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Department of English Language and Literature



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Representative men:

The antithesis and synthesis of Emersonian and Marxist
understanding of history

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Author: Patrícia Holíková

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Supervisor: Mgr. Jakub Ženíšek, Ph.D.

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this bachelor thesis is completely my own work and that no other sources were used in the preparation of the thesis than those listed on the works cited page.

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Abstract

This paper discusses the understanding of history in the philosophy of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Karl Marx as representatives of the idealistic and materialistic ways of this understanding. It will show that both approaches, in essence, have Hegel's dialectic as their first principle. Emerson, like Hegel, **thought** that the driving force of history **was** the World Soul (the World Reason), guiding and ensuring the development of mankind and the continuity of historical eras. Marx proposed a different, materialistic, but also dialectical interpretation of the course of history, treating society as a kind of integrity capable of self-development, explaining the change of formations in society by the fact that productive forces develop, violating the correspondence between themselves and the production relations, which implies the need to change these relations, and, behind them, others, “superstructure” relations, that is, the whole society. In frames of the research, their representations about the essence of life, the being of the individual and the social community and freedom are also considered. Emerson’s concept of ‘self-reliance’ and Marx’s concept of alienation, in particular, are discussed. The contrast and meeting points of these two philosophers’ positions are analyzed. Similarities and differences in the views of Emerson and Marx on the ideal society and ways to achieve it are noted and analyzed.

Key words

Ralph Waldo Emerson, Karl Marx, American romanticism, Hegel's dialectic, perception of history, self-reliance, alienation

Anotace

Tato práce se zabývá porozuměním historii ve filozofii Ralpa Waldo Emersona a Karla Marxe jako představitelů idealistického a materialistického způsobu tohoto porozumění. Ukáže, že oba přístupy mají v podstatě jako svůj základní princip Hegelovu dialektiku. Emerson, stejně jako Hegel, považoval za hybnou sílu historie světového ducha (světový rozum), který lidstvo vede a zajišťuje jeho rozvoj a kontinuitu historických období. Marx nabídl jinou, materialistickou, ale rovněž dialektickou interpretaci běhu historie, v níž vnímá společnost jako celek schopný samostatného rozvoje a vysvětluje změny ve společenských útvarech rozvinutím výrobních sil, které narušují rovnováhu mezi sebou samými a výrobními vztahy, z čehož vyplývá nutnost změnit tyto vztahy a za nimi stojící další „nadstavbové“ vztahy, neboli celou společnost. V rámci výzkumu je rovněž posouzena jejich reprezentace podstaty života, bytí jednotlivce a společenské komunity a svobody. Především je rozebírán Emersonův koncept „spoléhání na sebe sama“ a Marxův koncept odcizení. Jsou analyzovány rozpory a společné body těchto dvou filozofů. Práce rozebírá a analyzuje podobnosti a rozdíly v pohledech Emersona a Marxe na ideální společnost a způsoby, jak jí docílit.

Klíčová slova

Ralph Waldo Emerson, Karl Marx, americký romantismus, Hegelova dialektika, pojetí historie, soběstačnost, odcizení

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Introduction

The turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, in the world, became a time of searching for spiritual supports and landmarks. A wide range of opinions was found on most issues, and at the center of this ideological struggle, as it used to be before, was history and **human understanding of history**. Because a human has a historical consciousness, he lives in history, inside it. However, in this case, it is desirable for him to know the nature of the historical process in order to somehow orientate in it. In a sense, there is nothing more important and relevant for a person living in history than imagining the nature of history. The traditional philosophy of history **has dealt with** a number of issues which **imply** that history has an ontological quality. **These** include questions about the meaning of history, its direction, the goal sought by the historical process, questions about historical necessity, about the driving forces of history, and a number of others. In the traditional philosophy of history, history appeared as a certain reality, concerning which these questions were raised. The direction of the historical process, in the traditional philosophy of history, was set either by the goal history was supposed to seek, or by imparting in history the character of progress, or both. In various concepts of the philosophy of history, the postulated goals of history 'painted' a different social state, to which history leads, in which the diversity of social ideals and priorities of thinkers was expressed. In this connection, it seems advisable to analyze the concepts of the traditional philosophy of history in the theories of the representatives of the two largest schools of philosophy, which had a significant impact on the entire science of philosophy and its development, including in our time - Ralph Waldo Emerson and Karl Marx.

1. Theoretical part

1.1 American Romanticism as a unique phenomenon in world culture

American romanticism is a unique phenomenon in world culture, which had a colossal influence on aesthetic, ethical, political, and philosophical concepts and trends in the history of the second half of the 19th and 20th centuries. Decadence, impressionism, expressionism, symbolism, anarchism, Nietzscheism, Tolstoyism, movements for national liberation in India and among African Americans, feminism, pragmatism, existentialism, primitivism, environmentalism, traditionalism, geopolitics, Friedmann's model of the Universe, futurism, surrealism, avant-gardism, “black romanticism” of the Prague literary school, “magical realism,” jazz, the Beatniks, subcultures of hippies, punk and goth, classical cinema, pop culture, and many other significant phenomena, trends and directions of cultural life over the last two centuries are to some degree indebted to the main representatives of American Romanticism, including Ralph Waldo Emerson. The philosophical basis of this phenomenon is expressed most **poignantly** in the works of R. Emerson: *Nature*, *Experience*, *Representative Men*, *The Conduct of Life*.

However, there are no special works devoted to the general philosophical foundations of American Romanticism, at least, in English. There is only information on individual personalities (their lives and work), or specific **issues of concern** (for example, epistemological, cosmological, ethical, ontological, aesthetic, literary, historical-comparative, and political).

It seems expedient to explain the unique nature of American romanticism, which consists of imposing a sacred worldview on secularism and borrowing a pre-modern philosophical basis in the conditions of the modernist paradigm prevailing in the United States at that time.

1.2 Aesthetic theory and literary practice of Emerson

An American researcher **David Stovall (1943)** once observed that anyone who wanted to understand America should understand Emerson. Perhaps, in these words, there is a certain exaggeration, but there is a considerable truth in them. Emerson, indeed, belongs to one of the main landmarks in the history of the American national consciousness, which developed particularly rapidly in the era of Romanticism. During his lifetime, he acquired the reputation of “the wisest of Americans”, the spiritual ‘mentor’ of youth, the “national patriarch” (Waggoner 200). This reputation has been preserved to this day, despite the fact that certain provisions of his philosophy have repeatedly been severely criticized.

Emerson's work was extremely multifaceted: he acted as a philosopher, poet, orator, preacher, art theorist, essayist, etc. As the head of the transcendental direction in American philosophy, he developed ideas that were important for the development of US culture both in the 19th and 20th centuries. For Romantic writers, his theoretical positions became the subject of sharp polemics, the center of attraction and repulsion.

The aesthetic theory and poetic practice of Emerson, to some extent, was a reaction to existing romantic artistic structures and types of thinking, and, in a broad sense, a reflection of the public consciousness of the American nation at a certain stage of its historical development. The basic principles of his poetics consist of the priority of thought, ideological content over form, reason over feeling, an image over the metrics and rhyme of a poem, and the romantic imagination becomes for him the privilege of the intellect. Poetry for Emerson is a way of knowing the essence of being and human nature.

The philosophical platform of Emerson makes possible the appearance of elements of an elemental-materialistic worldview in his poetic thinking. In his poetry, the cosmic vision of the world arises, which becomes the hallmark of the work of the next generation of Romantics - Whitman and Dickinson. Emerson's symbolic system, synthesized aphoristic thoughts and multivalued character, go beyond the style, **and constitute a** continuation of his philosophy.

The main religious and philosophical influences on American romantics are ancient Indian, ancient Chinese, classical (primarily Platonism) and German classical philosophy, as well as Goethe and British romantics. Swedenborg also had a significant influence on Emerson (Bercovitch 17).

In 1836, Emerson published his first work - **an influential** essay under the capacious title *Nature*. In perspective of the time, it represents a milestone in the development of American literature and the formation of the philosophical thought of the United States. The essay contained, in an extremely compressed form, the main ideas of the writer. He defined

in it his attitude to being, nature, the moral ideal, the questions of cognition, the place of humans in the universe. In one of the rough drafts, Emerson wrote that when creating a theory of nature and man, it is necessary to attribute freedom to the will, and good intentions to God. In other words, one has to take the standpoint that will prove the existence of free will in contrast to the idea of universal determinism and a good goal, pre-established by the creator. This methodological principle can be traced throughout the work of the writer. It is central, also, in his natural philosophy.

Emerson perceived nature as the otherness of God, a visible reflection of divine intentions. The purposes of nature are to serve a human, give him means of existence, educate him in the concepts of morality and beauty so that the soul can satisfy its 'thirst for beauty.' The process of spiritual purification requires loneliness in the vastness of intact nature, where one can contemplate the miraculous beauty of the world. Namely there, when tapping into the world soul, a person experiences a state of mystical ecstasy, a feeling of fusion with the higher spiritual principle, which is dissolved in nature.

Faith in the opportunity to join the deity, identify oneself with him, characteristic of all mystical teachings, fueled Emerson's optimism. Emerson's philosophical optimism is the reverse side of his pantheism. The writer recognized, albeit with reservations, the identity of the divine principle and nature. Like other pantheists, he "dissolved" God in nature, deifying it. The rapprochement of human with nature is an indispensable condition of mystical communication with God.

The title given by the writer to his first book was full of deep meaning. He expounded in it the symbol of faith, the most important part of which was the philosophy of nature. Further development of the theme of "man and nature" he continued in an essay with the same title (*Nature*), included in the second collection of essays (1844).

The concept of nature is viewed in it from two perspectives: as the material world ("natura naturans") and as the environment around us, not spoiled by human intervention, or "natura naturata". In the second meaning, nature is treated as the embodiment of the world soul, the 'divine city.' The world of sublime beauty is compared with the prosaically real, which was quite in the traditions of the English and American romantic schools. However, there was something unconventional in this essay.

It reflected Emerson's interest in the natural sciences and evolutionary theories of Lamarck, Lyell, Cuvier, and Agassiz. The American writer took the ideas of evolution, widely discussed in the scientific world, and in many ways prepared the ground for their distribution in America. The metaphysical idea of nature was destroyed by the joint efforts

of scientists –contemporaries and predecessors of Darwin - and romantic philosophers, including Schelling and Emerson (Porter 36).

In the essay of 1844, the idea of the unity of the world acquired a cosmic character. Emerson's imagination considers the question of the origin of the world; he talks about the primary and gravity, the multiplicity of worlds and the finiteness of the universe. He, actually, claims that the famous first burst appeared as a spring, which set in motion all the planets of the system, every atom in every planet, all animal species. It manifests itself both in the history and behavior of each individual (Waggoner 177). Emerson uses as synonyms such notions as single impulse, aboriginal push, projection, shove, and the word *balls*, as the context implies, means “planets,” since the dialogue between the astronomer and the metaphysician is about the origin of the universe.

Relying on the correspondence rule, Emerson projects the laws of the micro world on the macrocosm and vice versa. Nature, he wrote, is characterized by generosity, without which evolution and survival are impossible (Waggoner 177). Reflecting on the problems of cosmogony, he speaks of a similar phenomenon: the first-primary burst, in its power, must be many times stronger than the gravity force. The generosity of the Higher Mind in the social world takes other forms: in order to ensure the fulfillment of its plans, it empowers people with an excess of spiritual energy (violence of direction), obsession, fanatical adherence to the idea (Waggoner 178). This is the “cunning of Reason” (according to Hegel's expression). Nature gives people an impulse that makes them fight each other. As a result of the clash of wills and practical interests, the highest goals are achieved, which people did not even think about - Truth, Beauty, and Good.

The essay *Nature* concludes with the thesis proclaimed as far back as 1836: human is a particle of the divine essence; humanity goes to a good goal, pre-set by the Creator. The pantheistic theme of the first essay sounds in the epigraph of the second and its final part: if instead of identifying ourselves with the created one, we feel that the creator's soul is flowing through us, we will discover that the morning silence is in our heart, and the endless forces of attraction and chemical interaction, and, most importantly, the forces of life, persist in us in their highest form (Waggoner 186).

Thus, in Emerson's two essays on nature, the ‘romantic and the real’ were united (Bercovitch 165). They are written with the pen of a romantic and a naturalist, united in one person. The poetization of nature inherent in romanticism is combined with a view of it as the result of the action of physical and chemical forces in boundless space and endless time (Bercovitch 173).

1.3 Nature in Emerson's philosophy

Nature is one of those common ideas that, in the Emersonian moral system, fulfill the role of the ideal. In the lecture about the attitude of man to the world, the writer spoke of the amazing expediency of nature, the perfect arrangement of the world, all parts of which are adjusted to each other and are in constant organic interaction. Nature - the standard, its laws - symmetry, interrelation, proportionality, renewal, multivariance - are the criteria of the beautiful and moral. The writer assesses human actions and the activities of the human community from the point of view of their correspondence to the laws of nature. **It can be argued that this feature of the Emersonian worldview prefigured, to some extent, the principles of social Darwinism, a controversial observation which will be later addressed in some detail.** However, unlike the representatives of this trend, he spoke about the need for moral assessments and 'designed' a moral ideal.

The ideal, the propaganda of which Emerson devoted all his life, was determined by the belief in the unity of the world and its moral foundation. The idea of total unity, the interrelationship of things and phenomena became decisive in his moral philosophy.

1.4 Emerson's Social Philosophy

The writer was worried about the moral state of American society. He saw the cause of many social ills in alienation, which he understood very broadly. Everywhere around him he found evidence of the disunity of people, their alienation from the spiritual culture of mankind, from his own essence, initially healthy, and, finally, from the fruits of his labor, which is, to some extent, is concordant with the ideas of Marx. The motive for the inharmoniousness of life, the gap between the ideal and the real, clearly appears in the lectures and essays of Emerson.

He talked about spiritual ill-being in the life of American society, one of the symptoms of which was, in the eyes of Emerson and some of his contemporaries (Cooper, Thoreau), the atrophy of individuality. In a country considered to be the embodiment of democratic ideals in Europe, phenomena were discovered that were **considered worrisome** by the most sensitive observers and historians of social mores.

In the essay *Self-Reliance*, the writer's concern is clearly that the personality in America was deformed, merged with the masses. Emerson claimed that **people were** becoming one face (Kateb 56). Sometimes, Emerson resorted to powerful means to **support** the basic thesis - the need to educate the individual, this unique creation of free will, intellect, and high citizenship. The writer linked the dignity of a person with unconditional submission to the voice of conscience, which he considered the voice of God in the soul of man. He formulates the principles of spiritual individualism as a property of an honest and conscientious personality that is able to distinguish good from evil on his own without referring to the messages of the president or the manifestos of political parties. He believed that there is nothing more sacred than the purity of the soul, and we need to follow its 'orders' and, thus, we will deserve the approval of the world; good and evil are only words that we easily transfer from one concept to another. Good is only that which is consistent with one's principles. Meeting evil, we must behave as if everything around us is ephemeral and insignificant except ourselves (Kateb 52).

To understand these words as a manifestation of moral relativism would be a great simplification. On the contrary, they condemn this dangerous tendency. An innate moral sense, conscience, confidence in the Mind, intuitive consciousness of what is Good and Truth - all this helps, according to the writer's deep conviction, to see low motives and selfish motives behind the screen of lofty words and loud slogans.

In Emerson's teaching, the idea of public service is imprinted. A person must have the courage to do what he considers a civic duty, without regard to the prevailing views and institutions. Individualism, understood as a similar way of thinking and behavior, is unconditionally moral, and, sometimes, acquires a touch of genuine heroism. The practice of "self-confidence" makes a person great, Emerson said, and the fear of following the dictates of the inner voice kills the person in him.

The theme of man and the crowd always interested the writer. He began to develop it in early public appearances in the 1830s. In the lecture about the present age (1837), he said that the crowd is a mass of people who are not personalities, dangerous in their unanimity and lack of spirituality, for they are capable of any destructive actions. Real life convinced him that many of his compatriots have eye bandage: at best, they see only what they are allowed to see. Too many blindly obey group interests that run counter to the interests of the nation. This was the case, in particular, during the wide propaganda campaign that accompanied the US aggression in Mexico in 1846, or in the 50s, after Congress passed the law on fugitive slaves.

The social situation of those years put people in front of the choice: to be silent accomplices in crimes or to decide on civil protest. Every thinking person, faced with organized violence - physical or spiritual - had to make a choice, and Emerson helped many. His moral philosophy contained a profound analysis of the phenomenon, which in sociology of the 20th century is called social conformism (Paul 120).

The study of conformism as a phenomenon of mass psychology led Emerson to understand the need for civil disobedience, although he did not use these words. The meaning of his 'preaching' of "self-reliance" consisted precisely in calling for a civil protest that did not translate into forms of violence, - to individual refusal to support the unjust actions of the authorities.

In 1841, Emerson put forward a thesis, the meaning of which was that any state **was** unjust, and, therefore, one should not blindly obey the law. The logical development of this **thought was** the essay *Self-Reliance*, where he spoke about the responsibility of man primarily to his conscience. Any laws, except those that we recognize above ourselves, are ridiculous – Emerson stated (Emerson 1883, 52). In his view, these were the laws of higher justice, not subject to the will of the legislator or official, a certain moral absolute. The categorical imperative, formulated in the essay, presupposes indispensable social activity of the individual. For Emerson, "self-reliance" was identical with spiritual non-conformism, heroism, while being directly opposite to selfishness.

As György Lukács points out, Leo Tolstoy, who highly appreciated Emerson's essay, saw in him the expression of his own thoughts. Tolstoy's nonconformity, both civil and religious, had something in common with the rebellion of Thoreau, Emerson **or** Parker. The echo of the disputes raging in America about the correlation of true wisdom and political expediency, human institutions and the highest moral law was recoiled to Russia, repeatedly reinforced, in the teachings of Tolstoy (Lukacs 1973).

However, in Emerson's teaching about self-reliance, there was also another aspect. The philosopher reflected in it the traits of the American national character inherent in the 'man who made himself.' This is entrepreneurship, the independence of action, a kind of 'economic individualism,' the perseverance and courage of the pioneer and even some kind of adventurism. This spirit was peculiar not only to the pioneers who **populated** the Far West, but also the Americans who inhabited the middle and eastern states, business people, energetic persons who were the creators of their destiny. "Self-reliance" meant for them a support for their own strength, practical grasp, firmness of spirit, and endurance.

The idealization of such a typically American phenomenon as the “man who made himself” is neighbor in Emerson's views with an aversion to compassion, and charity. He was alien to the ethics of compassion, which in Europe was developed by Schopenhauer and which was reflected, for example, in Dostoevsky's novels. The faults of Emerson's moral philosophy become obvious if one compares his central ethical doctrine with the moral preaching of the great Russian writer. Focusing on the laws of nature, where the struggle for survival dominates, Emerson believed that in society too, people should not artificially create obstacles to the formation of character. Helping the poor, the weak, compassion, and pity, in his opinion, are harmful things. In this respect, he anticipated Nietzsche with his cult of the strong and contempt for the weak.

An important part of Emerson's ethical program was the notion of friendship and love as steps in the process of improvement. At the same time, Emerson's views had a clearly expressed teleological character. Love, for the writer, is not an irrational and blind instinct for procreation, as for Schopenhauer, neither a biological instinct, as it is for Nietzsche, Freud, the social Darwinists, but the instrument of all-good Providence in achieving its goal of creating a harmonious society. Passion, Emerson (1965) writes, “like a certain divine rage and enthusiasm, seizes on man at one period, and works a revolution in his mind and body,” “enhances the power of the senses, opens the imagination, adds to his character heroic and sacred attributes, establishes marriage, and gives permanence to human society” (Emerson 161).

In his analysis of Emerson, Lawrence Buell makes the argument that, in the understanding of friendship, the writers-transcendentalists converged in the main. For example, this topic was elaborated by Henry David Thoreau - another bright representative of transcendentalism along with Emerson, the youngest member of the Transcendental club, founded in 1836 (Emerson also was a member of this club). They saw in it the second stage of the “erotic way of cognition,” the stage of man's ascent to perfection (Buell 368). An excited, confessional intonation, a quivering feeling, similar to falling in love, sounds in both Emerson's essays devoted to friendship.

There is an opinion that the writer did not know human nature well and built his utopia on the shaky foundation of idealized ideas about humans and the world. However, it is not so. In the diary entry of October 12, 1838 we can read a curious confession: “The nature of man he knew well [here, Emerson writes about the “scientist” in general, but also implies himself, as is evident from the following words], the insanity that comes to inaction and tradition, and knew well that when their dream and routine were disturbed, like bats and

owls and nocturnal beasts they would howl and shriek and fly at the torch-bearer. But he saw plainly that under this their distressing disguise of bird-form and beast form, the divine features of man were hidden, and he felt that he would dare to be so much their friend as to do them this violence to drag them to the day and to the healthy air and water of God, that the unclean spirits that had possessed them might be exorcised and depart.” (Perry 1937, 137).

This purely personal, unreported recognition says that Emerson was not an idealist “in the clouds,” as he was often represented by contemporaries and critics. His optimism was a deliberate and deeply suffered position.

Emerson paid much attention to the development of aesthetic views, to which he devoted several essays. In his view, art can shorten the gap between humanitarian culture and scientific knowledge which can be fatal for civilization. It should bring up a man of culture (Emerson 1883, 86). At the same time, he treated “culture” extensively - as a humanitarian way of thinking, reliance on intuition, civic courage, and the desire for harmonious coexistence with nature, philosophical tolerance, and dislike of fanaticism in any of its manifestations. He deduced the tasks of art from the triad-unity of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. The first goal of art, according to Emerson, is the knowledge of truth, inaccessible to ordinary knowledge. Hence, there is the idea of the prophetic function of art and the special role of the poet-prophet. The second goal of art he considered the creation of imperishable beauty, which bears the imprint of the highest perfection. In *Nature*, he gave the following definition of beauty (1965): “Beauty is the mark God sets upon virtue” (Emerson 25). In this brief formula, the writer expressed a postulate which was important for him - the connection between the categories of ethical and aesthetic. Emerson's aesthetics had a clearly expressed ethical character, for he considered upbringing to be the third goal of art. The purpose of the poet is to serve as a mentor and teacher, who, knowing the truth, passes it on to people, inspires them with an idea of the beauty of the moral.

The didactic orientation of Emerson's creativity is the result of the fact that he was a follower of the Puritan tradition, which had, among its representatives, famous New-English theologians and preachers, Cotton and Increase Mather, Jonathan Edwards. Not supporting their ideas about the world, Emerson gave due educational role to Puritan literature, which propagated Christian morality.

He laid out his aesthetic views in his early lectures and speeches *The Method of Nature* (1841), in two collections of essays (Essays, 1841, 1844). The first of them ended with an essay on “Art,” the second one was opened with the essay “The Poet.”

1.5. Marx' social philosophy

The main philosophical idea of Marxism is the materialist understanding of history. Marx gave its substantiation in the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), introducing for the first time such philosophical and sociological concepts as "productive forces," "production relations," "basis," "superstructure", "social revolution," and others. An important achievement of Marxism is the doctrine of the repetition of history, the existence of objective laws in it that can be learned and then use the knowledge gained for the accelerated development of society. Hence, there is the idea of Marx about the inevitability of the onset of communism and its victory throughout the world, about the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat that is transitional to this victory.

Marx set his goal not just to study the laws governing production, distribution, and exchange of material goods, but to discover the laws of the development of socio-economic formations, more broadly, the laws of the development of human society. Unlike representatives of classical political economy, who viewed the capitalist mode of production as eternal and unchanging, Marx pointed to its transient nature, and, namely from these positions, he investigated it in his works, in particular, in *Capital*.

For the philosophical-historical method of Marx, a very important method is the identification of mechanisms for the transition from phenomenon to essence. The fact is that, behind every phenomenon of social life, there is an essence - this or that form of socio-historical practice, which makes it possible for this or that phenomenon to manifest itself in the immediate life of the available given, namely, as this particular phenomenon. In this respect, according to Jon Elster, the methodology of Marx's socio-historical research consists in seeing in each phenomenon of social and spiritual life not only the phenomenally given surface, the "deceptive appearance of things," but also explore those existential foundations that stand beyond that phenomenal appearance (Elster 49-53).

This moment of Marxian methodology can be called a phenomenological-essential analysis of a phenomenon in which the same phenomenon is viewed both as a phenomenon and as an entity (essence).

Another important method of the general philosophical-historical methodology of Marx is the dialectic of the abstract and concrete, which consists of the following methodological steps of the study:

- The ascent from the abstract to the concrete: the movement of the study of socio-historical being from the level of the social formation (general), through the national specifics (special), to everyday life (single);

- The ascent from the concrete to the abstract (to which the researchers of the philosophy of Marx often do not pay attention) means the analysis of social being in the reverse perspective: from the daily routine and everyday life of concrete living individuals to the social formation, from the individual, through the special, to the universal (Mi and Mao 73-76);

- The dynamic synthesis of these two sides on the basis of the subject-activity theory and the inclusion of this synthesis in the context of concrete historical research, in which there is revealing of regularities of the emergence, development, and death of the establishing social totality (werden sein), which is understood as a process (Elster 1985).

That is, it is a method of explicating the processes of historical constituting a social phenomenon in the processes of historicity: 1) the phenomenon is first analyzed as arising in the course of the ascendant process from everyday to formation; the reasons and conditions for its emergence in everyday practices are revealed and then extrapolated to wider spheres of social life; 2) then, the same phenomenon is investigated as being formed already from the side of the formation structures up to its universal conditioning; 3) the synthesis reveals the unity of these processes and establishes a real history of this phenomenon (Chitty and Mcivor 2009).

Therefore, in accordance with the philosophy and methodology of Marxism, the essence of any social phenomenon can be understood only from the mechanisms of its specific historical establishing and the identification of diverse connections, relationships, and interactions with other elements of the social system; what specific place does it occupy in the structure of social reality, and what are the attributive and accidental properties of the phenomenon under investigation in one or another context.

2. Analytical Part

2.1. Emersonian perception of history

Central in the constructions of Emerson was the figure of the creator of art - a poet, an artist, endowed with a special gift of foresight, an intermediary between God and man, the

creator of the beautiful, guide and preacher of transcendent wisdom, which he comprehended intuitively, with the help of Reason. Creativity of the artist and art are subordinated to the natural laws of inequality, graduation, hierarchy, in which there are higher and lower stages, as all things in nature and society are in different degrees of remoteness from the source of divine wisdom - in other words, the super-soul. The poet, in Emerson's aesthetic system, stands closest to this absolute essence. Such a perception of the place of the poet in society did not contradict the democratic convictions of the writer. Equality, he believed, is a social and political category. In art, there are its own, specific laws; in it, there is no equality due to his inseparable connection with nature, which does not know equality. However, a special position imposes enormous social responsibility on the poet. The poet, said Emerson in the lecture *The Method of Nature*, is the guardian and defender of spirituality in a country that is engulfed in a frenzy of accumulation, struck by greed, experiencing self-doubt.

The moral utopia of Emerson represents the reverse side of social criticism of reality. The writer worked out the 'charter' of the "correct life" and strove to follow it, although he did not do it nearly as consistently as Alcott or Thoreau.

In connection with the characteristic of Emerson's aesthetic views, there is one more thing to be said: about the 'prophetic' character of his talent. "America," he remarked, "is a poem in our eyes" ... "and it will not wait long for metres" (Waggoner 1974, 41). Like John the Baptist, who foretold the coming of Christ, Emerson predicted the appearance of the Great American Poet. Ten years after the publication of Emerson's essay in the American literary horizon, a 'star of the first magnitude' - Walt Whitman - was lit. The author of *Leaves of Grass* sang America, having executed Emerson's 'order' addressed to the future poet, "to sing" the rafts floating on our rivers, the stands at political rallies, and the speeches that they utter, our fisheries, our Indians and Negroes ... , the greasers' quarrel, the fearful complacency of our venerable citizens, the industry of the North, the plantations of the South, the forest of the West, where the axes are clashing, Oregon and Texas (Emerson 1883, 37).

The development and establishment of the poetic talent of Whitman, Thoreau, and Dickinson took place under the direct influence of Emerson's artistic practice and his philosophical thought. His preaching of "self-reliance," addressed to the artist and poet, played not the least role in this: "O poet, but persist. Say 'It is in me, and shall out.' Stand there, balked and dumb, stuttering and stammering, hissed and hooted, stand and strive, until at last rage draws out of thee that dream-power which every night shows thee is thine own" (Emerson 1883, 40).

In comparing scientific facts and phenomena of spiritual life and revealing their “identity,” Emerson saw a way of humanizing science. Once, in a letter, he noticed that great discoveries in the field of natural sciences will require poetry of appropriate height and scale, or finish it off (Whicher 110). The beauty of scientific discoveries fascinated him, and he came to the idea of the need to combine science and poetry. It is no accident that he called Newton, Herschel, and Laplace “poets.” The consequence of this view was the widespread use of scientific facts in the language of poetry to create symbols, metaphors, comparisons. Here are some examples of how concrete objects and facts of science began to play the role of symbols, give material for metaphors.

Emerson described the nature that he considered a materialization of the spirit, in particular, like this: what once existed in thought as a pure law is now embodied in Nature (1965): it already existed in the mind in the form of a solution, but now, as a result of evaporation, it turns into a bright sediment, which is the world (Emerson 188). In the other case (1965), he is equaling the natural and the cosmic - in nature there is nothing complete – he writes, but the tendency is visible in everything - in planets, planetary systems, constellations, the whole nature develops like the field of corn in July, becomes something else, is in the process of rapid transformation. The embryo strives to become a human, like that bundle of light that we call a nebula, strives to become a ring, comet, ball, and give life to new stars (Emerson 194). Reflecting on certain spiritual forces capable of keeping society from decay, he develops the thought in the following way: since the solar system can exist without artificial limitations (Waggoner 1974, 210), then similar ties should operate in the public system. Having opened them, one can abolish coercion by the state.

The central ethical doctrine of Emerson is illustrated by the above-mentioned *Self-Reliance*. To substantiate it, the poet finds images in nature. He compares the voice of God in the soul with the innate instinct of the bird, with the behavior of the magnetic needle pointing unmistakably to the north, claiming that, in good deeds, he is always guided by this voice (Leer 22).

Emerson not only managed to catch the spirit of the times, to capture its concrete signs in images that still do not lose artistic value, but also express eternal truths in poetry, which, for the depth of philosophical thought and the freshness of artistic form, was appreciated by many great poets, ‘heirs’ of the Emersonian tradition.

In the philosophical system of Emerson, a special place is occupied by views that can be called his social philosophy. In the most concise form, they are presented in the book *The Conduct of Life* (1860), which was the result of the writer's philosophical reflections on the

essence of life, the being of the individual, and the social community, freedom of will and predestination, the relationship of man as a biological species with nature.

The Calvinistic doctrine of predestination was always alien to the writer, but he most clearly formulated the idea of free will namely in this book, in the essay *Fate*. He considered the will in two plans - social and metaphysical, which allowed him to 'reconcile' freedom and necessity. If, at the social level, humans and society can decide their own destiny, then at the "cosmic" level, there is only the good will of the Creator, which Emerson called "the beautiful necessity." The ways of Providence to their goal are inscrutable, abounding in potholes and ruts - Emerson writes, - and there is no need to embellish its huge and complex tools, to clothe a cruel benefactor in a clean shirt and white tie of theology student (Lieber 13-14).

The study of the laws of evolution had a great influence on the worldview of the writer and made him look more materialistically at nature and man. He came close to recognizing the biological concept of life, according to which the universal law is the struggle for survival - in the sea and on land, in the micro- and macrocosm, in nature and society. He tried to understand the human as a biological being; he talked about biological determinism, genetic code, heredity, temperament. At this, he referred to the authority of the founder of phrenology, Johann Spurzheim, who believed that the fate of a person is predetermined from birth and laid in the lobes of his brain. Unlike Spurzheim, Emerson did not believe that the influence of heredity is decisive, but he did amend his doctrine of boundless optimism: previously, we underestimated the power of heredity and thought that a positive force [Mind] can solve everything, but now we see that the negative force, the force of circumstances, is half the matter – he writes (Lieber 20).

The biological life force acts, from the point of view of Emerson, not only in the life of an individual, but also of a whole people or race. In the existence of strong and weak races, he saw the manifestation of natural laws. He considered one of the strong races to be Anglo-Saxons, about which he wrote, like Carlyle, with undisguised admiration - the cold and sea elements will foster the Anglo-Saxon race, the builder of the empire. Nature cannot afford this race to die out (Lieber 1973, 36).

Emerson's racial preferences were devoid of ideological categoricity, as it was the case with Nietzsche or the social Darwinists. In a speech in 1844 on the occasion of the decade of the abolition of slavery in the West Indies, he said that if a black race carries in itself the necessary features of a new civilization, then, for the sake of their preservation, no evil, no force, no circumstances can harm it. It will survive and play its role in history

(Ortega and Gasset 172). The writer viewed the historical events of previous eras in Europe and America as a process that took place under the sign of the emergence, powerful development, and spread of one race, which, however, will inevitably give way to another one over time.

The biological concept of life is part of Emerson's worldview, 'staining' him, and it was somehow unusual for romanticist tones. In the book, at least in some chapters, we hear not a preacher interpreting the spiritual and the transcendent, but a philosopher for whom biological forces are the determining ones. Behind the struggle of natural forces, he saw the good plan of Providence: the whole cycle of animal life - tit for tat, a universal brutal struggle for food, the cry of the vanquished and the triumphant roar of the victors, until at last the entire animal world, its whole chemical mass becomes soft and cleansed for the higher goal - this cycle, seen from a long distance, pleases the eye (Lieber 39-40). There is some resemblance to the ideas of Jack London's *Stories of the North*, in which the biological concept of life received art embodiment. However, if cruelty in nature, according to Emerson, is a manifestation of beneficial necessity, then Jack London, in the struggle for a place in the sun, saw the cruel law of a cruel world.

In the second essay of the book, entitled *Power*, the concept of power appears as a synonym for the life force. Relations between people and groups of people - as Emerson saw them - are built on strength: in the life competition, the strongest wins. In the foreground, Emerson now has other heroes than those he wrote about in *Self-Reliance* or *American Scholar*.

In his first works *Nature* and *American Scholar*, Emerson expressed deep dissatisfaction with his contemporary American life: there are no people ... a person is just a machine that earns money (Packer 1982). In the lecture *Literary Ethics*, Emerson severely condemns the 'preachers' of moneymaking, the morals of the proprietary. *The Young American* shows his concept of the historical development of mankind. Emerson addresses the American youth with an appeal to seek spiritual values, strive for a different life. He also comes to the conclusion that capitalism will come down from the stage. He sees the new society as an alliance of farmers, traders, and artisans.

However, later, the imagination of the writer was possessed by strong, energetic individuals, ruthless towards the weak and less fortunate. He likes adventurers who are "created" for war, sea, gold prospecting, hunting and clearing forests, for dangerous and risky businesses and a life-rich adventure. Their explosive energy (Porte 1973, 63) should receive a 'productive output,' and the task of society is to direct it in the right course.

Primitive strength, masculinity (virility) acquire, in his eyes, a positive social significance. Moreover, the desire for power, the possession of wealth and property, are no longer considered as something unworthy, but as a need for a strong and healthy organism.

In the chapter *Wealth in The Conduct of Life*, Emerson conducts a hidden polemic with Alcott and Thoreau, whose ideals of voluntary poverty seem far from indisputable to him. Wealth, in Emerson's understanding, is first of all, freedom - freedom to travel, to engage in the occupation that a person likes, enjoy music, art, literature. Material wealth makes it possible to realize one's plans, while poverty limits the freedom of a person, humiliates him. Here, Emerson disagreed with his friends, Thoreau and Alcott, who considered freedom a state of mind, independent of external conditions.

2.2. Money, property, and capitalism in Emersonian philosophy

Being faithful to the rule of considering each phenomenon from different points of view, Emerson made no exception for concepts such as money and property. Their positive evaluation is already contained in the speech *The Method of Nature*. Now, he treats capital as a necessary foundation of culture and civilization, and competition and trade - like things that contribute to the prosperity of the nation. If money is not an end in itself but a way of gaining freedom and developing a culture, it should be regarded positively. Emerson states that wealth is moral (Poirier 29), while specifying the socially active function of money. He acts in an unusual role for him, thinking about the intention of capital and free competition, about the danger of “enslaving” the economy: “Wealth brings with it its own checks and balances. The basis of political economy is non-interference. The only safe rule is found in the self-adjusting meter of demand and supply. Do not legislate. Meddle, and you snap the sinews with your sumptuary laws. Give no bounties: make equal laws: secure life and property, and you need not give alms. Open the doors of opportunity to talent and virtue, and they will do themselves justice, and property will not be in bad hands” (Emerson 2000, 622).

The writer was not afraid to destroy the image of the transcendental philosopher, who was associated in the representation of Americans with the name Emerson for three decades already. He approved the competition, condemned state interference in the economy (“the basis of political economy is non-interference in the free market”), expressed the conviction

that private entrepreneurship is the only reliable mechanism for self-regulation of the economy, the basic law of which is demand and sentence.

The problems Emerson touched on would be raised in the journalism of the second half of the 19th century, in books and essays by William Sumner, John Fisk, Leicester Ward, Benjamin Kidd, Thorstein Veblen and other lesser representatives of social Darwinism, and in the first decades of the 20th century, in the journalism, stories and novels of Jack London and the novels of Dreiser. Speaking about the continuity of philosophical thought in the middle and the end of the century, it is important to emphasize the difference in the basic principles on which Emerson's worldview and, say, William Sumner was based. Adherence to the ideas of Neoplatonism did not allow him to cross the line separating transcendentalism from the ideology of social Darwinism.

In the 1960s, the absolute ideal for Emerson was natural harmony and an endless variety of the natural world. He affirmed the idea that the laws of nature, to which “both atoms and galaxies” are equally subject (Buell 44), must be accepted as a given, to know them and to obey them for their own good and the public good, because “the actions of individual people are consistent with the life of the solar system and the laws of equilibrium prevailing in nature” (Bercovitch 35). The outlines of moral utopia in the book are blurred, and the features of “organic mythology,” which were less noticeable earlier, appear more clearly.

Emerson develops a “philosophy of life,” which could serve as a practical tool for people of a wide variety of social and cultural backgrounds. The main principle that man must follow on his life path and nation in his development, he considered to be the need to learn from nature and follow its laws.

In Emerson's eyes, the pursuit of the good of human and society is the goal, and the means to achieve it are, no less, the development of commodity-money relations, investment of capital, expansion of the sphere of production, natural competition, which should not be hampered by state protectionism. His recommendations were not only literal, but also metaphorical (Jacobson 1993).

2.3. “Ascension” as natural development of personality and social organism

The main rule of the science of life was “ascension”: spiritual development, moral perfection of the personality and harmonious, “natural” development of the social organism. To illustrate this thought, Emerson builds a detailed metaphor, which is worth it to bring it out almost completely. “The merchant has but one rule, absorb and invest: he is to be capitalist: the scraps and filings must be gathered back into the crucible; the gas and smoke must be burned, and earnings must not go to increase expense, but to capital again. Well, the man must be capitalist. Will he spend his income, or will he invest? His body and every organ is under the same law. His body is a jar, in which the liquor of life is stored. Will he spend for pleasure? The way to ruin is short and facile. Will he not spend, but hoard for power? It passes through the sacred fermentations, by that law of Nature whereby everything climbs to higher platforms, and bodily vigor becomes mental and moral vigor. The bread he eats is first strength and animal spirits: it becomes, in higher laboratories, imagery and thought; and in still higher results, courage and endurance” (Emerson 2000, 641-642).

So, the spiritual is emphasized as the supreme value. Utopia is not inferior to its positions, acquiring only other outlines. In the chapters *Culture, Behavior, Beauty* the writer repeats the ideas of the early essays, speaks about self-improvement, the development of free, independent thought, the purifying effect of beauty (Emerson 1870). Let's pay attention to one more important thought. Emerson writes about the need to reflect life with greater fidelity to nature than was the case in the aesthetics of Romanticism. Divine Providence - he writes, - does not hide from people the diseases, the ugliness, or the vices of society. It manifests itself in passions, wars, entrepreneurship, in the pursuit of power and pleasure, in hunger and poverty, in tyranny, in literature and art. So, we should not hesitate to describe things honestly, such as they are ... “The solar system has no anxiety about its reputation...” (Emerson 1883, 202).

Emerson appeared to be able to observe life and feel changes in public moods. His works are a kind of art document of the era. The time he wrote about was the decline of morality, connected with the decline of faith, the disintegration of ties between people, and the intensification of “materialism.” The disbelief and skepticism that prevailed in society forced him to proclaim again his own symbol of faith (he founded the all-presence and omnipotence of God in the reaction of every atom in Nature (Emerson 2006)) and talk about the moral dignity of human and the necessity of non-conformism. Namely, these qualities characterize, in his eyes, a person of culture and religion.

The most fruitful period of creativity for Emerson falls on the 30-60-ies of the 19th century. That was the time of the escalation of the conflict between the North and the South,

which culminated in the Civil War. The turbulent events of those years forced the Americans to comprehend their place in the world, to compare their history with the destinies of other nations. In America, there was debate about the meaning of history, its interpretation, the nature and direction of historical development. Emerson reflected on these crucial questions.

He set out his philosophy of history with sufficient consistency in a number of essays. Like his contemporaries and romantic writers, he tried to 'catch' internal patterns under the surface of events; he tried to establish a connection between the past and the present. Against a purely "eventual" approach to the history peculiar to the American scientists, he spoke in an essay that opened the first collection of his essays and was called *History*. "He who cannot unravel with over wise comprehension the facts... of the era, he serves them. The facts take him prisoner" (Horstmann 49). According to the writer, to see behind the phenomena, the principle is to find that thread of Ariadne, which will help to understand the maze of disparate facts and formulate regularity. To make history acquire meaning, the researcher must find a method. In search of this method, Emerson turned to Europe (Baum 1973).

Ideas of the philosophy of history, developed by Kant, Herder, Schelling and Hegel, appeared to be consonant with the thinker. He saw in them confirmation of his own thoughts about the laws of history and social progress, the nature and sources of historical development. Like Hegel, he considered World Reason the driving force behind history. The American philosopher believed that the World Reason (he used other concepts - the world soul, the infinite supreme essence, the supreme spirit, the super-soul) directs the development of mankind, determines the time of the fall and flowering of civilizations, ensures the continuity of historical epochs. History is a record of the deeds of the World Reason, he wrote. All world laws owed him their existence; they all more or less clearly express the dictates of this supreme entity (Emerson 1883, 11). In the struggle of human passions and interests, Emerson saw the action of the World spirit. Hegel's thought was close to him: individuals and peoples, seeking and achieving their own, at the same time, are the means and tools of something higher and distant, about which they know nothing and what they unconsciously perform (Cavell 1988).

Whatever aspect of life and human activity an American thinker could analyze, in everything, he saw the action of a moral law guided by the World mind. He was close to the 'spirit' of the current European philosophy of history, which researchers called "eudemonic" (Howe 1986). Its representatives considered the force that guided the historical process, "intentionally all-good" and all-powerful.

In understanding progress as the realization of the principle of freedom, Emerson followed Hegel. In world history, he saw the movement of mankind towards a state that will be characterized by a harmonious connection between the individual and the social, the lack of coercion, the altruistic ministry of one's neighbor. He attributed the achievement of the ideal of freedom to a distant future. However, the question arises - how did he imagine the process of historical development? The answer to this question can be found in his lecture *The Conservative* (1841). In it, he said that the source of development is the struggle of antagonistic principles - past and future, conservatism and radicalism, necessity and freedom (Gray 1917).

The American state seemed to him an inevitable stage in the historical path of the nation. With philosophical calm he observed the dramatic events of political life, seeing in them all the same "beautiful necessity" (Howe 1986), which protects a person and his property from the arbitrariness of the authorities ..., determines the forms and methods of government corresponding the nature of each nation (Emerson 1883, 198).

His attitude toward American democracy was ambivalent. From the point of view of common sense, he believed, US state institutions are successfully performing their functions. However, to look at them from the standpoint of higher justice and moral law, it turns out that they are far from perfect. He saw the necessary historical development in the struggle of the parties, but, on the other hand, he severely judged the democrats for corruption and demagoguery, and Whigs - for lack of adherence to the republican principles, including the struggle for civil rights, freedom of trade, broad electoral rights, and reform of criminal code.

In publicistic sharp manner, he expressed his distrust of political figures in the essay *Politics*. For him, it is a sphere of expediency, an area dominated by lowly desires. Non-participation in such activities was his principle, and, in this, he followed Carlyle, who did not believe in the possibility of reforming society 'with the help of a ballot box' (Emerson 2006, 139-145).

Emerson's ambivalent relationship to American democracy is explained by the double focus of his vision. In creating an ethical utopia, he drew a social ideal, strikingly unlike American reality, a comparison which revealed the imperfection of American democracy. However, pondering over the historical problems, he covered by the view the processes that took place not tens but hundreds of years ago and involved different peoples and civilizations. This approach revealed the positive aspects of the American state.

Emerson was alien to a metaphysical view of history as a chronicle of crimes, a long and monotonous conglomeration of misfortunes, as the Enlighteners saw it. The past, in his

eyes, was heterogeneous; good and evil in it are inextricably linked, and their confrontation determines the progressive course of history. For him, the doctrine of the “useful past,” formulated by Rufus Choute, a brilliant orator, lawyer and politician, was unacceptable. He claimed that it is necessary to cover only the bright sides of the past and to keep silent about the dark ones. However, Emerson understood that arbitrary selection and interpretation of events, the silence of old crimes, and such facts as persecution of dissidents, religious fanaticism, and Salem processes, is fraught with moral losses for future generations. He saw the task of the writer, philosopher, and historian in recreation of the true picture of the American past, in which the ups and downs of the human spirit alternate with the shameful evidence of mass psychosis, fanaticism and cruelty.

Emerson solves the methodological problem of mastering history, explains the significance that, in his eyes, is inherent in historical knowledge in the process of personality formation. In the foreground, as always, there are moral tasks. The writer seeks to discover analogies between different epochs, to emphasize the universal character of the historical process, its “identity.” The writer's intention was to explain history, based on the individual experience of the person. At this, private life, the “biography,” acquires depth and sublimity. Namely, in this sense, history can be “useful.”

In the essay *History*, there are clear traces of the influence of Kant, who considered time a category of the transcendence. Having perceived the lesson of the German philosopher, Emerson regarded time also as a category of thinking, and not an objective property of matter. He seemed to “dissolve” the past in the present, “destroy” time, in order to emphasize the significance of consciousness, the experience of each individual: “When a thought of Plato becomes a thought to me,- when a truth that fired the soul of Pindar fires mine, time is no more.” (Emerson 1883 26-27). Each person, according to Emerson, can survive the history of civilization, because, in his mind, there is the whole of humanity's past, and personal experience contains parallels to historical events. All history becomes subjective; in other words there is properly no history, only biography (Emerson 1883, 15). In the 20th century, the English scholar Roger Collingwood, who developed an idealistic postulate of the identity of the subject and object, expressed a similar view of history as “replaying the past” (Collingwood as cited in Bloom 1985).

In the works of Emerson 40-ies, there was an antinomy: “history is subjective” (*History*) and “history is objective” (*Politics, The Conservative*). The view of Emerson about “anti-historicism” can arise if one relies on only one essay, *Nature*, and does not take into account others, as well as his lectures and essays, where he often expressed his views on

history. Meanwhile, he was consistent in his own way. Trying to expand the boundaries of subjective cognition, he combined the phenomena of the cosmic and atomic levels. In doing this, he was assisted by the doctrine of conformity: since the human soul is part of the super-soul in which all the facts of history are originally contained, individual destiny reflects, as in a drop of water, the entire world history. World history is also related to life (“biography”), as a macrocosm and a microcosm. Between general human experience and individual destiny, there is an analogy that one needs to learn to notice, and doing so will help more “self-reliance.” Thus, Emerson's historical views merge with his ethical program. Reading history should be active, not passive - he believed - then, the muse of history will be forced to reveal to us its prophecies (Porte 1982, 13).

The basis on which Emerson built his philosophy of history was the idea of the world as the unity (identity) of the ideal and the material. For him, history and human destiny exist simultaneously but in different historical dimensions. One is universal, the other is singular; the one belongs to Eternity while the other belongs to Time. Changing the perspective, Emerson brought incredibly remote phenomena and found in them analogies with modern life.

It should be said that Hegel's ideas, the comprehension of history and social development, the nature and influence of commodity-money relations, as well as the question of moral requirements to a human, were also reflected in the philosophy of Marxism, but in a different vein.

2.4. Marxist dialectics

The dialectical nature of Marxist philosophy is connected with the materialist processing of Hegel's idealistic dialectic, as well as with the dialectical processing of metaphysical materialism.

Marx can be considered a disciple of Hegel who went beyond his teacher. Marx, sometimes, called himself a Hegelian, or at least he gave himself reason to consider himself to be a Hegelian. He was considered Hegelian by Engels and others, but the connection between Marxism and Idealism, usually, is very exaggerated. The inscription Engels made in 1891 in his portrait is known: “We, German socialists are proud of the fact that we are derived not only from Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte, and Hegel” (Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen 25). If we understand this in the sense of the

historical genesis of socialism in general, then this is quite true; if this is understood in the sense of direct spiritual continuity, then this completely does not correspond to the real relation of Marxism and Idealism. In fact, there is no connection between German classical idealism and Marxism, in particular, between Hegel and Marx. Marxism grew on the basis of decomposition, already completely the collapse of German idealism. If this connection exists and is quite obvious in Lassalle, it is absolutely obvious in Rodbertus, then, in Marx we seem to return to the age of enlightenment, 18th-century French materialism, which spiritually precedes the century of classical idealism.

Marx is usually considered the representative of the so-called Left Hegelianism. From Hegel, directly opposite currents to the right and left came, and among the representatives of the left wing, there were Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, Strauss, and others. Concerning these thinkers, one can directly state their genesis, their connection with Hegel. However, we find none of this in Marx. The closeness of Marx and Hegel is expressed in external and internal signs, primarily, in certain peculiarities of style - with some Hegelian expressions, the chapter *On the Forms of Value* was written in the 1st chapter of Volume 1 of *Capital*. Marx himself admitted in the preface to the second volume of *Capital* that here he “flirted” with imitation of Hegel (Perry 2002). This imitation is purely external, verbal. Of course, being in the atmosphere of the University of Berlin in the 1940s, where Hegel ‘reigned,’ Marx could not remain alien to this ‘acquaintance’ with Hegel. However, this external, partial imitation of Hegel's style, in effect, ends almost all of Hegel's influence on Volume 1 of *Capital*, and this external imitation, of course, speaks against the very possibility of his internal influence, rather than for it.

The so-called dialectical method is much more important for solving the question of the closeness of Marx and Hegel. Marx himself wrote that his dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian method, but it is also its direct opposite (Blackledge 2011). However, this expression is still quite soft. In fact, what Marx calls his dialectical method, not only does not constitute an opposite, but simply has nothing in common with the Hegelian dialectical method. It must be firmly established and remembered that Hegel has no special dialectical method, and not only does not, but cannot have. What is called in Hegel's method is its metaphorical ontology, that is, the image of the development of concepts, the image of their movement, arising from their essence. As Russian philosopher Sergei Bulgakov believed, this is not at all a method of cognition but the metaphysical essence itself, and the movement of concept is accomplished by thesis and antithesis not because dialectics is the very nature of Hegelian concepts. On this basis, it is simply

impossible to separate this method of Hegelian concepts movement from the very teaching of this concept, and, therefore, one can speak only about the method conditionally or by misunderstanding (Rockmore 2002).

Traditionally, it is believed that the following three provisions have great significance in Marx's theory:

- The doctrine of surplus value (the political economy of capitalism),
- Materialistic understanding of history (historical materialism),
- The doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat (Scientific Communism)

2.5. Marxist perception of history: history as class struggle

The materialist conception of history was first described systematically in the work *German Ideology* which was written in collaboration with Engels. Marx's social philosophy was expressed in the preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*, *the Manifesto of the Communist Party*, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, *Capital*, and Engels's *Anti-Duhring*, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, and the *End of Classical German Philosophy*, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, and other works.

As it is known, according to the social philosophy of Marxism, it is not the consciousness of people that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness. The basis of social life is the mode of production, which is the unity of the productive forces and production relations. It determines the spheres of politics, law, morals, philosophy, religion, and art, which, in turn, have an active backward impact on social being.

The materialist understanding of history, or historical materialism, is interpreted in Marxist literature as the extension of philosophical materialism to an understanding of social life. As defining categories, Karl Marx distinguishes the categories of “socio-economic formation of society,” “social relations,” “conformity to the laws of history.” With the help of these categories, he tries to trace the logic of world history as a consistent replacement of certain stages of historical development.

According to the materialist understanding of history, the determining basis of social being is material production, or the production of material goods, which every new human generation receives as a ‘legacy’ from previous generations and which it develops in order to pass on to the next generation. In the social production of their lives, people enter into the necessary, independent of their will relations - production relations, which correspond to a certain stage of development of their material productive forces. The totality of these production relations is the economic structure of society, on which the legal and political superstructure rises and to which certain forms of social consciousness correspond. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with existing production relations. From the forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then, the era of social revolution comes. With the change in the economic basis, an overturn is taking place in the whole enormous superstructure. One cannot judge such an era of an overturn according to its consciousness

(just as one cannot judge an individual person on the basis of what he thinks about himself). Consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between social productive forces and production relations.

Thus, historical materialism, for the first time in the history of social thought, connects the history of mankind with the development of social production.

The materialist understanding of history gave a clear and unambiguous answer to the question: how is it possible that people themselves create their history, if neither the external, surrounding nature, nor their own human nature is independent of them? According to this doctrine, neither this nor that determines the nature of the social order and the history of mankind, but is determined only by the development of social production, which is a two-sided historical process: on the one hand, the change of an external nature by people, and on the other, a change in human nature itself, human development.

The discovery and investigation of the social relations of production laid the foundation for a materialist understanding of history. Marx and Engels believed that labor made humans human. In the conditions of human existence, labor is not just a specific way, but is also determining of people's life. In practical activities, it realizes its social goals, satisfies needs and interests (McBride 2015).

Material production, within the framework of a materialistic understanding of history, ultimately determines all the conditions for the existence of people. Marxist philosophy has no analogues in its most important achievement; the expansion of materialism to the sphere of social phenomena. The emergence of this doctrine is objective; this is the answer to questions posed by the social philosophy of that period. Contraposing materialist conception of history to the idealistic views, Marx tried to prove that social being determines social consciousness.

The “Founding fathers” of Marxism were, originally, adherents of not just a natural-science approach (naturalism, but also evolutionism in the broad sense of the word - not only in biology). Their thinking was fundamentally Heraclitean and was permeated with the feeling that “change is the law of all things” and, moreover, that the global course of change has a certain general direction. Within this picture of the world, the question of the origin of mankind inevitably arises. Although, as Heinz Lubasz convincingly showed, Aristotle was not just a classic for Marx, but a source of direct influence (Lubasz 1977), the founders of Marxism could hardly agree with the Aristotelian doctrine of the invariance of species. Undoubtedly, if in the 1840s, Marx and Engels already had ‘at their disposal’ Darwinism

and the anthropological theory of the formation of human, they would find a link between these scientific achievements and their original concept.

However, in practice, the authors of the *Communist Manifesto* did not immediately establish this connection. Obviously, their thoughts were initially focused on history, rather than on biology and anthropology. Over time, the situation changed: the “founders” began to draw their inspiration not only from Hegel but also from Morgan (Balibar and Turner 2014). One of the most important provisions of the Manifesto is that the whole history is a history of class struggle. In one of the later editions of the book (after the death of Marx), Engels made a very substantial reservation to this thesis - he added to the words “the whole history” the following: “that is, the entire written history.”

It was meant that there is also an unwritten history covering the period before the emergence of writing, the object of which are such societies where there are no classes and class struggle, and, hence, their inevitable companions - social coercion and the state. Thus, Engels recognized the reality of “primitive communism” as the first stage of mankind, for which the absence of classes and antagonistic social contradictions is characteristic. In Soviet Marxist literature, this stage since 1920s-1930s is mentioned as a “primitive society” (Cohen 2000).

The concept of “primitive communism,” more precisely, “primitive communalism,” should not be considered an accidental build-up on Marxism, which has no semantic load. “Primitive communalism” is seen as the baseline of human history, and this category is necessary for the integrity of the Marxist socio-historical concept. When we talk about the “baseline,” we mean not only the chronological originality of “primitive communalism,” but, more importantly, the moral and theoretical meaning of this concept. It denotes a reference point not only in historical but also in normative terms. Due to it, the essence of history is revealed at the very beginning. It indicates the need not only to explain a number of phenomena, but also changes, or more precisely, corrections. This concept provides the basis for a morally-philosophical justification inherent in Marxism, which is supposedly called upon not to fulfill the obligation imposed on the outside, but to realize the deep potential of the human person, temporarily distorted by an unnatural social system.

Many are familiar with Marx on the works of Karl Popper. In the Popperian interpretation, Marxist teaching removes the ethical obligation imposed from the outside since it derives the norms of social legitimacy from the inevitability of a certain future state of society. Thus, the moral justification for certain actions turns into a kind of historical prediction, and, therefore, does not stand up to criticism, like any attempt of making

prophecy (Rockmore 2002). However, such an understanding of Marxism should be recognized as simplistic. After all, the Marxist prediction of the future is based on the reconstruction of the past; that is, at the early stages of history, according to Marx, there was a classless, free, and a harmonious society.

Hence, by this (and only this) way, it can be shown that communist social relations constitute the real ideal of humanity. In Marxism, in principle, there is no place for any obligation, no binding; moral compulsion is as alien to Marxist teaching as political coercion. The difference between being and ought is to be overcome by mankind only when it passes from prehistory to the era of true history. However, humanity already knew this state at the dawn of its historical development. Kant believed that overcoming the category of “duty,” the fusion of the concepts “I am” and “I should” is given only to the angels; Marxism asserts that this is available to man on Earth – however, before and after the period of class history, which morally can be considered as a prehistory. True history will not begin until our alienation from ourselves ceases.

2.6. Private property and alienation in Marx’ philosophy

Like Emerson, Marx paid attention to the analysis of private property and commodity production. With this analysis, Marx connected the problem of alienation.

Philosophy of the 20th century has made alienation its central concept, which it owes much of to Marx. However, Marx himself borrows it from the philosophy of Hegel and, in particular, the philosophy of Feuerbach, in which religion is understood as the alienation of human essence.

As for Marx, behind religious alienation, he sees another alienation, which Feuerbach did not notice - the alienation of real human life. Religious alienation, he writes, as such, occurs only in the sphere of consciousness, in the sphere of the inner world of humans, but economic alienation is the alienation of real life - its abolition, therefore, covers both sides (Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen 1936). Economic alienation is the basis for the alienation of real life, and the actual life of a human, according to Marx, is, first of all, his practical life. That is why Marx sees the root of all forms of alienation in the alienation of labor, and the first form of manifestation of alienation of labor is private property, which, according to Marx, is namely both the result of the alienation of labor and its basis (Balibar and Turner 2014).

Political economy, Marx observes, does not explain the fact of alienation, nor does it explain the origin of private property. This fact, writes Marx, expresses only the following: the object produced by labor, its product, resists labor as an alien being, as a force independent of the producer. The product of labor is labor fixed in a certain object, embodied in it; this is the objectification of labor. The performing of labor is its objectification. Under those orders that are supposed to be by political economy, this implementation of labor, its putting into reality is disabling the worker from reality; objectification acts as the loss of an object and enslavement by an object, the mastering of an object as alienation.

Thus, objectification takes place with all forms of labor, but it turns into alienation only under certain historical conditions, namely, when labor itself no longer belongs to the worker, because conditions of his labor do not belong to the latter. Then the worker, according to Marx, becomes the slave of his subject. The worker's activity no longer belongs to him now; it is not his self-activity. It belongs to another, and, therefore, there is a loss of himself by the worker.

Another important thought expressed by Marx in his early works is that in “civil society,” alienation takes a universal character - universal also in the sense that all essential human forces, as Marx calls them, are subject to alienation and perversion, and in the sense that this refers to all members of this society: both the worker and the capitalist. After all, above both, the superhuman power dominates - the power of material wealth and uncontrolled socio-economic circumstances. This is the root of all the mystifications that are generated by this society of general alienation - not gods and not nature, but only the human himself can be this alien force that dominates a person (Balibar and Turner 2014).

The paradox is that this mystification - when a person perceives his own alienation as the pressure of anonymous forces - occurs precisely in “civil society,” where all forms of direct oppression of humans by humans are removed and where a person, in a formal legal sense, is absolutely free. The further this democratic “civil society” develops, the more the dominance of anonymous forces over a human is aggravated.

In this connection, Marx concludes that the full emancipation of the human must mean his emancipation from “civil society.” Already in the article *On the Jewish Question*, he writes that only when a real individual person takes on an abstract citizen of the state and, as an individual, becomes a generic being in his empirical life, in his individual work, in his individual relationship, only when a person learns and organizes his “forces propres” as social forces and, therefore, no longer separates social forces from himself in the form of political power - only then, will human emancipation take place (Rockmore 2002).

According to Marx, the destruction of private property means the complete emancipation of all human feelings and features (Rockmore 2002), and this means that the main motive of his speech against private property was by no means economic. Economically, private property has been and still is the most effective, in comparison with all forms of property. However, its inevitable end, according to Marx, is due to the fact that it is anti-human since it alienates humans from each other. Marx and Engels considered the abolition of private property the basic position of communist theory.

So, the problem of violence within the framework of Marxist teaching is, primarily, the problem of revolutionary violence. Revolutions are considered by Marx and Engels as regular stages in the development of an antagonistic society in an era when the progress of the productive forces is constrained by the obsolete social relations of production.

It should be emphasized that this general sociological conclusion has as its basis a real historical experience: bourgeois, anti-feudal in its content, revolutions of the 17th-19th centuries. If the transition from feudalism, within which the capitalist economic system develops and establishes, to bourgeois society became possible only as a result of a series of revolutions, then a transition to a fundamentally new post-capitalist social order that excludes an antagonistic production relationship is, in principle, impossible without a violent revolution. This was the course of thought of Marx and Engels, based on a thorough study of the history of bourgeois revolutions. It is important to emphasize this circumstance, since it makes clear the origin of the idea of a violent revolution and as a tool of the flow of history.

2.7. Emerson and Marx: the contrasts between the two positions

Speaking about the differences in the theories of Emerson and Marx, one should first note the difference in their approaches to understanding the driving force of history. In Emerson, this driving force is idealistic and even mystical - he considered the driving force behind the history of World Reason (the World Soul), guiding and ensuring the development of mankind and the continuity of historical epochs. Emerson, in everything, saw the action of the moral law, guided by the World Reason.

Why do laws rule in nature, and not lawlessness? - Emerson asks and answers: because the "Super-soul" introduces a harmonious beginning into nature. The human is a part of nature, and "Super-soul" is also present in him: the human consciousness is the smallest particle of the "Super-soul," possessing all its properties. Just as there are physical "laws of

nature,” there are also moral “laws of the spirit” (spiritual laws): “law of consciousness,” “compensation law,” etc. According to Emerson, “Super-soul” just does not allow chaos in the sphere of morality, as it does not allow, say, deviations from the law of gravitation or conservation of energy.

Proceeding from his philosophical anthropology, according to which the essence and way of human existence in the world is the joint goal-oriented conscious transforming activity (praxis), Marx understands history as the activity unfolding in time, activity of human pursuing his goals.

History, therefore, is the activity of people unfolding in time, which, at each new stage of its 'unwinding' (arising from the transformation of the previous state of being) retains within itself the moments of the past. However, with the preservation and retention of the main function and structure, nevertheless, there is adding of new functions as well as new structural moments of social existence. The new state, therefore, differs from the previous state, that is, there is not a simple quantitative change but a qualitative transformation - however, the one in which the functional, intrinsic, and structural moments of the past are preserved in the structures of the new. Thus, for all the importance of fixing the moment of variability, in this process, there is also a moment of continuity (consistency) between successive states of the transformation of objectness. The dialectic of these two moments forms the basis of what we call historicity.

The moment of variability grasps the process nature of being, and the moment of stability is continuity. At this, there is no metaphysical absolutization of the moments of movement/change and rest/constancy, as happened, say, in Heraclitus and Parmenides. Marx's approach to the study of historicity is associated, precisely, with this dialectic of movement: objectivity under the influence of certain factors is changed by people towards its correspondence to newly emerging conditions. However, at the same time, a new, already changed, already transformed in its form, it bears in itself both a formal and a functional trace of the preceding objectivity.

Marx's materialistic understanding of history presupposes the consideration of society as a social organism, as a single social system, the source of development and formation of which lies primarily in itself, and not outside. The idea of social conditioning, reasonably supplemented in classical Marxism by the notion of the relative independence of morality, permeates also a provision about the regular historical development of the definite form of social consciousness, and the principle of a concrete historical approach to any one moral and ethical phenomenon, and an understanding of the essence of humanity. The key in the

Marxist formulation of the problem of the human is the affirmation of sociality as an essential generic characteristic (the essence of the human is not an abstraction inherent in a separate individual; in reality, it is the totality of all social relations), which is in continuous development and predetermining the realization of individual characteristics and freedom of the person. Moreover, the concept of “the essence of human” includes consciousness (conscious vital activity directly distinguishes human from animal life), ability to creatively transform activities, universality. These general characteristics are dialectically related to the individual (biological, psychological, emotional, etc.) manifestations of human existence, and morality, in this context, acts as a necessary means of overcoming the boundaries of subjectivity and harmonious inclusion of the individual in social connection with others. The humanistic aspirations of Marxism, which put forward “the development of the richness of human nature as an end in itself,” (McBride 2015) are closely related to his transformative pathos.

Indeed, Marx's well-known thesis - that philosophers only explained the world in different ways, but the thing is to change it - expresses the fundamental orientation of the entire Marxist ideology and gives a special meaning to ethical doctrine, in principle opposing it to contemplations of classical ethics. Ethics should be aimed not at condemning the undue nature of things but at actively participating in its revolutionary transformation. In accordance with this, all moral problems are translated into a practical plane; the resolution of moral antinomies is not associated with the construction of ideal projects, called (by ideal means) to elevate disharmonious reality to the perfection opened by the mind, but with the reorganization of the basic structures of the society. Therefore, the aim of the revolutionary movement proposed by Marxism (a society in which the free development of everyone is a condition for the free development of all (McBride 2015)) is justified as a real task for the implementation of which an appropriate strategy of political struggle is being developed, based on the need for revolution and the leading role of the ideas of the proletariat.

Unlike Emerson's vision of an ideal society, communism is derived by Marx from the economy and not from ethics. Marxism did not fit the conditions of capitalist production, resting on appropriating surplus labor of producers by non-productive members of society, with a moral criterion, with a moral measure but analyzed and explained it.

Emerson emphasized “ascension” as the basic rule of life, by which he understood spiritual development and moral perfection of the personality and the corresponding harmonic, “natural” development of the social organism.

The philosopher sees the grounds for self-reliance in an intuitive experience. In his views, Emerson was a spiritualist. The only reality he considered the spirit, and the main aspiration of the soul - in the self-improvement of human. Unlike other philosophers who adhered to the individualistic point of view (for example, M. Stirner and others), Emerson did not deny goodness, morality as attributes of the Higher cause: Emerson's reasoning on property is interesting. He believes that people's trust in property, as well as in state institutions and the government testifies to a lack of confidence in self (self-reliance). The greatest value is the person himself, because what he represents, he necessarily acquires by himself, and acquired by himself is a 'living property' that is not threaten by anything until a person dies (Emerson 2000, 39). The main conclusion that Emerson makes is that, in any case, a person should rely only on himself. At the same time, the philosophical and anthropological ideas of Marx and Engels with the affirmation of the primacy of the ancestral social essence of human, the priority of the social over the individual, became the logical conclusion of Marx's philosophical views.

Emerson believed that "Not less conspicuous is the preponderance of nature over will in all practical life." We impute deep-laid, far-sighted plans to Caesar and Napoleon; their power was in nature, not in them" (Emerson as cited in Miller 2011, 129). In general, humanity goes to a good purpose, pre-set by the Creator. This methodological principle is traced throughout the writer's work. It is the central one in his natural philosophy.

At the same time, the fundamental idea of Marx is that human makes the history himself - he is its creator. A human creates himself in the process of production. In other words, from the point of view of Marx, human is not only an object but also a true subject of the historical process.

The study of conformism in mass psychology led Emerson to the realization of the need for civil disobedience, although he did not call for it directly. "Self-reliance" called for civil protest but without the use of violent forms, with individual refusal to support the unjust actions of the authorities.

However, in Emerson's understanding, the main goal is the pursuit of the good of humans and society, and the means for achieving this goal is not communism but the development of commodity-money relations, investment of capital, expansion of the sphere of production and natural competition without state protectionism.

Unlike Marx's conviction of the need to build socialism and the destruction of private property (which was supposed to be achieved through violence), Emerson offers what is today called "capitalism with a human face." He sees the goal of wealth in the person's

gaining of freedom - freedom to travel, engage in favorite occupations, art, literature, etc., unlike Marx, who believed that to achieve freedom and the possibility of creative work, it is necessary to overcome the alienation of the results of human labor.

Actually, Emerson is a vivid representative of teleological liberalism while Marx is one of the most consistent and determined critics of liberal theory and ideology.

2.8. Emerson and Marx: the meeting points between the two positions

The fundamental similarity between the theories of Emerson and Marx is the dialectic nature of their approaches. The ideas of Hegel's dialectic are reflected in both Marx and Emerson. Although Marx uses materialistic dialectics in the sense of “dialectics as a logic,” which is a materialistic analogue of the science of Hegel's logic, in Emerson the immortal soul is viewed not as a pure spirit but as a more subtle matter in comparison with the gross matter of the visible world, yet Hegel's dialectical reasoning became one of the foundations of the theory of both philosophers. History is seen in Marxist philosophy as an objective and logical process and, at the same time, a process of self-development of the human. In Marx, the law of unity and struggle of opposites - the basic law of dialectics, which reflects the driving force of development - is the basis of any transformations. According to Marx, the coexistence of two mutually contradictory sides, their struggle, and merging into a new category constitute the essence of the dialectical movement.

The principle of polarity is the basis of Emerson's dialectical worldview. The principle of equilibrium is inextricably linked with it. Dialecticism also determines the very dynamics of the world and stimulates its development.

Marx, in fact, identified the notions of private property and the division of labor. Together with the division of labor, as Marx and Engels believed, containing all the above contradictions and resting, in turn, on the naturally arising division of labor in the family and the disintegration of society into separate families opposing each other - together with this division of labor, at the same time, the distribution is given, which is, both quantitatively and qualitatively, an unequal distribution of labor and its products; consequently, property is also given, the germ and initial form of which is already observed in the family, where the wife and children are male slaves (Balibar and Turner 2014).

In Emerson, technical progress also caused serious concerns. The division of labor, which inevitably accompanies it, is shown by him as a social disease. The human, he

believed, increasingly becomes an appendage of the machine, which harms the individual, depriving him of independent creativity. He ends the essay *Art* with a phrase that seems to have nothing to do with art: “When science is learned in love, and its powers are wielded by love, they will appear the supplements and continuations of the material creation.” (Emerson 1883, 343). So science approaches art as part of a single organic process.

Thus, Emerson and Marx, in some way, unite the dialectical approach to history and the ideal image of a free human, but the “engine” of history and social development, as well as the ways to achieve people's happiness, differ in these philosophers.

An essential definition of Marx's philosophy is that it is a 'philosophy of practice.' In ontological and methodological aspects, this means that, according to Marx, on the basis of human existence in general, there is praxis (Praxis, Praktik, Tätigkeit, Arbeit in a broad sense) - a single material and spiritual conscious goal-setting social subjective transformative activity of people (Elster 398-459). In other words, any socio-historical phenomenon is either activity itself or some kind of its mode, some state of it, some result of it.

Therefore, human reality, which is the totality of the inner (a human himself, his corporeality and spirit) and the external (the natural world, drawn into the sphere of human practice, the objective world created by people, the world of culture), for its study, a priori implies the use not only of "materialistic" but also "idealistic" understanding of history, which, in their unity, constitute a praxeological (activity-based) understanding of history.

Thus, in the light of the understanding of every social phenomenon as one or another mode of praxis-substance having two attributes - material and spiritual activity, given in the dialectical totality of the life process, in the historical process one must see not only the material and production aspect (the change in the modes of production and social formations), as it is usually done and which is always emphasized, but also the spiritual aspect, existential (when the historical ones are the most diverse forms of a person's relationship to the world of nature, culture, other people, and self).

3 Conclusion

As the study shows, history - in the form of a real process or knowledge about it - is a subject of professional interest not only for historians, but also philosophers.

The conducted research clearly shows two interesting approaches to understanding history – Emerson’s and Marx’s approaches, which represent, accordingly, idealistic and materialistic understandings of history.

The idealistic understanding of the historical process, guided by the World Soul, in Emerson, represents an understanding of the historical process, proceeding from the recognition of the primacy of social consciousness in comparison with social being, absolutizing and mystifying subjective factors in history. However, apparently, the presence of this subjective factor in the Emersonian sense of history prevents him from suggesting any violent measures of civil protest.

Marx believed that, in history, different types of production relations are observed and each time the relations of people among themselves are determined by their relation to the means of production. If some people own the means of production while others do not, then the latter has no choice but to work for the first – owners. Hence, the division of people into classes that form a social hierarchy of domination in society: slave owners rule over slaves, feudal lords over peasants, capitalists over workers. From here, the possibility of periodizing history follows, classifying the types of society – “social formations” - in accordance with various forms of ownership of the means of production, with different modes of production.

Transcendentalism can be called a kind of anti-Marxism. Recognition of historical necessity, which determines the course of history, in any form, means the transcendental thinking of history. Transcendental historical necessity is fundamentally different from ordinary scientific laws, presupposing the repeatability of certain phenomena, as postulated by Marx. In Marx, history is interpreted as a product of human activity and human freedom, which makes its choice in various diverse life situations.

Ethics based on transcendentalism is the ethics of self-improvement through the development of "one's self." Marxism turned ideas over, putting the material side of life first, while subordinating consciousness to it, presenting it as a derivative of the conditions of life. The goal was to create more perfect living conditions - a communist society, which should form a more advanced human consciousness. The driving force is the objective course of history as a result of the interaction of the productive forces and production relations.

However, despite the fact of this discrepancy, Emerson and Marx converge in the application of a dialectical approach to the history and understanding of human happiness.

Both in Marxism as well as in transcendentalism, the goals of development and the forces driving it were thought outside of human, as existing regardless of his consciousness. In this coincidence, there is a regularity, conditioned by the dualism of consciousness and

matter, on which both transcendentalism and Marxism relies. This reliance on external forces, as a justification of a human's moral duty, reflects and fixes the gap between the interests of the individual and the public interest, forces or induces the individual to subordinate personal interests to the public ones. In this system of representations, the presence of an external force, which determines, to some extent, an element of the external or internal coercion, is associated with a low level of human consciousness, limited only by a circle of narrowly selfish personal interests. The external force removes the contradictions of the selfishness of private interests. The dualism of the thinking of the modern era is a dualism of the particulars and the generals, which causes and preserves the notions: religious ones, philosophical transcendentalism, and communism. The main arguments in their favor are the following: the need for order, the moral image of a person, public interests. The only difference is that in Marxism, an external goal in relation to human - communism - is closer to reality than transcendental.

Social praxis always contains the material and the ideal. Therefore, if we say that everything in human society is an activity (either it itself in various forms, or its results, or some of its aspects or states), then we must also recognize that history, being nothing less than the activity of the person pursuing his goals, is represented in both material and ideal forms. Thus, if this is the case, the material and ideal factors of praxis act as the driving forces that determine the social structure of society and the socio-historical life process.

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