

Abstract:

Gottlob Frege made in his famous article „Über Sinn und Bedeutung“ an distinction between meaning and referent of an expression. Meaning has an ideal character. Referent is than an object of the expression. Later in his study „Der Gedanke“ he extended this distinction of the whole sentence. The meanings are in this case understood as thoughts of the sentences. Referent than Frege called as truth value. The question is, how is it possible for human mind to access this region of ideality of meanings and thoughts. Frege wrote, that we are able to grasp an thought by force of thinking. Few years later Edmund Husserl made in his Logical investigations similar distinction between ideal sense and object of intention. In many ways is it possible to compare both conceptions. But for Husserl „grasping“ of ideality is a form of an abstraction from the intentional act. It is not an abstraction in empirical sense, but ideation, where are ideas are „seen“ in original intuition. The main topic of this study is is the attempt to analyse Husserl's ideative abstraction in special case of ideal meaning of an expression.