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**Securitisation of Islam and Counterterrorism Policy
in France**

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Abstract

The Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation establishes the construction of security as a predominantly political phenomenon. The discursive formation of an issue as threatening to the survival of a referent object is therefore considered a political act that can be observed and analysed. Between 2012 and 2017, a wave of terrorist attacks took place in France, resulting in a securitarian response from the government that have been questionable regarding its impact on civil liberties. French Muslims have been the collateral victims of the new measures introduced in this time of crisis and Islamophobia have increased in the country, where integration is already problematic and the place of Islam within the secular system of France is questioned. This dissertation aims at questioning the discourse about Islam within the counterterrorism discourse by the government. It reveals the different legitimisation strategies used as a justificatory framework for the measures implemented, and argues that the narrative of Islam within this framework result in a remote securitisation of the religion. It argues that this securitisation can affect negatively further the future relationship of the state and French Muslims, in addition to undermine the ongoing effort of integration and counter-radicalisation.

Keywords:

Terrorism; securitisation; discourse analysis; Islam; counterterrorism measures; legitimisation; France

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Introduction

I. Introduction and Context

On the 13th November 2015, France has experienced one of the most traumatic series of terrorist attacks on its soil and capital of Paris. This event was enshrined into what seems to have been a never-ending timeline of terrorist attacks on the country, which started in March 2012 with the shootings in Toulouse and Montauban. (BBCNews, 2016)

Terrorism has emerged as one of the most important political subjects of contemporary history since the 9/11 attacks on the Empire State building in 2001. (Jackson, 2007b, p. 394) While terrorism itself is not a new phenomenon since the term 'terror' first appeared during the French Revolution, although, terrorism inspired from Islamic religion, famously called 'Islamic terrorism', became a major security threat since 2001. Most European countries started reacting to the urgency of the threat following the year, and when the first attacks occurred on the continent: in 2004 in Madrid, followed by the murder of Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh on the same year and the bombings in London in 2005. (Beydoun, 2015, p. 1291) Thus, European countries felt the need to respond and adapt through measures and laws appropriate for the urgency and the nature of the threat, deeply embedded into the technological world and the interconnectivity that emerged since the start of globalisation. (Bigo, et al., 2015)

Before 2012, France was already answering to the threat of terrorism, and more specifically to the concerns of the propagation and expansion of extremism and radicalisation on French soil, by the establishment of controversial policies that have been argued to target France's Muslim communities and civil liberties. (Beydoun, 2015, p. 1293) However, policies and legislations for the fight against terrorism started to shift following the Merah affair of 2012, considered the symbol of the increasing influence of Al-Qaeda in France, and the subsequent Nemmouche Affair about IS's influence. (Beydoun, 2015, p. 1292) In order to adapt to the 'exceptional' context of the threat, 'exceptional' powers have been used, and major reforms and laws have been enacted which sharpened the tools necessary to cope with the situation. (Tsoukala, 2006; Baker-Beall, The Evolution of the European Union's 'Fight Against Terrorism' Discourse: Constructing the Terrorist Other, 2014; Aradau & van Muster, 2007) Those emergency measures, such as stop and search, surveillance, arrest and custody or exceptional forms of detention, have been formulated gradually following each wave of terrorist attacks on the country. (Table 1.??) Nonetheless, the 'exceptional' context seems to have justified as well, the gradual and permanent implementation of those measures into the domestic legal framework. (Bogain, 2017)

The issue of the relationship between security and human rights has been brought up in this context. The intrusion of the state through the proliferation of surveillance measures and the control of liberties in the fight against terrorism has been widely shown in the research on Western countries. The exceptional governance during times of crisis exposes the presence of illiberal practices within liberal regimes. (Bigo, et al., 2015; Huysmans, 2004; Jackson, 2005) Salter has showed how the desire to increase security is leading to a paradox of governance through the acceptance of 'the exceptional as

mundane' practices. (Salter, 2008, p. 246) Through the construction of security threats, other subjects are becoming objects of threat in the search for potential terrorists that attempts to cover as much fields as possible. (Zedner, 2009)

Additionally, to this focus, there has been some increased political and mediatic attention to the subject of religion in France since the start of the social panic following the terrorist attacks. In particular, the religion of Islam has been questioned once again regarding its place in the liberal democratic model that is France. (Fredette, 2014) While Islamophobia has risen and subjects of integration and radicalisation have become intertwined, French Muslims have become the first collateral victims of the counterterrorism policy. (Beydoun, 2015)

II. Islam and France

Securitisation of Islam is a term that has been increasingly used in the recent years through the academic and political debate. This expression has been at the centre of the attention and accounted for the growing perception that Islam represents a threat to the liberal and secular order in Western countries and societies, the fear of radicalisation and the laws against terrorism and immigration and how they have had disproportionate effect on Muslim minorities. (Mavelli, 2013; Moller, 2003; Cesari, 2009; Bicchi & Martin, 2006; Silvestri, 2010)

The massive media coverage on Muslims started following the 9/11 attacks and their onslaught of Muslims in Western countries, and how they have been associated with terrorism is well-documented in researches on both the US and Europe. (Nurullah, 2010; Polonska-Kilmunguyi & Gillespie, 2016) While Islam has been targeted, other religion such as Judaism or Christianity have not been exposed to this trend, which increased the Islamophobia in countries where the integration of Islamic religious traditions and customs is already complicated.

France's history with Muslims can be traced back centuries ago but the first encounter with the culture was with the conquest Algeria, where it became its first colony with a large Muslim population in 1830. (Nurullah, 2010) However, the presence of Muslims in France began during the First World War and then the Second World War when the first massive migration of Muslims occurred. Colonial subjects came to serve in the French army and to work behind the scenes, replacing French workers in the factories for the country to continue to run economically. (Frémeaux, 1991). The French state established the residence permit in 1917 in the support with this immigration and some symbolic buildings were built as a commemoration of this initial Muslim presence, such as the Paris Mosque inaugurated in 1926. (El Karoui, 2016) Nevertheless those large-scale arrivals of Muslims in France resulted over time in more than a million of Muslim immigrants living on French soil by 1975, mostly originating from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. (Noiriél, 1988) However, following the 1970s and the first oil-crisis, Muslims' immigration for work purposes have decreased and is mainly for the reunification of families. Nowadays, many Muslims in France have the citizenship, and have been implanted in the country since two or three generations, while a smaller part accounts for the converted Muslims. (El Karoui, 2016)

The current population of Muslims in France today is difficult to assess due to the strong upholding of the secularism tradition. Therefore, there has not been any officially collected data on religious affiliation since the law of 1872 that prohibits any collection of data on individuals' ethnicity or religious beliefs from the state. (Cosgrove, 2011) Nevertheless, *estimates* (emphasis added) from the French government states that there is about 6 million Muslims in France in 2018, which would account for 8% of the population. (Piser, 2018) The high number of Muslim in France has been a source of anxiety since the 1980s when temporary workers seemed to be settling permanently in the country, a predominantly Catholic Christian nation. (Fetzer & Soper, 2005) It started the debate about the relationship between the French Republic and Islam within the principles of *laïcité*. (El Karoui, 2016) The state secularism of France, or *laïcité*, is the principle that establishes the separation between the church and the state and prohibits the state from any involvement on religion. (Piser, 2018) *Laïcité* also means 'the freedom to practice one's religion as long as one does not actively proselytise' (Fredette, 2014, p. 18).

The difficult relationship between the state and Islam additionally got influenced by far-right discourses and debate since the 1980s, where in the fear of take-over by Muslims and the Arab culture resulted in different laws targeting specifically the religion of Islam. This resulted in the banning of all visible religious symbols in public schools in 2004, followed by the ban on face veils in public spaces. (Allen, 2010) While the recent terrorist attacks worsened this relationship, Islam was additionally already linked with terrorism since the Algerian war of independence happening throughout the 1950s, and the series of assassinations that took place in the country along this period. (Fetzer & Soper, 2005) This relationship has been since characterised by mutual suspicion with, on one side an exhibition of discrimination based on a lack of knowledge, and on the other side, a hostility towards the French state due to the perceived repeated discrimination. (Adida, Laitin, & Valfort, 2014)

III. Research Aim and Objectives

In the circumstances of the fight against terrorism, the French state's securitarian response have been criticised to have an impact on the civil liberties of its population. And the control measures implemented through the state of emergency to have been directed towards the Muslim population. Those 'repressive' measures and increased security established throughout the years have nevertheless been accepted by the population and the Congress as necessary for the safety of the country. However, as Tsoukala explained: 'if liberal governments cannot legitimate exceptional measures they cannot be morally distinguished from the terrorists, who believe that the end justifies the means'. (Tsoukala, 2006, p. 609)

This dissertation aims at uncovering the discursive process through which the French state justified the counterterror measures and justified them in the political speeches of the fight against terrorism. Falling into the securitisation theory, this research will allow to understand how linguistic strategies enabled the acceptance of those measures as securitising practices to be implemented into the everyday lives of its citizens. Subsequently, it will provide the basis for understanding the type of narrative the French state holds regarding its Muslim population and if Islam in general is securitised throughout this justificatory framework and if the discourse of the state is responsible for the reproduction of negative ideas of the religion.

While this dissertation acknowledges the legislative and democratic issues of the process through which laws and measures are implemented, it will be focusing on the discourse. Furthermore, it is important to note that while religion is discussed, theology questions will not be addressed much further and that the complex relationship of France and Islam cannot be researched into depth. This dissertation will merely attempt to provide a slight understanding of the deeply rooted problems through this discourse analysis through small lenses of the recent context of the past few years. The author of this dissertation also evolves in the context that the social world is socially constructed and that language and text have power and an impact on it, however it is not considered that words alone can change every aspect of it.

IV. Chapters Outline

This dissertation is divided into six different chapters that tend to address the above research objective. This chapter of introduction has outlined briefly the circumstances of terrorism in our contemporary times and the long relationship between France and Islam. It also attempted to express already the deeply rooted issues that arise from this 'Clash of civilisation' between the secular aspect of the country and the opposition with the cultural aspect of Islam, which will be discussed further in the fifth chapter.

The second chapter of the literature review first examines the theory of securitisation into depth, in order to provide the basis of this dissertation research, such as it was developed by the scholars Buzan, Waever and Wilde in 1998. This first theorisation of securitisation is then criticised and more recent development of its application are considered. The dissertation will then review the research available on the same topic in order to understand what has already been done academically on subjects of counterterrorism in Western countries, Europe and the United States specifically, securitisation in relation to contemporary debates, and discourse analysis in this context.

The third chapter is providing the methodological framework and strategy of the research, as based on political discourse analysis, as a development of critical discourse analysis. In addition, it outlines the overall strategy of the research, with the method of sampling and how the data were chosen for the analysis of discourse, with a thorough description of the types of speeches used.

The fourth chapter is the analysis of the data and at first based itself on the legitimisation categorisation of Van Leeuwen. The scholar developed a framework of legitimisation strategies which allow the analysis of the justificatory process through which the French elite justifies the different measures implemented. It includes three types of strategies that are used in this research: the authorisation legitimisation, the rationalisation legitimisation and the moral evaluation legitimisation. (Van Leeuwen, 2008) Through this analysis process, the different narrative of the elite discourse are uncovered, such as the discourse on Islam that can be observed within and in relation to the overall discourse of terrorism.

The fifth chapter is the discussion which involves an examination of the different measures on terrorism and laws and their effect on civil liberties and human rights and explain how French Muslims

are targeted by those measures. It subsequently discuss the construction of the securitisation in relation to terrorism and the Muslim identity as provided by the discourse. Finally, it depicts the position of the government of Macron on the subject of terrorism and the integration of Muslims and outlines the different impact of the discourse and his standing can have on the future of the already complicated relationship between Islam and the French State. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the dissertation and provide some recommendations.

Securitisation Theory

I. Copenhagen School

This thesis contends that security is a social construction, constructed through discursive practices and social interaction. Therefore, the theory of securitisation as developed by the Copenhagen School is the logical initial approach for researching the intersubjective social processes through which security is produced and reproduced in the context of France.

At the end of the Cold War, the Copenhagen School thought to broaden the agenda in security studies, with this analytical framework that is securitisation, which became of major cornerstone of the field of international relations.

The first accounts of the theory as developed by the Copenhagen School, were centred around the idea that security and securitisation are distinct from 'normal' politics, (Buzan B., 1998) and even considered to be a failure of normal politics. (Wæver O. , 1995) The differentiation was recognised between: politics taking place in the political debate and decisions of a democracy within the procedures and regulations of the rule of law, and security taking place outside of those boundaries and this realm of what has been called 'normal' politics. (Buzan B., 1998) In this sense, an issue can be considered politicised when part of the public debate and needs to be dealt with by the government. While an issue is considered securitised when it becomes presented and accepted as a threat to society and the nation, and in need of emergency measures. Those measures are deemed 'extraordinary' because of the urgency of the situation, which requires a rapid response that is outside of normal procedures and regulations of normal politics. (Buzan B., 1998)

From their perspective, security is seen as a 'speech act', as articulated first by J.L. Austin and its language theory. (Austin, 1975) (Wæver O. , 1995) The speech act is used to label the term 'security' to the issue. Discursive practices therefore dramatise the issue and legitimise the claim to use extraordinary measures to deal with it. (Buzan B., 1998, p. 26) Those type of sentences and linguistic practices are called being performative (in contrast to descriptive ones), as 'the utterance itself is the act'. (Wæver O. , 1995, p. 55) The social interaction of securitisation is therefore a rhetorical one. The practice of security is also a 'self-referential practice', because through the enunciation of security, it becomes socially constructed as a security issue. (Buzan B., 1998, p. 24)

The referent object is the entity that is considered threatened by the issue and the way its survival is in danger because of this issue, is put forward through the speech act. In this initial theorisation, the standard referent objects are the state and the nation. (Buzan B., 1998, p. 21) However, another major concept developed by the Copenhagen School are the idea of the different sectors concerned when speaking about security. Therefore, the referent object depends of the environment that is securitise: the state is still usually the main referent object for military, political, environmental and economic security, and society is usually the referent object for societal security. (Buzan B., 1998) As an example, if the state is the entity considered threatened, through the discourse, the preservation of national identity and state sovereignty will be put forward. While, for an environmental security, the referent

object would be the ecosystem, and therefore at some point, the survival of the country. (Eroukmanoff C. , *Securitisation Theory*, 2017, p. 105)

The construction of the threat is presented by a securitising actor deemed legitimate enough in order for the security claim to be considered legitimate itself. In this initial theorisation, the threat is presented by political leaders to domestic constituents. (McDonald, 2008, p. 567) In the case of a government, a variety of officials can be regarded as securitising actors due to their position of power towards regular citizens and in the practice of politics. (Lucke & Dück, 2016, p. 2) While a range of different actors can securitise, the state is considered the main one, because the securitising actor needs the necessary capabilities for a successful securitisation, which are practically held by the state. (Croft, 2012, p. 79)

Those domestic constituents represent the audience, the entity at which securitising moves are directed towards. The audience has the role of accepting the presentation of the issue as a threat and the actors' arguments for the emergency measures, and through this, enables a successful securitisation. (McDonald, 2008, p. 568) Depending on the issue, it is mostly presented through the discourse, in a way that positioned it as a threat towards a particular community. (McDonald, 2008, p. 578) Therefore, the audience does not have to always be the standard audience of the general public, but sometimes the one community that is the most likely to listen to that securitising moves, and the most likely to accept the security threat. The language is then adapted to the specific experience of the audience depending on the specific issue. (Balzacq , *Securitisation Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, 2011, p. 11) According to this, the emergency measures are implemented, if the securitisation is successful, to safeguard the core group against the threat and to raise its survival. (Croft, 2012, p. 79)

Securitising moves are not always successful, if the audience does not accept it, the securitisation can be merely an attempt. Since its success is conditional on the acceptance of the audience, some facilitating conditions can help securitising moves to land the response expected on the side of the audience. Those can be the form of the act, the position of the speaker, the historical resonance of some threats. All of those conditions under which the speech act works, facilitate its success. (Buzan B., 1998, p. 32) The internal conditions can be how the discourse is formed in the speech act, such as the internal logic, semiotic or grammar, while external conditions can be the position of the speaker, and a specific context and environment in which the attempted securitisation takes place. (Lucke & Dück, 2016) Despite some criticisms about the consideration of external developments to the theory, Balzacq considered them to be central to the constructivist approach to security. (Balzacq , *Securitisation Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, 2011, p. 13)

Overall, through the Copenhagen School's lenses, security is seen as a negative process and therefore, the final main goal is to desecuritize the issue. Desecuritisation would be the process that moves the issue from the security agenda, to the political one, and back in the sphere of normal politics and usual procedures and regulations to deal with it. Nevertheless, Desecuritisation is a long-term goal as it implies that that the threat has been dealt with on a security level and is no longer considered a threat. (Waever O. , 1995)

II. Criticisms and Developments

While the Copenhagen School gave us a new comprehension of security through this framework, the theory of securitisation has been widely criticised as a consequence of the major impact it had in security studies.

The process of securitisation has been more recently researched and further developed on its weaknesses, especially by scholars such as McDonald and Croft among others, that made considerable contribution to the theory. Croft examined the main pillars of the initial theory and made some amendments to some aspects of those pillars, while McDonald focused on the distinction between the construction of security and the narrow concern with the discursive positioning of threats. (Croft, 2012) (McDonald, 2008)

The first major criticism that needs to be considered is about the intersubjectivity nature of the social reality that is securitisation and how the narrow focus on the speech act neglects other way to communicate meaning. (Croft, 2012, p. 80) (Hansen, *The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School*, 2000) (Williams, 2003) (Möller, 2007, p. 180) (McDonald, 2008) The role of images or silence for example in transmitting meaning has been further taking into consideration by those scholars because of the way they can reach the audience. Both Möller and Williams examined the impact of television footages of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre towers and how they developed the perception of threat and urgency for security not only in the United States but also in the entire world. (Williams, 2003) (Möller, 2007) in (McDonald, 2008, p. 568) Similarly, Van Rythoven studied the role of emotions in the construction of threat and how securitisation can easily be unsuccessful because the audience was not convinced that an issue was something to be feared and a threat to them. (Van Rythoven, 2015) This idea is backed-up by what Vuori's observed: that 'images can evoke emotions that thereby facilitate the "purchase" of a securitising argument'. (Vuori, 2010, p. 4) In the case of a terrorist attack, the audience is often 'ordinary people' that will accept the security issue based on emotions, which idea is often lost in theorisation in the field of International Relations (IR). (Sylvester, 2013)

Hansen, Wilkinson and McDonald also expressed that the emphasis on that specific moment of securitisation, that is the speech act, fails to understand fully the impact of securitisation which occurs after a process of 'routinized practices', as developed by the Paris School. According to McDonald, the threat is not constructed at a specific moment when the issue shift from normal politics to the sphere of security and reject the polarity between the two realms that he believed to be inaccurate because of the either/or approach, where the construction of a threat takes time. (McDonald, 2008, p. 570) The specific moment for securitisation can be understood to occur at different times. While Buzan and Weaver determined that this moment is when extraordinary measures are implemented, McDonald believed that the specific moment is unclear as it can be considered to be at the time of the speech act or when the audience backs-up and acquiesces to the designation of threat. (Buzan, 2003) (McDonald, 2008) In order to get a full grasp of a phenomenon such as securitisation, it is believed that a long-term perspective is essential in order to get the maximum contextual aspects relevant to its process. (Stritzel, 2011, p. 343)

The designation of the threat is also an area problematic for some scholars, which criticised that the nature of the act is solely defined by designation rather than understanding and interpretation. (McDonald, 2008) Furthermore, it does not explain why a specific actor chose to designate a security issue. (McDonald, 2008, pp. 570-1) This limitation is a major issue of the conceptualisation of security, especially because of the subjectivity of this labelling is put forward in the writings of the Copenhagen School due to the intentional aspect of this choice for labelling. (Wæver O. , 2000, p. 251) Following this, McSweeney expressed that the definition of this construction of a security issue as a political act is too narrow in the sense where, while there is a focus on facilitating conditions, the context should be further put forward in the theory. (McSweeney, 1996, p. 81) Social, political and historical context should have a rather more major place in the securitisation theory as it could explain the reasons why an actor makes such choices of designating a security threat. (McDonald, 2008, p. 573) By forgetting the importance of context, some factors such as dominant narratives or the role of identity is somehow downplayed by Copenhagen School. However, those type of contextual factors such as history or how a national identity is constructed over time, are complicated to research and theorise (McDonald, 2008, p. 580)

Furthermore, the Copenhagen School focuses heavily on state actors as being the primary securitising agents due to their capabilities to construct the security issue successfully. (Floyd, 2007, p. 47) However, while the actor must be in a position to be heard, taken seriously and reach the audience overall, this can be achieved as well by actors of the television and print media, novelists, religious bodies, and think-tanks and non-governmental organisations. (Croft, 2012, p. 82) This development on actors of securitisation allows to take into account the role of cultural sources and the media in the influence over people and for the process of the security threat. McDonald even agrees about expanding the theory in order to recognise all non-state actors and representations of security. (McDonald, 2008, pp. 580-582) However, this conceptualisation of security could also mean an open process of securitisation through which any issue could be securitised. (Williams, 2003, pp. 513-514) For Balzacq, the ability of the securitising actor to claim a security threat does not depend on the capacity they have to act about the threat. Therefore, security is not constructed by a prominent actor who has a socially valid voice in global politics, but by anyone as long as the relevant audience accept it. (Balzacq, 2005, p. 172) Contextual factors are downplayed as well in this version of the theory.

In contrast, the Copenhagen School's theorisation of the security issue has been criticised to have a narrow focus on the articulation of the issue itself, which underemphasise the role of the audience. The central role of the standard securitising actor, due to its position in society and government, in the securitising process seems to reduce this audience to a position of bystanders. (Croft, 2012, p. 83) The 'power elite' makes the speech act and asserts that the survival of the referent object is in imminent danger. However, the audience has to get mobilised for securitisation to be successful and might even have interests in the securitisation of the issue. According to this idea, Croft believes that the audience is not only not fixed in its position of bystanders, but that it is also reconstituted through the securitising act. By accepting the designation of the security issue, the performance of everyday routine changes for the audience as well as for the elite. As an example of this, Croft exposes the difference of status of the German Jews which immigrated in Britain before the Second World War. As migrants, they constituted the audience in the country, however before the outbreak of the war they were viewed as 'victims' and 'future Britons' and shifted to 'potential enemies' during the war. (Croft,

2012, p. 83) The way the speech act produces and constructs the audience is a way more pro-active action than emphasised initially by the Copenhagen School. (Croft, 2012) (Weldes, 1996) (Fierke, 1997)

A similar important aspect of theory subject to debate and development is about when a securitisation is considered successful. Where the Copenhagen School argues that when extraordinary measures are implemented, and thus accepted by the audience, that the securitisation is considered successful. Croft's revision of the theory about the reconstitution of the audience through the performance of the securitisation, considers that it is when the new social reality is established that securitisation has been successful. (Croft, 2012, p. 84) This securitisation takes place in two stages, with the first being the practice of identity through the speech act made by the elite and the audience in the everyday life. And then, after accepting and practicing securitising moves on a routine basis, this practice of identity becomes the new reality. But in this theorisation, securitisation is a process that need to continue occurring or it can be replaced by another new one. (Croft, 2012, p. 85) Roe also developed an interesting adjustment to the theory through his duality of audiences. The standard audience needs to be convinced, but also national representatives in the parliament have securitising moves directed towards them. (Roe, 2008, p. 620) The securitisation can be considered to be successful in two different cases: when one of the audiences is convinced (called a 'rhetorical securitisation'), and when both audiences are convinced. (Roe, 2008, p. 633) While both scholars make good contribution to the theory, Roe's duality of audiences is especially compelling in the context of a liberal democracy such as France, where the implementation of extraordinary measures to deal with the security threat has to go first through the parliament for approval.

III. Literature Review

However, the Copenhagen School's securitisation still provided a good starting point for further developments, such as Croft expressed 'it represents a grammar for analysing security that is comprehensible to a wide range of scholars'. (Croft, 2012, p. 79) The theory has been used widely in the literature when considering terrorism and the counterterrorism measures that subsequently took place. More recently the securitisation of Islam has acquired more attention and relevance in the academic debate.

Jackson and Baker-Beall researched the political discourse of counterterrorism policy, respectively in the United States (US) and in the European Union (EU). They both focused on the consequences of this discourse. (Jackson, 2015) (Baker-Beall, *The Discursive Construction of the EU Counter-terrorism Policy: Writing the 'Migrant Other', Securitisation and Control*, 2009) The first article was rather more centred on how practices such as pre-emptive war, targeted killings, mass surveillance, torture and deradicalization programmes are counterproductive. According to Jackson, there is a deep issue in the understanding and interpretation of terrorism, referred in the article as an 'epistemological crisis', which obstructs the quality of the discourse and therefore to an effective practice of counterterrorism. (Jackson, 2015) Through a review of the literature, Baker-Beall considered that outside of Richard Jackson, the academic literature was more focused about the differences in counterterrorism policies between the US and the EU, than about the discursive construction within the EU. (Baker-Beall, *The Discursive Construction of the EU Counter-terrorism Policy: Writing the 'Migrant Other', Securitisation and Control*, 2009, p. 189) Therefore, the scholar studied the discursive construction of

counterterrorism policy in the EU, where he argued that counterterrorism policy has socially constructed the threat of the 'migrant other' through the construction of the 'terrorist other'. (Baker-Beall, *The Discursive Construction of the EU Counter-terrorism Policy: Writing the 'Migrant Other', Securitisation and Control*, 2009, p. 190) Baker-Beall based his article analysis on a (re)conceptualisation of the securitisation theory that considers that a security threat is constructed through everyday routines and the technologies of professionals. (Baker-Beall, *The Discursive Construction of the EU Counter-terrorism Policy: Writing the 'Migrant Other', Securitisation and Control*, 2009, p. 193) Low-level professionals are therefore taken into account as securitising actors in the constitution of those everyday practices. Through a two-levels critical discourse analysis of the EU's main counterterrorism policy documents, the scholar identified two meta-narratives: the first one constructs the 'terrorist other' as a threat to the globalised and open society of the EU, through which the second one is constructed, where the advocacy of control measures against migration and asylum are directly linking the 'migrant other' to the threat of the 'terrorist other'. (Baker-Beall, *The Discursive Construction of the EU Counter-terrorism Policy: Writing the 'Migrant Other', Securitisation and Control*, 2009, pp. 194-8) Both scholars studied the subject of counterterrorism with a focus on the political discourse it involves in both continents, giving a contemporary lens to the practices of counterterrorism. However, Baker-Beall's development of the two-levels critical discourse analysis in the context of securitisation makes it more relevant for this thesis despite the focus on the 'migrant other' rather than the 'Muslim other'.

Islam is a subject widely researched nowadays, however only a few scholars explored its securitisation, due to the complicated cross-disciplinary aspect between politics and religion. Cesari is part of those who attempted to bridge the gap between religious studies and political studies and wrote an article on the subject of the securitisation of Islam in Europe in 2009. Through an analysis of the political and academic discourse of Islam as a security threat, Cesari showed that factors such as immigration, ethnicity, socio-economic deprivation and the war on terror are conflated with the religion. The article explains the process through which European governments are fostering radicalisation in their response and discourse against terrorism that tend to make European Muslims feel insecure and threatened, and more likely to turn from conservatism to fundamentalism due to discontent. (Cesari, 2009) Despite lacking a theoretical background to the securitisation and focusing more on the consequences of the securitisation than on the conditions, the article was compelling due to the qualitative research of 500 Muslims across Europe to understand their attitudes towards religious cultures and integration.

Although, Croft's reconceptualization of the securitisation theory has already been reviewed above, his book, intitled *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security*, is also significant regarding how Islam is securitised, especially on a methodological level. The scholar examined how in Britain, the British identity has been constructed and framed over time and was built in contradistinction to the securitised 'Radical Other', or the 'Jihadi' British Muslim. (Croft, 2012, p. 15) Securitisation in this theory is considered to be shaping simultaneously the identity of the securitised object and of the securitising actor. Thus, Croft underwent an ontological approach of security that allowed him a closer look to the relationship between identity, narrative and security. (Croft, 2012, pp. 15-17) Based on a similar type of discursive construction than the 'terrorist other' and the 'migrant other' observed by Baker-Beall, Croft explored the construction of the 'radical other' as an outcome of a successful securitisation, among other conceptions of 'Otherness' developed by Hansen. (Hansen, 2006, p. 45)

(Croft, 2012, p. 88) The solid theoretical framework developed by Croft is distinguishable in comparison to other contemporary developments due to the large research on the formation of identity and securitisation of the object over a long period of time. The scholar's typology of the different identities shaped through the discursive process has broadened the initial theory, which a few scholars used consequently for further research of securitisation. (Mavelli, 2013) (Eroukhmanoff C. , 2015)

Following the footsteps of Croft, Mavelli based his research on the same theoretical framework in order to enlarge it and shift its focus on the relationship between security and religion. While the scholar did not consider the securitisation in the context of terrorism and the subsequent emergency measures implemented, he considered how the construction of the threat of Muslims minorities can be traced back to the historical process of the securitisation of Christianity and religion. (Mavelli, 2013, p. 162) The research explained how this historical securitisation constituted the idea of secularism and how Islam is perceived in the West to have escaped this privatisation of religion and as a result became perceived as a threat. The construction and reproduction of secular form of subjectivities thus implicates a 'securitisation of Muslim subjectivities'. (Mavelli, 2013, p. 162) Finally, Mavelli examined the case study of the securitisation of the headscarf and the burqa in France through former President Sarkozy's speech of 2009, and how the discursive gendered construction of the threat depicted 'Muslim women as vulnerable subjects in need for rescue'. (Mavelli, 2013, p. 175) The angle of the scholar of the concept into the under researched interaction between religion and security provided a pertinent explanative framework for the case study of France due to the unique secularism of the country and its history.

Furthermore, Eroukhmanoff also extended the theory developed by Croft to analyse the securitisation of Islam in the context of the US. Building on Croft's 'range of otherness' typology, the scholar formulated the idea of 'remote securitisation', through the idea of the 'Remote Other' as an ontologically distant and unconnected identity from the 'Self'. (Eroukhmanoff C. , 2015, p. 248) Through an analysis of the discourse of counter-radicalisation reports, considered as 'speech acts', Eroukhmanoff explained that the linguistic 'remoteness' is constructed through the use of metaphors and euphemisms that place Muslims at a distance from what is considered in contrast the 'Us'. (Eroukhmanoff C. , 2015, p. 250) This discourse analysis showed how the linguistic differentiation of the Self in those counter-radicalisation reports seemed to bring up underlying assumptions dehumanising Muslims, which the scholar based on the discourse of 'evil and cruelty' as developed by Baumeister in 2001. Those assumptions about the inherent violence of the Islamic religion are built at the exceptional level of security practitioners when they are using language tricks to avoid the framing of the existential threat. The constructivist approach of this academic paper and the methodological focus on the linguistic and discursive construction of the threat are making interesting developments on the understanding of securitisation. However, it could also be argued that the sole focus on the speech act limits the understanding as well, as it fails to analyse in-depth the role of the audience and contextual factors to this securitisation.

Finally, Polonska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie and Bogain underwent researches more specifically on the French discourse of terrorism in the recent years. Polonska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie went through an examination of the discursive construction of terrorism by the broadcaster *France 24* in the aftermath of the attacks on the magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015. While the article does not account for the development of the securitisation theory, the scholars researched into the context of France and

the 'othering' construction of Muslims in France is relevant for the thesis. Similar to Jackson's explanation of the 'epistemological crisis', Polonska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie expressed that the understanding and knowledge of terrorism by the broadcaster is deeply obstructing the way it speaks about Muslims. (Polonska-Kilmunguyi & Gillespie, 2016) In order to study this discourse formation, the scholars based their analysis on both Foucault and the production of the 'regime of truth' and then underwent a textual, inter-textual and contextual analysis. Methodically speaking, this research is compelling, however, the securitisation theory is missing, especially when the article explores the concept of discourse productivity and how it produces audiences and their responses. On another hand, Bogain focused on the political discourse provided by the French government in the process of justification of the measures implemented in the fight against terrorism. While this research does not provide an analysis of Islam in France in this context, its methodological developments through an analysis of the discourse provide an understanding of the political manipulation of reality. Based on Van Leeuwen's legitimation linguistic strategies, the research help understanding how the French state manage to discursively shield itself and its actions against criticisms of illiberalism. (Bogain, 2017)

Methodology

I. Methodological Scope and Theory

Methodology is understood and conceptualised as a theory combined with a specific method in both the construction and the analysis of a subject of research. (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992)

The aim of this dissertation is to shed light and make sense of the discursive construction of the security threat of terrorism by the elite through the justification of emergency measures implemented in France since 2012. Following the idea of the securitisation theory that security is built through the 'speech act' and falls into the conceptualisation of language theory, discourse analysis is considered an appropriate tool and logical research strategy for this dissertation. (Waeber O. , 1995) It provides a perspective 'on the nature of language and its relationship to the central issues of social sciences'. (Phillips, 2003, p. 222) Therefore, discourse analysis examines how discourse has a way of building the social world through its practices which create the meaning of things. (Gee, 2014)

i. Critical Discourse Analysis and Political Discourse Analysis

In the larger field of discourse analysis, the development of critical discourse analysis (CDA) was established in the 1980s through the work of Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Teun Van Dijk, among others. Following the idea of Fairclough (1992, p. 64), discourse is seen as a way that can be 'signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning' rather than a neutral description of things. In this sense, CDA originally draws from social theory, and the contributions of many scholars such as Louis Althusser, Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. (Fairclough N. , 1995) The purpose of CDA is to analyse the relationships between dominance, discrimination, power and control, through the way they are manifested in the language. (Van Dijk, 1998) Bourdieu established of the 'symbolic power', as an extension of Austin's work on the speech act theory, through which the power of the state is recognised in its use of language. The scholar's work is especially relevant in the context of this dissertation, as it provides a basis for many researches on the maintaining and dominance of power of a state over a population. (Webb, Schirato, & Danaher, 2002)

Political Discourse Analysis, an approach contributing to the studies of CDA, focuses more specifically on the way politics is a form of deliberation and arguments over courses of actions. Politics is seen as a realm where decisions and strategies are used to respond to specific events. (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012) More specifically, political discourses have an ideological character which can legitimately assess knowledge and ideas by accepting and specifying what can be expressed and dictated as 'normal' or not. (Bogain, 2017, p. 479) In this sense, CDA can help revealing which type of knowledge expressed in a political discourse is privileged before another, and normalised, and the way it become legitimised. (Jackson, 2015, p. 148) Language can therefore be more than a mean of communication, but have a role in the creation of social identities, how individuals affiliate with social groups, and how the world is perceived through the creation of those social identities. (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) Social identities

and also ideologies can be produced and reproduced in the performance of the discourse. (Bangstad, 2013)

In the context of France, this approach is legitimate, because the speeches of French elite about the events and circumstances following each specific attack and throughout time from 2012 until 2017, expressed an overall argumentation about the course of action in response to the crisis. Because discourses of members of the government are naturally political due to their position of power, the narratives explanations and justifications provides an influence over the decision-making of the Congress for the acceptance of measures, and on the rest of the population in order to keep their role of leaders. In the political sphere, where practice is seen as both the struggle for power and the cooperation between political actors, we are interested in understanding what type of discourse have been enacted by the French elite and the impact it can have as a consequence. In this sense, power can be both a social construct and can impact on the we act and we think. (Lukes, 2004)

II. Research Strategy

The empirical data is extracted from a collection of 26 speeches, conveniently sampled from March 2012 until July 2017. Speeches were gathered from the government website *Vie Publique*, which provides a database of all archives related to the public life in France and documents regarding the government. This data has been chosen following a convenient sampling due to the qualitative nature of the research. While the speeches are quite numerous, the aim of the research is to do a qualitative in-depth analysis of the discourse used by the elite. Thus, quantifiable data is not taken into consideration as no generalisation will be attempted and the results of this research might lack representativeness.

The sampling of the speeches through the government database was made on a few different criteria. The database allowed the practicability of searching with the key words 'islam' and 'terrorism' in order for the speeches to provide and allow the following analysis of the discourse about religion and Muslims in the context of terrorism.

The main criterion for the data collection and sampling has been therefore contextual. The time period chosen has been identified to be the most critical years for the threat of 'Islamic' and contemporary terrorism in France. The first speech chosen is the speech made by president Sarkozy in front of the country following the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Mohammed Merah in March 2012. The Merah affair has been considered to be the symbol of the increase influence of Al-Qaeda on French soil, and the time period when policies and laws against terrorism started shifting towards the current strategy. (Beydoun, 2015) The terrorist threat has since decreased, and there have been still many different attacks, less striking and emotional in nature such as those of November 2015. Although the exact time period of the decrease in terrorist attack, or the decrease in media coverage cannot be exactly identified. Therefore, the last speech has been chosen to be the one made by Gérard Collomb, current minister of the interior, on the 18th July 2017 in front of the French senate when presenting the bill that subsequently passed in November 2017.ⁱ This law is quite important for the symbolic of this thesis, as its adoption and implementation characterised the end of the state of emergency, which lasted around 2 years. It also provided the implementation into permanent law of some of the exceptional

features of the state of emergency such as: the closing of places of worship where terrorism, hatred and discrimination is promoted; the monitoring of individuals who present as a 'particularly serious' threat, which can include the prohibition of individuals to leave a certain geographic area; allowing local prefect, upon authorisation from a judge, to order law enforcement to conduct searches of any place that a terrorism suspect frequents if 'serious reason to believe' it. (Boring, 2017)

Additionally, the speeches chosen are considered 'speech acts' performed by members of the elite, and specifically of the government as following the idea of the securitisation theory. In order for the securitisation to be successful and accepted by the audience, the securitising actor must be deemed legitimate in his presentation and construction of the threat. (Balzacq, *The Three Faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and Context*, 2005) In this situation, the legitimate actors for the securitisation of terrorism are members of the governments, which have been narrowed down to the president, the prime minister, and the minister of the interior. This thesis is not only focusing on the speeches regarding and following terrorist attacks, but also on speeches that presents and/or justify the different legislations and measures in response to the threat.

Because the time period is extended on 5 years, the members of the government chosen have changed with the different administrations that took over following the elections, in 2012 and in 2017. Therefore, the different speakers are Nicolas Sarkozy and Manuel Valls for the administration from March until May 2012, as president and minister of the interior, François Hollande Bernard Cazeneuve and Manuel Valls for the administration of May 2012 until May 2017, as respectively president, minister of the interior and prime minister. The administration of Macron in the rest of the speeches will be analysed further in the discussion to understand the similarities and differences of the political standing on the matter, and the direction the new administration is taking in the fight against terrorism.

Another aspect taken into consideration is the different types of audiences the speeches were made for. Following the securitisation theory developments made by the scholar Roe, not only the standard audience (i.e. general population) needs to be convinced, but also the national representatives in the parliament. (Roe, 2008) This duality of audiences is consistent with the idea that the French parliament has an important role in the passing of laws and exceptional measures. Therefore, the speeches chosen are either made in response to a terrorist attack for the purpose of the general population, in justification of laws and measures in front of the parliament, or both. Another type of speech has been accepted for the subsequent research: the speeches made in front of the representative of the French Muslim community, such as the annual occasion of the iftar (meal for breaking the fast of the month of Ramadan), or other occasions in the context of crisis due to terrorism where the elite discursively constructed the threat and justified their response against it.

All of the speeches are listed chronologically in Appendix 1. Finally, the speeches are all in French, which the author of this dissertation speaks. The original content will be directly translated by the author, with the original version of the references available in the end notes.

III. Limitations

There are a few limitations to this research and dissertation that are important to discuss and disclaim before going further with the analysis. First, on a methodological level, because of the qualitative aspect of the research and the convenient sampling method, the speeches can only be representative to an extent in the specific boundaries of the discourse on terrorism and the justification of the counterterror measures. The personal and educational biases of the author need to be considered in the context of her personal French nationality and upbringing. Where the objectivity will be the goal throughout this dissertation, this bias could have an impact on the interpretation of the findings.

The case study of France as chosen for this research, will only be analysed in the context of the domestic fight against terrorism, which will fail to take into account the discourse of the international threat of terrorism due to a lack of time. This has been chosen on purpose by the author in order to understand the impact of the discourse within French territory and on its population, but will fail to get a bigger picture of the rest of the discourse. This dissertation in general, fails to take into account the impact that the media and its discourse can have on the successful securitisation of terrorism and the discourse on Islam, which would provide a much more complete window for understanding the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the outcome of this dissertation will hopefully provide a basis for future research into French response to the threat of terrorism and the discourse of Islam in this context.

Analysis

By deconstructing the speeches and categorising the main themes, the main narratives of the discourse against terrorism were uncovered through the analysis of how measures were justified by members of the state. For the purpose of analysing how the 'exceptional measures' implemented were justified and legitimated throughout those years in the fight against terrorism, the framework of 'Linguistic Realisation of Legitimation' developed by Van Leeuwen is used. The second will consist of analysing the reference to Islam and French Muslims in the discourse and understand the underlying narrative takes place.

I. Justification of Counterterrorism Measures

It is essential to analyse how the response of terrorism is justified by the government, because through this justification, the authority 'attempts to establish and cultivate the belief in its legitimacy', as Weber explained. (Weber, 1977, p. 325) According to this idea, Van Leeuwen established a categorisation of the different types of linguistic legitimation that can be applied to the case study of France and the discourse given by its elite. It includes four types of legitimation strategies: authorisation, rationalisation, moral evaluation and mythopoesis. (Van Leeuwen, 2008) However, only the first three of the categories will be used in for analysing legitimation strategies, as the fourth one will fall under the last category of 'moral evaluation' due to their similarities. Thus, the analysis of the justification for exceptional measures will be broken into the following: (a) Authorisation, a legitimation strategy through references to some type of authority/authorities; (b) Rationalisation, a legitimation strategy by references to goals and the use of institutionalised social belief systems; (c) Moral Evaluation, a legitimation strategy through the references to value systems and moral narratives

i. Rationalisation

The justification for the improved security against terrorism in France is constructed at first through a rationalisation of the implementation. This rationalised legitimation is built through successive claims which overall present a plausible argument. However, when disentangled, the argument uncovers a highly politicised manipulation of French History, discourse about Human Rights and presentation of the country and culture.

First, the current situation of the time of the speeches in France is described to be exceptional due to a highly serious threat that is not likely to decrease in the near future. This idea started when Manuel Valls expressed in October 2012, 'the threat is here. It is diverse'^{viii} (2)^{iv}. A few months later, in January 2013, he continued that 'the global threat is still present'^v, 'serious and very high risks remain'^{vi} and that 'to an exceptional situation must respond exceptional measures'^{vii} (9). While the situation did not seem to have shifted following the vote of two laws, François Hollande followed this description by adding that 'we are at war'^{viii} and in 'a state of crisis'^{ix} following the attacks of November 2015 (12), and still in September 2016 that 'the threat, it is here and it will last'^x (20). On a time period of four

years, the speech about the situation does not shift and despite the subsequent measures implemented and laws voted in the meanwhile, the danger is still very present and the risk very high. The following statement by Manuel Valls in July 2016 was used as a justification for the following prorogation of the state of emergency (which one?) in Front of Senate, and a colourful depiction of the future in France:

‘The truth that we ought to our fellow citizens, is also that there is and there will never be zero risk. The truth, the hard truth to which we have to be prepared, is that Islamist terrorism will try again to strike and that there will be again, it costs me to say it this way, innocents killed.’^{xii} (18)

The lexical of war and battle is very present in the discourse: ‘France is at war’^{xiii} (12), ‘this war will be long’^{xiiii} (9), and the mentioning of ‘battle’ more than 40 times across the speeches. The image of peril is reinforced through the politicised war theme and became intensified following the attacks of November 2015. This framing is the basis to the securitisation and the rationalising argument for emergency measures.

The object that is directly threatened by terrorism is not at first the population of France, but rather the civil liberties being exposed to the danger and the risk of terrorism. Civil liberties are positioned as the object to protect and the reason why those measures are needed, as exposed by Bernard Cazeneuve when presenting a bill^{xiv} in front of the National Assembly in September 2014:

‘To hear some statements, it seems sometimes that there is indeed a disastrous mistake to present as liberticide, in the name of the defence of public liberties, the will of democracy to protect itself from terrorists who strive to undermine these specific liberties’^{xv} (5).

Civil liberties and human rights, among other values defended by the government through those measures, are at the centre of the discourse. Security is constructed as a condition to the survival of those values in the discourse. This argument results in the parallel construction of the underlying assumption that the practice of security cannot restrict civil liberties if it provides for its protection. Therefore, the measures cannot be unreasonable in their effect.

Another aspect of this justification is the linkage between human rights and France. References to democratic values and human rights are made throughout all of the speeches from freedom of expression and freedom of speech to equality, but other values to defend are fraternity, diversity, pluralism, tolerance or humanity. Through the use of linguistic generalisation and objectification, some attributes are attributed to ‘France’ or ‘French citizens’ which works within the overall rationalisation to establish what France is. (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 115). François Hollande stated in a tribute to the death of three policeman during the attacks of January 2015: ‘what France represents, diversity, democracy, pluralism, secularism, the ideal of peace’^{xvi} (8). Manuel Valls expressed on the same day in front of the National Assembly that ‘France is the spirit of the Enlightenment’^{xvii} (9). In November 2015, François Hollande declared: ‘France is always a light for humanity’^{xviii} in addition to ‘we are the homeland to Human Rights’^{xix} (12). France is through this process of glorification, hyperbolically constructed in the discourse as the country that created the idea of human rights. (Dembour, 2001)

Through references to the period of the Enlightenment, and the mentioning of France being a 'light for humanity', French History is brought up as well as the French Revolution. Finally, France is depicted to embody the generous state that gave to the rest of the world human rights and is still now 'a country that is an example, a reference for many others'^{xx} (20).

Presented as such, France in all of its glory and magnificence through its connection and devotion to its many values and to human rights, is understood to never will be going against such human rights in its response against terrorism. The discourse is both goal-orientated towards the protection of the country that is in great peril and imminent danger, and effect-orientated towards making the country and its values safer in its response. (Bogain, 2017, p. 485)

ii. Authorisation

The second step in the justification for measures is the strategy of authorisation legitimization, where the government calls for a higher authority as a reference for the lawfulness of the measures implemented. This authority is considered as such due to tradition, customs, law and/or a specific person vested with some kind of institutional authority. (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 108)

In this discourse, reference to institutional authority is quite present throughout the speeches with the naming of domestic and international institution. The first recurrent mention is to the rule of law as the higher authority of a democratic legal framework. There is a continued invocation of the rule of law in the presentation of measures, and even when in the same text the lexical of war and destruction is thoroughly used. This justification is expressed especially following the attacks of November 2015 when the state of emergency started to get prolonged six times from the initial three months to about two years. François Hollande expressed in front the Congress in November 2015 that this state of emergency allows the fight against terrorism to be fully lawful ad democratic: 'in order for public powers to act, in accordance to the rule of law, against war terrorism'^{xxi} (12). Bernard Cazeneuve also justified the prorogation of the state of emergency in front of the Senate in November 2016 that:

'It is for allowing our country to face an exceptionally serious threat that the government decided to take, in the scrupulous respect of the rule of law, exceptional measures.'^{xxii}
(15)

The respect of the rule of law is called to be the reason why the state of emergency and the exceptional measures need to be extended further. The two concepts, the rule of law and the state of emergency, are quite oxymoronic as the first one is meant to ensure that the law protects from abuse of powers and the other provided the state with exceptional executive powers. Nevertheless, the rule of law is in this discourse declared to be the protector of the state of emergency, such as François Hollande puts it: 'the state of emergency is not the contrary to the rule of law: it is on the contrary, when the situation demands it, its shield'^{xxiii} (15). Through this idea, exceptional measures provided by the state of emergency are discursively constructed to be both in accordance with, and necessary to the practice of the rule of law for the democratic system in France.

Furthermore, the rule of law and general lawfulness of the measures are provided by the respect of the human rights, as already mentioned above. References to human rights and liberties are made all along the speeches, the authority of the Declaration of the Rights of Human and Civic Rights of 1789 is called on by François Hollande in front of the Congress again in November 2012:

‘The Declaration of Human and Civic Rights affirmed in its article 2 that security and resistance to oppression are fundamental rights’^{xxiv} (12).

When the former president establishes this authorisation strategy, he also at the same time calls upon a rationalisation strategy through expertise by calling upon a respected text that embodies values of the French Republic and refers to its past. However, this invocation of the Declaration of the Human and Civic Rights omits some important details in order for the discourse to make sense. (Bogain, 2017, p. 482) In its actual wording, the article 2 of the text states that “These rights are Liberty, Property, Safety and Resistance to Oppression”, (The Avalon Project, 2008) but the text never mentions any hierarchical ordering of the rights. Additionally, the European Convention on Human Rights is used as a higher international authority to justify the lawfulness of the measures. Manuel Valls invokes it in November 2015 for the bill^{xxv}, that aim to extend for the second time the state of emergency:

‘All of those measures, house arrests, searches, dissolutions of associations, lie, of course within the framework of international law, notably the one regarding the Human Rights. I remind you that article 15 of the European Convention of Human Right – the ECHR – has authorised us to take derogatory measures in case – I quote – of “war” or “other public danger threatening the life of the nation”’^{xxvi} (13).

This particular justification works within the framing of imminent danger and intense threat on the country, that is at ‘war’. It reminds the audience of the current circumstances as already discursively positioned, and not to question the lawfulness of the measures, as it would mean to question the authority of the European Convention of Human Rights, and human rights themselves.

Finally, the French domestic legal system is being used in the authorisation process, with the French Constitution, along with the mentioning of the State Council and Constitutional Council. In November 2015, François Hollande stated: ‘Our Constitution is our collective pact, it unites all citizens, it is the common rule, it bears our principles’^{xxvii} (12). The Constitution is introduced as what bring together France and its citizens and as the foundation of French rules and principles. Nevertheless, later in the same text, that in order to survive terrorism: ‘we must evolve our Constitution’^{xxviii} (12) when referring to the state of emergency. Manuel Valls also expressed the same idea when advocating for the prorogation of the state of emergency in front of the National Assembly, and its implementation into the Constitution: ‘To provide a long-time response, it is then to revise our Constitution’^{xxix} and ‘it is essential to inscribe the state of emergency in our Constitution’^{xxx} (13). This technique of legitimisation, where the fact that a measure is written in the common charter of a country makes its legitimacy guaranteed, was labelled by Bogain ‘constitutionalisation technique’. (Bogain, 2017, p. 488) The legitimacy of the measures is also justified when referring to the Constitutional Council, which ensures that the principles and rules of the Constitution are ensured. Bernard Cazeneuve explained that the Council ‘has confirmed the perfect constitutionality and conformity to the law of measures undertaken in the context of the state of emergency’^{xxxi} (16).

The discourse invokes those sanctioning bodies that would strike down the measures if they were going against the principles of the state of France such as the protection of the civil liberties and human rights in its fight against terrorism. The legitimisation strategy is built in order for the state to be depicted and perceived as fully compliant with both international and domestic laws, and therefore in no position to be denounced about the state of emergency and the of other measures.

It is important to note that the French Constitution of the Fifth Republic provides the president with special powers in times of crisis but throughout time, the practice led him to become the decision-maker-in-chief. (Bogain, 2017, p. 479; Grossman & Sauger, 2013) However, it is well hidden in all of the speeches that some measures have indeed been struck down or questioned by the Constitutional Council. (De Senneville, 2015) What should be kept in mind:

‘The practical challenge is that many of the most grave and systematic human rights abuses occur during public emergencies, when states employ extraordinary powers to address threats to public order’ (Criddle & Fox-Decent, 2012)

Overall, the response to terrorism is described and depicted to be rightful and proportional to the situation, which could be criticised to be proportional to the depiction of the situation itself only.

iii. Moral Evaluation

The moralisation process of legitimisation is built through reference to value systems and the establishment of what is good or bad. (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 110) The moralisation strategy works mostly in binary on that level. France’s moral standing and glorification has been already mentioned above. It has been hyperbolically constructed throughout the discourse of the different speeches. Its past glory through references of the Enlightenment period and the French Revolution was brought up, as well as its foremost respect of human rights, democratic values and principles that makes the country an example for the rest of the world.

In order for the glorification of France and consequently their response to terrorism to be successfully perceived as rightful, the perpetrators of the attacks need to be perceived as a negative other. (Croft, 2012, p. 87) This can be perceived throughout the speeches were terrorists are dehumanised on every level, whether regarding their ideology, the attacks or the ‘strategy’ of terrorism in general. Descriptors of the attacks and terrorists highly charged with negative descriptors. (Polonska-Kilmunguyi & Gillespie, 2016) The terrorist is in general depicted as a barbaric and violent being which method of war is considered pure cowardice, as expressed better by François Hollande in November 2012: ‘a terrorist which barbarism was arming the cowardice’^{xxxii} (3). Adjectives are also used in the moral discourse, with the ones referring to terrorists the most: ‘coward’, ‘blind’, ‘appalling’, ‘abject’, ‘despicable’, ‘wild’, ‘heinous’^{xxxiii} (1 to 12). They are said to be lacking ‘sensibility towards others’ emotions^{xxxiv} (10), to be ‘without any mercy’^{xxxv} (13) and crazy: ‘terrorism madness’^{xxxvi} (8), ‘these lunatics’^{xxxvii} (7). This representation of terrorist and terrorism in general is working towards discredit them and their actions. The use of highly negative descriptors through a wide use of adjectives helps transmuting the moral discourse into some kind of ‘generalised motives’ about terrorists. (Bogain,

2017) This enables the speaker to gain and ensure 'mass loyalty' from the audience. (Habermas , 1976, p. 36) Reference to the ideology of Islamist terrorism is made by associating it with 'fanatism'^{xxxviii} (3, 7, 8, 14, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26), 'obscurantism'^{xxxix} (9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 20, 25), 'Totalitarianism' (13, 14, 20, 22) and even 'Nazism'^{xl} (20) and 'Fascism'^{xli} (20). The negative labelling of their ideology and analogy to other negative concepts enables the state to depict the 'enemy' as a cruel and evil entity. (Baumeister, 2001) A practice of exclusion of both their ideology and what it entails or the reason why someone would chose to act and kill innocent people is completely omitted and ignored in the texts.

On another level, it also shows a strategy of authorisation by referring to conformity: what should, or should not be. (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 108) The conformity authorisation established through the process of 'evilisation', in contrast to 'heroisation', and reference to the craziness of terrorists. In this sense, they are not conform to the rest of the society, which puts them in direct opposition to the depiction of France, as fully conform and compliant to what it is supposed to be. This binary presentation formulates the terrorist as the 'Other' in the sense where it is linguistically positioned remotely from the 'Us' (i.e. France and its citizens mostly). (Eroukhmanoff C. , The Remote Securitisation of Islam in the US post-9/11: Euphemisms, Metaphors and the 'logic of expected consequences' in counter-radicalisation discourse, 2015; Croft, 2012; Mavelli, 2013; Jackson, 2007b) This categorisation of the threatening 'Other' allows to complete the full picture, as given by the securitising actors, of the circumstances and the danger France is subjected to which calls for a more 'interventionist state'.

II. Discourse of 'Others' and narrative of Islam

In this discourse of legitimation of exceptional measures implemented in the context of the fight of terrorism, the linguistic 'Othering' process enables the construction of the threat of terrorism through a colourful depiction of the social identity of the terrorist. Identity is a concept contested and at the centre of scholarly debates and disagreement. (Fredette, 2014) However, from the research about the relationship between sovereignty and exceptionalism, identity is found to be subject to the practices of discourse. Through the designation of the enemy to be excluded, in opposition to the norm as demonstrated above, identity borders are subsequently created as a consequence of the discourse. (Agamben, 1997; Tsoukala, 2006) Language is said to have an active in the construction or reproduction of social identities and in the consequential perception of the world about them (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). This is especially the case when the discourse is produced through the 'Langue Légitime' (in English, 'Legitimate Language') as developed by Bourdieu, that is the recognised language of the state. French Muslims and their place in the French society are at the very centre of the debate surrounding terrorism and the fight against it in the country. Their place can therefore be established in the analysis of this discourse and of the social construction of their identity in the context of the justification for emergency measures.

Within the already established narrative surrounding the justification for emergency measures, Islam is depicted as both something completely different and remote from terrorism and the link to terrorism on the French soil. Through careful qualifications and linguistic designation, French politicians are focusing and emphasising on distancing the religion of Islam from the ideology of terrorism and terrorist actions in order to avoid expression of prejudicial materials. (Jackson, 2007b)

Those sentences are often used at the beginning of the speeches acting as a disclaimer for what will follow. Therefore, François Hollande stated in November 2012 that ‘Radical Islamism is not Islam’^{xlii} (3), or following the attacks of January 2015 that ‘The ones who committed those acts, [...] Have nothing to do with Muslim religion’^{xliii} (7). On another level, Islam is linked within the narrative of terrorism, through the depiction of how the threat is coming within the French territory. This is expressed by François Hollande in July 2016 following the terrorist attack at Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray: ‘Our country [...] wages war within to fight against radicalisation, by tracking down jihadist individuals, by eradicating criminal networks and we will continue’^{xliv} (19).

Radicalisation is the link with terrorism and what is responsible for the propagation of terrorism on French soil in the discourse and it has become an increasingly concerning subject with the acceleration of terrorist attacks in France. The narrative of radicalisation established in the discourse is contradictory, as it manages to both victimise and dehumanise radicalised individuals. The victimisation occurs when the speaker refers to the French identity of radicalised individuals. This is the case when Bernard Cazeneuve draws the image of French people dying in the Middle East following radicalisation:

‘The departure of our youth in Syria or in Iraq, where 500 fighters and more than 110 have lost their lives on a foreign land and in a baneful fight, a dead end, without hope and without other perspective than the death by the most abject arms of barbarism’^{xlv}
(11)

The discourse of radicalised individuals, here suggested to be French through the mentioning of ‘our youth’, depicts them indirectly as victims in a land of barbarism where death surrounded them. Contrastingly, the discourse becomes a lot harsher when referring to radicalised individuals that are considered foreigners on French soil and the law is directly and coldly brought up as a warning to any future behaviour against the country’s institutions. Manuel Valls in October 2012 explained that: ‘foreign nationals who found themselves who are on our territory, and want to target our institutions, will be subjected, as the law allows it, to expulsions’^{xlvi} (2). The minister of interior also described the phenomenon of radicalisation to be ‘often born within our popular neighbourhoods’^{xlvii} (2). In the speeches, the ‘ghettos’ (9) in France are socially constructed to be at the most risk of radicalisation, due to the socio-economic situation of individuals living there: ‘the process of radicalisation is complex and involve many factors, not always religious’ (14). Through the use of a sanitised language, Bernard Cazeneuve’s assume that the process of radicalisation is associated, predominantly with religion, and thereafter with the socio-economic factors. This narrative provides the link between terrorism and popular neighbourhoods, which consequently distance individuals from those neighbourhoods from the norm. This ‘Othering’ process proceeds to categorise them as a threat within the social borders of ‘potential terrorists’. This can be perceived when Manuel Valls explicitly stated that ‘Of course, our popular neighbourhoods are affected [...] it is there, in the first place, that Salafism has the more devastating effect. It is there, in the first place, that it needs to be fought’^{xlviii} (18).

Furthermore, while both foreign nationals and individuals from popular neighbourhoods are presented to be depicted within the social boundaries of the threat within the country by the elite, Islam is somehow discursively connected to them and associated to this threat. Manuel Valls, in January 2015, expressed concern regarding radicalisation in popular neighbourhoods: ‘To switch [...] in our

neighbourhoods, from tolerant, universal, benevolent Islam towards conservatism, obscurantism, Islamism, and worst the temptation of jihad^{xlix} (9). Manuel Valls assumes in this discourse that radicalisation is inherent to Islam, and that radicalisation to Islamic terrorism occurs within Islam of already religious individuals, rather than the radicalisation to a radical ideology deriving from Islam of non-religious individuals. Furthermore, Manuel Valls associates Islam with immigration and radicalisation in October 2012 through his statement 'Many Muslims in our country, and particularly those from the second and the third generation, that can doubt their identity, are exposed to the Salafist interpretation of Islam'^l. He continues by explaining that this 'dangerous interpretation is not the one from their parents or country of origin'^{li} (2). In this sentence, French Muslims are inherently assumed to be from foreign backgrounds, which emphasis undermines their 'national' identity as French citizens. It discursively limits the social identity of French Muslims to be 'originally foreigners' without taking into account the fact that they are fully French due to their birth place. In addition, the use of the word 'exposed' in this sentence provoke the understanding that both their religion and background makes them more likely than the rest of the population to be radicalised. This narrative establishes an 'Othering' process of French Muslims by distancing them to the norm, which would be the rest of the population that is not deemed to be mentioned in this context. French Muslims are discursively constructed to fall under the categorisation of the 'foreign Other' and the 'potential terrorist Other' and constructed as ontologically distant from the elite and French Society. This narrative therefore reproduces the questioning of Muslims' place within France.

Discussion

I. Counterterrorism measures

Counterterrorism measures and legislations have already been deeply rooted into the French legislative system before 2012 despite the overall perception that more of them needs to be implemented in order to survive the terrorist threat. The encounter of France with contemporary terrorism started during the Algerian War during the 20th century, and later in the 21st century with the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent bombings on European soil in 2004 in Madrid. In the 1980s, terrorist violence peaked after state-sponsored groups from the Middle East targeted France due to its interest within the Cold War and the binary tensions East-West. (Rault, 2010) Accordingly, France had been preparing itself and its counterterrorism arsenal since the 1990s. This counterterrorism arsenal has started getting increasingly developed following the Merah affair and the first attacks that took place on French soil linked to Al Qaeda. The new government, at the time, of Hollande voted in December 2012 a law which allowed the prosecution of act of terrorism committed by French nationals or residents, as well as the prosecution of the incitement to terrorism. This billⁱⁱⁱ was adopted with a large consensus in Parliament, (Leplongeon, 2012) but described by François Hollande to have been unanimous (4). Other laws adopted include: the law voted in November 2014^{liii} that reinforce the counterterrorism provisions already implemented, the law of July 2015 that reinforced the means of action of French intelligence services^{liv}, the law of November 2015 that extend the state of emergency for the first time^{lv} and the fifth consecutive ones that followed. (Gouvernement, 2017)

Regarding the positioning of the administration of Macron in the context of counterterrorism since he became elected at the presidency in Mai 2017, seems to have been following the steps of his predecessor. In July 2017, a sixth and last extension to the state of emergency was introduced in a bill to the Congress. At first it seems to be following the same trend in justification through the discourse, that is influencing the National Assembly's votes by introducing the voting of the Senate a few days prior to the speech: 'I have the honour of presenting you this morning the bill aiming at extending the state of emergency, as amended and adopted this Tuesday by the Senate with 312 votes for and 22 votes against'^{lvi} (24). However, soon promising the presentation of the 'bill [...] for allowing the exit from the state of emergency'^{lvii} (24). This new law was adopted largely by both Houses of French Parliament and authorised several measures that were part of the previous state of emergency to become permanent. (BBCNews, 2017) However, this law seems to be approved in the country only apart from some human rights groups. An opinion poll made by the news journal *LeFigaro* found that 85% of people surveyed think this law will improve their security, along with 62% of them acknowledging that the law will deteriorate their liberties. (Cornevin, 2017)

It is striking, but needs to be acknowledged, that outside of the 'exceptional measures' implemented through the very first the state of emergency, as declared in November 2015, all of the other means of emergency against terrorism were implemented through a democratic process by being duly approved by the National Assembly and the Senate. (Lucke & Dück, 2016, p. 12) However, one questionable aspect of the process through which the laws manage to pass, is the speed and unanimity they were adopted, which could suspect some executive political pressure in the circumstances of crisis and emergency. (Lucke & Dück, 2016, p. 12) Most decisions of the Congress

seems to have been with great majority in both of the Houses of Parliament. François Hollande's discourse proves this point when he expressively stated: 'And Ladies and Gentleman parliamentarians, I invite you to vote before the end of the week'^{lviii} in conclusion to his speech following the attacks of November 2015 (12).

The measures of the state of emergency allowed member of the government rather than judges to approve for the mandatory confinement of individuals to their home town requiring the reporting to the police once a day. It also allowed an increased security and security parameters in some places deemed at risk such as airports or train stations and mosques or other places of worship to be shut down if preachers are found promoting a radical version of Islam. (BBCNews, 2017) Macron's proposal for his counterterrorism law also involved granting the police the right to place individuals under house arrests without trial, the raiding of home and meeting places without the prior consulting with a judge and to forbid public gatherings. (McQueen, 2017)

The counterterrorism measures in France have raised a great deal of voices against it from human rights activists and organisations that aim protect civil liberties around the world. Lechte and Newman stated that 'it is the idea of "security" [...], that, above all, renders all human rights implementation ineffective'. (Lechte & Newman, 2013, p. 2) Some of the organisations complaining of the religious profiling in France have been the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF) and the Human Rights Watch (HRW) which have both been supported by the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH). (McQueen, 2017) Such discrimination were made possible especially in the framework of the state of emergency where no evidence is needed to justify measures such as raids on the home of individuals. The only suspicion of people who reports to the authority against their neighbours where sufficient for the measures to be put into action. This opens the window for both personal vendetta and the wrongfully assumptions of what is constituting evidences of 'radicalisation'. (McQueen, 2017) The measures used against terrorism have been, up to this date, almost exclusively applied against Muslims. (McQueen, 2017) Except during the event of the COP 21 where those measures where abused in their use against ecologist militants that were deemed potentially dangerous and to trouble the public peace. (Cahn, 2016)

Additionally, those measures have allowed a number of police misconducts, especially during house raids, with the very specific case of a girl of six years old to be injured by a shrapnel when the police officers raided her parents' home while paving their way in there by shooting. However, it has been proved later on that the girl's home where not the initial target of the raid but her neighbour's home instead. (McQueen, 2017) Moreover, house arrests where used to detain individuals for extended periods of time, and as long as for over a year, without them ever going through a trial first. (McQueen, 2017) It has been calculated that in January 2016, 3 021 searches and seizures took place an 381 house arrests were ordered since the beginning of the state of emergency in November 2015. Despite the terrorist attacks being at their peak, those numbers are immensely high considering that they only took place in two months. (Cahn, 2016) By February 2017 the rate of house raids' rate decreased with an overall of 4 551 raids since the beginning of the state of emergency. (McQueen, 2017) Nevertheless, Amnesty International found that this number of raids involved only 7% of court proceedings afterwards (Vilars, 2016), and 0.3% of them resulting in terrorism-related criminal charges and most of those charges were accusing individuals to 'glorify terrorism' rather than planning any attacks.

(McQueen, 2017) This lack of effectiveness was furthermore acknowledged by the government through a parliamentary inquiry performed in July 2017. (Fenech & Pietrasanta, 2017)

The law adopted in October 2017 by the administration of Macron, have been additionally worrying regarding the impact it will have on individuals' rights. The law's initial aim and the way it was presented was to stop any further prorogation of the state of emergency and in this way, to stop the practices of emergency and exceptionalism. However, what this law have done in reality is to take the elements of emergency practices, such as the intrusive search powers, the restrictions on individuals through the house arrests, the closure of places of worship. (Raj, 2017) It seems to be taking the very same measures that have been troublesome and lacked effectiveness in their goals of stopping terrorism and implement them into normal everyday administrative practice. The Human Rights Watch found that even in the establishment of the measures into permanent law, the judiciary's controlled is weakened as well over its ability to check the potential abuse of those measures. (Raj, 2017) In the case of the closing of places of worships, the law seems to written in a way were the language is vague enough to allow it be on 'ill-defined grounds'. (Raj, 2017) Furthermore, most orders implemented into the law have the possibility of lasting for longer times, such as the order by a prefect to close an area for increased searches, and this without needing the basis of the imminent threat behind it . (Raj, 2017) An expert from the United Nations (UN), Fionnuala Ni Aolain, also raised concern about this legislation and about how it undermines some human rights such as the following: liberty, privacy, association, movement and religious freedom. (UNHR, 2018) Subsequently, she claims that they have a indisputable disproportionate effect on citizens of the Muslim faith, which stigmatise and further marginalise them. (UNHR, 2018)

II. Acceptance of Securitisation

The problematic and paradox of the securitisation of terrorism is the following: the emergency measures, or in this case the state of emergency, are implemented in a intent to deal and address a particular 'situation', however, in the case where the situation is always prevalent, it coincides and becomes the norm. (Lechte & Newman, 2013, p. 4) Through the sovereignty of the state, French government have the potential to suspend the normal practice of the law and declare a state of exception at any moment, such as François Hollande have done by introducing the state of emergency. This discourse, as analysed above, produced the shift from the normal state to the state of exception by moving the issue of terrorism into the realm of security. This was done through the justification of the emergency measures and of the 'necessity' to apply them against terrorism. It can be pointed out that the state of exception is justified by the state of 'necessity'. (Agamben, 2005, p. 30) The normalisation of the emergency measures in this case, has been produced by this discourse of necessity, such as De Benoist stated: '[the necessity of] security will trump liberty in a world where threats are omnipresent and invisible at the same time'. (De Benoist, 2007, p. 90)

The narrative of terrorism that imposed and present itself within the discursive establishment of power and sovereignty in times of crisis, can determine the main perception of the event and provide a 'reality' construction through the deployment of language. (Jackson, 2006, p. 172) The reason this narration of the state works and is being as accepted in times of crisis, such as in the situation of terrorism in France, is because power is a 'regime of truth'. According to Foucault, those who produce

discourse have the power to produce what he intitled a 'regime of truth'. (Foucault, 1980; Polonska-Kilmunguyi & Gillespie, 2016) Through the introduction of the state of emergency and of the measures, the state manifest itself in its most powerful form when designating the enemy to be excluded. (Agamben, 1997, p. 2002; Tsoukala, 2006, p. 608) This can be argued to emphasise and increase the 'regime of truth' established during the norm. Therefore, the discursive construction of the national identity and the discursive construction of the 'enemy' as excluded by the Othering process can be understood to impact further on the audience.

The many laws and counterterrorism measures in France have been showed and proved to be repressive and to impact on civil liberties by human rights activists and organisation and the few debates that occurred within the country. However, the narrative deployed by the state when justifying those measures have proven to be much stronger in comparison where the securitising speech has been accepted, at the exact same moment when those measures became implemented into permanent law. Overall, when observing the liberty vs security struggle within the country, it seems that security has won and taken over.

III. Securitisation of Islam and Impact

The securitisation of Islam occurs in parallel to the securitisation of terrorism. Through the acceptance of the designation of the existential threat of terrorism and the measures responding to it, Islam has been demonstrated to be subsequently securitised as a consequence to it. By excluding Islam and Muslims in France from the norm and linked them to the risk of terrorism, as the first victims of radicalisation, it presented them as a potential terrorist other. The securitisation of Islam occurs in the sense where the discourse about the Muslim identity in France is excluding it from the discourse of the national identity in the context of the designation of terrorism as a threat, and through this process creates identity borders through linguistic framing, creates a distanced identity from the norm.

The overall militaristic-policing interventionist system that has become France, through the emergency measures both with the state of emergency and with its implementation into domestic law has created an atmosphere of insecurity for the Muslim communities in the country. This can be added to the already attempt of cultural assimilation that can be argued to 'reform, erode or overtake Islam instead of accommodating it' (Beydoun, 2015, p. 1321)

Overall, the discourse of the state and its behaviour towards Muslims in France suggests an epistemological crisis as the knowledge of the religion and of its own population seems flawed and narrow minded by the years of suspicion and lack of interest. And a subjective view of what citizenship means in this process of delimiting their identity. As an example, one measure that did not pass and got accepted by the counterterror discourse is the forfeiture of nationality. However, the attempt for such law to pass alone, provides a view of what is the national identity in the discourse of the state. Instead of enacting political inclusion for all of its population, the practices of denaturalisation provides the evidence of an unequal citizenship in its perception. (Beauchamps, 2016, p. 32) It express explicitly that there is a difference between citizens that acquired the French nationality and those who were born with it. This applies to the discourse on Muslims as observed in the analysis where there are depicted through their origins or the origins of their grand-parents, and not including the fact of their

own French nationality, or only when expressing the counter idea in confrontation to the criticisms of the discriminatory impact of their policy.

The sense of insecurity is therefore not only perceived by the targeting of Muslims by the counterterrorism measures, but also by the overall framing of their identity. The framing in the discourse of Muslim in opposition not only to national identity but to the social order also explains the acceptance of the securitisation by the rest of the population. Because the national identity is depicted as a referent object in the securitisation, which survival is endangered, the audience is somehow obliged to understand and accept the protection of it, as it is their own perception of self that is endangered. (Huysmans, 2004) This was expressed by Lechte and Newman when they stated that “there is an acceptance of human rights violations where force is inflicted on others, in order to protect the social order and national identity’ (Lechte & Newman, 2013, p. 13) The meddling of the state with civil liberties of French Muslims only asserts and reproduces the narratives already existing of the idea that France and Islam are overall irreconcilable and warring. (Beydoun, 2015, p. 1323)

The epistemological crisis can be perceived as well in the fact that the French Muslims are considered to be part of one whole Muslim community that shares the same ideas and ideals. This conflation of Islam at large further marginalise French Muslims, as well as explain the reason why radicalisation is directly linked to Islam. It follows the same train of thought that, if one individual of Islam religion on French soil has been radicalised they must all be potential terrorists.

Regarding radicalisation, the process does not involve Islam as a radicalising factor for disaffected youths but rather disaffected youths subscribe to Salafism or another extreme and deviant interpretation of the religion and then radicalised the faith. (Beydoun, 2015) This is another example of a problematic in epistemology of the phenomenon of radicalisation, which is transposed in the discourse and therefore reproduced by the state. Additionally, Beydoun has observed that the state radicalisation effort is directed towards French popular neighbourhoods, *les banlieues*. This effort will be flawed in the case where only Imams, business owners and student leaders, among other respected figures of the communities will be make good informants where the rest have lesser chances to trust the state. (Beydoun, 2015, p. 1321)

The suspicion of radicalisation has been proven to, at its very first stage, be associated with religious expression through the lens of the French state. This idea explains the assimilationist approach and aim of the state when thinking about the integration of Muslims. (Beydoun, 2015, p. 1333) Through the negative impact of the reasoning that religious symbols equal to radical thinking and further to radicalisation, the state’s objective, for the future of its population and in the respect of its narrative of its own national identity, is to integrate Muslims in assimilating and reform their identity into the identity’s archetype of the ‘French’ citizens in accordance with their discursive production of this identity. (Beydoun, 2015, p. 1279) While the discourse of terrorism and Islam by the French state have been exposed through this period of crisis, the measures implemented for the purpose of the respect of secularism can be understood in the same manner. The discourse of the banning of all visible religious symbols in public schools or of face veils in public spaces could maybe demonstrate that the same approach was adopted by the state already a few years back, although without having the formulation of the serious threat and imminent danger. It is the iterations of Islam that disturbs.

Conclusion

To conclude, the research has found that well manipulated and politicised discourse from the elite does not allow much criticisms regarding its actions due to the linguistic framing of what France is and represent and that there is indeed a securitisation of Islam, at least on the discursive level. By putting forward the religion of Islam at the centre of the political debate within the context of terrorism and in the same discourse along the narrative and designation of threat, Islam is being indirectly securitised. The discourse poses issues for the future relationship between Islam and the French Society, and specifically with the state. This narrative proposed also does not shift with the different administration of Macron that took over François Hollande's in May 2017.

Some recent developments of the Macron's administration could have an impact on the future of the relationship between them. The current direction Macron is taking is to speak about a reforming of the 'Islam of France' (in French *Islam de France*), an expression used since a few years, which means the religious Muslim of France, which can vouch for the singularity of the Muslim community in the state perception. (Chambraud, 2018; Belkaïd & Schmid, 2015) A discourse is currently being prepared by president Macron in order to present this reform which will probably be the subject of much criticisms and applauds in the French political system. As a president in a country where 'laïcité' is enclaved into the past and History, and upheld to an extreme length, an intervention and involvement in the reforming of Islam of France will be viewed as another discriminatory measures against Muslims. Additionally, an interventionist as straightforward as this one targeting directly the organisation and the practice of a religion, will go completely against the *Laïcité*, considered one of the most important principle for France and its citizens. If such a reform were indeed going to pass, the discourse to justify it would be of the most importance and a great development to this dissertation's subject. Furthermore, while such discourse would reproduce the securitisation of Islam in France, or produce it as it would not be within the discourse of the existential threat, it would stop the re-enactment of the identity of France and French citizens, constructed in parallel with their values of principles such the one of *Laïcité*.

Finally, it can be argued that the principle of *Laïcité* could be the one reformed. The discourse as exposed in this dissertation provides the evidence of the non-neutrality of the French state when referring to their perception and to the perception they're upholding about them. If it's not the principle of *Laïcité* that will evolve to take into account an important percentage of its population.

Finally, the observations and analysis of the author about the French discourse about Islam may seem harsh in nature, but are never meant to undermine the impact of terrorist attacks or side with the individuals that perpetrated them. Or the difficulty in responding to such a threat on the part of the government for that matter. It merely focuses on the impact of the measures on its population, and this is why it decided to shift its focus away from further discussion on the effectiveness of the measures.

The recommendation for the government is that for the perceptions to change, the discourse needs to change, which can only be done first at the highest level of the State. The discourse of Islam needs to be disentangled from international politics and their discourse. It needs to be disentangle from the discourse of the existential threat and given a new portrayal that could inspire the new generations and the youth of France to trust its government and even to feel and be perceived with the same national identity than the rest of the country, which break the cycle of the 'Othering' process.

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Appendix 1.

- (1) Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les attentats à Toulouse et Montauban et sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, à Paris le 22 mars 2012.
- (2) Déclaration de M. Manuel Valls, ministre de l'intérieur, sur les grandes orientations du projet de loi relatif à la sécurité et à la lutte contre le terrorisme, au Sénat le 16 octobre 2012.
- (3) Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, le racisme et l'antisémitisme, à Toulouse le 1er novembre 2012.
- (4) Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, à Toulouse le 17 mars 2013.
- (5) Déclaration de M. Bernard Cazeneuve, ministre de l'intérieur, sur les grandes orientations du projet de loi renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme, à l'Assemblée nationale le 15 septembre 2014.
- (6) Déclaration de M. Bernard Cazeneuve, ministre de l'intérieur, sur l'enquête concernant les auteurs de l'attentat au siège de l'hebdomadaire "Charlie Hebdo" et de la fusillade de Montrouge (Hauts-de-Seine), le déclenchement du niveau d'Alerte Attentat du plan Vigipirate et la nécessité de préserver le consensus républicain dans la défense de la liberté de la presse et des valeurs de la démocratie, Paris le 8 janvier 2015.
- (7) Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur l'attentat contre l'hebdomadaire "Charlie Hebdo", le meurtre d'une policière et les deux prises d'otages des 7, 8 et 9 janvier 2015, à Paris le 9 janvier 2015.
- (8) Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, en hommage aux trois policiers morts en service lors des attentats des 7 et 8 janvier 2015, à Paris le 13 janvier 2015.
- (9) Déclaration de M. Manuel Valls, Premier ministre, sur la guerre contre "le terrorisme, le djihadisme et l'islamisme radical" et les mesures exceptionnelles envisagées ("jamais nous n'adopterons de mesures d'exception qui dérogeraient au principe du droit et des valeurs"), à l'Assemblée nationale le 13 janvier 2015.
- (10) Déclaration de M. Manuel Valls, Premier ministre, sur le renforcement du dispositif de lutte contre le terrorisme, à Paris le 21 janvier 2015.
- (11) Déclaration de M. Bernard Cazeneuve, ministre de l'intérieur, sur la nécessité de "faire prévaloir un islam de lumière et de paix" et l'enracinement de l'islam en France et dans la République, à Paris le 1er juillet 2015.

- (12) Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, devant le Parlement réuni en Congrès à la suite des attaques terroristes perpétrées à Paris et en Seine-Saint-Denis, Versailles le 16 novembre 2015.
- (13) Déclaration de M. Manuel Valls, Premier ministre, sur les grandes orientations du projet de loi prorogeant l'état d'urgence et modernisant le régime d'exception de la loi du 3 avril 1955, à l'Assemblée nationale le 19 novembre 2015.
- (14) Déclaration de M. Bernard Cazeneuve, ministre de l'intérieur, sur le "Manifeste citoyen des musulmans de France" condamnant le terrorisme, l'état d'urgence, la répression des actes antimusulmans et la délivrance de diplômes universitaires de formation républicaine aux cadres religieux, à Paris le 29 novembre 2015.
- (15) Déclaration de M. Bernard Cazeneuve, ministre de l'intérieur, sur la prorogation de l'état d'urgence pour une durée supplémentaire de trois mois, au Sénat le 9 février 2016.
- (16) Déclaration de M. Bernard Cazeneuve, ministre de l'intérieur, sur le projet de loi prorogeant l'état d'urgence pour une durée supplémentaire de trois mois, à l'Assemblée nationale le 16 février 2016.
- (17) Déclaration de M. Manuel Valls, Premier ministre, sur le projet de loi prorogeant l'état d'urgence pour six mois, à l'Assemblée nationale le 19 juillet 2016.
- (18) Déclaration de M. Manuel Valls, Premier ministre, sur le projet de loi prorogeant l'état d'urgence, au Sénat le 20 juillet 2016.
- (19) Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur l'attentat à Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray et la lutte contre le terrorisme, à Paris le 26 juillet 2016.
- (20) Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur la démocratie face au terrorisme, à Paris le 8 septembre 2016.
- (21) Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur le terrorisme islamiste et sur le dialogue entre les religions, à Paris le 5 janvier 2017.
- (22) Déclaration de M. Emmanuel Macron, Président de la République, sur l'islam en France, à Paris le 20 juin 2017.
- (23) Déclaration de M. Gérard Collomb, ministre de l'intérieur, sur la promotion d'une "laïcité de liberté" respectueuse de la liberté de conscience, l'objectif du développement de formations universitaires en islamologie et la nécessité de réaffirmer que "Daesh, ce n'est pas l'Islam", à Paris le 22 juin 2017.
- (24) Déclaration de M. Gérard Collomb, ministre de l'intérieur, sur la sixième et dernière prorogation de l'état d'urgence, à l'Assemblée nationale le 6 juillet 2017.

(25) Déclaration de M. Emmanuel Macron, Président de la République, en hommage aux victimes de l'attentat de Nice du 14 juillet 2016, à Nice le 14 juillet 2017.

(26) Déclaration de M. Gérard Collomb, ministre de l'intérieur, sur les grandes orientations du projet de loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme, au Sénat le 18 juillet 2017.

ⁱ Intituled in French : 'projet de loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme'.

ⁱⁱ References to specific sentences or words from the speeches will be directly translated by the author of this thesis. The original versions will be exposed in the notes.

ⁱⁱⁱ Original version : 'La menace est là. Elle est diverse.'

^{iv} References to a specific speech can be found through its number as chronologically ordered in the Appendix 1.

^v Original version : 'la menace globale est toujours présente'

^{vi} Original version : 'des risques sérieux et très élevés demeurent'

^{vii} Original version : 'A une situation exceptionnelle doivent répondre des mesures exceptionnelles'

^{viii} Original version : 'Nous sommes en guerre'

^{ix} Original version : 'l'état de crise'

^x Original version : 'La menace, elle est là et elle va durer'

^{xi} Original version : 'La vérité que nous devons à nos concitoyens, c'est également que le risque zéro n'existe pas et n'existera jamais. La vérité, la dure vérité à laquelle nous devons être préparés, c'est que le terrorisme islamiste essaiera à nouveau de frapper et qu'il y aura à nouveau ☐ cela me coûte de le dire ainsi ☐ des innocents tués'

^{xii} Original version : 'La France est en guerre'

^{xiii} Original version : 'cette guerre sera longue'

^{xiv} Intituled in French : projet de loi renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme,

^{xv} Original version : 'A entendre certaines déclarations, il me semble parfois qu'il y a en effet comme une funeste erreur à présenter comme liberticide, au nom de la défense des libertés publiques, la volonté de la démocratie de se protéger des terroristes qui s'acharnent à porter atteinte à ces libertés mêmes'

^{xvi} Original version : 'ce que la France représente, la diversité, la démocratie, le pluralisme, la laïcité, l'idéal de paix'

^{xvii} Original version : 'La France c'est l'esprit des lumières'

^{xviii} Original version : 'la France est toujours une lumière pour l'humanité'

^{xix} Original version : 'nous sommes la patrie des Droits de l'Homme'

^{xx} Original version : 'un pays qui est un exemple, une référence pour beaucoup d'autres'

^{xxi} Original version : 'pour permettre aux pouvoirs publics d'agir, conformément à l'état de droit, contre le terrorisme de guerre.'

^{xxii} Original version : 'C'est pour permettre à notre pays de faire face à une menace exceptionnellement grave que le Gouvernement a décidé de prendre, dans le respect scrupuleux de l'État de droit, des mesures exceptionnelles.'

^{xxiii} Original version : 'L'état d'urgence n'est pas le contraire de l'État de droit : il en est au contraire, dès lors que la situation l'exige, le bouclier' 15

^{xxiv} Original version : 'La Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen affirme dans son article 2 que la sûreté et la résistance à l'oppression sont des droits fondamentaux'

^{xxv} Intituled in French : projet de loi relatif à la prorogation de l'état d'urgence et renforçant l'efficacité de ses dispositions

^{xxvi} Original version : 'Toutes ces mesures, assignations à résidence, perquisitions, dissolutions d'associations, s'inscrivent, bien sûr dans le cadre de la législation internationale, notamment celle relative aux droits de l'Homme. Je vous rappelle que l'article 15 de la convention européenne des droits de l'Homme - la CEDH - nous

autorise à prendre des mesures dérogatoires en cas - je cite - de « guerre » ou d'« autre danger public menaçant la vie de la nation ».

^{xxvii} Original version : 'Notre Constitution est notre pacte collectif, elle unit tous les citoyens, elle est la règle commune, elle porte des principes'

^{xxviii} Original version : 'nous devons faire évoluer notre Constitution'

^{xxix} Original version : 'Apporter une réponse de long terme, c'est ensuite réviser notre Constitution.'

^{xxx} Original version : 'Il est donc impératif d'inscrire l'état d'urgence dans notre Constitution'

^{xxxi} Original version : 'le Conseil constitutionnel [...] a confirmé la parfaite constitutionnalité et conformité au droit des mesures prises dans le cadre de l'état d'urgence'

^{xxxii} Original version : 'un terroriste dont la barbarie armait la lâcheté'

^{xxxiii} Original version : 'lâche', 'aveugle', 'effroyable', 'abject', 'méprisables', 'sauvage', 'odieux'

^{xxxiv} Original version : 'l'absence de sensibilité à la souffrance d'autrui'

^{xxxv} Original version : 'sans aucune pitié'

^{xxxvi} Original version : 'la folie terroriste'

^{xxxvii} Original version : 'ces illuminés'

^{xxxviii} Original version : 'fanatisme', 'fanatiques'

^{xxxix} Original version : 'Obscurantisme'

^{xl} Original version : 'nazisme'

^{xli} Original version : 'fascisme'

^{xlii} Original version : 'L'islamisme radical n'est pas l'Islam.'

^{xliii} Original version : 'Ceux qui ont commis ces actes, N'ont rien à voir avec la religion musulmane'

^{xliv} Original version : 'Notre pays [...] fait la guerre à l'intérieur en lutte contre la radicalisation, en traquant les individus djihadistes, en éradiquant les réseaux criminels et nous continuerons'

^{xlv} Original version : 'le départ de nos jeunes en Syrie ou en Irak, où 500 combattent et plus de 110 ont perdu la vie sur une terre étrangère et dans un combat funeste, sans issue, sans espoir et sans autre perspective que la mort par les armes les plus abjectes de la barbarie.'

^{xlvi} Original version : 'les ressortissants étrangers qui se trouvent sur notre territoire, et qui veulent s'en prendre à nos institutions, feront l'objet, comme la loi le permet, d'expulsions.'

^{xlvii} Original version : 'naît souvent au sein de nos quartiers populaires'

^{xlviii} Original version : Bien sûr, nos quartiers populaires sont touchés [...] C'est là, en premier lieu, que le salafisme fait le plus de ravages. C'est là, en premier lieu, qu'il doit être combattu.'

^{xlix} Original version : 'Basculer[...] dans nos quartiers, de l'Islam tolérant, universel, bienveillant vers le conservatisme, vers l'obscurantisme, l'islamisme, et pire la tentation du djihad'

^l Original version : 'Beaucoup de musulmans de notre pays, et tout particulièrement ceux issus de la deuxième et de la troisième génération, qui peuvent douter de leur identité, sont exposés à l'interprétation salafiste de l'Islam'

^{li} Original version : 'interprétation dangereuse qui n'est pas celle de leurs parents ou de leurs pays d'origine'

^{lii} Intituled in French: projet de loi relatif à la sécurité et à la lutte contre le terrorisme

^{liii} Intituled in French : projet de loi renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme

^{liv} Intituled in French : projet de loi renforçant les moyens d'action des services de renseignement

^{lv} Intituled in French : projet de loi prorogeant l'état d'urgence

^{lvi} Original version : 'j'ai l'honneur de vous présenter ce matin le projet de loi portant prorogation de l'état d'urgence, tel qu'amendé et adopté mardi par le Sénat par 312 voix pour et 22 voix contre'

^{lvii} Original version : 'projet de loi [...] pour permettre cette sortie de l'état d'urgence'

^{lviii} Original version : 'Et mesdames, messieurs les parlementaires, je vous invite à le voter d'ici la fin de la semaine'