

Abstract

DUBOVEC, M.: *Heidegger's concept of freedom, 1927-1930*

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The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to present Heidegger's concept of freedom between 1927 and 1930. It puts emphasis on the difference between the fundamental-ontological and the transcendental concept of freedom. The elaboration of this difference is founded on the transformation of the ontological difference in its three forms: the difference of the being of beings (existential approach), the difference of the being and beings (transcendental/metontological) and the cosmological difference as a difference between the thing and the world (phenomenological metaphysics). The central manifestation of the difference is the possibility of a deeper understanding of freedom beyond its existential structures (*Being and time*) that focus on authenticity. The transcendental concept of freedom is the essence of the ground in the context of transcendence and the world and as such it is also the ground for existentially conceived freedom. In order to show this hierarchy in particular, Heidegger's debate on Kant's concept of freedom as spontaneity will be explained. Spontaneity is a specific form of causality and as such it is also grounded in transcendental freedom. The limits of a hierarchical way of thinking illustrate themselves in the significance of freedom for the essence of truth. This refers to the inner transformation of Heidegger's philosophy into the thinking of being from itself. In this context, the importance of a possibility to evolve the concept of freedom in its metontological turn is emphasised. On this metontological way of Heidegger's thinking, Tengelyi follows with his concept of phenomenological metaphysics that is placed beyond the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics.

Key words: freedom, world, transcendence, Heidegger, phenomenological metaphysics