PhD Thesis

‘Goliath Versus Goliath: EU Democracy Promotion in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia’s Alternative Agenda’

By Bogdana Depo
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Prof. Wessels and Prof. Rovna who were encouraging me to finish and gave me a unique chance to follow the prestigious Marie Curie Programme.

To Philippe, who always believed in me and was a source of inspiration and emotional support.

To my family

To my friends
INTRODUCTION

The proclamation of the ultimate victory of the liberal democracy, which was popular in the 1990s, has clearly become inconsistent today, especially if one looks at the Eastern Partnership countries. Whereas EU was the biggest democracy promoter in the world, establishing stable democracy in its Eastern European neighbourhood remains a challenge. It seems that the EU would be successful in repeating democratization as it was done towards the Central and Eastern European States; nevertheless, it is not the case. Therefore, the main question of these PhD thesis is how to explain that the EU did not succeed in achieving its democratization agenda in the Eastern neighbourhood.

Goliath versus Goliath describes EU’s growing assertiveness with democracy promotion and Russia’s alternative agenda which offsets EU’s influence in the shared neighbourhood. Theoretically speaking it might appear as a clash of the liberal democracy concept versus realism. Therefore, the main assumption of these thesis is that Russia’s competitive agenda has outbalanced EU’s efforts in democracy promotion, or at least challenged it. As Russian Minister Lavrov stated: ‘This example illustrates an axiomatic fact – there are many development models – which rules out the monotony of existence within the uniform, Western frame of reference. Consequently, there has been a relative reduction in the influence of the so-called “historical West” that was used to seeing itself as the master of the human race’s destinies for almost five centuries. The competition on the shaping of the world order in the 21st century has toughened’ (Lavrov 2016). What this thesis is to prove is that the EU’s liberal democracy promotion towards the Eastern Partnership countries is confronted with a more and more assertive agenda advanced by the Russian Federation, and fails in finding a way to overcome it because of the liberal view of the world it defends. This thesis will prove this point by a systematic comparative analysis of three dimensions: normative, economic and security.

Comparison of the EU’s policy instruments and the ones advanced by Russia allows to see how the EU’s democracy agenda is ultimately offset by Russia’s aggressive policy towards the same countries. This paradigm and competitive dynamics is also manifested by the research timeline, which starts with the 1991, when the EU has started introducing its democracy promotion instruments to the Newly Independent States and when Russia,
following its weakness after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has immediately started to ‘recollecting the lost territories’.

This competition was manifested by considerable evolution of the policy instruments developed by both competitive actors. On EU’s side, by 2013 it was ready to conclude enhanced agreements, which were close to pre-accession models. At the same time, Russia was ready to stop this extensive willingness to build liberal democracies on its backyard by any means, including by military actions in Georgia and in Ukraine. Therefore, the main conclusion of these thesis is that the EU was not be able to advance its democracy promotion as every new step in democratization was met with a spiral of Russia’s assertive actions.
# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cross Border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEECs</td>
<td>Central Eastern Europe Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEU</td>
<td>Eurasian Economic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSP</td>
<td>General System of Preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative/Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favoured Nation Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGIMO</td>
<td>Moscow State Institute of International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>Newly Independent State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small Medium Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIEX</td>
<td>Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLAP</td>
<td>Visa Liberalization Action Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................. 2
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 3
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................... 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................... 6

CHAPTER 1: Democracy Promotion: Evolution of the EU Foreign Policy Tool and of the Research Avenues .................................................................................................................................................. 10

1.1 DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF THE EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION .......... 10
   1.1.1 Definition of the Democracy Promotion .............................................................................. 10
   1.1.2 1990-2004: Democratization of the Western NIS .............................................................. 12
   1.1.3 Pre-accession Process – An Instrument of Democratization .............................................. 14
   1.1.4 2004 Enlargement: Attempt to Duplicate the Success with New Eastern Neighbours ... 15
   1.1.5 2009: Launching the Eastern Partnership ........................................................................... 17
   1.1.6 2011 ENP Review ............................................................................................................... 19
   1.1.7 2015 ENP Review ............................................................................................................... 20

1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW: Waves of Research of the EU Democracy Promotion with regards to the Eastern Neighbourhood .............................................................................................................. 22
   1.2.1 2003-2005: ‘Coloured Revolutions' and Internal Post-Soviet Transformations ............... 22
   1.2.2 2004: Launching the ENP .................................................................................................. 24
   1.2.3 2010-2011: Arab Spring: Democracy versus Stability Dilemma ..................................... 26
   1.2.4 2014: EuroMaidan as a Game-changer ............................................................................... 27
   1.2.5 In Search of the New Research Avenue ............................................................................ 28

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PUZZLE AND METHODOLOGY .................................................. 29

2.1 Liberal Democracy by Francis Fukuyama ............................................................................... 29
2.2 Putting Fukuyama’s Predictions at Test .................................................................................. 32
   2.2.1 Testing Democratization of the Neighbourhood ............................................................... 32
   2.2.2 Fukuyama’s Prediction of No Competition to the Liberal Agenda .................................... 34
2.3 Democracy Promotion as a Threat to Strategic Interests ....................................................... 36
   2.3.1 Russia as Autocracy Promoter ........................................................................................... 38
   2.3.2 Assumption: Autocracy Versus Democracy Promoter ...................................................... 40
   2.3.3 Any Alternative Assumptions? ........................................................................................... 42
2.4 Balance of Power Thesis .......................................................................................................... 43
2.5 Identifying Balancing between Democracy Promoter and Autocracy Promoter ................. 44
   2.5.1 Step 1: Identifying Balancing Through Categories ............................................................ 45
5.1.2 Friction over the Shared Neighbourhood ..................................... 99
5.1.3 By 2008 - New Level of EU-Russia Cooperation ............................ 102
5.2 EU: More Assertiveness and Strategy ............................................. 103
  5.2.1 Normative Dimension: Cooperation Based on Common and Shared Values 105
  5.2.2 Economic Dimension: More Programmes and Pre-Accession Instruments 106
  5.2.3 Security Dimension: Stability, Security and Well-Being .................. 108
5.3 Russia: Era of Undeclared Wars against the Shared Neighbourhood 111
  5.3.1 Normative Dimension: Through Passportization to ‘Russkiy Mir’ .......... 113
  5.3.2 Economic Dimension: Fading Economic Influence ........................ 116
  5.3.3 Security Dimension: Three War Fronts of Russia towards the Shared Neighbourhood 118

Chapter 6: 2009-2016 - EU’s New Approach towards the Eastern Neighbourhood - the Eastern Partnership .......................................................... 137
  6.1 Geopolitical Context ................................................................. 137
  6.2 The Aim of the Eastern Partnership ............................................ 139
    6.2.1 Multilateral Track .................................................................. 139
    6.2.2 Bilateral Track ....................................................................... 149
  6.3 Financial Support to the Liberal Democracies in the Eastern Partnership - Support of the Association Agreement Introduction .................................. 156
  6.4 Involvement of other International Financial Institutions .................. 157
  6.5 EU’s vision of the Russia’s Involvement ......................................... 157

CHAPTER 7: 2009-2016 Russia Versus EU’s Enhanced Democratization .......................... 159
  7.1 Russia’s Vision of the Eastern Partnership ...................................... 159
  7.2 Russia’s Alternative Projects to the Eastern Partnership ...................... 162
  7.3 Paradox: Inspired by the Soviet Union and Built on the EU’s Experience 165
    7.3.1 Soviet Legacy as a Foundation for Reintegration .......................... 165
    7.3.2 EU’s Institutional Set-Up as a Blueprint ...................................... 166
  7.4 Russia’s Offer of Equal Cooperation or Imperial Overstretch? ................. 168
    7.4.1 Normative Dimension: Reuniting the ‘Russian World’ by All Means 168
    7.4.2 Economic Dimension: Doubtful Economic Interest behind the Eurasian Economic Union 172
    7.4.3 Security Dimension .............................................................. 175
  7.5 Interpretation of the EU’s Actions by the Russian leadership .................. 179
    7.5.1 Normative Dimension: Democratic Values as Western ‘Messiahship’ 179
7.5.2 Economic Dimension: EU’s Offer of Economic Integration is Incompatible with Russia’s Projects ...........................................................................................................182
7.5.3 Security Dimension: EU’s Security by Means of NATO’s Expansion to the East is a Threat to Russia .................................................................................................184

CHAPTER 8: Strategy towards Destruction of the EaP .................................................................................186
8.1 Armenia ............................................................................................................................................186
  8.1.1 Dangerous U-Turn ....................................................................................................................189
  8.1.2 EU-Armenia Relations after the U-Turn ....................................................................................190
8.2 Azerbaijan .......................................................................................................................................191
8.3 Belarus ...........................................................................................................................................193
  8.3.1 Paralysing Belarus’s Independence through Deep Integration ................................................193
  8.3.2 Remunerated for Loyalty, Punished for Independent Actions ..................................................195
8.4 Georgia ...........................................................................................................................................196
  8.4.1 ‘Break-Away Regions’ as the Sword of Damocles over Tbilisi ..................................................197
  8.4.2 Hitting Georgia’s Strategic Infrastructure ..................................................................................200
  8.4.3 Russia’s Economic Instruments ...............................................................................................201
8.5 Moldova .........................................................................................................................................203
  8.5.1 First Threats - Then Economic Embargo ..................................................................................203
  8.5.2 Transnistria: Security and Energy Threats .................................................................................204
  8.5.3 Pressure on Workers ..................................................................................................................206
  8.5.4 EU’s Support to Moldova .........................................................................................................206
8.6 Ukraine ...........................................................................................................................................208
  8.6.1 The Gas Deal in Exchange for the Black Sea Fleet .....................................................................208
  8.6.2 Prior to the Association Agreement: Gifts, Threats and Sanctions ..........................................209
  8.6.3 Russia’s Strategy After the Ukraine’s Revolution: Fighting Back for its Influence...211
  8.6.4 Russia’s Narratives: Fight for the Future with Ukraine and Against EU’s Negative Influence 216
  8.6.5 EU’s Attempts to Save Democracy in Ukraine.........................................................................217

THESIS CONCLUSIONS .........................................................................................................................230

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................................238
CHAPTER 1: Democracy Promotion: Evolution of the EU Foreign Policy Tool and of the Research Avenues

This chapter sets the theoretical framework for the research question. The core research question is: how to explain that the EU did not succeed in achieving its democratization agenda in the Eastern neighbourhood?

This chapter sets up the scene by analysing what the EU considers as democracy promotion and how this policy has been discussed in the academic scholarship, depending on the situation on the ground. Indeed, this first step of our analysis is key, because the semi-failure of EU’s action is not only a failure of its instruments, but a misconception of the world view the EU is defending, which is at the root of its own identity narrative.

Our analysis starts with an overview of the evolution of the term of the democracy promotion in the framework of the different EU policies and approaches towards the EU’s neighbourhood. This genealogy helps to better understand why and how the democracy promotion has developed as the EU’s tool of foreign policy tool. In the second part of this chapter, which is the literature review, the thesis elaborates on research avenues of the EU’s democracy promotion as well as historical events which have shaped them. The final part of the chapter introduces the reader to a theoretical puzzle as well as to methodology which is to be applied in this thesis.

1.1 DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF THE EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

This part of the thesis introduces the reader into the definition of the democracy promotion and looks into the evolution of this term for nearly the last three decades. In the framework of this thesis, which aims to explain why the EU did not succeed with its democracy promotion, the first essential step is to explain how the EU defines what the democracy promotion is as well as in which context and how the democracy promotion has evolved as EU foreign policy tool throughout the time.

1.1.1 Definition of the Democracy Promotion
The term ‘democracy promotion’ as a foreign policy tool is a term with no precise definition. Only recently, the EU has developed an unofficial definition of the democracy promotion (Council of the EU, 2006). In an unofficial paper of the Council of the EU, it says that the democracy promotion is ‘to encompass the full range of external relations and development cooperation activities which contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy in third countries’; further in the text the document specifies that those are ‘all measures designed to facilitate democratic development’ (Council of the EU, 2006: 1, 3). However, neither this nor any other EU document gives an explanation of what the democracy promotion is and the reason is: EU never invested much before in democratisation of non-to-be EU members.

Nevertheless, in the past the EU has developed an implicit policy of democracy promotion. The first under-researched cases are the cases of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) and the process of their accession into the EU. In these three cases, the main issue was to transform post-authoritarian capitalist countries into European Economic Community Member States.

In 1993, the EU understood that the accession of Central Europe countries would be a much more difficult task: transforming post-communism into liberal democracy, commanded economy into liberal capitalism and to avoid any ethnic-based conflict in the region. Therefore, the EU for the first time agreed on a definition during the Copenhagen Summit of 1993 and these ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ became the road-map to accession, which have turned out effective because of the promise of becoming fully-fledge members of the EU club. After 2004 and the enlargement, the situation became more problematic: how to define an EU democratisation policy without the aim (and the tool) of integration.

The academic community has stepped in by researching the practice of the EU with regards to third countries. The research about democracy promotion in the Eastern neighbourhood has started in the 90s with the focus on the pre-accession process of the CEECs, launch of the programmes in the Western Newly Independent State (Western NIS), and finally the ENP.

---

1 The Copenhagen criteria, also known as accession criteria, were laid down in 1993 European Council conclusions. These criteria define the conditions that the European state should comply with in order to become EU Member. Those are political, economic criteria and administrative capacity.
2 In the 90s, the term Newly Independent States (NIS) covered the post-Soviet countries, excluding Russia which was always mentioned separately in the EU documents as well as the Baltic States which were covered
(Buşcaneanu 2005). Having become cornerstone of the EU foreign policy, democracy promotion has become one of the main items in the academic research agendas (Youngs 2002)3.

1.1.2 1990-2004: Democratization of the Western NIS

In 1990s, the EU has started developing democratization as its foreign policy tool (Olsen 2000; McFaul 2004). In its 1995 Communication on the Inclusion of the Democratic Principles and Human Rights, the European Commission has proposed including general references to human rights and democratic value in the preamble of the international agreements with third countries (European Commission 1995). Moreover, it has stressed on the importance to include in the body of the agreement an obligation to respect those democratic values and human rights by the third country. The Commission has gone even further by proposing that in case if this obligation was not obeyed by the third country, the agreement might be suspended (European Commission 1995).

Democratizing the Western NIS intended to be channelled via three main instruments: firstly, via the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) launched in 1992, secondly, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) launched in 1994, and thirdly, by means of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) concluded with partner countries between 1994 and 1999. TACIS was mandated to strengthen political stability and democracy by stimulating partnerships between the EU and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Nevertheless, it has proven to have a limited effectiveness as an instrument of democracy promotion (Holden, 2009: 95). The evaluation by the Court of Auditors has identified a number of problems in the implementation, bringing attention to the deficiencies in management, excessive centralization, problems of transparency and lack of sufficient investments (Sodupe and Benito 1998).

---

3 It is not the focus of our research but we should not forget that the EU contemplated a similar policy of democratization in the Mediterranean in the 1990s as well with the Barcelona Process, which was partly copied on the Helsinki model. One major difference of the South Mediterranean area with Eastern Europe remains that Eastern Europe, as a part of Europe, is technically a potential candidate for EU’s accession, while Morocco is not.
In 1994, the EU has launched the EIDHR which became a new democracy promotion instrument in the third countries supporting the civil society organizations. This instrument was providing direct, but rather marginal support (Fergus and Massey 2006). On one hand this instrument was not underpinned by the EU’s conditionality based on which the aid was disbursed (Börzel and Risse 2004), but at the same time given the scale of the problem EU’s financial contribution was marginal. Since 1991 till 2003, the EU has disbursed EUR 2723 million for all programmes aimed at Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus; whereas for Poland during the same period of time EU has allocated EUR 5710 (Raik, 2006b: 27). This shows the modest financial engagement of the EU not only into democratizing the Western NIS, but it has also manifested low interest in the given countries.

During 1994-1999 EU has concluded the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. These agreements contained identical human right clause which was stressing on ‘the observance of the principles of democracy, the respect and promotion of human rights’ (as example: EU-Ukraine PCA, 1998: 11). During this time, the EU tried with safeguarding compliance with this human rights clause. According to the 1995 Communication by the European Commission, in case if the partner countries would not comply with the clause, the ‘appropriate measures’ were to be taken (European Commission 1995). Differently from what the European Commission has suggested in its 1995 Communication, the PCAs did not envisage suspension in case of violation and the ‘appropriate measures’ were never elaborated. The PCAs low-credibility threat was combined with minor economic and financial incentives (Shapovalova 2008). It can lead to the conclusion that the EU was paying lip-service to its objective of promoting democracy because it is a core part of EU’s narrative, but the EU did not invest serious means to fulfil this objective.

With an aim to incentivize the partner countries to reform, the EU has developed some conditionality principle within which the reform progress achieved by the partner countries would be remunerated by the EU. In the individual Action Plan of those partner countries, the EU has specified the democracy promotion objectives by spelling out concrete reform priorities in each area. Based on the achievement of the country-specific democracy and

---

4 The Action Plan is a political document laying out the strategic objectives of the cooperation between the given country and the EU with a duration of three years. Therefore it breaks down the bigger political documents, *e.g.* the PCA or Association Agreement, into more tangible and achievable objectives.
human rights reform priorities mentioned in the individual Action Plans, the EU has pledged to monitor the progress of the democracy promotion (Magen 2006). Moreover, the EU has also developed a system of remuneration for the efforts of the democracy promotion, which were in form of the international recognition, financial assistance, access to trade, etc (Christiansen, Petito, and Tonra 2000).

Therefore, in the 1990s the EU has also developed a number of instruments aiming at democracy promotion in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Those were its first steps towards democratizing the Western NIS through TACIS, EIDHR, and PCAs. Nevertheless, its political attention was not with these countries. In the 90s, EU’s political focus and democratization efforts was with the CEECs (Christiansen, Petito, and Tonra 2000).

1.1.3 Pre-accession Process – An Instrument of Democratization

Since the 1990s, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, democracy promotion has become one of the top priorities of the West (Reginald, 2006: 50) both for the EU Members, as well as precondition for the third countries willing to approximate with the EU (Gower 1999). In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty proposed to streamline the foreign and security policy objectives, where the European Union and its Member States have committed ‘to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Maastricht Treaty, 1993: V, J1.2). A year later, in the Copenhagen criteria the Member States reaffirm the mentioned objectives as condicio sine qua non for the third countries, demanding them to comply with those conditions if they are would be willing to apply for the EU membership. Consequently, liberal democracy, which was a core of the European Union, has become a cornerstone precondition for the accession process (Schimmelfennig, Frank Sedelmeier, 2005: 29).

The 2004 enlargement, which has become a synonym to effective democratization (Vaduchova, 2007: 105), has incentivized a vast academic research on the EU democracy promotion (Pridham 2002; Schimmelfennig, Frank Sedelmeier 2005; Ekiert, Kubik, and Vachudova 2007). Having obtained a strong backing from the EU, enlargement as a foreign policy tool has equally proven to be one of the main factors in ensuring the widespread support to democratization within the post-communist countries (Sadurski 2004). Therefore, the academics researched the 'external' pressure as an element of effective democracy
promotion in the CEECs (Sadurski 2004). This pressure was coming from the EU institutions and EU Member States demanding introduction and elaboration of the democratic rules and procedures (Pridham 2002).

In order to achieve democratization during the pre-accession process, the EU was applying combination of different leverage and linkage mechanisms, meaning the conditionality. The EU has become skilled in balancing EU aid and trade (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010). Having gradually become known as ‘a great unsung success story’ (Peel 2006) and having discovered the magnetic force of the EU (Vaduchova, 2007: 105), the 2004 enlargement has inspired EU decision-makers to elaborate new foreign policy tool aimed the neighbours – the European Neighbourhood Policy (Magen 2006; Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005).

1.1.4 2004 Enlargement: Attempt to Duplicate the Success with New Eastern Neighbours

Aiming to repeat the success with the democratization of the post-Soviet countries, the ENP was largely built on the pre-accession instruments (Comelli 2004; Balfour and Rotta 2005a; Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008). The empirical data has manifested that the democratic transformation of the CEECs has facilitated also the transition to the economic liberalization of these states, which were also post-communist and post-Soviet. Therefore, EU leaders have decided to do the same miracle with the other Eastern European countries (Ghanem, Zoli, and Dethier 1999).

As a preparation to launching the ENP, European Commission President Prodi said that the EU’s neighbourhood will be ‘sharing everything but institutions’ (Prodi 2002), meaning that they would enjoy the same support as the countries of 2004 enlargement had, however the EU membership would not be granted. The expectation was that the new policy would repeat the success of the pre-accession, which has proven that ‘progressive spread of the rule of law

---

5 The technical explanation to this could be that after the 2004 enlargement the Enlargement General Directorate of the European Commission was left with almost no work (with the exception to follow-up pre-accession of Bulgaria and Romania). And the official, who were previously working for the pre-accession policy, have applied the pre-accession instruments to the ENP countries.

6 Three Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, were also part of the Soviet Union, not only satellite-states as in case of the other post-communist countries. In the case of the Baltic States, the challenge was similar to the Eastern neighbourhood: not only the EU had to help transforming the economy or assist a transition to democracy, but also to build states with borders and a functioning rule of law.
and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies’ – as it was mentioned in European Security Strategy (Council, 2003: 1).

Eventually the EU has developed new upgraded policy, the ENP, aimed at ‘spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law, and protecting human rights’ (Council 2003: 10). In 2003 Communication, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood, the European Commission notes that ‘WNIS <Western NIS> and Russia have a history of autocratic and non-democratic governance and poor records in protecting human rights and freedom of the individual’ (Commission, 2003: 11). Therefore, in the next document, namely in the 2004 ENP Strategic Paper of the European Commission, special attention was paid to the strengthening of its democracy promotion efforts in the broad EU neighbourhood by stipulating that the ‘EU wishes to see reinforced, credible and sustained commitment towards democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and progress towards the development of a market economy’ (European Commission, 2004: 11).

Having taken democracy promotion as ENP key priority, the ENP instruments were readjusted from the pre-accession instruments (Comelli 2004) following the ‘blind copy of the pre-accession democracy and the rule of law promotion practices’ (Kochenov 2008). Differently from the pre-accession countries, which were offered membership prospective as a final goal of their rapprochement with the EU, the ENP partner countries were offered closer cooperation in return for their efforts of democratization (Balfour and Rotta 2005b; Magen 2006; Sadurski 2004). Therefore, what the EU was expecting from the ENP countries was the implementation reforms which was to bolster the rule of law, enhance democracy and civil society, reinforced trade ties; in exchange, the EU would gradually give access to the freedoms offered by the European market (Perchoc 2015).

The 2005 Commission Communication on the ENP has put the accent on the EU’s interest of safe and stable neighbourhood, which is traded for the closer partnership with the EU and in

---

7 The 2003 Communication on Wider Europe covered Russia and three Western NIS. After the protests of Russia against being defined as EU’s neighbourhood, but rather strategic partner, Russia was excluded from the new policy – the ENP. And the same time, given the recent pro-democracy protests, the EU has taken a strategic decision to include the three Southern Caucasus countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia into the ENP.

8 One should not under-estimate the fact that the democratisation of the Eastern neighbourhood is also key for the stability of the region, as well as for a possible democratisation of Russia (from EU’s point of view) and also, good for EU firms which would benefit from new stable markets in the East.
return the partner counties should manifest democratization: ‘EU’s interests <is> to have a zone of increasing prosperity, stability and security on its borders’ and in order to achieve this, ‘EU offers a new kind of relationship with the EU’. (European Commission, 2005: 1) ‘In turn, ENP partners accept precise commitments, which can be monitored, to strengthen the rule of law, democracy and the respect for human rights...’ (European Commission, 2005: 1).

The 2006 Commission Communication, which evaluates the ENP, has mentioned the democracy-related elements only ones, suggesting that the ‘Action Plans provide for an active cooperation in the field of freedom, security and justice, promoting the rule of law’ (European Commission, 2006: 3). The 2007 Communication has identified ENP priorities were far from the democracy promotion agenda, notably on trade and economic integration, mobility, or addressing regional conflicts, but it has also mentioned that it will continue ‘promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law throughout the neighbourhood’ (European Commission, 2007: 7).

The 2008 Communication evaluating the ENP implementation has noted a series of crisis which have hampered the implementation of reforms, including the democracy promotion (European Commission 2008). With regards to the Eastern neighbourhood, those were the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, disruptions of gas supplies as a result of a conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and the global economic and financial crisis. As the result of these external factors, the Commission has noted the slower reform pace particularly in democratic reforms and human rights standards (European Commission, 2008: 1). With an aim to support the partners in challenging times, Commission announced elaboration of the Eastern Partnership. This policy was called to ‘consolidate their <the Eastern European neighbours> statehood and sovereignty, including through democratic reforms, and to their stated choice to intensify their relations with the EU’ (European Commission 2008). Therefore, the Eastern Partnership was to become a new instrument supporting the democracy promotion towards the Eastern neighbours.

1.1.5 2009: Launching the Eastern Partnership

In 2008, the Polish and Swedish governments made proposals for a tailor-made regional dimension of the ENP in the East, which was an answer to the French-led ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ launched in the South. As a result, in 2009, the Eastern Partnership initiative
was launched as a joint initiative between the EU and EU’s Eastern European neighbours, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The commitment to the democracy promotion of the partners was restated at the multilateral and bilateral levels of cooperation. With regards to multilateral, those were in a form of the bi-annual Summit.

The Summit Declaration, which was inaugurated the Eastern Partnership, included commitment of all the partners ‘to the principles of international law and to fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Prague Declaration, 2009: 5). Two years later, the next Declaration has reconfirmed that the ‘Eastern Partnership is based on a community of values and principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’ (Warsaw Declaration, 2011: 1). The next Declaration has reconfirmed the commitment and recalled ‘that much remains to be done to tackle the persisting challenges posed to democracy’ (Vilnius Declaration, 2013). The most recent declaration has reiterated the above-mentioned commitment. At the same time the participants have also indicated ‘that strengthening democracy and enabling functioning market economies <...> open new prospects for cooperation, contributing also to trade, growth and competitiveness’ (Riga Declaration, 2015: 2, 3).

The latest declaration also brought attention to the importance of the key bilateral instrument - the Association Agreement, which was signed in 2014 between the EU and the three countries, namely Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. The Declaration stresses that their implementation is ‘a key means of achieving sustainable democracy and the deep modernisation’ (Riga Declaration, 2015: 4).

The bilateral instrument of cooperation between the EU and the mentioned three countries - the Association Agreement mentions the term democracy few times in the preamble to the Agreements. Most of these provisions are the same for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. In the preamble to the EU-Ukraine Association it says:

\[
\text{COMMITTED to a close and lasting relationship that is based on common values, namely respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental freedoms, <...>}
\]
RECOGNIZING that the common values on which the European Union is built - namely democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law – are also essential elements of this Agreement (EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, 2014: 4).

The democracy promotion was and is a key objective behind the Eastern Partnership which went as a thread which follows through all the Eastern Partnership Declarations. At the same time, every next declaration was aimed at reinforcing the message of strong commitment to the democracy and rule of law statement. Nevertheless, given the fact that the desired democracy promotion efforts were not bearing all its fruits in the Eastern neighbourhood (Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010), the EU was continuing to search for new methods to promote democracy.

1.1.6 2011 ENP Review

The Arab Spring, which was a wave of the protests in the Northern Africa against the authoritarian regimes, gave a new impetus for the EU to redefine its commitment to the democracy promotion. As the reflection upon these developments, the European Commission has developed a Joint Communication ‘A new response to a changing neighbourhood’. This document brings attention to the need of democratic consolidation. It stresses that the new (according to the Commission) approach towards the neighbourhood is to be based on ‘shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (European Commission 2011). The Communication also introduces among all new term ‘deep democracy’ which according to the text includes:

- free and fair elections;
- freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media;
- the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial;
- fighting corruption;
- security sector reform and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces (Commission, 2011: 3).

Consequently, the ENP Review Communication was the first document which has brought some criteria into democracy promotion. The EU documents do not contain definition of the
democracy promotion, nevertheless this evolution testifies that the democracy promotion as a policy instrument was extensive developed by the EU. At the same time the EU has develops broad political discourse and legal language around this term, for example by referring to peace, stability, freedom, prosperity, good governance, and the rule of law (Grimm & Leininger, 2012: 392). Therefore, the next part of this chapter looks into how the academic circles have researched the EU’s strong commitment, which is supported by vague interpretation and implementation of the democracy promotion in the Eastern neighbourhood.

1.1.7 2015 ENP Review

In 2015, following the overwhelming refugee crisis and security challenges, the EU has launched a new extensive revision of the ENP. Differently from before, the EU links the necessity of democratization with its own security interest. In the 2015 Communication, it has stated the following: ‘The EU’s own stability is built on democracy, human rights and the rule of law and economic openness and the new ENP will take stabilisation as its main political priority in this mandate’ (European Commission 2015c: 2). Therefore, given that the EU has prioritized stabilization of the neighbourhood and where democratization serves as an instrument to attain this goal, some academics have acknowledged a more realist approach towards the EU’s policy (Gstöhl and Schunz 2015; Lannon 2016).

Following this revision, the EU has started addressing the individual interests of the partner countries. Given that not every EaP partnership country was interested in deep approximation (e.i. Azerbaijan) and some are limited with the other obligations (e.i. membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union of Belarus and Armenia), the EU was forced to develop new individual approaches towards these countries. Therefore, the EU has started developing even more individual and differentiated approach which were reflecting more on the (geo)-political reality of these countries.

Traditionally EU has reconfirmed its commitment to the ‘more for more’, incentive-based approach. The same document specifies that the success in supporting reforms in the fields of good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights was achieved when there was a commitment by partners to such reforms (European Commission 2015c: 5). Therefore, the same document reconfirms its support given that the states are committed to democratization.
As a conclusion to this part of the thesis, which is about the evolution of the term and policy of the democracy promotion in the EU documents, firstly the EU has started developing some informal understanding of democracy promotion by addressing the enlargement in 1980s to the Southern Europe. After the EU has formalised it through the Copenhagen criteria, which have defined the pre-accession vision for the CEECs. However, after 2004, for the first time in its history the EU faced the challenge of a democratisation of the third countries without integration. Consequently, it was forced to develop its working definitions and instruments of the results it wanted to see in the Eastern Neighbourhood. In order to bring more clarity into this evolution, the next part of this chapter looks into how the academic community has analysed and researched the development of the EU’s democracy promotion strategy.
1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW: Waves of Research of the EU Democracy Promotion with regards to the Eastern Neighbourhood

The waves of the academic research on the democracy promotion are discussed in connection to some major policy developments towards the neighbourhood. Research democratization becomes trendy, given the fall of the Soviet Union as well as breakthrough publication by Francis Fukuyama called ‘The End of History’ as well as by Samuel Huntington named ‘The Third Wave: Democratization in Late Twentieth Century’.

Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the Newly Independent States were not in the primary focus of the researchers. During 1990s and up to the moment when the EU has started discussing establishing new policy addressing the new neighbours to the East, the academic circles were focusing mainly on researching the pre-accession process. Consequently, the substantial academic research of the democracy promotion starts with the 2000s. The main academic waves of research of the democratization were built around the following events: the Coloured Revolutions to the EU’s East, the launch of the ENP and the Arab Spring to the South. The latest academic avenue of democracy promotion was reopened with the uprising in Ukraine, known as EuroMaidan or Revolution of Dignity.

1.2.1 2003-2005: 'Coloured Revolutions' and Internal Post-Soviet Transformations

During 2003-2005 the ‘coloured revolutions’ have laid grounds for a refreshed academic debate over the EU democracy promotion. The civil protests, which were a massive protest against electoral fraud, have swept through Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan in 2005, Belarus in 2006. In Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan those have led to the eventual change of the ruling authorities, whereas the revolutions have failed in meeting the demands of the protesters in Azerbaijan and Belarus. Nevertheless even if the protests were successful in changing the ruling authorities by conducting new elections, the revolutions did not lead to anticipated democratic transformations of the state system (Fairbanks 2007; Lucan Way 2008; Mitchell 2012). Consequently, the successful coloured revolutions did not automatically insure practice of democracy in the (semi-) authoritarian states (Trejo 2014).
The lost expectations have led to the broad academic research asking the impact and results of the coloured revolutions on the democratization of the given countries. Some academics discussed internal dynamics by exploring how the informal networks which existed during protest period have transferred into formal social capital active at the social and political levels (Polese 2009), how the rudiments of the autocratic regimes were counteract to the activities of the civil society and were weakening genuine non-formal networks promoting democracy (Lane 2009), and how the ruling elites in other post-Soviet countries have started developing strategies aimed at preventing similar democratic revolutions (Finkel & Brudny, 2012; E. Korosteleva, 2012).

Other scholars have looked at the geopolitical level: some have accentuated on the interference of the West during and immediately after the coloured revolutions, others on the influence of Russia on the weak democracies in the post-Soviet space. Some discussed 'how sponsored democracy promotion and western-inspired ‘soft power’ politics have failed' (Lane 2008); others explored the impact of strongly or weakly established links between the post-Soviet countries and the West (Lucan Way 2008; Levitsky and Way 2005). With regards to Russia’s influence, scholars explored how Kremlin adopted strategies that combined a political, administrative and intellectual assault on the opposition as well as on the ideas of democracy promotion promoted by the West (Finkel and Brudny 2012a). Consequently, special attention was paid to the parallel structures that were immediately established by Russia aiming to stimulate economic cooperation with the states with non-successful democratic revolutions, ei Belarus and Kazakhstan, and economic sanctions for the ones pursuing democracy, ei Georgia and Ukraine (Silitski 2010). Therefore, both groups - with and without successful coloured revolutions - were under strong external pressure.

Nevertheless, the division of the post-Soviet states into two groups, namely the ones pursuing democracy and the others fighting against it, was temporary, as both groups of the states have immediately experienced the authoritarian backlash (H. E. Hale 2005; Silitski 2010). Scholars have discovered that even such major events such as the massive protests demanding the government to follow the democratic principles as well as the eventual democratic elections do not lead to the regime-type endpoint - either democracy or autocracy - but are rather cyclic, meaning from autocracy toward greater democracy, then back toward more autocracy (H. E. Hale 2006; Tucker 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2010).
1.2.2 2004: Launching the ENP

Immediately after the ENP was launched, the research of the democracy promotion in the ENP was in a constant comparative analysis with the EU's success with democratizing the CEECs through the enlargement policy (Agarin 2014; Tocci 2005; Eriş 2012). Being not able to further enlarge, EU has developed the substitute policy – the ENP (Emerson 2004a). Even though, the ENP was modelled on the pre-accession instruments (Wallace 2003; K. Smith 2005; Emerson et al. 2005), the limitation of the ENP instruments comparing to the CEECs ones were immediately apparent (in terms of objectives as well as in terms of instruments).

Towards the CEECs, the EU has applied combination of strong and soft conditionality, which has resulted in strengthening of the democratic institutions in the countries concerned; with regards to the ENP countries, EU offered the same level of conditionality, with much less financial support and no offer of its membership perspective (Raik 2006b; F. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008a). Consequently, one of the main conclusions of multiple researches was that the ineffective democracy promotion is challenged lack of leverage on the partner countries as a result of weak conditionality and no membership perspective (F. Schimmelfennig 2007; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011; F. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008a). These conclusions were made in the framework of two main research avenues, namely Europeanization and External Governance.

A. Europeanization

With regards to democratization, Europeanization provides us with knowledge on methods used by the EU in the process of democratization, as well as on strategies, instruments and effectiveness applied towards the neighbourhood (Frank Schimmelfennig 2009; F. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008b). The general conclusion was that the ENP, which is aimed at democracy promotion (Ferrero-Waldner 2006) followed the 'one-size-fit all' policy supported by rigid and often inconsistent top-down rather than bottom-up approach (Bosse 2009; Casier 2011; Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweickert 2010; Schweickert et al. 2008).

---

9 Today, one can discuss whether these changes were irreversible if you consider the situation in Poland or in Hungary.
While some scholars were focused on Europeanization and impact of the EU on the third countries (Schimmelfennig 2009: 5), others analysed the extent and conditions under which the EU could be successful in Europeanization (Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweickert 2010). Special attention was paid towards conditionality and social learning in the ENP which were successfully applied towards the CEECs and which have resulted in their reforming in the areas of democracy and human rights (Kelley 2006). As to socialization, meaning multiple personal and institutional contacts which were one of the key mechanisms of Europeanization fostering democratization of the CEECs institutions (Mungiu-Pippidi 2005), the instruments within the ENP policy lacked socialization channels as the ENP countries had no access to the EU policies and programmes enabling such a contact (Solonenko 2009). And those are the channels through which the values and democratic principles penetrated the domestic institutions in CEECs enabling the democratic transformation of their institutions.

B. External Governance

The External Governance concept was called analyse how the enlarged Union would 'manage its new interdependence in an altered geopolitical context’ by looking into how EU has built its interdependence and the institutional configuration with its near abroad in the area of 'soft security' issues: justice and home affairs (meaning democracy promotion), environmental and energy policy (Lavenex 2004). Later, Sandra Lavenex and Schimmelfenning looked on the impact of the EU on the Eastern neighbours by examining the extent to which a common EU system of rule is transposed in those partner countries (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). In their later research, they have concluded that neither weak ‘linkage’ nor ‘leverage’ tightened to no-membership prospective have actual impact on the democracy promotion (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011). Consequently, in attempt to analyse external governance as democracy promotion tool, the conclusions was that ‘the EU governance rules are often transferred without significant impact on third country political dynamics’ (Youngs, 2009: 896).

Other scholars looked at the geopolitical scope of external governance and concluded that the effectiveness of the EU’s democracy promotion should be examined within broader geographical and historical framework as it will show the links of interdependence of the post-Soviet space with the West and Russia (A. Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009). Eventually
those links inevitably lead to the competition between EU and Russia in exporting their policies (A. Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009). Therefore, the links of the CIS with the Russian Federation constitute main constraint for the effective external governance and democracy promotion.

The broader conclusion on the researched done is the framework of the Europeanization and External Governance was that the EU does not have a strategy in dealing with seriously defective democracies of the ‘outsiders’ (A. Dimitrova and Pridham 2004) within the situation where the ‘external incentive model’ is based on weak conditionality (Frank Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Consequently, weak leverage and links neither create incentives for the ruling elites to undergone the rigid reform process aimed at democratization (Grabbe 2006) nor provide the channels of socialization through which norms and values would penetrate the institutions (Solonenko 2009).

1.2.3 2010-2011: Arab Spring: Democracy versus Stability Dilemma

Further academic research on the EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood was triggered by process the Arab Spring which started in December 2010. For decades the EU was making deals with the authoritarian regimes prioritizing European security interests democracy promotion in the Mediterranean (Hollis 2012; Behr 2012, 2009). As the result of the events, the HR/VP Catherine Ashton has brought attention to the fact that the ‘events in the region show that the ‘old stability’ wasn’t working’; therefore the EU had to respond to the ‘hopes for democratic change, social justice and democratic development’ expressed by the local societies (Ashton 2011b). Consequently the developments in the Southern neighbourhood have stimulated the academic circles to focus on how the EU has shift from being stability promoter to democracy promoter (Peters 2012; Hollis 2012; Schumacher 2011; Behr 2012; Perthes 2011).

The expectations that the EU would prioritize democracy over stability promotion were false: even though, the EU has prioritized the democracy promotion in the discourse and in documents, the (in-)activities in the regions have proven that the EU was more interested in stabilizing the situation rather than engaging into the volatile democracy promotion (Börzel, Dandashly, and Risse 2015; Risse and Babayan 2015a; Panchuk and Bossuyt 2014; Börzel
and van Hüllen 2014). Consequently some scholars have critically noted how the security-oriented dynamics deluded the ideational discourse of the EU (M. E. Smith 2011).

In 2011, having realised limits of its democracy promotion strategy (Pace 2014; Behr 2012), the EU has developed a new document aimed at re-launching the ENP. The revised approach offered the EU partners support in return for their engagement into building ‘deep democracy’ (European Commission 2011). The academic circles have immediately started criticizing lack of strategy behind this notion (Pace, 2012: 57), questioning the EU whether ‘become like us’ is an effective strategy (Emerson 2011), as well as claiming that by its new strategy the EU has become a promoter of ‘shallow’ democracy in the region (Reynaert 2011). Therefore, the Arab Spring has opened a Pandora Box of discourse on ‘security versus stability’ in their connection to the EU’s democracy promotion efforts.

1.2.4 2014: EuroMaidan as a Game-changer

In 2014, the pro-European protest in Ukraine, known as EuroMaidan or Revolution of Dignity, has fully opened the Pandora box of the ‘values versus interests’ debate which was previously pre-opened by the above-mentioned milestone developments in the ENP policy. The democratic protest which has erupted to the refusal to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement has swiftly developed into a pro-democracy and against corrupt undemocratic regime (Saryusz-Wolski 2014; Risse and Babayan 2015a; Kuzio 2015).

However, few weeks into EuroMaidan, major conclusions were drawn by expert and academic communities. What became apart is that the Euromaidan has erupted as a protest against corrupt and semi-authoritarian post-Soviet state, where the EU was antipode of the past and vision of bright democratic future (Miszlivet 2015; Saryusz-Wolski 2014). The EuroMaidan protesters were inspired by the utopian visions of ‘Europe’ and ‘democracy’ (Ryabchuk 2014). What was also apparent is that the crisis of democracy, such as EuroMaidan has proven to be, cannot be neither confined nor defined by the boundaries of the nation state or its national policy (Miszlivet 2015), but was rather an issue of the clash of civilizations between the Soviet, Russia-promoted governance, and the democratic, pro-European Union (Saryusz-Wolski 2014).
Even though there is vast amount of literature on the EU’s efforts in democracy promotion, the academic circles did little to explore why the EU was not effective in democracy promotion in its Eastern neighbourhood. The academic circles have researched in-depth the instruments and policy aiming to reply on how the EU attempted to democratize the Eastern neighbourhood. Consequently, this thesis is to address the why-question by looking into other theories which were left outside of the mainstream academic agenda.

1.2.5 In Search of the New Research Avenue

The above-given research suggests that the different waves of the academic research avenues, which were developed during the last three decades are not helpful in explaining EU’s lack of success in achieving its democratization agenda in the Eastern neighbourhood. The current research avenues have made important conclusions with regards to the limited impact of the EU policies; however, what was not researched enough is that the same region is the object of a competition of at least two main actors, namely the EU and Russia. Therefore, one could assume that the EU’s democracy promotion agenda might be limited by the agenda advanced by the other actor.

The theoretical framework, which is needed for this research, has to address EU’s attempts of democracy promotion. It can be done for example by testing Fukuyama’s explanation in his book ‘End of History’ suggesting that liberal democracy is to become the only game in the house after the collapse of the Soviet Union and failure of its communist ideology. However, it is not the case as differently to the prediction, the EU’s democracy promotion agenda has become a factor of new external pressure and alternative agenda.

Consequently, applying only Fukuyama’s theoretical framework would be limiting given the geopolitical reality and the influence of the Russian Federation on the shared with the EU Eastern neighbourhood. Given the resurgent geopolitical rivalry, classical realism, and foremost the balance of power thesis is to be applied. This theoretical framework might better explain the limited success of the EU’s agenda in the Eastern neighbourhood given that the assumption is that it is offset by the alternative agenda advanced by Russia which is outbalancing EU’s democratization agenda and its core worldview of liberal world order.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PUZZLE AND METHODOLOGY

This the chapter looks into two theories which are to be applied to this work with an attempt to explain the reality and to answer the research question on why the EU is not successful in democratizing the Eastern Partnership countries. Firstly, this is the liberal democracy thesis promoted by Fukuyama. With the fall of communism and collapse of the bipolar world, Fukuyama argued that the Western-style liberal democracy will automatically spread around the world as there is no alternative left, but for all the states to democratize. Therefore, in this part the author discusses the liberal democracy thesis and applies it towards the reality in the Eastern European neighbourhood. The second theory discussed in this chapter is the realist balance of power thesis which puts the EU’s attempt of democratization into the system of international relations. Consequently, it discusses the democratization not as an isolated process, but as an action in the system of international relations.

2.1 Liberal Democracy by Francis Fukuyama

The fall of communism and collapse of the bi-polar system of the international relations, liberal democracy seemed to be the only plausible avenue for development of the free from communism states. In the 1989 article, called ‘The End of History’, Fukuyama has declared the global triumph of liberalism in the world political system. In this and his later book called ‘The End of History and the Last Man’, Fukuyama has made a number of important claims. Firstly, he said that there would be no major ideological international conflict, as with the collapse of communism there is no alternative, but the Western liberal democracy. Secondly all the states understood the importance of protection of laws. Third argument was that states will aim at economic prosperity and democracy (Fukuyama 1989).

Argument 1: Triumph of Western Liberalism over Alternative Systems

According to Fukuyama, with the triumph of Western liberal democracy, all the states will inevitably become liberal. Until the end of 80s, communism and previously fascism constituted systemic alternatives which were previously challenging Western liberalism (Fukuyama 1989). Therefore, Fukuyama argued that the conflict within the international system which was inspired by the rivalry ideology following their own national interests (be it capitalism or communism) will seize to exist (Fukuyama, 1992: 7).
Previously, human history was built on contradictions and confrontations, such as dichotomy between capitalism and proletariat, struggle for the universal recognition of rights, etc. However, due to the fact that with collapse of communism there was no obstacle to democratization, Fukuyama argued that the ‘liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe’ (Fukuyama, 1992: xiii). Consequently, at the end of history there is universal homogenous state, where all conflicts are resolved and contradictions have disappeared (Fukuyama, 1989: 3). This end of history was seen in the collapse of the Soviet Union, end of communism and bipolar competitive international relations.

What we may be witnessing in not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (Fukuyama, 1989: 1).

Fukuyama argued that the nature of conflicts will change, but will never be again a bipolar international confrontation that existed during the Cold War period. According to him, the conflicts, which will exist, will be based on ethnic and nationalist violence. Consequently, the world agenda will focus on terrorism and wars of national liberation, but not on the large scale as it was before the collapse of communism because there would be no competing ideological paradigms.

**Argument 2: All States will become Liberal Democracy**

As there will be no alternative system, such as communism or fascism, liberal democracy will become universal. According to Fukuyama, at the end of history, states recognize and understand the importance to protect system of law as well as universal rights to freedom and democracy (Fukuyama, 1989: 3). Therefore, liberalism brought new rules into reforming stipulating that the responsibility of the people for their own affairs, responsibility of the political bodies to respond to the demands and needs of the citizens, and finally – rule of law should prevail over injustice and arbitrary actions of the law enforcement bodies. Consequently, the elements of the liberal state would be separation of powers, independent judiciary, as well as protection of the private property (Fukuyama, 1989: 10-11).
... the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness <…> there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run' (Fukuyama, 1989: 1).

The ideal grounds lie in the forthcoming economic behaviour manifested by the states, while many mistakenly think that the economic factor is a driving one. Differently to this false claim, the liberal state can survive many economic hardships in the name of the ideals that it is striving for. At the same time, it is liberal democracy together with liberal economics, which boost and preserve liberalism in the political sphere (Fukuyama, 1989: 3-4).

**Argument 3: Economic Welfare as Ultimate Goal of the State**

In the same publication, Fukuyama suggests that the states will stop fighting because the fight for ideology would be replaced by economic considerations. In the world free of conflict and contradiction, only economic considerations are important (Fukuyama, 1989: 3). Because there is no command economy, states will be focusing on satisfying consumer demands, environmental concerns as well as other issues aimed at bettering the well-being. The fact that citizens would inevitably enjoy vast economic liberalism it will incentivize states to persevere and foster liberalism in political sphere. He suggested that the liberal principles in economics, so-called free markets, have spread and will continue spreading insuring material prosperity in both developed and what was called before the ‘third world’ (Fukuyama, 1992: 7).

However, Fukuyama was against materialist determinism and he strongly argued that both economics and politics are essential for liberal state. Therefore, the state that permits growth of liberalism is stabilized by the abundance of a free market economy. The same way the growth of free market economy is reinforced by the state with liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1989: 6).

Given these predictions, one could assume that the EU’s efforts in democratization of the Eastern neighbourhood would be easy. Following Fukuyama’s logics, there is no alternative system which would compete with liberalism. This suggests that EU would have no obstacle in its efforts. Consequently, according to Fukuyama, those states would become liberal and
cooperate because of their shared goal of the economic welfare. Nevertheless, this prediction seems as the one which has not come true.

2.2 Putting Fukuyama’s Predictions at Test

If the Fukuyama’s prediction of - what he called as - ‘ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy’ (Fukuyama 1989) - was true, it should have been easy for the EU to help democratizing its Eastern neighbourhood. Following Fukuyama’s assumption, as the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism, the Newly Independent States would on the long run become liberal, democratic and by now should have become strong market economies. Consequently, the EU’s democratization efforts should have been a supplementary push for the newly independent states following the global tendency of democratization. Fukuyama’s predictions were true and false at the same time.

2.2.1 Testing Democratization of the Neighbourhood

As predicted in the above-mentioned article, after the collapse of the communism there was a progress in liberties: elected governments restored individual right, as well as the course taken on rebuilding the post-communist countries into market economy (Fukuyama, 2014: 2). In the 90s, the bumpy road towards building liberal democracies was reconfirmed by the massive civil protests voicing for democracy and which eventually gave them independence from the totalitarian Soviet Union (Paul Kubicek 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002). The epic event supporting this assumption were the ‘coloured revolutions’ which have put the black-sliding democracies of Georgia and Ukraine back on the democratization track, at the same time the attempt (even though not successful) to organize revolutions in Belarus and Azerbaijan have manifested the interest of the citizens in democratization (Raik 2006a).

Nevertheless, the countries in the region concerned, with the exception of Belarus and Azerbaijan, have regularly conducted both presidential and parliamentary elections which were acknowledged to be in the line with the international law and standards\textsuperscript{10}. Therefore, on

\textsuperscript{10} The statements that the elections were held in confirming with the international standards is taken from the OSCE/ODIHR reports, as well as from the joint reports with the European Parliament mission and the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. Those reports are also followed by the recommendations for the country concerned on how to improve the electoral process in future. Regardless of some problem areas, in these four countries the elections were acknowledged fair and democratic.
one hand, some of these countries have manifested a stable track record of the electoral democracy (Nasieniak and Depo 2013), and on the other hand, the two other countries from the same region, like Belarus and Azerbaijan, have not advanced beyond the electoral democracy (Silitski 2005; Alieva 2006). Therefore, these cases again suggest that Fukuyama’s prediction was partly true.

Finally, all Eastern neighbourhood countries made a progress in rebuilding their countries from common into market economy and consequently became WTO members. Belarus and Azerbaijan were granted observer status in this organization. Interestingly, WTO membership was the EU precondition for the new enhanced agreement between the EU and the mentioned countries. Nevertheless, the Eastern neighbourhood countries are far from being stable democracies. Even though all the EaP countries have made a significant progress after having gained independence, recently they have again started demonstrating democratic rollback.

Lack of progress and in some bases even democratic slide-down is manifested in different research papers analysing the democracy performance of the Eastern Partnership countries. For example, the Freedom House has concluded that the countries which perform better are the ones which have higher level of commitment to the European integration, such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Those countries are rated as ‘Partly Free’. Nevertheless, the graph below shows that the ‘freedom of press’ index went down in 2015 in the mentioned three countries (Dunham and Aghekyan 2015). The three remaining countries of the Eastern Partnership are rated as ‘Not Free’, both Belarus and Azerbaijan rank among the worst media environments in the world and also manifest the slide-down in the rating (Dunham and Aghekyan 2015).

**Press Freedom Scores of the Eastern Partnership Countries since 2009**
The other example is the European Integration Index which compares the progress for the years of 2012, 2013, and 2014 in the area of ‘deep and sustainable democracy’. The overall result is slightly inspiring as it manifests a limited progress in all the Eastern Partnership countries which was accomplished during three years in all the EaP countries, excluding Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the report also suggests that more should and could be done with regards to the democracy reforming (Lovitt 2014), and therefore, stressing on ‘democratic limbo’ in the neighbourhood (Solonenko 2015).

Coming back to the data mentioned above and Fukuyama’s prediction, one could conclude that these six countries have not turned into liberal democracies. Until recently Moldova was the only country making some progress with regards to democratic reforming (Solonenko and Shapovalova 2011). Therefore, the Eastern Partnership countries have still a long way to go until they could be defined as liberal democracy.

2.2.2 Fukuyama’s Prediction of No Competition to the Liberal Agenda
What Fukuyama has wrongly predicted in his 1989 publication was the impact of the Russian Federation on democratization of the post-Soviet space as well as the competitive agenda which it will advance. He has stated that the competitive behaviour of Russia (as well as of China) would ‘disappear from the face of the earth’ (Fukuyama, 1989: 23). He has equally undermined the autonomic assumption arguing that ‘Russia shorn of its expansionist communist ideology should pick up where the czars left off just prior to the Bolshevik Revolution’ (Fukuyama, 1989: 21). He also stated that Russia’s return to foreign policy views a century out of date in the rest of Europe would be impossible (Fukuyama, 1989: 21).

However, the Russia’s active expansionist involvement with the neighbourhood and foremost the war in Ukraine has shown that the imperial Russia is back. Already in 2014 former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that Putin believes he is a ‘new czar’ (Kopan 2014), while others have started discussing ‘Czar Putin’s next moves’ trying to understand ‘his spare capacity to produce trouble’ (Friedman 2015). The academics have pointed at how ‘Putin has borrowed freely from the Tsarist and Soviet past’ (Cannady & Kubicek, 2014: 6), suggesting that the empire has stroked back using new tactics of war which was built on the satirized - by Vladimir Putin - the moral and legal arguments used by Western states (Dunn and Bobick 2014). The imperial vision which has incentivized invasion of Georgia and eventually of Ukraine, participation in protractive conflicts, etc, was to ‘assert that the cost for the hegemony were limited, bearable, and short term’ (Galeotti, Mark; Bowen 2014a). Therefore, what Fukuyama has undermined in his work was a possibility that there would be a competition to liberal thought.

Nevertheless, Fukuyama was partially true as the liberal agenda was challenged only a decade later. During 1990s, the democracy promotion has become a hegemonic agenda of the West in post-Cold war era (Kurki, 2010: 365). Democracy, as the ‘world’s new universal religion’ was spreading (Corcoran, 1983: 14) as it was almost left unchallenged by other global player (Kurki 2010).

As of 2000s, contrary to the expectation of establishing the stable and democratic Eastern European neighbourhood, the partner countries were not only in weak economies and democracies, but also have also become a source of the security threat. Fukuyama has stressed that establishing liberal democracy is not an easy task as it makes the state much more fragile. As Fukuyama has mentioned before, the liberal state by definition is weak
(Fukuyama, 1992: 15). This weakness results in the strict delimitation of the individual rights and the state interference. At the same time, authoritarian regime is strong as the state has a full power of control as well as power to encroach into the freedoms (Fukuyama, 1992: 15).

At the same time, all the EaP countries have some paramilitary component bringing in instability. Three ‘frozen conflicts’ - which are on the territory of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova - have become a source of the resurgent instability. Eventually, in 2008 a war has erupted in Georgia and few years later – in Ukraine. Both countries have seen de facto (in case of Georgia) and de jure (in case of Ukraine) annexation of their territory. The common denominator to all the troubles was the Russian Federation (Tolstrup 2009; Mankoff 2011; Wilson and Popescu 2009).

The Eastern neighbourhood has found itself in between democratization and authoritarianism (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015), being torn between the desire to proceed with the European integration while being kept back by Russia which tries to reincarnate Soviet system (Galbreath 2008; Dunn and Bobick 2014; Galeotti, Mark; Bowen 2014b). Therefore, instead of the successful democratizations process, as it was with the CEECs in the 90s, EU has found itself in pure geopolitics. And already in 2014 Fukuyama has admitted that the old-fashioned geopolitics has returned a big time and that the global stability is threatened, where ‘Russia is a menacing electoral authoritarian regime fuelled by petrodollars, seeking to bully its neighbours and take back territories lost when the Soviet Union dissolved’ (Fukuyama, 2014: 2).

To sum up, Fukuyama’s early works had some limitations as he has not predicted the resurgent role of the Russian Federation in the region as well as its imperial appetite towards the former Soviet countries. His attention was focused on the globalization of the liberal thought, which in case of the post-Soviet space has faced an alternative agenda. Consequently, the assumption which might help answering the question why the EU has failed in democratizing its Eastern neighbourhood can be found with Russia, which was and is counteracting with strategy which is to pursue its interest through a mix of transborder corruption, economic imperialism and cultural domination in the Neighbourhood.

2.3 Democracy Promotion as a Threat to Strategic Interests
From the strategic point of view, democracy promotion can be seen as a major strategic interest (Youngs, 2004: 4-7). In the long-term, stable democratic regimes provide stability and security (Seeberg 2009; Durac and Cavatorta 2009). Multiple researches suggest that the democracies rarely fight other democracies and they refrain from going into war with other states (Ember, Ember, and Russett 1992; Gleditsch 1992; Mintz and Geva 1993). Successful democratic states allow the West to secure their own benefits, such as security, trade and investment. Consequently, established democracies have not only normative, but also are of genuine strategic interest (Wolff and Wurm 2011).

Logically, Russia could also benefit from the stable and democratic neighbourhood. However, this is not the case. Democracy promotion, which is promoted by the West, can be seen as a threat and it might be challenged by the other actors if the democratization efforts threaten their security, political and economic interests and/or the survival (Börzel, 2015: 520). There are a number of arguments why a state, like Russia which considers the post-Soviet as its sphere of influence, would oppose the democracy promotion. Firstly, democracy promotion means an integration with the EU and its system of values (Wolff and Wurm 2011). For compliance with the set EU’s conditionality partners get rewards which leads to a new round of deeper integration (F. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008b; Raik 2006b). Each EU reward brings the shared neighbourhood closer to the EU and distances them from Russian influence.

Secondly, by promoting democracy the EU supports the modern liberal state which is characterized by establishment of a well-functional bureaucratic state based on the rule of law. The system is impersonal, as there should be no nature of one’s personal relationship to the rulers (Fukuyama 2014b). This state is also characterized by the infrastructural (that is administrative) power\textsuperscript{11}, where state, law and accountability are functioning independently from each other and at the same time are constraining and limiting powers of each (Fukuyama 2014b).

Differently from the EU, Russia being a neo-patrimonial state (Fukuyama 2004; Ilkhamov 2007; L. F. Shevtsova and Eckert 2001) supports despotic (meaning coercive) powers in the region which are also neo-patrimonial. Under this system, which is built on personalities,

\textsuperscript{11} The differentiation between despotic (meaning coercive) and infrastructural (meaning administrative) powers was developed by Michael Mann in his book the \textit{Source of Social Power}, 1986.
there is little distinction between the private and public good, weak rule of law and widespread clientelism and corruption (Fukuyama 2014b). Less democracy – easier it is to influence the third country.

For Russia it is easier to influence neo-patrimonial post-Soviet countries, which are characterized by vertical, personalized and cohesive power. The democratic horizontal decision-making promoted by the EU is a threat to Russia’s influence. Therefore, Russia is resistance to the EU’s rhetoric about universal values of democracy as its influence over the neighbourhood is threatening Russia’s immediate strategic interest (Whitehead, 2014: 15-16). This leads to definition of Russia as of autocracy promoter.

2.3.1 Russia as Autocracy Promoter

Autocracy promotion (Burnell 2008; L. A. Way 2015) or ‘democracy resistance’ (Nodia 2014) is a concept opposite to democracy promotion. The definition of the autocracy promoter is of the ‘one that goes beyond deliberate attempts by autocratic governments to export their own political institutions’ into the third country (Burnell, 2010: 5). Further in his works, Burnell defines the following characterises which belong to the autocracy promoter:

1. Deliberate attempts to influence a regime in an anti-democratic direction by offering concrete forms of support, calling it ‘true autocracy export’. This characteristic suggests that the actor will use both hard and soft power instruments which would boost authoritarian trends or bring instability to democratic regime;
2. Diffusion the authoritarian value in the third country through imitated institutions of foreign models which were not compromised. The actor might involve non-state and transnational entities which promote specific concepts diffused by organizations and social movements.
3. Support to the third country in countering the inducement and pressure to democratize coming from the democracy promoters.
4. Deliberate attempts to influence the public policies, especially foreign policy, and other conditions in the third countries which might help to shift the regime into anti-democratic direction.
5. Doing ‘business as usual’ with a regime which gives the third country greater freedom to determine its political trajectory vis-à-vis all its international partners, towards both democracy promoter and autocracy promoter. This creates an illusion of the free
choice, which might potentially facilitate ownership of democratic reforms and make democratic sustainability more likely. However, given that the third country, found in between of democracy and autocracy, this technique might also produce the opposite effect and therefore help to maintain or even increase of authoritarian characteristics (Burnell, 2010: 5).

As a recent research avenue, the scholars have started analysing the regional authoritarian powers which assist to authoritarian regimes nearby, including Russia’s actions in the shared with EU neighbourhood (L. A. Way 2015; Levitsky and Way 2002; Ambrosio 2009; Risse and Babayan 2015a; Börzel 2015; Vanderhill 2012). Russia is a vivid example of hostility towards the democracy promotion in the Western neighbourhood (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015) which is overwhelmed with the fear of democratic contagion (Ambrosio 2009). The EU’s assertive democracy promotion has stimulated Kremlin to develop a number of instruments which would give a stronger countervailing response to the West (Tolstrup 2009; Delcour and Wolczuk 2015; Whitehead 2014). Consequently, Russia is seen as the actor with a strong interest in influencing the authoritarian maintenance, revival or return on the territory of the post-Soviet space (Burnell 2010a).

The trick of the authoritarian promoter is that this actor does not explicitly promote the autocracy, but it rather oppresses the democratic movements in its periphery at the moment when democratization threatens its security interests or is perceived to endanger their regime survival (Risse and Babayan 2015a; Börzel 2015). The actions unveiling Russia as the autocracy promoter are easier to be spotted during the turning points for the post-Soviet countries, such as (non-) democratic elections, coloured revolutions, and wars and/or escalation in ‘frozen conflicts’ areas (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015; Burnell 2010b). At the same time, while analysing broader timeframe, if the government ruling in the given country was pro-Russian, the Russian government was supportive of the regime (L. A. Way 2015). At the same time it was also conducting granting assistance to opposition and segmented societal groups in countries where anti-Russia governments were in power (Tolstrup 2015).

The actions of Russia, which has a role of the ‘black knight’ in the post-Soviet space (Tolstrup 2015), demand vigilance and attention of the democracy promoters (L. Way 2016). The fact that Putin’s Russia attempts to maintain the pro-Russian semi-autocratic political regime at home was academically proven (Boonstra 2008a; Ambrosio 2007, 2009; Risse and
Babayan 2015a; Börzel 2015). However, only thorough cross-time analysis might help to identify the actions taken to spread authoritarian values built on foreign models and attributed assistance to regimes in the third countries with an aim to suppress democratization (Risse & Babayan, 2015a: 382). It should be noted, that autocracy promotion limits itself to a certain degree: the autocracy promoter does not intend to reinforce third country capabilities to resist the promoter. It is more a system of vassal / suzerain relationship in which the vassal is supported by the suzerain as long as it recognises his superiority, his share of the power (political and economic) and his right to influence the system.

2.3.2 Assumption: Autocracy Versus Democracy Promoter

As it was discussed above, some regional powers might counteract democracy promotion by fostering autocracy and/instability as an alternative type of regime (Whitehead 2001; Börzel 2015). Consequently successful democracy promotion would be possible only if there is no competition, if there is no another power in the region opposing and countering the democracy promotion in the third country (Risse and Babayan 2015a; Börzel 2015). The regional powers – be it democracy or autocracy promoter - will continue protecting their own strategic interests. At the same time, we should avoid considering EaP countries as objects and no subjects of international relations: depending on the size and resources of the country, it might also be more resistant to EU’s influence.

The main assumption of this thesis is that the EU’s democracy promotion in the Eastern neighbourhood is limited by the competitive strategy of the Russian Federation. Both EU and the Russian Federation have the same aim towards the region: security and stability; nevertheless, the nuances are different. Whereas EU and the US have put their efforts into stabilization of the region by reinforcing democracy (Börzel 2015), Putin’s strategy is to establish a ‘managed instability’ (Tolstrup 2009). As both, EU and Russia pursue geopolitical goals towards the neighbourhood, the Putin’s strategy is to defend its sphere of influence against what he considers being expansion of the EU into historically Russian post-Soviet space (Börzel, 2015: 523).

Even though the liberal theoretical thought is one that is the closest to the ideas pursued by democracy promoter and therefore it touches upon the essence of the EU’s strategy towards the Eastern neighbourhood, nevertheless, its biggest limitation is the assumption that every
actor in the system of international relations would follow path of liberal democracy and that there would be no any other competitive model. The limitation of a concept developed by Fukuyama is grounded within its self-centred concept. Firstly, it suggests that there is a win-win situation to every problem. Secondly, it stresses on the interdependence and cooperation between the actors. And thirdly, it is strongly based on the suggestive cooperative nature of the actors in the international relations which abide the international law. This approach disregards the fact that the actors of international system can take a different path.

The liberal democracy thesis developed by Fukuyama has its limitations when democracy promotion meets Russia’s real politics. Even though Fukuyama is right that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the six post-Soviet countries were moving towards the democratization and with EU’s assistance made some progress, their efforts were limited by external pressure, the Russian Federation. Shortly it will become apparent that EU’s democracy promotion is not the only game in town and that Russia pursues its own, competitive strategy towards the same region (Ademmer, 2017: 2). This is exactly what Fukuyama did not predict – the resurgent power which would develop an alternative strategy countering the liberal democracy and therefore preventing the EU from democratizing its Eastern Neighbourhood. Consequently, in order to answer the research question, set in this thesis, a different theoretical framework is needed, namely the realist balance of power thesis.

The Russian Federation pursues a different vision with regards to the threat of EU’s democracy promotion – a realist one (Ambrosio and Vandrovec 2013; Sakwa 2008; Morozova 2009). The Russian Federation has developed realist approach which is grounded on the assumptions opposing to liberalism. Firstly, it is based on the zero-sum-game concept which suggests that one’s gain is one’s lose. Secondly, it stresses that the states are self-interested and will protect what they consider being their interests. Finally, the best way to secure their interests is by insure balance of power, but not through cooperation as the democracy promoter suggest, but through the countervailing strategy.

Whereas it is the EU’s policies which are driving the democratization efforts in post-Soviet space (Nodia 2014), Russia opposes the EU’s expansionist agenda into historically its post-Soviet space (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2015: 460). EU stresses that democracy promotion is about values, whereas Russia sees it nothing but geopolitical project masking the power grabs (Nodia, 2014: 147). Therefore, the democracy promotion is seen as geopolitical tool aimed at
outbalance the Russia’s influence. Consequently, according to some scholars, Putin’s Russia is pursuing a full-fledged anti-democracy promotion strategy which is modelled on mirroring EU’s strategy towards the neighbourhood (Jackson 2010; Ambrosio 2007).

The Russian Federation is mirroring the EU’s policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood with an aim to prevent its democratization. During the last two decades, the Russian Federation was developing an alternative security, economic and normative projects in which it has involved the former post-Soviet space and especially the six countries concerned. Mirroring EU’s strategy with a weak alternative is not enough, especially given the strong support to the democratic values in the Eastern Neighbourhood countries and fading attractiveness of the Russia’s model (Klitsounova 2009). Consequently the main objective of Russia is to be present as a destabilizing element in the Eastern the neighbourhood (Whitehead 2014; Tolstrup 2009).

2.3.3 Any Alternative Assumptions?

There are two other alternative assumptions which might explain EU’s lack of success with its democracy promotion agenda and which are not covered by this thesis. First explanation is the wrong policy choice, as the EU’s policy of democratization towards its Eastern neighbours was modelled on the pre-accession policy for the CEECs. While looking at the region which is researched in this thesis, EU has not equipped those countries neither with the ‘carrot’ of membership prospective nor with significant financial support which would underpin the rigid reform process. Consequently, the EU had a strong leverage allowing to enhance democratization of the CEECs. In this case the EU had an effect of the ‘magnetic force’ on these countries. Comparing the CEECs to the researched region, even up until today these countries are neither offered the membership prospective nor adequate financial support underpinning democratization process.

The second argument would be weak domestic institutions which were not fit to the competitive agenda advanced by the EU and Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, six countries have found themselves in a completely new world order, where Russia had still a strong influence on them and the EU has already started with some attempts of introducing democracy promotion instruments. These countries have taken the path of democratization having almost no memory of what the democratic rules were due to the decades of the
communist legacy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union they seemed to engage into building market liberal economy having previous experienced only with the command economy. The situation was aggravated by the volatile security situation and the eruption of the conflicts in four out of six countries.

Even those, these might be good arguments to be further researched, they only part explain the EU’s lack of success in achieving its democratization agenda in the Eastern neighbourhood. I would argue that the EU’s democratization agenda would be successful with no (or far away membership perspective) and limited financial support under condition that it would be the only actor in the region. Would Russia have not advanced its assertive alternative agenda towards the post-Soviet space these countries would see no other model, but the one advanced by the EU.

2.4 Balance of Power Thesis

The theoretical framework which might be instrumental in explaining this competition is the balance of power. The balance of power between liberal, as the EU is, and autocracy promoter/illiberal democracy, such as Russia is, naturally creates a competition (Vanderhill 2012). Strive for security inevitably leads to hegemony which eventually results in intensified security competition. Consequently, the actors bring some order into the system of international relations (IR) through balancing the actions of each other (Milner, 2009: 70).

The balance of power thesis suggests that the actors self-organize within the system of anarchy with an aim to gain more power (Waltz 2001). The actors of within the system of International Relations will protect their own power position if their security or power interests are jeopardized (Morgenthau 1948). The balancing occurs as there is a dissatisfaction with the current allocation of status, material benefits, or other goods which might lead states to enhance the capabilities and to challenge a predominate power (Nexon 2009: 334).

This realist theory argues that the actors are constantly under pressure to respond to the threats coming from other actors (Waltz, 1990; Buzan 2009). As the international system is anarchic, the actors of the system are in constant search of security and maximization of power (Hollis & Smith, 1991: 38). The patterns of their behaviour depend upon the
calculations which are based on actions taken by other actors as well as on position in the system (Keohane, 1986: 167).

Consequently, the ability of the actors to obtain their objective is restrained by the actions taken by other actors in the system (Waltz, 1979: 104-110). The actors enter a constant play between ‘struggle for wealth and power along with the independent actors within the anarchy’ (Gilpin, 1981: 7). Therefore, hiding behind EU’s agenda of the democracy promotion in its Eastern neighbourhood, the EU is driven by self-interest and calculations of stable and predictable neighbourhood - this objective is well understood in Russia (Holden 2009: 18-19).

2.5 Identifying Balancing between Democracy Promoter and Autocracy Promoter

In order to see how the Russian Federation offsets EU’s project of democracy promotion one should compare and assess the ongoing or completed project, programmes or policy and their design which are aimed at outbalancing the EU’s influence on the shared neighbourhood (Burnell, 2010: 5). The aim of the comparison is to define the objectives of the actors, evaluate the sustainability of their actions, and the outcome of their results. The comparison of the actions taken by the democracy/autocracy promoter is by means of identifying different policy instruments, means, tools and strategies aimed to outbalance the advance of the democracy promotion strategy (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Burnell 2010b).

How to prove that balancing exists? Nearly all of the scholars agree on the systematic element of the balance of power, which is central to this thesis. It means that the balancing occurs only when there is a danger of the potential hegemon who maximizes its power. When this concentration of power appears the system of international relations calls for balancing (Wohlforth 2004: 218). In order for Russia to start the contra-balancing EU’s democracy promotion efforts, the EU has to trigger this reaction by maximizing its power towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. Consequently, the Russian Federation, having observed the EU’s maximization of power in different areas, has developed the instruments which would outbalance the EU’s influence over the shared neighbourhood.

There are different methods of balancing, namely to arm, to seize territory, to establish buffer zones, to form alliances, to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, and finally to divide and conquer (Organski 1968: 267). As the historical analysis testified, all of those techniques of the foreign policy were used with an aim to maintain a perceived balance of
power (Sheehan 1996: 54). Therefore, when discussing the instruments applied by each of the actors, the special attention is to be paid to these methods in order to identify if the mentioned methods of balancing were applied by the actor.

2.5.1 Step 1: Identifying Balancing Through Categories

The EU-Russia balance of power can be categorized in a different way. Copying the democracy promoter, the autocracy promoter also use diplomatic, financial, economic, military and other security assistance (Burnell, 2010: 6). Nexon and Holden have discussed different types of technologies clustered within administrative, military, social or economic technologies that help to re-establish the equilibrium (Nexon 2009; Holden 2009). Samokhvalov has discussed the zero sum relation within the EU-Ukraine-Russia relations within the following dimensions: geo-economics, geo-political, security, and socio-cultural (Samokhvalov 2007). Bringing all the acquis académiques together the space of balancing will be divide within security, economic and normative dimensions.

Normative dimension

Normative dimension of the EU-Russia competition in the shared neighbourhood is defined through the realist perspective which covers the instruments of ‘what otherwise <is> done by military arsenals or economic incentives’ (Diez 2005: 616). Morgenthau calls these actions
as the ones aimed at controlling the minds and actions of other (Morgenthau: 1978: 9, 30, 108).

While discussing the EU instruments within the normative dimension, the accentuation will be on the instruments and means which help the EU with its democracy promotion agenda. Until recently the EU’s normative dimension was developed around approximation with the EU values and norms, which were to help the EU’s partners to establish liberal democracies. With the introduction of the EaP, the EU has slightly modified its strategy and started developing other instruments. This includes visa liberalization dialogues with the EaP countries, institutionalized dialogue with the civil society leaders whom Putin called grant-eaters and Judas\textsuperscript{12}, as well as opening educational programmes, such as Erasmus Mundus, Youth in Action, and others.

However if we look at this dimension from the academic point of view, scholars have a different vision on the aims of the EU’s democracy promotion agenda. When discussing the EU’s instruments within the normative dimension, the EU is aimed at extending its ‘power to shape the values of others’ (Diez 2005: 616), where the EU is ‘promoting its own norms in a similar manner to historical empires and contemporary powers’ (Manners 2002: 240). Some other scholars agree with this opinion classifying the ‘EU’s attempt to extend its own norms and standards beyond its borders <…> as an evidence for the assumption that EU foreign policy vis-à-vis neighbouring countries is rather to be characterized as dominitive or with civilizing ambitions than as universalistic or cosmopolitan’ (Barbé et al. 2009). An attempt to frame the EU as ‘ethical power’ was criticized from the realist prospective (Hyde-Price 2008). Despite of the EU’s good will to be a democracy promoter, the EU was called ‘realist actor in normative cloths’ (Seeberg 2009).

Comparing to the EU, Russia has stronger influence on the shared neighbourhood due to the post-Soviet heritage encompassing shared culture, history, and the importance of the Russian language. Contrary to the EU which for a long period promoted exclusively the EU values, Russia reinforced its presence by variety of instruments, such as promotion of Russophone

\textsuperscript{12} During his presidential campaign, Putin has addressed the Congress of his Party with the criticism of the activity of Russia’s partners which according to him brings together the grant-eaters and give them instructions to conduct specific type of activities with an aim to influence the presidential campaign in Russia. Part of Putin’s address is available following the link: \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcRBvQR59jY}. Accessed on: 27.07.2013.
media, issuance of passports to the ones who were born in the Soviet Union or who feel Russian\(^\text{13}\) (Samokhvalov 2007: 27). Promotion of Russian citizenship in the post-Soviet space, a policy which was later named as ‘passportization’, became especially popular in the break-away regions (Sinkkonen 2011; Roslycky 2011).

Morgenthau also suggests that ‘All nations are tempted to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes’; however, the purposes, should be ‘filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place’ (Morgenthau 1954: 10). The time and points of departure for the EU and Russia are different given their history of relations with this region. Consequently, the instruments with which they can apply towards the shared neighbourhood are also different. Therefore, comparing the approach of the Russian Federation and of the EU within the normative dimension would allow the reader see how the balancing of power is implemented by the EU in practice.

**Economic dimension**

The economic dimension of the competition between Russia and the EU is about safeguarding a post-Soviet system versus the EU’s support to the liberal economy. The post-Soviet space has empowered the network of personalism and clientism, making the post-Soviet states vulnerable to external manipulation (Robinson, 2012: 107). Having inherited economic links with the post-Soviet countries, Russia has further extended them via new economic integration projects, which is characterized by environment of i) vertical power, ii) weak horizontal networks, iii) weak integration into competitive external market (Feklyunina and White 2012). The EU’s economic cooperation with the shared neighbourhood has undergone steady development. The EU has developed economic instruments towards the shared neighbourhood which were about to establish the rule of law, liberal democracy, and transparent competition (Elsuwege and der Loo 2012). Having presented an alternative to the Russia-led projects, the latter has immediately reacted to this maximization of power and therefore has engaged into a competitive behaviour (A. Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009; Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012a).

Therefore, economic dimension following the definition of Buzan is also about access to resources, finances and markets in the shared neighbourhood which is of high interest for Russia as well as for the EU (Buzan et al. 1998: 8). Both actors aim to endorse extensive cooperation with the six countries which offer 80 million of ‘potential consumers and favourable production zones with qualified workforces’ (Meckel and et al 2012). With an aim to protect their interest the actors engage in ‘a competitive game in which they try to preserve or enhance their power’ (Zimmermann 2007: 815).

In his discussion on the EU as a Realist Power, Zimmermann suggests that the EU preferences in international trade negotiations are ‘shaped by mercantilist considerations of maximizing wealth relative to other powers’ (Zimmermann 2007: 814). While the ‘other’ within this thesis is the Russian Federation, the EU aims to maximize its wealth via competing instruments of economic integration. Since the 90th, the EU was gradually developing instruments aiming to balance the Russia’s economic integrationist projects.

Security Dimension

Security and democratization are strongly linked. External threats from other regional actors decrease democracy (Colaresi and Thompson 2003). Moreover, it negatively influences the efforts in democratization (Rasler and Thompson 2011). That leads to the idea that the greater threats the shared neighbourhood experiences, less democratization it will undergo (Rasler and Thompson 2011). Therefore, the security strategies of both actors – EU and Russia – inevitably influence success or failure of democratization of the shared neighbourhood.

The goals of the security interests pursued by the EU and Russia towards the shared region are contradictory. Whereas the EU aims at establishing stable and democratic neighbourhood, Russia’s preference is weak and an unstable region (Kanet and Freire 2012; Averre 2009, 2005; Racz 2010). Finding solution with the ‘frozen conflicts’ is a major concern for the EU, while Russia is actively supporting the break-away regions (Kapitonenko 2009; Trenin 2009; Wilson and Popescu 2009). However, the security dimension goes further than military conflicts.
Given the challenges of the 20th century, the security dimension will not only include classical understanding of military power meaning coherence by strength, such as military interventions (Campbell and O’Hanlon 2006), but it will be characterized by the unconventional feature. If for Russia, it is mainly about its influence over the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’, the EU has limited instruments in the security and defence area. Therefore, when it comes to the EU what is to be analysed are different CFSP/CSDP instruments. One should not also disregard the importance of NATO as an element of the European security architecture (NATO 1995).

This institution represents an extended European liberal community (Frank Schimmelfennig, 2004: 86). Firstly, NATO was established with an aim to defend the EU from the threat coming from the Soviet Union. Secondly, for decade it was the only EU’s military security organization, which was neither autonomous nor competing against the EU, but was complementing the missing defence component. Finally, the NATO’s enlargement was open only to the European states (Frank Schimmelfennig, 2004: 86-87). In its ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’, membership is considered within the context of a ‘European security architecture’ (NATO, 1995: para 2) and therefore its enlargement is seen as a complementary in supporting the integration of the new members into European institutions (ibid: para 2). Consequently NATO has become a complementary component in EU’s absent defence capabilities, which is dependent on the economic, civilian and humanitarian resources of the EU Member States (Bono 2004).

Secondly unconventional element in the EU’s security is energy, which was used as a weapon both by the EU and Russia to offset each-other’s capabilities with regards to the neighbourhood. While some experts were predicting Russia becoming an ‘Energy Empire’ (Hill 2004) or even ‘Energy Tsar’ (M. Freedman and Brown 2006), few years later energy has turned into Russia’s weapon of influence over the shared neighbourhood (Lilliestam & Ellenbeck 2011; Smith Stegen 2011). The 2006 and 2009 gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine which have resulted in the cut-offs of the gas supplies to the South-East Europe have stimulated the EU to develop new instruments addressing security governance.

Since the interests of both actors towards the shared neighbourhood are contradictory, the instruments of the EU and the Russian Federation are of conflictual nature. Therefore, within the security dimension the analysis is built firstly on the EU instruments which aim
addressing the insecurity and instability in its eastern neighbourhood and after those are contrasted with the Russia’s strategy aiming to re-establish its own interests and influence.

2.5.2 Step 2: Historical Overview of the Balancing

Analysis of the balance of power depends on the historical milieu during which the given policy was developed. Morgenthau explains that ‘the theoretician, dispensing with the historical recital, makes the theory explicit and uses historical facts in bits and piece to demonstrate his <her> theory’ (Morgenthau 1962:55-56). Otherwise if the researcher fails to recognize the impact of moment of milieu on his/her own research it might lead to elaborating historically contingent constructs as timeless laws of politics outside of the reality (Smith 1999: 3). Therefore, Morgenthau and other scholars support argument that the theory and history was untenable, especially in discussing the balance of power that needs an overview over time.

According to Burnell, the comparative evaluation of balancing between the democracy and autocracy promoter – is the appropriate baseline, which means relevant time period and census date which would allow collecting the evidences. This baseline will allow reconstructing detailed records to which the actions taken by the democracy and autocracy promoter will be compared (Burnell, 2008: 7). Given that the main assumption is that the Russian Federation is countervailing the EU’s efforts of democracy promotion, the timeline will start with the EU’s policies in the democracy promotion which are to be compared with the efforts of the Russian Federation in outbalancing these efforts. Together these actions create the balance of force on the ground (Risse and Babayan 2015b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>EU’s involvement</th>
<th>Russia’s involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1997</td>
<td><strong>1994-1995 conclusions of the PCAs</strong></td>
<td>Following the Soviet Union collapse, the post-Soviet countries are re-united under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU’s introduction into the region;</td>
<td>the Russia-led integrationist projects. Russia stabilizes the ‘frozen conflicts’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conclusion of the PCA and start</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of bilateral cooperation with the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To conclude, given that this thesis applies interpretative qualitative approach, balance of power would help firstly to systematize the information proving the competition over the shared neighbourhood between the democracy and autocracy promoter. Therefore this historical overview allows to test if the concept fits in the observed data. This thesis also argues that looking at the EU’s policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood - through the prism of balancing - offers better understand of the limits in EU’s efforts in democracy promotion. At the same time, applying balancing would also contribute to better understanding of interrelations between the EU and the Russian Federation vis-à-vis the shared neighbourhood.

### 2.6 Methodological tools

In order to identify the balancing between the democracy promoter and autocracy promoter, the following methodological tools are to be applied. Firstly, it is the regional approach and not individual study cases. Secondly, it is the qualitative content approach which looks into...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern neighbourhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1998-2003</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003 - Wider Europe is launched</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004-2008</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009-2014</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
primary and secondary literature. This approach is applied to this research with an aim to address the explanatory nature of the thesis. Thirdly, the political discourse analysis is to help to identify the power discourses pointing at or explaining the balancing techniques applied by the actor. Fourthly, the elite interviews will be used primarily to confirm and better explain the main arguments discussed in the thesis. Finally, the fifth part introduces the reader to the structure of the thesis by leading him/her through each chapter and explaining the logics behind the research endeavour.

2.6.1 Case Studies – Regional Approach

This thesis does not look at the individual study case, but it proceeds with a regional approach. It looks at the EU’s and Russia’s policy towards the region and towards six countries together (on the map below – in green colour). The reason for that is that both the EU and Russia have developed the regional approaches and after they would make them tailor-made given the specificity of each country. In the case of the EU, it would develop an instrument, for example TACIS or EIDHR, and would apply it to the countries concerned. Even the bilateral treaties, such as the PCAs or the AA/DCFTAs, were following the same structure and most of the articles in these documents would even contain the same wording. During the negotiations phase, these bilateral treaties were re-adjusted given the specificity of each country.
The Russian Federation has also developed its own regional approach. Given that it considers the post-Soviet space as historically its sphere of influence, it develops laws, policies and strategies which are applicable to all countries concerned. However, these thesis might also demonstrate that, similarly to the EU, Russia would also develop country-specific approach.

Given that both, the EU and Russia, readjust their regional policies and strategies in order to address specific needs and/or vulnerabilities of the individual countries, these thesis will draw attention to such readjustments in their approach. As the main focus will be on the regional policies developed by two actors in competition, the readjustment to the individual situation will show how the given actor attempted to safeguard or reinforce their influence. Nevertheless, the main accentuation will be specifically on the regional approach.

2.6.2 Qualitative Content Analysis

The Qualitative Content Analysis is the main method as this thesis is mainly built on the primarily sources and secondary literature, while discourse analysis and elite interviews are used to verify and reinforce the arguments flowing from the research. The literature is to be...
analysed by applying text interpretation (Mayring 2000). The literature is divided into primarily and secondary sources.

To start with the primarily sources, those would include official documentation of the EU, of the Russian Federation and of the EU Member States, as well as the interviews of the officials. All of the official documents from the mentioned actors are available on the official websites. As to the secondary source, those are the academic books, publications and journals, as well as well as the expert websites and the newspapers. The websites and newspapers are especially crucial in gathering the information on the Russian Federation, as the speeches of the President, which are often not available on the official website, are cited in the leading Russian newspapers.

As to the Russian sources, the quoted journals or news agencies are exclusive pro-governmental, unless specified otherwise. Given the strong scrutiny of the state-led media (such as Izvestia, Sputnik, Komsomoslka Pravda, and others), the information and quotes provided in their publications are amended and after approved by the state officials. The same is with the pro-governmental think tanks and state institutes, such as the Russian Institute of Strategic Research (RISI) or the Moscow Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Those institutions discuss and analyse the policies from the state perspective. Contrary to the practise of the Western think tanks and educational establishments, the Russian ones often tend to defending and justifying the official vision of Kremlin and provide little critical thinking and analysis.

2.6.3 Political Discourse Analysis

The political discourse analysis which has recently fused into the critical discourse analysis deals among all with ‘reproduction of political power, power abuse or domination through political discourse, including the various forms of resistance or counter-power’ (van Dijk 1997: 11). Identifying and explaining this phenomenon is the purpose of this research as the assumption is the EU’s democracy promotion agenda is limited by the power abuse abuse and domination of Russia in the same shared neighbourhood; therefore, the speeches are to be analysed while considering if they are reproducing the political power, power of abuse or aim at expressing domination.
Following the suggestion of van Dijk one should limit a circle of actors whose speech acts are to be analysed (van Dijk 1997). Only speeches of the actors which represent the official position are to be considered. While researching the EU-Russian competition, when discussing Russian Federation, the main actors are the President, the Prime Minister, and the leaders of the State Agencies. The EU side is more complicated, as it is known for multitude of actors; however, within this research those are to be limited to the Presidents of the Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament, High Representative, Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood as well speeches of the Heads of States or Government presiding the EU at the given period.

### 2.6.4 Exploratory Interviews

The purpose of the interviews was verification of the information gathered from the secondary literature as well as from the discourse analysis of the elite speeches. ‘Interviews are particularly useful for getting the story behind a participant's experiences’ (McNamara 1999: 1); therefore, the high level interviews are conducted with an aim to verify already accumulated and analysed data, pursuing the aim of ‘verification rather than discovery’ (Gable 1994: 115). Consequently, the interviews were semi-structured, which have allowed to frame the questions around themes and specific issues that were of particular interest. Semi-structured interviews allowed discovering new information, which was not the original purpose of the interviews.

The interviews were conducted mainly during 2011-2014. Those interviews were conducted with the EU political elites as well as with the diplomats in the partner countries. Unfortunately, regardless of the attempts, the interviews were not conducted with the Russian diplomats. That is why the qualitative content analysis is used as a main pillar of methodology in this thesis and the interviews are used mainly to verify and/or support the argumentation.

### 2.6.5 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is constructed in the following way. In the Chapter 1, the thesis introduces the reader into the evolution of the democracy promotion as the EU’s foreign policy instrument, as it was discussed in the EU’s documents, and in the second part it constrasts this policy
evolution with the academic researches which has attempted to explain this evolution through different theories or theoretical frameworks. In the Chapter 2, the theoretical puzzle, which is built on the liberal democracy by Fukuyama and classical realist balance of power thesis, is presented; the second of this chapter, presents methodological tools applied towards this research.

Then, the body of the thesis is divided into chapters which follow the chronological order:

- Chapter 4: 1998-2003
- Chapter 5: 2003-2008

Each chapter starts with introduction of the EU-Russia relations, then it proceeds with the analysis of the EU’s instruments aimed at the democracy promotion in the region, and after it looks into Russia’s instruments which aim to reinforce its influence as well as outbalance the one of the EU. This part is essential to better understand the point of the departure by each actor as well as to better explain why and how they have developed the given instruments towards the region.

The last part of the thesis explains in details firstly EU’s assertive agenda of democratization (Chapter 6) and secondly Russia’s realist vision and actions aimed to off-set the EU’s plan (Chapter 7). The final Chapter 8 shows how Russia has managed to destabilize EU’s agenda of democratization by developing individualised approach towards each country by applying its ‘security trump’ developed in the 1990s and by instrumentalizing EU’s weaknesses in this regard, which were not addressed since the 90s until present. The conclusions to this thesis draw attention to the comperative nature of the research, by looking at EU’s attemps to introduce its democracy promotion agenda and on the development of Russia’s alternative agenda which has challenged these efforts.

As it was discussed in the earlier chapter, the balancing of power can be identified and analysed only if the longer period of time is analysed. This thesis and the chapter starts with 1991, which is a year of the independence gained by a number of the post-Soviet countries, including six countries of the researched region as well as by the Russian Federation. This chapter introduces the reader to EU’s first attempts in democracy promotion efforts aimed at the countries concerned and Russia’s attempts to safeguard its influence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The chapter ends with 1997, a year when the EU has concluded the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the countries of the region.

This chapter starts with the introduction to the state of the EU-Russia relations. Their evolution might also have impact on the EU’s efforts in democracy promotion. At the same time Russia’s approach might reflect EU’s efforts. This is yet to be defined.

3.1 The EU-Russia Relations: Anticipated Beginning of the Common Path towards the Liberal Democracy

As to the EU-Russia relations, the 90s, which were characterized by the collapse of the communism and of the bi-polar world, have brought new hopes on cooperation with Russia. The EU-Russia relations were promising to be in a spirit of cooperation. There was a widely-supported assumption that Russia would develop from the post-Soviet system into a liberal market-oriented one (D. Medvedev 2008b; Deudney and Ikenberry 2009; Fukuyama 1989, 1992). Therefore EU, and the West in general, has immediately started developing and providing extensive support to Russia’s transition by disbursing financial and providing technical support (Shleifer and Treisman 2005; Pautola 1996), consequence Russia’s reform process was at the top priorities of the Western governments and even of the banks (Timmermann 1996).

From a confrontation Soviet Union Russia has turned into a cooperative partner. On the global scale Russia was also cooperative in the peace-related issues. One of the important issues of that time was Russia’s participation and support to the denuclearization of Ukraine and of other post-Soviet countries (G. Allison, et al. 1996). It has also agreed to NATO enlargement to the post-communist former Warsaw Pact countries and has even signed a
cooperation agreement with the Alliance (L. Shevtsova 2007). Russia was also an important player in the Balkan War aftermath due to its influence over Serbia (Woodward 1995). This open approach was a new experience to the EU; therefore, its Member States have offered a new type of bilateral cooperation and support to the Russian Federation.

Consequently, already in 1994, the EU and Russia have signed the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which has contained a number of commitments by Russia with regards to human rights, development of the democratic norms, institutions as well as democratic practices. This gesture opened the prospect of integrating Russia as a partner into the Western liberal markets upon the condition that Russia would maintain progress in its democratic development (Timmermann 1996). These talks have led to the broader discussion on the establishment of the free trade area between the EU and Russia (Pautola 1996). The ever-stronger cooperation was also incentivized by the statements of Russian President Yeltin delivered the occasion of signing the PCA stated by stating the following: ‘our country has made a strategic choice in favour of integration into the world community and, in the first instance, with the European Union’ (Johnson & Robinson, 2004: 106). Therefore, the EU-Russia cooperation was promising.

Already in 1995, the EU-Russia relations were already jeopardized by the Chechen war. Following Russia’s military offensive and unwillingness to participate in the OSCE peace talks, the European Parliament has suspended the PCA for few months (H. Smith, 2000: 106). Few months later, the Interim Agreement which was supposed to be facilitating the PCA implementation was also suspended due to Russia’s ongoing war in Chechnya. And this act was a demonstration to Russia that the EU’s conditionality on democratic principles is not empty words (Gower, 2000: 74). After the first Chechen war, the relationship between EU and Russia have improved following the brokered by EU Member States14 Khasavyurt peace agreement in 1996 and visible ceasefire. In 1997 the PCA has entered into force.

3.2 EU’s Arrival to the Eastern Neighbourhood (1991-1997)

---

14 In 1995 following the breakout of the Chechen War troika representatives from France, Spain and Germany went to Moscow and laid down a three conditions which would unlock the PCA Interim Agreement, those were: installment of ceasefire, progress in the settlement of the conflict, unimpeded access of humanitarian aid and establishment of permanent OSCE mission in Chechnya (Pursiainen, 1999: 150).
At the beginning of the 90s, the EU, which was composed out of 10 Member States, had different priorities than engaging with the unknown and still far-away post-Soviet space. Firstly, it has undergone an important domestic transformation following the Maastricht Treaty signature. Secondly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism, the EU has confronted with the post-communist Central and Eastern European States who have declared their ‘return to Europe’ (Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997; Fierke and Wiener 1999). All these demanded high political attention, as well as technical and foremost financial support disbursed to the immediate neighbours to the East.

At the beginning of the 90s, the Newly Independent States and the post-Soviet space in general was ‘terra incognita’ for the EU (Varwick & Lang 2007: 130). The EU’s aspired status of the global actor has obliged it to involve with the outer world, including the neighbours of the neighbours of that time - the post-Soviet countries (Bretherton and Vogler 1999). However, it was difficult for the EU to develop an approach to the countries with which the EU had no formal contact and which until recently were in EU’s ‘blind spot’ (Delcour 2011: 23). Therefore, for decades prior to collapse of the Soviet Union, Kremlin was the only interlocutor for the West.

In the beginning of the 90s, the cooperation with the Newly Independent States goes via prior consultation with Moscow.15 And for a while, the bilateral relations between the EU and the six countries were covered by the Trade and Co-operation Agreement of 1989 which was signed between the European Communities and the USSR (European Commission, 1998: 1). Nevertheless, Moscow has remained a centre for diplomats. At the beginning of the 90s, the only EU representation office was in Moscow, and it is only in 1994 that it opens an office in Kyiv covering Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova; and the another one in Tbilisi which was covering the Southern Caucasus.

In 1992, the EU has launched one, but multi-facet programme called TACIS - the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States. This programme was aimed at enhancing the institutional transition process, building the civil society, funding nuclear safety and agricultural projects, a campaign for food aid and railway rehabilitation for the South Caucasus (European Commission, 1995), as well as other humanitarian aid operations

15 From an interview with Michel Emerson, EU Ambassador working in Moscow at the beginning of the 90s (March 2011, Brussels).
aiming to support internally displaced people and vulnerable groups (Ambassador de Luzenberger 2011). It was led by – what its project leader called - a small nucleus of pioneer staff that had no prior knowledge of the region (Frenz 2006). Moreover, this project had ‘no adequate procedures, no adequate rules and regulations, no common corporate culture’ (Frenz 2006).

As the time was passing, the EU started negotiation the bilateral agreement with each of the six countries, namely the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PAC). By the end of the 90s, the EU has concluded agreements with most of the post-Soviet countries (incl. Belarus, but the agreement has not entered into force). Prior to the establishment of the PAC, the EU relations with the post-Soviet Space were on one hand covering a broad range of issues, and at the same time those had limited resulted and impact on the ground (Ambassador de Luzenberger, 2011; European Affairs Committee House of Lords 2008: 168).

3.2.1 Normative Dimension: Introduction of the Region to What the Democracy Is

The EU’s democracy promotion was started with the overwhelming TACIS project, which among all, aimed at reinforcing good governance and helping to build a democracy. The TACIS ‘meant to assist the transition towards a market economy and to strengthen democracy’ (European Commission, 1998: 2). As its lead expert has mentioned, democratization process was rather ‘problematic in a region where no citizen had any experience of democracy’ (Frenz 2006). Consequently, this programme had little effect as an instrument of democracy promotion (Holden, 2009: 95). Few years later, having evaluated the TACIS, the Court of Auditors has noted deficiencies in the implementation, excessive centralization, little transparency and insufficient investment into the project (Sodupe and Benito 1998).

In 1994, following the European Parliament initiative, the EU has launched the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which was a new programme aimed at reinforcing overall EU’s agenda of democracy promotion and human rights through the extensive support to the civil society. Nevertheless, the disbursed EUR 100 million was covering not only the Newly Independent States (NIS), but also the Central European and Eastern European States which were on the EU highest priority list for the funding (Balfour,
2006: 188). Consequently, some have concluded that it was providing rather marginal support to the civil society (Fergus and Massey 2006).

Having little capacity to deal with the region, the EU has concluded a sort of a gentlemen agreement with the US: while the EU was involved with the democratisation and the ‘return to Europe’ agenda for the Central Eastern Europe Countries (CEECs), the US was working on the territories of the Western NIS and the Caucasus. It has actively involved with the post-Soviet Space after it became clear that Moscow is not going to turn democratic (Trenin 2006: 91); therefore, Bill Clinton’s administration has reoriented the U.S. policy to intensive interaction with Ukraine and the Caucasian countries (Froltsov 2005: 96). It was the US and not EU which since 1991 was a top bilateral donor to Ukraine actively engaging into democracy society building by working with civil society, media, national and local governments (Shapovalova 2010: 2).

3.2.2 Economic Dimension: Introducing Market Economy

At the beginning of the 1990s, the EU was mainly an actor fostering market economy and helping to establish the necessary institutions. At the bilateral level, EU has concluded some sectoral agreements with Ukraine as its biggest trade partner. Those were the Agreement between the European Communities and Ukraine on Trade in Textile Products in 1993 and the Agreement between the European Community on Steel and Coal and the Government of Ukraine on Trade in Certain Steel Products in 1997. However, these agreements are disregarded both by the academic and expert communities. This might suggest, those sectoral agreements had either no or very little impact on supporting building market economy in Ukraine. Ukraine’s agreements with the EU were rather exceptional.

In introducing the liberal democracy, TACIS was the instrument for the EU aimed at all six countries. This instrument was supposed to help the countries to support transition from the command to market economy. Consequently, there were five priorities established, namely the Enterprise Restructuring and Development (ERD), Food and Agriculture (F&A), Energy and Environment (ENE), Transport and Telecommunications (TPT), and Human Resources Development (HRD) (Commission 1991). Nevertheless, introducing ‘market economy’ rules

\[\text{From an interview with the US Diplomate, which took place in DC, May 2013.}\]
was not an easy task, as government(s) were used to central economic planning within which they had a power to determined products and recipients (Frenz 2006). As the ‘central plan’ for economy was absent and its leadership was overwhelmed with excessive freedoms, the economy of the countries concerned went down (Frenz 2006).

Two of the particularly important projects financed by TACIS were TRACECA and INOGATE. TRACECA was launched in 1993 with an aim to connect the regions of the Black and Caspian seas by investing into the ‘development of regional transport dialogue and ensuring the efficient and reliable Euro-Asian transport links, promoting the regional economy on the whole’ (European Commission 2016h). This project aimed to invest into modern communication and transport system. INOGATE, launched in 1996, was an international energy co-operation programme between EU and the Eastern European countries, the Southern Caucasus, and the Central Asia. Its aim was to support a reduction of their dependency on fossil fuels and imports, improvement of the security of their energy supply and mitigating overall climate change (Commission 2016).

Both of these projects had some geo-economic implications, as eventually those have become a part of the ‘Silk Road Project’, a project which will later lay foundation for regional cooperation, bringing political flexibility, providing trade diversification and by reinforcing foremost trade and transport connections (Fedorenko 2013). Both were aimed at helping to insure the political and economic independence of the Eastern European and Southern Caucasus states. Therefore the ultimate goal was to enhance their ability to access world - and foremost European - markets, through alternative transport routes which are not controlled by Russia (Dekanozishvili 2004).

In order to boost the export from the post-Soviet countries, EU has facilitated import from these countries by allowing benefiting from the General System of Preferences (GSP). Regardless of the EU’s interest to support the economy of these countries, the EU was constrained by the internal politics. Consequently, these countries have been granted the GSP only in 1993 on ‘exceptional and temporary basis’ (Bartomiej Kaminski 1996).

3.2.3 Security Dimension: Or better to Say ‘Its Absence’
Given that the EU’s priority was to boost the democracy and liberal economy of these countries, it has equally become clear that the region constitutes some security threats. The conflicts (which later in the academic literature will be classified as ‘frozen conflicts’) have escalated on the verge of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s the EU was not capable to address the conflicts which have emerged in the post-Soviet countries. Firstly, these were the countries EU had little knowledge of, not speaking of the internal security dynamics. Secondly, the EU had neither military capabilities nor experience in conflict management; consequently, it could not address the conflicts within the post-Soviet countries.

That is why, during this period the academic circles discuss the EU as civil power Europe, a concept developed by Dûchene in the 70s. Not surprisingly, with the immeregence of the conflicts in the post-Soviet spaces, the EU was aside. The OSCE, and some EU Member States within this organization, have taken the lead by having developed the conflict resolution formats. Contrary to the EU, Russia was actively involved in settling and freezing the conflicts (discussed in the next part).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Conflict Resolution Format</th>
<th>EU Member States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnistria in Moldova</td>
<td>In 90s: Moldova, 5+2 format Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine. Later EU and the US entered as observers.</td>
<td>None in the 90s. Later the EU became observer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia</td>
<td>OSCE Minsk Group co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States</td>
<td>France as a co-chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Ossetia and Abkhazia</td>
<td>In 1992, the OSCE has started monitoring the situation in the South</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 Ian Manners has interpreted it as ‘centrality of economic power to achievement of national goals, the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems, and the willingness to use the supranational institutions to achieve international progress.’ (Brisku 2013; Gegout 2010)
This was a period of time, when for the EU, Russia was a security partner. For example of the Commission President Delhors during that time stipulated that the European Communities and independent Russia Federation, which is grouping the post-Soviet republics around it, would constitute a two-pillar structure of the European security (Delcour 2011: 43-44). The EU discourse creates a new vision of security on the continent which is built on two poles - the EU and Russia. During this period the EU was not considering itself as an actor capable to shape the geopolitical balance in the region, but rather a technical and financial aid giver and the biggest trade partner (Fischer 2012: 37).

To conclude on the EU’s involvement with the countries during 1991-1997, it is characterized by the following elements. Firstly, for all, it is a period which is marked by getting acquainted with the recently emerged countries, which for the last 70 years were behind the Iron Curtain. That is why Moscow remained the main interlocutor for the EU. Secondly, being faced with the weak post-Soviet states, the EU’s main attention went into building the democratic institutions and the civil society, as well as into stabilizing the state institutions and helping to open the states to the world market. Thirdly, the EU has not involved with the conflicts in the region, having relied upon the OSCE and Russia, as the pillars of security.
3.3 Russia’s Policy towards the Post-Soviet States in the 90s: Keeping Post-Soviet Space on Strings and the EU in Tension (1990 – 1997)

The collapse of the Soviet Union was dramatic for Russia, as the territory within its de jure influence has reduced to its 17th century boundaries and 40% of the actual size of the Soviet Union, meaning that it lost control over 5.3 million km² of territory and 139 million citizens (Gayoso 2009: 240). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has immediately foreseen a new project of the Community of the Independent States (CIS), which was aimed to become ‘a vehicle for consolidating Russia’s ‘zone of influence’” (Bailes et al. 2007: 169). Therefore, while CIS has become a substitution of the collapsed Soviet Union, the broader idea of Russia was to find the way to maintain common armed forces, which would be reinforced by economic, societal, cultural commonalities (Bailes et al. 2007: 167). The political weakness of the young post-Soviet capitals made Moscow a centre of strong influence well into the 90s and beyond.

At the beginning of the 90th a number of the Western scholars, diplomats and journalists have started mentioning the Russian ‘imperialism’, ‘neo-imperialism’, ‘proto-imperialism’ on the territory of the former Soviet Union (W. Russell 1995) which has established the Pax Russica over the former Soviet Union (M. Smith 1993). Russia could not still agree with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and definitely would not let those countries go. Its President Yeltsin would use every opportunity to undermine the independence of these countries by going as far as saying in 1993: “Russia reserves the right to review the borders with those republics that declared themselves independent” (Zaborsky, 1995: 7). Therefore, this part discusses how Russia, even though being economically and politically weak state in the 90s, has succeeded to keep the countries concerned on strings that are effective even today.

3.3.1 Normative Dimension: Reinforcing ‘Inseparable’ Bond of the Soviet past

The approach of the Russian Federation towards the regions was shaped by the long-standing experience of the Soviet legacy. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has confined the countries through the Marxist-Leninist ideology which was meant to establish ‘a camp of socialism <based on> mutual trust and peace, national freedoms and equality,
peaceful co-existence and fraternal cooperation of the peoples.¹¹⁸ As the history has testified, the reality was different to this declaration. Nevertheless, the co-existence and cooperation was built by means of forcing all the countries to adhere to one and the only cultural, linguistic and political system which resulted in establishment of the socialist community and one Soviet people (Preamble to the USSR Constitution 1977). These people were supported by the ‘spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism’ (Art. 36 of the USSR Constitution).

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, new Russia’s reintegration projects had an easy access point. As Moscow was the centre promoting the uniformity of the Soviet peoples, the Soviet republics have reached high-level approximation in the political, economic, social, as well as cultural aspects of life. As the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, those countries shared not only common past, but also lifestyle, language, economy and even state systems that keep the region both socially and politically linked to Russia. Therefore, the bond of the Soviet past and nostalgia after its collapse has stayed in the hearts of many citizens of the newly independent states for long time, regardless of the cruelty of the Soviet regime.

For Russia, it was important to protect its primacy in the region by protecting ties with the Russian-speaking population. Already in 1994 the President has issued Decree requesting the relevant Ministries to develop a state policy towards the compatriots living abroad (President of the Russian Federation 1994). In 1996 the Government has issued a detailed Programme of Measures for Support of the Compatriots Living Abroad (Government of the RF 1996), which goes into all the spheres of support and promotion of the Russian language, culture, socialization, and encouragement to acquire citizenship in the countries outside of the Russian Federation.

Nevertheless, it was already becoming obvious that the influence of the Russian Federation on the six countries was becoming weaker. These countries, having signed the PCAs with the EU have attracted foreign investments to their countries; some of the countries got involved into NATO-led military operations. The new offices of the foreign organizations were

---

¹¹⁸ This is a translated Chapter 1 of the Treaty on the Establishment of the USSR. The original text is following: ‘Здесь, в лагере социализма — взаимное доверие и мир, национальная свобода и равенство, мирное сожительство и братское сотрудничество народов.’
heavily investing into the development of the civil society. Among these organizations there were the Freedom House, the National Institute for Democracy, and many others. Therefore, Russia had to find stronger integration projects which would bond the countries back with Moscow.

3.3.2 Economic Dimension: Re-/Dis-integrating Post-Soviet space

Russia, with its weak economy which was severely damaged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has made a number of efforts in reuniting the post-Soviet space through different economic agreements and institutions. In view of Russia’s national security and interest to preserve its influence over the post-Soviet space, Russia pursued with economic re-integration (Кулик, Спартак, & Юргенс, 2010: 5-6). However, this process was two-folded as some countries have manifested strong interest, others not. The future of the economic reintegration was not that obvious.

In 1991, as the reflection to the ‘Velvet Revolution’ and growing tension between Moscow and its satellites in the collapsing Soviet Union, Russia has started the ‘Nine plus One’ process. The participants to this process were nine countries (out of six researched countries excluding Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia) and ‘One’ was Moscow represented by Gorbachev. Whereas all the participating countries have expressed desire to exercise their sovereignty independently from Moscow, Gorbachev insisted on Moscow’s supervision. Consequently, the Economic Community Treaty was signed later the same year and has overseen loose economic reforming and Moscow as the capital superstate (Brzezinski & Sullivan, 1997: 14). The same year, a new treaty was drafted establishing the ‘Union of Sovereign States’ which was to establish common foreign, economic and military policy as well as common border control; according to the draft treaty the centre of coordination would be in Moscow (ibid).

The same year, Russia has undergone some internal turbulence; meanwhile thirst for full independences was growing stronger among the post-Soviet countries. In December 1991, it has proclaimed its independence. Other countries have continued the rally. The deal breaker was Ukraine which was against new Union and opposed extensive economic cooperation as well as sharing the military powers.
In pure economic terms, Russia’s trade interest was only with Ukraine (Samokhvalov 2007: 15). Therefore, in economic terms this project was oriented on Ukraine mainly, as it represented a significant part of the Soviet production complex and market (ibid). Consequently, the idea of the new version of the super state was fading with ever new proclamation of independence of the post-Soviet countries and foremost by Ukraine (Brzezinski & Sullivan, 1997: 14).

In December 1991, following the agreement on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Presidents of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine\textsuperscript{19} have signed a treaty acknowledging the cessation of existence of the Soviet Union and on establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Other post-Soviet states have joint the organization shortly after (excluding the Baltic States, which have denounced of the Soviet past). Armenia has joint in 1992, Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1993 and Moldova in 1994.

This treaty is based on ‘historical community of the peoples and the existing links between them <...> striving to ensure - by means of joint efforts - economic and social progress of its peoples’ (Statutory Document of CIS, 1991). Whereas this agreement covered a number of areas, it made a strong accent on the economic cooperation. The statute stipulates that the aim is ‘cooperation and development of the common economic space of the European and Eurasian markets, Customs Union’ (Statutory Document of CIS, 1991, Art. 4).

Given the fact that all the states were in a difficult economic situation suffering from the dispersed chains of production of each product around the former Soviet Union (Комаров 2005), the CIS was expected to be a temporary organization that would help the weak former command economies to develop into the open market economies (Ломакин 2012). It is also interested to note that the declarative aim was to establish economic space which would integrate with the European market. Consequently, Russia aimed to create a pan-European economic organization.

The CIS Treaty has served as a base for other agreements promoting further economic integration. In 1993, an agreement on ‘Establishment of the Economic Union’ was signed aiming to be a first phase in creating the common economic space (Кэмбаев, 2008: 114).

\textsuperscript{19} Ukraine has neither signed nor ratified the CIS statutory agreement, as Article 3 has also envisaged military integration and notably potential dislocation of the foreign troops.
This treaty was again based on the argument of the ‘historical communality of its people and understanding of the importance of the widening and deepening of the comprehensive and mutually beneficial economic relations’ (Preamble to the Treaty on Establishment of the Economic Union 1993). A year later, the states have attempted to create a Free Trade Area, which was not put into place effectively, since the states did not agree on the list on the products excepted from the free trade.

Therefore, already in 1994, the CIS countries were split into two groups. The first one, led by Russia, was advocating for deeper economic integration with political aspects, such as establishment of the Customs Union. The other group was against any political aspect in the economic integration, those were Ukraine, Armenia, Uzbekistan\textsuperscript{20}, Georgia, and Moldova, the countries which have later established Kyiv-based organization - GUUAM (Кембаев, 2008: 114).

Regardless of the internal disagreements between the CIS, Russia was proposing new treaties on almost annual basis. The subjects of the treaties were sector specific, for example the Payments Union of 1996, Agreement on Trade and Industrial Cooperation in the Field of Mechanical Engineering of 1996, etc. The same year it has also established the Customs Union, which was joint by Kazakhstan and Belarus. However, this project remained on the paper, as the countries have faced severe economic crisis and had to fight for their survival (Кембаев, 2008: 115).

Having met difficulties on the multilateral level, Russia has concluded series of the bilateral free trade agreements with different post-Soviet States. The most significant from the political point of view was the one establishing the Community between Russia and Belarus in 1997, which was nullified next year by a Treaty on the Union between Russia and Belarus. This union has eventual led to full economic, political and military integration of Belarus into Russia’s system (Ambrosio 2006).

With other five countries Russia has concluded much more modest agreement called the Treaty on Cooperation. The Treaty on Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine was concluded in 1990s and on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership in 1997. This agreement

\textsuperscript{20} Uzbekistan will suddenly leave this organization in 2002.
became the backbones for cooperation. The same treaties were concluded with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. Eventually the cooperation went beyond general agreements and extended into 140 bilateral agreements with CIS states (Коношенко, Круговых, and Севергин 1999).

The CIS and similar post-Soviet projects had a little chance of survival. Consequently the CIS was referred to as ‘vehicle of ‘civilised divorce,’ rather than an efficient integration project’ (Vorobiov, 2014: 99) or a ‘still-born baby’ (Tarasyuk 2009). The Russia-led Customs Union has met the same challenge, as instead of cancelling the customs duties the states were protecting them-selves by introducing more barriers for each other (Кембаев, 2008: 115).

3.3.3 Security Dimension: Military Bond is Stronger than Social Ties

In the 90s Russia has made four important attempts aiming at re-establishing its influence over the post-Soviet states which were assertive in claiming their independence: firstly, it has immediately involved into the internal dynamics and conflicts by sending or activating the USSR/Russian soldiers there. Secondly, it has made attempts to (re)-establish regional security organization. Thirdly, it has tried to obtain its ‘special status’ at the level of the UN. Finally, it has legalized its permanent military presence in the countries concerned.

A) Russia’s Attempt to Prevent the Independence by Military Means

To start with the first point, in 1991 General Varennikov was sent by Moscow to the capitals of the respective countries threatening them with military repression for the disobedience in case if the opposition forces (meaning the national forces claiming independence) were not neutralized (Барабаш & Et al. 2011: 58). The promises of perestroika could not satisfy the hunger of sovereignty and the glasnost policy had a counter-effect of the nationalist ball rolling (Pravda 2010: 358). Therefore, the massive peaceful demonstrations were inevitably leading to independence. Consequently in 1991 the Declaration of Independence was adopted by Ukraine. The same year similar peaceful protests have brought independence to Belarus.

The other four countries have experienced the intervention of the Soviet army throughout 1989-1990. In case of Moldova, in 1989 this intervention has averted an outbreak of violence
in Gagauzia (populated by Turkish/Gaguz minority) and Transnistria (with high Russian-speaking population) (Kaufman 1996; Roper 2001). Later in 1992, the former Soviet 14th Guards Army took side of Transnistria, by opening fires against the forces of Moldovans (Бергман 2004).

As to the Southern Caucasus countries, in Georgia the anti-Soviet peaceful demonstrations were violently suppressed by the USSR Transcaucasus Military District on the 9 April 1989; therefore, the Georgians have demonstrated in front of the House of Government asking for independence with slogans ‘Stop Russian imperialism’ and ‘USSR-prison of peoples’ (Собчак 1989). Similar military intrusion has happened in Azerbaijan. The Soviet Special Forces have entered Baku on the 19 January 1990. The aim of the intervention was to stop the Popular Front which was mobilizing forces to fight against Armenia since Soviet government of the former has decided to annexe Nagorno-Karabakh21. Consequently, by means of these military interventions Russia has secured its military presence in four countries, namely Moldova, Georgia, and between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

B) Attempt to Re-establish Military Organizations

As the second step, Russia made an attempt to re-establish the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on the post-Soviet Space, excluding the Baltic States. In 1992 this idea has materialized into the Tashkent Agreement which was signed in 1992 by Armenia; and in 1993 - by Belarus, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The two latter states have joint the agreement following the Russia’s efforts in freezing the conflicts on their territories (Куртов 2008). Consequently this agreement was concluded for five years (Захаров 2011). Only Ukraine has abstained, as there was an agreement among the Ukrainian political community to keep Ukraine outside of the military blocks.

In 1995, in the framework of the CSTO, the Collective Security Concept was developed. The signatories to this pact agreed not to join other military alliances, to refrain from threat of force against each other, and in case of the aggression by a third country to immediately launch consultations on the measures which are to be collectively taken against the threat

---
21 Nagorno-Karabakh is an ethnically mixed area highly populated by Armenians and Azeri. This region was an area of constant clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the syntetic redifintion of the borders by Stalin in the early 1920.
However, it was difficult to find agreement and full support to this idea among all the states. Eventually Azerbaijan and Moldova have not signed it, while Belarus have signed, but with some derogations (Kurtov 2008). The other attempt was the CIS Mutual Security Pact of 1993 which was signed by Armenia and Belarus22. Eventually Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova were against any involvement into post-Soviet para-military organization.

C) Attempt to Obtain from the UN ‘Special Status’ of Peacekeeper

Thirdly step of the Russian Federation was to insure its supremacy over these countries at the international level. Following its announcement of being the successor of the Soviet Union, it has decided to secure its influence by obtaining ‘special status’ with regards to the newly independent states. Firstly, in 1993 Yeltsin stated: ‘I believe the time has come for distinguished international organizations, including the UN, to grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the former regions of the USSR’ (Hill and Jewett 1994) and by this he has claimed financial assistance from the international community to implement this special mandate in the post-Soviet space (ibid). However, the West had specific reservations with regards to Russia as a ‘peace-keeper’. By that time, there was a set of evidence proving ‘there is good reason to doubt that Moscow can be trusted to act as an honest broker in the region’ (Hill & Jewett, 1994: 2).

In 1994, President Yeltsin, having not obtained the UN’s recognition of its special status in the region, instead the G7 has acknowledged ‘Russia's special status as a debtor and creditor nation’, given that it was ‘major donor granting easy-term credits to CIS states’ (G7 Information Centre 1994). As a reply to this non-recognition, Yeltsin has signed a directive ordering the Russian Foreign and Defence Ministries to continue working on bilateral agreements with the concerned countries on legalizing the presence of the military bases or military facilities on the territory of the CIS countries.

D) Legalizing its Military Boot on the Ground

22 Belarus has shortly left the pact having given up on the nuclear weapons.
In the situation where all post-Soviet countries were reluctant to join the Russia-led security organizations and showed their hesitation in close military cooperation, Russia has come up with a different strategy on how to secure its military presence in all six countries. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Russian leadership has favoured Armenia, which was historically dependent on Russia for protection against Turkey and Azerbaijan (Hill 2003). In May 1992 after Azerbaijan has refused to join another CIS Mutual Security Pact, Russia-backed troops of Nagorno-Karabakh have created a land bridge connecting this area to Armenia (Brown, 1996: 124). The same month, Armenia and Russia have signed agreement on stationing the Russian 7th Army and the patrolling of Armenian borders by Russian troops (Hill & Jewett, 1994: 10). Consequently, the Russian troops were stationed in between of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In Georgia, by 1993 there were 18,000 Soviet troops on its territory that Russia refused to withdraw from the Georgian territory (Hill & Jewett, 1994: 47). Even though, Russia pretended to be neutral, it has provided the break-away regions with weapons, equipment, trainings etc (Brown, 1996: 122-123). Later Georgia was forced to agree with Russia’s demands, namely due to its CIS membership, to grant Russia long-term access to the military basis on the Black Sea, and to allow indefinite dislocation of its troops in Georgia (Brown, 1996: 122-123).

Russia has followed the same pattern of action with regards to the Moldova’s Transnistria. Moldova has insisted on withdrawal of the Russian troops (14th Army) as well as it has refused to join the Russia-led security projects and other organizations. The Russian officers were actively supporting the Russian-speaking protesters who were against the government’s proposal to reunify with Romania. Similarly to Georgia, Moldova was forced to agree to the CIS membership and is forced to become an obedient supporter Russia-led initiatives (Hill & Jewett, 1994: 63-65), nevertheless its troops were not withdrawn from Moldova.

With regards to Ukraine, the focus was on the Black Sea Fleet which has strategic location in the Crimea peninsula which is giving naval access to the Black Sea Region and to the Mediterranean Sea. At first, in 1991 Russia tried to put the Black Sea Fleet under the subordination of the Black Sea Fleet to the CIS Joint Armed Forces (Zaborsky, 1995: 28), nevertheless, with the independence of Ukraine, the Black Sea Fleet was firstly under full control of Ukraine. Consequently, not been able to agree, the two states have engaged into a
war of decrees over subordination of Crimea: firstly, President Kravchuk has issued a decree on establishment of the Navy which also included the Black Sea Fleet; immediately after, President Yeltsin has issued his decree stating that all the Black Sea Fleet was under Russia’s jurisdiction (Zaborsky, 1995: 28).

Already in 1994, the division of the fleet has become the dominant aspects in Russian-Ukrainian relations having become an arena for the verbal duel between Kyiv and Moscow (Zaborsky, 1995: 32). In 1995, Russia and Ukraine come to 50:50 ratio of control over the military base (Kuzio, 1995: 105). Already two years later, in 1997, Kuchma and Yeltsin have signed an agreement ‘Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet’ which has foreseen the distribution equivalent to 18.3% under Ukrainian jurisdiction and 81.7% under Russian (Zaborsky, 1995: 32). This agreement has allowed Russia to station in Sevastopol 25,000 troops, 24 artillery systems, 132 armoured vehicles, and 22 military planes in Crimea (Karagiannis 2014) under the condition that Russia would respect sovereignty of Ukraine, not interfere into Ukraine’s domestic affairs as well as its fleet was to abide to the laws of Ukraine (Treaty: Art 6.1-2).

As of 1992, the other important aspect for the Russia-Ukraine dispute was nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. Many believed that Ukraine would not give away its nuclear weapons, as it was an instrument of leverage and a strong reason why Russia has not started wars as it did in other post-Soviet countries (Hill and Jewett 1994). During the same period of time, the unprecedented rapprochement in US-Russia relations touched upon series of questions, including denuclearization and the US and Soviet/Russian commitment to deep reduction of strategic nuclear weapons (G. Allison, et al 1996: 5-6). Therefore, already at the end of 1993, under the US-Russian auspice, the trilateral settlement between three President Clinton, Yeltsin and Kravchuk has launched the Ukraine’s denuclearization. Under their agreement, Ukraine has transferred nuclear warheads to Russia, and Russia has shipped Ukraine nuclear fuel rods for use of nuclear reactors (G. Allison et al., 1996: 6). As Ukraine has voluntarily surrendered its nuclear arsenal to Russia, the US, Russia, France and the UK have given Ukraine their security assurances of its sovereign territorial integrity. In 1994 the four above-mentioned states have signed the Budapest Memorandum providing security guarantees to Ukraine.

---

23 President of Ukraine during 1994-2005.
**To sum up this part**, above all normative and economic instruments, Russia has used multiple military-related instruments of pressure the six post-Soviet countries. Those were numerous, for incentivized internal conflicts, establishing military bases on their territories, gaining control of the Black Sea Fleet and an instrument its ownership of nuclear weapons (Deyermond 2007). Furthermore, the 1993 Military Doctrine defined the post-Soviet Space as the ‘near-abroad’ stating that it was a *vital zone* of its interests for the Russian Federation (Frank Schimmelfennig, 2004: 38). The Russia’s actions in towards the former CIS testified that the ‘*unilateral and forcible intervention by the Russian military, disguised as ‘peace-making’*, was in fact an instrument of imperial restoration, or at least of a frank pursuit of the *Russian national interest*’ (Trenin, 1998: 171). All manifested how Russia encroached into sovereignty and prevented the restoration of their full independence from Russia.

**In conclusion to this chapter, while looking at the period of 1991-1997**, the EU and Russia were not on equal footing. At the beginning of the 90s, these countries are not known to the EU. As of 1991, the European Union starts exploring the newly independent states, tries understanding their interrelation with Moscow, begins developing its democratization policy towards the Newly Independent States as well as to other countries to the East of its borders. The Russian Federation, which has declared itself being a successor of the Soviet Union, had a different point of departure with the post-Soviet countries. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has firstly re-established contacts with all the post-Soviet space via newly created Russia-led organizations. Secondly, it has secured its military presence in the neighbourhood’s conflict areas. Finally, it has ensured that all the international cooperation with these countries is conducted upon Russia’s agreement.

While the EU was getting acquainted with the region and was investigating how to support the democratic aspirations and to facilitate transformation of these countries into liberal economy, Russia had developed a different agenda, namely to secure its dominant position. Firstly, it was attempting to prevent the independence, having failed in this aim it has started developing the other multilateral organizations (both supranational economic and military ones) with the centre in Moscow, and final aspect was legalizing the presence of its military contingent in the region.
By 1997 the EU develops a set of the liberal democracy instruments towards these countries and finalises bilateral agreements with each of them. While the EU has attempted to introduce these countries to the world of the liberal democracies, Russia has left its military boot in almost each of the countries. Therefore, from the beginning the EU’s liberal democracy agenda was challenged also by strong security component brought by the Russian Federation.
Chapter 4: 1998-2003

This chapter starts with 1998 which has furthered the EU and Russia cleavage in approaching the shared neighbourhood. For the EU, it was a year when most of the PCAs, the bilateral agreements between EU and some post-Soviet countries, have entered into force\textsuperscript{24}. These were framework agreements defining scope of bilateral relations which have upgraded the level of cooperation with the mentioned post-Soviet countries. Therefore, these independent agreements, which were negotiated and entered into force independently from Moscow’s approval, have offset Russia’s aspirations of remaining a key state in the post-Soviet space which has a monopoly on the post-Soviet space and their future relations with the outside world.

For Russia, it was a year of a major economic collapse which had devastating effect on the interdepend economies of other post-Soviet countries. This phenomenon has paralysed Russia as well as its activities in the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, by 2000 Russia has already elaborated two concept documents within which it has committed itself to tighten integration with the CIS.

As to the EU-Russia relations, in the year of 1998 those have hit the lowest point. The relations were negatively impacted by lack of internal democratic reforming in Russia regardless of all support from the West, the Chechen war, as well as disagreement on approaches to the Kosovo war. At the same time, EU, which was preoccupied with the upcoming 2004 enlargement, has paid less attention to Russia and the shared with Russia neighbourhood. Instead the EU has concentrated on developing new foreign and security approaches, which are concluded with the introduction of the 2003 Wider Europe concept and followed up with 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy.

\textsuperscript{24} With the Western NIS (namely Ukraine and Moldova) the treaties entered into force in 1998. The EU-Belarus PCA was also concluded; however, by 1998 on the EU side it was clear that it will not enter into force due to the democratic slide-down in Belarus, which included also the decision by President Lukashenka to change the Constitution allowing him to gain more power. With the other three South Caucasus countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the treaty has entered into force in 1999.
4.1 The EU-Russia Relations: from Cooperation to a Conflict

During the period of 1998-2003, the EU-Russia relations were marked by signs of turbulence. Regardless of the PCA being launched and a set of recommendations given to Russia by the EU and the West in general, the trade relations were not beneficial due to the weak legislature which has followed a pattern of being was either weak laws or their non-implementation (Jones & Fallon, 2002: 121). Therefore, regardless of the immense investments into the Russian reform process by means of financial and technical support of the liberal democracy programme, Russia was not reforming (Gaddy and Ickes 1998; Carothers 1998).

In 1998, there were enough evidence showing that Russia was not aiming at building the liberal democracy, but it was rather turning into autocracy in all spheres: politics, economic and with regards to the civil society (Kagarlitsky 2002). As to the political level, the some liberal parties which were built on Western values have met significant glass ceiling while arriving to politics (H. Hale 2004), while others which carried the name ‘liberal’ were actually closer to nationalist ones (Malcolm and Pravda 1996). At the economic level, Russia was opting for closing market, for example it has gone for state control of natural resources over the frontier capitalism of the 1990s (Van Der Meulen 2009). Finally, the development of the civil society was hindered, as it was not clear whether the state will give more liberties or will use the system against destroying the civil society (H. E. Hale 2002).

Consequently, August 1998 was a dramatic year for Russia as the state system has undergone some unusual ‘self-implosion’, which was neither triggered by the social unrest nor by any external pressure. Paradoxically the regime has collapsed under the weight of its own mistakes and miscalculations (R. Medvedev, 2000: 5) and the state was hit by sever economic crisis. Although it was not yet clear whether the state deliberately refrains from the democratic development, it became clear that it becomes unpredictable (L. Shevtsova 2007; R. Medvedev 2000).

In 1999, after the PCA with the EU has entered into force\textsuperscript{25}, the EU has started developing the Common Strategy on Russia as it was declared in June Cologne Presidency Conclusions.

\textsuperscript{25}Michael Emerson, the EU Ambassador in Moscow at that time, during an interview in June 2011 has mentioned that even though the EU-Ukraine PCA was ready to be concluded as well as to enter into force before the EU-Russia PCA, Kremlin has insisted on being the first country in the post-Soviet country to conclude this
The Presidency Conclusions have reconfirmed, that the EU was looking forward ‘to working with a Russia that is increasingly open, pluralistic, democratic and stable and is governed by the rule of law, underpinning a prosperous market economy’ (European Council, 1999a: 26). Therefore, in its Common Strategy on Russia, the European Council has stated: ‘A stable, democratic and prosperous Russia, firmly anchored in a united Europe free of new dividing lines, is essential to lasting peace on the continent’ (European Council, 1999b: 1). As it has mentioned in its objectives, EU’s vision of Russia were as of A) governed by the rule of law and underpinning a prosperous market economy, and B) a partnership which would help to maintaining European stability, promoting global security (European Council, 1999b: 1). The same year, the European Council has proposed the strategic partnership. In its conclusions, it was stated the following: ‘the strategic partnership develop within the framework of a permanent policy and security dialogue designed to bring interests closer together and to respond jointly to some of the challenges to security on the European continent’ (European Council 1999b).

Already by the end of 1999, following second Russian offensive on Chechnya, the EU’s reaction towards Russia was much quicker and resolved (H. Smith, 2000: 110). In its December Declaration on Chechnya, the European Council has strongly condemned Russia’s bombing of Chechen cities seeing these acts as being in ‘contradiction with the basic principles of humanitarian law, the commitments of Russia as made within the OSCE and its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe’ (European Council 1999c). As Russia has broken a set of rules, the EU has pledged to draw consequences from this, namely:

- for the implementation of the European Union’s Common Strategy on Russia, which should be reviewed;
- for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, some of the provisions of which should be suspended and the trade provisions applied strictly;
- for TACIS, the budgetary authority is asked to consider the transfer of some funds from TACIS to humanitarian assistance. Finance in the budget for 2000 should be limited to priority areas, including human rights, the rule of law, support for civil society and nuclear safety (European Council, 1999c: 9-10).

agreement with the EU given its importance in the post-Soviet space. Therefore, the EU-Russia PCA was concluded and entered into force few months early before the one with Ukraine.
In 2000, due to pressure including from the European Parliament, the Council has immediately followed-up on its decision by suspending signature of Scientific and Technological Agreement (European Parliament 2000). Then the Commission has frozen 30 million of unspent financial support, then the TACIS-2000 was refocused to democracy promotion and support to civil society, finally it has also suspended the General System of Preferences (H. Smith, 2000: 111). And already at the next meeting, the European Council has again demanded from Russia 1. to put an end to the indiscriminate use of military force, 2. to allow independent investigations of human rights violations, 3. to allow the competent international organisations and observers to perform their mission freely, 4. to pursue without delay the search for a political solution (European Council, 2000: 9).

The other aspect which has soured EU-Russia relations was Kosovo war. Being unease with the upcoming Kosovo solution, prospective EU and NATO enlargement (O. Antonenko 1999), it was forced to accept the new rules because it was weak as a state in present time and because it was defeated after the Cold War (Popescu & Leonard, 2007: 19). After the Kosovo war was over, the suspicion and anger at the West which has engendered on the Russian side was not easy to dissipate (O. Antonenko 1999).

In 1999 the EU has launched its own European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It was not created against Russia; moreover, Russia does not figure in EU’s documents at a potential threat (Forsberg 2004). On its side, Russia has acknowledged the EU as a new player in European security, seeing the EDSP as a possible competitor to NATO and American influence (Rontoyanni 2002), which would was expected to undermine the so-called ‘unipolar trend’ (Rontoyanni 2002).

Two years later, the terrorist acts in the US in September 2001 have allowed Russia to come back into international arena following the announcement of ‘War on Terrorism’. Due to its experience with what Russia called ‘anti-terrorist action’ in Chechnya it has created itself a place in the anti-terrorist operation (H. Smith, 2000: 115). By 2002, the EU statements on negative consequences with regards to Chechnya have disappeared by 2002 and the downgrading was explained by the ‘quiet diplomacy’ (H. Smith 2000). This meant that the EU has preferred engaging Russia rather than isolating it.
By 2002, Commissioner President Prodi has introduced to the concept of the Common European Economic Space, within which the partners ‘could ultimately share everything but institutions’ (Prodi 2002). By this time, the European-Russian High-Level Group was already advanced in discussing blocks of the prospective economic spaces. By 2003, when the European Commission has presented the ‘Wider Europe’ Communication, Russia was included into the ‘ring of friends’ together with other Western NIS. Later in the document it suggests that underlines that the upcoming EU-Russia strategic partnership will be one pillar of a new neighbourhood policy (European Commission, 2003b: 5).

On one hand, the 2003 European Security Strategy acknowledges Russia as an important partner in the global security. The document mentions it as being an important energy supplier, contributor to the regional security following the Balkan War and contributor to the Middle East peace process. Finally the document concludes, that ‘We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity’ (Council 2003).

On the other hand, by 2003 first big internal disagreements between EU Member States start over Russia. As it is stated in the Report to the House of Lords, by 2003 there were two groups of EU Member States. First group of states - composing out of such states as France, Italy and Germany - was emphasising on the importance of economic cooperation with Russia and safeguarding pragmatic relations vis-à-vis this country including because of the energy interest. They were also advocating close cooperation with Russia, as it would foster its democratisation. The other states – led by the Great Britain – advocated a tough approach towards Russia (House of Lords, 2008b: 169). Nevertheless, it is stated in the report that before 2004 no EU Member States perceived Russia as a security threat (House of Lords, 2008b: 169).

Regardless of all the bilateral contacts and the strategic partnership, the EU has included Russia into its broader neighbourhood by mentioning it in ‘the Wider Europe’ Communication. This Communication was launched in anticipation of the upcoming enlargement and widening of its geography, the EU has developed a new policy towards the neighbours which was setting a broader framework of cooperation. This document has included the Russian Federation as one of the neighbours along with the Western NIS – Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The new policy approach was aiming at ‘enhancing relations
with the new neighbours’ (European Commission 2003: 3), where the Russian Federation, similarly to the situation with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, was put at the same level with states within its sphere of influence.

During the period 1998-2003, the EU-Russia relations have gone through different phases, including strong support, but also conflicts. Those included the strong support during the economic crisis in 1998, sanctions as the follow-up to the Chechnya war. Later those have developed into ‘quiet diplomacy’ and strategic partnership. However, by 2003 Russia was again defined as EU’s neighbour, standing on the equal footing with the post-Soviet countries.
4.2 EU: From Little Cooperation to 'Everything but Institutions'

In 1998, since the EU membership negotiations were open to the Central European neighbours of that time, it has become apparent that with the upcoming accession, the EU will border new neighbours to the East. After the PCAs with the Newly Independent States have entered into force, the EU has started reconsidering its ‘Russia first’ approach as the EU got more and more familiar with the Newly Independent States (Vahl 2006: 9). Consequently, there was a broader understanding that the policy of seeing the post-Soviet space countries via prior consultation with Moscow and treating them as its sphere of influence was not adequate anymore (Varwick & Lang 2007: 130). Therefore, since 1999, the EU has ‘gradually and purposefully developed a capacity to act: diplomatically, economically and militarily’ (Pedi 2012: 44).

Anticipating the 2004 enlargement, the EU was in search of elaborating an adequate approach towards its upcoming new neighbours, as for long time there was no strategy towards the Western CIS and in general the EU has paid too little attention to the region (Kuzio 2003: 3). During the same period of time, the EU has become also more assertive in the common security and defence (Shake, Bloch Lainé, and Grant 1999). After the Amsterdam Treaty and the establishment of the position of the High Representative, the EU has elaborated new instruments CFSP which could be potentially effectively address the security challenges in the region, namely the frozen conflicts. However, immediately after it was launched, it has become apparent that building consensus among the EU Member States on the employment of the CFSP would be very difficult (Popescu 2011: 26).

By 2002, the EU had already a clearer vision of its neighbourhood. In his epic speech, the Commission President of that time, Romano Prodi, has underlined that the EU’s goal is to surrounded by ‘ring of friends’ (Prodi 2002). The EU was ready to share with its neighbourhood ‘everything but institutions’ (ibid), which became an alternative to the EU membership (K. Smith 2005).

4.2.1 Normative Dimension: Democratic Values as the Base of the Bilateral Relations

During this period of 1998-2003, the EU’s democracy promotion has continued through the already established tracks. Firstly, this is the PCA. In this document, the EU does not have a
strong normative stand yet. For example, in the PCA with Ukraine, the democracy is mentioned twice, in the provisions where the EU offers support in consolidation of democracy and cooperation in this matter. The democracy-related articles were the same almost in all PCAs. And secondly, those were the already launched programmes aimed at the building good governance and the civil society in the framework of TACIS.

However, what is also worth to note that the EU has disbursed limited financial resources for this democracy promotion agenda. Until the end of 2003, the EU has disbursed EUR 2723 million on all programme aimed at Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, whereas for Poland during the same period of time EU has allocated EUR 5710 (Raik, 2006b: 27). This shows the modest financial investment into the democracy promotion projects.

At the same time, what is new in the EU’s approach towards the neighbourhood was that the EU was ready to compromise values for the bigger strategic partnership. This was clearly seen in the 2002 Joint Statement of the EU-Ukraine Summit. The document stated that the ‘progress made by Ukraine towards democracy’ was taken into account with an aim ‘to acquire a new and strengthened dimension of our strategic partnership’ (EU-Ukraine 2002: 7). At the same time, the academic circles have noted that Ukraine is drowning in massive corruption during Kuchma’s presidency (Karatnycky 2005; P. Kubicek 2001), which got even a special name for that - ‘managed democracy’ (McFaul 2007; Kuzio 2005). In the areas where the broader international community has also noted the slide down of democracy and increase of corruption, the EU has welcomed the progress.

With the anticipation of consequences following the 2004 enlargement, the European Commission has presented the ‘Wider Europe’ Communication, which covered Russia, the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean. In this document, the European Commission reflects on the political and economic interdependence which is to promote the political stability, security and sustainable development within and outside the EU (European Commission, 2003b: 3-4). And the way to the anticipated political stability and security is through democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law (ibid: 26).

---

7). Consequently, the democracy promotion, as a baseline for stability, goes as a main theme in the document.

In December 2003 the EU has introduced the European Security Strategy (EES), where it has put as a goal ‘to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’ (Council 2003: 7). As the experts have noted, for the first time, the EU Member States had agreed on a common document defining the EU’s role and policy in a changing international environment by describing itself as a normative power towards its neighbourhood (Fischer 2012: 32).

The EU explicitly manifests its interest in extending its influence towards the neighbourhood by acknowledging, that ‘enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe’ (Council 2003: 8). Furthermore, it suggests to ‘extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there’ (Council 2003: 8). This statement made clear to Russia and to the countries concerned that the EU was coming with a more structural proposal of cooperation aiming to give more coherency to its normative influence.

4.2.2 Economic Dimension: From Donor to Partner

The EU economic cooperation with the six post-Soviet states was based on the PCAs, which contained significant part on trade cooperation. Following the 1998 economic crisis, which has unrolled in all CIS countries and Russia, the EU becomes a primary trading partner (Wallace, 2003: 3). By means of the PCAs, the EU has started promoting integration with the liberal markets of the CIS countries (as well as Russia). For example, the PCAs has foreseen the establishment of the free trade area with the EU, along with the WTO membership (M. Roberts and Wehrheim 2001).

The PCAs has also envisaged granting the signatories the ‘most favoured nation’ treatment (MFN). This system was also a subject to exceptions for regional trade agreements (for example like CIS). A party was not allowed to apply quantitative restrictions on imports from the other party, although special provisions were made for separate agreements on ‘sensitive’ products (such as textiles and clothing, and iron and steel products). This meant that the EU
has accommodated to the sensitive areas of these trade partners, while supporting their efforts in connecting to the liberal markets without ‘cutting the oxygen’ to already existing post-Soviet network and by trying to preserve their sensitive trade areas.

The PCA has also concluded a set of other provisions which were pushing the CIS towards the liberal economy rules. For example, those were:

a/ CIS partners agreed to use rules of WTO in relations and trade with the EU;

b/ any protective measure of the market may be introduced only after prior consultations and only after 30 days after the consultations;

c/ there are provisions for establishment of foreign enterprises on the respective territories;

d/ there are no restrictions for foreign direct investments;

e/ rules of competition and protection of property and intellectual rights have been introduced;

f/ economic cooperation for mutual acknowledgement of standards should develop;

g/ the EU has confirmed financial assistance through TACIS (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska & Rosati, 2002: 6).

The PCA were were good enough to help those countries to introduce to the liberal economy, but not serious enough to help them making some break-threw in this regards. Worth to note that this process was also supported with limited financial means. This can be easily seen by the amount of the EU’s financial support to the region. Until 2002, the EU’s assistance to the Balkan states amounted in average 246 EUR per capita and to the Mediterranean countries 23 EUR, whereas for the CIS it was 8 EUR in average and for the Russian Federation - 7 EUR (Vahl 2006: 8). The financial perspective for 2000-2006, the pre-accession countries and new EU Member States have received 1200 euro per capita, the Western Balkan - 200 euro, the Mediterranean partners 31 euro; and only 13 EUR for Russia and the other New Independent States (Vahl 2006: 8). Therefore, comparing to the other regions, the CIS (as well as Russia) were not priority for the EU.

4.2.3 Security Dimension: New Instruments in Addressing the Security Issues

As of 1999, the EU has introduced some new instruments, which allowed it finding some place in the security-related issues. The issues discussed below are the introduction of the
High Representative position (HR), establishment of the policy planning and early warning unit, as well as the introduction of the new position of the Special Representative for the South Caucasus. The HR had a difficult start at the beginning due to some lack of clarity in how this post was to be executed and linked to the EU system. The position of the HR was created in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997; however, it was only in 1999 that the position was taken by Javier Solana. The HR, who was mandate to head the intergovernmental CFSP and which relies on the Commission budget, was strongly constrained by the EU Member States acting through the European Council and the Council (Crum 2006: 390). Nevertheless, the period of 1998-2003 had some significant breakthrough, at least in bringing more visibility to the EU in the Southern Caucasus region.

In 2001, the ‘troika’ of the EU, composing out of the Swedish MFA, Lindt, High Representative, Solana, and the Commissioner on Foreign Policy, Patten, has visited the Southern Caucasus. This was visit was important as it has, on one hand, re-introduced the importance of this region for the EU, and, on the other hand it was a sign of the EU’s stronger active involvement with the region. The EU leadership did not come empty handed. Prior their official visit, the policy planning and early warning unit was set up by the HR (Болгова 2011: 86-87). Therefore, the EU was better equipped with intelligence allowing it to promptly react to the developments in the crisis areas, including with regards to the ‘frozen conflicts’.

The next, but more targeted step in attributing the special attention towards the countries or the parts of the region covered by the conflict was appointing EU Special Representatives. In 2003 first European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus was appointed with ‘the intention of the EU for actively contributing to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the South Caucasus and for deepening EU relations with Georgia and the other two countries of the region, Armenia and Azerbaijan’ (EU Delegation in Georgia, 2012). Grevi in his paper, stated that the position of the EUSR was not only aimed at enhancing its visibility and better dialogue with the states, but also being the ‘ears’ and ‘eyes’ of the EU, providing the EU with the constant information on the development and analysis (Grevi 2007: 11). Later the EU has applied its new best practise to other country in the same region - the Moldova’s Special Representative will be nominated in 2005.

27 The unit was about gathering information and providing analysis to the HR and EU Member States on the CFSP-related issues with an aim to reinforce Union’s effective reactions to international developments.
The position of the HR was not effective enough to address the security issues in the region, which was aggravated by the protracted conflicts. The Member States could not often agree on the CFSP instruments towards the shared with the Russia neighbourhood, as at that time good cooperation with Russia was the priority for many States (House of Lords 2008: 169). The security rhetoric came vividly into the EU debate just before the conclusion of the EU enlargement to the Central and Eastern Europe, which had a common Soviet past with the Russian Federation. Therefore, in the 2003 European Security Strategy, the EU has already reiterated its involvement with the troublesome neighbourhood, by stating that ‘We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region’ (Council 2003: 8).

**While summing up the period of 1998-2003,** the EU has started with launching new bilateral instruments with six CIS countries and already by 2003 it had a rather complex vision towards the new neighbourhood. At the same time, for the neighbourhood, the EU was an important actor trying to remedy the economic crisis, as well as it was also promoting liberal market reforming via the PCAs, encouraging cooperation between them as well as opening its market to these countries with an aim to diversify their market access. As to the security component, for the first time, the EU has addressed the ‘frozen conflicts’ by launching special CFSP instrument, such as the EU Special Representatives. The EU’s resolution to get involved into resolution of the conflicts has also appeared in the EU documents. Therefore, the EU has manifested not only a interest to be a democracy promoter in the region, but has got involved with the security issues. At the same time, to be fair, this interest has remained rather limited.
4.3 **Russia: Rethinking the Strategy towards the CIS**

The post-Soviet space, including Russia, was severely hit by the 1998 economic crisis (which is also known as ‘Rubble Crisis’). The internal economic crisis has paralysed Russia’s links and strings to the neighbourhood (Fic and Saqib 2006). The ‘Rubble Crisis’ has led to a loss of the investor confidence, competitiveness of the Russian Federation, breakdown of the banking system, decrease of GDP and investment by 10-20%, as well as inflation of 63-85% depending on the product (Глазьев & Шенаев, 1999: 12-16). All this has jeopardized the Russia’s influence on the CIS.

This economic crisis had also regional impact. It has spilled-over to the interlinked economics of the CIS countries (Schnabl 2005), as Russian enterprises became unable to accept barter deals which was a common practice of trade at that time (Westin 2008). Consequently, the crisis has weakened the leadership position of Russia in promoting the CIS interdependence (Giorgadze 2002). Therefore, the CIS states have started exploring in full the meaning of being independent and sovereign states.

One of such ideas was new organization without Russia’s participation. GUAM was established as an alternative regional project of integration to the ones which were Russia-led. It was composed out of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (Kuzio 2000). Initially, it was planned as defence cooperation organization between Ukraine and three Southern Caucasus aiming to counterweight Russian influence in the CIS space (Splidsboel- Hansen 2000). In the eyes of Moscow, this organization was seen as a ‘Trojan horse’ prepared by NATO and the US, therefore, it was quick with reply by saying: ‘Russia will continue to counter any attempts to bring a military component into GUUAM activities’ (Allison 2004: 475-477).

Another, but much bigger geopolitical project, which has put pressure on Russia, was the upcoming enlargement of the EU and NATO. Given the fact that the states from the former socialist bloc and the post-Soviet Baltic States were accessing the EU and NATO, the Russian Federation has experienced the encroachment of the West on its borders (Поляков 2007). Later in the Russian official documents this enlargement will be described as ‘the attempts to build individual "oases of peace and security"’ (MFA, 2000: para 8). Moreover, given the fact that the EU has already started elaborating new policy towards the CIS
(meaning the upcoming ENP), Russia has speeded up reinforcing its cooperative relations with its near-abroad (Поляков 2007).

Already by 2000, with the arrival of Putin, Russia has restarted a number of its policies aimed at reinforcing Russia’s regional and global influence (Nygren 2007). The fundamental document explaining the national policy was *The Concept of National Security*. This document suggests that the structure of the International Relations is built on the dominance of the West as well as ‘*is accompanied by competition and by the striving of a number of states to increase their influence*’ (MFA, 2000b: I). Consequently, the EU’s activities in Russia’s former neighbourhood were seen a threat. Out of eight issues which are defined in the document as ‘*main threats*’, the West and the CIS is mentioned in the following ones:

- the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO's eastward expansion;
- possible appearance of foreign military bases and large troop contingents in direct proximity to Russia’s borders;
- a weakening of the integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States;
- outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (MFA, 2000b: III).

The same year, *The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation* was elaborated. In this document, the cooperation with the CIS member states became one of the essential elements and is discussed in details within the section *IV. Regional Priorities* (MFA 2000a). With regards to the normative dimension, the documents states that the aim is to preserve and increase common cultural and civilizational heritage, with a special attention paid ‘*to providing support to compatriots living in the CIS Member States, as well as to negotiating agreements on the protection of their educational, linguistic, social, labour, humanitarian and other rights and freedoms*’ (MFA, 2000a: para 45).

The document also discusses the importance of cooperation in the economic sphere where it foresees ‘*strengthening of the CIS as a basis for enhancing regional interaction among its participants who not only share common historical background but also have great capacity for integration in various spheres*’ (ibid, para 42). In order to develop better economic
cooperation and mutually beneficial ties with the CIS, ‘Russia sees as a priority the task of establishing the Eurasian Economic Union’ (MFA, 2000a: para 44).

Finally, the document pays special attention to the military security. It stresses that it will bring the CIS into ‘ensuring mutual security, including joint efforts to combat common challenges and threats’ (MFA, 2000a: para 46). It also forces the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a ‘one of the key elements of the modern security system in the post-Soviet space’, which is ‘capable of counteracting current challenges and threats under the growing pressure of diverse global and regional factors’ (MFA, 2000a: para 47). By cooperation within the CSTO, Russia aimed at enhancing its prompt response mechanisms, the peacekeeping potential of the CIS, as well as their foreign policy coordination.

Therefore, what became clear after these documents were published was Russia’s deep preoccupation with the EU and NATO enlargement and its strong determination to prevent the further encroachment on what it considers as the ‘historically its territories’. The different framework agreements, such as CIS, Eurasian Economic Union or CSTO, were was supposed to make the Russia’s periphery stable and safe for its activities (Trenin, 2009). Despite of the envisaged military and economic cooperation, establishing the stronger links with the Russian compatriots was aimed at preserving common civilizational past.

4.3.1 Normative Dimension: Coining the ‘Compatriots’

Russia has elaborated some legal documents aimed at establishing link with the millions of compatriots living in its near abroad. In 1999, the Federal Law on the State Policy towards the Compatriots Living Abroad was adopted. What is interesting in this law is a very broad definition of the ‘compatriots’. The definitions of the compatriots is the following: ‘the people who were living in one country <implying the Soviet Union>... or the ones who share the language, history, cultural heritage, as well as direct descendants of this person ... the citizens of the Russian Federation living abroad, ... the descendants who live outside of the Russian Federation, ... as well as the ones who have made a free choice for the spiritual, cultural, and legal link to the Russian Federation... ’ (Duma, 1999: Art 1.(1-3)). To sum up, the law has defined the Russian compatriots in a broader way covering anyone who lived in the Soviet Union, their descendants, as well as the ones who might decided to have any type of link with Russia.
This law has redefined the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation vis-à-vis the compatriots living outside of Russia. It states that the ‘protection of the basic rights and liberties enjoyed by the citizen which is to be equally applied to compatriots, is the integral part of foreign policy of the Russian Federation <...> and the non-compliance by the foreign states in guaranteeing the fundamental rights and liberties <...> will be a ground for the state institutions of the Russian Federation to take measures aimed to protect the interests of its compatriots based on the norms of the international law’ (Duma 1999, Art.14 (5)\textsuperscript{28}). Therefore, this law stresses on the responsibility of Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, to protect the civil, political, economic, and other rights of the people who qualify under the above-mentioned definition.

This law poses three big problems. Firstly, the definition of ‘compatriots’ is so broad that it can cover anyone who has a slight link to the Soviet Union, as well as the ones who live outside of the post-Soviet space, but for example speaks Russian. Secondly, there is no actual specification on how the people should formally acknowledge their ties with Russia in order to be in the category of the Russian compatriot. Finally, the law goes even further as it pledges support to its compatriots in other countries and allows the state to protect the interests with any measures.

4.3.2 Economic Dimension: Knocked Down by the ‘Rouble Crisis’

The economic cooperation between Russia and the CIS was not advancing due to a series of reasons. Firstly, Russia was on the edge of default. As a saving mechanism, in summer 1998 it has negotiated with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank a package of measures for financial stability amounting USD 25 billion. Nevertheless, Duma has rejected the agreement. Since 1998 the government was borrowing weekly USD 15 billion from the market. This money was spent on repaying the debts and supporting other state policies, such as social programmes, defence policy and sustaining the state funded institutions and organizations (Гайдар & Чубайс, 2011:107-108).

The difficult economic cooperation has echoed on other CIS countries. The trade turnover during the period 1998 - 1999 between the CIS and the Russian Federation has gone down by

\textsuperscript{28} This article was slightly modified by the 2010 Federal Law; however, the phrase in bold remained the same.
21,3%, (Ситарян, 2001: 2). During 1996-1999, the cooperation with Ukraine, which was the most valuable trade partner for Russia among the CIS, has gone down by 55,5%. If in 1996 it was $14,4 billion, three years later it was only $ 8 billion (Центр Разумкова: 15).

Therefore, it became apparent that the Russia-led economic projects were neither successful nor beneficial for the CIS countries (Nygren, 2007: 27). Apart of the economic crisis, the CIS was overloaded with a number the treaties which were followed by constant non-fulfilment of the taken obligations. The states were also rejecting cooperating in most of the areas, especially within the economic dimension. Following the 1998 ‘Rubble Crisis’ in Russia and its negative impact on other CIS countries, making the CIS countries to agree to the enhanced economic cooperation with Russia was even more difficult.

Russia was putting efforts into revitalizing the CIS cooperation by giving it some impetus and showing its dedication and determination. By 1999, Russian legislative body – Duma – has ratified 27 treaties with CIS countries; nevertheless, most of the treaties were either not effective in establishing tight cooperation, or the CIS states were simply ignored by the rest CIS (Коношенко, Круговых, and Севергин 1999). Consequently, the majority of the other agreements were not abided.

4.3.3 Security Dimension: ‘As NATO grows, so do Russia’s worries’

The Russian Federation has seen the security threat from both the outside and within its sphere of influence. The EU and NATO extensive cooperation which has started end 90s and was confirmed in 2002 ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement was not comfortable to Russia, quoting the Russian Defence Minister of that time ‘As NATO grows, so do Russia’s worries’ (Ivanov 2004). During the Cold War period NATO was established to protect the Western Europe against the Soviet threat during the Cold War (Frank Schimmelfennig 2004).

In the 90s, with an aim to insure the extension of security on the content to the East, NATO membership has started preceeding EU’s enlargement (Mattox 2000). For the EU, its enlargement to the CEE countries was an inherent part of the European security architecture and a complementary process to the EU’s enlargement open to all the European states. NATO was of the same opinion (NATO, 1995: para 18), while for Russia it as a broken commitment, allegedly given by the West, not to extend NATO beyond reunified Germany.
In Kremlin NATO’s enlargement was seen as if NATO was encroaching into the former Warsaw Pact countries (Rühle 2014).

In 2002, the Russian Duma (parliament) has also expressed its concern with the upcoming NATO enlargement. In its statement, Duma has expressed its negative attitude towards the upcoming enlargement on the CEE countries and underlined that it would not help solving common security challenges (Duma 2002). Two years later, it has again underlined its dissatisfaction, as well as stressed on a special concern ‘around the tendency of the presence of military forces of NATO on the territories of some CIS member states’ (Duma 2004).

Incentivized by the West, the post-Soviet countries were also trying to float away from the influence of Russia while seeking more security from the EU, NATO and the OSCE (OSCE 1999). At first, Azerbaijan has offered NATO its territory for the NATO military base, which meant it offered NATO the strategic access to monitoring of the Caucasus (Гавриш, 2000: 66). Then Ukraine has announced integration with NATO which was laid down in the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan in 2002, while the official cooperation of both parties has started already in 1997. Georgia became a founding country of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. And already in 2002 at the NATO Prague Summit it has announced its intention to join this security alliance.

Armenia and Belarus remained the only loyal partners to Russia. Armenia was the only country which kept its traditional orientation towards Russia due to its heavy economic and military dependence on it (Гавриш, 2000: 56). Armenia’s over-reliance and dependence of Russia made it extremely vulnerable (Delcour 2014). As to Belarus, Russia came back to the Belarus proposal on strategic partnership, but in its terms. Sergey Ivanov, the Russian Defence Minister of that time, stated at the joint session with his Belarus counterpart that the ‘the contemporary international situation, including the NATO enlargement process, confirmed the necessity of coordination of common measures in the political and military spheres. In such conditions, unification of Russian and Belarusian defence potentials to no doubt be one of the key factors which could affect the situation in the world’ (Alexeev 2004: 7). Therefore, Russia has proceeded with steps towards building a stronger Union State with Belarus.
As expected, the geopolitical developments on the Russia’s Western borders as well as within the CIS have prompted Russia’s quick reaction and mobilisation of its own forces. Those were visible at the level of the state policies as well as those could be seen in attempts aimed to reintegrate military cooperation at the post-Soviet space. As to the state policy, its leadership has adopted *The Concept of National Security* in 2000. NATO expansion, the strengthening of military-political blocs as well as possible establishment of the foreign military bases and large troop contingents in direct proximity to Russia’s borders were mentioned as the main threats to the Russian Federation (MFA, 2000b: III).

In 2002, Russia gave another attempt to push further military integration of the CIS in the form of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. This organization has roots in the inspired by Russia Collective Security Treaty which dated 1992 and was supposed to be launched in the framework of the CIS. Ten years later, Russia’s vital interest was to restore its hegemony in the region given the growing competition coming from the EU and NATO (R. Allison 2004b). Consequently, by 2002 there was even an ambition to develop this organization into some military alliance which would counterbalance the West (Weinstein 2007: 167-168, 169). However, it was only Belarus and Moldova out of six countries that have joint the initiative.

A year later, in the annual speech of the President to the Parliament, President Putin has brought attention to collective and multilateral actions of security with Russia’s partners, the CIS, as well as Russia’s readiness to individual involvement with the potential ‘hot spots’ in the region (Putin 2003). As to the multilateral level of security engagement, Vladimir Putin has once again underlined that the CIS is the area of the strategic interests, where the established the Collective Security Treaty Organization is ‘to guarantee the stability and security within the space of the former Soviet Union’ (Putin 2003). As to the unilateral level of securitization, Putin declared military reform and modernization of the armed forces as one of his top priorities. With the envisaged by him professional army established by 2007, Russia could send its professional soldiers to ‘hot spots’ to fight in local conflicts with an aim to protect itself as well as partners.

Therefore, throughout the above-discussed three dimensions, Russia, which in 1998 was on the knees due to the ‘Rubble Crisis’, by the end of 2003 has re-emerge in international scene like a Phoenix (Weinstein 2007). It has pushed for a number of integration projects,
developed the laws which allow it to intervene into the CIS countries as well as started developing capabilities that would make it possible. Even though, it was not clear yet if Russia’s renewed geopolitical ambitions are viable, it was clear that Russia will not tolerate the EU’s expansion to the East.

To conclude the period 1998-2003, due to the fact that the EU has started active cooperation by further extending its democracy promotion agenda in the shared neighbourhood, by 2003 it became clear that its involvement is of conflict nature to Russia’s policy. For the EU relations with the six countries, this period has started with entry into force of the bilateral PCAs. Those constituted first overwhelming agreements of the CIS which were outside of Russia’s orbit and patronage. For Russia, 1998 was a year of economic collapse, which gave more space for the EU’s rapprochement with the CIS. Meanwhile the EU has also got involved with the security dimension by developing new instruments, such as the EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus.

Already by 2003, the EU was not only democracy and liberal economy promoter, but has also committed to get involved with the frozen conflicts in the neighbourhood, which is an area where just few years earlier Russia has claimed its ‘special status’ as a peacekeeper. Being foremost traumatised by the EU and NATO enlargement to the former Warsaw Pact country, but also having witnessed EU’s ‘encroachment’ on the post-Soviet space, Russia made it clear that it would not tolerate further expansion to the east and therefore it has committed to reinforce its cooperation with the CIS countries, has adopted a special law on the compatriots allowing itself to protect them by any means in the post-Soviet space, and has developed a tailor-made approach towards each country in order to bond them closer to its orbit.
Chapter 5: 2004-2008

This chapter starts with 2004, which was an important year for the EU, for its eastern neighbourhood as well as for their relations. In 2004, the EU has become different as it has enlarged to ten Central European states, four\footnote{The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.} of which were until recently the communist satellite states of the URSS as well as the members of the Russia-led Warsaw Pact and three Baltic States were members of the USSR. Consequently, on one hand, the EU has enriched itself with the EU Member States which have direct experience with Russia and which used every opportunity to brandish deteriorating democracy and human rights in Russia (Emerson, 2004b: 28); on the other hand, on the day of the enlargement, the EU has woke up to new geography and a set of new neighbours with which it still had limited experience (Aydin, 2004: 5). Clearly, the 2004 enlargement had a very strong impact on the EU-Russia interaction which Russian academics have defined as a start of the crisis in the relationship between two parties (Белковский 2008).

For the Eastern Neighbourhood it was an important year, as the pro-democracy movements, known as the ‘coloured revolutions’ took place in Georgia and Ukraine\footnote{In Georgia this revolution, known as the Revolution of Roses, has started in November 2003; and in Ukraine in the same time in 2004.}. The massive protests were against the manipulation which took place during the parliamentary elections in Georgia and presidential elections in Ukraine. Eventually, the protests have turned against the pro-Russian president Shevardnadze in Georgia and presidential candidate Yanukovych in Ukraine (D’Anieri 2005; Copsay 2005; Kandelaki 2006; Nodia 2005). Moreover, during the revolutions, the protesters have expressed their interest in the EU membership (Emerson, 2004b: 28). In both cases the EU, as well as the wider international community, took side of the people by showing visible support to the protesters and by demanding the authorities to listen to their demands\footnote{In case of Georgia, this support was offered in form of the visits by the EU Special Representative upon request of the CFSP chief Solana as well as visit by the European Parliament Ad Hoc Mission to Tbilisi. Along with some other EU politicians, those supported protesters on the street of Tbilisi. For more information see: \url{http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoo/election_observation/missions/2003_2004_georgia_report_en.pdf}. At the same time, the European Parliament has also adopted a resolution on Georgia (P5_TA(2003)0602), where it stated has congratulated ‘the people of Georgia on the political change that they have recently set in motion; congratulates the new authorities, and calls on them to create the conditions for a full return to democracy and the setting-up of credible and reliable institutions’ (para 1). In case of Ukraine ‘Orange Revolution’ EU’s support was similar to the one manifested in Georgia. Differently from Georgia, the CFSP chief Solana was personally involved into mediation between Ukrainian and Russian leadership (Brisku 2013; Gegout 2010). The EP has adopted two resolutions on the Forthcoming Elections in}. After several months of manifestations, the people won in both
countries. Both countries have elected the pro-EU and pro-democratic presidents, Saakashvili in Georgia and Yushchenko in Ukraine.

The ‘coloured revolutions’ in both countries have showed the overlap of the EU’s and Russian strategy towards the shared neighbourhood (Ambrosio 2007). For Russia it became clear that the EU, as an international actor is a threat (Finkel and Brudny 2012b). Consequently, in order to prevent further EU’s influence it was ready to develop some new strategy (Ambrosio 2007).

5.1 **EU-Russia Relations: the Strategic Partnership**

As of 2004 until 2008 the EU-Russia relations became very complex and rather conflictual, especially when those would concern the status of the EU-Russia relations and secondly – the shared neighbourhood. The year of 2004 itself was marked by few conflicts. Firstly, it was the EU’s inclusion of Russia into the EU’s ‘Wider Europe’, which has put Russia on the same level with other post-Soviet countries; and secondly, EU’s active engagement with the ‘coloured revolutions’ in the Eastern neighbourhood.

5.1.1 **EU-Russia Relations: from Russia as a ‘Wider Europe’ to Russia as a Strategic Partner**

The EU-Russia friction has started at the end of 2003, when Russia has found itself enlisted in the ‘Wider Europe’ – a document defining EU policy towards its new neighbourhood. This new concept offered *concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated framework* to a wide range of countries to its East and South, including Russia, Ukraine, and Morocco, as well as Palestine Authorities (European Commission 2003a). This was a Communication within which the ‘EU was the leading actor, while Russia was still a second European hub’ (Emerson 2004b). By offering Russia to be within its neighbourhood policy, the EU has secured itself a privileged position in shaping the relationship and determining common and cooperative policies (Lehti 2006: 56).
Consequently, by the end of 2003 Vladimir Chizov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, has firstly highlighted that Russia was interested in creating common spaces and in the strategic partnership with the EU (Chizhov 2003). He also has brought attention to the prospective negative impact from the EU’s enlargement as well as stressed on reluctance from the EU side to engage with Russia into conducting a joint study aiming to mitigate negative effects, for example with regards to the Kaliningrad region (ibid). Finally, the Deputy Minister has also stressed on separate integration processes between Russia and the CIS, by saying the following: ‘Russia, of course, has a foreign policy doctrine of its own that includes, inter alia, integration projects involving neighbouring states. We proceed departing from the assumption that the new EU doctrine should contravene neither our bilateral agreements with the European Union nor integration processes within the CIS’ (ibid). At the same time, he also brought attention to potential positive effect of the EU’s cooperation with the CIS. Consequently, it was clear that Russia does not see itself as EU’s Wider Europe; moreover, it considers EU’s further expansion to the East as the one contracting with Russia’s policies.

Unsurprisingly, Russia has refused being treated as the EU neighbourhood and the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched in 2004 without Russia being mentioned. Instead, the EU-Russia relations have started to develop in the framework of the four common spaces and were reinforced by high-level discussions led by the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council (Fergus and Massey 2010). Consequently, as of 2004, Russia has managed to elevate the status of the EU-Russia relations, and therefore it has differentiated itself from other post-Soviet space. Even though Russia has rejected to be a part of the ENP, it has still benefited from the ENP instruments. Contrary to the ENP countries, Russia could use these EU instruments with no conditionality imposed by the EU (Haukkala 2008b: 43-44).

5.1.2 Friction over the Shared Neighbourhood

Differently from the 2003 Wider Europe Communication, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was launched in 2004, was not mentioning Russia. Instead it included three Southern Caucasian states, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The involvement of the Southern Caucasus marked EU’s high interest in the region following the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia (Ghazaryan 2012). Consequently, in its Communication the Commission proposed to give equal opportunity to the mentioned countries offering them to develop links with the EU within the new framework, as well as suggested to develop
individual Action Plans with these countries on the basis of their individual merits (European Commission 2004).

By means of the ENP creation, the EU has declared its further extension to six post-Soviet countries. It has reconfirmed its resolution to create a democratic and stable region by means of applying instruments of the European integration, as well as by addressing the security and stability issues in a more comprehensive manner (Whitman and Wolff 2012). By launching this policy, for the realist academics it meant the EU has drawn more porous ‘neo-medieval’ ring (Tassinari, 2006: 28).

In May 2005 during the EU-Russia Summit, the partners have agreed on ‘road maps’ establishing four ‘common spaces’ of cooperation, which meant deep integration in economics and trade; internal security and justice; science, education and culture; and external security. The adopted document was very vague, as it did contain neither deadlines nor plans for specific projects. Even though it would take at least two decades to transform this document into some meaningful cooperation, it was useful for both the EU and Russia to create a spirit of cooperation (Trenin, 2005: 7). For the EU it gave a feeling of Russia’s involvement, while for Russia these road maps were reflecting its understanding of the upcoming strategic partnership. The new EU-Russia document has also touched on the shared neighbourhood. The Road Map for the Common Space of External Security of May 2005 stipulated that ‘They <EU and Russia> will give particular attention to securing international stability, including in the regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’ (EU-Russia Road Map 2005: 35).

The Russia’s leadership was calling the EU to reinforce cooperation. In 2006, Putin called the EU to conclude the negotiations on the common spaces by saying that: ‘We have seen it compact, politically significant, forward-looking document, which will set out the objectives and mechanisms of equal cooperation Russia-EU. ... Russia's position on the European prospective is known. The main objective - is the formation of a single economic space, as well as ensuring the free movement of citizens’ (Putin 2006b). As the Russian academics explained, Russia was opposing the EU which has become a ‘normative hegemon’, meaning that the EU was trying to impose on Russia its values (Трешенков & Грецкий, 2012: 124-125). Instead Russia wanted to be an equal partner (ibid).
Putin called upon the EU to avoid counterbalancing the policies of each other which were developed towards the shared neighbourhood, by saying: ‘In recent years, the European Union and Russia have become each other's most important political and economic partners. At the same time, we will strictly adhere to the principle that such cooperation should not be artificially opposed with our relations with other countries and regions. I am convinced that this approach is in the interests of all, including the European Union’ (Putin 2006b). Nevertheless, already in February 2007 at the Munich Security Conference Putin has criticized an idea of proposed new missile defence’s location in the Central Europe; he was equally sharp on further proposals for the NATO expansion to Georgia and Ukraine (Putin 2007a), which were considered as historically Russia’s sphere of influence (Kuchins 2014; T. German 2015; Bojcun 2015). Later in 2008, the Russian President of that time, Medvedev, has called his European partners to establish a binding European security treaty, by stating ‘I am convinced that without addressing all of our concerns in a frank and fair way we will be unable to make any headway in building a Greater Europe’ (D. Medvedev 2008a).

The same year, the EU made an attempt to involve Russia into one of its newest initiatives – the Black Sea Synergy. Having learnt its ‘mistake’ with the ‘Wider Europe’, when Russia was included as EU’s neighbour into its documents, the EU has again made a step towards Russia inviting it to participate as a strategic partner. Even though, the aim of Black Sea Synergy was to be an inclusive policy fostering regional cooperation (European Commission 2007a), on the geopolitical level, it was clear that this was ‘a diplomatic ballet between the EU and Russia, with the EU countering Russia's pursuit of its own 'geopolitical regionalism' (Emerson, 2008: 12). Therefore, the EU’s efforts to engage with Russia as well as its attempts to engage it with the EU’s policy towards shared neighbourhood were regularly meeting impasse. Even though, both parties tried to avoid open confrontation by regularly proposing cooperation within the mentioned region, the EU-Russia cooperation have not seen success, but rather every party has continued pursuing its own agenda.

The 2008 Report on the Russian foreign policy which was prepared by the Russian MFA has summed up Russia’s frustration with the EU policy, its interference in the CIS and what it saw as the EU’s ‘containment’ policy of Russia, by saying:

Events of 2007 pointed out that it is impossible to exclude disruptions in global politics in the coming period. This is especially true in the European Affairs, where
the inertia of bloc approaches is felt and which is hindering the qualitative transformation of the entire European architecture, bearing the imprint of the ideology of "victory in the Cold War", a modern open system of collective security. In European politics and the CIS, the loudest declaration is the desire of certain political forces to act in line with the political and psychological attitude of "containment" of Russia. This line has deeper historical roots than the ideological constructions which dates the "Cold War". An integral part of this geostrategic game was an attempt to rewrite history, to confront Russia with some "historical account" and, ultimately, prevent the creation of a truly united Europe without dividing lines (МИД России, 2008: 4).

That is why by 2007-2008, Russia considered the EU’s extensive cooperation as a new style of confrontation and so-called policy of containment of Russia. Regardless of the EU’s efforts to accommodate Russian interest (for example from excluding it from the ENP, but at the same time granting it access to the ENP financial instruments and programmes, or by granting Russia strategic partner status, involving it into the Black Sea Synergy, etc), its leadership has taken confrontational approach towards the EU.

5.1.3 By 2008 - New Level of EU-Russia Cooperation

By 2007-2008, the EU and Russia were working on some improvement of the situation. This was seen in opening up or concluding negotiations of the major bilateral agreements. Firstly, given that the Cooperation Agreement has expired, in 2008, the parties have entered into negotiations on the new treaty, which was expected to be of legally binding nature and not only as a political document (Tumanov, Gasparishvili, and Romanova 2011: 129). Similarly to the PCA, it would be built on the common interested and shared values; differently from the previous agreement this one was anticipated to be far-reaching, as it was to cover cooperation including far-reaching trade, investment and energy provisions (European Commission 2011).

Secondly, the EU-Russia Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement were signed and entered into force in 2007. In theory, this agreement was supposed to ease up the tight visa regime between the EU and Russia. In practice, this agreement was concluded with a number
of the Western Balkan states and the Eastern neighbourhood with an aim to exercise effective and comprehensive border management.

In June 2008, President Medvedev has also proposed to launch a pan-European security agreement. Nevertheless, this initiative has neither found support in the EU nor it comprised concrete form and content with regards to the crisis management and regulation (Tumanov, Gasparishvili, & Romanova, 2011: 128). And already in August 2008, the Georgia-Russian War\textsuperscript{32} has had a major impact on the EU-Russia relations.

5.2 EU: More Assertiveness and Strategy

In the 2004, the EU launched the ENP, which was an attempt to transform EU’s external borders from ‘areas of demarcation and division into areas of exchange and interaction’ (Comelli, Greco, and Tocci 2007). Its cooperation with the countries in its neighbourhood was aimed at creating zones of new type of interaction, opportunities and exchanges (B. Dimitrova 2010). By this creative integration, the EU’s intension was to address the problematic issues in the neighbourhood, as well as to step-by-step explore security challenges emanating from its neighbourhood, foremost to the East (Bonvicini and Comelli 2009).

The ENP had a rather low start, as it was immediately criticized of being over-whelming and wishy-washy due to its broad objective, limited policy tools, and high expectations (Balfour and Rotta 2005a; Kelley 2006; Tocci 2005; Kochenov 2008). Firstly the problem was seen in the geographic scope which was combining the Southern, which were/are the Mediterranean states and neighbours of Europe, and the Eastern Neighbourhood, which are post-Soviet states, European neighbours who were/are also covered by the legal space of the Council of Europe and OSCE (Celata and Coletti 2015). Secondly, it was a policy which was including different visions of the EU Member States. While some Member States saw the ambitious transformative objectives from the ENP, including eventual EU membership perspective, some other EU Member States considered it as a policy favouring token gesture to the partner states not encouraging rigorous reforming that could lead to demand of membership (Emerson 2004a). Therefore, the Russian expert from the Russian Academy of Science has

\textsuperscript{32} It is discussed in more details later in this chapter.
concluded that the ENP is rather a compilation of different visions of the states rather than one coherent EU strategy (Hocon 2005: 95).

Two years later, the European Commission has made some readjustment. In order to incentivize the partner countries to proceed with democratic and liberal economy reforming, it announced a new ‘Communication on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy’. In this document the EU made it clear that there will be additional financial support to the states willing to undertake reforms. Consequently, the Commission has introduced so-called principle of positive conditionality, quoting the document: ‘The ENP is a partnership for reform that offers “more for more”: the more deeply a partner engages with the Union, the more fully the Union can respond, politically, economically and through financial and technical cooperation’. (European Commission, 2007: 2). It meant more Ukraine or Azerbaijan for example would reform, more financial and technical support they would receive from the EU.

Towards its new neighbourhood, the EU has started also applying a number of the pre-accession instruments which were previously applied towards the CEECs, such as TAIEX, Twinning and others, (Haukkala 2008c). For example, since 2007 EU has started direct budget support, which meant transfers to the bilateral financial assistance to the state budgets of the partner countries (Kaca & Kaźmierkiewicz, 2013: 10). Differently from before, the EU’s aim was to create the ownership of the partner state over the reform agenda in defining its priorities and the action plan. As the result of this approach, the EU’s bilateral assistance has become more efficient and targeted (ibid).

While thinking of broadening the regional cooperation, in 2007 the EU has launched the Black Sea Synergy envisaged to address issues and cooperation sectors which reflected common priorities, such as democracy, regional economic cooperation and security issues (European Commission, 2007a: 2-7). Consequently, its official aim was to bring differentiation to the ENP as well as to foster regional cooperation by means of a new inclusive framework of cooperation in the wide Black Sea Region, as it brings together the countries involved into three EU policies, namely the few EU Members, Turkey covered by

---

33 ‘The Black Sea region includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova in the west, Ukraine and Russia in the north, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the east and Turkey in the south. Though Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece are not littoral states, history, proximity and close ties make them natural regional actors (cited from the Communication document on the Black Sea Synergy’ (European Commission, 2007a: 2).
the pre-accession, the Eastern ENP countries, and the strategic partner – the Russia Federation.

5.2.1 Normative Dimension: Cooperation Based on Common and Shared Values

Since 2004, the EU’s has fully focused on the democratic transformation of its Eastern neighbourhood. Having succeeded to put the Eastern countries into the democratic path, the EU has started imposing its normative stands on them. Contrary to the Russian Federation, the EU did not have military means or other resources that would allow it to become a military power; therefore, it chooses non-military forms of influence (Diez 2005: 619). Using ‘power to shape the values of others’ (Diez 2005: 616), EU starts promoting European, shared and common values which were constantly mentioned in all EU documents defining cooperation with its neighbouring countries. The EU’s priority towards these countries was good governance and the rule of law, which was the major challenge in this region (Delcour and Duhot 2011). The new dimension of cooperation, which was based on democratic values, was expected to become a sine qua non condition for further remuneration of the European Neighbourhood countries with the EU financial or technical assistance.

In order to achieve its goals with furthering democratization, the EU has extensively developed principle of conditionality. The conditionality, which was widely applied prior the 2004 enlargement, meant that the financial and technical assistance was given as a reward for the domestic reforming in the framework of democratization (Kochenov 2008). Consequently, the EU has supported the normative convergence with a number of instruments providing these countries with the needed instruments. Until 2006, the EU’s support was channelled through TACIS, which was mainly oriented on trade and state capacity building, but also at supporting civil society, independent media, and democracy in general (Shapovalova 2010: 3). Another instrument was the EIDHR which was mainly targeted on the civil society.

After 2006 the support was channelled in the framework of the ENP instrument (ENPi). It has united under the ENPi umbrella different instruments, including the Twinning and TAIEX which were new for the ENP countries as those were previously pre-accession instruments. These funding was channelled mainly into supporting good governance through training of the state officials by the EU experts; and only a minor part of its funding was used for the
civil society (Shapovalova & Youngs, 2012: 3). The same year the EU has developed the ‘Governance Facility’, which was to offer those countries demonstrating clear progress in democratic reforms additional financial resources from the EU (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). As mentioned by the EU External Relations Commissioner of that time, Mrs Ferrero-Waldner, the EU was offering a share in its single market, closer cooperation in energy and in transport, as well as participation in the EU’s internal programmes – all this in return for progress in strengthening rule of law, democracy, and promotion of the market-oriented economic reforms (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006: 4).

Regardless of the significant financial and technical assistance into democratization, many believed that the EU’s strategy in applying conditionality was not successful. There were three main reasons for that: firstly, the strong conditionality was based on the realist needs and EU, meaning it was constantly balancing between the realist interests of the EU Member States and the interest in democracy promotion (Seeberg 2009; Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008; Bosse 2007). Secondly, the incentives for the Eastern ENP countries were too weak comparing to the costs of reforming (Haukkala 2008: 1615); moreover, the rewards for the reforming from EU were vague and uncertain (Casier 2010: 108). Thirdly, the operationalization of the conditionality was weak, as since there was no precise benchmarking it was difficult to evaluate if the state has complied with the political conditionality or not (Bosse 2007: 50). It means that the individual ENP Action Plans lacked detailed plan in which areas the state was recommended to reform, and consequently it was difficult for the European Commission to access the progress in democratization which was achieved by a given country.

The democratization of the neighbourhood has resulted in the geopolitical reorientation within the Russia’s near abroad (Trenin 2006). By means of the ENP instruments, the EU was exporting its model of governance built on the democratic principles and values (Khasson, Vasilyan, & Vos, 2008: 227). The EU’s strategy with democratization was clear - the famous quote in the EU Security Strategy saying ‘the best protection of our security is a world of well-governed states’ (Council, 2003: 10) has become guiding principle for the ENP (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006: 3).

5.2.2 Economic Dimension: More Programmes and Pre-Accession Instruments
One of the main aims of the ENP was to establish a prosperous neighbourhood. As the ‘coloured revolutions’ gave hope for accelerated democratic reforming, the EU’s main interest was not only to become an important trading partner, but also to assist those states in reforming and by this helping them to be open to the competitive world economy. Therefore, by launching the ENP it has offered a number of instruments. For example, the EU has facilitated access to its market in the framework of the General System of Preferences (GSP), as well as provided more targeted assistance in supporting the economic reforms.

The EU’s magnetic force of attraction was sustained by a number of the instruments. Firstly, all six countries were within the EU’s GSP, GSP+, so-called autonomous preferential trade preferences. These regimes have established a set of rules for the exporters from all six countries allowing them to pay lower or no duties on some or all products that they were selling to the EU market. By creating this scheme, the EU has facilitated access to its competitive market and to generate additional revenues, moreover it has supported development of the new sectors of economy (Goryachov and Yurko 2010).

Secondly, with an aim to attract more foreign investment and facilitate economic cooperation, the EU has significantly increased financial support to the immediate eastern neighbours, as well as opened a number of new programmes, which were previously available only to the countries within the pre-accession. The EU’s support was channelled through TACIS and later through two new instruments of pre-accession, TAIEX and Twinning, which were made available to the neighbouring countries, including Russia. Opened in 2006 for the mentioned beneficiaries, according to the Commission the programme aimed to ‘promote the voluntary approximation of the EU acquis on the basis of commonly shared norms’ (European Commission 2009). Twinning also was originally aimed at the candidate countries for the EU membership helping them to ‘acquire the necessary skills and experience to adopt, implement and enforce EU legislation’ (European Commission 2009). On the later stage a new programme SIGMA was aimed at supporting public administration reforms, incl. in

34 From an interview at the DG Trade, European Commission, Brussels, March 2013.
35 Plus in GSP means that additional preferences were offered under condition of the reforming following EU’s democracy promotion agenda.
36 The six countries got GSP+ during 2005-2006, and already by 2008 it was prolonged. The two exceptions were Ukraine and Belarus. Ukraine’s export to the EU was liberalized before; therefore, it was covered by the GSP since 1993. Belarus was covered by the GSP, but EU has withdrawn it in 2007 due to lack of protection of core labour rights in Belarus, however, this withdrawal has not jeopardized trade relations which continued growing.
financial control, governance, public-private partnership which was aimed at building liberal economy.

The EU has also significantly invested into developing regional economic cooperation. In 2007, the Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) was firstly offered to the Eastern neighbourhood countries aiming to foster their cooperation in the Black Sea region. The economic pillar of the CBC was aimed at local economic development, promotion of tourism, people-to-people contact, etc. The global aim of the project was to promote regional initiatives and economic cooperation between the countries in the region. For example, only into the Black Sea Energy Transmission System, which were interconnecting the electricity grids, the EU has invested EUR 300 million via newly established financial instrument called the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (Delcour & Duhot, 2011: 16). Therefore, on a broader scale, through a number of these programmes, the EU’s aim was to support their economic development, to help establishing economic environment which would be friendly for investment and as well as to raise standard of living of the citizens of these countries (Meskhia & Seturidze, 2013: 1418).

5.2.3 Security Dimension: Stability, Security and Well-Being

With the introduction of the ENP in 2004, the European Union has deployed a wide range of the foreign policy instruments intending ‘strengthening stability, security and well-being’ in the region (European Commission 2004: 3). Given the fact that the frozen conflicts were not only source of insecurity, but were also involved into trafficking of weapons, drugs and people, organised crime, and smuggling addressing the frozen conflicts becomes a priority. The EU’s involvement with the security issues was welcomed by the interests of the countries affected by the frozen conflicts, as internationalization of the conflict resolution process by involvement of other actors (especially of the EU) would automatically diminish the dependence on Russia as the ‘peacekeeper’ (Глинкина 2007: 129).

As to the instruments, the EU has appointed the EU Special Representative for Moldova in 2005 and new to the Southern Caucasus in 2006. In Moldova, it has also launched a civil mission in the framework of the ESDP, called the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). Launched in 2005, its aim was to strengthen Moldova’s capacity to
control the Transnistrian secessionist region. After the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008, the EU has launched the Monitoring Mission in Georgia in October of the same year. This autonomous mission among all was to monitor the fulfilment of agreements between Georgia and Russia which were concluded by means of the EU’s mediation efforts. Therefore, during this time the EU also was involved into the peace talks on all ‘frozen conflicts’ in the region, be it as the EU or through its Member States.

Regardless of the EU’s active involvement into security dimension, its activities were criticized by the international partners, such as UN Mobile Team, OSCE, and the Minsk Group (Açıkmeşe 2011: 175). According to them, the EU was lacking focus on the conflict resolution itself, which could be also concluded from the loose mandate of the EUSR, as the EU has not produced concrete road map for this function (ibid). Therefore, the EU’s involvement into security situation on the ground was almost unremarkable as it could not have any meaningful influence (Boonstra & Melvin 2011: 4; Popescu 2011: 2). The EU’s involvement with the security aspect in the region was even stronger criticized by the expert community after the August war of 2008 in Georgia. The EU seemed to be helpless and could not come with an idea how to help this country (Wilson 2008). The EU’s instant reaction to the war was to send 200 observers who did not even have access to the secessionist regions. The EU helpless position made it clear that it would not be able to prevent or stop the process of ‘de-freezing’ of other conflicts in the region, including Ukraine that hosted the Russian Black Sea Fleet and has a number of Ukrainian citizens with the Russian passports. Therefore, the existing ENP framework with all the CFSP instruments could not address the essential issue of the security in this region (K. Smith 2005).

Nevertheless, the elaboration of the new instruments as well as the prompt deployment of new missions to the neighbourhood (as it was in case with the EUSR and EUMM) has manifested political unity of the EU. It had also a political significance by showing EU’s readiness to seriously get involved with the resolution of the frozen conflicts (Delcour & Duhot, 2011: 14). Therefore, regardless of the criticism, the EU’s enhanced involvement into

---

37 The Georgia-Russia War is discussed later in this chapter.
38 The EU is involved into the 5+2 peace talks on Transdniestria conflict where EU is one of the participants, along with Moldova, Transdniestria, the OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the US. Geneva talks over Georgia’s breakaway regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – are managed within 3+3 format, where the on hand there is Georgia, Russia and the US, and on the other EU, the UN, and the OSCE. The Minsk Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan include France as the EU Member State (but not EU itself), as well as the Russian Federation, and the United States of America.
the security issues has extended the direct scope of the ENP, as it was manifested by the EUSR and EUMM (Delcour and Duhot 2011).

To conclude on this part discussing EU during 2004-2008, the EU’s relations with its Eastern neighbourhood were remarkable for a number of issues. Firstly, the EU has started to be more assertive and strategic towards these countries by applying the pre-accession instruments which were expected to foster their democratization and approximation with the EU’s legal system. Secondly, the EU has started to extensively invest into regional economic cooperation between the countries. Finally, it has managed to elaborate and deploy new security instruments (such as EUSR, EUMM) aimed at directly addressing the frozen conflicts in the region (even though those have limited mandate and possibilities to act). Consequently, the EU has become an active participant of the security issues in the region. To sum up, the EU has created space of its own in the Eastern neighbourhood; therefore has manifested ambitions to create alternative to Russia’s model of integration.
5.3 Russia: Era of Undeclared Wars against the Shared Neighbourhood

The EU’s interest of democratization was becoming irritating to Russia, as it believed that its position was threatened by the establishment of a new order from which it was self-excluded (Mankoff 2011: 12). Therefore, Russia has started being more active in developing countermeasures by putting forward its agenda aimed at balancing EU’s normative agenda (Haukkala 2008b: 41). However, contrary to the EU’s value-shaping strategy, Russia has developed other mechanisms of influence, by using energy as a new diplomatic weapon, promoting instability through ‘frozen conflicts’, as well as developing alternative mechanisms of the economic integration.

Russia was not satisfied with the introduction of the ENP. The director of the Institute of the European Law in MGIMO, Mark Entin, in his monograph explained that with the different level integration projects, such as the ENP, EU was changing the ‘interrelation of the powers in the favour of Brussels’, therefore, it tried ‘to include that regions into its own sphere of influence <...> which would lead at making it a competitor of Russia within the post-Soviet space’ (Энтин, 2011: 193). Furthermore, the academic has explained that preoccupation is growing due to the fact that the EU integration has become a part of the national policy of the post-Soviet countries. Those states were attracted by the well-being and prosperity which are associated with the EU. Therefore, ‘Brussels often does not need to take active steps. It’s enough for it to support the <European> aspirations’ (Энтин 2011: 193). Therefore, the hidden agenda of the EU is counterbalance the existing types of regional unions of the NIS under the Russian leadership (Глинкина and Косикова 2009).

The vivid democratization in the post-Soviet countries by the EU was seen as ‘values imperialism’, which was ‘a helpful way of conceptualising the relationship between the EU and the states that came within its sphere of influence after the end of the Cold War’ (White 2014). It has also become clear that following the ‘colour revolutions’ in Ukraine and Georgia, which was ‘an area where Moscow was still dominant and felt more or less at ease, was starting to disintegrate’ (Trenin 2006: 92). Moreover, these revolutions were assumed to be planned events which were allegedly financially supported by the West deeming to weaken Russia’s influence by challenging the established pro-Russian governments in those countries (Lozansky 2010). Putin on his behalf stated that ‘it’s an elaborated scheme of actions aimed at destabilization of the society, and it was not self-born’ (quoted in Чирков 2011).
In its Decree, Duma (the Russian Parliament) called the EU’s interference as being destructive ones. In this document it has ‘expressed inquietude for the actions taken by some EU representatives, including of the European Parliament and the OSCE, which supports the destabilization in Ukraine. ... Their one-sided approach, which is seen including in absence of unbiased assessment of the pressure exercised on the representatives of the authorities by the opposition, and therefore <the EU representatives> are pushing the part of population with radical views towards the dangerous moves, which would spill into the massive disobedience, chaos, and the division of the country’\(^{39}\) (Duma 2004). This type of political statement, disapproving the EU’s actions in the shared neighbourhood, was adopted by the highest legislative body.

With the second arrival of Putin, the policy of the Russian Federation would become more concentrating on competition and conflicts, where the balance of power would take significant space (Adomeit 2011: 13). The policy of the Russian Federation and its assertion became clear from the speech of the President Putin to the Russian ambassadors and temperate missions (Putin, 2004). Defining the CIS as the main priority, Putin has stressed on the importance to streamline all the integration processes; he also brought attention to the recent EU and NATO enlargement as it has created new geopolitical situation that needs special measure to ‘minimize potential risks and damages for security of their economic interests’. He has also stressed on the ‘non-existence of the vacuum in international relations’, where ‘lack of the activity of the Russian policy within the CIS or even unjustified pause would lead inevitably lead to a vigorous fill of this political space by other more active states’ (Putin 2004). As further expansion towards the Russia’s traditional sphere of influence by the other actors was not acceptable, the new Putin’s Russia took more assertive approach.

Promptly, Russia has become very active in the shared neighbourhood and has developed a number of instruments aimed at the compatriots (discussed in the section below). Therefore, few years later, already in 2007 in his speech commemorating 50\(^{th}\) anniversary of the Treaties

\(^{39}\) Translated from the following text: "Депутаты Госдумы с возрастающей тревогой наблюдают за деятельностью ряда представителей Евросоюза, в том числе Европарламента и органов ОБСЕ, не способствующей стабилизации обстановки на Украине. ... Их однобокий подход, выражающийся в том числе в отсутствии принципиальной оценки беспрецедентного давления на власть сторонников от оппозиции, фактически подталкивает к опасным действиям радикально настроенную часть населения Украины, что грозит массовыми беспорядками, хаосом, расколом страны".
of Rome, Russian President has brought attention to competition in the EU-Russia relations, by saying:

_of course, the EU and Russian interests cannot always and everywhere be the same. Competition – is the other side of cooperation and an integral part of the process of globalization. But it is not necessary, for example, to search behind the "clean" economic interest some political intrigues. And putting on the legitimate and quite understandable activities aimed at protecting national interests some ideological ‘labels’ from the arsenal of the ‘Cold War’. Let me say again: we are ready to settle differences through open dialogue and compromise, based on mutually agreed rules_ (Putin 2007b).

Consequently, during 2004-2008 the clash between the EU-promoted value and Russia’s influence over the shared neighbourhood has become apparent. Russian leadership started questioning EU’s intentions by saying that the EU was become a self-asserting, postmodern power (Nitoiu 2011a; Averre 2005, 2009; Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012a). The EU’s interference into the shared neighbourhood through promotion of the common values and democratic principles was seen as a threat against the common post-Soviet identity which was installed by Russia (Nitoiu, 2011a: 467). It also made Russia to act as ‘the great power it was in tsarist times’ (Trenin 2006: 92) attempting to rebalance the system of international relations.

5.3.1 Normative Dimension: Through Passportization to ‘Russkiy Mir’

As of 2004, Russia has started aggressively developing a number of normative claims and policies which would justify its superiority in the post-Soviet space. Russia’s justification of its involvement with the region was built on the historical and cultural identity developed during the Soviet times. Its policy was based on the pervasiveness of the Russian language, the large number of Russian minorities living in the area and the coagulating character of the Orthodox Church (Nitoiu 2011b). Consequently, Russia’s objective number one was promotion of the Russian language as a common linguistic and cultural background on the post-Soviet space. Secondly, it aimed at creating a community of Russian-speaking society whose rights it would protect based on the 1999 Law on Russian compatriots. And thirdly, in order to secure legal connection with the Russian compatriots it has developed unprecedented
tool in the international law known as passportization of the citizens mainly loving in the
shared with EU neighbourhood (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), and mainly the ones from
the break-away regions (namely the South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in
Moldova and the Russian-speaking Crimea and Donbas region in the east of Ukraine).

Step One: Promotion of the Russian language as a common linguistic and
cultural background

It is only after the 2004 EU enlargement that Russia has started extensively developing and
building on the concept of the ‘Russian compatriot’ which was previously put into the 1999
Federal Law (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.1 discussing Russia’s normative dimension). In 2005
the Governmental Commission was established under the leadership of the Foreign Minister
Lavrov. This body was commissioned to develop relations with the compatriots living abroad
(Карасин 2007). In one of the interviews given by the Russian Foreign Minister, in which he
explained his vision of the Russian foreign policy, he stressed that ‘the main priority – is to
protect rights and interests of the Russian compatriots living abroad, to support preservation
of the Russian-speaking space, and to help the needy categories of our citizens’ (Воробьев
2006). Further in the interview, he also stressed that the new Programme on Involvement
with the Compatriots Living Abroad for 2006-2008 is aimed at consolidating them, as well as
helping the compatriots to reinforce their capacity to protect their rights and interests (ibid).

The next year, in 2006, during the Summit of the World Congress of the Compatriots was
held in Saint-Petersburg, President Putin and the state officials have reconfirmed devotion to
the Russian compatriots living abroad as well as committed to realization of some concrete
projects. Consequently, already in 2006, according to the Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin,
the Federal budget line dedicated to support of the Russian compatriots was increased to
RUB 323 million, and in 2007 – 342 million (Карасин 2007). This money was used on
financing the Russian universities in the CIS, buying books, as well as organizing Russian
cultural events in Crimea (such as ‘The Great Russian Word’) and in the Baltic states (such as
‘Vivat, Russia!’).

Step two: Establishment of the ‘Russkiy Mir’ (Russian World)
It was not enough to develop the idea of ‘compatriots’, Russian state started developing a new ideology, such as the ‘Russkiy Mir’ (the closest translation would be the Russian World). In 2006, President Putin, while addressing the Russian compatriots, has referred to the unification around idea of the ‘Russkiy Mir’ and stressed on the unity of all the peoples which were divided due to history. He stressed: ‘We really are one, and no boundaries and barriers will prevent this unity. We only have one common goal - to make this unity stronger’ (Putin 2006a). Already next year, in 2007 President Putin has established ‘Russkiy Mir’ Foundation. The MFA and the Ministry of Education were founding parties to this Foundation and the Federal Budget (a state commission) was tasked to prepare the adequate funding (Presidential Decree 2007). According to the website of this organization, the main activity of the ‘Russkiy Mir’ was promotion of the Russian language, while its objective were much broader and include export of the Russian educational services, cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church, support of the Russian media, and other activities aimed at promotion of the Russian language and support of the communities abroad (Русский Мир 2007).

Consequently, by 2008 Russia was advancing in full-scale its idea of Russkiy Mir, which became an idea of the independent community. In his article, the Russia MFA Director responsible for work with the compatriots has summed up that much has been done towards ‘reintegrating Russia inside and outside’, but more has to be done in future (Чепурин 2009). He stressed that Russia and the foreign Russians (in Russian: зарубежные россияне) belong to one civilizational space; even though they were outside of its periphery, Russia is a centre of the Russian world, culture, and mentality (ibid). Paradoxically, this community was/is based on assumption that a cultural and spiritual unity existed among the ‘Orthodox nations’; and according to the Russian discourse the values of the Russkiy Mir constituted civilizational clash with the West (Wawrzonek 2014; Nitoiu 2011b).

Step Three: Active Passportization

Starting with 2004, Russia started an aggressive policy of passportization by granting the Russian citizenship and by giving away passports to almost anyone willing from the ENP countries (Wilson & Popescu, 2009: 42). During the same period, Russia has also facilitated procedure of acquiring and issuing Russian passports for the CIS citizens to anyone who considers being a Russian compatriot. Promotion of the Russian citizenship in the post-Soviet
space became especially popular in the break-away regions (Sinkkonen 2011; Roslycky 2011).

Interesting to note, at first, the passports were issued mainly in the areas of tension in Georgia, on the territories of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Even though this process has started in 2002, active passportization was accelerated after the 2003 Rose Revolution (Artman 2013a). Therefore, already in 2004, having obtained a significant number of citizens with the Russian citizenship, the South Ossetia Parliament asked the Russian Duma to defend its citizens (Illarionov 2009: 56).

Promotion of the Russian language and acquisition of Russian citizenship were/are tools which have started to be actively used on the Crimean peninsula and in the East of Ukraine, and also in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as in Transdnistria of Moldova (Караваев 2010). The passportization is a unique and unprecedented instrument in the foreign policy which has become a reality, especially due to the fact that this instrument was applied without consent of the ENP country where passportization was conducted (Artman 2013b; Mühlfried 2010). At first, the passportization as a phenomenon has not received a great deal of neither scholarly attention nor from the political circles (Artman 2013b). However, promptly ‘passportization’ has become a trade-mark innovation in the public diplomacy as it would eventually allow Russia to extend its influence over the secessionist entities and consequently on the ENP countries. It was clear that only later the full potential of this instrument would be unveiled.

Comparing to the EU, Russia had stronger ties to the shared neighbourhood which derived from the post-Soviet heritage encompassing shared culture, history, as well as the Russian language. Contrary to the EU which for a long period promoted exclusively respect of the shared democratic values, Russia reinforced its presence by a variety of instruments, such as promotion of Russophone media, Russian language and the adherence to the Russkiy Mir (Samokhvalov 2007: 27).

5.3.2 Economic Dimension: Fading Economic Influence

It became also apparent that the countries were opening up to the global economy, mainly to the EU market. As the result of finding new markets for trade, the trade between the CIS has
also significantly decreased. For example, if in the 1990s the trade between the post-Soviet republics was 77%, by 1994 it was only 34% and already by 2007 only 24% (Гурова, 2009: 93). The EU has become the most important partner for these countries, for example Armenia’s export was 45%, Azerbaijan – 57%, Belarus – 46%, Moldova – 50%, Ukraine – 32% (ibid: 93, quoting WTO 2008).

Russia’s economic influence over the CIS countries was fading away as the Russian export to the CIS countries has significantly decreased. Only during the period of 2004–2008 the turnover between Russia and CIS countries has decreased from 27% to 21.5%, including import from 38% to 27% (Кулик, Спаракт, and Юргенс 2010). While analysing the data from the beginning of the 1990, this number has decreased more than twice. The CIS import to Russia has decreased from 30% to only 13% in 2009 (Кулик et al. 2010: 9-11).

Nevertheless, Russia has jumped into developing idea of a deeper economic integration. Russia has started developing the Eurasian Economic Community, and according to the report of the Foreign Affairs Council of the Russian Federation to the Federal Council, in 2003 four countries, namely Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, have started preparing a number of economic treaties which would establish the Common Economic Space (Совет Федерации, 2004: 56). These organization would be led by the supranational institutions (Совет Федерации, 2004: 57). The director of the CIS in the Ministry of Trade stated that given the experience of the economic integration between these countries as well as 'having the Treaty of Rome in mind we should build <our economic integration> taking it <the EU> as a sample. We should put into the treaty a step-by-step approach, including the establishment of the Common Economic Space (free movements of goods, capitals, workers,...), as well as to include in the text the obligations taken by the states and the objectives which would be achieved within the pre-defined timeline’ (Совет Федерации, 2004: 62).

Nevertheless, this project was thwarted following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (Wiśniewska, 2013: 8). Only in October 2007, during the meeting of the Intergovernmental Council held in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia agreed on establishing the Customs Union which would coordinate their economic, currency and migration rules on the basis of WTO principles (Weitz, 2014: 32).
Nevertheless, Russia was able to launch these economic integration projects only after the 2009.

Therefore, immediately after its failure to effectively engage with the CIS countries, which were further integration with the EU (Трещенков & Грецкий, 2012: 125), Russia has engaged into the economic war against the vulnerable economies of Moldova and Georgia, which were still much dependent on the economic cooperation with the Russian Federation. In March 2006, Russia introduced embargo on wine, spirits and other economic products coming from Moldova regardless of its deepn understanding of the detrimental impact of this action on Moldova’s weak economic situation. The realist strategy, which could be classified as ‘divide et impera’, was observed the same year with regards to Georgia, when Russia has imposed an import embargo on wine, mineral water and spirits (Florek and Conejo 2007).

5.3.3 Security Dimension: Three War Fronts of Russia towards the Shared Neighbourhood

While the EU was slowly ‘encroaching’ on the Russia’s borders (Трещенков and Грецкий 2012; Rühle 2014), Russia was preparing a plan on reinforcing its influence over ‘historically its neighbourhood’. With the 2004 EU enlargement as well as the NATO membership of the CEE states, Russia felt threatened. The danger has become more present in the Russia political discourse after the discussions of the PRO system establishment in Eastern European EU Member States (Браун 2009: 11), as Putin stated in his interview to Le Monde ‘NATO enlargement means building new Berlin Wall’ (Putin 2008b). Consequently, the Russian Federation was quick with the reaction aimed at stopping further NATO expansion to the East and safeguarding its influence over the CIS region.

The Russian interests and the Russian military presence in the conflict zones is an inalienable component of the so-called stability balance or as one could also say ‘controlled by Russia instability’, where the main idea is to find the way to keep control over the conflict, which would be a source of the threat, but would be controlled. Consequently and gradually it as become Russia’s new strategy. That is why Russia had to find the way to be present in the countries, which were gradually sliding away from Russia into the EU’s orbit.
The part below discusses in details three stages of wars launched by Russia against the countries in the shared neighbourhood. The first one was a set of the economic measures aimed at the vulnerable economies of six researched countries. The second was the energy war. And the final culmination was the 2008 August War in Georgia.

5.3.3.a WAR 1: 2006 Economic Blockade against Georgia and Moldova

As of 2006, Russia has developed a new instrument of leverage over the neighbourhood which was sliding in the European dominance - the economic pressure. Aiming ‘to expand its sphere of influence and achieve control of economic interests’ (Popescu & Leonard 2007: 8), Russia has developed very precise instruments targeting the vulnerability of the economic interdependence of the post-Soviet countries. While the post-Soviet Space (especially Ukraine and Georgia) were reinforcing bilateral cooperation with the West, their economies and trade between the former Soviet countries was still highly interconnected. Knowing that the disruption of trade would have hurt the relatively weak and interdependent economics, the Russian Federation has developed the instruments coercing the weaker neighbours (Leonard & Popescu 2007: 14). The two main elements of the economic pressure exercised by Russia were: firstly, the economic embargo on the import from the Russian Federation, and secondly penetrating the weakened markets by the Russian state monopolies.

Pressure on the Weak Economies: Imposing Embargo

In spring 2006 a ban on the import of Georgia and Moldovan agricultural and meat products was put by the Russian Federal Authority allegedly due higher amount of pesticides, heavy metals, and other hazardous substances. Russia has started with its trade restrictions on the Georgian agricultural products at the end of 2005 and already at the beginning of 2006 Russia has introduced compete agricultural embargo on the Georgia’s products. This was followed by the expulsion of the famous Georgian water ‘Borjomi’ from the Russian markets (Papava 2006: 666). After the embargo was extended into cutting the transport and postal service to Georgia, which served as an important connection with Europe (Goldman 2010: 150). Consequently, Russia embargo costed Georgia USD 50 million in wine sector, USD 13

40 Paradoxically, the EU Member States and other CIS countries, which had higher standards and sanitary guidelines than Russia had, have not imposed sanctions against these products and continued buying them.
million in mineral water, and USD 12 for ethyl spirits, making overall cost of the embargo over USD 100 million (OECD, 2011: 128).

As to Moldova, at the end of 2005 was the first time Russia imposed ban on the agricultural products, and already as of 2006 the restriction was extended on Moldovan wine. The ban was lifted in 2007 and the trade has restarted with some major difficulties (Thissen, Bolognini, Paczynski, & Mincu, 2010: 27). The economic wars had a very negative consequence on Moldova, given that about 80% of Moldova's wine was exported to Russia and would amount nearly 25% of Moldova’s GDP (Thissen et al., 2010: 26). Consequently, the Russia’s ban of wine costed Moldova USD 6.6 million as it lost 29% of Moldova’s export to Russia (Economist 2013). In economic terms the total cost of the embargo created trade deficit with Russia USD 193 million in 2006, the wine production dropped and has indirectly affected the economy of all the country (Thissen et al., 2010: 26).

Both Georgia and Moldova have undermined Russia's supremacy in the region. Both were demanding from Kremlin to cease its control over so-called breakaway territories, and both were accusing Russia of using its monopoly over the energy resources to bully them in fuel and electricity markets (Chivers 2006). Even though the official reason for embargo was increased amount of pesticides, for many it was clear that it was Russia’s response to Georgia’s declared objective to join EU’s political and economic space, as well as to become member of NATO (Emerson et al, 2014: 7). Russia has imposed the embargo on Moldova’s product as the latter has threatened to block Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization. Following the agreement reached between the two countries, when Russia has obtained guarantees that Moldova would support its membership, the embargo was lifted (Thissen et al. 2010).

**Penetrating Weakened Economies in the Southern Caucasus**

At the same time, while putting embargo on the vital for Georgia’s economy products, Russia has reinforced its presence in national economy, especially within the energy sector. Russia’s Inter RAO UES owned and operated the electricity distribution which provides electricity supply to Tbilisi (Tsereteli 2009: 9-10). The electricity, which was/is provided by this company, amounted 25% of electricity generation and 35% of distribution. But this is not the only sector where the Russian companies had strong presence. The companies with the
Russian capital were found in banking, mining sector as well as telecommunications (Tsereteli 2009: 9-10).

Russia had also strong ambitions to penetrate into the entire railway system of the Southern Caucasus which became a part of economic pressure. The Russian Railway Company has managed Armenian Railway, which had an agreement for a period of 30 years. This situation has made the Southern Caucasus states alert of the potential control over the railway system by the Russian Federation (Tsereteli 2009: 9-10). The project of the Russian Federation has gone even further, pressuring Georgia to restore its railway connection with Abkhazia.

Connecting Armenia with Russia was its top priority. Would have Russia been successful in establishing the railway connection from the Russian territory to Abkhazia and all the way to Armenia, this project would have been economically advantageous to Russia as it would decrease the transportation cost, but also it would create the railway connection between Armenia and Russia. However, at the same time, Georgia has realized that this railway project would give easier access of the Russian Federation to Abkhazia creating an easier transit route for potential deployment of additional military contingent (Katcharava 2006). Therefore, Georgia was not quick with supporting the construction of the mentioned railway. The doubtful intensions of the Russian Federation were confirmed just few years later with the eruption of the August war in 2008.

5.3.3.b WAR 2: Energy Wars

The countries in the shared neighbourhood are important energy transit area for both Russia and the EU. These countries in the region are either carrying Russia’s gas to the EU Member States or providing an alternative to Russian gas coming from the Caspian Sea. Ukraine and Georgia are the most pivotal in this matter. For the EU energy security, Ukraine is an important transit country, as more than 80 % of Russian gas coming to the EU Member States was flowing through this state (Stern 2006: 34). As to Georgia, both EU’s projects of diversification, namely Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and South Caucasus Pipeline, cross the territory of Georgia making this country essential for the EU’s energy diversification (Baran 2007: 136). These new project plans would partially ease EU’s dependence on the Russia-controlled strategic energy infrastructure and exports to Europe (German 2009: 344).
Georgia and Ukraine have become the main targets for Russian’s energy policy, which were later called as the ‘pipeline politics’ (Mackinnon 2008; German 2009; Skarbo, Jonathan 2008) or the ‘energy wars’ (Milov 2008; Lucas 2008; M. Walker 2007). Whereas Ukraine was and still is the main transit country for the Russian oil and Georgia served as a transit area for the new pipeline projects, those countries have experienced strong pressure from the Russian Federation.

**Russia’s ‘Pipeline War’ against Georgia**

The destabilization of Georgia, as the main transit country for the EU’s pipeline projects which would bring more independence from Russian gas, started in January 2006. That year the gas pipeline to Georgia was blown up on the Russian side next to the border of Georgia. As the result of this event, Georgia and Armenia have experienced disruption of the gas delivered during the cold winter period (Papava 2006: 665-6).

Georgian President Saakashvili stated the Russia’s arbitrary cut-off was a message that it would continue using the energy source as a weapon of political influence (Saakashvili 2006b). Having accused Russia of ‘blackmailing’ (Welt 2006), Georgia has promptly deployed into a search of solutions. The short-term one was addressed with support of Azerbaijan which has satisfied the needs of its neighbour by forwarding extra gas to Georgia by diminishing some supply to Turkey (Bilgin 2009: 4486). The long-term solution was to insure the energy security of Georgia by gaining independence from Russian energy supply. Consequently, since 2006 the cooperation between Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as the EU has significantly increased making Georgia pivotal in the hydrocarbons transportation network (Lussac 2010a).

Just in few years three pipelines have become operational as the result of the cooperation between two Southern Caucasus countries and the EU. The greater energy diversification was reached by means of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, and one gas pipeline called as the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline. By 2008-2009, three mentioned routes have transported about 45.5 million tons of oil and 6.1 billion cubic meters of gas (Lussac 2010: 607-8).
For Georgia as well as for the EU, these infrastructure projects were of high importance. For Georgia these three projects meant domestic energy security which granted it stability of transit (Tsereteli 2009: 6-7). On a region level these projects were significant contribution into the development of the entire regional infrastructure. These aims coincided with the EU’s global strategy of stable neighbourhood. The EU aimed at reinforcing the stability and energy independence of the region by investing into these high-cost projects and into Georgia specifically as a transit country (Penev 2007: 34-5). Nevertheless, these three projects were also to bypass Russia.

Map of the three energy projects bypassing the Russian Federation

Source: Storch 2012

The 2008 August War\(^{41}\) has dispelled doubts on resolution of Russia to prevent the success of the energy projects by bringing instability into Georgia. It became clear that behind the alleged ‘protection of the Russian citizens’ one of the realist explanation was to control strategic energy infrastructure in the region as well as transit to Europe. The deliberate targets of the Russian attacks were the pipelines which were bypassing the territory of the Russian Federation (T. C. German 2009b).

The rational of the Russian Federation was to destabilize the region and to keep Georgia from operating the new pipelines which were to bypassing Russia. This would allow the Russian

\(^{41}\) The 2008 August War is discussed in more details in the later part of this chapter.
Federation to remain the only monopolist of the gas supply to the EU (Goldman 2010; Fischer 2009; Tsereteli 2009a). In the South Ossetia and Abkhazia, having at the leadership ‘puppet-theatre of Russian thugs and ex-security men’ (Rayfield 2009a), the Russia has established control over the stability in the Southern Caucasus and the developments in the region.

Russia’s ‘Energy War’ against Ukraine

Ukraine has the pivotal geographical position for transiting 80% of Russian gas to Europe. Ukraine-Russia energy relations have experienced two major crises: in January 2006 and in December-January during 2008-2009. The first major crisis has developed in 2006, when by the end of 2005, Russia has set an ultimate to Ukraine demanding it to pay the ‘European price’ for gas, meaning USD 230/mcm. It came as a surprise for Ukraine, as for the last decade and prior to the Orange Revolution, Kyiv was paying Kremlin only USD 50/mcm. Consequently Russia’s demand was not reasonable for Ukrainian leadership (Newnham 2011: 138).

By the end of 2005, Russia has developed a creative proposal for Ukraine. Russia would have ceded its demand under condition that Ukraine would allow Gazprom\(^{42}\) accessing an equity stake in the Ukrainian transit pipeline network. If it would have accepted, Ukraine’s gas transit would become fully dependent on the Russia’s decision-making.

After some discussions with the EU, Ukraine has rejected the Russia’s proposal and has agreed to a higher price under the condition that it would pay in in parts over longer period of time. Ukraine has asked for price amounting maximum of $80/mcm instead of 230/mcm. At the end of 2005, Putin has started insisting on the price of $230/mcm, which Ukraine could not afford paying and did not pay. Consequently, few days later, on January 1, 2006 at 10 in the morning Gazprom has cut off gas supplies to Ukraine (Stern 2006), having accused Ukraine of stealing its gas from the transit pipelines (Bahgat 2006: 961).

Map: Gas Transit Pipelines via Ukraine

\(^{42}\) Gazprom is Russian state gas company.
Even though the sides have reached the compromise after the 2006 crisis and the gas flow to the EU Member States was renewed, Russia has undermined itself as a reliable partner providing gas to the EU. The 2006 energy crisis has ‘catapulted energy security to the forefront of the EU agenda’ (Baran 2007a). The EU Energy Commission of that period, Andris Piebalgs, has stressed on a need of a ‘clearer and more collective and cohesive policy on security of energy supply’ (Piebalgs 2006).

In 2009, a new energy war has erupted leaving 16 EU Member States to freeze during the Christmas holidays. The 2009 energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine was ‘by far the most serious of its kind’ (Pirani et al. 2009: 4). The Russian gas supply to Ukraine was stopped on the 1st of January 2009, following the expiration of the previous agreement on 31st of December 2008. The full flow has restarted on the 20th of January following the signature of new agreements after the signature of the Agreement between Russian Prime Ministers of that time, Mr Putin, and his Ukrainian counterpart, Mrs Tymoshenko.

This conflict has made profound consequences on a number of states. Left without heating, the Balkan countries have experienced a humanitarian emergency, while Hungary and
Slovakia have experienced strong economic problems due to the limited gas supply (Pirani et al. 2009: 4). These striking humanitarian and economic problems have prompted the reaction of the President of the European Commission, Mr Barroso, who has stated that ‘It was utterly unacceptable that European gas consumers were held hostage to this dispute between Russia and Ukraine’ (Barroso 2009).

The crisis had even more profound consequences for the future relations EU relations with Russia and Ukraine. As it has damaged a reputation of Russia as supplier and Ukraine as a transit country, the EU had to find on one hand the way to secure the future transit, but also to diversify its own energy supply. As the result, the EU has put its efforts into engaging with modernization of the Ukrainian gas pipeline network, but has also intensified its work on the different pipeline projects, such as the North Stream and South Stream.

Gas Price as an Instrument of Coercion against Modova

Similarly to Georgia and Ukraine, Moldova has found itself in a difficult situation at the end of 2005 (Smith Stegen 2011). It is important to note, that its situation was even more difficult due to a number of reasons. Firstly, it had a poor household and very weak economy; secondly it had to sustain costly Transdnister conflict; finally, the gas-fired Cuciurgani power plant which was its main electricity provider was and is situated on the territory of the break-away Transdnister region (Newnham 2011). Differently from Georgia which had benefited from strong support from other neighbours in the region and differently from Ukraine which had EU directly involved into the conflict, Moldova was left almost face-to-face with Russia.

At the end of 2005 Russia has demanded increased payment for gas supply from Moldova. The requested price for Moldova was $160/mcm, which was double of regular price, and Moldova has refused to pay it (Stern, 2006a: 11). The punishment has followed: no gas came to Moldova during first 2 weeks of January 2016 (Stern, 2006: 11), and Transdniester has stopped supplying power to Moldova (Baclajanschi, Iaroslav Bouton and Mori 2006). Even though, comparing to other countries this crisis was much smaller, for Moldova’s economy that was a strong hit by Russia.

Chart: Increase of Gas Prices by Russia
Belarus and Armenia, being close allies of Russia have experienced smaller increase in price comparing to Ukraine, Georgia and even Moldova. Out of all six future EaP countries only Azerbaijan became energy independent due to its own supply from the Caspian Sea (Bilgin, 2009). As it has stopped buying Russian gas, it has not experienced pressure from the Russian Federation, but to the contrary it has started conducting independent from Russia energy policy (Ciarreta and Nasirov 2012).

Belarus and Armenia remained two countries loyal to Russia and this loyalty was generously remunerated (Baev 2008). Belarus was supporting Moscow in all its projects and was neglecting the EU’s call for democratization. As it was mentioned in the Report to the Russian Federal Council of the Russian Federation, Lukashenko was offered the lowest gas price in return for his support of the Kremlin’s projects of integration (Совет Федерации, 2004: 63). Consequently, Belarus was also a stable partner of the Russia-led integrationist projects. For this loyalty, it was remunerated by a cheap gas amounting USD 46/mcm, which in 2008 became USD 125. Similar situation was with Armenia, which was and still is dependent on Russia as economy and security provider (Socor 2010; Griffin, Kelly, and McKinley 2002). Consequently, Russia has heavily subsidized Armenia, incl. its energy sector (Newnham 2011: 139). Therefore, it was paying only USD 56/mcm in 2005 and USD 110 in 2008.

At the beginning of 2006, depending on the level of friendship, loyalty and political allegiance to the Russian Federation, the latter has continued to unilaterally redefine the gas prices. As a result of this manoeuvring, the Russian Federation has in increased its revenue, but also has punished ‘its enemies and reward its friends at the same time’ (Newnham 2011: 139). For example, while the price for Russian gas for Georgia was USD 235/mcm, Belarus was asked to pay only USD 110/mcm.
These energy wars have brought to a number of important conclusions. Firstly, it became apparent that Russia being ‘energy power’ (Finon and Locatelli 2008a) would not be reluctant playing an energy card in future. It has proven to be an effective instrument of influence helping Russian to attain its external political goal (Hadfield 2008a: 327). Secondly, the attention to the war of words and the legal power struggle between Russia and six post-Soviet States has brought attention to the vulnerability of the latter (Finon and Locatelli 2008b). Being energy dependent on Russia, but also being economically squeezed by Russia’s power of dictating the price (Spanjer 2007), those countries have no means to independently reform their energy sector. Finally, the 2009 energy war between Russia and Ukraine has shown that the energy dispute between two states has resulted in freezing half of the European continent and creating humanitarian crisis in some of the countries. Even though Russia’s decision to cut off the gas supply in January was described as ‘unnecessarily risky and commercially irrational action’ (Pirani et al. 2009: 60), this tool was one of the most powerful instruments of pressure which was at its disposal.

5.3.3.e WAR 3: 2008 August War in Georgia

The August War in Georgia which has erupted in August 2008 has brought a new reality to the region as well as into the regional geopolitical reality. The armed conflict between Georgia and Russia which was only 5-days long was ‘a little war that shook the world’ (Roland Asmus 2010). This part of the chapter discusses firstly the origins of the conflict, after the justification by the sides on why the war has started/escalated, and finally on the conclusions which were drawn from the Russia’s war on Georgia.

Origin of the Russian-Georgian War

The eruption of this war was grounded in two post-Soviet ‘frozen conflicts’ – the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions – which are situated in Georgia. The conflicts have erupted with the collapse of the Soviet Union and establishment of Georgia’s independence in the early 1990s, when the South Ossetia has failed to gain support from Russia in its intension to reunite with the Northern Ossetia (situated in Russia) and Abkhazia has failed to regain its independence from Georgia. The conflicts between Georgia and two break-away regions were mediated by Russia. The latter has intervened as a ‘peacekeeper’, stationed its troops on
the secessionists territories, and the Russian militaries have never left Georgian territory (King, 2008; Nichol, 2008; Rayfield, 2009b).

The war was induced by a number of incidents between Georgia and Russia which were provoked by either Russia’s belief that it could use Georgia’s territory for its own purpose or when Georgia was trying to depart from the integration course which was set by Russia. For example, in 1999 and 2002 both tensions have developed between two countries, as Russia wanted to conduct bombing against the Chechen guerrillas who were allegedly hiding in the Pankisi Gorge situated in Georgia (Talbott 2010: viii). The next years, a number of clashes were constantly reported between the Georgian troops and the inhabitants of the two regions.

Meanwhile Russia continued extending its influence over both regions. Russian became official language in South Ossetia and the Russian Rubble became its currency (T. C. German and Bloch 2006). As mentioned in the previous chapter, as of early 2000s, Russia started extensive passportization. Already in February 2004, the leader of South Ossetia of that time, Mr Kokoity, stated that about 100 000 of the republics citizens were holders of Russian passports (T. C. German & Bloch, 2006; T. German, 2009). The same processes have started in Abkhazia, as already in few years about 200 000 Abkhaz have become Russian citizens (Zevelev, 2008: 54). All of those citizens were defined by the Russian law as ‘compatriot’ which would allowed Russia to qualify the problems of compatriots living abroad as Russian internal issue (Zevelev, 2008: 52).

The next spiral of escalation with Russia has started with pro-European and pro-democratic attitude of newly elected Georgian President Saakashvili who has defeated the pro-Russian candidate following the democratic appraising known as the Rose Revolution. President Saakashvili has offered South Ossetia and Abkhazia ‘special status’ within Georgia and proposed the establishment of a federal state giving the republics considerable autonomy (T. C. German and Bloch 2006), but under control over the central government (Nichol 2008). This tactic move would allow Georgia to reintegrate its territory. Nevertheless, hopes for a peaceful resolution have faded away as tensions with Russia have followed.

In 2006, following Georgia’s attempt to block Russian WTO membership (Tarr 2008), Russia’s ‘diplomacy of coercion’ was quick to respond (Zevelev 2008). The tensions have spilled into embargo introduced by Russia on Georgian wine and on the other, which was
followed by the disruption of the electricity flow from Russia, arrest of a Russian spy in Georgia – all of these actions were strongly criticized by the Georgian leadership (Saakashvili 2006a). In 2007, the Georgians have reported a Russian aircraft entering its airspace and firing a missile. Despite of the radar evidence, Russia has denied its involvement. All actions taken by Russian were aimed on intimidation of Georgian state, on squeezing its economy by manipulating energy supplies as well as by introducing embargo, and deporting ethnic Georgians from Russia. At the same time, the global goal was to distract Georgia from its pro-European and pro-democratic reform process (Cornell 2007).

The expert community has noted that the Georgian secessionist regions are supported by Russia in all means, meanwhile its ‘peacekeeping troops’ were guarding the borders keeping Georgia apart from two break-away regions (Popescu 2006). While making South Ossetia and Abkhazia fully dependent on Russia’s economic and military support (King 2004), this gave Russia strong political leverage over the country as well as over the region (German 2006: 13). Consequently, Russia with its peacekeeping missions, financial and military support to the secessionist parts, has established solid grounds to become a part of a problem, but not a solution (Lynch 2004: 62).

The further escalation of the conflict has started in spring 2008. In April, Georgia has withdrawn from the bilateral agreement with Russia and from the CIS Air Defence Agreement. It has also suspended bilateral talks with Moscow on its WTO membership and threatened to block its entry in the WTO after it has found out that Russia has sent its military reinforcement to help the separatists in preparation of the war (Barry 2011).

Almost simultaneously in spring 2008, Russian leadership has engaged into the annexation policy (Tagliavini, 2009b: 179). In April the Russian President, Putin 43 has instructed the Government to develop the mechanisms of protection and support to the population of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The measures were developed aiming at securing the interests of the general population. The newly appointed Prime Minister of that time, Vladimir Putin, has also made reference to the Duma Resolution of 2008 calling on the acknowledgement of the independence of two break-away regions (Putin, 2008). According to this document, Putin has called upon intensification of cooperation with the authorities in two regions. He

43 President Medvedev was inaugurated on 7 May 2008 and served until May 2012. During that time former President Putin was serving as a Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.
has also called to acknowledge legal force of the documents issued by the authorities in the Russian Federation. Cooperation with the authorities and endorsement of their legal acts was already a partial acknowledgement of the sovereignty. Consequently, the EU Fact Minding Mission stated that this act was a ‘dramatic escalation in Moscow’s annexation policy’ (Tagliavini 2009b: 179).

Eruption of the War: The Unjustified Justification

The war in Georgia has woken up Europe at the night of 7-8 of August, 2008. The night before President Saakashvili was informed by the intelligence on a Russian forces coming through the Roki Tunnel on the Russian-Georgian border into Georgia (Fawn 2013). The Georgian peacekeeping commander called his Russian counterpart to ask what those troops were doing; however, he got no reply. The reports have followed on presence of elements of the other regiments which had no authorization to be in Georgia. President Saakashvili took the decision to protect Georgian territory (Roland Asmus, 2010: 20-21). Promptly the Russian, South Ossetian and Abkhaz military units have fought back. By August 10, Russian militaries have occupied a significant territory of South Ossetia and went further into Georgia, which they started shelling. Russians took several Georgian cities. Its warships took more troops to Georgia’s Abkhazia region and after they have reached the Georgia’s Black Sea coast (Nichol 2008). Russian armed forces have cover by air strikes big territory of Georgia, penetrating deep inside the land and reaching the port in Poti, as well as Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital. As the result, the war has taken 850 lives, many more were wounded, and more than 100 000 civilians have left their homes in search of security (Tagliavini 2009: 5, 10). Only later, it would become apparent that Russia’s attack was pre-planned long ahead of the event (Cornell 2009).

After the August 2008 war in Georgia, Russian leadership was rather quick with official acknowledgement of the independence of the two regions. In his address, Russian President of that time, President Medvedev has announced the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as this was ‘the only way to protect lives of people’ (D. Medvedev 2008b). The acknowledgement of the independence was also supported by Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru, Vanuatu, and Tuvalu.
Russians justification of war was simple. According to the Russian President of that time Dmitri Medvedev, Russia was protecting its citizens following the attacks of the Georgian army in Southern Ossetia (Medvedev 2008). Russian citizenship holders were not only the peace-keepers, but also a significant number of ethnic Ossentians who were issued Russian passports immediately after the Rose Revolution in Georgia. By 2005, over 80% of Abkhaz populations were Russian passport holders (German 2007: 364). Consequently, on the 8th of August, at the meeting with the Security Council, Medvedev has argued that ‘According to the Constitution and Federal Law, as a President of the Russian Federation, it is my obligation to protect lives and dignity of the Russian citizens, regardless of where they are’ (D. Medvedev 2008c). According to the deputy commander of the Russian peacekeeping mission the justification to intervene was with an ‘aim to prevent aggression of Georgia, protection of the citizens of Russia and civilians, and prevention of humanitarian catastrophe’ (Новитский 2008). The legitimation of the intervention is based on the previously discussed law of citizenship and on protection of compatriots.

The President of Georgia argued that the actions of Georgia were guided by self-defence. Saakashvili stated that the decision was taken because of two external factors. Firstly, he pointed at increased number of tanks and soldiers on the border between Russia and Georgia. And secondly, the escalation was a result of a week-long deadly provocations conducted by the Russian military forces and its proxies (Saakashvili 2008).

The EU Fact-Finding Mission has condemned the actions of both parties. Having stated that the start of the war by Georgia was not justifiable (Tagliavini 2009b: 22), the report also stated that ‘the Russian military action taken as a whole was therefore neither necessary nor proportionate to protect Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia’ (Tagliavini 2009b: 275). The EU Fact-Minding Mission has also concluded that the war was stimulated by ‘the extended period of ever-mounting tensions and incidents’ (Tagliavini 2009b: 5), which was triggered by the reconstruction works ‘aimed at providing logistics support to Russian troops during the intervention’ (Tagliavini 2009b: 178).

**Aftermath of the Russia-Georgian War**

The Georgia-Russia war had a number of important consequences. Firstly, it has influence the security dynamics in the region. The war has disrupted the energy security of two other
Southern Caucasus states - Azerbaijan and Armenia - which were highly dependent on the infrastructure in Georgia (Nitoiu, 2011b: 467). Ukraine was also indirectly involved into the war as Russia used the Black Sea Feet which was/is stationed on Ukraine’s territory against Georgia having obtained no consent from Ukraine (Nitoiu, 2011b: 467). Consequently, Russia has attempted to damage friendly Ukraine-Georgia relations which were cemented after the ‘coloured revolutions’ and reinforced by common desire of the Euro-Atlantic integration. Being surrounded by partially EU and NATO members and the countries which were willing to join the alliance of democracies, the conclusion Russia made was that army and navy its only true friends abroad (Trenin 2008: 117).

Secondly, it became apparent that the same scenario might be applied to other countries in the neighbourhood. Passportization has produced exceptional spaces within the territory of the ENP countries, where the norms of international law and the modern state system were effectively suspended by third country – the Russian Federation (Artman 2013b). The military capabilities which it possessed would be enough to bring the insecurity in the EU’s neighbourhood. In case of Georgia, Russia used several armoured battalions, air power and marines which was enough to defeat and destroy much of the Georgian military. This military force was enough to re-establish the influence in Moscow’s backyard, to make it clear that ‘Russia has embarked on a new era of muscular intervention’ (King 2008: 7).

Thirdly, the war in Georgia, which was justified by Russia as the protection of its citizens, could be easily replicated in other CIS countries where the Russian citizens were residing. Heated debate among politicians and expert circles has developed in Ukraine, where the major focus was on possible provocation in Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine (Cornell 2009; Mikhelidze 2009; Oksana Antonenko 2009; Arel 2008). According to some experts the scenario could be as following: the potential clash in the proximity of the Russian military base could ‘provoke’ a similar reaction as in Georgia, and the Russian Federation would be ‘obliged’ to intervene in order to protect its citizens (Polit UA 2008). The similar scenarios could be potentially developed in Moldova, Azerbaijan or Armenia. All together it made the security situation in the Eastern EU’s neighbourhood very fragile.

Finally, there were important conclusions made for the EU. Russia knew that the EU would not be able to properly react. Finding EU helpless has reinforced Russia’s position. The EU’s two hundred unarmed observers deployed to Georgia were flattering for the Russia self-
perception of the Great Power. Whereas since the end of the Cold War ‘Moscow endured at the West’s hands’ (Mankoff 2011: 293), now this war has changed the situation. Therefore, the war in Georgia was a ‘wake-up call to EU actors’ (Delcourt 2010: 543), which has unveiled weaknesses of the EU and its limited influence in its security agenda in the region.

It became clear that the EU with its instruments ENP instruments cannot provide stability in the region. The EU was far from being ‘the motor of European security’ (Bengtsson 2008: 597), even though it wishes to be so. The conflict prevention dimension was undeveloped and the limited instruments were completely ineffective (Christou 2011: 207). Even though well-governed partners in the neighbourhood was EU’s main objective, given the destructive assertiveness of Russia, EU could only attempt to ‘create conflict-reducing milieu’ (Christou 2011: 208).

Nevertheless, EU’s good will was not enough. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister called this war as ‘The gravest consequences for overall European security’ (Spiegel 2008). After the war has erupted, on one hand, Moscow has managed to maintain its influence over the region. On the other it has also displayed its military capacity and strong resolution to keep leadership in the neighbourhood (Boonstra 2008a).

To sum up, the war has demonstrated the fragility of the regional stability, inability of the EU to properly react to the crisis in its neighbourhood and the resolution of the Russia to keep its influence in the region and EU in tension. The war in Georgia was a demonstration of its assertiveness and strong resolution to keep its periphery under the control with no regards to the measures. The instruments of influence, such as the control military and economic support of the separatist regions, artificial linkage of the population with the notion of the ‘Russian compatriot’ and passportization of the Georgian citizens, have become instruments of the Russia’s foreign policy justifying its war on the territory of Georgia.

This war has set the scenario for a potential conflict in other states of the Western NIS - Moldova with its Transdnister, Azerbaijan and Armenia with the Nagorno-Kharabakh – both of which were supported by the Russian Federation in the military and economic terms. All

---

44 The 2003 European Security Strategy stressed on the EU’s interest in the well-governed neighbourhood, as ‘in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe’ (Orlov 2016). Therefore, the 2004 ENP was aimed to address ‘stability and security’ by means of different instruments.
mentioned states had a significant number of the Russian passport holders, Russian military troops, as well as economic influence over the ‘secessionist regions’. Therefore, it became clear that the war scenario which has unfolded in Georgia could potentially be unfolded in any of those countries.

The Russia-Georgia war has also lead to a new wave of the academic debate. The academic community has started immediately discussing the reason for the eruption of this war. Some would say that Russia’s expansion on Georgia’s territory was aimed to secure full control over Georgia’s territory and resources (A. P. Tsygankov 2012; Sherr 2010; Boonstra 2008b). Others would state that as the result of the ‘coloured revolutions’ in the region, Russia had to restore its internal legitimacy (Ambrosio 2009; Delcour and Wolczuk 2015).

This war in Georgia has highlighted Russia’s resurgence as a power in its sphere of influence which was/is capable to use overwhelming force to protect its interests (Mankoff 2011: 293). It became also apparent that the Russian Federation, which had relatively weak and limited military forces (Vendil Pallin and Westerlund 2009), has grown in its determination to stop the European and NATO influence over its traditional sphere of interests. Consequently, the aim was not only to stop Georgia from becoming a pro-Western democracy, but also to show its influence on the region to the EU, NATO and the US. Russia has expressed its long-term commitment to maintain influence over the region (King 2008:5).

The 2008 war was interpreted by many as the ‘revanchist imperialism that seeks to restore hegemony over the post-Soviet states, if not to deprive them of their independence’ (Prozorov 2010: 265). That is why immediately after the war, President Medvedev was speaking of the ‘privileged interests’ in the neighbourhood and the obligation of Russia to protect them (Trenin 2009). As Mankoff argues, the main motivation of Russia was the balance of power since the equation between the Russia and states which supported Saakashvili has fundamentally changed after the 2004 enlargement (Mankoff 2011: 294). For Russia it was ‘an efficient means of demonstrating to the Western states <that it was> great power on the international scene’ (Larsen 2012: 103). The realist reading of the conflicts explains it as a Russia’s desire to establish a new status quo in the region of the former Soviet Union (Karagiannis, 2013: 77).
To sum up on this chapter, discussing series of Russia’s war against the weak democracies in the East, it became clear that Russia has thought to achieve the toppling of the democratic governments which were supported by the EU (Cornell 2009). At the same time, the evolution of the attacks against these states has gone from the economic and energy wars into the military aggression. Consequently, Russia’s pressure on these states has gone from the instruments of coercion into a direction of aggressive expansion.
Chapter 6: 2009-2016 - EU’s New Approach towards the Eastern Neighbourhood - the Eastern Partnership

This chapter discusses exclusively the EU’s new policy – the Eastern Partnership – which was developed towards the region. The EU, having witnessed multifaceted wars launched by Russia against the partner countries, has accelerated elaboration of its own multilateral policy towards the six countries which would enhance the process of their democratization and would focus on prosperity and stability in the region. Consequently, by means of the EaP has foreseen an ambitious goal of transforming the EU’s Eastern neighbours into well-governed, secure, and economically prosperous countries by bringing them closer to the Union.

In this part of the thesis, we firstly discuss the geopolitical context within which the Eastern Partnership was launched. After we will discuss the aim of this new initiative as it is explained in the EU documents. These parts will also explain the global ambition behind this newly developed policy. The next parts of this chapter explain a set of multi- and bilateral instruments with which the Eastern Partnership was/is equipped as well as the financial support disbursed to underpin this process. The final parts of this chapter explain EU’s vision on how it considered involving other international players (along with Russia) into its new policy towards the region which Russia considered as historically its periphery.

6.1 Geopolitical Context

The Eastern Partnership was yet another initiative aimed at reinforcing democratization of the region through the tailored made programmes and instruments, while its introduction was accelerated by the 2008 war in Georgia. The geopolitical setting for a more targeted differentiation was favourable, as in the 2008, the EU has launched the Union for Mediterranean. Following the launch of the separate initiative for the South, the Eastern Partnership was already under discussions for some time (Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010). Consequently, the EU was working on a new policy which would allow promoting democracy building in its Eastern Neighbourhood through the socio-economic reforms. This project was envisaging a profound integration with the EU through harmonization of state’s legal systems with the EU’s *acquis communautaire*. Looking at the broader picture, the EU was creating conditions for deep political integration through shared values without the immediate membership prospective (Tumanov et al., 2011: 130).
The recent crisis situations in the eastern neighbourhood have accelerated the launch of the Eastern Partnership. The ‘five-day war’ between Russia and Georgia has provoked vigorous international reaction. The assertive, but still weak position of the Russian Federation, prompted the EU to accelerate its engagement with the region. The EU leadership has convened at the extraordinary meeting as its leadership needed to rethink the strategic options in a narrowed geopolitical environment (Larsen 2012: 103). The Extraordinary European Council, which was held on 1 September 2008, has mandated the European Commission to precipitate the elaboration of the EaP. As the European Council was ‘concerned by the open conflict which has broken out in Georgia, by the resulting violence and by the disproportionate reaction of Russia, <...> the European Union considers that it is more necessary than ever to support regional cooperation and step up its relations with its eastern neighbours’ (European Council 2008). The European Council has also invited the Commission to submit proposals in December 2008. These crises have also highlighted some shortcomings of the EU’s policy towards the neighbourhood and allowed the EU to engage into the critical reflection on the weak points of its policies of democratization.

Differently from the previous approaches focusing mainly on democracy promotion instruments, the war in Georgia gave grounds to think over the security aspect in the Eastern neighbours. Firstly, it became apparent that the ‘frozen conflicts’ with Russia’s ‘support’ or stimulus can explode in any moment in any of the Eastern country; secondly, Georgia as well as other countries were not equipped well to face such aggression; and finally, the EU had no adequate response to the Russia’s revanchist strategy (Mikhelidze 2009). The experience with the ENP showed that it does not address the security problem, therefore, the EU had to develop a policy that could create a ‘conflict-reducing milieu’ (Christou 2011).

The new policy was to (at least) partly address the shortcomings which derive from the instable security situation, by also contributing to the conflict (not resolution) prevention. ‘Drawing on the EU’s unique range of instruments, we are seeking to achieve a new, innovative style of partnership with countries which are still emerging from a communist past’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2009). Therefore, it was foreseen that the EaP would create a stronger link between the partner countries and the EU and as a result it would transform the conflict dynamics in the region (Christou 2011: 208).
6.2 **The Aim of the Eastern Partnership**

In May 2009, the first EaP summit was held in Prague. At this event, the participants have agreed that the new cooperation would *be based on commitments to the principles of international law and to fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to market economy, sustainable development and good governance* (Council, 2009: 5, para 1). Therefore, again in this document, the EU has restated its commitment to help the partner countries with the deeper engagement in democratization of the region as well as supporting the liberal democracy there. As it explained later, the *EU cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries is about encouraging political and socio-economic reforms. This means consolidating democracy and pursuing sustainable and inclusive growth for the benefit of citizens* (The EaP Civil Society Forum 2014).

Already with the first document inaugurating the Eastern Partnership, the Declaration discusses political association and economic integration as the main goal of this policy:

> *The main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries.*

This document suggests that differently from before, when there was a global interest to promote democratization, by means of the Eastern Partnership, the EU has offered the partner countries political association, stronger economic integration, which would be supported by the necessary conditions allowing this goal to be attained. As the Commissioner of that time, Štefan Füle, stated it is better equipped *to support democratic and market-oriented reforms in partner countries, consolidate their statehood and bring them closer to the EU* (Š. Füle 2010b). Consequently, the global aim of building the liberal democracies in the region was to be supported by enhanced old and some new multilateral and bilateral instruments of cooperation.

6.2.1 **Multilateral Track**
The novelty of the Eastern Partnership was its multilateral dimension which had to secure democratization of the partner countries by different means. Those were built on the principles, framed around the thematic platforms and flagship initiatives as well as supported by a number of multilateral institutions established to support the main goal. The EU has envisaged the Eastern Partnership multilateral platforms as a forum where the information and experience could be shared by the EU with the partner countries as well as between themselves. This dialogue would be a step towards transition, reform and modernization; it would also give the EU substantial instrument allowing to accompany and foster these processes (European Commission, 2014: 1-2).

**Principles**

The EaP is governed by three main principles: joint ownership, differentiation and conditionality (Prague EaP Declaration, 2009). The joint ownership stands for ‘mutual interests and commitments as well as on shared ownership and responsibility’ (Prague Declaration: 5). At the inaugurating event in Prague, the Eastern Partnership Declaration was adopted as joint document and was launched as a ‘common endeavour of the Member States of the European Union and their Eastern European Partners’ (Prague Declaration: 5). Nevertheless, the first Summit was held in Prague EaP Declaration was elaborated with a limited consultation of the EaP countries.45

The other two principles, both of which were borrowed from the EU’s enlargement policy, were not new for the neighbourhood. Traditionally, conditionality meant that certain benefits are conditional to fulfilment of obligations or implementing reforms by the partner country, and differentiation meant that the EU’s policy will be accommodated to individual priorities and needs of these countries. Therefore, even though the EaP was established based on the principle of the joint ownership, it became apparent that the joint ownership was neutralized by the conditionality (Boonstra & Shapovalova 2010: 5). Therefore, regardless of the declared joint ownership, the EU has become a driving force in setting the political guidelines for the integration with the EaP countries.

45 From an interview with Borys Tarasyuk, former Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Kyiv, April 2013.
Thematic Platforms of Cooperation and Flagship Initiatives

With an aim to effectively transform a number of governance levels, the EU has launched thematic platforms around which the activities on different levels were organized. Few years after the EaP was launched, every platform has its own sectoral Minister in the EaP country as well as their correspondents in the EU. The four areas of co-operation are:

1. Democracy, good governance and stability
2. Economic integration and convergence with EU policies
3. Environment, climate change and energy security
4. Contacts between people

The multilateral cooperation is also supported by the flagship initiatives. These initiatives were to ‘give additional momentum, concrete substance and visibility to the Eastern Partnership and are looking forward to an early discussion of the platforms in this regard’ (Prague EaP Declaration, 2009: 9, para 13). Eventually, the flagship initiatives have allowed mobilizing the funding from different IFIs and investment from the private sector. By 2016 there were six initiatives aimed at establishing the elements of democratic governance within and between the partner countries:

1. Integrated Border Management;
2. Small and Medium Enterprise facility;
3. Regional electricity markets, energy efficiency and renewable energy;
4. Diversification of energy supply;
5. Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man-made disasters;

The other novelty brought by the Eastern Partnership is inexplicit security component which was present both in the thematic platforms and flagship initiatives. These activities were meant to establish stronger cooperation between the EaP countries and by this would ‘further promote stability and multilateral confidence building’ (Prague EaP Declaration, 2009: 6, para 2). In the situation when the conflicts impede cooperation, these activities were to develop stronger ties between themselves and the EU (ibid).
**Eastern Partnership Multilateral Platforms**

The multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership is supported by a set of platforms introduced in the Prague Eastern Partnership Declaration. Those platforms are mandated to promote dialogue, exchange of view and cooperation between the EaP countries and the EU Member States. They involve different societal levels and are held at the level of heads of states or governments, ministerial level, level of the legislators, business representatives and the civil society from the EU and the region concerned.

**The Eastern Partnership Summit**

The Summits, which were/are held every two years, is the highest platform of dialogue which brings together the heads of states and governments. It is used by the EU to mark the note the progress made by the EaP partner countries and/or to draw attention to the lack of the efforts in democratization. Until 2016 there were four Eastern Partnership countries and each of them had peculiarities.

- The **Prague Summit** has inaugurated the policy, introducing the bi- and multilateral frameworks of cooperation, as well as laid down the principles of cooperation and further engagement under condition of democratization by the EaP countries.

- The **Warsaw Summit** was held in September 2011. The attention of the EU leadership was overshadowed by the political tensions in Belarus and Ukraine. With regards to Belarus, it concerned stable non-abidance to the democratic principles, repression of the public protects in 2010 and continuous repressive actions against the representatives of the Belarus civil society. As the European Council President stated ‘*the EU remains attached to the vision of a democratic Belarus. ... But we can not re-engage fully with Belarus without clear progress towards democratisation and respect for human rights*’ (Van Rompuy 2011). Consequently, the EU has not invited President Lukashenka to the Summit; in revanche, Belarus Foreign Minister has refusal to attend this event, threatened to withdraw the country from the Eastern Partnership and has accused the EU in act of discrimination against Belarus (Belarus MFA 2011).

As to Ukraine, it was overshadowed by the arrest of the former Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yuliya Tymoshenko, and other members of her party, former ministers, in
opposition to the ruling elites. Consequently, for Ukraine the Eastern Partnership has preluded with calls to postpone the Association Agreement with Ukraine should Mrs Tymoshenko remain incarnated (A. Paul & Belmega, 2011: 4). Therefore, the EU has used the Summit to once again stress on the importance of the democratic norms, respect of the European values, and put back these two states to the democratization path.

- The Vilnius Summit held in October 2013 was set to discuss the guidelines and to setting ‘a long-term perspective for the Eastern Partnership policy’ (Linkevičius 2013). The big milestone was planned for this Summit, namely signature of the Association Agreements, instead the EU has experienced turbulence and numerous speculations regarding expectations about the signature of Agreements (Havlik, 2014: 21). As the result of the Russia’s meddling, Armenia was the first one to fall out of the process, as it has become the member of the Russia-led Customs Union. According to Commissioner Fule, this membership was considered to be incompatible with the EU’s trade part of the Association Agreement (Š. Füle 2013). With regards to Ukraine, until the last moment the EU was kept in suspension on whether President Yanukovych would sign the Association Agreement or not. Under Putin’s pressure and blackmail, President Yanukovych has called off signature of the Association Agreement just one week before the Eastern Partnership Summit (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015) as the leadership was considering joining the Russia’s Customs Union (Tsereteli 2014). Belarus and Azerbaijan were out of the Association Agreement track. As the result of this interference by Russia, out of six countries covered by this policy, only Moldova and Georgia have initialized an Association Agreement at the Vilnius Summit.

- The Riga Summit of May 2015 has confirmed EU’s commitment to the Eastern Partnership countries, stressed on the differentiation of the policy as well as restated its commitment to the people-to-people contact (EaP Riga Declaration, 2015). In reality, this summit was coined by the Latvian Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs as ‘survival summit’ (Gotev 2015a). To start with the preparation of the Joint Declaration, it was a difficult endeavour, as the members of the Russia-led Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union, namely Armenia and Belarus, were blocking statement on the ‘illegal’ annexation of Crimea (Jozwiak 2015). The situation was clouded by the

---

46 All four cases and Russia’s role behind their decision are discussed in details in the later part of the thesis.
division of the Eastern Partnership into the countries with and without the Association Agreement. By that time Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have already concluded the agreement, while Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus were at different levels of motivation and ambition on how to cooperate with the EU (Kostanyan 2015). Therefore, it became more difficult to come with a unified offer on democratization of the EaP.

The Formal and Informal Ministerial Dialogues

The EU has organized a number of Ministerial Dialogues of the EU national Ministers, Commissioners together with the EaP Ministers from the sectoral Ministries. Since the Eastern Partnership was established, the Council of Ministers has launched cooperation within the following EaP institutions. Firstly, as suggested in the Prague Declaration, the Ministers of the Foreign Affairs from the EU Member States as well as EaP countries were holding annual meetings. Promptly after, the informal meetings of the Ministers were launched with an aim to convene twice a year. Finally, similarly to the Council of Ministers, the multilevel system was developed within the EaP multilateral dimension which has allowed involvement and participation of the civil servants and expert community into preparation of the meetings at high level.

As to the annual meetings within the EaP, as it was previewed by the Prague Declaration the EU Ministers of the Foreign Affairs as well as the EaP counterparts convene together with an aim to discuss the progress achieved (EaP Prague Declaration 2009: 8-9). According to the Joint Statement of the EaP Ministerial Meetings of 2012, they have discussed the implementation of the Road Maps elaborated by the European Commission and High Representative. At the 2013 meeting, they intend to review the implementation of the Roadmap and to discuss further development (EaP Ministerial Meeting 2012), as well as the discuss the preparation of the Vilnius EaP Summit. According to the Lithuanian MFA Linkevičius during the meeting, the EU Ministers also aimed at encouraging the EaP countries to achieve concrete deliverables prior to the Summit (Civil Georgia 2013).

Regarding the sectoral Ministerial Meetings, those were firstly developed within one direction of transport issues. Already in 2011, 33 Transport Ministers (EU 27 and 6 from the EaP) have met with met Siim Kallas, Vice-President and EU Commissioner for Transport.
The agenda points were developed on regulatory approximation and market integration as well as on new project ideas on the better transport connections (Lithuanian Presidency 2013).

As to the informal meetings of the Ministers, known as the Informal EaP Dialogue, it was established in Sopot, Poland in 2010. During this meeting, the partners have discussed the practical implementation of the EU policy, the financing principles, as well as the methods of implementing the respective stages of the EaP. They have also discussed the possible involvement of the EaP countries in designing and implementing activities and projects (MFA of Poland 2010). Later, the official aims of these meetings was explained as aiming at ‘strengthening the link between the bilateral and multilateral processes, of boosting the sense of joint ownership of the Eastern Partnership and of fostering a regional dynamic’ (EaP Roadmap 2012: 11).

The major success of these informal meetings is involvement of the Belarus delegation. Taking into consideration that Belarus does not have regular bilateral relations with the EU, the involvement of the Belarus Minister and other officials lays down the ground for a dialogue. As the result of this informal dialogue, the Belarus MFA Makei who was banned from entry into the EU (due to his implication into the human rights abuse) was invited to attend the annual EaP ministerial meeting held in Brussels in June 2013. Having suspended the EU entry ban for the term of his participation in the Ministerial meeting, the EU leadership has rebuilt a narrow bridge to the fragile EU-Belarus relations (A. Gardner 2013).

Today those ministerial meetings cover different areas, such as transport, environment, culture, as well also the highly political issues, such as foreign policy and national security. These meetings are preceded by the discussions and meetings at the expert level. The good governance and liberal economy, as pillars of democratization, are embedded into and promoted through these meetings. For example, the recent Ministerial meeting on the Digital Community, was aimed at ‘supporting better market opportunities, connectivity, mobility of people and good governance’ (Hahn 2016).

**EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly**
The discussions on the establishment of the Parliamentary Assembly for the Eastern European partner countries were launched in the European Parliament by Mr Saryusz-Wolski in 2006 and preceded the establishment of the Eastern Partnership. The official idea behind this parliamentary cooperation was to bring the legislators from the European Parliament and the Eastern neighbourhood with an aim to discuss both legislative and political issues. The grant goal behind this interaction was to share with the legislators from the east the EU experience in good governance and transparent parliamentary practices.

Already in June 2008, the European Parliament has organised a Parliamentary Conference called ENP-EAST, inviting representatives of the six Neighbourhood countries. Belarus was represented by the democratic opposition. In the final conference statement, the idea of creation of EURONEST was adopted (Saryusz-Wolski 2009). This idea was to address the ‘matters of mutual interest, such as democracy, sound governance and stability, economic integration, energy security and interaction between people’ (ibid: p. 2 quoting European Parliament President of that time, Mr. Pöttering).

After it was formally enlisted in the Prague Declaration inaugurating the Eastern Partnership, this multilateral framework of cooperation conducts annual plenary session to discuss regional matters of the common interest within four thematic standing committees: political, economic, energy and social. The EURONEST PA laid an important preparatory foundation for the legal approximation of the EaP countries with the EU acquis communautaires. While bringing the national legislation into the conformity with the EU one was/is one most difficult task for the legislators from the east, the Parliamentary Assembly became a platform to voice their challenges, to discuss their priorities and action plans, but also to address the EU with their recommendations and vision on the cooperation.

With the launch of the Eastern Partnership, two years later in the Warsaw Declaration the states have acknowledged that the EURONEST PA played ‘an important role in supporting progress towards the realisation of the objectives of the EaP’ (Warsaw EaP Declaration, 2011: 7). However, from the interview with the former co-chairs of the Euronest PA, Mr Tarasyuk, it became clear that the participants were experiencing three major challenges in

---

47 From an interview with Mr. Saryusz-Wolski, MEP, chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee and initiator of the Parliamentary Assembly.
48 From interview with Mr. Saryusz-Wolski, MEP, 20.04.2013, Brussels.
the cooperation. Firstly, the partner countries were/are at the different levels of integration with the EU. Secondly, none of the Eastern Partnership countries exhibited strong motivation to cooperate at the regional level. And finally, all six countries have more or less difficult relations with the Russian Federations\textsuperscript{49}. Therefore, finding common issues for discussion was becoming more and more difficult while reaching any satisfactory agreement on the contradictory issues was often becoming impossible.

Regardless of the factors which complicated the cooperation, this platform has created a premise to ease the tension as well as laid foundation for further discussion on the contested issue\textsuperscript{50}. For example, in the situation when the conflict resolution efforts in the framework of the Minsk Group\textsuperscript{51} have had limited success, the EURONEST PA has brought together the conflicting parties: Armenia and Azerbaijan. These two conflicting countries have even agreed on the common resolutions in the framework of this parliamentary cooperation, for example on the Resolution on Regional Security Challenges in Eastern European Partner Countries. Definitely, the EURONEST PA made a platform for security dialogue. As well as it serves a platform to discuss the accomplishments and challenges of the legal approximation with the EU.

**The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum**

The Eastern Partnership has for the first time officially institutionalized the involvement of the civil society from both the EU and the partner countries from the East. The purpose of the Forum is to establish networking among NGOs and to facilitate their dialogue with state authorities pushing them towards the democratic practices and reforming. The aim of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum was/is ‘to serve as a civil society and people-to-people dimension of the initiative that will contribute to democratic and economic transformation of the Partners countries’ (The EaP Civil Society Forum 2014). The Civil Society Forum operates on the same principle as the thematic platforms and receives financial support from the European Commission. Its documents, elaborated during their reunions, send an important message to their national governments and the EU – all these

\textsuperscript{49} From interview with the Co-President of the EURONEST PA, former MFA of Ukraine, Borys Tarasyuk, 24.04.2013, Kyiv.

\textsuperscript{50} From interview with the administrator at the European Parliament, Eastern Partnership and Russia Unit, Michal Czaplicki, 21.06.2013, Brussels.

\textsuperscript{51} The Minsk Group is the OSCE efforts of peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
activities are crucial for democracy (Kaca, Kucharczyk, and Łada 2011). Consequently, with the Eastern Partnership what we have witnessed was the shift from the traditional path of democratization which is elite-driven to the ‘bottom-up’ perspective (Fiedlschuster, 2016: 87).

Additionally, the EU has launched new instruments in support to the civil society. The first one is the instrument called Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility. This facility supports financially projects which were/are led by civil society and are relevant in the context of the Eastern Partnership and EU’s aim of democratization (ENP Info Centre 2016). The second new instrument is the institution – European Endowment for Democracy (EED) – established by the EU in 2012. The EED is an independent foundation which maintains distance from European institutions, while other instruments are subject to the priorities which are set by the European Commission which need no approval from the partner countries (Kaca and Kaźmierkiewicz 2013). Therefore, the EED sets its own priorities based on the internal assessment of the needs in the neighbourhood, including the Eastern Partnership countries.

These new instruments manifested that support to civil society as an agent of democratization has become a substantive item on the EU’s agenda which for years was relatively neglected. These new instruments which were reinforced by the previously existing European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights have composed a powerful package of democratization. It has allowed strengthening civil society organizations organizationally as well as enabled them to step up with their advocacy activities (Kaca and Kaźmierkiewicz 2013).

As the conclusion to the multilateral mechanisms of the Eastern Partnership, the democratic principles and values are steaming from the set of multilateral frameworks of cooperation. According to Kratochvıl, the EaP’s multilateral framework has several major strengths which support the overall EU’s idea of democratization of its Eastern neighbourhood. Firstly, that was the relatively simple and flexible “operational structure”; secondly, that was the rigid focus on regulatory reforms aimed at democratization; thirdly, the introduction of the so-called flagship initiatives and finally the increased involvement of the civil society (Kratochvıl 2010).
6.2.2 Bilateral Track

Another instrument with the help of which the EU has channelled its democratization efforts towards the Eastern Partnership countries was the Association Agreement, which has constituted the bilateral track of the relationship. Designed to replace the PCA, this agreement was envisaged as the enhanced form of partnership. This type of agreement was heavily modelled on the pre-accession agreements – called ‘Europe Agreements’ – which were offered to the future EU Members of 2004 enlargement (Raik 2012). Differently from the ‘Europe Agreements’, the Association Agreement was seen by some as a new generation of comprehensive agreements without the membership prospective (Hillion 2013).

The ‘enhanced agreement’ (the initial name) was firstly offered in 2006 prior to the launch of the Eastern Partnership as the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was elapsing (Š. Füle 2013). In the course of the Eastern Partnership development, the Association Agreement (the new name) was offered and started to be negotiated with all countries (with the exception of Belarus which was under the EU sanctions). The implementation of these agreements and their eventual benefits for the five countries were expected to convince Belarus to rethink its strategy. Therefore, the Association Agreements were seen as a promising element of democratization.

Officially these agreements were leading towards progressive enhanced political association and deep economic liberalization (Youngs & Pishchikova, 2013: 3-4). This new association with the EU had to be built on a set of overwhelming political, institutional and economic reforms, which meant adoption of a wide range of the acquis communautaires. Consequently, this bilateral track was seen as a natural extension of the EU’s norms and rules on the territory of the six partner countries.

All of these reforms were to be based on the EU norms and standards. However, as before, this cooperation was conditional. The EU ‘offers a degree of economic integration, financial assistance and fund political dialogue in exchange for reforms and democratization’ (Wilson & Popescu, 2009: p 13). Therefore, the compliance was remunerated by a variety of instruments which comprised financial support, access to EU’s market and even visa free regime.
The Association Agreement, which was/is a cornerstone of the bilateral track, was supported by one more important element – the visa liberalization – which means EU’s offer to facilitate access for the Eastern Partnership citizens to the EU in return for reforms in defined areas. The conditionality on democratization, as defined in the political and trade part of the Association Agreement, was interlinked with the visa liberalization or facilitation for their citizens. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner has explained this circle of conditionality in the following way:

‘Building relationships with the Eastern Partners has to be a two way street. They want freer trade and easier travel. The EU wants to encourage reform. We can only make real progress on Free Trade Agreements with economies that are genuinely ready to open up to competition. And we can only offer visa facilitation to countries which have secure travel documents, properly run borders and arrangements for readmission of returnees. But if we want to protect our security, we need to be willing to move on neighbours' key desires. This means opening our markets to goods from new competitors. It means allowing - in controlled mobility partnerships - greater access for workers from these countries when they bring skills we lack in our job markets. And it means devoting EU taxpayers' money to the initiative’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2009).

The following part of this chapter discusses the different aspects of the bilateral track of cooperation applied by the EU with aims to reinforced democratization of the six partner countries. Firstly, this is a political part of the Association Agreement which aims to establish a rule of law state. Second part is the trade component of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The final part is the offer of free movement of people – the Visa Liberalization Action Plan. Even though, from the first glance these elements are different, they are interconnected with conditionality, reinforced by the monitoring of reforming, and united with the global aim – approximation of these states towards the EU’s style of democratic state.

**Political Part**

The Association Agreement is foremost a political document which is aimed at democratization of the Eastern Partnership countries. The political reforming, which is all
about democratization, better governance and rule of law, were a subject of strong conditionality. However, there is a broader spectrum of the requirements which is a non-negotiable must for these countries, namely respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law; political dialogue, justice, freedom and security (European Commission 2014b). Consequently, EU does not only demand the reform process in these areas, but it is also monitoring the abidance and protection by the states of the existing common shared values.

To secure the effective democratization to the partner countries, the EU needed tangible results in any of them (Youngs and Pishchikova 2013). Differently from before, when the main condition was free and fair elections (Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010), now EU has decided to develop a closer cooperation which were conditional to rigid reforming. In return, the political part of the this agreement, was offering ‘shared commitment to a close and lasting relationship’ (European Commission, 2014b: 1).

In more than 1000-page bilateral document, EU offers a unique instruments which could make desired political association a reality (Van der Loo, Van Elsuwege, and Petrov 2014). The preamble, the most important political opening to the documents, sets the general tonality of the enhanced cooperation between the EU and the given country, which is based on the common values and shared history. It also sets an objective in progressing towards convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas. The document covers in details prioritisation and sequence of the approximation process at the national, sectoral and regional levels (Wolczuk 2014). A number of reforms were to align the legislation of the EaP partner countries with the EU acquis communautaire by exporting the regulatory framework towards these countries.

**Trade Part**

The innovative part of the Association Agreement was not a political one, but a trade part – the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (Koeth 2014). The trade part of the Association Agreement makes about 80 % of the document. The objective of concluding these agreements is to enhance the gradual integration of each Eastern Partnership country into the internal market of the European Union. By giving access to of these countries to the EU market, the EU expected to increase trade and promote the welfare of their societies.
Eventually, it was to form a stable and more predictable relations with the liberal democracies established in the Eastern Partnership region.

The ‘deep and comprehensive’ means that the agreement goes beyond trade tariffs. According to the European Commission this is a framework for modernising the trade relations of the partner countries and for their economic development by the opening of markets via the progressive removal of customs tariffs and quotas and by an extensive harmonisation of laws, norms and regulations in various trade-related sectors (European Commission, 2013a: 2). The ultimate goal is to eliminate tariffs and non-trade barriers⁵² which impede trade between the EU and the relevant countries.

All these concepts, including the ‘deep and comprehensive’ part, were readopted by the EU from the ‘Europe Agreements’ which were offered to the CEECs prior to their access (Bildt, 2015: 6). Therefore, EU was applying a previously successful scheme to partner countries which were demanding Membership (like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). However, instead the EU has offered conditional access to its markets.

The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) was designed as a template for substantial reforming which was inevitably leading to the closer regulatory integration of the partnership countries with the EU in a number of areas, such as specific service sectors, energy, competition policy, procurement, and adaptation of the phyto-sanitarian measures. As all these demanded significant financial and administrative investment, the EU has committed to support this difficult journey while being focused on a common objective of building a liberal state. Therefore, the Prague Declaration, inaugurating the EaP has clearly stated EU’s objectives with this overwhelming trade component of the Agreement:

*New Association Agreements, beyond existing opportunities for trade and investment, will provide for the establishment of the objective of establishing deep and comprehensive free trade areas, where the positive effects of trade and investment liberalization will be strengthened by regulatory approximation leading to convergence with EU laws and standards. Open markets and economic integration are essential to the sustainable economic development of the partner countries and to*

---

⁵² There are numerous examples of non-tariff barriers, for example restrictive licencing, unjustified sanitary and phyto-sanitary conditions, complex regulatory environment, product classification, corrupt customs duty, quota shares, etc.
underpin political stabilisation. Establishing bilateral deep and comprehensive free trade areas between the EU and partner countries could in the long-term perspective grow into a network of deep and comprehensive free trade areas (EaP Prague Declaration, 2009: para 5).

The DCFTA was anticipated to bring some significant benefits in the long-term prospective. Firstly, it would potentially improve welfare through better access different number of goods coming from the EU markets, it would also introduce stricter safety requirements for products on domestic market of the partner countries; and it would eventually lead to higher incomes in long-run due to more new business opportunities and more efficient allocation of the resources. Secondly, it would give the partner countries access to the largest world market of their domestic products. Thirdly, it would make the products of the Eastern Partnership countries more competitive on the global market if they successful undergo harmonization with the high EU standards (Movchan & Shportyuk, 2012: 16).

At the same time, the DCFTA had some significant limitations. On top of expensive approximation with the EU acquis and standards, there were some political shortcomings from this type of cooperation. The DCFTA was indeed bringing the partner countries closer to the Single Market, at the same time the Eastern neighbours had limited access to EU’s agricultural markets, as well as to the funds and had no say in setting common rules (Koeth, 2014: 25).

**Visa Liberalization**

The offer of granting visa free regime or at least visa facilitation granted for the citizens of the Eastern Partnership countries has become an important tool enhancing reform process and therefore contributing to stronger democratization (Cadier 2013). The Prague Eastern Partnership Summit on 7 May 2009 has reaffirmed the EU’s long-term objective to grant full visa liberalisation for citizens from the partner countries provided that conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place (Prague EaP Declaration, 2009). Differently from other EU offers, such as deep and comprehensive trade for example, free visa travel to EU is tangible and a very concrete offer which is easy to understand. Therefore, the conditionality of reform agenda as a precondition for visa liberalization gave a strong incentive to comply with the EU’s reform requirements (Shapovalova and Youngs 2012; Shapovalova 2010).
The visa liberalization was seen as remuneration for an achievement; therefore, the path towards visa free is paved in stages. The first one is the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements which is accompanied with the Mobility Partnership. By these agreements the EU offered more relaxed travel conditions which consists of cheaper and faster way of obtaining visas (European Commission 2013d). In exchange EU has demanded endorsement of the Readmission Agreement and implementation of reforms in domestic justice and home affairs (Kruse and Trauner 2008). As of 2016, two countries, namely Armenia and Azerbaijan,\(^{53}\) have recently concluded the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements. As to Belarus, the conclusion of this type of agreements with the EU is conditional to concrete progress with regards to the democratic standards.

The next step is the visa liberalization with the EU, which means that the citizens who are holders of biometric passports can travel to the Schengen zone countries without visa. The conditionality for visa free is defined by the European Commission in the Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP). The VLAP identified the benchmarks a given country needs to meet in order for its citizens to travel with no visas requirement. Each VLAP consisted out of four blocks:

- **Block 1: Document security, including biometrics**
- **Block 2: Integrated Border Management, Migration Management, and Asylum**
- **Block 3: Public Order and Security**
- **Block 4: External Relations and Fundamental Rights**

The individual recommendations mentioned in the VLAPs were presented by the European Commission to the governments of the respective countries. If the first two blocks are rather of technical character, the last two are about the rule of law, justice, and fundamental rights – all are the aspects of democratization. Those included judiciary reforms, laws on freedoms and liberty (for example on equal treatment), and even constitutional amendments. The

---

\(^{53}\) Armenia - the EU-Armenia Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements were signed and entered into force in January 2014. Azerbaijan signed the Visa facilitation Agreement in November 2013 and the Readmission Agreement in February 2014. Belarus aims to start negotiations on a Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement and on a Mobility Partnership, however, for that Belarus needs to make steps to improve EU-Belarus relations. All three countries have signed the Mobility Partnership.
European Commission was regularly assessing the progress made by these states and regularly producing Progress Reports and recommendations on how to improve.

Eventually, following the scrupulous fulfilment of the VLAP, the European Commission has issued a positive assessment on Moldova’s fulfilment of recommendations. Consequently, it was granted visa liberalization on 28 April 2014 ‘based on the progress made by the country in implementing major reforms in areas such as the strengthening of the rule of law, combating organised crime, corruption and illegal migration and improving their administrative capacity in border control and security of documents’ (Council of the European Union 2014). Given this accomplishments, the VLAP seemed to be an effective instrument of democratization.

As to Georgia and Ukraine, those have also obtained positive assessment by the European Commission in 2016. For Georgia, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos said: ‘Today's proposal recognises the efforts of the Georgian authorities to carry out far-reaching and difficult reforms with a significant impact on the rule of law and the justice system’ (European Commission 2016c). In case of Ukraine, Commissioner Avramopoulos said: ‘This is the result of the success of the Ukrainian government in achieving far-reaching and difficult reforms in the Justice and Home Affairs area and beyond, impacting on areas such as the rule of law and justice reform’ (European Commission 2016d). Consequently, based on a compliance with a set of reforms both countries were promised the visa free in the nearest future.

The visa free regime with the EU, which is a highly aspired aim for the people of the given countries as well as a strong political bonus for the leadership which has achieved it, has turned out to be one of the strongest incentives for democratization of the Eastern Partnership countries. For example, Ukraine had to comply with 144 clauses (UNIAN quoting Commissioner Hahn, 2016), while Georgia had to comply with a similar amount of legislative preconditions.

Granting visa liberalization became also an instrument of democratization. The visa free regime will be granted upon the guarantees of the state in non-reversibility of the reform
preconditions under which the visa regime was granted\textsuperscript{54}. This means that should a state slide-back on the democratic reforming, the EU Member States can suspend the visa free regime for the given country until the laws and/or institutions are again put back into place.

6.3 **Financial Support to the Liberal Democracies in the Eastern Partnership - Support of the Association Agreement Introduction**

The integration and approximation with the EU via the Association Agreements is a costly process; therefore, the EU was ready to support its preliminary application when needed. In order to support the process financially, the EU has foreseen significant support for the Eastern Partnership countries. As of 2007 this financial support was allocated via the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). During 2007-2013 EU has disbursed €2.5 billion for cooperation programmes with the Eastern European Partners (European Commission 2016b).

As of 2014, in the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which is successor of the ENPI, for new programmes in the Eastern Partnership EU has committed EUR 730 million. Those programmes address the needs and priorities of the EaP countries, for example the macro-economic stabilization of Ukraine or support to the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Georgia and Moldova. The funds of the ENI are invested in three major sectors, namely justice, public administration reform, agriculture and rural development, education or private sector development with an aim to maximise the impact on sector reforms of the partner countries (European Commission 2016e).

Additionally, every year the countries can apply for funding from the ENI ‘umbrella programme’. This additional support serves as an incentive-based mechanism which is to reward progress in building deep and sustainable democracy (ibid: 6). Therefore, ‘EU has

\textsuperscript{54} This condition was under long discussion on visa suspension mechanism in trialogues between the Council, European Parliament and Commission. However, this condition was already mentioned in the AFET Opinion to the Visa Free for Ukraine prepared by Member of the European Parliament, Mr Saryusz-Wolski. The document says: ‘In order to further incentivise reform process, a monitoring mechanism should be introduced ensuring that EU has a leverage while monitoring continuous implementation of the anti-corruption and rule of law legislation. The currently considered suspension mechanism is not sufficient, as it focuses only on migration risks, and it should be completed by adding continued fulfilment of required standards and benchmarks.’ Full text following the link: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&mode=XML&language=EN&reference=PE583.952&secondRef=02
mobilised different instruments and resources to support democratic transition and inclusive growth in the region’ (ibid: 5).

6.4 **Involvement of other International Financial Institutions**

In the Eastern Partnership, the EU has involved other financial institutions to support the reform process in these countries. In the Prague Declaration it is stated: ‘The participants of the Prague Summit encourage the European Investment Bank, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and other International Financial Institutions to step up their efforts to assist all partner countries with the reform and modernisation process and to identify suitable investment projects’ (Prague EaP Declaration, 2009: para 18, p 11). Both were to support a number of projects in transport, energy, telecommunication, infrastructure and environment, as well as the SMEs. Previously their mandate covered only five countries, excluding Belarus due to the inadmissible democracy and human rights situation.

As of 2016, the European Investment Bank, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development mandate has extended on all Eastern Partnership countries and including Belarus, which only recently has restarted the Human Rights dialogue with the EU and has made some small steps towards toward democracy-building. Therefore, the involvement of these institutions into the investment projects in these countries was and is still conditional to the democratization as well as to the EU’s assessment on their progress.

6.5 **EU’s vision of the Russia’s Involvement**

The EU tried to stay open and inclusive with regards to Russia. Previously, Russia has opted for a special type of relations with the EU and was not willing to be covered by the EU’s neighbourhood policy. At the same time, Russia was benefiting from some financial support from the EU, had access to the ENP programmes and was offered to be a participating state to the EU’s Black Sea Synergy initiative. However, formally Russia was not involved into the Eastern Partnership.

The EU was looking for the way to indirectly invite Russia to contribute to the Eastern Partnership objectives or at least to make a gesture of involvement. In 2010, at the informal meeting of the Eastern Partnership Foreign Ministers, the Polish MFA, the Polish MFA,
Radosław Sikorski, has initiated the ‘Group of Friends’ of the Eastern Partnership, where Russia, along with Norway, Canada, the United States and Japan was invited to join the initiative. Commissioner Füle has welcomed this idea by saying that ‘third countries outside our circle of 33 can also make valuable contributions to the implementation of Eastern Partnership objectives’ (Š. Füle 2010a). The Russian Federation, along with some other states, was invited to join some of the programmes within the multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership in order to support the implementation of its objectives.

**To sum up on this chapter**, the EU’s Eastern Partnership was an ambitious policy launched with an aim to extensively and comprehensively promote the democratization in six partner countries. The democratization plan was modelled on the EU’s successful policy of integration with the partner countries through conditional remuneration for the promotion of the EU values and principles as well as for the adoption of the EU’s acquis communautaire and standards. Every step of approximation with the EU was remunerated with more financial support and access to new projects. Therefore, it was envisaged that eventually the Eastern Partnership would help six partner countries to become fully-fledged European-style rule of law states which would be governed by democratic values and functioning on liberal democracy principles.

For the EaP countries, the EU was offering different instruments which would help them to build a liberal democracy; however, again it has failed to address their security problems. Therefore, the EaP countries, which were ready to democratize were immediately facing security challenges from Russia – and at the end they could do nothing to oppose, as the EU’s policy did not equip them enough to protect their democratization aspirations. This aspect is discussed in details in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7: 2009-2016 Russia Versus EU’s Enhanced Democratization

This chapter discusses Russia’s agenda after the Eastern Partnership was launched. Firstly, it discusses Russia’s vision of the developments in the Eastern neighbourhood. Secondly, it introduces to the alternative projects which would off-set EU’s democratization agenda. Thirdly, it looks into the contradictory ideas based on which its alternative projects were launched. Fourthly, it frames Russia’s actions within the normative, economic and security dimensions. And finally, it explains Russia’s tailor-made actions taken towards the individual countries of this region.

7.1 Russia’s Vision of the Eastern Partnership

With the launch of the Eastern Partnership, the rhetoric of the Russian leadership on the initiative was rather reserved, cautious and somehow sceptical. As the state-led media outlet ‘Izvestia’ has put it: ‘Medvedev has promised not to intervene in EU’s development of the Eastern Partnership’ (Izvestia 2009). In this article, President of that time, Mr Medvedev was quoted saying: ‘How can I urge the states not to participate in this or that association, if the states consider it being advantageous?! ... I do not see anything extraordinary in this ‘Eastern Partnership’. But frankly speaking and I do not see a particular benefit from it. But I do not see anything and aimed directly against our country’ (ibid). After he has continued by stating that he got reassurance from the EU Members States which were offering Russia ‘all kinds of associative forms of participation’ in the new initiative (ibid). The President has confirmed that Russia was not excluded from the Eastern Partnership as the EU tried to find modalities of how to include Russia. Finally, he has also expressed hopes that the Eastern Partnership would not be some kind of anti-Russian project by saying: ‘Of course, if there is to be discussed any kind of anti-Russian themes, I like the President will not like it, but I hope that our partners will refrain from it. And let discuss whatever they want’ (ibid).

Later Russia’s Foreign Minister has also used an opportunity to express his worries at the Brussels Forum held in 2009. At the event itself, Mr Lavrov has started his intervention with a rhetoric question on whether the Eastern Partnership ‘was envisaged to mislead <the post-Soviet countries> from the path which they were to choose freely’ (Трешенков & Грецкий, 2012: 128). As the result of this his European counterparts have engaged into a dialogue aiming to explain Russian Foreign Minister the harmlessness of the new initiative.
Later President Putin has confirmed his rather positive impression of the Eastern Partnership initiative, by stating the following: ‘Our first reaction on the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, of the idea of itself, was very positive. Why? Because we depart from an idea that Russia and Eastern European countries are interlinked with thousands of threads between them, including in the economic sphere. ... We have departed from a belief that Europe will start cooperating with us, will bring them closer, and it will inevitably lead to a constructive process of cooperation with Russia. And we will cooperate. On some issues we would argue, on others – agree, but we would come to common conclusions, which would allow us to create a common economic, and as a final aim – humanitarian and political space’ (Putin 2015). Nevertheless, while the project was advancing and further developing, the Russian leadership and its academic community have started discussing three main arguments explaining why the Eastern Partnership is of conflictual nature to Russia and its upcoming integrationist projects.

A) Argument 1: ‘The Eastern Partnership Offsets Russia’s Influence’

The first argument, which was developed and advanced by the Russian leadership (and it has also resonated with the Russian academic community), was that Russia was excluded from the project as EU’s aim was to offset Russia’s integrationist projects in the post-Soviet space. Already in 2014 Lavrov has concluded that ‘the EU programme of the Eastern Partnership, despite of our warnings and precautions from its early beginning, was developed privately, and it became clear that it was conceived on the basis of the zero-sum games logic, as a tool to counter the integration process with the participation of Russia’ (Rossijskaya Gazeta quoting Minister Lavrov, 2014). The domestic expert community has supported this opinion by concluding that the introduction of the Eastern Partnership ‘has synthetically made Russia a third party <meaning redundant> in this programme, and therefore, it means also <making it redundant> - for the participant countries’ (Гаман-Голутвина et al., 2014: 5).

The next logical conclusion according to the pro-state Russian academic circles was the interpretation of the Eastern Partnership as a buffer zone. According to the Russian pro-state expert community from MGIMO, ‘the Eastern Partnership would also create a space, which would negatively impact the implementation of the projects by Moscow on the economic and political integration of the post-Soviet countries, meaning it would serve as a buffer between
Europe and Russia’ (ibid). In the same publication, they further explained that differently to the officially declared aim and objectives of the Eastern Partnership, ‘in reality the strategy of the accelerated political approximation and of the economic integration between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine was a reaction on the reinforced international position of Russia and <the integration> was aimed at achieving domination over the Northern Eurasia and subordination of the politics of the mentioned states, including, in case if needed, by means of destabilizing this space’ (Гаман-Голутвина et al., 2014: 20-21).

**B) Argument 2: Democracy promotion and economic integration is EU’s attempt to establish full influence over the shared neighbourhood**

The Eastern Partnership, which according to the Russian leadership was enveloped into democratic principles and liberal state building, was seen as a threat to Russia’s influence. The values and democratic principles were often interpreted as EU’s or Western worldview, by promotion of which EU tried to pull the Eastern Partnership countries under its influence. The democratic values, such as effective and democratic governance, rule of law, human rights, as well as the principles of market economy and sustainable development, were seen as ‘strong motors of integration driving the Eastern Partnership’ (Гаман-Голутвина et al., 2014: 4). According to the MGIMO academicians, with its help the EU tried ‘to modernize six post-Soviet states on its own European way, and therefore reinforce its influence over these countries’. Therefore, another aim of the EU’s policy is to reinforce its position within those six states (Сергунин 2010: 207).

Some leading experts from the MGIMO academic community have concluded that whereas the ENP was programme with no clear normative boundaries, the Eastern Partnership was seen as a programme which was ‘increasing an extensive economic, political and cultural influence of EU in the Eastern neighbourhood’ (Гаман-Голутвин, Пономарева, & Шишелина, 2014: 21). Moreover, according to them, ‘as a result of this, an active policy aimed to integrate the post-Soviet countries in the area of the EU influence under a strict condition on ceasing ties with Russia has not only seriously complicated regional cooperation, but has established a restricted zone, instability and has also formed a ‘continental rift’ (ibid). Consequently, according to the Russian academic community, the EU’s values serve as its fortress securing the influence.
C) Argument 3: the Eastern Partnership is a conflictual concept to Russia’s integrationist projects

Shortly after the Eastern Partnership was launched, Russia has furthered its integrationist projects (these initiatives are discussed in the later part). The expert community from MGIMO has concluded that during the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, ‘its potential for conflictual nature was growing, which became apparent during the purely ideological confrontation of the integrationist platforms of the ‘Eastern Partnership’ and the Eurasian Union’ (Гаман-Голутвина, Пономарева, and Шишелна Л. 2014). The EU academic community has also acknowledged that the clash with the Western values has led Russian leaders to argue that the EU is only a self-asserting, normative, postmodern power which follows its own agenda in the region (Nitoiu 2011b; Wilson and Popescu 2009; Averre 2009). Therefore, the Russian leadership has focused on renewed and reinforced integrationist projects which would secure Russia’s influence over the six countries. Those elements are discussed in the later part.

7.2 Russia’s Alternative Projects to the Eastern Partnership

With the introduction of the Eastern Partnership, Russia’s leadership has started to actively develop and promote its own integrationist projects. After the Eastern Partnership was launched, year-by-year Russian leadership was proposing new integrationist projects bringing integration to a higher level. Starting with 2010, the project has gone from the Customs Union to a single market within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union. Therefore, the Russian integrationist projects have undergone a very rapid development since the Customs Union was launched.

In January 2010, the common customs tariff of the Customs Union was launched. It was introduced by the key regulatory document named the Customs Union Code and was led by the executive body – the Commission – which has immediately become operational. Nevertheless, this was not the first attempt to launch the Customs Union. It was a project in making for the last two decades. In 1995 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and later Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the first agreements on the establishment of the Customs Union. Later their commitment was renewed in 1999 in a new treaty on the Customs Union, which was
also setting an ambition to establish the Eurasian Customs Union. In 2007 the treaty setting up the Eurasian Customs Union was signed, and finally only in 2010 the Customs Union has become fully operational (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012b).

The next integrationist project was the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area (CIS FTA) in 2011. The agreement on its establishment, which was pushed by Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, was also signed by Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia as well as some Central Asian States,55 at the same time Georgia and Azerbaijan have not signed. This one CIS FTA, being comprehensive and overwhelming, was to replace other multiple economic agreements previously concluded by the CIS (M. Russell 2017). It would also allow remove barriers to trade between the contracting parties and leave them free to shape their trade policies towards third countries. The question, which was immediately raised, was why this agreement is needed and what its added value is in the situation where similar agreements were already in place since 1991 (M. Russell 2017).

The next step of the Russia-led integrationist projects was the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union. In October 2011, President Putin has announced that the Economic Union would be launched as of January 2012 and would cover Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The Izvestia article by Vladimir Putin had an ambitious titled: ‘New Integration Project for Eurasia – Future, which is Born Today’. In the text, Vladimir Putin introduced this project in the following way: ‘with no exaggeration a historic milestone not only for our three countries, but also for all the post-Soviet countries’ (Putin 2011). This Union would give ‘access to 165 million consumers, unified legislation, and free movement of capitals, services and workforce’ (ibid).

The final step in the economic integration was making the Eurasian Economic Union operational. Finally, this project was launched in 2015 with Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan as its members. With a seat in Moscow, its supranational body named the Eurasian Economic Commission develops and implements the policies. The policies include managing the following areas:

55 The Central Asian states which have signed this agreement were Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan.
- The Customs Union which establishes the common external trade tariff and, in principle, guarantees free circulation without customs barriers of goods between its members;
- Internal market (similarly to the one in the EU), which is about free movement of goods, services, persons and capitals;
- Macroeconomic coordination, which is about coordination of the economic policy, as the members have agreed to keep the budget deficit below 3% of GDP and public debt below 50% of their GDP;
- Competition policy, which aims at monitoring the anti-competitive behaviour of two or more states;
- Energy policy, which focuses on establishment of the common market, for example the next big object is to establish a common electricity market by 2019 and a common gas and oil one by 2015 (which did not happen), as well as to harmonize standards and establish competitive pricing;
- Agricultural and regional development, which envisages coordination of the policy, such as agricultural subsidies and market support; however differently from the EU this policy states exclusively national competence (M. Russell, 2017: 4-5).

Differently from the EU’s project of integration, this one does not invoke shared values. What is very visible is that this is an economic project, which is built on the customs union, harmonization of the trade standards and better access to the market. According to Victor Khristenko, Chairman of the Eurasian Economic Commission, who was speaking of the founding treaty: ‘the Treaty lays down the legal framework for a common market of services which yet has to be established. The document sets forth the plans on joint elaboration of the industrial and agricultural policies’ (Eurasian Economic Community, 2015: 5). Therefore, technically speaking the political integration is not even a final goal behind the Eurasian Economic Union.

Nevertheless, while speaking of the Russia-led integrationist project, Putin made it clear that this integration is all about geopolitics by referring to its projects as a ‘pole in the modern world’ (Putin 2011). Therefore, the broader aim of these initiatives was to keep the former Soviet republics under the Moscow’s influence and to exclude the influence of the West (M. Russell 2017). What Russia wanted was the mechanism which would allow it to establish the
effective control over the Eastern neighbourhood with the help of structures which would allow it to manage, arbitrate and veto their relations with the EU (or the West in general), as well as to block any expansion of the Western influence on ‘its’ territories (Liik 2017). This supranational integrationist projects were of help in achieving this aim.

7.3 Paradox: Inspired by the Soviet Union and Built on the EU’s Experience

Paradoxically, the inspiration of the Eurasian integrationist projects was built on two opposing ideas. On one hand, the Russian leadership got inspired by the Soviet legacy, when the communist states were all united into the big super state. On the other hand, Russia’s leadership has also admitted building its new integrationist project on the EU’s model. One could doubt whether it is possible to be inspired, on one hand, by the totalitarian oppressive regime with command economy, and, on the other hand, with the system cherishing democratic values and liberal economy. Especially that both systems were in antagonistic relations for few decades until the Soviet Union collapsed. Apparently, it is possible. The part below discusses how the Russian leadership has combined two systems under its Eurasian project.

7.3.1 Soviet Legacy as a Foundation for Reintegration

Russia’s leadership got its inspiration by the Soviet Union, which is the model far from the democratic principles and economic liberalization. The first contemptible referral to the Soviet Union was in 2005, when President Putin has stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was ‘major geopolitical disaster of the century’ (Putin 2005). During his annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation he has also referred to the overall negative consequences for all the post-Soviet space: ‘Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots found themselves outside Russian territory ... and our ideals were crashed’ (Putin 2005). After the Eastern Partnership was launched, Russian’s leadership came back to this subject in the public discourse.

The reference to the ‘major geopolitical disaster’ has not remained a historical anecdote, as the Russia’s leader was regularly coming back to this discussion. In 2010, President Putin has
again expressed his strong regret about the Soviet Union has collapsed and underlined the unfulfilled expectations of the compatriots to be united under some new para-state formation. In his address, he stressed that ‘Many people in Russia and Ukraine, and in other republics hoped that then emerged Commonwealth of Independent States would become a new form of a common statehood. After all, they were promised the common currency, the common economic space, and the common armed forces, but all this remained only promises and the great state has disappeared’ (Putin 2010). Therefore, the global aim was to establish control over what was considered as Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.

In 2015, in an exclusive interview President Putin tried to explain that he does not want to restore the Soviet Union, but aims to defend Russia’s interest (Ingrassia 2014). Nevertheless, the same year, following annexation of Crimea in Ukraine and aggression in the East, on 9 May, Russia has held the biggest Victory Parade since the collapse of the Soviet Union (BBC 2015a). Therefore, shortly it became apparent that Russia’s interest it to have a Russocentric Eurasian Union, which would have a strong control over Moscow’s former empire (Umland 2015; Dragneva and Wolczuk 2014; Weitz 2014). And those are elements on which the Soviet Union was governed.

### 7.3.2 EU’s Institutional Set-Up as a Blueprint

The Russia-led integrationist projects were inspired by the EU. This fact was admitted by Russian leadership as well as can be empirically proven by analysing the institutional set-up of the EU. Therefore, some scholars have argued that Russia took EU as the blueprint for its Eurasian Economic Union (Dreyer and Popescu 2014). President Putin has partially denied and partially confirmed modelling the Russia-led integrationist projects on the EU experience. Firstly, he has confirmed that ‘it was the experience within the CIS which has allowed building the multi-level and multi-speed integration on the post-Soviet space’ (Putin 2011). According to the Russian President, this experience has also allowed building the State Union with Belarus, the CSTO, Eurasian Economic Union, Customs Union, and finally the common Eurasian space (ibid). On the other hand, later in the speech he has also reconfirmed drawing on the EU’s experience by stating: ‘Europeans needed 40 years to pave their way from the European Coal and Steel Community to fully fledged European Union. Building the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union is much more dynamic, as the experience of the EU and other regional organizations is taken into consideration. We see
their strong and weak sides. This is our strong advantage, which allows us to avoid mistakes and duplicating different bureaucratic curtains’ (Putin 2011).

The template of the Eurasian Economic Union looks extremely similar to the EU model. The Russia-led integration project includes strict harmonization of national legislation, furthering the political and economic integration with the rest of the members as well as foresees a set of mechanisms which safeguard the implementation of the commitments and common rules (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012b; Ademmer 2017a). It is also built on the Customs Union, which has allowed its member states to establish a common import duty on about 85% of the goods. The newly established internal trade was liberalized in most of the areas. Furthermore, there is no border control between its members56, but the members have reinforced border controls with the CIS neighbours which have opted to stay out of this union (Dreyer and Popescu 2014). The Russia-led Union has even included the famous ‘Four Freedoms’, which include freedom of movement of goods, services, people and movement of capital (Eurasian Economic Commission 2016). As the timeline on the Commission website indicates, the freedom of goods was to be fully implemented by 2011, of services – by 2015, and the other two elements – by 2025 (ibid).

The institutional set-up of this union is mirroring the EU’s institutional architecture, where the Eurasian Economic Commission is an epicentre of the decision-making with regards to the trade-related issues, harmonization of different types of standards, and is mandated to negotiate with the other trade blocks on behalf of its members (M. Russell 2017). As to the disputes between the members, those can be resolved in the Court of Eurasian Economic Union, ‘where the cases on discrimination and violation of the competition law as well as the business practices between states as well as of third parties can be discussed’ (Putin 2011). Similarly, to the EU supranational level, the leaders of states or governments also unite at the level of summits where they endorse general political strategy. This body is called the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council – a prototype of the European Council. The other intergovernmental body is the Council of the Commission which resembles the Council of the EU. As to the Parliament (which would be similar to the European Parliament), President

56 The Russian Federation has continued using the occasional reestablishment of the border control as an instrument of pressure on the union members, as it was used against Belarus in 2016 and 2017. It has also impeded transit of goods coming from Ukraine which have entered via Belarus and were to transit Russia on their way to the central Asian states.
Putin has also supported this idea (Putin 2013a); however for now this idea was not materialized.

It became clear that the projects are ‘an attempt by the Kremlin to create a rival to the European Union and its Eastern Partnership project’ (Dreyer & Popescu, 2014: 1). The establishment of the Customs Union has testified that the EU’s projects is not the ‘only game in town’ (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012b: 2), but that Russia will propose and further develop alternative plan challenging integration with the EU. Interestingly enough that these alternative models were built on the EU’s model of integration. Therefore, the next part analysis Russia’s integrationist projects within the normative, economic and security dimension.

7.4 Russia’s Offer of Equal Cooperation or Imperial Overstretch?

Having discussed Russia’s vision of the Eastern Partnership as well as the alternative project which it has started to actively promote, this part looks into Russia’s instruments, policies and strategies. As in the previous chapters, the part below goes into discussing the normative, economic and security dimension of Russia-led integrationist ideas which were implemented between 2009 and 2016.

7.4.1 Normative Dimension: Reuniting the ‘Russian World’ by All Means

The normative toolset has become key weaponry in achieving the specific integrationist ambitions of the Russian Federation. Differently from the EU, which has focused on the democracy promotion, the Russia’s approach was much complex and often contradictory: Russia’s leadership has continued developing its own proper normative doctrine, known as ‘Russkiy Mir’ (translation: Russian World). As it was also discussed in the chapter earlier the important components of its foreign policy, which were framed around this doctrine, were promotion of the Russian language as well as of the concept of the Russian compatriots whom Russian state is deemed to protect. However, as of 2009 new unconventional instrument was heavily used towards the neighbourhood – the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. This church, being influential in the conservative post-Soviet space and consequently it has become a valuable instrument of the Russia’s foreign policy. The
Moscow Patriarchate was used to promote the main idea of one nation which unites the post-Soviet space, especially Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

The Russian Orthodox Church, which was the only church allowed during the Soviet times and was strongly linked to Kremlin, has remained a strong pillar of the Russia’s soft power in the post-Soviet space (Sergunin & Karabeshkin, 2015; Sherr, 2013; Van Herpen, 2015). It has also gradually become ‘the most effective instrument of the Russian soft power in the ‘near abroad’ (De Waal 2011). Reliance of Kremlin on the church in attaining the policy objectives was and remains high. At the Valdia discussion club, President Putin has concluded that ‘without spiritual, cultural and national self-definition ... one cannot stand against external and internal challenges, neither can we succeed globally’ (Putin 2013c).

Therefore, while speaking of (Kievan) Rus’ baptism, in his remarks President Putin has explained the decisive spiritual and cultural significance of this event for Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the uniqueness of the Orthodox values in the modern world (Putin 2013b). In the same discourse in Kyiv, he has also stressed that the baptism is an important event for ‘all our nation’, and even though there are three different peoples, namely Russian, Ukrainian and Belarussian, all share the common spiritual values, which make these peoples one nation (ibid).

In this context, the Moscow Patriarchate, having moral authority over believers57, would explain and promote the Kremlin’s official policy line towards the former post-Soviet space and even by going on the mission and promoting it in the Eastern Partnership country. According to its status, the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate covers Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Estonia, as well as other Orthodox believers living in other countries which have voluntarily joint the church (Moscow Patriarchate, 2008: para 3). Therefore, the Moscow Patriarchate overstretches its influence and power to the post-Soviet space.

The global mission as understood by Patriarch Kirill was to reinforce the influence over the ‘near abroad’ via the church links and promotion of the ‘Russian World’ concept. Even

---

57 As published by the leading news agency in Russia in June 2016, Patriarch Kirill took the 8th place in ranking of the most influential politician in Russia, preceded by President Putin, Prime Minister Medvedev, Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, and few other prominent figures of Russia’s political life (Мигранян 2015).
though, the Moscow Patriarchate tried to maintain some influence over the post-Soviet countries since the Soviet Union collapse, the active involvement has started only after the Eastern Partnership was introduced. In 2009, during the third assembly of the ‘Russian World’, where the future of this policy was discussed, Patriarch Kirill has stated that the ‘core’ of the ‘Russian World and of the Holy Rus’ are Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus; according to him, the Russian Orthodox Church has a special mission towards these people (Patriarch Kirill 2009). In the same intervention, Patriarch Kirill also adds that Moldova is also a part of the Russian World (ibid). He also stressed that: ‘I believe that only a united Russian world can become a strong subject of the global international politics, stronger than any political alliances. In addition, without coordinating the efforts of the state, the Church and the civil society, we will not achieve this goal’ (ibid). Later the Patriarch would advocate for the special mission of Russia in this process, by saying that for centuries this state was uniting the lands around and that the genesis of this cooperation with Russia in the centre served as a role model for many in providing security and societal development (Patriarch Kirill 2010).

Similarly, to President Putin, in his speeches, Kirill has tried on numerous occasions to underline the unity of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine as one nation, which being decedent of Holy Rus’, are united by the Orthodox values. During his 75-anniversary in Kyiv, he has addressed Ukrainian people by saying: ‘the people who safeguard the great spiritual tradition of Holy Rus’ – will never weaken so that we may preserve the unity of our Church to which you have made such a great contribution. Through this unity we can feel spiritual power, through it we go beyond our national and ethnic limits, through it we develop an ecumenical vision and enter a divine ecumenical perspective’ (Patriarchal Ministry 2010). Consequently, by saying this, the Moscow Patriarchate, similarly to Kremlin’s foreign policy, has erased territorial boundaries between the states.

Having embraced his mission fully, Patriarch Kirill has paid a number of visits to these countries. He came to Ukraine in 2008, 2009, and three times in 2010. He has campaigned for pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych, conducted a special liturgy in Kyiv before his presidential inauguration and has also participated in the inauguration ceremony of Yanukovych (IBP USA, 2012: 57). As to Belarus, Kirill also came to Belarus in the framework of the ‘Russian World’ official programme, which was also considered as the neo-imperial programme of Russia (Van Herpen, 2015: 173). With regards to Georgia after the
2008 war, Kirill has addressed the freshly recognized by Russia so-called ‘states’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by saying: ‘Our brotherly churches, which are so close to each other geographically and cordially, should be two locomotives pulling our interstate relations out of the difficult situation they are now in’ (Quoted in De Waal, 2011).

Often the Church narrative would be against the Western democratic values. The close ally of Kirill, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, chairman of the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society, stated the following: ‘The Orthodox civilization stands in opposition to the Western democracy, whose downfall is not far off’ and that ‘multi-confessionality, multiparty systems, separation of powers, competition, administrative conflicts – all that the present political system takes pride in – are symptoms of spiritual unhealthiness. The very existence of a pluralistic democracy is none other than a direct result of a sin’ (quoted in Anderson, 2016). This is one example of many, where the Russian Orthodox Church walks on a fine line between the ‘godless West’ and the value-driven Moscow Patriarchate (Demacopoulos & Papanikolaou, 2013: 18), where the political and church leadership has instrumentalized the critics of the West on the basis of the ethical pretentious and legally reckless arguments with a final aim to justify their foreign policy (ibid: 200).

The analysis suggest that there was a growing convergence in the foreign policy messages of Kremlin and of the Moscow Patriarchate (Carter 2011; Blitt 2011), as both would symphonically resonate the official Kremlin foreign policy line (Petro, 2015). The coincidence of timing and synchronization between the messages delivered by Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate have suggested that the Russian leadership has united all forces to counter EU’s newly established Eastern Partnership policy (Van Herpen 2015). Consequently, the Moscow Patriarchate was one of the strong elements of the Russia’s normative agenda.

At the same time promotion and protection of the Russian language has remained one of the core elements of the normative policy aimed at the post-Soviet countries. As Minister Lavrov has stated: ‘We will actively further support Russian language, which is a uniting element of many <compatriots> living abroad, as well as <it serves as a basis> in developing the integrationist process on the CIS space’ (Rossijskaya Gazeta quoting Minister Lavrov, 2014). The same year, while speaking of Crimea after it was annexed by Russia, President
Putin has reconfirmed his devotion to the Russian-speaking population. 'Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people leave in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means’ (Putin 2014). In the same address, he has mentioned that ‘95 % of the people think that Russia should protect the interests of Russians and members of their ethnic groups, ... more than 83 % think that Russia should do this even if it will complicate our relations with some other countries’ (ibid). Therefore, the protection of the Russian-speaking population was and will be used by Russia as its foreign policy tool.

While comparing to the EU’s normative agenda of democracy promotion, the concept of the ‘Russian World’ was encompassing many more elements. Russia’s ‘soft’ instruments were going into a sensitive area by playing with historical and religious commonalities centred around Russia. The ‘Russian World’ concept was growing. It would smoothly transition into the constantly developing integrationist projects. This concept was also an integral part of the Orthodox Church, which interferes into the national politics of the Eastern Partnership countries. The ‘Russian World’ concept unites everyone who speaks Russian language, admires its culture and feels a special link to the compatriots living in the post-Soviet space. Consequently, the ‘Russian World’ policy was fully engaged into rebuilding the Russian speaking–Orthodox–Slavic community in the former post-Soviet space (Liik 2017). This means that the post-Soviet countries, and, foremost, the ones covered by the Eastern Partnership, were united by the Soviet/Russian culture, common language, historical memory of the common past, as well as traditional Orthodox faith.

7.4.2 Economic Dimension: Doubtful Economic Interest behind the Eurasian Economic Union

This part discusses the economic integration as a bond which was supposed to reunite the six countries around Russia. As the Chairman of board of the Eurasian Economic Union stated: ‘Closer economic ties improve the entire resistance of our countries’ economies to the continuous global economic recession and amplify the consolidated standpoint as the economic decisions on the global platforms are being develop’ (Eurasian Economic Community 2015). Consequently, this project was supposed to reinforce the economy of the participating states, similarly as it was done in the EU.
The economic benefit of the Russia-led projects was far from clear. As explained above, the Russia’s economic organizations were modelled on the EU’s model of integration. However, already from the beginning, it was clear that the economic benefit for the participating countries was doubtful, as ‘the greatest problem of the Eurasian Economic Union <is that it> has little to do with the economy’ (Astapenia 2015). Whereas the EU is mostly a union of the middle-size and small countries, the Eurasian Union is less balanced in its composition. Russia’s dominance of the Customs Union is overwhelming, accounting for 86% of the bloc’s GDP and 84% of its population (Dreyer and Popescu 2014).

Given the importance of the economic weight of the countries, the decision making was dividing accordingly. At the beginning the decision of the Customs Union Commission were to be taken by the qualified majority, according to which Russia’s votes weight 57%, while Belarus and Kazakhstan would have 21%58. Therefore, even if the two latter countries would act jointly, their votes would be not enough to counterbalance Russia’s proposal (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012b). Consequently, a striking asymmetry was seen in the way the states could influence the decision-making.

The lack of possibility to influence the decision-making brings uncertainty to the intra-trade between the member states in this Union. The mistrust and disappointment have started growing from the beginning, as the rules of the game within the Union were/are defined mainly by Russia and there is no external arbiter (i.e. WTO) which could potentially intervene into the process. The first challenge, which the states (except of Russia), have immediately faced was that the common external tariff was increased by two. As the common external tariff was largely based on Russia’s pre-WTO external tariffs, it had little impact on Russia’s economy, nevertheless both Belarus and Kazakhstan have immediately felt negative impact of the tariff on their economic situation (Shumylo-Tapiola 2012; Tarr 2016).

The second challenge was deriving from the limitation on goods which would be covered by the free trade. Moscow insisted on the free trade to be limited to the good produces by the Union states, Belarus was the first one to suffer as it was getting many products from the EU (Shumylo-Tapiola 2012). As it had no possibility to influence the decision-making, its

58 The official data post 2015, after the enlargement including on the Armenia, is not available. However, the voting weight, as calculated by the Russian professor, was expected to be the following: Armenia – 0.96%, Belarus - 11.2%, Kazakhstan – 6.46%, Kyrgyzstan – 2.35%, Tadzhikistan – 1.03% and Russia – 77.3% (Alieva 2015).
interests were not taken into account. Lack of trust and growing disagreements between the participating countries have led to trade wars mainly between Belarus and Russia.

The final big challenge was the distribution of the customs revenues. After some heated debate, the states have agreed to unite the revenue in one account and divide it in the following way: 87.97% to Russia, 7.33% to Kazakhstan, and 4.70% to Belarus (Shumylo-Tapiola 2012). There was a special arrangement between the states on the oil and the deriving from it products, which were made in Russia. The agreement was that 100% of export revenue for Russian oil would return to Moscow, even if Belarus and Kazakhstan would process and sell it (ibid).

The conflicting nature of the Russia-led project was not only internal, but also external. In the situation, when the global markets go for convergence of markets, the Russia-led projects have taken up the Soviet standards as the main benchmark. Eventually by 2012, the Soviet GOST system of standards has covered 62%, Russian standards covered 23% and the ones from Belarus only 14.5% (Shumylo-Tapiola 2012).

Few years into the Russia-led integrationist projects, it became apparent that there is a difference between what is on the paper and the facts. On paper, the Eurasian Economic Union is seen as economic and technocratic project, which would offer its members a number of benefits, namely in the area of easing cross-border trade. However, in reality it has resulted in their reorientation to the Russian market and their diversion from the global markets. Therefore, this economic integration project is unlikely to bring economy benefits to its members (Dreyer and Popescu 2014; Shumylo-Tapiola 2012; Tarr 2016). However, contrary to the expectations, this project has binded the economies of the member states to Russia, which on top of everything has also imposed its standards and economic preferences.

Therefore, while looking at the economic component of the Russia-led integration it becomes clear that what was designed as foremost an economic project is far from being such. Foremost, it offers little or no economic benefits for the member states. Russia’s economic integrationist ideas are overwhelmed with the geopolitical consideration of the dominance over the post-Soviet countries. As the decisions are top-down driven and there is insufficient attention paid to reforming of the domestic institutions, Russia’s growing geopoliticisation of the project was/is conducted at the expense of economic rationalisation (Dragneva and
Therefore, the functionality of this organization is weakened by internal and conceptual contradictions (Cadier 2013).

7.4.3 Security Dimension

Similarly, to the normative and economic dimension of the Russian foreign policy, the security dimension is also as complex as the other two. The legal documents, which are defining the security priorities, were also regularly changing given the geopolitical situation in the neighbourhood. On May 2009, Russian President Medvedev has endorsed the National Security Strategy until 2020, which served as a basis of the military doctrine and its foreign policy. Perhaps referring to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the document also stressed on the responsibility to protect Russian citizens in its neighbourhood (Nichol, 2011: 3). This document criticises NATO by referring to it, on one hand, as to an obsolete regional security organization, but, on the other hand, defining it as a threat. The next year, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was adopted, where again NATO is mentioned as a danger due to its enlargement and the development of the strategic missile defence system. It has also stressed on the importance to protect the Russian interest abroad (ibid).

Given the importance of the security dimension for the Russian Federation, the same documents were endorsed by President Putin. Consequently, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was signed in 2014 and the Strategy on National Security of the Russian Federation in 2015. Differently from before, the Military Doctrine introduce a much bigger list of threats, but one can assume, it also reflects the geopolitical reality of the moment, such as protests in Ukraine, change of the authorities, its aggression against Ukraine as well as the NATO military build-up following the war in Ukraine. However, the Russian Military Doctrine has its own interpretation of the events (Baev 2014). The document lists the following threats:

- the build-up of NATO military capabilities;
- destabilization of the internal situation in some states;
- the deployment (build-up) of the military contingents of the foreign states (or groups of states) on the territories of states adjacent to the Russian Federation and its allies;

Some threats, which are mainly of domestic nature, were deliberately omitted by the author of the thesis. Therefore this list is not full, as the selected parts serve the purpose of this this.
- territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies, interference in their internal affairs;
- the use of military force in the territories of States;
- the escalation of the armed conflicts in the territories of the states adjacent to the Russian Federation and its allies;
- establishment of the new regimes in the states adjacent to the Russian Federation, including as a result of the overthrow of the legitimate government bodies whose policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation (Федеральный Выпуск 2014).

After the endorsement of the Doctrine, the strategy has followed. Strategic stability and the development of the strategic partnerships is one of the pillars of the *Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation* (Presidential Decree 2015). Following the wars in Georgia and Ukraine, this document says that ‘Russian has demonstrated its ability to secure its sovereignty, state and territorial integrity, as well as to protect rights of the compatriots living abroad’ (ibid: para 8). In the same paragraph, the document also concludes the ‘growing importance that the Russian Federation plays in solving the international problems, settlement of the military conflicts, as well as securing strategic stability and supremacy of the international law in the international relations’. Consequently, the mentioned documents were justifying Russia’s interpretation of the events as well as its actions towards the neighbourhood.

Russia’s external security is built on different pillars which are aimed to justify its foreign policy goals. Firstly, it is institutional mechanism by means of the CSTO which would further integrate the post-Soviet countries under the Russia’s leadership. Secondly, it is about the protection of its interests and the interests of its Russian compatriots, which legitimises Russia’s influence over these countries.

**Collective Security Treaty Organization**

The CSTO members, namely Armenia and Belarus, along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have agreed to coordinate their security and defence policies and have

60 The regional developments are discussed in more details in the next chapter.
formed rapid-reaction forces for various contingencies. Similarly, to other integrationist projects, this one is also Russia-led and Russia-centred. Firstly, the organization is led by the Russian nation, Nikolai Bordyuzha, who serves as a Secretary General of this organization since 2003. Secondly, the more than half of the important events and decision were taken during the Summits in Moscow. Finally, Russians leadership has also advanced new projects of the CSTO, for example recently President Putin has invited the CSTO leaders to the newly launched National Defence Control Centre in Moscow and requested their countries to join the centre. Finally, most of the trainings and drills are conducted under the leadership of the Russia’s generals (Baev 2014).

Similarly, to other Russia-led organisation, the CSTO remains an organization with low viability. Its functionality is not supported by adequate staff and financial means, therefore it was seen as an empty bureaucratic shell (Baev 2014). This organization, being conceived as a regional response to NATO, has never proved itself in action. Foremost, it is due to the fact that it has no military capabilities to do so (Matveeva, 2013: 489).

For Russia, this institution serves as a legal base for its military presence in those countries. Formally, the CSTO is a mechanism which legalises the presence of the Russian militaries on the territories of the third country. In return they expect Russia’s readiness to step-in in case of a need of protection, which in case of Armenia is vitally important61.

**Protection of the Compatriots**

Protection of the compatriots has become one of the central elements of the Russia’s foreign policy. Following Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008 on the basis of the protection of the Russian citizens, in October 2009 Russia’s legislators have voted on a law providing the Federation Council with a power to use of troops abroad in order to protect its ‘peacekeepers’ and citizens (Nichol, 2011: 3).

As the next step, the protection of the compatriots has smoothly transited to the 2015 *Strategy of the National Security*. While taking the credit for effective and efficient protection of the rights of compatriots living abroad (Presidential Decree, 2015: para 8),

---

61 Armenia’s argumentation to join the CSTO is discussed in more details in the next chapter.
the same document suggest that ‘in order to reinforce the national security... <the Russian language> will be a base for the development of the integrationist processes on the post-Soviet space as well as measure satisfying language and culture needs of the compatriots leaving abroad’ (ibid: para 81). The same types of the formulation were later repeated in other documents, for example in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. The document sets Russia’s commitment to pursue the following:

- to ensure the protection of rights and legitimate interests of the Russian nationals abroad, which are subjects to the international law and international treaties concluded by the Russian Federation;
- to protect rights and legitimate interests of compatriots living abroad, which are subjects to international law and international treaties concluded by the Russian Federation, while recognizing the significant contribution by compatriots into preserving and promoting the Russian language and culture;
- to further the consolidation of compatriots living abroad so as to enable them to better realize their rights in the countries of residence, and to facilitate the preservation of the Russian diaspora’s identity and its ties with the historical homeland, as well as the voluntary relocation of compatriots to the Russian Federation (Russian MFA, 2016: para 45 d-f).

Consequently, these documents show how gradually, but consistently the protection of the compatriots has become one of the essential elements of the domestic and foreign policy. Even though, it is a regular practice for the states to protect the citizens living abroad, as mentioned in the chapter above, Russia’s strategy of protecting the ‘compatriots’ went beyond citizens and overstretched to the ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, but also included their families as well others who may have cultural or other connections to the Russian Federation. Following the 2008 war in Georgia, this definition of the ‘compatriots’ has become worrisome for other Eastern Partnership countries.

To conclude on the part discussing three normative economic and security dimensions, Russia’s policy seems to be multi-dimensional and rather complex. It became apparent that the common denominator for these activities is to secure and guarantee its influence over the post-Soviet countries. As President Putin stated: ‘Eurasian integration is a chance for the entire post-Soviet space to become an independent centre for global development, rather than remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia’ (Putin 2013c). Paradoxically, this integration
is built both on the Soviet legacy and on the EU’s institutional experience. The normative component of its integrationist projects is about promotion of the unity of all Russian speaking–Orthodox–Slavic communities living on the post-Soviet space. As to the economic component, the viability of the Eurasian Economic Union is challenged by the empirical data showing little economic incentives for the member states. The Russia-led CSTO project is more of an empty bureaucratic shell with no adequate funding and staffing.

Therefore, while looking at the Russia’s integrationist project it became clear that ‘the Eurasian Union is an expression of the Russian leadership’s desire to be perceived as representatives of not just a large Euro-Asian nation state, but of a geopolitical bloc or even of a distinct civilization of its own’ (Umland 2015). In political sense the Russian leadership has promoted the concept to strengthen Russia’s domestic stability, restore its status of a world power, and increase Russia’s influence in post-Soviet neighbouring states (Petro 2015).

7.5 Interpretation of the EU’s Actions by the Russian leadership

After the Eastern Partnership was launched by the EU and while Russia was advancing and/or relaunching its own integrationist projects, its leadership has started developing series of arguments explaining its vision of the EU’s/Western encroachments on what Russia considers as historically its sphere of influence (Kuchins 2014; T. German 2015; Bojcun 2015). In order to facilitate understanding of Russia’s complex approach, its arguments are divided into built on normative, economic and security dimensions.

7.5.1 Normative Dimension: Democratic Values as Western ‘Messiahship’\(^{62}\)

Since recently the EU’s soft power tools and values were under strong attack by the Russian leadership. Prior to the Eastern Partnership inauguration, Russia has portrayed itself as a pro-Western democracy. In 2007 at the Munich Security Conference, President Putin has underlined the devotion of the Russian people to the democratic principles following the collapse of the Soviet Union by saying: ‘But we should not forget that the fall of the Berlin

\(^{62}\) This term was used by Foreign Minister Lavrov in his remarks and answers to media questions at a news conference on the results of Russian diplomacy in 2016, Moscow January 17, 2017. Source: [http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWYmR/content/id/2599609](http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWYmR/content/id/2599609)
Wall was possible thanks to a historic choice – one that was also made by our people, the people of Russia – a choice in favour of democracy, freedom, openness and a sincere partnership with all the members of the big European family’ (Putin 2007a). The same year, in his article commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, President Putin has reconfirmed the commitment to the democratic values and principles, by stating that ‘today, while building a sovereign democratic state, we fully share the basic values and principles that forms the worldview of the overwhelming majority of Europeans’ (Putin 2007b).

However, already in 2012, in the context of the Arab Spring upraising, President Putin has launched criticism on the Western democratization efforts in his article to Moskovkiye Novosti. He claimed that behind the slogans of democratization, the EU hides its real foreign policy goals; the new tendency is that having no possibility to resort to the use of force, the West tries to exert new type of influence (Putin 2012). According to Putin, the Western ‘soft power’ is deployed to ‘develop and provoke extremist, separatist, and nationalistic attitudes, to manipulate the public and to conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries’, therefore ‘it is important to distinguish the human rights and normal political activities, and the illegal instruments of ‘soft power’’ (Putin 2012). Few years later, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov reconfirmed the same vision by giving an example of the developments in Ukraine and of the consequence of the ‘Arab Spring’ by saying: ‘I repeat, the export of democracy and values continues to sow problems in international relations. It is precisely the export of values and the demand to accept only the European view of things that triggered the crisis in Ukraine. The export of democracy and values led to the so-called ‘Arab spring’, and we are now reaping the consequences’ (Lavrov 2017).

However, recently the Russian leadership has started contrasting Russia’s value system and the EU’s liberal system. According to Russian leadership, differently from the liberal West, Russia is the defender of the true Christian values. In his 2016 article, the Foreign Minister Lavrov has stressed: ‘I perceive this as an echo of the eternal dispute between pro-Western liberals and the advocates of Russia’s unique path’ (Lavrov 2016). In the next article, he has stressed on the divide between the EU and Russia, by stating the following: ‘I'm referring to the divide between what underlies the foreign policy of a particular country – pragmatism, correctly understood national interests – versus messianism, the aspiration to disseminate values across the world, what’s more, according to the interpretation that has evolved and
developed within this group of states’ (Lavrov 2017). By the ‘group of states’ one could understand EU’s democracy promotion. Later in the text the Foreign Minister brings in precision by saying: ‘If we talk about Western and European values, which are constantly put forward as example for us, these are probably not the values the grandfathers of today’s Europeans espoused but something new and modernised, a free-for-all, I would say. These are values that can be called post-Christian. They are radically and fundamentally at odds with the values handed down from generation to generation for centuries in our country, which we would like to cherish and hand down to our children and grandchildren. ... There is a struggle between two trends. The messianic addiction to propagating values (there was the export of democracy, and now we can see an attempt to export values) stands in opposition to the growing desire of serious politicians to focus on pragmatically assessing their own interests, .... You see, I believe the clash between pragmatism and messianism in foreign policy is adding a new dimension to the contradictions that have been observed over the past few years’ (ibid).

The scrutiny of the negative consequences of the EU’s ‘messianism’ was followed up by the Russian officials and state institutions. Firstly, President Putin stated that the dimension of human rights scrutiny should not be given to anyone; therefore, the Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has launched its own Report ‘On the situation with the human rights in a number of states’ (Putin 2012). The series of these documents provided year-by-year scrutiny over the problems in the EU Member States, for example criticism of France with regards to its immigration policy, discrimination in Germany, racism and xenophobia in Sweden, etc (Russian MFA, 2011: 46-50). The document was also monitoring efforts of the European Parliament in evaluating the situation of the human rights in the EU, which according to the document ‘is half-hearted and impersonal: as only the problems are indicated, with no reference to which country this problem belongs to, and no specific examples of human rights violations’ (Russian MFA, 2011: 23).

The 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and approved by the President Putin also acknowledged the ‘threat’ from the ideological values imposed from outside. This document states the following: The ideological values and prescriptions, <which where> imposed from outside these countries in an attempt to modernize their political systems, have exacerbated the negative response of their societies to current challenges (Russian MFA, 2016: para 14). Therefore, in later part, this document
sets the goal ‘to counter attempts to use human rights theories to exert political pressure and interfere in the internal affairs of States, including with a view to destabilizing them and overthrowing legitimate governments’ (Russian MFA, 2016: 45 (b)). Steadily, but surely, the public discourse of Russia’s leadership on EU’s democracy promotion was reflecting Russians understand of the geopolitical reality and after this vision has found its place in the policy papers of the Russian Federation.

7.5.2 Economic Dimension: EU’s Offer of Economic Integration is Incompatible with Russia’s Projects

The biggest economic misinterpretation was of the EU’s offer of economic integration by means of the trade component of the Association Agreement. This component, known as Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), has resulted in series of discussions by the Russian leadership. The focal point of attention was Ukraine and its DCFTA with the EU.

The first argument advanced by President Putin was that by means of the DCFTA, EU’s products will flood Russia’s market. In his interview to the European media, President has explained Russia’s position on the DCFTA. First of all, according to the President in the framework of the DCFTA, ‘Ukraine takes an obligation to lower the external trade tariffs’, and as there will be an excessive amount of goods, ‘which will be pushed into our market, on the market of the Customs Union, on the market of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus’ (Putin 2013d). However, this is not correct, as the EU products which enter Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia in the framework of the newly established free trade agreement, would be a subject to the ‘rules of origin’, which is applied to all WTO members. This means that if products would transit Ukraine and arrive to Russia, they would be a subject Russia’s import tariffs, as they were ‘made in the EU’ (Emerson 2014).

The second argument was developed around the adoption of EU’s technical standards by the countries covered by the DCFTA, which according to Russia’s leadership, would hinder exports to Russia and other states from the Eurasian Economic Union as the latter have different standards. President Putin has specified, that ‘Ukrainian enterprises would have to produce everything, for example, elevators, cars, shirts, watches ... all following the technical requirements of the EU. Those are high standards, but very heavy ones, and
therefore require multi-million investments’ (Putin 2013d). Consequently, allegedly the trade flows would be disrupted, as according to the President, those enterprises in Ukraine would go bankrupt. President also gives example of rocket and space industry of Ukraine, which would not exist without Russia’s market. However, according to the EU experts, this argument is partially true, as the enterprises from the DCFTA countries would apply these standards only if these products would go to the EU market. However, they could also choose to produce goods for Russia’s market following its standards (Emerson 2014).

The official line of argumentation, which was advanced by Russia’s leadership, was supported by the Report published by the Academy of Science of the Russian Federation. The document titled: ‘Eurointegration of Ukraine: Prospects, Consequences and Russia’s Policy’ goes into deep analysis of the negative consequences of Ukraine’s integration with the EU. As it is stated in the report, the academics support the arguments advanced by President Putin (Громыко, Ананьева, & Борко, 2015: 23-24). It firstly confirms that Ukraine would serve as an ‘open door’ through which EU’s product will flood the CIS market; and secondly, the document also brings attention to the EU’s requirement imposed on Ukraine to follow its standards, norms and rules, which exist in the CIS (ibid: 23-24). The scientists have also stated the damage from the DCFTA will be about USD 2.5 billion (ibid: 24).

Contrary to the public discourse of the Russian leadership, the EU’s FTAs set now limits for economic cooperation, at the same time the economic model of any customs union sets barriers for its member states to conclude free trade agreements. In the Russia-led customs union, the member states set common external tariff as well as have agreed to conduct common foreign trade policy (Movchan & Giucci, 2011: 9). Consequently, Russia’s integrationist projects were not compatible with the EU’s DCFTA offer, as the members of the customs union may not negotiate free trade agreements with the third partner; whereas a state outside of the Customs Union can negotiate as many FTAs as it can (De Micco, 2015: 7).

In order to solve these misconceptions, which were mainly focused on Ukraine, the EU has offered trilateral negotiations during which these myths would be dismantled. During these negotiations representatives from EU, Russia and Ukraine were trying to openly discuss their concern and to settle the disagreement. After numerous rounds, the Russian Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev has concluded the following: ‘They want us to
agree with the reduction of Ukraine's obligations within the CIS free trade zone and at the same time to sustain our obligations on preferential trade, we believe that it is unfair and economically damaging’ (RIA 2016). Therefore, already on 1 January 2016, Putin has signed a decree suspending the free trade agreement with Ukraine. The title of the Decree is self-explicit: ‘On measures to ensuring economic security and national interests of the Russian Federation in the implementation of international transit transport of goods from the territory of Ukraine to the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan through the territory of the Russian Federation’ (Presidential Decree 2016). Therefore, even though, the arguments, which were advanced by the Russian leadership, go against the economic logics, many agreed that Russia’s goal of (non)-integration is primarily political rather than economic (S. P. Roberts and Moshes 2016; Weitz 2014; Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012b).

7.5.3 Security Dimension: EU’s Security by Means of NATO’s Expansion to the East is a Threat to Russia

The final aspect of misinformation or misconception was about EU’s cooperation with NATO, which will inevitably drag the shared neighbourhood into this military alliance. With regards to the Eastern Partnership, Russia’s leadership has advanced two main arguments. Firstly one is about NATO’s alleged promise not to expand eastwards. President Putin has quoted the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990, saying ‘the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee’ (Putin 2007a). However, he came back to this subject already in 2014 in the attempt to justify the annexation of Crimea, while framing it as a defence against NATO’s possible expansion to Ukraine. President Putin said: ‘...they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed before us an accomplished fact... It would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory [Sevastopol], and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia’ (Putin 2014). Speaking in other words, according to President Putin, Ukraine would be dragged into the Alliance. This alleged expansion had broader implications for the EU-Russia relations: ‘This is the essence of the systemic problems which have soured Russia’s relations with the United States and the European Union’ (Lavrov 2016).
The claim about the promise of the NATO’s non-expansion was refuted by the former Russian President, Mikhail Gorbachov, as well as by NATO itself. In his interview, Mr. Gorbachov clarified that ‘The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. ... Another issue we brought up was discussed: making sure that NATO’s military structures would not advance and that additional armed forces would not be deployed on the territory of then-GDR after German reunification. Baker’s statement was made in that context... Everything that could have been and needed to be done to solidify that political obligation was done. And fulfilled.’ (Kórhunov 2014). After the NATO has refuted this claim in a note saying ‘Should such a promise have been made by NATO as such, it would have to have been as a formal, written decision by all NATO Allies’ (NATO 2014).

The NATO has also collected a series of claims advanced by the Russian leadership and was systematically refuting them, including about the continuous threat of enlargement. The NATO fact sheet states that in close cooperation with the EU, both institutions have helped the nations of Central and Eastern Europe to advance difficult reforms during their pre-accession period; and therefore now the citizens there benefits from the democratic choice, the rule of law, and substantial economic growth (NATO 2014).

**To sum up on this chapter,** Russia’s integrationist projects did not constitute an appealing model of the integration which could potentially compete with the EU’s offer of the Eastern Partnership policy. This policy ‘is clearly seen by Russia as a vehicle for reintegrating the post-Soviet space, including the countries that fall within the sphere of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood’ (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012b: 3). Nevertheless, by advancing its alternative agenda, Russia was ‘backpedalling’ on democracy (Zamyatin 2004; Baran 2007b). Therefore, the benefits of Russia’s integration projects were immediately questioned and the argumentation of Russia’s leadership was challenged. Nevertheless, Russia has developed individualized approach towards each country covered by the Eastern Partnership with an aim to undermine EU’s influence, which are discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 8: Strategy towards Destruction of the EaP

The last chapter discusses the tailor-made approaches and attacks on the individual EaP countries, which were aimed to coheret them to joining the Russia-led organization. Immediately after the inauguration of the EaP Russia starts promoting its Eurasian projects of integration and for that it has actively started putting pressure on each EaP countries. While carefully considering the specificity of each EaP country and knowing well their vulnerability, Russia knew where to target. Leaving all Russia’s Doctrines and Strategies aside, this chapter introduces to how Russia has excercised its pressure with an ultimate goal to keep them away from final conclusion of the AA/DCFTA with the EU and by this preventing their extensive democratization.

8.1 Armenia

Armenia was one of the most vulnerable countries to Russian pressure. Knowing its weak sides, it was working towards the European integration. However, in 2013, after having finalized the Association Agreement with the EU, it made a U-turn in its foreign and consequently in its domestic politics by choosing Russia-led integrationist projects over the EU. Therefore, this part discusses the dynamics of these developments.

Armenia had a strong resolution to approximate with the EU. In order to facilitate this process, in April 2009, the EU launched an Advisory Group with ‘the aim of supporting the Armenian authorities in the implementation of the key areas of the ENP Action Plan such as strengthening democratic structures and human rights, anticorruption, trade and customs, and fiscal policy including debt management’ (European Commission, 2010: 2). A year later, within the bilateral track of this EaP, the EU and Armenia have started negotiating the Association Agreement including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.

However, already as of 2009-2010, Armenia has found itself in an extremely difficult situation. Firstly, the Russian-Georgia August war of 2008 has manifested the regional vulnerability and fragility. This was has brought attention to the weak defence capabilities of Armenia. Secondly, Armenia was strongly impacted by the economic crisis. According to the data produced by the International Monetary Fund, in 2009 the economy has contracted by 18
%, real estate prices have fallen by 34 %, and the remittances (80 % of which comes from Armenians living in Russia) and which amount about 18 % of the country’s GDP; consequently, its GDP has collapsed by 30 % (IMF, 2009: 5).

Nevertheless, joining the Customs Union was not on the political agenda of Armenia. In spring 2012 Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan gave an interview to the Russian daily 'Kommersant' in which he has stated that becoming a member of the Customs Union would be futile and from the economic perspective - not even reasonable (T. Sargsyan 2012). In this interview, the Prime Minister has unequivocally explained that Armenia has no common border with the members of the block; therefore such membership would be meaningless. As the Prime Minister has stated:

‘The meaning of the Customs Union is that the exchange of goods is carried out without customs inspection. In our case, this is impossible, because we have to go through the territory of a neighbouring state and double customs clearance. This makes all this simplification procedure meaningless for economic entities. In exchange, we would receive only problems related to the increase of customs duties and taxes. In the economic sense, this is impractical’ (ibid).

In the same interview to the Russian state media, the Prime Minister has answered a question why the Eastern Partnership project is not aimed against Russia. While defending the Eastern Partnership, he explained that Armenia being a small country should continue developing partnership with the EU and NATO. At the same time, it values its strategic partnership with Russia, which is also in its value not aimed against the EU (ibid).

Nevertheless, already by 2013, two month after Armenia has finalised its Association Agreement with the EU, it had to back out from this agreement (International Crisis Group 2016). The conclusion was that the Russian had exercised strong pressure on Armenia in different areas. Armenia’s decision can be justified by the following arguments:

- **Economic dependence**: being highly dependent on the remittances from Armenians working in Russia (IMF 2009; De Micco 2015), Armenia’s interest is to guarantee an agreement with the Russian Federation securing free movement of the work force and capital (Arutyunyan et al., 2013: 6). As the experts reported, Armenia was threatened
with a ban of Armenian exports to Russia, furthermore it was threatened with blocking private money transfers to Armenia via Russian banks as well as with deporting Armenian migrant workers (Grigoryan, 2014: 106).

- **Energy dependence**: in the interview to Euronews, Armenia President has confirmed that the Russian leadership told that Armenia could sign the agreement with the EU, but it would have pay for its energy at the market price\(^\text{63}\) (S. Sargsyan 2017). With this, Armenia was cornered. The other regional actor which could potentially diversify its gas supply were Azerbaijan; however, given the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict this cooperation is unlikely in the upcoming future. Consequently, by 2013, Gazprom-Armenia has obtained full monopoly on gas supply in the country. Following Armenia’s resignation from the Association Agreement, Russia has reconfirmed its commitment with regards to the energy price. In December 2013 intergovernmental agreement with Russia, Gazprom has pledged supplying Armenia with up to 2.5bcm of natural gas per year under the favourable price (De Micco, 2015: 21).

- **Security dependence**: Armenia explained its decision to join Russia’s umbrella as it needed security guarantees in the ongoing dispute with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh (Popescu 2014). Russia has already established strong ties with Armenia, as for example the 1995 bilateral treaty has allowed Russia to have its military bases in Armenia, the 1997 treaty allowed joint defence of borders with the non-CIS countries – this gave a right to the Russian border to control Armenia’s border with Iran and Turkey. Both treaties were recently updated and extended in 2010. Recently, in the framework of the CSTO, Russia has introduced two additional tools: firstly, right to veto establishment of new foreign military bases on the territories of the CSTO member states, and thus limited their cooperation with NATO; secondly, Russia has secured a possibility to intervene in case of internal instability under a CSTO Rapid Reaction Force mandate, thus to provide Armenian leadership with support in case if it is unable to suppress an opposition uprising (Grigoryan, 2014: 98-99).

The final drop with regards to the Armenia’s security was the 2013 arms deal between Russia and Azerbaijan amounting USD 1 billion (Saryusz-Wolski 2014). This deal has provided Azerbaijan with the most advanced Russian military equipment. Given that the Armenia’s

\(^{63}\) The market price would mean 70 percent increase in price.
state budget equals Azerbaijani defence budget (ibid), the latter had no choice, but to surrender to Russia’s ‘offer’ of closer friendship.

8.1.1 Dangerous U-Turn

The political U-turn of opting for the Customs Union was a dangerous move for Armenia. The expert community has brought attention to the growing asymmetry of the Armenian-Russian relationship. Firstly, this asymmetry derives from the institutional limitations imposed by the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. Secondly, it has also weakened the position of the domestic politic elites over its own population, which even though remains pro-Russian was never is not pro-Putin, but also pro-EU (Giragosian 2015). Therefore, this decision was met by widespread protest in Yerevan questioning the legitimacy of the changed vector of political integration (Stronski, 2016: 12).

Finally, the decision of becoming a part of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union has resulted in deepening Armenia’s already pronounced over-dependence on Russia. Consequently, this cooperation has set more limitations than benefits from this membership. For turning back on the enhanced treaty with the EU and for entering the Eurasian Economic Union, Yerevan was expecting to gain annual trade benefit amounting $250–$300 million, cheap energy price, as well as it was offered discounted prices for weapons after joining the Eurasian Economic Union (Stronski 2016).

The reality has turned out to be different: in 2015 exports to Russia have dropped by 26 %; even though, according to President Sargsyan, in 2016 the trade went up by 12 %, these figures have not contributed to re-establishing the profitable trade balance (A. Grigoryan 2014). Russia also promised Armenia to grant USD 200 million credit to bolster Armenia’s military capabilities with offensive military hardware and defensive equipment, which would also include ‘Iskander’ tactical missiles, Russian-made anti-tank weapons, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, etc (A. Grigoryan 2014; Minasyan 2015). But in 2016, according to Radio Free Europe, during the meeting with Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in Yerevan on April 7, his Armenian counterpart complained about a ‘certain slowdown’ in the implementation of the loan arrangement by the Russia’s state arms exporter (A. Grigoryan
Consequently, Arbahamian asked the Russian Prime Minister to instruct this state agency to ‘conclude the contracts’ with the Armenian side as it was previously agreed (ibid).

The final aspect is that Russia has skillfully instrumentalized this rapprochement with Armenia. According to the Carnegie expert, the Russian companies have managed to penetrate in a non-transparent manner into Armenia’s market (Stronski 2016). By means of the large-scale investments, the Russian firms have obtained dominant position in the key sectors of economy, particularly in the energy, telecommunications and mining sectors (Stronski 2016).

8.1.2 EU-Armenia Relations after the U-Turn

Given the new geopolitical reality, both EU and Armenia had to readjust the bilateral track of cooperation which would take Armenia’s commitment towards the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) into consideration. Regardless of the pledged and unrealised economic benefits from the EEU, the EU has remained the main economic partner for Armenia. According to Armenia’s official statistics bureau, exports in 2014 to the EU (which amounted 28.8 %) were higher than those to Russia and to fellow EEU members, namely to Belarus and Kazakhstan (which amounted 21.4 %); consequently trade with EU represents just under 30 % of Armenia’s overall trade turnover (M. Grigoryan 2015). This data explains why Yerevan was interested to resumed negotiations with the EU on establishing new cooperative framework for deepening trade and political ties.64

According to the European Council President following his meeting with President Sargsyan upon the conclusion of the new EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, ‘This new agreement will broaden the scope of our relations, taking into account the new global, political and economic interests we share and challenges we want to face together. We are looking forward to stronger cooperation in sectors such as energy, transport and the environment, for new opportunities in trade and investments, and for increased mobility for the benefit of our citizens’ (Tusk 2017). Nevertheless, the EU has

64 In 2017 Armenia has concluded a new agreement with the EU during the EaP Summit in November 2017. President Serge Sargsyan has stated the agreement is not as different when it comes to the political part (S. Sargsyan 2017). However, the trade agreement is limited by the commitments in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union; therefore, Armenia had to conclude an agreement which would not be contradicted by Russia (ibid).
stressed on the democratization, by stating: ‘We have discussed today our shared values including our commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, which underpin the new agreement and our future cooperation’ (ibid). Therefore, democratization has still remained in focus, even though Armenia has lost most of its sovereignty to Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union and even though the freedoms expressed by its people might be limited by the defence CSTO defence annexes.

8.2 Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is an interest case for both, the EU and Russia, as for years it has resisted the EU’s efforts of democratization as well as Russia’s influence (Cornell 2014; Alieva 2014). With regards to the EU, the relations have developed steadily since the 1990s. In 1999, the EU and Azerbaijan have concluded the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. This agreement has covered a range of parts, including political dialogue, trade, investment in economic matters, as well as it has included a heavy democracy promotion component; all was done according to the template which was also offered to other five countries. After that Azerbaijan was included into the European Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2004 as well as into the Eastern Partnership of 2009, which were followed by visa facilitation and readmission agreements, known as a Mobility Partnership.

When it came to the bilateral agreement within the Eastern Partnership, Azerbaijan has declined an offer on the Association Agreement/DCFTA. Instead it has asked for ‘Strategic Modernisation Partnership Agreement’ (Alieva 2015). The negotiations on the new comprehensive agreement (with no name yet) have started in 2017. While announcing the launch of these negotiations, President Tusk stated that ‘During our talks, I stressed the importance we attach to human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression. The EU believes that an open society is the best guarantee for long term stability and prosperity’ (Tusk 2017). The cautious formulation by President Tusk is a result of the previous tension with Azerbaijan, as any EU’s democratization efforts, including as EP
Resolutions\textsuperscript{65}, were taken as the anti-Azerbaijani critics and resulted in diplomatic collisions\textsuperscript{66}.

As to Russia, it tried to stimulate Azerbaijan joining the Customs Union as well as the EEU. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan had low economic interest in joining. The only benefit would be greater access to the Russian market. Firstly, it is about the free mobility of labour. However, legalising two million of Azerbaijani economic migrants in Russia would remove the only instrument of leverage for Russia over this country. Therefore, it is unlikely that Russia would accept it (Cornell, 2014: 145-146). The second argument would be the access of the agriculture products to Russia, which accounts 5\% of GDP, but employs up to 40\% of the population (\textit{ibid}). Nevertheless, it will have a negative effect on Azerbaijan, due to low productivity in this area comparing to other countries, as well as due to the highly vulnerable of Azerbaijan to oil price changes (Alili et al. 2013).

The biggest disadvantage in joining the EEU would be the obligation of a common internal and external energy policy (Pastukhova and Westphal 2016). However, for Azerbaijan Russia’s arrangement on the energy products was not favourable, meaning that 100\% of the revenues which result from the export of Russian crude oil must be returned to Moscow, including value-added profits on products which other member states refine and sell (J. M. Roberts, Cohen, & Blaisdell, 2013: 3). At the same time, in the given situation the gas deals between Russia and Azerbaijan are steadily growing, as the state led companies - Azeri Socar and Russian Gazprom - are regularly concluding new agreements with an aim to increase the gas export on the mutually beneficial terms (Alili et al., 2013: 14). Therefore, the Azerbaijan’s membership in the EEU would be beneficial for Russia, whereas for Azerbaijan this cooperation would be disadvantageous as it would lose control over its energy policy as well as lose the financial benefits from its energy deals with Russia as well as with other partners, for example the EU.

Currently, Azerbaijan supplies EU with around 5\% of the EU's oil demand and plays a pivotal role in bringing Caspian gas resources through the Southern Gas Corridor to the EU.

\textsuperscript{65} For example, following the adoption of the 2015 EP Resolution on the human rights in Azerbaijan (RC-B8-0856/2015), the Azerbaijani Parliament Mejlis has left the Eastern Partnership Parliamentary Assembly for almost 1 year.

\textsuperscript{66} The Euronest Co-Presidents have expressed ‘deep regret’ of the Azerbaijani withdrawal and stated that the ‘doors are open’ (Alieva 2015). Nevertheless, it took 1 year of ‘silent diplomacy’ to bring them back to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.
market (EEAS, 2016: 2). The Southern Gas Corridor project is to bring the Caspian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern gas to the EU; and therefore it constitutes a major diversification tool for the security of energy supply, given EU’s high dependency on Russia’s gas (ibid). Consequently, Azerbaijan, with its substantial oil reserves and the strategic location, is important for both the Eurasian Economic Union and the EU (Alili et al. 2013). This advantage allows Azerbaijan to seek ways to diversify its energy supplies (including in cooperation with Turkey and Iran), which boosts its economy, rather than entering into any type of exclusive cooperation. This fact has allowed Azerbaijan to conduct an independent policy from both the EU and Russia.

8.3 Belarus

Belarus is another interesting case, which for years was aligning its position with the Russian Federation. The loyalty of Belarus was insured by two main measures taken by the Russian Federation towards Belarus. Firstly, already in the 1990s, Russia has taken measures to constrain Belarus’s independence by deep integration of Belarus with the Russian state by means of different agreements and para-state state formation. Secondly, Belarus’ loyalty was remunerated and its independent steps were met with strong retaliation measures.

8.3.1 Paralysing Belarus’s Independence through Deep Integration

Deep integration of Belarus with Russia started in 1996, when two states have signed Treaty Establishing the Community of Belarus and Russia on political and economic integration. In 1999, Lukashenka and Yeltsin have signed the Agreement on Establishment of the Union State of Belarus and Russia setting up legal basis for integration between these two countries (Belarusian MFA 2017). According to the same website, both states were obliged to conduct the same policies. For example, with regards to security and defence, they have set up a joint regional military force, as well as they agreed to coordinate their air defence systems and to perform joint military drills. With regards to the law enforcement, they have built a unified crime database as well as started to coordinate a number of measures aimed at suppressing

67 According to the CIA data, Azerbaijan has 23rd place in crude oil, Russia is on the 1st place and the EU on 18th, Norway – 16th, and Kazakhstan – 15th, the UK – 22nd. The other countries mentioned on the list are outside of the Eurasian region. For more details: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html
crimes, terrorist acts and human trafficking. Both countries have a single system of social guarantees and have unified national legislation on labour issues (ibid). Year-by-year the cooperation was extending into many new areas, therefore today it is even difficult to estimate where the limit of the integration starts or ends.

The type of integration it has with Russia is deeper than the current Customs or the Eurasian Economic Union. President Lukashenko has agreed that the Belarus-Russia State Union might be abolished, however under a condition that the Russia-led organizations meet the same level of integration as the State Union provides it with. As President Lukashenka stated to the Russia-led media outlet TASS: ‘We can liquidate the Union State, if somebody wants to do so, under condition that the Customs Union or the Eurasian Economic Union reach the Union State level. We haven’t accomplished even half of it’ (TASS 2014). Therefore, as for now, the Russia-Belarus Union State constitutes the most advanced post-soviet integration entity.

At first, due to the deep integration with Russia, its memberships in the Customs Union and the EEU were not expected to have significant negative impact on Belarus (Tochitskaya 2010). However the research has produced different results., The calculation in the CASE study of 2010 suggested that Belarusian budget would have even gained from its participation in the Customs Union, as about 40% of the Russian imports would through customs clearance in this country, and the possible revenue would be transferred to Belarusian budget (under condition that it would not be redistributed among the member states) (ibid). Consequently, Belarus would be the only CIS country which might benefit from the Customs Union, as firstly, it has largely retained its Soviet-era structures allowing Russian state-backed companies to win better position in monopolizing the country’s economic assets (Dreyer & Popescu, 2014: 4). And secondly, the remaining divergences were addressed by the State Union with the Russian Federation; and consequently membership in the Customs Union and EEU had no visible impact as there were no adjustment cost and economic transition.

As to the cooperation in the defence, Belarus is also a member to the CSTO. Within this organization, Belarus has a series of obligations which cover three regional security complexes — the East European, the Caucasian, and the Central Asia. At the same time, the bilateral Belarus-Russian cooperation in the Western flange, such as military drills on the
EU’s eastern border, is much larger comparing to the one which exists within the CSTO, for example Vzaimodeistvie-2013 (F. Starr & Cornell, 2014: 13).

Belarus and Russia have significant experience of conducting bilateral military drills on the EU’s eastern border. During the recent Zapad 2009 and Zapad-2013 military drills, Belarus was used as a territory for the training by the Russian troops (Blank 2013). These drills were used for a comprehensive review of the command and control systems, for verifying the ability of the Russian armed forces to complete combined forces operations, as well as for testing the joint operations of Russia’s armed forces comprising land, sea and air forces operating simultaneously in a single operation (ibid). The fact that troops conducted the military drills under the command of the Russian generals posed a question on the independence of the decision-making of the Belarus leadership, when it comes to the security and defence. At the same time this Belarus-Russia duo, and their military so-called ‘cooperation’ under Russian command on Belarussian territory raised security concerns for its neighbours. Therefore, the upcoming drill, named Zapad 2017, which is expected to be the biggest military drill in the modern history, raised many concerns in NATO and the EU’s Member States, which border Russia and Belarus (Kowalik, Tomasz K Jankowski 2017).

8.3.2 Remunerated for Loyalty, Punished for Independent Actions

The loyalty of the Belarus leadership was generously remunerated by Russia. Firstly, it was granted low energy price, which equals USD 100 per 1000 bcm and got a promise that by 2025 the gas price for Belarus will be equal to the one of Russia (Drakakhrust 2016). Another example was in 2009, when Belarus leadership has decided to build a nuclear plant on the border with the EU, already in 2011 Russia has committed disbursing USD 9.4 billion for this project (Korosteleva, 2012a: 240). Finally, Belarus is also heavily dependent on subsidies, as it benefits from duty-free oil imports since 2007 and at the same time it applied 30% of duties to other importers; consequently throughout the years, this difference gave Belarus significant income accounting USD 2 billion in one year of 2014 (Alp Kocak & De Micco, 2016: 28).

Nevertheless, every independent decision by the Belarusian leadership was met with the retaliation measures on behalf of the Russia. For example in 2009, when Belarus has joint the Prague Declaration launching the Eastern Partnership, Belarus has met different types of
transactional disputes and conflicts with Russia (Korosteleva, 2012a: 240-241). The conflict was also aggravated by Belarus’ disagreement to acknowledge the ‘breakaway’ regions in Georgia following the war with Russia in August 2008 (ibid). Few years later, in 2014 Lukashenko has labelled Russia’s annexation of Crimea as ‘a bad precedent’ and a year later has refused Russia in building the airbase on its territory (BBC 2015b; Reuters 2014). The cost of these demarches was banning access of a series of Belarusian food products to the Russian market during 2014-2017 on the ground of phyto-sanitarian concerns and suspicion of infection (Германович 2017). Given that some food export to Russia brings Belarus more profit than oil exports, Belarusian producers have experienced significant and irreversible losses.

The recent conflict arose in 2017 when Belarus has decided to introduce visa-free regime for tourists, including from the EU. As the reply to this measure, Russia has re-established a border with Belarus which has significantly hampered the bilateral trade relations. Then President Lukashenka has also accused Russia of trying to bolster its influence over energy pipelines situated in Belarus and of using oil and gas supplies as a leverage of power. As the reaction to this measure Belarussian President has stated: ‘Russia has often grabbed the oil and gas pipeline. It is happening now as well, ... after such conflicts they have always told me, 'We went a bit too far'. But why to grab the vital thing? Why to grab us by the throat?’ (RFE/RL’s Belarus Service 2017). Therefore, it is clear that the Belarus leadership experiences constant and regular pressure from Russia.

Regardless of this pressure, the strong relations with Russia as well as its financial support dismiss any thought of its potential departure from Russia-led projects. As a proof to this statement is a fact that regardless of numerous threats and regular pressure from Russia, Belarus leadership has regularly refuted allegations on its plans to leave Russia-led organizations. Consequently, Belarus is seen as a ‘reluctant follower’ whose sovereignty was sold for Russia’s financial support (F. Starr and Cornell 2014).

8.4 Georgia

Georgia has entered the Eastern Partnership with 20% of its territory being occupied by the Russian troops following the 2008 August war (Tamkin 2017; Cenusa et al. 2014), which
Currently station some 40 km away from the Georgian capital Tbilisi (Reuters Staff 2008). Since the 2008 war these territories have become a powerful destabilizing instrument. On top to the military instrument undermining security of the state, Russia has also used trade and energy as tools to pressure the state of Georgia. Therefore, in the part, what is discussed is firstly Russia’s strategy vis-à-vis the ‘break-away territories’ of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Secondly, how Russia has hit Georgia’s strategic infrastructure. As the third instrument, that was Russia’s economic measures.

8.4.1 ‘Break-Away Regions’ as the Sword of Damocles over Tbilisi

On 26 August, the Russian Federation has officially recognized the South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent. As the pretext for Russia’s intervention, it has referred to the referendum asking to intervene which has manifested the clear will of the people. According to the Russian President of that time, Mr Medvedev, ‘Presidents of the Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, having based on the referendums and the decision of their parliaments, have decided to address Russia asking to recognize the state sovereignty of the Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Federal Council and the Russian State Duma have voted to support these requests’ (D. Medvedev 2008c). Later in 2017, while recalling the 2008 war, Mr Medvedev stated: ‘There is no doubt that Russia will always protect its citizens, ... I am speaking of citizens of the Southern Ossetia, which had Russian passports and about our peacekeepers, who were there to support stability in the region. We were protecting them’ (Interfax.Ru quoting Medvedev, 2017). Therefore, again the official justification of the intervention was protection of its citizens.

Following the August 2008 war in Georgia, the Russian troops have remained in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Their presence was hanging as the ‘Sword of Damocles’ over the Georgian decision-maker. Given the proximity of the Russian troops, during 2009-2011 a number of terrorist attacks took place in Tbilisi allegedly organized by the Russian forces (Kapanadze 2014). Regardless of the efforts to prove Russian connection, the implication of the Russian military intelligence and the suspicion of the Russian officer Yevgeny Borisov,

68 The other countries which have recognized the independence are Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, as well as the other Moldova’s Transnistria, and the recently established on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh so-called Artsakh.
who was stationed in Abkhazia, has remained unproven as Kremlin has refused to cooperation with the investigation (*ibid*).

Nevertheless, the Russian encroachment has not stopped there. Instead, it has engaged into a series of actions, which were further destabilizing Georgia. Firstly, Russia started with the ‘borderization’, meaning that the Russian border guards have set the so-called ‘state borders’ of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia republic with barbed-wire partitions or other obstacle which would be moved over night further into the Georgian territory (Higgins 2016). This ‘creeping’ shift of the occupation line has even physically divided villages and even farmlands (Socor 2013). In this process, the Russian troops are officially helping to guard the so-called borders between the two regions and the rest of Georgia (Gerrits and Bader 2016).

The next action undertaken by the Russian Federation was the conclusion of a wide range of agreements with the South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Just few weeks after having recognised their independence, Russia and two regions in question have signed ‘Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Support’. These agreements, which touched on a wide range of issues, including a pledge to defend the sovereignty in case of aggression. Those agreements went even further by granting access to build the military basis and by allowing the foreign country to use them. On 17 September, 2008 having signed these agreements the Russian President of that time, Dmitry Medvedev, has stated ‘The agreements we have signed contain provisions enabling our countries to take the necessary joint measures to remove threats to peace and respond to acts of aggression. We will provide each other with all necessary support, including military support ... I want to take this opportunity here and now to stress that any repeat aggression by Georgia (and revanchist feelings are visible there, unfortunately, and the state is continuing its militarisation) would lead to a regional catastrophe. There should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that we will not allow another military adventure’ (D. Medvedev 2008c). This meant the following: should Georgia make any effort to reclaim the occupied territories, Russian troops would be quick to respond to these actions.

Already few years later, Russia has signed enhanced treaties of cooperation: in 2014 with Abkhazia and in 2015 with South Ossetia. For example, the treaty with Abkhazia suggests

---

69 The latest action of borderization took place in June of 2017 and constituted of placing the green border signs marking the territory of the South Ossetia further into the Georgia’s territory (Morrison 2017).
that the aim of the relationship is ‘cooperation and strategic partnership in the following domains: common and coordinated external policy, establishment of the common defence and security space, establishment of the common social and economic space, support of the social and economic development of Abkhazia, creation of the favourable environment for full participation of the Republic of Abkhazia in the process of integration on the post-soviet space, which are initiated and (or) encouraged by the Russian Federation’ (Russian-Abkhaz Treaty, 2014: Art 3). It goes even further, namely into the establishment of the joint military unites, which would jointly protect the Abkhaz borders with Georgia (ibid: Art 5). The treaty also includes a NATO-inspired Article 5, stipulating that aggression against one state will be treated as an aggression against the other one (ibid: Art. 6.2). The treaty also obliged the states to start with the gradual unification of the military standards of command as well as to supply the Abkhaz troops with the modern type of weaponry (ibid: Art. 8.1). Russia will cover all the financial expenses related to this modernization (ibid: Art. 8.2).

Similarly, the 2015 Treaty with the South Ossetia stipulates in the first article that the parties agree to conduct a common foreign policy, and in return, Russia guarantees integration of this ‘state’ into the international community and to promote it international recognition (Russian-South Ossetian Treaty, 2015: Art 1.1). The Russian Federation guarantees of the defence capability and being security provider to the South Ossetia, including protection of its borders, and in order to insure that some military unites would enter the Military Forces and Security Agencies of the Russian Federation (ibid: Art 2.1-2). Similarity to the above-mentioned treaty with Abkhazia, this one also gradual upgrading of the defence capabilities of the military defence capabilities of the South Ossetian troops (ibid: Art. 4.4) as well as foresees Russian’s military assistance in this process (ibid: Art. 4.5). This treaty also envisages integration with the other spaces defined by the Russian Federation, such as the Customs Union (ibid: Art. 5), but also with the educational, medical and pension schemes (ibid: Art. 7-12).

The high level of economic and security linkages made the South Ossetia and Abkhazia de facto Russia’s protectorate (Rukhadze 2014). For example, about 80% of what Abkhazia consumes enters from Russia and most of the FDIs, which come into these regions, are from Russia (Gerrits and Bader 2016). Both regions have gradually integrated into the Russia’s economy, by even adopting its technical and commercial standards, as well as the unification of the electricity grids (ibid). The above-mentioned treaty has also foreseen unification and
approximation of the laws with the ones existing in the Eurasian Economic Union, and ‘in case of its absence, with the one of the Russian Federation’ (Russian-Abkhaz Treaty, 2014: Art 11). Both treaties have foreseen simplification of granting Russian citizenship to these break-away regions (Art. 13 in Abkhaz and Art. 6 in South Ossetian Treaty).

Both separatist regions, being fully integrated into Russia’s defence and security system constitute a perpetual threat to Georgia. This threat had also a major political threat and impact on the decision-making of Georgia’s leadership. Therefore, two occupied regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are Russia’s trump card in hindering Georgia’s rapprochement with the EU and in its democratization (Kapanadze 2014).

8.4.2 Hitting Georgia’s Strategic Infrastructure

The August 2008 war has exposed the vulnerability of all its strategic infrastructural project. During the recent decade, the EU and the US were developing new energy export infrastructure, consequently making Georgia an epicentre of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan, Baku–Supsa oil pipelines and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum. It was foreseen that these new pipelines would bypass Russia and would make not only Georgia, but also other Caucasian states more independent.

The second project idea was the new railway connection. The idea was that Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey would become connected by the common rail system. This would allow to create a much shorter and faster railway corridor linking Asia and Europe (Kakachia 2011). Consequently, Georgia would become a hub for both energy and railway routes with strategic importance both for the EU and Asia. Be it energy pipelines or transport projects, the goal was to help Georgia in gaining more independence from Russia.

The way Russia saw it is that these projects would undermined Moscow's hegemony in the region, which it considered to be its own ‘strategic backyard’ (T. German 2009). Therefore, one of the biggest reasons behind Russia’s military intervention into Georgia in 2008 was mainly the new Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. This was/is also EU’s vital energy connection linking EU with the Caspian Sea and the Central Asia energy pipelines (Brzezinski 2009a). Given the
military conflict in August, the projects, as well as air and maritime traffic were immediately halted (Kakachia 2011).

Even though, the war has not directly affected the infrastructural project, the conflict has demonstrated vulnerability of these project ideas given their proximity to the conflict areas (Kakachia 2011). Years into conflict, the recurrent movement of the borders by the Russian guards, known as ‘borderization’, has brought new tensions. For example, recently Georgia accused Russia of violating international law after its troops have built new ‘border’ markings on so-called South Ossetian-Georgian border. This movement has led to effectively seizing part of a BP-operated oil pipeline Baku-Supsa (North 2015). Georgia has advanced the same accusation with regards to Russia’s actions in Abkhazia (ibid).

8.4.3 Russia’s Economic Instruments

Russia knew well the weaknesses of Georgia and this is where it was aiming. On one hand, Russia’s economic influence on Georgia remains limited. As according to the data from the
Statistics Office of Georgia (Geostat), which is seen from the chart below, the five biggest investors in Georgia were and remain Azerbaijan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Panama, and the Netherlands. Russia is not even mentioned as the FDI investor in Georgia (Geostat 2016). Moreover, since 1996 Russia’s FDI into Georgia was steadily shrinking, accounting to 2% in 2012 (Kapanadze, 2014: 2).

FDI by major investor countries in Q4 2016 is shown in table No. 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>389</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of which:
- Azerbaijan
  - 64
  - 78
  - 110
  - 89
  - 57
  - 161
  - 178
  - 154
  - 137
  - 146
  - 151
  - 145
- Turkey
  - 25
  - 20
  - 21
  - 4
  - 28
  - 40
  - 40
  - 37
  - 57
  - 29
  - 111
  - 75
- United Kingdom
  - 33
  - -14
  - 24
  - 64
  - 45
  - 128
  - 39
  - 174
  - 44
  - 64
  - -27
  - 40
- Panama
  - 9
  - -1
  - 44
  - 18
  - 0
  - 7
  - 2
  - 0
  - 3
  - 27
  - 9
  - 39
- Netherlands
  - 87
  - 98
  - 99
  - 99
  - 61
  - 63
  - 60
  - -30
  - 21
  - 16
  - 24
  - 33
- Czech Republic
  - 9
  - 12
  - 19
  - 13
  - 3
  - 0
  - 14
  - 0
  - 2
  - 36
  - 28
  - 27
- International Organizations
  - 2
  - -116
  - 5
  - 3
  - 16
  - -3
  - 19
  - 8
  - 16
  - 4
  - 2
  - 11
- Luxembourg
  - 16
  - -54
  - 17
  - 23
  - 33
  - 22
  - 29
  - 22
  - 11
  - 5
  - 52
  - 10
- Germany
  - 0
  - 2
  - 0
  - 2
  - 3
  - 3
  - 8
  - -17
  - 6
  - 5
  - 3
  - 16
- Other countries
  - 65
  - 62
  - 386
  - 229
  - 44
  - 41
  - 94
  - 53
  - 91
  - 127
  - 113
  - -59

*Preliminary data.

Share of FDI by major foreign direct investor countries allocated as follows: Azerbaijan (44 percent), Turkey (23 percent) and United Kingdom (12 percent).

Source: Geostat, 2016 (chart 6)

On the other hand, Georgia had some weakness vis-à-vis Russia. Georgia supplied its agriculture products, mainly wine and water, but also fruits and vegetables. Traditionally, Russia was the biggest trade partner for Georgia. However, after the 2006 embargo imposed by Russian on Georgia, export to Russia constituted only 8.6% and during 2008-2012 export constituted of average 2% (R. E. Newnham 2015: 165-166). Russia’s embargo has affected mainly the rural population. According to FAO, agriculture accounts for about 52% of the country’s labour force, at the same time 98% of farm workers are self-employed and they do not have many alternative employment opportunities (FAO 2017). As the result of this durable embargo, according to the official data which dates 2011, 15.5% of the working population was unemployed (Eurasianet 2011).

Russia’s punitive policy had a different effect. With time Russia has lost an opportunity to influence Georgia by embargo, as this country overall has entered the healthy trend of export diversification. As the result of Russia’s punitive policy, Georgia export of agricultural
products has grown by 90% (Cenusa et al. 2014: 7). Regardless of the pressure, in 2013, the EU has proceeded with initialization of the Association Agreement during the Vilnius Summit. As Alex Petriashvili, Georgian Minister of European Integration of that time, said Russia was publicly arguing that it would not oppose the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, while simultaneously it has used Russian troops stationed on the territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to raise the political temperature (Oliver 2014).

8.5 Moldova

Moldova got under strong Russian pressure as of 2013, when the state was in process of the conclusion of the Association Agreements with the EU. First the verbal threats came. On 2 September 2013, during the TV interview on Rossiya-24, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin has warned Moldova that signing the Association Agreement with the EU would lead to ‘serious consequences’ for Moldova’s future, while referring mainly to a possible interruption of energy supply as well as challenges with the break-away Transnistria (Euractiv Team 2013). Traditionally, Russia has hit into the most vulnerable areas of Moldova. Those threats were of different kind, firstly those were economic ones; second instrument was the security and energy security threat; thirdly, those were pressure on Moldova’s workers in Russia. This part of the thesis concludes with the EU’s involvement into this crisis situation with an aim to mitigate the crisis situation in Moldova.

8.5.1 First Threats - Then Economic Embargo

When Moldova has decided to proceed with concluding its AA with the EU, Russia has introduced embargo. Russia’s pressure was manifested through the economic embargo mainly by banning a series of agricultural products, such as on wine, meat, fruits, and vegetables. In the moment when the sanctions were introduced, the trade structure of the Republic of Moldova was over-dependent on wine and agricultural export to Russia (De Micco 2015: 25). In 2012 Moldovan export to the CIS countries accounted for 42.9 % of total exports (ibid), and two third of this export goes to Russia (Radeke, Giucci, and Lupusor 2013: 5). Consequently, Russia has hit country’s agricultural exports. As in case of Georgia, agriculture accounted only about 4% of its total agricultural production (ibid: 6); however, a very high number of people is employed into this sector, namely 41% of population works in
this sector and it constitutes 11% of the Moldova’s GDP (World Bank 2010). Therefore, the Russia’s sanctions against Moldova made its economy vulnerable to other shocks.

The table below, which was produced by the CEPS experts, shows a series of the trade measures that Russia took against Moldova. Those measures were taken in steps: a) in 2013 as an attempt aiming to stop Moldova from signing the Association Agreement and the DCFTA; and b) in 2014, after the mentioned agreement with the EU was concluded. This table shows us that Russia’s sanctions have hit exactly into the most vulnerable areas of economy, namely the agricultural products.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 2. Russia’s punitive trade measures against Moldova, 2013-14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on imports of Moldovan wine (September 2013).</strong> Since September 2013, wine exports to Russia have been prohibited, allegedly because of non-compliance with quality rules set by Rospotrebnadzor. This decision was taken a few months before - and thus intended as a warning not to carry out - the AA/DCFTA inaugurating at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (27-28 November).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on imports of processed pork meat products (8 April 2014).</strong> Rosselhoznadzor, the Russian agricultural health surveillance authority, blocked supplies from the Moldovan meat producing company “CARNE SUD” on the grounds that the products derived from materials with stamps issued by the EU countries. Russia had previously restricted imports of all pork meat produced in Europe because of reported African swine fever infections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on imports of canned vegetables (July 2014).</strong> The closing to the Russian market for canned vegetables followed soon after Moldova signed the AA/DCFTA with the EU on 27 June. Non-compliance with Russian quality requirements was invoked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ban on fruit imports (July 2014).</strong> Apples, pears, quinces, apricots, cherries and sour cherries, peaches, nectarines, plums and blackthorn were banned, owing to the alleged discovery of pests by Russian phytosanitary experts, beginning 21 July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cancellation of trade preferences for imports of 19 categories of products (31 August 2014).</strong> A Russian government resolution cancels zero duties on Moldovan products for 19 categories of commodities, including wine, meat, vegetables, fruit and grains, thus suspending provisions of the Russia-Moldova CIS Free Trade Agreement signed on 18 October 2011.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cenusa et al. 2014, pp 5-6

### 8.5.2 Transnistria: Security and Energy Threats

Another threat to Moldova’s economic and its political security is its dependence on Russian gas and deliveries of electricity (Calus 2014). Prior to the Association Agreement signature, Mr. Rogozin has stressed that the new deal would affect the situation in Transnistria (Euractiv Team 2013). Therefore, during his press conference in Chişinău, Mr Rogozin has threatened:
“Moldova’s train en route to Europe would lose its wagons in Transnistria” (Dempsey 2013).

For Russia, Transnistria is a trump card in its relations with Moldova. Firstly, Russian citizens in this ‘break-away’ region make one third of the population. Given that Russia has conducted a military intervention into other EaP countries under the pretext of protection of its citizens, Moldova was/is aware of the possible scenario.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Russian troops are still stationed in Moldova. What Russia calls, the Operational Group of Russian Forces, are stationed there in order to protect ammunition warehouses located on Transnistria’s territory, where, according to Russian data, approximately 19 tons of very old ammunition is stored (Dyner 2016: 6-7). The Russian Forces consist of two battalions of mechanized forces, making approximately 1 500 soldiers, and a battalion of Russian peacekeeping forces of around 400 soldiers. For example, in 2015, these troops have held more than 1 000 small-scale exercises, 400 of which involved shooting drills, while 100 were training in counter-terrorism and the suppression of sabotage and intelligence groups (ibid). The Russian troops stationed in this break-away region guarantee the continued de facto independence of the pro-Russian Transnistria (Dyner 2016). Similarly, to other Eastern Partnership countries, the possible recognition of break-away region of
Transnistria as an independent state by the Russian Federation has a significant effect upon the decision-making of the Moldovan leadership (F. Starr and Cornell 2014: 138).

The second vulnerability for Moldova is that Transnistria is also a transit region for Russia’s energy supply. 98% of Moldova’s energy supply is imported and most it comes from Russia. On top of being a transit area for gas supply, 70% of Moldova’s electricity usage is generated in Transdnistria (Najarian 2017). Therefore, while being in Chisinau, Mr. Rogozin has reminded about Moldova’s dependency on Russia’s energy, by saying ‘Energy is important. The cold season is near. Winter is on its way. We hope that you will not freeze this winter” (Dempsey 2013). Luckily for Moldova this threat has not materialized, even though it has kept Moldovan decision-makers in tension.

8.5.3 Pressure on Workers

Moldova’s economy is also heavily dependent on workers’ remittances from Moldova’s seasonal workers and temporary residents in Russia. Their share in the GDP is considerable, for example, they accounted for nearly 25 of the GDP (ECom&HR 2015). However, Russia has gradually changed its immigration legislation. Between 2012 and 2015, about 50 laws were adopted, half of which envisaged strengthening the administrative and criminal penalties for violating migration laws (Denisenko 2017). Consequently, different patents and permits were required from the seasonal workers. The only exception in this legislation were/are the migrants coming from the Customs Union countries, which gave additional incentive to EaP countries to reconsider changing their foreign policy vector towards Russia.

These measures had dramatic effect on Moldova’s economy. As the result of this legislative restriction, already between 2014 and 2015 the share of Moldovans working in Russia has dropped by 50% (Denisenko and Chudinovskikh 2017). Gradually, the issue of the re-entry bans imposed on Moldovan workers who have violated the new Russian legislation became a major concern for Moldova.

8.5.4 EU’s Support to Moldova

Given the strong pressure on Moldova, EU has given it a hand of support. First of all, the EU has opened its market to the Moldovan products. In September 2013, the European Commission proposed to fully open the European Union's market to wine imports from the Republic of Moldova. These steps were taken prior to the envisaged provisional application of the EU - Republic of Moldova AA/DCFTA. The Commission has explained it ‘as a measure to ease some of the difficulties the Republic of Moldova is experiencing with its wine exports to some of its traditional markets’ (European Commission 2013c). While building on the EU’s successful experience of the economic integration, the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, Dacian Ciołoş, stated: ‘The European Union’s market is a sustainable alternative and a viable pole of stability for the Moldovan wine sector. A fully opened EU market for Moldovan wines in a time when Moldovan farmers are in difficulty, reflects that, beyond being a very successful economic integration project, the EU is also a space of solidarity’ (ibid). This hand of help has saved a lion share of Moldova’s GDP.

On 1 September 2014, following the AA/DCFTA entry into force, Moldova’s exports of plums to the EU have increased almost eight times, exports of grapes by six and apple exports have increased by three times. Exports of Moldovan wines on the EU market have increased by 25 % within 1 year (Calus 2014). Since then, the EU has remained the main trading partner of Moldova. Its exports, which until recently amounted above 53% and 48.2% of total Moldovan imports, is steadily growing (European Commission and the High Representative 2015). Comparing to the same period of 2013, in 2014 the exports to the EU grew by 22.5% (Cenusa et al. 2014: 7).

As to the Moldova’s energy dependence, in fear of the winter cut-off in gas supplies, the EU has promoted and sponsored the reversed flow from Romania. In August 2013, the new pipeline, connecting Romania and Moldova was inaugurated. The 42-km long interconnector became the first direct gas pipeline connecting Moldova and the EU. According to the Commissioner Oettinger, this new pipeline would cover around 1/3 of the gas consumption in Moldova (European Commission 2013a). At the same meeting, the building of new and more powerful gas interconnector was announced.
8.6 Ukraine

Ukraine had always been pivotal element in the Russia’s foreign policy. As Zbigniew Brzezinski once wrote, ‘Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire’ (Brzezinski 1997). Therefore, for the last two decades, Kyiv was balancing between Moscow and the West with an aim to maximise economic and political gains (De Micco 2015). In the recent history of Ukraine, there were two major clashes, which have put the EU’s pro-democracy and Russian pro-status quo model into confrontation: the 2004 revolution and 2013 Revolution of Dignity (also known as EuroMaidan). In both cases, the EU and Russia took the opposing stands. Both developments, which have eventually become a major geopolitical crisis between the EU and Russia, have posed the question about Ukraine’s geopolitical vector and its democratization at stake.

The deepening of the EU-Ukraine relations was followed by the Russia’s growing pressure on Ukraine. Therefore, this process is explained in the next part. Firstly, it discusses Russia’s offer with regards to the Black Sea Fleet in exchange for the better energy prices. Secondly, it explains different Russia’s instruments of pressure prior to the AA/DCFTA signature. Thirdly, it introduces to Russia’s actions following the victory of the pro-EU protests in Ukraine. Fourthly, the Russia’s narrative justifying its actions is explained. And finally, this part concludes with the EU’s involvement into the crisis by helping Ukraine in the crisis situation and addressing Russia’s breach of the international law following the annexation of Crimea and destabilization of the situation in the East of Ukraine.

8.6.1 The Gas Deal in Exchange for the Black Sea Fleet

Immediately after the introduction of the EaP as well as with the progress of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA negations, Russia started using it’s the most efficient tool in the case of Ukraine, namely the energy weapon. This time, differently from its previous tool of cutting the gas supply, the Russian leadership was more creative by offering an interesting price for gas in return for a significant political agreement. Russia has offered Ukraine a discount on the gas price of 30 % or USD 100 per one thousand cubic meters, in exchange for the lease of Sevastopol, the naval base of Russia’s Black Sea fleet until 2042 (Aslund 2013). As the next step, the Russian leadership has offered Ukraine a much bigger discount for gas price, should Ukraine join the Customs Union (A. Tsygankov 2015).
This offer as well as the above-mentioned deal represented a trade-off aiming to support the financial solvency of Ukraine in exchange for the Russian hegemony over the country (H. Gardner 2014: 7). While following the pro-Russian vector, Ukraine’s Parliament has voted for the neutrality status as a manifestation against NATO (ibid). At the same time it has accepted the extension of the Russia’ Black Sea Fleet presence in Crimea which has contradicted its ‘neutrality status’. These inconsistent decisions which are not made on the basis of the rule of law show how this country is vulnerable to any external pressure, and in this context to Russia’s offers.

8.6.2 Prior to the Association Agreement: Gifts, Threats and Sanctions

The pressure has increased when the signature of the Association Agreement, which was negotiated since 2008, has become a real offer on the table. It has risen a furore in Kremlin, which for years was effectively blocking Ukraine’s deeper integration with the EU (Aslund 2013: 13). For the Russian Federation, it was important to avert this major geopolitical shift. Therefore, firstly, the Russian leadership has engaged into explaining the gains and profits from the integration with the Russia-led Customs Union. It was predicting that should Ukraine join this organization by 2030 its economy would boost to 6-7% of total GDP volume (Aslund 2013: 6). At the same time, Russian Prime Minister mentioned that Ukraine’s membership would bring about USD 6-9,5 billion, whereas the Secretary of the Customs Union Commission, Sergei Glazyev, told that already in 10 years Ukraine would get additional USD 100 billion into its budget (Атабаев 2011). At the same time, according to the Russian state-led media, the price of non-alignment with the Customs Union was high; for example, only in 2012 the trade balance has decreased by 10.8% comparing to 2011 and was equal to $45 billion (Фаляхов and Топалов 2013). Therefore, Ukraine was offered to sign the Memorandum of its participation in the Customs Union granting it an observer status, which was a midway between approaching Russia-led initiative, but at the same time bearing no legal obligation.
Secondly, when it became clear that Ukraine’s leadership would rather opt for the Association Agreement with the EU\textsuperscript{70}, Russia’s leadership has entered into a phase of imposing the sanctions. In summer 2013, Russia has launched a trade war against Ukraine by restricting the import of a number of the goods from Ukraine. Naturally, this blockade made Ukraine’s bad economic situation even more difficult (Götz 2015). As President Putin has explained, should the Association Agreement be introduced, it would have negative effect on Russia’s economy. According to President Putin, Ukraine would take additional obligations on lowering its external tariffs and barriers for the EU’s products; it would introduce EU’s standards, which would result in a bigger flow of the unwanted/unsuitable products into Russian market as well as into the one of the Customs Union members (TASS 2013). Consequently, Russia had to protect its markets by introducing additional measures.

Thirdly, in November 2013, when Ukraine’s President Yanukovych has finally rejected the Association Agreement signature, the Russian leadership has made Ukraine some ‘brotherly gift’ of compensation. Following the trade war, Kremlin offered Ukraine a support of the USD 15 billion in low-interest loans and a steep discount on natural gas (Götz 2015). The proposal was as following: to purchase the mentioned amount in Ukraine's Eurobond and sell gas for USD 268 per 1,000 cubic metres instead of the USD 400, President Putin stated that Ukraine 'is without doubt, in the full sense of the word, our strategic partner and ally' (S. Walker 2013). This development has led to the accusations that Ukraine’s President has ‘sold its country to its former Soviet master’ (Korsunskaya and Heritage 2013).

By providing President Yanukovych with the immediate and large-scale economic support, which were much more than what the EU could offer, Russia has extended the lifeline of yet another authoritarian regime (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015). This has worked with Armenia and Belarus, and it has worked with Ukraine. Eventually the economic and political pressure combined with significant incentives has become an effective Russian strategy, which has also led to the international isolation of the authoritarian leader, President Yanukovych (Ambrosio 2016). It seemed like Ukraine was doomed to remain one of the authoritarian states in Russia’s backyard.

\textsuperscript{70} By 2013, the pro-Russian President Yanukovych was getting more convinced that the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is better for Ukraine, as the Customs Union would violate the WTO membership commitments as well as make any further FTA with other countries impossible. At the same time, given that majoring of Ukrainians was opting for the integration with the EU, he knew that manifesting for the EU’s vector of integration would help him to be reelected (Cenusa et al. 2014).
Nevertheless, when President Yanukovych has rejected the AA/DCFTA signature, Ukrainian society has decided to stand for their choice opting for building a democratic and rule of law state. The small protests against Yanukovych’s rejection of the EU’s documents has grown into a massive pro-EU and pro-democracy protests. Those have ended in February when Yanukovych has fled the country.

8.6.3 Russia’s Strategy After the Ukraine’s Revolution: Fighting Back for its Influence

The Maidan protests, which were at the beginning about bringing back the cooperation with the EU and offsetting the Russian influence, have brought back the possibility of further systemic redirection back towards the real democratization (Pridham 2014). Ukrainian society was of a help in this process, as many were fed up with their government, which was deeply corrupt, utterly incompetent in addressing the country’s economic problems, as well as open to Russia’s blackmailing (Götz 2015; Dunn and Bobick 2014). Contrary to Russia’s offer, many Ukrainians saw the EU’s vector of integration as a promise for democracy, rule law and liberal economy. In this process, the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA was considered as means which would bring Ukraine towards this big dream (L. A. Way 2015; Börzel 2015; Delcour and Wolczuk 2015). At the end February of 2014, the President has fled Ukraine and left to Russia, the government was changed into the pro-European and shortly the new president was elected.

As this development was not in Russia’s plan, Ukraine with its pro-EU authorities have become a subject to even stronger pressure. Firstly, Russia has proceeded with the annexation of Crimea. Its primary aim was to safeguard control over the naval bases in Sevastopol and surroundings (Götz 2015); therefore immediately after Yanukovych fled, the ‘green men’ (unidentified at the moment soldiers in the common uniform) have captured the administrative building in Crimea and Ukraine’s military basis. Already on 16 March, the so-called referendum was held on independence of Crimea and the same month it was annexed (or what Russian authorities call ‘reunified’) with Russia.

At the moment of the military intervention, President Putin has denied that the ‘green men’ were Russian soldiers (Pifer 2015). However, few weeks later, on March 28, during the
official reception Putin congratulated Russian officers for their conduct of the Crimean operation. At the same event, the Russian Defence Ministry inaugurated these soldiers with the victory medal for the "return of Crimea"; on May 18, President Putin publicly confirmed that the troops in Crimea were Russian and stressed that the Crimea’s ‘reunification’ was possible only due to Russia’s military involvement (ibid). In 2015, during his annual press conference and after in the documentary praising the so-called return of Crimea, President Putin has acknowledged that the military intelligence officers were operating in Ukraine. He stated the following: ‘I gave the orders and instructions to the Ministry of Defence, why hide it, under the guise of protection of our military facilities in Crimea, to deploy a special division of the Main Intelligence [Directorate] (the GRU) together with naval infantry forces and paratroopers’ (Bildt 2017).

Secondly, having the successfully annexed Crimea, Putin has started a new stage – the destabilization of the East of Ukraine. The Russia-led ‘green men’ have appeared in Donbas, where Ukraine extracts anthracite coal, the only type of coal which it uses in its heavy industry as well as by its nuclear power stations. For Ukraine, Donbas was also its industrial heart, as its contribution to the GDP equalled 25 %, export revenue amounted 40 %, as well as made 25 % of industrial production (Shatokha 2016).

Understanding the economic importance of this region for Ukraine’s survival, President Putin has pledged to protect the Russian-speaking population in the Ukraine, as well as to protect the ones who, quoting President Putin, ‘feel the link with Russia’ (Vedomosti 2014). The Russian leadership has involved into the protection seriously by having deployed its military personnel, which is experience in conducting military operations, as well as by having engaged into the conflict with providing military support and financial means.

---

71 The other countries, where this type of coal is extracted, are the South Africa and Russia, while the coal extracted in Poland or other EU Member States is of a different kind and cannot be a substitute to anthracite coal.

72 For example, Igor Girkin, whose pseudonym is Igor Strelkov and who is a staff of Russia's GRU military intelligence agency, was so-called Defense Minister of Donbas People's Republic, and has personally led the takeover of the town of Slavyansk in April 2014; previously he has also participated in the military conflicts in Transdniester (Moldova) and Bosnia in the early 1990s, as well as served during both Chechen wars as an officer in Russia’s FSB security services (S. Walker 2016).

73 The scale of the military operations made Russia’s direct military support obvious, given the quantity and type of weapons and ammunition, which was used by so-called rebels or the Russian soldiers ‘on holidays’ or the ones who ‘crossed accidentally the border’ - as mentioned by President Putin, when he was confronted with the testimonies of Russian soldiers captured by Ukrainian army (Oliphant 2015); the other example was the tragic accident with the MH17 passanger plane, which was put down by a Buk-launcher with personnel from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade from Kursk in central Russia that on July 17 2015 (Bildt 2017).
In the east of Ukraine, the Russian leadership offered its support to the newly-emerged so-called separatist part of Ukraine under the name of Novorossiya (translated as the ‘New Russia’). This territorial entity has existed in XVIII century under the imperial Russia and which today would cover about one third of Ukraine’s territory. Therefore, with this imperial overstretch, Novorossiya has marked a start of Putin’s empire-building ambitions (C. Freedman 2014).

Source: EdMaps 2017

Even though Russia’s leadership has justified its involvement in the eastern Ukraine as a need to protect the Russian speakers in Ukraine, the Russian Military Intelligence Staff, Igor Strelkov has provided different evidence. He stated the following: ‘I was the one who pulled the trigger of this war, ... If our unit hadn’t crossed the border, everything would have fizzled out — like in Kharkiv, like in Odesa’ (Dolgov 2014). Given the growing internal resistance to the Russia-led Novorossiya project, on May 20 the so-called ‘authorities’ of newly-established Donetsk and Luhansk Republics have resigned from the idea of establishing

previously the US General has estimated presence of about 12000 of Russian soldiers in the Eastern of Ukraine (M. Russell 2016).
Novorossiya allegedly on the grounds that its existence was not stipulated in the Minsk agreements (Suslov 2017). In reality it meant that Russia’s strategy was changed. The Russian leadership has concentrated its efforts on reinforcing the position of both so-called ‘republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk with an aim to secure its influence over Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy. Using the Minsk format of negotiations, Russia attempted to force the Ukrainian government to negotiate directly with the so-called ‘separatists’. It has offered a permanent peace settlement, which would offer some form of the special status for both ‘republics’ within Ukraine (P. Robinson 2016).

Thirdly, having put Ukraine into security and economic instability, the same year the Russian Gazprom announced switching to a system of pre-payment for gas as well as raising the price of gas delivered to Ukraine to the world market price. This meant doubling the gas price. According to Gazprom in June 2014, ‘The overdue debt of the company for the supplied Russian gas equals USD 4.458 billion: USD 1.451 billion – for November and December 2013 and USD 3.007 billion for April and May 2014’ (Gazprom 2014). This announcement has made the country’s economic situation even harder. It meant that Ukraine might enter again the new gas war with Russia, as the same month Russia has stopped its gas delivery to Ukraine (Cenusa et al. 2014).

Fourthly, in September, while Ukraine and the EU were preparing to the simultaneous ratification of the AA/DCFTA, Russia has engaged into threatening to cancel the CIS free trade preferences (Cenusa et al. 2014). On 12 September, Ukraine and the EU proposed to postpone the provisional implementation of a large part of the AA/DCFTA until the end of 2015 (Joint EU-UA Statement 2014). Nevertheless, the same day, on 12 September 2014, the Russian government has issued a 9-page document introducing tariffs on a number of goods originating from Ukraine. Those goods were meat and milk products, as well as a number of fruits and vegetables. As the decree specifies, this decision was taken based on the introduction of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA provisions (Government of the RF 2014). This was yet another factor aggravating the economic situation, given that few weeks earlier, Russian regulatory agency has introduced measures against agri-food products as well as against railcars (allegedly) due to the non-conformity with the require standards (Lavrov 2017).

At the beginning of 2016, when the AA/DCFTA has fully entered into force, Russia has suspended preferential treatment of all products coming from Ukraine, as well as it has
introduced the customs duties and embargo on some the products, equivalent to its sanctions against the EU (Ria Novosti 2016). As Prime Minister Medvedev has clarified, ‘Under these circumstances <meaning the AA/DCFTA entry into force>, we need to protect our market and our producers and to prevent imports from other countries under the guise of Ukrainian goods’ (Von der Burchard 2015). Gradually, but painfully, Ukraine has lost access to Russian market, which was vitally important at that moment.

For Russia’s actions, Ukraine has paid an expensive price. As the result of the annexation of Crimea and the war in the East, Ukraine has lost about 20 % of its GDP as well as control over about 7 % of its territory (Nepop 2016). Moreover, according to the Financial Times, Ukraine’s national currency, hryvnia, lost about 70 % of its value against the dollar, inflation has hit 60 % and the combined fiscal deficit was more than 10 % of GDP, its economy contracted by 6.6 % in 2014 and by 9 % in 2015 (Clark 2017). And as the graph below shows, Ukraine has only recently started to recover.

As Ukraine’s financial and political resources were spent on fighting the war, those resources are rerouted at the expense of the reform efforts foreseen in the AA/DCFTA provisions. Until present, Ukraine does not control 409 km of its border with Russia (MFA of Ukraine 2017), which allows free flow of arms and person between Russia and the parts of the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions. The situation is also aggravated by the war consequence as 9,800 Ukrainian people were killed, about 23,000 wounded and almost 1.8 million of internally displaced persons (ibid). The potential escalation of the conflict with Russia created unfavourable investment climate for the Foreign Direct Investment (World Bank 2017). These circumstances left Ukraine with limited financial resources.

### 8.6.4 Russia’s Narratives: Fight for the Future with Ukraine and Against EU’s Negative Influence

After the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war, Russia has also engaged into promotion of its realist justification of its actions. Back then, Russia’s leadership has advanced two important narratives. Firstly, about the common and inseparable future of Russia and Ukraine which is according to President Putin ‘one nation’ (Putin 2013d). As he said: ‘Regardless of whatever would happen in Ukraine and whichever road it would take, at some point we will meet. Why? Because we are one people. ... Because we have one Dnipro and Kyivan baptism, we have one historical past and common destiny, we have a common religion, common faith, similar culture, language, tradition and mentality’ (ibid). Therefore, for Russia, the dividing lines between Ukraine and Russia are blurred, as two countries are one people with common past and future.

As described above, Russia’s leadership was ready to use all measures to protect its common future. As explained to the wider public, what the Russian leadership was doing in Crimea and in the East, was protecting the Russian-speaking population. As President Putin has mentioned, ‘Millions of Russians and Russian speakers live in Ukraine and Russia will always protect their interest by political, diplomatic and legal means ... Russia’s foreign policy on this matter drew its firmness from the will of millions of our people, our national unity and the support of our country’s main political and public forces’ (Putin 2014). Therefore, the developments in Ukraine were justified, as those were meant to defend the ‘national unity’.

The second parallel narrative was on EU’s negative influence over Ukraine. Just before Ukraine was supposed to signed its AA/DCFTA with the EU, Russian leadership has seen it as a major ‘geopolitical threat’. According to them, Ukraine would have lost its sovereignty
and a possibility to independently take political and economic decisions without prior consultation with Brussels. According to the statement by Sergei Glazyev, at that time advisor to President Putin, ‘Ukraine ceases to be a strategic partner for us <the Russian Federation>, it disappears as an international partner, as a subject of international law, since all its actions in the trade area it will have to coordinate with the European Union. Ukraine will not be able to make a step towards us without Brussels being allowed to do it’ (Яливец 2013).

The EU’s democracy promotion efforts in Ukraine were badly seen. Firstly, it was Russia’s Ambassador to the EU, who called upon the EU to give up on its ‘messianic project’ of democracy promotion, as his country has witnessed ‘with understandable concern’ the establishment of ‘an exclusive ideological underpinning of the European Union”. And according to him, the epic event was the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership which was all about ‘winning Ukraine in the geopolitical battle of Europe’ (Gotev 2015b).

Later the same call was voiced by Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov who stated the following: ‘I repeat, the export of democracy and values continues to sow problems in international relations. It is precisely the export of values and the demand to accept only the European view of things that triggered the crisis in Ukraine. The export of democracy and values led to the so-called “Arab spring”, and we are now reaping the consequences (Lavrov 2017). Consequently, according to Russia’s top diplomats, they were disturbed not only by the EU’s democracy promotion, but it has also became a source of crisis in Ukraine.

8.6.5 EU’s Attempts to Save Democracy in Ukraine

The mechanisms of EU’s assistance varied according to the domestic situation in Ukraine. Therefore, one can see three different types of assistance in democracy promotion. First one was since the EaP was launched and up until the Maidan period. Secondly, as of August 2013 when the EU has engaged into an active dialogue with Russia over Ukraine’s choice to sign the Association Agreement. The third one was during the popular protests on Maidan, and the final part was unprecedented support to Ukraine in the reform process following the annexation of Crimea and the war in the East.
Since 2009 – Until EuroMaidan Protests

Since the launch of the EaP, the main aspects of the EU-Ukraine bilateral relations, namely the conclusion of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as well as of the visa-free regime talks, have become a hostage to the democracy deterioration. The biggest challenge was that the ruling authorities of that time was aimed at consolidation of power (Moshes 2013; D’Anieri 2012). The most draconian measure was taken against the political opposition. The authorities have applied selective justice by imprisoning its main political opponent, former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, as well as of other opposition leader. Consequently, in its Declaration on behalf of the European Union, the High Representative Catherine Ashton has stated:

The EU will reflect on its policies towards Ukraine. The way the Ukrainian authorities will generally respect universal values and rule of law, and specifically how they will handle these cases, risks having profound implications for the EU-Ukraine bilateral relationship, including for the conclusion of the Association Agreement, our political dialogue and our co-operation more broadly (Ashton 2011a).

The other aspect was the changes to the electoral law in 2011, which were negatively assessed by the Venice Commission. In its Opinion, the Commission stressed on the need to have an impartial legislative system, given that ‘the main rules is particularly important since electoral legislation should not favour the interests of one political party’ (Council for Democratic Elections and Venice Commission 2011: para 8). Therefore, the EU, taking also on board the Venice Commission opinion as a tool, has embarked on the rigorous protection of the democracy in Ukraine.

In order to put back Ukraine on the democratization track, it has applied a number of diplomatic instruments. For example, in 2011 in protest to the Tymoshenko’s imprisonment, the EU cancelled Yanukovych’s visit to Brussels and in the December during the EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv, the EU refused to initial the Association Agreement (Kuzio 2012: 409). In 2012, the European Parliament has also initiated an unprecedented mission to monitor court proceedings involving imprisoned of Yulia Tymoshenko. This mission was suggested by the Ukraine’s Prime Minister Mykola Azarov during his meeting with EP President Schulz, as
there were major concerns about safety in prison.\textsuperscript{74} Former European Parliament President, Mr. Pat Cox and the former President of Poland, Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, as the personalities with high international reputation, were mandated to monitor court proceedings involving Tymoshenko on behalf of the European Parliament.

This instrument has become informal diplomacy tool, which has allowed to establish communication between the EU and Ukrainian authorities. The Cox-Kwaśniewski mission had regular meetings with the President of Ukraine, the Prime Minister, the Prosecutor-General, who could explain their position to Brussels. In 2012, in the times when the EU-Ukraine bilateral relations were in deadlock, this mission insured communication with the EU, and therefore prevented from full degradation of the relationships. Regardless of the EU’s diplomatic efforts, prior to 2012 parliamentary elections Yuliya Tymoshenko was not released and the above-mentioned law was not changed\textsuperscript{75}. Therefore, Ukraine’s democracy standard was gradually sliding down due to deliberate weakening of the institutions, norms, and reinforced development of the methods used to weaken the political competition (D’Anieri 2011).

EU was strict on its demand to bring back rule of law and the previously existing democratic standards back. The 2012 Council Conclusions recalled that its attention was on: ‘the compliance of the 2012 parliamentary elections’ with international standards and follow-up actions, as well as Ukraine’s progress in addressing the issue of selective justice and preventing its recurrence, and in implementing the reforms defined in the jointly agreed Association Agenda’ (Council of the European Union 2012). In this document, it has outlined the conditions under which the agreements would be signed by stipulating:

\textit{The Council reaffirms its commitment to the signing of the already initialled Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, as soon as the Ukrainian authorities demonstrate determined action and tangible

\textsuperscript{74} According to an interview with the EU politician, there was a major concern within the EU about safety of the former Prime Minister. The European political circles still remember the recent case in Russia when the auditor Magnitsky was arrest and subsequent died in custody. Therefore, as soon as Tymoshenko has raised concern about her safety in the prison, the EU political circles have started discussing of instruments safeguarding her security.

\textsuperscript{75} In 2013, the Venice Commission has issued its Opinion saying the carried-out reform ‘introduces only limited amendments to the electoral legislation’ (Council for Democratic Elections and Venice Commission 2013: para 11).}
*progress* in the three areas mentioned above, possibly by the time of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013 (Council of the European Union 2012: 2).

As Ukraine was not complying with the EU’s demands, even though the last round of the negotiations on the Association Agreement has concluded in November 2012, the Council has not proceeded with its conclusion. In 2013 the European Council in its conclusions has again confirmed ‘its commitment to the signing of the agreement with Ukraine, in full compliance with the Council conclusions of 10 December 2012’ (European Council 2013: 4, para 8 (a)). Also the Council has asked the High Representative and the Commission to monitor and update this institution on the progress made by Ukraine in the mentioned areas (European Commission 2013e). In April 2013, the EU’s High Representative, Catherine Ashton and Commission Füle, have issued their joint statements expressing their concern on a set of issues, for example:

- On 7 April 2013: ‘We salute that President Yanukovych has exercised his prerogatives of pardoning in the cases of former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko and former Environmental Protection Minister Heorhiy Filipchuk. … We now look forward to Ukraine addressing without further delay the outstanding case of selective justice and preventing any recurrence of selective justice by a comprehensive judicial reform in line with European standards’ (Ashton and Füle 2013a).
- On 30 April 2013: ‘In light of today’s judgement76, we call on the Ukrainian authorities to reconsider thoroughly the situation of Ms Tymoshenko, the leader of one of the strongest opposition parties in the country, who remains detained after a trial that did not respect fair, transparent and independent legal proceedings. We stress the importance of a clearly expressed commitment by the Ukrainian authorities to early implementation of all judgments of the European Court of Human Rights’ (Ashton and Füle 2013b).

The EU was regularly and attentively monitoring the developments in Ukraine. However, the bigger obstacle impeding signature of the Association Agreement was yet to come – the Russian pressure on Ukraine. Even though, both EU and Ukraine have a substantial track

---

76 The ECHR, in its case Tymoshenko v Ukraine, has confirmed the concerns consistently expressed by the EU regarding the arbitrary legal proceedings.
record in dealing with Russia’s pressure, both were not prepared to the bouquet of gifts, threats and other coercive measures.

EU’s Engagement over Ukraine into a Dialogue with Russia

During the summer of 2013, the EU was attentively observing Russia’s pressure on Ukraine. As the Commissioner Füle stated, ‘We are currently witnessing a more assertive Russian policy in this respect’ (S. Füle 2013). And while referring to the Russia’s threat on the trade measures against EU’s products, which allegedly would transit Ukraine and enter the Russian/Customs Union market, the Commissioner explained that ‘In view of Russia’s concerns over rules-of-origin problems, it is worth recalling that in the context of the Russia/Ukraine free trade area, in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), EU goods exported to Ukraine through the future DCFTA will not qualify for preferential treatment when exported from Ukraine to Russia. Therefore, the signature of a free trade agreement with a third party, meaning us, may not be used as a justification for the tightening of customs procedures’ (ibid). Later in the text, he also stresses that the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement will not be at the expense of the Ukraine-Russia relations, but it would bring benefit to all.

In September, while speaking in front of the European Parliament, the Commissioner has reconfirmed EU’s support to Ukraine and condemned Russia’s intimidation. In his speech, the Commissioner has stressed that ‘any threats from Russia linked to the possible signing of agreements with the European Union are unacceptable … the possible misuse of energy pricing; artificial trade obstacles such as import bans of dubious WTO compatibility and cumbersome customs procedures; military cooperation and security guarantees’ (Š. Füle 2013). In the same speech, he has stressed on the importance of the win-win game, especially when one speaks of engaging with Russia. However, due to Russia’s pressure it already seemed like the EU might potentially lose Ukraine.

Ukraine’s participation in the EaP is crucial for the viability of the EU’s policy. ‘We cannot loose Ukraine’, Ashton said (Estonian Government Communication Unit 2013). This was underlined in a number of statements. Recently, the Foreign Ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Germany, in their Joint Statement have underlined ‘the key importance of Ukraine for the future of the region’ (EurActiv 2013). The same year, the former
Commissioner President, Mr Romano Prodi, has even called upon EU’s proactive position saying that ‘The dialogue between the EU and Russia must not be in spite of Ukraine, but because of Ukraine’ (Korosteleva, Merheim-Eyre, and van Gils, Eske Mnatsakanyan 2015). Consequently, Ukraine has become the centre of the integrationist project for the EU’s EaP, as well as for Russia’s integrationist projects.

As November 2013, given that the EuroMaidan protests, which was triggered by Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement and foremost due to people’s devotion to the shared European values, the EU has engagement into even a stronger discussion with the Ukraine’s leadership. For the EU, it was also symbolic, as EuroMaidan was the first that massive protest where the EU integration process was in the epicentre of the discussion. It was also the first time in the EU history that the people were actually killed under the EU flags by the state militia.

The EU’s involvement was growing with the growing violence of the authority against the protesters. In November 2013, after the first violent attacks by the riot police against the protestors, High Representative Ashton stated: ‘The European Union strongly condemns the excessive use of force last night by the police in Kyiv to disperse peaceful protesters, who over the last days in a strong and unprecedented manner have expressed their support for Ukraine’s political association and economic integration with the EU’ (Ashton and Füle 2013c). Already two weeks later in December 2013, Catherine Ashton has stated ‘I am still in Kiev. I was among you on Maidan in the evening and was impressed by the determination of Ukrainians demonstrating for the European perspective of their country’, and she called upon the dialogue between the political forces and society (Ashton and Füle 2013c).

At the same time, given the alternative narrative on the developments in Kyiv, which were advanced by Russia, the EU tried to find the common stands with its Russian counterpart. In December 2013, during the meeting of Minister Lavrov with the High Representative, Mr. Lavrov stated that ‘...it was our common agreement that everyone should respect the sovereignty of any country, including Ukraine and everyone should allow the people to make their free choice of how they want to develop their country and how they want to develop their state’ (RFERL 2013). As the next step, Russia made an offer to Ukraine’s leadership that it could not resist: it offered to buy its Eurobonds worth of EUR 15 billion and to give gas discount amounting almost third of its price.
Given that Ukrainian’s government has stepped up with the violence against the protestors, the EU’s statements got harsher. Nevertheless, those remained at the level of ‘deeply concerned’ statements. This phrase was regularly repeated by HR/VP Ashton and has eventually become very irritating for the protesters on Maidan (Marynovych 2014), who have regularly faced violence on behalf of the riot police and of hired thugs (Wilson 2014).

The EU tried to mediate. On behalf of the EU, Catherine Ashton and Stefan Füle had numerous discussions with their Ukrainian counterparts and with President Yanukovych trying to convince him to compromise. The rally was taken by the Foreign Ministers of Poland and Sweden, Radislaw Sikorski and Carl Bildt. End of February after dozens of people were killed, three EU foreign ministers, Sikorski of Poland, Steinmeier of Germany and Fabius of France, as well as Russian human rights ombudsman Ludkin, have met in Kyiv for the emergency negotiations with Yanukovych and the protesters. At the same time, the Council has taken a decision to ‘In light of the deteriorating situation, the EU has decided as a matter of urgency to introduce targeted sanctions including asset freeze and visa ban against those responsible for human rights violations, violence and use of excessive force’ (Foreign Affairs Council 2014: 2). Finally, Yanukovych has agreed to some concessions. At the same time, protestors had also to agree, as otherwise President was threatening to introduce the martial law (Wilson 2014). Seen no political future for himself in the given situation, Yanukovych has fled to Russia and the protests have stopped.

End of March 2014, the European Council has introduced sanctions against Ukraine’s leadership, including former President Yanukovych. The EU has decided to freeze the funds and economic resources of politicians and officials who were ‘responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian State funds and persons responsible for human rights violations in Ukraine, and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them, with a view to consolidating and supporting the rule of law and respect for human rights in Ukraine’ (Foreign Affairs Council 2014: 66/1 (4)). In total, the sanctions were put on 18 people, including former President Yanukovych, his sons, Prime Ministers Mykola Azarov as well as the head of Yanukovych's presidential administration, Andriy Klyuyev (ibid, Annex I: 66/28-30).
The EU used every opportunity to praise the protesters for the fight for rule of law and democracy. On March 2016, the EU Head of States or Governments in their Council Conclusions on Ukraine have stated the following ‘We applaud the courage and resilience shown by the Ukrainian people these last months and weeks’. A year later as the recognition of the contribution of EuroMaidan, the protesters were even nominated and became one of three finalists in the Sakharov Prize of the European Parliament, a prize which is awarded to individuals and organisations for defending human rights and fundamental freedoms (European Parliament 2014).

**EU’s Engagement After 2014 Crimea Annexation by the Russian Federation and the War in Donbas**

Russia could not live with the defeat in Ukraine. Immediately in March, it has proceeded with the annexation of Crimea and destabilization activities in the East of Ukraine. In reacting to this, the EU has taken the three-track strategy: firstly, it imposed sanctions against the illegal actions by the Russian Federation and towards the East; secondly, it has engaged with Russia and Ukraine into a trilateral dialogue; thirdly, it has granted support to Ukraine in establishing rule of law democratic state. All of these commitments were reconfirmed in a number of the Council Conclusions as well as followed-up with concrete actions.

As to **EU’s actions against Russia’s illegal actions** in Ukraine, just two weeks prior the annexation, on 3 March, 2014, the Council has condemned Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine, and consequently proposed to suspend bilateral talks with the Russian Federation on visa matters as well as talks with the Russian Federation on the New Agreement (Foreign Affairs Council 2014b). On 6 March, 2014, the European Council has again condemned the actions the violation against Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity and called upon Russia ‘to immediately withdraw its armed forces to the areas of their permanent stationing, in accordance with the relevant agreements’ (European Council 2014).

After the annexation of Crimea, the European Council has restated again that ‘The European Union remains committed to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. ... It strongly condemns the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation and will not recognise it’ (European Council 2017). In the same document, the European Council has tasked the ‘Commission to evaluate the legal consequences of the
annexation of Crimea and to propose economic, trade and financial restrictions regarding Crimea for rapid implementation’ (ibid). The elaborated sanctions have targeted 149 and 38 entities due to their involvement into undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (Council 2017).

Russian has also experienced political isolation. In March 2014, the leadership of the EU Member States, participating in G8, have decided to suspend their participation in activities associated with the preparations for the upcoming G8 Summit in Sochi (Council 2017). Since then, the meetings have continued without Russian, in G7 format. Later, the EU Member States also supported the suspension of negotiations over Russia's joining the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as well as of the International Energy Agency.

Eventually, the EU imposes different types of restrictive measures:
- diplomatic measures;
- individual restrictive measures (asset freeze and travel restrictions);
- restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol;
- economic sanctions;
- restrictions on economic cooperation (Council 2017).

The second aspect of EU’s efforts was the engagement into a dialogue with Russia. In its Council Conclusions, the EU has invited the Russian leadership to the dialogue. In its March 2014 Conclusions, the EU Member States have expressed their readiness ‘to engage stands ready to engage in a frank and open dialogue with them <meaning Ukraine and Russia>’ (European Council 2014). In order to address Russia’s concerns over the EU-Ukraine DCFTA the trilateral consultation process was launched in July 2014. During the working meetings, the Russian Minister for Economic Development Alexei Ulyukayev could raise his concerns to the EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin. For example by end 2015 (after 18 months), 22 trilateral meetings were held (European Commission 2016g: 1). Whereas the meetings were organized with an aim to defuse the tension over Ukraine, its leadership was clear that despite of Russia’s demand, the negotiations on the DCFTA will be neither reopened nor renegotiated (ibid). As Russia’s main demand was not fulfilled and the DCFTA has entered into force, Russia has suspended its CIS FTA obligations towards Ukraine. As stipulated in the Commission memo, this
became an additional element of pressure that violated conditions agreed by Ministers to engage in the trilateral talks.

Similar trialogue was established on gas, as there was a growing concern that the ‘gas war’ might restart again. On 2015, the EU has inaugurated a trialogue, which was chaired by the Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič and brought together the Minister for Energy of the Russian Federation Alexander Novak and the Ukrainian Minister for Energy and Coal Industries Vladimir Demchyshyn (European Commission 2015b). The ‘gas war’ has not erupted. Consequently, these are the examples when the EU tried to re-establish dialogue with Russia, by addressing its concerns, as well as to protect Ukraine from Russia’s pressure. It demonstrated that on numerous occasions, the EU has made attempts to explain the bilateral cooperation to Russia and comfort it by saying that this policy does not pose threat to Russia (Hillion and Mayhew 2009; Christou 2010).

As to EU’s support to Ukraine’s efforts to establish a democratic rule of law European state, the EU has developed a number of unprecedented instruments of support. In this regard, in its March Council Conclusions, the EU has concentrated on stabilization of Ukraine as well as stressed on the fulfilment of the commitments. Additionally to the conditions on rule of law and fair electoral reform, which were set by the EU during the Yanukovych rule, the EU has also stressed on the newly emerged challenges, such as protection of national minorities given Russia’s intension to protect the Russian-speakers (Foreign Affairs Council 2014b).

The EU has pledged substantial financial support. According to the EU Factsheet, in 2017, the EU has pledged to disburse EUR 12.8 billion of support package for the next few years aiming at the reform process (EEAS 2017). The EU’s support to Ukraine, which has started as an economic aid, has extended much beyond up to customised pre-accession techniques. However, given the endemic corruption and weak institutions, a more substantial support was needed (Langbein 2014).

In order to support and guide Ukraine in its pro-EU reform process, the EU has established the Support Group for Ukraine within the European Commission. Serving as a coordinating body of aid and assistance to Ukraine, it has mobilised expertise from the EU Member States and has developed a substantial support package with an aim to enhance the reform process.
Currently the experts working in this Support Group cover all the reform areas. They support the development of the reform through advising, monitor the decision-making over the given reform sector as well as pass the information to the EU management should a political pressure be needed (Pridham 2014).

As the next unprecedented practise for the ENP country, the EU has imbedded its officials in certain ministries in Kyiv, including the justice and energy ones, which are the most sensitive for Russia and Ukraine. Close cooperation was built with OLAF, the EU’s anti-corruption/anti-fraud agency, whose leadership was directly involved into setting up the anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine. This cooperation was also formalized in the framework of the Administrative Cooperation Arrangement stepping up efforts to counter fraud against the European Union's financial interest and by this protecting EU’s financial support disbursed in Ukraine (OLAF 2016).

The EU has also involved into the civilian security sector with an aim to enhance the rule of law at the level of police. In July 2014, the EU has established an Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform within the CSDP. As the official website of the Mission stipulates: 'EUAM Ukraine aims to assist the Ukrainian authorities towards a sustainable reform of the civilian security sector through strategic advice and hands-on support for specific reform measures based on EU standards and international principles of good governance and human rights' (EUAM 2017).

EU has also involved into supporting the reform process of the legislative branch. In 2015, the European Parliament has selected Ukraine to be its priority country in the framework of its democracy support programme. Being inspired by the established communication channels during the Cox-Kwasniewski mission, the former EP President, Mr Cox, became a chief of a new EP mission, which was tasked to assess the needs of the Ukrainian parliament – Verkhovna Rada – in view of its interest in the reform process. In March 2016, the European Parliament and the Verkhovna Rada have concluded a framework agreement which has reinforced its technical and financial support (EP-Rada 2015). A roadmap for improvements, comprised out of 52 recommendations on the institutional capability of Verkhovna Rada, was presented by Pat Cox during the ‘Ukraine Week’ at the European Parliament (European Parliament 2015). One month later, in March these recommendations were politically endorsed by Rada during the vote at the plenary.
The TEU’s support was strictly bound to the political conditionality. For example, granting visa free for Ukrainian citizens was bound to 144 reform items stipulated in the Visa Liberalization Action Plan, which included the establishment of the anti-corruption institutions. According to the sectoral Commissioner, the decision of granting Ukraine visa-free regime ‘is an acknowledgment of the successful and far-reaching reforms carried out by Ukraine, often in very challenging circumstances’ (EEAS 2017). On different occasions the EU would stress on its support being conditional on progress in reforms made by Ukraine (EEAS 2016b; European Parliament 2017; European Commission 2016a; European Court of Auditors 2016; European Commission 2016f, 2015a). Therefore, in few years, the EU has transformed itself from a passive observer into an active contributor to building a rule of law European Ukraine.

To conclude on EU’s support to Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea and war in the East, the EU has taken a firm and a consistent position supporting the democracy promotion process. Firstly, by defending the international values and principles by imposing sanctions on Russia. Secondly, the EU left a space for dialogue with Russia, while trying to refute all concerns advanced by Russia. And finally, the EU has stepped up with unprecedented support to Ukraine’s reform efforts, foremost by focusing on democratization and rule of law aspects.

While concluding on the EU’s approach towards the Eastern neighbourhood, 2014 has become a pivotal year which was market by signature of the AAs with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. It was also a year when the EaP was also divided the countries into two groups: the first group is benefiting from the enhanced bilateral relations with the EU by means of the Association Agreement (those are Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine); and the second group of states which has opted out from the extensive relations with the EU and with which the EU is developing new type of bilateral cooperation (namely with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus). In ENP 2015, given the fact that not every EaP partnership country was interested in deep approximation and not all partners aspire to comply with the EU rules and standards, the EU has started developing individual and differentiated approach.

When looking at this chapter in full, which is analysing Russia’s assertive approaches to each partner country, one can see that there are some patterns. For example, Russia used the
weakest points of every country in order to force each of them to follow its projects. Those instruments were numerous, *i.e.* cancellation of the trade preferences, food bans, giving out passport to Russians, restrictions on employment *etc.* Consequently, differently from the EU, Russia could be more creative while developing its instruments of pressure, making them exquisite and tailor-made. However, those served one goal – to destroy the EU’s democratization agenda which was channelled via the Eastern Partnership. According to one of the leading Armenian expert it is to ‘to undermine the implementation of the EU’s Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; to divide and destabilise the EaP by weakening the top-tier states (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and restraining the remaining states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus); to consolidate Russian power and influence throughout its ‘near abroad’ by leveraging a combination of hard power, or ‘hybrid war’ in Ukraine, and soft power targeting the internal vulnerability of the other EaP member states’ (Giragosian 2015).

Knowing vulnerable areas of economy as well as security concerns, Russia has used both economic and security triggers aiming to prevent these countries from concluding the Association Agreements. In return, the EU was able to address the economic pressure, for example by opening up its markets to the agricultural products from some of the Eastern Partnership countries. However, it has failed to address the security challenges and the so-called frozen conflicts. This fact gave Russia advantage, as the ‘grey zones’, which are under control of Russian or pro-Russian forces, have put each country into the state of insecurity and are hanging as the ‘Sword of Damocles’ over each of them.

Even though, Russia’s integrations projects are mirrored on the experience of the European Union, Russia-led project is missing the value component in integration. Therefore, differently from the EU-integration, where the six countries are interested in deeper integration and in reaching EU’s standards of democracy, rule of law and standards in goods, Russia’s ‘magnet of attractiveness’ was a combination of subsidies and coercion. While concluding this chapter on Russia’s instruments of pressure and the EU’s support to the Eastern Partnership countries in their democratization, one can see that the Eastern Partnership was successfully destabilized by Russia.
THESIS CONCLUSIONS

The democracy promotion agenda of EU’s Eastern neighbours, namely of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, is one of the EU’s big objectives since the collapse of the Soviet Union and since they have gained independence, which was *de facto* independence from Russia’s influence over them. Given that the record of EU’s democratization of this region is not strong, this thesis aimed to contribute to the discussion on how to explain that the EU did not succeed in achieving its democratization agenda in the Eastern neighbourhood. This thesis conclusions firstly present the chapter-by-chapter overview of the main conclusions and secondly they sum up the main general conclusions.

The *Chapter 1* has introduced the reader to the definition and the evolution of the democracy promotion as EU’s foreign policy and contrasted it with the academic studies of the same subject as of the 1990s. The famous liberal democracy thesis, which is advanced by Francis Fukuyama, would suggest that democratization process would be automatic given that the alternative ideology would cease to exist with collapse of the Soviet Union and of its communist ideology, seemed to be a viable assumption in the early 1990s.

However, when the *Chapter 2* has put this assumption into question, the empirical data showed that those countries have not become democracies; therefore, the EU regularly re-tables its democracy agenda priority towards this region. Consequently, the theory which was chosen for this thesis was the balance of power resorting from the classical realism. The assumption is that the EU’s democracy promotion agenda is limited by an alternative agenda advanced by the Russian Federation. The main assumption is that in this balance of power act, the EU is a democracy promoter and the Russian Federation is an autocracy promoter.

*Chapter 3* covers the years 1991-1997. It looks into how the EU has entered this region, demonstrates the EU’s low start with the democracy promotion agenda towards the region is explained by the limited knowledge and understanding of the region. Moreover, its priority was with the immediate eastern neighbourhood which were in pre-accession stage. Therefore, the EU was started introducing some democracy promotion instruments. The EU has also focused on introducing some instruments which would help these countries in building the liberal economies. For seven decades the Eastern European states were under authoritarian regime with command economy and therefore had no institutional memory of any democratic
processes or basic understanding of the liberal democracy. Given that the EU had no experience with the security conflicts, especially in the 1990’s, the EU was a bystander in the process when the military clashes have become the ‘frozen conflicts’.

While contrasting it with Russia’s agenda, it becomes clear that the latter has used all available instruments to re-establish its influence over the region. Having declared itself as the successor of the Soviet Union, Russia has immediately started re-establishing supranational organizations on the post-Soviet space with the centre in Moscow (however, the countries which have recently gained independence have strongly resisted to the establishment of the Russia-led supranational organizations). Moscow has also skilfully used the volatility of the security situation in the region, which has allowed it to insure its military presence in all six countries. Therefore, step-by-step Russia was re-establishing its dominance over the region. This chapter demonstrates that differently from the expectations, Russia was assertive already with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It tried to re-establish its influence over the region by means of military presence and regional organizations.

Chapter 4 (covers 1998-2003) demonstrates the big step in EU’s approach towards the shared neighbourhood. While preparing itself to the 2004 enlargement, the EU, which was anticipating to repeat its democratization success as in preparation to the enlargement, has offered its new neighbourhoods to the east ‘everything but institutions’. By that time, the bilateral PCAs were already ratified (with the exception of Belarus). The EU has introduced new democracy promotion instruments aimed at the building good governance and the civils society in the framework of TACIS. Nevertheless, the modest financial contribution (comparing to the countries under pre-accession) manifested lack of political will in the tangible democracy promotion. At the same time, it was also the first time when the EU introduced security instruments by establishing the position of the EU Special Representative for South Caucasus and by launching the policy planning and early warning unit which was to provide EU with the intelligence on the frozen conflicts.

In 1998, Russia was paralysed by the economic crisis which has also negative effect on its in activities as well as on the projects aiming to reintegrate the post-Soviet space. However, already in the 2000s, while having realised the approaching EU and NATO enlargement, President Putin has advanced The Concept of National Security and The Concept of Foreign Policy which elaborated on the international competition, where the EU and NATO
expansion were seen as a threat. Immediately Russia’s leadership has also engaged into developing the concept of the Russian-speaking compatriots. It has pledged to protect them by all means. Moscow has taken steps towards establishing the Eurasian Economic Union which was meant to reconnect the states into EU-type supranational organization. And finally, it has further enhanced the idea of the Collective Security Treaty Organization which was to guarantee stability and security within the space of the former Soviet Union. Out of six countries of this region, only Armenia and Belarus have partially given in to Russia’s projects of integration due to their economic and security vulnerability towards Russia.

Chapter 5 (covers 2004-2009) discusses the EU’s assertive step in introducing a rather profound European Neighbourhood Policy, giving neither differentiation to the Eastern European neighbours nor clear vision with regards to aim of this cooperation. The regional atmosphere was overshadowed by the coloured revolutions in the region (Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004). These two big events have created a geopolitical division between EU and Russia, between pro-EU and pro-Russian candidates, where the EU meant democracy, and the the post-Soviet authoritarianism has become affiliated to Russia. Regardless of the fact that the pro-EU, pro-democracy candidates have won against the pro-Russian candidates, the anticipated democratization of Georgia and Ukraine has gone it a much slower pace than anticipated. Moreover, there was not anticipated spill-over democratization process on the region. That is why the EU was regularly upgrading the regional approach, by bringing in the missing elements which were meant to reinforce its democracy promotion agenda. However, the 2008 Russian-Georgian war was a wake-up call to which EU has again found no answer due to lack of instruments.

By 2004, Russian leadership was full of resolution, but also well equipped with instruments, not to let its influence to fade away. Firstly, it has started with an extensive passportization of its Russian speaking compatriots, foremost the ones living in the areas covered by the ‘frozen conflicts’ and in territories densely populated by the Russian-speaking population. During this period, it has also elaborated a new ideology of the ‘Russkiy Mir’ (Russian World), built on the common history, Slavic identity and Orthodox religion. This set of elements, according to the Russian leadership, constituted a civilizational clash with the Western democratic world. At the same time, Russia has also continued developing its economic integration projects. However, it has achieved low success in convincing the countries concerned to join its initiatives. Given Russia’s assertiveness and their slow detachment due
to EU’s democratization agenda, Russia becomes more assertive towards them. As of 2006, Georgia and Moldova become victims of Russia’s economic embargos on their countries hitting their the most vulnerable areas. It has also attempted to penetrate into the strategic infrastructural projects, such as railway and motorways in South Caucasus with an aim to create an easier transit route for potential deployment of additional military troops. The other coercive instrument were the Russia-Ukraine energy wars, which left half of Europe with no heating on the New Year’s Eve and urgent involvement of the EU into the crisis management. The final drama was the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, which was ‘a little war that shook the world’ and to which EU could not again properly react to. This assertive approach, which constituted of the well-elaborated targeted war games, was as an earthquake to EU’s democracy promotion given that the attention was again shifted back into mitigating the crisis.

Chapter 6 (2009-2016) starts with the introduction of an EU’s ambitious policy of the Eastern Partnership, in which again the democracy and liberal economy are in the heart of its enhanced democracy promotion agenda. Differently from before, this policy is much more elaborated and sophisticated, as it is composed of bilateral and multilateral component, both of which are reinforced by ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’ principles encouraging democracy reform process in the partner countries. According to these principles, the partner countries would be remunerated with more fore financial support and access to EU programmes should they make concrete steps in reforming towards building democratic states built on rule of law principles. Therefore, with the launch of the Eastern Partnership, the EU has engaged into yet another spiral of extensive democratization which would also mean gradual integration of these countries into the EU’s orbit. The AA/DCFTA implementation would eventually lead to adaptation of the EU’s values, as well as of governance style based on the rule of law principles, as well as would even include compliance with the EU high standards and requirements with regards to the products. Hence it would gradually cut-off Russia’s influence in all areas.

Chapter 7 (2009-2016) discusses, first of all, Russia’s mixed reaction to such enhanced democracy promotion agenda by the EU. At first, Russian leadership made positive statements approving the Eastern Partnership. But immediately after, the discourse has changed into a rather negative one, suggesting that the Eastern Partnership offsets Russia’s influence, as it is democratizing and integrating these countries in its own European way, and
consequently this new policy is in competition to Russia’s projects of integration. As the next step, Russia’s leadership has engaged into finalizing and launching its own alternative projects, which paradoxically, on one hand, it was built on the Soviet legacy aiming to reunite the artificially separated peoples and, on the other hand, this integration project was modelled on the European Union itself. Russia has launched the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, even though the conceptual idea was there in different forms since the 1990s and even though none of the countries would have had economic benefits from this integration. Nevertheless, Russia did not stop here, but continued with creative instrument of further developing Russkiy Mir and even involving Orthodox Church into communicating its foreign policy. It has also reinforced its security dimension by means of the documents which were to justify Russia’s military activities in the shared neighbourhood.

After EU has become even more assertive with the AA/DCFTAs, Russia’s leadership has started being defensive with regards to the EU’s democracy promotion agenda. Kremlin condemned the export of democracy and the European values elsewhere by contrasting its own ‘constructive approach’ towards the shared neighbourhood with what Moscow considered as failed messiahship, bringing instability. Russia’s leadership has also deliberated misinformed about the consequences of the DCFTA and its negative impact on the bilateral trade with Russia.

Chapter 8 discusses Russia’s tailor-made approach towards each country of the Eastern Partnership. Knowing the vulnerability of each state, Russia had a possibility to use its creativity in applying instruments of different nature. Those were primarily economic ones, but also included energy prices, financial concessions (even in form of political bribes), as well as offering political support, occasionally military intimidation, security threats and even military actions in form of the annexation of Crimea and aggressive actions in Crimea. Eventually, these actions have led into the final division of the Eastern Partnership into two groups: the ones which have withstood and continue the integration with the EU and the others which were to give up on the integration with the EU and join the Russia-led organizations. Regardless of these situation, the EU remained consistent in its approach and continued supporting all six countries with the adequate programmes, financial support and encouragement to continue with democratization.
This research leads to the following general conclusions:

**Conclusions 1: Fukuyama’s prediction of automatic democratization has failed given Russia’s assertiveness.** Whereas in the early 1990s, the EU has started with modest democratization instruments, contrary to the expectations, Russia has not turned towards the liberal democracy, but has immediately re-engaged into rebuilding its influence over what it considers as historically its backyard. Therefore, the analysis of these instruments and of Russia’s policy towards these regions suggests that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, contrary to the wide-spread belief, Russia was not aiming to be a liberal democracy power. Instead, it has established different types of instruments in order to insure control over what EU aimed to democratize and make a safe and secured neighbourhood.

**Conclusion 2: The balance of power thesis is a suitable theoretical framework, which explains the reality on the ground by demonstrating how EU’s democracy promotion agenda is challenged by Russia’s advancement of predominantly (in)-security instruments.** To arrive to this conclusion, the historical overview and break-down into three dimensions, namely normative, economic and security dimensions, has insured holistic approach by providing coherence to the research. The historical overview manifests that while EU was slowly entering the Eastern neighbourhood region, Russia has started re-establishing political, economic and military structures already since the 90s. These structures were supposed to help Russia in safeguarding its influence over the territories controlled in the past. It took EU a long time until it could develop a comprehensive democracy promotion agenda towards this region. Despite the democracy promotion in the Eastern Neighbourhood has become EU’s foreign policy goal already in the early 1990s, the enhanced Association Agreements modelled on the Europe Agreements have arrived only recently. Therefore, it took EU 25 years to develop to the concept of the deep democratization, formulated in the framework of the Eastern Partnership. At the same time, already in the 1990s Russia has laid down the grounds and established instruments of pressure on its ‘near abroad’, which were used only in the later stage. Military pressure was exercised on the states which were the best pupils of the EU’s democracy promotion agenda, namely Georgia and Ukraine. Economic pressure was used against Moldova and Belarus, while Armenia was put into security conditions which made Yerevan renounce from the already finalised AA/DCFTA with the EU and forced to enter the Eurasian Economic Union.
Conclusion 3: The EU and Russia’s approach were opposite: EU started with democratization and ended with developing some security instruments, while Russia has safeguarded its security presence and after has started preparing normative dimension and economic integration projects. Since 1990s until 2016, EU was gradually building-up its democracy promotion instruments, having made ‘lessons learnt’ from its cooperation with this neighbourhood and having also drawn on the successful democratization of the CEECs. At the same time having understood the importance of the security dimension, the EU was slowly developing new instruments trying to catch-up with the security threats in the region. However, given the EU’s nature of a ‘soft power’ it could not neither reach the expectations of the partner countries nor address the root cause. Russia had a different approach. It understood that the shared neighbourhood will remain bound to Moscow not because of the ephemeral values of the Russkiy Mir or via unprofitable Eurasian Economic Union, but because of the (in)-security threats.

Conclusion 4: The EU’s democracy promotion was for a long time not on the EU’s priority list, whereas Russia’s objectives were straight from the beginning. Therefore, when the EU has started being actively involved with the democracy promotion instruments it was too late and too little. By the time when the Eastern Partnership was launched, Russia has already fully established its influence and was further developing its ‘soft power’ instruments of normative and economic dimension. However, Russia’s promotion of the normative (via Russkiy Mir, passportization, compatriot concept) or economic ties (Eurasian Economic Union or bilateral economic ties) served as a justification of Russia’s assertive approach towards the individual countries and even resulted in war in Georgia and Ukraine. EU’s democracy promotion agenda, according to the Russian leadership, was leading to chaos as was not compatible with the ‘Orthodox Russian civilization’.

Conclusions 5: The EU’s democracy promotion agenda is toothless when it comes to the Russia’s assertiveness. Comparing to the EU, which offers programmes and instruments aimed at democratization, Russia’s normative agenda is a pretext for further military aggression. The problem with the EU’s effort in democratization is that it cannot compete with Russia’s military interventions as well as strong verbal argument. The EU’s democracy promotion agenda is faced with the perpetual tension resorting from its inability to provide security guarantees for the partner countries which want to proceed with the EU’s agenda. Moreover, differently from the EU, which has a clear normative stand and set of rules, Russia
is more flexible and creative while developing its ‘hybrid’ approaches towards the shared neighbourhood. The EU has a clear understanding of the democracy promotion agenda which is developed within the strict (geo)-political, normative and institutional framework. For the Russian leadership there is no limits for creativity, neither when it comes to the normative broad definition of compatriots, which goes as far as encompassing everyone who is Russia-speaker, nor when the decision is taken to grant the president with a power to conduct military intervention into one of the countries in the shared neighbourhood to protect the compatriots, nor to introduce ban on agricultural products following their expressed interest to further proceed with the EU’s promoted agenda.

The EU tried to establish prosperous and stable neighbourhood via democratic promotion agenda, but in return it has obtained the partner countries surrounded by the conflict areas and struggling to preserve their independence. Every big step towards EU’s democratization efforts was met with the Russia’s assertive actions. As a response to the wars or conflicts, the EU tried again and again to re-engage Russia into its policy towards the shared neighbourhood. The belief was that Russia felt excluded from the EU’s activities. However, in reality the EU’s democracy promotion in the region is a threat for Russia’s dominance.

**Limitation and suggestions for the new avenue of research**

As it was intended, following the realist assumption that the states are the black boxes, this thesis does not look at the dynamics inside of the researched countries. Moreover, it takes the researched countries as the objects which are a subject of pressure from the two regional leaders advancing their agendas. Consequently, this thesis has not discussed the internal motivation of the EaP countries. At the same time, one of the alternative answers of why the EU was not successful with its democracy promotion agenda was the internal dynamics of the Eastern neighbourhood countries, which might impede the process of democratization. It is possible that the EU has not addressed their realist consideration. Therefore, the challenge of the democratization was possibly linked to the fact that the EU has not attained the expectations or needs of the EaP countries which would enhance the democratization. Consequently, this could be a recommendation for the further research of this subject.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


———. 2004b. “Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s Central Asia Policy.” International Affairs


Averre, Derek. 2005. “Russia and the European Union: Convergence or Divergence?”

———. 2009. “Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ‘Shared Neighbourhood.’”
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezp2.bath.ac.uk/10.1080/09668130903278918.


doi:10.1080/03932720508457107.


Cenusa, Denis, Michael Emerson, Tamara Kovziridse, and Veronika Movchan. 2014.
“Russia’s Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.”


http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/06/world/europe/06russia.html?_r=0.

http://archive.mid.ru//bdomp/bl.nsf/062c2f5f5fa065d4c3256def0051fa1e/bad7fec519a73ce343256ddb0047f328!OpenDocument.


https://www.ft.com/content/9d2173a2-60d7-11e7-8814-0ac7eb84e5f1.


Constitution of the USSR. 1977. USSR.


——. 2012. *Council Conclusions on Ukraine.*


———. 2004. “О Заявлении Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации "В Связи С Расширением НАТО" (Translation from Russian: Declaration of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Due to the NATO


Elsweger, Peter Van, and Guillaume Van der Loo. 2012. “Competing Paths of Regional Economic Integration in the Post-Soviet Space: Legal and Political Dilemmas for


f. 2014. *EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.*

EU and Russia Road Map. 2005. *Road Map for the Common Economic Space - Building Blocks for Sustained Economic Growth (Annex 1).*


http://books.google.de/books?id=4rOD7ErUYToC&pg=PA169&lpg=PA169&dq=partnership+and+cooperation+agreement+with+the+post-soviet+states&source=bl&ots=OA1bLGxyvZ&sig=qMoUyNyBZDuMmYljXOOIrAFsZvs&hl=nl&sa=X&ei=6L37UNuwCO6U0QX80oDoDA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=partnership+and+cooperatTACIS&f=false.


254


256

———. 2016e. “Support for the Eastern Partnership.”


European Court of Auditors. 2016. Special Report EU Assistance to Ukraine.


———. 2014b. *Council Conclusions on Ukraine*.


Freedman, Colin. 2014. “Vladimir Putin’s Novorossiya May Mark Just the Start of His
Empire-Building Ambitions.” The Telegraph, December 6.


Füle, Stefan. 2013. EU-Ukraine: Statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle Following the Meeting with Andriy Klyuyev about the Road to Signing the Association Agreement.


———. 2009. “David and Goliath: Georgia and Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy.” *Defence*


Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit. 2015.


Kaca, Elżbieta, Jacek Kucharczyk, and Agnieszka Łada. 2011. “Eastern Partnership Civil
Society Forum & How to Improve It.” *PISM Research Reports.*


http://cria-online.org/6_4.html.


Central European Candidate Countries to the European Union on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Trade and Investment Effects.” Warsaw.


guam-transformation-of-the-post-soviet-area.


Meulen, Evert Faber Van Der. 2009. “Gas Supply and EU–Russia Relations.” Europe-Asia


http://archive.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fd0c32575d900298676/36aba64ac09f737fc32575d9002bbf31!OpenDocument.


doi:10.1080/03932720903148807.


http://www.mid.ru/documents/10180/d7a77e54-9144-4c03-b43e-de8924de8a44?t=1406688743818.
274

———. 2016. “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (Approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016).” MID.
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248.


Moscow Patriarchate. 2008. УСТАВ РУССКОЙ ПРАВОСЛАВНОЙ ЦЕРКВИ.


Eastern Partnership Regional Trade Cooperation.” *SSRN Electronic Journal.*

Russian-Georgian Conflict (Respond to This Article at

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2005. “EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress.” In
Brussels: CEPS Paperback Series.

Najarian, Mark. 2017. “Moldova’s Reliance On Russia, Transdniestra For Energy Seen As
russian-transdniestra-energy-seen-risky-allin-baker-hughes/28615600.html.

Nasieniak, Magdalena, and Bogdana Depo. 2013. “Conditionality and Election Performance
within the Framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.” *IEP Policy Papers on


———. 2014. “Russia’s Accusations - Setting the Record Straight.” *NATO Fact Sheet.*
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_07/20140716_140716-
Factsheet_Russia_en.pdf.


Newnham, Randall. 2011a. “Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia’s Energy Resources as a Foreign
doi:10.1016/j.euras.2011.03.004.

———. 2011b. “Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia’s Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy

Newnham, Randall E. 2015. “Georgia on My Mind? Russian Sanctions and the End of the
doi:10.1016/j.euras.2015.03.008.


Oliver, Christian. 2014. “Georgia and Moldova Fear Russian Backlash from EU Trade


Patriarchal Ministry. 2010. “Patriarch Kirill: It Is a Joyful Day for the Whole Church of Holy Rus’ Today.” The Russian Orthodox Church - Department for External Church


http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/48b9194a-9911-11da-aa99-0000779e2340.html#axzz3kIo3XVgO.


———. 2016. “Указ Президента Российской Федерации От 01.01.2016 Г. № 1 О Мерах По Обеспечению Экономической Безопасности И Национальных Интересов Российской Федерации При Осуществлении Международных Транзитных Перевозок Грузов С Территории Украины На Территорию Респуб.”


———. 2006b. “Через Партнерство России И ЕС – К Строительству Единой Европы, К Новым Возможностям Для Всех Европейцев.”


Ria Novosti. 2016. “Украина Вошла В Зону Свободной Торговли ЕС И Потеряла
Преференции РФ.” *Ria Novosti*, January 1.


Sargsyan, Tigran. 2012. “«Таможенный Союз Не Имеет Для Нас Смысла».” 


Saryusz-Wolski, Jacek. 2009. “BACKGROUND NOTE on EASTERN PARTNERSHIP and Its Parliamentary Assembly- EURONEST.” AFET Chairman Note.


Shumylo-Tapiola, Olga. 2012. “Ukraine at the Crossroads: Between the EU DCFTA &


(Vol. III).” Brussels.


Zamyatin, Viktor. 2004. “Zbigniew Brzezinski: ‘Ukraine Is Neither a Pawn nor a Queen but a Very Important Figure.’” *Den Newspaper.*

http://isndemo.atlasproject.eu/asset_demo/file/a8be31e7-71e5-4117-9649-60d3faea0292/d3b1d8a9-eb6-4063-8b13-c4177bf822c0/5.pdf.


Российская Газета, April 11. 2014.
Захаров, В. М. 2011. Военное Строительство В Государствах Постсоветского 
Пространства. Москва: Российский институт стратегических исследований. 
Караваев, Александр. 2010. “Что Такое ‘соотечественник’ и Каково Значение 
‘гражданского Сектора’ в Политике России На Постсоветском Пространстве 
(What Is Compatriot and What Is the Meaning of the Civil Society in the Russian 
Politics in the Former Soviet Union).” Независимая, April 12. 
Дел России Г.Б.Карасина ‘Россия И Соотечественники’, Опубликованная В 
журнале ‘Международная Жизнь’ № 12, 2007 Года.” Международная Жизнь 12. 
http://www.mid.ru/activity/compatriots/min/-
/asset_publisher/evI8J0czYac3/content/id/353370.
Журнал Российского Права 10 (142): 109–17.
Развития.” Центральная Азия И Кавказ 1 (37): 163–70.
Коношенко, В.А., И.Э Круговых, and С.А Севергин. 1999. “Ратификация 
Международных Договоров Российской Федерации И Международная 
Деятельность Государственной Думы (Translation from Russian: Ratification of the 
International Treaties by the Russian Federation and International Affairs of the State 
Кулик, Сергей, Андрей Спартак, and Игорь Юргенс. 2010. “Экономические Интересы 
И Задачи России В СНГ (Translation from Russian: Economic Interests and Goals of 
Ломакин, В.К. 2012. Мировая Экономика. 4thed. Москва: Юнити-Дана.
Мигранян, Аза. 2015. “Экономико-Правовая Оценка Развития Интеграционных 
МИД России. 2008. “‘Внешнеполитическая И Дипломатическая Деятельность 
Российской Федерации В 2007 Году’. Обзор МИД России.”


Трещенков, Е.Ю., and И.В. Грецкий. 2012. “Европейская Политика Соседства: Нюансы
Федеральный Выпуск. 2014. “Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации.”
Чепурин, А.В. 2009. “«Три Кита» Российской Диаспоральной Политики.” Россия В Глобальной Политике 3 (май-июнь).
http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/activity/compatriots/min/-/asset_publisher/evI8J0czYac3/content/id/285446.