



CHARLES UNIVERSITY

**The Role of Civil Society in Ukraine's National Security
and Defence**

May 2018

2277804

90720172

**Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirement for
the Degree of MSc International Security, Intelligence
and Strategic Studies (SECINTEL)**

Word Count: 19255

Supervisor UofG: Dr Sergiu Gherghina

Supervisor Charles Uni: Aliaksei Kazharski PhD



CHARLES UNIVERSITY

MSc International Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies

2017-2019

Dissertation Archive Permission Form

I give the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow permission to archive an e-copy/soft-bound copy of my MSc dissertation in a publicly available folder and to use it for educational purposes in the future.

Student Name: _____ LUKAS SKOLEK _____

Student Number: _____ 2277804S _____

Student Signature: _____ Date: _____ 31/05/2018 _____

PLEASE INCLUDE A COPY OF THIS FORM WITH THE SUBMITTED SOFT-BOUND COPY OF YOUR DISSERTATION.

Abstract

Keywords: securitization, Ukraine, civil society, reform, resilience, approximation

This thesis aims to clarify the role of Ukrainian civil society in the approximation process of the Ukrainian defence sector to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The research question this thesis seeks to answer is: How does the activity of the civil society, influence the approximation process of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? The thesis then chooses the theoretical framework of analysis offered by the securitization theory. The speech act framing the existential threat to state's legitimacy is clearly defined and based on this referent object of security is selected. Extraordinary measures which include closer cooperation with representatives of CSOs are named. Then, NATO's criteria for admission into Membership Action Plan are confronted in order to select those, which most closely coalign with the mission of partnerships of civil society organizations and the government brought together as extraordinary measures resulting from the securitization. These organizations are: The Public Council under the Ministry of Defence, ProZorro, Reforms Project Office, and the Ministry of Information Policy. After this, analysis of the activity of these civil society organizations reveals their particular relevance in the approximation process of Ukraine to NATO. In this process important trends from the Ukrainian defence sector are revealed and elaborated upon.

List of Abbreviations:

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
EU – European Union
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
ATO – Anti-terrorist Operation
JFO – Joint Forces Operation
SBU – Security Service of Ukraine
MoIA – Ministry of Internal Affairs
MoD – Ministry of Defence
AFU – Armed Forces of Ukraine
STANAG – North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreement
MAP—Membership Action Plan
PCuMoD/ Council – Public Council under the Ministry of Defence
CSO – Civil Society Organization
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
RT—Russia Today (major state run news channel)
MOOTW—Military Operations Other Than War
MoIP—Ministry of Information Policy
TIU—Transparency International Ukraine
NGO—Non-Governmental Organization
OGP—Open Government Partnership
UAH—Ukrainian Hryvnia (currency)

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank both of my supervisors, Sergiu Gherghina and Aliaksei Kazharski for always being kind and helpful, even when I could have certainly done more to show that I truly value their advice.

Secondly, I want to thank all those who participated on the creation and administration of the SecIntel Programme. I am sure it will continue to produce very qualified graduates and become internationally recognized within and beyond the fields of security studies and strategic studies.

Thirdly, my many thanks go to my classmates, without whom I would not have learned nearly as much as I did; regarding security and so much more.

Fourthly, I am happy to thank Mr. Dmitri Teperik from the International Centre for Defence and Security who introduced me to one of two people who actually met with me in Kyiv. My thanks naturally go to the interviewees as well, their insight proved crucial for this thesis and their interest in my research made me feel very welcome in Ukraine.

Contents

Abstract.....	2
List of Abbreviations:	3
Acknowledgements.....	4
1.0 Introduction	6
2.0 Literature Review, Theory and Necessary Definitions	15
3.0 Methodology.....	28
4. Analysis	32
4.1 Public Council under the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (PCuMoD).....	32
4.2 ProZorro	40
4.3 Reforms Project Office (RPO).....	44
4.4 Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine (MoIP).....	49
5.0 Discussion of the Results.....	52
6.0 Conclusion.....	57
6.1 Limitations of the conducted research	58
6.2 Implications for further research	59
6.3 Policy Implications	59
6.3.1 Policy Implications for Ukrainian authorities.....	59
6.3.2 Policy Implications for other states seeking NATO membership.....	60
Legal Sources in Order of Appearance:.....	61
Appendix A.....	62
Appendix B	63
Appendix C	63
Bibliography	64
Scheme 1	75
Chart 1.....	76
Chart 2	76

1.0 Introduction

“Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a perspective, not the truth.”

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations

"Slava Ukrayini!"

"Heroyam slava!"

[Glory to Ukraine!]

[Glory to the heroes!]

Ukrainian independence movement greeting brought back to usage after Euromaidan Revolution; President Petro Poroshenko uses it at the end of all his speeches & since the 5th of February 2018 it has been the official greeting of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Etymologically, the name ‘Ukraine’ does have very simplistic, yet quite fitting explanations understood, if not known, by most native speakers of Slavic languages. The preposition ‘u’ can be translated to English as ‘at’, while the noun ‘krai’¹ can be translated as either ‘a land’ or ‘an edge’. Ukraine certainly does have a lot of landmass. With some fifty thousand square kilometers more than France, Ukraine is a country covering the second largest area in Europe. When comparing sizes on the old continent, only its eastern neighbour, Russian Federation, surpasses it. In Ukrainian case, with quantity comes quality as well. Ukraine can boast with high agricultural potential, as it does this on its blue and yellow flag, where the colour blue symbolizes clear skies, and the yellow below it represents country’s fields. Black soil (or chernozem) is one of the most fertile types of land on Earth and it covers more than sixty percent of Ukraine (Magocsi, 2010, p. 6). In fact, even when Nazi Germany crafted its plans to conquer all of Europe, Ukraine’s final role in the scheme was planned to be the one of the food suppliers for all of the Third Reich (Harrison, 2014, p. 56). Hence, this first reading of the name ‘Ukraine’ leads us to its nickname ‘breadbasket of Europe’.

¹ This word can be spelled in several ways depending on precisely which Slavic language is used when making the translation. Here, simplistic ‘krai’ was chosen for the easier connection to the English spelling of Ukraine.

And while the topic of agricultural production can be assigned strategic importance, as was the case in Harrison's *The Economics of Coercion and Conflict* (2014), it is the second understanding that comes as crucial in this text (pp. 56-99).

When we consider the modern border of Europe to begin at the Strait of Gibraltar, stretch across the Mediterranean Sea followed by Aegean Sea, then the Turkish Straits, after which it reaches the Black Sea, Ukraine truly does sit on the edge. The precise position of an imaginary line between the Black Sea and Ural mountain range in Russia, where the supposed border ends, is interpreted variously. However, even if the most extreme interpretation is assumed, where the border would run through the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov, along the river Don and later Volga, to finally connect with the Ural Mountains, all of Ukraine along with Crimean Peninsula would still end up inside Europe. This is how Ukraine comes to its second nickname 'Borderland'. The location favored that Ukraine would go through several different rules and serve as home to different peoples. Another reason for this is that Ukraine's lack of natural obstacles on its area makes it easily invadable (Marshall, 2015, p. 6). Richard Sakwa (2014, p. 22) summarizes this by saying that Ukraine, much like the Balkans "*produces more history than it can absorb*". Some of this 'abundant' history, was at times borrowed by Russia.

In the seventeenth century, Russian Empire conquered the territory of today's Ukraine, where hundreds of years ago Kievan Rus once used to be the governing entity. The Russian Empire cleverly made Kievan Rus into a Slavic golden age story (Magocsi, 2010, p. 10). This was then frequently used for centuries to justify Slavic togetherness, under the leadership of Moscow. Echoes of this cultural clash are still heard from both sides on pro-government news channels (Russia Today, 2016; Tyapkin, 2014; Dashkevych, 2014).

Finally, another object of Russian affection is the Crimean Peninsula. Pleshakov (2017, p. 57) describes Russia's relationship with Crimea as a national fetish, which wound up in Ukraine by a mistake made by Khrushchev in 1954. Crimea

used to have its own native population comprised mainly of Tatars, who were forcibly relocated² during Stalin's rule over the Soviet Union (USSR) (Magocsi, 2010, p. 691). Ever since its inception in 1922, the Union included Ukraine as one of the fifteen federal republics. When USSR fell apart in 1991 and Ukraine declared its independence in the same year, Crimea ended up being populated and governed by native Russians (Magocsi, 2010, p. 722). This subsequently resulted in tensions between Kiev and the peninsula, where a massive portion of the population favoured reunification with Russia (Magocsi, 2010, p. 727). The newly born Ukrainian democracy was struggling due to massive impact of oligarchs, who undermined state institutions via corruption. The country had practically zero prior experience with liberal democracy, so the traditional institutions like rule of law and separation of powers were nonexistent. In fact, the situation was so critical, that in 1994 a National Intelligence Estimate produced by the US Central Intelligence Agency predicted a collapse of the Ukrainian state in a period of five to ten years (Pifer, 2004). As we now know, the collapse came in twenty years, as opposed to ten, but it is still essential to mention the Orange Revolution, which took place in 2004. When reformist candidate Yushchenko lost presidential election run-off to Viktor Yanukovich, masses took to streets and demanded a rerun of the election, due to widespread fraud reports. The rerun was finally agreed upon, and this time Yushchenko won the election, but the following years did not bring about the change so many Ukrainians were striving for (Aslund, 2015, p. 69).

In 2010, Viktor Yanukovich, the man against whom once much of Ukraine protested on public squares, secured the presidency in an election which was internationally recognized as free and fair. Yanukovich, a Donetsk native who previously held the office of governor of said area, was bound not to stabilize the situation in the country. Already in 2004, after his initial victory in the presidential election, the Russia-friendly Yanukovich was well aware of the calls for a referendum about greater autonomy of his home region (Lavelle, 2004). His

² In 1988, Tatars were given the option to come back to Crimea, and according to Magocsi some 80,000 did in just one year (2010, p. 722).

candidacy was actively supported by the President Vladimir Putin and the then mayor of Moscow and an influential patriot Yuri Luzhkov; both men repeatedly showed up at Yanukovich's campaigning events (Menon & Rumer, 2015, p. 35). Yanukovich was a hardline advocate of the non-block status, which called for Ukraine not to be aligned with either the Russian Federation or the West, meaning primarily the European Union (EU) in the political sphere, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the strategic sphere. The non-block status was often backed by claiming that it allowed for Ukraine to get the best out of both competitors. Moscow provided cheap gas and important trade partnership, while the EU continued to offer substantial economic incentives and expert consulting regarding the transition towards open market policy. Although Ukrainian cooperation with NATO did not spark the 2014 crisis, it is necessary to mention that in 2011, during the first year of Yanukovich presidency, 81.9% of the multilateral cooperation activities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) were held with NATO, as opposed to only 3.5% with the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); on bilateral field, the amount of activities conducted with the US tripled those which Ukraine held with the Russian Federation (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2012, pp. 56, 58). This is a valid indicator of Yanukovich's will to continue to work with the West, even in sensitive issues such as military cooperation, as long as the non-block status was upheld.

Towards the end of 2013, the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement was being finalized and regarded as an upcoming expiration of the non-block status. The deal would set up a framework for political and economical cooperation on a scale that would simply make the EU Ukraine's preferred partner in these fields. Despite promising pro-EU claims by the President (Interfax Ukraine, 2013), Yanukovich administration was stalling the agreement and finally stepped out of the negotiations, sparking the massive protests on Kiev's Independence Square, which then became known as Euromaidan. The protests turned into a revolution, ousting Yanukovich in early 2014.

This brings us back to the topic of Ukraine as the state ‘at the edge’. After the government collapsed, and interim chaos ensued throughout the country, the regions most defining that very edge were the ones most affected by this power shift. Both, the Crimean Peninsula and the Donbas region are the ones geographically furthest from the central government in Kiev. Politically, their distance from the capital can be judged by the fact that these enjoyed the biggest amount of autonomy within the state, and also by their previous attempts at secession referendums. And while the events that have taken place in Kiev during the revolution can be largely omitted in this text, for these do not tie directly to the topic of this thesis, the failure to uphold territorial sovereignty in Crimea and Donbas has to be explained, because the reforms and civil initiatives analyzed in this thesis are a direct product of this failure. Because the cases of Crimea and Donbas are very different, they shall be described separately.

What made Crimea particularly attractive for the Russian annexation was the local warm water port in Sevastopol, or as it is often called ‘home of the Black Sea fleet’. One of the main strategic characteristics of Russia is the lack of warm water ports on its coasts. A vast majority of naval bases are periodically dysfunctional as a result of the water in their bays freezing for several months during the winter. Since the breakup of the USSR, the solution to this was a lease of the naval base in Sevastopol together with a permission to station Russian soldiers on Ukrainian territory. The 2010 iteration of such deal was called the Kharkov Agreement, which specified that for the next 25 years Ukraine was to receive a hefty sum of USD 100 million every year, together with a significant discount on Russian natural gas, in return for renting out the naval base (Grant, 2015, p. 46). This naturally meant that there were Russian soldiers already present in Crimea well ahead of the crisis, but it was not just them who participated on the takeover. The Russian hybrid warfare included mobilizing and arming nationalist groups, famously the biker gang from Sevastopol called the Night Wolves, which under the leadership of some sixteen thousand Russian troops stationed in Sevastopol helped overcome the eighteen thousand surprised Ukrainian servicemen who did not fight back (Pleshakov, 2017, p. 111). Regardless of

whether the number of Russian troops, who were not wearing any insignia to ensure initial deniability, was higher than the limits established in Kharkov Agreement, the movement of troops throughout the peninsula to secure strategic sites was a clear violation.

Today, this operation is now widely regarded as a model case of Russian hybrid warfare strategy, but the term will be addressed in more detail later in the theoretical section. The fast and relatively bloodless annexation of Crimea in March 2014 is attributed largely to an exemplary cooperation between the involved governmental institutions and various branches of armed forces. On an operational level, there was a clear roadmap of objectives (military control of key-points, cyber warfare disrupting opponent's communication with central command, involvement of indigenous forces in the form of local volunteers, propaganda campaign, etc.) pointing towards a finite end-point on a strategic level, which was the annexation with carefully arranged, albeit largely unrecognized, legal grounds anchored in municipal law acts, a referendum, and a presidential executive order. Kremlin also displayed its deep care for political symbolism, when besides officially accepting the Republic of Crimea into the federation, it granted Sevastopol the status of a federal city, until then reserved only for Moscow and Saint Petersburg (Yekelchuk, 2015, pp. 131, 132).

The territorial loss of the Donbas area occurred in very different terms. The term 'Donbas' refers to the basin of the river Donets, which covers roughly two easternmost regions of Ukraine: Donetsk and Luhansk. The last official census in Ukraine was held in 2001, and the numbers show that around half of the 1.5 million citizens living in Donbas identify themselves as Russian nationals (Databank of State Statistic Service of Ukraine, 2001). From topological perspective, the area does not present many natural barriers being mostly flat as the rest of the country. There is robust infrastructure present, which was built in order to support the coal-mining and heavy industry in the area. Despite these rather favourable conditions, the insurgency in Donbas was neither a spontaneous local revolt nor an open invasion by Russian Federation, and even skilled

researchers like Pleshakov (2017, p. 116) seriously doubt that it is already possible to precisely pinpoint the dynamics of the beginning of the insurgency. A very plausible narrative of the early 2014 events comes from Nikolay Mitrokhin's (2015, pp. 222-224) identification of several small-time criminals who gained political power once the insurgency has started, all of whom previously served in the USSR / Russian Armed Forces. These are said to have cooperated with Russian special operations forces (SOF) and pro-Russian public organizations grouped in civil councils which provided some political legitimacy for the insurgency (Mitrokhin, 2015, pp. 225-227).

In early 2014, three weeks after Russia annexed Crimea, these foreign and domestic insurgents seized control over governmental buildings in Donbas, and a week later, the acting President of Ukraine declared a beginning of an anti-terrorist operation (ATO) (Aslund, 2015, pp. 255, 256). The occupied area in Donbas became known for the next four years as the ATO zone. Only recently, in April 2018, the operation was replaced by the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) (Ponomarenko, 2018).

This is not a matter of mere semantics, because the ATO was under the command of the Anti-Terrorist Center at the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) (Security Service of Ukraine, 2018). With the SBU being Ukraine's internal intelligence agency, the conflict's management was much closer connected to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), as opposed to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) which would traditionally play the dominant role in a crisis like this. While there is no unified official explanation of this type of approach, it can be explained as a measure to avoid a direct military confrontation with Russia, although at that time Moscow's direct involvement was not yet confirmed. Furthermore, the MoD and the AFU proven their ineffectiveness in Crimea, which quite likely contributed on the decision to task the MoIA with the ATO. Finally, it was the volunteers who have done much of the fighting on the side of the government from the very beginning and keeping it that way, along with jurisdiction of the MoIA instead of the MoD, can be seen as a move to limit the internal escalation of the conflict and

prevent a civil war, which was still far from an inevitable scenario in April 2014. Together with the intensity of fighting, the support from Russia grew, ultimately reaching undisputable levels in August 2014 (Mitrokhin, 2015, p. 243). The transition to JFO meant that the government's military effort of regaining territorial sovereignty over Donbas is now headed by a joint command under the AFU, which brings the authority back to the MoD.

The post-Maidan reforms are being materialized in virtually all governmental sectors but given the mentioned geographical (flat terrain) and political weaknesses (low state legitimacy due to failure of Orange Revolution, wide spread corruption, and a substantial portion of pro-Russian population) of the Ukrainian state, which are skillfully exploited by the Russian Federation, the defence sector has become in many ways a priority. Because the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution can be characterized as a popular uprising, the civil society subsequently became one of the main actors pushing for these reforms. It gained prominence and experience by its quick mobilization in the face of the Russian hybrid strategy, which also incorporated usage of civil society.

Prior to that, the only reformative efforts have been subtly voiced mainly by representatives of the West, and in the defence sector by NATO. However, Ukraine's NATO membership was not a fully official policy goal under the post-Maidan government until mid-2017 (Interfax Ukraine, 2017a). Previously, even newly drafted strategic documents mostly mentioned meeting the membership criteria, achieving interoperability, or a bigger number of Standardization Agreements (STANAG). The civil society did not miss this opportunity, like it did before after the fall of communism and after the Orange Revolution. This time, its involvement was maintained.

In this work the involvement of civil society in the Ukrainian defence sector reforms process since 2014 will be analyzed. The ultimate goal of the mobilized civil society voiced in 2014 protests was an abolishment of the non-block status, and within the defence sector a bid for NATO membership. Ukraine is still far from NATO membership, currently not even being a part to the Membership

Action Plan (MAP), which is the official NATO programme for official membership candidates. Hence the membership or its likelihood of it cannot be used as a dependent variable in an academic work. However, it should be possible to define the approximation process that precedes the membership well enough, so it can serve as a dependent variable for this work. Consequently, the research question this thesis seeks to answer is:

How does the activity of the civil society, influence the approximation process of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

A formulation like this necessitates a clear definition of civil society for the purposes of this research. It was not chosen to be intentionally vague. Instead, this thesis was originally meant to analyze the activity of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (PCuMoD), which is an official recommendatory body composed out of several civil society organizations (CSOs). After conducting research, the lack of evidence of activity of the PCuMoD has made the original analysis impossible. Instead on focusing solely on PCuMoD, the multiple defence-related actors from the civil society were selected and analyzed. The preliminary hypothesis from the research proposal was also refined after this development:

The activity of the civil society positively influences the approximation process of Ukraine to NATO, because the extraordinary measures resulting from securitization of Russian hybrid warfare included measures that were meant to achieve cooperation of the government with the civil society in areas vital to the approximation process.

The selection is described in detail in following chapters. The section on theory, definitions and literature review explains application of securitization theory in order to provide a framework for sensemaking in this complex research puzzle.

2.0 Literature Review, Theory and Necessary Definitions

Arguments and evidence from a wide variety of sources will be presented in this thesis to support a well-founded case. From a theoretical perspective, the thesis will be built on the concept of securitization presented first by Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde (1998). The Copenhagen School of international relations developed this theory to explain the process where a familiar issue suddenly becomes a security threat. The theory argues that this happens because a securitizing actor takes securitizing action usually in form of a speech act aimed towards a certain audience, to frame a certain issue, which was not necessarily a security issue prior to securitizing action, as a referent object of security and another object as a security threat. Reversibly then, desecuritization occurs when the previously securitized issue is no longer being framed as a security threat to the referent object of security. Over the years since its inception, securitization theory has been applied to a wide variety of topics, becoming one of the major theories of security studies. In works dealing with the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), securitization theory is often applied to the energy sector (Langvad, 2017; Janeliūnas & Tumkevič, 2013). The Russian Federation is the largest natural gas supplier for the area, so energy security of CEE is at stake whenever the mutual relations are harmed. This is the case especially for Ukraine, which has suffered one of the worst gas crises after a dispute of energy companies in 2009. Hence, the securitization of energy dependence of Ukraine is not something that can be tied so directly with the Euromaidan Revolution. One of the genuinely new security topics that emerged in 2014 was the issue of social resilience.

The most widely used definition of state comes from Max Weber's *Politics as a Vocation* and portrays state as an organization, which has a legitimate monopoly on the use of physical violence over a certain area (2004, p. 33). By this definition, Ukraine has failed as a state in 2014 when it was unable to preserve its territorial sovereignty, but also due to the continuous lack of legitimacy. As a modern republic, Ukraine ought to have its legitimacy from legal authority—its constitution and laws. This authority was not fully restored or repaired immediately after the revolution. In return, in a Gallup poll conducted only a year

later, 79% of Ukrainians said they did not have confidence in the national government (Ray, 2015). A recent research from the eastern part of the country shows that the distrust towards SBU, which still was the representation of the national government in charge of the ATO, is still high, but importantly there is a trust among the people towards CSOs (Teperik, et al., 2018, p. 8). The government realized both, that it lacked legitimacy, and that people trusted active civil society in the form of CSOs. In order to gain legitimacy then, it devised a way to incorporate into the governmental structures the resilience shown by the many Ukrainians who volunteered to defend Donbas (and those many who helped them). Before this process of incorporation (and securitization) can be described, resilience needs to be defined.

Resilience is a relatively new term in the field of security studies making its arrival to the mainstream topics only within the last decade or so (Cavelty, et al., 2015, p. 5). While it is often argued that its origin is anchored in the science of ecology, a recent much-needed article by Philippe Bourbeau points to its multilateral ancestry, coming from several different scientific fields and importantly influenced by neoliberalism (2018, pp. 24-31). The neoliberal impact on the surge of the usage of the term resilience should be noted especially in the Ukrainian case, because one of the main building blocks of the post-Maidan government was cooperation with the EU—an institution with neoliberal values and policies. The multifaceted origin of resilience suggests that it would traditionally fit better within the scope of critical security studies, which is a theory that deals the most with interdisciplinary subjects. Even human security theory can be linked to resilience more directly, because resilience is firmly established in the field of psychology, where it is downright defined by the American Psychological Association (Bourbeau, 2018, p. 30). Authority for the purpose of this research parallel to the American Psychological Association could have been NATO, however attempts at definition of resilience made within the structure of NATO (Shea, 2016; Lasconjarias, 2017, p. 2; Meyer-Minnemann, 2016, pp. 92-93) utilize all-of-nation approach and were found too broad to be applicable to this situation. Some definitions like one by Brad Allenby and

Jonathan Fink (2005, p. 1034) must be omitted for their distinctly static understanding of the term, which does not permit for the object of resilience to change its own structure while remaining resilient. The EU, perhaps because of its neoliberal policies, does have a simple, yet very fitting definition: *“the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises”* (European Union, 2016, p. 23). This dynamic understanding of resilience not only allows for a change but makes reform an intrinsic attribute of resilience. That is the reason why this definition will be used throughout this thesis.

For securitization to begin, traditionally there needs to be a speech act by the securitizing actor specifying existential threat to a referent object of security, which should also be specified. For securitization to occur, this actor has to be in a position of power (Barry Buzan, 1998, p. 33). On the 7th of June 2014, one of the wealthiest Ukrainians Petro Poroshenko became the President of Ukraine. In the first weeks of his administration he delivered three major speeches, which outlined the administration’s narrative of the situation in Ukraine. These excerpts were selected for demonstration:

“The national elections of the President have put a complete stop to the myth of the so-called illegitimate Kyiv government. This myth was planted and grown by Russian propaganda and Yanukovich’s clan, which betrayed Donbas and stole more from it than the entire country.

[...] It is them who are totally responsible for the political and socio-economical situation which [Donbas] has ended up in.”

From Petro Poroshenko’s speech at the inauguration (2014a).

“There have been many efforts to undermine the European unification project like they did in Ukraine throughout last months.”

From Petro Poroshenko’s speech at the occasion of signing the association agreement between Ukraine and European Union on the 27th of June 2014 (2014b).

“...[T]he sea of lies in which highly sophisticated and well-funded machine of Russian propaganda is trying to drown the truth about Ukrainian democracy.

[...] Given the current situation in and around Ukraine, the implementation of comprehensive reform is not a matter of Ukraine succeeding but Ukraine surviving.

[...] Ukraine needs to rely more on its strong, vibrant and dynamic civil society.”

From Petro Poroshenko’s speech at the joint session of US Congress on the 18th of September 2014 (2014c).

From the very beginning, the new administration has been securitizing the information space dealing with the pro-European integration reforms. This narrative did not mark only the year 2014. It was upheld numerous times since then at major events:

“The full-scale information war and propaganda campaign have become a particular destructive form of non-military aggression.

[...] That is why the task of strengthening the role of information in the maintenance of peace and security is more important than ever.”

From Petro Poroshenko’s speech at the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the 29th of September 2015 (2015).

The specified threat that comes from Russian Federation is referred to as information war or propaganda campaign which is aimed at the referent object of security. This object can be understood in a broad scope as the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, or in a narrower sense as the reformative efforts within the state itself. It is necessary to point out, that what is understood here as a threat towards the narrowly understood reformative efforts, was present in the past well-before Euromaidan. Traces of older Russian propaganda mocking the pro-reforms Yushchenko and vilifying the EU can be easily found in the archives of Russia Today (RT) (2010a; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b; 2008). The lack of significant measures against this from the side of Ukraine proves that the topic was first truly securitized under Poroshenko, when the intensity of this information war was

recognized to have reached a critical level which was a threat also to the legitimacy of the state as a referent object of security. Commonly, extraordinary measure that follows securitization is deployment of military force. In this case, the mentioned threat had a hybrid nature and included military aggression, which met a response that has been slightly delayed³, untraditionally organized under the MoIA, and strangely co-manned by many volunteers, but in its essence, it still was military. To look at the measures which are considered extraordinary in the Ukrainian case, it is critical to first examine what exactly falls under the term hybrid war.

First of all, hybrid war is not a new term in the field of strategic studies. As editors of *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*, Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor come very close to producing a genealogy of hybrid warfare, yet their work mostly discusses the asymmetry of conflicts and the use of indigenous forces (2012). While very helpful in showcasing that the term is not as new as many may say, it was published two years too early to comment on the unexpected vibrancy the term gained after the Russian aggression in Ukraine. At the time when the war in Donbas was starting, Mark Galeotti published a document called *The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War* on his blog (2014), unleashing what have been long four years of misunderstanding among the strategic studies scholars. Among many who have interpreted the 'Gerasimov Doctrine' in an unfortunate way is András Rác (2015) who described *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine*⁴ as a new-generation warfare, or Soňa Rusnáková who titled her paper on this topic *Russian New Art of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine* (2017). The use and misuse of the term Gerasimov Doctrine / hybrid warfare has prompted a response by Mark Galeotti in a recent article (2018) where he apologizes for coming up with the term, and sets things right by stating:

³ This is a reference to the fact that it took a week for the central government of Ukraine to declare the ATO following seizure of power in Donbas.

⁴ Coincidentally this is also the exact title of Rác's 104 pages long report.

“[The Gerasimov Doctrine] doesn’t exist. [...] What Gerasimov was talking about was the use of subversion to prepare the battlefield before intervention, precisely the kind of operations used in Ukraine. Breaking the chain of command, stirring up local insurrections, jamming communications — these are all classic moves that hardly began in Crimea.”

Ofer Fridman explains the difference between Russian and Western understanding of hybrid war in more detail. According to this author, while the Western perception is much closer to Murray’s and Mansoor’s mix of conventional and irregular military deployment, Russian perspective mainly looks at a combination of non-military ways of achieving a state failure, or a status so close to it, that even a limited force deployment will afterwards suffice to achieve objectives that would not be possible to achieve without the prior state-undermining campaign (Fridman, 2017, pp. 45, 46). To help with conceptualization, it can be perhaps useful to think of the Russian understanding of hybrid warfare as an offensive version of military operations other than war (MOOTW). MOOTW groups activities such as peacekeeping, disaster relief, support of critical infrastructure, medical assistance, demining operations, etc. Crisis traditionally precedes MOOTW, which are consequently of reactionary nature, while this particular type of understanding of hybrid warfare is proactive and the crisis is one of the objectives. Similarly, to the difference in center of gravity between regular military operations and MOOTW, the center of gravity for Russian hybrid warfare is almost analogous to the one of MOOTW. Where MOOTW traditionally aim to aid the receiving state, ultimately resulting in a functioning governance, Russian hybrid warfare seeks to undermine legitimacy of the state, ultimately causing its failure. What then stands in the way of this hybrid warfare fulfilling its objective is resilience— *“the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises”* (European Union, 2016, p. 23). Despite the controversy caused by Gerasimov Doctrine, when describing the threat in the securitization process this thesis will use the term hybrid war, in the way Fridman describes the Russian understanding of it, partly because many strategic documents still refer to it today, and partly because the term got simply woven into so many descriptions of the War in

Donbas, that it would be obscure to avoid it. To reiterate, there was the aspect of cooperation between conventional army and irregular militias that Murray and Mansoor talk about, but such strategy should certainly not be exalted as a revolution in military affairs, or even the success of it should not. After all, not that long ago in the Second Chechen War, Moscow's cooperation with irregular forces in form of *Kadyrovtsy* yielded success as well.

With the threat defined, another element of securitization that must not be overlooked is the audience. In securitization theory, audience is the subject which either accepts or rejects the securitization speech act and the extraordinary measures that follow it. Adam Côté argues for more consideration to be given to the under-researched topic of audiences, because ignoring them damages the intersubjective (actor and audience) character of securitization theory (2016, pp. 554, 555). However, in the case of Ukrainian citizens, perhaps because of the securitization process being long overdue, or because of the military operations were already taking place, the audience did not significantly influence the securitization process, and arguably for the most part just passively agreed to it. The extraordinary measures which will be discussed later on, were not as controversial as in many other cases, given the active hostilities in Ukraine. However, the mentioned Poroshenko's speeches were given to four very different audiences. The one given later to the United Nations General Assembly can be viewed as a simple repetition of the themes prevalent in the first three speeches, with mixed narrative due to the broad audience. But in each of the first three speeches, elements that point to audience centered narrative can be identified. To provide a comprehensive inquiry into these narratives, methods of discourse analysis would be necessary, but for a basic illustration pointing to simple examples should suffice.

The speech at the joint session of the United States Congress included a plea for more lethal military aid with a memorable phrase “[...] *one cannot win a war with blankets*” (Poroshenko, 2014c). Despite Ukraine asking for lethal military aid from EU states, such formulation was for a good reason avoided in the speech

at the occasion of signing the EU association agreement. There, the President focused more on common threats to other EU partners present like Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, with Ukraine being described as the extreme example of these threats materializing (Poroshenko, 2014b). In the address to his home crowd, Poroshenko importantly defended the use of Russian language in Ukraine, underlining the statement by delivering the selected parts of the speech in Russian (2014a). This was done no doubt as a reaction to the interim government's brief attempt to ban Russian as an official language (Pleshakov, 2017, p. 54). Such sensitivity then shows that the securitization process did not occur under a complete ignorance of the audience from the side of the securitizing actor. The audience's response to the securitization and the extreme measures introduced by it differed due to the differences among audiences. The feedback from the United States is positive, demonstrated among other instances by a recent supply of lethal military equipment (Brown, 2018). The EU too welcomed the changes introduced in Ukraine as an outcome of this securitization, because of its reform-oriented interests that were and will be discussed throughout this thesis. Finally, the response from Ukrainian citizens will be given space in the concluding chapter of this thesis, as the extraordinary measures which impacted them the most will be discussed next and then throughout the chapter focusing on analysis.

Military deployment which is frequently a prime example of an extraordinary measure following a securitization speech, cannot be cast into the category of extraordinary measures in the case of Ukraine as described in this work, or at least not traditionally, without some retrospective elements. The ATO began months before Poroshenko's address at his inauguration. Some of the first identifiable extreme measures were produced already during the summer of 2014, when Ukraine's MoIA decided to ban 14 Russian television channels (including Russia Today) for broadcasting propaganda (Prentice, 2014). While the impact of securitization on the media sector is not analyzed in this thesis, it should be still mentioned for the visibility of these measures and clear connection to the securitization speech. From the perspective of the population, perhaps the harshest extreme measure targeted the Russian presence on the internet and social media

sector couple years later. In 2017, the Ukrainian government decided to ban a number of websites and internet services, including VKontakte (social network akin to Facebook), Mail.ru (email service with the highest number of Ukrainian users), and Yandex (most frequently used search engine) all due to their suspected involvement in Russian *hybrid war* which was also stated explicitly and at least a bit paradoxically by the President Poroshenko on the social media network VKontakte (Luhn, 2017). Since then, indicators such as an online poll of one of the major Ukrainian news outlets—UNIAN, hint that this might not have been the most popular policy with 65 percent (of the total of 17 thousand respondents) disagree with it, and some 11 percent view it as ridiculous as North Korea's society-wide ban on all of internet (2017). As far as the effectiveness of the policy goes, the social network VKontakte still ranks as the fourth most used website a year later, despite the ban (Interfax Ukraine, 2018a).

The less visible, but for the purposes of this thesis more important extreme measures first came in the form of a resolution of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine⁵ *On the Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine* which called for establishment of the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine (MoIP) (Parliament of Ukraine, 2014, No. 52). This ministry is meant to counter the influence of Russian propaganda on Ukrainians, by effectively running its own propaganda campaign.

Another less recognizable form of these measures is an inclusion of the threat as well as the referent object of security (in this case the narrowly understood one—reformative efforts within the state) in strategic documents. This type of official recognition is understood as a measure resulting from securitization in the aforementioned work on securitization of energy sectors in CEE (Janeliūnas & Tumkevič, 2013, p. 70). The three major strategic documents, all produced after the 2014 revolution, that include this narrative are *National Security Strategy*, *Military Doctrine of Ukraine*, and *Strategic Defence Bulletin* (President of Ukraine, 2015, No. 105, No. 555; 2016, No. 240). These documents recognize

⁵ Ukraine's unicameral parliament composed of 450 deputies.

Moscow's hybrid threat in more than just military terms and view bigger civil-military interaction as a countermeasure. Additionally, civil society is given its own promotion strategy by an order of the President, which talks about civil society in all sectors, but does mention specifically the volunteering aid to the defence sector that came as a response to the War in Donbas (2016, No. 68). These documents represent a direct link between the securitization speech act given by the President and the inclusion of civil society in the defence sector of the country as a countermeasure to the non-military aspect of Russian hybrid warfare.

These measures regarding the civil society's role in the defence sector did not remain strictly on the level of strategic planning. The concrete step that has shown the government is willing to actually start a new level of cooperation with the civil society even in the defence sector, is the gradual delegation of competencies to the institution of PCuMoD. This step will be further discussed in the chapter on analysis.

While the PCuMoD already existed, there was a measure establishing a completely new civil society body under the structure of MoD with more specific task of reform implementation within the AFU. The Reforms Project Office has been assigned this mission in 2015 by an Order of Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (No. 426). This too will be a subject of the analysis later in this thesis.

Finally, the last term that needs to be clarified is the approximation process of the Ukrainian defence sector to NATO. Perhaps the most frequently used pieces of terminology when discussing assimilation or approximation efforts of any state to NATO are the STANAGs. Not all of these agreements are made public, but based on the ones that are, it can be deduced that these are very explicit. While many may think that the exactness comes from the technical details of military equipment they discuss (best illustrated by the 5.56x45 mm NATO ammunition), this is only partly true. STANAGs also deal with procedural, administrative, and operational issues aiming to achieve standardization and interoperability throughout defence sectors of NATO's members and partners. Hence, the

explicitness largely has to come from the military role of the alliance. There is however, also a political role, where the requirements are not, and by the very essence cannot be equally explicit. NATO has made it clear in the Washington Treaty that only states in Europe that uphold the principles of democracy, rule of law, and individual liberty may ask to join the alliance (NATO, 1949). Ukraine certainly does belong to Europe geographically not only by the description of the borders of Europe, put forward in the introduction to this thesis, but also according to NATO's understanding of Europe, since ongoing debate between the two sides did not include a mention of non-eligibility due to Ukraine's geographical location. The principles of democracy on the other hand, are not as easy to pinpoint. Each state is structured differently. It has its own institutional history and cannot be simply replaced by universally applicable criteria, especially if these were to go into same amount of explicit detail as STANAGs do. Such state would pay a heavy toll in the terms of sovereignty. The organization, to which the state aimed to get approximated to, would be seen as imposing the criteria rather than outlining them. A good example of this are the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership eligibility. To meet the criteria for the rule of law for example, the applicant state does not *en masse* replace its laws by ones drafted in the EU. It follows an approximation process, where the criteria are roughly outlined, and it is up to the applicant to approximate to them, to a degree which the organization sees fit. Within NATO this is embodied by the MAP. To underline the character of the criteria, a description from a NATO spokesman is useful here:

"[...] MAP is very rigorous. But I want to avoid, as I said, being mechanistic. There are a lot of things which countries need to do which are very hard to quantify. This is not a computer program. It is not a subjective process, but you cannot turn it into a mathematical formula. And we are fully realistic about the fact that some countries have to start further back than other countries because of the particular problems they have"

NATO spokesman Mark Laity in an interview for Radio Free Europe (Tomiuc, 2002).

Once party to the plan, the applicant submits a yearly progress report (annual national programme) and receives an annual feedback with advice structured in five chapters which are: Political and Economic issues, Defence/Military issues, Resource issues, Security issues, and Legal issues (NATO, 1999). It is only the first two chapters that are directly related to the activities of the Ukrainian civil society. The most relevant points of the first chapter state that it is expected of the applicant party to demonstrate commitment to the rule of law, enforce a democratic and civilian oversight of the defence sector, and commit to practices of building consensus on all issues (ibid.). Oversight over the most relevant parts of the second chapter is delegated to Planning and Review Process of the Partnership for Peace programme (ibid.). Since Ukraine already is a member in both of these institutions, membership in which precedes membership in the MAP, the goals set by them are not as high as the goals set by the MAP. Obscurely, despite currently only seeking MAP membership (Radio Free Europe, 2018), Ukraine does already submit annual national programmes categorized according to the five MAP chapters (President of Ukraine, 2018, No. 89). This makes it possible to see approximation priorities set for Ukraine according to the MAP criteria. Another noteworthy piece of information is that this year's document was developed together with the members of civil society (Interfax Ukraine, 2017b). The document is very thorough, proposing some 444 pieces of advice to 58 governmental institutions (Interfax Ukraine, 2018b). The approximation goals selected as the most connected to the civil society are:

- decentralization of government with widest involvement of civil society institutions,
- providing more transparency in budgeting by effectively employing electronic procurement system with participating CSOs,
- improvement of performance of Public Councils under state institutions,
- close cooperation in the area of strategic communications with CSOs in effort to counter the effects of hybrid warfare (President of Ukraine, 2018, No. 89).

It is recognized that the Annual National Programme 2018 outlines goals for the future, which have not been achieved yet. Out of those however, only long-term issues were selected to serve as representation of approximation, therefore it should be acceptable to use them as categories for evaluating the influence of the civil society on the approximation process of Ukraine to the NATO. Following chapter will discuss the methods used in this evaluation.

3.0 Methodology

As mentioned earlier in the text, this work was originally meant to focus solely on the institution of the activity of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. However, lack of available empirical data (in both Ukrainian and English language) produced by the PCuMoD as a result of a relative lack of activity of this body made such research impossible given the required scale of this thesis. It is not a coincidence that there has not been a single similar sized research devoted solely to this institution. In fact, publications about civil society's involvement in Ukraine's defence sector seldom mention it. Instead the authors frequently focused on CSOs active in the ATO zone, especially during the first two years of the fighting in Donbas when a quantitative surge in active CSOs occurred. Since this research is about policy development process, not humanitarian nor charitable achievements, data produced by such CSOs was omitted. This significantly narrowed down the scope of the research, because the majority of CSOs represented in the PCuMoD are humanitarian, charitable, religious, or alternatively a grouping of servicemen or veterans of various branches of the AFU. As these were hardly policy oriented CSOs, the option of analysis of activity of individual CSOs within the PCuMoD in addition to the analysis of the activity of the PCuMoD was avoided.

Given how unique the PCuMoD is as an institution, the idea of including it in the analysis was not avoided completely. It was necessary to widen the scope of the analysis and here NATO's strategic documents were approached. Instead of selecting active policy-oriented CSOs at random, the areas of NATO approximation process closest to the civil society's activity were first selected (strategic communication, decentralization, public procurement). Here, PCuMoD would serve as the most influential actor of civil society on decentralization, RPO as the most influential actor of civil society on reform implementation, and ProZorro as the most influential actor of civil society on public procurement. Prior to this decision, the civil society related to Ukrainian defence sector was thoroughly researched and there were institutions, mainly international or network-based think-tanks (Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Transparency

International Ukraine (TIU), Institute for Social and Economic Research, Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy Council, etc.), which have higher amount of activity recorded in terms of produced material than the institutional bodies selected for the analysis. However, their proximity to the government is lower than that of the selected institutions and hence the impact on policy making was assumed to be lower as well. In fact, all⁶ of the selected institutions are legally connected to the government, and in the case of the strategic communications category, the 2014 establishment of MoIP was so thought provoking that the decision to include it in the analysis under the category of strategic communications was made. Given how many CSOs active within this category, it would be difficult to choose a viable representation⁷. Even though MoIP is not a body of civil society, its function is traditionally preformed by an institution of civil society (independent media, public-sector media, state-owned media). Strategic communications with the involvement of civil society is a very resonant issue throughout NATO strategic documents' narrative on combating hybrid threats that include psychological warfare, so the option not to include it because in Ukraine this function is performed by a ministry was dismissed. The MoIP then was included to understand its mutual relationship with other CSOs like the RPO, which also participates in strategic communication on a minor scale. More precisely, the aim is to determine whether the relationship is just an institutional overlap, or possible attempt by the government to further its censorship measures by creating the MoIP.

As the aim of this research is to determine the nature of the relationship between civil society and the process of NATO approximation, this is a correlational study where the civil society is an independent variable and NATO approximation is a dependent variable. This research includes just one case study—involvement of civil society in Ukrainian defence sector since 2014. It is recognized that it would be useful to have a second case study, such as the involvement of civil society in

⁶ The RPO maintains a complicated relationship with the MoD and claims its independence, however it was established by a decree of the MoD, which leaves it in a grey area. Naturally, its status will be discussed later in the thesis.

⁷ Although this would probably be the Ukraine Crisis Media Center.

Ukrainian defence sector in an earlier time period, however, the lack of publicly available data from this period makes such case study impossible. To provide theoretical backing for the research and to aid in the sense-making process of this complex research puzzle, theory of securitization was applied in this research. It describes how the activity later analyzed in the four segments of the case study, originated from extraordinary measures that followed a securitization speech act. In order to help illustrate the flow of the argumentation, Scheme 1⁸ was drawn.

The analysis section will be structured into four separate sections according to the analyzed institutions in the order as follows: PCuMoD, ProZorro, RPO, and MoIP. Each of the sections will begin with an explanation of the institution's origin and proceed with the analysis of the activity of said institution in-between the years 2014 and 2018. As none of these institutions is covered extensively (with a slight exception of ProZorro) in secondary literature, the analysis will use primary sources almost exclusively. Where the primary sources were available in Ukrainian only, translations were made by the researcher, with their accuracy later confirmed by a native speaker of Ukrainian language. The translations of Ukrainian sources produced over 100 pages of text. All electronic primary data used was open-source, found on the websites of the discussed institutions.

An attempt was made to include data gathered from qualitative interviews with experts from the selected institutions. Face-to-face interviews were meant to provide an extra in-depth perspective that would come from within these institutions. A total of 32 figures closely associated with the institutions that are the object of this analysis, were contacted. Out of these 32 people, most were Ukrainians residing in Kyiv, and prior to contacting them, their online presence was examined (in some cases their colleagues were consulted) to determine their level of English language competency. Only those (32) who were known to speak English were contacted. Just 12 people replied to the carefully structured interview

⁸ Please note that the absence of a legend from the scheme is intentional. The central line of argumentation is signified with thick black outlines. Given the variety of the nature of connections to related issues and events in the scheme, labeling would result in too many categories which would ultimately badly damage the readability of the whole scheme.

invitations, out of whom seven were interested in conducting the interview. This was still seen as a success for the research, since the sample was perceived as big enough (the respective backgrounds of the potential interviewees varied) to capture multiple perspectives within the sector on the discussed *problematique*. Semi-structured format which relied on follow-up questions was selected and the School's Ethics Committee has approved of the research. A short trip to Kyiv was promptly organized, but it ended up in a major failure as only three experts actually showed up for arranged interviews. The interviews were still carried out, and overall, two hours and thirty-one minutes of audio recording was captured as both of the interviewees have agreed to this practice. One source declined to publishing her/ his name in the thesis, while the other one was Mr. Iurii Myronenko, the Director of the Institute for Social and Economic Research—a strategic think tank based in Kiev focused on policy analysis with regards to EU and NATO integration. Because only these two interviews were made, findings from them will not be presented in a separate section within the chapter on analysis, nor as subsections to sections on the four discussed institutions. Instead these will be added to text where necessary, to either support, contradict or provide a different perspective on the findings from the collected primary data.

The empirical data collected included: minutes of meetings, procedural protocols, internal structural documents, notes, reports, annual proceedings, infographics, websites, popularizational and promotional material, white papers, laws, decrees, and orders. The analysis of this data aims to reveal whether or not are these institutions of civil society actually acting according to their purpose, which aligned with the approximation criteria set by NATO in the MAP as explained earlier. Additionally, trends and other actions within and in-between these institutions are expected to be discovered, which either aid or harm the approximation process. Put together with the evaluation of how these institutions perform, it should create supporting evidence for the hypothesis, or evidence that negates it.

4. Analysis

4.1 Public Council under the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (PCuMoD)

In 2003, the history of democratic oversight of the defence sector of Ukraine began with a law that made it possible for the members of public and CSOs to be granted access to MoD and AFU documents and discussions that are not subject to any security clearance level (Parliament of Ukraine, 2003, No. 975-IV). Furthermore, under this law, MoD and AFU were given a responsibility to periodically report developments in the defence sector to media in order to inform the public (ibid.). Only a year later, still under the Kuchma presidency, the institutions of Public Councils under state bodies were established (President of Ukraine, 2004, No. 854). Under this decree, the PCuMoD shared the basic freedom of access to information that individual CSOs and members of public already had, but it also gained the similar responsibility of the MoD and AFU, to provide information to the media and members of the public upon request (ibid.). Having only observatory powers at that time made them largely unimportant, and the then-undeveloped CSOs suffered an additional blow, when capable staff left them to join the government following the Orange Revolution and eventual victory of the pro-reform Yushchenko in the presidential race (UNDP, 2012, p. 3). The PCuMoD did not make it to strategic documents until 2012, when it was for the first time mentioned in the *White Book 2011: Armed Forces of Ukraine*. Here the structure of the PCuMoD is mentioned for the first time, enacted by the ministerial order *On Provision of Public Participation in Organising and Implementing the State Policy within the Military Sphere* (Ministry of Defence, 2011, No. 262). This order structures PCuMoD as follows:

- Head of the Public Council,
- The First Deputy Head,
- Deputy Heads,
- Secretariat,
- Administration,
- Committee on reformation and development of the Armed Forces organisation of military-patriotic education and patronage, and humanitarian policy formation;

- Committee on arms and armament, conversion and assistance in the military-technical cooperation;
- Committee on social defence, resettlement and professional retraining of service personnel, retired service personnel and their families and civil servants of the AFU;
- Committee on service personal's housing, implementation of surplus property and land and military camps' conversion;
- Committee on international, civil-military, military-technical cooperation, peacekeeping activity and technological security;
- Committee on cooperation with Civil Society Institutes, religious organisations, COMs⁹ of Ukraine, Parliament of Ukraine, bodies of executive power, bodies of local self-government and mass media;
- Committee on legal guarantees and corruption resistance;
- Committee on social protection of conscripted and contracted service personnel;
- Committee on developing military education science and healthcare;
- Committee on financial and economic activity (ibid.).

The second important piece of information extracted from this publication is the announcement of the beginning of cooperation between the PCuMoD and the Open Government Partnership (OGP) (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2012, pp. 45, 46). This international initiative sets out goals for the participating states to achieve better transparency and public empowerment in their governments (Open Government Partnership, 2018). Year 2012 did not see its own White Book, and in the 2013 one, PCuMoD was rebranded into Public Board of the Ministry of Defence, which at that time included 75 representatives, out of whom some were pointed out to be Cossacks, an ethnic minority native to South-Eastern Ukraine, which is traditionally more pro-Russia oriented as noted earlier in this text (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2014, pp. 44, 45). The connection between this development and the pro-Russian Yanukovych government is tentative at best, however this mention of PCuMoD also states that its members were elected, implying that there was high enough interest in the institution for

⁹ Unfortunately, the definition of this acronym was not included in the source. However, it was preserved in the text to maintain the accuracy, and it is believed to signify the AFU commands.

the membership be to in need of getting narrowed down by elections to what is still a quite high number of members (ibid.). The Public Board, as it was known in that year only, only held five meetings that year, mostly devoted to housing of servicemen and issues regarding the methodology of counting the length of military service (ibid.). Unfortunately, the election procedure is not described in the scarce documents from this time period and only appears in 2015. Before that, the changes that came with the Euromaidan Revolution need to be addressed. In 2014, the institution got back to its old name—PCuMoD, and retained the seventyfive-strong membership (PCuMoD, 2014a). The archives show that the number of three hour long meetings of the PCuMoD has increased to nine per year (ibid.), and *White Book 2014: Armed Forces of Ukraine* significantly altered the mission of the PCuMoD which now included: “[...] *formulating and monitoring the state policy in the field of European integration [...]*” (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2015, p. 47). It grouped 66 CSOs (ibid.), and the number increased further to 105 in 2015 (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2016, p. 57). In 2014, PCuMoD gained the competency to control the use of donations received by the MoD and AFU, which in 2014 totaled some 426 million hryvnias (UAH), roughly equal to EUR 25.5 million¹⁰ out of which some UAH 7 million (EUR 420,000) were raised by the PCuMoD (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2015, pp. 47-49). The council upheld its interest in housing of the servicemen, suggesting some 15000 additional apartments to be built in the period 2015-2017, since only 588 apartments were yearly allocated to servicemen, which did not meet the needs (PCuMoD, 2014b). The council formally asked the President to provide additional funds (UAH 360 million, roughly EUR 15.6 million) to the MoD for the project (ibid.). The data from White Books shows that the yearly number of housing facilities provided for the service members increased, however by far not as dramatically as suggested by the PCuMoD, but in a pace greater than the curve

¹⁰ The exchange rate was not stable given the situation, to a rough average EUR 1 = UAH 0.06 for the year 2014 was used.

established by the numbers from past years (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2016, p. 65; 2017, p.75). Another one of the changes proposed by the PCuMoD in 2014 were significant raises for servicemen of the AFU as well as increased military spending, which should amount for 3% of the GDP to be spent on the AFU alone (PCuMoD, 2014c; 2014d). To illustrate the development of salaries of Ukrainian servicemen, Chart 1¹¹ was produced.

The salaries did not increase immediately after the suggestion came from the PCuMoD, but the substantial raise did come later, in 2016. The activity within the council in this matter was argued mainly by the representatives of CSOs which grouped veterans of AFU, and it was confirmed by the two of the interviewees that PCuMoD played a major role in the increase of the salaries, *de facto* lobbying for this development in and out of the PCuMoD (Anonymous Source, 2018; Myronenko, 2018). The funds allocated to AFU did not reach 3% of Ukraine's GDP until the budget on year 2018 was approved (Ponomarenko, 2017). While this does not prove causality between the PCuMoD's recommendation and the final defence budget planning decision, the fact that it came three years later proves that PCuMoD was not just simply suggesting something everyone in the sector new about, and the fact that increase came by a sharp 28 percent spike in the defence spending refutes the possibility that the budget just arrived at the 3 percent mark continuously because of the ongoing War in Donbas. The year 2015 was more insightful; for the first time the minutes of meeting were published online from the first session of the year which has the purpose of establishing the council (PCuMoD, 2015a). Importantly, it shed some light on the process of so-called election, as it was labeled in the *White Book 2013: Armed Forces of Ukraine*. The CSOs that showed up at the establishing meeting, were simply allowed to have one representative in the PCuMoD if they were legally established as CSOs under the laws of Ukraine, hence the council now had an

¹¹ This chart uses information gathered from the *White Books 2011-2016: Armed Forces of Ukraine* (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2012, p. 48; 2014, p. 36; 2015, p. 52; 2016, pp. 62, 63; 2017, p. 74)

impressive 105 members (ibid.). However, without primary data from earlier years, it is impossible to tell for sure whether this was the practice before as well. With such big and diverse membership, it was able to produce very detailed and concrete recommendations for improvements to be done in the AFU, e.g. an appeal to modernize sights on small arms (PCuMoD, 2015b). In the light of the Euromaidan Revolution and War in Donbas, the Public Council was restructured again in 2015, to make the use of its new composition in new priorities which are visible from the arrangement of its internal structure:

- Head of the Council,
- Secretariat,
- Board,
- Commission on Ethics and Parliament Issues,
- Committee No.1 on increasing the defense potential of the country, defense capacity of the Armed Forces and ATO conduction;
- Committee No.2 on legal support, the corruption countermeasures and lustration of authorities;
- Committee No.3 on finance and economic activities, armament, equipment and maintenance;
- Committee No.4 on science, education and personnel policy;
- Committee No.5 on social protection of servicemen and veterans of the AFU;
- Committee No.6 on housing of acting, reserve and retired servicemen;
- Committee No.7 on medical support of the servicemen, ATO participants, veterans of the AFU and their families and civil personnel of AFU;
- Committee No.8 on military and patriotic education, patronage and military and historical work and cooperation with international organizations;
- Committee No.9 on volunteer activities and support and peacekeeping activities;
- Committee No.10 on morale, soul, culture and on increasing the role in civil society of acting and retired servicemen (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2016, p. 57).

The name of the institution was also altered into: The Public Council under the leadership of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, although in the Council's documentation the name remained unchanged (ibid.). Even though previously not numbered, the structure did retain the same shape in the figure portraying it in the White Books. Most visible differences are: introduction of the ATO to the

structure, cooperation with international organizations in Committee No.8, increased status of corruption, which made it to Committee No.2 from what would be Committee No. 7; and last but not least Committee No.10, aim of which could be described as societal resilience (ibid.). Additionally, each of the committees now had its own subcommittees, group of experts, working groups, and secretariat (ibid.).

A useful indicator for interest of the public in state affairs is the number of inquiries handled by the public councils, unfortunately not published for each sector separately, but still making it to the PCuMoD archive¹². Between 2011 and 2014, the yearly average stood at 2195¹³, the period from 2015 to 2017 averaged at 3752 (Government of Ukraine, 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018). The commitment to increasing social resilience can be seen in some of the resolutions on this topic approved unanimously like the recommendation to counter the Russian psychological and information warfare by running certain explicitly mentioned videos, popular on YouTube and Social Media, on state-run TV networks and mentioning them on radio stations, making sure they are brought to public attention for their powerful patriotic content (PCuMoD, 2016). Furthermore, there is also a recommendation for the state to cooperate with certain media production companies which are producing such content (ibid.). These are examples of practical, actionable pieces of advice produced by PCuMoD, however the later proposition hints at another side to the activity of the Council. Professionals involved in the defence sector often identify these suggestions of certain companies as lobbying for them, in order to get to public funds (Anonymous Source, 2018; Myronenko, 2018). It is often the AFU officials that are more skeptical of members of PCuMoD who come up with such propositions, even though the companies suggested are not tied to any oligarchs, but are mostly new

¹² However, as only some of these statistics were in the PCuMoD archive, it was decided to use a different source, the central website of the government, which included more complete data.

¹³ This number was adjusted (8010 requests in the period would mean an average 2002 yearly requests) to fit the fact that in 2011 the data collection started on the 9th of May, hence the amount of years used in the calculation was 3.65. This was done in order to eliminate the possibility of misuse of the detail for the purpose of getting more dramatic results.

start-ups (Anonymous Source, 2018). Additionally, that sole available record of minutes of meeting from 2016 shows that the PCuMoD had 107 members at that time (PCuMoD, 2016).

The records from 2017 show increased interest of the PCuMoD in investigating corruption (PCuMoD, 2017a; 2017b). During a joint session with representatives of the MoD and general staff of the AFU, PCuMoD made a plea for decision making powers related to investigation of corruption, which was largely ignored (PCuMoD, 2017b). These documents show that the structure of this institution was yet again changed, however, for the first time it was a reduction of its members to just 35 (ibid.). As the *White Book* for the year 2017 remains unpublished, complete description of this change is yet unknown. The nature of the available documentation from 2017 suggests that this brought professionalism into the PCuMoD, as most of the documents are now organized in PDF files following a matching labeling method and structure of the document; this was not always the case. Before, these varied from just texts published at the website, PDF scans, or PDF files where the structure and labeling changed from report to report. Equally importantly, the PCuMoD now has defined statutes, which limit the membership to maximum of 35 members, who are in the position for two years (PCuMoD, 2017c). This means that at the constitutive assembly of the council, once every two years, there are actual elections, where the CSOs that are legal under the laws of Ukraine can nominate one representative per organization (ibid.). Unfortunately, it is who gets to vote in this election, it is just assumed each of the participating CSOs has one vote (ibid.). Overall, this document shows that the PCuMoD realizes the need to connect representation of civil society with efficiency and professionalism to fully utilize one of its main positive traits—motivation.

A good example of this motivation is restoration of ties with the Open Government Partnership which was expressed in a document that was translated

but is no longer available on the online archives of the PCuMoD¹⁴. The previous attempt at cooperation with OGP in public involvement in governance, was a major failure resulting from the unprofessionalism of the project. The project took form of an online platform within a website¹⁵ where citizens were supposed express themselves with regards to the governments actions in different spheres, and state institutions should interact with them. Launched in 2012, this platform employed a relatively modern concept of gamification, however the style with which this was done was really unattractive, reminiscent of forum websites from late 1990s or early 2000s. As a part of the research, this platform was tested by the researcher, and was also found not practical, setting very strict limits for its users from the very beginning¹⁶. This unpopularity of the website can be expressed by the fact that in the end of 2017, the defence topics had only 12 comments by just two accounts, and the Facebook page¹⁷ of the platform has just 119 followers. Despite this failure, the second take at this project appears to be currently under way, as the website is now under reconstruction.

Theoretically, one of the main assets of the PCuMoD is the possibility of using this institution to professionalize civil society, with regards to the procedures of the MoD. Active civil society cannot come up with actionable recommendations, when it is not familiarized with the way MoD operates. It appears that the PCuMoD has only started working on this aspect in a serious manner since 2017, and even that is still far from professional. Its lack of proper book keeping makes it very hard for anyone, not personally involved in the defence sector, to understand how the Council operates. Perhaps paradoxically, much like the government, the PCuMoD alienates itself from the public by its own

¹⁴ This document called for proposals on behalf on the PCuMoD which could be included in the "Open Government Partnership" initiative in 2018-2020. Deadline for the proposals was the January 31st, 2018. This information could be verified via the mentioned contact for such proposals: The Civil Society Development and Public Relations Department of the Department of Information and Communications of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers, e-mail: pakhno@kmu.gov.ua (Anna Anna Pakhno, tel .: (044) 256-63-38).

¹⁵ <http://civic.kmu.gov.ua/>

¹⁶ A user first had to rate a set amount of content of the platform and fill out enough information about himself, to have the comment feature unlocked. Posting a question required a set amount of comments first. This was a very forceful attempt at gamification.

¹⁷ https://www.facebook.com/pg/civik.kmu.gov.ua/about/?ref=page_internal

nontransparent behaviour. Any recordable amount of decentralization which should be observed according to the methodology selected to support the hypothesis was not present in the 2014-2018 period. The fact that the MoD allocated only a very limited number of competencies to PCuMoD should not cause a loss of interest in keeping records of activity, especially in a collective that among others includes: a prominent investigative journalist, an ex-general of the AFU, an ex-officer of the AFU, an ex-intelligence service employee, a representative from the national academy of sciences, and a representative of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (PCuMoD, 2017d).

4.2 ProZorro

Both, the 2008 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution happened in part as a reaction to an ongoing wide-spread corruption in the government. Out of the many anti-corruption initiatives which began in 2014 on the Independence Square in Kiev, very few had as much impact on the way the Ukrainian government worked as ProZorro did. It is important to recognize that ProZorro started as a volunteer organization aided by international organizations like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the TIU (McDonough, 2017, p. 10). Only later, in 2016, ProZorro eventually replaced the old state-owned enterprise *Zovnishtorgvydav* which oversaw the public procurement (Kyiv School of Economics, 2016, p. 18). It is not just ProZorro's civil society related origin that makes it unique and special; its interoperability anchored in the possibility of pooling the existing marketplaces for public procurement under a single transparent portal, while enabling other marketplaces to be set-up by other state institutions where needed via using ProZorro's open source software, made the project very successful, with uniquely low costs (ibid.). A thorough research was already done on the subject of the cost of setting up and running ProZorro until fully functional and applied beyond its original scope in June 2017; it showed that the overall sum roughly equaled to EUR 4.69 million and was kept that low partly because of the involvement of the civil society (Vissapragada, 2017, p. 19). This procurement system also won several

international awards proving its excellence beyond the scope of Ukraine (ProZorro, 2018).

ProZorro does have a strong tie to the defence sector. During the time when its conception was discussed by its founders, Ukraine was under a military attack, and much of the unpreparedness of the AFU was blamed on the corruption within the defence sector. There were several problems within the sector, beginning with outdated technology and equipment. A transition to a different procurement system would hardly change those fast enough, as the procurement of these items usually involves a lengthy process of selection, testing, long delivery, and gradual implementation. However, the logistics and the procurement of basic products for everyday functioning of the army were outdated, and prone to corruption, as minimum oversight could be implemented given the size of AFU and the fact that the system was still paper-based (Reforms Project Office, 2015). This is why even before ProZorro was implemented on a large scale, a pilot project to test its performance was developed. While there were several pilot projects developed, the first and initially most productive was in cooperation with the MoD (Kyiv School of Economics, 2016, p. 23). This project also gets a brief mention in the *White Book 2015: Armed Forces of Ukraine* stating that it was only applied to procurement of clothes, food, medicine, fuels, and lubricants, claiming to have saved an impressive amount of UAH 260 million (EUR 10.4 million¹⁸) (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2016, p. 31). In the same publication from the following year, ProZorro got much more attention, being mentioned several times throughout the document and besides its positive impact on the ministry's budget, its role in faster logistics and adaption of European principles of procurement was recognized (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2017, p. 4). A recognition important for the purposes of this research came from the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, which in its review of implementation of changes related to Ukraine's approximation to NATO brought up and praised ProZorro (2017).

¹⁸ Conversion rate used is UAH 1.00 = EUR 0.04.

From the mentioned sources it may appear that there is little to no room left for any possible criticism. An excellent Master thesis by Anja Schøll and Doriyush Ubaydi from Norwegian School of Economics analyzes data generated by ProZorro from February 2015 through October 2017 and ends with a conclusion that ProZorro does reduce prices in public procurement and especially so in cases of procurement of simple goods (Schøll & Ubaydi, 2017, p. 61). It is unfortunate that their research does not categorize the data according to governmental sectors, which would be very useful here. For example, their data show a sudden drop in savings (expressed in percent, compared to estimated market value) in May 2016, and this is attributed to inflation as the data shows (ibid. p. 48, 50). Another interesting development from May 2016 was the introduction of the law *On the Specifics of the Procurement of Goods, Works and Services for Guaranteed Defense Requirements* (Parliament of Ukraine, 2016, No. 1356-VIII). This law effectively establishes what can be labeled a state of emergency public procurement rules for the defence sector. It significantly cuts down the bidding period for the tenders from 60 days to just two weeks, and it establishes mechanisms of disqualification from entry to the competition (ibid.). While there is also, a provision, which would be seen as useful for the purposes of Euro-Atlantic integration—a requirement to include the announcement in English if the value of the contract exceeds EUR 35,000 in case of goods and services, and EUR 1.5 million for works, this should be broadened significantly, because currently ProZorro will only show ‘winner’ next to a company that won the contract, name of the contract in English, and listed items or services in English, which is hardly enough to navigate the precise terms of the contract (ibid.). The shorter time period makes it much harder for new companies to join this market, which was one of the major aims of ProZorro. At the same time, new provisions for disqualifications make groundless disqualification more likely, and there are reports of some 125 cases of this practice happening in just one year (Transparency International, 2017). One of the interviewees noted, that it is still a frequent practice in the defence procurement that the tenders shut down prematurely, after a preferred candidate has placed a bid, or that initial bid is

much lower than the final price which includes various extra charges, making even the lowest bid much more expensive than the other offers (Myronenko, 2018). Both, the small number of bids per contract and renegotiations of contracts resulting in higher off the records price are among the findings of the mentioned thesis (Schøll & Ubaydi, 2017, pp. 58, 60). The recorded number of bids per contract is between 1.92 and 2.48 depending on the type of procurement (ibid., p. 58) which is comparable to the lowest performing state of the EU—Slovakia, where the average value in 2016 stood at 2.35 (European Commission, 2017, p. 2; TASR, 2017).

Judging from a purely economic perspective, ProZorro's positive effect on the overall and defence sector economy is a major accomplishment of cooperation between state and civil society with regards to the MAP criteria. However, positive economic developments in public procurement did not bring about the wanted effect in the field of societal resilience, where the statistics of corruption perception index show an opposite trend—as illustrated on the Chart 2¹⁹.

Disillusionment with the reform process is a frequent description of Ukrainian society four years after Euromaidan. However, it should be brought up that this does not have the same impact throughout Ukrainian society. A line should be drawn between the Ukrainian society in general (all citizens) and active (also called mobilized or professional) civil society which participates in various NGOs, CSOs, Public Councils. While the former shows signs of fatigue in the opinion polls, continuous activity of the latter shows that the motivation there to seek reforms did not just fade away. Part of the problem of the Orange Revolution was that the professional civil society did not stay mobilized and active in the same fashion as after Euromaidan. Both parts of civil society need to be active to perform optimally in their mission, but they need to be active in their own respective ways. The official slogan of ProZorro, which says: *Everyone can see everything* helps to illustrate this. This feature does make ProZorro a major step in

¹⁹ This chart uses information gathered from *Transparency International Ukraine's Corruption Perception Index 2010-2017*

liberalization of the market, but a random citizen of Ukraine (or of any other country for that matter) will not be able to find a trace of corruption just because the contracts are there to look at. The vast amount of complex data produced by Ukrainian public procurement is impossible to effectively search through via a simple search window and with limited knowledge of the technicalities of the procurement process. To effectively battle corruption, ProZorro only²⁰ really needs to be used by the skilled, professional civil society which knows how to use analytical tools to effectively navigate the databases. These professionals among the civil society then need to be backed up and actively, publicly supported by the much broader group of ordinary citizens who have a much bigger impact in voicing their opinions than a few journalists, or activists who detected a case of corruption. The leadership of ProZorro realized this challenge and tries tackling it with creation of another portal parallel to ProZorro, DoZorro²¹ where activists, ProZorro staff, and the public can cooperate and communicate with regards to the oversight of the public procurement. During the first year of its function, DoZorro has helped to flag around 3000 violations of the procurement procedure, which is certainly an applaudable figure (Transparency International, 2017). The fact that this resulted in only 109 criminal investigations and just 3 court decisions is worrisome, but also very much out of the scope of activity of professional civil society (ibid.).

4.3 Reforms Project Office (RPO)

Much like the PCuMoD, the RPO is a recommendatory body to the MoD. It does not have such a long history of advising the MoD, as it was only established in 2015 (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, No. 426). According to its website, it currently has 40 members from various CSOs, so in terms of size, it is also very comparable to the PCuMoD. A major difference is that the RPO is contracted; its members receive salaries, whereas a membership in the PCuMoD is purely voluntary, so PCuMoD members do not receive any salaries from their position in

²⁰ This is of course not to say its openness to everyone should be cancelled.

²¹ While prozorro can be roughly translated to English as 'transparency', dozorro means 'oversight'.

the Council. When it comes to competencies, it is the PCuMoD that is charged with the outreach to the public, but the cumulative statistics on all ministerial public councils mentioned before, do not reveal how much of a burden this is for the PCuMoD, and the more traditional ways of communicating with the public remain largely uncontested²². Paradoxically, for the PCuMoD social media presence remains an untapped resource, while the RPO has managed to foster some 2,000 Twitter followers and 750 followers on Facebook since 2015. When facing the Russian hybrid threat, social media presence should be one of the priorities of any institution that aims to establish a closer connection of civil society to the military in the 21st century. Much, if not most of the information warfare's battle for resilience, happens precisely there. The RPO maintains a well-structured website²³ with a user-friendly design, where the content includes a very decent news section publishing around half a dozen MoD reform related articles per month since 2016. Regarding informational purpose of the website to the general public, it is very important that it explains the concept of civil oversight over the defence sector in understandable terms together with examples from other states, but it also provides access to strategic documents like: National Security Strategy of Ukraine, Military Doctrine of Ukraine, and Strategic Defence Bulletin. Most of the content is also available in English, although the translation is very poor²⁴ in some of the earliest material. Despite the appropriate content and attractive presentation, there are still signs, confirmed by a basic traffic statistics analysis freely available on the internet (Alexa, 2018), that the website is not professionally maintained—some webpages²⁵ still include the '*Lorem Ipsum*' placeholder²⁶ used by graphic designers, as well as unfinished content. For future reference in the text, it is important to note that the website as well as infographics

²² See page 39; the main hyperlink to the webpage of PCuMoD is located just one line above a hyperlink to a document concerning the *Society of Military Hunters and Fishermen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine*, which should underline the webpage's undisturbed presence on the official website of the MoD.

²³ <https://defense-reforms.in.ua/en>

²⁴ Most likely done via a Google Translate.

²⁵ http://civilian.defence-reforms.in.ua/en/what_aims

²⁶ This is a short excerpt in Latin by Cicero used to test out the selected font, prior to its usage on a website. It should naturally be deleted upon completion of the project.

published on it were produced by a company called StratComUA. On the site there are also published press releases concerning the activity of the RPO and these were the main source of data for the analysis of RPO's impact on the reform process as a decentralizing body of civil society; these together with infographics were available in Ukrainian only and were translated.

The main competency of the RPO is really to *de facto* serve as the MoD's official start-up lab. The *White Book 2016: Armed Forces of Ukraine* does mention RPO especially bringing up its cooperation with NATO personnel on multiple issues, and it admits that more precise information about the activities of RPO is available on RPO's website (Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2017, p. 69). Nothing about the structure of the RPO is mentioned, and the space given to this institutional body is about the same as space devoted to description of PCuMoD's yearly change of structure and activity. This is unfortunate, as both of the interviewees recognized the RPO as a very useful actor within Ukraine's defence sector (Anonymous Source, 2018; Myronenko, 2018). The main role of the RPO is to oversee the very initial parts of a pilot project (oversight of which is delegated to it from the MoD) which is meant to be adapted by either the AFU or the MoD later, if proven in this testing phase (Zagorodnuk, 2016). The head of the RPO also explains that the money for the salaries of the employees of the RPO comes partly from the Big Four²⁷, as does the money for the pilot projects, until the point when they are not fully adapted by the MoD and the AFU (*ibid.*). As it is basically only the funding and the choice of professionals (in contrast to relying on elections among CSOs) that sets the RPO apart from the PCuMoD, it can be confidently stated, that without the Big Four, RPO would more closely resemble the PCuMoD. It should be pointed out that the website does not directly disclose the the Big Four involvement on the funding of the RPO, which is usually the good practice in cases like this. Furthermore, the head of the RPO expresses his hopes that the government should be the actor that funds the RPO, not foreign banking groups

²⁷ This term refers to four major accounting firms: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, Ernst & Young, Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG), and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)

(ibid.). It comes as a very natural step, given the effectivity of RPO which has been functioning like this for the third year now.

A British defence expert Glen Grant, an ex-affiliate of the RPO where he participated on the reform of servicemen housing, has recently publicly commented on the JFO creation, more precisely on how the General Staff of the AFU should not be allowed to interfere in the decision-making process of the JFO command (2018). Just a few days later, the RPO issues a borderline absurd official statement where it downplays the role of Mr. Grant by repeatedly stating that he was not an official advisor from the British Armed Forces, nor the MoD, nor the AFU, without saying that none of the RPO staff are civil servants and the RPO should technically still be an NGO as described by its head (Reforms Project Office, 2018; Zagorodnuk, 2016). This was not the first time former British Armed Forces Colonel Glen Grant came out against the General Staff of the AFU; in 2016 he simply claimed that there are people within the 250 strong General Staff, that have no interest in winning the War in Donbas (Grant, 2016). This opinion was shared with the anonymous interviewee in this research, who claimed that the General Staff is in position of power and fully realizes that true comprehensive reforms would mean vast cuts in the numbers of the General Staff of the AFU (Anonymous Source, 2018). Simply put, the reforms in which the General Staff is interested are managed and funded by the MoD, while other reforms that should still be in the MoD interest's own interest are outsourced to the RPO, where its members are forced to raise funds from international sources (ibid.). This is certainly not how decentralization of the government should look like, but for three years this has been the norm in Ukraine.

One of the very first pilot projects started by the RPO was a reform of food that was procured for the soldiers. The standards on rations that were still in use in 2015, were developed under the USSR in 1960s and only included 32 items that were rotated to develop the menu, resulting in very poor nutritional value (RPO, n/a [a]). The pilot project introduced by the RPO was based on practices in foreign armed forces and included 248 items out of which the menu was

comprised (ibid.). It was also developed in a way that the ordering could be done via ProZorro, and the nutritional value of a meal was balanced according to modern practices (ibid.). This project was introduced only for two military units in Lviv and Odesa, where the approval of the new meals was at 98% among the servicemen, compared to 27% approval of the older menu (RPO, 2015a). Integration of ProZorro into this reform, made it possible for Metro Cash & Carry Ltd. to win a tender for the food procurement a year later (RPO, 2016a). Last year, there were just 23 military units taking part in the project, which is still under control of the RPO, and the main cause for the slow spread of this reform is identified by an RPO affiliate Diana Petrenia as government's reluctance and complicated bureaucracy (Petrenia, 2017).

Another field where the RPO is active to a bigger degree than the MoD and the AFU is the reform of provision of medical care of servicemen in the field of battle. A simple step was taken by drafting new protocols on medical evacuation from battlefield, as the old standards were based on on-the-ground situation control, same channels of communication, and no central coordination (RPO, n/a [b]). The optimisation of the process involved adapting to NATO Standards in the medical evacuation procedures, such as separate protected channel of communication and automated medical emergency dispatching center (ibid.). A more concrete step in this field was setting up a training facility for combat medics according to the US Army specification 68 W, the first of its kind in Ukraine (RPO, n/a [c]). The training was to be done by 10 NATO-affiliated instructors and should have lasted 16 weeks, after which the new combat medics were to be deployed to the ATO, and subsequently sent on rotations back to the training facility, where they would teach new medics and apply their fresh experience from the field (ibid.). This did not materialize on the same scale as the RPO hoped for, however the project is proceeding according to the plan and the best graduates of the course are now instructors at what is now an established training facility for combat medics complete with modern equipment (Reforms Project Office under the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2018). There were other noteworthy projects; the RPO participated on the implementation of ProZorro in

the defence sector where it cooperated with experts from the NATO Support and Procurement Agency. However, the area of procurement was largely covered by the section on ProZorro, so the food reform project and the reform of medical care provision were selected because of their uniqueness to the RPO, availability of data, overlap with the MAP criteria, and because of a recent realignment of strategic priorities for the RPO, where these two projects are among those that were kept under the leadership of the RPO, while the guidance of others was transferred to the MoD departments.

4.4 Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine (MoIP)

On a first glance it may seem ridiculous to mention a ministry alongside CSOs and institutional bodies composed out of them, but MoIP's significant impact on the sphere of strategic communication and information has grown during the four years of MoIP's existence into a *de facto* oversight, which means mentioning another CSO instead of it, would provide a less accurate portrayal of the situation within this field. At the same time, this ministry has a very limited internal structure and staff, employing only 29 people in 2015 (together with administrative employees); a conducted interview narrowed down this figure to just 12 people who are working full time on the projects run by the MoIP (Myronenko, 2018). There have not been reports on staff increases since, and the structure of the ministry suggests that there were not any. What then sets the ministry apart from the CSOs active in this sector (or any other sector in Ukraine) is its yearly budget, which for the year 2018 has been set to some UAH 862 million (EUR 28.45 million)²⁸ (CASE Ukraine, 2018). The internal structure may pose as non-threatening, MoIP's small size casts an image that the MoIP is hardly going to become a massive propaganda machine, but it is its budget and a relatively small range of topics it has to cover (pro-EuroAtlantic reforms within all of the government and the War in Donbass, in comparison to a full-scale propaganda effort that would strive to cover and spin any type of news) that allows it to dominate the efforts of civil society to be in the charge of this sector. Of course, it is hard to imagine it possible for the MoIP to produce enough

²⁸ Conversion rate used is EUR 1 = UAH 0.033.

material or somehow spend EUR 28.45 million while producing it with the limited number of staff of the MoIP. Hence some of the workload has to be outsourced and interestingly enough, one of just four examples of this type of project published on MoIP's website has been created by StratComUA (Ministry of Information Policy Ukraine, 2016).

There are then two separate problems with the MoIP. First, there appears to be have a very limited effort in countering the propaganda campaign of Russian Federation, which was defined as the objective of this ministry by the President Poroshenko (Interfax Ukraine, 2014). The MoIP's social media presence, which as articulated before is where this information war takes place, is negligible for a task that important; it comprises of just 60 followers on Instagram, 5600 on Twitter, 1300 on YouTube, and 5500 on Facebook. Both of the interviewees stressed that the MoIP frequently has trouble providing a reasonable explanation on how its considerable budget is spent (Anonymous Source, 2018; Myronenko 2018). Information about the tenders by the MoIP published on ProZorro shows that most of the large purchases focused on traditional (print/ TV/radio means) means of what the MoIP calls social advertising. The seventy examples of these campaigns available on MoIP's website show that is clearly is just pro-government propaganda (Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, 2018). A proposed explanation of this phenomenon is that the size of MoIP does not allow it to produce more complex campaigns and at the same time, the MoIP is not very interested in contracting third parties with content creating service. Using older delivery methods allows it to remain in full control over the content. The result is that the MoIP fights Russian propaganda in an older information space (comprised of discussions, seminars, billboards, and booklets) where for the most part there is none.

This creates a second problem, which is an inevitable opposition to propaganda. Negative sentiments towards the creation of the MoIP have been voiced by Ukrainian and foreign journalists, but more importantly, also by the then US

ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt who stated this was one of the biggest mistakes Ukraine could have made (Radio Free Europe, 2014; Reporters Without Borders, 2014; Interfax Ukraine, 2016).

Even despite having a recent record of cooperation with the British diplomatic mission in Ukraine (Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, 2018), the MoIP as an extreme measure resulting from securitization speech act is recognized as negative in the overall impact on the NATO approximation. The achievements of the MoIP in the information warfare came at a high price of damaged status of the Ukrainian fragile democracy; democracy which is crucial for NATO membership as the preamble of its founding treaty states. This could have been partly avoided by decentralization of the ministry's activity and delegation of authority over more campaigns and funds to CSOs. Furthermore, the limited effectivity of the campaign could have been improved by the involvement of CSOs, as these would be likely to conduct campaigning on the internet, where the MoIP is scarcely active. Additionally, from a long-term perspective, this creates space for instability, because there are no assurances that the next governments will use the structure and practices set up under the MoIP with the same limited scope focusing on countering Russia's propaganda.

5.0 Discussion of the Results

Early on into the research, when primary literature like the *White Books* of the AFU was being confronted, the PCuMoD seemed like a useful governmental body. It was not really something comparable to any other structural body within the defence sectors of NATO member states. Ministries of defence in Europe frequently cooperate with think tanks and NGOs or create expert groups where such representatives of CSOs are included even for longer time periods, but the cooperation does not take place the way it is being done in Ukraine. When the research moved towards the phase of translating documentation produced by the PCuMoD, a resemblance to one specific type of organizational body was becoming more and more clear. As PCuMoD was established together with public council under all ministries in single decision in 2004; it was not meant to participate on any reform process. From its complex structure signified with no shortage of committees, and its creation by an industrial director turned communist party apparatchik turned then President of Ukraine, the Public Councils (which were co-created together with local councils which should play the same role only under local governmental representation) appear to be somewhat close to the model of old soviet-era trade unions. On a much larger scale, these we also created to make it look like the people had power and control over the government, when in reality the government ruled unbothered. After Euromaidan revolution, not much has changed and same trends occur as did before. In the interview with an anonymous source, the activists were compared to children, but not at all dismissingly as it may sound (2018). They want to prove themselves, but approach the subject in rush, filled with emotions (ibid.). This is showcased by an experience of Mr. Myronenko from a joint meeting with members of the PCuMoD who agreed to write up material for a draft of a law; out of thirty people who should have participated on this, only two managed to bring any material to the next meeting, out of which only one was usable in the drafting process (2018). This then produces a dismissal of their attempts from the older, more established members of the professional civil society (ibid.). There is also the notion that some of the activists see this as way to secure a job at the

particular ministry eventually as a result of the cooperation which provides yet another reason for the older staff not to be willing to cooperate with them as much as they could (Bulakh, 2018, p. 4). To bring the parallel with children even further, members of CSOs often have different ‘parents’ on whom they are dependent (sponsors like foreign embassies of interest groups like the Big Four), and this can and does create conflict of interest among the CSOs. Moreover, the activists tend to discuss big reforms and very progressive ideas (Anonymous Source, 2018). But given the complex bureaucratic system at place, especially in the defence sector, what really works are small steps gradually growing bigger.

This is the case with ProZorro and projects that originated in RPO. It is necessary to recognize that both of these institutions continued to perform despite the process, and even showed willingness to get involved with the government beyond what was expected of them, in order not to lose progress or future potential of the reform they started. ProZorro did this when a part of its previously CSO leadership became the leadership of a state-owned enterprise, which is an entirely different position, with completely different set of duties. The RPO showed what is almost a case of conformity for the greater good, in its dismissal of Mr. Grant’s very constructive criticism. This really shows what type of professionalism is needed to be accepted by the MoD’s inner circle, and to be allowed to participate on the reform process. In fact, both of these institutions not only participated, but developed and delivered their own unique reforms, which should be highlighted as a common trait of the successful cases. In comparison to ProZorro which is creating additional structures on top of what has been already fully developed, the RPO’s unfinished reforms can be explained for their strict focus on the military, and hence lower public and international support.

At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the approximation process is broader than just practical reforms inside the defence sector. The civil oversight of the armed forces is an important part of it, within Ukrainian defence sector a problem with regards to the semantics was identified here. In the context of Ukrainian defence sector and its very rigid power structure, what is traditionally

called civil oversight over the armed forces, appears to be understood not as oversight by civil servants under the MoD, but oversight directly by the civil society exercised over the whole of the defence sector, including the MoD. This involvement of the public is an important sign of democracies and in the recent decade its status has been elevated together with the rise of liberal democracy in the post-soviet CEE. Much this development is owed to the vibrant foreign policy of the EU, which is mostly focused on enlargement. However, when the neoliberal emphasis on the closer involvement of the public with the government arrived at Ukraine, Ukraine's defence sector was not yet over the prerequisite step, which is the demilitarization of the MoD. What has made this problem much worse is that when the growing neoliberal element fully materialized at the Independence square in Kiev in 2014, the chance to demilitarize the MoD was not taken. This is most likely because the military did not intervene (or even interfere) with the political situation and afterwards the new government was in no position (facing the Russian aggression at the time) to make an enemy out of the AFU. The result of this is that most of the top positions in the MoD (as well as the position of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine) are still occupied by generals of the AFU. The spike in the post-Maidan CSO activity, especially in the defence sector connected to the volunteer batalions makes it very easy to forget that Ukraine has never fully committed to the pre-requisite step in ensuring civil oversight of the military—making sure that civilians control the MoD. It is then very much in the interest of the MoD's top officials to make the MoD's cooperation with the CSOs be visible as much as possible, all the while transferring just miniscule amounts of powers to the CSOs to actually reform the sector. This is precisely what is happening, and it maximizes the survival of the military's control over the MoD. Given the hostilities which are still taking place in Donbas, this problem is somewhat more tolerable, but in peacetime such leeway from both, the Euro-Atlantic community and Ukrainian politicians, can hardly be expected. This argumentation based on the handling of the CSO's role in the defence sector should supplement Mr. Grant's potent doubts on whether the general staff is truly devoted to winning the war as fast as possible.

Another finding of the thesis is the absence of the volunteer militias from this sphere of the defence sector. During the preliminary phase of the research, it was expected that the battalions would welcome this opportunity to engage with the government via the PCuMoD and seek to influence policy-making as much as they influenced the situation on the frontlines. The idea that the PCuMoD was staffed to a large part by representatives of the battalions, was also held by several non-Ukrainian professionals who were approached during the initial research phase, however, not by either of the interviewees. Most of the major battalions have non-military CSOs, which could serve as representatives in the PCuMoD and during the time of seeking membership a few did, but this did not bring about much of a change to the functioning of the council. When real elections were conducted for the staff of the 2017 PCuMoD, none managed to get a representation among the thirty-five seats. On the other hand, the approach towards the government taken by the largest battalion²⁹ is very important for the future efforts of various other CSOs. Guided by the same *do it yourself* principle which characterized its early approach towards the defence of Ukraine, the Azov battalion created a political party called National Corps, success of which among the electorate is yet to be seen, as this happened in 2016 and the next parliamentary elections are in 2019. Rise of anti-systemic parties with far-right narrative is a current trend among the CEE states, forcing one to consider the possibility of some amount success of the National Corps, which would most definitely badly damage the approximation process.

Lastly, the MoIP was expected to be much more decentralized, contracting third parties with content creation in order to preserve democratic nature of the institution. Because this was found not to be the case, MoIP had hardly any institutional overlap with the RPO, as it focused on social marketing as opposed to fact-based reporting. It is no coincidence that in an otherwise very thorough *Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It*, the MoIP made it only to two sentences: “*In December 2014, a new Ministry of Information was formed. Such*

²⁹ Azov Battalion infamous for grouping far right extremists.

a ministry should not exist in a democratic country” (Aslund, 2015, p. 135). Perhaps it would have been for the best if the same amount of brevity was reserved for the MoIP in this text as well.

6.0 Conclusion

The results of the analysis of representative CSO initiatives which were selected to best showcase the impact of the Ukrainian civil society on the approximation of the Ukrainian defence sector to NATO varied significantly. The impact of ProZorro and of the projects run by the RPO clearly benefited the approximation process; the limitations highlighted in both of the initiatives should not be recognized as failures on the side of the respective institutions but can be mostly attributed to other actors and factors.

The results of analysis of the activity of the PCuMoD and the MoIP are more difficult to interpret. What was encountered during the analysis is a relative inactivity of the PCuMoD, which then cannot be used to support the hypothesis that calls for activity of civil society. As the approximation criteria set for the PCuMoD was to improve its performance, and this was certainly not being done based on the available data even though there might have been optimization efforts within the PCuMoD in 2017, this analysis of this indicator must be concluded with claiming that this representation of civil society failed to positively impact the approximation process, because of its stagnation. Since publication of data related to its activity is one of the ways PCuMoD reports to the public, which is among its duties, the conclusion on PCuMoD's stagnation being a failure should not be dismissed for the possible lack of data. The lack of data in this case is another indicator supporting this very verdict.

On the other hand, the misuse of the PCuMoD to demonstrate that Ukraine is on par with the neoliberal civil society involvement concept of NATO states with regards to civil oversight over the AFU, should not be attributed to the activity / inactivity of the PCuMoD. This certainly does have negative influence on the approximation process as it seeks to hide that Ukraine was never fully committed to demilitarization of the MoD, but the civil society is not the one to put the blame on.

Finally, the MoIP as Ukraine's official substitute for the CSOs active in the field of strategic communication has a decisively negative impact on the approximation process.

Putting the results of the analysis of the four selected indicators together would make the hypothesis dysfunctional, not because the overall results would be inconclusive, but because the analysis shows that the MoIP's cooperation with the civil society was much lower than in the other three selected institutional bodies. Therefore, the MoIP cannot be used to support the hypothesis. As described in the methodology section³⁰, the analysis of the MoIP was done in order to determine whether this peculiar body groups the CSOs active in the strategic communication, or acts as their state-run iteration. Since it was the latter that was proven true, the hypothesis can only be supported by three out of the four selected categories.

Following the theoretical roadmap using securitization theory, which has led to selection of four key indicators of the impact of the civil society on Ukraine's approximation to NATO, out of which three were applicable after the analysis was conducted, the hypothesis of civil society's positive impact on the approximation process is overwhelmingly supported by the successes of ProZorro and RPO, compared to which the stagnation of the PCuMoD's activity is a minor issue, even if viewed as having a clearly negative impact as opposed to inconclusive.

6.1 Limitations of the conducted research

The major limitation of this research was the lack of fluency in Ukrainian language, which has very likely contributed to the low number of conducted interviews. This also made translation of documents timely, given the research was self-funded.

The lack of prior research combined with the lack of available data made this research somewhat limited in depth. Also, much of the data from the analysed

³⁰ See page 29

institutions was self-reported, and even though this fact was approached with an utmost caution, it is necessary to recognize this as an inevitable limitation.

Further on, the fact that the situation in Ukraine is very much an on-going one. The announcement of the JFO happened quite recently and its complex implications are yet unknown to civilians.

6.2 Implications for further research

Because this research was focusing on a very specific, under-researched and constantly developing topic, it had elements of exploratory research. This allows further research to go into more depth in some of the topics encountered. However, any more-detailed research necessitates knowledge of Ukrainian language, as other sources this detailed are practically nonexistent. Some of the research topics which can be suggested stemming from this research are:

- Analysis of the effect of the law *On the Specifics of the Procurement of Goods, Works and Services for Defense Requirements* on the cost of defence procurement of the AFU,
- Comprehensive research of the effect of propaganda of the MoIP on Ukrainian population,
- Comprehensive research of the effect of the PCuMoD's oversight over the MoD on corruption,
- Analysis of foreign sponsors of the Ukrainian defence sector reforms,
- Analysis of the factors that are keeping the General Staff of the AFU in power.

6.3 Policy Implications

Even though this research was certainly not conducted in a way to specifically produce policy implications, a number of them has arisen from the conclusions.

6.3.1 Policy Implications for Ukrainian authorities

Even a complex reform of the MoIP that would contract CSOs and media production companies with content creation is a limited goal. As cited earlier from Aslund (2015, p. 135), this ministry simply has to go, if Ukraine wants to move forward towards Europe. It is especially dangerous in Ukraine, where some of the oligarchs (like Poroshenko) already have accumulated ownership of large

media networks. Furthermore, concrete steps need to be taken by the government to limit the power currently held by the General Staff. First and foremost, this includes appointment of a Minister of Defence of Ukraine who is a civilian and chooses civilian deputies and key personnel. Once this hurdle is cleared, the blocking of progressive reforms by the power-hungry General Staff will significantly increase the impact of projects like the ones ran by the RPO, and their implementation rate should go up faster. It is necessary to delegate more power to the PCuMoD, especially in terms of interaction with the Ministry. For example, the current powers of the head of the PCuMoD of attending any non-classified meeting of any department of the MoD should be broadened to all of the members of the PCuMoD, in case the current 35-member structure is preserved (PCuMoD, 2017c). The latest development with shrinking the PCuMoD is a clear intention of an effort to make it more professional, so the MoD should reciprocate in the same manner. Further on, the law *On the Specifics of the Procurement of Goods, Works and Services for Defense Requirements* should be ammended, and instead of quartering the bidding period, cutting it in half would seem more reasonable, for invitation of more competition into the sector.

6.3.2 Policy Implications for other states seeking NATO membership

This research also opened an interesting topic for states that will seek to join NATO or any other international organization in future, which calls for resilience and society participating in governance. More precisely, as very important results were delivered by mobilizing the civil society in a wake of a threat, it should be analyzed and perhaps tested if such securitization would work with a threat that is non-existent, or artificially created. It is very likely that this would not yield same sort of results, however for some states which are struggling with maintaining legitimacy, any sort of help and recognition from civil society might be very useful.

Legal Sources in Order of Appearance:

Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada. 2014. *'On the Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine'*. (No. 52) Kiev: Parliament of Ukraine.

Presidential Decree. 2015. *'On the National Security Strategy of Ukraine'*. (No. 105/2015) Kiev: President of Ukraine.

Presidential Decree. 2015. *'On the New Edition of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine'*. (No. 555/2015) Kiev: President of Ukraine.

Presidential Decree. 2016. *'On the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine'*. (No. 240/2016) Kiev: President of Ukraine.

Presidential Order. 2016. *'On Promoting the Development of Civil Society in Ukraine'*. (No. 68/2016) Kiev: President of Ukraine.

Ministerial Order. 2015. (No. 426/2015) Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Presidential Decree. 2018. *'On approval of the Annual National Programme under the auspices of the Ukraine-NATO Commission for 2018'*. (No. 89/2018) Kiev: President of Ukraine.

Law of Ukraine. 2003. *'On Democratic Civilian Control over the Military Organization and Law Enforcement Bodies of the State'*. (No. 975-IV) Kiev: Parliament of Ukraine.

Presidential Decree. 2004. *'On Providing Conditions for Wider Participation of the Public in Formulating and Implementing State Policy'*. (No. 854/2004) Kiev: President of Ukraine.

Ministerial Order. 2011. *'On Provision of Public Participation in Organising and Implementing the State Policy within the Military Sphere'*. (No. 262/2011) Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Law of Ukraine. 2016. *'On the Specifics of the Procurement of Goods, Works and Services for Defense Requirements'*. (No. 1356-VIII/2016) Kiev: Parliament of Ukraine.

Appendix A

Data Gathered from the Public Council Archives³¹ in Order of Appearance:

PCuMoD. 2014a. *Protocol of the Sixth Session of Public Council under the Ministry of Defence*. [Minutes of Meeting] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

PCuMoD. 2014b. *Decision One of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence*. [Resolution] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

PCuMoD. 2014c. *Decision Two of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence*. [Resolution] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

PCuMoD. 2014d. *Protocol of the Seventh Session of Public Council under the Ministry of Defence*. [Minutes of Meeting] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

PCuMoD. 2015a. *Protocol of the First Session of Public Council under the Ministry of Defence*. [Minutes of Meeting] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

PCuMoD. 2015b. *Protocol of the Second Session of Public Council under the Ministry of Defence*. [Minutes of Meeting] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

PCuMoD. 2016. *Protocol of the Sixth Session of Public Council under the Ministry of Defence*. [Minutes of Meeting] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

PCuMoD. 2017a. *Protocol of the Fourth Session of Public Council under the Ministry of Defence*. [Minutes of Meeting] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

PCuMoD. 2017b. *Protocol of the Joint Session of Public Council under the Ministry of Defence, General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Ministry of Defence of Ukraine*. [Minutes of Meeting] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

³¹ The archives were accessible at <http://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/zvyazki-z-gromadskisty/gromadska-rada/arhiv.html> ; the last time they were visited was the 29th of May 2018.

PCuMoD. 2017c. *Statutes of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence*. [Internal document] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

PCuMoD. 2017d. *Composition of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence*. [Internal document] Internet Archive of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defence. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Appendix B

Data gathered from the Reforms Project Office³² in Order of Appearance:

RPO. 2015a. *The Ministry of Defense Described How the Diet of Ukrainian Defenders Will Change in the Future*. [Press Release]. Materials for media found on the website of RPO. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

RPO. n/a [a]. *Food Reform: Before and After*. [Infographic]. Materials for media found on the website of RPO. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

RPO. 2016a. *The Food for Ukrainian Fighters Will be Supplied by a Large International Company for the First Time*. [Press Release]. Materials for media found on the website of RPO. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

RPO. n/a [b]. *Optimization of Evacuation System*. [Infographic]. Materials for media found on the website of RPO. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

RPO. n/a [c]. *Training Center of Tactical Medicine*. [Infographic]. Materials for media found on the website of RPO. Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Appendix C

Interviews:

Anonymous Source. 2018. *The Role of Civil Society in Ukraine's National Security and Defence*. Interviewed by Lukas Skolek. In Kiev, on the 9th of May 2018.

Iurii Myronenko. 2018. *The Role of Civil Society in Ukraine's National Security and Defence*. Interviewed by Lukas Skolek. In Kiev, on the 11th of May 2018.

³² <https://defense-reforms.in.ua/for-press> ; there is also an English version of the webpage, however, it does not include as many infographics (<https://defense-reforms.in.ua/en/for-press>);

Bibliography

Alexa, 2018. *Traffic Statistics of "defence-reforms.in.ua"*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/defence-reforms.in.ua>
[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Allenby, B. & Fink, J., 2005. Toward Inherently Secure and Resilient Societies. *Science*, CCCIX(5737), pp. 1034-1036.

Aslund, A., 2015. *Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It*. 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Barry Buzan, O. W. d. W., 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bourbeau, P., 2018. A Genealogy of Resilience. *International Political Sociology*, XII(1), pp. 19-35.

Brown, D., 2018. *This Is the Javelin Anti-Tank Missile System That the US Just Sent to Ukraine*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.businessinsider.com/this-the-antitank-missile-that-the-us-sending-ukraine-2017-8>
[Accessed 23 May 2018].

Bulakh, A., 2018. *Security Sector Reform in Ukraine*, Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security.

Bustikova, L., 2015. Voting, Identity and Security Threats in Ukraine: Who Supports the Radical "Freedom" Party?. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, XLVIII(2), pp. 239-256.

Byshok, S. & Kochetkov, A., 2014. *Neonazis & Euromaidan: From Democracy to Dictatorship*. 3rd ed. Moscow: Knizhny Mir.

CASE Ukraine, 2018. *Expenditure by Agency*. [Online]
Available at: <http://cost.ua/en/budget/expenditure/agencies/>
[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Cavelty, M. D., Kaufmann, M. & Kristensen, K. S., 2015. Resilience and (In)security: Practices, Subjects, Temporalities. *Security Dialogue*, XLVI(1), pp. 3-14.

Côté, A., 2016. Agents Without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory. *Security Dialogue*, XLVII(6), pp. 541-558.

Dashkevych, Y., 2014. *How Moscow Hijacked The History of Kyivan Rus*. [Online]
Available at: <http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/05/14/how-moscow-hijacked-the->

[history-of-kyivan-rus/](#)

[Accessed 20 April 2018].

Databank of State Statistic Service of Ukraine, 2001. *Distribution of the population by nationality and native language*. [Online]

Available at:

http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Database/Census/databasetree_en.asp

[Accessed 10 May 2018].

European Commission, 2017. *European Semester Thematic Factsheet: Public Procurement*, Brussels: European Commission.

European Union, 2016. *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*. [Online]

Available at:

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

[Accessed 21 May 2018].

Fridman, O., 2017. Hybrid Warfare or Gibridnaya Voyna?. *The RUSI Journal*, CLXII(1), pp. 42-49.

Galeotti, M., 2014. *The 'Gerasimov doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War*. [Online]

Available at: <https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>

[Accessed 22 May 2018].

Galeotti, M., 2018. *I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'*. [Online]

Available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/>

[Accessed 22 May 2018].

Gatskova, K. & Gatskov, M., 2016. Third Sector in Ukraine: Civic Engagement Before and After the "Euromaidan". *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, XXVII(2), pp. 673-694.

Gaufman, E., 2017. *Security Threats and Public Perception: Digital Russia and the Ukraine Crisis*. 1st ed. Cham : Palgrave Macmillan.

Government of Ukraine, 2015. *The Results of Work on Requests for Information Submitted to the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from May 9, 2011 to December 31, 2014*. [Online]

Available at:

http://old.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=247864665&cat_id=244316991

[Accessed 28 May 2018].

Government of Ukraine, 2016. *The Results of Work on Requests for Information Submitted to the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015*. [Online]

Available at:

http://old.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=248753128&cat_id=244316991

[Accessed 28 May 2018].

Government of Ukraine, 2017. *The Results of Work on Requests for Information Submitted to the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016*. [Online]

Available at: https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/gromadskosti/dostup-do-publichnoyi-informaciyi/zviti-pro-nadhodzhennya-zapitiv/2016-rik_/pidsumki-roboti-iz-zapitami-na-informaciyu-sho-nadiishli-na-adresu-sekretariatu-kabinetu-ministriv-ukrayini-z-1-sichnya-po-31-grudnya-2016-

[Accessed 28 May 2018].

Government of Ukraine, 2018. *The Results of Work with Requests for Information Sent to the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from January 1 to December 31, 2017*. [Online]

Available at: https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/gromadskosti/dostup-do-publichnoyi-informaciyi/zviti-pro-nadhodzhennya-zapitiv/2017-rik_/pidsumki-roboti-iz-zapitami-na-informaciyu-sho-nadiishli-na-adresu-sekretariatu-kabinetu-ministriv-ukrayini-z-1-sichnya-po-31-grudnya-2017-

[Accessed 28 May 2018].

Grant, G., 2016. *How Powerful are Armed Forces of Ukraine* [Interview] (2016 May 2016).

Grant, G., 2018. *How Ukraine Can Build an Army to Beat Putin*. [Online]

Available at: <http://ukrainedemocracy.org/?articles=article-glen-grant-ukraine-can-build-army-beat-putin>

[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Grant, T. D., 2015. *Aggression Against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility, and International Law*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hale, H. E. & Orttung, R. W. eds., 2016. In: *Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing Reform in Ukraine*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Harrison, M., 2014. *The Economics of Coercion and Conflict*. 1st ed. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.

Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, 2017. *NATO-Ukraine Cooperation Annual National Programme 2016*, Kiev: Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation.

Interfax Ukraine, 2013. *Yanukovich: Ukraine has no alternative but European integration*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/yanukovich-ukraine-has-no-alternative-but-european-integration-332248.html>
[Accessed 9 May 2018].

Interfax Ukraine, 2014. *Poroshenko: Information Ministry's Main Task is to Repel Information Attacks Against Ukraine*. [Online]

Available at: <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/238615.html>
[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Interfax Ukraine, 2016. *U.S. Ambassador Calls Formation of 'Ministry of Truth' Serious Mistake, Urges Ukraine to Focus on Progress and Development*. [Online]

Available at: <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/321326.html>
[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Interfax Ukraine, 2017a. *Rada Restores Ukraine's Course For NATO Membership as Foreign Policy Priority*. [Online]

Available at: <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/427216.html>
[Accessed 19 May 2018].

Interfax Ukraine, 2017b. *Annual National Program of NATO-Ukraine Cooperation for 2017 Discussed in Kyiv*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/annual-national-program-nato-ukraine-cooperation-2017-discussed-kyiv.html>
[Accessed 25 May 2018].

Interfax Ukraine, 2018a. *Banned VK Social Network 4th in Internet Traffic in Ukraine in April*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.kyivpost.com/business/banned-vk-social-network-fourth-internet-traffic-ukraine-april.html>
[Accessed 23 May 2018].

Interfax Ukraine, 2018b. *Poroshenko Approves Annual National Program of Ukraine-NATO Cooperation*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.unian.info/politics/10060226-poroshenko-approves-annual-national-program-of-ukraine-nato-cooperation.html>
[Accessed 25 May 2018].

Janeliūnas, T. & Tumkevič, A., 2013. Securitization of the Energy Sectors in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine: Motives and Extraordinary Measures. *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, Issue 30, pp. 65-90.

Kuzio, T., 2015. *Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism*. 1st ed. Santa Barbara: Praeger.

Kyiv School of Economics, 2016. *Co-Creation of ProZorro: An Account of the Process and Actors*, Kiev: Transparency International Ukraine.

Langvad, E., 2017. *Gas Security in Central and Eastern Europe – A Comparison Between Czech Republic and Hungary's Approach to Gas*. MA thesis ed. Prague: Charles University.

Lasconjarias, G., 2017. *Deterrence Through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared*, Rome: Research Division - NATO Defense College.

Lavelle, P., 2004. *Analysis: Ultimatum in Ukraine*. [Online]
Available at: https://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2004/11/29/Analysis-Ultimatum-in-Ukraine/UPI-96121101747439/
[Accessed 8 5 2018].

Luhn, A., 2017. *Ukraine Blocks Popular Social Networks as Part of Sanctions on Russia*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/ukraine-blocks-popular-russian-websites-kremlin-role-war>
[Accessed 23 May 2018].

Magocsi, P. R., 2010. *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*. 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Marshall, T., 2015. *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need To Know About Global Politics*. 1st ed. London: Elliot and Thompson.

Matlary, J. H. & Heier, T. eds., 2016. In: *Ukraine and Beyond: Russia's Strategic Security Challenge to Europe*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

McDonough, M., 2017. Public Procurement in Ukraine - A System Transformed. *Law in Transition Journal 2017 EBRD*, III(1), pp. 8-13.

Menon, R. & Rumer, E., 2015. *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order*. 1st ed. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Meyer-Minnemann, L., 2016. Resilience and Alliance Security: The Warsaw Commitment to Enhance Resilience. In: D. S. Hamilton, ed. *Forward Resilience: Protecting Society in an Interconnected World*. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations,, pp. 91-99.

Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2012. *White Book 2011: Armed Forces of Ukraine*, Kyiv: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2014. *White Book 2013: Armed Forces of Ukraine*, Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2015. *White Book: 2014 Armed Forces of Ukraine*, Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2016. *White Book 2015: Armed Forces of Ukraine*, Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Ministry of Defence and The General Staff of The Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2017. *White Book 2016: Armed Forces of Ukraine*, Kiev: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, 2018. *Social Advertising*. [Online]
Available at: <https://mip.gov.ua/en/news/7/>
[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, 2018. *Ukrainian-British Consultations on Countering Cyber Threats Held in London*. [Online]
Available at: <https://mip.gov.ua/en/news/2313.html>
[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Ministry of Information Policy Ukraine, 2016. *Impletemented Projects with the Support of the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine*. [Online]
Available at: <https://mip.gov.ua/en/content/proekti-yaki-realizovani-za-pidtrimki-mip.html>
[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Mitrokhin, N., 2015. Infiltration, Instruction, Invasion: Russia's War in the Donbass. *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society*, 1(1), pp. 219-249.

Murray, W. & Mansoor, P. R. eds., 2012. *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

NATO, 1949. *The North Atlantic Treaty*. [Online]
Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm
[Accessed 25 May 2018].

NATO, 1999. *Membership Action Plan (MAP)*. [Online]
Available at:
https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?selectedLocale=en
[Accessed 25 May 2018].

Onuch, O., 2014. *Mapping Mass Mobilization: Understanding Revolutionary Moments in Argentina and Ukraine*. 1st ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Open Government Partnership, 2018. *About OGP*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/about/about-ogp>
[Accessed 26 May 2018].

Pabriks, A. & Kudors, A. eds., 2015. In: *The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe*. Riga: University of Latvia Press.

Petrenia, D., 2017. *The Battle for Food: How 'Men in Black' are Reforming the Ukrainian Army* [Interview] (6 September 2017).

Pifer, S., 2004. *Ukraine's Future and U.S. Interests*. [Online]
Available at: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/32416.htm>
[Accessed 20 April 2018].

Pleshakov, C., 2017. *The Crimean Nexus: Putin's War and the Clash of Civilizations*. 1st ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ponomarenko, I., 2017. *Ukraine's Defense Budget up by 28 Percent in 2018*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukraines-defense-budget-28-percent-2018.html?cn-reloaded=1>
[Accessed 2017 December 2018].

Ponomarenko, I., 2018. *As ATO Ends, Joint Forces Operation Launched in Donbas*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ato-ends-joint-forces-operation-launched-donbas.html>
[Accessed 18 May 2018].

Poroshenko, P., 2014a. *Petro Poroshenko's Speech at the Inauguration: Full Text*. [Online]
Available at: <http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/06/07/petro-poroshenkos-speech-at-the-inauguration-full-text/>
[Accessed 22 May 2018].

Poroshenko, P., 2014b. *Poroshenko's Speech On Signing EU Association Agreement*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1YFu-bj-gLw>
[Accessed 22 May 2018].

Poroshenko, P., 2014c. *Full Text of Poroshenko's Speech to Joint Session of US Congress*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/full-text->

[of-poroshenkos-speech-to-joint-session-of-us-congress-365182.html](http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zagalnih-debatah-70-yi-sesiyi-36057)

[Accessed 22 May 2018].

Poroshenko, P., 2015. *Statement by the President at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly*. [Online]

Available at: <http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zagalnih-debatah-70-yi-sesiyi-36057>

[Accessed 22 May 2018].

Prentice, A., 2014. *Ukraine Bans Russian TV Channels for Airing War 'Propaganda'*.

[Online]

Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-television/ukraine-bans-russian-tv-channels-for-airing-war-propaganda-idUSKBN0GJ1QM20140819>

[Accessed 23 May 2018].

ProZorro, 2018. *Achievements & Awards*. [Online]

Available at: <https://prozorro.gov.ua/en/about/achievements>

[Accessed 28 May 2018].

Rącz, A., 2015. *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist*, Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Radio Free Europe, 2014. *'No Big Brother!' Ukrainian Journalists Oppose Kyiv's New Ministry Of Information*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-ministry-information-journalists-protest/26723352.html>

[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Radio Free Europe, 2018. *Poroshenko: Ukraine Seeking NATO Membership Action Plan*.

[Online]

Available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-ukraine-poroshenko-membership-action-plan/29090212.html>

[Accessed 25 May 2018].

Ray, J., 2015. *Ukrainians Disillusioned With Leadership*. [Online]

Available at: http://news.gallup.com/poll/187931/ukrainians-disillusioned-leadership.aspx?g_source=link_NEWSV9&g_medium=TOPIC&g_campaign=item &g_content=Ukrainians%2520Disillusioned%2520With%2520Leadership

[Accessed 21 May 2018].

Reforms Project Office under the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2018. *A Look Back At How the AFU Opened Its First Specialised Training Centre For Medics In Desna*. [Online]

Available at: <https://defense-reforms.in.ua/en/news/yak-u-desni-vidkrivali-pershij-u->

zsu-faxovij-navchalnij-centr-dlya-medikov

[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Reforms Project Office, 2015. *Reform of the Ministry of Defence Procurement of Ukraine*. [Online]

Available at: <https://defense-reforms.in.ua/en/projects/reforming-procurement-system>

[Accessed 28 May 2018].

Reforms Project Office, 2018. *Explanation From the MOD Reforms Project Office of Glen Grant's Status In the Ministry of Defence And the Information In His Article On Reforming the Ukrainian Army*. [Online]

Available at: <https://defense-reforms.in.ua/en/news/rozyasnennya-proektnogo-ofisu-reform-mou-shhodo-statusu-glena-granta-v-ministerstvi-oboroni-ukraini-a-takozh-informacii-vikladenoi-v-jogo-statti-pro-reformuvannya-ukrainskoi-armii>

[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Reporters Without Borders, 2014. *RWB Opposes Creation of Information Ministry*. [Online]

Available at: <https://rsf.org/en/news/rwb-opposes-creation-information-ministry>

[Accessed 31 May 2018].

Rusnáková, S., 2017. Russian New Art of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine. *Slovak Journal of Political Sciences*, XVII(3-4), pp. 343-380.

Russia Today, 2008. *EU: Stalin Planned Ukrainian Famine*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.rt.com/news/eu-stalin-planned-ukrainian-famine/>

[Accessed 21 May 2018].

Russia Today, 2010a. *Yushchenko Brings Stalin To Court Over Genocide*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.rt.com/politics/holodomor-famine-stalin-ukraine/>

[Accessed 21 May 2018].

Russia Today, 2010b. *Ukraine's Orange President To Face New Probe Into Mysterious Illness*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.rt.com/politics/yushchenko-poisoned-ukraine-prosecutor/>

[Accessed 21 May 2018].

Russia Today, 2011a. *Ukrainian Court Rules Against Nazi Collaborators Becoming Heroes Again*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.rt.com/politics/ukraine-bandera-shukhevich-decision-859/>

[Accessed 21 May 2018].

Russia Today, 2011b. *One Eurasian Union, Please. And Hold the Imperialism!*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.rt.com/politics/union-putin-integration-soviet-207/>

[Accessed 21 May 2018].

Russia Today, 2016. *Ukraine wants to criminalize calling Russia 'Russia'*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.rt.com/news/333076-ukraine-wants-ban-russia/>
[Accessed 20 April 2018].

Sakwa, R., 2014. *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands*. 1st ed. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

Sauer, T., 2017. The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West. *Global Policy*, VIII(1), pp. 82-91.

Schøll, A. & Ubaydi, D., 2017. *Impact of Technology on Corruption: A Study of Impact of e-Procurement on Prices of Various Government Purchases*, Norwegian School of Economics: Master's thesis.

Security Service of Ukraine, 2018. *Structure and Performance Principles*. [Online]
Available at: <https://ssu.gov.ua/en/pages/38>
[Accessed 18 May 2018].

Shea, J., 2016. *Resilience: A Core Element of Collective Defence*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/en/index.htm>
[Accessed 21 May 2018].

Shekhovtsov, A. & Umland, A., 2014. Ukraine's Radical Right. *Journal of Democracy*, XXV(3), pp. 58-63.

TASR, 2017. *O 48% Vzárostol Priemerný Počet Účastníkov Aukcie v Rámci Obchodovania na Elektrickom Trhovisku od Zavedenia Zmien Systému Spustených v Prvý Februárový Deň Tohto Roka*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.teraz.sk/ekonomika/eks-rastie-priemerny-pocet-ucastni/255972-clanok.html>
[Accessed 28 May 2018].

Teperik, D. et al., 2018. *A Route To National Resilience*, Tallinn: ICDS.

Tomiuc, E., 2002. *NATO: What Does It Take To Join?*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/1099020.html>
[Accessed 25 May 2018].

Transparency International, 2017. *One Year of DoZorro: 3000 Violations Detected, Only 3 Court Decisions*. [Online]
Available at: <https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/one-year-of-dozorro-3000-violations-detected-only-3-court-decisions/>
[Accessed 31 May 2018].

- Tyapkin, V., 2014. *Is There a Place for The Russian Orthodox Church in Post-Maidan Ukraine?*. [Online]
Available at: <https://sputniknews.com/columnists/20140728191410875-Is-There-a-Place-for-The-Russian-Orthodox-Church-in-Post-Maidan/>
[Accessed 20 April 2018].
- UNDP, 2012. *Defining Civil Society for Ukraine: Summary of the Research Report*, Kiev: United Nations Development Programme Ukraine.
- UNIAN, 2017. *Do you support blocking VKontakte, Yandex and other Russian sites in Ukraine?*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.unian.net/society/1924689-podderjivaete-li-vyi-blokirovku-vkontakte-yandeksa-i-drugih-rossiyskih-saytov-v-ukraine-opros-unian.html>
[Accessed 23 May 2018].
- Vissapragada, P., 2017. *Open Government Case Study: Costing the ProZorro e-Procurement Program*, Washington, D.C.: Results for Development.
- Vorbrugg, A., 2015. Governing Through Civil Society? The Making of a Post-Soviet Political Subject in Ukraine. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, XXXIII(1), pp. 136-153.
- Weber, M., 1965. *Politics as a Vocation*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
- Weber, M., 2004. *The Vocation Lectures*. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Wolff, A. T., 2015. The Future of NATO Enlargement After the Ukraine Crisis. *International Affairs*, XCI(5), pp. 1103-1121.
- Wood, E. A., Pomeranz, W. E., Merry, E. W. & Trudolyubov, M., 2016. *Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine*. 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Yekelchik, S., 2015. *The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zagorodnuk, A., 2016. *Interview on Censor.net by Anastasiya Bereza* [Interview] 2016.

Scheme 1




Chart 1



Chart 2

