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The Concept of Security in the Postmodern Era
on the European Background

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1. Introduction

"Security is a precondition of development".¹

The rapid course of changes with respect to security environment and international security situation in last decades influenced not only the security relations among Western European states but also the terms under which the security itself is analysed and reflected. These changes came, firstly, as a consequence of the transition from the modern to the postmodern social and political organisation and, secondly, as an outcome of the development in the postmodern world as such. However, the transition did not touch only upon security field, but the postmodernisation process exerted its power also across the whole Western European societies in political, economical and needless to say even in personal spheres.

The postmodern structure opens up many new options how to cope with political disputes, racial hatred, emigration or military conflicts, on the other hand these belong to the group of completely new threats and risks that the postmodernity brought about, or better, let them be visible. The postmodern security policy thus remains no longer dependent exclusively on military force and armament, but rather on transnational co-operation of particular states and international organisations, namely on common agreement and, in the first instance, on negotiations. Some of these international organisations have been through quite a long history, but it is no more than two decades, ever since the disintegration of the Soviet block and the end of the Cold War conflict, that

¹ A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 2

they can truly influence the policy implementation on the European background to any greater extent.

With respect to security, NATO has always played the role of the main security provider, nevertheless, the European Union shows the world that it disposes of the capabilities and willingness of its member states to create its own security policy, independent of NATO or USA. The historical development nonetheless proves that the way to common security or even defence policy of the EU was long and hard and it still remains full of obstacles to deal with.

1.2 Thesis structure

The first chapters of this thesis (2. - 2.6.2) present main transformation that took place not only in the sphere of politics, but also in society in the last decades, respectively century, i. e. the process of postmodernisation. Pinning down main differences of the particular stages of societal and political development gives a basis to understand the transition of the concept of security as well as of the concept of threats and risks. The nature of threats and risks mutually influences the understanding of security, and consequently even the security politics. This is the reason why chapter 2.7 of this thesis deals with the main threats of the present world and thereafter sums up all the adumbrated conclusions so as to complete the picture of security in the world of today.

Further, the second part introduces the reader to the security policy of the European Union and using conclusions from previous chapters it shows the

postmodern perception of security in practise out of theoretical vacuum. It presents not only the historical background of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (together with the European Security and Defence Policy, CFSP/ESDP, chapter 3.2), but it tries to complete it with main tendencies within the EU and primary problems it faces (chapters 3.3, 3.4).

To sum up, in the first part this thesis compares the modern and the postmodern era in general, then comes the shift in perception of threats or risks and their changing nature and finally the transition of the concept of security. In the second part, the thesis shows the development of the EU security policy and it argues to what extent, if at all, the security policy strategies and attitudes of particular European states to this question have transmuted side by side the transformations of the phenomena discussed in the first part.

1.3 Main objectives

As the title suggests, the thesis aims at presenting the concept of security in the contemporary world. By describing the main social, economical and political transitions in the world due to the postmodernisation process, it wants to stress the significance and pervasiveness of this phenomenon in everyday life. The short insight into the CFSP/ESDP of the EU intends to show the postmodern international security relations among the European states and their views, attitudes and behaviour within this framework. The purport is twofold: to underline that the CFSP/ESDP still has a long way ahead to become a true postmodern security actor, and that the role of CFSP/ESDP goes beyond pure security provider.

1.4 Research questions

Except for the general introduction to the postmodernisation process, its impacts on the concept of security and the depiction of CFSP of the European Union, this thesis tries to answer two questions:

1. Does the liberal security theory apply to the CFSP/ESDP of the EU?
2. Is enhancing of security the exclusive aim of the CFSP/ESDP?

The first question touches upon the postmodern nature of security relations, which is more and more attributed to the CFSP of the EU. In fact, it considers whether or not the CFSP through its quite short history can be labelled as a true postmodern security actor and if not what hinders or impedes such an ambition.

The second question argues what role the CFSP/ESDP actually plays within the EU. In other words, the question stands whether the CFSP ensures exclusively the security and defence capabilities for the EU or whether its significance and impact can be traced in other spheres as well. If the importance of the CFSP/ESDP goes beyond the security relations, the question suggests itself: what does the role of the CFSP/ESDP then all in all amount to?

1.5 Methodology

The first chapter of this thesis serves as a background to the postmodern concept of security. For this aim, the comparison of the modern and the postmodern society, i.e. the introduction to the postmodernisation process,

grows vital. As the topic of this part belongs to rather contemplative philosophical sphere, I drew information predominantly from sociological literature. The societal part of the postmodernisation process is mostly discussed in the works of A. Giddens and Z. Bauman (2003, resp. 1995), whereas the economical side together with its impacts belongs to the domain of U. Beck (2004). Last side of the postmodernisation, its political aspect, is insightfully analysed in the latest work of R. Cooper (2004). Since the primary aim of this part is not to find the differences among various concepts of postmodernity, diverging views of these authors on the postmodernisation itself fall beyond the scope of this thesis, quite the contrary, their views on what threatens contemporary society in its particular spheres grew crucial.

Then, following chapters presenting the postmodern concept of security together with the main threats of the present world are based on professional literature, namely publications, articles or expertise written and carried out by specialists in the sphere of international security relations. I gathered most of these resources at Maastricht University while attending the course External Relations of the European Union. So as to give a coherent view on this topic, studies by Czech experts complete these sources.

The second part on the CFSP/ESDP stems from analyses of the primary documents of the European Union (such as treaties, declarations, conclusions of presidencies and others). Additionally, I used official speeches of European representatives and completed it with comments and views included in relevant literature. Again I tried to stick to the method of combining foreign and Czech sources so as to provide the reader with a more complex perspective.

1.6 Note on terminology

The first part of this essay mostly deals with the comparison of the two stages of societal and political development, the modern and the postmodern era. Especially the term postmodern varies in sociological literature with other terminology, such as late modernity, radicalised modernity, reflexive modernity, postmodern modernity and others. So as to enable easier orientation, the terms postmodernity and postmodern will mostly prevail.

Furthermore, the third chapter discusses the nature of postmodern threats and risks. The confusion of these two terms is very common even in official documents², in this essay the difference is as follows: threat unlike risk is a phenomenon of an objective character, it expresses the ability or even intention to harm someone, and it simply ushers in such influence. On the other hand, risks are rather social phenomena derived from threats, thus always of a subjective character. The acknowledgement of a risk unwinds from decision and acting of those, who assess the situation and act accordingly (Eichler, 2004: 17, 18).

Then, chapters discussing the security in the postmodern world operate with basic terminology of the security studies. Here belongs, firstly, the term security itself. As elusive as the term security may be, two definitions of this complex concept show two possible approaches to the security politics field. Negative determination underlines the lack or the absence of potential threat, whereas positive definition relates to particular subject and expresses the elimination or reduction of its potential threats. Both approaches indicate the

²For instance the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), in which the risk no. 8 is “the threat of aggression”. (see Bezpečnostní Strategie ČR, Ministerstvo Zahraničních Věcí ČR – AVIS, 1999)

relativity of the term, and in fact it remains to be a double-sided coin: security is always proportional to the threats or risks, and on the other hand, it can never be provided fully, rather more or less.

Furthermore, the term *referential objects*, i.e. the entities, which are existentially threatened and can legitimately stake a claim for the right to survival. Secondly, the *actors of securitisation*. These are actors proclaiming the referential objects to be existentially threatened; thus they trigger the process of securitisation (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde, 2005: 48).

Thirdly, the term *existential threat*. It can be understood only with regard to particular referential object and its characteristics, but in general it aims at the vital core or essence of the given object or phenomenon (Stejskal, 2006: 3). Within the political sector, the existential threat can be e.g. the loss of sovereignty or legitimacy. Then, the *process of securitisation*, whose precise definition and criteria, as Buzan stresses, roots from the intersubjective construction of the existential threat. The first step of securitisation thus remains the definition of existential threats, followed by implementation of emergency measures and subsequently accompanied by impacts of such acting on the relations among the units. (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde, 2005: 37).

2. The modern versus the postmodern

2.1 The modern society

Modern era, modernity or modern world, as it might be called, it all refers to ways or organisations of social life which emerged in Europe for the first time approximately in 17th century. However, not sooner than in 19th century the process of modernization broke up agrarian society and created industrial structures. Notwithstanding, modernization has proceeded and as it broke down the agrarian society, it has been changing the nature of the present world in a constant manner. For these changes grew into a radical transformation of the modern society, it is vital to distinguish these two social structures. Here below the thesis discusses four main attributes of the two different social organizations, the modern and the postmodern.

The first main characteristic feature of the industrial society remains its fear of indeterminateness and its struggle against vagueness. Modern society in the framework of industrial structures always seeks for order. Actually, all modern institutions were destined to provide the order and they left anyone a chance but to move ahead from one such institution to another throughout his lifetime. Society as such, thus, disposed of a structure independent of individuals, a structure based on regime of surveillance and control. This kind of safety and reliability gave an individual freedom and choice, however, under the condition that he was aware of what is necessary and unavoidable.

Second specific feature of the modern society remains its natural tendency towards the production of goods. One's centre of life became the work

place and the typical image of a modern man is the image of a provider of goods. Wages, career, status and the like functioned as symbols of success and personal satisfaction. This production frenzy stems from another, third, main tenet of modernity and shares one attribute in common with it. The whole concept of modernity roots from the image of universal power of reason. Reason as a weapon against the imperfect presence orientates rather outwards, to the outer world. So does a regular modern man. As the reason claims that every problem has its solution and that the flaws of today can be solved in future, the life of a modern man turns to the world as well, asking himself how to change the existing world into a better one. Consequently, on one hand, scientists replace priests and, on the other, determination and devotion replace hopelessness and resignation with fate.

The claim for universal power of reason, all the institutional changes with regard to life styles of common people first came to birth in Western Europe and it was there as well where other modern invention was unearthed. While production and science worked as engines within societies, system of relatively small nation states became the drive for European politics (Cooper, 2004: 19n). Modern political order was no longer based on the distinction between empires and the rest of the world overruled by chaos, but on the recognition of state sovereignty and autonomy. In contrast to empires, nation state system secularized and the rising independence of particular states could be seen writ large on the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. Whereas particular government conducted domestic matters, the question of foreign affairs turned into designing strategies of creating and dissolving coalitions. Modern political order thus grows into the balance-of-power system constituted by small nation states acting according to their calculus of interests.

Herein the four main features of the modern era lie: first, order provided by institutions with its impact on individual; second, orientation towards production; third, universal power of reason mostly represented by scientific (empirical) knowledge, and, finally, the concept of nation state system. These four characteristics serve as a limited, yet still rich background for comparison with the social organization, institutions and individual behaviour and tendencies within the world of today, within the so-called "postmodern" world.

2.2 The postmodern society

Following the same structure as above, the first phenomenon to compare comes the order and stable social structure in the modern world. Firstly, nowadays we witness obvious absence of one such social structure that would determine the terms of what is possible serving as a helping hand for the endeavour oriented to realisation of any of the chosen options. In the world of today, an individual disposes of unprecedented freedom and space for acting. Secondly, the nature of modern institutions itself changes. Modern institutions are bounded with mechanisms of trust, with complex expert systems, as Giddens would say³. People today trust in expert systems, which makes these systems work, although they lack the knowledge to understand their fundamentals.

Consequently, all social relations and contact networks have to be chosen, created, protected or abandoned individually. The postmodern social institutions, unlike the modern ones, which participated in the creation of social reality, actually become preservative agents of social reality that more and more ceases

³ Giddens further divides expert systems into abstract systems (e.g. market) and symbolic signs (e.g. money) (Giddens, 2003: 27).

to exist. In place of institutions⁴ providing order and stable social structures based on class differentiation, a new so-called "market individual" emerges (Beck, 2004: chapter 1). This Beck's term expresses profoundly the nub of the problem. The market of today offers liberation from the necessity to consider responsibility and consequences of the choice and so it provides reckless irresponsibility, which the individual experiences as a gift of freedom. To sum it up, instead of modern institutions the social integration and system reproduction is left up to free and independent game of individual and group initiatives.

Second typical feature of modernity, the orientation towards production, is closely related to the position of an individual as aforementioned. The rapid and extensive development of market slowly but surely led to the intensification of production of goods. However, the production plays no longer the role of the most importance. In contrast, consumption outran the production. Thus, whereas modern man produces and orientates outwards, man of present time prefers consuming and tries to get from the outer world as much as possible for his own good and pleasure. Yet, the replacement of a man as a provider of goods by a man as a constantly consuming collector of excitements, as Bauman puts it (Bauman, 1995: 76), is accompanied by another replacement, namely, the replacement of production of goods by the production of information.

Later on, taking into consideration all so far pinned down changes, the impact on the individual grows immense. The process of modernization not only gives the industrial society a new societal form, but it also penetrates to the personal life of every individual. As a necessary consequence, then, under all the pressure a man is exposed to, a process of individualisation takes place. This

⁴ Leaving aside social institutions such as family or religion breaking down already during the modern era.

process touches individual's own identity, which is no longer given and stable aspect of every human being, but it becomes rather a project. Individualisation thus turns into transformation of intimacy consisting of self-realisation, self-fulfilment and searching for own identity.

However, retracing back to the market, a new and specific feature of the postmodern world should be mentioned, which is its globalizing character. Globalisation process intensifies world-wide relations, which link remote locations in such a manner that local events are influenced by those happening miles away. It comes without saying then, that modern institutions necessarily adopt this very same globalizing nature. As aforesaid, the institutions of today are based on expert systems and they work only thanks to the fact that people trust in these systems. However, the process of globalisation gives unprecedented importance and urgency to this matter of fact. In the world in which many aspects of modernity are globalized none can consequently "disembed" from the expert systems.

Scrutiny of the third feature of the modern society comes next. The third characteristic of the modern world was the claim for universal power of reason, represented by scientific and empirical knowledge. Due to the further development of scientific technologies, nothing can be any longer proclaimed for sure; revision of anything takes place anytime in the light of new findings. Furthermore, thanks to constantly advancing findings, inventions and progress any scientific paradigm has throughout the time lost its privileged epistemological primacy. Today all paradigms have lost their validity and there can no longer be any paradigmatic revolution that would return the privileged position to a new paradigm (T. S. Kuhn, 1965). This leads to the loss of credit of scientific knowledge to a great extent. No finding remains ultimate so as to

believe in it completely, paradoxically enough then, the position of science as such has been shaken, however, not swept away.

Together with the constant revision of scientific knowledge another feature of postmodernity emerges. These permanent revisions comprise one aspect of uniquely complex nature of today's society, the reflexivity of the modern social life. This typically postmodern attitude towards not only empirical knowledge, but also towards social practices actually penetrates and applies to all spheres of day-to-day life of every human being. In other words, reflexivity concerns not only self-reflection, searching for own identity (as above), but it arises in public life as well (new social movements). Globalizing modernisation through reflexivity thus faces its own premises and functional principles; in a different way, the process of modernization becomes its own problem. All critics emerging today, all the antimodernist attitudes come out as a natural product, as a consequence of modernisation process.

At last but not at least, the system of small nation state remains the fourth feature of the modern era. The radical change in this sphere finds its roots again in the changing character of the market. The development of the market, more and more complex division of labour and the process of globalisation that necessarily exerts its influence on the latter as well as on the former lead to growing separation of the economic system from the politics. This split between the political and economic side opens up unprecedentedly broad field for international companies⁵. Although the nation state remains the dominant actor on the global political scene, corporations seized this privileged position on the scene of the world economics.

However, how does the nation state itself fare in the postmodern time? The globalisation has its share even in this sphere, exerting pressures for centralisation among states based on the interconnectedness of their markets. Consequently, settling disputes amongst states by force has lost its general consent, Western European countries seemingly no longer want to fight each other. The interrelatedness of markets is not the only case why the use of military force meet with general rejection. The common historical experience of two world wars probably plays its role as well.

Then, while the modern state system is based on balance-of-power, the postmodern European state system is set up on openness and co-operation, or as Cooper calls it "on the post-balance system" (Cooper, 2005). The openness has reached such an extent that the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs of a particular state begins to break down, not talking of borders turning increasingly irrelevant for the postmodern states. Following the traces of globalisation, even the situation among the states grows bipolar. On one hand, we witness a tendency towards centralisation among states, however, on the other, naturally, the tendency towards the protection of state autonomy and sovereignty. Thus, although economy, law making, defence policy and framework for settling disputes between the European states may be increasingly embedded in international setting, identity and democratic institutions remain stubbornly national.

Nevertheless, together with the changing character of the environment among states, even the concept of sovereignty and autonomy alters. The core of sovereignty remains in the domestic control, in legal monopoly on force, in the ability to make and enforce laws, but internationally the emphasis has shifted

⁵ Some of the biggest transnational corporations dispose of budgets exceeding those of several states together.

from the control of territory and armies to the capacity to join international bodies and to make international agreements. As Cooper precisely defines this shift, sovereignty of today means "a seat at the table" (Cooper, 2005: 44). To put it simply, in the postmodern world the individual action of one state infringes its autonomy, whereas co-operation with other states enhances it.

To conclude, the comparison of the four features is accomplished. Firstly, the order provided by social institutions is replaced by a gap that waits to be filled by individual action and responsibility. Secondly, the orientation towards production weakens and, instead, consumption overrules lives of most of the people. Consumption remains only one aspect of presently booming process of individualisation, caused by globalizing character of the world economic markets. Then, consequently, under the mass of information brought through globalised means of communication, any knowledge can be revised and thus the universal power of scientific knowledge has been shaken. This loss of scientific primacy belongs to one of many expressions of the intensive reflexivity present in the postmodern society (the individualisation process appertains to this phenomenon as well). Finally, the system of nation state has inevitably undergone remarkable changes too. Under the impact of globalisation of markets, separation of economy from politics and deeper co-operation among states took place.

Finally, after concerning the four features of the two different ways of social organization, further on the thesis concentrates on the main characteristic features of the threats, which they have gained throughout the postmodernisation process.

2.3 The main characteristic features of the postmodern threats

„In an era of globalisation distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand.“⁶

Stepping backwards, the first characteristic trait of the modern and postmodern structure that differed was the position of social institutions. In the postmodern society these institutions lost their position and they no longer play the role of a provider of social order, hence, the role of security guard. The question consequently arises, how does the postmodern society deal with the lack of former order then?

Contemporary society simply admits missing fundamentals and goals, formerly provided by social institutions. Quite the contrary, the fact that present-day society lacks coherent foundation, as well as individuals actually do, is praised and talked highly of, for people consider it the condition of true and fully developed freedom. On the other hand, the development and spread of modern institutions has provided unprecedented possibilities for people to lead safe and secure life. Expert systems as the foundations of modern social institutions furnish day-to-day life with security to a great extent. They created broad sphere of secure co-ordinated acting, which enables and simplifies modern social life.

The second field for comparison stood the transforming character of market and the changing position of an individual within. The orientation towards

⁶ A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 6

production was the first aspect discussed. As far as this facet is concerned, in the effort for the increase in production none has ever taken into consideration possible threats it brings about. Hence, the threats we face today are simply products of industrial machinery of progress, in other words, they root from modern causes. This way a true and systematically escalating clash emerges between interests connected with gain and property, the engines of industrialization, and their variously threatening consequences which regressively endanger them back. That is what Beck means by saying that: "... *modernisation undercuts modernisation, unintended and unseen...*" (Beck, 1994: 176).

Furthermore, due to the globalizing character of the present market, threats gain brand new and unprecedentedly urgent nature. If it is accepted that the world becomes smaller and immensely interconnected thanks to the process of globalisation, the threats, which the modernisation yields, globalise as well. This globalisation of threats exerts its influence not only with regard to the intensity, but also to the spread of potential risk environment. Moreover, the nature of threat environment itself changes. Threats, as aforementioned, stem from investment and industrial markets and from the socialised nature (Giddens, 2003: 113n), the primary nature is no longer the source of threats⁷. Another aspect of the postmodern threats connected with globalization remains the well-distributed awareness of their presence. Giddens even underlines this feature as one of the main characteristics that actually makes the modern and the postmodern society different. In simple terms within the postmodern society people recognise risks as risks.

⁷ I.e. to such extent as it used to be in the modern or even pre-modern time.

Consequently, the globalization creates one world, in which the distribution of risks necessarily accompanies the distribution of wealth. The spread and market use of risks is not, however, in opposition to the logic of capitalist development, contrariwise, civilizational threats offer bottomless source of needs which produce itself by itself. Risks remain not only risks, but they also serve as possible opportunities for different market branches. As Beck puts this paradox, even the fight against environmental threats turns into flourishing industrial branch. In this context he dares to exaggerate a bit by saying that we all are sort of "advertising agencies in advance" for creating new markets for risks (Beck, 2004: 57). Nevertheless, these tensions between the disposal of risks and market concerns penetrate in fact through all spheres of social activity and here we face another important aspect of the postmodern conception of threats, which is the threat-risk interpretation game.

After what has been said about the impacts of the process of globalization on the nature of threats, the interpretation of threats as risks grows into a matter of the highest significance. Hereby, we enter the third field of comparison, the position of science and empirical knowledge in general. As aforesaid, the claim for universal power of reason has been shaken to a great extent due to the rising plurality typical for the postmodern world. Plurality has become the principle of society and the new paradigm of science (Welsch, 1993: 493). Nonetheless, with regard to risks we all remain dependent on measure instruments, on theories and on the experts, no matter how much of their credibility they have lost. Many of the new threats need perceptive organs of science in order to become visible at all and to be ever interpreted as a risk. So as to define the threats, scientists try to improve their technologies and by insisting on higher and higher quality of scientific devices and methods they endeavour to characterise the threats as precisely as possible.

However, the position of science is not enviable one. The globalizing dimensions of the nature of threat leaves any empirical claim for objective determination, of what the threat amounts to, on unstable speculations and assumptions. Any such attempt inevitably oscillates in terms of probabilities, what caused what, simply where and what plays a part in the causality chain, which in return encourages further researches. Thus, the trust in science and research from the side of society is demanded and declared. Hereby the two types of rationality intersect. The scientific examination of the risks of industrial development remains, on one hand, dependent on the social expectations and value horizons, while, on the other hand, social discussions and perception of threats as risks remain dependent on scientific argumentation. That is what Beck means by saying that: *"...scientific rationality without social rationality remains empty, but social rationality without scientific rationality remains blind."* (Beck, 2004: 30).

The scientists or security analysts do not decide, however, whether a particular problem should be designated as an existential threat, that is the role of security actors. In other words, risks as such have become a strong political instrument. Once a modernisational risk gains general acknowledgement, which means that people collectively know about it and that it is politically clarified together with its consequences, then it generates unbelievable political dynamics. If the particular risk matches with desirable political reforms, political campaign uses/abuses it for its purposes, and vice versa. Consequently, a certain topic can become a security problem, not necessarily because particular existential threat truly exists, but because the topic is presented as such a type of threat (Buzan, Waeber, Wilde, 2005: 35).

Nevertheless, what concerns the sphere of politics the above compared European system of state influences the nature of risks on the political scene. Cooperation among states based on openness and transparency, borders becoming irrelevant and external politics more and more connected with the domestic affairs, all these aspects necessarily have impact on the nature of state threats. On one hand, close international co-operation means no civil wars accompanied by general pacification within the European states, on the other hand, the globalizing character of the present world forces these states to deal with problems and threats geographically remote yet dangerous. Thus, for instance, providing a helping hand for those, who are excluded from the postmodern world, is no longer only a humanitarian task, but it grows into a necessary and unavoidable key to the security of the West itself.

2.4 Conclusion

Following the same structure, we can summarise several characteristic features of the threats we face today. Firstly, if the society admits its lack of foundations and it opens up for chaos, it becomes unclear how the matters of morality, good and justice can in this world progress. In society that openly admits missing foundations and uniting goal, any morality can exist, morality out of control and unpredictable (Bauman, 1995: 125n)⁸. This insecure position of morals together with the absence of any stable social structure necessarily threatens to deconstruct the social life of the postmodern society as such from inside.

⁸ With regard to morality in the postmodern era, Bauman uses the expression *adioforation*, i.e. the process during which some categories of human activities become ethically indifferent, meaning that in postmodern society even interpersonal relations are excluded from moral evaluations (Bauman, 1995: 105, 106)

Secondly, the globalizing markets no longer deal only with distribution of wealth, but the logic of distributing the risks prevails. Thus, it grows popular to send the risks from the sorting out stations to the provincial stations which are less developed and still fight the need and lack, for that make them blind to the risks the train brings about (Beck, 2004: 41). Nonetheless, the division and growth of risks cause situations of global social endangerment, because sooner or later, the risks affect even those who produce them or benefit from them. That is what Beck expresses by saying that there are "no others" anymore (Beck, 2004). The spread of modernisational risks makes all social differences and boundaries relative.

One aspect interconnecting the first two compared features, the social structure and the globalizing market, was the individualisation process. In both spheres, for any failure only individual remains responsible. Taking the market, for instance, the highly developed division of labour coincides with general complexity and this complexity coincides with general loss of responsibility. Postmodernity gradually divides itself into particular differentiated subsystems, which turn irresponsible to a non-existing whole. Anyone, thus, can act physically without acting politically or worse morally. Consequently, it is highly difficult to determine who causes, for instance environmental crisis, in legally relevant manner and to trace back the culprit carrying the responsibility.

Yet the individualisation process, apart from the responsibility, which is not referable anymore, unearths another unpleasant aspect. Since the individual reflects on himself and searches for his own identity, it stays again up to him to cope with all the potential threats endangering his personal security. The society of today comprises of individuals for who the ability to come to terms with fear and uncertainty becomes biologically and politically crucial civilizational

qualification. Understandably, everyone tries to shift this task of utmost difficulty to somebody else or, by and large, to ignore it and eventually becomes in most cases indifferent. However, this attitude grows into the biggest threat ever.

Thirdly, the position of science as the main interpreter of the postmodern threats outlines another characteristic feature of the risks of today. The risk exists only after being specified scientifically. Only after e.g. the deforestation is acknowledged as a threat to the creation of oxygen and as a consequence of industrialisation, it becomes a long-term problem. Moreover, the insistence of scientists on causal interpretation of dangers ignores the presence of circumstances (Beck, 2004: 63)⁹. Furthermore, causal connections stay beyond the perception of the ordinary people making the potential risk only a theoretical concept.

Finally, the politic situation becomes problematic as well. In the past, nation state provided state security, however today, living with dangers stays beyond the control not only of individuals, but also of big organizations including states. Thus, unlike class societies organised within the nation states, the postmodern dynamics creates "*common forms of endangerment*, which have to be coped with within the worldwide society. We constantly face risks, which ignore state borders or any other bounds, making any national provisions look ridiculous. Here another aspect of the global character of the present threats arises. Contemporary threats become global also for their solution indispensably requires transnational co-operation. Unluckily, the global co-operation stays

⁹ Beck illustrates this notion by so-called limit values, which actually do not prevent the contamination but rather allows it to certain extent, ignoring the effect, which the limit-values of all instances can bring in their co-existence (ibid.)

halfway so far, mainly because the global risks are experienced to different extents in different parts of the world.

According to these conclusions of the characteristics of the postmodern risks, many questions arise which the postmodern society has to manage. For instance, how to prevent risks and threats systematically produced in advanced process of modernisation so that they do not hinder the modernisation process, the ground our postmodern society stands on? How to prevent all the threats when in some cases its culprits and victims coincide? Who is actually responsible? Is it at all possible to organise this "general exposition to risk" in a political manner?

Moreover, as demonstrated above, talking about risks and threats means, as a matter of fact, considering the solutions to situations, which will come or more precisely may come or could come. This postmodern orientation towards future contributes to the absurdity and helplessness of the present position of the political representatives: How can they pretend to control something, which is completely uncontrollable?¹⁰

Since the process of modernization hand in hand with the industrialization stemmed from the Western Europe, the second part of this thesis tries to answer these questions by showing how the EU handles this complex "risk situation" on the European background. However, before penetrating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, following chapter presents how the concept of security in the postmodern era differs from the modern one.

¹⁰ Beck even asserts that designation of risks is actually an attempt to make the incalculable calculable (Beck, 1994: 181)

2.5 The concept of security in the modern era

Unlike societal and individual sphere, from political point of view, the turning point designated as the dividing line between the modern and the postmodern clearly stands the end of the Cold War. The Cold War order was the balance of power system writ large and as Cooper calls it, it was the last highly culminated stage of this system. The main interest was to keep the balance stable, although in this case only between two main coalitions. Even though the balance of power was accompanied by the same balance of terror, it disposed of certain orderliness.

The bipolarity of the Cold War order rooted from the results of the Second World War, however, the European nation state system previous to 1945 was multipolar. As Mearsheimer stresses (Mearsheimer, 1990: 35n)(one of the outspoken adherents of the realist approach to the security policy relations), unlike the bipolar constellation, a multipolar system is much more fluid and unstable, the risk of small or, more precisely said, local wars is much higher. As the number of coalitions is higher, the calculation of potential military conflict grows complicated and at the end almost unmanageable. Quite the opposite, the strategic confrontation between the USSR and the United States, mostly understood as an ideological stand-off between communism and capitalism, combined not only elements of conflict but of stability as well. There is no denying about the presence of nuclear weapons, however, we can contemplate whether the proliferation of such weapons was not divided evenly between the two blocks, thus providing equilibrium.

The nuclear armament during this military and geographical confrontation bolstered the peace by moving the power relations among states towards equality. If the USSR disposed of higher amount or higher quality nuclear

equipment, the US block would enlarge its nuclear arsenal immediately. This equality meant that the two blocks avoided direct conflict, and in fact, as Cooper puts it, the Cold War was war with propaganda, bribery and subversion, rather than through open military clashes (Cooper, 2004: 13). If a military combat took place, it took shape of civil wars or ideological and political wars¹¹, not of wars between particular countries within the Cold War order. Necessary to add, although both sides spent on nuclear arsenal fortune, neither of them actually wanted to go on open nuclear conflict. This attitude culminated in 80's by the American-Soviet declaration "that there are no winners in the nuclear war" and shortly after by signing the bilateral Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty¹² liquidating these in Europe (Eichler, 2004: 56n).

Anyway, in such a political and military constellation, security necessarily concentrated on states either on one or the other side of the curtain. Security was ensured by equality between them, in case it was misbalanced, new militarisation or armaments counterbalanced it. The main threat made public remained the potential favourable position of the rival side, other problems, that both sides were facing, were in the light of one main enemy diminished, if not completely ignored. Exploitation of workers and natural resources, pollution of nature, politically motivated illegal imprisonment of people, military atrocities and other facts were overshadowed by this narrow-minded straightforward orientation. Moreover, this ignorance to other than purely military threats contributed to the urgency of the threats we face today. Nonetheless, at that time both sides considered themselves secure as long as they reckoned themselves able to face the attack of the adversary.

¹¹ That was the case in Nicaragua, Angola or Korea.

¹² Signed in Washington, D.C., December 8, 1987 by President Ronald Reagan and General-Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

This concept of security represents a traditional concept of national security, which is provided by military means and applies exclusively to state interests. In this case the securitizing actor, i.e. who evaluates the threats and vulnerabilities as existential threats, remains the state and coincides with the referential object (again exclusively the state). The standard model of mutual security independence in such an anarchic international system is represented by "clusters". These security complexes created by signing coalition treaties remained stable yet not permanent parts of the international system. Although the postmodern perception of security has changed to great extent (see below), the importance of military conflict as an analytic key to the understanding of security and the model of security complexes are still relevant for so-called traditionalist security studies (Buzan, Waever, Wilde, 2005: 25).

2.6 The concept of security in the postmodern era

After the tumble of the Iron Curtain this bipolar military and political order necessarily changed. To argue what contributed the most to this demise of the Cold War order is inconclusive. While Cooper underlines its missing legitimacy, others stress the influence of American pressure or the Soviet economic decline. Nevertheless, altogether we can consider the end of the Cold War either as a complete turn upside down, or as nothing to make much fuss about. The bipolar system turned into new multipolar constellation, redefinition of Europe geographically as well as politically took place and rivalry between capitalism and communism ended by the predominance of the former. However, the position of USA has not been shaken, Europe continued the same path of integration as it had taken long before the Cold War ended, moreover, institutions built up in the modern era remained central to the management of

the international system in the postmodern era. Furthermore, as Huntington adds, the fact that the Cold War clash of secular economic ideologies came to conclusion, does not mean the end of the conflict as such (in Cox, 2005 : 136).

As bewildering as it may be, already in 1990 Mearsheimer argues that the end of the former bipolar system will lead to greater instability in Europe and in the world as whole. Already then, he envisages potential ethnic conflicts, clashes over resources, which are less controllable than military combats, and chaos and misery produced by dissolving structures especially in countries formerly completely overruled by one of the blocks (e.g. West Africa etc.). Until today the dividing line remains lying between the rich and prosperous North and poor South with economic activity running late.¹³ Cooper stresses other difficulties the new multipolar system needs to face, the problems democracy necessarily copes with such as the sense of identity, definition of political community, the idea of nation and so forth. Eventually, the end of the Cold War was the victory of democracy, but, was it also the triumph of security?

The victorious liberal-capitalist stream captivated first decade of the post-Cold War period. The key features of the postmodern era as described above played their role. The growing globalisation did not only define a more open world-economy. It referred to a situation, in which the nation-state was undermined by transnational movements of capital and where every government was compelled to play by a single set of economic rules given by the International Monetary Fund (Cox, 2005: 139). It was the world of privatisation, deregulation and cut-throat competition. The bureaucratic weight of those government departments whose primary purpose was to help companies win

¹³ On the question what will this division lead to, i.e. whether the weaker, the zone of conflict, will begin to penetrate and impinge upon the zone of peace, or whether the more powerful zone of peace will seek to penetrate and influence the zone of conflict, see Buzan, 2000: 354n.

markets increased to a great extent. As Fukuyama has predicted, politics was fast becoming a debate about how to manage the market rather than how to move beyond it (ibid. p. 136).

What was the impact of such a situation in the field of security? First, security in the early 90's meant foremost the control of disarmament and armament. After the Charter of Paris (November 1990) signed up by 34 representatives who committed themselves to: *"... to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries."* (Charter of Paris, 1990:3), other treaties targeting disarmament arose. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (December 1990) and the Document of Vienna including Confidence and Security Building Measures (1994) have started such trend. The treaty START I. (July 1991) meant approximately 30% reduction of strategic nuclear forces in the US and in former USSR. START II. (January 1993) aimed at further reduction of strategic nuclear forces to one third and at dislocating the inter-continental ballistic missiles. In 1995 the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was prolonged and till the present day it plays a crucial role in the field of international security relations. Thanks to these treaties the military tension decreased as well as the threat of nuclear conflict.

Beside the German unification, the war in former Yugoslavia and the enlargement of NATO, another important event influenced the first decade of the post-cold war period. This was the European integration and its expansion to the East. More integrated Europe meant more effective Europe, and additionally enlarged Europe meant the end of Cold War legacy. Again the impact of the market should not be underestimated, closer European co-operation led to the

creation of a serious economic player in global terms and this situation encouraged the enlargement of such a co-operation.

Further co-operation mostly among European states was supposed to increase openness and transparency, which guaranteed mutual openness and thus security. However, as mentioned above, this trend has started already deep in the Cold War. Fouchet's plan from 60's brought for the first time the idea of communitarisation of defence and foreign policies of European states. Its refusal led to the signing of the Treaty of Elysée in 1963 giving birth to French-German co-operation, which consequently turned into the engine of European efforts for unification. Later, after the summit in Hague (1965) the Davignon report (1970) was approved resulting first in European Political Cooperation (1970), later in the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992.

2.6.1 The widening of the concept of security

It has been shortly found out that as the political and military division of Europe has changed after the end of the Cold War so have even the security threats. The threats literally dispersed over the new multilateral system. Suddenly all the countries formerly overruled either by the Soviet or the American block were liberated and so grew into incalculable, thus potential threats. Their necessary transition to capitalist and democratic regime became unconditional not to threaten the Western European democracies, nevertheless, nobody knew how these, in some cases newly established, states would thrive and many of them could not fight the underdevelopment so as to succeed. The new threats thus come from the pre-modern and modern world, as Cooper labels it

(Cooper, 2005: 77n). Which is to say, from those parts of the globe in which chaos predominates and in which states collapse and crime takes over, or on the other hand, from those parts of the world, in which states are successful, yet stubbornly keeping their modern (sometimes even pre-modern) nature. However, this narrow international-political sense of security remains no longer the only perception of the word.

The enlargement of referential objects was another transformation the concept of security has undergone. Ever since the Westphalia Peace, the state and its interests remained the only player in the security field, and it stayed the main referential object of security till the end of the Cold War conflict. However, since 1989 the concept of security has been widening. Nowadays security concentrates on more referential objects, asking who else's security except for the state is at stake. The range of objects the attention is fixed at varies great deal. In present days these are not only states, but also transnational organizations, economic systems, minority groups and foremost individuals. That is why the division of security into military, political, economic, environmental and societal areas takes up (Balabán, Rašek, Stejskal, 2007: 7). This sector division belongs to another category through which the concept of security widens. Furthermore, the enlarged concept of security deals not only with potential threats, but also with their character and it asks what should be considered as a threat at all, simply what extent of the intensity is necessary for us to consider the threat a security threat.

Altogether we can distinguish three levels of the widening concept of security. Firstly, *whose security*, i.e. who or what can be considered a referential object. Secondly, *security where and how*, which touches upon various sectors or dimensions, unearthing the nature of potential threats. And

finally, *security against*, i. e. what the intensity has to be for us to label the threat a security threat (Stejskal, 2006: 5).

Additionally, the tendency to deepen the concept of security especially stressing the importance of human and individual aspects takes place (*human security*). Moreover, in 1995 the Commission on Global Governance has concentrated on the concept of security from the point of humanitarian catastrophes during post-confrontation periods and it marked out two main requirements, which are the freedom from fear and the freedom from want. Similarly, the Humanitarian European Security Doctrine (September 2004) counts on the creation of humanitarian forces of security reaction, for the security of European citizens cannot be divided from the security of people anywhere else around the globe (Balabán, 2005: 17).

Last but not least, logically, if the amount of security referential objects increases so the number of security actors does. Beside states and their national governments other international and intergovernmental organisations stand out (mostly UN and NATO¹⁴) and the role of their chief leaders assumes particular significance. Such organisations and their leaders can plead for more abstract and general principles or values as their security referential objects.

To sum up, three main differences between the Cold War and the post-Cold War period concerning the concept of security may be pinned down. First of all, the security environment has changed to a great extent. The dissolving of the two Cold War blocks created a new multilateral system based on unprecedented mutual openness and cooperation, on the other hand, it gave birth to new potential threat areas. Secondly, the concept of security has deepened,

considering the seriousness of its other aspects than purely military ones (new referential objects) and it comprises of more actors as well.

Necessary to add, the widening of the concept of security meant opening to other than purely military threats, on the other hand, security shortly included so many topics that it started losing its main sense and significance. A vicious circle asserts itself that constantly enlarge the concept of national security. In reaction to such views, the *Copenhagen school of security studies* in order to handle the booming number of security topics, coins the sector and regional attitude to the security questions. Thus, using the sector attitude, to understand the existential threat becomes possible only with respect to typical features of the particular referential object. Furthermore, in stead of traditionalist security complexes, the Copenhagen school concentrates on regional security complexes and stresses the interaction among them. Claiming that the essence of security lies not in analysing the subjects, but rather among these subjects. Additionally, this school deals also with *desecuritarisation*, i.e. the removal of problematic topics from the category of critical situations and their inclusion to the standard negotiation process in the political sphere (Buzan, Waeber, Wilde, 2005: 43, 13).

The last change concerns the nature and the spectrum of the new postmodern threats and it can be argued whether or not this last point triggered the cooperation among states and caused the enlargement of the postmodern concept of security. Does the post Cold War co-operation really symbolise the fact that democracies do not want to fight anymore, as liberal adherents would claim? Or rather, was not it a pure necessity, for the states realised that only teamwork can increase their relative power and thus national

¹⁴ The position of the EU as a security actor is discussed in the following chapters.

security in this brand new security environment? If the nature of postmodern threats leaves any state unable to handle them on its own (see above), collaboration seems the only solution.

2.6.2 Threats and risks in the postmodern world

Before proceeding to the main threats of the contemporary world, a short note on the different perception of the threats and risks coming together with the postmodern time is still needed. As aforementioned (see p. 9), these two expressions can be grasped in terms of objective versus subjective nature (risk resp. threat). Nevertheless, after the end of the Cold War this unambiguous determination grows complicated.

Already the Rome Declaration (1991) stresses: *"The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy."* (Rome Declaration, Security Challenges and Risks, Paragraph 7). The term threat thus seems to lose its significance, whereas, the expression risk is highlighted. *"In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess."* (ibid., Paragraph 8). Later on (Paragraphs 9 and 10) characterise risk as something unpredictable, as a phenomenon possibly coming from various directions adopting many forms.

Ever since 1991 the term risk thus loses its subjective character and replaces formerly used term threat. Risks were defined as: *"Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory*

of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe." (ibid., Paragraph 9). This tilt towards giving preference to risks rather than to threats can be ascribed to the efforts to continuation of the process of positive changes within the international situation. Following paragraphs support this idea by stressing the non-adversarial nature of USSR - NATO relations.

The complicated situation with threats and risks is however still inconclusive. Newly implemented term "*security challenge*" brings us back to the drawing board. Security challenge disposes of no such nature to threaten directly security of the member states: "*They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.*" (ibid., Paragraph 9). Moreover, this declaration entitles proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage as risks (Paragraph 12). Later on, it adds to this group even the nuclear terrorism, although at that time the experience with Gulf War I. clearly proved that nuclear terrorism is clearly a direct threat of military nature.

In comparison with the beginning of the 21st century, a remarkable shifts what concerns risks and threats can be traced in the last years. Taking for instance the European Security Strategy (2003), terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or organised crime are no longer labelled as risks, but clearly as threats. Last note let be the fact that environmental issues in this document do not belong to the group of key threats but to the group of global

challenges. Similarly, in the Commission Work Programme for 2005 Europe faces environmental challenges, not threats.

2.7 Main threats of the postmodern world

If it is accepted that newly emerging threats necessarily influence the behaviour within the international security field, it grows vital to present at least some of them. Undoubtedly, this can retrospectively help to understand the motivations of security actors and thus answer the question whether the liberal approach gives a true picture of the European security policy.

As discussed with the Copenhagen school, several security areas can be distinguished within the postmodern concept of security, which can serve as a clue how to divide the postmodern threats as well.¹⁵

2.7.1 Military security

First comes the military security. In this case the main referential object still remains the state, however, NATO or any other security communities can be concerned likewise. The role of securitizing actors in this sphere is mostly held by governments or decision bodies of security communities. To the group of the main military threats belong: armed aggression, nuclear weapons proliferation and regional conflicts.

Regarding the first of the three, the armed aggression against any of the European states has grown almost impossible. Attacking any of them, most of them being the member states of NATO, represents unbearable costs for the potential aggressor. Under this umbrella, the threat of direct military attack remains insignificant for European states.

Contrariwise, the proliferation of nuclear weapons grows into much more complex threat for the West. Unlike direct military aggression, NW proliferation is a double-edge sword: on one hand, it regards the export and proliferation of equipment, technologies and know-how for production of nuclear, biological, chemical and bacterial weapons or missiles, while on the other hand, it concerns secret and illicit efforts of particular states to reach the ability to produce such weapons. Among these Iraq, Iran or Democratic People's Republic of Korea belong, moreover, the insufficiently controlled area of former USSR threatens both ways (Eichler, 2004). Globalisation process, helping distributing all sorts of information all over the world, is of assistance to the spread of information on nuclear technologies and their availability, likewise.

At last, the regional conflicts as already mentioned above, no longer stay out of the scope of European interests. Since every country around the globe can run its international airport, European states can no longer ignore these parts of the world no matter how distant they may seem. If regional balance breaks down, may it be in peripheral location to Europe, it could easily threaten the global security situation. Hitherto, the colonisation represented the way to handle such dangers. Nevertheless, nowadays, the imperial colonisation is out of the question. The postmodern version of the imperial colonisation has to be

¹⁵ The division of security areas does not necessarily have to use the sector key, similarly we can use geographical key, which divides security to national, international, regional and global security. However, sector division shows the threats in a more transparent manner.

voluntary so as to be acceptable, however, being voluntary leaves it with less chance to succeed (Cooper, 2004).

In general, the main characteristic feature of the military conflicts in 21st centuries is their asymmetry (Eichler, 2004: 127n). On one hand, asymmetry concerns the misbalance with regard to military armament and equipment, on the other hand, it touches upon the discrepancy between the two fighting sides with respect to their goals, values and principles of military discipline. The larger the asymmetry in the first sense is, the greater the space for asymmetry in the second meaning. Thus even after successful military actions, the threat of guerrilla wars comes. So as to prevent this situation, readiness for post-conflict work grows vital¹⁶.

2.7.2 Economic security

Secondly, the economical threats regard economic interests of particular states and international economic and business groups. Similarly, as was the case of military threats, even here the decision and executive bodies of these groups play the role of security actors. The main task in this sphere is to find the balance between drawing on economic sources for national defence needs and economy needs suffering from this militarisation in the long term. From broader point of view, the main attributes of economic security is the access to resources and raw materials, monetary and financial stability, competition ability and productivity necessary to assure security capacities and social coherence. From the global view, it concerns threats such as the instability of world

¹⁶ Moreover, another aspect of military politics today is the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, which reflects the contemporary tendency of most of the developed states to lower the number of military conflict victims. Through interrelation of politics, security policy and new scientific findings it tries to enhance the security of soldiers as much as possible (Eichler, 2004: 64).

markets and the economic crises. With respect to the former, world markets have already more times shown that their stability is not given and can easily be subverted. What concerns the latter, economic crisis in one country can easily trigger chain reaction in neighbouring states undermining society both psychologically and politically.

2.7.3 Environmental security

Unlike all so far mentioned groups of threats, the environmental threats lack any global system of protection. Main attention is paid to regional or local attitudes and mostly ecological groups organise all activities in this field. The position of these environmental groups grows difficult, because the threats they stress remain onerously perceivable, yet affecting all of us unconditionally. Everything that has been said about the characteristics of the postmodern threats clearly fits the case of environmental threats. Especially in the environmental sphere the problem of responsibility, scientific determination, economic negligence or abuse and political half-hearted approach stand out.

Very insightful analysis brought by Meadows in 1972 and then again in 1992¹⁷ introduces three main threats to the world, which is the exponential growth (of production, but also of population etc.), exploitation of sources (both renewable and non-renewable) and overflowing sinks. However, these threats apply not only to environmental field, but to the economic sphere as well. Without sources no economic market performs its function, however, the speed the production, and in the postmodern time, mostly even the consumption assumes, threatens it with its own limits. Notwithstanding, as Meadows stresses *"...these limits are neither limits to the number of people on the amount of*

capital, nor space limits, contrariwise, they are limits to throughput, to flow rate and particularly they are speed limits." (Meadows 1992: 99). More concretely, the chapter on ozone depletion shows the characteristic scheme: scientific recognition of a threat, political negligence, further research, social movements action, political action and only then, remedy or provision implementation.

2.7.4 Social security

Next, the social security orientates towards the protection of individuals, minorities, national identities and confessions. According to for instance the Conclusions of Presidency from the European Council of Nice (Part IV., A), this group further on includes issues such as employment, social exclusion and discrimination. The agenda of the EU representatives in this respect thus in fact remains never-ending.

Moreover, this sphere needs to come to terms with questions such as for example the uncontrolled population growth, lack of sources, mass migration (immigration), rising nationalism and its consequences or other economic or cultural ramifications of the globalisation process. Herein, the rise of nationalism should be stressed, for the more the world grows globalised the more divergent confessions and different principles of particular cultures intersect. Additionally, this sphere necessarily touches upon individual and personal uncertainties caused by reflexivity of oneself, which is inevitable part of the postmodernisation (as above mentioned), because these feelings of intimate insecurity no less threaten the coherence of the contemporary society.

¹⁷ Limits to Growth (1972), respectively Beyond the Limits (1992)

2.7.5 Political security

Intentionally, the last group of threats belongs to the political sphere. The European Security Strategy (ESS) stresses environmental threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failure, the organised crime and others as the main political threats. Thus it comes without saying that, firstly, political representatives necessarily have to cope with threats of diverse nature because of greater level of globalisation and, secondly, that *"no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own."* (ESS, 2003:1.) Nevertheless, as the threat number one stands the terrorism linked to violent religious extremism. This document admits that: *"...it [terrorism] rises from complex causes, such as the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises and that Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism."* (ESS, 2003: 3, cf. the merging of the victims and the culprits, chapter 2.4).

The list remains understandably incomplete. Firstly, it named only few of the threats linked to particular sectors, and then, the list is incomplete also with respect to the sectors themselves. Except for those mentioned regarding the Copenhagen school, other sectors can be named as well. These are e.g. energetic and mineral security, technological and infrastructure security or cultural security (Stejskal, 2006: 12) . Anyway, from the little that was named the interrelatedness of particular security fields is indisputable. Nevertheless, the threat that comes as the most urgent remains the possibility that the threats even in non-military security areas will develop into and eventually be solved as classical political and consequently even as military conflicts among states (Balabán, Rašek, Stejskal, 2007: 12). Moreover, as the Copenhagen school stresses, in order to cope with above-mentioned threats, the particular sectors necessarily need to be pieced together. Only by considering these areas

together, can be the analysis of the postmodern threats completed not ignoring the interrelatedness and mutual influence of these sectors on each other.

3. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union

This part aims to describe historical development, main tendencies and downsides of the CFSP whatever they may root from (e. g. its institutional constellation or the ever-changing political and strategic situation). Given the scope of the topic, following part is necessarily selective, it does not deal in depth with the EU - NATO or EU - USA foreign and security relations, for these are topics deserving undoubtedly even more space than this whole essay amounts to.

Furthermore, for the main target of this essay is the concept of security, not the security policy as such, this part neglects such analyses as the decision-making procedure or jurisdiction of particular bodies of the CFSP. Quite the contrary, following chapters underline main transformation security and defence policy underwent in the postmodern era. Chapters to come concentrate on the behaviour of particular member states, so as to help answer the question whether or not the liberal approach truly depicts the contemporary condition of the security policy on the European background as well as to reveal the complete role of the CFSP/ESDP.

3.1 Theories on international relations

Within international relations the security stands for the absence or non-existence of threats to the highest values of a state or community. A state is, then, considered secure in case the defence of its territory, inhabitants, institutions and values is provided, in other words if its identity is protected. Leaving the objective factors of security provision aside, such as geography, territory or history of the particular state, subjective factors have played the crucial role ever since. Subjective factors, e.g. diplomacy representing the non-military part and forces building for the military part, create the security policy of the present states (Eichler, 2004).

Security policy relations among modern states, as was the case with the term security itself, can be also looked on from different viewpoints. The liberal attitude sees the international security relations as a result of co-operation among states, consequently it emphasises the term "*collective security*". This approach operates with a threefold assumption: the possibility of avoiding conflicts through restrictions of military actions (the control of both militarisation and demilitarisation), the possibility of overcoming the aggression and the notion of retribution on the side of the potential aggressor. Liberals argue that the end of the Cold War stands for the ultimate victory of the West, thus its principles (Cox, 2005: 134n). Democracies unlike authoritarianism breed peace; capitalism creates a powerful set of material incentives to compel the nations not to fight each other and rather co-operate; and institutions work as a mediator among the states to prevent anarchy and conflict. According to Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 1989), one of the most influential adherents of the liberal theory of the post-cold war era, we are facing the world in which conflict is not

completely avoidable, however, less probable, thus leaving Clausewitz's doctrine¹⁸ absolutely irrelevant.

On the other hand, the realist approach to the topic (Cooper, 2004:22n) bases on the precondition that each and every state firstly follows its own national interests. Thus the international security politics take shape according to the most influential actors who are currently in power and the utmost interest of the particular state is to exert as much influence within the international scene as possible. Peace is, then, acquired through the balance of power system and we talk of "*co-operative security*", whose primary aim remains the national security. Additionally, the realists stress the danger of other than purely ideological clashes such as civilizational or cultural, new conflicts over resources, moreover, chaos and misery caused by the dissolving of old structures and traditional certainties.

So as to fully depict the complex image of security theories, the constructivist approach represents another viewpoint. This stream doubts the existence of any stable or quasi-natural structures within international security relations (Cox, 2005). Constructivist adherents consider the international security relations to be dependent on interpretation made by its main actors and consequently they label these relations as results of social construction (preferable term is then "*security culture*"). Unlike constructivist stream, the critical approach rather asks who should be protected, who is the aggressor and subsequently whose security should be of our interest? Last, but not least, the neomarxist radical theory stresses the influence the historical development has

¹⁸ "We maintain that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means." (Clausewitz, On War, 1873, in: Cooper, 2004)

and concentrates on economic and social sources of security threats of military and non-military character (ibid.).

Each of these theories comes with aspects that should be taken into account and all together they serve as a rich background to the analysis of the ever-changing concept of security. Nowadays security remains high on the policy agenda of the European Union (see below) and especially in last decades it undergone dramatic changes. All this is certainly not only due to the terrorist attacks that have lately affected the whole world, but also due to the changes in the society necessarily associated with the postmodernisation. Under all these impacts security turns out to be not that much a state of matters but rather a process (Balabán, Rašek, Stejskal, 2007: 19).

3.2 Historical background of the CFSP

Ever since the first attempts to European integration, the convergence in the economic area prevailed, leaving the politic unification obviously falling behind. The Treaties of Rome make no mention of foreign policy and the European Economic Community long focused exclusively on domestic economic policy. Although some efforts can be traced back, such as the European Defence Community in 1950, not before 1969 the idea of common foreign policy was newly awakened during the summit in Hague. Subsequently, the promotion of European Political Cooperation (EPC) was agreed, however, without being included in the founding treaties. The EPC thus remained a loose and voluntary arrangement situated rather outside the Community. The reluctance to give up much of own independent powers persisted even after the creation of the final document

from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975¹⁹. Later on, the Single European Act giving formal recognition to the EPC confirmed that the member states would: "*endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy.*" (McCormick, 2002: 195)

3.2.1 The establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Nevertheless, the very divergent reactions of the Community members to the Gulf War I. proved the necessity for unanimity in foreign policy matters. Unification in foreign dimension would complete and consequently foster the position of Europe as an actor in the international relations. The watershed in building common foreign and security policy of the EU remains the Maastricht Treaty (MT), which unlike the Single European Act created a new basis for further development of the foreign and security policy. This treaty actively obliged the signatories to: "*... safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international co-operation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.*" (Title V, Article J.1.2). The Common Foreign and Security Policy established by this treaty should lead to the creation of common

¹⁹ This document for instance binds signatories to notify each other in case of greater (more than 25 000 men) military manœuvres.

defence²⁰ and for this purpose the Western European Union should serve, becoming an inseparable part of the Union's development.

During the intergovernmental conference on the CFSP (1991/1992) two groups of opinion arose²¹. The first group consisted of states endorsing the intergovernmental attitude (France, the UK, Denmark, Portugal and Ireland), whereas the other group was constituted by states supporting the implementation of more supranational elements to the decision-making process concerning the CFSP (Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Italy and Germany) (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003: 550). Similarly, the debate on common defence witnessed the creation of two opposing alignments. This time of those wanting to preserve the dominant position of NATO in Europe (the UK, the Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark) and, on the other side, of those espousing greater independence of the Europeans from NATO (Greece, Italy, Spain, Belgium and to certain extent even Germany).

Under the provisions of the MT a new system was created, in which the Council of the EU made decisions unanimously, except for procedural matters (resolved by simple majority) and resolutions already unanimously ratified by the European Council. Logically, this dominant position of the Council formed mixed decision-making structure. This way the CFSP was shaped out of the community area, yet within its institutional structure (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003: 555). On the top of this complicated system of co-operation, the European Council stood deciding over the principles and general tendencies of the CFSP (unanimously). Consequently, according to these decisions the Council of ministers of foreign affairs accepted the resolutions necessary for specification and execution of

²⁰ „The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.“ Article J.1.

²¹ Lecture by S. Vanhoonaeker, 2006, „*The Impact of the Maastricht treaty*“, May 8, Maastricht

the CFSP (common actions and common positions). The position of the European Parliament remains consultative and it has the right to be regularly informed about the development of the CFSP, but otherwise than that, it is no influence on decision-making process within the CFSP.

Similarly, the financing of the CFSP was grounded on elaborate basis. Administration costs were paid by the EC budget, so did the operational ones, however, the Council could have decided on the latter to be paid by the member states (using budget rate key) (Article J.11 of the MT). The MT thus permitted to adopt resolutions in terms of one pillar and subsequently draw sources from another one.

From historical point of view, ever since the MT till 1996 it was not easy for the member states to come up to any conclusion on positions and implements concerning international events without previous statement of the UN. On the other hand, it grew into a very useful forum where own viewpoints were to a greater extent created independently from those of USA. Consequently, the EU could be finally considered to have made the first step to become a true security community.

The CFSP, as set up by the MT, disposed of no legal means, such as regulations or directives. The MT only defined three main unilateral legal acts: general guidelines, common actions and common positions. Concerning the common positions four main areas of interest were determined in Edinburgh (1992): disarmament and control of armament in Europe, nuclear weapons non-proliferation and economic aspects of security. These were later on joined by general targets of the European security, which were defined in Brussels in 1993 to be: the protection of territorial integrity and political independence of the

EU, preservation of democratic principles, economic stability and the stability in neighbouring regions (European Council, Brussels, 1993, October 29).

To the contrary, the common positions stood for systematic co-operation concerning matters of common interest, yet of less interest than in the case of common actions. The Council thus could adopt common position leaving it up to the member states whether their national position would coincide. Obviously, the greatest disincentive in adopting common positions remained the incapability of the member states to reach common consent no matter the urgency of a particular foreign matter.

Main problems of the CFSP, shown for instance during the crisis in former Yugoslavia, remained of institutional nature. While the Commission carried out trade negotiations on behalf of the EU as whole, discussions on the CFSP rested more firmly with the Council of Ministers, and were thus more intergovernmental. Two working-groups, respectively two separate and independent executive centres, functioned, one for economic relations, while the other for the CFSP. Furthermore, as mentioned above, even the financing system reflected the problems of inter-pillar intersections. The pillar structure proved to be a negative element eroding the functioning of the CFSP, not exclusively concerning the financing but even regular coming to terms with particular foreign policy problems which demanded the usage of more than one political aspect (pillar)²². Other complications rooted from the member states themselves, who while trying to enforce their own national influence to the maximum extent possible hindered decision-making process and the final adoption of positions, respectively actions.²³ Other shortcoming, substantially

²² As was for instance the case of dual-use goods, potentially used for both, military and civil, purposes.

²³ For example the attitude of France to the situation in Algeria serves as an obvious evidence of permanently strong national factor in the supranational policy of the Union.

connected to the previous one, was the lack of common interests, a necessary condition for creating common identity²⁴²⁵.

3.2.2 Reforms of the CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty

Subsequently, the Intergovernmental Conference (1996-97) dealt with the necessary reform of the CFSP, reacting not only to the capabilities-expectations gap problem, but also to the expiring WEU Treaty²⁶. However, even then the national clashes remained decisive as ever. No matter the topic of the discussion (external representation of the CFSP, financing matters, communitarisation of the CFSP or the relationship between the EU and the WEU) groups of opinion formed each time based on different aspects (geographical, economic, political and others). This situation grew even more complicated after having accepted three neutral member states in 1995²⁷, adding to the already existing opposing groups of "Atlanticists" (the UK, the Netherlands and Portugal) and "Europeanists" (France, Spain, Italy and sometimes Germany) another "neutral" group.

Beside the discussion on the creation of a representative office for the CFSP and the clause on "constructive abstention"²⁸ this Intergovernmental Conference brought a very important shift of standpoints on the side of some of the Atlanticists (mainly the Netherlands, partially even Portugal and Denmark). Unlike in Maastricht, during the sharp opinion confrontation on the future image

²⁴ Lecture by S. Vanhooacker, 2006, „The Impact of the Maastricht treaty“, May 8, Maastricht

²⁵ Other downside of the CFSP remained the voting system, the basis for decision-making mechanism, leaving all important decision on the common will of the member states.

²⁶ Established on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 with the accession of West Germany and Italy in 1954.

²⁷ Finland, Sweden and Austria

²⁸ Mechanisms enabling a country not to be included in policy within the CFSP on which it abstained, providing it respects and does not hinder the implementation of that particular policy.

of the EU - WEU relations this time they viewed the WEU no longer as a means of fostering Atlanticist relations, but rather as a means of europeanisation of the NATO. This could be due to the fact, that these states realised their better future position within the NATO as a member of a whole (the EU) so as to influence the policy of the NATO, than as an independent member.²⁹ This convergence, however, did not fully overshadowed the lack of political will, which subsequently only led to little changes in the CFSP.

The main changes brought by the Amsterdam Treaty (AT), as signed on 18. 6. 1997, concerned the enlargement of the CFSP goals, now including: *"...to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; - to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."* (the AT, Article 11 ex. J.1). Furthermore, according to this treaty the Council and the Commission are no longer only responsible for the coherence of all activities of the Union, but should co-operate so as to provide it. Then, the Declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and the early warning unit (the AT, Article J.15) explicitly utters its aim to be the assurance of co-operation with the European Commission and thus the safeguarding of cohesiveness with outer economic and development policies of the Union.

²⁹ Certain influence must have had even the accession of social-liberal political parties to the government in these countries and their moderate views (Lecture by S. Vanhoonaeker, 2006, The impact of Maastricht treaty, May 8, Maastricht).

Furthermore, the AT brought only little change concerning the institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, the creation of the office of Secretary-General of the Council who in the name of the Council leads the negotiation with third party should not be omitted. This Secretary-General is in charge of the planning group within the policy planning and early warning unit, moreover, becomes a part of so-called Troika³⁰. Other than that, the position of the Commission as well as of the European Parliament has been transformed to no greater extent.

Even the decision-making procedure remained more or less the same. The transformation touched only upon the enlargement of the majority voting use and it implemented constructive abstention (see above). What concerns financing the Interinstitutional treaty between European Parliament and the Commission on financing the CFSP has been amended saying that according to the Commission's proposal the European Council together with the European parliament decide on the total amount of costs destined for the CFSP.

To sum up, the AT brought reforms within the CFSP, however, not really far-reaching. The CFSP remained even after the AT intergovernmental rather than supranational policy, the effort to foster the position of the European Parliament and the European Commission did not live up to the expectations. Take for instance the financing field, although the European Parliament strengthened its position within the budget confirmation, however, it has some weight exclusively only if the Council does not decide otherwise. Likewise, the enlargement of qualified majority voting as well as the new instrument (common strategies) do not exert any larger influence on the creation of the CFSP. The

³⁰ Together with the present presidency, coming presidency, the highest representative of the CFSP and the Commission's representative. On the contrary, the former Troika consisted of the former, present and coming presidency.

change in voting only helped to the transparency of the CFSP, but, it does not relate to more important decision-making fields. Moreover, any state can always interpose a veto in case the particular problem threatens its national interests. Thus it seems that national interests still play a role of high importance within the CFSP. National interests make even the functioning of the Planning board harder, for it cannot work properly without adequately defined common interests of the EU within the foreign and security policy. States, however, proved to prefer forming coalitions ad hoc to being co-ordinated by some Political board.

3.2.3 The Amsterdam Treaty and defence

The greatest breakthrough the AT has resulted in remains definitely the discussion on the common European Security and Defence Policy. With regard to the relations between the EU and the WEU, the so-called Petersberg tasks³¹ were incorporated into the contractual framework of the CFSP. Furthermore, the AT enables the member states to integrate the WEU into to EU, should the European Council decide so. Similarly, the common defence policy of the Union may be created, should the European Council decide so. Thus instead of long-term determination of common defence policy, the AT speaks off gradual establishment of defence policy (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003: 566). Hereby, the contractual revision of the AT develops defence aspects of the CFSP.

³¹ 19.6. 1992 in Petersberg a meeting of ministers of defence and foreign affairs of the WEU member states took place. They declared that: “... they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.” (The Petersberg Tasks, II. On Strengthening the WEU’s operational role, Paragraph 2), specifically in the humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and other crisis management missions, including peacemaking, in cooperation with OSCE and the UN Security Council.) (ibid., Paragraph 4).

Even the vague difference between the common actions and common positions has vanished due to the AT and a new means of the CFSP has been added. Concerning the later: "*The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.*" (AT, Article J.3). Thus, except for the general guidelines and principles defined by the European Council, it shall decide on common strategies as well. With regard to the common positions and common actions, their acceptance and adoption lies in the hands of the Council of Ministers.³²

To sum it up, the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks, the convergence of the WEU and the EU and especially the potential creation of common defence policy of the Union belong to the main landmarks the AT brought. However, the AT turned out to be an impulse for further negotiations and triggered the development and fostering of the CFSP.

The conference in St. Malo (3.-4. November 1998) could serve as such an example. It was there, where France and Britain (represented by J. Chirac and T. Blair) issued a joint statement proving the will to foster the CFSP. According to the 1. Article of the *Joint Declaration on European Defence*: "*It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP.*" The 2. Article of this Declaration goes even further: "*the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and the readiness to do so.*" Later, the German-French

³² While common actions serve to resolve specific situations, in which the operational action from the Union's side is considered desirable, the common positions only determine the Union's attitude towards a particular matter of geographical or thematic nature. (Article J.4 and J.5 *ibid.*)

initiated the incorporation of the Eurocorps³³ into the European armed forces. Besides, the steadily merging of the WEU to the EU has come about. Firstly, in December 1999 the European Council decided that by the year 2003 the EU should be capable for carrying out the Petersberg tasks and finally, by 2002 the WEU virtually merged into the EU³⁴.

3.2.4 The European Security and Defence Policy

In December 1998 the Saint-Malo Declaration was approved by other member states, and shortly after (June 1999 in Cologne) accompanied by newly worked out agenda concerning the development of common defence. In the Conclusions of the Presidency new term European Security and Defence Policy emerges³⁵ together with the creation of Political and Security Commission based in Brussels. Furthermore the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs should be according to this declaration completed by the ministers of defence.

The negotiations on the European Security and Defence Policy have truly started during the Summit in Helsinki³⁶. The first report concerned the management of crisis military operations and it mainly aimed at setting up military unit of fast service comprising up to 50-60 000 men till the year 2003 capable of carrying out at least a year long intervention within 60 days (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003: 573). Unlike the first report, the second one regarded non-military means of crisis management and it stressed the importance of co-

³³ Eurocorps, created in May 1992 comprising of 60 000 members, only underline the effort of the Europeans to dispose of an army independent of the American military forces.

³⁴ The convergence of these two institutions was obvious already on 25. 11. 1999 when Javier Solana became the secretary-general of the WEU being already the secretary-general of the CFSP.

³⁵ „The European Council continued its discussion on a common European policy on security and defence and issued the annexed declaration on the further development of a common European security and defence policy“.
(Article 55, Conclusions of the Presidency, Cologne European Council, 1999)

³⁶ 10-11.12.1999

ordination of the national and European means in terms of one common crisis management mechanism. The message from Helsinki was thus the balance of military and non-military means³⁷. However, the constellation of France, Germany, the UK and Italy sent quite contrary message, favouring the military capacities building to those of non-military nature.

Later, the EU representatives met in Nice (7-10 December 2000). Although the issue of the CFSP was not on its agenda³⁸ (it was mainly the "leftovers" from AT), the amendments of Nice were however related to the issue of security and defence. The new bodies, formally created during this Council, included the Political and Security Committee, the European Union Military Committee and the European Staff Organisation. These three institutions were destined to facilitate the functioning of the ESDP. Following summits in Göteborg³⁹ (2001, June 15-16) and especially in Laeken (2001, December 15-16) were amended by the Declaration on readiness to use EU capacities within the ESDP (Fiala, Pitrová, 2003: 578).

³⁷ The balance of „hard“ and „soft“ security is what to great extent differs the EU from NATO (Balabán, 2005: 17).

³⁸ The Conclusions of the Presidency from this summit deal with the CFSP only in one short paragraph. Available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice1_en.htm#III>

³⁹ This summit dealt with the question of non-military crisis actions, more with regard to co-operation with international organisations and non-member states.

3.3 EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001

„ [Europe]...a decaying continent lacking the political will and means to defend and assert itself in a changing strategic environment.“ (van Ham, 2006: 32)

After Al-Qaeda dealt the US the staggering blow, the EU foreign policy consequently stood face to face to new challenges. Firstly, the problem of immediate reaction, secondly, the war in Afghanistan, then the conduct of a long-term “war on terror” and finally, the dilemmas over the Iraq.

Concerning the first point, the NATO members had already by the 12 September invoked Article V of the Treaty to declare their full support for the United States, later on this commitment has been declared operational. Javier Solana straightforwardly announced that: *“the European Union stands firmly and fully behind the States.”*⁴⁰ Similarly the European Central Bank reacted, claiming to be ready to support the normal functioning of markets and relevant operational systems. Last but not least, the Commission tabled proposals for a “European Arrest Warrant” to simplify Europol’s work against cross-border terrorists. However, soon enough ominous signs for European foreign policy penetrated onto the surface. Firstly, Berlusconi’s cavils standing out in a general picture of unity⁴¹, and later on the evident wish of the three big states, particularly Britain, not to stand politely in waiting for the Belgian Presidency to act for them⁴². In reaction, the excluded states (the Netherlands, Belgium,

⁴⁰ Press release, Brussels (11 September 2002) No. 0146/01, statement by Javier Solana, EU High Representative

⁴¹ Berlusconi felt uneasy over the possible implications of the European Arrest warrant for Italian politics (Gegout, 2002).

⁴² Blair, Chirac and Schröder met before the Ghent Council on 20th October and then again, ignoring the protests of the excluded, in London on 4th November, 2001.

Italy and Spain) met together with the High Representative and forced their way to the table.⁴³ As Christopher Hill puts it, this was a "*humiliating public demonstration of the tensions between national and collective criteria, and between the stronger and weaker members of the European foreign policy system.*" (Ch. Hill, 2004: 147).

With regard to the second point, the European foreign policy proved to be rather a "*social work*". Although the French and German side declared their active support for the American response and to offer military contributions towards it and though the Europeans in general shared two strategic aims with the Americans (i. e. to force Al Qaeda from their base in a sovereign state and to remove the Taliban regime, which had had harboured Al Qaeda and was therefore complicit in acts of aggressive war), the Europeans could never have mounted such an operation themselves had they been the original victims of Al Qaeda. The civilian power approach ideally suited to the help of reducing chaos in post-war Afghanistan and similarly, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) comprised largely of Europeans⁴⁴. On the other hand, the Europeans could neither collectively, nor in sub-groups handle the Petersberg tasks represented by Afghanistan, thus by August 2003 the NATO had taken over the leadership of ISAF.

Thirdly, within the war on terrorism the Europeans had picked up the major responsibility for reconstruction. Furthermore, although in the past the Europeans had been very sensitive about the US requests for a seat at their table, the USA has been given privileged access to Europol and the new Eurojust system of expert legal co-ordination. Soon enough the inefficiencies and

⁴³ More on this see „Guess who wasn't Coming to Dinner“, *Economist*, 10 November 2002

⁴⁴ The ISAF has had contributions from at least 19 countries, of which 12 are EU members.

structural weaknesses of the CFSP came to light such as for instance the lack of a common European intelligence service. The ESDP seemed to have to encourage more exchanges of military intelligence, but equally it raised sensitive questions about relations with the Pentagon and the CIA.

With regard to the Iraq, throughout the local crisis the CFSP remained almost wholly silent. The most obvious reason for this paralysis is the divergence of the three big member states, which make up an informal *directoire*. While Blair identified with the US policy, Schröder used public antipathy to both war and to President Bush to help get himself re-elected (September 2002). On the other hand Chirac and de Villepin picked up the gauntlet in public opposition to the Anglo-American lead and made common cause with Germany and Russia, but split up both NATO and the EU. This insufficient initial consensus and deep uncertainty over ultimate strategy showed the EU being unable to speak with a single voice.

In fact, the complex backstage workings of the EU's negotiation process have not been a secret. As Gegout describes, the so-called *quint* undoubtedly exerts certain influence on the decisions made within the Union⁴⁵. The quint is rather a coalition of those willing states, possessing considerable economic and military power (all of them members of the G7), which reaches agreement outside the CFSP decision-making process. However, the quint does not divulge the outcome of its meetings to the representatives of the EU member states. Thus, next to official groups discussing EU foreign policy matters, and accepted groups within the EU framework (the bilateral or multilateral groups), there is the *quint* as an unofficial group outside the EU framework (Gegout, 2002: 337).

⁴⁵ The quint was originally created with respect to the Balkan crisis (Germany, the UK, France, Italy and the US).

It can be seen undemocratic, for the quint discusses major sensitive issues addressed and decided by the EU, yet excluding other EU member states. Is it really so that "*fast moving diplomacy required that a minority led diplomacy*"?⁴⁶ Moreover, the question rises to what extent do the US influence the European policy being a member of this *directoire*?⁴⁷

3.4 Main Downsides of the CFSP

This brief overview of the historical development and present tendencies within the CFSP obviously proved that most states have no intention of relinquishing their own diplomacy, but equally it would not occur to them to opt-out of the CFSP⁴⁸. September 11 sharpened the existing contradictions in European foreign policy-making and made them more visible, underlining the existence of two groups, those considering the CFSP useless and those mobilising it (mostly for own favour).

What still hinders the CFSP was thus the inability to translate its presence into "actorness". As the member states do not always share common interests, the logic of diversity tends to block agreement on creating more supranational foreign policy-making machinery. Consequently, the EU's foreign policy mechanisms and outputs still clearly reflect the tension between the desires to act collectively in international relations and to retain national prerogatives in foreign policy. The linchpin of presence-actorness problem thus

⁴⁶ Quoting former UK Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind (in Gegout, 2002: 341).

⁴⁷ Bearing in mind the fact that the US belong to those four big EU member states leadership group of the EU in relation to foreign policy.

⁴⁸ This amphibiousness can be seen writ large in the case of France or Britain, both disposing of nuclear weapons, yet not planning to give them up to the EU.

lies not in the lack of effective instruments, but in the difficulties involved in finding the will to use those instruments in a strategic, coherent fashion.

The other problem what the CFSP faces is the lack of public conviction of its meaningfulness, rooting both from the deficiency of one European identity and from the opinion that it creates nothing more than a new transnational elite (cf. quint). On the other hand, EU foreign policy outside the EU symbolises Europe's identity in the international system and possibly represents a major alternative to the hegemony of American foreign policy. The question whether the EU's substantial policy co-operation actually produces effective results is thus more complex than it seemed. Unlike in the sphere of "low politics" where the EU wields considerable power, in the area of "high politics", to which the CFSP/ESDP affairs belong, the Community is still finding its way. Taking into consideration for instance only the right to interpose a veto, an action of just one EU member state can limit common policy initiative. In this respect, the US security strategy seems an "easy job"⁴⁹.

⁴⁹ Cooper even asserts that: "...in some sense it is [the US] the only power with an independent strategy at all." (Cooper, 2004: 45)

3.5 Does the liberal approach give a true picture of the CFSP?

Stepping back, the main tenet of the liberal theory remains the fact that democracies breed peace, thus the more democratic states, the more peaceful the world grows. Under the conditions of increasingly integrated system, democratic states do not want to fight each other anymore. Instead of typical modern balance of power system, the tendency to co-operation, openness and transparency characterises the postmodern international relations. May it be the post-balance of power system we call it, in this postmodern constellation military conflicts retreat and negotiations prevail and these co-operative structures in Europe reinforce security.

Firstly, as described in the chapter *Main characteristic features of the postmodern threats* (chapter 2.3) some of the most urgent threats we face today come from, as Cooper labels it, the modern or pre-modern world. In other words, anarchy remains the underlying reality in the security field in the biggest part of the world. For most non-European states the co-operative world system, though highly beneficial to them in many ways, is resented because it interferes with the full exercise of their sovereignty. Thus altogether we live in a divided world. Within the hegemony of the postmodern, which rests on the rejection of force and on self-enforced rules of behaviour, we can (still only to certain extent, see beneath) apply the logic of liberal theory, however beyond this system the law of jungle still overrules. The question then rises to what extent the liberal theory gives a picture of the world as it is, warts-and-all, if its main representatives adhere to it only when acting within particular sphere and abandoning its tenets when acting beyond it?

Moreover, as Everts puts in one of his articles: " ...by making a success of integration we are demonstrating to the world that it is possible to create a method for peace." (Everts, 2001, in Kagan, 2002: 11) The consequent matter then becomes whether the international problems can be in fact settled in the European way if necessarily dealing with areas of the world not belonging to its domain.⁵⁰

Secondly, even within the postmodern system the liberal theory faces certain pitfalls. As described in the second part of this thesis (*The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, chapter 3*) forming of blocks or groups of opinion has constantly been marking the historical development and even the contemporary tendencies within the CFSP. The slow pace of co-operation and vigilant transformations approved throughout the process of integration in the field of security politics reflect still strongly persisting national interests behind the action of particular states.

In this regard, the liberal theory rather truly describes the postmodern security politics environment, than the behaviour of its main actors. The EU shapes the international environment, in which persuasion, legal agreements, dialogue and positive incentives grow valid, however, this setting seems only to serve for the pursuance of national concerns. This situation grows even more complex due to the enlargement waves, making any greater agreement on further development or on potential deepening of the co-operation almost impossible⁵¹. The liberal theory thus applies more to the security policy environment, than to the particular security actors.

⁵⁰ In this respect we can argue whether the success of European integration does not imply the need to have this success affirmed and accepted by others, particularly by the „mighty“ US.

⁵¹ Thoughtful note on this gave Václav Bělohradský saying, that the EU acted as fallen out spouses, who thought that having a baby would overcome their old disputes. (Public lecture, 2007. “The End of Politics”, Club Golem, February 28)

Thirdly, as summarised in the chapter *Main threats of the postmodern world* (p. 17n), the mankind nowadays needs to cope with many other than purely ideological conflicts. Naturally and logically rooting from the changes the whole society experienced (chapter 2 of this thesis), these threats loom large as intensively as the ideological clashes in the past. Who knows whether the clashes over resources or rising nationalism will not eventually lead to a conflict, especially considering the national protectionism on the side of particular political representatives?

3.6 European Security Strategy

In reaction to the weakness of divided Europe in key international questions, such as Iraq crisis definitely was, the European Council ratified new European Security Strategy (ESS) "*A Secure Europe in a Better World*" (December 2003). This document shows for the first time compact view of the EU on the international security environment and it defines cohesive procedure of the European states. New security strategy touches upon the ambitions of the EU, main threats, priorities and instruments to use in order to meet the goals.

In the part on European ambitions, the ESS clearly states that especially after the enlargement wave, creating a community of already 25 members, the approaching to the sore points becomes inevitable. Europe as a continent cannot isolate itself from the rest of the world, moreover, it does not even wish to do so. According to the ESS, Europe: "*...should be ready to share in the*

responsibility for global security and in building a better world." (ESS, 2003: 1). Europe is ready to support the development of societies build on the same values of democracy anywhere around the globe.

Further on, the ESS stresses five main threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. The EU has to cope with these threats actively by transposed defence and by actions concentrated on the roots of these threats. What should be underlined is that in order to do so, the ESS supports using all sort of instruments, thus not only those targeting good governance of public affairs, functioning law and the protection of human rights, but it shows much more open-minded attitude towards the use of military force (Kohl, 2003: 9).

The "*mixture of instruments*" (ESS, 2003: 7) should help meet the main priorities of the EU. As defined in the ESS here belongs firstly, addressing the threats, namely terrorism, proliferation of WMD and the organised crime. Since the threats grow dynamic and can exert its influence on longer distances they require complex prevention using all kinds of broadcasting, political, economic and military means. Secondly, the security building in the EU neighbourhood comes next. The EU realises the enlargement should not create new dividing lines, quite the contrary, it points down problems in Southern Caucasus, Arab/Israeli conflict, Mediterranean economic stagnation and other areas as its interests becoming aware that these regions will in due course also be a neighbouring regions. (ESS, 2003: 8).

Other priority comes the effective multilateralism that should lie beneath the international order. In this respect UN and NATO play crucial role, together with other international organisations such as WTO or regional

organisations as for instance ASEAN, MERCOSUR, OSCE and the like. According to the ESS, the international norms, rules and laws are the basis for the international stability.

Finally, the ESS presents policy implications for Europe as well (ESS, 2003: 11n). It claims that the EU needs to be more active in pursuing its strategic objectives, more capable in diplomacy as well as in transforming militaries into more flexible and mobile forces, and more coherent so as to gain greater strength. At last, the transatlantic co-operation remains indispensable and the European aim should be: *"... an effective and balanced partnership with the USA."* (ESS, 2003: 13).

To sum up, the ESS articulates for the first time the security strategy for the EU, moreover it claims its responsibility for the global security and stability. By stressing coherent and active attitude it tries to overcome the reprovved inefficiencies of the CFSP during the past interventions. Except for this document, the European Council approved the establishment of a Defence agency and military-civil planning cell, both aiming at enhancing European capability.

The claim for European historical responsibility comes out in the *Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (HSD, September, 2004) as well. In this document: *"The European Union does, ..., recognise that it has obligations concerning the human security of people outside its borders."* (HSD, 2004: 10). Using the term *"enlightened self-interest"* it explains that Europeans can no longer feel secure as long as people elsewhere around the world live in serious endangerment. With regard to the instruments of the ESDP, it underlines tasks as state-building, nation-building and post-conflict reconstruction embodied in

"Human Security Response Force" combining military and civil conception of the European security policy.

Moreover, the trials to support the capability of the CFSP/ESDP continued. In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe the creation of a union foreign minister emerges. „*The empowerment of a new EU Foreign Minister who is at the same time Vice-President of the Commission responsible for External Relations will go far towards providing the EU with a more effective, better co-ordinated and rapidly-acting foreign policy capability.*” (Crowe, 2005: 9). This again proves the effort of the EU to become a real security player, what more, to show and convince the international scene, that preventing conflicts, restoring post-war regions and thus enhancing security, is the key role of the EU.

3.7 What is the role of the CFSP/ESDP?

The tendencies of the CFSP/ESDP development, as discussed in the 2. chapter of this thesis, presented it as a constantly developing policy, yet still facing obstacles mostly embodied in national interests of the member states. The thesis claims this to be the reason why the EU cannot be called a true postmodern security actor. However, through coping with new and more urgent threats and real attacks, the EU proves to be dynamic and capable organisation.

One of the main reasons why the national interests still play a role of importance stands for the lack of one common European identity. A claim prevails that member states should endeavour to raise the credibility of the EU and particularly of the CFSP in the eyes of ordinary people so as to enhance the European identity which will in return foster the Union and its policies.

However, as the documents, presented throughout this thesis, support, the EU particularly strives to create a security and defence policy different from any other in the contemporary world. This illustrates, firstly, the emphasis that the EU representatives put on the balance between military and non-military means in security relations and particularly during its interventions. This stress laid on "*human security*" and conflict prevention is the most obvious difference between the EU and US security strategy. Although the EU admits the necessity to use military force, it still remains only half of its strategy.

Secondly, the CFSP/ESDP differs not only by its accent on the balance of soft and hard power, but also by its attitude towards the enhancement of security. The main role of the EU becomes the assurance of the global security, in other words the EU is responsible for maintaining the global peace. The European responsibility is historically rooted and it combines not only peace, but also spreading democracy and the values necessarily connected to it.

The CFSP/ESDP thus becomes not only an instrument to provide the security for the European continent, but it also serves as a great field of performing what makes the Europeans different from any other security players. By opposing to for instance the US security strategy, the EU presents its mission and thus its identity. Consequently, the CFSP/ESDP grows to be the domain where the Union can show its nature, its dissimilarity and thus foster its own identity.

4. Conclusion

Already in the *Note on terminology* (1.6), security stands out as a term evidently difficult to grasp. To make the task of defining it easier, the thesis step by step analyses the changing conditions under which the concept of security had been shaped and thus tries to show the reader at least some of its main aspects.

The first chapters show the transformation of our society, which came due to the postmodernisation process. It deals not only with changes on political scene, but it also discusses transitions in social life, indicating that the postmodernisation penetrated deep through the life of every individual. Consequently, the image of the postmodern society as it is, is one of a constant revision, subsequently lacking any stable grounds and eventually breeding uncertainty. The thesis stresses these phenomena because it comes without saying that this situation itself, as it is, threatens our society.

To top it all, the following chapter (2.3) depicts the nature of postmodern threats rooting from the characteristics of the postmodern society itself. Among others, it underlines the influence of globalisation and the interpretation game of threats as the main features to influence the urgency of potential risks.

Furthermore, by analysing the differences between the concept of security in the modern (i. e. the Cold War era) and the postmodern society, following chapters again emphasise the widening of this concept. Especially compared with the Cold War security policy the differences loom up. Most importantly, the enlargement of security objects and security players mark the postmodern situation. The postmodern society, as described in previous

chapters, only proves the need for more security actors than purely military or political ones and it abandons the old modern concept of security with the state as its linchpin.

To complete the image of the postmodern situation the follow-up chapter briefly presents some of the main postmodern threats. This chapter thus shows the complex security situation we face today and that the only way to cope with these threats remains the co-operation based on common agreement.

For the time still omitted, the outline of the situation within the European political framework comes next. The second part of this thesis presents the historical course and main tendencies the CFSP has experienced, completed by the creation of ESDP. Throughout these chapters (3.2 - 3.4) the inefficiency and difficulties within this EU policy grow tangible and mainly in comparison with the tenets of the liberal theory even visible.

To conclude, our contemporary society has undergone remarkable changes throughout the postmodernisation process. Similarly, even the threats and their natures assume different and disturbing dimensions. As already many times mentioned in this essay, the postmodern threats need foremost collective reaction in order to be either prevented or overcome, so as to ensure the security of present society. However, the political representation on the European background stays in many cases unable of compromise, for the national interests still play a role of importance. The answer to the first research question can thus be formulated this way: The postmodernisation and the changes it brings about can be traced in the new political environment that is being formed, yet it remains still only halfway in the acting of particular players.

Although the CFSP/ESDP does not completely coincide with the liberal theory it proved to be a great forum for the EU to present itself as a different security player from any other. The answer to the second research question can subsequently be articulated as follows: Although one common European identity is designated to be the missing element so as to find common agreement in carrying out particular strategies, the CFSP/ESDP as discussed in the last chapter paradoxically proves to foster the European identity, by stressing European mission and responsibility for the global peace.

The question rising from the hindsight remains. What would fostering the European identity imply? What would in fact abandoning one's own national interests mean? Hypothetically, we might face terrorism or organised crime in a better manner, nevertheless, would not it bring about other threats? Discussing this phenomenon would get us too far from the topic, however, purely conjecturally, would not the fostering of European identity necessarily imply, as Cooper calls it, the "breaking of nations"? Supposedly created, would not this situation breed more threats than it would solve? Could one European identity replace the multitude of European identities?

Last but not least, although the postmodernisation with its implications has entered our society, the necessary change in the attitude towards it seems to be hindered not only in the acting of political representatives, but also in general public awareness. We still rely to great extent on the political representation to deal with security matters for us. As shown in this essay such attitude is short-sighted. Many threats, although not so often articulated in an outspoken way, endanger individual safety and thus the society as a whole, and these are threats the political representation can hardly deal with. This state of affairs subsequently leaves space for individual action, which overcomes the

natural tendency to indifference and ignorance and is willing to share, if not to take, the responsibility.

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