increased for the country during the time period in question.

Following this success, in 2016, the Indonesian Government decided that the existing legislation was not enough. In response to the January 14, 2016 bomb and gun attacks in Jakarta, Indonesian President Joko Widodo sought to push through a new counterterrorism law. This was also occurring during the backdrop of the “fighting between Philippine security forces and Islamist militants in Marawi City in the Philippines”\textsuperscript{244}. This is the new law that has drawn the attention and scrutiny of human rights analysts\textsuperscript{245}.

“Article 12B of the draft law permits the government to annul the citizenship of Indonesian citizens convicted of terrorist acts. It also contains ambiguous phrasing that could grant the security forces extremely broad power to detain and prosecute individuals for terrorism offenses. Article 13A provides for up to 12 years in prison for individuals whose “speeches, thoughts, behaviors or writings” inspire others to “commit violence, anarchy and other actions which adversely impact other people/communities,” without providing any clarification of those terms. Article 6B criminalizes violence or threats of violence against “the environment”\textsuperscript{246}.

The revisions also allow for a longer detention period for those criminals that are being charged with acts of terrorism.

One of the primary issues that human rights activists raise with this proposed new law stems from a principle in international law that “prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of citizenship”\textsuperscript{247}. This is found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights


\textsuperscript{245} As mentioned in this section’s introduction.


(ICCPR), which Indonesia has ratified. Another issue many take with the law is the doubling of the possible detention period for the criminals being charged, and not yet convicted, with an act of terrorism. And lastly, the vagueness attached to the term “the environment” from Article 6B also causes concern.

Overall, there is little question that the Indonesian law enforcement is effective at putting possible terrorist criminals behind bars, however, there is more question regarding what happens to them once they are in the prison environment.

6.4 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Criminal Macro Model with a decentralized terrorism unit of the Intelligence Community shows some strong results. There is clearly a decrease in the number of terrorist crimes occurring within Indonesian borders, as well as an increase in incarcerated terrorists as a result of the strong law enforcement response to terrorist activities. However, the trend of increasing police and military strength is beginning to draw the attention of Human Rights Analysts, who worry that the Indonesian efforts to neutralize extremists will supersede the citizen’s rights. Even with the show of strong policing action, the public perception of the threat of terrorism does currently seem to be very high, which may convince the local population to accept many of these more drastic measures in the name of national security.

Ultimately, while this combination of intelligence and Criminal Macro Model seems to deal very well with the threat of terrorism within borders, it also creates a new space to radicalize disenfranchised youths to the extremist perspectives, hinting at possible long-term issues in the near future.
This section of our proposed model represents a country that has a centralized terrorism section of the Intelligence Community and has adopted a Disease Model for its counterterrorism complex.

Saudi Arabia meets all of the necessary qualifications that we delineated earlier in this thesis. The country ranks as number 32 on the Global Terrorism Index\textsuperscript{248} with a rating of 5.404/10, qualifying as a moderate threat level within the study.

On another Global Terrorism Index from the Vision of Humanity organization, Saudi Arabia ranks within the same category of threat level: ranking at a 5.808 out of ten.\textsuperscript{249} These rankings solidify Saudi Arabia’s position within the terrorist threat level of the other case studies.

Saudi Arabia is an interesting case regarding the United Nations Universal Human Rights Index\textsuperscript{250}. While Saudi Arabia has a large amount of recommendations on the Index, they only

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Centralized & Decentralized \\
\hline
War Model & I & II \\
\hline
Criminal Model & III & IV \\
\hline
Disease Model & V & VI \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}


have 10 filed concerns, rating on the average scale with the rest of our case studies within the thesis.

Therefore, with the direction of the global terrorist index rating and the trend on the United Nations Human Rights Index, Saudi Arabia qualifies as one of the project’s case studies.

7.1 Structure of the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Community in regards to Counterterrorism

The Saudi Arabian intelligence system largely revolves around the General Intelligence Presidency (GIPS), also known as al Mukhabarat al 'Amma al Mamlaka al Arabyah Saudihya. The GIP focuses primarily on national security, utilizing the tools of “espionage, counter-espionage and analysis”. However, what separates the GIP from other Saudi intelligence agencies is that it has secured the position of being “the most accredited advisor to the king”. The king uses this agency to coordinate with all of the other intelligence ministries throughout the state and to act as the primary Saudi party in any bilateral relations and communications with foreign intelligence agencies.

Even the structure within the GIP is centralized and linear. The Director of the GIP is supported by his deputy, who leads a team consisting of the “Inspector General for protocol, an office for External Relations and an Office for the Presidency complete the staff at the summit of the organization”.

Branching out underneath this committee lead by the deputy, there are a series of assistants to the Director who head various departments:

“Department for Financial and Administrative Affairs, Department for Communications and Tapping, a Technical Department, a Training and Planning Department, an Operations Department in charge of coordinating domestic stations and the ones abroad, an Analysis Department that is sub-divided on the basis of different themes: political, terrorism etc. Not all branches are located in Riyadh, but also in Jedda and Taif”.

This focus on the GIP is indicative of the style for the Saudi Intelligence Community as a whole. All of the agencies within the Intelligence Community report to the King. Whether they

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are military, border patrol, law enforcement or covert, the King is the one who gives a final order for any and all actions. Therefore, the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Community is clearly a highly centralized system and can fall under this column in our proposed model.

7.2 **SAUDI ARABIAN COUNTERTERRORISM MACRO MODEL**

Today, the Saudi Arabian counterterrorism intelligence program is a leading example of the Disease Macro Model. However, this model was almost forced upon the Saudi forces based on circumstance. Prior to the strong counterterrorism narrative within the country, “there was a significant amount of sympathy for extremism among the general population. In countering terrorism, officials realized that the more sympathy there was in society for a group or a cause, the easier that group’s recruitment would be (i.e., a society-wide approach to removing this sympathy was needed”).

The current Saudi society wide approach is a two-stage program that was created and launched in 2005. The first step within this system is the arrest of a suspected terrorist. Upon their arrest, “the individual is immediately engaged in dialogue on their reasons for becoming involved in radical causes and about their religion more broadly”. These suspected terrorists are then considered conference participants and are “allowed to attend social events, including family gatherings and sports (often games among beneficiaries, police, and program tutors to foster trust), but are engaged all the while in a program consolidating the “correct notions and concepts” of Islam”. In addition to this reconditioning of possible extremists, the Saudi program goes to great lengths to create an environment of stability for repentant extremists. This is done through encouraging these conference participants to marry, providing financial support and even returning some of them to the same jobs that they held prior to radicalization. The program also offers healthcare and medical benefits in order to lessen the appeal that many extremist groups have for possible recruits through the lure of financial stability.

While many in the international community accuse Saudi Arabia’s program of being too kind and lenient towards past terrorists, Saudi Arabia has very actively created this program in response to what studies have shown causes and incentivizes many to radicalize in the first place. They find that the financial support and community offered by terrorist organizations to some struggling populations can be a major cause of radicalization. They also noticed that while Islam and terrorism are not synonymous terms, there does seem to be a certain number of mosques that


produce terrorist fighters. “The Saudi-program organizers suggest that imams can play a very important role in extremism: “it is important to look at the imam; if he is radical, he will radicalize others”.258 This understanding transcends religion boundaries and enters into schools as well. This has caused the Saudi government to remove “approximately 200 administrative positions, for fear that, if allowed in classrooms, they would radicalize their students”.259

The Saudi model also acknowledges that many young persons are radicalized in prisons, and so “two separate prison systems exist in the country: one for non-extremist criminals and another for extremists and convicted terrorists”.260 This ensures that the moderates will not be radicalized by the extremists within an environment where they are already desensitized to violence.

In order for this system to exist, the program has three subcommittees that act as an advisory board. The first of these is the religious committee that “allows program facilitators to engage in open dialogue with detainees about Islam and facilitates long study sessions that deal with variety of misunderstood topics”.261 The second is the psychological and social committee who “coordinates evaluations of the psychological and social condition of beneficiaries, as well as the provision of financial assistance”.262 And finally, the third is the security subcommittee that “helps gather important information on the person’s prospects for release and their safe transition back into society”.263

In order to be released from this system, a participant must go through all three subcommittees and complete a prerelease care program. This program “emphasizes the message that none of the many Islamist movements the world has seen has actually achieved its goals, and that there are peaceful ways to alter the status quo”.264

Post their release; the participants are highly encouraged to continue communicating with their mentors and advisors from the program. They also continue to receive relevant information in order to keep the participants engaged in general society.

In tandem to this state based program is an Internet based de-radicalization project called Sakina. Sakina was created in response to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations taking advantage of the Internet for recruitment, to organize attacks and to control the narrative surrounding their actions. The program has “a carefully appointed group of intellectuals visit websites where radicals congregate online and they challenge extreme interpretations of Islam. They also carry out youth dialogues over the Internet, mirroring the use of the Internet by violent extremists to recruit prospective terrorists”. The program was also quick to pick up on the demographic tendencies of those who the terrorist organizations were targeting. Many of the youths being radicalized came from homes that were either not functioning smoothly or where a family member had already been radicalized. In response, Sakina developed a social and psychological department that dealt “comprehensively with beneficiaries’ problems”.

Overall, “Brigadier General Mansour al-Turki, spokesman for the Saudi Interior Ministry, which runs the rehab program, claims the program's success stemmed from its guiding principle that jihadis are victims, rather than villains”. Extremists do, however, still undergo punishment prior to their rehabilitation. Many must first complete their prison sentences of varying lengths, and some, the most “hard core” radicalized inmates, are not allowed into the program as “[w]ith some people, there is just no cure”. In order to be considered for the program “there are two major requirements: participants must demonstrate a “willingness to change” and their activities cannot have resulted in the injury or death of any Saudi nationals”.

Saudi Arabia is also equipped with two other powerful tools that aid in their counterterrorism endeavors. The first is that they have “foreign language speakers who, to put it bluntly, aren't white” and the second is that Saudi Arabia does not “kill or capture every

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terrorist we find”. The first of these tools accounts for Saudi intelligence agencies being able to place inconspicuous agents within their fields of interest. “White faces stand out in places like the Middle East, and most American universities teach formal Arabic rather than the many local dialects more commonly used”. The second of these tools has Saudi Arabia often monitoring possible suspects for years rather than eliminating them on an individual basis. They can “even work with them, seeking to turn an individual from an enemy into an informant”. Leaving a network preserved in this manner allows Saudi Arabia to monitor the full network, giving it more chances to either turn a member of the watched cell or at least, discover the other linked cells.

In an attempt to disseminate this counterterrorism ideology, Saudi Arabia hosted the first International Counterterrorism Conference in February of 2005. “The late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz called upon the international community to establish an international center to combat terrorism out of his firm belief that terrorism can be most effectively fought when nations work closely together in all areas, including the sharing of information”. This call to action was followed up on in 2008 as the royal family “pledged $10 million to the United Nations to establish the Centre and, in 2011, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with the U.N. to launch the UNCCT. In 2014, Saudi Arabia provided the Centre with a donation of $100 million to enhance its capabilities and effectiveness in helping countries combat terrorism”.

It is clear that the Saudi Arabian counterterrorism macro model is a leading force in the Disease Model world. With such a strong rehabilitation program that is not only operating within the Saudi borders but also being spread to the international community, the Saudi Macro Model is one that the royal family is attempting to share with the rest of the world.

7.3 **SAUDI ARABIAN COUNTERTERRORISM EFFICIENCY**

As stated within the Methodology chapter of this thesis, a state’s counterterrorism efficiency will be measured through three main indicators: (1) The number of executed terrorist attacks over the chosen ten year time period; (2) the public opinion towards terrorism and faith in the state’s national security; and (3) the number of imprisoned terrorists. All three of these factors will be measured, to the best of the author’s ability, over the span of 10 years (from 2006-2016).

7.3a **NUMBER OF TERRORIST ATTACKS**

Using the database from the University of Maryland\(^\text{278}\) we are given the number of terrorist incidents by year within Saudi Arabia. The following Figure shows us a summary of this data from 2006 – 2016.

**Figure 39: Terrorist Incidents Over Time**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Saudi Arabian numbers are particularly interesting, as they seem to jump up very heavily in the final two years. This may be in part due to the worsening conflict with Qatar, but it is more likely due to a change in Saudi Arabia’s definition of terrorism. In 2014, the Saudi government began defining “all deviants as terrorists”.\(^\text{279}\) This largely increased the amount of “terrorist” acts occurring within the country and allowed Saudi Arabia to have a larger voice in the counterrorism global community.

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7.3B Public Opinion of Terrorist Threat

Saudi Arabia has the one of the most intimate relationships with the Muslim religion out of all of our case studies. This was seen in a 2003 poll by Nawaf Obaid (a Saudi based consultant for national security) that shows more than half of the 15,000 Saudi’s polled “held a favourable view of Osama bin Laden’s sermons and rhetoric”.280 It seems that “as long as recruitment for jihad in Saudi Arabia was channeled towards jihad in other countries, the authorities had no problem”.281 However, speaking to the effectiveness of the de-radicalization program stated in 2005, another more recent poll from 2015 showed that 78% of Saudi’s had a very negative view of ISIS with an additional 14% holding a “fairly negative view”.282

Another poll by the Jewish Virtual Library shows that the Saudi Arabian population placed a high importance on defeating “Al Qaeda and other Jihadi Groups” with 42% of the polled population placing it as “Very Important”. Another poll by the same organization exemplifies the Saudi understanding of the global jihadi network and placed a 60.2% of the polled population who thought: “Providing financial assistance to mosques and madrassas in other countries” was “Very Important”. And finally, the last poll by this group asked whether “Addressing the problem of terrorism” was of a high value, to which 74.5% of the population said “Very Important”, and a total of 88% of the population said it was important to consider.

These opinions show that the Saudi general public, while susceptible to the ideology of Sharia law, overall seem to agree that terrorism is a major issue that should be addressed. They also allude to how the de-radicalization program may have helped show the local population the difference between various Islam narratives; drawing attention to the harm of terrorism.

7.3C Imprisoned Terrorists

Finally, the Figure below shows us the trend of general imprisonment within the Saudi Arabian police system283. We can see a slow increase in imprisonment numbers, though not enough to really prove a significant trend. However, as Saudi Arabia does not employ a criminal model, we do not expect to see any strong trends with this particular statistic.

283 The author chose to include the Year 2000 as there is less data in the system for Saudi Arabia and this will show more of a prolonged trend.
Figure 40: Saudi Arabian Prison Population Trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prison Population Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>23,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>28,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>44,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.4 **CONCLUSION**

In conclusion, the Disease Macro Model with a centralized terrorism unit of the Intelligence Community seems to show us the most promising long-term results. The endorsed message by the government, on a domestic and international level, shows a strong level of consistency, which may also be an explanation for the fairly homogenous public opinions. It also appears that the centralized line of command for Intelligence and National Security has helped with the short-term results of counterterrorism efforts.
This section of our proposed model represents a country that has a decentralized terrorism section of the Intelligence Community and has adopted a Disease Model for its counterterrorism complex.

Bangladesh qualifies through the aforementioned delineated thesis parameters. The country ranks as number 22 on the Global Terrorism Index\textsuperscript{284} with a rating of 6.479/10, qualifying as a moderate-high threat level within the study. While this is on the higher end of our case studies, it has dropped to 6.181/10 in the recently released 2017 Terrorist threat index\textsuperscript{285}, showing that it’s terrorism threat trend brings it closer to the current case studies.


Regarding the United Nations Universal Human Rights Index\textsuperscript{286}, Bangladesh does not have many cases of concern registered within the Human Rights Index. In fact, with a total of only 13 filed reports, Bangladesh actually has one of the fewest number of registered reports of concern with the United Nations out of all of the proposed case studies.

Therefore, with the direction of the global terrorist index rating and the trend on the United Nations Human Rights Index, Bangladesh qualifies as one of our project’s case studies.

8.1 Structure of the Bangladesh Intelligence Community in Regards to Counterterrorism

Bangladesh first gained its independence in 1971 from Pakistan and has been dealing with the turbulence of the geographical region ever since. With all of the political turmoil in Southern Asia, Bangladesh immediately established “four major categories of intelligence agencies, with often overlapping responsibilities in the domains of: (a) national security; (b) defense services; (c) law enforcement; and (d) financial crime”\textsuperscript{287}. The intelligence agencies that focus primarily on national security cumulatively create the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and the National Security Intelligence (NSI). Other agencies that would fall under this category of intelligence “may also include the Special Security Force (SSF), and the Border Security Bureau (BSB)”\textsuperscript{288}. These particular agencies focus on the territorial integrity of the country and on the physical well being of high value people for the government. Some of these agencies, including the DGFI, NSI and SSF, report to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), “while the BSB reports to the reconstituted BGB, an entity under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA)”\textsuperscript{289}. Speaking to the decentralization of the Bangladeshi Intelligence Community, the DGFI is currently led by a serving major general within the Bangladeshi army, while the NSI is led by a retired major general. These two agencies have similar, and even sometimes clashing, responsibilities, “especially in the domains of intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism”\textsuperscript{290}, and also seem to have followed the same trajectory of deviating “from their

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
original goals of providing impartial assessments on vital issues of national interests, and instead turned into the coercive instruments of political control by successive governments."\textsuperscript{201}

Within the second category of intelligence agencies falls the three services associated with the defense sector: the Directorate of Military (Army) Intelligence, the Directorate of Naval Intelligence, and the Directorate of Air Intelligence. All three of these agencies report to the Ministry of Defense (MoD), which is controlled by the Bangladeshi Prime Minister. Due to the nature of their work, “there are few publicly available data on such agencies, and hence they are excluded from further discussion.”\textsuperscript{202}

The next type of intelligence agency works on law enforcement. “It includes the Special Branch (SB), the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), and the intelligence wing of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)”\textsuperscript{203}. Seeing as they all focus on crime prevention and law enforcement, these intelligence agencies logically fall under the jurisdiction of the Bangladeshi police and report to the Home Ministry. However, “critics observe that the police headquarters and the home ministry have less control over the operations of the RAB than over the SB and the CID”\textsuperscript{204}. This may be because while the RAB is technically led by an inspector general of the police, many of its operational aspects are controlled by officials from the military domain, who do not often interact with the police sector. Of note for this thesis, “the CID is the lead agency for the investigation and analysis of criminal offenses such as murder, human trafficking, and terrorist attacks”\textsuperscript{205}. However, as many of the responsibilities between this section of intelligence agencies are overlapping, there is often a jurisdictional disagreement surrounding high importance crimes, such as terrorism.

And finally, the fourth intelligence agency group is that which focuses on the financial crime sector. This intelligence largely comes from the Bangladesh Bank (BB) (the central bank of Bangladesh) and the National Board of Revenue (NBR) (the primary tax administration of Bangladesh).


Financial crimes such as money laundering and terrorist financing were long ignored and it was not until 2002, when a new anti-money laundering law was enacted paving the way for the creation of the Anti-Money Laundering Department (AMLD) at the central bank, that much attention was paid to this sector. \textit{[Part of the results of the law was that]} the AMLD was later renamed Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU) in 2012 with expanding remits in detecting and analyzing terrorist financing and money laundering\textsuperscript{296}.

A summary of the primary intelligence agencies can be found in the Figure below:

\textbf{Figure 42: Bangladeshi Intelligence Agency Descriptions}


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.N o.</th>
<th>Name of the Agency</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Year of formation</th>
<th>About the Agency / Vision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI)</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>It is the main Military Intelligence agency of Bangladesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Security Intelligence (NSI)</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>It is the leading civilian intelligence agency of Bangladesh, directly responsible to the office of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>It is a specialized wing of the Bangladesh Police. It carries out investigations into crimes, including terrorism, murders and organized crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Special Branch (SB)</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>It is the prime intelligence agency of Bangladesh, being an important agency in the Bangladeshi intelligence community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>It is an elite anti-crime and anti-terrorism unit of Bangladesh Police constituted amending the Armed Police Battalion Ordinance, 1979.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This analysis leads to the realization that intelligence agencies who are primarily concerned with national security and defense are largely controlled by the armed forces. However, those agencies who are focused on criminal offenses are controlled by the criminal police, the central bank and the tax administration. Within the domains of control, all of the groups seem to report to different people, whether it be the Prime Minister, the Home Minister or the Finance Minister, further confirming the decentralized character of the Bangladeshi Intelligence Community.

Other than analyzing the existing agencies, it may also be of value to understand how they have developed. There were two major intelligence overhauls that affected our studied time period. The first that came in 2002, based on the pressure from the United States for intelligence, created the counterterrorism section of the DGFI (this later evolved into the Counterterrorism Intelligence Bureau (CTIB) in 2006). Between this cycle of development, the NSI also opened a

counterterrorism branch in 2004. Both of these developments led to further turf battles regarding whose jurisdiction counterterrorism intelligence truly fell under\textsuperscript{297}.

The second major series of intelligence reforms came in 2009, following the BDR mutiny that had occurred in February. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina blamed many of the intelligence downfalls on the "ad hoc intelligence coordination structure"\textsuperscript{298,299}. In response he created the NCIC in July of 2009, in an attempt to centralize the intelligence coordination process. However, while "district level coordination bodies exist, they lack any authority to synthesize operational intelligence"\textsuperscript{300}. Also created were coordinating bodies for the border intelligence agencies and the financial intelligence agencies. However, there is no system in place for these three high level coordinating bodies to interact and communicate officially, defeating the ultimate goal of centralization.

Another important factor of intelligence gathering for Bangladesh that has yet to be discussed, is the participation of local communities. "The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), with support from the Australian High Commission in Dhaka, has undertaken a comprehensive project on People Peace Building Program in Bangladesh spanning from 2009-2010. The project, in principle, seeks to identify the obstacles that hinder scopes of inter-agency information sharing mechanisms in Bangladesh and to address the barriers to cooperation between the grassroots community and the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies"\textsuperscript{301}.

This large push to centralize the Bangladeshi Intelligence Community speaks to how grossly decentralized the community truly was. However, in an attempt to centralize, the Bangladeshi government created multiple centralizing bodies, which only continued the trend of not centralizing communication or decision making. Even though "after years of slow responses to change, the intelligence community in Bangladesh has recently gone through a process of innovation and adaptation"\textsuperscript{302}; this evolution is primarily in the organized crime and terrorism domains, where their attempts at centralization have still not found strong footing and the Intelligence Community remains, at least for the time being, as decentralized.


\textsuperscript{301} BANGLADESH ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE. "PUBLIC INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN BANGLADESH A STRATEGY PAPER." Public Information, Dhaka, 2011.

8.2 Bangladesh Counterterrorism Macro Model

The Macro Counterterrorism Model of Bangladesh is likely the most difficult to categorize within the chosen case studies. In reality, the model is a hybrid model between the Criminal and Disease Models. Especially when comparing it to the surrounding states in the area, the Bangladeshi model has undergone quite a bit of recent change in an attempt to conform to the American demand for information and intelligence. However, what this thesis purports to show is that the legal tools that can be seen within the modern Bangladeshi counterterrorism evolution are actually effective measures for their Disease Model goals. This section will first begin by delineating the legislation and law enforcement strategies for the countries national security and will then delineate the Disease Model of counterterrorism that the state is strongly emphasizing. Finally we will show how the adopted legal measures serve to strengthen this Disease Model.

One of the most important legal counterterrorism measures implemented by the Bangladeshi government is the Antiterrorism Act of 2009 (ATA). This act was further amended in 2012 and 2013. “Although Bangladesh’s ATA does not outlaw recruitment and travel in furtherance of terrorism, the broad language of the ATA provides several mechanisms by which Bangladesh can implement UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2178 (2014), related to addressing the foreign terrorist fighter threat”. This speaks further to the influence that the American system and demand for information has had on the Bangladeshi counterterrorism system. Bangladesh also began to share law enforcement and security information with INTERPOL at the request of the UN (and in turn, the US). But, without the American led influence, Bangladesh still lacks any specific laws addressing foreign terrorists and does not have a dedicated terrorist watch list, possibly indicating that some, if not all, of the criminal tendencies within the Bangladeshi model are actually imposed from the outside influence of the United States.

However, one aspect of the Bangladeshi counterterrorism that does stem from Bangladesh and may fall under the Criminal macro Model is their stance towards the financing of terrorism.

“Bangladesh is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. The Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU) is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. The Bangladesh Bank (the central bank) and the BFIU lead the government’s efforts to comply with the international anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards and international sanctions regimes”\textsuperscript{305}.

However, it should also be noted that most, if not all, counterterrorism models have some form of financial tracking and freezing as it is found to be one of the most efficient means to identify existing and operating terrorist networks. This is also a key component to being found internationally compliant in the counterterrorism effort and to access any financial or logistical aid from the international community.

An identifying factor of the Bangladeshi counterterrorism model is the Community Support Mechanism (CSM) that falls under the jurisdiction of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). This is a fund that supports “local, grassroots efforts to counter violent extremism”\textsuperscript{306}, “The Ministry of Religious Affairs and the National Committee on Militancy, Resistance, and Prevention work with imams and religious scholars to build public awareness against terrorism”\textsuperscript{307}. The police and national security forces of Bangladesh are recruiting and utilizing religious leaders to fight violent extremism. These religious leaders are “helping to counter militant propaganda with appropriate scripture-based messages and engaging imams to speak to surrendered militants to explain that the Koran does not support terrorist violence”\textsuperscript{308}. The police are also working with local universities, having them help identify missing students and address any possible radicalization occurring on campus grounds. This falls under the exact definition of a Disease Model in counterterrorism. The agencies in charge of national security are attempting to target the source of terrorism, violent extremism, instead of just addressing the terrorist attacks themselves.

This focus on attempting to combat violent extremism is particularly important due to the renewed interest of ISIS in Bangladesh. “Bangladeshi IS leader Abu Ibrahim al Hanif, emphasized the geographic significance of Bangladesh for expanding the group’s activities to


India and Myanmar”. Recently, IS has proven its ability to “raise funds, both from domestic and external channels” within Bangladeshi borders, and has broadened its recruitment strategy to include urban and affluent classes. It has even further recruited from “the often experienced and madrassa-educated members of the local terrorist group Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)”.

In order to help and combat this far-reaching strategy, the counterterrorism (CTTC) Unit of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police and the Rapid Action Battalion, along with other law enforcement agencies, have created a mobile app that facilitates citizens reporting terrorism related information and activities. The Bangladeshi government has understood that it is the citizens who must feel empowered to react against terrorism in order to stop the extremist ideology from spreading further within their society. To help in this endeavor, there is also a “new programme offering cash incentives to militants for renouncing radicalism”. Further falling into the Disease Macro Model for counterterrorism, Bangladesh has turned to a leading group of Islamic scholars in Bangladesh who have issued a “fatwa condemning terrorism and militancy, including violent attacks on non-Muslims. The fatwa was signed by more than 100,000 Islamic scholars, legal experts and clerics”.

The Bangladeshi de-radicalization program has been characterized as having a strong state presence. It rests on four pillars: incarceration, intelligence, intellectual intervention (particularly religious discourse to counter radical interpretations of Islam), and investment in all of the above. These “four I’s” are at the crux of the program, which operates in three targeted districts identified on the basis of historic events and the recruitment levels of various extremist groups. This is done through a grass roots approach, when prevention of radicalization looks at “religious and community figures’ propagating the true spirit of Islam, the promotion of modern education (including the teaching of English and training in information technology), and the collection and dissemination of information on Islamic issues”.

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These programs are primarily addressing madrassa students and those who the
government believes would be more prone to radicalism. In order to truly engage this population,
the program has a “heavy participatory element” and leans on organized events. Following the
events, the program supports the lessons and conversations with publications and the possibility
of financial support “to the unemployed, assistance to participants in getting into further
education, and help to some prisoners’ families (education of children, for example)”.
This allows the government to temper the spread of hatred and radicalization to communities affected
by terrorist prisoners.

Ultimately, what we see with the Bangladeshi Counterterrorism Macro Model is a strong
Disease Model that is enforced by a police and law enforcement presence.

8.3 BANGLADESH COUNTERTERRORISM EFFICIENCY

As mentioned above, the Bangladeshi counterterrorism model does seem to be pushing
towards a hybrid model in recent years. However, the crux and main focus of the program is
firmly a Disease Model basis, which addresses the radicalization of its citizens rather than on a
military response to the act of terrorism itself.

“While the impact of deradicalization programs are notoriously hard to quantify, participants pointed to the decline in terrorism
incidents and local level violence, as well as falling recruitment by religion-based extremist groups. Indeed, many deem Bangladesh’s
fairly low-budget program successful. But some cautioned that the Asian country’s soft counterterrorism measures are reinforced by
its parallel iron-fist approach to terrorism, and that it is hard to disaggregate the effects of hard versus soft measures.”

8.3a NUMBER OF TERRORIST ATTACKS

Using the database from the University of Maryland we are given the number of
terrorist incidents by year within Bangladesh. The following Figure shows us a summary of this

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Figure 43: TERRORIST INCIDENTS OVER TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above Figure shows us a very steep rise in terrorist activity within Bangladeshi borders beginning in 2013. Prior to that date, however, the data shows a general decreasing trend of terrorist activities. This drastic change in terrorist activity may point to one of the main drawbacks of the Disease Counterterrorism Model. Even though the model seemed to be successful with slowing the spread of extremist ideologies within the Bangladeshi border, it does not deal with, or stop, the actions occurring outside of the Bangladeshi territory. Being that Bangladesh finds itself in a particularly interesting hotspot for terrorist activity (i.e. neighboring Pakistan and India), it is not a terribly huge surprise that much of the terrorist activity affecting Bangladesh does not originate from without its borders. In response to this recent rise of terrorist activity the Government of Bangladesh has articulated a zero-tolerance policy towards terrorism, made numerous arrests of terrorist suspects, and continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the international community”321.

8.3B PUBLIC OPINION OF TERRORIST THREAT

The public opinion of the terrorist threat is coupled with a few other considerations. Firstly, much of the general public views the Bangladeshi government as corrupt, “ranking 145th out of 167 in the Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perception Index”322. However, on an international scale, Bangladesh is an important provider of global security, and is consistently one of the largest contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions”323. This is an interesting juxtaposition, as the counterterrorism model seems to suggest the exact opposite


emphasis. While the domestic population views Bangladesh as politically corrupt, the
government seems to focus very strongly on their domestic counterterrorism plan. Meanwhile,
on the international security sphere, the world seems to view Bangladesh as a strong
counterterrorism proponent. However the Bangladeshi counterterrorism model seems to ignore
the international component, largely leading to the current spike in terrorist activity.

Looking at the domestic sphere, the Bangladeshi’s also have some interesting views
regarding their own government structure and its place in Islamic thought. “While Bangladeshi’s
overwhelmingly support democracy, there is disagreement about what this means. Some 38
percent believed that democracy is compatible with Islam while 59 percent disagreed with the
contention”324. This is also relatively consistent with the public’s opinions on how secular and
religious laws interact: “A majority (66 percent) believed that if laws are passed by
democratically-elected officials and are in accordance with the constitution, these laws should
not be subject to a veto by religious scholars. However, 31 percent believed that there “should be
a body of senior religious scholars that has the power to overturn laws when it believes they are
contrary to the Quran”325.

Interestingly, the Bangladeshi opinion of terrorism outside of the Bangladeshi borders is
much more tolerant than would be expected of a state who operates as “one of the largest
contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions”326. When asked to focus on the “groups
in the Muslim world that attack Americans,” [largely looking at civilian attacks,] 40 percent of
surveyed Bangladeshi approved of some but disapproved of others and another 9 percent
approved of them all”327. When instead asked to focus on the military side of this with the prompt
of “whether or not they approve of “attacks on US military troops based in the Persian Gulf
States,” 56 percent of Bangladeshi respondents approved, 19 percent said they had mixed
feelings, and 20 percent disapproved”328.

Speaking even further to the positive view of some terrorist activities, in Bangladesh, 26 percent out of a population of 166 million view suicide bombings in defense of Islam as justified\textsuperscript{329}.

Ultimately, it would appear that while Bangladesh is winning the ideological war domestically, it might not be doing as well internationally. The local population does not inherently disapprove of terrorism, but rather on the terrorist activity with the Bangladeshi borders.

8.3c Imprisoned Terrorists
The Figure below shows us the trend of general imprisonment within the Bangladeshi police system. As we can see, the number of arrests has not shown any strong movements or trends, which holds consistent with the fact that Bangladesh does not truly employ a Criminal Macro terrorism model, even if it may have some Criminal Model tendencies.

\textbf{Figure 44: Bangladeshi World Prison Population Trend}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prison Population Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>71,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>86,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>69,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>68,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>65,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>73,117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, the Disease Macro Model with a decentralized terrorism unit of the Intelligence Community shows some interesting results. If able to isolate the country from the rest of the world, Bangladesh has done a wonderful job of controlling the narrative of Islam and curbing the extremism ideology within its own population. However, partially due to its decentralized nature, it has not coupled this domestic push with an international one, keeping the international threat of cross-country terrorism strong and largely not dealt with.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

After analyzing the six different case studies from our model the author is able to draw a few key conclusions that enlighten the readers to possible effects of the chosen axes on a country’s counterterrorism efficiency.

As a reminder to the reader, the primary research questions were: (1) Can we create a categorical model for the world’s various Intelligence Communities that would be able to predict an Intelligence Community’s effectiveness in conducting Counterterrorism? (2) How do the various combinations of the Counterterrorism macro model and centralization of terrorism intelligence within an IC affect a state’s effectiveness in their counterterrorism efforts?

In regards to the first question, the author does not find that she was able to ascertain a clear response. While it may still be possible to create a categorical model for the world’s various Intelligence Communities that would be able to predict an Intelligence Community’s effectiveness in conducting Counterterrorism, the model that the author has created does not seem to show any major difference in counterterrorism effectiveness due to the Intelligence Community’s centralization. In our case studies, results tended to show that while centralization might play some role, the key variable is the specific Macro Model chosen.

That being said, we do see one major similarity when comparing the centralized case studies (i.e. Section 1: Russia, Section 3: France, and Section 5: Saudi Arabia). They all seem to have a more consistent message being emanated by the entire counterterrorism complex in the countries. In Russia, it is a clear message from the Kremlin of terrorism not being permitted within Russian borders but largely being ignored, or even expelled, within the surrounding areas. In France, there is a clear anti-immigrant policy and criminalization of terrorism being utilized by all of the French police, military and government policies. In Saudi Arabia, the message of de-radicalization and the correct narrative (as deemed by the government) for Islam is consistently repeated from every aspect of the counterterrorism complex.

On the other hand, within our three decentralized examples (Section 2: The United States of America, Section 4: Indonesia, and Section 6: Bangladesh), we do not see this same unity of message. In the United States there seems to be a different conversation regarding terrorism and radicalization from every facet. The military community wants to physically remove any trace of

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330 Defined later in the thesis
331 This will be further explained in the theory and methodology chapters to follow.
332 Intelligence Community
333 The definition of how a counterterrorism model is deemed effective will be further discussed in the theory and methodology sections of this thesis.
334 Defined later in the thesis
extremism through war, the intelligence community is attempting to infiltrate these radicalized communities to either remove them completely or use them for America’s own personal gain, and the diplomatic channels are attempting to placate all of the international parties upset with the military liberties taken. In Indonesia the very large Muslim population forces a two-pronged response from the state. Their primary message to the international community is one of zero tolerance, whereas, internally, the state is developing an increasing amount of de-radicalization programs in an attempt to not lose the support of the Muslim population. And finally, in Bangladesh, the state has a very clear division between their domestic and international narrative. Whereas on the domestic level the Bangladeshi model is strong and has seen some good results in de-radicalization, their international presence is much weaker and ill equipped to handle any terrorist threat.

Therefore, while there is not a huge difference that can be observed between the centralized and decentralized case studies, the centralized states do seem to use a more unified counterterrorism narrative between their domestic and foreign efforts. The author deems this clarity as favorable.

However, this being the main difference that can be understood from the above analysis, the author cannot say with confidence that she has created a model that accurately predicts an Intelligence Community’s success in counterterrorism measures. The author would like to explore the possibility and cause of any possible outliers from the model in a further study. However, on a whole, we see consistent responses regarding the unification of a message based on the centralization of an Intelligence Community and the type of long and short-term successes that are likely to occur based on a state’s macro model.

In regards to the second question: the author’s model does enlighten us as to how the various case study combinations can affect a state’s counterterrorism efforts. We can clearly see how influential the three macro models of counterterrorism are to a state’s counterterrorism efficiency. The author’s findings follow what is anticipated by much of the literature surrounding the three macro models. In particular, the actual case studies, particularly the War Model case studies, follow much of what Sederberg predicted in his 1995 article. He argued, “that two major models of this political context - the war model and the rational actor model - not only fail to preclude conciliatory strategies, they actually incorporate them.” However, Sederberg also states: “If we abandon the concept of terrorism to the ideologues or ignore the differences

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between terrorism and other forms of coercion, we hamper the possibilities for successful political action to contain this particular tactic”\(^{337}\), this seems to speak against the entire basis of the Criminal Model, which we have seen in our case studies can work rather well. But he does agree that the strong short-term response, such as that exhibited by Russia and often seen in the War Model, and, also, sometimes seen in the Criminal Model, will likely cause long-term issues. “More thoughtful analysts, however, recognize that external military action or internal police repression may not only damage democratic principles and processes, but also they may fail to lessen the problem of terrorism and could even inflame it further”\(^{338}\). This sentiment is also echoed by Crenshaw\(^{339}\) in many of her articles. Intriguingly, there does not seem to be as much major literature regarding the Disease Model, which this thesis hopes to have helped fill.

In particular, this model has shown how the War Model employed by Section 1:Russia, and Section 2: The United States of America has a strong short-term effectiveness but a troubling long-term trend of further international radicalization. As the cross-national networks see their brethren being militarily demolished and their communities being destroyed by the War Model’s militaries, people are pushed to anger and frustration, resulting in the possibility of radicalization that is often capitalized upon by the various terrorist organizations. In fact, the foreigners’ hand in local affairs is one of the main grievances of many international terrorist organizations.

The Criminal Model also shows some short-term successes and long-term drawbacks, but seems to have fewer international drawbacks than the War Model. In the short and mid-term, the Criminal Model is effective at discovering and freezing (or at least slowing down) terrorist networks. This is in large part due to their focus on finances and network mapping since they treat the terrorist network in a similar manner to any other organized crime network. The Criminal Model is also effective at downplaying the terrorist ideology within the public narrative (as opposed to the War Model which places it as a higher threat, thereby gaining more attention), since it is viewed as a crime (albeit more serious than most). However, in the long-term, the Criminal Model also tends to lead to further radicalization, as the prison systems are often a wonderful recruiting ground for terrorist organizations. The prison inmates are isolated from society, desensitized to violence, and do not have many supportive opportunities awaiting them upon their release. The terrorist organizations realize this and offer them (and their families) a sanctuary that the state does not.


The Disease Model does not show many short-term successes, but does show the most promising long-term successes. The de-radicalization programs utilized by Section 5: Saudi Arabia, and Section 6: Bangladesh, seem to work well to decrease the potential attractiveness of the terrorist organizations and send a message of support and community to anyone who may be more prone to radicalization. However, the primary downfall of this model is that the state is often not equipped to deal with the rest of the foreign networks’ attacks that originate from outside of a country’s borders.

Ultimately we can see how the macro models were affected, albeit only slightly, by the centralization of the Intelligence Community, and also how impactful the three macro models are on a state’s counterterrorism efficiency.

If looking at pure examples of the three macro models (which do not exist in the real world, hence the prototypic graph utilized for this thesis), the author would encourage that every state utilize a Disease Model. This seems to be the strongest model to neutralize both the message of radicalization and the possible incentive that a terrorist network can provide to militants.

However, the primary drawback of the Disease Model seems to be its inability to protect against any external threat from a terrorist organization as this model does not prescribe any build up of military or police forces in response to violent attacks. This means that, realistically, this is not a helpful recommendation for a state’s counterterrorism model. Instead, the author believes that, further research should be done on Hybrid Models, as this can possibly combine the best properties of various models into one recommendation.
Based on the results from the case studies above, the perfect combination of a Hybrid Model seems to be the Model C+D (A combination of the Criminal and Disease Model). If a state can implement a strong Disease Model within its borders but also develop a criminal capacity to deal with the foreign-based threats that may arise from the surrounding nations, this may prove to be a realistic possibility that is best equipped to handle the terrorist threat. The author would advocate for removing the War Model altogether as a primary counterterrorism technique. While it may be initially effective at eradicating the existing terrorist threat, it also has too strong a possibility of further radicalization and therefore threat on the homeland.

Therefore, ultimately, the author argues for a centralized Hybrid Model that leans most heavily on the Disease Model to eradicate domestic threats, but also has the protection afforded by the Criminal Model from external threats.
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