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Russian integration into the liberal security order

Master's thesis

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Declaration

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2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
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References

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Abstract

This work deals with the Russian Federation's position in the international security system after the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a process of integration of the Russian Federation into the security order led by the U.S. and constructed mainly after the World War II. The thesis explores the development of this process by examining Russia's cooperation with the U.S.-led West on the resolution of three conflicts, which each presented a sort of a crisis for the new security environment and for the integration process. In the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo and Syria, Russia was presented with a challenge of finding or updating its position in relation to the West. Cooperation or clashes are observed mainly in the military, diplomatic and narrative dimensions. The thesis provides an account of events which are seen as indicative of the status of the integration process. It is found that in the wars accompanying the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Russian Federation was attempting to gain international prestige as a constructive member of the international community, but in many cases, it lacked the capability to achieve its goals, especially when they required opposition to the U.S. and the West. In the period between the Kosovo War and the Syrian Civil War, the Russian Federation assumed a more assertive foreign policy position and modernized its military, which allowed it to project power in Syria and gain a significant level of independence on the West in the security area as well as the ability to oppose it, at least in the specific region of the Middle East.

Abstrakt

Tato práce se zabývá pozicí Ruské federace v mezinárodním bezpečnostním systému po konci Studené války. Poté, co Studená válka skončila a Sovětský svaz se rozpadl, začal proces integrace Ruské federace do bezpečnostního řádu vedeného Spojenými státy, zkonstruovaného především po druhé světové válce. Tato práce sleduje vývoj tohoto procesu skrze zkoumání spolupráce Ruska se Západem vedeným Spojenými státy při řešení tří konfliktů, které představovaly svého druhu krize nového bezpečnostního systému i krize integračního procesu. Ve válkách v Bosně, Kosovu a Sýrii se Rusko potýkalo s problémem zaujetí vlastní pozice vůči Západu v mezinárodním systému nebo její aktualizace. Spolupráce i střety jsou sledovány hlavně ve vojenské, diplomatické a narativní sféře. Tato práce zaznamenává události, které jsou považovány za vypovídající o stavu integračního procesu. Je zjištěno, že ve válkách provázejících rozpad Jugoslávie se Ruská federace pokoušela získat mezinárodní prestiž konstruktivního aktéra v rámci mezinárodního společenství, ale v mnoha

případech jí chyběla síla potřebná k dosažení jejích cílů, zvláště pokud k němu bylo zapotřebí postavit se do opozice vůči Spojeným státům a Západu. V období mezi Kosovskou válkou a Syrskou občanskou válkou zaujala Ruská federace asertivnější zahraničněpolitický postoj a modernizovala svou armádu, což jí dodalo sílu mocensky působit v Sýrii a získat v oblasti bezpečnosti značnou úroveň nezávislosti na Západu a schopnosti mu vzdorovat, alespoň ve specifickém prostředí Blízkého východu.

Keywords

Integration, hegemony, Russia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Syria

Klíčová slova

Integrace, hegemonie, Rusko, Bosna, Kosovo, Sýrie

Title

Russian integration into the liberal security order

Název práce

Integrace Ruska do liberálního bezpečnostního řádu

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Table of Contents

List of abbreviations.....	1
Introduction.....	2
Methodology.....	4
Theoretical background.....	5
Bosnian War.....	9
Kosovo War.....	15
Syrian Civil War.....	29
Conclusions.....	40
Summary.....	42
List of References.....	42
Diploma thesis proposal.....	51

1 List of abbreviations

ACTORDs	Activation warning
ACTWARN	Al-Nusra Front
ANF	Combined Joint Task Force (Operation Inherent Resolve)
CTFJ-OIR	European Union
EU	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FRY	Free Syrian Army
FSA	Group of Seven
G-7	Group of Eight
G-8	International Monetary Fund
IMF	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISIL	Jaish al-Fatah
JAF	Joint Investigative Mechanism
JIM	Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
KDOM	Kosovo Force
KFOR	Kosovo Liberation Army
KLA	Kosovo Verification Mission
KVM	
Activation orders	NAC
	NATO

OSCE
SAF
SFOR
START
UN
UNSC
U.S., USA
North Atlantic Council
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Syrian Armed Forces
Stabilisation Force
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
United Nations
United Nations Security Council
United States of America

2 Introduction

The Cold War was a war unlike any other, and its uniqueness manifested in the way it ended as well. Populations of the Western and Eastern Blocs felt the relief that accompanied the fall of the Berlin wall, the Iron Curtain, and the oppressive pro-Soviet regimes in the Central and Eastern Europe. The threat of nuclear confrontation, ever-present in the bipolar world, diminished. The Soviet Union dissolved, ultimately due to its internal political turmoil and economic strain it faced, marking the end of the Cold War, as one of its participant superpowers no longer existed. But unlike most defeats, this one was achieved without direct military confrontation, and with less dramatic change in the lives of ordinary people. In one respect, however, the war yielded the same result as all great wars: the existing world order was gone, and a new one was to be established.

The old order followed the logic of confrontation between two worlds, each of which had a respective „inside“ order as well. There was the liberal, democratic and capitalist order, built mainly by the United States. After World War II, the United States picked up the threads of post-World War

I order building and extended and ultimately reinvented the liberal international project, expanding economic and security relations across the democratic capitalist world¹. Against it stood the Communist bloc, based on ideological unity and Soviet leadership. When this bloc disintegrated, there was nothing to stop its rival order to cease being an „inner“ order of a bloc and expand to the global level, becoming the center of the international system.

Just like after each war, the states stand before a challenge of integrating the defeated side into the emerging order. The United States had experience of integrating Germany or Japan after World War II, turning them into democracies and even building its alliance hubs in their respective regions around those states. Understanding how the process of Russian integration fared shall help scholars better understand why events of the last decades unraveled as they did, and, more importantly, what the nature of the relationship between the Russian Federation and the West is today.

The case of Russian Federation as the Soviet Union's successor state was, however, entirely different from the examples of Germany and Japan. As stated earlier, the Cold was ended by a mixture of economic and political pressures, which may have been rooted in arms race and involvement in conflict abroad, but a direct military confrontation never ensued— there were no American troops on Russian soil when it fell apart, no peace treaty to be signed, and the Russian population was not exposed to the kind of suffering commonly accompanying a defeat. This may help explain the difficulties which the integration process soon encountered. While it meant losing a quarter of the state's territory, half of its economy, two thirds of its military personnel and political control over Central European satellites², the defeat was never deeply internalized, which meant that the modern „Westernization“ of Russia was quite possibly doomed to be merely a shallow political phenomenon, which was later challenged when problems arose by nationalizing and authoritarian attitudes, and political forces supporting it were marginalized. On the other hand, it meant that the Western states never had much confidence in a genuine change regarding Russian imperialism and in the country's stability, and treated it either as a source of instability or a „learner“, a junior partner consuming Western values³. This manifested most clearly in times of international crises in the European region, where Russia was a natural partner to the West. I chose two such conflicts for my analysis, one from the formative years of the integration process (Bosnian War), the other to represent the times of emerging difficulties (Kosovo War). Additionally, I chose one conflict from

1 IKENBERRY, John G, 2011. *Liberal Leviathan*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12558-9, p. 17.

2 DITRYCH, Ondřej, 2014. Bracing for Cold Peace. US-Russia Relations after Ukraine. *The International Spectator*. 49(4), 76-96. DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2014.963958, p. 78.

3 DITRYCH, Ondřej, 2014. Bracing for Cold Peace. US-Russia Relations after Ukraine. *The International Spectator*. 49(4), 76-96. DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2014.963958, p. 78.

present time (Syrian War) to contrast the historical account with the latest development and to see what the Russian involvement in the Syrian war can tell us about the present state of the integration project. Such knowledge would be helpful in attempts to identify the strategic goals of Russia in the ongoing conflicts and the underlying interests pertaining to Russia's position within the international community. This remains to a significant extent obscured by uncertainty, which could prove perilous as Russian leadership favors increasingly assertive and confrontational attitudes.

3 Methodology

In this section, I would like to present the kind of data I will be analyzing, defend my case selection, and consider the limitations that the work has. Because I will be looking at integration into the global liberal order as described by John Ikenberry, I will be focusing on direct contact between the Russian Federation and the core of the liberal order – mainly the United States as the driving actor, but also its allies, whose positions were not always uniform. Integration proved to be difficult to grasp and to conceptualize exactly in a work like mine. Ernst B. Haas defines integration in international relations as a „process whereby the quality of relations among autonomous social units... changes in such a way to erode the autonomy of each and make it part of a larger aggregate.“ He continues stating that „In specifically political discussions the term is reserved for the analysis of such changes among more or less ‚sovereign‘ political units, and in the study of international relations the term is confined to the analysis of cumulatively changing relations among states, resulting in their acceptance of some new central authority⁴.“ From this definition, it is obvious that integration is not a binary variable with „integrated/not integrated“ modes, but is instead a spectrum. It must be noted, that before the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation acquired and built for many years the identity of the West's adversary. Our expectations of Russian integration should thus be cautious. Because integration as Russia's acceptance of the U.S. authority is far-fetched, I work with finer nuance which would imply integration if they were consistent: cooperation, inclusion in multilateral action, coordination or sacrifice of own interest to accommodate the community. I do make an attempt to roughly estimate the overall level of integration at several specific points in time, but it is more important to give an account of individual events that give a basis for such estimates.

4 International Integration. *Encyclopaedia.com* [online]. 2008 [cit. 2018-06-26]. Available at: <https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/international-integration>

The research area this thesis is contributing to is very broad. If we examine a change of a state's position after a geopolitical shift, a wide array of factors may be considered: the state's relations with other states, its domestic political dynamics, market shifts and their economic impact, cultural osmosis and more. Given the scope of the thesis and resources available, it is not the goal to encompass all possible aspects and present an exhausting account of a question which could probably be able to support a monograph dedicated to it. Rather than doing so, I focus on the specific issue of cooperation between states in times of crisis – conflict management and conflict resolution. Conflict management can be carried out by violent or nonviolent means and its aim is to limit the negative aspects of the conflict, while conflict resolution looks for ways to bring the conflict to its end, usually via diplomatic means, because achieving the same goal with the use of force is usually labeled as peace enforcement. My thesis thus concentrates on the cooperation or clashes with regard to conflict management and conflict resolution in three specific wars. There are alternative ways to trace the process of integration, such as the adoption of legal documents or joint statements, but these indicators reveal little about the actors' behavior once a crisis appears. I do, however, follow them to a lesser extent when it seems relevant.

While the upside of such approach is that it can result in an account which, even though it might not be all-encompassing, is coherent and can serve as a starting point for further research, it is also vulnerable to criticism when it comes to its weak spots. First and foremost, it can be argued that a selective approach to data can result in arbitrary perspective on the subject. The overwhelming amount of data which could possibly be taken into consideration makes it difficult to justify the selection because there will always be more that could be added. I will try to eliminate this issue by providing general context in the overview sections of the text, and treating the events that I describe not as isolated occurrences, but rather significant markers of a process that we are tracing. Still, criticism may arise revolving around the issue of whether a specific point can be glanced over as a mere contextual remark, or whether it should be analyzed in more detail.

As for the three cases I will examine (Bosnia, Kosovo, Syria), I believe some sort of a justification is in order as well. To illustrate the Russian Federation's position in regard to conflict management, I was looking for conflicts which occur in what Russia considered its sphere of its interest, but to which Russia is not a primary party. The wars in Yugoslavia were naturally the first pick, as they were indicative in more than one way of the shift that occurred in European security environment – there was significant international involvement and pressure to resolve the conflict and the question of state sovereignty versus individual and group rights and humanitarian principles was present. Though the wars in the Balkans haven't started with Bosnian War, I have chosen it as

the first case because it was the most complex one, and it involved in the greatest extent the religious cleavage, which I thought might prove relevant. The complexity is predominantly due to one aspect that sets Bosnia and Herzegovina apart from the other five Yugoslav republics. While in the others, medialized violence was used to show that peaceful and stable multiethnic states are not viable, this was not an option in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was multiethnic and multinational as a political fact and cultural ideal, as none of the three constituent nations (Muslims, Serbs, and Croats) was a majority and the entire territory was ethnically mixed⁵. The Kosovo war was chosen because of heightened intensity of the conflict and subsequent increased international pressure, which creates an atmosphere in which states' positions manifest most clearly in their policies and political gestures. The echoes of the Serbian trauma from the international resolution of the conflict involving NATO's bombing campaign, amplified by years of Russian use of it within its propaganda, can be felt to this day and the conflict marks an important point in the evolution of European security.

While those two first cases share a number of characteristics as well as certain historical consequentiality, the last one, Syrian war, does not intuitively belong. To make my study relevant and up to date, I was looking for a more recent conflict, but to be included, it had to satisfy several conditions. First, Russia had to be involved, but not as one of the primary sides of the conflict. This way, the broadest array of steps taken and policies adopted can be studied. They can range from diplomatic to military means, and states have more space to navigate and maneuver. Second, there had to be a significant international involvement besides Russian. This allows us to trace not only Russian policy and actions but also its relation to other states and structures. Third, the conflict had to be sufficiently important as to have an impact on the global security system's evolution, which makes it indicative of changes in broader strategy and allows us to draw conclusions relevant for future cases of crisis management.

4 Theoretical background

To analyze the process of Russian integration into the post-Cold War international system, we have to clarify first, what kind of international system we have in mind. G. John Ikenberry presents

⁵ WOODWARD, Susan L., 1995. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 9780815722953, p. 233.

his conception of the post-World War II international system as a liberal hegemonic order led by the United States. Ikenberry argues, that after the World War II, the United States engaged in a process of building such a system with their allies (incorporating the losing powers of the war as well) by establishing international institutions and becoming a hub of political, diplomatic and economic connections. Ikenberry draws predominantly from a liberal political tradition. The existence of a liberal hegemonic order rests on the connections between countries, the agreed-upon principles of international law and the institutions that uphold it. But Ikenberry admits that his writing also, to smaller extent, draws from the realist tradition – power is a primary condition for a state to even be able to construct such order deliberately, and while such power can be used with restraint, it is up to the dominant state whether and how it will restrain its power.

According to Ikenberry, international orders can be based on three different logics. The first one emerges when a *balance of power* is achieved. When states in the system are not powerful enough to dominate one another, they reach a stalemate and cement their positions, amassing power and forming alliances to prevent any single one to take control, which results in a relatively stable order⁶. The Cold War or the concert of powers after 1815 serve as examples of such equilibrium being reached. Another type of order is organized around a hegemonic leading state which rules through *command*. Other states are integrated vertically in subordinate and superordinate positions. The hierarchical terms of the order may be enforced strictly through coercion (imperial rule), or be moderated according to principles of autonomy, bargaining or reciprocity (liberal characteristics). Such hierarchical order is exemplified by the British and American-led orders, each characterized by its own ,repertoire‘ of power. Finally, an order can exist that is based on *consent*. In this case, the system is organized around agreed-upon rules and institutions that allocate rights and limits on the exercise of power⁷. Power still plays its part in the negotiation of the order and its settlement, but it is circumscribed. Both British and American-led orders are built around consent, as well as the European Union as a regional order.

These three types of international order are ideal types and the examples listed vary in regard to the extent to which they approach those ideal types. While the designation of the Cold War order as one based on the balance of power is fairly unproblematic, the American-led liberal order is far less clear-cut. It comprises of hierarchical structures and agreed-upon rules of command and consent and the mixture varies greatly depending on geopolitical region and also changes in time. The dynamic of the order is different in Europe, where it takes on its most liberal form (widespread

6 IKENBERRY, John G, 2011. *Liberal Leviathan*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12558-9, p. 25.

7 IKENBERRY, John G, 2011. *Liberal Leviathan*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12558-9, p. 25.

consensus is accentuated), in Latin America or the Middle East, where crudely imperial characteristics become apparent (such as indirect rule through local elites), and in East Asia, where the hegemony works with a hub-and-spoke system of client states (states engage in separate bilateral relations with the hegemon, which allows the hegemon to fully benefit from the power asymmetry)⁸. But overall, it can be said, that the liberal hegemonic order with the United States as its leader works as a hierarchic system, which nevertheless strives to maintain legitimate, consensual authority. To achieve it, the dominant state works within the framework of rules it creates (unlike an empire) provides services (security and open trade) and frameworks for cooperation, keeping the system open and inviting participation and compliance. Ikenberry argues that the larger the state becomes, the easier it is to identify its interests with the interests of the whole system, acquiring in turn liberal characteristics and hegemonic stability, as other states have fewer incentives for a costly confrontation – though the degree of consent can range from grudging acquiescence to normative embrace.

Ikenberry's book is mainly concerned with the United States' role in the system, its methods of building, maintaining and adapting it, incentives to do so and challenges it has to face. Because the primary object of my research is a non-leading state, the most meaningful chapters for this research are the ones describing the hegemon's interaction with other states. In this respect, the hegemon's behavior is crucial in the formation of other states' behavior as well. I will therefore accept Ikenberry's United States-centered approach for now, and try to link it to my cases later in the thesis.

When it can, the state working within the framework of liberal hegemony will use benign methods of achieving its goals. The first concept to introduce is strategic restraint. The leading state acknowledges that there will be limits on how it can legitimately exercise its power, giving the order somewhat 'constitutional' characteristics. For example, the UN Charter and the limitations that it imposes on the use of force against sovereign states have been central to the functioning of the liberal hegemonic order. While it does limit every member of the United Nations, the limitations are lesser for the less powerful ones, as they lack the power to threaten their more powerful peers anyway. It is apparent from this logic that the most powerful is most limited by such an agreement, but it through the limitation, it makes the order more acceptable and legitimate, and thus also more stable, allowing it to enjoy its hegemonic position for longer. Such arrangement is also beneficial to the stability of the order because it lowers the prize for the 'winner', or the actor that replaces the

8 IKENBERRY, John G, 2011. *Liberal Leviathan*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12558-9, p. 34.

United States as a hegemon, because the winner would find himself limited the same way the United States is.

Ikenberry warns of failure to exercise this strategic restraint. It is one tool for the hegemon to maintain the order it favors. There are, on the other hand, incentives for the hegemon to defect. If it fails to achieve its goals via benign methods, it might be tempted to find a way around the rules and limitations it imposed on itself. Such incentives might even be greater for the leading state than for the others. As it assumes the role of the guarantor of security, this responsibility may lead it into questionable situations. Ikenberry argues, that this is the reason why the United States is not party to the anti-landmine convention (because the extent to which its troops are in harm's way) or the International Criminal Court treaty (because its global security presence makes Americans vulnerable to politically inspired prosecutions)⁹. But the hegemon doesn't necessarily have to rigidly stick to how the order is built. It can strive to renegotiate some of the hegemonic bargains in play. The power shift after the Cold War allowed the United States to engage in such adjustment process, which entailed the expansion and deepening liberal international order. Steps that American policymakers decided to take make the United States seem like a revisionist unipolar power, which is driven by its power advantages to pursue an ambitious agenda of global transformation to some observers¹⁰. Ikenberry worries primarily about the effect of rise of unilateralism during G. W. Bush's administration, but while I will mention the war in Iraq briefly, I will argue that the difficulty of Russia's (but objections were not raised solely by Russia; even French Foreign Minister, representing one of the democratic powers most closely tied to the liberal hegemonic system, has worryingly described the United States as a ,hyperpower' and called for „*steady and persevering work in favor of real multilateralism against unilateralism, for balanced multipolarism against unipolarism, for cultural diversity against uniformity*”¹¹.) integration has its roots deeper in the United States' unilateral moment of the 1990s.

5 Bosnian War

9 IKENBERRY, John G, 2011. *Liberal Leviathan*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12558-9, p. 245.

10 IKENBERRY, John G, 2011. *Liberal Leviathan*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12558-9, p. 244.

11 IKENBERRY, John G, 2011. *Liberal Leviathan*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12558-9, p. 243.

The series of conflict in the Balkans accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia will be remembered as an important point of European history, as it constituted a major crisis of European security. After the end of the Cold War, while some expressed their worries about the result of ending a balance of power, for most of Europe it was a time of optimism. Western Europe was able to savor the taste of triumph of its political and economic system over the planned economy of the Soviet type, and Eastern Europe was enjoying the euphoria following the overthrow of oppressive communist regimes. Francis Fukuyama's essay „The End of History?“ and the book expanding on its topic is often cited as a representation of such feelings, raising the question whether the humanity's sociocultural evolution has reached its peak in the prevalence and universalization of the Western liberal democracy. Yugoslavia, given its non-aligned stance, wasn't part of the disintegrating Eastern bloc, but its economic and political system was collapsing in a fashion similar to that of the Soviet Union. In deteriorating living conditions and after the death of Yugoslavia leader Josip Broz Tito, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the official policy of „*bratstvo i jedinstvo*“ (brotherhood and unity). Nationalism was on the rise, and when the Serb leader Slobodan Milošević stirred the Serb nationalism, starting a spiral of interethnic tensions and subsequent secessions, what used to be Yugoslavia descended into violence and war.

As stated earlier, the conflicts weren't seen as a problem of the Balkans alone, but as a crisis of the European security regime¹² that the international community should act upon and take part in resolving, even though only when armed clashes and talk of independence grew into a full-scale war, as major powers dismissed the warnings coming from diplomats, scholars, and intelligence agencies¹³. The involvement of important Western actors was mostly signified by intense diplomatic effort, but they were overall quite reluctant to commit troops to achieve political goals as they hoped for spending the „peace dividend“ gained by ending the Cold War on domestic economic recovery and mending their strained welfare system¹⁴. The Bosnian War warranted the highest degree of international involvement, but it was organically connected to the other conflicts: the Slovenian Independence War, which was ended by Brioni Declaration, establishing a permanent ceasefire under the political sponsorship of the European Community¹⁵, and the Croatian Independence War, which was still raging as the Bosnian War started, and in which UNPROFOR, a UN peacekeeping force, was operating.

12 WOODWARD, Susan L., 1995. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 9780815722953, p. 2.

13 WOODWARD, Susan L., 1995. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 9780815722953, p. 148.

14 WOODWARD, Susan L., 1995. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 9780815722953, p. 2.

15 GRIZOLD, Anton, 1992. Military Intervention in Slovenia. *International Social Science Review*. 67(1), p. 11.

Russia played an important role in the negotiations of peace and ceasefire agreements in this conflict. It retained the permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) granted to the Soviet Union in order to get it on board with the project¹⁶. It also replaced the Soviet Union, if not in a position of a superpower, then in a position of a regional power for sure. Furthermore, internal dynamics of Yugoslavia were quite similar to those unraveling in Russia, and Russia began to take a more assertive role in the conflict over the course of 1992 in response to domestic pressures¹⁷.

However important Russia was, the leading power in the exertion of diplomatic pressure was the United States. The hegemonic state had both the responsibility to resolve the conflict as a provider and guarantor of international security, and an opportunity to promote its own interests (which, many at that time would argue, included spreading the norms of religious tolerance, protection of human rights and advancement of democracy¹⁸) and gain influence in the Balkans. While there existed an internal struggle between American isolationists and interventionists, with rising levels of violence, the superpower could just no longer afford to ignore the conflict, and the dispute started revolving around *how* the United States should approach it. President Clinton's policy is considered liberal interventionist, but also multilateralist as he has been intent on obtaining cooperation and consent for American policy from the allies¹⁹. His administration recognized the need to cooperate with Russia as well as with Western European allies and made steps to involve them in multiple areas.

While the many steps which led to Bosnian ceasefire and, eventually, Dayton Agreement were facilitated by Western powers' diplomatic efforts (creation of the Muslim-Croat federation or support of Croat and Muslim militarily) and the NATO air strikes in the summer of 1995 became the tipping point, Russia had a special role to play because of its close ties to the Serbs. This relationship and the influence that Russia had over the Serbs was often overestimated – the relationship was in its nature opportunistic – Serbs saw an advantage in having a strong ally with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and for Russia, this was an opportunity to reassert itself on the international stage as a great power while re-emphasizing its nationalist credentials to an often doubting domestic audience. But when there were disagreements, Serbs didn't hesitate to

16 Najít v Act of Creation

17 WOODWARD, Susan L., 1995. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 9780815722953, p. 287.

18 WOLF, Jr., Charles, *To Intervene or Not to Intervene* [online], 2000 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2000/11/to-intervene-or-not-to-intervene.html>

19 MILLER, Judith, Grand Strategy: Round and Round on U.S. Interests; Kosovo Rekindles a Debate, Dormant for Nearly a Decade, of America's Global Role. *The New York Times* [online], 1999 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/24/arts/grand-strategy-round-round-us-interests-kosovo-rekindles-debate-dormant-for.html>

ignore Russian diplomatic initiatives even at the expense of Russia's international prestige, and Russia was quick to distance itself from its Balkan ally when its lack of influence over the Serbs was publicly exposed²⁰. Nevertheless, Russia can be credited with steering the Belgrade towards making concessions at Dayton and taking steps to make a peaceful settlement possible. It was also willing to negotiate with Bosnian Serb leadership directly, unlike the United States, which regarded them as dependent on Yugoslavia and Serb authority and pressured them through Slobodan Milosević as such. That was, however, a simplification of the relationship between Karadzic's entity and Milosević's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the Serb leader did not exercise complete control over Bosnian Serbs. A direct approach yielded in some cases tangible outcomes, such as Vitaly Churkin's success in getting Serbs to agree to NATO's demands to withdraw heavy weaponry in 1993 and thus averting the risk of NATO air strikes at that time²¹, or Andrei V. Kozyrev's agreement with Radovan Karadzic concerning reopening the airport of Tuzla for humanitarian purposes²². Both of these examples were preceded by threat of force or use of force by NATO, and offered Serbs an opportunity to save face and gain a minor boon of increasing their ally's presence (which was criticized by Muslims and Western critics, arguing that Russian troops offer Serbs protection and encourage further atrocities; Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic complained about their behavior, stating in a letter to UN Secretary-General that „their arrival was accompanied by their manifestations of support to the aggressor²³“), while Russians could announce a rare diplomatic victory.

There were several moments, which marked a shift from U.S.-Russian consensus towards partisanship. The first was when Croats abandoned their alliance with Muslims and started their own land-grab. The perception of a single villain was shattered, and singling out FRY for punishment by economic sanctions suddenly became more difficult to justify. This shift avoided the Western leaders for the most part, but Yeltsin, who was heavily pressured on the domestic stage by the nationalist opposition which didn't miss an opportunity to use Bosnian developments against him, decided to start taking a more pro-Serb position to repel the accusations of servility towards the West. This stance was further reinforced by NATO's air strikes against Serb positions on the ground near the declared safe-area Gorazde. NATO justified the strike as a defense of UN troops

20 BOWKER, Mike, 1998. The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 50(7), p. 1245.

21 BOWKER, Mike, 1998. The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 50(7), p. 1252.

22 STANLEY, Alessandra, Urged by Russia, Bosnia Serbs Yield on Airlift. *The New York Times* [online]. 1994 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/02/world/urged-by-russia-bosnia-serbs-yield-on-airlift.html>

23 STANLEY, Alessandra, Urged by Russia, Bosnia Serbs Yield on Airlift. *The New York Times* [online]. 1994 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/02/world/urged-by-russia-bosnia-serbs-yield-on-airlift.html>

under siege, an action authorized under UN Resolution 824, but Moscow was suspicious of underlying motives and Yeltsin was dismayed by the West's lack of consultation on matters which could cause him embarrassment at home.

In 1994, the Contact Group was established. It was an informal group of states consisting of the United States and Russia along with Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Italy. It was an invaluable diplomatic tool when it came to policy coordination and ultimately played a role in the cessation of hostilities. It put forward a peace plan which replaced the failed Vance-Owen plan, proposing to give the newly formed Muslim-Croat federation 51 % of Bosnian territory and 49 % to the Bosnian Serbs. While Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan, it led to a split between them and Milosević who supported the plan, which turned out to be a turning point in the course of the war. It also meant freezing of relations between Bosnian Serbs and Moscow, and Russia focused on its support for Slobodan Milosević in his new role of a peacemaker²⁴.

NATO air campaign *Deliberate Force* was criticized heavily by the Russian government and Moscow called for it to end immediately. Russia threatened to help the Serbs unilaterally, to leave the Contact Group and to reconsider military cooperation agreements with the U.S. It put forward a proposal for the UNSC to condemn the bombing, but Holbrooke writes, that „Ambassador Albright swiftly headed it off“. But the rising tension could not be ignored – Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was sent to Moscow for ‚quiet consultations‘ to explain how essential the bombing is for the negotiations, and Russian concerns abated considerably²⁵. NATO continued the campaign, and the air strikes forced Bosnian Serbs to lift the siege of Sarajevo and provided the Muslim-Croat Federation with enough support to push Serb forces roughly to the territorial share outlined by the Contact Group plan. The Dayton Agreement was signed on November 22nd, 1995. Implementation Force under NATO command was to police the agreement until replaced in December 1996 by Stabilisation Force. Despite differences over policy during the war, Russia was showing interest in being included in these efforts. The conditions were negotiated over the vital channel between Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and United States Secretary of Defense William Perry. Russia didn't want to participate in a force led by NATO, but by UN or a special coalition, where they would have an equal role to the U.S., but for the U.S. this was a dealbreaker since it meant a violation of the principle of unity of command²⁶. But it was important to President Clinton to

24 BOWKER, Mike, 1998. The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 50(7), p. 1253.

25 HOLBROOKE, Richard, 1999. *To End a War: The Conflict in Yugoslavia*. Modern Library. ISBN 978-0-375-75360-2, p. 144.

26 HOLBROOKE, Richard, 1999. *To End a War: The Conflict in Yugoslavia*. Modern Library. ISBN 978-0-375-75360-2, p. 206.

involve the Russians. As the Russians insisted on the condition of joint authority for all decisions, the final decision was left for Clinton-Yeltsin summit in New York on October 23rd, 1995. One day before, Yeltsin delivered a speech to the UNSC criticizing NATO expansion and states he will not participate in a force under NATO command. Nevertheless, the Presidents agreed on the inclusion of Russia and on the function of the force, and leave the structure of command to Perry and Grachev. Finally, an arrangement is negotiated, where the Russian contingent was commanded by a Russian officer (at that time Colonel General Shevtsov), but in theatre, the Russian troops were under the tactical control of a U.S.-led multi-national division²⁷. It was important, that General Joulwan was commanding the force as a general of U.S. forces in Europe, not as NATO supreme commander, as NATO „was still a four-letter word in Moscow“. According to Holbrooke, the arrangement was a historic achievement, because, for the first time since the World War II, U.S. and Russian troops would operate in a unified command²⁸.

Chapter summary

From the presented analysis of Russian integration into the U.S.-led liberal security system over the course of the Bosnian war, it seems justified to consider this phase of the process hopeful or optimistic, though the question whether such optimism was justified is more complicated. While many didn't consider the handling of the crisis a success due to widespread destruction and suffering that was not prevented, major clashes among great powers were averted despite warnings that they might occur²⁹. While Russia wasn't among the most active powers in agenda setting, it mostly decided to conform to international consensus. It also scored some diplomatic victories, mostly when it played the role of a „good cop“, offering the Serb side options that allowed both states to save face. This was possible because Serbs trusted, to a certain extent, that Russian presence would serve to guarantee their fair treatment. There were times of heightened tensions, such as after the Croatian land-grab in Bosnia started, or at the beginning of *Operation Deliberate Force*. Russian reaction remained largely rhetorical, but the sentiment should not be dismissed, because it produced a diplomatic fallout, which affected the states' future behavior. Russia may not have acted on its narrative due to Russian dependence on non-confrontational foreign policy stance

27 BOWKER, Mike, 1998. The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 50(7), p. 1255.

28 HOLBROOKE, Richard, 1999. *To End a War: The Conflict in Yugoslavia*. Modern Library. ISBN 978-0-375-75360-2, p. 214.

29 SHAPIRO, Margaret, Bosnia Arms Vote Risks World War, Russian Warns. *The Washington Post* [online]. 1994 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-895787.html>

because of foreign aid it needed during its period of economic reforms³⁰, because of the need to signal Moscow's break with the past and its willingness to play a more positive role in the future of European security³¹, or a lack of political will to invest in a relatively marginal conflict. Anyway, as a result, it maintained unity with its U.S.-led allies on the political, diplomatic and military level for most of the conflict. It can be said that the U.S.-led coalition failed to exercise strategic restraint, but this did not lead to a strong or immediate clash with the Russian side, while it may have been noted with concern.

The moments of friction between Russia and the U.S. did not stem from major ideological or policy differences (Russia agreed, that Belgrade bore „much greater responsibility“ than any other regarding the developments in the Balkans, as Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev stated at the London Conference on Yugoslavia in 1992³²), but rather from not being consulted and involved in the decision-making process. Authors agree that the goal of Russia during its involvement in Bosnian War was to gain recognition and prestige as an active power on the international field, to find respect equal to that of other European powers and to become part of European security like it wasn't since 1914^{33 34}. This is consistent with Russia's effort on the international field in a broader sense. During 1994, Russian integration has accomplished several important steps, such as the country's inclusion in the *Partnership for Peace* initiative (following the establishment of relations with NATO within the framework of *North Atlantic Cooperation Council* in 1991, and followed by signing the *Founding Act* in 1997), or its inclusion at the Group of Seven (G-7) summit in Naples (with Russia's situation and future role discussed as one of the topics of the summit; since then, Russia met with the group on informal basis until formally joining in 1998, forming with the others the Group of Eight). While not always agreeing with the West, Russia was looking for a place among decision-makers it deemed rightful. On the other hand, it still assumed the role of a protector of the post-Soviet space, and the sentiment of pan-Slavic solidarity together with more pragmatic reasons pressured Russian leadership to side with the Serbs, or at least appear like they did because such sentiment also became a political tool on the domestic political scene³⁵. This led Moscow to oppose the use of force against the Serbs, and even though it

30 SUROVELL, Jeffrey, 2012. The Grand Deception: Post-Soviet Russia and the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia. *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 25, p. 292. DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2012.705562.

31 BOWKER, Mike, 1998. The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 50(7), p. 1248.

32 SUROVELL, Jeffrey, 2012. The Grand Deception: Post-Soviet Russia and the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia. *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 25, p. 287. DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2012.705562.

33 HOLBROOKE, Richard, 1999. *To End a War: The Conflict in Yugoslavia*. Modern Library. ISBN 978-0-375-75360-2, p. 117.

34 BOWKER, Mike, 1998. The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 50(7), p. 1245.

always gave in eventually, it caused diplomatic complications and delay, which at given time could easily mean loss of human lives.

Therefore, Russia only succeeded at its goal partially. Its efforts were acknowledged in many European capitals, but its image suffered because of its conduct during the war. The more positive aspects were too often lost in petty obstructionism and hyperbolic language, such as Yeltsin's talk of genocide when NATO took action against the Serbs in the summer of 1995. It contributed to Russia's image as an unreliable partner and to the fears that Russia's more cooperative policy towards the West stems from the country's weakness and not internalization of benefits of the partnership, and therefore that it would not last long³⁶. The U.S., frustrated by lack of political will to intervene, turned out to be willing to resort to unilateral action rather than insist on Russia's inclusion because of its position of the provider of security in the post-Cold War world, as is consistent with Ikenberry's writing on the possible behavior of the hegemon. Russia found itself sidelined again and again whenever it decided to take position colliding with policy of the U.S., which increasingly seized initiative as the conflict progressed.

6 Kosovo War

In several years, another war broke out in the province of Kosovo, where Slobodan Milosević's rise started in 1987. The Dayton Agreement which effectively ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not address the situation in Kosovo, where ethnic tensions remained high. With the signing of the Agreement, the international pressure on Slobodan Milosević's regime decreased. The sanctions imposed on FRY were lifted and diplomatic relations were normalized. Moreover, the government in neighboring Albania, which supported Kosovars over the border in their plight, collapsed in 1997. Chaos ensued, allowing Albanians in Kosovo to stock up on weapons³⁷. As non-violent opposition (pursued since 1989) seemed less and less viable, some of the discontent Kosovar Albanians were led to believe that they will need to take up arms to fight for independence

35 BOWKER, Mike, 1998. The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 50(7), p. 1258.

36 BOWKER, Mike, 1998. The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community. *Europe-Asia Studies*. 50(7), p. 1258.

37 SCHNABEL, Albrecht (Ed.), THAKUR, Ramesh (Ed.), 2000. *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*. Tokyo: United Nations University press, p. 425. ISBN 92-808-1050-2.

and employ violence to attract international attention³⁸. Attacks of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) intensified, provoking Serb response and retaliation, until the unrest in the province indeed warranted Contact Group concern, as it called to give it a special status within Serbia on September 24th, 1997³⁹. In 1998, the situation became so alarming, that the UNSC saw fit to impose economic sanctions and arms embargo on the FRY in March⁴⁰, with hopes that this would end the excessive use of force by the government. Members of the Council agreed (including Russia, but excluding abstaining China, which considered the dispute an internal matter of FRY), that only the end of violence could allow the Albanians in Kosovo to pursue a prospect of self-determination and autonomy, and called on the authorities in Belgrade to offer Kosovars a genuine political process to realize such pursuit, but they insisted that a solution should primarily ensure the territorial integrity of FRY.

Russia stepped in to take initiative in resolving the conflict in June 1998 when Presidents Yeltsin and Milošević negotiated a compromise agreement, mandating an independent international team of roughly fifty diplomats to observe security conditions in the province and provide an overt international presence of non-intrusive observer teams. The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) was launched on 6 July 1998 in cooperation between Russian and U.S. embassies in FRY (the U.S. contributed 12 members to the international mission)⁴¹. The Kosovo crisis could not be regarded as an internal issue of Serbia or FRY anymore.

Establishment of the mission was soon followed by another UNSC Resolution. Resolution 1199 was adopted on 23 September 1998 with Chinese abstention, demanding an end of hostilities and ceasefire from both Yugoslav and Albanian party. It also revolved around the question refugees, which became increasingly pressing as their numbers rose to 230 000 and up to 50 000 of them lost access to shelter and other basic necessities in Kosovo and other parts of FRY alone, as estimated by the United Nations High Representative for Refugees⁴².

Meanwhile, American diplomat Christopher Hill was engaged in shuttle diplomacy, traveling between Yugoslavia and Albanian leaders, trying to find some middle ground. He was, however, having a hard time identifying exactly whom to speak to on the side of KLA, as the organizational structure of its units was somewhat loose due to their localized nature. Combined with Milošević's

38 *Ivo Daalder Interview* [online]. [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/daalder.html>

39 *Kosovo Chronology: 1997 to the End of the Conflict*. 1999.

40 *Security Council Resolution 1160* [online]. 1998 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1160>.

41 *Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission: Fact Sheet Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs* [online]. 1998 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/fs_980708_kom.html

42 *Security Council Resolution 1199* [online]. 1998 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1199>

reputation (as described in President Clinton's statement: „Balkan graveyards are filled with President Milosevic's broken promises⁴³.“), this fact created an environment in which promises between the sides lacked credibility because they could be broken by only a small group of militants⁴⁴. Other problems comprised of KLA's reluctance to agree on anything at all, or any agreement not carrying the promise of a referendum on the status of the province, with independence remaining the ultimate long-term goal. This was unacceptable for Belgrade, and on top of that, it would not even endorse a framework document which ensures the territorial integrity of the FRY, but barely mentions either it or Serbia by name and which includes provision for inclusion of Kosovo Albanian representation on the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY, the highest decision-making body on military affairs⁴⁵. Shuttle diplomacy was therefore unsuccessful at the moment (though its outcomes were later used to form base for deliberations over a new peace plan during NATO occupation of Kosovo) and tensions continued to rise, forcing North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO to issue an „activation warning“ in September 1998 (ACTWARN)⁴⁶, signalling that NATO would not hesitate to use force (limited air option and phased air campaign) if necessary, and subsequently ‚activation orders‘ (ACTORDs) in October, declaring that such action will be taken in approximately 96 hours unless Milosević chooses to comply with NATO demands⁴⁷. Such strong pressure forced Milosević to come to terms with Richard Holbrooke, negotiating an agreement averting the threat of air strikes, asking that the Yugoslav forces fall back and refugees are allowed back, and letting Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) into the country to confirm compliance with the agreement. This constituted quite a breakthrough, as the Yugoslav President long opposed similar foreign presence (KDOM was a significantly smaller mission, and KVM was supposed to take over its responsibilities after some interim period), and the mission was OSCE's most complex task yet. Supported by UNSC Resolution 1203, adopted on 24 October 1998, its goal was to avert a humanitarian disaster predicted for those tens of thousands Kosovars who had fled the violence of the preceding summer/autumn and taken to the hills, without provision for the harsh winter months ahead, and to create a climate of less violence and greater stability in order to improve the chances

43 DROZDIK, William, *NATO Approves Airstrikes on Yugoslavia* [online]. 1998 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/nato101398.htm>

44 BUCKLEY, William Joseph (Ed.), 2000. *Kosovo – Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions*. Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, p. 133.

45 GOW, James, 2008. Kosovo after the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement. What Now? *The International Spectator* 33(4), p. 18.

46 *Statement by the Secretary General following the ACTWARN decision* [online]. 1998 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980924e.htm>

47 *Statement to the Press by the Secretary General Following Decision on the ACTORD* [online]. 1998 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013a.htm>

of reaching a definitive political settlement⁴⁸. On the other hand, the KLA did not waste the chance to take advantage of the situation, and the positions abandoned by the Serbs were immediately taken. In Russia, this strengthened the perception, that this development meant that the winning Serbian army has been outmaneuvered by the KLA and that the ethnic cleansing against Albanians only escalated after the initiation of the NATO air campaign⁴⁹⁵⁰.

At this point, Russia's cooperation was becoming more and more problematic. Russia did not veto Resolution 1203 outright, but it abstained from the vote, showing that it is opposed to any kind of international use of force in FRY. The threat of force constituted by ACTWARN and ACTORDs resonated in Moscow because, in Russian view, such strike would necessitate an explicit UNSC authorization, while Washington argued that Yugoslav blatant violation of Resolution 1199's requirements provided sufficient legal ground for NATO to undertake military action⁵¹. It was argued that Resolution 1203 provided much clearer legal ground for the possible use of force. First, it was the right to protect nationals involved in the KVM if their safety was threatened. In addition, the resolution contained a passage that stated that the OSCE mission would need to „consider arrangements to be implemented in cooperation with other organizations“ to provide for action to ensure their „safety and freedom of movement“⁵². Russia, as well as China, declared, however, that they do not see the resolution as authorizing any use of force⁵³. Despite expressing „grave concern“, they chose not to veto. Another point of disagreement was KVM's human rights mandate. William Walker, the head of KVM, argued at a conference in Warsaw that human rights are important to the credibility of the mission because the whole crisis in Kosovo was largely based on egregious violations of human rights by both parties. Representatives of Ukraine, Belarus, and (most importantly) Russia objected, that the mission should adhere to a strict interpretation of KVM mandate by OSCE Permanent Council – and this mandate does not even mention the word „human rights“⁵⁴. Others, such as OSCE Chairman-in-Office Bronisław Geremek, argued that human rights provision is implicit in every OSCE mission because the human dimension and the security

48 WALKER, William G. OSCE Verification Experiences in Kosovo: November 1998-June 1999, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 4(3-4), p. 128.

49 ARBATOV, Alexei G., 2000. *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*. Marshall Center Papers. ISBN 1-930831-02-1

50 HARZL, Benedikt C. Conflicting Perceptions: Russia, the West and Kosovo, *Review of Central and East European Law* 33, p. 501.

51 GUICHERD, C, 1999. International Law and the War in Kosovo. *Survival*. 41(2), p. 26.

52 GOW, James, 2008. Kosovo after the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement. What Now? *The International Spectator* 33(4), p. 19.

53 Security Council Report S/PV.3937 [online]. 1998 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SPV%203937.pdf>

54 WALKER, William G. OSCE Verification Experiences in Kosovo: November 1998-June 1999, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 4(3-4), p. 129.

dimension are tightly linked and indivisible, but this was unlikely to change the mind of Milošević or his allies in Moscow. The mission was carried out according to its American head's and OSCE's Polish Chairman-in-Office's perspective, and as time went on, it became the *de facto* human rights protection mechanism in Kosovo⁵⁵. The mission monitored, reported and verified human rights violations throughout the province. Initiated projects to increase the capacities of domestic human-rights-watch groups and provided training to its own members on such issues as freedom of movement, trial monitoring, interviewing and reporting.

William Walker writes in his account of the mission, that it encountered „almost total non-compliance“ on the part of Belgrade authorities⁵⁶, constituted by over a thousand of human-rights complaints, some of which KVM verified as abuses against the rights to life, the right to liberty, freedom from torture and ill-treatment, and freedom of movement, combined with violations of humanitarian law in Racak, Rogovo, Rakovina and other villages. The regime is reported to be progressively more hostile and non-cooperative towards the mission's personnel and leadership, attacking them via its media and stirring up emotions in local Serb enclaves and villages, which reacted in an equally hostile fashion upon KVM vehicles arrival⁵⁷. This inevitably led to the force's withdrawal, as it was unable to perform its mandated tasks and every day brought greater risk, that one or more of the verifiers would be badly hurt. The withdrawal of the force meant a further escalation of the conflict.

In view of the deteriorating situation, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov met on 26 January 1999⁵⁸. They called upon the „Serbian authorities to carry out the commitments in their 11 point Statement of Principles of a Political Settlement of October 13“ and determined to maintain close contact in order to „coordinate U.S. and Russian support for a resolution of the crisis“. On the next day, the United States announced their intention to add a credible threat of force to diplomacy on the issue of Kosovo, saying it would be implemented through a decision of the Contact Group⁵⁹. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana urged both parties to end violence and pursue their goals by peaceful means only. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan visited NATO headquarters, saying in his statement, that the UN may be

55 WALKER, William G. OSCE Verification Experiences in Kosovo: November 1998-June 1999, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 4(3-4), p. 131.

56 WALKER, William G. OSCE Verification Experiences in Kosovo: November 1998-June 1999, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 4(3-4), p. 134.

57 During the Rambouillet peace process, see below.

58 PERLEZ, Jane. Russia and U.S. Urge Kosovo Talks; Albright Weighs Troops. *The New York Times* [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-24]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/27/world/russia-and-us-urge-kosovo-talks-albright-weighs-troops.html>

59 WELLER, Marc. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 1999. *International Affairs*. 75(2), p. 221.

approaching a moment when the use of force would be needed in Yugoslavia again⁶⁰. The Contact Group met on 29 January, agreeing to summon representatives from the federal Yugoslav and Serbian governments as well as representatives of the Kosovo Albanians to Rambouillet by 6 February to begin negotiations with the direct involvement of the Contact Group. It also demanded that the FRY stop offensive actions and repression in Kosovo, comply with the commitments it had made to NATO and OSCE, and with the UNSC resolutions. An ambiguous phrase that „the Contact Group will hold both sides accountable“ for non-compliance, has later been cited as a threat of force included in the group’s statement. UNSC welcomed the Contact Group decision and also demanded compliance⁶¹. NATO’s NAC also demanded compliance and stressed the necessity of acceptance of the summons to Rambouillet, threatening using whatever measures necessary in case of non-compliance, and even made explicit mentions of air strikes against targets on FRY territory⁶². The legitimacy of such threat was disputed, as NAC based it on the authority already claimed last October to enforce ceasefire, which was also one of humanitarian action, but no explicit mandate came from the UNSC, which assumed primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in the context of the Kosovo crisis (as stated in Resolution 1203⁶³) since then. The UNSC, however, did formally endorse the Holbrooke agreement in Resolution 1203, which resulted from the threat of force by NATO in October 1998⁶⁴. The ambivalence of the situation opened the option of use of force for the active actors, but Moscow officials felt cheated as they explicitly expressed that their actions can not be seen as consent to use of force. Russia has, for the most part, maintained political unity with the international community. It sent 76 OSCE observers to participate in the KVM and supported two out of three UNSC resolutions, not vetoing the third – but this was because it felt it can use the veto to stop any development that crosses the line for Russia, such as the use of force. This feeling of being cheated, along with the threat of being sidelined, seems to have impacted Russia’s future policy.

The negotiations at Rambouillet were fraught with difficulties. The delegations from Kosovo and Serbia/FRY (both entities were invited, but FRY, dominated by the Serbs on the federal level as well, regarded the Kosovo crisis most importantly a Serbian issue) did not engage in direct negotiation, but instead in proximity talks. While the Rambouillet conference was co-chaired

60 UN Press Release SG/SM/6878. [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990128.sgsm6878.html>

61 Statement by the President of the Security Council [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-24]. Available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BF99B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/kos%20SPRST%201999%205.pdf>

62 Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-24]. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27459.htm

63 Security Council Resolution 1203 [online]. 1998 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1203>

64 WELLER, Marc. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 1999. *International Affairs*. 75(2), p. 224.

formally by French and British foreign ministers, the most important role of negotiators actually leading the conduct of negotiations was appointed by the Contact Group and represented USA (Christopher Hill), Russian Federation (Boris Mayorski) and European Union (EU, Wolfgang Petritsch). The Serb delegation criticized the format and said it would prefer direct negotiation with the Kosovars, and it was supported by Russia, but its demand was refused⁶⁵. It did not provide constructive comments and propositions for modification for the draft proposed by the Contact Group, instead offering to sign it without any interference with its contents. The Kosovo delegation chose a different approach – after all, the resulting document would serve as Kosovo’s constitution, and they would have to live with the end results, on top of being held accountable for them by their domestic constituents⁶⁶. The delegation stated that the proposal is acceptable in principle, but produced many comments on how it could be improved. Few of these were accepted, or even discussed in depth, as the deadline for acceptance of a resulting agreement approached, to the frustration of the delegation. The conference did, after lengthy and heated negotiation, produce some result, issues of Kosovar self-government, the scope and character of „international presence“ and overall implementation were left to be discussed at Paris follow-on talks⁶⁷. These talks ended in a deadlock after the Serbia/FRY delegation proposed a draft completely outside of the framework of non-negotiable principles presented prior to Rambouillet by the Contact Group. This led to an earlier version from Rambouillet being opened for signing. The Kosovo delegation signed the accords⁶⁸. Upon signing, it presented an interpretative statement, confirming the acceptance of the accords, inviting NATO implementation and expressed its intention to hold a referendum on independence, after the agreed upon three years of interim period. Serbia/FRY refused to take part in further substantive discussions and was condemned and warned by the co-chairmen who decided not to resume the talks unless the Serbs express their acceptance of the Accords. Instead, in spite of Richard Holbrooke’s attempt in Belgrade to persuade FRY/Serbia to reconsider, the parliament voted to reject the interim agreement. By then, Serb military was deployed in Kosovo again, starting new offensive operations and forcing the KVM to withdraw rapidly to Macedonia. On 22 March, NATO authorized the launching of military operations against the FRY in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, as the number of displaced had again risen to over 200000⁶⁹. The first bombs of Operation Allied Force hit targets on 24 March 1999.

65 WELLER, Marc. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 1999. *International Affairs*. 75(2), p. 228.

66 WELLER, Marc. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 1999. *International Affairs*. 75(2), p. 230.

67 WELLER, Marc. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 1999. *International Affairs*. 75(2), p. 234.

68 Russian Ambassador Mayorski refused to witness the signing of the document by the Kosovars.

69 WELLER, Marc. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 1999. *International Affairs*. 75(2), p. 236.

This turn of events constituted a shock to Russia's relations with the USA and West. The accounts of Russian activity at Rambouillet are diverse. The description of Russia's (Boris Mayorski's) behavior ranges from „as a representative of one of the parties party“⁷⁰, to being steered by desperation, yet professional and dedicated⁷¹ and finally to being constructive, while firmly rejecting the idea of NATO use of force without the approval of the UN as a matter of principle⁷². But the rejection of the Russian *basso continuo* „Keep Kosovo in Yugoslavia and keep NATO out of Kosovo“⁷³ (which made Russia vulnerable to Milosević's intransigence) caused an immediate reaction. The Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov who was flying to the United States for an official visit, turned around halfway through his flight the day before, to signal Russian condemnation of the operation. It seems there existed a consensus among the Russian political spectrum on the condemnation. Yeltsin reacted on 24 March, calling the operation a „naked aggression“ and stressing, that Russia would mediate the conflict. The State Duma passed a resolution on 27 March suspending Russia's ties with NATO (Yeltsin withdrew his chief military representative to NATO along with many others including troops receiving training in NATO countries, but not his ambassador), suspending START II ratification, supporting volunteer efforts and endorsing humanitarian aid to Yugoslavia, and accelerating the integration into Commonwealth of Independent States. Several Communist and ultra-nationalist legislators visited FRY to show their support, including Duma leaders Sergey Baburin and Gennadiy Seleznev⁷⁴. A ship was sent from the Black Sea Fleet to the Adriatic off Yugoslav coast to gather intelligence. The public wasn't any less outraged by NATO's moves than the political representation. Sharyl Cross, an American academic who was teaching at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, gives an account of the public being united in criticism of the air strikes but divided in opinion on how Russia should react⁷⁵. She points out the differences between the perceptions of the conflict based on its differing portrayal in Russian and Western media – with the latter concentrating on atrocities committed against Kosovar Albanians and neglecting the retaliatory violence against the Serbs and the criminal associations and activities of the KLA, while

70 WELLER, Marc. The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 1999. *International Affairs*. 75(2), p. 251.

71 KLARIN, Mirko. ANALYSIS: Petritsch Sheds Light on Rambouillet. *Institute for War and Peace Reporting* [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-27]. Available at: <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/analysis-petritsch-sheds-light-rambouillet>

72 HARZL, Benedikt C. Conflicting Perceptions: Russia, the West and Kosovo, *Review of Central and East European Law* 33, p. 499.

73 HARZL, Benedikt C. Conflicting Perceptions: Russia, the West and Kosovo, *Review of Central and East European Law* 33, p. 502.

74 COLUMBUS, Frank (ed.), 2003. *Russia in Transition*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. ISBN 1-59033-234-2, p. 56

75 CROSS, Sharyl. Russia and NATO towards the 21st Century: Conflicts Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo [online]. 2001 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/cross.pdf>, p. 12

the former hardly mentioned it⁷⁶ and put a greater emphasis on the plight of the Serb victims and casualties. But while the Western audience was mostly unfamiliar with Russian discourse, Russians elites were vocal in their criticism of Western coverage, and Russian society listened. There was the talk of World War III as well as paranoia that perceived aggression against Serbia could be a rehearsal for a similar scenario in Russia⁷⁷ (not taking into account the striking difference between FRY and Russia with respect to nuclear deterrence⁷⁸).

While the bombing of Serbian targets meant an end of the post-Cold War phase of international affairs for the Russians⁷⁹, when it came to the effect of their immediate responses, it was mostly symbolic in terms of immediate reaction and did not contribute to the resolution of the conflict in Kosovo. Boris Yeltsin was under pressure to resolve the conflict that Russian ultra-nationalists and hard-line Communists used to bolster their attractiveness. Also, an important stimulant for Russia to a moderating stance was its need for international financial aid⁸⁰. Yeltsin delivered his annual State of the Federation speech on 30 March 1999, denouncing the strikes as contrary to the UN Charter and as threatening the very foundations of the international law, but stressed that Russia has to react rationally, according to its interests, and not let itself to be drawn into the war⁸¹. The government was not united in a moderating stance, as Ivanov and his Foreign Ministry, which resurrected its harsh rhetoric on 15 April, calling NATO action a „criminal act“. Communists demanded that „pro-Nato“ media, which reported ethnic cleansing by Serb troops, be censored⁸². The West was trying to break Russian international isolation in the case of Kosovo, and as if to soothe the Russian humiliation stemming from apparent impotence in supporting its own declarations and commitments, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed „working constructively with Russia“ in April, and NATO’s parliamentary assembly welcomed Russia’s peace efforts. Yeltsin attempted to counter the hard-liners and their supporters such as Ivanov and Primakov by appointing a new special

76 SCHNABEL, Alfred (ed.) , THAKUR, Ramesh (ed.), *Kosovo and the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention*. UNU Press. ISBN 92-808-1050-2, p. 103

77 CROSS, Sharyl. Russia and NATO towards the 21st Century: Conflicts Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo [online]. 2001 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/cross.pdf>, p. 14

78 Alexei Arbatov, former deputy chair of Duma Defense Committee, describes in his review of lessons learned from Kosovo War a profound Russian fear, that while full-scale war may be deterred by the threat of suicidal series of nuclear strikes, selective air and naval strikes might not. This would put Russia under risk that its deterrence capability would be destroyed.

79 ARBATOV, Alexei G., 2000. *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*. Marshall Center Papers. ISBN 1-930831-02-1

80 SCHNABEL, Alfred (ed.) , THAKUR, Ramesh (ed.), *Kosovo and the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention*. UNU Press. ISBN 92-808-1050-2, p. 59

81 President Yeltsin’s State of the Federation Speech [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-27]. Available at: <https://www.c-span.org/video/?122179-1/russian-evening-newscast>

82 COLUMBUS, Frank (ed.), 2003. *Russia in Transition*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. ISBN 1-59033-234-2, p. 59

representative in Yugoslavia Viktor Chernomyrdin⁸³. He pressured Milosević diplomatically and announced on 28 May, that Milosević accepted („in principle“) the peace proposals of the G-8 (amounting to a halt of the bombing, sending international peacekeeping force under auspices of the UN and a Yugoslav Army force limited to 11500 troops to remain in Kosovo). Their plan was, however, dismissed because it did not require the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo and because NATO forces were not at the core of the peacekeepers.

Internal pressures within the Russian government were probably to blame for the greatest Russian *tour de force* of the conflict: the surprise occupation of the Slatina Airport in Pristina. Among the critics of the President's handling of the Kosovo crisis were the hard-line parliamentarians and a significant part of the military. Yeltsin's dispatch of Chernomyrdin was not received well by the Duma, because of the widespread notion, that the envoy would serve the U.S. and NATO's interests⁸⁴. Due to the confusing situation, until this day, it isn't clear on whose order the approximately 200 soldiers from Russian Stabilisation Force (SFOR) contingent in Bosnia marched to the airfield in clear violation of the terms of SFOR, just as the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered the province. Foreign Minister Ivanov denied that he knew of the move and called the troops' arrival to Kosovo a „mistake“⁸⁵ (a Russian general confirmed that they are staying on 13 June 1999⁸⁶). This preemptive move aimed at securing a Russian-controlled sector in Kosovo brought the conflict dangerously close to an hot war between NATO and Russian troops – which may have been prevented by the choice of a British commander Mike Jackson to refuse to block the runways to prevent Russians from receiving additional reinforcements or taking control of a sector in Northern Kosovo as ordered by General Commander Wesley Clark, saying famously: „Sir, I'm not going to start Third World War for you.“⁸⁷ Blockade at the airport wasn't necessary after all, since neighboring Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary rejected the entry of Russian aircraft through their airspace, cutting the soldiers at the airport of from any support. This situation forced the isolated group to engage in countertrade the local population and eventually back down. Russia was not able to secure by force an independent sector in Kosovo along with the Americans, British,

83 Chernomyrdin, the founder of Gazprom, played a part in reopening of gas valves for Sarajevo, which were closed when Bosnia could not afford to pay for gas. This state was a point of coordinated effort by Bosnia, Serbia and the U.S., since energy starvation endangered the stability of a potential ceasefire. According to Richard Holbrooke's account, the decision to close the valves was most likely motivated financially, not politically, and when Bosnia pledged not to hold Gazprom responsible for explosions and malfunctions during the opening of the valves, the supply was restored, which in turn enabled the ceasefire, also to Chernomyrdin's credit.

84 CROSS, Sharyl. Russia and NATO towards the 21st Century: Conflicts Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo [online]. 2001 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/cross.pdf>, p. 14

85 <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/cross.pdf>, p. 16

86 FISK, Robert. Russians Refuse to Back Off. *Independent* [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-27]. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/russians-refuse-to-back-off-1099750.html>

87 TRAN, Mark. „I'm not going to start Third World War for you,“ Jackson told Clark. *The Guardian* [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-27]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/aug/02/balkans3>

French, Germans, and Italians, which was denied to them due to experience with past partisanship in Bosnia, where Russians allegedly passed the Serbs information on SFOR operations⁸⁸.

Ultimately, the decisions regarding Kosovo's future and the arrangement for the deployment of peacekeepers were finalized on a political level, at the G-8 summit in Cologne. There, Russia agreed to the terms produced by the G-8 and they were imposed on Milosević, who accepted them, although they differed only marginally from those proposed by NATO⁸⁹. At this conference, Russia achieved the permanent status of a full member in this Group in both political and the economic respects, and other states promised to pressure the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to release aid blocked after Russia's financial crisis in 1998. A Russian contingent was envisaged as a part of Kosovo Force (KFOR) by the detailed chapter on military implementation in the Rambouillet accords⁹⁰ and Russia and the U.S. agreed on 3600 troops in Kosovo. In Russia, some voices could be heard that without an independent sector, this only amounts to political support for a NATO-led peacekeeping operation, and Russia remained a junior partner without an opportunity to influence the situation in Kosovo⁹¹. It was, however, a manifestation of a joint effort, which opened the way for Resolution 1244 of the UNSC. China agreed to abstain from the vote and not exercise its veto when Belgrade agreed to the G-8 terms in principle⁹². The resolution was ratified on 10 June 1999, demanding the withdrawal of all FRY forces from Kosovo and as Milosević lost Russian support, he agreed to the peace terms, marking the end of the Kosovo War.

Chapter summary

An analysis Kosovo War's role in the process of Russian-Western integration involves two levels, which are interconnected – the events during the war, which led to some of the highest points of confrontation between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War, and their aftermath, because these events left a mark on Russian collective consciousness and motivated a broader shift

88 [CROSS, Sharyl. *Russia and NATO towards the 21st Century: Conflicts Peacekeeping* in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo \[online\]. 2001 \[cit. 2018-06-08\]. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/cross.pdf>, p. 18](https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/cross.pdf)

89 SCHNABEL, Albrecht (Ed.), THAKUR, Ramesh (Ed.), 2000. *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*. Tokyo: United Nations University press. ISBN 92-808-1050-2, p. 457.

90 Rambouillet Weller 246

91 SCHNABEL, Albrecht (Ed.), THAKUR, Ramesh (Ed.), 2000. *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*. Tokyo: United Nations University press. ISBN 92-808-1050-2, p. 112.

92 SCHNABEL, Albrecht (Ed.), THAKUR, Ramesh (Ed.), 2000. *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*. Tokyo: United Nations University press. ISBN 92-808-1050-2, p. 135.

in Russia's foreign policy posture and reconsideration of key elements of military aspects of security. Russia operated from the onset of war as a careful ally to the Western states, cooperating with them within the Contact Group and mostly supporting similar positions in international organizations like UN or OSCE. The initiative was left to other states, but Russia's consent working as an authorization was needed and given freely in terms of declarations and calls on FRY. The fact that this time, unlike in the Bosnian War, the international community was engaging a sovereign state, not only an ethnic minority and its leadership, played a huge role for Russia, which assumed a conservative stance to the norms of sovereignty. Due to Russia's own struggle with separatist movements at home, most notably Chechnyan separatists, it was much more sensitive to pressing a sovereign state to make any sort of political concessions to the rebels. When it came to taking more concrete action, Russia started to show resistance to Western policy, as exemplified by its abstention from Resolution 1203. This resistance, however, showed to be quite futile, because the West chose to ignore it in the face of the threat of humanitarian catastrophe and loss of prestige. At the start of a military campaign against FRY, Russia was most vocal in its resistance and even threatened retaliatory action⁹³, but no such response in a military sense was realized. Russia's reactions must be understood as a way to cope with perceived humiliation and provocation of status denial stemming from disrespecting Russia's identity as a constructive and constitutive part in international crisis management and European as well as international security affairs. These feelings resonated within the political circles and general public alike, and while they did not result in any immediate break or rift in Russian-Western relationship (possibly due to Russia's economic dependence on the West), the resulting loss of trust and undermining of Yeltsin's policy may have affected the development of Russian foreign policy for years to come. The anti-Western sentiments have helped Vladimir Putin's ascendancy to presidency⁹⁴, as he acted as a proponent of a more assertive foreign policy and reclaiming Russia's status as a great power. It is, however, important to keep in mind that President Putin's orientation is realist and pragmatic, and his policy is not anti-Western at its core; it was him, after all, who resumed Russia's relations with NATO as one of his most important foreign policy decisions as President⁹⁵.

NATO's use of force against FRY also altered Russia's behavior for the rest of the conflict and beyond. The client-sponsor relationship, which was fleeting and questionable until that point, was solidified. Russian-Serb relations were already, before the bombing, above standard, given the

93 HELLER, Regina, 2014. Russia's Quest for Respect in the International Management in Kosovo, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47, p. 341

94 HARZL, Benedikt C. Conflicting Perceptions: Russia, the West and Kosovo, *Review of Central and East European Law* 33, p. 492.

95 LAFRANIERE, Sharon. Russia Mends Broken Ties with NATO. *Washington Post* [online]. 2000 [cit. 2018-06-09]. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/2000-02/17/077r-021700-idx.html>

critical situation – based on historical and cultural, as well as pragmatically political grounds, and visible in cooperation between Russian troops operating in Yugoslavia and the Serbs or Boris Mayorski's diplomatic role at Rambouillet. Operation Allied Force stirred numerous Russian fears: that expanding NATO is gaining power in Europe to the detriment of the UN and OSCE, that norms of sovereignty are being eroded and that Russia's interests are being overlooked either with malicious intent or due to neglect. This led Russia to be vocal about its conservative stance when it came to the state of the international system and its norms, and it became more reasonable to assume a somewhat placatory stance towards the emergent pariah state. Again, while this statement is supported by evidence such as the deployment of Liman intelligence ship at Milosević's request⁹⁶ or Yeltsin's endorsement of Milosević's proposal of Yugoslavia joining the Russia-Belarus Slavic Union⁹⁷, but at the same time, it must be taken with a grain of salt, since as soon as August 1999, Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin acknowledged at the Balkan Reconstruction Summit, that „the sufferings of the Yugoslav population were caused not only by the bombings but chiefly by Milosević's regime“⁹⁸.

On the whole, cooperation regarding the management of Kosovo War was much more problematic than in Bosnian War on all levels concerned. On the political level, the prevailing unity demonstrated in statements and condemnations was revealed to be an illusion when the deteriorating humanitarian situation pushed the international community to action. Then it became apparent that powers have quite disparate views on what kind of action should be taken if any. The U.S. and its allies were willing to take advantage of the unipolar moment to enable the international community to deal with humanitarian catastrophes by pressing rogue states like Milosević's FRY into submission even with the use of force, and even without the authorization of the UNSC. Russia (as well as China or Belarus and India, which submitted together with Russia a draft resolution in the UNSC to condemn the use of force, and others⁹⁹) saw this as a threshold of unipolarity it wasn't willing to let the U.S. cross, favoring the older iteration of international order, but disregarding the new power realities. In the light of Russia's political, economic and military potential at given time (its GDP fell to 2.5 per cent of that of the U.S. and its defense budget shrank to 2 per cent of the American¹⁰⁰), there was little it could do to stop the action of NATO, especially when the vast

96 Milosevic's Weapons Plea. *BBC* [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-09]. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/310624.stm>

97 PONSARD, Lionel, 2007. *Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security: Bridging the Gap*. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-40723-0, p. 74.

98 FOSSATO, Floriana. Russia: Djukanovic's Visit to Moscow Seen as ‚Turning Point‘. *RFE-RL* [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-09]. Available at: <https://www.rferl.org/a/1091887.html>

99 UN Press Release SC/6659. [online]. 1999 [cit. 2018-06-08]. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990326.sc6659.html>

100 **ARBATOV, Alexei G., 2000.** *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*. Marshall Center Papers. ISBN 1-930831-02-1

majority of the UNSC was united in its support of the humanitarian intervention. While whether this was a case of „might makes right“ is debatable because other justifications of action must be considered, might definitely could make right should these justifications fail.

While this rift became crystal clear with the advent of the air strikes, it was hinted earlier by Russia's reluctance, and the cautiousness of the powers trying to avoid confrontation hindered diplomatic effort long before. The Western states sidelined Russia preemptively, conducting diplomatic missions on their own and turning to the Contact Group only when it appeared necessary to show unity. Reluctance to allow Russia to promote its own interests and play a more significant role in the management of the conflict stemmed from the lack of credibility and volatility of Russian internal politics, which made it difficult for Western leaders to predict the country's behavior, and made circumventing it instead of including it in decisionmaking appear as a less risky strategy. Russia, on the other hand, was skeptical about the West's determination to assure that its promises are upheld to Russia's satisfaction (preservation of FRY's territorial unity, demilitarization of KLA), leading it to pursue its own diplomacy. This diplomatic rift could most clearly be observed at the Rambouillet peace conference and contributed to its failure.

As for the military realm, the Kosovo War, like Bosnian War, ended with a NATO-led peacekeeping force including Russian troops, but that is where parallels end – it was preceded by NATO's unilateral strikes against FRY and Russia's rogue action at Slatina airport. In Bosnia, Russia opposed the air strikes against Bosnian Serbs but recognized their use as a „last resort“ to protect UN troops present in Bosnia¹⁰¹. In Kosovo, Russia supported Milosević in his opposition to the deployment of any international force including NATO on the territory of a sovereign state. Russian inclusion in the Kosovo Force wasn't without hardships either, as the U.S. and its allies weren't willing to grant Russia an independent sector that it was demanding, possibly due to negative experience from IFOR and SFOR. There were also moments of positive development, such as the establishment of KDOM, but the mission did not accomplish much, and overall, the cooperation deteriorated during the conflict and further steps in Western-Russian integration were blocked (such as freezing of the START-III treaty, or the implementation of already ratified treaties – START-I, Chemical Weapons Convention and others¹⁰²) after the intervention, necessitating a lengthy process of reconstruction.

101 ERLANGER, Steven. Yeltsin Adamant on Role in Bosnia [online]. 1994 [cit. 2018-06-18]. Available at:<https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/16/world/yeltsin-adamant-on-role-in-bosnia.html>

102 ARBATOV, Alexei G., 2000. *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*. Marshall Center Papers. ISBN 1-930831-02-1, p. 2

7 Syrian Civil War

The Syrian War, ignited in 2011 by the flames of Arab Spring sweeping through North African and Middle Eastern states, is the bloodiest and most turbulent conflict of the decade. Syria has for a long time been Russia's strategic ally in the Middle East. Probably the most important to Russian strategic interests is Russia's only Mediterranean naval base located in Tartus, which was opened in 1971 under an agreement between Leonid Brezhnev and the father of the current leader Bashar al-Assad, Hafez al-Assad. On 30 September 2015, Russia started a military intervention in Syria, joining Iran as requested by the Assadist regime, and since then it appears as one of the most important actors of the conflict.

An entire era passed since the events of Kosovo War, and it is necessary to give at least a brief overview of the development of the Western-Russian relations. In 2000, the Russian Federation elected a new President to succeed Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin. The events of Kosovo and the narrative of Western arrogance and an unjust decline of Russian power contributed to Putin's rise as mentioned above, and the regime worked with the motive since then to increase its legitimacy and provide itself with a cause for assertive security policy. Especially in President Putin's second term, nostalgia for a superpower status and frustration by alleged neglect of Russian interests were important motives in Kremlin's narrative. The President famously stated in 2005 called for the acknowledgment, that „the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.¹⁰³“ Whatever the narrative, Putin's regime strived for economic cooperation with the West, and there were areas of shared interest in security, such as the effort to combat international terrorism. This was especially important in after the 2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S., when Russia offered sympathy and supported *Operation Enduring Freedom* (i.e. through sharing intelligence), targeting Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. The fight against international terrorism was one of the most integrative issues in the security area. For Russia, terrorism and separatism were evils which needed to be combated using all available means, and the securitizing rhetoric of George W. Bush and his declaration of War on Terror converged with Russian stance on terrorism – both countries now agreed that it warranted emergency measures¹⁰⁴. A NATO-Russia Council was created at the May Summit of 2002, allowing Russia to participate in NATO decisions,

103 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation [online]. 2005 [cit. 2018-06-18]. Available at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931>

104 HALLENBERG, Jan (ed.), KARLSSON, Håkan (ed.), 2006. *Iraq War: European Perspectives on Politics, Strategy and Operations*. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-203-01313-1, p. 50

especially those involving issues such as the struggle against terrorism, regional emergencies, and arms control. On the other hand, there were new challenges for cooperation in the new millennium: Russia opposed the U.S. plans to build missile defence system in Central Europe as well as new NATO enlargement, concerning Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltic republics, which the Duma condemned with a resolution stating that „common responses to modern global challenges don't require a build-up of weapons on the territories of Russia's neighbors“ and recommended the government to strengthen Russia's nuclear deterrent and consider the deployment of additional troops on the country's western borders¹⁰⁵.

A significant conflict pertaining to norms of sovereignty and intervention in a fashion similar to wars in the Balkans was 2003 Iraq War. After a unanimous vote for UNSC Resolution 1441 demanding Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to comply with his disarmament obligations, President George W. Bush's administration declared that such compliance wasn't achieved and Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction¹⁰⁶ and launched an invasion against it without the authorization of the UNSC. A resolution to sanction the operation was being prepared, but it fell prey to the „silent veto“ - the draft is never put to vote if a veto is expected. In this particular case, it would be very difficult to justify an invasion into Iraq after an explicit defeat at the UNSC. On the other hand, according to a text by Paul. J. Saunders, who served in the Bush Administration from 2003 to 2005 as Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, there have been indications that Russia would be prepared to abstain if the resolution was written vaguely enough to allow for appropriate explanation to the Russian people, who were overwhelmingly opposed to an American use of force, before the opposition hardened again and the window of opportunity closed¹⁰⁷. The same text hints of a development which is also stressed by G. John Ikenberry – that Russian opposition may have been induced by the diplomatic effort of France and Germany, both supposed members of the U.S.-led liberal security order, definitely significantly more integrated into it than Russia. This erosion of the U.S.-led Western order came hand in hand with transformation into an illiberal hegemony under the leadership of Bush's administration, Ikenberry argues. Russia may have been expected to support the intervention on the basis of a shared effort to combat international terrorism, just like it did in Afghanistan (though there were, since 2001, hints that it would not). But this time, a different crucial element of Russian foreign policy was prioritized – the conservative outlook on international law and the principle of state sovereignty.

105 Russia Condemns NATO's Expansion. *BBC* [online]. 2004 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: [online]. 2004 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3587717.stm>

106 A Transcript of George Bush's War Ultimatum Speech from the Cross Hall in the White House [online]. 2003 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq>

107 SAUNDERS, Paul J. The U.S. and Russia after Iraq. *Hoover Institution* [online]. 2003 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: <https://www.hoover.org/research/us-and-russia-after-iraq>, p. 29

Russia never accepted the U.S. view that Iraq is a part of an „axis of evil“ (with North Korea and Iran) and it did not consider it a threat to international security¹⁰⁸. Vladimir Putin, who from then on criticized American involvement in Iraq quite frequently¹⁰⁹, saw it as stemming from the failure to take Russia into account and to comply with the framework of international law¹¹⁰. The President also listed Yugoslavia in his list of mishandled conflicts, along with Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan.

Since Iraq, Russia had to swallow the bitter pill of Kosovo independence in 2008, but it did so with vocal opposition, confirming its position that Kosovo’s independence should not be recognized without the consent of Serbia and that Serbian territorial integrity should be upheld, as supposedly demanded by UNSC Resolution 1244. President Medvedev alluded to a similarity between what Iraq is for the U.S. and Kosovo is for the EU – examples of the undermining of international law¹¹¹. Russian Foreign Ministry called on the UN and NATO to „take immediate action to fulfill their mandates as authorized by the Security Council, including voiding the decisions of Pristina’s self-governing institutions and adopting severe administrative measures against them“¹¹². But no such thing happened, and instead, Kosovo’s sovereignty was recognized by a majority of UN members.

In 2008, Russia also engaged in a war against its neighbor, Georgia. This case is interesting in the context of previously analyzed Balkans conflicts, as Russia supported the separatist entities Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the point of official recognition, citing the Kosovo case and claiming ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity on these territories, that Russia had a „responsibility to protect“ via military intervention. An analogy was even made between Saddam Hussein and the Georgian President Saakashvili, whom Vladimir Putin suggested to hang¹¹³. The war led to a cooling of Russia-NATO relations, including the suspension of cooperation within the NATO-Russia Council until the withdrawal of Russia’s armed forces from Georgia (this lasted almost a year) or freezing of peacekeeping cooperation between Russia and NATO¹¹⁴.

A major clash between Russia and the U.S. with its European allies was caused by Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its involvement in the war in Eastern Ukraine. In a narrative to

108 HALLENBERG, Jan (ed.), KARLSSON, Håkan (ed.), 2006. *Iraq War: European Perspectives on Politics, Strategy and Operations*. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-203-01313-1, p. 57

109 SHANKER, Thom, LANDLER, Mark. Putin Says U.S. Is Undermining Global Stability. *The New York Times* [online]. 2007 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/world/europe/11munich.html>

110 Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club [online]. 2014 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860>

111 Russia’s Medvedev Condemns Western ‚Paternalism‘. *ABC News* [online]. 2008 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-07-16/russias-medvedev-condemns-western-paternalism/439974>

112 Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kosovo. [online]. 2008 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/d-ru20080313_/d-ru20080313_08.pdf

113 TUATHAIL, Gearóid Ó., 2013. Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War over South Ossetia. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 49(6), p. 696

114 DE HAAS, Marcel. NATO-Russia Relations after the Georgian Conflict. [online]. 2009 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20090000_cscp_artikel_mhaas.pdf

justify these moves, President Putin presented himself as the protector of the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers and as the defender of Russia's identity as a conservative-minded proud nation that is ready to withstand political and economic pressure from the West¹¹⁵. Russian action was interpreted as a rejection of the European order, in which, after 1989, borders among European nations were made semi-permeable, allowing a free flow of capital, people, goods, and ideas. Russia was possibly looking for a place within such a system, but after the annexation of Crimea, Russia made it clear it values state sovereignty, which may suffer a significant degree of corrosion as a result of integrative processes, above all¹¹⁶. The reversal of integration and isolation from the rest of Europe took a concrete form when the West reacted with sanctions and suspension of Russian membership in G-8, as a means of making Russia pay a price and signal resolve of the West not to accept the situation they strongly disapprove of. The sanctions likely caused significant damage to Russian economy (however complicated it is to evaluate the actual impact, due to a number of macroeconomic challenges Russia was already facing, such as the fall of oil prices), but they did not achieve a reversal of Russian policy in Ukraine, and the issue remains one of the most important barriers to cooperation between the West and Russia.

When looking at Syria, a different approach must be adopted than that which was used for wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. We have to keep in mind that the conflict is still ongoing, no actor's position is permanent and much of the war's intricacy will remain obscured until it ceases to be a hot geopolitical topic. But when observing the war, one can discover certain parallels with the wars in the Balkans as well as striking differences. The start of a civil war in Syria was marked by an escalation of violence when Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria, responded with force when the Arab Spring knocked on Syria's door. There existed a long-standing opposition against the repressive regime of the Assad family, and the country experienced its own Damascus Spring following the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, his son, the new President, significantly reduced the numbers of political prisoners and engaged in rhetoric favoring reform and modernization, but the political reforms demanded proved too much for the regime to bear, and the Damascus Spring was followed by the Damascus Winter, a crackdown on the opposition and regime critics, leading to imprisonment of a large portion of them¹¹⁷. The regime argued that this was to prevent civil war, and since then, it actively undermined opposition, infiltrating its groups, accusing it of being lackeys of the West (especially after the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq¹¹⁸), restricting civil

115 ALCARO, Riccardo (ed.). *West-Russia Relations in Light of the Ukraine Crisis*. Roma: Edizioni Nuova Cultura [online]. 2015 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iairp_18.pdf, p. 67

116 ALCARO, Riccardo (ed.). *West-Russia Relations in Light of the Ukraine Crisis*. Roma: Edizioni Nuova Cultura [online]. 2015 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iairp_18.pdf, p. 18

117 LANDIS, Joshua, PACE, Joe, 2006. Syrian opposition. *The Washington Quarterly*, 30(1), p. 47

118 LANDIS, Joshua, PACE, Joe, 2006. Syrian opposition. *The Washington Quarterly*, 30(1), p. 52

society groups, and imprisoning its leaders (including a „revolving door“ arrest policy, periodically granting amnesties to detainees, but arresting others to maintain a constant level of pressure¹¹⁹. On top of this, the opposition suffered from internal incoherence and disunity. It consisted of individual activists, Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, secular opposition, the Kurds and other groups, and it disagreed on a number of issues, such as foreign assistance (nationalists refused to „ride to heaven on the back of Satan“ and liberals welcomed anything that can weaken the regime) or Kurdish rights (Arab opposition was sceptical about them, but needed to utilize the level of Kurdish mobilization). When the fragmented opposition was faced with regime forces in 2011, even though a sizeable portion of the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) defected and formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to avoid targeting fellow Syrians or out of political calculation, these problems would likely lead to its demise, if it wasn't supported. The regime's collapse would be a strategic geopolitical prize for the U.S., especially after their allies in Egypt and Tunisia fell to the Arab Spring because it would limit Iran's influence in the region and undermine Russian efforts to maintain a foothold in the Mediterranean¹²⁰. Russia has taken a firm position in support of the Assad regime since the beginning of the Syrian revolution. Syria has historically enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union, and for today's Russia, it remains an important, while not vital, area of Russian geopolitical and economic interest as it provides Russia with access to the eastern Mediterranean area and through it to three different continents as well as important naval routes. Additionally, Syria is a major procurer of Russian military equipment, particularly since the start of the war^{121, 122}. Since President Barack Obama called on Bashar Al-Assad to step down in 2011, it became clear in a very early stage of the conflict, that the U.S. and Russia will support two opposing sides.

Russia frames its involvement in the war as part of its struggle with terrorism, with upholding Assad's rule over Syria as a secondary objective which is also instrumental to the primary one. This fits its wider narrative regarding the support of militant, anti-Western rulers that had close relations with the Soviet Union as well. This support was justified as an effort to curb Islamist infiltration of Caucasian terrorist groups in Russia and as a contribution to the international „war on terror“¹²³. „Terrorists“ is the term that President Assad uses when referring to any opposition armed groups, including those supported by the West. The U.S. Congress authorized the provision of nonlethal

119 LANDIS, Joshua, PACE, Joe, 2006. Syrian opposition. *The Washington Quarterly*, 30(1), p. 60

120 *The Syrian Conflict: A systems conflict analysis* [online]. 2016 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: <http://arkgroupdmcc.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ARK-Syria-Conflict-Analysis-Digital-copy.pdf>, p. 26

121 Syria's Russian Weapon Buys [online]. 2015 [cit. 2018-06-25]. Available at:

<https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/syria-buying-mig31s-mig35s-for-1-billion-03391/>

122 AMOS, Howard. News Analysis: Russia Damages Image in Arab Spring. *The Moscow Times* [online]. 2011 [cit. 2018-06-25]. Available at: <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/news-analysis-russia-damages-image-in-arab-spring-9152>

123 BESEMERES, John, 2016. *A Difficult Neighborhood: Essays on Russia and East-Central Europe since World War II*. ANU Press. ISBN 9781760460617, p. 308

assistance to elements of the Syrian opposition in 2013 and doubled down in 2014 when it authorized the provision of lethal support as well. Originally, the Obama administration requested this to provide vetted Syrians to support them in „defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime“, but the subsequent advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) organization and the congressional debate resulted in a program focused on counterterrorism assistance¹²⁴. But the selection of opposition groups to back was a source of much anxiety for the U.S. due to the lack of consensus within it and the clear influence of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements and due to fears about the shape of post-Assad and post-secular Syria. After observing the disastrous effects of de-Ba‘athification in Iraq, the U.S. officials were aware, that a power vacuum created could lead to proliferation of the regime’s considerable arsenal of non-conventional weapons (which was not entirely avoided) and to establishment of a model of governance preferred by al-Nusra Front (ANF) or similar groups, if territory is gained but not held. Support was provided to FSA and other secular-leaning or otherwise moderate Islamist brigades, but it was intermittent, non-decisive and hampered by misgivings stemming from lack of unity within both the civilian and the military opposition, from the moderate opposition’s underwhelming performance and from civilian and military cooperation between FSA-affiliated armed groups¹²⁵ and more powerful Salafi-oriented militant groups¹²⁶. As these groups became increasingly dominant within the opposition (due to their superior cohesiveness as well as funding from the Persian Gulf countries or Turkey) and the ISIL on the rise, the West chose the Kurdish militias battling primarily ISIL to receive most of the support. This caution regarding the vetting of opposition groups could not prevent the equipment falling into the hands of extremist groups hostile to the U.S. and its allies, such as the case of ANF’s dismantlement of U.S.-supported brigades in the fall of 2014 and early 2015 and its seizure of their equipment. This certainly didn’t help to debunk the claims present in Syrian regime’s and Iran’s propaganda, that the West backs terrorist, also present to a lesser extent in the Russian discourse, and spread by Russian channels to international audiences.

There is space for cooperation and coordination between the West and Russia in Syrian stemming from one of the key characteristics of the Syrian Civil War: the multitude of actors and

124 HUMUD, Carla E., BLANCHARD, Christopher M., NIKITIN, Mary Beth D, 2018. *Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response*. Congressional Research Service, p. 1

125 FSA became an umbrella term for a constellation of armed groups, led, for the most part, by Syrian Armed Forces defectors, armed conscripts and civilians. However, it failed to create an agreed chain of command or an overarching strategy to guide tactics. Many groups continue to be identified with the „Free Syrian Army“, but many of them lost their ties to what remains of the exiled FSA command structure, which led them to draw strength from alliances with other rebel groups and funding solicited directly from states and affluent individual benefactors, often on a haphazard basis.

126 HUMUD, Carla E., BLANCHARD, Christopher M., NIKITIN, Mary Beth D, 2018. *Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response*. Congressional Research Service, p. 47

the intricate web of relationships among them. On the background of the general struggle between Assad's regime and his opponents, upon closer examination of 2015's battlefield there emerge at least five conflicts: the war between President Assad and the moderate secular opposition, the core of which was the FSA; the war between the regime and Islamist groups: ISIL, ANF, Jaish al-Fatah (JAF) and others; the struggle among rival Islamists ISIL and ANF; the war between the ANF and the FSA; and the war of ISIL and Turkey-backed groups against the Kurds¹²⁷. As apparent from this list, ISIL is a common enemy to many actors of the Syrian War, and, while the term „terrorists“ is applied generously to many groups, there is a unanimous consensus that ISIL presents a prime target for a campaign against terrorism. On top of its support for the Syrian opposition, and partially within a shift of focus on the struggle against ISIL, the U.S. entered the Syrian battlefield directly in September 2014, following the ISIL expansion and leading an international coalition, which intervened through air strikes and attempts at moulding local anti-ISIL forces that will deprioritise the fight against Assad. Russia intervened directly as well in 2015, as it was invited to support the troops of the Assad regime by air strikes. These strikes targeted non-ISIL opposition in the country, but ISIL targets as well. A de-facto alliance against ISIL was thus formed – however uneasy it was, Russia established communication with at least U.S., Israel, Jordan and France¹²⁸¹²⁹. A report from the American Congressional Research Service describes the de-confliction mechanisms as air safety protocols necessary due to operations of the U.S. and Russia being carried out in close proximity, preventing conflict between the militaries without the need to have an agreed-upon plan. They involve contact between the militaries on a daily basis, on the Western coalition's side carried out by the American Air Force and by the headquarters of Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), a joint task force set up by the US Central Command which aims to „formalize ongoing military actions against the rising threat posed by ISIL in Iraq and Syria¹³⁰.“

For Russia, its campaign in support of the regime forces helped it to reinforce its position of a key player of the conflict, to ensure that it will be part of the deal whatever the final outcome of the war will be, and to consolidate its influence over the Syrian regime *vis-a-vis* Iran. Forming a broad coalition against ISIL was a stated goal of Russian diplomacy, which claimed to strive to unite the regime, the West, and the united Syrian opposition. It repeated the mantra of the fight against terrorism in an attempt to split the political space into pro-ISIL and anti-ISIL camps¹³¹. The fact that

127 ROZANOV, Danila. „It's impossible to bomb without end. *Gazeta.ru* [online]. 2015 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/10/09_a_7812335.shtml

128 As of 2015.

129 CASULA, Philipp, 2015. The Syrian Conflict through Russian Eyes revisited, *Russian Analytical Digest* 175, p. 9

130 HUMUD, Carla E., BLANCHARD, Christopher M., NIKITIN, Mary Beth D, 2018. *Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response*. Congressional Research Service, p. 40

131 CASULA, Philipp, 2015. The Syrian Conflict through Russian Eyes revisited, *Russian Analytical Digest* 175, p. 9

Russia didn't only target ISIL, but everyone who threatened the Damascus-Homs-Hama-Aleppo corridor and the Syrian coast undermined this effort, as well as the divide between Russia and Iran on one side and the Gulf states, the West and the opposition on the other side as to whether to include the Syrian regime in the fight. Although the fight against ISIL was not without conflict between the Russian and coalition forces¹³² and fraught with accusations of collusion with ISIL¹³³, the group's clutch on Syrian territory was largely dismantled by now.

In the area of peace effort and negotiations, the agendas of the West and Russia may have some convergent points, but they are divergent in the tracks they pursue. At the Geneva I Conference on Syria, a *communiqué* was adopted by the representatives of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Nations, the European Union and the League of Arab States, which established a very basic framework of the planned peace process – it reaffirmed the members' commitment to UNSC Resolutions 2042¹³⁴ and 2043¹³⁵, establishing the UN observation role, and Kofi Annan six-point peace plan¹³⁶, aiming at de-escalation of violence in Syria, and envisaged a political transition under a government with full executive powers, which could include members of Syrian government and opposition¹³⁷. From the following remarks by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who ruled out President Assad's participation on such transitional body, and the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who said there were no preconditions to the proposed transition that dictated who should or should not be in the transitional government, it however immediately became clear that the interpretation of the *communiqué* and the intentions for the future of the peace process differ significantly¹³⁸. Discussion about the shape and form of the transitional government continued at the Geneva II Middle East peace conference. Topics discussed involved rebuilding the Syrian state, the profile of the transitional leadership or empowering the non-armed opposition. In the end, the obstacle posed by the person of President Assad and his regime. The regime and its supporters argued that his removal

132 NECHPURENKO, Ivan, MACFARQUHAR, Neil, GIBBONS-NEFF, Thomas. Dozens of Russians Are Believed Killed in U.S.-Backed Syria Attack. *The New York Times* [online]. 2018 [cit. 2018-06-26]. Available at:

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/world/europe/russia-syria-dead.html>

133 BLINOVA, Ekaterina. Abu Kamal and Raqqa: Is the US-led Coalition Colluding with Daesh in Syria? *Sputnik News* [online]. 2018 [cit. 2018-06-26]. Available at: <https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201711161059165849-russia-us-daesh-syria/>

134 *Security Council Resolution 2042* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2018-06-23]. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10609.doc.htm>

135 *Security Council Resolution 2043* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2018-06-23]. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10618.doc.htm>

136 Text of Annan's Six Point Peace Plan for Syria. *Reuters* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2018-06-23]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-ceasefire/text-of-annans-six-point-peace-plan-for-syria-idUSBRE8330HJ20120404>

137 Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué. *United Nations* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2018-06-23]. Available at: <http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniquéActionGroupforSyria.pdf>

138 UN Envoy Calls for Transitional Government in Syria. *BBC* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2018-06-23]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18650775>

would be a consequence of foreign meddling in Syrian affairs and that only the Syrian people have the right to choose their political future. It also called on the opposition to unite to be able to negotiate with the regime, but this seems rather empty considering how complex the conflict is and that there are, as stated above, actually numerous conflicts taking place in Syria simultaneously. The opposition ruled out that a proper transition can ensue under President Assad's rule¹³⁹. The conference produced no tangible results. An important step in the peace process came in the year 2015 with the beginning of the Vienna Process, which for the first time brought to the negotiating table the representatives of both Saudi Arabia and Iran, arguably the two most important regional stakeholders of the conflict and the key contenders in Syria's proxy war. The negotiators agreed on an 18-month transition plan to establish a new Syrian government¹⁴⁰, but the key issues of President Assad's role in the process and the proper representation of the opposition remained unresolved. Russia made an attempt at steering the negotiations into its sphere of influence in 2017, co-hosting peace talks with Iran and Turkey in the Kazakh capital of Astana. Russia plays a leading role in these talks, which present an alternative track to the Geneva process. The prospect of Astana superseding Geneva has been strongly opposed by the U.S., which views Geneva as the only legitimate forum for Syrian political negotiations, and protested, that the format of Astana may be easier for the regime to manipulate, and is also contrary to UNSC Resolution 2254¹⁴¹, which was adopted unanimously and requested that the UN Secretary-General through his good offices and the efforts of his Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura – convenes representatives of the Syrian government and opposition to engage in formal negotiations on a political transition¹⁴². The talks have, however, produced some results in the form of the creation of „de-escalation areas“ such as Eastern Ghouta or Idlib, and they continue to the present day - the cooperation between Russia and the West on the peace process remains complicated by intractable issues and opposing interests in the conflict, which so far appear to outweigh the benefits of a potential political settlement.

Chapter summary

139 Future of Syria Peace Talks in Question. *Al Jazeera* [online]. 2013 [cit. 2018-06-23]. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/11/syria-rejects-kerry-comments-peace-talks-201311316159370972.html>

140 CASULA, Philipp, 2015. The Syrian Conflict through Russian Eyes revisited, *Russian Analytical Digest* 175, p. 9

141 HUMUD, Carla E., BLANCHARD, Christopher M., NIKITIN, Mary Beth D, 2018. *Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response*. Congressional Research Service, p. 18

142 *Security Council Resolution 2254* [online]. 2015 [cit. 2018-06-23]. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12171.doc.htm>

While the conflict in Syria may be far from over, its development so far indicates a lot about the present state of the international order and about the actors engaged in it. The West's political will to take a decisive role in Middle Eastern affairs seems to be nearing exhaustion, and this is primarily the case of its leader, the U.S., which committed a disproportionate amount of human and material resources to the wars of the last two decades. For Russia on the other hand, the conflict presents an opportunity to recover some of the prestige on the international stage in a situation in which it is able to project power, and to set an alternative example on how to handle conflicts in the Middle East after years of condemnation of the West's conduct in the region¹⁴³.

According to Russia's narrative, keeping the person of President Assad in power is not crucial. Russia admits the possibility of a transition of power to another actor, but in reality, it is highly improbable that it would give up one of the assets, that helped it establish significant influence in Syria and achieve military successes. The ability to maintain a unity of purpose together with greater commitment gave the Russia-Iran-Hezbollah camp the upper hand over the Syrian opposition and helped it manage to ensure Assad regime's survival. While each actor in this camp is pursuing some degree of parochial interests, they have a relatively simple goal in common, which is to return of Syria to the pre-2011 status quo, and they also have a clear lead actor for achieving this goal, the SAF, and affiliated militias¹⁴⁴. The fact that Russia found in Iran a powerful regional ally with a deeply vested interest in the outcome of the conflict is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Syrian Civil War, and it stands out in comparison to the other conflicts analyzed in this thesis. Coupled with Western reluctance to intervene, allying with Iran allowed Russia to act with a great degree of independence.

In the diplomatic field, there was some alignment of interests in the strife to uproot ISIL, which haunted the U.S. in Iraq as well as Europe when it claimed responsibility for terror attacks in the streets of its cities. Islamism and terrorism were one of the stated reasons why Russia supported the Serbs in Kosovo, but also in the Bosnian War, which attracted mujahideen from around the world¹⁴⁵, Russia also justified its own actions in Chechen Wars by the adversary's extremism, and reached out to the U.S. after the attacks on 11 September 2001. This was an opportunity for it to gain recognition in the struggle against international terrorism in its purest form. The demarcation of which groups should be targeted was, however, another difficult issue to resolve. Assad's regime, on one hand, labeled as terrorists most of the groups it was fighting and accused their supporters of sponsoring terrorism. The Western powers, on the other hand, did not fight non-ISIL jihadist groups

143 CASULA, Philipp, 2015. The Syrian Conflict through Russian Eyes revisited, *Russian Analytical Digest* 175, p. 8

144 *The Syrian Conflict: A systems conflict analysis* [online]. 2016 [cit. 2018-06-11]. Available at:

<http://arkgroupdmcc.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ARK-Syria-Conflict-Analysis-Digital-copy.pdf>, p. 47

145 LEBL, Leslie S, 2014. *Islamism and Security in Bosnia*. Strategic Studies Institute & U.S. Army War College Press.

with equal commitment, firstly due to limited resources and secondly because they militarily weakened the regime, which was an important military objective. The Gulf states provided resources to groups which even the West regards as terrorists¹⁴⁶. Iran sponsoring Hezbollah does not evade accusations either. In such environment, it is difficult to proclaim any sort of a united front fighting terrorism, even if it can lead to de-facto alliances with some degree of coordination, such as in the case of ISIL.

A similar case of a nominally declared match of a shared goal and practical failure to coordinate policy is the enforcement of chemical weapons regime. In 2012, President Obama declared the deployment of Assad regime's admitted chemical weapons a red line, hinting that a military intervention could ensue, when the Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdissi said that such weapons would only be used in the event of external aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic¹⁴⁷. The threat of military action was averted when Russia proposed to establish international control over Syrian chemical weapons and called on the Syrian leadership to agree to their destruction and to join the treaty on prohibition of chemical weapons, which it did in 2013. To this day, however, there have been dozens of reports of chemical weapons use. The regime denies categorically the use of such weapons, and Russia supports its position, claiming that there is no proof that chemical attacks were carried out by the regime (or even that they happened)¹⁴⁸, and also with diplomatic action, such as vetoing unfavorable resolution proposals in the Security Council¹⁴⁹ or dismantling the OPCW-U.N. Joint Investigative Mechanism, established in 2015 by UNSC Resolution 2235¹⁵⁰. While the goal of strict control over weapons of mass destruction is shared by the West and Russia, it has to face the political and strategic reality on the ground, which, it seems, takes precedence.

146 SENGUPTA, Kim. Turkey and Saudi Arabia Alarm the West by Backing Islamist Extremists the Americans Had Bombed in Syria. *Independent* [online]. 2015 [cit. 2018-06-26]. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-turkey-and-saudi-arabia-shock-western-countries-by-supporting-anti-assad-jihadists-10242747.html>

147 MACFARQUHAR, Neil, SCHMITT, Eric. Syria Threatens Chemical Attack on Foreign Force. *The New York Times*. [online]. 2012 [cit. 2018-06-26]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/world/middleeast/chemical-weapons-wont-be-used-in-rebellion-syria-says.html?>

148 Full Interview: Russia Will Protect Its People in Syria. *Youtube.com* [online]. 2012 [cit. 2018-06-26]. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F0ds2TUpB4M>

149 SAMPATHKUMAR, Mythili. UN in Deadlock After US and Russia Vote Against Each Other to Investigate Syria Chemical Weapons Attack. *Independent* [online]. 2018 [cit. 2018-06-26]. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/syria-chemical-attack-douma-latest-us-russia-un-deadlock-investigation-a8298671.html>

150 *Security Council Resolution 2035* [online]. 2015 [cit. 2018-06-26]. Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12001.doc.htm>

Russian representatives, chiefly President Putin, frequently point to the West's shortcomings, such as lack of respect, neglecting the equality of rights or balance of interests¹⁵¹, or inconsistencies in policy or narratives, and thus they frame Russia's involvement to a great extent in opposition to the West, and it is hardly possible to imagine how Russia could ally with Iran or Syria, whose anti-western rhetoric is much sharper, unless their narratives converged as well. On the other hand, it seems that Russia is looking for opportunities for cooperation where possible, it is just rarely willing to alter its policy significantly to achieve it due to the high stakes and path dependence. While recognizing that it might sound strange, President Putin said at the annual press conference in December 2015 that the Russian plan for Syria broadly coincides with the American vision, mentioning cooperative work on the constitution, creating mechanisms to control future early elections, holding the elections and recognizing the results based on this political process¹⁵². In practice, this will definitively prove to be much more complicated. A quote by a U.S. military spokesperson relating to the de-confliction measures in place is illustrative of the relationship between two great powers who realize a direct and open confrontation is out of the question, and have to settle in an uneasy partnership: „...it's difficult to link up with someone while in contact with the enemy, and especially in the dark. So it gets even tougher when you have a force that may be something other than friendly – not necessarily an adversary, but something other than friendly – and you don't have great communications with them and you don't have an agreed-upon plan. Well, then – and then you add the enemy there, and it becomes fraught with friction. So we knew we had to have this deconfliction system, and we have acquired that, at the CJTF headquarters¹⁵³.“ In Syria, Russia may not be an adversary, but it definitely is something other than friendly, and with time passing, the relationship doesn't seem to grow friendlier, as demonstrated by the events Deir ez-Zor, where U.S. and Russian citizens most probably clashed, even though the mercenary status of the latter gives the government¹⁵⁴ an option of denying responsibility¹⁵⁴.

8 Conclusions

151 CASULA, Philipp, 2015. The Syrian Conflict through Russian Eyes revisited, *Russian Analytical Digest* 175, p. 8

152 Vladimir Putin's Annual News Conference.[online]. 2015 [cit. 2018-06-26]. Available at:

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/press_conferences/50971

153 HUMUD, Carla E., BLANCHARD, Christopher M., NIKITIN, Mary Beth D, 2018. *Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response*. Congressional Research Service, p. 22

154 REUTER, Christoph. The Truth About the Russian Deaths in Syria. *Spiegel Online* [online]. 2015 [cit. 2018-06-26]. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/american-fury-the-truth-about-the-russian-deaths-in-syria-a-1196074.html>

Almost 30 years after the end of the Cold War, there still seems to exist a liberal order that is dominant in the global security system, and the U.S. remains the leading power of this order. Over these years, however, it has been increasingly challenged. With new emerging threats, the question of whether the provision of security is in decline has been posed in times of international crises. The position of Russia, which constituted the power center of the Soviet Union, the other pole before the bipolar world crumbled, has had an interesting role to play. In the 1990s, it struggled to undergo internal reforms and it depended on the West to provide aid and invest, and its leadership came to the conclusion, that cooperation with the dominant U.S.-led order was inevitable, even if it required certain sacrifices from Russia, such as consent to German unification, Germany's admission to NATO, support for UNSC resolutions against Iraq during the Gulf Crisis or withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan¹⁵⁵. However, there also existed a sense of deep-rooted distrust towards NATO in Russian politics, resulting in protests against its enlargement and often to the manner in which it transformed. During the wars accompanying the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Russia showed signs of resistance to the way the Western powers were dealing with the conflict, but it lacked the power and resolve to make a significant impact on the conflict resolution, was largely reluctant to compromise its international standing, and maintained unity with the Western powers, with some exceptions. The most notable of those was Russia's vocal opposition to the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO disregarded Russia's opposition in favor of prevention of crimes against humanity on a massive scale, which forced the Serb leader Slobodan Milosević to succumb to NATO's demands. It was, however, a significant blow to the project of integrating Russia into the liberal security system. Under the newly elected President Vladimir Putin, the country started assuming a more assertive role in foreign affairs, and while cooperating with the West on many levels, it eventually grew bold enough to unilaterally take part in conflicts around its borders, such as Ukraine (annexing part of the country's territory in the process) or Georgia, and with time even enough to project power in Syria, which it considered an ally within its sphere of influence. In contrast with the break with the West over the Crimean Crisis, Russia's actions in Syria provoked much less outrage and outright condemnation.

In *Liberal Leviathan*, John Ikenberry argues that one of the features that make liberal hegemony successful is the distribution of benefits and services among the members of the order, and thus that what benefits the hegemon also benefits the others. The book reacts to the presidency of George W. Bush and the attempts at renegotiation of hegemonic bargains his administration pursued, and argues that what made those attempts fail was its fallback from a liberal standpoint to a more

155 PONSARD, Lionel, 2007. *Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security: Bridging the Gap*. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-40723-0, p. 62

hierarchical position, which would guarantee to the other states the provision of security, but it would come at a price of more severe subordination to the United States, which has the responsibility and the privilege of determining threats, using force and transforming the system¹⁵⁶. I'm finding that such approach was not entirely new under President Bush and that the U.S. foreign policy under President Clinton shared some of its characteristics – in Bosnia and Kosovo, its multilateralism was often merely formal, and the underlying American dominance and ability to form political alliances were the most important factors determining the outcome of the conflicts. The commitment to the concept of „responsibility to protect“ and rethinking the norms of sovereignty to better fit the new security environment was a part of the new hegemonic bargain. Russia implied that it opposes it, but lack of capability was forced it to tolerate it. In Syria, Russia found itself in a favorable position to reject the new bargain. Seeing the relative success of Russia's alliance with Syria and Iran, Ikenberry's claim that liberal hegemony does not provoke sufficient balancing response to be overcome due to its benign nature might turn out to be outdated or invalid.

Russia is often labeled a revisionist nation in the post-Cold War environment. This might be true to some extent, as the humiliation stemming from the break up of the Soviet Union and the „lost empire syndrome“ were never really overcome and the end of the Cold War was not fully internalized as a defeat, as Russia was not conquered militarily and the loss of status was thus more abstract and more difficult to justify. But on the other hand, in the new order, Russia assumed the position of a conservative power, when the U.S. attempted to renegotiate its hegemonic bargains. Revisionism thus depends on our point of departure. Given the expected turbulence caused by the newly elected President Donald Trump, who is critical of the way NATO, NAFTA, and other international organizations operate, the future of Russia's integration into the U.S.-led order (and the shape of this order or its persistence indeed) depends heavily on what kind of renegotiation of hegemonic bargains his leadership brings.

9 Summary

V této práci jsem dospěl k tomu, že projekt integrace Ruské federace do mezinárodního liberálního bezpečnostního systému z větší části selhal, alespoň tedy v úzkém smyslu toho slova.

156 IKENBERRY, John G, 2011. *Liberal Leviathan*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-12558-9, p. 219.

Přestože v některých fázích vývoje po konci studené války došlo k ústupkům ze strany Ruské federace v zájmu mezinárodního společenství, při pohledu z dnešní perspektivy se nezdá, že by stát omezoval svou autonomii, nebo odevzdával zásadní část své suverenity do rukou jiného aktéra nebo mezinárodních režimů. Naopak, Rusko se v konfliktu v Sýrii stalo jádrem vyvažující aliance, která bojuje proti zájmům liberálního hegemonického rádu tvořeného Spojenými státy, dalšími západními zeměmi, a případnými ad-hoc partnery. Zdá se, že ochota spolupracovat s tímto řádem i za cenu ohrožení vlastních zájmů vyplývala spíše z nedostatku síly potřebné ke vzdorování. V politické reprezentaci Ruské federace po většinu 90. let existovaly síly nakloněné v oblasti conflict managementu spolupráci se Západem za účelem znovunabytí mezinárodní prestiže, ale nezdá se, že by v ruském politickém prostředí hluboce zakotvily, protože když se tohoto cíle nepodařilo dosáhnout, byl pocit pokoření byl jedním z faktorů, které podobné tendence v ruské politice zadusily. Dnešní prezident Ruské federace Vladimír Putin projevuje ochotu spolupracovat se Západem pouze v omezeném rozsahu (například v otázce boje proti terorismu), a v závislosti na situaci je schopen jednat proti zájmům hegemonu, byť to Ruskou federaci přivádí do izolace od partnerů, kteří jsou pro ni důležití i podle slov prezidenta Putina.

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11 Diploma thesis proposal

Univerzita Karlova

Fakulta sociálních věd

Institut politologických studií

Katedra bezpečnostních studií

Projekt diplomové práce

Integration of Russia into Liberal Hegemonic Security

Order

Vypracoval: **Hugo Kafka**

Ročník: **3.**

Semestr: **LS 2018**

Vedoucí práce: **PhDr. et JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, PhD.**

Souhlasím s vedením magisterské diplomové práce:

Datum odevzdání: 4.7. 2018

Research problem

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international security system has encountered dramatic global changes. The open, liberal system, which had been constructed by the United States and its allies since the end of World War II has now spread and encapsulated the globe with no significant competition, marking the demise of a bipolar world and the beginning of a liberal

hegemonic era. This American-led order, characterized by its openness and a typical mix of command and consent, has been termed by G. John Ikenberry a ‚liberal hegemony‘. The aftermath of each great war brings with it the challenge of integration of the defeated side into the newly formed system. The process of this integration had begun, as the President of the Soviet Union’s successor state has stated in 1992, that one of the fundamental principles of his foreign policy was the integration of Russia into the ‚community of civilized states‘¹⁵⁷. The new era brought with it new dangers, often differing from what the world was used to. The threat of a nuclear or conventional conflict among great powers was overshadowed by threats of a transnational and diffuse nature such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental issues or spread of deadly disease, and the world needed Russia’s cooperation to be able to face such threats more effectively. But overtime, it was becoming clear, that such cooperation would be impeded by numerous difficulties. In Russian domestic politics, frustration by the post-Cold war development became apparent and left its mark on the political dynamic. In the security area, Russia became dissatisfied with its position as a junior partner and the perceived neglect from the Western states¹⁵⁸, and has reacted with irritation to the erosion of the sovereignty norm, starting with NATO’s involvement in the Balkans and continuing to present day. The relations between Russia and the West have been growing ever colder (in spite of an attempted „reset“ of President Obama’s administration in 2009. One of the lessons we are being taught by the current conflict in Syria is that the project of integrating Russia into a coherent liberal hegemonic order has not been successful. My thesis will take a closer look at the timeline and outcome of this project.

Research goals

In its history since 1991, Russia has gone through several different phases, and has assumed different positions within the global security order. Its positions ranged from being the West’s informal ally in the initial hopeful stage to becoming the global order’s discontent. My goal is to explore the dynamics of the process of integration (or the lack of it), examine the factors that contributed to integrating Russia as well as identify which events and policies have had a repulsive effect, and provide an account of Russia’s reactions and the development of its own perspective of its role and new identity in the international system. Ultimately, finding answers to my research

157 Stivachtis, Yannis A., *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, p. 131.

158 Bagno-Moldavsky, Olena. *Russian Policy in the Middle East: No Change in the Offing. Strategic Assessment* (2013), p. 124.

questions would contribute to our understanding of geopolitical dynamics of the post-Cold War world and US-Russian relations.

Research questions

Research questions include: To what extent did the West succeed in integrating the Russian Federation? How did the integration process develop in terms of conflict management in given cases and what were the grounds for its successes and failures? What are the prospects for the integration in future?

Theoretical basis

I will base my thesis on John Ikenberry's work on American-led international system, broadly set on the perspective of liberalism, mainly his book *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American System*. His theory sees the roots of current international order already in 1940s when the United States became the most central state of such an order and its involvement has started to transform it. It was built on industrial society, international capitalism, and multilateral institutions. From this point of view, the rise of the Eastern bloc and the Cold War stemming from its rivalry, is merely an episode, and after its downfall, the liberal order which was kept 'inside' one of the blocs now also manifests as the 'outside' global order as well.

Ikenberry's mainly liberal theory admits some features of realism as well. The accent on American power embodies two of those features simultaneously – the centrality of a state as the leading actor in international affairs, and power as the central concept and the aim of the state. But in liberal hegemony, these realist concepts are managed from a liberal perspective – the United States takes an active part in muting and mediating its power through institutionalized rules, and it offers access to it via international organizations and institutions to other states. The order thus created achieves mutual acceptability for the hegemon and other states, as possible returns for the 'winners' are reduced by clear rules, and possible losses are not finite and liquidating.

The prime realist concept of anarchy in international system is also accepted, but Ikenberry, like Alexander Wendt, is not satisfied with just stating that the international system is anarchic and insists that there are ways to illuminate the logic of this anarchy and of relations between superordinate and subordinate states in a hierarchical system.

Considerable portion of Ikenberry's book is devoted to developments after the end of the Cold war, and how the order changes in reaction to the changing positions of the states and changing security environment. He warns, that the foundations on which liberal order is based (credible offers of power restraint made by the leading state, multilateralism, functioning international institutions) are endangered by the increasing unilateral tendencies in the US foreign policy. The book was published in 2011, and the criticisms are mostly targeting the administration of G. W. Bush, with quite optimistic prospects for Barack Obama's administration. Today, it is clear that Barack Obama's administration has hardly improved cooperation with Vladimir Putin's Russia, and the fragile and tense situation on the Syrian battlefields suggests that Russia has succeeded in establishing its position of discontent of the US-led order rather than integrating within it.

Methodology

My thesis is a case study of American and Russian policy and conflict management, examining how the integration of Russia into the Western liberal order has developed. Since the degree of integration can be most sharply observed in times of crises and conflicts and the degree to which the actors are willing and able to cooperate, I have chosen three conflicts from three periods in which Russia's role in the international system could be examined, and which themselves have contributed to cementing its position to various extent. First, I will look at the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. This conflict represents the 'optimistic' period following the end of the Cold War, in which Russia sought to redeem its great power status mostly through cooperation with the Western powers. The second event to examine is the Kosovo war, which arguably constituted one of the breaking points, in which the divisions between the West and Russia became apparent and Russia started to claim in its own niche in the international security system. The third choice is the conflict in Syria, in which Russia appears as a strong player with a great power posture, and which best represents the current state of affairs, as it is still unraveling.

For each conflict, I will examine the robustness of Russia's cooperation with Western international actors. Such cooperation took place on various level, including the United Nations Security Council, informal bodies such as the Contact Group in the Balkans, other international organizations such as OSCE, diplomacy carried out by envoys, ministers of Presidents as well as the military area, ranging from serving under an unified command in IFOR to notification of the other during a military operation such as the April 2018 missile strikes in Syria. To a lesser extent, the thesis will deal with

the rhetorical level, because narratives of governments and media played an important part in each of our cases.

As indicated earlier, these three crises play both the role of indicators, as they reveal the actors' positions when it comes to the crunch, and the constitutive role for the states' policy. I have chosen them because they share some common features – neither US nor Russia are primarily involved, but due to the sensitivity of the regions and complexity of the conflicts, significant level of international involvement is present. With regard to the erosion of sovereignty norms, which is central to the matter of this thesis, it is possible to argue that I am emitting some important cases, most notably the war in Iraq, which could be considered another breaking point. In the thesis, I will provide sufficient context for each case, and summarize the developments taking place in between them, to account for similar emissions, but the three cases I have chosen are ones sharing crucial features while providing enough data on the topic of Russian integration.

Outline

1. Introduction
2. Methodology
3. Theoretical background
4. Analysis of the cases
 - 4.1. Bosnian War
 - 4.2. Kosovo War
 - 4.3. Syrian War
5. Conclusions and prospects for future
6. Bibliography

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